

PSC 356/556 Political Institutions and Behavior

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Tuesday 12:30-15:15 Zoom meetings.

Objective. This course is designed primarily as one of the four required graduate seminars in comparative politics. Its object is to introduce the participants to the comparative study of democratic political institutions and political behavior. No background in comparative politics is assumed. It is appropriate as an introduction for students new to the field or as an "outside" course. Undergraduates are welcome with permission of the instructor.

Approach. The comparative study of democratic institutions and political behavior focuses on the role of competitive elections in choosing political leaders and makers of public policies in the context of relative freedom of political information and action. We begin by discussing the meaning of contemporary representative democracy. We turn to political parties as the critical institutions linking citizens and policymakers, sketching first the literature on party competition and then the way that parties and party systems are shaped by (and can shape) election rules, social and economic cleavages, and socio-economic development. We then turn to the major configurations of democratic institutions (parliamentary, presidential, and other) and the behavior of party leaders and other elites in and with those institutions. The last part of the course turns to the comparative study of individual citizens' attitudes and behavior (electoral responses to party choices and to the performance of incumbent policymakers, problems of citizen information and attention.) We conclude with an overview through studies of political representation.

Many seminar sessions will be divided into two main parts. In one of these, we shall discuss the required collective readings listed right after each week's topic on the syllabus. Our discussion is designed to accomplish both substantive and methodological objectives. On one hand, we want to understand how to explain the particular substantive theme, addressing the concepts, theories and evidence presented. The readings are designed to introduce a variety of substantive topics, not to be definitive on any of them. (Readings listed as optional are recommended either as background material or for those interested in following up some additional aspects of these topics.) On the other hand, we want to understand strengths and limitations of various approaches to comparative analysis--cross-sectional or longitudinal comparisons, sample of countries or units, quantitative vs. qualitative measurement of variables, specification issues, identification and causality issues.

In the other part of the session, we shall have presentations by seminar members. These presentations are of several types, exemplifying some of the important approaches to the study of democratic processes in comparative politics. **Each seminar participant is responsible for two presentations.** They should be of two different types. Each type of presentations should be about 20 minutes long, followed by another 10 minutes of discussion. A written summary or annotated bibliography should be emailed ahead of time.

The first presentation could be one of three types as follows:

- Presentation of a particular **comparative quantitative data set**, as suggested in parenthesis each week. The student is responsible for examining the appropriate website and related material, downloading the data (or a subset of it), doing some simple analysis to show that the data are accessible, describing to the class the unit basis of the data, the types of variables and their measurement, and identifying some publications or papers using these data. Any special problems or limitations of the data should be noted. Feel free to find other data sets.
- A **replication** of an existing published political science article that uses quantitative analysis. The student should obtain the data, reproduce (if possible) the core finding, and then conduct an additional analysis that tests the robustness of the results, possibly based on an alternative theory.
- A case-study type of presentation **focusing on a specific country** and application of the general theme of the week to the politics of that country and vice versa. We would hope for a presentation that would focus on a theoretical issue and demonstrate the importance of context, or trace some particular institution or process in a case-study approach.

The second presentation should be a research proposal for the paper you plan to work on during the semester. The presentation should succinctly convey the research question, situate the question in the literature, describe the plan of attack (data used, type of analysis, etc.) and expectations about findings. We particularly encourage discussion of research ideas that propose an identification strategy to recover **causal effects**. This could be a regression discontinuity design, a natural experiment exploiting exogenous randomization, an instrumental variables approach, etc. In any case, the proposal should outline the theory to be tested, the data to be used, expected results, and the plausibility of the identifying assumptions. An annotated literature review should accompany this research presentation.

The two presentation need not take place in that order and you are encouraged to present your research proposal earlier rather than later. We expect that all students solidify their research proposal early in the semester, and that all presentations of the research proposal take place no later than November 17. You are encouraged to visit our virtual office hours as early and as frequently as possible to discuss your research ideas and come with a viable research plan.

Grades and Responsibilities of Seminar Participants. Seminar participants are responsible for two presentations and associated written summaries/annotated bibliographies. Grades will be based on student's participation (20%), on class presentations (20%), and on the final research paper (60%). Undergraduate students in the class may (with prior instructor consent) opt for a final exam instead of a research paper.

Availability of Materials. We suggest purchasing used copies of most of these books on line. But we have ordered them through the bookstore also.

Achen and Bartels. *Democracy for Realists*. Princeton 2016.

- Cox, Gary. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge, 1997.
 Duch and Stevenson. *The Economic Voter*. Cambridge. 2008.
 Helmke, Gretchen. *Institutions on the Edge*. Cambridge 2016.
 Laver & Shepsle, *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge 1996.
 Tsebelis, George. *Veto Players*. Cambridge 2002.

Required assigned chapters in other books will be available through Blackboard or distributed by email.

Sept. 1 Democratic Concepts

- Dahl, Robert. 1989. *Democracy & Its Critics*, Yale, chs. 6-8, 15.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation," *APSR* 97:515-528.
- Weingast, Barry R. 1997. "The Political Foundation of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *American Political Science Review* 91 (2): 245-63.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Aristotle. *Politics*. Books IV and VI <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.3.three>
 Schedler, Andreas. 2002. "Menu of Manipulation," *Journal of Democracy* April.

Sept. 8 Parties, Party Systems as Democratic Linkages

- Aldrich, John. 1995. *Why Parties?*, Ch 1-2.
- Powell, G. Bingham. 2019. *Ideological Representation: Achieved and Astray*, Cambridge. Ch. 1.
- *Achen, Christopher & Larry Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton: Ch. 1, 2.
- Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, et al., 2013. *Brokers, Voters and Clientelism*, Chs. 1, 3, 7, 8.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Kitschelt, Herbert & Daniel Kselman, 2013. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46: 1453-1484.
 Kraymon & Posner 2013. "Who Benefits..." *Perspectives on Politics*.

Sept. 15 Shaping Party Systems 1: Electoral Rules & Cleavages

- * Cox, Gary. *Making Votes Count* . 1997, Esp. Ch 1-4,7-8,10-12,15 (A two-part discussion.)
- Fujiwara. 2011. "A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 6: 197-233.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. *Commerce & Coalitions*, Ch. 1

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Lijphart et al. 1994. Electoral Systems...
- Riker, William. 1982. "Two-Party Systems & Duverger's Law" *APSR*.
- Moser & Scheiner, 2012. Electoral Systems,
- Shugart and Taagepera, Votes from Seats 2018
- Ferree, Karen. 2012. "How Fluid is Fluid? Ethnic Demography and Electoral Volatility in Africa" in Chandra, Kanchan, ed. Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics. Oxford University Press.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2017. "Populism & Economics of Globalization" NBER working paper .
- Lipset, S.M. & Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems & Voter Alignments, pp. 1-64.
- Posner, Daniel. 2004. "Political Salience of Cultural Differences," *APSR* Nov..

Sept. 22 Shaping Party Systems 2: Cleavages & Election Rules

- Boix "Setting the Rules" *APSR*, 1999.
- Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. "The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation: Partisan Biases and Electoral Regime Change under Increasing Party Competition." *World Politics* 61 (2): 254-295.
- Leeman, Lucas and Isabela Mares. 2014. "The Adoption of Proportional Representation." *Journal of Politics* 76(2), 461-478.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Benoit, Kenneth. 2007. "Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10: 363-390.

Sept. 29 Party Competition & Party Positioning

- Downs, Anthony. 1957. Economic Theory of Democracy, Ch. 7-8.
- Cox, Gary W. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 903-35.
- Meguid, Bonnie. 2005. "Competition among Unequals...." *APSR* Aug.
- Schofield, Norman & Itai Sened, 2006. Multiparty Democracy, Ch. 1,2,4, 9,

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Calvo and Hellwig "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems" *AJPS*
- Hicken, Allen. 2009. Building Party Systems, ch. 2,3.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties & Party Systems, Ch. 6.
- Groffman, Bernie. 2004. "Downs." *Annual Reviews of Political Science*.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2005. "Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99.3 : 315.

- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot." *APSR 102* : 19-31.

Oct 6 Policymaking Institutions 1: Parliamentary Government Formation (Comparative Manifesto Project)

- *Laver, Michel & Kenneth Shepsle. 1996. Making & Breaking Governments, Chapters 4,5,7-9
- Baron "Spatial Bargaining Theory" *APSR* March 1991.
- Martin, Lanny & Randolph Stevenson. 2001. "Government Formation," *AJPS*,

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Budge, Ian, et al. 2001. Mapping Policy Preferences.
- Laver & Schofield, Multiparty Government, 1990.
- Martin & Stevenson, Effect of Incumbency, *APSR* 2010.
- Volden, Craig, and Clifford J. Carrubba. 2004. "The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 521-37.
- Warwick PV, Druckman JN. 2006. "The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship," *EJPR*, 45(4): 635-65.

Oct 13 Policymaking Institutions 2: Government survival and termination

- Lupia and Strom (1995). "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, no. 3: 648-669.
- Schleiter, P. and E. Morgan-Jones. 2009. "Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets," *American Political Science Review*, 103(3): 496-512.
- Smith A. 2003. "Election Timing In Majoritarian Parliaments," *British Journal of Political Science*, 33(3): 397-418.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Diermeier & Stevenson, "Cab terminations" *APSR* 3 2000.
- Warwick P. 1992. "Economic-Trends and Government Survival In West European Parliamentary Democracies," *American Political Science Review*, 86(4): 875-887.
- Kayser M. 2004. "Who surfs who manipulates" *APSR*.

Oct 20 Policymaking Institutions 3: Legislative Institutions, Coalitions

- Martin, Lanny & Georg Vanberg, Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance. Oxford University Press 2011. Ch. xxx
- Fortunato, David. 2019. "Legislative Review and Party Differentiation in Coalition Governments" *American Political Science Review* 113: 242-247.
- Huber, John D. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 90 (2): 269-282.
- Daniel Diermeier and Timothy Feddersen, 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure," *American Political Science Review*, 92: 611- 621.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 81, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 85-104

Oct 27 Policymaking Institutions 4: Divided Power, Presidentialism, & Federalism

- *Tsebelis, Veto Players Princeton 2002., esp. ch1-4, 6-9
- * Helmke, Institutions on the Edge, ch
- Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Barry R. Weingast, "Self-Enforcing Federalism," in *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 2005 21:103-135.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Erik Wibbels, "Madison in Baghdad?: Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 9: 165-188.
- Barry R. Weingast, "The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional Perspective," in Claude Menard and Mary M. Shirley (eds.) *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005.
- Shugart & Carey Presidents and Assemblies Ch.
- Chibber & Kollman Formation of National Party Systems, ch.
- Elkins and Ginsberg. 2009. *The Endurance of National Constitutions*. Cambridge.

Nov. 3: Policy making Institutions 5: Courts & Bureaucracy

- Huber JD, Shipan CR, Pfahler M. 2001. "Legislatures and statutory control of bureaucracy," *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(2): 330-345.

- Hanssen Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence? [American Economic Review](#)
- *Tsebelis, Veto Players Princeton 2002., esp. chs. 6, 10.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Ramseyer, J. 1994. “The Puzzling (In)dependence of courts - A comparative approach” *Journal of Legal Studies*, 23(2): 721-747.

Nov. 10 Citizen Behavior 1: Programmatic Responses (Ideology, strategic voting, partisan shortcuts) (CSES Election Studies)

- *Achen & Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists, ch 4-6
- Bargsted and Kedar. “Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation.” *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2): 307-323.
- Jörg L.Spenkuch. 2018. “Expressive vs. strategic voters: An empirical assessment.” *Journal of Public Economics* Volume 165, September Pp 73-81.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Dalton, Russell, David Farrell & Ian McAllister. 2011. Political Parties and Democratic Linkages, ch 1-4.
- Downs, 1957. Economic Theory of Democracy. Ch. Xxx
- Kedar. 2005. When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections, *APSR*. Volume 99, Issue 2 May 2005 , pp. 185-199
- Rabinowitz & McDonald “Directional Theory of Issue Voting,” *APSR* 1989.
- Quinn, “Voter Choice...” *AJPS* 1999 43:4

Nov. 17 Citizen Behavior 2: Retrospective Evaluation

- *Duch & Stevenson, The Economic Voter 2008, Ch. 1-4,7,9
- Samuels, “Presidentialism & Eco Voting” *APSR*, Aug 2004
- Kayser & Peress. “Benchmarking across Borders,” *APSR* 2012.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Kayser & Wleziën “Performance Pressure” *EJPR* 2011

- Nichter & Peress, “Request Fulfilling:....,” *CPS* 50(8) 2017

All Research Proposal presentations must be delivered by Nov. 17.

Nov. 24 THANKSGIVING WEEK NO NEW ASSIGNMENTS

**Dec. 1 Citizen Behavior 3: When Can Citizens Use Elections?
(World Values)**

- *Achen and Bartels, 2016. Democracy for Realists, Ch. 7-11
- Fortunato, et al. 2016. “Context and Political Knowledge.” *JOP* 78: 1211-1228.
- Fortunato, David. 2017. “Electoral Implications of Coalition Policymaking,” *BJPS*.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Clarke, et al. 2017. “Why Britain Voted for Brexit.” *Parliamentary Affairs* 70:439-464..

Dec. 8 Responsiveness and Representation

- Powell, G. Bingham. 2019. Ideological Representation, ch 3, 9.
- Thompson, et al. 2017. “The Fulfillment of Parties Election Pledges.” *AJPS* 61:527-542.
- Stokes, Susan. 2001. Mandates & Democracy, Ch. 1.

OPTIONAL SUGGESTIONS:

- Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy. ch 1.
- Crisp, et al., 2020. The Chain of Representation: Preferences, Institutions and Policy in Presidential Systems. Cambridge.
- Pettersson-Lidbom “Do Parties Matter?” *JofEEA* S
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work.
- Folke, O. 2014. “Shades of Brown and Green: Party Effects In Proportional Election Systems,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 12(5): 1361–1395.

Papers are due on Friday December 11.