Professor of Political Science and Economics
PhD, Caltech, 1995. Positive political theory, social choice theory, game theory. Managing editor of Social Choice and Welfare, advisory editor for Games and Economic Behavior, former editor of Journal of Economic Theory and Mathematical Social Sciences. Current work is on dynamic models of bargaining and elections, multi-dimensional spatial models of political competition, informational aspects of voting and elections, and incentives in social planning problems. Publications include "A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice," Review of Economic Studies (2010); "The Case for Responsible Parties," American Political Science Review (2009); "Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates," Games and Economic Behavior (2007); "Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model," Journal of Economic Theory (2006); "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior (2001); "Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information," Economics and Politics (2000); "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review (2000); "Strategic Manipulability without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized," Social Choice and Welfare (2000); "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica (1997); and "Arrow's Theorem in Public Good Environments with Convex Technologies," Journal of Economic Theory (1996). Teaches courses in the field of positive theory.