

The One Thing You Need to Know about American Politics by the Numbers

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There is, I'm sure you've noticed, a certain sameness to these titles for all the papers in this conference. What is the one thing you need to know about American politics by the numbers? The other authors will no doubt be far more successfully single-minded than I, but I think that the title is a bit of a tease and somewhat misleading. You might take it to be asking what single thing do we really, really need to know about understanding American Politics by the numbers. What one piece of data trumps all others, which one fact holds the key to unlocking understanding? There are candidates for such, but each ultimately reveals the inadequacy of considering any one the be-all-and-end-all.

If we really had a single thing to tell and teach in American Politics, our job would be a simple and more easily doable. It's not.

My answer to the challenge posed by the title is an attitude toward learning and seeking through a reliance on data, not a decisive fact or piece of objective knowledge uncovered through numbers. This approach to learning is not unique to the use of data. Encouraging questions, revising and refining understanding by realizing the questions are perhaps more important than the answers—this approach has broad applicability in education. In this paper I will discuss aspects of this approach and the reliance on data in undergraduate courses. Then extended

consideration will be given to Hispanic political mobilization, recent and ongoing, to illustrate this approach.

This paper does not raise the related questions of more involved statistical analysis, sticking instead to what can be done with data displays of rather simple numbers—percentages, ratios, medians, averages, and such—to advance our understanding of American politics. A similar effort could be made for other subfields such as international relations or comparative politics. American politics is the focus of this paper, not the limits of its applicability.

Humility inhibits my natural tendency to reach deep into *Vital Statistics on American Politics 2007-2008* for all the examples and illustrations needed.¹ I leave that as an enjoyable task for the reader. Affecting a more broad-minded approach, I'll reach out to examples by others. (This will make it easier to be critical.)

Using numbers to understand American politics is a never-ending task and quest. The data that effectively address a particular question do not produce arrivals at decisive destinations so much as opportunities to pose follow-up questions, to probe deeper, to find out more, to ask about relationships whose importance was previously hidden from view. My attempts to teach American politics over the past 29-and-a-half years at the University of Rochester and Southern Methodist University drive home this point.

In my presidential elections class I recently drew on a report from the Project for Excellence in Journalism about media coverage of the presidential election so far.² Students in late October

¹ Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, *Vital Statistics on American Politics 2007-2008* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008).

² “The Invisible Primary—Invisible No Longer: A First Look at Coverage of the 2008 Presidential Campaign,” October 2007, http://journalism.org/files/The%20Early%20Campaign%20FINAL_0.pdf.

pressed hard that the study examined only the first five months of the year. Much had taken place since May and the contests for the nomination seemed to have differing aspects. Even accepting the report as accurate for the time period, curiosity was heightened about what a longer, up-to-date study would reflect.

Doing American politics by the numbers is data-reliant, display rich. The proper answer to a question leads to other questions and that's okay. Students need to know that. The result should be not confusion but questioning, more of a process than a product. This approach is true to the spirit of inquiry and not the same as a persistent pestering or resistance to knowing anything by questions suggesting we know nothing. There are appropriate answers to questions but these raise other questions. This process of gaining knowledge leads to wondering more.

But what about questions with straightforward answers with seemingly indisputable numbers? How many electoral votes did George W. Bush win in 2004 has a right answer—286. But that right answer raises others. Compared to what? So what? Context and significance turn on other facts. Bush's electoral vote total was over 270, so he won, that's important to note. For an incumbent seeking reelection, was the margin of victory one of the closest presidential elections? What slight changes in the popular vote in which states would have led to a John Kerry win?

Questions about data are inherent. Whatever the data discussed, there is the inevitable come-back, "Compared to what?" Data, by its nature, demands comparison and contrast. No single perspective suffices. We can share data from the latest poll on presidential job approval of President Bush (it's low), or Congress (it's even lower), or the trial heats for the Republican or Democratic presidential nomination (Clinton looks inevitable, Giuliani holds a surprisingly

durable lead) or the 2008 presidential general elections (Clinton by a bit for now) but the curious question comes, what have other polls shown? How do these compare? How has this changed, if at all, since the last round of polls? More generally, how does this compare to presidential nomination and general election contests in previous years? How does this compare to other presidents in the next-to-last year of their second term?

Critical questioning is valuable up to a point, but it can be overdone. Too much of a good thing can be bad. Some students use questions that can be raised about data displays to remain agnostic and cynical, jaded to the possibility of knowing anything through a consideration of data. Questioning is good, curiosity great. Snap disbelief followed by persistent resistance is not a helpful attitude. This goes too far.

This data analysis is worth doing even though questions remain and the seemingly ceaseless questing has to be stopped rather than finished. In a fundamental sense the quest is never done. When the process stops, when the clock runs out, questions remain. Yet the approach is worthwhile even if important questions remain. The advance in our understanding is real and appreciable. The unanswered questions can be answered and, in the process, raise more questions. The glass may be half empty but it's also half full and we all too easily lose sight of that as our curiosity raises questions about what we do not know.

Every quest begins with questions. What you need to know depends on the questions being asked. The Iraq War has led to signs you may have seen in yards and on automobile bumpers—"War is not the answer." To which I wonder, what's the question? "Raw" spelled backwards is what? Well, war is the answer there.

Many students resist doing American politics by the numbers. Statistics have a bad rap. It's oft repeated claim that there are lies, damn lies, and statistics. More charitably, another common observation holds that figures don't lie but liars can figure.

Undergraduates all too often overlook tables and figures. Tables and figures are met with some relief by students—that's another page they don't have to read. And they have developed that attitude with good reason. Many introductory American government textbooks treat tables and figures as similar to those glossy photographs throughout the texts—something essential for the cutesy layout. Undergraduates quite rightly figure that if the table or figure is discussed in the text, they need not bother with trying to make more sense of it on their own. And if the table or figure is not discussed in the text, it's just another colorful piece of the layout whose content is not worth troubling with.

Students often, despite our best efforts, muddle along alone, and the rewards of a reliance on figuring out data displays are not always evident—will-this-be-on-the-test? Some students have difficulty following numbers, preferring more easily digested words. Simple confusion over row and column percentages can wreck understanding. Some authors are needlessly complex. Sometimes statistics require additional training and education, certainly to produce, but even to consume. In times of such political polarization and spin, students see everyone has their talking points and statistics to prove them. Understandably, after a time, a certain numbness sets in.

Well-honed data, in an important sense, answers questions even as it leads to others. This is not a failing but an admirable feature of a data-intensive approach. Students need help in learning how to question data. A series of first steps, rules of thumb, could be useful to make sense of tables and figures. An excellent starting point is the *Statistical Abstract*. The two-page "Guide to

Tabular Presentation” (attached) presented there is a helpfully lucid reminder of how to help people read tables. We would do well to remind ourselves of the need to make what may seem obvious to us more so to others.

I favor what I call “face intelligibility.” Ideally, tables and figures exhibit “face intelligibility.” If a table or figure does not have this, it is up to the reader to fix the problem.

What do I mean by “face intelligibility?” Tables or figures should be interpretable on their face. Titles, notes, and format should provide the reader with what is needed to read the table intelligently. If space becomes a problem, notes should at least refer to where the reader can find the additional information needed.

Earl Black and Merle Black have a fine work focusing on the emergence of southern Republicans in Congress over the past several decades.³ And the book has been required reading in my southern politics course for the past four years. The Blacks illustrate their work with about forty elegant tables and figures that get to the heart of their insights. Harvard University Press let the authors and the readers down by not including a listing of these tables and figures in the table of contents, but the careful reader, with some tedium can make his own. I did.

Great though these figures are, they lack “face intelligibility.” For example, consider Figure 1.6, tracing the prominence of conservative Democrats and Republicans in the southern delegation between 1952 and 1998. (attached) But who is a conservative Democrat? The figure provides no clue and the surrounding text is silent. The definition comes 32 pages later and again in the endnotes (page 412, note 49). Or, another example, Figure 2.2. (attached) “Forfeits” presumably follows the dictionary definition but the dividing line between serious and token

³ Earl Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

competition is not noted in the figure. Two text pages later the dividing line is given—getting less than 40 percent of the vote makes a candidate token, getting 60 percent or more makes the seat safe. Other examples could be given (such as Figure 2.4, page 68; Figure 12.3, page 376), but these are elegant figures whose interpretation and readability could be enhanced by noting the definition of terms used in the figures. Even if the surrounding text gives the needed notes for concepts in the graphic, the later use of those same concepts in subsequent graphics poses perils for the reader who dips back into the book later. The book is a remarkable one and I insist that my students study the figures and tables because they effectively encapsulate the essence of the book.

I was so enamored of the data-rich displays that four years ago, I gave my southern politics students a test composed entirely of ten figures and tables from the book and asked students, not to convey literally what the graphic contained, but to discuss knowledgeably the trends reflected in the graphics and their context. I was almost lynched. Even though I thought substantial class time had been given over to interpreting tables and figures, they felt they could not rise to the occasion—this was not an exam that let them put their best foot forward. I think next semester, just for variety, I will teach the book with an even heavier reliance on the book's graphics and tell them from the start that the test will ask them to interpret tables and figures to show a mastery of the reading. We'll see how that goes.

Several of these points might best be illustrated with a sustained example. Hispanic political mobilization in the U.S. provides an excellent example of the potential of data and simple arithmetic manipulation. To keep the example straightforward, only two groups, Hispanics and non-Hispanics, will be considered. The Census Bureau Current Population Report on registration

and voting provides most of the data needed. For this illustration, the 2004 presidential election, a peak turnout point for Hispanics as well as non-Hispanics, will be used.⁴

To preview the discussion: the Hispanic population share is surging. The Hispanic voter share is growing as well, but not to the extent one expects in light of the growth in Hispanic population share. Why is that? The reasons for this Hispanic gap between vote shares and population shares are straightforward: compared to non-Hispanics, proportionately more Hispanics are not citizens and proportionately more Hispanics are too young to vote. But even once we control for citizenship status and age, Hispanic voter registration and turnout still lag behind that of non-Hispanics, raising additional questions for exploration.

Hispanic population growth in the U.S. has gained substantial attention in recent years. The rapid rise, greater dispersion, and projections of even greater growth underscore the importance of understanding the political significance of this group. Both parties have courted Hispanics and the issue of immigration seems likely to scramble politics farther for the foreseeable future.

The total Hispanic population was 9 million in 1970, but rose to almost 43 million in 2006. In percentage terms, the Hispanic population increased from 4.46 percent of the national population in 1970 to 14.69 percent in 2006.⁵ Census Bureau projections predict strong increases

⁴ U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2004, Current Population Report P20-556, Washington, D.C., March 2006 <http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting.html>. For the mid-term election of 2006, see Pew Hispanic Center, "The Latino Electorate: An Analysis of the 2006 Election" <http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/34.pdf>

⁵ 1970: Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 To 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States, Population Division Working Paper No. 56, U.S. Census Bureau Washington, D.C., September 2002; 2006: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2006, Ethnicity and Ancestry Statistics Branch, Population Division, Internet release date: 10-05-2007.

to continue: by 2050, Hispanics will number 102.6 million or 24.43% of the projected total population.⁶

Yet growth in the Hispanic population has far outpaced the growth in Hispanic voters. In recent elections the media have repeatedly rediscovered the potential Hispanic voter as a difference-maker. But these high expectations are repeatedly dashed as Hispanic political mobilization nudges rather than surges upward.

Figure 1 vividly displays the divergence between increase in Hispanic population and the much lower increase in Hispanic voters. Hispanic voters at the polls, 2.1 million in 1972, increased to 7.6 million in the presidential election of 2004 while the total Hispanic population rose from about 10 million to 41.4 million.⁷

Why is there this divergence between Hispanic in population and voters?

One reason is obvious—noncitizens make up a large proportion of the Hispanic population in the U.S. Many of these non-citizens are here legally, others are not. The Census Bureau questions individuals about citizenship status but does not determine whether noncitizens are in the country illegally. Census figures for 2006 establish that 60 percent of the Hispanic population

⁶ U.S. Census Bureau, "Census Bureau Projects Tripling of Hispanic and Asian Populations in 50 Years; Non-Hispanic Whites May Drop To Half of Total Population," March 18, 2004; <http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/001720.html>. Although recent Hispanic population gains have resulted from immigration (both legal and illegal), the years immediately ahead are ones in which the continuing Hispanic population growth will result less from immigration than child-bearing by U.S. Hispanic citizens. While first generation Hispanics (those born outside the U.S. who may be naturalized U.S. citizens, legal immigrants, or illegal immigrants) dominated the Hispanic population growth between 1970 and 2000, the second generation (U.S. citizens, born in the U.S. but with at least one foreign born parent who may be a naturalized U.S. citizen, legal immigrant, or illegal immigrant) is projected to dominate between 2000 and 2020. This rise of the second generation resulted from the high levels of immigration in the 1970s and 1980s. "The rise of the second generation is the result of births and immigration that have already taken place, and it is now an inexorable, undeniable demographic fact." Robert Suro and Jeffrey S. Passel, "The Rise of the Second Generation: Changing Patterns in Hispanic Population Growth," Pew Hispanic Center, October 14, 2003.

⁷ U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2004, Current Population Report P20-556, Washington, D.C., March 2006 and earlier versions of this biennial publication. The report on the 1972 election is the first giving information on Hispanics.

was born in the U.S., thus citizens. Another 10 percent of the Hispanic population was foreign-born but have become U.S. citizens through naturalization. The remaining 30 percent of Hispanics are foreign-born, non-U.S. citizens. Some in this thirty percent are here legally.

Estimates of what some call “unauthorized migrants,” and others call “illegal immigrants” vary, but Jeff Passell of the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that in March 2006 there were 11.5 to 12 million undocumented U.S. residents. Approximately 80 percent of them were Hispanic.⁸ This would suggest that in 2006 perhaps one-fourth of the Hispanic population was in the U.S. illegally.⁹

We can determine the effect a larger number of non-citizens among Hispanics has on Hispanic political mobilization with Census data on citizenship, but to simplify the presentation, consider a second reason for the gap between total population and voters among Hispanics—the younger age distribution of the Hispanic population. A larger proportion of Hispanics are under 18 than is the case for non-Hispanics—relatively more Hispanics are not yet old enough to vote.

As Table 1 reveals, the Census Bureau estimated the Hispanic population as over 41 million in July 2004. Hispanics 18 years old and over numbered just over 27 million, or 66.00 percent of all Hispanics. Non-Hispanics numbered over 252 million, of whom 193 million were of voting-age (76.52 percent). A smaller percentage of Hispanics relative to non-Hispanics is old enough to

⁸ Jeffrey S. Passell, "The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S. Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey, Pew Hispanic Center, March 7, 2006; www.pewhispanic.org. Jeffrey S. Passell, "Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S. Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey," Pew Hispanic Center, March 7, 2006; <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf>

⁹ We can note that by law citizens do not vote. Of course, law and practice can differ. Earl Black and Merle Black tell the story of one southern governor who approached the Mexican consulate after a presentation on the increasing presence of Mexicans in the U.S. with a desire to get this group more involved in politics and voting. The consulate noted that many of this new population were not citizens to which the governor is reported to have replied, “Not a problem!”

vote. This fact is reflected in the lower Hispanic share of the voting-age population (12.40 percent) compared to the Hispanic share of the total population (14.10 percent).¹⁰

This may seem self-correcting as young Hispanics age up. Yet even though that happens, new births keep the overall age distribution in the Hispanic population younger than in the non-Hispanic population.

What impact do differential citizenship rates have on Hispanic and non-Hispanic mobilization? Table 2 indicates that citizens make up only 59.30 percent of Hispanics of voting-age, contrasted with 95.94 percent of non-Hispanics, a huge differential.

Yet these non-citizenship rates and a younger age distribution do not explain all of the divergence between the size of the total population and the number of voters among Hispanics. Notice that after taking into account differential citizenship rates and age distribution, a sizable gap remains. Table 3 shows that lower registration and turnout rates among Hispanics compared to non-Hispanics make a substantial impact on Hispanic mobilization. An analysis of registration and turnout rates of the citizen voting-age population shows that Hispanics lag here as well. Hispanics registration equals 57.86 percent of the citizen voting-age population compared with 73.38 percent among non-Hispanics; 47.16 percent of the Hispanic citizen-voting age population voted in 2004, compared to 65.31 percent of the non-Hispanics.

¹⁰ Source: Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Table 2: Annual Estimates of the Population by Selected Age Groups and Sex for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006 (NC-EST2006-02) and Table 4: Annual Estimates of the Hispanic or Latino Population by Age and Sex for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006 (NC-EST2006-04-HISP); Release Dates: May 17, 2007; <http://www.census.gov/popest/national/index.html>. These population estimates differ slightly from those in the November 2004 Current Population Survey on voting and registration.

Slaloming through voting-age population shares, citizenship rates, registration rates and turnout rates drive home that at each of these points, Hispanic political mobilization suffers relative to non-Hispanics.

To appreciate that point more, start with an equal population of Hispanics and non-Hispanics, say 1,000 of each group, and apply the rates detailed above to determine how many voters are likely to result out of each population. The equal population of 1,000 becomes unequal as we factor in the more youthful Hispanic population, leaving 660 Hispanics of voting-age ($1,000 * .6600$) and 765 non-Hispanics ($1,000 * .7652$). The citizenship differential widens the inequality even more: 391 Hispanics ($660 * .593$) and 734 non-Hispanics. Registration rates reduce the numbers farther: 226 Hispanics ($391 * .5786$) and 539 non-Hispanics. Turnout rates produce 185 Hispanic voters ($226 * .8151$) and 479 non-Hispanic voters. Non-Hispanic voters outnumber Hispanic voters by over two-and-a-half times. Table 4 summarizes the analysis.

With nothing fancier than simple arithmetic, one could take Table 4, assume Hispanic rates matched non-Hispanic rates (or some other figure) for one or more dimensions, and calculate the difference such a change in a rate would make. The greatest difference in the Hispanic vote would be made by equal citizenship rates. With everything else left as it was, equalizing citizenship rates would yield 299 Hispanic voters. Equalizing registration rates would make the next largest impact, yielding 234 voters. Matching the non-Hispanic share of voting-age proportion would produce 214 Hispanic voters. Identical voter turnout rates would make the smallest difference, yielding 202 Hispanic voters.

What might explain these lower registration and turnout rates among Hispanics compared to non-Hispanics? Characteristics of Hispanics as a group are associated with lower turnout such as

relatively lower educational attainment, lower income, and shorter residency play a part and in a similar vein, simple arithmetic could explore these possibilities. But this should suffice for present purposes.

So far this process has raised questions, not simply resolved some. There are others to raise and explore. One can extend the analysis geographically (beneath the national to the state level) or in time (backward using recent elections or forward using population projections). One can go beyond political mobilization measured in terms of registration and turnout to ask about various political clout. Size is one factor in a group's political clout, group cohesion is another.

Both political parties have courted Hispanic voters. Political cohesion among Hispanic voters does not match the high 90 percent levels of support black voters give Democratic candidates. Cuban Hispanics notably favor Republicans. Other Hispanics tend to side with Democrats more often than not, but Republicans, particularly George W. Bush, Karl Rove, and associates have sought to whittle down the overall two-to-one advantage Democrats enjoy over Republicans.¹¹ How successfully Republicans secured Hispanic support in the 2004 presidential election is a matter of dispute. National media exit polls reported 44 and 45 percent support for Bush. An exit poll by the William C. Velazquez Institute, conducted in 14 states and 56 precincts with high concentrations of Hispanics, put Hispanic support of Bush at 31 percent.¹² While the exact

¹¹ Karl Rove, presidential political adviser, has said that, for Republicans, winning over Latinos is "our mission and our goal." The imperative is in the numbers. If the same percentage of minorities votes for Bush in 2004 as did in 2000, he would lose the election by 3 million votes, says Matthew Dowd, a senior consultant to the Republican National Committee. To avoid that, Republicans should aim to boost their take of the African-American vote from 9 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2004, and of the Hispanic vote from 35 percent to 40 percent, he says." Francine Kiefer, "Bush Plans 2004 Wedding with Hispanics," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 2001.

¹² "Hispanic Swing is Rude Awakening for Democrats," *Daily Telegraph* (London), November 5, 2004; Suro, Fry, Passel, "Hispanics and the 2004 Election: Population, Electorate and Voters," Pew Hispanic Center, June 27, 2005, 1-44; Leal, Barreto, Lee, and de la Garza, "The Latino Vote in the 2004 Election," *PSOnline*, January 2005, 41-49; Mitofsky, "Comment on the Latino Vote in 2004," *PSOnline*, April 2005, 187-188; Flores, "National Latino Exit Poll 2004 Analysis," William C. Velasquez Institute, November 2004, 1-7; De la Garza, "Continuity, Not Change:

percentage of support Bush obtained in 2004 is disputed, greater inroads by Republicans into Hispanic support were made, inroads imperiled by the continuing debate over immigration reform and the hard-line stance taken by several Republican officials.

One can consider Hispanic political clout in terms of presidential elections and the Electoral College. The extent to which Hispanics are geographically concentrated in swing states affects this group's pivotal status. But the structural problem is that sixty percent of Hispanics live in California, New York, or Texas, not exactly political battleground states in today's polarized politics.¹³

Looking to the future, one can wonder about the effect of demographic trends such as birth rates, migration rates, and naturalization rates in terms of the growth of the Hispanic population in general and its citizenship component in particular. Naturalization rates for legal immigrants have fluctuated. Reports suggest an uptick in recent naturalization rates.¹⁴

The massive Hispanic mobilization in the Spring 2006 marches provided an opportunity for registering Hispanics to vote. Hispanic registration drives and turnout efforts for the 2006 election made some progress, but such efforts proved disappointing, highlighting the still unrealized potential of the Hispanic vote.¹⁵

The Latino Vote in 2004," Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper 59/2004, January 12, 2005, 1-5
<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/657.asp>.

¹³ Roberto de la Garza, "The Future of Latino Politics," Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper 59/2004, November 30, 2004, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/151.asp>.

¹⁴ Jeffrey S. Passel, "Growing Share of Immigrants Choosing Naturalization," Pew Hispanic Center, March 28, 2007
<http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=74>

¹⁵ USA Today, November 2, 2006: "After huge immigration protests across the country earlier this year, advocates for immigrants' rights vowed to capitalize on the energy and register 1 million new foreign-born voters, mostly Hispanics. But rhetoric has run headlong into reality: Organizers say that, as of last week, they had signed up fewer than 150,000 new people for the Nov. 7 elections for Congress and for state and local offices." "'People were waving signs — 'Today we march, tomorrow we vote' — but that may not be something that's literally tomorrow," said Lionel Sosa, a Republican political strategist who heads Mexicans & Americans Thinking Together, a Web-

Hispanic political mobilization is but one example of our need to understand American Politics by the numbers and the challenge of that undertaking. Questions raised may be answered, but in those answers other questions arise. That's the nature of the enterprise as we seek to develop and encourage numerical skills and savvy among our students.

based nonprofit group. "It will be slow, but eventually everyone running for political office will understand that this is a vote to be reckoned with." This spring, immigrants demonstrated nationwide, sparked by a bill in the House of Representatives that would have made it a felony to be in the country illegally. The Senate's immigration bill left that provision out and the two chambers failed to reach a compromise, meaning the bill did not become law. Immigrants' advocates seized on momentum from the protests and organized what they called Democracy Summer. They pledged to register 1 million new foreign-born voters by the Nov. 7 elections — and another 2 million before the presidential contest in 2008. But Germonique Jones, spokeswoman for the Center for Community Change, an umbrella organization of some of the nation's biggest immigrants groups, said the total is roughly 146,000. The Center for Community Change arrived at the figure by totaling estimates from the various groups with which it has been collaborating. "The 1 million — we were looking at the potential of immigrant voter power," Jones said. "Looking back, we realize ... the immigrant community is complicated — not monolithic."

Guide to Tabular Presentation

Example of Table Structure

Table 519. **Border Patrol Enforcement Activities: 2000 to 2004**

[As of September 30. Excludes Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigations' data. The source of the data is administrative records that come from the Performance Analysis System (PAS)]

Activities	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Persons processed by the Border Patrol ¹	1,689,195	1,277,577	967,044	946,684	1,179,296
Deportable aliens located by the Border Patrol	1,676,438	1,266,214	955,310	931,557	1,160,395
Mexican aliens	1,636,883	1,224,046	917,994	882,012	1,085,006
Working in agriculture	1,330	1,248	1,821	1,908	1,647
Working in trades, crafts, industry, and service	2,167	2,678	2,897	3,856	3,634
Seeking employment	1,525,422	1,107,550	822,161	810,671	997,986
Canadian aliens	2,211	2,539	1,836	1,611	1,497
All others	37,344	39,629	35,480	47,934	73,892
Smugglers of aliens located	14,406	8,720	8,701	11,128	16,074
Aliens located who were smuggled into the United States	236,782	112,927	68,192	110,575	193,122
Seizures (conveyances)	17,269	5,892	7,250	9,355	18,024
Value of seizures (mil. dol.)	1,945	1,581	1,564	1,680	1,696
Narcotics	1,848	1,519	1,499	1,608	1,620
Other	97	62	65	72	75

¹ Includes deportable aliens located and nondeportable (e.g., U.S. citizens).

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2004*. See also <<http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ybpage.htm>>. Data as of 8 May 2006.

Headnotes immediately below table titles provide information important for correct interpretation or evaluation of the table as a whole or for a major segment of it.

Footnotes below the bottom rule of tables give information relating to specific items or figures within the table.

Unit indicators show the *specified quantities* in which data items are presented. They are used for two primary reasons. Sometimes data are not available in absolute form and are estimates (as in the case of many surveys). In other cases we round the numbers in order to save space to show more data, as in the case above.

EXAMPLES OF UNIT INDICATOR INTERPRETATION FROM TABLE

Year	Item	Unit Indicator	Number shown	Multiplier
2000	Value of seizures	\$ Millions	1,945	1,000,000

To Determine the Figure it is Necessary to Multiply the Number Shown by the Unit Indicator:

Value of seizures by Border Patrol – 1,945 x \$1,000,000 – \$1,945,000,000 (over \$1.9 billion)

When a table presents data with more than one unit indicator, they are found in the headnotes and column headings (Tables 2 and 31), spanner (Table 44), stub (Table 29), or unit column (Table 128). When the data in a table are shown in the same unit indicator, it is shown in boldface as the first part of the headnote (Table 2). If no unit indicator is shown, data presented are in absolute form (Table 1).

Vertical rules are used to separate independent sections of a table (Table 1), or in tables where the stub is continued into one or more additional columns (Table 2).

Averages—An average is a single number or value that is often used to represent the “typical value” of a group of numbers. It is regarded as a measure of “location” or “central tendency” of a group of numbers.

The *arithmetic mean* is the type of average used most frequently. It is derived by summing the individual item values of a particular group and dividing the total by the number of items. The arithmetic mean is often referred to as simply the “mean” or “average.”

The *median* of a group of numbers is the middle number or value when each item in the group is arranged according to size (lowest to highest or visa versa); it generally has the same number of items above it as well as below it. If there is an even number of items in the group, the median is taken to be the average of the two middle numbers.

Per capita (or per person) quantities—a per capita figure represents an average computed for every person in a specified group (or population). It is derived by taking the total for an item (such as income, taxes, or retail sales) and dividing it by

the number of persons in the specified population.

Index numbers—An index number is the measure of difference or change, usually expressed as a percent, relating one quantity (the variable) of a specified kind to another quantity of the same kind. Index numbers are widely used to express changes in prices over periods of time, but may also be used to express differences between related subjects for a single point in time.

To compute a price index, a base year or period is selected. The base year price (of the commodity or service) is then designated as the base or reference price to which the prices for other years or periods are related. Many price indexes use the year 1982 as the base year; in tables this is shown as “1982 = 100.” A method of expressing the price relationship is: The price of a set of one or more items for a related year (e.g. 1990) **divided by** the price of the same set of items for the base year (e.g. 1982). The result multiplied by 100 provides the index number. When 100 is subtracted from the index number, the result equals the percent change in price from the base year.

Average annual percent change—Unless otherwise stated in the *Abstract* (as in Section 1, Population), average annual percent change is computed by use of a *compound interest formula*. This formula assumes that the rate of change is constant throughout a specified compounding period (1 year for average annual rates of change). The formula is similar to that used to compute the balance of a savings account that receives compound interest. According to this formula, at the end of a compounding period the amount of accrued change (e.g., school enrollment or bank interest) is added to the amount that existed at the beginning of the period. As a result, over time (e.g., with each year or quarter), the same rate of change is applied to a larger and larger figure.

The *exponential formula*, which is based on continuous compounding, is often used to measure population change. It is preferred by population experts, because they view population and population-related subjects as changing without interruption, ever ongoing. Both exponential and compound interest formulas assume a constant rate of change. The former, however, applies the amount of change continuously to the base rather than at the end of each compounding

period. When the average annual rates are small (e.g., less than 5 percent) both formulas give virtually the same results. For an explanation of these two formulas as they relate to population, see U.S. Census Bureau, *The Methods and Materials of Demography*, Vol. 2, 3d printing (rev.), 1975, pp. 372–381.

Current and constant dollars—Statistics in some tables in a number of sections are expressed in both current and constant dollars (see, e.g., Table 660 in Section 13, Income, Expenditures, and Wealth). Current dollar figures reflect actual prices or costs prevailing during the specified year(s). Constant dollar figures are estimates representing an effort to remove the effects of price changes from statistical series reported in dollar terms. In general, constant dollar series are derived by dividing current dollar estimates by the appropriate price index for the appropriate period (e.g., the Consumer Price Index). The result is a series as it would presumably exist if prices were the same throughout, as in the base year—in other words, as if the dollar had constant purchasing power. Any changes in this constant dollar series would reflect only changes in real volume of output, income, expenditures, or other measure.

Explanation of Symbols

The following symbols, used in the tables throughout this book, are explained in condensed form in footnotes to the tables where they appear:

- Represents zero or rounds to less than half the unit of measurement shown.
- B Base figure too small to meet statistical standards for reliability of a derived figure.
- D Figure withheld to avoid disclosure pertaining to a specific organization or individual.
- NA Data not enumerated, tabulated, or otherwise available separately.
- S Figure does not meet publication standards for reasons other than that covered by symbol B, above.
- X Figure not applicable because column heading and stub line make entry impossible, absurd, or meaningless.
- Z Entry would amount to less than half the unit of measurement shown.

In many tables, details will not add to the totals shown because of rounding.




Figure 1.6 Two streams of southern conservatism in Congress, 1952–1998. Sources: Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C., 1994); and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, various issues.




Figure 2.2 Republican campaign effort in the South, 1930s–1990s. Sources: Same as Figure 2.1.






Figure 2.4 Southern House elections in the 1950s: Democratic incumbents with safe seats preserve the Solid South. Sources: Same as Figure 2.1.


1952–1960 Winners



1961–1981 Winners



1982–1991 Winners



1992–2000 Winners





Figure 12.3 The racial and ideological restructuring of southern House politics.
Sources: Calculated from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, various issues.

Figure 1 Hispanic Voters, Hispanic Population: The Widening Gap



Note: Population and voters are in millions. For sources, see paper.

Table 1 Total and Voting-age Population, Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, 2004

	<i>Hispanic</i>	<i>Non-Hispanics</i>	<i>All persons</i>	<i>Percent Hispanic</i>
Total population	41,410,733	252,227,425	293,638,158	14.10
Voting-age population	27,330,324	193,013,228	220,343,552	12.40
Voting-age population percent of total population	66.00	76.52	75.04	--

Note : Hispanics may be of any race.

Source: Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Table 2: Annual Estimates of the Population by Selected Age Groups and Sex for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006 (NC-EST2006-02) and Table 4: Annual Estimates of the Hispanic or Latino Population by Age and Sex for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006 (NC-EST2006-04-HISP); Release Dates: May 17, 2007; <http://www.census.gov/popest/national/index.html>

Table 2 Total and Citizen Voting-age Population, Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, 2004

<i>Voting-age</i>	<i>Hispanic</i>	<i>Non-Hispanics</i>	<i>All persons</i>	<i>Percent Hispanic</i>
Total VAP	27,129,000	188,565,000	215,694,000	12.58
Citizen VAP	16,088,000	180,918,000	197,006,000	8.17
Citizen VAP percent of total VAP	59.30	95.94	91.34	--

Note : Hispanics may be of any race.

Source: Calculated from Table 2 in U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, November 2004. Internet Release date: May 25, 2005;
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2004.html>

Table 3 Citizen Voting-age Population, Registration and Turnout, Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, 2004

<i>Citizen voting-age population (CVAP)</i>	<i>Hispanic</i>	<i>Non-Hispanics</i>	<i>All persons</i>	<i>Percent Hispanic</i>
Total CVAP	16,088,000	180,918,000	197,006,000	8.17
Registered	9,308,000	132,762,000	142,070,000	6.55
Registered, percent of total CVAP	57.86	73.38	72.11	--
Voted	7,587,000	118,149,000	125,736,000	6.03
Voted, percent of total CVAP	47.16	65.31	63.82	--
Voted, percent of registered	81.51	88.99	88.50	--

Note : Hispanics may be of any race.

Source: Calculated from Table 2 in U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, November 2004. Internet Release date: May 25, 2005;
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2004.html>

Table 4 Effect of voting-age, citizenship, registration, and turnout differentials among Hispanics and Non-Hispanics

	<i>Hispanics</i>	<i>Non-Hispanics</i>
Total population	1,000	1,000
18+	0.6600	0.7652
VAP	660	765
Citizenship	0.5930	0.9594
CVAP	391	734
Registration	0.5786	0.7338
Registered	226	539
Voting	0.8151	0.8899
Voters	185	479

Note: This example applies voting-age, citizenship, registration, and turnout rates from the 2004 election to determine the number of voters each initially equal population of Hispanics and non-Hispanics would produce.