

PSC535  
Professor Rothenberg  
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Bureaucratic Politics  
Fall 2022

**Course Purpose:** We overview the literature on bureaucratic politics, particularly as it relates to the American political system (however, we can build in a more comparative component if students care to explore). Emphasis is on current major research areas (rather than a survey of previous decades' "greatest hits"), of which there are quite a few, as both the real-world importance of the American bureaucracy and the scholarly interest in the executive branch and related agencies has grown considerably in recent years.

**Availability:** If you want to get in touch with me outside of class for any reason, feel free to stop by Harkness 108 (note, also teaching Tues. and Thurs. at 11 and Weds. at 3:45) or send me an e-mail at [lawrence.rothenberg@rochester.edu](mailto:lawrence.rothenberg@rochester.edu).

**Requirements:** Course requirements include research presentations and a longer final paper— either original research, a detailed literature review, or a research proposal (roughly 15 pages will suffice).

**Readings:** Required readings will be made available through Dropbox.

**Grading:** Grading will reflect your class participation and your final paper (weighted approximately 1/2, 1/2).

I. *Introduction* (9/12)

II. *Bureaucratic Delegation—and its Measurement* (9/19)

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. "Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 697-722.

Hill, Adam. 2015. "Does Delegation Undermine Accountability? Experimental Evidence on the Relationship Between Blame Shifting and Control," *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 12 (2): 311-339.

Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2019. "Giving Advice vs. Making Decisions: Transparency, Information, and Delegation," *Political Science Research and Methods* 7 (3): 471-488.

Bolton, Alexander, and Sharece Thrower. 2019. "The Constraining Power of the Purse: Executive Discretion and Legislative Appropriations," *Journal of Politics* 81 (4): 1266-1281.

Vannoni, Matia, Elliot Ash, and Massimo Morelli. 2021. "Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative Texts: Methods and Application to U.S. States," *Political Analysis* 29 (1): 43-57.

Other pieces of potential interest:

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test," *Journal of Politics* 58 (2): 373-397.

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*. Cambridge.

Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of the Bureaucracy," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (2): 330-345.

Bendor, Jonathan, and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. "Spatial Models of Delegation," *American Political Science Review* 98 (2): 293-310.

Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," *American Economics Review* 94 (4): 1034-1054.

Prendergast, Canice. 2007. "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats," *American Economics Review* 97 (1): 180-196.

- Fox, Justin, and Stuart V. Jordan. 2011. "Delegation and Accountability," *Journal of Politics* 73 (3): 831-844.
- Ting, Michael M., James M. Snyder, Shigeo Hirano, and Olle Folke. 2013. "Elections and Reform: The Adoption of Civil Service in the U.S. States," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25 (3): 363-387.
- Prendergast, Canice. 2016. "Bureaucratic Responses," *Journal of Labor Economics* 34 (2): S183-215.
- Anastasopoulos, Jason, and Anthony Bertelli. 2020. "Understanding Delegation through Machine Learning: A Method and Application to the European Union," *American Political Science Review* 114 (1): 291-301.
- Lerner, Joshua Y., and Gregory P. Spell. 2021. "Using Deep and Active Learning Classifiers to Identify Congressional Delegation to Administrative Agencies." CSAS Working Paper 21-31.
- McCann, Pamela J. Clouser, and Charles R. Shipan. 2022. "How Many Major US Laws Delegate to Federal Agencies? (Almost) All of Them," *Political Science Research and Methods* 10 (21): 438-444.
- Walters, Daniel E., and Elliott Ash. 2023. "If We Build It, Will They Legislate? Empirically Testing the Potential of the Nondelegation Doctrine to Curb Congressional 'Abdication,'" *Cornell Law Review* (forthcoming).

### III. *The Civil Service System* (9/26)

- Ujhelyi, Gergely. 2014. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6 (2): 338-380.
- Bolton, Alexander, John M De Figueiredo, and David E. Lewis. 2021. "Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the US Federal Government," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 31 (2): 451-466.
- Gibbs, Daniel. 2020. "Civil Service Reform, Self-Selection, and Bureaucratic Performance," *Economics & Politics* 32 (2): 279-304.
- Huber, John D., and Michael M. Ting. 2021. "Civil Service and Patronage in Bureaucracies." *Journal of Politics* 83 (3): 902-916.
- Bugarin, Mauricio S., and David E. Lewis. 2021. "Building Effective Bureaucracy: Career Concerns, Productivity, and Politicization in the Public Sector," working paper.

Other pieces of potential interest:

Forand, Jean Guillaume. 2019. "Civil Service and the Growth of Government," *Journal of Public Economics* 177 (1): 1-17.

Doherty, Kathleen, David Lewis, Scott Limbocker. 2019. "Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 29 (2): 159-174.

Cameron, Charles M. and John M. de Figueiredo. 2020. "Quitting in Protest: Presidential Policymaking and Civil Service Response," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 15 (4): 507-538.

Ash, Elliot, Massimo Morelli, and Vannoni, Matia. 2022. "Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform," *Political Science Research and Methods* 10 (1): 82-96.

#### IV. *Learning and Responsiveness* (10/3)

Patty, John, and Sean Gailmard. 2012. *Learning while Governing*. Chs. 2-7.

Kogan, Vlad. 2017. "Administrative Centralization and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: Evidence from the Food Stamp Program," *Journal of Administration Research and Theory* 4 (1): 629-646.

Lowande, Kenneth. 2019. "Politicization and Responsiveness in Executive Agencies," *Journal of Politics* 81 (1): 33-48.

Other pieces of potential interest:

Li, Christopher M., Greg Sasso, and Ian R. Turner. 2020. "Accountability in Government Hierarchies," unpublished paper. <file:///C:/Users/Irot/Downloads/LiSassoTurner-Mar2020-ONLINE.pdf>

Ian Turner. 2022. "Reviewing Procedures versus Judging Substance: How Increasing Bureaucratic Oversight Can Reduce Bureaucratic Accountability," *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy* 2 (4): 569-596.

V. *Organization, Politicization, Capacity, and Reputation* (10/17, 10/24)

- Huber, John D., and Nolan McCarty. 2004. "Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform," *American Political Science Review* 98 (3): 481-494.
- Callander, Steven. 2008. "A Theory of Policy Expertise," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 3 (2): 123-140.
- Carpenter, Daniel P., and George A. Krause. 2012. "Reputation and Public Administration," *Public Administration Review* 72 (1): 26-32.
- Selin, Jennifer L. 2015. "What Makes an Agency Independent?" *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (4): 971-987.
- Richardson, Mark D. 2019. "Politicization and Expertise: Exit, Effort, and Investment," *Journal of Politics* 81 (3): 878-891.
- Decarolis, Francesco, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi, and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2020. "Bureaucratic Competence on Procurement Outcomes," *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization* 36 (3): 537-597.
- Bils, Peter. 2020. "Policymaking with Multiple Agencies," *American Journal of Political Science* 64 (3): 634-648.
- Nicholas R. Bednar. 2021. "The Workforce Capacity of the United States Bureaucracy," 1998–2020," working paper.
- Bertelli, Anthony M., and Madalina Busuioc. 2021. "Reputation-Sourced Authority and the Prospect of Unchecked Bureaucratic Power," *Public Administration Review* 81 (1): 38-48.
- Foarta, Dana. 2021. "How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability," working paper.

Other papers of potential interest:

Carpenter, Daniel P. 2010. *Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA*. Princeton University Press.

Anastasopoulos, L Jason, and Andrew B Whitford. 2019. "Machine Learning for Public Administration Research, With Application to Organizational Reputation," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 29 (3): 491–510.

Gailmard, Sean, and John Patty. 2013. "Stovepiping," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25 (3): 388–411.

Jo, Jinhee, and Lawrence Rothenberg. 2014. "The Importance of Bureaucratic Hierarchy: Conflicting Preferences, Incomplete Control, and Policy Outcomes," *Economics and Politics* 26 (1): 157-183.

Limbocker, Scott, Mark D. Richardson, and Jennifer L. Selin. 2022. "The Politicization Conversation: A Call to Better Define and Measure the Concept," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 52 (1): 10-37.

Forand, Jean Guillaume, Michael M. Ting, and Gergely Ujhelyi. 2022. "Bureaucrats and Policies in Equilibrium Administrations."  
<https://www.uh.edu/~gujhelyi/eqadmin.pdf>.

VI. *Appointment Processes I* (10/31)

McCarty, Nolan, and Rose Razaghian. 1999. "Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations, 1885-1996," *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4): 1122-1143.

McCarty, Nolan. 2004. "The Appointments Dilemma," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 413-428.

Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments*, chs. 3-5.

Note: Entire book is available online at

<https://catalog.lib.rochester.edu/vwebv/holdingsInfo?searchId=482&recCount=50&recPointer=0&bibId=7279800&searchType=7>.

Jo, Jinhee, and Lawrence Rothenberg. 2012. "Rational Incompetence," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 24 (1): 3-18.

VII. *Appointment Processes II* (11/7)

Hollibaugh, Gary E., Jr., and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2018. "The Who, When, and Where of Executive Nominations: Integrating Agency Independence and Appointee Ideology," *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (2): 296-311.

Kinane, Christina M. 2021. "Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments," *American Political Science Review* 115 (2): 599-614.

Hollibaugh, Gary E., and George A. Krause. 2021. "Executive Appointee Reliability under Separated Powers: Presidential Loyalty Among Leaders of U.S. Federal Agencies," working paper.

Krause, George A., and Jason S. Byers. 2022. "Confirmation Dynamics: Differential Vetting in the Appointment of US Federal Agency Leaders," *Journal of Politics* 84 (2): 1189-1201.

Lewis, David E., Christopher Piper, and Mark D. Richardson. 2022. "When Vacancies Matter for U.S. Federal Agency Performance," working paper.

Other pieces of potential interest:

Gallo, Nick, and David E. Lewis. 2012. "The Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Federal Agency Performance," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 2 (2): 219-243.

Hollibaugh, Gary. 2014. "Naïve Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage, Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 25 (2): 341-372.

Hollibaugh, Gary E., Jr., Gabe Horton, and David E. Lewis. 2014. "Presidents and Patronage," *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (4): 1024–1042.

Bonica, Adam, Jowei Chen, and Tim Johnson. 2015. "Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of "Inferior Offices," and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 10 (1): 5-40.

Krause, George A., and Anne Joseph O'Connell. 2016. "Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments," *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (4): 914–931.

Waterman, Richard W., and Yu Ouyang. 2020. "Rethinking Loyalty and Competence in Presidential Appointments," *Public Administration Review* 80 (5): 717-732.

Hollibaugh, Gary E., Jr., and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2021. "The Structure of Appointment Politics: Consistency or Change?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 46 (2): 391-426.

Lim, Claire S.H. and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2021. "What Shapes the Quality and Behavior of Government Officials? Institutional Variation in Selection and Retention Methods," *Annual Review of Economics* 13: 87-109.

Resh, William G., Gary E. Hollibaugh, Patrick S. Roberts, and Matthew M. Dull. 2021. "Appointee Vacancies in US Executive Branch Agencies," *Journal of Public Policy* 41 (4): 653-676.



VIII. Putting Agencies in the Policy Space (11/14)

Chen, Jowei, and Tim Johnson. 2015. "Federal Employee Unionization and Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy: Estimating and Explaining Ideological Change in Executive Agencies," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27 (1): 151-174.

Bertelli, Anthony M., Dyana P. Mason, Jennifer M. Connolly, and David A. Gastwirth. 2015. "Measuring Agency Attributes with Attitudes Across Time: A Method and Examples Using Large-Scale Federal Surveys," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 25 (2): 513-544.

Richardson, Mark D., Joshua D. Clinton, and David E. Lewis. 2017. "Elite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill," *Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 303-308.

Acs, Alex. 2019. "Ideal Point Estimation in Political Hierarchies: A Framework and an Application to the US Executive Branch," *Journal of Law & Economics* 36 (1): 207-230.

Spenkuch, Jorg L., Edoardo Teso, and Guo Xu. 2021. "Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations," working paper.

Other pieces of potential interest:

Clinton, Joshua, and David E. Lewis. 2008. "Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences" *Political Analysis* 16 (1): 3-20.

Bertelli, Anthony M., and Christian R. Grose. 2011. "The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress," *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (4): 767-781.

Clinton, Joshua D., Anthony M. Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis, and David C. Nixon. 2012. "Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress," *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2): 341-354.

*IX. Rulemaking and Administrative Procedures I (11/21)*

McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3 (2): 243-277.

Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2017. "Participation, Process, & Policy: The Informational Value of Politicized Judicial Review," *Journal of Public Policy* 37 (3): 233-260.

Potter, Rachel. 2017. "Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking," *Journal of Politics* 79 (3): 841-855.

Lowande, Kenneth, and Rachel Potter. 2020. "Congressional Oversight Revisited: Politics and Procedure in Agency Rulemaking," *Journal of Politics* 83 (1): 401-408.

Feinstein, Brian D., and Abby K. Wood. 2022. "Divided Agencies," *Southern California Law Review* (forthcoming).

*X. Rulemaking and Administrative Procedures II (11/28)*

Acs, Alex, and Charles Cameron. 2013. "Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a Chilling Effect and "OIRA Avoidance" in the Agencies?" *Political Research Quarterly* 43 (3): 443-467.

Bolton, Alexander, Rachel Augustine Potter, and Sharece Thrower. 2016. "Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 32 (2): 242-271.

Haeder, Simon, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2018. "Presidentially Directed Policy Change: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as Partisan or Moderator?" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 28 (4): 475-488.

Lewis, David E., Mark D. Richardson, and Eric Rosenthal. 2019. "OMB in its Management Role: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Executives," unpublished paper. <https://cdn.vanderbilt.edu/vu-my/wp-content/uploads/sites/411/2011/12/03103617/lre-omb-paper.pdf>

Potter, Rachel Augustine. 2021. "Macro Outsourcing: Evaluating Government Reliance on the Private Sector," *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming).

Other papers of potential interest:

- Yackee, Jason Webb, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2010. ““Is Agency Rulemaking ‘Ossified’? Testing Congressional, Presidential, and Judicial Procedural Constraints,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 20 (2): 261-282.
- Nelson, David, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2012. “Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking,” *Journal of Politics* 74 (2): 339-353.
- Jordan, Stuart. 2007. “OIRA Review and Presidential Control of Agencies,” unpublished paper. PhD dissertation, Princeton.
- Sunstein, Cass R. 2013. “Commentary: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,” *Harvard Law Review* 126: 1838-1879.
- Raso, Connor, and William West. 2013. “Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications for Bureaucratic Responsiveness and Bureaucratic Control,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 23 (3): 495-519.
- Bubb, Ryan, and Patrick L. Warren. 2014. “Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review,” *Journal of Legal Studies* 43 (1): 95-135.
- Carpenter, Daniel, and Jesse Gubb. 2014. “A Political Clearinghouse? Organizational and Presidential Effects in OIRA Review,”  
[http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper\\_33430.pdf](http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_33430.pdf)
- Raso, Connor. 2015. “Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures,” *Administrative Law Review* 67 (1): 65-132.
- Doherty, Kathleen M., and Jennifer L. Selin. 2015. “Does Congress Differentiate? Administrative Procedures, Information Gathering, and Political Control.”  
[http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/741/docs/Panel\\_4a\\_paper1\\_DohertySelin\\_Does\\_Congress\\_Differentiate\\_SoCLASS\\_USC\\_2015.pdf](http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/741/docs/Panel_4a_paper1_DohertySelin_Does_Congress_Differentiate_SoCLASS_USC_2015.pdf)
- Rodriguez, Daniel B., and Barry R. Weingast. 2015. “The “Reformation of Administrative Law” Revisited,” *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 31 (4): 782-807.
- Boushey, Graeme and Robert McGrath. 2017. “Experts, Amateurs, and Bureaucratic Influence in the American States,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 27 (1): 85-103.
- Susan Webb Yackee. 2019. “The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 37-55.

Potter, Rachel. 2019. *Bending the Rules*. University of Chicago Press.

Bils, Peter, Robert J. Carroll, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2020. "Strategic Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures," unpublished paper.

Yackee, Susan Webb. 2020. "Hidden Politics? Assessing Lobbying Success During US Agency Guidance Development," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 30 (4): 548-562.

#### *XI. Separation of Powers/Congress/President/Courts (12/5, 12/12)*

##### 1. Separation of Powers

Callander, Steven, and Keith Kreihbiel. 2014. "Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World," *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (4): 819-834.

Potter, Rachel Augustine, and Charles R. Shipan. 2019. "Agency Rulemaking in a Separation of Powers System," *Journal of Public Policy* 39 (1): 89-113.

##### 2. Congress

Clinton, Joshua D., David E. Lewis and Jennifer L. Selin. 2014. "Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight," *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (2): 387-401.

Wood, Abby K., and David E. Lewis. 2017. "Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 27 (4): 581-595.

Ritchie, Melinda. 2017. "Back-Channel Representation: A Study of the Strategic Communication of Senators with the US Department of Labor," *Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 240-253.

Feinstein, Brian D. 2018. "Congress in the Administrative State," *Washington University Law Review* 95 (5): 1187-1248.

Patty, John W., and Ian R. Turner. 2021. "Ex Post Review and Expert Policymaking: When Does Oversight Reduce Accountability?" *Journal of Politics* 83 (1): 23-39.

Prato, Carlo, and Ian R. Turner. 2022. "Institutional Foundations of the Power to Persuade."

Bellodi, Lucca. 2022. "'Listen to me': Ideological Agreement and Bureaucratic Influence in the Legislative Arena."

Kroeger, Mary A. 2022. "Bureaucrats as Lawmakers," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 47 (1): 257-289.

### 3. *Presidency*

Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2014. "The Elusive Search for Presidential Power," *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (3): 653-668.

Acs, Alex. 2018. "Policing the Administrative State," *Journal of Politics* 80 (4): 1225-1238.

Acs, Alex. 2021. "Presidential Directives in a Resistant Bureaucracy." Unpublished paper.

### 4. *Courts*

Eskridge, William N., and Connor Raso. 2010. "Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases," *Columbia Law Review* 110: 1727-1819.

Turner, Ian R. 2016. "Working Smart *and* Hard? Agency Effort, Judicial Review, and Policy Precision," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 29 (1): 69-96.

Barnett, Kent, Christina L. Boyd, and Christopher J. Walker. 2018. "The Politics of Selecting *Chevron* Deference," *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 15 (3): 597-619.

Other papers of potential interest:

Rogowski, Jon C. 2020. "The Administrative Presidency and Public Trust in Bureaucracy," *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy* 1 (1): 27-51.

Bolton, Alexander. 2022. "Gridlock, Bureaucratic Control, and Nonstatutory Policymaking in Congress."

*XIII. Student Presentations/Conclusions (12/12).*

Some Data Sources:

<http://web.stanford.edu/~bonica/data.html> Adam Bonica's Ideal Points

<https://agencydata.wordpress.com/> Relatively old agency preference data

<http://www.tim-j.com/bureaucratic-ideal-points/> Chen-Johnson agency ideal point scores

<http://www.fedview.opm.gov/> Federal Employee View Survey; see also  
<http://www.mrichardson.info/data>

<http://www.tim-j.com/feddata/> Federal Personnel Surveys

<http://www.performance.gov/> Government Assessments of Agency Performance

<https://www.epstein.wustl.edu/jcs/>: Judicial Common Space Scores

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/part.html> PART scores

<http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/PIMP/index.htm> Political Ideology Measurement Project

<https://sfgs.princeton.edu/>: Survey of the Future of Government Service

<https://sunlightfoundation.com/api/>: Various big data; note the foundation pulled the plug, but a number of the datasets have been farmed out

<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/harvard/?q=alex%20acs>: Includes Alex Acs' recent agency ideal point estimates

*Review Papers that Might Be Helpful:*

- Dal Bó, Ernest. 2006. "Regulatory Capture: A Review," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 22 (2): 203-225.
- Krause, George. 2011. "Legislative Delegation of Authority to Bureaucratic Agencies," *Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy*.  
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238958.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199238958-e-22>
- Lewis, David. 2011. "Presidential Appointments and Personnel," *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. "Formal Models of Bureaucracy," *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Moe, Terry M. 2013. "Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy," in *Handbook of Organizational Economics*.
- Krause, George A., and Neal D. Woods. 2014. "Policy Delegation, Comparative Institutional Capacity, and Administrative Politics in the American States," *Oxford Handbook of State and Local Government*.  
<https://www-oxfordhandbooks-com.ezp.lib.rochester.edu/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579679.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199579679-e-015>
- McCann, Pamela J. Clouser, Douglas M. Spencer, and Abby K. Wood. 2021 "Measuring State Capture," *Wisconsin Law Review* 2021 (5):1141-1186.
- Brierley, Sarah, Kenneth Lowande, Rachel Augustine Potter, and Guillermo Toral. 2022. "Bureaucratic Politics: Blindspots and Opportunities in Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science* (forthcoming).  
[file:///C:/Users/lrot/Dropbox/New%20Bureaucracy/new%20bureaucracy%202022%20papers/bureaucratic\\_politics\\_arps\\_july22.pdf](file:///C:/Users/lrot/Dropbox/New%20Bureaucracy/new%20bureaucracy%202022%20papers/bureaucratic_politics_arps_july22.pdf)