

IR/PSC 251: Authoritarian Regimes and Transitions

University of Rochester
Spring 2018
TR, 11:05am-12:20pm
Classroom: Morey 501

Instructor: Jack Paine
Office: Harkness 326
jackpaine@rochester.edu
www.jackpaine.com
OHs: Tuesdays 12:30-2:30

TA: Jacque Gao
Office: Harkness 336
agao3@ur.rochester.edu
OHs: Wednesdays 1-3

Course overview. This course will teach students about politics in authoritarian regimes, transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, and democratic backsliding and reversion. Topics include trends over time in regime type, examining institutions and key actors in authoritarian regimes (parties, militaries, elections, media), domestic and international causes of democratization, and historical and contemporary cases of democratic backsliding.

Grading for non-W students:

- **50% essays assigned throughout semester.** There will be three essays of 500-900 words each assigned throughout the semester on dates listed in the schedule of courses. The questions will be closely related to topics discussed in class and in the readings. Essays must demonstrate substantial use of the assigned readings to earn better than a C. You can occasionally reference the lectures in the essays, but do so sparingly because most of the material from the lectures arises from the readings. You are encouraged to use your notes and to consult the readings when writing your essays, but you CANNOT discuss the essays with any classmates until you have handed them in.
- **40% final.** There will be a final exam during the university-scheduled period. It will consist of 2-3 essays of the same format as those described above. It is a comprehensive exam, although you are guaranteed at least one question from Part III of the course. Bring your laptop to the exam room. If you need a laptop provided, please let us know as soon as possible so that we can make appropriate arrangements.
- **10% Class attendance, participation, and reading questions.** As discussed below, attendance in lecture is required and participation is encouraged even though this is a lecture course. Additionally, six times during the semester, students are required to email Jacque with one question about one or several of

the readings *prior* to the first lecture for which the reading is assigned. The sets of lectures are numbered 1a, 1b, etc. through 6a and 6b. One reading question is due for each paired lecture sets (e.g., one for 1a and 1b, one for 2a and 2b), which means that one question is due prior to the first lecture on the topic about every two weeks.

Grading for W students:

- Essays are 30%, final is 30%, attendance etc. is 10%.
- The remainder comes from a final paper of roughly 20 pages with instructions provided at the end of the syllabus. The due dates for a first draft of about 10 pages (10% of final grade) and for a final draft (20% of final grade) are listed in the schedule of courses. **For W students that do not have a class immediately following lecture on Tuesday, we will meet after the second class on January 23.** If you cannot make that time, we can arrange another time. Please read the assignment ahead of time to be able to ask questions, and have several cases in mind that you might want to study. Please come prepared with several possibilities because I want each student to examine different cases.

Role of the TA. The role of the TA is somewhat unique in this course because Jacques will not teach a separate section. However, with a course of this size, he will be an invaluable resource. Jacques is your first line of defense for most email inquiries and other questions about the course. That does not mean you should never contact me, but for most questions, it will be best to contact Jacques first. He will also grade all the essays, albeit with input from me. I will, however, grade the draft and the final version of the W papers.

Reading. Required reading accompanies each group of lectures. All readings are available on the Blackboard page unless otherwise stated or if an Internet link is provided. Students are expected to have spent several hours with the readings prior to the first lecture for which it is assigned, and then to spend several more hours after hearing the lecture material reviewing and completing the reading (for topics that span three classes, I don't expect students to have closely completed every reading prior to the first lecture; the readings will be covered roughly in the order in which they are listed on the syllabus). Although it is a lecture course, I encourage students to ask questions throughout and, when appropriate, we will have broader class discussions. Being acquainted with the material prior to lecture will facilitate better questions and discussions during class. There are several incentives for actually doing the reading, despite the absence of a discussion section. First, as mentioned above, essays must demonstrate substantial use of the assigned readings to earn better than a C. Second, also mentioned above, students are required to email six questions about the reading prior to lecture to Jacques throughout the semester. Third, students who consistently do not attempt to complete the readings forgo the right to use office hours for either myself or for Jacques. (By contrast, students who attempt the readings and have questions about parts they do not understand are very much encouraged to ask about them in class or office hours.) As the semester goes along, if most students are found not to do the readings prior to lecture, we may do occasional reading quizzes at the beginning of lecture—let's hope it doesn't come to that.

Finally, every week contains questions to help guide the readings and to gain key takeaway points. However, these key questions should not encourage students only to read until the point at which they can answer those specific questions. Although we will discuss those topics in class, we will cover other questions that arise from the readings as well. Furthermore, students will produce questions of their own that we can discuss.

Attendance. Attendance is required at all sessions. Please notify Jacque of any known and unavoidable absences (e.g., University-sponsored academic or sporting event) at the beginning of the semester, and any unforeseen circumstances (e.g., family issues, illness) as soon as possible if they arise. I understand that unforeseen events do happen on occasion, but it is your responsibility to keep us updated. Students who have arranged with Jacque to miss a class should contact classmates to receive notes. Students who regularly miss lecture forgo the right to use either of our office hours.

Submitting assignments and late policy. All assignments will be emailed directly to either Jacque or myself (see instructions below for each assignment) as a Microsoft Word document by the day and time indicated on the syllabus. Please save each file as “LAST NAME-ASSIGNMENT TITLE” to make them easy to catalog. We will make comments on the papers, and this is easiest to do in Word. The late policy is that assignments handed in between 1 and 24 hours late will receive a full grade off, assignments handed in between 24 and 48 hours late will receive two full grades off, and assignments handed in more than 48 hours late will not be accepted. As with attendance, it is your responsibility to keep us updated and to coordinate an alternative plan if needed as soon in advance as possible.

Academic honesty. Tempted to cheat? Don't do it. Fortunately, there are few possible opportunities for cheating in this course. Students are encouraged to talk to each other about the readings outside of class, and are encouraged to use their notes when writing the essays. The only exception is that students are NOT ALLOWED to discuss their answers to essay questions with each other or with anyone else prior to handing them in. If I learn that students collaborated or otherwise received help on an essay, then they will receive no credit for that essay and there may be further repercussions. The university's academic honesty policy can be found at: <http://www.rochester.edu/college/honesty>.

Anything else. If any of these policies are unclear or if there are other relevant details for your situation, please contact us sooner rather than later. If you have a disability for which you may request an academic accommodation, you are encouraged to contact either of us and the access coordinator for your school to establish eligibility for academic accommodations (please see <https://www.rochester.edu/disability/students.html>). I hope this course will be an enjoyable experience for everyone, which I suppose makes me a benevolent authoritarian ruler.

Schedule of classes

Part I. Authoritarian Regimes

1a. January 18, 23, 25 – Overview of Trends and Authoritarian Survival Tools

Key questions: What distinguishes authoritarian from democratic regimes? What are distinguishing characteristics of different types of authoritarian regimes? What are major trends over time regarding the frequency of dictatorships relative to democracies, as well as the frequency of different types of authoritarian regimes? What strategies do authoritarian rulers use to stay in power?

- Svobik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2: “The World of Authoritarian Politics.”
- Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” *Perspectives on Politics*.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press. Chapter 1: “What?” Available on Google Books:
https://books.google.com/books?id=IMjyTFG04JYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+third+wave+huntington&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwid8Me8_dPYAhXxcd8KHYr3D1kQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 “Introduction” and Chapter 2 “Explaining Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories.”

W students – meet after class on Jan. 23

1b. January 30 and February 1 – Personalist Regimes

Key questions: How can rulers stay in power without the institutionalized support of other actors? What are common sources of vulnerability in personalist regimes? How do personalist dictators lose power?

- Goodwin, Jeff and Theda Skocpol. 1989. “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World.” *Politics & Society*, 17(4): 489-509.
- Read pgs. 245-253 (stop at section “Democratic stability”) in Weingast, Barry R. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” *American Political Science Review*, 91(2): 245-263.
- Byman, Daniel and Jennifer Lind. 2010. “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea.” *International Security*, 35(1): 44-74.
- Katouzian, Homa. 1998. “The Pahlavi Regime in Iran.” In *Sultanistic Regimes*, Eds. H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 182-205.

2a. February 6 and 8 – Guarding the Guards and Military Regimes

Key questions: Why do militaries sometimes intervene in politics? Why do leaders of military regimes relinquish power? Why have military regimes become so rare since the Cold War ended?

Reading:

- Geddes, Barbara, Erica Frantz, and Joseph G. Wright. 2014. "Military Rule." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17: 147-162.
- Quinlivan, James T. 1999. "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." *International Security*, 24(2): 131-165.
- Marinov, Nikolay and Hein Goemans. 2014. "Coups and Democracy." *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(4): 799-825.
- Read chapter 5 "The End of the Regime: Political Society and the Military" (pgs. 55-67) of Stepan, Alfred. 1988. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Essay #1 released after class on February 8. Due via email to Jacque by midnight on Sunday Feb. 11

2b. February 13 and 15 – Party-Based Regimes

Key questions: In what ways do parties provide effective organizations for helping authoritarian regimes remain in power? What are the difficulties and tradeoffs involved in creating strong authoritarian parties? What are sources of vulnerability in party regimes?

Reading:

- Magaloni, Beatriz and Ruth Kricheli. 2010. "Political Order and One Party Rule." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13: 123-143.
- Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. "Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy*, 14(1): 6-17.
- Read the theory section and sections on Malaysia (pgs. 44-52, 74-93, 116-124, 146-163, 211-225) in Slater, Dan. 2010. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Levitsky and Way (2010, 318-328) provide a condensed summary of more recent events in Malaysia that may prove useful.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press. Read pages 236-258 of Chapter 6 "Africa: Transitions without Democratization" (you will read most of the rest of the chapter later in the semester).

3a. February 20 and 22 – Economic Development in Authoritarian Regimes

Key questions: Because regimes that are strong enough to enforce property rights are also strong enough to take them away, how can dictators ever credibly commit to protect property rights? What incentives do authoritarian regimes have to pursue policies that either promote or undermine economic growth? Under what conditions can authoritarian regimes succeed at promoting economic development?

Reading:

- Haber, Stephen. 2008. "Authoritarian Government." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Eds. Donald A. Wittman and Barry R. Weingast. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Read pgs. 123-125 and 134-139 (skip section 2 "Model and analysis") of Gehlbach, Scott and Philip Keefer. 2011. "Investment without Democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracy." *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 39: 123-139.
- Chapters 1 and 2 (pgs. 3-51) of Shirk, Susan. 1993. *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Read chapter 3 "Decision Making in Postcolonial Africa" (pgs. 113-151) in van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

3b. February 27 and March 1 – Electoral Authoritarianism

Key questions: It is very common for contemporary authoritarian regimes to hold at least semi-competitive elections, in contrast to 30 years ago. Why have so many dictators agreed to hold elections? In what ways can these elections facilitate democracy? In what ways can these elections serve as a tool to bolster authoritarian rule?

Reading:

- Gandhi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. "Elections Under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12: 403-422.
- Miller, Michael K. 2015. "Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since 1815." *British Journal of Political Science*. Only read pgs. 501 through the top three lines on pg. 513.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2009. "Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Regime Transitions." *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(3): 515-532.
- Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Color Revolutions." *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3): 535-551.

Essay #2 released after class on March 1. Due via email to Jacque by midnight on Sunday March 4

4a. March 6 and 8 – Controlling the Media

Key questions: What are authoritarian rulers' goals when imposing media controls? Under what conditions can rulers achieve these goals? When might authoritarian regimes benefit from loosening media controls? How has the advent of the Internet and social media affected prospects for authoritarian regime survival?

Reading:

- King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review*, 107(2): 326-343.
- Read pgs. 402-405 (stop at section "Setup") and pgs. 410 (starting with "Evidence") to the end of Lorentzen, Peter. 2014. "China's Strategic Censorship." *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2): 402-414.

- Adena et al. 2015. “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- McMillan, John, and Pablo Zoido. “How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(4): 69-92.
- Three brief newspaper articles:
 - <http://www.dw.com/en/african-authoritarian-regimes-dread-of-social-media/a-19067717>
 - https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/authoritarian-regimes-retool-their-media-control-strategy/2014/01/10/5c5bfa6e-7886-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6_story.html?utm_term=.3f3e72e7370c
 - <http://www.wired.com/2016/01/social-media-made-the-arab-spring-but-couldnt-save-it/>

March 13 and 15 – No class. Enjoy spring break.

Part II. Democratization

4b. March 20 and 22 – Domestic Causes of Democratization

Key questions: Why would elites democratize to solve a commitment problem? What types of elites are most resistant to democratization? Are organized labor and capitalists helpful or harmful for democratization? How do personalist regimes democratize?

- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 “Paths of Political Development” and Chapter 2 “Our Argument.”
- Ansell, Ben W. and David J. Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 “Introduction” and Chapter 3 “Actors and Interests.”
- Bellin, Eva. 2000. “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries.” *World Politics*.
- Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1994. “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa.” *World Politics*.

***No class March 29**

5a. March 27 and April 3 – International Causes of Democratization

Key questions: What varieties of colonial rule are most highly associated with democratization? How successful were these democracies? How did high linkage contribute to democratization in Eastern Europe? Why did high leverage typically fail to create democracy in Africa?

- Lee, Alexander and Jack Paine. 2017. “Did British Colonialism Promote Democracy? Divergent Inheritances and Diminishing Legacies.”
- Review your notes on chapters 1 and 2 of the Levitsky and Way (2010) book assigned in the first week of the semester.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3 “Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization in Eastern Europe” and pgs. 276-299 of Chapter

6 “Africa: Transitions without Democratization” (you already read the first part of the chapter).

W students only – First paper draft due via email to Prof. Paine by 5pm on Friday April 6

5b. April 5 and 10 – The Arab Spring

Key questions: What enabled ordinary citizens to suddenly rise up and precipitate authoritarian turnover in several Middle Eastern/North African countries in the spring of 2011? What accounts for differences in outcomes across countries in the region? Which authoritarian tools that we have discussed proved most or least effective?

- Bellin, Eva R. 2012. "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring." *Comparative Politics*, 44(2): 127-149.
- Gause III, Gregory F. 2013. "A King for All Seasons: How the Middle East's Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring." *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper*, No. 8.
- Each of these short pieces by leading Middle East or oil scholars:
 - Anderson, Lisa. 2011. "Demystifying the Arab Spring." *Foreign Affairs*, 90(3): 2-7.
 - Gause III, Gregory F. 2011. "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring." *Foreign Affairs*, 90(4): 81-90.
 - Ross, Michael L. 2011. "Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring?" *Foreign Affairs*, 90(5): 2-7.
- Short newspaper clips about Egypt five years later:
 - <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/02/10/five-years-after-egypts-arab-spring-we-didnt-need-a-revolution/>
 - <http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/27/middleeast/egypt-how-we-got-here/>
 - <http://www.dw.com/en/five-years-on-egypt-after-the-arab-spring/a-18973463>
 - <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/middle-east-egypt-us-policy/409537/>

Essay #3 released after class on April 5. Due via email to Jacque by midnight on Sunday April 8.

Part III. Democratic Decline

6a. April 12, 17, 19 - Interwar Europe and Post-Cold War Cases

Key questions: What are the typical modes by which democracies decline? How have these modes changed in frequency over time? What propelled the Nazis to power in interwar Germany? What are the biggest threats to democracies today in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa?

- **Overview reading:** Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. "Democratic Backsliding." *Journal of Democracy*.
- **Interwar Europe readings**

- Ertman, Thomas. 1998. "Democracy and Dictatorship in Interwar Western Europe Revisited." *World Politics*.
- Luebbert, Gregory M. 1991. *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 1 "Introduction" and Chapter 8 "Social Democracy and Fascism."

***Note:** For each of the following contemporary cases, the first is a longer social science article and the next two are shorter media pieces (the links are embedded into the titles).

- **Latin America readings**
 - Weyland, Kurt. "Latin America's Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist Left." *Journal of Democracy* 24(3): 18-32.
 - Corrales, Javier. "Hugo Boss." *Foreign Policy*. February 19, 2006.
 - Naim, Moisés & Francisco Toro. "Venezuela's democratic façade has completely crumbled." *The Washington Post*. July 1, 2016.
- **Eastern Europe readings**
 - Greskovits, Béla. 2015. "The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe." *Global Policy* 6: 28–37.
 - Ost, David. "Regime Change in Poland, Carried Out from Within." *The Nation*. January 8, 2016.
 - Marcinkiewicz, Kamil & Mary Stegmaier. "Poland appears to be dismantling its own hard-won democracy." *The Washington Post*. July 21, 2017.
- **Africa readings**
 - Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2015. "Africa's Waning Democratic Commitment." *Journal of Democracy* 26(1): 101–13.
 - Louw-Vaudran, Liesl. "Term-limit changes the biggest threat to democracy in Africa?" *ISS Today*. September 14, 2016.
 - Cheeseman, Nic. "How Zambia's long-stable democracy ended up in a political crisis in 2017." *Quartz*. July 7, 2017.

6b. April 24, 26, May 1 – The United States

Key questions: In what ways has the United States been exceptionally democratic throughout its history? In what ways has the U.S. restricted democracy? How different are the U.S.'s democratic challenges post-2017 from previous challenges to democracy? How relevant are other countries' experiences for understanding the U.S.?

Historical readings:

- North, Douglass C., William Summerhill, and Barry R. Weingast. 1999. "Law, Disorder, and Economic Change: Latin America vs. North America." Only read pg. 1 through the top of pg. 28 (stop at Section 4)
- Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2005. "The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World." *Journal of Economic History*. Only read pg. 891 through the top of pg. 909 (stop at section "Latin America")

- Keyssar, Alexander. *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States*. Introduction, Chapter 8 “Breaking Barriers,” Chapter 9 “The Story Unfinished,” and Conclusion.
- Short media article on the electoral college:
<https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/stephen-henderson/2016/11/19/electoral-college-race-problem/94079504/>

Contemporary reading (may change by the time we get here):

- Lieberman et al. (2017). “Trumpism and American Democracy: History, Comparison, and the Predicament of Liberal Democracy in the United States”
- Shorter media pieces:
 - New York Times article “Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democracy?” Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-threat-to-democracy.html>
 - Follow-up to the previous one:
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trump-democracy-ziblatt-levitsky/550340/>
 - Bright Line Watch Survey Report: Wave 3. Available at:
<http://brightlinewatch.org/blw-survey-wave3/>
 - Vox article “20 of America’s top political scientists gathered to discuss our democracy. They’re scared.” Available at:
<https://www.vox.com/2017/10/13/16431502/america-democracy-decline-liberalism>
 - Vox article “An expert on the European far right explains the growing influence of anti-immigrant politics.” Available at:
<https://www.vox.com/2016/5/31/11722994/european-far-right-cas-mudde>
 - Blog post “Everyday authoritarianism is boring and tolerable”
<https://tompepinsky.com/2017/01/06/everyday-authoritarianism-is-boring-and-tolerable/>
 - Wall Street journal article “About that Trump ‘Autocracy’” (Available on Blackboard)
 - Washington Times article “Anti-Trump left a threat to American democracy.” Available at:
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/19/anti-trump-left-threat-american-democracy/>
- **Optional:** For those interested in further reading on the contemporary U.S. from an academic perspective, see <http://democratic-erosion.com/syllabus/>

W students only – Final paper to be emailed to Prof. Paine by 5pm on Friday May 4.

May 10 – Final exam, 8:30am. Bring your laptop to the exam room. If you need a laptop provided, please let us know as soon as possible so that we can make appropriate arrangements.

Assignment for W students

Levitsky and Way's (2010) book *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold Cold War* proposes a theoretical framework that examines how various domestic and international conditions affect the likelihood that a "competitive authoritarian" regime will survive and, if not, whether it will be replaced by a democracy. A competitive authoritarian regime, as we will discuss in class, is a regime that holds semi-competitive elections for the executive office, but in which the electoral playing field is heavily skewed toward the incumbent. They include numerous case studies (35) in their book to test their argument. However, questions remain regarding how widely their argument applies. Each W paper will examine two case studies and provide a write-up of approximately 20 pages that resembles the structure of the case studies from Levitsky and Way's book, of which we will read many during the semester. Students will choose their two cases in consultation with the instructor, with the restrictions that the case is not covered in the book and there is no overlap in cases among the students. The following pairs are suggestions, and I can fill in additional details regarding why I suggest each pair. However, these are not the only possible cases that students could choose to study, depending on their interests:

- Argentina and Guatemala
- China and South Korea
- Singapore and Indonesia
- Angola and Liberia
- South Africa and Namibia
- Benin and Mali
- Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
- Saudi Arabia and Jordan
- Algeria and Libya