

Elections in Developing Countries, PSC/IR 262
Fall 2017 Syllabus

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Classroom & Time: HUTCH 473, TR 11:05-12:20

Course Overview

How do elections work in developing democracies? Do contexts that are specific to countries in the developing world have implications for the nature and operation of electoral politics therein? In this course we will explore a number of issues that have particular relevance for elections in developing countries, including clientelism and vote buying, electoral manipulation and fraud, ethnic voting, and electoral violence. In addition, we will consider how limited levels of information and political credibility affect both the operation of electoral accountability and the nature of electoral competition. In doing so, we will draw on examples from Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Lectures and Readings

There is no textbook for this course. Most readings will come from recent academic papers on the subject, and those are available for download at the library website. Book chapters that are not available for download will be posted on blackboard.

Readings are “required”, which means that any component of them could appear in the exams. The readings marked with an * are “recommended”, which means that they are relevant to the subject in question, and might have “testable” components, as long as I talk about them in the lectures. The lectures will focus on the main ideas being presented by each paper. Many of the readings, however, are quite technical. Here are a few tips on how to better read academic papers in this course:

1. Focus on the main idea. What is the research question being answered? How does it fit in the themes discussed so far in the course? How does it relate to the other readings? These components are usually well summarized in the first few pages of the paper.
2. Every paper has a section explaining the context for the case study (i.e., details of the policy being evaluated, details on the country in question, etc.). Read this part carefully, so you can understand what the researcher is doing. Do not dwell on specific events, but think about how information from the case study provides insight into the broader themes of the course.
3. The empirical methodology or the mathematical model, when present, can be quite challenging. Do not focus on this part. When necessary or relevant, I will provide accessible explanations during the lectures. This means, however, that you might face questions on the intuition of the statistical analysis or models in the exams (as long as I talk about it in the lectures).
4. In order to better understand quantitative results in a paper, focus on the conclusion, where they should well summarized.
5. Be prepared. If you do not read in advance, you might not be able to follow the lectures.

Assessment and Grading

There will be four in-class exams with 2 essay questions each. These will be taken from a list of 4-5 questions that I will distribute (on blackboard) the day before each exam. The exams will last 60 minutes. The scores on these will comprise 100% of your grade, and the material for each exam is non-cumulative.

The weight of each exam in the final grade is as follows: lowest grade (5%), highest grade (45%), the remaining two (25% each).

Letter grades will be assigned as follows:

A	93-100
A-	85-92
B+	80-84
B	75-79
B-	70-74
C+	66-69
C	63-66
C-	60-62
D+	56-59
D	53-55
D-	50-52
Fail	below 50

In the exams, provide clear and concise arguments. A good answer would include your opinion, based on a thoughtful analysis of the theory and evidence presented in the readings and lectures. The more you prepare in advance, the better you will do in the exams. Also, **prepare your OWN answers in advance** (see academic honesty below).

The grade for students missing exams will be zero. If a true emergency arises, contact me before the exam. If I determine that the excuse is justifiable, then we'll reschedule a make-up exam.

For W Students only

There will be a final paper of 10-12 pages, which will represent 25% of the final grade (the exams will represent 75% of the grade). The paper provides students with an opportunity to examine the topics discussed in class from the in-depth perspective of one or several empirical cases of their choosing. The paper will require W students to cite at least six academic sources not among assigned readings.

Academic Honesty

Tempted to cheat? Don't do it. Fortunately, there are few possible opportunities for cheating in this course. Students are encouraged to talk to each other about the readings, and to study them together. The only exception is that students are **NOT ALLOWED** to share written answers to potential exam questions preceding each exam. Students should prepare their own answers. Attempting to plagiarize someone else's work in the exam (and in life!) will only make your own answers to appear shallow, weak and unoriginal. The university's academic honesty policy can be found at: <http://www.rochester.edu/college/honesty>.

Anything else

If any of this is unclear or if there are other relevant details for your situation, please contact me sooner rather than later. If you have a disability for which you may request an academic accommodation, you are encouraged to contact both myself and the access coordinator for your school to establish eligibility for academic accommodations (please see <https://www.rochester.edu/disability/students.html>). I hope this course will be an enjoyable experience for everyone.

Schedule and Readings

Aug 31 Syllabus discussion

Introduction

- Sep 05 Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-43.
- Sep 07 Lizzeri, A., Persico, N. (2004). Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119(2): 707-765

Part I. Minimalist Democracies

- Sep 12 Bidner, C., Francois, P., Trebbi, F. (2015). A Theory of Minimalist Democracies. Working Paper.
- Sep 14 LaGatta, T., Little, A., Tucker, J. (2015). Elections, Protest, and Alternation of Power. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(4): 1142-56.
- Sep 19 Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press. Introduction, pages 1-30, and Chapter 1.
- Sep 21 Achen, C., Bartels, L. (2016). *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press. Chapter 1.
- Sep 26 Glaeser, E., Ponzetto, G. (2017). Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth. Working Paper.
- Sep 28 EXAM 1

Part II. Accountability

- Oct 03 Bidner, C., Francois, P. (2013). The Emergence of Political Accountability. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(3): 1397-1448
- Oct 05 Besley, T., Burgess, R. (2002). The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4): 1415-51
- Oct 10 No class
- Oct 12 Ferraz, C., Finan F. (2008). Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(2): 703-745.
- Oct 17 Svobik, M. (2013). Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability, Government Performance, and the Consolidation of Democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*. 57(3): 685-702.
- Oct 19 Fujiwara, T., Wantchekon, L. (2013). Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 5(4): 241-55
- Oct 24 EXAM 2

Part III. Clientelism and Vote Buying

- Oct 26 Brusco, V., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., Stokes, S. (2013). *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.
- Oct 31 Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., Nitcher, S. (2014). Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 58: 415-32.

- Nov 02 Larreguy, H., Marshall, J., Querubin, P. (2016). Parties, Brokers and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party's Capacity to Monitor Brokers. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1):160-179.
- Nov 07 Vicente, P. (2014). Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa. *The Economic Journal* 124: 356-87
- Nov 09 Anderson, S., Francois P., Kotwal A. (2015). Clientelism in Indian Villages. *American Economic Review* 105(6): 1780-1816.
- Nov 14 EXAM 3

Part IV. Fraud and Violence

- Nov 16 Rundlett, A., Svolik, M. (2016). Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobias in Electoral Fraud. *American Political Science Review* 110(1):180-97
- Nov 21 No class
- Nov 23 No class
- Nov 28 Gehlbach, S., Simpson, A. (2015). Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control. *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (1): 212-24
- Nov 30 Harish, S., Little, A. (2017). The Political Violence Cycle. *American Political Science Review* 111(2): 237-55
- Dec 05 Collier, P., Vicente, P. (2014). Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria. *The Economic Journal* 124: 327-55
- Dec 07 Chandra, K. (2005). Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability. *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (2): 235-52
- Dec 12 EXAM 4