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REVIEWS

The logic of pronominal resumption. By ASH ASUDEH. (Oxford studies in theoretical linguistics.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xix, 463. ISBN 9780199206438. \$45.

Reviewed by NICOLAS GUILLIOT, *University of Nantes*

Ash Asudeh's *The logic of pronominal resumption* is devoted to the description and formal representation of resumption across natural languages, a general phenomenon by which a pronoun occupies the base position of a syntactic dependency. Building empirically on a representative sample of languages (Irish, Hebrew, Swedish, Vata, and English) and two types of syntactic dependency (unbounded dependencies and raising constructions, although only one chapter is specifically devoted to the latter), this book, composed of thirteen chapters, is on the one hand clearly inspired by traditional generalizations or distinctions made in the literature, but on the other hand brings a quite novel approach to resumption, coming mainly from the specific framework defended by the author—lexical-functional grammar (LFG) associated with glue semantics (based on linear logic proofs). My overall impression of the book is that it is a very valuable reading for anyone interested in that phenomenon and especially for those interested in how resumption can be formalized.

Building on traditional literature on the topic (McCloskey 2002, 2005, Sells 1984), the author uses three fundamental empirical generalizations as guiding principles for his own theory, which is clearly expressed in Chs. 1 and 2.

The first one is the distinction originating from Sells (1984) between true and intrusive resumptives, which the author restates as grammatically licensed versus processor resumptives (i.e. not fully grammatical, whose production would be related to processing).

The author also builds on a second well-established generalization in the literature based on a distinction between two lines of approach to resumption (distinguishing resumptive strategies across languages or within the same language) regardless of the specific model adopted (head-driven phrase structure grammar (HPSG), LFG, generative grammar): either a syntactic 'base-generation' of both the resumptive pronoun and the detached (WH-) constituent, and a binding relation between the two, or a 'movement' approach to resumption that equates the two elements to one syntactic function, the resumptive being more or less like a gap. These two approaches just follow from the duality of a resumptive construction, which interacts with both pronominal anaphora (binding processes) and movement or unbounded dependencies (see McCloskey 2005:96, Sharvit 1999, and also Rouveret 2011 for an extended discussion of the issue).

Building on these first two distinctions, the author ends up distinguishing between three kinds of resumption in unbounded dependencies: anaphora-like (true/grammatically licensed) resumptives, which he calls syntactically active resumptives (SARs); gap-like (true/grammatically licensed) resumptives—syntactically inactive resumptives (SIRs) in A's terminology; and intrusive or processor resumptives. Ch. 2 restates traditional arguments to distinguish between these three uses of resumption, such as island sensitivity, weak crossover, reconstruction, or binding by a quantified antecedent. A very precise analysis is developed for each type of resumption throughout the book: Irish (Ch. 7) and Hebrew (Ch. 8) display SARs, whereas cases of resumption in Swedish (Ch. 9) and Vata (Ch. 10) are used to illustrate the analysis of SIRs. Processor resumptives are discussed further in Ch. 11, with cases of resumption in English.

The last fundamental generalization that A uses (borrowed from McCloskey 2002) relies on the observation that resumptive pronouns are just ordinary pronouns, and that both should make strictly equivalent contributions. A uses this generalization as the starting point of his theory of resumption. But the main originality of his theory of resumption is undoubtedly the correlation with resource sensitivity, and more precisely the assumption that resumptive pronouns constitute a resource surplus (compared to gaps) in semantic composition, thus requiring some managing or

consuming device. The general intuition is that the difference between each kind of resumption (SARs, SIRs, and processor resumptives) resides in whether and how it can manage/consume the resource surplus created by the resumptive, through specific properties given to the complementizer system of the language. The intuition is first developed in Chs. 5 and 6, where the author presents an instructive discussion of different types of logic and of the resource sensitivity of natural language, before arguing that this intuition should therefore be formalized through the use of a resource logic. A valuable contribution of the book can be found in the introduction of the framework (LFG and glue semantics), which has a clear exposition in Chs. 3 and 4 that makes it easy even for a nonexpert reader to understand details of the analysis. Independent of the introduction of the framework, Chs. 7–11, illustrating each kind of resumption, contain precise representations of LFG structures and semantic proofs.

Having stated my overall impression of the book, I now would like to discuss further several points that on the one hand bring strength to the book, but on the other hand also raise some conceptual or technical questions.

One major originality of A's theory of resumption relies on the resource sensitivity hypothesis: that is, the fact that the contribution of the resumptive pronoun creates a resource surplus (compared to a gap that just corresponds to nothing in the framework defended by A), and therefore the resumptive needs to be consumed and licensed (by the complementizer system in his theory). Although I find completely justified the idea of relating different types of resumption to different properties of the complementizer system, its formalization in terms of resource-surplus (resumptive) and consumer (complementizer) gives the impression that resumption is unexpected in natural language, compared to gaps. In other theoretical frameworks, and especially the ones that consider gaps as bound variables (such as generative grammar), the occurrence of resumptive pronouns instead of gaps comes as no surprise, as a bound variable interpretation is clearly one of the possible interpretations of pronouns in natural language, hence confirming McCloskey's (2002) generalization that resumptive pronouns are just ordinary pronouns.

And even if the formalization of this resource management theory of resumption is quite convincing, one aspect remains puzzling: the fact that the complementizers licensing resumption (in the case of SARs or SIRs) end up contributing a lot in the semantic composition (up to three meaning constructors) and at different stages of the semantic proof. On the one hand, as A states, natural language is resource-sensitive in the sense that elements of combination in grammars cannot be freely reused or discarded. But on the other hand, the lexical entries of these complementizers have more than one use in the sense that they contribute several meaning constructors (for example, one that allows semantic combination between the relative clause and the antecedent, and another one that consumes the semantic surplus coming from the resumptive pronoun). I understand that the properties of the framework make that possible, but it just seems surprising for a nonexpert reader, especially in the context of the resource sensitivity hypothesis.

One interesting aspect of the book is the comparison with the generative approach. Very regularly, A compares his own take on the phenomenon with the way it is conceptualized and formalized in the generative literature. One good thing is that such comparisons help the reader to understand the analysis within the LFG-glue semantics framework (especially in Ch. 5 when A compares his view on the resource sensitivity hypothesis with similar principles in generative grammar, such as the theta criterion, the projection principle, or the principle of full interpretation). Another good thing is that it clearly shows some weaknesses in parts of the generative approach to resumption (for example, in the case of SIRs traditionally analyzed as the spell-out of gaps in generative grammar). Some of the arguments given against the generative approach, however, are not so compelling to me. For example, the author compares his analysis of complementizer patterns in Irish relative clauses (e.g. [_{CP} ... *aN* ... [_{CP} *aL* ...]]) with the one proposed in McCloskey 2002, which he discards on the basis that semantic composition in intermediate positions could not be handled with such an analysis (as the embedded CP would end up denoting a predicate instead of a proposition). One thing that makes it easier a priori in A's framework is that the relativizer (which basically composes the relative clause with the relative head) comes from the relative-CP rule, and is independent of lexical properties of the complementizer system. I

think, however, that several propositions seem reasonable in the generative framework to account for the general idea that *aL* is related to movement, and *aN* to binding, especially if the operator is not itself the lambda-abstractor. In a case like [... *aL* ... λ ... *aL* ... λ], each movement step could be associated with lambda-abstraction, with the operator left uninterpreted (schematic representation: [*Op* λ_1 [_{CP} t_1 [λ_2 t_2]]]). Notice that the embedded CP denotes a proposition, as expected. In a case like [... *aN* ... *aL* ... λ], the lower movement step creates lambda-abstraction, while the upper lambda-abstraction comes from binding, as independently needed for base-generated resumption (schematic representation: [*Op* λ_1 [_{CP} *pro*₁ [λ_2 t_2]]]).¹

My last comment is related to A's analysis of intrusive pronouns as not fully grammatical processor resumptives. I found this idea both intuitive and at the same time quite problematic in some ways. It is intuitive in the sense that it is true that resumption in English or French is highly related to production (except if we consider dislocation in French as a resumptive construction). The author gives two main reasons to distinguish such resumptives from true/grammatical resumptives (SARs/SIRs). One argument relies on grammaticality judgments, and more precisely the fact that speakers just tend to consider them ungrammatical. The second argument goes back to Sells (1984), who gives several tests to argue that intrusive pronouns in English do not pattern like bound variables (for example, the fact that they could not be bound by quantifiers like *every* or *each*). But does this mean that they should be excluded from the grammar?

What this second argument shows is that such cases of resumptives do not seem to correspond to classical bound variables. But nothing prevents the resumptive from being interpreted as E-type, which should be another possible interpretation of the resumptive pronoun if we take McCloskey's generalization seriously. And as A himself suggests, these intrusive pronouns are very good candidates for such interpretation as they cannot be related to these quantifiers resisting E-type interpretation (*each* or *every*). If such cases are indeed related to an E-type phenomenon (see Guilliot & Malkawi 2011 for an analysis of resumption related to E-type), should we really consider them not to be fully grammatical, although they just seem to reflect another property of ordinary pronouns?

As for the first argument about grammaticality judgments, it is true that many constructed examples with resumptives, especially the ones testing resumption as a saving device (in strong islands), are not considered grammatical by native speakers, casting doubt on a general theory of resumption based on last resort. I completely agree with the author on that. But at the same time, such (un)grammaticality judgments should be used carefully as they may be influenced by many factors: sociolinguistic factors, competition with a more standard construction, and influence of the norm. Take other constructions in French such as *c'est qui qui* ... 'it is who who ...' instead of *qui est-ce qui* ... 'who is it that ...', or *la voiture à ma sœur* instead of *de ma sœur* 'the car of my sister', which are produced systematically, but would not be judged as grammatical by the same speakers. Does it mean that our grammar should not generate them? And what about a model for which the distinction between grammar and production or parsing constraints is not so clear (see Cann, Kempson, and Marten's (2005) dynamic syntax)? Such cases of imbalance between production and grammaticality judgments thus raise very interesting and challenging questions about the relation between grammar and processing constraints. This goes beyond the author's analysis of such processor resumptives, which nevertheless has the great advantage of tackling the issue.

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¹ Or you could state that the operator performs lambda-abstraction only when inserted to bind something, that is, when there is no movement.

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Language in cognition: Uncovering mental structures and the rules behind them. By CEDRIC BOECKX. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Pp. 264. ISBN 9781405158824. \$48.95.

Reviewed by CARLOS P. OTERO, *University of California, Los Angeles**

In contrast with *Linguistic minimalism* (2006), written with the already committed students of language in mind, Cedric Boeckx's *Language in cognition (LinC)* is instead addressed to readers who are still unaware of the significance of the mid-1950s revolution in the study of language and the brain, and it attempts to open a smooth, helpful path for the readers toward that goal, in the process helping them to appreciate what we already know. As Marc Hauser points out in his book jacket endorsement, *LinC* shows 'why biology must form a core part of the mind sciences, and how the mind sciences, and especially language, can pose new challenges for biology'.

Linguistics plays three roles (13): (i) as a theory of a particular aspect of human cognition (the language faculty or, perhaps more to the point, the language organ), (ii) as a model for the investigation of other aspects of human cognition, and (iii) as a program for the formulation of 'questions about how the brain produces the mind' (in other words, psychoneurology, with some hints about its relation to physioneurology, terms not used in *LinC*; see Moro 2012).

Needless to say, the term 'cognition' does not cover a unitary phenomenon, as B makes clear; rather, it is an overall term that includes a number of systems—knowledge, understanding, interpretation, perception, belief, and so on. Language is just one of the systems that interact to form the whole complex of human cognitive structures.

B's aim, which he takes to be 'very modest' (clearly an understatement), is 'simply' 'to give the reader a sense of what it took to lay the foundations of modern cognitive studies' (12–13) and, by bringing out some of its richness and promise, hopefully to convince his readers of the significance of the advances of the last half century and help a number of them to realize that they too might be able to make a contribution.

As is to be expected, his guiding idea is Noam Chomsky's central claim that humans come genetically equipped with the capacity to develop knowledge of at least one spoken or signed language (visual or tactile, used by deaf/blind individuals—the Tacoma method) from the utterances they hear or the signs they see, and to make sense of those utterances or sign sequences. As B emphasizes, this capacity—like other capacities that have been studied, such as vision (Marr 1982), music (Lerdahl & Jackendoff 1983), or morality (Mikhail 2011)—is both severely constrained and extremely rich in its potential, in ways that can be understood only from a mentalist (psychoneurological) stance, as he attempts to show. Needless to say, this requires a readiness to posit principles of the mind that are up to the challenge of language 'acquisition' by the child (more precisely,

* I am indebted to Noam Chomsky for the reference to Lewontin's paper.