

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Pol. Sci. 513
Professor Rothenberg

Spring 2024

INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

Purpose: This course principally introduces students to the political science and political economy literatures on interest groups. This includes developing an understanding of the makeup of the group system, contribution decision that help support groups, the internal politics of organizations, the strategies that groups employ and the role that they play with respect to political institutions. As the study of organized groups cuts across many subdisciplines in political science and political economy, and includes certain elements of finance and even accounting, this course might have a wide appeal.

Requirements: Course requirements include research presentations and a longer final paper—either original research, a detailed literature review, or a research proposal (roughly 15 pages will suffice).

Office Hours. I am located in Room 108 at Harkness (Department of Political Science/Wallis Institute of Political Economy). You can come by any time and I will see you barring extenuating circumstances. My phone number is x3-4903 and my e-mail is lawrence.rothenberg@rochester.edu. Zoom meetings are also available.

Availability of Readings. Articles will be made available through Dropbox. There are several standard books that I am happy to reference—as well as extended reading readings on any topic—if students would like. Additionally, if you would like a broader appreciation of what interest group scholars in Political Science do, you might consult the journal *Interest Groups & Advocacy*. Also, please note that data for many of the empirical papers are available through Dataverse.

Grading. Grading will reflect your class participation and your final paper (weighted approximately 1/2, 1/2).

Week I: Introduction/Overview. (Jan. 19th)

Overview Pieces on Interest Groups (**not required reading**):

Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Beth L. Leech. 2012. "Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: Reexamining Interest Group Research," *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 79-99.

John M. de Figueiredo and Brian Kelleher Richter. 2014. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 163-185.

Martin Gregor. 2017. "Lobbying Mechanisms," in *State, Institutions, and Democracy*, Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero eds., 17-52.

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. 2020. "Empirical Models of Lobbying." *Annual Review of Economics* 12: 391-413.

Eitan Hersh. 2023. "The Political Role of Business Leaders," *Annual Review of Political Science* 26: 97-115.

Keith E Schnakenberg, and Ian R. Turner. Forthcoming. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Week II: Macro-Perspectives (Jan. 26th).

Herschel F. Thomas and Timothy M. LaPira. 2017. "How Many Lobbyists are in Washington? Shadow Lobbying and the Gray Market for Policy Advocacy," *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 6 (3): 199-214.

Lee Drutman, Matt Grossmann, and Tim LaPira. 2019. "The Interest Group Top Tier: More Groups, Concentrated Clout," in *Can American Govern Itself?* Frances E. Lee and Nolan McCarty, eds.

Jesse M. Crosson, Alexander C. Furnas, and Geoffrey M. Lorenz. 2020. "Polarized Pluralism: Organized Preferences and Biases in the American Pressure System," *American Political Science Review* 114 (4): 1117-1137.

Matt Grossmann, Zuhaib Mahmood, and William Isaac. 2021. "Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Unequal Class Influence in American Policy," *Journal of Politics* 83 (4): 1706–1720.

James Strickland. 2021. "A Quiet Revolution in State Lobbying: Government Growth and Interest Populations," *Political Research Quarterly* 74 (4): 1181-1196.

Week III. Micro-Foundations (Feb. 2nd).

Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray. 2001. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox," *American Political Science Review* 95 (3): 663-672.

Zhao Li. 2018. "How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from Access-Seeking PACs," *American Political Science Review* 112 (4): 792-808.

John Lefebvre and David Martimort. 2020. "When Olson Meets Dahl': From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," *Journal of Politics* 82 (3): 1026–1043.

John R. Conlon and Paul Pecorino. 2022. "Public Goods Provision with Participation Costs." *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 24 (2): 241-258.

Thomas T. Holyoke. 2022. "Strategic Lobbying and the Pressure to Compromise Member Interests," *Political Research Quarterly* 75 (4): 1255-1270.

Note: Please be familiar with the basic logic of collective action at least to the level of Olson (1965); if not, review Mancur Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action*, Chs. 1, 2, and 6. There are also a variety of other works in this tradition as well to which I would be happy to provide citations. Here are three somewhat recent reviews of collective action theory:

Luis Medina. 2013. "The Analytical Foundations of Collective Action Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Developments," *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 259-283.

Paul Pecorino. 2015. "Olson's *Logic of Collective Action* at Fifty," *Public Choice* 162 (3-4): 243-262.

Todd Sandler. 2015. "Collective Action: Fifty Years Later," *Public Choice* 164 (3-4): 195-216.

Week IV. Lobbying: Who Lobbies—Part I (Feb. 9th).

William R. Kerr, William F. Lincoln, and Prachi Mishra. 2014. “The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying,” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6 (4): 343-379.

In Song Kim. 2017. “Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization,” *American Political Science Review* 111 (1): 1-20.

Alexander Fourinaies, and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. “How do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees,” *American Journal of Political Science* 62(1): 132-147.

In Song Kim, and Dmitriy Kunisky. 2021. “Mapping Political Communities: A Statistical Analysis of Lobbying Networks in Legislative Politics.” *Political Analysis* 29 (3), 317-336.

Bo Cowgill, Andrea Prat, and Tommaso Valletti. 2023. *Political Power and Market Power*.

Notes:

On measures of group ideology, see:

Adam Bonica. 2013. “Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (2): 294-311. Data: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/HUZNE2>

Kevin M. Esterling. 2021. “Using Committee Hearings to Place Lobbyists, Experts and Other Outside Agents into Legislative Preference Space.”

Sahar Abi-Hassan, et al. 2023. “The Ideologies of Organized Interests and Amicus Curiae Briefs: Large-Scale, Social Network, Imputation of Ideal Points,” *Political Analysis* 31 (3): 396-413.

Kevin McAlister, et al. 2023. “The Multiplicity of Factions: Multi-Dimensional Ideal Points for Interest Groups & Members of Congress.”

For a broad modeling exercise, see:

David P. Baron. 2019. “Lobbying Dynamics,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 31 (3): 403–452.

Week V. Lobbying: Purpose and Strategies (Feb. 16th)

Richard L. Hall, and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,” *American Political Science Review* 100 (1): 69-84.

Christopher J. Ellis, and Thomas Groll. 2020. “Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy,” *American Political Science Review* 114 (1): 179–205.

In Song Kim, Jan Stuckatz, and Lukas Wolters. 2020. “Strategic and Sequential Links between Campaign Donations and Lobbying.”

David R. Miller. 2022. “On Whose Door to Knock? Organized Interests’ Strategic Pursuit of Access to Members of Congress,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 47 (1): 157-192.

Alexander V. Hirsch, Karam Kang, B. Pablo Montagnes, and Hye Young You. 2023. “Lobbyists as Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence,” *Journal of Politics* 85 (2): 731-748.

Week VI: Lobbying—Coalitions and Venue Selections (Feb 23rd)

Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2012. “Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” *Journal of International Economics* 87 (1): 18-26.

Frederick J. Boehmke, Sean Gailmard, and John Wiggs Patty. 2013. “Business as Usual: Interest Group Access and Representation across Policy-Making Venues,” *Journal of Public Policy* 33 (1): 3-33.

Heaney, Michael T., and Philip Leifeld. 2018. “Contributions by Interest Groups to Lobbying Coalitions.” *Journal of Politics* 80 (2): 494-509. Data: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/UTJGTF>

Geoffrey Lorenz. 2020. “Prioritized Interests: Diverse Lobbying Coalitions and Congressional Committee Agenda Setting.” *Journal of Politics* 82 (1): 225-240.

Emiel Awad. 2020. “Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators,” *American Journal of Political Science* 64 (4): 938-951.

Week VII: Impacts of Lobbying (Feb. 23rd)

Karam Kang. 2016. Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector,” *Review of Economic Studies* 83 (1): 269-305.

Federico Hunneus and In Song Kim. 2021. “The Effects of Firms’ Lobbying on Resource Misallocation.”

Alex Garlick. 2021. “Interest Group Lobbying and Partisan Polarization in the United States: 1999-2016,” *Political Science Research and Methods*.

Stephane Wolton. 2021. “Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 16 (4): 467-503.

Senay Agca and Deniz Igan. 2023. “The Lion’s Share: Evidence from Federal Contracts on the Value of Political Connections,” 66 (3): 409-638.

Week VIII. Personnel: The Revolving Door (March 1st)

Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. 2012. "Revolving Door Lobbyists," *American Economic Review*, 102 (7): 3731-3748.

James M. Strickland. 2020. “The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists: Evidence from the American States,” *American Journal of Political Science* 64 (1): 67-81.

Michael E. Shepherd, and Hye Young You. 2020. “Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress,” *American Political Science Review* 114 (1): 270-284.

Benjamin C.K. Egerod, and Joshua McCrain. 2023. “Lobbyists into Government,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 18 (1): 403-425.

Joseph Kalmenovitz, Siddharth Vij, and Kairong Xiao. 2022. “Closing the Revolving Door.”

Week IX. *Political Contributions—Motivations for Giving* (March 8th)

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. 2011. “Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress,” *Journal of Public Economics* 95 (7-8): 587-611.

Alexander Fournaies, and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. “How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 62 (1): 132–147.

Michael Barber, and Mandi Eatough. 2020. “Industry Politicization and Interest Group Campaign Contribution Strategies,” *Journal of Politics* 82 (3): 1008-1025.

Jan Stuckatz. 2022. “How the Workplace affects Employee Political Contributions,” *American Political Science Review* 116 (1): 54-69.

Edoardo Teso. 2023. “Influence Seeking the U.S. Corporate Elites’ Campaign Contribution Behavior,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*.

Week X. *Political Contributions—Impacts* (March 22rd)

Meng Gao, and Jiekun Huang. 2016. “Capitalizing on Capitol Hill: Informed Trading by Hedge Fund Managers,” *Journal of Financial Economics* 121 (3): 521-545.

Anthony Fowler, Haritz Garro, and Jörg L. Spenkuch. 2020. “Quid Pro Quo? Corporate Returns to Campaign Contributions,” *Journal of Politics* 84 (2): 844-868.

Federico Huneeus and In Song Kim. 2021. The Effects of Firms’ Lobbying on Resource Misallocation.

Alexander Fournaies and Anthony Fowler. 2022. “Do Campaign Contributions buy Favorable Policies? Evidence from the Insurance Industry,” *Political Research and Methods* 10 (1): 1-17.

Alexander C. Furnas, et al. 2023. “More than Mere Access: An Experiment on Moneyed Interests, Information Provision, and Legislative Action in Congress,” *Political Research Quarterly* 76 (1): 348-364.

Overview paper (not required):

Simon Weschle. 2024. “Campaign Finance.”

Weeks XI-XII. Lobbying the Courts and Bureaucracy/Presidency. (March. 29th, **NO CLASS**
Apr. 5th, Apr. 12th)

Bureaucracy:

Richard L. Hall and Kristina C. Miller. 2008. "What Happens After the Alarm? Interest Group Subsidies to Legislative Overseers," *Journal of Politics* 70 (4): 990-1005.

Simon Haeder, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2015. "Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget," *American Political Science Review* 109 (3): 507-522.

Brian D. Libgober . 2020. "Strategic Proposals, Endogenous Comments, and Bias in Rulemaking," *Journal of Politics*. 82 (2): 642-656.

Susan Webb Yackee. 2020. "Hidden Politics? Assessing Lobbying Success During US Agency Guidance Development," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 30 (4): 548-562.

David Ryan Miller. 2023. "The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests," *American Political Science Review* 117 (3): 1019-1035.

Note—on data:

Daniel Carpenter, Devin Judge-Lord, Brian Libgober and Steven Rashin. 2020. "Data and Methods for Analyzing Special Interest Influence in Rulemaking," *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 9 (2): 425-435.

Courts:

Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson, and Matthew P. Hitt. 2013. "Quality Over Quantity: Amici Influence and Judicial Decision Making," *American Political Science Review* 107 (3): 446-460.

Paul M. Collins, Jr., and Wendy L. Martinek. 2015. "Judges and Friends: The Influence of Amici Curiae on U.S. Court of Appeals Judges," *American Politics Research* 43 (2): 255–282.

Peter Bills, Lawrence S. Rothenberg, and Bradley C. Smith. 2020. "The Amicus Game," *Journal of Politics* 82 (3): 1113-1126.

Week XIII. Private Politics (Apr. 19th)

David P. Baron. 2012. "The Industrial Organization of Private Politics," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7 (2): 135-174.

Gregory Egorov, and Bård Harstad. 2017. "Private Politics and Public Regulation," *Review of Economic Studies* 84 (4): 1652-1682.

Geeyoung Min and Hye Young You. 2019. "Corporate Political Spending and Shareholder Activism." *Journal of Legal Studies* 48 (1): 81-116.

Neil Malhotra, Benoît Monin, and Michael Tomz. 2019. "Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?" *American Political Science Review* 113 (1): 19-37.

Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, Francesco Trebbi, and Eyub Yegen. 2023. "Investing in Influence: Investors, Portfolio Firms, and Political Giving."

Week XIV: Student Presentations (Apr. 26th)

Some Data Sources

American data:

LobbyView: <https://www.lobbyview.org/>

Adam Bonica's Ideal Point Data: <https://web.stanford.edu/~bonica/data.html>

Maplight Data: www.maplight.org

Open Secrets: <https://www.opensecrets.org/>

Some European data:

<http://www.intereuro.eu/public/data>

<https://www.cigsurvey.eu/>

See, also, the 2020 special issue of *Interest Groups & Advocacy* on data sources:

<https://browzine.com/libraries/107/journals/10580/issues/356254176>

and

Brian Libgober, and Connor T. Jerzak. 2023. "Linking Datasets on Organizations Using Half a Billion Open Collaborated Records."