

**Political Science 372/572: Field Seminar in International Relations  
Friday 9:30-12:00, Fenno Room (Harkness 329)**

Bethany Lacina  
Harkness Hall 322  
273-5840  
[blacina@ur.rochester.edu](mailto:blacina@ur.rochester.edu)

Randall Stone  
Harkness Hall 321  
273-4761  
[randall.stone@rochester.edu](mailto:randall.stone@rochester.edu)

**Purpose of the course:** This is an advanced course intended to prepare Ph.D. students for comprehensive exams in international relations. The course conducts a broad survey of major works in the field and current research into the causes of international conflict and cooperation.

**Course Requirements:** This is a seminar with a heavy reading load, and it is essential to complete the required reading. Students are expected to write short (no more than 2-page) papers critiquing the assigned readings for each week following week 1, due Thursday at noon. The lowest two grades will be dropped. There will be a 24-hour take-home final exam, due Friday, May 5 at 5:00 pm. Grading will be as follows: 1/3 class participation, 1/3 the average of the papers, and 1/3 final.

**Readings:** The papers and some book chapters will be in folders in the cubby hole on the third floor, if they aren't available through JSTOR. We recommend purchasing the books below through Amazon.com.

Fortna, Virginia Page. *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008).

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).

Kydd, Andrew H. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Krasner, Stephen. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lake, David A. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilich. 1917. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

Powell, Robert. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Schelling, Thomas. *The Strategy of Conflict*. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960).

Spruyt, Hendrik. 2005. *Ending Empire*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Stone, Randall W. *Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002).

Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.)

Waltz, Kenneth. *A Theory of International Politics*. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

### **Course Outline:**

***Friday, Jan. 20: Introduction to the course***

#### **Week One**

***Friday, Jan 27: Realism and its critics***

Waltz, Kenneth. *A Theory of International Politics*. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977, 2nd. ed., 1989). Parts I and V (pp. 3-60, 245-82).

#### **Week Two**

***Friday, Feb. 3: Open Economy Politics***

Gourevitch, Peter. The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics. *International Organization* 32 (Autumn 1978): 881-912.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *The American Political Science Review*, 81(4): 1121–1137.

Frieden, Jeffrey A., and Ronald Rogowski. The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview. In Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. Protection for Sale. *The American Economic Review*, 84 (4) (Sept., 1994), pp. 833-850.

Lake, David A. 2009. Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. *The Review of International Organizations*. 4 (3): 219 – 244.

Peters, Margaret E. 2015. Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization. *World Politics*, 67 (1): 114-154.

Jensen, J. B., Quinn, D. P. & Weymouth, S. 2015. The influence of firm global supply chains and foreign currency undervaluations on US trade disputes. *International Organization* 69 (04): 913–947.

### **Week Three**

#### ***Friday, Feb. 10: Institutions & Transaction Costs***

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984). Chpts. 1-7, 11.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4) (Autumn 2001).

Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. *International Organization* 54 (3) (Summer 2000): 421-56.

Keohane, Robert O., and David Victor. The Regime Complex for Climate Change. *Perspectives on Politics* (March 2011).

### **Week Four**

#### ***Friday, Feb. 17: International Organizations***

Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization* Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 1999): 699-732.

#### ***Friday, Feb. 24: Constructivism and International Organizations***

Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization* Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 1999): 699-732.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." *International organization* 46.02 (1992): 391-425.

Nelson, Stephen C. "Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF's Lending Decisions." *International Organization* 68, 2 (2014): 297-328.

Weaver, Catherine. Chapter 2, "The World Bank Hypocrisy Trap," in *Hypocrisy trap: The World Bank and the poverty of reform*. Princeton University Press, 2008.

Woods, Ngaire. Chapter 2, "The Globalizing Mission," in *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. Chapter 2, "Normative Change from Within," in *Capital Ideas*, Princeton University Press, 2009.

Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization* 66 (Fall): 537-69.

## **Week Five**

### ***Friday, March 3: Sovereignty and Hierarchy***

Krasner, Stephen. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lake, David A. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

## **Week Six**

### ***Friday, Mar. 10: Imperialism***

Lenin, Vladimir Ilich. 1917. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

Doyle, Michael. *Empires*. (New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986). pp. 19-47, 123-61, 232-305.

Spruyt, Hendrik. 2005. *Ending Empire*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Introduction, Chpts. 1-4, 7, Conclusion.

### ***Friday, Mar. 17: No class (Spring Break)***

## **Week Seven**

### ***Friday, Mar. 24: Delegation & Principal-Agent Problems***

Vaubel, Roland. A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. *Public Choice* 51 (1986): 39-57.

Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. Delegation under Anarchy.... In Hawkins et al., eds. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006.

Stone, Randall. *Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996). Chapters 1-3, 7.

Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2) (Spring): 241-76.

Byman, Daniel and Sarah E. Kreps. (2010). Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism. *International Studies Perspectives* 11 (1), 1-18.

McKoy, Michael K. and Michael K. Miller. (2012). The Patron's Dilemma: The Dynamics of Foreign-Supported Democratization. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (5), 904-932.

## **Week Eight**

### ***Friday, Mar. 31: Credibility***

Stone, Randall W. *Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002). Chapters 1-4, 6, 9.

Powell, Robert. Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD. *American Political Science Review* 81, No. 3 (September 1987): 717-37.

Martin, Lisa L. Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions. *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Apr., 1993), pp. 406-432.

Fortna, Virginia Page. *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008). Chapters 1, 4-7.

## **Week Nine**

### ***Friday, April 7: Bargaining***

Schelling, Thomas. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960. Chpts. 1-3.

Fearon, James D. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.

Powell, Robert. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Fey, Mark, and Kristopher Ramsay. Mutual Optimism and War. *American Journal of Political Science*. 51(4) (2007): 738-754.

## **Week Ten**

### ***Friday, April 14: Reputation***

Kydd, Andrew H. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. Chapters 1-4, 7, 8.

Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Chpts. 8, 10.

Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Part I (pp. 3-113).

Walter, Barbara. Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists But Not Others. *American Journal of Political Science*. (Spring 2006).

## **Week Eleven**

### ***Friday, Apr. 21: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining***

Putnam, Robert D. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. *International Organization* 42 (3) (Summer 1988): 427-61.

Fearon, James D. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88 (Sept. 1994): 577-92.

Schultz, Kenneth. Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises. *American Political Science Review* 92 (Dec. 1998): 829-44.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade. *American Political Science Review* 94 (2) (June 2000): 305-22.

Weeks, Jessica. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization*. (Winter 2008).

Mousseau, Michael. The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It's the Economy. *International Studies Quarterly* (March 2013).

Dafoe, Allan, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett. The Democratic Peace: Weighing the Evidence and Cautious Inference. *International Studies Quarterly* (March 2013).

## **Week Twelve**

### ***Friday, April 28: Global Domestic Politics***

Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization* 66 (Fall): 537-69.

Kelley, Judith. 2007. Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-surrender Agreements. *American Political Science Review* 101 (3) (August): 573-589.

Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara Walter. 2002. Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence. *International Organization*. Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring).

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62 (Fall): 689-716.

Voeten, Eric. 2008. The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights. *American Political Science Review* 102(4) (November): 417-433.

Mansfield, Edward D., and John C. Pevehouse. 2006. Democratization and International Organizations. *International Organization* 60 (1): 137-67.

### **Friday, May 5: Final Exam Due**