
PSC 576

Modeling International Conflict

Spring 2003
2pm-4:40 Thursday
Harkness 303

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PURPOSE: This course is intended for advanced graduate students interested in formal and quantitative analysis of international conflict. It pulls together various techniques for such analysis and applies those techniques in a systematic manner to issues in international conflict. Particular attention will be paid to formalizing theories of conflict and then testing those theories with statistical models derived from the formalizations. The goal will be for students to (1) derive or prove results presented by the various authors, (2) identify contributions made by the authors, and (3) identify ways to improve upon the research. Because the course involves the application of game-theoretic and statistical techniques, students must have completed graduate courses in (1) mathematical statistics, (2) introductory econometrics, and (3) introductory game theory.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS: There are two requirements for this course: a research paper (70%) and weekly presentations of articles (30%). The main requirement is a 20-30 page paper, which must be original research, single authored, and on a topic that is consistent with the course. The final paper will be due the first day of class of the Fall semester.

In addition to the paper, each week each student will be responsible for presenting and critiquing one of the articles below. The presentation should consist of (1) a summary of the article's main points, (2) proofs or derivations of technical results, and (3) a critique of the paper. Overhead transparencies are not required. However, handouts should be provided for everyone in the class.

READINGS: Almost all of the readings are articles. Many are available on JSTOR. Readings will be assigned two weeks in advance. For an article not available on JSTOR, the student presenting it is also responsible for ensuring the rest of the class has access to it a week in advance.

COURSE SCHEDULE:

1. Organizational Meeting

2. Rational Choice and International Relations

- Walt, Steven. Spring 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis". *IS*.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and James Morrow. Fall 1999. "Sorting through the wealth of notions". *IS*. 24(2).

- Martin, Lisa. Fall 1999. "The contributions of rational choice: a defense of pluralism". *IS*. 24(2).
- Niou, Emerson and Peter Ordeshook. Fall 1999. "Return of the Luddites". *IS*. 24(2).
- Powell, Robert. Fall 1999. "The modeling enterprise and security studies". *IS*. 24(2).
- Zagare, Frank C. Fall 1999. "All mortis, no rigor". *IS*. 24(2).
- Walt, Stephen. Fall 1999. "A modeling disagreement". *IS*. 24(2).

3. Models and Empirical Testing

- Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz and Richard Tucker. 1998. "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable" (in Workshop). *AJPS*. 42(4).
- Beck, Neal, Gary King and Lengche Zeng. 2000. "Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture." *APSR*. 94(1).
- Reed, William. 2000. "A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation." *AJPS*. 44(1).
- Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict" *APSR*.
- Signorino, Curtis S. 2000. "Theoretical Sources of Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models"
- Signorino, Curtis S. and Kuzey Yilmaz. 2003. "Strategic Misspecification in Regression Models." *AJPS*. Forthcoming.
- Smith, Alastair. 1999. "Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation" (in Workshop). *AJPS*. 43(4).

4. Balance of Power

- Brito, Dagobert and Michael Intriligator. 1996. "Proliferation and the probability of war: a cardinality theorem". *JCR*. Vol. 40 no. 1.
- Niou, Emerson and Peter Ordeshook. 1987. "Preventive War and the Balance of Power." *JCR*. 31(3).
- Niou, Emerson and Peter Ordeshook. 1990. "Stability in Anarchic International Systems." *APSR*. 84(4).
- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Stability and the Distribution of Power". *World Politics*.
- Wagner, Harrison. 1986. "The Theory of Games and Balance of Power." *World Politics*. 38(4).
- Wagner, Harrison. 1994. "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power." *APSR*. 88(3).

5. Alliances

- Fink, Humes and Schwebach. 1997. "The Size Principal and the Strategic Basis of an Alliance." *II*. 22(3).
- Gartner, Scott and Randolph Siverson. 1996. "War expansion and war outcome". *JCR*. Vol. 40 no.1.
- Morrow, James. 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs." *JCR*. 38(2):270–97.
- Niou, Emerson and Peter Ordeshook. 1994. "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems." *ISQ*. 38(2).
- Signorino, Curtis S. and Jeffrey M. Ritter. 1999. "Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions." *ISQ*. 43(1).
- Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *ISQ*. 39(4).
- Smith, Alastair. 1996. "To Intervene or Not to Intervene." *JCR*. 40(1).
- Smith, Alastair. 1998. "Extended deterrence and alliance formation". *II*. Vol. 24, no. 4. (Note: Be careful of typos.)
- Sorokin, Gerald. 1994. "Alliance formation and general deterrence: a game theoretic model and the case of Israel." *JCR*. Vol. 38, no. 2.

6. Power Transition

- Fearon, James. "Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power." forthcoming.
- Kim, Woosang and James Morrow. 1992. "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" *AJPS*. 36(4).
- Organski, Kenneth and Jacek Kugler. 1993. "The Power Transition." in Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*.
- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement." *APSR*. 90(4):749–764.
- Powell, Robert. 1999. Chapter 4, "Bargaining in the Shadow of Shifting Power." *In the Shadow of Power*. Princeton.

7. Deterrence and Escalation

- Fearon, James. 1994. "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests." *JCR*. 38(2).
- Kilgour, Marc and Frank C. Zagare. 1991. "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence." *AJPS*. 35(2).
- Nalebuff. 1986. "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World." *World Politics*. 43(April).

- Signorino, Curtis S. and Ahmer Tarar. 2000. "A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence."
- Zagare, Frank C. 1990. "Rationality and Deterrence." *World Politics*. 42(2).
- Zagare Frank C. and Marc Kilgour. 1993. "Asymmetric Deterrence." *ISQ*. 37(1).
- Zagare, Frank C. and D. Marc Kilgour. 1995. "Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of "Flexible Response." *World Politics*. 47(3).

8. Bargaining and War

- Banks, Jeff. 1990. "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games." *AJPS*. 34(3).
- Farrell and Gibbons. 1989. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining." *Journal of Economic Theory*. 48(1).
- Fearon, James. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *IO*. 49(3).
- Sartori, Anne. 2002. "A Reputational Theory of Communication in Disputes." *IO*. 56(1).
- Gartzke, Erik. Summer 1999. "War is the Error Term". *IO*.
- Morrow, James. 1989. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve." *AJPS*. 33(4).
- Powell, Robert. 1987. "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD." *APSR*. 81(3).
- Powell, Robert. 1988. "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information." *APSR*. 82(March):155–178.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War". *AJPS*. Vol. 44, no. 3.

9. Cooperation, pt I

- Axelrod, Robert. 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." *APSR*. 80(4).
- Bendor, Jonathan and Mookherjee. 1990. "Norms, Third Party Sanctions, and Cooperation." *JLEO*. 6(1).
- Bendor, Jonathan. 1993. "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation." *JCR*. 37(4).
- Cederman, Lars-Erik. 2001. "Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Selection Process." *JCR*. 45(4).
- Langlois, Catherine and Jean-Pierre Langlois. 1999. "Behavioral issues of rationality in international interaction: a game theoretic analysis". *JCR*. 43(5).
- Signorino, Curtis S. 1996. "Simulating International Cooperation Under Uncertainty." *JCR*. 40(1).
- Stone, Randall. 2001. "The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations: The Theory of Moves." *JCR*. 45(2). See also response by Brams.

10. Cooperation, pt II

- Fearon, James. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation". *IO*. 52(2).
- Kydd, Andrew. 1997. "Game theory and the spiral model". *World Politics*.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2000. "Trust, reassurance, and cooperation". *IO*. 54(2).
- Morrow, James. 1997. "When do relative gains impede trade?". *JCR*. 41(1).
- Schneider, Gerald and Lars-Erik Cederman. 1994. "The change of tide in political cooperation: a limited information model of European integration". *II*. Summer.
- Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *American Political Science Review*. 95(4).

11. Domestic Politics, pt I

- Iida, Keisuke. 1993. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?" *JCR*. 37(3).
- Mo, Jongryn. 1994. "Two-level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions." *JCR*. 38(3).
- Mo, Jongryn. 1995. "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games." *APSR*. 89(4).
- Tarar, Ahmer. 2001. "International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints." *JCR*. 45(3).

12. Domestic Politics, pt II

- Downs, George and David M. Rocke. 1994. "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection." *AJPS*. 38(2).
- Fearon, James. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *APSR*. 88(3).
- Fearon, James. 1997. "Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs". *JCR*. Vol. 41, no.1.
- Kilgour, Marc. 1991. "Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior." *JCR*. 35(2).
- Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie Campbell. 1991. "Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War." *JCR*.
- Richards, Diana, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick Wilson, Valerie Schebach, and Gary Young. 1993. "Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: a tale of some not-so-free agents". *JCR*. Vol. 37, no. 3.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. "Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises". *APSR*. 92(4).
- Smith, Alstair. 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics". *APSR*. 92(3).

13. Domestic Politics, pt III

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph Silverson. "War and the survival of political leaders: a comparative study of regime types and political accountability". *APSR*. 89(4).
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James Morrow, Randolph Silverson, and Alstair Smith. 1999. "An institutional explanation of the democratic peace". *APSR*. 93(4).
- Gowa, Joanne. Spring 1998. "Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad". *IO*.
- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1992. "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace." *APSR*. 87(3):624–38.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War". *IO*. Spring.

14. International Political Economy

- Downs, George, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. 1998. *IO*. Spring.
- Gawande, Kishor and Wendy Hansen. 1999. "Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of 'Free and Fare' Trade". *IO*. Winter.
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1997. "Linkage Politics". *JCR*. 41(1).
- Milner, Helen and Peter Rosendorff. 1997. "Domestic politics and international trade negotiations: elections and divided government as constraints on trade liberalization". *JCR*. 41(1).
- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *IO*. 55(4).
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *IO*. 56(3).
- Pahre, Robert. 1998. "Reactions and reciprocity: tariffs and trade liberalization from 1815 to 1914". *JCR*. 42(4).
- Reuveny, Rafael and John Maxwell. 1998. "Free trade and arms races". *JCR*. 42(6).