PSCI 212-1 The United States Supreme Court:
The Constitution at the Crossroads
Professor Joel Seligman
Fall 2020: Monday/Wednesday 2:00 –3:15 pm
This course will be taught remotely

This course will address our Constitutional system of government, particularly focusing on leading United States Supreme Court decisions, including those that address the separation of powers, the powers of the President, Congress and Judiciary, racial equality, freedom of expression and the religion clauses of the First Amendment, economic regulation and voting rights.

All readings for the course will be in Noah Feldstein and Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Law (20th ed. Foundation Press 2019) (CB) or in Handout Materials.

There is a reading assignment for the first class.

Academic Honesty: All students will be expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the University's Academic Honesty policy. Assignments will be graded on an individual basis with the expectation that each assignment will be completed by each student acting alone. Students may e mail questions to me at seligman@rochester.edu. Students also may study together for class preparation.

Grades: Your grade for this course will be based 25 percent on your performance on the Mid-term Examination, October 12, and 50 percent on a written presentation and 25 percent on an oral presentation at a Constitutional Convention, December 2 and 7. For the Constitutional Convention, each of you will be expected to propose an Amendment to the Constitution and based on the readings in this course to prepare the most persuasive legal analysis of why the Amendment should be adopted. Final papers may be up to 20 double spaced pages including footnotes with a font no smaller than 12.

August 26: Legal Reasoning: Brown v. Board of Education, CB 661-663, Handout 1-10.

August 31: The Structure of the United States Legal System, Handout 11-26.

September 2: The American Revolution: Download Declaration of Independence; Articles of Confederation, and read in Casebook (CB), The Constitution of the United States, Casebook lix-lxvii. Just read the original Constitution. We will study Amendments later.

September 7: A President, Not A King: Preamble and Article II of the Constitution, CB lix, lxiii-lxv; Download The Federalist Paper No. 69, Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, CB 298-306; Download Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 591 U.S. (2020) – just read Chief Justice Roberts Opinion.

September 9: Presidential Powers in Times of War: Note, Executive Power in Times of War or Terrorism; CB 341-350; Ex Parte Milligan, Casebook 350-353; Ex Parte Quirin, CB 353-355; Note, The Executive Response to the Events of 9/11, CB 357-358; Rasul v. Bush, CB 358-359; Hamdan v. Rumsfield, CB 372-379; Boumediene v. Bush, CB 379-387.

September 14: Limits on the Power of the President: United States v. Nixon, CB 425-427; Nixon v. Fitzgerald, CB 428-429; Clinton v. Jones, CB 429-435; Note, Impeachment of the President., CB 437-441; download Trump v. Vance, 591 U.S. – just read Chief Justice Roberts Majority Opinion; Trump v. Mazars, 591 U.S. - just read Chief Justice Roberts Majority Opinion, focus on the final Part IIE.

September 16: Congress and the Separation of Powers: Article I of the Constitution, CB lix-lxiii; McCulloch v. Maryland, CB 79-89; United States v. Comstock, CB 92-94.

September 21: Congressional Powers under the Commerce Clause: Note, CB 116-120; Lochner v. New York, CB 489-498; Note, The Commerce Clause and the New Deal, CB 122-128; United States v. Caroline Products, CB 503-504; United States v. Darby, CB 131-133; Wickard v. Filburn, CB 134-135.

September 23: Congressional Powers under the Commerce, Taxation and Spending Clauses: National Federal of Independent Business v. Sibelius, CB 160-166, 196-199, 212-217.

September 28: The Power of the Judiciary: Article III of the Constitution, CB lxv; Download Federalist Paper No. 78; Marbury v. Madison, Casebook 2-9; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, CB 17-18; Cooper v. Aaron, CB 21-22; Dred Scott v. Sanford, CB 446-449.

September 30: The Second American Revolution: 13th-15th Amendments: CB lxix; Slaughter House Cases, CB 451-455; Note, The Civil Rights Statutes, CB 853-856; Civil Rights Cases, CB 856-859; Plessy v. Ferguson, CB 657-659; Brown v. Board of Education I and II, CB 661-663, 667-668.

October 5: Implementing Board v. Board of Education: Note, CB 667-670; download Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) – just read Majority opinion; Note, Race Preferences in Employment and Contracting, CB 699-704; Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, CB 704-709.

October 7: Affirmative Action: Regents of California v. Bakke, CB 692-698; Gruter v. Bollinger, CB 710-719; Graetz v. Bollinger, CB 719-722; Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, CB 733-735; Fisher v. University of Texas, CB 729-733; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, CB 736-743

October 12: Midterm Examination.

October 14: Gender Classifications: Craig v. Boren, CB 761-764; Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, CB 765-767; United States v. Virginia, CB 768-775; Note, Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the Question of Gender, CB 775-786; download Justice Gorsuch Opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. (2020).

October 19; The Right to Privacy and Reproductive Rights: Griswold v. Connecticut, CB 511-518; Eisenstadt v. Baird, CB 519-520; Roe v. Wade, CB 521-524; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, CB 531-538; Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt, CB 544-546.

October 21: Marital Rights: Loving v. Virginia, CB 672-673; Lawrence v. Texas, CB 563-570; United States v. Windsor, CB 575-582; Obergefell v. Hodges, CB 583-586.

October 26: Voting Rights: Reynolds v. Sims, CB 814-818; Everwel v. Abbott, CB 818-819; Download Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. (2019); Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, CB 1494-1502; McCutcheon v. F.E.C., CB 1507-1512.

October 28: Freedom of Expression under the First Amendment: Schenck v. United States, CB 947-948; Abrams v. United States, CB 950-954; Gitlow v. New York, CB 961-964; Whitney v. California, CB 965-969; Brandenburg v. Ohio, CB 978-980

November 2: Fighting Words and Hate Speech: Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, CB 986-987; Texas v. Johnson, CB 1186-1195; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, CB 1038-1044; Snyder v. Phelps, CB 1030-1033.

November 4: Time, Place and Manner Tests: United States v. O'Brien, CB 1176-1180; Cox v. Louisiana, Casebook 1222; Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, CB 1222-1224; International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc. v. Lee, CB 1264-1267; Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, CB 1227-1231; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, CB 1232-1236.

November 9: Prior Restraint and National Security: Near v. Minnesota, CB 1374-1375; New York Times v. United States [The Pentagon Papers Case], CB 1377-1382; United States v. Progressive, Inc., CB 1383-1384; Snepp v. United States, CB 1383-1384; Wikileaks, CB 1385.

November 11: Libel and New Media: New York Times v. Sullivan, CB 1006-1009; Reno v. ACLU, CB 1111-1117; Ashcroft v. Free Speech California, CB 1121-1123; Parkingham v. North Carolina, CB 1124-1125; Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, CB 1129-1131.

November 16: Commercial Speech: Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, CB 1133-1136; Regulating Lawyers' Advertising, CB 1141-1142; Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, CB 1142-1145; Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, CB 1148-1152.

November 18: The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment: Note, A History of the Religion Clauses, CB 1558-1565; Reynolds v. United States, CB 1581; Sherbert v. Verner, CB 1583-1585; Wisconsin v. Yoder, CB 1586-1588; Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, CB 1593-1600; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, CB 1608-1614.

November 23: The Establishment Clause: Note, CB 1615-1616; Lee v. Weisman, CB 1648-1655; Edwards v. Aguillard, CB 1660-1664; Lynch v. Donnelly, CB 1671-1677; McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, CB 1682-1687; Trinity Church v. Comer, CB 1699-1702.

December 2: Constitutional Convention

December 7: Constitutional Convention

I. Plain Language of 14th Amendment

"No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

- does not explicitly address public education

- does not explicitly prohibit or permit segregation

Text of 14th Amendment, standing alone, is insufficient to resolve issue of whether segregation in public education is constitutionally forbidden.

II. Legislative Intent

When the plain text is not decisive, courts commonly try to ascertain the "intent" of the lawmakers.

Brown court concluded that a review of "the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868" was "inconclusive."

- the most "avid proponents" intended "to remove all legal distinctions"
- the opponents wished for the "most limited effect"
- "what others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty."

III. Precedent – "Stare Decisis"

Stare Decisis: like cases should be decided alike

Brown **court determined that prior cases – holding that "separate but equal" treatment was constitutionally permitted – should be distinguished**

Plessy v. Ferguson **addressed segregation in public transportation – not segregation in public education**

In six subsequent cases involving public education the "separate but equal" doctrine was not challenged

IV. Historical Context

Courts are also guided by historical context.

Brown court observed that in 1868

- in the South, "the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold";
- in the North, public education was "rudimentary," "three months a year" and "compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown"; and
- this state of affairs contributed to "the inclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools"

The *Brown* court was, therefore, not surprised "that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education."

V. Policy And Other Considerations

In contrast to the impoverished state of public education in 1868, the *Brown* court observed that

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments … it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education"

"[M]odern authority" in "psychological knowledge" shows "segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development" of children

Based on these considerations, the Court wrote:

[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs … are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

II. ANNOTATED *PLESSY V. FERGUSON* OPINION

The "Style of the Case" information is usually at the top of the opinion.

PLESSY v. FERGUSON
163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896)
Supreme Court of the United States
May 18, 1896

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

The sentence below indicates that the opinion is supported by at least five Justices, because five of the nine must join in an opinion for it to be the opinion of the Court. Justices that agree with the majority holding, but differ in their reasoning, may write separate, concurring opinions. Justices that disagree with the holding may write a dissenting opinion. There may be one opinion written for the majority, or several opinions may make up a majority holding.

Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

In the following paragraphs the Court gives the language of the statute that is challenged on constitutional grounds and the narrative facts. One has to glean the procedural facts: It is clear that criminal charges were filed against Plessy; the reference to "[t]he petition for the writ of prohibition" means Plessy asked an appellate court, (the Supreme Court of La.), to order a lower court to cease prosecution because the statute was unconstitutional. The reference above, to "in error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana," means the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition by Plessy for *writ of certiorari*, by which it reviews the Supreme Court of Louisiana's decision for error.

This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the general assembly of the state of Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing for separate railway carriages for the white and colored races. The first section of the statute enacts "that all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this state, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations . . . . No person or persons shall be permitted to occupy seats in coaches, other than the ones assigned to them, on account of the race they belong to." By the second section it was enacted "that the officers of such passenger trains shall have power and are hereby required to assign each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to which such passenger belongs; any passenger insisting on going into a coach or compartment to which by race he does not belong, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days in the parish prison, ..."

The information filed in the criminal district court charged, in substance, that Plessy,

being a passenger between two stations within the state of Louisiana, was assigned by officers of the company to the coach used for the race to which he belonged, but he insisted upon going into a coach used by the race to which he did not belong. . . .

The petition for the writ of prohibition averred that petitioner was seven- eights Caucasian and one-eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him; and that he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity secured to citizens of the United States of the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were accommodated, and was ordered by the conductor to vacate said coach, and take a seat in another, assigned to persons of the colored race, and, having refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected, with the aid of a police officer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer a charge of having violated the above act.

Below the Court identifies the issue, or at least says what Constitutional provision the statute is alleged to have violated, and gives the language of the Constitutional provision at issue and its interpretation in an earlier case.

The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground that it conflicts . . . with the . . . the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part of the states.

. . . .

2. By the fourteenth amendment, all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are made citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside; and the states are forbidden from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The proper construction of this amendment was first called to the attention of this court in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, which involved, however, not a question of race, but one of exclusive privileges. The case did not call for any expression of opinion as to the exact rights it was intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally that its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro, to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the states, and to protect from the hostile legislation of the states the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of citizens of the states.

Next the Court gives the legal framework of its reasoning, focusing on the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. It says the amendment only guarantees political and civil, not social, equality. This was historically its purpose, the Court asserts, and the contrast between cases upholding state laws racially segregating schools and its own case precedent invalidating racial segregation of juries illustrates the distinction.

The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two

races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which have been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of states where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced. . . . [The Court here cites decisions in states including Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and California.]

. . .

The distinction between laws interfering with the political equality of the negro and those requiring the separation of the two races in schools, theaters, and railway carriages has been frequently drawn by this court. Thus, in *Strauder v. West Virginia*, 100 U. S. 303, it was held that a law of West Virginia limiting to white male persons 21 years of age, and citizens of the state, the right to sit upon juries, was a discrimination which implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security of the right of the colored race, and was a step towards reducing them to a condition of servility. . . .

Below the Court refines the precise issue in terms of the reasonableness of a statutory classification that affects social equality, and gives its holding.

In this connection, it is also suggested by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error that the same argument that will justify the state legislature in requiring railways to provide separate accommodations for the two races will also authorize them to require separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain color, or who are aliens, or who belong to certain nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk upon one side of the street, and white people upon the other, or requiring white men's houses to be painted white, and colored men's black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, or that a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another color. The reply to all this is that every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class. . . .

So far, then, as a conflict with the fourteenth amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or . . . obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment . . . .

The Court then gives additional rationales for its holding, rejecting the reasoning of Plessy's attorney on the real meaning of the statutory classification, reasoning that legislation cannot affect social bias or practices, and defining the type of rights that Plessy alleges the statute violates as social, rather than political or civil.

We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. . . . The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. . . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.

. . . .

Under the allegations of his petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance whether, under the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored race.

The following paragraph states the judgment. As the preceding paragraph makes clear, the prosecution of Plessy will proceed, and ascertaining his race will be important.

The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.

A SAMPLE BRIEF FOR *PLESSY V. FERGUSON*:

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896)

FACTS: Narrative: Plessy is alleged to be "of colored blood," and while riding on a railroad in Louisiana, took a seat in a carriage reserved for whites. The conductor told him to leave and sit in a car for colored persons. He refused, was forcibly ejected and arrested.

Procedural: Plessy was charged with violating a La. statute that required railroads carrying passengers within La to " provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and colored races" and made it a crime for a passenger to insist on "going into a coach or compartment to which by race he does not belong." He challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated the 14th Amendment, and petitioned for a writ of prohibition, asking the Louisiana Supreme Court to order the lower court to cease the prosecution because it was based on an unconstitutional law. He lost, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

ISSUE: Does the La statute requiring separate railroad cars for white and colored persons violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Ad., because it is an unreasonable exercise of the state police power?

HOLDING/JUDGMENT: No. A state law that requires separation of races in public conveyances does not violate the political or civil equality enforced by the 14th Ad. and is a reasonable exercise of state police power. La Supreme Court affirmed.

REASONING:

1. The purpose of the 14th amendment was to enforce civil and political, but not social, equality of the races. Case precedent illustrates the distinction: Laws limiting jury service to white males violate the 14th Ad. by U.S. Sp. Ct. holding, those requiring separation of the races in places where they are likely to be brought into contact have been upheld by state courts as within the police powers of the states, including laws separating schools.

2. The 14th Amendment requires a state statute to be reasonable, enacted in good faith for the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class. The state legislature is given large discretion, and can act according to established customs and to preserve public peace and good order.

3. The La railway segregation statute deals with social equality, and does not violate civil or political equality. It is not unreasonable: it does not "stamp the colored race with a badge of inferiority." Legislation cannot impose social equality.

4. The 14th Amendment does not, cannot, enforce social equality.

The U.S. Judicial System



Article III of the Constitution – Judicial Power

Section 1:

The Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

The Federal Court System




Geographic Boundaries
of United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts
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Article III of the Constitution – Judicial Power

Section 2:

The judicial Power shall extend to all ***Cases*** *. . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States. . . [and] to* ***Controversies*** *to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States . . .*

Case or Controversy

- The "judicial Power" of federal courts – including the United States Supreme Court – only exists where there is a "Case" or "Controversy"
- No "advisory opinions." There must be a concrete dispute between two (or more) adversarial parties.
- There are two basic types of cases: criminal and civil. Criminal cases can only be brought by the government. Civil cases can be brought by the government or private persons.
- "Class actions" are cases involving a group of similarly-situated individuals. They permit the efficient adjudication of large numbers of related cases.
- *Brown v. Board Of Education* was the resolution of four class actions.

The Parties Involved

- The person filing the Complaint is the "Plaintiff"
- The person being sued is the "Defendant"
- Federal judges are appointed for life "during good Behavior," and their compensation may not be reduced. Judges decide issues of law and procedure.
- Generally, a Jury determines the facts (sometimes a Judge is the fact finder)

The Federal Court System

- Federal cases usually begin in United States District Court
- Trial occurs here
- In a criminal case, facts at issue must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
- In a civil case, facts must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence

The Federal Court System

- Jury (or judge) makes findings of fact and renders a verdict or a judgment.
- In criminal case, verdict of guilty or not guilty. In civil case, judgment for plaintiff (often monetary damages) or defendant.



The Federal Court System: Court of Appeals

- District Court decision can be appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
- Appellate courts are more concerned with legal issues than with factual issues, but will review factual determinations for clear error.

The Federal Court System: Supreme Court of the United States

- The Supreme Court of the United States is the court of last resort.
- The Supreme Court, for the most part, chooses which cases to review. The Court receives approximately 7,000-8,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari each year. The Court grants and hears oral argument in about 75-80 cases.
- The Supreme Court is almost exclusively concerned with substantive legal issues of special significance.

Presenting . . .the Supremes!



The State Judicial System

- Each State has its own court system as well.
- Many cases can be brought either in federal court or in state court.
- Certain cases can be brought only in federal court (e.g., copyright cases), while other cases can be brought only in state court (e.g., cases arising under state laws brought by citizens of the same state)

Finding and Citing Court Opinions

- Courts issue "opinions" that explain their decisions and their reasoning.
- Opinions are reported in a series of books or "reporters."
- Different courts have different reporters.
- Published opinions are the primary source of law (together with statutes and regulations).

Finding and Citing Court Opinions

- Opinions by the Supreme Court are regularly published in three reporters (and now are available online)
- The official reporter, the United States Reports (abbreviated as "U.S.")
- A private reporter, the Supreme Court Reports (abbreviated as "S. Ct.")
- Another private reporter, the Lawyers' Edition (abbreviated as "L. Ed.")

Finding and Citing Court Opinions

Opinions should be cited as follows:

Name of Petitioner v.
Name of Respondent, Vol. #
[Reporter] Starting Page #
(Court and Year)

For example:

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

LIN
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/civilrights/brown/index.htm