

MOVING

THE LONG

TOWARD

EMANCIPATION

BLACK FREEDOM

RINALDO WALCOTT

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞
Designed by Courtney Leigh Richardson and typeset in Minion Pro
and Trade Gothic by Copperline Book Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Walcott, Rinaldo, [date] author.

Title: The long emancipation : moving toward black freedom /
Rinaldo Walcott.

Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2021. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020027617 (print)

LCCN 2020027618 (ebook)

ISBN 9781478011910 (hardcover)

ISBN 9781478014058 (paperback)

ISBN 9781478021360 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Blacks—United States—Social conditions. |
Marginality, Social—United States—History. | Racism—United
States. | Blacks—Caribbean Area—Social conditions. | Marginality,
Social—Caribbean Area. | Racism—Caribbean Area.

Classification: LCC E185.86 .w3345 2021 (print) |

LCC E185.86 (ebook) | DDC 973/.0496073—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020027617>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020027618>

Cover art: *A Single Section: The Journey #3*, 2016, acrylic on canvas,
60 × 60 in. © Torkwase Dyson. Courtesy of the artist.

9. THE LONG EMANCIPATION

Old pirates, yes, they rob I,
Sold I to the merchant ships,
Minutes after they took I
From the bottomless pit.

—BOB MARLEY, “Redemption Song,” from *Uprising* (1980)

Migration. Can it be called migration? There is a sense of return in migrations—a sense of continuities, remembered homes—as with birds or butterflies or deer or fish. Those returns which are lodged indelibly, unconsciously, instinctively in the mind. But migrations suggest intentions or purposes. Some choice and, if not choice, decisions. And if not decisions, options, all be they difficult. But the sense of return in the Door of No Return is one of irrecoverable losses of those very things which make returning possible. A place to return to, a way of being, familiar sights or sounds, familiar smells, a welcome perhaps, but a place, welcome or not.

—DIONNE BRAND, *A Map to the Door of No Return: Notes to Belonging* (2001)

Movement is central to the shape of the modern world: whether post-Columbus European expansion around the globe, the movement of millions of Africans into the Americas, or the expropriation and movement of millions of Indigenous peoples from their traditional lands. Movement was also one of the central problematics of emancipated ex-enslaved Black people. At the heart of migration and citizenship sit the questions of emancipation and freedom. Recent events in Europe and the Americas make such a claim exceedingly clear.¹ One cannot help but think about the ways that people’s movements now sit as one of the central problematics of late neoliberal capitalist arrangements. In fact, postslavery movements of all kinds are conditioned by the afterlife of slavery and more specifically by the twentieth-century anti-Black migration policies of the West. It is precisely because the ex-enslaved refused to remain on plantations that Asian indentureship became a central postslavery phenomenon. Black people or the ex-enslaved began to move around internally and externally as an

element of their newly emancipated selves. That movement opened up a new era of post-transatlantic migrations. African “transshipped” peoples’ movement became central to the modern and late-modern world.² The ability to move, then, became a central dynamic of freedom in a postslavery world. This movement was not merely within already-set borders (like the movement of millions of Black people from South to North within the United States) but was also beyond borders in the Caribbean archipelago.

It is not surprising that at yet another moment of significant crisis, this time in neoliberal capitalism, Black movement has retained its animating force concerning questions of nation, citizenship, and freedom. Indeed, despite claims otherwise, the emancipation of those enslaved in both the then British Empire and the United States (1834/1838 and 1865, respectively) was considered first a crisis of capital and then a significant social and cultural problem. Plantations and slaveholders in both places were monetarily compensated for their “loss.” The compensation to former slave owners marks a significant element of the juridical process of emancipation bringing contract law and monetary policy into the equation, further cementing my claim that emancipation is not freedom. Freedom is extralegislative—freedom exists beyond the confines of the law as a mode of experiencing life without bounds. The logics of transatlantic slavery continue to shape Black movement and, therefore, Black belonging globally. My particular concern is with the ways that Black movements, since the period of transatlantic slavery, have been circumscribed and animated by a desire for freedom and halted by the realities of brutal deaths. These deaths are occasioned by the limits of the nation-state to provide avenues of and for citizenship that might appear to move toward the promise of freedom for Black subjects or what I have come to call the Black life-form. Situating the nation-state as central to the legacy of transatlantic slavery and its afterlives unsettles settlement, citizenship, and nation. My attention to situating Black life and its deathly limits within the legal process of emancipation is to accentuate the difference between emancipation and freedom and the ways in which the legislative practices of statecraft work to make impossible Black citizenship and even Black belonging in nations, especially those designated Western.

The tension and difference between the idea of emancipation and the idea of freedom is captured in part by Bob Marley’s “Redemption Song.” The song is a masterpiece of analysis because in its moving from the hold of the ship to atomic energy it is able, through the economy of the lyric, to capture the period from African enslavement to late modernity with its

potential nuclear implosion while demonstrating the discontinuous continuity that constitutes one historical period. In “Redemption Song,” freedom and emancipation are in a tense relationship. Emancipation is a prior moment to being able to sing songs of freedom, but first minds must be emancipated from mental slavery. Marley invokes emancipation and freedom as entangled elements of everyday life but, most important, as the metapractices that shape how we might respond to the world around us. Still in a period of emancipation—the long emancipation—it is the question of unfreedom that animates my thinking here. Marley’s call for emancipation from mental slavery echoes the concern that freedom has not yet been achieved. *Freedom is still in advance of our desires*. As we attempt to bring to a conclusion this long process of emancipation, a process that is temporally different in different parts of the world—the Spanish and Portuguese in Cuba (1886) and Brazil (1888) emancipated the Black enslaved later than the English, the French, and the Americans—freedom remains elusive. “Illegal” forms of slavery existed much longer than the temporal period of legal emancipation. The image-archive of post-Columbus slavery even finds resonance in photographs coming from the continued intractability of Euro-American global empire ongoing in Libya and the postwar exposure of the Black enslaved there.

The legal parameters of emancipation in each region were different, but in no instance did emancipation give the formerly enslaved the right simply to leave their surroundings. Attempts by the formerly enslaved to exercise any form of freedom are met with a torrent of laws that extend the enclosure: laws against idleness, vagrancy, or noise; pass laws, and so on. The potential for freedom begins, one might argue, in two parts: first the refusal of apprenticeship and second the refusal to remain on plantations. Taken together, those two refusals were the first salvo in an articulation of postslavery freedom that then had to be interrupted. Laws restricting Black movement quickly became central to postslave societies buttressed by tremendous forms of violent enforcement. The point at which freedom of movement is expressed and acted on by the formerly enslaved reveals the limits of emancipation. In such instances, the law asserts itself to reinstate emancipation as a process and an unfinished project that could have been one of moving toward freedom. In fact, the British emancipation act was not repealed until 1998 in a cleanup of English statute law. What the cleanup did leave in place, however, was antislavery legislation that was heavily influenced by, or premised on, the “new” language of antitrafficking laws.

In each instance in the contemporary where concerns about migration take center stage, the Black body, the Black life-form, is read as abundant to the problem. Whether we are thinking of fortress Europe or the gates/borders/walls of North America, the specter of the Black life-form entering plays a significant role in state policy marking migration and citizenship. While in the popular media in the United States, migration or migrants are often understood to be Latinx and read, therefore, as not Black, the reality is far more complex. In both the United States and Canada, large numbers of Black-identified people exist as “undocumented aliens” (and many of them are Latinx). The large numbers of non-Black Latinx people who have organized and made their desires public have provided a screen to make invisible Black others, including those Afro-Latinx people who organized with them. One must be clear, however, that it is their existence and presence that often fuel state policies on migration meant to hold Black populations in stasis in North America. Dating back to the turn of the twentieth century, Canada has had a history of anti-Black migratory practices wherein Black people were “deemed unsuitable” for entry, existence, and citizenship. In fact, many of the post-September 11, 2001, enhanced immigration policies build on earlier policies put in place to limit and demarcate Black migration. Put another way, historically and presently, most North American and European migration policies have been framed on keeping blackness out in order to locate blackness as the constituent outside, and to limit the numbers within.

To more fully account for Black movement in the contemporary world, we might want to spend some time thinking with Walter Rodney’s book *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. The force of Rodney’s argument is that colonial management coupled with the history of transatlantic slavery produced within Africa the very conditions that prohibited its development on the terms that the West states are the terms of development. The carving up of Africa in 1884 and the prior theft of its peoples continue to shape the continent’s registers of life. Rodney’s critique of colonial power remains useful despite some critics’ claims that it is a too-simple analysis. In fact, reading Rodney alongside Sylvia Wynter, one sees more clearly the ways that the logics of development are decidedly cast against Africa and blackness. One sees that the project of development in a still-colonial globe means that even with the contemporary discourse of “Africa rising,” Africa will remain perpetually “underdeveloped” and “behind.”³ Thus, the desire of Africans to leave the continent, as evidenced by the crossing of the Mediterranean at the Strait of Gibraltar, is a crucial and not surprising

outcome of a history of what Rodney termed “planned and unplanned” migration for African peoples. The ejection of Africans and their subsequent migration are a direct result of those planned underdevelopment policies. It should be clear from this argument that Africa is a central part of the long emancipation, since independence from former colonial masters has not reshaped global relations in ways that we might call freedom. In fact, the ongoing global colonial relations are the central backdrop for why some Africans need to move, because postcolonial independence is a continuation of juridical and legislative emancipation. While some might suggest that the postcolonies of Africa are not ex-enslaved colonies and therefore the language of emancipation does not apply, I suggest that the nature of the colonialism that produced those postcolonial states is in part also the lineage of transatlantic slavery. In the Americas we get freed, and in Africa they get independence.

If we join Rodney’s thought with Fanon’s and Wynter’s, we see everywhere that the “bio-evolutionary dysselected peoples of African and Afro-mixed descent” find themselves marked as outsiders.⁴ Thus, the question of citizenship bears a weightiness in regard to one’s proximity to those marked as dysselected peoples and to “their degrees of nearness to or distance from its signifier status as the ultimate marker of genetic non-being.”⁵ This is why a phenotypically “white-looking” Latinx person can become the face of the migrant movement in the United States and Canada. In short, the logics of anti-Black racism structure even the resistance to migratory regulations in our time. In order to adequately gauge these disturbing conditions of Black being, we must be able to notice the severe limits that everywhere mark the Black life-forms’ conditions of possibility. The limited boundaries provided by emancipation and postcolonial nation-states mean that Black migratory practices occasion the breaking of those boundaries of confinement and containment, and open up new possibilities.

The project of Black movement, however, is not only conditioned by African or Black enslavement and continental exploitation and “underdevelopment.” Black movement is also conditioned by global articulations of race and blackness conceived in the time of transatlantic slavery and African colonization and partition. Jemima Pierre’s book *The Predicament of Blackness*, an anthropological study of race in Ghana, demonstrates persuasively that global ideas of race, racism, blackness, and whiteness permeate the African continent in ways, for example, that are both similar to and different from New World blackness. Pierre’s argument suggests that only faulty thinking takes Africa outside of the global logics of race. Using the



FIGURE 9.1. Libyan coastguardman stands on boat during rescue of immigrants, 2017. Photo by Taha Jawashi/AFP; courtesy of Getty Images.

way in which the language of the “native” comes to take center stage in the African colonial project, she highlights how the word *native* works to racialize Black people into subordinate and inferior roles: “Nativization was racialization but this racialization worked through *ethnicization*—the constitution and reorganization of a constellation of tribal groupings whose incorporation into colonial society depended on mediating its racial and cultural separation from the ‘civil’ and ‘civilized’ society of White European colonizers.”⁶ Colonial Ghana was structured through forms of segregation, pass laws, and all the other forms of racialization that marked the slaveholding Americas. Thus, the idea that race and racialization were not a part of the African colonial project is a rather odd one that has nonetheless had much currency over the years. But equally important, Pierre shows how the mark of “native” came to serve larger social, cultural, and economic contexts that in the long run also helped to produce the push toward migration for some Africans both past and present. Taking Pierre alongside Rodney and Wynter, we get the full force of the conditions that mark Black/African movement around the globe. Those conditions—economic, cultural, social, and otherwise—constitute the belly of European colonial practices and the reordering of the globe on their own terms as the only terms for living a life.



FIGURE 9.2. Group of people who claim to be Haitian prepare to cross the border from New York into Canada, 2017. Photo by Geoff Robins/AFP; courtesy of Getty Images.

Stuart Hall writes that “migration is the joker in the globalization pack” and that both planned and unplanned migrations demonstrate that “migrants have an ambivalent position in contemporary globalization.”⁷ Hall sums up the problematics of contemporary migration in this way:

Migration constitutes a disruptive force with globalization. Unlike earlier phases, where the problems of religious, social, and cultural difference were held at a safe distance from metropolitan homelands, contemporary migration intrudes directly into, disturbs, challenges, and subverts, metropolitan cultural space. It projects the vexed issue of pluralism and difference into the epistemic rupture, generating the thematics of a new problematic—that of the postcolonial moment.⁸

It is postcolonial pushes of various sorts, from poverty to war to economic adjustments and trade imbalances, that have further occasioned the refining of migratory policies aimed now at “returning” or fixing the formerly colonized in their place so that, as Hall states: “Only labor—people—are supposed to stay still.”⁹ And yet people move despite the significant attempts to hold them in their places, “a sort of deregulated globalization-from-below.”¹⁰ In places such as Canada, where Temporary Foreign Worker Programs are significant, labor moves in and under very

proscribed terms. The fear for neoliberal politicians and late capitalism is that such “moving” labor might become unruly; thus, its numbers are limited. Asylum seekers, migrant labor, illegal, undocumented, dreamers, refugees, *sans papiers* are some of the ways in which, for some, relations to the nation-state and the lack of citizenship are marked. But it is precisely because the state remains the arbiter of citizenship and because citizenship suggests settlement that these forms of naming mark a relational condition to the state and remain wholly inadequate for what is being experienced in this moment of global crisis. These names and conditions mark the insufficiency of the nation-state as an avatar for producing Black life and instead point to it as a site of multiple violences.

10. CATASTROPHE, WAKE, HAUNTOLOGY

In his articulation of tidalectics, Edward Kamau Brathwaite has argued that Caribbean culture is a submerged culture. From Lampedusa, Italy, to the Caribbean Sea, Black life is submerged culture because of the multiple ways in which its watery existence comes into being. The question of the ship, already prefigured in these pages by Wynter's "transshipped culture," brings with it the dreaded possibilities of death. But Brathwaite refuses to take death as finality.¹ Instead, he offers the submerged as a double articulation of death, catastrophe, and a rebirth that requires that we rethink the very terms of life itself. The submerged culture is neither a counterculture nor an alternative culture, but a living critique of the past and the present.

The Haitian movement in the Caribbean Sea has caused panic for the "Black" island nations of that region and the United States and even Canada. One reason is because the submerged memories of transatlantic slavery's horrors surface as still present to the region of the Americas, and Haiti's historic revolution remains a repressed event of the death zone of the Americas. The movement of these Haitians finds its corollary in the African crossings of the Mediterranean Sea to Lampedusa, Italy. The crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar by Africans has been characterized as a second Middle Passage. In the long emancipation, such crossings are an extension of the Middle Passage and are not a new Middle Passage. Indeed, the Middle Passage cannot be pluralized; its uniqueness as the ongoing project of coloniality demands otherwise. If we take seriously Rodney's claim of the underdevelopment of Africa due to transatlantic slavery and colonial theft, we are able to see, as uniquely its own, the extensions and evidence of the Middle Passage into the present.

As Sylvia Wynter argues, in her unmaking of the notion of "natural scarcity": "These archipelagoes of joblessness and poverty function at a world-systemic level as the chaos to our First World 'developed' societies, in as lawlike a manner as the inner cities' dystopia negates the behavior-

orienting goal of the ‘affluent pursuit of happiness’ of those who live in the utopia of the suburbs.”² It is the lawlike practices, not just the laws, that continually fashion a certain Black out-of-placeness everywhere, and those practices are the basis of migratory practices and policies in the “developed” West. Those practices have their foundational originality in the ongoing long emancipation from transatlantic slavery to the present now governed by the laws of movement globally constituted out of and by old and new empires.

Three interlocking ideas or concepts have been useful for me to think through this problem: catastrophe, the wake, and hauntology. Together, these concepts allow us to access something about how anti-Black logics of the globe shape the ways in which Black life-forms are prohibited from citizenship and belonging in nations. These three ideas make sense of the broader dynamics of how blackness has been globalized as the life-form to be avoided or, as Frank B. Wilderson terms it, “always already void of relationality.”³ Kamau Brathwaite further develops his articulation of submerged culture in what he calls the literature of catastrophe. I replace *literature* with *culture* in order to argue that culture of catastrophe signals the deadly arrival of Africans in the Americas and the life that comes from crossing the Middle Passage or Atlantic into a new world. The *deadly living* that comes of that crossing and its resultant histories of survival provide the template for the long emancipation. Emancipation was and is a compromise meant to retain control over Black bodies, Black life-forms, and our movement while appearing to offer significantly changed conditions from those of enslavement and colonization. The struggle was for freedom, *not* emancipation, and it began before the slave ships left the African coast.

Importantly, then, Christina Sharpe’s articulation of “the wake” adds immeasurably to my proposition of the culture of catastrophe because it allows us the respite to meditate on the *longue dureé* of moving toward freedom. Sharpe’s articulation and formulation of the wake require that we grapple with death, with the necessary and functional Black dead as the resource toward making modernity and capitalism. Sharpe tells us, in conversation with Saidiya Hartman, that

to encounter people of African descent in the wake both materially and as a problem for thought is to encounter that * in the grand narrative of history; and, in the conditions of Black life and death such as those delineated by Hartman (“skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death”) and the ways we are po-

sitioned through and by them, the ways we occupy the “I” of Hartman’s “I am the afterlife of slavery” (Hartman 2008, 6).⁴

The signal importance of Sharpe taking up the concept of the wake is that it contends with the work that Black death does in this world. Asking if the Black womb is a tomb, Sharpe prefigures Black life as almost always already dead in a postslavery world that continually finds Black people to be out-of-place and waste. To be in the wake, then, is to live in the desire to work toward freedom in the face of death. And yet Sharpe’s articulation reaches beyond the pessimistic to provide us with a conceptual turn that allows us also to mark the cultures that Black people make as forms of life with death. The practice of the Black wake is about more than death. In the moment of death, the wake works to honor lives lived and to provide a conduit for those left behind so that life might be experienced as more than merely that of subjection.

The culture of catastrophe, as one lives in the wake, moving toward freedom, might be understood as a hauntology. Jacques Derrida, in concert with Sharpe, argues that the learning of life is “only from the other and by death.”⁵ Derrida, in *Specters of Marx*, is an excellent companion for Brathwaite and Sharpe, since his concern with specters is also concern with “a *politics* of memory, of inheritance, and of generation.”⁶ Both Brathwaite and Sharpe take memory and inheritance seriously as powerful points to and for Black life. It is precisely the ways in which legacies of the past condition present circumstances that allow for Black lives to exist in a space of unbelievability. Derrida reminds us as he moves toward, but does not arrive at, a definition of hauntology that the ghost is both an event and a first time, but, importantly, it is also a repetition.

The simultaneous value and lack of value for Black life, hinted at earlier in my discussion of James and lynching, is most evident in the ways that Black people, their bodies, and their practices are spectacularized. Following Derrida, it is at the point of event and repetition that Black life is made both present and unbelievable. Black life generally finds itself in a repeated cycle of being spectacularized, often through visual representations in popular culture (found in sport, in music, on social media, in memes and GIFs, in movies, etc.). At the same time, and more specifically, the state violence that is repeatedly inflicted on Black people is seen as otherworldly and somehow not believable. And yet, this repeated spectacularization of violent events occasions a frenzied gaze and the repeated viewing of the brutality inflicted by non-Black people on Black people. Black

people bear witness to this disbelief with the certainty that, for example, the police who murder Black people or those white people protected by “stand your ground” laws in the United States will not be convicted even as their acts of violence are spectacularly displayed on our collective screens. The video-recorded evidence and the body of the dead Black person are not enough to secure belief that what has taken place is, in fact, a murder. Thus, through a logic of disbelief, Black life is produced as both immediately present and immediately absent—appeared and disappeared.

HOW DID OUR SLAVE past become our emancipated, neoliberal present? Because we are not yet free, our slave past haunts and mars our attempt to render the past as past and the foundation for a future to come. The persistence of the past announces itself in discourses and practices of diversity, equity, multiculturalism, and antiracism policies, all of which can be tied to the logics of legislative emancipation’s juridical form. This, too, is the long emancipation. Those modes of adaptation that are often embraced as transformation and change meant to signal the shifting foundational arrangements of our societies are actually grounded in the extended logic of the terms and conditions juridical emancipation set out for Black life. These terms and adaptations are tutelage, and their trace lies in apprenticeship.

Indeed, hauntology requires that every moment of claimed change becomes suspect; or, as Derrida phrases it, “Haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony.”⁷ Emancipation as a mode of freedom is a hegemony that haunts. It is the persistence of Black life-forms that continually both show up and offer other possible ways of living a life beyond all bounds that makes evident the haunting nature of emancipation as a limit on what freedom might be. Black life-forms always find ways to exceed the boundaries of capital and other forms of containment as a way to imagine, build, and produce conduits that lead to collective self-referential lives.

- 9 Toni Morrison, "Home," in *The House That Race Built: Black Americans, U.S. Terrain*, ed. Wahneema Lubiano (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997), 3–13.
- 10 I am thinking here of the existence of the Kriolles in Sierra Leone, of Liberia; and movements/religions like Rastafari.
- 11 Derek Walcott, "A Far Cry from Africa," in *Collected Poems 1948–1984* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1986), 17.
- 12 Derek Walcott, "The Schooner Flight," in *Collected Poems 1948–1984*, 345–61.

8. NEW STATES OF BEING

- 1 Houston A. Baker Jr., *Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 15.

9. THE LONG EMANCIPATION

- 1 Here I am thinking of fortress Europe, in particular, violent attacks across Europe in places like Germany, France, and Italy on African migrants; and in North America Canada, the United States, and Mexico all either enforcing to the letter or making changes to migration policies to inhibit and even make illegal Black people crossing their borders, especially Haitians.
- 2 Sylvia Wynter, "Columbus, the Ocean Blue," in *Poetics of the Americas: Race, Founding, and Textuality*, ed. Bainard Cowan and Jefferson Humphries (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 153.
- 3 Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.
- 4 Wynter, "Columbus, the Ocean Blue," 159.
- 5 Wynter, "Columbus, the Ocean Blue," 159.
- 6 Jemima Pierre, *The Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the Politics of Race* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 19.
- 7 Hall, "Creolization, Diaspora, and Hybridity in the Context of Globalization," 195.
- 8 Hall, "Creolization, Diaspora, and Hybridity in the Context of Globalization," 196.
- 9 Hall, "Creolization, Diaspora, and Hybridity in the Context of Globalization," 295.
- 10 Hall, "Creolization, Diaspora, and Hybridity in the Context of Globalization," 196.

10. CATASTROPHE, WAKE, HAUNTOLOGY

- 1 Wynter, "Columbus, the Ocean Blue," 153.
- 2 Wynter, "Columbus, the Ocean Blue," 147.
- 3 Wilderson, *Red, White and Black*, 18.
- 4 Christina Sharpe, *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 33.
- 5 Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), xviii.

6 Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, xix.

7 Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 37.

11. BODIES OF WATER

- 1 See Édouard Glissant, *Poetics of Relation*, trans. Betsy Wing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 138.

12. SLAVE SHIP LOGICS/LOGISTICS

- 1 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, *Situation of Migrants in Transit* (Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/StudyMigrants/OHCHR_2016_Report-migrants-transit_EN.pdf.
- 2 Simone Browne, "Everybody's Got a Little Light under the Sun: Black Luminosity and the Visual Culture of Surveillance," *Cultural Studies* 26, no. 4 (2012): 542; and in Simone Browne, *Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 63–88.
- 3 See Browne, *Dark Matters*; Martha Jones, *Birthright Citizens: A History of Race and Rights in Antebellum America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Alondra Nelson, *The Social Life of DNA: Race, Reparations, and Reconciliation after the Genome* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2016).

13. PROBLEM OF THE HUMAN, OR THE VOID OF RELATIONALITY

- 1 Sylvia Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, after Man, Its Overrepresentation—an Argument," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3, no. 3 (2003): 257–337.
- 2 Wilderson, *Red, White and Black*, 18.
- 3 Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom."

14. NO HAPPY STORY

- 1 Sylvia Wynter, "On Disenchanting Discourse: 'Minority' Literary Criticism and Beyond," in *The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse*, ed. Abdul R. Jan-Mohamed and David Lloyd (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 449.
- 2 See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
- 3 Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua, "Decolonizing Anti-racism," *Social Justice* 32, no. 4 (2005): 120–43; Zainab Amadahy and Bonita Lawrence, "Indigenous Peoples and Black People in Canada: Settlers or Allies?," in *Breaching the Colonial Contract: Anti-colonialism in the US and Canada*, ed. A. Kempf (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2009), 105–36.