Profile:

PhD, UCLA, 2000. Works on comparative political institutions; models of participation, elections, and policy-making; revealed political preferences and scaling techniques; and numerical methods tailored to mathematical models of politics. He has published articles in the American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, Economics Letters, Economic Theory, European Journal of Political Research, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Mathematical and Computer Modeling, Political Analysis, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Social Choice and Welfare, and Theoretical Economics. Recent publications include "A priori bounds on legislative bargaining agreements," American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming), "Generalized medians and a political center," Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming), and "National electoral thresholds and disproportionality" (with Miguel Rueda) Political Analysis (2021). Teaches game theory, political economy, and comparative institutions.