Poland and Central-Eastern Europe in Times of Strategic Threat

When Vladimir Putin sent up to 200,000 soldiers into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he probably thought he could sweep into the capital, Kyiv, in a matter of days and depose the government. It was a plan for another contemporary “blitzkrieg,” which was expected to be completed within two or three weeks. Ukraine was to become a colony administered by the Kremlin, ultimately to be forcibly annexed as part of the re-created Russian Empire. If successful, this would change the balance of power in Europe and the world. Russian forces quickly captured large stretches of territory but failed to encircle Kyiv. Special troops of the Russian Airborne Forces airlifted to Hostomel were unable to gain control of Antonov Airport, which held strategic value as it is located less than 10 kilometers outside of the capital. The Ukrainian military responded with a successful counterattack, but in the following days, the Russians continued their assaults on strategic positions in Hostomel. Finally, on April 2, 2022, Ukrainians restored full control of the airport following the Russian withdrawal from the Kyiv Oblast. The blitzkrieg plan turned out to be a failure, and in the coming months, Russian troops were forced into a series of humiliating retreats, first in the north, then in the south and the east. They have lost more than half of the territory seized at the start of the invasion. However, that was not the end of the invasion, and Putin was ready to sacrifice the lives of hundreds of thousands of his men to continue the offensive, especially in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine.

Dramatic Consequences of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

In the fourth year of the invasion, the situation on the front stabilized, and both sides reinforced their positions. The war took on a positional character, which was compared to the situation during World War I, although airstrikes on further civilian targets and on facilities deemed critical infrastructure in Ukraine became a regular element of the Kremlin's military operations. Despite attempts to reclaim occupied territories in the east and south of the country, the Ukrainians were unable to break through the Russian defenses. Russian forces controlled approximately 20% of Ukraine's territory, including Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Melitopol.

The scale of wartime losses, especially the number of fatalities, is challenging to estimate, as neither Ukrainians nor Russians are interested in disclosing the actual number of soldiers and civilians killed. According to the BBC, the true number of Russian military deaths could range from 146,194 to 211,169. If one adds estimated losses from DPR (Donetsk People’s Republic) and LPR (Luhansk People’s Republic) forces, the total number of Russian-aligned fatalities may range from 167,194 to 234,669 (February 2025). The number of injured is estimated to be over 550,000. Ukraine last updated its casualty figures in December 2024, when President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged 43,000 Ukrainian deaths among soldiers and officers. Western analysts believe this figure to be an underestimate. The website Ukraine Losses, which compiles casualty data from open sources, currently lists more than 70,400 surnames of Ukrainian soldiers. Therefore, it is quite possible that the number of military casualties on the Ukrainian side is much higher than indicated by the data presented by President Zelensky.

The data regarding civilian casualties in Ukraine is also difficult to verify, especially since the Russian army deliberately targeted objectives that had no military significance, and the number of casualties in many cases proved extremely difficult to finally assess. For psychological reasons, the Ukrainian authorities are not always willing to publish comprehensive reports on the civilian casualties.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) verified a total of 43,610 civilian casualties during Russia's invasion of Ukraine as of March 31, 2025. Of them, 30,700 people were reported to have been injured. However, OHCHR specified that the real numbers could be higher.  OHCHR has estimated the number of deaths of civilians, or non-armed individuals, in Ukraine at 12,910 since the start of the war on February 24, 2022. The highest death toll was recorded in March 2022, at over 3,900.

The situation is dramatic concerning the demographics of Ukraine. It is worth remembering that the population of the country right after gaining independence in 1991 was over 52 million, while in 2025, it is estimated to be around 38.9 million. However, it cannot be ruled out that this number is inflated and that the actual number of residents is only slightly above 30 million (excluding the regions under Russian occupation). Since 2022, an estimated 6.9 million Ukrainians have fled to neighboring countries and globally, with 3.7 million internally displaced within Ukraine. This makes it the largest forced displacement crisis in Europe since World War II. The war has created a massive need for humanitarian aid, with an estimated 12.7 million people in need of assistance. In such a situation, one of the most important tasks for Ukraine after the war will be to encourage millions of citizens to return to the country, especially those who are young and well-educated. It would be difficult to think constructively about rebuilding the state without the participation of millions of young Ukrainians who are currently living in exile.

Military aid for Ukraine

The courage and determination of the Ukrainian army have played a fundamental role in stopping the Russian invasion, but without subsequent military, humanitarian, and financial aid, effective defense of the country would have been very difficult, if not impossible. Many countries have provided or promised military aid since February 2022. This included weaponry, equipment, logistical support, as well as financial support. According to various sources, European countries have provided 132 billion euros in aid (military, financial, and humanitarian) as of December 2024, while the United States has provided 114 billion euros. It should be emphasized that the assistance from the U.S. government has financed American companies producing the most advanced weapons and military equipment. For the Ukrainian army, intelligence support from the U.S. has been extremely important, enabling effective defense against the significantly larger Russian army. Poland alone has delivered a huge amount of equipment to Ukraine, including, among others, reconnaissance UAVs, loitering munitions, man-portable air defense systems, trucks and SUVs, main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and speedboats. Noteworthy military assistance has also been provided by the Baltic countries, such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, for whom the Russian invasion poses an existential threat to their own statehood.

Further military equipment aid for Ukraine is necessary, although it will depend on many factors: Putin’s ability and willingness to continue the war, the readiness of President Trump’s administration to provide ongoing military aid to Ukraine, the increase in the arms production capacity in European Union countries, and political decisions regarding greater support for Kyiv in the event of reduced or ceased military assistance from the United States. The key issue is primarily the situation in Russia and its plans to continue the invasion, and in the longer term, the likelihood of attacking a NATO member, probably in the Baltic or Nordic countries. This, in turn, is a consequence of Putin's imperial ambitions and his rather eclectic ideology, which envisions the "reconstruction" of the Russian empire and granting Russia real status as a superpower.

Russian or Putin’s ideology?

It is difficult to unambiguously define the ideology propagated by Russia, or conceived by Putin. It lacks the coherence in describing the problems of the modern world that Marxism-Leninism once had, nor does it seem to be a straightforward continuation of the ideology of Tsarist Russia. It combines elements of Soviet imperialism and historical Russian imperialism, proclaiming the 'uniqueness' of Russian culture, as well as glorifying the principle of the three-in-one Russian nation, which would, in practice, mean the annexation of territories in Ukraine and Belarus. It does not hide its hostility towards the broadly understood West and its values, especially the principles of liberal democracy and genuine, not fictional, elections that impede the entrenchment of dictatorial or even autocratic rule. The Kremlin, as can be inferred from many statements, is interested in building its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, if necessary, through military conquests. Snegovaya, Kimmage and McGlynn explain the process of developing modern Russian ideology as follows:

The Kremlin has made serious, consistent, and increasing investments in promoting certain values. Borrowing heavily from czarist and Soviet themes, as well as other intellectual sources like the twentieth-century radical right, Putinism elevates an idea of imperial-nationalist statism amplified by Russian greatness, exceptionalism, and historical struggle against the West. Notable throughout this period has been the Kremlin’s attention to education and memory politics, accompanied by a growing emphasis, reactionary in nature, on what the Kremlin describes as traditional values. Since the mid-2010s this was followed by a shift in focus from narratives and monuments alone to establishing and funding public engagement with these narratives. Phases marked by the more active promotion of these ideas coincide with external and internal challenges to the regime, often triggered by color revolutions in Russia’s “near abroad,” domestic protests, or the wars Putin started. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its radical break with the West have prompted the regime to mount a more sustainable ideology-building effort. (The Ideology of Putinism. Is It Sustainable?, Center for Strategic and International Studies)

From the perspective of Central and Eastern European countries, the most concerning element of this ideology is, of course, the Kremlin's ambition to rebuild the former Soviet sphere of influence and attempts to undermine European unity. Russian propaganda seems to be quite effective in many European countries, primarily in Hungary and Slovakia, but also— to some extent— in Germany and France. Therefore, one cannot exclude the possibility that Russia's actions in the coming years (regardless of who holds power) will be aimed at strengthening its influence in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Western Europe, using very diverse methods: from classic propaganda, through financial support for selected political groups in various countries, to acts of sabotage and subversion. Many of these actions may prove to be successful in strengthening Russian direct and indirect influence in Europe.

Poland, Central Europe and Strategic Dilemmas

The Russian invasion of Ukraine made Polish and Baltic citizens realize that neighboring countries will need an additional long-term 'insurance policy.' Currently, they can formally count on full military and economic support from NATO and the European Union ('Allies will defend every inch of NATO territory'), but the current American administration and President Trump himself cast doubt—at least in their declarations and statements, which can be interpreted in various ways—on the unity of the transatlantic community and do not seem to fully accept the possibility of direct US military support for a NATO member under attack. The strained relations between President Trump and President Zelensky, along with the leniency of US representatives towards aggressive Russia, are forcing leaders of many European countries to reconsider their policies towards Russia and America. An example is Steve Witkoff, who has been appointed as the de facto special US envoy to Vladimir Putin and publicly expressed understanding for the Kremlin's annexation of Ukrainian territories. It is possible that the United States will not be perceived by Europeans as a reliable and fully credible ally in the near future. This, in turn, means that Europe must fundamentally reframe its defense policy. The situation is serious for the countries of the so-called eastern flank of NATO, which will need to closely cooperate with one another, of course with strong support from other European allies such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For Poland, the Baltic states, and also Finland, Sweden, and Norway, the following geostrategic assumptions remain extremely important:

1. Russia will not abandon its plans to expand its empire in the foreseeable future.
2. Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states—Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia—as well as Finland (and to a lesser extent Sweden) have the right to feel seriously threatened by Russian imperialism. Other Central European countries do not border directly with Russia, so their sense of threat is limited.
3. Belarus may be annexed by Russia within the next decade, which would constitute an additional existential threat for Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states.
4. The process of strengthening military, intelligence, and economic cooperation among NATO Eastern flank members should be optimally implemented with strong cooperation within the EU. Such cooperation will have obvious political implications; however, it does not mean building a "separate grouping."
5. The real sense of threat from Russia serves as a common denominator for all Central-Eastern, Baltic, and Nordic countries, motivating them to work closely together.

The European Union clearly understands the implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, although the awareness of the threat is not uniform across all regions. Nonetheless, in the face of the Kremlin's policies threatening the stability of the Old Continent and the growing uncertainty regarding the future role of the United States in NATO, the European Union has made significant decisions regarding defense, which in the recent history of Europe is undoubtedly a precedent on an earlier unimaginable scale. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled a $840 billion plan to increase EU defense spending on March 4, 2025. “Europe is ready to massively boost its defense spending,” she stated in Brussels, noting that this was necessary to support Ukraine against ongoing Russian aggression and also “to address the long-term need to take on much more responsibility for our own European security.”

Such statements have been enthusiastically received in Poland, which already allocates nearly 4% of its GDP to armaments and clearly relies on European solidarity in this matter. Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in his key address to the European Parliament, underscored security issues while skillfully linking them to the defense of democratic values, which are openly rejected by the Kremlin: “Security is extremely important in the day-to-day lives of all Europeans. Let me tell you this: if we believe that a change of presidency or administration in the US is a leap into the unknown, remember this: Europe has never been afraid to leap into the unknown. I listen to other world leaders who remember their moments of greatness. […] I would like to tell you that you can tackle the problem of illegal migration and issues related to internal security in Europe without nationalistic and xenophobic slogans. In this area, as well as with external security, I would like us to favor traditional democracy based on classic democratic values such as individual freedoms, respect for minority rights, freedom of speech, the rule of law, public life free from corruption, and politics free from the omnipotence of oligarchs. I would like all those who profess these values to show their power and strength when we need to defend our borders and our security.”

Delivered in Polish and translated simultaneously, this speech was directed not only at European Parliament members but also at Tusk’s domestic electorate. In national addresses, Tusk has further linked security concerns to the defense of freedom and, by extension, to the foundational principles of the European Union. Speaking in Warsaw at the official inauguration of Poland’s EU Council Presidency, he stated: “If Europe is powerless, it will not survive. Let's do everything so that Europe and Poland do not have to pay the highest price for freedom, for strength, for sovereignty. Let's do everything to make Europe strong again.”

It is difficult to definitively say whether such declarations and statements have been received with equal enthusiasm in other Central European countries, especially in Hungary and Slovakia, which are perceived as exceptionally pro-Russian and therefore unreliable in the eyes of many other EU members. However, regardless of the assessment of the current EU plans to increase the defensive capabilities of individual European countries, the financial decisions made will have a remarkable impact on the overall defense policy in Europe.

It is worth emphasizing that Europe holds a significant advantage over Russia in military spending. In 2024, EU nations collectively spent $457 billion on defense compared to Russia’s $146 billion defense budget; however, this does not necessarily translate into a much greater combat capability of European armies. In terms of conventional military strength, the balance of power is more nuanced. Europe, including the UK, fields around 1.47 million active-duty military personnel, according to SIPRI data from 2024. In comparison, Russia is reportedly working to expand its active-duty force to 1.5 million troops. The quality and effectiveness of Western weapons are likely much higher than those of Russia, as demonstrated by their use by the Ukrainian army. On the other hand, the Russians are capable of modifying their military equipment in the coming years or sourcing a significant amount of weapons from countries like Iran or North Korea.

It should also be noted that while Russia has moved its economy to a wartime footing and is set to continue increasing military spending, many European countries have recently committed to boosting their own defense budgets. Since World War II, there has long been reluctance among some NATO members to meet the alliance’s two percent target, but French President Emmanuel Macron and others are now calling on Europeans to dramatically increase annual defense spending to over three percent of GDP.

It should be emphasized that while Russia retains a strategic advantage in nuclear capabilities, the UK and France possess nuclear arsenals that can provide Europe with a credible deterrent. The question that needs to be addressed is how France and the UK could provide a “nuclear umbrella” for other NATO members in the event that the United States were to withdraw its reliable nuclear guarantees for its European allies. Preliminary statements by President Macron regarding the possibility of such guarantees from France suggest that Europeans are ready to take full responsibility for their security. In a democratic country, however, such statements may appear very controversial. It cannot be ruled out that President Macron's declaration will face significant opposition from a large part of French society, which is aware of the potential consequences of Paris's involvement in a nuclear conflict with Moscow.

Another important issue is the role of Turkey, a NATO member that maintains good relations with both Ukraine and Russia. Turkey has repeatedly signalled the possibility of mediating peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow. This indicates that Turkey is interested in participating in the process of stabilizing the European continent, as well as fulfilling its allied commitments.

"It is inconceivable to establish European security without Turkey. And it is becoming increasingly impossible for Europe to continue its role as a global actor without Turkey,” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said after the Secure Our Future London Summit on March 2, 2025. From the declarations made, it appears that Turkey would be ready to deploy troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping mission "if deemed necessary." Many European politicians, as well as representatives of NGOs, have serious reservations about the Turkish government and President Erdogan personally, who is perceived as an autocratic leader reluctant to fully adhere to the democratic norms prevailing in the EU. On the other hand, consideration must be given to Turkey's military potential and its support for Ukraine (the famous Bayraktar TB2 drones—unmanned combat aerial vehicles, which were useful in the initial phase of the invasion), as well as its readiness to actively participate in a possible peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. In the event of a potential military conflict between Russia and NATO, Turkey's role could be significant, especially if the United States is reluctant to actively support its allies.

Uncertain Future - Brief Conclusions

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has proven that the Kremlin is interested in using forceful methods to expand its empire and maintain an antagonistic stance towards the collective West. The fact that the Russian army has been unable to conquer Ukraine during four years of war does not mean that Moscow will abandon its aggressive expansion plans in the future, regardless of who is in power in the Kremlin. For the European Union, especially for countries located near Russia, this is an exceptional situation that will require a rethinking of their foreign and internal policies and an increase in defense spending.

It can be assumed that Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries will collaborate more closely, primarily relying on their allies in Europe, especially France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It is also possible that Turkey will become a close ally. It is currently difficult to assess how reliable a partner the United States will be for Europe during a serious political and military crisis under President Donald Trump, particularly in the face of the hybrid war being waged by Russia. The European Union, as well as the European part of NATO (possibly including Canada), will need to prepare for a prolonged conflict with Russia, which will not necessarily be of a military nature. This will not be an easy task, as there are political parties and organizations in Europe that openly call for cooperation with the authoritarian and ruthless regime in the Kremlin. Russian propaganda is also effective, with its main goal being to undermine or at least weaken the unity of the West. The awareness of the Russian threat is, for obvious reasons, different in Portugal or Spain compared to Estonia or Lithuania. Nonetheless, the declarations and actions of the European Union seem to confirm the thesis that Europeans feel united and are ready to confront Russia, particularly when they are uncertain about American guarantees within the North Atlantic Alliance. The coming years will reveal how much this unity will be a reality and how much merely a wish. The security of Central and Eastern Europe will depend on this.

Piotr Kłodkowski was visiting professor in the Skalny Center in 2019, 2021, 2023 and 2025. He is professor at the Centre for Comparative Studies of Civilizations, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland. He served as the Polish Ambassador to India from 2009-14.