

**Political Science 568: International Organization**  
**Friday, 9:30-11:55, Fenno Room (Harkness 329)**

**Fall 2019**

Randall Stone  
Professor of Political Science  
University of Rochester  
randall.stone@rochester.edu

Harkness Hall 336  
273-4761

**Purpose of the course:** This is an advanced course intended for Ph.D. students. The course conducts a broad survey of the field, focusing on recent developments in the theory of international organization, and making use of historical examples from a range of substantive issue areas.

**Course Requirements:** Each student writes a data-based research paper (20-25 pages, described below). A draft of the paper is due Weds., December 11, at 5:00 pm, and the final version is due December 17 at 12:00 noon. There will be opportunities to present versions of the paper during the semester, and all of the papers will be presented and discussed on December 13. There will be a take-home final exam, due December 20 at 4:00 pm. Grading: 1/3 class participation, 1/3 final paper, 1/3 final.

**Research Papers:** Although the papers are short (no more than 25 pages, please), the standards are high. The papers are expected to formulate a hypothesis, ground it in appropriate literature, illustrate an argument or puzzle using qualitative evidence, and test the hypothesis using quantitative evidence.

**Books:**

- Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2002. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Davis, Christina L. 2012. *Why Adjudicate: Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).
- Koremenos, Barbara. *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998.
- Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- Vreeland, James R. and Axel Dreher. 2014. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

***Course Outline:***

**Aug. 30: No class (APSA)**

**Sept 6: Public Goods and Transaction Costs**

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Stone, Randall W., Branislav Slantchev and Tamar London. 2008. Choosing How to Cooperate. *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2) (June): 335-62.

**Sept. 13: Institutional Design**

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. *International Organization* 54 (3): 421–456.

Koremenos, Barbara. 2016. *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 4, 7, 9.

Lipsy, Phillip Y. Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas, Outside Options, and the Bretton Woods Institutions. 2015. *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (2): 341-356.

Allison Carnegie and Austin Carson. 2018. The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order. *International Organization* 72 (3): 627-57.

**Sept. 20: Delegation and Agency**

Vaubel, Roland. A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. *Public Choice* 51 (1986): 39-57.

Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations *International Organization* 53 (4).

Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2) (Spring): 241-76.

Johns, Leslie. 2007. A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats. *International Organization* 61 (2): 245-275.

Copelovitch, Mark S. 2010. Master or Servant? Common Agency, Preference Heterogeneity, and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (1): 49-77.

Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization* 66 (Fall): 537-69.

Johnson, Tana. 2013. Institutional Design and Bureaucrats' Impact on Political Control *The Journal of Politics* 75 (1) (January): 183-197.

**Sept. 27: Informal Governance**

Stone, Randall W. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Malik, Rabia, and Randall W. Stone. 2018. Corporate Influence in World Bank Lending. *Journal of Politics* 80 (1) (January): 103-18.

Nelson, Stephen C. 2014. Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF's Lending Decisions. *International Organization* 68 (2): 297-328.

**Oct. 4: Voting in the UN**

Vreeland, James R. and Axel Dreher. 2014. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker. 2006. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (4): 905-30.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland. 2009. Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? *Journal of Development Economics* 88 (1), 1-18.

Carter, David B., and Randall W. Stone. 2015. Multilateralism and Democracy: The Case of Vote Buying in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization* 68 (1): 1-33.

Voeten, Erik. 2000. Clashes in the Assembly. *International Organization* 54 (2) (Spring): 185-215.

**Oct. 11: Institutional Change in the European Union**

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press.

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. *International Organization* 52 (2) (Spring): 397-419.

Schneider, Gerald, and Lars-Erik Cederman. 1994. The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration. *International Organization* 48 (4): 633–662.

Special Issue: Decision-Making During the Eurozone Crisis. 2019. *European Union Politics*. 20 (1) (March).

***Oct. 18: No class (IO Board Meeting)***

***Oct. 25: The World Trading System***

Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2002. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Chapters.

Steinberg, Richard. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-74.

Davis, Christina. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1) (February): 153-69.

***Nov. 1: Trade Disputes and Adjudication***

Davis, Christina L. 2012. *Why Adjudicate: Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kucik, J. and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization* 62 (3): 477-505

Busch, Marc L. 2007. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. *International Organization* 61 (4) (Oct): 735-61.

Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett, and Christina Davis. 2009. Who Files? Developing Country Participation in WTO Adjudication. *Journal of Politics* 71 (3) (July): 1033-1049.

Johns, Leslie, and Krzysztof J. Pelc. 2018. Free-Riding on Enforcement in the WTO. *Journal of Politics* 80: 873-889.

***Nov. 8: International Law, Norms and Domestic Politics***

Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Arrangements Influence Government Repression. *International Organization* 59 (1): 593-629.

Kelley, Judith G., and Beth A. Simmons. 2015. Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations. *American Journal of Political Science* 59: 55-70.

Hyde, Susan D. 2011. Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion. *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 356-369.

**Nov. 15: No class (IPES)**

**Nov. 22: International Law and Courts**

Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds. 2000. *Legalization and World Politics: A Special Issue of International Organization*. *International Organization* 54 (3) (Summer).

Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel and Charles R. Hankla. 2008. Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. *American Political Science Review* 102 (4): 435-452.

Voeten, Eric. 2008. The impartiality of international judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights. *American Political Science Review* 102 (4), 417-432.

Simmons, Beth A., and Allison Danner. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. *International Organization* 64 (2).

**Nov. 29: No class (Thanksgiving)**

**Dec. 6: Regime Complexes**

Keohane, Robert O., and David G. Victor. 2011. The Regime Complex for Climate Change. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9 (1) (March): 7-24.

Morse, Julia C., and Robert O. Keohane. 2014. Contested Multilateralism. *Review of International Organizations* 9 (4): 385-412.

McLean, Elena, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. The Kyoto Protocol: Two-Level Bargaining and European Integration. *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (1) (March): 99-113.

Johnson, Tana, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2012. A Strategic Theory of Regime Integration and Separation. *International Organization* 66 (4) (Fall): 645-677.

Pratt, Tyler. 2018. Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes. *International Organization*, 72(3), 561-590.

***Dec. 13: Block Seminar (student presentations)***

***Dec. 20: Final exam due 4:00 pm***