PhD, Caltech, 1995. Positive political theory, game theory, international conflict. Current research focuses on voting and elections, comparative electoral systems, and international conflict. Publications include "Mutual Optimism and War," American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming); "The Swing Voter's Curse with Adversarial Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory (2007); "The Common Priors Assumption: A Comment on Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution (2006); "Repeated Downsian Electoral Competition," International Journal of Game Theory (2006); "Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," (with John Duggan), Games and Economic Behavior (2005); "May's Theorem with an Infinite Population," Social Choice and Welfare, (2004); "A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Supermajority Rules," Social Choice and Welfare, (2003); "The Swing Voter's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review (2002); and "Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Pre-Election Polls and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review (1997). Teaches courses in the field of positive theory.