

**Prof. Tasos Kalandrakis**

Office Hours (Harkness 336): Wednesday, 10:00-11:00am

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Updated: 8/23/2023

This seminar focuses on the study of modern democratic institutions and their political consequences. We will emphasize both theoretical ideas and empirical research on political institutions and consider some of the core topics of inquiry in the comparative study of institutions. These include: electoral systems and party systems, legislatures, parliamentary and presidential institutions, coalition formation, courts and the judiciary, and we will conclude with a study of questions on democratic representation. Added emphasis will be placed on ideas that can or have been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny, and a good part of the seminar will be devoted to assessing the strength of certain hypotheses in light of empirical evidence. The ability to interpret statistical evidence is a prerequisite for mastery of course material and all participants are expected to have completed at least one course in data analysis. A review of background concepts and nomenclature will be introduced as necessary.

Assigned readings consist primarily of journal articles (which are available online through Jstor or other online repositories accessible through the University) and, occasionally, book chapters and notes that I will hand out in class. Unless otherwise indicated, reading should be completed before class meetings and students are expected to participate in discussion. While the amount of required reading is relatively small and will typically involve two of the articles listed on each topic, some readings are likely to prove challenging especially at the beginning of the course. You are advised to start reading early in the week and to seek my advise in office hours should any questions arise. I will request written summaries of specific readings ahead of class meetings. During each meeting, I will expect you to contribute significantly in summarising and discussing assigned readings. Your overall contribution in class discussions will form a significant component of your final grade.

This course follows the College credit hour policy for four-credit courses.

The University of Rochester respects and welcomes students of all backgrounds and abilities. In the event you encounter any barrier(s) to full participation in this course due to the impact of disability, please contact the Office of Disability Resources. Visit <http://www.rochester.edu/college/disability/> for more information.

## EVALUATION

Your grade will be based on:

- class participation (30%),
- written summaries (5%),
- midterm exam (30%), and
- final exam (35%).

If you are taking the ‘W’ version of the course, then grading is based on:

- class participation (25%),
- written summaries (5%),
- midterm exam (20%),
- term paper (25%), and
- final exam (25%).

### **EXAMS**

The midterm exam will take place in class on October 24 and will consist of identification terms and essay questions. I will make a list of possible identification terms available ahead of time. The final exam is scheduled for Wednesday, December 20, 12:30pm. It is going to be cumulative and have the same format as the midterm.

### **EXTRA WRITING REQUIREMENT**

Students that opt for the ‘W’ version of the course, are required to complete a term paper. The paper should be ten to twelve (10-12) pages long (excluding annotated bibliography) and focus on one of the topics covered in class. It should contain a succinct statement of the question you are trying to answer, a literature review, and a presentation of the evidence brought to bear on the question. You are requested to submit a one-page summary of your paper by October 13. An annotated bibliography is due no later than October 27. A draft should be submitted by December 1st. The final paper is due on December 15.

### **READING MATERIALS**

Most of the reading consists of published research articles that are available online through University available repositories and/or will be distributed through Blackboard.

### **MISCELLANEOUS POLICIES**

I expect all deadlines to be met. Extensions are granted rarely and only under serious extenuating circumstances. There are no extra credit provisions.

### **ACADEMIC HONESTY**

University policies and guidelines regarding academic honesty apply. Study groups where students discuss upcoming readings are allowed and even encouraged. This

collaboration does not apply to any reading summaries for these readings which students are expected to produce on their own.

## COURSE OUTLINE (tentative)

### Week 1 (9/5): Organizational meeting.

Course overview.

### Week 2 (9/12): Electoral systems I

- Riker, William. 1982. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science." *American Political Science Review* 76: 753-766.
- Ordeshook, P. and Shvetsova, O. 1994. "Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties." *AJPS*, 38 (Feb.): 100-123.
- Fujiwara. 2011. "[A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law](#)," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 6: 197-233.

### Week 3 (9/19): Electoral systems II

- Carles Boix. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3):609-24.
- Benoit, K. 2007. "Electoral Laws As Political Consequences: Explaining The Origins And Change Of Electoral Institutions," *Annual Review of Political Science*, (10): 363-90.
- Leeman, Lucas and Isabela Mares. 2014. "The Adoption of Proportional Representation." *Journal of Politics* 76(2): 461-478.

### Week 4 (9/26): Legislative Procedures

- Huber, John D. 1992. "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States." *APSR* 86(3): 675-687.
- Döring, Herbert. 2001. "Parliamentary Agenda Control and Legislative Outcomes in Western Europe." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* XXVI: 145-166.
- Tsebelis and Money. 1997. *Bicameralism*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

### Week 5 (10/3): Veto players

- Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making In Political Systems: Veto Players In Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25:289-325.
- Notes to be distributed in class.

### **Week 6 (10/10): Presidential systems**

- Mainwaring, S. 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy – The difficult combination," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(2): 198-228.
- Cheibub, JA and Limongi, F. 2002. "Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5: 151-179.
- Elgie, Robert. 2005. "From Linz to Tsebelis: three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies?" *Democratization*, 12(1): 106-122.

**\*\*\* W REQUIREMENT: ONE PAGE SUMMARY OF PAPER DUE 10/13 \*\*\***

### **Week 7 (10/17): Fall Break**

### **Week 8 (10/24): Midterm**

**\*\*\* W REQUIREMENT: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY DUE 10/27 \*\*\***

### **Week 9 (10/31): Coalition government formation**

- Notes to be distributed in class.
- Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2001. "Government formation in parliamentary democracies." *AJPS* 45(1) January: 33-50.
- Desai, Zuheir and Tasos Kalandrakis. "The core of the party system," working paper.

### **Week 10 (11/7): Coalition government agreements**

- Warwick PV, Druckman JN. 2006. "The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship," *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(4): 635-65.
- Fujiwara, Thomas and Sanz, Carlos. 2020. "Rank Effects in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation," *Review of Economic Studies* 87(3): 1261-1295.
- Albarello, Alessio. 2021. "Coalition Policy in Multiparty Governments: Whose Preferences Prevail?" *Political Science Research and Methods*.

### **Week 11 (11/14): Courts and Judiciary**

- Ramseyer, J. 1994. "The Puzzling (In)dependence of courts - A comparative approach" *Journal of Legal Studies*, 23(2): 721-747.
- Hanssen, Andrew F. 2004. "Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?" *American Economic Review*, 94(3): 712-729.
- Brouard, Sylvain and Hoennige, Christoph. 2017. "Constitutional courts as veto players: Lessons from the United States, France and Germany," *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(3): 529-552.

### **Week 12 (11/21): Bureaucracy**

- McCubbins M., Noll R., and Weingast B. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as instruments of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 3(2): 243-277.
- Huber JD, Shipan CR, Pfahler M. 2001. "Legislatures and statutory control of bureaucracy," *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(2): 330-345.

### **Week 13 (11/28): Representation I – Participation**

- Hinnerich, Bjorn Tyrefors and Pettersson-Lidbom, Per . 2014. "Democracy, Redistribution, And Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919-1938" *Econometrica*, 82 (3): 961-993.
- Fujiwara, Thomas. 2015. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, And Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil" *Econometrica*, 83(2): 423-464.
- Hoffman, Mitchell, Leon, Gianmarco, and Lombardi, Maria. 2017. "Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria," *Journal of Public Economics*, 145: 103-115.
- Sanz, Carlos. 2020. "Direct democracy and government size: evidence from Spain" *Political Science Research and Methods*, 8(4): 630-645.

**\*\*\* W REQUIREMENT: DRAFT OF PAPER DUE ON 11/30 \*\*\***

### **Week 14 (12/5): Representation II – Party effects**

- Pettersson-Lidbom, P. 2008. "Do Parties Matter For Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach" *Journal of The European Economic Association* 6(5): 1037-1056.
- Folke, O. 2014. "Shades of Brown and Green: Party Effects In Proportional Election Systems," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 12(5): 1361–1395.
- Caughey, Devin, Warshaw, Christopher, and Xu, Yiqing. 2017. "Incremental Democracy: The Policy Effects of Partisan Control of State Government" *Journal of Politics*, 79(4): 1342-1358.

### **Week 15 (12/12): Representation III -- Systems**

- Huber, J. D., and Powell G. B. 1994. "Congruence Between Citizens and Policy-Makers In Two Visions of Liberal Democracy." *World Politics*. 46: (3) 291-326.
- Tsebelis, G. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production In Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 93(3): 591-608.

**\*\*\* W REQUIREMENT: PAPER DUE ON 12/15 \*\*\***

**\*\*\* FINAL EXAM ON WEDNESDAY 12/20, 12:30pm \*\*\***