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THE DEFINITIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION

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WORLD WAR II

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The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection

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Foreword

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For Major General David T. Zabecki, USA retired, PhD,
distinguished military historian, exemplary colleague, and friend.

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Spencer C. Tucker, PhD, has been senior fellow in military history at ABC-CLIO since 2003. He is the author or editor of 56 books and encyclopedias, many of which have won prestigious awards. Tucker's last academic position before his retirement from teaching was the John Biggs Chair in Military History at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington. He has been a Fulbright scholar, a visiting research associate at the Smithsonian Institution, and, as a U.S. Army captain, an intelligence analyst in the Pentagon. His recently published works include *World War I: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection, Wars That Changed History: 50 of the World's Greatest Conflicts*, and *U.S. Conflict in the 21st Century: Afghanistan War, Iraq War, and the War on Terror*, all published by ABC-CLIO.

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Foreword

After the huge number of casualties and the massive destruction in what was called the Great War before it came to be referred to as World War I, most people in most countries were quite certain that one such disaster was more than enough for the century, perhaps for all time. The commemoration of the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, could be seen as one indication of this feeling. On all other days of the year, people in most communities in Europe and some in North America, Australia, New Zealand, and other parts of the world could visit local memorials erected in innumerable towns with the names of those who had lost their lives in that conflict. In the European countries that had participated in the war it would afterward have been quite difficult to find a family in which no members had been killed or wounded, and that search would have had to exclude my own family in which my father had been wounded serving in the German Army during the fighting in what became Latvia after the war.

The fact that after the armistice and the peace treaties there would be local struggles between individual countries that turned into open hostilities, internal quarrels that rose to the level of civil wars, and the resumption of prior expansionist efforts by some countries that also produced open conflicts is not terribly surprising given the troubles and ambitions in the international arena and within some states. An example of the first category would be the war between the Soviet Union and Poland in 1919–1921. The Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 is an example of the second category, and the Italian conquest of Abyssinia/Ethiopia and Japan’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931

and open war with China starting in 1937 are examples of the third category. The suffering and destruction caused by these conflicts and the legacies of hatred they left behind were indeed substantial. But how could the world essentially as a whole descend into another global war that in dimensions and effects substantially exceeded those of the war of 1914–1918?

Of those defeated in the prior great conflict, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires had dissolved, while the czarist Russian Empire had been displaced after two revolutions by a Bolshevik regime that supported communist parties in many countries but was primarily concerned about a possible capitalist coalition against itself. Germany, though defeated, had been left united, was occupied by Allied forces only in part and that only for some years, and in spite of having had to return some pieces of territory to those from whom they had been taken was in a relatively stronger position in Europe than before 1914, since there were now small countries rather than powerful empires on its southern and eastern borders. There were, however, several developments in the Germany of the postwar years that contributed to the new descent into worldwide conflict.

The reality of defeat at the front was obscured for many Germans. Unlike the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 when the victorious armies of France's enemies had marched the streets of the French capital, 1918 had seen instead of a parade of Allied soldiers one of German soldiers in Berlin. The willingness of the Allies to forgo such an event and instead allow an armistice to preclude the further casualties that a drive into Germany would have involved facilitated the spread inside Germany of what came to be known as the stab-in-the-back legend. Assiduously spread by German military leaders and some politicians and increasingly actually believed by them, the legend implied not only that domestic groups, especially socialists and Jews, had cheated Germany of the victory its armed forces had earned but also that a different internal structure that precluded any development of a similar nature would guarantee victory for a country that had come so close the last time. The intellectual isolationism of the time kept the German leadership and public from recognizing that in reality the German home front of World War I had been generally more solid and less affected by domestic dissent than that of any other major belligerent power.

A second factor was that the effort of the peacemakers at the end of the

war to implement the transition from states based on the dynastic principle to states based on the national principle was bitterly resented by most Germans. Especially hated was the obvious implication of such a restructuring of Europe: the revived independence of a Polish state that had been partitioned in the 18th century by Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The establishment of an east-west corridor connecting the Prussian and Brandenburg territories of King Frederick II of Prussia through the intervening Polish lands in 1772 was one of the accomplishments of that ruler that contributed to his being referred to in Prussia and later Germany as Frederick the Great. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles that returned much of this land to a Poland that had held it for half a millennium before 1772 was considered an absolute outrage by most Germans. As would become clear in World War II, many Germans thought it far better to adjust people to boundaries instead of boundaries to people—and would be even more outraged when the victors applied that principle to them—but there was a further aspect of the Po-lish issue that must be included in any effort to grasp what happened two decades after 1919.

In the thinking of large numbers of Germans, Poles were a form of inferior beings. The racial concepts that dominated in the German academic world and had spread widely in the population insisted on a racial hierarchy in which Slavic peoples, such as Poles, were inherently inferior to the racially categorized Germanic or Aryan people. The inclusion in the peace treaty of plebiscites in areas of doubt, where the locals would vote as to whether they thought of themselves as Germans or Poles, implied an equivalence that was deeply resented. Would one ask a human being and a cockroach which nationality one belonged to? This facet of the situation in postwar Germany needs to be seen in connection with the continuing spread of anti-Semitic attitudes according to which Jews were even lower in the scale of beings than the despised inferior Poles.

It is with this context in mind that it may be easier to understand how in one of the countries that had been very much involved in World War I a political party that called publicly for more wars to gain living space at the expense of inferior races could attain an increasing number of supporters until it became the largest in the country. In his speeches and writing, Adolf Hitler called for a one-party state, praising fascist Italy and communist Russia for having already adopted that brilliant concept. He also promised that he would be willing to lead the German people to where Germany would shed

its blood not for the little bits of territory lost by the peace treaty—advocating that this was the obvious sign of how stupid other parties and their leaders were—but for hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of land to settle German farmers. Before Hitler became chancellor of Germany, Theodor Heuss, who would become postwar West Germany's first president, published a book titled *Hitlers Weg* (Hitler's Path). It illuminated the road to war that a National Socialist government would pursue, but not enough Germans were persuaded at the time that this would be an extremely dangerous path to follow.

Once installed in power, Hitler drastically increased the rearmament of Germany already secretly under way to a small extent and, until 1933, assisted by the Soviet Union. The rearmament program was keyed to a series of wars, first against Czechoslovakia, then against France and Britain, thereafter against the Soviet Union, and then against the United States. Once the development and production of the weapons systems for what he believed would be the most difficult war, that against France and Britain, was well under way in 1937, he ordered the designing and subsequent production of the weapons systems he believed was needed for war against the United States. In his view of the inherent weakness of the Soviet Union, no new weapons systems would be needed to crush it. By what Hitler considered the fortunate Bolshevik Revolution, the prior partly Germanic ruling elite had been replaced by incompetents trying to hold together racially inferior peoples. While the United States was also considered a weak mixture of peoples and races, it was far away and had a substantial navy. Intercontinental bombers and superbattleships would take care of these obstacles, and since it would take considerable time to design and develop them, work on them needed the earliest possible start.

World conquest was the object of the program that Hitler set for Germany, and at least some of his advisers and assistants understood that, regardless of the extent to which the cheering masses of Germans who mostly held to him until 1945 believed and understood it. In that new world, there would be only Germanic and allegedly related peoples, as others were eliminated either by killing or mass sterilization. The handicapped and all Jews on Earth would have to be killed first while the rest of the demographic revolution on the globe proceeded in a series of wars.

Hitler greatly regretted turning back from the first of the series, that

against Czechoslovakia, in 1938. He considered the Munich agreement not a triumph for Germany but instead the worst mistake of his career as chancellor and made certain that no one cheated him of war in 1939, as he believed British prime minister Neville Chamberlain had done in 1938. Since Poland, unlike Hungary and Lithuania, would not subordinate itself to Germany as it struck in the west, it would be attacked first with the turn of the French and British coming either thereafter or simultaneously if they so decided. German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to sign a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union and a secret protocol that divided Eastern Europe between the two powers. To obtain Soviet aid as Germany fought Poland and the Western powers, Ribbentrop was authorized to give Joseph Stalin even more than the latter asked for, since the Germans were expecting to take it all when the time came to crush their temporary partner. The absence of Germany's ambassadors from Warsaw, London, and Paris in the last days of peace was no coincidence. Hitler was taking no chance of anything happening to deprive him of war. As he had explained to his military commanders a few days before ordering war, his only worry was that at the last moment some "Saukerl," some SOB, would come along with a compromise or other proposal.

Hitler got the war he so desperately wanted, and at first it appeared to go well for Germany. He very much hoped to strike in the west still in the fall of 1939, but a variety of factors, primarily the weather, forced a postponement to 1940. That year again all appeared to go as he had hoped, and with what looked like victory in the west he intended to invade the Soviet Union that fall. Once again technical issues obliged him to postpone that move into 1941. The first serious setback came at the same time: Britain would not give in, had won the battle against Germany's effort to gain the complete control of the sky needed to protect an invasion of the British Isles, and was clearly determined to continue to fight. In this context, Hitler looked to the Japanese as possible allies against Britain, as he had earlier been pleased to have the Soviet Union assist Germany in the crushing of Poland and the war in the west. The Tokyo authorities agreed with Berlin that this was a great opportunity to seize the colonial empires of defeated Holland and France and a threatened Britain but explained that they planned to move in 1946. Understanding that this was Japanese concern about the American intention to let the Philippines become independent in 1944 but maintain bases there

until 1946, Hitler assured Tokyo that if they moved promptly, Germany would join them in war against the United States. Since Germany was going to fight the United States anyway and the superbattleships and intercontinental bombers were not yet ready, there was from Hitler's perspective the obvious alternative to act as soon as possible by recruiting an ally who already had a big navy. It is not known at this time whether in 1940–1941 he knew that, in the same calculation as his own, the way to cope with America's large navy and ability to build more was to build superbattleships and that the Japanese were completing the three biggest warships ever constructed until then, but he did know that Japan had a very large navy.

After much discussion within government circles and after reassuring themselves that Germany and Italy were indeed going to join them in war with the United States, the Japanese struck in December 1941. With Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the British and French colonial empires already in the conflict and with fighting taking place in North and Northeast Africa and the Middle East and on the world's oceans, the conflict was already no longer simply a European war. But with Japan drawing the United States into hostilities and almost all Central and South American countries also becoming belligerents, the war had become global, with only the most minimal exceptions.

The two alliances that fought each other operated quite differently. The discussion in public at the time and the literature afterward recounted and stressed the differences among the Allied powers, but these were nothing like those on the Axis side. The Allies did have different aims, interests, and ambitions, but they managed to work together in spite of this until victory was achieved. The Americans and the British came to be especially close in their plans and operations at a time when the Axis powers never came sufficiently close to each other to quarrel seriously. In the military the most important issue is rank, but next to it comes the question of decorations. Examples from the two sides may illustrate the difference between them. In the summer of 1945 between the surrenders of Germany and Japan, the British released some of their officers and men. Churchill's liaison to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Sir Hastings Ismay, wrote a letter to General Walter Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's chief of staff, complaining about the failure of his government to award an appropriate

medal to a senior officer who was going home after six years of war without a decoration. Could Eisenhower help? General Smith responded that he remembered the officer who was not on the list of British officers that Eisenhower had sent forward but would be recommended for the appropriate medal: a general in one country's army complaining about his own government to a general in another country's army and asking that the situation be remedied and then placing the correspondence, conducted with first names, in his files where snooping historians, such as this one, can find it. This is a clear contrast to what happened when the German naval attaché in Tokyo suggested that the German government award a major decoration to Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku at the funeral ceremony in Tokyo after he had been killed in a targeted American 1943 air strike. The collection of decoded intercepts in the United States National Archives has the text of this document and the answer from Berlin: a request for a biography of Yamamoto. German World War II headquarters did not have such on the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet of its major ally!

The victory of the Allies did leave them divided in the developing Cold War but saved the world from the horrors of a system that planned a demographic revolution on the globe, a revolution of which they had made a start by killing about a third of the world's Jews, slaughtering or letting die of starvation or disease several million Soviet prisoners of war, and murdering hundreds of thousands of handicapped people, including many of their own seriously wounded veterans. Germany's generals could not blame the home front for their defeat this time, so they blamed their beloved leader Hitler instead. Having managed to have almost three times as many of their soldiers killed compared to the prior conflict, some excuse was again needed. Through their initiating war, the Germans and Japanese had brought about a major expansion of Soviet influence in Europe and prepared the way for the communists to triumph in China. At the same time, the conflict accelerated the process of decolonization and brought advances in medicine and transportation that would save lives and improve travel in the postwar world. While the Japanese in 1945 were set on a path that in effect picked up where the military had shot their way into power 15 years earlier, the Germans had to learn the hard way a lesson they had not learned after World War I: if you do not want your house to burn, don't set the world on fire.

Because the conflict had involved almost all countries on Earth, affected

quite considerably the few states that had remained neutral, cost somewhere in excess of 50 million dead, and completely altered the international landscape, it has been a subject of constant interest ever since. Books and articles about it appear almost daily, and television regularly has programs dealing with it. Vast quantities of sources have become available, sometimes in big piles, such as from the war crimes trials, sometimes in a steady stream from declassification programs, and sometimes in delayed trickles as Soviet, Chinese, and more Japanese sources become accessible. The encyclopedia in these volumes is designed to reflect the current state of knowledge for those who look for information on individuals and specific events. Because all countries generally utilized the poorest-quality paper during the war in order to save resources for more important war-related purposes, whatever remains closed will, unless microfilmed, be as inaccessible to its custodians as to all others because the paper is deteriorating into dusty and illegible fragments. New perspectives will no doubt be put forward, new questions will be asked and answered, and hitherto neglected topics will find dedicated authors, but very little new documentary material is likely to become accessible in the future.

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Preface

World War II, often heralded as “The Good War” for its presumed match of good versus evil, continues to excite our interest today perhaps more than any other world conflict. Although World War I was arguably more important in its consequences for the world than World War II, the latter conflict certainly embraced more territory and claimed many more lives. It also largely set the international borders in place today, although efforts continue to change these, as we have seen all too recently in Ukraine.

This work is the revised edition of the encyclopedia published in 2004. More comprehensive and of greater length, it has in addition to front and back matter 1,639 entries totaling some 1,220,000 words. Virtually all entries carried forward from the first edition have been revised to some extent and many have new references. There are also 212 new entries that did not appear in the first edition. We also have included additional documents in the revised edition.

This encyclopedia treats the causes, course, and effects of World War II. All entries are arranged alphabetically, with the exception of the introductory essays as well as the glossary of terms, the chronology, an explanation of military awards and decorations of the various countries involved, an explanation of military organizations, tables of ranks, and a selective bibliography. Entries treat the states involved, the major theaters of war, the campaigns, the individual battles, the major weapons systems, diplomacy, and influential individuals on both sides of the conflict. The reader will find

entries on the home fronts, the role of women in the war, and art, literature, and film. Virtually every first-edition entry has been revised.

A few words on ranks. For the most part we have used an English translation. Thus, the German “general der infanterie” appears as “general of infantry.” We follow this with other countries as well. We also use the British designation of brigadier for the equivalent U.S. rank of brigadier general. The reader will find full explanations of ranks in the back matter of ranks and tables showing equivalents.

We have throughout employed the Japanese system of expressing names; that is, the family name precedes the given name. For Chinese proper names and locations we use both pinyin and the older Wade-Giles system.

I am greatly indebted to my fine associate editor, Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr., who assisted in the selection of new entries and helped keep track of and edit the entire work, no easy task. Dr. Priscilla Mary Roberts of the University of Hong Kong produced her usual excellent work in the documents volume, which she assembled for the first edition and has now added to in the revised version. She has also written the fine introductions to the individual documents.

Three assistant editors have read all the entries and proved invaluable in their suggested changes and recommendations for additional entries. Dr. Timothy Dowling is professor of history at the Virginia Military Institute specializing in the history of 20th century Central and East European history; he is the author of a well-received study of the World War I Brusilov Offensive. Dr. David Zabecki is a retired U.S. Army major general and an author of several highly acclaimed books on World War I. He was Dr. Leo A. Shifrin Distinguished Professor in Military History at the U.S. Naval Academy in 2012 and is currently honorary senior research fellow in war studies with the University of Birmingham (England) and senior historian of the Wieder History Group. Mr. William Van Husen came to me justifiably highly rated by General Zabecki, having collaborated with him on a number of projects. Van Husen is a 24-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force, has master’s degrees from the University of Maryland and Troy State University, has taught history for the University of Maryland in its overseas division, and is currently an information technology specialist at Edwards Air Force Base, California.

I am also indebted to many individuals who contributed new entries as

well as to the assistant editors of the initial encyclopedia, who must again be mentioned here: Mr. Jack Greene; Dr. Malcolm Muir Jr.; Dr. Priscilla Mary Roberts; Colonel Cole Kingseed, USA, Retired, PhD; and General Zabecki. Dr. Law Yuk-fun of the History Department at the University of Hong Kong read all the Chinese entries and assisted with their editing and the pinyin and Wade-Giles spellings. Retired rear admiral Hirama Yoichi, PhD, located Japanese authors for many entries, checked their work, and answered many inquiries.

We are pleased to have a large number of foreign authors in this project, including scholars from such nations as Austria, Australia, Britain, China, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, and Russia. We believe that these authors provide unique perspectives and in many cases information that is not available in other sources. This reference work certainly has the most complete biographies of Chinese, Japanese, and Soviet individuals of any general encyclopedia of the war to appear in English.

Finally, I am most indebted to my wife, Dr. Beverly B. Tucker, who, while entreating me to retire, continues nonetheless to give me her full support in my writing and editing endeavors.

All of us who have labored on this encyclopedia trust that it will be an asset both to scholars researching the war and students seeking to learn more about it. We hope that it will also contribute to our understanding of how wars occur and might thereby be avoided.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

General Maps

Europe, September 1939

Participating Powers in World War II



Eastern Front, July 16, 1941–December 5, 1941

Eastern Front, 1944–1945



The Balkans, 1944–1945

Caucasus, July 1942–February 1943

Mediterranean, 1940–1943

Mediterranean Maritime Battles, 1940–1943

Norway and Baltic Sea, 1941–1945

Black Sea, 1941–1944

Pacific Theater, 1941–1945

China

Manchuria

Indian Ocean, 1942



Australia and New Guinea, 1940

Spheres of Influence, 1945

Postwar Europe, 1945

Origins of the War

On September 1, 1939, German forces invaded Poland. Two days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany to begin World War II. Some historians date the war from 1937, with the Japanese invasion of China. Japanese official histories, however, begin with 1931, when their forces overran Manchuria, but perhaps the most accurate place to begin is with the end of World War I. That conflict exacted a horrible human and economic cost, destroyed the existing power structure of Europe, and toppled all the continental empires. It also sowed the seeds for a new conflict.

In January 1919, representatives of the victorious Allied (Entente) powers met in Paris to impose peace terms on the defeated Central Powers. The centerpiece of the settlement, the Treaty of Versailles, was the worst of all possible worlds—too harsh to conciliate but too weak to destroy. It was also never enforced, making almost inevitable a renewal of the struggle.

The Paris peace settlement was drafted chiefly by Britain, France, and the United States. The Germans claimed that they had assumed that the November 1918 armistice would lead to a true negotiated peace treaty, yet in March and May 1918 when they were winning the war, their leaders had imposed a truly harsh settlement on Russia. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia lost most of its European territory, up to a third of its population, and three-quarters of its iron and coal production. It was also required to pay a heavy indemnity.

Far from being dictated by French premier George Clemenceau, as many Americans still believe, the Paris peace settlement of 1919 was largely the

work of British prime minister David Lloyd George and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, who repeatedly blocked proposals advanced by Clemenceau. The irony is that the British and American leaders prevented a settlement that, although punitive, might have brought actual French and Belgian security and prevented war in 1939.

The most novel creation of the conference was undoubtedly the League of Nations. Clemenceau did not place much stock in a league, but if there had to be one he wanted mandatory membership and an independent military force. The Anglo-American league relied primarily on moral suasion; its strongest weapon was the threat of sanctions.

The most contentious issue at the peace conference, and arguably its most important matter, was that of French and Belgian security. Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France, and for security purposes Belgium received the two small border enclaves of Eupen and Malmédy. France was granted the coal production of the Saar for 15 years in compensation for Germany's deliberate destruction of French mines at the end of the war. The Saar itself came under League of Nations control, with its inhabitants to decide their future at the end of the period.

A storm of controversy broke out over the Rhineland, the German territory west of the Rhine River, however. France wanted this area to be reconstituted into one or more independent states that would maintain a permanent Allied military presence to guarantee that Germany would not again strike west, but Lloyd George and Wilson saw taking the Rhineland from Germany as "an Alsace-Lorraine in reverse." They also wished to end the Allied military presence on German soil as soon as a peace treaty was signed.

These vast differences were resolved when Clemenceau agreed to yield on the Rhineland in return for an Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee, whereby Britain and the United States promised to come to the aid of France should Germany ever invade. The Rhineland would remain part of the new German Republic but would be permanently demilitarized, along with a belt of German territory east of the Rhine 30 miles deep. Allied garrisons would remain for only a limited period: the British would occupy a northern zone for 5 years, the Americans a central zone for 10 years, and the French a southern zone for 15 years. Unfortunately for France, the pact for which it traded away national security never came into force. The U.S. Senate refused

to ratify it, and the British government claimed that its acceptance was contingent on American approval.

Germany lost some other territory: northern Schleswig to Denmark and a portion of Silesia and the Polish Corridor to the new state of Poland—both of which the Allies justified along ethnic lines. The Polish Corridor allowed Poland access to the sea but also separated East Prussia from the remainder of Germany and became a major rallying point for German nationalists. Despite these losses, German power remained largely intact; it was still the most powerful state in Central and Western Europe. Nonetheless, Germans keenly resented the territorial losses.

The Treaty of Versailles also limited Germany in both the size and nature of its military establishment. The new German Army, the Reichswehr, was restricted to 100,000 men (with only 6,000 of these officers) in 12-year enlistments. It was denied heavy artillery, tanks, and military aviation, and the German General Staff was to be abolished. The navy was limited to 6 predreadnought battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and no submarines. From the beginning the Germans violated these provisions. The General Staff remained, although clandestinely in the guise of the Truppenamt (Troop Office); Germany maintained military equipment that was to have been destroyed and worked out arrangements with other states, notably the new Soviet Union, to develop weapons and train military personnel.

Other major provisions of the settlement included Article 231, the “war guilt clause.” It blamed the war on Germany and its allies and was the justification for reparations, which were fixed at $33 billion in 1920, well after Germany had signed the treaty on June 28, 1919. British economist John Maynard Keynes claimed that reparations were a perpetual mortgage on Germany’s future and that there was no way the Germans could pay them, yet Adolf Hitler’s Germany subsequently spent more in rearming. In any case Germany, unlike France following the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, was never really forced to pay.

The breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the peace treaties following the war led to the creation of a number of new states in Central Europe, most notably Poland but also Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Resolving the boundaries of Poland proved difficult, especially in the east; it was not until December 1919 that a commission headed by Lord Curzon

drew that line. Neither the new Po-lish government nor Soviet Russia recognized it, however. Romania was greatly enlarged with the addition of Transylvania, which was taken from Hungary, the other principal loser at the peace conference; it was left with only 35 percent of its prewar area. The much reduced rump states of Austria and Hungary were now confronted by Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The latter three, the so-called Little Entente, allied to prevent a resurgence of their former masters. They were linked with France through a treaty of mutual assistance between that nation and Czechoslovakia.

The Allied solidarity of 1918, more illusion than reality, soon disappeared. When the peace treaties were signed, the United States was already withdrawing into isolation, and Britain was disengaging from the continent. This left France alone among the great powers to enforce the peace settlement. Yet France was weaker in terms of population and economic strength than Germany. In effect, it was left up to the Germans to decide whether they would abide by the treaty provisions, which all Germans regarded as a vengeful *Diktat.* Moreover, the shame of the Versailles settlement was borne not by the kaiser or the army—who had been responsible for the decisions that led to the defeat—but rather by the leaders of the new democratic Weimar Republic.

The new German government deliberately adopted obstructionist policies, and by 1923 it had halted major reparations payments. French premier Raymond Poincaré acted. He believed that if the Germans were allowed to break part of the settlement, the remainder would soon unravel. In January 1923 Poincaré sent French troops, supported by Belgian and Italian units, into the Ruhr, the industrial heart of Germany. German chancellor Wilhelm Cuno’s government adopted a policy of “passive resistance,” urging the workers not to work and promising to pay their salaries. The German leaders thereby hoped to secure sufficient time for the United States and Britain to force France to depart. Although that pressure was forthcoming, Poincaré refused to back down, and the result was catastrophic inflation in Germany.

The mark had already gone from 4.2 to the dollar in July 1914 to 8.9 in January 1919. It then tumbled precipitously because of deliberate German government policies. By January 1920 it was 39.5 to the dollar, and in January 1922 it was 191.8 to the dollar. Then came the French occupation of the Ruhr and Cuno’s ruinous policy. In January 1923 the mark was 17,972 to

the dollar, but by July it was 353,412. In November when the old mark was withdrawn in favor of a new currency, the mark was 4.2 trillion to the dollar. The ensuing economic chaos wiped out the German middle class, many of whom now lost all faith in democracy and voted for Adolf Hitler a decade later.

Germany now agreed to pay reparations under a scaled-down schedule, and French troops withdrew from the Ruhr in 1924. Although Frenchmen generally approved of Poincaré's action, they also noted its high financial cost and the opposition of Britain and the United States. These factors helped bring the Left to power in France in 1924, and the new government reversed Poincaré's go-it-alone approach. The new German government of Chancellor Gustav Stresemann, moreover, announced a policy of living up to its treaty obligations. "Fulfillment" and "conciliation" replaced "obstruction" and led to the Locarno Pacts of 1925, by which Germany voluntarily guaranteed its western borders as final and promised not to resort to war with its neighbors and to resolve any disputes through arbitration. For at least half a decade international calm prevailed.

By the 1930s national boundaries were still basically those agreed to in 1919. Italy, Germany, and Japan were still dissatisfied with this situation, however, and in the 1930s the economic difficulties resulting from the Great Depression enhanced popular support in those nations for politicians and military leaders who supported drastic measures, even at the risk of war, to change the situation in the "revisionist" powers' favor. The status quo powers of France, Great Britain, and the United States saw no advantage in making changes but were simultaneously unwilling to risk war to defend the 1919 settlement. They therefore acquiesced as, step by step, the dissatisfied powers dismantled the peace settlement. From the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, those who wanted to overturn the status quo used force but not those who sought to maintain it.

The Western democracies seemed paralyzed. This was partly because of the heavy human cost of World War I. France alone had lost 1,397,800 dead or missing in the conflict. Including wounded, 73 percent of French combatants had been casualties. France could not sustain another such bloodletting, and the defensive military doctrine it adopted came to be summed up in the phrase "Stingy with blood; extravagant with steel." In 1929 France began construction of a defensive belt along the frontier from

Switzerland to Belgium. Named for Minister of War André Maginot and never intended as a puncture-proof barricade, the Maginot Line nonetheless helped fix a defensive mind-set in the French military.

By the 1930s, attitudes toward the Great War had changed. German people believed that their nation had not lost the war militarily but had been betrayed by communists, leftists, pacifists, and Jews. Especially in Britain and the United States, many came to believe that the Central Powers had not been responsible for the war, that nothing had been gained by the war, and that the settlement had been too hard on Germany.

In Britain there was some sympathy in influential upper-class circles for fascist doctrines and dictators, who were seen as opponents of communism. British member of Parliament Winston Churchill, for example, praised Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. The British government avoided continental commitments, and its leaders embraced appeasement, the notion that meeting the more legitimate demands of the dictators would remove all need for war. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain (1937–1940) was the principal architect of this policy. There was also great concern in Britain, as elsewhere, over the possible air bombardment of cities in any future war.

The United States had been one of the few powers actually to benefit from the war. At modest cost in terms of human casualties, it had emerged from the struggle as the world's leading financial power. Yet Americans were dissatisfied with their involvement in European affairs; they believed that they had been misled by wartime propaganda and that the arms manufacturers (the so-called merchants of death) had drawn the nation into the war to ensure payment for sales to the Entente side. In the 1930s the United States adhered to rigid neutrality, and Congress passed legislation preventing the United States from loaning money or selling arms to combatants in a war. Unfortunately, such legislation benefited the aggressor states, which were already well armed, and handicapped their victims. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–1945) understood the threat that the aggressors posed to the world community, but most Americans eschewed international involvement.

The Soviet Union was also largely absorbed in its internal affairs. Following World War I, Russia experienced a protracted and bloody civil war as the communist "Reds," who had seized control in November 1917, fought off the "Whites," who were supported by the Western Allies. War

communism ended with the Russian Civil War in 1921 and was replaced by the New Economic Policy, which was a mixed economy and brought the country back to stability and, by 1928, prewar levels of production and consumption. If any era qualifies in Soviet Russia, this period (1921–1928) was its golden age. In the 1930s Soviet leader Joseph Stalin pushed both the collectivization of agriculture, bringing the deaths of millions of Soviet citizens and the industrialization essential for modern warfare.

In foreign policy, Stalin was a revisionist who did not accept the new frontiers in Eastern Europe as final. Particularly vexing to him was the new Poland, which had been partially carved from former Russian territory. Russia had also lost additional lands to Poland following its defeat in the 1919–1920 Russo-Polish War.

After 1933 and Adolf Hitler's accession to power, Stalin became especially disturbed over Germany, for the German führer (leader) had clearly stated his opposition to communism and his intention of bringing large stretches of Eastern Europe under German control, even by the sword. The German threat led Stalin to turn to collective security and to pursue an internationalist course. In 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations.

Simultaneously, Stalin launched unprecedented purges against his own people, largely motivated by his own paranoia and desire to hold on to power. The number of victims may have been as high as 40 million, with half of these killed. The so-called Great Terror consumed almost all the old guard Bolshevik leadership and senior military officers. The consequences of the latter were felt in 1941 when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union.

Negotiations between Western leaders and the Soviet Union continued. The problem was that the West could offer nothing Stalin wanted. Thus, despite the fact that the Kremlin was willing to enter into arrangements with the West against Germany and Japan, no effective international coalition was forged.

In 1931 Japan seized Manchuria. Japan had been one of the chief beneficiaries of World War I. At little cost, it had secured the German islands north of the equator and concessions in China. Riding the crest of an ultranationalist wave, Japanese leaders sought to take advantage of the chaos of the worldwide economic depression and the continuing upheaval in China after the 1911 revolution to secure the natural resources their country lacked.

The Japanese sought these not only in Manchuria but also in Mongolia, China proper, and Southeast Asia.

Although Japan had many of the trappings of a democracy, it was not one. The army and navy departments were independent of the civilian authorities; from 1936 onward the ministers of war and navy had to be serving officers, giving the military a veto over public policy, as no government could be formed without its concurrence. Army leaders had little sympathy for parliamentary rule or civil government, and in the 1930s they dominated the government and occasionally resorted to political assassinations, even of prime ministers.

On the night of September 18, 1931, Japanese staff officers of the elite Guandong (Kwantung) Army in southern Manchuria set off an explosion near the main line of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden, an act they blamed on nearby Chinese soldiers. The Japanese military then took control of Mukden and began the conquest of all Manchuria. Tokyo had been presented with a fait accompli by its own military, but it supported the action.

The Japanese held that they had acted only in self-defense and demanded that the crisis be resolved through direct Sino-Japanese negotiation. China, however, took the matter to the League of Nations, the first major test for that organization. The League Council was reluctant to embark on tough action against Japan, and Japan ignored its calls to withdraw its troops, continuing military operations. In February 1932 Japan proclaimed the “independence” of Manchuria in the guise of the new state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo). A protocol that September established a Japanese protectorate over Manchukuo. In 1934 the Japanese installed China’s last Manchu emperor, deposed in 1911, Aixinjuelo Puyi (Aisingioro P’u-i, known to Westerners as Henry Pu-Yi) as emperor of Manchukuo.

A League of Nations investigating committee blamed Japan and concluded that only the presence of Japanese troops kept the government of Manchukuo in power. On February 24, 1933, the League Assembly approved the report of its committee and the Stimson doctrine, named for Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, of nonrecognition of Manchukuo. Of 42 member states, only Japan voted no. Tokyo then gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the League of Nations.

Manchukuo was larger than France and Germany combined, but in March Japanese troops added to it the province of Rehe (Jehol). Early in April they

moved against Chinese forces south of the Great Wall to within a few miles of Beijing (Peking) and Tianjin (Tienstin). In May Chinese forces evacuated Beijing, then under the authority of pro-Japanese Chinese leaders. The latter concluded a truce with Japan that created a demilitarized zone administered by Chinese friendly to Japan.

Germany was the next to move. In January 1933 Adolf Hitler became German chancellor, by entirely legitimate means, and in October 1933 he withdrew Germany from both the League of Nations and the international disarmament conference meeting in Geneva. In July 1934 Austrian Nazis, acting with the tacit support of Berlin, attempted to seize power in Vienna and achieve Anschluss (union) with Germany. Ultimately Austrian authorities put down the putsch without outside assistance, although Mussolini, who considered Austria under his influence, ordered Italian troops to the Brenner Pass.

Germany was then still largely unarmed, and Hitler denied responsibility for the coup attempt, expressed regret at the murder of Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, and assured the world that Germany had no role in the failed coup. The attempted Nazi takeover of Austria was clearly a setback for Hitler. Secure in French support, that September Mussolini met with new Austrian chancellor Kurt von Schu-schnigg in Rome and announced that Italy would defend Austrian independence. A French pact with Italy rested on agreement with Yugoslavia, and on October 9, 1934, King Alexander of Yugoslavia arrived at Marseilles for discussions with the French government. Croatian terrorists assassinated him and French foreign minister Louis Barthou. This event was a great embarrassment for France, although Barthou's successor, Pierre Laval, did secure the pact with Italy. The January 1935 French-Italian accords called for joint consultation and close cooperation between the two powers in Central Europe and reaffirmed the independence and territorial integrity of Austria. They also recommended a multilateral security pact for Eastern Europe. In secret provisions Italy promised to support France with its air force in the event of a German move into the Rhineland, and France agreed to provide troops to aid Italy if the Germans should threaten Austria. France also transferred land to the Italian colonies of Libya and Eritrea, and Laval promised Mussolini that France would not oppose Italy's efforts to realize its colonial ambitions. Thereafter Mussolini behaved as if he had France's approval to wage aggressive war.

Only a week later, with Hitler declaring the Saar to be his last territorial demand in Europe (the first of many such statements), 90 percent of Saarlanders voting chose to rejoin Germany. On March 1, 1935, the League Council formally returned the Saar to German control. A fortnight afterward on March 16, Hitler proclaimed the rearmament of Germany. Secret rearmament had been under way for some time, including an air training center at Lipetsk, a gas warfare school at Torski, and a tank school at Kazan, all in the Soviet Union, but Hitler now announced publicly that the Reich would reintroduce compulsory military service and increase its army to more than 500,000 men, moves he justified on the grounds that the Allies had not disarmed. France, Britain, and Italy all protested but did nothing further to compel Germany to observe its treaty obligations. In April 1935 Laval, Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald of Britain, and Mussolini met at Stresa on Lake Maggiori and formed the so-called Stresa Front, agreeing "to oppose unilateral repudiation of treaties that may endanger the peace" (with "of Europe" being added at Mussolini's request).

On May 2, France and the Soviet Union signed a five-year pact of mutual assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression against either power. The French rejected a military convention that would have coordinated their military response to any German aggression, however. On May 16 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed a similar mutual assistance pact, but the Soviet Union was not obligated to provide armed assistance unless France first fulfilled its commitments.

Britain took the next step in the appeasement of Germany, shattering the Stresa Front. On June 18, 1935, the British government signed a naval agreement with Germany that condoned the latter's violation of the Versailles Treaty. In spite of having promised Paris in February that it would take no unilateral action toward Germany, London permitted the Reich to build a surface navy up to 35 percent that of Britain, in effect a force larger than the navy of either France or Italy. London also allowed Germany 45 percent of the Royal Navy strength in submarines, armaments prohibited Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. British leaders were unconcerned. The Royal Navy had only 50 submarines, and this would mean that the Germans could build only 23. Moreover, the British were confident that asdic, later known as sonar, would enable them to detect submarines out to a range of several thousand yards. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was the first occasion

when any power sanctioned Germany's misdeeds and won Britain the displeasure of its ally France.

On October 3, 1935, believing with some justification that he had Western support, Mussolini invaded Ethiopia (Abyssinia). Long-standing border disputes between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia were the excuse. Mussolini's goal was to create a great Italian empire in Africa and to avenge Italy's defeat by the Ethiopians at Adowa in 1896. The outcome of the Italo-Ethiopian War was a foregone conclusion. In May 1936 Italian forces took Abbis Ababa, and Mussolini proclaimed the king of Italy as the emperor of Ethiopia.

On October 7, 1935, the League of Nations condemned Italy, the first time it had branded a European state as an aggressor. But behind the scenes British foreign secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and French foreign minister Pierre Laval devised the infamous Hoare-Laval Proposals to broker away Ethiopia to Italy in return for Italian support against Germany. Public furor in these two countries swept both men from office when the deal became known.

Ultimately the League of Nations voted to impose some economic sanctions but not on oil, which would have brought an Italian withdrawal. In the end, even those ineffectual sanctions that had been voted for were lifted. Italy, like Japan, had gambled and won, dealing another blow to collective security.

Probably the seminal event on the road to World War II occurred in early 1936, when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland. On March 7, 1936, some 22,000 lightly armed German troops marched into the Rhineland, defying not just the Treaty of Versailles but also the Locarno Pacts, which Germany had voluntarily negotiated. Hitler deliberately scheduled the operation to occur while France was absorbed by a bitterly contested election campaign that brought the leftist Popular Front to power.

Incredibly, France had no contingency plans for such an eventuality. French intelligence services also grossly overestimated the size of the German forces in the operation and believed Hitler's false claims that the Luftwaffe had achieved parity with the French Armée de l'Air. Vainly seeking to disguise its own inaction, Paris appealed to Britain for support, but Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made it clear that Britain would not fight for the Rhineland, which was after all German territory.

Had the French acted, their forces would in all likelihood have rolled over

the Germans, which would probably have meant the end of the Nazi regime. Remilitarization of the Rhineland provided Germany protection for the Ruhr and a springboard for invading France and Belgium. It also led Belgian leaders that October to renounce their treaty of mutual assistance with France and seek security in neutrality.

Almost immediately after the German remilitarization of the Rhineland another international crisis erupted, this time in Spain, where civil war began on July 18, 1936. The issue centered on whether Spain would follow the modernizing reforms of the rest of Western Europe or maintain its then-present structure, favored by Spanish traditionalists. When the Republicans won a narrow victory in the Spanish elections of 1936, the traditionalists, known as the Nationalists, took to arms.

It is probable, though by no means certain, that the Republicans would have won the civil war had Spain been left alone to decide its fate. Certainly the conflict would have ended much sooner. Germany and Italy intervened early, providing critical air support that allowed the airlifting of Nationalist troops and equipment across the Strait of Gibraltar from Morocco to Nationalist-held territory in Spain, in effect the first large-scale military airlift in history.

Germany even formed an air detachment, the Kondor Legion, to fight in Spain, a key factor in the ultimate Nationalist victory. The Germans also tested their latest military equipment under combat conditions, developed new fighter tactics, and learned the necessity of close coordination of air and ground operations, along with the value of dive-bombing. Italy also provided important naval support and sent three divisions of troops, artillery, and aircraft.

Surprisingly, the Western democracies did not support the Spanish Republic. France initially sent some arms but, under heavy British pressure, reversed its stance. British leaders devised a noninterventionist policy. Although all the great powers promised to observe it, only the Western democracies did so. This agreement, which made it impossible for the Republicans to obtain the arms they needed, was probably the chief factor in their defeat.

Only the Soviet Union and Mexico provided military aid to the Republic. Stalin apparently hoped for a protracted struggle that would entangle the Western democracies and Germany on the other side of the European

continent. During the war the Soviet Union sent advisers, aircraft, tanks, and artillery. Eventually this Soviet aid permitted the Spanish communists, not a significant political factor in 1936, to take over the Republican government. Finally, in March 1939 Nationalist forces, led by General Francisco Franco, entered Madrid, and by April hostilities ended.

The Western democracies emerged poorly from the test of the Spanish Civil War. Although tens of thousands of foreign volunteers had fought in Spain, most of these for the republic, the governments of the Western democracies had remained aloof, and many doubted that the West had any will left to defend democracy. Internationally, the major effect of the fighting in Spain was to bring Germany and Italy together. In October 1936 they agreed to cooperate in Spain, to collaborate in matters of "parallel interests," and to work to defend "European civilization" against communism. Thus was born the Rome-Berlin Axis.

On November 25 Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact to oppose activities of the Comintern (Third International), created to spread communism. Germany and Japan also signed a secret agreement the same day that provided that if either state was the object of an unprovoked attack by the Soviet Union, then the other would do nothing to assist the Soviet Union. On November 6, 1937, Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. Shortly afterward Mussolini announced that Italy would not assist Austria against a German attempt to consummate the Anschluss. Italy also withdrew from the League of Nations and recognized Manchukuo as an independent state in November 1937, followed by Germany in May 1938.

Japan meanwhile continued to strengthen its position in the Far East, asserting its exclusive right to control China. Tokyo demanded an end to Western loans and military advisers to China and threatened the use of force if such aid continued. In 1935 Japan began encroaching upon several of China's northern provinces. The Chinese government at Nanjing (Nanking), headed by Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), initially pursued a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis the Japanese, but students and the Chinese military demanded action. The Chinese Communists expressed themselves willing to cooperate with the Nationalist government and place their armies under its command if Nanjing would adopt an anti-Japanese policy. The rapid growth of anti-Japanese sentiment in China and the increasing military

strength of the Nationalists alarmed Japanese military leaders, who worked to establish a pro-Japanese regime in China's five northern provinces.

On the night of July 7, 1937, a clash occurred west of Beijing between Japanese and Chinese troops. Later that month after Nanjing rejected a Japanese ultimatum, the Japanese invaded the coveted northern provinces. In a few days they had occupied both Tianjin (Tientsin) and Beijing (Peking), and by the end of the year Japan had extended its control into all five Chinese provinces north of the Yellow River. In mid-December Japan also installed a new government in Beijing. Japan never declared war against China, however, enabling it to evade U.S. neutrality legislation and purchase American raw materials and oil. This also permitted Washington to send aid to China, though.

The fighting was not confined to northern China, for in August 1937 the Japanese attacked the great commercial city of Shanghai. Not until November, after three months of hard fighting involving the best Nationalist troops, did the city fall. Japanese forces then advanced up the Changjiang (Yangtse) River and in December took Nanjing, where they committed wide-scale atrocities.

As scholars have noted, Japan after the war developed a collective amnesia over its actions at Nanjing and its atrocities in the war through South Asia in general. This Japanese evasion of responsibility stands in sharp contrast to German attempts to come to terms with the Holocaust and has affected Japan's relations with China and other nations in Asia right up to the present.

While trying to clear the Changjiang River of all Western shipping, on December 12, 1937, Japanese forces attacked a U.S. Navy gunboat, the *Panay.* Other American ships belonging to an oil company were also bombed and sunk, and British vessels were shelled. Strong protests from Washington and London brought profuse apologies from Tokyo. The Japanese, falsely claiming that they had not realized the nationality of the ships, stated their readiness to pay compensation and give guarantees that such incidents would not be repeated. Washington and London accepted these amends, and the episode only served to convince Tokyo that it had little to fear from Western intervention.

Again China appealed to the League of Nations, which once more condemned Japan. Again, though, the West failed to withhold critical

supplies and financial credits from Japan, so once more collective security failed. By the end of 1938 Japanese troops had taken the great commercial cities of Tianjin, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Hankow, and Guangzhou (Canton); the Nationalists were forced to relocate their capital to the interior city of Chongqing (Chungking), which Japan bombed heavily. In desperation, the Chinese demolished the dikes on the Huang He (Hwang Ho, known to Westerners as the Yellow River), costing hundreds of thousands of lives and flooding much of northern China until 1944.

Japan was also confronting the Soviet Union. Fighting between Japanese and Soviet troops began in 1938 in the poorly defined triborder area normally referred to as Changkufeng where Siberia, Manchukuo, and Korea met. Although no state of war was declared, significant battles were fought, especially at Changkufeng Hill in 1938 and Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan) in 1939. The fighting ended advantageously for the Soviets. A cease-fire in September 1939 preempted a planned Japanese counterattack, and the dispute was resolved by treaty in June 1940. The fighting undoubtedly influenced Stalin's decision to sign a nonaggression pact with Germany in August 1939. It also gave Tokyo a new appreciation of Soviet fighting ability and in 1941 helped to influence Japanese leaders to strike not north into Siberia but against the easier targets of the European colonies in Southeast Asia.

In the West, by 1938 the situation was such as to encourage Hitler to embark upon his own territorial expansion. Mussolini was now linked with Hitler, while France was experiencing another period of ministerial instability. In Britain "appeasement" was in full force, so much so that in February 1938 Anthony Eden, a staunch proponent of collective security, resigned as foreign secretary.

Austria was Hitler's first step. In February 1938, Austrian chancellor Schuschnigg traveled to Berchtesgaden at Hitler's insistence to meet with the German leader. Under heavy pressure, Schuschnigg agreed to appoint Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart as minister of the interior and other Austrian Nazis as ministers of justice and foreign affairs. On March 9, however, in an attempt to maintain his nation's independence, Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite on the issue of the Anschluss to be held in only four days, hoping that the short interval would not allow the Nazis to mobilize effectively.

Hitler was determined that no plebiscite be held, and on March 11 Seyss-

Inquart presented Schuschnigg with an ultimatum demanding his resignation and postponement of the vote under threat of invasion by German troops, already mobilized on the border. Schuschnigg yielded, canceling the plebiscite and resigning. Seyss-Inquart then took power and invited in the German troops “to preserve order,” although German forces had already crossed the frontier. Germany’s military was hardly ready for war; hundreds of German tanks and vehicles of the German Eighth Army broke down on the drive toward Vienna.

On March 13 Berlin declared Austria to be part of the Reich, and the next day perhaps 1 million Austrians gave Hitler an enthusiastic welcome to Vienna. France and Britain lodged formal protests with Berlin but did nothing more. After the war Austrian leaders denied culpability for their association with the Third Reich and claimed that their country was the first victim of Nazi aggression.

The Anschluss greatly strengthened Germany’s position in Central Europe. Germany was now in direct contact with Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary and controlled virtually all the communications of Southeastern Europe. Czechoslovakia was isolated, and its trade outlets were at German mercy. Militarily, Germany outflanked the powerful western Czech defenses. It was thus not surprising that despite Hitler’s pledges to respect the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, he should next seek to bring that state under his control.

In Austria, Hitler had added 6 million Germans to the Reich, but another 3.5 million lived in Czechoslovakia. Germans living there had long complained about discrimination in a state that had only minority Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians, and Poles. In 1938, however, Czechoslovakia had the highest standard of living east of Germany and was the only remaining democracy in Central Europe.

Strategically, Czechoslovakia was the keystone of Europe. It had a military alliance with France, a well-trained 400,000-man army, and the important Skoda munitions complex at Pilsen as well as strong fortifications in the west. Unfortunately for the Czechs, the latter were in the Erzegeberge (Ore Mountains) bordering the Bohemian bowl, where the population was almost entirely German. From the German point of view, it could now be said that Bohemia-Moravia, almost one-third German in population, protruded into the Reich. Hitler now took up and enlarged the past demands of Konrad

Henlein's Sudetendeutsch (Southern German) Party to relieve legitimate complaints into a call for outright separation of the German regions from Czechoslovakia and their union with Germany.

In May 1938 during key Czechoslovakian elections, German troops massed on the border and threatened invasion. Confident of French support, the Czechs mobilized their army. Both France and the Soviet Union had stated their willingness to go to war to defend Czechoslovakia, and in the end nothing happened. Hitler then began to construct fortifications along the German frontier in the west. Known to Germans as the West Wall, these were clearly designed to prevent France from supporting its eastern allies.

Western leaders, who believed that they had just averted war, now pondered whether Czechoslovakia, which had been formed only as a consequence of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, was worth a general European war. British prime minister Chamberlain concluded that it was not. In July he sent an emissary to Prague as a mediator and, on September 7, based on his suggestions, Prague offered Henlein practically everything the Sudeten Germans demanded, short of independence.

A number of knowledgeable Germans believed that Hitler was leading their state to destruction. During August and early September 1938 several opposition emissaries traveled to London with messages from head of the Abwehr (German military intelligence) Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and chief of the German General Staff General of Artillery Ludwig Beck. They warned London of Hitler's intentions and urged a strong British stand. Beck even pledged, prior to his resignation in mid-August, that if Britain would agree to fight for Czechoslovakia, he would stage a putsch against Hitler. Nothing came of this, however, as London was committed to appeasement.

By mid-September Hitler was demanding "self-determination" for the Sudeten Germans and threatening war if it was not granted. Clearly, he was promoting a situation to justify German military intervention. France would then have to decide whether to honor its pledge to Czechoslovakia. If it chose to do so, this would bring on a general European war.

In this critical situation Chamberlain asked Hitler for a personal meeting and on September 15 flew to Germany and met with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. There Hitler informed him that the Sudeten Germans must be able to unite with Germany and that he was willing to risk war to accomplish this. London and Paris now decided to force the principle of self-determination on Prague,

demanding on September 19 that the Czechs agree to an immediate transfer to Germany of those areas more than 50 percent German. When Prague asked that the matter be referred to arbitration, as provided under the Locarno Pacts, London and Paris declared this unacceptable. The Czechs, they said, would have to accept the Anglo-French proposals or bear the consequences alone.

The British and French decision to desert Czechoslovakia resulted from many factors. The peoples of both countries dreaded a general war, especially with air attacks, for which neither nation believed itself adequately prepared. The Germans also bluffed the British and French into believing that their Luftwaffe was much more powerful than was the case, and both Chamberlain and French premier Édouard Daladier feared the destruction of their capitals from the air. The Western leaders also thought they would be fighting alone. They did not believe they could count on the Soviet Union, whose military was still reeling from Stalin's purges. It also seemed unlikely that the United States would assist even with supplies, given its neutrality policies. Nor were the British dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa likely to support Great Britain in a war for Czechoslovakia. In France and especially in Britain there were also those who saw Nazism as a bulwark against communism and hoped that Hitler could be diverted eastward and enmeshed in a war with Soviet Russia in which communism and fascism might destroy one another.

Chamberlain, who had scant experience in foreign affairs, hoped to reconcile differences and prevent a general European war. He strongly believed in the sanctity of contracts and could not accept that the leader of the most powerful state in Western Europe was a blackmailer and a liar. But the West also suffered from a moral uncertainty. In 1919 it had touted "self-determination of peoples," and by this standard Germany had a right to all it had hitherto demanded. The transfer of the Sudetenland to the Reich did not seem too high a price to pay for a satisfied Germany and a peaceful Europe. Finally, Hitler stated repeatedly that once his demands upon Czechoslovakia had been satisfied, he would have no further territorial ambitions in Europe.

Under heavy British and French pressure, Czechoslovakia accepted the Anglo-French proposals. On September 22 Chamberlain again traveled to Germany and met with Hitler, who, to Chamberlain's surprise, demanded that all Czech officials be withdrawn from the Sudeten area within 10 days and that no military, economic, or traffic establishments be damaged or removed.

These demands led to the most serious international crisis in Europe since 1918. Prague informed London that Hitler's demands were absolutely unacceptable. London and Paris agreed and decided not to pressure Prague to secure its acceptance. It thus appeared that Hitler might have to carry out his threat to use force and that a general European war might result.

Following appeals by Roosevelt and Mussolini to Hitler, however, the German leader agreed to a meeting. Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini then repaired to Munich to meet with Hitler on September 29. The Soviet Union was not invited, and Czechoslovakia was not officially represented. There were no real negotiations, the object being to give Hitler the Sudetenland in order to avoid war.

The Munich agreement, dated September 30, gave Hitler everything he demanded, and early on October 1, 1938, German troops marched across the frontier. Other neighboring states joined in. Poland demanded, and received, an area around Teschen of some 400 square miles with a population of 240,000 people, only 100,000 of whom were Poles, and in November Hungary secured some 4,800 square miles of Czechoslovakia with about 1 million people.

In retrospect, it would have been better for the West to have fought Germany in September 1938. The lineup against Germany might have included the Soviet Union and Poland, but even discounting them, the German Army would have been forced to fight against France and Britain as well as Czechoslovakia. Hitler's claims to the contrary, Germany was not ready for war in September 1938. The Luftwaffe had 1,230 first-line aircraft, including 600 bombers and 400 fighters, but nearly half of this number was earmarked for use in the east, leaving the rest too thinly stretched over the Reich frontier to counter any serious offensive by the French Air Force and the Royal Air Force (RAF). The Luftwaffe was also short of bombs. Worse, on the ground only five German fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions were available to hold eight times that number of French divisions.

Britain too was far from ready, its rearmament program having begun only the year before. France had many more artillery pieces than Germany but was weak in the air. According to one estimate, France had only 250 first-quality fighters and 350 bombers out of perhaps 1,375 frontline aircraft, but France could have counted on 35 well-armed and well-equipped Czech

divisions, backed by substantial numbers of artillery and tanks, and perhaps 1,600 aircraft.

Later those responsible for the Munich debacle advanced the argument that it bought a year for the Western democracies to rearm. Winston Churchill stated that British fighter squadrons equipped with modern aircraft rose from only 5 in September 1938 to 26 by July 1939 (and 47 by July 1940), but he also noted that the year "gained" by Munich left the democracies "in a much worse position compared to Hitler's Germany than they had been at the Munich crisis."

The September 1938 crisis had far-reaching international effects. Chamberlain and Daladier were received with cheers at home, the British prime minister reporting that he believed he had brought back "peace in our time." But the agreement effectively ended the French security system, since its eastern allies now questioned French commitments to them. Stalin, always suspicious, was further alienated from the West. He expressed the view that Chamberlain and Daladier had surrendered Czechoslovakia to Hitler to facilitate Germany's Drang nach Osten (Drive to the East) and a war between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Despite Hitler's assurance that the Sudetenland was his last territorial demand, events soon proved the contrary. The day after Munich, Hitler told his aides that he would annex the remainder of the country at the first opportunity. Within a few months Hitler took advantage of the internal situation in Czechoslovakia. In March 1939 he threw his support to the leader of the Slovak Popular Party, Jozef Tiso, who sought complete independence for Slovakia. On March 14 Slovakia and Ruthenia declared their independence. That same day Hitler summoned elderly Czech president Emil Hácha to Berlin, where the commander of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, threatened the immediate destruction of Prague unless Moravia and Bohemia were made Reich protectorates. German bombers, he alleged, were awaiting the order to take off. Hácha signed, and that same day, March 15, Nazi troops occupied what remained of Czechoslovakia. The Czech lands became the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia," while Slovakia became a vassal state of the Reich.

Thirty-five highly trained and well-equipped Czech divisions disappeared from the anti-Hitler order of battle. Hitler had also eliminated what he had referred to as "that damned airfield," while the output of the Skoda arms

complex would now supply the Reich's legions. In Bohemia and Moravia the Wehrmacht acquired 1,582 aircraft, 2,000 artillery pieces, and sufficient equipment to arm 20 divisions. Any increase in armaments that Britain and France achieved by March 1939 was more than counterbalanced by German gains in Czechoslovakia, which included nearly one-third of the tanks they deployed in the west in the spring of 1940. Between August 1938 and September 1939 Skoda produced nearly as many arms as all British arms factories combined.

Hungarian troops crossed into Ruthenia and incorporated it into Hungary. Later in March Germany demanded from Lithuania the immediate return of Memel, with its mostly German population. Lithuania had received the Baltic city after World War I to gain access to the sea but had no recourse but to comply.

Hitler's seizure of the rest of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that his demands were not limited to Germans and were rather determined by the desire for *Lebensraum* (living space). His repudiation of the formal pledges given Chamberlain at Munich did serve to convince the British that they could no longer trust Hitler. Indeed, Britain and France responded with a series of guarantees to the smaller states now threatened by Germany.

Clearly Poland would be the next pressure point, as the German press orchestrated charges of Polish brutality against its German minority. On March 31 Britain and France extended a formal guarantee to support Poland in the event of a German attack. At the 11th hour and under the worst possible circumstances, with Czechoslovakia lost and the Soviet Union alienated, Britain had changed its East European policy and agreed to do what the French had sought in the 1920s.

Mussolini took advantage of the general European situation to strengthen Italy's position in the Balkans. In April 1939 he sent Italian troops into Albania. King Zog fled, whereupon an Albanian constituent assembly voted to offer the crown to King Victor Emanuel III of Italy. On April 13 Britain and France extended a guarantee to defend Greece and Romania.

The Western powers began to make belated military preparations for an inevitable war, and they worked to secure a pact with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the guarantee to Poland gave the Soviet Union protection on its western frontier, virtually the most it could have secured in any negotiations.

On May 23 Hitler met with his leading generals at the Reich Chancellory. He reviewed Germany's territorial requirements and the need to resolve these by expansion eastward. War, Hitler declared, was inevitable, and he announced that he intended to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

The same month Britain and France initiated negotiations with the Soviet Union for a mutual assistance pact. Although negotiations continued until August, these failed to reach agreement. Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were all unwilling to allow Soviet armies within their borders, even to defend against German attack. Many in these countries feared the Soviets more than the Germans, and Polish leaders refused to believe that Hitler would risk war with Britain and France. But due to the 1920 Russo-Polish War, Poland's eastern border extended almost to Minsk, and the Soviets believed that the French and British wished them to take the brunt of the German attack. The Poles also had an exaggerated sense of their own military power. In any case, the Anglo-French negotiators refused to sacrifice Poland and the Baltic states to Stalin as they had handed Czechoslovakia to Hitler.

While the Kremlin had been negotiating more or less openly with Britain and France, it concurrently sought an understanding with Germany, even to the point of Stalin dispatching personal emissaries to Berlin. On March 10, 1939, in an address to the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Soviet Union, Stalin had said that the Soviet Union did not intend to "pull anyone else's chestnuts out of the fire." He thus signaled to Hitler his readiness to abandon collective security and negotiate an agreement with Berlin. Within a week Hitler had annexed Bohemia and Moravia, confident that the Soviet Union would not intervene. Another consideration for Stalin was that the Soviet Union potentially faced war on two fronts. Japanese pressure on Mongolia and the Maritime Provinces may well have played a significant role in predisposing Stalin to make his pact with Hitler.

In early May 1939, Stalin gave further encouragement to Hitler when he dismissed Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maksim Litvinov and appointed Vyacheslav Molotov in his place. Litvinov was both a champion of collective security and a Jew. Hitler later said that the dismissal of Litvinov made fully evident Stalin's wish to transform its relations with Germany. Contacts begun in May culminated in the Nazi-Soviet pact of August, signed on August 23 in Moscow by Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.

The Soviet-Nazi agreement signed that night consisted of an open 10-year

nonaggression pact together with two secret protocols, which did not become generally known until Rudolf Hess revealed them during the proceedings of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg after the war. These secret arrangements, never publicly acknowledged by the Soviet Union until 1990, partitioned Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union in advance of the German invasion of Poland, for which Hitler had now in effect received Stalin's permission. Any future territorial rearrangement of the area would involve its division between the two powers. The Soviet sphere included eastern Poland, the Romanian province of Bessarabia, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Lithuania went to Germany; a month later Hitler traded it to Stalin for further territorial concessions in Poland. In addition, a trade convention accompanying the pact provided that the Soviet Union would supply vast quantities of raw materials to Germany in exchange for military technology and finished goods. This economic arrangement was immensely valuable to Germany early in the war, as Churchill later made quite clear to Stalin.

Certainly Stalin expected that Hitler would face a protracted war in the west that would allow the Soviet Union time to rebuild its military. All indications are that Stalin welcomed the pact with Germany, while he regarded the subsequent wartime alliance with Britain and the United States with fear and suspicion. This becomes understandable when one realizes that Stalin's primary concern was with the internal stability of the Soviet Union. The Non-Aggression Pact nevertheless had the impact of a thunderbolt upon the world community. Communism and Nazism, supposed to be ideological opposites on the worst possible terms, had come together, dumbfounding a generation more versed in ideology than power politics.

On August 22 Hitler summoned his generals and announced his intention to invade Poland. Neither Britain nor France, he said, had the leadership necessary for a life-and-death struggle: "Our enemies are little worms," he said, "I saw them at Munich." British and French armament did not as yet amount to much. Germany therefore had much to gain and little to lose, for the Western powers probably would not fight. In any case, Germany must accept the risks and act with reckless resolution.

The German invasion of Poland, set for August 26, occurred on September 1, a delay caused by Italy's decision to remain neutral. Prompted by his foreign minister and son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini lost faith

in a German victory. Ciano proposed that Mussolini tell Hitler that Italy would enter the conflict only if Germany would agree to supply certain armaments and raw materials. On August 25 the Germans rescinded their plans and engaged in frenzied discussions. The next day Mussolini asked for immediate delivery of 170 million tons of industrial products and raw materials, an impossible request. Hitler then asked that Mussolini maintain benevolent neutrality toward Germany and continue military preparations so as to fool the English and French, and Mussolini agreed.

On September 1 following false charges that Polish forces had crossed onto German soil and killed German border guards—an illusion completed by the murder of concentration camp prisoners who were dressed in Polish military uniforms—German forces invaded Poland. On September 3 following expiration of ultimatums to Germany, Britain and France declared war on Germany.

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Overview of World War II

World War II was the most destructive enterprise in human history. It is sobering to consider that more resources, material, and human lives (as many as 75 million to 100 million dead) were expended on World War II than on any other human activity. This conflict was so all-encompassing that few side wars took place simultaneously, the Russo-Finnish War of 1939–1940 being one of the exceptions.

The debate over the origins of World War I had become something of a cottage industry among historians in the 1920s and 1930s. The question rarely arises over World War II except on the narrow issue of whether U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt had advance knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Whatever their grievances (certainly minor in comparison to the misery they inflicted on their victims), Germany and Japan are almost universally considered the aggressors of World War II.

World War II is historically unique in that it represents if not necessarily a crusade a conflict of good against evil. More than 70 years after the end of this war, no mainstream or serious historians defend Nazi Germany's policies. Perhaps more surprisingly, there are also few if any scholars who would do likewise for militaristic Japan. In practically all previous conflicts, historians find sufficient blame to give all belligerents a share. For example, no prominent historian takes seriously the Versailles provision that Germany was somehow completely responsible for the outbreak of World War. German führer Adolf Hitler and his followers have thus retained mythic

status as personifications of pure evil, something not seen since the Wars of Religion of 17th-century Europe.

The starting date of World War II, however, is disputed. Some have gone as far back as the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931. Others date its outbreak to the opening of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. But these were conflicts between two Asian powers, hardly global war.

The more traditional and accepted date for the start of World War II is September 1, 1939, with the quick but not quite blitzkrieg (lightning warfare) German invasion of Poland. This action brought France and Great Britain into the conflict on September 3 in accordance with their guarantees to Poland. (The Soviet Union's invasion of eastern Poland on September 17 provoked no similar reaction.)

The Germans learned from their Polish campaign and mounted a true blitzkrieg offensive against the Low Countries and France, commencing on May 10, 1940. In blitzkrieg, the tactical airpower of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) knocked out command and communications posts as integrated armor division pincers drove deep into enemy territory, bypassing opposition strongpoints. When all went well, the pincers encircled the slow-moving enemy. Contrary to legend, the armored forces were simply the spearheads; the bulk of the German Army was composed of foot soldiers and horses. Further, the French Army and the British Expeditionary Force combined had more and usually better tanks than the Germans, and those nations' forces were not too seriously inferior in the air.

The sluggish Allies were simply outmaneuvered, losing France in six weeks, to the astonishment of the "experts." France remains the only major industrial democracy ever to be conquered, and that after a single campaign. It was also the only more or less motorized nation to suffer such a fate; many French refugees fled the rapidly advancing Germans in their private cars. The Germans found that the French Routes Nationales, designed to enable French forces to reach the frontiers, could also be used in the opposite direction by an invader. The Germans themselves relearned this military truth on their autobahns in 1945.

Germany suffered its first defeat of the war when its air offensive against Great Britain, the world's first great air campaign, was thwarted in the Battle of Britain. The margin of victory was small, for there was little to choose between the Royal Air Force's Hurricane and Spitfire fighters and the

Luftwaffe's Bf-109 or between the contenders' pilots. The main advantages of the Royal Air Force in this battle were radar and the geographic fact that its pilots and their warplanes were shot down over Britain; German pilots and aircraft in a similar predicament were out of action for the duration and also had farther to fly from their bases. But Great Britain's greatest advantage throughout this stage of the war was its prime minister, Winston Churchill, who gave stirring voice and substance to Allied defiance of Hitler.

Nonetheless, by the spring of 1941 Nazi Germany had conquered or dominated all of the European continent with but few exceptions. Greece, which had beaten back an inept Italian offensive, finally capitulated to the German Balkan blitzkrieg in the spring of that year. At the same time the Battle of the Atlantic raged, with German submarines seeking to starve out Britain.

Nazi Germany then turned on its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, on June 22, 1941, in Operation BARBAROSSA, the greatest military campaign of all time, in order to fulfill Hitler's enduring vision of crushing "Judeo-Bolshevism." (How far Hitler's ambitions of conquest ranged beyond the Russian East is still a matter of dispute.) If he had any introspective moments then, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin must have wished that he still possessed the legions of first-rate officers he had shot or slowly destroyed in the Gulag in the wake of his bloody purge of 1937. Stalin's own inept generalship played a major role in the early Soviet defeats, and German forces drove almost to within sight of the Kremlin's towers in December 1941 before being beaten back.

Early that same month war erupted in the Pacific, and the conflict then became truly a world war, with Japan's coordinated combined attacks on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor and British, Dutch, and American imperial possessions. With the Soviet Union holding out precariously and the United States now a belligerent, the Axis had lost the war, even though at the time few recognized that fact. America's "Great Debate" as to whether and to what extent to aid Britain vanished in a national outpouring of collective wrath.

Pearl Harbor was bad enough, with 2,280 Americans dead, four battleships sunk, and the remaining four battleships damaged; much worse was to follow. As with the Germans in France, more professional Japanese forces surprised and outfought their opponents by land, sea, and air. Almost

before they knew it, British and Dutch forces in Asia, superior in numbers alone, had been routed in one of the most successful combined-arms campaigns in history. (The French had already yielded control of their colony of Indochina, whose rice and raw materials were flowing to Japan, while the Japanese military had the use of its naval and air bases until the end of the war.) The course of the Malayan-Singapore campaign was typical. British land forces scarcely even delayed the Japanese army, Japanese fighters cleared the skies of British aircraft, and Japanese naval bombers flying from land bases quickly sank the new battleship *Prince of Wales* and the elderly battle cruiser *Repulse.* This disaster made it obvious that the aircraft carrier was the capital ship of the day. Singapore, the linchpin of imperial European power in Asia, surrendered ignominiously on February 16, 1942.

The British hardly made a better fight of it in Burma before having to evacuate that colony. Only the Americans managed to delay the Japanese seriously, holding out on the Bataan Peninsula and then at the Corregidor fortifications until May. The end of imperialism, at least in Asia, can be dated to the capitulation of Singapore, as Asians witnessed other Asians with superior technology and professionalism completely defeating Europeans and Americans.

And yet on Pearl Harbor's very "Day of Infamy," Japan had lost the war. Its forces had missed the American aircraft carriers as well as the oil tank farms and the machine shop complex. The Japanese killed many Americans, destroyed mostly obsolete aircraft, and sank a handful of elderly battleships, but they outraged Americans, who were determined to avenge the attack so that Japan would receive no mercy in the relentless land, sea, and air war that the United States was now to wage against it. More significant, American industrial and manpower resources vastly surpassed those that Japan could bring to bear in a protracted conflict.

And yet oddly, in view of its own ruthless conduct of warfare and occupation, Japan was the only major belligerent to hold limited aims in World War II. Japan basically wanted the Western "colonial" powers out of the Pacific, to be replaced, of course, by its own Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (a euphemism for "Asia for the Japanese"). No unconditional surrender demands ever issued from Tokyo. To Japan's own people, of course, the war was presented as a struggle to the death against the arrogant "Anglo-Saxon imperialists."

Three days after the Pearl Harbor attack, Hitler decided to declare war on the United States, a blunder fully as deadly as his invasion of the Soviet Union and even less explicable. But the Nazi dictator, on the basis of his customary “insights,” dismissed the American soldier as worthless and the industrial power of the United States as vastly overrated. This decision meant that the United States could not focus exclusively on Japan.

The tide would not begin to turn until the drawn-out naval-air clash in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942), the first naval battle in which neither side’s surface ships ever came within sight of each other. The following month the U.S. Navy avenged Pearl Harbor at the Battle of Midway (June 3–6), sinking no fewer than four invaluable Japanese carriers, again without the surface ships involved ever sighting each other. The loss of hundreds of superbly trained combat-experienced naval aviators and their highly trained maintenance crews was as great a blow to Japan as the actual sinking of its carriers. The Americans could make up their own losses far more easily than the Japanese, who did not deviate from their high prewar standards until the last months of the war.

Although considered a sideshow by the Soviets, the North African campaign was of the utmost strategic importance and until mid-1943 the only continental land campaign that the Western Allies were strong enough to mount. Had North Africa, including Egypt, fallen to the Axis (as almost occurred several times), the Suez Canal could not have been held, and German forces could have gone through the Middle East, mobilizing Arab nationalism, threatening the area’s vast oil fields, and even menacing the embattled Soviet Union itself. Not until the British commander in North Africa General Bernard Montgomery amassed a massive superiority in armor was German general Erwin Rommel defeated at El Alamein in October 1942 and slowly pushed back toward Tunisia. American and British landings in Rommel’s rear, in Algeria and Morocco, were successful, but the raw American troops received a bloody nose at Kasserine Pass. The vastly outnumbered North African Axis forces did not capitulate until May 1943.

Four months earlier the German Sixth Army had surrendered at Stalingrad, marking the resurgence of the Soviet armies. One should nonetheless remember that the distance between Casablanca and Cape Bon is much the same as that from Brest-Litovsk to Stalingrad, and more Axis troops surrendered at “Tunisgrad” than at Stalingrad. (One major difference

was that almost all Axis prisoners of the Western Allies survived their imprisonment, while fewer than 1 in 10 of those taken at Stalingrad returned.)

By this time, U.S. production was supplying not only its own military needs but also those of most of its allies and on a scale moreover that by comparison to all other armed forces (except possibly the Canadians) was simply lavish. Everything from the canned meat product Spam to Sherman tanks and from aluminum ingots to finished aircraft crossed the oceans to the British Isles, the Soviet Union, the Free French, the Nationalist Chinese, the Fighting Poles, and so forth. To this day Russians refer to any multidrive truck as a *studebork* (Studebaker), a result of the tens of thousands of such vehicles shipped to the Soviet Union.

Moreover, quantity was not produced at the cost of quality. Although some of America's allies might have felt some reservations toward Spam, the army trucks, the boots, the small arms, and the uniforms were unsurpassed. British soldiers noted with some envy that American enlisted men wore the same type of uniform material as did British officers. The very ships that transported the bulk of this war material, the famous mass-produced Liberty Ships ("Rolled out by the mile, chopped off by the yard"), could still be found on the world's oceanic trade routes decades after they were originally scheduled to be scrapped.

After the North African campaign ended in 1943, the Allies drove the Axis forces from Sicily and then in September 1943 began the interminable Italian Campaign. It is perhaps indicative of the frustrating nature of the war in Italy that the lethargic Allies allowed it to begin with the escape of most Axis forces from Sicily to the peninsula. The Germans were still better at this sort of thing. Winston Churchill to the contrary, Italy was no "soft underbelly"; the Germans conducted well-organized retreats from one mountainous fortified line to the next. The Italian Campaign was occasionally justified for tying down many German troops; it tied down far more Allied forces, British, American, Free French, Free Poles, Brazilians, Canadians, Indians, British and French African colonials among them. German forces in Italy ultimately surrendered in late April 1945, only about a week before Germany itself capitulated.

The military forces of World War II's belligerents, as might be expected in so historically widespread a conflict, varied wildly. The French Army in 1939, considered by "experts" the world's best, was actually a slow-moving

mass, often supplied with very good equipment and led by aged commanders who had “learned the lessons” of World War I. No other such powerful army was so completely defeated in so short a period of time. The French Air Force and the French Navy likewise had some excellent equipment and more progressive commanders than did the army, but France fell before they could have any great impact on the course of battle.

The German Army, by general agreement, was superb, so much so that some authorities would venture that the Germans traditionally have “a genius for war.” Obviously, Germany’s greatest and traditional failing has been denigration of the fighting ability of its opponents. But on the ground at the operational and tactical levels, the combination of realistic training, strict discipline, and flexible command made the German Army probably World War II’s most formidable foe.

One need only look at a map of Europe from 1939 to 1945 and calculate Germany’s enemies compared to its own resources. The Luftwaffe had superbly trained pilots, although their quality fell off drastically as the war turned against Germany. German fighters were easily the equal of any in the world, but surprisingly, given that Hitler’s earlier ambitions seemingly demanded a “Ural bomber,” the Luftwaffe never put a heavy four-engine bomber into production. Germany led the world in aerodynamics, putting into squadron service the world’s first jet fighter (Me-262), with swept wings, and even a jet reconnaissance bomber. German jet engines lagged somewhat behind those of the British. The Luftwaffe also fielded the Me-163 rocket-powered interceptor, but this craft was as great a menace to its own pilots as to the enemy.

The German Navy boasted some superb surface vessels, such as the battleship *Bismarck*, but Hitler found the sea alien, and he largely neglected Germany’s surface fleet. Submarines were an entirely different matter. U-boat “wolf packs” decimated Allied North Atlantic shipping, and the Battle of the Atlantic was the only campaign that the eupeptic Churchill claimed cost him sleep. German U-boats ravaged the American Atlantic coast, in the first months of 1942 ranging into Chesapeake Bay to take advantage of inexcusable American naval unpreparedness. As in World War I, convoy was the principal answer to the German U-boat, a lesson that had to be learned the hard way in both conflicts.

The British Army, on the whole, put in a mediocre performance in World

War II. As with the French, although to a lesser degree, the British feared a repetition of the slaughter on the World War I Western Front, and, except for elite units, rarely showed much dash or initiative. Montgomery, the war's most famous British general, consistently refused to advance until he had great superiority in men and material over his enemy. The British Expeditionary Force fought well and hard in France in 1940 but afterward moved sluggishly. By far the worst performance of the British Army was in Malaya-Singapore in the opening months of the war.

For all of their commando tradition, moreover, the British undertook few guerrilla actions in any of their lost colonies. Churchill was moved to wonder why the sons of the men who had fought so well in World War I on the Somme, with such heavy losses, suffered so badly by comparison to the Americans still holding out on Bataan. As late as 1943, the Japanese easily repulsed a sluggish British offensive in the Burma Arakan.

This situation changed drastically when General William Slim took command of the beaten, depressed Anglo-Indian forces in Burma. His was the only sizable Allied force not to outnumber the Japanese, yet he inflicted the worst land defeat in its history on Japan and destroyed the Japanese forces in Burma. Unlike so many Allied generals, he led from the front in the worst climate of any battle front. Slim managed to switch his army's composition from jungle fighters to armored cavalry. His only tangible advantage over the enemy was his absolute control of the air, and with this he conducted the greatest air supply operation of the war. Although the modest Slim, of lower-middle-class background, achieved the highest rank in the British Army and then became one of Australia's most successful governor-generals, he is almost forgotten today. Yet considering his accomplishments, with limited resources and in different conditions, William Slim should be considered the finest ground commander of World War II.

The Royal Navy suffered from a preponderance of battleship admirals at the opening of the war, most notably Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, convinced that "well-handled" capital ships could fight off aerial attacks. He was proved emphatically and fatally wrong when Japanese torpedo bombers rather swiftly dispatched his *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* on the third day of war in the Pacific. The Royal Navy also labored under the handicap that not until 1937 did it win control of the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) from the RAF, which had little use for naval aviation and starved the FAA of funds and attention

through the interwar years. Although the Royal Navy's carriers were fine ships and their armored flight decks gave them a protection that the U.S. Navy envied, albeit at the cost of smaller aircraft capacity, Fleet Air Arm aircraft were so obsolete that the service had to turn to U.S. models. Even so, the FAA made history on November 11, 1940, when its obsolete Fairy Swordfish torpedo bombers sank three Italian battleships in Taranto Harbor, a feat that the Japanese observed carefully but the Americans did not.

British battleships and carriers kept the vital lifeline through the Mediterranean–Suez Canal open through the darkest days of the war and, together with the Americans and Canadians, defeated the German submarine menace in the North Atlantic. Significant surface actions of the Royal Navy included the sinking of the German battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941 by an armada of Royal Navy battleships, cruisers, carriers, and warplanes and the destruction in December 1943 of the pocket battleship *Scharnhorst* by the modern battleship *Duke of York.*

The Soviet Army almost received its deathblow in the first months of the German invasion. Caught off balance and shorn of its best commanders by Stalin's maniacal purges, their successors Stalin's obedient creatures, it suffered heavier losses than any other army in history. Yet spurred by the bestiality of the German war of enslavement and racial extermination and by Stalin's newfound pragmatism, the Red Army was able to spring back and, at enormous cost at the hands of the more professional Germans, fight its way to Berlin.

The Red Air Force developed into one of the most effective tactical airpowers of the war. (The Soviets constructed few heavy bombers.) The Sturmovik was certainly one of the best ground-attack aircraft of the time. The Red Navy, in contrast, apparently did little to affect the course of the war; its main triumph may have been in early 1945 when its submarines sank several large German passenger ships crammed with refugees from the east in the frigid Baltic in early 1945, the worst maritime disasters in history.

The United States emerged from World War II as the only nation since the time of the Romans to be a dominant power on land and sea, not to mention in the air. In 1945 the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy could have defeated any combination of enemies, and only the Russian Army could have seriously challenged the Americans on land. In 1939 the U.S. Army was

about the size of that of Romania; by 1945 it had grown to some 12 million men and women.

World War II in the Pacific was the great epic of the U.S. Navy. From the ruin of Pearl Harbor, that service fought its way across the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean to Tokyo Bay and eventually had the satisfaction of watching the Japanese surrender on board a U.S. Navy battleship in that harbor. Immediately after Pearl Harbor it was obvious that the aircraft carrier was the ideal capital ship for this war, and the United States virtually mass-produced such warships in the Essex class. The U.S. Navy had much to learn from its enemy especially in night-fighting techniques, as demonstrated in the Battle of Savo Island (August 9, 1942), when Japanese cruisers sank one Australian and three U.S. cruisers in the worst sea defeat in U.S. naval history.

By the end of the war, though, almost all of Japan's battleships and carriers had been sunk, most by naval airpower. U.S. Navy submarines succeeded where the German Navy had failed in two world wars, as U.S. unrestricted submarine warfare strangled the Japanese home islands, bringing near starvation. Equally impressive, the U.S. Navy in the Pacific originated the long-range sea train, providing U.S. sailors with practically all their needs while thousands of miles from the nearest continental American supply base.

The U.S. Marine Corps was a unique military force. Alone among the marine units of the belligerents, it had its own air and armor arms under its own tactical control. U.S. marines were the spearhead that stormed the Japanese-held islands of the Pacific, and the dramatic photograph of a small group of marines raising the American flag over the bitterly contested island of Iwo Jima became an icon of the war for Americans.

The Japanese Army was long on courage but shorter on individual initiative. A near-medieval force, its men often were led in wild banzai charges by sword-flourishing officers against machine-gun emplacements. The entire nation of Nippon was effectively mobilized against the looming Americans under the mindless slogan "Our Spirit against Their Steel." But the history of the Japanese Army will be stained for the foreseeable future by the bestial atrocities it practiced against Allied troops and civilians alike; untold numbers of Chinese civilians, for example, were slaughtered during Japanese military campaigns in China, which continued to tie down substantial Japanese military resources. Only two-thirds of Allied troops unfortunate enough to fall into Japanese hands survived to the end of the war.

Yet the Japanese Army was probably the best light infantry force of the war and was certainly the only World War II army that, on numerous occasions, genuinely fulfilled that most hackneyed order: “Fight on to the Last Man!”

The Imperial Japanese Navy and the air arms of the army and navy were superb in the early stages of the Pacific war. Both had extensive combat experience in the Chinese war and modern equipment. Japanese admirals were best in their class in 1941–1942, and Japanese air and naval forces, along with the Japanese Army itself, quickly wound up European colonial pretensions. Only the vast mobilized resources of the United States could turn the tide against Japan. And except for their complete loss of air control, only in Burma were the Japanese outfought on something like equal terms.

The aftermath of World War II proved considerably different from that of World War I’s prevailing disillusion. Amazingly, all of World War II’s belligerents, winners and losers alike, could soon look back and realize that the destruction of the murderous, archaic, racialist Axis regimes had genuinely cleared the way to a better world. All enjoyed peace and the absence of major war. Even for the Soviets the postwar decades were infinitely better than the prewar years, although much of this measure of good fortune might be attributed simply to the death of Joseph Stalin. Except for Great Britain, the British Commonwealth nations and even more so the United States emerged from the war far stronger than when they entered it after enduring a decade of the Great Depression.

By the 1950s, both war-shattered Western Europe and Japan were well on their way to becoming major competitors of the United States. The uniquely sagacious and foresighted Western Allied military occupations of Germany, Japan, and Austria in many ways laid the foundations for the postwar prosperity of these former enemy nations. (For the most part, similar good fortune bypassed the nondeveloped nations.) Within a few years former belligerents on both sides could agree that despite its appalling casualties and destruction, World War II had been, if not perhaps “The Good War,” at least something in the nature of a worthwhile war.

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Legacy of the War

Across the globe, people greeted the end of World War II with a profound sense of relief. By virtually any measurement, the war had been the most devastating conflict in human history. All nations were touched by it to some degree. The war's economic cost alone has been calculated at perhaps five times that of World War I. In human terms, World War II claimed half again as many military lives: 15 million versus 10 million for World War I. Including civilians, between 75 million and 100 million people died in the war, a figure that would have been much higher without the advent of sulfa and penicillin drugs and blood plasma transfusions.

When the war finally ended, vast stretches of Europe and parts of Asia lay in ruins. Whole populations were utterly exhausted, and many people were starving and living in makeshift shelters. Millions more had been uprooted from their homes and displaced; many of them had been transported to the German Reich to work as slave laborers in industry and agriculture. Transport—especially in parts of Western and Central Europe and in Japan—was at a standstill. Bridges were blown, rail lines were destroyed, and highways were cratered and blocked. Ports, particularly those in Northwestern Europe and Japan, were especially hard-hit, and many would have to be rebuilt. Most of the large cities of Germany and Japan were piles of rubble, their buildings mere shells.

Some countries had fared reasonably well. Damage in Britain was not too extensive, and civilian deaths were relatively few; Denmark and Norway escaped with little destruction. The rapid Allied advance had largely spared

Belgium, although the port of Antwerp had been badly damaged. The United States emerged from the war virtually unscathed in terms of physical damage and civilian casualties. The Netherlands, however, sustained considerable destruction, and portions of the population were starving. The situation in Greece was also dire, and Poland suffered horribly from the brutal German and Soviet occupation policies and armies sweeping back and forth across its territory.

Among the major powers, the Soviet Union was the hardest hit. With upwards of 40–50 million of its people killed in the war, national demographics were dramatically affected, a shift that has persisted even to the present. In 1959, Moscow announced that the ratio of males to females in the Soviet Union was 45 to 55. Aside from the catastrophic human costs, the Germans had occupied the Soviet Union's most productive regions, and the scorched-earth policy practiced by both sides resulted in the total or partial destruction of 1,700 towns, 70,000 villages, and 6 million buildings, including 84,000 schools. The Soviet Union also lost 71 million farm animals, including 7 million horses. There was widespread destruction in such great cities as Kiev, Odessa, and Leningrad. Perhaps a quarter of the property value of the Soviet Union was lost in the war, and tens of millions of Soviet citizens were homeless. Simply feeding the Soviet population was a staggering task. All of these factors help to explain the subsequent policies, both internal and external, of the Soviet Union.

Relief efforts in Europe and Asia centered for several years on the pressing problems of providing food, housing, and employment. As it turned out, the damage was not as extensive as initially thought, and many machines were still operational once the rubble was removed. In one perverse sense, Germany and Japan benefited from the bombing in that they rebuilt with many of the most modern techniques and systems.

With the end of the war, the liberated nations carried out purges of fascists and collaborationists. Many of these individuals were slain without benefit of trial. In France, 8,000 to 9,000 people were executed; subsequently, 1,500 more were sentenced to death and executed following regular court procedures. The victorious Allies were determined to bring to justice the leaders of Germany and Japan, whom they held responsible for the war. Two great trials were held, in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Punishment varied greatly according to nation and circumstance, and it proved virtually

impossible to work out acceptable formulas that might punish the guilty when so many people had to some degree collaborated with the occupiers.

At the end of the war, it appeared as if the idealistic, left-leaning resistance movements might realize their goals of forging new political, economic, and social institutions to bring about meaningful change. Although most people thought a return to prewar democratic structures was impossible, bright hopes for building new structures were soon dashed as well. Resistance leaders fell to quarreling among themselves, and the fracturing of the Left, as occurred in France and Italy, made room for the return of the old but still powerful conservative elites. The political structures that ultimately emerged from the war, at least in Western Europe, were little changed from those that had preceded it. In much of Eastern and Central Europe, where the Soviet Union now held sway, there was significant change, including land reform. Soviet rule also brought widespread financial exactions in the form of reparations and the stifling of democracy.

The war did intensify the movement for European unity. Many European statesmen believed that some means had to be found to contain nationalism, especially German nationalism, and that the best vehicle for that would be the economic integration of their nations, with political unification to follow in what some called the "United States of Europe." They believed that a Germany integrated into the European economy would not be able to act alone. Although Europe was slow in taking steps in that direction, such thinking led, a decade after the end of the war, to the European Common Market.

Asia was also greatly affected by the war. In China, the bitter prewar contest between the Chinese Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (GMD), or Kuomintang—and the Chinese Communist Party resumed in a protracted civil war when Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) sent troops into Manchuria in an effort to reestablish Nationalist control of that important region. The conflict ended in 1949 with a communist victory. To the west, British imperial India dissolved into an independent India and Pakistan.

The United States granted the Philippines delayed independence, but in other areas, such as French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies, the colonizers endeavored to continue their control. Where the European powers sought to hold on to their empires after August 1945, there would be further bloodshed. The French government, determined to maintain the nation as a

great power, insisted on retaining its empire, which led to the protracted Indochina War. Fighting also erupted in many other places around the world, including Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

Even where the European powers chose to withdraw voluntarily, as with Britain in Palestine and the Indian subcontinent, there was often heavy fighting as competing nationalities sought to fill the vacuum. Nonetheless, independence movements in Africa and Asia, stimulated by the long absence of European control during the war, gathered momentum, and over the next two decades much of Africa and Asia became independent.

One of the supreme ironies of World War II is that Adolf Hitler had waged the conflict with the stated goal of destroying communism. In the end he had gravely weakened Europe, and rather than eradicating his ideological adversary, he had strengthened it. In 1945 the Soviet Union was one of the two leading world powers, and its international prestige was at an all-time high. In France and Italy, powerful communist parties were seemingly poised to take power. The Soviet Union also established governments friendly to it in Eastern and Central Europe. Under the pressure of confrontation with the West, these states became openly communist in the years after World War II. In 1948, the communists made their last acquisition in Central Europe in a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia. Communists also nearly came to power in Greece.

Far from destroying the Soviet Union and containing the United States, Germany and Japan had enhanced the international position of both. Western and Soviet differences meant that although treaties were negotiated with some of the smaller Axis powers, there were no big-power agreements concerning the future of Germany and Japan. Germany, initially divided into four occupation zones, became two states in 1949: the western Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). Korea also had been "temporarily" divided at the 38th parallel for the purposes of administering the Japanese surrender. Unlike Germany, which was reunited in 1990, Korea remains divided—another legacy of World War II.

Despite the continued importance of secondary powers such as Britain and France, the year 1945 witnessed the emergence of a bipolar world in which there were two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union.

Added to the confrontational mix was the threat of nuclear war as both governments embarked on a new struggle known as the Cold War.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

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A

Aachen, Battle of (September 13–October 21, 1944)

Located on the western border of Germany, the city of Aix-la-Chapelle (later Aachen) had been the capital of the Holy Roman Empire during the reign of Charlemagne in the early ninth century. Because German dictator Adolf Hitler considered Charlemagne the founder of the first German Reich (empire), the city held special status for him. Aachen was the first major German city encountered by U.S. troops, and the five-week-long battle for it gave notice to U.S. forces that the war against the Third Reich was far from over. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, commander of the American First Army, had hoped to bypass Aachen to the south, quickly break through the defenses of the West Wall (Siegfried Line), and reach the Rhine River.

In September 1944, German lieutenant general Gerhard von Schwerin's understrength 116th Panzer Division defended Aachen. Schwerin entered the city on September 12 and quickly concluded that Aachen was lost. He halted the evacuation of the city so that the population might be cared for by the Americans. Only local defense forces prevented occupation of the city on the morning of September 13. Unaware of this, the commander of U.S. VII Corps, Major General J. Lawton Collins, continued his attack on the Siegfried Line. Late on September 15, troops of Major General Clarence R. Huebner's 1st Infantry Division began to surround Aachen from the south and southeast. Hitler ordered the city evacuated, but Schwerin refused that order and was relieved of command; as many as 145,000 of the population of 160,000 fled the city.

Meanwhile, the pause in Allied operations along the Siegfried Line during Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26) allowed the Wehrmacht the chance to reinforce its West Wall defenses. By the end of September with the collapse of MARKET-GARDEN, operations around Aachen resumed.

From October 7 to 20, elements of the U.S. VII and XIX corps strengthened their hold around the city, now defended by the I Panzer Korps (116th Panzer Division), 3rd Panzergrenadier Division, and 246th Volksgrenadier Division under Colonel Gerhard Wilck.

On October 8, U.S. forces began their attack on Aachen. On October 10, Huebner sent a message into Aachen threatening the destruction of the city if the Germans did not surrender. When this demand was rejected, 300 P-38s and P-47s of the Ninth Air Force dropped 62 tons of bombs on Aachen on October 10. U.S. artillery also pounded the city.

On October 12, Wilck assumed command of some 5,000 German defenders in Aachen. The German troops, supported by assault guns and tanks (mostly Mark IVs), held their positions tenaciously. On October 12, the U.S. fighter-bombers returned and dropped another 69 tons of bombs, and U.S. artillery fired 5,000 rounds into the city.

On October 13, troops of the 26th Infantry Regiment assaulted the city proper. The fighting was house to house, with the U.S. infantry accompanied by tanks and self-propelled artillery to knock out German armor and reduce strongpoints. Infantry blasted holes in the outer walls of buildings with bazookas and then cleared resistance room by room with small arms and hand grenades. Many Schutzstaffel (SS) troops died at their posts rather than surrender.

A seemingly endless procession of German soldiers, captured with the fall of Aachen, marching through the ruined city streets to captivity, October 1944. (National Archives)

When German troops west of Aachen tried to relieve the siege in hastily organized counterattacks, American artillery beat them back. Aachen was completely surrounded, and gradually the German defensive position shrank to a small section of the western part of the city. Wilck's efforts to break out on October 18 and 19 failed, and he surrendered what remained of Aachen on October 21.

The Allied rebuff in Operation MARKET-GARDEN and German resistance at Aachen prevented a quick Allied crossing of the Rhine and bought Hitler time to strengthen his West Wall defenses, but the costs were high. U.S. forces took some 12,000 German prisoners, and thousands more German soldiers were killed. Several hundred civilians also died. U.S. losses of 3,700 men (3,200 from the 30th Infantry Division and 500 from the 1st Infantry Division) were also high, particularly among experienced riflemen.

Remarkably, amid all the ruin and destruction, Aachen's magnificent medieval cathedral survived.

TERRY SHOPTAUGH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bazooka; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; West Wall, Advance to the

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Abadan, Iran, British Attack on (August 25, 1941)

British attack on an Iranian port 50 miles east of Abadan, at the head of the Persian Gulf and the terminus of the Iranian State Railway. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the British War Cabinet became concerned about German influence in Iran. British leaders feared that Berlin might intervene in Iran, as it had in Iraq in April 1941. The Allies invaded Iran on August 25, 1941, after the Iranian government headed by Shah Reza Pahlavi refused to move against German interests as demanded by the British and Soviet governments.

Anticipating the need to intervene, the Royal Navy had assembled a scratch flotilla based at Basra under Commodore Cosmo Graham. This included an armed merchant cruiser, four sloops (including one Australian and one Indian), a corvette, a gunboat, an armed yacht, a trawler, and a number of river steamers, tugs, motorboats, and dhows. The Royal Iranian Navy, which had its main base at Khorramshahr, 40 miles up the Shatt-el-Arab waterway, consisted of a pair of 1,000-ton sloops and four 330-ton patrol boats. All six of these warships were Italian-built and had Italian

crews. Six Axis freighters—five German and one Italian—and two Italian tankers were sheltering at Bandar Shahpur with two of the Iranian patrol boats.

On August 23, Commodore Graham received orders to proceed with Operation COUNTENANCE and attack Bandar Shahpur, Abadan, and Khorramshahr at dawn on August 25. The force assigned to Bandar Shahpur was anchored in the Persian Gulf south of the Shatt-el-Arab's mouth. The armed merchant cruiser HMAS *Kanimbla* had on board two companies of infantry as a landing force. Supporting it were a gunboat, a sloop, a corvette, an armed trawler, two tugs, two dhows, and a pinnacle.

This flotilla navigated up the Khor Musa inlet, which narrows to a width of three miles, without incident, arriving at 4:15 a.m. The German ship crews sounded the alarm, and several ignited large fires in an attempt to scuttle their ships. Landing parties, however, managed to contain the damage in most instances and captured seven of the eight Axis vessels, totaling 44,000 tons. The Iranian gunboats offered no resistance, and the *Kanimbla* proceeded to land its troops. By evening, Bandar Shahpur had been secured.

The force assigned to capture Khorramshahr and Abadan set out from Basra, with the exception of the sloop HMS *Shoreham* at Fao at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab. The sloop HMAS *Yarra* arrived at Khorramshahr first and lay unseen alongside a British merchantman until the sound of firing from downstream at Abadan. The *Yarra* then illuminated the Iranian sloop *Babr* and shelled it from close range, preventing its surprised crew from manning their guns. The Iranian warship quickly sank at its dock. Boarding parties then captured the two patrol boats. The sloop HMS *Falmouth* arrived several hours later, having grounded in transit, and its troops went ashore. There was heavy fighting, but the naval base was secured that evening.

The Abadan flotilla arrived at 4:10 a.m., joined by the *Shoreham*, which had made its way upstream. It achieved complete surprise. The *Shoreham*'s first salvo disabled the Iranian sloop *Palang* and caused a large explosion. Iranian ground forces, however, put up a stiff resistance. The *Shoreham* provided gunfire support to the Indian troops until they finally secured the refinery and the town that afternoon.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Australia; Great Britain, Navy; Iran; Red Sea, Naval Operations in

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ABDA Command

First attempt by the Allied powers to establish a joint command for the defense of Southeast Asia. The attempt resulted from the Arcadia Conference (December 22, 1941–January 14, 1942). Both U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill appreciated the need for a joint effort to protect their strategic interests in the Pacific from the Japanese. A key goal was protection of the resource-rich Dutch East Indies. In addition to the United States and Britain, the command included Australia and the Netherlands—hence the name ABDA (American, British, Dutch, and Australian) Command.

On January 15, 1942, the ABDA Command was established when British general Sir Archibald Wavell took command of all Allied forces in Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, western New Guinea, and the north and northwest coasts of Australia. Admiral Thomas C. Hart had command of its naval assets, consisting of 2 heavy cruisers (USS *Houston* and HMS *Exeter*), 4 light cruisers (USS *Marblehead*, HMAS *Perth*, and HNLMS *De Ruyter* and *Java*), and 19 destroyers.

The ADBA naval force was wholly inadequate to defend against Japanese attacks. On January 24, 1942, four ADBA destroyers sank four Japanese transports and a patrol boat off Balikpapan in the Dutch East Indies, but this success only delayed Japanese operations. Subsequently, the ABDA Command suffered setbacks on sea and land.

On February 4, Japanese air strikes crippled the cruiser *Marblehead*, while on February 15, Singapore fell to the Japanese Army. Amid the declining fortunes of the command, both Wavell and Hart were replaced by Dutch officers in charge of all remaining land and sea assets of the command.

In effect, by late February, the ABDA Command existed more in theory than in fact, as it was entirely Dutch-controlled.

Subsequent efforts to stem Japanese advances resulted in the near destruction of the naval forces of the ABDA Command. On February 27, 1942, in the Battle of the Java Sea, Rear Admiral Karel Doorman, commanding 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers, attempted to intercept a Japanese invasion force bound for Java escorted by 4 cruisers and 14 destroyers. The Allies lost 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Then on February 28–29, 1942, in the Battle of Sunda Strait, the cruisers USS *Houston* and HMAS *Perth* were sunk while attacking a Japanese landing force. On March 1, Japanese warships and aircraft sank the heavy cruiser HMS *Exeter* and 2 destroyers off Surabaya. Ultimately, only 4 destroyers of the ABDA Command managed to reach safe harbor in Australia.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Australia, Navy; Balikpapan, Battle of; Doorman, Karel Willem Marie; Great Britain, Navy; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of; Sunda Strait, Battle of; United States Navy

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Abe Hiroaki (1890–1949)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born on March 15, 1890, in Ehima Prefecture, Japan, Abe Hiroaki graduated from the Naval Academy in 1911. He held various positions and commands in the 1920s and 1930s and graduated from the Naval Staff College. On December 1, 1932, he was promoted to captain. He commanded the battleship HIJMS *Fusō* in 1937 and was promoted to rear admiral on November 15, 1938. In December 1941, Abe led Cruiser Division

8 in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Later that month, his forces assisted during the attack on Wake Island.

On June 3–6, 1942, Abe commanded the cruiser and battleship screen in the Battle of Midway; that August, he led the Vanguard Group in the Southwest Pacific. This force, consisting of the Japanese battleships *Hiei* and *Kirishima* and the cruisers HIJMS *Kumano, Suzuya*, and *Chikuma*, was involved in the carrier battles off the eastern Solomon Islands. During October 26–27 the Vanguard Group, augmented by destroyers, fought in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, which was a tactical victory for Japan but at some cost. The *Chikuma* was especially hard-hit.

In early November, the Japanese planned a direct assault on Guadalcanal. Abe was ordered to shell the U.S. air base, Henderson Field, to prepare for an amphibious assault. As his ships moved southward, they met the defending Allied force commanded by U.S. rear admiral Daniel Callaghan on the night of November 12–13, 1942. The resulting battle was one of the fiercest in naval history, and although Callaghan lost two cruisers and four destroyers and was himself killed, he forced Abe and 13,000 Japanese troop reinforcements to turn back. Abe lost two destroyers in the battle. His flagship, the *Hiei*, was also crippled and succumbed to subsequent U.S. air attack.

Abe took the blame for the unsuccessful mission. He was relieved of his command on December 20, 1942, and resigned from the navy in March 1943. Abe died in Kamakura, Kanagawa Prefecture, on February 6, 1949.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Callaghan, Daniel Judson; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Wake Island, Battle for

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Abe Koso (1892–1947)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born in Yamagata, Japan, on March 24, 1892, Abe Koso became a career naval officer. He specialized in naval gunnery and served as a naval gunnery officer on ships ranging from destroyers to battleships. Later he commanded cruisers and battleships. Abe was promoted to lieutenant in 1918, lieutenant commander in 1925, and commander in 1930. On November 15, 1934, he was promoted to captain, and on November 15, 1940, he was promoted to rear admiral.

During Operation mo, the planned invasion of Port Moresby, Abe commanded the Port Moresby Transport Force. It consisted of 12 transports carrying the army's South Seas Detachment and the navy's Kure 3rd Special Naval Landing Force. Abe's convoy left Rabaul on May 4, 1942.

On May 7, the first day of the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8), Abe lost his close air support when U.S. aircraft sank the light carrier *Shoho.* The Transport Force retired to the north while the main forces slugged it out. Although the Japanese won a tactical victory in the battle, Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi could no longer provide close air support to Abe and ordered the invasion postponed until July 3. Later events caused the invasion to be canceled.

Abe was promoted to vice admiral and assigned command of the Marshall Islands to prepare for an American invasion there. Ten days after U.S. marines landed on Guadalcanal, the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, known as Carlson's Raiders, landed on Makin Atoll. They wiped out its small garrison and then withdrew to the two submarines that had carried them to the island. Nine Raiders did not make it back to the submarines. They were captured on August 21 by the Japanese relief force. The American prisoners were transferred to Kwajalein, where they were well treated.

In early October 1942, Abe met with a staff officer from Truk. The officer informed Abe that a revised policy allowed him to deal with prisoners locally and not transport them to Japan. Abe ordered Captain Obara Yoshio, commander of the Kwajalein garrison, to execute the prisoners. Despite Obara's protests, Abe insisted.

The commander ordered four of his officers to perform the executions. Obara selected the day of Japan's annual memorial to departed heroes, the Yasukuni Shrine festival, as the execution date. On October 16, 1942, in the presence of Abe, the nine Americans were led to a large grave and beheaded.

The Japanese attempted to cover up the crime, but after the war Marshall Islanders told U.S. authorities about the executions. Abe was arrested and tried on Guam for war crimes. Convicted, he was hanged there on June 24, 1947.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Inouye Shigeyoshi; Makin Island Raid

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Abe Nobuyuki (1875–1953)

Japanese Army general and prime minister (1939–1940). Born in Ishikawa, Japan, on November 24, 1875, Abe Nobuyuki was trained as an artillery officer. As the commander of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment between 1918 and 1919, Colonel Abe took part in the Siberian Intervention. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1927, he held several important posts, including vice war minister (1928–1930), deputy war minister (1930), commander of the 4th Division (1930–1932), and commander in chief of the Taiwan garrison (1932–1933). Promoted to full general in 1933, Abe served as a member of the Military Council until his retirement in 1936.

When Baron Hiranuma Ki'ichirō resigned as prime minister in the political crisis following the surprise conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-

Aggression Pact in August 1939, Abe was appointed prime minister, effective August 30. He tried to change the course of national policy toward rapprochement with Britain and the United States, but on January 16, 1940, army hard-liners brought about the collapse of the cabinet. Thereafter, Abe held diplomatic assignments, including ambassador to the Republic of China (April–December 1940), minister of the House of Peers (May 1942–February 1946), and the last Japanese governor-general of Korea (July 1944–September 1945) while retaining his seat in the House of Peers. Abe died in Tokyo on September 7, 1953.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Japan; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

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Abrams, Creighton Williams (1914–1974)

U.S. Army colonel, later general. Born in Springfield, Massachusetts, on September 15, 1914, Creighton Williams Abrams graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1936 and was commissioned in the cavalry. Assigned to Fort Bliss, Texas, he joined the famed 7th Cavalry Regiment.

An early convert to the armored force, Abrams during World War II commanded the 37th Tank Battalion of the 4th Armored Division in fighting across Europe, performing brilliantly and earning a battlefield promotion to colonel in April 1945 and two Distinguished Service Crosses. His command was the first to cross the Moselle River, and he led the advance that resulted

in the relief of Bastogne. His unit was also the first element in the Third Army to reach the Rhine.

Following the war, Abrams headed the Department of Tactics at the Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Later, he commanded the 63rd Tank Battalion in Germany and then the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. During the 1950–1953 Korean War, he served in succession as chief of staff of all three U.S. Army corps there. He was promoted to brigadier general in February 1956 and then served a Pentagon tour before returning to Germany as assistant commander of the 3rd Armored Division.

Promoted to major general in June 1960, Abrams soon after commanded the 3rd Armored Division. He became a lieutenant general in August 1963 and commanded V Corps in Europe. In September 1964, he was named army vice chief of staff and promoted to full general. In 1967 Abrams went to Vietnam as deputy U.S. commander, and in 1968 he succeeded to the top command. During four years in that post, he radically revised the way the war was conducted, discarding body count as a measure of merit and emphasizing security for the rural population.

In 1972, Abrams became chief of staff of an army in desperate need of rebuilding and leadership. He served in that post for two years, stressing combat readiness and taking care of the soldier. Abrams died in Washington, D.C., on September 4, 1974. Subsequently, the U.S. Army named its new main battle tank in his honor. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey Jr. observed that the success of U.S. armed forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War was largely attributable to reforms initiated by Abrams.

LEWIS SORLEY

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Armored Warfare; Bastogne, Battle for

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Abrial, Jean Marie Charles (1879–1962)

French Navy admiral. Born at Réalmont, Tarn, France, on December 17, 1879, Jean Marie Charles Abrial entered the French Naval Academy in 1896 and commanded an antisubmarine patrol boat during World War I. During the early 1920s, he commanded a squadron of torpedo boats in the Mediterranean. He was promoted to captain in 1925. Abrial then studied at the Naval War College, commanded a cruiser, and held various staff positions. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1930 and to vice admiral in 1936. From 1936 to 1938, he commanded the Mediterranean Squadron. On May 23, 1940, shortly after German forces invaded France, he became commander of Northern French Naval Forces.

Five days later as Allied troops retreated to the French channel port of Dunkerque, Allied supreme commander General Maxime Weygand ordered Abrial and his deputy commander, Lieutenant General Maurice Fagalde, to organize a beachhead there. The two French officers believed that Dunkerque could be held successfully against German forces, but on May 20 France's British allies, having decided that retreat from the continent was inevitable, began to organize the withdrawal effort.

Abrial learned of this decision when the evacuation began on May 26, and he quickly organized all available French maritime vessels into an evacuation fleet. Requisitioning all private boats in the area, he began to embark both British and French troops on May 29. He also demanded equal space for beleaguered French troops aboard British vessels. Altogether, by June 4, British and French ships had taken off some 364,000 troops, including some 140,000 French.

Abrial, one of the last to leave Dunkerque, moved to Cherbourg, and on June 19 he surrendered that port to German forces. Remaining in France with the Vichy government following the defeat of France, Abrial was governor-general of Algeria from July 1940 to July 1941, and from November 1942 to March 1943 he was secretary of the navy in the Vichy government.

Abrial was charged with collaboration after the liberation, and in August 1946 he was sentenced to "national indignity" and 10 years of hard labor, which was later commuted to 5 years' imprisonment. Released provisionally in December 1947 and amnestied in 1954, Abrial died at Dordogne in the Tarn on December 19, 1962.

See also

Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Navy; France Campaign; Vichy France; Weygand, Maxime

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Absolute National Defense Zone

Plan adopted in September 1943 for a Japanese defensive line in the Pacific against the Allied counteroffensive. At the beginning of 1943, Japan lost Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands in the Southwest Pacific, and in August and September 1943, the United States took back the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska. These developments led Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo to reexamine the planned defensive perimeter in the Pacific Ocean area. Imperial General Headquarters now judged that it would be difficult to hold an overextended front line against an Allied counteroffensive and thus decided to withdraw forces from some areas to shrink the defensive zone and make better use of available resources.

On September 25, 1943, Imperial General Headquarters drew a line that included the Kurile Islands, the Ogasawara Islands, the Mariana Islands, the Caroline Islands, western New Guinea, and the Sunda Islands to Burma. This area was labeled the Absolute National Defense Zone (Zettai kokubo ken). The new defensive perimeter thus excluded the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands, and eastern New Guinea. The army and navy General Staffs planned to reorganize and build up the military and naval forces inside the zone for a decisive battle with U.S. forces.

On September 30, the plan was declared officially in effect during a meeting where Emperor Hirohito was in attendance. The plan called for the

following: (1) the establishment of the Absolute National Defense Zone to meet an Allied counteroffensive, (2) the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, (3) the conclusion of the war in China on terms favorable to Japan, (4) the strengthening of relations with Germany, (5) the education of the peoples of Japanese-occupied areas and the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, (6) the reorganization of the nation for total war, and (7) the intensification of propaganda against the Allies.

Despite this, the Japanese Army continued to be preoccupied with China to the detriment of the defense of the Pacific islands, and the navy persisted in holding Truk Island in the Central Pacific, which was outside the defense zone. The failure of the army and navy to reach consensus regarding the defense zone was of considerable benefit to the Allies during 1944 and 1945.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Japan; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Truk, Raid on

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Adachi Hatazō (1890–1947)

Japanese Army general. Born in Chiba on June 17, 1890, Adachi Hatazō graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1910 and the Army War College in 1922. Promoted to major in 1926 and to lieutenant colonel in 1930, he was district commander of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army Railway Unit in 1933. He was promoted to colonel in 1934, and he commanded the 12th Infantry Regiment in 1936.

At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), Adachi commanded the 37th Infantry Division. As chief of staff of the North China Area Army, he played a prominent role in defeating Chinese forces during Operation CHŪGEN in May 1941. He was promoted to major general in 1938 and lieutenant general in 1940.

Following the death of Lieutenant General Horii Tomitaro in November 1942, Adachi was appointed commander of the newly formed Eighteenth Army at Rabaul, designated for the defense of New Guinea and numbering at peak strength some 140,000 men. The Eighteenth Army's first full-scale landing attempt on New Guinea shattered in the March 2–5, 1943, Battle of the Bismarck Sea when U.S. air attacks sank all of Adachi's eight transports, resulting in the loss of 3,000 men and a great amount of supplies and equipment.

Allied air superiority forced Adachi to bring his troops ashore in small scattered formations along more than 400 miles of the north New Guinea coast. A lack of transports and air cover inhibited the concentration of Eighteenth Army forces and led to many deaths among Adachi's men from hunger and disease.

When on April 22, 1944, Allied forces went ashore at Hollandia and Aitape, key strategic points on the north-central New Guinea coast, Adachi skillfully assembled his remaining 60,000 troops and moved them 300 miles overland to contest the Allied forces. Adachi ordered an all-out attack on July 10, 1944, and his forces successfully broke through the Allied front lines in place. The early attacks soon lost momentum, forcing Adachi to withdraw.

In the struggle for Aitape, Adachi lost more than 10,000 men. Thereafter, the Eighteenth Army simply struggled to survive Australian Army mopping-up operations. On September 13, 1945, Adachi surrendered with only about 10,000 of his force alive.

Although Adachi was an officer of great personal integrity and fighting ability, especially in adversity, his offensive tactics have been called into question and contrasted with those of his superior, General Imamura Hitoshi, commander in chief of the Eighth Area Army at Rabaul. Adachi's repeated attempts to attack superior Allied forces led to unnecessarily heavy casualties. In contrast, Imamura on New Britain Island prepared his men for sustained defensive operations and followed a force-in-being strategy throughout the remainder of the war.

After the war the Australian government prosecuted Adachi for war crimes, specifically the mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war at Rabaul. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Adachi committed suicide in prison at Rabaul on September 10, 1947.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Hollandia, Battle of; Horii Tomitaro; Imamura Hitoshi; New Guinea Campaign; Papuan Campaign

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Adam, Wilhelm (1877–1949)

German Army general. Born in Ansbach in Bavaria on September 15, 1877, Wilhelm Adam joined the German Army in 1897. He began his military career in a communications unit but then transferred to the engineers. In 1899 he was commissioned a lieutenant. He was promoted to captain in 1911 and at the end of World War I served as a staff officer in a Bavarian reserve division. Adam was promoted to major in 1919 and to colonel in 1927.

During the interwar period Adam served in staff positions, including chief of staff of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1930 he headed the Truppenamt, the secret German General Staff. That same year he was promoted to major general, and in 1931 he was promoted to lieutenant general. In late 1933 after Adolf Hitler came to power, Adam was assigned to Bavaria as commander of its military district. In 1935, he was promoted to general of infantry and named commander of the newly created Wehrmachtakademie (War Academy) in Berlin. He served there until March 1938, when he became commander of Army Group 2, which had headquarters at Kassel and was responsible for the defense of western Germany. Adam expressed concern

that German fortifications along the western border were inadequate to protect against a combined British-French attack, a view that brought him into conflict with Hitler.

That summer at Hitler's insistence, German military planners began preparing an invasion of Czechoslovakia, which necessitated pulling troops from the Rhineland. Adam and others, including army chief of staff General Ludwig Beck, argued strongly against the invasion, fearing that it would provoke French and British action. In July, Adam went so far as to characterize the planned attack on Czechoslovakia as a "war of desperation."

Hitler was well aware of these sentiments. Beck was relieved of his command in August 1938 and replaced by General Franz Halder. In November Adam also was sacked, replaced by General Erwin von Witzleben. Adam retired in December 1938. His removal was part of Hitler's effort to secure complete control of the army. Portions of Adam's unpublished memoirs were used after the war as background information at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Adam died in Garmisch-Partenkirchen on April 8, 1949.

LAURA J. HILTON

See also

Beck, Ludwig; Czechoslovakia; Halder, Franz; Hitler, Adolf; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Munich Conference and Preliminaries; Witzleben, Erwin von

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Admiralty Islands Campaign (February 29–May 18, 1944)

Allied military offensive in early 1944 that resulted in the seizure of the Admiralty Islands, an island group off of New Guinea. Located 200 miles

north of New Guinea, the Admiralty Islands were an attractive target for commander of the Southwest Pacific Area General Douglas MacArthur. Seeadler Harbor, an enclosed harbor formed by Manus and Los Negros Islands, and airstrips on the islands provided a base complex that could support subsequent operations against Japanese strongpoints in New Guinea and complete the isolation of Rabaul. The latter, a major Japanese air and naval base on New Britain Island, had been the major objective of Allied operations in the South Pacific since the summer of 1942.

MacArthur planned to invade the Admiralties in a division-size operation on April 1, 1944, but air reconnaissance in February 1944 indicated that the islands were lightly defended. Ignoring the estimates of his intelligence staff that there were more than 4,000 Japanese troops in the islands who would likely put up stiff resistance, MacArthur decided to gamble and advance the landing to the end of February, even though all the forces earmarked for the operation would not be ready by that point. He planned to land a reconnaissance force on Los Negros and then rush in reinforcements faster than the Japanese could react.

Men of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division storm ashore at Los Negros, the third largest of the Admiralty Islands. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The Admiralties operation began on February 29 with the landing of 1,000 assault troops from the 1st Cavalry Division at Hyane Harbor on the east coast of Los Negros. Although there were 2,000 Japanese on Los Negros, their commander had expected a landing on the other side of the island, and Hyane was only lightly defended. The attackers quickly captured Momote Airfield and set up a defensive perimeter. During the next days, aided by air support, they beat back piecemeal Japanese counterattacks. MacArthur poured in reinforcements, and by the morning of March 4 the last Japanese counterattack had been defeated.

On March 9, U.S. troops went ashore at Salami Plantation on the other side of Los Negros, and in 10 days of heavy fighting, the island was secured. In the meantime, American troops landed on Manus Island west of Lorengau Airfield, and with the seizure of the airfield on March 18, the important part of that island was in American hands.

The last Japanese stronghold in the Admiralties, Pityilu Island, was captured on March 31. Except for a few stragglers in the jungles of Manus, all of the Japanese defenders in the Admiralties had been wiped out. U.S. casualties were 330 killed and 1,189 wounded. Japanese losses included some 3,280 killed or wounded and 75 captured. MacArthur's gamble to advance the date of the Admiralties landing had paid off. The initial invaders had fought well even though outnumbered on February 29, and once MacArthur could bring to bear all of the 1st Cavalry Division, the Japanese were doomed.

With the capture of the Admiralties, MacArthur could now extend his operations. Most important, at a time when the Joint Chiefs of Staff were deliberating future strategy in the Pacific war, the successful Admiralties operation helped convince them to underwrite MacArthur's ambition to liberate the Philippine Islands by an offensive along the north coast of New Guinea.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

MacArthur, Douglas; New Guinea Campaign; Rabaul; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Adriatic Sea, Naval Operations in

The Adriatic Sea runs southeast 420 nautical miles between the Italian and Balkan Peninsulas and is 90 miles at its widest point. In 1940, Italy and Yugoslavia had the only navies on this narrow body of water. The main Italian bases were Venice, Pola, Brindisi, Taranto, and Durazzo in Albania, while Yugoslavia's main base was Kotor (Cattaro) on its south coast.

Hostilities commenced in the Adriatic with Italy's invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940. The Brindisi-Valona route was critical for maintaining Rome's expeditionary army, and convoys ran on a daily basis. A British cruiser-destroyer force destroyed a four-ship Brindisi convoy on November 12, 1940, as part of the far-flung movements associated with the air raid on Taranto, but nine other raids up through the end of the year, mostly by Greek destroyers, had no effect.

There was little naval activity associated with the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. One destroyer, 4 small torpedo boats, and 10 motor torpedo boats (MTBs) of the Yugoslav Navy deployed to assist in an attack on the Italian enclave at Zara, but Italian bombers put this force to flight. The Italians improvised several battalion-size (and many smaller) landings in the Dalmatian Islands.

In the end, Italy captured nearly the entire Yugoslav Navy. Only four ships escaped this fate; one destroyer was blown up in harbor, while one submarine and two MTBs escaped to join the Allies. They formed the nucleus of the Royal Yugoslavian Navy in exile.

From this point, the Adriatic became an Italian lake with the exception of minor activity by Tito's partisan naval service. Nearly 2 million tons of matériel and 1 million men were transported across the narrow sea from June

1940 through September 1943, with 99.9 percent of the men and 99.6 percent of the matériel arriving safely. This phase ended with the Italian armistice concluded with the Allies on September 8, 1943.

Germany reacted with predictable violence to news of the armistice, and Italian and German forces fought down the length of the sea for two weeks as Italian naval units reacted to the changed situation and regrouped to the south. The *Regia Marina* also evacuated more than 25,000 troops from the Balkans to safety in southern Italy through the end of September.

Thereafter, Germany needed to secure the Adriatic Sea to guard its Balkan flank, and the Kriegsmarine established naval forces on the Adriatic using captured Italian vessels and coastal forces already present (along with a minor and ineffective Croatian naval service). Control of the Adriatic allowed Germany to meet army supply requirements along the Italian and Balkan coasts, since land transport was inadequate.

While indispensable supplies went south, resources flowed north: Albanian crude and chrome and Croatian bauxite were especially invaluable to Germany’s war economy. The Kriegsmarine’s first actions, starting on November 13, 1943, were to evict partisans from the northern islands of Krk, Cherso, and Lussino, which they had occupied following the collapse of the Italian army.



U.S. ships ablaze following a German air attack on the Adriatic port of Bari, Italy, December 2, 1943. (Keystone/Getty Images)

The British, meanwhile, established a destroyer force at Bari and joined the partisans holding Vis Island in mid-November, basing two MTB flotillas there. Notwithstanding British interference, the Germans proceeded with landing operations on the middle archipelago, assaulting Korcula on December 23; Solta on January 12, 1944; Brac on January 13; and Hvar on January 19. Most of these landings involved battalion-size forces delivered by *Marinefährprähme* (MFPs; armed landing barges), motor sailboats, and other auxiliaries.

British destroyers patrolled the middle and upper Adriatic, sinking an MTB off Hvar on January 12 and bombarding Durazzo on January 15, Korcula on January 16 and 18, Recanati and Pesaro on February 1, and Korcula again on February 4, 12, and 27. At the same time, the Kriegsmarine was commissioning torpedo boats captured in Italian yards to serve as the capital ships in its Adriatic mosquito fleet. In total the Kriegsmarine commissioned 19 torpedo boats and corvettes in the Adriatic from the Italian armistice to the end of the war.

On February 29, 1944, the French 10th Light Squadron, consisting of the large destroyers *Le Terrible*, *Le Malin*, and *Le Fantasque*, attacked a German freighter in the upper Adriatic and sank it along with a torpedo boat and a corvette from the escort and badly damaged another torpedo boat. On March 8, British destroyers shelled Korcula again. *Le Terrible* and *Le Fantasque* raided into the northern Adriatic during March 2–4 and then, on the night of March 7, bombarded Zante in the Ionian Sea. These powerful warships attacked three Siebel ferries and an MFP on March 19. They sank two vessels and crippled the other two, suffering light damage in return.

During the summer of 1944, Yugoslavian partisans gained territory and strength, while German naval forces suffered steady attrition. The Dalmatian Islands were frequent battlegrounds, subject to British commando raids, such as against Hvar on July 11 and 12. In September after Romania signed an armistice with the Soviet Union, the Germans began evacuating the southern Dalmatian archipelago. British coastal craft attacked this traffic and destroyed two small coastal convoys off Vir on the night of October 11.

The torpedo boats and corvettes of the German 2nd Escort Division operated out of Fiume during this period. These warships shelled partisan positions and kept the British MTBs and partisan naval forces at bay. Partisan advances forced further evacuations. Early on October 31, barges and landing craft lifted a German regiment from Zara to Sibenik. This provoked the other major naval action that occurred in the Adriatic. Acting on signals intelligence, two British Hunt-class escort destroyers ambushed and sank two corvettes and one torpedo boat of the 2nd Escort Division off Pag Island on November 1, although they missed the convoy.

Throughout the winter and into the spring of 1945, the Kriegsmarine, assisted by units of Mussolini's small but efficient republican navy, kept to the upper Adriatic. A shortage of fuel and suffocating Allied air and sea superiority limited the time that German ships spent at sea; however, the Axis powers continued to undertake operations to the limits of their abilities. For example, six German explosive boats attacked the British light cruiser *Delhi* at Split on February 12, 1945.

The Allies destroyed Germany's last operational destroyer-size warships during the war's final weeks. MTBs torpedoed the *TA45* in the Gulf of Fiume on April 13, 1945, while the *TA43* scuttled at Trieste on May 1. The final mission of the eight surviving German MTBs involved sailing from Pola to Ancona crammed with 100 men who preferred to surrender to the British rather than to Yugoslavian partisans.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Germany, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Taranto, Attack on

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Aegean Sea Naval Operations

The Aegean Sea is an arm of the eastern Mediterranean separating Greece and Turkey, providing access to the Black Sea and the southern Balkans. The Aegean Sea extends more than 300 miles north from Crete and varies in width from 100 to 200 miles. In 1940, Greece controlled the archipelagos scattered across that sea except for the Italian Dodecanese to the southeast, which included the major islands of Rhodes, Kos, and Leros. There the Italian Regia Marina based two destroyers, four torpedo boats, and eight submarines.

Naval activity in the Aegean began from the second day after Italian entrance in the war (June 10, 1940), when French warships probed the Dodecanese. In July, an Italian attempt to base two light cruisers at Leros to raid British shipping into the Bosporus ended in failure when they encountered an Allied cruiser/destroyer force and lost the cruiser *Bartolomeo Colleoni.*

The British occupied Crete at the beginning of November 1940 and thereafter regularly ran convoys through the Kaso Strait along the island's eastern edge. The Italians patrolled this route, but their surface forces enjoyed only one success, when a torpedo boat torpedoed a tanker north of Crete on January 31, 1941. Their submarines had no substantive successes during this period, and supply shortages limited Italian activities.

On February 25, 1941, the British landed on Castelorizzo, the most easterly of the Dodecanese, but an Italian counterinvasion two days later drove them off. The German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941 and the subsequent attack on Crete sparked a flurry of naval activity that ended with heavy British losses and the expulsion of Allied power from the Aegean.

Between June 1941 and September 1943, the Axis powers completely occupied the Aegean. By the end of this period, the Germans controlled Milos, Lemnos, Chios, Skiros, Metelino, and nearly all of Crete. The Italians occupied the balance of the Aegean islands. Allied submarines patrolled the sea, but it was a target-poor environment because much of the area's traffic consisted of small schooners and caiques. The Italians maintained three destroyers and three torpedo boats in the Aegean, while the Germans built a brown-water fleet of *Unterseebootsjäger* (submarine hunters) consisting of

converted minesweepers, fishing trawlers, and yachts; they also deployed motor minesweepers, motor torpedo boats, and *Marinefährprähme* (MFP) barges.

Following the Italian armistice in September 1943, against the advice of his own navy's leaders, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered the Aegean held for reasons of prestige and to deny the Allies access to the Black Sea. Germany quickly seized the Italian destroyers and torpedo boats in Greek ports and commissioned five of them by the end of October.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill saw the Aegean as a prize and an opportunity, and the British tried to snatch the archipelago, despite the concurrent operations under way in Italy and a lack of U.S. support. The British deployed a scratch force of destroyers, landing craft, a few fighter and bomber squadrons, and an infantry brigade then being refitted. In the confused aftermath of the Italian armistice, the British occupied several of the larger Italian-held islands, including Kos (which had the only airfield outside of Rhodes), Leros, Kalymnos, Samos, Symi, and Stampalia. The Italians were generally cooperative but were also demoralized and confused.

The Germans were quick to rally, however, and brought to bear superior airpower. They also proved remarkably adept at improvising an amphibious campaign. Although several small convoys fell afoul of British or Greek surface forces, German air superiority restricted Allied warships to night operations. The British deployed a Spitfire squadron on Kos, but the Luftwaffe overwhelmed the British fighters. On October 1, Kos fell to a German assault.

The British responded to this disaster by reinforcing their Aegean naval forces with four light cruisers and three destroyers. On October 7, these destroyed another German convoy. Later that same morning, however, Luftwaffe bombers badly damaged one of the British cruisers, and German troops landed on Kalymnos, just south of Leros.

Back-and-forth attrition continued as each side delivered reinforcements and supplies by night and suffered air attacks by day. Although British signals intelligence provided many details of Axis operations, the Germans slowly gained the upper hand. On November 12 a German flotilla, which included ex-Italian torpedo boats, assaulted Leros in conjunction with a paratroop drop. At the critical moment the Royal Navy failed to control the nighttime waters surrounding Leros, and the Allies capitulated on November

16. This embarrassing defeat cost the Allied navies 6 destroyers, 2 submarines, and 10 smaller ships sunk; 5 cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 11 other ships were seriously damaged.

By winter 1943, eight British, Dutch, and Greek submarines were active in the Aegean. Unfortunately, their greatest success came on February 8, 1944, when a British submarine sank a transport carrying 3,173 Italian prisoners of war, of whom 2,600 drowned. In September 1944, Soviet advances into the Balkans threatened to isolate Greece, and on September 5, the Germans began withdrawing from portions of Crete and some of the Aegean islands. For this task, the Kriegsmarine deployed 52 merchant ships and more than 200 caiques and landing craft.

The British retained a strong interest in the Aegean, now fearing Soviet domination of the Dardanelles and Balkans. Churchill sought to interest the Americans in a Balkan invasion but to no avail. Even as the Germans began evacuating, the British assembled a flotilla of 7 escort carriers at Malta. It then sailed for Alexandria. Accompanied by 7 cruisers and 20 destroyers, this force rampaged through the Aegean and, in a series of engagements and air attacks, savaged the German warships remaining there. On October 10, Soviet troops cut the rail line between Athens and Berlin. Germany evacuated Piraeus on October 12. British paratroopers descended on Athens's airport that same day.

By the end of October, the Germans had evacuated more than 37,000 troops, losing only 380 men in the process. Allied forces sank 29 merchant ships, 5 torpedo boats, a minelayer, a motor minesweeper, and 3 submarine hunters. The remaining German ships were scuttled when Germany evacuated Salonika on October 31, leaving behind cut-off "fortress" garrisons on Crete, Rhodes, Leros, and Kos. British and Greek destroyer flotillas remained in the Aegean harassing these isolated garrisons to the end of the war.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Black Sea, Area of Operations; Cape Spada, Battle of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Crete, Battle of; Hitler, Adolf

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Afghanistan

A landlocked state in Central Asia located between British-held India to the south and the Soviet Union to the north. Afghanistan, which had a 1939 population of approximately 7.49 million, encompasses 272,772 square miles. Throughout much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, Afghanistan served as a traditional buffer state between the British and Russian Empires, although the British exercised considerable influence in Afghanistan, particularly after the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880).

Afghanistan was formally nonaligned during World War II, but there were nonetheless complex diplomatic, political, and military developments of consequence in and around that country.

Afghanistan was effectively positioned for neutrality. The February 1921 Soviet-Afghanistan treaty of mutual recognition was followed in 1926 by a formal nonaggression pact between the two countries. The government in Kabul clearly saw the Soviet Union as an effective counterweight to British power and influence in the region. The November 1921 Anglo-Afghanistan Treaty had accorded Afghanistan full and formal independence, and the Afghanistan Constitution, adopted in April 1923, declared the country free and independent, with a free press and a free economy. Other democratic guarantees were made explicit in writing, although they were not always followed in actual practice. A constitutional monarchy governed the country, with Islam as the established religion.

Moderate rule dating from the 1930s was an advantage in dealing with the turmoil and uncertainty of the period, and Afghan leaders also established broader ties with Germany. In 1935, they decided to rely mainly on Germany for economic and military modernization. Weekly air service between Berlin and Kabul commenced in 1938. The German Todt Organization also began construction and improvements of airfields, bridges, roads, and industrial

plants. German officers began training the Afghanistan military and introduced modern equipment, techniques, and weapons.

The British government, irritated by Kabul's partnership with Germany, refused to aid Afghanistan in territorial and related disputes with the Soviet Union. Despite this, Afghan leaders generally saw Britain in positive terms, and after World War II began, developments pressed Afghanistan toward the Allied camp. The August 1941 British-Soviet invasion of Iran meant that Afghanistan was virtually surrounded by Allied-controlled territory. In preparation against a German invasion, antitank mines were laid in the Khyber Pass, and other defensive measures were taken. At Allied insistence, Afghanistan expelled German and Italian representatives in the country and severed all ties with the Axis powers.

ARTHUR I. CYR

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; India; Iran; Organization Todt

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Africa

Africa was an important theater of operations in World War II. The continent offered war materials and important routes for air and sea communications. Control of the Suez Canal in Egypt was essential to Allied strategic planning, and during the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill diverted scant British military resources there. Had the Axis powers taken that vital waterway, all British shipping to India would have been forced to detour around the Cape of Good Hope, doubling the length of the voyage.

Securing the vital oil supplies of the Middle East was another important consideration for Allied planners. From Cairo, the British Middle East Command directed operations to secure the Suez Canal and then to take the

offensive against Italian forces invading from Libya and resident in East Africa.

World War II saw no fighting in Southern Africa, though the Union of South Africa, a British dominion, rallied to the British cause and made major contributions to the Allied war effort. The French African empire was another situation entirely. Following the defeat of France, most of the empire remained loyal to the new collaborationist Vichy regime, although Chad declared early for Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle.

Allied operations occurred at Dakar and Madagascar and in the Horn of Africa (Italian East Africa), but most of the fighting took place in French North Africa and in Northeast Africa. The road from Tripoli, in western Libya, through Benghazi and east to Alexandria, Egypt—the Benghazi Handicap—was the primary scene of fighting as Allied and Axis ground forces advanced and retreated along the narrow coastal band of desert.

Benito Mussolini's Italian forces invaded Egypt from Libya in September 1940. The fighting there seesawed, with both sides increasing the stakes. Finally, with the British offensive at El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942) and simultaneous British and U.S. landings in French North Africa, Axis forces there were caught in a vise. The continent was cleared of Axis troops in the Battle of Tunis during May 3–13, 1943.

A U.S. Army Air Transport Command Douglas C-47 Skytrain loaded with war supplies flies over the pyramids in Egypt in 1943. (National Archives)

The war had tremendous influence on African nationalism, often because of the role African troops played in the war effort. General Charles de Gaulle acknowledged during the conflict that France owed a special debt of gratitude to its African empire for providing the base and resources that enabled France to reenter the war in its final phases. It was thanks to the French colonial empire, moreover, that the independent existence of France was preserved. De Gaulle therefore pledged to establish a new relationship between metropolitan France and its colonies after the conflict.

Although Churchill was very much an imperialist, he could not override the strong anticolonial attitudes expressed by the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt had often declared himself opposed to European colonialism, and when he attended the Casablanca Conference in early 1943, he denounced French imperial practices. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin often denounced Western imperialism, although this did not prevent him from imperialist practices himself in Eastern and Central Europe or from requesting bases in Libya.

Nationalism found fertile ground in those African states that had been cut off from the mother countries during the war, especially the French and Belgian African possessions. Serious uprisings against French rule occurred both in Madagascar and at Sétif, in Algeria. French authorities put these down with significant loss of life. Repression only temporarily quieted nationalism, which fed on the lack of meaningful political reform. Nationalism also affected the colonial African empires of Britain, Belgium, France, and Portugal.

In 1945, Ethiopia, Egypt (nominally), Liberia, and the Union of South Africa were the only free states in Africa. During the course of the next two decades, however, most of the African states secured independence. Sometimes this occurred peacefully and sometimes with significant loss of life. Italy lost its African empire except for Italian Somaliland as a mandate; Libya became independent.

World War II was a watershed for Africa. It led to the fulfillment of nationalist dreams that had first washed over the continent during World War I. Unfortunately, the governments of many of the newly independent states

seemed incapable of managing effectively the development of the continent's vast resources and the education and betterment of their people.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Casablanca Conference; Dakar, Attack on; de Gaulle, Charles; East Africa Campaign; Egypt; El Alamein, Battle of; North Africa Campaign; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; South Africa, Union of; Stalin, Joseph; Tunis, Battle of

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Africa Corps

See Afrika Korps

African Americans in World War II

During World War II, African Americans represented approximately 10 percent of the U.S. population. They lived predominantly in the South, with some large African American concentrations in major northern cities such as Detroit and New York. The vast majority of African Americans worked in agricultural jobs or as domestic laborers.

Socially and legally, African Americans were treated as second-class citizens, and discrimination against them was rampant. Jim Crow laws, primarily in the South, dictated the strict segregation of public facilities. Most

of the time, the segregated facilities for African Americans were patently inferior to those reserved for whites.

During the war, white southerners moving north to seek employment in war-related industries pushed for expanded segregation policies in the North. Although much of the North did not have Jim Crow laws per se on the books, discrimination was nevertheless widespread.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's victory over President Herbert Hoover in the November 1932 presidential election was primarily due to Hoover's inability to deal with the Great Depression. For the first time, however, African American voters began shifting their allegiance to the Democratic Party in 1932. In 1936, they voted in even larger numbers for Democrats.

By 1940, African American leaders realized their impact as a voting bloc, as did Roosevelt when he ran for a third term that year. Realizing that he had to make concessions to keep the African American vote, Roosevelt nominated Colonel Benjamin O. Davis Sr. for promotion to brigadier general in the U.S. Army. Davis's promotion was approved on October 25, 1940, making him the first African American general officer in U.S. history.

Although such relatively minor gestures were welcomed, African American leaders sought more significant change in America's racial policies, namely full and equal civil rights. This became part of the so-called Double V Campaign during World War II, during which African Americans sought victory against America's enemies abroad and victory at home in the form of full civil rights.

Even before the United States entered the war in December 1941, the American industrial base had begun gearing up for war. This required large influxes of workers to keep up with demand, but many African Americans were shut out of this labor pool as factory owners and managers refused to employ them. In 1941, the president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, A. Philip Randolph, challenged the Roosevelt administration to end discrimination against African Americans in war-related industries. Randolph threatened to lead a massive march on Washington, D.C., if Roosevelt did not eliminate racial discrimination in government, in defense industries, and in the military. Randolph called off his march when Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, the Fair Employment Act, forbidding discrimination in government employment or in defense industries, on June 25, 1941.

Roosevelt did not believe that he had sufficient strength to tackle discrimination in the armed forces, however.

To carry out the mandates of Executive Order 8802, Roosevelt established the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to investigate any discrimination claims in government or defense-industry employment. Despite much fanfare, the FEPC had less impact than many had hoped. Furthermore, the military assiduously opposed further attempts to integrate the armed services.

The entry of the United States into the war on December 8, 1941, significantly affected African Americans. As war industries lost more and more employees to military service, they were forced to replace them with African Americans and other minorities as well as white women. African American workers in defense industries increased from 3 percent of the workforce in 1942 to 8 percent by 1945. Defense industries hired African Americans mainly as unskilled laborers, however, partly due to discrimination but also because of the lack of proper training and education among African Americans. Some firms were cowed into hiring only unskilled African American workers because of pressure from organized labor.

The American Federation of Labor (AFL) rarely recognized African American unions or accepted African American members. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the other major American labor union, accepted African Americans in large numbers, however, continuing a trend begun in the 1930s. African American union membership grew to about 1.5 million during the war.

Some unions and locals only grudgingly accepted African Americans in the labor force, and some locals went on strike to oppose the hiring or promotion of African Americans for skilled or supervisory positions. Furthermore, although the federal government required equal pay for the same job, not all companies abided by the requirement, nor did all unions support equal pay for African Americans. Still, defense jobs paid much better than other jobs for African Americans.

Better employment opportunities and wages in the North, the Midwest, and the West resulted ultimately in some 1.5 million African Americans migrating from the South during the 1940s, one of the largest population shifts in U.S. history. Between 1940 and 1950, the African American population in the North, the Midwest, and the West increased dramatically.

New York State's African American population grew by 347,000 people, that of Michigan by 234,000, and that of California by 343,000. Cities were unprepared for such rapid population growth during the war, however.

African Americans faced great difficulties in their new locales, especially in regard to housing. They could generally find only limited, often substandard, and significantly more expensive accommodations. Other public facilities, such as hospitals, schools, and public parks, were limited in number and often segregated. These factors, in addition to continued discrimination in hiring practices and police harassment, intensified African Americans' frustrations and led to some racial violence.

Racial violence in the United States occurred sporadically but still rather routinely during the war. Most violent acts occurred on a small scale especially in the South, where African American uniformed military personnel became victims of crime, ranging from harassment to murder, at the hands of white locals, including the police. African American newspaper reports of these incidents only increased the animosity toward the police.

Several large race riots occurred during the war. The Detroit Race Riot, the largest and deadliest of all the wartime riots, began on the evening of July 20, 1943, when African American and white youths confronted each other at Belle Isle. Quickly escalating out of control, the riot spread throughout the city. Because the police were unable to control the rioters, the federal government sent in army troops. The mayhem ended on July 21. The rioting claimed 34 deaths: 25 African Americans and 9 whites. Hundreds more were injured, and property damage came to an estimated $2 million.

During August 1–2, 1943, another race riot occurred in Harlem, the African American section of New York City, after unfounded rumors that a police officer had shot and killed an African American soldier spread throughout the area. Quick action by African American leaders and New York City mayor Fiorello LaGuardia prevented the riot from spreading, thus limiting casualties to six dead, several hundred wounded, and property damage estimated at between $250,000 and $1 million. Different groups placed the blame on various factors, yet both sides noted that discrimination played a role in the riots.

Prior to America's entry into the war, military policies governing the use of African Americans had focused on limiting their number in the military and restricting them to segregated units. The Navy and War Departments

believed that wartime was not an appropriate time for social experiments in integrating the armed forces. As of September 1939 the majority of African American service members were in the army, excluding the U.S. Army Air Corps and the Signal Corps, which had none. The navy had few African Americans, the majority working as stewards, while the U.S. Marine Corps had none at all. The U.S. Coast Guard's few African Americans mostly worked as stewards, although some were assigned to lighthouse duty or lifesaving stations.

Political pressure before and during the war forced Roo-se-velt to open more areas of military service for African Americans. By July 1941, the Army Air Corps began accepting African Americans and created several segregated combat units; in January 1942, Roosevelt ordered the Department of the Navy to enlist African Americans in general service positions.

When the United States entered World War II, African Americans volunteered to enlist in large numbers and were subject to the draft. Out of the 2.5 million African Americans eligible for service, however, only about 1 million served. The army had the only African American regular line officers in the military—Brigadier General Davis and Captain Benjamin O. Davis Jr., the latter promoted to lieutenant colonel on March 21, 1942. This lack of African American officers and large numbers of African American noncommissioned officers (NCOs) initially meant that most African American units were commanded by white officers and staffed by white NCOs. Segregated officer training during World War I and after had resulted in poorly trained African American officers. As a result, African American officer candidates during World War II, except for those in the Army Air Corps, underwent integrated basic officer training.

Basic training was segregated at the base or unit level. The army sent African Americans to various training bases throughout the United States; the Army Air Corps initially trained ground crew at Chanute Field in Illinois and pilots at Tuskegee Army Airfield in Alabama. Seamen trained at Camp Robert Smalls, a part of the Great Lakes Training Center in Illinois. Marines established a separate camp at Montford Point, North Carolina, and coastguardsmen trained at Manhattan Beach Training Station, New York.

Most African Americans serving in the military were assigned to segregated support or combat support units. African American army combat units included the 92nd and 93rd Infantry Divisions; the 758th, 761st, and

784th Tank Battalions; the 351st Field Artillery Battalion; and other units. The Army Air Corps activated several African American combat units composed of the Tuskegee Airmen, who had been trained at Tuskegee Institute.

Civil rights advocates increased pressure on the U.S. Marine Corps to accept its first African American volunteers on July 1, 1942. Although they trained and served in segregated units, the men performed well in Pacific Theater fighting. (Library of Congress)

The most celebrated Tuskegee units were the 99th Pursuit Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group. The 99th, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Davis Jr., arrived in North Africa on April 24, 1943, and participated in actions in the North African and Mediterranean theaters. The 99th later merged with the 332nd Fighter Group, which was also commanded by Davis. The 332nd, operating out of Italy, was primarily assigned to bomber escort missions. The Tuskegee Airmen were highly effective, losing only 25 bombers to hostile enemy aircraft out of the hundreds they escorted.

Navy policy generally restricted African Americans from serving at sea and abroad. Minor policy changes beginning in mid-1943 resulted in African Americans being deployed to the Pacific theater, many in support units such as the various all–African American construction battalions (CBs, or Seabees). Additionally, the Evarts-class destroyer escort *Mason* (DE-529)

and a PC 461–class submarine chaser, *PC-1264*, were temporarily integrated and later primarily manned by an almost completely African American crew. In August 1944, integration of the navy's auxiliary fleet occurred slowly and remained policy until the war's end.

Two African American marine composite defense battalions were also formed, the 51st and 52nd. Neither saw combat, yet a number of the Marine Corps' 63 African American depot or ammunition units were involved in combat operations. Although the Coast Guard still had segregated units, at least two ships, the weather ship *Sea Cloud* (IX 99) and the Tacoma-class frigate *Hoquiam* (PF-5), were integrated.

Segregationist policies in the military during the war proved inefficient and costly. Yet the military still refused to completely integrate after the war, despite the fact that African American military personnel had proven equally capable as whites when given equal opportunities and training. To reduce military expenditures and retain support for the Democratic Party, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which fully desegregated the armed forces, on July 26, 1948.

Integration of the armed forces would take time, however. The air force and the navy integrated quickly, but the army did not fully desegregate until the Korean War (1950–1953). The Double "V" campaign had been only partially successful. African Americans contributed greatly to the military victory against America's foreign enemies but made only minimal gains in civil rights.

Unlike the post–World War I era, in which African Americans had failed to make any substantial gains toward achieving full civil rights, after World War II they refused to let their wartime sacrifices be wasted and pushed harder. The limited but successful integration experiments during the war proved that African Americans could perform as well as whites. The success of the African American community in persuading Roosevelt to make some changes in segregationist policies during the war gave African Americans hope that further changes would occur. This combined with the political, organizational, and managerial skills gained by African Americans in the military and government during the war provided the raw material for the civil rights movement, which would begin in earnest in the late 1950s.

WYNDHAM E. WHYNOT

See also

Davis, Benjamin Oliver, Jr.; Davis, Benjamin Oliver, Sr.; Fair Employment Act, U.S.; Randolph, Asa Philip; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; Tuskegee Airmen; United States; Document 162; Document 220

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Afrika Korps

The Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK), better known as the Afrika Korps (Africa Corps), was the name given to the initial two German armor divisions sent to Libya in 1941 as part of Operation SONNENBLUME (SUNFLOWER). Commanded by Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel, the Afrika Korps grew and changed in character as Rommel received promotions and as other commanders took over, but its mystique would forever be associated with Rommel, known as “the Desert Fox.”

The DAK’s 5th Light Division began to arrive in Libya in February 1941 (in August it was officially reconstituted as the 21st Panzer Division). Elements of the 15th Panzer Division arrived in April. At various times other units were added to or subtracted from the Afrika Korps. Thus, at the time of Operation CRUSADER (November 18–December 30, 1941) the then-nonmotorized Afrika Division was attached, as was the Italian Savona Division. During the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942), the DAK consisted of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, the 90th and 164th

Light Motorized Infantry Divisions, the Ramcke Parachute Brigade, the (Italian) Giovanni Fascisti Regiment, and assorted supporting units. During the 1943 Tunisia Campaign, the 10th Panzer Division was added.



Axis air equipment and installations took a heavy pounding from bombers of the U.S. Army Air Forces as they pursued Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's retreating Afrika Korps through Libya and Tripoli to the Tunisian coast. This former hangar was located at Castel Benito Airdrome. (Library of Congress)

Because North Africa was an Italian theater, the DAK was technically subordinate to the Italian high command and thus was affected by the variables of coalition warfare. DAK commanders often exceeded their authority and could always (and frequently did) appeal directly to Berlin.

The DAK was largely dependent on supply convoys. Thus, the ebb and flow of the naval war in the Mediterranean directly influenced DAK operations, especially fuel supplies. As a consequence of a deteriorating naval situation for the Axis powers in the Mediterranean, most of the officers and men arrived in or departed from Africa by air, especially after 1941. By the end of October 1942, the DAK was critically short of fuel and ammunition. Resupply efforts were thwarted by Allied interdictions in the Mediterranean. What supplies arrived came by submarine and were just a trickle of what was needed.

Joining with the better-trained and better-led Italian units shipped to Libya in early 1941, the DAK went on the offensive, advancing quickly to the Egyptian border and laying siege to Tobruk. It was involved in Britain's Operations brevity (May 15–16, 1941), battleaxe (July 15–17, 1941), and crusader and in the Battle of Gazala (May 26–June 13, 1942) and the Battle of El Alamein.

The DAK formed the core of Axis forces in the retreat across Libya to Tunisia and in the ensuing battles there including Kasserine Pass (February 12–22, 1943) and El Guettar (March 23-Aoril 7, 1943). The DAK ended the war serving under Italy's best general, Marshal Giovanni Messe, who commanded the First Italian Army. The DAK's last commander, General of Panzer Troops Hans Cramer, surrendered with the DAK on May 13, 1943.

More than 1 million Axis soldiers served in Africa, 260,000 of them German. In the North African fighting, 18,594 Germans died, with another 3,400 missing in action and presumed lost. Approximately 101,784 Germans became prisoners following the Allied conquest of Tunisia.

Although the wisdom of sending German forces to Africa may be questioned, certainly the major mistake Adolf Hitler made was in not sending sufficient resources early on. Major General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma's study, prepared for Hitler before the dispatch of the DAK, recommended that Germany send either four divisions or none to North Africa.

This recommendation was based on the difficulty of supplying forces in North Africa and on all that would be required to conquer Egypt. Had four divisions been sent at the beginning, Rommel in all probability could have secured the Suez Canal and had a major impact on the course of the war. Hitler only made a halfhearted effort in a theater he always considered to be secondary, though. The majority of German forces arrived during the Tunisia Campaign, and only a small percentage of them belonged to the DAK.

JACK GREENE

See also

Bastico, Ettore; crusader, Operation; El Alamein, Battle of; Gazala, Battle of; Hitler, Adolf; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Messe, Giovanni; North Africa and the War; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Suez Canal; Thoma, Wilhelm Ritter von; Tobruk, First Battle of; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of; Tunisia Campaign

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Ainsworth, Walden Lee "Pug" (1886–1960)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born on November 10, 1886, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Walden Lee "Pug" Ainsworth graduated from the University of Minnesota in 1905 and from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1910. Ainsworth participated in operations against Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914. During World War I, he served on transports as a gunnery officer.

In February 1919 Ainsworth was appointed inspector of ordnance at the navy's Armor Plate Plant and Projectile Factory, where he served two years ashore before returning to sea as an executive officer of a transport and a light cruiser and as captain of the destroyer *Marcus.* Ainsworth was then an inspector of ordnance at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and he served at the New York Navy Yard. In 1925 he was made gunnery officer for destroyers, Asiatic Fleet, and then became commander of the destroyer *Paul Jones.*

Ainsworth left this billet in 1928 to serve for three years as an instructor in navigation at the Naval Academy. Various assignments afloat and ashore followed, including a stint at the Naval War College before returning to sea as executive officer of the battleship *Mississippi* in 1936. Ains-worth headed the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps unit at Tulane University from 1938 to 1940.

Promoted to captain, Ainsworth commanded Destroyer Squadron 2 in the Atlantic in 1940 and 1941 and then was assigned to Vice Admiral William F. Halsey's staff. In December 1941, Ainsworth took command of the battleship *Mississippi.* Promoted to rear admiral in July 1942, he became commander, destroyers, Pacific Fleet. He took a leading role in the August 1942–February 1943 Solomon Islands Campaign, commanding the bombardment of the

Japanese airfield at Munda during January 4–5, 1943, long considered a textbook operation.

As commander of Cruiser Division 9 (January 1943–October 1944), Ainsworth commanded three cruisers and five destroyers escorting the U.S. invasion force to New Georgia. He fought in the Battle of Kula Gulf (July 5–6, 1943), for which he was awarded the Navy Cross. He also fought in the Battle of Kolombangara (July 12–13, 1943). In these two actions, Cruiser Division 9 suffered one ship sunk and three damaged by Japanese torpedoes. Ainsworth also saw action in the Marianas, Guam, and the Leyte Gulf and at Peleliu. He then commanded the cruisers and destroyers of the Pacific Fleet (October 1944–July 1945).

After the war, Ainsworth commanded the Fifth Naval District (August 1945–December 1948) until his retirement as a vice admiral. He died on August 7, 1960, in Bethesda, Maryland.

GARY KERLEY

See also

Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Kolombongara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Airborne Forces, Allied

The concept of airborne forces originated in 1918 during World War I, when Colonel William Mitchell, director of U.S. air operations in France, proposed landing part of the U.S. 1st Division behind German lines in the Metz sector of the Western Front. Thus was born the idea of parachuting, or air-landing troops behind enemy lines to create a new flank, what would be known as vertical envelopment. The concept was put into action in the 1930s.

The U.S. Army carried out some small-scale experiments at Kelly and Brooks fields in 1928 and 1929, and in 1936 the Soviets demonstrated a full-blown parachute landing during Red Army maneuvers. Some 1,500 men took part in the exercise. One observer—British major general Archibald P. Wavell—commented that the previous year vehicles had also been landed by aircraft.

During World War II, the Soviets maintained an airborne corps and numerous Guards airborne divisions. These elite troops were never employed for strategic purposes. On several occasions, however, the Soviets dropped parachute troops behind German lines to aid partisan operations or disrupt German lines of communication. Ominously for the paratroopers, there were no operations in which drives of ground troops were coordinated to relieve these troops once they had been committed to battle.

British reaction to the reports of experiments with airborne forces in the Soviet Union was mild interest only, although some antiparachutist exercises took place in the Eastern Command; Lieutenant Colonel Frederick A. M. Browning, commanding the 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, took part. (Later in the war as a lieutenant general, Browning would command all British airborne forces.) The matter then rested until the Germans showed how effective parachute and air-landing troops were when they carried out their spectacular landings in 1940 in Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands.

Although manpower demands in Britain in 1940 were such that it should have been impossible to raise a parachute force of any significance, at the urging of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, 500 men were undergoing training as parachutists by August 1940. Fulfillment of Churchill’s order that the number be increased to 5,000 had to await additional equipment and aircraft.

Glider-borne troops were part of the plan, and various gliders were considered as troop-carrying aircraft. Inevitably such a new branch of infantry was beset with problems, mainly of supply, and there was also resistance to the concept in the regular units of the British Army. This often led battalions to post their least effective men to such new units merely to get rid of them; the best men were jealously guarded by their commanding officers.

The War Office (representing the British Army) and the Air Ministry (representing the Royal Air Force [RAF]) had to agree on aircraft. Because

Bomber Command was becoming aggressively conservative of aircraft, however, the only plane initially available for training and operations was the Whitley bomber. Aircraft available to airborne forces were initially severely limited until a supply of Douglas C-47 Dakota (Skytrain, in U.S. service) aircraft was established, whereupon the parachute troops found their perfect drop aircraft. The British were also the first Allied nation to develop gliders.

Progress in developing British airborne forces was slow; RAF objections were constant, in view of the pressure to carry the continental war to Germany via the strategic bombing campaign. Once the United States entered the war in late 1941, the situation eased enormously, and equipment that Britain was unable to manufacture became readily available.

To provide more men for the airborne forces, the War Office decided in 1941 that whole battalions were to be transferred, even though extra training would be needed to bring many men up to the standards of fitness for airborne troops. At the same time, the Central Landing Establishment became the main training center for airborne forces. The 1st Parachute Brigade, consisting of four parachute battalions, was established under the command of Brigadier Richard N. “Windy” Gale. Initially three battalions were formed, which exist to this day in the British Army as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, Parachute Regiment.

At an airfield in England, U.S. Army brigadier general Anthony C. McAuliffe, artillery commander of the 101st Airborne Division, gives last-minute instructions to glider pilots before take-off on D plus 1 in Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September 18, 1944. (National Archives)

The Glider Pilot Regiment, also formed in 1941, was based at Haddenham, near Oxford, having moved from Ringway (now Manchester Airport). Pilots were selected from army and RAF volunteers, but they were part of the army once trained. Airborne forces were infantry but had to be fitter than the average soldier, so training was rigorous. Troops were trained to endure in the cold, in wet weather, and in heat. They also had to be fit to withstand the impact of the landing, to fight alone with light weapons, and to fight without support for some days.

The airborne concept at that time was twofold: to raid, in which case troops would be extracted by land or sea after the operation (such as the attack on the German radar station at Bruneval in northern France on February 27–28, 1944), or to land at the rear of the enemy to capture a strategic target. Two examples of the latter are the Orne bridge landing on D-day in June 1944 and the September 17–26, 1944, Operation MARKET-GARDEN (market was the airborne portion), when the 1st Airborne Division tried to capture the bridges across the Rhine at Arnhem in Holland.

Airborne forces were regarded, justifiably, as an elite force, but they were a force of considerable strength by the end of the war. Despite the losses suffered at Arnhem, where the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment held the northern end of the road bridge for four days against two German Schutzstaffel (SS) panzer divisions, the 1st Airborne Division was again up to strength for the Rhine crossing operation in March 1945.

British airborne forces were also engaged in the Far East, and the 44th Indian Airborne Division came into being there. In the Pacific theater, airborne operations were on a smaller scale than in Europe because the jungle limited the ability to drop large numbers of troops.

U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall was an enthusiastic advocate of airborne forces. The first U.S. airborne division was the 82nd, a conversion of the 82nd Infantry (all-America) Division, formed in March 1942. Major General Omar N. Bradley commanded the division, with Brigadier General Matthew B. Ridgway as his assistant. Ridgway was appointed divisional commander as a major general in June 1942, and the division became the 82nd Airborne Division that August.

The 82nd went to North Africa in April 1943, just as German resistance in that theater was ending. It took part in operations in Sicily and Normandy, and under the command of Major General James M. Gavin it participated in

Operation MARKET-GARDEN in the Nijmegen-Arnhem area and also in the Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945).

The 101st Airborne Division was activated in August 1942 with a nucleus of officers and men from the 82nd Division. The 101st was commanded by Major General William C. Lee, one of the originators of U.S. airborne forces. The division left for England in September 1943. Lee had a heart attack in the spring of 1944, and the division was taken over by Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, who led it through D-day and Operation MARKET-GARDEN, when it secured the bridge at Eindhoven. The division distinguished itself in the defense of Bastogne during the German Ardennes Offensive.

Three other U.S. airborne divisions were established: the 11th, which served in the Pacific, jumped onto Corregidor Island and fought in the February 3–March 4, 1945, Battle for Manila; the 17th, which was rapidly moved to Europe for the German Ardennes Offensive and then jumped in the Rhine crossing with the British 6th Airborne Division; and the 13th, which arrived in France in January 1945 but never saw action.

Cooperation between British and U.S. airborne forces was close. When the U.S. 101st Airborne arrived in England, it was installed in a camp close to the training area for the British 6th Airborne Division, which had prepared much of the camp in advance. Training and operational techniques were almost identical, and there were common exercises and shoots to create close bonds among troops. There were also frequent personnel exchanges to cement friendship. Similar arrangements were made between the U.S. 82nd Airborne and the British 1st Airborne Division. Parachute training in the United States was centered at Fort Benning, Georgia, and in 1943, some 48,000 volunteers commenced training, with 30,000 qualifying as paratroopers. Of those rejected, some were kept for training as air-landing troops.

One great contribution made by the United States to the common good was the formation and transfer to England of the U.S. Troop Carrier Command. As noted previously, transport aircraft shortages had bedeviled airborne forces' training and operations from the outset. The arrival of seemingly endless streams of C-47 aircraft was a major assist. Further, the RAF in 1944 had nine squadrons of aircraft, or a total of 180 planes, dedicated to airborne forces.

In Britain, Polish troops were also trained as parachutists to form the

Polish 1st Parachute Brigade, which fought at Arnhem in MARKET-GARDEN. Contingents from France, Norway, Holland, and Belgium were also trained, many of whom served operationally in the Special Air Service Brigade. The British Commonwealth also raised parachute units. Australian paratroopers (the 1st Australian Parachute Battalion) served in the Far East, and the Canadian 1st Parachute Battalion served in Europe.

Several small-scale operations had been carried out before 1943 with mixed success, but the big date for airborne forces was June 6, 1944. Plans for D-day (June 6, 1944) required the flanks of the invasion beaches to be secured in advance, and only airborne forces could guarantee this. In Britain for the invasion were two British airborne divisions (the 1st and 6th) and two American airborne divisions (the 82nd and 101st). The plan was to use all the available airborne and glider-borne troops in the initial stages of the operation. Unfortunately, even in June 1944 transport aircraft available were insufficient for all troops to be dropped at once. All aircraft were organized in a common pool so that either British or American troops could be moved by mainly American aircraft. This was another fine example of the cooperation that existed at all levels within the Allied airborne forces.

Operation OVERLORD (D-day) began for the paratroopers and gliders in the dark, early morning of June 6. To the west, American paratroopers dropped at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula to secure the forward areas of what were to be the Omaha and Utah beaches. Despite many dispersal problems, the troops managed to link up and were soon in action, denying the Germans the ability to move against the beachheads. The troops fought with great gallantry despite their weakened strength (caused by air transport problems), and by the end of the day contact had been established with the shipborne forces from the beachheads.

In the east, Britain’s 6th Airborne Division was charged with controlling the left flank of the British invasion beaches. Perhaps the most startling operation (for the Germans) was the coup de main attack by glider-borne air-landing troops of the 11th Battalion, Oxford and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, who landed so close to their target that they were able to capture bridges over the Caen Canal and the River Orne. On a larger scale, the 3rd Parachute Brigade was ordered to take out the Merville Battery, which posed a threat to the invasion beaches. The 9th Parachute Battalion, which planned to attack with 700 men, was so spread out on landing that only 150 men were

available. With virtually no support, the men attacked the battery and captured it. The battalion lost 65 men and captured 22 Germans; the remainder of the German force of 200 were either killed or wounded.

The essence of airborne forces is morale; training inculcates a feeling of superiority among the men, and their distinctive headgear and equipment mark them as men apart. All Allied parachute and glider troops in the war were of a high standard, and their fighting record bears this out. Even when things went wrong, as often happened when troops were dropped from aircraft, the men made every effort to link up and carry out the task they had been given.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

Airborne Forces, Axis; Aircraft, Transport; Anzio, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Bastogne, Battle for; Blitzkrieg; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Browning, Frederick; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Commandos/Rangers; Gavin, James Maurice; Infantry Tactics; Manila, Battle for; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Naval Gunfire, Shore Support; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Parachute Infantry; Parachutes; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Sicily, Invasion of; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Airborne Forces, Axis

An initial German airborne force was formed in the spring of 1936 as an experiment after German observers had watched Soviet airborne troops in an exercise. Set up at Stendhal, the force was made up of men from the General

Göring Regiment of the Luftwaffe. Within a year of the establishment of the first parachute regiment, the Schutzstaffel (SS) was also training a platoon, and the army was evaluating parachute troops. Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring, however, ensured that air force troops only were to form the parachute force.

The first German exercises took place in the autumn of 1937, followed later that year by the first use of cargo gliders. Expansion was rapid, and in 1938 Major General Kurt Student was organizing the first airborne German division to take part in the “liberation” of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. This 7th Fallschirmjäger (Parachute) Division had two parachute battalions, one airborne infantry battalion and an airborne infantry regiment, three airborne SS battalions, and airborne artillery and medical troops. The division was not needed in 1938, and it was decided that the 7th Parachute Division would be all-parachute, whereas the 22nd Infantry Division would be glider-borne.

In the German invasion of Norway (April 1940), a parachute battalion dropped on Stavanger Airfield and secured it in 35 minutes. On May 10, 1940, Germany captured bridges and an airfield in Holland, while glider-borne troops attacked and captured Fort Eben Emael in Belgium, which opened the German route into the Low Countries during the invasion of France. Airborne operations had proved their worth, so much so that the British immediately began to form their own parachute units.

These successes encouraged the German high command to expand its airborne assets. It soon formed XI Flieger Korps, which included three parachute regiments of three battalions each plus parachute signals, medical, artillery, antiaircraft, antitank, machine gun, and engineer battalions and the necessary supply troops. These troops were originally seen as the spearhead of the invasion of Britain, but that operation never took place.

The Germans next employed paratroops in their 1941 Balkan Campaign to capture the island of Crete (May 1941). Student saw this as the forerunner of other more ambitious airborne operations. The largest airborne operation to that point in history, it involved 9,000 men and 530 Junkers -Ju-52 transport aircraft flying from Greece.

Thanks to Allied Ultra intercepts, the defenders knew the drop zones in advance. Although by rushing in reinforcements the Germans were able to secure their objectives, they paid a heavy price. They sustained 6,700

casualties (3,000 killed) and lost some 200 transport aircraft in the operation. Student wanted to go on and try to take Malta, but Hitler refused. Crete was the graveyard of the German airborne forces; thereafter they fought as elite ground troops only, though their fighting abilities were recognized by all who met them in battle.

The Italians started early in their evaluation of airborne forces. Their first experiments occurred in 1927, when nine men dropped on Cinisello Airfield. Some 250 paratroops then began training and took part in a training drop at Gefara, in Libya. A training center was set up at Tarquinia, in central Italy, and in April 1941, Italian paratroops captured the island of Cephalonia, off the west coast of Greece. Although a small number of parachute troops continued thereafter, the planned Italian assault on Malta never took place, and Italian paratroops fought in a ground role for the rest of the war.

The Japanese began parachute training in 1940 with four training centers in the Japanese home islands. In the autumn of 1941, some 100 German instructors arrived, and soon there were nine training centers and 14,000–15,000 men under training. Both the Japanese Army and Navy had paratroops, all of whom were ready for operations at the start of the war.

German Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft. Powered by three radial engines, the Ju-52 was employed by the Luftwaffe as a military transport and to drop paratroopers. (Berliner Verlag/Archiv/DPA/Corbis)

Japanese Army paratroops numbered about 6,000 men and were known as raiding units. They were divided into parachute and glider-borne units.

Their first mission was to capture Menado Airfield in the Celebes Islands on January 11–12, 1942. They then attacked the airfield and oil refineries at Palembang on February 14–16. Although the Japanese managed to capture the airfield, the refineries were destroyed before they could take them over. A week later the Japanese successfully struck Timor, in coordination with seaborne troops.

Operations after this were mainly tactical, especially an assault on Leyte in December 1944. This attack was a total failure; however, Allied intelligence summaries noted that the Japanese parachute troops were part of a well-organized, well-trained force that could have proved extremely effective had the emphasis in the Pacific war not been on manpower and ships to capture the many islands of this area.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Aircraft, Transport; Crete, Battle of; Eben Emael, German Capture of; Freyberg, Bernard Cyril; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Manado, Battle of; Netherlands Campaign; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Norway, German Conquest of; Palembang, Battle of; Signals Intelligence; Student, Kurt

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Aircraft, Bombers

Aircraft designed to attack enemy targets including troop concentrations, installations, and shipping. During the 1930s, bomber designs underwent something of a revolution; performance increased to the point that many bombers were faster than the fighters in service. The prevailing wisdom, according to Italian general Giulio Douhet, was that “the bomber will always

get through.” It was assumed that the bomber would be fast enough to evade most defending fighters and that defensive armament could deal with any that did intercept. The bomber was therefore seen as something of a terror weapon. Events in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, including the German bombing of Guernica, and early German experience in World War II tended to reinforce this view.

At the start of the war, most combat aircraft were not equipped with self-sealing fuel tanks, and most did not have adequate protective armor. Operational experience during 1939 and early 1940 led the European powers to retrofit their aircraft with armor and self-sealing fuel tanks. Some aircraft designers took this to extremes: for example, about 15 percent of the weight of the Russian I1–2 Shturmovik (1941) was armor plate. On the other hand, many Japanese aircraft had no protection of any sort until late in the war; they were known to their crews as “flying cigarette lighters” and were easy to shoot down.

Other changes also affected bomber capabilities. The Germans embraced dive-bombing, and all their bombers had to be able to dive-bomb. The necessary structural changes greatly added to the bombers’ weight and decreased bomb loads. The flying weight of the Ju-88, for example, went from 6 to 12 tons, sharply reducing both its speed and bomb-carrying capacity.

Defensive armament of the majority of bombers in service at the start of the war was inadequate in terms of the number and caliber of weapons and/or their field of fire. This situation came about partly because of the assumption that interceptions at 300-plus mph were difficult and would therefore be rare. The early B-17Cs, for example, were quite vulnerable because their few defensive weapons had several blind spots and were single manually aimed weapons. Later B-17Es had much better defensive armament deployed as multiple weapons in power turrets, making them much more difficult to shoot down. An alternative tactic was to dispense with all defensive weapons and rely on speed and performance to evade the defenses. The De Havilland Mosquito, which carried out many pinpoint attacks from 1942 onward, epitomized this approach.

The following text describes the most significant bombers employed by both sides during World War II. See also Table 1.

Germany

The Heinkel He-111 entered service in 1935, and the B model served with distinction in the Spanish Civil War, where it was fast enough to fly unescorted. Nearly 1,000 He-111s were in service at the start of the war; they formed a significant part of the Luftwaffe’s medium bomber strength early in the conflict, although they were roughly handled during the Battle of Britain in spite of carrying nearly 600 pounds of armor. Later versions had better defensive armament and were used in various roles, including torpedo bombing. Approximately 7,450 He-111s were built before production ended in 1944.

The Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber virtually ruled the skies in World War II until the 1940 Battle of Britain, but then continued to perform useful service on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The prototype Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber flew in 1935, entering service with the Luftwaffe in the spring of 1937. Examples sent to Spain with the Kondor Legion in 1938 were able to demonstrate highly accurate bombing under conditions of air superiority. Stukas were highly effective in the invasions of Poland in 1939 and France in 1940. During the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, they suffered such heavy losses from opposing British fighters that they were withdrawn from operations partway through the campaign. They continued to serve in the Mediterranean theater, however, and on the Eastern Front in dive-bombing and close ground-support roles. A total of 5,709 Ju-87s of all versions were built.

Table 1. Bombers, All Powers—Specifications

Name	*Year of Introduction*	*Crew*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Takeoff Weight (lb)**	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Operational Ceiling (ft)*	*Range (mi)†*	*Armament/Payload*
Germany										
Junkers Ju-87 B-1 (late 1938)	Early 1937	2	1 × 900-hp Junkers Jumo v-type	45 ft 3.25 in.	36 ft 5 in.	9,370	242 mph at 13,410 ft	25,250 ft	342 mi with 1,102 lb bombs	3 × 7.9-mm machine guns, up to 1,542 lb bombs
Heinkel He 111 H-3 (late 1939)	1935	5	2 × 1,200-hp Junkers Jumo v-type	74 ft 1.75 in.	53 ft 9.5 in.	24,912	258 mph at 16,400 ft	25,590 ft	758 mi with maximum bomb load	1 × 20-mm cannon, 5 × 7.9-mm machine guns, 4,409 lb bombs
Junkers Ju-88 A-4 (1942)	Late 1939	4	2 × 1,340-hp Junkers Jumo v-type	65 ft 7.5 in.	47 ft 3 in.	26,700	269 mph at 14,765 ft	25,900 ft	650 mi with maximum bomb load	9 × 7.7-mm machine guns, up to 3,306 lb bombs
Great Britain										
Handley Page Hampden I (late 1938)	Late 1938	4	2 × 980-hp Bristol Pegasus radials	69 ft 2 in.	53 ft 7 in.	18,756	265 mph at 15,500 ft	22,700 ft	1,095 mi with maximum bomb load	6 × 0.303-in. machine guns, 4,000 lb bombs
Bristol Blenheim IVL (early 1939)	Early 1939	3	2 × 920-hp Bristol Mercury radials	56 ft 4 in.	42 ft 9 in.	13,500	266 mph at 11,800 ft	27,260 ft	1,950 mi maximum	5 × 0.303-in. machine guns, 1,000 lb bombs
Short Stirling I (late 1940)	Late 1940	7 or 8	4 × 1,590-hp Bristol Hercules radials	99 ft 1 in.	87 ft 3 in.	59,400	260 mph at 10,500 ft	20,500 ft	1,930 mi with 5,000 lb bombs	8 × 0.303-in. machine guns, up to 14,000 lb bombs
Vickers Wellington III (early 1941)	Late 1938	6	2 × 1,500-hp Bristol Hercules radials	86 ft 2 in.	64 ft 7 in.	29,000	255 mph at 12,500 ft	19,000 ft	2,200 mi with 1,500 lb bombs	8 × 0.303-in machine guns, 4,500 lb bombs
Avro Lancaster B.I (early 1942)	Early 1942	7	4 × 1,280-hp Rolls Royce Merlin v-type	102 ft	69 ft 4 in.	68,000 maximum	287 mph at 11,500 ft	24,500 ft	1,730 mi with 12,000 lb bomb load	8 × 0.303-in. machine guns, up to 18,000 lb bombs
Handley Page Halifax B.II (late 1943)	Early 1941	7	4 × 1,615-hp Bristol Hercules radials	104 ft 2 in.	71 ft 7 in.	54,400	282 mph at 13,500 ft	24,000 ft	1,985 mi with 7,000 lb bombs	9 × 0.303-in. machine guns, up to 13,000 lb bombs
De Havilland Mosquito B.XVI (early 1944)	Late 1941	2	2 × 1,680-hp Rolls Royce Merlin v-type	54 ft 2 in.	40 ft 6 in.	19,093	408 mph at 26,000 ft	37,000 ft	1,370 mi with 4,000 lb bombs	Up to 4,000 lb bombs
Italy										
Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79-II Sparviero (early 1940)	1937	6	3 × 1,000-hp Piaggio radials	69 ft 6.5 in.	53 ft 1.75 in.	25,133	295 mph at 13,120 ft	27,890 ft	1,243 mi with 2,756 lb bombs	3 × 12.7-mm machine guns, 2 × 7.7-mm machine guns, 2 × 450- mm torpedoes, or 2,756 lb bombs
CANT Z.1007bis (late 1940)	1937	5	3 × 1,000-hp Piaggio radials	81 ft 4.5 in.	60 ft 11 in.	38,206	283 mph at 15,100 ft	26,500 ft	1,243 mi with 2,430 lb bombs	4 × 12.7-mm machine guns, 2,430 lb bombs, or 2 × 450-mm torpedoes
Japan										
Mitsubishi Ki-21-IIb (1942)	1937	5–7	2 × 1,500-hp Mitsubishi Ha-101 radials	73 ft 10 in.	52 ft 6 in.	21,407	302 mph at 15,485 ft	32,810 ft	1,350 mi with maximum bomb load	5 × 7.7-mm machine guns, 1 × 12.7-mm machine gun, 2,205 lb bombs

Name	Year of Introduction	Crew	Engine	Span	Length	Takeoff Weight (lb)*	Maximum Speed (mph)	Operational Ceiling (ft)	Range (mi)†	Armament/Payload
Japan (*continued*)										
Mitsubishi G4M2a Betty (mid-1944)	Early 1941	7	2 × 1,850-hp Mitsubishi Kasei	81 ft 8 in.	64 ft 5 in.	33,069 maximum	272 mph at 15,090 ft	29,365 ft	1,497 mi with normal bomb radials	4 × 20-mm cannon, 1 × 7.7-mm machine gun, up to 2,205 lb 1 × 1,764-lb torpedo
Soviet Union										
Ilyushin Il-4 (1940)	1940	3–4	2 × 1,100-hp M-88B radials	70 ft 4 in.	48 ft 6.5 in.	22,046 maximum	255 mph at 21,000 ft	29,530 ft	2,647 mi with 2,205 lb bombs	3 × 7.7-mm or 12.7-mm machine guns, up to 5,512 lb bombs
Petlyakov Pe-2	Early 1941	3	2 × 1,100-hp Klimov v-type	56 ft 3.5 in.	41 ft 6.5 in.	18,734	336 mph at 16,400 ft	28,900 ft	700 mi with maximum bomb load	3 × 7.7-mm machine guns, 2,645 lb bombs
Ilyushin Il-2m3 Shturmovik (late 1942)	Mid-1941	2	1 × 1,770-hp Mikulin v-type	47 ft 11 in.	38 ft 2.5 in.	12,147	251 mph at 4,920 ft	19,685 ft	373 mi with normal load	2 × 23-mm cannon, 2 × 7.62-mm machine guns, 1 × 7.62-mm machine gun, 1,323 lb bombs or 8 rockets
United States										
Douglas A-20 C Havoc (1941)	1940	3	2 × 1,600-hp Wright Cyclone radials	61 ft 4 in.	47 ft 5 in.	24,500 maximum	342 mph at 13,000 ft	24,250 ft	1,050 mi with maximum bomb load	7 × 0.303-in. machine guns, 2,000 lb bombs
Martin B-26B Marauder (early 1942)	1941	7	2 × 1,920-hp Pratt and Whitney radials	71 ft	58 ft 3 in.	37,000	282 mph at 15,000 ft	21,700 ft	1,150 mi with 3,000 lb bombs	11 × 0.5-in. machine guns, 11 × 0.3-in. machine gun, up to 5,200 lb bombs
Boeing B-17F (mid-1942)	1939	9–10	4 × 1,200-hp Wright Cyclone radials	103 ft 9.5 in.	74 ft 8.75 in.	55,000	299 mph at 25,000 ft	37,500 ft	1,900 mi with 6,000 lb bombs	8 or 9 × 0.5-in. machine guns, 1 × 0.303-in. machine gun, 12,800 lb bombs
North American B-25 J Mitchell (1943)	Late 1940	5	2 × 1,700-hp Wright Cyclone radials	67 ft 7 in.	52 ft 11 in.	33,450	275 mph at 15,000 ft	25,000 ft	1,275 mi with 3,200 lb bombs	13 × 0.5-in. machine guns, up to 4,000 lb bombs
Consolidated B-24J Liberator (1944)	Early 1941	8–12	4 × 1,200-hp Wright Cyclone radials	110 ft	67 ft 2 in.	56,000	290 mph at 25,000 ft	28,000 ft	1,700 mi with 5,000 lb bombs	10 × 0.5-in. machine guns, 5,000 lb bombs
Boeing B-29 Superfortress (mid-1944)	Mid-1944	10	4 × 2,200-hp Wright Cyclone radials	141 ft 3 in.	99 ft	120,000	357 mph at 30,000 ft	33,600 ft	3,250 mi with 10,000 lb bombs	1 × 20-mm cannon, 10 × 0.5-in. machine guns, up to 20,000 lb bombs
Douglas A-26 B Invader (late 1944)	Late 1944	3	2 × 2,000-hp Pratt and Whitney radials	70 ft	50 ft	35,000 maximum	355 mph at 15,000 ft	22,100 ft	1,400 mi with maximum load	10 × 0.5-in. machine guns, up to 4,000 lb bombs

Sources: Eric Brown, *Wings of the Luftwaffe* (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 1993); William Green, *Famous Bombers of the Second World War*, 2nd ed. (London: Book Club Associates, 1979); Philip Jarrett, ed., *Aircraft of the Second World War* (London: Putnam, 1997); Kenneth Munson, *Bombers, Patrol and Transport Aircraft, 1939–45* (Poole, UK: Blandford, 2002).

* Weight is normal takeoff weight unless specified otherwise.

† Range is maximum flyable distance, including reserves.

The Junkers Ju-88, one of the most effective and adaptable German aircraft of the war, entered Luftwaffe service in September 1939. The Ju-88 had good performance for a bomber, particularly the later versions, which were used as night fighters. Specialized variants were also produced for dive-bombing, antishipping, reconnaissance, and training. Ju-88C fighter variants were used in daylight during the Battle of Britain, but they were unable to cope with attacks by modern British single-engine fighters. A total of 14,980 Ju-88s were built, including 10,774 bomber variants.

Italy

The principal Italian bomber and one of the most capable Italian aircraft of the war was the trimotor Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 Sparviero (Sparrow). The Italians used it as a bomber, torpedo bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft. Originally designed by Alessando Marchetti as a high-speed, eight-passenger transport, it had retractable landing gear. The SM.79 entered service in 1936 and first saw service in the Spanish Civil War. A total of 1,217 were produced during World War II. Reconverted to military transports after the war, Sparvieros served with the Italian Air Force until 1952.

The CANT Z.1007 Allcione (Kingfisher) was Italy's second most important bomber of the war. Entering production in 1939, it was both a medium conventional bomber and a torpedo bomber. It was of largely wooden construction with weak defensive armament. It appeared both in single- and twin-rudder configurations without differing designations and often in the same squadron. The CANT Z.1007 was widely used all over the Mediterranean theater. Of good design and easy to fly, it was nonetheless poorly defended and suffered heavy losses from Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters. CANT Z.1007s continued in service until the end of the war on both sides after the Italian surrender of 1943. A total of 560 were built.

The Italians had only one four-engine bomber, the Piaggio P.108. Designed by Giovanni Casiraghi, it entered service in May 1941 and was only intermittently used. It had a crew of six, a maximum speed of 261 mph, and a range of 2,190 miles. Armed with eight machine guns, it could carry 7,700 pounds of bombs. Only 33 were produced, however, 8 of which went to the Germans for use as transports.

An Italian Savoia Marchetti SM-79 bomber. (Corbis)



A formation of Japanese Army Mitsubishi Ki-21 medium bombers (known as “Sally” in the Allied reporting system) during a mission against China in November 1943. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Japan

The Mitsubishi Ki-21 medium bomber (“Sally” in Allied designation) was the winner of a 1936 bomber design competition run by Japan’s army air force. It entered service in 1937 as the Ki-21-Ia and was replaced shortly afterward by the Ki-21-Ic, which had additional armament and defensive

armor as a result of combat experience in China. The Ki-21 was the standard Japanese air force bomber at the end of 1941, encountered throughout the Pacific and the Far East. When production ended in 1944, 2,064 had been built by Mitsubishi and Nakajima as well as about 500 transport versions by Mitsubishi.

The Mitsubishi G4M medium bomber ("Betty") entered service with the Japanese Army early in 1941 and was involved in pre–World War II operations in China. It was designed in great secrecy during 1938–1939 to have the maximum possible range at the expense of protection for the crew and vital components, and it was mainly used in the bomber and torpedo bomber roles. G4M1s were mainly responsible for sinking the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse* off Malaya in December 1941. The G4M had an extraordinary range, but more than 1,100 gallons of fuel in unprotected tanks made the aircraft extremely vulnerable to enemy fire. The G4M2 appeared in 1943 and was the major production model, with more powerful engines and even more fuel. Losses of the aircraft continued to be heavy, and Mitsubishi finally introduced the G4M3 model late in 1943 with a redesigned wing and protected fuel tanks. A total of 2,479 aircraft in the G4M series were built.

Great Britain

The Bristol Blenheim was developed from the private-venture Bristol 142, and the short-nosed Mk 1 entered service as a light bomber in March 1937, although some were completed as fighters. The Blenheim was an effective bomber, but lacking adequate defensive armament and armor, it was vulnerable to fighter attack. The most numerous versions were the long-nosed Mk IV and V, but their performance suffered from significant weight growth, the Mark V in particular suffering heavy losses. The Blenheim nevertheless filled an important capability gap in time of need, and it was exported to Finland, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. A total of 5,213 Blenheims of all versions were built.

The Vickers Wellington entered service with the RAF late in 1938 and (with the Whitley and Hampden) bore the brunt of the RAF bomber offensive for the first two years of the war. Its light but strong geodetic structure enabled it to carry a respectable bomb load, and it could withstand a

significant amount of battle damage. The Wellington was one of the first monoplane bombers to be fitted with power turrets, but (in common with all early World War II bombers) it was vulnerable to fighter attack when flown unescorted in daylight. The Wellington was mainly employed as a medium bomber, although some were used for maritime reconnaissance, torpedo-bombing, mine-laying, and transport duties. Wellingtons were in production throughout the war, with 11,461 being built up to October 1945.

The Handley Page Hampden entered RAF service late in 1938. Of imaginative design, it delivered a reasonable performance on only average engine power, but the cramped fuselage caused crew fatigue, and the defensive field of fire was limited. Hampdens were used as medium bombers and minelayers until late 1942, and they served as torpedo bombers and maritime reconnaissance aircraft until the latter part of 1943. A total of 1,430 Hampdens and variants were built.

The Short Stirling, the first of the RAF's four-engine "heavies" to see combat, entered service in late 1940. It was built to specification B.12/36, which unfortunately meant that the wingspan should be less than 100 feet to fit in a standard hangar; this compromised the aircraft's altitude capability to the extent that attacks on Italy required British pilots to fly through the Alps rather than over them. The Stirling was nonetheless outstandingly maneuverable for such a large aircraft. It was used as a bomber, a minelayer, a glider tug/transport, and (with 100 Group) an electronic countermeasures aircraft. A total of 2,381 Stirlings were built.

The Handley Page Halifax I entered service early in 1941 and was found to be a good bomber, but it lacked adequate defensive armament. The Halifax B.II had a dorsal gun turret but suffered from weight growth and a tendency to spin when fully loaded. Later B.IIs underwent a weight- and drag-reduction program and had larger fins fitted to correct these faults. The B.III version was the most numerous, using more powerful Bristol Hercules engines in place of the Merlins. Although the Halifax's main role was as a bomber, it was also employed as a transport, glider tug, and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. A total of 6,176 Halifaxes were built.

The Avro Lancaster was a successful development of the Rolls-Royce Vulture-powered Manchester, entering operational service with the RAF in early 1942. The Lancaster remained in service until the end of the war and rapidly became the primary strategic bomber for the RAF. It lost fewer

aircraft per ton of bombs dropped than either the Halifax or Stirling. The Lancaster had a large bomb bay and was designed to take 4,000-pound bombs; successive modifications enabled it to carry 8,000- and 12,000-pound weapons, and the B.I (special) carried a single 22,000-pound “grand slam” armor-piercing bomb. The Lancaster participated in several special operations, including the Dam Busters raid in May 1943, when specially adapted Lancasters of 617 Squadron attacked dams in the Rhine Valley using a skipping bomb designed by Barnes Wallis. A total of 7,366 Lancasters were built.

The De Havilland Mosquito was constructed largely from a plywood/balsa sandwich and was designed to be fast enough to outrun enemy fighters. It had excellent handling characteristics. It began operations with the RAF in the bomber role early in 1942 and quickly demonstrated that it could carry out extremely accurate attacks, including the daring low-level attack on the Gestapo headquarters in Oslo, Norway, in late 1942. Mosquitoes originally equipped the RAF’s pathfinder force, and they were able to roam across Germany largely unmolested. Operationally, the Mosquito had by far the lowest loss rate of any aircraft in Bomber Command (about 0.6 percent), as its speed enabled it to avoid interception and its structure tended to absorb cannon hits. A total of 6,439 Mosquitoes of all marks were built.

Soviet Union

The Ilyushin Il-4 was the most widely used Soviet medium bomber of the war. Initially designed as the DB-3 in 1935, it entered service in that form in 1938. The updated DB-3F was redesignated Il-4 in 1940, and many examples were built. Following Soviet entry into the war, a force of Soviet Navy Il-4s carried out the first Soviet attack on Berlin in August 1941. As a result of shortages of strategic materials, parts of the airframe including the outer wing panels were redesigned to use wood instead of metal. The Il-4 was a maneuverable aircraft in spite of its size, and approximately 5,000 were built up to 1944.

The Petlyakov Pe-2 entered service early in 1941. It was originally designed as a fighter and therefore had unusually responsive controls for a bomber. It turned out to be one of the most versatile aircraft produced by the Soviet Union in the war, being used as a heavy fighter, light bomber, dive-

bomber, ground-attack, and reconnaissance aircraft. More than 11,000 Pe-2s were built.

The Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik was probably one of the most effective ground-attack aircraft of World War II, entering service on the Eastern Front in mid-1941. Initial versions were single-seaters, but the higher-performance Il-2m3 introduced in mid-1942 had a gunner and was highly effective in aerial combat at low altitude, even against single-seat German fighters. Later versions of the Il-2m3 had a more powerful engine and a 37mm cannon against German Panther and Tiger tanks. The Shturmovik was remarkably tough; about 15 percent of its empty weight was armor plate that protected the engine, fuel systems, and crew, and it had few weak points. Approximately 35,000 Shturmoviks were built.

United States

The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress was designed in 1934 and sold to Congress as a U.S. Army Air Corps requirement for an offshore antishipping bomber. The B-17B entered service late in 1939; it was fast and had a high operational ceiling, but the initial versions were not particularly capable. The B-17E, which entered service early in 1942, had much-improved defensive armament, including a tail-gun turret, and the B-17G (late 1943) introduced an additional chin turret, which was later fitted to some F models. The B-17 E, F, and G models formed the mainstay of the U.S. heavy day-bomber force in Europe and remained in service until the end of the war. There were 8,685 B-17s built.

The Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy bomber was designed with a high aspect-ratio wing that, together with its Davis high-lift airfoil, gave good range/payload performance. The first Liberators entered service with RAF Coastal Command in mid-1941, and the type went on to serve with the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) and the U.S. Navy. USAAF B-24s conducted the ill-fated raid on the Ploieşti oil field on August 1, 1943. The Liberator developed a reputation for fragility in the European theater and was prone to catch fire when hit, but its long range made it the preeminent strategic bomber in the Pacific theater. The B-24 was employed as a reconnaissance, antisubmarine, and transport aircraft as well as in its primary strategic

bombing role, and it was produced in greater quantities than any other American aircraft, with 18,188 being built up to May 1945.

A U.S. Army Air Forces Consolidated B-24 Liberator bomber. The B-24 performed a variety of roles in the war and saw extensive service in both the European and Pacific Theaters. (Corbis)

The Douglas Aircraft Company built the A-20 attack bomber as a private venture, albeit with the help of U.S. Army Air Corps technicians at the specification stage. It entered service early in 1940 with the French Armée de l'Air, with outstanding orders being transferred to the RAF when France capitulated to the Germans. The A-20 (designated Boston or Havoc, depending on the role) was an excellent airplane. Fast, docile, and pleasant to fly, it had a commendably low loss rate. It was adaptable and was produced in both solid-nose and transparent-nose versions. Used in many roles including low-level attack, strafing, torpedo-bombing, reconnaissance, and night fighting, it remained in frontline service until the end of hostilities. A total of 7,385 variants were built.

North American was awarded a contract to build the B-25 Mitchell without the usual prototypes, relying instead on experience with the NA-40 design and feedback from the Army Air Corps. Self-sealing fuel tanks and armor protection were incorporated on the production line following combat reports from Europe. The Mitchell had good handling characteristics and was

probably the best all-around medium bomber of the war. The B-25 achieved lasting fame when 16 of them attacked Tokyo on April 18, 1942, flying from the carrier *Hornet.* The Mitchell was adapted to multiple missions including ground strafing, torpedo-bombing, antisubmarine work, and reconnaissance, mounting a variety of main armament including up to 18 .50-caliber machine guns in the B-25J and a 75mm cannon in the B-25H. Mitchells were used by most Allied air forces, and approximately 11,000 were built.

The Boeing B-29 Superfortress, the heaviest bomber of the war, evolved from a 1940 Army Air Corps requirement for a "hemisphere defense weapon." The resulting XB-29, which first flew late in 1942, had several innovative design features including a pressurized fuselage and remote-controlled gun turrets. The B-29 entered service in the first half of 1944 and mounted increasingly heavy attacks against the Japanese mainland from bases in the Mariana Islands. Operationally, the B-29 was successful largely as a result of its speed and altitude capabilities. B-29s forced the Japanese surrender following attacks with atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively. A total of 3,970 were built.

The Douglas A-26 Invader was a worthy successor to the Douglas A-20 Havoc. It entered service late in 1944. The A-26B had a solid attack nose carrying six .50-caliber machine guns, and the A-26C had a more conventional transparent nose for a bombardier. The A-26 was fast and well-armed, and it had a low loss rate (about 0.6 percent), even allowing for low enemy fighter activity toward the end of the war. A total of 2,446 Invaders were built, and they continued to serve well into the 1960s. After World War II when the Martin B-26 was retired, the Douglas A-26 was redesignated the B-26.

The Martin B-26 Marauder entered service early in 1942 and initially gained a reputation as a difficult aircraft to fly, partly because of its weight and high landing and takeoff speeds. Certainly it required skill and practice to master. In later models (B-26F onward), the wing incidence was increased to reduce the landing and takeoff speeds. The B-26 could absorb a lot of damage and was an effective bomber; its final combat loss rate was less than 1 percent. A total of 5,157 Marauders were built.

ANDY BLACKBURN

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Air Warfare, Naval; Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Britain, Battle of; B-29 Raids against Japan; Guernica, Kondor Legion Attack on; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Kondor Legion; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Pathfinders; Ploieşti, Raids on; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Sinking of; Spanish Civil War; Tokyo Raid; Wallis, Barnes Neville

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Aircraft, Fighters

Aircraft designed to shoot down other aircraft. World War II was a period of transition for fighters; by 1945 aircraft weight, armament, and performance had increased dramatically, and jet fighters were approaching the speed of sound.

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, most air forces were equipped with biplane fighters that were little more advanced than their twin-gunned ancestors that had fought on the Western Front in World War I. By the mid-1930s, aero engine design and airframe construction techniques had advanced dramatically, and newer prototypes were appearing with stressed-skin construction, retractable undercarriages, and top speeds of over 300 mph. These aircraft entered service in the late 1930s, just in time for World War II.

Many of these new designs had flush-fitting cockpit canopies (e.g., Bf-109, Spitfire), partly for reasons of aerodynamic efficiency but also because it was thought (incorrectly) that the classic World War I dogfight would be impossible at speeds of over 300 mph. Visibility from the cockpit turned out to be very important; about 80 percent of pilots shot down during the war never saw their attackers. Some fighters received bulged cockpit hoods to alleviate the problem, but later aircraft were fitted with clear Perspex canopies that gave unrestricted rearward vision.

Most fighters are defined by performance and maneuverability. Of the two, performance was probably more important during World War II. A speed advantage over an opponent (ignoring surprise attacks and tactical advantage) enabled a fighter to dictate the terms on which combat was joined and also enabled an easy escape if the fight was not going well. Comparisons tend to be problematic because performance varied dramatically with altitude; an aircraft that had a significant advantage against an opponent at sea level could find the position dramatically reversed at 30,000 feet. In any case, in-service improvements could change performance characteristics, and new aircraft usually had the latest equipment and engine variants, further complicating the issue.

Maneuverability is essentially a measure of the ability of an aircraft to change direction and is dictated to a large extent by the wing loading of the aircraft. Some lightly loaded aircraft (particularly the early Japanese fighters) were capable of remarkably tight turns, but the ability of the aircraft to roll and establish the turn also played a part. Some fighters, such as the Focke-Wulf FW 190, had an excellent rate of roll that to some extent compensated for their average rate of turn. An aircraft's handling qualities degrade to a greater or lesser extent as the weight inevitably increases with each new version, and heavier aircraft tend to be less agile than lighter ones. Twin-engine aircraft are particularly disadvantaged in roll, as more mass is distributed around the centerline than with a single-engine aircraft.

Many early fighters had tactical limitations because of control difficulties. There is a relationship between the size and shape of a control surface and the effort required to move it; it becomes progressively more difficult to deflect as speed increases and may in some cases exceed the ability of the pilot to apply sufficient force. For example, the Messerschmitt Bf-109 had very heavy stick forces at normal speeds, Spitfires had metal-covered ailerons fitted late in 1940 to make high-speed rolls easier, and the Mitsubishi Zero had (in common with most other Japanese fighters) huge control surfaces that gave outstanding agility below about 200 mph (as with the F4U Corsair and the Tempest) but almost none above 300 mph. Much later in the war, new designs had spring tabs fitted on control surfaces to balance the extra air resistance at high speeds.

In 1939 few, if any, aircraft had self-sealing fuel tanks or armor. Operational experience in the European theater showed that aircraft were

very vulnerable unless so equipped, and in 1940 crash programs were instituted to retrofit fuel tank liners and armor plate to most aircraft. This added weight reduced performance slightly, but most air arms were prepared to accept the price; however, the Japan's army and navy were not.

As a result, most Japanese aircraft, which were lightly constructed anyway, were extremely vulnerable even to machine-gun fire, and cannon hits caused immediate and catastrophic damage. The use of armor and other protection on bombers had already obliged designers to fit heavier weapons, and continuing development encouraged the adoption of cannon. The Messerschmitt Me-262 was probably the ultimate World War II bomber-killer with four 30mm cannon, only three hits from which were usually required to down a four-engine bomber.

The increased performance of fighters brought compressibility effects into play. As speeds increased at high altitude, airflow over parts of the structure could reach the speed of sound (Mach 1.0) even in quite shallow dives, leading to buffeting, nose-down trim changes, and eventually loss of control of the aircraft. Recovery from the dive was difficult, and reducing power usually led to the nose dropping farther. Sometimes, the only solution was to wait until the aircraft reached warmer air at lower altitudes and the local speed of sound increased above the critical value. These effects were not well understood at the time and caused tactical limitations to some aircraft: the Lockheed P-38 ran into serious compressibility effects above Mach 0.68, and the Messerschmitt Me-262 could reach its limit of Mach 0.83 only in a shallow dive.

World War II was a fascinating period for fighter development; the following aircraft were the most significant fighters of the conflict. See also Table 1.

Germany

The Messerschmitt Bf-109 entered service in its earliest form (Bf-109B) in 1937 and remained in service throughout the war. It continued to be modified during the conflict. It received progressively more powerful engines, and in common with many other aircraft, its handling qualities and maneuverability degraded with successive versions. The Bf-109 could not turn tightly (although the 109E and 109F models were better than commonly supposed),

but it was an effective fighter when handled correctly, possessing excellent dive and zoom-climb capabilities. The later versions in particular were better at high altitude, but the controls became stiff at high speeds, and visibility from the cockpit was poor. Approximately 35,000 examples were built.

Fighters, All Powers—Specifications

Name	*Year of Introduction*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Wing Area (sq ft)*	*Takeoff Weight (lb)**	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Combat Ceiling (500 ft/min)†*	*Range (mi)‡*	*Armament/Payload*
France										
Dewotine D.520 (early 1940)	Early 1940	1 × 910-hp Hispano-Suiza v-type	33 ft 5.5 in.	28 ft 8.5 in.	171.7 sq ft	6,129 lb	329 mph at 19,685 ft	34,000 ft	620 mi	1 × 20-mm Hispano cannon, 2 × 7.5-mm MAC machine guns
Germany										
Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-1 (early 1939)	Mid-1937	1 × 1,100-hp Daimler-Benz DB601 v-type	32 ft 4.5 in.	28 ft 4 in.	174 sq ft	5,523 lb	354 mph at 12,300 ft	34,000 ft (est)	412 mi	2 × 7.9-mm MG 17 machine guns, 2 × 20-mm MG FF cannon
Messerschmitt Bf 110 C-4 (mid-1939)	Mid-1939	2 × 1,100-hp Daimler-Benz DB601 v-type	53 ft 5 in.	39 ft 8.5 in.	413 sq ft	15,300 lb	349 mph at 22,965 ft	30,000 ft (est)	565 mi	4 × 7.9-mm MG 17 machine guns, 2 × 20-mm MG FF cannon, + 1 × flexible 7.9 mm MG-15 machine gun
Messerschmitt Bf 109 F-3 (early 1941)	Mid-1937	1 × 1,300-hp Daimler-Benz DB601 v-type	32 ft 6.5 in.	29 ft 0.5 in.	174.4 sq ft	6,054 lb	390 mph at 22,000 ft	35,000 ft (est)	440 mi	2 × 7.9-mm MG 17 machine guns, 1 × 15-mm MG 151 cannon
Focke-Wulf FW 190 A-3 (mid-1941)	Mid-1941	1 × 1,700-hp BMW 801 radial	34 ft 5.5 in.	28 ft 10.5 in.	197 sq ft	8,770 lb	408 mph at 21,000 ft	32,000 ft	500 mi	2 × 7.9-mm MG 17 machine guns, 2 × 20-mm MG 151 cannon, 2 × 20-mm MG/FF cannon
Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-6 (mid-1942)	Mid-1937	1 × 1,475-hp Daimler-Benz DB605 v-type	32 ft 6.5 in.	29 ft 8 in.	174.4 sq ft	6,950 lb	387 mph at 22,970 ft	36,500 ft (est)	450 mi	2 × 13-mm MG 131 machine guns, 1 × 20-mm MG 151 cannon
Focke-Wulf FW 190 D-9 (mid-1944)	Mid-1941	1 × 2,240-hp Junkers Jumo v-type	34 ft 5.5 in.	33 ft 5.25 in.	197 sq ft	9,480 lb	426 mph at 21,650 ft	40,500 ft (est)	520 mi	2 × 13-mm MG 131 machine guns, 2 × 20-mm MG 151 cannon
Messerschmitt Bf 109 K-4 (early 1945)	Mid-1937	1 × 1,800-hp Daimler-Benz DB605 v-type	32 ft 6.5 in.	29 ft 4 in.	174.4 sq ft	7,410 lb	440 mph at 24,750 ft	38,000 ft (est)	387 mi	2 × 13-mm MG 131 machine guns, 1 × 30-mm MK 108 cannon
Great Britain										
Hawker Hurricane Mk I (early 1940)	Late 1937	1 × 1,030-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	40 ft	31 ft 11 in.	257.5 sq ft	6,218 lb	324 mph at 17,800 ft	31,000 ft	425 mi	8 × 0.303-in. Browning machine guns
Supermarine Spitfire Mk IA (early 1940)	Mid-1938	1 × 1,030-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	36 ft 10 in.	29 ft 11 in.	242 sq ft	6,050 lb	355 mph at 19,000 ft	32,500 ft (est)	425 mi	8 × 0.303-in. Browning machine guns
Bristol Beaufighter IF (late 1940)	Late 1940	2 × 1,590-hp Bristol Hercules radial	57 ft 10 in.	41 ft 4 in.	503 sq ft	20,800 lb	323 mph at 15,000 ft	26,500 ft (est)	1,500 mi	4 × 20-mm Hispano cannon, 6 × 0.303-in. Browning machine guns
Hawker Hurricane Mk IIC (early 1941)	Mid-1940	1 × 1,260-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	40 ft	32 ft 2.5 in.	257.5 sq ft	7,544 lb	329 mph at 17,800 ft	32,400 ft	460 mi	4 × 20-mm Oerlikon cannon
Supermarine Spitfire Mk VB (early 1941)	Mid-1938	1 × 1,470-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	36 ft 10 in.	29 ft 11 in.	242 sq ft	6,525 lb	371 mph at 20,000 ft	35,500 ft (est)	470 mi	2 × 20-mm Hispano cannon, 4 × 0.303-in. Browning machine guns
Hawker Typhoon Mk IB (late 1941)	Late 1941	1 × 2,180-hp Napier Sabre II-type	41 ft 7 in.	31 ft 10 in.	279 sq ft	11,400 lb	405 mph at 18,000 ft	32,000 ft (est)	610 mi	4 × 20-mm Hispano cannon
Supermarine Spitfire Mk IX (mid-1942)	Mid-1938	1 × 1,585-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	36 ft 10 in.	29 ft 11 in.	242 sq ft	7,400 lb	408 at 28,000 ft	38,000 ft	434 mi (later 660 mi)	2 × 20-mm Hispano cannon, 4 × 0.303-in. Browning machine guns

Name	Year of Introduction	Engine	Span	Length	Wing Area (sq ft)	Takeoff Weight (lb)*	Maximum Speed (mph)	Combat Ceiling (500 ft/min)†	Range (mi)‡	Armament/Payload
Hawker Tempest Mk V series 2 (early 1944)	Early 1944	1 × 2,200-hp Napier Sabre II-type	41 ft	33 ft 8 in.	302 sq ft	11,400 lb	435 mph at 17,000 ft	34,000 ft (est)	820 mi	4 × 20-mm Hispano cannon
Supermarine Spitfire Mk XIV (early 1944)	Mid-1938	1 × 2,050-hp Rolls-Royce Griffon v-type	36 ft 10 in.	32 ft 8 in.	242 sq ft	8,400 lb	446 mph at 25,400 ft	41,500 ft	460 mi	2 × 20-mm Hispano cannon, 2 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
De Havilland Mosquito NF Mk 30 (late 1944)	Mid-1942	2 × 1,710-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v type	54 ft 2 in.	40 ft 10.75 in.	454 sq ft	20,000 lb	407 mph at 28,000 ft	36,500 ft (est)	1,300 mi	4 × 20-mm Hispano cannon
Italy										
Fiat C.R.42 (mid-1939)	Mid-1939	1 × 840-hp Fiat A.74 radial	31 ft 10 in.	27 ft 1 in.	240.5 sq ft	5,042 lb	266 mph at 13,120 ft	31,300 ft (est)	482 mi	2 × 12.7-mm Breda-SAFAT machine guns
Macchi Mc202 (mid-1941)	Mid-1941	1 × 1,175-hp Alfa-Romeo R.A.1000 v-type	34 ft 8.5 in.	29 ft 0.5 in.	180.8 sq ft	6,459 lb	370 mph at 16,400 ft	35,750 ft (est)	475 mi	2 × 7.7-mm Breda-SAFAT machine guns, 2 × 12.7-mm Breda-SAFAT machine guns
Japan										
Kawasaki Ki-45 KAIc "Nick" (early 1942)	Early 1942	2 × 1,080-hp Mitsubishi Ha.102 radial	49 ft 5.25 in.	36 ft 1 in.	344.4 sq ft	12,125 lb	340 mph at 22,965 ft	30,000 ft	746 mi	1 × 37-mm Ho-203 cannon, 2 × 20-mm type 2 cannon
Kawasaki Ki-61-Ia "Tony" (early 1943)	Early 1943	1 × 1,160-hp Kawasaki Ha-40 v-type	39 ft 4.5 in.	28 ft 8.5 in.	215.5 sq ft	7,650 lb	348 mph at 16,404 ft	30,500 ft (est)	1,118 mi	2 × 7.7-mm type 89 machine guns, 2 × 20-mm MG 151 cannon
Nakajima Ki-44-IIb "Tojo" (mid-1943)	Late 1942	1 × 1,520-hp Nakajima Ha.109 radial	31 ft	28 ft 9.75 in.	161.4 sq ft	6,107 lb	376 mph at 17,060 ft	34,500 ft (est)	497 mi	4 × 12.7-mm type 1 machine guns
Kawanishi N1K1-J "George" (early 1944)	Early 1944	1 × 1,990-hp Nakajima Homare radial	39 ft 4 in.	29 ft 1.5 in.	252.9 sq ft	9,526 lb	362 mph at 17,715 ft	37,000 ft (est)	888 mi	2 × 7.7-mm type 97 machine guns, 4 × 20-mm type 99 cannon
Nakajima Ki-43-IIb "Oscar" (early 1944)	Late 1941	1 × 1,130-hp Nakajima Ha.115 radial	35 ft 6.75 in.	29 ft 3 in.	232 sq ft	5,320 lb	320 mph at 19,680 ft	34,500 ft (est)	1,006 mi	2 × 12.7-mm type 1 machine guns
Nakajima Ki-84 "Frank" (late 1944)	Late 1944	1 × 1,900-hp Nakajima Ha.45 radial	36 ft 10.25 in.	32 ft 6.5 in.	226 sq ft	7,965 lb	388 mph at 19,680 ft	32,000 ft (est)	1,025 mi	2 × 12.7-mm type 103 machine guns, 2 × 20-mm type 5 cannon
Soviet Union										
Polikarpov I-16 type 24 (1941)	Late 1934	1 × 1,000-hp Shvetsov M-62 radial	29 ft 6.5 in.	20 ft 1 in.	161 sq ft	4,189 lb	326 mph at 14,765 ft	27,500 ft (est)	249 mi	2 × 7.62-mm ShKAS machine guns, 2 × 20-mm ShVAK cannon
Yakovlev Yak-9D (early 1943)	Late 1942	1 × 1,210-hp Klimov M-105 v-type	32 ft 9.75 in.	28 ft 0.5 in.	185.7 sq ft	6,897 lb	373 mph at 11,485 ft	30,000 ft (est)	808 mi	1 × 20-mm MPSh cannon, 1 × 12.7-mm UBS machine gun
Lavochkin La-5FN (mid-1943)	Late 1942	1 × 1,640-hp Shvetsov M-82 radial	32 ft 1.75 in.	27 ft 10.75 in.	188.5 sq ft	7,406 lb	402 mph at 16,405 ft	30,000 ft (est)	435 mi	2 × 20-mm ShVAK cannon
Yakovlev Yak-3 (early 1944)	Early 1944	1 × 1,222-hp Klimov M-105 v-type	30 ft 2.25 in.	27 ft 10.75 in.	176 sq ft (est)	5,684 lb	403 mph at 16,400 ft	33,000 ft (est)	560 mi	1 × 20-mm ShVAK cannon, 2 × 12.7-mm BS machine guns

(continued)

Fighters, All Powers—Specifications (*continued*)

Name	*Year of Introduction*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Wing Area (sq ft)*	*Takeoff Weight (lb)**	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Combat Ceiling (500 ft/min)†*	*Range (mi)‡*	*Armament/Payload*
United States										
Curtiss P-40B (late 1940)	Late 1940	1 × 1,090-hp Allison V-1710 v-type	37 ft 3.5 in.	31 ft 8.5 in.	236 sq ft	7,610 lb	351 mph at 15,000 ft	28,000 ft (est)	606 mi	2 × 0.303-in. and 2 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
Bell P-39D Airacobra (mid-1941)	Mid-1941	1 × 1,150-hp Allison V-1710 v-type	34 ft	30 ft 2 in.	213 sq ft	7,650 lb	360 at 15,000 ft	29,000 ft (est)	600 mi	1 × 37-mm M-4 cannon, 4 × 0.303-in. and 2 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
Curtiss P-40E (early 1942)	Late 1940	1 × 1,150-hp Allison V-1710 v-type	37 ft 3.5 in.	31 ft 2 in.	236 sq ft	8,515 lb	334 mph at 15,000 ft	27,000 ft (est)	716 mi	6 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
Lockheed P-38F-15-LO Lightning (early 1942)	Early 1942	2 × 1,225-hp Allison V-1710 v-type	52 ft	37 ft 10 in.	327.5 sq ft	15,900 lb	395 mph at 25,000 ft	37,000 ft	900 mi	1 × 20-mm Hispano cannon, 4 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
North American P-51A-10-NA (early 1943)	Early 1942	1 × 1,200-hp Allison V-1710 v-type	37 ft 0.25 in.	32 ft 2.5 in.	232 sq ft	8,600 lb	390 mph at 20,000 ft	29,000 ft (est)	1,000 mi	4 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
Republic P-47B Thunderbolt (early 1943)	Early 1943	1 × 2,000-hp Pratt and Whitney radial	40 ft 9.75 in.	35 ft 3.25 in.	300 sq ft	12,245 lb	429 mph at 27,000 ft	39,500 ft (est)	550 mi	8 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
Bell P-39Q-5-BE Airacobra (mid-1943)	Mid-1941	1 × 1,325-hp Allison V-1710 v-type	34 ft	30 ft 2 in.	213 sq ft	7,600 lb	376 mph at 15,000 ft	32,000 ft (est)	525 mi	1 × 37-mm M-4 cannon, 4 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
Lockheed P-38J-25-LO Lightning (late 1943)	Early 1942	2 × 1,425-hp Allison V-1710 v-type	52 ft	37 ft 10 in.	327.5 sq ft	17,500 lb	414 mph at 25,000 ft	41,500 ft (est)	1,175 mi	1 × 20-mm Hispano cannon, 4 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
Republic P-47D-22-RE Thunderbolt (late 1943)	Early 1943	1 × 2,300-hp Pratt and Whitney radial	40 ft 9.75 in.	36 ft 1.75 in.	300 sq ft	13,500 lb	433 mph at 30,000 ft	37,500 ft (est)	640 mi	8 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
North American P-51B-1-NA (early 1944)	Early 1942	1 × 1,620-hp Packard Merlin v-type	37 ft 0.25 in.	32 ft 3 in.	232 sq ft	9,200 lb	440 mph at 30,000 ft	37,500 ft (est)	810 mi	4 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
North American P-51D-25-NA (early 1944)	Early 1942	1 × 1,695-hp Packard Merlin v-type	37 ft 0.25 in.	32 ft 3 in.	233 sq ft	10,100 lb	437 at 25,000 ft	37,500 ft (est)	1,300 mi	6 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns

Sources: Eric Brown, *Wings of the Luftwaffe* (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 1993); William Green, *War Planes of the Second World War*, 4 vols. (London: MacDonald, 1960–1961); William Green, *Famous Bombers of the Second World War*, 2nd ed. (London: Book Club Associates, 1979); Francis K. Mason, *The Hawker Hurricane* (Bourne End, UK: Aston, 1990); Francis K. Mason, *The British Fighter since 1912* (London: Putnam, 1992); Philip Jarrett, ed., *Aircraft of the Second World War* (London: Putnam, 1997); Kenneth Munson, *Bombers, Patrol and Transport Aircraft, 1939–45* (Poole, UK: Blandford, 2002); Alfred Price, *World War II Fighter Conflict* (London: Macdonald and Janes, 1975); Alfred Price, *The Spitfire Story* (London: Arms and Armour, 1986).

* Weight is normal takeoff weight unless specified otherwise.

† Combat ceiling is the maximum height at which the aircraft would fight and maneuver. The service ceiling would typically be 2,000 or 3,000 feet higher than this.

‡ Range is maximum flyable distance on internal fuel, including reserves. Combat radius would typically be 30 percent to 35 percent of this value.

The Messerschmitt Bf-110 was designed as a long-range escort fighter, entering service with the Luftwaffe in 1939. It had a useful top speed and was well armed, but it could not meet contemporary single-engine fighters on equal terms. It was not a success as an escort fighter, but it was first used as a fighter-bomber during the Battle of Britain, and from 1943 the Bf-110 G-4 enjoyed much success as a radar-equipped night fighter. Approximately 6,150 were built.

The Focke-Wulf FW-190A entered service in mid-1941 and became one of the best low- and medium-altitude fighters of the war. It had light and effective controls and possibly the best rate of roll of any World War II

fighter, attaining 160 degrees per second at about 260 mph. It was superior to the contemporary Spitfire Mk V in all areas except turning circle and was generally regarded as a strong and rugged aircraft. The 190F and 190G were similar to the 190A, but they had extra armor for ground-attack missions, and the 190D had a 2,240-horsepower (hp) Junkers Jumo liquid-cooled engine for better high-altitude performance. A total of 20,001 Focke-Wulf FW 190s were built.

Italy

The Fiat CR-42 entered service with the Italian Air Force in 1939 and was exported to Belgium, Sweden, and Hungary. It was a highly maneuverable fighter with (for a biplane) good dive acceleration. It was lightly armed and quite vulnerable to enemy fire, however, and not really capable of taking on modern fighters on equal terms. A total of 1,781 were built.



U.S. Army Quartermaster troops inspect German Focke-Wulf FW-190 fighter planes grounded either by rubble or lack of gasoline at Oschersleben, Germany. The FW-190 saw wide service in a variety of roles with the Luftwaffe during World War II. (Library of Congress)

The Macchi Mc 200 first entered service during 1940. A well-built and extremely maneuverable fighter with finger-light controls, it could outturn most of its opponents. It was, however, lightly armed with only two machine guns. The Macchi Mc 202 was a Mc 200 airframe with a license-built

Daimler-Benz DB601 engine. It was probably the most effective Italian fighter of the war, retaining most of its predecessor's maneuverability, and was able to meet the Spitfire Mk V on at least equal terms. A total of 2,251 Mc 200 and Mc 202 aircraft were built.

Japan

The Nakajima Ki.43 ("Oscar" by the Allied identification system) entered service late in 1941 and was highly maneuverable but not particularly fast (304 mph at 13,120 feet). It had extremely sensitive controls that unfortunately stiffened significantly at speed. Allied fighters found that they could not turn with the Oscar but could outdive and outzoom it. Its armament was weak; pilot armor and self-sealing tanks were introduced with the more powerful Ki.43-IIa late in 1942, but the Oscar remained vulnerable to enemy fire. It continued to undergo development throughout the Pacific war, with 5,751 examples being built.

The Kawasaki Ki.45 ("Nick") was designed to a 1937 specification for a long-range escort fighter and entered service early in 1942. The Ki.45 was increasingly used as a night fighter from early 1944 using two 12.7mm or 20mm weapons firing obliquely upward. It was relatively successful against U.S. B-29 night raids, and it later became the first Japanese Army Air Force type to be used on a kamikaze mission. A total of 1,701 were built.

The Nakajima Ki.44 interceptor ("Tojo") first appeared in service late in 1942, although some of the 10 prototypes were evaluated on operations during 1941 and early 1942. The Tojo was reasonably maneuverable with a good climb, but its high takeoff and landing speeds made it unpopular with pilots. The Ki.44-IIc appeared in mid-1943; armed with two 40mm cannon and two machine guns, it was quite effective against high-flying U.S. B-24 and later B-29 bombers. A total of 1,233 were built.

The Kawasaki Ki.61 ("Tony") appeared early in 1943 and was the only Japanese fighter powered by a liquid-cooled engine to see operational service. It carried self-sealing fuel tanks and armor and was more maneuverable than heavier opponents. Its dive characteristics were also good, comparable to the best U.S. fighters. The Ki.61 was one of few Japanese fighters able to engage the U.S. B-29 bombers at high altitude. A total of 3,078 Ki.61s were built. Engine production was slow and the power plant

gave problems in service, so early in 1945 many Ki.61 airframes were refitted with a 1,500-hp Mitsubishi Ha 112 radial to produce the Ki.100. Only 272 were built by war's end, but it was the best Japanese fighter during the conflict.

The Kawanishi N1K1-J ("George") evolved from a floatplane and was one of the best fighters of the Pacific theater. Entering service early in 1944, it had automatic combat flaps and was outstandingly maneuverable, its pilots coming to regard even the F6F Hellcat as an easy kill. Its climb rate was, however, relatively poor for an interceptor, and the engine was unreliable. The later N1K2-J was redesigned to simplify production, and limited numbers entered service early in 1945. A total of 1,435 aircraft of the N1K series were built.

The Nakajima Ki.84 ("Frank") was one of the best Japanese fighters of the war. It entered service late in 1944. The Ki.84 could outmaneuver and outclimb late-model P-51 and P-47 fighters and had excellent maneuverability. It was well armed, strong, and well protected, and it was easy for novice pilots to fly. Production examples were beset with manufacturing faults and engine difficulties, causing performance to suffer, particularly at high altitude. A total of 3,470 Ki.84 aircraft were built.

France

The Dewotine D.520 was designed as a private venture and entered service with the French Air Force in 1940. It was probably the most effective French-designed fighter of the war, shooting down 100-plus enemy aircraft in exchange for 54 losses during the Battle for France. After the fall of France, the D.520 continued in Vichy French service and was encountered by the Allies in Vichy North Africa. A total of 905 were built.

Great Britain

The Hawker Hurricane entered service in 1937 and was the first monoplane fighter of the Royal Air Force (RAF), serving on all fronts. The Hurricane Mk I was the major RAF fighter during the Battle of Britain. On paper it was average, but it had hidden strengths; it was an excellent gun platform and was more maneuverable than the Spitfire. Its controls did not stiffen appreciably

at high speed, and it was strong, able to withstand maneuvers that would literally pull the wings off its contemporaries. Later versions (MK IID, Mk IV) were mainly built as fighter-bombers. A total of 14,233 Hurricanes were built.

The Supermarine Spitfire was an advanced design when the Mk I entered service in 1938 and was able to accept progressively more powerful engines and heavier armament as the war progressed, with only a slight reduction in handling qualities. The “Spit” was fast and maneuverable and was widely regarded as a pilot’s aircraft. In performance terms, it was usually considered superior to its direct opponents, although the FW-190 gave Spitfire Mk V pilots a hard time until the Mk IX redressed the balance in mid-1942. The Spitfire was continuously updated and revised with many specialist high- and low-altitude versions, and the late-war marks had a particularly impressive performance. It remained in production until after the war. A total of 20,351 were built.

A Royal Air Force Supermarine Spitfire fighter over the English countryside in 1939. Produced in greater numbers than any other British aircraft of the war, the “Spit” was certainly one of the best fighter aircrafts. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The Bristol Beaufighter was designed as a private venture using components from the Beaufort torpedo bomber. The Mk IF entered service as a radar-equipped night fighter late in 1940. It operated successfully in Europe, the Western Desert, the Mediterranean, the Far East, and the Pacific as a night fighter, long-range fighter, ground-attack aircraft, and torpedo bomber. It was a big, heavy aircraft with a good performance at low level and a heavy armament. A total of 5,562 Beaufighters were built.

The Hawker Typhoon was rushed into service late in 1941 to combat the German FW-190 threat, but it suffered from teething troubles. Its performance at low altitude was good, particularly its acceleration and dive, but its performance above about 20,000 feet was poor because of its thick wing. The Typhoon was used later in the war as a ground-attack aircraft. The Hawker Tempest appeared early in 1944 and was an aerodynamically cleaner Typhoon with a thinner laminar-flow wing. The Tempest was fast and one of the best late-war fighters. It could be maneuvered easily at high speed and had outstanding dive acceleration and zoom-climb capabilities. It was, however, not easy to fly to its limits. A total of 3,300 Typhoons and 800 Tempests were built.

The De Havilland Mosquito was conceived as a bomber but was also produced in radar-equipped night-fighter and fighter-bomber versions. The NF.II entered service with the RAF in May 1942 and was successful on night-intruder missions; Mosquito night fighters were used over Germany from late 1944 onward and seriously hampered German night-fighter operations. A total of 1,053 Mosquito night fighters of all versions were built; the most numerous fighter version was the FB.VI, of which 2,718 were built.

Soviet Union

The Polikarpov I-16 Rata entered service late in 1934, the first of the new generation of monoplane fighters. More than 450 machines were operationally tested in the Spanish Civil War, and I-16s bore the brunt of the initial German assault on the Soviet Union. The Rata was marginally stable at best but was outstandingly maneuverable; it had a good zoom climb but poor

diving characteristics. Approximately 20,000 were built, the type remaining in service until 1943.

The Yakovlev series of fighters began with the Yak-1 in early 1942. It was fast at low altitude, but both the Yak-1 and the more powerful Yak-7 were slightly short on range. The Yak-9 appeared late in 1942 with a more powerful engine and particularly effective ailerons; it was capable of outturning all its opponents at low altitude. The Yak-3 was a specialized low-altitude fighter, entering service early in 1944. It had excellent performance below about 10,000 feet and was the preferred mount of the Normandie-Niemen Groupe de Chasse. Approximately 30,000 Yak fighters were produced, of which 16,700 were Yak-9s.

The Lavochkin La-5 was a successful adaptation of the problematic LaGG-3 airframe to take a 1,330-hp Shvetsov M-82 radial engine. The La-5 entered service late in 1942 and was an immediate success as a highly maneuverable low-altitude fighter. The more powerful La-5FN appeared in mid-1943; it was faster and lighter with improved controls that gave better handling qualities. It is thought that about 15,000 Lavochkin fighters were built, although the total may well have been nearer 20,000.

United States

The Curtiss P-40 entered service in 1940. The aircraft was based on the Curtiss P-36, which was itself a reasonable fighter; French P-36 variants (Hawk 75A) accounted for approximately 70 percent of French Air Force kills during the May 10–July 11, 1940, Battle for France. The P-40 had reasonable dive acceleration but a poor ceiling and climb. It was average in most departments, its major attribute being that it was available in numbers when required. It was, however, continuously developed until December 1944, when the last of 13,738 P-40s, a P-40N, rolled off the production line.

The Bell P-39 Airacobra entered service in 1941. It was fast at low altitudes and pleasant to fly, but its performance fell away above 12,000 feet. Together with the P-40, the P-39 bore the brunt of the early fighting in the Pacific until later U.S. types appeared. The P-39 was rejected by the RAF but was used with some success as a low-altitude fighter by the Soviet Union, which took more than half the production total of 9,558 machines. The P-39

was used by at least 20 Soviet aces, including Aleksandr Pokryshkin (59 kills) and Grigorii Rechkalov (56 kills).

The Lockheed P-38 Lightning entered service in numbers early in 1942 and was possibly the ultimate long-range tactical fighter of the war. Its long range and twin engines made it the primary U.S. Army Air Forces fighter in the Pacific theater. Not as maneuverable as a single-engine fighter, it was fast with effective armament and an outstanding zoom climb. Compressibility problems handicapped diving maneuvers, however. A total of 9,923 Lightnings were built.

The North American P-51 Mustang was one of the most successful fighters of World War II. Offered to the British Air Purchasing Commission in April 1940 as an alternative to the Curtiss P-40, the P-51A entered service early in 1942. Using the same Allison engine as in the P-40, it was appreciably faster than the P-40 because of its laminar-flow wing and efficient cooling system. It had an excellent dive and zoom climb and was quite maneuverable, but it lacked performance at high altitude. The Mustang’s performance was transformed by the substitution of a 1,620-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin engine in the P-51B, increasing the ceiling by nearly 10,000 feet and providing a marked performance advantage over Luftwaffe piston-engine fighters, particularly above 20,000 feet. A total of 15,686 P-51s were built.

A North American P-51 Mustang. With drop tanks (shown here), the P-51 could accompany bombers to Berlin and back. Fast and highly maneuverable, the P-51 was perhaps the best all-around fighter aircraft of World War II. (U.S. Air Force)

The Republic P-47 Thunderbolt was designed for high-altitude combat and was the heaviest single-engine fighter of the war. Entering service early in 1943, the P-47B was at its best at high speed and altitude. Maneuverability was quite good at high speed, but it became ponderous at lower speeds. Although its climb rate was poor, it had exceptional dive acceleration and was very rugged. The major production model was the P-47D, which had provision for bombs and rockets and was an effective ground-attack aircraft. A total of 15,683 Thunderbolts were built.

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See also

Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Aircraft, Naval; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Britain, Battle of; B-29 Raids against Japan; France, Battle for; Kamikaze; Radar; Spanish Civil War

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Aircraft, Gliders

A glider is an aircraft without an engine that is most often released into flight from an aerial tow aircraft. During World War II, both the Axis and Allied militaries developed gliders to transport troops, supplies, and equipment into battle. Although this technique had been discussed prior to the war, it had not been implemented. Gliders were to land behind enemy lines, often at night, and the men carried by them would then become infantrymen on the ground.

The Germans were first to recognize the potential of gliders in the war, in large part because of extensive pre–World War II scientific research and sporting use. The Germans embraced gliding because it did not violate

military prohibitions in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Gliding clubs, which developed in other countries as well, increased interest in gliding worldwide. Sport gliders used air currents to climb and soar for extended periods, while military gliders simply descended on release from aerial tows.

By the late 1930s, Germany had developed a military glider, the DFS-230. Built of plywood, steel, and fabric, it had a wingspan of 68 feet 5.5 inches, a length of 36 feet 10.5 inches, and a height of 8 feet 11.75 inches. It weighed 1,896 pounds empty and had a maximum weight loaded with troops and cargo of 4,630 pounds. A total of 1,022 were produced.

This glider was designed to mount a machine gun, which the crew could use for defense. DFS-230 gliders were employed in the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands in May 1940, especially in securing Fort Eben Emael (May 10), which was the key to overrunning Belgium. The Germans also used gliders in the invasion of Crete (May 21–June 1, 1941) and during fighting in the Soviet Union in the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943).

The Gotha 242 glider was larger than the DFS-230 and could carry more men. The Gotha 242 had a wingspan of 80 feet 4.5 inches, a length of 51 feet 10 inches, and a height of 14 feet 4.5 inches. It weighed 7,056 pounds empty and 13,665 pounds fully loaded. A total of 1,528 were built, of which 133 were adapted into G0–242s with twin engines. Some were launched by rockets, but most were simply towed by aircraft.

The huge Messerschmitt Me-321 glider had a wingspan of 180 feet 5.5 inches, a length of 92 feet 4.25 inches, and a height of 33 feet 3.4 inches. It weighed 27,432 pounds empty and 75,852 pounds fully loaded. It could perform level flight after rocket-assisted takeoff. A total of 200 were built. The Me-321 could transport 200 troops but was difficult to launch, and most were transformed into the six-engine Me-323.

Great Britain was the first Allied nation to deploy gliders. The Air Ministry’s Glider Committee encouraged the use of the Hotspur to transport soldiers in late 1940. The Hotspur had a wingspan of 61 feet 11 inches, a length of 39 feet 4 inches, and a height of 10 feet 10 inches. It weighed 1,661 pounds empty and 3,598 pounds fully loaded. The Hotspur was designed to transport two crewmen and six soldiers. A total of 1,015 were built.

In 1941, the British developed the Horsa. It had a wingspan of 88 feet, a length of 68 feet, and a height of 20 feet 3 inches. It weighed 8,370 pounds

empty and 15,750 pounds fully loaded. It was capable of carrying 2 crewmen and 25–28 passengers or two trucks. In all, Britain manufactured some 5,000 Horsas. They were employed in Operations OVERLORD (June 6, 1944) and MARKET-GARDEN (September 2–26, 1944).

The largest Allied glider was the British Hamilcar. With a wingspan of 110 feet, a length of 68 feet 6 inches, and a height of 20 feet 3 inches, it weighed 18,000 pounds empty and 36,000 pounds fully loaded. It could transport 40 troops, a light tank, or artillery pieces. A total of 412 were built. The Hamilcar was employed during Operation OVERLORD.

The Soviet Union introduced the A-7 glider in 1939. It had a wingspan of 62 feet 2 inches and a length of 37 feet 7 inches. It weighed 2,000 pounds empty and carried a pilot and eight passengers. A total of 400 were manufactured. The Soviets, however, had few aircraft available for glider tows, and following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, their priority was with other weaponry. They used the A-7 chiefly to transport supplies to partisans working behind German lines.

The U.S. Navy explored the possibility of military applications for gliders as early as the 1930s. In February 1941, chief of the Army Air Corps Major General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold ordered that specifications be drawn up for military gliders. The Waco Aircraft Company in Troy, Ohio, received the first U.S. government contract to build training gliders, and the army began organizing a glider training program.

Constructed of plywood and canvas with a skeleton of steel tubing, the Waco CG-4A had a wingspan of 83 feet 6 inches, a length of 48 feet 4 inches, and a height of 12 feet 7 inches. Its empty weight was 3,300 pounds, and its loaded weight was 7,500 pounds. It could carry 15 troops or 3,800 pounds of cargo, including artillery pieces, a bulldozer, or a jeep. The Ford Motor Company plant at Kingsford, Michigan, manufactured most of the U.S. gliders, although 15 other companies also produced the Waco. In all 13,908 Wacos were built, making it the most heavily produced glider of the entire war by any power.

Because the gliders were so fragile, soldiers dubbed them “canvas coffins.” Men and cargo were loaded through the wide, hinged nose section, which could be quickly opened. Moving at airspeeds of 110–150 mph at an altitude of several thousand feet, C-47s towed the gliders with a 300-foot

rope toward a designated landing zone and then descended to release the glider several hundred feet aboveground.

En route to the release point, the glidermen and plane crew communicated with each other either by a telephone wire secured around the towline or via two-way radios. Glider duty was hazardous indeed; sometimes gliders were released prematurely and did not reach the landing zones, and on occasion gliders collided as they approached their destination.

The U.S. 11th, 13th, 17th, 82nd, and 101st Airborne Divisions were organized with two glider infantry regiments, a glider artillery battalion, and glider support units. U.S. gliders were sent to North Africa in 1942 and participated in the July 9–August 22, 1943, Sicily invasion, accompanied by British gliders. High casualties sustained in that operation led General Dwight D. Eisenhower to question the organization of airborne divisions and threaten to disband glider units. A review board of officers convinced the military authorities to retain them, however. Improvements were also made in structural reinforcement of the glider and in personnel training.

A U.S. Waco CG-4A glider with a Griswold Corey nose skid, seen here under tow. (Corbis)

By mid-1944, gliders had become essential elements of Allied invasion forces. Occasionally they were used to transport wounded to hospitals. During the invasion of Normandy that began in June 6, 1944, U.S. glidermen with the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions flew across the English Channel in 2,100 gliders to participate in the D-day attack. Many gliders and crews

were lost during that mission. New gliders were manufactured for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, the assault on the Germans in the Netherlands, three months later.

Initially, the military did not authorize hazardous-duty pay for glidermen. These soldiers also did not qualify for wing insignia worn by parachutists. Some of the men created posters; one read "Join the Glider Troops! No Jump Pay. No Flight Pay. But Never A Dull Moment." By July 1944, glider wings were authorized for glider soldiers, and they received hazardous-duty pay. Also in 1944, the modified Waco CG-15A appeared, offering improved crash absorption. The Waco CG-18A could carry 30 soldiers and was deployed during the 1945 Rhine campaign.

Gliders were also used in the Pacific and China-Burma-India theaters. The final U.S. glider mission of the war occurred on Luzon Island in the Philippines in June 1945. In July, IX Troop Carrier Command commander Brigadier General Paul L. Williams issued an order to grant the Air Medal to Normandy glider pilot veterans. Gliders were gradually phased out of military inventories after the war, although the Soviets retained them through the 1950s.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Airborne Forces, Axis; Aircraft, Transport; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Belgium Campaign; Crete, Battle of; Eben Emael, German Capture of; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Germany, Air Force; Great Britain, Air Force; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Rhine Crossings; Sicily, Invasion of; Soviet Union, Air Force; United States Army Air Forces; Versailles, Treaty of

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Aircraft, Jet and Rocket

Aircraft propelled by gas turbines or rocket engines. Compared to the piston engine, the gas turbine (or jet engine) (see Table 1) promised to offer unrivaled power-to-weight ratios, provided that the metallurgical, mechanical, and aerodynamic design problems could be solved.

While still a Royal Air Force cadet in 1928, Frank Whittle argued that the gas turbine was a practical power unit. He continued to work on the idea and formed his own company, Power Jets, in 1935. In Germany, Hans-Joachim Pabst von Ohain developed a jet engine that first ran in 1937, flying it in a Heinkel 178 test aircraft in August 1939. Whittle's prototype engine flew in the Gloster E28/39 in May 1941.

The Germans also experimented with rocket fighters, with the Messerschmitt Me-163 entering service in June 1944 against U.S. bombers. The Me-163 had an incredible climb but used a highly corrosive fuel that was inclined toward instability, and many pilots were lost in landing accidents. Fewer than 50 Me-163s were operational at any one time; they had limited success, but their effect was mainly psychological.

The first operational jet fighter was the British Gloster Meteor, which entered service in July 1944. The Meteor I was distinctly underpowered and had serious limitations as a fighter, being difficult to control at speeds greater than Mach 0.67. It was armed with four 20mm cannon. All World War II jet and rocket aircraft had compressibility problems at high speeds and were generally slow to accelerate at low speeds, but they were much better than propeller-driven rivals at high speed, easily outclassing them in acceleration and zoom climb.

The German Messerschmitt Me-262 first flew on jet power in July 1942 and also entered operational service in July 1944, but it was a much better fighter than the Meteor. Like most jets, it was vulnerable during landing and takeoff. It was armed with four 30mm cannons. A total of 1,200 were built, but only about 200 entered squadron service.

The Heinkel He-162 jet fighter utilized nonstrategic materials and required an experienced pilot during takeoff and landing. Armed with two 20mm cannons, it was prone to catastrophic structural failure if carelessly handled. A handful of He-162s became operational in April 1945.

Table 1. Jet and Rocket Aircraft Specifications

Plane	*In Service*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Wing Area*	*Normal Takeoff Weight*	*Maximum Speed*	*Combat Ceiling (500 ft/min)*	*Range**	*Armament/ Payload*
Messerschmitt Me-163B-1 (mid 1944)	Mid-1944	1 × 3,748 lb thrust Walter Liquid rocket	30 ft, 7.5 in.	19 ft, 2.5 in.	199.0 sq ft	9,502 lb	597 mph at 29,500 ft	37,500 ft (estimated)	80 miles (estimated)	2 × 30 mm MK 108 cannon
Gloster Meteor Mk I (mid 1944)	Mid-1944	2 × 1,700 lb thrust Rolls-Royce Welland turbojet	43 ft, 0 in.	41 ft, 3 in.	374.0 sq ft	11,800 lb	410 mph at 30,000 ft	37,500 ft	750 miles (estimated)	4 × 20 mm Hispano cannon
Messerschmitt Me-262A-1a (mid-1944)	Mid-1944	2 × 1,984 lb thrust Junkers Jumo turbojet	40 ft, 11.5 in.	34 ft, 9.5 in.	233.6 sq ft	14,101 lb	541 mph at 19,685 ft	35,000 ft	652 miles	4 × 30 mm MK 108 cannon
Arado Ar-234B (late 1944)	Mid-1944	2 × 1,984 lb thrust Junkers Jumo turbojet	46 ft, 3.5 in.	41 ft, 5.5 in.	284.0 sq ft	20,870 lb	461 mph at 19,500 ft	30,000 ft (estimated)	1,012 miles	Typically, 1 × 1,102 lb or 2 × 551 lb bombs
Yokosuka Ohka (early 1945)	Early 1945	3 × 588 lb thrust Type 4 solid rocket	16 ft, 9.75 in.	19 ft, 10.75 in.	64.6 sq ft	4,720 lb	534 mph at sea level	not applicable	37 miles maximum	Nose-mounted warhead of 2,646 lb
Heinkel He-162A-2 (early 1945)	Early 1945	1 × 1,764 lb thrust BMW 003 turbojet	23 ft, 7.5 in.	29 ft, 8.5 in.	120.6 sq ft	6,184 lb	562 mph at 19,690 ft	34,500 ft (estimated)	385 miles	2 × 20 mm MG 151 cannon

*Range is maximum flyable distance on internal fuel, including reserves. Combat radius for jet aircraft would typically be 30 to 35 percent of this value at high altitude, 15 to 18 percent if at sea level.

Source: Eric M. Brown, *Wings of the Luftwaffe* (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 1993); Jeffrey Ethell, and Alfred Price, *World War II Fighting Jets* (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 1994); and Philip Jarrett, ed., *Aircraft of the Second World War* (London: G. P. Putnam, 1997).

The German Arado 234 “Blitz” was the world’s first jet bomber. A prototype flew for the first time in June 1943, but delays in securing its engines meant that it did not enter service—and then, in only limited numbers

as a reconnaissance variant—until August 1944. The first bomber version was operational in December 1944. A total of 210 were built.

The Japanese also built such aircraft. Their Yokosuka Ohka MXY 7 Oka ("Cherry Blossom"), produced at the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, was essentially a rocket-propelled, man-guided missile, carried to the target area under a specially converted Mitsubishi G4M Betty bomber. Once the pilot was in position, the canopy was sealed shut. Employed in combat from March 1945, most of these planes were shot down by Allied navy fighters, although one did sink the U.S. destroyer *Monnert L. Abele* in April.

The Bell P-59 Aircomet was the only jet aircraft of the U.S. Army Air Forces to see combat in the war. The twin-engine, straight-wing P-59 flew for the first time in October 1942. It had a top speed of only 400 mph and offered few advantages over the piston-powered U.S. aircraft then in service. Fifty production models were initially deployed with the 412th Fighter Group in 1945. Although the P-59 proved to be a valuable testing platform, the first mass-produced U.S. jet fighter was the Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star. Utilizing the British H-1 turbojet engine, it first flew in January 1944 and exceeded 500 mph on its first flight. The U.S. Army ordered 5,000 P-80s, but with the end of the war, production was scaled back to 917 aircraft. Ultimately, 1,714 were built.

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See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Reconnaissance and Auxiliary; Whittle, Sir Frank

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Aircraft, Lighter-Than-Air

Lighter-than-air (LTA) craft included barrage balloons, blimps, dirigibles, and zeppelins. A number of disasters during the interwar period, combined

with ever-advancing airplane technology, caused most nations to move away from using LTA craft for military purposes by World War II. The U.S. Navy lost three dirigibles between the wars: the *Shenandoah* (1923) and *Akron* (1933), both due to adverse weather, and the *Macon* (1935), due to structural failure.

Many countries employed barrage balloons in defending cities or military installations against low-level air attacks. The British staged some 450 large kite balloons around London that were sent aloft while trailing large steel cables that had to be avoided by incoming aircraft. British sources claimed 200-plus kills of German V-1 buzz bombs from these barrage balloons. The Soviet Union employed similar technology against German air attacks.

During World War I and in the interwar period, the United States tried several types of LTA technology with varying degrees of success. By 1939, the U.S. Navy had determined that rigid airships were not effective in military applications.

Nonrigid airships, or blimps, saw the most extensive wartime use. The navy registered 167 blimps, most of which were used to patrol the North American coastline or as long-range air support for convoys in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Of more than 89,000 total ships escorted by blimps in convoy in two world wars, only 1, the tanker *Persephone*, was lost (May 25, 1942) while under airship protection. LTA craft could patrol in more varieties of weather than airplanes could and were capable of remaining aloft far longer; however, they had extremely limited offensive uses. No submarine kills by blimps have been confirmed, but the blimps were an effective deterrent, forcing the submarines to stay submerged and inactive.

Three different types of blimps were employed during World War II by the U.S. Navy. The G-series came from the navy's 1935 purchase of the Goodyear *Defender*. The next seven G-series airships held six crewmen, measured 192 feet in length and 45 feet in diameter, and had a volume of 196,000 cubic feet and a speed of 60 mph. The K-series comprised the majority of the Navy's LTA fleet. These blimps housed a 12-man crew, measured 251.7 feet in length and 62.5 feet in diameter, and had a volume of 425,000 cubic feet; they had a top speed of 75 mph and a range of 2,000 miles.

Only a few M-Series craft were built. They had distinctive 117-foot-long cars. These held 10-plus crewmen, had a volume of 647,000 cubic feet

(refurbished to 725,000 cubic feet), and a top speed of 75 mph. These craft were posted along both U.S. coasts and in the South Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean.

In the postwar years, LTA technology was never again so widely employed in military use. By the 1960s, nearly all LTA craft were retired from military service.

MATTHEW ALAN MCNIECE

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; United States Navy

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Aircraft, Naval

Most naval aircraft fall into one of four main classifications: spotters, patrol aircraft, land-based attack aircraft, and carrier-based aircraft. Battleships and cruisers usually carried catapult-launched spotter aircraft to correct gunfire against enemy vessels or shore targets. Most spotter aircraft tended to be relatively slow floatplanes (e.g., the Mitsubishi F1M2 [“Pete” in the Allied identification system] and the Vought OS2U Kingfisher) because the design parameters were restricted by the launch and recovery mechanism. These aircraft were also useful in search and rescue missions.

Patrol aircraft were designed to keep track of enemy ships and—in some cases—to attack small vessels such as submarines. The major performance requirements for patrol aircraft were range and endurance; the sea covers a vast area, and an enemy fleet occupied a relatively tiny part of it, so the abilities to search large areas and remain on station for a long time were important. Flying boats were widely used as patrol aircraft (e.g., the Consolidated PBY Catalina, Kawanishi H8K, and Short Sunderland), but land-based patrollers with longer ranges (e.g., Lockheed Hudson, Ventura,

and Consolidated B-24 Liberator) were used toward the latter part of the war, initially to patrol colder areas such as the Aleutians and Iceland, where flying boats found operation difficult.

Land-based attack aircraft were employed by most combatants and were sometimes successful, provided that they employed special antiship attack techniques. Torpedo-bombing was probably the most effective form of attack, but results varied depending on the efficiency of the weapon. American torpedoes suffered from a number of problems and were largely ineffective until the second half of 1943, whereas the Japanese 18-inch “Long Lance” torpedo was extremely effective with a large warhead. Italian, German, and British torpedoes were all moderately effective. Dive-bombing and skip-bombing were also effective, but attacks by high-level bombers were universally unsuccessful against moving ships, as the target vessel had plenty of time to take evasive action.

Great Britain employed purpose-designed torpedo attack aircraft (the Beaufort and Beaufighter). The United States mainly used conversions of existing aircraft as torpedo carriers (the B-25 Mitchell and B-26 Marauder) but usually employed skip-bombing rather than torpedoes. Medium bombers were also used as torpedo-aircraft by Japan (the GM-4 “Betty”), Germany (He-111H), Italy (SM.79), and the Soviet Union (Ilyushin DB-3T/Il-4). German and Japanese bombers were particularly effective.

Two specialized torpedo bombers were widely used during World War II: the Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 and the Bristol Beaufort. The Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.79, originally designed as a commercial transport, was adapted for use as a bomber when its excellent performance became known. The SM.79-I entered service in 1936 and was used with some success during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. The more powerful SM.79-II was employed throughout World War II in the Mediterranean theater as a torpedo bomber (carrying two 17.7-inch torpedoes), a medium bomber, reconnaissance aircraft, close-support aircraft, and transport/training aircraft. A total of 1,330 were built between 1936 and 1944.

The Bristol Beaufort was the standard British land-based torpedo bomber until it was replaced by the Bristol Beaufighter TF.X in 1943. Entering service late in 1939, the Beaufort was also used for bombing and mine-laying operations. It was reasonably successful although occasionally ineffective

because of malfunctioning torpedoes. A total of 1,429 were built in the United Kingdom, and 700 were built under license in Australia.

Flying an aircraft off and onto an aircraft carrier places many more stresses and strains on the aircraft's structure than comparable activities on land. As a consequence, carrier-based aircraft were generally heavier and more robust—and thus slower and less maneuverable (at least in theory)—than their land-based counterparts. Parts of their structure usually folded to allow the aircraft to be taken below to the hangar, further increasing the weight. On top of that, landing characteristics had to be superior, which required a light wing loading, large flaps, good stall behavior, and a compliant undercarriage. Combining all of these characteristics in a single aircraft was not easy; many of the aircraft that served on carrier decks during World War II had flaws.

Of the major combatants, only the United States, Japan, and Great Britain had aircraft carriers, and each had a different approach to design of carrier-based aircraft (see Tables 1, 2, and 3 for carrier-based attack aircraft, fighters, and bombers, respectively).

Name	*Year of Introduction*	*Crew*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Takeoff Weight (lb)**	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Operational Ceiling (ft)*	*Range (mi)†*	*Armament/Payload*
Fairey Swordfish Mk I (late 1936)	Late 1935	3	1 × 690-hp Bristol Pegasus radial	45 ft 6 in.	36 ft 4 in.	9,250 lb	139 mph at 4,750 ft	10,700 ft	546 mi	2 × 0.3-in. machine guns, 1 × 1,610-lb torpedo
Douglas TBD-1 Devastator (late 1937)	Late 1937	3	1 × 900-hp Pratt and Whitney twin-wasp radial	50 ft 0 in.	35 ft 0 in.	10,194 lb	206 mph at 8,000 ft	19,500 ft	716 mi	2 × 0.3-in. machine guns, 1,000 lb bombs
Nakajima B5N2 "Kate" (late 1940)	Late 1937	3	1 × 1,000-hp Nakajima Sakae radial	50 ft 11 in.	33 ft 9.5 in.	9,039 lb	235 mph at 11,810 ft	27,100 ft	1,237 mi	1 × 7.7-mm machine gun, 1 × 1,764-lb torpedo
Blackburn Skua MK II (late 1938)	Late 1938	2	1 × 890-hp Bristol Perseus radial	45 ft 2 in.	35 ft 7 in.	8,228 lb	225 mph at 6,500 ft	19,100 ft	761 mi	5 × 0.3-in. machine guns, 740 lb bombs
Fairey Albacore Mk I (early 1940)	Early 1940	3	1 × 1,065-hp Bristol Taurus radial	50 ft 0 in.	39 ft 9.5 in.	10,600 lb	161 mph at 4,000 ft	20,700 ft	930 mi	3 × 0.3-in. machine guns, 1 × 1,610-lb torpedo or 1,650 lb bomb
Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless (early 1941)	Mid-1940	2	1 × 1,000-hp Wright Cyclone radial	41 ft 6 in.	32 ft 8 in.	10,400 lb	250 mph at 14,000 ft	27,100 ft	1,345 mi	4 × 0.3-in. machine guns, 1,200 lb bombs
Aichi D3A1 "Val" (mid-1940)	Mid-1940	2	1 × 1,000-hp Mitsubishi Kinsei radial	47 ft 2 in.	33 ft 5.5 in.	8,047 lb	240 mph at 9,840 ft	30,050 ft	915 mi	3 × 7.7-mm machine guns, 813 lb bombs
Grumman TBF-1 Avenger (mid-1942)	Mid-1942	3	1 × 1,700-hp Wright Cyclone radial	54 ft 2 in.	40 ft	15,905 lb	271 mph at 12,000 ft	22,400 ft	1,215 mi	3 × 0.3-in. machine guns, 1,600 lb bombs or 1 torpedo
Curtiss SB2C-1 Helldiver (early 1943)	Early 1943	2	1 × 1,700-hp Wright Cyclone radial	49 ft 9 in.	36 ft 8 in.	16,616 lb	281 mph at 16,700 ft	25,100 ft	1,110 mi	2 × 20-mm cannon, 2 × 0.3-in. machine guns, 2,000 lb bombs
Yokosuka D4Y1 "Judy" (early 1943)	Early 1943	2	1 × 1,200-hp Aichi Atsura v-type	37 ft 9 in.	33 ft 6.5 in.	9,370 lb	343 mph at 15,585 ft	32,480 ft	978 mi	3 × 7.7-mm machine guns, 683 lb bombs
Fairey Barracuda Mk II (early 1943)	Early 1943	3	1 × 1,640-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	49 ft 2 in.	39 ft 9 in.	14,100 lb	210 mph at 2,000 ft	21,600 ft	604 mi	2 × 0.3-in. machine guns, 1 × 1,610-lb torpedo or 1,600 lb bomb
Nakajima B6N2 "Jill" (late 1943)	Late 1943	3	1 × 1,850-hp Mitsubishi Kasei radial	48 ft 10.5 in.	35 ft 8 in.	12,456 lb	299 mph at 16,075 ft	29,660 ft	1,892 mi	2 × 7.7-mm machine guns, 1 × 1,764-lb torpedo

* Weight is normal takeoff weight unless specified otherwise.

† Range is maximum flyable distance including reserves.

Sources: Eric M. Brown, *Duels in the Sky* (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 1989); Philip Jarrett, ed., *Aircraft of the Second World War* (London: Putnam, 1997); Kenneth Munson, *Bombers, Patrol, and Transport Aircraft, 1939–45* (Poole, UK: Blandford, 1969); Kenneth Munson, *Fighters, Attack and Training Aircraft, 1939–45* (Poole, UK: Blandford, 1969).

Table 2. Carrier-Based Fighters, All Powers—Specifications

Name	*Year of Introduction*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Wing Area (sq ft)*	*Takeoff Weight (lb)**	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Combat Ceiling (500 ft/min)†*	*Range (mi)‡*	*Armament/ Payload*
Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero model 21 (mid-1940)	Mid-1940	1 × 925-hp Nakajima Sakae radial	39 ft 4.5 in.	29 ft 8.75 in.	241.5 sq ft	5,313 lb	332 mph at 16,570 ft	31,000 ft (est)	1,595 mi	2 × 7.7-mm type 97 machine guns, 2 × 20-mm type 99 cannon
Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat (early 1941)	Late 1940	1 × 1,200-hp Pratt and Whitney Twin Wasp radial	38 ft 0 in.	28 ft 9 in.	260 sq ft	7,002 lb	328 mph at 21,000 ft	35,000 ft (est)	845 mi	4 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns
Hawker Sea Hurricane Mk IIC (early 1941)	Mid-1940	1 × 1,260-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	40 ft 0 in.	32 ft 2.5 in.	258 sq ft	7,618 lb	317 mph at 17,500 ft	28,000 ft	452 mi	4 × 20-mm Oerlikon cannon
Fairey Fulmar II (early 1941)	Mid-1940	1 × 1,300-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	46 ft 4.5 in.	40 ft 2 in.	342 sq ft	9,672 lb	272 mph at 7,250 ft	24,500 ft (est)	780 mi	8 × 0.303-in. Browning machine guns
Grumman F6F-3 Hellcat (early 1943)	Early 1943	1 × 2,000-hp Pratt and Whitney R-2800 radial	42 ft 10 in.	33 ft 7 in.	334 sq ft	11,381 lb	376 mph at 17,300 ft	36,000 ft (est)	1,090 mi	6 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns plus 2 × 1,000-lb bombs or 6 × 5-in. rockets
Supermarine Seafire F.III (early 1944)	Mid-1942	1 × 1,470-hp Rolls-Royce Merlin v-type	36 ft 10 in.	30 ft 2.5 in.	242 sq ft	7,100 lb	352 mph at 12,250 ft	31,000 ft (est)	465 mi	2 × 20-mm Hispano cannon, 4 × 0.303-in. Browning machine guns plus 500-lb bombs
Vought F4U-1D Corsair (early 1944)	Early 1943	1 × 2,250-hp Pratt and Whitney R-2800 radial	40 ft 11 in.	33 ft 4 in.	314 sq ft	12,039 lb	425 mph at 20,000 ft	34,500 ft (est)	1,015 mi	6 × 0.5-in. Browning machine guns plus 2 × 1,000-lb bombs or 8 × 5-in. rockets
Mitsubishi A6M6c Zero model 53c (late 1944)	Mid-1940	1 × 1,130-hp Nakajima Sakae radial	36 ft 1 in.	29 ft 9 in.	229.3 sq ft	6,047 lb	346 mph at 19,680 ft	32,500 ft (est)	1,194 mi	3 × 12.7-mm type 3 machine guns, 2 × 20-mm type 99 cannon

* Weight is normal takeoff weight unless specified otherwise.
† Combat ceiling is the maximum height at which the aircraft would fight and maneuver. The service ceiling would typically be 2,000 or 3,000 feet higher than this.
‡ Range is maximum flyable distance on internal fuel including reserves. Combat radius would typically be 30% to 35% of this value.
Sources: Eric M. Brown, *Duels in the Sky* (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 1989); Philip Jarrett, ed., *Aircraft of the Second World War* (London: Putnam, 1997); Kenneth Munson, *Bombers, Patrol, and Transport Aircraft, 1939–45* (Poole, UK: Blandford, 1969); Kenneth Munson, *Fighters, Attack and Training Aircraft, 1939–45* (Poole, UK: Blandford, 1969).

United States

In 1941, the United States had several large carriers and well-organized carrier operational procedures; it used scout/dive-bombers (SBD Dauntless), torpedo/level bombers (TBD-1 Devastator), and fighters (F4F Wildcat). Generally speaking, U.S. carrier aircraft were rugged and quite suitable for maritime use. The Douglas TDB-1 Devastator carrier-based torpedo bomber entered service late in 1937 and was largely obsolete when the United States entered the war. Its combat career was terminated by the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway, where it proved vulnerable to fighter attack while unescorted. A total of 129 TBD-1s were built.

The Douglas SBD Dauntless entered service with the U.S. Marine Corps in mid-1940 and with the U.S. Navy later in 1940. It was the standard navy carrier-borne dive-bomber in December 1941. Operationally, the Dauntless

was successful and could absorb a lot of battle damage, having the lowest attrition rate of any U.S. carrier aircraft in the Pacific theater. It played a major part in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942) and the Battle of Midway and later flew off escort carriers on antisubmarine and close-support missions. A total of 5,936 Dauntless were built.

Table 3. Naval Bombers, All Powers—Specifications

Name	*Year of Introduction*	*Crew*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Takeoff Weight (lb)**	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Operational Ceiling (ft)*	*Range (mi)†*	*Armament/ Payload*
Bristol Beaufort Mk I (late 1939)	Late 1939	4	2 × 1,130-hp Bristol Taurus radials	57 ft 10 in.	44 ft 3 in.	21,228 lb	265 mph at 6,500 ft	16,500 ft	1,600 mi	4 × 0.303-in. machine guns, 1 × 1,650-lb torpedo, or 2,000 lb bombs
Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79-II Sparviero (early 1940)	1937	6	3 × 1,000-hp Piaggo radials	69 ft 6.5 in.	53 ft 1.75 in.	25,133 lb	295 mph at 13,120 ft	27,890 ft	1,243 mi with 2,756 lb bombs	3 × 12.7-mm machine guns, 2 × 7.7-mm machine guns, 2 × 450-mm torpedoes, or 2,756 lb bombs

* Weight is normal takeoff weight unless specified otherwise.
† Range is maximum flyable distance, including reserves.
Sources: William Green, *Famous Bombers of the Second World War*, 2nd ed. (London: Book Club Associates, 1979); Philip Jarrett, ed., *Aircraft of the Second World War* (London: Putnam, 1997); Kenneth Munson, *Bombers, Patrol and Transport Aircraft, 1939–45* (Poole, UK: Blandford, 2002).

The Grumman F4F Wildcat entered service with the Royal Navy late in 1940 and became operational with the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy at the beginning of 1941. The F4F-3 was the standard navy shipboard fighter when the United States entered the war and was generally inferior to the Japanese A6M2 Zero in performance and maneuverability. The F4F was rugged and had good dive performance, however, giving a good account of itself when using the correct tactics. Later in the war, the Wildcat gave sterling service on escort carriers. Approximately 8,000 Wildcats were built.

The Grumman TBF Avenger first flew in August 1941 and became the standard navy carrier-based torpedo bomber. It entered service in mid-1942 in time for the Battle of Midway. It could take a lot of punishment, and although it was not very maneuverable, it was easy to land on a deck. A total of 9,836 Avengers were built; most served with the U.S. Navy, but 958 were supplied to the Royal Navy.

The Curtiss SB2 Helldiver was the most successful carrier-based dive-bomber in U.S. Navy service, in spite of its handling faults and a reputation for structural weakness. Entering service early in 1943, its first major action was the Rabaul Campaign during November 2–11, 1943, and it took part in almost every major naval/air action during the remainder of the war. The navy was the major user of the Helldiver, although some were flown by the

U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. A total of 7,200 Helldivers were built in the United States and Canada.

The Vought F4U Corsair entered service with the Marine Corps early in 1943; it was not an easy aircraft to deck-land and was initially rejected by the U.S. Navy in favor of the Hellcat. The gull-winged F4U operated from land bases in the Pacific and flew off Royal Navy carriers from late 1943. The Corsair was a good fighter, convincingly superior in performance to the Mitsubishi Zero and much better than the North American P-51B Mustang below about 20,000 feet. Eventually the Corsair matured into a reasonable deck-landing aircraft, and it began to supplant the F6F Hellcat as the standard U.S. Navy carrier fighter by the end of the war. It saw extensive service after the war and continued in production until 1952. A total of 12,571 were built.

The Grumman F6F Hellcat entered service early in 1943. It was the most successful carrier-based fighter of the war, accounting for 76 percent of enemy aircraft destroyed by U.S. Navy carrier pilots. It was extremely rugged and had much better speed and dive capabilities than the Mitsubishi Zero, which it could normally beat in an even fight. Many of the U.S. Navy aces flew Hellcats. The Hellcat was also employed with some success at night; approximately 1,300 of the 12,272 produced were dedicated radar-equipped night-fighter versions.

Japan

The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had several carriers at the start of the war, the air groups of which were weighted toward attack aircraft rather than fighters. Its aircraft were lightly built and had very long range, but this advantage was usually purchased at the expense of vulnerability to enemy fire. The skill of Japanese aviators tended to exaggerate the effectiveness of the IJN’s aircraft, and pilot quality fell off as experienced crews were shot down during the Battle of Midway and the August 1942–February 1943 Solomon Islands Campaign.

A Curtiss SB2C Helldiver dive bomber in upper landing circle above the aircraft carrier *Yorktown* in July 1944. (National Archives)

The Nakajima B5N ("Kate" in the Allied designator system) first entered service in 1937 as a carrier-based attack bomber, with the B5N2 torpedo bomber appearing in 1940. The B5N had good handling and deck-landing characteristics and was operationally successful in the early part of the war. Large numbers of the B5N participated in the June–August 1944 Mariana Islands Campaign, and it was employed as a suicide aircraft toward the end of the war. Approximately 1,200 B5Ns were built.

The Aichi D3A ("Val") carrier-based dive-bomber entered service in mid-1940 and became the standard IJN dive-bomber. It was an effective bomber, capable of putting up a creditable fight after dropping its bomb load. It participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the major Pacific campaigns, including Santa Cruz (October 26–27, 1942), Midway, and the Solomon Islands. Increasing losses during the second half of the war took their toll, and the D3A was used on suicide missions later in the war. Approximately 1,495 D3As were built.

When it first appeared in mid-1940, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero was the first carrier-based fighter capable of beating its land-based counterparts. It was well armed and had truly exceptional maneuverability below about 220 mph. Its capabilities came as an unpleasant shock to U.S. and British forces.

It achieved this exceptional performance at the expense of resistance to enemy fire, with a light structure and no armor or self-sealing tanks. Its Achilles' heel was the stiffness of its controls at high speed, with control response being almost nil at indicated airspeed over 300 mph. The Zero underwent continued development throughout the war, with a total of 10,449 being built.

The Nakajima B6N ("Jill") carrier-based torpedo bomber entered service late in 1943 and was intended to replace the B5N, but the initial B6N1 was plagued with engine troubles. The B6N2 with a Mitsubishi engine was the major production model, appearing early in 1944. Overall, it was better than its predecessor but not particularly easy to deck-land. It participated in the Marianas Campaign and was encountered throughout the Pacific until the end of the war. A total of 1,268 were built.

The Yokosuka D4Y ("Judy") reconnaissance/dive-bomber entered service on Japanese carriers early in 1943 and was fast for a bomber. Initially assigned to reconnaissance units, it was intended to replace the D3A, but it was insufficiently armed and protected and suffered from structural weakness in dives. In common with most other Japanese aircraft, it was used for kamikaze attacks, and a D4Y carried out the last kamikaze attack of the war on August 15, 1945. A total of 2,819 D4Ys were built.

The motion of its props causes an "aura" to form around this U.S. Navy Grumman F6F Hellcat on the carrier *Yorktown*. Rapid change of pressure and drop in temperature create condensation. Rotating with

the blades, the halo moves aft, giving depth and perspective. November 1943. (National Archives)

Great Britain

During the 1930s, Great Britain had a limited number of air assets with which to patrol a far-flung empire; the Admiralty was therefore obliged to buy multirole aircraft and accept the inevitable compromises in performance. The Royal Navy entered the war with low-performing aircraft, and its efforts to introduce better aircraft were compromised by conflicts in engine supply. In 1943 it was only too pleased to have the use of F4U Corsairs that were surplus to the requirements of the U.S. Navy.

The Fairey Swordfish carrier-based torpedo/spotter/reconnaissance aircraft entered service late in 1936 and participated in the night raid on Taranto (November 11, 1940), the Battle of Cape Matapan (March 28, 1941), and the sinking of the *Bismarck* on May 27, 1941. It was slow but astonishingly agile, with excellent flying qualities. Easy to deck-land, it was a natural choice for use on Atlantic convoy escort carriers. It remained in service until mid-1945, outlasting its replacement (the Fairey Albacore). A total of 2,391 Swordfish were built.

The Blackburn Skua came on line late in 1938 as a carrier-based fighter/dive-bomber. It was not easy to deck-land and had poor stall characteristics, but it was an effective dive-bomber, sinking the German cruiser *Königsberg* in Bergen Harbor in April 1940. A total of 190 were built.

The Fairey Albacore carrier-based torpedo/dive-bomber/reconnaissance aircraft entered service as a replacement for the Swordfish early in 1940 and took part in many of the Middle East operations. The Albacore had only a slightly better performance than the Swordfish and few redeeming features, and its service with the Royal Navy ended late in 1943. A total of 800 were built.

The two-seat Fairey Fulmar carrier fighter entered service in mid-1940 and was principally designed to combat unescorted bombers and maritime patrol aircraft. It had adequate range but was underpowered, and its performance was insufficient to deal with contemporary fighters. Nevertheless, it filled a gap until better aircraft became available. A total of 600 were built.

The Hawker Sea Hurricane was first used on catapult-assisted merchantmen (CAM) ships during early 1941. Many were conversions of existing land-based fighters. Sea Hurricanes were operational on carriers from late 1941; they were maneuverable and well armed but usually had a lower performance than their adversaries. Approximately 800 Sea Hurricanes were built or converted.

The Supermarine Seafire was an adaptation of the land-based Supermarine Spitfire VB fighter. When it appeared in mid-1942, it was the fastest operational carrier fighter in the world, but it was difficult to deck-land and not sufficiently robust for use at sea. Later versions were effective at low altitude, the Seafire LIIC having an outstanding climb and roll performance. Approximately 1,900 were built or converted before the end of the war.

The Fairey Barracuda carrier-based dive/torpedo bomber entered service early in 1943. It was usually used as a dive-bomber and was not popular with its crews; its performance was mediocre and its defensive armament poor. It was, however, a reasonably good dive-bomber and easy to deck-land. A total of 1,718 were built.

ANDY BLACKBURN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft Carriers; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Mariana Islands Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Taranto, Attack on; Torpedoes

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Aircraft, Production of

Key aspect of World War II industrial production that tipped the scales in the air war decisively in favor of the Allied powers. Although Germany and

Japan entered the war with advantages in numbers and quality of aircraft because they had begun military rearmament earlier than the Allies, the combined industrial potential of the Allies far exceeded that of the Axis nations. Even though Axis aircraft production increased during the course of the war, it paled in comparison to that of the Allies, especially the United States. To the extent that World War II was a total war that depended on industrial output, the Allied advantage in manpower and industry ultimately proved decisive, and aircraft production is a key indicator of that advantage (see Table 1).

Axis Powers

Although Germany had entered the war in September 1939 as the world's leading airpower, with 4,840 frontline aircraft and an aircraft industry producing 1,000 airplanes a month, the Luftwaffe's arsenal had serious defects. Germany had never developed a satisfactory long-range bomber, in part because the German military's focus on blitzkrieg (lightning war) emphasized production of medium-range bombers and ground-attack aircraft, which had proven so successful in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War.

Germany's defeat in the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940) revealed the flaw of this policy from a strategic standpoint, as aircraft such as the Heinkel He-111, the Dornier Do-17, and the Junkers Ju-87 proved ineffective against technologically advanced British fighters. Likewise, Germany's lack of long-range bombers prevented it from conducting long-range air operations at sea or later striking manufacturing centers that had been relocated deep within the Soviet Union.

Despite the damage inflicted by the Allied air campaign, the German armaments industry, ably led by Fritz Todt and Albert Speer, not only managed to increase production from 8,295 aircraft in 1939 to 39,807 in 1944 but also introduced the world's first jet fighter, the Messerschmitt Me-262, in the second half of 1944. These successes, however, proved too little and too late to make a difference, and the Allies had unquestioned air supremacy in the last two years of the war.

Japan also entered the war with a powerful air arm, which included some 2,900 combat-ready aircraft on December 7, 1941, the day Japanese air assets attacked Pearl Harbor. Yet Pearl Harbor was a desperate gamble designed to

cripple the U.S. Navy and purchase time for Japan to build a defensive perimeter before U.S. industrial might reached heights that Japanese leaders knew their country could never equal. Japanese industry produced just 5,088 aircraft in 1941, compared with 26,277 for the United States.

Failure to destroy the U.S. carriers in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a clear strategic failure for Japan. Once it lost the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), Japan was forced into a defensive war in which it could not compete with the American war machine. Despite Allied attacks that crippled its shipping industry and weakened its industrial infrastructure, Japan still managed to produce 28,180 aircraft in 1944, a testament to the perseverance of its workers on the home front. That the United States produced 96,318 aircraft during the same year is proof of the futility of Japan's challenge to American industrial might.

Table 1. Aircraft Production in World War II

	Axis Powers			
Year	*Germany*	*Japan*	*Italy*	*Axis Totals by Year*
1939	8,295	4,467	1,692	14,454
1940	10,826	4,768	2,142	17,736
1941	11,776	5,088	3,503	20,367
1942	15,556	8,861	2,818	27,235
1943	25,527	16,693	967	43,187
1944	39,807	28,180	x	67,987
1945	7,544	8,263	x	15,807
Axis totals (all years)	119,331	76,320	11,122	206,773

	Allied Powers			
Year	*Great Britain*	*Soviet Union*	*United States*	*Allied Totals by Year*
1939	7,940	10,382	5,856	24,178
1940	15,049	10,565	12,804	38,418
1941	20,094	17,735	26,277	64,106

1942	23,673	25,436	47,836	96,945
1943	26,263	34,845	85,898	147,006
1944	26,461	40,246	96,318	163,025
1945	12,070	20,052	49,761	81,883
Allied totals (all years)	131,550	159,261	324,750	615,561

Source: Stewart Wilson, *Aircraft of WWII* (Fyshwick, Australia: Aerospace Publications, 1998).

Although Italy's Benito Mussolini had built a powerful air force in the late 1920s and early 1930s, by the beginning of World War II in September 1939, Italy's air force was largely obsolete. This decline was in part a reflection of Italy's weak economy. When Italy joined the war on June 10, 1940, barely half of its 3,296 aircraft were of combat quality. While assistance from Germany (particularly in supplying aircraft engines) allowed the Italian aircraft industry to make modest increases from 2,142 aircraft produced in 1940 to 3,503 aircraft in 1941, Italy's weak industrial sector could not withstand the impact of the Allied bombing campaign, and production dropped to 2,818 aircraft in 1942 and just 967 aircraft by the time Italy switched sides in September 1943.

Allied Powers

Although Germany enjoyed a great lead in the number of combat-ready aircraft at the start of the war, Great Britain had an advantage in that its industry was in the process of introducing aircraft such as the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire that were more technologically advanced than their German counterparts. This qualitative advantage proved critical to defeating Germany in the Battle of Britain.

Secure from the threat of German invasion, British industry succeeded not only in increasing productive capacity with each passing year of the war but also in introducing aircraft such as the Handley Page Halifax and the Avro Lancaster that played a critical role in the Allied bombing campaign against Germany. Great Britain's highest annual production total reached 26,461 aircraft in 1944, compared with 39,807 aircraft for Germany that year. Nevertheless, Great Britain's overall production of 131,550 aircraft during the war exceeded that of Germany, which produced 119,331 aircraft.

The Soviet Union possessed large numbers of aircraft at the outbreak of the war, but most were inferior to their German counterparts. Making matters worse, when Germany launched its invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, it destroyed 1,200 Soviet aircraft in the first nine hours of the attack. The Soviet Union managed not only to sustain this loss but also to recover because of its monumental efforts in transferring industries eastward, beyond the reach of Germany's army and air force.

In the first three months after the German invasion, the Soviet Union relocated 1,523 factories. The primary production line for the Yakovlev Yak-1, for example, was moved more than 1,000 miles and returned to production in less than six weeks. The success of these efforts allowed the Soviet Union to exceed German production for each year of the war, including 1941, for a total of 159,261 Soviet aircraft compared with 119,331 German aircraft.

In 1939 the U.S. economy was still suffering from the effects of the Great Depression, with 8.9 million unemployed workers. The success of the German blitzkrieg against Western Europe in 1940 spurred the American war machine into action. The Burke-Wadsworth Act of September 16, 1940, introduced peacetime conscription for the first time in American history, and massive military spending got the American economy working again. Unlike Germany and Japan, the United States not only had a large population base and abundant natural resources that could be mobilized for production but also enjoyed an industrial infrastructure far removed from its enemies. By 1944, 18.7 million Americans, approximately 50 percent of whom were women, had entered the American workforce.

Long lines of A-20 attack bombers roll ceaselessly off the assembly line, night and day, through the Douglas Aircraft plant at Long Beach, California, in October 1942. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

Of all of their industrial achievements, none was more spectacular than aircraft production. From just 5,856 aircraft produced in 1939, the United States would produce the staggering total of 96,318 in 1944—almost one-third more than that produced by Germany and Japan combined for that year. For the war years as a whole, the United States manufactured 324,750 aircraft, compared with a combined total of 206,773 for Germany, Japan, and Italy. The U.S. output, combined with that of the British and the Soviet Union, gave the Allies an advantage greater than three to one, with 615,561 aircraft. With such an advantage, it is little wonder then that the Allies won the war in the air.

JUSTIN D. MURPHY

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Gliders; Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft, Reconnaissance and Auxiliary; Aircraft, Transport; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Britain, Battle of; Germany, Air Force; Great Britain, Air Force; Italy, Air Force; Japan, Air Forces; Midway, Battle of;

Mussolini, Benito; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Soviet Union, Air Force; Spanish Civil War; Speer, Albert; Todt, Fritz; United States Army Air Forces

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Aircraft, Reconnaissance and Auxiliary

Aircraft that provide support for land, sea, and air forces. From the beginning of military aviation, air reconnaissance of enemy positions and movements has been crucial not only for defense against attack but also in preparation for offensive action. Just as improvements in aviation technology during the 1920s and 1930s greatly expanded the capabilities of fighters and bombers by the beginning of World War II, the same was true of reconnaissance and auxiliary aircraft. High-altitude photoreconnaissance was crucial to successful planning for military invasions such as the Normandy landings on June 6, 1944. Long-range reconnaissance was also crucial for naval operations in the Atlantic and Pacific.

Three main types of reconnaissance and auxiliary aircraft were employed during World War II: land-based aircraft, floatplanes, and flying boats designed to conduct reconnaissance missions; army cooperation aircraft designed for multipurpose roles such as liaison or tactical support; and training aircraft designed to train pilots and crewmen for service.

In addition to aircraft specially designed for reconnaissance or auxiliary service, numerous bombers and fighters were either converted to take on these roles or were relegated to these purposes after becoming obsolete in their intended roles. Such aircraft include France’s Bloch 131 and Latécoère Laté 298; Germany’s Arado Ar 234 Blitz, Junkers Ju-86, Ju-88, and Ju-188 and the Messerschmitt Me-210; Great Britain’s De Havilland Mosquito, Fairey Swordfish, Supermarine Spitfire, and Vickers Wellington; Italy’s Cant

Z. 506 Airone and Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79; Japan's Yokosuka D4Y Suisei; Poland's PZL P.23 Karas; the Soviet Union's Petlyakov Pe-2; and the U.S. Lockheed Hudson, Martin Maryland, and North American P-51 Mustang.

The following describes the most significant aircraft employed primarily for reconnaissance and auxiliary purposes by both sides during World War II (see also Table 1).

Germany

Entering service in September 1940, the twin-engine, three-seat Focke-Wulf Fw-189 Uhu (Owl) served as the primary tactical reconnaissance aircraft of the German Army, especially on the Eastern Front. Although its maximum range of 584 miles limited it to tactical reconnaissance, its rugged construction enabled it to absorb heavy punishment from antiaircraft fire, and its armament of three to four 7.9mm machine guns afforded protection from Soviet fighters. These qualities also allowed it to provide close support for German troops on the ground. A total of 894 were produced.

Introduced in August 1939, the single-engine, two-seat Arado Ar. 196 proved to be one of the most versatile reconnaissance seaplanes in the German Navy's arsenal. Designed as a catapult-launched aircraft, it was carried aboard Germany's major capital ships to provide reconnaissance at sea. It also conducted coastal and maritime patrol, antisubmarine hunting, and convoy escort operations in the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Bay of Biscay while operating out of coastal bases. A total of 546 were produced.

Germany relied during the war on three flying boats for reconnaissance and auxiliary purposes. Originally designed for passenger service by Hamburger Flugzeugbau, the three-engine, six-seat Blohm und Voss Bv-138, of which 279 were constructed, entered military service in late 1940. With a maximum range of 2,500 miles, the Bv-138 was capable of remaining aloft for up to 18 hours, enabling it to conduct long-range patrols in the North Atlantic, where it reported the positions of Allied convoys to German U-boats.

Table 1. Reconnaissance and Auxiliary Aircraft, All Powers

Aircraft	*Year of Introduction*	*Engine (Primary)*	*Span*	*Length*	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Ceiling (ft)*	*Range (mi)*	*Weight (Loaded) (lb)*	*Crew*
Aichi E13A	1941	1 × 1,080-hp Mitsubishi Kinsei 43 14-cylinder radial	47 ft 7 in.	37 ft	234 mph	28,640 ft	1,298 mi	8,818 lb	3
Aichi E16A Zuiun	1944	1 × 1,300-hp Mitsubishi Kensei 51 or 54 14-cylinder radial	42 ft	35 ft 6.5 in.	274 mph	32,810 ft	1,504 mi	10,038 lb	2
Arado Ar 96	1939	1 × 485-hp Argus As 410MA-1 inverted V12	36 ft 1 in.	29 ft 11.5 in.	211 mph	22,965 ft	615 mi	3,858 lb	2
Arado Ar 196	1939	1 × 900-hp BMW 132K 9-cylinder radial	40 ft 10 in.	36 ft 1 in.	193 mph	22,965 ft	670 mi	8,223 lb	2
Avro Anson	1936	2 × 355-hp Armstrong Siddeley Cheetah IX 7-cylinder radial	56 ft 6 in.	42 ft 3 in.	188 mph	19,500 ft	820 mi	8,500 lb	6
Beechcraft AT-11 Kansan	1940	2 × 450-hp Pratt and Whitney R-985-An-1 Wasp Junior 9-cylinder radial	47 ft 8 in.	34 ft 3 in.	214 mph	20,000 ft	850 mi	8,727 lb	8
Beriev MBR-2 (Be-2)	1931	1 × 860-hp Mikulin Am-34NB	62 ft 4 in.	44 ft 3 in.	171 mph	25,920 ft	650 mi	9,359 lb	5
Blohm und Voss Bv 138	1940	3 × 880-hp Junkers Jumo 205D inline diesel engine	88 ft 4 in.	65 ft 1.5 in.	170 mph	18,700 ft	2,500 mi	34,100 lb	6
Boeing-Stearman Kaydet	1936	1 × 220-hp Jacobs R-755-7-cylinder radial	32 ft 2 in.	25 ft 0.25 in.	124 mph	11,200 ft	505 mi	2,717 lb	2
Cant Z. 501 Gabbiano	1934	1 × 900-hp Isotta-Fraschini Asso XI R2 C15 V12	73 ft 10 in.	46 ft 11 in.	171 mph	22,966 ft	1,490 mi	15,542 lb	4–5
Cessna AT-17/ UC-78 Bobcat	1939	2 × 245-hp Jacobs R-755-9-7-cylinder radial	41 ft 11 in.	32 ft 9 in.	195 mph	22,000 ft	750 mi	5,700 lb	2–5
Consolidated PB2Y Catalina	1936	2 × 1,200-hp Pratt and Whitney R-1820-92 Twin Wasp 14-cylinder radial	104 ft	63 ft 10 in.	196 mph	18,100 ft	3,100 mi	34,000 lb	7–9
De Havilland Dominie	1935	2 × 200-hp De Havilland Gipsy Queen 3 6-cylinder inline engine	48 ft	34 ft 6 in.	157 mph	16,700 ft	570 mi	5,500 lb	5–9
De Havilland Tiger Moth	1931	1 × 130-hp De Havilland Gipsy Major 4-cylinder inline engine	29 ft 4 in.	23 ft 11 in.	109 mph	14,000 ft	300 mi	1,825 lb	2
Dornier Do 18	1938	2 × 700-hp Junkers Jumo 205D 6-cylinder diesel engine	77 ft 9 in.	63 ft 7 in.	166 mph	17,200 ft	2,175 mi	23,800 lb	4–5
Dornier Do 24	1937	3 × 1,000-hp Bramo 323R-2 Fafnir 9-cylinder radial	88 ft 7 in.	72 ft 2 in.	211 mph	19,360 ft	2,950 mi	35,715 lb	6
Fiat R.S. 14	1938	2 × 840-hp Fiat A 74 RC38 14-cylinder radial	64 ft 1 in.	46 ft 3 in	254 mph	16,400 ft	1,553 mi	17,637 lb	5
Fiesler Fi 156 Storch	1939	1 × 240-hp Argus As 10C inverted V8	46 ft 9 in.	32 ft 5.75 in.	109 mph	15,090 ft	600 mi	2,910 lb	2
Focke-Wulf Fw 189 Uhu	1940	2 × 465-hp Argus As 410A-1 inverted V12	60 ft 4.5 in.	39 ft 4 in.	221 mph	27,560 ft	584 mi	8,708 lb	3
Grumman J2F Duck	1934	1 × 950-hp R-1820-50 Cyclone 9-cylinder radial	39 ft	34 ft	188 mph	27,000 ft	780 mi	7,700 lb	2–3
Henschel Hs 126	1938	1 × 850-hp Bramo Fafnir 323A-1/Q-1 9-cylinder radial	47 ft 6.75 in.	35 ft 7 in.	193 mph	27,000 ft	534 mi	7,209 lb	2
Kawanishi H6K	1938	4 × 1,000-hp Mitsubishi Kinsei 43 14-cylinder radial	131 ft 2.75 in.	84 ft 1 in.	211 mph	31,365 ft	4,210 mi	47,399 lb	9
Kawanishi H8K	1941	4 × 1,530-hp Mitsubishi MK4B Kasei 12 14-cylinder radial	124 ft 8 in.	92 ft 4 in.	290 mph	28,740 ft	4,460 mi	71,650 lb	10
Lockheed F-4 and F-5 Lightning	1942	2 × 1,150-hp Allison V-1710 V12	52 ft	37 ft 10 in.	389 mph	39,000 ft	975 mi	15,500 lb	1
Mitsubishi F1M	1939	1 × 875-hp Mitsubishi Zuisei 13 14-cylinder radial	36 ft 1 in.	31 ft 2 in.	230 mph	30,970 ft	460 mi	6,294 lb	2

Aircraft	Year of Introduction	Engine (Primary)	Span	Length	Maximum Speed (mph)	Ceiling (ft)	Range (mi)	Weight (Loaded) (lb)	Crew
Mitsubishi Ki-46	1941	2 × 1,080-hp Mitsubishi Ha-102 14-cylinder radial	48 ft 2.75 in.	36 ft 1 in.	375 mph	35,170 ft	1,537 mi	12,787 lb	2
Nakajima C6N Saiun	1944	1 × 1,990-hp Nakajima NK9B Homare 21 18-cylinder radial	41 ft	36 ft 1 in.	379 mph	34,236 ft	3,330 mi	11,596 lb	3
North American AT-6 Texan/Harvard	1938	1 × 600-hp Pratt and Whitney R-1340 9-cylinder radial	42 ft 0.25 in.	29 ft 6 in.	208 mph	21,500 ft	750 mi	5,300 lb	2
Piper L-4 Grasshopper	1941	1 × 65-hp Continental O-170-3 4-cylinder	35 ft 3 in.	22 ft	85 mph	9,300 ft	190 mi	1,220 lb	2
Polikarpov U-2/Po2	1928	1 × 100-125-hp Shvetsov M-11 5-cylinder radial	37 ft 5 in. upper; 34 ft 11.5 in. lower	26 ft 9 in.	93 mph	13,125 ft	329 mi	2,167 lb	2–3
Short Sunderland	1938	4 × 1,065-hp Pegasus XVIII 9-cylinder radial	112 ft 9.5 in.	85 ft 4 in.	210 mph	16,000 ft	2,900 mi	45,210 lb	10–13
Supermarine Walrus	1935	1 × 775-hp Pegasus VI 9-cylinder radial	45 ft 10 in.	37 ft 7 in.	124 mph	18,500 ft	600 mi	7,200 lb	4
Tachikawa Ki-26 and Ki-55	1938	1 × 510-hp Hitachi Ha-13a 9-cylinder radial	38 ft 8.5 in.	26 ft 3 in.	216 mph	26,900 ft	659 mi	3,791 lb	2
Vought OS2U Kingfisher	1940	1 × 450-hp Pratt and Whitney R-985-AN-1 Wasp Junior 9-cylinder radial	35 ft 11 in.	33 ft 10 in.	164 mph	13,000 ft	805 mi	6,000 lb	2
Vultee Valiant	1939	1 × 450-hp Pratt and Whitney R-985-AN-1 Wasp Junior 9-cylinder radial	42 ft	28 ft 10 in.	180 mph	21,650 ft	725 mi	4,360 lb	2

Sources: Enzo Angelucci, ed., *The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft: 1914 to the Present* (Milan, Italy: Arnoldo Mondadori S.p.A., 2001); John C. Fredriksen, *Warbirds: An Illustrated Guide to U.S. Military Aircraft, 1914–2000* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1999); John C. Fredriksen, *International Warbirds: An Illustrated Guide to World Military Aircraft, 1914–2000* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2001); and Stewart Wilson, *Aircraft of WWII* (Fyshwick, Australia: Aerospace Publications, 1998).

Designed prior to the war as a transatlantic mail carrier, the twin-engine, four- or five-seat Dornier Do-18, of which 152 were constructed, was quickly adopted for military use when Germany began its rearmament program and was used primarily in the Baltic and the North Sea for maritime patrol and air-sea rescue operations. Larger, faster, and possessing greater range than the Do-18, the three-engine, six-seat Dornier Do-24, of which 294 were constructed, entered service in 1937. In addition to maritime patrol and air-sea rescue operations, it served as a transport and troop evacuation aircraft.

The two-seat Fieseler Fi-156 Storch and Henschel Hs-126 were small light aircraft that served effectively as army cooperation and utility aircraft. Noted for its short takeoff and landing capabilities—it required just 213 feet for takeoff and just 61 feet for landing—the Fi-156 Storch (Stork) was a liaison and staff transport, air ambulance, and tactical reconnaissance aircraft. It was also used in the daring rescue by the Germans of Benito Mussolini in September 1943. A total of 2,834 were produced by war's end.

The Hs-126 had proved its usefulness in the Kondor Legion during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War in tactical reconnaissance, as an artillery spotter, and for strafing enemy positions. It continued in these roles in the

early stages of World War II until it was withdrawn from frontline service by early 1943. A total of 803 were produced.

Introduced in 1939, the two-seat Arado Ar-96 was the Luftwaffe's primary trainer throughout the war. Its unarmed version served as a basic trainer, while its armed version (with a single 7.9mm machine gun) served as an advanced trainer. It also performed other auxiliary roles, such as liaison transport, glider towing, and reconnaissance. A total of 11,546 were produced.

Great Britain

Designed in 1935, the twin-engine Avro Anson entered service with the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1936 as an armed coastal patrol aircraft. While it continued in that role until 1941, it was as an aircrew trainer that it made its primary contribution to the British war effort, training navigators, radio operators, and air gun operators. One variant, the Mk.X, was used for transporting freight or up to eight passengers. A total of 10,996 were produced until 1952, and it remained in service until 1968.



A Dornier Do 18 flying boat. Obsolete by the beginning of World War II, it was nonetheless employed on North Sea reconnaissance missions as well as in air/sea rescue. Only one squadron was still operational by mid-1941, however. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

The four-engine Short Sunderland was a maritime patrol and antisubmarine flying boat with a maximum range of 2,690 miles. Nicknamed the “Flying Porcupine” because it was equipped with eight .303-caliber machine guns, the Sunderland was more than capable of defending itself. In addition to its reconnaissance and antisubmarine roles, it was also employed in transport and air-sea rescue operations and played an important role in successfully evacuating forces from Norway, Greece, and Crete. A total of 749 were constructed, and it remained in service with the RAF until 1959.

First introduced in 1935 by Australia, where it was known as the Seagull V and intended as a maritime patrol and antisubmarine aircraft, the single-engine Supermarine Walrus entered British service in 1936 as an amphibious biplane used for search and air-sea rescue operations. Capable of operating in rough seas, it rescued as many as 5,000 downed pilots in the waters around Britain and another 2,500 in the Mediterranean. A total of 771 Walrus aircraft were constructed.

Introduced originally as a passenger liner (the D.H.89 Dragon Rapide), the twin-engine De Havilland Dominie served primarily as a radio and navigator trainer and as a communications aircraft. With the outbreak of the war, civilian versions were pressed into military service in an effort to supply the British Expeditionary Force in France. A total of 730 of all varieties were constructed.

The De Havilland Tiger Moth, a single-engine, open-air–cockpit biplane, served as one of the primary trainers for Allied pilots who flew in World War II. In addition to the 8,796 trainers produced, 420 radio-operated, wooden-constructed versions, known as queen bee drones, were manufactured to serve as antiaircraft gunnery targets.

Italy

Introduced in 1934, the single-engine, four- to five-seat Cant Z. 501 Gabbiano served as Italy’s only flying boat during World War II. Intended as an armed reconnaissance/maritime patrol aircraft, the wooden-constructed Gabbiano had set numerous long-distance records in the mid-1930s. With Italy’s entry into the war, however, it proved extremely vulnerable to enemy fire and so was relegated primarily to coastal patrol service. By the time Italy

surrendered in September 1943, only 40 remained out of the 445 that had been produced.

Introduced in 1941, the twin-engine Fiat R.S. 14 was originally designed as a coastal reconnaissance floatplane. Although its performance soon proved far better than that of the Cant Z.506 and Savoia-Marchetti SM.79, allowing it to be used as a torpedo bomber, only 187 were produced.

Japan

In addition to transporting troops and supplies, the four-engine Kawanishi H6K and four-engine Kawanishi H8K flying boats served important roles as long-range reconnaissance aircraft, with the former having a maximum range of 4,210 miles and the latter 4,460 miles.

Japan relied on three primary reconnaissance floatplanes during the war. The three-seat Aichi E13A, of which 1,418 were produced, was Japan's most widely used floatplane of the war. Entering service in early 1941, it was employed for reconnaissance leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), and it participated in every major campaign in the Pacific theater, performing not only reconnaissance but also air-sea rescue, liaison transport, and coastal patrol operations. Introduced in January 1944 as a replacement for the E13A, the two-seat Aichi E16A Zuiun offered far greater performance capabilities but came too late in the war to make a significant difference, primarily because Japan's worsening industrial position limited production to just 256 aircraft.

Based on a 1936 design that underwent several modifications, the two-seat Mitsubishi F1M biplane, of which 1,118 were produced, proved to be one of the most versatile reconnaissance aircraft in Japan's arsenal. Operating from both ship and water bases, it served in a variety of roles throughout the Pacific, including coastal patrol, convoy escort, antisubmarine, and air-sea rescue duties. It was even capable of serving as a dive-bomber and an interceptor.

The three-seat Nakajima C6N Saiun, of which 463 were produced, was one of the few World War II reconnaissance aircraft specifically designed for operating from carriers. With a maximum speed of 379 mph, a maximum range of 3,300 miles, and a service ceiling of 34,236 feet, the C6N proved virtually immune from Allied interception. Unfortunately for Japan, it did not

become available for service until the Mariana Islands Campaign (June–August 1944).

The twin-engine, two-seat Mitsubishi Ki-46, of which 1,742 were produced, served as Japan's primary strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the war. Entering service in March 1941, the Ki-46 was one of the top-performing aircraft of its type in the war and had a service ceiling of 35,170 feet, a range of 2,485 miles, and a maximum speed of 375 mph.

Although the two-seat Tachikawa Ki-36 served as an effective army cooperation aircraft against the Chinese when it entered service in November 1938, it proved vulnerable against better-equipped Allied forces after the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The Ki-55 was an advanced trainer version that became available in 1940. Both were later used as suicide aircraft toward the end of the war. A total of 2,723 of both types were constructed.

Soviet Union

When it entered service in 1928, the two- to three-seat Polikarpov U-2/Po2 biplane was intended as a basic trainer. By the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, approximately 13,000 had been constructed for both military and civil use. The U-2/Po2 performed a wide variety of roles besides training, such as tactical reconnaissance, air ambulance, night artillery spotting, and close ground support. One version, the U-2GN, was equipped with loudspeakers and used for propaganda purposes. Production continued in the Soviet Union until 1948 and in Poland until 1953; more than 33,000 were ultimately produced.

The five-seat Beriev MBR-2 (Be-2) flying boat was first introduced in 1931 for coastal patrol service. Incorporating a wooden hull and metal wings and utilizing a single pusher engine, it proved to be one of the most versatile flying boats of its time. In addition to its reconnaissance role, it was employed in air-sea rescue, light transport service, and mine-laying operations. More than 1,500 of all varieties were produced.

United States

The single-seat Lockheed F-4 and F-5 Lightning were modified versions of the Lockheed P-38 Lightning, which had cameras and clear panels installed

in place of its guns in the nose section. First deployed in the Pacific in early 1942, these were among the most widely used photoreconnaissance aircraft of the war. Of the 1,400 employed during the war, 500 were new, and the remaining were converted from existing stocks of P-38s.

Designed to operate from land or be catapulted from a ship, the two-seat Vought OS2U Kingfisher, of which 1,519 were produced, first entered service in August 1940 and served as the U.S. Navy's primary observation aircraft in every theater of the war. In addition to its reconnaissance duties, it performed air-sea rescue, antisubmarine patrol, and liaison transport missions.

A U.S. Navy Vought OS2U Kingfisher reconnaissance aircraft. The principal shipboard observation aircraft used by the United States Navy during World War II, the Kingfisher had a crew of two: the pilot and a radio operator/gunner. (Frank Scherschel/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Entering service in 1936, the twin-engine, seven- to nine-crew Consolidated PB2Y Catalina was the most widely used flying boat of World War II. A total of 3,290 were produced in the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union. With a maximum range of 3,100 miles, the Catalina served on all fronts of the war primarily for long-range maritime reconnaissance. Other duties included air-sea rescue, mine laying, and transport.

The two- to three-seat Grumman J2F Duck, of which 641 were produced, was an amphibious biplane that entered service in 1936 with the U.S. Navy

and the U.S. Coast Guard as a coastal patrol aircraft. After Pearl Harbor, the Duck was pressed into a variety of roles in both the European and Pacific theaters, including air-sea rescue, target towing, coastal patrol, and maritime reconnaissance.

Utilizing a three-tiered system of training—primary, basic, and advanced—for its pilots, the United States relied on training aircraft that corresponded to each level. The two-seat Boeing-Stearman Kaydet, of which approximately 10,000 were constructed, was an open-air biplane that served the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) and the U.S. Navy as a primary trainer throughout the war. The two-seat Vultee Valiant, of which a total of 11,525 were produced, served as the most important basic trainer for the USAAF and the U.S. Navy. Finally, the two-seat North American AT-6 Texan/Harvard, of which over 17,500 were produced in the United States and Canada, served as the most important Allied advanced trainer of World War II.

Other prominent American auxiliary aircraft included the Cessna AT-17/UC-78 Bobcat, which was used as an advanced trainer and a light utility transport; the Piper L-4 Grasshopper, which served as an artillery spotter, a trainer, and a liaison transport; and the Beechcraft Kansan, a military version of the Beechcraft Model 18 that served as a navigation, bombing, and gunnery trainer.

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See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Gliders; Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft, Production of; Aircraft, Transport; Kondor Legion; Photoreconnaissance

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Aircraft, Transport

Aircraft the primary purpose of which is the movement of personnel and supplies. Although fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft played major roles in World War I, the technology of the time did not allow aircraft to play a meaningful role in transporting troops and supplies. By the early 1930s, however, improvements in aircraft design and, more important, aircraft engines resulted in the emergence of civil aviation aircraft, such as the Douglas DC-3, for commercial passenger service. Military planners were quick to note these developments, which raised the prospect of rapidly deploying large numbers of men and a large amount of supplies to the battle zone, including behind enemy lines. By the outbreak of World War II, most of the powers that would become involved in the war had either already developed military variants of these civil aircraft or had introduced specially designed military transport aircraft.

Two main types of transport aircraft were employed during the war: large multiengine land-based aircraft or flying boats designed to move many troops or supplies (some of these also served in bombing and reconnaissance roles) and assault or transport gliders designed to be towed and then released so they could glide silently to a landing behind enemy lines.

The following are the most significant aircraft employed primarily for transport by both sides during World War II (see also Table 1).

Germany

Designed originally in 1930 as a three-engine passenger carrier for Deutsche Lufthansa, the Junkers Ju-52/3m served as the primary transport aircraft of the German Army in World War II. Including the approximately 200 civil models constructed prior to the war, a total of 4,800 Ju-52/3ms were built by the end of 1944. The aircraft made its military debut as a bomber and troop transport during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. Successive versions of the Ju-52/3m incorporated more powerful engines that provided greater load capacity (approximately twice its empty weight of 12,600–14,300 pounds) and interchangeable wheel, ski, or float landing gear that allowed it to operate in a variety of conditions. In addition to its transport duties, the Ju-52 served as a bomber, an air ambulance, a glider tug, and a paratrooper transport.

Intended as a replacement for the Ju-52/3m, the Junkers Ju-252 Herkules relied on the same three-engine configuration as the Ju-52/3m but featured

improved interior and exterior design and more powerful engines, which not only made it faster and capable of bearing heavier loads but also gave as much as twice the range of the Ju-52/3m. Unfortunately for Germany, shortages of resources and manpower forced the Luftwaffe to limit production of the all-metal Ju-252 to just 15 aircraft. A mixed wood and tube-steel version, the Ju-352 entered service in 1944, but it came too late in the war to make a difference. Just 45 of the Ju-352s were constructed.

Table 1. Transport Aircraft, All Powers

Aircraft	*Year of Introduction*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Ceiling (ft)*	*Range (mi)*	*Weight (Loaded) (lb)*
Airspeed Horsa	1941	None	88 ft	67 ft	150 mph	NA	NA	15,500 lb
Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle	1942	2 × 1,560-hp Bristol Hercules XI 14-cylinder radials	77 ft	59 ft 11 in.	265 mph	18,000 ft	1,300 mi	36,500 lb
Beechcraft C-45 Expeditor	1940	2 × 450-hp Pratt and Whitney R-985-An-1 Wasp Junior 9-cylinder radials	47 ft 8 in.	34 ft 3 in.	214 mph	20,000 ft	850 mi	8,727 lb
Blohm und Voss Bv 222 Viking	1940	6 × 1,000-hp BMW Bramo Fafnir 323R 9-cylinder radials or 6 × 980-hp Junkers Jumo inline diesel engines	150 ft 11 in.	121 ft 4.5 in.	242 mph	23,950 ft	3,790 mi	109,026 lb
Bristol Bombay	1940	2 × 1,010-hp Bristol Pegasus XXII 9-cylinder radials	95 ft 9 in.	69 ft 3 in.	192 mph	25,000 ft	2,230 mi	20,000 lb

(continued)

Table 1. Transport Aircraft, All Powers (*Continued*)

Aircraft	*Year of Introduction*	*Engine*	*Span*	*Length*	*Maximum Speed (mph)*	*Ceiling (ft)*	*Range (mi)*	*Weight (Loaded) (lb)*
Consolidated Liberator Transport C-87	1940	4 × 1,200-hp Pratt and Whitney R-1830-43 Twin Wasp 14-cylinder radials	110 ft	66 ft 4 in.	306 mph	31,000 ft	2,900 mi	56,600 lb
Curtiss C-46 Commando	1940	2 × 2,000-hp Pratt and Whitney R-2800-51 Double Wasp 18-cylinder radials	108 ft 1 in.	76 ft 4 in.	269 mph	27,600 ft	1,600 mi	56,000 lb
DFS 230	1938	None	68 ft 5.5 in.	36 ft 10.5 in.	112–130 mph	NA	NA	4,630 lb
Douglas C-47 Skytrain	1942	2 × 1,000–1,200-hp Wright R-1820 Cyclone 9-cylinder or 2 × 1,200-hp Pratt and Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp 14-cylinder radials	95 ft 9 in.	64 ft 5.5 in.	229 mph	24,000 ft	1,500 mi	29,300 lb
Douglas C-54 Skymaster	1942	4 × 1,350-hp Pratt and Whitney R-2000-7 or -11 Twin Wasp 14-cylinder radials	117 ft 6 in.	93 ft 10 in.	275 mph	22,500 ft	3,900 mi	73,000 lb
General Aircraft Hamilcar	1943	None	110 ft	68 ft	150 mph	NA	NA	21,400 lb
Gotha Go 242	1941	None	80 ft 4.5 in.	51 ft 10 in.	149 mph	NA	NA	15,653 lb
Junkers Ju 252/352 Herkules	1939	3 × 1,410-hp Junkers Jumo 211F inverted V-12s	112 ft 3 in.	79 ft 5 in.	205 mph	19,685 ft	1,852 mi	52,911 lb
Junkers Ju 52/3m	1931	3 × 725-hp BMW 123A-3 9-cylinder radials	95 ft 11.5 in.	62 ft	171 mph	18,000 ft	800 mi	23,149 lb
Kawanishi H6K	1938	4 × 1,000-hp Mitsubishi Kinsei 43 14-cylinder radials	131 ft 2.75 in.	84 ft 1 in.	211 mph	31,365 ft	4,210 mi	47,399 lb
Kawanishi H8K	1941	4 × 1,530-hp Mitsubishi MK4B Kasei 12 14-cylinder radials	124 ft 8 in.	92 ft 4 in.	290 mph	28,740 ft	4,460 mi	71,650 lb
Kawasaki Ki-56	1941	2 × 990-hp Nakajima Ha-25 14-cylinder radials	65 ft 6 in.	48 ft 10.5 in.	249 mph	26,250 ft	2,060 mi	17,692 lb
Lockheed Lodestar	1941	2 × 1,200-hp Pratt and Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp 14-cylinder radials	65 ft 6 in.	49 ft 10 in.	266 mph	30,000 ft	1,660 mi	18,500 lb
Martin PBM Mariner Flying Boat	1941	2 × 1,700-hp Wright R-2600-12 Cyclone 14-cylinder radials	118 ft	80 ft	198 mph	16,900 ft	2,240 mi	58,000 lb
Messerschmitt Me 321 Gigant	1942	None	180 ft 5.5 in.	93 ft 4 in.	112 mph	NA	NA	48,500 lb
Mitsubishi Ki-57	1942	2 × 1,050-hp Mitsubishi Ha-102 14-cylinder radials	74 ft 2 in.	52 ft 10 in.	292 mph	26,250 ft	1,865 mi	18,600 lb
Savoia-Marchetti S.M.75	1939	3 × 750-hp Alfa Romeo A.R. 126 RC 34 9-cylinder radials	97 ft 5 in.	70 ft 10 in.	225 mph	20,500 ft	1,070 mi	28,700 lb
Savoia-Marchetti S.M.82 Canguru	1941	3 × 950-hp Alfa Romeo 128 RC 21 9-cylinder radials	97 ft 4.5 in.	75 ft 1.5 in.	230 mph	19,685 ft	1,864 mi	39,727–44,092 lb
Tupolev TB-3 (ANT-6)	1930	4 × 730-hp M-17F V-12s or 4 × 1,200-hp Am-34FRNV V-12s	132 ft 10.5 in.	82 ft 8 in.	122–179 mph	12,470–25,393 ft	839–1,939 mi	37,920–54,012 lb
Waco CG-4A Hadrian	1942	None	83 ft 8 in.	48 ft 4 in.	150 mph	NA	NA	7,500–9,000 lb

Sources: Enzo Angelucci, ed., *The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft: 1914 to the Present* (Milan, Italy: Arnoldo Mondadori S.p.A., 2001); John C. Fredriksen, *Warbirds: An Illustrated Guide to U.S. Military Aircraft, 1914–2000* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1999); John C. Fredriksen, *International Warbirds: An Illustrated Guide to World Military Aircraft, 1914–2000* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2001); and Stewart Wilson, *Aircraft of WWII* (Fyshwick, Australia: Aerospace Publications, 1998).
NA = not applicable

Originally designed for Deutsche Lufthansa to serve as a transatlantic flying boat, the six-engine Blohm und Voss Bv-222 Viking was the largest flying boat, and the largest aircraft of any kind, to serve in World War II. Although only 13 were produced, the Bv-222, which could carry up to 110 troops in addition to its 11-man crew, played an important role in transporting troops in the Mediterranean and North African campaigns.

Germany employed three types of gliders as transports during World War II: the DFS-230, the Gotha Go-242, and the Messerschmitt Me-321 Gigant. Entering service in 1938, the DFS 230 could carry eight airborne troops and

proved to be the standard assault glider used by the German Army during the war, with approximately 1,500 being constructed.

Introduced in late 1941, the Gotha Go-242 could carry up to 23 airborne troops or the equivalent weight in supplies. As one of the largest aircraft of the war, the Messerschmitt Me-321 Gigant was capable of carrying up to 120 troops, 21,500 pounds of freight, or 60 wounded soldiers. The Go-242 and Me-321 served primarily on the Eastern Front to bring food and supplies to German soldiers. Powered versions, the Go-244 and Me-323, were also developed for transport service.

Great Britain

Although the twin-engine Bristol Bombay was designed as a troop transport carrier in 1931, the economic conditions of the Great Depression delayed production until early 1939. While only 51 were produced, the Bristol Bombay, which was capable of carrying up to 24 troops or a payload of 7,200 pounds, saw significant action for the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the first half of the war, ferrying troops and supplies across the English Channel in 1940, evacuating British forces from Crete in 1941, and dropping paratroopers behind enemy lines in North Africa.

Originally intended as a bomber, the Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle was instead converted to transport service. A total of 310 were used as transports for special operations, such as inserting paratroopers behind enemy lines. An additional 247 served as the standard tug for the Airspeed Horsa assault glider, seeing action in the invasion of Sicily in 1943 and the D-day landings in June 1944. At least 10 were shipped to the Soviet Union.

Great Britain produced two primary transport gliders during the war: the Airspeed Horsa and the General Aircraft Hamilcar. The Horsa came in two varieties: the Mk.1, which was configured for carrying up to 25 troops, and the Mk.2, which could carry up to 7,000 pounds of freight and featured a hinged nose section for easier loading and unloading. Approximately 3,800 of the Horsa gliders were constructed.

The Hamilcar was the largest Allied glider of the war, capable of carrying a payload of 17,500 pounds. It first saw action in the D-day landings (June 6, 1944) and proved immensely significant because it could provide heavy

equipment, such as the British Tetrarch Mk.IV tank, to airborne troops operating behind enemy lines.

Other British aircraft employed in a transport role included those that also served as bombers or reconnaissance aircraft, such as the Handley Page Halifax, the Short Stirling, and the Vickers Warwick.

Italy

Although Italy relied on several aircraft for transport duties, such as the Caproni CA 309–316, the Piaggio P.108, and the Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 Pipistrello, their primary role was as bombers or reconnaissance aircraft. The Savoia-Marchetti SM.75 and the Savoia-Marchetti SM.82 Canguru were exceptions. The SM.75 had originally been designed for passenger service for Ala Littoria in 1937. Requisitioned for military service when Italy entered the war in June 1940, the SM.75 could carry up to 30 troops. It saw action throughout the Mediterranean until the end of the war. A total of 98 were constructed.

The three-engine SM.82 proved to be one of the best heavy transports available to the Axis powers. It was capable of carrying up to 40 fully equipped troops or almost 9,000 pounds of freight. Of approximately 400 SM.82s constructed between 1941 and 1943, at least 50 entered service with the Luftwaffe in the Baltic area of the Eastern Front. Those that survived the war continued in service with the Italian Air Force into the 1950s.

Japan

Although Japan employed a variety of multipurpose aircraft, such as the Nakajima G5N Shinzan and the Tachikawa Ki-54, for transporting troops and supplies, it relied primarily on four main transport aircraft during World War II: the Kawanishi H6K and Kawanishi H8K flying boats, the Kawasaki Ki-56, and the Mitsubishi Ki-57.

When Japan entered the war, the four-engine Kawanishi H6K served as the navy’s primary long-range flying boat. Although used at first primarily for long-range reconnaissance, it was soon relegated to transport duty because of its vulnerability to Allied fighters. Capable of carrying up to 18

troops in addition to its crew, the H6K remained in production until 1943. Of the 217 constructed, 139 were designed exclusively for transport.

The four-engine Kawanishi H8K entered service in early 1942 and gradually replaced the Kawanishi H6K. While it also served in a variety of roles, its transport version, the H8K2-L, of which 36 were built, could carry up to 64 passengers. With a cruising speed of 185 mph and a range of up to 4,460 miles, it was well suited for the Pacific theater, and its heavy armament afforded better protection than the H6K.

Ironically, Japan's primary light transport aircraft, the twin-engine Kawasaki Ki-56, was a military version of a license-built American plane, the Lockheed 14 Electra. It was capable of carrying a payload of up to 5,290 pounds or 14 passengers and had a range of approximately 3,300 miles. A total of 121 were constructed between 1941 and 1943.

Originally intended for passenger service with Nippon Koku KK, the twin-engine Mitsubishi Ki-57 was quickly adapted for service with both the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy beginning in 1940. After Japan entered the war, the original production series, of which 101 were built, was modified by adding more powerful engines. Between 1942 and early 1945, 406 of the new version (Ki-57-II) were constructed. These were capable of carrying a crew of 4 and up to 11 passengers or a cargo of approximately 7,000 pounds to a range of up to 1,835 miles.

Soviet Union

While the Soviet Union relied heavily on American aircraft, such as license-built Douglas C-47 Skytrains, for transport purposes, the four-engine Tupolev TB-3 (ANT-6), originally designed in the early 1930s as a heavy bomber, had been converted primarily for troop and freight transport by 1941. Later versions fitted with four 1,200-horsepower engines were capable of carrying more than 12,000 pounds of cargo. In addition to carrying airborne troops and supplies, it also served as a glider tug. Some were even modified to carry a tank or truck between their undercarriage legs.

United States

Of all the powers in World War II, the United States had by far the largest number and variety of transport aircraft, in part because it was conducting simultaneous campaigns in the European and Pacific theaters.

Without question, the twin-engine Douglas C-47 Skytrain was the most famous transport aircraft of World War II. Along with the DC-3, it had revolutionized civil air travel before the war. Once the United States entered the war, the Skytrain went into full-scale military production; 10,665 were produced by war's end, including 4,878 in 1944 alone. Of its variants, the C-47 Skytrain (known as the Dakota in British service), accounted for more than 9,000 of the total produced, approximately 1,800 of which went to Great Britain through Lend-Lease. An additional 2,500 were constructed on license by the Soviet Union as the Lisunov Li-2. Even the Japanese built 485 as the Nakajima L2D through a 1938 license. With a range of 1,500 miles and capable of carrying 28 troops or a cargo of 10,000 pounds, it saw service in every theater of the war.

The four-engine Consolidated Liberator Transport C-87 was a transport version of the Consolidated B-24 Liberator bomber. A total of 287 C-87s were produced and served with the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) and the RAF as a transport and a tanker. As a transport, it was capable of carrying up to 25 passengers and up to 10,000 pounds of freight. As a tanker, it could carry up to 2,400 gallons of fuel, which proved useful in a variety of theaters but especially in support of Boeing B-29 Superfortresses operating in China.

Originally designed in 1936 as the CW-20 (a 36-passenger pressured airliner), the twin-engine Curtiss C-46 Commando entered service in 1942 after undergoing extensive modifications for military service. These included the installation of a large cargo door, a strengthened floor, and folding troop seats. It was capable of carrying up to 50 troops, 33 wounded soldiers, or 10,000 pounds of cargo. These characteristics, combined with its excellent climbing ability, made it ideally suited for flying over the Himalayas ("the Hump") from India to China. A total of 3,341 were produced.

As with the Douglas C-47 Skytrain, the Douglas C-54 Skymaster was originally designed for passenger airliner service as the DC-4. After Pearl Harbor the U.S. military quickly adopted it, with the first C-54 Skymaster entering service in February 1942. With a maximum range of 3,900 miles, Skymasters flew almost 80,000 transatlantic flights during the course of the war with a loss of just three aircraft. It was capable of carrying 50 troops or

28,000 pounds of cargo. It would remain in service until 1974 and is famous for its role in the Berlin Airlift of 1948–1949.

The Waco CG-4A Hadrian was one of the most effective transport gliders produced in the war. Designed for mass production, the Hadrian featured fabric-covered wooden wings and a steel tube fuselage, which was easily replicated by the 15 firms involved in constructing the 13,910 Hadrians produced during the war. Its most notable feature was a hinged nose section that raised and allowed cargo to be loaded directly into the cabin. It was capable of carrying 15 troops or 3,800 pounds of cargo, which could include a jeep or a 75mm howitzer and its crew. It proved effective in landings in Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943), the D-day invasion, and the Rhine crossings (March 7–24, 1945), and it would have been an integral part of an Allied invasion of the Japanese mainland had the atomic bombings not ended the war.

U.S. Army paratroopers preparing to board their Douglas C-47 Skytrain aircraft during the Allied invasion of Sicily, July 10, 1943. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Other successful U.S. transport aircraft of the war included the twin-engine Lockheed Lodestar, of which 625 were produced, a military version of the civil Lockheed Model 14 Super Electra; the twin-engine Beechcraft C-45

Expeditor, of which 1,391 were built, a military version of the civil Beechcraft Model 18 light transport; and the Martin PBM Mariner Flying Boat, of which 1,405 were produced, that served in a variety of roles besides transport, including antisubmarine warfare, air-sea rescue, and maritime patrol.

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See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Airborne Forces, Axis; Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Gliders; Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft, Production of; Aircraft, Reconnaissance and Auxiliary; Airlift; Crete, Battle of; DRAGOON, Operation; Germany, Air Force; Great Britain, Air Force; Hump, The; Italy, Air Force; Japan, Air Forces; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Parachute Infantry; Rhine Crossings; Sicily, Invasion of; Soviet Union, Air Force; Spanish Civil War; United States Army Air Forces

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Aircraft Carriers

Ships capable of launching and recovering fixed-wing aircraft. Almost without exception, the aircraft carriers commissioned by combatant navies during World War II owed their origins to designs developed between the two world wars. Furthermore, because this warship type was so new, most of the first generation of semiexperimental vessels remained in frontline service at the outbreak of hostilities. These included the British carriers *Eagle* (converted from an incomplete ex-Chilean battleship into a flush-deck carrier

with an offset island), *Furious* (a World War I battle cruiser converted into a carrier during the course of that conflict), and *Hermes* (the first vessel constructed as a carrier from the keel up, also flush-decked with an island) and the similar Japanese carrier *Hosho.*

Provisions of the 1922 Washington Treaty had freed large U.S., British, French, and Japanese hulls for conversion into carriers. The United States and France converted two battle cruisers and a battleship, respectively, into the flush-deck carriers *Lexington, Saratoga*, and *Béarn.* British and Japanese concepts emphasizing rapid aircraft launching led both navies to develop designs incorporating multiple flight deck levels to permit several aircraft to fly off simultaneously. Britain rebuilt the *Furious* with a three-quarter-length flush deck and a forward flying-off deck at a lower level, and it similarly converted two near-sister ships, the *Courageous* and *Glorious.* Japan took this idea still further and configured a battleship and a battle cruiser, the *Kaga* and the *Akagi*, as carriers with two forward flying-off decks beneath the main deck. Both navies learned through experience that efficient deck-handling procedures were more effective in increasing launch rates. Japan subsequently rebuilt its two carriers with conventional flush decks and greatly enlarged air groups, but the British ships still served unaltered in the front line at the outbreak of war.

Operational experience with these large converted carriers had a profound influence on subsequent carrier doctrine and designs. Their speed allowed them to operate with the battle fleet, and their size and aircraft capacity gave commanders invaluable opportunities to appreciate the importance of efficient deck-handling procedures, rapid launch and recovery, and concentrated mass attacks. They also served as development platforms for crucial operational equipment, including effective arresting gear using transverse wires, safety crash barriers, hydraulic catapults, and fast elevators to move aircraft between the hangar and the flight deck.

During the 1930s, Japan and the United States added new carriers to their fleets. Although constrained by provisions of the 1922 Washington Treaty, both navies produced effective designs that became the basis for later construction. Their first treaty vessels, the Japanese *Ryujo* and the U.S. Navy's *Ranger*, were not entirely satisfactory but formed the basis for the two ships of the Sōryū class and the three-vessel Yorktown class, respectively. They were ships that combined large flight decks, substantial air

groups of 60 to 80 aircraft, strong defensive armament (for the period), high speed, and long range in vessels suitable for extended oceanic operations. Britain was a latecomer to new carrier construction in the 1930s. The *Ark Royal*, commissioned in 1939, incorporated internal hangars, an enclosed bow, and a flight deck that was also the vessel's principal strength deck—all features that characterized subsequent British carrier designs—and embarked a similar-size air group to those of its U.S. and Japanese contemporaries.

The large fleet carriers commissioned by Britain, Japan, and the United States during World War II derived from their earlier 1930s designs. Japan commissioned two ships of the enlarged Shōkaku class in 1941 with greater offensive and defensive capabilities, followed by the *Taiho*, a variant incorporating an armored flight deck (although at the cost of a reduced air group). During 1942–1943, Japan laid down the six-ship Unryu class, which was derived directly from the Sōryū class, although only two of these vessels entered service. The United States standardized on the Essex class, an expansion of the Yorktown class. No fewer than 32 units were ordered, of which 24 were completed to serve as the backbone of U.S. carrier forces from 1943. They combined a powerful offensive air group of as many as 100 aircraft, substantially augmented defensive armament, long range, and high speed in hulls the size of which conferred great adaptability to changing operational requirements.

The six British wartime carriers of the Illustrious type introduced armor protection for both flight decks and hangar sides. Incorporating this feature into the basic Ark Royal–class design produced vessels that proved effective in the confined waters of the Mediterranean and in the face of kamikaze attacks, but it also incurred severe penalties. Air group capacity was slashed substantially (the original design accommodated only 36 aircraft; modified to carry 54, it still fell short of the *Ark Royal*'s embarked 72 machines), hangars were cramped, and it proved difficult and expensive to upgrade these ships postwar.

Both the U.S. Navy and the British Royal Navy developed a third generation of carrier designs from their wartime experience. These emphasized the importance of large air groups, efficient layout for fast aircraft operation, and strong defensive features—both passive in the form of armor at hangar and flight-deck level and active by means of large batteries of antiaircraft guns. None of these carriers served during World War II. The

U.S. Navy commissioned the three ships of the Midway class just after the war, but the Royal Navy's Malta class was canceled, although two vessels of the intermediate Audacious class entered service postwar as the *Ark Royal* and the *Eagle.*

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier *Lexington* (CV-2). Commissioned in 1927, "Lady Lex" was lost in the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea. (The Mariners' Museum/Corbis)

Both Britain and the United States studied small, austere carrier designs before World War II, but only the Royal Navy seriously considered vessels for trade protection (the U.S. Navy's XCV projects envisaged second-line fleet duties). In 1935–1936, the British Naval Staff agreed on sufficiently firm requirements to earmark five specific merchant vessels for conversion should war break out. No action was taken until December 1940, when work began to create Britain's first escort carrier, the *Audacity*, commissioned in June 1941.

U.S. Navy planning for austere mercantile conversions began in October 1940, resulting in the completion of the *Long Island*, its first escort carrier, also in June 1941. The *Long Island* was converted from a completed diesel C-3 cargo ship, the *Mormacmail*, but 45 subsequent conversions used

partially completed hulls and steam turbines rather than the mechanically unreliable diesel plants featured in the first five U.S.-built escort carriers. More than half of these vessels went to Britain under the Lend-Lease Act, and all 50 were in service before the end of 1943.

The United States also converted 4 fleet tankers into escort carriers. These larger twin-shaft turbine vessels were successful, but a general shortage of tanker hulls prevented further conversions. Nevertheless, they formed the basis for the U.S. Navy's first purpose-designed escort carriers, the 19 Commencement Bay–class ships. These were the only escort carriers to continue to operate postwar, because their size and speed suited them for the larger antisubmarine warfare aircraft then entering service.

The 50 Casablanca-class ships, however, formed the bulk of the U.S. Navy escort carrier force, even though they were outside the mainstream of U.S. Navy design. All came from the Kaiser Vancouver yard and were commissioned within one year starting in July 1943. Their design was by Gibbs and Cox, and their construction was under the auspices of the Maritime Commission. Shortages of both turbines and diesels forced the use of reciprocating machinery, but the ships were faster and more maneuverable than the original C-3 conversions, had longer flight decks, and had larger hangars than even the Sangamon-class converted tankers.

Other than the *Audacity*, Britain completed only five escort carriers of its own, all conversions from mercantile hulls. They were similar to contemporary U.S. C-3 conversions although generally somewhat larger. Thirty-eight of these, transferred under the Lend-Lease Act, formed the core of the Royal Navy's escort carrier force throughout the war.

Escort carriers, initially conceived as platforms providing air cover for convoys, soon expanded their activities into a wide variety of tasks. In the U.S. Navy, escort carriers formed the core of specialized antisubmarine hunter-killer groups, provided close air support for landings, served as replenishment carriers and aircraft transports, and operated as training flight decks. In addition, during 1942 the *Sangamon* took on fleet carrier assignments to compensate for shortages of first-line ships.

The Royal Navy employed its escort carriers in much the same way. Its own shortage of large carriers, however, and its operational responsibilities within more confined waters led it to assign escort carriers additional frontline duties. The small carriers operated in strike roles either within a

larger force or as autonomous units in the East Indies, in the Aegean, and off the Norwegian coast, including attacks on the German battleship *Tirpitz.* Escort carriers also provided night-fighter coverage for the British Pacific Fleet.

To circumvent 1922 Washington Treaty quantitative limitations, Japan designed several fast naval auxiliaries and passenger liners for quick conversion into carriers. Beginning in 1940, conversions from five auxiliaries and three liners joined the Combined Fleet as frontline light fleet carriers. Japan also completed several mercantile conversions similar in capability to the British and U.S. escort carriers. Unlike the Allied ships, however, these were designed and usually deployed as integral components of Japan's main carrier force. In addition, Japan converted one Yamato-class battleship hull, the *Shinano*, into a huge carrier that never entered operational service and commenced conversion of an incomplete cruiser as a light fleet carrier.

The United States also deployed converted warships—the nine Independence-class light fleet carriers based on Cleveland-class cruiser hulls formed an integral part of the fast carrier force from early 1943. Although conceived as first-line units, their design owed much to plans for the escort carriers, and their operational limitations made them suitable only for emergency service.

Britain also appreciated the need for smaller, less sophisticated carriers that could enter service more quickly, but it chose to construct new vessels rather than convert existing hulls. The design was similar to that of the larger fleet carriers, but the carrier was unarmored. Britain also deliberately conformed to mercantile rather than naval standards, because the Admiralty contemplated selling these ships for conversion into passenger liners or fast cargo ships after the war—an interesting reversal of procedures. Four of this Colossus class of light fleet carriers served with the British Pacific Fleet late in 1945, and they joined six sister ships to form the core of British carrier power into the later 1950s, as they proved economical to operate.

France's converted carrier *Béarn* remained its only example throughout the war, serving mainly as an aircraft transport because of its low speed. France began building a pair of new carriers, the *Joffre* and the *Painlevé*, just before war began, but the fall of France in 1940 terminated construction. The final design incorporated a flight deck offset to port to minimize

superstructure intrusion, a feature that has reappeared in several designs in recent years.

Before and during the war, Germany undertook some carrier construction. Its prewar design, the *Graf Zeppelin*, reached an advanced stage of construction by 1940, but subsequent reductions in priority, design changes, and disputes among the Kriegsmarine, the Luftwaffe, and the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (Reich Air Ministry, RLM) over provision of aircraft and aircrew combined to prevent carrier completion before the war's end. A similar fate befell several conversion projects from merchant vessels and warships.

Italy's government and air force, subscribing to the position that geography would permit shore-based aircraft to provide entirely sufficient air cover and offensive strike potential for its fleet, opposed funding of any of the carrier designs that the navy proposed in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Wartime experience led to a change in this view, and the Italian Navy began two conversions from mercantile hulls to create the fleet's first carriers.

The *Aquila* was a sophisticated, nearly total reconstruction of the liner *Roma* that was virtually complete when Italy surrendered in 1943. The Italians sabotaged the *Aquila* to prevent its use by Germany, and the ship subsequently was seriously damaged at Genoa by Allied bombing and an attack using manned torpedoes. The hulk was scrapped after the war. Conversion of the liner *Augustus* into the *Sparviero*, a more austere vessel similar to Allied escort carriers, began in 1941, but it too was never completed.

Airpower at sea came of age during World War II. The combination of unprecedented striking power (both in volume of ordnance and range of delivery), mobility, and flexibility of use transformed the aircraft carrier into the world's major fleets' new capital ship, a position it retains today.

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See also

Air Warfare, Naval; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Human Torpedoes; Hunter-Killer Groups; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Lend-Lease; United States Navy

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Airlift

Use of aircraft to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies. Airlift provided the capability to move critical resources rapidly and over great distances, providing important support to combat forces in all theaters of operation during the war. Airlift operations were restricted by practical realities, however, including the need for airfields and maintenance facilities, restricted capabilities in bad weather, and vulnerability to enemy air defenses. Additionally, the limited payload of aircraft restricted the role of airlift; surface transportation was essential to move and sustain large combat forces. Beyond the limitations, however, the speed and range of transport aircraft made airlift a critical component of military operations. Basic airlift concepts and capabilities existed before World War II, and wartime demands stimulated the rapid growth of airlift forces and the refinement of operational missions.

The first airlifts were primarily for liaison purposes, moving key personnel about. As aircraft capabilities grew, air transportation came to include the rapid delivery of logistical support for air and surface forces. Additionally, during World War I, supplies were dropped to ground forces, and agents were inserted by parachute behind enemy lines. Airlift potential grew as aircraft capabilities for payload and range increased during the interwar years because of the development of enhanced bomber designs and improved aircraft produced for the rapidly growing commercial air transportation industry.

Several military experiences illustrated the expanding potential of airlift, including the movement of ground units from North Africa to Spain during

the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, which was critical for the Nationalist side at the beginning of the war. Additionally, both Germany and the Soviet Union experimented with the use of parachute forces and gliders in airborne assaults and with the air-landing of combat forces and supplies to support rapid-offensive ground operations.

From the early phases of World War II, airlift played an important role—in a mission commonly referred to as tactical airlift—by providing routine and emergency logistical support for combat forces in all major theaters of operation. The importance of aerial logistical support for ground forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces in all theaters grew significantly during World War II. This support included the rapid movement of key personnel, delivery of critical equipment and supplies, movement of mail, and evacuation of wounded or ill personnel. The German military demonstrated the exceptional value of airlift during its rapid ground operations, especially in the Eastern theater in the vast expanses of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also used airlift to support its widely dispersed and often isolated and cut-off forces.

U.S. and British forces also relied heavily on airlift support, both in geographically remote locations—such as the China-Burma-India theater and the Southwest Pacific islands—and in support of mobile combat operations. The aerial resupply of China by flying over the Himalayas—"the Hump"—was a high point in large-scale airlift support operations during the war. U.S. and British airlift was also important in mobile operations in North Africa and Western Europe. In the drive across France, supplies delivered by British and American transports and bombers were especially important in helping ground forces and tactical air units continue offensive operations under the logistical constraints imposed by limited port facilities.

Aircraft also provided for the rapid movement and air landing of small units, delivery of airborne assault forces, and the rapid reinforcement or resupply of units in isolated locations or in dangerous combat situations.

The Germans had a well-developed operational concept at the start of the war, demonstrating remarkable effectiveness in the early seizure from the air of key facilities during the 1940 Norwegian Campaign and in securing the fortress of Eben Emael (May 10, 1940) in Belgium during the invasion of France and the Low Countries. German landings in Crete during May 1941 also demonstrated the value of aerial envelopment as well as the inherent

dangers and risks of such activities. Later, the Germans employed aerial logistical support to supply their forces trapped in Stalingrad and under pressure in North Africa. These efforts had limited effect; however, the Germans' airlift capability was restricted and aircraft losses were high in these missions compared with the needs of the forces being supplied.

Soviet doctrinal concepts for airborne and air-landing support of offensive operations were well developed and openly demonstrated in exercises during the 1930s. The impact of early losses, however, and German control of the air limited Soviet assault operations. Nonetheless, in the final campaign of the war, the Soviets conducted extensive air assault operations against Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea, often seizing airfields and key facilities.

In the Pacific theater, the Japanese employed airborne forces early in the war. U.S. and British forces effectively used airborne landings in Burma and often supplied ground forces that were operating away from fixed supply lines. In the Southwest Pacific, airborne assaults and aerial resupply efforts were important for American operations in the widely dispersed islands of that theater. American and British forces conducted a series of increasingly sophisticated large airborne operations in North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, southern France, Operation MARKET-GARDEN (the September 17–26, 1944, attempt to cross the Rhine at Arnhem), and Operation VARSITY (March 24, 1945, the final Rhine crossing). Some Allied bombers were also used during September 1944 in an attempt to supply the Polish Home Army in its uprising in Warsaw.

For special missions that supported covert and guerrilla operations, airlift resources were used to insert personnel, deliver supplies, and extract personnel from enemy-occupied territory. The Soviets conducted extensive operations in support of partisan activities in German-held territories. British and U.S. aircraft regularly worked with Allied agents and local resistance organizations in occupied Europe, especially in France and the Balkans. Similar activities were conducted to support local guerrilla bands in the China-Burma-India theater and observer operations in the Pacific islands. An additional innovative development was the use of helicopters for the first time in rescue roles.

The significant development of tactical airlift during the war was matched by the equally impressive growth of the use of long-distance aerial routes

between theaters in a mission that has become known as intertheater airlift or strategic airlift. The long-distance airlift grew from the prewar commercial transportation systems, including the flying boat services in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Airlift allowed key personnel and critical supplies to be delivered in a timely fashion, especially compared with the time needed for surface travel on a global scale.

The most extensive system was the U.S. airlift network that stretched from the continental United States to every theater of operations, covering all continents except Antarctica. During the early period of the war, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), in addition to absorbing airline operations under contract, developed its long-range delivery capability in the Ferrying Command. This organization delivered aircraft under the Lend-Lease program and developed operations for passengers and high-value freight.

In June 1942, the USAAF established the Air Transport Command, which had responsibility for all ferrying and air transportation activities to the combat theaters. The American air routes grew into a global web: routes included from the northeast United States to Canada and across the North Atlantic to England and Europe (paralleled by British routes); to Canada and Alaska and on to the Aleutian Islands and to Soviet Siberia; from southeast U.S. bases to Brazil and on to Africa and the Middle East, continuing on to the Soviet Union or India and China (the longest leg of the network); and from West Coast bases to Hawaii and on to the Pacific islands and Australia.

These flights moved matériel and key personnel to all theaters and allowed the rapid return of wounded personnel and returning combat-experienced aircrew members, who became trainers for new flying personnel. Additionally, senior commanders and staff members were able to quickly visit theaters for on-the-scene assessments and conferences with the theater commanders and staffs. By the end of the war, the Air Transportation Command included approximately 210,000 military and 105,000 civilian personnel. The extensive global coverage provided routine and regular flights as well as responsive emergency missions over the entire system.

The Air Transportation Command provided the foundation for the Military Air Transport Service, the long-range transport capability of the U.S. Air Force after the war. The evolution of airlift missions during World War II established the patterns of airlift for all major military forces in the postwar period.

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See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Airborne Forces, Axis; Aircraft, Gliders; Aircraft, Transport; Eben Emael, German Capture of; Hump, The; Lend-Lease; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Parachute Infantry; Parachutes; Rhine Crossings; Sicily, Invasion of; Spanish Civil War; Stalingrad, Battle of; Warsaw Rising

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Air-Sea Rescue

The rescue of aircrews forced to bail out or ditch their aircraft at sea as well as shipwrecked mariners. With the advent of long-range aircraft, it became apparent that some system was necessary to increase the chances of survival for pilots whose aircraft went down during long-distance flights over water. The development of air-sea rescue (ASR) programs was hampered by technological limitations and interservice rivalries, but the rewards of such a program were apparent, especially with mounting casualties of the air war and a shortage of aircrews. Aside from simple lifesaving, rescue meant that personnel could return to the flight line, saving the cost and time of training replacements. Such programs also improved the morale of flight crews.

Sometimes a downed crew would send out a Mayday (from the French *m'aidez*, or "help me") radio signal with a location. The crew would either

bail out of their aircraft with parachutes, or the plane would be ditched—meaning that it would crash-land on the water and the crew would endeavor to get out before it sank. Fighters such as a P-51 Mustang sank almost immediately, but large bombers such as the Boeing B-17 could often remain on the surface for 30 minutes.

After leaving their aircraft, aircrew would endeavor to stay afloat in the water using a life preserver or a rubber raft until an airplane or boat could locate them by following a radio signal, seeing a large puddle of dye in the ocean, or spotting the men in the water. Crews needed to be prepared for long waits; especially in the Pacific theater, it could take a week or more for a downed crew to be rescued.

Germany was the first country to develop an ASR program. In 1936, Seenotdienst (air-sea rescue service) units were organized as part of the Luftwaffe and employed floatplanes and flying boats for rescues in the North Sea. German aircraft on overwater missions were equipped with collapsible rubber dinghies with radio transmitters. During the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, Seenotdienst units operated in the English Channel.

The Allies were slower to develop ASR operations. During the Battle of Britain, downed pilots had only life preservers until they were rescued. Eventually, they were provided with dinghies and dye markers. In 1942, the British introduced a lightweight radio transmitter for downed crewmen, nicknamed the “Gibson Girl” and based on a captured German model. In addition to aircraft operated by Fighter Command, rescue motor launches (RMLs) operated near the coast.

German and British rescue aircraft were painted white and marked with the large red cross of the International Red Cross. The decks of the RMLs were painted yellow, another sign of neutral craft. Both sides considered their ASR vehicles immune from enemy attack and rescued all downed pilots, regardless of their side in the conflict. Because a rescued pilot would return to duty, though, both sides frequently shot down ASR aircraft, leading to protests from each side in turn.

In January 1941, the British Air Ministry created the Directorate of Air-Sea Rescue to coordinate operations among the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy, and Coastal Command. In the first six months of 1941, of 1,200 pilots who ditched 444 were rescued. The British also assumed primary

responsibility for all rescue operations in the European and Mediterranean theaters, relieving their allies from developing their own programs.

The United States organized ASR operations based on the British system, even using British officers in training. Because the British had taken primary responsibilities for rescue operations in the European and Mediterranean theaters as well as for all planes departing India, the Americans were able to concentrate on the Pacific theater. Such efforts were hampered by interservice rivalries, however. Each U.S. service went its own way, conducting its own operations and duplicating labor and equipment.

This cumbersome arrangement was finally resolved with the establishment early in 1944 of the Air-Sea Rescue Agency, which was charged with overseeing all such operations. A school for training crews was established in Gulfport, Mississippi, but by the time trained crews began to graduate, the need for them was almost over. The U.S. Navy also played an important role in the rescue of B-29 crews flying from the Mariana Islands late in the war. The navy set up submarines stationed at intervals between the Marianas and Japan that acted as lifeguards for downed crewmen.

Although air-sea rescue saved many lives during World War II, its practices, operations, and equipment were constantly improvised and sometimes inefficient. Lessons learned during the war, however, led to improved ASR techniques thereafter.

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See also

Aircraft, Reconnaissance and Auxiliary; Britain, Battle of

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Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics

Methods and procedures for employing fighter aircraft against enemy aircraft.

The sky offers extremes of visibility and no natural cover except clouds. The victor in any fight is usually the one who sees his opponent first. Spotting enemy aircraft was generally difficult; visibility from the cockpit of a typical World War II fighter varied from very bad to good, and there were always blind areas to the rear and below. Early fighter aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf-109E had particularly poor cockpit visibility; later aircraft such as the Typhoon and the P-51D had bubble canopies that afforded better visibility, but their pilots could still be surprised from behind and below.

Assuming that the cockpit framing and bulletproof windscreen did not get in the way, individual fighter-sized aircraft could usually be seen perhaps two miles away, four-engine bombers at three or four miles away. A formation or group of aircraft sometimes could be seen six or seven miles away. Visual detection range could be doubled if enemy aircraft were maneuvering. Aircraft could not be seen by anyone looking directly at or close to the sun, however, and clouds could provide concealment.

To mount a coordinated attack on a target, it was necessary for a group of fighters to fly in formation. The number of aircraft in the formation and their positions had a large influence on effectiveness and survivability.

Before World War II, the basic formation used by many air forces, including the British Royal Air Force (RAF), was a V or "vic" of three aircraft flying about a wingspan apart. A squadron was typically composed of four vics. This was fine for air displays and flying in clouds, but every pilot except the formation leader was concentrating on maintaining formation, leaving little time to look for enemy aircraft. Considering that about 80 percent of all pilots shot down never saw their attackers, the folly of this type of formation can be readily understood. Several instances are recorded of a single enemy plane shooting down two or three aircraft without the rest of the formation noticing anything.

The German Luftwaffe had learned from combat experience in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War; at the urging of Werner Mölders, a leading German fighter pilot in Spain, it adopted a widely spaced *Rotte* (pair) as the basic tactical unit, the two aircraft flying a few hundred yards apart. Each pilot was then free to search for enemy aircraft without worrying about avoiding collision and could easily check the other's blind area, making a surprise attack less likely.

When the formation leader attacked a target, the wingman's duty was to

guard his leader’s tail. The basic unit of maneuver was two pairs arranged side by side like the four fingers of a hand, with the leaders of the pairs at positions two and three. When the RAF and most other air forces eventually adopted this formation during 1941 and 1942, it was usually known as the Finger Four.

The U.S. Navy adopted a variation of this in which the pairs flew farther apart (about one turn radius). When either pair was attacked, the two pairs turned toward each other, providing one with a head-on shot at the attacker. This was known as the Thach Weave after its originator, Lieutenant Commander John S. “Jimmy” Thach. A variant was used by the Soviet Air Force later in the war. The Soviet Air Force also learned lessons from the Spanish Civil War, but many of the officers who might have made a systematic change were victims of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s purges.

The nature of fighter-versus-fighter combat is such that the greatest chance of success is obtained by gaining a positional advantage, making a single unobserved attack, and then breaking off. This was essentially the technique used by German ace Erich Hartmann on the Eastern Front. There are numerous recorded instances of this technique working for a single attacker against a large formation of aircraft. The fact is that a single aircraft is much more difficult to spot than a formation, and a formation is more difficult to control than a single aircraft.

A positional advantage is really any position that allows an aircraft to launch an attack, the precise nature of which will vary depending on the characteristics of the fighter and target aircraft. When attacking single-seaters, this was somewhere in the rear hemisphere of the target, preferably positioned so that the target would have to look into the sun to see the attacker, and usually higher, so that the fighter could dive on the target with a speed advantage.

The fighter would then open fire in the dive or dive below the target and shoot in a shallow climb. This variation was favored by German ace Adolf Galland. Many aces were good shots; some went very close to their targets—within a few yards, in some cases—to be sure of a kill.

The art of air-to-air gunnery is to ensure that the projectiles and target arrive at the same point in space simultaneously. To accomplish this, the pilot must aim some distance in front of the target; this is called the deflection angle. This applies unless the shooter is immediately behind the target or

attacking head-on. Some pilots were able to instinctively apply the correct amount of deflection, but most could not. The British introduced the gyro gun sight in 1944, which dramatically increased the number of hits scored by the average squadron pilot.

Having delivered the attack, the pilot could either break off or convert his speed advantage into an altitude advantage and attack again. This latter tactic could be particularly effective if the fighter had good dive acceleration and zoom-climb capabilities (e.g., Messerschmitt Bf-109, P-51 Mustang).

The usual counter to a fighter attack was a hard (break) turn toward the attacking aircraft to present a difficult firing solution. After the attacker had fired, several possible courses of action were open to the defender—assuming that the attacker had failed to do significant damage on his first pass. If the attacker was forced to overshoot, a roll back toward the attacker could yield a firing solution for the defender, but this would probably be fatal if the attacker had a wingman.

This maneuver could degenerate into what is called a “scissors”; in it, each aircraft repeatedly turns hard toward the other to try to force an overshoot. The advantage would usually be with the aircraft that had the lower wing loading, although pilot skill played a part.

Alternatively, if the attacker continued turning to get a firing solution and was flying a significantly more maneuverable aircraft (e.g., Spitfire IX versus Messerschmitt Bf-109G or Mitsubishi Zero versus Curtiss P-40), the defender’s best option was to break off the engagement. The preferred method varied with the aircraft’s relative capabilities. If the attacker did not have a significant top speed or dive advantage, a favored technique was to half-roll and enter a full-throttle vertical dive (the “split-s” or *Abshwung*). This could lose as much as 10,000 feet in altitude quickly, and if the attacker did not also immediately dive, the defender would get sufficient separation and speed to break off the engagement.

Finally, if the defender had a maneuverability or performance advantage, he could elect to fight it out by turning hard to get onto his opponent’s tail. If his aircraft had a significantly lighter wing loading, three or four circles were usually enough to gain a firing position.

If a formation of disadvantaged aircraft was attacked by enemy aircraft, a viable tactic was to form a defensive circle, or Lufbery, named for a famous American World War I fighter pilot Major Raoul Lufbery. In this tactic, the

defenders flew in a circle so that each aircraft covered the one in front. An attacker would then have to fly through the field of fire of the following aircraft to attack any aircraft in the formation.

The defensive circle could be a double-edged sword, though; during the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, British Spitfires were able to get inside defensive circles of Messerschmitt Bf-110s flying in the opposite direction and engage each aircraft in turn without exposure to significant enemy fire. In June 1942, German ace Hans Joachim Marseille managed to shoot down six South African P-40 Tomahawks over Libya by making repeated dives and zoom-climb passes inside a defensive circle and shooting at high deflection angles.

If the target aircraft had a second crew member, the priority was to approach such that the target was not aware of the presence of the fighter. In the case of a two-seater, this usually meant attacking from below and behind, out of the field of fire of defensive weapons. If an unobserved approach was impossible (e.g., for a well-armed four-engine bomber), the choices came down to approaching either from a direction that had poor defensive coverage (e.g., from the beam if the target only had nose and tail weapons) or in such a way as to present a difficult target for defensive weapons (e.g., with a large speed advantage from the rear quarter).

If the attacking pilots could shoot accurately, however, the frontal attack was a better and possibly safer option. Bombers usually had fewer and less effective weapons firing forward, so the attackers were exposed to defensive fire for a much shorter period of time, and the bomber’s defensive armor was designed to protect from attacks originating from below and behind rather than from the front.

If the target had defensive armament and was flying in formation, the other aircraft in the formation could contribute defensive fire, and attacking became significantly more hazardous. The effect of defensive fire could be reduced by making multiple simultaneous attacks or by selecting a target on the edge of the formation. Some antibomber weapons (e.g., the German Wgr-21 rocket) were designed to break up formations and allow individual targets to be picked off.

Late in the war German jet fighters were used against bombers, and the amount of excess speed generated in a dive made sighting extremely difficult. To cope with this, a roller-coaster–type attack was developed whereby the

attacking jets approached from the rear of the formation, dived through the fighter screen at speed to a position 1,500 feet below and behind the bombers, then pulled up into a steep climb to bleed off most of the excess speed before selecting a target and opening fire.

The tactics employed by radar-guided night fighters were concerned more with accurate interception techniques and visual acquisition before firing than with violent maneuvering, although there were exceptions. The tactics were dominated by the target-acquisition performance of onboard radar; the British AI Mk IV had an effective range of three to four miles at 15,000 feet, degrading to half a mile at 3,000 feet. The minimum usable radar range was usually about 1,000 yards, and the maximum visual acquisition range was usually about 1,400 yards, although this varied depending on moon and cloud conditions.

Most home-defense night fighters relied heavily on ground controllers, although both sides had electronic devices that allowed a fighter to home in on a target from many miles away. The Germans had a Flensburg receiver that homed in on the Monica tail-warning radar and also had Naxos, which detected H2S bombing radar; the British had Serrate, which homed on to German airborne radar transmissions, and Perfectos, which triggered German aircraft IFF (identification, friend or foe) equipment.

Ground control and radar operators usually aimed to approach the target from astern and from slightly below so that the target was silhouetted against the night sky, maximizing the chance of visual acquisition. Low targets, however, usually were approached from above to maximize radar detection range. German night fighters fitted with *Schräge Musik* (upward-firing cannon, literally “shrapnel music”) could attack from almost directly below the target and were effective against RAF bombers until the tactic became known.

ANDY BLACKBURN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Baby Blitz; Britain, Battle of; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Great Purges; Gyro Gun Sight; Hartmann, Erich Alfred; Identification, Friend or Foe; Kondor Legion; Marseille, Hans-Joachim; Mölders, Werner; Radar

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Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation

Ground-attack aviation refers to the dedicated use of combat aircraft to attack ground combat units and their supporting echelons on or near the front lines to support friendly ground forces. By the end of World War I, the practice of supporting infantry ground attack with aircraft was gaining acceptance. Air attacks increasingly were employed both in immediate support of ground operations at the front and upon rear-echelon enemy units.

During the interwar period, military theory and doctrine bifurcated, and two distinct schools of thought developed about the proper use of airpower. One school, following the precepts of Italian theorist Guilio Douhet, advocated concentration on strategic bombing by heavy self-defending "battle planes" on targets far behind the battle lines, with the intent of collapsing an enemy nation's will to continue. Most British and U.S. airpower advocates supported this concept.

The second school of thought, generally adhered to by the Soviet Union, France, and Germany, advocated airpower as direct support for ground operations. In this vision, aircraft primarily attacked targets on the front lines or behind the front, which might extend as much as 150 miles. These theorists saw air forces enabling ground forces to move farther in the attack or to yield less terrain in the defense.

Each school drove aircraft design in particular directions. Thus, the United States and Great Britain came up with four-engine "strategic" bombers such as the American Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress (Douhet's self-defending "battle plane") and the British Avro Lancaster. The Germans, however, concentrated on fast fighters such as the Bf-109 (also known as the Me-109) to secure air superiority over the battlefield for fast, medium-size, dual-engine bombers such as the Heinkel He-111 and the Dornier Do-17.

The Germans, having learned from U.S. Marine Corps operations, also embraced dive-bombing, developing their important single-engine Junkers Ju-87 Stuka, which could deliver its ordnance with great accuracy and proved vital during the war's early campaigns. The Luftwaffe was essentially intended for close air support, geared to ground operations.

The multiple German blitzkriegs against Poland (1939), Norway (1940), and France (1940) demonstrated the great importance of the ground-attack school of thought. Luftwaffe units, working in close coordination with advancing columns of German infantry and armor, were a key element in allowing those columns to cut through opposing forces with seeming ease. We now know that German air-to-ground coordination was far from perfect and that German soldiers became casualties of friendly fire.

First with the British in fighting in eastern North Africa and then with the Americans in French North Africa, the Western Allies developed their own system of close air support. Almost immediately, the Americans discovered that their own system of command and control for ground-attack operations, developed before the war, was inefficient and could not keep pace with rapidly shifting operations on the ground.

Capitalizing on their great strength of adapting to circumstance, the Americans jettisoned their own doctrine nearly wholesale and adopted a modified version of the British system. Thereafter their efficiency in ground-attack operations increased markedly.

At the same time, the Soviet Air Force, which had suffered heavily in the German invasion during June 1941, perfected its own system of ground support aviation. The Soviet Union developed some highly successful ground-attack fighters and fighter-bombers in the Yakovlev Yak-4 and especially the Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik. Flying low and employing rockets, Sturmoviks were efficient tank killers. Sturmoviks, purpose-built for the ground-attack role, were heavily armored at crucial points to protect against German antiaircraft fire. The Il-2 was perhaps the best ground-attack aircraft of the war. In testimony to its success, the Sturmovik remained in production until 1955; the Soviets produced some 36,000 of them.

Simultaneously, the Western Allies began to specialize—in use if not in design—their own aircraft. Both Great Britain and the United States entered the war with credible, if not outstanding, medium bombers such as the North American B-25 Mitchell and the British Bristol Blenheim. The British added

other aircraft, including the versatile De Havilland Mosquito, while the Americans produced excellent fighters in the ground-attack role, such as the Vought F4U Corsair, the twin-engine Lockheed P-38 Lightning, the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, and the North American P-51 Mustang.

The P-38, P-47, and P-51 were originally designed as bomber escorts or classic conventional pursuit planes (hence the “P” in the nomenclature). The P-51 Mustang, a superb aircraft, may have been the best all-around fighter of the war, but the P-38 and P-47 each had characteristics that made them more suited to lower-level work and the rigors of close air support.

For the Thunderbolt, it was the fact that the aircraft could absorb significant damage and continue flying. Its air-cooled engine was less susceptible to failure from damage than the Mustang engine, and ground-attack work generally meant taking ground fire while flying at low altitude. The Lightning had twin engines on twin booms with a pod for the pilot slung between them, and it combined decent range with the heavy punch of five .50-caliber machine guns that fired straight ahead from the central pod. (The guns of most conventional aircraft were aimed inward to a single point.) This gave it lethal accuracy; the dual air-cooled engines gave the pilot a decent chance to make it home even if one engine shut down. On the British side was the Hawker Typhoon, an underappreciated contender for the title of best ground-attack aircraft of the war.

The air-ground team for the Western Allies in the European theater of operations truly came into its own in the summer of 1944 during the Allied push across France. The penultimate display of this was the complete linkage between Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s Third Army, the widest-ranging and fastest-moving element of the Allied sweep across France, and Major General Elwood “Pete” Queseda’s IX Tactical Fighter Command. Patton, with no spare forces to cover his right flank, committed the security of that increasingly vulnerable edge to the air units under Queseda’s command.

Ground-attack aviation was also important in the Pacific theater, although it was marginally less effective in jungle terrain. U.S. airpower proved vital in the struggle for Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943), for example; both the Japanese and the Americans saw control of Henderson Field as the key to the campaign. Overwhelming air support proved immensely important to Allied forces in the subsequent island-hopping campaigns in the Southwest

Pacific along the New Guinea coast (March 8, 1942–September 3, 1945) and at Bougainville (November 1, 1943–August 15, 1945). The introduction of napalm in 1944 gave another potent weapon to close air support fighters such as the F4U Corsair—the combination was used to great effect in the Marianas (June–August 1944) and the Philippines (October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945) and on Okinawa (March–June 1945). Ground-attack aviation, which began in World War I, came into its own in World War II.

ROBERT BATEMAN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Blitzkrieg; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Quesada, Elwood Richard "Pete"

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Air Warfare, Naval

On November 14, 1910, flying a Curtiss pusher aircraft, American Eugene B. Ely made the first flight from a ship, the light cruiser *Birmingham*, at Hampton Roads, Virginia. On January 18, 1911, Ely landed the same Curtiss pusher on the armored cruiser *Pennsylvania* in San Francisco Bay for the first landing of a plane on a ship. Britain's Royal Navy later conducted similar tests.

The world's major navies developed four major roles for naval aircraft: reconnaissance, spotting for naval gunnery, attacking enemy fleet and shore installations, and defending the fleet from enemy aircraft. Navies first relied on seaplanes and land-based aircraft, but during World War I, Britain began the conversion of several ships into aircraft carriers. This undertaking came to include the battle cruisers *Furious*, *Courageous*, and *Glorious*, all of which

served in World War II. The U.S. Navy commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the *Langley*, in 1922, the same year Japan commissioned its first carrier, the *Hosho.*

Following World War I, the world's navies deployed catapult-launched seaplanes on their battleships and cruisers for reconnaissance and spotting. Many navies considered building aircraft carriers, but only Great Britain, Japan, and the United States built them in significant numbers. During the 1920s and 1930s, aviators in all three of these navies solved the many technical problems of carrier operations despite low budgets, some opposition, and the Washington and London treaties limiting the size, number, and armament of the carriers. Large new aircraft carriers joined the three navies' fleets in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

Each nation developed a force suited to its particular needs. The United States and Japan planned for operations across the vast and relatively empty stretches of the Pacific Ocean, where land air bases would be few. Both nations developed long-range seaplanes, such as the U.S. Consolidated PBY Catalina, to extend their search range, although only the Japanese Navy developed land-based bombers to support its carrier aircraft. Japan also sought to maximize the number of planes on its aircraft carriers. Limited by the size of their internal hangars, Japan's larger carriers generally carried between 70 and 80 planes. On U.S. carriers, planes were parked on the decks, and hangars were used only for repair and maintenance. This enabled the United States to bring as many as 100 planes into battle. The U.S. Navy also took better advantage of folded-wing airplanes to fit large complements on its carriers. Keeping planes on deck also substantially increased the pace of operations on the U.S. carriers, allowing planes to be launched at a much higher rate than from their Japanese and British counterparts.

Britain planned for war in Europe, where its fleet was likely to confront land-based airpower. The British therefore favored heavily protected aircraft carriers with armored flight decks capable of withstanding 500-pound bombs. Although this scale of protection reduced the British aircraft complement to half that of comparably sized U.S. aircraft carriers, it paid off repeatedly when British aircraft carriers survived damage that likely would have sunk a U.S. or Japanese carrier. On January 10, 1941, while protecting a convoy bound from Alexandria to Malta, the carrier *Illustrious* survived hits by 500-pound and 1,000-pound bombs as well as further damage inflicted while

under repair at Malta. Later in the war, several British carriers withstood hits from Japanese kamikaze aircraft with minimal damage.

Unlike the case in Japan or the United States, the Royal Air Force, rather than the navy, had authority over naval aviation until 1937. This divided leadership slowed innovation, and the Royal Navy entered the war with obsolete aircraft such as its Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bomber.

Japan developed its aviators into an elite strike force, selecting only 100 new aviators each year from its rigorous training program. In 1941, they flew the best naval aircraft in the world: the Mitsubishi A6M2 Reisen ("Zero") fighter, so named because it entered service in 1940, the Japanese year 5700, and was henceforth known as the type 0; the Aichi D3A "Val" dive-bomber; and the Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo bomber. These aircraft sacrificed protection for speed and maneuverability, and they considerably outperformed and outranged U.S. naval aircraft. Japanese fleets sent their search planes out to almost 600 miles, compared with 350 miles for the U.S. Navy, and their strike aircraft had a combat radius of 300 miles, compared with 200 miles for most U.S. aircraft.

The Zero established a deadly combat reputation, and Americans flying Grumman F4F Wildcats could only best it with careful tactics and teamwork. The U.S. Douglas SBD Dauntless proved to be an excellent dive-bomber and served through much of the war, but the obsolete Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bomber was slow and vulnerable. The U.S. Navy replaced it as soon as it could with the more modern Grumman TBF Avenger following the great carrier battles of 1942.

During the first two years of war, aircraft did little to fulfill the promises of prewar aviation advocates. German aircraft rarely hit British warships during the 1940 Norwegian Campaign, and the German battle cruisers *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* sank Britain's aircraft carrier *Glorious* with gunfire. In November 1940, British carrier aircraft surprised the Italian fleet anchorage at Taranto and torpedoed three battleships, but this proved little to critics, who argued that battleships at sea would evade bombs and torpedoes and devastate attacking aircraft with their heavy defensive armament.

Critics were also unimpressed by the battering by land-based aircraft that British carriers sustained while escorting convoys through the Mediterranean; however, carrier aircraft proved critical in bringing the German battleship *Bismarck* to battle. On May 16, 1941, torpedoes dropped by Swordfish

aircraft launched from the *Ark Royal* jammed the *Bismarck*'s rudder. Yet it required the heavy guns of British battleships to actually sink the ship. Similarly, Japan's brilliantly conceived and executed attack on Pearl Harbor proved only that bases and stationary ships were vulnerable to surprise air attack. Three days later, though, Japanese Navy Mitsubishi G4M land-based bombers located and sank the newest British battleship, the *Prince of Wales*, and the battle cruiser *Repulse* in an hour-long battle off the coast of Malaya. The British warships shot down only 3 of 129 attacking aircraft. Aircraft would dominate many future sea battles.

Japanese and U.S. aircraft carriers engaged each other in four battles in 1942. The first of these, the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8), ended with roughly equal losses for both sides. At Midway (June 3–6), though, Japan lost four carriers and sank only one U.S. carrier, the *Yorktown.* There followed a series of grueling battles around Guadalcanal in which both navies suffered heavily: the Eastern Solomons (August 24–25), which cost the Japanese one light carrier and the Americans damage to the carrier *Enterprise*, and the Santa Cruz Islands (October 25), where the U.S. carrier *Hornet* was sunk and two Japanese carriers were damaged.

Aircraft carriers, loaded with fuel and ordnance, proved particularly vulnerable to even minor damage, and few survived the first year of war in the Pacific. The United States lost five of its seven carriers in these battles, and the sixth suffered heavy damage. Japan suffered similar losses to its carrier fleet; more than 400 of the 765 airmen who attacked Pearl Harbor had died in battle by the end of 1942, in part the consequence of a poor Japanese pilot-replacement and -training system.

In an effort to replace lost aircraft carriers, the United States converted light cruisers into small aircraft carriers, such as the 33-aircraft *Independence*, which joined the fleet in June 1943. Japan also added partial flight decks to two battleships, allowing them to launch but not recover planes, and it converted a Yamato-class battleship to an aircraft carrier, the 64,800-ton *Shinano.*

Yet U.S. industry easily won the naval building race. During the war Japan completed 15 fleet, light, and escort car-riers, while the United States commissioned 139, including 17 of the large Essex class; 9 of the light Independence class; 113 escort carriers of the Bogue, Sangamon, Casablanca, and Commencement Bay classes; and 4 conversions. Of these, 37 escort

carriers served with the Royal Navy. By mid-1944, the United States was launching a large aircraft carrier every month.

U.S. carrier operations became increasingly sophisticated after the 1942 battles. Improving radar, which by early 1944 could detect even low-flying aircraft, and new control and communications systems allowed U.S. fighters to intercept attacking aircraft with great success. New ships, increasing antiaircraft armament, and the proximity fuze considerably improved fleet defense. Radar-equipped TBF Avengers proved adept at locating targets at sea and in the air, allowing the U.S. Navy to intercept attacking aircraft at night. Whereas the Japanese Navy continued to rely on its prewar aircraft designs, the United States developed several new airplanes, which began joining the fleet in 1943. These included the excellent Grumman F6F Hellcat and Vought F4U Corsair, both of which completely outclassed Japan's Zero in combat.

U.S. aircraft also joined the British Royal Navy—first Wildcats and later Corsairs, Hellcats, and Avengers. By 1943, the United States was supplying most of the Royal Navy's aircraft. U.S. industry also churned out dozens of small escort carriers for both its own navy and the Royal Navy. Carrying two dozen aircraft, these "baby flattops" provided continuous air cover for convoys crossing the Atlantic. Other escort carriers formed the core of antisubmarine hunter-killer groups that prowled the ocean in search of German U-boats and reinforced convoys under attack. Combined with land-based airpower, the escort carriers provided the answer to the threat from Germany's U-boats and, in mid-1943, turned the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic. They also provided vital air support for numerous amphibious invasions.

A series of U.S. carrier raids and air offensives further wore down Japanese air strength in the Pacific during 1943. By November, when the United States invaded Tarawa and began its drive across the Central Pacific, 11 U.S. carriers faced only 6 Japanese carriers. U.S. Navy carriers, supported by an enormous fleet train and logistical system, raided throughout the Central Pacific. They isolated Japanese-held islands before invasion, protected amphibious landings, and provided close air support for the invading soldiers and marines. U.S. training and combat performance continued to improve, and an excellent submarine and seaplane rescue

service saved the lives of many American pilots shot down during these missions.

The Japanese carrier fleet, rebuilt from the 1942 battles and supported by land-based planes, confronted a far larger U.S. fleet in June 1944 during the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The result was the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” as the better-trained and better-equipped Americans shot down scores of poorly trained Japanese pilots who failed to press home their attacks and often missed their targets. Japan lost 475 planes and almost as many pilots; the United States lost 100 planes and 16 pilots. Japanese naval airpower never recovered from this defeat.

In the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, Japan used one heavy aircraft carrier and three light carriers (with a total of only 116 planes on board) as a diversion to draw away the U.S. battle fleet so Japanese battleships and cruisers could attack the landing beaches. Instead of the superbly trained pilots who attacked Pearl Harbor, Japan relied on kamikazes, whose suicidal attacks sank dozens of U.S. ships. In the March–June 1945 Battle for Okinawa, the kamikazes inflicted more casualties on the U.S. Navy than it had sustained in all of its other wars combined. But the Japanese were unable to stem the U.S. Navy advance across the Pacific. Throughout the Pacific, from the Mariana Islands to the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, U.S. naval aircraft smashed Japanese defenses, destroyed Japanese aircraft, supported invasions, sank Japanese ships, and raided Japanese positions.

By 1945, four British aircraft carriers operated in the Pacific, and these joined more than a dozen U.S. carriers in launching a series of devastating air attacks on Japanese positions in July and August. All told, 1,000 U.S. and 250 British carrier aircraft destroyed more than 3,000 Japanese aircraft in the air and on the ground, adding to the damage that B-29 bombers had already inflicted on Japan’s home islands. New aircraft carriers continued to join the U.S. fleet, although the first of large 47,000-ton Midway-class battle carriers were not commissioned until September 1945, after the end of the war. Of Japan’s carriers, only the old experimental *Hosho* survived the war. Japan’s fortunes in the Pacific war had risen and then sunk with its aircraft carriers.

STEPHEN K. STEIN

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft Carriers; Air-Sea Rescue; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Caroline Islands Campaign; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Hunter-Killer Groups; Identification, Friend or Foe; King, Ernest Joseph; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chūichi; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Nimitz, Chester William; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Sinking of; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Sherman, Frederick Carl; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Taranto, Attack on; Truk, Raid on; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing

Strategic bombing may generally be defined as air attacks directed at targets or systems capable of having a major impact on the will or ability of an enemy nation to wage war. Airpower proponents have touted strategic bombing as a unique war-winning capability and used it to justify independent air services.

When World War II began, only two nations had coherent and committed strategic bombing programs: Great Britain and the United States. Although most states with advanced militaries had interest in airpower, continental concerns, resource limitations, or misguided procurement policies hindered most aspirants to powerful long-range bombing forces. Only relatively protected naval powers such as the United States and Britain could afford much attention to strategic bombing, lured by the strong political appeal of its

promise of quick victory at low cost. Both efforts had roots in the experience of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in World War I, when Sir Hugh Trenchard developed tactics and policies for the world's first independent air service and talented subordinates such as Hardinge Goulburn Giffard, 1st Viscount Tiverton (subsequently 2nd Earl of Halsbury), pioneered target analysis for morale and material effects to assault the foundations of the German war economy.

Although airmen in both countries became aware of the ideas of General Giulio Douhet during the interwar years and used them to support arguments for strategic airpower, Douhet had little impact on the evolution of the RAF or the U.S. Army Air Corps. The RAF continued to pursue Trenchard's ideal of a massive aerial offensive, assisted by politicians who were willing to fund an aerial deterrent instead of large expensive land armies that could become involved in more bloody continental wars. Targeting priorities remained vague, however, and the war would reveal the large gap between claims and capabilities.

The Americans took a different approach that can be traced back to Tiverton. Although the subordinate army air service's primary mission remained ground support, a group of capable young officers at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) developed a theory of precision daylight bombing of carefully selected targets in the industrial and service systems of enemy economies. Pinning their hopes on the capabilities of new aircraft such as the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, these airmen expected unescorted, self-defending bombers to destroy vital nodes of the enemy's war economy that would grind it to a halt.

Bombing examples before and during the early days of World War II—in Spain and China and even the German Blitz on London—appeared to demonstrate the ineffectiveness and drawbacks of indiscriminate attacks on cities and to support the superiority of precision tactics. When U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the army and navy for munitions estimates for a potential war in 1941, many of those ACTS instructors had joined the Air Staff in Washington. They soon developed a plan, known as AWPD/1, that envisioned a precision bombing campaign as a key component of the American war effort. When a larger plan that included AWPD/1 was accepted, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) finally had a justification for

pursuing independent strategic bombing. It proved difficult to put theory into practice though.

Early British attacks moved from a Tivertonian focus on key systems such as power plants or oil to a more Trenchardian reliance on widespread morale effects. Daylight raids proved deadly for RAF Bomber Command, revealing critical deficiencies in the number and quality of their bombers. Operations shifted to the night, but the August 1941 Butt Report concluded that only about one in five aircrews were bombing within five miles of their intended targets.

Adapting to the reality of their capabilities, in February 1942 Bomber Command was directed to attack area targets—that is, cities—with the objective of undermining German civilian morale, particularly that of industrial workers. Under the direction of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris, Bomber Command built up its strength and obtained better aircraft, especially Halifax and Lancaster four-engine bombers.

A Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress drops bombs on Nuremberg in 1945. The B-17 was the principal U.S. strategic bomber in the European Theater during World War II. (Library of Congress)

On May 30, 1942, Bomber Command mounted the first "thousand bomber raid" on Cologne, and in July 1943 it achieved the first bombing-induced firestorm against Hamburg, killing some 45,000 people. German

night defenses adapted, however. When Harris decided to mount a full-scale assault on Berlin in late 1943, the Luftwaffe shot down so many British aircraft and bombing results were so disappointing that the utility of the whole night area campaign was brought into question.

Meanwhile, the Americans also encountered difficulties. At Casablanca in January 1943, Allied leaders had agreed to a Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) of round-the-clock attacks. It was rather poorly coordinated, but it did allow each air force to pursue its preferred approach. The most significant USAAF strategic attack of that year was General James Doolittle's July 1943 attack on Rome from North Africa, which heavily damaged the marshaling yards, limited collateral damage with impressive accuracy, and contributed to the fall of Benito Mussolini's government.

Elements of the Eighth Air Force began bombing the continent from England in August 1942, although they did not fly deep-penetration raids into central and eastern Germany until a year later. Losses among unescorted B-17 and B-24 "Liberator" bombers were horrendous, especially during attacks against ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt in August and October 1943. Although the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy joined the daylight campaign in November 1943, the Americans were unable to sustain such attrition.

By the end of the year, such deep attacks on Germany were suspended, and it appeared that the Luftwaffe was on the verge of winning the strategic air war in Europe.

Everything changed, however, with the advent of the Allied long-range escort fighter, most notably the P-51 "Mustang." In mid-February 1944, the U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) began their "Big Week" attacks against German aircraft factories. The air battles that ensued decimated the Luftwaffe, and by the time of the D-day landings in June, the Allies achieved air supremacy over France and air superiority over Germany. The escort fighters began by sticking close to their bombers, but they proved most effective when they were released to sweep against enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground. Because of the American adoption of radar-directed bombing methods through overcast skies, the Germans had little respite even in poor weather, and their losses were increased by many accidents.

Although the strategic bombers had an initial priority to operations in support of the coming invasion, Allied airpower had built up to the point that USSTAF commander General Carl Spaatz could begin sustained attacks

against oil targets in May. By the fall of 1944, Luftwaffe and Wehr-macht operations were severely crippled by fuel shortages, and concentrated attacks against transportation networks further limited German mobility and economic activity.

During this period, Harris resisted diversions against “panacea targets” such as oil and remained committed to “de-housing” German workers. British bombers did sometimes assist with attacks on oil and transportation targets, though, and their larger loads of bombs could cause considerable damage. The RAF greatly improved its ability to navigate and bomb at night or in bad weather, and it usually achieved greater accuracy than the Americans under such conditions.

Even in clear weather, precision bombing did not approach the image often portrayed in the press of bombs dropping down smokestacks. Usually, all aircraft in the B-17 and B-24 formations dropped their loads together, with intervals set between bombs so they would fall a few hundred feet apart. The pattern therefore covered a wide area. As USSTAF strength increased and targets became scarcer, planners became more tolerant of civilian casualties, adopting less accurate radar-directed bombardment methods in bad weather and hitting transportation objectives in city centers.

At least in Europe, American air leaders remained committed to attacks aimed primarily at economic and military targets instead of at civilian morale, a policy that sometimes caused friction with their British allies. There were also differences over bombing in occupied countries, where the British were particularly sensitive to political repercussions. The Americans were willing to bomb any Axis factory regardless of the nationality of the workers, whereas the British preferred to strike any German anywhere. The British also favored heavy attacks on the capitals of Axis allies in the Balkans, although the Americans successfully blocked what they saw as an inefficient and ineffective diversion of valuable airpower. Debates about the relative success and morality of RAF and USAAF bombing continue to the present day.

The differing national approaches also played a role as the war in Europe approached its end, and both air forces sought an aerial death blow to finish the war. The British plan, code-named thunderclap, was based on shattering morale by destroying Berlin. That major assault was conducted by the Eighth

Air Force on February 3, 1945. Allied concerns about assisting the Soviet advance helped produce the firestorm that devastated Dresden 10 days later.

The corresponding American plan, code-named clarion, aimed to awe the German populace with widespread attacks on targets in every village. It was eventually changed into primarily a transportation assault because of concerns for efficiency, public image, and even morality. The controversy in Great Britain over the Dresden attack was one factor in the suspension of the strategic air war against Germany in April, although it was not as important as the simple fact that Allied bombing forces were running out of suitable targets.

American air leaders such as USAAF commanding general Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, who had hoped to build support for service independence by demonstrating the ability of air forces to win wars on their own, still had a chance against Japan. The USAAF referred to the B-29 Superfortress either as a very heavy bomber or a very long-range bomber, and by World War II standards it was assuredly both. Every theater wanted to receive the B-29s, but the aircraft's impressive capabilities and late availability destined it for the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Twentieth Air Force and named Arnold its "executive agent" to command the B-29s. Although operational control of the aircraft supposedly remained in Washington, in practice the commanders of the subordinate XX and XXI Bomber Commands enjoyed a great deal of independence.

The XX Bomber Command, based in India and China, mounted its first raid against Japan in June 1944. Operation MATTERHORN had little success, even after Arnold assigned his leading troubleshooter, Major General Curtis LeMay, to command it. Bases were too far from key Japanese targets, were difficult to supply, and were hard to protect from Japanese ground attacks. Additionally, the B-29s had been deployed a year early, and testing had to be completed in combat.

More was expected from the XXI Bomber Command based in the Mariana Islands, which was within range of the most important enemy industrial complexes in Honshu. Initial attacks were launched from Saipan in November 1944, but again results were disappointing. Besides technical and logistical problems, the command faced severe weather over target areas that made normal high-altitude precision bombing impossible. Although the vulnerability of Japanese cities to fires was well known and had inspired

some USAAF planning for incendiary bombing, there was no meaningful pressure from Washington for such tactics.

Impatient for a better payoff on a huge investment, however, Arnold decided in January 1945 to concentrate all the B-29s in the Marianas under LeMay. Although the feisty and innovative air commander received little specific guidance from Washington, LeMay knew that he too could be relieved if he proved ineffective.

After trying to make daylight precision bombing work, on his own initiative LeMay adopted a new approach to destroy key industrial targets. His first low-level nighttime area incendiary raid in March 1945 was a spectacular military success, incinerating 16 square miles of Tokyo and killing 90,000 people. Although he would mount some periodic day- and night-precision attacks, the fire raids dominated LeMay’s air campaign

against Japan. Eventually he burned 178 square miles of some 66 Japanese cities, killing hundreds of thousands of people and causing millions to flee to the countryside. B-29s also dropped the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

MacArthur's Far East Air Forces contributed three attacks against Kyushu before the Japanese surrender, but the last American bombs that fell on Japan came from the Twentieth Air Force. More than 1,000 planes hit Japan on August 14, some even after the Japanese radio had announced acceptance of the terms of surrender.

Both the British and the Americans conducted postwar assessments of the strategic bombing campaign. The massive U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey compiled an impressive collection of data, although differing personalities and agendas within the survey committees produced several conflicting conclusions. They agreed, however, that the American approach to targeting was superior to RAF area bombing. The British Bombing Survey Unit relied on the American data along with some of its own, but overall it was not as thorough or comprehensive. It was also critical of the city attacks, but it gave much credit to the RAF-USAAF campaign against transportation.

In retrospect, the most important contribution that strategic bombing made in Europe was to defeat the Luftwaffe and ensure that when Allied troops driving across Northwestern Europe saw aircraft, they could be certain that the planes were friendly. The CBO did not prevent the late-mobilizing German economy from peaking in 1944, but the oil and transportation campaigns had a major impact on degrading it thereafter. Civilian morale did not break, but some British observers have noted that the city bombing motivated German industry to disperse, thus making it more vulnerable to transportation interdiction. More than 700,000 German civilians died from Allied bombing, about the same number who succumbed to the effects of the British naval blockade in World War I.

The cost of the CBO was also high for the air forces involved. The USSTAF lost 9,949 bombers, 8,500 fighters, and 64,000 airmen killed. RAF Bomber Command lost 57,000 killed or missing from all causes. In the Pacific, the incendiary attacks and atomic bombs were an important component of the series of shocks that produced the Japanese surrender, although the significance of other factors such as the submarine and naval blockade as well as Soviet entry into the war cannot be underestimated.

The World War II strategic bombing experience had several legacies. In the United States, the new U.S. Air Force was born in 1947, espousing a doctrine of air warfare based on the perceived lessons of the U.S. air campaigns against Germany and Japan along with the awesome power of nuclear weapons. "Vertical" targeting approaches against key Soviet industries resembled the German oil and transportation attacks, whereas "horizontal" methods based on LeMay's incendiary campaign were aimed at Soviet industrial concentrations in cities. One planner described the Strategic Air Command's early war plans as "precision attacks with area weapons."

Since that time, the U.S. Air Force has dedicated itself to the pursuit of real precision, and the extreme accuracy of its contemporary munitions as well as current targeting doctrines have roots in the ideas developed at ACTS in the 1930s. While Americans trumpet their ongoing commitment to the principles of precision bombing, however, the rest of the world also remembers the images of Tokyo, Hamburg, and Dresden.

CONRAD C. CRANE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Antiaircraft Artillery and Employment; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; B-29 Raids against Japan; Baby Blitz; Berlin, Air Battle of; "Big Week" Air Battle; Blitz, The; Britain, Battle of; Carpet Bombing; Casablanca Conference; Combined Bomber Offensive; Doolittle, James Harold "Jimmy"; Douhet, Giulio; Dresden, Air Attack on; Eaker, Ira Clarence; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Great Britain, Air Force; Guernica, Kondor Legion Attack on; Hamburg, Raids on; Harris, Sir Arthur Travers; Incendiary Bombs and Bombing; Köln, Raid on; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Norden Bombsight; Ploieşti, Raids on; Portal, Sir Charles Frederick Algernon; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Rotterdam, Destruction of; Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids; Shuttle Bombing, Soviet Union; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"; Tokyo, Bombing of; Tokyo Raid; Udet, Ernst; United States Army Air Forces; Wilhelmshaven, Raid on; Document 156

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Aisingioro P’u-i

See Aixinjueluo Puyi

Aitken, William Maxwell (1879–1964)

Canadian-born British business press magnate and member of the 1940–1942 cabinet. William Maxwell Aitken was born on May 25, 1879, in Maple, Ontario, Canada. Soon thereafter his family relocated to Newcastle, New Brunswick, Canada, which he considered “home” for the remainder of his life. He briefly attended the University of New Brunswick but never earned a college degree. Aitken was a gifted writer (he authored 11 books) who focused early on amassing a fortune. After making several trips to London, he moved there in July 1910. He became active in politics and business, buying and selling control of the Rolls-Royce Company. In 1911 Aitken was elected to the British Parliament on a platform of promoting British Empire trade, serving until 1916. A member of the Liberal Unionist Party, he was knighted in 1911 and became Lord Beaverbrook in 1917.

Aitken purchased control of the *Daily Express* newspaper in December 1916 and set about building its circulation. Two years later he began the *Sunday Express*, and he took control of the *Evening Standard* in 1924, giving him control of morning, evening, and Sunday London papers. This editorial base made him a powerful figure in British political circles.

Maxwell Aitken, First Baron Beaverbrook (Lord Beaverbrook), was a Canadian-born businessman, politician, and newspaperman who became a forceful figure in the political scene of Great Britain. During 1940–1941 he played an important role as minister of aircraft production. (Baron/Getty Images)

Aitken quickly became one of Winston Churchill's closest advisers when Churchill became prime minister on May 10, 1940. Churchill gave Aitken the post of minister of aircraft production in the War Cabinet. He served just less than a year (May 14, 1940, to April 30, 1941), but in that crucial period he marshaled Britain's aircraft industry to turn out thousands of fighters and bombers. His forceful methods made many enemies in the cabinet, the Air

Ministry, and the Royal Air Force (RAF). Aitken attempted to resign several times on grounds of health, but Churchill dissuaded him. Residing at 12 Downing Street, he became a minister of state on April 30, 1941, continuing to advise Churchill but without specific ministerial portfolio.

On June 22, 1941, Aitken was named minister of supply to supervise broader wartime production. Here his impact was less sensational than in the aircraft sector. He accompanied Churchill to the Placentia Bay meeting with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (August 8–11, 1941) and to subsequent meetings in Washington, D.C. Aitken also traveled as Churchill's emissary to meet with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in October 1941.

Aitken resigned as a minister on February 28, 1942, ostensibly over some of the personnel decisions made in a cabinet reshuffle. He continued to serve as an informal adviser to Churchill for the remainder of the war, however, often championing Soviet interests. Returning to publishing after the war, Aitken died in London on June 9, 1964.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain; Placentia Bay Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Aixinjueluo Puyi (1906–1967)

Last emperor of China, more commonly remembered as the puppet ruler of Japanese-controlled Manzhouguo (Manchukuo, formerly Manchuria) from 1932 to 1945. Born in Beijing (Peking) in Hebei (Hopeh) on January 14, 1906, and nicknamed Henry by his English tutor (he was known to Westerners as Henry Puyi), Aixinjueluo Puyi (Aisingioto P'u-i) ascended the throne in December 1908, at age two, as Xuan Tong (Hsuan T'ung).

During the Chinese Revolution of 1911–1912, the emperor's mother negotiated frantically with General Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) for a settlement that would guarantee their lives and financial security. Ignoring the claims to the throne of Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen), Puyi abdicated in favor of Yuan, who was authorized to create a provisional republic and establish national unity by embracing all antiimperial forces.

Briefly restored in 1917 by the intrigues of warlord politics, Puyi soon was again deposed, and he finally sought refuge in the Japanese concession in Tianjin (Tientsin) in Hebei Province by 1924. In July 1931 his brother visited Japan and met with various rightist politicians. Shortly after the 1931 Mukden (Shenyang) Incident in Liaoning, representatives of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army visited Puyi to discuss the future of Manchuria, assuring him that they were merely interested in helping the people of Manchuria establish an independent nation. The Japanese military was vague about whether the new state would be a monarchy or a republic. Negotiations continued through the fall and winter of 1931–1932, and Puyi finally agreed to be smuggled to Manchuria by sea and to accept the title of chief executive of the state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo). Tokyo belatedly recognized the army's creation in August 1932.

Aixinjueluo Puyi, the last emperor of China and then the puppet ruler of Japanese controlled Manzhouguo (Manchukuo, formerly Manchuria) from 1932 to 1945. Pictured here in 1934. (Illustrated London News Picture Library)

In 1934 the Guandong Army allowed Puyi to ascend to the throne as emperor of Manzhoudiguo (Manchoutikuo), the Manzhu (Manchu) Empire, wearing imperial dragon robes sent from the museum in Beijing. As "emperor," Puyi served the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere loyally until 1945, including undertaking a state visit to Tokyo.

When Soviet forces invaded Manzhouguo in August 1945, Puyi was dethroned and imprisoned. Released to Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) China in 1950, Puyi was again imprisoned and subjected to reeducation programs until his "rehabilitation" in 1959. He spent his final years as a gardener in Beijing's botanical gardens until his death from cancer on October 17, 1967.

ERROL MACGREGOR CLAUSS

See also
China; Guandong Army; Manzhouguo; Mao Zedong

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Alamein, First Viscount Montgomery of

See Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law

Alam Halfa, Battle of (August 31–September 7, 1942)

Battle in North Africa between German field marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps and British lieutenant general Bernard Law Montgomery's Eighth Army. Fearful that he would permanently lose the initiative to the Eighth Army after his advance was halted at the First Battle of El Alamein during July 1–27, 1942, Rommel reorganized his forces with the intention of resuming his advance toward Suez. Meanwhile, Montgomery assumed command of the British Eighth Army on August 13 and began planning for the offensive, all the while expecting Rommel to attack first.

Late on the evening of August 30, Rommel attempted—as at Gazala, although his force was weak in armor—to get around the Eighth Army's left flank. With diversionary attacks designed to hold British forces along the coast, Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps east and south of Alam Halfa Ridge, aiming to swing north to the Mediterranean coast behind Montgomery and thus enveloping the Eighth Army.

The Eighth Army had established a defense in depth, including strong positions on the Alam Halfa and Ruweisat ridges, and Montgomery rejected any withdrawal. The 10th Armored Division, 22nd Armored Brigade, and the 44th Division defended Alam Halfa, while the 7th Armored Division was south of the ridge. Montgomery ordered his armored units to defend from their current positions rather than advancing to meet Rommel's panzers.

Slowed by British minefields and fuel shortages, Rommel's tanks did not reach Alam Halfa until the evening of August 31. Daylight brought vicious Desert Air Force attacks against the Axis advance, and the 7th Armored Division's placement forced Rommel to swing north prematurely, into the teeth of a tank brigade on Alam Halfa Ridge. Fuel shortages prevented the Afrika Korps from outflanking Alam Halfa to the east, forcing Rommel onto the defensive there.

On September 1, after a flank assault on the 22nd Armored Brigade failed and having suffered severe losses, Rommel ordered his forces to retire to their original positions. The withdrawal, which began the next day, exposed the Afrika Korps to further devastating British aerial attacks. Rommel repulsed a counterattack by the 2nd New Zealand Division on the evening of September 3, and Montgomery believed that he lacked the resources to force a general Axis withdrawal, so he decided not to press his advantage for the time being. Certainly Rommel's past successes made Montgomery wary of pushing too far forward.

Montgomery nonetheless had fought his first battle as commander of the Eighth Army with great skill. Rommel now had no choice but to go on the defensive. He established positions between the Mediterranean and the Qattara Depression as both sides prepared for the Eighth Army's upcoming offensive: the Second Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942).

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Africa; Afrika Korps; El Alamein, Battle of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; North Africa and the War; North Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen

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Alamogordo (July 16, 1945)

Site of the first successful test of an atomic device. By the spring of 1945 the ongoing Manhattan Project had produced sufficient plutonium for several fission bombs, but scientists were unsure of the reliability of the implosion technique required to initiate a nuclear chain reaction and an explosion. Small-scale experiments were unrevealing, because nothing below critical mass can explode. Thus, Major General Leslie R. Groves, overall director of the Manhattan Project, authorized a full-scale test (known as Trinity) of the implosion technique.

The Jornada del Muerto (Dead Man's Trail) near Alamogordo, New Mexico, was chosen as ground zero for the explosion. Remote and ringed by high peaks, the site helped to preserve secrecy and contain radioactive fallout, the effects of which were not yet then fully known.

Secured atop of a 100-foot steel tower, the device exploded at 5:30 a.m. on July 16, 1945. With a predicted minimal yield of 500 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and an optimal yield of 5,000 tons if all parts functioned synergistically, the device actually produced a yield of 20,000 tons of TNT. Accompanied by a blinding flash of light, a powerful shock wave, and an awesome roar, the device vaporized the tower, creating a crater some 400 yards in diameter and 10 to 20 feet deep. A mushroom cloud rose to 41,000 feet; the explosion was heard 100 miles away, and the light produced was seen from 200 miles away. To allay concerns of local residents, army officials reported that an ammunition dump had blown up.



The first test of an atomic bomb, near Alamogordo, New Mexico, July 16, 1945. (Fotosearch/Getty Images)

Scientists were awestruck by the power of the explosion. Julius Robert Oppenheimer, a theoretical physicist who had labored for many months on the Manhattan Project, famously recalled the god Vishnu's line from the Bhagavad Gita: "I have become death, shatterer of worlds." Groves simply predicted, "The war's over."

A report on the success of the detonation was quickly passed to President Harry S. Truman, who was then at Potsdam, Germany, meeting with newly elected British prime minister Clement R. Attlee and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Truman's negotiating stance with Stalin hardened considerably based on the stunning results of the Trinity test, although Stalin certainly knew of the Manhattan Project because his spy network had long ago penetrated the top-secret program.

The Trinity test site is located on White Sands Missile Range. It is open to the public twice a year: the first Saturday in April and the first Saturday in October.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Bush, Vannevar; Einstein, Albert; Fermi, Enrico; Groves, Leslie Richard; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Manhattan Project; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Oppenheimer, Julius Robert; Potsdam Conference; Truman, Harry S.

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Alanbrooke, First Viscount

See Brooke, Sir Alan Francis

Alaska-Canadian Highway

Overland military highway completed on October 28, 1942, that connected Alaska with the lower 48 U.S. states via Canadian-held Yukon and British Columbia. The Alaska-Canadian (ALCAN) Highway was a joint U.S.-Canadian venture, although the U.S. government funded it and provided most of the manpower and equipment to build it. When completed, the ALCAN covered nearly 1,700 miles; today, the highway is considerably shorter (1,387 miles) because it has undergone continual improvement and rebuilding. The ALCAN begins in Dawson Creek, British Columbia, where several Canadian highways converge, and meanders northwestward, terminating at Delta Junction, Alaska, about 100 miles to the south of Fairbanks, Alaska.

As early as the 1920s, American officials sought to construct a road that would link Alaska with the lower 48 states, but the Canadian government showed little interest in such a venture because only a few thousand Canadians in the Yukon would have benefited. The December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, however, coupled with fears that the Japanese might menace the U.S. and Canadian west coasts and the Aleutian Islands, made the

construction of an Alaskan-Canadian link a military necessity. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration approved the project in early February 1942, with the official start of construction on March 8, 1942. The Canadian government readily agreed to support the project, although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did the vast majority of the work.

The ALCAN was a massive undertaking not only because of the distances involved but also because of the rugged terrain and harsh climate of the region. The route was scheduled to be completed by the autumn of 1942, as the arctic cold and deep snows would have precluded any construction during the winter months. The U.S. Army commandeered Canadian heavy equipment and trains to move supplies and equipment to Dawson Creek. To hasten completion, construction crews worked from both the northern and southern ends of the route, meeting near the British Columbia-Yukon border at approximately the 60th parallel.

The initial route was not terribly direct and traversed rugged terrain, but it represented the best way to move goods and military supplies from the United States to airfields in Alaska, the Yukon, and British Columbia. From there, U.S. military transports were able to move Lend-Lease supplies to Russian Siberia with much greater ease and speed. The route could be perilous, with steep grades, sharp drop-offs, no guardrails, dangerous curves and switchbacks, and poor pavement. Most bridges were initially built of pontoons or logs; steel bridges were built only when necessary. During the spring of 1943, a 100-mile portion of the ALCAN became impassable as the permafrost melted, which necessitated the building of a temporary corduroy road (made of logs laid perpendicular to the roadbed).

The ALCAN proved to be of major military importance, chiefly because of its role in the conveyance of Lend-Lease goods to Soviet Russia. After the war, the Canadian portion of the ALCAN was turned over to the Canadian government. By the 1980s, most of the roadway had been paved with asphalt, and large portions of the ALCAN have been incorporated as sections of newer major highways, including Alaska Route 2 and Canadian Highways 1 and 97.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Engineer Operations; Lend-Lease

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Albania

Located in the western Balkans on the Adriatic Sea, Albania proclaimed its independence from the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) in November 1912, following the First Balkan War. Albania, which encompasses approximately 11,100 square miles, had a 1939 population of 1,073,000.

Prior to and during World War I (1914–1918), Albania descended into anarchy. In 1915, Italy established a virtual protectorate over much of Albania, a development that was secretly underwritten by the other Allied powers. The tiny nation was left in ruins as a result of the war, but in 1925, a republic was established there; however, in 1928 it was replaced by a monarchy under King Zog I that finally brought some stability to the country.

Having dominated Albania politically and economically for some time, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini planned a formal annexation of Albania in the spring of 1939. Italian troops invaded on April 7, 1939, and met only light resistance, although a small force led by Colonel Abas Kupi held the Italians at Durazzo for 36 hours, sufficient time for King Zog and his family to escape.

On April 16, 1939, King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy accepted the Albanian throne, and a profascist government was installed. The British government, still hoping to prevent an alliance between Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, acceded to the annexation, but the Greeks prepared to resist an Italian invasion of their own country from Albania, which occurred on October 28, 1940.

After Italy's entrance into the war on the side of Germany, Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) had attempted to create a united front movement under Abas Kupi and to stimulate a revolt against the Italians in northern Albania. The effort began well but faltered after the German conquest of Yugoslavia in April 1941 and the subsequent transfer of Kosovo

Province from Yugoslavia to Albania. As Axis fortunes waned in 1943, however, Albanian resistance revived.

In the mountains of southern Albania, the communists, encouraged by Tito (Josip Broz), leader of the Yugoslav Partisans, coalesced under Enver Hoxha. Liberal landowners and intellectuals formed the Balli Kombëtar (National Front) resistance movement. In central and northern Albania, Abas Kupi and various tribal leaders also established resistance groups. SOE agents Colonel Neil McLean and Major David Smiley were sent into southern Albania, and they subsequently recommended that the British provide aid to both Hoxha's Partisans and the Balli Kombëtar.

The disintegration of the Italian forces in Albania following the overthrow of Mussolini in September 1943 provided the Albanian guerrillas with arms and other supplies captured from or abandoned by the Italians. The Germans quickly sent in troops to clear out the remaining Italian forces, savagely repressed the local population, and "restored Albanian independence." The Germans established a new Albanian government under Mehdi Frasheri, but it was able to control only the main towns and coastal plain. The rest of the country descended into chaos as various guerrilla chieftains vied for power.

The British Balkan Air Force headquarters at Bari controlled support to anti-Axis guerrillas in the Balkans and was decidedly pro-Partisan, in both Albania and Yugoslavia. The British hoped to use all of the Albanian resistance forces to harass the German withdrawal from Greece, which began in September 1944. But when Hoxha's communists attacked the Balli Kombëtar and Abas Kupi instead, the British cut off aid to the noncommunist resistance groups, thereby ensuring their defeat. Kupi and the Balli Kombëtar leaders were evacuated to Italy with the McLean SOE mission, and the communists took over Albania.

With Yugoslav support, Hoxha seized power on November 29, 1944, and the People's Republic of Albania was recognized by the Allies. Albanians subsequently developed anti-Western views and supported a highly insular Stalinist regime for nearly half a century. Not until 1992 were the communists swept from power; the year prior, a constitutional republic had been proclaimed.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Balkans Theater; Mussolini, Benito; Special Operations Executive; Tito; Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy

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Aleutian Islands Campaign (1942–1943)

Military campaign for a 1,100-mile-long chain of U.S. islands stretching west from Alaska in the Bering Sea toward northern Japan. Although the Aleutians had a negligible population, no useful resources, and extreme climatic conditions that made them unsuitable for major military staging bases, they were nonetheless the scene of bitter fighting between U.S. and Canadian forces on the one hand and those of Japan on the other.

On June 7, 1942, elements of Japanese vice admiral Hosogaya Boshiro's Northern Naval Task Force seized the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska. The Japanese aim was twofold: to support Japan's advance on Midway Island by luring U.S. forces north and to gain bases in the Aleutians to deter U.S. attacks on the Japanese Kurile Islands. By May 1943 the Japanese had more than 2,500 men on Attu and more than 5,400 on Kiska.

This Japanese foothold on U.S. soil triggered a substantial response from the United States and Canada, which together would eventually commit more than 100,000 troops to this remote region. Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald commanded Task Force 8, an array of sea, air, and land units charged with expelling the Japanese from the Aleutians. Theobald intended to interdict Japanese lines of communication into Attu and Kiska by isolating the Aleutian waters and engaging Japanese transports and warships where possible.

Initially, the Allies employed submarine attacks in the western Aleutians. When Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid replaced Theobald in January 1943, he doubled the effort to interdict Japanese supply convoys. On March 26, 1943, a small U.S. Navy task force intercepted and defeated a larger Japanese

force of cruisers, destroyers, and transports in the Battle of the Komandorski Islands (March 26, 1943). This action ended further Japanese surface resupply efforts.



Along with naval interdiction, U.S. and Canadian aircraft harassed the Japanese from bases in Alaska and the eastern Aleutians. In August 1942, U.S. forces established an airfield on Adak Island, from which bombers could strike Japanese forces in the western Aleutians. By September, Allied aircraft bombed targets on Kiska nearly every day for three weeks. The Japanese were forced to rely on submarines to ferry minimal subsistence supplies. By April 1943, the Allies had succeeded in tightening an air-sea noose around the Japanese bases.

Even so, U.S. commanders determined that invasions of Attu and Kiska were necessary. One consideration focused on unpredictable weather, especially fog, which could cloak naval activity and allow the Japanese to reclaim control of the seas. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division was designated as the landing force. It received amphibious warfare training at Fort Ord, California until April, when it deployed north for operations. Attu was chosen as the first objective, because intelligence estimated Japanese troops there to be only 500 men, considerably fewer than on Kiska.

The 7th Division, commanded by Brigadier General Eugene Landrum, landed on Attu on May 11, 1943, with almost 11,000 men. At first, U.S. commanders thought they had surprised the Japanese when they met no resistance at the shoreline. As American troops traversed through marshy tundra and ascended mountains ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea level, however, they discovered more than 2,500 Japanese waiting in trenches along ridgelines, using the inhospitable terrain to their advantage.

The supply-starved Japanese troops conducted a stubborn defense that exacted a heavy toll on the U.S. force. After 19 days of attrition defense, the Japanese carried out a final banzai suicide attack with more than 600 soldiers, many of whom blew themselves up with grenades rather than surrender. U.S. losses were 561 killed and 1,136 wounded. Only 28 Japanese were taken prisoner.

Following the loss of Attu, the Japanese decided to evacuate the 5,400 troops remaining on Kiska. On the night of July 28, while U.S. ships were off refueling in foggy weather, two Japanese cruisers and six destroyers entered Kiska Harbor and in one hour evacuated their troops from the island. Not knowing about the evacuation, on August 16 the Allies conducted the planned amphibious assault on Kiska with more than 34,000 U.S. and Canadian troops. It took the Allies several days to realize the Japanese had departed, but the operation cost some 300 casualties from friendly fire and Japanese booby traps.

The campaign in the Aleutians was an indecisive one that challenged both Japanese and Allied planners. In the end, the Allies removed the Japanese from the two islands, but at great cost in resources committed for questionable gain.

STEVEN J. RAUCH

U.S. soldiers firing mortar shells over a ridge into a Japanese position on Attu in the Aleutian Islands, June 4, 1943. (Library of Congress)

See also

Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Komandorski Islands, Battle of the; Midway, Battle of; Theobald, Robert Alfred

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Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George (1891–1969)

British Army general. Born on December 10, 1891, in London, Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander was educated at Harrow and Sandhurst and commissioned in the Irish Guards in 1911. He served on the Western Front during World War I and rose to command a battalion and, temporarily, a brigade, ending the war a lieutenant colonel. Following the war, he helped organize military forces in Latvia in 1919. He then graduated from the Staff College at Camberley and the Imperial Defence College and held staff assignments, first at the War Office and then in the Northern Command. From 1934 to 1938, he commanded the Nowshera Brigade of the Northern Command in India as a brigadier. On his return to Britain in 1938, he was promoted to major general and received command of the 1st Division.

General Sir Harold Alexander (left), Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. (center), and Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk (right) during the inspection of an Allied invasion task force off the coast of North Africa in 1943. (Library of Congress)

Alexander's division was sent to France, where he distinguished himself during the May 10–June 25, 1940, Battle for France by commanding the British rear guard in the retreat to Dunkerque, I Corps. Promoted to lieutenant general in December 1940, Alexander had charge of the Southern Command in Britain. In February 1942, Alexander received command of British forces in Burma. Recalled to Europe, that July he became commander of British forces in the Middle East. There he worked well with Eighth Army commander General Bernard Law Montgomery as well as other Allied leaders and played a key role in building up British forces for the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942).

Alexander attended the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, after which he became deputy supreme commander of Allied forces in North Africa and commander of 18th Army Group. Alexander initially had a low opinion of U.S. Army generals and thought that American forces were poorly trained. He realized that cooperation with the Americans was vital but gave greater latitude to British commanders.

Appointed commander in chief of the 15th Army Group for the July 9, 1943, invasion of Sicily, Alexander failed to maintain adequate control over his subordinates, Montgomery and U.S. lieutenant general George S. Patton Jr., each of whom sought the preeminent role.

Alexander then directed the Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943. Again the command was hindered by rivalries between his subordinates and grandstanding by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark. His command in Italy, however, brought Alexander promotion to field marshal in November 1944 and elevation to the position of supreme Allied commander in the Mediterranean.

On May 1, 1945, German forces in Italy surrendered unconditionally, and that October Alexander handed over his Italian command. In January 1946 he was named Viscount Alexander of Tunis.

From 1946 to 1952, Alexander was the appointed governor-general of Canada. Named Earl Alexander of Tunis in January 1952, he then served as British minister of defense (February 1952–October 1954). Alexander died in Slough, England, on June 16, 1969.

FRED R. VAN HARTESVELDT AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Casablanca Conference; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Clark, Mark Wayne; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; El Alamein, Battle of; France, Battle for; Italy Campaign; Leese, Sir Oliver William Hargreaves; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rome, Advance on and Capture of; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation; Tunis, Battle of

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Allen, Terry de la Mesa (1888–1969)

U.S. Army general. Born on April 1, 1888, at Fort Douglas, Utah, Terry de la Mesa Allen grew up in Texas. He entered the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1907 but was discharged after five years for academic deficiency. He continued his studies at Catholic University in Washington, D.C.; graduated in 1912; and obtained a cavalry commission that November. During World War I, Captain Allen commanded a battalion in the 90th Division in France and was wounded several times. He returned from France as a major and attended army schools, the last being the Army War College in 1935. On August 1, 1935, Allen was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

On October 1, 1940, Allen, who never held the rank of colonel, was promoted to brigadier general, and in June 1942, he was promoted to major general. He took command of the 1st Infantry Division in August. Allen led his division through the training buildup for Operation TORCH (the invasion of North Africa on November 8, 1942) and in the subsequent campaigns in Tunisia during 1943 and Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943). Known as a tough, inspirational commander, Allen was revered by the men of the 1st Infantry Division (the “Big Red One”). As a result of his unswerving advocacy of his division and incidents that suggested toleration of lack of discipline, however, Allen and his assistant division commander, Brigadier General

Theodore Roosevelt Jr., were removed from command following the attack on Troina, Sicily (July 31–August 6, 1943).

Allen then returned to the United States to organize and train the 104th Infantry Division (Timberwolves). He took the division to France in September 1944, where they fought alongside his beloved Big Red One. Allen was restored to division combat command because he was an effective fighter and a distinguished soldier. After successful campaigns in Central Europe, Allen took his Timberwolves home in June 1945. Allen retired in August 1946 and died in El Paso, Texas, on September 12, 1969.

JOHN F. VOTAW

See also

Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr.; Sicily, Invasion of; torch, Operation; Tunisia Campaign

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Allied Military Tribunals after the War

Following the conclusion of World War II, leading figures of the German and Japanese governments and armed forces were prosecuted on war crimes charges. The trials of the principal figures took place at Nuremberg in Germany and Tokyo in Japan.

In August 1945, representatives of the British, French, U.S., and Soviet governments, meeting in London, signed an agreement creating the International Military Tribunal and set ground rules for the trial. To avoid using words such as "law" or "code," the document was named "The London Charter of the International Military Tribunal." It combined elements of Anglo-American and continental European law. Defendants' rights and the rules of evidence differed in several ways from those in American courtrooms.

The four nations issued indictments against 24 persons and six organizations in October 1945. The counts of the charges were as follows: (1) conspiracy to wage aggressive war; (2) waging aggressive war, or crimes against peace; (3) war crimes; and (4) crimes against humanity. Of 21 defendants (it was decided that Hitler, Himmler, and Goeb-bels would not be tried posthumously), 3 were acquitted, 12 were sentenced to death, and the remainder received prison terms.

At the conclusion of this trial, six Nazi organizations were charged: the Sturmabteilungen (SA), the Reichsregierung (cabinet of the Reich), the General Staff and high command of the German armed forces, the Schutzstaffel (SS, bodyguard units), the Gestapo, and the Corps of the Political Leaders of the Nazi Party. The first organization was not convicted, and the next two had so few members that the Allies decided simply to deal with the individuals who had belonged to these organizations. The last three organizations were found guilty, making it possible later to convict individuals on the basis of having belonged to them.

On December 9, 1946, the so-called Doctors' Trial opened, conducted by the Allies. It dealt with individuals associated with the Nazi euthanasia program (T4). A total of 23 individuals were indicted for their involvement. On August 20, 1947, the court proclaimed 16 of them guilty; 7 were sentenced to death and executed on June 2, 1948. In secondary trials before that, 22 of 31 doctors charged were found guilty and sentenced to death at Buchenwald, the concentration camp where many of their crimes were committed.

The Allied occupying powers also conducted individual war crimes trials in their zones of occupation. The Americans scheduled more than 169,000 trials. Although fewer were actually held, the Americans did sentence 9,000 Germans to prison terms, and others were fined. The British and French were not greatly interested in prosecuting war criminals; the British held 2,296 trials in their zone. The Soviet Union was perhaps the least interested in such legal proceedings but executed by far the most individuals.

Trials continued under the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) but with little punishment for the guilty. Alfred Krupp served only three years in prison for conscripting slave labor in his industrial enterprises, and on his release his business empire was restored to him. The chemical firm I. G. Farben was not broken up. (It was, however, liquidated in 1952.) From 1975

to 1981, the government prosecuted 16 individuals associated with the Majdanek concentration camp. Only 1 person was found guilty of murder, and 5 were acquitted.

In January 1946, General Douglas MacArthur approved a charter to inaugurate the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), which was dominated by the United States. On May 3, 1946, the IMTFE opened with the trial of 28 of 80 Class A Japanese war criminals at Tokyo. The hearings covered crimes that occurred between 1928 and the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The indictments were based on the concept of war crimes that had been stipulated at Nuremberg—that is, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggressive war. In the Tokyo proceedings, however, there was no assumption of collective guilt as in the case of Germany, and thus no organizations were charged.

Of the 28 defendants, 19 were professional military men and 9 were civilians. The prosecution team was made up of justices from 11 Allied nations: Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Indictments accused the defendants of promoting a plan of conquest, and the commission of both war crimes and crimes against humanity.

On November 4, 1948, the sentences were meted out: 2 defendants had died, 1 was considered insane, 7 were sentenced to death, 16 were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the rest were given jail terms. Japanese emperor Hirohito, in whose name so many war crimes had been committed, was not charged. A second group of 23 men and a third group of 19 men were never brought to trial; they were released in 1947 and 1948, respectively. All those sentenced to prison were released over the next several years. No trials of the infamous Japanese Unit 731, which would have been akin to the Doctors' Trial in Germany, were conducted. This was because of a bargain struck by the U.S. government to drop prosecution in return for all information on experiments in germ and biological warfare on human guinea pigs, including U.S. prisoners of war.

The British carried out minor war crimes trials of Japanese nationals in Southeast Asia, and other countries also held war crimes trials for individuals guilty of these offenses in their national territories. In China, there were trials in 10 locations.

THOMAS J. WEILER

See also

Bataan Death March; Cairo Conference; Germany, Postwar Occupation of; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Holocaust; International Military Tribunal, Far East; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Japan, Occupation of; MacArthur, Douglas; Moscow Conference; Potsdam Conference; Prisoners of War; Unit 731, Japanese Army; United Nations, Formation of; United Nations Declaration

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ALPHABET, Operation (June 5–8, 1940)

Evacuation of Allied troops from Norway. Although the Allies had retaken Narvik on May 28, the overall Norwegian Campaign was going poorly for them, and more important, the Germans had invaded the Low Countries and France on May 10 and were overrunning both. This prompted the Allied decision on May 24 to evacuate the 25,000 men remaining in northern Norway. The evacuation force included the British aircraft carriers *Ark Royal* and *Glorious*, the British cruisers *Southampton* and *Coventry*, 16 destroyers, and numerous other smaller warships, transports, and cargo vessels. The evacuation began on June 5 and was completed by June 8. Another British cruiser, the *Devonshire*, evacuated the Norwegian royal family and government, and it sailed under radio silence independently for Scapa Flow.

Captain Guy D'Oyly-Hughes of the *Glorious* requested and received permission to proceed independently at greater speed, with the justification that his ship was short of fuel. Unknown to the British, however, the Germans had powerful forces at sea. Escorted by the destroyers *Acasta* and *Ardent*, the *Glorious* was intercepted by the German battleships *Scharnhorst*

and *Gneisenau* some 280 miles west of Harstad, Norway. The carrier had on board six Swordfish aircraft, but for reasons that will never be known, D'Oyly-Hughes did not have them aloft and was thus caught by surprise.

Homing on smoke from its stack, the two German capital ships opened fire on the *Glorious* at a range of some 27,000 yards. Before any aircraft could be launched, a German shell hit the forward hanger, destroying the Hurricanes there and preventing passage of torpedoes. The *Glorious* was soon listing and went down within 20 minutes. Although the two British destroyers were also sunk, the *Acasta* heavily damaged the *Scharnhorst* with a torpedo, and both German ships were hit repeatedly by 120mm shells. Damage was sufficient to cause the German commander, Vice Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, to order the two German battleships to steam for Trondheim, which allowed the safe passage of the *Ark Royal* and the remainder of the British evacuation transport and store convoys later that same day, sailing without battleship protection.

The eventual loss in lives from the three British warships was 1,519 men (1,474 Royal Navy and 49 Royal Air Force); only 45 men survived, 39 of them picked up by a Norwegian ship, while 6 others became prisoners of the Germans. The remaining British forces made it safely to Scapa Flow.

One consequence of the evacuation was increased German pressure on both Sweden and Finland, leading to an agreement in June whereby the government in Stockholm permitted unarmed German troops to transit Sweden on its railroads, that country's major departure from neutrality during the war.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Marschall, Wilhelm; Scapa Flow

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Alsace Campaign (November 1944–January 1945)

Allied campaign to capture Alsace from German forces. Formidable barriers to the east and west protected the plains of Alsace from invasion; to the east was the Rhine River and to the west the Vosges Mountains. The two primary gaps in the Vosges were the Belfort Gap and the Saverne Gap, with the former defying capture by the German Army both in 1870 and 1914. The vaunted Wehrmacht did what past German armies failed to do when Panzer Group Guderian penetrated the Belfort Gap in the French Campaign of 1940. German forces occupied Alsace until the Allied campaign of winter 1944–1945.

French troops during the fighting to secure Alsace in 1944. (Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

The Alsace Campaign was a joint American-French campaign to capture Alsace and reach the Rhine River. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), had low expectations for the campaign in Alsace; its attention was focused on the battles to the north involving the 12th and 21st Army Groups. Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, commander of the Allied 6th Army Group, exercised overall control. His forces consisted of the U.S. Seventh Army under Lieutenant General Alexander Patch and the

French First Army under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. The VI and XV Corps made up the Seventh Army, and the First French Army consisted of the I and II Corps.

Opposing was the German Nineteenth Army under General of Infantry Friedrich Wiese. His army consisted of eight infantry divisions, six of which would be nearly destroyed in the campaign. Wiese's most reliable unit was the 11th Panzer Division. Ultimate control of the German forces, however, was in the hands of Army Group G commander General of Panzer Troops Hermann Balck.

General Devers was to clear the Germans from his front and secure crossings over the Rhine River. In the 6th Army Group zone, General Patch's XV Corps, commanded by Major General Wade Haislip, held the left, or northern, flank and was linked up with Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third Army of the 12th Army Group. Next in line was VI Corps under Major General Edward Brooks, who took over when Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott was reassigned. Holding the southern flank was the First French Army; this was also the southern flank of the entire Allied line.

The campaign was to begin in coordination with the fighting to the north. XV Corps was to jump off on November 13, 1944, and capture Sarrebourg and the Saverne Gap and then exploit its gains eastward while at the same time protecting Patton's flank. (Patton's offensive started on November 8.) VI Corps was scheduled to begin its campaign two days after XV Corps started, or November 15. It would attack in a northeasterly direction, break out onto the Alsatian plains, capture Strasbourg, and secure the west bank of the Rhine.

Farther south, the First French Army was to commence operations on November 13. The I and II Corps would force the Belfort Gap, capture the city of Belfort, and exploit its success. There was ample opportunity for spectacular success.

XV Corps attacked in a snowstorm on November 13 with the 79th and 44th Infantry Divisions and the French 2nd Armored Division. The 79th captured Sarrebourg on November 21 and advanced so quickly that General Patch directed XV Corps to capture Strasbourg if it could get there before VI Corps. On November 23, though, elements of the French 2nd Armored Division liberated Strasbourg, capital of Alsace.

VI Corps began its attack on November 15 with the 3rd, 36th, 100th, and

103rd Infantry Divisions and achieved similar success. Crossing the Meurthe River, the 100th Infantry Division penetrated the German “Winter Line” on November 19; the position quickly crumbled.

The attack in the First French Army sector began on November 13. The French troops successfully breached the Belfort Gap, and elements of the 1st Armored Division of I Corps reached the Rhine on November 19, the first Allied troops in the 6th Army Group zone to do so.

In the midst of this success in the 6th Army Group zone, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and General Omar N. Bradley, commanding the 12th Army Group, met with Devers and Patch on November 24. The result was an order for the Seventh Army to turn northward and attack the West Wall (the series of fortifications protecting Germany’s western frontier) along with Patton’s Third Army. The XV and VI Corps, minus two divisions, were subsequently turned northward while the First French Army and the 3rd and 36th Infantry Divisions focused their attention on German troops around the city of Colmar.

The attack northward began on December 5, with XV Corps on the left and VI Corps on the right. After 10 days of heavy fighting, elements of VI Corps entered Germany on December 15. The 100th Infantry Division’s effort around the French city of Bitche was so fierce that it was given the sobriquet “Sons of Bitche.” The Seventh Army offensive was halted on December 20 to enable it to cooperate with the Allied defense in the Ardennes.

The German troops in the 6th Army Group front planned an offensive for late December 1944, known as Operation NORDWIND. Just before midnight on New Year’s Eve, the onslaught commenced. Through much of January 1945, the attack forced Allied troops to give ground. Eisenhower even toyed with the idea of abandoning Strasbourg, but General Charles de Gaulle vehemently opposed such a plan. The city was held, and by January 25, the offensive petered out and the German forces withdrew.

With the attack defeated, the only Wehrmacht troops remaining in Alsace were located around Colmar. The First French Army was assigned the responsibility of reducing the Colmar pocket, and it began this task on January 20, 1945. I Corps attacked the southern flank of the pocket, while II Corps assaulted the northern flank. The plan was for the two forces to meet at the Rhine, enveloping the pocket. On February 2, Colmar was captured, and

by February 5 German resistance had ended. The campaign in Alsace was over. Although overshadowed by the 12th and 21st Army Groups to the north, General Devers's 6th Army Group had achieved an important accomplishment.

CHRISTOPHER C. MEYERS

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Balck, Hermann; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Colmar Pocket, Battle for the; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; Devers, Jacob Loucks; Eisenhower, Dwight David; France Campaign; nordwind, Operation; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.

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Altmark Incident (February 16, 1940)

World War II Royal Navy seizure of a German merchant ship within Norwegian territorial waters. The *Altmark* was a supply ship serving the German pocket battleship *Graf Spee* in the South Atlantic. The *Altmark* also became a prison ship, taking aboard survivors from the nine ships sunk by the *Graf Spee.*

Since the outbreak of war, ships of the Royal Navy had been searching for the *Graf Spee* and its supply ships. On December 13, 1939, in the Battle of Río de la Plata, British cruisers located the *Graf Spee* and damaged it. Believing that the British had assembled a superior force, Captain Hans W.

Langsdorff of the *Graf Spee* scuttled his ship. The *Altmark*, which had refueled the pocket battleship just prior to its last fight, departed the South Atlantic in late January 1940 for Hamburg. Commanded by Captain Heinrich Dau, it reached the Norwegian coast on February 12, 1940.

On February 14, the *Altmark* entered Norwegian territorial waters at Trondheim. Although Norwegian naval vessels twice stopped the *Altmark*, Dau hid his ship's guns below and claimed he had no prisoners on board. He resisted any effort to search his ship on grounds it was a German naval ship, immune to search. Despite misgivings and suspecting the nature of the cargo, the Norwegians allowed the *Altmark* to proceed. Norwegian officials did not want to create an incident that might be used to precipitate a German invasion of their neutral country.

Word of events, however, reached the British embassy at Oslo, and the naval attaché there informed the British Admiralty of the situation. On February 16, 1940, after British planes had located the *Altmark*, Captain Philip Vian's destroyer flotilla cornered the *Altmark* near Jössing fjord within Norwegian territorial waters. The Norwegian gunboat *Skarv* hampered the British ships' efforts to force *Altmark* to sea, and the German supply ship then slipped into the fjord.

In London, meanwhile, the War Cabinet met concerning the situation and the reports that the *Altmark* had on board some 300 British seamen, who were in fact being held belowdecks in difficult conditions. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill personally authorized the boarding and search of the *Altmark* and the liberation of its prisoners.

At 11:00 p.m. on February 16, Vian's flagship, the destroyer *Cossack*, entered the fjord. Dau tried to ram the British destroyer, but expert British ship handling saved the *Cossack* from damage. As the two ships brushed together, some of the boarding party leaped across to the German ship. The *Cossack* then again closed and the remainder of the boarding party followed, while the *Cossack* backed clear. In a brief fight, 7 crew members of the *Altmark* were killed and 299 British prisoners were freed.

The *Altmark* incident was certainly an infringement of Norway's neutrality by Britain. Neutral countries could no longer be certain of their inviolability in this war. This incident caused German chancellor Adolf Hitler on February 19 to order an acceleration in his plans to invade Norway, Operation WESERÜBUNG. After they had conquered Norway, the Germans

erected a commemorative marker at Jössing fjord reading (in German), “Here on February 16, 1940, the *Altmark* was attacked by British sea-pirates.”

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm; Norway; Río de la Plata, Battle of; WESERÜBUNG, Operation

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Amau Doctrine (1934)

Japanese foreign policy tenet enunciated on April 17, 1934, that preserved Japan’s right to act unilaterally to keep peace and order in East Asia and to assert its predominance in China. The Amau Doctrine, named after Foreign Ministry spokesman Amau Eiji, was viewed as Japan’s version of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, by which U.S. policy makers announced that their nation would not tolerate foreign meddling in the Americas.

The Amau Doctrine in fact codified trends in Japanese foreign policy that dated back to the turn of the century. An up-and-coming world power certainly since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which resulted in a decisive Japanese victory, Japan had systematically begun to assert its supremacy over large portions of East Asia, beginning with Korea in 1910. Before long, Japan had also begun seeking preferential and exclusive rights in China. In 1931, Japan unilaterally annexed Chinese Manchuria, renaming it Manchukuo. This was accomplished amid the dire dislocations of the Great Depression, a time in which the Western powers were mired in isolationism. Thus, there was little more than rhetorical opposition to the bold Japanese move.

The Amau Doctrine was designed chiefly to solidify Japan’s hold on Manchuria and to announce its intention to penetrate China more deeply in the future, thus helping to complete its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity”

sphere. The doctrine was also quite clearly meant to repudiate the old "Open Door Policy" in China, which was first conceptualized by the British in the aftermath of the First Opium War (1839–1843). That policy was formally codified by U.S. secretary of state John Hay at the turn of the 20th century via his "Open Door Notes" to the major world powers then vying for influence in China. In essence, Hay announced that all nations should have equal access to commerce and trade within China. Clearly, the Japanese no longer intended to abide by Hay's antiquated tenet.

The Amau Doctrine was also prompted by the global economic downturn of the early 1930s, during which Japan had seen its international trade shrink dramatically as trade barriers went up worldwide. By turning China into a client state, the Japanese hoped to shore up their finances and use China as a wellspring of raw materials that the resource-poor Japan badly needed. In addition, the doctrine was meant as a warning to the Soviets, who had begun to move troops into areas adjacent to Manchuria.

Specifically, Amau announced that the Chinese did not have the right to ask for foreign assistance or to actively resist Japanese control. Further, any outside power seeking to do business in China had to consult Japan first. The other major world powers did not act to reverse the annexation of Manchuria, nor did they actively protest the Amau Doctrine. Instead, they hoped—rather quixotically—that the Soviets would act as a check on Japanese imperialism. The Soviets, however, did little more than protest. In the end, the Amau Doctrine cleared the way for Japan's full invasion of China in 1937, another move that went largely unanswered by the other world powers.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

China; Japan; Soviet Union

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Ambrosio, Vittorio (1879–1958)

Italian Army general. Born in Turin on July 28, 1879, Vittorio Ambrosio joined the army in 1901 and served in the cavalry during the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War. From 1915 to 1918 he was in charge of the 3rd Cavalry Division. His postwar career advanced steadily, culminating in command of the Second Army in 1939.

Ambrosio commanded Italian occupation forces in Yugoslavia following the German invasion of that country in April 1941. Appointed army chief of staff in January 1942, Ambrosio became involved in efforts to oust Marshal Ugo Cavallero, the inept supreme command chief of staff. In February 1943, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini finally sacked Cavallero and replaced him with Ambrosio.

As the new chief, Ambrosio established three major goals: to pull back to Italy proper as much of the overextended army as possible, dig in his heels against the Germans and their demands, and lighten the top-heavy high command. He failed to achieve any of the three. Although the broken remnants of Italian forces in the Soviet Union were eventually repatriated, Mussolini refused to sanction an Italian withdrawal from North Africa or from the Balkans. Ambrosio's attempts to adopt a firmer posture vis-à-vis the Germans only antagonized Italy's ally, and his attempts to restructure the high command foundered on the firmly embedded military bureaucracy.

Meanwhile, Italy's war effort staggered toward collapse. In May 1943, remaining Axis forces in North Africa surrendered in Tunisia, and in July, the Allies invaded Sicily. Skeptical both of Italy's prospects for victory and of the alliance with Germany, Ambrosio urged Mussolini to stand up to Adolf Hitler and quit the war. Rebuffed, Ambrosio played a major role in the coup against Mussolini on July 24–25, 1943, by ensuring the army's support. Subsequently, Ambrosio supported Marshal Pietro Badoglio's attempts to conduct armistice negotiations with the Allies while also trying to persuade the Germans that Italy would remain in the war.

The Allied armistice proclamation on September 8, 1943, forced Ambrosio to flee from Rome with Badoglio. He escaped German vengeance but left the army leaderless. He resigned on November 18, 1943, and became army inspector general until his retirement in November 1944. Ambrosio died in Alessio, Italy, on November 20, 1958.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; Cavallero, Ugo, Conte; Hitler, Adolf; Italy, Army; Mussolini, Benito

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America First Committee (1940–1942)

Leading U.S. anti-interventionist organization prior to the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The America First Committee was established in July 1940 as the presidential election approached. Both Republicans and Democrats nominated pro-Allied candidates, but some prominent Americans were convinced that the United States was in grave danger of being needlessly and foolishly drawn into World War II. The organization's founders included several midwestern businessmen, including Robert E. Wood of Sears, Roebuck & Company and Robert Douglas Stuart of Quaker Oats, who provided much of the organization's financial support.

Most America First members were midwestern Republicans, many from the party's conservative wing. Some, however, such as Governor Philip La Follette of Wisconsin and Senator Gerald P. Nye, were political liberals or even leftist radicals. America First also included a contingent of liberal Democrats, such as Chester Bowles and Kingman Brewster of Connecticut and the radical historian Charles A. Beard. Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, the famed aviator, was its most celebrated member, and former president Herbert Hoover, although he held aloof so as not to compromise his efforts to feed children in occupied Western Europe, sympathized strongly with the group's stance.

America First members generally united around the belief that the European crisis did not threaten the security of the United States sufficiently to justify intervention. They also believed that American involvement in war would be highly detrimental domestically. While supporting measures to

strengthen U.S. defenses, they generally opposed, albeit with little success—especially after President Franklin D. Roo-se-velt's electoral victory in November 1940—many measures the administration introduced. The latter included the establishment of the Selective Service (September 1940), the 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement, Lend-Lease (March 1941 military aid program to various nations), and the administration's aggressive naval policies against Germany in the Atlantic. America First members opposed these on the grounds that they were moving the United States ever closer to war with Germany. After Pearl Harbor, America First members, despite lingering private misgivings over past administration policies, largely rallied around the wartime president. On April 22, 1942, the organization was officially dissolved.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Fight for Freedom; Lend-Lease; Lindbergh, Charles Augustus; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Selective Service Act

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American Battle Monuments Commission

Independent agency of the U.S. government created by Congress in 1923 to commemorate and memorialize the service and sacrifice of America's armed forces since 1917. General of the Armies John J. "Black Jack" Pershing was the prime mover behind the establishment of the American Battle

Monuments Commission. He believed that the United States should formally memorialize its soldiers who had served in World War I. The commission was designed to begin its work retroactively to April 6, 1917, the day on which the United States formally entered the conflict.

Since its founding in 1923, the commission has established and maintained 24 permanent military cemeteries overseas and has designed or supervised the design of memorials and shrines to America's fallen soldiers on foreign soil. The commission deals principally with soldiers lost during World War I and World War II; it also maintains one small cemetery in Mexico City that holds the remains of approximately 750 U.S. soldiers who died during the 1846–1848 Mexican-American War.

In all, the cemeteries under the commission's purview include nearly 125,000 graves, while an additional 94,000 soldiers missing in action are memorialized on tablets, markers, and other monuments. The American Battle Monuments Commission currently supervises European cemeteries in France, Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands dedicated to soldiers killed in both world wars. In Asia, the commission operates the Manila American Cemetery and Memorial in the Philippines, dedicated to World War II soldiers. In Tunisia, North Africa, it maintains a cemetery and memorials to World War II soldiers. Finally, it operates a cemetery in Panama.

In addition to cemeteries, the commission has established and continues to maintain battle and other monuments in Belgium, Cuba, France, Gibraltar, Mariana Islands, Morocco, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the United States (New York City, Honolulu, and Washington, D.C.). From 1923 until his death in 1948, Pershing served as chairman of the commission. Thereafter, all subsequent chairmen have been four-star U.S. Army officers. Besides its chairman, the commission has 11 other members, appointed by the president at regular intervals, and a secretary-general, also appointed by the president.

Virtually all of the cemeteries are visually stunning, located in prime locations, and feature large white granite or marble monuments and row upon row of perfectly aligned white headstones usually in the form of a cross or the Star of David. In nearly all of the cemeteries, separate memorials list the names of those missing in action.

Burial grounds dedicated specifically to those who served in World War

II include five in France (Brittany, Epinal, Lorraine, Normandy, and Rhone), one in Great Britain (Cambridge), two in Belgium (Ardennes and Henri-Chapelle), two in Italy (Sicily-Rome and Florence), one in Luxembourg, one in the Philippines (Manila), and one in Tunisia. The commission also maintains a number of monuments to World War II soldiers in the United States, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, France, New Guinea, the Mariana Islands, and Morocco.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also
Casualties

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American Volunteer Group

See Flying Tigers

Amphibious Warfare

The projection of sea-based ground forces onto land. Amphibious warfare was more widely conducted in World War II than in any previous conflict and on a greater scale than ever before or since. Involving all aspects of naval and military operations—from mine warfare to air and ground combat—amphibious operations are the most complex and risky of all military endeavors. The basic principles had been established during World War I and the postwar period, but the lessons were largely ignored by most military leaders, except those in the Soviet Union, the U.S. Marine Corps, and Germany's Landungspionieren (Landing Pioneers). The Royal Navy

concluded that the British Gallipoli operation had demonstrated the great difficulty of a successful amphibious assault in modern war.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Navy and Japanese Army developed separate procedures, forces, and equipment to conduct amphibious operations, and they had the good fortune to carry out their early assaults from 1937 against undefended beaches in China and at the beginning of the Pacific war. The German Navy had no interest in amphibious operations before the war, but, ironically, Germany initiated the war's first large-scale amphibious operation when it invaded Norway in April 1940. It was the Allies, however, who demonstrated true mastery of the amphibious art. In the end, they landed more than 4 million troops in five major amphibious assaults, dozens of tactical landings, and countless raids along German-occupied coasts of Europe. Amphibious operations provided the Western Allies with their only means of taking the ground war to the European Axis countries. In the Pacific theater, there could be no Allied victory without amphibious warfare.

Amphibious operations come in three levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—depending on the intended objectives. The Allied landings in France, the Philippines, and Italy and the planned invasion of Japan are examples of strategic landings intended to have decisive impact on the war. The November 8, 1942, North African landings (Operation torch), the German assaults in the Dodecanese Islands beginning on October 3, 1943, and most of the Allied assaults in the Pacific were operational-level landings that supported a specific campaign, each part of an overall strategic effort. Soviet landings and most Allied commando raids were tactical-level operations for limited objectives, although some had a strategic impact (capturing German codes, radars, and so on). The Dunkerque (May 26–June 4, 1940) and Crete (May 1941) evacuations are difficult to categorize, but most observers would describe them as operational-level efforts.

Amphibious operations fall into four types: raids, assaults, evacuations, and administrative (noncombat) landings. The first of these is the most dangerous, as it generally is executed against superior enemy forces and involves elements of both an assault and an evacuation. An administrative landing is the safest, being conducted in a benign environment with no enemy ground, air, or naval forces present. Assaults and evacuations face varying levels of risk, depending on the defender's strength and support. The 1940 German invasion of Norway is an example of an assault, although many of its

forces came ashore in circumstances approaching that of an administrative landing. Britain's Dunkerque evacuation was the war's first major combat evacuation, while Germany's naval evacuation of its forces from the Baltic in the war's final months was the conflict's largest such operation.

An LVT-2 Water Buffalo amphibious tractor loaded with marines churns its way through the water for Tinian Island in the Marianas, July 1944. (National Archives)

In 1939 the German Army was the only service to recognize the need to rehearse landings and procedures for a specific landing. By 1943, every major military leader realized the necessity to practice for a specific landing. Then, as today, amphibious operations were broken down into five phases: (1) planning, (2) embarkation, (3) rehearsal, (4) movement to the objective area, and (5) the assault. Soviet doctrine added a sixth phase, the landing of the follow-on army forces.

Germany did not generate a capacity to land troops against determined opposition until well into 1942. By then, Germany's strategic situation precluded such operations except in limited and special circumstances, such as the landings on Kos and Leros during the Dodecanese Campaign. Despite its prewar aversion to amphibious operations, the German Navy conducted the war's largest amphibious evacuation.

Conducted during the war's final six months under desperate circumstances of Soviet air superiority and naval parity, Germany's withdrawal of more than 2 million troops, civilians, and critical equipment from the Baltic area is one of the war's more remarkable military achievements. Nonetheless, amphibious warfare was never more than a useful adjunct to German military operations and usually was conducted as an ad hoc affair before 1942.

Necessarily, the Japanese military was much interested in amphibious warfare in the 1930s. The Japanese pioneered development of ramp-front-end landing craft, later copied by other countries, including the United States. The Imperial Japanese Army used amphibious landings to outflank British forces in Malaya and to invade the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and other Pacific islands. In Malaya and the Philippines, the army used its own ships and land-based aircraft to support operations, receiving little or no assistance from the navy other than to have its ships attack those of enemy naval forces. The Japanese Navy had its own specialized naval landing troops to execute its amphibious assaults on Wake Island and other Pacific islands. The assault on the Dutch East Indies was the only time Japan's two services cooperated in executing an amphibious invasion, and there, as in Malaya, the landing beaches were not defended. In cases where the beaches were defended, the Japanese suffered heavy losses, as at Wake.

The Soviet Union had a specialized amphibious force of naval infantry at war's start, but it lacked equipment and training. Soviet amphibious forces were expected to land on the beach using ships' boats or other improvised transport. Soviet doctrine called for naval infantry to conduct amphibious raids and support the army's landing by seizing and holding the beachhead while conventional forces disembarked behind them. Although this approach economized on the number of troops requiring specialized amphibious assault training, it proved costly in combat, because any delays in the follow-on landing left the naval infantry dangerously exposed to counterattack. As a result, Soviet naval infantry suffered heavy casualties in their amphibious assaults, but one can argue that they led the Allied way in these operations.

On September 23, 1941, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet conducted the Allies' first amphibious assault, when Captain Sergei Gorshkov landed a naval infantry regiment against the coastal flanks of the Romanian forces besieging Odessa. The action temporarily eliminated the Romanian threat to the city's

harbor. In fact, amphibious raids and assaults figured prominently in Soviet naval operations along Germany's Black and Arctic Sea flanks, with the Soviets conducting more than 150 amphibious raids and assaults during the war.

There was little to no cross-fertilization of ideas or lessons learned among the Allied powers regarding amphibious landings, particularly between the European and Pacific theaters. This largely was due to the respective service leaders' antipathy and parochialism, but the primary contributing factor was the differing military challenges posed by the Japanese and European Axis countries. The Japanese Army had few mechanized units, no heavy tanks, and little artillery, but it was much better at camouflage and improvised defenses than the Germans or Italians. The Germans, conversely, rapidly reinforced their beach defenders with heavily mechanized forces and heavy artillery, and they employed more extensive minefields and beach obstacles than did the Japanese. These differences shaped Allied doctrine and tactics in their respective theaters.

Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill forced Britain to develop an amphibious warfare capability with the formation of Combined Operations Command. Beginning in June 1940, this organization conducted amphibious commando raids along the coasts of German-occupied Europe. Gradually, such amphibious raids became more effective as lessons were learned, expertise expanded, and training improved.

Britain's assault tactics and equipment were driven primarily by lessons learned from the unsuccessful Dieppe Raid on August 19, 1942. The beach obstacles, extensive minefield belts, and overlapping antitank and artillery fire proved devastating, suggesting to the British a need for specialized vehicles and equipment. Those "funnies," as they came to be known, were ready by the June 6, 1944, Normandy landings but not in time for the earlier Allied landings in North Africa (1942) and Italy (1943).

The U.S. Army, present in only a limited capacity at Dieppe, saw little requirement for specialized amphibious equipment other than landing craft, but it did see a need to remove beach obstacles and isolate the beachhead from enemy reinforcement. The smaller land areas and the lack of a heavily mechanized counterattack threat obviated the need to isolate Pacific assault beaches from reinforcements. Hence, airborne operations were not endemic

to Pacific theater amphibious assaults, although they were planned for the invasion of Japan.

Operation torch in North Africa on November 8, 1942, was the Western Allies' first amphibious assault against a defended beach in the European theater, albeit not a heavily contested one; however, it did provide the foundations for U.S. amphibious warfare doctrine in Europe. The torch landings saw the first employment of underwater demolition teams (UDTs) and the specialized amphibious landing ships that were so critical to getting forces ashore quickly. The tank landing ships were particularly important since they enabled tanks to land directly on the assault beach.

Although many mistakes were made in the planning and execution of torch, it established the basic foundations for all future Allied assaults in the west. All subsequent landings were preceded by special forces, such as UDTs and commandos, to remove obstacles and seize key terrain and defensive features before the main assault force approached the beach. Operation TORCH also exposed the need to rehearse the actual landings well in advance of the assault to ensure a smooth and rapid disembarkation.

Costly Allied naval antiaircraft fire against Allied aircraft carrying the airborne assault force during the Sicily landing (Operation husky) of July 9–August 22, 1943, demonstrated the need for reliable coordination and identification procedures. The operation involved two armies—one British and one U.S.—of two corps each. The six-week battle for Sicily opened the 1943–1945 Italian Campaign and drove Benito Mussolini from power; however, it was a close-run affair.

The Germans launched an armored counterattack on the landing's second day, July 10, that nearly cut the beachhead in half and was stopped only by intensive naval gunfire support. The Germans' near success convinced Allied planners that the early assault waves needed tanks, placing a premium on tank-landing ships in naval construction.

Additional lessons about air and naval support were gained there and at the September 9, 1943, Salerno landings (Operation avalanche), where naval gunfire support proved critical to stopping German armored counterattacks. More significantly, procedures and equipment were developed to accelerate the pace of force buildup ashore. That it was a successful effort can best be measured by the success of the Normandy landings (Operations NEPTUNE and OVERLORD) on June 6, 1944, that placed six divisions ashore in less than 24

hours and nearly 1 million men and their equipment in France in less than a week—a phenomenal accomplishment. The subsequent August 15, 1944, landings in southern France (Operation DRAGOON) were not as large, landing fewer than 250,000 troops, but were equally impressive and, coming only two months after the Normandy landings, highlighted the Allies' growing amphibious capacity.

The U.S. Marine Corps landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in August 1942 marked the first U.S. offensive actions in the war. The Japanese failure to defend the beaches masked the planning and execution errors that marked early U.S. amphibious operations. Ships were loaded for an administrative landing rather than an assault. U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps planners applied the lessons learned about combat loading their assault ships to their later assaults. Unfortunately, they did not learn about the importance of prelanding reconnaissance due to the absence of reefs and beach obstacles that enabled the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal to go smoothly. The Americans would learn that lesson at Tarawa (August 20–24, 1943) but at much greater cost.

The almost-disastrous Tarawa landing was the pivotal experience that shaped the U.S. Navy–Marine Corps team's amphibious warfare doctrine. The failure to chart and survey the offshore waters meant that hundreds of marines had to wade half a mile in shoulder-deep water under heavy Japanese fire. Casualties in the first wave amounted to more than 85 percent killed or wounded. Naval air and gunfire support was poorly planned and coordinated, leaving the marines to win by sheer force of will and superior combat cohesion ashore.

All subsequent landings employed extensive preassault UDT beach surveys. Fire-support plans were refined, and preassault advanced-force operations became more extensive and powerful. Firepower for the assaulting troops was substantially increased in terms of automatic weapons, demolitions, and flamethrowers. After Tarawa, as in Europe after Sicily, amphibious assaults in the Pacific enjoyed extensive preassault rehearsals and practice landings.

In contrast to the army's practice in Europe, the marines developed specialized amphibious vehicles and equipment to facilitate their movement ashore and to provide some armored-vehicle support to the first landing wave. Japan's adroit use of camouflage, obstacles, booby traps, and terrain

made such equipment critical to the landing's success. At a minimum, it reduced marine casualties against a determined and innovative opponent.

The U.S. Marine Corps also developed special tactics. Squads were broken down into three four-man fire teams centered on an automatic weapon to ensure more flexible employment and firepower in combat. Special teams incorporating flamethrowers and satchel charges were used to take out bunkers. More critically, the marines developed tactics to isolate fortified positions for later destruction so the landing's momentum could be maintained.

In the Pacific theater, the U.S. Army also developed its amphibious operations along different lines from its European theater counterparts and that of the marines. The U.S. Navy's VII Amphibious Force applied the lessons learned from Guadalcanal throughout the Solomon Islands and New Guinea campaigns, but Southwest Pacific theater commander General Douglas MacArthur's preference for assaulting undefended beaches away from the main objective precluded the need for extensive advanced preparation for operations. Much of this was also due to his Southwest Pacific landings on larger islands with more operational depth and landing options than those taken by the marines. Also, by the time MacArthur's forces landed at Leyte in the Philippines (October 20, 1944), the Japanese had learned not to defend at the beach, where they would give away their positions and face overwhelming U.S. naval gunfire.

The U.S. Marine Corps February 19–March 26, 1945, invasion of Iwo Jima (Operation detachment) saw the Japanese defenders adopt this new tactic. Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, the island's commander, implemented a new strategy that relied on some 1,500 interlocking strongpoints inland, designed for a battle of attrition. The 21,000 Japanese defenders dug out thousands of yards of tunnels in the soft volcanic rock. The high cost of securing the island for the marines—6,500 dead and 20,000 wounded—is testimony to its deadly success.

Operation iceberg, the U.S. invasion of Okinawa (March–June 1945), marked the Western Allies' final amphibious operation, applying the lessons learned from all the previous landings in the Pacific. More than 5,000 ships delivered two corps of more than 100,000 men onto the main island of Okinawa after a prolonged air and naval bombardment. Again, Japan chose to conduct the fight inland, making a determined stand at virtually every piece

of high ground. It was the first time the army troops had faced concentrated Japanese fortifications with only limited room to maneuver around them. Additionally, Japan mounted an unprecedented suicide campaign by kamikazes against the amphibious fleet.

The Battle of Okinawa claimed more than 107,000 Japanese and Okinawan military and civilian personnel dead. It was also the costliest battle of the Pacific war for the United States. The army lost 12,520 killed in action and 36,631 wounded. Marine casualties totaled 2,938 dead and 13,708 wounded, while the navy lost 4,907 men killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks.

The navy was the only service in the battle in which the numbers of dead exceeded the wounded. Indeed, navy casualties for this battle were greater than those for the navy in all U.S. wars to that date. Although the U.S. Navy lost no capital ships, it did suffer 34 ships sunk and 368 damaged (of these, 43 had to be scrapped). The comparatively heavy losses of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns were the basis of the heavy casualty estimates for Operation DOWNFALL, the planned invasion for Japan that influenced the decision to employ the atomic bombs.

Amphibious operations were critical to the Allied victory in the war. Lacking a land border with Axis territory after 1940, the Western Allies could never have contributed to Germany's defeat or beaten Japan had they not mastered amphibious operations, the most complex of all military activities. The war firmly established the amphibious operations procedures that are employed by all Western nations to this day.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Crete, Battle of; Dieppe Raid; DOWNFALL, Operation; DRAGOON, Operation; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kamikaze; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation

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Anami Korechika (1887–1945)

Japanese Army general and army minister. Born in Oita on February 21, 1887, Anami Korechika graduated from the Japanese Imperial Military Academy in 1905. He was advanced to major in February 1922 and to lieutenant colonel in August 1925. From 1929 to 1930, Anami served as military aide to Emperor Hirohito. Promoted to colonel in August 1930, Anami commanded the Imperial Guards Regiment during 1933–1934 and headed the Tokyo Military Preparatory School from 1934 to 1936.

Anami was promoted to major general in 1935 and to lieutenant general in March 1938, when he took command of the 109th Division. During 1940–1941, he was vice minister of war. Anami commanded the Eleventh Army in central China from April 1941 to July 1942. He next headed the Second Army in Manchuria and was promoted to full general in May 1943.

In December 1944, Anami became inspector general of army aviation. Highly regarded within the army, in April 1945 he became army minister in the government of Prime Minister Suzuki Kantarō. Anami was one of those who urged that Japan continue the war. Even after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and the Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan two days later, Anami urged Emperor Hirohito to remain in the war. Anami believed that Japan could negotiate more satisfactory terms if it could inflict heavy losses on Allied forces invading the Japanese home islands. Foreign minister Tōgō Shigenori and minister of the navy Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa opposed Anami's position.

In any case, Emperor Hirohito decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender. Anami and other hawks in the army then plotted a military coup d'état, but Anami finally agreed to accept the surrender, and this

development led to collapse of plans for a coup. Anami committed suicide in Tokyo on August 15, 1945, shortly before Hirohito's broadcast to the Japanese people announcing the Japanese surrender.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Japan, Army; Japan, Surrender of; Potsdam Conference; Suzuki Kantarō; Tōgō Shigenori; Yonai Mitsumasa

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Anders, Władysław (1892–1970)

Polish Army general. Born to a peasant family in Blonie near Warsaw on August 11, 1892, Władysław Anders graduated from Saint Petersburg Military Academy in 1917. He served in the Polish Army Corps during World War I and, during the Poznan Rising of 1918–1919, as chief of staff in the Poznan Army. He commanded a cavalry regiment during the Russo-Polish War of 1919–1920 and during 1921–1923 studied at the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris. An opponent of Józef Pisudski's coup d'état in 1926, Anders did not become a general until 1930.

In September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, Anders commanded the Nowogródek Cavalry Brigade of the Polish Modlin Army at the East Prussian border. During his brigade's subsequent withdrawal to southeastern Poland, the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east, and Anders was captured.

Imprisoned in Moscow's Lubyanka Prison, Anders was released following an understanding between the Polish government-in-exile and the Soviet Union. On July 30, 1941, General Władysław Sikorski and the Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, Ivan Majsky, agreed to restore diplomatic relations and form a Polish army on Soviet territory. That army was to be

composed of Polish soldiers detained in the Soviet Union since 1939. Anders was appointed its commander in chief with the rank of lieutenant general.

Establishing his first headquarters at Buzuluk on the Volga, Anders continued to insist on the liberation of Po-lish prisoners held by Soviet authorities, but he had only limited success. In 1942 he was allowed to move his army to Yangi-Yul, near Tashkent, and then to Pahlevi in Persia, where his troops were no longer subordinate to the Soviet Supreme Command. Linking up with the British in Iran, Anders's newly formed II Polish Corps was transferred to North Africa and Italy. There it distinguished itself as part of the British Eighth Army at Monte Cassino in May 1944. Victory here helped open the way to Rome for the Allies.

In the last stages of the war, Anders commanded all Po-lish forces in the west. After the war, he refused to return to communist-ruled Poland and became a prominent member of the Polish émigré community. Anders died in London on May 12, 1970.

PASCAL TREES

See also

Italy Campaign; Katyn Forest Massacre; Poland; Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz

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Anderson, Frederick Lewis, Jr. (1905–1969)

U.S. Army Air Forces general. Born in Kingston, New York, on October 4, 1905, Frederick Lewis Anderson Jr. graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1928 and was commissioned in the cavalry. He transferred to the Air Corps and graduated from flight school at Brooks Field,

Texas, in 1929. He then served in the Philippines and at various posts in the United States, mostly with observation squadrons.

In 1931, Anderson transferred to bombardment aviation and helped to develop strategic bombardment practices and training methods. He was promoted to captain in May 1935. In 1940, he became the first director of the Bombardiers Instruction School. During that time, he also served as head of the Bombardment Tactics Board. In January 1941, he was promoted to major.

Following a tour in Britain in 1941 studying Royal Air Force bombing operations, Anderson became deputy director of bombardment for the Army Air Forces in 1942 and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in January 1942. Anderson was promoted to brigadier general on February 7, 1943, and that July he was appointed commanding general of the VIII Bomber Command in England, serving under Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz. Anderson oversaw U.S. bombing of German U-boat pens in France and of industrial targets, including the Messerschmitt plants at Regensburg (August 17, 1943) and the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt (October 14, 1943). He also oversaw the massive bombing raids of the "Big Week" of February 20–25, 1944. Although there were heavy losses and disappointments in these raids, adjustments such as shuttle-bombing, twilight raids, and bombing through clouds helped to reduce the loss rate.

Promoted to major general on November 4, 1943, Anderson served as deputy commander of operations for Strategic Air Forces, European theater of operations, during 1944 and 1945.

Following the war, Anderson served as chief of staff for personnel of the Army Air Forces until he retired in 1947. He then worked in investment banking and served as the U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during 1952–1953. Anderson died in Houston, Texas, on March 2, 1969.

PAMELA FELTUS

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Berlin, Air Battle of; "Big Week" Air Battle; Doolittle, James Harold "Jimmy"; Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"

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Anderson, Sir Kenneth Arthur Noel (1891–1959)

British Army general. Born in Madras, India, on December 25, 1891, Kenneth Arthur Noel Anderson was commissioned in the British Army upon graduation from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1911. He served in India and was a captain by 1915. During World War I, Anderson was badly wounded in the 1916 Battle of the Somme in France. Following his recovery, he took part in campaigns in Palestine and Syria.

After the war, Anderson attended the Army Staff College at Camberley, commanded a regiment on the Northwest Frontier of India, and served in Palestine from 1930 to 1932. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1930 and to colonel in 1934, he commanded the 11th Infantry Brigade as part of the 3rd Infantry Division of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France at the beginning of World War II, having been promoted to acting brigadier in 1938. During the Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation (May 26–June 4, 1940), he took command of the 3rd Division. Promoted to major general, he held a variety of posts in the United Kingdom during the next two years, culminating in heading the Eastern Command.

In the autumn of 1942, Anderson became the senior British officer in Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower's U.S. headquarters in London. Although he was unpopular with many U.S. officers, Anderson was well liked by Eisenhower. Anderson commanded the Eastern Task Force in the Allied invasion of North Africa, Operation TORCH, beginning on November 8, 1942. Anderson's units landed at Algiers, although in respect to French sensibilities, an American, Major General Charles Ryder, had charge of the actual landing. Anderson took over the day after the landing, and on November 11, 1942, he became head of the newly constituted British First Army and was concurrently promoted to lieutenant general. Anderson's

acerbic nature and dour personality tinged with pessimism did not suit him for command of an Allied force, however.

Ordered to advance quickly eastward to Tunis, 500 miles away, Anderson had only four brigades at his disposal. Rugged terrain, poor weather, stiffening Axis defenses, and lack of transportation thwarted his offensive, which was stopped 12 miles short of its goal. In January 1943, Eisenhower added to Anderson's command the Free French XIX Corps and Major General Lloyd Fredenhall's U.S. II Corps. German field marshal Erwin Rommel and Colonel General Hans Jürgen von Arnim then launched a series of counterattacks, most notably at Kasserine Pass during February 14–22, that threw the Allied armies into disarray. Although there were efforts to replace Anderson, he remained in command of the First Army, and his troops entered Tunis in May 1943.

Anderson returned to Britain to assume command of the British Second Army in June 1943 and began to plan for the invasion of France. In January 1944, however, he was shifted to the Eastern Command. From January 1945 to October 1946, Anderson headed the East Africa Command. During 1947–1952, he was governor and commander in chief of Gibraltar. Promoted to full general in 1949, he retired in 1952. Anderson died at Gibraltar on April 29, 1959.

DANA LOMBARDY AND T. P. SCHWEIDER

See also

Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Fredendall, Lloyd Ralston; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; torch, Operation; Tunis, Battle of; Tunisia Campaign

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Andrews, Frank Maxwell (1884–1943)

U.S. Army Air Forces general. Born in Nashville, Tennessee, on February 3, 1884, Frank Andrews graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1906 and was commissioned in the cavalry. He then held routine assignments in the American West, Hawaii, and the Philippines. In July 1916, he was promoted to captain. When the United States entered World War I in 1917, Andrews transferred to the Signal Corps, and in 1918 he qualified as a military aviator, although too late to see active service in France. That same year he was promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel. On July 1, 1920, Andrews was promoted to major (permanent). In mid-1920, he succeeded Brigadier General William Mitchell as the Air Service officer of the American Army of Occupation in Germany.

Returning to the United States in 1923, Andrews then commanded the 1st Pursuit Group. He established several speed and altitude records until transferred to staff assignments. Andrews was promoted to lieutenant colonel on January 13, 1930. On March 1, 1935, he was promoted to temporary brigadier general and assigned to command General Headquarters (GHQ), Air Force. The new organization placed for the first time all the U.S. Army's air-strike elements under a single commander. Andrews became a strong advocate of the four-engine strategic bomber that became the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, and he was certainly one of the leading architects of American military airpower in the years before World War II.

Andrews molded GHQ, Air Force, into the offensive combat arm that became the model for the U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II. GHQ, Air Force, was also the model of the U.S. Air Force's post–Cold War Air Combat Command. On December 26, 1935, Andrews was promoted to temporary major general.

In 1937, Andrews clashed with elements in the army General Staff when he forcefully advocated an air force as an independent service during testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee. In 1939, he was reassigned to an insignificant staff position at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and reduced from his temporary rank of major general to the permanent rank of colonel. Just a few months later, though, General George C. Marshall became chief of staff of the army; Marshall brought Andrews back to Washington

and made him assistant chief of staff of the army for training and operations. Andrews was the first aviator to hold that key General Staff position.

U.S. Army Air Forces lieutenant general Frank M. Andrews was an articulate and vocal proponent of American air power, particularly with respect to strategic aircraft and the heavy bombers that demolished German and Japanese industry in World War II. (Library of Congress)

In 1941, Andrews took over the Caribbean Defense Command, becoming the first American air officer to command a theater. In November 1942, he assumed command of U.S. forces in the Middle East. On February 5, 1943, Andrews became the supreme commander of U.S. forces in the European theater of operations (ETO). Three months later on May 3, Lieutenant General Andrews died at the controls of a B-24 bomber while attempting a landing at Kaldadarnes, Iceland, in conditions of poor visibility.

Andrews's appointment to command the ETO was a tacit recognition that most of the American forces in Europe at the time were air rather than ground

units. Many contemporary observers at the time of his death considered him, rather than Dwight Eisenhower, the leading candidate for supreme Allied command of the invasion of the continent. Andrews had the complete confidence of General Marshall and possessed an almost ideal balance of intellect, character, courage, and military skill. Andrews Air Force Base (now Joint Base Andrews) in Maryland was later named for him.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Marshall, George Catlett; United States Army Air Forces

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Angelis, Maximilian de (1889–1974)

German Army general. Born on October 2, 1889, at Budapest, Hungary, into a military family, Maximilian de Angelis graduated from the Theresian Military Academy in 1910. He was then commissioned a second lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian Army. Angelis first served and fought with the 42nd Field Artillery Regiment in 1914. During 1915–1916, he served on the staff of the Kaiserjägerdivision. From October 1916 to the end of the war, Angelis served in the 2nd Kaiserjäger Brigade as a staff officer, and he was detached to the 1st Kaiser Jäger Brigade and the 88th Infantry Division.

Taken prisoner by the Italians in November 1918, Angelis was not released until October 1919. He then held a variety of different billets in the Austrian Army. Following the German absorption of Austria in March 1938, Angelis joined the German Army. He was promoted to major general on March 15, 1938.

Angelis commanded the 76th Infantry Division from September 1939 to January 1942. On June 1, 1940, he was promoted to lieutenant general. Following the defeat of France, his division participated in the 1941 campaign in the Balkans and the invasion of the Soviet Union that began on June 22, 1941. In January 1942, Angelis took command of the XLIV Army Corps. He was promoted to general of artillery in March 1942. As chief artillery officer on the Eastern Front, Angelis reported directly to the General Staff. Angelis fluctuated between command of the XLIV Army Corps and the Sixth Army until 1944.

In September 1944, Angelis took command of the Second Panzer Army, and he held this post until the end of the war. The Second Panzer Army fought Soviet forces at the Battle of Lake Balaton in Hungary during the March 6–15, 1945, Operation SPRING-AWAKENING. The operation was an attempt to cut off the Red Army and seize Budapest from the rear, along with the rest of eastern Hungary. The plan was a failure, and German forces were progressively driven back after each counterattack as the war came to a close.

Taken prisoner by the Americans at the end of the war, Angelis was turned over to Yugoslavia in April 1946. There he was tried and sentenced to prison for 20 years followed by a double sentence of 25 years in prison upon transfer to the Soviet Union in March 1949. Freed in 1955, he settled in Graz, Austria, where he died on December 6, 1974.

KEITH L. HOLMAN

See also

Balkans Theater; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Budapest, Battle of; France, Battle for

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Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 18, 1935)

Important naval agreement between Britain and Germany preceding World War II. According to Article 190 of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, which was negotiated at the end of World War I, Germany was not permitted any naval aviation or submarines. Its navy was limited to 6 predreadnought battleships of the *Deutschland* or *Lothringen* type, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 12 torpedo boats.

In November 1934, however, German chancellor Adolf Hitler communicated to London his desire to secure a naval agreement with Britain; in March 1935 he announced Germany's rearmament in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. Despite the fact that the British government had in February 1935 promised that it would take no action toward Germany without first consulting with the French government, it proceeded to reach a naval arrangement with Germany. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed on June 18, 1935.

The British hoped that this was the opening step in a series of arms limitations agreements that would contain German power, while the Germans saw in it the beginning of an alliance against France and the Soviet Union. The agreement was of great advantage to Germany, for it gave that country the right to build a surface navy up to 35 percent the size of the British Commonwealth aggregate fleets. This would mean that the German Navy might now be larger than the fleets of either France or Italy. The percentage would apply to each individual class of ship, except submarines, where Germany was granted parity with Britain, although it did agree not to go beyond a proportional strength of 45 percent of that possessed by members of the British Commonwealth, except in the event of a situation arising that would make a higher percentage necessary, in which case the German government would notify the British. Submarines, of course, had been specifically prohibited to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles.

Because Germany's own fleet at the time was almost negligible, the promise was only another predated German check, and it cost Great Britain the open hostility of its principal ally, France. It also brought the collapse of the so-called Stresa Front of British, French, and Italian opposition to

Germany's rearmament and marked another step in the appeasement policy of Nazi Germany.

British leaders believed that they had contained a threat to Britain's security, and in the House of Lords, Admiral David Beatty declared that Britain had cause to be grateful to the Germans for agreeing to limit their naval strength. But the agreement shattered the Versailles Treaty and was a promise Hitler was not prepared to honor. He repudiated the agreement on April 28, 1939.

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See also

Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Versailles, Treaty of

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Anglo-Soviet Treaty (May 26, 1942)

Diplomatic agreement between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom finalized in London on May 26, 1942, in which both nations agreed not to seek an armistice or peace with any of the Axis powers without consulting the other first. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which was negotiated chiefly by British foreign secretary Anthony Eden and his Soviet counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov, was more an agreement of understanding dictated by the exigencies of war. It was signed only after months of often contentious negotiations.

Talks began in earnest in December 1941, only days after the United States entered the war, when Eden traveled to Moscow to hammer out a wartime agreement with the Soviets. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt were by then quite

concerned that the Soviets might exit the war early or sue for a separate peace, leaving virtually all of Europe open to German occupation and ending Nazi leader Adolf Hitler's ill-advised two-front war. There was precedence for such a scenario, as Russia had exited World War I in early 1918, well before the fighting was over.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Molotov drove a hard bargain. Stalin insisted that no treaty would be forthcoming unless the British officially recognized the Soviet Union's sizable territorial acquisitions made after the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (August 23, 1939) and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which had begun on June 22, 1941. These included the Baltic states, eastern Poland, northern Romania, and part of Finland.

Churchill, in constant communication with Roosevelt, refused the Soviet demands, and when Molotov traveled to London to continue talks, the negotiations remained deadlocked. In midwinter 1942, with the war going badly in Europe and the Pacific, Churchill cabled Roosevelt and hinted that for the sake of the so-called Grand Alliance, perhaps the Soviet demand should be met. Roosevelt, however, steadfastly refused to bow to Stalin's wishes and counseled Churchill not to give in.

In the end, Molotov—still in London—decided to sign the Anglo-Soviet Treaty without having secured recognition of the Soviet Union's prior territorial acquisitions. Other parts of the treaty included agreement that neither nation would seek further territorial expansion or interfere in the other's internal affairs. Ancillary clauses dealt with specific actions to be taken during the war. Although the treaty accomplished little of great substance, it clearly indicated the precarious and ad hoc nature of the Grand Alliance. It also heightened Churchill's growing distrust of the Soviets and their motives.

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See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph; Document 99

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Animals

During the war, animals fulfilled unique military support roles that humans and machines could not perform. Probably more horses were employed in the war than any other animal. Although a number served in cavalry or dragoon units in the war, horses were chiefly used for transport—to pull artillery or transport supplies. The German Army, often viewed as being highly mechanized, in fact relied on large numbers of horses: a German infantry division of 1939 required between 4,000 and 6,000 horses, and even the panzer divisions used them. As late as 1944, an estimated 85 percent of German infantry divisions were horse drawn, with few motor vehicles. Millions of horses were employed, and died, during the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Japanese also used horses in Burma, and the Chinese soldiers often traded ponies captured from the Japanese to the Americans.

Many horses were killed for their meat in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, as was the case of the U.S. Army's 26th Cavalry's mounts in the Philippines. After the war, animals deemed in poor shape were destroyed, and their meat was distributed to the local population. Many healthy horses, mules, and oxen that had been captured were sent to countries to help develop agricultural programs for reconstruction.

Mules were also invaluable as pack animals during the conflict, and they saw service on many fronts. Mules could carry one-third of their half-ton weight. The military prized mules for being steady on their hooves despite rocky conditions and for their ability to follow trails even when paths seemed nonexistent. U.S. forces employed mules first in North Africa at the end of 1942 and the next year in Sicily and Italy, where they proved particularly useful in mountainous terrain.

Most U.S. military mules were assigned to the China-Burma-India theater, however. Shipped to the war zones via Liberty ships, mules were

then sent on to base camps via the railroads. Mules transported artillery, crew-served weapons, and ammunition. Mules were distributed among transportation, demolition, communication, and reconnaissance platoons, and some were selected for use by medics and for casualty evacuation.

Mules could be cantankerous, especially when being loaded into aircraft to fly from India over “the Hump” to China. Mules sometimes kicked soldiers and expressed fear when encountering elephants. Because mules could alert an enemy that Allied troops were approaching, veterinarians sometimes surgically removed their vocal cords.

Elephants proved useful to Allied and Japanese troops in the China-Burma-India theater. Elephants could perform heavy work equivalent to that of a dozen people. Elephants were employed to transport supplies and to load cargo planes. One elephant, called Elmer, was often featured in the press and was shown lifting 55-gallon fuel drums with his trunk to adjacent airplanes. Elephants were also used to string communication lines, especially in swampy locations where vehicles could not navigate.

Pigeons, cared for by various signal corps, carried messages between units and were essential during periods when radio silence was imposed. Thousands of soldiers, many of them pigeon fanciers, worked in the U.S. Army Pigeon Service, tending to some 54,000 pigeons. The British, Canadians, and Australians also organized pigeon units. Some Allied pigeons were trained to fly messages at night in an attempt to evade enemy fire. The Axis powers also used bird messengers.

U.S. Marine Raiders and their dogs, which were employed in scouting and running messages, starting off for the jungle front lines on Bougainville Island, 1943. (National Archives)

Pigeons accompanied ground troops and were also deployed from submarines and seaplanes. Paratroopers often carried pigeons on their jumps. Pigeons flew hundreds of miles over land or water from behind enemy lines to their lofts. Messages carried by pigeon alerted officers to downed aircraft, grounded ships, and the need for plasma supplies. News pigeons carried timely dispatches from the front written by war correspondents. Communication by pigeon only worked one way, however, from the front to the rear areas.

War pigeons faced death not only from enemy weapons but also because of disease and birds of prey. Because of difficult jungle climates and high humidity, the militaries bred pigeons in those areas so that the offspring would be accustomed to tropical conditions. Pigeons were essential in some areas where jungle prevented line and wireless communications from being effective. Many World War II pigeons received ranks and service awards. Some were buried with military honors, while others were mounted for display in museums.

Both Allied and Axis forces mobilized war dogs. British handlers and dogs prepared at the War Dogs Training Schools. The Soviets trained sledge

dogs and placed mines on dogs that crawled underneath tanks prior to detonation. After the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, dog fanciers in the United States discussed the idea of establishing a system to identify and train war dogs for the military.

World War I veteran Harry I. Caesar and poodle breeder Alene Erlanger communicated with quartermaster general Major General Edmund B. Gregory to form Dogs for Defense. This group encouraged patriotic Americans to donate dogs of suitable size and temperament for military service. Newspaper advertisements, posters, and movie reels promoted U.S. war dogs. Regional and state Dogs for Defense representatives recruited and evaluated the animals. Many people donated their dogs because they could not afford to feed them during the war. In any case, donors were not allowed any information as to the disposition of the dogs.

American Kennel Club dog shows sponsored war dog exhibitions and classes to raise funds and identify dogs with qualities the military sought. War dogs were also featured at the prestigious Westminster Kennel Club Dog Show. Throughout the country, war dog demonstrations and rallies were held, with themes such as “Back the Attack.” On the home front, war dogs guarded prisoner-of-war camps and defended industries from saboteurs. Other breeds, such as beagles, were used to assist in the rehabilitation of wounded veterans.

German-born trainers such as Willy Necker introduced effective training regimens at American war dog training and reception centers. Such facilities were distributed throughout the United States, with significant sites located at Front Royal, Virginia; San Carlos, California; and Fort Robinson, Nebraska. Necker left no doubt about his allegiance, teaching one dog to place its paw over its snout whenever it heard the name “Hitler.”

U.S. Marine Corps war dog platoons trained at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and Camp Pendleton, California. Their mission was to locate enemy forces, mines, and booby traps. These dogs, mostly Doberman pinschers, guarded soldiers on patrol and alerted them to approaching enemy soldiers. The marine dogs also transported supplies and messages. Each marine division had an attached war dog platoon.

Germany mobilized an estimated 200,000 war dogs. Japan trained war dogs at Nanjing (Nanking) in China, and it had 25,000 trained before its attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese used black dogs for night service and white dogs to serve in snow.

After their service was completed, American war dogs were shipped to war dog centers for training to readjust to civilian life before returning to their families. Even after war dogs returned home, their owners did not know where their pets had served. War dog handlers formed closed attachments to their charges, and they often asked the dogs' owners if they could keep the dogs with which they had served. Heroic animals were often praised in newspaper accounts. Chips, perhaps the war's most famous dog, who assisted in the capture of Italian soldiers, gained notoriety for biting General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

World War II motivated strange uses of animals. Camels provided the power for mills used to mix mortar. Mice in the Soviet Union chewed through German tank engine wires; the Germans responded by procuring cats to eat the mice. Canaries and mice helped soldiers determine whether poisonous gases were present in tunnels. Among the more bizarre use of animals was a U.S. Army Air Forces plan to place incendiary bombs on bats, which would then be released to fly in kamikaze-style raids against Japanese military sites. Millions of animals and birds served in the war, and numerous memorials around the world testify to their contributions.

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See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Burma Road; Cavalry, Horse; China-Burma-India Theater; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Engineer Operations; Liberty Ships; United States

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Antiaircraft Artillery and Employment

Antiaircraft artillery (AAA) is ground defense against aircraft. The Germans knew antiaircraft fire by the term *flak* (German acronym for *Flugzeug* [aircraft] *Abwehr* [defense] *Kanonen* [cannon]; the British knew antiaircraft artillery as “ack-ack”). The Americans used these two terms and also “Triple A.” In the latter half of the 1930s, new equipment appeared in antiaircraft units around the world. Countries adopted slightly larger-caliber and more effective guns with higher rates of fire.

Introduced in 1928 and modified in 1935, the German 88mm gun became perhaps the most feared artillery weapon of the war. Widely used as a tank gun, it was also a powerful antitank gun and a coast-defense and antiaircraft weapon, although it required purpose-designed ammunition for each role. With a practical ceiling of 35,000 feet, the 88mm posed a great threat to enemy bombers. A 105mm gun also saw widespread use, and in 1942, with Allied bombing intensified, Germany fielded a 128mm gun as an interim system (pending development of a superheavy 150mm gun, which, however, never entered service). Lighter German antiaircraft guns ranged from 20mm to 55mm.

A Bofors antiaircraft gun overlooking the Algerian coast and manned by a U.S. artillery crew, 1943. (Library of Congress)

Germany used 20mm and 37mm antiaircraft guns in a variety of configurations on several motorized platforms. The effectiveness of German antiaircraft defenses was reduced by a lack of precision radar control (RPC) systems and the fact that its antiaircraft projectiles lacked proximity fuzes. The Italians also used a wide range of antiaircraft guns up to 90mm in size.

Beginning in 1938, the British produced a 3.7-inch gun, which many came to believe was their best gun of the war. It had a ceiling of 28,000 feet. Its effectiveness was greatly increased by the introduction of RPC in 1944. This combination of radar, predictors, and proximity-fuzed ammunition gave it a high rate of success against German V-1 flying bombs. The U.S. Army began to replace its 3-inch gun with a 90mm gun in 1940.

The Soviets also employed a wide range of antiaircraft weapons. They reproduced both the Swedish Bofors 25mm and 40mm guns, retooling the latter to fire a 37mm projectile. The largest Soviet field antiaircraft weapon was the 76.2mm gun; for home defense the Soviets relied on the 85mm gun. Produced in large numbers, it was the principal Soviet antiaircraft gun of the war.

As with the smaller 76.2mm gun, the 85mm piece saw widespread service as main tank armament. The Soviets claimed that antiaircraft guns shot down 2,800 Axis aircraft, 40 percent of the total downed.

Operating on the generally held belief in the 1930s that bombers would always get through, the British focused their aviation efforts on developing a strategic bomber force at the expense of air defense. At war’s outbreak, antiaircraft artillery was directed by predictors that followed the path of aircraft mechanically; they were useless at night or in poor visibility. Although all major powers experimented with new direction devices, the British made the primary strides in the field of operational radar. This interception device established the height, course, and speed of enemy aircraft. Throwing up shell barrages through which aircraft flew was no more successful as a tactic in World War II than it had been in World War I, but ground-fire threats increased substantially when the speed and height of a bomber stream could be ascertained by radar.

In the autumn of 1939, Britain still had only 540 antiaircraft guns larger than 50mm. During the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), antiaircraft artillery took second place to fighter aircraft. Most sources place the number of aircraft shot down by antiaircraft artillery at fewer than 300 of the nearly 1,800 Luftwaffe planes destroyed. Yet ground fire forced aircraft to higher elevations, unnerved aircrews, and diminished bombing accuracy.

Flak was the principal defense against night attack. Night fighters were still being developed, although the requisite technology would evolve rapidly. Artillery sighting was largely visual until October 1940, when the British began to equip their forces with gun-laying radar, which increased the accuracy of artillery fire in all weather.

Reliance in Britain on lesser-trained territorial forces for antiaircraft defense foreshadowed personnel difficulties the Axis powers would later encounter in the war. Experienced men usually deployed to distant fronts or to sea, and so air defense depended on women, those too old to qualify for military service, or the physically restricted. During the war about 70,000 women served in British antiaircraft units.

When the Royal Air Force (RAF) and U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) strategic bombing campaigns gained impetus in 1942, German flak posed a serious threat. Aircraft coming in below 8,000 feet often suffered grievous losses from ground fire. Damage from flak continued to rise in the air war, and gunfire from the ground shot down more Allied bombers than did fighter aircraft.

Technological developments moved at a staggering pace as the fighting continued. By 1941, German flak units began deploying incendiary shells, gun-laying radar, and grooved projectiles that fragmented into small pieces, causing dreadful damage to aircraft. By 1943, most antiaircraft artillery shells had been converted from powder to mechanical fuzes. Flashless propellants augmented the efficiency of the guns, as did automatic fuze-setters that improved accuracy and amplified the rate of fire two or three times. Use of electric predictors became fairly common. In 1944, the Germans introduced double fuzes, both contact and timed, that boosted the efficacy of guns severalfold. By then, the Allies were customarily arming their shells with the U.S. Navy–developed proximity fuzes, a technology the Germans never successfully developed.

For all that, the Germans put to trial several innovative antiaircraft

techniques, such as squeeze-bore and sabot mechanisms designed primarily to increase the muzzle velocity of guns. During the course of the war, Germany developed four types of flak rockets, some guided, some not. The effect of flak rockets was in the main psychological, though, since German forces lacked operational proximity fuzes, and radio-controlled guidance systems were rudimentary and subject to degradation.

In several urban areas, such as Berlin, Vienna, and the "flak alley" around Köln (Cologne), Germany constructed large flak towers to serve as gun platforms. Some covered an entire city block and were more than 130 feet high (corresponding to a 13-story building) with reinforced concrete walls up to 8 feet thick. Batteries sited on the roofs mounted heavy antiaircraft artillery and multiple-barreled pom-pom cannon in the structures' turreted corners.

As the war progressed and Allied air raids occurred almost daily, German antiaircraft defenses faced challenges in growing measure. The quality of flak personnel plummeted as youngsters, women, disabled veterans, foreigners, and even prisoners of war serviced the artillery. At war's end, nearly half of all German gun crews were auxiliaries or civilians. Ammunition shortages manifested themselves in a big way in 1944, necessitating firing restrictions during air raids. Shortages would eventually reduce firing potential by more than half.

Nonetheless, German flak units caused about one-third of Allied aircraft losses and inflicted at least two-thirds of total aircraft damage through 1944. As German fighter protection became weaker, antiaircraft artillery invariably took on a larger role, continuing to impair Allied aircraft and to degrade bombing accuracy. According to U.S. reports, the USAAF lost 18,418 aircraft in European combat, 7,821 of them downed by flak. Follow-on studies credited antiaircraft artillery for as much as 40 percent of bombing errors.

After the June 1944 Allied invasion of Europe, Germany launched its V-1 buzz bomb campaign in earnest. These low-altitude weapons, flying at nearly 400 mph, were tricky to locate and even harder to down. Fighters had little time to spot and destroy a buzz bomb. Antiaircraft artillery constituted the final line of defense against the V-1s.

Increasing motorization of land forces fostered a need for self-propelled antiaircraft artillery. Although U.S. ground forces used the .50-caliber Browning machine gun in various configurations for basic air defense, these

were frequently mounted with the 37mm antiaircraft gun, so the latter could aim with the Browning's tracer fire. After 1943, the army's chief heavy antiaircraft artillery piece, the 90mm gun, was often mounted on a multipurpose carriage for antiaircraft or field artillery use. In early 1944, the army adopted the 120mm antiaircraft stratosphere gun, which was nearly twice the size and weight of the 90mm gun.

Beginning in 1940, the U.S. Navy devoted considerable attention to improving its antiaircraft defenses. Experience showed that 20mm cannon of Swiss design were many times more effective against aircraft than machine guns. By 1945, the navy had deployed about 13,000 20mm artillery tubes aboard ship and had inflicted nearly one-third of all Japanese aircraft losses with these weapons. In due course, the navy deployed some 5,000 40mm guns of Swedish design in single, dual, and quad mounts. Also widely used shipboard was the 5-inch/38-caliber dual-purpose—that is, antiaircraft and antiship—gun, and some 3,000 were eventually mounted on ships. Proximity fuzes in the 5-inch weapon greatly increased antiaircraft effectiveness.

Throughout the war, technological constraints and manufacturing hindrances beset Japanese antiaircraft-antiartillery capabilities. In 1941, the Japanese deployed just 300 guns in defense of the home islands, and by 1945, even in the face of the American air onslaught, Japan had only 2,000 guns earmarked for homeland defense. The standard Japanese antiaircraft gun throughout the war was the 75mm type that first saw service in the 1920s. In the Japanese Navy, the 25mm was the standard light antiaircraft gun, and the 5-inch was the standard heavy. Some 500 heavy artillery pieces were committed to the defense of Tokyo by 1944, but fire-control and radar capabilities for most weaponry remained inadequate.

Compared with that of the Germans, Japanese flak was far less effective against Allied air attack. During the entire war, Japanese antiaircraft artillery was credited with destroying just 1,524 American aircraft. Japanese naval vessels, perennially lacking in shipboard antiaircraft defense, suffered accordingly.

In sum, during the war, flak was often quite lethal and cost-effective, downing many enemy aircraft and complicating air missions. It made low-altitude bombing and strafing operations a risky business. Evolving technology—above all, radar—increased gun efficacy exponentially.

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See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Braun, Wernher von; Britain, Battle of; Proximity Fuze; Radar; V-1 Buzz Bomb

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Antiaircraft Defense of Surface Ships

Prior to World War II, most navies regarded the aircraft threat with a mixture of unconcern and overconfidence. The U.S. Navy was typical. In 1933, the chief of naval operations admitted that ranking officers simply did not have time to study antiaircraft gunnery. In the 1934 edition of the *General Tactical Instructions*, less than 1 page (out of 292) dealt with antiaircraft fire. The navy vastly overestimated the effectiveness of its existing defenses, as it relied on the 5-inch gun firing under local control and especially on the .50-caliber machine gun for close-in defense.

Despite this general complacency, some storm warnings were flying. As aircraft performance improved toward the end of the decade, the chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics warned that bomb hits might well be more numerous than shell hits in the next war. In 1939, Admiral Ernest J. King, then commander of a carrier unit in the Annual Fleet Problem naval exercise, dedicated his postexercise comments solely to the question of antiaircraft defense, with special emphasis on fire control.

The outbreak of war brought the issue squarely to the fore. On April 17, 1940, the British destroyer *Gurkha* became the first ship ever to succumb to hostile air attack. Other losses quickly followed. The rapidly expanding capabilities of military aircraft proved especially challenging. Although some

pessimists suggested that henceforth capital ships would not dare steam into range of land-based planes, navies scrambled to remedy the situation.

Some services were in a better position than others in facing the threat. For instance, the design of many large ships, even the newest, made too little provision for antiaircraft defense. Modern battleships of the Axis navies carried two secondary batteries: one for defense (about 6-inch low-angle) against surface craft, the other (4.1-inch for Germany, 5-inch for Japan, and 90mm for Italy) for antiaircraft work. Designers in Britain and the United States had been more farsighted in mounting dual-purpose secondary guns (about 5-inch) useful for either role.

So dangerous was the aircraft menace that at least two navies (those of the United States and Japan) experimented with shooting heavy projectiles into the sea to throw up columns of water in front of torpedo planes. Only the Japanese put these ideas into practice. They developed a special 18.1-inch shell filled with almost 10,000 bursting charges, and the battleship *Yamato* fired these unsuccessfully in April 1945. The basic problem was the difficulty of tracking a fast-moving plane with the ponderous turret guns. Also, the blast from these huge weapons made it impossible to man the smaller antiaircraft guns in exposed positions.

Suitable gun batteries were only part of the solution. Prewar fire-control systems, such as the Japanese Type 94, the German Type 1937, and the British Mk IV, encountered severe problems in compensating for the increasing speed of aircraft. Of these navies, only the Royal Navy deployed an adequate replacement in the Mk VI. Most successful was the U.S. Navy, which had under development in 1940 an advanced antiaircraft director, the Mk 37. Although this design was basically sound, it was heavy (at 16 tons), susceptible to vibration, and required a crew of seven. Nevertheless, variants of the Mk 37 were fitted to ships as small as destroyers and made to serve throughout the entire war by constant updating, with one model undergoing 92 modifications. As aircraft speeds went up, the Mk 37 director proved amenable to the addition of radar. The British considered the Mk 37 the best heavy director in the world.

No matter how excellent the guns and fire-control equipment, a weak link remained in the system. Standard antiaircraft shells were detonated by time fuzes, which were inherently inaccurate due to variations in manufacture and to the necessity to set them manually. In 1940, the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of

Ordnance embarked on a most ambitious project to produce a fuze that would detonate automatically when the shell passed close to an airplane. The ultimate result was the proximity or variable time (VY) fuze that was, in effect, a tiny radar set in the nose of a 5-inch shell. It first saw action in January 1943; from that date on, VT-fuzed projectiles proved four times as deadly as conventional ones.

For close-in defense, navies relied on lighter weapons with their high rate of fire. Wartime experience quickly showed that machine guns, such as the .50 caliber, firing solid bullets lacked the necessary range and lethality. Much more promising were rapid-fire cannon with their explosive projectiles. The Japanese concentrated their efforts on the 25mm Type 96, derived from the French Hotchkiss. Under local control, this weapon, with a rate of fire of 220 rounds per minute, was fitted in triple, dual, and single mountings. Similarly, the British invested in the 2-pounder, produced in a variety of mounts from single- to six-gun.

Allied navies also came to rely heavily on guns produced under license from arms manufacturers in two neutral nations: the 20mm Oerlikon developed in Switzerland and the Swedish 40mm Bofors. The U.S. Navy tested the latter weapon in both twin and quadruple mounts early in 1942 and began large-scale production in the summer. The Oerlikon was fitted in both single and twin mounts, and this gun proved to be the most effective antiaircraft weapon until the fall of 1944, when the heavier 40mm accounted for 50 percent of all kills by antiaircraft fire. Unfortunately, miniaturization had not developed to the point that the VT fuzes could be fitted to 40mm or 20mm shells.

From 1941, all navies added these lighter guns to their warships in unprecedented numbers. By end of the war, the British and Dominion navies had taken delivery of almost 55,000 20mm Oerlikons. The largest warships carried huge antiaircraft batteries. In 1944, the German battleship *Tirpitz* mounted 16 37mm and 84 20mm guns, and the Japanese *Yamato* mounted 166 25mm guns. The British battleship *Duke of York* carried 55 20mm and 8 40mm guns, in addition to 88 2-pounders.

The evolution of the U.S. Navy’s last class of battleships is instructive. In 1941, the original plans of the battleship *Iowa* called for 24 40mm and 40 20mm guns. By October 1942, the number of Bofors grew to 40 guns and a month later to 16 quadruple mounts in addition to 60 20mm guns. In June

1943 as the *Iowa* was fitting out, the ship's captain asked for a considerable increase in the already heavy antiaircraft battery. By this point, though, deck space was a limiting factor. There were antiaircraft guns crammed into every corner and even on turret tops. Ultimately, this class of ships carried up to 80 40mm and 52 20mm guns.

To increase the flexibility of the antiaircraft armament, U.S. officers in 1942 began interconnecting the heavy and light directors so that the 5-inch/38 mounts could be employed for close-in work and the 40mm Bofors could fire at night using the radar equipment of the larger gun. These arrangements became so complex that the crew often rigged an electric status board to keep up to date on which mounts were controlled by which computer and which director. These samples of Yankee improvisation served well enough. Ordnance experts concluded after the war that the U.S. Navy had the best antiaircraft fire control in the world.

In addition to vastly expanding the number of lighter guns on existing warships, some navies modified or constructed ships especially configured for the antiaircraft mission. The British as early as 1940 operated off Norway older cruisers that had been converted for this work, and by May 1940 the Royal Navy regarded the ships as "worth their weight in gold." The British built 16 ships of the Dido class, the majority armed with 10 5.25-inch dual-purpose guns. During the war, the U.S. Navy took delivery of the eight Atlanta-class cruisers equipped with up to 16 5-inch guns.

By midwar, all ships of destroyer size and smaller featured dual-purpose batteries. Typical were the Japanese Terutsuki-class destroyers with 8 100mm guns, the U.S. Fletcher-class with 5 5-inch guns, and the British Hunt-class escorts armed with the 4-inch gun. Of course, such ships also carried close-in antiaircraft cannon.

The attention lavished on antiaircraft defenses paid dividends in battles such as Santa Cruz and the Philippine Sea. Military analyst Bernard Brodie calculated that by the end of 1943, the effectiveness of the U.S. battle fleet's antiaircraft gunfire had increased a hundredfold in two years. But the race between ship defenses and aircraft was constant. Aircraft improved in capability as well, with kamikazes (essentially missiles guided by humans) and standoff weapons such as the German Hs-293 adding a new order of lethality. Following the war, navies would turn to missiles to defend their surface warships.

MALCOLM MUIR JR.

See also

Battleships; *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz*, German Battleships; Cruisers; Destroyers; Iowa-Class U.S. Navy Battleships; King, Edward Postell, Jr.; Proximity Fuze; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Anti-Comintern Pact (November 25, 1936)

Formal alliance between Germany and Japan. Signed in Berlin on November 25, 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact was ostensibly a response to the activities of the Communist International (Comintern), the Soviet organization that claimed leadership of the world communist movement. Nominally intended to oppose the existence and expansion of international communism, the agreement was really a diplomatic tool directed at achieving other goals.

German special ambassador plenipotentiary Joachim von Ribbentrop first proposed such an agreement in 1935, but the Foreign Office and the army opposed it. Since World War I, the Germans had worked to develop a close relationship with China. This pact would nullify these efforts, as Japan and China were at loggerheads over the Japanese takeover of Manchuria. Nevertheless, German chancellor Adolf Hitler's approval ended discussion. Hitler hoped that the pact would pressure Great Britain not to interfere with Germany's military buildup and his plans for eastward expansion. In any case, British leaders were concerned about the escalating Japanese threat to their interests in the Far East.

Developed from conversations between Ribbentrop and Japanese military attaché Major General Hiroshi Ōshima, the pact was Hitler's effort to tie Japan to Germany. Japanese leaders saw it as an important step toward finding an ally in an increasingly hostile world. Alienated from the West by its takeover of Manchuria, Japan was also involved in armed clashes with

Soviet forces in the Far East. The Japanese hoped that a pact with Germany would strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Thus, the wording of the pact was more important to the Japanese than to the Germans.

On the same day, Germany and Japan signed another agreement providing that in case of an unprovoked attack by the Soviet Union against Germany or Japan, the two nations would consult on what measures to take "to safeguard [their] common interests," and in any case they would do nothing to assist the Soviet Union. They also agreed that neither nation would make any political treaties with the Soviet Union. Germany also recognized Manzhouguo (Manchukuo), the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria.

Germany later employed the Anti-Comintern Pact as a litmus test to determine the loyalty of minor allies. Italy adhered to the pact on November 6, 1937. The pact was renewed in 1941 with 11 other countries as signatories.

To many observers, the pact symbolized Germany's resurgence as the most powerful country in Europe. The threat of global cooperation between Germany and Japan directly imperiled the overextended empires of France and Great Britain. Much like Germany's actual capabilities, however, the pact was more illusion than reality. Both signatories failed to cooperate, and rarely did one even inform the other of its intentions. An even greater indication of the pact's worthlessness was Hitler's breaking of its terms when he signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939.

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See also

Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Japan; Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Ōshima Hiroshi; Ribbentrop, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim von; Tripartite Pact; Document 15; Document 16

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Antishipping Campaign off Norway

Between April 1944 and May 1945 the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Coastal Command conducted an intensive campaign against German merchant shipping, light warships, and submarines off the Norwegian coast. The three principal objectives were to relieve German pressure on the Allied Arctic convoys bound for the Soviet Union, disrupt and destroy the important ore trade to Germany, and interdict U-boats attempting to reach the North Atlantic.

Aircraft conducted the bulk of the campaign. Royal Navy carrier aircraft launched over 30 operations during this period. Fleet carriers engaged in strikes against the battleship *Tirpitz* in April and August 1944 (operations tungsten and goodwood) also undertook missions against German coastal shipping while on station off the Norwegian coast. Individual fleet carriers also conducted specific antishipping operations in June, September, October, and December 1944, after which they transferred from home waters to the British Pacific Fleet. In total, aircraft from the fleet carriers sank almost 100,000 tons of shipping, damaged an equal amount, and destroyed numerous small escort vessels and flak ships.

Escort carriers undertook many more antishipping operations, usually individually but occasionally as a squadron of two or three carriers. Over this period 12 escort carriers deployed off the Norwegian coast, sufficient to ensure at least two strikes per month. Their smaller air groups militated against duplicating the success of the fleet carriers, but their aircraft still sank almost 80,000 tons of shipping, a depot ship, 2 U-boats, numerous smaller auxiliary warships, and more than 15,000 tons of shipping in a simultaneous mining campaign.

Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s land-based antishipping squadrons cooperated closely with the carrier campaign. In late 1943, it opened a base at Banff in Canada and, by the spring of 1944, four squadrons were operational, a force that soon expanded to eight squadrons of Mosquito fighter-bombers and Beaufighter strike aircraft with the addition of an airfield at Dallachy.

The Banff and Dallachy strike wings maintained an intensive tempo of operations against Norwegian coastal shipping, averaging more than 20 strike

packages a month from September 1944 onward. The wings sank over 80,000 tons of shipping during the campaign and numerous warships, including a minesweeper and seven U-boats in April–May 1945 alone.

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See also

Arctic Convoys; Convoys, Axis; *Tirpitz*, Attacks on

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Antisubmarine Warfare

The effectiveness of submarine attacks made the development of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tactics one of the most important challenges for both sides during World War II. At the beginning of the war, both the Allied and Axis powers underestimated the potential impact of submarine warfare. The British were confident that asdic (acronym for Anti-Submarine Detection Investigating Committee), later known as sonar (*so*und *na*vigation and *r*anging), would enable them to detect submarines out to a range of several thousand yards and that they would thus be able to sink German submarines at will. Then, too, at the beginning of the war Germany had few submarines. On September 1, 1939, commander of German submarines, Commodore Karl Dönitz, had available 57 submarines, of which 27 were oceangoing types.

Nonetheless, submarines quickly emerged as potent weapons in the European theater because of the domination of the British surface navy and improvements in both weapons and tactics. During the first two months of the war, U-boats were able to sink 67 Allied naval and merchant vessels. Italian submarines also participated in this effort, in the course of the war sinking half a million tons of Allied Atlantic shipping. Allied losses continued to

climb, and at the peak of the Battle of the Atlantic, in March 1943, U-boats sank 96 ships in only 20 days.

Meanwhile, after overcoming deficiencies in armament and strategy, U.S. Navy submarines extracted a significant toll on Japanese shipping in the Pacific theater. By the end of the war, U.S. submarines had accounted for 57 percent of all Japanese naval and merchant losses.

Initially, the principal tactics and weapons used in antisubmarine efforts by both sides during the war were those that had been developed and honed during World War I. Soon after the outbreak of World War II, the British reintroduced the convoy system. This had proved successful in World War I, and it minimized losses during World War II. At the outbreak of World War II, for instance, ships traveling in convoys between North America and Great Britain suffered only 2 percent losses until the Germans developed improved tactics.

The *Rudeltaktik* (wolf tactic, which the Allies referred to as the "wolf pack") developed by Dönitz involved simultaneous attacks at night by many submarines. It diminished the effectiveness of the convoy system, which was in any case initially hampered by a lack of escort ships. Not until 1943 could the Allies deploy sufficient numbers of escorts to optimize the convoy system, which worked best with a ratio of at least one escort for every three merchant ships.

One exception to the convoy system in the Atlantic was the use of fast liners to carry troops. Liners such as the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Queen Mary* were able to steam at more than 26 knots and outrun U-boats. Throughout the war, the superliners sailed without escorts and ultimately without loss. Concurrently, in the Pacific, U.S. submarine success was partly attributable to Japan's failures to pay attention to the protection of sea transport, develop the specialized tools such as forward-thrown ASW weapons, and construct the specialized escorts required to effectively convoy their traffic. In December 1941, the Japanese had only four Shimushu- or Type A–class ships, their only purpose-built escort warships, and they were not equipped with hydrophones until the autumn of 1942, when the Royal Navy had some 2,100 vessels of all types equipped with sonar.

British defenses of the vital Atlantic trade routes were strengthened in May 1941, when the U.S. Navy began escorting convoys between the United States and Iceland. Then, in June 1941, Canada created the Canadian Escort

Force for the same purpose. The Royal Canadian Navy played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic. Comprising only 6 destroyers and 5 minesweepers at the beginning of the war, the Royal Canadian Navy grew by war's end to include 2 light carriers, 2 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 63 frigates, 109 corvettes, 89 minesweepers, and many other vessels. Virtually all these were committed to the Battle of the Atlantic.

Antisubmarine weapons existed in two broad forms: passive and active. Passive weapons included underwater mines and impediments, such as submarine nets, designed to prevent submarines from moving into certain areas. Underwater contact mines exploded when they touched a hull; magnetic mines exploded when a ship or submarine was in their vicinity. Mines could be placed at a variety of depths to make them more effective.

To protect their ships against torpedoes, the Allied powers developed several countermeasures. One of the most successful was the noisemaker. Towed behind a ship, it could disable advanced acoustic torpedoes. Another was the degausser, which discharged an electronic current at regular intervals through a cable around the hull of a ship. The current helped to reduce the ship's magnetic field, reducing its vulnerability to the magnetic detonators in certain torpedoes.

Active antisubmarine weapons included depth charges, torpedoes, aerial bombs, and other explosive devices designed to rupture the hull of a submarine and sink it. The depth charge was a waterproof bomb that could be set to explode at a particular depth. The charge did not have to come into contact with a submarine to be effective; at close range, its concussion could breach a submarine's hull.

Depth charges improved during the course of the war. Such weapons could be either rolled off the stern of a ship or fired from projectors. The Italians had a multirack system that could deliver 48 depth charges in a single pass. Weapons such as the hedgehog, fired from a ship, delivered many smaller charges ahead of the escort vessel. Depth charges and torpedoes could also be delivered by aircraft. As the war progressed, the crews of Allied planes and ships became more adept at developing patterns to enhance the effectiveness of depth charge runs.

U.S. Navy sailors loading hedgehog bomb projectors employed aboard ships for antisubmarine warfare. (Corbis)

Key to the success of a surface attack on submarines was the escorting ships' ability to use their superior speed to keep enemy submarines contained within a certain area and then deliver successive depth charge attacks. Submarines usually had a smaller turning ratio than escort vessels, so containment of the submarine was especially important to a successful attack.

Antisubmarine weapons were most commonly deployed by escort ships and airplanes. The escorts were usually small, lightly armed, fast craft ranging from destroyers and corvettes to frigates and small motor launches. Some merchant ships were also equipped with depth charges or other antisubmarine weapons. Aircraft proved especially useful in antisubmarine warfare. They could spot submarines from long distances and either attack the submarines themselves or report a submarine's presence to surface units. Aircraft could also use a variety of weapons to attack the submarine. Because of the Battle of Britain and the subsequent concentration on strategic bombing, however, British and U.S. air commanders were reluctant to allocate aircraft for antisubmarine roles. Large flying boats and later the long-

range Consolidated B-24 Liberator equipped with radar proved critical in closing the mid-Atlantic gap, a wide area in the Central Atlantic that had lacked air protection.

In 1943, the German Navy began equipping U-boats with significant antiaircraft defenses made up of rapid-fire 20mm and 37mm cannon. These German antiaircraft defenses were subsequently overcome as the Allies began to deploy additional long-range bombers. During one week in the summer of 1943, Allied aircraft sank nine U-boats in the Bay of Biscay alone.

The increased use of aircraft along the coasts of the United States and Great Britain reduced the number of submarine attacks in these regions. To improve the convoys' chances, the British began modifying ships into escort carriers—merchant or naval ships that had the capability to launch one or more aircraft.

Critical in antisubmarine warfare was the ability to locate the submarine and therefore render its stealth meaningless. Sonar devices sent out sound pulses and then ranged underwater using the echoes. Using detection devices and direction finders, the Allies were able to detect and attack submarines before they came in range of the merchant vessels. Ships could also be fitted with hydrophones or other listening devices that detected the sounds emitted by a submarine. Although the Germans endeavored to develop rubber sheathing for their U-boats, sonar remained the most important detection device in antisubmarine warfare.

Surface radar could also be used to detect submarines, since the subs had to surface periodically to recharge their electric batteries. British Coastal Command aircraft were also equipped with lightweight 10cm radar developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology radiation laboratory; working with Royal Navy corvettes, such aircraft played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic. Radar enabled Allied aircraft or surface ships to locate Axis submarines and attack them, even at night. The widespread installation of radar in Allied aircraft brought increasing numbers of U-boat kills. In response, the U-boats began using their own acoustic detection devices, called Biscay crosses, to warn of approaching aircraft. However, the devices often did not provide the U-boat crews sufficient time to react before an attack.

Even before the United States entered the war, the United States and

Great Britain had initiated a variety of cooperative programs to protect merchant ships. German successes added urgency to these efforts, which led to establishment of the Anglo-American integrated convoy system. As a result of the Allied Convoy Conference in 1943, lines of control over convoys were split: the United States controlled the Central and South Atlantic, and Canada and Great Britain controlled the northern convoy routes.

In May 1943, U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest King created the Tenth Fleet. Although it did not have ships attached to it, the Tenth Fleet maintained the submarine tracking room (covertly classified as unit F-21), which used radar and sonar reports and cryptologic intelligence—of immense importance in this campaign—to plot the movement of Axis submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific. F-21 coordinated U.S. antisubmarine efforts with the British tracking section at the Admiralty in London and with a much smaller unit attached to the Canadian naval command.

The combination of aircraft, better intelligence, increased use of radar and sonar, and improved coordination and tactics led to massive losses among the German U-boat force. In May 1943, the Germans lost 43 subs. The average monthly losses, due to all causes, were 12 for the last six months of 1942 and 19 in 1943. By the summer of 1943, the Battle of the Atlantic was being won. In 1943 and 1944, the Allies sank 453 U-boats, and Allied merchant losses were dramatically reduced.

Aircraft proved vital in antisubmarine warfare. Early in the war, in order to provide fighter protection, the British equipped several merchantmen with a forward catapult that held a modified Hurricane fighter. After launch and intercept, the fighter would try to make landfall or else would land in the water.

A more satisfactory solution was to fit a flight deck to the hull of a merchant ship. The German cargo/passenger ship *Hannover*, taken in March 1940, was converted into the first escort carrier, the *Audacity*, and entered service in June 1941 carrying 6 fighters. Additional escort carriers soon appeared in the form of U.S.-built conversions. They entered service with the Royal Navy in the first half of 1942. Designed to carry 15 aircraft each, the escort carriers proved invaluable.

Unlike their British counterparts, U.S. captains of escort carriers late in the war enjoyed complete freedom of action to mount hunt-and-kill missions. Teams composed of an escort carrier and half a dozen destroyers or new

destroyer escorts sank 53 U-boats and captured 1; the teams may have been the single most important U.S. contribution to the war against the U-boats.

German U-boats succeeded in shattering a special convoy designated TM I that sailed from Trinidad for Gibraltar at the end of December 1942 and inflicted 77 percent losses. This led British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt to concentrate on the U-boat menace during their meeting at Casablanca in January 1943. Churchill urged that priority be given to the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Allied leaders decided to provide for the effort additional convoy escorts, aircraft assets (including the VLR Consolidated B-24 Liberator, which was to be based at Newfoundland for the first time to close the Greenland air gap), and escort carriers. Unfortunately, nearly three months passed before these assets were diverted to the battle.

Carrier-based aircraft were essential in closing the mid-Atlantic gap, and long-range aircraft flying from Britain also were important, although the preoccupation of the Royal Air Force with strategic bombing meant that Coastal Command possessed few long-range aircraft. Only grudgingly did Bomber Command's Air Marshal Arthur Harris make such air assets available. The U.S. Consolidated PBY Catalina and PB2Y Coronado and the British Short Sunderland flying boats proved invaluable, as did long-range B-24 Liberator and British Lancaster bombers.

In August 1944, Royal Air Force Bomber Command Squadron 617 (the "Dam Busters") mounted attacks with special "tallboy" bombs against the concrete-reinforced U-boat pens of the Bay of Biscay. These raids were highly effective, and in the last year of the war, 57 U-boats were destroyed by bombing, compared with only 5 destroyed by bombers in the previous five years. This shows what might have been accomplished had the bombers been directed against the submarines earlier.

After March 1943, aircraft were probably the chief factor in the defeat of the U-boats. Between March 1943 and May 1945, a total of 590 U-boats were destroyed, compared with only 194 in the previous three and a half years of war. Of the 590 destroyed, 290 were by airpower, 174 by ships, and the remainder through a combination of the two or from other causes.

A number of factors brought the Allies victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. The convoy system was important, but so too was technology, primarily the 10cm radar sets, sonar, improved depth charges, rockets fired

from aircraft, and forward-thrown shipborne antisubmarine hedgehogs, or “mousetraps” (small depth charges known to the British as squids). The high-intensity Leigh light on aircraft illuminated the submarines on the surface at night. Radio detection equipment was vital, and long-range aviation helped narrow the so-called black hole in the Central Atlantic. Intelligence also played a role, chiefly Ultra intercepts of U-boat communications that guided aircraft to the submarines. The hunter-killer groups operating independently of the convoys also carried the war to the submarines. It is true, however, that Allied and interservice cooperation was far too long in coming.

In the Pacific theater, Allied success came in part because the Japanese never developed effective antisubmarine techniques. The Japanese also failed to use their submarines effectively. Although they developed some fine, large, long-range types, the Japanese never really deployed their submarines against Allied merchant ships. The Imperial Japanese Navy subscribed to the doctrine that submarines were an ancillary weapon of the main battle fleet. The early ineffectiveness of U.S. submarines in the Pacific because of faulty torpedoes only reinforced the Japanese attitude that submarines were not a key weapons system.

The Japanese often used their own submarines as long-range transports and supply vessels, and some Japanese submarines carried aircraft. In addition, design problems (the Japanese submarines were large and easily detectable) further minimized Japanese submarines’ effectiveness.

Because they lacked radar detection and avoidance systems, Japanese submarines were especially vulnerable to antisubmarine efforts. The Japanese deployed 190 submarines during the course of the war, and the Allies sank 129 of them. For their part, Japanese submarines sank 184 merchant vessels during the entire war, and they made little effort to attack Allied transport and supply convoys from the mainland United States. The most significant danger to Allied merchant shipping in the Pacific theater actually came from the handful of German U-boats and raiders based in Sumatra and operating mainly in the Indian Ocean or from Japanese air units. In the Pacific theater, the Allies also successfully employed the antisubmarine tactics developed in the Atlantic Campaign to further minimize merchant losses.

Ineffective Japanese antisubmarine warfare techniques led to the lowest percentage of losses for U.S. submarines of any of the submarine forces of the major powers during the war. Still, the U.S. Navy lost 52 subs—hardly a

small number. It was not until the end of 1943 that the Japanese Navy established its first escort squadron and not until 1944 that significant air units began to engage in antisubmarine patrols. It was a case of too little, too late. The first Japanese depth charges, which used a time fuze rather than a pressure-activated detonation device, were also ineffective. More significantly, the Japanese lacked antisubmarine sonar and lightweight radar sets. These considerations and the loss of so many Japanese aircraft in combat reduced the effectiveness of Japan's antisubmarine patrols. Finally, U.S. submarines could detect Japanese radar emissions.

Antisubmarine warfare came into its own in World War II. It was certainly a key factor in the war at sea, at least in the Atlantic theater.

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See also

Aircraft Carriers; Atlantic, Battle of the; Canada, Navy; Casablanca Conference; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Depth Charges; Dönitz, Karl; Hunter-Killer Groups; Germany, Navy; Japan, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Mine Laying, Sea; Radar; Sonar; Submarines; Torpedoes; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Antitank Guns and Warfare

The evolution of antitank (AT) warfare in World War II was a continual trade-off between technology and tactical doctrine. At the start of the war,

most armies believed that the tank itself was the most effective AT weapon. In the earliest days of the fighting, however, it became clear that the smaller-caliber guns on most tanks were ineffective against opposing armor. The light, towed antitank guns that were supposed to be the backup system were even more ineffective.

Thus, field artillery firing in the direct-fire mode became the primary antitank system in 1941 and 1942 on the Eastern Front and in North Africa. Field artillery was only able to return to its primary direct-support mission in late 1942 after large numbers of heavier AT guns had been fielded. Infantry armed with AT rifles, supposed to be the third line of AT defense, proved mostly worthless and were quickly replaced with projector-type weapons, such as the U.S. bazooka, the British PIAT, and the German Panzerfaust.

For a good 10 years before the war, German doctrine recognized that high-velocity, flat-trajectory antiaircraft guns could be used in an antitank role in emergency situations. In North Africa, the Germans quickly discovered that their 88mm flak guns were devastatingly effective against British tanks. The Soviets, meanwhile, also believed that the enemy's infantry, rather than its tanks, should be the primary target of Soviet tanks. Therefore, in 1942 the Soviets revived the German World War I practice and assigned an antitank role to all artillery weapons. By the final two years of the war, Soviet gun production rates widely outmatched that of the Germans, and the balance tipped in favor of the Soviets.

Most armies used field artillery crews to man antitank units. As the war progressed, antitank guns became larger and more powerful, and many were mounted on self-propelled (SP) carriages to give them mobility equal to the tank. The Germans on the Eastern Front pioneered the use of SP antitank guns in an offensive role. The Soviets also developed a wide range of SP weapons. Distinctions blurred among the Soviet Union's field, assault, and antitank SP guns. Almost all American SP antitank guns were turret-mounted, but the Germans and especially the Soviets favored turretless vehicles. They were simpler and cheaper to build, and the lack of a turret produced a lower profile that made the vehicles smaller targets.

The Soviets spent the first two years of the war on the defensive, and as a result they mastered defensive AT tactics. At Stalingrad, they deployed four sets of antitank belts, to a depth of 6.2 miles. Soviet tanks only counterattacked after all forms of their artillery had stopped the German tank

attack. The tactics that the Soviets developed at Stalingrad were refined and applied with devastating effect later in the July 5–13, 1943, Battle of Kursk, the graveyard of the German panzers.

The U.S. Army organized AT guns into tank-destroyer (TD) battalions. In 1942, a TD battalion had three companies of three platoons with four guns each, either towed or self-propelled. American SP tank destroyers did not do well in North Africa. The operational area was too vast for the guns to mass effectively, and the terrain was too open for the SP vehicles to find good defensive hull-down positions.

Many American commanders shifted to the British system of towed antitank guns, but these proved far less effective when combat operations later moved to Western Europe. In that more restricted terrain, the towed guns moved too slowly, and they were too close to the ground to shoot over hedgerows. By July 1944, the U.S. Army started reequipping all TD battalions with SP guns, but some units still had towed guns by the time of the Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes Offensive) of December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945.

As World War II progressed, the balance shifted back and forth between heavier and more powerful AT guns and thicker and heavier tank armor. Tank designers were faced with the challenge of developing tanks with guns powerful enough to defeat enemy armor yet with armor strong enough to resist the fire from enemy tanks and AT guns. Larger guns produced more recoil, which required a larger and heavier turret. This combined with stronger armor added to the overall weight of the tank, decreasing the tank’s mobility and creating a larger target. Most World War II tanks had heavier armor on the front and sides, where the tank was more likely to be attacked.

Soviet antitank guns, preparing to fire on Axis forces, June 1942. (Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

Tanks can be defeated in differing degrees, with correspondingly different results. In a mobility kill, a tank becomes immobilized because of damage to its treads or drive train. Many mobility kills resulted when a tank hit a mine. An immobilized tank can still fire, but it can no longer maneuver. The advantage from the attacker's standpoint is that the tank becomes more vulnerable to subsequent attack. A firepower kill happens when the tank's main gun system can no longer fire. Although the tank has almost no combat power at that point, it still has the mobility to withdraw from the action, where it can be repaired and returned to combat. A total kill results when the tank is completely destroyed and the crew is killed or severely wounded. In some situations, a trained tank crew may be more difficult to replace than the tank itself.

There are two basic categories of AT projectiles: kinetic energy and chemical energy. A kinetic energy round is a solid-shot projectile that depends on weight and velocity to penetrate and defeat opposing armor. As weight and velocity increase, so does penetrating power. The distance to the target is also a factor. As the round travels farther, its velocity and penetrating power decrease accordingly. The German 88mm PAK 43 could penetrate 207mm of armor at a range of 1,640 feet but only 159mm at a range of 6,562 feet.

The angle of impact also affects a round's penetrating power. At a 30-degree angle of impact, the penetrating power of the PAK 43 at 1,640 feet dropped to 182mm. Thus, beginning with World War II, most tanks have had sloped armored fronts. The earlier kinetic energy rounds also had a tendency to ricochet off the sloped surfaces. The solution to that problem was a special soft nose cap that allowed the round to stick to the armor surface just long enough for penetration to begin.

Tapering the bore of the gun also could increase the velocity of a kinetic energy round. The squeeze-bore guns fired a round with a plastic driving band that wore away as the round moved forward through the bore. As the bore narrowed, the pressure behind the round increased, which in turn increased muzzle velocity. As the round left the gun's muzzle, the remnants of the driving band fell away. The Germans used this technique on their smaller 42mm and 75mm PAK 41 antitank guns, but technical factors limited the effectiveness of the squeeze-bore technique in larger calibers.

Dense and heavy material such as tungsten made the best kinetic-energy rounds. But at 1.4 times the density of steel, a projectile made completely from tungsten would have been too hard and too heavy for the bore of the gun to survive more than a handful of firings. In 1944, the British solved that problem with the introduction of the armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) round. A relatively small but heavy main projectile was encased completely in a plastic casing that fell away as soon as the round left the muzzle. This system had the advantage of placing the pressure produced by a large-bore gun behind a smaller projectile. The result was greater velocity and penetrating power. The APDS remains the primary AT round today.

Chemical-energy rounds defeat armor through a blast effect. The effectiveness of the round depends on its size, composition, and physical configuration rather than on its velocity. Chemical energy rounds tend to travel more slowly and have a more arched trajectory than kinetic energy rounds. Thus, their aiming is far more dependent on an accurate estimate of the range to the target.

Chemical-energy projectiles that produce a uniformly distributed blast effect, such as conventional high-explosive (HE) field artillery rounds, were effective against tanks only in the early days of World War II. As the war progressed and armor became heavier and stronger, riveted tank hull construction gave way first to welding and then to whole casting. In response,

rounds known as hollow-charge or shaped-charge rounds were developed based on the so-called Monroe Effect.

In a hollow-charge round, the explosive material is configured in the shape of a recessed cone, with the base of the cone toward the front of the round. The surface of the inverted cone is lined with light retaining metal such as copper. When the round first hits the target, the explosive is detonated from the rear of the round forward.

The hollow cone has the effect of focusing the entire force of the blast onto a small spot on the tank's skin exactly opposite the apex of the cone. The result is a hot, concentrated jet of gas that punches its way through the tank's armor and sends red-hot fragments into the tank's interior. The tank crew is killed by its own armor. The shaped-charge chemical-energy rounds were designated "high-explosive antitank" (HEAT).

When a HEAT projectile is fired from a conventional gun tube, the stabilizing spin imparted by the bore's rifling tends to degrade the round's penetrating power. This led to the development of fin-stabilized projectiles fired from smoothbore launchers, such as the bazooka and the Panzerfaust. These close-range infantry weapons proved relatively effective. The HEAT warheads did not depend on velocity, so they could be fired from relatively light weapons. HEAT projectiles do depend on warhead weight, however, and in these weapons that was limited to what an infantryman could carry.

No single system stood out in World War II as the premier tank killer, although certain systems predominated at certain times and in certain theaters. Overall for the war, some 30 percent of British tanks that were knocked out fell victim to antitank guns, 25 percent were knocked out by enemy tanks, 22 percent hit mines, 20 percent fell victim to artillery indirect fire and air attack, and the rest were knocked out by infantry AT weapons. In North Africa, Axis AT guns accounted for 40 percent of the British tanks knocked out, whereas in Italy it was only 16 percent. Throughout the war, German tanks were generally better armed and more powerful than their British and American counterparts. This meant that Allied tanks destroyed far fewer panzers than the other way around.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Armored Warfare; Artillery Doctrine; Infantry Tactics; Kursk, Battle of; Mines, Land; Stalingrad, Battle of; Tanks, All Powers

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Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946)

Romanian marshal and dictator. Born in Piteşti on June 14, 1882, to an aristocratic military family, Ion Antonescu graduated from Romanian military schools in Craiova (1902) and Iaşi (1904). A cavalry lieutenant during the 1907 Peasant Revolt, he fought in the Second Balkan War (1913) and was an operations officer during World War I. From 1922 to 1927, he was military attaché in Paris, Brussels, and London. He was chief of the army General Staff in 1933 and 1934.

Like most others among the nationalist Romanian military elite, Antonescu favored British and French political influence. He closely monitored both the Third Reich's ascendancy and the Soviet Union in his vigilance regarding Romanian territorial integrity, however, pragmatically preparing to accomodate the Germans should this become necessary. As minister of defense, Antonescu became embroiled in and frustrated by the corrupt governing vicissitudes of King Carol II, especially after 1937. Protesting Carol's February 1938 establishment of the Royal Dictatorship and his suppression of the fascist Legion of Saint Michael (the Iron Guard), Antonescu defended the Iron Guard's leaders in court, was briefly jailed, and then was posted to Chisinau (Kishinev) near the Soviet border.

Romanian premier Ion Antonescu, during a July 1943 visit to Munich to confer with Adolf Hitler. Six days later Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, with Romanian forces fighting alongside those of Germany. (Heinrich Hoffmann/Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Following the Soviet Union's occupation of Bessarabia and the ceding of Transylvania to Hungary in the summer of 1940, in September Carol was coerced into naming Antonescu head of the troubled government before abdicating, under pressure, in favor of his son Michael, age 19.

Antonescu's title, Conducător, was the Romanian equivalent of Duce or Führer (leader), and he used his broad powers to oust the Iron Guard from government in January 1941. That June, he assigned 14 Romanian divisions to Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation BARBAROSSA, which began on June 22, 1941. For reclaiming Romanian lands from the Soviets, Antonescu was proclaimed marshal by King Michael I on August 23, 1941. Antonescu continued to supply the German war effort with troops (ultimately, Romania lost substantially more men than Italy) in exchange for

German military favor, but on the home front he sought to temper his ally's overbearing appetite for Romania's oil and agricultural production.

In coming to terms with Romania's "Jewish question," Antonescu—like Benito Mussolini—preferred his own solution to anything dictated by Berlin, employing policies that (officially) allowed Jews to emigrate in exchange for payment or to face deportation to Romanian-administered work camps in the Ukrainian region of Transdnistria. Despite its refusal to join Germany's "Final Solution" outright, Antonescu's regime was responsible for the deaths of more than 250,000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews and Romas (Gypsies) from its "romanization" policies during 1940–1944.

Antonescu was deposed by a coup that installed King Michael as the real power on August 23, 1944, and turned over to the occupying Soviet forces. His war crimes show trial, held in Bucharest on May 4–17, 1946, led to a death sentence; he was executed there on June 1, 1946.

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See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Carol II, King of Romania; Holocaust; Romania

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Antonov, Alexei Innokentievich (1896–1962)

Soviet general. Born the son of a czarist artillery officer in Grodno, Belorussia, on September 15, 1896, Alexei Antonov attended the Pavlovsky Military School in Petrograd. He was commissioned as an ensign in the Russian Army in 1916 during World War I and was wounded in the last great Russian offensive of 1917. In 1918, Antonov joined the Red Army and had his first experience with staff work as chief of staff of a brigade in the Russian Civil War. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1931 and was then posted to the Kharkov Military District. In 1937, he graduated

from the General Staff Academy, and from 1938 to 1940 he was a lecturer at the Frunze.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Antonov was promoted to major general and became chief of staff of the Kiev Military District. He was chief of staff of the Southern Army Group from August 1941 to July 1942. In December 1941, Antonov was promoted to lieutenant general, and during 1942 he was chief of staff first of the North Caucasus Army Group, then of the Transcaucasus Army Group. Appointed chief of operations of the General Staff in December 1942, after April 1943 Antonov was also deputy chief of the General Staff and thus at the center of events for the remainder of the war. Antonov was promoted to general of the army in August 1943, a rank he held for the remainder of his military career.

Because chief of the General Staff Aleksandr Vasilevsky was frequently absent, Antonov assumed that role much of the time. A meticulous planner, he helped to orchestrate the major Soviet offensives of the war, including Operation BAGRATION (June 22–August 29, 1944), the encirclement of the German salient in Belorussia and East Prussia that brought the Red Army to the Elbe.

In February 1945, Antonov replaced Vasilevsky as chief of the Soviet General Staff. He was a member of the Soviet delegation to both the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. Demoted in 1946 to first deputy chief of the General Staff and then to first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, Antonov became commander of that same military district in 1950. In April 1954, he was again first deputy chief of the General Staff, and in 1955, he also assumed the post of chief of staff of Warsaw Pact forces. He held these posts until his death in Moscow on June 16, 1962.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BAGRATION, Operation; Potsdam Conference; Soviet Union, Army; Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich; Yalta Conference

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Antwerp, Battle of (September 4–October 2, 1944)

Western Front battle for the key Belgian port of Antwerp. Port facilities there made Antwerp an important strategic city in Europe. Antwerp is about 54 miles from the open sea, connected by the Scheldt River, which is narrow below the city and then broadens into a wide estuary. The southern bank of the estuary is formed by the European mainland. The northern side is formed by the South Beveland Peninsula and Walcheren Island, which is connected to the peninsula by a narrow causeway. The port had 600 hydraulic and electric cranes as well as numerous floating cranes, loading bridges, and floating grain elevators. Its clearance facilities included extensive marshaling yards and excellent linkage with the Belgian network of railroads and navigable waterways. It was thus essential for the Anglo-American forces to secure Antwerp as a supply port to sustain their eastward offensive.

The British Second Army took Brussels on September 3 and managed to cover the 60 miles to Antwerp on September 4. The British 11th Armoured Division entered the city to find that the port was relatively intact, largely thanks to activities of the Belgian Resistance. Commander Major General George Philip Roberts of the 11th Armoured Division ordered a pause for two days, neglecting to secure the bridges over the Albert Canal on the northern edge of the city. Had the bridges been secured on September 4, the way would have been open to the eastern base of the South Beveland Peninsula, some 17 miles distant. This would have trapped the remaining units of Colonel General Gustav von Zagen's Fifteenth Army of some 100,000 men in a pocket. By September 6, however, German resistance had rallied to permit the British only a small bridgehead that was subsequently destroyed.

The German Fifteenth Army was sealed off in the Calais-Flanders region in what was known as the "Breskens Pocket." On September 4, Zagen ordered an evacuation across the estuary, in which the troops were ferried to Walcheren. By the time the evacuation was completed on September 23, the Germans extracted some 86,000 men, 616 guns, 6,200 vehicles, and 6,000 horses. Had the Beveland Peninsula been cut off, the evacuation would have

taken a different route, a 12-hour journey to reach safety, allowing for more Allied interference.

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery did not bring the full force of his 21st Army Group to bear on clearing the surrounding countryside to allow traffic on the Scheldt River. He did not even order the First Canadian Army to clear the Scheldt estuary until late September, even while that force was still tasked with clearing the Channel ports. Not until October 16 did Montgomery order that the Scheldt be cleared with the utmost vigor, irrespective of casualties. The port itself did not open for traffic until November 26.

British soldiers lay down covering fire as others dash across a bridge during the fighting to secure Antwerp, Belgium, in September 1944. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Most scholars believe that Montgomery's failure at Antwerp influenced his concern that the maximum amount of force and effort be applied in the subsequent Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 2–26, 1944). Certainly the Battle of Antwerp was a lost opportunity for the Allies to open a major port early, trap a large German force, and potentially end the war sooner.

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See also

MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Scheldt, Battles of the

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Anzio, Battle of (January 22–May 25, 1944)

Fighting in Italy that followed the Allied invasion of early September 1943 was some of the most bitter of the war and at times resembled World War I trench warfare. German field marshal Albert Kesselring had charge of German forces in Italy and made skillful use of the ideal defensive terrain. The central mountainous spine of the Apennines rises above 10,000 feet, with lateral spurs running east and west. Between these, there are deep valleys with wide, rapidly flowing rivers. In 1943 the few north-south roads were confined to 20-mile strips adjacent to the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts, where the bridges were dominated by natural strongpoints.

Kesselring formed German divisions in southern Italy into the Tenth Army under Colonel General Heinrich von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel. Following successful Allied landings by British general Sir Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army at Calabria and Taranto and by U.S. lieutenant general Mark Clark's Fifth Army at Salerno, Vietinghoff succeeded in holding up the Fifth Army at the rain-swollen Volturno River by blowing its bridges. Skillful German delaying actions allowed them time to bring up reinforcements and consolidate behind a formidable defensive line. Known as the Winter Line and the Gustav Line, it was some 10 miles deep and ran from the mouth of the Garigliano River on the Gulf of Gaeta west along its swift-running tributary, the Rapido River, and then over the mountains to the Adriatic, north of the Sangro River.

A shell explodes in the water as the Germans try to prevent Allied landing craft from resupplying the beachhead at Anzio, Italy, in January 1944. The Anzio landing, designed to flank the German defensive line to the south and secure Rome, failed to achieve its objective. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

The Fifth Army eventually got across the Volturno but soon found itself crowded into a small attack zone along the Rapido. German resistance, difficult terrain, constant rain or snow, and a morass of mud all produced a stalemate on the ground. The town of Cassino, astride the main road from Naples to Rome, was the hub of the German defenses.

The Allies now tried to outflank the Gustav Line by a landing north of it at Anzio on the west coast of Italy, just 25 miles from Rome. British prime minister Winston Churchill was the plan's chief advocate. The Allies hoped to divert German units from the Gustav Line, allowing a breakout there and permitting the two Allied pincers to converge on Rome. Anzio, however, turned out to be an incredible opportunity thrown away.

General Clark had overall command of the Anzio operation, but VI Corps commander U.S. major general John Lucas led the actual invasion force. The landing began on January 22, 1944. The invaders consisted principally of British major general W. R. C. Penney's 1st Division on the left flank and U.S. major general Lucian K. Truscott's 3rd Infantry Division on the right.

U.S. lieutenant colonel William Prescott's 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion had the task of securing the port of Anzio.

Code-named Operation SHINGLE, the landing proceeded virtually unopposed. By the end of the day, more than 36,000 men, 3,000 vehicles, and large quantities of supplies had come ashore at a cost of only 13 dead, 97 wounded, and 44 missing or captured. Unfortunately for the Allies, a captured soldier was carrying a copy of the operation plan.

Two days before the invasion, the Allies launched their planned diversionary strike against Cassino. Kesselring immediately rushed two reserve divisions there from Rome. Consequently, when the Anzio invasion occurred there were no German reserves to meet a swift Allied thrust to Rome. Although Lucas did get valuable amounts of supplies ashore quickly, which enabled the Allies to beat back subsequent German counterattacks, he was overly cautious at first and failed to take advantage of the temporary German weakness to secure the critical nearby Alban Hills. Although Colonel Reuben Tucker's U.S. 504th Parachute Regiment was available for that purpose, Clark had vetoed an airborne drop. The 504th came ashore by LST (landing ship, tank) to fight as infantry.

After the successful landings, nothing went right for the Allies. The chief reason for the failure of the Anzio operation was insufficient resources in the initial assault. Landing craft and other assets from Italy had been sent to prepare for the upcoming Normandy Invasion. Lacking adequate resources at Anzio, the Allies would have been better off to have mounted a decisive operation along the Gustav Line.

The Anzio beachhead soon developed into a precarious situation whereby the Germans constantly rushed up more men, ultimately committing Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen's entire Fourteenth Army there. It soon threatened to drive the Allied forces into the sea. Ultimately the Allies were forced to commit more than 110,000 men to the beachhead.

The more aggressive 3rd Infantry Division commander, U.S. major general Lucian K. Truscott, took over from Lucas as VI Corps commander in late February, but extremely cold weather and stiff German resistance led to a 125-day stalemate. Not until May 25 and after more than 40,000 casualties were the Allied able to break out from Anzio and drive on Rome.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Clark, Mark Wayne; Darby, William Orlando; Italy Campaign; Kesselring, Albert; Lucas, John Porter; Mackensen, Eberhard von; Roose-velt, Franklin D.; Salerno Invasion; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.; Vietinghoff genannt Scheel, Heinrich Gottfried von

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Arakan Campaign, First (October 1942–May 1943)

First British offensive to regain land lost to the Japanese in Burma. In January 1942, Japanese forces drove into Burma (present-day Myanmar) from Thailand to sever Allied lines of communication into China, gain a dominant position in Southeast Asia, and threaten British India. By May, British forces—along with allied Indian, Burmese, and Chinese units—were being pushed north and east into China and north and west into India. In June, the British-controlled forces were holding along the Indian border forward of Ledo, Imphal, and Chittagong, where they began to rebuild and refit their battered forces. In July, commander of the British Eastern Army Lieutenant General N. M. Irwin began planning for an offensive operation against Arakan, a northwestern coastal province of Burma separated from the rest of Burma by mountainous jungle terrain.

The offensive was to begin in the late fall and was designed to clear elements of Japanese lieutenant general Takeuchi Hiroshi's 55th Division from the Mayu Peninsula and Akyab Island. In December, Major General W.

L. Lloyd's 14th Indian Division conducted a two-pronged assault down the peninsula. Initially successful, the British were in striking distance of Akyab when General Iida Shōjirō, commander of the Japanese Fifteenth Army, reinforced and strengthened the defensive positions near Donbaik and Rathedaung. The British then reinforced the stalled 15th Indian Division with five infantry brigades and a troop of tanks. The March 1943 assault on Donbaik failed, and the Japanese quickly began a counteroffensive that drove Allied forces back up the peninsula. The 55th Division struck from Akyab, while other Japanese units worked their way over the supposedly impassable mountains to hit the British left flank and rear areas during March 13–17.

In early April, Major General C. E. N. Lomax relieved Lloyd, with the mission of stemming the Japanese attack. British lieutenant general William Slim, commander of XV Corps, and his staff were redeployed from Ranchi to Chittagong, although Slim did not receive command of the operation until mid-April. The 26th Division headquarters deployed to relieve the staff of the 14th Division. Fighting on the Mayu Peninsula raged as Japanese units used their proven jungle warfare tactics to outmaneuver and cut off British units at multiple points.

Lomax attempted to entrap the rapidly advancing Japanese forces; although his plan was sound, the battle-weary British forces were overcome and were again forced to retreat, having suffered significant losses of transport and equipment. The Japanese reoccupied Arakan on May 12. British forces were finally able to disengage and establish a stable defensive position near Cox's Bazaar. The first campaign for the Arakan area was over. The British offensive to regain Burmese territory had failed, and the reputation of Japanese forces as unmatched jungle fighters continued to grow.

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See also

Arakan Campaign, Second; Burma Theater; Iida Shōjirō; Slim, Sir William Joseph

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Arakan Campaign, Second (December 1943–July 1944)

Allied Burma theater campaign. Arakan is the northwest coastal province of Burma (present-day Myanmar) and is separated from the rest of Burma by mountainous jungle terrain. In early 1944, Allied forces in the China-Burma-India theater were preparing to go on the offensive. U.S. Army lieutenant general Joseph Stilwell, chief of staff of the Nationalist Chinese Army, planned to direct Merrill's Marauders and Chinese forces against Myitkyina in northern Burma, supported by British brigadier Orde Wingate's Chindits. At the same time, Lieutenant General William Slim's British forces would attack from Assam to regain control of the Irrawaddy Valley. An attack in the south by the British XV Corps would secure the Arakan region by again moving down the Mayu Peninsula toward Akyab. Similar in design to the 1942–1943 operation, which had ended in a major British defeat, this offensive had a different result.

In late 1943, three divisions of the British XV Corps were ready to move into the Arakan. The 81st West African Division deployed into the Kaladan Valley to the east of the Mayu Peninsula. The 5th and 7th Indian Divisions relieved the 26th Indian Division forward of Chittagong. A brigade of tanks, the 25th Dragoons, moved forward to provide additional offensive punch. The 55th Japanese Division, supported by units of the Indian National Army, was defending the Arakan. These formations were later reinforced with elements of the 54th Division. The British aim was to move down the coast of Burma, take the island of Akyab, and prepare to continue the offensive, supporting the overall campaign to retake Burma.

In late December 1943, the Second Arakan Campaign began with the 7th Indian Division attacking on the eastern side of the peninsula and the 5th Indian Division attacking in the west to secure the port of Maungdaw. The initial British objective was to secure the Japanese fortifications guarding the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road that crossed the mountainous spine of the peninsula. The British secured land routes, airfields, and coastal ports to support the offensive, as there was little doubt that the Japanese would

counterattack. To forestall this, the British 26th and 36th Indian Divisions were alerted for movement to the Arakan.

The British advance was halted by Lieutenant General Hanaya Tadashi's 55th Division, which was dug in along a mountain spur extending west to the sea near Maungdaw. This Japanese position blocked land access to Akyab. For nearly two months, the British tried without success to break the Japanese defenses, which Burma Area Army commander Lieutenant General Kawabe Masakazu reinforced with the 54th Division. In early February 1944, the 55th Division counterattacked. One element attacked to fix the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions in place, while a second smaller force moved against the 81st and a third force infiltrated into the XV Corps and attacked the rear area. Designed to cut off supplies and destroy the British divisions when they retreated, this was the identical strategy the Japanese had used successfully in the same area a year earlier.

The Japanese plan was stymied when General Slim refused to authorize a withdrawal, and the Allied units dug in. Resupply efforts by air were successful, and the units held. The Japanese then found themselves encircled by the Indian 26th and British 36th Divisions, which came forward, while at the same time the two frontline British divisions reestablished contact with the Japanese. Although the 81st Division was not able to hold in Kaladan, in the Mayu area British units went on the offensive.

Allied troops clambering up a rough, precipitous hillside in typical Arakan hill country during a daylight attack of the Second Arakan Campaign in Burma (December 1943–July 1944). (Keystone/Getty Images)

In fierce fighting, the British XV Corps drove through the Maungdaw position. Fighting continued through May, but with the British about to continue on to Akyab, they were obliged to break off the attack to send reinforcements to the Imphal area. Nonetheless, for the first time in Burma, British forces had decisively defeated a major Japanese attack. With victory in the Arakan, the tide in Burma had decisively turned.

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See also

Arakan Campaign, First; Burma Theater; Chindits; Kawabe Masakazu; Merrill, Frank Dow; Myitkyina, Siege of; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Wingate, Orde Charles

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Arcadia Conference (December 22, 1941–January 14, 1942)

Post–Pearl Harbor conference between U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill. This meeting, code-named Arcadia, took place in Washington, D.C., from December 22, 1941, to January 14, 1942. It came only two weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry into the war, and its purpose was to hammer out joint strategy and cooperative agreements to achieve victory over the Axis powers.

Roosevelt was determined that the direction of the Allied war effort would come from Washington, and the meeting was designed to underscore that end. Churchill, however, saw the meeting as a means of bringing about

full U.S. commitment to the war effort. Members of the British delegation entered the talks believing they would show the Americans how things should be run. It did not work out that way, and there were sometimes heated exchanges. The British delegation was appalled by the lack of organization and procedure on the U.S. side.

The U.S. representatives sought to establish a council similar to World War I's Supreme Allied War Council with many participants, which the British opposed. At a meeting early on Christmas Day, U.S. Army chief of staff George C. Marshall made a strong appeal for unity of command of the South Pacific area. The British concurred, but the issue then arose of which entity the American-British-Dutch-Australian commander (General Archibald Wavell) should report to. Ultimately they decided that the authority would be the American military chiefs in Washington with representatives of the British chiefs but leaving the authority of both intact.

This decision, approved by Roosevelt on January 1, led to the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, involving the military chiefs from the British and U.S. sides. This also created, without executive order, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. component of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In effect, the Americans had won, and the war would be run from Washington. The establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff marked the beginning of perhaps the closest-ever collaboration between two sovereign nations at war.

Toward the end of the conference, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to set up an agency for munitions allocation with equal bodies in Washington and London. Marshall strongly opposed this, insisting that there be only one entity. Roosevelt agreed, and the U.S. side prevailed.

The conferees also discussed the possibility of an invasion of North Africa, General Douglas MacArthur's appeal for assistance to the Philippines, and the issue of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. The conferees also agreed that U.S. troops would be sent to Iceland and Northern Ireland.

The Arcadia Conference also led to agreement on the epochal Declaration of the United Nations, signed on January 1, 1942, by representatives of 26 countries. It called for the overthrow of the Axis powers and peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter. But perhaps the chief result of Arcadia was that the war would be managed from Washington rather than London.

See also

Atlantic Charter; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Combined Chiefs of Staff; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lend-Lease; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United Nations Declaration; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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ARCHERY, Operation

See Vågsøy Island Raid

Arctic Convoys

Convoys transporting war matériel from the United States and Britain to the Soviet Union. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the British government made the decision to support the Soviet Union with armaments, and almost simultaneously, the United States extended the benefits of the Lend-Lease Act to include supplying Russia. The first convoy, seven merchant ships in Operation DERVISH, left Liverpool on August 12, 1941, and the final round-trip transit (convoys JW/RA 67) occurred on May 12–30, 1945, just after the surrender of German forces in Europe.

Shipping headed to or from Soviet Arctic ports faced a quadruple German threat in addition to the hazards of navigation in stormy, fog-bound, icy seas. Germany based large numbers of U-boats in Norway, and from the spring of

1942, most of its modern heavy surface warships transferred there, too. The Luftwaffe stationed substantial forces in Norway and transferred specialist antishipping units there as the Allied convoy system became more established. Finally, Germany conducted a steady mining campaign against the ports themselves.

The proximity of the convoy route to Norway and the deployment of German heavy surface units and antishipping aircraft had a profound influence on the conduct of convoy operations. Almost all Arctic convoys were more heavily escorted than regular trade convoys. In addition to the usual small escort vessels, the close escort usually included several fleet destroyers. Furthermore, the British Home Fleet often deployed heavy covering forces for the convoys, ranging in size from one or two cruisers (plus escorts) to large squadrons that also included battleships and fleet and escort carriers.

Actual sorties or threats of excursions by German heavy surface warships precipitated several notable actions. Intelligence that the German battleship *Tirpitz* had sortied led to convoy PQ 17 being ordered to disperse on July 4, 1942. The unescorted merchantmen were easy targets for German aircraft and submarines; 23 of the 34 ships in the convoy were sunk. Other significant actions were the Battle of the Barents Sea (December 31, 1942), in which a British combined cruiser-destroyer force fought off an attack by the pocket battleship *Lützow*, the heavy cruiser *Hipper*, and destroyers, allowing the entire convoy to reach the Soviet Union unscathed, and the Battle of the North Cape (December 26, 1943), in which the German battleship *Scharnhorst* was sunk. In addition, the presence of the *Tirpitz* precipitated a series of underwater and air attacks between September 1943 and its sinking on November 12, 1944.

A total of 848 merchantmen sailed to Russia in 42 convoys and one major unescorted operation, of which 65 were sunk. Of 735 ships that sailed from Russia in 36 convoys and one major unescorted operation, 40 were sunk. Overall, this loss rate was slightly higher than that of North Atlantic convoys although distorted by the very high casualties of PQ 17.

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See also

Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Electronic Intelligence; Fraser, Bruce Austin; North Cape, Battle of; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Submarines, Midget; *Tirpitz*, Attacks on; Tovey, Sir John Cronyn

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Ardeatine Massacre (March 24, 1944)

Atrocity committed by the Germans in Italy in reprisal for an Italian partisan bombing in Rome. On March 23, 1944, the communist-led Gruppi Azione Patriotica (Patriotic Action Group, GAP) commanded by Carlo Salinari exploded a bomb in the Via Rasella in the center of Rome. The bomb detonated just as a group of 156 German Schutzstaffel (SS) were marching by. The survivors were attacked with automatic weapons and grenades. As many as 42 Germans were killed outright, as were 10 Italian civilians. Another 60 Germans were badly wounded.

British Army military police escort SS Obersturmbannführer Herbert Kappler to trial in November 1946. Kappler ordered the World War II Ardeatine Massacre in which 335 civilians were executed in retaliation for a partisan bomb that killed 44 German policemen and 10 Italians. (Corbis)

In retaliation, the German high command in Berlin ordered the immediate execution of 50 Italians for each German killed in the Via Rasella incident. German commander in chief in Italy Field Marshal Albert Kesselring reduced the number to 10 Italians for each German and directed that those to be executed should be prisoners already under sentence of death. Sufficient condemned prisoners were not located, however, and SS-Obersturmbannführer Herbert Kappler, Nazi police chief of Rome, ordered additional arrests. The details of the operation were arranged by SS-Hauptsturmführer Erich Priebke.

In all, 335 Italians, 75 of whom were Jews and most of whom had no connection with the Via Rasella bombing, were taken from various Roman prisons and transported to the caves on the Fosse Ardeatine (Via Ardeatine)

in the southern part of Rome, near the catacombs of Saint Calixtus. There the Germans shot them in groups of five and buried them in the caves. Most victims died by a single shot to the head, but some were no doubt buried alive when the caves were dynamited. Among the Italians executed were several women and two teenaged boys.

In postwar trials, Kesselring, German commandant of the city of Rome Lieutenant General Maeltzer, and Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen, German Fourteenth Army commander, were tried and sentenced to death for their parts in the Ardeatine massacre. The sentences of all three were later commuted to terms of imprisonment. Through a quirk in Italian law, Kappler, the principal perpetrator of the massacre, could not be sentenced to death but was imprisoned. He escaped from a prison hospital in 1977 and died in Germany the following year. Priebke was extradited from Argentina to Italy in 1995 and was eventually convicted and sentenced to life in prison in 1998; he died, unrepentent, in 2013.

The Ardeatine massacre has become a symbol of German wartime atrocities in Italy, and the historical realities have been obscured by myth and conjecture. The actual number of Germans killed in the Via Rasella, for example, and whether Adolf Hitler actually issued a *Führerbefehl* (führer order) for the reprisal are still unclear. It has also been alleged that the Via Rasella bombing was planned by the GAP specifically to provoke a reprisal that would fall most heavily on the many noncommunist antifascists in German prisons. Only three of the Ardeatine victims were communists, including Antonello Trombadori, who until February 2, 1944, had commanded the GAP.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Italy; Kesselring, Albert; Mackensen, Eberhard von; Rome, Advance on and Capture of

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Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945)

By the autumn of 1944, Germany's fate was largely sealed. The Western Allies were driving on Germany from the west, and the Soviets were closing from the east. German leader Adolf Hitler, however, rejected the rational course for his people of surrender; his alternative was a desperate gamble. The resulting monthlong German Ardennes Offensive, popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge, only speeded the German military defeat.

With the Eastern Front static for several months and the Allied offensive in the west gaining ground, in September 1944 Hitler conceived a sudden offensive in the Ardennes region to take the Western Allies by surprise, break their front, and recapture the Belgian port of Antwerp. Hitler hoped at the least that such an attack would purchase three to four months to deal with the advancing Soviets. Commander of German forces in the west Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt thought that the plan was unrealistic, as did other high-ranking officers. Hitler refused to budge, though, and substantial German forces were transferred from the Eastern Front for what turned out to be the largest battle fought on the Western Front in the war and the largest single engagement ever for the U.S. Army. The German code name for the offensive was Operation WACHT AM RHEIN (WATCH ON THE RHINE), after the German patriotic hymn of the same name.

Hitler could not have selected a better location for his attack than the Ardennes. Allied forces there were weak because supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force General Dwight D. Eisenhower had deployed most of his strength northward and southward. The 80-mile-wide central sector in the Ardennes was lightly defended by Major General Troy Middleton's VIII Corps of the 4th, 28th, and 106th Infantry Divisions; the 9th Armored Division (less Combat Command B); and the two-squadron 14th Cavalry Group. Neither the 9th Armored Division nor the 106th Infantry Division had experienced combat, and the 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions were absorbing thousands of replacements after suffering massive casualties in fighting in the Hürtgen Forest.

From south to north on the VIII Corps front were the 4th Infantry Division and part of the 9th Armored Division, the 28th Infantry Division on a 25-mile front, and the 106th Infantry Division, holding a front of almost 16

miles. The 14th Cavalry screened a 5-mile sector between Major General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps to the south and Major General Leonard T. Gerow's V Corps to the north.



The timing could not have been better for the Germans either, as poor weather initially restricted the use of Allied airpower. German security was excellent, with Hitler having restricted all communication to secure landlines, which Allied Ultra radio intercepts could not pick up.

The Western Allies were complacent, because the difficult Ardennes terrain mitigated against a German attack, because Ultra revealed nothing of the German plans, and because they believed that only they could launch an offensive. Telltale signs were disbelieved. In an exceptional achievement, the Germans secretly marshaled 410,000 men, 1,420 tanks and assault guns, 2,600 artillery pieces and rocket launchers, and just more than 1,000 combat aircraft. While this was considerably greater than the Allied forces in the Ardennes, it was also dwarfed by what the Allies could ultimately bring to bear.

In the predawn darkness and fog of December 16, 1944, the Germans began their offensive, catching the Allies by surprise. Initially, 12th Army Group commander General Omar N. Bradley and his subordinate, Third Army commander Lieutenant General George S. Patton, did not believe it to be a major operation. Eisenhower did, and on its second day he ordered the battle-weary 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to the front from a reconstitution camp in France. Traveling in trucks, the 101st arrived at midnight on December 18 near the important road hub of Bastogne. This small Belgian town would play a key role in the battle.

The attacking German force of 24 divisions, moving against 3 divisions of Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges's First Army, soon drove a bulge in the American lines that gave the battle its name. The Battle of the Bulge was more a campaign of a series of smaller battles, however, each lasting a week or more, with the whole extending over a month. The German penetration eventually extended some 50 miles deep and 70 miles wide.

U.S. soldiers of the 289th Infantry Regiment moving up to cut off the St. Vith-Houffalize road in Belgium in January 1945. The Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes forest of Belgium was Hitler's last major offensive and the largest land battle on the Western Front of the war. (National Archives)

On December 22, four German soldiers under a white flag walked toward an American outpost near Bastogne. They carried an ultimatum addressed to "the U.S.A. commander of the encircled town of Bastogne." This message called on the American commander (Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe, in the absence of Major General Maxwell D. Taylor) to save his troops with an "honorable surrender." McAuliffe's response to the Germans was one of the most memorable statements of the war: "To the German Commander: Nuts. The American commander."

German forces flowed around Bastogne, heading northwest toward the Meuse. Field Marshal Walther Model, commander of Army Group B and charged with carrying out the offensive, sought to have the Fifth Panzer Army make the main effort. Hitler, ignorant of the situation on the ground, insisted that this be done by SS-Oberstgruppenführer Josef "Sepp" Dietrich's Sixth Panzer Army.

On the north shoulder of the bulge, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division dug in. The Americans massed 348 artillery pieces that shattered the German attack. In the center, units fighting mostly in isolated formations stood firm, impeding the German advance. Meanwhile, Patton's Third Army rushed to the rescue from the south. Patton had ordered his staff more than a week earlier to prepare for just such a contingency and assured an unbelieving Eisenhower that he could wheel his army 90 degrees and strike north into the bulge with three divisions in only three days. Patton accomplished this feat in one of the most memorable mass maneuvers of the war.

Other Allied resources were also diverted to the Ardennes fighting. Then on December 23, the weather changed along the front, clearing the sky, freezing the ground, and making the terrain passable for armor. Allied aircraft quickly filled the skies and transports parachuted supplies into Bastogne, where the defenders were down to only 10 rounds per gun. On Christmas Day the German tanks ground to a halt, out of fuel, while U.S. 2nd Armored Division gunners had a turkey shoot at Celles, almost at the German objective of the Meuse, in which they destroyed 82 German tanks. On December 26, the 4th Armored Division of Patton's Third Army lifted the siege of Bastogne.

Unfortunately, 21st Army Group commander British field marshal Bernard L. Montgomery had elected to remain on the defensive, overruling U.S. VII Corps commander Major General J. Lawton Collins's plan to cut off

the bulge by striking from each shoulder. Finally, the Allies attacked midway up the salient, although this obviated the chance to surround the Germans. Patton held that timidity on the part of Eisenhower and Montgomery allowed the bulk of the German attackers to escape.

On January 1, 1945, as part of the offensive, the Germans mounted an air attack on Allied air bases in Belgium. Operation BODENPLATTE (BASE PLATE) destroyed 500–800 Allied aircraft, most of them on the ground, but it also saw about 300 German aircraft shot down and 214 trained pilots lost to German as well as Allied antiaircraft fire.

On the ground, the Battle of the Bulge dragged on into the middle of January. Hitler had already ordered part of the participating panzer divisions transferred east, but before these resources could arrive, the Soviets began their last great offensive. By the end of January the American First and Third Armies had reached the German frontier and reestablished the line of six weeks before.

The Battle of the Bulge had been fought and won largely by American forces. Of the 600,000 U.S. troops involved, 19,000 were killed, about 47,000 were wounded, and 15,000 were taken prisoner. Of the 55,000 British engaged, casualties totaled 1,400, of whom 200 were killed. The Germans sustained nearly 100,000 killed, wounded, or captured. Both sides suffered heavy equipment losses, about 800 tanks on each side, and the Germans lost virtually all their aircraft committed. But the Western Allies could quickly make good their losses, while the Germans could not. Hitler had also seriously weakened German defenses in the east. In effect, all Hitler had accomplished was to hasten the end of the war. Germany surrendered four months later.

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See also

Bastogne, Battle for; Dietrich, Josef “Sepp”; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Gerow, Leonard Townsend; Hitler, Adolf; McAuliffe, Anthony Clement; Middleton, Troy Houston; Model, Walther; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Document 209

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Arima Masafumi (1895–1944)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Kagoshima on September 25, 1895, Arima Masafumi joined the Japanese Navy in 1915. During the Sino-Japanese War beginning in 1937, he commanded the *Kamikawa-maru*, a transport that had been converted into a seaplane tender, and took part in the operations in southern China. Between 1938 and 1941, Arima had charge of various naval air units.

During October 26–27, 1942, in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, Captain Arima commanded the fleet aircraft carrier *Shōkaku*, flagship of Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi's Third Fleet. Although the *Shōkaku* was heavily damaged by U.S. aircraft in that action, Japanese damage control and navigation skills saved the ship. Also in this battle, the *Shōkaku*'s aircraft fatally crippled the U.S. aircraft carrier *Hornet*, which was later abandoned and eventually sunk by Japanese destroyers. At the close of the battle, Arima called for continuing air attacks on the remaining U.S. ships, but Nagumo flatly rejected this suggestion. In this sense, Arima was in the same position Yamaguchi Tamon was at the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942).

Following a short stint at the Navy Aviation Department as head of the training section, in 1943 Arima was promoted to rear admiral, and in the following year he took command of the 26th Air Flotilla based in the Philippines. During the air battle off Taiwan (Formosa) on October 15, 1944, Arima led an attack on U.S. warships. When his "Betty" bomber was hit, Arima ordered the pilot to dive the plane into the U.S. aircraft carrier

Franklin, but the aircraft was shot down by the U.S. combat air patrol and missed its intended target. To that date, Arima was the highest-ranking Japanese naval officer to carry out a suicide (kamikaze) air attack. His dramatic death preceded the first organized kamikaze operation, which took place off Leyte on October 25. Arima was posthumously promoted to vice admiral.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Kamikaze; Kusaka Ryūnosuke; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chūichi; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Ugaki Matome; Yamaguchi Tamon

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Armaments Production

Armaments production in each combatant nation, as with other economic aspects of the war effort, was intimately tied to decisions about grand strategy, the structure and ideology of the political economy, and the use of military force. Governments analyzed their economic resources and potential industrial mobilization, and they considered how noneconomic factors such as political tradition, cultural institutions, and the limits of state power would modify or restrict those plans. The resulting policies, which Allan Milward calls "strategic synthesis," allowed governments to distribute finite resources among the civilian economy, war production, and the armed forces in a more or less rational manner. Put another way, although munitions production was theoretically unlimited, competing demands on resources meant that armament creation was often constrained in ways that could not be overcome. The different national limitations on armament expansion help explain why the Allies dominated munitions production during the period 1939–1945.

Limits on armaments production in Nazi Germany were initially political, with the regime explicitly refusing to mobilize the economy too deeply. Given Germany's weaker economic position and fewer resources vis-à-vis its opponents, Adolf Hitler planned to avoid a long war of industrial attrition. Instead, he intended to wage short, intense campaigns with the limited military forces under development since 1936. Hitler's guiding strategic concept was to defeat his enemies quickly and avoid military stalemate. Italian and Japanese leaders took a similar approach, mainly due to their inability to compete with Britain and the United States in war production. The relatively small size of the Japanese and Italian economies and the drain on Japan of the Sino-Japanese War precluded major mobilization efforts in any case.

The initial Axis strategies called for a high investment in modern military equipment; a readiness to conduct short, opportunistic campaigns; and the careful avoidance of long-term economic mobilization. Unfortunately for the Axis powers, the course of the war quickly rendered these plans obsolete.

The Western Allies' strategic synthesis was also based on the wartime experience of 1914–1918, although different lessons were drawn from that Pyrrhic victory. Although the war itself was viewed as a political and economic disaster, the concept of mass industrial mobilization was taken for granted. By investing in technologically intensive and financially costly but manpower-saving armament programs, the Western democracies hoped to avoid the mass bloodletting of World War I. Future wars, their leaders believed, would be won by industrial might invested in such programs as the Maginot Line or four-engine bombers, not by running infantry against enemy trench lines. In contrast to the Axis strategy, the Allied strategy was slow to develop, as it took time to gather resources and mobilize industry for war.

Soviet strategy during 1921–1937 actually favored short wars, as military thinkers did not believe that the Soviet Union could compete with the Western industrial powers economically. Only during 1937–1942, after the purges, did the opposite come about, and then mostly by necessity. Despite the extreme social and economic disruption caused by industrial and agricultural five-year plans in the 1930s, the experienced and hardened Soviet bureaucracy was confident of a massive industrial response to any future conflict.

Viewed in these terms, there were four main centers of armaments

production during World War II: the Western democracies (after 1940, only the United States and British Commonwealth), the European Axis (Germany and Italy), the Soviet Union, and Japan. These economic spheres were in no way equal, however; the Axis powers were at a severe disadvantage. In 1938, for example, the Allied gross domestic product (GDP) was 2.4 times that of Axis nations. This ratio is meaningless if such economic power is not translated into combat-ready munitions though.

Young, uniformed American workers assembling 40mm antiaircraft guns during the war. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

In 1939–1941, the Axis nations enjoyed a significant armaments advantage, as their rearmament programs had begun earlier and had concentrated on frontline aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment. The Western democracies and the Soviet Union were still heavily engaged in long-range rearmament programs at the outbreak of war. The British and the French were building aircraft factories and capital ships in 1940, for example, while the Russians were still focused on engineering, machine tools, and factory construction. Before the fall of France in June 1940, U.S. armament expenditure was quite low, and the munitions industry was backlogged with European orders for machine tools and aircraft.

This partly explains the military success of the German and Japanese offensives through 1941. Allied fortunes were then at a low point as entire countries and colonies fell under Axis control, and the Allied GDP ratio over the Axis fell to 2:1 at the end of the year.

From 1942 on, however, the ratio moved steadily against the Axis powers, particularly as the Allies began coordinating armaments production on a massive scale. During 1942, the United States, Britain, and Canada agreed to pool their resources and allocate the production of munitions on a combined basis. The governing idea was to take advantage of each nation's manufacturing potential and strengths, covering any shortfall in other areas through imports from other Allied countries. The British, for example, dedicated a higher proportion of national income to war production than they could normally support (more than 54 percent), covering the resulting gap in the civilian economy with imports from North America. It was the ability of the Western Allies to trade via the world's oceans, despite the challenge by German U-boats, that allowed the combined production process to work.

By 1944, an immense quantitative mobilization drive nearly doubled the 1938 GDP in the United States (with 42 percent of national income dedicated to the war), steadily increasing the Allied production ratio to 3.3:1 over Germany and Italy and to almost 10:1 over Japan. Combat armament production in the United States alone equaled 50 percent of total world munitions output, with the British adding another 15 percent. Although partly a function of mass-production methods, another key to Allied success was the advanced level of economic development in Britain and North America. Well-established transport networks and other advantages gave the Western Allied labor force a 1.4:1 productivity advantage over German workers. The combination led to Allied dominance in the output of a whole range of weapons.

The Soviet Union meanwhile struggled, owing to the civil war, the shattering effects of the purges, collectivization, and the abrupt shifts of its five-year economic plans. It also was forced to relocate half its industry east, behind the Urals during 1939–1942. Following a 25 percent drop in GDP after the German invasion in the summer of 1941, the Soviets labored under tremendous pressure to match Axis ground armament production. During a two-year period, almost half the Soviet economy was shifted from civilian to military efforts, with almost 60 percent of national income allocated to the

war in 1943. The ability of the Soviet government to mobilize resources and people proved astonishing, and as noted by Richard Overy, it was this "genius for industrial management" but also a great disregard for human life that allowed the Soviets to pull even with Germany by the end of that year. Despite the accompanying suffering and privation—what Overy called "an exceptional, brutal form of total war"—Soviet workers were helped tremendously by Lend-Lease aid from the United States and provided the Red Army with sufficient material to eventually destroy the German armies on the Eastern Front.

Table 1. Selected Munitions Production of the Great Powers, 1939–1945 (1,000s)

	1939	*1940*	*1941*	*1942*	*1943*	*1944*	*1945*
Tanks and self-propelled guns							
Germany	1.3	2.2	3.8	6.2	10.7	18.3	4.4
Italy	Total production, June 1940–August 1943 = 3.0						
Japan	0.2	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.8	0.4	0.2
United Kingdom	0.9	1.4	4.8	8.6	7.5	4.6	2.1
United States	—	0.4	0.9	27.0	38.5	20.5	12.6
USSR	2.9	2.8	4.8	24.4	24.1	29.0	20.5
Combat aircraft							
Germany	2.3	6.6	8.4	11.6	19.3	34.1	7.2
Italy	1.7	3.3	3.5	2.8	2.0	—	—
Japan	0.7	2.2	3.2	6.3	13.4	21.0	8.3
United Kingdom	1.3	8.6	13.2	17.7	21.2	22.7	9.9
United States	—	—	1.4	24.9	54.1	74.1	37.5
USSR	—	—	8.2	21.7	29.9	33.2	19.1
Guns							
Germany	2.0	6.0	22.0	41.0	74.0	148.0	27.0
Italy	Total production, June 1940–June 1943 = 10.0						
Japan	1.0	3.0	7.0	13.0	28.0	84.0	23.0
United Kingdom	1.0	10.0	33.0	106.0	118.0	93.0	28.0
United States	—	1.8	3.0	188.0	221.0	103.0	34.0
USSR	17.0	15.0	30.0	127.0	130.0	122.0	72.0

— = Data incomplete.

Sources: Mark Harrison, ed., *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (New York: Norton, 1996).

Although the German economy was increasingly mobilized for war after 1939, hopes for a quick end to the war were finally dashed that winter, and the German government embarked on a more systematic approach to economic mobilization. The ad hoc style of the past was more or less abandoned, although the mobilization program did not truly get under way until after the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943. German gains in war production, shown in Table 1, could simply not keep pace with the Allies. Germany was beset by enemy armies and heavily bombed from the air, and its economy collapsed in 1945.

In comparison with the larger powers, both the Japanese and the Italians fell woefully short in armaments production. Beginning with major disadvantages in resources, transportation, and population, neither country was able to mobilize for a long war of industrial attrition. The disruption of imports, the confusion in domestic resource allocations, and the loss of overseas supplies such as fuel, coal, and iron ore led to mobilization failures and declining armaments production. Indeed, labor and resource problems meant that Italy was never able to commit more than 23 percent of its GDP to the war effort. Japan fared a little better, dramatically raising the low 1941 ratio (27 percent of GDP) in a massive last-ditch mobilization effort (76 percent of GDP dedicated to military outlays in 1944) before economic collapse helped end the war a year later.

The core of Allied armaments production superiority was resource and industrial mobilization. Firmly rooted in prewar strategic thinking, the Allies refused to be derailed by Axis success during 1940–1941 and continued to plan for a long war of industrial attrition. Though their efforts were improvised and often wasteful, the Western Allies and the Soviet Union gathered resources from around the world, mobilized workers and industrial plants on a massive scale, and achieved a steady increase in armaments production. The Axis powers, smaller in size and resources even at the height of their conquests, could not match this effort, and this failure helped bring about their defeat.

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See also

Blitzkrieg; Germany; Great Britain; Italy; Japan; Lend-Lease; Soviet Union; Stalingrad, Battle of; United States

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Armored Cars

Four- to six-wheeled ground vehicles protected by a light to moderately thick steel armor skin and armed with weapons ranging from machine guns to a medium gun. Armored cars were employed primarily in reconnaissance. They were fast enough to maintain position in front of a body of tanks or mechanized infantry, armored well enough to stop most small-arms fire, and sufficiently armed to engage hostile infantry and armored cars with a significant chance of success. Virtually all powers in the war used armored cars, but differences can be seen in the designs of cars manufactured by the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.

The United States produced only three armored car designs in any great number: the M8 Scout Car, the M3A1 Scout Car, and the M20 Armored Utility Car. The M8 and M20 were built by Ford, and both used the same basic six-wheeled chassis, armored hull (20mm of armor, sufficient to stop even a .50-caliber machine gun), Hercules 6-cylinder gasoline engine, and four-man crew. The major difference lay in armament. The M8 had a 37mm cannon and two machine guns mounted on a turret. The M20 deleted the turret, replacing it with a single machine gun mounted on the turret ring.

The M3A1 Scout Car was a four-wheeled design manufactured by White. Slower and having a shorter range than the M8/M20, it was thinly armored (7mm, sufficient to stop most small arms). It boasted a pair of machine guns, one heavy and one medium.

The British Army produced an array of armored car designs. The predominant manufacturers were the Associated Equipment Company (AEC), Daimler, Humber, and Morris. These four companies built myriad armored cars of considerable variety, but those of Morris and AEC represent the range of British armored cars.

AEC produced a single design, the AEC Armoured Car, in three models: Marks I, II, and III. These had a common hull armored to early tank standards (57mm), a four-wheel drive system attached to a 6-cylinder diesel engine, a top speed of 40 mph, and a range of 250 miles. Their chief difference lay in armament. The Mark I carried turreted 2-pounder cannon with a coaxial machine gun, the Mark II a turreted 6-pounder with a coaxial machine gun, and the Mark III a 75mm gun with a coaxial machine gun.

The Morris company produced two designs, the Morris Armored Reconnaissance Car and the Morris Light Reconnaissance Car. The Morris Armored Reconnaissance Car went to war with a turreted Boys antitank rifle (.55-caliber bolt-action rifle) and a coaxial machine gun, a thin armored shell (7mm), a 6-cylinder gasoline engine, and the ability to maintain a speed of 45 mph for a range of 240 miles. This armored car had a four-wheel drive train, but unlike most four-wheeled cars, it was not four-wheel drive. The Morris Light Reconnaissance Car was slightly superior, possessing 7mm of additional armor plate and an armament of two machine guns.

Germany also produced a large number of armored car designs built by several firms, including Deutsche Werke, Daimler-Benz, Bussing-NAG, and Magirus. The 15 vehicles produced by these companies consisted of three basic models. The first, the SdKfz 234/2—at nearly 12 tons the largest of German armored cars—was capable of 50 mph on its eight-wheel suspension system and had a range of more than 500 miles. It was heavily armed with a 50mm tank gun and a coaxial machine gun, but its armor—although heavy for an armored car at 30mm—left it vulnerable to tanks.

The SdKfz 231 was of a smaller six-wheeled design and weighed under 6 tons. It was slower, shorter ranged, more lightly armored (15mm), and weaker armed than the 234/2, with a top speed of 38 mph, a range of 250 miles, and an armament of either an M42 machine gun or a 20mm cannon.

The SdKfz 233 was somewhere between the other two armored cars; weighing a bit more than 8 tons, it had a speed of 52 mph and a range of 185 miles. Its armor varied in thickness from 15mm to 30mm depending on the amount of supplemental armor welded on. Its most outstanding features, apart from its eight-wheel suspension, were the open-topped frame and a 75mm tank gun with a coaxial machine gun behind a thin steel shield.

Three things are clear about armored cars of World War II: there were only so many ways of building a light, fast, wheeled vehicle; most nations produced at least one armored car designed to resemble a wheeled tank; and no matter the manufacturing nation and the components of the particular hull, the objective of the vehicle was the same—to locate enemy forces rather than to engage them in battle.

HAROLD R. CARFREY

See also

Armored Warfare; Tanks, All Powers

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Armored Personnel Carriers

German military exercises in 1934 showed that in order to keep up with the now faster tanks, infantry needed to be motorized. Trucks were sufficiently fast on roads, but they were not at all that mobile in open country. Also, troops being transported needed better protection. Consequently, armored half-tracks and fully tracked vehicles were developed to carry infantry; these came to be known as armored personnel carriers (APCs).

The Germans, with their tactics of rapid deployment of armored and mechanized forces (what came to be called later the blitzkrieg, or lightning war), were the first to develop these kinds of troop carriers in their SdKfz (Sonderkraft-fahr-zeug, or special motor vehicle) 250 and Hanomag 251 series. Preliminary trials had begun as early as 1926, and in 1939 the German Army issued a call for an armored vehicle that could carry half a platoon (four men). Demag built the D7 chassis based on the SdKfz 10, and Buessing-NAG developed an armored body. Production began in June 1941.

The SdKfz 250 weighed six tons; it could achieve a cross-country speed of up to 37 mph and a road speed of 42 mph. In 1943, the production process was simplified, reducing the main armor from 19 complex plates to 9 straight plates. The new version entered production in October 1943. The larger SdKfz 251/1 became the standard vehicle to equip German armored infantry (Panzergrenadier) units and could carry 12 men. It had a cross-country speed of up to 30 mph and a road speed of more than 35 mph; its road range was just under 200 miles.

Both the SdKfz 250 and the SdKfz 251 came in various subtypes. The SdKfz 250 had 12 main variants, the SdKfz 251 a total of 16. Usually the vehicles were equipped with one or two machine guns, but some also carried

guns or mortars and were employed as tank hunters or self-propelled artillery. These half-tracks were produced at least until 1944. In theory, all tank divisions operated together with armored infantry divisions in APCs from the summer of 1942 onward, but the reality was quite different. Despite having started the trend, the German Army was never as mechanized as the American or British forces.

The United States produced the well-known M-2 and M-3 half-tracks, which were used by all the Allies, including the Soviet Union. Although less sophisticated than their German counterparts, these vehicles were produced in much greater numbers. The engine was in the conventional truck position, the transmission being led forward toward the driven front wheels and backward to the track drive wheels through a transfer box. The track suspension had four road wheels, and the tracks had continuous steel bands with metal crosspieces driven by drive wheels that were elevated and to the front.

As staunch advocates of rapid movement in battle, the Germans were the first to develop armored personnel carriers for the transport of their infantry. This image shows German soldiers on a SdKfz 250 in the Soviet Union on August 5, 1941. (Heinrich Hoffmann/Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

The M-2 design originated in the four-wheel-drive Scout Car M-3A1, with the rear wheels being substituted through tracks. This led to the Car, Half Track, M-2, which could carry 10 men. It had two machine guns and a 147-horsepower (hp) engine that provided a road speed of 40 mph and a cross-country speed of up to 33 mph. It had a 6.35mm armored hull with 12.72mm frontal protection. The M-3 was slightly elongated and had room for 13 men. It too came with various modifications, such as the antitank gun motor carriage M-3, a personnel carrier that also mounted a 75mm gun. To meet demand, the International Harvester Company was tasked with producing the M-5 and M-9 series, which were similar to the M-2 and M-3. But even the combined production of the various American factories could not keep up with orders.

During the last stages of the war, self-propelled guns such as the M-7 Priest howitzer motor carriage, the Canadian Ram Mk I (adopted from the U.S. M-3), and the U.S. M-4 Sherman medium tanks were converted to APCs by having their guns or turrets and top decking removed. This meant that the upper bodies of people in the vehicles were visible and vulnerable and that a grenade or shell landing in the open compartment could kill all inside.

The best-known Japanese APCs were the half-tracked Type 1 (known as the Ho-Ha) and the tracked Type 1 (Ho-Ki). The Ho-Ha was similar to the German SdKfz 251 but somewhat larger. Powered by a 134-hp 6-cylinder engine and weighing 7 tons, it provided room for 15 men protected by armor up to 8mm thick. The Ho-Ki weighed half a ton less and had 6mm all-around protection, but it also provided no overhead protection for the rear troop-carrying compartment. It had a top (road) speed of 25 mph.

During the war, APCs were used extensively in Europe and North Africa. The jungles of the Pacific theater were less favorable for mechanized combat, so APCs were little used there, although the U.S. Marine Corps did employ large numbers of armored amphibious vehicles (known as amphtracs) to deploy troops, equipment, and supplies in their Pacific amphibious operations.

THOMAS J. WEILER

See also

Armored Cars; Armored Warfare; Tanks, All Powers

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Armored Warfare

A number of the belligerents in World War I employed both tanks and armored cars in combat, but it was in World War II that tanks and other armored fighting vehicles came into their own. In World War I, armored vehicles supported infantry; in World War II, the tank became the centerpiece of armored warfare.

As World War II began, the structure of armored forces depended much on the philosophy driving a country's mechanization efforts. Germany had been particularly active, in spite of treaty restrictions. Working secretly in the Soviet Union as early as 1922, Germany led the world in the development of an all-arms armored fighting force, with the role of other weapons subordinated to the requirements of tanks. An important part of emerging German armor doctrine was that offensive tanks should detour around the strongpoints of enemy defense.

Meanwhile, as late as the end of the 1930s, the British General Staff believed that breakthroughs would be accomplished by infantry supported by tanks, and tank units would be used only to exploit success. In France, although there was a move toward mechanization, most tanks were in separate tank battalions designed to support infantry. In the United States, progress was limited by both budgets and branch jealousy. Tanks were assigned to the infantry, and mechanization of the cavalry was slow. Having learned with the Germans the value of integrated mechanized arms, the Soviet Army, initially developing a combined-arms armored force along with Germany, took a giant step backward with Joseph Stalin's purge of most senior army officers and the breakup of armored formations. When war came in September 1939, Germany's success in Poland and later in France brought widespread realization of the effectiveness of all-arms armored warfare.

During World War II, armored forces played a role in every theater, but the impact of armored warfare was most evident in Poland in 1939, in France in 1940, on the Eastern Front, in North Africa, and in Western Europe during 1944 and 1945. Difficult terrain limited the importance of armored forces in other theaters.

The German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and its blitzkrieg tactics opened the eyes of many to the potential of armored warfare. Germany attacked with a force of 54 divisions, 6 of them armored and 4 mechanized. With 3,195 tanks as well as a supporting fleet of 1,538 combat aircraft, in a matter of a few weeks the German Army overwhelmed Po-lish defenses. Learning from operations in Poland, the German Army assigned each armored (panzer) division its own air element. The Germans also learned that truck-mounted infantry could not accompany tanks cross-country or survive even infantry fire. Accompanying infantry required cross-country mobility and some armor protection.

In 1940, except for the Soviet Union, France had the strongest armored force in the world, but French leaders failed to learn from German experience. Most French tanks remained dispersed among infantry formations, and the French were slow to organize armored divisions. The British had created an armored division, but it was never deployed to France, where only one armored brigade joined the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The Allied defensive strategy in the west assumed that Germany would attack through the Low Countries, and forces were deployed to meet that expectation. On May 10, 1940, however, Germany struck through the Ardennes toward the Meuse near Sedan, planning to then swing northwest in a wide arc toward the coast.

German Army tanks (Panzerkampfwagen II, PzKpfw II) in Warsaw, Poland, during fighting for the capital city in late September 1939. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

In spite of the superior armor and firepower of many British and French tanks, the combined-arms attack of the German panzer divisions, accompanied by effective close air support, reached the English Channel by the end of May. By early June, following the evacuation of the BEF and some French forces from Dunkerque, the German Army turned its forces south. By the end of June, Germany had defeated France. German armored forces—employed in mass, using surprise, aiming at weak points, and well supported by aircraft—had enjoyed success.

Following the defeat of France, British leaders realized the necessity of building an armored force sufficient to counter German armor, especially as the war had extended into North Africa when Italy attacked Egypt. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill set a goal of 10 armored divisions by the end of 1941. The government quickly ordered 4,000 tanks from a variety of sources.

The focus of armored warfare next shifted to North Africa, where on September 13, 1940, Italian forces in Libya launched an offensive against British forces in Egypt. The weak British forces, including only one tank battalion and totaling 36,000 men, were pushed back, but the Italian force was exhausted after a 60-mile advance. By December the British, reequipped,

were able to launch a successful counterattack, using speed and surprise, with a force that included the 7th Armored Division (only the second to form) and the well-trained Indian 4th Infantry Division. The Italians were shattered. To save his ally from defeat in Libya, however, German chancellor Adolf Hitler organized and dispatched the Afrika Korps under Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel. Outmaneuvering the British, Rommel drove them back to Egypt. Through 1941 and most of 1942, the war in the African desert swung back and forth.

German tanks were superior to those of Britain, even when the British received tanks from the United States, but the British had more of them. Logistics for both sides were difficult but particularly so for Germany and Italy, given Britain's dominance in the Mediterranean. Armored combat in Africa was characterized by rapid movement over long distances and close-in violent fighting when forces met. Rommel employed antitank guns as an integral part of his operations, especially the powerful 88mm antiaircraft gun in a new role as a highly effective antitank gun.

Meanwhile, both the Soviet Union and the United States used the experiences of combat in France to rethink their armored forces. The Soviets stopped considering tanks useful solely for infantry support and began a rapid buildup of armored and mechanized units built on the German pattern. In the United States, the Armored Force was created in July 1940; it placed all armored units under one command. New tanks were designed, and production increased. Two all-arms armored divisions were formed, with three more soon to follow. Ambitious plans of the Armored Force, however, were greatly reduced by the commander of army ground forces, Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair, who believed that infantry and artillery would be the key to success. The army planned for only about 10 percent of its divisions to be armored. Each corps would also have a group of tank battalions for infantry division support.

On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The scale of armored warfare in this theater would dwarf other armored operations. The Germans invaded with 3,200 tanks; the Soviets defended with 20,000. But Germany planned to use the same blitzkrieg tactics of deep armored thrusts that had been successful in France and could select the points of attack. Although the attack was led by 25 panzer divisions, the invading army also included 750,000 horses.

Within weeks, the Soviets had been driven back 200–400 miles; they suffered massive losses as units ordered to stand firm were surrounded and captured. By mid-July, however, the Soviet defenders began to employ special tactics to repel the invaders. If a German armored spearhead broke through the lines, the Soviets, instead of retreating, closed in on both flanks to try to halt the flow, while other units took up defensive positions to the rear. Large reserve armored units would then attack the German flanks. In addition, the Soviets set up antitank guns and sowed large minefields along expected axes of German advance.

Nevertheless, it was August before the German advance slowed. On November 19, the Soviets were able to launch a counteroffensive. Inexperienced in the use of mass tank offensive operations, Soviet commanders often failed in their attacks, but by the end of 1941 the Germans were on the defensive. By mid-January 1942, tactical defeats suffered by the Germans threatened strategic disaster. Creating and holding a series of strongpoints, the Germans were able to stabilize the front by March. Several weeks of muddy conditions then held both armies in place. By then, the Soviets had realized that any continued offensive would require large massed armored formations, which they created in the form of armored and mechanized corps.

Germany was able to launch offensives in the summers of 1942 and 1943, but the relative strength of the two combatants was changing. On July 4, 1943, German forces, having concentrated most of their Eastern Front armor, attacked the 50-mile-deep Kursk salient, hoping to eliminate it and to cripple Soviet offensive capability. The Soviets were aware of the German plans and prepared a defense in depth marked by an intricate system of minefields and antitank defenses. In the Battle of Kursk, the greatest tank battle of all time, the Soviets yielded ground skillfully and launched strong counterattacks. By July 23, the Soviets had defeated the German offensive.

Each winter, the Soviets countered German attacks with offensives aided by their adaptability to winter and their massive armies. Germany was losing tanks and experienced tank crews at an alarming rate. Meanwhile, the Soviets were able to increase their armor strength substantially because of their own huge ordnance industry and through tanks shipped from the United States. From 1942 to 1945, the Soviets manufactured some 30,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the United States provided 7,056 tanks. The Soviet T-34

medium tank and the IS-2 heavy tank also proved to be more than a match for most German tanks.

Although the Soviets for the most part did not accomplish the breakthroughs typical of German offensives, they were able to conduct a successful war of attrition. Overall, the Soviet Union, with its unending miles of difficult terrain, its large population, its massive defense industry, and its terrible winters, proved too much for the German military machine. By the spring of 1945, the Soviet army had reached the Elbe River and joined hands with U.S. forces.

Meanwhile, U.S. forces were also conducting successful armored operations. Indeed, the U.S. Army was the most highly mechanized military force to that point in history. On November 8, 1942, the United States committed its new Armored Force to battle with successful landings in North Africa. Moving east rapidly, the inexperienced American force was bloodied at the first major contest with the Germans in the Battle of the Kasserine Pass (February 14–12, 1943). Recovering, the Americans soon combined with British forces to encircle the Axis forces in Tunis and defeat them there by May 13, 1943. U.S. armor units continued to gain experience in Sicily and Italy, but terrain there made impractical the employment of large armored forces. Besides, the Allies now placed their emphasis on building up a force to invade Northwestern Europe.

The June 6, 1944, landings on Normandy were accomplished by infantry, although a few tanks rigged as amphibians contributed to the effort. After a firm lodgment had been achieved, large armored forces could be committed. In late July, the highly mobile U.S. Third Army broke out of Normandy. Within a month, the Allies had advanced to the line of the Seine River and liberated Paris. Advancing on a broad front, by mid-September Allied forces had cleared Belgium and northern France. Although the Germans did not offer significant organized resistance, their Panther and Tiger tanks took a toll on the lighter and lesser-gunned—but more numerous—Allied tanks, especially the M-4 Sherman medium. Indeed, the United States did not have a heavy tank, the M-26 Pershing, in combat until early 1945.

In a winter offensive, the Allies attacked the German West Wall on a broad front with the aim of breaking through to the Ruhr industrial district. Gathering his armored forces for a counteroffensive, on December 16 Hitler surprised the Allies with a mobile attack through the weakly held Ardennes.

The Germans lacked the means to exploit their initial breakthrough, and within a month, they were stopped. By March 1945, Allied forces had encircled and defeated German forces west of the Rhine and crossed the river. Capitalizing on their highly mobile armored divisions and on weakening German defense, Allied forces then drove across Germany, which surrendered on May 8.

Clearly, in the 1930s, Germany had seized the initiative in the development of armored forces and the implementation of armored warfare. Its blitzkrieg tactics were highly successful until attrition and logistics problems began to play a part (particularly on the Eastern Front) and the Allies caught up in fielding effective armored forces. Whereas the Soviets defeated the German forces by overwhelming them, tactics played a greater part in the West. There the concepts of armored breakthroughs and exploitation were effective, especially in the American Third Army, led by Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.

Tanks and other armored vehicles were used effectively in other theaters of the war, but in those areas they usually served as infantry support rather than as highly mobile maneuver forces. Nevertheless, they played an important role in many Pacific campaigns. Among variants, flamethrower tanks proved effective.

From 1939 to 1945, Germany produced some 53,700 tanks, peaking at 22,100 in 1944. During the same period, Japan produced only 4,572, and Italy manufactured 3,054 through August 1943. Great Britain produced 28,296 tanks during the course of the war. The Soviet Union manufactured more tanks than any other power—105,232, more than 40,000 of which were T-34 tank variants. By December 1945, the United States had produced 88,479 tanks in 17 different plants. Production figures for supporting armored vehicle were similarly impressive. Clearly, armored warfare had come of age.

PHILIP L. BOLTÉ

See also

Afrika Korps; Alam Halfa, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Armored Personnel Carriers; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Berlin, Air Battle of; Berlin, Land Battle for; Blitzkrieg; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; El Alamein, Battle of; France, Battle for; Germany, Collapse of; Guderian, Heinz; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Kursk, Battle of; McNair, Lesley James; Patton,

George Smith, Jr.; Poland Campaign; Rhineland Offensive; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tanks, All Powers; Tunis, Battle of; Tunisia Campaign; West Wall, Advance to the; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Arnauld de la Perière, Lothar von (1886–1942)

German Navy admiral. Born in Posen (today Poznan, Poland) on March 18, 1886, Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière entered the Imperial German Navy in 1903 and was commissioned in 1906. He became a torpedo specialist. Following sea duty, in 1913 Arnauld became adjutant to chief of the naval staff Admiral Hugo von Pohl. Arnauld then spent time in Britain acquiring language skills until the outbreak of World War I.

Returning to Germany, Arnauld volunteered for the Imperial Naval Air Service (Zeppelins), but he was recalled by Pohl. He then volunteered for U-boat service, and on completing submarine school, in October 1915 he took command of the *U-35* based at Pola on the Adriatic. From November 1915 to March 1918, Arnauld completed 14 cruises with the Pola Flotilla. During one cruise alone in 1916, he sank 54 ships totaling more than 90,150 tons. In March 1918, Arnauld took command of the *U-139* in the Atlantic. During his 16 wartime patrols, he sank 196 ships totaling 455,716 tons. This record stands unsurpassed.

Retained in the German Navy following World War I, Arnauld filled staff billets and commanded the light cruiser *Emden* from 1928 to 1930. He left

the navy in 1931 as a captain and subsequently taught at the Turkish Naval Academy from 1932 to 1938. Recalled to the German Navy at the start of World War II, Arnauld served as naval commander in Belgium, the Netherlands, Brittany, and western France. Promoted to vice admiral and named Admiral Southeast, he died in a plane crash at Le Bourget airport in Paris on February 24, 1942, en route to take up his new command.

DANA LOMBARDY AND T. P. SCHWEIDER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Submarines

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Arnhem, Battle of

See MARKET-GARDEN, Operation

Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von (1889–1962)

German Army general. Born at Ernsdorf on April 4, 1889, Hans von Arnim was commissioned in the German Army in October 1909. During World War I, he saw service on both the Western and Eastern Fronts and was promoted to captain in January 1917. Arnim continued in the Reichswehr after the war, and in 1935 he took command of the 69th Infantry Regiment. Promoted to major general in January 1938, Arnim had charge of an army service depot at Schweid-nitz in Silesia during 1938–1939.

Following the outbreak of World War II, on September 12, 1939, Arnim assumed command of the 52nd Infantry Division. He was promoted to lieutenant general in December 1939. In October 1940, he shifted to

command of the 17th Panzer Division and led it in Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

Assigned to General Heinz Guderian's Second Panzer Group, Arnim proved his mettle as a panzer commander. Seriously wounded near Schklov on June 27, 1941, Arnim did not return to action until September. He participated in the encirclement of Kiev later that month. His forces then took the important railway junction of Bryansk.

Shortly after the victory at Bryansk, Arnim was promoted to general of panzer troops effective in October 1941. He then commanded the XXXIX Motorized Corps, which became a panzer corps in July 1942, and saw action at Tikhvin and Cholm. Arnim was promoted to colonel general in December 1942 and assumed command of the Fifth Panzer Army in Tunisia.

Following meetings with Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Arnim assumed command of Axis forces in Tunisia on December 9, 1942. His performance in this role has drawn criticism from historians. Arnim and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel often worked at cross-purposes, and Arnim failed to take advantage of Rommel's victories at Kasserine and Tebersa. Arnim's own attack by the Fifth Panzer Army in February 1943 toward Medjez el Bat and Beja failed, even though he won a series of tactical victories. Following those events, Arnim received command of Army Group Africa on March 9, 1943.

British forces took Arnim prisoner on May 12, 1943. Incarcerated in an English country house at Hampshire until 1947, Arnim then took up residence in Bad Wildungen, Germany, where he died on September 1, 1962.

GENE MUELLER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tunisia Campaign; Vyazma-Bryansk, Battle for

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Arnold, Henry Harley “Hap” (1886–1950)

U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) general who led the USAAF and its predecessor, the Army Air Corps, throughout World War II. Born on June 25, 1886, in Gladwyne, Pennsylvania, Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1907 and was commissioned in the infantry. He transferred into the aeronautical division of the Signal Corps in 1911 and received his pilot’s certificate after training with Orville Wright. In 1912, Arnold set a world altitude record and won the first Mackay Trophy for aviation.

During World War I, Arnold served on the army staff in Washington, rising to the temporary rank of colonel and overseeing all aviation training. After the war, Arnold reverted to his permanent rank of captain. During the 1920s, he held a variety of assignments. Arnold supported Colonel William Mitchell at the latter’s court-martial, although this was not well received by his superiors. Arnold also wrote or cowrote five books on aviation, won a second Mackay Trophy, and continued to rise in the Army Air Corps. He became its assistant chief as a brigadier general in 1935. Three years later he became chief of the Army Air Corps as a major general following the death of Major General Oscar Westover in a plane crash.

General Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold seated at desk in his Munitions Building office. Arnold commanded the U.S. Army Air Forces during World War II. Arnold is the only U.S. airman to have achieved five-star rank. (Library of Congress)

Arnold proved particularly adept at improving the readiness of his service and expanding its resources, even with tight interwar budgets. Promoted to lieutenant general in December 1941, he was designated commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces in the March 1942 War Department reorganization, which raised the air arm to equal status with the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces. Because the British had a chief of air staff, Arnold was included on the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff as well as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although he was not a major player in their decisions, he was a loyal supporter of U.S. Army chief of staff George C. Marshall, who repaid Arnold after the war by supporting the establishment of an independent U.S. Air Force. Arnold was promoted to general in March 1943 and became one of four five-star generals of the army in December 1944.

During the war, Arnold built an organization that reached a peak of approximately 2.5 million personnel and more than 63,000 aircraft. He was a fine judge of people and selected the best men as his advisers, staff, and field

commanders. Arnold also established an emphasis on technological research and development. Although he was not really involved in day-to-day combat operations, his authority to relieve the field commanders who really did run the war gave him leverage to influence their actions. Poor health limited his effectiveness late in the war, especially after a fourth heart attack in January 1945.

Arnold was a proponent of precision bombing, but his pressure for more raids despite bad weather led to increased use of less accurate radar-directed bombardments in Europe, and his demand for increased efficiency in Japan inspired the fire raids there. His main goals were to make the largest possible contribution to winning the war and to ensure that the USAAF received credit through proper publicity.

Although Arnold retired in June 1946, his goal of an independent U.S. air service was realized the next year by his successor, General Carl Spaatz. In May 1949, Arnold was named the first general of the U.S. Air Force. Arnold truly deserves the title "Father of the United States Air Force." He died at Sonoma, California, on January 15, 1950.

CONRAD C. CRANE

See also

B-29 Raids against Japan; Eaker, Ira Clarence; Marshall, George Catlett; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"; United States Army Air Forces; Document 239

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Art and the War

Although World War II imagery is often thought of in terms of its haunting photographic legacy, thousands of other visual records were created by artists who depicted the war as it unfolded around them. Artists served as high-profile correspondents throughout much of the war, vividly documenting its conflicts in drawings, watercolors, and paintings executed on the spot and often under harrowing conditions.

An important precedent for European artists had been set by Pablo Picasso's mural-sized painting, *Guernica* (1937), named after the Basque town bombed by the German Kondor Legion during the Spanish Civil War. In *Guernica*, distended forms and disfigured characters were blown up large and linked to a vast panorama of brutality. The painting, which extended Picasso's fragmented Cubist pictorial language into the political arena, was all the more powerful for its ability to express an idyllic world shattered by the sweeping acts of anonymous warfare.

The warring powers linked art to propagandistic rhetoric. Perhaps the most unusual coupling of art and propaganda can be traced to Adolf Hitler's imagined lineage of the Germanic people from the Greek civilization of antiquity. The revival of severe forms of Greek classicism, along with a *Volkish* art and architecture (art and architecture "of the people"), would result in Germany in the most spectacular public rejection of modernism in the 20th century.

As early as 1933, the Nazi Party in Germany had stormed the legendary Bauhaus (an academy of applied arts founded in 1919) in Dessau and padlocked its doors. In 1937, the Nazis ordered museums purged of artwork they considered to have a corrosive effect on the morals of the German people. The targets of Nazi aggression were some of the greatest works of the avant-garde—the lyrical abstractions of Wassily Kandinsky, the raw energetic forms of Ernst Ludwig Kirchner and *Die Brücke*, and the antimilitarist sentiments and nihilist acts of George Grosz, Otto Dix, and Berlin Dadaists. Particularly scorned were the works of Jewish artists who expressed their spirituality in their work such as Marc Chagall, who had already lived through Russian pogroms in the century's first decade.

Many of the works of the artists in Nazi disfavor were simply destroyed (although some did find their way into the collections of the Nazi elite, such as Hermann Goering), but 650 were selected for a special exhibition, *Entartete Kunst* (Degenerate Art), which traveled to a dozen cities in

Germany and Austria. In the exhibition, paintings were poorly displayed, often at crooked angles, and sculptures were crowded together in piles. Instead of didactic labels, graffiti scrawled on the walls ridiculed the objects and their creators. More than 3 million people attended this exhibition and a companion to it, *Degenerate Music.* The success of the exhibit caused the Nazis to shut it down.

Generals Dwight Eisenhower (right), George Patton Jr. (center), and General Omar Bradley (far left) inspect art treasures stolen by the Germans and hidden in a salt mine in Germany, April 12, 1945. (National Archives)

During the war, a number of nations sent combat artists into the field. The United States was particularly active in this regard. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers sent eight artists to document the experiences of American combat troops in Europe. In late 1942, a second War Art Unit was created. The War Art Advisory Committee led by muralist George Biddle and composed of

museum directors, curators, and including novelist John Steinbeck identified artists for the special unit. Of the 42 individuals selected by the committee, 23 were already on active military duty. Although the first artists were sent to the Pacific theater, shortly thereafter official artists were deployed to cover other theaters. By 1943, each branch of the military had assembled its own art unit to commemorate its contribution—by land, air, or sea.

Military artists were first and foremost soldiers who assumed the additional duties of documenting the war's events with the tools of the artist. The images they generated run the gamut from portraying soldiers' and sailors' everyday routines to stirring portrayals of troops in the heat of battle. Such artists participated in the events they recorded, and at times they had to take up weapons with their fellows. When the opportunity arose, they would take out their pads and drawing instruments to make sketches and jot down notations. Such sketches matured into full drawings or were translated into paint once the combat artists had the opportunity and resources.

Soldier-artists also served as illustrators for military publications such as the U.S. Army magazine *Yank*, which was created for the troops. Although civilian artists did not serve in combat, they accompanied the troops on dangerous missions and put themselves in harm's way.

When Congress's failure to appropriate funds threatened to eliminate the army's War Art Unit shortly after its inauguration, the contracts of 17 of the 19 civilian artists were taken over by publisher Henry R. Luce's *Life* magazine. The magazine profiled war artists such as Fletcher Martin, Floyd Davis, Tom Lea, Paul Sample, and Rubin Kadish, and photographs of the artists sketching in airplane cockpits or painting on aircraft carriers often appeared next to their works.

Life also ran several contests on the theme of art in the armed services and featured soldiers' work in subsequent multipage spreads. The magazine quickly became the vehicle by which the images moved beyond their original function as reportage to achieve acclaim as works of art in their own right. *Life* sponsored exhibitions of war art at populist venues such as state fairs and at venerable institutions such as the National Gallery in Washington, D.C., and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. It was by examining the objects firsthand—hurried pencil sketches and pen-and-ink scrawls, watercolors and oils put down on wrapping paper and pasteboard from packing boxes—that the public could fully grasp their immediacy. They

could also ponder the obstacles the artists had to overcome to record each scene and be convinced of the soldiers' patriotic duty to make the art.

A second source of funding for the U.S. civilian art contracts came from Abbott Laboratories, a pharmaceutical company in Chicago that provided medical supplies to the troops. The company had an established record of patronage in the arts, and its director of advertising, Charles Downs, realized the power of images to rally public support. Working with the Associated American Artists group in New York, Abbott Laboratories recruited a dozen artists to be sent overseas and successfully lobbied the War Department to provide the artists with the same degree of support given to photographers and filmmakers in terms of housing, transportation, and security clearance.

Many of the artists, such as Thomas Hart Benton, Reginald Marsh, and John Stuart Curry, had worked on large-scale mural projects sponsored by the Works Projects Administration during the Great Depression years. Abbott Laboratories commissioned thematic sets of images, often showcasing their own products, although the stated mission of the project was to create permanent collections that were later donated to the military branches. Abbott also sponsored traveling exhibitions of these works to university galleries and museums across the country.

Although even the Museum of Modern Art in New York met the public's appetite for war pictures by sending art supplies to the front and mounting exhibitions from the battlefield, a small but vocal group of artists protested these images as sanitized portrayals of war—or worse, products of the American propaganda machine. Some were critical of the civilian component of the art units and those who traveled as artist-correspondents, charging that they played no direct role in the war effort. Artists who served in the war, however, designed camouflage patterns or condensed information into strategic charts and maps. Their skills directly contributed to the war effort.

Some artists objected to the lack of psychological or philosophical commentary in the images themselves, arguing that works of art should offer information beyond that of a photograph and should give a truer sense of the atrocities faced by the soldiers who were battling for freedom. The large community of European exiles gathered in New York City during the early 1940s created a more ambivalent body of images that speaks of the emotional and psychological complexities of a world at war. Paintings by Max Ernst and the Chilean artist Roberto Matta, often nightmarish plunges into

landscapes ruled by irrational forces, were executed in expressionist or surrealist styles.

After the war, U.S. soldiers who had worked in the art units or as artist-correspondents as well as those who had interest in but no actual background in the arts were offered the opportunity to pursue formal art training through the GI Bill. It created a generation of college-educated artists who sought to distance themselves from their experiences on the battlefield. Because of the association of conservative pictorial styles with Nazi propaganda and international outrage over Adolf Hitler's extreme forms of censorship, much postwar art in the Western world would attempt to break from the past altogether by experimenting with nonobjective styles that would be difficult for any party or platform to co-opt.

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See also

Propaganda; Spanish Civil War

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Artillery Doctrine

Artillery and fire-support tactics in World War II owed more to the lessons of World War I than to the theories of mechanized warfare that evolved between the wars. Between 1914 and 1918, artillery went through a series of radical changes, altering forever the face of modern warfare. Most of the artillery innovations of 1914–1918 are still around today, albeit in far more refined technological forms.

Major changes that occurred in World War I had an especially profound influence on the way World War II was fought. The most important was the perfection of indirect fire, as opposed to direct fire. Indirect fire techniques

had been developed before 1914, but during World War I they were standardized and became the norm rather than the exception for artillery combat. Firing an artillery piece by direct fire required the crew to be able to see the target and to aim at it directly, either through open iron or optical sights. Firing by this method limited the range at which guns could engage targets and required the guns to be far forward and exposed to enemy fire. Indirect fire is a system in which a gun can be fired at targets the gun crew cannot see. The gun crew instead aims the piece by sighting on a reference point.

Initially, indirect fire required a forward observer who could see the target and had some means of communication to transmit corrections back to the guns. After the first shot was fired, the observer would make successive corrections until the fall of shot was adjusted onto the target. Near the end of World War I, however, several armies had mastered the technique of firing without observer corrections. Using the correct current weather data and accurate ballistics data about the ammunition and the guns, the necessary adjustments could be mathematically predicted—hence the name “predicted fire” for the technique.

Indirect fire combined with predicted fire had several significant consequences for war fighting. First, it was no longer necessary to physically mass guns on the ground to produce massed fire effects on a target. Guns at diverse points on the battlefield could all fire simultaneously on the same target. The second major consequence was the introduction of depth to combat operations. The ability to engage targets beyond visual range transformed the conducting of warfare from a linear two-dimensional problem to a three-dimensional problem. The advent of combat aircraft also added significantly to three-dimensional warfare.

These changes came to dominate combat operations in the final years of World War I, but they were not fully developed by the time the war ended. Two major constraining factors were the relatively primitive mobility and communications technologies of the day, which limited the effectiveness of the new fire-support capabilities. Between the wars, the technologies of battlefield transportation and communications made great advances, which contributed significantly to the fact that the stagnation of the trench warfare of World War I was not repeated in World War II.

Germany

Germany led the world in the development of artillery tactics during World War I. Between 1916 and 1918, Colonel Georg Bruchmüller pioneered many of the most important artillery tactical methods: neutralization and suppressive fires, as opposed to simple destructive fires; performance of specific tactical missions by specially trained artillery groups, including infantry support, counterbattery, and deep attack; and fire preparations organized into phases to accomplish specific tactical objectives. In early 1918, Bruchmüller championed the work of Captain Eric Pulkowski, who developed a technique of meteorological corrections—still in use today, albeit computerized—that made accurate predicted fire both possible and practical.

Ironically, Germany in the interwar years all but abandoned most of the artillery lessons it had taught the rest of the world during World War I. German artillery had been so devastating that the Versailles Treaty only allowed the postwar German Army 284 artillery pieces, none larger than 105mm. As late as 1936, three years after Adolf Hitler came to power, the German army still had only 284 guns. An army not allowed any significant amount of artillery, then, focused on developing alternative tactics centered on the tank, which in theory was supposed to provide its own close fire support. This led the Germans to conclude that even if they had adequate artillery, the guns and especially their ammunition supply would not be able to keep pace with the tanks.

The Germans recognized that even a massive tank force would sometimes encounter stiff opposition that would slow its momentum. In such situations, the additional required fire support would come from the air, most notable the Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber. By 1940, the Germans had developed an impressively sophisticated air-to-ground coordination system that was capable of concentrating as many as 2,700 aircraft over a critical sector. As successful as this system was in France, the Germans recognized that their panzer forces would still benefit from the addition of highly mobile, organic fire-support assets. At that point, they started to develop and field a limited number of self-propelled assault, antitank, and field guns.

The German system of relying primarily on airpower for fire support worked fairly well in France. As the war progressed, though, the Germans

realized that their approach was subject to flaws in three critical areas: mass, weather, and air superiority. When the German Army invaded the Soviet Union, the operational theater was so vast and Soviet ground forces spread so widely that the Luftwaffe could not be everywhere it was needed at one time. The weather in the Soviet Union also severely restricted Luftwaffe operations. But conventional field artillery is practically impervious to weather conditions, and the massively gunned Red Army almost always had adequate fire support. Finally, as the war progressed and attrition sharply affected the Luftwaffe, the Germans lost air superiority. The real importance of the Combined Bomber Offensive mounted by the Western Allies was not so much its effect on Germany's industrial base but rather the steady attrition of Luftwaffe fighters and pilots. By late 1944 and 1945, Germany no longer controlled the air over its own territory, let alone over the battlefields in France or the Eastern Front.

Again abandoning lessons it had taught the world in 1918, the German Army of World War II rarely emphasized the massing of artillery above the divisional level. It failed to provide artillery concentrations at the corps, army, or army group levels. The Soviets, though, considered artillery at those levels to be decisive. By 1944, the Germans had come to fully recognize their critical error with respect to artillery, and they desperately tried to re-create the fire-support structure and assets that had served them so well in 1918. By then, however, it was too little, too late.

Japan

The Japanese Army believed that the immediate close support of the infantry attack was the primary mission of field artillery. Secondary artillery missions included destroying the enemy's supporting infantry weapons, destroying obstacles in the way of the infantry advance, and interdicting enemy lines of communication. Counterbattery work had the lowest priority.

The Japanese stressed the importance of keeping their guns well forward, often placing firing positions within a few hundred yards of an enemy's forward positions. Command posts were sited right next to the guns so the battery could be controlled by voice command. The fire and observation conditions of Asian jungles, however, created special problems for close infantry support. The terrain often made it difficult or impossible to

accurately track the positions of the infantry units. The requirement to fire over trees almost always meant that the fall of shot would be too far forward of the infantry. The solution to that problem was to position the guns on the flanks of the attacking infantry.

Under Japanese doctrine, artillery was oriented primarily to the offense. Before an attack, standard Japanese artillery preparation lasted between one and two hours. The preparation was conducted in three phases of roughly equal duration: range adjustment, obstacle destruction, and fire on the enemy's forward positions. As the infantry began its attack, the mission of the artillery shifted to direct support. In defensive situations, the main weight of the Japanese guns would be echeloned 1 to 1.2 miles behind the main line of resistance. As the enemy massed for the attack, the defending artillery would fire a counterpreparation. Once the enemy attack started, the mission of the artillery was to break up the momentum of the assault with a series of standing barrages.

As with the Germans, the Japanese throughout World War II suffered from too little artillery and inadequate organization and control at the higher echelons. Artillery in small units was allocated directly to the tactical-level infantry units, which left almost no fire-support assets for centralized command and control at the divisional level and up. By 1944 the Japanese too had come to recognize the gravity of these shortcomings, and they moved to correct the problems. As with their German allies, it was too little and too late.

France

The French were slow to modernize their artillery following World War I. Throughout the interwar years, all French tactical thinking was either woefully outdated or too heavily influenced by a defensive orientation. The French believed that massive firepower was the key to victory. They took this idea to its extreme and also rejected mobility. They came to regard "weight of metal" as the decisive factor in any defense or attack. This, of course, led to the massive defensive system of the Maginot Line, which sought to replicate on a grand scale the fixed fortifications of Verdun, which had held out in 1916.

The French put most of their interwar artillery efforts into fortresses, largely ignoring mobile field artillery. In the early 1930s, the French did experiment with a mechanized division, but French field artillery was not even motorized until 1934. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, French tactical doctrine emphasized that the mission of artillery was to destroy any obstacles in the path of the infantry, accompany the infantry by fire, and strike at the enemy artillery's capability to hit the friendly infantry. The emphasis on these missions, however, was always within a framework of counterpreparations and defensive fires.

Just prior to the start of World War II, a French artillery preparation had three primary targets: the enemy's infantry, the enemy's known antitank weapons, and the enemy's suspected antitank weapons. Counterbattery fire against the enemy's guns had almost completely fallen out of the French doctrine. The French believed that modern technology and mechanization made counterbattery fires impractical, if not impossible. Finally, the French failed to provide any real doctrine for coordinating artillery with air support and air defense. A result of this failure was that two French divisional artilleries were cut off and routed at Sedan in May 1940 before the German ground forces had even crossed the Meuse.

United States

As early as the mid-1920s, the U.S. Army started to abandon many of the hard-learned artillery lessons of World War I, and ground tactics shifted back to an infantry-centered world. Right up to the start of World War II, the U.S. Army neglected the requirements of artillery command and control above the divisional level and almost totally ignored corps-level artillery. What passed for corps-level artillery was little more than a holding pool for units and guns not otherwise assigned. According to the doctrine, corps artillery was responsible for counterbattery fire. As late as May 1943, though, the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was still recommending that corps artillery units be parceled out to the divisions during operations.

The U.S. Army, however, did not go quite as far as the British, the French, or even the Germans in abandoning the artillery lessons of World War I. The American penchant for technical solutions prevailed, and Fort Sill experimented with various forms of fire-control techniques, including aerial

observation. By 1934, Fort Sill had developed the first battalion Fire Direction Center, which could simultaneously control and mass the guns of all three of an artillery battalion's batteries. In 1940, Fort Sill introduced the graphical firing table, a specialized artillery slide rule that greatly speeded the calculation of the firing solution. In April 1941, Fort Sill demonstrated for U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall a divisional shoot, controlling and massing against a single target the fires of four separate battalions, totaling 12 batteries.

In the late 1930s, Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair was the assistant school commandant at Fort Sill. McNair had commanded a field artillery brigade in France during World War I. Later, as commander of U.S. Army Ground Forces, he became the chief architect of the U.S. military buildup going into World War II. McNair was a strong believer in flexible massed fires. He championed the development of longer-range guns and supported all initiatives to centralize artillery command and control systems. Under his direction, the number of nondivisional medium and heavy artillery battalions in the U.S. Army nearly doubled between 1942 and 1944.

U.S. Army doctrine in World War II identified two primary field artillery missions: supporting the ground-gaining (infantry, cavalry, armored) units by either neutralizing or destruction fires and giving depth to combat by counterbattery fire, fire on enemy reserves, restricting movement in enemy rear areas, and disrupting enemy command and control systems.

As the war progressed, the U.S. Army's logistical advantage became increasingly decisive, and the American tactical experience mirrored that of the other Allies. At the corps level, the emphasis increased on command, joint operations, and airpower. Joint operations and airpower were especially important in the Far East, where amphibious operations and jungle terrain made it almost impossible to mass artillery on the ground.

Great Britain and British Commonwealth

The British Army had (and still has) a somewhat different approach to artillery command and control. In almost all other armies, the forward observers (FO), who accompanied the infantry and requested and, if necessary, adjusted the supporting fires were junior officers, usually lieutenants. The more senior artillery officers remained in command of the

guns or in the command posts of the artillery battalions or the divisional artillery headquarters. The British attached their more senior officers to the command post of the supported maneuver unit. Thus, a British infantry company would have a captain as an FO—or forward observation officer (FOO), as the British called them. The supported infantry battalion commander would have an artillery major as his artillery adviser.

The idea behind the British system is that the senior and more experienced officers would better understand the overall tactical situation. Whereas a lieutenant FO in most armies could only request fires, a British FOO had the authority to order the fires. The British believed that this system produced quicker and more responsive fire support. The system depended heavily on radio communication, which was widespread and effective in the British Army from 1940 forward.

As with the Germans, the British had rejected most of the artillery lessons of World War I. Great Britain entered World War II with a tactical doctrine that de-emphasized artillery, based on the theory that tanks could operate independently without much support from the other arms. Unlike the Germans, the British did not have an air force structured to provide air-to-ground support for emergencies. The Royal Air Force before World War II concentrated on building up its bomber forces. The lack of air support for their ground troops cost the British dearly in the campaign for France in 1940.

The British approach to mobile tactics worked well against the Italians at the start of the campaign in North Africa. Once the Germans entered that fight, though, the British were at a severe disadvantage against the German combined-arms tactics and organizations. Too often, the British tried to attack German positions without adequate artillery preparation and paid a high price. At the same time, the British had difficulty establishing an effective defense built on fire and maneuver.

What made the British situation even more difficult was that they were forced to use most of their field artillery in an antitank role, which left little for infantry support. By 1942, the British were pouring new antitank guns and more field artillery into North Africa, which allowed them to develop new tactical methods.

General Bernard Montgomery was the primary architect of the new British approach. Montgomery stressed the steady buildup of a superior

firepower ratio and the use of artillery to produce shock action in coordination with the other arms. The two main tactical techniques to achieve this were the creeping barrage and the timed concentration. These techniques had been developed in World War I, but in World War II they were far more sophisticated and effective because of better communications and predicted, rather than observed and adjusted, fire. At El Alamein, for example, 1,000 British guns produced a massive shock effect by firing more than 1.2 million shells at plotted German targets without having to telegraph the attack by first adjusting the fall of shot. The British also developed a standard fire mission they called the "72-gun battery," which concentrated all the guns of a division on a single target.

Soviet Union

Virtually alone among the world's major armies, the Red Army following World War I intensely studied the artillery lessons of that war and diligently applied them during the interwar years. In the 1920s, Soviet chief of artillery Lieutenant General Yuri Shedeyman personally translated from German into Russian the books written by Colonel Georg Bruchmüller about his artillery innovations during World War I. Reflecting their faith in massed firepower, the Soviets by the 1920s had built their army into a combined-arms force with artillery as a major component at all levels.

In 1941, the Soviets initiated a major reorganization of their artillery. The number of guns in a division was reduced by almost two-thirds, but the number of mortars increased by the same proportion. The objective was to make the divisions more mobile. The Soviets grouped their heavier artillery pieces into artillery reserve units, which then could be massed at the decisive point of any battle. Following these reorganizations, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1942 directed that artillery should be concentrated to support a breakthrough in a designated sector and that more mobile artillery had to be developed to support the armored units that would exploit the breakthrough.

Final assembly of an artillery piece for the Red Army at a Soviet factory in the Urals in 1942. (Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

In late 1942, the Soviets organized their artillery reserve units into artillery divisions. With the exception of one artillery division with which the Germans experimented briefly, the Soviets were the only ones to field such organizations in World War II. By the end of the war, the Red Army had some 90 artillery divisions, about the same number of total divisions in the U.S. Army. In 1943, the Soviets began grouping their artillery divisions into breakthrough artillery corps of two or more artillery divisions and one rocket launcher division. The Soviets believed in holding artillery in reserve—the opposite of the American belief that artillery is never held in reserve. At the start of the war, some 8 percent of the Red Army's artillery was in the High Command Artillery Reserve. By the end of the war, this percentage had risen to 35 percent.

On the defensive for the first part of the war, the Soviets drew the following conclusions about fire support in defensive operations: artillery, not aircraft, was the superior form of fire support in the defense; the antitank plan should be the basis for determining the overall deployment of forces; all guns should be capable of direct fire; an artillery reserve was essential; armor

should counterattack only after a tank attack had been stopped by artillery; artillery must be sited in depth in prepared positions; and indirect fire was effective only when massed and centrally commanded.

Soviet Union attack doctrine grew out of Soviet experiences launching counterattacks from the defensive. By the time the Red Army went on the offensive in the final years of World War II, its artillery had three primary missions: preparation of the attack; support of the attack, principally through a creeping barrage or fixed concentrations; and accompaniment of the maneuver forces. Accompanying fire was the primary mission of the divisional artillery units, more often than not through close-range direct fire. As a result, divisional artillery units generally suffered 10 times the casualty rates of nondivisional units.

The Soviet system worked but had its drawbacks. Operations required a methodical buildup of overwhelming force, which in turn required periods of stability. This meant that operations on the Eastern Front went through cycles of long periods of buildup, followed by brief surges of steamroller-like momentum. The Soviets ultimately had the manpower and the resources to succeed with this approach on the operational level, but during the interim periods the Germans often were able to achieve stunning tactical successes because of their more flexible organization and doctrine. In the end, the Soviets succeeded; they proved that conventional artillery—the "god of war," as Stalin called it—was in fact a decisive element at the operational level of war.

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See also

Artillery Types; Hitler, Adolf; Infantry Tactics; Maginot Line; Marshall, George Catlett; McNair, Lesley James; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Stalin, Joseph

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Artillery Types

Firepower and maneuver are the two primary elements of land combat power. From the late Middle Ages to the early years of the 20th century, artillery was the only significant source of land-based firepower. Even after the appearance in World War I of machine guns, tanks, and ground-attack aircraft, artillery remained the major source of firepower on the battlefield. Throughout history, firepower and mobility technology have been in a constant tug-of-war. Rarely has one achieved a significant advantage, but whenever that has happened, the results have been devastating.

During World War I, firepower technology far outstripped mobility technology. In the years between the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) and the start of World War I (1914), there was vast technological improvement in artillery and infantry weapons, particularly the machine gun. The result was previously unimaginable levels of battlefield firepower. Battlefield mobility, however, was still primarily a matter of human and animal muscle, as it had been for thousands of years. Thus, firepower had become mechanized by 1914, mobility had not, and the result was trench warfare. By World War II, mobility technology had caught up, and the balance was restored.

Artillery pieces are broadly classified by the ballistic performance of the projectiles they shoot. The three basic categories of cannon, or tube, artillery have not changed in the past 300 years, although individual technologies have advanced considerably. Guns fire projectiles at a high velocity and on a relatively flat trajectory; they have the greatest range and tend to be the heaviest of artillery pieces. Mortars are generally light weapons that fire a relatively light projectile at low muzzle velocities and short ranges, but at angles of fire above 45 degrees. Howitzers are extremely versatile weapons, capable of firing at both high and low angles. The muzzle velocity and range of a howitzer are less than those of a gun of comparable size, but a howitzer is far more accurate. A howitzer also can fire a heavier shell than a gun of the same weight. Most armies in World War II had both guns and howitzers in their arsenals. Although technically artillery pieces, mortars were considered infantry weapons by almost all armies.

All forms of artillery through the start of the 19th century were the same smoothbore, muzzle-loading, black-powder mechanisms that had been in use for hundreds of years. They had poor mobility, and the gun crews engaged their targets by direct fire—that is, the gunner had to see and directly aim at the target, just as if he was firing a large rifle. In the last half of the 19th century, artillery made several technological leaps in areas such as improved metallurgical and manufacturing techniques, rifled bores, breech-loading mechanisms, fire-control instruments, and, most important, recoil mechanisms.

Modern recoil mechanisms, introduced at the end of the 19th century, allowed the artillery piece to hold its position on the ground as each round was fired. That, in turn, meant that the piece did not have to be reaimed after each round, which produced far more rapid rates of fire. The result was vastly improved accuracy and repeatability, which—combined with modern optics and fire-control techniques—made indirect fire possible.

Indirect fire is the technique of accurately firing at targets that the gun crew cannot see directly. That important advance extended the effective depth of artillery fire, which in turn led to the concept of deep battle. The first artillery piece with modern fire-control and recoil systems was the French Canon de 75 mle 1897 (75mm gun, model 1897), widely known as the "French 75."

Through World War I, all field artillery was horse-drawn. In the interwar years, the horse gave way to the truck as the artillery prime mover in the British Army and the U.S. Army. Many armies, however, including those of Germany, Japan, Italy, and the Soviet Union, relied heavily on horses until the end of World War II. Self-propelled (SP) artillery—guns mounted on a wheeled or tracked carriage—also appeared shortly after the end of World War I, when the British Birch Gun was introduced. By the end of World War II, almost all armies had SP guns and howitzers.

According to an old maxim of the British Royal Artillery, the real weapon of the artillery is the projectile—the gun is merely the means of sending a projectile to the target. During World War II the standard artillery projectile was high-explosive (HE), producing both blast and fragmentation effects. The blast was employed primarily against fortifications, and fragmentation was used against personnel. Smoke rounds were used to obscure enemy visibility on the battlefield, and illumination rounds were utilized to enhance

friendly visibility at night. In the early years of the war, most armies were forced to use their field artillery in an antitank role, which required the guns to fire special armor-piercing (AP) and high-explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds. During World War I, most armies developed and used a wide array of chemical rounds that produced various combinations of lethal and nonlethal, persistent and nonpersistent effects. Although all sides still had these chemical rounds in their arsenals during World War II, they were not employed.

The fuze is perhaps the most critical element of an artillery round. The point-detonating (PD) fuze triggers the round as soon as it touches the ground, producing a surface burst. Most PD fuzes could be set on "delay" to allow the round to penetrate into the ground and produce a subsurface burst. The concrete-piercing fuze is a variation of the delay fuze that allows an artillery projectile to burrow into the wall of a bunker or fortification before exploding. The mechanical time fuze was used to produce an airburst, which rained fragments on the target below. This was generally the most effective means of attacking troops in the open. The time fuze, however, required a high degree of skill on the part of the forward observer and the fire direction center personnel to get the time of flight and the height of burst just right.

Near the end of World War II, the U.S. Army introduced the proximity fuze, adapted from naval antiaircraft artillery for field artillery work. Also called the variable-time fuze, it contained a small radar transmitter and receiver that produced a perfect 66-foot height of burst every time. The "funny fuze," as Lieutenant General George S. Patton called it, was first used by U.S. artillerymen with devastating effect during the German Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945).

United States

The U.S. Army classified its field artillery guns and howitzers into three basic categories by weight: light, medium, and heavy. Light guns, used for direct support, were found only in divisional artillery. The airborne divisions and the 10th Mountain Division were armed with the 75mm M-1A1 pack howitzer. It was designed for easy disassembly, which allowed it to be dropped from the air or transported by six mules. The 75mm pack howitzer

was widely used in Italy and in the jungles of the Pacific, where its transportability was its most important feature.

The workhorse of most infantry divisional artillery was the 105mm M-2A1 howitzer, the most widely used artillery piece in history. It was accurate and reliable, and it could withstand a great deal of punishment and mishandling. It was first developed in the 1920s as a weapon capable of being towed by a team of six horses, and the design was approved in March 1940.

The M-2A1 was towed by a two-and-a-half-ton truck, which also carried the gun's crew and its basic load of ammunition. The armored divisions used the M-2A1's tube and gun carriage on one of several self-propelled mounts. The standard was the M-7B1, which was mounted on a Sherman tank chassis. In 1945, these guns began to be replaced by the M-37, which was mounted on a Chaffee tank chassis.

In 1943, the army introduced a lightened version of the M-2A1 with a shortened barrel to give airborne units more firepower than the 75mm pack howitzer delivered. The M-3 howitzer was not a successful design, however. After World War II, the M-2A1 was modified somewhat to become the M-101A1. That version remained in service with the U.S. Army through the Korean War and the Vietnam War. More than 10,200 M-2A1s or M-101A1s were built and supplied to some 45 different armies between 1940 and 1953.

The 155mm M-1A1 towed howitzer was the standard American medium artillery piece used by the general support battalions of almost all the infantry divisions. It was a successful and popular design although heavy and somewhat difficult to handle. The cannoneers on the gun crews called these weapons "pigs"—short for pig iron. A self-propelled version of the 155mm howitzer mounted on a Chaffee tank chassis was designated the M-41, but only about 100 were ever built.

Men of the U.S. Army 109th Field Artillery Regiment training with a 155mm M-1 gun at Base Devizes in Warminster, Wiltshire, in southwest England, on August 3, 1943. (US Army/FPG/Getty Images)

The most widely used American heavy gun was the 155mm M-1 towed gun, which is not to be confused with the 155mm M-1A1 towed howitzer. The 155mm gun was two and a half times as heavy as the 155mm howitzer and could shoot a shell of the same weight (95 pounds) 60 percent farther. The 155mm gun had a 19-foot barrel and was nicknamed the “Long Tom” by all sides. One self-propelled version was the M-12, based on a modified Grant tank chassis. The M-40 version was based on a modified Sherman tank chassis.

Front view of a U.S. Army 240mm howitzer of B Battery, 697th Field Artillery Battery, in the Magnano area, Italy, January 30, 1944. This was the most powerful U.S. field artillery weapon of the war. (National Archives)

The 8-inch M-2 towed howitzer used the same carriage as the 155mm M-1 towed gun. Where the bore sizes of all other U.S. Army artillery pieces were designated in millimeters, though, this one was designated in inches because it originally was adopted from a U.S. Navy design. Despite its relatively short barrel, the 8-inch had the reputation of being the most accurate artillery piece ever invented. It remained in service in the U.S. Army into the 1960s and in the British Army into the 1970s. After World War II, the U.S. Army also mounted the 8-inch on a self-propelled carriage, and that version remained in service until just after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The heaviest U.S. artillery piece was a 240mm M-1 towed howitzer called the “Black Dragon.” Towed by a 38-ton M-6 tractor, it had surprisingly good mobility for a gun weighing almost 21 tons. Once the gun arrived in a firing position, it took the crew about two hours to place the piece into action. The 240mm howitzer saw extensive service in the Italian Campaign.

France

At the start of the war the French Army still had large numbers of the World War I–era 75mm guns in service. One of these, the French 75, had been the world's first truly modern artillery piece, featuring a hydraulic recoil mechanism and a screw-type breechblock that allowed a high rate of fire. Between the wars, the French had tried to modernize the weapon, updating it with pneumatic tires and a split trail. The Germans captured thousands of these guns from the French in 1940 and incorporated them into lower-priority Wehrmacht units. The Germans also modified the French 75 as an antitank gun for service on the Eastern Front.

In 1939, the French still had more than 1,000 105mm and 3,000 155mm World War I–vintage artillery pieces in service. These obsolete weapons were a detriment in 1940. The standard French 105mm gun was the Canon de 105 mle 1913 Schneider. The French also still had in service 450 Canon de 155 Grand Puissance Filloux (Can 155 GPF). Despite the age of these weapons from an earlier war, the Germans placed many of the captured weapons into service with their own units—an indicator of Germany's overall weakness in field artillery.

The French did have some small numbers of modern light field guns, including the Canon de 105 mle 1934-S, the Canon de 105 court mle 1935-B, and the Canon de 105 L mle 1936 Schneider. Only 159 of the M-1936 guns were in service in 1940. The Germans used those captured pieces primarily for coastal defense. Of more value to the Germans was the Can 155 GPF (the updated version of the Can 155 GPF-T), which had a carriage designed for motor transport.

Soviet Union

The Soviets read the lessons of World War I as requiring more artillery rather than less. In 1937, the Red Army had an inventory of 9,200 field and heavy guns, more than twice that of the German Army and triple that of the French Army. When Germany attacked in June 1941, the Soviet artillery arsenal stood at 67,000 tubes. Throughout the war, Soviet artillery designs were more reliable, durable, and effective than those of virtually all other armies. Soviet Army guns generally had longer ranges. The Soviets also developed innovative mass-production techniques that produced large numbers of relatively inexpensive guns. Through their system of design evolution, they

repeatedly combined the successful features of various existing designs and could introduce improved models in a short period of time.

The Soviet Army did not put much effort into developing increasingly powerful antitank guns. Soviet field artillery pieces generally fired at a higher velocity than those of most other armies, and experience in the Spanish Civil War convinced the Soviets that if they were provided with the proper ammunition, field guns were the best weapons against tanks. With the Soviet Union's overwhelming tube superiority over Germany, Soviet field guns could be used effectively to mass indirect fires against distant targets and then quickly switch to a direct-fire point defense against tanks when the situation required. In 1941 and 1942, most German tank losses were to fire from towed field guns.

The Red Army suffered huge equipment losses in the early period following the German attack in 1941. In the first five months of the war, the Soviets lost upward of 20,000 guns. But this loss quickly led to a surge in mass production of modern, standardized weapons. The basic divisional support gun was the 76.2mm M1942 ZIS-3, a long-barreled gun with a split trail. By the end of the war, variants on the same design had been introduced in 85mm and 100mm types. With a range of nearly 13 miles, the latter outranged all comparable divisional support guns. The 100mm version also was mounted on the SU-100 SP assault gun. Soviet medium artillery included the excellent 122mm M-1931/37 A-19 and the 152mm M-1937 ML-20 and M-1943 D-1.

Massed artillery was the basis of the defense of Moscow in the winter of 1941. According to Soviet reports, artillery destroyed more than 1,400 German tanks between November 16 and December 10 alone. The Soviets relied on the same tactics in the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943). At Kursk on July 5, 1943, the Red Army fired a counterpreparation with 3,000 guns against the assembling German attack force. It was a dramatic demonstration of the power of massed artillery to disrupt an armored attack before it could be launched.

As the war wound into its final years and Soviet production continued to swell the Red Army's arsenal, artillery preparations became more and more massive. During the offensive to cross the Vistula and Oder Rivers in January 1945, the Soviets massed 7,600 guns and mortars along the 21-mile breakthrough sector alone, with 33,500 tubes deployed across the entire front.

The Germans were better armed with artillery than the Soviets in just one area. In 1944, a typical panzer division had some 70 SP guns with calibers up to 150mm. A Soviet tank corps of the same period had only 20 76mm SP guns. Despite their overwhelming number of tubes, only about 30 percent of the Soviet guns were larger than 100mm. The maximum effective range of most of the smaller guns was only about 3.1 miles. Much beyond that range, Soviet gunners had great difficulty supporting the advance of the maneuver units. Thus, the Soviets' large numbers of massed but relatively immobile guns were effective in creating the conditions for successful breakthroughs but ineffective in supporting and sustaining them.

Great Britain and British Commonwealth

In 1939, the British Army was the first fully motorized army in the world. All British field guns were towed by a four-wheel-drive truck that also carried the gun crew and the ammunition. The primary British close-support gun was the 25-pounder, which fired a 3.45-inch round. Initially designed in 1930, the 25-pounder had a box trail and an innovative central firing platform that allowed the crew to traverse the gun a full 360 degrees.

The earliest version, the MK-1, was based on the modified carriage of a World War I–vintage gun. The MK-1s saw service in France in 1940. The MK-2, with a carriage specifically designed for the 25-pounder, was introduced in 1940 and saw service in Norway. When firing special armor-piercing ammunition, the 25-pounder was pressed into service as an effective antitank gun during the early years of the war. In 1943, the Australian Army introduced a lightweight version of the 25-pounder for jungle operations. The British also mounted it on a Valentine tank chassis to produce a self-propelled version known as "The Bishop." A far more successful design called "The Sexton" mounted the 25-pounder on a Canadian Ram tank. The Royal Artillery also used the American 105mm M-7 SP howitzer, a system known as "The Priest."

At the start of the war, British medium artillery consisted of World War I–vintage guns, including the 6-inch gun, the 6-inch howitzer, and the 60-pounder. These were soon replaced by the 4.5-inch and 5.5-inch guns, which used the same chassis. The 5.5-inch gun was first developed in the 1930s, and its final version was approved in August 1939. It fired a 100-pound shell. The

4.5-inch gun first saw service in North Africa in 1942. Both guns were grouped together in medium field artillery regiments.

Early British heavy artillery also consisted mostly of World War I weapons, including the 8-inch, 9.2-inch, 12-inch, and 18-inch howitzers and 6-inch and 9.2-inch guns. All of these weapons were too heavy and cumbersome for modern mobile warfare, and the British lost most of them in France in 1940. Although the British started to design and develop more modern heavy artillery, they suspended those efforts when the United States entered the war. The British instead adopted the American towed 155mm gun and towed 8-inch howitzer.

Germany

The Germans had four categories of artillery: the *Kanone* (cannon), the *Haubitze* (field howitzer), the *Mörser* (a heavy howitzer firing at high angle only), and the *Werfer* (mortar). Generically, all artillery pieces were called *Geschütze* (guns). The three primary calibers of German field artillery were 75mm, 105mm, and 150mm. (The Germans used centimeters to designate their weapons—7.5cm, 10.5cm, and 15cm.) Almost from the start of the war, the Germans recognized that 75mm guns were ineffective for modern warfare. Those guns, including ones captured from the French, were issued only to low-priority units.

The towed 10.5cm leichte Feldhaubitze 18 (le FH 18) was the principal German close-support gun. Designed at the end of World War I, it remained a capable weapon throughout World War II. The main problems were that the Germans never had enough of them, and in almost all units right up until the end of the war they were drawn by horses. On the Eastern Front, the le FH 18 was an effective antitank weapon when armed with the proper ammunition. A self-propelled version for the panzer divisions called the *Wespe* (Wasp) was mounted on a PzKpfw-II tank chassis.

The heavier artillery at the divisional level included a gun (the 10cm s K 18) and a medium field howitzer (the 15cm schwere Feldhaubitze 18 [s FH 18]). The SP version of the s FH 18, called the Hummel (Bumblebee), was mounted on a PzKpfw-IV tank chassis. In the corps and field army echelons, the most common heavy support guns were the 17cm K 18 gun and the 21cm Mörser 18 (Mrs 18) heavy howitzer. Both weapons had a common carriage.

In most World War II armies, the organic fire support for infantry units came from mortars. The Germans did have effective mortars at both company and battalion levels, but on the basis of their experiences from World War I, they also fielded infantry guns right up until the end of the war. The two basic types were the 7.5cm leichtes Infantriegeschütz 18, designed late in World War I, and the heavier 15cm schweres Infantriegeschütz 33. The latter was actually too heavy for an infantry gun.

The Germans did produce several SP versions of their field and antitank guns, and they also produced a self-propelled weapon called an assault gun that was more like a turretless tank. Whereas the SP field and antitank guns consisted mostly of standard towed guns mounted on various tank chassis, many of the SP assault guns had no towed equivalent. The 7.5cm Sturmkanone 40 (Stu. K. 40) fired a 15-pound shell approximately 4 miles, the 10.5cm Sturm-haubitze 42 (Stu. H. 42) fired a 33-pound projectile 4.8 miles, and the 15cm Stu. H. 43 fired a 95-pound shell only 2.8 miles from a barrel that was about 6 feet long.

German artillerymen were tactically skilled, and their guns were generally technically advanced. Initially, though, the Luftwaffe provided the close fire support for the fast-moving panzer divisions on the Eastern Front. When the Germans found that the Luftwaffe could not be everywhere at once across the vast expanses of the east, though, especially in bad weather, they found themselves woefully outgunned by the Soviets.

Italy

The Italians entered World War II with many obsolescent artillery pieces in service. Italy had, however, undertaken a rearmament program in the 1920s, ahead of most other nations. The Italians entered the war with several modern artillery designs, but none produced in great numbers. As the war progressed, even the more modern Italian guns were outclassed by British and American guns whose development had started much later, in the 1930s.

The 75mm Cannone da 75/32 modello 37 was initially developed in the 1920s, but it never entered full production. The 75mm Obice da 75/18 modello 35 howitzer was another good design, but the Italians only had 68 in service by September 1942. The Italians started the war with more than 900 of the obsolete 149mm Cannone da 149/35 in service. Based on a turn-of-the-

century design and lacking a modern recoil system, the gun had to be relaid after every round. It was supposed to be replaced in 1940 by the 149mm Cannone da 149/40, but that weapon also never went into mass production. By 1942, in service were only 147 of the Obice da 149/19 howitzers and only 20 of the heavy 210mm Obice da 210/22 modello 35, which was an accurate and mobile piece for its heavy caliber.

Japan

The Japanese came late to artillery. Most Japanese had never seen a cannon before the arrival of Admiral Matthew Perry in 1853. Through World War II almost all Japanese artillery was based on European designs. Japanese guns, however, were lighter and had greater range than European designs of the same caliber. Japanese designers achieved the weight savings at the expense of the strength of the tubes, trails, and especially the recoil systems. As a result, these weapons suffered from a lack of ruggedness and also from high failure rates that proved costly in light of the heavy firing that was necessary during sustained combat.

Throughout the war, the Japanese had both horse-drawn and motorized artillery units. Whereas the U.S. Army and most European armies moved between the wars from 75mm to 105mm as the standard caliber for direct support of infantry, the Japanese stayed with 75mm throughout World War II. The standard divisional support gun was the 75mm type-90. It was introduced in 1930, but many units entered the war still equipped with the older type-38. The type-90 had a high muzzle velocity, which made it especially effective in an antitank role. The 75mm type-94 mountain gun was also widely used in the jungle as pack artillery. Weighing just 1,181 pounds, it could be carried by 18 men and assembled and laid for firing in about 10 minutes.

The Japanese also had an infantry gun. The 70mm type-92 battalion gun weighed only 450 pounds, but its range was only about one-third that of the type-94 mountain gun.

Japanese general support guns included the 105mm type-91 howitzer and the 105mm type-92 gun, introduced in 1931 and 1932, respectively. Both guns fired the same basic projectile, but the far heavier type-92 had almost twice the range. With a range of 11.3 miles, the type-92 could throw a 35-

pound shell farther than most other artillery pieces of World War II. The Japanese medium artillery battalions were armed with either the 149mm type-96 howitzer or the 149mm type-89 gun. Despite weighing almost three times as much as the 105mm type-92 gun, the 150mm type-89 gun had a range only 0.9 miles greater. The largest Japanese artillery piece of the war was the 240mm type-45 howitzer. An elderly pre–World War I design, it was most effective as a coastal defense gun.

With Japan's overwhelming emphasis on the infantry attack, the Japanese entered World War II without adequate industrial resources for large-scale artillery production and maintenance. Their production facilities were not tooled for standardized production and the mass production of interchangeable parts. Thus, the Japanese Army was always chronically short of artillery, and it had trouble keeping what it did have in service.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Antiaircraft Artillery and Employment; Ardennes Offensive; Artillery Doctrine; Kursk, Battle of; Moscow, Battle of; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Stalingrad, Battle of; Tanks, All Powers

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Aruga Kosaku (1897–1945)

Japanese Navy officer. Born on August 31, 1897, in Nagano Prefecture, Aruga Kosaku became a career naval officer. He specialized in surface warfare, especially in destroyers. In 1923, he graduated from the advanced course at the Torpedo School, and during the next decade he served in light cruisers. He was promoted to captain in November 1940.

By the beginning of World War II, Aruga was commanding Destroyer Division 4. Aruga's destroyers screened Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi's 1st Carrier Strike Force in the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway. Two months later, Aruga's Destroyer Division 4 participated in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, screening Admiral Abe Hiroaki's Vanguard Group.

In March 1943, Aruga took command of the cruiser *Chokai.* In July 1944, he was appointed head of the Torpedo School. On November 25, 1944, Aruga, now a rear admiral, assumed command of the battleship *Yamato.* That ship's war record had been undistinguished, and as flagship of the Combined Fleet it had often been kept far from the action. The *Yamato* had been damaged by a torpedo from the American submarine *Skate* on December 25, 1943, and its only surface action had been in the battle off Samar in October 1944 against American escort carriers.

On April 1, 1945, U.S. forces landed on Okinawa. Taunted by his army counterpart that the *Yamato* was a floating hotel for idle and inept admirals, commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Toyoda Soemu drafted orders for Operation ICHI-TEN. The *Yamato* was provided sufficient fuel for a one-way trip to Okinawa. Escorted by a light cruiser and eight destroyers, the *Yamato* was to draw off American carrier planes, leaving the American fleet vulnerable to a mass attack by kamikazes. The *Yamato* would then destroy the American transports off Okinawa and beach itself to serve as an unsinkable fortress, with most of its crew joining the fighting on land.

When the task force commanders learned of the orders, they protested. Although they were willing to die for Japan, they did not believe that the plan would produce significant results. They wanted instead to attack U.S. lines of communication. When Second Fleet commander Vice Admiral Itō Seiichi, who took command of the operation aboard the *Yamato,* refused to change the orders, Aruga and the other commanders accepted their fate. Aruga was heard to state, "What a glorious way to die!"

The *Yamato* sortied on the afternoon of April 6. Naval cadets and ill sailors were landed before departure. U.S. forces located the *Yamato* early the

next morning and pounded it with waves of carrier planes. The ship was hit by at least 7 bombs and 11–15 torpedoes. When flooding caused a serious list to port, Aruga ordered counterflooding, although many men were trapped belowdecks. By 2:00 p.m., Aruga realized that the end was near. He ordered that Emperor Hirohito's portrait be saved and had himself tied to the compass mounting to avoid surviving the sinking of his ship. At 2:23 p.m., the *Yamato* rolled onto an even keel and exploded. Aruga and Itō were not among the 269 survivors of the *Yamato*'s 2,767-man crew. Aruga was posthumously promoted to vice admiral.

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See also

Abe Hiroaki; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Kamikaze; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chūichi; Okinawa, Invasion of; Toyoda Soemu; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Asaka Yasuhiko (1887–1981)

Japanese Army general and prince. Born on October 2, 1887, in Kyoto, Japan, Asaka Yasuhiko was the uncle-in-law of Emperor Hirohito. Commissioned a sublieutenant in the army on graduation from the Military Academy in 1908, Asaka graduated from the Army Staff College in 1914. In the early 1920s, he spent time in France studying European military establishments.

Asaka was promoted to colonel in 1925 and to major general in 1930. He then taught at the Staff College. In 1933, he received a further promotion to lieutenant general and assumed command of the Imperial Guards Division.

Asaka became a member of the Supreme War Council in 1935, using his influence as a member of the imperial family to further the interests of the military faction in the Japanese government.

As the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria escalated in November 1937, Asaka was assigned as deputy commander of the Center China Area Army Group, which was driving on the then Chinese Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) capital of Nanjing (Nanking). The commander, General Matsui Iwane, became ill, and as a result Asaka led the final assault, ending in the capture of Nanjing on December 13, 1937. In the ensuing weeks, Japanese troops under Asaka's command committed atrocities against Chinese civilians and soldiers. This event, known as the "rape of Nanjing," was reported to the world by foreign correspondents. Asaka returned to Japan and was promoted to full general in 1939. He held no further field commands.

After the war Asaka was questioned by U.S. investigators, but as a relative of the emperor he was not charged with war crimes. In his later years, he was well-known in Japan for his interest in golf. Asaka died on April 13, 1981, at Atami.

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See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Nanjing Massacre; Sino-Japanese War

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Athenia, SS, Sinking of (September 3, 1939)

The passenger liner SS *Athenia* was the first British ship sunk by Germany in World War II. Launched at Govan, Scotland, in 1923 and owned after 1935 by the Donaldson Atlantic Line Ltd., the *Athenia* displaced 13,465 tons and was 536 feet 4 inches in overall length with a beam of 66 feet 5 inches. The ship was regularly employed in the transatlantic run between either Liverpool or Glasgow and Quebec and Montreal.

On September 1, 1939, the day that Germany invaded Poland, the *Athenia* sailed from Glasgow for Montreal. Commanded by Captain James Cook, it had a crew of 315 and was carrying 1,103 passengers, more than 300 of whom were Americans. Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. That same afternoon, the *Athenia* was steaming near the Hebrides Islands off Scotland's west coast when it was spotted and then tracked for three hours by the German submarine *U-30*, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Fritz-Julius Lemp. The attack occurred at 7:40 p.m. without warning, despite German chancellor Adolf Hitler's instructions that U-boat commanders follow the Hague Conventions. Lemp later claimed that because the ship was darkened and zigzagging, he assumed it was a troop transport or a disguised Q-ship or auxiliary cruiser.

Two torpedoes struck the *Athenia*, only one of which exploded. The ship soon began to settle by the stern, although it did not sink for 14 hours, until 10:40 a.m. on September 4. Seven ships, including three British destroyers, raced to the scene and rescued survivors. Of 117 people who perished (98 passengers and 19 crew members) in the torpedo explosion and the subsequent evacuation, 28 were Americans.

The sinking of the *Athenia* was reported in newspaper headlines throughout the English-speaking world. It certainly exacerbated anti-German sentiment in the neutral United States. Berlin claimed that the British had sunk the *Athenia* themselves to win U.S. sympathy.

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See also

Atlantic, Battle of the

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Atlantic, Battle of the

The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of World War II. In it, the German Navy tried to sever the Allied sea lines of communication along

which supplies necessary to fight the war were sent to Great Britain. To carry out the battle, the Germans employed a few surface raiders and long-range aircraft, but principally they used U-boats.

At the beginning of the war, the German Navy possessed not the 300 U-boats deemed necessary by Commodore Karl Dönitz (he was promoted to rear admiral in October 1939) but 57 boats, of which only 27 could reach the Atlantic from their home bases. Although an extensive building program was immediately begun, only in the second half of 1941 did U-boat numbers begin to rise.

On the Allied side, Royal Navy leaders were at first confident that their asdic (acronym for Allied Submarine Detection Investigating Committee) location device would enable their escort vessels to defend the supply convoys against the submerged attackers so that shipping losses might be limited until new merchant ships built by Britain, Canada, and the United States could settle the balance. Dönitz planned to concentrate groups of U-boats (called wolf packs by the Allies) against the convoys to permit attacks by multiple submarines on the surface at night. It took time, however, before the battles of the convoys really began. The Battle of the Atlantic became a running match between numbers of German U-boats and the development of their weapons against the Allied merchant ships, their sea and air escorts (with improving detection equipment), and new weapons.

The Battle of the Atlantic can be subdivided into eight phases. During the first of these, from September 1939 to June 1940, a small number of U-boats, seldom more than 10 at a time, made individual cruises west of the British Isles and into the Bay of Biscay to intercept Allied merchant ships. Generally, these operated independently because the convoy system, which the British Admiralty had planned before the war, was slow to take shape. Thus, the U-boats found targets, attacking at first according to prize rules by identifying the ship and providing for the safety of its crew. When Britain armed its merchant ships, however, the German submarines increasingly struck without warning.

Dönitz’s plan to counter the convoy system with group or pack operations of U-boats—also developed and tested before the war—was put on trial in October and November 1939 and in February 1940. The results confirmed the possibility of vectoring a group of U-boats to a convoy by radio signals from whichever U-boat first sighted the convoy. At this time, though, the

insufficient numbers of U-boats available and frequent torpedo failures prevented real successes.

The German conquest of Norway and western France provided the U-boats with new bases much closer to the main operational area off the Western Approaches and brought about a second phase from July 1940 to May 1941. During this time the U-boats, operating in groups, were directed by radio signals from the shore against the convoys, in which were now concentrated most of the maritime traffic to and from Great Britain. Even if the number of U-boats in the operational area still did not rise to more than 10 at a time, peak efficiency was attained in terms of the relationship between tonnage sunk and U-boat days at sea.

This was made possible partly by the weakness of the convoy escort groups—because the Royal Navy held back destroyers to guard against an expected German invasion of Britain and maintained large forces in the Mediterranean to offset the loss of the French navy. In addition, British merchant shipping losses were increased during this phase by the operations of German surface warships in the North and Central Atlantic; by armed merchant raiders in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans; by the attacks of German long-range bombers against the Western Approaches; and by heavy German air attacks against British harbors. The Germans were also aided by Italian submarines based at Bordeaux and sent into the Atlantic, the numbers of which in early 1941 actually surpassed the number of German U-boats.

In late 1940 and the spring of 1941, when the danger of an invasion of the British Isles had receded, London released destroyers for antisubmarine operations and redeployed Coastal Command aircraft to support the convoys off the Western Approaches. Thus, in the third phase of the Battle of the Atlantic, from May to December 1941, the U-boats were forced to operate at greater distances from shore. Long lines of U-boats patrolled across the convoy routes to intercept supply ships. This forced the British, in June, to begin escorting their convoys along the whole route from Newfoundland to the Western Approaches and—when the U-boats began to cruise off West Africa—the route from Freetown to Gibraltar and the United Kingdom as well.

In March 1941, the Allies captured cipher materials from a German patrol vessel. Then on May 7, 1941, the Royal Navy succeeded in capturing the German Arctic meteorological vessel *München* and seizing its Enigma

machine intact. Settings secured from this encoding machine enabled the Royal Navy to read June U-boat radio traffic practically currently. On May 9 during a convoy battle, the British destroyer *Bulldog* captured the German submarine *U-110* and secured the settings for the high-grade officer-only German naval signals. The capture on June 28 of a second German weather ship, the *Lauenburg*, enabled British decryption operations at Bletchley Park to read July German home-waters radio traffic currently.

This led to interception of German supply ships in the Atlantic and cessation of German surface ship operations in the Atlantic. Beginning in August 1941, Bletchley Park operatives could decrypt signals between the commander of U-boats and his U-boats at sea. The Allies were thus able to reroute convoys and save perhaps 1.5 million gross tons of shipping. During this third phase, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet was first involved in the battle.

The entry of the United States into the war ushered in the fourth phase of the battle, presenting the U-boats with a second golden opportunity from January to July 1942. Attacking unescorted individual ships off the U.S. East Coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Caribbean, German U-boats sank greater tonnages than during any other period of the war.

THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC
Axis or Axis-controlled, Nov. 1942
Convoy Routes
Main U-boat Operational Areas
Sep. 1939–July 1942
Aug. 1942–May 1945
Limit of Allied Air Cover
Sep. 1939–July 1942
Aug. 1942–May 1945
GREENLAND
Spitsbergen
Barents Sea
ICELAND
Reykjavik
Murmansk
NORWAY
Faroe Is.
Bergen
Stavanger
Kiel
IRELAND
CANADA
St. Johns
Halifax
EUROPE
Brest
Lorient
Bordeaux
New York
UNITED STATES
Azores
Gibraltar
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
Bermuda
Casablanca
Mediterranean Sea
Operation DRUMBEAT
Miami
Dakar
Trinidad
Freetown
AFRICA
BRAZIL
SOUTH AMERICA
Ascension
N
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
Rio de Janeiro
Cape Town
Montevideo
0 400 800 mi
0 400 800 km
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Officers on the bridge of a U.S. destroyer, part of the escort element of a large convoy of ships, keep a sharp lookout for German submarines, ca. 1942. (Library of Congress)

Sightings and sinkings off the U.S. East Coast dropped off sharply after the introduction of the interlocking convoy system there though, and Dönitz found operations by individual U-boats in such distant waters uneconomical. Thus, in July 1942 he switched the U-boats back to the North Atlantic convoy route. This began the fifth phase, which lasted until May 1943, and proved to be the decisive period of the conflict between the U-boat groups and the convoys with their sea and air escorts. Increasingly, the battle was influenced by technical innovations. Most important in this regard were efforts on both sides in the field of signals intelligence.

On February 1, 1942, the Germans had introduced their new M4 cipher machine, leading to a blackout in decryption that lasted until the end of December 1942. This accomplishment was of limited influence during the fourth phase because the German U-boats operated individually, and there was no great signal traffic in the operational areas. When the convoy battles began again, the Germans could at first decrypt Allied convoy signals.

When Bletchley Park was able to decrypt German signals anew, rerouting convoys again became possible, although this was at first limited by rising numbers of German U-boats in patrol lines. In March 1943, the U-boats achieved their greatest successes against the convoys, and the entire convoy system—the backbone of the Allied strategy against “Fortress Europe”—seemed in jeopardy. But now Allied decryption allowed the dispatch of additional surface and air escorts to support threatened convoys. This development, in connection with the introduction of new weapons and high-frequency direction finding, led to the collapse of the U-boat offensive against the convoys only eight weeks later, in May 1943.

This collapse came as a surprise to Dönitz. Allied success could be attributed mainly to the provision of centimetric radar equipment for the sea and air escorts and the closing of the air gap in the North Atlantic. In a sixth (intermediate) phase from June to August 1943, the U-boats were sent to distant areas where the antisubmarine forces were weak, while the Allied air forces tried to block the U-boat transit routes across the Bay of Biscay.

The change to a new Allied convoy cipher in June, which the German decryption service could not break, made it more difficult for the U-boats to

locate the convoys in the seventh phase, from September 1943 to June 1944. During this time, the German U-boat command tried to deploy new weapons (acoustic torpedoes and increased antiaircraft armament) and new equipment (radar warning sets) to force again a decision with the convoys, first in the North Atlantic and then on the Gibraltar routes. After short-lived success, these operations failed and tapered off as the Germans tried to pin down Allied forces until new revolutionary U-boat types became available for operational deployment.

The eighth and final phase, from June 1944 to May 1945, began with the Allied invasion of Normandy. The U-boats, now equipped with snorkel breathing masts, endeavored to attack individual supply ships in the shallow waters of the English Channel and in British and Canadian coastal waters. The U-boats' mission was to pin down Allied supply traffic and antisubmarine forces to prevent the deployment of warships in offensive roles against German-occupied areas. Construction of the new U-boats (of which the Allies received information by decrypting reports sent to Tokyo by the Japanese embassy in Berlin) was delayed by the Allied bombing offensive, however, and the German land defenses collapsed before significant numbers of these boats were ready.

The Battle of the Atlantic lasted without interruption for 69 months, during which time German U-boats sank 2,850 Allied and neutral merchant ships, 2,520 of them in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The U-boats also sank many warships, from aircraft carriers to destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and other antisubmarine vessels. The Germans lost in turn the battleship *Bismarck*, the pocket battleship *Graf Spee*, some armed merchant raiders, and 650 U-boats, 522 of them in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

The Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic resulted from the vastly superior resources on the Allied side in shipbuilding and aircraft production (the ability to replace lost ships and aircraft) and from superior antisubmarine detection equipment and weapons. Allied signals intelligence was critical to the victory.

JÜRGEN ROHWER

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Bletchley Park; Depth Charges; Dönitz, Karl; Hunter-Killer Groups; Radar; Río de la Plata,

Battle of; Signals Intelligence; Torpedoes; Wolf Pack Tactic; Document 98

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Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941)

Declaration of Allied goals for the postwar world agreed upon between leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom that served as the basis for the United Nations Declaration. The conference that produced the Atlantic Charter was the first face-to-face meeting between U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill. The meeting was critical because it marked the beginning of an extraordinarily close relationship between the two men, and it also demonstrated to the British that the United States would likely enter the war sooner rather than later. The conference occurred almost four months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor that would bring the Americans into the war against the Axis powers.

Arranged by Roosevelt, the Atlantic Charter meeting took place in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Roosevelt had put out on the presidential yacht *Potomac* under cover of a vacation, and he then transferred secretly to the cruiser *Augusta.* Churchill traveled across the Atlantic in the battleship *Prince of Wales.* The two leaders and their staffs (including all service chiefs

of each side) met aboard these ships beginning on August 9 for four days. Topics of discussion included Lend-Lease aid, common defense issues, and a strong joint policy against Japanese expansion in the Far East. Almost as an afterthought, the meetings produced a press release on August 14, 1941, that came to be known as the Atlantic Charter.

The Atlantic Charter had eight main points: (1) the eschewing of any territorial aggrandizement for their countries, (2) opposition to territorial changes without the freely expressed consent of the peoples involved, (3) the right of all peoples to choose their own forms of government and determination to restore freedom to those peoples who had been deprived of it, (4) free access for all nations to the world's trade and raw materials, (5) international cooperation to improve living standards and to ensure economic prosperity and social security, (6) a lasting peace that would allow peoples everywhere to "live out their lives in freedom from fear and want," (7) freedom of the seas, and (8) disarmament of the aggressor states "pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security."

Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt aboard the British battleship *Prince of Wales*, August 14, 1941. The meeting aboard the British ship led to the Atlantic Charter. (National Archives)

Although there was no formally signed copy of the Atlantic Charter—only the press release containing the eight guiding principles—these principles had the same appeal as President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen

Points of January 1918. Certainly the talks strengthened the bonds between the United States and Britain. Isolationists in the United States denounced the charter for the determination it expressed to bring about "the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny." The government of the Soviet Union later announced its support for the charter's principles, but even at this early stage in the war there were sharp differences between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union over what the postwar world should look like.

The Atlantic Charter subsequently formed the basis of the United Nations Declaration issued on January 1, 1942, one of the results of the December 22, 1941–January 14, 1943, Arcadia Conference.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Arcadia Conference; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United Nations Declaration; Document 104; Document 109

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Atlantic Wall

German defenses along the European coast, last of the great defensive lines to be built (1941–1944). As German plans to invade Britain faded late in 1940, it became clear to the German high command that thousands of miles of European coast had to be defended from possible Allied invasion. The German submarine bases in France, the occupied Channel Islands, and the Dover-Calais narrow point in the English Channel were heavily protected from the beginning. Following the June 1941 invasion of Russia and the U.S.

entry into the war in December 1941, Germany went on the defensive in the west. Formal work on the Atlantic Wall began in May 1942.

There never was a continuous wall per se. That would have been impossible to build or man. What was built was a series of defended zones—artillery and infantry positions overlooking likely invasion beaches and ports. Rivalries and different designs among army and navy units and civilian construction battalions often held up progress, as did strategic arguments about the comparative value of fixed defenses versus mobile reserves. So did Allied bombing of transport of construction materials. The three-year effort by Germany was massive nevertheless, involving huge quantities of men, money, and material.

Thousands of emplacements were built along the coast of France, with lesser facilities in the Low Countries, Denmark, and along the Norwegian coast. Where possible, existing fortifications and weapons were used. Highlights of the wall were the often extensive artillery batteries built into extensive steel-reinforced cement casemates designed to deflect air attacks. A typical position might include four separate 8-inch gun casemates (which, while protecting the gun and its crew, also limited the weapon's field of fire) plus one or more observation and combat-direction posts, all built close to the coastline. The largest positions might feature mobile 14-inch railway-mounted artillery or huge turret-mounted guns. Some of the latter, installed in massive emplacements built near the French coast, could actually shell England directly across the Channel.

Among German defenses were scores of smaller emplacements for machine guns, observation, personnel, command posts, and minefields. Some were camouflaged to look like houses or other structures, and most were at least partly built into the ground for further protection. A large number of so-called standard bunker designs were employed, although each service had its own set of standards. Extensive propaganda made the wall seem impregnable.

When placed in command of German beach defenses in October 1943, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel made the high-tide mark into the main line of defense, adding obstacles and intervening emplacements covering possible landing points. There were half a million beach obstacles along the English Channel alone, many armed with mines. In the end, the stupendous construction project was largely for naught. Although two-thirds of a planned

15,000 emplacements were completed, few of them fired in anger. D-day (June 6, 1944) was hardly hindered by the several emplacements in Normandy (some were shelled from the sea, and others were taken by paratroopers or special ranger attacks, as at Pointe du Hoc), and the rest of the coastal forts were generally captured from behind by advancing Allied forces. Extensive remains of the Atlantic Wall exist to this day.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Coastal Defense; Fort Drum, Manila Bay; Maginot Line; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Todt, Fritz

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Atlantis, KMS

The 7,862-ton *Atlantis* was the most successful of nine armed merchant cruisers deployed by the Germans in World War II. Launched as the freighter *Goldenfels* on December 16, 1937, the ship was refitted in the fall of 1939 and commissioned on December 19, 1939. Commanded by Captain Bernhard Rogge, the *Atlantis* sank or captured Allied 22 ships, for a total of 145,698 tons, during its 622 days at sea.

The *Goldenfels* was transformed into an armed merchant cruiser by the addition of six 150mm guns, one 75mm warning gun, two 37mm twin antiaircraft guns, and four 20mm automatic guns as well as torpedo tubes, mines, and two patrol aircraft. The ship sailed from Germany in March 1940, reaching its operating area in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific by the end of April. Designated as Ship 16 by the Germans and

Raider C by the British, the *Atlantis* preyed on British shipping under a variety of names, flags, and disguises between May 1940 and November 1941. In accordance with prize regulations, Rogge attempted to pick up the survivors of his attacks when possible, earning him a reputation as a fair opponent.

In the late summer of 1940, a British War Cabinet report suggested that no reinforcements would go to the Far East if a war developed there. Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies were all regarded as indefensible. Churchill decided not to tell the Australian and New Zealand governments, but he did send a copy to the British commander in the Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. The report went out in a weighted bag at the end of September on the steamer *Automedon*, which was captured on November 11, 1940, by the *Atlantis.* The boarding party blew the master's safe and secured the document. Rogge then headed for Japan without delay, arriving there on December 4. The naval attaché, Vice Admiral Paul Wennecker, immediately telegraphed a four-page cipher summary to Berlin. German chancellor Adolf Hitler, calling it of the "utmost importance," ordered it turned over to the Japanese. One authority has said, "By any standard, it was one of the worst intelligence disasters in history."

On November 22, 1941, the British cruiser *Devonshire* located and destroyed the *Atlantis* while the ship was transferring supplies to the submarines *U-68* and *U-126* in the South Atlantic. Rogge and most of his crew were picked up by the U-boats and reached Saint-Nazaire after a series of mishaps. Rogge and his adjutant, Ulrich Mohr, both survived the war to write about their experiences.

DOUGLAS PEIFER

See also

Commerce Raiders, Surface, German

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Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ

Although there were extensive consultations about the employment of the atomic bomb, discussions always focused on how to use the new weapon, not whether to use it. Its employment was a natural extension of bombing tactics already in use, including the firebombing of German and Japanese cities in which civilians were killed by the many thousands.

Intelligence reports had shown that Nazi Germany was working furiously to develop an atomic weapon, so during the first years of the top-secret Manhattan Project, military planners assumed that an American-made bomb would be used against the Germans. Germany surrendered, however, before the U.S. bomb could be successfully tested. In the spring and summer of 1945, the primary aim of Allied decision makers was to achieve the unconditional surrender of Japan as quickly as possible at the lowest cost in lives, and everyone of importance assumed that if the Manhattan Project could produce a workable weapon, that weapon would be expended against an enemy target.

It could be argued that the decision to use the atomic bomb was made on December 6, 1941, when the first funds were approved for its development. At the time, American leaders assumed that the new invention would be a legitimate weapon in the war, and they never questioned that assumption afterward.

Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s key advisers on the project concluded in May 1943 that the first operational bomb should be dropped on Japan, the choice of targets really did not receive systematic attention until two years later. A special Target Committee for the Manhattan Project began meeting in April 1945, and by the next month it had a shortlist of cities including Kyoto and Hiroshima. On May 31, a blue-ribbon Interim Committee appointed by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson began meeting to discuss how best to use the new weapon. A suggestion made at lunch to try a warning and noncombat demonstration was quickly rejected. First, if a demonstration detonation failed, the United States and the Allies would be deeply embarrassed; it might also have served to stiffen Japanese resolve rather than forcing surrender. Second, at the time, there were only two or

three bombs under development; if one failed or did not impress the Japanese, that left only one or two bombs in the American arsenal. The committee thus recommended that the bomb be dropped without warning on a target that would make the largest possible psychological impression on as many inhabitants as possible.

On July 16, 1945, the United States successfully detonated the world's first atomic bomb in the desert near Alamogordo, New Mexico. Eventually, military planners came up with a target list of Hiroshima, Kokura, Kyoto, and Nigata. Stimson persuaded the planners to substitute Nagasaki for the shrine city of Kyoto and then presented the list to President Harry S. Truman in late July.

Truman approved the directive without consulting anyone and wrote in his diary that the bomb would be used between July 25 and August 10. The new weapon offered the possibility of ending the war sooner, and he had no compelling reason not to employ it. Despite some historians' claims to the contrary, there was no reliable evidence of any imminent Japanese collapse or surrender. Although some leaders did perceive a display of the atomic bomb's power as a potential tool to intimidate the Soviet Union in the future, this was a secondary benefit of its employment and not a factor in operational decisions.

No single government document shows Truman's decision to use the bomb, but there were two relevant military directives from the Joint Chiefs to the U.S. Army Air Forces. The first, to General Henry "Hap" Arnold on July 24, designated the four possible targets. The next day, a similar order to General Carl Spaatz, who was commanding strategic air forces in the Pacific, added a date: "after about August 3, 1945." That document also directed that other bombs were to be delivered against targets as soon as they were ready. On the basis of these orders, Spaatz selected Hiroshima and then Kokura to be the targets for the first and second atomic missions. Cloud cover on the day of the second raid caused the shift to the secondary target of Nagasaki.

Some critics have questioned why there was not more deliberation about whether to use the terrible new weapon. The main concern for decision makers was to win the war quickly while avoiding a costly invasion of the Japanese mainland or losing public support for unconditional surrender. Under the conditions in 1945, which had already produced fire raids that had killed far more Japanese civilians than did the attacks on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, no U.S. president or general could have failed to employ the atomic bomb.

CONRAD C. CRANE

See also

Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; B-29 Raids against Japan; Groves, Leslie Richard; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Manhattan Project; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Tokyo, Bombing of; Truman, Harry S.; Document 228; Document 229; Document 230; Document 240

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Attlee, Clement Richard (1883–1967)

British politician, leader of the Labour Party and deputy leader of the House of Commons, and prime minister (1945–1951). Born on January on 3, 1883, in the Putney part of London, Clement Attlee was educated at University College, Oxford. He initially practiced law, but after working with the poor in London's East Side, he joined the Labour Party in 1907, living in a settlement house until 1922 (except during World War I). He served as a lecturer at the London School of Economics. During World War I, Attlee rose to the rank of major and served at Gallipoli and in the Middle East and later on the Western Front.

Elected to Parliament in October 1922, Attlee held various minor posts in Labour and national governments. He became the head of the Labour Party in 1935 as a compromise candidate, a middle-of-the-road democratic socialist. Attlee and a growing proportion of his party agreed with Winston L. S.

Churchill’s call for faster rearmament in the face of the threat from Nazi Germany.

Refusing to serve under Neville Chamberlain, Attlee helped to bring about Winston Churchill’s government during the crisis of May 1940, when Chamberlain was forced to resign. On May 10, Churchill named Attlee lord privy seal (he served to 1942) and deputy leader of the House of Commons (effectively deputy prime minister), a position he held from 1942 to 1945. Attlee often chaired cabinet sessions during Churchill’s constant travels, and he remained loyal to Churchill throughout the war.

British Labor Party leader Clement Attlee. Prime minister during 1945–1951, he had to deal with a number of major challenges confronting his country. (Library of Congress)

Attlee worked closely with fellow Labourite Aneurin Bevin to develop the 1943 white paper on postwar social plans. He was renowned for his ability to remain calm in a crisis, outline major positions in few words, and

make hard decisions. Pressed by his party, however, he led Labour out of the national coalition in May 1945 after the defeat of Germany (there had not been a general election for a decade). This led to national elections in which Labour won a resounding victory, and Attlee became prime minister on July 26, 1945. He replaced Churchill as the British representative for the remainder of the July 17–August 2 Potsdam Conference.

Attlee presided until October 1951 over creation of the British welfare state with its nationalization of health services, steel, coal, railways, and civil aviation. He supervised the granting of independence to India and Pakistan on August 14, 1947, a key step in converting the British Empire to the Commonwealth of Nations. He also dispatched British troops to the 1950–1953 Korean War and was instrumental in the decision to permit the Federal Republic of Germany to rearm as the Cold War deepened in the early 1950s. On retiring as party leader, he was made an earl in 1955. He spoke often in the House of Lords against Britain becoming part of the Common Market. Attlee died in Westminster, London, on October 8, 1967.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Potsdam Conference

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Auboyneau, Philippe Marie Joseph Raymond (1899–1961)

French Navy admiral. Born in Constantinople (Istanbul) in the Ottoman Empire on November 9, 1899, Philippe Auboyneau graduated from the École

Navale in 1918. Between the wars, he attended the French War College and commanded a torpedo boat. He was promoted to commander in December 1939, and when World War II began, he was in the Far East serving as French liaison officer to British forces based at Colombo, Ceylon. After Germany invaded France in May 1940, Auboyneau was reassigned to the Mediterranean as liaison officer to British Mediterranean forces under Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham.

Three months later, Auboyneau chose to follow Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle and joined the Free French in London. There Auboyneau took charge of the 1st "Fighting French" Destroyer Division. Promoted to captain in November 1941, in March 1942 he became commander of all Free French naval forces, and he also headed naval representation on the Council of National Liberation.

In November 1942 shortly after the Allied landings in North Africa, Auboyneau moved to Algiers with most of the Free French leaders, becoming deputy chief of the French General Staff. In January 1943, he was promoted to rear admiral. In July 1944, Auboyneau directed the 3rd Cruiser Division in Operation DRAGOON, the Allied invasion of southern France.

Auboyneau was promoted to vice admiral in command of French naval forces in the Far East in September 1945, and he held the position for two years during the Indochina War. In August 1955, he became commander in chief of French naval forces in the Mediterranean based in Algiers. He received promotion to full admiral in December 1957 and directed French naval operations for five years during the Algerian War. Auboyneau retired in December 1960 and died in Paris on February 22, 1961.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; de Gaulle, Charles; DRAGOON, Operation; France, Navy; Free French

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Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre (1884–1981)

British Army general. Born at Aldershot, England, on June 21, 1884, Claude Auchinleck, known as “the Auk,” graduated from the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst in 1902. He saw extensive service in India and Tibet (1904–1912), in the Middle East (1914–1919), and in India again (1929–1940). In 1930, he was promoted to colonel; three years later he was appointed a temporary brigadier. He became a major general in November 1935.

Auchinleck returned to England in January 1940, expecting to prepare British units for action in France. Instead, he was sent on May 7, 1940, to command British forces in Narvik in the disastrous Norwegian Campaign, which suffered from lack of air cover and inadequate forces and equipment. Just after Britain’s evacuation of Norway, on June 14, 1940, Auchinleck took over the Southern Command to prepare for a possible German invasion. In this role, he worked effectively to improve the Home Guard.

As fears of invasion receded, Auchinleck was promoted to general and sent to India as commander in chief on November 21, 1940. British officials charged him with controlling pressures for independence while overseeing the training of Indian units for Allied use elsewhere.

Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill called on Auchin-leck to take the same role in the critical Middle East theater (June 21, 1941), replacing Archibald Wavell. While in Egypt, Auchinleck came under constant pressure from Churchill to undertake aggressive action against General of Panzer Troops Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. Auchinleck countered that he first had to train his force and overcome the difficulties of having inadequate supplies and armaments. Auchinleck began his offensive, Operation CRUSADER, against Libya on November 18, 1941, but it suffered from the weakness of Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham. That effort would end on December 30. Auchinleck replaced Cunningham with Major General Neil Ritchie, and for a time the offensive went well. Rommel struck back, though, leading to the fall of Tobruk on June 21, 1942, when more than 30,000 men were taken prisoner.

Auchinleck then took direct control of the Eighth Army and stabilized his line at the First Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4) later that month, thus saving Egypt. Churchill, impatient for success from a more aggressive commander, nevertheless relieved him of command on August 5, 1942. Damning reports from Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery about Auchinleck surely greased the skids.

Turning down a proffered command in Syria and Iraq, Auchinleck returned to India as commander in chief of the army there (June 18, 1943–14 August 1947). He was made a field marshal in June 1946, refusing a peerage a year later (he did not wish to be honored for helping to divide India and Pakistan, a result he abhorred). Auchinleck retired in 1967 to live in Marrakesh, Morocco, and died there on March 23, 1981.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon; Great Britain, Army; Norway, German Conquest of; Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Aung San, U (ca. 1915–1947)

Burmese Army general and nationalist leader. Born in Natmauk in the Magwe district of Myramir (Burma, today Myanmar), U Aung San's date of birth is obscure but was possibly February 13, 1915. As a young man, Aung was active in student politics, and in 1936 he and U Nu led a student strike. Aung graduated from Rangoon University (now the University of Yangon) in 1938 and became involved with the Dohbama Asiayone, a Burmese

nationalist organization that sought to obtain independence from Britain. His activities aroused the suspicion of British authorities, who sought to arrest him in 1940.

Aung fled first to China and then to Tokyo, where he arranged with the Japanese to create a military force known as the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) to aid the Japanese in their impending invasion of Burma. During the actual battle, which began with the invasion on December 14, 1941, and continued into the next summer, Aung's BIA provided the Japanese with intelligence and logistical support. Aung received the rank of major general in the Japanese Army.

Japanese forces overran Rangoon (now Yangon) in March 1942. In August 1943 Japan gave Burma nominal independence, and Aung served in the new government as minister of defense. He soon became disillusioned with the Japanese military government, and in August 1944 he formed the Anti-Fascist League of Burma and secretly worked against the Japanese. On March 27, 1945, as Allied forces advanced into Burma, his army switched sides and joined the British.

Allied forces captured Rangoon in June 1945. When the Japanese surrendered in August, Aung began negotiations with the British for Burmese independence, his true goal. This effort culminated in an agreement between British prime minister Clement Attlee and Aung on January 27, 1947, that promised an independent Burma in one year. Facing communist opposition, Aung's party won a large majority in the April 1947 elections.

On July 19, 1947, Aung was assassinated in Rangoon along with six other political leaders. U Saw, Aung's rival for power, was blamed for the assassination. Aung's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, is a major political figure and a member of the National League for Democracy in Burma. She was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 and was elected a member of parliament on April 1, 2012.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Attlee, Clement Richard; Burma Theater; China-Burma-India Theater

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Auphan, Paul Gabriel (1894–1982)

French Navy admiral. Born on November 4, 1894, at Alès, Gard, France, Paul Gabriel Auphan entered the French Naval Academy in 1911. He served in the World War I Dardanelles Campaign and in a submarine. Between the wars, he commanded submarines, destroyers, a cruiser, and a naval school ship.

Auphan was deputy commander of the Naval Academy at Brest and studied at the Naval War College. He was promoted to rear admiral in March 1931. As a vice admiral in 1936, he commanded the French Mediterranean Squadron (1936–1938) before becoming maritime prefect at Toulon. Known for administrative rather than seagoing skills, in September 1939 Auphan, a protégé of French Navy commander in chief Admiral Jean Darlan, became naval deputy chief of staff. The day before Franco-German armistice negotiations began in June 1940, Darlan and Auphan promised the British that they would never permit Adolf Hitler to control the French fleet, even if this meant scuttling it.

In July 1940 after the armistice, Auphan became director of the French merchant marine. In September 1941, he was named chief of the naval General Staff, a position to which in April 1942 he added that of secretary of the navy in the Vichy government. Auphan's defenders later claimed that he only accepted these posts to ensure the fleet's continued freedom from German control.

Both before and after the November 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa, Auphan and former French supreme commander General Maxime Weygand pressed Marshal Henri Pétain, head of the Vichy government, to support the Allies openly. After the Allied landings on November 8, 1942, Auphan and Weygand urged Pétain to accept the North African cease-fire with the Allies that Darlan, then in Algiers, had negotiated. At the insistence of collaborationist French premier Pierre Laval, Pétain initially condemned Darlan's negotiated cease-fire, but Auphan persuaded Pétain to reverse this stand. On November 10, 1942, Auphan sent a telegram legitimizing Darlan's

accord with U.S. Army lieutenant general Mark W. Clark. Auphan hoped to arrest Laval but could not obtain Pétain's authorization and was the only minister to advocate a cease-fire agreement for all North Africa.

On November 11, Auphan ordered Admiral Jean de Laborde at Toulon to destroy the French fleet should German forces threaten the port. With Pétain's approval, on November 13 Auphan cabled Resident General Charles Noguès of Morocco to transfer to Darlan command of all North Africa. On November 18, Auphan resigned to protest Laval's assumption of full governmental powers.

On August 18, 1944, Pétain empowered Auphan to negotiate the transfer of power to the Free French leader Charles de Gaulle, a development that de Gaulle completely ignored. In September 1944, the new French government revoked Auphan's pension, and in August 1946, the French High Court sentenced him to lifetime imprisonment and forced labor for treason, including for having commanded the Toulon fleet's destruction. Released in January 1955, Auphan was rehabilitated in November 1956. He subsequently published extensively in naval and political history. Auphan died at Versailles (Yvelines Department) on April 6, 1982.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at

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Australia

Australia played an important role in Allied operations in all theaters of World War II. Although its population was only about 7 million people, Australia constituted 3 million square miles of territory strategically located in the Southwest Pacific. The war, however, caught Australians unprepared. As with the other Commonwealth nations, Australia followed Britain's lead, and Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced a declaration of war on Germany on September 3, 1939.

The exuberance that had marked the nation's entry into war in 1914 was lacking in 1939. Australians remembered the heavy losses sustained in World War I. Many had suffered in the Great Depression, and ties with Britain had grown weaker. Initially, the nation's war effort was directed at supporting Britain in the European theater of operations. After Japan's entry into the war, though, Australia became the principal Allied staging point in the Pacific, and during the conflict Australians served in virtually every theater of war.

With 10 percent of its population unemployed, Australia could easily raise men for the war effort, but weapons and equipment were in desperately short supply. In 1939, Australian defense spending was only 1 percent of its gross national product (GNP). Not until 1942 did the level of Australian defense spending approach that of the other warring powers. In 1943–1944, Australia was spending 37 percent of GNP on the war effort, in large part from higher taxes and the sale of low-interest government bonds.

During the course of the war the Australian economy shifted to military production, and real industrial expansion was achieved. For example, during the conflict Australia produced 3,486 aircraft. Although new defense spending was concentrated on production of equipment, including guns, ammunition, aircraft, and ships, measures were also put in place to increase the reserves. The government introduced conscription but only for home service, which included assignments to Papua and the mandate of New Guinea. As part of the mobilization for war, industrialist Essington Lewis was placed in charge of the production of munitions, and newspaper publisher Keith Murdoch headed propaganda.

In October 1941, the Labour Party took power; John Curtin served as prime minister until his death in July 1945. Labour would govern Australia for the remainder of the war. The generally ambivalent popular attitude toward the war changed when Japan joined the conflict in December 1941.

The early widespread, rapid Japanese victories raised the possibility of an invasion of Australia itself. This led to more government controls over the economy, including the right for the government to order men and women to work in any occupation. Wages and prices were controlled, and rationing was introduced. The government also increased efforts at civilian defense and the improvement of coastal defenses.

An even greater blow for Australians was the February 1942 fall of Singapore and the loss of two brigades of the Australian 8th Division there. The Japanese raid on Darwin later that month—the first time since the arrival of Europeans in Australia that Australians had been killed on their own soil by an invader—caused great anxiety.

Curtin then called for the return of Australian troops and naval assets from the Mediterranean theater. Gradually, most of these forces were released. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill was loath to see so many fine fighting men lost at once from the North African theater, however, and he called on Washington to take up the slack. The United States then became Australia's chief ally. Many thousands of U.S. servicemen arrived in Australia. (Eventually some 10,000 Australian women married U.S. military personnel.) This influx required the construction of bases and facilities, creating an acute labor shortage and necessitating the discharge of some personnel from the Australia armed forces. Italian prisoners of war were also pressed into labor service.

The labor shortage was also the result of the extensive Australian armaments program, which included an indigenous tank—the excellent medium cruiser Sentinel—that entered production in 1943 and a large shipbuilding program that produced three destroyers and 56 corvettes, in addition to some 30,000 small craft and amphibious vehicles. Australian shipyards also repaired or refitted thousands of Australian and Allied ships. To alleviate labor shortages, women's auxiliary units were created for each branch of the military, and large numbers of women went to work in industrial occupations.

In March 1942, the Australian government agreed to the formation of the Southwest Pacific Command, with American general Douglas MacArthur as commander in chief and General Sir Thomas Blamey as the commander of land forces. Australia became the principal logistics base for Allied military actions, particularly in the campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomon

Islands. The Australian conscripts proved to be an embarrassment for the government. Under pressure from MacArthur, who believed that Americans were doing an unfair share of the fighting, the Curtin government secured in February 1943 what became known as the Militia Bill. It permitted deployment of conscripts overseas, although this was to be limited to the Southwest Pacific Area. In August 1943, the Australian Labour Party scored a resounding election victory.

Tensions developed (largely behind the scenes) between MacArthur and the Australian government and armed forces, especially given MacArthur's tendency to take personal credit for any successes and blame others for anything that went wrong. His disparaging attitude toward Australians notwithstanding, Australians distinguished themselves in every theater of war, including North Africa and the Mediterranean and also with the Royal Australian Air Force in Bomber Command. Australian troops scored important successes on the ground in New Guinea and Papua, and they also helped garrison Allied island conquests. In 1945, Australian troops led the invasions of Borneo and Tarakan. They were also in garrison on New Britain Island. The July 1945 invasion of Balikpapan was the largest amphibious operation undertaken by Australian forces during the war.

By the end of the fighting, 993,000 Australian men and women had served in the army, air force, and navy, and more than half of them had been deployed overseas. In addition, the nation had suffered 27,073 military dead (including prisoners of war who died in captivity) and 23,467 wounded. World War II had a profound effect on the Australian nation. During the conflict Australia established formal diplomatic ties with many more nations, and after the conflict it took pride in its place as a principal Pacific power. The war enhanced Australian relations with the United States but at the expense of existing ties with Great Britain.

THOMAS LANSFORD AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Australia, Air Force; Australia, Army; Australia, Navy; Blamey, Sir Thomas Albert; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Convoys, Allied; Crete, Battle of; Darwin, Raid on; El Alamein, Battle of; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; MacArthur, Douglas; Milne Bay, Battle of; New Britain, Landings on; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval

Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Tobruk, First Battle of; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Australia, Air Force

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) played an important role in the Allied war effort. At the beginning of the conflict, the RAAF was a small ill-equipped but well-trained force of 3,489 personnel and 146 mostly obsolete aircraft. These included Anson bombers, flying boats, and the Australian Wirraway, essentially a training aircraft that proved totally inadequate as a fighter.

When the war began in September 1939, one squadron was en route to Great Britain to secure new aircraft. The Australian government released this squadron to serve with the Royal Air Force (RAF), which it did for the remainder of the war under the auspices of RAF Coastal Command. In this role, the Australian squadron was responsible for sinking six enemy submarines. Other squadrons served under the RAF in the Middle East and in the Italian campaigns. Although there were 17 formal RAAF squadrons during the war, Australian pilots served in more than 200 individual Commonwealth squadrons.

To facilitate air training, representatives of the Commonwealth established the Empire Air Training Scheme. This brought potential pilots to Australia for initial training and then sent them to Canada for final flight

school and dispatch to Great Britain to serve in the RAF. The RAAF established several flight schools in Australia for a program that eventually trained some 37,000 pilots.

The initial deployment of RAAF assets was to support the war in Europe. The entry of Japan into World War II in December 1941 led to a redeployment of Australian squadrons to the Pacific. Japanese military advances and Japan's air raid on Darwin on February 19, 1942, increased pressure for better air defense over Australia. Beginning in 1942, U.S. air units were dispatched to Australia to bolster the RAAF. On April 17, 1942, all RAAF squadrons in the Pacific were placed under the auspices of Allied Air Forces Headquarters, part of U.S. general Douglas MacArthur's Southwestern Pacific theater command.

The RAAF participated in almost every major campaign of the Pacific theater. Four RAAF squadrons, two with Hudson bombers and two flying obsolete Brewster Buffalo fighters, fought in the 1941–1942 Malaya Campaign. Later, elements of these squadrons were withdrawn to the Netherlands East Indies and finally back to Australia. Two other RAAF squadrons fought in the Netherlands East Indies before being relocated to Australia. RAAF units distinguished themselves in the defense of Milne Bay in September 1942.

Early deficiencies in aircraft were overcome with the addition of P-40E Kittyhawk and Spitfire fighters. The RAAF played an important role in supporting ground operations and in attacking Japanese shipping, including during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 2–5, 1943). It also assisted in long-range mine-laying operations throughout the war. The RAAF also provided wireless units to its troops who participated in the invasion of the Philippines (October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945). By the end of the war, the RAAF numbered 131,662 personnel and 3,187 aircraft.

THOMAS LANSFORD

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Australia; Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; MacArthur, Douglas; Malaya Campaign; Milne Bay, Battle of; New Guinea Campaign; Papuan Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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Australia, Army

The Australian Army contributed to Allied successes in North Africa and the Middle East and in the Pacific theater. During the 1930s, the army had been drastically reduced in size as a consequence of financial pressures. The Australian government hoped that in an emergency, it could rely instead on reserve or territorial forces. By statute, these forces could not be deployed overseas. On the eve of World War II, the army did expand its reserve component and embark on a program of improving coastal defenses.

When Australia declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, the army numbered 82,800 men, but this included 80,000 poorly trained volunteer militia. The regular army was basically a small cadre force of officers, noncommissioned officers, and support staff. After New Zealand offered to raise a division to serve with Commonwealth forces in the European theater, the Australian government announced its intention to do the same, and later it pledged to raise a corps. Given the high casualties sustained by Australian forces in World War I, the government extended conscription only for home defense. This meant that forces would have to be recruited for service abroad. The army grew to four divisions—the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th—formed into the Second Australian Imperial Force (the first being that of World War I).

The Imperial Staff decided to send this force to the Middle East for training prior to deployment in France. The first of the Second Australian Imperial Force, the 6th Division, departed Australia in January 1940. Some of the division, which became the nucleus of the 9th Division, went to Britain. In effect, Australia then fielded two separate armies: one in the Middle East and the other for the defense of Australia and its mandate of New Guinea.

With the fall of France in June 1940, the 6th, 7th, and 9th Divisions made up a corps in the Middle East under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Thomas A. Blamey. Recalled to Australia in March 1942, Blamey became both commander of the Australian Army and commander of land forces, Southwest Pacific Area.

In North Africa, Australian forces took part in the early victories against Italian forces. Part of the 6th Division was detached to join the British Expeditionary Force dispatched to Greece and was caught up in the defeats both in Greece and in Crete during the spring of 1941. The 7th Division fought in Syria, and the 9th Division helped defend Tobruk.

Amid increased anxieties about Japanese intentions, additional Australian troops were assigned to bolster Commonwealth garrisons throughout the Pacific. In August 1941, two brigades of the 8th Division and two squadrons of Royal Australian Air Force aircraft had been sent to reinforce Singapore, where the men were then taken prisoner. With the entry of Japan into the war in December 1941, the Australian government secured the release of two of its divisions from the Middle East. A third division remained there and played an important role in the Allied victory of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942), after which it also returned to the Pacific.

In March 1942, much of the 7th Division was redeployed to Colombo. Part of the 7th was also sent to Java in the Netherlands East Indies, where it was captured by Japanese forces. Land forces in Australia itself consisted of an armored division with few tanks and seven militia divisions. Australia appealed to the United States for military aid and also passed legislation that allowed reserve units to be deployed anywhere in the Pacific south of the equator.

A member of an Australian tank crew awaits the signal to resume the attack during fighting at Buna in 1943. (Library of Congress)

In March 1942, the Southwest Pacific Command was formed under U.S. general Douglas MacArthur but with General Blamey as commander of land forces. The agreement gave MacArthur complete control of the Australian Army, which rankled many Australian officers and politicians—especially as the imperious MacArthur often excluded Australian officers from planning, gave the Australians little credit for their contributions, and generally viewed Australia as a base for American operations. Blamey and MacArthur often disagreed over strategy and over MacArthur's belief that the Australian general was too cautious. MacArthur's forces initially consisted of the seven militia divisions, the Australian 6th and 7th Divisions, and the U.S. 41st Infantry Division in April 1942, followed by the 32nd Infantry Division and other units.

The main thrust of the Australian land effort centered on the defense of Port Moresby and on a domestic buildup to counter a possible Japanese invasion. From July 1942 to January 1943, the Australians and Americans were locked in combat with the Japanese in Papua New Guinea. In late August 1942, Japanese forces landed at Milne Bay (August 25–September 6, 1942), at the eastern edge of Papua. Australian forces, not greatly superior to the Japanese, contained the landing and forced the Japanese to withdraw.

This event, a great psychological lift for the Allies and a humiliation for the Japanese, proved that the Allies could defeat the Japanese in jungle warfare.

Although Australia faced significant manpower shortages, its troops continued to support Allied operations in New Guinea, Papua, and Guadalcanal. The Australians were assigned the task of clearing the Japanese from New Guinea. Australian forces also took part in operations on New Britain and in Borneo in 1945. The Australian Army launched its largest amphibious invasion of the war on July 1, 1945, when troops landed at Balikpapan as part of the effort to recapture Brunei.

During the war, 691,400 men and 35,800 women served in the Australian Army, which suffered (including prisoners of war recovered) 19,351 casualties in the war in Europe and 42,224 in the war in the Pacific. For the two theaters combined, total casualties were 18,713 dead, 22,116 wounded, and 20,746 prisoners of war recovered.

THOMAS LANSFORD AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Australia, Air Force; Australia, Navy; Blamey, Sir Thomas Albert; Crete, Battle of; El Alamein, Battle of; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; MacArthur, Douglas; Milne Bay, Battle of; New Britain, Landings on; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Syria; Tobruk, First Battle of; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Australia, Navy

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) played an integral part in the Allied war effort in both the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters. At the beginning of World War II, in September 1939, the RAN had declined in strength to two heavy cruisers (the *Australia* and the *Canberra*) mounting 8-inch guns, four light cruisers (the *Adelaide*, the *Hobart*, the *Perth*, and the *Sydney*) mounting 6-inch guns, five old destroyers, and two sloops. Its primary missions were coastal defense and protection of trade.

When the war began, the Australian government immediately started work to build up the country's naval strength. In all, the RAN requisitioned 200 civilian vessels for military use, mainly coastal defense, transport, and search-and-rescue missions. Several small vessels were converted into minesweepers. The government also ordered construction of several warships, including 3 destroyers, 6 frigates, 56 corvettes, and 35 motor launches. By the end of the war, the RAN had 337 vessels in service (and an additional 600 in the naval auxiliary) with 39,650 personnel.

At the beginning of the war, the Australian government sent its five destroyers into the Mediterranean to assist the British there. The *Perth* went to the East Indian station, and the *Australia* and the *Canberra* helped escort Australian troop convoys to Egypt. The RAN also converted three liners into armed merchant cruisers for Royal Navy use, two of them manned by Australian personnel. Two others were commissioned in the RAN. All were sent to the China station. After Italy entered the war, the Australian government sent the *Sydney* to the Mediterranean, where it sank an Italian destroyer and helped to sink an Italian cruiser. In December 1940, the *Sydney* was replaced in the Mediterranean by the *Perth.* Other naval units were also sent, and Australian ships took part in many Mediterranean battles, including the Battle of Cape Matapan (March 28, 1941). Australian ships also participated in the hunt for the German battleship *Bismarck* and performed Atlantic convoy duty. Later in the war, eight RAN ships supported the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943.

The first real blow to the RAN came in November 1941, when the *Sydney* was sunk off Western Australia by the *Kormoran*, a German armed merchant cruiser. After Japan entered the war in December 1941, nearly all Australian ships were withdrawn to the Pacific theater either to Singapore or Australia. The cruiser *Perth* was sunk in the Battle of Sunda Strait during February 28–March 1, 1942. The Japanese air raid on Darwin (February 19) and the

midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbor (May 31) underscored the need for increased naval strength. By the end of 1942, the Japanese had sunk 30 ships in Australian waters through air, naval, or submarine attack.

For the remainder of the war, RAN ships in the Pacific undertook several duties. They engaged in antisubmarine and convoy protection missions and were credited with sinking six Axis submarines and escorting some 1,100 convoys. The RAN also laid some 10,000 defensive mines around Australia and New Zealand and engaged in minesweeping operations throughout the Pacific. RAN ships also fought in many of the major battles of the theater, including the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942), the August 1942–February 1943 Solomon Islands Campaign (the cruiser *Canberra* was sunk in the Battle of Savo Island), and the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944). They also supported operations in Borneo and Burma and the Australian landings at Taraken, Brunei, and Balikpapan in 1945. In all, 45,800 men and 3,100 women served in the RAN during the war.

THOMAS LANSFORD AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Convoys, Allied; Crete, Battle of; Darwin, Raid on; Great Britain, Navy; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Mine Laying, Sea; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Sunda Strait, Battle of

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Austria

Landlocked nation located in Central Europe. In early 1938 prior to the German takeover, Austria was bordered by Germany to the north, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to the east, Yugoslavia and Italy to the south, and Switzerland to the west.

Austria emerged from World War I diminished and impoverished, a shadow of its former self. Once the anchor of the great multinational Hapsburg (Austro-Hungarian) Empire, the Federal Republic of Austria became a small (32,500-square-mile) state with an overwhelmingly German-speaking population of some 7 million people in 1939. Forbidden by the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain to unite with Germany, Austria was nonetheless drawn inexorably toward its aggressive northern neighbor. After years of political upheaval and economic hardship, Austrians could not shake the impossible urge to pursue contradictory courses: to foster self-determination and Austrian nationalism and to pursue Anschluss (union) with Germany (despite the treaty prohibition).

Adolf Hitler's accession to power as chancellor of Germany in 1933 put great pressure on Austria's social, political, and economic stability. Hitler was determined to bring the land of his birth into a greater German Reich. He undoubtedly realized that the annexation of Austria would have international repercussions, and thus he worked to achieve the annexation indirectly. Because the Austrian Nazis took their orders from Hitler, a political victory by that party in Austria would bring about the de facto union of the two states.

To achieve this end, Hitler's government began spending considerable sums on propaganda in Austria, including leaflets and radio broadcasts from stations in Bavaria. Berlin also applied major economic pressure, cutting off German tourism (an important source of revenue in Austria) by imposing severe limits on the amount of currency that might be taken out of Germany to that state. Meanwhile, the worldwide economic depression hit the Austrian economy hard.

With armed groups forming in Austria and the threat looming of civil war between the militias of the Christian Socialists and the Social Democrats, Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, himself a nominal Christian Socialist, on February 12, 1934, moved against the Social Democrats, outlawed the party, arrested its leaders, and proclaimed martial law. In March the Austrian parliament—without opportunity to debate and with more than half its

members, including Social Democrats, absent—approved a new constitution submitted by Dollfuss. It established an authoritarian corporate state and abolished both universal suffrage and political representation of the people.

On July 25, 1934, a small group of Austrian Nazis seized the government radio station and announced that the government had fallen. Another group seized the chancellery, mortally wounding Dollfuss, who had refused to flee, and holding other cabinet ministers captive. The plot was poorly organized, however, and soon collapsed. Within a few days, the Austrian government had put it down without outside assistance, and on July 29 a new cabinet was formed under Kurt von Schuschnigg, a Christian Socialist colleague of Dollfuss. A dozen leaders of the putsch were eventually executed, and hundreds more were sentenced to prison.

These events had repercussions abroad. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who considered Austria under his sway, ordered troops to the Brenner Pass. Hitler had initially expressed pleasure at the putsch, but when news arrived of its failure he washed his hands of it. There was in fact little he could have done, as Germany—still largely unarmed—was in no position to oppose Italy. Hitler expressed regret at the Dollfuss murder, recalled his ambassador (who had promised the putschists asylum), and assured the world that Germany had no role in the failed coup.

Schuschnigg attempted to continue the Dollfuss agenda, especially the cultivation of relationships with Italy and Hungary. He also endeavored to improve relations with Hitler, but at the same time he contemplated the restoration of the Austrian ruling house of Hapsburg, which Hitler vehemently opposed. By 1938 the international situation had dramatically changed for Austria, as Mussolini had become a confederate of Hitler in the Axis alliance.

In consequence Schuschnigg, while he pursued an alliance with Czechoslovakia, had little choice but to mend fences with Hitler. On February 12, 1938, he traveled to Berchtesgaden at Hitler’s insistence to meet with the German leader. Under heavy pressure, Schuschnigg agreed to appoint Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart as minister of the interior and other Austrian Nazis as ministers of justice and foreign affairs.

On March 9, however, in an attempt to maintain his nation’s independence, Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite on the issue of Anschluss to be held in only four days, hoping that the short interval would not allow

the Nazis to mobilize effectively. Hitler was determined that no plebiscite be held, and on March 11 Seyss-Inquart presented Schuschnigg with an ultimatum demanding his resignation and postponement of the vote under threat of invasion by German troops, which were already mobilized on the border.

A Nazi banner with swastika being hung in the plaza in front of the Schloss Esterházy in Eisenstadt, Austria. (Library of Congress)

Schuschnigg gave in, canceling the plebiscite and resigning. Seyss-Inquart then took power and invited in the German troops (which had actually already crossed the frontier) “to preserve order.”

Had it been ordered to fight, the small Austrian army might have given a good account of itself. Germany would have won, of course, but its military was hardly ready for war, and a battle might have dispelled some rampant myths about the invincibility of the German military. Hundreds of German

tanks and vehicles of the German Eighth Army broke down on the drive toward Vienna.

On March 12, Hitler returned to his boyhood home of Linz, Austria, and the next day Berlin declared Austria to be part of the Reich. On March 14, perhaps 1 million Austrians gave Hitler an enthusiastic welcome to Vienna. France and Britain lodged formal protests with Berlin, but that was the extent of their reaction.

The consummation of Anschluss greatly strengthened Germany's position in Central Europe. Germany was now in direct contact with Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary and controlled virtually all of the communications of Southeastern Europe. Czechoslovakia was almost isolated, and its trade outlets were at the mercy of Germany. Militarily, Germany outflanked the powerful western Czech defenses. It was thus not surprising that despite Hitler's pledges to respect the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, he should next seek to bring that state under his control.

The Austrian Army was absorbed into the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-Schutzstaffel (armed SS). Austria eventually contributed three army corps and additional military assets (a total of some 800,000 military personnel) to the Axis effort, and the country suffered roughly 400,000 military and civilian casualties during the war.

Certainly a great many Austrians enthusiastically supported the Nazi cause. Although Austrians comprised but 6 percent of the population of Hitler's Reich, they furnished 14 percent of SS members and 40 percent of those involved in the Nazi extermination efforts. Anti-Semitism was rife in Austria, and actions against the Jews (who had been prominent in the professions in Vienna in particular) were applauded by a significant sector of the population, unlike in Berlin.

Austrians who had welcomed the incorporation of their country into the Reich soon discovered to their dismay that German interests dominated much of Austria's economy and that the inhabitants of the Ostmark (as Austria was now known, its medieval name having been revived) were often treated more as a conquered people subject to intense scrutiny and discrimination. This says nothing of the experiences endured by minorities and Jews who came in for special, and horrific, treatment.

Resistance groups formed around the old political factions—socialists, monarchists, nationalists—and soon developed contact with the Allies. In-

country resistance and the work of Austrians abroad limited the extent to which Austria remained identified with Nazi Germany. In the 1943 Moscow Declaration, the Allies recognized Austria as the first victim of Hitler's aggression, a view that Austrian politicians did their utmost after the war to nurture.

Austria experienced air attacks beginning in 1943, and the attacks escalated as the Allies moved eastward in 1944. When Germany's military situation crumbled in the spring of 1945, Allied armies converged on Austria. The Red Army entered Austria at the end of March and liberated Vienna in mid-April. At the end of April, a provisional government headed by Social Democrat leader Karl Renner and established under Soviet direction nullified the Anschluss. As with Germany, Austria was divided into Soviet, U.S., British, and French occupation zones.

In October 1945, the Allies formally recognized Austria's provisional government. The Allied military occupation of Austria did not end until the Treaty of Belvedere in 1955.

JESSICA WOYAN, DAVID COFFEY, AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Croatia; Czechoslovakia; Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Hungary; Moscow Conference; Mussolini, Benito; Poland; Schuschnigg, Kurt von; Seyss-Inquart, Arthur; Yugoslavia; Document 26

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Automedon, Sinking of (November 11, 1940)

The *Automedon* was a British Blue Funnel cargo ship of 7,528 tons. Steaming from Liverpool to Singapore with a cargo of crated aircraft, automobiles, spare parts, and other items, the ship was intercepted in the Indian Ocean on November 11, 1940, by the German commerce raider *Atlantis.* At less than 5,000 yards' range, the German ship ran up the German ensign and uncovered its guns. The *Automedon* got off only the start of a distress signal before its transmissions were jammed by the *Atlantis.* The German ship opened fire at only 2,000 yards, and its shells destroyed the British ship's bridge, killing everyone there including the captain. The shells also killed a crewman endeavoring to return fire from the British ship's stern gun.

With extensive damage to the ship, 6 crewmen killed, and 12 wounded, the British ship then surrendered. The Germans boarded and searched the ship and found 15 bags of top-secret mail for the British Far East Command. In the ship's safe the Germans discovered a copy of the British War Cabinet minutes for August 1940. This 87-paragraph document outlined British strategy in the Far East.

The most important part of the document, COS(40)592, was addressed to Air Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, British commander in chief in the Far East. It indicated that Britain would not go to war against Japan, even if the Japanese were to invade French Indochina. The document also stated that the British chiefs of staff regarded both Thailand and Hong Kong as indefensible against Japanese attack.

Bernhard Rogge, captain of the *Atlantis*, recognized the significance of these papers. He ordered the members of the British crew transferred to his own ship, along with all the mail and food, and the *Automedon* scuttled. He then sent the papers via the vessel *Ole Jacob*, which had been captured earlier, to German authorities in Japan.

The *Ole Jacob* arrived at Kobe on December 4, and the papers were then delivered to the German naval attaché in Tokyo, Rear Admiral Paul Wenneker. He forwarded them to Berlin. Adolf Hitler ordered the information passed to the Japanese, and Japanese naval attaché Captain Yokoi Tadao sent a summary of the documents to the Navy Ministry in Tokyo.

On December 12, 1940, Wenneker handed the documents to Vice Admiral Kondō Nobutake, the Japanese Navy vice chief of staff. Wenneker

also stressed the weak British military posture in Asia and conveyed to Kondō Hitler's suggestion that the Japanese attack Singapore.

There is no doubt that these documents encouraged the Japanese leadership in its decision to advance into Southeast Asia in 1941. They convinced the Japanese naval minister, Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, that Britain would not wage war with Japan over French Indochina.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Kondō Nobutake; Oikawa Koshiro; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Auxiliary Vessels

The scope of World War II required huge numbers of auxiliary vessels for combat and support duties. In addition to the construction and conversion of specialist vessels, large numbers of civilian ships were requisitioned. The greatest demand was for coastal patrol, mine warfare, and antisubmarine vessels. Less frequently demanded, although no less important, were aviation ships, hospital ships, harbor craft, floating antiaircraft batteries, and the indispensable support vessel types of the fleet train.

Coastal Patrol Craft, Auxiliary Minesweepers, and Submarine Chasers

As in World War I, fishing fleets provided a cheap and reliable source of vessels and crews for the navies. Fishing vessels were versatile, and with modification they could usually perform patrol, minesweeping, and

antisubmarine escort tasks. So successful was the concept of using fishing fleets that the Royal Navy alone ordered the construction of 240 naval trawlers in addition to the nearly 1,000 that it requisitioned during the war.

As the sea frontier of its occupied territories increased throughout the war, Germany too compensated for the shortfall of purpose-built craft by converting hundreds of national and captured foreign fishing vessels, pilot boats, yachts, harbor craft, and even landing craft into patrol vessels, auxiliary minesweepers, dispatch vessels, escorts, submarine chasers, artillery support ships, and the like. The German Navy also built large numbers of commercial-type trawlers, which became known as KFKs (*Kriegsfischkutter*), specifically for military purposes.

Finally, the Germans revived the concept of the mine destruction vessel (*Sperrbrecher*) to counter the growing mine threat against its ships and bases. Sperrbrechers were medium-sized merchant ships employed for tactical underway mine protection of high-value units. The ships were equipped with bow protection gear and strong magnetic influence gear. Any mine not so swept, such as pressure mines, would ultimately be actuated by the ship itself. To absorb the blast, the ships' holds were lined with sandbags and filled with empty drums or timber to provide additional buoyancy.

Auxiliary Aviation Ships

The increasing demand for aircraft in naval warfare outpaced the capability of many belligerents to respond with new construction of adequate aircraft carriers. Many navies thus relied on seaplane tenders as ersatz carriers. The majority of those vessels in turn had been converted from civilian vessels or requisitioned from civilian aircraft operators. The Royal Navy in particular had to improvise because of the shortage of escort aircraft carriers (which it introduced in 1941). The Battle of the Atlantic thus witnessed the development of two new types of allied auxiliary aviation vessels: the catapult-assisted merchant ship and the merchant aircraft carrier.

A German Navy submarine tender. (Dirk Steffen)

The former represented a desperate stopgap measure designed to combat the German long-range patrol aircraft, which served as spotters for groups of U-boats and as attack aircraft. Catapult-assisted merchant ships (known as Catapult Aircraft Merchantmen, or CAM ships) were merchantmen fitted with a single catapult over their forecastle from which a fighter (usually a Hawker Hurricane) could be launched. At the end of the mission, the aircraft was ditched, and the pilot had to parachute into the water to be retrieved by a rescue vessel.

The concept was superseded by the merchant aircraft carriers (MACs). These too were regular merchantmen; however, their superstructure and masts had been razed to the weather deck to make way for a flight deck suitable for launching and receiving a small number of aircraft.

The Fleet Train

The vast and highly specialized navies of World War II required an extraordinary amount of support to function and maintain their operational readiness. The fleet train catered to those needs by providing an array of ship types ranging from replenishment ships (tankers and storeships), tenders, and repair and depot ships to crew-accommodation vessels. Lesser navies, including the German Navy, expanded their small prewar core of dedicated support ships by requisitioning merchantmen and converting them into the

required support roles. The Germans only used their tankers for underway replenishment of their surface raiders, if in a rather novel fashion as one-stop support ships. The repair and depot ships remained confined to a role of floating base facilities.

Only the U.S. Navy disposed a sophisticated purpose-built fleet train that could deploy to distant waters with the entire fleet. Lacking such, the Royal Navy in 1945 had to rely on the U.S. fleet train. The Japanese Navy, although it had a few fleet oilers, never developed a full fleet train team and advanced base force with floating docks, repair ships, and such. The U.S. Navy had designed its fleet train precisely for these operations to make up for the interwar limitations on base construction in the Western Pacific. The 13,000-ton Vulcan-class repair ships, for instance, could cope with most emergencies except heavy battle damage. For major repairs, the U.S. Navy commissioned no fewer than 30 forward-area floating docks, including 3 battleship docks. Since the tankers and storeships were expected to accompany the fleet even beyond the forward-area bases, underway replenishment capabilities became an integral part of U.S. support ship design. The demand for forward underway replenishment, often at high speeds, ultimately resulted in the development by the U.S. Navy of fast one-stop replenishment ships that could supply consumables, such as oil, aviation fuel, water, ammunition, and stores at once and under way.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Aircraft Carriers

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AVALANCHE, Operation

See Salerno Invasion

Avon, First Earl of

See Eden, Sir Robert Anthony

Avranches, Battle of (August 7–12, 1944)

Land battle in France. A town of fewer than 9,000 inhabitants, Avranches is one of the oldest municipalities in Normandy. Situated on a 200-foot bluff at the southwestern base of the Cotentin Peninsula, Avranches overlooks the Bay of Mont Saint-Michel. The Saint-Michel abbey is some eight miles distant.

On July 31, 1944, following the breakout of the American First Army from its Normandy bridgehead, Major General John S. Wood's U.S. 4th Armored Division captured Avranches. This forced open a gateway for Lieutenant General George S. Patton's newly activated U.S. Third Army to push west into Brittany, or south and east toward the heart of France.

After Patton's advance beyond Avranches to the south revealed the Germans' inability to seal the breach in their line, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge would have done well to make a timely general withdrawal to a backup defensive line, possibly at the Seine River. Adolf Hitler, at his command post in distant East Prussia, adamantly refused to countenance such, though. Instead, he demanded a massive offensive west to Avranches. Hitler insisted that such an attack would enable the Germans to reverse the outcome of the entire Normandy Campaign.

Colonel general in the Waffen-SS Paul Hausser's Seventh Army, part of Kluge's Army Group B, mounted the counterattack. It began on August 7 and was intended to cut off Patton's army from Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges's U.S. First Army. Deciphered German radio traffic betrayed the German intentions, however, and Major General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps of the First Army deployed to repel the counterattack. Collins noted Hill 317, a commanding elevation near Mortain, a crossroads town nearly 20

miles east of Avranches. Soon the 2nd Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment of Major General Leland S. Hobbs's 30th Division held this key position.

Hausser's Seventh Army launched its attack early on August 7, but the German forces had assembled hastily and did not deploy in the strength Hitler had desired. Even so, the Germans managed to achieve local surprises and make forward progress, including the isolation of Hill 317. The hill's defenders held on tenaciously but suffered some 300 casualties during the next few days.

Meanwhile, U.S. artillery forward observers there called down devastating fire, and Allied air forces dominated the battlefield from above. Heavy fighting engaged all or parts of six American divisions under Collins (north to south): the 9th, 4th, 30th, 1st, and 35th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Armored Division. The battle lasted until August 12, but as early as August 8 it was clear that the German attack would fail.

A furious Hitler demanded a second and more powerful stroke, which required some days to organize. Kluge and his subordinates persuaded him to strike first at Major General Wade Hampton Haislip's XV Corps of Patton's army. Haislip was moving eastward around the Germans' left flank and then northward toward their rear. The Germans failed to stop Haislip, to launch another attack toward Avranches, and to impede the relentless advance of additional American forces through the Avranches corridor. Thus, the principal result of the unsuccessful German counterattack toward Avranches was to place their own forces in a pocket, risking envelopment and destruction.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

COBRA, Operation; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Hausser, Paul "Papa"; Hitler, Adolf; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Patton, George Smith, Jr.

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"Axis Sally" (1900–1988)

American-born propaganda broadcaster for the Germans. Born on November 29, 1900, in Portland, Maine, Mildred Elizabeth Sisk later adopted her stepfather's name, Gillars. She studied drama at Ohio Wesleyan University but left in 1922 without graduating. She moved through a series of jobs, ending up in Germany by September 1934. There she taught and did translating for the Berlitz School in Berlin. She then began an affair with Max Otto Koischwitz, another former American, who was broadcasting propaganda for Germany as "Mr. O.K."

Gillars was apparently first heard on a German radio station on May 6, 1940, as an announcer on a service directed toward Britain. She soon became the host of entertainment programs. Persuaded by Koischwitz (she later testified) and joined by him, she began regular broadcasts titled *Home Sweet Home* for the German Rundfunk (Radio), aimed at U.S. soldiers in North Africa. She used the air names "Midge" and "Sally" (her American listeners called her "Axis Sally").

Gillars was soon among the highest-paid broadcasters in Germany. In *Midge's Medical Reports*, Gillars featured broadcasts from prisoner-of-war camps, attesting that the camps had high standards of treatment. *Midge at the Mike* offered music and talk for lonesome soldiers interspersed with considerable propaganda. In a particularly chilling broadcast before the June 6, 1944, Normandy landings, *Vision of Invasion*, she claimed that thousands would perish.

Koischwitz died in 1944, and Gillars spent the remainder of the war in Berlin. Arrested there by Allied authorities in 1946, she was released and gave an ill-advised press conference explaining her role. That forced Allied action, and she was rearrested and later tried in Washington, D.C. On March

10, 1949, she was found guilty of one of the eight treason counts and sentenced to between 10 and 30 years in prison. She was released on parole on July 10, 1961, from a federal reformatory after serving 12 years. She took up residence at a convent in Columbus, Ohio, and taught languages and music at a parochial school there. Gillars died on June 25, 1988, in Columbus.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

"Lord Haw Haw"; Propaganda; "Tokyo Rose"

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B

Bab el Mandeb Strait

Narrow channel linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. The Bab el Mandeb (Gate of Tears) Strait is approximately 20 miles across and separates Yemen (on the Arabian Peninsula) to the east from Djibouti and Eritrea in the west. It is a vital passageway linking the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea (by way of the Suez Canal).

The strait is divided into two primary shipping channels by Perim, a volcanic island that for years was used as a coaling station for ships heading for the Suez Canal to the north. There is also a small cluster of islands located near Djibouti, known as the Seven Brothers. The eastern channel is about 2 miles wide, and the western channel is about 16 miles wide. Water depth ranges from 100 feet to about 1,000 feet. Currents are not strong, but there are two opposing ones: in the east channel, the flow is inward; in the western channel, the flow is outward.

Bab el Mandeb Strait has long been considered a choke point for shipping and remains so today. Control of the strait means ultimately control of the southern approaches to the Suez Canal. The Allies went to considerable measures to retain that control during World War II.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Suez Canal

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Babi Yar Massacre (September 29–30, 1941)

German mass shooting of Soviet Jews outside Kiev, Ukraine. Following the German Army's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, four Schutzstaffel Einsatzgruppen (SS deployment groups) entered Soviet territory, their task being the physical annihilation of Communist Party functionaries, Red Army commissars, the physically and mentally handicapped, partisans, and Jews.

As the Wehrmacht drove into the Soviet Union, the Einsatzgruppen followed, rounding up and slaughtering their victims. Consequently, by the time of their disbanding in 1943, when the war on the Eastern Front swung irreversibly in favor of the Red Army, the Einsatzgruppen—with the assistance of the German Army and a host of enthusiastic collaborators from the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian populations—had committed a multitude of unspeakable atrocities and murdered an estimated 1.5 million Soviet Jews and others.

Among the numerous Einsatzgruppen crimes, the slaughter of Jews at Babi Yar in late September 1941—perpetrated by SS colonel Paul Blobel's Sonderkommando 4a, a subunit of Otto Rasch's Einsatzgruppe C—was arguably the most notorious. On September 19, 1941, units of German Army Group South occupied Kiev, the capital of Soviet Ukraine. In the days immediately following, a series of explosions rocked the city, destroying German field headquarters, burning more than one-third of a square mile of the Kiev city center, and leaving some 10,000 residents homeless. Although these explosions were likely the work of the Soviet political police, or NKVD, the Germans saw them as a convenient justification to massacre the city's Jews, a task that Blobel's Sonderkommando would have carried out regardless.

German SS troops preparing to execute Kiev Jews during the Babi Yar Massacre in Ukraine, September 29–30, 1941. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Following discussions among Blobel, Rasch, and Major General Kurt Eberhard, the German field commander in Kiev, the latter ordered the city's Jews to assemble with their possessions—including money, valuables, and warm clothing—near the Jewish cemetery by 7:00 a.m. on Monday, September 29. The posted order indicated that the Jews were to be resettled and warned that failure to comply would be punishable by death.

Once assembled, Kiev's Jews were marched to Babi Yar, a partially wooded ravine just outside the city. There the Germans, following the procedure used by Einsatzgruppen since the mass shootings of Soviet Jews began in late June, forced the Jews to strip, dispossessed them of their belongings, and shot them to death in groups of 30 to 40 people. In the course of two gruesome days, Blobel's men—relying exclusively on automatic weapons—murdered 33,771 innocent men, women, and children. Subsequently, they reported that the Jews had offered no resistance and until the last minute had believed they were to be resettled.

During the months that followed the initial Babi Yar Massacre, the Germans periodically used the ravine as a murder site, killing several thousand more Jews there plus an untold number of Gypsies and Soviet prisoners of war. In July 1943, with Soviet forces having seized the military initiative and advancing rapidly, the Germans launched Operation

SONDERAKTION (SPECIAL ACTION) 1005 (or AKTION 1005) to eradicate evidence of their crimes in the Soviet Union.

Blobel, who had been released from his duties as commander of Sonderkommando 4a in early 1942 and transferred to Berlin, returned to Kiev. Throughout August and September, Blobel's men and conscripted concentration camp inmates reopened the mass grave, crushed bones, and cremated the remains of the dead. Despite the Germans' efforts to hide their crimes, significant evidence of the massacres remained and was discovered by Soviet forces following the liberation of Kiev in November 1943.

The Babi Yar Massacre of late September 1941 was not the largest German "special action" against the Jews. In October 1941, the Germans and their Romanian allies murdered an estimated 50,000 Jews at Odessa. Nevertheless, more than any other, Babi Yar has come to symbolize an aspect of the Holocaust that is invariably overshadowed by the horrors of Auschwitz and the other death camps.

BRUCE J. DEHART

See also

Holocaust; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Waffen-SS

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Baby Blitz (January–May 1944)

German bombing raids against London in 1944. As 1943 drew to a close, the Allies had been achieving great military success against Germany. With British and U.S. bombing raids on German cities increasing in frequency and

destructiveness, German leaders were determined to carry out some action to boost German civilian morale.

German propagandists turned to *Vergeltung* (revenge). From January 1943, Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels called on Germans to be patient, as a massive strike to drive Britain from the war was imminent. This blow was to be carried out with Germany's new V-1 buzz bombs and V-2 rockets, but production difficulties forced the Germans to rely on traditional bombers. The bombing plan was drawn up in November by Major General Dietrich Peltz. At Chancellor Adolf Hitler's direction and beginning in December 1943, the Luftwaffe stationed all available bombers at fields in northern France in preparation for the offensive.

On January 21, 1944, operations commenced when Peltz sent two waves totaling 447 bombers against London. Effective British antiaircraft measures and poor German navigation meant that only a minority of the bombers actually reached their targets. The Germans employed target markers from Pathfinder aircraft and dropped a mix of high-explosive and incendiary bombs, but only about 32 tons of bombs actually fell within Greater London. Of 268 tons dropped, most bomb loads were scattered over the English countryside, and 25 bombers were shot down.

On January 29, the Germans mounted a second attack on London with 285 bombers, mostly Junkers Ju-188s and a few Ju-88s. The bombing produced only minimal damage in the London area at a cost of 28 German aircraft shot down.

During February, the Germans sent 1,300 sorties (a sortie is one flight by one aircraft) against London. On February 18, they managed to drop 175 tons of bombs on the city, and thereafter 50 percent of the German bombs hit within London. The decreasing size of the German attacking force rendered the greater accuracy less significant, however. By the end of April, when the Germans had to break off the attacks because of prohibitive losses, they had launched a dozen attacks against London, Hull, Bristol, and Portsmouth and dropped some 2,000 tons of bombs at a cost of 329 bombers lost.

Although these attacks, dubbed by the British the "Baby Blitz," involved more aircraft than any other strikes on Britain since 1941, they caused relatively minor damage and few casualties. The raids were more costly for German military capabilities than for the British, draining the Luftwaffe of its experienced crews and aircraft and thus strength to oppose Operation

OVERLORD. From the end of December 1943 to May 1944, German bomber strength in northern France fell from 695 to 133 aircraft.

WILLIAM P. MCEVOY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Germany; Germany, Air Force; Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Great Britain, Air Force; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Propaganda; V-1 Buzz Bomb; V-2 Rocket

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Bach-Zelewski, Erich von dem (1899–1973)

German Schutzstaffel (SS) general and commander of antipartisan units on the Eastern Front during World War II. Born to a Junker family in Lauenburg, Pomerania, on March 1, 1899, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski volunteered in 1914 and served in the German Army during World War I. In the course of the war, he was awarded the Iron Cross and promoted to lieutenant. After the armistice, he served in a Freikorps unit and then as a Reichswehr officer until 1924.

In 1930, Bach-Zelewski joined the National Socialist Party and its elite SS paramilitary unit. After 1934, he commanded SS units in East Prussia and Pomerania. In 1939, he was promoted to SS general, and two years later, he was assigned to Army Group Center on the Eastern Front. Bach-Zelewski was largely responsible for masterminding and carrying out the massacre of ethnic and political enemies of the Reich. In July 1941, he took control of

11,000 SS troops, four times the number assigned to the special execution squads (Einsatzgruppen). Some 6,000 ordinary police were also under his authority. By the end of 1941, Bach-Zelewski commanded more than 50,000 men, whose job it was to kill "race enemies," such as Jews, Gypsies, the mentally and physically disabled, and homosexuals.

In June 1943 SS commander Heinrich Himmler appointed Bach-Zelewski as the antipartisan chief on the entire Eastern Front. In the late summer of 1944, Bach-Zelewski commanded the German units responsible for crushing the Warsaw Rising. Known for his brutality and improvisational skills, he ended the war as a corps commander.

The fact that Bach-Zelewski testified for the prosecution at the Nuremberg war crimes trials and denounced his fellow police chiefs spared him extradition to the Soviet Union. In March 1951, he was condemned by a Munich court to 10 years of special labor, which in practice meant being confined to his home in Franconia. The only individual among the mass murderers who personally took responsibility for his wartime actions, Bach-Zelewski was never prosecuted for his role in the anti-Jewish massacres. Instead, he was tried in 1961 for his participation in the 1934 Blood Purge and sentenced to four and a half years in prison. Indicted again in 1962 for the murder of six communists in 1933, he was tried at Nuremberg and received the unusually harsh sentence of life imprisonment. Neither indictment mentioned his wartime role. Bach-Zelewski died in a prison hospital in Munich on March 8, 1973.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Bór-Komorowski, Tadeusz; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; Partisans/Guerrillas; Warsaw Rising

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Bader, Sir Douglas Robert Steuart (1910–1982)

Royal Air Force (RAF) officer and ace in World War II. Born in London on February 10, 1910, Douglas Robert Steuart Bader was commissioned in the RAF on graduation from the RAF Flying School in 1930. After losing both legs in an aircraft accident while performing low-level acrobatics in December 1931, Bader was medically retired with a disability pension on his recuperation in 1933. He then went to work for Shell Petroleum but taught himself how to use his artificial limbs well enough to fly again. After the beginning of World War II in September 1939, Bader argued his way back to active duty, flying Hawker Hurricanes. In early 1940, he became a flight commander in a Spitfire squadron.

During the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, Flight Lieutenant Bader became famous both for the fact that he was a double amputee and because he quickly became an ace. His aggressive flying style and inspired leadership while commander of 242 Squadron, flying Hurricanes in Number 12 Group during the height of the Battle of Britain, came to epitomize British pluck. Dissatisfied with the prescribed tight line-astern formations, Bader insisted, to the point of insubordination, that the RAF conduct attacks in looser formations utilizing all available aircraft. This approach came to be known as the Big Wing concept, identified with Number 12 Group's commander, Air Vice Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory. By 1941, Bader was promoted to wing commander and took command of Number 11 Wing of three Spitfire squadrons in Sussex.

On August 9, 1941—at the time credited with 22.5 kills, making him one of the highest-scoring British aces—Bader was flying near Le Touquet, France, when he was shot down. Parachuting to safety, he badly damaged one of his artificial legs in the landing. Major General Adolf Galland, commander of the unit that had shot him down, interceded with Air Marshal Hermann Göring to allow the British to air-drop Bader a replacement leg.

Bader repeatedly attempted to escape imprisonment until he was finally sent to the German maximum-security prisoner-of-war camp of Colditz Castle, where he spent the remainder of the war. Bader led the Battle of Britain flyby in the postwar victory parade and retired from the RAF as a group captain in February 1946. His life was the subject of the book *Reach*

for the Sky and the movie of the same title. Bader died in London on September 5, 1982.

ROBERT BATEMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Britain, Battle of; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Leigh-Mallory, Sir Trafford

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Badoglio, Pietro (1871–1956)

Italian Army marshal. Born in Grazzano Monferrato (later renamed Grazzano Badoglio), Italy, on September 28, 1871, Pietro Badoglio entered the Italian military in 1890 as an artillery officer. He participated in campaigns in Abyssinia during 1896–1897 and Tripolitania (Libya) during 1911–1912. A captain at the beginning of World War I, Badoglio rose to lieutenant general in August 1917 and commanded XXVII Corps in the October–November 1917 Battle of Caporetto. His deployment and poor handling of his corps opened a gap in the Italian lines and facilitated the Austro-German advance. Some information on this situation was suppressed, and Badoglio's career did not suffer. Indeed, Badoglio became deputy to chief of staff of the Italian Army General Armando Diaz.

From November 1919 to February 1921, Badoglio was army chief of staff. During 1924–1925, the antifascist Badoglio was ambassador to Brazil. In May 1925, however, he returned to Italy as chief of the General Staff and was promoted to field marshal in June 1926.

From 1928 to 1933, Badoglio served as governor of Italian North Africa, and during that period he oversaw suppression of the Senussi Rebellion. In November 1935, he assumed command of Italian forces in Ethiopia, completing the conquest of that country. Rewarded with the title "Duke of

Addis Ababa," he was named viceroy there in May 1936. In November 1939, Badoglio was again chief of staff of the Italian armed forces, a post he held until he was forced to resign on December 4, 1940, following the failure of Italian forces in Greece.

Italian marshal Pietro Badoglio helped engineer Italy's switch from Axis power to the Allied side as a cobelligerent. He then headed the Italian government until the liberation of Rome in June 1944. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

After Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's arrest in July 1943, King Victor Emmanuel III selected Badoglio to head the Italian government and command the armed forces. Badoglio dissolved the Fascist Party and many of its institutions, released political prisoners, and did not enforce the anti-Semitic legislation. He also helped engineer Italy's change from the Axis to the Allied side as a cobelligerent, a move carried out secretly on September 3, 1943.

When the German Army took over much of Italy, Badoglio, the king, and other members of the government escaped Rome on the night of September 8–9 and made their way to Brindisi. There they set up a government in cooperation with the Allies. On September 29, 1943, Badoglio formally surrendered Italy, and on October 13, 1943, Italy declared war on Germany. Following the liberation of Rome, Badoglio stepped down on June 5, 1944. Badoglio died at his family home in Grazzano Badoglio on November 1, 1956.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian; Italo-Ethiopian War; Italy; Mussolini, Benito; Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy; Document 166

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Bagramyan, Ivan Khristoforovich (1897–1982)

Soviet Army general. Born to Armenian parents in Elizavetpol (now Ganca), in Azerbaijan, on December 2, 1897, Ivan Bagramyan (also widely spelled Bagramian) entered the Imperial Russian Army in 1915 and was a junior lieutenant by 1917. He joined the Red Army in 1920 and the Communist Party only in 1939.

Bagramyan attended both the Higher Cavalry School and the Frunze Military Academy. For four years, he was a lecturer at the General Staff Academy. He attained the rank of colonel by 1940, at which time he was posted to the Kiev Special Military District as deputy chief of staff to its commander, General Georgii Zhukov. Bagramyan assisted in preparing a paper for Zhukov titled "Conducting a Contemporary Offensive Operation,"

which the latter presented at the December meeting of the heads of military districts. The paper helped assure Bagramyan of Zhukov's future support.

At the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Bagramyan was operations officer for Marshal Semen Budenny's Southwestern Front. Bagramyan escaped the Kiev encirclement and was promoted to major general. In August 1941, he became chief of staff to Marshal Semen Timoshenko, commander of the Southwestern and Southern fronts. Bagramyan orchestrated two Soviet counteroffensives and in April 1942 was promoted to lieutenant general and made chief of staff of an operational group consisting of the Southern, Southwestern, and Bryansk fronts.

In late March 1942, Timoshenko had sent Bagramyan to Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin to discuss plans for the recapture of Kharkov. Bagramyan impressed Stalin, and in May he was made chief of staff of the Direction (Axis) as well. The Soviets recaptured Kharkov, but German forces then threatened to cut them off. Bagramyan sensed the danger and on May 18 urged that the plan be changed; however, Stalin refused to intervene, and three Soviet armies were lost. Stalin made Bagramyan the scapegoat for the disaster, removing him from his post.

In July, a rehabilitated Bagramyan took command of the Sixteenth Army, which he led in Operation RZHEV-SYCHEV to drive German forces from north of the Volga River and east of the Vazuza. In February, following the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943), the Sixteenth Army was increased to six divisions, two brigades, a tank corps, four tank brigades, and several artillery regiments. The Sixteenth Army performed well and was renamed the Eleventh Guards Army. It played a major role in the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943). For this success, Bagramyan was promoted to colonel general on July 28.

The Eleventh Guards Army was then redeployed as part of the 2nd Baltic Front in preparation for Operation BAGRATION, the Soviet offensive to destroy German Army Group Center. In November 1943, Stalin promoted Bagramyan to army general in command of the 1st Baltic Front. Bagramyan was the only front commander during the war of non-Slavic origins. On July 31, 1944, his forces reached the Baltic near Riga. In January 1945, his forces took Memel, cutting off 20 German divisions. In disfavor for not making as

much progress in East Prussia as Stalin expected, Bagramyan found his front downgraded to the Zemland Forces Group.

In April 1945, Bagramyan was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, a post he held until its disbandment that August. He had command of the Baltic Military District from 1946 to 1954. In 1955 he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union and appointed inspector general of the Ministry of Defense, and from 1956 to 1958 he headed the General Staff Academy. Through the decade that followed, he was chief of home front services. Bagramyan died in Moscow on September 21, 1982.

NEVILLE PANTHAKI AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich; Kursk, Battle of; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad, Battle of; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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BAGRATION, Operation (June 22–August 29, 1944)

Massive Soviet offensive in Belorussia in 1944, commencing exactly three years after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The offensive was in part timed to meet Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's pledge at the November 28–December 1, 1943, Tehran Conference for an operation to prevent the transfer of German forces to the west to meet the Allied invasion of Normandy. The operation—named for Petr Ivanovich Bagration, a distinguished Russian general of the Napoleonic Wars—resulted in the most calamitous defeat of German forces in the war.

By the beginning of 1944, the Red Army clearly held the initiative on the Eastern Front. The campaign opened in January with offensives at Leningrad

and the Ukraine. The Leningrad offensive broke the German siege and ended with Soviet forces on the Estonian border. The Ukrainian offensive ended after nearly all of the Ukraine had been regained and after a southern salient had been created that nearly reached L'viv (Lvov), with the Red Army threatening the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the process, these offensives destroyed five German armies, causing more than 1 million German casualties and untold equipment losses and putting pressure on Finland and Romania, Germany's allies.

Because of these successes, particularly in the Ukraine, German leader Adolf Hitler believed that the Soviet summer offensive would continue from the Ukraine. The Soviets needed favorable terrain for mechanized operations, and two options seemed the most advantageous for them. First, they could push west from Ukraine and then south, removing Romania and its resources from German reach. Second, and most likely, they could push west and then north toward the Baltic to cut off both Army Group Center in the Belorussian bulge and Army Group North along the Baltic coast. A direct thrust in the north seemed possible but provided less strategic advantage, and an attack into Belorussia against Army Group Center seemed least likely because of the poor road network and the restrictive terrain in the forests and the Pripet Marshes.

The Soviets considered roughly the same options and chose the Belorussian thrust primarily because the others would leave large German forces on the Soviet flanks and because an assault straight into Belorussia would free the Soviet territory that remained occupied. In many respects, Operation BAGRATION was the reverse of Operation BARBAROSSA, fought over many of the same battlefields.

Arrayed against Field Marshal Ernst Busch's Army Group Center were four Soviet fronts (army group equivalents). From north to south were the 1st Baltic Front and the 3rd, 2nd, and 1st Belorussian Fronts, commanded by Generals Ivan Bagramyan, Ivan Chernyakhovsky, Georgii Zakharov, and Konstantin Rokossovsky, respectively. In addition, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin appointed two veteran commanders as Stavka (Soviet high command) special representatives—Marshal Georgii Zhukov overseeing the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts and Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky coordinating operations of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. The Soviet fronts

counted 168 divisions plus a large Belorussian partisan movement. German Army Group Center numbered only 54 divisions.

German intelligence keyed on identifying main thrusts by the location of Soviet tank armies, of which there were six in 1944. Soviet air supremacy and a shortage of assets denied the Germans long-range aerial reconnaissance. German military intelligence was forced to rely on signals intercepts, and Soviet deception focused on disguising heavy reinforcements moving into Belorussia and tank concentrations behind the front lines.

Operation BAGRATION began on June 22, with Soviet battalion- and company-sized infantry raids along the front probing for weaknesses while several divisions conducted major attacks to seize openings in the line. Between June 23 and 28, the Red Army broke through German lines in six places and encircled large German forces at Vitebsk and Bobruisk, taking 20,000 prisoners. On July 3 the Soviets, striking from two directions, entered Minsk, the Belorussian capital, capturing nearly 100,000 Germans east of the city.

After five weeks, the Red Army had advanced almost 360 miles while destroying Army Group Center. The operation ended inside Poland on the Vistula River. Between June 23 and August 29, 1944, along a more than 600-mile front, the Soviets defeated Army Group Center and advanced from 300 to 360 miles. The German Army high command’s official figure of losses was about 300,000 men, or 44 percent of those engaged, but this number may be low. Soviet losses were also heavy, with more than 178,000 dead and missing (8 percent of the total force involved) and more than 587,000 sick or wounded.



The success in Belorussia led to Soviet advances in other sectors of the front, the Ukraine, and Estonia and Latvia, where Army Group North's link to other German forces was temporarily cut. Operation BAGRATION was one of the greatest Soviet victories of the war and one from which German forces could never recover.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Bagramyan, Ivan Khristoforovich; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Busch, Ernst; Chernyakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich; Eastern Front; Estonia; Germany, Army; Kursk, Battle of; Latvia; Lithuania; Moscow, Battle of; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad, Battle of; Tehran Conference; Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich; Warsaw Rising; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Bai Chongxi (1893–1966)

Nationalist Chinese general. Born in Guilin (Kweilin), Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province, on March 18, 1983, Bai Chongxi (Pai Ch’ung-his) graduated from the Baoding (Paoting) Military Academy in 1916, serving in his native provincial forces. In December 1924, in cooperation with another Guangxi officer, Li Zongren (Li Tsung-jen), Bai gained control of Guangxi.

Bai joined the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists) in 1925, participating in the Northern Expedition of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) between 1926 and 1928 while maintaining his power base in Guangxi. In 1929, Bai and Li, known as the Guangxi Clique, rebelled against Jiang for his concentration of power. The resulting struggle ended in stalemate, as national unity seemed more important after the September 1931 Mukden (Shenyang) Incident in Liaoning. In late 1931, Bai and Li rejoined the GMD, working to create a reformist provincial government and resolving their differences with Jiang. In mid-1936, their forces were reorganized as the Nationalist government’s Fifth Route Army, with Bai as deputy commander.

In the 1937–1945 Sino-Japanese War, Bai was both deputy chief of staff of the Military Affairs Commission and a member of the National Aeronautical Council, responsible for devising military strategy for the Nanjing (Nanking)-Shanghai area in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. Given the heavy losses sustained by GMD forces during October and November 1937, Bai opposed the stand at Nanjing and argued for keeping Chinese forces intact. Jiang accepted Bai’s strategy, known as “trading space for time,” and

moved the Nationalist government to Chongqing (Chungking) in Sichuan (Szechwan) Province.

In Chongqing, Bai continued to participate in strategic planning that led to the first Chinese victory in the Tai'erzhuang (T'ai-erh-chuang) Campaign of March and April 1938 in Jiangsu. In July, Bai commanded the Fifth War Zone, covering Shandong (Shantung) and part of Jiangsu north of the Changjiang (Yangtze) River. In December, Bai personally commanded Chinese forces to halt the Japanese drive on Guangxi. Failing in that goal, he was recalled in January 1939.

Bai remained in Chongqing until the end of the war as deputy joint chief of staff, director of the Military Training Board, and chairman of the Military Inspection Commission. Despite his growing opposition to the Chinese Communists, he strongly supported the "protracted war" theory developed by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) in 1940 to fight the Japanese.

During the 1946–1949 Chinese Civil War, Bai, first as defense minister and then as director of the Strategic Advisory Commission, grew frustrated by Jiang's refusal to yield any authority and by his military policy related to the civil war, and he resigned in 1948. He returned later that year to command an army group in central China but again disagreed with Jiang's military policies that led to the disastrous defeat of the GMD. At the end of 1949, Bai fled to Taiwan (Formosa), where he became vice chairman of the Strategy Advisory Committee and a member of the Central Executive Committee of the GMD until his death in Taipei on December 2, 1966. Bai was one of the finest generals of the Chinese Civil War, but unfortunately his advice was often ignored.

DAVID M. BULL, LAW YUK-FUN, AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

China, Army; Jiang Jieshi; Li Zongren; Mao Zedong; Nanjing Massacre; Sino-Japanese War; Taiwan

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Balbo, Italo (1896–1940)

Italian air marshal who argued against fighting the Allies in World War II. Born in Qartesana, Italy, on June 6, 1896, Italo Balbo joined the army in 1915 when Italy entered World War I and fought as a lieutenant in the Alpini. He joined the Fascist Party in 1921 and was a leader of the 1922 fascist March on Rome. One of the more brutal commanders of the antisocialist fascist militia, he became a top adviser to Benito Mussolini. After Mussolini became premier, Balbo held various cabinet posts before becoming minister of aviation in 1929, working to make Italy a major airpower. Balbo personally led a number of transatlantic flights to North and South America that captured public attention in Italy and abroad. But the Italian Air Force, despite setting numerous air records, was largely a paper tiger and had few modern aircraft.

Promoted to Italy's first air marshal in 1933, Balbo came to be seen as a political threat by Mussolini, who, in January 1934, appointed him governor and commander in chief of Italian forces in Libya. There, Balbo worked against the policy of Italian domination advocated by others. He instead favored a degree of assimilation for the Arab and Berber populations.

Balbo also criticized Italy's alliance with Germany. At a fascist Grand Council meeting on December 7, 1939, he raised the possibility of Italy fighting on the side of France and Britain. He continued to speak out, even to the British ambassador, against Italy going to war with the Allies.

After Italy declared war in June 1940, Balbo accepted command of Italian forces in North Africa. On June 28, his plane was shot down near Tobruk by Italian antiaircraft fire, and he was killed. A British air raid had just taken place, and Balbo's plane was downed while attempting to land after it failed to give the proper identification signal. Rumor had it that Mussolini had ordered his death. Il Duce later remarked that Balbo was "the only one capable of killing me."

Italian aviator and politician Count Italo Balbo, shown here on September 13, 1929. Minister of aviation in 1929 and made Italy's first air marshal in 1933, Balbo opposed the alliance with Germany and Benito Mussolini's decision to go to war against the Allies. (Library of Congress)

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Italy, Air Force; Mussolini, Benito

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Balck, Hermann (1893–1982)

German general who commanded the Sixth Army at the end of World War II. Born in Danzig-Langfuhr, Prussia, on December 7, 1893, Hermann Balck was the son of William Balck, a World War I division commander and one of Germany's most noted writers on tactics. The younger Balck entered Hanover Military College in February 1914. During World War I, Balck served as a mountain infantry officer on the Western, Eastern, Italian, and Balkan fronts, rising to command a company. He was wounded seven times and was recommended for but did not receive the Pour le Mérite.

Balck remained in the postwar Reichswehr, transferring to the cavalry and becoming an early exponent of mechanization. He twice refused opportunities to be trained as a General Staff officer. Nonetheless, during the 1939 invasion of Poland, he served in Lieutenant General Heinz Guderian's Inspectorate of Mobile Troops, where he was responsible for managing the reconstitution of the German panzer divisions. In late 1939, Balck assumed command as a lieutenant colonel of the 1st Rifle Regiment in the 1st Panzer Division of Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps. On May 13, 1940, Balck's regiment crossed the Meuse River, spearheading Guderian's breakthrough at Sedan.

Largely on Balck's recommendation, after the fall of France German tanks and infantry were task-organized into combined-arms battle groups (Kampfgruppe). This change was a major development in the evolution of combined-arms warfare doctrine. Promoted to colonel, Balck served in the April 1941 Greek Campaign as commander of the 3rd Panzer Regiment. After the Germans broke through the Metaxis Line, he commanded the panzer battle group that outflanked the British at Mount Olympus. In November 1941, Balck became inspector of Mobile Troops, the position Guderian had held in 1938. During Operation TAIFUN, the abortive drive on Moscow, he was responsible for managing tank replacements for the panzer divisions.

In May 1942, Balck became the commander of the 11th Panzer Division in the Soviet Union. Promoted to major general that October, he often commanded from the front. His principal tactical axiom was "night marches are lifesavers." In December 1942, during the Soviet offensive along the Chir River north of Stalingrad, the 11th Panzer Division crushed a Soviet assault with a series of stunning counterattacks. With Balck issuing only verbal orders by radio, his division counterattacked in three different directions over

a period of four days, destroying a Soviet tank corps and defeating the Fifth Shock Army in the process. The Chir River may have been the most brilliantly fought divisional-level battle of the war.

Promoted to lieutenant general in January 1943, Balck briefly commanded the XIV Panzer Corps at Salerno in 1943, where he was injured in an airplane crash. He was made general of panzer troops in November 1943 and returned to duty as commander of the XLVIII Panzer Corps, heading it during the fierce fighting at Kiev, Radomyshl, and Tarnopol in 1944, when his corps destroyed three Soviet armies. Balck's chief of staff, Colonel Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, remained with him for most of the rest of the war. In August 1944, Balck and Mellenthin took over the Fourth Panzer Army. Counterattacking near Baranov, they halted the Soviet offensive in the great bend of the Vistula. For that action, Balck became the 19th recipient (out of only 27) of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds.

In September 1944, Balck assumed command of Army Group G in the west. His mission was to stop Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third Army to prevent it from interfering in the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). Late in December, however, Balck was relieved of his command, the victim of political intrigues by Schutzstaffel (SS) chief Heinrich Himmler and Adolf Hitler's periodic witch-hunts. Thanks to the intervention of Guderian, he was reassigned as commander of the reconstituted German Sixth Army, which also had operational control of two Hungarian armies. When the war ended, he kept his troops out of Soviet hands by surrendering them to the U.S. XX Corps in Austria.

Balck remained in captivity until 1947. Throughout that period, he declined to participate in the U.S. Army Historical Division's series of interviews and monographs. That decision may partially account for Balck's relative obscurity today—and the fact that the U.S. Army's official history tended to dismiss his role in the September 1–December 18, 1944, Lorraine Campaign. In his widely regarded 1956 book, *Panzer Battles*, Mellenthin rejected the standard portrayal of Balck in the Lorraine Campaign and called him Germany's finest field commander. Balck died in Erbenbach-Rockenau, Germany, on November 29, 1982.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Armored Warfare; Eastern Front; France, Battle for; Germany, Army; Greece Campaign, German; Guderian, Heinz; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Lorraine Campaign; Mellenthin, Friedrich-Wilhelm von

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Baldwin, Stanley (1867–1947)

British Conservative politician and three-time prime minister (1923–1924, 1924–1929, 1935–1937). Stanley Baldwin was born on August 3, 1867, in Bewdley, Worcestershire, England, to a wealthy and politically prominent family. His father served as a Conservative in Parliament beginning in 1892. Baldwin studied history at Trinity College, Cambridge. He then joined his father's iron and steel business, making a name for himself as a shrewd yet progressive industrialist. When his father Alfred died in 1908, the younger Baldwin took his seat in Parliament.

In 1917, Baldwin became financial secretary of the treasury and after World War I pushed hard to pay down Britain's war debt. Indeed, he donated one-fifth of his personal wealth to the treasury and appealed to other wealthy Britons to follow his example. Baldwin became president of the Board of Trade in 1921 and soon thereafter was chancellor of the exchequer. In May 1923, he became prime minister for the first time. In January 1924 after the defeat of his effort to pass trade protection legislation, Baldwin resigned his post. In November 1924, however, he was returned to power, this time for nearly five years. His second term saw the passage of progressive initiatives, including working-class pensions, increased modest-income housing, and the right of women over the age of 21 to vote. Baldwin also championed the

1925 Locarno Pacts, which attempted to normalize international relations after World War I. After his party lost the May 1929 election, Baldwin left office the following month.

In 1931 amid the domestic and international financial crisis precipitated by the global economic depression, Baldwin played a key role in the formation of the national coalition government under Labor leader Ramsay MacDonald. As lord president of the council, Baldwin also pushed for international disarmament and urged government leaders to seek accommodation with Germany and Italy.

Baldwin began his third stint as prime minister in June 1935. By now, he had come to doubt the wisdom of disarmament in the wake of menacing moves by the Italian, German, and Japanese governments. He did, however, reach a compromise with Italy after that nation invaded and occupied Abyssinia. At the same time, Baldwin attempted to co-opt both Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler into accepting a general European framework in which no nation sought to annex or attack another European country. By 1936, the Baldwin government had resolved to begin a general re-armament effort in the face of German and Italian recalcitrance. This effort, however, was compromised by political infighting and a lack of firm leadership and oversight on the part of Baldwin's cabinet. Further complicating the process was the Labour Party's firm opposition to general rearmament. Baldwin's critics, including Conservative Winston L. S. Churchill, engaged in a noisy campaign to discredit Baldwin's handling of the rearmament issue.

In May 1937 in the wake of the King Edward VII abdication crisis, which Baldwin handled quite deftly, the prime minister resigned and retired from politics, exhausted by his last tenure in office. The following year, he welcomed the ill-fated Munich Agreement. After World War II began in 1939, Baldwin tended to be reviled by many as an appeaser who too slowly grasped the peril posed by Hitler's Germany. This, however, is an unbalanced and unfair interpretation. There were, in fact, few statesmen who comprehended Hitler's true motives prior to 1938, and Baldwin did the best he could given the domestic limitations he faced during the 1930s. Baldwin died at Stourport-on-Severn, Worcestershire, on December 14, 1947.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain; Hitler, Adolf; Munich Conference and Preliminaries; Mussolini, Benito

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Balikpapan, Battle of (January 24, 1942)

On January 21, 1942, after the Japanese capture of Tarakan in northern Borneo, a Japanese troop convoy sailed for Balikpapan, the port and important oil field two-thirds of the way down Borneo's east coast. The day before, following a premature Dutch report of the Japanese movement, Task Force 5, the U.S. Navy cruisers *Boise* and *Marblehead*, and six destroyers sailed to intercept. However, after the *Boise* tore its hull on an uncharted pinnacle, Rear Admiral William A. Glassford Jr., commander of Task Force 5, ordered Destroyer Division 59 under Commander Paul H. Talbot and consisting of the 1919-vintage destroyers *John D. Ford*, *Pope*, *Parrott*, and *Paul Jones* to patrol Makassar Strait's southern exit while the *Boise* and the *Marblehead*, which had burned out a turbine, retired, escorted by two destroyers. When further reports of the Japanese invasion convoy arrived, Division 59 proceeded north on the morning of January 23, intending to arrive off Balikpapan and deliver a surprise attack two hours before dawn.

The Japanese force under Rear Admiral Nishimura Shoji consisted of 15 transports escorted by the light cruiser *Naka* and 10 modern destroyers. There were also 3 large patrol boats (ex–World War I destroyers) and 4 minesweepers. Dutch aircraft attacked during the approach and damaged 2 transports, but the Japanese convoy arrived on schedule at 8:15 p.m. on January 23 and anchored off Balikpapan in two rows. The Dutch garrison had ignited the oil fields, and thick black smoke reduced visibility.

At 11:45 p.m., the Dutch submarine *K-XVIII* torpedoed a Japanese transport, and the Japanese destroyers deployed into the channel to hunt the submarine and prevent another attack. Meanwhile, assisted by a weather front, the U.S. destroyers approached undetected until 2:45 a.m. on January

24, when four Japanese destroyers crossed ahead. In the poor visibility, they misidentified the U.S. ships as friendly vessels.

Coming upon the anchored transports, the U.S. destroyers, using torpedoes only, missed with their initial salvos, but at 3:00 a.m., the American column came about and torpedoed an ammunition ship, which exploded with a tremendous blast. Admiral Nishimura did not believe that enemy destroyers could penetrate the anchorage, and the powerful Japanese force continued to operate in the channel. At 3:10 a.m., the destroyers torpedoed a second transport. As the Americans, shrouded in smoke from the burning oil installations, cut through the shallow anchorage at high speed, they accounted for a patrol boat at 3:19 a.m. and then, six minutes later, a third transport.

Circling this stricken vessel, the *John D. Ford* led the column north. The *Pope* and *Parrott,* out of torpedoes, engaged with gunfire. After penetrating the first line of Japanese transports again, at 3:40 a.m. the *John D. Ford* sheered out of line to starboard, believing that a minefield lay ahead. This disrupted the tight line, and the *Parrott* and *Paul Jones* circled south and out of the action, followed shortly after by the *Pope.*

The *John D. Ford* continued alone and torpedoed the same ship damaged by the Dutch submarine before gunfire from a transport slightly damaged the U.S. ship. As the *John D. Ford* circled this ship, its 4-inch guns inflicted 50 casualties. At 4:00 a.m., the *John D. Ford* turned south and withdrew. Nishimura was still querying his patrol boats whether they were mistaking friendly destroyers for enemy cruisers.

Destroyer Division 59 did not stop the Japanese invasion, but it won a tactical victory in the first surface engagement fought by the U.S. Navy since the Spanish-American War. The Americans eluded a vastly superior force, torpedoed a quarter of the enemy convoy, and escaped unharmed.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

ABDA Command; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of; Lombok, Battle of; Madoera Strait, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Nishimura Shoji

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Balkans Theater

The Balkan Peninsula lies between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara to the east, the Mediterranean Sea to the south, the Ionian Sea to the southwest, and the Adriatic Sea to the west. The northern boundary of the Balkans is generally considered to be formed by the Sava and Danube Rivers. In 1939, there were six states south of that line: Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, European Turkey, most of Yugoslavia, and southeastern Romania.

The Axis powers of Germany and Italy gained the allegiance of some of the Balkan states and then in 1940–1941 invaded and conquered the remainder, with the exception of Turkey—which remained neutral. This ensured that the Axis powers had control over the eastern side of the Mediterranean and provided the security on the southern flank that was a prerequisite to a German invasion of the Soviet Union.

With the rapid collapse of France during May–June 1940, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin moved swiftly to secure gains promised him under the August 1939 Soviet-German pact. The Red Army occupied Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This was expected, but Adolf Hitler professed himself surprised by the subsequent Soviet moves in the Balkans.



In late June 1940, Stalin ordered the annexation of the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Bessarabia had been assigned to the Soviet sphere under the August 23, 1939, Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, but northern Bukovina had not. Also, unlike Bessarabia, Buko-vina had never been part of Imperial Russia, and it was the gateway to the Romanian oil fields at Ploieşti, vital to the German war machine.

Italy also sought to take advantage of the defeat of France as well as Britain’s weakness by opening new fronts in Africa and in Greece. In April 1939, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini had ordered Italian forces to seize Albania. Then on October 28, 1940, he sent his army into Greece from Albania, without informing Hitler in advance. Hitler knew of the Italian plans but neither restrained his ally nor reproached him.

Mussolini’s decision, taken on short notice and against the advice of his military leaders, had immense repercussions. Not only did the Greeks contain the Italians, but they drove them back and began their own counterinvasion of Albania. That winter the campaign deadlocked, which caused Hitler to consider sending German troops to rescue the Italians.

Meanwhile, Hitler acted aggressively in the Balkans to counter the Soviet moves and shore up his southern flank before the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In November 1940, he forced both Hungary and Romania to

join the Axis powers and accept German troops. Bulgaria followed suit at the beginning of March 1941. Hitler took advantage of irredentist sentiment but also used hardball tactics to secure the allegiance of these countries. He pressured Yugoslavia, and in late March, under German threats, Prince Regent Paul reluctantly agreed to join the Axis powers.

Meanwhile early in March 1941 and honoring the pledge to defend Greece, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill dispatched to that country two infantry divisions and an armored brigade. Churchill hoped thereby to forestall a German invasion, but this also forced the British Middle East commander, General Sir Archibald Wavell, to halt his offensive against the Italians in North Africa.

On March 27, elements in the Yugoslavian Army carried out a coup in Belgrade that overthrew Paul and repudiated the German alliance. This move was motivated, above all, by popular sentiment among the Serbs against the alliance. Furious at the turn of events, Hitler ordered German forces to invade Yugoslavia. Marshal Wilhelm List's Twelfth Army and Colonel General Ewald von Kleist's 1st Panzer Group, positioned in Hungary and Romania for the forthcoming invasion of the Soviet Union, now shifted to southwestern Romania and Bulgaria.

The German invasion of Yugoslavia began on April 6, 1941, with a Luftwaffe attack on Belgrade that claimed 17,000 lives. Eleven German infantry divisions and four tank divisions invaded from the north, east, and southeast. Other Axis troops, including the Third Hungarian Army, took part, but Hungarian premier Pál Teleki committed suicide rather than dishonor himself by participating. The invasion was so swift that the million-man Yugoslav army was never completely mobilized. Yugoslavia surrendered unconditionally on April 17.

Simultaneous with their move into Yugoslavia, the Germans came to the aid of the hard-pressed Italians by invading Greece. This move caught the Greeks with 15 divisions in Albania and only 3 divisions and border forces in Macedonia, where the Germans attacked. Also, the scratch British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in Greece was woefully unprepared to deal with German armor and the Luftwaffe, and between April 16 and 30, it precipitously evacuated Greece. Many of the roughly 50,000 troops taken off were then landed on Crete. During the evacuation of Greece, British naval

units were savaged by the Luftwaffe, with the Royal Navy losing more than two dozen ships to German air attack; many other ships were badly damaged.

In May 1941, the Germans continued their push south by occupying Crete in the first airborne invasion in history. The invasion turned out to be the graveyard of German paratroop forces. Hitler saw the action only as a cover for his planned invasion of the Soviet Union, securing the German southern flank against British air assault and helping protect the vital oil fields of Ploieşti.

The German invasion, conducted by parachutists and mountain troops carried to the island by transport aircraft, began on May 20 and was soon decided in favor of the attackers. Again, the Royal Navy suffered heavy losses, although it did turn back a German seaborne landing effort. Churchill's decision to try to hold Crete, unprepared and bereft of Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter support, ignored reality. But Hitler, by his aggressive Balkan moves, barred Soviet expansion there and secured protection against a possible British air attack from the south. These goals accomplished, he was ready to move against the Soviet Union.

From the beginning of the Axis occupation, the Balkans theater was ripe for guerrilla warfare until the Red Army invaded in August 1944. In both Greece and Yugoslavia, there were communist and noncommunist resistance groups, which often fought among themselves as well as against their Greek and Italian occupiers. In Greece, the lead was taken by the National People's Liberation Army (Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós, ELAS), which came to be dominated by the communists, and the National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos, EDES).

In Yugoslavia, the Chetniks were led by former army officers. Soon, a rival resistance group, known as the Partisans, came to the fore, dominated by the communists. As in Greece, these two groups would become bitter enemies, even fighting one another. Ultimately the British, who oversaw Allied aid to the Yugoslav resistance, decided to back only the Partisans, a decision that helped bring Josip Broz (Tito) to power in Yugoslavia after the war. The Yugoslav resistance largely freed the country from German control.

German paratroopers capturing British soldiers during the German invasion of Crete in May 1941. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

When Italy left the war in September 1943, Germany had to provide the occupying forces on its own, severely straining resources in men and material. The Allies also conducted a number of commando raids in the Balkans, including the German-occupied islands of the eastern Mediterranean.

In late August 1944, the Red Army's 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts launched an offensive in Romania against Army Group South Ukraine. Romania and Bulgaria soon capitulated and then switched sides, declaring war on Germany. In the case of Romania, these events occurred on August 23 and September 4, and for Bulgaria, they took place on August 25 and December 8, 1944.

In Greece, the communists made three attempts to seize power: the first came during the 1943–1944 Axis occupation in anticipation of an early end to the war, the second occurred in Athens in December 1944, and the third effort came in the form of a bloody and prolonged civil war from 1946 to 1949. The fighting in the Balkans was extremely costly in terms of human casualties, both directly—in actual military losses and civilian casualties resulting from warfare—and indirectly, stemming from shortages of food and other necessities.

In the immediate postwar period, the alignment of the Balkans actually worked out by and large along the lines of the agreement made between Churchill and Stalin at Moscow in October 1944. The Soviet Union dominated Romania and Bulgaria, whereas Greece ended up in the Western camp. Yugoslavia, which was to have been a 50-50 arrangement, freed itself from Moscow's grip in 1949, pursuing an independent, nonaligned foreign policy.

See also

Albania; Bulgaria; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Churchill-Stalin Meeting; Crete, Battle of; Croatia; Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian; Hitler, Adolf; Hungary; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Mussolini, Benito; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Romania; Romania Campaign; Stalin, Joseph; Tito; Turkey; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of; Yugoslavia Campaign

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Balloon Bombs

In Operation FU-GO between November 1944 and July 1945, the Japanese Army launched balloon bombs carried by the jet stream across the Pacific Ocean from Japan to North America. The operation was planned by Colonel Kusaba Sueki of the 9th Research Division in reprisal for the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo of April 18, 1942. The original plan was to launch the bombs from submarines near the U.S. West Coast, but the Japanese Navy refused to provide the submarines, and in consequence plans were developed to launch the balloons from Japan.

The balloon bombs were made of paper and *konjak* (a Japanese food made from taro paste, used as glue). They were about 30 feet in diameter and filled with hydrogen. Each balloon carried one 33-pound antipersonnel bomb or two 13.2-pound incendiary bombs.

The balloons flew at a maximum speed of some 120 mph at an altitude of 24,000 to 30,000 feet. The flights, which began in Japan, took about 50 hours to reach North America. During the war, Japan produced 10,000 balloon bombs and launched 9,000 of them against North America. However, only about 285 incidents involving them were reported in the United States and Canada. The balloons had no sensor or guidance systems, and once they were released, their flight depended entirely on the jet stream air currents. Therefore, the bombs rarely hit their targets.

The bombs reached British Columbia in Canada and Alaska, Oregon, Montana, Washington, California, northern Texas, and even Michigan in the United States. The only reported fatalities from the balloon bombs were one woman and five children killed while on a picnic in Oregon on May 5, 1945. Some West Coast forest fires were attributed to the balloon bombs, but there is no direct evidence of this.

The U.S. government feared that Japan would use the balloons as biological weapons and prohibited press reports about them to prevent panic among its citizens. The Japanese made preparations for such an effort, although it was never carried out.

The U.S. military, meanwhile, endeavored to locate the balloon launch sites, which were finally identified by analyzing a balloon captured by the U.S. Navy. That the balloons had come across the Pacific from Japan was a considerable surprise.

The Japanese Army expended enormous resources in Operation FU-GO. Some 30,000 Japanese soldiers and almost 30,000 civilians were engaged in the operation during a two-year period, and 6 soldiers were killed in an accident while loading bombs for the balloons.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Japan; Tokyo, Bombing of

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Baltic Sea, Naval Operations in

The Baltic Sea is a shallow enclosed body of water that separates Scandinavia from Northern Europe. In 1939, the major powers bordering its shores were Germany and the Soviet Union, while Poland, Sweden, and Finland also maintained moderate to small naval forces there.

The first naval actions in the Baltic were fought during a short campaign sparked by Germany's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Anticipating this aggression and realizing that it could not contest German power, the Polish government dispatched three destroyers to Britain two days before the war began. The Kriegsmarine hunted the remainder of Poland's navy—which included another destroyer, a large minelayer, some smaller vessels, and five submarines—and even dispatched destroyers to shell the Polish naval base at Hel on September 3, 1939.

Nonetheless, Poland's submarines operated until September 19, laying mines that sank a German minesweeper before fleeing to Britain and to Sweden. Upon the conclusion of this campaign Germany controlled the Baltic, which provided a secure zone for training, particularly for the crews of submarines. This state of affairs lasted until June 22, 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union maintained a strong fleet in the Baltic based at Kronstadt near Leningrad, with secondary facilities at Ust-Dvinsk near Riga, Tallinn in Estonia, Hankö in Finland, and Libau in Latvia. The Soviet Baltic fleet included 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 23 destroyers, 7 guard ships, and 69 submarines. Its mission was to defend the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga, interrupt German sea communications, and support the Red Army's maritime flank. The sudden eruption of war caught the Baltic Fleet unprepared, however, and it failed to carry out these missions.

The German naval command deployed light forces to the Baltic and focused on mine warfare. It did not develop plans to maximize the navy's resources in support of army operations. After the Germans captured Riga on July 3 and its protective minefield barrages were swept, however, convoys of barges and small merchant ships used this port to supply German land forces. Soviet destroyers and light forces attacked these convoys but failed to stop

the traffic, and they lost 3 destroyers in the process. The Baltic Fleet's major action in 1941 was the breakout from Tallinn to Kron-stadt on August 28, when 68 Soviet merchant ships and 128 warships from torpedo cutters to cruisers ran a gauntlet of German mines, aircraft, coastal batteries, and motor torpedo boats, losing in the process 5 destroyers, 3 guard ships, 5 other warships, and 34 civilian ships. The Soviets evacuated Hanko by December 3 but also had to cross an Axis minefield at great cost. As many as 20,000 soldiers and sailors died in these two operations; they would have been considered a fiasco by most standards, but the 30,000 men and considerable supplies they delivered to Leningrad represented an important contribution to that city's defenses.

In September 1941, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered the formation of a Baltic fleet centered on the battleship *Tirpitz* in case Soviets ships attempted to break out to Sweden, but this was never needed, and the season ended with the Soviet fleet bottled up in Kronstadt, with many units damaged and crews drafted to fight in ground units. Twenty-six submarines were also lost in the first summer of operations; they sank up to 13 Axis and neutral ships in return, all but 1 with mines. The guns of the large warships were instrumental in defending Leningrad. Weather heavily affected the operations that followed, because almost half of the sea, including the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga, freezes from December to April.

German and Finnish forces laid 10 major minefields in the Gulf of Finland before the winter freeze. In May 1942 the Soviets prepared submarines to break out into the Baltic, while the Germans refreshed their massive mine barrages to seal them in. Some submarines penetrated this barrage, but their cruises were largely unproductive, sinking or mining 25 Axis and neutral ships totaling 50,863 gross register tonnage at a cost of 12 submarines lost.

In April 1943, Finnish and German forces placed two rows of antisubmarine nets from Finland to Estonia. This barrage proved impenetrable, and there was no Soviet naval activity in the Baltic that year to disturb German training activities or commerce.

In 1944, ground advances finally allowed the Soviets to break the blockade of Kronstadt. Although the Germans strenuously sought to maintain their minefields in the Gulf of Finland, Soviet motor torpedo boats and aircraft forced the patrol craft maintaining these barrages to withdraw by July

1944. The Kriegsmarine's loss of three torpedo boats in August and two large destroyers in December to their own mines likewise demonstrated the dangerous impartiality of these weapons.

Finland was driven from the war and forced to sign an armistice with the Soviets in September 1944. The Soviets then mounted an amphibious invasion of the Estonian islands on September 29, 1944. These events finally unleashed the Baltic Fleet's submarines. Between October 1944 and April 1945, they enjoyed access to the open sea and during that period accounted for 37 ships sunk, totaling 102,856 gross register tonnage. However, 40 percent of the Axis tonnage lost occurred with the sinking of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* on January 30 and the *General Steuben* on February 10 during the evacuation of East Prussia. Some 10,000 soldiers and civilians died in these two sinkings alone.

The poor results achieved by Soviet submarines were not due to a lack of targets. Hitler assigned a high priority to maintaining German control of the Baltic because it was necessary for training the most important of his new war-winning weapons—high-speed submarines of the XXI type and the Walter turbine boats—all of which required extensive training and working up. For this reason, the 500,000-strong Army Group North maintained control of the Courland Peninsula rather than bolstering the homeland's defenses. In August 1944, 2.4 million tons of shipping plied the Baltic sea-lanes between Germany and the Courland bridgehead. Even as late as December 1944, traffic consisted of 575 vessels totaling 1.1 million tons.

In the war's final months, the Kriegsmarine undertook direct support of the German Army using *Panzerschiffe*, cruisers, and destroyers; naval gunfire was a key ingredient in the German Army's stubborn defense of littoral areas. The Kriegsmarine also evacuated 2 million troops and civilians in the face of the Soviet advance in what was certainly one of its greatest accomplishments of the war. Large Soviet warships remained inactive throughout this period. From the first day of the war to the last, Germany effectively controlled the Baltic Sea.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Germany, Navy; Minesweeping and Mine Laying, Sea; Poland, Navy; Soviet Union, Navy; *Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben*, and *Goya*, Sinking

of

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Ba Maw (1893–1977)

Burmese political figure and one of the leaders of Burma's movement to gain independence from Britain, which was achieved soon after World War II. Born in Maubin, Burma (today Myanmar), on February 8, 1893, into an aristocratic family, Ba Maw graduated from college in Rangoon in 1913. He also studied abroad at the universities of Calcutta in India, Cambridge in England, and Bordeaux in France, obtaining both certification as a lawyer in England and a doctorate.

Ba Maw returned to Burma, then a British crown colony, and began the practice of law. He made his mark by defending Saya San, a leader of the Thayawaddy peasant uprising in 1930. In 1933, Ba Maw organized a moderate political party known as Simyetta (People's Party). He became a member of the Legislative Council of Burma and then minister of education for Burma.

In April 1937, Ba Maw was appointed the first prime minister of the Burma Crown Colony government when Burma was officially separated from India. Facing radical labor and student unrest, he resigned in March 1939. He then formed a new political alignment, known as the Freedom Bloc, with the Thakin Party, and became its chairman. Protesting British policies toward Burma, he quit the legislature in 1940.

Ba Maw was arrested and imprisoned by the British in August 1940 on charges of maintaining contact with the Japanese and advocating noncollaboration with the British war effort. Escaping from prison in August 1942, Ba Maw came under the protection of Japanese forces advancing to Rangoon. He collaborated with them and was appointed chief of the Burma

Central Executive Council established by the Japanese authorities, adopting the title "Ahnashin" (Lord of Authority). When Japan recognized Burma as an independent state in August 1943, Ba Maw became the chief of state of the new Republic of Burma and took the title "Adipati" (Chief), leading an authoritarian, one-party state.

In November 1943, Ba Maw attended the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo with other Asian leaders collaborating with Japan. But the Burmese Army, led by Aung San, revolted in March 1945, and when Allied forces defeated the Japanese in Burma the next month, Ba Maw fled to Tokyo via Bangkok. In August 1945, when Japan surrendered, Ba Maw was arrested and interned in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo. Released in July 1946, he returned to Burma and resumed his political activities. He retired from politics in 1962 when the military, led by U Nu, carried out another coup d'état. Ba Maw published his autobiography in 1968. He died in Yangon (Rangoon) on May 29, 1977.

TOBE RYOICHI

See also

Aung San, U; Burma Theater; China-Burma-India Theater

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Bär, Heinrich (1913–1957)

German Air Force officer and World War II ace. Born in Sommerfeld, Germany, on March 25, 1913, Heinrich "Pritzel" Bär joined the Luftwaffe in 1937 and began World War II as an unteroffizier (corporal). Within a year, he had both attained the rank of sergeant and qualified as a noncommissioned fighter pilot. During this time, he was stationed with Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Group) 51.

On September 25, 1939, Bär scored his first confirmed victory (kill). During the May 10–July 11, 1940, Battle for France, he earned a battlefield

commission as a lieutenant. He then fought in the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), raising his kills total to 27.

Transferring to the Soviet Front in 1941 and now a first lieutenant, Bär continued to score victories in aerial combat. He obtained 96 kills in this campaign, including 6 against Soviet pilots in a single day. Once shot down behind Soviet lines, Bär made his way back to German-held territory. He was hospitalized with a spinal injury but rejoined his unit shortly thereafter.

In the spring of 1942, newly promoted Captain Bär was assigned as commander of JG-77 during the North African Campaign, flying from Sicily. In January 1945, Bär took command of JG-1, a jet fighter training unit. He was then transferred to JG-3, where he scored his 200th career victory. His final assignment of the war was with JV-44, Lieutenant General Adolf Galland's "Expert Squadron." Flying the Me-262 jet, Bär reached 220 career victories in more than 1,000 combat missions. His total of 16 victories in the Me-262 remains the record for a jet aircraft.

Bär completed his military service as a lieutenant colonel. He died in an airplane crash in Brunswick, Germany, while demonstrating the capabilities of a light plane on April 28, 1957.

KYLE D. HAIRE

See also

Britain, Battle of; France, Battle for; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Germany, Air Force; North Africa Campaign

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BARBAROSSA, Operation (June 22, 1941)

German invasion of the Soviet Union that opened World War II on the Eastern Front. German chancellor Adolf Hitler's objective in Operation BARBAROSSA was simple: he sought to crush the Soviet Union in one swift blow. With the Soviet Union defeated and its vast resources at his disposal,

surely Britain would have to sue for peace. So confident was he of victory that he made no effort to coordinate the invasion with his Japanese ally. Hitler predicted a quick victory in a campaign of, at most, three months.

German success hinged on the speed of advance of 154 German and satellite divisions deployed in three army groups: Army Group North in East Prussia, under Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb; Army Group Center in northern Poland, commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock; and Army Group South in southern Poland and Romania under Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt. Army Group North consisted of 3 panzer, 3 motorized, and 24 infantry divisions supported by Luftflotte (Air Fleet) 1 and joined by Finnish forces. Farther north, German colonel general Nikolaus von Falkenhorst's Norway Army would carry out an offensive against Murmansk to sever its supply route to Leningrad. Within Army Group Center were 9 panzer, 7 motorized, and 34 infantry divisions, with Luftflotte 2 in support. Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Army Group South consisted of 5 panzer, 3 motorized, and 35 infantry divisions, along with 3 Italian divisions, 2 Romanian armies, and Hungarian and Slovak units. Luftflotte 4 provided air support.

To meet this onslaught were 170 Soviet divisions organized into three "strategic axes" (commanding multiple fronts, the equivalent of army groups)—Northern, Central, and Southern or Ukrainian—that would come to be commanded by Marshals Kliment E. Voroshilov, Semen K. Timoshenko, and Semen M. Budenny, respectively. Voroshilov's front was responsible for the defense of Leningrad, Karelia, and the recently acquired Baltic states. Timoshenko's front protected the approaches to Smolensk and Moscow, while Budenny's front guarded the Ukraine. For the most part, these forces were largely unmechanized and were arrayed in three linear defensive echelons, the first as far as 30 miles from the border and the last as much as 180 miles back.

The German plan called for three phases in which they hoped to achieve three broad objectives: the destruction of Soviet armed forces, the capture of political and industrial centers, and the occupation of coal, iron, and agricultural centers in the Ukraine and Caucasus. Phase one called for Nazi ground forces, supported by air, to drive deep into Soviet territory and encircle and destroy Soviet forces west of the Dvina-Dnieper Line while disrupting supply lines and creating maximum chaos. Phase two objectives

were the seizure of Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine to prevent political-military direction and economic support to the Red Army. In phase three, the Wehrmacht was to advance to and hold the Volga-Arkhangelsk Line.

Initial Soviet defensive plans differed, but the primary defense in all was to position the bulk of forces along the perceived path of any German attack. The differences in the plans came from disagreements over the exact direction of the assumed main thrust. One concept held that the principal German attack would occur in the north, whereas another prepared for the main attack in the south, into the Ukraine. For whatever reasons, none considered the center of the front toward Moscow as primary. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin believed that the assault would be launched toward the Ukraine and Caucasus because of the agricultural and mineral resources there, and final General Staff plans were developed accordingly.

Whatever the direction of any German attack, Stalin counted on a repeat of the stalemate of the Western Front of 1914 to 1918 or at least a campaign lasting a year or more. Soviet planning estimated that any war between Germany and the Soviet Union would last a minimum of three years. Critical to ensuring the ability of the Soviet Union to fight a protracted war would be denial of the eastern Ukraine to the Germans, which is why so much Soviet armor was positioned forward in June 1941.

Stalin refused to believe Soviet intelligence reports that German forces were massing on the western approaches to the Soviet Union. He also rejected Western warnings with detailed information of the impending German attack. He received a reported 100 Western warnings but dismissed all as efforts by the Western powers to involve the Soviet Union in the war. The German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Count Friedrich von Schulenberg, who opposed war between Germany and the Soviet Union, even informed an astonished Vladimir Dekanozev, the Soviet ambassador to Berlin, that Germany would invade. Reportedly, Stalin informed the Politburo that “disinformation has now reached ambassadorial level.”

Although Stalin had utilized the respite of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact period to improve war stocks and develop military industries, he ultimately resisted fully mobilizing the Red Army for fear that doing so would provoke Hitler. These factors, plus the self-inflicted decapitation of the Soviet armed forces in the 1937 purges that liquidated 60

to 75 percent of the senior officer corps, left the Red Army unable to prevent the Wehrmacht from achieving tremendous initial victories.

Hitler had ordered preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union completed by May 15, but the assault did not actually occur until June 22, almost the very day that Napoleon Bonaparte had begun his ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812. Heavy spring rains in Eastern Europe were the most important factor in the delay, as the panzers needed dry, hard ground for an advance across a country with few roads. Also, it took more time than anticipated to assemble the invasion force of more than 3 million men, the largest in history. Motor transport had to be allocated, and the Luftwaffe was also slow to build forward airfields. Moreover, units taking part in the campaign in the Balkans had to be relocated and refitted.

Despite all the German preparations, there was a great disparity in military hardware. The Luftwaffe, still waging operations against Britain and also supporting the Afrika Korps (Africa Corps) in North Africa, was forced to keep 1,150 combat aircraft in these theaters. Thus, only 2,770 combat aircraft were available against the Soviet Union. Arrayed against them were 18,570 Soviet aircraft, 8,154 of which were initially in the west and the bulk of them tactical aircraft of sturdy basic designs, including the excellent Ilyushin I1–2 Shturmovik ground-attack aircraft.

Soviet tanks moving to the battle front on June 22, 1941, the first day of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Germany deployed some 6,000 tanks, the Soviets 23,140 (10,394 in the west)—and even in 1941, the Soviets possessed some of the best tanks of the war. Their BT-series and T-26 were superior in armor, firepower, and maneuverability to the German light PzKpfw I and II and could destroy any German tank. Similarly, the Soviet T-34 medium tank and KV-1 heavy tank were superior to the PzKpfw III and IV and indeed any German tank in June 1941.

The German attack began at 3:00 a.m. on June 22, 1941, the longest day of the year, with only two hours of total darkness. Soviet forces were taken completely by surprise. German panzer and mechanized divisions easily broke through the defenses and were deep into Soviet territory by nightfall. Striking Soviet air forces within range, the Luftwaffe, in one day's operations, for all practical purposes, gained air supremacy over the operational area. Army Group North took Kaunas in one day and reached the Dvina River after four days, then rolled into Riga on June 29. Not until they reached new Soviet defensive positions south of Pskov on July 8 did the Germans encounter stiff resistance.

The progress of Army Group South was slowed by numerous natural obstacles, which allowed Soviet forces to withdraw in a more orderly manner and even to counterattack occasionally. The southern army group advanced along three lines: the Lublin-Kovel-Lutsk-Zhitomir-Kiev line, the Przemysl–L'viv (Lvov)–Vinnitsia–Dnieper River line, and a third line from Romania to Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk. Soviet forces avoided German encirclement attempts in this southern zone until Uman, where, in early August, over 100,000 men were encircled and surrendered, along with 300 tanks and 800 pieces of heavy artillery.

Army Group Center achieved the most spectacular results. It reached the Dnieper River by July 6, where it encountered increased Soviet resistance. Before arriving there, however, one column took Vilnius on June 24 and then headed for Minsk, where it joined the second column that had come from Brest-Litovsk. On June 27, the two columns met to surround a large number of Soviet troops around Grodno and Bialystok, provoking the surrender of 320,000 men, 3,000 tanks, and 2,000 pieces of heavy artillery. Even with stiffening resistance, Soviet forces could not prevent the Germans from crossing the Dnieper on July 9 and seizing Smolensk on July 16, where they captured another 300,000 prisoners.

Phase one of Operation BARBAROSSA seemed a success. Despite increased resistance, Wehrmacht forces appeared to have open roads to Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev after capturing nearly 1 million Soviet troops and killing countless others. Phase two of the German plan, however, proved more difficult to achieve for several reasons. Soviet defenses were stiffening because the initial shock of invasion had worn off and an additional 5 million men in reserve forces had been mobilized and thrown into the breach. In addition, Hitler and his generals had been debating the best course of action for phase two, and the objectives continued to change. The generals believed that the army should concentrate on securing Moscow because it was the Soviet capital and a vital communication and industrial center. It offered, they believed, the best chance to destroy the Soviet armies. Hitler, however, at first thought that the priority should be the seizure of Leningrad and a linkup with the Finns; then, the Germans and Finns together should clear the Baltic and open a sea line of communications. But by mid-August, Hitler had changed his mind and directed the main effort to focus on the Ukraine and the Caucasus to gain the resources of those regions, relegating both Leningrad and Moscow to secondary priority. He even ordered the other two army groups to yield forces to reinforce Army Group South.

Phase two finally began with an assault on Kiev, which fell to the Germans on September 19 and netted 650,000 additional prisoners. Then, fall rains and mud slowed the German advance in the south. Movement toward Leningrad also slowed, partly because of increased Soviet resistance but also because Hitler conceived a new plan. This plan, known as Operation TAIFUN (TYPHOON), called for Leningrad to be encircled, put under siege, and starved into submission; the Crimea, the Donbass, and the Caucasus were to be taken for the coal and oil resources that would be gained for Germany’s use.

The new plan accorded the highest priority, however, to the encirclement and capture of Moscow. Previously transferred panzer forces were now to revert to Army Group Center, and operations were to commence on September 30. In the drive on Moscow, the Germans took Orel on October 3, and 17 days later, around Vyazma and Bryansk, they captured 665,000 Soviet prisoners. But again, fall rains and mud, increasing Soviet resistance as the Germans neared the capital, and an early drop in temperature to well below zero ground the German advance to a halt.

Some success was had elsewhere, however. Leningrad was nearly

surrounded, and the Crimea was taken along with Odessa, Kharkov, and Rostov-on-Don, but these achievements were short-lived when, along the entire front, the Soviets opened their first major counteroffensive in early December 1941.

Because the strategic objective did not change, it can be argued that Operation BARBAROSSA continued for the entire period of Germany's strategic advance, from the surprise attack on June 22, 1941, until the assault that stalled before Moscow in November. However, the commencement of Operation TAIFUN, with its change of operational focus and main objectives, technically ended Operation BARBAROSSA.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Bock, Fedor von; Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich; Eastern Front; Falkenhorst, Nikolaus von; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Germany; Germany, Air Force; Germany, Army; Great Purges; Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von; Moscow, Battle of; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Soviet Union; Soviet Union, Air Force; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad, Battle of; Tanks, All Powers; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich; Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich; Vyazma-Bryansk, Battle for; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich; Document 79; Document 94

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Barbey, Daniel Edward (1889–1969)

U.S. Navy admiral who established the navy's Amphibious Warfare Section and commanded the Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet. Born on December 23, 1889, in Portland, Oregon, Daniel Edward Barbey graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1912. He served on several ships during World War I and rose to the rank of lieutenant.

Following the war, Barbey was stationed in Wales and Turkey before returning to sea duty in 1922. Between 1928 and 1931, he served as an administrator at the U.S. Naval Academy. Promoted to commander in 1933, Barbey held various positions before being assigned to the War Plans Section of the Bureau of Navigation in 1937. There, he worked on developing mobilization strategies. He also became fascinated with amphibious warfare, a subject that had been little studied since World War I. In February 1940, Barbey was promoted to captain and assumed command of the battleship *New York.*

In January 1941, Barbey became the chief of staff to Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs of the Service Force and Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. Barbey was promoted to rear admiral in June 1942 while on the staff of chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest King. In this capacity, Barbey founded the Amphibious Warfare Section of the U.S. Navy and worked to establish doctrine and tactics as well as to secure equipment better suited to amphibious operations. Under his leadership, the DUKW amphibious truck ("Duck") was developed, along with other new landing craft designs.

In January 1943, Barbey became commander of the Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet, setting up his headquarters at Port Stevens, Australia. Working under General Douglas MacArthur from 1943 until the summer of 1945, Barbey commanded 56 amphibious landings in support of various invasions, including those in New Guinea, the Philippines, and Borneo.

Promoted to vice admiral in December 1944, Barbey was the ranking naval subordinate to MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. After the war, Barbey held various positions, including commander of the Seventh Fleet, commander of the Atlantic Amphibious Forces, commander of the Fourth Fleet, and chairman of the Joint Military Board. From March 1947 until September 1950, he commanded U.S. naval forces in the Caribbean. Barbey

retired from the navy in June 1951. He died at Bremerton, Washington, on March 11, 1969.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Amphibious Warfare; King, Ernest Joseph; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Barkhorn, Gerhard (1919–1983)

German Air Force officer and fighter pilot, the second-highest-scoring ace of World War II, with 301 victories. Born in Königsberg, East Prussia, on March 20, 1919, Gerhard Barkhorn joined the Luftwaffe in March 1938. On completion of his pilot training, he was posted to Staffel (Squadron) 3, Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wing) 2 (3.JG-2), in October 1939. In August 1940, he was transferred to JG-52 for the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940). Barkhorn did not score his first victory until his 120th mission, on July 1, 1941. Within a year, his total stood at 60, and he was awarded the Knight's Cross and, six months later, in January 1943, the Oak Leaves. On January 23, 1944, Barkhorn became the first Luftwaffe fighter pilot to have flown 1,000 combat missions and the second to reach 250 victories. For the latter feat, he was awarded the Swords to his Knight's Cross.

During his career, Barkhorn entered combat more than 1,100 times. He was shot down nine times, bailed out once, and was wounded twice. On May 31, 1944, with 273 victories, he was well on his way to becoming the leading ace in the Luftwaffe when he was severely wounded in a dogfight. The four months he spent in the hospital allowed another JG-52 ace, Erich Hartmann,

to surpass his record. Barkhorn scored his 301st—and final—victory on January 5, 1945.

Barkhorn ended his wartime career as a major flying the Me-262 jet in JV-44, Major General Adolf Galland's "Squadron of Experts." Injuries from a crash landing took Barkhorn out of combat permanently on April 21, 1945. At the end of the war, he surrendered to the Americans and was held prisoner until September 1945.

Barkhorn's postwar career included service in the Federal Republic of Germany's (West Germany) air force from 1956 until his retirement as a major general in 1976. On January 6, 1983, he and his wife, Christl, were involved in a serious automobile accident near Köln (Cologne). Christl died at the scene, and Barkhorn died in the hospital in Köln on January 8, 1983.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Britain, Battle of; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Germany, Air Force; Hartmann, Erich Alfred

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Barrage Balloons

Balloons sent aloft to protect against low-level air attack. In 1938, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Balloon Command was established to arrange a system of barrage balloons at strategic sites in Great Britain as antiaircraft devices to guard communities, ports, and industries. Barrage balloons flown from boats prevented aircraft from mining estuaries. Within two years, approximately 6,400 barrage balloons protected Britain, 5,000 of which were in the London area. Air Marshal Sir E. Leslie Gossage directed 52 barrage balloon squadrons, involving 33,000 personnel.

Barrage balloons were designed to prevent low-altitude German air attacks against British factories and other strategic targets. Most of these

large hydrogen-filled, football-shaped balloons were connected to wagons by thick steel cables, which could damage any aircraft that hit them. Camouflage and clouds helped prevent enemy pilots from seeing the barrage balloons.

Mobility was crucial to form barriers of barrage balloons. Balloon crews, consisting of members of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force and the RAF Balloon Command, moved barrage balloons as needed and operated winches on the wagons to lower and raise the balloons to designated heights. Some barrage balloons actually reached an altitude of 5,000 feet. Not only did they help prevent German pilots from flying at low altitudes, they also increased the vulnerability of enemy aircraft to antiaircraft weapons, which could be concentrated to fire above their altitudes. During the Blitz (August 1940–May 1941), balloon crews devoted night duty to keeping barrage balloons at effective defensive heights and positions. Some 66 German aircraft were lost to collisions with barrage balloon cables.

Smaller barrage balloons were also used to protect shipping, and they floated above Allied ships approaching Normandy for the D-day landings on June 6, 1944. In addition to countering airplanes, barrage balloons were used to protect against attacks by V-1 buzz bombs. In 1944, operators placed a circle of 1,750 barrage balloons in south London, and the balloon cables stopped an estimated 231 V-1s.

The United States employed barrage balloons to help protect vulnerable sites on the U.S. West Coast and the Panama Canal. The Allies also used them in North Africa and in other locations in the Mediterranean. The Germans raised barrage balloons over strategic sites in the Reich. Italy and Japan also employed barrage balloons during the war.

U.S. Marine Corps barrage balloons at Parris Island, South Carolina, in May 1942. Barrage balloons trailing cables were one defense against low-flying enemy aircraft. (Library of Congress)

A number of the barrage balloons were destroyed by enemy fire or by lightning strikes, and wind and storms often caused balloon damage. Arthur Vestry, a Scottish physicist, devised ways to make the balloons lightning-proof, and the Germans sought to develop methods to cut barrage cables without ruining aircraft.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Antiaircraft Artillery and Employment; Blitz, The; Britain, Battle of; Camouflage; Great Britain; Great Britain, Women's Auxiliary Air Force; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; V-1 Buzz Bomb; Women in World War II

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Barents Sea, Battle of (December 31, 1942)

Battle fought in the Barents Sea between German surface warships and British warships escorting convoy JW-51B to Kola Inlet in the Soviet Union. Following heavy losses sustained by convoys PQ-17 and PQ-18 during the summer of 1942, the British temporarily suspended the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. The convoys were resumed with the onset of winter and the long Arctic nights, which offered greater security.

In late 1942, German naval forces commanded by Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz based in Alta Fjord near Norway's North Cape included the pocket battleship *Lützow*, the heavy cruiser *Admiral Hipper*, and 6 fleet destroyers: the *Theodor Riedel, Richard Beitzen, Friedrich Eckoldt, Z29, Z30*, and *Z31*. The Germans also had 23 U-boats operating in Arctic waters.

Convoy JW 51B consisted of 14 merchant ships, escorted by the British destroyers *Achates, Orwell, Oribi, Onslow, Obedient*, and *Obdurate;* the corvettes *Rhododendron* and *Hyderabad;* and the minesweeper *Bramble.* Captain Robert St. V. Sherbrooke commanded the escorts. In addition to the convoy escort, distant cover was provided by the Royal Navy's Force R, commanded by Rear Admiral Robert L. Burnett. It consisted of the British cruisers *Sheffield* and *Jamaica* and 2 destroyers.

Convoy JW 51B sailed from Scotland on December 22, 1942, and linked up with its escort on December 25. The day before, German aircraft had spotted the convoy and began tracking it. At noon on December 30 the *U-345* reported the convoy 50 miles south of Bear Island. Poor weather and low visibility, however, had caused the convoy to disperse.

Kummetz launched Operation REGENBOGEN (RAINBOW) shortly after noon on December 30. The German commander, however, was constrained by long-standing orders not to risk his ships by engaging superior enemy forces. As he put to sea with his flag in the *Admiral Hipper*, Kummetz received an ambiguous message: "Use caution even against enemy of equal strength; accepting undue risks for cruisers undesirable."

Proceeding cautiously, Kummetz divided his force into two sections at 2:40 a.m. on December 31. One half of the force proceeded north to intercept JW 51B's projected route, while the other half remained to the south ready to

intercept in the event of evasive action. At 7:18 a.m. that morning a German lookout spotted the convoy approximately eight miles to the northeast. Both of Kummetz's elements then began to close on it.

At 9:20 a.m. the *Friedrich Eckoldt*, *Richard Beitzen*, and *Z29* opened fire on the British destroyers. Force R, meanwhile, closed on the convoy from northward to provide additional support but initially mistook the stragglers for the main body. That error delayed the entry of the *Sheffield* and *Jamaica* into the fight.

About 10:00 a.m. the *Hipper* opened fire, scoring several hits on the *Onslow*. Sherbrooke was among the severely wounded. Shortly thereafter gunfire from the *Hipper* sank the *Bramble.*

Sometime before 11:00 a.m. the *Lützow* and the second arm of Kummetz's pincer passed within three miles to the front of JW 51B without sighting the convoy, and the double envelopment thus did not close. Burnett, meanwhile, realized his error in mistaking the convoy's stragglers for the main body and was now closing fast with his Force R. The *Sheffield* and *Jamaica* opened fire on the *Hipper* at 11:31 a.m., scoring several hits and reducing the *Hipper*'s speed. As other British warships also began to close in, Kummetz ordered his force to break contact and withdraw to the west. Before the Germans could disengage, however, the *Sheffield* sank the *Friedrich Eckoldt.* Although the fighting was at an end, the *Achates* had also been heavily damaged. It sank at 1:15 p.m.

Convoy JW 51B continued its voyage and successfully delivered 202 tanks, 2,046 other vehicles, 87 fighter aircraft, 33 bombers, 11,500 tons of fuel, and 12,650 tons of aviation fuel to Murmansk. The battle had been a tactical draw that cost the Germans one destroyer and 330 seamen killed. The British lost one destroyer, one minesweeper, and 250 men killed. Operation REGENBOGEN, however, was a major operational and strategic failure for the Germans. The supplies made it through to the Soviets, bolstering Allied confidence. The failure at the Barents Sea contributed directly to Grand Admiral Raeder's downfall three weeks later and his replacement as commander of the German Navy by Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz. Hitler also ordered that the German Navy now focus on U-boat operations at the expense of the surface warships.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Convoy PQ 17; Convoy PQ-18, Battle of; Dönitz, Karl; Hitler, Adolf; Raeder, Erich

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Barré, Georges Edmund Lucien (1886–1970)

French Army general. Born at Saint-Augnan-sur-Cher on November 26, 1886, Georges Barré graduated from the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr in 1912. He then became a colonial officer in Morocco. He distinguished himself in combat in World War I and in subsequent Moroccan pacification efforts. In December 1939, Barré was promoted to brigadier general, and when Germany invaded France in May 1940, he commanded the 7th North African Infantry Division, deployed on the French frontier. Barré's forces fought continuously, sustaining combat casualties of over 30 percent and winning high commendation.

After the June 1940 armistice, Barré was named to head the French delegation to the Italian demilitarization commission on the Libyan frontier. In January 1942, he was promoted to major general and appointed the senior military commander in Tunisia. When British and U.S. forces landed in Africa in November 1942, Barré initially hedged his bets and declared neutrality, prudent because German reinforcements under General of Panzer Troops Walter Nehring swiftly arrived in Tunisia, whereas the Allies had not yet landed the 5,000 men they had originally promised to send. Barré withdrew his forces into the hills, parleying with the Germans while waiting for Allied forces to arrive.

Early in the morning on November 19, 1942, Nehring delivered an ultimatum to Barré, demanding his withdrawal from his stronghold of Medjez-el-Bab within three hours, before dawn. Barré refused, holding the critical redoubt and communications center all day against heavy German air

attacks and assaults by the German 5th Parachute Regiment, while the 1st British Parachute Battalion and a U.S. artillery battalion hastily advanced to his support.

The French troops finally withdrew under cover of darkness to join with the Free French XIX Corps, fighting hard for the remainder of the Tunisia Campaign.

In 1943, Barré was promoted to lieutenant general. He retired after the war and died in Paris on January 22, 1970.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

France, Army; Nehring, Walther Kurt; Tunisia Campaign

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Baruch, Bernard Mannes (1870–1965)

Wall Street financier, U.S. governmental and presidential adviser, Democratic Party loyalist, and U.S. representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (1946). Born in Camden, South Carolina, on August 19, 1870, Bernard Mannes Baruch graduated from the City College of New York in 1889. His financial acumen had made him a millionaire by age 30.

Baruch served on a number of government advisory bodies and was chairman of the War Industries Board during World War I and a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks in 1919. Baruch provided both official and unofficial advice to Presidents Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin Roosevelt between the wars.

Prior to America's entry into World War II, Baruch successfully counseled that existing U.S. neutralist legislation should be modified to

permit belligerent nations to purchase war supplies on a cash-and-carry basis—effectively aimed at Great Britain and its allies. During World War II, Baruch served as an adviser on economic and mobilization issues. By 1940, he had urged major increases in American naval and military strength and supported a comprehensive mobilization of the entire civilian population and U.S. resources. Baruch also advocated price and wage controls and pushed for the creation of a centralized government body to control all industrial production; the latter was accomplished with the establishment of the War Production Board (WPB) in January 1942. South Carolina senator James F. Byrnes, an old friend and associate of Baruch's, headed the WPB for a time. In February 1944, Baruch and John Hancock, an executive at Lehman Brothers, cowrote a lengthy report submitted to the government that detailed postwar demobilization policies and called for a rapid end to government controls over the economy. The Harry S. Truman administration and the U.S. Congress implemented many of the report's recommendations.

In early 1946, President Truman appointed Baruch to lead the U.S. delegation to the newly formed United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). Baruch began his work with a proposal developed by Dean Acheson at the State Department and David E. Lilienthal, head of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, that included a preliminary plan by atomic scientist Robert Oppenheimer arguing for international control of nuclear weapons by commanding, mining, and producing nuclear materials. Baruch modified this proposal, and the resulting concept for international control of atomic energy was commonly referred to as the Baruch Plan. The UNAEC approved the Baruch Plan in December 1946, but it was never ratified as a United Nations resolution or an international treaty. The Baruch Plan was perceived by the Soviets as an effort to limit their development of nuclear weapons while allowing the United States to retain its nuclear monopoly, and they vetoed it.

Until his death in New York City on June 20, 1965, Baruch continued to comment on public policy issues and was an active philanthropist and Democratic Party operative.

JEROME V. MARTIN AND PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Byrnes, James Francis; Cash-and-Carry; Oppenheimer, Julius Robert; United Nations, Formation of; United States Neutrality Acts; United States War Production Board

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Bastico, Ettore (1876–1972)

Italian Army field marshal appointed governor of Libya in 1941. Born in Bologna on April 9, 1876, Ettore Bastico joined the army in 1896 and served in the elite Bersaglieri (light infantry). In 1912, he was posted to Libya, where he took part in pacification operations. Promoted to colonel during World War I, brigadier general in 1928, major general on May 29, 1932, and lieutenant general on February 10, 1936, Bastico commanded a division and then a corps during the invasion of Ethiopia.

A close friend of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, Bastico was dispatched to Spain in April 1937 to head the Italian expeditionary force supporting the Nationalist side in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. Although he scored one of the few Italian victories at Santander in August, he was relieved of his post in October because of conflicts with the Spanish Nationalist leader General Francisco Franco. Nevertheless, in 1938, Bastico received command of the Second Army, stationed on the border with Yugoslavia, and in December 1940, he was appointed governor of the Dodecanese Islands.

In July 1941, Bastico became governor of Libya. Although he was, in theory, the superior of Afrika Korps (Africa Corps) commander Erwin Rommel, he and Rommel immediately developed a contentious relationship. Rommel’s repeated rebuffs of Bastico’s attempts to rein him in as well as the

German general's increasingly ill-disguised contempt for the Italian Army led to a series of heated exchanges between the two, with Rommel referring to Bastico as "Bombastico." Nevertheless, the Axis forces were able to cooperate sufficiently to force the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942. As a result, Bastico was promoted to field marshal on August 12, 1942.

After the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942, Rommel as usual disregarded Bastico's cautious directives and invaded Egypt. Consequently, the Axis forces became overstretched, setting the stage for the decisive British counteroffensive at El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942). In the wake of the Axis defeat, Bastico was relieved of command in February 1943. He remained in the army, but without a field command, for the rest of the war.

Bastico retired from the army in 1947 and wrote a three-volume study of the evolution of warfare. He died in Rome on December 2, 1972.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

El Alamein, Battle of; Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Italy, Army; Mussolini, Benito; North Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Spanish Civil War; Tobruk, First Battle of; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Bastogne, Battle for (December 19, 1944–January 9, 1945)

Key battle within the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge). Bastogne, Belgium, was an important communications hub; seven main roads, a railroad line, and several minor roads met there. Elements of the U.S. First Army had liberated

Bastogne and the Ardennes area in September 1944. By December, following failed Allied attempts to invade Germany, lines in the west had solidified along the German West Wall (Siegfried Line). As the Allies prepared their next move, German chancellor Adolf Hitler put in motion a counteroffensive in the Ardennes with the goal of destroying Allied units and recapturing the port of Antwerp. At the least, Hitler expected to buy time to deal with the Soviets on the Eastern Front. German success in what was known to the Germans as Operation WACHT AM RHEIN (WATCH ON THE RHINE) depended on surprise and a rapid capture of Bastogne and the Allied fuel depots and communications routes between it and Saint Vith.

The German offensive, which opened early on December 16, caught the Americans completely by surprise. General of Panzer Troops Heinrich von Lüttwitz's XLVII Panzer Corps, the spearhead of the southern German thrust, made for Bastogne, some 20 miles from the German line of attack. The Germans expected to occupy Bastogne no later than December 18, but the poor state of the roads and misinformation provided by Belgians delayed their arrival. Meanwhile, supreme Allied commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower correctly concluded that this was a major German offensive rather than a spoiling attack and ordered up reinforcements, including the 101st Airborne Division. The 101st arrived at Bastogne near midnight on December 18. The first American units to reach the city, however, were elements of the 10th Armored Division, which had arrived there a few hours earlier.

Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein's Panzer Lehr Division reached Bastogne just after midnight on December 19. It attacked immediately, as Bayerlein was aware from radio intercepts that the 101st Airborne was on the way. The Americans beat back the German assault but were under constant German pressure from this point and were completely encircled in a six-mile-diameter pocket by the evening of December 21. The Germans then brought up supplies and reinforcements.

On December 22, four German soldiers, one carrying a white flag, walked toward an American outpost near Bastogne. They carried an ultimatum addressed to "the U.S.A. commander of the encircled city of Bastogne." The message urged the American commander to save his troops with an "honorable surrender." The response of Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe, in command of the division in the absence of Major General

Maxwell D. Taylor, was memorable: “To the German Commander: Nuts. The American commander.”

Even though the Germans pressed their offensive all around Bastogne, they failed to take the city. The Allied forces did not break, and meanwhile Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s Third Army was rushing to relieve Bastogne from the south in one of the most memorable mass maneuvers of that or any war.

On December 23 the weather cleared, freezing the ground and making it passable for armor. Allied planes filled the skies, and transports dropped supplies to the Bastogne defenders, then extremely short of ammunition. On Christmas Day, 2nd Armored Division gunners had a “turkey shoot” near the Meuse, destroying 82 German tanks. Then on December 26, Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams’s 37th Tank Battalion of the 4th Armored Division broke through the German lines, lifting the siege of Bastogne.

U.S. soldiers of the 4th Armored Division fire at German troops during the American advance to relieve the pressure on surrounded airborne troops at Bastogne, Belgium, December 27, 1944. (National Archives)

The battle now expanded as both sides poured in reinforcements. General of Panzer Troops Hasso Eccard von Manteuffel, commanding the Fifth Panzer Army, made Bastogne its principal effort, as the planned German drive on Antwerp turned into a struggle for Bastogne. Meanwhile, the Americans brought up significant amounts of artillery and armor. Allied

aircraft also attacked the German armor without letup, destroying large numbers of tanks. The last major German attack on the city occurred on January 4. Other smaller attacks took place until January 8, with the battle ending the next day. The fight for the city had claimed about 3,000 German and 2,700 American casualties; 782 Belgian civilians also died.

WILLIAM P. HEAD AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Abrams, Creighton Williams; Ardennes Offensive; Bayerlein, Fritz; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Manteuffel, Hasso Eccard von; McAuliffe, Anthony Clement; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Siegfried Line, Breaking the; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport

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Bataan, Battle of (January 7–April 9, 1942)

Key battle of the failed American defense of the Philippine Islands between 1941 and 1942. Bataan is a peninsula on the big island of Luzon; it is some 25 miles long and roughly 20 miles wide and extends south into Manila Bay. The peninsula figured prominently in General Douglas MacArthur's plans for defending the Philippines against a Japanese invasion. The original plan called for U.S. and Philippine forces to withdraw onto the Bataan Peninsula and there fight an extended defensive battle until reinforcements arrived from the United States.



MacArthur changed this plan prior to the U.S. entry into the war following the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. He believed that even with his mobilizing Philippine army and promised reinforcements from the United States, he could defend the entire Philippine Islands against a Japanese invasion. But when elements of Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu's Fourteenth Army landed at Lingayen Gulf on December 22, 1941, it became apparent that MacArthur's new plan would not work. Japanese forces quickly broke through MacArthur's lines north and south of Manila, forcing him to fall back on the original plan but not in orderly fashion. Vast quantities of supplies were lost in the process.

By the end of December, more than 67,500 Filipino and 12,500 U.S. troops as well as 26,000 civilians, were on the Bataan Peninsula. The shortage of supplies put everyone on half rations. Malnutrition, dysentery, and malaria were soon commonplace, with many soldiers unable to fight.

Still, U.S. and Filipino troops put up a stout defense. They lost their main line of defense in late January 1942, but at their secondary line, they stopped Homma's forces by mid-February. The defenders bravely fought on, halting two battalion-sized Japanese landings in late January and early February.

Meanwhile, most of Homma's best troops were diverted to the Netherlands East Indies; with more than 2,700 dead, 4,000 wounded, and 13,000 sick, Homma was temporarily unable to mount additional attacks.

MacArthur used this pause to shore up his defensive positions, but the realization that no relief force was coming from the United States caused bitter disappointment. The Americans and Filipinos called themselves the "Battling Bastards of Bataan." In the wake of U.S. defeats at Pearl Harbor, Guam, and Wake Island as well as the British defeat at Singapore, the resistance mounted in Bataan boosted morale on the American home front.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to leave the Philippines on March 11, and command of U.S.-Filipino forces fell to Major General Jonathan Wainwright, promoted to temporary lieutenant general. He inherited a hopeless cause. Homma received reinforcements, and his troops finally broke through the American-Filipino lines on April 3. MacArthur ordered Wainwright not to surrender, but the U.S. ground forces commander, Major General Edward P. King Jr., realizing that the cause was hopeless, decided to end the fight and capitulated on April 9.

A newspaper from April 9, 1942, displayed at a newsstand at a corner drugstore in Hayward, California, announcing the U.S. surrender of Bataan in the Philippines. (Library of Congress)

More than 20,000 Americans and Filipinos perished in the campaign, and roughly 2,000 escaped to the nearby island of Corregidor and fought on until they in turn were forced to surrender on May 6. The 76,000 prisoners of war of the battle for Bataan—some 64,000 Filipino soldiers and 12,000 Americans—then were forced to endure what came to be known as the Bataan Death March as they were moved into captivity. They had succeeded, however, in delaying the Japanese conquest of the Philippines for 148 days and briefly inspiring the Allied cause during the dark early days of U.S. participation in World War II.

LANCE JANDA

See also

Bataan Death March; Clark Field, Japanese Raid on; Corregidor, Battle of; Homma Masaharu; Iba Field, Attack on; King, Edward Postell, Jr.; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew

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Bataan and Corregidor, Recapture of (January 29–February 8, 1945)

Following the invasion of Luzon, the rapid advance of U.S. forces south on Manila imposed a major strain on supply lines back to the Lingayen Gulf. Securing Manila Bay was thus essential from a standpoint of supplying U.S. forces on Luzon. Although the Americans controlled the harbor, before it could be used for supply purposes they would have to secure the Bataan Peninsula and the island of Corregidor to the west.

Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army received the assignment of retaking Bataan and Corregidor. Major General Charles P. Hall's XI

Corps, consisting of the 38th Infantry Division and the 34th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the 24th Infantry Division, freed by the end of the Leyte Campaign, had been scheduled to land at Vigan on the northwest coast of Luzon but was now diverted to come ashore on the Zambales coast some 25 miles northwest of Bataan. It was to drive rapidly east across the base of the peninsula, cutting off Japanese forces, then push south with allied Filipino guerrillas to clear the peninsula. American intelligence grossly overestimated Japanese strength on Bataan at 13,000 men when there were in fact only some 2,800 troops on the peninsula, the principal unit being Colonel Sanonebu Nagayoshi's 39th Infantry Regiment.

On January 29, 1945, the 38th Division landed in the San Narciso area of Zambales Province. Surprise was complete, with the principal battle occurring in the rugged Zambales Mountains at the northern base of the peninsula, which the Americans named ZigZag Pass. The fighting was difficult, and the Americans took heavy casualties, despite substantial air support. Mopping-up operations were not completed until February 15.

The brutal fighting for ZigZag Pass claimed 338 Americans killed and 688 wounded. More than 2,400 Japanese perished, and 75 were wounded. Nagayoshi escaped with about 300 men and joined other Japanese farther south.

As other units of XI Corps swept south along the eastern coast of Bataan, on February 14 the 38th Division's 151st RCT went aboard ships of Task Group 78.3 at Olongapo in northwestern Bataan and proceeded to the southern tip of the peninsula. After the sweeping of mines—some of them of U.S. manufacture left from three years before—the next day the troops went ashore at Mariveles Harbor against little opposition. On February 21, Bataan was declared secure.

Corregidor was taken during February 16–22 following heavy U.S. naval bombardment and air strikes. Amphibious and airborne forces then assaulted the island. A reinforced battalion of the 34th Regiment of the 24th Division proceeded to the island by water from Mariveles, while the 503rd Parachute RCT arrived by air from Minanado. The subsequent fighting claimed U.S. casualties of 207 killed and 608 wounded; the Japanese sustained an estimated 6,600 killed and 19 prisoners. Several dozen Japanese stragglers survived in caves and tunnels, 20 of whom surfaced in January 1946. U.S.

Southwest Pacific theater commander General Douglas MacArthur returned to Corregidor on March 2, 1945, for an impressive flag-raising ceremony.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Hall, Charles Philip; Krueger, Walter; MacArthur, Douglas

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Bataan Death March (April 1942)

Forced march of 12,000 U.S. soldiers and 64,000 Filipino troops after the Japanese captured the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines. On April 3, 1942, Japanese general Homma Masaharu launched a new offensive against the Bataan defenders. The U.S. Far Eastern commander, General Douglas MacArthur, had ordered the troops to continue to fight, but six days later, with his men worn down by the strain of constant combat, disease, and starvation, Major General Edward P. King, commander of the forces on Bataan, ordered them to surrender. The troops had been on half rations since January.

Homma had decided that he would hold the prisoners at Camp O'Donnell, 100 miles away. The Japanese forced the prisoners to march 52 miles from Mariveles to San Fernando, Pampanga, in order to be transported by rail to Capas, Tarlac. They would then walk another 8 miles to Camp O'Donnell. King expressed concern about his men being able to make this trip given their condition and asked that trucks transport them to their final location. Homma rejected the request.

The trek began on April 10, 1942, and lasted for over a week. Temperatures during the day were in the high 90s, compounded by smothering tropical humidity. The march is remembered for its sheer brutality, but before it even began, each prisoner was searched, and anyone

found to possess a Japanese souvenir was executed on the spot. Allied soldiers were, for the most part, denied food and water by their guards until the completion of their journey. The only food that some received was a bit of rancid rice. The prisoners of war were given only a few hours of rest each night in crowded conditions. One of the worst forms of punishment inflicted on the captives was known as the sun treatment, in which the prisoner, denied any water, was forced to sit in the scalding Philippine sun without the protection of a helmet. Prisoners were beaten, kicked, and killed for falling behind or violating the smallest rule.

Between 7,000 and 10,000 of the prisoners died before reaching Camp O'Donnell. The Japanese were indifferent to both the poor health of their captives and their large numbers. Although a few of the prisoners escaped into the jungle, most were physically unable even to make the attempt. A number were murdered at random by their guards.

The start of the brutal Bataan Death March of American soldiers taken prisoner by the Japanese in the Philippines. (Library of Congress)

Many who survived the march died in the overcrowded, suffocating boxcars on the rail trip to Capas. In the two months after reaching the camp,

1,600 Americans and 16,000 Filipinos died of starvation, disease, and maltreatment. The cruelty of the march became well known, and U.S. commanders used the story of the Bataan Death March to motivate their troops in subsequent fighting against the Japanese.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM

See also

Bataan, Battle of; Homma Masaharu; King, Edward Postell, Jr.; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew; Document 137

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Batov, Pavel Ivanovich (1897–1985)

Soviet Army general who served with the Bryansk Front and in the Battle of Kursk, among many other engagements. Born on June 1, 1897, in the village of Filisovo in the Rybinsk region of Yaroslavl Province, Russia, Pavel Batov entered the army in 1915 during World War I and fought on the Russo-German front. He won two St. George crosses and was wounded in combat in 1917. On his recovery, he was assigned to the noncommissioned officer (NCO) school in Petrograd, where he became a convert to Bolshevism.

Batov joined the Red Army in August 1918 and fought in the Russian Civil War. Between 1926 and 1927, he attended the Vystrel Officers' School. On graduation, he took command of a battalion of the 1st Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division. He served with this division for nearly nine years, commanding its 3rd Rifle Regiment in 1933. In 1936 and 1937, he served as an adviser to the Republican side in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War and was twice wounded.

Promoted to brigade commander on his return to the Soviet Union in December 1937, Batov took command of the X Rifle Corps. In early 1938, he assumed command of the III Rifle Corps. At the same time, he served on a special commission to recommend the restructuring of Red Army mechanized and motorized forces. The commission's report, approved in November 1939, unwisely recommended abolishing the army's 4 tank corps and replacing them with 15 smaller motorized divisions.

Batov's III Corps of four divisions participated in the September 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland and in the February–March 1940 phase of the Soviet invasion of Finland. His service in Finland earned him promotion to lieutenant general in June 1940, and soon thereafter, he was named deputy commander of the Transcaucas Military District. In June 1941, Batov was summoned to Moscow and given command of the IX Separate Rifle Corps in the Crimea. No sooner had he taken up his post then the Germans invaded the Soviet Union.

In October 1941, Batov became deputy commander of the Fifty-First Special Army. From January to February 1942, he commanded the Third

Army of the Bryansk Front, and from February to October 1942, he was deputy front commander. He then headed the Fourth Tank Army, the redesignated Sixty-Fifth Army, in the Stalingrad area. Following the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in January 1943, Batov fought in the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943), the crossing of the Dnieper River, and the drive through Belorussia into East Pomerania and across the Oder River. Batov was popular with his men because he was one of the few senior officers who visited the front lines and conversed with the soldiers.

Promoted to colonel general in June 1944, Batov was in the Northern Group of Forces between 1944 and 1948 and was first deputy commanding general of Soviet forces in the occupation of East Germany. Promoted to army general in 1955, he commanded the Carpathian Military District from 1955 and 1958 and participated in suppressing the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Batov commanded the Baltic Military District between 1958 and 1959 and the Southern Group of Forces in 1961 and 1962. He served as chief of staff of Warsaw Pact forces between 1962 and 1965. He then served as inspector general in the Soviet Ministry of Defense until his death in Moscow on April 19, 1985.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BAGRATION, Operation; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Kursk, Battle of; Stalingrad, Battle of; Soviet Union, Army

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Battle Cruisers

Large armored cruisers that incorporated the speed and generally the armor of a cruiser but with the armament of a battleship. The original concept for this ship was developed by Italian naval constructor Colonel Vittorio Cuniberti in the early 20th century. The first power to fully endorse Cuniberti’s ideas was

Great Britain, through the work of First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher, who viewed this ship type as capable of performing the duties of cruisers and battleships.

Germany and Japan built these ships in tandem with the British in the years before and during World War I (the United States began six as a result of the 1916 naval building program but finished none). Each country pursued its own designs, the Germans placing more emphasis on armor than their British rivals. In the 1916 Battle of Jutland, poor armor protection contributed to the destruction of three British battle cruisers, whereas the Germans lost only one. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 discontinued construction of battle cruisers, and many of the surviving units were scrapped.

By the beginning of World War II, two nations retained some of their World War I–era battle cruisers. The British maintained the two ships of the Renown class. As built, the *Renown* and *Repulse* measured 794 feet in overall length and 90 feet in beam and displaced 30,835 tons at full load. They were protected by an armor belt with a maximum thickness of 6 inches. They mounted a primary armament of 6 15-inch guns as well as 17 4-inch guns (following a major refit, the *Renown* substituted 20 4.5-inch guns for its 4-inchers). Their engines produced a maximum speed of 30 knots. The British also operated the battle cruiser *Hood*, completed in 1920 to a World War I design, that displaced 45,200 tons fully loaded on a hull that measured 860 feet in length and 104 feet in beam and was protected by armor with a maximum thickness of 12 inches. It was armed with 8 15-inch guns and 12 5.5-inch weapons. Its engines could produce a speed of 31 knots.

The Japanese also retained their battle cruisers from World War I. These were the four ships of the Kongo class. They measured 704 feet in length and 92 feet in beam and originally displaced 32,200 tons fully loaded. The ships were rebuilt between the wars to be both faster and better protected. Their hulls were protected by belt armor with a maximum thickness of 8 inches. They were armed with 8 14-inch and 14 6-inch guns and could steam at a maximum speed of 27.5 knots. After reconstruction between 1927 and 1931, these four ships were reclassified as battleships.

France built two battle cruisers in the interwar period—the two ships of the Dunkerque class completed in 1937 and 1938. The *Dunkerque* and *Strasbourg* displaced 35,500 tons fully loaded, measured 703 feet 9 inches in length and 102 feet in beam, and were protected by belt armor of a maximum

thickness of 9.75 inches. They were armed with 8 13-inch and 16 5.1-inch guns. Their maximum speed was 29.5 knots.

The United States ordered six battle cruisers, of the Alaska class, during World War II but completed only two, both officially classified as large cruisers. Completed in 1944, the *Alaska* and *Guam* displaced 34,253 tons fully loaded on hulls that measured 808 feet 6 inches in length and 91 feet 1 inches in beam and were protected by armor 9 inches in thickness. Their armament consisted of 9 12-inch and 12 5-inch guns. These ships could steam at a maximum speed of 33 knots.

World War II battle cruisers were employed in a variety of duties that included surface action, shore bombardment, antiaircraft fire support to protect aircraft carriers, and occasional service as convoy escorts, in the case of the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. The majority of these ships were lost in the war. Surface action claimed the British battle cruiser *Hood* when design deficiencies in its armor resulted in a magazine explosion while the vessel was engaged with the German battleship *Bismarck.* The British battle cruiser *Repulse* succumbed to Japanese air attacks off Malaya. All four of the Japanese battle cruisers were sunk by air, surface, or submarine attacks. Finally, both of the French battle cruisers were scuttled to prevent their capture by the Germans.

Only the U.S. Alaska-class ships and the British *Renown* survived the war, but these ships were scrapped after the conflict—the *Renown* in 1948 and the *Alaska* and *Guam* in 1961.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Battleships; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Central Pacific Campaign; France, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Japan, Navy; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Sinking of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; United States Navy

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Battleships

Large complex warships that had the primary mission of establishing control of the seas. Battleships were the toughest warships built. Despite yielding pride of place to the aircraft carrier as the principal sea-control and power-projection warship, battleships remained useful throughout World War II in carrying out a wide array of tasks.

The major naval powers continued to build battleships into World War II. The construction of these capital ships was only arrested under the pressure to construct submarines, antisubmarine warships, landing craft, and aircraft carriers. Italy and Germany launched new battleships as late as 1939 and 1940. Germany's *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz* were 41,700 tons, mounted eight 15-inch guns, and were capable of making a speed of 29 knots. Italy's *Vittorio Veneto, Italia, Roma,* and *Impero* (the latter never finished) displaced 40,700 tons, mounted nine 15-inch guns, and were capable of 30 knots.

The vulnerability of the battleship to aerial attack was finally demonstrated on November 11, 1940, when three Italian battleships were hit at anchor in Taranto Harbor by aging British Swordfish torpedo bombers from the carrier *Illustrious.*

It took only four days, December 7 to 10, 1941, for the Japanese Navy to emphasize that the battleship was no longer the capital ship of the world's navies. Building on the Taranto example, Japanese naval airpower crippled the U.S. Navy's Pacific battleship fleet during the attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Even after that destruction, there were still those who argued that a well-handled battleship, under way and with good antiaircraft protection, could beat off an aerial assault. They were proven incorrect on December 10, when the modern Royal Navy battleship *Prince of Wales* (36,700 tons, 10 14-inch guns, 29 knots) and the aging battle cruiser *Repulse* (17,300 tons, 6 15-inch guns, and 32 knots), under way and defended by an array of antiaircraft guns, were sunk in short order by Japanese naval warplanes. Yet those four days in December simply confirmed a trend that

was already in effect: by that time, no nation was laying down any new battleships.

In November 1941, the Royal Navy had begun the *Vanguard* (44,500 tons, eight 15-inch guns, and 30 knots), but this battleship was not completely new, having been constructed to put to use the 15-inch guns and turrets removed from two battle cruisers that had been converted to aircraft carriers following World War I. The *Vanguard*, leisurely constructed, was not commissioned until 1946, but the French battleship *Jean Bart*, finished in 1955, was the world's last battleship to be completed.

Nonetheless, battleships were still so valued during World War II that all of the capital ships from World War I and the immediate interwar era that had escaped the scrapping frenzy of the 1920s were pressed into combat service. For example, the Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth–class ships, all but one of which—the *Queen Elizabeth* (27,500 tons, eight 15-inch guns, 23 knots)—had fought at Jutland, saw hard service in this new war. Only the Royal Navy, however, could boast of battleships that had fired their main batteries in battleship-to-battleship clashes in both world wars.

Most of the later World War I–era battleships that survived into World War II had been extensively modernized in the 1930s to protect them against air and submarine attacks, and in all cases they were converted to oil-fired propulsion. Although the main armament remained remarkably constant, virtually all World War I–era battleships were extensively rebuilt to afford much greater elevations for the main batteries. In terms of both dollars and time, the cost entailed in rebuilding these ships usually exceeded the original cost of construction.

Construction of the battleships that served in World War II, with the exception of the *Vanguard*, had been started before their nations had opened hostilities. (The last two units of the U.S. Navy's last battleships of the Iowa class were indeed started six months after Pearl Harbor, but the *Illinois* and *Kentucky* [48,000 tons, nine 16-inch guns, and design speed of 32.5 knots] were never completed.)

Battleship duties in World War II were not all that different from those in World War I: convoy escort and line-of-battle actions, although shore bombardment received far greater emphasis. There were only two line-of-battle fleet actions and but few battleship-to-battleship clashes. Among the latter category, the Royal Navy battle cruiser *Hood* (42,700 tons, 8 15-inch

guns, 31 knots) and battleships *Barham* (same statistics as the *Queen Elizabeth*) and *Resolution* (28,000 tons, 8 15-inch guns, 24 knots) attacked the stationary French *Bretagne* and *Provence* (both 22,200 tons, 10 13.4-inch guns, 20 knots) and *Dunkerque* and *Strasbourg* (both 26,500 tons, 8 13-inch guns, and 29.5 knots) at Mers-el-Kébir (Oran, Algeria) on July 8, 1940. The 15-inch shells from the British ships sank the *Bretagne* and heavily damaged the *Provence* and *Dunkerque.* Return fire lightly damaged the *Hood.*

At Dakar in West Africa, the *Resolution* and *Barham* engaged in a gunnery duel with the 95 percent completed *Richelieu* in September 1940, in the course of which a French submarine severely damaged the *Resolution.* The *Prince of Wales, King George V,* and *Rodney* (33,300 tons, nine 16-inch guns, 23 knots) participated in the sinking of the powerful German battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941; in November 1942, the U.S. Navy's *Washington* (37,500 tons, nine 16-inch guns, 28 knots) sank the Japanese battleship/battle cruiser *Kirishima* (32,100 tons, eight 14-inch guns, 30 knots, as rebuilt). The *South Dakota* suffered some moderate damage in the same action. Also in November 1942, the *Massachusetts* (38,000 tons, nine 16-inch guns, 27.5 knots) hit the uncompleted and stationary French *Jean Bart* (38,500 tons, eight 15-inch guns, 32 knots as designed but with only four 15-inchers in this action) with seven 16-inch shells at Casablanca, and in December 1943 the Royal Navy's new *Duke of York* (same characteristics as the *Prince of Wales*) sank the German *Scharnhorst* (31,900 tons, nine 11-inch guns, 32 knots) off North Cape, Norway.

The only battleship fleet actions of World War II took place on July 9, 1940, off Calabria, southern Italy, and on October 25, 1944, at Surigao Strait, near Leyte, Philippines. In the first action, the British battleships *Warspite* and *Malaya,* both Queen Elizabeth–class vessels, and the R-class *Royal Sovereign,* supported by an aircraft carrier, 5 cruisers, and 16 destroyers, encountered an Italian fleet with the rebuilt World War I–vintage battleships *Cavour* and *Cesare* (25,900 tons, 10 12.6-inch guns, 28 knots as rebuilt), 14 cruisers, and 16 destroyers. The Italian fleet disengaged after the *Warspite* moderately damaged the *Cavour* with an extreme range hit.

At Surigao Strait, a fleet consisting of the aging U.S. battleships *West Virginia* (31,800 tons, 8 16-inch guns, 21 knots), *California, Mississippi, Tennessee,* and *Pennsylvania* (all 32,000–32,300 tons, 12 14-inch guns, 21 knots), and *Maryland* (31,500 tons, 8 16-inch guns, 21 knots), with seven

U.S. and one Australian cruisers and four destroyer squadrons, sank the Japanese battleships *Fuso* (30,600 tons, 12 14-inch guns, 22.5 knots) by destroyer torpedoes and the *Yamashiro* by gunfire and destroyer torpedoes. The *West Virginia* inflicted the most damage, with its 16-inch guns directed by the Mk 8 gunfire control radar.

Not surprisingly, the Japanese Navy, with its fixation on the concept of the decisive battle, was also the most battleship-minded of any navy engaged in World War II. Although the Japanese built the largest battleships in history (the Yamato class), both completed units—the *Yamato* and *Musashi* (62,300 tons, 9 18.1-inch guns, 27 knots)—were sunk by U.S. naval airpower.

Perhaps the most impressive battleships from World War II are those of the U.S. Navy's Iowa class. These magnificent warships have an unmatched battle history, having fought in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War (the *New Jersey* only [48,100 tons, 9 16-inch guns, 32.5 knots]), and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. All four units easily reached 30-plus knots during their reactivation in the 1980s.

Throughout World War II, the battleships performed magnificently in a shore-bombardment role. They also served effectively as antiaircraft platforms for the aircraft carriers and as fast oilers for the destroyers. Eight battleships of World War II remain in existence as museum pieces, and all are American: the *Texas* (27,000 tons, 10 14-inch guns, 21 knots), which also served in World War I, as well as the *Massachusetts*, *North Carolina*, *Alabama*, *Iowa*, *New Jersey*, *Missouri*, and *Wisconsin.*

STANLEY SANDLER

See also

Battle Cruisers; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Iowa-Class U.S. Navy Battleships; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States Navy; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Bay of Biscay, Battle of (December 28, 1943)

After the invasion of the Soviet Union severed German land access to strategic raw materials such as rubber and tin, blockade-runners became essential to the Axis war effort, and the Kriegsmarine maintained destroyers and fleet torpedo boats on the French Biscay coast to escort blockade-runners into port during the dangerous final leg of their voyage. On December 27, 1943, two German flotillas sortied to meet the blockade-runner *Alsterufer*, not realizing that Allied aircraft had surprised and sunk it the day before. The German units were the 8th Destroyer Flotilla (Captain Hans Erdmenger), with the *Z27*, *Z23*, *Z24*, *Z32*, and *Z37*, and the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla (Corvette Captain Franz Kohlauf), with the *T23*, *T22*, *T24*, *T25*, *T26*, and *T27*. Two British light cruisers, the *Glasgow* and *Enterprise*, which had been hunting the *Alsterufer*, were south of the Germans and, learning of their mission from signals intelligence, moved to intercept.

The German flotillas united just after noon on December 28 and swept eastwardly. The sea was rough with a strong easterly wind. Conditions were difficult aboard the German Type 36A destroyers, which were poor sea boats, and they were worse for the torpedo boats, which had green seas breaking over their bows and spray inundating their bridges.

At 1:32 p.m., the *Glasgow* spotted the Germans, and eight minutes later, the *Z23* saw the British cruisers bearing down. At this point, the Germans were steaming south by southeast in three columns. Almost immediately, Erdmenger ordered a torpedo attack, which was impractical due to the range and rough seas. Meanwhile, the British closed, and at 1:46 p.m., the *Glasgow* fired the first salvo from a range of 18,000 yards.

Initially, both forces ran south-southeast trading long-range broadsides. At 1:56 p.m., Erdmenger ordered another torpedo attack, and the *Z32*, *Z37*, and *Z34* took station to port and edged toward the cruisers. At 2:05 p.m., a

shell from the *Z32* struck the *Glasgow*, killing two men. At 2:15 p.m., the *Z37* fired four torpedoes from 14,000 yards.

Erdmenger then decided to divide his force, even though German shooting had been at least as good as that of the British. At 2:19 p.m., the *T26, T22, T25, Z27,* and *Z23* turned north as *Z32, Z37, Z24, T23, T24,* and *T27* continued southeast. The *Z27* turned toward the British rather than away, and the flagship became the first German vessel damaged when a 6-inch shell from the *Enterprise* penetrated a boiler room and ignited a huge fire.

As the Germans divided, the *Glasgow* joined the *Enterprise* and ranged its turrets on the three torpedo boats heading north. At 2:54 p.m., the *Glasgow* damaged the rear warship, the *T25.* Then the *Glasgow* shifted fire to the *T26* and hit its boiler room.

After temporarily disengaging to clear some gun defects, the *Enterprise* joined the *Glasgow,* and the two cruisers sank the *T26,* the most southerly of the three damaged ships, at 4:20 p.m. The *Enterprise* dispatched the *T25* at 4:37 p.m. with a single torpedo. Finally, the *Glasgow* located the *Z27* drifting with all guns silent. It closed and exploded the German destroyer's magazines at 4:41 p.m. The British cruisers then made for Plymouth. The *Glasgow* had been hit once, while the *Enterprise* received minor splinter damage from numerous near misses. The rest of the German force safely made port.

The Germans fired 34 torpedoes from impossibly long ranges in eight separate attacks, but in rough conditions with extended visibility, the better gun platform prevailed. The German commander's decision to divide his flotilla also proved ill-advised, as afterward ranges dropped. In the engagement, the Germans lost three ships.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Blockade-Running; Destroyers; Les Sept Iles, Action off

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Bay of Biscay Offensive (February–August 1943)

Major anti–U-boat operation conducted by the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Air Force. Beginning in January 1942, Allied maritime patrol aircraft carried out air antisubmarine transit patrols in the Bay of Biscay. The advent of the new 10cm radar in late 1942 and new methods of operations research encouraged a fresh approach to the flagging campaign there. The revised concept foresaw a continuous barrier patrol of the U-boat transit exit routes from the Bay of Biscay into the Atlantic by a total of 260 aircraft equipped with brand-new ASV Mk III 10cm-band radars. Operational command would lie with the Number 19 Group of the Royal Air Force's Coastal Command. Allied projections for success were vague and excessively optimistic, but the planners assumed correctly that it would take the Germans at least four months to respond effectively to the new 10cm radar.

The actual offensive was preceded by three trial phases: Operations GONDOLA (February 4–16, 1943), ENCLOSE I (March 20–28, 1943), and ENCLOSE II (April 5–13, 1943). Beset by difficulties, such as the withdrawal of the U.S. Army Air Force's Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers, slow delivery of the ASV Mk III radar, and lack of aircraft, the operations were nonetheless a success in that they demonstrated an increased efficiency in aircraft allocation and in U-boat sightings.

British air marshal Sir John C. Slessor, head of Coastal Command, decided to launch the full-scale offensive (Operation DERANGE) on April 13 with 131 aircraft. The repeated, accurate night attacks by the Vickers Wellington medium bombers of Number 172 Squadron, then the only Coastal Command aircraft equipped with new ASV Mk III radars and Leigh lights, produced instant, although unforeseen, results. The failure of the German threat receivers to warn the U-boats of the incoming aircraft and the success of two U-boats in shooting down the attacking planes convinced the German U-boat command that the remedy was to give up the night surface transit and order the U-boats to fight it out with aircraft while on the surface during daylight hours.

Coastal Command aircraft wreaked havoc among the grossly overmatched U-boats during those daylight battles. In May alone, six U-boats were destroyed and seven were so severely damaged that they had to return to

their bases. In turn, the U-boats accounted for only 5 of 21 aircraft lost by the Coastal Command in the Bay of Biscay that month.

The German withdrawal from the North Atlantic convoy routes following the "Black May" of 1943 allowed Slessor to step up the operation with additional air assets. The Germans took to sending the U-boats in groups in order to provide better antiaircraft defense, yet in June four U-boats were lost and six others severely damaged. DERANGE peaked in July, when Allied aircraft claimed 16 U-boats—among them 3 valuable Type XIV U-tankers—compelling Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz to call off a planned operation in the Western Atlantic.

German losses in the Bay of Biscay dropped considerably thereafter, but the air patrols remained a formidable obstacle throughout the remainder of the war by forcing the U-boats to stay submerged for most of the time during transit. Although the Battle of the Atlantic was ultimately won around the convoys, the Bay of Biscay Offensive contributed to the success by preventing many U-boats from reaching their operational areas in time to saturate convoy defenses, as they had done in March 1943.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Leigh Light; Radar; Slessor, Sir John Cotesworth; Submarines

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Bayerlein, Fritz (1899–1970)

German Army lieutenant general whose various commands included the Panzer Lehr Division. Born in Würzburg, Germany, on January 14, 1899, Fritz Bayerlein joined the German Army at age 16 and fought on the Western Front in World War I. He entered the Reichswehr in 1921 and was

commissioned a second lieutenant in January 1922. Bayerlein held a variety of positions in the interwar years and was a major at the beginning of World War II in September 1939.

During the invasion of Poland, Bayerlein served as chief of staff of the 10th Panzer Division, part of General of Panzer Troops Heinz Guderian's XIX Corps. Bayerlein was also operations officer for Panzer Group Guderian in the May 10–July 11, 1940, Battle for France and was promoted to lieutenant colonel that September. He continued to serve with Guderian as the operations officer of Guderian's Second Panzer Group in the first three months of the invasion of the Soviet Union.

In October 1941, Bayerlein was transferred to North Africa as chief of staff to General of Panzer Troops Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps (Africa Corps). Bayerlein became chief of staff for Panzer Army Afrika in April 1942 and was promoted to colonel. On August 30 when General of Panzer Troops Walther Nehring was wounded at the start of the Battle of Alam Halfa (August 31–September 7, 1942), Bayerlein took command of the Afrika Korps. He again led a decimated Afrika Korps during its long retreat after the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942). Wounded during the last days of the fighting in North Africa, he was evacuated prior to the Axis surrender on May 13, 1943.

Bayerlein was promoted to major general in July 1943. In October he took command of the 3rd Panzer Division, beginning his second tour on the Eastern Front. The division distinguished itself in the face of heavy odds, and his breakout of encirclement at Kirovgrad in January 1944 permitted the escape of his and four other German divisions.

Bayerlein then commanded the newly formed Panzer Lehr Division, which he led from its creation in early 1944 until February 1945. Under Bayerlein, who was promoted to lieutenant general in May 1944, the division fought in Normandy. The division helped slow the British advance on Caen but was decimated by the massive air attack on July 25 at Saint-Lô in Allied Operation COBRA (July 25–31, 1944). Later reconstituted, the division was a unit of the XLVII Panzer Corps of General of Panzer Troops Hasso Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army in the fighting at Bastogne during December 19, 1944–January 9, 1945. In February 1945 Bayerlein commanded LIII Corps, which included remnants of his old Panzer Lehr Division, and he defended the Ruhr Pocket until its surrender on April 15, 1945.

Bayerlein was held as a prisoner of war until 1947. Following his release, he wrote about his wartime impressions and experiences in North Africa, in the Soviet Union, and on the Western Front. He also contributed more than 20 studies to the postwar German Military History Program. His postwar reminiscences offer insightful historical analyses of Germany's leaders and military campaigns. Bayerlein died in Würzburg on January 30, 1970.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Afrika Korps; Alam Halfa, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Armored Warfare; Bastogne, Battle for; COBRA, Operation; El Alamein, Battle of; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; France, Battle for; Germany, Army; Guderian, Heinz; Nehring, Walther Kurt; North Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Ruhr Land Campaign; Saint-Lô, Battle of; Tunisia Campaign

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Bayonet

Thrusting weapon attached to the end of a rifle. Developed during the early to mid-17th century in Bayonne, France, the bayonet gave a musketeer a means by which to defend himself during close combat. It eventually rendered obsolete the foot soldiers with pole arms who were employed to protect the musketeers.

The first bayonets were simply inserted into the muzzle of the barrel. This action, however, rendered the firearm useless for its intended purpose. Such plug bayonets were later replaced with the socket style of bayonet that fit over the barrel itself, an invention sometimes attributed to Marquis Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban. Such bayonets use a metal stud or the front sight to

stay aligned. A simple pressure fit or a locking ring keeps the bayonet attached. The blade is offset from the barrel, allowing the firearm to be loaded and fired with the bayonet mounted. By the 20th century most bayonets were attached, by means of a spring-loaded catch, to a separate lug mounted next to the barrel.

Most early bayonet blades had a triangular cross section. In the early 19th century, long sword bayonets with flat, knifelike cross sections made their appearance. By the 20th century, this style of bayonet was dominant, although numerous other shapes, including the cruciform and the spike, could also be found.

By World War II, the bayonet had lost prominence as a fighting weapon. Its length and weight, which had proven cumbersome in the trenches of World War I, also affected the accuracy of the firearm to which it was attached. Furthermore, many bayonets were expensive to produce, ill-suited as fighting knives, and of little use to the soldier requiring a utility knife capable of opening cans or hammering tent pegs. More important, however, the increased use of rapid-fire semiautomatic and fully automatic weapons had made close combat an increasingly rare occurrence.

Today's soldier still carries the bayonet, but incorporating the experiences of World War II and later conflicts, it is short, well balanced, and strong. It is also capable of performing numerous tasks, both as a weapon and as a tool.

STEPHEN L. GIBBS

See also

Rifles

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Bazooka

U.S. antitank weapon developed during World War II. The bazooka was based on the hollow- or shaped-charge principle. By the spring of 1942 the U.S. Army had produced an excellent M-10 shaped-charge grenade capable of stopping German tanks, but it lacked an effective means of delivery. U.S. Army colonel Leslie Skinner charged Lieutenant Edward G. Uhl with developing a delivery system for the grenade. Uhl created a small rocket but needed a means of both aiming the weapon and protecting the person firing it from the rocket exhaust. Passing by a scrap pile, Uhl saw a piece of pipe about the same size as the grenade, and that became the solution. Uhl then developed the rocket launcher and is generally credited as the inventor of the bazooka. The prototype M1 was produced at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., with the help of Clarence Hickman, who had worked for rocket pioneer Robert H. Goddard, who had developed a tubed rocket for the army in 1918.

U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall learned of the experiments and immediately ordered production of 5,000 bazookas, now officially designated Launcher, Rocket, Anti-Tank, M1, to be ready in 30 days. General Electric accepted the contract on May 19, 1942. It is a considerable testimony to American manufacturing that this deadline was met, with 89 minutes to spare.

The M1 bazooka consisted of a sheet metal tube launcher with a wooden shoulder stock, hand grip, and sight (replaced by metal in production models), into which the 60.07mm-diameter (officially designated the “M6, 2.36-inch” to avoid confusion with rounds for the 60mm mortar) rocket grenades were inserted at the rear. The bazooka was operated by a two-man crew of gunner and loader.

The hand grip contained a trigger assembly that was an electric generator to send a current along a wire. Each rocket had two wires extending from the nozzle at its rear; when the rocket was packed, the wires were tucked along the body and grounded with a shorting cap. The loader pulled off the shorting cap before he placed the rocket in the rear of the launcher, then individually tied off the wires against electrical posts at the back of the launch tube that were connected to a two-cell dry battery. When the gunner squeezed the trigger, it generated an electric current through the wires to ignite the solid fuel in the rocket. The rocket had a diameter of 2.36 inches, and its tube launcher was 54 inches long. The rocket weighed 3.5 pounds, and tube and

rocket together were 18 pounds. The rocket's cast steel warhead contained 1.6 pounds of Pentolite high explosive. Skinner named the new weapon the "bazooka" after a long tubular custom-made musical instrument devised by then-popular radio comedian Bob Burns.

The 2.36-inch M1 rocket launcher was introduced in June 1942, and the improved M1A1 appeared in August 1943. The M9 bazooka, introduced in June 1943, was a major redesign and improvement of the original weapon. It was replaced in turn by the M9A1 in September 1944. The 2.36-inch rocket could penetrate about 80mm of armor and proved highly effective against German and Japanese tanks. The Germans used captured bazookas to produce their Raketenpanzerbüsche 54, also known as the *Panzerschreck* (tank terror), but firing a much more deadly 88mm rocket. That in turn spurred the Americans to upgrade from a 2.36-inch to a 3.5-inch rocket.

A U.S. soldier demonstrating the M1 2.36-inch bazooka in 1943. Developed in record time, this weapon was designed for use against enemy tanks. (Library of Congress)

During the Korean War, the 2.36-inch proved ineffective against the better-armored Russian T-34 tank. The 3.5-inch M20 superbazooka arrived in Korea by mid-July 1950. Putting more gas at greater temperature inside a

tank, it could knock out the T-34, the chief communist advantage in the early phase of that conflict.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
Antitank Guns and Warfare; Marshall, George Catlett

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Beaverbrook, First Baron/Lord

See Aitken, William Maxwell

Beck, Ludwig (1880–1944)

German Army general who was involved in attempts to overthrow German dictator Adolf Hitler. Born in Biebrich, Germany, on June 29, 1880, Ludwig Beck joined the army in 1898 and as a lieutenant attended the Kriegsakademie (War Academy) in Berlin from 1908 to 1911. Promoted to captain in 1913, he qualified as a General Staff officer the same year and served in a variety of staff and command positions during World War I on the Western Front.

Beck remained in the postwar Reichswehr, rising to command of the 1st Cavalry Division. Promoted to major general in February 1931 and to lieutenant general in December 1932, he was appointed, in October 1933, chief of the Truppenamt (Troop Office), the thinly disguised covert General Staff prohibited to the Germans under the 1919 Versailles Treaty. In 1933, Beck was the primary author of *Truppenführung* (Unit Command), which remained the principal war-fighting manual of the German Army until 1945.

The body of doctrine in that manual profoundly influenced the conduct of combined-arms warfare for the remainder of the 20th century.

In March 1935, the Truppenamt was redesignated the General Staff of the Army, and in May, Beck was promoted to General of Artillery. He presided over the expansion of the revived General Staff and the development of war plans based on a defensive strategy. His peers considered him a master military planner. He clearly understood that any future war would necessarily become a multifront conflict, which Germany could not win.

As late as 1935, however, Beck continued to believe that the officer corps of the German Army could keep the National Socialists under control. But as Chancellor Adolf Hitler continued the push to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938, Beck began to oppose him openly, writing a series of memoranda describing the inherent dangers in the policy of aggression. He attempted to mobilize other generals to oppose Hitler's policies but failed to gain the support of army commander in chief Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch.

In August 1938, Beck retired from the army and was promoted to colonel general. He then organized a covert opposition group of active and retired officers and other conservatives, maintaining contact with other democratic opposition movements. Beck also contacted London in an attempt to secure British and French support for a coup against Hitler. British prime minister Neville Chamberlain declined to support such a move, however. Shortly before the 1940 invasion of Belgium and France, Beck's group tried to warn the Belgians of an impending attack.

By 1943, Beck had become convinced that the only way to save Germany was to assassinate Hitler. His group tried several times, culminating in Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg's bomb attempt on July 20, 1944. If Stauffenberg had succeeded, the conspirators planned to use the Replacement Army (Ersatzheer) to establish martial law, seize the radio stations, and arrest the key Nazi and Schutzstaffel (SS) leaders. As the head of the planned interim government pending free elections, however, Beck refused to agree to the systematic summary execution of party and SS leaders to secure success.

Colonel General Ludwig Beck was chief of staff of the German army before the war. Retiring in 1938, he deeply despised Adolf Hitler and his plans for war and sought unsuccessfully through secret emissaries to convince the British to stand up to the German leader. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

When the conspirators learned that Stauffenberg had failed, Beck nonetheless insisted on continuing the putsch, called Operation VALKYRIE, saying that Germany deserved the attempt; it was unsuccessful. Arrested and confined in the Bendlerstrasse in Berlin, Beck was offered the privilege of shooting himself. When two tries only rendered him unconscious, a sergeant shot Beck in the neck, ending his life on the night of July 20–21, 1944.

Despite being unfairly and inaccurately painted by Heinz Guderian as a rigid and unimaginative opponent of armored warfare, Beck helped rebuild the German military into an efficient war-fighting machine.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Brauchitsch, Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von; Germany, Army; Guderian, Heinz; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Stauffenberg, Claus Philipp Schenk von

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Belgium

Belgium, situated in Northwestern Europe, is bordered by the North Sea and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the north, Germany to the east, Luxembourg to the southeast, and France to the west and south. Belgium encompasses some 30,500 square miles. The nation also possessed the vast Belgian Congo, which completely dwarfed the mother country in size.

At the beginning of World War II in September 1939, Belgium was a constitutional monarchy of some 8.2 million people sharply divided along linguistic lines: the Dutch-speaking Flemish provinces in the north and the French-speaking Walloon area of the south and Flanders. The capital, Brussels, was a Walloon preserve, and French speakers dominated the political, economic, and intellectual life of the nation. In the decades before the war, the Flemish areas were beginning to assert themselves, and a Flemish nationalist party, the Vlammsch National Verbond (VNV), held 17 seats in parliament.

Belgium followed a neutralist foreign policy. The nation had secured its independence from the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, and its neutrality and territorial integrity had been guaranteed by an international treaty signed by the major powers in 1839. The German government's decision to violate that neutrality in August 1914 at the beginning of World War I brought Britain into the war. Occupied by the German Army between

1914 and 1918, Belgium had then allied itself with France. With the increase in tensions in Europe, Belgium again sought refuge in neutrality in 1936. King Leopold III and the tripartite government of the Socialist, Catholic, and Liberal Parties renounced the French alliance. The government, however, proclaimed Belgium's right to maintain a military establishment to protect the nation from attack. This policy of armed neutrality found broad support among the Belgian people, who hoped that it might prevent another attack from the east.

In September 1939 when World War II began, Belgian premier Hubert Pierlot, leader of the Catholic Party, reiterated the government's resolve to remain neutral, and the government deployed the army along both the German and French borders. Belgians knew the true threat was from Germany, and the government reinforced the frontier with Germany following invasion alerts in November 1939 and January 1940. In the latter case, a German military aircraft had landed in Belgium by mistake, and its passenger was found to be carrying the entire German plan to invade the west, including Belgium.

Thus, the German invasion of May 10, 1940, did not catch the Belgian government by surprise. Indeed, some limited military plans had been made with Britain and France to prepare for that eventuality. Nonetheless, the Belgian military was quickly overwhelmed by German troops. Although there had been some coordination with the French and British, there were no prepared positions for the latter, and the military situation rapidly deteriorated. On May 25, King Leopold and his chief ministers met in Wynendaele and agreed on the need to end the military campaign in their country as quickly as possible. Leopold decided to remain in Belgium and share the fate of his subjects, whereas the ministers insisted that the government go to France, with whatever military forces could be withdrawn, to continue the fight against Germany. Both parties did what they believed to be appropriate.

King Leopold surrendered the Belgian Army unconditionally on May 28, without coordinating this decision with the allies who had come to the rescue of his country. This decision produced an immediate 30-mile gap between the British Expeditionary Force and the North Sea that rendered the British military position untenable and forced its evacuation from the French port of Dunkerque (Dunkirk), located only some 6 miles from the Franco-Belgian

border. Having taken this decision, Leopold then repaired to his palace at Laeken outside Brussels, where he remained under self-imposed isolation for the next four years before being removed to Germany in June 1944.

Leopold's ministers, meanwhile, fled to France, where they held a session of the Belgian parliament in Limoges on May 31 and criticized the king's actions. When France fell to the German Army in late June, the Belgian parliamentary representatives abandoned their effort to support the Allies and sought a rapprochement with the king, which he rejected. He—and most Belgians, for that matter—believed that the war was, in effect, over and that Germany had won. These parliamentarians then set up a Belgian government-in-exile in London. Belgian soldiers who escaped their country to Britain later formed the Independent Belgian Brigade, which operated under British command. Most of the 100 ships of the Belgian Merchant Marine evaded capture and, in accordance with a July 1940 agreement, operated under British control.

Following the surrender, German authorities promptly established an occupation government in Belgium. The German enclaves of Eupen, Malmédy, and Saint Vith, assigned to Belgium in the settlement following World War I, were promptly reintegrated into the Reich. A German Army administration nominally headed by General Ludwig von Falkenhausen ruled Belgium. Eggert Reeder, president of the military administration, was the real decision maker and also oversaw German authorities in Belgium, such as the Schutzstaffel (SS) and the Foreign Ministry. Reeder's priorities included advancing the position of the "Germanic" Flemish population at the expense of the francophone Walloons (in accordance with a July 1940 order from German leader Adolf Hitler), ensuring that Belgian industry was harnessed for the war machine of the Reich and administering Belgium with as little German manpower as possible.

On May 10, 1940, the Belgian parliament had passed a law allowing civil servants to administer the country in the absence of the political leaders, and the senior members of each department, the *secrétaries-généraux*, thus became the administrators of Belgium. Reeder worked through these officials in a system of indirect German rule, and although there were conflicts, the *secrétaries-généraux* agreed to maintain law and order and the nation's industrial and agricultural production.

Some Belgian elites were able to use this time of turmoil to enhance their

own positions. The Comité Galopin, a small group of influential bankers and industrialists, controlled the economy and ensured that Belgium provided Germany with the essential materials it required while maintaining their own interests. Many Belgians suffered terribly during the German occupation, however. The dislocation of the fighting and German requisitions led to a severe food shortage, and perhaps a fifth of the population was starving by the fall of 1940. King Leopold III was able to convince the Germans to scale back their requisitions of food, and he was also able to win some exemptions for women, war orphans, and children of war prisoners among those Belgians deported from the country to work in the Reich.

Resistance to the Germans, only sporadic at first, grew with the addition of the communists after the German invasion of the Soviet Union and as the overall German military situation deteriorated. Relations between these resistance groups and the government-in-exile in London were sometimes strained, however.

As in other countries occupied by the Germans, some people collaborated actively and were appointed to positions of influence as a result. The Germans also recruited an SS formation under Léon Degrelle for service on the Eastern Front. For most Belgians, however, the occupation produced a sense of solidarity against the occupier as they struggled to secure food, clothing, and shelter and as they lived with the ever-present risk of deportation to work in the Reich.

Belgium remained under German occupation until September 1944, when Allied troops arrived and rapidly liberated the country, with the Belgian parliament returning to Brussels. The sole feat of resistance by arms was the liberation of the port of Antwerp (September 4–October 2, 1944) and the prevention of its destruction by the German military, an important step. Some German forces remained on islands at the mouth of the Scheldt River until November 28, 1944, from which they were able to prevent the Allies from using the port.

On December 16, on Hitler’s orders, German forces launched what became the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), the goal of which was to take back Antwerp. During the course of the fighting, the Germans reoccupied part of Belgium, but in January 1945, Allied troops were again able to clear all Belgium of German control.

Belgium was fortunate in that the rapid German advance in 1940 and retreat in 1944 had left its cities and countryside relatively unscathed. Antwerp, the least bomb-damaged port in the Channel area, became a major Allied base in the closing campaigns of the war and was the target of a substantial number of German V-2 rockets in early 1945. The Belgian government took reprisals against collaborators, convicting some 53,000 men and women of assisting the enemy.

Shortly after V-E day (May 8, 1945), King Leopold III and members of the royal family were freed outside Strobl, Austria, by U.S. troops. The king became the center of political turmoil for having surrendered the army and for his refusal to go abroad with his ministers to support a government-in-exile. He was also suspected of having both German sympathies and authoritarian preferences. Then, too, he had compounded his unpopularity by his wartime marriage to a commoner. Leopold's brother, Prince Charles, the Count of Flanders, assumed the title of regent. A referendum in March 1950 gave Leopold a 58 percent favorable vote, but his return led to a major crisis, and he relinquished control of affairs to his son, Baudouin, who became king in 1951.

LAWTON B. WAY

See also

Antwerp, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Belgium, Air Force; Belgium, Army; Belgium Campaign; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Léopold III, King of the Belgians

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Belgium, Air Force

Formed in March 1920 as part of the Belgian Army, the Belgian Air Force had fewer than 250 aircraft in May 1940, including 90 fighters, 12 bombers, and 120 reconnaissance aircraft. Of this total, only 50 were relatively modern. Belgium produced some of its own planes, including the Renard R-31 reconnaissance aircraft, but most of its aircraft were acquired from Britain and the United States.

Belgian air bases lacked space to disperse the aircraft, and 53 planes were destroyed on the ground by the Luftwaffe at the beginning of the German invasion of Belgium on the morning of May 10, 1940. Two days later, the Belgians had only between 70 and 80 aircraft remaining. These planes, along with many Dutch aircraft, were incorporated into British and French units. In addition to providing ground support for Allied units, Belgian bombers also carried out one bombing mission in which two squadrons of nine bombers were sent to destroy bridges across the Albert Canal.

Although the strike was successful in hitting the targets, the light bombs the planes carried proved ineffective; moreover, six aircraft were lost. This action was the only independent mission carried out by Belgian aircraft during the campaign. Some Belgian Air Force units participated in the remainder of the Battle for France (May 10–July 11, 1940), in the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), and in the fighting on the Western Front between 1944 and 1945.

LAWTON B. WAY

See also

Belgium; Belgium, Army; Belgium Campaign; Britain, Battle of; France, Battle for

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Belgium, Army

In 1936, Belgium renounced its 1919 treaty of alliance with France and reasserted its traditional neutrality. As a consequence, Belgian forces did not carry out any joint maneuvers with their potential French and British allies before the German invasion of May 1940.

Belgium mobilized its armed forces beginning on August 25, 1939. With the outbreak of the war, the government immediately reaffirmed the nation's neutrality, retaining the right to strengthen its military to prevent attack. Belgian king Leopold III acted as commander in chief of the armed forces, which consisted of an army of 18 infantry divisions, 2 partly motorized divisions, and 2 motorized cavalry divisions in May 1940. In all, the army numbered some 600,000 men. Although impressive on paper, the army suffered from serious weaknesses. Both its men and officers were poorly trained and equipped. Further, the army had virtually no antiaircraft artillery and only 54 tanks (42 British Carden-Loyd M1934s and 12 French Renault AMC-35s). The navy consisted of only a few small coastal defense vessels.

In hopes of remaining neutral, King Leopold had prevented significant military coordination with the French and British military staffs. Although British and French forces did come to the aid of Belgium when it was invaded by German forces on May 10, 1940, the Germans breached the initial Belgian defensive line along the Albert Canal that same day. King Leopold then withdrew the bulk of his forces to a line east of Brussels. British and French troops reinforced the new line, but the German strike through the Ardennes Forest flanked it. Soon, the Allies were forced to abandon Brussels and the surrounding area.

By May 24 the Belgian Army had regrouped in western Flanders, where it was again supported by both French and British forces. The only major battle of the campaign occurred there on May 24–25, with Belgian forces again unable to hold off the superior German forces. On May 28, King Leopold surrendered his army. In addressing the House of Commons on June 4 concerning the Belgian defeat, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill said that the surrender was given "suddenly, without prior consultation, with the least possible notice" and that this action had "exposed our whole flank and means of retreat." Although Leopold's decision was definitely not the cause of the German victory, it rendered the British military

position untenable and led to the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkerque (Dunkirk) during May 26–June 4, 1940.

In the 18 days of fighting during the campaign, the Belgian Army nonetheless fought bravely, with limited resources. Belgian casualties amounted to some 7,500 killed and 15,850 wounded. An additional 2,000 who had been taken as prisoners of war died in German captivity. Some Belgian soldiers and airmen managed to escape to Britain, where they formed the Independent Belgian Brigade and operated under the British for the remainder of the war.

LAWTON B. WAY

See also

Belgium; Belgium, Air Force; Belgium Campaign; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Léopold III, King of the Belgians

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Belgium Campaign (May 10–28, 1940)

A key element of the German invasion of Western Europe. Belgium had proclaimed its neutrality and sought to avoid involvement in World War II, but to invade and defeat France swiftly, the Germans needed to secure Belgium. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, thereby initiating World War II, Belgium declared a state of armed neutrality. Prime Minister Hubert Pierlot resolved to defend the country against all invaders and deployed forces along both the French and the German borders.

Still, Belgians knew that the real danger lay to the east, and they had begun mobilizing their armed forces on August 25, 1939. By May 1940, their country fielded an army of more than 600,000 men organized into 22 divisions: 18 infantry divisions, 2 partially motorized Chasseurs Ardannais divisions, and 2 motorized cavalry divisions. Unfortunately for Belgium, this sizable force was hardly equipped to defeat a German invasion. The Belgians

possessed few antiaircraft guns and had only 42 light and 12 medium tanks. What's more, their air service had only 184 operational aircraft. Thus, Belgium had no hope of winning a prolonged land campaign with Germany without outside assistance.

German colonel general Fedor von Bock's Army Group B operated against Belgium and the Netherlands. The Germans committed Colonel General Walther von Reichenau's Sixth Army, with 17 infantry and 2 tank divisions, to the initial invasion of Belgium. It was to drive southwest. General of Artillery Georg von Küchler's Eighteenth Army of 11 divisions (9 infantry and 1 each of cavalry and tanks) was expected to subdue the Netherlands quickly and then drive south to join the fighting in Belgium.

German soldiers raise the Nazi flag at the Royal Castle at Lacken following the German invasion of Belgium in May 1940. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Although Belgian intelligence accurately forecast the German attack that occurred on May 10, 1940, no one anticipated the audacious German attack on the fortress of Eben Emael in the first hours of the fighting. Eben Emael was a series of concrete and steel emplacements north of Liège that guarded bridges over the Albert Canal at Briedgen, Veldwezelt, and Vroenhoven. Garrisoned by more than 700 men, it was crucial to Belgian defensive plans because the only hope of slowing the German panzers lay in keeping them east of the canal. German Army planners took special notice of Eben Emael for that reason, and at 5:25 a.m. on May 10, 1940, they sent 78 specially trained men of Assault Detachment Kock in gliders to crash-land on top of the fortress. The attackers employed hollow charges to destroy the key gun turrets and bunkers. At the same time, German paratroopers captured the major bridges. Troops of the 223rd Infantry Division followed close behind and took the rest of the Belgian position the next day. In less than 24 hours,

the Germans had breached the key Belgian defensive line on the Albert Canal.

Fighting bravely, the Belgians fell back to the Dyle Line east of Brussels, with King Leopold III in personal command. The British and French had planned to send their own forces into Belgium in the event of a German invasion, but there had been little prior coordination between Britain, France, and neutral Belgium. On May 12, however, elements of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and General Georges Blanchard's French First Army began joining the Belgian defenders, and by May 15, the Allies had some 35 divisions in the Namur-Antwerp area.

As Reichenau's Sixth Army probed the Dyle Line, Küchler's Eighteenth Army turned south from the Netherlands after the surrender of that country to the Germans on May 15. This threatened the Allied left flank. At the same time and to the south, the hammer blow of Colonel General Karl Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group A, heavy in tanks, was driving west and then north through the Ardennes Forest. The overall German plan, Operation SICHELSCHNITT (CUT OF THE SICKLE), worked to perfection.

On May 25, King Leopold III met with his ministers at the château of Wynendaele to discuss the possibility of surrender. His ministers wanted to flee to Great Britain and continue the war on the Allied side, but Leopold, despite a pledge to the British and French not to surrender unilaterally, believed that the campaign was lost and that he should end the fighting to save bloodshed and then remain to share the fate of his people. Leopold surrendered the Belgian armed forces on May 28. This exposed the left flank of the British-French line and ended any Allied hopes of holding part of Flanders. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill then ordered the Royal Navy to evacuate British forces at Dunkerque (Dunkirk).

The 18 days of the Belgian Campaign cost the nation some 7,500 troops killed in action and 15,850 wounded. At least 2,000 Belgian prisoners of war died in German captivity. The country remained under German occupation for the next four years.

LANCE JANDA AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Airborne Forces, Axis; Aircraft, Gliders; Belgium; Belgium, Air Force; Blanchard, Jean Georges Maurice; Bock, Fedor von; Dunkerque,

Evacuation of; Eben Emael, German Capture of; Küchler, Georg von; Léopold III, King of the Belgians; Reichenau, Walther von; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; SICHELSCHNITT, Operation

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Belorussia, Land Campaign, 1944

See BAGRATION, Operation

Belov, Pavel Alekseyevich (1897–1963)

Soviet Army general. Born at Shuya, Russia, on February 18, 1897, Pavel Belov joined the Russian Army as a private in 1916 during World War I and rose to noncommissioned officer. In 1919, he joined both the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party. During the Russian Civil War, he commanded a cavalry squadron.

Between 1922 and 1929, Belov led a cavalry regiment. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1934 and then was deputy commander and later commander of a cavalry division. From 1935 to 1940, he was chief of staff of a cavalry corps.

In 1940, Belov took command of the II Cavalry Corps, later redesignated the I Guards Cavalry Corps, which played a major role in halting the German advance on Moscow in December 1941. Promoted to lieutenant general, Belov took command of the Sixty-First Army from General Markian Popov in June 1942 and participated in heavy fighting with the Germans in the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943) and also around Voronezh. Promoted to colonel general in July 1944, Belov fought with his army in the recovery of

Ukraine (November 1943–July 1944) and the Soviet invasion of Poland (July 1944–April 1945). He then participated in the Berlin Offensive (March 31–May 2, 1945).

Following the war, Belov commanded the Southern Ural Military District from 1945 to 1955, then chaired the Voluntary Association for Support of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. He retired in 1960 and died in Moscow on December 3, 1963.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Berlin, Land Battle for; Kursk, Battle of; Poland–East Prussia Campaign; Popov, Markian Mikhailovich; Soviet Union, Army; Ukraine Campaign

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Beneš, Edvard (1884–1948)

Czech statesman and president of Czechoslovakia. Born on May 28, 1884, at Kozlany, Bohemia, Edvard Beneš studied at Charles University in Prague, the Sorbonne in Paris, and the University of Dijon, where he earned a doctorate in law in 1908. In 1909, Beneš was appointed professor of economics at the Prague Academy of Commerce, and in 1912, he became a professor of sociology at the University of Prague. There, he met Czech nationalist leader Tomáš G. Masaryk and came to embrace his social and political philosophies. As one of the leaders of the Czech nationalist movement against Austria, Beneš went abroad during World War I, first to Paris, where he worked as a journalist to promote the cause of Czech independence. That same year, he joined the Czechoslovakian National Council, recognized by the Allies in 1918 as the provisional government of Czechoslovakia.

Edvard Beneš, Czech patriot and president of Czechoslovakia (1935–1938, 1945–1948). (Library of Congress)

On his return to Prague at the end of the war, Beneš became the first foreign minister of the new state. From 1918 to 1935, he worked to strengthen the security of Czechoslovakia, the cornerstone of which was a 1924 alliance with France. In addition, he worked to cooperate with Romania and Yugoslavia, with the three states signing collective security arrangements that led to the so-called Little Entente. Beneš was also a tireless advocate of the League of Nations, the predecessor to the United Nations, serving as League Council chairman five times. He secured a mutual security pact with the Soviet Union in 1935.

In December 1935, Beneš succeeded Masaryk on the latter’s resignation as president of Czechoslovakia. The one problem he could not solve was that of the minorities in his nation. The Czechs were not even a majority of the population of the state, and there were serious problems with the Ukrainians,

the Slovaks, and especially the Germans. German leader Adolf Hitler pushed the demands of the latter from relief of grievances into annexation by the Reich of those areas in which Germans were a majority. Beneš and his government went as far as they could without actually ceding territory, but at the September 1938 Munich Conference, the British and French agreed to Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. A week later, Beneš resigned and went into exile in France.

Beneš became president of the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile in London in July 1940. He hoped to make his country a bridge between the East and the West, and he signed a 20-year treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union in 1943. He returned to Prague on May 16, 1945, stopping first in Moscow to confer with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

Beneš was reelected president in 1946, but his hopes of nonalignment ran afoul of the Cold War. The Soviets staged a coup d'état in Prague in February 1948, and Beneš was forced to accept communist control. Rather than agree to a new constitution that would legalize the communist seizure of power, he resigned on June 7, 1948. Beneš died in Sezimovo Üsti, Bohemia, on September 3, 1948.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

Czechoslovakia; France; Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Munich Conference and Preliminaries; Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph

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Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910–1986)

Royal Air Force (RAF) air vice marshal. Born in Toowoomba, Queensland, Australia, on September 14, 1910, Donald Bennett enlisted in the Australian Air Force as a young man, acquiring licenses as a pilot, navigator, wireless operator, and ground engineer. He resigned in 1935 to join British-based Imperial Airways, and in 1938 he set the world's long-distance air record for seaplanes in a flight from Dundee, Scotland, to South-West Africa.

In 1940, Bennett became flight superintendent of the Atlantic Ferry service, and that winter he piloted the first of thousands of American-built airplanes that would be flown to Britain. In 1941 he returned to the RAF, joining the Air Navigation School, where he began to develop pathfinding techniques for guiding bombers to their targets hundreds of miles distant. In 1942, he commanded Number 77 and Number 10 bomber squadrons at Leeming, Yorkshire. Shot down over Norway during an attack on the German battleship *Tirpitz*, Bennett escaped via Sweden and was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.

Shortly afterward, the British Air Ministry directed Bomber Command to establish the Pathfinder Force, and Bennett assumed command of Number 8 Group. The Pathfinder Force quickly developed great expertise in identifying and marking targets and effectively orientating bombers toward them. In 1943, Bennett was promoted to air vice marshal; his contributions to Bomber Command were a major factor in its success, but his relations with other bomber group commanders were often strained. In particular, his colleagues resented losing some of their best crewmen to Number 8 Group.

Bennett left the RAF at the end of the war to become a civil aviation executive. During the 1948–1949 Berlin Airlift, his private commercial aviation firm flew numerous flights to Berlin, 250 of them with Bennett himself piloting an aircraft. For some months in 1945, he had held a vacant seat in Parliament as a Liberal, but he lost it in the general elections that same year. He ran unsuccessfully as a Liberal in 1948 and 1950 and then ran again in 1967 as a decidedly reactionary National Party standard-bearer. Bennett died on September 15, 1986, at Wexham Hospital, Buckinghamshire, England.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Great Britain, Air Force; Pathfinders

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Bennett, Henry Gordon "Cocky" (1887–1962)

Australian Army general. Born in Melbourne, Australia, on April 15, 1887, Henry Bennett was an insurance clerk and reserve officer in the early years of the 20th century. When World War I began, he served in the Australian infantry with distinction in the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign and on the Western Front, winning recognition as an outstanding frontline commander. He was also known for his frequent complaints, self-promotion, tactlessness, and poor interpersonal skills.

Between the wars, Bennett pursued a successful business career and rose from colonel to major general in the Australian citizen armed forces. He resented and publicly criticized both permanent regular army officers and British military representatives. Bennett particularly disliked Sir Thomas Blamey, who headed the World War II Australian Infantry Force, a position Bennett coveted.

Despite his seniority, Bennett received no command until September 1940, when he headed the Australian 8th Division. In September 1941, he accompanied his force to Singapore, where his relations with his juniors and with British military officers were predictably fractious. When the Japanese invaded in January 1942, Bennett commanded Westforce on the peninsula, enjoying some initial successes against the Japanese troops. Withdrawing to Singapore Island, he commanded the Western Area, which bore the brunt of the main Japanese assault on February 8. After five days of fierce fighting, Bennett and others advised British commander Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Ernest Percival to surrender. When negotiations began, Bennett handed over

command of his force to a subordinate and with other Australian officers fled by sampan from Singapore, reaching Melbourne on March 2.

Bennett received a mixed reception. He was promoted and became commander of III Corps in Perth, but Blamey ensured that he received no further field command, and in May 1944, Bennett gave up active duty. He published a highly apologist book seeking to explain his conduct, an effort undercut when General Percival was released by the Japanese at the end of the war in August 1945 and wrote to Blamey condemning Bennett's action as desertion. A military court of inquiry ruled against Bennett, although a civilian commission exonerated him, a decision that was generally considered politically motivated. In retirement, Bennett cultivated an orchard farm and wrote extensively on military topics. He died at Dural, New South Wales, on August 1, 1962.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Australia; Australia, Air Force; Blamey, Sir Thomas Albert; Percival, Arthur Ernest; Singapore, Battle for

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Bergamini, Carlo (1888–1943)

Italian Navy admiral. Carlo Bergamini was born near Modena on October 24, 1888, and became a midshipman in 1908. Bergamini soon demonstrated a talent for technical matters and ballistics, publishing before 1915 studies of an improved fire-control computer. He was considered one of the four fathers of the Regia Marina's mechanical computer directors introduced after 1930.

In 1917, although still a lieutenant, Bergamini became fire-control officer of the armored cruiser *Pisa*, which on October 2, 1918, sank the Austro-Hungarian steamer *Stambul* at Durazzo. Bergamini was promoted to captain in 1932 and to rear admiral in 1937.

In August 1939, Bergamini was promoted to admiral and picked by Italian Navy chief of staff Admiral Domenico Cavagnari as chief of staff for fleet commander Admiral Inigo Campioni. During the spring of 1940, Bergamini was reassigned to fix problems associated with the 15-inch guns of Italy's new battleships *Littorio* and *Vittorio Veneto.* As a consequence, he missed the action off Calabria. Bergamini then supervised the salvage and recovery efforts of Italian ships damaged in the British air attack on Taranto of November 12, 1940. He was passed over for the position of commander of the Italian battle fleet in favor of Admiral Angelo Iachino when Campioni was removed from command, even though the navy's outgoing chief of staff, Cavagnari, considered him an aggressive leader and a first-class technician and had recommended him for the position.

In December 1941, Bergamini assumed command of the V Division of three modernized battleships: the *Doria*, *Duilio*, and *Cesare.* He left port immediately with the mission of escorting an important convoy to Libya at all costs. Interpreting his orders literally, he included his battleships inside the convoy as an antiaircraft screen.

On February 14, 1942, Bergamini sortied with the battleship *Duilio*, two light cruisers, and seven destroyers to intercept a British Malta convoy. The merchant ships in the convoy were disabled by air attacks and scuttled after the British learned of Bergamini's approach, and thus no action followed. In their return to base, the warships encountered a strong storm. Bergamini gave his commanders total freedom of maneuver, and damage was limited, with no ship losses, in stark contrast to the strict centralized control exercised by Admiral Iachino after the Second Battle of Sirte on March 22, 1942.

Bergamini assumed command of the battle force on April 5, 1943. He wanted to sortie on July 10 to attack British convoys off Sicily, although he recognized that with no air support and just two battleships against six (and two carriers) for the British, his chances would be slim. However, both Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and the navy chief of staff vetoed his request. On September 8, 1943, Bergamini was preparing to lead the fleet against the Allied forces off Salerno when news of the armistice arrived. Bergamini wanted to scuttle his ships, but Admiral Raffaele de Courten convinced him to sail them to the Sardinian base at La Maddalena instead. German bombers attacked the fleet at 3:50 p.m. on September 9 while en route, sinking the admiral's flagship *Roma* and taking his life and 1,252 of his men.

Bergamini was known as a humane commander who always demonstrated interest in the welfare of his men. He received the Medaglia d'Oro, Italy's highest military award, both from King Victor Emmanuel III and Mussolini's republic in 1944 and is today considered a key figure in the Italian Navy's history.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Calabria, Battle of; Campioni, Inigo; Cavagnari, Domenico; de Courten, Raffaele; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy; Sirte, Second Battle of; Taranto, Attack on

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Bergeret, Jean Marie Joseph (1895–1956)

French Army general and air minister in the Vichy government. Born in Gray, Haute Saone, France, on August 23, 1895, Jean Marie Joseph Bergeret volunteered for military service at the start of World War I in 1914 and was selected for special officer training at the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr. Immediately after graduation, he saw combat and distinguished himself, winning rapid promotion. After attending the French War College, he joined the Armée de l'Air, the French military air service, in 1928. He rose to air staff chief of operations and was promoted to brigadier general shortly before the beginning of World War II in 1939.

When Germany invaded France in May 1940, the marked French inferiority to Germany in the air caused Bergeret some humiliation. He remained loyal to the Vichy government, heading the commission that negotiated armistice terms with Italy in the summer of 1940. From September 1940 until April 1942, he served as air minister. The return to the government

of the collaborationist Pierre Laval, whom Bergeret despised, brought his resignation. Bergeret was then appointed inspector of air defenses.

In November 1942, just before the Allied invasion of North Africa, Bergeret joined General Henri Giraud in Algiers, where he became personal assistant and confidential adviser to Admiral Jean Darlan. Bergeret was in charge of the latter's headquarters security arrangements when Darlan was assassinated in his office in December 1942. From then until March 1943, Bergeret was deputy high commissioner for North Africa. In October 1943, a Gaullist purge of the National Resistance Council brought Bergeret's arrest and that of several other Vichy officials, and he was imprisoned until September 1945. Eventually, in November 1948, all charges against him were dropped, although his career was effectively over. Bergeret died in Neuilly, near Paris, on November 30, 1956.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France; France, Air Force; Giraud, Henri Honoré; Laval, Pierre; TORCH, Operation

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Berlin, Air Battle of (November 1943–March 1944)

Between November 1943 and March 1944, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command conducted 16 raids on the German capital in an attempt to defeat Germany by destroying Berlin. This effort was the third in a series of campaigns in 1943, with the first levied against German industrial production in the Ruhr Valley from April to July and the second launched against the city of Hamburg late in July.

The largest city in Germany, Berlin covered nearly 900 square miles. Attacking it not only would strike at the seat of power in the Third Reich but also would cripple a major industrial base for the German armed forces. Factories in Berlin contributed one-third of the Reich's electrical components as well as one-quarter of the army's tanks and half its field artillery.

Bolstered by the success of recent air raids, in particular the attack on Hamburg, British air chief marshal Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris believed that he could do the same with Berlin and force a German surrender. If he could get the Americans to join in, he expected losses to be between 400 and 500 aircraft. Because of its own recent heavy losses over Germany, though, the U.S. Army Eighth Air Force could not participate.

Despite this setback, Harris received approval in early November 1943 from Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill to begin the bomber offensive. Harris employed the RAF's new Avro Lancaster heavy bomber, as this four-engine aircraft had the requisite range to strike targets deep in German territory. The first raid, the largest battle that Bomber Command had yet fought, occurred on the night of November 18–19.

Attacking heavily defended Berlin was not an easy task. The city was ringed with a flak belt 40 miles wide and a searchlight band over 60 miles across. The defenses centered on 24 128mm antiaircraft guns grouped in eight-gun batteries on flak towers. Additionally, the city's extensive subway system provided underground shelter for the civilians. Only the Ruhr region was more heavily defended.

The British employed strips of foil, known as "Window," that were dropped from aircraft to jam German radar. To counter this, the Germans organized groups of single-engine fighters to attack the bombers as they were caught in searchlights. The Germans called this new tactic *Wilde Sau* (wild boar), and the technique helped them until they could develop effective radar. By early 1944, German night-fighter aircraft—primarily Ju-88s, FW-190s, and Bf-109s—were successfully employing bomber-intercept tactics with the help of SN2, an aircraft-based, air-to-air radar that would cause Bomber Command's losses to approach 9 percent for a single raid. To make matters worse for the British, many bombs did not come close to their desired targets, as chronically poor weather over Berlin forced Pathfinders to mark targets blindly, relying exclusively on H2S radar; this problem was exacerbated by

the fact that the number of experienced Pathfinder radar operators dwindled as casualties mounted during the campaign.

The Battle of Berlin came to a close in March 1944 when the bombers passed under the operational control of the Supreme Allied Command to prepare for the Normandy Invasion. During the offensive, Bomber Command flew 9,111 sorties to Berlin and dropped 31,000 tons of bombs. Bomber Command lost 497 aircraft—5.5 percent of the force employed—and more than 3,500 British aircrew were killed or captured. On the German side, nearly 10,000 civilians were killed, and 27 percent of the built-up area of Berlin was destroyed. Harris's goal of defeating Germany was not, however, realized.

MARLYN R. PIERCE AND JOHN D. PLATING

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Antiaircraft Artillery and Employment; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Germany; Germany, Air Force; Great Britain, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Hermann, Hans-Joachim "Hajo"; Kammhuber, Josef

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Berlin, Land Battle for (March 31–May 2, 1945)

Berlin, the capital of the Reich, was vital to the German war effort. German leader Adolf Hitler spent little time there during the war, but the city was the administrative center of the new German empire and a powerhouse of the war effort. Berlin was also a vital communications and transportation hub and a key production center, particularly for electrical products and armaments.

In August 1940 after the bombing of London, Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force (RAF) raided Berlin, but the city enjoyed a respite thereafter until March 1943. The battle for the city began in earnest in November 1943 with the first in a long series of punishing Allied air raids, with particularly severe attacks in March 1944. Berliners managed to carry on amid the ruins.

Hitler returned to Berlin from the Adlerhorst (Eagle's Nest), his retreat at Ziegenberg, by train on January 16, 1945, and as the war drew to a close, the city became the ultimate prize, at least for the Soviets. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wanted it desperately. So did British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, but he was overruled by U.S. leaders, who showed little interest in capturing the city, particularly after agreements setting up the postwar occupation placed Berlin deep within the Soviet zone.

Soviet bomber aircraft supporting the Red Army troops on the ground in the Battle for Berlin, April 20, 1945. (Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

Supreme commander of Allied forces in the west General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was in any case distracted by a phantom Nazi Alpine "National Redoubt," said he had no interest in taking the city. High casualty estimates (Lieutenant General Omar Bradley posited a cost of 100,000 men)

also deterred Eisenhower. Thus, although U.S. forces, including the 82nd Airborne Division, were readied for such an assault, the task was left to the Soviets.

Stalin concealed the U.S. ambivalence concerning Berlin from his front commanders, Generals Ivan S. Konev and Georgii K. Zhukov. By early February, Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front and Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front had completed the initial phase of their advance into Germany. Zhukov's troops were across the Oder River, 60 miles from Berlin. The Soviets had surrounded large German troop concentrations at Breslau and Posen. Soviet forces carried out a horrible revenge on eastern Germany, in which tens of thousands of civilians were murdered. Total German casualties ranged into the millions.

Zhukov might then have pushed on to the capital in another several weeks had not Stalin ordered a halt, necessary because of logistical problems resulting from the vast distances the Soviet forces had covered to that point. Meanwhile, Konev's forces threatened the German capital from the southeast. In defense of Berlin, Hitler had only the remnants of his Third Panzer and Ninth Armies, now constituting Army Group Vistula. In March, however, he ordered that the city be held "to the last man and the last shot."

On March 8, alarmed by the American crossing of the Rhine the day before, Stalin summoned Zhukov to Moscow to discuss an offensive against Berlin. The now rapid progress of the Western Allies eastward set off alarm bells in Moscow, and Stavka (the Soviet high command) rushed plans for an offensive to take the German capital. On March 31, Stalin ordered the offensive to begin.

Zhukov would make the principal drive on Berlin, while Konev supported him on the left flank and Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front moved on Zhukov's right flank. Altogether, the three fronts had some 1.5 million troops, 6,250 armored vehicles, and 7,500 aircraft. Opposing them, the German Ninth Army and Third Panzer Army had only 24 understrength divisions, with 754 tanks and few aircraft.

Zhukov's frontal assaults on Berlin's defenses from the east failed. On April 18, Stalin ordered him to proceed around Berlin from the north, while Konev encircled the city from the south. Hitler, meanwhile, ordered his Ninth Army to stand fast on the Oder, thus facilitating Konev's move.

On April 20, Hitler's birthday, Konev's tanks reached Jüterbog, the

airfield and key ammunition depot south of Berlin. That same day, Hitler allowed those of his entourage who wished to do so to leave the city. He pledged to stay.

The Soviets completed the encirclement on April 25. Also on that day, Soviet and U.S. forces met on the Elbe River. Hitler attempted to organize the Ninth Army as a relief force for Berlin, but it too was surrounded and soon destroyed. Although Lieutenant General Walther Wenck's Twelfth Army tried to reach Berlin from the west, it was too weak to accomplish the task.

Meanwhile, the defense of Berlin itself fell to miscellaneous German troops unfortunate enough to be pushed back there and by old men and boys hastily pressed into service for the daunting task. On April 30, with the defenders' ammunition nearly depleted, the defenses fast crumbling, and Soviet troops in the Reichstag (parliament) building, Hitler committed suicide in his underground bunker. On May 2, Lieutenant General Hans Krebs, chief of the German General Staff, surrendered Berlin.

Given their country's suffering in the war, Soviet soldiers hardly needed encouragement to destroy the German capital, the symbol of Nazism, and they committed widespread atrocities in the city both during and after its fall.

Bradley's estimate of the cost of taking Berlin was, in fact, low. According to one source, the "Berlin Strategic Offensive" from April 16 to May 8, involving the 1st Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, produced a staggering total of 352,475 Soviet casualties (including 78,291 dead)—an average of 15,325 a day.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Berlin, Air Battle of; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Krebs, Hans; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Stalin, Joseph; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich; Document 218; Document 219

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Bernadotte, Folke (1895–1948)

Swedish diplomat and Red Cross official who worked on behalf of prisoners of war. Folke Bernadotte was born in Stockholm, Sweden, on January 2, 1895; his father was a brother of King Gustav V. Although hemophilia limited his activities, Bernadotte served in the Swedish Army from 1918 to 1930. His skills were diplomatic rather than military, and he also worked closely with the Swedish Red Cross, of which he became a vice president, organizing prisoner-of-war exchanges.

Bernadotte was also a vice president of the Swedish Boy Scouts, and during World War II, he integrated that organization into neutral Sweden's defense network. He traveled extensively on behalf of the Swedish Red Cross, arranging exchanges of thousands of British and German prisoners in 1943 and 1944, and between 1944 and 1945, he concluded an agreement with Germany whereby Scandinavian prisoners would be transferred to the Neuengamme camp near Hamburg.

Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden. As an intermediary between the Allies and Germany during World War II, he successfully negotiated the exchange of thousands of prisoners held by the Allies and Germans. (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy National Archives)

Bernadotte visited Berlin in February 1945 to finalize the details of this arrangement with Heinrich Himmler, head of the Schutzstaffel (SS). At that time, Himmler expressed interest in negotiating surrender terms with the Western Allies, under which the Germans would spare those Jews still alive in concentration camps in exchange for Allied concessions. (Bernadotte has sometimes been criticized for a lack of concern about rescuing Jews, but this charge is based on a forged letter purportedly sent from him to Himmler.) In April 1945, Himmler met again with Bernadotte, suggesting that Germany would surrender in the west to Britain, France, and the United States, in exchange for their assistance against the Soviet Union in the east. Bernadotte relayed these suggestions to British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill,

who passed them on to U.S. president Harry S. Truman, only to have them promptly rejected.

Bernadotte became president of the Swedish Red Cross in 1946. In May 1948, the United Nations appointed him to mediate peace in Palestine. Just four months later, however, on September 17, 1948, Jewish terrorists of the Lohamei Herut Israel (Lehi Group or Stern Gang) assassinated Bernadotte in Jerusalem.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Himmler, Heinrich; Prisoners of War; Sweden

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Besson, Antoine Marie Benoit (1876–1969)

French Army general. Born on September 14, 1876, in Saint Symphonien near Lyons, France, Antoine Marie Benoit Besson graduated from the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr in 1898. He then joined the 4th Regiment of Zouaves. During World War I, he distinguished himself in fighting on the Western Front, winning numerous decorations and eventually rising to command his regiment.

In July 1937, Besson was promoted to general of the army, commanding the Sixth Army, and he became a member of France's Supreme War Council. During the German invasion of France beginning on May 10, 1940, he commanded the 3rd Army Group (consisting of three armies totaling 36 divisions on the extreme right flank of the Allied line) on the Colmar-Mulhouse section of the front, protected by the Jura Mountains and Switzerland.

Following the German breakthrough, Besson followed orders and withdrew to the Seine River on June 8 to positions below the Aisne and Somme Rivers as far as Neufchâtel. Within a week as his men retreated in disorder to be isolated on the Loire River, he became a strong advocate for an

armistice, preferring that outcome to the continued senseless slaughter of his men. Besson spent the remainder of the war as a German prisoner of war. Subsequently, he became director of the French Prisoner of War Service. Besson died in Paris on July 25, 1969.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also
France, Battle for

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Beta Convoy Battle (November 9, 1941)

Royal Navy interception and destruction of a large Axis convoy carrying vital supplies to North Africa. Under pressure to more effectively interdict traffic to Africa, Vice Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, dispatched Force K under Captain W. G. Agnew, consisting of the light cruisers *Aurora* and *Penelope* and the destroyers *Lance* and *Lively*, to Malta on October 21, 1941.

In response, Italian naval headquarters temporarily suspended convoys, but a planned November 21 Axis offensive in North Africa forced the dispatch of an unusually large convoy, code-named Beta, of seven ships with ammunition, fuel, and vehicles. Beta received an unusually strong escort, consisting of the 10th Destroyer Squadron under Captain Ugo Bisciani, including the *Maestrale, Fulmine, Euro, Grecale*, *Libeccio,* and *Oriani*, and a distant escort of the III (heavy cruiser) Division under Rear Admiral Bruto Brivonesi with the *Trieste* and *Trento* and the 13th Destroyer Squadron of the *Granatiere, Fuciliere, Bersagliere*, and *Alpino.*

The Italian convoy's route to Tripoli circled east of Malta. Experience taught that aircraft were the principal danger during the day and that a surface interception at night was nearly impossible unless enemy forces knew the convoy's exact route and speed. If, however, a night encounter did occur,

improved training and the recent introduction of a primitive radar detection and jamming device gave the Italians some confidence that their escort could handle the situation. The Italians did not, however, understand the evolving capability of British radar or that signals intelligence had disclosed the convoy's itinerary.

Acting on Enigma decrypts, a British aircraft discovered Beta on the afternoon of November 8. Force K weighed anchor at 5:30 p.m., but the aircraft that was to vector Force K onto its target suffered equipment failures. Finally, at 12:39 a.m., the *Aurora*'s lookouts sighted the Italian ships. The transports were in two columns of three, with the odd ship bringing up the rear. The *Maestrale* sailed at the convoy's head, while the *Euro* and *Fulmine* guarded the starboard side, the *Oriani* and *Libeccio* the port side, and the *Grecale* the rear. The III Division and the 13th Squadron zigzagged five miles astern, the area believed most vulnerable to British attack.

The *Aurora* maneuvered to a down-moon position on the convoy's starboard quarter. Lookouts on the *Fulmine* sighted the British ships but assumed they were Brivonesi's cruisers. British lookouts likewise spotted the III Division looming in the darkness, but Captain Agnew assumed they were more merchant ships, and he decided to focus on the larger target dead ahead.

In the faint moonlight, the *Aurora* laid its guns with radar and opened fire at 12:57 a.m. at a range of 5,700 yards, followed seconds later by the *Penelope* and *Lance.* Their initial barrage severely damaged the *Grecale.* The convoy leader, the *Maestrale*, reacted to the outburst by turning away from the British. The escort commander assumed that Brivonesi's cruisers had the starboard quarter covered, and he was uncertain of the direction from which the sudden attack had come. The *Libeccio* and *Oriani* remained on the unengaged side. Brivonesi's lead destroyer broadcast an alert, and, in response, the admiral steered southwest and increased speed from 12 to 18 knots.

At 12:59 p.m., the *Aurora* turned to run down the convoy's starboard side, unknowingly pulling away from Brivonesi's approaching cruisers. The merchant ships filled the air with antiaircraft fire and made no attempt to scatter or turn away. At 1:03 a.m., the *Fulmine* tried to make a torpedo attack, but 6-inch gunfire from the *Penelope* exploded on the Italians' bridge and mortally wounded the captain. At the same time, the *Trieste* opened fire 7,000 yards off the *Lively*'s starboard quarter. No one in Force K realized that

a pair of heavy cruisers was even present. Several more broadsides struck the *Fulmine,* causing the destroyer to capsize and sink within minutes.

The *Euro* turned toward the British ships and closed to 2,000 yards. However, the escort commander on the *Maestrale* ordered the destroyers to concentrate around his flagship on the convoy's other side, which caused the *Euro*'s captain to think that the British must be there and that he was stalking the *Trieste.* Consequently, he turned away, realizing his mistake only when the *Aurora* and *Penelope* engaged. The cruisers hit *Euro* six times, but their shells passed through without causing crippling damage. As the *Maestrale, Libeccio, Oriani,* and *Euro* withdrew east to regroup, the convoy continued on course, engaging imaginary bombers. The British circled around the convoy's head, and at 1:25 a.m., they began passing up the convoy's other side, setting ablaze one ship after another.

The Italian III Division and 13th Squadron were still steaming south as the British column disappeared behind the smoke of the burning steamers, and the heavy cruisers ceased fire and turned north at 1:29 a.m., when Brivonesi attempted to intercept the British withdrawal. With every ship in sight burning, Force K headed home at 2:05 a.m. and, at 2:30 a.m., passed 20 miles astern of Brivonesi's cruisers, which were still steaming north. Force K had destroyed all seven transports, sunk the *Fulmine,* heavily damaged the *Euro* and *Grecale,* and escaped harm itself except for splinter damage to the *Lively.*

The Beta action was one of the most brilliant British naval surface victories of the war, demonstrating superior doctrine, technology, and leadership coupled with luck, surprise, and inept opposition. Italian Naval Headquarters relieved both commanders. The Germans were furious at the battle's outcome and tried to force their advisers upon the Italians.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Convoys, Axis; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Signals Intelligence

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Béthouart, Marie Émile Antoine (1889–1982)

French Army general. Born at Dôle, France, in the Jura Mountains, on December 17, 1889, Marie Émile Antoine Béthouart graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in 1912. During World War I, he served with Alpine troops and was wounded three times. As French military attaché, he was present when King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French foreign minister Louis Barthou were assassinated at Marseille, France, in October 1934.

Promoted to general of brigade in April 1940, Béthouart led the Franco-Polish expeditionary force that took part in the Norwegian Campaign of that spring. After France surrendered to Germany in June 1940, he initially remained with Vichy forces and took over the Casablanca Division in southern Morocco.

By late 1942, Béthouart was prepared to collaborate with U.S. forces invading North Africa, and he negotiated with American representatives, including U.S. civilian Robert Murphy. Béthouart promised that men under his command would occupy all key points and welcome the invaders. At the last moment in the confused meetings and negotiations, he also informed his superior, Governor-General Charles Noguès. Noguès had earlier warned the Americans that his forces would oppose them, and he ordered Béthouart and a subordinate arrested and tried for treason. Noguès then ordered their execution, a command that U.S. Army major general George S. Patton Jr. was able to countermand following the American landing.

From December 1942, Béthouart headed the French mission in Washington, negotiating military aid from the United States. Returning to Algiers, he became chief of the National Defense Staff, organizing the French Army of Africa in preparation for the invasion of France. In August 1944, Béthouart commanded I Corps of the French First Army in the invasion of southern France, through the Vosges Mountains into Alsace and across the Rhine as far as the southern bank of the Danube. His men saw particularly heavy action in the Colmar region.

Béthouart subsequently headed French occupation forces in Austria. In 1949, he became a general of army. After retiring in 1955, he entered politics and became a senator. Béthouart died in Fréjus in southern France, on October 17, 1982.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

France; France, Army; Juin, Alphonse Pierre; Noguès, Charles Auguste Paul; North Africa Campaign; Norway, German Conquest of; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; TORCH, Operation

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Bevin, Ernest (1881–1951)

British trade unionist, statesman, and member of the War Cabinet. Born at Winsford, Somerset, England, on March 7, 1881, the illegitimate son of a village midwife, Ernest Bevin became a drayman in Bristol. During a dock strike in 1910, he affiliated the local carters with the Dockers' Union. By 1914, Bevin was a national organizer for the Transport Workers' Federation.

Although noted for his pugnacious personality, Bevin preferred negotiation to confrontation with employers. He supported British participation in World War I and later made the massive Transport and General Workers' Union, which he organized in 1921, a restraining force on volatile occasions such as the General Strike of 1926. Bevin deplored the coalition with Conservatives and Liberals formed in 1931 by Labour prime minister Ramsay MacDonald, but his equally strong distaste for pacifism and appeasement of the fascist regimes alienated him from other Labour Party leaders who had also broken with MacDonald. Bevin was finally drawn

toward Conservative Winston L. S. Churchill's circle, which refused to countenance appeasers.

When Churchill became prime minister in May 1940, he appointed Bevin minister of labor, bringing him into the War Cabinet the following October. Bevin remained at his post until the Labour Party withdrew from Churchill's wartime coalition in May 1945. Many asserted that no one else could have mobilized the country's manpower and industrial resources as efficiently. With a mixture of coercion and rewards informed by humane common sense, Bevin reluctantly conscripted and deployed workers, including women, where they were most needed.

But Bevin also insisted on full rights of collective bargaining with employers and adequate provision for workplace safety and comfort. Work stoppages nearly disappeared. Ministers responsible for production and procurement often challenged him, but skillful use of his near dictatorial powers and the intense personal loyalty he evoked among millions of workers gave him the advantage in political and bureaucratic controversies.

When the British Labour Party took office after Churchill's electoral defeat in July 1945, Bevin became foreign secretary. Until ill health forced his retirement in 1951, he strove to prevent the spread of communism in Western Europe and successfully built an anti-Soviet alliance that included the United States. Bevin died in London on April 14, 1951.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Attlee, Clement Richard; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain

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Bey, Eric (1898–1943)

German Navy admiral. Born in Hamburg on March 23, 1898, Eric Bey joined the Imperial German Navy during World War I on June 13, 1916, and served

in destroyers. He continued in the German Navy (the Reichsmarine) after the war and, by the beginning of World War II, had risen to the rank of commander in the Kriegsmarine (the navy of the Third Reich). After engaging in mine laying off the English coast in December 1939, Bey commanded the 4th Destroyer Flotilla of three destroyers in Commodore Friedrich Bonte's naval force transporting troops of the 3rd Mountain Division to the port of Narvik during the German invasion of Norway on April 9, 1940.

In the naval battles at Narvik on April 10 and 13, 1940, Bey distinguished himself in leading his destroyers against superior Royal Navy resources, including the battleship *Warspite.* Despite the annihilation of his command, his performance earned him the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. On May 10, 1940, Bey was promoted to captain and given command of the German destroyer force, succeeding Bonte, who had been killed at Narvik on April 10. Bey commanded the destroyer screen protecting the battle cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* and the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen* in Operation CERBERUS (the so-called Channel Dash) in February 1942.

Promoted to rear admiral, Bey commanded the task force consisting of the battle cruiser *Scharnhorst* and the destroyers *Z29, Z30, Z33, Z34*, and *Z38* that sortied from Altafjord, Norway, on December 25, 1943, in Operation OSTFRONT, intending to intercept Allied Convoy JW-55B en route to Murmansk. Bey was freed of the restraints that Chancellor Adolf Hitler had imposed on German surface warships. Bey separated his destroyers to search for the convoy to the southwest while he proceeded north in the *Scharnhorst*, only to encounter a superior British force led by the battleship *Duke of York* that had located the German ship by radar. The ensuing Battle of the North Cape on December 26 was fought in conditions of poor visibility, with the British enjoying significant radar superiority. It was also the last classic single-ship duel between battleships.

The forward radar on the *Scharnhorst* was destroyed early in the battle by a lucky shot from the heavy cruiser *Norfolk* of the British screening force. In the ensuing running battle, the *Scharnhorst* was hit by both shells and torpedoes and went down. Of its crew of 1,968 men, only 36 were plucked alive from the icy waters, no officers among them. Reportedly, Bey and the *Scharnhorst*'s captain were spotted in the water badly wounded, but they

disappeared before they could be rescued. The sinking of the *Scharnhorst* ended German surface attacks on the Allied Murmansk convoys.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

CERBERUS, Operation; Convoys, Allied; Germany, Navy; Narvik, Naval Battles of; North Cape, Battle of

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Bhamo, Siege of (November 14–December 15, 1944)

Key battle in north Burma (today Myanmar) in late 1944. In August 1944, Allied forces had taken Myitkyina on the China-Burma border. Chinese generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) then demanded that Chinese divisions at Myitkyina be directed south against Bhamo to draw off the Japanese from Lungling. Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of all U.S. Army forces in the China-Burma-India theater and chief of staff to Jiang, opposed this move on the basis that the troops needed rest, but he also believed the Japanese could hold Bhamo without withdrawing troops from Lungling. In mid-September, Jiang again demanded that Stilwell undertake an offensive against Bhamo to take pressure off Lungling; if that did not occur, he said, he would withdraw Y-Force back across the Salween River to protect Kunming. Jiang feared that a Japanese victory at Lungling would be followed by an attack on Kunming.

With the rainy season in north Burma coming to an end and as part of a campaign to take Rangoon, Stilwell ordered a renewal of the offensive. He had five Chinese divisions, the excellent British 36th Division, and the Mars Force of one Chinese and two U.S. regiments. Opposing him was Japanese lieutenant general Honda Masaki's Thirty-Third Army of three understrength

divisions. Stilwell planned an envelopment to trap the Japanese between his own force and Y-Force in Yunnan.

The offensive opened on October 15, 1944, with Chinese lieutenant general Sun Liren (Sun Li-jen) and his First Army, composed of the 30th and 38th Divisions, advancing toward the main elements of the Thirty-Third Army at Bhamo as the British 36th Division moved down the Railroad Corridor to protect the flank. At the same time, the bulk of Stilwell's troops were to proceed south from Mogaung, cross the Irrawaddy River near Shwegu, and gain the Burma Road near Lashio.

On October 18, three days after the offensive began, Stilwell was relieved of command. The charge that the American general had disobeyed orders in failing to advance on Bhamo was part of Jiang's litany of complaints in demanding Stilwell's relief. U.S. Army lieutenant general Dan I. Sultan, Stilwell's deputy, took over as commander of U.S. and Chinese forces in the South-East Asia Command.

On November 6, Chinese forces began crossing the Irrawaddy, and on November 14 the siege of Bhamo began. Stubborn Japanese defenses there held up the Chinese 30th and 38th Divisions for a month. With further resistance impossible, some 800 Japanese survivors managed to escape at night, rejoining the 56th Division in the mountains between Bhamo and Namkham. The siege officially ended on December 15. The Chinese divisions then began a slow pursuit.

The offensive was soon abandoned, the consequence of a Japanese offensive in China. Jiang decided to withdraw the Chinese 14th and 22nd Divisions from Burma. Both were flown out to stop Japanese drives in southern China. This action forced Sultan to abandon Stilwell's plan to encircle the Thirty-Third Army in favor of securing the road east from Bhamo to Namkham.

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See also

Burma Theater; Honda Masaki; Jiang Jieshi; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Sultan, Daniel Isom; Sun Liren

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Biak, Battle for (May 27–August 17, 1944)

Battle during the Papua New Guinea Campaign. Biak (also spelled Wiak) is a small island some 45 miles long and 23 miles wide located at the entrance of Cenderawasih (Geelvink) Bay near the northwestern coast of Papua New Guinea, then part of Dutch New Guinea (from the 1960s, it has been part of Indonesia). Biak is the largest island in the small archipelago of the same name (formerly the Schouten Islands).

The Japanese took Biak Island in April 1942 and constructed a large air field complex there. U.S. Southwest Pacific theater commander General Douglas MacArthur was determined to secure Biak for subsequent operations against the Philippines, but he erred in his estimate that the Japanese had only some 3,000 troops on the island, code-breaking information to the contrary. In fact, Colonel Kuzume Naoyuki commanded some 11,000 defenders. During the subsequent fighting the Japanese also landed some 1,200 reinforcements but lost at least one destroyer in the effort. The Japanese had also constructed extensive fortifications on Biak, taking advantage of numerous caves in the hills and constructing pillboxes and bunkers.

Following naval bombardment and air attacks from the newly secured airfield on Wakde Island, on May 27 Major General Horace H. Fuller's U.S. 41st Infantry Division, less its regimental combat team at Wakde, landed on Biak near the principal town of Bosnek and moved inland for the airfields near Mokmer village. Only then did the Japanese emerge from their caves to mount a surprisingly effective resistance in some of the bitterest fighting of the Pacific war.

On May 29, Kuzume committed a number of light 9-ton tanks armed with 37mm guns to attack an isolated American battalion. In the first tank-on-tank battle in the Pacific theater, these were destroyed by the more powerful (75mm gun) U.S. M4 Sherman tanks. Having declared victory on Biak early

in the fighting, the stubborn MacArthur was loath to send in reinforcements, especially with Americans celebrating the triumph of his rival, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, at Normandy. MacArthur dispatched Lieutenant General Robert Lawrence Eichelberger to take command of operations on Biak. Despite some reinforcements, Japanese resistance continued until an amphibious landing at Wardo Bay on August 17.

U.S. losses in securing the island amounted to some 400 killed and 2,000 wounded. Nonbattle casualties, chiefly from typhus, were more than 7,000. Later, Biak's airfields were transferred to the Royal Australian Air Force.

During the fighting and concerned that an American success here would threaten Japanese land-based air supremacy over the waters south of the Palaus, Japanese admiral Toyoda Soemu ordered the giant battleships *Yamato* and *Musashi* to proceed at flank speed for Biak and shell the landing sites there. This mission was called off on June 13, however, with news of the American landings on Saipan.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Eisenhower, Dwight David; MacArthur, Douglas; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Tanks, All Powers; Toyoda Soemu; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships; Document 186

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Biak, Naval Battle of (June 8–9, 1944)

Pacific theater naval action during June 8–9, 1944, resulting from the U.S.-Australian interception of a Japanese destroyer force attempting to reinforce Biak Island.

On May 27, 1944, U.S. troops landed on the large island of Biak (also spelled Wiak), off western New Guinea, as part of General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Campaign. Hoping that a long struggle for Biak would provoke a decisive battle, the Japanese Navy attempted to ferry reinforcements to the island in destroyers.

Six destroyers (three towing troop barges) and the cruisers *Aoba* and *Kinu* departed Sarong at midnight June 7 under the command of Rear Admiral Sakonju Naomaso. Allied aircraft spotted the Japanese, and at 12:45 p.m. on June 8, 10 U.S. Army Air Forces North American B-25 Mitchell twin-engine medium bombers sank one of the destroyers and three barges. The cruisers turned back, but Sakonju pressed on with the five surviving destroyers. These included the *Shikinami*, *Shigure*, and *Uranami* in the support role and the *Shiratsuyu* and *Samidare* in the transport role.

Task Force (TF) 74/75, commanded by Royal Navy rear admiral Victor Crutchley, guarded Biak against a Japanese landing. TF 74/75 included the heavy cruiser *Australia*, the light cruisers *Phoenix* and *Boise*, and 13 destroyers (Destroyer Division 42 under Commander Albert E. Jarrell with 4 ships, Destroyer Division 47 under Captain Kenmore M. McManes of 4 ships, Destroyer Division 48 under Commander John B. McLean with 3 ships, and an Australian destroyer division of 2 ships).

At 10:00 p.m. on June 8, a search plane warned Crutchley that the Japanese force was 60 miles to the northwest. Thinking that the nearly full moon made a surprise torpedo attack unlikely and that the destroyers would need gunfire support from the cruisers, Crutchley intended to assume battle formation after contact. At 11:20 p.m., the *Boise* reported a contact at 26,000 yards. Sakonju sighted Crutchley's force at the same time, and at 11:23 p.m., the Japanese reversed course, made smoke, and launched torpedoes while casting off the troop barges they had been towing.

After the sighting, Crutchley methodically formed his cruisers into column and ordered Destroyer Division 47 to the van, Division 48 to the rear, and Division 42 to take station on the cruiser column's port quarter. Commander Jarrell, however, noted that the range was opening. Disregarding Crutchley's instructions, he swung north in pursuit of the enemy. Crutchley released divisions 47 and 48 to join Division 42. It was 11 minutes after first contact and 8 minutes after the Japanese had reversed course. Meanwhile, the cruisers worked up to 25 knots while the two Australian destroyers trailed. At

11:40 p.m., a torpedo passed behind the *Boise*, causing the column to maneuver and lose more ground. Division 42 began seeing troop barges at the same time; the destroyer *Fletcher* passed one so rapidly that its machine guns could not track fast enough to fire.

At 12:17 a.m. on June 9, the *Fletcher* opened fire with its bow mounts, hoping for a lucky hit or at least to force the enemy to maneuver. The Japanese replied in kind, hoping for a similar result. At 12:45 a.m. the cruisers dropped out, and Crutchley recalled Division 48 to screen them while the Australian destroyers backtracked to hunt down the barges. Jarrell's Division 42 and McManes's Division 47 continued the chase.

At 1:26 a.m., when it had closed the distance to 14,000 yards, Division 42 turned to port, and all four ships fired broadsides hoping to drive the Japanese ships toward Division 47. This scheme provoked more torpedoes from the Japanese and brought Division 47 to within 15,000 yards, whereupon it likewise opened fire. At 2:11 a.m., lookouts reported an explosion. The Americans had hit the *Shigure* twice, but its speed was unaffected. Finally, at 2:27 a.m., facing a deadline imposed by Admiral Crutchley, the Americans broke off contact. Ironically, most of the Japanese barges delivered their troops to Biak.

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See also

Biak, Battle for; Crutchley, Sir Victor Alexander Charles; Southwest Pacific Theater

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"Big Week" Air Battle (February 20–25, 1944)

Name later given by the press to air combat over Germany during Operation ARGUMENT, a series of intensive Allied air strikes at the end of February 1944 against the German aircraft industry's final-assembly plants, ball-bearing factories, and facilities producing aircraft components. The Western Allies initiated the operation to reduce the numbers of Luftwaffe fighters contesting the presence of Allied bombers over Germany and to prepare for the invasion of Normandy. Although the Luftwaffe still maintained significant numbers of aircraft, it could not long survive both sustained losses in the air and attacks on its production facilities.

A period of clear weather allowed the Allies to begin the campaign. Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force (RAF) joined in for nighttime raids, but the bulk of the attacks were carried out by the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) in daylight operations. Between February 20 and 25, 1944, some 1,000 bombers and 900 fighters of the U.S. Eighth Air Force carried out 13 major attacks against 15 centers of the German aviation industry, such as the Messerschmitt -Bf-109 factory at Leipzig. In the last four days of the offensive, the Fifteenth Air Force, headquartered at Foggia, Italy, joined in.

During February 20–25, the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces flew a combined total of 3,800 sorties (3,300 from England, 500 from Italy) and dropped almost 10,000 tons of bombs. German fighters contested the raids, and USAAF losses were heavy but acceptable, with 226 bombers shot down (137 from England and 89 from Italy) amounting to 6 percent of the force engaged. Fighters from other Allied countries also flew 3,673 sorties. A total of only 28 fighters were lost (for a rate of less than 1 percent). Total U.S. personnel losses in killed, wounded, and missing were 2,600. The USAAF claimed more than 600 German fighter aircraft shot down, although actual German losses were probably on the order of 355, with nearly 100 pilots killed in action.

The aircraft factory at Obertraubling, Germany, following a U.S. raid on February 22, 1944, by planes of the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force. Unfinished ME-109 jet fighters lie among the debris. (Corbis)

In “Big Week” the USAAF North American P-51 Mustang fighter played a notable role. Equipped with long-range fuel tanks, it could accompany the bombers all the way to Germany and return. The Mustang outclassed the German fighters in speed, ceiling, and climb rate. German fighters were simply no match for it, especially with many weighed down by the heavy armaments designed to destroy the Allied bombers. The Luftwaffe now removed from service in the west its twin-engine antibomber designs such as the Messerschmitt Me-410 Hornisse (Hornet) that had earlier proved highly effective against the Allied bombers but were extremely vulnerable to the more nimble Allied fighters. The defense of Germany in the skies passed primarily to the higher-performance single-engine designs.

Big Week also saw the USAAF register two firsts. The USAAF sent aloft 1,000 bombers, and the number of its aircraft exceeded those of Bomber Command. From this point forward the USAAF carried the majority of the bomber war against Germany. In the months following Big Week, the Allied bombers switched over to concentrate on German oil-production facilities.

Clearly, the days of the Luftwaffe were numbered. Big Week boosted morale among USAAF bomber crews and was a major defeat for the Luftwaffe. German aircraft production levels fell off in the weeks to come, and although they would rise again later in the spring, by that time Allied fighters were more than a match for anything the Germans could send aloft. Particularly grievous from the German standpoint was the number of trained fighter pilots lost. This reduction in German air strength was an essential prelude to the successful Normandy Invasion in June 1944.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing

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Billotte, Gaston Henri Gustave (1875–1940)

French Army general. Born on February 10, 1875, in Sommeval (Aube), near Troyes, France, Gaston Henri Billotte graduated from the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr in 1896. Commissioned in the naval infantry, he served in Indochina until 1915, and during World War I he held a variety of command and staff positions. While leading an infantry division, he was twice gassed.

Billotte returned to Indochina after the war, was promoted to general of division in 1927, and became commander of French forces there in 1930. He was promoted to general of the army in 1933, and served as inspector general of colonial troops in 1937. Billotte advocated the employment of tanks in the French military, and Charles de Gaulle credited him with the establishment of

the first two French tank divisions. Just before the outbreak of war in 1939, Billotte took command of the 1st Army Group and positioned this unit along the Belgian border around Malmédy. Among its five armies was the British Expeditionary Force.

Billotte's 1st Army Group played the major role in the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940). On the German invasion, Billotte moved the bulk of his forces into Belgium in accordance with prearranged plans. The Germans then struck to the south, overrunning Billotte's southernmost army, the Ninth, in the area between Sedan and Givet. On May 14, realizing the threat this posed to his northern forces, Billotte ordered a withdrawal from the Dyle Line to the Escaute River.

On the night of May 21, Billotte was seriously injured in a car accident after meeting with the new French Army commander, General Maxime Weygand. His incapacitation increased confusion in the French Army command. Billotte died in Ypres of his injuries on May 23, 1940.

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See also

de Gaulle, Charles; France, Army; France, Battle for; Weygand, Maxime

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Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of (May 1941)

The sinking of the *Bismarck* occurred at the height of German battleship operations in the Atlantic Ocean. Commander of the German Navy Grand Admiral Erich Raeder expected the new battleship *Bismarck* to be available in the spring of 1941 to provide an opportunity to test the navy's battle group strategy in support of a war on commerce. Repairs to the battleships *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* forced delays, and the naval command decided to

send the *Bismarck* and the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen* to sea as soon as possible to attack shipping in the North Atlantic in Operation RHEINÜBUNG (RHINE EXERCISE). Raeder was determined to demonstrate the value of the battleships to the war effort, and the *Bismarck* was rushed into action with an incomplete antiaircraft control system and equipment scavenged from other ships.

Vice Admiral Günther Lütjens, the fleet commander and task force leader, opposed such a piecemeal approach. He advocated delaying the mission until the other battleships were available, including the *Tirpitz.* His pessimism would play a key role in his decisions during the course of the operation.

British intelligence, including Ultra, alerted the Royal Navy that a major German naval operation was under way, and aircraft spotted the two ships refueling at Bergen, Norway, on May 21, 1941. The British took countermeasures to patrol the Iceland-Faroes passage and the Denmark Strait to block a German breakout into the Atlantic. On May 23, the British cruisers *Norfolk* and *Suffolk* spotted the two German raiders in the Denmark Strait. The persistence of the British cruisers in shadowing the German ships led Lütjens to conclude that the British possessed new radar.

Off Iceland at about 5:55 a.m. on May 24 in the Iceland Battle, or Battle of the Denmark Strait, British rear admiral Lancelot E. Holland's battle cruiser *Hood* and battleship *Prince of Wales* engaged the *Bismarck.* The *Hood* was hit in its magazines by the *Bismarck*'s fourth salvo and blew up. Only 3 of its 1,419 crewmen survived. The *Prince of Wales* took seven hits (four from the *Bismarck*) and was damaged.

Although the *Bismarck* had received only three hits, the ship was leaking oil, and its speed was also reduced from flooding in the forward compartments. At about 4:00 p.m., Lütjens detached the *Prinz Eugen* in a vain effort to draw the British off while the *Bismarck* made for the French port of Saint-Nazaire to carry out repairs. On May 24, nine Swordfish torpedo bombers from the carrier *Victorious* attacked the German battleship under difficult conditions and scored one hit, but damage was superficial.

In the early morning of May 25, the *Bismarck* managed to elude its pursuers, but Lütjens was unaware of this despite reports from Naval Command Group West. When Lütjens broke radio silence, these messages were picked up by Allied high-frequency direction-finding receivers.

Increased German radio traffic along the French coast suggested that the destination of the *Bismarck* was a French port, which was later confirmed by a British intercept of a Luftwaffe signal. The principal British ships, which had been chasing the *Bismarck* in the wrong direction due to a plotting error, now altered course. In the meantime, Force H with the aircraft carrier *Ark Royal* had departed Gibraltar to provide air reconnaissance off the French west coast.

On May 26, Swordfish torpedo bombers from the *Ark Royal* and Coastal Command's patrol bomber aircraft regained contact with the *Bismarck.* Late in the day the Swordfish attacked, and a lucky torpedo hit jammed the German battleship's twin rudder system, rendering it unable to maneuver. With no air cover or help from the U-boats or other ships available, the fatalistic Lütjens, remembering the reaction to the scuttling of the *Graf Spee* and Raeder's orders to fight to the last shell, radioed the hopelessness of the situation.

Arriving on the scene at 8:45 a.m. on May 27, the British battleships *King George V* and *Rodney* opened fire. By 10:00 a.m., although hit by hundreds of shells, the *Bismarck* remained afloat. As the heavy cruiser *Dorsetshire* closed to fire torpedoes, the Germans scuttled their ship. Three torpedoes then struck, and the *Bismarck* went down. Reports of German submarines in the area halted British efforts to rescue German survivors. Only 110 of the crew of 2,300 survived. Lütjens was not among them.

A furious Adolf Hitler regarded the sinking of the *Bismarck* as a major loss of prestige and ordered that no more battleship operations be undertaken without his permission. The major German ships were now relegated to the defense of Norway, leaving the brunt of Germany's naval war to the U-boats.

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See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Holland, Lancelot Ernest; Lütjens, Günther; Raeder, Erich; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Signals Intelligence; Submarines

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Bismarck and *Tirpitz*, German Battleships

The two Bismarck-class battleships were the largest German warships of World War II. Although often regarded as the epitome of German battleship design, they actually represented something of a compromise, because German chancellor Adolf Hitler had concluded a naval agreement with Great Britain and did not want to provoke the British when the ships were laid down only a year later. Indeed, Hitler had hoped that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of July 1935 would be the foundation for an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union.

The two ships followed closely in design the *Baden*, the last German battleship built for the Imperial German Navy. Horizontal armor was somewhat thicker, vertical armor slightly thinner. Major compartments were larger to provide better working conditions for the crews. Armament was standard for the day. The ships were extremely broad in beam, making them excellent gunnery platforms even in heavy seas. So as not to alarm the British, the tonnage displacement figure was announced as 35,000. Not until after the war was it learned that the displacement was nearly 7,000 tons more than the Washington treaty limit.

The *Bismarck* was laid down on July 1, 1936, at the Blohm and Voss shipyards in Hamburg. It was launched on February 14, 1939, and commissioned on August 24, 1940. Named for Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), the ship was outfitted by January 1941 and underwent trials in March and April. Captain Ernst Lindemann was granted permission to refer to the ship with the pronoun "he" to honor Bismarck.

The *Tirpitz* was named for Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), father of the German High Seas Fleet. Built at Wilhelmshaven Navy Yard, it was laid down on October 20, 1936; launched on April 1, 1939; and commissioned on February 25, 1941.

The *Bismarck* displaced 41,700 tons standard and 50,900 tons deep load. The *Tirpitz* displaced 42,900 tons standard and 51,600 tons deep load. The ships were 813 feet 8 inches in overall length and 118 feet 1 inch in beam. Their hulls were protected by an armor belt ranging in thickness from 8.5 inches to 10.5 inches. The main turrets were protected by up to 14.25 inches, while deck armor was up to 4.75 inches in thickness. Their three geared turbine engines were capable of producing a top speed of 29 knots.

The Bismarck-class ships were armed with 8 15-inch guns in four double turrets and 12 5.9-inch secondary guns in six double turrets. They also mounted 16 105mm guns in eight double mounts, 16 37mm guns (eight double mounts), and 12 20mm guns. They could carry four to six aircraft. Normal crew complement was 2,092 officers and men for the *Bismarck* and 2,608 for the *Tirpitz.*

Both ships were sunk by the British. The *Bismarck* succumbed early, while on its first commerce raiding sortie. After sinking the British battle cruiser *Hood* and damaging the battleship *Prince of Wales* (the *Bismarck* was also damaged in the engagement and leaking oil), its rudder was jammed by torpedoes dropped by Swordfish aircraft flying from the carrier *Ark Royal.* This enabled the British battleships *King George V* and *Rodney* to close. Rendered largely hors de combat in the ensuing engagement, the *Bismarck* was struck by three torpedoes and then scuttled by its crew on May 27, 1941. Only 110 crew members of a complement of 2,300 survived. On June 9, 1989, undersea explorer Robert D. Ballard located the wreck of the *Bismarck* some 600 miles off the French coast. Ballard's investigations seemed to confirm the German view that the scuttling had sent it to the bottom.

The *Tirpitz* received additional armament in 1942 in the form of six 533mm torpedo tubes taken from the cruiser *Leipzig.* Its antiaircraft armament was also steadily increased, to 40 20mm guns in single and quadruple mounts. Stationed in Norway, the *Tirpitz* represented a great threat to the Allied Arctic convoys and was subjected to numerous Allied attacks, some of them by Royal Air Force Lancaster bombers, with special 12,000-pound "tallboy" bombs. It finally succumbed to one such attack on November 12, 1944, with 917 of its crew dying in the attack. After the war, much of the hulk was sold for scrap.

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See also

Anglo-German Naval Agreement; Atlantic, Battle of the; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Convoys, Allied; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Sinking of; *Tirpitz*, Attacks on

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Bismarck Sea, Battle of (March 2–5, 1943)

Southwestern Pacific air-naval battle. As the troops of Southwest Pacific theater commander General Douglas MacArthur fought to expel the Japanese from New Guinea, it fell to the U.S. Fifth Air Force under Major General George C. Kenney to interdict Japanese resupply efforts. When Kenney assumed command of the Fifth Air Force in August 1942, he found many of his units operating obsolete aircraft and employing ineffective tactics.

Kenney quickly introduced two important new changes. The first was skip-bombing, in which medium bombers—the Douglas A-20 Havoc and North American B-25 Mitchell—attacked Japanese ships from low altitude and literally skipped bombs into the sides of their targets. The bombs used time-delayed fuzes so that the explosions would occur either within the ships, should they penetrate the hulls, or below their waterlines as the bombs sank after hitting the hulls. The second was the installation in the medium bombers of additional forward-firing .50-caliber machine guns, designed to sink small vessels and suppress antiaircraft fire. Kenney also had available several squadrons of the Royal Australian Air Force to supplement the Fifth Air Force.

In January 1943, Allied forces undertook a major offensive along the New Guinea coast. In response, the Japanese dispatched additional resources via convoys across the Bismarck Sea. On the night of February 28, 1943, Rear Admiral Kimura Masatomi departed Rabaul with eight transports and eight destroyers, transporting 6,900 troops of the 51st Division, bound for Lae, New Guinea.

The Japanese recognized the threat posed by Allied airpower, but Lae was thought too important to lose. Some 100 fighters (40 navy and 60 army) provided air cover for the convoy. Kenney knew of the Japanese activity through signals intelligence and reconnaissance flights. American Consolidated B-24s first sighted the Japanese formation on March 1, but eight Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses sent to attack it failed to locate their quarry because of cloud cover. The following day, another B-24 reacquired the target, and eight B-17s attacked with 1,000-pound demolition bombs, sinking one transport and damaging another. Two of the Japanese destroyers rescued approximately 950 men and rushed ahead to Lae, returning to the convoy early the next morning.

On March 3, the largest Allied air effort yet seen in the theater assembled to attack the Japanese when the convoy came within range of the medium bombers. At 10:00 a.m., B-17s bombed the convoy to disrupt its formation. Shortly thereafter, Australian Beaufighters, followed by heavily armed B-25s and A-20s, attacked the convoy from an altitude of 500 feet or less, while Lockheed P-38 Lightnings engaged Japanese escort fighters. Out of 47 bombs dropped by the attackers, reportedly 28 found their targets. Allied aircraft repeated their assault that afternoon but with less success, as the weather began to interfere.

By the end of the day, all of the Japanese transports and three of the destroyers had been sunk. A fourth destroyer was heavily damaged and was sunk by Allied aircraft the next day. The remaining destroyers collected as many survivors as possible and returned to Rabaul. During the course of the next few days, aircraft and patrol-torpedo (PT) boats patrolled the area, machine-gunning and bombing any remaining Japanese to prevent enemy troops from reaching land. Allied pilots sought retribution against Japanese flyers who had reportedly machine-gunned an American crew parachuting from their stricken B-17.

In the battle, the Japanese lost some 60 aircraft, 12 ships, and 3,700 men.

The Allied cost was 3 fighters, 1 B-17, and 1 B-25. MacArthur described the victory as “the decisive aerial engagement” in the Southwest Pacific theater. Japanese transports never again approached within range of Allied airpower for the rest of the campaign. Without reinforcement, the Japanese lost Lae to Australian troops some seven months later.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Air Warfare, Naval; Kenney, George Churchill; Kimura Masatomi; Rabaul; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater

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BITING, Operation (February 27–28, 1942)

British combined-arms raid. The objective of Operation BITING (Bruneval Raid) was to bring back parts of a German Würzburg radar array determined to be located at a farmhouse on cliffs at Bruneval near Le Havre on the English Channel. The radar was providing the Germans warning of British aircraft and ships approaching the coast, and the British believed that it and similar radars were in large part responsible for recent heavy Royal Air Force (RAF) bomber losses. It was believed that a seaborne assault would provide the Germans too much warning, so an airborne operation was planned, with the men to be extracted by sea. The raid commander was Major John Frost, who led 120 men of C Company of the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 1st Airborne Division. Flight Sergeant C. W. H. Cox, an RAF expert radio mechanic, accompanied them. RAF 51 Squadron under Wing Commander P. Pickard had the task of delivering the raiders in its Armstrong

Whitworth Whitley bombers. Their extraction was to be by Royal Navy motorboats under Commander F. N. Cook of the Royal Australian Navy. As training proceeded, the French Resistance reported that the Bruneval position was being strengthened. While 30 German troops were at the farmhouse, some 100 others were in the immediate vicinity.

The attacking forces departed on the night of February 27–28. The airdrop was uneventful, and the attackers assembled at the designated point for the movement to the radar station location. The attack proceeded as planned; Cox dismantled vital parts of the radar, and Frost then led his men to the beach shortly after 2:00 a.m. on February 28. Managing to avoid detection by two German destroyers and 2 E-boats less than a mile from his own craft off shore, Cook sent in six landing craft to extract the men, who had come under heavy German machine-gun fire from the cliffs. The raiders and their precious cargo then transferred to the motor gunboats for the return to Portsmouth. Four Royal Navy destroyers and RAF Supermarine Spitfire fighters provided protection against possible German intervention.

The attackers suffered two killed, six wounded, and six captured. The Germans lost five killed, two wounded, two captured (including a radar technician), and three missing. The attack was judged a great success. Tests on the radar components helped the British in their development of countermeasures (code-named Window) to neutralize it.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Radar

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Bittrich, Wilhelm (1894–1979)

German Waffen-SS general. Born in Wernigerode, Germany, on February 26, 1894, Wilhelm “Willi” Bittrich was a fighter pilot in the Imperial German Air Service during World War I. Following the war, he served in a Freikorps

unit, then spent several years as a civilian stockbroker. He joined the Schutzstaffel (SS) in 1932.

During the September 1939 Polish Campaign, Bittrich served as the adjutant on Oberführer Josef "Sepp" Dietrich's Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, a Waffen-SS regiment. Bittrich then fought in the SS-Verfügungs Division (later the 2nd SS Division) in the campaign for France (May 10–June 25, 1940). Promoted to Oberführer, Bittrich took command of SS Regiment Deutschland in the 2nd SS Das Reich Division at the end of 1940. During the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he briefly led that division when its commander was wounded in December 1941. In January 1942, illness forced Bittrich to resign his command.

From May 1, 1942, to February 15, 1943, Bittrich, promoted to SS-gruppenführer and lieutenant general in the Waffen-SS, was head of the SS Cavalry Brigade, which grew into a full division during that time and saw continuous action on the Eastern Front. Bittrich was then tasked with organizing and commanding what eventually became the 9th SS Panzer Division (Hohenstaufen) and directed the division in its first combat in the breakout of the Soviet encirclement at Tarnopol in April 1944.

In July 1944, Bittrich was transferred to the Normandy front in France and appointed commander of the II SS Panzer Corps. Remnants of the corps that escaped destruction in the Falaise Pocket in August were in an ideal position to deal with the British 1st Airborne Division's attack on Arnhem on September 17, 1944, during Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26). Bittrich's reaction was decisive: he ordered the 9th SS Panzer Division to contain and attack the 1st British Airborne at Arnhem and the 10th SS Panzer Division to attack the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division at Nijmegen and stop the advancing British XXX Corps. This quick response resulted in the destruction of the British at Arnhem.

Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps also participated in the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge). In January 1945, the corps was transferred to the Eastern Front but fought its way back to the west before the end of the war. Surrendering to the Americans, Bittrich was turned over to the French, who convicted him of war crimes and imprisoned him until 1954. Bittrich died in Wolfratshausen, Germany, on April 19, 1979.

DANA LOMBARDY

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Dietrich, Josef “Sepp”; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Germany, Army; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Poland Campaign

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Black May (May 1943)

Defeat of German U-boats in the North Atlantic. The climactic convoy battles of March 1943 had given a first hint that Allied antisubmarine forces were finally gaining the upper hand in the battle for the North Atlantic. By early 1943, the fully mobilized American shipyards were producing vast numbers of escort vessels in addition to building more merchant ships than were being sunk by U-boats. Meanwhile, modern long-range naval patrol aircraft, such as the Consolidated B-24 Liberator, and escort carrier–based aircraft were closing the dreaded air gap, the wolf packs’ last refuge from Allied airpower in the North Atlantic. At the same time, Allied signals intelligence was reading the German U-boat cipher Triton almost continuously and with minimal delay.

On April 26, 1943, the Allies suffered a rare blackout in their ability to read the German cipher, just as 53 U-boats regrouped for an assault on the convoy routes. Miraculously, two eastbound convoys, SC.128 and HX.236, escaped destruction, but ONS.5, a weather-beaten westbound slow convoy of 30 merchant ships escorted by 7 warships, stumbled into the middle of the wolf packs on May 4. During the next 48 hours, the U-boats sank 12 ships but at an unacceptable cost. Escort vessels sank 6 U-boats, and long-range air patrols claimed 3 others. Radar in aircraft and escort vessels had played a decisive role in giving the numerically overmatched escorts a tactical edge in the battle.

The commander of the German U-boat arm, Admiral Karl Dönitz, was aware of the tilting balance, but he urged his U-boat commanders not to relent. Yet many of the vessels did not even reach their areas of operations.

The determined antisubmarine offensive in the Bay of Biscay (February–August 1943) by aircraft of the Royal Air Force Coastal Command destroyed six U-boats during May alone and forced seven others to return to base.

In the second week of May, the ragged survivors of the North Atlantic wolf packs regrouped and deployed against HX.237 and SC.129. Only three merchantmen were sunk, at the expense of the same number of U-boats. In addition to radar, the small escort carrier *Biter*, which had provided air cover for HX.237 as well as for SC.129, was vital in denying the German submarines tactical freedom on the surface near the convoys. When the U-boats renewed their attacks against Convoy SC.130 between May 12 and 20, escort vessels sank two U-boats, and shore-based aircraft claimed three others. SC.130 suffered no casualties. The U-boat offensive failed entirely against HX.239, a convoy with a rather generous organic air cover (aircraft attached to the convoy) provided by the escort carriers USS *Bogue* and HMS *Archer*. Not a single U-boat managed to close with the convoy, and on May 23, a U-boat fell victim to the rockets of one of the *Archer*'s aircraft. The following day, Dönitz recognized the futility of the enterprise and canceled all further operations in the North Atlantic.

During May 1943, to that point, more than 33 U-boats had been sunk and almost the same number had been damaged, nearly all of them in convoy battles in the North Atlantic or during transit through the Bay of Biscay. The month went down in German naval annals as "Black May," with the loss of 40 U-boats. At the end of May 1943, the British Naval Staff noted with satisfaction the cessation of U-boat activity. SC.130 was the last North Atlantic convoy to be seriously menaced during the war.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft Carriers; Air Warfare, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Bay of Biscay Offensive; Convoys, Allied; Convoys SC 122 and HX 229, Battle of; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Radar; Signals Intelligence; Submarines; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Black Sea, Area of Operations

The Black Sea is an oval-shaped inland sea stretching 600 miles west to east and ranging from 300 to 140 miles north to south. In 1941 the Soviet Union occupied a coastline along the northern shore of more than 2,200 miles (including the Sea of Azov), with the neutral state of Turkey to the south and the German allies Bulgaria and Romania to the west. The only maritime route into the Black Sea runs through the Turkish-controlled Bosporus Straits. The inability of the Soviets to construct major warships during the conflict and that of the Axis powers to send ships through the Bosporus forced both sides to fight with the large warships with which they had started the conflict. Another prominent geographic factor affecting naval operations was the Crimean Peninsula, which juts into the middle of the Black Sea. Possession of the Crimea and its great port, Sevastopol, ensured domination of the entire body of water.

In 1941 the Soviet Black Sea Fleet included 1 battleship, 3 heavy and 2 light cruisers, 17 destroyers, 2 guard ships, 44 submarines, and 120 other warships from gunboats to motor torpedo boats (MTBs). Sevastopol and Novorossiysk were the fleet's major bases. The fleet's mission was to control the Black Sea, prevent enemy naval forces from entering the region, destroy the Romanian Navy, and support the Red Army. Romania had bases at Sulina and Constanta, and its navy consisted of 4 destroyers, 3 small torpedo boats, 1 submarine, 11 smaller warships, and a flotilla of river monitors. Germany had no naval forces in the Black Sea, and Bulgaria prudently declined to fight the Soviet Union. Berlin believed that the capture of the coastline would eliminate the need for naval forces.

The first major operation of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was an ineffective bombardment of Constanta, Romania, by two destroyers. One was mined and sunk and the other damaged. Two Romanian destroyers contested the attack in what was the only encounter between major warships in the Black Sea during the entire war.

Romania was a major supplier of oil to the Axis, and while most of Germany's allotment went up the Danube River, Italy's share was shipped through the Bosporus. Soviet submarines attacked this vital traffic, but beginning in October 1941, the Romanians fenced off the coastal route with a mine barrage. Thereafter, the Romanian Navy focused on the protection of the sea-lanes in the western Black Sea. Through December 1941, Soviet submarines (or submarine-laid mines) accounted for only 10 ships totaling 19,000 tons.

The rapid German advance into the Ukraine during the summer of 1941 cut off large Soviet forces in the major port of Odessa. The Black Sea Fleet effectively supported Odessa until the Soviet high command decided to evacuate. This highly successful operation, conducted from October 1 to 16, extracted 86,000 soldiers and 15,000 civilians, along with most of their weapons and supplies, without the Axis even being aware of the operation and just in time to meet Axis forces advancing into the Crimea.

German and Romanian forces besieged Sevastopol beginning on October 30, and for the balance of the year the Black Sea Fleet supported the fortress. The most important operation was the December 26–28 landing of 42,000 men on the Crimea's eastern finger, the Kerch Peninsula, and around Feodosiya in the largest and most complex Soviet amphibious operation of the war. This operation disrupted a German offensive to capture Sevastopol and helped the fortress hold out another six months.

Sevastopol's resistance convinced the German command that they needed naval assistance and led to the shipment of MTBs, *Marinefährprähme* (MFP) barges, and small submarines overland and down the Danube into the Black Sea. The captured shipyards at Nikolayev began fabricating MFPs as well. Italy contributed a flotilla of MTBs and miniature submarines.

During 1942, the Black Sea Fleet continued to support Sevastopol until its capture in July, bringing in supplies and reinforcements and conducting almost nightly shore bombardments. The months of May through July cost the fleet six destroyers and one light cruiser to mines and aircraft. Italian MTBs torpedoed the cruiser *Molotov* after a bombardment of Feodosiya on August 3, 1942.

The Germans crossed the Kerch Strait at the end of August using a flotilla of barges and small craft and captured Novorossiysk on September 6. This forced the fleet to retreat to the minor ports of Poti and Batumi near the

Turkish border. In 1942 Soviet submarines accounted for as many as 17 Axis and neutral ships of 12,660 gross register tonnage. The surface fleet remained active.

On December 1, a cruiser and a destroyer bombarded Fidonisi, Romania, at the cost of mine damage to the cruiser. In a subsequent raid by a destroyer and four large minesweepers, the Soviets struck a convoy escorted by a Romanian torpedo boat and four German R-boats (125-ton motor-minesweepers). In a two-hour action, the Soviets demonstrated heart but a lack of training and doctrine, failing to harm their vulnerable targets.

In 1943, the Soviet winter offensive forced a precipitous Axis retreat. Sea power, however, allowed the Germans to defend the Kuban bridgehead on the Tamen Peninsula. This required up to 2,500 tons of supplies per day, nearly all delivered by barges. The Black Sea Fleet retained 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 29 submarines, and more than 100 smaller warships while the Germans had accumulated a mosquito fleet of 6 small submarines, 16 MTBs, 23 R-boats, 26 subchasers, and more than 100 MFPs. The Romanian Navy continued to escort shipping along the sea's western shores. During the year, Soviet submarines sank 20 ships of 34,000 gross register tonnage.

After the Soviet summer 1943 offensives threatened German land access to the Crimea, the Germans abandoned the Kuban bridgehead. Between September 15 and October 10, the Kriegsmarine pulled out 250,000 men with their supplies and equipment. The Soviet Navy failed to effectively contest this evacuation. In a costly defeat, German aircraft sank three Soviet destroyers after they had engaged in a melee with German MTBs. Following this episode, Moscow ordered that large surface warships could only operate with its authorization, a restriction that kept them in port for the remainder of the war.

Soviet armies cut off the Crimea by November 1943, but the German high command decided to retain the peninsula as a fortress to control the Black Sea and protect the Romanian oil fields. The Soviets tried to hustle the Germans out of the Crimea by landing at the tip of the Kerch Peninsula and at Eltigen south of Kerch on November 1, 1943. The Germans contained these landings and blockaded the more isolated beachhead at Eltigen with R-boats, MTBs, and MFPs. After an intense battle for maritime access, the Germans eradicated the Soviet position by December 11, 1943. Both sides had suffered

greatly, and a lull in operations ensued as the Germans concentrated on supplying and reinforcing their 200,000-man Crimean garrison.

The Soviets, with limited ability to repair their hard-used forces, regrouped; their ongoing westward advance ensured that the German tenure in the Crimea would be limited no matter what the naval situation was. Nikolayev fell on March 28, 1944, and Odessa was isolated shortly thereafter, necessitating the evacuation of this port by sea, an activity completed by April 9 and one that the Soviets permitted without interference.

Soviet forces then broke into the Crimea, and on May 9, German leader Adolf Hitler finally authorized a retreat from Sevastopol. Soviet submarines, MTBs, and aircraft contested this evacuation. The Black Sea Fleet continued to hold back its major warships, although their deployment could have turned a rushed and costly evacuation into a debacle. The Germans and Romanians brought off 130,000 men by sea (more than 30,000 in the last three days), but they lost 7 transports, 11 small warships and auxiliaries, and 11 barges, mainly to air attacks. More than 8,000 Axis troops drowned. This was the last major naval operation in the Black Sea. The campaign ended with the surrender of Romania on August 23, 1944.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Baltic Sea, Naval Operations in; Bulgaria, Navy; Germany, Navy; Romania, Navy; Sevastopol, Siege of; Soviet Union, Navy

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Blackshirts

Fascist paramilitary units in Italy, officially established in 1923 by Italian premier and future dictator Benito Mussolini. Known as the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (Volunteer Militia for National Security, MVSN) but informally called the Blackshirts for the distinctive

black shirts as part of their uniform, they were patterned after Giuseppe Garibaldi's Red Shirts during the Risorgimento in the last half of the 19th century.

Open to men between the ages of 17 and 50, the Blackshirts were formed largely from the fascist action squads that had battled the socialists and communists in the streets and helped bring Mussolini to power. Once Mussolini was firmly established in authority, the Blackshirts essentially functioned as Italy's fourth armed service. During the crisis following the murder of socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti in 1924, six legions of the MVSN were mobilized to defend the regime if need be. Blackshirt units were also deployed in the Italian Empire and later fought in both Africa and Europe during World War II.

The Blackshirts were organized into legions of 1,340 men. Each member wore a black cotton shirt underneath his uniform and carried a ceremonial dagger. Although Blackshirt units were under the command of the Italian Army, they also remained under Mussolini's direct orders. Theoretically, one Blackshirt battalion was attached to each infantry division, but a shortage of numbers meant that only about half the divisions actually received one. Blackshirts also manned coastal and antiaircraft batteries in Italy.

Before World War II Blackshirt units helped maintain order in Libya, and they fought in the 1935–1936 Italo-Ethiopian War and stayed on there afterward to participate in the low-level counterinsurgency operations. They also fought in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). At the end of 1940, the MVSN numbered some 312,000 men, of whom 112,000 were in 194 active battalions.

In June 1940 when Italy formally entered World War II, Blackshirt units were dispatched to East Africa, North Africa, and Greece. Two Blackshirt battalions comprised of Italian colonists from Ethiopia and Eritrea formed the Eleventh Blackshirt Legion and participated in the invasion of British Somaliland in August 1940. The Tenth Blackshirt Legion was raised from Italian colonists in Ethiopia and charged with the defense of Addis Ababa. Four Blackshirt battalions were recruited in Libya to police Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna. Four Blackshirt divisions from Italy joined Marshall Rodolfo Graziani's Tenth Army in the invasion of Egypt in September 1940. The First Blackshirt Division assisted in the capture of Fort Capuzzo and Sidi

Barrani. All four divisions were largely destroyed in the British winter offensive.

Seven Blackshirt battalions served with the Italian Eleventh Army during the invasion of Greece in November. In 1941, Blackshirts operated in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union while continuing their activities in Greece and Africa. Additional Blackshirt battalions were sent to reinforce the Kelcyre Pass in Greece in January 1941. The Eleventh Blackshirt Legion defended the Dongolaas Gorge during the Battle of Keren from February until April, when Italy lost Eritrea to British forces.

Elite "M" (Mussolini) Battalions were also formed from experienced Blackshirt units that had distinguished themselves in combat. Six "M" Battalions were among the Blackshirts sent to engage in antipartisan warfare in Yugoslavia. "M" Battalions joined the Italian Eighth Army in the invasion of the Soviet Union in July 1941. The "M" Battalions were driven out of the Soviet Union along with the Italian Eighth Army in January 1943.

Blackshirts also played a role in the defense, collapse, and reestablishment of Mussolini's regime in 1943. An "M" division outfitted with 36 German Tiger Tanks was stationed outside Rome in May 1943 to defend the regime from insurrection. Cut off from its commander in Rome, General Enzo Galbiati, the armored "M" division was unable to act in time to prevent Mussolini's overthrow that July.

Native Blackshirts turned on their Italian officers in Albania, and many Blackshirts in Yugoslavia became anti-Axis partisans when Mussolini was deposed. A new fascist militia, the Republican National Guard commanded by General Renato Ricci, came into being when Mussolini was restored to power in September. It was comprised of 30,000 poorly trained and equipped teenagers who conducted antipartisan activity in Italy and acted as Mussolini's bodyguard.

By 1944, desertions had reduced the Republican National Guard to only 3,000 members. In July 1944, fascist Black Brigades commanded by Alessandro Pavolini were raised from men between the ages of 17 and 61. These undisciplined groups sought to crush partisan resistance through looting and torture. Mussolini took personal command of what remained of the Republican National Guard in August 1944.

JEFFREY LAMONICA AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Graziani, Rodolfo, Marchese di Neghelli; Italo-Ethiopian War; Italy; Mussolini, Benito; Somalia; Spanish Civil War

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Blamey, Sir Thomas Albert (1884–1951)

Australian Army general. Born on January 24, 1884, in Wagga-Wagga, Australia, Thomas Blamey secured an army commission through competitive examination in 1906. He made captain in 1910 and attended staff college in India during 1911–1913. During World War I, Blamey served as a staff officer in Egypt and fought at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. He rose to brigadier general in 1918. Following the war, he served on the Imperial General Staff. In 1925, Blamey retired from the regular army and became chief police commissioner in Victoria, Australia, while remaining a general in the militia.

Blamey resigned his police position in 1936 following a minor scandal in which he lied under oath to protect the reputations of two women who were victims of robbery. Shortly after the beginning of World War II, he rejoined the regular army, was promoted to lieutenant general, and was assigned command of I Corps. Serving in Egypt in 1940 under General Archibald P. Wavell, he oversaw the evacuation of Australian troops from Greece following the German invasion of that country in April 1941. Promoted to general in September 1941, Blamey became commander in chief of Australian forces in March 1942.

Under orders from U.S. general Douglas MacArthur, who was concerned about the Japanese occupation of Buna in Papua and a possible invasion of Australia, Blamey took personal command of the ground forces and led them

in the recapture of Buna in January 1943. He also held personal command in September 1943 in a campaign that took the city of Lae and liberated the eastern New Guinea coast. Following these actions, Blamey found himself relegated to a background role by MacArthur.

As the Allies island-hopped closer to Japan, Blamey undertook operations against isolated Japanese troops in islands bypassed by MacArthur. These actions, bereft of significant naval and air support, proved costly and were criticized by many as unnecessary, but Blamey believed that it was in Australia's interest that these occupied islands be freed. At the end of the war, he signed the Japanese surrender document as the Australian representative.

Retiring from active duty in January 1946, Blamey was promoted to field marshal in June 1950. Australia's first-ever field marshal, Blamey died at Melbourne on May 27, 1951.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Australia; Australia, Army; Buna, Battle of; Greece Campaign, German; MacArthur, Douglas; New Guinea Campaign; Papuan Campaign; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Blanchard, Jean Georges Maurice (1877–1954)

French Army general. Born at Orléans on December 9, 1877, Jean Georges Maurice Blanchard graduated from the École Polytechnique in 1899 as an artillery specialist and was commissioned in the artillery. During World War I, he served at the front and on staff assignments, winning two citations for bravery and promotion to major. He was promoted to general of brigade in

1932 and to general of division in 1935. In 1938, Blanchard became director of French higher military instruction.

When World War II began, Blanchard took command of the First French Army near Cambrai, France, as part of General Gaston Billotte's 1st Army Group. When Germany invaded on May 10, 1940, Blanchard followed the prearranged French strategic plan, moving his army forward to the Dyle River in support of the Belgians. The British Expeditionary Force under Lord John Gort was on his north flank and General André Corap's Ninth French Army was to the south. After advancing approximately 25 miles, Blanchard encountered Colonel General Walther von Reichenau's German Sixth Army and was forced to withdraw and join those Allied troops cut off by the German drive down the Somme River to the English Channel.

Following Billotte's death in an automobile accident on May 25, 1940, a shattered Blanchard took over command of the 1st Army Group. British colleagues, such as Lieutenant General Alan Brooke, grimly noted that he was "merely existing and hardly aware of what was going on around him," completely bewildered and incapable of issuing orders. On May 29, Brooke even threatened to have Blanchard shot if his orders disrupted Brooke's evacuation plans. On June 1, 1940, Blanchard left Dunkerque for Britain on a French destroyer, and in late August, he was placed on the French Army's reserve list. Thereafter, he faded into obscurity, although he was later awarded the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor. Blanchard died at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 23, 1954.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Billotte, Gaston Henri Gustave; Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Corap, André Georges; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Battle for; Reichenau, Walther von; Vereker, John Standish Surtees Prendergast

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Blandy, William Henry Purnell (1890–1954)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in New York City on June 28, 1890, William Henry Purnell Blandy graduated at the head of his class from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1913 and began his career in the battleship *Florida.* He participated in the 1914 Veracruz landing and served in convoy duty during World War I.

During the interwar period, Blandy specialized in naval gunnery and ordnance. As head of the Bureau of Ordnance's Gun Section between 1927 and 1929, he contributed to innovations in gun design. In February 1941, he was selected over more than 100 more senior officers to become chief of the Bureau of Ordnance as a rear admiral. In this post, Blandy was instrumental in the production of new weapons systems, such as the 40mm Bofors and 20mm Oerlikon guns as well as the proximity fuze. He also had to resolve problems such as the malfunctioning Mark XIV torpedoes.

In December 1943, Blandy left administrative work to assume command of Amphibious Group 1 of the Pacific Fleet, from January 1944 to July 1945. His first combat operation was during the Battle for Kwajalein (January 19–February 6, 1944). Blandy then commanded Task Group (TG) 51.1, the Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve, at Saipan (June 15–July 9, 1944). For the attack on the Palau Islands in September 1944, he commanded TG 32.2, the Angaur Attack Group.

Blandy's expertise in gunnery and ordnance made him the choice to command Amphibious Support Task Force (TG 52), charged with all prelanding activities, including shore bombardment, minesweeping, and underwater demolition. Blandy commanded preassault operations at Iwo Jima in February 1945. His Amphibious Support Task Force played a key role in the Okinawa operation during March–June 1945, where it paved the way for the landings on Kerama Retto and Okinawa. Blandy ended the war as commander of Cruisers/Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, from July to November 1945. He was promoted to vice admiral in November 1945.

As the navy's ordnance expert, Blandy commanded the joint army-navy nuclear tests (Operation CROSSROADS) at Bikini Atoll in July 1946. From

February 1947 until his retirement three years later, he was commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet. Blandy died in Queens, New York, on January 12, 1954.

ROBERT KRUMEL

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Antiaircraft Defense of Surface Ships; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kwajalein, Battle for; Naval Gunfire, Shore Support; Okinawa, Invasion of; Saipan, Battle of; Torpedoes; United States Navy

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Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von (1883–1948)

German Army general. Born on July 10, 1883, at Peterswalde, East Prussia, Johannes Albrecht von Blaskowitz saw action on both fronts during World War I, rose to the rank of captain, and was awarded the Iron Cross. He continued in the Reichs-wehr after the war and was promoted to general of infantry in December 1935. The following year, he took command of Military District II, and in January 1938 he became the commander of the Third Army, leading it into Prague as part of the German absorption of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

Blaskowitz commanded the Eighth Army in the September 1939 German invasion of Poland, charged with protecting the Tenth Army's northern flank during the drive on Warsaw. Following initial German success, the Poles counterattacked on September 9 against the flank of the Eighth Army and managed to destroy one of Blaskowitz's five infantry divisions before they were defeated with the Tenth Army's assistance. The Battle of Kutno was the biggest Po-lish victory of the campaign.

On October 23, 1939, Blaskowitz assumed command of German forces occupying Poland. An officer of the old school who set high standards for his men, he was shocked by the brutal actions of the Schutzstaffel (SS) against

the local population. Blaskowitz went so far as to draw up a memorandum protesting these actions, which earned Adolf Hitler's displeasure.

Blaskowitz briefly commanded the Ninth Army in the invasion of France (May 10–June 25, 1940), then was military governor of northern France before being assigned to command the First Army in France in October 1940. He remained in this position until May 10, 1944, when he was assigned command of Army Task Group G, defending the Mediterranean and South Atlantic French coasts. In Operation DRAGOON (August 15, 1944), the Allies invaded the French Riviera and easily pushed aside Blaskowitz's thinly spread forces. Relieved of his command in September 1944, Blaskowitz returned to command Army Group H in Holland in January 1945, where he demonstrated compassion for the Dutch by permitting them medical supplies and food during the Allied advance.

Captured on May 8, 1945, by Canadian forces, Blasko-witz was charged with war crimes that involved passing along Hitler's order regarding the execution of enemy commandos. Rather than face trial, he committed suicide on February 5, 1948, in Nuremberg, Germany.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Commando Order; DRAGOON, Operation; Germany, Army; Hitler, Adolf; Poland Campaign

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Bletchley Park

Secret British decryption center. Just prior to the beginning of World War II, the British Government Code and Cypher School purchased a Victorian mansion known as Bletchley Park (BP, also called Station X or War Station), located some 50 miles north of London in Bedfordshire. British code

breakers, some of them veterans of World War I, began moving to the BP in August 1939, just before the beginning of World War II. The staff, headed by Alistair Dennison, soon numbered 150 people.

Thereafter, the BP grew rapidly. By late 1942, BP personnel numbered around 3,500, a figure that would expand to 10,000 by 1945. The BP's overseas stations were the Combined Bureau, Middle East; the Wireless Experimental Centre at Delhi; and the Far East Combined Bureau. Each had its own outposts.

The personnel at Bletchley Park were a mix of mathematicians, cryptographers, engineers, and eccentrics. Among them was Alan Turing, regarded as the father of the modern computer. There were also members of the various British military services as well as foreign military personnel. At the BP, they continued the work begun by the Poles in reading German signals traffic and unlocking the secrets of the German Enigma encoding machine.

To house the growing staff, wooden huts were built on the garden grounds. These were numbered, and different types of analysis were conducted in each. Hut 3 decrypted German Army and Air Force codes, Hut 6 focused on German Army and Air Force Enigma cryptanalysis, Hut 4 worked on German naval translating and processing, and Hut 8 handled German Navy Enigma cryptanalysis. Others worked on Italian and Japanese codes. The intelligence produced by the BP was code-named Ultra.

By 1940, Bletchley Park had come up with additional devices that, given time, could sort through the possible variations of an encoded text. Careless German practices, mostly in the Luftwaffe, gave the electromechanical devices called "bombes" a head start and greatly shortened the delay between receiving and decoding messages. The changeable settings of the Enigma machine meant that most messages could not be read in real time, but the information was nonetheless invaluable.

The BP staff was ultimately able to provide an important advantage to the Allies in the war. The Axis powers never learned of the success of the Allied decrypting operations, and the activities at the BP remained unknown to the public until 1974, when Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham revealed them in his book, *The Ultra Secret.*

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY

See also

Electronic Intelligence; Signals Intelligence

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Blitz, The (August 1940–May 1941)

English term for Germany's sustained night air attacks on British cities, chiefly London, from August 1940 to mid-May 1941. The term "blitz" is taken from the German word *Blitzkrieg* (lightning war). Early in the war, the British government undertook preparations to deal with air attacks, especially in London.

The Blitz began as the daylight Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940) for control of the air over the island was reaching a climax. The Germans hoped at first to drive the Royal Air Force (RAF) from the skies, and then they sought to destroy the RAF by hitting factories and ground installations; finally, they turned to terrorizing the civilian population by bombing cities. This thrust was, in effect, triggered on the night of August 24–25 when German bombers that were supposed to target an oil depot at Thameshaven struck London instead.

The German bombers had hardly retired when British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill ordered a retaliatory strike on Berlin. On September 5, German leader Adolf Hitler issued a directive calling for "disruptive attacks on the population and air defenses of major British cities, including London, by day and night." Such bombing could not have significant military value and was intended primarily to destroy civilian morale.

On September 7, 1940, the German Luftwaffe carried out a major raid that devastated London's East End. The bombers returned over the next two days, and more than 1,000 people were killed. From the beginning to the middle of November, London was the target. The intensity of raids varied,

but with good weather and a full moon, they were massive. On October 15, for instance, 538 tons of bombs fell on the city.

British authorities had rejected both the idea of building deep shelters and the concept of using the Underground (subway), for fear of creating a bunker mentality; some actually worried that people would refuse to return to the surface. Londoners forced the issue on September 8 when crowds pushed their way into the subway's Liverpool Street Station for refuge. The authorities capitulated, and by Christmas, 200,000 bunks were available in the Underground, with that many more ready for installation. A decision to build deep shelters was taken in October, but the Blitz was over before the first was completed. Nonetheless, by February 1941, some 92 percent of Londoners could be sheltered in a combination of public and private facilities.

A uniformed woman leads a group of boys through a bomb-damaged residential area of London during the "Blitz" in 1941. (Library of Congress)

Initially, the shelters were dismal places. Overcrowding was the rule, and sanitation was primitive at best. In mid-November 1940, the government instituted a food train to supply the hungry and thirsty citizens belowground,

and communities began developing. People returned to the same shelter night after night and slept in the same bunks. Sing-alongs were organized, and professional entertainment was often provided. The authenticity of this sort of camaraderie has been questioned, and some scholars have referred to the "myth of the Blitz." Certainly, the camaraderie has been exaggerated at times, but Londoners seem to have known that a brave front was expected of them, and they made real efforts to live up to the expectation.

The cheerful endurance and determination that was initially claimed and later rejected as myth was real. It was not universal or without cracks, but Londoners by and large kept daily routines in place with humor and mutual support. Predictions of disruptions proved mostly false. Initial class discontent because working-class areas in the East End were the first targets disappeared as the Germans pounded the rest of the city.

Life was not easy in London during that period. In the first six weeks of major raids, some 16,000 houses were destroyed and another 60,000 badly damaged, with the result that 300,000 people needed places to stay. By the end of the Blitz, one in six Londoners had been rendered homeless. Many historical sites were also damaged, including Buckingham Palace. Most sites, however, survived and proved to be symbols of defiance. The king and queen remained in London, and Big Ben, despite sustaining some damage, struck every hour. London also received some respite as raids were directed against other cities. There was a major attack on Birmingham on October 25, 1940, and on November 14, the city of Coventry was hit with a level of intensity beyond all previous efforts. Liverpool, Southampton, Birmingham (again), and Bristol were also struck.

London passed the Christmas of 1940 in comparative tranquility, and precautions were relaxed. Then, on December 29, the great fire raid came. It was not the biggest raid ever, but the Christmas complacency among Londoners resulted in a slowed response, and enormous damage ensued. After another respite, March and April 1941 saw the skies again filled with German raiders. The worst nights were April 16 and 19, which left 2,000 people dead and 148,000 homes damaged. Providers such as the Londoners' Meal Service, which was operating 170 canteens, were strained. Once again, however, there was a relative pause—and again, precautions waned.

On May 10, crowds flooded into London for a football championship match, only to be joined by German raiders. The attack was the worst raid of

the war, with more than 3,000 dead or seriously injured, 250,000 books burned at the British Museum, and pilots reporting the glow of fires visible as far away as 160 miles. It was also the last major raid of the Blitz. The British—and Londoners in particular—still had to face occasional raids and the V-1 and V-2 terror weapons at the end of the war, but for the Germans, strategic and tactical plans no longer included massive assaults from the air. Of course, as time passed, their ability to make them also waned.

One of the lessons of the Blitz was that contrary to German expectations and intent, bombing the civilian population often strengthened its morale and determination, a lesson the Allies failed to learn in their strikes against civilian targets in Germany. In the United States, extensive coverage of the Blitz provided by U.S. news correspondent Edward R. Murrow of CBS Radio was thought to have tipped U.S. public opinion toward aiding the British well before the nation entered World War II.

FRED R. VAN HARTESVELDT AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Baby Blitz; Britain, Battle of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain; Murrow, Edward Roscoe; Document 177

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Blitzkrieg

The so-called blitzkrieg (lightning war) doctrine is one of the most enduring myths of World War II. In the early years of the war, however, the swift and stunning German successes in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 came to be interpreted in the West as the result of some sort of revolutionary new

military doctrine that relied on combined-arms operations, with ground and air forces working together as a well-oiled military machine.

Military doctrine has been defined as the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. But what became known popularly as blitzkrieg was not a set of fundamental principles, nor was it written down as an authoritative document. Rather, the term "blitzkrieg" was created for public consumption. It did appear occasionally in the military literature between 1936 and 1940, but the German writers generally used it in reference to a short war, as opposed to the drawn-out trench warfare of World War I. The term became fixed in the public mind after articles appeared in *Time* magazine, one on September 25, 1939, about Germany's invasion of Poland and another on May 27, 1940, about the fall of France.

Immediately following World War I, the leaders of the much reduced German Army studied the causes of the defeat in 1918 and concluded that a lack of traditional mobile, maneuverable forces and tactics had resulted in the war of attrition that eventually doomed Imperial Germany on the battlefield. Unlike the French, who determined that better defenses would be the key to winning the next war and hence built the Maginot Line, the Germans concluded that the next war would be of short duration and would be won by maneuver warfare in the classical sense.

The German field service regulations of 1921, *Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen* (Command and Combat of Combined Arms), together with the updated version of 1934, *Truppenführung* (Unit Command), were infantry-oriented documents that cast tank and air assets strictly in an infantry-support role. Although *Truppenführung*, which remained the official doctrine for the German Army through 1945, emphasized traditional German thinking on mobility, it did allow for decentralization of control and provided considerable latitude for force structure changes. It was also not tied rigidly to specific operational concepts, to the exclusion of all others. Rather than an inflexible tactical cookbook, the manual was a philosophical treatment of the conduct of operations and leadership.

During the interwar years, the German mobility advocates enthusiastically read the works of the leading mobile warfare theorists of the time, J. F. C. Fuller, Charles de Gaulle, and Basil Liddell Hart. Younger German officers aggressively advanced the argument that a tank force could

alter the outcome of battles. Many of the older officers resisted the notion that the tank could be a decisive combat arm, remembering the grave difficulties that armored units experienced in World War I.

After Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, he quickly made it clear that he intended to rearm the nation, and he was interested in the iconoclastic ideas of the younger officers. In June 1934, Colonel Heinz Guderian became chief of staff of the newly formed Motorized Troop Command. A little more than a year later, the Germans fielded an experimental panzer division. In October 1935 while still only a colonel, Guderian assumed command of one of the three new panzer divisions. He immediately set out to convince the traditionally infantry-oriented German General Staff to accept the concepts of armored warfare. Although Guderian received only limited support from some of his superiors, Hitler encouraged his aggressive concepts.

Meanwhile, the fledgling German Air Force also underwent important changes. Prior to German intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), most Luftwaffe officers saw airpower in the same terms as their peers in most other air forces of the period. The two most essential missions were conducting long-range strategic bombing and achieving air superiority over the battlefield; the ground-support mission was largely ignored. But the successes of German air-ground operations during the Spanish Civil War convinced a number of high-ranking Luftwaffe officers to reconsider ground support.

General Ernst Udet, in charge of Luftwaffe development after 1936, pushed through the development of a dive-bomber, the Junkers Ju-87 Stuka. The aircraft was extremely accurate and mobile and was designed specifically to support ground forces. It became the plane that added the critical air dimension to mobile operations.

A German motorized detachment in the remains of a Polish town captured during the German Blitzkrieg of September 1939. (Library of Congress)

The Poland Campaign of 1939 was executed in short order and had all the outward appearances of a dazzling success of German arms. But the so-called blitzkrieg doctrine was never used in that campaign. Rather than being committed en masse, the panzer units were allocated to the various field armies. The Luftwaffe was primarily concerned with establishing air superiority and striking deep at Polish lines of communications. Tank maintenance was a severe problem, and too often the German system of resupply was unequal to the required tasks. But in the end, Germany crushed Poland quickly, and that success obscured the serious operational, tactical, and technical problems that the Wehrmacht experienced.

Between the end of the Polish Campaign and the start of the attack in the west against France and Britain in May 1940, the German Army made some significant changes. The panzer divisions were organized into corps. The

number of tanks in the German Army increased only slightly, but the number of tanks per division decreased, and thus the number of panzer divisions grew. Out of necessity rather than doctrinal design, the panzer divisions became combined-arms units, with a balance between tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, and other arms. Tactical air, especially with the Stuka, became an important element in the combined-arms mix because Germany was woefully short of field artillery.

The Germans did not go into France planning for a rapid and overwhelming victory. But they achieved one because of a combination of luck, better leadership and training, superior concentration of forces, and correspondingly poor French leadership, training, and tactics. At first the Germans were stunned by their success, but they soon fell victim to their own propaganda and began to believe in the myth of blitzkrieg.

In June 1941, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, this time anticipating a rapid campaign. They did not mobilize their economy for the invasion, nor did they accumulate the necessary stockpiles or provide adequately for the long lines of communications or winter conditions. Drawing the wrong lessons from the French Campaign, they believed that their use of tactical airpower had been so successful that it more than compensated for their severe shortage of artillery.

That approach may have worked against the poorly deployed French and British, but against the artillery-oriented Soviets, it was a recipe for disaster. The Germans learned quickly that the Luftwaffe could not be everywhere at the same time over the vast expanses of the eastern battlefields, especially with the onset of poor weather. The Soviets, with their abundant conventional field artillery, seldom lacked direct fire support.

The term “blitzkrieg” described a set of results, unique to a specific place and a specific time. The coordinated use of mobility, communications, and combined arms was not a revolution in military affairs, as it has often been portrayed, but rather a natural evolution of military doctrine that was clearly identifiable in the closing months of World War I. The myth of blitzkrieg, however, did obscure serious flaws in the German war machine, including supply, transport, maintenance, artillery, and intelligence. That circumstance proved progressively costly to the Germans as the war advanced and the Allies grew stronger and as the mechanized battlefield became increasingly lethal.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Britain, Battle of; de Gaulle, Charles; France, Battle for; Germany, Army; Guderian, Heinz; Hitler, Adolf; Infantry Tactics; Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry; Maginot Line; Poland Campaign; Spanish Civil War; Udet, Ernst

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Bloch, Claude Charles (1878–1967)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Woodbury, Kentucky, on July 13, 1878, Claude Charles Bloch graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1895 and was present at the Battle of Santiago Bay during the 1898 Spanish-American War. He later was a member of the international force sent to relieve the foreign legations in Beijing during the 1900 Boxer Uprising. He also participated in the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914. During World War I, Bloch commanded the troop transport *Plattsburg* carrying members of the American Expeditionary Forces to France. He was promoted to captain in 1918.

Bloch was assistant chief of the Bureau of Ordnance during 1918–1921, then its chief as a rear admiral during 1923–1927. From 1927 to 1929, he commanded the battleship *California.* Graduating from the Naval War College in 1929, he commanded cruisers in the Battle Force during 1932–1934, then was judge advocate general of the navy in 1934–1936. He

commanded Battleship Division Two during June 1936–January 1937. A staunch advocate of preparedness and a member of the navy "Gun Club," which emphasized a blue-water navy based on battleships and cruisers rather than carrier aviation, Bloch supported the fortification of Guam. Promoted to full admiral in January 1937, Bloch became commander of the Battle Force in 1937. During 1938–1940, he commanded the West Coast–based U.S. Fleet.

In 1940, Bloch assumed command of the Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, normally an enjoyable preretirement assignment. As a warning gesture to Japan in 1940, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt transferred the Pacific Fleet from California to Hawaii.

Bloch sought to strengthen Hawaiian defenses, but he encountered much interference and obstruction from the fleet's new commander, Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel. Yet Bloch's own opposition to the installation of antitorpedo nets contributed to the disastrous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941. Bloch was also largely responsible for placing the fleet on a rigid schedule so that its movements were entirely predictable. Although both Kimmel and General Walter C. Short, the army commander, were removed from their commands, Bloch served out his term until April 1942, when he retired. A congressional inquiry subsequently exonerated him of all responsibility for the Pearl Harbor debacle.

Recalled to Washington in April 1942 to serve on the navy's General Board, Bloch retired in August 1942. In retirement, he headed the Navy Board for Production Awards until the end of World War II. Bloch died in Washington, D.C., on October 4, 1967.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Kimmel, Husband Edward; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Short, Walter Campbell; United States Navy

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Blockade-Running

In the early stage of World War II, the main lines of communication between the Axis powers were either by land via the Trans-Siberian Railway or, when Japan entered the war in December 1941, across the sea by surface blockade-runners. Japan used German blockade-runners to send such goods as rubber, cooking oil, lead, tin, and tea to Germany. In return, the ships carried industrial products such as locomotives and machinery and various pieces of technical equipment, scientific instruments, and chemical and pharmaceutical products to Japan. In addition, ships carried supplies and spare parts for German warships in the Far East. Some blockade-runners also supplied German armed merchant cruisers operating in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the continental line was cut, and only sea routes remained. Blockade-running that began in April 1941 and ended in October 1943 involved a total of 36 ships traveling from Asia to Europe. Six of them were recalled or returned after sustaining damage, and of the 30 that remained, 11 were sunk by Allied forces or were scuttled by their own crews to prevent capture. Another 2 were accidentally sunk by German submarines, and 1 was seized by a U.S. cruiser. Thus, 16 ships actually completed their voyages and delivered their cargo to the port of Bordeaux in German-occupied France.

In the other direction, 23 ships, including 5 fleet supply ships, were sent from Europe to the Far East between September 1941 and April 1943. Of these, 16 reached Asian ports, 5 were sunk or scuttled, and 2 were recalled or returned to port.

Overall, 45.8 percent of the blockade-runners on the Far East route were lost; however, annual ship losses rose dramatically over the course of the war. Between April 1941 and October 1942, only 12.1 percent were lost, whereas in 1943 losses rose to 85.7 percent. Of 104,700 tons of materials loaded on the ships, only 26,600 tons reached their destinations. In addition to raw materials and equipment, these ships also transported passengers. Some 900 passengers embarked to travel from the Far East to Europe, but fewer than half of them arrived safely. A total of 136 died when their ships

were sunk, and the remainder became prisoners of war or remained in the Far East after their ships turned back.

From early 1944, submarines took over the blockade-runners' mission. Between then and early March 1945, 16 German U-boats sailed to the Far East as combat cargo transporters. But only 8 actually arrived in Far Eastern ports, carrying some 930 tons of cargo. The other 8 boats were lost, most of them to hostile action. Through the end of 1944, only 3 submarines reached Europe, but none got to Germany: the *U-843* arrived at Norway but was sunk in the Kattegat Straits, and the *U-510* and *U-861* reached French ports.

Under the code name AQUILA, five Italian submarines also participated in blockade-running. Departing France, they carried some 500 tons of supplies for German/Italian submarine bases in the Far East as well as personnel and cargo for Japan. None of them returned to Europe. The Japanese also sent five submarines to Europe to transport German military technology and to exchange personnel. Ultimately, four of them reached the continent, but only three returned: two to Singapore and one to Japan. All these submarines had Japanese and German technicians, liaison officers, and equipment and blueprints of Germany's newest weapons. Of 89 passengers aboard Axis submarines traveling from Japan, 74 arrived in France; the remainder died when their boats were sunk. A total of 96 passengers sailed in the opposite direction, 64 of them arriving safely; 22 were lost while under way, and 10 others fell into U.S. hands.

HIRAMA YOICHI

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; British Naval Blockade of the European Axis Powers; Japan, Navy; Submarines

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Blomberg, Werner von (1878–1946)

German field marshal and minister of war (1933–1938). Born in Stargard, Germany, on September 2, 1878, Werner von Blomberg entered the German Army in 1897 and graduated from the Prussian Kriegsakademie in 1907. In 1908 he qualified as a General Staff officer and then served with distinction on the Western Front during World War I. From 1927 to 1929 as a major general, he headed the Truppenamt, the clandestine version of the General Staff that had been outlawed under the Treaty of Versailles.

Blomberg traveled to the Soviet Union to further the secret military cooperation between it and Germany, and he was one of the first German generals to support Adolf Hitler. Blomberg participated in the Geneva disarmament talks but was recalled at the end of January 1933 to become defense minister (later, war minister) in Hitler's first cabinet. In April, he was made commander in chief of the German armed forces.

An enthusiastic Nazi, Blomberg was a key figure in Hitler's consolidation of power. He pressured the führer to remove the Sturmabteilungen (SA, or Storm Troops) as a possible threat and supported Hitler in the subsequent June 1934 purge of the SA (the Blood Purge), after which he issued an order congratulating Hitler, even though two army generals were among the victims. On the death of German president Paul von Hindenburg, Hitler called on Blomberg to swear an oath of allegiance to him personally, which Blomberg in turn imposed on his fellow officers, thereby helping confirm Hitler's control of the armed forces. (Blomberg was soon known by his fellow officers as the "Rubber Lion.") In gratitude for his support, the führer promoted Blomberg in April 1936, making him the first field marshal of the Third Reich.

The relationship between the two men soon changed, however. After Hitler revealed his expansionist plans in November 1937, Blomberg and army commander Colonel General Werner von Fritsch objected, and Hitler then decided to remove both men from their posts. The opportunity to get rid of Blomberg came in January 1938 after the field marshal remarried. Both Hitler and Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring were at the marriage, with Göring as best man. It was soon revealed, however, that Blomberg's new wife had been a prostitute. There were immediate calls for Blomberg to resign, and he did so on January 27. In a meeting with the führer, Blomberg suggested that Hitler assume the post of war minister himself, which he did a week later.

Blomberg took no part in the war, but as a prominent German official, he was detained after the war and testified at the war crimes trials in Nuremberg. He died there while still in detention on March 14, 1946.

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See also

Fritsch, Werner Thomas Ludwig von; Germany; Germany, Army; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Hitler, Adolf; Versailles, Treaty of

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Blomberg-Fritsch Affair (1938)

The Blomberg-Fritsch Affair of 1938 resulted in the complete subordination of the Reichswehr (German Army) to the Nazi Party. In November 1937 during a secret meeting with German leaders at the chancellory, Adolf Hitler revealed his plans to acquire additional territory to the east. Believing that the army was not ready for the general European war that would surely follow, both minister of war Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg and commander of the Reichswehr Colonel General Werner von Fritsch expressed openly their serious doubts. Hitler was determined to get rid of both men and to purge the senior officer corps.

Hitler's opportunity came following Blomberg's marriage on January 12, 1938, to Margarethe Gruhn, a 26-year-old typist. Both Hitler and Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring had attended the wedding, Göring having been Blomberg's best man and Hitler having served as a witness. The Nazi leadership was a nest of ambitious men eager to discredit their rivals, and a few days later reichsführer of the Schutzstaffel Heinrich Himmler, who sought to embarrass Göring and also discredit the senior army leadership, supplied evidence that Blomberg's new wife had a criminal record as a

prostitute and had posed for pornographic photographs. This revelation led to calls for Blomberg to resign, which he did on January 27.

Simultaneously, Himmler produced evidence that Fritsch was gay. This charge was completely false; the only truth in it was that a Captain Fritsch was indeed a homosexual, but he was no relation to the general. The much-respected Fritsch resigned his post, however, to demand a court-martial to clear his name. Although it subsequently cleared Fritsch, Hitler refused to reinstate him.

The Blomberg-Fritsch Affair allowed Hitler to abolish the Ministry of War and create a new high command, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). This new organization was in direct competition with the General Staff and served as Hitler's personal staff. An unabashed admirer of Hitler, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Keitel became OKW commander and took his orders directly from Hitler. Another enthusiastic Nazi, Colonel General Heinrich von Brauchitsch, became the new commander of the army. In the ensuing command shake-up 16 generals were relieved of their posts and another 44 transferred. Hitler now had complete control of the German armed forces.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Blomberg, Werner von; Fritsch, Werner Thomas Ludwig von; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf

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Blue Division (1941–1943)

Spanish division that fought with the German Army against the Soviet Union in World War II. Lieutenant General Augustin Muñoz Grandes commanded

the Division Azul of 18,000 men. The initiative for a Spanish expeditionary force came from Spanish dictator Francisco Franco immediately after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The division was assembled in some haste, as Franco feared that the Soviet Union would be defeated before Spain could make a military contribution. Motivations behind its establishment were Franco's gratitude to Germany for critical assistance to the nationalist cause during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), his staunch anticommunism, and to provide a dumping ground for Spanish fascist (Falange) hotheads advocating social revolution in Spain.

Fearful of offending the Allied powers too greatly, Franco styled the division a "volunteer" force. The division's name came from the blue shirts worn by the soldiers, although its official designation in the German order of battle was the 250th Division.

Adolf Hitler saw the division as a means to bind Spain more closely to the Axis cause. He therefore ordered it to be issued German equipment and transports and even pension payments. The division reached the Eastern Front by early October 1941 and soon proved itself in the difficult fighting before Leningrad, especially in the winter of 1942. Of the 47,000 who fought with the division in its two years at the front, 22,000 were casualties, but estimated Red Army losses opposite the Blue Division totaled more than 49,000 men. Hitler called the Spanish soldiers "extraordinarily brave, tough against privations, but wildly undisciplined." Spanish improvisation was a constant irritant to the Germans.

With the Allied invasion of North Africa and the German reversals at Tunis and Stalingrad, Franco recalled the division in October 1943, replacing it with a legion of only 1,500 men. The division failed to achieve its goals of defeating communism, but it had another purpose as well. This was to demonstrate to Hitler that the Spanish would fight and take any casualties to forestall any German plans to occupy Spain and take Gibraltar. Undoubtedly the Blue Division did impress Hitler on this point and helped to keep Iberia free of fighting in World War II.

ANDREW W. LANDER

See also

Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Leningrad, Siege of; Spain; Spanish Civil War

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Blum, Léon (1872–1950)

French politician and premier (1936–1937, 1938, and 1946–1947). Born in Paris on April 9, 1872, Léon Blum attended the prestigious École Normale Supérieure. While studying law at the Sorbonne, he became a socialist. After graduating in 1894 with highest honors, Blum pursued a literary career as a critic. The Dreyfus Affair drew the Jewish Blum into politics, and he joined the French Socialist Party (SFIO) in 1904. Rejected for military service in World War I, he won election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1919.

The socialist-communist split in 1920 presented Blum with an enormous challenge as he worked to rebuild the SFIO. He came to be considered the leader of his party through his frequent articles in its chief newspaper, *Le Populaire.* Certainly, his moderate approach and his quiet, effective leadership were key factors in the party's revival.

The SFIO became the leading party in the Popular Front of the 1930s, which also included the Radicals and communists. After the Popular Front victory in the spring 1936 elections, Blum became France's first Jewish and first socialist premier on June 4, 1936. Under his leadership, the government enacted sweeping social legislation, including the nationalization of leading banks and industries and the establishment of a 40-hour workweek and other worker benefits. These changes came at precisely the time that Germany was cutting worker benefits and straining to rearm.

Blum failed to win centrist and rightist support for his programs, and the flight of capital abroad and foreign reverses, especially the failure to aid the Spanish Republic (under pressure from London) during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, led to his undoing. Too late, he realized that France needed to rearm. After the Chamber of Deputies refused his request for

emergency fiscal powers, Blum resigned as premier in June 1937, although the SFIO continued in the Popular Front coalition. Blum was again premier briefly during March 13–April 10, 1938.

Arrested on the orders of the collaborationist Vichy government following Germany's defeat of France in July 1940, Blum was put on trial in Riom in February 1943, along with other leaders of the Third Republic, and charged with responsibility for the French defeat. His spirited defense embarrassed the Vichy government and helped lead to the suspension of the trial. Taken prisoner by the Gestapo later in 1943, he was held in the Buchenwald and Dachau concentration camps until the end of World War II.

Blum returned to France after the war as a respected elder statesman. He headed a caretaker government between 1946 and 1947 and secured aid from the United States to assist in the reconstruction of his nation. He then retired permanently to his estate at Jouy-en-Josas, although he continued to write for *Le Populaire.* Blum died there on March 30, 1950.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

France; France, Battle for; Vichy France

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Blumentritt, Günther (1892–1967)

German Army general. Born in Munich on February 10, 1892, Günther Blumentritt entered the army in 1911, serving a year as a Fahnenjunker (officer cadet) in the Thüringen 71st Infantry Regiment before entering the Danzig Kriegs-akademie (War Academy) in early 1912. Commissioned in November 1912, Blumentritt served in various staff positions on the Eastern Front during World War I, ending the war as a senior lieutenant. He served

briefly in the Thüringen Freikorps in 1919. His performance was sufficient for his retention in the postwar Reichswehr, and in November 1919 he took command of a company in the 11th Jäger (light infantry) Regiment.

Blumentritt's postwar career followed a conventional path, with rotations between staff and low unit command positions in infantry, cavalry, and artillery units. His star began to rise in the early 1930s, assisted by his close friendship with future field marshals Erich von Manstein and Wilhelm von Leeb. In 1933, Blumentritt became an instructor in tactics at the Officers' Course, Germany's clandestine General Staff College (an institution forbidden under terms of the Versailles Treaty of 1919). In 1935 he left the War College as a lieutenant colonel and General Staff officer.

Most of Blumentritt's World War II assignments were in General Staff positions. He was Colonel General Karl Gerd von Rundstedt's operations chief for the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and then Colonel General Günther von Kluge's chief of staff for the invasions of France in May 1940 and the Soviet Union in June 1941. Blumentritt became chief of staff to Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Army Group D in France in September 1942 but was injured in a railway accident in January 1943 and did not return to service until June 10, 1944, after Allied troops had landed in Normandy.

Blumentritt's association with Kluge and others involved in efforts to overthrow Adolf Hitler led to his temporary suspension in early September 1944. Later that same month, he was promoted to general of infantry and assigned command of XII SS Corps on the Western Front. In January 1945 he assumed command of the Twenty-Fifth Army in Holland, and in March he assumed command of the First Parachute Army, ending the war in Schleswig-Holstein. He was held as a prisoner of war until January 1948.

Blumentritt enjoyed a brief postwar career as a commentator on Western Allied strategy, and he wrote extensively. In addition to his memoirs, he wrote a well-received book on Rundstedt and edited another on the German tactics and operations against the Allies in the fighting in Normandy. Blumentritt died in Munich on October 12, 1967.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Germany, Army; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von; Manstein, Erich von; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von;

Versailles, Treaty of

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Bock, Fedor von (1880–1945)

German Army field marshal. Born into an old noble Prussian family at Küstrin, Germany, on December 3, 1880, Fedor von Bock joined the army in 1898. During World War I, he was promoted to major and won the Pour le Mérite.

After the war, Bock remained in the Reichswehr and, despite his known monarchist leanings, was not purged when the Nazis came to power in 1933. Promoted to colonel general, Bock participated in the German invasions of Poland (September 1939) and France (May 10–June 25, 1940), commanding army groups North and B, respectively. Although shocked by the Schutzstaffel (SS) treatment of Jews in Poland, he declined to make an official protest. In July 1940, he was among 12 new field marshals created by Adolf Hitler.

During the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA) on June 22, 1941, Bock's Army Group Center was assigned the task of capturing Moscow. In July 1941, his forces took Minsk and three weeks later reached Smolensk. When Bock was only 225 miles from Moscow, Hitler decided to divert some of his forces to Leningrad and Kiev. Bock was not able to resume his advance before October, and bad weather forced a halt in December 1941.

Hitler then dismissed Bock, but after only a month's rest he was again sent to the Eastern Front to command Army Group South. In the 1942 summer offensive, Hitler instructed Bock to destroy Soviet forces west of the Don River, reach the Volga, and secure the Caucasus oil fields. Bock enjoyed initial success at Voronezh, but after his progress slowed, Hitler replaced him with Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs on July 15, 1942. Bock never returned to command.

German field marshal Fedor von Bock. (Keystone/Getty Images)

In 1944 Bock's nephew, Henning von Tresckow, approached him about the possibility of joining the July bomb plot against Hitler. Bock refused as he had in 1941 after being confronted with SS atrocities in the Soviet Union. An old-style Prussian officer, he chose not to break his oath of office, but he did not pass his knowledge about the plot to overthrow the führer on to the Gestapo.

Bock continued to press for a return to military service, but his efforts were in vain. He and his wife were killed as the result of an Allied air raid in Schleswig-Holstein on May 3, 1945, during which a fighter pilot fired on their car. Bock died the following day.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; France, Battle for; Germany, Army; Guderian, Heinz; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Minsk, Battle for; Moscow, Battle of; Poland Campaign; Smolensk, Battle of; Vyazma-Bryansk, Battle for; Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von

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BODENPLATTE, Operation (January 1, 1945)

Operation BODENPLATTE (BASE PLATE) was the last major effort by the Luftwaffe to check Allied airpower in the west. The commander of German fighter defenses, Major General Adolf Galland, attempted to hoard his fighter force for one concentrated blow against the Allied air forces. Each time he was able to gather such a force, however, it was dispersed to other fronts or used piecemeal against waves of attacking Allied bombers. In the fall of 1944, Galland had again assembled a sizable fighter force, only to have it decimated during the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge). In desperation, the Luftwaffe high command directed Major General Dietrich Peltz, commander of II Jagdkorps (Fighter Corps), to execute a surprise attack on Allied bases in Belgium.

The intent of the plan was to buy time for the Luftwaffe to battle the Allied bombers. The Germans hoped to force the Allies to remove their fighters from the continent, allowing the Luftwaffe an opportunity to regain control of the skies over the front and achieve some advantage against the bombers. The plan envisioned hurling all available aircraft in an early-morning, low-level attack against 16 Allied fighter fields in Belgium. Planning began in strict secrecy in mid-December, with the operation set to take place in the next period of good weather. Weather analysts determined that the conditions would be right on January 1, 1945, and orders were issued accordingly on December 31.

To maintain operational security, group commanders were not briefed on the details of the plan, and for many the first news of the upcoming attack came late on December 31. By the time orders reached subordinate levels, there was not always sufficient time for proper briefings. In many cases, the briefing consisted of a simple "follow me" direction. Even in the best of circumstances, an operation of this complexity would have been hard to execute, but it was particularly difficult for the poorly trained Luftwaffe pilots at the end of 1944.

Some 800 aircraft took part in the attack. Early on January 1, the fighters lifted off from fields behind the front. Some experienced night-fighter pilots led the formations to the front lines and then turned back, leaving the other fighters to find their targets and return on their own. An unexpected ground mist delayed some takeoffs, and confused German antiaircraft gunners opened fire on late-arriving aircraft, shooting down a number of them. Some pilots became lost and attacked the wrong fields. Over some target areas the surprise was complete, but at others the Allies were beginning their own daily air operations and were able to react quickly.

In the final analysis, Operation BODENPLATTE achieved some tactical success but at an unacceptable cost. The Germans destroyed a total of 134 Allied aircraft and damaged an additional 62. The Allies could easily absorb these losses, however, and there was no thought of relocating air operations to Britain. The Luftwaffe lost some 300 aircraft to all causes. More important, 214 Luftwaffe pilots were killed, missing, or captured. This operation marked the end of the road for the German Air Force, which was largely ineffective for the remainder of the war.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Germany, Air Force

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Bodø, Norway Raid (October 4, 1943)

On October 4, 1943, the Americans and British undertook a raid against German shipping at Bodø, Norway, located some 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle. With the code name of Operation LEADER, it involved a U.S. Navy task group under the command of Rear Admiral Olaf M. Hustvedt as well as Royal Navy ships. The strike force was the U.S. aircraft carrier *Ranger*. The covering force consisted of the British battleships *Duke of York* and *Anson*, the U.S. heavy cruiser *Tuscaloosa*, the British light cruiser *Belfast*, and 12 American and British destroyers.

Surprise was complete, with the Allied ships arriving before dawn on October 4. Aircraft from the *Ranger* then attacked and sank six merchant ships and damaged eight others. Three of the attacking aircraft were shot down by German antiaircraft fire. That afternoon three German aircraft located the *Ranger*, but its combat air patrol shot down two and chased off the other.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Norway

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Bogan, Gerald Francis (1894–1973)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born on July 27, 1894, at Mackinac Island, Michigan, Gerald Bogan graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1916. Following U.S. entry into World War I in 1917, he served aboard the cruiser *Birmingham* on convoy duty. An instructor at Annapolis during 1923–1924,

Bogan became a naval aviator in 1925. As superintendent of aviation training at the Naval Air Station Pensacola, he impressed the commandant there, future Admiral William F. Halsey. In 1937 Halsey made Bogan his executive officer. When Halsey took command of Carrier Division 2, Bogan joined the carrier *Yorktown* as a navigator and was then its executive officer (1939–1940). He commanded the Miami Naval Air Station during 1940–1942.

Bogan took command of the carrier *Saratoga* in October 1942. Promoted to rear admiral that December, he participated in battles in the Eastern Solomons. Bogan was then commander, Naval Air, Tenth Fleet, during June–October 1943, and then of Fleet Air, Norfolk, until January 1944.

For the remainder of the war Bogan served as commander of carrier divisions in the Pacific theater. In July 1944 he took command of Task Group 58.4, which provided pre-invasion bombardment and close air support for the assaults on Guam and Tinian. Bogan's carriers struck the Palau Islands and Mindanao in August and September, setting the stage for the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944). On October 24 Bogan's carriers covered San Bernardino Strait and attacked the Japanese Center Force in the Sibuyan Sea. The next day Halsey ordered strong naval forces (including Bogan's carriers) north to chase the Japanese decoy carriers, but Halsey soon had to turn south to assist Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's invasion force at Leyte. Bogan later stated that Halsey made a "great mistake" in the battle, but he failed to press his concerns at the time. Bogan's carriers supported the invasion of Luzon, suffering fierce kamikaze attacks. Bogan briefly went home on leave but returned to participate in the April 1945 invasion of Okinawa.

Bogan's postwar assignments included commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet (1946–1948). In 1949 he was embroiled in the so-called Revolt of the Admirals. His letters, deriding cuts in naval aviation at the expense of strategic bombers, were leaked to the press, and in February 1950 Bogan was forced into early retirement as a vice admiral. He died at La Jolla, California, on June 8, 1973.

JAMES D. PERRY

See also

Guam, Battle for; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Kamikaze; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Okinawa, Invasion of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of

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Bohr, Niels Henrik David (1885–1962)

Nobel Prize–winning Danish atomic physicist. Born in Copenhagen on November 18, 1885, Niels Henrik David Bohr earned a doctorate in physics from Copenhagen University in 1911. He then studied in Britain, at Cambridge and Manchester, under leading physicists J. J. Thompson and Ernest Rutherford. By 1913, Bohr had received international acclaim for his work on the development of quantum theory. Returning to Copenhagen, he speedily made that university a leading international center of theoretical physics, attracting distinguished scientists from around the world. In 1922, a Nobel Prize recognized his work on quantum theory and atomic structure.

In 1938 and 1939, Bohr visited the United States, warning American scientists of his belief that German experiments had proved that the atom could be split and, by implication, that the opponents of Nazi Germany must develop atomic weapons before Germany did so. After Germany occupied Denmark in 1940, Bohr refused German requests for scientific collaboration and was active in the anti-Nazi resistance. In the late 1990s, Michael Frayn's acclaimed play *Copenhagen* provoked a well-publicized historical debate over Bohr's part in dissuading his former student, German scientist Werner Heisenberg, from pressing ahead with a German nuclear bomb project.

British Secret Service operatives helped Bohr escape to the United States in 1943, where he joined the Manhattan Project's laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico, working under its director and his old scientific associate, J. Robert Oppenheimer. There, Bohr contributed materially to the secret program developing atomic weapons. With the 1945 atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bohr hoped that the bomb's destructive potential might eventually force nations to abandon war as unacceptably devastating, a view that influenced Oppenheimer.

When the war ended, Bohr returned to Copenhagen to resume his scientific work. He campaigned for the open exchange of ideas and people among nations as a means of controlling nuclear weapons. One Soviet

general has alleged that Bohr deliberately assisted a Soviet physicist with vital atomic information. Bohr died in Copenhagen on November 18, 1962.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Manhattan Project; Nuclear Weapons; Oppenheimer, Julius Robert

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Boisson, Pierre François (1894–1948)

French colonial administrator and governor-general of French West Africa for the collaborationist Vichy regime. Born at Saint-Launeuch in Brittany, France, on June 19, 1894, Pierre Boisson entered the army at the beginning of World War I in August 1914. He lost a leg in the 1916 Battle of Verdun. After the war, Boisson joined the French Colonial Service, and in 1936, he was appointed governor-general of French Equatorial Africa. Based at Brazzaville, he was known as a harsh but honest and able administrator.

Following France's armistice with Germany in late June 1940, Boisson at first vehemently demanded that French forces continue fighting, but he was soon won over to the Vichy government when its head of state, Marshal Philippe Pétain, sent him to Dakar as governor-general of French West Africa and high commissioner for French Africa. Arriving in Dakar on July 23, 1940, he banned Germans from the city, but in September 1940, he also defeated an attempt by Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle to take over both Dakar and the French battleship *Richelieu*, which was sheltered there.

After the November 8, 1942, Allied landings in North Africa, Admiral Jean Darlan reached an accord with Lieutenant General Mark Clark, deputy U.S. commander, and ordered Boisson to bring French West Africa into the Allied camp, instructions Boisson took 10 days to obey. Nonetheless, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt rather admired the straightforward Boisson's uncompromising and evenhanded style, which, although brutal on occasion, was direct, honest, and effective. Boisson's relations with the Allies were cold but correct, and Roosevelt initially insisted that de Gaulle leave him in his post; only on July 1, 1943, after de Gaulle became head of the Provisional French National Committee, was Boisson dismissed.

Ignoring Roosevelt's protests, de Gaulle ordered Boisson arrested on December 15, 1943. He was then incarcerated for two years without trial and released on grounds of ill health. In 1948, Boisson was summoned before the French High Court of Justice, but before proceedings began, he died suddenly, on July 20, at Châtou, Paris.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Africa; Clark, Mark Wayne; Dakar, Attack on; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; France; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Vichy France

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Bong, Richard Ira "Dick" (1920–1945)

U.S. Army Air Forces officer and ace of aces: the highest scoring U.S. ace ever. Richard Ira "Dick" Bong was born in Superior, Wisconsin, on September 24, 1920. The son of Swedish immigrants, he grew up one of nine

children on a farm in Poplar, Wisconsin. Bong entered Superior State Teachers College in 1938, enrolled in its Civilian Pilot Training Program, and took private flying lessons. In 1941 he enlisted in the Army Air Corps Aviation Cadet Program. Commissioned a second lieutenant on January 9, 1942, he was assigned as a gunnery instructor.

Bong's first operational assignment was to a fighter squadron at Hamilton Field, California, where he learned to fly the Lockheed P-38 Lightning. Temporarily grounded for having flown low over the house of a fellow pilot who had just gotten married, he missed deployment to England with his squadron in July 1942. Bong was assigned to another squadron and ordered to the Southwest Pacific theater.

In September 1942, Bong was stationed at Darwin, Australia, with the 9th Fighter Squadron of the 49th Fighter Group. While awaiting delivery of P-38s, Bong and the other pilots of his squadron flew with the 39th Fighter Squadron of the 35th Fighter Group at Port Moresby, New Guinea. Bong scored his first aerial victories on December 27, 1942, when he shot down both a Mitsubishi A6M Zero and a Nakajima Ki-43 Oscar over Buna, for which he was awarded the Silver Star.

Returning to the 49th Fighter Group in March 1943, Bong was stationed at Schwimmer Field near Port Moresby. On July 26, 1943, he shot down four Japanese fighters over Lae, for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Following leave in the United States during November and December 1943, Bong returned to his unit. By April 1944 Bong, now a captain, had shot down 27 Japanese aircraft, surpassing the leading American ace of World War I, Captain Eddie Rickenbacker. Bong said that he did not trust his gunnery skills and so tried to get as close as possible to his opponent in his P-38 before opening fire, which meant that he often flew through debris fields and, on one occasion, actually collided with a Japanese aircraft.

Following another leave in the United States in May 1944, Major Bong returned to New Guinea in September. Although assigned to V Fighter Command staff and thus not required to fly combat missions, he continued flying from Leyte during the Philippine Islands campaign, increasing his aerial victory total to at least 40 by December. For Bong's accomplishments, including continuing to fly combat missions when not required, commander of Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, Lieutenant General Richard C. Kenney recommended Bong for the Medal of Honor. General Douglas

MacArthur presented it in December 1944. Ordered to the United States in January 1945, Bong took part in numerous public relations activities, including the promotion of war bonds.

Assigned to Lockheed at Burbank, California, Bong was a test pilot for its P-80 Shooting Star jet fighter. On August 6, 1945, during takeoff, the primary fuel pump on Bong's P-80 malfunctioned. Although Bong was able to clear the aircraft, there was insufficient altitude for his parachute to deploy, and he was killed.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Buna, Battle of; Kenney, George Churchill; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1906–1945)

German theologian and Abwehr (German military intelligence service) counterspy. Born on February 4, 1906, in Breslau, Silesia, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was the son of the prominent neurologist and psychiatrist Karl Bonhoeffer and studied theology at Tübingen, Rome, and Berlin during 1923–1927. From 1930 to 1931, the younger Bonhoeffer attended classes taught by preeminent Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. In 1931, Bonhoeffer began teaching theology at Berlin and was ordained a Lutheran minister. From July 1933 until April 1935, he served two German parishes in London.

After Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, Bonhoeffer rejected his government's efforts to create a united national Protestant church, the German Christians, that would synthesize National Socialism and Christianity. Instead, he urged evangelical Christians to join the Confessional

Church, which opposed Nazism. Bonhoeffer returned to Germany to lead a Confessional Church seminary at Finkenwalde, which was closed by the authorities in October 1937.

In 1938, Bonhoeffer's brother-in-law Hans von Dohnanyi introduced him to Major General Hans Oster, Colonel General Ludwig Beck, and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris of the Abwehr. Bonhoeffer then decided to join active resistance to the Nazi regime, and by 1939, he had become a double agent in Canaris's counterespionage service. As an Abwehr counterspy, he maintained links abroad and held to his pacifist principles.

In Stockholm in 1943, Bonhoeffer secretly met with Anglican Bishop George Bell of Chichester, England, for the Abwehr. This meeting failed to gain Allied support for the German resistance. Bonhoeffer also participated in Abwehr Operation SEVEN to spirit Jews out of Germany.

Arrested by the Gestapo on April 5, 1943, on charges of conspiring to overthrow the regime, Bonhoeffer was held at the Tegel, Buchenwald, and Flossenburg concentration camps. He was hanged at Flossenburg on April 9, 1945. Many Christians consider him a martyr.

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY

See also

Canaris, Wilhelm Franz; Counterintelligence; Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Religion and the War; Resistance; Stauffenberg, Claus Philipp Schenk von

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Borghese, Junio Valerio (1906–1974)

Italian Navy officer and ardent fascist. Born on June 6, 1906, at the family estate near Rome, Junio Valerio Borghese spent three years as a student in Britain before entering the Italian Naval Academy. Graduating in 1928, he was commissioned an ensign. Lieutenant Borghese was commanding a

submarine off Spain during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War when, on August 31, 1937, believing it to be a warship of the Spanish Republican Navy, he mistakenly attacked the British destroyer *Havock* while it was on neutrality patrol. In trying to locate Borghese's submarine, the *Havock* employed sonar, the first time this had been done in a wartime situation. Neither the Italian submarine nor the British destroyer was damaged in the exchange.

During World War II Borghese was a proponent of special attack units, and his 620-ton submarine *Scire* transported three two-man guided slow (2–4 knots) torpedoes in the daring and successful attack on Alexandria on December 19, 1941. The raid sank the battleships *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant* and damaged a destroyer and an oiler. Although the battleships were refloated and repaired, it severely curtailed British naval operations in the Mediterranean in the first half of 1942.

Promoted to commander, Borghese assumed command of the 10th Light Flotilla, known as the "X MAS" (Decima Mas). Now known as the "Black Prince," Borghese conducted other operations up to the September 1943 armistice, resulting in total Allied losses of almost 200,000 tons of shipping, although many of the ships were sunk in harbors and subsequently returned to service.

A diehard fascist, Borghese struck an agreement between his X MAS unit and the Germans after the armistice to continue the war as an autonomous force. Borghese's unit ultimately numbered some 25,000 men and operated primarily on land in antipartisan activities, especially in the border areas with Yugoslavia, Austria, and Switzerland, in an attempt to retain those lands as Italian territory. In April 1945, Borghese and his wife, who worked in the office of the secretary of state of the Vatican, were taken prisoner by the Americans.

Held in prison for three years after the war, Borghese was put on trial in Rome in November 1948 on charges of having committed war crimes against the partisans. Acquitted, he was set free in February 1949. He then entered Italian politics on the far right wing. On December 7, 1970, he led an abortive coup against the Italian government. Fleeing to Spain, Borghese died in Cádiz on August 26, 1974.

JACK GREENE

See also

Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Frogmen; Italy, Navy; Submarines; Submarines, Midget

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Borie, USS, vs. *U-405* (November 1, 1943)

The U.S. Navy destroyer *Borie*, commanded by Commander Charles H. Hutchins, U.S. Naval Reserve, was part of hunter-killer Task Unit 21.14 centered on the escort carrier *Card* when it was detached to search for two German submarines spotted by aircraft. On the night of October 31, 1943, some 700 miles north of the Azores, it picked up a radar contact on a German submarine, which promptly submerged. The *Borie* carried out three depth charge attacks on the submarine, the *U-256.* After the third attack a large oil slick was spotted, and the *Borie* reported having sunk the submarine. Actually, the *U-256* was only damaged and managed to make it safely to its base.

At about 2:00 a.m. on November 1, the *Borie* picked up another radar contact, the *U-405*, which promptly submerged. The *Borie* then carried out a depth charge attack, and the *U-405* surfaced again in heavy 15-foot seas, apparently unable to submerge. During the next hour the two fought the most intense destroyer-submarine engagement of the war. The *Borie*'s 14-inch spotlight kept the submarine illuminated throughout the engagement except for periods when it was turned off for tactical reasons. The U-405's machine guns achieved hits on the destroyer as the deck gun crew traversed their 88mm gun to take aim on the *Borie*'s waterline, but 20mm gunfire from the *Borie* killed the exposed members of the sub's crew topside, and a salvo of three 4-inch shells blew off the sub's deck gun before it could fire a single shell. Finally the *Borie* was able to ram the *U-405*, but the two become

locked together for some 10 minutes, during which the crews exchanged small-arms fire from their decks. The Germans finally managed to free the submarine, but it suffered fatal damage in gunfire from the *Borie* and sank.

The *Borie*, however, had sustained heavy damage to its bow in the ramming, and despite a 16-hour effort to save the ship, Hutchins was forced to order abandon ship. Eight officers and 121 seamen were taken aboard two other destroyers, but 27 crewmen were lost. Surprisingly, the *Borie* remained afloat but was so badly damaged that the decision was made not to take it in tow. After torpedoes and naval gunfire failed to sink it, the *Borie* was sunk by bombs from the *Card*'s aircraft. As a consequence of this engagement, a number of Atlantic Fleet destroyers were modified with strengthened bows.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Hunter-Killer Groups

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Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria (1894–1943)

King of Bulgaria whose country, although nominally an Axis power, remained autonomous throughout the war years. Boris III was born Boris Klemens Robert Maria Pius Ludwig Stanislaus Xaver, prince of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, duke of Saxony, and prince of Tirnovo, at the royal palace in Sofia on January 30, 1894. His father was the bombastic and Machiavellian Czar Ferdinand, who had ruled since 1887. His mother, Princess Maria Luisa of Bourbon Parma, died while giving birth to his youngest sibling. Boris was educated by palace tutors and married Princess Giovanna of Savoy, daughter of King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, in 1930. They had two children, Maria Luisa and Crown Prince Simeon.

Boris came to the throne following his father's abdication on October 3, 1918, at the end of World War I. Bulgaria was then in desperate straits. The 1919 Treaty of Neuilly involved loss of territory and the payment of

reparations. As a consequence of his country's many problems, Boris experienced an exceptionally stormy reign. The 1920s were filled with internal political strife, and economic problems forced Bulgaria to depend on Germany for supplies.

In the interwar years, Boris favored a neutral course for his country. He proved to be an adept diplomat and an intelligent yet cautious leader who was genuinely respected by his people for his skillful handling of the many problems besetting the kingdom. He was an unwilling junior partner in the Axis alliance during World War II. Pressured into joining the alliance by Germany, Boris regained the southern Dobruja region from Romania in 1940, which led to his being known as the "King Unifier" and the "Liberator Czar."

By 1941, Boris had little choice but to commit to the Axis powers and allow German troops to cross through his country en route to the Soviet Union. Unlike the other Balkan states, though, Bulgaria remained autonomous during the war. It did not invade Yugoslavia or Greece, but its troops did garrison parts of Macedonia and western Thrace. In December 1941, Bulgaria declared war on the United States and Britain, but Boris infuriated Adolf Hitler by withholding Bulgarian troops from the war effort and refusing to declare war on the Soviet Union or send Bulgarian Jews to the death camps. His actions helped save at least 50,000 Jews. Boris and Giovanna also arranged transit visas permitting thousands of other Jews to go to Palestine.

Boris's continuous obduracy regarding German policies led to a stormy meeting with Hitler at the latter's Wolfs-schanze headquarters near Rastenburg on August 14, 1943, in which Boris bluntly said that Bulgaria would follow its own path. He returned to Sofia depressed over the probable eventual fate of his country. Boris died at the royal palace in Sofia two weeks later, on August 28, 1943, most likely from an embolism. A regency then took power on behalf of the underage King Simeon II, who reigned until September 9, 1946.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

Bulgaria; Germany; Hitler, Adolf

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Bór-Komorowski, Tadeusz (1895–1966)

Polish Army general and commander of the armed underground movement in Poland. Born in Chorobrów, a village in the Brze#lbany district of Austrian Poland, on June 1, 1895, Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski joined the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1913 and studied at the Military Academy in Vienna. Until 1918, he fought on the Russian and Italian fronts, attaining the rank of second lieutenant. After 1918, he served in the Polish Army, mostly commanding cavalry units, and was promoted to colonel in 1933.

Komorowski was supervising a cavalry training center in the Polish Corridor (the territory separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany) at the time of the September 1, 1939, German invasion. Although his unit was forced to surrender at the end of September, Komorowski avoided capture and joined the underground Związek Walki Zbrojnej (Union for Armed Struggle, ZWZ) in Kraków.

In May 1940, commander in chief of Polish armed forces in exile General Władysław Sikorski sent Komorowski to Warsaw as a brigadier general and deputy commander to General Stefan Rowecki, then leader of the ZWZ. When the German Gestapo arrested Rowecki in 1943, Komorowski replaced him, under the pseudonym Bór, as commander of the armed underground movement, which had become the Armia Krajowa (Home Army, AK) in 1942.

On Komorowski's orders, given with the approval of the government-in-exile's delegate in Poland and with the encouragement of the Soviets, who promised assistance, the Home Army rose against the German occupation in Warsaw on August 1, 1944. Although the Germans were hard-pressed to put down this Polish effort to retake Warsaw, after two months of heavy fighting the uprising ended in utter defeat for the Poles, who received no aid from the Soviets.

After his promotion to commander in chief of the Polish armed forces on September 30, Komorowski was captured by the Germans in October 1944. Liberated by the U.S. Army on May 5, 1945, he immigrated to London and resigned as commander in chief in 1946. As prime minister of the Po-lish government-in-exile from 1947 to 1949, Komorowski remained a prominent member of the Polish émigré community until his death in London on August 24, 1966.

PASCAL TREES

See also

Poland; Rowecki, Stefan; Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz; Warsaw Rising

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Bormann, Martin Ludwig (1900–1945)

German official who was head of the Chancellery and Adolf Hitler's private secretary. Born in Halberstadt, Germany, on June 17, 1900, Martin Ludwig Bormann served in the German Army at the end of World War I. He then joined a Freikorps unit, but in 1924 he was sentenced to a year in prison for committing a vengeance murder.

Following his release, Bormann joined the National Socialist Party and was attached to the Sturmabteilungen (SA, Storm Troops) Supreme Command. From July 1933, he was the chief of staff in the office of Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess. Diligent and efficient, Bormann secured Hitler's trust by running his villa, the Berghof, at Berchtesgaden. He then began taking over Hess's duties and made himself indispensable to Hitler.

After Hess's flight to Scotland in May 1941, Hitler abolished the Office of Deputy Führer and renamed it the Party Chancellery, choosing Bormann as its head. In April 1943, Bormann was appointed secretary to the führer. He wrote down all of Hitler's oral commands, translating them into firm orders, and he controlled access to the führer. He also proved to be a master of

intrigue and manipulation. He was virtually Hitler's deputy and, some would argue, the second most powerful man in the Reich.

Skillfully steering Hitler into approving his own schemes, Bormann acquired the inside track for displacing dangerous rivals. Always a guardian of Nazi orthodoxy, he strengthened the Nazi Party and increased his grip on domestic policy. He advocated radical measures when it came to the treatment of Jews, the conquered peoples, and prisoners of war.

In October 1944, Bormann became executive head of the Volkssturm (militia). He signed Hitler's last will and testament and watched the führer commit suicide in the Chancellery bunker on April 30, 1945. Bormann then left the bunker. Most likely, he was killed trying to cross the Soviet lines. Doubts persisted, and numerous sightings of him were reported. He was sentenced to death in absentia at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. Bormann was pronounced dead in 1973 after his remains were found in Berlin and identified.

MARTIN MOLL

One of the most powerful figures in the Third Reich, Martin Bormann was Nazi Party secretary and private secretary to Adolf Hitler, thus controlling access to the führer. (Corbis)

See also

Germany; Hess, Walter Richard Rudolf; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Document 140

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Borneo Campaign (May 1–August 1, 1945)

The last major campaign of the war in the Southwest Pacific. Code-named Operation OBOE and begun on May 1, 1945, the Borneo Campaign was conducted by some 35,000 men of the Australian Army's I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Leslie "Ming the Merciless" Morshead. It was part of the larger Allied effort to secure the Netherlands East Indies (present-day Indonesia) and the southern Philippines. Borneo is the world's third-largest island and is important for its oil. Support was provided by the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet, commanded by Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, and its Amphibious Force, joined by Australian warships. Elements of the U.S. Army Air Force's Thirteenth Air Force and the Australian First Tactical Air Force provided air support.

On May 1, the 26th Brigade of the 9th Division landed on Tarakan Island just off the coast of northeastern Borneo. They encountered strong resistance from the Japanese, but by the next day they secured the town of Tarakan and its airstrip. In all, the Japanese had in the defense of Borneo some 35,000 men of their Thirty-Seventh Army and Third Air Army under Lieutenant General Masao Baba and naval forces under Vice Admiral Kamada Michiaki. The Australians secured the island by June 22.

On June 10, meanwhile, elements of the 9th Division came ashore at Brunei Bay, a major harbor in British North Borneo, and rapidly pushed inland to establish airfields. During July 1–10 in the last major amphibious assault of the war, the Australian 7th Division landed at the oil center of Balikpapan on the southeast coast across Makassar Strait from Celebes. The Australians soon secured all of their major objectives.

Fighting on Borneo continued until the end of the war. Australian casualties in the campaign were light: fewer than 2,000 killed or wounded. The Japanese suffered perhaps 7,000 killed and another 1,000 captured. Most of the remainder surrendered at the end of the war, some not until October 1945. They surrendered their weapons and were told to march to Beaufort for transport back to Japan. Many were slain by Murut tribesmen on their march to that port.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Morshead, Sir Leslie James

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Bose, Subhas Chandra(1897–1945)

Indian nationalist politician. Born at Cuttack, Orissa, in the Bengal Presidency on January 23, 1897, Subhas Chandra Bose attended college in India and then went to Cambridge University to prepare for a civil service career. Although he passed the exams in 1920, he instead embarked on a career in nationalist politics. He joined the Indian National Congress and took part in a number of acts of civil disobedience in the 1920s and 1930s, for which he was frequently jailed. In 1938, Bose became president of the congress. At that point, however, Bose broke with Mohandas Gandhi and other congress leaders because he advocated the use of violence to expel the British from India.

Bose was arrested by the British authorities in June 1940, but he managed to escape to Afghanistan and eventually made his way to Germany. Arriving in Berlin in January 1941, Bose, who had developed an admiration for totalitarian political systems, attempted to enlist German support for the creation of a pro-Axis Indian army recruited from among prisoners of war in North Africa. Because of Nazi racial biases, however, Bose was able to raise only a small token unit.

Hoping to have better luck with Germany’s Axis partner, Bose undertook a perilous long submarine journey to Japan. After arriving in Tokyo in June 1943, he became the leader of the Indian National Army, a Japanese-sponsored force of approximately 13,000 Indian former prisoners of war. In October 1943, Bose led the Provisional Government of Free India. In that capacity, he made propaganda broadcasts for the Japanese, and in November 1943 he participated in the Greater East Asia Conference, an attempt by

Japan to foster Asian solidarity under its leadership. Bose was killed in an airplane crash in Taiwan on August 18, 1945.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; India

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Bougainville Campaign (November 1, 1943–August 15, 1945)

One of the northern Solomon Islands, Bougainville is approximately 130 miles long and 48 miles across at its widest point. The Allies established and held a bridgehead there beginning in November 1943 to help neutralize the nearby Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain Island.

On November 1, 1943, Allied forces, organized into the I Marine Amphibious Corps under Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandergrift (after November 9, under Major General Roy S. Geiger), landed at Empress Augusta Bay about midway up the west coast of Bougainville. Japanese lieutenant general Hyakutake Haruyoshi's Seventeenth Army defended the island. The next day in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, U.S. Navy forces turned back an attempt by a Japanese task force to attack the landing force, while Allied air units secured aerial supremacy over Bougainville. On November 25, American destroyers intercepted a Japanese task force bringing reinforcements to nearby Buin Island in the Battle of Cape St. George, sinking two Japanese destroyers and a destroyer transport and halting further Japanese shipment of reinforcements to the Solomon Islands.

U.S. marines seen in front of a Japanese dugout on Cape Totkina on Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, which they helped to secure, January 1944. (National Archives)

Initially Hyakutake, who had 40,000 troops and 20,000 naval personnel, put up little resistance in the belief that the U.S. landing was a ruse. Moreover, he was hindered in organizing a counterattack by the island's rugged terrain. During the next weeks, the invading marines expanded their perimeter to the ridges overlooking the bay and established a strong defensive position while construction units built airfields to assist in the defense of the bridgehead and to attack Rabaul. In December 1943 the marines were withdrawn, and defense of the bridgehead was entrusted to the U.S. Army XIV Corps, commanded by Major General Oscar W. Griswold.

In March 1944, Hyakutake finally launched a major offensive to destroy the bridgehead, hurling 15,000 men against some 60,000 Americans defenders. Fierce battles took place at the Creeks area and Hill 700 in the middle of the perimeter and at Hill 260 on the east side. The American positions were too strong, however, and by the end of the month, the Japanese had been repelled, having lost 5,000 killed and another 5,000 wounded.

By this time, Rabaul had been effectively neutralized, and thereafter Bougainville, which had provided vital air bases for the victory, became a backwater. The Japanese, cut off from outside aid, were content to be contained, and Griswold saw no need to undertake an offensive against them as long as the bridgehead was secure. U.S. forces engaged only in aggressive patrolling to keep the Japanese off balance. At the end of 1944, the Australian I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Savige, replaced the Americans in the bridgehead.

Unlike the Americans, the Australians were not content to be garrison troops, and in early 1945, Savige launched an offensive to wipe out the remaining Japanese. Although they were handicapped by disease, starvation, and supply shortages, the Japanese resisted in sustained fighting until the end of the war, losing 18,000 dead to all causes; the Australians suffered 516 killed and 1,572 wounded. Of the 60,000 Japanese on Bougainville when the Americans landed, only 21,000 remained to surrender in August 1945.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Cape St. George, Battle of; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Geiger, Roy Stanley; Griswold, Oscar Woolverton; Hyakutake Haruyoshi; Rabaul; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Vandegrift, Alexander Archer

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Bowhill, Sir Frederick William "Ginger" (1880–1960)

British air chief marshal. Born on September 1, 1880, in Gwalior, India, the son of an army officer, Frederick William Bowhill worked in the merchant marine for 16 years. In 1912, he learned to fly, and the following year he became a flying officer in the Royal Flying Corps, Naval Wing. During World War I, he saw combat attacking German submarine bases and zeppelins. He also served in Mesopotamia and in the Mediterranean, finishing the war as a wing commander. He remained in the Royal Air Force (RAF) after the war, serving in Britain, Egypt, and Iraq and at the Air Ministry in London.

In 1931, Bowhill was promoted to air vice marshal and appointed air officer commanding Fighting Area, Air Defence, of Great Britain. In August 1937, now knighted and an air marshal, Bowhill took over the Coastal Command, where he remained until June 1941. An innovative leader, he developed systems to control aircraft from the ground that proved invaluable during the Battle of Britain (July 1–September 30, 1940) and afterward. He also urged the use of barrage balloons to protect cities from low-level aerial bombardment, and he helped to develop the Women's Auxiliary Air Force. Bowhill's command participated in the rescue of captured British seamen from the German blockade-runner *Altmark* in February 1940 and in the destruction of the German battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941.

In June 1941, Bowhill moved to Canada to organize and take over from civilian control the RAF Ferry Command, initially set up in 1940 by a group of Montreal businessmen to fly desperately needed North American–built airplanes to Britain. The assignment demanded tact, charm, and diplomacy, all qualities that Bowhill and his wife exercised in abundance. In 1943, Bowhill became air officer commander in chief, Transport Command; he remained in this post until the end of the war, retiring four years after the normal retirement age. He spent two further years in Montreal as the British representative of the provisional International Civil Aviation Organization. Until 1957 he was also the Ministry of Civil Aviation's chief aeronautical adviser. Bowhill died in London on March 12, 1960.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Altmark Incident; Barrage Balloons; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Britain, Battle of; Great Britain, Air Force

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Boyington, Gregory “Pappy” (1912–1988)

U.S. Marine Corps officer and aviator. Born on December 4, 1912, in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, Gregory Boyington graduated from the University of Washington in 1934 with a degree in aeronautical engineering. Joining the Marine Corps in 1935, he became a naval aviator two years later. Excessive drinking, marital estrangement, financial difficulties, and disrespect for superior officers characterized his next four years of service; nevertheless, he was recognized as an excellent pilot and was promoted to first lieutenant in November 1940. In late 1941, Boyington volunteered for service with Colonel Claire Chennault’s American Volunteer Group (the Flying Tigers) in China.

Flying in defense of Burma and later in China during the spring of 1942, Boyington was credited with two aerial victories, although he maintained that he had downed six Japanese aircraft. Transferred to the South Pacific in early 1943, he was promoted to major and ordered to form a new squadron to take the place of the refitting VMF-214 unit. This new unit, also designated VMF-214 and operating in the Solomon Islands, became legendary as the Black Sheep Squadron.

Between September 1943 and January 1944, the Black Sheep Squadron claimed to have destroyed or damaged 197 Japanese aircraft. Boyington, nicknamed “Gramps” by his men and “Pappy” by the press because he was 30 years old, became something of a folk hero in the United States, immortalized in lavish news coverage. He downed 22 Japanese aircraft in this period. Combined with his earlier 6 in China and Burma, his 28 aerial victories made him the leading Marine Corps ace of all time.

Boyington was shot down on January 3, 1944, on a fighter sweep over Rabaul after being jumped by more than 20 Japanese aircraft. Picked up by a

Japanese submarine, he spent the remainder of the war in prisoner-of-war camps. On his return to the United States in 1945, he was promoted to colonel and awarded the Medal of Honor and the Navy Cross.

Boyington left the service in 1947. He then held a succession of jobs, constantly struggling with alcoholism and marital problems. In 1958, he wrote *Baa Baa, Black Sheep*, detailing his war experiences. In the 1970s, he produced the short-lived television series *Baa Baa Black Sheep*, based loosely on his book. Boyington died in Fresno, California, on January 11, 1988.

LUKE B. KINGREE

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Chennault, Claire Lee; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; United States Marine Corps

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Bradley, Omar Nelson (1893–1981)

U.S. Army general. Born in Clark, Missouri, on February 12, 1893, Omar Nelson Bradley secured an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1911. He graduated in 1915, a member of what would become known as the "class the stars fell on," and was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry.

Assigned to the 14th Infantry Regiment in Spokane, Washington, Bradley saw service along the Mexican border during the 1916 crisis that followed Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico. Like his classmate Dwight D. Eisenhower, Bradley missed combat in World War I. During the interwar period, his career followed a familiar pattern, with a number of troop commands interspersed with assignments at various military schools,

including West Point. His most significant assignment was as chief of the Weapons Section during Colonel George C. Marshall's tenure as deputy commandant at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Bradley graduated from the Army War College in 1934. Following service in General Marshall's secretariat of the General Staff between 1939 and 1941, he was promoted directly from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general on February 24, 1941, and assigned command of the Infantry School. Promotion to major general followed on February 18, 1942, and Bradley successively commanded the 82nd Infantry Division and the National Guard 28th Infantry Division. In February 1943, Marshall dispatched him to North Africa, where General Dwight D. Eisenhower assigned him as deputy commander of Lieutenant General George S. Patton's II Corps in the wake of the Kasserine Pass debacle (February 14–22, 1943). When Patton assumed command of the Seventh Army, Bradley took command of II Corps and led it with great distinction both in Tunisia and in Sicily. Bradley was promoted to lieutenant general on June 9, 1943.

U.S. Army general Omar Bradley, shown here in 1950. During World War II, Bradley commanded the 12th Army Group and was probably General Dwight Eisenhower's most trusted adviser. (Library of Congress)

In October 1943, Bradley assumed command of the First Army and transferred to Britain to prepare for the cross-Channel invasion. He commanded U.S. ground forces on D-day (June 6, 1944) in Operation OVERLORD and during the ensuing Normandy Campaign. On July 26, the First Army broke the German lines outside Saint-Lô in Operation COBRA (July 25–31), Bradley's operational masterpiece. On August 1, 1944, he assumed command of the 12th Army Group, which then encompassed General Courtney Hodges's First Army and General George Patton's Third Army.

During the subsequent drive across France, Bradley performed well but not spectacularly. His failure to close the Falaise-Argentan gap reflected poorly on his ability as a strategist and undoubtedly extended the war in the west. When the Germans launched the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945,

Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), Bradley was slow to react, but in the subsequent campaign, he renewed Marshall's and Eisenhower's confidence by carefully orchestrating the advance of the American armies on Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's right flank. By war's end, Bradley had clearly emerged as Eisenhower's most trusted military adviser. As the 12th Army Group grew to include four separate armies, the largest purely American military force in history, Bradley was promoted to general on March 29, 1945, on the eve of Germany's capitulation.

Following the war, Bradley headed the Veterans' Administration, and in February 1948 he succeeded Eisenhower as army chief of staff. In this post, Bradley championed the continued unification of the nation's armed forces. One year later, he became the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was subsequently promoted to the five-star rank of general of the army on September 22, 1950. During the 1950–1953 Korean War, Bradley supported President Harry S. Truman's relief of General Douglas MacArthur in April 1951 and opposed expansion of the war. Bradley retired from active military service in August 1953 to become chairman of the board of Bulova Watch Corporation. During the Vietnam War, he served as an adviser to President Lyndon Johnson. Bradley died on April 8, 1981, in Washington, D.C.

COLE C. KINGSEED

See also

Ardennes Offensive; COBRA, Operation; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; France Campaign; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; North Africa Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rhine Crossings; Saint-Lô, Battle of; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation; Truman, Harry S.; West European Theater of Operations

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Brandenberger, Erich (1892–1955)

German Army general. Born on July 15, 1892, in Augsburg, Germany, Erich Brandenberger became an officer candidate in July 1911 and was commissioned in the artillery in 1913. He fought in World War I and remained in the army thereafter, primarily in staff positions. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1934 and to colonel two years later.

Brandenberger was serving as chief of staff of XXIII Corps at the outbreak of war in September 1939. Promoted to major general in July 1940, he took command of the 8th Panzer Division in February 1941. His unit was part of Colonel General Erich Hoepner's Fourth Panzer Group of Army Group North at the June 22, 1941, commencement of Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union. In the first few days of the offensive, Brandenberger's men seized a critical viaduct and then bridges over the Daugava River at Daugavpils.

Promoted to lieutenant general in August 1942, Brandenberger remained with the 8th Panzer Division until January 1943 and was engaged in the effort to relieve the pocket at Velikiye Luki. He was promoted to general of panzer troops in August 1943 and then led XVII and XXIX Corps on the Eastern Front. The latter was active in the southern Ukraine.

Brandenberger assumed command of the Seventh Army in August 1944 under Field Marshal Walter Model, commander of Army Group B. His delaying tactics in the Hürtgen Forest–Eifel Mountains area slowed the U.S. advance, inflicting heavy casualties on the Americans. His defense of this area ensured German control of the northern Eifel area, enabling Germany to launch the Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945) with a secure northern flank. Brandenberger's Seventh Army was the southernmost of the three German armies, and his objective was to secure the southern flank to protect the operations of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. He enjoyed some initial success, but in the end, he was forced back by the counterattacks of Lieutenant General George S. Patton's U.S. Third Army.

Making the most of the meager resources available to him, Brandenberger mounted effective actions against superior numbers of advancing Allied troops for the remainder of the war. Following the Ardennes campaign, he fought skillful delaying actions west of the Rhine River against the U.S. First and Third Armies, often recommending withdrawal in the face of

overwhelming odds. As a result of such actions, however, his relations with Model were strained, and the latter relieved him of command on February 20, 1945. Brandenberger returned to active duty to command the Nineteenth Army on March 25, 1945, against the French First Army in the Black Forest area. The Nineteenth Army was forced back through southern Germany until surrendering on May 5, 1945, near Innsbruck, Austria.

Brandenberger was interviewed by the Americans during his postwar internment and contributed 10 manuscripts for the German Military History Program. He died in Bonn on June 21, 1955.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Bastogne, Battle for; Dietrich, Josef "Sepp"; Germany, Army; Hoepner, Erich; Hürtgen Forest Campaign; Lorraine Campaign; Manteuffel, Hasso Eccard von; Model, Walther; Palatinate Campaign; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rhine Crossings; West Wall, Advance to the

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Brauchitsch, Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von (1881–1948)

German Army field marshal. Born in Berlin on October 4, 1881, Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von Brauchitsch entered the 3rd Guards Field Artillery Regiment in 1901. He was promoted to captain in 1904, and between 1910 and 1912 he studied at the War Academy and served as a General Staff officer in Berlin. During World War I, he continued as a staff officer in several divisions and then a corps.

Brauchitsch remained in the Reichswehr after the war. In 1921 he commanded an artillery battery, and the next year he served as a staff officer in the Truppenamt (the secret General Staff), organizing maneuvers to test the employment of motorized troops supported by aircraft. In 1925 as a lieutenant colonel, he commanded a battalion of the 6th Artillery Regiment. Following additional staff work, he was promoted to colonel in 1928. Two years later, he was promoted to major general and became a department head in the Truppenamt. In 1932 he was inspector of artillery, and a year later he was promoted to lieutenant general and took command of both the Königsberg Military District and the 1st Division. In 1935 he commanded the I Army Corps at Königsberg, and in April 1936 he was promoted to general of artillery. Brauchitsch was instrumental in the development of the 88mm gun, one of the finest artillery pieces of World War II, as both an antitank and antiaircraft weapon.

In 1938 when General Werner von Fritsch resigned as chief of staff of the army, Adolf Hitler promoted Brauchitsch to colonel general and appointed him Fritsch's successor. Brauchitsch was an enthusiastic National Socialist, but he opposed Hitler's plans for territorial expansion, although not with the passion of his predecessor. Brauchitsch believed strongly that the military should maintain a neutral stance in politics, and he believed himself bound by his soldier's oath to obey Hitler as commander in chief.

Brauchitsch coordinated the early German victories in World War II in Poland, France, the Low Countries, and the Balkans. He opposed the stop order during the campaign for France (May 10–June 25, 1940) that allowed the British Expeditionary Force to escape at Dunkerque during May 26–June 4. Hitler raised Brauchitsch to field marshal in July 1940, but the June 22, 1941, German invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation BARBAROSSA, increased tensions between the two men. Brauchitsch believed that Moscow should be the primary target, whereas Hitler ordered a shift toward Leningrad in the north and the Donets Basin in the south. Brauchitsch also opposed Hitler's stand-fast order calling on the army to hold fast in the face of the Soviet counteroffensive, believing that the army should withdraw to more easily defended positions. Ultimately, Hitler went so far as to blame Brauchitsch for the failure of the 1941 offensive in the Soviet Union.

On December 9, 1941, Hitler dismissed Brauchitsch and assumed the post of commander of the army himself. Brauchitsch retired from the army 10

days later. Listed as a major war criminal and in poor health, he testified at the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg after the war. Brauchitsch died on October 18, 1948, in a British military hospital at Hamburg-Barmbeck while awaiting trial.

GENE MUELLER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Battle for; Fritsch, Werner Thomas Ludwig von; Germany, Army; Halder, Franz; Hitler, Adolf; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Keitel, Wilhelm

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Braun, Eva Anna Paula (1912–1945)

Longtime companion of German Nazi leader Adolf Hitler and, for a brief time, his wife. Eva Anna Paula Braun was born on February 6, 1912, in Munich, Germany. She was educated at a Catholic lyceum and briefly at a convent before taking a job at age 17 as an assistant to Heinrich Hoffmann, official photographer of the Nazi Party. It was in this capacity that she met Hitler, who was 23 years her senior. Beginning in 1930, Hitler began to see Braun sporadically on a social basis. When Braun attempted suicide in 1932 in an apparent attempt to capture Hitler's romantic attention, Hitler and Braun became intimate, although Hitler was careful not to be seen in public with her.

After Hitler became German chancellor in 1933, he carefully cultivated his image as the purportedly chaste military warrior and political hero who was irresistible to women but married to the German nation. He had determined that remaining single enhanced his power and appeal, so only a few Germans close to Hitler knew of Braun and her relationship with the führer.

In 1935, Braun again attempted suicide in a bid for Hitler's attention. By the next year, she had become a fixture at Hitler's Berghof residence outside Berchtesgaden, although she still spent much of her time in a commodious Munich apartment that Hitler had provided for her and her sister.

Braun has been described by contemporaries as a somewhat vapid and vain woman who was far more interested in fashion and film than politics. Nevertheless, she remained undyingly faithful to Hitler, who likely saw in her a woman who could be easily manipulated and controlled. In June 1944, Braun's sister Gretl married Hermann Fegelein, a liaison officer on Hitler's staff and an aide to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. This permitted Hitler to include Braun in official settings, although she was introduced merely as "Fegelein's sister-in-law." Even when Braun and Hitler were out of the public eye, few individuals reported any sort of display of affection between them.

As Soviet troops advanced into Berlin in April 1945, Braun expressed her desire to join Hitler at the Führerbunker beneath the Reich Chancellery. She traveled incognito from Munich to Berlin and refused to leave as Soviet forces fought their way toward the chancellery. Late in the evening of April 29, Hitler and Braun were married in a simple civilian ceremony in the bunker.

In the midafternoon of April 30, Hitler and Braun retreated to a private sitting room. There Braun bit into a cyanide capsule, which promptly killed her. Hitler then shot himself in the right temple with a pistol. Aides carried both corpses out of the bunker and into an adjacent garden, where they were burned beyond recognition. Only after their deaths did the public become aware of Hitler's relationship with Braun and their brief marriage.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Germany; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf

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Braun, Wernher von (1912–1977)

German physicist and rocket scientist. Born in Wirsitz, Posen, Germany (now Poland), on March 23, 1912, Wernher von Braun decided as a teenager to become a physicist and pioneer in space rocketry. After graduating from the Berlin Institute of Technology in 1932, he earned a doctorate in physics from the University of Berlin, concentrating on developing liquid-fueled rocket engines.

In 1932, the German military began funding Braun's work, and after heading a team of 80 engineers building rockets in Kummersdorf, he took over a new custom-designed facility at Peenemünde in the Baltic, the remoteness of which allowed long-range rocket testing. By 1943, Braun's team had successfully developed several rockets—the A-2, A-3, and A-4, the last capable of reaching Britain. Braun made no secret of his interest in sending rockets to explore space rather than using them as weapons, leading the German Schutzstaffel (SS) and Gestapo to arrest him for frivolous indulgence.

In 1943, as an Allied victory seemed increasingly likely, German leader Adolf Hitler ordered Braun's group to develop the A-4 as a "weapon of vengeance" to shower explosives on London. Braun's colleagues argued that without him, they could not accomplish this task, so he was freed. The first operational V-2 ("Vengeance") rocket was launched in September 1944.

In early 1945, fearing for his group members' personal safety and their program's future, Braun stole a train, forged travel documents, and led his production team to surrender to U.S. military representatives in western Germany. The Americans seized V-2s, spare parts, and scientific documents from the Peenemünde and Nordhausen facilities and gave Braun and 126 of his scientists visas for the United States. The group initially settled at Fort Bliss, Texas, but transferred to Huntsville, Alabama, in 1950, where they shared their knowledge with American scientists and laid the foundations of the U.S. rocketry and space-exploration programs.

German physicist and rocket scientist Wernher von Braun in a post-World War II photograph. (Library of Congress)

Braun's well-publicized suggestions that the United States build a space station and launch manned missions to the moon contributed to the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958, the Apollo space program during the 1960s, and Slylab in the 1970s. Braun retired in 1972, and he died in Alexandria, Virginia, on June 16, 1977.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

V-2 Rocket

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Brazil

Nation in South America with a 1939 population of approximately 40,289,000. The largest country in South America, Brazil encompasses 3,287,597 square miles. It is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the east; Venezuela, Guyana, and French Guinea to the north; Colombia to the northwest; Peru and Bolivia to the west; Argentina and Paraguay to the southwest; and Uruguay to the south. At the time of World War II, Brazil was ruled by a virtual dictatorship under President Getúlio Vargas, who was in power from 1930 until 1945.

The participation of Brazil on the side of the Allies in World War II marked a new chapter in the nation's history. The war severed Brazil's traditional relationships with West European sources of loans and investment capital. As a consequence, even before the United States joined the war in late 1941, President Vargas entered into an agreement with Washington to lease bases in northeastern Brazil along the air routes to Africa in return for Washington's support for Vargas's project of developing a national iron and steel mill at Volta Redonda. Such a step was unprecedented in Brazilian history and left Vargas open to charges that he had bargained away the national sovereignty.

Brazil did not follow the United States into the war in December 1941. Although the Brazilian government declared its solidarity with the United States, it also maintained diplomatic ties with the Axis states. The pretense of neutrality ended when Brazil severed these diplomatic relations, a step announced at the February 1942 Rio Conference. The fact that this consultative conference was held in Rio de Janeiro was indicative of the strategic importance that the U.S. government attached to Brazil. Following the conference, Brazil received a large quantity of U.S. military supplies, and it allowed the stationing of some U.S. troops on its soil.

Any Brazilian government efforts to avoid outright involvement in the war ended with the sinking of Brazilian merchant ships by German submarines. On August 22, 1942, Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy (it did not declare war on Japan until June 5, 1945), and in return, it received important military and technological aid from the United States.

Brazil proved to be an important addition to the Allied military effort. The country occupied a strategic position geographically, and bases there played a significant role in the war against German U-boats in the South Atlantic. Brazil was also a key link in the air route between Florida and the Middle East, and it furnished important raw materials, especially rubber, to the Allied war effort. Brazil was also the only Latin American state, apart from Mexico (with one air squadron), to furnish combat forces.

Under the order of Vargas, Major General João Baptista Mascarenhas de Moraes, commander of the Second Military Region of São Paulo, began organizing the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (Força Expedicionária Brasileira, FEB) in late 1943; it was to cooperate with Allied military operations in Europe. In 1944, Brazil shipped this expeditionary force to Italy. It also sent other military elements by air, including doctors and nurses.

The first part of the FEB departed Rio de Janeiro for Naples on July 2, 1944. Other elements followed over the next months, with the fifth and last component arriving in February 1945. The FEB troops were largely untrained and had no combat experience when they arrived in Italy to serve with Lieutenant General Mark Clark's U.S. Fifth Army, but they entered fighting that September and continued in the line until the end of the war. In all, 25,445 Brazilians fought in the Italian theater.

In addition to army personnel, 400 men of the Brazilian Air Force fought with the 350th Squadron of the U.S. Army Air Forces in Italy. Ships of the Brazilian Navy also worked with the U.S. Navy in patrolling the Brazilian coast.

Brazil's cooperation with the Allies in the war affected national development through the growth of important ties between the nation and the United States. The U.S. share in Brazilian trade jumped from 24 percent in 1938 to 55 percent in the early 1940s. Further, the war also had been fought in the name of democracy, and in 1945, the Brazilian Army overthrew Vargas and his dictatorship in a bloodless putsch.

See also

Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Clark, Mark Wayne; Italy Campaign; Latin America and the War

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Brecht, Bertolt (1898–1956)

Anti-Nazi critic, composer, poet, and playwright. Bertolt Brecht was born in Augsburg, Bavaria, Germany, on February 10, 1898. His most famous works completed during the pre-Nazi era include *The Threepenny Opera* (1928) and *The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny* (1930).

The *Threepenny Opera*, one of the first musical comedies ever performed, had quite serious subject matter. Reflecting Brecht's Marxist leanings, the play was essentially a Marxist critique of capitalism and its excesses. The musical score, by Kurt Weill, was pathbreaking and heavily influenced by the new jazz form. One song from the musical went on to become a smash hit, the jazz/swing tune "Mack the Knife."

The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny, a BITING political satire, caused an uproar among Nazis. This play was again set to music by Weill, essentially making it a modern opera. With these two works, Brecht became the star of Epic Theater, a form of theater that dealt with contemporary issues and relied on the audience itself to determine the efficacy of a play's conclusions.

A lifelong Marxist, Brecht fled Germany shortly after the Reichstag fire in Berlin in February 1933. During the next 14 years, he lived in exile in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and finally in the United States from July 1941 to October 1947.

Although he was a resolute anti-Nazi, Brecht wrote on a variety of themes in wartime. His most notable contribution to the anti-Nazi effort was his collaboration with Fritz Lang on an important Hollywood film titled *Hangmen Also Die* (1943). The plot of the movie dealt with the assassination of Nazi official Reinhard Heydrich in Prague in May 1942 and the brutal German reprisals that followed. Neither Lang nor Brecht claimed to be happy with the finished product, but it is generally viewed as an excellent film of the war and one of the few that showed what life was like under German occupation.

About the same time, Brecht also wrote an anti-Nazi play titled *The Private Life of the Master Race* (1938). It was, however, performed only twice during the war. Perhaps Brecht's most blatant anti-Nazi works were a series of songs that were performed for broadcast on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

Brecht remained in the United States after the war but left for Zurich, Switzerland, in 1947 after being required to testify in front of the Congressional House Un-American Activities Committee. Outraged by the reinstatement of several former Nazis in the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Brecht went to live in communist-controlled East Berlin upon the invitation of East German officials.

While Brecht's creative output decreased in his later years, he did produce a series of moving poems while in East Berlin. He died there of a heart attack on August 14, 1956.

MICHAEL POLLEY AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Film and the War; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Literature and the War

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Brereton, Lewis Hyde (1890–1967)

U.S. Army Air Forces general. Born on July 21, 1890, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Lewis Hyde Brereton attended St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, for two years before entering the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, where he graduated in 1911. He then gave up his ensign's commission to secure a commission as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army coastal artillery.

In 1912, Brereton transferred to the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and became a pilot the following year. When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, he was among the first aviators of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France. As commander of the 12th Aero Squadron between March and October 1918, he shot down four German planes and earned the Distinguished Service Cross.

Following occupation duty in Germany, Brereton served as air attaché in Paris from 1919 to 1922. He next was an instructor at Kelly Field, Texas, and Langley Field, Virginia, and commanded the 2nd Bombardment Group. Brereton graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1927 and then held a succession of assignments. Promoted to temporary brigadier general on October 1, 1940, he commanded the 17th Bombardment Wing at Savannah, Georgia. On July 11, 1941, he was promoted to major general and commanded the Third Air Force at Tampa, Florida.

In November 1941, Brereton took command of the Far Eastern Air Force in the Philippines. General Douglas MacArthur refused him permission to launch an immediate strike on Formosa following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and as a result, nearly half of his planes were destroyed in the Japanese attack of December 8. Following the fall of the Philippines, Brereton took command of Tenth Air Force in India.

In June 1942, Brereton went to Cairo to command the Middle East Air Force, later designated the Ninth Air Force. He planned the air strikes against the oil refineries of Ploieşti, Romania, which began on August 1, 1943. Promoted to lieutenant general in April 1944, Brereton took command of the First Allied Airborne Army, which participated in the September 17–26 Operation MARKET-GARDEN, the unsuccessful Allied invasion of the Netherlands. In December 1944, during the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), Brereton's planes dropped supplies to the encircled 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, Belgium, and

in March 1945, they dropped troops near Wesel, Germany, in Operation VARSITY to secure a bridgehead over the Rhine.

After the war, Brereton again commanded the Third Air Force at Tampa, Florida. He transferred to the newly established U.S. Air Force in 1947 and was a member of the Military Liaison Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission before retiring in 1948. Brereton published his memoirs in 1946. He died in Washington, D.C., on July 19, 1967.

ZOLTÁN SOMODI

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Ardennes Offensive; Clark Field, Japanese Raid on; MacArthur, Douglas; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Ploieşti, Raids on; Rhine Crossings

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Brett, George Howard (1886–1963)

U.S. Army Air Forces lieutenant general. Born in Cleveland, Ohio, on February 7, 1886, George Howard Brett graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1909 and a year later was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Philippine Scouts. In 1911, he received a regular army commission in the cavalry, and in 1916, he became a pursuit pilot in the Signal Corps. During World War I, Brett served in France and England in logistical assignments.

Between the world wars, Brett graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1930 and the Army War College in 1936. Promoted to brigadier general in 1938, he served as chief of the Matériel Division at Wright Field, Ohio, from 1939 to 1940. In October 1940, promoted to major general, he was named acting chief of the army air corps.

Promoted to lieutenant general in January 1942, Brett took command of U.S. Army forces in Australia with responsibility for turning Australia into a

support base. For a brief time in early 1942, Brett was the deputy commander of the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, headquartered on Java in the Netherlands East Indies. Following his return to Australia, Brett became commander of the Fifth Air Force and deputy supreme commander and head of all air forces in the Southwest Pacific Area.

From the outset, Brett's relations with General Douglas MacArthur, commander of Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), were strained. MacArthur saw him as too close to Australian politicians, believed Brett had too many Australians in command and administrative positions, and saw him as responsible for the alleged poor performance of SWPA units in combat. In Brett's defense, it must be pointed out that the SWPA suffered from a lack of supplies and trained staff officers and from poor aircraft. But in the summer of 1942, MacArthur replaced Brett with Major General George Kenney.

In November 1942, Brett became head of the Caribbean Defense Command, a post he held until the end of the war. He retired in March 1946 and died in Winter Park, Florida, on December 2, 1963.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Kenney, George Churchill; MacArthur, Douglas; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Bretton Woods Agreements (July 22, 1944)

International economic system intended to help rebuild Europe in the wake of World War II, provide aid to developing countries, and avoid the economic problems that arose after World War I. In July 1944, delegates from 45 countries met at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to discuss postwar reconstruction and economic development. Following three weeks of meetings, the delegates signed the Bretton Woods

Agreement on July 22, 1944. The agreement established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, known today as the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The IBRD had five main goals: to assist in the reconstruction of member countries, either underdeveloped or devastated by war; to promote private foreign investments; to promote balanced international trade growth; to prioritize assistance so that countries with greater need would be dealt with first; and to enable a smooth transition from wartime economies to peacetime economies. Each member contributed a designated amount to the bank's initial capital formation of $10 billion. The United States provided the largest individual share ($3.2 billion), followed by Great Britain ($1.3 billion) and the Soviet Union ($1.2 billion).

The main purpose of the IMF was to establish and regulate monetary exchange rates among nations and lasted until the early 1970s. Under the IMF system, all member nations were required to maintain their currencies within a narrow range that varied by just 1 percent in either direction. The agreed-upon exchange rate was to be based on gold. That system was replaced by a system of floating exchange rates after 1971, when the Richard M. Nixon administration took the United States off the gold standard amid a period of increasing inflation and economic instability.

CHRISTOPHER C. THOMAS

See also

Great Britain; Soviet Union; United States; Document 194

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Bridgeford, Sir William (1894–1971)

Australian Army general. Born on July 28, 1894, at Ballarat, Australia, William Bridgeford studied at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. Service in France during World War I earned him a Military Cross. An excellent

administrator with a genial personality, Bridgeford served in assorted staff and training positions in the small Australian Army between the wars and also took further courses at the Staff College, Quetta, and the Imperial Defence College, London. By the late 1930s, Bridgeford seemed destined for success, but during World War II, he attained advancement and high command more slowly than expected, probably because of personal enmities he aroused during the Greece Campaign (October 28, 1940–March 1941).

When World War II began, Bridgeford was military liaison officer in the Australian High Commission in London. In June 1940, he was promoted to temporary brigadier and took command of the 25th Australian Infantry Brigade then being formed in Britain. From November 1940 through early 1942, he was deputy adjutant and quartermaster general at the headquarters of I Corps in the Middle East. He made valiant efforts to supply operational units during the Greece Campaign, for which he was awarded the Commander Order of the British Empire.

In the late winter of 1942, Bridgeford returned to Australia, assuming command of the 3rd Armoured Division in April, now with the rank of temporary major general. From August 1943 to April 1944, his forces participated in the campaign leading to the successful occupation of Madang, New Guinea. Bridgeford took command of the 3rd Infantry Division on July 1, 1944, leading it during the November 1, 1943–August 15, 1945, Bougainville Campaign and receiving four mentions in dispatches for bravery.

After the war, Bridgeford became quartermaster general of the Australian Military Forces; on October 1, 1948, he was made a permanent major general. In February 1951, Bridgeford was promoted to temporary lieutenant general, and from November 1951 to February 1953, he commanded British Commonwealth forces in the Korean War. Bridgeford retired from the army in 1953 as a lieutenant general. He was the chief executive officer of the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games and remained strongly interested in sports activities until his death in Brisbane on September 21, 1971.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Australia, Army; Bougainville Campaign; Greece Campaign, Italian

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Britain, Battle of (July 10–September 30, 1940)

A series of individual engagements between the German Luftwaffe and the British Royal Air Force (RAF) between July 10 and September 30, 1940. The battle was first given its name by Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill during a speech before Parliament.

German chancellor Adolf Hitler assigned the Luftwaffe the task of eliminating the RAF and winning control of the skies over Britain, an essential precondition to the German invasion of England (Operation SEELÖWE [SEA LION]). There were additional reasons for the attack. Hitler did not particularly want a war with the British and had publicly appealed for an end to the conflict, only to be rebuffed. He nevertheless hoped that if the Luftwaffe were to inflict sufficient damage, the British would be forced to sue for peace. Thus, plans went forward, although Hitler expressly forbade Luftwaffe attacks on civilian targets and on London in particular.

The British frantically worked to prepare for a German invasion, although their army had been forced to abandon most of its equipment in France during the May 26–June 4, 1940, Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation. The British did what they could, removing signposts and such, and a blackout had been observed from early in the war. The Germans were expected to attack in strength by parachute, and there was a certain amount of hysteria about fifth columnists (covert enemy sympathizers) and spies. The British also experimented with means of setting the sea on fire, and Bomber Command secretly trained crews in the use of poison gas.

German plans called for the Luftwaffe to establish air superiority over southern England between August 8 and September 15. To accomplish this, the Luftwaffe had to achieve a highly favorable kill ratio in the air or destroy RAF Fighter Command’s infrastructure on the ground while keeping a sufficiently large fighter force intact to protect the German invasion fleet.

Although Luftwaffe leaders were confident of defeating the RAF in the air, they were concerned about attrition among German aircraft.

Luftwaffe commander Reich Marshal Hermann Göring had three Luftflotten (Air Fleets) available to prosecute the battle (see Table 1). Luftflotte 2, based in Belgium and commanded by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, was the largest with 1,206 aircraft, more than half of them fighters. Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle headed Luftflotte 3, with 1,042 aircraft, in France, and Colonel General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff commanded Luftflotte 5, based in Norway, with only 155 offensive aircraft.

Table 1. Luftwaffe Frontline Attack Aircraft in the Battle of Britain, as of August 13, 1940 (excluding reconnaissance and weather reconnaissance aircraft)

Unit, Commander, and Base Location	*Fighter*		*Dive-Bomber*	*Bomber*		
	Bf-109	*Bf-110*	*Ju-87*	*Do-17*	*He-111*	*Ju-88*
Luftflotte 2 Kesselring Brussels	536	119	58	235	207	51
Luftflotte 3 Sperrle Paris	303	112	241	~6	164	216
Luftflotte 5 Stumpff Stavanger	Out of range	32	—	—	61	62

Source: Data from Stephen Bungay, *The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain* (London: Aurum, 2000).

Photograph taken of the London dock area during the first massive German air raid on the British capital city, September 7, 1940. Tower Bridge stands out against a background of smoke and fires. (National Archives)

RAF Fighter Command, headed by Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, was organized into four fighter groups with 754 single-seat aircraft (see Table 2). Air Vice Marshal Sir Quintin Brand commanded 10 Group, covering the southwestern United Kingdom. It bordered 11 Group, headed by Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, which was in the southeast and thus likely to bear the brunt of the German attack. Air Vice Marshal Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory commanded 12 Group in the Midlands, and Air Vice Marshal Richard Saul headed 13 Group, covering northern England and Scotland. Of the four group commanders, Keith Park was probably the most capable.

Dowding had a significant aid in that his force boasted the world's only integrated air defense system. Based on the telephone and teleprinter network, it was resilient, merging inputs from radar stations and observer corps, filtering friendly or "doubtful" contacts, and devolving responsibility to group and sector levels. Group headquarters allocated raids to sectors, which then scrambled fighters and guided them by radio to intercept the attacking aircraft. The system was the product of years of careful thought,

and it enabled Dowding to make the most effective use of his inferior resources. The Luftwaffe was, of course, aware that some sort of fighter-direction system was in use but had no idea of its scope or capabilities.

In terms of aircraft, the German Messerschmitt Bf-109 and the British Supermarine Spitfire were quite evenly matched; the British Hurricane was of lower performance but more maneuverable. Both RAF fighters benefited from the introduction of constant-speed propellers and 100-octane fuel during the battle. The Bf-110 was shown to be inferior to single-engine fighters, and the German Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber was so vulnerable that it was withdrawn partway through the Battle of Britain. The RAF, however, had much to learn about fighter tactics. The Luftwaffe was using flexible, open formations that had worked well in Spain and earlier in the war. Many RAF squadrons were still using close formations that allowed little tactical flexibility.

Table 2. RAF Fighter Command Frontline Day-Fighters and Night-Fighters in the Battle of Britain, as of July 1, 1940

Unit, Commander, andBase Location	*Day-Fighter*			*Night-Fighter*
	Hurricane	*Spitfire*	*Defiant*	*Blenheim*
10 Group Brand Box (created from 11 Group, 8 July 1940)	24	20	—	11
11 Group Park Uxbridge	194	72	—	28
12 Group Leigh-Mallory Watnall	72	57	12	20
13 Group Saul Newcastle	58	51	14	10

Source: Data from Stephen Bungay, *The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain* (London: Aurum, 2000).

About 80 percent of the RAF pilots were British, and roughly 10 percent were from Commonwealth countries, the bulk of them New Zealanders and

Canadians, with some Australians, South Africans, and Rhodesians. In June 1940, No. 1 Squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force arrived with its own Hurricanes. Most of the remaining 10 percent were pilots who had escaped from occupied Europe (Poles, Czechs, Belgians, Free French); complete squadrons of Czechs (310 and 312) and Poles (302 and 303) were formed as the battle progressed. There were probably about 11 American pilots, but since some of the Americans pretended to be Canadian in order to circumvent U.S. neutrality, it is difficult to be certain of the exact number.

Beginning on July 4, 1940, a few isolated engagements occurred between British and German fighters, but on July 10, the Germans began the actual battle by mounting their first bombing raid against a convoy in the English Channel. The British had one ship sunk and one Hurricane lost; the Germans lost two Dornier Do-17s, two Bf-109s, and a Messerschmitt Bf-110. Over the next few weeks, the Luftwaffe mounted repeated raids on convoys and coastal targets and attempted to engage British fighters en masse with fighter sweeps, but RAF controllers carefully avoided fighter-versus-fighter combat. Early in the battle, German harbors and shipping became the RAF Bomber Command's priority targets; many mine-laying and antishipping sorties were made against the massing invasion barges.

On August 12, the Luftwaffe attacked and temporarily disabled radar stations at Dover, Pevensey, and Rye, and the Ventnor station was out of action for three days, although a dummy signal was sent out while repairs were made. The following day was designated Adlertag (Eagle Day) and marked the beginning of the German attack on Fighter Command. The Germans' plan for multiple raids was handicapped by bad weather and poor communications, however. Some of their bombers attacked without escorts, and they were lucky to escape with relatively few losses.

There was heavy fighting on August 15, with the Luftwaffe flying over 2,000 sorties against airfields and aircraft factories. Luftflotte 5 attacked from Norway for the first and last time and was badly mauled. The Luftwaffe lost a total of 75 aircraft in exchange for 34 RAF fighters.

Both sides inevitably overestimated the amount of damage they were inflicting on the enemy and overinflated claims for propaganda purposes. This caused the Germans to shift their targeting prematurely. The Germans believed that the RAF was down to 300 fighters, partly because they had badly underestimated the production rate of British aircraft. In fact, Dowding

still had about 600 fighters. The high sortie rate (RAF pilots sometimes flew five missions daily) was beginning to take its toll on the aircrews of both sides, however, and cases of combat fatigue were becoming more common.

Bad weather between August 16 and 19 offered some respite for the defenders. The Germans then heavily escorted subsequent bombing raids in a bid to wear down the last few British fighters. The RAF's No. 11 Group suffered determined attacks on several airfields, and a dispute broke out between Park, who used squadron-sized attacks, and Leigh-Mallory, who favored use of a "big wing" of five squadrons to deal a crushing blow to the enemy. However, the big wing took so long to assemble that it only contacted the Germans at full strength on three occasions, and the large number of fighters involved led to exaggerated claims that gave a misleading impression of its effectiveness.

Toward the end of August, Dowding was beginning to run out of pilots, in spite of transfers from other commands and the length of the pilot training course being cut. The Poles of No. 303 Squadron were declared operational and quickly became the squadron in Fighter Command with the highest kill-to-loss ratio, 14 to 1.

Following the inadvertent jettisoning of German bombs over London and subsequent night raids by the RAF on Berlin, the Luftwaffe shifted its focus to London on September 7. With hindsight, this decision can be seen as a mistake, but the prevailing view in the Luftwaffe was that the RAF had taken heavy damage and had few fighters left. On September 15, the Luftwaffe launched a large attack protected by many escorts that were progressively engaged by Park's fighters as the force approached London, where the bombers were confronted by Leigh-Mallory's big wing. Many aircraft were shot down on both sides; the RAF claimed 185 kills, but the Luftwaffe actually lost 56 aircraft against 28 RAF fighters.

On September 27, Germany's Operation SEA LION was postponed indefinitely. At Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's insistence, however, units of the Italian Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) arrived in Belgium in mid-September and began training for attacks in England. They were, however, equipped with obsolete aircraft, and on their only daylight raid, on November 11, 1940, nearly half of the attacking force of two dozen aircraft were shot down, with no loss to the RAF. German daylight raids continued during October but tailed off through November as the emphasis gradually shifted to night attacks.

The Luftwaffe had effectively blunted itself on the most sophisticated air defense system in the world and was never again to be as strong relative to its opponents. In the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe reported 2,698 experienced aircrew killed or captured, resulting in a shortfall that the German training machine was poorly equipped to make up. The RAF lost 544 fighter pilots and more than 1,100 bomber aircrew, but it learned several important lessons and built up a cadre of experienced fighter units.

ANDY BLACKBURN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing;

Chemical Weapons and Warfare; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Combat Fatigue; Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Battle for; Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Great Britain, Air Force; Hitler, Adolf; Kesselring, Albert; Leigh-Mallory, Sir Trafford; Park, Sir Keith Rodney; Radar; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; Sperrle, Hugo Walter; Document 69

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British Eastern Fleet

Established in 1904 with its headquarters at Singapore, the British Eastern Fleet (East Indies Fleet, Far East Fleet) was loosely organized into three separate commands: the East Indies Squadron, the China Squadron, and the Australian Squadron. During World War II, its primary duty was securing the safety of Allied convoys east of Suez. The fleet counted ships and personnel from other navies, including the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal New Zealand Navy, the Royal Netherlands Navy, and the United States Navy.

In September 1939 with the beginning of World War II, the chief threat faced by the British Eastern Fleet came from German commerce raiders and submarines. These included both the pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* and auxiliary cruisers (converted merchant ships, the last of which was not sunk until October 1943) as well as submarines attacking British merchant shipping. When Italy joined the war in June 1940, its Red Sea Flotilla of destroyers and submarines operating from Italian East Africa posed a great threat to British shipping and especially the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. This threat was neutralized through naval engagements in part but primarily by the capture of Italian bases from the land in the British East

Africa Campaign. The Eastern Fleet then supported British land operations in Iraq and Iran.

Japan posed a much greater threat. In September 1940, following the defeat of France by Germany, Tokyo secured bases in French Indochina that placed most of Southeast Asia within range of its bombers. This brought economic pressure from the United States, Britain, and the Dutch, leading the Japanese to declare war. On the commencement of hostilities with Japan on December 8, 1941, the Eastern Fleet amalgamated the East Indies Squadron and the China Squadron.

The Japanese ran riot. On December 10, their aircraft sank off Malaya the new British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse.* They went on to conquer Malaya, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies. Then in the spring of 1942, Japanese carrier forces under Admirals Nagumo Chūichi and Ozawa Jisaburo operated freely in the Eastern Indian Ocean, attacked Colombo and Trincomalee in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and sank a number of merchantmen and British warships, including the small carrier *Hermes* (April 9, 1942), and also disrupted sea traffic along the eastern coast of India. There was worry in London that the Japanese might force the Royal Navy from the Indian Ocean entirely, with dire implications for India. Fortunately for the Eastern Fleet, the Japanese soon withdrew without discovering and destroying its major assets.

With the death of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips in the sinking of the *Prince of Wales*, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton assumed command of the Eastern Fleet. Under Japanese pressure, Layton was forced to withdraw to Java and then to Trincomalee. In March 1942, Admiral Sir James Somerville assumed command. At this time, the Eastern Fleet had 2 modern and 1 small carrier (with fewer than 100 aircraft), 5 old battleships, 2 heavy and 5 light cruisers (1 Dutch), 16 destroyers, and 7 submarines (2 Dutch). Realizing the inadequacies and lack of security of Trincomalee and Colombo, Somerville established a new secret fleet anchorage at Addu Atoll in the Maldive Islands, but most of the fleet relocated to Kilindini near Mombasa, Kenya. The fleet was also severely strained by the siphoning off of its ships to meet other more pressing commitments, especially in the Mediterranean. The Eastern Fleet soon found itself little more than a glorified convoy escort force.

The Eastern Fleet supported the invasion of Madagascar (Operation IRONCLAD) in May 1942, brought on by British fears that Japan might secure

bases there. In this operation, the fleet was forced to deal with Vichy French navy ships as well as Japanese submarines.

Allied successes in 1943 and 1944 released British naval resources for the Indian Ocean. These included aircraft carriers; the battleships *Howe, Queen Elizabeth*, and *Valiant;* and the battle cruiser *Renown.* With the increase in forces and the liberation of British Pacific possessions in the offing, and with London determined to restore British prestige in the Pacific, agreement was reached with the United States, the Allied power in command of the Pacific Ocean area, regarding British participation in that theater. Following a training exercise in late March 1944, in April and May the Eastern Fleet, operating with U.S. Task Group 58.5, attacked Japanese installations and oil facilities in Sabang and Surabaya. On June 21 the Eastern Fleet mounted a carrier raid on the Andaman Islands, and on July 25 it struck Sabang with both air attack and naval gunfire.

On August 23, 1944, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser replaced Somerville as commander of the Eastern Fleet. With the creation of the British Pacific Fleet in November 1944, the Eastern Fleet became the East Indies Fleet until the end of the war. Then it became the Far East Fleet, operating in all the Far East, including the Pacific Ocean.

In August and September 1944, the Eastern Fleet again struck oil installations in Sumatra, and in October it attacked the Nicobar Islands in an effort to divert Japanese attention from the U.S. landings on Leyte. Additional British ships arrived, including the carriers *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* in January 1945 to carry out attacks against oil refineries in Sumatra and Java.

With the reestablishment of their control in the Bay of Benghal, British submarines based at Ceylon attacked Japanese merchant shipping and sank one Japanese and two German submarines. Subsequent operations for the East Indies Fleet included support for the recapture of Burma, to include landings near Rangoon (Yangon). Then on May 15–16, 1945, the 26th Destroyer Flotilla (HMS *Saumarez, Venus, Verulam, Vigilant*, and the *Virago*) used torpedoes to sink the Japanese heavy cruiser *Haguro* in the Malacca Straits. In late August it landed forces at Penang, and on September 2 it did the same at Singapore.

After the war, the fleet took part in putting down the Malayan Emergency. The Far East Fleet was disbanded in 1971.

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See also

British Pacific Fleet; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Great Britain, Navy; Indian Ocean Campaign; Nagumo Chūichi; Ozawa Jisaburo; Phillips, Sir Thomas "Tom" Spencer Vaughan; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Sinking of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes

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British Naval Blockade of the European Axis Powers

With the beginning of World War II, the Royal Navy took the lead in the effort to prevent Germany, and later Italy, from securing raw materials and goods that would aid their war efforts. Given the success of the World War I Allied naval blockade of the Central Powers, British planning for possible war against Germany included as early as 1936 implementation of a naval blockade, supplemented by a bombing campaign to damage the German economy.

With its declaration of war against Germany on September 3, 1939, Britain therefore established a blockade that resembled closely that of World War I. Once again, it was a distant blockade, one that sought to intercept commerce at points away from the German coast rather than in German territorial waters. Two forces implemented the blockade of the North Sea. The primary one was the Northern Patrol, which policed a line running from Scotland to Iceland, later extended to run to the Denmark Straits.

Based at Kirkwall, this force was charged with interdicting ships bound for the North Sea and ultimately European ports to check for contraband of war and, if necessary, send these ships to a British port for examination of their cargoes. As in World War I, the force consisted primarily of aging fleet

cruisers at first, but over time these were replaced primarily with armed merchant cruisers and trawlers. At the outbreak of the war, the Admiralty had at its disposal 50 armed merchant cruisers, armed principally with 6-inch guns.

In addition to the Northern Patrol, until it could be replaced by a minefield, a force based at Ramsgate guarded the English Channel. A further element of the naval blockade was a patrol based at Gibraltar. It had the assignment of interdicting ships entering the Mediterranean Sea with cargoes that might be bound for Germany and then Italy when that country entered the war in June 1940.

Wedded to the naval effort of the blockade, and equally as important to its potential success, were diplomatic agreements crafted with neutral European nations and the United States. The agreements with European nations resembled those of World War I and centered on making certain that supplies bound for these countries were solely for domestic consumption rather than reexport to an Axis power. Agreements with the United States centered on ensuring that major U.S. industries did not ship contraband to the same neutrals for reexport to the Axis. A key element of the effort rested on the issuance of navicerts, documents that certified at the port of departure that the cargo of a ship was not contraband and consequently exempted those vessels from search by British blockaders.

Axis efforts at sea to undermine the British blockade were concentrated against forces in the North Sea and were consequently German operations. These resulted in losses for the Northern Patrol but not to such a degree as to upset operations. The best-known engagement between German naval units and the British blockaders occurred on November 23, 1939, when the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* sank the armed merchant cruiser *Rawalpindi,* southeast of Iceland. The majority of attacks on the Northern Patrol were carried out by German submarines, however. Nine armed merchant cruisers succumbed to these attacks, the majority of these also near Iceland.

While the efforts of the Kriegsmarine did not change the strategic situation, the naval blockade of Germany was undermined initially by the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, not only allowed the German invasion of Poland to proceed, but its secret provisions provided for the partition of

Poland and the Baltic states, and the Soviet Union agreed to supply Germany with essential raw materials from its own vast stocks and to act as a purchasing agent for other goods abroad. This was a tremendous boon to the Germans and a blow to any hopes that a British naval blockade might have ruinous effect on the German economy. In addition, the 1940 conquests of Norway, Denmark, and France provided both raw materials and food stocks.

Germany's access to the resources of much of Europe also undermined British efforts to deny strategic materials to Italy upon that country's declaration of war. The blockade did cause great disruption, as Italy had few natural resources and was consequently heavily dependent on imports of raw materials, particularly oil and coal. In September 1939, Italy had oil stockpiles equivalent to only nine months of peacetime consumption. The blockade was also responsible in part for the Italian implementation of rationing for foodstuffs. Even so, the Italians were able to mitigate these problems through reliance on Germany.

The greatest accomplishment of the blockade was in the reduction of German exports (by some 80 percent) and largely ending imports of such goods as copper, magnesium, nickel, and tungsten. Importation of other raw materials, most notably oil and rubber, was also greatly reduced. These achievements ultimately amounted to little, however, because Germany was able to make up the shortages from its continental conquests and alliances. The Germans did incur additional expense garnering goods by land transport, which was costlier than shipment by sea, and they also had to devote more manpower to the domestic production of these goods. Even so, the operation failed to achieve the strategic goal of the destruction or severe weakening of the civilian and government sectors of Axis economies to cripple those nations' capacity to wage war.

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See also

Germany, Navy; Gibraltar; Great Britain, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; *Rawalpindi*, Loss of

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British Pacific Fleet

The British Pacific Fleet (BPF) was a British Commonwealth naval force that took part in operations against Japan in the last year of World War II. Formally established on November 22, 1944, it was also the most powerful conventional force in British naval history.

Following their withdrawal to the western side of the Indian Ocean in 1942, British naval units did not return to the Southwest Pacific until May 17, 1944, when they took part in an Anglo-American carrier task force raid on Surabaya, Java. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill was anxious that Britain's overseas possessions be recaptured by its forces and that British influence be restored. Although U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King was opposed, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt immediately accepted the offer of British naval assistance at the second Quebec Conference in September 1944. Although King had stipulated that the BPF be wholly self-sufficient, in practice the U.S. Navy provided substantial material assistance.

The British Eastern Fleet was reorganized into the BPF and the British East Indies Fleet, based in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, formerly commander of the Eastern Fleet, assumed command of the British Combined Fleet, flying his flag in the British battleship *Howe.* Although the Royal Navy provided the majority of the ships and all of its capital ships, the BPF included ships and personnel from the British Royal Navy, the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal New Zealand Navy. The Royal Australian Navy's contribution was limited because its larger ships had been integrated with U.S. Navy formations since 1942. South African Navy personnel also contributed, while the U.S. Navy provided substantial fleet train support, an area in which the Royal Navy had scant resources. At peak strength the fleet numbered 4 battleships, 6 fleet carriers, 4 light carriers, 9 escort carriers, and 2 maintenance carriers, all with some 500 aircraft. There were also 11 cruisers, 35 destroyers, 14 frigates, 44 smaller warships, 31 submarines, 35 minesweepers, and numerous support vessels.

Although Fraser exercised formal command, actual command devolved to Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, with Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian in charge of air operations. The U.S. Navy, which had control of all Allied operations in the Pacific Ocean, designated the BPF as Task Force (TF) 57 when it operated with the Fifth Fleet beginning on March 15, 1945; it became TF-37 on May 27 when it passed under the U.S. Third Fleet. The fleet train element was designated TF-113.

Major actions in which the fleet was involved included air strikes in January 1945 against oil production facilities at Belawan Deli and Palembang in Sumatra, followed by support for Operation ICEBERG, the U.S. invasion of Okinawa, by neutralizing Japanese aviation operating from the Sakishima Islands, both through air strikes and naval gunfire against airfields. In April 1945 the British 4th Submarine Flotilla transferred to the Allied submarine base at Fremantle, Western Australia, as part of BPF. On June 8, the submarines *Trenchant* and *Stygian* sank the Japanese heavy cruiser *Ashigara* off Sumatra, and on June 31 the British midget submarine XE3 sank the Japanese Navy heavy cruiser *Takao* at Singapore.

Beginning on July 17, battleships and aircraft from the fleet attacked the Japanese home islands. The battleship *King George V* shelled naval installations near Tokyo, the last battle action by a British battleship. Carrier air strikes against land and sea targets disabled a Japanese escort carrier. Although the British had accepted that the BPF should become a component element of the U.S. Third Fleet, its commander, Admiral William F. Halsey, excluded it from a raid on the Japanese Navy base at Kure, noting after the war that he did not intend to give the British any basis for claiming that they had helped destroy the Japanese Navy. Regardless, the BPF would have played a major part in the proposed invasion of the Japanese home islands, Operation DOWNFALL, which was canceled after Japan surrendered.

With the end of the war, the fleet formed the naval arm of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. The performance of the BPF at the end of the war did help repair to some extent British prestige and influence in the Pacific area.

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See also

DOWNFALL, Operation; Fleet Train; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Okinawa, Invasion of; King, Edward Postell, Jr.; Vian, Sir Philip Louis

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Brittany, Battle of (June 9, 1944)

Battle fought in the English Channel between units of the German Navy and the Allied navies on June 9, 1944, three days after the initial Allied invasion of France in Operation OVERLORD. It was sparked by the German attempt to reinforce their naval forces on the western front of the Normandy Invasion zone with the last surviving large warships on the Atlantic coast, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla of destroyers *ZH1*, *Z32*, and *Z24*, under the command of Captain Theodor F. von Bechtolsheim, and the torpedo boat *T24*.

Signals intelligence alerted the Allies to this operation and allowed them to ambush the German force with the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, a veteran unit led by Royal Navy captain Basil Jones. It numbered eight destroyers: the British ships *Tartar* (flagship) and *Atshanti* and the Canadian ships *Haida* and *Huron* in one division, and the Polish *Blyskawica* and *Piorun* along with the British *Eskimo* and *Javelin* in another division.

At 1:16 a.m. Allied radar detected the Germans at 10 miles' range on an overcast and rainy night in which, despite a nearly full moon, visibility was no greater than 3 miles. The first division, let by the *Tartar*, charged the German formation in a staggered line-abreast formation heading straight for the Germans so that the forward guns of every ship could bear while presenting a minimal torpedo target. This anticipated the German tactic

employed successfully in several naval battles in 1943 of firing torpedoes and immediately turning away.

The first three German ships repeated the earlier tactic within a minute of the first star shells bursting overhead, but their torpedoes missed, while the marksmanship of the gunners on the British and Canadian ships was exceptionally good. The flagship, *Z32*, sheered away to the northwest lightly damaged; the *ZH1* was disabled; and the *Z24 was* moderately damaged as it and the *T24* fled southwest. German return fire was also slow and ineffective.

The battle then became a fragmented, confused melee. The *Z32* blundered into the northern division led by the *Blyskawica* and lightly damaged the *Eskimo* before breaking contact. The *Haida* and *Huron* pursued the *Z24* and *T24*, but they escaped the Canadian destroyers by successfully passing through a British minefield and eventually returned to Brest. The *Z32* returned to the original battle area trying to find its flotilla mates and had another encounter with the *Tartar* and *Ashanti*. The *Z32* severely damaged the *Tartar* before breaking contact. Shortly thereafter, the *Tartar* and *Ashanti* came upon the *ZH1* and sank it with torpedoes.

Meanwhile, the *Z32* ran into the *Haida* and *Huron* returning from their futile chase. The large German destroyer was able to disengage once, but when it set course to return to Brest, the Canadians again located it, and after a running gun battle and with damage mounting, the German captain ran his ship aground at 5:10 a.m. to save its crew.

With the Germans operating in three groups and the Allies in as many as four, the Battle of Brittany was confused, even for a night action. It demonstrated how the evolution of night combat tactics and technology had left the Kriegsmarine's first-line units behind, and it ended Germany's last hope of countering the Allied invasion with the largest warships it had left in the Atlantic.

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See also

Destroyers; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for

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Brody-Lwow, Battle of (July 13–27, 1944)

In early 1944, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin approved a plan to force German troops then occupying Ukraine. The objectives were the encirclement of German forces in Galicia, the seizure of Lwow in western Ukraine and the Lublin region of Poland, and the establishment of a new front along the Vistula and San Rivers. Collectively these were known as the Lwow-Sandomierz operation. This offensive was to occur in conjunction with Operation BAGRATION, the Belorussian Offensive.

Operation BAGRATION began on June 23. German Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Ernst von Busch, waged a futile effort to hold against the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. Within two weeks Army Group Center had collapsed, with 25 German divisions destroyed. Field Marshal Walther Model now replaced Busch. Model now commanded what remained of Army Group Center in addition to Army Group North Ukraine.

Army Group North Ukraine covered the Borislav-Drohobych oil fields and the approaches to southern Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Silesia. Facing it was Marshal Ivan Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front. The Germans here were outnumbered three to one in manpower, five to one in tanks, and six to one in aircraft. Model’s units consisted of the First Panzer Army, the Fourth Panzer Army, the Seventeenth Army, and the Hungarian First Army.

On July 13 Konev attacked Model’s forces. Following heavy artillery and air attacks, the Soviet Third Army moved forward but registered little progress against Colonel General Josef Harpe’s Fourth Panzer Army. The next day, the Soviet Thirteenth Army pushed deeper into the Fourth Panzer’s line at Brody. At the same time, the Soviet Thirty-Eighth and Sixtieth Armies hit the First Panzer Army, commanded by Colonel General Erhard Raus, east of Lviv (L’viv). By July 18, the Fourth Panzer Army had been pushed back along its entire front. Reportedly it had only 20 tanks still operational. The Soviet Third Guards Army encircled the German XIII Corps and destroyed it. Of its 35,000 soldiers, only 5,000 managed to break out. The Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division (Galicia) continued resistance for three days after being

surrounded, delaying the Red Army advance into Lviv and allowing several thousand civilians to flee westward. By the end of the battle this division had suffered two-thirds casualties; only some 3,000 soldiers managed to escape.

On July 20, the Soviet First Guards Tank Army drove a wedge between the First and Fourth Panzer Armies. Meanwhile, the Third Guards Tank Army approached Lviv from the north, and the Fourth Tank Army came up from the south. The next day the Fourth Tank Army cut the lines of communication at Przemysl, isolating the First Panzer Army in and around Lviv. The First Guards Tank and Third Guards Tank Armies pushed westward to the San River and would have continued to Krakow. Stavka (the Soviet supreme command), however, instead directed the First Ukrainian Front to drive the Germans from Lviv.

On July 27 the First Panzer Army abandoned Lwow and, together with the Hungarian First Army, withdrew toward the Carpathians to become part of Army Group A in Slovakia. The Fourth Panzer Army was pushed across the Vistula River, where it held static defensive positions in southern Poland until January 1945. With the liberation of Lviv, all Ukraine was under Soviet control.

The next phase of the Soviet operation was the crossing of the Vistula and the capture of Sandomierz in southeastern Poland. Konev met strong resistance from Harpe, but a German counterattack failed to push the Red Army back across the Vistula or prevent the capture of Sandomierz. Army Group North Ukraine was redesignated Army Group A in September 1944.

WILLIAM H. VAN HUSEN

See also

BAGRATION, Operation; Busch, Ernst; Harpe, Josef; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Model, Walther; Ukraine Campaign

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Brooke, Sir Alan Francis (1883–1963)

British Army general and chief of the Imperial General Staff from December 1941 to January 1946. Born on July 23, 1883, in Bagnères de Bigorre, France, Alan Francis Brooke graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and was commissioned in the Royal Artillery in December 1902. He served in Ireland and India in the years before World War I. On World War I's Western Front, he rose from captain to lieutenant colonel. Between the wars, Brooke was an instructor at the Staff College (1923–1926), commandant of the School of Artillery (1929–1932), and inspector of artillery as a major general by 1935. In 1938, he was promoted to lieutenant general on assuming command of the Anti-Aircraft Corps. Early on, it was clear that his was one of the strongest intellects in the British Army.

On the eve of war (August 31, 1939), Brooke was assigned command of II Corps of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France, a position that lasted until his evacuation with many of his troops at the end of May 1940. Brooke briefly returned to France from June 12 to 18, 1940, this time as nominal commander of the BEF. He became commander of the Home Forces on July 19, 1940, working to improve readiness for the expected German invasion.

Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff during World War II. (Getty Images)

Brooke was named chief of the Imperial General Staff on December 25, 1941, and held the post until January 25, 1946, serving concurrently (from March 1942) as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In January 1944, he was promoted to field marshal. He attended all summit conferences from 1942 through 1945 concerned with the strategic direction of the war. Brooke held off the premature American desire for a cross-Channel invasion while supporting action in North Africa and Italy to spread and destroy German forces prior to an invasion of France.

Brooke's feelings toward Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill varied from admiration to exasperation. Churchill's penchant for late-night meetings, his impetuosity and interference in military affairs, and his focus on detail at the expense of broader strategic thinking constantly tried

Brooke's patience. Brooke's diaries, first published in highly edited fashion in the mid-1950s (and only made available in their full form in 2001), include some of the first postwar criticism of Churchill. Brooke grew to hate the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the constant wrangling that arose—especially given his dim view of the strategic thinking of U.S. military leaders, particularly Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. A firm supporter of General Bernard Montgomery, Brooke had little patience for those he believed to be of limited abilities.

Brooke was created a baron (becoming Lord Alanbrooke of Brookborough in September 1945) and a viscount (in January 1946). In 1946 he was made a Knight of the Order of the Garter. He died on June 17, 1963, at Ferney Close, England.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Great Britain, Army; Marshall, George Catlett

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Brooke-Popham, Sir Henry Robert Moore (1878–1953)

Royal Air Force (RAF) air chief marshal. Born on September 18, 1878, at Mendlesham, Hartismere, in Suffolk, England, Henry Brooke-Popham entered the army upon graduation from Sandhurst in 1898. In 1911 he became a pilot, and he was a major in the Royal Flying Corps in 1914 at the beginning of World War I.

Considered too old to fly missions, Brooke-Popham served as a staff officer on the Western Front. Following the war, as a member of the RAF, he was posted to the Air Ministry and went on to command the RAF Staff College between 1921 and 1926. Promoted to air vice marshal in 1926, he served in various leadership positions in Britain and the Middle East until retiring in 1937 to become the governor of Kenya.

Brooke-Popham returned to active duty in September 1939 at the beginning of World War II. His first assignment was to help organize the British Empire Air Training Scheme in Canada and South Africa, a program that trained pilots from the British dominions. In October 1940, now an air chief marshal, he was appointed British commander in chief of the Far East, responsible for ground and air forces in the British possessions of Burma, Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore.

Plagued by organization difficulties, including the lack of a clear chain of command (area naval forces reported to a different commander), Brooke-Popham attempted to balance his military-diplomatic role and bolster British defenses against a possible Japanese attack. His ideas, including a proposed British invasion of Thailand, were mostly ignored. British and colonial troops under Brooke-Popham's command were ill-prepared for the Japanese invasion of Malaya in early December 1941 and the subsequent loss of Singapore (February 15, 1942), and he was relieved on December 27. Brooke-Popham died at Halton, Buckinghamshire, England, on October 20, 1953.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Malaya Campaign; Singapore, Battle for

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Brown, Wilson, Jr. (1882–1957)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on April 27, 1882, Wilson Brown Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1902. He returned to Annapolis as an instructor during 1907–1908. Staff assignments followed. During World War I, Brown served as an aide to Admiral William S. Sims and later commanded the destroyer *Parker*.

Brown next commanded the destroyer *Blakeley* during 1919–1920. He was naval aide to President Calvin Coolidge during 1926–1929. Promoted to captain, Brown commanded the battleship *California* during 1932–1933, then was chief of staff of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, during 1933–1934. He was then naval aide to President Franklin Roosevelt during 1934–1936. Promoted to rear admiral in July 1936, Brown commanded the Training Squadron, Scouting Force, during 1936–1938 and then was superintendent of the Naval Academy during 1938–1941.

Promoted to vice admiral in February 1941, Brown assumed command of Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet. He led the aborted carrier raid on Rabaul on February 20, 1942, and then commanded the largest task force put together by the United States in the war to date, consisting of the carriers *Lexington* and *Yorktown*, 8 heavy cruisers (7 U.S. and 1 Australian), and 14 destroyers, leading it in the highly successful March 10 attack against the Japanese landing force in the Salamaua-Lae area of northeastern Papua New Guinea. Because chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King believed that Brown was not sufficiently aggressive, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz moved him to command of amphibious forces in April until July 1942.

Brown was commandant of the First Naval District during 1942–1943, then again naval aide to President Roosevelt during February 1943–December 1944, when he retired. Brown died at New Haven, Connecticut, on January 2, 1957.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

King, Ernest Joseph; Nimitz, Chester William; Rabaul; United States Navy; United States Navy Carrier Raids

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Browning, Frederick (1896–1965)

British Army general and founder of British airborne forces. Born in London on December 20, 1896, Frederick Browning was educated at Eton and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He joined the British Army in France in 1915 and served with the Grenadier Guards. At age 20, he commanded a company, earning the nickname "Boy," which he kept for life. He also won the Distinguished Service Order and the French Croix de Guerre.

Continuing in the army after World War I, Browning served a tour as adjutant at Sandhurst between 1924 and 1928. From 1935, he commanded the Grenadier Guards battalion, mostly in ceremonial duties. On September 1, 1939, he was promoted to colonel. In 1940, he took command of a brigade as a brigadier. At the end of that year, Browning, a certified pilot, assumed command of the 1st Airborne Division, which he organized from scratch.

After his promotion to major general on November 3, 1941, Browning organized the Airborne Command, which eventually had 17 brigades. He set high standards for himself and his men in terms of training, fitness, and dress. Marked by strong esprit de corps, the British Airborne Command adopted the red beret and the name "Red Devils."

Elements of Browning's airborne forces participated in the Allied "race for Tunis" in November 1942. Browning then served as airborne adviser to U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower in planning the airborne assault on Sicily, although he personally saw no action. Promoted to lieutenant general on January 7, 1944, Browning took command of the I Airborne Corps, which included the 1st and 6th Airborne Divisions, a Special Air Service unit, and, later, the Polish 1st Separate Airborne Brigade. He led the I Airborne Corps in the Normandy Invasion that commenced on June 6, 1944.

In August 1944, on the establishment of the First Allied Airborne Army, Browning became its deputy commander under U.S. Army lieutenant general

Lewis H. Brereton, although Browning retained command of I Airborne Corps as well. He played a major role in Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944), landing at Nijmegen by glider with the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. He later led the I Airborne Corps in the crossing of the Rhine (March 7–24, 1945) and the advance to the Baltic.

Following the end of fighting in Europe, Browning was appointed chief of staff of the South-East Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten. Browning returned to Britain in late 1946 and served as secretary to the minister of war. He retired from the army in January 1948 but served as comptroller of Princess (later Queen) Elizabeth's household. Browning died at his estate, Menabilly, near Fowey in Cornway, Britain, on March 14, 1965.

JOHN A. KOMAROMY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Brereton, Lewis Hyde; Eisenhower, Dwight David; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Rhine Crossings; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation

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Broz, Josip

See Tito

Bruneval Raid

See BITING, Operation

B-29 Raids against Japan (June 1944–August 1945)

The attacks on Japan by the Boeing B-29 Superfortresses of the Twentieth Air Force, part of the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), began in June 1944 and were key components in the series of shocks that produced the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The bombers burned down cities, mined waterways, destroyed major industrial targets, and eventually dropped two atomic bombs.

Planning for the use of the long-range B-29s against Japan began in early 1943. Operation MATTERHORN, launching these heavy bombers from China, was finally approved at the Cairo Conference in December 1943, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff there also supported basing in the Mariana Islands. In April 1944, General Henry "Hap" Arnold established the Twentieth Air Force, to be commanded out of Washington so he could keep the B-29s under his control. The first aircraft were rushed to the Far East that month.

Primary bases for the XX Bomber Command of the Twentieth Air Force were located in India, with forward operating fields in China. Results were disappointing, even after Arnold sent his best problem solver and combat commander, Major General Curtis LeMay, to take over the troubled unit. Facilities were austere, supply lines were long, crew training was inadequate, and the hastily fielded B-29s suffered from a host of technical problems, especially with their engines. In 10 months of operations, the XX Bomber Command delivered fewer than 1,000 tons of bombs to Japan, all against targets in Kyushu.

The USAAF had greater hopes for the XXI Bomber Command based in the Marianas, which launched its first attack on Japan in late November. This unit had better logistics and more secure airfields, and it was closer to Japan than the XX Bomber Command. Arnold expected Brigadier General Haywood Hansell, one of the architects of precision-bombing doctrine, to exert decisive airpower against Japan's homeland fortress and prove the worth of an independent air service. But Hansell was unable to put his theories into effective practice. In addition to the same problems faced in MATTERHORN, the XXI Bomber Command ran into a combination of cloud

cover and jet stream winds over targets that rendered high-altitude precision bombing almost impossible.

In January 1945, a frustrated Arnold decided to consolidate all B-29s in the Marianas under LeMay, who reorganized the staff, instituted new training, and improved maintenance. After a month of ineffective precision attacks, however, LeMay, on his own initiative, shifted tactics. He adopted low-level nighttime area incendiary attacks, designed to cripple key targets by burning down the cities around them and to destroy the Japanese ability and will to carry on the war. The first raid on Tokyo on the night of March 9–10 was a spectacular success militarily, killing more than 90,000 people and incinerating 16 square miles. By the end of the war, B-29s had burned out 178 square miles in some 66 cities and killed many hundreds of thousands of people.

The Superfortresses also performed other missions against the Japanese home islands. A psychological warfare campaign to drive panicked civilians out of targeted cities caused over 8 million Japanese to flee to the countryside. Mines dropped in waterways during the last five months of the war sank or damaged over 1 million tons of scarce shipping. And, of course, B-29s from the 509th Composite Bomb Group dropped two atomic bombs, one on August 6, 1945, and the other on August 9. On August 15, the Japanese agreed to surrender terms. Japanese leaders and postwar bombing evaluations acknowledged that the B-29s made a significant contribution to ending the war.

CONRAD C. CRANE

U.S. Army Air Forces Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers dropping incendiary bombs on Japan in June 1945. (Library of Congress)

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Incendiary Bombs and Bombing; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Tokyo, Bombing of

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Buckner, Simon Bolivar, Jr. (1886–1945)

U.S. Army general. Born near Munfordville, Kentucky, on July 18, 1886, Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. was the son of a Confederate Army general and governor of Kentucky. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1908 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry. Assignment to the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps kept him in the United States during World War I but also made him one of the most air-minded of the army's ground officers.

Buckner was an instructor in tactics at West Point between 1919 and 1923. He then completed the Infantry Advanced Course. After graduating from the Command and General Staff School in 1925, he continued there as an instructor from 1925 to 1928. He graduated from the Army War College in 1927, where he would also be an instructor between 1929 and 1932. Buckner then returned to West Point as an instructor, and from 1933 to 1936 he was commandant of cadets.

Promoted to colonel in 1937, Buckner commanded the 66th Infantry Regiment in 1937 and 1938. He was then on duty with the Civilian Conservation Corps in Alabama between 1938 and 1939 before serving as chief of staff of the 6th Infantry Division in 1939 and 1940. Buckner was promoted to brigadier general in October 1940 and to major general in August 1941. Between 1940 and 1944, he headed the Alaska Defense Command. His primary responsibility was the construction of defense facilities, but units of his command cooperated with the navy in evicting the Japanese from two of the Aleutian Islands, Attu and Kiska.

U.S. Army lieutenant general Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., commanded American forces in the invasion of Okinawa, where he died from a shell explosion, becoming the highest ranking U.S. officer killed by enemy action in the war. (AP Photo)

A month after being promoted to lieutenant general in May 1943, Buckner went to Hawaii to organize the new Tenth Army. He then headed an army review panel that investigated the intraservice dispute over U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant general Holland M. Smith's relief of U.S. Army major general Ralph Smith on Saipan. Buckner commanded the main landings on Okinawa in April 1945. Citing logistical difficulties, he rejected navy pleas that he mount a subsidiary landing on the south end of the island.

On June 18, 1945, just three days before organized Japanese resistance ended, Buckner was killed on Okinawa by a coral fragment sent flying by the explosion of a Japanese shell. He was the highest-ranking American officer killed by enemy fire during the war. Buckner was posthumously promoted to general by a special act of Congress in 1954.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of; Saipan, Battle of; Smith, Holland McTyeire; Smith, Ralph Corbett

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Budapest, Battle of (November 3, 1944–February 13, 1945)

A long siege that ended with the expulsion of German troops from Budapest by the Soviet Army. During this one battle, Soviet forces sustained half of all casualties suffered by them during the campaign in Hungary.

The city of Budapest stretches along both sides of the Danube River and consists of Pest on the east bank and Buda on the west bank. During the siege, there was heavy fighting for virtually every building. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were trapped in the city, unable to leave and caught in the cross fire without food and bereft of essential services, such as electricity. The siege lasted 108 days, and for 52 of those days, the defending Germans were completely surrounded.

In September 1944, Soviet troops invaded Hungary from Romania. The Hungarian government was then desperately trying to leave the war, and on September 28, representatives of Hungarian regent Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya were dispatched to Moscow. There, they signed a preliminary armistice agreement on October 11, which Horthy announced four days later. This step led to the German Army's occupation of Budapest. Using his son as a hostage, the Germans forced Horthy to appoint Ferenc Szálasi, head of the Hungarian Arrow-Cross (fascist) Party, as "Leader of the Nation."

SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch commanded the German defense of Budapest. He had at his disposal the 8th and 22nd SS Cavalry Divisions and elements of the 13th Panzer Division, the 60th Panzergrenadier Division, and the 271st Volksgrenadier Division. Some units of the Hungarian Army under General Iván Hindy fought alongside the Germans. Altogether, the defenders numbered some 92,000 men. Adolf

Hitler ordered that Budapest and Hungary be held at all costs. He needed Hungary for its agriculture and industry but also as a location from which to mount a future counterattack in the Carpathian Basin.

Joseph Stalin's goal was to drive Hungary from the Axis alliance and introduce a Soviet-style political and social system as soon as possible. His plan to expand the Soviet sphere of interest was threatened by a British proposal to send forces to the Adriatic in the autumn of 1944 and from there perhaps move against the Carpathian Basin. Stalin was determined to forestall any British presence in the area, and on October 28, 1944, he ordered the capture of Budapest. He did not anticipate a lengthy battle for the city.

The Soviet 2nd Ukrainian Front (army group), commanded by Army General Rodion Y. Malinovsky, and the 3rd Ukrainian Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Fedor I. Tolbukhin, now converged on the Hungarian capital. In all, the Soviets committed some 157,000 men, including a Romanian contingent, to the operation. Red Army troops first reached the east bank of the city (Pest) on November 3, 1944, but operations then halted.

Following several unsuccessful attempts, Soviet forces completed the encirclement of the city on December 25. On January 1, 1945, the Soviets took the first buildings in Pest proper, and by January 18, they had all of Pest under their control. Many civilians and defending army units escaped across the Danube to the Buda side, but before the evacuation was completed, all the bridges over the Danube connecting the two halves of the city were blown.

Meanwhile, on December 24, 1944, fighting had begun in Buda on the west bank. Pfeffer-Wildenbruch wanted to break out with his forces on December 28 when the Soviet encirclement was still loose, but Hitler strongly opposed this and ordered his troops to stand fast. Hitler did attempt to relieve the German garrison, however. The first effort was made in early January 1945 by SS-Obergruppenführer Herbert Gille's IV SS Panzer Corps from Komárno, about 30 miles west of Budapest but was unsuccessful. Gille then tried again from the vicinity of Lake Balaton to the southwest but got no closer than 15 miles from the city.

Intense fighting continued, meanwhile, between German and Soviet forces in a small area of Buda, only some three miles by four miles in size. On February 11, 1945, Pfeffer-Wildenbruch authorized his remaining men to

break out westward through the Buda Hills to join up with other German troops just outside the Soviet encirclement. Only some 800 men succeeded. The Soviets declared Buda secure on February 13. Pfeffer-Wildenbruch was among those captured and remained a prisoner in the Soviet Union until 1955.

The fighting is estimated to have claimed the lives of 60,000 German troops. The Soviets lost 72,000 confirmed dead, with another 80,000 missing. Some 105,000 Hungarians, mostly civilians, were also dead. Among survivors of the siege were some 100,000 Jews who had managed to escape Arrow-Cross roundups. The last German Army units did not leave Hungary until April 4, 1945.

ANNA BOROS-MCGEE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós; Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich; Romania; Stalin, Joseph; Tolbukhin, Fedor Ivanovich; Vörös, János

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Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born on April 25, 1883, on a farm near Platoskaya, Russia, on the Don River, Semen (Semyon) Mikhailovich Budenny (Budyonny) entered the czarist army at age 20 and served as a dragoon in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. In 1907, he attended cavalry school, graduating as a sergeant. Returning to his regiment, he served as a platoon sergeant during World War I.

In the Russian Civil War beginning in 1918, Budenny fought on the Bolshevik side and served in a partisan cavalry regiment in the Don region

that grew to a brigade and then a division. Given brigade command, he showed great talent as a cavalry commander at the Battle of Tsaritsyn. Budenny distinguished himself against the best opposing White (counterrevolutionary forces) cavalry generals, and he ended the civil war in command of a cavalry army. During the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1921 he was assigned to support the Western Front. He and Kliment Voroshilov—encouraged by political officer Joseph Stalin—refused to obey front commander General Mikhail Tukhachevsky's orders, which led to the defeat of the Red Army in Poland.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Mikhailovich Budenny. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Budenny was appointed deputy commander of Cavalry Forces in 1923. When that post was abolished in 1924, Stalin secured Budenny's appointment as inspector of the cavalry. Despite this relatively modest post, he was one of five generals appointed marshal of the Soviet Union in 1935.

During the 1937 military purges, Budenny headed the Moscow Military District and served on the tribunal that condemned his colleagues to death. Poor troop performance during the First Finnish-Soviet War (1939–1940, Winter War) exposed Budenny's outdated training views, causing his removal from district command and appointment to the honorific post of deputy defense commissar. He held this post when the Germans invaded in June 1941.

Given command of the strategic Southern Axis, Budenny became responsible for Kiev, which Stalin ordered not to be surrendered. When it became apparent that the city would fall, Budenny recommended its abandonment, resulting in his relief and transfer to command the Reserve Front behind Moscow.

Unable to organize an effective defense when the German Army launched its advance on Moscow, Budenny was replaced by General Georgii Zhukov. In the spring of 1942, Budenny took command of the strategic North Caucasus Axis but was relieved after the Germans crushed the Crimean Front and raced into the Caucasus. In January 1943, Stalin appointed Budenny commander of the Red Army Cavalry. He held that post until 1953. Budenny died in Moscow on October 26, 1973.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Cavalry, Horse; Eastern Front; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Great Purges; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Moscow, Battle of; Stalin, Joseph; Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich; Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Bulgaria

Country located in Southeastern Europe encompassing 42,823 square miles. Bulgaria borders Romania to the north, Serbia and Macedonia to the west, Greece and Turkey to the south, and the Black Sea to the west. In 1939, Bulgaria had a population of approximately 6,340,000 people. It had both a czar and a popularly elected parliament. Czar Boris III dominated the nation's foreign policy and was largely responsible for the nation's neutrality on the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. Boris hoped that peace might be quickly achieved in Europe, and he took note of the fact that although the Bulgarian people were largely pro-Soviet, the officers of the army were pro-German.

The weakness of Boris's policy, however, was the popular desire to attain additional territory in the Balkans. In World War I, Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers in an attempt to recoup territorial losses from the Second Balkan War. The country's defeat in 1918 led to a peace settlement that had further reduced Bulgarian territory. By 1940, the nation remained the only former Central Power that had not regained some of the land lost through the World War I peace treaties. Popular sentiment to redress this situation was high. Germany partially fulfilled these territorial ambitions on September 7, 1940, in the Treaty of Craiova, which granted the southern Dobruja region to Bulgaria.

German interest in Bulgaria was the product of the increased strategic importance of the country. By late 1940, German plans for the invasion of Greece and those for the conquest of the Soviet Union rendered Bulgaria much more significant to the Axis cause. On March 1, 1941, Sofia entered into an agreement whereby Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Powers and allowed German troops to move through Bulgarian territory. Unlike governments in other regions of Eastern Europe, however, the government of Bulgaria remained autonomous.

Sofia stayed uncommitted militarily until December 13, 1941, when it declared war on the United States and Great Britain; the country never declared war on the Soviet Union. Bulgaria's military participation in World War II was limited to the Balkans and centered on the acquisition of territory. Bulgarian troops did not take an active part in Germany's conquest of Yugoslavia or Greece, but the army did occupy both the Yugoslav and Greek portions of Macedonia and most of western Thrace.

Beyond this, Bulgaria contributed little to the Axis cause and often

opposed German requests in both the military and civilian sectors. Military operations were confined to garrison duties in Macedonia and Thrace, despite Berlin's attempts to persuade Sofia to commit troops against the Soviet Union. Boris and his government also compromised little on the issue of the Jews, who formed about 1 percent of the nation's population. By the end of the war, most of Bulgaria's Jews had escaped extermination, although to appease Berlin the government had confined them to labor camps.

Bulgarian fortunes declined after August 28, 1943, with the death of Czar Boris III. His successor, Simeon II, was a child, and the regency that governed in his stead was less effective than Boris. Political unrest was compounded by popular instability due to declining Axis fortunes and a weakening of the Bulgarian home front. On November 19, 1943, Sofia experienced its first heavy attack by Allied bombers, and by late 1943, food and consumer goods were in short supply.

Support for a coalition known as the Fatherland Front, which included the communists, rose as the Soviet Red Army marched toward Bulgaria's northern border in the spring of 1944. Efforts by Sofia to secure a peace settlement with the Americans or the British failed. Amid mounting Soviet pressure for a Bulgarian declaration of war against Germany, a new government acceded to Soviet demands on September 8; Moscow had declared war on Bulgaria three days earlier. Red Army troops subsequently occupied the country and appointed members of the Fatherland Front to the government.

The new government, eager to please Moscow, committed 450,000 Bulgarian troops to serve with the Red Army in operations in Yugoslavia and Hungary, at a cost of 32,000 killed or wounded. As operations unfolded, communist officials in Bulgaria began the process of firmly fixing the country in the Soviet sphere of influence.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Balkans Theater; Boris III, Czar of Bulgaria; Bulgaria, Air Force; Bulgaria, Navy; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

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Bulgaria, Air Force

As a defeated Central Power in World War I, Bulgaria was forbidden under the Treaty of Neuilly to maintain an air force. In 1936, however, it illegally reconstituted its air force with German biplanes, adding Polish fighters and German Messerschmitt Bf-109E fighters after 1938. Simultaneous domestic production at the Bulgarian national aircraft factory, Darjavna Aeroplanna Rabotilnitza (DAR), augmented the force. Following Bulgaria's declaration of war on Great Britain and the United States in December 1941, the Royal Bulgarian Air Force was further increased through Germany's contribution of a number of ex-Czechoslovakian aircraft. Bulgaria entered the war with 228 fighters, dive-bombers, and medium bombers of German, Polish, and Czechoslovakian design, together with DAR dive-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.

The Bulgarian Air Force was largely inactive until August 1, 1943, when the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) conducted their first major bombing raid on the Axis-held oil fields of Ploieşti, Romania. The Bulgarians' attempt to engage the U.S. Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers clearly showed that their air arm was hopelessly obsolete. Most of the fighters could not catch the bombers, and Bulgarian aircraft shot down only two B-24s. The Ploieşti Raids lasted until August 18, 1944. The Germans then provided the Bulgarians with 120 French Dewoitine D.520 fighters and additional Messerschmitt aircraft.

These additional planes did little to improve the effectiveness of the Bulgarian Air Force. Between December 1943 and January 1944, Allied bombers sortied virtually unmolested over Bulgaria, and their defensive cover of Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters shot down 39 Bulgarian fighters with negligible losses. Introduction of the superior North American P-51 Mustang fighter further reduced the effectiveness of Bulgarian air defenses.

After it was invaded by Soviet forces in September 1944, Bulgaria switched sides in the war. Royal Bulgarian Air Force units then provided ground support for the Red Army in Yugoslavia and Hungary.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Production of; Balkans Theater; Bulgaria; Bulgaria, Navy; Ploieşti, Raids on

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Bulgaria, Navy

Bulgaria has never maintained a large navy, but the diminutive size of its naval force by the late 1930s was also the product of treaty restrictions stemming from the country's defeat in World War I and the difficult economic conditions Bulgaria faced during the interwar years. The core of the navy consisted of four obsolete Drski-class torpedo boats. Launched in 1907, they displaced 98 tons, were capable of 26 knots, and mounted three 17.7-inch torpedo tubes. The remaining naval unit, the torpedo gunboat *Nadiejda*, was built in 1898 and displaced 715 tons. It was armed with two 3.9-inch guns and two torpedo tubes and had a maximum speed of 17 knots.

This force was augmented after 1937, when Bulgaria entered into a military assistance agreement with Germany that eventually yielded five motor torpedo boats of the 1939 *Lurssen* design. They displaced 57.6 tons at full load, had a maximum speed of 37.1 knots, and were armed with two torpedo tubes and a 20mm antiaircraft gun. On Bulgaria's entry into World War II in March 1941, Germany also supplied three former Dutch motor torpedo boats.

The Bulgarian Navy saw little fighting in World War II. Its principal action came in October 1941, when it and the Romanian Navy mined Bulgarian coastal waters. Up until the time Bulgaria was invaded and then occupied by Soviet forces in September 1944, the navy's chief duties were escorting coastal vessels in the Black Sea and patrolling the Danube River.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also
Black Sea, Area of Operations; Bulgaria; Romania, Navy

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Bulge, Battle of the

See Ardennes Offensive

Bull, Harold Roe (1893–1976)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Springfield, Massachusetts, on January 6, 1893, Harold Roe "Pink" Bull graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1914 and was commissioned into the infantry as a second lieutenant. Bull served in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France during World War I and was an instructor at West Point from 1921 to 1924.

Bull graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1928 and was an instructor at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, between 1928 and 1932. He graduated from the Army War College in 1933 and from the Naval War College in 1934. Bull was secretary of the War Department General Staff in 1938 and 1939. Promoted to brigadier general in July 1941, he was assistant divisional commander of the 4th Infantry Division. He then served as assistant chief of staff for operations of the War Department General Staff in 1942. Promoted to major general in March 1942, Bull headed the Replacement and School Command, Army Ground Forces, from 1942 to 1943. In 1943, U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall sent him to North Africa as a special observer. Bull returned to the United States in midyear to take command of III Corps but soon was assigned to Britain on the cross-Channel invasion planning staff.

In early 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower made Bull his deputy chief of staff for operations at AEF Supreme Headquarters, and he served in that position in 1944 and 1945. Eisenhower thought that Bull would be a fine corps commander if he were not so indispensable as a staff officer. In February 1945, he ranked Bull 14th among all U.S. officers in the European theater. Yet Bull was overshadowed by his British deputy, Major General John Whiteley, and in May 1944, the planning function of the operations section went to Whiteley, who was thus more influential in shaping strategy.

Bull's job involved preparing situation reports, conducting briefings, and handling relations with operational headquarters, the Allied governments, and the French Resistance. In January 1945, he accompanied Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder on a mission to Moscow.

At times a difficult man, Bull found it hard to deviate from an original plan. He was present at General Omar Bradley's command post when news came of the capture of the Remagen Bridge over the Rhine, and he angered Bradley by insisting that the bridgehead had no place in the overall plan for the defeat of Germany.

After the war, Bull was commandant of the National War College. He retired from the army as a lieutenant general in July 1950. Bull died in Washington, D.C., on November 1, 1976.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Marshall, George Catlett; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the; Tedder, Sir Arthur William

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Bullitt, William Christian, Jr. (1891–1967)

Journalist, writer, and U.S. diplomat. William Christian Bullitt Jr. was born into a patrician family in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on January 25, 1891. He graduated from Yale University in 1913 and attended Harvard Law School before dropping out in 1914. He then worked for several newspapers and magazines as a European correspondent before becoming an aide to President Woodrow Wilson during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference following World War I.

Bullitt proved to be a strong supporter of Wilsonian internationalism. While the negotiations were under way, Bullitt and several others made a clandestine trip to Russia in an attempt to open diplomatic ties with the Bolsheviks. Bullitt was unable to convince Wilson to establish relations with Russia, however, and he promptly resigned his post. He never forgave Wilson for spurning his work, and he later testified against the ratification of the Versailles Treaty in the U.S. Senate. Bullitt now turned his attention to writing and journalism, and in 1926 he published a critically acclaimed novel, *It's Not Done.*

Considered a liberal Democrat, Bullitt was selected by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to become America's first ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1933. Bullitt proved popular with the Soviet leadership, and he had high hopes of forging a meaningful relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. By the time he relinquished his post in 1936, however, he had developed a jaded and hostile view of the Soviet regime. Bullitt would remain a committed anticommunist the rest of his life.

In October 1936 Roosevelt appointed Bullitt ambassador to France. As a francophile and francophone, he was ideally suited to the position, and he entertained lavishly at a château he rented in Chantilly. Bullitt also became quite close with France's senior leadership. He conversed almost daily with Roosevelt, particularly as the clouds of war gathered. The ambassador was sometimes influenced too heavily by favorites and too prone to gossip to send truly objective dispatches to the State Department.

In the fall of 1938, amid the crisis over Czechoslovakia, Bullitt publicly declared that the United States stood by France in both war and peace. Roosevelt quickly clarified that the United States would not commit to war if

it came over the future of Czechoslovakia. This incident began a rift between the two men that would never be resolved.

In June 1940, when German forces invaded France, Bullitt refused to vacate Paris and travel with the government-in-exile to Bordeaux. The mandate to leave was a direct presidential order that the ambassador ignored, much to Roosevelt's annoyance. This marked the end of Bullitt's diplomatic career. The rift between the president and Bullitt only deepened when Bullitt attempted to discredit Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who was a favorite of Roosevelt. Bullitt's attempts threatened to turn into a political scandal, and Roosevelt finally accepted Welles's resignation in 1943, although he was loath to do so.

Bullitt ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Philadelphia in 1943, and it was alleged that Roosevelt told fellow Democrats not to support his former ambassador. During the war years, Bullitt authored numerous commentaries and articles on the dangers of communism and fascism, and by the early 1950s he had become a strident opponent of communist China and the Soviet bloc. In a 1954 article in *Look* magazine, he famously advocated an immediate attack on China and suggested that the next crisis with Moscow be met with nuclear bombs. Bullitt continued to write and provide commentary on contemporary issues until his death on February 15, 1967, in Neuilly, France.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

France; France Campaign; Hull, Cordell; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Soviet Union; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

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Buna, Battle of (November 16, 1942–January 22, 1943)

Key battle in New Guinea in the July 1942–January 1943 Kokoda Trail Campaign. In July 1942, Japanese major general Horii Tomitaro's South Seas Detachment landed at Buna on the northern coast of Papua New Guinea. During the next weeks, the Japanese moved south on the Kokoda Trail over the Owen Stanley Mountains toward Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea, from which point they could reach Queensland, Australia, by air. Opposed by Australian and local Papuan forces, the Japanese offensive stalled some 30 miles short of Port Moresby, and during September and October, the remaining Japanese retreated back to Buna. There, the Japanese carved out a fortified zone approximately 16 miles long and 7 miles deep. It was manned by 8,000 men occupying well-camouflaged bunkers and trenches, most in strongpoints at Gona and Buna villages and Sanananda Point.

General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, was determined to seize Buna as part of the Allied design to neutralize the Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain Island. During the fall of 1942, troops from the Australian 7th Division and the U.S. 32nd Infantry Division moved by land and airlift to the Buna area. Because of the reluctance of Allied naval commanders to risk exposing their heavy ships to air attack or the treacherous reefs, MacArthur's divisions had no naval gun support and no transports to carry heavy artillery or tanks. For fire support, these troops had to depend on aircraft, which proved ineffective, and light guns and mortars, the shells of which failed to penetrate the thick log walls of the Japanese bunkers.

The Allied attack began on November 16. The Australians made some limited progress in their assaults on Gona and Sanananda. At Buna, however, the 32nd Infantry Division faced a tactical nightmare and was stopped in its tracks. Lacking sufficient men, forced to cross nearly impassable swamps and jungles, and encountering murderous machine-gun fire, the division made no headway during the next two weeks despite suffering heavy casualties. High humidity and temperatures as well as jungle diseases added to the hardship.

Convinced that the troubles at Buna were the result of poor leadership in the 32nd Infantry Division rather than a lack of proper weapons or the

strength of the Japanese positions, MacArthur relieved its commander, Major General Edwin F. Harding, and turned the battle over to the I Corps commander, Major General Robert L. Eichelberger. Many members of the 32nd believed that MacArthur had done little to support them and did not understand the situation at the front. A resourceful commander committed to the welfare of his men, Eichelberger led from the front and came to be regarded as one of the best Allied commanders in the Pacific. He restored Allied morale and improved the logistical situation.

In early December, U.S. engineers were able to open an airfield near Buna, significantly improving the Allied supply situation. The Australians received some artillery by air, and they also managed to transport light tanks by coastal barge. The tanks, although few in number, proved invaluable. The fighting was bitter, but on December 9 the Australians took Gona. The more heavily fortified Buna resisted U.S. pressure, but on December 14, the Americans took Buna Village. By January 2, 1943, all of the Japanese in the American sector had been eliminated, and on January 22, the Australians wiped out the last Japanese pocket at Sanananda.

The cost of the Buna operation was high. Some 7,000 Japanese defenders were killed, another 1,200 were injured and evacuated, and around 250 others were captured. The Australians and Americans lost 640 dead, 2,065 wounded (many more were hospitalized as a result of disease), and 132 missing. Yet for the Allies, Buna was a significant victory, for it provided airfields to support additional offenses in New Guinea and also taught valuable lessons about Japanese tactics and jungle fighting.

The bodies of three U.S. soldiers on the beach at Buna, New Guinea. The men died in the fighting for Buna Gona in November 1942. (George Strock/Getty Images)

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Horii Tomitaro; Kokoda Trail Campaign; MacArthur, Douglas; New Guinea Campaign; Rabaul; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Burke, Arleigh Albert (1901–1996)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born on October 19, 1901, near Boulder, Colorado, Arleigh Albert Burke came from a family of modest means. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1923, and he earned a master's degree in engineering from the University of Michigan in 1931. For the next eight years, Burke held a series of ship assignments and served in the Bureau of Ordnance in Washington.

At the time of the U.S. entry into World War II, Commander Burke was an inspector at the Naval Gun Factory. His attempts to secure a sea billet were not successful until May 1943, when he was promoted to captain and received command of the eight-ship 23rd Destroyer Squadron in the South Pacific. He then saw action in the Solomon Islands and the Marianas Campaign (June–August 1944).

Burke led the 23rd Squadron, known as the "Little Beavers," in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay on November 2, 1943. In all, the 23rd Squadron fought in 22 engagements and helped to sink one Japanese cruiser, four destroyers, and one submarine. It also claimed more than 30 Japanese aircraft shot down. There are different versions of how Burke earned the nickname "31 Knot Burke," but the most likely is that it came from a radio message he made prior to the November 25, 1943, Battle of Cape St. George, stating he was making for the interception point at 31 knots. Because he had previously reported his best formation speed as 30 knots, Admiral Halsey addressed his next order to the captain with "Thirty-one knot Burke."

Known for his innovations as a commander, Burke became chief of staff of the 1st Fast Carrier Force, under Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, in January 1945. Burke retained that post for the remainder of the war, coordinating carrier strike operations in the Battle of Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945) and the Battle of Okinawa (March–June 1945).

Between 1945 and 1947, Burke was chief of staff of the Atlantic Fleet before serving in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and as director of the navy's nuclear weapons program (1947–1949). His high profile in the so-called 1949 Admirals' Revolt, in which the navy protested the priority

given to the needs of the air force, led the administration of President Harry S. Truman to remove him temporarily from the list for promotion to admiral.

Nevertheless, Burke was promoted to rear admiral in July 1950. During the 1950–1953 Korean War, he commanded Cruiser Division 5 in Korean waters, and in July 1951 he was named a negotiator for the United Nations Command in armistice talks. In 1952, he became director of the Strategic Plans Division in Washington, D.C. Two years later, he took command of Cruiser Division 6, followed by command of the Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet (1954–1955).

In August 1955, Burke was appointed chief of naval operations, serving an unprecedented three terms. Refusing a fourth term, he retired as a full admiral in August 1961. While chief of naval operations, he oversaw the introduction of nuclear-powered ships in the navy as well as the implementation of the Polaris Ballistic Missile Program.

After his retirement, Burke was involved in various business enterprises. He died in Bethesda, Maryland, on January 1, 1996. The Arleigh Burke class of guided-missile destroyers is named for him.

JASON R. HARR

See also

Cape St. George, Battle of; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Mariana Islands Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Okinawa, Invasion of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Burke-Wadsworth Act

See Selective Service Act

Burma, First Earl Mountbatten of

See Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas

Burma Air Campaign (1941–1942)

By the time the United States entered World War II at the end of 1941, China had been at war with Japan for four years. Virtually the only American force fighting the Axis powers anywhere in the world in December 1941 was the American Volunteer Group (AVG), popularly known as the Flying Tigers. Since August 1941, members of the AVG had been training at the British fighter base in Toungoo, Burma (Myanmar).

The Guomindang (GMD, Chinese Nationalist) government headed by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) was not only at war with the Japanese but was also locked in an uneasy truce with Chinese Communist forces led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). By late 1941, Jiang's troops had failed to block the Japanese move toward Burma, threatening the only land supply route into China that ran over the Himalayas, along the hairpin mountain curves of the Burma Road.

As the Japanese advance threatened Burma, the British requested one of the AVG's three squadrons to help defend Rangoon (Yangon). On December 12, 1941, the AVG 3rd Squadron, commanded by squadron leader Arvid Olson, moved south to Rangoon to join units of the Royal Air Force (RAF), while the other two squadrons flew to Kunming in China to cover the terminus of the Burma Road.

The AVG's first combat occurred over Yunnan Province in China on December 20. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons shot down 9 of 10 Japanese bombers, losing only 1 of their own P-40Bs. On December 23, the 3rd Squadron and RAF aircraft shot down 6 Japanese bombers and 4 fighters over Rangoon. The RAF lost 5 aircraft in the battle, and the AVG lost 4. On December 25, the Japanese sent 80 bombers over Rangoon in two waves, escorted by 48 fighters. The AVG knocked down 23 without suffering a single loss. The Japanese attacks continued through New Year's Eve. After 11 days of fighting, the AVG had shot down 75 Japanese aircraft, losing only 4 fighters and 2 pilots in the process.

In early January 1942, 8 aircraft from the AVG's 1st Squadron reinforced the 3rd in Rangoon. The rest of the 1st Squadron followed by midmonth. The AVG went on the offensive, attacking Japanese air bases in Thailand. During one raid alone, AVG pilots destroyed more than 60 Japanese aircraft on the ground. On January 23, the Japanese again hit Rangoon with 72 aircraft. The AVG shot down 21, suffering only a single loss.

The air battles over the Burmese capital continued until March 9, 1942, when the city finally fell to Japanese ground attack. The Japanese captured the remainder of Burma in May, effectively cutting China off from ground access. For most of the rest of the war, the United States supplied China by air from India in the massive airlift that became known as flying "the Hump."

During the 10 weeks of combat for the AVG over Rangoon and the Burma Road, it only had between 5 and 20 operational fighters in Burma at any given time. Yet in 31 separate air battles, they destroyed a confirmed total of 217 Japanese aircraft and probably had 43 more kills (victories). In the process, they lost 6 pilots and 16 P-40s. Fighting alongside the AVG, the RAF had 74 confirmed kills and 33 probable kills, losing 22 Buffaloes and Hurricanes.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Burma Road; Chennault, Claire Lee; Flying Tigers; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Sino-Japanese War

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Burma Road

Important route by which the Western Allies sent supplies to China. The Burma Road followed an ancient trail traveled by such legendary warriors and adventurers as Kublai Khan and Marco Polo as well as anonymous spice

and tea traders. In the early 20th century, Chinese laborers transformed the path into a road. The route was further improved between 1937 and 1938 during the Sino-Japanese War. The completed Burma Road stretched approximately 700 miles from Lashio in Burma, then a British colony (now Myanmar), to Kunming, capital of China's southwestern Yunnan Province. The Chinese shipped military supplies from the Irrawaddy River ports at Rangoon (Yangon) on the railroad to Lashio for transportation to China via the Burma Road.

When Japanese forces occupied Indochina and China's coastal areas, the interior route became more heavily traveled. The narrow, twisting Burma Road crossed through jungle, plateaus, mountainous terrain as high as 11,000 feet above sea level, gorges, rivers, and valleys. Steep grades, dangerous switchbacks, and plummeting drops challenged those who traveled it.

Allied transportation of military supplies from Burma via the road was disrupted when Japanese forces seized its southern end in April 1942. Hoping to delay a Japanese invasion, Chinese troops destroyed the Salween River Bridge and 25 miles of the adjacent Burma Road passing through the river's canyon. China was now isolated from Allied aid and faced perhaps its gravest crisis of the entire war. The United States responded by initiating cargo flights over the Himalayas. The cargo capacity of such flights over "the Hump" was severely limited, however, and the Western Allies feared that China might use its lack of military supplies as an excuse to conclude a separate peace with Japan. By September 1942, Allied forces gained control of some of the region, and Colonel Leo Dawson of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had command of road reconstruction. He directed a large group of Chinese engineers and approximately 30,000 local laborers.

A U.S. military convoy ascending the 21 curves of the Burma Road at Annan, China, on March 26, 1945. (National Archives)

In December 1942, U.S. combat engineers began building a road from Ledo in Assam, India, to Burma as an alternate route to bypass the Japanese-controlled sections. As of the autumn of 1943, Major General Lewis A. Pick directed work on the Ledo Road. By the next summer, builders had connected the Ledo and Burma Roads at Mongyu, Burma, and military transport expanded. The two roads, known collectively as the Stilwell Road, were 1,079 miles in length. The road was named after U.S. lieutenant general Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of all U.S. Army forces in the China-Burma-India theater.

Ultimately, some 28,000 U.S. and British engineers and 35,000 Burmese, Chinese, and other ethnic laborers surveyed, cleared, cut rock, widened, and repaired the Burma Road and built bridges. They also constructed a pipeline paralleling the road. Monsoon winds and the rainy season caused muddy

conditions, and workers were plagued by red ants and mosquitoes that transmitted malaria. The strenuous work resulted in more than 1,000 deaths.

The previously Japanese-held parts of the Burma Road were reopened by mid-January 1945, with Pick leading a convoy. By August 1945, 120,000 tons of material and 25,000 vehicles had been transported on the Burma Road.

Following World War II and the Chinese Civil War, parts of the Burma Road fell into disrepair. The road was also altered by the building of more direct routes, and in places, it was improved with easier grades. In some spots, it was widened to as many as six lanes.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER

See also

Burma Air Campaign; Burma Theater; China-Burma-India Theater; Engineer Operations; Pick, Lewis Andrew; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Burma Theater (1941–1945)

As part of Japan's southern offensive in the aftermath of its December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, its forces landed on the Kra isthmus and moved down Malaysia to take the great British naval base of Singapore. Thereafter, Japan repositioned forces used in the attack on Malaysia and moved into Burma (Myanmar) to threaten the British in India. The location and topography of Burma helped determine that it would be a minor theater of action in World War II. As with much of Southeast Asia, the country features mountains and rivers running mostly north and south, and thus it presented

difficult topographical barriers for the Japanese forces advancing from east to west and for the British seeking to move from west to east. Terrain, climate, and disease remained formidable obstacles.

Despite these problems, the Japanese sought to secure Burma to cut the so-called Burma Road and further the isolation of China and to bring about an end to the Sino-Japanese War as well as to stir up nationalist opposition to the British in India. The British government, meanwhile, sought to keep China in the war and contain Japanese military forces sufficiently to the east to prevent them from encouraging Indian nationalist sentiment.



On December 8, 1941, Japanese lieutenant general Iida Shōjirō sent the 33rd and 55th Divisions that comprised his Fifteenth Army into Thailand. Then on January 20, 1942, Iida's reinforced divisions, with air support, crossed into Burma, driving west toward Moulmein and Tavoy. The Japanese had some success in mobilizing Burmese nationalists (notably Aung San) to their cause, promising them independence from British rule. Some uprisings occurred against the British.

The British defenders, initially commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas Hutton, believed that the difficult terrain would limit the Japanese to roads and cleared areas. The British suffered early and serious defeats

because of this mistaken preconception. On January 30–31, 1942, the Japanese drove Hutton's ill-equipped force—equivalent to two understrength divisions of British, Indian, and Burmese troops—from Moulmein, inflicting heavy casualties in the process. The faster-moving Japanese then forded the Salween River and outflanked the British left. In the February 18–23 Battle of the Sittang, they nearly surrounded Hutton's entire force, destroying 12 British battalions and virtually all heavy equipment.

On March 5, 1942, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Alexander arrived in Rangoon (Yangon) and took command from Hutton but without markedly different results. Reinforcements from India restored British strength to two small divisions, but Alexander knew that he could not hold back the Japanese, and on March 7 after hard fighting, he abandoned Rangoon and vast storehouses of supplies to the advancing Japanese; Alexander barely evaded capture. The Japanese occupied Rangoon the next day.

At that point, the understrength Nationalist Chinese Fifth and Sixth Armies, nominally commanded by U.S. lieutenant general Joseph Stilwell, entered northern Burma along the Burma Road to help the retreating British. The British held the right (southern) side of a rough defensive line across Burma; the two Chinese armies held the center and left. Major General William Slim, who arrived in Burma in mid-March, took command of the Burma Corps, as the British units were titled. Slim turned out to be one of the top field commanders of the war. The British continued to move along roads, however, and the Japanese continued to move along jungle trails and thus were able to outflank and defeat them.

A Chinese machine gun crew in their gun pit in the Burmese jungle, March 1942. (Library of Congress)

Iida made plans to attack first at Yenangyaung. He intended to occupy the Chinese Fifth Army, leave the Sixth Army to the east alone, and then mass against the Burma Corps at Yenangyaung to secure the oil fields there.

On March 21, 1942, the Japanese struck the Fifth Army at Toungoo, cutting off the entire Chinese 200th Division. Chinese counterattacks under Stilwell, supported by Slim's British troops, allowed the 200th Division to fight its way free. Allied forces were slowly driven back, however. Although both Chinese armies at times fought well, they and the British did not cooperate effectively. Both sides were then reinforced, leading to a temporary pause in the fighting. The addition of part of the Chinese Fifty-Sixth Army permitted Stilwell to strengthen his defense of the Rangoon-Mandalay Railroad. Slim and Stilwell now laid plans for a counteroffensive, but Iida had also been reinforced, in the form of two additional divisions freed up by the surrender of Singapore.

The Japanese struck first, attacking the Burma Corps, defending Yenangyaung, and holding elsewhere. In the ensuing Battle of Yenangyaung (April 10–19, 1942), the Japanese temporarily trapped the Burma 1st Division, but British counterattacks, supported by pressure from the Chinese

38th Division on the Japanese flank, allowed the 1st Division to escape. At this point, the Japanese 56th Division surprised the Chinese Sixth Army in the Loikaw-Taunggyi area and defeated it. On April 29, troops of the Japanese 56th Division entered Lashio and cut the Burma Road to China. Alexander now ordered his troops to withdraw across the Irrawaddy River.

General Slim continued to retreat under heavy Japanese pressure until he reached the Indian border and Imphal, with the Japanese pursuit halting at the Chindwin River. Meanwhile, the Chinese Sixth Army largely disintegrated under Japanese attacks, and other Chinese forces withdrew into Yunnan.

The rainy season beginning in May brought a welcome lull in operations for both sides. The Japanese now occupied four-fifths of Burma and needed time to organize their vast gains there and elsewhere, and the British wanted the respite to prepare a defense of eastern India. The cost of the fighting had been high, particularly for the British. A Japanese army of 50,000 men had beaten 40,000 British and Indian troops and inflicted on them some 30,000 casualties. The Japanese had also defeated 95,000 Nationalist Chinese troops, and only Major General Sun Liren's (Sun Li-jen) 38th Division withdrew as a fighting unit. At the same time, the Japanese had suffered only some 7,000 casualties themselves.

Allied air support had been largely ineffective. Colonel Claire Chennault's American Volunteer Group (AVG), known as the Flying Tigers, and Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters did what they could, claiming a high kill ratio against Japanese aircraft. But a surprise Japanese raid on Magwe on March 21, 1941, destroyed most British and American planes there and forced the RAF to withdraw to airfields in India. Although the RAF and the Flying Tigers continued to try to assist the withdrawing Allied troops, ground-air communications were poor, and the long distance from their airfields limited the time over target and thus rendered their efforts largely ineffective.

The arrival of long-range Spitfires for the RAF helped somewhat, and in June 1942, with land resupply to China through Burma no longer possible, Stilwell, now commanding the China-Burma-India theater, began aerial resupply by transport aircraft flying from airfields in northeastern India to Kunming. The planes were forced to fly over the eastern Himalayas, known to the American pilots as "the Hump."

British general Archibald Wavell, now commanding in India, worked to

prepare defenses against a possible Japanese invasion of that country from Burma. Wavell realized that it would be a year or more until he would have trained troops and sufficient matériel to assume the offensive, but at the same time, he worried about the effects of inaction on British, Indian, and Burmese morale. As a consequence, he decided to conduct a limited offensive action during the 1942–1943 dry season. Accordingly, in December 1942 the British launched a counterattack by the Indian 14th Division and British units against Arakan, the northwest coastal province of Burma and an area largely separated from the rest of the country by rugged mountains. Although the Japanese there were badly outnumbered, the 14th Division moved too slowly, allowing the Japanese to build up their strength and fortify.

Iida rushed in reinforcements, and in March 1943 troops of the Japanese 55th Division went on the offensive and worked their way over the mountains to hit the British in the flank and force their troops back to India by May. The British had again been proven wrong in their assumption that the Japanese would stick to existing roadways.

Meanwhile, Brigadier Orde Wingate secured Wavell's approval to try "long-range penetration attacks" with his Indian 77th Brigade, known later as the Chindits (their emblem was a *chinthe*, a mythical Burmese beast resembling a lion, and they operated beyond the Chindwin River). This move was a British effort to try to beat the Japanese at their own game in using infiltration tactics. The Chindits would operate deep behind enemy lines in an effort to damage Japanese communications, destroy supplies, and sow confusion. The force of 3,000 Chindits would rely entirely on aerial resupply for food, clothing, medicines, and arms.

The first Chindit raid began with a crossing of the Chindwin River in February 1943. The force managed to cut sections of the Mandalay-Myitkyina and Mandalay-Lashio railroads, and in mid-March they crossed the Irrawaddy River. This brought major Japanese reaction, forcing a Chindit withdrawal in April. Newspapers in the Allied countries claimed a great victory, but the raid had been a failure militarily. The damage to Japanese troops and positions was slight, and the raiders lost half of their force.

Although the British fared poorly on land, the Royal Navy continued to control the Indian Ocean, which was immensely important for the long supply lines to the Middle East and to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, to secure the loyalty of Indian nationalists, the British held out the promise of

sovereignty after the war. The major Allied problems in the Burma theater remained the nearly complete lack of cooperation between the British and Chinese strategists, the inability to cope with Japanese tactics, and inadequate resources and supplies for a fighting front far down the Allied priority list.

Stilwell now mounted a drive into northern Burma. In February 1943, he committed the American-trained reconstituted Chinese 38th Division in upper Assam on the Burma-India border, where U.S., Chinese, and Indian engineers were building a road from Ledo. The 38th Division drove the few Japanese from the area. In late October, having secured the reluctant support of General Wavell and the agreement of Chinese Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to employ his forces to reopen a land route to China, Stilwell committed the 38th Division south into the Hukawng Valley, where it was resupplied entirely by air. At the same time, the Chinese 22nd Division moved up from Ramgarh to Ledo. Meanwhile, Stilwell pushed construction of the road from Ledo.

In late November, Japanese forces struck the 38th and subjected it to punishing attacks, completely cutting off some of its units. U.S. aerial resupply prevented the Japanese from overrunning the troops, however. At the end of December, Stilwell arrived, along with light artillery, and the Chinese then counterattacked, driving the Japanese from the Hukawng Valley.

During January and February 1944, there was stalemate in the Hukawng Valley. Japanese major general Tanaka Shinichi’s 18th Division halted the advance of the Chinese 38th and 22nd Divisions. The Chinese resumed their advance in late February.

Much of the rest of Burma had remained quiet throughout 1943. In a considerable engineering feat, the Japanese built a 250-mile railroad across Burma, in the process employing as slave labor British prisoners captured at Singapore and some American captives. The Japanese utilized the railroad to mass supplies for an attack on eastern India. On August 1, 1943, they also granted Burma its “independence,” although this step did not resonate sufficiently with the Japanese-installed Burmese government to enable Japan to fully exploit Burmese rice and petroleum resources.

The Japanese reorganized their forces in Burma, which were under the overall command of the Southern Resources Area commander, Field Marshal Count Terauchi Hisaichi, in Saigon. In March 1943, Lieutenant General

Kawabe Masakazu had assumed command from General Iida of the six Japanese divisions in Burma. Kawabe had direct supervision of the two divisions in southwest Burma; the other four Japanese divisions were in the north under Lieutenant General Mutaguchi Renya. Kawabe directed Mutaguchi to invade eastern India with three of his divisions, and toward that end the Japanese amassed some 100,000 troops. The Japanese intended to seize the Imphal-Kohima Plain of Manipur, the logical British staging area for an invasion of Burma from central India. Their second major goal was to take and hold the rail line into Assam that passed through Manipur. Along it flowed most of the supplies that were ferried into China as well as those destined for Stilwell's divisions in north Burma.

On the night of February 3, 1944, the Japanese attacked in the south, and once again they surprised the British with the size and speed of the assault. But the now experienced British and Indian troops held their positions even when surrounded and did not surrender their supply dumps, which the Japanese needed to support their advance. British and U.S. aircraft flew supplies to the defenders in Imphal, and other aircraft strafed the Japanese. General Slim also organized a relief column, drove it to Imphal, and broke the siege on June 22. After desperate fighting by both sides, the Japanese, short of supplies and facing the onset of the monsoon season, called off the attack, and the Fifteenth Army began to withdraw.

In October 1943, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten had taken up his post as commander of the new South-East Asia Command, although command ambiguities remained. He and Slim agreed that British forces could not do much until the next dry season, although they were willing to organize some spoiling attacks to take pressure off a larger offensive sought by General Stilwell for his Chinese units. Wingate, now a major general and enjoying the full support of British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, planned a second and even more audacious raid for his Chindits that would include three brigades supported logistically by the U.S. Army Air Forces. The operation involved 25,000 men, of whom 3,000 were Americans. Led briefly by Brigadier General Frank Merrill, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was known popularly as Merrill's Marauders.

The March 1944 raid began with high promise, but the venture was doomed because its success rested on the active participation of Chinese divisions. These forces were being husbanded by Jiang Jieshi, who drove his

chief of staff, Stilwell (also commanding all U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater), to distraction. In secret instructions to his generals, Jiang sharply limited Chinese military involvement, which in any case proved ineffectual.

Another factor that contributed to the failure of the raid was the death of Wingate in a plane crash in India on March 24, whereupon Stilwell controlled operations. Wingate and Stilwell were much alike—both eccentric and dynamic—but they seldom disclosed their intentions, and as a result there were serious failures in planning and staff work. Stilwell, in fact, disliked the British and did not use the Chindits effectively. Nor did he understand the difficulties facing guerrilla forces while dependent on aerial resupply but operating as conventional units.

The Japanese, heavily outnumbered in the air and lacking other modern weapons, fought back with considerable tenacity. Finally, the monsoon rains that began in mid-May slowed the offensive and brought more malaria. By June, the chief Allied enemies were not the Japanese but exhaustion, malnutrition, and disease. Although the raid inflicted 50,000 Japanese casualties against only 17,000 for the British, Allied forces were obliged to withdraw from Burma in July. Since it was ultimately unsuccessful, the 1944 Burma Campaign has remained a controversial subject. Unfortunately for all involved, it had no practical effect on the outcome of the war.

The lack of Chinese support in this operation displeased U.S. leaders, who had hoped that Nationalist armies would tie down the Japanese forces. Jiang, however, seemed more preoccupied with building up his own strength so he could do battle with his domestic opposition, the Chinese Communists, after the war. Washington’s realization that it could not count on Jiang to fight the Japanese resulted in increased support for forces under Admiral Chester Nimitz in the Central Pacific and General Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific.

As the Japanese offensive ended, the Allies began their own offensive in October 1944, with the British largely in support of a Chinese attack. Stilwell employed five American-trained and -equipped Chinese divisions to take Myitkyana. Opposing them was the Japanese Thirty-Third Army, composed of three depleted divisions commanded by Lieutenant General Honda Masaki. Stilwell hoped to be able to trap the Thirty-Third Army between the five divisions in Burma and the Y-Force in Yunnan.

However, Stilwell's poor relationship with Jiang and the situation in China after the Japanese attacked to remove the threat of U.S. strategic bombers there led Jiang to demand that Washington replace Stilwell. This change occurred on October 18, with Stilwell succeeded by Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan. Jiang's recall of two of the Chinese divisions from Burma to help stop the Japanese offensive in southern China brought the Chinese offensive against the Japanese in Burma to a halt in December.

By the fall of 1944, the Allied position in Burma had improved considerably while the Japanese position had weakened, reflecting the relative fortunes of each side in the larger conflict. General Slim followed up his successful relief of Imphal, and in October the British crossed the Chindwin River. The new Japanese commander in Burma, Lieutenant General Kimura Heitaro, had 10 divisions. He wanted to let the British advance in the center and outrun their supplies; then, he would counterattack to cut off and surround the British. This approach set the stage for the climactic battles of 1945.

In December 1944, the Allies assumed the offensive in the south (assisted by landing craft no longer needed for the invasions of France), in the center, and from China in the north. The southern advance required crossing many rivers and canals, and the going was naturally rather slow, although the Anglo-Indian forces regained the port of Akyab and Ramree Island as Kimura withdrew. Meanwhile, two Chinese divisions advanced into northern Burma, reopened the Burma Road against negligible Japanese resistance, and seized Lashio in early March.

The chief battle took place in central Burma. Slim figured out Kimura's plan and, with great fanfare, dispatched forces to cross the Irrawaddy River while sending several divisions quietly to the south to outflank the Japanese, cut their line of communications and retreat, and possibly take the entire Japanese force defending central Burma. Advancing on a 140-mile front, the British captured Meiktila on March 4. They took Mandalay two weeks later while repulsing a simultaneous Japanese counterattack against Meiktila.

Slim sought to gain Rangoon while the roads and rice paddies were still sunbaked, dry, and hard. On May 3, a combined amphibious, land, and airborne attack recaptured the capital city, and the fighting largely came to an end. Most Japanese troops fled to neighboring Thailand.

See also

Airlift; Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Arakan Campaign, First; Arakan Campaign, Second; Aung San, U; Burma Air Campaign; Burma Road; Chennault, Claire Lee; Chindits; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Engineer Operations; Flying Tigers; Honda Masaki; Hump, The; Iida Shōjirō; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Jiang Jieshi; Kawabe Masakazu; Kimura Heitaro; Magwe, Battle for; Meiktila, Battle of; Merrill, Frank Dow; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Mutaguchi Renya; Myitkyina, Siege of; Nimitz, Chester William; Sittang, Battle of the; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Sultan, Daniel Isom; Sun Liren; Tanaka Shinichi; Terauchi Hisaichi; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Wingate, Orde Charles; Yenangyaung, Battle of; Document 176

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Burns, Eedson Louis Millard (1897–1985)

Canadian Army lieutenant general. Born in Westmount, Quebec, on June 17, 1897, Eedson Louis Millard Burns attended the Royal Military College at Kingston, Ontario. During World War I, he served with the engineers and signalers and was wounded twice. He received the Military Cross, and ended the war as the youngest staff captain in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

Burns remained in the army after the war and advanced steadily. He studied at the School of Military Engineering at Chatham in 1920, served as an instructor at the Royal Canadian Military College (1924–1926), was

assigned to the Geographic Section of the General Staff (1931–1936), and attended the Staff College at Quetta (1928–1929). He was promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel in 1935. Burns was a prolific writer, authoring numerous articles in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* and H. L. Mencken's *American Mercury*.

When World War II began in Europe, Burns was studying at the Imperial Defence College. He was assigned from there to the General Staff under Brigadier Henry Crerar at Canadian Military Headquarters, London. When Crerar was posted as chief of the Canadian General Staff, Burns accompanied him as special assistant and then became assistant deputy chief of the General Staff. He was posted to the General Staff with the Canadian Corps in Britain in February 1941.

Burns was then promoted to brigadier and took command of a brigade in the Canadian 4th Armoured Division. He then commanded the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division and the Canadian 5th Armoured Division, being promoted to major general in January 1944. He took command of the Canadian I Corps in Italy in March 1944.

Burns's first task was to pierce the Hitler Line across the Liri Valley. The May 1944 attack started out well, but casualties soon began to mount, and movement was hampered both by inexperience at lower levels of command and by traffic jams. Burns received the blame and was rated poorly by Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese, commanding the British Eighth Army. Burns's leadership style made his subordinates uncomfortable. This included his dismissal of suggestions and use of sarcasm as well as his preoccupation with trivial matters of troop dress and discipline.

In August and September 1944, the Canadian I Corps played a major role in breaking the Gothic Line, for which Burns received much praise. This success did not save him, however, and when the advance stalled in the mud, the old complaints resurfaced. Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes replaced him in November 1944.

Burns served the rest of the war commanding all Canadian rear-area units of 21st Army Group. After the war, he worked with the Department of Veterans Affairs until 1954, when he took command of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization operating along the Israeli-Arab borders. Burns was promoted to lieutenant general in 1958 and retired the following year. He died at Manotick, Ontario, on September 13, 1985.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

Canada, Army; Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; Foulkes, Charles; Italy Campaign; Leese, Sir Oliver William Hargreaves

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Burress, Withers Alexander "Pinky" (1894–1977)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Richmond, Virginia, on November 24, 1894, Withers Alexander Burress graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1914, where he received the nickname "Pinky," and was commissioned in the infantry two years later. During World War I, he served in the 2nd Division in the American Expeditionary Forces. Burress graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1931 and the Army War College in 1935. An excellent instructor, he served in that capacity at the Infantry School for two years (1920–1922) and again at the Command and General Staff School from 1931 to 1933. In 1935, he returned to the Virginia Military Institute as a Reserve Officers' Training Corps instructor and subsequently as commandant, remaining there until 1940.

In 1940, Burress joined the G-3 (training) section of the General Staff, with special responsibility for raising and training troops as wartime pressures suddenly caused a huge expansion in the army. From October 1941 to early 1942, Colonel Burress was assistant commandant of the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. He was promoted to brigadier general in March 1942 and assigned to the Puerto Rican District on its activation in August 1942, at which time he was promoted to major general. He then commanded and trained the 100th Infantry Division. That division landed at Marseille, France, in October 1944 and fought in the difficult Vosges Mountains Campaign (including the sustained winter siege and assault on the

Maginot fortress at Bitche), winning a further spectacular victory at Heilbronn in early 1945 and pressing on to Stuttgart.

From September 1945 to 1946, Burress commanded VI Corps. He commanded the Infantry School at Fort Benning from 1948 to 1951, I Corps from 1951 to 1953, and the First Army from 1953 to 1954. He retired as a lieutenant general in 1954. Burress died in Arlington, Virginia, on June 13, 1977.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

United States Army; Vosges, Advance to

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Busch, Ernst (1885–1945)

German Army field marshal. Born in Essen-Steele in the Ruhr July 6, 1885, Ernst Busch graduated from Gross-Lichterfelde Cadet Academy in 1904 and joined the Westphalian 13th Infantry Regiment as an officer candidate. Commissioned a second lieutenant in the 57th Infantry Regiment in 1908, he was promoted to first lieutenant and attended the War Academy in 1913. Busch spent most of World War I on the Western Front commanding infantry. Promoted to captain in 1915, he became a battalion commander in the 56th Infantry Regiment and fought in numerous battles, including Verdun, and was awarded the Pour le Mérite.

Retained in the German Army after the war, Busch held various staff billets. He was promoted to major in 1925 and to lieutenant colonel in 1930. After serving as a battalion commander in the 9th Infantry Regiment, he rose to colonel and assumed command of that regiment in 1932.

Busch became an enthusiastic follower of Adolf Hitler and Nazism. Promoted to major general, Busch took command of the 23rd Infantry Division in 1935; two years later, he was promoted to lieutenant general.

Busch was rewarded for his unflagging support of Hitler during the 1938 Blomberg-Fritsch crisis by being promoted to general of infantry and given command of VIII Corps.

In the September 1939 invasion of Poland, Busch's VIII Corps formed the left flank of Army Group South, taking Kraków, advancing along the Vistula River, and ending the campaign at L'viv (Lvov). Given command of Sixteenth Army for the May 1940 invasion of France and the Low Countries, Busch was assigned to cover the left flank of General of Panzer Troops Heinz Guderian's XIX Motorized Corps. In recognition of his service, Busch was promoted to colonel general.

During Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Busch's Sixteenth Army covered the right flank of Army Group North on its drive to Leningrad. From 1942 to 1943, his army opposed numerous Soviet attacks and conducted the successful defense and relief of the Kholm and Demyansk pockets. Busch suffered no serious defeats, but after the initial push into the Soviet Union in 1941, he won no major victories.

Promoted to field marshal in February 1943, Busch assumed command of Army Group Center in October. Eight months later, in Operation BAGRATION, the Soviets destroyed his army group. Relieved of his command on June 28, Busch was retired but was brought back to command Army Group Northwest in March 1945 to oppose the Allied western advance into Germany. Busch died in British captivity at Aldershot, England, on July 17, 1945.

DANA LOMBARDY AND T. P. SCHWEIDER

See also

BAGRATION, Operation; BARBAROSSA, Operation; France Campaign; Leningrad, Siege of; Poland Campaign

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Bush, Vannevar (1890–1974)

U.S. scientist who was involved with the Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb. Born on March 11, 1890, in Everett, Massachusetts, Vannevar Bush earned both bachelor's and master's degrees in engineering at Tufts College before completing a joint doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard University. By 1932, he was dean of engineering at MIT.

During World War I, Bush designed a device utilizing magnetic fields to detect submarines. The navy deemed it worthless for combat, which affected Bush's attitudes regarding the relationship between science and government. He was interested in machinery that would automate thinking, and by 1931 he had built the first electronic analog computer to solve, at great speed, complex differential equations.

In 1938, Bush was selected as president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C.; his duties included advising the government on scientific research. He also was chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics from 1939 to 1941. During World War II, he worked to establish relationships between scientists and government officials regarding research resources, especially those concerning defense work. He also emphasized the importance of technological innovation and proficiency to national security.

In June 1940, Bush presented President Franklin D. Roo-se-velt his ideas about the coordination of military research as a partnership of scientific, industrial, business, and government groups. This approach led to the establishment of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), with Bush as its director, in June 1941. In addition, Bush secured congressional funding to create the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which then oversaw the NDRC.

An adroit administrator, Bush became involved in significant technological developments, particularly in putting together a team for the Manhattan Project as well as improving radar and developing radio-guided bombs. He also recruited civilian scientists to work on military projects. His July 1945 report "Science: The Endless Frontier" advised President Harry S. Truman regarding governmental peacetime development of science and technology. The 1950 National Science Foundation incorporated many of

Bush's ideas for postwar science and government cooperation for basic research and education.

In 1945, Bush's *Atlantic Monthly* essay "As We May Think" discussed the hypothetical "memex," a machine capable of information storage and retrieval with associative linking. This automatic technology would enable humans to augment their memory technically. Computer engineers later stated that Bush's ideas influenced their digital development of hypertext and the Internet. Bush died at Belmont, Massachusetts, on June 28, 1974.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER

See also

Engineer Operations; Manhattan Project; Radar; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; United States

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Bushido

Almost all accounts of World War II in the Pacific theater—both contemporary and those that have appeared since the war—note the tenacity of Japanese resistance, even after any hope of victory had vanished. The determination of individual Japanese soldiers to fight to the death was a hallmark of the bitter island battles of the Pacific theater. It perhaps found its most extreme expression in the kamikaze (divine wind) suicide aircraft attacks of Allied ships.

The explanation for the nature of this Japanese behavior lies partly in the intensely violent battlefield culture that developed in the Pacific and that deterred soldiers on both sides from surrendering, and partly in the extreme interpretation of the bushido warrior ethic that Japan's militarist rulers fostered within Japanese society.

Bushido was rooted in the value system of the samurai military caste that had dominated Japan from the 12th century to the middle of the 19th century.

It originated as a code that governed the conduct of the samurai. The term “bushido” translates as “the way of the warrior.” This warrior code was based on the concepts of Zen Buddhism, which combined warlike nature, and Confucianism, which instilled notions of the proper social hierarchy and correct social values. Bushido required loyalty above all else to the feudal lord, the daimyo. It placed bravery, honor, and personal loyalty above life itself. Ritual suicide (*seppoku*) was the respective alternative to dishonor or defeat.

Even though the political influence of the samurai declined following the Meiji Restoration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, their cultural influence remained dominant. As the Japanese military and Japanese society modernized to keep Western political and economic influences at bay, the officers of the new military (many of whom were descended from samurais) gained positions from which they could dominate the value systems and culture of the new Japan.

They worked to indoctrinate rank-and-file servicemen and the wider society with the values of the ancient warrior caste. Loyalty to the divine figure of the emperor (only a figurehead in medieval Japan) took the place of loyalty to the daimyo. Their views found wide acceptance in the environment of cultural extremism that increasingly dominated Japan in the years after World War I.

The conscripted Japanese soldier of the 1930s and 1940s was raised in a society that emphasized worship of the divine figure of Japan’s emperor and glorified the way of the warrior. Training throughout the armed forces, but especially in the army, reinforced this cultural imperative. The training regimen was harsh and characterized by brutal treatment to enforce discipline throughout the command structure. Officers physically abused noncommissioned officers who, in turn, brutalized their enlisted men. Soldiers became hardened through a demanding program of rigorous physical training and long marches with heavy packs under the most adverse conditions.

Training stressed the offensive, with defensive tactics receiving limited attention. It emphasized the idea that in war, the soldier’s life belonged to the emperor, and thus, it was a great honor to die for him. A soldier shamed himself, his family, and the emperor if he did not fight to the death. Surrender or capture meant disgrace. Parallel to the glorification of death over surrender

was the castigation of American and Western culture as materialistic, impure, and soft.

This bushido-based training and indoctrination produced an army of tough, fatalistic soldiers who were fiercely determined on the attack and tenacious in defense. Although they were never the invincible jungle warriors that many Allied soldiers believed them to be early in the Pacific war, the Japanese proved adept at cover and concealment, infiltration, and the construction of strong defensive positions. At the same time, they lacked individual initiative and tended to choose death in a suicidal banzai charge or remain in an untenable defensive position when retreat would have saved their lives and enabled them to fight another day.

The brutal training and indoctrination, the glorification of death, and the vilification of Western culture also led to horrific treatment of Allied prisoners of war and civilian populations in Japanese-occupied territory that intensified hatred of Japan throughout Asia and in the Allied nations. The brutal Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners was a reflection of bushido. Because the Allied soldiers and occupied peoples had not fought to the death, they were deemed to be cowards and unworthy of honorable treatment.

The determination of Japanese soldiers to die fighting and their brutality and ruthlessness in battle translated into vicious no-quarter combat on dozens of Pacific islands and throughout East Asia. Patterns in Japanese resistance changed, however, as the war continued. Initially, Japanese responses to American landings on Pacific islands relied on the offensive. Their approach was to attack and destroy the beachhead before it could be consolidated. The result was frequent reckless and wasteful banzai charges that inevitably failed against overwhelming American firepower.

Following the disastrous loss of the Marianas islands of Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, Japanese strategists realized that victory was no longer possible. Their priorities then shifted to the defensive and the inflicting of unacceptable casualties on Allied forces, thereby forcing the United States and Britain into negotiations. On Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa and in the Philippines, American soldiers and marines had to fight costly actions to root the Japanese out of stout fortifications. At sea, Allied ships faced suicide attacks from kamikazes, Japanese planes loaded with explosives that crashed into American and British vessels. This tactical shift notwithstanding, the

principles of the bushido code remained in place. Japanese soldiers were expected to die in place, killing as many Allied soldiers as possible.

As a result of this tactical shift, American casualty rates soared in the last year of the Pacific war. Japanese soldiers proved their willingness to endure unimaginable conditions and to choose death when there was no longer any chance for victory. Their suicidal resistance, however, did not have the desired effect. Instead, their adherence to the principles of bushido only served to reinforce the American decision to use the atomic bomb in August 1945 to force Japan's leaders to surrender.

WALTER F. BELL

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guam, Battle for; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Japan; Japan, Army; Japan, Surrender of; Kamikaze; Okinawa, Invasion of; Peleliu Island, Battle of; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Prisoners of War; Saipan, Battle of; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of

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Byrnes, James Francis (1879–1972)

U.S. politician, wartime "assistant president" to Franklin D. Roosevelt, and secretary of state from 1945 to 1947. Born on May 2, 1879, in Charleston, South Carolina, James Francis Byrnes studied law. After qualifying as a lawyer, he won election to Congress in 1910, and in 1931 he became a senator for South Carolina. A longtime friend of President Roosevelt, Byrnes used his considerable negotiating talents to steer New Deal legislation through Congress from 1933 onward. In 1941, Roosevelt appointed him to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Sixteen months later in 1942, Byrnes left the Supreme Court to head the new Office of Economic Stabilization. The following year, he became

director of the Office of War Mobilization (from 1944, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion). In domestic policy, Byrnes, often called the "assistant president," exercised powers second only to those of Roosevelt himself. Responsible for coordinating all domestic war agencies and federal government departments, Byrnes worked closely with both Congress and the bureaucracy to devise the most efficient arrangements to implement the war effort.

Passed over as Roosevelt's vice presidential running mate in 1944, Byrnes, already considered a hard-liner on the Soviet Union, attended the February 1945 Yalta Conference of the "Big Three" Allied leaders. Returning to Washington, he successfully lobbied Congress to support the outcome of Yalta, deliberately glossing over outstanding contentious issues dividing the Soviet Union and its allies. Still disappointed over the 1944 election, he resigned in March 1945.

On Roosevelt's death one month later, Vice President Harry S. Truman became president. Truman immediately appointed Byrnes as head of a top-secret committee on the employment of atomic weapons, then in their final stage of development, whose existence Byrnes recommended be kept secret even from U.S. allies until their first use in combat. He believed that U.S. possession of the bomb would make Soviet behavior more malleable.

In July 1945, Truman named Byrnes secretary of state. Attending the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, Byrnes hoped that the speedy employment of atomic weapons against Japan would prevent the Soviet Union from entering the Pacific war and enhancing its influence in Asia. He also helped to reach a compromise agreement on German reparations. Returning to Washington, he took part in drafting the Japanese surrender agreement in August, implicitly agreeing to retain the emperor.

As Soviet-U.S. relations became more strained after the war, Byrnes sought for several months to negotiate compromise solutions, traveling extensively to meet with other foreign ministers outside the United States. In early 1946, political complaints that he was too conciliatory led Byrnes to assume a harsher rhetorical stance toward the Soviet Union. Even so, in January 1947 Truman—increasingly irked by Byrnes's policies, his secretive diplomacy, and his condescending attitude—made George C. Marshall secretary of state in his stead.

Byrnes returned to South Carolina and wrote his memoirs. In 1948, he

broke with Truman over the issue of civil rights. Subsequently, Byrnes served two terms, from 1951 to 1955, as governor of South Carolina, defending segregationist policies. He died in Columbia, South Carolina, on April 9, 1972.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Marshall, George Catlett; Potsdam Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; Yalta Conference

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C

Cairo Conference (November 23–26 and December 3–7, 1943)

Code-named Sextant, this two-part conference was held in Cairo, Egypt, during November and December 1943 to discuss military strategy and postwar settlements. The primary participants were U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill. The meetings in Cairo took place before and after a meeting that brought together Roosevelt, Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin at Tehran. The Tehran Conference (code-named Eureka) proved necessary after Stalin refused to attend Sextant because a Chinese delegation, headed by Jiang Jieshi -(Chiang Kai-shek), was to participate. Because the Soviet Union was not then at war with Japan, Stalin did not want to attend or allow any other Soviet representative to take part in Sextant. Churchill had doubts about a meeting with Jiang, too, for he regarded China as a sideshow until the war in Europe was won. Roosevelt, however, envisioned China as a fourth great power after the war. In addition to large American, British, and Chinese delegations, Lord Louis Mountbatten, supreme commander of the Allied Southeast Asia Command, attended Sextant with his own delegation.

Roosevelt traveled across the Atlantic in the battleship *Iowa* and met with General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Algeria before flying on to Cairo, where he met with Jiang. At the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Jiang restated their determination to fight on until the war was won. Jiang pressed for an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal to coincide with Chinese participation in the fighting in Burma. Roosevelt initially agreed to this plan but was forced to withdraw his pledge following discussions at Tehran.

The Allied leaders announced at the Cairo Conference that after the war, Japan would be reduced to the territories it held before World War I. China would regain Manchuria, the Pescadores Islands, and Formosa, and Korea would, “in due course,” be restored to independence. In the meantime, a joint

U.S., Chinese, and Soviet trusteeship would hold sway in Korea, an arrangement that might last for 40 years. The mandated Japanese islands would, in all probability, pass to U.S. control, and it was implied that the Soviet Union would regain South Sakhalin Island (lost in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War) and secure the Kuriles (which had never been Soviet territory). Stalin also wanted a warm-water port for the Soviet Union, probably at Dairen, Manchuria.

The second part of Sextant, which followed the Tehran Conference, included discussions with Turkish president Ismet Inönü in an effort to draw his country into the war on the Allied side. In addition, Roosevelt informed Churchill of his decision to appoint General Eisenhower to command the Normandy Invasion.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Burma Theater; China; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Jiang Jieshi; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; Turkey; Document 173

Left to right: Chinese nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the 1943 Cairo Conference. The three

leaders addressed issues related to Allied policy against Japan during World War II and to the future of the Asia-Pacific region. (Keystone/Getty Images)

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Calabria, Battle of (July 9, 1940)

Mediterranean air and naval battle fought between the British and Italians off the Calabrian coast of Italy on July 9, 1940. The engagement is known to the Italians and Germans as the Battle of Punta Stilo. Beginning on the evening of July 6, 1940, the Italians dispatched a large convoy from Naples to Benghazi (Libya). At the same time, the British commander in the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, sent two small convoys with numerous civilians on board being evacuated from Malta to Alexandria, Egypt.

On July 7, the Italians learned of the British ship movements and immediately sent naval units from several bases to sea. Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni had command, concentrating the ships in the Ionian Sea. Campioni had the modernized but small battleships *Cesare* and *Cavour*, with 12.6-inch guns; 6 heavy and 10 light cruisers; and 41 destroyers and torpedo boats. Also at sea but scattered throughout the Mediterranean were 25 Italian submarines.

Cunningham planned to cover the convoys with his naval force at Alexandria, consisting of the battleships *Warspite* and *Malaya* and the unmodernized *Royal Sovereign*, all armed with 15-inch guns; the aircraft carrier *Eagle;* 5 light cruisers; and 23 destroyers. Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville sortied from Gibraltar with Force H as a feint, which resulted in the loss of a destroyer to an Italian submarine and some minor splinter damage from high-altitude Italian bombing.

Following the safe arrival of the Italian convoy at Ben-ghazi, Campioni decided to try to intercept the British convoy and its escorts steaming from Alexandria, Egypt. He hoped that by the time of the naval encounter, the Italian Air Force would have been able to damage the British ships as they approached the Italian coast. Indeed, more than 100 Italian aircraft conducted attacks on the British ships, but the high-level bombing did little damage; all but one bomb missed. The bomb that hit its target damaged the light cruiser *Gloucester*, and a near-hit caused damage to the carrier *Eagle*, keeping it from participation in the air attack on Taranto four months later. The Italian planes also carried out several attacks in error on their own warships, again with no result.

Meanwhile, Cunningham was maneuvering to position his ships to block the Italian fleet from returning to Taranto. The *Eagle* launched several air attacks. Although not hitting any Italian ships, these attacks disrupted their movement, and British fighters did shoot down and chase off Italian reconnaissance aircraft. As a consequence, by the morning of July 9, the Italians were not cognizant of the exact location of the British force, whereas the British had fairly reliable information on the location of the Italian ships.

The battle opened on the afternoon of July 9 as the two fleets at last came into contact and lasted nearly two hours. The fight was initially a long-range cruiser gunnery duel, resulting in no damage to either side, although the British salvo spreads tended to be much tighter than those of the Italians.

As the Italian battleships came into action, they were opposed by Cunningham's flagship, the *Warspite*, fastest of the three British battleships. In the ensuing action, three British 6-inch shell hits on the Italian heavy cruiser *Bolzano* and one 15-inch shell hit on the *Cesare* slowed both and compelled the Italian main force to retire. The fact that three British battleships had outgunned the entire Italian fleet deeply affected Italian tactics.

As the Italian main force pulled back, both sides ordered their destroyers forward. At long range, the Italians fired torpedoes through their smoke screens but registered no hits. The ships in the Italian fleet then retired to their home ports. The Germans later criticized the Italians for not having launched night torpedo attacks with their numerous destroyers.

On July 10, the *Eagle* mounted an air strike on Augusta, Italy. An Italian destroyer was sunk (it was later raised and repaired), and an oiler was

damaged. Meanwhile, the British Malta convoys arrived safely at Alexandria.

The Battle of Calabria raised British morale, for the Royal Navy had successfully engaged a numerically superior enemy force close to its own coast. The Italians' failure could be traced to poor coordination between their air and naval assets. The Italians also came to realize the ineffectiveness of high-altitude bombing against warships maneuvering at high speed and firing back. The battle also demonstrated the fallacy of the decision made by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and his navy to completely embrace land-based aviation at the expense of aircraft carriers. Thereafter, Italian naval leaders were reluctant to commit major naval units beyond the range of their land-based aircraft.

JACK GREENE

See also

Campioni, Inigo; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Taranto, Attack on

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Callaghan, Daniel Judson (1890–1942)

U.S. Navy rear admiral. Born on July 26, 1890, in San Francisco, Daniel Judson Callaghan graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1911. He served chiefly on destroyers, commanding one in 1916 before becoming the engineering officer of a cruiser during the last two years of World War I.

Following that war, Callaghan served on battleships and cruisers as a gunnery and operations officer. Known as an excellent staff officer, he became naval aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in July 1938, a post he feared would hamper his chances of becoming an admiral. Callaghan

returned to sea duty in the spring of 1941 as the captain of the cruiser *San Francisco,* which was at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, but was undamaged in the Japanese attack.

In April 1942, Callaghan was promoted to rear admiral and in June became chief of staff to the commander of the Southwest Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Ghormley. Callaghan represented Ghormley at the planning conference leading up to the Operation WATCHTOWER, the landings on Guadalcanal in August 1942. On October 30, after Vice Admiral William F. Halsey had replaced Ghormley in the Southwest Pacific, Callaghan took over Task Group 67.4, a cruiser/destroyer force, raising his flag on his old ship, the cruiser *San Francisco.*

In early November, Callaghan's two cruisers and eight destroyers escorted a U.S. reinforcement convoy to Guadalcanal. When the transports departed to return to Noumea on November 12, Halsey ordered Callaghan, whose force was now joined by an antiaircraft cruiser and two destroyers under Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept a much more powerful Japanese bombardment force under Vice Admiral Abe Hiroaki, which was also acting as cover for Japanese transports carrying a large troop reinforcement for Guadalcanal. Scott was junior to Callaghan, and the latter assumed command.

Just after midnight on November 13, Callaghan's ships intercepted Abe's force of 2 battleships, 1 light cruiser, and 14 destroyers off Lunga Point, Guadalcanal, on its way to shell Henderson Field. In a hard-fought, 38-minute action, the Americans sank 2 Japanese destroyers and crippled the battleship *Hiei* (which was later sunk by carrier aircraft), while losing 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Abe's squadron as well as the task force carrying 13,000 Japanese reinforcements to Guadalcanal that it was designed to mask both turned back.

Callaghan, dubbed "the Fighting Admiral," was killed by a shell that struck the bridge of the cruiser *San Francisco* during the action. He was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Abe Hiroaki; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William

Frederick, Jr.; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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CAM Ships

British merchant vessel fitted with a catapult to launch fighters to provide defensive cover for North Atlantic convoys during World War II. CAM is an acronym for "catapult-assisted merchantman." This was an emergency response to the acquisition by Germany of bases in France from which their submarines and aircraft could attack Allied shipping beyond the range of British shore-based aircraft and in the absence of escort carriers for organic convoy defense. On completing their missions, CAM pilots would either seek the nearest land within range or abandon their aircraft close to the convoy and await rescue.

The Royal Navy fitted out five auxiliaries and a merchant ship in early 1941 to carry two fighters apiece. Between May and October, their fighters launched on 10 occasions, shooting down one Focke Wulf Fw 200 Condor and driving off several others, although three of the ships were lost to submarine attack.

The Royal Air Force's Merchant Ship Fighter Unit largely took over this task from the summer of 1941 until it disbanded in September 1943. It operated some 60 aircraft from 34 CAM ships, all modified merchant vessels with small air force contingents embarked to maintain and operate Hawker Hurricane fighters.

CAM-ship fighters destroyed six Condors and drove off several others during 170 round-trip voyages, but the arrival of the first escort carrier, the *Audacity*, in late 1941, followed by mass-produced units from U.S. shipyards

the following summer, rapidly rendered the concept obsolete. CAM ships were a valuable stopgap, but their inherent operational risks made deployment of carriers, to which aircraft could return, infinitely preferable.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Merchant Aircraft Carrier Ships; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Camm, Sir Sydney (1893–1966)

British aircraft designer who specialized in military planes. Born in Windsor, England, on August 5, 1893, Sydney Camm showed a keen interest in aviation at an early age. In 1912, he designed and flew a man-carrying glider. Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, he joined the Martinsyde Aircraft Company as a woodworker. He left Martinsyde in 1923 to be a senior draftsman with the Hawker Engineering Company, rising to chief designer within two years. He remained with Hawker for 43 years, where his work emphasized simplicity, symmetry, and lightness.

From 1925 onward, Camm concentrated on military designs, working closely with the Royal Air Force (RAF) and producing the Rolls-Royce aircraft engines that were closely integrated into the aircraft. His first big success was the Hawker Hart day-bomber biplane and its variants, of which 3,000 were eventually built. In 1933 Camm moved to monoplanes, and in 1934 he took on a British Air Ministry order for an eight-gun fighter named the Hurricane. The RAF's first monoplane fighter aircraft, the Hurricane was fast, maneuverable, and sturdy. A low-wing plane with retractable landing gear and an enclosed cockpit, it was built around the Rolls-Royce Merlin

engine. The Hurricane carried eight .303-caliber machine guns and reached a top speed of 315 mph at its first flight in late 1935.

During the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 20, 1940), the Hurricane made up the bulk of Fighter Command's aircraft and bore the brunt of the Luftwaffe onslaught. Though outclassed by the Messerschmitt Bf-109, the Hurricane could, in the right hands, hold its own against the German fighter. Later versions were used successfully as fighter-bombers in North Africa. By August 1940, more than 2,000 Hurricanes had been delivered to the RAF and were serving in 32 squadrons. During the war, a total of 14,500 Hurricanes were produced, many of which went to the Soviet Union. Camm designed two more fighters for the RAF during World War II, the Typhoon and the Tempest. Both were successful ground-attack aircraft.

Following the war, Camm began designing jet aircraft, including the Hunter and the first operational vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, the Harrier. He continued to serve on the board of Hawker Siddeley Aviation until his death in Surrey, England, on March 12, 1966.

MARLYN R. PIERCE AND PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Bader, Sir Douglas Robert Steuart; Britain, Battle of; Great Britain, Air Force

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Camouflage

The disguising of military personnel, equipment, or installations. With technical advances in long-range aviation and aerial photography as well as optical sights for weapons systems, camouflage became a regular feature of World War II. It was applied to individual soldiers, their equipment (such as tanks and warships), and industrial facilities and airfields.

Camouflage, also called protective concealment, attempts to disguise an object that is in plain sight and hide it from something or someone. If an object cannot be concealed—often something large, such as an airfield or a warship—camouflage may succeed merely by preventing an enemy from properly identifying the object. Camouflaging is normally accomplished by applying disruptive or blending paint or material to the object.

Modern camouflage techniques can be traced back to the French Army's Camouflage Division, established in 1915 when the army gave artists the responsibility for concealing airfields during World War I. The term "camouflage" comes from the French word *camoufler*, meaning "to blind or veil."

During World War II aircraft were often camouflaged, in direct contrast with the practice in World War I, attributed particularly to Germany, of painting some aircraft in bright colors to intimidate opposing aviators. World War II aircraft tended to be painted in graduated color schemes, with darker shades on top growing progressively lighter toward the plane's under section.

This technique served two purposes. The indistinct boundary between colors aided in obscuring the aircraft's silhouette and shape, leaving an opposing pilot unsure if a superior type of plane was about to be engaged. This scheme also allowed for a degree of camouflage both while the plane was in the air and when it was on the ground, particularly when a lightly painted aircraft belly was viewed against a light sky or when the green aspect of the same airplane parked on a grass field was seen from above.

Airfields were camouflaged to avoid enemy air strikes. An advanced airfield, for example, might be obscured by having camouflage netting extend a wheat field onto one of the runways and having another runway appear as a football field delineated by steel-wool "ditches." Troops might even play sports on the airfield to help deceive enemy reconnaissance.

Not one but two soldiers. The sniper on the left is wearing regular fatigues, while the one on the right is in camouflaged clothing so as to blend in with the terrain, 1942. (Library of Congress)

Although the aim was to avoid detection, obscuring clear identification often might suffice. For instance, the multiangular paint scheme in varying shades of gray that was applied to many naval vessels during the war served to confuse an enemy's determination of the vessels' speed and bearing rather than render them invisible. By diminishing torpedo or gunfire accuracy, a ship had a greater chance to avoid being hit.

Army vehicles, routinely painted green, brown, or gray to blend in with fields or urban areas, often had their camouflage augmented by their crews. Camouflage netting was used to break up the distinctive outlines of many vehicles, such that a parked tank might appear like a small tree. Netting, however, worked best with stationary vehicles, artillery pieces, and logistics sites. If used on other equipment or when a vehicle was moving, nets interfered with movement and vision, and they got in the way of effective tank fire.

Deception planners went to great lengths to create mock airfields and ports, complete with phony ships, planes, tanks, and personnel. Camouflage was incorporated into these plans; for example, simulated equipment was camouflaged to make it appear more authentic. Occasionally, such camouflage would intentionally be poorly applied: if it was too effective, the enemy might not have seen the phony equipment at all, negating the

deception effort. False sites drew many German air strikes during the July 10–-September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain.

A form of electronic camouflage was required as radar and radio interception expertise advanced. This type of camouflage normally took the form of maintaining radio silence to avoid detection. In the absence of stealth technology, however, it was easier to deceive radars through electronic camouflage than to conceal the target. In 1944, for example, German radars were tricked into believing that Calais was the target of Operation OVERLORD when small towed barges with electronic emitters gave off the radar reflection of approaching 20,000-ton amphibious ships.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, always interested in military gadgetry, was a great supporter of camouflage efforts, although his efforts in this field met with varying degrees of success. For instance, attempts to deny the Germans navigation landmarks by concealing inland lakes with coal dust failed: the dust blew to the edges and outlined the lakes, making them even more prominent. Churchill also insisted that factories be concealed with smoke, a technique that depended largely on wind conditions and adversely affected the workers involved. The Germans also frequently used smoke in an effort to obscure the targets of Allied air raids.

As the war progressed, increasingly technical reconnaissance and surveillance efforts and subsequent countermeasures forced intelligence staffs to confirm reports through more than one information source in their attempts to defeat complex camouflage problems.

ROBERT B. MARTYN

See also

Britain, Battle of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Deception; Photoreconnaissance

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Campioni, Inigo (1878–1944)

Italian admiral executed for treason by Italy's fascist regime. Born in Viareggio, Italy, on November 14, 1878, Inigo Campioni attended the naval academy at Livorno (Leghorn), graduating in 1896. He fought in the 1911–1912 war with the Ottoman Empire and served aboard a battleship during much of World War I. At the end of the latter conflict, he was a highly decorated destroyer commander.

In the interwar period, Campioni led naval design programs at the La Spezia weapons laboratory, served as naval attaché in Paris, and held various Naval Supreme Command staff posts. In 1936, he was promoted to full admiral, and two years later, he became vice chief of staff of the Italian Navy. In 1939, he was elected to the Italian senate.

Regarded as his country's most promising naval officer, Campioni was appointed to operational command of Italy's battle fleet at the beginning of World War II. He led the fleet in a number of engagements against the British in the Mediterranean, notably the Battle of Calabria (Punta Stilo) on July 9, 1940, and the Battle of Cape Teulada (Spartivento) on November 27, 1940. In the latter engagement, Campioni failed to intercept two converging British convoys. His superior naval force was hampered by poor Italian reconnaissance and by the failure of Italian air cover to materialize for well over an hour after the start of the battle. Campioni was subjected to intense criticism for his lack of aggressiveness, especially on those rare occasions when his fleet outgunned the opponent. On December 8, 1940, he was relieved of operational command and made deputy chief of staff of the Naval Supreme Command.

In July 1941, Campioni was assigned to command Axis forces in the Dodecanese Islands. After Italy's surrender to the Allies on September 8, 1943, he was contacted by the British and urged to resist German attempts to establish control over the Aegean region. Although Italian forces on Rhodes resisted the German takeover, they were compelled to surrender on September 11, 1943.

The Germans held Campioni prisoner at Schokken (Skoki) in Poland until January 1944, when he was turned over to Benito Mussolini's puppet Italian Social Republic in northern Italy and jailed in Verona. Tried at Parma for treason, Campioni was found guilty and executed there by fascist authorities

on May 24, 1944. In November 1947, the Italian government honored Campioni by posthumously awarding him the Gold Medal for Military Valor.

GORDON E. HOGG AND JOHN P. VANZO

See also

Calabria, Battle of; Italy, Navy

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Canada

Located in northern North America, Canada encompasses 3,854,085 square miles. Its population on the eve of World War II was 11,267,000. The nation stretches from the Atlantic Ocean in the east to the Pacific Ocean in the west; it shares a long border with the United States to the south and the northwest; to the northeast lies Greenland, just across Baffin Bay and the Davis Strait. Canada is a parliamentary-style democracy; the British monarch serves as head of state although the country is entirely autonomous and a member of the British Commonwealth (Commonwealth of Nations). Arguably the greatest contributor, militarily and economically, of the "small" Allied powers in World War II, Canada put almost 10 percent of its population—slightly over 1 million men and women—into uniform and provided the fourth-largest output of war matériel.

Production of 500-pound bombs during the war at a factory in Canada. (Library of Congress)

Canada entered the war superficially united, but French Canadian support was lukewarm, and the specter of overseas conscription, which had been so divisive in World War I, loomed. Because Canada's military contribution could not be decisive, conscription remained a political issue, and its potential for wrecking national unity could not be overestimated.

Prewar isolationism had left Canada virtually disarmed, but when Canadian leaders declared war a week after Britain (a pointed display of their country's status as a completely self-governing dominion), they were confident that a military effort on the scale of World War I would be unnecessary. This time, Ottawa promised to match commitments to resources and make the economic sinews of war, not expeditionary forces, its priority. Predictably, this "limited liabilities" policy did not survive the defeat of France in 1940. Thereafter, for Canada, it would be total war.

On the economic front, after some faltering steps, the results were magnificent. Underutilized capacity, the country's bane during the depression, aided the government in its task of mobilizing the war economy. Coming up with the staggering sums to pay for it all proved to be an equal challenge. American neutrality—and Britain's precarious economic and financial position—greatly complicated Ottawa's task, a situation finally

resolved by the Hyde Park agreement signed with the United States in April 1941 that allowed American-produced war materials made in Canada for Britain to be included in the Lend-Lease agreement. By 1944, the gross national product (GNP) had more than doubled, with 50 percent of that figure being war production.

Although foodstuffs and vital raw materials such as nickel and aluminum dominated Canada's wartime exports to the United States and Britain, the production of armaments—including close to 1 million motor vehicles—was also significant. Sound management and the advantages of virtual economic integration with the United States ensured that Canada, alone among the Allies, avoided having to seek Lend-Lease assistance; it even launched its own generous Mutual Assistance Program, with Britain the chief beneficiary.

Given these important contributions to the common cause, Canadian officials aspired to play a role in Allied decision making. Canada more than earned its appointment to the Combined Food and Production and Resources Boards in 1943, but when it came to grand military strategy, vague hopes of "sitting at the table" went unfulfilled. Ottawa accepted its status as a junior partner gracefully, though, if somewhat reluctantly.

From the outset, Prime Minister Mackenzie King's focus had been to help Britain, an approach the great majority of Canadians embraced. Doing so necessitated close cooperation—especially economic cooperation—with the United States. The presumption that Canada could serve as a linchpin between Washington and London was a Canadian conceit, although certainly a neutral United States could materially assist Britain by helping Canada. Once the United States entered the war in late 1941, however, direct engagement with the British rendered Canada's erstwhile diplomatic role superfluous. Nonetheless, U.S.-Canadian ties deepened steadily for reasons of mutual benefit. With a war to win, few Canadians worried about the long-term implications of this shift in regard to their sovereignty.

In military terms, Canada boasted the fourth-largest air force and third-largest navy among the Allies by 1945 as well as an expeditionary force of nearly six divisions. In keeping with the country's Atlanticist orientation, Ottawa committed virtually the entire force to Europe. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Pacific war, except for some panic after Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), hardly touched the Canadian consciousness.

Nationalism dictated that the government follow a Canadianization policy

whereby the armed forces would, as far as possible, fight in recognizable national units under national command. At the same time, the English Canadian majority's undiminished emotional attachment to Britain, not to mention practical considerations, guaranteed that these forces would operate under overall British command and fight in British campaigns—in other words, the military-political relationship formalized in 1917 and 1918 would continue.

Unfortunately, Canadianization proved to be a mixed blessing. On one hand, it satisfied (and encouraged) national pride and unquestionably aided the voluntary enlistment system. On the other, the limited availability of experienced Canadian commanders—and particularly in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) the inability of domestic industry to produce technically sophisticated armaments in a timely fashion—exacerbated the enormous growing pains experienced by the rapidly expanding armed forces. Finally, until mid-1943, nationalism also dictated that the army not be split up, a decision that denied the army necessary combat experience.

Canada's military role was that of willing subordinate. Building armed forces in wartime guarantees a steep learning curve, and Canada's experience bears this out. In 1939, the Canadian regular forces numbered 10,000. At peak strength in 1944, 780,000 Canadians were in uniform: 80,000 in the RCN, 210,000 in the RCAF, and the remainder in the army. The achievements of the army in Italy, Normandy, the Scheldt, and the liberation of Holland; of the RCAF's administration of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan as well as participation in 6 Group and throughout RAF Bomber Command; and of the RCN in convoy operations in the Battle of the Atlantic all materially contributed to the Allied victory, at a cost of 42,000 Canadian dead.

Canada's role in the war, both militarily and economically, was far more significant than non-Canadians have credited over the years. That said, the major impact of Canadian participation was on Canada itself. The war rebuilt the Canadian economy, witnessed the implementation of overdue socioeconomic reforms, and greatly strengthened the sense of nationhood and national self-confidence. Isolationism gave way to internationalism, and the country emerged from the conflict well placed to do more than its share in the immediate postwar years to rebuild and defend Western Europe.

PATRICK H. BRENNAN

See also

Canada, Air Force; Canada, Army; Canada, Navy; King, William Lyon Mackenzie

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Canada, Air Force

Canada had virtually no air force before World War II but developed one quickly. When the war began in Europe in September 1939, the Canadian government agreed to help train Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots, leading to the development of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Through it, some 130,000 pilots and aircrew from Canada, Britain, and other Allied nations were trained at Canadian airfields built or enlarged with British and, later, American assistance. The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) itself grew to more than 250,000 personnel.

A Hawker Hurricane fighter aircraft and its Royal Canadian Air Force ground crew, 1943. (Corel)

Thousands of Canadian pilots and aircrew served in the RAF, often in fighter or bomber squadrons composed entirely of Canadians. Ultimately, the RCAF sent 48 squadrons and 94,000 personnel overseas. In the European theater, RCAF squadrons fought in the Battle of Britain, in Malta, in the campaigns of the Western Desert, and over Europe. In the Pacific theater, two Canadian transport squadrons served in Burma, and a squadron of Consolidated PBY Catalina patrol bombers was based at Ceylon. The RCAF also provided air defense for Canada and assisted in the defense of U.S. installations in Alaska.

In June 1941, the RCAF formed its first bomber squadron. Its Number 6 Group of eight squadrons was formed in Britain in January 1943, flying Wellington bombers from Yorkshire and then Lancaster and Halifax bombers. The group flew 41,000 sorties and dropped 126,000 tons of bombs, one-eighth of Bomber Command's total. It suffered 3,500 dead. In all, 17,101 Canadian aircrew died in the war, some 40 percent of Canada's total war dead.

RCAF pilots also played an important role in ferrying American-built aircraft to the British Isles. Air Commodore N. R. Anderson of the RCAF had lobbied for the ferrying of aircraft in April 1940, arguing that it would save valuable shipping space. The idea languished until the British minister of war production, Lord Beaverbrook, gave it his support and insisted on an

experimental flight. This flight took place in November 1940, when a group of Hudsons crossed the Atlantic from Newfoundland without loss.

Regular transfers continued, slowly at first because of a shortage of pilots and navigators but gaining momentum when increasing numbers of graduates of the Air Training Plan became available. Ultimately, the RCAF delivered more than 9,000 two- and four-engine aircraft to Britain in this manner. Subsequently, the RCAF also supplied Lend-Lease aircraft to the Soviet Union from airfields in northwest Canada. Many of the routes developed in this activity became the first routes of Trans-Canada Airlines after the war.

TERRY SHOPTAUGH

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aitken, William Maxwell; Great Britain, Air Force; Lend-Lease

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Canada, Army

Surmounting serious difficulties, Canada raised a substantial army that earned distinction in heavy fighting during World War II. In July 1939, the Permanent Active Militia, as it was then called, was a minuscule force of 4,261 soldiers. Reserves, most of them untrained, numbered 51,418 men. But by 1943, a prodigious effort produced six infantry divisions, two armored divisions, two armored brigades, two army artillery groups, an immense logistics organization, and the Canadian Women's Army Corps—a remarkable achievement for a nation of some 11.3 million people.

Initially, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King pursued a strategy that emphasized industrial and agricultural production, air and naval forces, and a small expeditionary ground force of two divisions. This strategy reflected the fundamental antagonism between English and Scottish Protestant Canadians and French Roman Catholic Canadians, with

the French minority constituting a quarter of the population. Efforts to impose conscription in 1917, during World War I, had sparked serious rioting, proved unenforceable in French communities, and pushed Canada to the brink of civil war. Understandably, the Canadian government in World War II was unwilling to risk such a crisis again. The conflict was sharpened by English and Scottish domination of the armed forces and officer corps.

This limited strategy was shattered by the German conquest of France in June 1940. All Canadian resources were mobilized for total war by the sweeping National Resources Mobilization Act of June 17, 1940. But compulsory military service was restricted to service in Canada; overseas service remained voluntary. Three infantry divisions were stationed on the coasts of Canada. Many French Canadians were willing to defend Canada, but few were willing to fight for Great Britain. Four French Canadian infantry regiments did have sufficient volunteers for overseas service, however.

In July 1940, Major General Henry Crerar assumed the post of chief of the General Staff. A capable administrator, he organized the framework within which the vastly expanded Canadian Army swiftly emerged. By December 1940, two Canadian infantry divisions formed the Canadian Corps in England. In June 1943, the Canadian Army in England numbered three infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and two armored brigades.

The Canadian Army was organized on the British model, and much of its equipment was also British. Rugged and accurate, the .303-caliber Lee Enfield No. 4 was the standard bolt-action rifle. Adapted by Enfield from a Czech design, the low-recoil and accurate Bren .303-caliber light machine gun proved effective. By 1942, 60 percent of all Bren guns were manufactured in Canada. The Mk-II 25-pounder (87.6mm) gun-howitzer—rugged, easily handled, and versatile—and the Mk-III 5.5-inch (140mm) medium gun, introduced in 1941, were the major artillery weapons. The Canadians did employ the U.S. M-4 Sherman as their tank.

The Canadian Army had to contend with serious difficulties. Undermanning was a constant problem, with Canadian units rarely at their established strength, a consequence of the voluntary system. Training suffered from the rapid pace of expansion and the lack of experience among senior officers. In addition, training in unit-level maneuvers was poor, and the army was slow to develop a common system of tactics.

An early tragedy of the war involved the Canadian garrison in Hong Kong. Caught up in the sweep of the opening Japanese offensive, 1,975 soldiers waged a forlorn defense in December 1941, suffering 800 casualties and the death of their commander. The Canadians also sustained heavy losses in the August 19, 1942, raid on the French seaport of Dieppe. A total of 4,963 Canadians from the 2nd Division took part and encountered well-planned German defenses. Only 2,110 of these men returned to England; 65 percent of the Canadian troops were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.

A Canadian soldier receives attention from a medical orderly next to a burning overturned German tank amid heavy rubble, while Allied forces attempt to trap the German Seventh Army in nearby Falaise, France, August 1944. (Library of Congress)

On July 10, 1943, the Canadian 1st Infantry Division and 1st Army Tank Brigade were committed to the invasion of Sicily, operating as part of the British Eighth Army. On September 3, the Canadians crossed the Straits of Messina to Italy and fought their way up the Adriatic coast. In November, they were joined by the 5th Armoured Division and formed the Canadian I Corps. Initially the corps was led by Crerar, but he returned to England and assumed command of the First Army in March 1944. The Canadian First Army fought within the framework of 21st Army Group, commanded by

Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery. Lieutenant General Eedson L. M. Burns then took command of Canadian forces in Italy.

In the heavy and often frustrating fighting of the 1943–1945 Italian Campaign, the Canadians acquitted themselves well. In May 1944, Canadian forces in the Liri Valley participated in the Allied offensive that broke through the Gustav Line. In August 1944, a Canadian thrust near the Adriatic created an opportunity to move into the Po River Valley, but the British moved too slowly, and the chance was lost.

In the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944, the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division and 2nd Armoured Brigade landed on Juno beach as part of the British Second Army. Joined by the 2nd Infantry and 4th Armoured Divisions, they formed the Canadian II Corps on July 11, commanded by Lieutenant General Guy Simonds. He had led both infantry and armored divisions in Italy. On July 23, 1944, the Canadian First Army was activated, led by General Crerar. It also included British I Corps and the Free Polish 1st Armored Division.

The battle for Normandy was a crucible of fire for the Canadians. They and the British were deployed in the eastern sector of the beachhead, terrain reasonably favorable for German armored operations. To thwart offensives in this area, most German armor fought the British and Canadians. Canadian forces proved well trained and skilled in combat and played a key role in the defeat of a formidable German opponent. In Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, the Canadian Army found an outstanding leader who proved to be an innovative and exacting commander. Crerar and Simonds were good partners, with Crerar the manager and Simonds the battlefield leader.

After Normandy, the First Army proceeded along the French coast taking seaports. On September 4, 1944, the British 11th Armoured Division captured the vital port of Antwerp, with the Belgian Resistance saving all its port facilities and docks from German destruction. However, Antwerp could only be reached by the 45-mile-long Scheldt estuary, and swift action was imperative to prevent German deployment of defenses along the Scheldt. At this critical juncture, British field marshal Bernard L. Montgomery halted his forces, preferring to concentrate his troops for a thrust into northern Germany, Operation MARKET-GARDEN. This decision gave the Germans time to establish strong defenses along the Scheldt and at its mouth.

After the defeat at Arnhem in late September, the strategic focus returned

to ousting German forces from the Scheldt and opening Antwerp. This daunting task fell heavily on the Canadian First Army. On September 26, Crerar had departed to England for treatment of complications from dysentery, and Simonds assumed command.

The Scheldt battles (October–November 1944) were a nightmare, fought on sodden mud flatlands bereft of cover and intersected by canals and dikes ideally suited for defense. Montgomery assigned the Canadians the lowest priority for supplies, and only a direct and explicit order on October 9 from General Dwight D. Eisenhower to clear the Scheldt compelled Montgomery to furnish the Canadians (including their British corps) the supplies they needed.

Throughout October, bitter fighting raged as Canadian and British soldiers slowly overcame tenacious German resistance. Amphibious tanks and tracked amphibious landing vehicles proved useful. Equipped for amphibious operations, the 52nd Lowland Scottish Division joined the Canadians in this battle.

The assault on Walcheren Island was the climax of the campaign. Commanding the mouth of the Scheldt estuary, Walcheren's defenses included heavy coastal artillery. Royal marines and commandos joined Scots and Canadians to capture Walcheren on November 9. Minesweepers cleared the channel, and Antwerp was finally opened on November 28, 1944. The Scheldt fighting cost the Allies 12,873 casualties, half of them Canadian.

In December, a shortage of infantry replacements compelled the Canadian government to extend conscription for overseas service to troops already in home service. This move aroused a furor, but only 16,000 of 63,000 eligible soldiers were sent overseas. When Crerar returned to lead the First Army, he was entrusted with an Allied force of 475,000 men dedicated to winning control of the Rhineland. In a series of massive operations in February and March 1945, Crerar demonstrated his skill in logistics. German forces were eliminated between the Maas and Rhine Rivers, a loss of more than 90,000 men. In the closing months of the war, the Canadian I Corps was transferred from Italy to the Netherlands and completed the liberation of the latter.

The Canadian Army made a substantial contribution to the Allied victory. The men of this overwhelmingly volunteer force had fought with courage and tenacity in many hard battles. But they also paid a heavy price, for 22,917 Canadians were killed and 52,679 wounded.

See also

Burns, Eedson Louis Millard; Canada; Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; Dieppe Raid; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hong Kong, Battle of; Italy Campaign; King, William Lyon Mac-kenzie; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Rhineland Offensive; Scheldt, Battles of the; Sicily, Invasion of; Simonds, Guy Granville

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Canada, Navy

At the outbreak of World War II, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) consisted of 6 destroyers, 5 minesweepers, and 2 small training ships. During the war, it underwent rapid expansion, astonishing for a nation of only 11.3 million people. By 1945, the Canadian Navy was the third-largest Allied navy in number of warships. Its core force consisted of 2 light carriers, 2 light cruisers, 15 destroyers, 60 frigates, and 118 corvettes. In all, it counted a total of 363 vessels, most of which were built in Canadian shipyards. Yards on the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes, and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts produced 70 frigates, 122 corvettes, 194 minesweepers, and numerous trawlers, motor torpedo boats, motor launches, and landing craft. From a permanent force of 1,774 men and 2,083 reserves on the outbreak of war in September 1939, the RCN expanded to some 100,000 personnel (6,700 of them women) by the end of the war in 1945.

Throughout the war, the RCN's primary function was convoy protection. In the gale-swept North Atlantic, RCN ships played a crucial role in the long struggle against German submarines. Having expanded so rapidly, however, the RCN suffered from poor training as well as a dearth of advanced equipment. Early in 1943, Canadian corvettes and frigates were sent to British bases, where they were fitted with new radar, sonar, and high-frequency direction-finding detection gear. In addition, the crews underwent intensive training in antisubmarine tactics and warfare. Of particular value was the Western Approaches Tactical Unit established in Liverpool in February 1942, which trained escort captains and commanders in a common doctrine of convoy defense. Practical training was provided by exercises against Royal Navy submarines. By mid-1943, the Canadians fought much more effectively in the Atlantic arena. As radio interception and the breaking of German codes assumed major roles in the war against the submarines, the RCN Operational Intelligence Centre proved to be a key Canadian capability.

The Canadians organized the massive convoys that set out from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. In 1943 the ocean area off Canada and Newfoundland, which had been under British and then U.S. strategic control, became a strictly Canadian theater under Rear Admiral Leonard W. Murray, commander in chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic. He now controlled all Allied ships and aircraft involved in protecting Allied convoys in the region.

In 1944 Rear Admiral (later vice admiral) George C. Johnes replaced Vice Admiral Percy Nelles as chief of the naval staff. By 1944 also, Canadian ships were providing a majority of close escort in the North Atlantic convoys. In all, the RCN provided eight mid-Atlantic support groups and escorted more than 25,000 merchant ship voyages with 180 million tons of cargo from North America to Great Britain.

Built to a British design stressing mass production, the Flower-class corvette was the mainstay of the escort fleet. Displacing 1,245 tons at full load, this ship was armed with a 4-inch gun and 40 (later 70) depth charges. The Flower-class ships proved to be miserable high seas vessels, however, taking on water and rolling furiously, and at 16.5 knots, they were too slow for offensive operations. A far more effective escort was the River-class frigate, weighing 1,920 tons at full load. The River-class ship could make 21 knots and mounted two 4-inch guns, a Hedgehog mortar, and 126 (later 150) depth charges.

While protecting the Allied convoys was the chief Canadian contribution to the war effort, the RCN made significant contributions in other areas. Canadian destroyers assisted in the May 26–June 4, 1940, Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation of Allied soldiers from France and then protected Allied merchant ships in British waters. Three passenger liners were converted into auxiliary cruisers to help hunt down Axis commerce raiders in the North Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the North Pacific.

The acquisition of four large British Tribal-class destroyers (the *Athabaskan*, *Haida*, *Huron*, and *Iroquois*) gave the RCN additional capability for surface warfare operations. At full load, the Tribals displaced 2,519 tons (later 2,710 tons) and easily made 36 knots. Formidably armed for their size, they mounted six 4.7-inch guns, two 4-inch dual-purpose guns, and four 40mm antiaircraft weapons. They also carried four torpedo tubes. Two other Tribals (the *Micmac* and *Nootka*) were launched at Halifax in 1943 and 1944, respectively. The Canadian Tribal-class ships saw heavy action, especially in the spring of 1944 in the English Channel against German destroyers and heavy torpedo boats (900-plus tons). In the course of these battles, the *Athabaskan* was lost on April 29, 1944.

The RCN contributed 17 corvettes to Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of Northwest Africa, which commenced on November 8, 1942. RCN ships also played a considerable part in the Normandy Invasion (June 6, 1944). Some 10,000 officers and seamen and 109 RCN warships participated in Operation NEPTUNE, landing 45,000 troops on the beaches. The Canadian contribution included 15 destroyers, 11 frigates, 19 corvettes, 16 minesweepers, and 30 landing craft.

In 1944, the Canadians acquired two British light aircraft carriers, the *Magnificent* and *Warrior* (displacing 14,000 and 13,350 tons, respectively). Both saw action overseas, with the RCN thereby acquiring valuable experience in naval aviation. Their 40 aircraft were wholly British, however. The RCN also secured two light cruisers from Britain, the *Uganda* (in August 1941) and the *Ontario* (in July 1943). The *Uganda* took part in the Okinawa invasion (March–June 1945).

In the course of the war, the RCN lost 24 ships sunk and 2,024 men killed. At the same time, the RCN played an important role in the Allied victory by destroying or capturing 42 Axis surface warships and helping sink 33 submarines.

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Canada; Convoys, Allied; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation

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Canaris, Wilhelm Franz (1887–1945)

German Navy admiral. Born in Aplerbeck, Westphalia, Germany, on January 1, 1887, Wilhelm Franz Canaris entered the German Navy in 1905. Serving aboard the cruiser *Dresden* off the South American coast at the beginning of World War I, he established an intelligence network to track Allied movements. From November 1915 until October 1916, he was in Spain on an intelligence mission. In April 1918, he took command of a U-boat in the Mediterranean.

Following the war, Canaris, an ardent conservative and nationalist, was active in covert operations to rebuild the German military, specifically working in Japan with German designers to build submarines. He then resumed his naval career, increasingly in intelligence activities. Promoted to captain in 1931, he took command of the battleship *Schlesien* the next year. He was named to head German military intelligence—the Abwehrabteilung (Abwehr)—in January 1935 and was promoted to rear admiral that April. One of his first successes was convincing German chancellor Adolf Hitler to intervene on the side of the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939).

Canaris became disillusioned after the Fritsch Affair in 1938, when untruthful allegations of homosexual activities were brought against Colonel General Werner von Fritsch because of his opposition to Hitler's announced plans for war. Shortly thereafter, the Abwehr became tied to anti-Nazi elements in Germany. Canaris believed that Hitler's policies would lead to inevitable German defeat. Despite the admiral's reticence, Hitler personally liked him, and the Abwehr provided much useful information, all of which gave Canaris some protection as he aided a limited number of Jews and covertly undermined German attempts to involve Spain in the war. Canaris was promoted to full admiral in January 1940.

Canaris resisted efforts by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office), to take over the Abwehr, but his position was threatened when Heydrich uncovered evidence that Canaris had committed treason. Heydrich's assassination in May 1942 provided a brief reprieve for the admiral, and it was not until February 1944 that Hitler removed him from his post. Shortly thereafter, Canaris was placed on the navy's inactive list. Canaris lived under a loose but comfortable house arrest at Burg Lauenstein until June, when Hitler recalled him to Berlin as head of mercantile warfare.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of German military intelligence (the Abwehr) during World War II. Canaris actively opposed German leader Adolf Hitler, believing he would lead Germany to defeat. Implicated in a plot against Hitler, he was executed in April 1945. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Implicated in the July 1944 bomb plot against Hitler (although he did not take an active role), Canaris was arrested afterward. Initially there was no evidence against him, but discovery of his secret diaries led to his trial and conviction. Canaris was hanged at Flossenburg Prison on April 9, 1945.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Fritsch, Werner Thomas Ludwig von; Germany, Navy; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot

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Cape Bon, Battle of (December 13, 1941)

Mediterranean Sea naval action between units of the Italian Navy and the Royal Navy. In November and early December 1941, British surface, air, and submarine forces operating from Malta enjoyed considerable success against Axis shipping to North Africa, sinking about two-thirds of the matériel dispatched and in the process sparking a supply crisis there. The Italian Navy responded by using destroyers and light cruisers to transport gasoline to Africa.

On December 12, 1941, Vice Admiral A. Toscano sailed from Palermo, Sicily, bound for Tripoli with the light cruisers *Alberico Da Barbiano* and *Alberto Di Giussano*, accompanied by the torpedo boat *Cigno.* Each of the cruisers carried 950 tons of aviation fuel in cans stacked on their decks and superstructures.

Signals intelligence provided the British advance notice of this important sailing, and Vice Admiral Wilbraham Ford commanding at Malta planned to attack the Italian cruisers at dawn with torpedo bombers. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla under Commander Graham Henry Stokes, comprising the *Sikh*, *Maori*, and *Legion* and the Dutch destroyer *Isaac Sweers*, happened to be en route from Gibraltar to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet in Alexandria. When Stokes was informed of events, he increased speed in hopes of intercepting the Italian ships.

The British destroyers proceeded along the African coast, staying in French waters to avoid Axis minefields. At 3:02 a.m. on December 13 as they approached Cape Bon, lookouts spotted flashing lights that disappeared behind the promontory. The *Sikh*, followed by the *Legion*, *Maori*, and *Isaac Sweers*, rounded the cape in pursuit. Toscano, meanwhile, heard aircraft above his formation and assumed that the British had found him. The volatile nature of his cargo made him cautious, and he decided to abort his mission. The Italian warships executed a simultaneous turnabout, which positioned the *Cigno* to the formation's rear and put the Italians on a collision course with the Allied destroyers.

The British were inshore and hidden against the dark mass of the land, while the Italians were silhouetted against the horizon; thus, the British made the first sighting, and at 3:23 a.m. the *Sikh* fired four torpedoes at the *Da Barbiano* from 1,500 yards. Within a minute two torpedoes slammed into its hull, and the Italian flagship erupted in flames. By this time more torpedoes were streaming toward the Italians, and the Allied warships also opened fire with their guns.

As two more torpedoes hit the *Da Barbiano*, the *Di Giussano* fired three 6-inch salvos, but the rapidly converging destroyers were difficult targets, and the shells exploded ashore. At 3:27 a.m. a torpedo hit the *Di Giussano* amidships, along with two 4.7-inch shells and a stream of machine-gun fire. There was a massive explosion, and the cruiser swerved and lost way.

The *Cigno* launched a torpedo and opened fire as the Allied ships passed. The Italians incorrectly claimed several hits. The Dutch destroyer *Isaac Sweers* in turn targeted the torpedo boat, straddling it and launching four torpedoes, all of which missed. The Allied destroyers continued south at high speed, leaving the *Da Barbiano* sinking in a sea of flames and the *Di Giussano* waging a losing fight against uncontrollable fires. Toscano and more than 900 of his men died. The *Cigno* rescued survivors and returned to Sicily.

The Battle of Cape Bon was an embarrassing Italian defeat. Tactically, Toscano could not have picked a worse time to reverse course, and he should have kept the *Cigno* in the lead. But the real mistake was using cruisers as gasoline transports, which left them excessively vulnerable.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Convoys, Axis; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Signals Intelligence

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Cape Esperance, Battle of (October 11–12, 1942)

The second of five major surface actions fought off Guadalcanal. The battle occurred eight miles west-northwest of Savo Island as U.S. and Japanese forces maneuvered to protect their reinforcements moving toward Guadalcanal.

U.S. Navy rear admiral Norman Scott led Task Force 64, consisting of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and five destroyers. Scott's mission was to protect transports carrying the U.S. Army's 164th Infantry Regiment to Guadalcanal by searching for and attacking Japanese ships. Scott's crews had just undergone three hard weeks of night training, and the admiral was fully prepared to engage in a night action, in which the Japanese had hitherto enjoyed superiority. Scott had developed simple tactics and rehearsed them, keeping his crews at station from dusk to dawn. His ships operated in a single column, with destroyers forward and aft of his cruisers.

Japanese rear admiral Goto Aritomo commanded a bombardment group, Cruiser Division 6, comprising three heavy cruisers and two destroyers. It protected Rear Admiral Joshima Takagi's two seaplane carriers and six destroyers transporting to Guadalcanal some 700 men and artillery of Lieutenant General Hyakutake Haruyashi's Seventeenth Army. Goto planned to shell Henderson Field to neutralize the U.S. air threat while Joshima landed the reinforcements off the northwestern cape of Guadalcanal.

U.S. aircraft tracked Goto's force as he approached, although communication miscues aboard the U.S. ships nearly rendered that advantage moot. Goto and Joshima did not expect opposition, and preoccupied with navigation and preparations for the Henderson Field bombardment, they ignored indications that U.S. vessels were nearby. Lacking radar, the Japanese blundered into the Americans. Their lookouts did spot the U.S. ships and identify them as enemy, but Goto believed they were friendly and flashed recognition signals.

At 11:25 p.m. on October 11, U.S. radar from the light cruiser *Helena* first picked up the Japanese, but Scott, on the flagship heavy cruiser *San Francisco,* did not learn of this before he ordered his ships to turn at 11:30 p.m. Eight minutes later, while his formation was still in some mild disorder from the turn, Scott received his first radar indication. Initially, he believed

that this came from his own destroyers out of formation. Fortunately for Scott and the Americans, the turn inadvertently allowed the U.S. ships to cross the T of Goto's approaching ships. The *Helena* opened fire at 11:46 p.m. at 3,600 yards, quickly followed by the other cruisers. Surprise was total, and Goto believed that Joshima's ships were shooting at him.

The U.S. guns pounded the Japanese ships. Among the casualties was Goto, mortally wounded. Before his death he ordered his force to withdraw, and a running gunfire duel followed. The Japanese heavy cruiser *Furutaka* and the destroyer *Fubuki* were sent to the bottom. The heavy cruiser *Aoba* was badly damaged and would require four months to repair. In an associated action on October 12, aircraft from Henderson Field sank the Japanese destroyers *Murakumo* and *Natsugumo*, which were searching for survivors.

On the U.S. side, the destroyer *Duncan* was sunk, the cruiser *Boise* was heavily damaged, the cruiser *Salt Lake City* was lightly damaged, and the destroyer *Farenholt* was damaged. Meanwhile, Henderson Field had been spared Japanese shelling, and U.S. morale soared, especially as Scott claimed that his force sank three cruisers, five destroyers, and a transport.

Despite their tactical defeat, the Japanese did land their troops and supplies safely, as did the Americans on October 13. Because the Japanese had not successfully employed their torpedoes in the Battle of Cape Esperance, the Americans discounted their effectiveness. U.S. Navy leaders also incorrectly concluded that using the single-column formation and gunfire was the way to fight at night. This approach slighted the destroyers' main battery, the torpedo, and effectively tied the destroyers to the cruisers.

JOHN W. WHITMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Hyakutake Haruyoshi; Radar; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Torpedoes

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Cape Matapan, Battle of (March 28, 1941)

Naval battle between British and Italian forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Despite crippling fuel shortages, on the urging of its German allies units of the Italian Navy set out on March 26, 1941, to attack British convoys around Crete. Commanded by Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino, the Italian force included the battleship *Vittorio Veneto;* the heavy cruisers *Trieste, Trento, Bolzano, Zara, Fiume*, and *Pola;* the light cruisers *Luigi di Savoia* and *Garibaldi;* and 17 destroyers. On March 27, Royal Navy forces under Vice Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham (Force A), alerted by key radio intercepts of the Italian movements, steamed from Alexandria to join Vice Admiral Henry D. Pridham-Wippell (Force B), already in the Aegean, in search of the Italian force, although the British were not certain of its exact composition or mission.

At 6:35 a.m. on March 28, Italian aircraft spotted Pridham-Wippell's force, which consisted of four light cruisers and four destroyers, and shortly before 8:00 a.m., Rear Admiral Luigi Sansonetti's 3rd Division, with three heavy cruisers, made contact south of Crete and proceeded to chase the British squadron until 8:55 a.m., firing more than 500 rounds at long ranges but failing to obtain any hits.

Fearing that Sansonetti was sailing into a trap, Iachino ordered the 3rd Division to reverse course and concentrate on his flagship. When the Italian division turned away, Pridham-Wippell likewise came about and followed. Iachino then maneuvered to trap the British between his battleship and his cruisers. At 10:55 a.m., the *Vittorio Veneto* came in range and opened fire from 25,000 yards. The British cruisers immediately made smoke and fled south.

All this time, Cunningham's battleships and the carrier *Formidable* were forging up from Alexandria. Cunningham had already launched a strike of six

Albacore aircraft to assist his cruisers. Iachino suspected that there were more British forces about but had no firm intelligence.

The Italians obtained several straddles and near hits on Pridham-Wippell's ships but no actual hits. At 11:15 a.m., the *Vittorio Veneto* gave up the chase just as the British air strike arrived. The planes attacked through an intense antiaircraft barrage, but all their torpedoes missed astern.

In steady pursuit 40 miles back, Cunningham's task force, joined by Pridham-Wippell's Force B, followed Iachino's ships. It consisted of the *Formidable* and the battleships *Warspite, Valiant,* and *Barham* with 4 cruisers and 13 destroyers, bolstered by British aircraft from nearby shore bases, which conducted six separate attacks.

The Italians received little useful air cover from their own air force or that of the Germans and suffered accordingly. Despite withering antiaircraft fire from the *Vittorio Veneto* and escorting ships, in their second attack British Albacores from the *Formidable* torpedoed the Italian battleship at 3:10 p.m. on March 28.

Cunningham judged that the progress of the Italian force, now drawn in around its wounded flagship, would likely be slow, and he plotted it at about 12 knots. But despite having shipped 4,000 tons of water and making way on only two of four propellers, the *Vittorio Veneto* worked up to a speed of 19 knots and thus moved its formation farther along than expected on the run toward home waters.

With night falling, however, Iachino received the unwelcome news that the heavy cruiser *Pola* was dead in the water from torpedoes in a third air strike from the *Formidable.* Believing that the British were still far astern, he instructed the cruisers *Zara* and *Fiume* (with four destroyers) to turn back and tend to their sister ship. In fact, from a distance of less than 50 miles, Cunningham was closing as fast as his flagship, the old battleship HMS *Warspite*, and its sister ships *Valiant* and *Barham* could make way.

By 8:30 p.m. radars on the vanguard cruisers *Ajax* and *Orion* had picked up the derelict *Pola* some six miles distant; it was presumed to be the *Vittorio Veneto.* As the main British force drew closer and prepared to attack the *Pola*, an in-line formation of six more unknown ships (the *Zara* and *Fiume* and their escorts) was detected at 10:25 p.m. at 4,000 yards, which shifted the British targeting and drew a wall of concentrated fire from the British battleships' main and secondary batteries at nearly point-blank range. The

Zara and *Fiume* were reduced to flaming wrecks within minutes; the *Fiume*, along with the destroyers *Alfieri* and *Carducci*, sank within an hour. The *Zara* and *Pola* remained afloat until early the following morning, finally dispatched by scuttling charges and torpedoes from British destroyers. Some 40 miles ahead, the main body of the Italian force pressed onward, arriving in Taranto on the afternoon of March 29 after evading the renewed chase given by Cunningham.

Cunningham claimed that in the Battle of Cape Matapan the Royal Navy established primacy in the Mediterranean. The loss of five valuable warships and 2,300 lives shocked the Italian leadership, and they ordered the battle force to stay within land fighter range and avoid night battles until the fleet had radar. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini also ordered the conversion of the liner *Roma* into an aircraft carrier.

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See also

Battleships; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Radar; Sirte, First Battle of

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Cape Passero, Action off (October 12, 1940)

Mediterranean naval engagement involving the Royal Navy and the Italian Navy. On October 8, 1940, a convoy of 4 British supply ships sailed from Alexandria for Malta escorted by 4 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, 5 light cruisers, and 16 destroyers. The commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, ordered such a strong escort because 4 Italian battleships had sortied against the last Malta resupply operation.

Assisted by heavy weather, the convoy reached Malta undetected on October 11. That same day, however, an Italian aircraft reported the presence of the British warships. Italian naval headquarters responded by dispatching the 11th Destroyer Squadron of the *Geniere Aviere, Artigliere*, and *Camicia Nera* and the 1st Torpedo Boat Squadron of the *Alcione, Airone,* and *Ariel* to patrol east of Malta while the 7th Destroyer Squadron and a Motoscafo Armato Silurante (MAS or motor torpedo-boat unit) guarded the Sicilian Channel and two cruiser divisions raised steam.

The Mediterranean Fleet's main body remained south of Malta waiting to escort the empty transports back to Alexandria. The fleet's light cruisers scouted to the northeast, with the cruiser *Ajax* being the end ship on the line some 100 miles east of Malta. Meanwhile, the Italian 1st and 11th Squadrons swept west in an extended search line running north to south with 16,000 yards between the two squadrons.

At 1:35 a.m. on October 12, the *Alcione* detected the *Ajax* in bright moonlight 12 miles ahead and altered course southwest toward it. Within minutes the *Airone* and *Ariel* also spotted the enemy ship, and at 1:48 a.m. the squadron commander ordered a simultaneous torpedo attack.

At 1:55 a.m. lookouts on the *Ajax* spotted ships ahead and challenged the *Alcione,* which fired two torpedoes from under 2,000 yards. Almost at the same time the *Airone* off the British cruiser's port bow launched two torpedoes, while the *Ariel* off its starboard bow launched one. The *Ajax,* not having received the correct response to its challenge, had increased speed and altered course. This maneuver, along with Italian errors in calculating the British cruiser's speed and heading, resulted in all five torpedoes missing their target. The *Airone* closed rapidly and launched two more torpedoes from only 1,000 yards. That torpedo boat's 3.9-inch guns landed two shells on the *Ajax*'s bridge and another pieced the British ship's hull, but the torpedoes missed astern. The *Ariel* and *Alcione* opened fire as well but their aim was off, and the *Alcione* lost contact.

In response to the sudden Italian attack, the *Ajax* engaged the *Ariel* and the *Airone* with its main and secondary batteries. The first salvos crumpled the *Ariel*'s bridge and cracked its hull. The unarmored torpedo boat sank within minutes. The *Airone* tried to disengage, but a broadside of 112-pound British shells left the squadron flagship down at the stern and burning fiercely.

At 1:56 a.m. the 11th Destroyer Squadron began heading north. The *Aviere* sighted the *Ajax* at 2:10 a.m. and fired its guns, but the moon silhouetted the destroyer and made for effective shooting by the *Ajax*. Hit twice with major flooding, the *Aviere* staggered to starboard after only six minutes and lost contact. Crewmen in the *Geniere* spotted the *Ajax* at 2:18 a.m., engaged it briefly, and then withdrew. The *Artigliere* encountered the British cruiser at 2:29 a.m., and the *Ajax*, lurking unseen up-moon just a few thousand yards northeast, opened fire. The *Artigliere* launched one torpedo before an exchange of gunfire left the Italian destroyer adrift and on fire. The *Artigliere* retaliated with four shells that moderately damaged the cruiser.

The *Camicia Nera*, the southernmost Italian destroyer, came into action at 2:46 a.m., and the two opposing ships exchanged several ineffective salvos before the British cruiser reversed course and broke contact, ending the action. At 5:00 a.m. the *Camicia Nere* took the crippled *Artigliere* in tow, but at 8:40 a.m. the heavy cruiser *York* and the light cruisers *Gloucester* and *Liverpool* found and sank the *Artigliere.*

In the Battle of Cape Pessaro, the Italians lost the torpedo boats *Airone* and *Ariel* and the destroyer *Artigliere*, while the destroyer *Aviere* was severely damaged. The British cruiser *Ajax* suffered moderate damage that kept it out of action for two weeks. In the action the Italian torpedo boats had achieved surprise and attacked at point-blank range, but all their torpedoes had missed. This led Italian naval headquarters to conclude that its forces were technically inferior to the British in night actions. In fact, Italian weapons and tactics contributed to the defeat. The Italian torpedo boat commander conducted a brilliant approach, but his ships could only put five (of a maximum potential of six) torpedoes into the water. This feeble barrage was half that of one modern Allied destroyer. Then the 11th Destroyer Squadron, which possessed greater torpedo capability, never attempted to concentrate; instead its four ships presented themselves silhouetted in moonlight to the *Ajax*'s gunners one by one at close range. This proved ineffective as well as deadly.

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See also

Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Malta; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Cape Spada, Battle of (July 19, 1940)

Naval engagement on July 19, 1940, between ships of the Italian Navy and the Royal Navy. When Italian naval headquarters received intelligence that some small British tankers were leaving Romania after that nation's change of alliance and passing through the Bosporus into Greek waters, it ordered Rear Admiral Ferdinando Casardi's II Division of the light cruisers *Bande Nere* and *Colleoni* into the Aegean Sea to attack them. Casardi departed Tripoli on July 17. By chance, British warships were operating along his route, sweeping for submarines in advance of a convoy from Port Said to Greece.

At 6:17 a.m. on July 19, the Italian cruisers entered the Aegean Sea northwest of Crete, where they encountered the British 2nd Destroyer Flotilla under Captain H. St. L. Nicholson with the *Hero*, *Ilex*, *Hasty*, and *Hyperion* headed in their direction from 10 miles away. The Australian light cruiser *Sydney*, commanded by Captain John Collins, and the British destroyer *Havock* were operating independently 40 miles to the north-northeast in the Gulf of Athens.

Sighting the enemy cruisers, Nicholson's flotilla immediately turned northeast. Casardi pursued through rough seas and strong winds at 30 knots on a slightly diverging course. He naturally suspected that the destroyers were the van of a larger force and that he had stumbled upon a dangerous situation. He opened fire at 6:27 a.m. from 19,000 yards. The destroyers replied, but their salvos fell well short.

Collins received Nicholson's report of enemy contact at 6:33 a.m. and immediately turned toward it, maintaining radio silence. Rolling swells limited the cruisers to 32 knots, while mist and the morning sun made long-range spotting difficult. At 7:30 a.m., the *Sydney* arrived 20,000 yards to the

north-northeast and opened fire out of a fogbank. The Italians came about and responded with their aft turrets. Firing rapidly, the *Sydney* hit the *Bande Nere* at 7:35 a.m.

The two forces settled into a stern chase trading fire from roughly 18,000 yards. Conditions made gun laying difficult, but on the *Sydney* the Italian gunfire seemed accurate, if slow. At 8:21 a.m., a 6-inch shell holed the *Sydney*'s forward funnel. The Italians passed Cape Spada, and at 8:25 a.m., a 6-inch shell hit the *Colleoni*, jamming its rudder in the central position. Then two more British shells struck, knocking out two boilers. Fires erupted, and with the other boilers starved for water, the Italian cruiser lost way.

At 8:40 a.m., the *Ilex* discharged a torpedo salvo, and one struck, blowing off the tip of the Italian's bow. Shortly thereafter, the *Hyperion* scored a hit amidships. The *Bande Nere* circled and then at 8:50 a.m. turned west as the *Sydney*, *Hero*, and *Hasty* pursued. At 8:59 a.m., the *Colleoni* capsized and sank six miles off Cape Spada. Meanwhile, the *Sydney* hit the *Bande Nere* again but did not slow it. Finally, at 9:37 a.m., with the range slowly opening and munition supply becoming a concern, the *Sydney* broke off. The *Bande Nere* made port at Benghazi (Libya).

In the engagement, the Italian cruisers fired 500 shells, scoring no hits on the British destroyers and only one on *Sydney* during a period of three hours. The *Sydney*, fighting its third surface engagement in a month, expended 1,300 shells and obtained five long-range hits in two hours.

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See also

Aegean Sea Naval Operations; Australia, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; *Sydney*, HMAS, Sinking of

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Cape Spartivento, Battle of (November 27, 1940)

Mediterranean Sea battle between units of the British Royal Navy and the Italian Navy on November 27, 1940; the Italians know it as the Battle of Cape Teulada. After crippling three Italian battleships at Taranto on November 11, 1940, the British sought to exploit their victory by launching a major operation to reinforce Malta from both the west and east and to relocate a battleship and two cruisers from Egypt to the home islands. Elements of the British Mediterranean Fleet departed Alexandria on November 23, and Force H cleared Gibraltar two days later to escort three transports to Malta.

The Italian naval command learned that the British had major forces at sea, and Admiral Inigo Campioni sortied from Naples on November 26 with the battleships *Vittorio Veneto* and *Cesare;* the 1st Division of the heavy cruisers *Pola, Fiume,* and *Gorizia;* and the 11 destroyers of the 7th, 9th, and 13th Destroyer Squadrons. The 3rd Division of the heavy cruisers *Trieste, Trento,* and *Bolzano* and the 3 vessels of the 12th Destroyer Squadron under Rear Admiral Luigi Sansonetti left Messina the same day. Campioni and Sansonetti rendezvoused north of Sicily and headed west to challenge Force H.

Force H included the battle cruiser *Renown*, the carrier *Ark Royal*, two light cruisers, and nine destroyers. The convoy consisted of three transports escorted by two light cruisers, one destroyer, and four corvettes. Somerville planned to rendezvous with Force D of the battleship *Ramillies*, one heavy and two light cruisers, and five destroyers coming from Alexandria at noon on November 27 southeast of Sardinia. The combined force would then head toward the Sicilian narrows and return to Gibraltar, while the merchant ships, five destroyers, and the corvettes continued to Malta under the cover of darkness.

At dawn on November 26, Campioni’s fleet loitered off Sardinia with the cruiser divisions ahead of the battleships. Campioni’s orders were to remain under air cover from Sardinia, avoid action unless the enemy force was obviously inferior, and be highly aggressive while remembering the difficulty of replacing warship losses. When Campioni received a report that enemy ships had transited the Sicilian Channel heading west, he assumed that they

sought to join Force H, and hoping for an opportunity to fight within the constraints of his orders, he launched spotter aircraft.

As the Italians awaited news, Somerville sailed east, likewise scouting for the enemy. At 10:45 a.m. Campioni swung southeast, acting on an ambiguous report that led him to believe he could intercept the force previously reported in the Sicilian Channel. In fact, Force D had already slipped by. Somerville, meanwhile, had finally learned that there were Italian battleships astride his route.

Force H and Force D rendezvoused at 11:30 a.m., and as the *Ark Royal* and the convoy with their escorts cleared the area, Somerville turned north with the battleship *Ramillies* and the battle cruiser *Renown;* the heavy cruiser *Berwick;* the light cruisers *Manchester, Southampton, Sheffield,* and *Newcastle;* and 10 destroyers.

At 12:07 p.m., Campioni learned that the British force included a carrier. Considering that the odds were now tilted against him, he ordered his cruisers to discontinue their advance and concentrate on his flagship.

At 12:15 p.m., the British cruisers observed smoke on the northern horizon. On the Italian side, the cruiser divisions were heading east with Campioni to the east-northeast and closing. Despite orders to disengage, the *Fiume* fired a ranging salvo at the *Berwick* from 24,000 yards at 12:20 p.m. Within two minutes both Italian cruiser divisions were in action, having altered course away to maintain long range, which Italian doctrine favored. Almost immediately an 8-inch shell hit the *Berwick,* causing moderate damage. The British cruisers returned fire, and at 12:24 p.m. the *Renown* briefly engaged before losing its target in the smoke. The *Ramillies* discharged two ranging salvos that splashed far short, and the old battleship then slowly fell behind the rest of the fleet.

A brisk gunnery action ensued between 12:20 and 12:42 p.m. as the cruisers fought in a northeasterly direction at ranges up to 23,000 yards. Smoke rendered spotting difficult. Nonetheless, at 12:35 p.m. another 8-inch shell plunged into the *Berwick.*

The first British success came at 12:40 p.m., when a 6-inch round disabled the destroyer *Lanciere.* At the same time, 11 British Swordfish aircraft attacked the *Vittorio Veneto.* The battleship dodged every torpedo launched and then engaged the British cruisers from 32,000 yards. As giant

waterspouts erupted around the *Berwick* and the *Manchester*, the British squadron made smoke and fled southeast to close with the *Renown.*

As the Italians continued steaming northeast and disappeared over the horizon, Somerville quite correctly turned to close on the convoy before dark. During the remaining hours of daylight, both sides traded ineffective air attacks. After the battle, British prime minister Winston Churchill unfairly demanded Somerville's scalp, having questioned the admiral's offensive spirit ever since his reluctance to attack the French at Mers-el-Kébir (July 3, 1940). However, a board of inquiry exonerated Somerville. As for Campioni, although he had a mandate to be conservative, he had lost a splendid opportunity to defeat the British in a fleet action, and his days of command at sea were numbered. Nonetheless, the Italian Navy had demonstrated that despite the Taranto raid, it retained the battleships and the will to dispute the passage of even the most heavily escorted British convoys to Malta.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Campioni, Inigo; Great Britain, Navy; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Sansonetti, Luigi; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Taranto, Attack on

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O'Hara, Vincent P. *Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945.* Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Cape St. George, Battle of (November 25, 1943)

Pacific theater naval battle. This final surface action in the Solomon Islands area was brought on by the Japanese attempt to reinforce their garrison at Buka in northern Bougainville on the night of November 24–25, 1943. The

Japanese transport group under Captain Kagawa Kiyoto was made up of three destroyer-transports—the *Amagiri*, *Uzuki*, and *Yugiri*—escorted by the destroyers *Onami* and *Makinami*.

The Allies had long been reading the Japanese naval code, however, and Captain Arleigh Burke and his 23rd Destroyer Squadron of five destroyers arrived just after midnight and took up station athwart the direct Buka-Rabaul route to intercept the Japanese on their return trip. The night was dark, with low-hanging clouds with occasional rainsqualls. The sea was calm.

Burke's plan was for his ships—the *Charles F. Ausburne* (flagship), *Claxton*, and *Dyson*—to launch a torpedo attack while Commander B. L. Austin's *Converse* and *Spence* covered with their guns; then the two formations would reverse roles. The action unfolded nearly as Burke had hoped.

At 1:40 a.m. on November 25, the two unsuspecting Japanese escorts appeared, and Burke, closing the range quickly, launched 15 torpedoes at 1:56 a.m. then turned hard right to avoid any Japanese torpedoes coming his way. None did. Both Japanese escorting destroyers were mortally stricken. The *Onami* went down quickly, and the *Makinami* somehow managed to stay afloat until the *Converse* and *Spence* sank it with gunfire.

Burke then set out in pursuit of the three transports that had turned north toward Rabaul. In the running fight, the Japanese ships separated. Burke went after the *Yugiri* and, at 3:28 a.m., sank it with gunfire.

Burke continued the chase until 4:04 a.m., and then, with only two hours of darkness remaining to shield him from Japanese aircraft from Rabaul, he turned for home. He had fought a near-perfect action, sinking three Japanese destroyers at no cost to his force. For the Japanese, the battle brought down the curtain on the costly war of attrition they had waged in the Solomons, though in mid-May, they lost the submarines *I-176* and *I-16* while attempting to supply the Buka garrison.

RONNIE DAY

See also

Burke, Arleigh Albert; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Southwest Pacific Theater; Torpedoes

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Capra, Frank Russell (1897–1991)

Hollywood filmmaker who produced a series of inspirational movies during the war years. Born Francesco Rosario Capra in Bisacquino, Sicily, a village near Palermo, on May 19, 1897, Frank Russell Capra immigrated to the United States with his family in 1903. After a stint in the army during World War I, he made a career as a film director, emphasizing stories of ordinary Americans who overcame corruption, greed, or cynicism. His films included *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town* (1936), *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* (1939), and *Meet John Doe* (1941).

When the United States entered World War II, Capra was making *Arsenic and Old Lace*. Putting the project on hold until 1944, he rejoined the army as a major and was assigned to the Morale Branch in February 1942. U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall ordered Capra to "make a series of documented, factual-information films—the first in our history—that will explain to our boys in the Army why we are fighting, and the principles for which we are fighting."

After studying Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will* and other German propaganda films, Capra produced a series of seven movies titled *Why We Fight.* The first of these documentaries was released in October 1942. The films were shown not only to the troops but also in war plants beginning in April 1943 and then to the general public by the end of May 1943. They were designed to be at once educational, inspirational, and recreational. Each examined what was seen as a totalitarian plan to take over the world.

After releasing the last of these movies, subtitled *War Comes to America*, in 1945. Capra returned to civilian life to establish Liberty Films. He continued to make important films until 1961, among them *It's a Wonderful Life* (1946). Capra won three Academy Awards. He died in La Quinta, California, on September 3, 1991.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM

See also

Art and the War; Film and the War; Marshall, George Catlett; Propaganda; Riefenstahl, Leni; United States

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Carlson, Evans Fordyce (1896–1947)

U.S. Marine Corps brigadier general. Born in Sidney, New York, on February 26, 1896, Evans Fordyce Carlson enlisted in the army at age 16 in 1912 and served in the Philippines and Hawaii from 1912 to 1915 before being discharged. He was recalled a year later for service on the Mexican border. During World War I, he was a captain on the staff of General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, in France.

Dissatisfied with civilian life after the war, Carlson joined the marines as a private in 1922. The following year he was once again commissioned a second lieutenant. Intelligence duty with the 4th Marine Regiment in Shanghai from 1927 to 1929 sparked his deep fascination with China. After two years spent fighting Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua, Carlson returned to Beijing in 1933. In 1935, Carlson, now a captain, began a friendship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt while serving as second-in-command of the marine detachment at the president's Warm Springs, Georgia, retreat.

When the Sino-Japanese War commenced in July 1937, Carlson returned to China for a third time. He frequently wrote to Roosevelt regarding Chinese military and political affairs there. Carlson traveled extensively on officially sanctioned journeys with Chinese Communists, admiring the cooperation, simplicity, camaraderie, and fundamental democracy evident among officers and troops. He resigned in 1939 to write more freely about China's determined resistance in numerous articles and particularly in a book titled *Twin Stars of China* (1940). Despite being charged with naïveté, he extolled

the People's Army while optimistically foreseeing genuine cooperation between Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) and Communist Chinese forces.

Joining the marine reserve as a major, Carlson was called to active duty in April 1941 and was soon promoted to lieutenant colonel. He commanded the experimental 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, known as Carlson's Raiders, and emulated People's Army principles of cooperation, self-reliance, and guerrilla tactics. (The unit's catchphrase, "gung ho," approximates a Chinese term meaning "work together.")

Carlson's Raiders slipped ashore from submarines at Makin Atoll, in the Gilberts, on August 17, 1942 (with the president's son, James Roosevelt, as executive officer), to destroy communications and gather intelligence. The raid was moderately successful and boosted home front morale, but 30 of 200 men perished, including 9 who were stranded during exfiltration and later beheaded by their Japanese captors. Subsequently, Carlson's Raiders repeatedly engaged the Japanese on Guadalcanal during long-range patrols, killing nearly 500 enemy troops while suffering only 16 deaths themselves.

Slowed by malaria, Carlson served as an adviser on Hollywood's popular 1943 account of the Makin raid, appropriately titled *Gung Ho.* He later returned to the Pacific—but as an observer rather than a unit commander. Serious wounds received at Saipan while rescuing a fallen enlisted man forced his retirement, with promotion to brigadier general.

Carlson vigorously and publicly opposed aiding the Nationalists in China's civil war. He succumbed to heart disease in Portland, Oregon, on May 27, 1947. Some portrayed Carlson as a romantic or a Christian Socialist. Senator Joseph McCarthy branded him "the Red General," but U.S. Marine Corps commandant David Shoup remarked, "He may have been Red, but he wasn't yellow."

MARK WILKINSON

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Makin Island Raid; Saipan, Battle of; Sino-Japanese War; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Carol II, King of Romania (1893–1953)

Romanian monarch who reigned from 1930 to 1940. Born on October 15, 1893, at Sinaia, Romania, Carol was the eldest child of Ferdinand I of Romania and Princess Marie of Great Britain. Carol's upbringing was controlled by his great-uncle Carol I of Romania, who encouraged his fixation on German militarism, including service in a German Army regiment in Potsdam. Carol toured the front in the Second Balkan War but took little part in World War I except as a diplomatic envoy to Russia in January 1917. He provoked scandal by deserting and eloping with Joanna Marie Valentina (known as "Zizi") Lambrino in September 1918, although the marriage was later annulled by the Orthodox Church.

During the early 1920s, Carol appeared to have reformed, marrying Princess Helen of Greece and Denmark in March 1921 and fathering a son, Michael. However, Carol associated himself with a single political party, the National Peasants, and he played little role in running the country. Before long, he met a divorcée, Elena Lupescu, for whom he abandoned his marriage in August 1925 and went into exile in Paris, formally renouncing the throne in favor of his son. Carol's father, Ferdinand, died in 1927, and in May of the following year, Carol attempted a coup but was thwarted by British intelligence. On June 6, 1930, he successfully returned to Bucharest and disbanded the regency to seize the throne from his son.

Carol II, King of Romania, shown here in full regalia. He fled Romania in September 1940. (Library of Congress)

Carol’s reign was disastrous for Romania. He alienated the upper classes by persecuting the surviving members of his family, exiling his siblings Nicholas and Ilena and his ex-wife Helen, allowing his mistress to choose his advisers, and encouraging political gridlock by playing one political party against the other. Carol II also allowed Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu’s Iron Guard to promote fascism—at least until it began attacks on Lupescu, who was Jewish. Carol’s subsequent 1933 ban on the Iron Guard led to the assassination of two prime ministers.

After the national elections in February 1938 failed to establish a political majority for any party, Carol II declared himself dictator and named the Orthodox patriarch Miron Christea as his prime minister. Carol was unable to protect Romania from the effects of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, however, and was forced to cede part of Transylvania to

Hungary, Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, and the southern Dobruja region to Bulgaria.

Carol II fled the country with Lupescu and the royal art collection in September 1940, leaving Michael as king again, under the control of General Ion Antonescu. Carol spent the rest of his life in exile in Brazil and Portugal. He married Lupescu in 1952 and died in Estoril, Portugal, on April 4, 1953.

MARGARET SANKEY

See also

Antonescu, Ion; Romania

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Caroline Islands Campaign (February 15–November 25, 1944)

Part of the drive of U.S. forces across the Central Pacific. A widely scattered archipelago of some 680 coral islands, islets, and atolls stretching across the Pacific between the Mariana Islands and New Guinea, the Carolines were part of the German Empire prior to World War I. Japan occupied the Carolines in 1914 and, in 1920, received the islands as a League of Nations mandate. Japan also assumed control of the Marshall Islands and all of the Marianas except Guam, which was a U.S. territory.

These acquisitions dramatically increased Japanese power in the Pacific and created a potential major problem for the United States, as the Carolines straddled the sea-lanes between Hawaii and both the Philippines and China. Indeed, Japanese control of the islands spurred development of the U.S. Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrine during the interwar period, a process that accelerated after Japan fortified the Caroline islands of Ponape, Truk, Yap, and Palau in the 1930s.

Following the Japanese attack on the United States in December 1941, U.S. forces were finally able to halt further Japanese expansion and then

assume the offensive in the Central Pacific. Japanese bases in the Solomons and Gilberts were either overrun or isolated by U.S. forces. Kwajalein Atoll, in the Marshall Islands, fell on February 3, 1944, and U.S. Fifth Fleet forces under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance accelerated preparations to capture Eniwetok (Enewetak) Atoll, also in the Marshalls, as part of a plan approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in December 1943. The plan called for the seizure of key islands in the Marianas as bases to support a strategic bombing campaign against Japan and for selected attacks to support the South Pacific forces of General Douglas MacArthur.

To cover the Eniwetok landings, however, U.S. planners believed that certain bases in the Carolines first had to be neutralized. Between February 15 and 26, 1944, Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers from Major General Willis H. Hale's Seventh Army Air Force struck Ponape. The Eniwetok landings took place on February 17, and on that day and the next, aircraft carriers from Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 58 launched more than 30 raids on Truk, which served as the major forward Japanese fleet anchorage and base in the Central Pacific. Each of the raids included at least 150 planes, and together they destroyed more than 250 Japanese aircraft and some 200,000 tons of ships, including 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, 2 submarine tenders, 1 aircraft ferry, 6 tankers, and 17 merchant ships.

Eniwetok fell on February 22, and Mitscher's airmen carried out more attacks on Truk on April 29–30. Those attacks, combined with significant shore bombardment by Spruance's battleships, destroyed another 100 Japanese planes. The cumulative effect was so great that the Joint Chiefs of Staff chose to bypass Truk and move westward, isolating the substantial Japanese garrison there.

Between June and August, U.S. forces fought the July 19–21, 1944, Battle of the Philippine Sea and seized Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Marianas, then continued west to attack the Philippines. To cover the initial Philippine landings on Mindanao and Morotai, U.S. planners intended to capture both Peleliu and Yap in the Carolines for use as air bases and forward staging areas. Those plans changed, however, following the September 1944 raids on the Philippines by Mitscher's Task Force 38 of Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet. Halsey found Japanese defenses so weak that he recommended bypassing Morotai, Mindanao, Yap, and Peleliu altogether and moving ahead with the attack on Leyte in October. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

agreed but decided to launch the landings on Peleliu in the Carolines and Morotai anyway, because the troops for those attacks were already embarked.

Morotai fell on September 15, the same day that U.S. troops of the 1st Marine Division landed on Peleliu and began one of the most grueling and perhaps unnecessary campaigns of the war. For the first time, the Japanese chose not to defend the beaches of an island under assault. Instead, the 5,300 defenders burrowed into the coral and prepared a main line of defense well inland. The Japanese counterattacked frequently; made use of underground tunnels, bunkers, and caves; and fought a battle of attrition in heat that sometimes reached more than 120 degrees Fahrenheit. By the time the Peleliu Campaign ended on November 25, more than 1,950 U.S. troops had been killed, and a regiment of the Army's 81st Infantry Division had been brought in as reinforcements. Whether the island needed to be taken and whether it materially aided the capture of the Philippines is extremely doubtful.

A Japanese Nakajima B6N Tenzan torpedo bomber flying through hail of antiaircraft fire to attack the aircraft carrier *Yorktown* during the U.S. raid on Truk in the Caroline Islands. (Library of Congress)

If Peleliu was a mistake, U.S. forces compensated by performing brilliantly throughout the rest of the Caroline Islands Campaign. A regimental combat team of the 81st Infantry Division took Ulithi Atoll on September 23, and in less than two weeks the U.S. Navy was utilizing its splendid large anchorage for attacks against Formosa. The rest of the 81st Infantry Division took Angaur (in Palau, near Peleliu) from 1,600 Japanese defenders on October 23, and with that the Caroline Islands Campaign came to a close.

Although no decisive battles were fought during the campaign, it was a vital stepping-stone toward victory in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and in the conquest of the Marianas and the Philippines. Ulithi became the major U.S. forward fleet anchorage for the duration of the war and played a critical role in the eventual defeat of Japan. Moreover, the strategy of island-hopping reached maturity in the Carolines, as did the evolution of the U.S. Navy's fast-attack carrier groups and the concept of refueling and replenishing at sea. In these and other subtle ways, the campaign played an integral if underappreciated role in the final outcome of the war. One measure of the success of the U.S. strategy may be found in the experience of the British naval squadron that returned to raid Truk in June 1945. By then, that island

had been so pummeled by U.S. attacks and its garrison so emaciated by isolation and lack of supplies that the British had no targets worthy of the name. Truk was little more than a prison for its defenders.

LANCE JANDA

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Mariana Islands Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Naval Gunfire, Shore Support; Nimitz, Chester William; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Spruance, Raymond Ames

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Carpenter, Arthur Schuyler (1884–1960)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in New Brunswick, New Jersey, on October 14, 1884, Arthur Schuyler Carpenter graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1908 and was commissioned in the navy in 1910. He served in the battleship *Minnesota* during the Great White Fleet's around-the-world cruise in 1908–1909. Carpenter also took part in the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914.

In 1917 Lieutenant Carpenter commanded the destroyer *Fanning*, the first U.S. warship to sink a German submarine in World War I. Carpenter then commanded the destroyer *Maddox* during 1921–1922 and the *McDonough* in 1928. He was chief of staff to the Commander Destroyers in the Scouting Force during 1936–1937, commanded the cruiser *Northampton* during 1937–1939, and was then professor of naval science and tactics at Northwestern University until 1939.

Promoted to rear admiral in December 1941, Carpenter was Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet until June 1942. Promoted to vice admiral, from September 1942 to November 1943, he commanded the Southwest Pacific Force, known as "MacArthur's Navy," which, in February 1943, became the Seventh Fleet. Carpenter worked hard to alleviate supply problems and oversaw naval operations during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 25, 1943) and Operation CARTWHEEL (1943–1944).

From January 1944 to March 1946, Carpenter commanded the Ninth Naval District. He then retired and was promoted to full admiral. Carpenter died in Washington, D.C., on January 10, 1960.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Carpet Bombing

The tactical application of strategic area bombing, originally used to direct a "carpet" of bombs to obliterate a target. Carpet bombing was first employed by the Germans during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War at Guernica in April 1937. They characterized it as "a controlled vivisectional experiment in modern bombing tactics."

By 1944, Allied carpet bombing involved heavy bombers dropping thousands of tons of relatively small bombs in an effective preparatory assault prior to a land attack. In this sense, the tactic was first utilized against Monte Cassino, Italy, on February 15, 1944. Waves of heavy and medium bombers dropped 435.5 tons of high explosives and reduced the ancient abbey to ruins. Ironically, the Germans, who had not previously garrisoned the abbey, now moved into the rubble and strengthened their defensive lines.

Following the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, Allied planners envisioned using fleets of bombers to blow holes in the German defenses, through which Allied armor and mechanized forces could then pour. The British tried using heavy bombers in close air support during Operation CHARNWOOD in early July. The attempt failed largely because of poor target selection and the fact that the bombing ended hours before the British ground attack. That allowed the Germans to reorganize their defense. In Operation GOODWOOD in Normandy (July 18–20, 1944), British and American bombers tried again. After the carpet bombing, Allied ground forces met with initial success, but they foundered against a German antitank gun line that had not been a major target during the bombardment.

Operation COBRA (July 24–25, 1944) was another such bombing effort and the most significant example of carpet bombing. U.S. bombers dropped 4,169 tons of bombs on the Saint-Lô area as part of the effort to support the breakout from Normandy. The bombers struck a box that was 7,000 yards wide and 2,000 yards deep. During the first day, many of the bombs fell short, hitting U.S. frontline troops and inflicting hundreds of "friendly casualties." Among the dead was Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, chief of staff of Army Ground Forces. The second day's attacks were highly successful, helping Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley's forces break out from the bocage, or hedgerow, country.

The use of strategic bombers for tactical missions such as carpet bombing met with strong resistance from leaders of the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), who believed that army ground commanders were misusing airpower. They argued that the effects achieved at the tactical level were slight compared to those that could be achieved at the strategic level. The lack of priority afforded to tactical-strike support and interdiction finally forced the hand of the air commanders. Beginning in April 1944 and lasting until September, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was given control of the USAAF's strategic bombers.

Although the sight of an armada of bombers was awe inspiring and the simultaneous impact of hundreds of bombs was similar to an earthquake, the actual effect on tactical operations was mixed. The bombers lacked precision, and their bombs produced craters and rubble that impeded a rapid advance by attacking forces. The destruction of Caen in July 1944, for instance, was so complete that wheeled and tracked vehicles could not make it through the

bombed areas. Although carpet bombing in support of offensive operations raised the morale of attacking ground troops, it was a poor substitute for effective tactical air support.

C. J. HORN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Brereton, Lewis Hyde; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; COBRA, Operation; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; GOODWOOD, Operation; McNair, Lesley James; Quesada, Elwood Richard "Pete"

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Carton de Wiart, Sir Adrian (1880–1963)

British Army lieutenant general. Born on May 5, 1880, in Brussels, Belgium, Adrian Carton de Wiart briefly attended Oxford University before joining the British Army. With his reckless style of leadership, he was wounded in nearly every campaign in which he was a participant. He saw action in the 1899–1902 Boer War and in India. In November 1914 he lost an eye while fighting in Somaliland, and in May 1915 he lost a hand in the Second Battle of Ypres, though his actions in that conflict earned the Victoria Cross. One year later, he was promoted to brigadier general and became friends with Winston L. S. Churchill.

In February 1919, Carton de Wiart arrived in Poland as head of the British Military Mission and observed the Russo-Polish War (1919–1921). In 1924, he retired from the British Army and settled in Poland. Just prior to the beginning of World War II, he was recalled to British Army service and appointed head of the British Military Mission to Poland. After that country's collapse in the German invasion of September 1939, he escaped via Romania.

He stated in his memoirs that the campaign left him with an appreciation for the speed of mechanized warfare, the effect of airpower, and the peril posed by fifth columnists.

In November 1939 Carton de Wiart was assigned command of the 61st Division, and in April 1940 he took command of the Central Norwegian Expeditionary Force, tasked with securing Trondheim. Heavy air raids by the Luftwaffe prevented success, and Carton de Wiart and his troops were evacuated by the Royal Navy in early May. Afterward, he commanded the 61st Division while it trained and garrisoned Northern Ireland.

In April 1941, Carton de Wiart became head of the British Military Mission to Yugoslavia. On the way to his post, his aircraft was shot down, and he was captured by the Italians, spending the next two years as a prisoner of war. He and Lieutenant General Richard O'Connor broke out in March 1943 and enjoyed eight days of freedom before being recaptured. Carton de Wiart was repatriated to Britain in September 1943 on conclusion of the Italian armistice.

In October 1943, Prime Minister Churchill appointed Carton de Wiart as British representative to the Guomindang's (Kuomintang) Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and as liaison between Jiang and Lord Louis Mountbatten. Carton de Wiart retired in 1946 and published his memoirs, *Happy Odyssey*, four years later. He died in County Cork, Ireland, on June 5, 1963.

MITCHELL MCNAYLOR AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

China-Burma-India Theater; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Jiang Jieshi; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Norway, German Conquest of; O'Connor, Richard Nugent; Poland Campaign

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Casablanca, Naval Battle of (November 8–11, 1942)

As a part of Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of French North Africa, U.S. Navy forces commanded by Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt approached Casablanca, Morocco, to land army troops at Fédala and to suppress the area's strong land and naval defenses. Vichy French forces present at Casablanca included the battleship *Jean Bart* (immobile, four 15-inch guns) and the 2nd Light Squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Raymond Gervais de Lafond with the light cruiser *Primauguet,* the large destroyers *Milan* and *Albatros*, and the fleet destroyers *Fougueux, L'Alcyon, Frondeur, Brestois* and *Boulonnais.* The French also had the sloops *Commandant Delage, La Gracieuse*, and *La Grandière*, 4 patrol boats, 11 submarines, and, under repair, 3 more destroyers. A powerful coastal battery just south of Casablanca called El Hank and smaller batteries around Fédala and Casablanca aided the defense.

Hewitt's force included Task Group (TG) 34.1, under Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen, with the battleship *Massachusetts* and two heavy cruisers, *Tuscaloosa* and *Wichita*, screened by Destroyer Squadron 8, the *Wainwright, Mayrant, Rhind*, and *Jenkins.* Their mission was to contain the French fleet in Casablanca, neutralize the *Jean Bart,* and guard against a sortie by the other modern French battleship, the *Richelieu,* that along with three light cruisers and three large destroyers was based at Dakar, 1,350 miles south. TG 34.9, directly under Hewitt's command, had the heavy cruiser *Augusta;* the light cruiser *Brooklyn;* Destroyer Squadron 26 with the *Wilkes*, *Swanson*, *Ludlow* and *Murphy;* and Destroyer Squadron 13 with the *Bristol, Woolsey, Edison, Tillman, Boyle* and *Rowan.* These ships were to provide fire support and protect the transports. TG 34.2 included the aircraft carrier *Ranger,* the escort carrier *Suwannee,* one light cruiser, and five destroyers.

The landings at Fédala commenced without a preliminary bombardment in the hope that the French would not resist. At 7:01 a.m., however, the El Hank battery opened fire, and Giffen's force replied while Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from the *Ranger* swooped down on the harbor. During a bombardment that lasted until 8:35 a.m., American warships and aircraft hit the *Jean Bart,* jamming its operational turret, and they sank three

submarines and eight commercial ships. They also damaged several other vessels. Fire from the shore batteries failed to hit the American ships.

The *Massachusetts* group had sailed beyond containment range when at 8:15 a.m. Admiral Gervais de Lafond's 2nd Light Squadron emerged from port and began to head northeast up the coast under the cover of smoke to attack the transports off Fédala. A Grumman F4F Wildcat aircraft spotted the French ships and alerted the *Augusta* and *Brooklyn*, which had been on the far side of the landing zone. While the American warships rushed to respond to this unexpected and dangerous thrust, fighters strafed the French ships, killing or wounding many topside personnel, including Gervais de Lafond, who was wounded.

At 8:25 a.m. the *Milan* engaged the American destroyers *Wilkes*, *Swanson*, and *Ludlow*, causing them to retreat and hitting the *Ludlow* hard enough to force it from the action. The French destroyers also targeted the American landing craft, sinking one and damaging another. This was the only occasion during World War II when American landing craft came under fire from enemy warships at sea.

At this point the *Augusta* and *Brooklyn* intervened, and the French, who were just 7,000 yards from the nearest transports, turned back toward Casablanca in hopes of drawing the American cruisers within range of El Hank's heavy guns. Meanwhile, the *Massachusetts* had returned and opened fire at 9:18 a.m., but smoke and equipment malfunctions made it difficult for the Americans to find targets, and neither side registered hits. Assuming that Giffen's ships had the situation in hand, the *Augusta* and *Brooklyn* returned to their screening duties. Finally, at 9:40 a.m. a 16-inch shell disabled the *Fougueux* and, six minutes later an 8-inch round from the *Tuscaloosa* slammed through the *Frondeur*'s bridge.

At 10:00 a.m. the guns at El Hank landed a 194mm shell on the *Massachusetts*, but it did little damage. Shortly thereafter the battleship narrowly dodged a spread of four torpedoes launched by the French submarine *Méduse.* Despite these distractions, the *Massachusetts* disabled the *Milan* before ceasing fire at 10:16 a.m. and heading west.

The French destroyers *Boulonnais* and *Brestois* noted the battleship's withdrawal and lunged toward the transports. This caused the *Augusta,* the *Brooklyn,* and three destroyers to return to the fight. At 10:12 a.m., after dodging more submarine torpedoes, the *Brooklyn*'s rapid-firing 6-inch guns

crippled the *Boulonnais,* forcing its crew to abandon ship. An 8-inch round from the *Augusta* penetrated the *Brestois,* and at 10:20 a.m. three rounds struck the *Primauguet.*

All this activity caused the *Massachusetts* to reverse course, and at 10:30 a.m. the battleship lofted a salvo at the French from 30,000 yards. Over the next half hour the two forces traded salvos through smoky skies. The *Albatros* hit the *Brooklyn* and the *Primauguet* hit the *Massachusetts,* but in each case little damage was done.

At 11:03 a.m. the *Massachusetts* ceased fire to conserve ammunition in case the *Richelieu* appeared. The *Tuscaloosa* and *Wichita,* however, continued to press the French. The *Boulonnais* sank at 11:10 a.m., and 15 minutes later an 8-in shell disabled the *Frondeur.* At 11:28 a.m. a round from El Hank punched through the *Wichita;* two minutes later, a shell damaged the *Primauguet*'s boiler room. U.S. aircraft, meanwhile, continued to harass the French ships. At 11:40 a.m. they bombed the *Primauguet* and *Albatros,* and F4Fs circled, taking turns strafing the gravely damaged warships. At 11:46 a.m. a bomb burst alongside the *Brestois* and caused serious flooding.

At 11:50 a.m. the *Tuscaloosa* and *Wichita* disappeared southwestward in pursuit of a rumored enemy cruiser. French sloops and a tug used the respite to rescue survivors. Their presence inspired another intervention by the *Augusta* and *Brooklyn* until 1:56 p.m., when aircraft reported that all the French ships were out of action. The *Primauguet, Milan,* and *Albatros* were heavily damaged; the *Fougueux* and *Boulonnais* sank offshore; and the *Frondeur* and *Brestois* limped back to port, where they capsized the next day. Only *L'Alcyon* remained operational.

In this battle American aircraft effectively supported their ships while French shore batteries and submarines failed in their role as potential equalizers. The battle lasted so long because the American admirals had too many jobs to perform any effectively, and they did not effectively coordinate their activities.

On November 10 the final events in the naval Battle for Casablanca occurred. At 10:10 a.m. three French sloops sortied to support troops defending the city, and the *Augusta,* with four destroyers, intervened. The *Jean Bart* had cleared the turret jammed two days before, and at 11:46 a.m. the battleship opened fire from 17,500 yards. As the *Augusta* fled, making smoke, the *Jean Bart* fired eight more two-gun salvos to a distance of 29,000

yards, narrowly missing the cruiser. Then the *Ranger*'s aircraft appeared and dropped nine 1,000-pound bombs; two struck and cratered the battleship's deck. This knocked the *Jean Bart* out of action for good. Casablanca surrendered the next day.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Gervais de LaFond, Raymond-Émile; Hewitt, Henry Kent; TORCH, Operation

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Casablanca Conference (January 14–24, 1943)

Important Anglo-American strategic planning conference held in Morocco. Following the successful Allied landings in North Africa and the breakout of the British Eighth Army at El Alamein, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at Casablanca, Morocco, between January 14 and 24, 1943. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was invited but declined to attend, citing the pressure of ongoing military operations.

The conference was code-named symbol and took place in a hotel complex in Anfa, a suburb of Casablanca. The principal topics of discussion were strategic military options once North Africa had been cleared of Axis troops. The British, who arrived at the meetings far better prepared than the Americans, made a strong case for invasions of Sicily and then the Italian Peninsula. The Americans, who preferred concentration on a cross-Channel invasion of France, reluctantly acceded. "We came, we listened, and we were conquered," remarked U.S. major general Albert Wedemeyer.

The Allied leaders at Casablanca also took another important step in deciding to launch a combined bomber offensive against Germany. On the

day the conference opened, the survivors of a special convoy from Trinidad arrived at Gibraltar. The convoy's devastating losses to German U-boats—77 percent—forced the two Allied leaders to assign priority to winning the Battle of the Atlantic. They agreed to divert to that struggle additional convoy escorts, escort carriers, and aircraft assets (including the VLR [very long range] Consolidated B-24 Liberator, which would, for the first time, be based at Newfoundland to close the Greenland "air gap").

U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt, with British prime minister Winston Churchill at his side, addressing assembled war correspondents at Casablanca, Morocco, and announcing that the Allies would insist on unconditional surrender, January 24, 1943. (Library of Congress)

But the Casablanca Conference is chiefly remembered for Roosevelt's surprise announcement that the Allies would insist on "unconditional surrender." Churchill, who had not been informed that the announcement would be made, nonetheless immediately supported it. Some have charged that this decision needlessly prolonged the war by preventing negotiations with factions in the German resistance to Adolf Hitler that might have led them to topple his regime. Certainly, the declaration was a windfall for the German propaganda machine. In making the announcement, though, Roosevelt had in mind World War I and the way the German Right had

utilized the November 1918 armistice to spread the myth that Germany had not been defeated militarily. That had been a powerful assist in Hitler's rise to power.

Another aspect of the Casablanca Conference concerned relations with the French. General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, was not informed of the meeting beforehand; Churchill simply ordered him to Morocco, which was then still a French protectorate. Roosevelt and Churchill pushed de Gaulle into a partnership with General Henri Giraud, who had been spirited out of France by submarine. De Gaulle, already upset because Britain had undermined the French position in Syria and Lebanon, was eventually able to elbow the politically inept and equally stubborn Giraud into the shadows. However, the whole affair negatively affected de Gaulle's attitude toward Britain and the United States.

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See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Combined Chiefs of Staff; de Gaulle, Charles; El Alamein, Battle of; Giraud, Henri Honoré; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; TORCH, Operation; Wedemeyer, Albert Coady; Document 157

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Cash-and-Carry (November 1939)

U.S. program to allow nations that were victims of aggression to purchase American-made arms to fight the Axis powers. In July 1936, civil war broke out in Spain, and a year later, the Second Sino-Japanese War began. In May 1937, the U.S. Congress passed the Neutrality Act, which committed the nation to "permanent neutrality." The act revamped existing neutrality

legislation to include a prohibition on the sale of arms or munitions to either side in a civil war as well as a declared war between states. Travel by U.S. citizens on belligerent ships was made illegal, no longer just cautioned against as something undertaken at the passenger's risk. Well aware of the financial impact of trade, Congress provided that the president would draw up a list of certain strategic raw materials, such as oil, that were to be paid for on delivery and then transported on ships belonging to the belligerent power. Thus was born the phrase "cash-and-carry." These provisions were to last for two years.

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, beginning World War II in Europe. Public sentiment in the United States demanded that the country stay out of the conflict but also generally favored assistance to the states fighting Germany, Italy, and Japan. In any case, the cash-and-carry provisions of the 1937 act had expired in May 1939, with the consequence that U.S. merchant vessels were free to sail into the war zones, albeit with the possibility that they would be sunk. The Western democracies, however, could not purchase arms in the United States.

On October 27, 1939, the U.S. Senate voted 63 to 31 to repeal the embargo on arms to belligerents, and a week later, the House of Representatives followed suit, with a majority of 61 votes. Under the November 1939 act, though, cash-and-carry remained in effect. The United States could now sell war materials to belligerents provided that they could pay cash for the goods and transport them in their own vessels. This act was, in fact, a compromise: the noninterventionists yielded on the arms embargo to secure the provision preventing U.S. ships from sailing into the war zones, and the interventionists accepted the latter to secure an end to the ban on arms sales.

The terms were intentionally crafted to favor the Atlantic sea powers that possessed merchant and naval forces to transport the material. To remain within the legal bounds of American neutrality, though, cash-and-carry was extended to all belligerents, both Axis and Allied, that could meet the specific requirements of the act. Japan was thus able to take advantage of its provisions—until the U.S. government embargoed war goods and froze Japanese assets in 1941, precipitating Tokyo's decision to launch an attack on the United States.

British prime minister Neville Chamberlain informed U.S. president

Franklin D. Roosevelt that he thought the November 1939 act would have a "devastating effect upon German morale," but that was hardly the case, as U.S. factories were only just beginning to produce quantities of weapons. The act also opened up the dilemma of how to allot the few weapons that were being produced. U.S. rearmament was barely under way at that point, and the armed services would have to compete with the Western democracies for American weapons. Many Americans also opposed the act because it provided assistance to the Soviet Union, and the legislation became an issue in the 1940 presidential campaign.

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See also

Armaments Production; Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States; United States Neutrality Acts; Document 53

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Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of (1944)

A series of engagements between the Allies and Germans for control of Monte Cassino, a mountain strategically located at the entrance of the Liri Valley in Italy. The site of a Benedictine abbey established in 529 CE, Monte Cassino formed an important part of the German Gustav Line, a set of defensive positions stretching across the Italian Peninsula and blocking the Allied approach to Rome.

Following up on the Allied success on Sicily in July and August 1943 (Operation HUSKY), the American Fifth Army landed at Salerno, a city on the western coast of Italy, on September 9, 1943 (Operation AVALANCHE), and began to push north. With rugged mountain ranges, heavy rains, and stiff German resistance barring the advance, Allied progress was slow. In late 1943, having broken through the Volturno Line (a German defensive line anchored on the Volturno River), the Allies found themselves up against the

Gustav Line. To force the German commander, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, to fight in two directions (west and south), Fifth Army commander Lieutenant General Mark Clark planned Operation shingle, an amphibious landing at Anzio/Nettuno, north of and behind the Gustav Line. By landing at Anzio/Nettuno with a corps, Clark believed it would be possible to turn Colonel General Heinrich von Vietinghoff's Tenth Army out of the Gustav Line, thus opening the Liri Valley and the routes to Rome.

To prepare for the landing of Major General John Lucas's American VI Corps and its subsequent linkup with the Fifth Army, Clark ordered attacks by the British X Corps and the U.S. II Corps. To seize key heights to protect the southern flank of II Corps as it began its attack up the Liri Valley, Lieutenant General Richard McCreery's X Corps assaulted across the Garigliano River on January 17, 1944. Failing to cross the river, the British attacked once more two days later but did not achieve their objectives. As a result, Major General Geoffrey Keyes's II Corps would assault across the Rapido River with its left flank exposed.

Keyes's plan to attack into the Liri Valley was simple. The 36th Infantry Division would move forward, with two regiments abreast, roughly three miles downstream from the town of Cassino; the 34th Infantry Division would attack with three regiments abreast north of Cassino. Beginning their strike on January 20, the Americans immediately encountered stiff resistance from General of Panzer Troops Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin's German XIV Corps.

Throughout the night of January 20, the Americans struggled to find their way through minefields, cross the river in rubber rafts and canvas boats, and erect footbridges. Sunrise the next morning exposed the Americans to accurate German artillery and rocket fire. Concerned with his losses, the 36th Infantry Division commander, Major General Fred Walker, prevailed on Keyes to delay a renewed effort until after dark. Attacking again on the evening of January 21, the 36th Infantry Division suffered heavy losses without establishing a lodgment on the far side of the Rapido. Against Keyes's wishes, Clark authorized Walker to halt the attack on the morning of January 22.

With the 36th Infantry Division stalled, Clark now intended to envelop Cassino from the north. Attacking on January 25 with the 34th Infantry Division and units of General Alphonse Juin's French Expeditionary Corps,

the Allies soon ground to a halt. Once again, the soggy ground, a strong current, and determined German resistance frustrated Clark's efforts to capture Cassino. Over the next several days, the 34th Infantry Division, including the Nisei 100th Infantry Battalion, inched its way up and over the heights north of Cassino but was unable to capture the abbey or the town. By February 11, the II Corps attack was spent, and the task of opening the Liri Valley fell to Lieutenant General Bernard Freyberg's New Zealand II Corps.

Believing that the only way to capture Cassino was to eliminate the abbey from the commanding heights above the town, Freyberg received permission to bomb it, and on February 15, waves of bombers dropped 435.5 tons of high explosives, reducing the abbey to ruins. Although the Germans had not previously garrisoned the abbey, its destruction allowed them to position troops amid the rubble and to strengthen their lines. Launching Operation AVENGER on February 15, Freyberg's subordinates, facing the same problems the Americans had earlier, fought with little success to capture Monte Cassino. Frustrated by his lack of progress, Freyberg ordered a halt to AVENGER after three days.

Freyberg set the next attack for February 24. Called Operation DICKENS, the attack comprised two infantry divisions and a tank regiment. Believing that a direct approach would prove more effective, Freyberg planned to attack frontally into the town of Cassino, but heavy rains delayed the operation until March 15. Following the Italian Campaign's first massive carpet bombing, Freyberg's troops engaged in heavy fighting within the town and on the surrounding heights. For the next 10 days, the New Zealand II Corps fought in close combat amid the ruins of Cassino with little effect. Because Freyberg failed to commit his reserves in a decisive manner, his conduct of the operation resulted in the heavy casualties he had hoped to avoid. By March 24, the New Zealand II Corps attacks had halted, with the Germans still in possession of portions of Cassino and the abbey's ruins.

By mid-April, the Polish II Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Władysław Anders, began to move into the line opposite Cassino. As part of an Allied deception plan, activity along the Gustav Line almost completely ceased. On May 11, the Allies attacked with the Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army; although the offensive caught the Germans by surprise, casualties among the Poles were still high. The Fifth Army's progress south of Cassino in the Liri Valley, however, rendered Monte Cassino unimportant

to the Germans' defense. On the evening of May 17, the defenders withdrew, and the next day, the Polish II Corps occupied Monte Cassino, completing a four-month battle for the heights. Allied casualties numbered some 120,000; the Germans sustained almost 130,000.

The Allied effort to crack the German Gustav Line saw some of the most bitter fighting of the war in extremely difficult conditions. Monte Cassino guarded the entrance to the Liri Valley and the decision to bomb the 6th century Benedictine monastery atop the mountain was one of the most controversial of the war. (Rolls Press/Popperfoto/Getty Images)

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See also

Anders, Władysław; Anzio, Battle of; Clark, Mark Wayne; Freyberg, Bernard Cyril; Italy Campaign; Japanese Americans; Juin, Alphonse Pierre; Kesselring, Albert; Keyes, Geoffrey; Lucas, John Porter; McCreery, Sir Richard Loudon; Senger und Etterlin, Fridolin Rudolf von; Sicily, Invasion of; Vietinghoff genannt Scheel, Heinrich Gottfried von; Wilson, Henry Maitland

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Casualties

World War II exacted a heavy toll on the combatant nations and the world community. Although figures vary widely based on the sources employed, perhaps 50 million servicemen and civilians were killed in the course of the conflict. World War II was thus the most destructive war in human history (see Table 1).

In terms of combat losses for the principal Allied powers, the Soviet Union officially had 8,668,400 military personnel killed. The majority of these were in the army, as the Soviets bore the brunt of the fighting on land against Germany. The United States, Great Britain, and France sustained far fewer losses, although in relative terms, given their smaller populations, the impact was still high. Of these powers, Great Britain's armed forces had 397,762 men killed. This figure includes losses incurred by imperial and Commonwealth forces: Canada sustained 37,476 deaths, India 24,338, Australia 23,365, New Zealand 10,033, and South Africa 6,840. The United States suffered 292,129 battle deaths, and the French lost 213,324 servicemen. The latter figure includes Free French forces.

China suffered 3–4 million military deaths, but civilian casualties may have raised the total figure to 20 million. Some sources suggest that total Chinese deaths as a result of the war may have reached 50 million.

Smaller Allied powers also lost heavily in comparison to their populations. Poland had 320,000 killed, and Greece lost 73,700. The Netherlands lost 6,238 servicemen. Belgium's armed forces lost 7,760 men. The dead of Norway totaled 4,780, and Denmark's losses were 4,339, a figure that includes merchant sailors in the service of other Allied navies.

The principal Axis powers had significantly fewer casualties than did the Soviet Union, but their populations were also much smaller. Germany, which waged a two-front war, suffered the most, with 2,049,872 dead. Japan

sustained 1,506,000 deaths, and Italy lost 259,732 men. This number includes some 17,500 men killed in battle after that nation declared itself a cobelligerent of the Allies.

The other Axis powers endured heavy losses as well. Romania suffered greatly with 300,000 men killed, most of these incurred while the country was an Axis power but a small number being deaths suffered after it joined the Allies late in the war. Hungary lost 147,435 men, and Finland's dead numbered 79,047 soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Bulgaria, initially an Axis power, suffered 10,000 deaths, with some of these individuals being in the service of the Allies late in the war.

Civilian deaths greatly increased the human toll, as the age of total warfare embraced the civilian sector, too. Total Soviet deaths in the war (including battle deaths) may have reached as high as 50 million, although some of these were self-inflicted. Allied bombing raids claimed the lives of some 410,000 German civilians. Air attacks on the home fronts of other nations also carried a heavy cost. In Japan, about 500,000 people lost their lives, whereas Great Britain suffered 92,673 deaths.

Wounded Americans being removed from Munda Point, New Georgia Island, in a landing craft, July 1944. (National Archives)

Adding to civilian figures were atrocities committed against civilians. Chief among these was the Holocaust, the German campaign to exterminate Europe's Jewish population. The Holocaust claimed an estimated 6 million Jews; half of this number were Polish citizens, and some 1.2 million came from the Soviet Union. Several million Romas (Gypsies), communists, religious and political dissidents, homosexuals, and disabled people were also systematically exterminated by the Nazis. Hungary's figure for Jewish deaths was 450,000, and Romania's total reached 300,000. The Baltic states lost 228,000 of their citizens. Germany sent 210,000 of its own people to their deaths. The Japanese also committed widespread atrocities in China and elsewhere in Asia. In all, World War II may have claimed 15 million deaths in battle, with 25 million wounded. Civilian deaths were in excess of 45 million.

Table 1. Casualty Figures for World War II

	Battle Deaths	*Wounded*	*Missing in Action*	*Civilian Dead*
Allied Powers				
Australia	23,365	39,803	32,393	—
Belgium	7,760	14,000	—	76,000
Canada	37,476	53,174	10,888	—
China	1,324,516	1,762,006	115,248	1,000,000
Denmark	4,339	—	—	1,800
France	213,324	400,000	—	350,000
Great Britain	397,762	348,403	90,188	92,673
Greece	73,700	47,000	—	325,000
India	24,338	64,354	91,243	—
Netherlands	6,238	2,860	—	200,000
New Zealand	10,033	19,314	10,582	—
Norway	4,780	—	—	7,000
Poland	320,000	530,000	420,760	3,000,000
South Africa	6,840	14,363	16,430	—
Soviet Union	8,668,400	14,685,593	4,559,000	14,012,000
United States	292,129	670,846	139,709	6,000
Axis Powers				
Bulgaria	10,000	21,878	—	10,000
Finland	79,047	50,000	—	11,000
Germany	2,049,872	4,879,875	1,902,704	410,000
Hungary	147,435	89,000	170,000	285,000
Italy	259,732	77,494	350,000	146,000
Japan	1,506,000	500,000	810,000	500,000
Romania	300,000	—	100,000	200,000

Note: Dashes indicate that figure is unknown.

Sources: Data from Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives* (New York: Knopf, 1992); Richard Ernest Dupuy, *World War II: A Compact History* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969); John Keegan, *The Second World War* (New York: Penguin, 1989); John Keegan, ed., *The Times Atlas of the Second World War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989); G. F. Krivosheev, *Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century* (London: Greenhill Books, 1993); Martin K. Sorge, *The*

Other Price of Hitler's War: German Military and Civilian Losses Resulting from World War II (New York: Greenwood, 1986).

The aftermath of World War II claimed additional victims. Some of these losses were the result of efforts by the Soviet Union and other Eastern and Central European governments to drive out their German minorities. Perhaps 2 million of the 14 million ethnic Germans who had been living in Eastern Europe died in the course of this expulsion. The final legacy of the war was an estimated 20 million people displaced by the conflict, some of whom perished from simple lack of food or shelter.

In addition to the death totals, large numbers of people were wounded, many of them seriously. These casualties, too, imposed a heavy financial toll on all combatant states after the war. Finally, it should be noted that death tolls in the war would have been much higher except for new miracle drugs and blood plasma.

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See also

Displaced Persons; Holocaust; Medicine and the War; Document 234

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CATAPULT, Operation (July 1940)

British Royal Navy operation, beginning on July 3, 1940, to neutralize, seize, or, if necessary, destroy French Navy warships, which British leaders feared would fall into German hands. In 1940, the French Navy was the second most powerful in Europe and had many modern warships. With the defeat of

France and the German capture of its Atlantic ports, a number of French warships ended up in British harbors; by July 3, these included the old battleships *Courbet* and *Paris,* one superdestroyer leader, two destroyers, six torpedo boats (called light destroyers by the French), and numerous other small warships. Many more ships remained in French ports, however.

When the French entered into armistice talks with the Germans, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and the War Cabinet became concerned over the final disposition of the French fleet. Although the commander of the French Navy, Admiral Jean Darlan, had promised that France would scuttle the fleet rather than see it fall into German hands, Britain's leaders were not certain that would be the case. With a German invasion of Britain looming, Churchill was determined to neutralize the French fleet. Such a dramatic action would also demonstrate to the Americans the British determination to continue in the war.

The armistice terms allowed the French government to retain control of the fleet, but it was to be disarmed, mostly at the French naval base of Toulon and also at colonial French ports. At that time a majority of the French ships were in North Africa, at the ports of Mers-el-Kébir, Oran, Algiers, Bizerte, Alexandria, or elsewhere overseas. The almost completed and powerful battleships *Richelieu* and *Jean Bart* had escaped France and were at Dakar and Casablanca, respectively. At Mers-el-Kébir, there were the two fast battleships, the *Dunkerque* and *Strasbourg;* the two older modernized battleships *Provence* and *Bretagne;* the seaplane tender *Commandant Teste;* and some large destroyers and miscellaneous warships. Oran served as base to seven destroyers, and Algiers had six modern light cruisers.

Despite some opposition, the War Cabinet approved Operation CATAPULT to carry out the "simultaneous seizure, control or effective disablement or destruction of all the accessible French Fleet." French naval commanders were offered a series of options: they could join Britain and continue the fight, they could sail their ships to a neutral port and be disarmed there, or they could scuttle their ships. If French commanders rejected these options, the British naval commanders were under orders to open fire and sink the French ships.

The plan, which unfolded on July 3, met with considerable success in those areas under British control. At Portsmouth, the British seized the old French battleship *Courbet,* along with other small vessels. At Plymouth, they

secured the battleship *Paris*, 2 destroyers, 1 torpedo boat, and 3 sloops. There they also took the *Surcouf*, the world's largest submarine. Three submarines and other craft were secured from the ports of Falmouth and Dundee. In their home ports, the British secured almost 200 small warships, including minesweepers, tugs, submarine chasers, and trawlers. The vessels were taken at a cost of 3 sailors killed (2 British and 1 French). Later, 3,000 of the ships' 12,000 officers and sailors joined the Free French. Also seized were French merchant ships and their crews.

CATAPULT was also successful in the West Indies. Prolonged talks involving the British, French, and Americans led to the internment of the aircraft carrier *Béarn* and two light cruisers at Martinique.

At Alexandria, Vice Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham negotiated with Vice Admiral René Émile Godfroy, who commanded a French squadron consisting of the rebuilt World War I–era battleship *Lorraine;* the heavy cruisers *Duquesne, Tourville*, and *Suffren;* the light cruiser *Duguay-Trouin;* three destroyers; and one submarine. In deft negotiations, Cunningham managed to secure an agreement that the French ships would be disarmed and their fuel emptied. Some of the sailors were also repatriated to France.

The operation was not so effective farther west in the Mediterranean. At Mers-el-Kébir, the French refused to yield and fought a battle with Vice Admiral James Somerville's newly formed Force H from Gibraltar. In the action, the French battleship *Bretagne* blew up and sank. The *Provence* was also badly damaged and beached itself; the battleship *Dunkerque* ran aground. In this battle, 1,297 French seamen died; another 351 were wounded. During the battle, however, the *Strasbourg* and four of the large destroyers broke free and escaped. There was also fighting at Dakar, where a small British squadron built around the tiny aircraft carrier *Hermes* damaged the battleship *Richelieu* on July 8.

Because of CATAPULT, the collaborationist Vichy French government severed diplomatic relations with Britain. The German government also lifted demobilization requirements for the French fleet and elements of its air force, and the French then mounted several largely ineffectual air strikes against Gibraltar. On July 26, London declared a blockade of metropolitan France and French North Africa, although it was never heavily enforced.

Those who had opposed CATAPULT believed that it would drive a wedge between the two former allies; they also expected France to honor its pledge

to Britain to scuttle the fleet if necessary. In these beliefs, they were quite correct. Yet despite their sharp animosity toward Britain for launching CATAPULT—which lingers to this day—the French honored their pledge. In November 1942 following the Allied landings in North Africa (Operation TORCH), the French scuttled their ships when the Germans tried to secure them at Toulon. Operation CATAPULT was one of the most tragic aspects of the war.

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See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Dakar, Attack on; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; Godfroy, René Émile; Great Britain, Navy; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; TORCH, Operation

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Catholic Church and the War

The Catholic Church's record in World War II, particularly its assistance to Jews and resistance to the Holocaust, or lack thereof, has generated intense controversy. Individual Catholics certainly acted with considerable bravery in opposing Nazi agendas. Archbishop Clemens August Graf von Galen of Münster, Germany, condemned Germany's euthanasia program from the pulpit in 1941, which led Adolf Hitler to suspend mass killings. So-called mercy killings continued on a smaller hidden scale, however. Other Catholics hid Jews and served bravely in the Resistance in France or as chaplains at the front (more than 3,000 in the U.S. Army alone). Yet the Vatican refused to issue official statements condemning the Holocaust, fearing retaliation against Catholic laypeople and clergy within Germany. In an exercise in poor timing, moreover, the Vatican extended diplomatic relations to Japan early in 1942, at the high tide of Japanese aggression in Asia and the Pacific.

In part, nationalist loyalties constrained the Vatican and proved more powerful, if not more resilient, than supranational Catholicism. In the Nazi puppet state of Croatia, headed by Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso, Franciscan monks and ultranationalist priests lent their moral authority to the murder of tens of thousands of Jews and Orthodox Serbians in 1941. A few priests even joined in the killing. Meanwhile, anti-Bolshevism drove many European priests to support the Nazi "crusade" against the Soviet Union. Traditional expressions of biblical anti-Semitism and consistent opposition to Zionism tended to inhibit sympathy for Jews.

Ultimately, Pope Pius XII was responsible for exercising and enforcing the church's moral authority, and evidence indicates that he was a Germanophile. As a cardinal, he had negotiated the 1933 concordat between the Vatican and Nazi Germany that gave the Holy See tighter control over independent-minded German Catholics. It also gave Hitler important international recognition and a freer hand in Germany, as it led to the dissolution of Germany's Catholic Center Party.

In the invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Nazis revealed their murderous nature. Polish priests were either murdered or deported to concentration camps. In the Warthegau region alone, the Nazis killed more than 300 priests. Apparently concluding that official condemnations would goad the Nazis to further excesses, Pius XII remained silent. After failing to protest the mass murders of priests, it was not surprising that the pope, who knew of the mass murders of the Jews by mid-1942, nevertheless refused to condemn these crimes officially.

Pius XII was too cautious, and his well-intentioned attempts at behind-the-scenes diplomacy proved ineffectual. Critics have cited his reluctance to identify the Jews as victims (he preferred the pusillanimous term "unfortunate people") to suggest that he was an uncaring anti-Semite. Such accusations are unjust, however. Guided more by concerns about the preservation of the church hierarchy and the physical survival of Rome, Pius XII failed to lead morally and speak authoritatively. Exaggerated caution and the belief that communism was an even greater threat to the Catholic Church than Nazism, rather than anti-Semitism, accounted for his reluctance to remonstrate against Nazi war crimes.

In March 1998, Pope John Paul II issued a document titled "We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah." Although it called for Catholics to

repent if they had known about the Holocaust yet failed to act, this document absolved Pius XII of blame and praised him for resolute diplomacy that reputedly led to the salvation of hundreds of thousands of Jews. Controversy nevertheless continues today on whether Pius XII should be beatified and made a saint or vilified as "Hitler's pope." A middle ground does exist between hagiographers, on the one hand, and scandalous and carping caricaturists, on the other.

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See also

Chaplains; Charities; Holocaust; Pius XI, Pope; Pius XII, Pope; Religion and the War

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Catroux, Georges Albert Julien (1877–1969)

Free French general and colonial administrator. Born on January 29, 1877, at Limoges, France, Georges Albert Julien Catroux was the son of a general and spent much of his youth in the Middle East. He graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in 1898, was assigned to the French Foreign Legion, and served in North Africa. During World War I, Catroux was wounded and captured on the Western Front while commanding a company of Algerian *tirailleurs* (riflemen). Between the wars, he returned to colonial service, becoming a general of army and commanding XIX Corps in Algeria in 1938. In 1939, Catroux's advocacy of sweeping military reforms led chief of staff General Maurice Gamelin to place him on the reserve list.

In August 1939, Catroux, known for his relatively liberal views regarding colonialism, was sent to Indochina as governor-general. He was one of only

two overseas commanders who rejected the June 1940 armistice with Germany. Following the French military defeat, Catroux came under intense Japanese pressure for base rights in northern Indochina, which the Vichy government conceded in late August 1940 in exchange for Japanese recognition of French sovereignty over the colony. Ordered back to France on July 26, 1940, he led an unsuccessful colonial anti-Vichy revolt before joining Charles de Gaulle's Free French forces in London in September, the most senior French officer to transfer allegiance.

When British forces took Vichy-held Syria in June 1941, Catroux became the Free French delegate general for the mandates of Syria and Lebanon and promised the area's postwar independence, pledges that de Gaulle declined to endorse. Deeply involved in the complicated maneuverings between Vichy and Free French representatives in Algiers after the November 1942 Allied landings, in which the Free French eventually prevailed, Catroux was designated to establish control over all French colonial forces. Although he stalwartly supported de Gaulle, he lamented his leader's ferocious quarrels with the British.

In June 1943, Catroux became commissioner for Muslim affairs throughout the French colonies. Appointed governor of Algeria in June 1944, he began extending French citizenship to Algerian Muslims. In September, he was named French minister for North Africa.

After the war, Catroux spent the years between 1945 and 1948 as the French ambassador to Moscow. In 1954, he presided over France's inquiry into the loss of Indochina. In 1956, he became governor-general of Algeria but resigned after four days when reactionary European colonists objected to his proindependence views. A de Gaulle confidant during the general's 1953–1958 exile, Catroux chaired the court-martial in 1961 that condemned those French generals who rebelled against de Gaulle's instructions to cease hostilities in Algeria. Catroux died in Paris on December 21, 1969.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; Free French; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; North Africa Campaign

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Caucasus Campaign (July 22, 1942–February 1943)

German military campaign, dubbed Operation EDELWEISS, to capture the rich Caspian oil fields. Although the offensive was unsuccessful, the territory taken in this operation represented the farthest points to the east and south reached by the German Army during the war.

The great German summer offensive, Operation BLAU (BLUE), opened on June 28. General Erich von Manstein had argued for a concentration in the center of the front. He believed that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin would commit all available resources to save Moscow and that this approach offered the best chance of destroying the Red Army; it would also result in a more compact front. German leader Adolf Hitler rejected this sound approach and instead divided his resources. In the north, he would push to take Leningrad, still under siege, and link up with the Finns. But the main effort would be Operation BLAU to the south, with the ultimate prize the Caucasus oil fields located near Baku, Maikop, and Grozny. Securing these would severely cripple Soviet military operations while aiding those of Germany.

Hitler ordered Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group South to move east from around Kursk and take Voronezh, which fell to the Germans on July 6. Hitler then reorganized his southern forces into Army Groups A and B. Field Marshal Siegmund Wilhelm List commanded Army Group A, the southern formation; Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs had charge of the northern formation, Army Group B.

Hitler's original plan was for Army Groups A and B to cooperate in a great effort to secure the Don and Donets Valleys and capture the cities of Rostov and Stalingrad. The two could then move southeast to take the oil fields. The Germans expected to be aided by the fact that most of the region was inhabited by non-Russian nationalities, such as the Chechens, whose loyalty to the Soviet government was suspect.

On July 13 Hitler ordered a change of plans, now demanding that Stalingrad, a major industrial center and key crossing point on the Volga River, and the Caucasus be captured simultaneously. This placed further strains on already inadequate German resources, especially logistical support. The twin objectives also meant that a gap would inevitably appear between the two German army groups, enabling most Soviet troops caught in the Don River bend to escape eastward.

On July 22, Army Group A's First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies assaulted Rostov. Within two days, they had captured the city. A few days later, the Germans established a bridgehead across the Don River at Bataysk, and Hitler then issued Führer Directive 45, initiating EDELWEISS. He believed that the Red Army was close to defeat and that the advance into the Caucasus should proceed without waiting until the Don was cleared and Stalingrad had fallen. The operation was a classic case of strategic overreach.

Securing the mountain passes of the Caucasus region between the Black and Caspian Seas was crucial in any operation to take the oil fields. To accomplish this task, Army Group A had special troops trained for Alpine operations, including the Seventeenth Army's XLIX Mountain Corps. Supporting Army Group A's eastern flank was Army Group B's Fourth Panzer Army.

At the end of July, List had at his disposal 10 infantry divisions as well as 3 panzer and 2 motorized divisions, along with a half dozen Romanian and Slovak divisions. Hitler expected List to conquer an area the size of France with this force. Despite these scant German and allied forces, the Soviets had only scattered units available to oppose the German advance. On July 28, the Soviets established the North Caucasus Front, commanded by Marshal Semen Budenny, and Stalin ordered his forces to stand in place and not retreat. But even reprisals failed to stem the Soviet withdrawal before Army Group A's rapid advance, which had all the characteristics of a blitzkrieg. Indeed, the chief obstacles to the German advance were logistical, created by the vast distances involved and terrain problems. The Germans used aerial resupply where possible and also horses and camels to press their advance.

By August 9, the 5th SS Panzer Division had taken the first of the Caucasus oil fields at Maikop. To the west, infantry and mountain formations of the Seventeenth Army had made slower progress, but also on August 9, they took Krasnodar, capital of the rich agricultural Kuban region. They then

moved in a broad advance into the Caucasus Mountains, with the goal of taking the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, and Sukhumi. Soviet forces meanwhile continued to fall back into the Caucasus. As Budenny's North Caucasus Front prepared to defend the Black Sea ports, the Soviets sabotaged the oil fields, removing much of the equipment and destroying the wellheads. So successful was this effort that there would be no significant oil production from the region until after the war.

By the end of August, the German advance had slowed to a crawl. For the Seventeenth Army, the problems were terrain and stiffening Soviet resistance. Bitter fighting occurred in Novorossiysk beginning on August 18, when the Germans threw six divisions against the city. It fell on September 6, although the Soviets managed to evacuate their defending marine infantry by sea.

To the east, the advance of the First Panzer Army, pushing toward the oil fields at Grozny, also slowed. Problems there were largely logistical, with a serious shortage of fuel impeding forward movement. In addition, Hitler was gradually siphoning off the First Army's strength, including two divisions, some of its artillery, and most of its air support, to the cauldron of Stalingrad. Weather now became a factor, with the first snowfall in the mountains on September 12. Displeased with the progress of his forces in the Caucasus and despite List's objections, Hitler assumed personal control of Army Group A on September 10 and sacked List.

Hitler's plan proved far too ambitious for the assets committed. The weather had become a critical concern, as did continuing German logistical problems. The Soviets meanwhile were able to feed additional resources into the fight. On October 14, the Germans suspended offensive operations in the Caucasus except for the Seventeenth Army efforts on the Terek River and around Tuapse. The Germans took Tuapse several days later but then called a halt to offensive operations on November 4.

Events at Stalingrad now took precedence. By the end of November, Soviet forces had encircled the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, and Soviet successes there placed the Axis forces in the Caucasus in an untenable situation. Then on November 29, the Soviet Transcaucasus Front launched an offensive of its own along the Terek. The Germans repulsed this attack, but on December 22, German forces began a withdrawal from positions along the Terek River. At the end of December, with the situation to the north growing more precarious daily, Hitler reluctantly ordered Army Group A to withdraw. This movement began in early January, with Soviet forces unable seriously to disrupt it. By early February, German forces had withdrawn to the Taman Peninsula, from which Hitler hoped to renew his Caucasus offensive in the spring. In October 1943, however, German forces there were withdrawn across Kerch Strait into the Crimea.

Germany's Caucasus Campaign turned out to be a costly and unsuccessful gamble. Ultimately, by splitting his resources between Stalingrad and the Caucasus, Hitler got neither.

MICHAEL SHARE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bock, Fedor von; Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich; Crimea Campaign; Hitler, Adolf; List, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter; Paulus, Friedrich; Sevastopol, Siege of; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad, Battle of; Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von

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Cavagnari, Domenico (1876–1966)

Italian Navy admiral. Born on July 20, 1876, at Genoa, Italy, Domenico Cavagnari graduated from the Italian Naval Academy in 1895 and served as a destroyer captain in World War I. In 1933, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini named him both undersecretary of the navy and naval chief of staff, offices that over time Cavagnari would use to position the navy more favorably within the fascist regime, forestall developments in naval aviation, and assert the peculiar ethos of the harbor-bound "fleet in being" as a passive naval deterrent and preservative.

France had long been the Italian Navy's presumptive regional rival, but from March 1935 Cavagnari began to focus on Great Britain as a more likely Mediterranean threat. He proposed developing a large Italian counterfleet to deal with that threat, although Mussolini refused to consider the concept. The Italian Navy embarked on more modest building and rebuilding projects focused on capital ships, but as late as 1938 it had no plans for an aircraft carrier, which was manifest in the lack of cooperation between the navy and the air force. Also, the May 1939 Friedrichshafen summit confirming the Pact of Steel left Cavagnari skeptical of the practical benefits of a naval alliance with Germany.

The coming of war in June 1940 nonetheless found Italy with a navy that was well positioned to disrupt British movements in the Mediterranean. Cavagnari, however, did not deploy his forces decisively, which effectively

gave the initially weaker Royal Navy opportunities to regroup and build to strength.

The November 11, 1940, torpedo attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto by Royal Navy carrier aircraft clearly demonstrated the power of naval aviation and crippled not only the Italian Navy but also the credibility of the "fleet in being" imperative. Mussolini relieved Cavagnari of his dual command in December 1940, and the admiral soon went into retirement. Cavagnari died in Rome on November 2, 1966.

GORDON E. HOGG

See also

Italy, Navy; Mussolini, Benito; Taranto, Attack on

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Cavallero, Ugo, Conte (1880–1943)

Italian Army marshal, industrialist, and government figure. Born at Castello Monferrato, Italy, on September 20, 1880, Ugo Cavallero was commissioned an infantry lieutenant in 1900. He became a gunnery instructor in 1906 and graduated from the War College at Turin in 1911. As a captain, he fought in Libya during the 1912–1913 Italo-Turkish War. He served largely at the staff level during World War I, reaching the rank of brigadier general in 1918.

Cavallero also sought advancement in industry, assuming the directorship of the Pirelli Works in 1920. Five years later, Italian Premier Benito Mussolini appointed him undersecretary of war. In that capacity, Cavallero appointed Pietro Badoglio to the highest posts in the Italian Army before souring on him and stripping him of his powers in 1927 and then publicly snubbing him in 1928—a scandal that cost Cavallero his own position. Again finding a lucrative refuge in industry, he assumed the presidency of the Ansaldo arms and shipbuilding conglomerate, devoting himself to updating and improving its output. Ironically, the Italian Navy's 1933 protests that a

new cruiser was receiving substandard armor plate and machinery obliged Cavallero to resign in disgrace, although his complicity in the scandal was never established.

Cavallero was a member of the Italian delegation to the 1932–1934 Geneva arms conference. He commanded Italian forces in East Africa in 1937 but resigned in the spring of 1939 after a dispute with his superior, the Duke of Aosta. That June, Cavallero began shaping the Pact of Steel with Germany, conveying to Berlin Mussolini's wish to delay war until 1943, when Italy might be fully armed. In December 1940, he succeeded Badoglio as chief of staff, and he struggled to maintain the tenuous Italian Balkan Front even as Mussolini demanded a (doomed) March 1941 offensive.

Cavallero cleaned house at the War Ministry beginning in May 1941; his reforms of the three military branches came amid increased German strategic control of the Italian war effort and were hampered by Il Duce's habitual interference. Elevated to marshal in July 1942, Cavallero was thwarted in his plans for an assault on Malta by German demands for Italian forces on the Soviet Front. Until January 1943, he attempted to evacuate Libya while deflecting the criticism of, among others, Mussolini, who dismissed him from office on February 6, 1943.

Arrested and imprisoned by Badoglio after Mussolini was removed on July 25, 1943, Cavallero tried to link himself with anti-Duce conspirators. After the September 8 armistice, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German commander in Italy and a personal friend of Cavallero, released him and offered him military command of the new fascist Italian Social Republic. Cavallero was discovered dead of an apparently self-inflicted pistol wound at Kesselring's headquarters in Frascati, outside Rome, on September 14, 1943.

GORDON E. HOGG

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; Italy; Kesselring, Albert; Malta; Mussolini, Benito; Savoia, Amedeo Umberto di

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Cavalry, Horse

After their domestication, horses served as mounts for countless soldiers over the centuries. Associated with gallantry and courage, they were valued as cavalry mounts for their speed and ability to cover rough ground inaccessible to vehicles. Cavalry troops rode into battle; dragoons were mounted infantrymen who used the horses for transportation to battle and then fought dismounted. Not until the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War did mechanized vehicles began to replace horses. Although limited in number in comparison with previous conflicts, cavalry troops fought during World War II on both the Allied and Axis sides.

Britain and the United States did not utilize cavalry to any appreciable extent, but other Allied countries deployed horse cavalry because they could not afford sufficient mechanized equipment. Especially on the Eastern Front, horses proved to be capable transportation and combat mounts that could overcome difficult conditions and the lack of paved roads. Poland, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, China, Japan, and Hungary all employed horse cavalry units in the war.

Cavalry charges sometimes enabled soldiers to take enemy troops by surprise and also provided shock value. Mounted raids permitted soldiers to seize property and destroy military supplies and encampments. Mounted soldiers also performed reconnaissance duties. But modern weapons with high-volume firepower were serious obstacles for the vulnerable, unarmored cavalry; also, procuring forage and veterinary care for their horses presented problems.

Poland maintained cavalry reconnaissance units and brigades. In September 1939, it had 41 cavalry regiments, of which only 3 were mechanized. Armed with guns and antitank rifles, the Polish cavalry confronted German tanks. At Morka, for example, the Wolynska Cavalry Brigade engaged the 4th Panzer Division for three days and disabled 80 German tanks and armored vehicles before retiring. World War II myths include tales that Polish cavalry armed with lances charged German tanks, and Italian newspapers printed stories about a Polish cavalry attack that did not occur and was actually German propaganda. Some notable authentic

cavalry charges of the war, however, included the September 1, 1939, engagement between German lancers and Po-lish troops at the Ulatkowka River and the August 12, 1942, Italian charge at Chebotarevsky in the Soviet Union. Most World War II cavalrymen, however, were really dragoons who fought dismounted.

Germany fielded five cavalry divisions in 1940. In addition, the Germans assigned reconnaissance cavalry squadrons to infantry divisions and stationed a cavalry brigade in East Prussia. The German 1st Cavalry Division covered some 1,200 miles in the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940), when France also employed horse cavalry.

The German Army expanded its cavalry strength and capabilities for Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union that commenced on June 22, 1941. On the Eastern Front, the Red Army employed some 1.2 million horses to support its cavalry, artillery, and supply needs. At the time of the June 1941 German invasion, the Soviets had reduced their 7 cavalry corps and 32 cavalry divisions of 1937 to 4 corps and 12 divisions, of which 4 were mountain cavalry.

One of the last significant cavalry charges on the Eastern Front occurred in November 1941 outside Musino, near Moscow, when the 44th Mongolian Cavalry Division attacked the Germans. The defenders used machine-gun fire to kill many of the attacking troops and an estimated 2,000 horses in only 10 minutes. No Germans died in the battle.

The Soviets supplemented their mounted forces with artillery. Given the primitive Soviet transportation system and the weather that turned tracks into seas of mud, horses were often more effective at transport than were vehicles. Guerrillas in Ukraine also utilized horses to raid the Germans, and a number of these fighters, including Cossacks and Kalmucks who were highly skilled horsemen well familiar with local conditions, actually fought the Soviets, even after the end of World War II. When the Waffen-SS XV Cossack Cavalry Corps surrendered to the British and its members were turned over to the Soviets in 1945, the troops were either executed outright or sent to labor camps in Siberia.

The British Army deployed the 1st Cavalry Division as well as the Royal Dragoons and Royal Scots Greys, both of which were mechanized in 1941. The Cheshire Yeomanry and the Queen’s Own Yorkshire Dragoons fought Vichy French troops in Syria in 1941 before becoming mechanized. The final

horse cavalry charge in British history occurred on March 21, 1942, at Toungoo, Burma. Captain Arthur Sandeman commanded the Central India Horse of the Burma Frontier Force. Mounted on mostly Burmese ponies, his column of primarily Sikh horsemen spotted Japanese troops constructing trenches and defenses. Sandeman and his men mistook the Japanese for Chinese soldiers and approached them. Too late they realized their mistake, and Sandeman then led a charge but was killed.

The U.S. Army also had horse cavalry units at the start of the war, although half of its 17 cavalry regiments were dismounted by 1941. Most were mechanized, although some fought as infantry. On April 1, 1941, the army activated the 2nd Cavalry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas. Almost 6,000 cavalry horses were stationed at Fort Riley early in the war, but by the end of 1942, all U.S. cavalry regiments had been mechanized. They nonetheless retained emblems and traditions of the horse cavalry.

The U.S. 26th Cavalry Regiment served in the Philippines, arriving there in December 1941 as part of the effort to counter the invading Japanese. The cavalrymen played an important role in delaying the Japanese advance and allowing U.S. and Filipino troops to withdraw into the Bataan Peninsula. Because the Allied forces were short of food, the cavalry horses were subsequently killed for meat. The 26th Cavalry was then mechanized and fought until the April 9, 1942, surrender to the Japanese.

Major General Lucian K. Truscott Jr. formed the 3rd Provisional Reconnaissance Troop (Mounted) in Italy in 1943. The horses of this unit proved useful for travel in the mountains during the fighting there. Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. asserted that “If we’d had a brigade or a division of horse cavalry in Sicily and Italy the bag of Germans would certainly have been bigger.”

The National Defense Act of 1947 officially ended mounted units in the U.S. military. In post–World War II military actions, cavalry horses seemed obsolete except in parts of the Third World where deep snow and mountainous conditions hindered movement by vehicle. Modern cavalry is primarily known as mechanized, armored, or air cavalry.

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See also

Animals; Armored Warfare; BARBAROSSA, Operation; China-Burma-India Theater; Germany, Army; Italy Campaign; Partisans/Guerrillas; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Poland, Army; Poland Campaign; Soviet Union, Army; Tanks, All Powers; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.

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Celles, Battle of (December 24–27, 1944)

The Battle of Celles was the point of maximum penetration for German forces during their Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge). As a key part of the German main effort, the 2nd Panzer Division and 26th Volksgrenadier Division of XLVII Panzer Corps attacked on December 16, 1944. Their assignment was to seize within two days the crossings over the Meuse River at Dinant.

American forces, however, put up a far stiffer resistance than the German commanders had anticipated, and the German operational timetable quickly broke down. Although the XLVII Panzer Corps, commanded by General of Panzer Troops Heinrich von Lüttwitz, was supposed to bypass Bastogne, the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was drawn into the fight for Bastogne, which stripped the 2nd Panzer Division of its infantry support.

Nonetheless, Colonel Meinrad von Lauchert's 2nd Panzer Division broke through Allied blocking positions between Marche and Rochefort and advanced toward the Meuse. Supported by the 116th Panzer Division on its northern flank and the Panzer-Lehr Division on its southern flank, the 2nd Panzer Division was the main German spearhead. By the night of December

22–23, the 2nd Panzer found itself virtually alone as Allied resistance grew to their front and especially on their northern flank.

On December 23 after a short fight, the 2nd Panzer Division's reconnaissance battalion took the town of Foy-Notre Dame. Continuing its drive westward, by nightfall the reconnaissance battalion reached the town of Celles, about five miles from Dinant and the Meuse. Wary of Allied minefields to their front, the Germans established a defensive perimeter in Celles and waited for the main body of the division to close. Major General Ernest N. Harmon's U.S. 2nd Armored Division, meanwhile, was advancing on Celles from the north.

On December 25, the 2nd Armored Division cut off the German reconnaissance battalion and started to systematically destroy it. The main body of the 2nd Panzer Division tried to reach their forward elements but became bogged down southwest of Conneux and went into a defensive perimeter. The Panzer-Lehr Division was ordered to move to support the 2nd Panzer Division, but with clearing weather on December 25, Allied tactical air forces began attacking the fuel and supply routes of the forward-most German units. That same day, one battalion of the 2nd Panzer Division's artillery regiment was caught by Allied aircraft while refueling alongside the road and was destroyed. The last elements of the reconnaissance battalion in Celles were also destroyed on the 25th.

Continually pounded from the air, out of fuel, and under pressure from the 2nd Armored Division, the remainder of the 2nd Panzer Division in Marche was ordered on December 26 to destroy their equipment and then try to escape and evade individually. By December 27 some 600 survivors of the division managed to cross a bridgehead held by the Panzer-Lehr Division near Rochefort. The 2nd Panzer Division had been completely destroyed. German casualties totaled 2,500 killed or wounded and 1,200 taken prisoner. The division's 82 tanks, 83 assault guns, all of its artillery, and hundreds of motor vehicles were destroyed. The U.S. 2nd Armored Division lost 17 killed and 227 wounded and 26 tanks knocked out. Most of these tanks were back in service in a matter of days, however.

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See also

Ardennes Offensive; Bastogne, Battle for

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Censorship

The practice of suppressing and/or manipulating information and news, usually by a government agency. Every nation involved in World War II applied censorship to some degree, but exactly what was censored and how it was censored varied widely. Totalitarian Germany and the Soviet Union generally manipulated the news by completely controlling the newspapers and radio stations: citizens normally knew only what their governments decided they should know. German minister of propaganda Joseph Goebbels, for example, rigidly controlled the flow of news to the German people.

The governments of Italy and Japan held similar powers and used them frequently, but there were also surprising instances when newspapers were generally able to criticize those governments without severe repercussions. Still, the Japanese people at large knew nothing about their navy's great defeat in the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway.

In Great Britain, the wartime government preferred to enforce censorship through prior restraint by creating a detailed censorship code and having government employees enforce it by carefully reviewing the contents of all news before it could be published or broadcast. Most of the Commonwealth nations followed suit, creating censorship codes and enforcing them as Britain did.

The U.S. system of wartime censorship also employed written censorship codes, but the government enforced these codes in a less intrusive way. This unique system of "voluntary self-censorship" was created just after Pearl Harbor. President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided that American censorship should begin with separate spheres for military information and domestic news. Thus, the army and navy kept control of their information by such

traditional expedients as editing the mail of military personnel (the extent varied widely from unit to unit) and issuing very general press releases. In the field, the army and navy required American correspondents to agree to specific rules or be banned from combat theaters. Military censors also reviewed the copy written by correspondents, which had to be approved before it could be transmitted to their home offices.

For the most part, correspondents accepted military censorship without protest. At one point, virtually the entire press corps in Sicily voluntarily suppressed the story about Lieutenant General George S. Patton slapping two soldiers. Writer John Steinbeck, who spent about five months in Europe as a war correspondent, remembered that he and his colleagues censored themselves more vigorously than did the military censors.

For domestic news, Roosevelt created the Office of Censorship. This body was similar to the Creel Committee of World War I, which had developed a general censorship code that the media then pledged to follow. Knowing how American reporters and editors had resented George Creel's heavy-handed approach, however, Roosevelt shrewdly selected Byron Price, lead editor of the Associated Press, to head his new office. Price, in consultation with a censorship operating board composed of representatives of several federal agencies, handled the press fairly by applying the new censorship codes for the press and for radio news in a consistent manner.

Neither of the codes was long, and the details were deliberately vague. Price preferred to ask editors to guide their own actions by asking themselves "Is this information I would like to have if I were the enemy?" This appeal to patriotism worked well, for throughout the war editors tended to censor their agencies' stories so heavily that Price's staff and the volunteer monitors who reviewed local newspaper stories for the office often suggested that deleted information could be returned to the text.

The most serious challenge to censorship came in June 1942, when Stanley Johnston, a reporter for the *Chicago Tribune*, gained access to a confidential navy communiqué based on the navy's ability to read Japan's naval codes. From this information, Johnston wrote a story revealing that the U.S. Navy had advance information about the Japanese attack on Midway. This scoop, which the *Chicago Tribune* published without submitting it to Price's censors, threatened to expose U.S. code-breaking operations.

A page from the notebook of United Press correspondent Robert C. Miller, which has parts blacked out by naval censorship, 1942. (Library of Congress)

Outraged at the harm this could have done to the war in the Pacific, the Department of Justice prepared a case against the newspaper for violating the Espionage Act. In the end, however, the government dropped the matter, partly because the story had not contravened the existing censorship code but largely because a public trial would only further jeopardize the code-breaking secret. Fortunately for the Allies, the Japanese apparently were not aware of the story.

The censorship code was then revised and reissued with greater restrictions. The main impact of the incident seems to have made most editors even more cooperative in censoring their own stories. By 1944, a few reporters had picked up gleanings about the purpose of the top-secret Manhattan Project, yet all of them kept quiet about the knowledge that

America was building an atomic bomb. The fact that one of these reporters was the notorious whistle-blower Drew Pearson only underscores how readily the media accepted the need for wartime censorship.

Throughout the war, most of the Office of Censorship's 15,000 employees were not battling with the press but instead were monitoring the vast amount of mail, cables, and telephone calls that went overseas, seeking to keep information from falling into the wrong hands.

American citizens accepted this censorship without great protest. Few Americans complained about censorship at all, which was very different from the way they groused about rationing, taxes, shortages, or many of the other restrictions that the war had placed on their freedoms.

Even after 1945 there was remarkably little criticism of wartime censorship, in marked contrast to the complaints that followed the war in Britain and elsewhere. These attitudes shed light on popular American views of the emergency in the early months after Pearl Harbor. They also suggest that Byron Price had been right when he told President Roosevelt that he would get more cooperation from Americans by asking them to help him rather than telling them what to do.

TERRY SHOPTAUGH

See also

France, Battle for; Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Journalism and the War; Manhattan Project; Midway, Battle of; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Central Pacific Campaign

The U.S. Navy's overarching strategy for defeating the Japanese by pushing through the Central Pacific had its roots in a long-standing concept for a maritime war with Japan. The U.S. plan for war with Japan, War Plan

Orange, dated to 1898, and although modified many times, its basic scheme remained consistent. It called for marshaling the main battle fleet in the Eastern Pacific, then steaming to the Philippines, where a decisive battle fleet engagement in the style predicted by 19th-century geostrategist and rear admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan would occur. Simultaneously, the navy would relieve the beleaguered Philippine Army garrison. Faced with catastrophic defeat and total American command of the sea, Japan would surrender.

The successful Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, completely disrupted Plan Orange and the Central Pacific thrust. With all Pacific Fleet battleships sunk or damaged and only five aircraft carriers available in the Pacific, the navy was in no condition to execute Plan Orange, defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy in a decisive battle for command of the sea, or even reinforce or evacuate the Philippine defenders. Consequently, for almost two years, the navy engaged in peripheral operations against the Japanese defensive perimeter, supporting the marines and the army in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea and repelling Japanese main strike forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942) and the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942).

By mid-1943, with Essex-class fleet carriers coming on line from the "two ocean" Naval Expansion Act of 1940 and fast battleships of the North Carolina and South Dakota classes for antiaircraft support and shore bombardment, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz was ready to launch the Central Pacific assault against the Japanese Empire.

The dual-pronged Pacific strategy that emerged in 1943 represented a compromise between the services. The ABC Conference of Britain, Canada, and the United States in March 1941 established Pacific operational areas, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed in March 1942. The agreement gave the U.S. Navy operational control over the Central and South Pacific areas; the U.S. Army had responsibility for the Southwest Pacific. The army area commander, General Douglas MacArthur, advocated an advance up the New Guinea coast along the New Guinea–Mindanao axis to isolate the Japanese base at Rabaul and drive to the Philippines. The navy, meanwhile, pressed for a Central Pacific thrust. In March 1943, the Joint Chiefs agreed on a compromise whereby both services would advance along their preferred routes while simultaneously supporting each other. The results of this dual-

pronged strategy formed from compromise were devastating for Imperial Japan.

To face two simultaneous threats, the Japanese, unable to concentrate against a single-threat axis, had to stretch their air, naval, and ground forces perilously thin. Adopting a leapfrogging operational mode in both the Central and Southwest Pacific, U.S. forces attacked strategic points, such as islands with airfields, while simply bypassing and isolating large Japanese garrisons, such as Truk and Rabaul. These latter points then withered on the vine.

Another component of the Central Pacific strategy was the submarine offensive against Japanese shipping. This further reduced Japan's capability to reinforce and sustain isolated garrisons, as U.S. forces advanced key island by key island, beginning with Operation GALVANIC against the Gilbert Islands in November 1943. In the interwar years, the U.S. Marine Corps had made great strides in amphibious operations, and Guadalcanal had been a useful test of amphibious doctrine. Nimitz and his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance, had originally conceived of the first thrust going against the Marshall Islands; however, the Gilberts were closer to Hawaii and within range of land-based air cover.

The Central Pacific thrust offered a number of advantages. Its many islands and atolls provided a target-rich environment that prevented the Japanese from determining the precise route of advance and forced them to defend all points. The size of the islands and atolls discouraged the establishment of large garrisons. The long distances between islands mitigated mutual support, and American carrier airpower inhibited Japanese supply and reinforcement. Further, the lines of communications from Pearl Harbor and the mainland United States would be shorter than those to the Southwest Pacific. The Central Pacific also offered a more healthful climate than the jungles of New Guinea. And an advance through the Central Pacific would cut off and isolate Japanese forces in the South Pacific.

There were, of course, some disadvantages to a Central Pacific thrust. These included the requirement for overwhelming naval and air superiority, which could not be achieved until late 1943 and necessitated the defeat of the main Japanese battle fleet (which occurred in the Battle of Midway). The U.S. plan also relied on successful amphibious operations, which had not been totally proven.

Operation GALVANIC commenced in late autumn 1943 with landings on

Tarawa Atoll (the primary objective being Betio, with its airfield) and Makin Atoll. The joint army, navy, and marine force employed overpowering numbers, with more than 200 ships and 35,000 troops under Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of V Amphibious Force. Task Forces 52 and 53 assaulted the atolls on November 20, 1943. Six fleet carriers and five light carriers, escorted by six battleships, provided overwhelming firepower, naval gunfire support, and air cover. Additionally, several hundred army, navy, and marine aircraft participated from the base at Ellice Island. Despite Japanese air attacks from the Marshalls, the air threat proved negligible.

On Tarawa, strong fortifications, bunkers, hidden obstacles, and barbed wire slowed the advance—a prelude to future Japanese defensive schemes—and with orders to fight to the last man, the garrison staunchly resisted. Very few Japanese survived, another indicator of the bitter struggle unfolding in the Central Pacific Campaign. U.S. forces suffered a 17 percent casualty rate and encountered other problems as well, including faulty beach and surf intelligence, the inability of landing craft to negotiate shallow atoll waters, inadequate landing craft, too little advance shore bombardment, and poor communications. The Gilberts experience of November 1943 provided many valuable lessons for the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps on how to conduct future operations.

U.S. marines storm Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands, November 1943. (National Archives)

The Marshall Islands were next. Despite a dearth of transports, Operation FLINTLOCK finally commenced on January 31, 1944. Kwajalein (January 19–February 6, 1944) and Eniwetok (February 17–22, 1944) succumbed to overwhelming force and the pounding from Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force 58. The Americans had learned from the Gilberts experience, and casualties among the assaulting forces were much lighter. With the capture of the Marshalls by March, 10 weeks ahead of the established timetable, the navy bypassed several heavily fortified Japanese-held islands and turned its attention to the Mariana Archipelago.

The June–August 1944 assault on the Marianas, Operation FORAGER, aimed at taking Guam, Saipan, and Tinian islands. From these bases, the Japanese home islands would be within striking distance of the B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers. The assault on Saipan commenced on June 13, 1944, with landings on June 16. Determined to halt the advance by interdicting the supporting naval forces, Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo mounted an assault on the Americans in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The assault, which commenced on June 19, turned into disaster as the better-trained and better-equipped U.S. Navy pilots decimated the inexperienced Japanese airmen in what came to be called the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot." Ozawa lost 325 of 375 attacking aircraft; Japanese naval airpower disappeared in a day, never to play any significant role in the war thereafter except in desperate suicide attacks in the last months.

Saipan was taken by July 13. The marines landed on Tinian on July 24 and secured it on August 2. Guam, the last of the major islands, was struck on July 21 and declared secured on August 10.

With the loss of the Marianas, the Japanese defensive perimeter had been decisively breached. U.S. strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands now began in earnest and ended in the atomic bomb attacks launched from Tinian a year later. From the Marianas, the two prongs of the Pacific strategy came together again with the invasion of the Philippines in October 1944.

Tenacious Japanese defenders and their fortifications did cause heavy American casualties, and the difficulties inherent in staging such massive invasion efforts presented formidable challenges to U.S. operations. Nonetheless, the Central Pacific Campaign succeeded decisively. The

Imperial Japanese Navy's hitherto deadly air arm had been utterly destroyed, and the stage was set for the final Allied thrust through the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa and on toward the Japanese home islands.

STANLEY D. M. CARPENTER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Guam, Battle for; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kwajalein, Battle for; MacArthur, Douglas; Makin Island, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; New Guinea Campaign; Nimitz, Chester William; Ozawa Jisaburo; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Rainbow Plans; Saipan, Battle of; Southwest Pacific Theater; Tarawa, Battle of; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of; Two-Ocean Navy Program

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Century Group

See Fight for Freedom

Cephalonia Island Massacre (September 1943)

Scene of a German atrocity in 1943. Cephalonia Island (variously spelled as Cephallonia, Cefallonia, Kefalonia, Kefallonia, and Kefallinia) lies about 200 miles from Italy and is the largest of the Ionian Islands west of Greece. Located at the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, it is across a strait from the island of Ithaca. Beginning in April 1941, the Italians occupied the island and informed the Greek inhabitants that they were now Italian citizens.

In May 1943, the Italian Acqui 33rd Infantry Division arrived on Cephalonia. Its commander, Division General Antonio Gandin, was fluent in German, a veteran of the Soviet Front (1941–1942), known to a number of German generals, and a recipient of the Iron Cross. The 33rd Division was composed of about 11,500 enlisted men and officers and was centered on two infantry regiments (the 17th and 317th), an artillery regiment (the 33rd), the 27th Blackshirt Legion, the 19th Blackshirt Battalion, and various support units. In addition, the Italians had some naval coastal batteries, a few torpedo boats, and two aircraft.

Allied gains in 1943 led the Germans to consider the possibility that the Italians would opt out of the war, whereon the Germans decided to reinforce their token garrison on Cephalonia. Between July 5 and 6, Lieutenant Colonel Hans Barge's 966th Grenadier Regiment arrived, along with a battery of self-propelled guns and nine tanks. This addition brought the German strength to a total of 1,800 men. Shortly thereafter, on July 25, Mussolini's government collapsed. The Italians on Cephalonia, however, were ignorant of the plans of the Italian War Office and of the possibility of conflict with the Germans.

On the evening of September 8, 1943, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, with the agreement of Italian king Victor Emmanuel, ordered Italian troops to cease all hostilities against Anglo-American forces. Badoglio also ordered that Italian forces should respond with "maximum decision" to any offensive action from "[any] direction whatsoever." The Germans, meanwhile, chose to treat Italians who resisted their authority as mutineers.

On September 11, the Germans on Cephalonia gave Gandin an ultimatum to surrender his weapons. While he was attempting to delay a decision, word came that Italian forces on Corfu were fighting the Germans and that elsewhere the Germans were sending the Italians who surrendered to internment camps, despite promises they would be repatriated. On September 13, the Germans attempted to reinforce their garrison on Cephalonia, but the Italians opened fire on the two barges carrying troops and supplies and sank

both. The next day, Gandin was hand-delivered an order demanding that the Italians turn over their weapons, issued by Lieutenant General of Mountain Troops Hubert Lanz, commanding the German XXII Mountain Corps. That same day, elements of the 1st Alpine Division under the command of Colonel Harald von Hirschfeld landed on the island.

Meanwhile, the Italian War Office, now located at Brindisi, ordered the 33rd Division to fight the Germans. Gandin then issued orders to attack the German positions on the island on September 15 if they did not surrender. On that day, German aircraft attacked the Italian positions, and the Italians in turn captured 400 German troops. Intense fighting continued until September 22. During that time, the British and Americans, whether from ignorance or from distrust of the Italians, had forbidden Italy's navy or air force to aid Italian troops fighting in Greece. With their ammunition exhausted and having sustained some 1,300 casualties, the Italians surrendered. Almost simultaneously, the Italian War Office announced that help was on the way.

Men of the German XXII Mountain Corps had received a special Führer Order to execute all the Italian soldiers who had fought on Cephalonia. Many Italians who surrendered were shot in their positions, and a group of Bavarian soldiers who protested this action were threatened with summary execution. Large numbers of Italian troops were slain where they were taken; the remainder were transported to the town of San Teodoro and held in the town hall. Gandin was shot first, but before the bullets hit his body, he threw his Iron Cross into the dirt. His staff and then all the officers were executed, followed by the noncommissioned officers, the enlisted men, and even the medical personnel. The officers' bodies were then weighted and dumped into the sea by Italian Navy personnel who were, in turn, shot. In all, about 4,750 Italians were summarily executed. The only ones spared were the military chaplains, who would later provide many of the details of the massacre. About 1,200 Italians, led by Captain Renzo Appollonio, joined with some Greek partisans and escaped to the mainland.

A group of about 4,000 who had surrendered their arms without fighting were imprisoned in barracks on the island. In October, they were put onto three ships sailing for Greece, but these hit mines shortly out of port. Those who did not drown were machine-gunned by the Germans. In all, 390 Italian officers and 9,640 enlisted men perished at the hands of the Germans. In

1948, the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg sentenced Lanz to 12 years' imprisonment. He was released in 1954.

In 2000, Universal Studios released *Captain Corelli's Mandolin*, a romantic story of the Italian occupation and the 33rd Division's destruction that was based on Louis de Bernières's novel of the same name.

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy

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CERBERUS, Operation (February 11–13, 1942)

Passage of the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* and the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen* through the English Channel from Brest, France, to Wilhelmshaven, Germany, in February 1942. In March 1941, the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had arrived at Brest on the French Atlantic coast after a commerce-raiding voyage; they were joined there by the *Prinz Eugen* in June 1941. Although vulnerable to British bombing, the ships constituted a standing threat to Allied convoys in the Atlantic. By late 1941, however, Adolf Hitler was convinced that the British were planning to invade Norway, and, against the advice of his naval commanders, he demanded that the three ships return to Germany for deployment in Norwegian waters.

In early 1942, when British intelligence strongly suggested a possible German breakout and passage through the Straits of Dover, preparations for aerial and naval attacks, already under way for nearly a year, were accelerated. The British assumed that any transit by the German ships through the narrowest part of the channel would be at night, but the Germans planned Operation CERBERUS (also known as the Channel Dash) to conceal

the ships' departure from Brest and to run the straits in daylight, counting on surprise to prevent a timely British concentration of adequate resistance.

Exceptional cooperation between German naval and air commands combined with failures in British technology and communications brought the Germans almost complete success. At 10:45 p.m. on February 11, the three big ships and an escort of six destroyers, with Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax commanding, cleared Brest Harbor. Not until 11:09 a.m. on February 12, when the Germans were less than an hour from the straits and had been reinforced by torpedo boat squadrons from French ports, did the British identify the ships. By noon, the German ships were in the Dover narrows, and although attacked by British coastal artillery, torpedo boats, and the Fleet Air Arm, they passed through unscathed. Later attacks along the Belgian and Dutch coasts by destroyers and by Royal Air Force fighters and bombers were no more successful. Although the *Gneisenau* struck one mine and the *Scharnhorst* hit two (the second one seriously slowing it and separating it from the rest of the flotilla), all the German ships were safely in the Elbe estuary by 10:30 a.m. on February 13.

Amid German euphoria and British humiliation, thoughtful minds on both sides realized that this German tactical success in the Channel represented a self-inflicted strategic defeat in the Atlantic. Even the sense of victory was short-lived, for the mine damage to the *Scharnhorst* took six months to repair, the *Prinz Eugen* was torpedoed on February 23 by a British submarine in the North Sea, and the *Gneisenau* was irreparably damaged during air raids on Kiel on February 26–27.

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See also

Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy

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Chaffee, Adna Romanza, Jr. (1884–1941)

U.S. Army major general. Born in Junction City, Kansas, on September 23, 1884, the son of the second chief of staff of the U.S. Army, Adna Romanza Chaffee Jr. graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1906. He was commissioned in the cavalry and served with the 15th Cavalry Regiment in Cuba until 1907. Between 1907 and 1911, he was assigned to the Mounted Services School at Fort Riley, Kansas, commanding the mounted detachment supporting students and staff at the school. After attending the French Cavalry School at Saumur (1911–1912), Chaffee returned to teaching at Fort Riley. In 1914 and 1915, he served with the 7th Cavalry Regiment in the Philippines. Chaffee was then assigned to West Point, where he was senior cavalry instructor for the Tactical Department until 1917.

Following the U.S. entry into World War I, Chaffee attended the staff school at Langres, France, then was an instructor there. Thereafter, he was assigned as a staff officer with the 81st Division and fought with it in the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. He ended the war as a temporary colonel.

Following occupation duty in Germany as a staff officer of III Corps, Chaffee reverted to his permanent rank of captain in 1919. He was then an instructor at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Promoted to major in 1920, after various assignments he served as the G-3 of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Bliss, Texas, between 1921 and 1924. Chaffee graduated from the Army War College in 1925, and from then until 1927, he commanded a squadron of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment. He next served on the War Department General Staff. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1929, he was charged with developing mechanized and armored forces for the army.

A staunch supporter of mechanized warfare, Chaffee was a leading proponent of a separate armored force. In 1931, he joined the new 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) at Fort Knox, Kentucky, as its executive

officer. Between 1934 and 1938, Chaffee was chief of the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch of the War Department. He then returned to Fort Knox to command the 1st Cavalry Regiment. In November 1938, he was promoted to brigadier general and assumed command of the 7th Mechanized Brigade, which he led during the maneuvers at Plattsburgh, New York, in 1939 and in Louisiana in 1940, both of which had significant impact on U.S. Army mechanized doctrine.

Chaffee assumed command of the new Armored Force in June 1940 and thus was responsible for the development of the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions. In October 1940, he took command of the I Armored Corps as a major general, but by that point, he was already ill from cancer. The disease took his life in Boston, Massachusetts, on August 22, 1941. In 1945, the army named its new light tank, the M-24, in his honor. Chaffee is regarded as the father of the U.S. Army's armored branch.

MARK A. BUHL

See also

Armored Warfare; Tanks, All Powers

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Chamberlain, Arthur Neville (1869–1940)

British Conservative politician and prime minister (1937 to 1940). The son of a distinguished political family, Arthur Neville Chamberlain was born on March 18, 1869, in Birmingham, England. He graduated from Mason College, Birmingham; administered a family plantation in the Bahamas; and later ran a metals business, becoming lord mayor of Birmingham in 1915. Chamberlain was elected to Parliament in December 1918 and achieved cabinet rank quickly, serving as minister of health (1923, 1924–1929, and 1931) and becoming an important reformer in that post. After serving as chancellor of the exchequer (1923–1924, 1931–1937), he was clearly in line

to be prime minister and assumed that post on the retirement of Stanley Baldwin on May 28, 1937.

Intellectually arrogant and convinced that his opinions were correct in all things, Chamberlain rarely sought advice from a generally weak cabinet, listening only to his confidant, Sir Horace Wilson. Chamberlain was woefully ignorant of foreign affairs, and his policy through most of the 1930s was to cut defense spending while appeasing those who appeared to pose threats. In April 1938, he abandoned Royal Navy bases in Ireland. Until his final weeks in office, however, he enjoyed strong support in Parliament and from the establishment British press.

Chamberlain is remembered most for his dogged efforts to appease Adolf Hitler in order to avoid war, culminating in the shameful Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, which gave the Sudeten portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany (without any Czech participation in the decision) to avert a threatened German invasion. At home, Chamberlain was widely praised for bringing, in his words, “peace in our time.” He ignored the tiny parliamentary minority led by Winston L. S. Churchill, who argued that Britain had to rearm, and virtually forced Anthony Eden to resign as foreign secretary on February 19, 1938, when the two men disagreed about discussions with the Italian government. Chamberlain only reluctantly repudiated appeasement when Germany occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia on March 10, 1939.

Finally pushed hard by members of his own cabinet, Chamberlain issued an ultimatum to Hitler after Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Receiving no answer, Chamberlain took his nation to war two days later and directed Britain’s effort for the first eight months of the conflict. His war cabinet now included Churchill, back as first lord of the admiralty. Although much of the period passed as the so-called Phony War, the spring of 1940 saw Germany’s invasion and occupation of Norway and Denmark and its invasion of the Low Countries and France.



Neville Chamberlain served as prime minister of Great Britain during 1937–1940. He believed that he could avoid a new world war by making concessions to German leader Adolf Hitler (what became known as appeasement). (Library of Congress)

By then, Chamberlain had lost his support in the House of Commons, and after several days of emotional debate, he was replaced by Churchill on May 10, 1940, with a multiparty national government. Chamberlain became lord president of the council (he remained head of the party) and a member of the War Cabinet until September 30, 1940, when he resigned due to ill health. He died of cancer on November 9, 1940, in Heckfield, England.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; Hitler, Adolf; Munich Conference and Preliminaries; Mussolini, Benito; Document 29; Document 35

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Chang Fa-k'uei

See Zhang Fakui

Chang Hsüeh-liang

See Zhang Xueliang

Chang-ku-feng/Khasan, Battle of

See Zhanggufeng/Khasan, Battle of

Channel Dash

See CERBERUS, Operation

Channel Islands Campaign (June 1944–May 1945)

The Channel Islands, situated in the south-central portion of the English Channel and closer to France than mainland Britain, were the only British territory occupied by Germany in World War II. Germany fortified and equipped them with powerful coastal artillery emplacements as part of the Atlantic Wall. After the Allies invaded Normandy on June 6, 1944, the 26,100-man German garrison—which included the 319th Infantry Division and assorted coastal artillery, air force, navy, construction and supply personnel—remained in place. The decision to hold the islands rather than evacuate them led to a miniature naval war far behind the front lines that lasted nearly a year until the defeat of the Nazi regime in May 1945.

In the Gulf of Saint-Malo, the German Navy deployed the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla, with seven 775-ton M-class minesweepers; the 46th Minesweeper Flotilla of converted trawlers, numbered sequentially *M4600* through *M4628;* and the 2nd Patrol Boat Flotilla of converted trawlers, numbered *V201* through *V216.* Following the Normandy landings, German convoys sailed nearly every night throughout June, rushing supplies into the islands and evacuating construction workers and concentration camp inmates.

Allied forces patrolled across the English Channel to suppress this German traffic. On the night of June 13, the Polish destroyer *Piorun* and the British destroyer *Ashanti* attacked six German minesweepers of the 24th Flotilla along with assorted V-boats escorting a convoy from Saint-Malo. They sank the *M343* and damaged the *M412*, *M422*, *M432*, *M442*, and *M452.* On June 15, the Canadian 65th Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) Flotilla intercepted a convoy of two M-class minesweepers, three trawlers, and two merchantmen and torpedoed the *M133.*

On June 22, four boats of the Canadian 65th Flotilla, along with four MTBs of the Royal Navy's 52nd Flotilla, conducted a sweep off Jersey. The 65th's boats came upon a German convoy consisting of a minesweeper, a pair of armed trawlers, and the merchant ship *Hydra.* They sank the *Hydra*, but the *MTB-745* was severely damaged in the exchange. On the night of June 26, the 52nd Flotilla had better luck off Jersey, sinking the *M4620.* The Germans won a rare victory the next night when the large Tribal-class destroyers *Eskimo* and *Huron* intercepted the *M4611* and two patrol boats. The destroyers set the *M4611* ablaze, but the *V213*, a 282-ton ex-fishing boat, put an 88mm shell into the *Eskimo*'s number one boiler room, and a 37mm

round pierced the main steam line. The *Eskimo* was reduced to steaming in circles at six knots before eventually making it back to Plymouth.

On the night of July 3, the 65th Flotilla ambushed a convoy sailing from Jersey to Saint-Malo and torpedoed the *V210* and *V208* and the tug *Minotaure*. The *MTB748* was damaged. On the night of July 7, the destroyers *Huron* and *Tartar* sank the *M4605* and *M4601*.

On July 25, the Americans broke the German lines in Normandy around Saint-Lô and raced into Brittany. On the night of August 6, the surviving units of the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla, the *M-412*, *M-432*, *M-442*, and *M-452*, evacuated Saint-Malo. An Allied force of two destroyers and MTBs intercepted the Germans off Jersey but could not prevent the 24th from fighting its way through to Saint-Hélier, Jersey.

The Allies proceeded to quarantine the Channel Islands, and after August 2, this became the responsibility of the U.S. Navy. The Americans teamed destroyer escorts with PT squadrons 30 and 34 operating out of Cherbourg and began to patrol around the islands every night.

On August 9, the U.S. destroyer escort *Maloy*, with five PT boats, encountered six trawlers of the 46th Flotilla. The Germans emerged from this scrap intact, while *PT-509* was sunk. On August 11, the destroyer escort *Borum* supporting two PT boats attacked two ships of the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla off Jersey without result. On the night of August 13, the British destroyers *Onslaught* and *Saumarez*, with the *Borum* and two U.S. and two British MTBs, engaged four ships of the 24th Flotilla and a merchant vessel off St. Peter Port, Guernsey. The minesweepers inflicted slight damage and some casualties on the destroyers and suffered light damage in return. On August 19, Allied forces intercepted an interisland convoy escorted by the 24th Flotilla and heavily damaged a minesweeper.

After this action, as the U.S. Army liberated Brittany, the 24th and 46th Flotillas kept largely to port, while the U.S. Navy discontinued offensive patrols. As autumn passed into winter, supplies began to run low in the Channel Islands, and the civilian population faced starvation. The German naval commander decided to raid the mainland to obtain food and coal. By coincidence, the Allies were shipping coal to the nearby port of Granville on the Cotentin Peninsula, which had good rail connections to Paris.

On the night of March 8, 1945, the *M-412, M-432, M-442*, and *M-452* as well as a tug, three artillery lighters, three fast launches, and two armed

trawlers sailed from Saint-Hélier. They encountered and badly damaged the U.S. submarine chaser *PC-564* outside of Granville. The Germans then stormed ashore. Everything went as planned except that the *M-412* grounded on a mud bank in the outer harbor. At 3:00 a.m., the Germans retired with one collier loaded with coal. There was no time to salvage the *M-412*, however, and the crew blew it up. The Germans then returned to Saint-Hélier.

On May 8, 1945, following the collapse of the Nazi regime, the British destroyer *Bulldog* approached Guernsey to demand the island's immediate surrender. An emissary sailed out on a rusty and battered minesweeper and instructed the destroyer to depart. Facing 12-inch coastal guns, the British destroyer commander complied and did not receive the surrender until the next day. It was clear that the German defenders of the Channel Islands believed they had never been defeated.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Brittany, Battle of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Chaplains

Throughout the long history of warfare, nations have relied on the spiritual and emotional support of military chaplains of various denominations and spiritual traditions to attend to the needs of their fighting men and women. In some cases, military chaplains are commissioned officers in a branch of the military; in others, they are appointed by the leaders of their respective religious denominations and serve in a civilian capacity.

All of the major nations relied on chaplains. Great Britain and the Commonwealth nations commissioned chaplains from all denominations and gave them wide latitude in their responsibilities to meet the spiritual and emotional needs of their soldiers. The Church of England and Roman

Catholic dioceses provided the largest number of chaplains to the British military. During the “Great Patriotic War,” the Soviet government put aside its opposition to the Russian Orthodox Church, reopening churches and releasing priests and bishops from prison to bolster the morale of the Soviet people. Russian Orthodox priests also accompanied the Red Army in the field. Military chaplains in Germany and Italy were unique because of their close connection with the state. For example, German chaplains were required to pray for the Fatherland and the führer at their religious services. The Italian Army enjoyed the spiritual support of a wide range of Catholic chaplains as well as local Catholic clergy.

In the United States, chaplains of all of the major religious groups served the 12 million men and women of the armed services without regard to the religious affiliation of the supplicant. A total of 8,100 U.S. chaplains served during the war overseas as well as on the home front. The requirements for the chaplaincy were straightforward. Individuals needed a certificate of ordination, two years of successful ministerial experience, and endorsement from the individual’s denomination.

U.S. military chaplain candidates temporarily vacated their obedience to their religious bodies and were subject to the discipline and orders of their military superiors. In place of boot camp, the candidates were enrolled in Chaplain School (two weeks for the navy and four weeks for the army), where they were indoctrinated in armed forces law, drills, customs, and interdenominational cooperation. Those chaplains assigned to specialized units (such as paratroopers) were required to undergo the same training as the men they were serving, and many volunteered for these rigorous assignments. The Geneva Convention defined chaplains as noncombatants, and close attention was paid to ensuring that their roles were not compromised in combat situations.

Although the official functions of U.S. military chaplains included conducting religious services, preaching, encouraging those who were experiencing difficulties, and writing families of those lost in battle, many received medals and distinctions for valor. Two chaplains (a Protestant and a Catholic) on the battleship *Oklahoma* at Pearl Harbor were among the first to die in battle, on December 7, 1941. A total of 77 U.S. chaplains died during World War II, and chaplains received 2,453 medals for valor. One of the most highly decorated military chaplains was Catholic chaplain Albert

Hoffman, who received the Distinguished Service Cross and the Silver Star and lost a leg while serving with the 133rd Infantry Regiment in Italy. Perhaps the most famous act of courage occurred on the deck of the U.S. Army transport *Dorchester* on February 3, 1943, when four chaplains (Methodist reverend George L. Fox, Rabbi Alexander D. Goode, Roman Catholic reverend John P. Washington, and Reformed Church in America reverend Clark V. Poling) gave their life vests to others and went down with the ship.

In carrying out their duties, military chaplains of the belligerent nations demonstrated both compassion and personal bravery. Their services were much appreciated by the men and woman to whom they ministered, frequently in difficult circumstances. The chaplains often referred to their years in the military during World War II as the most rewarding of their ministries.

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See also

Catholic Church and the War; Religion and the War

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Charities

Private or quasi-private organizations created to provide aid to both civilians and military personnel during the war. At the beginning of World War II, the British and French instituted a naval blockade of Germany, halting the shipment of food, among other items. This policy often hurt innocents, as it contributed to hunger and even starvation in some places. A number of people in Britain opposed this policy and formed the national Famine Relief Committee at Oxford, which eventually became Oxfam.

At the beginning of World War II, Canadian charities mobilized to lobby the government regarding the Canadian Patriotic Fund Bill and the War Charities Bill, which were essentially improved versions of World War I legislation. To coordinate voluntary assistance, the Canadians created the Department of National War Services.

As American charities mobilized, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, aware that multiple war-relief appeals might discourage donations, issued an order in mid-September 1939 that required all war-relief organizations to secure certificates of registration from the Department of State. Among American charities, the Community Chests (successors of the Community War Chests of World War I and predecessors of today's United Way) joined with many relief agencies—including the United States Committee for the Care of European Children, the Volunteer Bureaus, and the Junior League—to meet wartime needs. U.S. charities often helped European refugees survive while they waited for visas and steamship tickets to the United States or elsewhere.

On September 16, 1940, the United States instituted its first peacetime conscription. To aid military personnel, the Navy Relief Society and the Army Relief Society were formed by the military itself. On March 11, 1941, Congress passed Lend-Lease legislation: as well as weapons, this aid included billions of dollars in food and nonmilitary assistance to nations fighting the Axis powers. That same year, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), National Catholic Community Service, Salvation Army, Jewish Welfare Board, and National Traveler's Aid Association formed the United Service Organizations (USO). At President Roosevelt's request, the USO operated the military services' huts and canteens.

In 1942 there was widespread starvation in Greece caused in large part by the German seizure of Greek food supplies. An estimated 500,000 Greeks starved to death in the war years. The Oxford Famine Relief Committee, well connected to the exiled Greek government, promoted international aid. Wheat from Canada, purchased by relief agencies, was allowed through the British blockade to Turkey in Swedish ships flying the Red Cross flag. The Germans allowed the wheat into Greece in ships flying Turkey's Red Crescent insignia. Spain also received food shipments from charities.

In 1943, Russian War Relief was organized as an agency of the National War Fund, with much of the aid coming from the United States. Also in

1943, many American agencies formed the United Relief organization, with the Red Feather as its symbol.

In Germany, the Nazis ran their own annual charity once a year. Known as Winterhilfe (Winter Help), it was the official private charitable organization of the Nazis, which nonetheless accomplished much. In China, many organizations were involved in relief work, including members of the Friends Society (Quakers), Mennonites, and the Brethren. The Red Cross was also active in relief work in Portugal, aiding refugees and handling tons of packages for prisoners of war; however, the relief work was hampered by the lack of provisions in the Geneva Convention to cover civilian relief.

In February 1944, Washington took the lead in moving from a policy of blockade to controlled relief. Dislocations at the end of the war increased the need for relief. By November 27, 1945, a consortium of 22 American charities came together to establish the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) to handle postwar charity. The new United Nations organization was also actively involved in this effort through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), created in late 1945.

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See also

Bernadotte, Folke; China; Greece; Portugal; Religion and the War; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Chemical Weapons and Warfare

Poison gas had been utilized with considerable effect by the major belligerents in World War I. In the course of the conflict, the combatants had deployed about 113,000 tons of chemicals, and some estimates have more than 1 million soldiers injured by poison gas during the war, 10 percent of them fatally.

In the interwar period, the major powers discussed outlawing the use of poison gas, but they also continued to produce it. Prior to World War II, more than 40 nations signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the offensive use of chemical weapons in warfare. All of the main combatants in World War II except the United States and Japan ratified the protocol, which went into force in August 1928. Although the United States had first proposed the treaty, isolationist sentiment blocked its ratification in the Senate. Japan feared giving away any advantage in case of a conflict with the far more populous China. The signatory powers, however, reserved the right to utilize chemical weapons in a retaliatory attack and to employ them against a country that had not signed the protocol.

Chemical weapons are categorized by their effects on human beings, animals, and plants. Lung irritants, such as phosgene, make victims choke or suffocate, with symptoms usually delayed for several hours after contact. Vesicants, such as mustard gas, cause the skin to blister and the eyes to swell, sometimes with loss of sight. The symptoms of vesicants can be delayed up to 48 hours. Lacrimators are tear gases, such as chloracetophenone and brombenzylcyanide, that irritate the eyes and cause difficulty with breathing.

The warring powers also produced irritant smoke (such as sneezing gases or adamsite), screening smokes, and incendiaries. A new and deadly chemical agent, nerve gas, was developed during the war. Nerve gases take effect quickly, producing symptoms in 10 to 30 minutes depending on whether they are inhaled or absorbed through the skin.

Chemical weapons can be launched in a variety of forms: through shells and bombs that explode and disperse the chemicals into the air in drops or small particles, from containers with vaporized solids that infiltrate the air as a smoke, and through liquids released from airplanes as drops or mist. Chemical weapons can be more useful than conventional weapons because their effects are longer lasting, sometimes persisting for days or weeks. The most desirable chemical agents have many of the same characteristics in common. They are effective in small concentrations, difficult to protect

against, quickly and cheaply manufactured, made from easily obtainable raw materials, heavier than air, easily and safely transportable, effective against multiple parts of the body, and not easily detectable.

Three of the most common means used to deploy chemical agents by the end of World War I were the portable gas cylinder, the Livens Projector, and the chemical mortar. But these delivery systems were obsolete by the time of World War II, given the greater mobility of infantry troops. Accordingly, the size of chemical mortars was increased, as was their range (to 1,400 yards), and the Livens Projector was replaced by 100mm-caliber mobile rocket launchers. During the interwar years, governments also experimented with using airplanes to deliver chemical weapons, through cluster bombs and spraying. By the time World War II began, aerial bombardment with chemical weapons was the most common deployment mechanism. It is also possible to deploy chemical weapons, particularly mustard gas, in land mines and grenades. German leaders debated the feasibility of combining missiles and chemical weapons, but production of such mechanisms did not occur.

A supervisor inspects mustard gas warheads at an unidentified U.S. arsenal. President Franklin Roosevelt made it clear that the United States would only employ the gas if the Axis powers did so first. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In stark contrast to the situation in World War I, chemical weapons were used only sparingly in World War II. The major powers were reluctant to employ them. This was in part because they were convinced that their opponents had extensive stockpiles of poison gases and because their own populations were not prepared to withstand a retaliatory attack. They also did not wish to be the first to violate the Geneva Protocol.

Several key leaders were hesitant to authorize the use of chemical weapons. German leader Adolf Hitler, who had been gassed at Ypres in 1918, had a strong aversion to the use of gas as an offensive weapon, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt also opposed the use of chemical weapons. For the European powers in particular, the threat of retribution against cities and large-scale civilian suffering was a major deterrent. Fighting in World War II,

marked as it was by rapid movement, also was dramatically different from the stalemated trench warfare of the previous conflict. Early in the war, the Axis powers scored a succession of quick victories and did not need to resort to poison gas. Finally, the shipping of chemical weapons and equipping friendly troops for chemical attacks also presented logistical difficulties.

The fate of SS *John Harvey* illustrated the difficulty of shipping poison gas. The ship sailed from the United States to Italy in 1943, carrying 2,000 bombs loaded with mustard gas. Each bomb held 60 to 70 pounds of the gas. The ship docked at Bari on November 28, 1943. Four days later, German aircraft attacked the port. Their 20-minute assault sank 17 ships and badly damaged 8 others. Racked by explosions, the *John Harvey* sank, and some of the mustard gas in the bombs in the hold was released. It mixed with the oil and smoke and rolled across the water. More than 1,000 Allied soldiers and Italian civilians died as a result, and hundreds were blinded, some permanently. The death rate was particularly high because no one knew of the cargo until several weeks had passed.

Yet such difficulties did not preclude the use of poison gas in the war. The Italians, for example, utilized mustard gas and tear gas grenades in their 1935–1936 conquest of Ethiopia. They employed it to protect their flanks by saturating the ground on either side of the advancing columns. They also targeted Ethiopian communications centers and employed mustard gas against Ethiopian military personnel. In fact, the Italians deployed more than 700 tons of gas against the local population, either as bombs (each container contained about 44 pounds) or sprayed from aircraft. Their use of chemical weapons was indiscriminate, targeting both military and civilian areas. One-third of all Ethiopian military casualties in this conflict resulted from exposure to chemical agents.

The Italian decision to employ chemical weapons on a large scale in Ethiopia prompted other nations to renew their production of such weapons and to plan for protecting their armed forces and civilian populations. France began production at a phosgene facility at Clamency in 1936. The U.S. government reopened mustard gas and phosgene plants in New Jersey the following year. The Soviet Union opened three new chemical weapons production plants. And in November 1938, after the Munich Conference, the British government issued tens of thousands of gas masks to civilians and

mandated a minimum level of production of 300 tons of mustard gas per week, with 2,000 tons held in reserve.

At the beginning of World War II, Germany held a commanding lead in the stockpiling of chemical weapons, but its government officials did not know this. German stockpiles in 1939 are estimated at 10,000 tons, as compared with 500 tons in Great Britain, 1,000 tons in the United States, and 2,000 tons in Japan.

During World War II in the European theater, chemical weapons were never deliberately employed on a large scale. In June 1940, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill discussed with his cabinet the idea of using poison gas to repel a German invasion of either Great Britain or Ireland. Although many of the senior military staff opposed this notion, the cabinet approved it. The British government also considered the use of poison gas to combat the German V-1 and V-2 rockets later in the war. By 1944, Germany's production capacity was 10,000 tons of poison gas per month; in addition, myriad delivery systems were available, including grenades filled with hydrogen cyanide. The Luftwaffe had more than 480,000 gas bombs, ranging in size from 33 to 1,650 pounds.

In the Pacific theater, the Japanese had been involved in massive production of poison gas since the later portion of World War I. By 1937, Japan was daily producing up to 2 tons of Lewisite, a virulent form of mustard gas. In their invasion and occupation of China from 1937 to 1945, the Japanese employed a wide variety of poison gases, including phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, mustard gas, and Lewisite. Since the Chinese population, both military and civilian, was completely unprotected against chemical warfare, the effects were devastating.

The Japanese deployed the chemical weapons by aerial bombardment and artillery shells. They also designed rockets capable of holding 10.5 quarts of a chemical agent and traveling up to two miles, flamethrowers that propelled hydrogen cyanide, and a handheld antitank weapon that employed hydrogen cyanide. The Japanese also utilized gas grenades during the Imphal and Kohima sieges (March–July 1944). The United States considered using poison gas during the invasion of Iwo Jima and the proposed invasion of the Japanese home islands, but the former was never ordered, and the latter proved unnecessary.

The deadliest form of chemical warfare at that time, nerve gas, was never

used in battle. A German scientist, Gerhard Schrader, employed by I. G. Farben in 1936, discovered tabun while he was trying to create a more powerful insecticide. Tabun can be absorbed directly into the body and is colorless and odorless. It stops the nervous system from producing a key enzyme, acetylcholinesterase, which allows contracting muscles to relax. If this enzyme is not active, important muscles, such as the heart, contract and begin to spasm. As all the body's muscles contract, the person suffocates.

Tabun is 100 to 1,000 times more deadly than chlorine gas and 10 to 100 times more deadly than mustard or phosgene gas. Later, Schrader discovered a second and even more toxic nerve gas, which he named sarin. It is almost 10 times more lethal than tabun. In 1944, a still more deadly nerve gas, soman, was discovered, but it was never mass-produced during the war. Great Britain also manufactured sarin and soman.

Germany's leaders chose not to deploy tabun, because they lacked the ability to protect their own population against this nerve gas and no known antidote existed. The Germans did test their nerve gases on unwilling inmates of concentration and prisoner-of-war camps. At the Natzweiler concentration camp, tests with both mustard and phosgene gases were also conducted on unwilling prisoners. Germany moved its storage of nerve gas in 1944 in anticipation of Allied advances in the west, but their production facility in Silesia fell into Soviet hands.

The German government used a poison gas, namely Zyklon B, against prisoners in concentration camps, notably the Jews, and in its killing centers in Poland. Zyklon B was developed in the 1930s by Deesch, a subsidiary of I. G. Farben that was experimenting with more powerful insecticides. Zyklon B, also known as Prussic acid, is hydrogen cyanide—a powerful toxic, volatile, and colorless liquid. In order to transport the gas, it was absorbed by wood circles or small cubes because of its great volatility.

Zyklon B was dropped into gas chambers and caused suffocation as well as vomiting and feelings of fear and dizziness. The Germans constructed gas chambers to use Zykl-on B in their camps at Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, Neuengamme, Majdanek, Mauthausen, Stutthof, Lüblin, Gross-Rosen, Ravensbrück, and Treblinka. In Auschwitz alone, more than 2.5 million people were murdered through the use of Zyklon B between May 1940 and December 1943. At other concentration camps and killing centers, prisoners were usually killed by carbon monoxide poisoning.

By 1945, the major combatants as a group had stockpiled more than 500,000 tons of chemical weapons, led by the United States with 110,000 tons. This amount was five times the total amount of gas employed in World War I. Although poison gases were never used in large-scale attacks during World War II, the threat was present throughout the conflict. Given their deadly nature, the updated deployment systems, and the large stockpiles, chemical weapons could have played an enormous role in World War II.

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See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Concentration Camps, German; Holocaust; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Incendiary Bombs and Bombing

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Chen Cheng (1898–1965)

Chinese Nationalist general who commanded the Chinese Expeditionary Army and served as war minister. Born in Qingtian (Ch'ingt'ien), Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province, on January 4, 1898, Chen Cheng (Ch'en Ch'eng) enrolled at the Baoding (Paoting) Military Academy in 1919 and graduated in 1922. He then served both in his native province and in Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province.

In 1924, Chen became an artillery instructor in the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy, where he joined the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists) and developed a close relationship with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Chen held a number of command posts in the Eastern and Northern Expeditions between 1925 and 1928 as well as in the antiwarlord and anti–Chinese Communist "extermination campaigns" of the early 1930s. Chen became

commander in chief of the Fourth Group Army, a position second only to that of Jiang, in early 1937.

After the start of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, Chen took command of the Fifteenth Group Army and became deputy commander of the Fourth Reserve Army; that November, he was also made commander in chief of the Third War Area of Zhejiang and southern Jiangsu (Kiangsu), defending both Shanghai and Nanjing (Nanking). When both cities fell at year's end, Chen went to Wuhan, Hubei (Hupeh), assuming the post of defense commander in chief in January 1938. He was concurrently commander of the newly created Ninth War Area of southern Hubei, northern Jiangsu, and Hunan in June and governor of Hunan in July. After Wuhan's fall in late October 1938 in the First Battle of Changsha in Hunan, Chen moved to Chongqing (Chung-king) in Sichuan (Szechwan), where he was responsible for guerrilla and corps training. In October 1939, he became commander of the Sixth War Area, comprising the areas west of Hunan including eastern and southern Hubei and eastern Sichuan. From May 1940, he held back the Japanese advance to Chongqing at Yichang (Ichang), Hubei.

In February 1943, Chen was also commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Army, responsible for preparing the joint Anglo-American–Chinese Burma Campaign launched the next year (he was succeeded in this post by Wei Lihuang [Wei Li-huang] in October). After the Japanese launched Operation ICHI-GO (April–December 1944) against Henan (Honan), Chen became commander of the enlarged First War Area of Hebei, northern Shandong (Shantung), Henan, Anhui (Anhwei), and Shaanxi (Shensi). When the Japanese advanced into Guangxi (Kwangsi), Guizhou (Kewichow), and Yunnan at the end of the year, Chen left the battlefield and, as war minister, concentrated on modernizing GMD forces, employing U.S. technical and material assistance.

After the beginning of the Chinese Civil War, Chen became director of the Northeastern Headquarters in August 1947. He resigned in January 1948 because of illness, and his position was taken by Wei. In October, Chen fled to Taiwan, where he assumed the governorship, preparing the GMD retreat from the mainland. In 1954, he was elected vice president of the Republic of China. Chen died in Taipei on March 5, 1965.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

China, Army; ICHI-GO, Operation; Jiang Jieshi; Sino-Japanese War; Wei Lihuang

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Chennault, Claire Lee (1893–1958)

U.S. Army Air Forces lieutenant general. Born in Commerce, Texas, on September 6, 1893, Claire Lee Chennault was raised in rural Louisiana. He taught English and business at a number of southern colleges until August 1917, when he became a second lieutenant in the army reserve. He remained in the United States during World War I, transferring to the Signal Corps and completing pilot training in 1920.

An accomplished flier, Chennault then held a number of assignments, among them command of the 19th Pursuit Squadron in Hawaii between 1923 and 1926. He became an outspoken advocate of fighter aircraft in a period when prevailing military thought subscribed to the doctrines espoused by Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet and the underlying assumption that "the bomber will always get through." While serving as an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School in 1935, Chennault wrote *The Role of Defensive Pursuit*, an important but controversial book at the time because it stressed the need for fighter aircraft. Removed from flying status in 1937 because of a serious hearing loss, Chennault was forced into medical retirement as a captain.

In May 1937, Chennault went to China as aviation adviser to the Nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). When the Japanese attacked China that September, he became a colonel in the Chinese air force and began testing his tactical theories. In late 1940, Chennault was

allowed to recruit American military pilots for service in China, despite the strong opposition of the State, War, and Navy Departments. His American Volunteer Group (AVG), popularly known as the Flying Tigers, consisted of some 200 ground crew and 100 pilots flying semiobsolete Curtiss P-40B fighters. The AVG entered combat for the first time on December 20, 1941. By the time the unit disbanded in July 1942, it claimed 296 Japanese aircraft shot down, with only 12 planes and 4 pilots lost.

In April 1942, Chennault was recalled to active duty with the U.S. Army as a colonel. A few months later, he was promoted to brigadier general and put in command of the newly formed China Air Task Force (CATF), a subordinate command of the U.S. Tenth Air Force in India. In March 1943, the CATF became the Fourteenth Air Force, with Chennault promoted to major general.

U.S. Army Air Forces major general Claire Chennault established and commanded the American Volunteer Group (AVG), known as the Flying Tigers, in China early in World War II. He then

commanded the Fourteenth Air Force. After the war Chennault founded Civil Air Transport (CAT), which later became Air America. (National Archives)

The CATF and the Fourteenth Air Force were economy-of-force organizations in a tertiary theater and therefore always operated on a shoestring. Operating under Chennault's theories, however, both organizations achieved combat effectiveness out of proportion to their size and resources. By 1945, the Fourteenth Air Force had destroyed some 2,600 Japanese aircraft and thousands of tons of supplies.

During his time in China, Chennault conducted a long-running and public feud with U.S. Army lieutenant general Joseph Stilwell, the equally stubborn and irascible U.S. commander of the China-Burma-India theater. Chennault engineered Jiang's demand for Stilwell's recall, but Chennault was removed from command and forced into retirement for a second time on August 1, 1945.

After the war, Chennault remained in China. He established and operated the Civil Air Transport (CAT) airline, which supported Jiang's Nationalist government in its civil war with Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and his Communist forces. In 1950, Chennault sold his interest in CAT to the Central Intelligence Agency, but he remained the chairman of the airline's board until 1955. He died at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, D.C., on July 27, 1958. Only days before his death, Chennault was promoted to lieutenant general.

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See also

China-Burma-India Theater; Douhet, Giulio; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Chen Yi (1901–1972)

Chinese military leader and marshal of the People's Republic of China. Born in Lezhi (Lochih), Sichuan (Szechuan) Province, to a well-to-do family on August 16, 1901, Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi/Ch'en I) studied at both Shanghai University and the Beijing (Peking) College of Law and Commerce before traveling to France in 1919 on a work-study program. During his stay in France, he met Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) and became politically active. In 1921, Chen was deported from France for involvement in protests by Chinese exchange students.

On his return to China, Chen joined the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist Party) in 1921 and the Communist Party in 1923; they were then loosely allied in the struggle to reunify China. Following study at the Sino-French University of Beijing between 1923 and 1925, Chen became a political instructor at the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy in 1925. He then served on the staff of General Ye Ting's (Yeh T'ing) 24th Division at the beginning of the Northern Expedition, the Nationalist-led reunification campaign launched in the summer of 1926.

In 1927 the alliance between the Communists and Nationalists collapsed, and civil war ensued. Chen participated in the abortive Communist Nanchang Uprising of Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province in August 1927. In January 1929, he joined Zhu De (Chu Teh) in the Communist enclave of Jiangxi and commanded the 12th Division of the Red IV Corps fighting Nationalist forces under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Chen did not join Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) in the epic Long March of 1934–1935. Instead, Chen stayed behind to organize guerrilla forces in south-central China, which eventually became part of the New Fourth Army. Following the beginning of war with Japan in 1937, he fought with the New Fourth Army against the Japanese along the Changjiang (Yangtze) River.

After the Japanese inflicted a sharp defeat on the New Fourth Army in January 1941, Chen, who had been a sector commander, took command of the entire army. From that point until 1945, his New Fourth Army greatly expanded the area of Communist control in central China by conducting a highly effective guerrilla campaign characterized by rapid maneuver.

Following Japan's surrender, Chen was formally assigned command of the New Fourth Army. In the 1946–1949 Chinese Civil War, he encircled the

Nationalist 2nd and 7th army groups, destroying them in the Huai-Hai Campaign between November 1948 and January 1949. After that, he advanced to take Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province in April and both Wuhan in Hubei (Hupeh) Province and Shanghai in Jiangsu Province in May. Chen served as mayor of Shanghai and commander of the East China Military Region (1949–1956) and vice premier (1956). He was promoted to marshal of the People's Liberation Army in 1955 and served as China's foreign minister from 1956 to 1968. Attacked by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, Chen died in Beijing on January 6, 1972.

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See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De

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Cherbourg, Capture of (June 1944)

The capture of the French port city of Cherbourg, on the northern shore of Cotentin Peninsula, was vital to the Allied buildup for the Normandy breakout. On June 7, 1944, the day after the Allied landings at Normandy, Major General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps attacked westward from the Utah Beach lodgment across the Cotentin Peninsula to isolate the port of Cherbourg. On June 18, VII Corps succeeded in cutting completely across the peninsula and isolating parts of four German divisions in the Cherbourg Pocket commanded by Lieutenant General Karl Wilhelm von Schlieben.

With VIII Corps holding the southern shoulder of the Allied success, VII Corps advanced northward on Cherbourg starting on June 19. That same day, a strong storm hit Normandy. Three days later when the storm lifted, the artificial harbor (Mulberry A) at Omaha Beach had been destroyed, rendering the capture of Cherbourg even more urgent. When Collins launched VII Corps with three divisions abreast, the German defenses along the eastern

shore of the peninsula were outflanked, and Schlieben had no choice but to fall back into the defenses that circled Cherbourg along high ground. By June 21, VII Corps invested the defenses, and the fall of the city was imminent.

On June 22, the Allies launched heavy air attacks to open the final phase of the battle. Collins ordered the main attacks in the center and left, conducted by the 79th and 9th Infantry Divisions, while the 4th Infantry Division supported in the east. On June 22, German leader Adolf Hitler ordered Schlieben to fight to the last and leave nothing but ruins for the Allies. VII Corps advanced steadily on June 22–23 and reached Cherbourg's outer suburbs of Octeville and Tourlaville, which were taken on June 24. The air attacks dampened German morale, and on June 25 a naval task force headed by three battleships supported the final attack on Cherbourg proper with naval gunfire.

The 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions seized their objectives inside the city by nightfall on June 25. The 79th Infantry Division had a more difficult fight around Fort du Roule, which finally fell on June 26. Schlieben made his final radio message that afternoon and was captured shortly thereafter; he refused to order a general surrender of forces.

Organized German resistance ended on June 27, but fighting continued as VII Corps reduced several strongpoints that had been previously bypassed, including Cap de la Hague at the northwest corner of the peninsula, the port facilities, and other resistance pockets on the Cotentin Peninsula. The harbor strongpoints, under heavy dive-bomber attack, held out until June 29, and when the 9th Division seized Cap de la Hague on June 30, the campaign was concluded.

Bomb damage in the French port city of Cherbourg, on its liberation in late June 1944. (National Archives)

The heavy fighting to take Cherbourg severely damaged the port facilities. VII Corps found landing berths blocked by sunken ships, the harbor mined, the breakwater ripped open, and dock facilities demolished. Three weeks passed before the docks were able to receive cargo, and it was several months before shipments could be received in quantity—a serious blow to Allied logistical planning.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Hitler, Adolf; Mulberries; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Chernyakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich (1906–1945)

Soviet Army general. Born in Uman in Ukraine on June 29, 1906, Ivan Chernyakhovsky joined the Red Army in 1924 and the Communist Party in 1928, when he was commissioned. He then held a variety of assignments. He graduated from the Kiev Artillery School in 1928 and the Mechanization and Motorization Academy in the late 1930s. By 1940, he was a colonel commanding the 28th Tank Division in the Baltic Special Military District.

Following the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, Chernyakhovsky fought with his division as a part of the XVIII Tank Corps on the Leningrad front until July 1942. He then commanded the Sixtieth Army and took part in the Kursk Offensive of July 5–13, 1943. The youngest Soviet front commander of World War II, he was promoted to colonel general in March 1944. Marshal Georgii Zhukov recommended him to command the Western Front, which he took over in April 1944 just before it was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front.

In the Belorussian Offensive, Chernyakhovsky's command participated in the taking of Minsk and then moved through Latvia and took Vilna (Vilnius). It then drove into East Prussia, eventually taking Königsberg (Kaliningrad). Promoted to army general in June 1944 just days before his 38th birthday, Chernyakhovsky was one of the finest Soviet front commanders. Unusual for senior Soviet commanders of the war, he was a Jew, had joined the army after the civil war, and never attended the Frunze Military Academy. Chernyakhovsky did not live to see the capture of Königsberg. He was mortally wounded by artillery fire at Melzak, Poland, and died on February 18, 1945.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Kursk, Battle of; Leningrad, Siege of; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Cherwell, Lord

See Lindemann, Frederick Alexander

Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917–1992)

Royal Air Force (RAF) group captain. Born at Chester, England, on September 7, 1917, Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire was educated at Oxford University and joined the Air Squadron there in 1936. He was commissioned in the RAF Volunteer Reserve in 1937, and when war became imminent he accepted a regular commission and was assigned to bombers.

Cheshire began his first combat tour in June 1940, with Number 102 Squadron. Completing his first tour, he immediately accepted a second, with Number 35 Squadron. After a short stint as an instructor pilot, during which he wrote *Bomber Pilot*, Cheshire returned for a third operational tour, as wing commander of Number 76 Squadron. His bombing missions took him over the heavily defended Ruhr region, Berlin, and Bremen. Finishing his third tour, Group Captain Cheshire became a deputy base commander in March 1943.

Cheshire was unhappy when not flying and relinquished his rank to return to flying duties for a fourth time, in October 1943, as a wing commander in Guy Gibson's Number 617 Squadron, the "Dam Busters." There, Cheshire pioneered the master bomber technique, in which a low-flying Mosquito bomber flew ahead of and below the main attack force to mark targets with incendiaries. This placed the marking aircraft, which Cheshire regularly flew, in the teeth of the fiercest enemy fire, at altitudes as low as 200 feet. While commanding the 617 Squadron, he led every raid using the master bomber procedure, including the April 24–25, 1944, raid against Munich. In this action, his Mosquito was pushed perilously close to its maximum fuel range at an altitude of 700 feet over the city's heavy air defenses, and it was exposed to 12 straight minutes of enemy fire during the withdrawal. Cheshire also flew important missions in support of the Normandy bombing campaign and against the Le Havre E-boat (German fast attack craft) pens.

Cheshire won a Victoria Cross, awarded September 8, 1944, for flying an incredible 100 missions over German-held territory between 1940 and 1944.

His citation prominently mentions the Munich raid. Retiring from the RAF in December 1945, he founded Cheshire Foundation Homes in 1948, a worldwide organization that provides housing and services to disabled persons. Created Baron Cheshire of Woodall in 1991, he died in Cavendish, Suffolk, England, on July 31, 1992.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Bader, Sir Douglas Robert Steuart; Gibson, Guy Penrose; Great Britain, Air Force; Harris, Sir Arthur Travers

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Chevallerie, Kurt von der (1891–1945)

German Army general. Born on December 23, 1891, in Berlin to a family of Huguenot origin, Kurt von der Chevallerie was commissioned in the army as a lieutenant in August 1911. His first assignment was with the 5th Guards Grenadier Regiment in Berlin-Spandau. Decorated for valor in World War I, he remained on duty with the 4th Infantry Regiment after the war.

During the interwar period, Chevallerie held a variety of infantry commands and staff posts. He commanded the 83rd Infantry Division as a major general at the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Promoted to lieutenant general, he commanded the 99th Light Division in Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union that began June 22, 1941. He took command of the LIX Army Corps in December 1941 and was promoted to general of infantry. In January 1942, Chevallerie's forces sealed a dangerous gap between Velikiye Luki and Rzhev, preventing a Soviet

breakthrough. He was also involved in the effort to rescue the surrounded garrison at Velikiye Luki in January 1943.

At the time of the June 1944 Normandy Invasion, Chevallerie commanded the First Army, part of Army Task Group G under Colonel General Johannes von Blaskowitz. Chevallerie's duties were to defend southwest France and the Bay of Biscay area. He had about 100,000 men but few first-rate combat soldiers. Most of his men were garrison or coastal defense troops fit mainly for occupation duties or limited defensive missions. Eventually Chevallerie defended the Paris-Orléans gap area south of Paris. He was unable to halt the Allied advance, however, so Adolf Hitler removed him from command and placed him on the command reserve list, where he remained for the rest of the war.

Chevallerie disappeared during the Soviet assault on and capture of Kolberg on March 18, 1945. He may have died in the city or in Soviet captivity shortly thereafter. His younger brother was Lieutenant General Helmut von der Chevallerie, who commanded the 11th Panzer Division and then the 273rd Reserve Panzer Division.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von; France Campaign; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von

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Chiang Kai-shek

See Jiang Jieshi

Children and the War

During World War II, millions of men and women around the world served in the armed forces of their respective nations. Millions of others contributed to the war effort by maintaining vital services and laboring in war-related industries. Children went to war as well. Even those far removed from the fighting were affected by the war. They collected scrap metal and other materials that would be vital to the war effort, participated in austerity programs, left school to work on farms, grew vegetables in urban plots, and suffered from the same shortages and wartime prohibitions as their parents.

In many lands, children experienced the horrors of war firsthand, both as combatants and victims. Children were the most vulnerable part of the population, and many perished from starvation, malnutrition, or disease. Others fell victim to Nazi Germany's euthanasia programs. Some 1.2 million Jewish children throughout Europe died in the Holocaust.

Many children perished as a direct result of Soviet policies as well. Polish authorities estimated that about 140,000 Polish children were uprooted from their homes in the Soviet-occupied portion of Poland. Of these, perhaps 40,000 simply disappeared. In the Far East, Chinese children suffered in the Japanese reprisal campaigns. Children were also innocent victims of the indiscriminate bombing of cities conducted by both sides, beginning with German air attacks on Warsaw and ending with the atomic bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Many children in nations under air attack were sent into the countryside to live with relatives or even with strangers. A number were also sent abroad, separated from their parents for years and, in many cases, forever; examples include British children sent to North America and Finnish children sent to Sweden.

In the Soviet Union, children helped patrol their neighborhoods at night to make certain that blackouts were being enforced. They filled sandbags and water buckets to prepare against incendiary bomb attacks and were enlisted to help in constructing antitank defenses before Moscow in the summer of 1941. Children were also actual combatants. They fought with partisan units in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia, among other nations. They also helped

collect intelligence on Axis occupying forces. And in the last desperate fighting of World War II in Europe, Adolf Hitler pressed many German boys into the army.

After the war, conditions were desperate in many parts of the world. In Indochina, perhaps 1 million people, including children, perished due to famine. Conditions were equally desperate in other nations. Large numbers of people were displaced by the war, left homeless and hungry. There were perhaps 13 million abandoned European children at the end of World War II. Poland claimed 1 million orphans, and France claimed 250,000. This became a problem of major proportion in many nations, especially in the Soviet Union with an entire generation of orphans.

A 10-year old Chinese soldier, with a heavy pack, and a member of a Chinese division, boarding planes at the North Airstrip, Myitkyina, Burma, bound for China, December 5, 1944. (National Archives)

Adults were changed by the war, but so were the children who survived it. As they aged, their childhood experiences remained a reference point for their adult lives and served as a benchmark with which to measure future generations.

JOHN MORELLO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Holocaust; Nagasaki, Bombing of

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China

Large Asian nation with a 1939 population of approximately 517,568,000 people, making it the most populous country in the world. Encompassing 3,704,427 square miles, China stretches from Korea and the Yellow Sea in the east to Afghanistan in the west and from Mongolia and Russia in the north to India and Vietnam in the south. In the decades before World War II, the Republic of China was politically fragmented; it was rather weakly governed by the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—of President Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), but the Chinese Communists had been waging a mounting insurgency to oust the GMD and establish a communist regime over all China. Several regions were under the actual control of local warlords, often but not always affiliated with the Nationalists. At the same time, China came under increasing pressure and repression from the Japanese, who hoped to turn China into a vassal state.

China was one of the four major Allied powers of World War II. It fought Japan alone for four years and throughout the war tied down more than 1 million Japanese troops. The war strengthened the position of the Chinese Communists, however, and helped to precipitate the eventual downfall of the GMD, which occurred in 1949.

For China, war began in July 1937, when long-standing hostilities with Japan, provoked by the latter country's effective annexation of Manchuria in 1931 and a continuing series of territorial, economic, and political incursions in other areas, caused a small skirmish near the Lugouqiao (Lukouch'iao) Marco Polo Bridge, close to Beijing (Peking) in Hebei (Hopeh) Province. The incident quickly escalated into full-scale warfare. The Chinese invariably called the conflict "the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression." Until December 1941, when China formally declared war on Japan and thereby aligned itself with the Western Allies after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan dismissively referred to the Chinese conflict as the

“China Incident.” After that date, it became part of the “Greater East Asia War.”

For much of the 1930s, the Chinese Nationalist government effectively acquiesced to Japanese demands. Although Jiang believed that war with Japan was inevitable, he sought to defer this until, with the help of German military advisers, he had successfully modernized China’s armed forces. In the early 1930s, his first priority was to eliminate the GMD’s major political rival—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by the charismatic and innovative Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), against whose forces Jiang mounted annual campaigns from 1930 to 1935. Only after December 1936—when another leading Chinese politician, the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang), captured Jiang and made his release conditional on the formation of a united Nationalist-Communist anti-Japanese front—did Jiang reluctantly and temporarily renounce his deeply rooted anticommunist hostility.

The two camps never trusted each other, and political factionalism within the GMD also continued throughout the war, hampering Jiang’s freedom of action and his ability to wage effective warfare against Japanese forces. Communist and GMD forces remained essentially separate, mounting independent operations. From late 1938 onward, the GMD government, headed by Jiang and based in Chongqing (Chungking) in Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, controlled southwest China. The Communists held sway over northwest China from their base in Yan’an (Yenan) in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province.

In its early stages, China’s war with Japan was one of rapid movement and military disaster. In late July 1937, Japanese troops took over the entire Beijing-Tianjin (Tientsin) area of northern China. They inflicted a series of major defeats on Jiang’s military, wiping out most of his modernized units and, over the following 18 months, successively taking Shanghai and Nanjing (Nanking), Guangzhou (Canton), and Wuhan, China’s provisional capital after Nanjing fell. Chinese troops had occasional triumphs. Notable was the April 1938 Battle of Taierzhuang (Hsieh Chan T’ai-Erh-Chuang). Yet these were rarely followed up. Japanese leaders assumed that Jiang would sue for peace before the end of 1938, but to their frustration, he refused to do so.

Jiang adopted a strategy of trading space for time, assuming that the Chinese could force the Japanese to overextend themselves, making them

vulnerable to a lengthy war of attrition. This proved substantially correct. By 1940, Japanese forces were bogged down in an inconclusive war in mainland China, occupying vast tracts of territory without fully controlling them. Even so, and despite the scorched-earth policy Jiang followed, the regions he ceded to Japanese rule—from March 1940 exercised through the puppet regime of renegade Chinese politician Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei)—included most of China's leading cities, its major industrial areas, and its most fertile and densely populated agricultural regions. Jiang's early dogged resistance to Japanese invasion won him great national prestige. His subsequent protracted abandonment of most of northern and eastern China to Japanese occupation, however, eventually damaged his standing and weakened his authority.

From 1931 onward, Jiang sought assistance against Japan from Western powers and the League of Nations. But effectual aid was rarely forthcoming. The league restricted itself to nonrecognition of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) and moral condemnation of Japan's policies, together with the imposition of limited economic sanctions on Japan. They were, however, restrictions that only some of its member states observed. In 1938, the U.S. government extended limited economic assistance to China, making a loan against its tung oil supplies.

By the late 1930s, the growing demands of Germany and Italy in Europe preoccupied most Western nations. Thus, the Sino-Japanese War remained a distant sideshow, albeit one with implications for the European powers' colonial positions in Asia. In the summer of 1940, the German conquest of most of Western Europe brought Japanese demands that Britain, France, and the Netherlands forbid the sale or transit of war supplies to China through their Asian colonies. France's Vichy government was also forced to open air bases in Indochina to Japanese warplanes. In the autumn of 1940, Japan formally joined Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Alliance of the Axis powers. These actions brought additional U.S. economic and military assistance for China, including the dispatch of American warplanes. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt drastically tightened economic sanctions on Japan and repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China.

When Japan attacked American forces at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, simultaneously declaring war on Great Britain and swiftly annexing British, Dutch, and American territories in East and Southeast Asia, China

finally formally declared war on Japan. Jiang was named supreme commander of the Allied China theater, receiving substantial amounts of military aid under the American Lend-Lease program. Even so—and despite his Western-educated wife's skillful dissemination in the United States of an image of China as a heroic, democratic, and modernizing state—Jiang's relations with other Allied leaders were poor.

Jiang's single-minded focus on Chinese interests, regardless of the impact on the broader Allied coalition, annoyed Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill. Nonetheless, it sometimes paid dividends. At the 1943 Cairo Conference, Allied leaders agreed that China should regain all territories annexed by Japan since 1895. Jiang also sought to end foreign extraterritorial privileges and concessions in China and, less successfully, to regain the British colony of Hong Kong. At the autumn 1944 Dumbarton Oaks meeting, China was one of the five great powers awarded permanent Security Council seats in the new United Nations. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, however, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin agreed (in Jiang's absence) that in return for joining the war against Japan from which it had remained aloof, the Soviet Union should regain the special rights the czarist Russia had exercised in Manchuria before 1905.

The continuing Chinese inability or reluctance to mount an aggressive campaign against the Japanese occupiers irritated British and American officials. This was especially the case with U.S. lieutenant general Joseph W. Stilwell, American commander of the China-Burma-India theater and Jiang's chief of staff. Stilwell hoped to modernize the Chinese Army and lead it in such a venture—an undertaking that Jiang opposed as impractical, probably motivated in part by fears that this would weaken his own control of the Chinese military and his postwar position vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists. Over Jiang's opposition, Stilwell also sought to supply weapons to all anti-Japanese forces in China, including the Communists. Ultimately, at Jiang's insistence, Roosevelt withdrew Stilwell in 1944. Many Allied officials and journalists also deplored the pervasive corruption of the Nationalist regime that Jiang, though personally honest, tolerated.

Such shortcomings among the Nationalists enhanced the image of the Chinese Communists. Since 1937, they had supposedly been Jiang's partners against Japan, though both the Nationalists and the Communists believed that civil war was inevitable and sought to strengthen themselves for the

anticipated confrontation. The Communists' Eighth Route Army, created in 1937, and the New Fourth Army built up by Lin Biao (Lin Piao) fought largely behind Japanese lines in central China and the northern Hebei and Shanxi (Shensi) Provinces. They worked closely with local guerrilla and partisan forces and built up bases that would potentially enhance the postwar Communist position. Communist forces adopted this strategy after their defeat in the "Hundred Regiments" Campaign of August to November 1940, in which Japanese rail and road networks in northern China were attacked. CCP-GMD cooperation largely ceased after the 1941 New Fourth Army Incident, when Nationalist troops attacked and defeated that unit in the lower Chanjiang (Yangtze) Valley.

Despite the Chinese Communists' undoubted ruthlessness, their reputation far surpassed that of the GMD government. Idealistic young students and intellectuals flocked to join the Communists. Their selfless dedication and austere lifestyle and the charm and ability of their top leaders, especially Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), later China's premier, impressed Western journalists and officials who visited the Communist Yan'an base. That included the young diplomats of the 1944 U.S. "Dixie Mission." Nonetheless, despite their disillusionment with GMD leaders, senior American officials never endorsed the Chinese Communists.

When the war ended in August 1945, Japanese troops were still in occupation throughout China. In Manchuria, despite objections from Jiang, Soviet forces turned over to Communist Chinese units arms and equipment captured from the Japanese. American leaders, especially Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley in late 1945, were concerned about communist inroads in China and sought to strengthen Jiang's regime. They also strove to promote reform and encourage GMD-CCP reconciliation and the formation of a coalition government in which communists would have limited influence. Between December 1945 and January 1947, former U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall was in China endeavoring to secure an accommodation between the two sides. In January 1946 he arranged a temporary cease-fire, but it was broken later that spring when, as Soviet forces withdrew, GMD forces attacked Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria. No further agreement acceptable to both sides could be brokered.

Civil war then continued until the Communists secured military victory. The GMD government retreated to the island of Taiwan, and on October 1,

1949, Mao proclaimed the new People's Republic of China. From then on, China would play a major role in the Cold War that succeeded and grew out of World War II.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Burma Theater; Cairo Conference; Chennault, Claire Lee; China-Burma-India Theater; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Japan; Jiang Jieshi; Lend-Lease; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Marshall, George Catlett; Sino-Japanese War; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Yalta Conference; Zhou Enlai; Document 20; Document 30; Document 56; Document 57; Document 76; Document 105; Document 108; Document 124; Document 231

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China, Air Force

In December 1941 at the beginning of the Pacific war, the Nationalist China Air Force (CAF) had already been at war with Japan for almost four years. Beginning in 1932, trainers, pilots, and aircraft from the United States, Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union had all played a part in building the

Nationalist Chinese air element and the small air arms of several Chinese warlords. In July 1937, the CAF had three air groups, with a mix of U.S. and Italian fighters and bombers. Fewer than 100 of the more than 600 aircraft in the Chinese inventory were combat ready, however, and there were few experienced or adequately trained pilots. With the beginning of the war, available forces immediately went into action to support Nationalist army units in their defense of Shanghai, Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, in early August and to assist in the fighting withdrawal of Chinese forces into central China. The CAF was decimated in the late 1930s by the well-trained and well-equipped Japanese forces.

From 1937 until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviets were the major supplier of aircraft, pilots, and trainers to China. In April 1937, though, retired U.S. Army Air Corps officer Claire Chennault arrived in China to serve as an aviation adviser to the Nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Chennault organized and led the American Volunteer Group (AVG) of the CAF, known as the Flying Tigers. In September 1941, Washington dispatched the American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA) to "advise and assist" in rebuilding the Nationalist forces. Providing aircraft to the CAF and its AVG was a high priority, and the creation of a Chinese military capable of taking the war to the Japanese was the mission of Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell.

Prior to Stilwell's arrival in Asia in March 1942, Washington had decided to try to build up and maintain a CAF of 500 operational aircraft, including the Lockheed P-38 Lightning, the Curtiss P-40E Kittyhawk, the Republic P-43 Lancer, the Vultee P-66 Vanguard, and later North American P-51 Mustang fighters and North American B-25 Mitchell and Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers. With the closing of the landline of communication through Burma, the United States also promised the Chinese Curtiss C-46 Commando and C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft. From 1941 to V-J Day in 1945, Washington allocated 1,568 U.S. aircraft for China.

When the line of communication with Burma closed, everything had to be flown over "the Hump" (the Himalayas) to bases in southwestern China. Chennault, who rose to major general commanding the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force in March 1943, wanted to concentrate air assets on the destruction of Japanese air forces in China and build a bomber force capable of striking targets in eastern China and the Japanese home islands. The United States

also continued training the CAF and supplying equipment and aircraft to it and to its logistic arm, the China National Aviation Corporation. The U.S. Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces, however, required most aircraft delivered to the China-Burma-India theater simply to keep the air bridge open and to support Allied offensives in Burma.

At the end of the war, U.S. aircraft were transferred to the CAF. When the Chinese Civil War began in 1946, Jiang's Nationalist forces had a competent air arm of nearly 500 aircraft and more than 5,000 trained pilots, aircrew, and maintenance personnel.

JOSEPH G. D. BABB

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Transport; Chennault, Claire Lee; China; China, Army; Flying Tigers; Hump, The; Jiang Jieshi; Lend-Lease; Sino-Japanese War; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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China, Army

The armed forces of China before and during World War II reflected the deep political divisions of that nation. Each major faction maintained its own military organization. In addition to conventional forces controlled by the principal political factions in the country, various warlords had their own regional forces, the loyalties of which shifted according to the circumstances of the moment. Alongside these, at the local level, village defense forces struggled to protect their inhabitants against bandit gangs that roamed large stretches of the countryside.

Civil war between the Nationalists, the Communists, and various regional warlords had been raging intermittently in China since 1911. Following the

Japanese takeover of Manchuria and incursions into northern China in 1931, the Communists and Nationalists arranged an uneasy truce, but the Chinese military effort during the war was undercut consistently by politics. By the end of 1942 Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and Communist leader Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) believed that the United States and its allies would defeat Japan. Given their ardent conviction that a powerful military establishment would be essential in winning the postwar political struggle that was bound to follow, they planned (or rather, did not plan) their military moves accordingly. This meant, for the most part, avoiding contact with powerful Japanese forces, much to the exasperation of such individuals as Jiang's army commander, U.S. Army lieutenant general Joseph W. Stilwell.

The Nationalist Army

The army had always been central to the power of the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD). The National Military Council (NMC) controlled the military establishment. Jiang was its chairman, with complete power over the NMC, and as such he directed all Nationalist military forces. At the beginning of the war, these numbered about 1.5 million men.

In the 1930s, the German government had sent military advisers to China to help train the Nationalist Army. In consequence, the Nationalist Central Armies were patterned more or less along German lines. Throughout the period these were the best trained of the Nationalist forces, although still inferior to Japanese or Western forces. At the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Central Armies numbered about 300,000 men. Included in this body was the Generalissimo's Own, a force of some 80,000 men. Armed with German weapons, it was the elite force of Jiang's military establishment. There were some 1.2 million men in other units of indifferent training and capability. Although Nationalist senior leaders were often corrupt and not well educated, the middle ranks—trained at the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy in Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province—were capable. Most Nationalist soldiers, however, were conscripts, dragooned into service and often of low quality.

In the summer of 1941, the United States extended Lend-Lease aid to the Nationalist government, although the bulk of the early assistance went toward

improving transport to China over the Burma Road from India. This route was cut off when the Japanese invaded Burma in force in early 1942, and it was not reopened until 1945. In the meantime, much of the U.S. military aid to China was flown in over the Himalayas (“the Hump”). Tonnages by air gradually increased, but heated arguments occurred over the allocation of these still inadequate resources.

By the end of the war, the Nationalist Army numbered some 300 divisions. Although each supposedly had 10,000 men, some were seriously undermanned. Much military assistance continued to flow into China after the war, and the bulk of this ended up in Nationalist hands. The result was an army that was large in size and relatively well equipped but of limited capability and with indifferent leadership and inadequate training.

Chinese Communist Army

According to the 1936 Xian Agreement whereby the Nationalists and Communists would make common cause against the Japanese, Chinese Communist forces in northern China came to be designated the Eighth Route Army, authorized to a strength of three divisions. In 1938, the Nationalists also authorized formation of the smaller New Fourth Army in the lower Changjiang (Yangtze) River region.

The Chinese Communists refused to allow any Nationalist political authority in areas they controlled and denied the Nationalist side their military resources. Communist military forces were controlled by the Military Affairs Committee, which was responsible to the Communist Party Central Committee, chaired by Mao.

Camouflaged Chinese soldiers repel a charge by Japanese troops along the Salween River near Burma, ca. June 1943. (National Archives)

Although the Communists' equipment was not on a par with that available to the Nationalists, their military leadership and training were both superior, and their morale was significantly higher. Unlike the Nationalist forces, in which many of the men taken into the service were removed to other areas and forcibly kept there, Communist forces remained in their own areas and were seen by the people as a positive force, even helping them with crops and looking after their welfare.

Meanwhile, Communist forces grew far beyond the numbers authorized by the Nationalists, although little expansion occurred after midwar, because the Communists endeavored to improve the quality of their forces and because of Japanese "pacification" campaigns and Nationalist military actions. Nonetheless, at the end of the war, Mao could claim an army of about 1 million men, with reserves and local-level militia forces numbering an additional 2 million.

Collaborationist Armed Forces

The Japanese organized collaborationist armed forces in the areas of China occupied by their troops. These highly unreliable forces were drawn from a

variety of sources under a wide range of motivations. Some local commanders obeyed whichever side seemed ascendant at the moment. Nominally at least, many of these forces belonged to the Nationalist side. In the early 1940s, collaborationist forces might have numbered some 900,000 men.

Nationalist forces suffered most heavily in the first year of fighting the Japanese, especially in three months of struggle for Shanghai and the subsequent effort to defend Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. The Chinese lost perhaps 1 million dead, wounded, or missing in the first year of the war alone. The Nationalists then withdrew into the interior, relocating the capital to Chongqing (Chung-king) in Sichuan (Szechwan). The Chinese then transformed the war into a struggle of attrition, which Japanese forces, despite their superior mobility, could not win.

Although the Communist forces conducted operations against the Japanese rear areas and some large-scale conventional offensives, the brunt of the fighting that then occurred was borne by the Nationalist Army and warlord forces loyal to Jiang. In the eight years of fighting through 1945, the Nationalists suffered more than 3 million casualties while inflicting up to 2 million casualties on the Japanese. They were never able to gain a decisive victory over their antagonist, but the Chinese tied down significant numbers of Japanese forces until the end of the war.

In January 1941, the Chinese united front was severely damaged when the Nationalists attacked the Communist New Fourth Army. Open war now broke out between the Nationalists and the Communists. The fighting in China was henceforth a three-way contest. The Nationalists were no longer able to launch major offensives against the Japanese, but they were in a relatively secure position in central China. The Communists had also been weakened in fighting against the Nationalists and the Japanese but maintained control of large areas in north-central China. The Japanese, with a great expenditure of troops and material, were only in control of the line of communications and were dangerously overextended in China even as they widened the war by attacking the United States.

Aside from grudgingly providing a small portion of their troops to Stilwell to assist in the Allied recapture of Burma, Nationalist forces did not conduct any major actions from 1942 until forced to defend against Japan’s

April–December 1944 ICHI-GO Offensive. That offensive was precipitated by the establishment of U.S. air bases from which the United States could conduct strategic bombing raids on the Japanese home islands. The real battles for the Nationalist and Communist forces came in 1945 over Manchuria and marked the beginning of the Chinese Civil War.

JOSEPH G. D. BABB AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

China; China, Air Force; China, Navy; Hump, The; ICHI-GO, Operation; Jiang Jieshi; Lend-Lease; Mao Zedong; Shanghai, Battle of; Sino-Japanese War; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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China, Eastern Campaign, 1944

See ICHI-GO, Operation

China, Navy

In the 1920s, Germany assisted the Nationalist government of China in establishing a naval academy at Mamei in Fujian (Fukien) Province, and in 1927 the Nationalist leaders also set up the Chinese Naval General Headquarters. The vast bulk of available resources, however, went into the army and air forces. When war with Japan began in July 1937, the Nationalist navy counted only a few old gunboats, some small coastal vessels, and assorted river craft. The navy also maintained a few naval stations inland on the major rivers and a facility that manufactured mines and naval explosives.

The Japanese quickly destroyed the larger Chinese naval craft during and after the August 1937 Battle of Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. Throughout the war, elements of the Chinese Navy nonetheless conducted sabotage attacks against Japanese ships and shore bases in China.

In early 1942, the U.S. Navy sent to China a small detachment known as the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, or the "Rice Paddy Navy," under the joint command of Nationalist general Dai Li (Tai Li) and U.S. Navy captain Milton E. "Mary" Miles. Its mission was to establish and man weather stations and communications facilities, gather intelligence, and conduct sabotage and guerrilla operations in the coastal areas and along the inland rivers of China. In 1943, Miles was promoted to commodore and assigned as commander, Naval Group China.

At the end of the war, there was a significant interservice battle over the type of navy China should maintain, who would control it, and how it would be equipped. Disputes thus slowed the effort to build a postwar Nationalist navy. Nationalist leaders, in any case, did not see maritime forces as critical in the coming battle with the Communists.

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See also

China; China, Air Force; China, Army; Dai Li

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China-Burma-India Theater

General geographic reference for the immersion of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia in the war against Japan. China-Burma-India (CBI) also refers to an Allied military command structure in the Pacific theater that was established early in the war. At the December 22, 1941–January 14, 1942,

Arcadia Conference in Quebec, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed to set up the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command under General Sir Archibald Wavell in India. Separate from but nominally equal to the ABDA was the China theater under Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) as supreme commander, in recognition of China's role in fighting Japan since at least the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, who had more experience in China than any senior U.S. Army officer and spoke Chinese fluently, became the senior Allied officer in the region. His two titles were "Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in the Chinese Theater of Operations, Burma, and India" and "Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander of the Chinese Theater." The chain of command was confusing, because American forces in China came under the authority of Wavell's ABDA Command. Wavell also commanded forces in Burma, whereas Stilwell was to have direct command of Chinese forces committed to Burma (initially, three armies of up to 100,000 men). From the beginning, Stilwell and Jiang did not get along, and Stilwell was repeatedly handicapped by Jiang's interference in military matters.

In February 1942 following the loss of most of the Netherlands East Indies, the ABDA Command was abolished. From that point forward, the Pacific became an American responsibility, with the British assuming authority from Singapore to Suez. Jiang continued to control the China theater, and Wavell, headquartered in India, had authority over India and Burma. At the same time, Stilwell formed a new headquarters, the American Armed Forces: China, Burma, and India. The command included the small prewar U.S. military advisory group and Colonel (later major general) Claire Chennault's American Volunteer Group (AVG), known as the Flying Tigers, later a part of the Tenth Army Air Force.

This command structure continued until the August 12–24, 1943, Quebec Conference, when Churchill and Roosevelt agreed on the establishment of the more integrated South-East Asia Command (SEAC), with British admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as commander and Stilwell as his deputy. Operations in Burma were separated from those in India, now under the command of General Claude Auchinleck, commander in chief there since June 1943.

Designed to improve Allied military operations in the region, the new command structure did not achieve that end. Conflicts and different goals remained, with Jiang being the chief problem in Allied cooperation. But the British and Americans also had different priorities. The British were mainly concerned with the defense of India and preventing the Japanese military from exerting an influence on growing Indian nationalism. London saw defeating the Japanese in Burma as the chief means to bring about that end rather than as a means to channel supplies to China. British military efforts in Burma would thus ebb and flow.

The United States was primarily interested in building up China's military strength, and Burma would be a chief route for these supplies to reach China; President Roosevelt saw China taking its rightful place as a major world power at war's end. U.S. military planners also saw China as a potential location for heavy bombers to be used in the strategic bombing of Japan. These conflicting views were exacerbated by the personalities involved. Stilwell continued to feud with Jiang and also held that the British were more interested in defending their Asian empire than in fighting Japan. Stilwell wanted to recover Burma, and he worked hard to improve the fighting ability of those Chinese Army units he could influence.

The only way to get substantial military heavy equipment to China—which was essential if its fighting ability was to improve dramatically—was by way of Burma, and so construction of the so-called Ledo Road there became imperative. In the meantime, the United States undertook a massive logistical air supply operation to China from bases in India over "the Hump" of the Himalaya Mountains, the highest in the world. The ubiquitous C-47 (DC-3) aircraft was the workhorse for much of this campaign.

Construction of the 478-mile Ledo Road to connect the old Burma Road from Ledo, India, to Bhama, Burma, took 25 months. The new road ran through jungles, over mountains, and across 10 rivers. U.S. Army brigadier general Lewis A. Pick commanded this vast project, one of the major engineering accomplishments of the war.

Meanwhile, Jiang refused to yield operational command of the growing Chinese military establishment to Stilwell. Jiang saw the Chinese forces as a means to defeat the Communists in China after the war as much as to destroy the Japanese forces in the current conflict. Stilwell fervently believed that properly trained and equipped, Chinese soldiers could be the equal of any in

the world, but all of his efforts to eradicate corruption, weed out ineffective leaders, and end political interference in the Chinese military were rebuffed by Jiang. The Chinese Nationalist leader repeatedly promised reforms but delivered only sufficient compliance to keep up the flow of U.S. military aid.

General Chennault and airpower advocates believed that Japan might be bombed into submission from bases in eastern China. Stilwell dismissed such views and pointed out that the Japanese could simply carry out an offensive to wipe out the bases. Nonetheless, the first production Boeing B-29 Superfortresses were sent to China from India, and an ambitious base-construction program was undertaken. Although a few air bombing missions were carried out, the Japanese responded by mounting a great ground offensive, the ICHI-GO campaign, during April–December 1944, during which all the bases were captured without significant Chinese ground resistance. The B-29s were shifted from the CBI to the Marianas in the Central Pacific.

Roosevelt now applied heavy pressure on Jiang to carry out the reforms advocated by Stilwell and place an American general, preferably Stilwell, in command of the Chinese Army. Frustrated by its inability to turn China into a major theater of war, the United States increasingly used its massive naval strength to invest in the highly productive leapfrogging strategy of securing important islands as stepping-stones toward Japan across the Central Pacific. As a result, China was more and more marginalized and downgraded to a minor theater of war, chiefly important for its role in tying down 1 million Japanese troops.

Stilwell, now at wit's end, reached an impasse with Jiang and was recalled to Washington in October 1944. Stilwell was replaced by U.S. Army major general Albert Wedemeyer, a far more tractable individual bent on getting along with Jiang. The demands for reforms in the Chinese military came to an end. In effect, the CBI ended in October 1944 when it was divided into two spheres of command, India-Burma and China. Stilwell's deputy, General Daniel L. Sultan, became the commander of U.S. forces in India-Burma and directed the Allied military effort in northern Burma.

The CBI saw unique air, guerrilla, and logistical operations. Among innovative military and air tactics originating in the CBI was the establishment of Long-Range Penetration Groups, more popularly known as Wingate's Chindits and Merrill's Marauders. Utilizing air assets, British and U.S. commanders projected ground troops far behind Japanese lines, their

communication and supply provided by air. Here and elsewhere, guerrilla operations were developed and intelligence and insurgency operations were carried out. William Donovan and the Office of Strategic Services were also active in the theater.

Finally, the CBI was a major scene of postwar confrontation. Early in the war, Japan had conquered and overrun much of China and most of the European and U.S. colonies in the Pacific. The arrival of Japanese forces in Indochina was a great blow to French influence, and the defeat of the British at Singapore had an even more powerful impact on British prestige.

President Roosevelt envisioned the end of colonization after the war, but with the arrival of the Soviet threat, new U.S. president Harry S. Truman was less sympathetic. Although the Philippines, India, Burma, and some other states gained independence just after the war, the process of decolonization was actually delayed in some areas, resulting in costly wars in the Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina. American efforts by Roosevelt's ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, to mediate between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists came to naught; that vast country soon disintegrated into civil war. The United States, which had already committed to Jiang, was unwilling and unable to adopt a neutral stance and paid the price in influence when the civil war ended in a Communist victory in 1949.

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See also

Arcadia Conference; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Burma Air Campaign; Burma Road; Burma Theater; Chennault, Claire Lee; China; China, Air Force; China, Army; Chindits; Donovan, William Joseph; Flying Tigers; Hump, The; ICHI-GO, Operation; Jiang Jieshi; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Office of Strategic Services; Pick, Lewis Andrew; Quebec Conference, First; Singapore, Battle for; Sino-Japanese War; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Wedemeyer, Albert Coady

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Chindits

Name applied to irregular forces raised by British brigadier Orde Wingate for special operations in Burma in 1943 and 1944. The name "Chindits," selected by Wingate, derived from the Burmese word "Chinthé," the name of a mythical griffin-like creature, stone effigies of which guard the entrance to Burmese temples.

In early 1942, Wingate was transferred to India at the request of General Archibald Wavell, who commanded Allied forces in the Far East. Wavell had known Win-gate since service in Palestine and respected his innovative thinking, especially in the use of irregular forces. Wingate was charged with applying this ability against the Japanese in Burma, who had seemed invincible up to that time. He developed the concept of long-range penetration operations, which consisted of semi-independent guerrilla forces operating deep in the rear of Japanese forces. These forces would be resupplied by air.

Under cover as the 77th Brigade, Wingate formed the Chindits out of disparate elements of Gurkhas, the Burma Rifles, and British units, and he conducted strenuous training in central India through 1942. On February 16, 1943, this force of about 3,000 men with 1,000 pack animals crossed the Chindwin River into northern Burma, thereby launching the first Chindit operation (Operation LONGCLOTH). The force was organized into six columns, the nucleus of each being an infantry company, and given the objectives of disrupting communications (notably, by cutting the Myitkyina-Mandalay

railway line) and creating general havoc through ambushes and other small-unit operations. LONGCLOTH, which ended in late April, achieved mixed success and took heavy casualties. Only 70 percent of those who had crossed the Chindwin in February returned, and of these, only about 28 percent would be fit for future active service.

Nevertheless, in a theater where all had been doom and gloom, the campaign's limited achievements were widely heralded. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, in particular, seized on the publicity and promised Wingate his personal support for future operations, even taking him along to the August 14–24, 1943, Quebec (Quadrant) Conference. Plans now commenced for a larger, more ambitious campaign. Using the cover of the 3rd Indian Division, six brigades and a U.S. air contingent were trained for an operation that was to be coordinated with a push south from northern Assam by a joint Sino-American force under Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell. Wingate expanded his concept to include strongholds, semipermanent bases from which operations could be conducted. Each was to be built around an airstrip and include other support facilities.

Members of Major General Orde Wingate's British India Special Force, known as Chindits, moving through the jungle in Burma. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

On March 5, 1944, the second Chindit operation (Operation THURSDAY) began. One brigade had begun to move by foot into the area of operations the previous month; two additional brigades, preceded by glider-borne pathfinder teams, were flown into strongholds deep inside Burma. The remaining brigades were held in reserve. Again, there were some successes. The railway line was again interrupted, the town of Mogaung was briefly captured, and the Japanese response appeared generally confused. Unfortunately, Wingate was killed in a plane crash on March 24. Without his inspired, if unorthodox, leadership, the operation slowly began to lose momentum. Eventually, it collapsed from both exhaustion and outside intervention.

In early April, the Chindits were placed under Stilwell's operational control. Stilwell distrusted the Chindit concept (and the British), and despite their specialized training, the Chindits were turned into regular infantry formations. In August, they were withdrawn from combat and at the beginning of 1945 disbanded.

In concrete terms, the achievements of the Chindits seemed small and their cost-effectiveness questionable. Yet Japanese Fifteenth Army commander General Mutaguchi Renya wrote after the war that Chindit operations, especially Operation THURSDAY, were an important factor in the inability of his forces to invade India. In any case, the Chindits served as a morale booster at a critical time and were a pioneering concept for special operations brought to fruition by a determined and imaginative Wingate in the face of significant opposition.

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See also

Burma Theater; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Mutaguchi Renya; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Wingate, Orde Charles

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Chir River, Battles of the (December 7–22, 1942)

A series of battles fought in the Soviet Union during December 7–22, 1942, along the Chir River north of Stalingrad, where the German Sixth Army was besieged. The commander of German Army Group Don, Field Marshal Eric von Manstein, hoped to relieve the Sixth Army with Colonel General Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army, attacking from the north of Stalingrad, supported by the XLVIII Panzer Corps. On December 7, however, before the XLVIII Panzer Corps could link up with the Fourth Panzer Army, elements of the Soviet Fifth Tank Army launched heavy attacks at various points along the Chir River. Two divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps were deployed along the west bank of the river, with the 7th Luftwaffe Field Division on the left and the 336th Infantry Division on the right. To their rear, the 11th Panzer Division, commanded by Major General Hermann Balck, was the corps reserve.

By the end of December 7, the Soviet I Tank Corps had penetrated 10 miles to the south, reaching State Farm 79. Balck attacked at dawn on December 8, with one Panzergrenadier regiment conducting a holding attack against the Soviet front and the 15th Panzer Regiment supported by another Panzergrenadier regiment delivering the decisive blow against the Soviet rear. By the end of the day, the I Tank Corps had been thrown back across the Chir with the loss of 53 of its tanks. For the next three days, the 11th Panzer Division fought a series of running battles, clearing out Soviet bridgeheads across the Chir.

Late on December 11, the Soviets made two more major penetrations into the XLVIII Panzer Corps sector. After another night march, the 11th Panzer Division attacked one of the Soviet penetrations at Lissinski from the flank and defeated it. Balck then moved his division 15 miles to the northwest and attacked the Soviet bridgehead at Nizhna Kalinovski. At dawn on December 13, the 11th Panzer Division was preparing to make its final attack when it

was hit on the right flank by another strong Soviet assault. One of the German battalions was temporarily surrounded, but Balck continued his assault on the bridgehead while methodically extracting the battalion. By the end of the day the Soviets had been fought to a standstill, although the Nizhna Kalinovski bridgehead was not completely eliminated. The 11th Panzer Division had been marching by night and fighting by day for almost eight continuous days.

On December 10, the Fourth Panzer Army began its attack to relieve the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Despite being heavily engaged along the Chir, the XLVIII Panzer Corps was ordered to link up with and support the Fourth Panzer Army. In order to do so, the XLVIII Panzer Corps had to cross the Don. On December 15, the 11th Panzer Division started moving toward Nizhna Chirskaya, just below the confluence of the Chir and the Don. Balck's division was prepared to force a crossing of the Don on December 17, but the Soviets struck first.

Ignoring the Fourth Panzer Army's attack, the Soviets struck a massive blow against the Italian Eighth Army farther north along the Don. This Soviet push threatened to take Rostov, at the mouth of the Don on the Azov Sea. Such a move would have cut off Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist's Army Group A in the Caucasus. Manstein was thus forced to draw heavily from the Fourth Panzer Army to defend Rostov. This sealed the fate of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad.

The new Soviet drive overlapped into the sector of the XLVIII Panzer Corps, overrunning units of the 336th Infantry Division. The assault crossing by the 11th Panzer Division was canceled, and once again Balck's troops were thrown into the breach. The 11th Panzer Division attacked on December 18 at Nizhna Chirskaya. It then conducted another night march and attacked at dawn on December 19 at Nizhna Kalinovski. Balck's 15th Panzer Regiment, which was now down to about only 25 tanks, attacked two Soviet columns, destroying 65 Soviet tanks and suffering no losses of its own.

Bitter back-and-forth fighting continued along the Chir for the next two days. By December 22 the series of defensive battles along the Chir had ended, with the Germans the clear tactical victors. That same day, however, the XLVIII Panzer Corps received orders to move immediately 90 miles to the west and establish blocking positions before Rostov. Despite their tactical success, the Germans had been outmaneuvered by the Soviets at the

operational level. Nonetheless, the battles involving the 11th Panzer Division along the Chir River are some of the most outstanding examples of maneuver warfare and mobile defense. Throughout, the XLVIII Panzer Corps' two infantry divisions served as a shield and pivot, behind which the 11th Panzer Division was the mobile counterattack force. During the 1980s and 1990s this series of battles was still studied by students at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College as a classic example of the principles of what would be AirLand Battle.

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See also

Balck, Hermann; Hoth, Hermann; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Manstein, Erich von; Mellenthin, Friedrich-Wilhelm von; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Cho Isamu (1895–1945)

Japanese Army general. Born in Fukuoka, Japan, on January 19, 1895, Cho Isamu graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1916. Promoted to captain in 1925, he graduated from the Army War College three years later. He was appointed a member of the Chinese Section of the army General Staff in 1929 and was promoted to major in 1931. Cho planned a coup d'état with his superior, Lieutenant Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, in March 1932. The attempt failed, but Cho was not punished.

In August 1937, Cho joined the Army Expeditionary Force in Shanghai as chief of the intelligence staff. He participated in the fighting for Nanjing (Nanking) and was one of the instigators of the atrocities in December 1937 there, known as the Nanjing Massacre. Cho was appointed commander of the 74th Infantry Regiment in March 1938 and fought against the Soviet forces at Changkufeng in July 1938. As chief of staff of the 26th Division, he

persuaded the governor-general of French Indochina, General Georges Catroux, to admit Japanese occupation troops in September 1940.

Cho was promoted to lieutenant general in October 1944 and appointed chief of staff of Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru's Thirty-Second Army on Okinawa. After invading U.S. forces smashed the Japanese defensive line, Cho and Ushijima committed suicide on June 23, 1945.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Catroux, Georges Albert Julien; French Indochina; Hashimoto Kingoro; Nanjing Massacre; Okinawa, Invasion of

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Choltitz, Dietrich von (1894–1966)

German Army general and military governor of Paris. Born on November 9, 1894, in Wiesegräflich, Upper Silesia, Germany, Dietrich von Choltitz was a fourth-generation professional soldier. A page in the Saxon court, he was educated at various cadet schools and began his military career as an officer candidate in the 107th Infantry Regiment in 1914; he fought in that unit during World War I as a company commander and adjutant. Choltitz served in the cavalry in the 1920s and early 1930s and then transferred to the air-transportable 16th Infantry Regiment of the 22nd Infantry (later, Air-Landing) Division. He was promoted to major in 1937 and to lieutenant colonel in April 1938. He took command of the 3rd Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment on September 1, 1939, and the entire regiment 10 days later.

Choltitz's regiment fought in Poland in September 1939, and he was with the element that attacked Rotterdam on May 14, 1940. He was promoted to colonel in April 1941. His regiment was part of the Eleventh Army of Army

Group South in Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union that commenced on June 22, 1941, in actions along the Prut, Dniester, and Bug Rivers and in the assault on the fortress of Sevastopol that began on October 30, 1941, where the unit suffered heavy losses. Choltitz was also involved in the summer 1942 assault on Sevastopol, and on June 28, 1942, his men crossed North Bay in rubber boats in the surprise attack in the rear of the fortress city, which surrendered on July 2.

German general Dietrich von Choltitz surrenders the city of Paris to Allied forces in August 1944. Choltitz disobeyed Adolf Hitler's express order to destroy the city rather than hand it over to the Allies. (Corbis)

Promoted to major general, Choltitz took command of the 260th Infantry Division in August 1942. He remained engaged in southern Russia and held a variety of positions, some of them only briefly. He was deputy commander of the crack XLVIII Panzer Corps in November 1942, acting commander of XVII Corps (December 1942–March 1943), commander of the 11th Panzer Division (March–May 1943), and acting commander of the XLVIII Panzer Corps (May–August 1943). He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1943.

On June 12, 1944, General of Artillery Erich Marcks, commanding LXXXIV Corps of Colonel General Friedrich Dollman's Seventh Army in

the Cotentin Peninsula of Normandy, was mortally wounded in an attack by an Allied fighter bomber, and on June 15 Choltitz replaced him. Units of the command were hard-hit by the Saint-Lô carpet bombing of July 25, 1944, and much of the command was destroyed. Choltitz made maximum use of the limited resources at hand to slow the American advance. Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, however, unjustly sacked him on July 28, 1944, for the Normandy debacle.

Adolf Hitler promptly reassigned Choltitz, promoting him to General of Infantry and appointing him commander of the greater Paris area on August 7, 1944. Choltitz had few available resources to stop the advance of the Western Allies, however, and he resolutely refused to allow aircraft and artillery attacks in defense of Paris. Receiving orders from Hitler on August 23 to begin demolishing parts of the city, he refused and ensured a relatively orderly turnover of the city, with little damage to its public buildings and monuments, via negotiations with the French Resistance. Swedish consul general Raoul Nordling served as one intermediary.

Choltitz formally surrendered on August 25, 1944, and became a prisoner of war. Three days later, Field Marshal Walther Model asked the president of the Reich Military Tribunal to open criminal charges against Choltitz. Recent scholarship indicates that Model initiated the action to keep it in military rather than Nazi political channels and thus screen Choltitz's family in Germany.

While in captivity, Choltitz contributed two monographs to the German Military History Program. Following his release in April 1947, he retired in Baden-Baden. Choltitz wrote a short monograph titled *Brennt Paris?* (Is Paris Burning?), published in 1950. He also published his memoirs, *Soldat unter Soldaten* (Soldier among Soldiers), in 1951. Choltitz died in Baden-Baden on November 5, 1966, probably better remembered in France than in Germany.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Cherbourg, Capture of; COBRA, Operation; Dollman, Friedrich; France Campaign; Guderian, Heinz; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Manstein, Erich von; Model, Walther; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Paris, Liberation of; Saint-Lô, Battle of; Sevastopol, Siege of

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Chou En-lai

See Zhou Enlai

Christian X, King of Denmark (1870–1947)

King of Denmark. Born on September 26, 1870, near Copenhagen, Christian X was the son of King Frederick VIII of Denmark and Princess Louise of Sweden. Christian was tutored within the palace and received military training. He married Alexandrine of Mecklenburg-Schwerin in 1898. On the death of his father, he inherited the throne on May 13, 1912.

King Christian X enforced Denmark's neutrality throughout World War I. He took in numerous Romanov relatives fleeing the Russian revolutions, including his aunt, the Dowager Czarina Maria Feodorovna. During the 1930s, the king promoted national unity and became the first European ruler to visit a Jewish synagogue. Denmark's nonaggression pact with Germany seemed to ensure peace, so Christian X was taken by surprise when the Germans invaded his country on April 9, 1940.

Christian X, King of Denmark. (Library of Congress)

Christian X instructed his forces to surrender and appealed to his subjects to behave correctly and give the Germans no pretext for further violence. Under house arrest, he became a rallying symbol for the Danes, noted for the daily horseback rides he took alone. His position was a difficult one, as he refused to allow Danish Nazis into the government but did allow Schutzstaffel (SS) recruitment and agreed to have a pro-German prime minister.

In 1941, Adolf Hitler interpreted Christian X's cool response to birthday greetings as a pretext for forcing Denmark to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 23. The king became even more important as a resistance symbol in 1943, when the Germans assumed control of the government over royal and cabinet protest. Guarded only by the Copenhagen police and confined to a wheelchair after a riding accident, the elderly king was beloved by his people, and his popularity gave rise to two apocryphal legends: that he

offered to wear a yellow star if Danish Jews had to do so and that he challenged German soldiers to shoot him for taking down a Nazi flag flying over Copenhagen.

After the liberation of Denmark in May 1945, the king asked for dispensation to avoid signing death sentences for collaborators but retained the ability to pardon them. He also exiled members of his family who had shown marked sympathy to the Germans during the occupation. Christian X died in Copenhagen on April 20, 1947.

MARGARET SANKEY

See also

Anti-Comintern Pact; Denmark; Denmark Campaign

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Christie, John Walter (1865–1944)

U.S. inventor and tank designer. Born in River Edge, New Jersey, on May 6, 1865, John Walter Christie went to work at the Delamater Iron Works in New York City at age 16. After attending evening classes at Cooper Union, he became a consulting engineer for several steamship lines. Around 1900, he developed a ring-turning lathe that resulted in a stronger turret track for naval guns.

Christie then entered the automobile industry, building his own cars and testing them in speedway races. Among these was a front-wheel-drive car, which was then considered a pioneering design. He also invented a steam-engine, piston-packing ring that was used in ferryboat engines. In 1912, Christie began manufacturing wheeled tractors to pull firefighting equipment, selling several hundred to New York City alone.

In 1916, Christie designed a four-wheel-drive truck for use by the military in the rugged terrain of the southwestern United States in the event of trouble with Mexico. That same year, the army contracted with his Front

Drive Motor Company for a motor carriage for a self-propelled, 3-inch gun. During World War I, Christie became interested in tank design. The first of some 15 designs for the army was for a “convertible,” self-propelled, 8-inch gun that could operate either on tracks (for cross-country mobility) or at a higher speed on its own road wheels. It was produced as a single prototype in 1921 but failed to meet army design specifications, beginning what would be an acrimonious relationship between Christie and the Ordnance Department.

This experience led Christie to design the first American postwar tank, the three-man, 13.5-ton Medium Tank M1919, with a removable track that could be stored around the tank hull during road operations. The M1928 was powered by a Liberty aircraft engine and had both great speed and a revolutionary suspension system of large weight-bearing wheels on torsion bars. The army ordered five M1928s. This vehicle was highly influential in tank design abroad, first in the Soviet Union and then in Britain. The Soviets acquired two copies and used the M1928 as the basis for their BT series. Their T-34 tank, which employed the Christie suspension system, may have been the best tank of World War II.

The U.S. Army purchased three M1931 (U.S. designation, T-3) Christie tanks, and the Soviets bought two. The vehicle was armed with both a 37mm gun and a machine gun. Christie’s M1932 employed lightweight materials and had a forward-facing propeller so that it could be dropped from a low-flying aircraft, fly, and hit the ground running. It was capable of road speeds of 36 mph on tracks or 65 mph on wheels, enabling it to leap a 20-foot gap from a 45-degree ramp. It was also sold to the Soviets. Christie’s M1936, a 6-ton, 2-man tank, was capable of cross-country speeds of up to 60 mph. In Britain, it evolved into the first Cruiser tank.

For the United States, Christie also designed turret tracks for battleships as well as gun mounts and carriages. His amphibious platform for a 75mm gun, begun in 1921, led to the first amphibious tank. Never fully appreciated in his own country, in part because of his acerbic and combative personality, Christie died penniless and embittered in Falls Church, Virginia, on January 11, 1944.

ROBERT BATEMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
Tanks, All Powers

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Christie, Ralph Waldo (1893–1987)

U.S. Navy vice admiral and commander of submarines in the South Pacific. Born in Somerville, Massachusetts, on August 30, 1893, Ralph Waldo Christie graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1915. Eight years later, he earned an MS degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). On entering the navy, Christie specialized in the submarine service and torpedoes, commanding individual submarines in 1919, 1920, 1923, and 1924 and pursuing research at MIT that contributed to the development of the trouble-prone magnetic torpedo exploder.

From 1939 to 1940, Christie commanded Submarine Division 15 before moving to Brisbane, Australia, to take command of Submarine Squadron 20, which he led from late 1940 to 1942. In November 1942 Christie was promoted to rear admiral, and in April 1943 he became commander of submarines in the South Pacific, operating out of Perth and Fremantle in Western Australia. Christie’s forces made extensive use of Magic code-breaking intelligence material, gathered from code-breaking and radio direction–finding technology used against Japanese vessels, and succeeded in interdicting Japan’s capacity to control its conquered Pacific territories and maintain an operational seagoing navy.

Despite Christie’s obvious talents and achievements as a submarine commander, he clashed repeatedly with Seventh Fleet commander Admiral Thomas Kinkaid concerning management of his force and the number of casualties resulting from his aggressive tactics. These led Kinkaid to replace him in February 1945.

Christie’s subsequent commands included the Puget Sound Navy Yard between 1945 and 1948 and the U.S. naval forces based in the Philippines. He retired in August 1949 as a vice admiral. Christie died in Honolulu, Hawaii, on December 19, 1987.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Submarines; Torpedoes; United States Navy

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Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich (1900–1982)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in the village of Serebryanye Prudy in the Moscow region on February 12, 1900, Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov left home and became a mechanic at age 14. He joined the Red Army four years later. By 1919 he had risen to command a regiment, and during the Russian Civil War he fought in Siberia and in the western Ukraine. He also fought in the 1919–1921 Russo-Polish War.

Chuikov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1925. Assigned to China two years later, he fought in the battle for the Chinese Eastern Railroad in 1929. He served in the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army until 1932 and managed to survive the purge of the officers in the Far East in the late 1930s.

Chuikov served in the Soviet invasions of Poland (1939) and Finland (1939–1940), commanding the Fourth and Ninth Armies, respectively. He was promoted to lieutenant general in June 1940 and returned to China for a third tour, serving as a military attaché beginning in December 1940. He was recalled in March 1942 to become deputy commander and then commander of the newly formed Sixty-Fourth Army (July 22, 1942). A protégé of Georgii Zhukov, Chuikov assumed command of the Sixty-Second Army on the west bank of the Volga at Stalingrad, which he defended at tremendous cost. His determination was a major factor in enabling the Soviets to hold until they could mount a counteroffensive.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Chuikov. (AP Photo)

Assigned to the Southwestern Front in March 1943, the Sixty-Second Army was redesignated the Eighth Guards Army. Chuikov then led his troops in spearheading the liberation of Ukraine and Belorussia from German forces and was promoted to colonel general in October 1943. In mid-1944, the Eighth Guards Army was transferred to Konstantin Rokossovsky's 1st Belorussian Front. The unit then distinguished itself in operations in eastern Poland, taking Lublin and Lodz. The Vistula-Oder operation between January and February 1945 opened the way to Berlin, and Chuikov's tanks spearheaded the final assault on Berlin in a front-wide night attack; on May 2, 1945, Chuikov's headquarters took the surrender of the German Berlin garrison on behalf of the Red Army high command.

Chuikov was promoted to army general after V-E day and served as deputy commander and then commander of Soviet occupation forces in eastern Germany (1946–1953). Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in

1955, he commanded the Kiev Military District (1953–1960) and then Soviet Ground Forces (1960–1964). He was chief of civil defense from 1961 to 1972, after which he served in the general inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense. Chuikov died in Moscow on March 18, 1982.

CLAUDE R. SASSO

See also

Berlin, Land Battle for; Krebs, Hans; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Churchill, Sir Winston L. S. (1874–1965)

British political leader, cabinet minister, and prime minister (1940–1945, 1951–1955). Born at Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, on November 30, 1874, Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill was the eldest son of Lord Randolph Churchill, third son of the Duke of Marlborough and a rising Conservative politician, and his wife, Jennie Jerome, an American heiress. Educated at Harrow and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, from 1895 to 1899, Churchill held a commission in the British Army. He visited Cuba on leave and saw active service on the Afghan frontier and in the Sudan, where he took part in the Battle of Omdurman. Captured by South African forces in 1899 while reporting on the Boer War as a journalist, he made a dramatic escape from Pretoria and went to Durban, winning early popular fame.

Churchill emulated his father—who attained the position of chancellor of the exchequer before a premature death ended his political career—by entering politics in 1900 as a Unionist member of Parliament. In 1904, his

party's partial conversion to protectionism caused him to join the Liberals, who made him president of the Board of Trade (1908–1910) and home secretary (1910–1911) after they returned to power.

As first lord of the admiralty (1911–1915), Churchill enthusiastically backed the campaign of first sea lord Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher to modernize the Royal Navy with faster battleships and more efficient administration. One of the few initial cabinet supporters of British intervention in World War I, Churchill was blamed for the disastrous 1915 Dardanelles expedition against the Ottoman Empire, prompting his resignation. He spent the six months up to May 1916 in active service on the Western Front but regained high political office in July 1917, when Prime Minister David Lloyd George made him minister of munitions in his coalition government.

In December 1918, Churchill moved to the War Office, where he unsuccessfully advocated forceful Allied action against Russia, in the hope of eliminating that country's new Bolshevik government. In late 1920, he became colonial secretary. Two years after Lloyd George's 1922 defeat, Churchill returned to the Conservatives, who made him chancellor of the exchequer in November 1924, a post he held for five years. He reluctantly acquiesced in Britain's return to the gold standard, and his determination to suppress the 1926 general strike won him the lasting enmity of much of the labor movement.

By 1928, Churchill believed that the postwar peace settlement represented only a truce between wars, a view forcefully set forth in his book *The Aftermath* (1928). When Labour won the 1929 election, Churchill lost office, but he soon began campaigning eloquently for major British rearmament, especially the massive enhancement of British airpower, to enable the country to face a revived Italian or German military threat. From 1932 onward, he sounded this theme eloquently in Parliament, but Conservative leaders remained unsympathetic. Churchill also became perhaps the most visible and vocal critic of the appeasement policies of the successive governments of Prime Ministers Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, who effectively tolerated German rearmament; Chancellor Adolf Hitler's deliberate contravention of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles; and Germany's and Italy's territorial demands on their neighbors.

When Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939, Churchill

resumed his old position as first lord of the admiralty. Despite the German attacks on the British aircraft carrier *Courageous* and the battleship *Royal Oak* as well as the responsibility he bore for the Allied disaster in Norway during April and May 1940, he succeeded Chamberlain as prime minister on May 10, 1940, the day Germany invaded France and the Low Countries. During the next three months, Britain sustained repeated disasters as German troops rapidly overran the Low Countries and France, forcing the British Expeditionary Force to withdraw in disarray from northern France at Dunkerque during May 26–June 4, 1940, abandoning most of its equipment. During the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), German airplanes fiercely attacked Britain in an apparent prelude to a full-scale cross-Channel invasion.

Churchill responded vigorously. Although he was 65 years old, he still possessed abundant and unflagging energy; his vitality was fueled by his habit of an afternoon siesta, after which he normally worked until 2:00 or 3:00 the next morning. His fondness for sometimes fanciful and questionable strategic plans often exasperated his closest advisers, as did his attachment to romantic individual ventures—such as those launched by the Special Operations Executive covert action agency, whose establishment he backed enthusiastically. Although he acted forcefully, he did not always make the best decisions.

Even so, Churchill was an outstanding war leader. On taking office, he delivered a series of rousing and eloquent speeches, affirming Britain’s determination to continue fighting even without allies and voicing his conviction of ultimate triumph. Churchill also followed a demanding schedule of morale-boosting personal visits to British cities, factories, bomb targets, and military installations, a practice he continued throughout the war.

Besides rallying the British people to endure military defeat in France and the bombing campaign Germany soon launched against Britain’s industrial cities, Churchill’s speeches, which caught the international imagination, were designed to convince the political leaders and people of the United States—the only quarter from which Britain might anticipate effective assistance—of his country’s commitment to the war. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt responded by negotiating the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement of August 1940, whereby the United States transferred 50 World War I–vintage

destroyers to Britain in exchange for naval basing rights in British Caribbean Islands and North America.

British prime minister Winston Churchill giving the victory sign. Churchill made a point of visiting bombed-out areas in an effort to keep civilian morale high. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

Since the war began, Britain had purchased war supplies in the United States on a “cash-and-carry” basis. By December 1940, British resources were running low, and Churchill wrote to Roosevelt to request more extensive U.S. aid. Roosevelt responded by devising the Lease-Lend Act that was passed by Congress the following spring.

In August 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt met for the first time, in Placentia Bay off the Newfoundland coast, and agreed to endorse a common set of liberal war aims—the Atlantic Charter—and to coordinate their two countries’ military strategies. Churchill also agreed to allow British scientists

to pool their expertise in nuclear physics with their American counterparts in the Manhattan Project, a largely U.S.-financed effort to build an atomic bomb; the project reached fruition in the summer of 1945.

Churchill was relieved by Japan's December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the subsequent German and Italian declarations of war on the United States, as they brought the United States fully into the war and, from his perspective, guaranteed an ultimate Allied victory. In the interim, Churchill needed all his talents to sustain British resolution through various disasters, including Japan's conquest of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma and British defeats in North Africa.

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Churchill also welcomed the Soviet Union as an ally, although his relations with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin were never close. Churchill made repeated visits to the United States and met Roosevelt at other venues. In addition, all three leaders gathered at major international summit conferences at Tehran in November 1943 and Yalta in February 1945, and Churchill also met Stalin separately on several occasions. Churchill traveled abroad more than any of the other Allied leaders, often at substantial personal risk.

Stalin resented the Anglo-American failure to open a second front in Europe until June 1944, a decision due in considerable part to Churchill's fear that if Britain and the United States launched an invasion of Western Europe too soon, the campaign would degenerate into bloody trench warfare resembling that between 1914 and 1918. Meeting Roosevelt in May 1943 in Washington, he finally succumbed to American pressure to open the second front the following summer. Churchill resented intensifying U.S. pressure for phasing out British colonial rule, a prospect made increasingly probable by Britain's growing international weakness.

As the war proceeded and Soviet forces began to push back German troops, Churchill feared that the Soviet Union would dominate postwar Eastern Europe. Soviet support for communist guerrillas in occupied countries and for the so-called Lublin government in Poland reinforced his apprehensions. In October 1944, he negotiated an informal agreement with Stalin whereby the two leaders delineated their countries' respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, Churchill and Roosevelt both acquiesced in effective Soviet domination of most of that region. The three leaders also agreed to divide Germany into

three separate occupation zones, to be administered by their occupying military forces but ultimately to be reunited as one state. In April 1945, Churchill unsuccessfully urged the United States to disregard existing understandings with Soviet forces and take Berlin. Despite the creation of the United Nations in 1945, Churchill hoped that close Anglo-American understanding would be the bedrock of the international world order, a perspective intensified by his continuing fears of Germany.

In July 1945, the British electorate voted Churchill out of office while he was attending a meeting at Potsdam, replacing his administration with a reformist Labour government. Churchill was still, however, honored as "the greatest living Englishman" and the war's most towering figure. He used his prestige to rally American elite and public opinion in favor of taking a stronger line against Soviet expansionism in Europe and elsewhere, a position he advanced to enormous publicity in his famous March 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. Churchill's six best-selling volumes of memoirs, *The Second World War*, presented a somewhat roseate view of Anglo-American wartime cooperation, and they were carefully designed to promote the continuing alliance between the two countries, which had become his most cherished objective.

From 1951 to 1955, Churchill served again as Conservative prime minister. Declining health eventually forced him to resign from office. A House of Commons man to the core, he consistently refused the peerage to which his services entitled him. In 1953, however, he did accept a knighthood in the Order of the Garter, the most prestigious and exclusive of all British orders.

Among Churchill's many honors was the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953 for his many published works. He also was the first person to be made an honorary citizen of the United States, by a special act of Congress. And in 1995 the United States named the guided missile destroyer *Winston S. Churchill* (DDG-81) in his honor.

Churchill died in London on January 24, 1965. For many, his death marked the symbolic final passing of Great Britain's imperial age. Churchill received the first state funeral for any British commoner since the death of the Duke of Wellington over a century before. An idiosyncratic political maverick whose pre-1939 record was, at best, mixed, Churchill rose to the

occasion to become the greatest British war leader since the 1st Earl of Chatham in the 18th century.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atlantic Charter; Britain, Battle of; Cash-and-Carry; Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill-Stalin Meeting; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Great Britain; Hitler, Adolf; Lend-Lease; Manhattan Project; Moscow Conference; Placentia Bay Conference; Quebec Conference, First; Quebec Conference, Second; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Special Operations Executive; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; Yalta Conference; Document 58; Document 59; Document 61; Document 69; Document 78; Document 165; Document 202; Document 219

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Churchill-Stalin Meeting (October 9–10, 1944)

Conference in Moscow that determined postwar spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Concerned particularly about issues involving postwar Poland, Greece, and the Balkans, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill suggested the meeting, code-named TOLSTOY. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin would not travel from the Soviet Union, so on September 27, 1944, Churchill asked him to receive a small British delegation to discuss these and

related issues, including the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan.

Facing imminent national elections, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt could not attend. (Churchill had just seen him in Quebec but informed him about this proposal only two days *after* sending his note to Stalin.) Roosevelt saw the meeting as a preliminary for the forthcoming summit at Yalta (to be held February 4–11, 1945) and asked that U.S. ambassador W. Averell Harriman observe, although in the end, Harriman was not present for some crucial two-man talks.

Stalin agreed to the meeting, and Churchill, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, and chief of the Imperial General Staff General Alan Brooke flew to Moscow, where they stayed from October 9 to 18, 1944. British ambassador Clark Kerr also joined the delegation.

Churchill's primary concern was to gain freedom of action in the difficult Greek political situation, which teetered on civil war. This he secured. During dinner conversation with Stalin, Churchill produced a half sheet of paper (terming it a "naughty document") and wrote out proposed spheres of postwar influence: Romania, 90 percent Soviet; Greece, 90 percent British; Yugoslavia and Hungary, both to be evenly divided between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies; and Bulgaria, 75 percent Soviet. Stalin checked and approved the page and returned it to Churchill. Although the numbers may seem somewhat arbitrary at first glance (with the exception of those for Greece, where the issue was very much in doubt), they merely reflected the reality of a surging Red Army and understated it in regard to both Yugoslavia and Hungary. Although Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and Eden dickered about some of the percentages the next day, nothing was changed. All parties present concurred that they were guidelines for discussion and nothing more.

Churchill and Stalin agreed to put off decisions about Poland until Roosevelt could be present. Still, there was considerable argument over the London Poles versus Lublin Poles and how they might share power after the war. The head of the London Poles, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, joined the conference briefly but disagreed with Lublin's representatives and with most of what was proposed as to border adjustments and governance.

Extensive discussions of military plans also took place, and regular reports were sent to Roosevelt in Washington by Churchill and Harriman and

to the War Cabinet in London by Churchill. The meeting laid some of the groundwork for the subsequent Yalta Conference, but it also cleared the way for firm British action in Athens in December 1944, designed to put down Greek communist guerrillas. The Soviets, true to the TOLSTOY discussions, did not intervene.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; Harriman, William Averell; Mikołajczyk, Stanisław; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich; Quebec Conference, Second; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Yalta Conference

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Chu Teh

See Zhu De

Chynoweth, Bradford Grethen (1890–1985)

U.S. Army brigadier general. Born in Fort Warren, Wyoming, on July 20, 1890, Bradford Grethen Chynoweth graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1912 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. He served through World War I, rising to temporary lieutenant colonel. Reverting to his permanent rank of captain after the war and despairing of his chances at promotion in the postwar military, he left the army in 1919.

Bored by civilian life, Chynoweth rejoined the army in November 1920 as a major of infantry. He was a close friend of Captain Dwight D. Eisenhower and Major George S. Patton Jr. Chynoweth contributed steadily to the professional discourse of the era, writing articles for a number of professional journals. In the *Cavalry Journal*, he argued strongly for tanks as a new combat arm.

Chynoweth served on the Infantry Board at Fort Benning, Georgia, when Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall was assistant commandant of the Infantry School there. Chynoweth's strongest supporter was his brother-in-law, Major George A. Lynch, author of the army's capstone doctrinal publication, *Field Service Regulations* (1923). Chynoweth attended both the Command and General Staff School (1927–1928) and the Army War College (1931–1932). Following an assignment with the army's G-3 (training) section, he served three years as a senior instructor with the 44th Infantry Division of the New Jersey National Guard.

Appointed military attaché in London in the spring of 1939, Chynoweth soon fell out with U.S. ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy Sr. over his own prediction that Germany would attack France and that, subsequently, the Germans would bomb London from the air. Kennedy did not trust Chynoweth and demanded and secured his recall. Given his choice of postings by his brother-in-law (now a major general and chief of infantry), Chynoweth took command of a tank battalion with the 66th Infantry Regiment. He served with the 66th between October 1939 and July 1940 and with the 53rd Infantry Regiment between July 1940 and November 1941.

During the 1941 maneuvers, Chynoweth finally was able to demonstrate his theories of mobile warfare, which he did with considerable success, despite considerable opposition. Colonel Chynoweth continued to argue for the independent employment of tanks. Assigned to the Philippines in the fall of 1941, he took command of the defenses of Cebu and the Visayan Islands. From there, he waged a masterful defense throughout the winter of 1941–1942, and he was prepared to retire to the interior of the islands, where he had stockpiled materials, when he was ordered by his superiors to surrender.

Chynoweth spent the remainder of the war as a prisoner of the Japanese. Only on his repatriation in 1945 did he learn that just prior to his capture, he had been promoted to brigadier general. He retired in October 1947; pursued graduate studies at the University of California, Berkeley; and wrote his

memoirs, *Bellamy Park.* Chynoweth died at the Presidio in San Francisco on February 8, 1985.

ROBERT BATEMAN, GEORGE F. HOFMANN, AND UZAL W. ENT

See also

Armored Warfare; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Marshall, George Catlett; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of

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Ciano, Galeazzo, Conte di Cortellazo (1903–1944)

Italian diplomat and foreign minister under Benito Mussolini. Born at Livorno (Leghorn), Italy, on March 18, 1903, Galeazzo Ciano was the son of World War I naval hero Admiral Costanzo Ciano. Dabbling in theatrical criticism and journalism and earning a law degree by 1925, the younger Caino was propelled by his father (by then a prominent fascist) into the foreign service of Italy's new regime. Posted to South America and then Asia, Ciano found diplomatic life and its connections most agreeable, particularly when his 1929 posting to the Holy See returned him to Rome, where he met and married (in April 1930) Edda Mussolini, Il Duce's daughter.

Galeazzo Ciano, son-in-law of Benito Mussolini. His diary is an important source of information regarding Italian government decisions during World War II. (Heinrich Hoffmann/Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

In June 1933, Ciano was the delegate to the World Monetary and Economic Conference in London, and by June 1935, he was minister for press and propaganda, a position he left two months later to lead a bomber squadron in the Ethiopian War (1935–1936). Less than a month after Ciano's return to Italy, on June 9, 1936, Mussolini appointed him foreign minister, a move that attracted much criticism.

Ciano's foreign ministry undertook a mix of standard fascist foreign policy initiatives (such as Italy's withdrawal from the League of Nations, Balkan incursions, and military intervention in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War) with proposals for regional alliances that sought to curb Germany's hegemony by linking Italy with, variously, Austria, Czechoslovakia,

Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Ciano's diaries reveal his antipathy toward Germany and detail his September 1939 forging of a "nonbelligerency" policy designed to forestall Italian entry into World War II.

With the Italian declaration of war on June 10, 1940, Ciano resumed bomber pilot duty over Greece, repatriating in April 1941 to find his minister's portfolio reduced to mere courier status. Eventually, he was fired in a February 1943 cabinet shift, and after participating in the fascist Grand Council's no-confidence vote on Mussolini's rule on July 25, 1943, he unsuccessfully sought asylum in Spain. Cynically (or guilelessly) arranging his family's passage to Germany instead that August, Ciano, not surprisingly, was made a prisoner of Il Duce's new Italian Social Republic after the September 1943 armistice. Receiving no mercy from Mussolini despite Edda Ciano's pleas, Galeazzo Ciano was tried and condemned on a charge of treason and executed by a firing squad at Verona on January 11, 1944.

GORDON E. HOGG

See also

Greece Campaign, Italian; Italy; Mussolini, Benito

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Ciliax, Otto (1891–1964)

German Navy admiral. Otto Ciliax was born in Gotha-Neudietendorf, Germany, on October 30, 1891. He entered the German Navy in 1910 and served in submarines during World War I. After the war, Ciliax continued in the navy and held various posts. During the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, he commanded the pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer* and in 1938 also briefly filled the post of senior officer of the naval forces in Spain.

At the outbreak of World War II, Captain Ciliax commanded the battleship *Scharnhorst.* Promoted to rear admiral on November 1, 1939, he was appointed chief of staff of Navy Group West at Wilhelmshaven. He then

commanded the German battleships between June 1941 and June 1942 until this post was disbanded. In the high point of his World War II service, in February 1942 then Vice Admiral Ciliax, flying his flag in the *Scharnhorst*, had charge of Operation CERBERUS, more widely known as the Channel Dash. Against the advice of German Navy commander Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered that the battleship *Scharnhorst* and its sister *Gneisenau* be returned to Germany along with the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen.* The three capital ships departed Brest, France, on the night of February 11 and, escorted by 6 destroyers and 14 torpedo boats, made it safely through the English Channel to Wilhelmshaven and the Elbe River estuary on February 13 in what proved to be a great embarrassment to the British.

From March 1943 to April 1945, Ciliax commanded German naval forces in Norway. Ciliax died at Lübeck-Travemünde on December 12, 1964.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

CERBERUS, Operation; Germany, Navy

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Clark, Mark Wayne (1896–1984)

U.S. Army general. Born at Madison Barracks, New York, on May 1, 1896, Mark Wayne Clark graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1917 and was wounded in action in France in 1918. He graduated from the Infantry School in 1925, the Command and General Staff School in 1935, and the Army War College in 1937.

Promoted to brigadier general in August 1941, Clark was working on army expansion when the war began. He was promoted to major general as chief of staff of Army Ground Forces the following April. He rose to

lieutenant general in November 1942 and was named deputy supreme commander for the Allied invasion of North Africa, Operation TORCH, under Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Clark met secretly with Vichy French officials in October 1942 prior to the invasion to seek their cooperation, and he negotiated a cease-fire with the French authorities two days after the landings.

Given command of the Fifth Army, Clark led the invading U.S. troops at Salerno, Italy, in September 1943. The Fifth Army's slow advance up the western side of the Italian Peninsula led to harsh criticism of Clark. His troops suffered heavy casualties in the attempt to penetrate the Gustav Line, and the bombing of the monastery on Monte Cassino tarnished his reputation, while heavy casualties at the Rapido River prompted a Senate investigation. The Anzio landings in January 1944 did little to speed up the Fifth Army's advance, and the assault failed to lead to a quick capture of Rome. The Fifth Army finally liberated Rome on June 4, 1944, but Clark was roundly criticized for his determination that U.S. troops be the first to enter the Eternal City, which allowed the German Tenth Army to escape encirclement and reach the Gothic Line to the north.

Lieutenant General Mark Clark, commander of the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy. Clark's decisions while commanding in Italy remain controversial. (Library of Congress)

As the cross-Channel invasion of France became the chief focus of Allied efforts in Europe, the Italian theater gradually became secondary. In December 1944, Clark succeeded Sir Harold Alexander as commander of the multinational 15th Army Group, and in March 1945, he became the U.S. Army's youngest full general. He led the Allied offensive that breached the Gothic Line, crossed the Po River, and entered Austria just as the war in Europe ended. On May 4, 1945, Clark personally received the surrender of all German forces in Italy.

After the war, Clark commanded U.S. occupation forces in Austria (1945–1947), the Sixth Army (1947–1949), and Army Field Forces (1949–1952). He succeeded General Matthew Ridgway as commander of U.S. forces in the Far East and of United Nations Forces in Korea (May 1952–October 1953) but chafed at restrictions placed on his command. Clark wrote

two memoirs, *Calculated Risk* (1950) and *From the Danube to the Yalu* (1954). On his retirement from the army in 1954, he served as president of The Citadel, the military college in South Carolina (1954–1960). Clarke died in Charleston, South Carolina, on April 17, 1984.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Anzio, Battle of; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Italy Campaign; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Salerno Invasion; TORCH, Operation; Wolff, Karl Friedrich Otto

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Clark Field, Japanese Raid on (December 8, 1941)

Devastating Japanese air attack in the Philippines. To secure the lines of communication between the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies and the home islands, the Japanese planned to seize the Philippine Islands. The first step in that process was the elimination of U.S. airpower.

American planners had long recognized the vulnerability of the Philippines to Japanese attack. In July 1941, President Franklin F. Roosevelt named General Douglas MacArthur commander of United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). His air commander was Major General Lewis Brereton. By the fall of 1941, Brereton had priority in aircraft deliveries, and in early December, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) possessed 35 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses, more than 100 modern Curtiss P-40 Warhawk fighters, and some 135 older aircraft.

At 2:40 a.m. on December 8, 1941 (December 7 Hawaii time), the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic Fleet Headquarters in Manila learned of the attack on Pearl

Harbor but then had trouble informing MacArthur. An hour later, MacArthur's chief of staff, Brigadier General Richard Sutherland, heard a commercial broadcast reporting the attack and woke the general. Official word from the War Department did not arrive until 5:30 a.m. Brereton placed his aircraft on standby and requested permission from MacArthur to strike Takao Harbor, Formosa, to destroy Japanese warships and shipping gathering there for the invasion of the Philippines. MacArthur refused, and Sutherland denied Brereton access to MacArthur.

At 9:20 a.m., Japanese Army aircraft bombed Baguio, the Philippine summer capital north of Clark Field. Fog on Formosa, however, delayed the Japanese Navy raid on the Clark and Iba airfields. At 11:30 a.m., reports of incoming aircraft reached FEAF headquarters. Clark Field received a warning, but it was not passed to the V Bomber Command. Although the Americans had one radar station operating and nearly 10 hours had elapsed since the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese caught most of Clark's aircraft on the ground, launching 53 bombers and 44 Zero fighters against the airfield. All the attacks on Luzon cost the Japanese only 7 fighters lost. The Americans lost 18 B-17s, 35 P-35s and P-40s, and another 25 to 30 B-10s, B-18s, and observation aircraft. The FEAF thus ceased to exist as a meaningful force on the first day of the war.

Blame for the American disaster has never been suitably determined. Complacency played a role, as American strategists discounted the technical achievements and fighting ability of the Japanese. Brereton wrote that had permission been granted to attack Formosa, his Clark Field bombers would not have been caught on the ground. Sutherland blamed Brereton for not dispersing all his B-17s to the south (only half had been sent there) as ordered prior to December 8, whereas MacArthur held the War Department responsible for not strengthening the defense of the Philippines soon enough. Nevertheless, although army and navy commanders at Pearl Harbor were removed following the Japanese attack there, MacArthur retained his post in the Philippines.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Brereton, Lewis Hyde; Iba Field, Attack on; Japan, Air Forces; MacArthur, Douglas; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of;

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States Army Air Forces

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Clay, Lucius DuBignon (1897–1978)

U.S. Army general. Born on April 23, 1897, in Marietta, Georgia, Lucius DuBignon Clay graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1918 and was commissioned in the engineers. He returned to West Point as an instructor during 1924–1928. Clay served on General Douglas MacArthur's staff (1937); was in charge of the construction of the Red River Dam near Denison, Texas from 1938 to 1940; and headed the Civil Aeronautics Authority Defense Airport Program from 1940 to 1941. In the latter position, he oversaw the expansion and improvement of 277 airports and the construction of 197 new ones.

In March 1942, Clay was promoted to brigadier general—the youngest in the army at the time—and appointed assistant chief of staff for matériel. Rising to major general that December, he oversaw both military procurement and production. In November 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower called Clay to Europe to take on the Herculean task of rejuvenating for Allied supply the French port of Cherbourg, which the Germans had destroyed. He was next deputy chief of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion in Washington (December 1944 to April 1945).

Clay returned to Europe at the end of the war as a lieutenant general and Eisenhower's civilian affairs deputy. In March 1947, Clay became U.S.

military governor in Germany. In that position, he played a key role in rebuilding western Germany. When the Soviet Union imposed a blockade of Berlin in 1948, Clay recommended that the Western Allies attempt an airlift, which President Harry S. Truman approved.

Days after the successful blockade ended in May 1949, Clay retired. One of the few occupying generals to have a street named after him (Clayallee in Berlin), Clay subsequently served as chairman of the board of the Continental Can Corporation, although he carried out several special governmental assignments as well. Clay died in Chatham, Massachusetts, on April 16, 1978.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM

See also

Cherbourg, Capture of; Eisenhower, Dwight David; MacArthur, Douglas

U.S. Army major general Lucius Clay. An outstanding logistician, Clay played a key role in the reconstruction of Germany after the war. (Library of Congress)

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CLAYMORE, Operation (March 4, 1941)

Allied raid against the Norwegian Lofoten Islands some 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle. Operation CLAYMORE, also known as the Lofoten Islands Raid, involved the Royal Navy troopships *Queen Emma* and *Princess Beatrix* transporting some 1,000 men of No. 3 Commando and No. 4 Commando, with a naval escort of five destroyers. The ships departed Scapa Flow on February 21, 1941, and then proceeded to the Faroe Islands for training and left there on March 1.

The primary target of the raid was the Norwegian fish oil factories, the destruction of which would adversely affect German glycerine production for munitions. Despite the ships having been spotted by a German aircraft in their approach, surprise was complete. During the March 4 raid, 11 factories, 800,000 gallons of oil, and five ships in harbor were destroyed. A total of 225 Germans and 60 Norwegian collaborators were taken prisoner, and 314 Norwegians volunteering to join their government's forces in exile were taken to Britain. In addition, the raiders secured from a German trawler a set of spare rotors for an Enigma coding machine, which was sent to Bletchley Park to assist British code breakers.

There were no British casualties. The success of the raid was a fillip to British morale, which had been badly shaken by a series of military reverses.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Scapa Flow; Signals Intelligence

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Coastal Defense

The defense of important harbors to protect against attack from the sea. During World War II, most fighting nations developed new harbor fortifications or manned ones developed before the war, although few of these locations saw action. Most major American port cities (including those in Panama and the Philippines) were protected by coastal forts, many of which originally dated from the turn of the century and were thus on caretaker status as obsolete when the war began. In the continental United States, more than 30 new batteries designed to a common standard and with greater ranges were constructed before and during the war. These installations were chiefly shielded twin batteries of 6-inch guns as well as a few heavily casemated 16-inch batteries, the largest coastal defenses ever installed. A number of existing batteries were also casemated to protect against possible air attack. Older weapons from other batteries were often sent to other nations, such as Brazil and Canada, to bolster their coastal defenses. Fully manned in the opening months of the war, batteries were increasingly placed on caretaker status, and new construction (of more than 100 batteries) was halted by 1944.

Only the American-built harbor forts at Manila—most constructed early in the century—actually saw action, as Japanese forces advanced down the Bataan Peninsula between December 1941 and May 1942. U.S. mortar and gun batteries on Corregidor and other harbor islands and the twin turrets of Fort Drum, the famous "Concrete Battleship," in Manila Bay dueled with Japanese artillery, ships, and aircraft until the final American surrender in April and May. The forces at Drum prevented Japan's use of Manila Bay and also kept the Japanese from flanking the Bataan defenses by sea. Hawaii (Oahu), already extensively armed, was further fortified with naval turrets,

including two removed from the sunken battleship USS *Arizona*, but none of its batteries saw action in the war.

In Canada, the key ports on the Atlantic (Halifax and Sydney, Nova Scotia) and the Pacific (Vancouver and Victoria) had been fortified earlier, usually with British 9.2-inch and smaller artillery in open emplacements. Several were upgraded with new guns and communications links. Although all of the Canadian forts were manned in support of convoy and military shipping, none saw action.

Major British harbors had been fortified at least since the mid-19th century. Although some new emplacements were constructed, chiefly along the coast facing the mainland, British batteries were largely holdovers from the turn of the century and World War I. With Britain facing invasion in 1940, a host of emergency batteries were hastily built using cast-off 4-inch and 6-inch naval weapons. Pillboxes and other armored positions festooned coast and countryside. Sizable antiaircraft "sea forts" were built in the Thames and Mersey estuaries in 1942 and 1943 and were quite effective. Huge 14-inch and 15-inch guns emplaced near Dover controlled the English Channel and could bombard Atlantic Wall defenses along the French coast. Unfortunately, British coastal batteries at Hong Kong (in 1941) and Singapore (in 1942) did little to slow the Japanese advances there.

Coastal defense was extensively developed by the Axis powers, most specifically by the massive German Atlantic Wall. The Italian ports of Genoa and Venice were heavily defended with batteries, and the Germans added more after 1943. Few of these saw action, as Allied forces typically went around them or took them from behind. Japan rapidly fortified Pacific islands taken over in 1941 and 1942, and most of these facilities saw active combat, as did some of the extensive facilities protecting the Japanese home islands.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Atlantic Wall; Fort Drum, Manila Bay; Hong Kong, Battle of; Maginot Line; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Singapore, Battle for

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COBRA, Operation (July 25–31, 1944)

U.S. Army breakout from the Normandy peninsula in July 1944. The success of the Allied invasion of June 6, 1944, turned to frustration when the tenacious German defense of the Cotentin Peninsula stifled efforts to expand beyond the initial beachheads. Supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force General Dwight D. Eisenhower had grown impatient with the disrupted timetable as General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery failed to take Caen and Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley's U.S. First Army remained stalled in the bocage, or hedgerow, country.

To break the deadlock, two offensive plans were developed. Operation GOODWOOD, led by British lieutenant general Miles C. Dempsey, would fix the German attention on British forces as they moved to capture Caen. Meanwhile, Bradley planned Operation COBRA, a mobile ground attack to break out of the Cotentin Peninsula and drive west into Brittany. That would culminate in a wide sweep to the southeast to stretch German defenses to the breaking point.

Tactical command for COBRA fell to aggressive VII Corps commander Major General J. Lawton Collins. Collins would have six divisions and almost 100,000 men for the attack. The plan hinged on a concentrated strike by heavy bombers to destroy a significant portion of the German lines. After the bombardment, an overwhelming ground attack by the U.S. 9th, 4th, and 30th Infantry Divisions would penetrate the disrupted German defenses and hold open a corridor for the exploiting mobile divisions. Opposing Collins

was German lieutenant general Dietrich Choltitz's LXXXIV Corps, which had experienced heavy fighting and had many understrength units, such as the Panzer Lehr Division, which could muster only 3,200 troops along a three-mile front.

A key element in the COBRA plan was to locate a point of penetration where there were sufficient parallel roads in the direction of the attack to allow follow-on forces into the breach. The most controversial aspect of the operation was the carpet bombing by strategic bombers. Bradley designated a rectangular target box 2,500 yards wide and over 7,000 yards long, and his IX Tactical Air Command commander, Major General Elwood "Pete" Quesada, met with Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory to coordinate the air attack. However, the competing needs for dropping maximum bomb tonnage, maintaining tactical positions for the infantry, and placing 1,500 bombers in the mile-wide corridor in a single hour could not be entirely reconciled.

COBRA was scheduled for July 24, but overcast skies led Leigh-Mallory to call off the carpet bombing. Unfortunately, U.S. Eighth Air Force bombers were already in flight, and they approached the target from a perpendicular direction, causing bombs to fall short of the target and into the 30th Infantry Division, killing 25 and wounding 131. The attack postponed and the surprise lost, an infuriated Bradley was told that another attack would follow the next day.

On July 25, bombers dropped 4,400 tons of bombs. The Germans, alerted from the previous attack, had dug in. Despite this, the Panzer Lehr Division was left in shambles, with 70 percent of its soldiers suffering shock and several battalion command posts destroyed. The Americans, in exposed positions and ready to move, suffered in "shorts" (bombs that fell short of their targets, landing on friendly forces) another 111 men killed, almost 500 wounded, and psychological trauma for 200 more. Among the U.S. dead was Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces, who was visiting the front to observe the attack.

In spite of this tragedy, VII Corps immediately attacked, although strong pockets of German resistance limited the advance to only a mile or two. The next day, Collins made a bold decision to commit his armored and motorized forces, even though no U.S. unit had reached its planned objectives. The disrupted German command-and-control network failed to react when U.S.

armored divisions sliced through the lines on July 26. The next day, Collins's mobile units exploited their success deeper into the German rear areas, which led Bradley to order VIII Corps through the breach to seize Avranches.

According to the plan, once forces moved toward Brittany, the U.S. Third Army, commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr., would be activated. To facilitate this transition, Bradley gave Patton immediate command of VIII Corps, which he drove hard to capture Avranches on July 31 and mark the end of COBRA. In just six days, the entire German front collapsed, enabling the Allies to carry out their own operational blitzkrieg deep into France.

STEVEN J. RAUCH

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Carpet Bombing; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Dempsey, Miles Christopher; France Campaign; GOODWOOD, Operation; Leigh-Mallory, Sir Trafford; McNair, Lesley James; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Quesada, Elwood Richard "Pete"

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Cochran, Jacqueline (1906–1980)

American aviator. Abandoned at birth, Jackie Cochran was born on May 11, 1906, near Muscogee, Florida. Growing up with a foster family in extreme poverty in Florida and Georgia, she received only two years of formal education. She worked at a variety of jobs in various settings, from cotton mills to beauty parlors. In 1932, Cochran earned her pilot's license, and in 1934, she won her first air race. She married Floyd Odlum, a wealthy businessman, in 1936. Two years later, Cochran was the first woman to win the Bendix Trophy for aeronautical racing and was recognized as the leading female pilot in the world.

When the United States entered World War II, Cochran attempted to change the U.S. Army Air Corps policy of not allowing women pilots to fly its planes. Seeing that the matter was hopeless, she took a group of women pilots to Britain to fly with the Royal Air Force's Air Transport Auxiliary. During her absence, the Air Transport Command organized the Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS), a civilian command for women to ferry aircraft throughout the contiguous United States. Nancy Harkness Love took command of the unit.

Cochran returned to the United States, angry that the WAFS had been formed without her. As a peace offering, the chief of staff of the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), General Henry H. Arnold, authorized Cochran to organize, in November 1942, the Women's Flying Training Detachment (WFTD) to train future ferry pilots. In August 1943, the two women's groups were merged under Cochran's command and renamed the Women's Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs). Seeing this as a chance for women to prove themselves as military pilots, Cochran pushed for missions beyond simple ferrying. In addition to ferrying every type of military aircraft in the U.S. inventory, the WASPs performed flight checks, towed antiaircraft targets, trained male pilots, and worked as test pilots.

Despite Cochran's efforts to secure military status for the unit—and Arnold's support for that designation—Congress failed to approve it, and the women remained civilians throughout the war and did not secure veteran's status until 1978. In 1945, Cochran was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Following the war, Cochran continued to fly. In 1953, she became the first woman to break the sound barrier, and she also campaigned for female astronauts. In 1960, she was the first woman to launch from and land on an aircraft carrier. Awarded the Legion of Merit by the U.S. Air Force in 1970, she was the first woman enshrined in the Aviation Hall of Fame, in 1971. By the time of her death in Indio, California, on August 9, 1980, Cochran held more aviation records and firsts than any other aviator.

PAMELA FELTUS

See also

Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; United States Women's Air Force Service Pilots; Women in World War II

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COCKLESHELL, Operation (December 6–12, 1942)

A small unit of British marines, known as the Royal Marines Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD), part of Combined Operations, on December 11–12, 1942, attacked German ships in the Gironde River at Bordeaux, France. The men had been organized under the RMBPD cover. Following intensive training, they set sail to execute Operation FRANKTON (popularly known as Operation COCKLESHELL). The plan had been developed at the headquarters of Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, chief of Combined Operations. It called for the launching of six two-man collapsible canoes on a moonless night off the Gironde estuary in an effort to destroy up to 12 German merchant ships. December had been chosen because the longer nights of winter would give greater cover to the raiders.

On the night of December 6, the party of 12 Royal Marines under Major Herbert G. "Blondie" Hasler arrived in the Bay of Biscay off the Gironde on board the British submarine *Tuna.* Their mission was to paddle the canoes, known as Cockle Mark IIs, nearly 100 miles from their launch point up the Gironde to Bordeaux and there destroy the German merchant ships with mines. The men were then to make their way home via Spain on foot.

Bad weather delayed the launch until the night of December 7, and an even more serious setback occurred when one canoe was damaged in launching and had to be scrubbed. The remaining five successfully launched and then set out for the mouth of the Gironde. Then one of the boats capsized, and its two men were drowned: just four canoes and eight men remained. The Gironde's tidal races caused another canoe to become separated. It was spotted by Germans ashore, and its crewmen were captured. Although the two men were in uniform, they were brutally interrogated (they revealed

nothing) and were executed at Bordeaux early on December 13 by a firing squad acting under Adolf Hitler's infamous Commando Order.

Another canoe sank after hitting an underwater obstacle as it neared Bordeaux. While making their way to Spain, the two men from this boat were betrayed to the Gestapo at La Reole. Taken to Paris, they were executed on or about March 23, 1943.

The men in last two canoes—the first containing Hasler and marine William Sparks and the second with Corporal A. F. Laver and marine W. H. Mills—paddled the 91 miles to Bordeaux at night (going ashore and sleeping in the day) in cold and wet conditions. Finally reaching their target, they set time-delay limpet mines on four cargo ships and a small tanker during the night of December 11–12. When the mines exploded the next morning, the ships flooded and sank; a minesweeping vessel was also badly damaged. None of the ships again saw service in the war.

After setting the mines, Hasler, Sparks, Laver, and Mills paddled to the riverbank, scuttled their canoes, and split up to attempt the trip to Spain and safety. Laver and Mills made for Ruffec but were betrayed to the Germans by French police at Montieu. They were shot in Paris on or about March 23, 1943.

Hasler and Sparks walked 100 miles northeast to make contact with the French Resistance at Ruffec. From there, Resistance members led them across France to the Spanish border, and they then made their way to Gibraltar. The only survivors of the operation, they arrived in Britain in April 1943. Hasler was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, and Sparks was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. The story was commemorated in a 1955 film titled *The Cockleshell Heroes.*

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY

See also

Commando Order; Commandos/Rangers; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas

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Code Breaking

See Signals Intelligence

Code Talkers

Native Americans specifically recruited to relay battlefield information in their native language in the clear (that is, without employing a cipher). During World War II, nearly all code talkers were Navajos operating with the U.S. Marine Corps in the Pacific theater. The U.S. Army employed a handful of Comanches in the European theater, but they numbered fewer than 20. In the Pacific theater, nearly 400 Navajos provided their services to the Marine Corps. The idea was that the enemy—especially the Japanese—would have no knowledge of Native American languages and thus be unable to figure out what was being said. There was precedence for such activity, as the U.S. Army had employed a small number of Choctaws as signalmen on the Western Front during World War I.

In early 1942, U.S. Marine Corps recruiters visited a Navajo reservation in the American Southwest with the express purpose of recruiting and grooming code talkers to be used on the battlefield to relay fire-control and combat intelligence. Many of the Navajos recruited had never been off their reservation, but the marines persevered, as did the Navajos they recruited. The men received basic military training and developed a simple code for some words that did not exist in Navajo. Thus “machine gun” was translated into Navajo as “rapid-fire gun,” while “battleship” became “whale.”

The code talkers first saw service during the Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942–February 1943). They performed in stellar fashion, and the Japanese were entirely unable to decipher their language. At first, the code included Navajo translations of 211 English words used mostly by the military. This was expanded until there were 411 terms in Navajo code. The

code talkers took great care to ensure that no codes or messages were ever written down; all communications were spoken in the Navajo code.

After their initial deployment at Guadalcanal, the Navajo code talkers saw extensive service at Tarawa (November 20–24, 1943), Peliliu (September 15–November 27, 1944), and Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945), among other battles and campaigns. Some Navajos experienced discrimination while in the service, while others were mistaken for the enemy because of the language and physical appearance. Nevertheless, the code talkers played an important role in the Pacific war, but none received public recognition of their contributions until the 1980s. In fact, their employment during the war had remained a government secret until 1968, at which time the operation was declassified.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

Henry Bake and George Kirk, Navajo Code Talkers in a U.S. Marine Corps artillery regiment, relay orders over a field radio in December 1943. The Navajo Code Talkers developed and implemented a

code based on their native language for use in military telephone and radio communications during World War II. (National Archives)

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Peleliu Island, Battle of; Signals Intelligence; Tarawa, Battle of; United States Marine Corps

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Collaboration

Literally “cooperation” or “unity of effort” but interpreted during World War II to mean working actively with the enemy, implying treasonable activity. The issue is a complex one, for collaboration could run from selling the occupier agricultural produce to rounding up Jews and actively assisting in the prosecution of military activities. Collaboration could be military, political, economic, social, or cultural. In any case, such activities implied treason (in varying degrees) on the part of the collaborator. One point that must be made, however, is that one side’s “collaborator” was the other side’s “ally,” “loyalist,” or “assistant.” Collaboration with enemy or occupying forces occurred on both sides during the war.

Western and Northern Europe

France presents a complicated picture. Following the defeat of France in 1940, the Germans dictated armistice terms that saw them occupy about two-thirds of the country in the north and west. The French were allowed to establish an “independent” government in the remainder of the country, with its capital at Vichy. The term “collaboration” was actually first used in the course of a meeting between Vichy head of state Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain and German leader Adolf Hitler at Montoire-sur-Loire on October 24, 1940. Pétain and his supporters concluded that Germany had won the war and that, for the foreseeable future, that nation would dominate the continent. The

marshal therefore informed the French people that he accepted “in principle” the idea of “collaboration” with Germany.

Despite Pétain’s pronouncement, the French population was bitterly divided. A small minority at first rallied to the Resistance led in London by young General of Brigade General Charles de Gaulle (condemned to death in absentia by the Vichy government as a traitor). Germany had direct sources of pressure on Vichy, including heavy “administration costs” that amounted to more than 60 percent of French national income, control over traffic across the armistice demarcation line, possession of 1 million French prisoners of war (POWs), and exploitation of the press.

Following the Allied invasion of French North Africa, the Germans occupied the remainder of France. While de Gaulle established his position in North Africa and the French Empire in general, Vichy premier Pierre Laval became increasingly open about collaborating with Germany within continental France, including active participation in the rounding up and deportation of Jews and the hunting down of partisans by the Milice, the 30,000-man-strong Vichy militia force. Meanwhile, as the fortunes of war shifted, de Gaulle’s influence in France grew.

Certainly, a large number of French men and women collaborated with the Nazi regime, and many made sizable fortunes in the process. In addition, little was done after the war to punish such war profiteers. The carefully nurtured myth in postwar France of a nation of resisters was totally false, although thousands of French men and women did risk their all for the Allied cause.

Occupation arrangements varied in other West European countries. Belgium experienced a rather harsh German military rule, whereas the Netherlands and Norway had civil administrations, and Denmark was able to retain sovereignty until August 1943. After the war, the Belgian government punished, in varying degrees, some 53,000 men and women adjudged to have collaborated with the German occupiers.

Vidkun Quisling of Norway was one of the most notorious collaborators, his name becoming synonymous with the term. In February 1942, Quisling became minister-president of Norway, but his effort to Nazify his country was ardently resisted by most of the population. Anton Mussert was his Dutch counterpart and founder of the Netherlands Nazi Party. The party

membership was 30,000 at the start of the war, increasing to a peak of 50,000.

Eastern Europe

Although Poles prided themselves after the war on offering little collaboration with the hated German and Soviet occupiers, collaboration did take place. In the General Government set up by the Germans, units of Polish police operated under German command, as did Jewish police in the ghettos established by the Germans. There were also Poles who collaborated with the Soviets in 1939 as well as in 1943–1944. The Lublin government set up by the Soviet Union is a prime example. Even during the Nazi-inspired Holocaust, the Germans discovered those individuals who would collaborate in the concentration camps—the Kapos, or trustees, who worked for the German guards in the Sonderkommando. When Soviet forces invaded eastern Poland, they mobilized large numbers of Poles to fight for them against Germany; many Poles regarded these soldiers as collaborators.

In the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, experiences varied. Bulgaria, nominally an Axis power, hardly participated in the war. Its government did send troops to occupy Thrace and Macedonia in Greece, but it steadfastly rejected Hitler's demands that it dispatch troops to the Eastern Front. Hungary and Romania both supplied troops for the German invasion of the Soviet Union, suffering heavy losses in the process. They also actively participated in rounding up Jews to be sent to the extermination camps. In both Greece and Yugoslavia, there was active resistance to the Germans, although the government of newly independent Croatia, carved from Yugoslavia, was highly supportive of Berlin and its policies.

Many inhabitants of the eastern portions of the Soviet Union, such as the Baltic states and Ukraine, openly welcomed the German Army as their liberator and collaborated fully with it, until they discovered that German occupation policies were even more repressive than Soviet rule. In 1943 alone, as Soviet troops moved westward, the Soviet Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD, or secret police) arrested more than 931,000 people for questioning. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet minorities—most notably the Crimean Tartars but also Turks and Chechens, among others—were simply deported en masse to the eastern Soviet Union as a consequence

of their wartime collaboration with the Germans. General Andrei Vlasov, a Hero of the Soviet Union, agreed to head the German-sponsored Russian Liberation Army, although Hitler refused to allow it any real function. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners worked in the German Army in nonmilitary roles, as cooks, drivers, and the like. Much of their motivation came from the simple desire to stay alive, as millions of Soviet soldiers perished from starvation in German POW camps. Stalin, however, deemed them collaborators—along with all other Soviet POWs—and condemned them to the gulags after the war.

One tragic episode following the war resulted from the decision by the Western powers to hand over to the Soviet Union millions of Soviet citizens, many of whom had lived in the West for decades and had played no wartime collaborative role. Nonetheless, they were shipped off to work at hard labor in the gulags.

Far East

In the Far East, Japan's occupation of its conquered territories was generally quite harsh. Paradoxically, as the war dragged on, Japan encouraged independence from colonial rule in some areas, especially in those lands that had been European or U.S. colonies. A notable example of the latter was the Netherlands East Indies, where indigenous peoples were treated comparatively well, in contrast to Europeans, and where the postwar independence movement was effectively encouraged. There as elsewhere, there was considerable popular support for Tokyo's efforts to eliminate the influence of the European colonial masters. One component of the Japanese theme of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was to grant independence to Asian states. But the phrase "Asia for the Asians" actually meant that Asian peoples were to be subordinate to Japan.

In French Indochina, the Japanese allowed the French colonial administration to remain in place for purposes of expediency, for it could thus be held with fewer Japanese troops. In March 1945, however, with the war almost certainly lost for Japan, the French plotted to liberate Indochina themselves. The Japanese then took control and granted Vietnam its "independence." The Viet Minh, die-hard Vietnamese nationalists led by Ho

Chi Minh, rejected collaboration, fought both the French and the Japanese, and appealed to Washington for support.

Much to the surprise of the Japanese, most Filipinos remained loyal to the United States. But under heavy Japanese pressure, the Philippine government did accept the principle of collaboration and even declared war on the United States. Following the liberation of the islands, however, few Filipino collaborators were punished, and the Philippines received independence. Burma had its share of collaborators. A number of Burmese regarded the Japanese as liberators, and the Burmese Independence Army actively fought on their side.

Throughout its long occupation of much of China, Japan sought collaborators. Wang Jingwei (Ching-wei), a founding father of the Nationalist Party, grew disillusioned with Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and his failure to make peace with the Japanese. In March 1940, the Japanese installed Wang as head of the puppet Reorganized Nationalist Government of China in Nanjing (Nanking). However, Wang's hopes of presenting himself as a credible alternative to Jiang were dashed on the rocks of Japanese military domination. Wang died in Japan in November 1944 while undergoing medical treatment.

After the Allied victories in Europe and the Pacific in the spring of 1945, collaborators were variously punished. Many individuals were simply executed on the spot by soldiers and civilians. In France, women who had fraternized with the Germans had their heads shaved, among other indignities. Some key political leaders, such as Quisling, were tried and executed. In France, the aged Marshal Pétain was tried and sentenced to death, but de Gaulle remitted that sentence in recognition of his World War I services, and the marshal spent the remainder of his life in prison.

ARTHUR I. CYR AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

China; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Concentration Camps, German; Conscript Labor; de Gaulle, Charles; France; Hitler, Adolf; Ho Chi Minh; Holocaust; Jiang Jieshi; Laval, Pierre; Partisans/Guerrillas; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Quisling, Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonsson; Resistance; Vichy France; Vlasov, Andrei Andreyevich; Wang Jingwei; Document 132; Document 171

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Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe" (1896–1987)

U.S. Army general. Born on May 1, 1896, in New Orleans, Louisiana, Joseph Lawton Collins was the brother of James Lawton Collins, another future U.S. Army general. Joseph Collins attended Louisiana State University during 1912–1913, then went on to the United States Military Academy at West Point, where he graduated in 1917, was commissioned a second lieutenant, and assigned to the 22nd Infantry. Although he did not take part in combat in World War I, he was promoted to captain in 1919 and served with U.S. occupation forces in Germany (1919–1921).

Collins was an instructor at West Point (1921–1925). He graduated from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1925 and then was an instructor there (1925–1931). Promoted to major in 1932, he was a student at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (1932–1933), then served in the Philippines (1933–1935). He attended the Army Industrial College (1936–1937) and the Army War College (1937–1938) before serving as an instructor at the latter (1938–1941). He was then chief of staff of VI Corps in Alabama (1941). Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), Colonel Collins was named chief of staff

of the Hawaiian Department. He was promoted to brigadier general in February 1942 and to major general that May, taking command of the 25th Infantry Division.

The 25th Infantry Division relieved the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal in December 1942. Collins earned the nickname “Lightning Joe” for his aggressiveness in this campaign, defeating the Japanese there in February 1943. Then Collins assumed command of VII Corps, the post he held for the remainder of the war. On D-day (June 6, 1944), spearheaded by its 4th Division, VII Corps landed on Utah Beach. It then seized the vital port of Cherbourg (June 27). VII Corps is probably best remembered, however, for Operation COBRA (June 25–31), the breakout from the Normandy beachhead at Saint-Lô (July 25), an operation largely planned by Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley but executed by Collins. VII Corps then repelled the German counterattack at Mortain (August 7–13), which led to the creation of the Falaise-Argentan Pocket.

U.S. Army lieutenant general Joseph L. Collins. “Lightning Joe” Collins was one of the outstanding corps commanders of World War II. (Corbis)

Collins led VII Corps during the disastrous Battle of Hürtgen Forest (September–December 1944); at the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945), where the corps held the northern shoulder of the bulge; at Köln (Cologne, February 1945); in the reduction of the Ruhr Pocket (March–April); and, as the war ended, in the Harz Mountains. In April 1945, he was promoted to lieutenant general.

Following the war, Collins served as director of information for the War Department (December 1945–September 1947). He then served as vice chief of staff of the army (1947–1949). Promoted to full general (January 1948), he was then chief of staff of the army (August 1949–August 1953). Collins is credited with full racial integration of the army during the Korean War (1950–1953), in accordance with President Harry S. Truman’s 1948 executive order.

Collins then served as U.S. representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Military Committee and Standing Group. Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration dispatched Collins to the State of Vietnam (later Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam), as special envoy with the rank of ambassador (1954–1955). Although Collins did not think that Ngo Dinh Diem was capable of leading South Vietnam, he followed his instructions of supporting the Diem government by helping it establish a military training program and agrarian reforms. Collins retired from the army in March 1956. After serving as vice chairman of the President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief, he entered private business. Collins died in Washington, D.C., on September 12, 1987.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Aachen, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Cherbourg, Capture of; COBRA, Operation; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; New Georgia, Battle of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Ruhr Land Campaign; Saint-Lô, Battle of

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Collishaw, Raymond (1893–1976)

Canadian fighter pilot and senior Royal Air Force (RAF) air vice marshal. Born on November 22, 1893, in Nanaimo, British Columbia, Raymond Collishaw became a seaman in the Canadian Fisheries Protection Service after leaving school, then joined the Royal Naval Air Service in January 1916. After training, he was assigned to France. Collishaw was credited with downing 59 enemy aircraft by the end of World War I.

Collishaw remained with the new Royal Air Force (RAF) after the war. He saw action in southern Russia in 1919, then served in a variety of home and overseas stations in the years before World War II. In 1940, now as air commodore, he was in command of Number 202 Group, the RAF units in the Western Desert of Egypt, when war with Italy began on June 10. Collishaw's theater commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, ordered him to keep his aggressive tendencies in check, largely because of immediate difficulties of supply. But as reinforcements arrived, Collishaw was able to extend air operations against the Italians.

In December 1940, preparations began for a full-scale land offensive into Libya. Collishaw's air units commenced a wide-ranging offensive to set the stage and provided close support for Lieutenant General Sir Richard O'Connor's spectacularly successful advance and destruction of Italian forces under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. This success was quickly reversed, as the British sent troops and aircraft to Greece and German forces under Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel commenced operations in Africa. Collishaw's air forces provided support as the British retreated and then again stabilized their situation on the Egyptian border.

Collishaw returned to Britain on the staff of Headquarters, Fighter Command, in August 1941, then took command of Number 14 Group, Fighter Command, on March 21, 1942. He retired as an air vice marshal in 1943 and remained in England until the end of the war, when he returned to

Vancouver. In Canada, he set up several successful mining-exploration operations. Collishaw died in West Vancouver on September 28, 1976.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Graziani, Rodolfo, Marchese di Neghelli; Greece Campaign, Italian; North Africa Campaign; O'Connor, Richard Nugent; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen

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Colmar Pocket, Battle for the (January 20–February 9, 1945)

The Colmar Pocket was the German bridgehead west of the Rhine River and south of the city of Strasbourg, held by Colonel General Friedrich Wiese's Nineteenth Army of eight divisions (some 50,000 men). On January 7, 1945, the Germans launched a major attack out of the Colmar Pocket, gaining little ground. But the Allies wanted to remove the pocket, and the task was assigned to General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny's French First Army of the Allied 6th Army Group.

Two smiling French soldiers fill the hands of American soldiers with candy, in Rouffach, France, during the Allied operation to close the Colmar Pocket, February 5, 1945. (National Archives)

On January 20, de Lattre's troops attacked the Colmar Pocket. The French I Corps led off by attacking the southern flank. On the night of January 22–23, II Corps assaulted the northern flank. The objective was to envelop the pocket by converging on Neuf-Brisach and the Rhine bridge at Breisach. Deep snow along with German mines, machine guns, tanks, and artillery kept the attacks from gaining much ground.

The U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, which was attached to the French, then crossed the Fecht and Ill Rivers. The Germans counterattacked, but the 3rd Infantry Division held them off and reinforced its bridgehead. Severe shortages of French troops led to the eventual attachment to the operation of Major General Frank Milburn's U.S. XXI Corps, composed of the 3rd, 28th, and 75th Infantry Divisions. XXI Corps took over the right of the French II Corps zone and the main effort to envelop the Colmar Pocket from the north. The II Corps secured its left, clearing that area to the Rhine.

The attack continued. The 28th Infantry Division arrived at Colmar on February 2, and the 75th entered the outskirts of Neuf-Brisach in the rear of the pocket. The U.S. 12th Armored Division was then added to the attack. On February 3 it drove south, passing through the 28th Infantry Division. Pockets of German resistance held up one arm of the attack, but the other,

driving down the main road, captured Rouffach on February 5. Other task forces surrounded the town and met the 4th Moroccan Division from French I Corps. This maneuver split the pocket.

On February 5, leading elements of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division arrived outside the walled town of Neuf-Brisach. Early the next morning as the Americans prepared to attack the city, they encountered a Frenchman who took them to a 60-foot tunnel that led into the town from the dry moat. An American platoon entered through the tunnel and found only 76 German soldiers, who surrendered without a fight. Before leaving, their officers had told them to fight to the finish.

French forces finished off the pocket on February 9. In the entire operation, the Allies had sustained about 18,000 casualties and the Germans between 22,000 and 36,000. Only the 708th Volksgrenadier Division, which evacuated on February 3, escaped reasonably intact. The German 2nd Mountain Division had 1,000 battle casualties and 4,700 men taken as prisoners. Only 500 members of the German 198th Infantry Division and 400 men of the German 338th Infantry Division managed to escape. The Germans also abandoned 55 armored vehicles and 66 field pieces.

UZAL W. ENT

See also

Alsace Campaign; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel

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Cologne, Raid on

See Köln, Raid on

Combat Fatigue

Combat fatigue—also known as battle fatigue, war neurosis, exhaustion, or shell shock—is a variable group of symptoms including excessive fatigue, an exaggerated startle response, tremors, violence, nightmares, delusions, hallucinations, withdrawal, and catatonia. Herodotus described combat-induced mental illness in the Athenian Army during the Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE, but the diagnosis was relatively infrequent prior to the 20th century.

The Russians established the first military psychiatric service during the 1905–1905 Russo-Japanese War. The problem became widespread in World War I, during which it was termed "shell shock" under the mistaken theory that explosive concussions caused small brain hemorrhages leading to cerebral dysfunction. By World War II, it was widely understood that the symptoms were psychiatric in nature, were similar to traumatic neuroses seen in the civilian population, and were not caused by identifiable anatomic brain damage. Today, this general set of conditions falls under the rubric of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

In spite of an early British emphasis on battlefield psychiatry and an American attempt to exclude men with psychiatric illness from military service, mental illness remained a major cause of combat disability, with about 30 percent of Allied combat zone casualties being psychiatric. Although physicians in World War I had learned that treatment close to the front lines made it possible to return a number of psychiatrically disabled soldiers to combat, the lesson was forgotten. Early in World War II, patients with combat fatigue were routinely evacuated to rehabilitation hospitals, and most were discharged. As manpower became scarce, more of these men were placed in pioneer or labor details in the rear area, but few returned to combat.

Captain Frederick R. Hanson, an American neurologist and neurosurgeon who had joined the Canadian Army early in the war and participated in the landing at Dieppe, transferred to the U.S. Army and developed what became a successful and widely employed treatment for what the British now termed "exhaustion" or "combat fatigue." The essential parts of the regimen included sedation, brief periods of rest, and treatment in a facility close to the front, where the patients and staff continued to wear combat clothing. Hanson realized that treating these patients as if they were mentally ill and physically

separating them from their units made it unlikely they would return to duty. Using his treatment protocols, the British Army and the U.S. Army were able to return 70 to 80 percent of combat fatigue victims to their units, and only 15 to 20 percent of patients requiring evacuation to the zone of the interior were psychiatric.

Shortly after the invasion of Italy, the U.S. Army established the post of division psychiatrist, and Hanson produced a manual for internists so nonpsychiatrists could use his methods. As the war went on, Allied military psychiatrists became convinced that no soldier was immune from combat fatigue. They hypothesized that any man subject to continuous combat for a long enough time would become nonfunctional and estimated that 200 days of constant action was about the maximum a soldier could be expected to tolerate. The British adopted a system of unit rotation to give their men regular periods of rest and were able to stretch the tolerable period to close to 400 days, but the Americans, except in the U.S. Army Air Forces, adopted a more haphazard approach of rotating individuals with the longest periods of service rather than entire units. It was not until later wars that regular unit rotation became standard.

Military physicians, mindful of the heavy clinical and financial burden of long-term psychiatric illness after World War I, correctly warned that the true cost of combat fatigue would not become evident until after the soldiers returned to civilian life.

JACK MCCALLUM

See also

Medicine and the War

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Combined Bomber Offensive (June 10, 1943–April 1945)

Sustained strategic bombing campaign of Germany conducted by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF). At the Casablanca Conference in French Morocco, North Africa, during January 14–24, 1943, British prime minister Winston Churchill, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) met to decide overall strategy for continuing the war against Nazi Germany. Having decided that an invasion of the European continent through France was not feasible in 1943, they worked to find another means by which to actively engage the Germans. The Allied senior leadership ultimately decided to support U.S. major general Ira C. Eaker's plan to begin a combined bomber offensive against Germany, with the Americans bombing principally during the day and the British bombing at night.

Chief of the RAF Air Staff Marshal Sir Charles Portal was assigned the mission of coordinating the operation. On January 21 the CCS issued the Casablanca Directive, which established the objective of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) as "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." A supplemental document called the "Directive for the Bomber Offensive" required the Allies to "take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, … to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force, and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war."

The concept of a combined bomber offensive was actually a compromise between the two opposing doctrines of the RAF and the USAAF. The American commanders believed that their heavily armed and supposedly self-defending long-range Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and Consolidate B-24 Liberator bombers would be sufficient to reach and attack the designated target without fighter escort while sustaining only minimal losses. Because the American bombers were equipped with the Norden bombsight, strategic precision bombing operations could be conducted from high altitudes, above the ceiling of ground-based antiaircraft artillery. American aircraft would

therefore be able to bomb in daylight with minimal loss and strike specific military and industrial targets with only limited collateral damage.

The RAF, which began the war in 1939 with a similar doctrine, quickly discovered that its lightly armed and armored bombers could not operate during the day without suffering crippling losses. In response, the British switched to nighttime area bombing. Although the CBO joined together the two operational concepts, both sets of doctrine were seriously flawed.

Although planned out in four phases between April 1943 and April 1944, the CBO did not actually begin until the "Pointblank Directive" was adopted by the CCS in June 1943. According to that document, continuous aerial warfare would effectively engage and disperse the German Luftwaffe through a war of attrition, particularly through maintaining regular Allied fighter intrusion by day. Putting further pressure on the German fighter defenses, aircraft factories were designated as a primary bombing target. Both the Casablanca directive and the Pointblank plan were based on the establishment of Allied air supremacy as a condition for the success of the Allied invasion of France. A follow-on Allied conference in August 1943 at Quebec, code-named Quadrant, confirmed the previously established set of priorities but rejected bombing attacks specifically to break German civilian morale as a means to achieve the strategic goal.

The missions resulting from the Pointblank plan included the large-scale attacks against Berlin, Hamburg, the Ruhr industrial area, and the ball-bearing manufacturing plants at Schweinfurt. The August 17, 1943, raid on Schweinfurt in particular was a failure because of the devastatingly high losses of U.S. Eighth Air Force bombers and aircrew. Attacking in two waves of 300 bombers without fighter cover, the U.S. aircraft were subjected to relentless attack by German fighters for some six hours. The USAAF lost 60 bombers shot down and 130 damaged. Every bomber downed also meant the loss of 10 highly trained aircrew members.

The Schweinfurt fiasco produced a crisis of confidence in the effectiveness and sustainability of CBO operations. The Americans suspended raids deep into Germany until the North American P-51 Mustang became operational in significant numbers. The new long-range fighter had the operational radius necessary to escort the bombers all the way to the target and back. Since dense cloud cover severely limited the effectiveness of the Norden bombsight, the Americans also postponed their attacks to wait for

better weather. By February 1944 the Americans were ready to resume bombing operations.

The final decision for Operation OVERLORD (the cross-Channel invasion of France) did much to refocus the conflicting priorities of the early CBO strategy. The Allied air forces were now given specific and limited operational target sets specifically designed to reduce the German ability to reinforce against the Allied invasion force ashore rather than the earlier and more ambiguous military and economic strategic targets.

The shift produced a rapid effect. In February 1944, the first six days of the renewed offensive, designated "Big Week," undercut an already weakened and demoralized Luftwaffe, and deep interdiction missions effectively disrupted German rail communications in Western Europe. By June 1944 and the start of Operation OVERLORD, the Luftwaffe was virtually incapable of mounting any significant attacks against the invasion force.

Despite the Combined Bomber Offensive, the production of German fighters actually increased and continued to increase until September 1944. But while the Germans were not quite running out of fighter aircraft, they were running out of fuel and adequately trained pilots. The resumed bombing raids with complete fighter cover cost the Luftwaffe heavily in both aircraft and pilots, but one trained pilot took far longer to replace than one fighter plane.

On D-day (June 6, 1944), therefore, the Allies were able to commit 12,387 aircraft, including 5,400 fighters. German Luftflotte 3 could send aloft only 329 aircraft in response. The virtual elimination of the Luftwaffe and the establishment of Allied air supremacy was one clear-cut success of the CBO.

At the end of the war the CBO was generally considered to have been an overall but costly success. The U.S. Eighth Air Force alone lost 2,400 bombers, and the RAF Bomber Command lost more than 8,000. The casualty rate for aircrew was significantly higher than for infantrymen. The postwar U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, however, concluded that the CBO largely failed to achieve its broader objective of inflicting significant damage on German strategic targets. Despite the large-scale destruction inflicted on German cities and the casualties to the civilian population, there was no evidence that the German will to fight had been measurably reduced. High-level precision bombing, especially in and near population centers in close proximity to the industrial and military targets, had killed more than 600,000

civilians. The outcome therefore continues to be questioned by historians on both moral and operational effectiveness grounds.

LEE W. EYSTURLID

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Casablanca Conference; Eaker, Ira Clarence; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids

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Combined Chiefs of Staff

Ad hoc organization, composed of the British and American military chiefs of staff, that coordinated combined strategic planning and conduct of World War II. The groundwork for military collaboration developed at least a year and a half before the United States was drawn into the war in December 1941. The U.S. Navy Department established a permanent observer mission in London to discuss naval cooperation and information exchange. U.S. Army observers only went to London on special missions until the War Department set up permanent liaison in the spring of 1941. In early 1941, agreements called for the exchange of military missions, and the British established its Joint Staff Mission, representing the British chiefs.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) was formally established by the two powers in January 1942 shortly after the Arcadia Conference made the Anglo-American alliance a fact. The organization was to consist of the British chiefs of staff and their opposite numbers in the United States. Because there were no opposite numbers established in the United States at that point, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was formed, consisting of the

army chief of staff, General George C. Marshall; the deputy army chief of staff for air and commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold; the chief of naval operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, and the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King. In March 1942, Stark's and King's positions were combined under King, and Stark went on to command U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, headquartered in London. In July, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, acting in his capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces, brought out of retirement former chief of naval operations Admiral William D. Leahy and appointed him chief of staff to the president.

The British Chiefs of Staff (BCS) organization included the chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke; the first sea lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound; and the chief of the air staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal. These men met with their American counterparts only at infrequent military-political conferences, but in the interim, they were represented at the permanent body in Washington by the Joint Staff Mission. The original members of that mission were Lieutenant General Sir Colville Wemyss, Admiral Sir Charles Little, and Air Marshal Arthur T. Harris. In addition, Field Marshal Sir John Dill sat as a member of the CCS representing Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill.

The CCS was to formulate and execute policies and plans related to the strategic conduct of the war, to include war requirements, allocation of munitions, and transportation requirements. Combined planning was done by the staffs of the JCS and BCS; the Joint Planning Staff, patterned after the British design; and the Joint Planners. Actual planning by the respective national staffs would work its way through the JCS or BCS for coordination by the Combined Planners, the CCS planning staff, which was more a coordinating than an originating body. This system worked surprisingly well during the war, as the United States and Britain closely integrated their war efforts.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Arcadia Conference; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Dill, Sir John Greer; Joint Chiefs of Staff; King, Ernest Joseph; Leahy, William Daniel; Marshall, George Catlett; Portal, Sir Charles Frederick

Algernon; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty”; Tehran Conference

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Commando Order (October 18, 1942)

Order issued by German leader Adolf Hitler to counter British commando raids. On October 18, 1942, Hitler issued order 003833/42g.Kdos.OWK/Wst, known historically as the Commando Order. In addition to this order, a directive from army headquarters (Number 551781/42G.K) stated that only commanders of units involved were to see the Commando Order. The order was issued in 12 copies only, and headquarters required that in no circumstances was it to fall into Allied hands and that both documents were to be destroyed immediately following their reading and comprehension.

Hitler claimed that the Allied commando raids were a violation of the Geneva Convention, and he ordered that “From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are in uniform, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man.” In his supplementary directive, he explained to his commanders the reason for the order. Because of Allied successes, Hitler noted,

> I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. … It must be made clear to the enemy that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man. … Under no circumstances can [they] expect to be treated according to the rule of the Geneva Convention. … If it should

> become necessary for reasons of interrogation to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.

Despite Hitler's order, the Allies continued commando raids until the end of the war.

BERRYMAN E. WOODRUFF IV

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Commandos/Rangers; Hitler, Adolf; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas

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Commandos/Rangers

Commandos and rangers are specialized, highly skilled, elite troops. Rangers were often the first to fight and generally conducted raids and other specialized tasks, frequently in advance of an amphibious assault. But because of their training, commando troops were often employed in patrolling and sniping after a landing and, on occasion, served as bodyguards for prominent figures. All rangers and commandos were trained in infantry skills as well as close-quarter battle techniques. They were adept with rifles, knives, grenades, and blunt instruments. Their fitness was paramount, and they were conditioned through long training to make their way across many miles of terrain to reach their objectives. They were self-reliant, resourceful, and aggressive.

Britain formed its first commando units in southern England in June 1940, just after the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from France. A designated British commando unit was the equivalent of a battalion and consisted of 10 troops of 50 men each. On formation and during their initial training, the first commando troops were given a ration allowance and billeted in local houses, where they were responsible for their own discipline

and were made to rely on their initiative and self-motivation. In October 1940, Number 3 Commando, with a total of 475 officers and men, moved to the Combined Training Centre at Inverary in Scotland. Other commando units were also forming at the time.

The first British commando operation took place in March 1941 against German installations on the Lofoten Islands of Norway. Later, commandos raided South Vaagso, also in Norway; conducted operations against the Channel Islands; were landed by submarine off Sicily before Operation HUSKY (July 9–August 22, 1943); and carried out many other operations against German coastal installations. Commandos were again in the forefront of the landings in France in Normandy in June 1944, and they took on an infantry role as they advanced inland, despite the fact that commando troops were not line infantry but special forces. On June 6, 1944, commandos mounted an attack on the German artillery battery at Merville overlooking the invasion beaches; the battery was destroyed.

When the United States entered World War II, Brigadier General Lucian Truscott, U.S. Army liaison to the British General Staff, convinced army chief of staff General George C. Marshall of the need for an American commando unit. On May 26, 1942, the army authorized formation of the 1st Ranger Battalion, which was activated on June 19. During the war, the United States formed six ranger battalions. The first through fifth served in the North African and European theaters, whereas the sixth served in the Pacific.

For training, the U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion was sent to the British Army Command's Training Centre in Scotland. For several weeks, the American rangers were tested to their limits by the Commando Centre trainers. Eighty-five percent of those who began the course graduated.

On August 19, 1942, 50 American rangers were added to a British and Canadian commando raid on the French port city of Dieppe. Three rangers died and five were captured, but the Americans won high praise for their efforts. Rangers subsequently took part in raids on Norway while attached to British commando units. They also fought in Sicily and participated in the landings in Italy at Salerno (September 9, 1943) and Anzio (January 22, 1944). As raiding forces they were only lightly equipped, but they were subsequently employed as infantry troops nonetheless. The 1st and 3rd Battalions led the attack on Cisterna but were almost wiped out. The

remaining 4th Battalion took heavy casualties while trying to rescue the first two. Of 1,500 men in these three battalions, only 449 remained.

During the Allied invasion of France, three companies of the U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion landed on the west flank of Omaha Beach and moved up to the village of Vierville-sur-Mer to secure the coastal road to Pointe du Hoc, destroying the German positions and radar station along the way. The other three companies, along with the 5th Ranger Battalion, landed with the 116th Infantry at the extreme end of Omaha Beach. The three companies of the 2nd Ranger Battalion received the important task of disabling a battery of six 155mm German coastal artillery pieces at Pointe du Hoc. These guns would be capable of hitting almost any Allied ship supporting the U.S. landing. The rangers successfully scaled the cliffs but found that the German artillery had already been removed. The rangers then pushed inland and sent out patrols to find them. First Sergeant Leonard Lommel led the patrol that found and destroyed the guns, along with all their stacked ammunition.

British commandos, having landed in Normandy on June 6, 1944, set out to capture a German artillery position. (Keystone/Getty Images)

A joint U.S.-Canadian brigade-sized unit, the 1st Special Service Force, known as “The Devil’s Brigade,” also took part in the Aleutian Islands Campaign (1942–1943), in the fighting in Italy, and in the August 1944 landings in southern France. In subsequent European fighting, rangers continued to lead the way and were some of the first units to counter the German Ardennes Offensive in December 1944. In 1945, ranger units established bridgeheads across the Rhine River into the heart of Germany.

Elite formations also served in the Pacific theater. During the Quebec Conference of August 1943, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill agreed to have a U.S. ground unit spearhead the Chinese Army with a long-range penetration mission behind Japanese lines in Burma. Its goal would be to destroy Japanese communications and supply lines and to play havoc with Japanese forces while an attempt was made to reopen the Burma Road.

A presidential call for volunteers for “a dangerous and hazardous mission” elicited some 2,900 volunteers. Officially designated as the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)—code-named GALAHAD—the unit later became popularly known as Merrill’s Marauders after its commander, Brigadier

General Frank Merrill. Organized into combat teams, two to each battalion, the Marauder volunteers came from various theaters of operation. Some came from stateside cadres, some came from the jungles of Panama and Trinidad, and the remainder were veterans of campaigns in Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and New Guinea. In India, some Signal Corps and Air Corps personnel were added in addition to pack troops with mules.

Following training, undertaken in great secrecy in the jungles of India, about 600 men were detached as a rear-echelon headquarters to remain in India to handle the soon to be vital airdrop link between the six Marauder combat teams (400 men to a team) and the Air Transport Command. In units designated by color-coded names—Red, White, Blue, Green, Orange, and Khaki—the remaining 2,400 Marauders began their march up the Ledo Road and over the outlying ranges of the Himalaya Mountains into Burma.

The Marauders, with no tanks or heavy artillery support, moved overland some 1,000 miles through extremely dense and almost impenetrable jungles and came out with glory. In 5 major and 30 minor engagements, they defeated units of the veteran Japanese 18th Division, the conquerors of Singapore and Malaya, who vastly outnumbered them. Moving in the rear of the main Japanese forces, they disrupted supply and communication lines and climaxed their operations with the capture of Myitkyina Airfield, the only all-weather airfield in Burma. The unit was consolidated with the 475th Infantry on August 10, 1944.

The 6th Ranger Battalion was activated at Port Moresby, New Guinea, in September 1944. Commanded by Colonel Henry “Hank” Mucci, it was the first American force to return to the Philippines. Its mission was to destroy Japanese coastal defense guns and radio and radar stations on the islands of Dinegat and Suluan off Leyte. Landing three days in advance of the main Sixth Army invasion force on October 17–18, 1944, the 6th Battalion swiftly killed or captured some of the Japanese defenders and destroyed all their communications. The unit took part in the U.S. landings on Luzon, and several behind-the-lines patrols, penetrations, and small unit raids served to prime the rangers for what was to become universally known as one of the most daring raids in U.S. military history.

On January 30, 1945, in the Cabanatuan raid—led in person by Colonel Mucci—C Company, supported by a platoon from F Company, struck 30 miles behind Japanese lines to rescue some 500 emaciated and sickly

prisoners of war, many of them survivors of the infamous Bataan Death March. The rangers, aided by Filipino guerrillas, killed more than 200 members of the Japanese garrison, evaded two Japanese regiments, and reached the safety of American lines the following day. Intelligence reports had indicated that the Japanese were planning to kill the prisoners as they withdrew toward Manila. Effective reconnaissance work by Filipino scouts contributed to the success of the raid.

Later commanded by Colonel Robert Garrett, the 6th Ranger Battalion played an important role in the capture of Manila and Appari. At the end of the war, it was preparing to take part in the invasion of Japan. The unit received the Presidential Unit Citation and the Philippine Presidential Citation. It was deactivated on December 30, 1945, in Kyoto, Japan. U.S. Army Rangers today draw their lineage from the six ranger battalions of World War II and from the 5307th Composite Unit. U.S. Army Special Forces today draw their lineage from the 1st Special Service Force.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Airborne Forces, Axis; Ardennes Offensive; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; COCKLESHELL, Operation; Commando Order; Dieppe Raid; Makin Island Raid; Marshall, George Catlett; Merrill, Frank Dow; Myitkyina, Siege of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Rhine Crossings; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Sicily, Invasion of; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.

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Commerce Raiders, Surface, German

Germany entered World War II with a navy ill-equipped for waging war against a major naval power. The head of the German Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, supported by German leader Adolf Hitler, had planned to build

a powerful surface fleet of capital ships to challenge Britain and the United States for world naval mastery. War came too early for this Z Plan, however.

When the war began in September 1939, Raeder recognized that his navy was inadequate for the task ahead, stating that it "would be able to do little more than show that it could die courageously." Lacking the ability to challenge the British and French in a general engagement, the German Navy fell back on the experience of World War I as Raeder sought to wage a war to destroy British commerce. He recognized that surface raiders patrolling the oceans and sinking ships in an irregular manner could in no way serve as a distant blockade of Great Britain. Instead, he hoped they would force the dispersion of Allied naval forces from more important theaters and wear down a large part of the Allied naval strength through the need to escort convoys and form task groups to hunt down elusive raiders.

Raeder had sent the pocket battleships *Deutschland* and *Admiral Graf Spee* to sea in mid-August 1939. Valuable time was lost, however, as Hitler's reluctance to make the first hostile move against Britain meant that the ships were not authorized to begin operations until September 26. The two German capital ships initially met Raeder's expectations, sinking numerous merchant ships and, by October, forcing the Allies to employ a force of 3 carriers, 3 battleships, and 15 cruisers in task groups to hunt for—or to provide strengthened convoy escorts against—these two German ships. The threat did not last long, however, because Germany's strategic position prior to June 1940 precluded easy transit and resupply of the ships. In November 1939 the *Deutschland* returned to Germany, and the *Admiral Graf Spee* met its demise in the Río de la Plata in South America in December 1939.

In late 1940 and early 1941, the *Admiral Scheer* and *Admiral Hipper* made productive raiding sorties in which they accounted for 144,000 tons of shipping, while the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had a highly successful two-month foray into the Atlantic in February and March, sinking 115,000 tons. The destruction of the battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941 near the beginning of another foray, however, led Hitler to restrict the use of his capital ships so that by 1943, they rarely ventured to sea.

Beginning in 1940, the Germans deployed another type of ship for commerce raiding, the armed merchant cruiser (AMC). They eventually fielded nine AMCs, known in German as *Hilfskreuzer* (auxiliary cruisers). Made to look innocuous, the AMCs were capable of rapidly changing their

profile to confuse prey and hunter alike; in essence, they were stealth ships. Freighters best served this purpose, because they possessed the holds needed to store supplies for long cruises and could mount six 150mm guns.

From 1940 through early 1943, the nine armed merchant raiders operated at sea, mainly in distant waters, where many unescorted Allied merchant vessels were still to be found. The German AMCs proved elusive, and by the end of 1940, they had sunk 54 Allied vessels totaling 366,644 tons; they also forced the British to devote a significant portion of their naval assets to the effort to hunt them down. As the war dragged on, though, Allied intercepts of German radio communications led to the sinking of four of the AMCs as well as some of their supply ships. The other five AMCs reached German-controlled ports but could not slip back out through the Allied blockade.

The German AMCs sank 846,321 tons of shipping, a major return for what was, after all, a relatively minor investment. This figure represented about 7.5 percent of the more than 11.3 million tons of shipping sunk by Germany in the war. The impact of the AMCs cannot be quantified by this statistic alone, however. These nine ships also disrupted shipping timetables, forced longer voyages, and delayed the arrival of desperately needed Allied war matériel. The capture of the British cargo ship *Automoden* by the AMC *Atlantis*, for instance, included the seizure of important British government papers and dealt a serious blow to Britain's position in the Far East.

A voyage that might normally have taken only two weeks may have extended into months because of a raider's activities. Beyond that, the secondary and tertiary effects, combined with the efforts to eliminate the AMCs, produced results well out of proportion to the time, money, and manpower that Germany put into the program. As in World War I, however, the German Navy could not take advantage of their impact, and by the spring of 1943, no more AMCs were at sea.

C. J. HORN

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; *Automedon*, Sinking of; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Raeder, Erich; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Z Plan

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Commissar Order (June 6, 1941)

Order issued to the German Army by Adolf Hitler on June 6, 1941, 16 days before the start of Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In early March 1941, Hitler addressed his generals and informed them of what would later be known as the "Commissar Order" (*Kommissarbefehl*). It called on the German military to execute any captured Soviet commissars, the Communist Party officials assigned to military units. This order contravened all international conventions governing the treatment of prisoners of war. In remarks to his commanders, Hitler justified his order on the grounds that the commissars were "the bearers of ideologies directly opposed to National Socialism." He also said that German soldiers guilty of breaking international law would be "excused." Although some German generals, including Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, refused to obey the order, it was widely carried out.

CRAIG S. HAMILTON

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Commando Order; Hitler, Adolf; Inter-national Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Manstein, Erich von

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Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies

The most prominent pro-Allied lobbying organization in the United States prior to American intervention in World War II. Established in May 1940 at the prompting of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA) was a private organization dedicated to assisting Britain and France by providing American support, both moral and material. The committee emerged from a 1939 lobbying group that had helped to bring about changes in American neutrality legislation, permitting Allied purchases in the United States. The CDAAA was headed by William Allen White, a prominent Kansas journalist. Its organizing committee included Clark Eichelberger, Frank Boudreau, Thomas W. Lamont, and Frederic R. Coudert. White requested 650 prominent Americans to join and form local committee chapters. Eventually, some 600 such groups existed nationwide, with their estimated membership totaling between 6,000 and 20,000 people.

Some CDAAA members favored outright intervention in the war. Publicly, however, the organization sought only to aid the Allies without going to war. Such a circumspect stance was made particularly politic in the bitterly fought 1940 presidential election, in which foreign affairs and peace were major issues. As interventionists became more prominent within the organization, White resigned in January 1941. In November, Eichelberger succeeded him.

Supposedly one step ahead of the Roosevelt administration, CDAAA leaders worked closely with pro-Allied officials, including Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Measures that CDAAA representatives proposed to the government—for example, increased American naval protection for convoys bound for Britain, enhanced material aid, and extended wartime protective zones—often actually originated within the administration. These tactics enabled the government to claim that it was responding to popular pressure. CDAAA officials also rallied popular and congressional support for government initiatives, including the 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement with Britain, the introduction of Selective Service conscription, and 1941’s Lend-Lease legislation. By mid-1941 with the election past, Roosevelt increasingly took

executive action on foreign issues, which decreased the CDAAA's significance.

After the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack, the CDAAA disbanded. Eichelberger and other CDAAA activists subsequently campaigned prominently for the creation of the United Nations.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Fight for Freedom; Knox, William Franklin "Frank"; Lend-Lease; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Selective Service Act; Stimson, Henry Lewis; United States Neutrality Acts

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COMPASS, Operation (December 7, 1940–February 7, 1941)

British campaign against Italian forces in North Africa. On September 13, 1940, three months after Italy entered World War II, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ordered commander of Italian forces in Libya Marshal Rodolfo Graziani to invade Egypt with General Mario Berti's Tenth Army. Graziani's nine ill-equipped divisions of 250,000 men vastly outnumbered the 36,000 British, New Zealand, and Indian troops of Lieutenant General Richard O'Connor's Western Desert Force (WDF) in Egypt. But Graziani made no attempt to advance after crossing the Egyptian-Libyan border and instead settled in a chain of fortified camps around Sidi Barrani.

British commander in chief General Archibald Wavell conceived a plan to throw Graziani off balance while he dealt with the Italians in East Africa. Because of a shortage of transport in particular, Wavell envisaged not a sustained offensive but a swift large-scale raid lasting no more than five days.

Operation COMPASS began on December 7 with a two-day, 70-mile march by British forces across the desert. After passing through a gap between the Italian camps, Major General Noel Beresford-Peirse's Indian 4th Division stormed Nibeiwa camp from the rear, spearheaded by 50 Matilda infantry tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment. The British surprised the Italian garrison and took 4,000 prisoners, almost without loss.

British forces also stormed Tummar East and West camps that same day and overran the camps around Sidi Barrani the next day. On the third day, Major General Michael Creagh's 7th Armoured Division—the famous Desert Rats—swept westward to the coast beyond Buq Buq and cut the Italian line of retreat. In three days, the British captured 40,000 Italian troops and 400 guns; the remnants of the Italian army took refuge in Bardia, the first town inside Libya, and were rapidly surrounded.

These astonishing results were unforeseen and caused immense problems. The Indian 4th Division was recalled for dispatch to Sudan, as previously planned, leading to the unusual spectacle of British troops withdrawing eastward just as the Italians fled west. The Australian 6th Division, commanded by Major General Iven Mackay, was transferred from Palestine, but the shortage of trucks and the need to feed and evacuate huge numbers of prisoners led to a three-week delay before the operation could be resumed. The ingenious development of field supply dumps in the desert alleviated the problems of transporting supplies across long distances, but the operation's success was only possible because of the capture of large numbers of Italian trucks.

Army Corps general Annibale "Electric Whiskers" Bergonzoli signaled to Mussolini that "In Bardia we are, and here we stay." The Australian infantry, supported by British battleship gunfire support, began the assault on January 3, 1941. After three days, the Italian garrison of 45,000 men surrendered, along with 462 guns and 129 tanks. The Matilda tanks, which were almost invulnerable to the Italian guns, were again the key to the rapid success, and the Australian commander claimed that each tank was worth an entire infantry battalion.

Even before the fighting concluded, the 7th Armoured Division drove west to encircle and isolate Tobruk, which was attacked on January 21. Although just 16 of the precious Matildas were still running, they once again

made the vital penetration, and the fortress fell the next day, yielding 30,000 Italian prisoners, 236 guns, and 87 tanks.

Tobruk's large port allowed supplies to be delivered by sea direct from Alexandria, and O'Connor intended to allow XIII Corps, as the WDF was known from January 1, 1941, to recuperate. On February 3, however, intelligence revealed that the Italians were preparing to abandon Cyrenaica and withdraw beyond the El Algheila bottleneck. O'Connor immediately planned a daring initiative and sent his depleted tank force from Mechili across almost 100 miles of the roughest country in North Africa in just 33 hours to cut off the fleeing Italians at Beda Fomm late on February 5. In a fitting climax, the minuscule British force of no more than 3,000 men and 39 cruiser tanks held off Italian attempts to break out until the morning of February 7 when, completely demoralized, 20,000 Italians surrendered, with 216 guns and 120 tanks.

In a scant 10 weeks, the Commonwealth force of two divisions advanced more than 700 miles and captured 130,000 Italian prisoners, more than 380 tanks, 845 guns, and well over 3,000 vehicles at the relatively slight cost of 500 killed, 1,373 wounded, and 55 missing. O'Connor's operations had far exceeded all expectations, but he was confident that he could continue his advance to Tripoli and completely clear Africa of all Italian forces. Historians have since argued that a golden opportunity to finish the war in Africa was wasted, but recent research has shown that without an operational port at Benghazi to maintain an advance, supply difficulties would have proven impossible. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill in any case already had directed Wavell to halt the advance at Benghazi in favor of the campaign in Greece and leave only a minimum force to hold Cyrenaica against the recently arrived German lieutenant general Erwin Rommel.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Egypt; Graziani, Rodolfo, Marchese di Neghelli; Mussolini, Benito; North Africa Campaign; O'Connor, Richard Nugent; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Concentration Camps, German (1933–1945)

Concentration camps are most often associated with Nazi Germany, but the modern concentration camp is generally thought to have originated with Spanish general Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau in 1896 during the Cuban insurrection against Spain. Weyler sought to concentrate the civilian population near army installations, isolating the *reconcentrados* from the guerrillas. In Cuba at that time—and also in the Philippines during the 1899–1902 Philippine-American War and in South Africa during the 1899–1902 Boer War—large numbers of civilians died in such camps as a consequence of overcrowding, disease, and inadequate supplies.

During World War II, Germany established a number of different types of concentration camps. They can be grouped as penal, transit, labor, or extermination centers. Most served more than one purpose; that is, they were typically both penal and labor. But all of the camps saw great brutality and loss of life, whether from disease, starvation, torture, exposure to the elements, forced labor, medical experiments, or outright execution. All major camps had subcamps that were sources of slave labor. Collectively, the camps numbered in the thousands.

The Nazis opened their first concentration camp at Dachau, near Munich, in March 1933, only two months after Adolf Hitler came to power. This camp was the model for the many others to follow. It operated continuously until April 1945, when the U.S. Army liberated the inmates. Originally intended for the temporary detention of political prisoners, the camps became permanent institutions manned by the Schutzstaffel (SS) Totenkopfverbände (Death’s Head detachments). In these camps, the more sadistic guards, of whom there was no shortage in the SS, were more or less free to inflict indescribable cruelties on the inmates without fear of disciplinary action. The camp system gradually evolved from penal camps to the infamous death mills of Auschwitz-Birkenau, Belzec, Chelmno, Maidanek, Sobibor, and Treblinka.

At first, the camps housed political enemies. Foremost were communists and social democrats. Jews were targeted insofar as they belonged to these other groups, but they were considered “spoilers of German blood” and eventually became the primary victims. In time, Gypsies, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, and the mentally ill all fell prey to the Nazis and their collaborators. By 1939 seven large camps existed, with numerous subcamps. These seven large camps were Dachau, Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald, Neuengamme, Flossenbürg, Mauthausen, and Ravensbrück. As the war spread, forced labor became more and more a part of war production, and prisoner exploitation expanded. In the end, the camps stretched from the Pyrenees to Eastern Europe, and millions of people had perished in them. Some camps, notably Drancy in France and Westerbork in the Netherlands, were primarily transit facilities, where Jews were herded together for onward shipment via railroad to the dreadful death mills. No one will ever know just how much the people in the surrounding communities knew about the internal workings of the camps, but the Nazis had accomplices wherever camps existed.

There were penal, work, or transit camps in all countries occupied by or allied with Germany. In Western and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, indigenous troops augmented the SS in the camps. In Southern Europe, local forces operated their own camps or executed their victims rather than ship them to the death mills of Eastern Europe. One glaring case was the Jasenovac camp operated by the Nazi puppet state of Croatia. There, the Croatian fascists, the Ustaše, killed tens of thousands of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and political enemies.

All the camps were similar. In them, the guards did everything they could to strip every bit of human dignity from the inmates. Those who could do so were forced to work at hard manual labor up to 12 hours a day. Those who could not were encouraged to die. The sign over the camp gate reading “Arbeit macht Frei” (Work Brings Freedom) meant the work of slave labor and freedom only in the release of death.

On arrival at a concentration camp, men and women were segregated and taken off for “medical inspection.” There, they were forced to strip naked and were deloused. Heads were shorn, the hair retained to use for manufacturing mattresses and upholstering furniture. Following a cursory medical inspection, those pronounced fit to work were given clothes, had numbers

tattooed on their arms, and were assigned to barracks where they would exist until they became too weak to work any longer. Those judged unfit to work were taken off in another direction to be executed.

For those who passed the medical inspection, life in the camp was defined by deliberate degradation, with every effort expended to break them physically, mentally, and morally. Barracks were so overcrowded that there often was not enough room for everyone to lie down at once. Buckets were frequently the only sanitary facilities provided, and there were never enough of these. Barracks were unheated, and in many there was no cover provided, even in winter.

Inmates of the Ampfing concentration camp in Germany following their liberation by the U.S. Army. (Library of Congress)

At dawn each morning, men and women lined up in front of their respective barracks for *Zahlappell* (roll call), standing in their thin rags even

in winter. This dreaded roll call occurred at 3:00 a.m. and was repeated at 5:00 p.m. It lasted for hours each time, until the guards could make an official and complete count. Every form of disease was present in the camps, with little or no medical treatment provided. Nourishment was totally inadequate. Breakfast usually consisted of a cup of ersatz coffee and a small portion of stale or moldy bread. Lunch was typically a cup of poorly fortified soup, and dinner routinely consisted of a small serving of bread, perhaps some potatoes or cabbage, and putrid tea.

Punishment in the camps was frequent and brutal, and it often occurred without justification: it had to be especially horrific if it was to exceed the brutality of daily life in the camps. Regulations in some camps required that beating with an ax handle was to be restricted to 25 blows at a time and that a week had to pass before a second beating could be given, but the guards seem not to have paid much attention to such rules. Often, the inmates were assembled to witness punishments and executions, and prisoners were sometimes placed in solitary confinement in total darkness in cells where they could neither stand nor sit nor lie for days or weeks. At Buchenwald, Belsen, and elsewhere, bizarre medical experiments were carried out on unwilling victims, who, if they survived, were often maimed for life. Such experiments investigated, among other things, the effects of rapid compression and decompression, how much cold and exposure a person could stand before he or she died, and how best to revive a victim of freezing.

A number of German industries—such as I. G. Farben, the giant chemical firm that manufactured the Zyklon B gas employed in the death camps—were attracted to Auschwitz and other camps with the promise of cheap slave labor. At Auschwitz, Farben built an enormous factory to process synthetic oil and rubber in order to take advantage of the slave labor available. This facility was the largest plant in the entire I. G. Farben concern, and it was built largely by slave labor. Work was physically exhausting, and beatings for any breach of the rules were common. I. G. Farben claimed that it provided a “special diet” for its workers, which nonetheless resulted in a weight loss of six to nine pounds a week for the prisoners. Death usually came after three months. As an I. G. Farben physician’s report noted, “The prisoners were condemned to burn up their own body weight while working and, providing no infection occurred, finally died of exhaustion.” Slave labor became a

consumable raw material. At least 25,000 people were worked to death at I. G. Farben Auschwitz.

All inmates had to wear insignia (colored triangles) revealing the reason for their incarceration. There were variations, but typically, Jews wore two superimposed triangles that formed a yellow star. Common criminals wore green. Political prisoners had red. Persons considered asocial (e.g., Gypsies and vagrants) wore black. Homosexuals wore pink, and Jehovah's Witnesses wore purple.

Prisoners had to observe a definite hierarchy of prisoner officials as well as the SS guards. The average prisoner had to answer to fellow prisoners at work or in the barracks. The most despised fellow prisoner was the *Kapo*, typically a heavy-handed supervisor willing to beat prisoners for the slightest infraction. The prisoners' work assignments and records were in the hands of other prisoners known as scribes and elders. These prisoner officials could make an inmate's life miserable—or even end it. Likewise, they could make life somewhat easier, and it often behooved ordinary prisoners to make note of this situation. Prisoner officials received better treatment in exchange for their cooperation. But comforts were rare indeed for the victims of this brutal process. The Nazi concentration camp system took the lives of millions and was the principal instrument of the Holocaust.

DEWEY A. BROWDER

See also

Allied Military Tribunals after the War; Croatia; Eichmann, Karl Adolf; Germany; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Jewish Resistance; Latvia; Lithuania; Mengele, Josef; Poland; Prisoners of War; Vichy France; Wannsee Conference; Document 190; Document 205

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Coningham, Sir Arthur “Mary” (1895–1948)

Royal Air Force (RAF) air marshal and pioneer in the use of tactical air support. Born in Brisbane, Australia, on January 19, 1895, Arthur Coningham served in the New Zealand Army in World War I until discharged for health reasons in April 1916. He then joined the British Royal Flying Corps and became a pilot, acquiring the nickname of “Mary,” derived from “Maori.” Following the war, Coningham remained in the newly formed Royal Air Force. He served in both Iraq and Egypt and taught at the RAF college, among other assignments.

At the beginning of World War II, Coningham was promoted to air commodore and given command of Number 4 Group, composed of long-range night-bombers based in Yorkshire. Coningham was convinced of the necessity of close air support, which he was able to demonstrate on his promotion in July 1941 to air vice marshal and assignment to North Africa as commander of the Western Desert Air Force. There he became one of the pioneers of tactical air support, which his units provided for the British Eighth Army on the ground. Coningham improved coordination between air and ground forces, and his aircraft played an important role in the British victory in the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942). He was knighted in 1942 for his services.

Coningham was in charge of air support in other key Allied operations. He commanded the First Tactical Air Force during the invasion of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and subsequent action in Italy. Transferred to command of Second Allied Tactical Air Force in January 1944, he worked to plan air support for the Normandy Invasion that commenced on June 6. During the invasion and until the end of the war in Europe, he earned high praise from Allied ground commanders.

At the end of the war, Coningham commanded the RAF Flying Training Centre. Promoted to air marshal in 1946, he nonetheless was forced to retire in August 1947, having had little service with the air staff: he had spent his entire career as an active pilot. Coningham died on January 30, 1948, in a passenger plane crash in the Atlantic Ocean.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; El Alamein, Battle of; Great Britain, Air Force; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of; Tedder, Sir Arthur William

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Connally, Thomas Terry (1877–1963)

Highly influential Democratic politician and a congressman (1917–1929) and senator (1929–1953) from Texas. Thomas Terry Connally was born in McLellan County, Texas, on August 19, 1877. He graduated from Baylor University in 1896 and earned a law degree at the University of Texas at Austin in 1898. That same year, he passed the bar and began the practice of law, first in Waco and then in Falls County. Connally served as a sergeant major during the Spanish-American War (1898) and as a captain during World War I (1918). He also became involved in local Democratic politics.

In 1916, Connally won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. He took office in 1917 and retained the seat until 1929. In Congress he immersed himself in foreign affairs and was a mouthpiece for Democratic foreign policy initiatives during the 1920s.

In 1928, Connally was elected to the U.S. Senate and was seated in 1929. He was an avid supporter of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, although he refused to support the president’s 1937 court-packing scheme. He reliably supported the Southern Democratic platform, which included opposition to the repeal of the poll tax and the implementation of an antilynching law. Despite his less than progressive stand on some domestic issues, Connally was a committed internationalist, and he was at the forefront of those senators who resisted the neutrality acts of the mid and late 1930s. In 1939, for example, he spearheaded the effort to repeal the arms embargo after

World War II had begun (Cash and Carry Act) and pushed aggressively for the implementation of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941.

In 1941, Connally became chairman of the powerful Committee on Foreign Relations, a post he held during 1941–1947 and again from 1949–1953. Connally firmly backed Roosevelt's foreign and military policies during the war and helped assemble a reliably bipartisan majority of internationalists in Congress. In 1943, he cosponsored legislation that extended the president's authority to seize munitions plants that were the subject of labor strikes. By the mid-1940s, Connally had become perhaps the most important U.S. senator.

In 1945, he was the vice chairman of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations (UN) Conference on International Organization, which drafted the UN Charter and commenced its operations. He also served as U.S. representative to the UN in 1946. Notably, Connally sponsored the so-called Connally Reservation, which slightly amended U.S. ratification of the UN Charter so that the International Court of Justice would have no power over domestic affairs in the United States.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Connally and Republican senator Arthur H. Vandenberg crafted a bipartisan approach to the building Cold War, and in 1949 Connally helped shepherd the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Charter through the Senate. He supported President Harry S. Truman's decision to send troops to Korea in 1950 and gird the economy for a possibly wider war.

Connally did not run for reelection in 1952 and left the Senate in January 1953. Thereafter he practiced law in Washington, D.C. Connally died there on October 28, 1963.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Cash-and-Carry; Lend-Lease; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; United Nations, Formation of; United States; United States Neutrality Acts

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Conolly, Richard Lansing (1892–1962)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Waukegan, Illinois, on April 26, 1892, Richard Lansing Conolly was commissioned in the navy on his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1914. He served in destroyers in the Atlantic, earning the Navy Cross for his part in rescuing a transport vessel damaged by a German submarine attack during World War I. Between the wars, Conolly earned a master of science degree at Columbia University, served as an instructor at the Naval Academy, and captained several destroyers.

From 1939 to 1942, Conolly served in the Pacific theater, successively commanding the 6th and 7th Destroyer Squadrons and providing the destroyer screen for the April 1942 raid on Tokyo. Promoted to rear admiral in July 1942, he spent several months on the staff of the chief of naval operations and commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King.

From March to October 1943, Conolly served with the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force and took part in the invasion of Sicily (July 9–August 22), where he earned the nickname “Close-in Conolly” for the naval fire support his ships provided the ground forces. On September 9, he commanded the amphibious component that landed the British 46th Division at Salerno, Italy. Again, he used his destroyers and cruisers to provide close gunfire support.

Conolly then transferred to the Pacific, employing his amphibious landing expertise in operations at Kwajalein (January 19–February 6, 1944), Wake, and Marcus Islands. In 1944 and 1945, he commanded Group 3 of the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force, leading the July 21, 1944, landing on Guam and landings in January 1945 in the Lingayen Gulf (Leyte) and on Okinawa (March 1945). He participated in six of the seven largest amphibious operations of World War II, missing only Normandy (June 6, 1944).

Conolly was the U.S. naval representative at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference. Promoted to full admiral, he subsequently commanded the Twelfth Fleet for four months and then U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleet, during 1947–1950. He then spent three years at Newport, Rhode Island, as president of the Naval War College. Conolly retired in November 1953 to become president of Long Island University,

where he remained until he and his wife were killed in a commercial air crash at La Guardia Airport in New York on March 1, 1962.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Guam, Battle for; King, Ernest Joseph; Kwajalein, Battle for; Leyte Landings; Okinawa, Invasion of; Sicily, Invasion of; Tokyo Raid; United States Navy

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Conscientious Objectors

Individuals who seek exemption from military service based on matters of conscience; in this regard, conscientious objectors (COs) differ from draft dodgers, who merely seek to avoid military service. The first COs were members of small Protestant religious denominations, notably the Mennonites. Although their members were not forced to bear arms, even by Germany and Russia, such groups were generally taxed or required to perform alternative service. During World War I, a number of the democratic nations made provisions for conscientious objection. In Britain, preference was accorded on religious grounds, but CO status was also extended to those who opposed the war on political and ethical grounds. This generous government view was, however, often tempered by local boards, which chose to interpret the law more narrowly.

Perhaps surprisingly given the rampant pacifism of the 1920s that followed the great bloodletting of World War I, COs were too few in number in World War II to have any impact on the war effort of their respective countries. The Axis states refused to recognize CO status, as did the Soviet

Union and many other warring states. CO status was most honored in North America, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states.

In the United Kingdom during World War II, CO status was granted on a fairer basis than it had been in World War I. Unconditional exemptions were granted to 6.1 percent of COs there, and alternate service was allowed in civilian jobs. Fewer than 10 percent of British COs were jailed, compared to 33 percent in World War I. The United Kingdom had 60,000 COs, or 1.2 percent of the number drafted, compared with 0.125 percent in World War I.

The United States also widened its interpretation of CO status in World War II. At the time Congress was about to vote on the Selective Service Act in 1940, there was uncertainty about how the draft would treat men who wanted to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscientious objection. A third of all Americans had indicated in polls that they favored either jailing COs or forcing them to fight in combat units, but Congress instead adopted a plan conceived by religious groups and known as Civilian Public Service (CPS).

The exact details of the CPS program were not worked out until early 1942, but it put COs to work on a variety of domestic tasks. Representatives of the Society of Friends (Quakers), the Brethren, and the Mennonites supervised those in CPS, and the costs of the program were paid by these three church organizations at the rate of $35 per month for each CO. CPS members sometimes received a few dollars a month for expenses from church groups but were otherwise not paid. Those seeking to obtain CO status had to file a special document, Form 47, along with their draft information. Local draft boards could and often did reject these requests, but an appeals procedure existed for such cases.

In all, about 37,000 American men obtained CO status. Most were Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren. There were also Jehovah’s Witnesses, socialists, communists, and others who professed pacifism. An additional 6,000 men who either did not receive CO status or turned it down were prosecuted for refusing to be inducted into the military and served some time in prison.

In many parts of the country, COs took up tasks that previously were assigned to members of the New Deal’s Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), such as reforestation, road and park building, and repairing drought damage.

Other COs performed excellent service in mental hospitals. A few volunteered as guinea pigs for medical research, and some valuable advances in battling malaria and other tropical diseases came from these experiments. Although Major General Louis Hershey, head of the Selective Service, testified before Congress that, overall, COs were making valuable contributions in the nation, they generally were not welcome in most localities.

Conscientious objectors at work in Wyeth, Oregon, during World War II. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Some COs did enter the military and served overseas in noncombat roles, including the dangerous job of combat medic. Among them was Desmond Doss, a CO who declined a chance to be in the CPS program and entered the U.S. Army as a medic. Private First Class Doss landed on Okinawa with the 77th Infantry Division. There on May 2, 1945, he pulled as many as 70 wounded soldiers off an escarpment while under heavy fire, for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

After the war ended, COs returned to civilian life, and their wartime status was generally forgotten. The CPS program, however, served as the model for subsequent objector programs during the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

TERRY SHOPTAUGH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
Hershey, Lewis Blaine; Okinawa, Invasion of; United States; Document 84

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Conscript Labor

The practice of forcing captive people to provide labor was widespread during World War II. The Axis powers utilized forced labor on a scale that dwarfed in size and severity that employed by the Allies. German practices and policies are the most extensively documented. Ironically, Germany complained forcefully about Soviet labor practices regarding prisoners of war (POWs).

Among other things, Moscow was accused of not adhering to the 1929 Geneva Convention, an international accord that detailed the requirements for fair and humane treatment of war prisoners. No doubt the Soviets were guilty of brutal and exploitative behavior; however (and with further irony), Soviet armies had been formally ordered to respect the convention, and Stalin's government had, through Sweden's good offices, requested that Germany do the same. Despite their protestations over Soviet policies, moreover, the Germans shot, starved, and worked to death millions of Soviet POWs after June 1941. In May 1944, a German government report indicated that of 5,160,000 POWs from the Soviet Union, only slightly more than 1 million survived. At the time, there were approximately 5 million conscripted foreign workers in Germany.

As war losses and production pressures grew, Germany increasingly turned to forced labor to address these problems. The Nazi occupation regime in Poland under Schutzstaffel (SS) Obergruppenführer Hans Frank provided the model for the rest of the Reich. Frank had virtually absolute powers, although his formal title was head of government and not head of state. Decrees and rules made Jews and all other Poles subject to arbitrary conscription for work.

Such policies were subsequently copied in the Baltic states and occupied Soviet territory. Masses of people were rounded up and sent to Germany as laborers, regardless of age or state of health. The indiscriminate approach quickly created new problems. By 1942, an estimated 100,000 such conscripts had been sent back home because they were too old or sick to be useful as labor. The trains used for this transport, as with the Jews in the Holocaust, diverted scant transportation assets from strictly military use.

The response by the regime in Berlin was to increase the comprehensiveness and severity of the conscription process. By the end of the war, the minimum age for laborers had been reduced to 10 years. As Germany began to suffer military reversals in the Soviet Union, pressures grew for additional manpower for the front, and this soon created direct competition with the military.

In the autumn of 1942, SS chief Heinrich Himmler reached an agreement with Minister of Justice Otto Thierack and Minister of Armaments Albert Speer whereby concentration camp inmates and POWs would be released for factory work in return for allocation of an agreed percentage of their output of weapons to the SS. This agreement provided explicitly that any person identified by the Nazi regime as “asocial” could be worked to death.

In March 1942, stricter and more detailed controls were added to the forced labor program. Fritz Sauckel was appointed plenipotentiary for the deployment of labor, with great power over German and foreign workers. The geographic reach of the program was extended, with forced conscription now used in Western and Southeastern Europe as well as in the east. In the Soviet Union, however, skilled workers tended to withdraw with the Red Army forces rather than wait for the occupiers. In Western Europe, existing factories were already supplying the German war effort.

German policies reflected not the implementation of any detailed plan but the increasing pressures of the war. By May 1943, Sauckel’s sustained and brutal approach had yielded approximately 2 million additional foreign workers, and the total labor force employed in Germany had been increased by just under 2 million, despite growing military manpower pressures at the fighting fronts. Clearly the expansion rate could not be maintained. By that time, Poland effectively had been drained of useful labor. Southeastern Europe had a large population, but a significant percentage of the people

there were needed for existing agricultural industry, which was, in turn, vital to feeding the populations in Germany and the other occupied territories.

Such pressures only mounted over time. By 1943, Soviet military offensives had reduced the number of workers available to the Reich. West European production facilities were becoming even more important as the Allied bombing effort took a toll on German factories. In desperation, German authorities began to bypass local governments and other established authorities in the drive to find laborers for the war production machinery. In a telling example, 1,000 French police in Marseille were forced into transport vans while they were out on a practice exercise.

Yet there was never a truly comprehensive recruitment of available workers, as ideology vetoed some ready and skilled conscription, most notably the Jews. Still, all occupied states were required to send laborers to work in the Reich, often in horrific conditions. France alone sent 2.5 million of its citizens to work in Germany, and 200,000 did not return home after the war.

The Nazis initially failed to make use of one ready labor source—women. Nazi doctrine dictated that a woman's place was in the home, focused on reproduction. In 1942, despite extensive military engagements in the Soviet Union and North Africa, 189,000 fewer women were employed in the German workforce than in 1939. As early as 1942, Speer had recommended that women be recruited for industry, but Adolf Hitler would have none of it. Not until 1943 were women between the ages of 17 and 45 required to register for work. Later, the upper age was raised to 50. By 1944, German women actually outnumbered men in the labor force.

Conscript workers ultimately provided a large component of the overall German workforce during the war. The total by 1944 had reached approximately 7 million people. They accounted for roughly one-fifth of the entire workforce during World War II in Germany.

Meanwhile, in the Pacific theater, Japanese approaches to forced labor approximately reflected the harshness of Germany. The population of Korea, which had been formally under Japanese control since 1907, endured particularly harsh treatment. Koreans were conscripted wholesale, the men for particularly grueling and unpleasant physical labor, the women often forced into prostitution for the Japanese military. In this particular case, Tokyo seems to have made special efforts to employ conscripted labor as a

means to degrade an old national opponent. In China and in Asia generally, Japan carried out brutal labor policies, along with widespread atrocities. Japanese behavior in China and elsewhere generally mirrored Nazi excesses throughout Europe, though unlike the Germans, the Japanese did not have a compulsion to provide detailed documentary records.

The Allies made plans to deal with the problem of refugees, including forced laborers, after the war. In November 1943, representatives of 45 nations, the United States among them, established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) as the official agency to handle the situation. At the time, estimates of the likely number of refugees at the conclusion of the war ranged up to 21 million. After the German surrender in May 1945, a range of structures, including former concentration camps and military barracks, were used for a comprehensive relief effort that continued until 1947. On July 1 of that year, the Provisional Committee of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) took over responsibility from the UNRRA for approximately 700,000 people remaining in its care.

Following the war, the newly formed United Nations gave sustained attention to defining and implementing standards for humane treatment of war prisoners and labor. This directly reflected the horrific legacy of World War II.

ARTHUR I. CYR

See also

Catholic Church and the War; Charities; Concentration Camps, German; Eichmann, Karl Adolf; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; Prisoners of War; Religion and the War; Rosenberg, Alfred; Sauckel, Fritz; Speer, Albert; Unit 731, Japanese Army

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Continuation War

See Finnish-Soviet War, Second

Contre-Torpilleurs

French warships, a new superdestroyer type inspired by the large destroyers built toward the end of World War I by the navies of Germany, Italy, and Britain. After the war, the French saw the Italians as their principal naval rival, and to counter the large Italian destroyers, in 1923 the French launched the first of a new class of ships, the six contre-torpilleurs of the Chacal class. These vessels were optimized for high-speed gunnery engagements in the Mediterranean, and French naval planners envisioned them acting as high-capacity scouts that could collect information about an enemy fleet while effectively screening their own battle line. Whereas most World War I destroyers were on the order of 1,000 tons' displacement, the Chacal-class vessels displaced 2,400–2,500 tons normal load and 2,950–3,050 tons deep load. They were 415 feet 11 inches in overall length and 37 feet 2 inches in beam. They had a main armament of five 130mm (5.1-inch) guns and carried six 21.7-inch torpedo tubes. They were capable of 35 knots.

The Chacal-class ships were followed during 1928–1931 by the Guépard, Aigle, and Vauquelin classes. These 6-ship classes displaced some 2,400 tons standard load and 3,200 tons deep load and had a main armament of five 138mm (5.5-inch) guns and six to seven torpedo tubes. They were capable of 36 knots. All 18 had four funnels, a unique feature among post–World War I constructed destroyers.

The six ships of the two-funnel Le Fantasque class of 1933 to 1934 were 2,569 tons standard load displacement and 3,200–3,400 tons full load. They were 434 feet 4 inches in overall length and 40 feet 6 inches in beam. They mounted a main armament of five 5.5-inch guns and carried nine 21.7-inch torpedo tubes. These were followed by the two-ship Mogador class, launched in 1936 and 1937. They were 2,884 tons standard load displacement and 4,018 tons full load. At 45l feet 1 inch in overall length and 41 feet 7 inches in beam, they were capable of 39 knots. They mounted eight 5.5-inch guns in four twin turrets. This last class carried 10 torpedo tubes.

All contre-torpilleurs also mounted antiaircraft guns, the number of which was steadily increased. The contre-torpilleurs were attractive ships, marked by fine lines. They were the largest, fastest, and most heavily armed destroyers in the world prior to World War II.

During the war, the contre-torpilleurs saw more action than any other class of large French warships. They served with the Force de Raid and participated in actions against the Italians before the armistice of June 1940. A squadron successfully fought its way out of Mers-el-Kébir during the British attack there of July 3, 1940, and a division of contre-torpilleurs defeated a British squadron in the Battle of Sidon off the coast of Syria on June 9, 1941. These ships also participated in the Battle of Dakar (September 23–25, 1940) and in the Battle of Casablanca against the U.S. Navy on November 9, 1942.

Four of the Le Fantasque–class ships served with the Allies from 1943 through the end of the war. Their high speed and heavy armament made them very useful especially for intruder missions as on February 29, 1944, when *Le Terrible* and *Le Malin* sailed up the Adriatic Sea and destroyed a German convoy. They continued in service until the mid-1950s. Because of their size and armament, the Allies designated them as light cruisers. Only six of the contre-torpilleurs survived the war.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Cruisers; Destroyers; France, Navy

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Convoy HG-76 Battle off Portugal (December 14–23, 1941)

On December 14, 1941, Abwehr agents at Gibraltar reported the departure from there of British convoy HG-76. The Kriegsmarine's B-Dienst (naval code-breaking service) had detected the shipping concentration from intercepted communications and alerted the Naval Operations Center (Seekriegsleitung, SKL). B-Dienst decrypts indicated that the convoy was westbound. U-boat command in Berlin notified the Luftwaffe's Fliegerfuhrer Atlantik (Air Commander, Atlantic) and ordered the assembly of a seven-U-boat wolf pack, designated Seeräuber (Pirate). Kampfgeschwader 40 (Bomber Wing 40) launching reconnaissance flights on December 15. *U-74* was the first to sight HG-76, just before midnight on December 14, but *U-77* was the only U-boat to conduct an attack, sinking a 4,970-ton merchantman.

Convoy HG-76's 32 merchant ships had a powerful escort of 13 warships and Britain's first escort carrier, the *Audacity*. More important, Britain had successfully broken the Kriegsmarine's and Luftwaffe's codes and warned the convoy's escort of German intentions. Convoy HG-76 turned southward toward Morocco before dawn on December 15, avoiding KG-40's reconnaissance flights while the *Audacity*'s aircraft drove the U-boats underwater. B-Dienst intercepted and decrypted the convoy's course change instructions, however, enabling German U-boat commander Rear Admiral Karl Dönitz to reposition his wolf pack and the Luftwaffe to support them. With both countries' code breakers at the height of their game, the resulting seven-day engagement off Portugal became a battle of attrition.

KG-40 located the convoy on December 16, but the *Audacity*'s aircraft drove off three U-boats and forced another, *U-131*, to scuttle. *U-434* was sunk two days later, and KG-40 lost two Fw-200 reconnaissance aircraft to *Audacity*'s fighters. Two more U-boats were sunk during the evening of December 18 after sinking only one merchant ship. With B-Dienst reporting virtually all of the convoy's sailing directions, Dönitz rushed every available U-boat within intercept range toward it. However, the *Audacity*'s aircraft prevented KG-40 from continuously tracking the convoy. They also patrolled ahead of the convoy, attacking and forcing the U-boats to dive, all but preventing them from shadowing the convoy or concentrating against it.

Five more U-boats entered the fray on December 20 and managed to sink another merchantman as well as the *Audacity* by December 22, at the cost of *U-567*. The escort successfully drove off the other U-boats and 2 more that intercepted the convoy on December 23, the last day of the battle. All told,

the Seeräuber wolf pack had committed 12 U-boats, losing 5 and sinking 2 merchant ships, an antisubmarine corvette, and the *Audacity.* The battle was a personal victory for escort commander Captain Frederick Walker, who went on to become the Royal Navy's most successful escort commander.

The Convoy HG-76 battle marked the first time Germany's U-boat losses exceeded the number of merchant ships sunk. Strategically the battle had no impact, but operationally it validated Walker's tactics. Also, Britain's code breakers began to suspect that Germany was reading the Merchant Navy Code and initiated an investigation that led to its replacement in April 1942. The convoy's constant rerouting and escort positioning also made Dönitz suspect correctly that the British were reading his signals, and he ordered his codes and systems changed over the objections of Germany's communications experts. He also ordered the development of radar warning systems to enable his U-boats to dive before Allied aircraft could bomb them. These expedients temporarily blinded British code breakers through most of 1942 and gave the U-boats a reprieve from air attacks, but the Allies made adjustments. The HG-76 battle may not have changed the tide in the Atlantic but did signal its coming.

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See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Convoy PQ 13, Attack on (March 29, 1942)

Allied Convoy PQ 13, consisting of 19 merchantmen bound for Murmansk and sailing from Reykjavik, Iceland, on March 20, 1942. On March 24, a violent gale blew up, and by March 27 when the weather moderated, PQ 13 was completely scattered. The German Naval Group North regarded it as a perfect target for surface units based in northern Norway.

On March 28, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla of *Z26* (commanded by Captain Gottfried Pönitz), *Z24*, and *Z25* left Kirkenes and headed north through calm seas. At 1:43 a.m. on March 29, they sank a straggler, the Soviet freighter *Bateau.* Thereafter the weather deteriorated, with snow showers and wind increasing to 25 knots.

Meanwhile, the escorts had collected eight merchantmen in one group, and a Soviet destroyer flotilla out of Murmansk consisting of the *Sokrushitelni* and the *Gremyashchi* and the British *Oribi* had reinforced the close escort of the destroyer *Eclipse* and the trawler *Paynter.* The light cruiser *Trinidad* sailed three miles off the convoy's starboard bow while the destroyer *Fury* guarded the rear approaches.

At 9:46 a.m., the German flotilla unexpectedly encountered the cruiser *Trinidad* looming out of the snow, the radar of which had provided some forewarning; its initial salvo fell short, but the cruiser's next broadside hit the *Z26*, disabling an engine and two gun mounts and igniting a large fire.

After five salvos, the *Trinidad* turned to the *Z25.* In reply, the German destroyers landed two shells on their adversary, causing light damage, then fired torpedoes and turned north. The *Trinidad* dodged this barrage and circled to pursue. At 9:56 a.m., radar detected the *Z26.* The German flagship had become separated from its flotilla and had no support as the cruiser followed its black smoke. The cruiser closed to point-blank range and inflicted heavy damage on the German ship. At 10:22 a.m., the *Trinidad* launched three torpedoes to finish the job, but two failed to deploy and the third malfunctioned. The intense cold had solidified the weapon's engine oil, and it circled back and exploded against the cruiser, causing serious damage.

The *Z26*, which could still maneuver, used the reprieve to escape, and when a destroyer appeared from the muck, it flashed its call sign, assuming that the newcomer was friendly. However, it was the *Eclipse.* Trailing oil and faced with British radar, the *Z26* was unable to break contact, and the British destroyer registered repeated hits on its crippled adversary. By 11:20 a.m. the *Z26* was dead in the water, and the *Eclipse* closed for the kill.

Then the snow stopped and visibility cleared, revealing the *Z24* and *Z25* steaming to assist. They drove off the *Eclipse*, seriously damaging it. It was too late for the *Z26*, which slowly foundered. The *Z24* and *Z25* returned to Kirkenes, while the *Trinidad* limped into Murmansk. The convoy had

escaped the surface threat, but U-boats and aircraft took a toll. Of the 19 ships that left Reykjavik, 14 arrived at their destination.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also
Arctic Convoys; North Cape, Battle of

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Convoy PQ 17 (June 27–July 7, 1942)

Disastrous Allied Arctic convoy to Murmansk in the Soviet Union. From August 1941 through May 1945, the Western Allies had sent some 4 million tons of supplies to the northern Soviet Union via the Arctic. A total of 811 ships in convoy sailed east, of which 58 were sunk.

A large percentage of these losses occurred in one convoy, PQ 17. It sailed from Iceland on June 27, 1942, with 36 merchantmen protected by 4 corvettes, 2 antiaircraft ships, and 4 antisubmarine trawlers. At the same time, eastbound convoy QP 13, made up of 35 merchantmen, sailed from Kola Inlet. British rear admiral Louis Henry Keppel Hamilton commanded a covering force to protect both convoys, consisting of 2 British and 2 U.S. heavy cruisers plus 1 British and 2 U.S. destroyers. En route, British commander Jack Egerton Broome joined them with six destroyers. Distant cover was provided by the Home Fleet under Admiral Sir John Tovey. He commanded a mixed British and U.S. force consisting of 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and 14 destroyers.

Tovey was under strict orders to steer clear of the German airfields in northern Norway, where the Luftwaffe had massed 103 bombers, 42 torpedo bombers, 20 dive-bombers, and 89 reconnaissance aircraft to block any convoy passage. The Germans also had 10 U-boats on station, so their tactical reconnaissance advantage was formidable. The Allies hoped to trump this with strategic intelligence gleaned through Ultra decrypts; however, a change in German Enigma cipher settings on July 3 led to an intelligence

blackout. Political pressure from Washington and Moscow compelled leaders to insist that the convoy proceed nonetheless, and it sailed blindly into a German trap.

British first sea lord and admiral of the fleet Sir Dudley Pound agonized over the choices of action. He could not recall the convoy, and he could not allow the Home Fleet to close with it and risk an overwhelming German air and submarine attack. Allied intelligence assumed that German surface units in Norway would attack as well. These forces consisted of the battleship *Tirpitz*, the pocket battleships *Scheer* and *Lützow*, the heavy cruiser *Hipper*, 10 fleet destroyers, and 2 oceangoing torpedo boats.

Even before PQ 17 sailed, Pound informed Tovey that if he believed that a German surface attack was imminent, he would order the convoy to scatter. Tovey pointed out in no uncertain terms that this was contrary to all recent British experience. In any case, at 9:00 p.m. on July 4, Pound, incorrectly assuming that the Germans' big ships were on their way to intercept the convoy and would reach it early the next day, began sending signals ordering PQ 17 to scatter and for its cruisers and fleet destroyers to withdraw toward the Home Fleet because they were too weak to face the German squadron that he believed to be at sea. Although scattering was the logical precaution when a convoy was under surface attack, it was a suicidal move against aircraft and submarines. When the order to scatter was received, it had covered more than half of its route with the loss of only three ships. Now the ships were widely spread, devoid of mutual protection and escorts.

The Germans took advantage. Of the 34 merchant ships still with the convoy when the order to scatter was given, only 13 reached Murmansk. The Allies had suffered one of their worst maritime defeats of the war; the tragedy was that it need not have happened. Convoys to Murmansk were then suspended for the summer, as perpetual Arctic daylight and German strength made them untenable.

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See also

Arctic Convoys; Convoys, Allied; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Tovey, Sir John Cronyn

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Convoy PQ-18, Battle of (September 12–21, 1942)

In late August 1942, the Kriegsmarine's B-Dienst intelligence service detected a concentration of ships and shipping off northern Scotland. This was Allied Convoy PQ-18, which departed Loch Ewe for Murmansk on September 2, 1942. Reconnaissance flights from Luftflotte 5 commenced monitoring its movements two days later. Departing just weeks after PQ-17 had lost 23 ships, PQ-18 was heavily protected. Its 40 merchant ships had a close escort of 10 destroyers, 2 antiaircraft ships, 4 antisubmarine corvettes, 9 antisubmarine trawlers, and 3 minesweepers. They were supported by another 47 warships, including 2 battleships, the escort carrier *Avenger* with 15 aircraft, 8 cruisers, and 20 destroyers. Air and submarines patrols were positioned off Germany's Norwegian operating bases to warn of warship and U-boat sorties. Three Royal Air Force Coastal Command squadrons were in direct support, giving the convoy a total escort of 76 warships and nearly 52 aircraft, a formidable force that, combined with September's cloudy weather, challenged any response from General Admiral Hermann Boehm, heading Marineoberkommando Norwegen, the Norwegian Navy high command.

Although Boehm had 26 U-boats and 4 major warships at his disposal and enjoyed good relations with Luftflotte 5 commander Colonel General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, poor weather and the *Avenger*'s air wing interfered with his efforts to track and attack the convoy. The battleship *Tirpitz* was undergoing a machinery overhaul in Trondheim and was unavailable. Boehm therefore moved the pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer*, the heavy cruiser *Admiral Hipper*, the light cruiser *Köln*, and six destroyers to Altenfjord, intending to commit them against PQ-18.

The British submarine *Tigris* attacked Boehm's ships as they transited up the Norwegian coast. Although the German warships suffered no damage, the

British were not alerted to their movement, while Boehm lacked information on the location of the British battleships. The *Tigris*'s attack convinced Boehm not to risk the surface ships, and he kept them out of the ensuing action.

The Germans initiated the battle on September 12 with an air strike as their U-boats moved to intercept. During the next eight days, Luftflotte 5's Kampfgeschwader 26 (Bombardment Wing 26) flew 337 sorties against the convoy, scoring 84 torpedo hits. The fiercest fighting took place on September 13 as the convoy passed between Spitzbergen and Bear Island. U-boat and Luftwaffe attacks claimed 11 ships and 5 aircraft. But events turned against the Germans the following day, when they lost the *U-457*, two seaplanes, and a dozen bombers while sinking only one ship. Clouds, high winds, and fog restricted Luftwaffe operations, and the convoy's powerful escort challenged the U-boats. Boehm's forces sank only one more merchant ship, at the cost of another U-boat lost before the convoy arrived in Archangel on September 21.

PQ-18 marked a turning point in the Russian convoy battles. Tactically, it proved the value of the escort carrier as both an antisubmarine and air defense platform, for which Germany had no effective counter. Operationally, PQ-18 proved that the Royal Navy had learned from the PQ-17 disaster. Convoy losses now continued to drop, and tonnage delivered rose. Strategically, the battle further undermined German chancellor Adolf Hitler's faith in his surface ships and demonstrated the Western Allies' resolve and capability to support their Soviet ally.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoy PQ 17; Dönitz, Karl; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Convoy QP 11, Attack on (May 1–2, 1942)

Allied Convoy QP 11, with 13 ships, sailed from Murmansk at the end of April 1942. Two days out of port, the *U-456* ambushed the convoy's largest escort, the *Edinburgh*, destroying that light cruiser's stern abaft Y turret. Within hours, Germany's Naval Group North ordered Destroyer Group Arctic, the *Z7, Z24*, and *Z25* under Captain Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs, to strike QP 11 and then double back to sink the cruiser, which was being towed toward Murmansk.

On May 1, Schulze-Hinrichs found the convoy hugging the pack ice southeast of Bear Island with an escort of four old destroyers, the *Bulldog, Beagle, Amazon*, and *Beverley;* the corvettes *Oxlip, Saxafrage, Campanula*, and *Snowflake;* and the armed trawler *Lord Middleton.* It was cold with intermittent visibility amid snow flurries and showers.

At 2:05 p.m. the *Z7* opened fire, whereupon the *Amazon, Beverley*, and *Beagle* formed up behind the *Bulldog* and came between the German destroyers and their target. In an exchange of gunfire from 10,000 yards, the *Amazon* was hit twice and severely damaged. Fearing torpedoes, the Germans did not press this advantage. At 2:30 p.m., they tried a long-range torpedo attack that sank the Soviet freighter *Tsiolkovski*, while a British torpedo salvo missed. Schulze-Hinrichs probed the escort four more times, hoping to catch it out of position or sneak up behind a snowstorm. Each time the British destroyers, feinting torpedo attacks, skillfully weaving smoke screens, and maintaining an intense counterfire, drove off the larger German warships. Finally, at 5:50 p.m. Schulze-Hinrichs disengaged to go after the British cruiser. The *Amazon* was the only warship significantly damaged during this prolonged engagement.

The *Edinburgh* was 250 miles east, limping toward Murmansk at 2 knots, escorted by the destroyers *Foresight* and *Forester*, the Soviet guard ship *Rubin*, and four British minesweepers, the *Hussar*, *Harrier, Gossamer*, and *Niger.* Rushing toward the distant enemy at 35 knots, Schulze-Hinrichs planned to attack with torpedoes from the north with the advantages of light and wind. With the *Edinburgh* unable to maneuver, this plan seemed to guarantee success.

Weather in the Arctic is unpredictable, however. At 6:17 a.m. on May 2, the *Z7* sighted the *Edinburgh* eight miles distant. As the Germans

approached, the cruiser cast off its towlines and, unable to maneuver, began steaming in a circle at eight knots, its best speed. At 6:34 a.m., Schulze-Hinrichs ordered his ships to turn and fire a concentrated torpedo salvo, but a snow shower descended between the *Z7* and the other destroyers, masking their target and leaving the German flagship to conduct the attack alone.

As crewmen on the *Z7* aimed its tubes, the *Edinburgh* circled. The cruiser had no power to train its turrets, but when the destroyer crossed its line of fire, the B turret opened up. Its second salvo landed two rounds that disabled the *Z7*'s engines. The destroyer dropped smoke floats and drifted to a stop.

The *Foresight* and *Forester* then attacked the *Z7*, inflicting additional serious damage. The *Z7* could only reply with single shots over open sights, and although it launched four torpedoes, all missed.

At 6:45 a.m., the *Z24* and *Z25* found their flagship and counterattacked. The *Z25* disabled the *Forester*, hitting it five times in the space of five minutes and leaving the British ship dead in the water. The *Z25* fired four torpedoes to finish the job as the *Foresight* rushed to the *Forester*'s aid. The *Z25* severely damaged the *Foresight* as well, however, and forced it to fall back on the *Edinburgh.* The *Forester* restored some power and slowly followed, hitting the *Z25* once. Then one of the *Z25*'s torpedoes, which had been fired some minutes before, hit the *Edinburgh*, and the explosion nearly broke the cruiser in two.

The minesweepers had kept their distance during the action, but the flashes from their 4-inch guns gave a false impression of strength, and this caused the two operational German destroyers to disengage. At 8:15 a.m., the *Z24* rescued most of the *Z7*'s men after they scuttled the wreck. The two surviving German warships then returned to Norway. Schulze-Hinrichs had led a successful sortie, credited with sinking a cruiser (the *Edinburgh* was scuttled due to damage) and a merchant ship and inflicting heavy damage on three destroyers at the cost of one of his own.

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See also

Arctic Convoys; North Cape, Battle of

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Convoys, Allied

Convoys are organized groups of merchant vessels escorted by warships to defend against Axis attack. As a result of its experience in the latter stages of World War I, Britain was quick to convoy merchant vessels at the beginning of World War II. There was some initial hesitation because of the feared detrimental effect that convoys could have on the efficient employment of shipping, but that changed after the liner *Athena* was torpedoed and sunk on September 3, 1939, indicating that Germany had commenced an unrestricted campaign of submarine warfare against merchant vessels. The first convoy—eight tankers sailing from Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf via the Cape of Good Hope—actually departed on September 2 with a cruiser escort for fear of a possible Italian entry into the war. Regular east coast convoys between the Firth of Forth and the River Thames began on September 6, as did outbound transatlantic convoys from Liverpool two days later.

Operational convoys were set up to cover the movement of merchant vessels chartered by the government to transport and supply the British Expeditionary Force across the English Channel. Subsequent convoys carried troops to Norway and supported operations in North Africa, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Far East, and all the other theaters of operations.

A special category of convoys included the series that carried cargo and war matériel to the Soviet Union and the smaller series that ran to resupply the island of Malta. These operations were unusual in that in addition to the strong naval close escorts that normally covered convoys, they often also featured substantial distant cover by heavy units of the main fleet. Between August 1941 and May 1945, 42 convoys were undertaken to the northern Soviet Union, and there were 36 return convoys. A total of 835 ships sailed outbound, losing 60 of their number; 710 returned, with a loss of 37 ships. The Malta convoys included a series of major fleet operations from both the eastern and western ends of the Mediterranean to assist the passage of supplies for the island. Between November 1940 and August 1942, 82 merchant ships took part in these convoys; of these 29 were sunk, and there were substantial losses among their naval escorts.

An Atlantic convoy reaches safety after having come under German air attack off the British Isles, March 14, 1941. (Planet News Archive/ SSPL/Getty Images)

Trade convoys were required for regular commercial traffic on those passages most at risk of air or submarine attack. The initial series operated along the east coast, from London down the English Channel, and outbound from the west coast across the Atlantic and to Gibraltar. The east coast convoys and those to Gibraltar were escorted throughout their passage, whereas escorts accompanied those outbound into the Atlantic only until they were just beyond the expected operating area of German submarines. At that point the convoy dispersed, each ship proceeding individually to its destination. Depending on their destination, some vessels might detach from an outbound convoy prior to its dispersal. Inbound convoys assembled at Halifax, Gibraltar, Freetown, and—for a short period—Kingston, Jamaica. These convoys were escorted by cruiser or armed merchant cruisers until they reached the limit of U-boat operations, where antisubmarine escorts took over. A heavily escorted convoy series also operated between Scotland and Bergen, Norway, commencing in November 1939.

The end of the so-called Phony War in May 1940, with the German invasion of France and the Low Countries, brought major changes to the convoy system. The German attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940 abruptly ended the Norwegian convoys, and the collapse of France in June brought even more substantial changes. From French bases, German aircraft operated against shipping in the English Channel and far into the Atlantic, and the operational range of the U-boats increased dramatically. Convoys

along the channel accommodated local traffic only, and all oceanic traffic from the east coast now sailed north around Scotland. A series of interlocking convoys provided escort for all coastal shipping.

To accommodate the need for more transatlantic convoys, a second series of slower convoys originating from Sydney, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, was initiated. The increased threat of attack led to the provision of escort throughout the voyage for all convoys to and from Freetown. Finally, Italy's entry into the war terminated all commercial traffic in the Mediterranean except for heavily escorted operational convoys to carry supplies into Malta and local convoys in the Aegean and along the coastline of the eastern Mediterranean.

The dispersal point for westbound transatlantic convoys and the pickup point for escort groups meeting eastbound shipping gradually moved westward as the range of the escorts was increased. In mid-1941, the United States imposed its neutrality zone on the Western Atlantic and began escorting British convoys in conjunction with Royal Canadian Navy escorts, operating from Argentia in Newfoundland. North Atlantic convoys now were escorted throughout their passage by antisubmarine vessels.



The German declaration of war on the United States on December 10, 1941, brought a major westward expansion of U-boat operations against shipping. A disastrous period followed while the U.S. Navy struggled to secure the escorts and crews required to convoy the enormous volume of merchant traffic along the east coast of the United States; it also struggled with the concept of convoy. Nevertheless, by mid-1942, an elaborate and comprehensive system of interlocking convoy routes and sailings was established for the east coast of North America and in the Caribbean. As commander of German submarines Admiral Karl Dönitz became aware that the convoy system had been extended to a specific area, he shifted U-boat operations to another area where unescorted traffic still operated. Consequently, the U.S. Navy's convoy system gradually expanded to encompass almost all traffic between Rio de Janeiro and Halifax.

Landing operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean brought about some changes. Apart from the significant number of operational troop convoys, the opening of the Mediterranean introduced a series of convoy routes within that sea, and a British shortage of fuel oil also led to a series of

fast tanker convoys between the Caribbean and the United Kingdom. In 1944, Allied military successes in France began to allow a gradual reduction in the scope of convoying. The reduction occurred because U-boats were forced to make more extended passages to their patrol areas as their home ports moved farther from the Atlantic and because German aircraft no longer had quick access to British coastal waters. All these trade convoys sailed at regular intervals, regardless of the number of ships waiting at the departure port. Changes in the interval or convoy cycle could be made but only after careful consideration of the impact on the efficiency of the limited escort force and on trade patterns.

Efficient use of both escorts and shipping required that the employment of convoy be extended or contracted in response to perceived threat levels. Because the U-boats' maximum surface speed was about 16 knots in ideal conditions and much less in the open ocean, ships capable of 15 knots or more sailed independently. Between November 1940 and June 1941, this minimum was lowered arbitrarily to 13 knots, and losses among vessels sailing independently almost tripled; the higher speed minimum was then reinstated. For oceanic convoys, a minimum speed of 7.5 knots soon became the norm, with slower vessels obliged to proceed independently. Ships in coastal convoys, however, could be appreciably slower.

To make the danger zone as a convoy passed a submarine as small as possible, the standard convoy formation, except while transiting cleared channels through minefields, was always a broad front. The most common formation had from 6 to 12 columns in the convoy, each with up to 6 ships. Some of the very large convoys that ran during the spring of 1944, when a shortage of escorts forced planners to consolidate convoys, had as many as 19 columns with 9 or 10 ships each, but this was far in excess of the normal size.

Ships in each column steamed at 400-yard intervals until mid-1943, when the growing number of less experienced captains forced an increase to 600 or even 800 yards. Columns were initially spaced 600 yards apart during daylight and 1,000 yards apart at night, but scientific analysis determined that the wider spacing was preferable from a hit-statistic perspective, and later convoys standardized on the broader spacing. Early in the war, smaller convoys of no more than 35 ships were considered easier to protect, but again, analysis demonstrated that larger convoys made more efficient use of available escorts, so the convoy size increased to 60 ships or more.

Convoys most certainly diminished the efficient use of shipping assets to some extent, and the simultaneous arrival of large numbers of vessels caused significant bottlenecks in the unloading process. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt as to the efficacy of convoys in protecting merchant vessels from attack during World War II, as the dramatic reduction of sinkings after the introduction of convoys on the east coast of the United States demonstrated.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Antisubmarine Warfare; Arctic Convoys; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Axis; Corvettes and Sloops; Depth Charges; Destroyer Escorts and Frigates; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Hunter-Killer Groups; Leigh Light; Liberty Ships; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Sonar; United States Navy; Walker, Frederick John; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Convoys, Axis

When war began in September 1939, Germany essentially abandoned any attempt to maintain its oceanic trade. Those ships beyond easy reach of the homeland endeavored to reach neutral ports, where they were interned, and closer ships broke for home, with the navy providing cover for those carrying important cargoes.

Norwegian and Swedish ore traffic was the most important sector in Germany's European trade, and securing it became the principal focus of the navy's trade protection efforts throughout the war. After the successful

German invasion of Norway, the navy introduced the convoy of merchant shipping along the Norwegian coast late in 1940. Convoys generally were small—three to six ships—and escorted by a few torpedo boats, trawlers, and light craft. British submarines and aircraft were the principal threats.

As the war progressed and British air attacks became more effective, Germany added defensive coastal antiaircraft batteries and antiaircraft escorts. In addition to ever-increasing strikes by shore-based Royal Air Force Coastal Command aircraft, the Royal Navy mounted periodic carrier strikes against German coastal shipping in 1942 and 1943, culminating over the next two years with more concentrated assaults using escort carriers that came close to paralyzing this traffic.

With the beginning of war with the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet Northern Fleet submarines initiated attacks on German shipping around northern Norway and were soon joined by British submarines operating from Kola Bay. Joint operations continued until 1944, when the British crews were sent home and the submarines were turned over to the Soviet Navy. Substantial numbers of Soviet naval aircraft also joined the attack against German convoys from 1943. This assault against the northern Norwegian convoys cost the Germans some 500,000 tons of shipping, a relatively small amount considering that annual traffic was well in excess of 6 million tons.

War with the Soviet Union also brought the threat of attack on Swedish ore traffic, primarily by Soviet submarines at first. The Germans endeavored to keep shipping within Swedish territorial waters as far as possible, escorting vessels for the final leg of their passage behind the protection of defensive minefields and net barriers. During 1942 and 1943, Soviet submarines succeeded in sinking only about 20 ships for a total of some 40,000 tons of shipping out of more than 1,900 vessels in convoy representing well over 5.6 million tons of shipping. During 1944, the Soviet Army’s advances and the defeat of Finland meant that aircraft played a greater role in antishipping operations, but German losses remained relatively light. The collapse of German positions on the Baltic coast early in 1945 required the evacuation by sea of more than 2 million troops and others. Despite some spectacular successes (the sinking of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* and *General Steuben* with 1,200 survivors from the more than 9,000 passengers aboard, for example), Soviet attacks were remarkably ineffective; the Germans lost only about 20 ships with a total of some 100,000 tons of shipping.

The Italian Navy began convoying traffic carrying supplies to its forces in Libya almost as soon as it entered the war in June 1940, for British submarines and aircraft immediately began an interdiction campaign. The navy's responsibilities expanded as Italy undertook campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 and increased still further when Germany took on a larger role in the Balkans and North Africa. During 1941, Italy also began convoying shipping along the Libyan coast.

Italian convoys generally were small—three to six merchant vessels, with two or three escorting destroyers or torpedo boats. As British surface forces operating from Malta began attacking Libya-bound shipping, the Italian Navy had to deploy heavier covering forces, often including cruisers and eventually battleships, to support particularly valuable convoys. In this struggle over shipping, the British possessed two great advantages: radar, which vastly enhanced the night-attack capabilities of its aircraft and surface ships, and signals intelligence, especially Ultra, which consistently gave them advance convoy routing information.

Axis fortunes in this campaign fluctuated greatly. From mid-1941, Axis forces in North Africa required approximately 100,000 tons of supplies each month. But in March 1942, for example, only 47,588 tons got through, whereas in April, 150,389 tons arrived. Overall, the Italian Navy succeeded in bringing about 80 percent of all convoyed shipping to North Africa through to its destination.

Despite its direct experience of successful convoy operations by its destroyers in the Mediterranean during World War I, the Imperial Japanese Navy was slow to introduce convoying of merchant shipping after the Pacific war began. The navy possessed few suitable escort vessels at the outbreak of war, which reflected the overwhelming emphasis it placed on planning for the decisive fleet action that was the centerpiece of its operational strategy. Japan's response to the burgeoning unrestricted submarine campaign conducted by the United States against its shipping was to increase aggressive surface and air patrols; the Japanese Navy continued to eschew defensive convoy of merchant traffic. Not until the later part of 1944, by which date its merchant fleet had been devastated by U.S. submarines, did the navy begin limited convoy, especially of the crucial tankers carrying fuel from the Dutch East Indies, but by then it was too late.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Germany, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Signals Intelligence; *Wilhelm Gustloff*, *General von Steuben*, and *Goya*, Sinking of

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Convoys SC-7 and HX-79, Battles in the North Channel (October 16–20, 1940)

Convoy battle in the North Channel, the strait separating northeastern Ireland from southwestern Scotland. Just before midnight on October 16, 1940, the crew of the *U-48* discovered the 35-ship home-bound Allied Convoy SC-7 northwest of Rockall Bank and attacked, sinking two ships and damaging a third. Losing contact shortly thereafter, the *U-48* reported the convoy's last known position and course a few hours later.

B-Dienst, the German naval code-breaking service, intercepted the convoy escort's report of the action, and commander of German submarines Rear Admiral Karl Dönitz ordered six U-boats—*U-46*, *U-48*, *U-99*, *U-100*, *U-101*, and *U-123*—to establish a patrol line along the convoy's suspected course. Dönitz ordered them to converge on the *U-38*'s sighting report of that morning. The first three boats reached the convoy early that evening. The ensuing battle would leave the U-boats positioned to intercept convoy HX-79 at its conclusion.

SC-7 was poorly protected, having only 1 corvette and 2 sloops for escort. The convoy had already lost 2 stragglers to individual U-boats before its encounter with the *U-48*. Alerted to the coming battle, the Royal Navy's Admiral Martin Dunbar-Nasmith's Combined Operations Headquarters in

Plymouth dispatched another corvette to reinforce the convoy. Unaware that he was facing a wolf pack that included U-boat aces Gunther Prien, Otto Kretschmer, and Joachim Schepke, the convoy commander left one of his corvettes with the damaged merchant ship, negating the impact of the reinforcement, although 2 other corvettes joined the convoy as the battle began. Four of the U-boats initiated their attacks that evening, sinking 17 merchant ships and damaging 2 others before dawn the next morning. The convoy escort exacerbated the situation by staying with damaged and sinking ships, leaving the U-boats free to ravage the remaining merchant ships at will. Three U-boats detached for home that morning because they had expanded all their torpedoes, but 2 other boats attacked on the evening of October 19, sinking 4 more ships. They later broke off contact as the convoy entered the English Channel and gained almost constant air support. The convoy had lost 20 ships, with 7 of them falling to Kretschmer's *U-99.*

Meanwhile, Gunther Prien in *U-47* reported sighting another convoy, the unescorted 49-ship HX-79, on the morning of October 19. Dönitz ordered 4 U-boats (*U-28, U-38, U-48* and *U-100*) to join *U-47*, just as the convoy's 10-ship antisubmarine escort arrived. All but *U-28* reached attack position by that evening. Prien opened the assault, sinking 2 ships. Despite the powerful escort, the U-boats sank 12 ships before daybreak on October 20. The two days of October 19–20 had seen the Germans sink 32 merchant ships and damage 3 others, making this the deadliest two days for Allied merchant shipping of the war.

The shipping losses were a major blow to British morale and caused British naval and political leaders to review the convoy system. This revealed the paucity of escorts, exacerbated by poor tactics and procedures with convoy escorts unprepared for the wolf pack tactics and night surface attacks. British prime minister Winston Churchill now gave the war against German submarines the highest resource and funding priority.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dönitz, Karl; Kretschmer, Otto August Wilhelm; Prien, Günther; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Convoys SC 122 and HX 229, Battle of (March 14–20, 1943)

Largest North Atlantic convoy battle of World War II. March 1943 was the high-water mark of the German U-boat campaign against Allied convoys in the North Atlantic. Between March 10 and 20, Allied signals intelligence suffered a temporary blackout in its operations against the German U-boat cipher Triton. At the same time, the German signals intelligence service was able to decipher the rerouting instructions for two eastbound convoys: SC 122 and HX 229.

The German U-boat command had an unprecedented concentration of submarines in the North Atlantic at that time, and on March 14 it set about forming three large wolf packs from boats that had been operating against convoys SC 121 and HX 228. Groups Raubgraf ("Robber Baron," 8 boats) and Stürmer ("Striker," 18 boats) were to operate against SC 122, and group Dränger ("Pressure," 11 boats) was deployed against HX 229.

On March 16, the first U-boat made contact with HX 229. The convoys were sailing close to each other, and HX 229 was closing on the slower SC 122, which had already passed the Raubgraf patrol line undetected. The Raubgraf boats as well as 11 boats of the Stürmer group were thus deployed against HX 229 in the mistaken belief that it was SC 122. Defended by only 2 destroyers and 2 corvettes, HX 229 suffered heavy damage during the night of March 16–17. The same night, U-boats of the Stürmer group made contact with SC 122. Realizing that the two convoys were about to merge, the German U-boat command committed the remainder of its 40 available U-boats within range to the battle. Throughout March 17, long-range Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers from Iceland and SC 122 escorts with high-frequency direction-finding (HF/DF) equipment succeeded in fending off the contact-keeping boats. Only 1 U-boat managed to close for an attack, sinking 2 ships out of SC 122 on that day.

On March 18, air cover provided by the Liberators of the Number 120 Squadron again prevented 21 of the 30 U-boats deployed against HX 229 from reaching the scene, and again, only 1 U-boat succeeded in closing for a daylight attack. A reinforcement of the surface escort group prevented serious losses during the night of March 18–19, when the U-boats claimed only 2 further ships before intensified air cover, now flying out of the British Isles, forced them to desist. Two U-boats were damaged and 1 was sunk before Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz called off the operation on March 20.

The tally of 21 Allied ships sunk, totaling 141,000 tons of shipping as well as 1 destroyer lost during this largest convoy battle of the war, was impressive, yet it was also deceptive. It had been achieved primarily because the sheer numbers of U-boats had saturated the convoy defenses. Only 16 of the 40 U-boats deployed against both convoys had actually been able to make contact, and owing to the diligence of the convoys' hard-pressed air and sea escorts, only 9 succeeded in torpedoing ships. Of the 39 U-boats that survived the battle, 16 subsequently required more than 40 days of maintenance due to damage sustained during the battle. Committing virtually all available North Atlantic boats to four convoys—SC 121, SC 122, HX 228, and HX 229—also meant that the other four eastbound North Atlantic convoys in March 1943 made their passage entirely unmolested.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Air Warfare, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Dönitz, Karl; Radar; Signals Intelligence; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Coral Sea, Battle of the (May 7–8, 1942)

Pacific theater battle fought by units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Japanese carrier forces as the United States attempted to prevent a Japanese landing at Port Moresby on New Guinea. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first naval engagement in history in which two fleets fought without opposing surface ships making visual contact.

Following their successful December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor and other early military triumphs, Japanese leaders were reluctant to continue with their original strategy of shifting to a defensive posture. They feared the adverse affect that this might have on their forces' fighting spirit and believed that it would allow the Western powers time to regain their strength.

Japanese naval leaders in particular were anxious to occupy the Hawaiian Islands and Australia, the two chief points from which U.S. forces might mount offensive operations. U.S. carriers were operating out of Pearl Harbor, still the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. If Japanese forces could take the Hawaiian Islands, it would be virtually impossible for the U.S. Navy to conduct long-range Pacific naval operations. Securing the islands to the north and east of Australia—the Solomons, New Caledonia, and Samoa—would enable the Japanese to establish bases and cut the Allied lifeline from the United States to Australia. Japanese long-range bombers would then be able to strike targets in Australia, preparatory to an invasion of that continent.

The Japanese Army was not enthusiastic about either proposal. Most of its assets were tied down fighting in China and garrisoning Manchuria. Invading Australia and occupying even the populated areas would require significant military resources that the army could not spare. The Army Ministry and General Staff in Tokyo therefore advocated holding the gains already achieved in the southern advance and shifting resources to China. The army formally vetoed the navy plan in early April 1942, but in effect, it was dead by the end of January. Japanese Navy leaders hoped, however, that a success either eastward toward Pearl Harbor or southwest toward Australia might overcome army opposition.



Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, and his staff favored taking Midway Island, 1,100 miles west of Pearl Harbor, as a preliminary step before invading Hawaii. Yamamoto expected that this would provoke a strong U.S. naval reaction, enabling him to trap and destroy the U.S. aircraft carriers. The Japanese naval staff, however, preferred the southeasterly drive to isolate Australia. By the end of March, the Japanese had already advanced from Rabaul into the Solomon Islands and along the northern coast of New Guinea.

The Japanese Imperial General Staff then sought a follow-up strategy. Initially, the Naval General Staff favored assaulting Australia, fearing that an Allied buildup there could lead to a counteroffensive against the Japanese defensive perimeter. The army rejected an Australian operation because of long distances, insufficient number of available troops, and inadequate transportation. In January 1942, both agreed on a less demanding joint invasion of Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea, the seizure of Tulagi in the Solomons, and the capture of the Australian base of Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea.

On March 8, 1942, U.S. carriers, sent to beleaguer the Japanese base at Rabaul northeast of New Guinea, interdicted Japanese landing operations at Lae and Salamaua on the Papuan Peninsula of eastern New Guinea. Two carrier task forces, one built around the carrier *Lexington* under Vice Admiral Wilson E. Brown and the other under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher centered on the carrier *Yorktown*, sailed into the Gulf of Papua on the opposite side of the peninsula. Together, on the morning of March 10 they sent 104 aircraft across the high Owen Stanley Mountains and surprised Japanese ships discharging troops and supplies at both Lae and Salamaua. The attacking U.S. aircraft sank three Japanese ships, including the armed merchant cruiser *Kongo Maru* at a cost of only one plane and one aviator lost.

The action convinced the Japanese operational commander, Vice Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi, that conquest of New Guinea would have to be postponed until he could secure fleet carriers for protection. That opportunity came only after the return of Japanese carriers from the raids into the Indian Ocean.



Fires rage on the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier *Lexington* during the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8, 1942. The fires could not be controlled, and the carrier had to be abandoned. It was then scuttled by torpedoes from a destroyer. (Library of Congress)

In early April 1942, the attention of the Imperial Naval General Staff was on southeast operations (seizure of strategic points in New Guinea, New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands, and Samoa) to isolate Australia. The April 1942

Doolittle Raid on Tokyo refocused their attention on the destruction of the U.S. carriers, however, and forced an earlier date for the Tulagi and Port Moresby operations, with the New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa operations to follow after Midway.

Admiral Inouye, commanding the Fourth Fleet and Operation mo, as it was designated, broke his forces into five groups: two invasion groups to land army and naval forces at Tulagi and Port Moresby, a support group to establish a seaplane base in the Louisiade Archipelago off New Guinea, a small covering group with the light carrier *Shoho,* and the main striking force of two fleet carriers, the *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku*, plus escorts. This strike force, commanded by Vice Admiral Takagi Takeo, was to support both landings and to protect the entire force from U.S. carriers.

At Pearl Harbor, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, determined from intercepts that the Japanese would probably attack Port Moresby on May 3. On April 29, he ordered Fletcher and his *Yorktown* group to operate in the vicinity of the Coral Sea beginning on May 1. The *Lexington* group, now under Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch, and the U.S. Southwest Pacific Command's combined naval force of two Australian cruisers, the U.S. heavy cruiser *Chicago*, and two U.S. destroyers under Rear Admiral John Crace of the Royal Australian Navy were also placed under Fletcher's tactical command. The two carrier groups and Crace's force formed Task Force 17 when they rendezvoused on May 1 some 250 miles off the New Hebrides. While the *Lexington*'s group refueled, Fletcher sailed the *Yorktown*'s group north on May 2 to reconnoiter, having received reports of approaching Japanese naval forces.

On May 3, the Japanese Tulagi invasion group began landing forces without opposition. Learning of this, Fletcher decided to strike Tulagi the next morning without waiting for the *Lexington.* He sent his fleet oiler and its escorts to inform Fitch and Crace of his change of plans and to order them to join him 300 miles south of Guadalcanal on May 5. The *Yorktown* then closed on Tulagi undetected on May 4 and launched three air strikes that met little resistance. Admiral Takagi's carrier striking force had been delayed and was nowhere near Tulagi.

Inexperienced as they were, the U.S. attackers were ineffective, only damaging a destroyer to the point that it had to be beached and sinking three small minesweepers and four landing barges. The planes also shot up some

grounded aircraft. Even this small success was sufficient to send the remainder of the Tulagi invasion force steaming back to Rabaul.

Withdrawing southward, Fletcher rejoined Fitch and Crace as scheduled on May 5. Task Force 17 then moved northwest, expecting to catch Japanese forces as they emerged from the Jomard Passage into the Coral Sea. Although sightings were made by both sides on May 6, ineffective reconnaissance led to little significant action by either.

Before dawn on May 7, the opposing fleet carriers passed within 70 miles of each other. At dawn, both sides sent out search planes over the Coral Sea. Japanese sightings of what they thought were a U.S. carrier and a cruiser led to the sinking of the destroyer *Sims* and fatal damage to the oiler *Neosho.* At about the same time, a U.S. scout aircraft reported two Japanese carriers north of the Louisiades. The action prompted by the U.S. sighting turned out to be a wild goose chase, but the *Lexington* and *Yorktown* pilots stumbled on the light carrier *Shoho* and sank it.

Early the next morning, the two carrier forces found each other. The U.S. planes concentrated their attack on the fleet carrier *Shōkaku* but hit it with just three bombs, causing only modest damage. The fleet carrier *Zuikaku* escaped by hiding in a rainsquall. The *Shōkaku*'s damage was sufficient to prevent launch-and-recovery operations, however; when the Americans withdrew, it turned north toward Japan.

Meanwhile, planes from the *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku* found the *Lexington* and *Yorktown.* Diving out of the sun, torpedo planes hit the *Lexington* twice on the port side, and dive-bombers scored two minor hits. The *Yorktown* was hit by only one bomb, which did no major damage. Confident they had sunk the *Saratoga*, the *Lexington*'s sister ship, and the *Yorktown*, the Japanese pilots withdrew. Neither ship sank, however, until gasoline vapors aboard the *Lexington* reignited fires that eventually became uncontrollable; as a result it was abandoned, with Fletcher forced to order it scuttled by torpedoes from a nearby destroyer.

Both sides claimed victory. Tactically, the Japanese came out ahead. The United States was hurt most by the loss of the fleet carrier *Lexington*, whereas Japan lost only the light carrier *Shoho* and suffered moderate damage to the large carrier *Shōkaku.* Although Japan scored a tactical victory, the United States had finally blunted a Japanese offensive thrust, preventing the occupation of Port Moresby and thus winning the strategic victory. In

addition, significant losses in aircraft, aircrew, and repairs to the *Shōkaku* prevented both Japanese carriers from taking part in the subsequent Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), undoubtedly impacting that critical battle.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Crace, Sir John Gregory; Doolittle, James Harold "Jimmy"; Fitch, Aubrey Wray; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Inouye Shigeyoshi; Japan, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Takagi Takeo; United States Navy; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Corap, André Georges (1879–1953)

French Army general. Born at Pont Andemer, Eure Department, France, on June 15, 1879, André Corap entered the French Army in 1898 on graduation from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr. He fought in World War I and earned distinction during the 1920–1926 Rif Rebellion in Morocco, where he captured rebel leader Abd-el-Krim in 1926. Ten years later, Corap served as a regimental commander in Morocco.

With the onset of World War II in September 1939 and the mobilization of French forces, Corap was appointed to command the 2nd Military Region of Amiens and the Ninth French Army. His sector of the northeastern part of the front was particularly poorly fortified, and he had far fewer divisions than his counterparts behind the Maginot Line. When German forces invaded on May 10, 1940, in accordance with the prescribed Dyle Plan, Corap

immediately wheeled his troops north to take up positions north of the Meuse River between Namur and Flize, just to the west of Sedan. His forces arrived on May 11–12 to find that two German panzer corps under Generals Hermann Hoth and Georg Hans Reinhardt had anticipated them. Badly mauled by frontal attacks from these troops and under heavy assault, the Ninth Army virtually disintegrated when its right flank came under heavy attack after the collapse of General Charles Huntziger's Second French Army, around Sedan. Only a few units held together and fell back to reserve positions during the night of May 14–15.

General Alphonse Georges, commander in chief of French northeastern forces, held Corap responsible for the German breakthrough, and on May 15, Georges insisted that Corap exchange commands with General Henri Giraud, who headed the Seventh Army. Corap held this post for only four days before Defense Minister Édouard Daladier removed him. On May 21, Prime Minister Paul Reynaud publicly held Corap responsible for the disaster on the Meuse frontier, implying that he might be tried for treason. This seems to have been a desperate search for a scapegoat. Ironically, Huntziger, who certainly bore at least as much blame as Corap, received a promotion and later became minister of war in the Vichy French government.

After the armistice, Corap accompanied the Vichy government to Bordeaux in a vain effort to clear his name. Subsequent revelations at the 1941 Riom trial largely exonerated him, but he held himself aloof from further debate, retiring to his home at Fontainebleau, where he died on August 15, 1953.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Daladier, Édouard; France, Battle for; Georges, Alphonse Joseph; Giraud, Henri Honoré; Hoth, Hermann; Huntziger, Charles Léon Clément; Maginot Line; Reinhardt, Georg Hans; Rey-naud, Paul

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CORKSCREW, Operation (June 11, 1943)

Allied operation to secure the small (32-square-mile) Italian island of Pantelleria situated in the Sicily Strait some 60 miles from Sicily and 70 miles from the North African coast. In 1943 the Western Allies considered the capture of Pantelleria vital to the success of Operation HUSKY, the planned invasion of Sicily. Pantelleria lay astride the main invasion route from North Africa to Sicily, but the real prize was a large airfield there, which the Allies wanted to use for fighters supporting the Sicily invasion. Otherwise, these aircraft would have to operate from bases in North Africa.

Operation CORKSCREW commenced in mid-May. In one of the outstanding examples of excessive use of force during the war, the Northwest African Air Force dropped 6,400 tons of bombs on Pantelleria in 4,218 bomber and fighter-bomber sorties. The 12,000-man Brigata Mista Pantelleria on the island was also subjected to naval gunfire. Airpower advocates hoped to demonstrate that bombing alone could force an enemy surrender. The Italian garrison on Pantelleria and nearby Lampedusa Island surrendered immediately on the landing of British troops on June 11. The British took 11,399 prisoners. The sole British casualty was a soldier bitten by a mule.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Sicily, Invasion of

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Cornell, Julien Davies (1910–1994)

Prominent U.S. civil liberties attorney who defended the rights of conscientious objectors during World War II. Born in Brooklyn, New York, on March 17, 1910, Julien Davies Cornell was reared a Quaker. He graduated

from Swarthmore College in 1930, and in 1933 he received his law degree from Yale University and joined his father's Wall Street law firm. He remained there until the start of World War II.

The 1940 Selective Service and Training Act represented an advance for religious conscientious objectors in contrast to the World War I law. But, in the opinion of Cornell, a pacifist, it did not go far enough. Although the 1940 law expanded conscientious objection classification and established the Civilian Public Service (CPS) camps, Cornell argued that the current draft legislation did not come close to resembling the British National Service Act of 1939, which allowed the "absolutist" (pacifist) exemption from any form of state service.

During World War II, Cornell handled hundreds of cases involving conscientious objectors who refused to register for the draft, be inducted, or report to CPS camps for alternative state service. Some of his most important cases were *United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, United States v. Julius Eichel, United States v. Clyde W. Summers,* and *United States v. James Louis Girouard.*

Cornell's experiences involving these matters led to the publication of *The Conscientious Objector and the Law* (1943) and *Conscience and the State* (1944). Both works summarized his views that (1) the U.S. government should adopt the British legal model regarding exemption from state service; (2) the conscientious objector should not be made to register or be inducted prior to declaring his objection to war, and that religious training and belief should not be the sole determination for such basis; (3) the CPS camps should not be controlled by the military; and (4) the denial of pay to objectors for camp labor and the government's refusal to provide dependency allotments to families was a gross injustice.

Cornell was best known for his representation in February 1946 of noted expatriate poet Ezra Pound, who was indicted on a charge of treason because of radio speeches he delivered from Rome in 1943. These broadcasts criticized President Franklin Roosevelt and the Allies and smacked of anti-Semitism. When interviewing Pound, Cornell realized that the poet's mental health had seriously deteriorated, probably from being held in solitary confinement in an American military prison in Italy. Cornell produced his own battery of psychiatrists to counter the testimony of the U.S. Army

doctors and prevailed in having Pound placed in a mental hospital, thereby saving him from a possible death sentence.

Shortly after the war, Cornell spent time in Europe working for the American Friends Service Committee. In 1950, he moved to Central Valley, New York, and established a successful legal practice there. Cornell died in Goshen, New York on December 2, 1994.

CHARLES F. HOWLETT

See also
Selective Service Act

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Cornell, Julien. *The Conscientious Objector and the Law.* New York: John Day, 1943.
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Cornioley, Cecile Pearl Witherington (1914–2008)

British Special Operations Executive (SOE) operative and French Resistance leader. Born in Paris on June 24, 1914, Cecile Pearl Witherington was one of four daughters of an English businessman who worked for a Swedish firm. Cecile, known as Pearl, had a difficult childhood, for her father's spendthrift habits and heavy drinking split the family. At age 17, she began work as a secretary, earning extra money by teaching English at night. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, she was employed as a secretary to the British air attaché in Paris. Her family managed to flee France in December 1940 and reach London, where Witherington secured a position with the Air Ministry.

Anxious to do more to assist the Allied war effort against the Germans, in June 1943 Witherington joined the SOE as an agent. During training she was recognized as the best marksman, male or female, in the SOE. Witherington, given the code name Pauline, parachuted into France near Châteauroux on the night of September 22–23, 1943. Soon she joined her French fiancé Henri

Cornioley, who had escaped a German prison and was active in the Resistance. Because of this blend of espionage and romance, some have seen Pearl Cornioley as the inspiration for Sebastian Faulke's popular 1998 novel, *Charlotte Gray*, later made into a film of the same name. She disclaimed this, claiming that she was motivated solely by the desire to defeat the Germans.

Posing as a cosmetics salesperson, Witherington traveled extensively throughout France as a courier. When the head of her network was captured in May 1944, she was forced to change her location and activities. Working in the Department of the Indre, she and Cornioley organized a Resistance group, which they then helped arm. The two were nearly captured on June 11, 1944, shortly after the Allied Normandy Invasion, but by July their Resistance group had grown to some 1,500 people. Witherington was the only SOE operative to head a network, and her Resistance group was credited with having killed as many as 1,000 German soldiers and having captured 18,000. The Germans offered a million-franc reward for her capture.

In September 1944, the couple made it to London, bringing with them—much to the surprise of their superiors—the money from parachute drops that had been unused. The two were married the next month. He became a pharmacist, while she worked as a secretary for the World Bank. In 1995, she published her memoirs, written with Hervé Larroque. Her husband died in 1999. Pearl Cornioley died in the Loire region of France on February 24, 2008.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

France; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Resistance; Special Operations Executive

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Corregidor, Battle of (April–May 1942)

Known officially as Fort Mills, Corregidor was the final bastion of U.S. and Filipino forces in the Philippines. At 2.74 square miles, the largest of the islands off the entrance to Manila Bay, Corregidor is shaped like a tadpole. Its chief installations included the post headquarters, a huge barracks, and coastal batteries. Contained within the tail of the island was a vast underground network known as Malinta Tunnel, which measured 1,400 feet in length and 30 feet in width, with 25 400-foot laterals branching from it. The tunnel was the administrative and operational heart of the island fortress. Kindley Airfield was situated on the extremity of the tail, on the second-highest point of the island.

The island also had batteries with an array of 18 12-inch and 10-inch coastal guns and 24 12-inch mortars plus antiaircraft guns and machine-gun positions. Almost all of the armament on the island was obsolete in 1942, but as long as the troops on Corregidor held the island, they could effectively keep the Japanese fleet from using Manila Bay. This was the basic mission of the troops on Corregidor in War Plan Orange.

On the departure of General Douglas MacArthur and his staff to Australia, Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright assumed command of the American and Filipino forces on March 12, 1942. The Japanese had bombed and shelled the island constantly since February, but they did so with growing intensity beginning in April. For 27 days, from April 9 to May 6, the Japanese daily increased the shelling. By May 5, the beach defenses had been destroyed, the huge seacoast guns had been silenced, and the antiaircraft batteries had been reduced to scrap. All wire communications had been destroyed, and every attempt to restore them was in vain. Even the geography of Corregidor had changed; the island lay scorched, leafless, pockmarked by bomb craters, and covered in the dust of thousands of explosions.

By the beginning of May, the 9,400 men on Corregidor knew that a Japanese attack was imminent. The island’s defenders had sustained 600 casualties since April 9, and those men who had not been injured were beginning to succumb to malnutrition and malaria. Wainwright wrote on May 4 that there was only enough water to last for four days and that the fortress’s power supply would only hold out for one week at most.

Late in the night of May 5, the long-awaited Japanese attack began, following a particularly intense artillery bombardment directed against the tail end of the island. Shortly before 10:00 p.m. as Japanese landing craft steamed toward the eastern end of the island, an order went out for all able-bodied troops to resist the landing.

The fight for Corregidor lasted only 10 hours. Japanese troops cut across the island, then turned west toward Malinta Tunnel. Most of the fighting during the night and the early morning of May 6 took place at Battery Denver, on a ridge near the east entrance of the tunnel. U.S. troops, including coast artillerymen and a battalion of 500 sailors, fought bravely. At 8:00 a.m., after the Japanese had taken tanks and artillery ashore for a frontal assault, Wainwright committed the last of his reserves. The first sight of armor panicked the defenders, however, and caused some to flee from the lines.

By 10:00 a.m. the situation was critical, with the defenders having no means of stopping the Japanese tanks. Already, 600 to 800 U.S. troops had been killed and another 1,000 wounded. All reserves had been committed, and the Japanese had destroyed all defensive artillery. The Japanese were planning to mount an attack on the other side of the island and would reach Malinta Tunnel, with its 1,000 wounded, in a few hours. Fearing a slaughter, Wainwright decided to surrender. By noon on May 6, all weaponry larger than .45 caliber had been destroyed; all codes, radio equipment, and classified materials had been burned; and the surrender message had been broadcast to the Japanese. The U.S. flag was lowered and burned, and a white flag was hoisted. Wainwright then communicated to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that he had made the decision to surrender. It had taken the Japanese five months to seize the island instead of the two months they had originally estimated.



The surrender of U.S. troops on the island of Corregidor in the Philippine Islands, May 6, 1942. (National Archives)

U.S. forces retook Corregidor in February 1945.

FRANKLIN P. SLAVIN III

See also

Bataan, Battle of; Fort Drum, Manila Bay; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew

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Corsica, Recapture of (September 8–October 4, 1943)

Corsica is a French Mediterranean island that was occupied by Italian forces on November 11, 1942. Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle was determined to retake Corsica, and the Allies soon began sending French and U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operatives there by submarine. In late August 1943 at de Gaulle's behest, General Alphonse Juin drew up invasion plans. Assuming the Italians would remain neutral, Juin planned a force of two divisions to carry out simultaneous east and west landings to cut the island's two main coastal roads.

On September 8, 1943, the armistice with Italy was announced. By that date, elements of the French troops were ready to deploy, but they lacked the sealift required for the men and their supplies. Nonetheless, de Gaulle was determined to proceed on a reduced scale if need be to liberate Corsica by force of French arms.

Lieutenant General Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin commanded Axis forces on Sardinia and Corsica. On September 11, following the Italian surrender, Adolf Hitler ordered Senger to transfer the 90th Panzer Division from Sardinia to join the Schutzstaffel (SS) brigade already on Corsica. The first French element, a battalion, landed at Ajaccio on September 12. Although Italian major general Giovanni Magli said that his men would fight the French, that did not last long. Soon, much of his VII Corps garrison of four divisions, as well as thousands of local Maquis resistance fighters, were engaging the Germans. Meanwhile, the French steadily built up their resources; two Free French cruisers and two destroyers as well as torpedo boats and submarines participated in the lift there of men and supplies. Commodore W. G. Agnew's British 12 Cruiser Squadron provided cover. Ultimately, the French landed some 6,800 men, 30 tanks, and 20 artillery pieces on the island.

On September 15, Hitler ordered the evacuation of Corsica. This took place through the port of Bastia, which the Germans had taken by force from

its Italian defenders two days earlier. The Germans completed their withdrawal from the island on October 4, wrecking harbor facilities as they departed. Although the Germans were able to remove most of their troops and 3,200 vehicles, the Allies sank 17,000 tons of German shipping; the Germans also had 55 transport aircraft destroyed, most of them on the ground, and they abandoned substantial quantities of equipment.

Military dead in the Allied reoccupation of Corsica totaled about 450 Germans, 637 Italians, 75 French and Moroccans, and 170 Maquisards.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; France; Juin, Alphonse Pierre; Maquis; Senger und Etterlin, Fridolin Rudolf von

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Corvettes and Sloops

Relatively small warships designed primarily for anti-submarine warfare and patrol duties. The Royal Navy in the years prior to World War II and during the war built several classes of both of these types, because their small size allowed for rapid construction not only by large shipyards but, in the case of corvettes, by small privately owned yards.

Britain built a large number of both corvettes and sloops to protect its trade lanes from submarine attack. A good example of the World War II–era sloop is the British Black Swan class constructed during 1939–1940 and a modified version of the same launched throughout the war. A modified Black Swan–class vessel displaced some 1,490 tons, measured 299 feet 6 inches in overall length by 38 feet 6 inches in beam and was capable of 19.75 knots. The unarmored hull mounted six 4-inch guns and carried 110 depth charges

on racks. During the war, upgrades to a few of these ships replaced the racks with hedgehog depth charge launchers. Crew complement was 192 officers and men.

Corvettes are typified by the Castle class, built between 1943 and 1944. Smaller than the sloop, it displaced 1,060 tons, was 252 feet in overall length and 36 feet 8 inches in beam, and was capable of 16.5 knots. Castle-class corvettes were armed with a single 4-inch gun and a Squid depth charge launcher. Crew complement was 120 officers and men.

While both sloops and corvettes participated in the Battle of the Atlantic, neither type proved wholly satisfactory. Corvettes were not ideal for antisubmarine duty because they lacked oceangoing qualities due to their small hulls. Not only were living conditions poor on these ships, but they could not store large amounts of fuel or supplies. Nonetheless, corvettes gradually supplanted sloops because they could be built in greater numbers thanks to their size, which allowed for construction in smaller yards. Larger and more capable frigates supplemented sloops and corvettes during the war.

Aside from the British, the Japanese launched several classes of escorts the size of corvettes and capable of antisubmarine warfare. Other powers such as the United States, France, and Italy also constructed these ships. The United States built one class of corvette as submarine chasers, while other nations that built vessels the size of sloops or corvettes attached duties to them other than antisubmarine warfare. Germany's corvettes were envisioned as fleet escorts, while France employed its corvettes as torpedo boats. Italy constructed 29 units of the Gabbiano class of 660 tons from 1942, and these ships proved capable in the antisubmarine role. Germany took over 4 and completed 10 more after the Italian armistice to equip its Mediterranean antisubmarine flotillas.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Convoys, Allied; Destroyer Escorts and Frigates; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; United States Navy

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Cota, Norman Daniel "Dutch" (1893–1971)

U.S. Army general. Born in Chelsea, Massachusetts, on May 30, 1893, Norman Daniel "Dutch" Cota graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1917 and was commissioned in the infantry with the 22nd Infantry Regiment. He was an instructor at West Point between 1918 and 1920. Cota transferred to the Finance Department in 1920 and was the finance officer of West Point until 1924, when he transferred back to the infantry. Cota graduated from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1925 and served in the Hawaiian Department. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1931, was an instructor at the Infantry School in 1932 and 1933, graduated from the Army War College in 1936, and was an instructor at the Command and General Staff School from 1938 to 1940.

Cota was in charge of plans and training for the 1st Infantry Division from March 1941; he was its chief of staff from 1942 to February 1943, taking part in the capture of Oran during Operation TORCH, the invasion of French North Africa (November 8, 1942). Promoted to brigadier general in February 1943, he became U.S. adviser to the Combined Operations Branch of the European theater of operations. Later that year, he was assistant commander of the 29th Infantry Division.

On June 6, 1944, Cota landed with his division on Omaha Beach, Normandy. Several of the men in his landing craft (an LCVP, or landing craft vehicle and personnel) were killed by German fire as soon as the ramp went down. Cota was the only general officer on Omaha Beach that day. With American forces almost pushed back into the sea, he was an inspiring presence. Realizing the men were doomed if they remained on the beach, he exposed himself to German fire as he repeatedly led small parties forward. Many historians credit him with almost single-handedly preventing a disaster that day. Cota later received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions. Wounded at the Battle of Saint-Lô (July 11–19, 1944) he spent two weeks in the division hospital.

On August 13, 1944, Cota took command of the 28th Infantry Division, which he led through Paris in a liberation parade in August 1944, part of a show of force in support of General Charles de Gaulle to prevent a possible communist takeover. Cota was promoted to major general in September 1944.

On November 2, the 28th Infantry Division began an attack to capture the town of Schmidt during the Hürtgen Forest Campaign (September 12–December 16), which was intended to break the Siegfried Line. The plan of attack was a recipe for disaster, with all three regiments of the division attacking in diverging directions, and had been imposed on the division by staff officers at V Corps. Cota protested his orders to both V Corps commander Major General Leonard Gerow and First Army commander Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges but was ordered to execute the plan. During the next nine days, the 28th Infantry Division suffered more than 6,000 casualties. Near the end of the battle, Cota collapsed under the pressure of what was happening to his division.

If not for his performance on Omaha Beach, Cota almost certainly would have been relieved of his command after this debacle; as it was, the events at Schmidt cast a long shadow over him. The 28th Infantry Division was pulled out of the line and sent south to a quiet sector in Belgium to reconstitute. On December 16, it was manning the sector of the line known as Skyline Drive when the Germans launched the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). Although the already weak 28th Infantry Division was mauled during the German attack, it did not break. Rather, it conducted a tenacious and effective fighting withdrawal that contributed in no small part to disrupting the German timetable for the offensive. Cota returned to the United States in August 1945 to prepare for the anticipated invasion of Japan.

Cota retired from the army as a major general in 1946. He died in Wichita, Kansas, on October 4, 1971.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; Gerow, Leonard Townsend; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Hürtgen Forest Campaign; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Siegfried Line, Breaking the; TORCH, Operation

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countenace, Operation

See Abadan, Iran, British Attack on

Counterintelligence

Organized activities initiated to counter an opponent's intelligence operations. Counterintelligence operations may include blocking an enemy's sources of information, carrying out deceptions, and working to prevent enemy sabotage and the gathering of intelligence information.

Electronic warfare had matured considerably since the end of World War I. In 1939, unlike in 1914, many nations had functioning cryptological departments, and virtually all nations during the war broke codes of the other side. Circumstances in 1939 varied widely, however. Great Britain, for example, had a solid organization, centered on the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park.

Communications technology did not solve all counterintelligence issues, as the British discovered soon after the fall of France in June 1940, when refugees began arriving on their shores. Before long, an average of 700 aliens were entering the country per month, and the Travel Section of MI-5 (Security Service) knew that each person needed to be interrogated so that spies could be identified before they could do harm. A pedestrian approach was required. Near the Clapham Junction Railway Station was the empty Royal Victoria Patriotic School (RVPS), built to educate the children of Crimean War veterans. The students of the RVPS and the nearby Emanuel School, an old and excellent London public (private, by American standards)

school, had been evacuated to the country for the duration of the war. The RVPS, later known as the London Reception Center (LRC), became -MI-5's principal interrogation facility. Some 33,000 aliens were inspected at the LRC during the war, and it is believed that only three enemy agents passed through undetected.

The agent at large for the longest period, from November 1940 to April 1941, was Dutch parachutist Englebertus Fukken. He was found dead in a Cambridgeshire air-raid shelter, a suicide. In the early days, a proven German agent might be hanged at the RVPS, next to the faculty common room. Eventually, after July 27, 1940, those aliens held at the LRC were sent to Ham in western London for further interrogation. Under the command of Colonel Robin William George "Tin Eye" Stephens, Camp 020 was the interrogation center of last resort. It should be remembered that Camp 020 functioned in 1940 under fear of the planned German invasion of the British Isles, Operation SEELÖWE (SEA LION).

As the war progressed, more and more German agents arrived, not via the refugee route but by parachute or coastal landing at night from German small craft or even U-boats. On capture—and MI-5 was good at that—these persons could not claim to be refugees. Some did not wait for apprehension but turned themselves in and volunteered to work for the Allies. Under the chairmanship of Sir John Masterman, an Oxford don who had the distinction of spending all of World War I interned in Germany, the XX (Doublecross) Committee was established to develop a deception plan to utilize these double agents.

Composed of representatives of MI-5, MI-6 (the Secret Intelligence Service), the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and other organizations, the committee set up a phony radio situation that fed doctored information mixed with some real facts back to German controllers. The ruse became more successful than most members of the XX Committee ever thought it would or could be.

The Germans were also quite active in counterintelligence operations, one of which worked specifically against the SOE. ENGLANDSPIEL (ENGLAND GAME) was a German operation set up in the Netherlands by Major Herman Giske of the Abwehr and Colonel Josef Schreide of the Reichssicher-heits-hauptamt (RSHA, the Reich Main Security Office) to break up British espionage rings in Holland.

The Abwehr, the military secret service under Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, contained many anti-Nazi elements. The RSHA, which was fervently pro-Nazi, was under Schutzstaffel (SS) chief Heinrich Himmler. The two organizations did not cooperate. ENGLANDSPIEL worked something like the XX Committee in reverse. The Germans "turned" several SOE parachutists, who then asked the SOE to send monetary, material, and human assistance to the espionage rings in Holland. That the British did. ENGLANDSPIEL lasted until two agents escaped from Haaren Prison and made their way to Switzerland, where they exposed the German operation.

The operation had ended by the beginning of April 1944, but it had been quite successful. The British carried out 190 aircraft drops of people and equipment. Of 54 captured agents, 47 were executed. The Germans took 3,000 Sten guns, 5,000 revolvers, 2,000 hand grenades, 500,000 rounds of ammunition, 75 radio transmitters, and 500,000 Dutch guilders. ENGLANDSPIEL was probably the greatest Allied espionage defeat of World War II.

Mention must also be made of the Germans' deception plan for Operation BARBAROSSA, their June 22, 1941, attack on the Soviet Union. For such a momentous military action, there was virtually no attempt at deception. The Abwehr and other organizations merely stated that the transfer of troops from west to east was (1) intended to aid Italy's faltering campaign against the Greeks and (2) a deception for British consumption designed to signal that Operation SEA LION had been abandoned. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin received as many as 100 warnings and ignored all of them, dismissing them as deliberate Allied disinformation.

The Western Allies had a great success in Operation MINCEMEAT, their unique deception campaign preceding the Sicily landings in July 1943. This operation was developed to convince the Germans that the Greek islands and Sardinia were the next Allied targets after North Africa, instead of the more logical Sicily.

Lieutenant Commander Ewen Montagu, who proposed Operation MINCEMEAT. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The most significant Allied deception of the entire war, however, was Operation FORTITUDE, which had two aspects. FORTITUDE north was designed to convince Adolf Hitler that the Allies were planning to invade Norway from Scotland. FORTITUDE SOUTH was designed to convince Hitler that the main Allied invasion of France would come through the Pas de Calais area. The deception plan worked out better than expected. Hitler held German units in place along the Pas de Calais. Indeed, some were still there a month after the Normandy landings.

ERNEST M. TEAGARDEN

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bletchley Park; Camouflage; Canaris, Wilhelm Franz; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Deception; Electronic Intelligence; Enigma Machine; FORTITUDE, NORTH and SOUTH, Operations; Himmler, Heinrich; Jiang Jieshi; Manhattan Project; Maquis; Midway, Battle of; MINCEMEAT, Operation; Nimitz, Chester William; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Office of Strategic Services; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Partisans/Guerrillas; Patton, George

Smith, Jr.; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; Signals Intelligence; Special Operations Executive; Stalin, Joseph; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Turing, Alan Mathison; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Crace, Sir John Gregory (1887–1968)

British Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) vice admiral. Born on February 6, 1887, at Gungahleen, New South Wales, Australia, John Gregory Crace joined the Royal Navy in 1902 as a colonial cadet at the midshipman training college at Devon, Britain. In World War I, he saw service at sea as a torpedo lieutenant.

After the war, Crace specialized in torpedoes. Following various assignments that included sea service, he became assistant to the second sea lord in 1937. A rear admiral when World War II began in 1939, Crace was assigned to command the Australian Squadron, in effect becoming the commander of the RAN. The RAN was subordinate to the British Admiralty, and Crace considered asking for another more responsible position in the Royal Navy.

After the United States entered the war in December 1941, the U.S. Navy assumed overall Allied command of the South Pacific, and Crace took command of the mixed U.S.-Australian cruiser Task Force 44. In May 1942, the Allies became aware that the Japanese were preparing to invade Port Moresby, New Guinea. Along with two U.S. carrier task forces, Crace and his squadron set out to intercept the Japanese invasion force, which reconnaissance aircraft had reported as headed for the Jomard Passage. In the

early afternoon of May 7, Japanese medium bombers and torpedo bombers attacked Crace's ships, but skillful maneuvering averted major damage at the hands of the Japanese and also from U.S. Army Air Forces Boeing B-17s, which mistakenly attacked the friendly force.

The presence of Crace's ships and mistaken Japanese impressions about the size of his unit led the invasion force headed for Port Moresby to turn back. Crace's ships played no other role in the May 7–8 Battle of the Coral Sea. They remained in the Jomard Passage for another two days, until being notified of the overall course of the battle, when they returned to Australia.

Crace received high marks from the Americans both as a seaman and as a commander of a joint force. He was placed on the retired list in 1945 but remained in charge of the Chat-ham Dockyard until 1946. Crace died in Liss, Hampshire, England, on May 11, 1968.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; Torpedoes

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Craig, Malin (1875–1945)

U.S. Army general and chief of staff. Born in St. Joseph, Missouri, on August 5, 1875, the son of an army officer, Malin Craig graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1898. Commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry, Craig saw combat during the Spanish-American War that same year with the 6th Cavalry Regiment in Cuba during the Santiago Campaign. Following garrison service in the American West with the 4th Cavalry Regiment, Craig served in the Philippines during the Philippine-American War (1899–1902), and also took part in the international relief expedition to rescue the foreign legations in Beijing (Peking) during the Boxer Rebellion.

Promoted to first lieutenant, he was assigned to the 6th Cavalry Regiment in February 1901.

Craig attended the Infantry and Cavalry School (1903–1904) and the Staff College (1904–1905) at Fort Leavenworth. Promoted to captain in May 1904, he served in the 10th and then the 1st cavalry regiments. He was regimental quartermaster at Fort Clark during 1906–1909.

Craig graduated from the Army War College in 1910. He then held a variety of administrative and troop assignments. Following service with the 1st Cavalry Regiment in the American West during 1912–1916, he was an instructor at Fort Leavenworth in 1916–1917. In 1917 he was detailed to the General Staff Corps.

Following U.S. entry into World War I in April 1917, Craig was promoted to major in May and to lieutenant colonel in August, when he became chief of staff of the 41st ("Sunshine") Division composed of National Guardsmen from the western states commanded by Major General Hunter Liggett; the division went to France as part of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Craig then became chief of staff of I Corps. Craig took part in the Second Battle of the Marne and the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Promoted to temporary colonel in February 1918 and to temporary brigadier general that June, he was chief of staff of the U.S. Army of Occupation in Germany during 1918–1919.

In August 1919, Craig reverted to his permanent rank of major and returned to the United States as director of the Army War College. Promoted to colonel, he commanded the District of Arizona in 1920–1921. He was once again a brigadier general in April 1921 and was commandant of the Cavalry School during 1921–1923. He commanded the Coast Artillery District of Manila during 1923–1924. Promoted to major general in July 1924, he was chief of cavalry during 1924–1926 and assistant chief of staff for training of the army, 1926–1927, then commanded the Panama Canal Department in 1928–1930 and the IX Corps Area in 1930–1935. He was commandant of the Army War College in 1935.

Promoted to general, Craig succeeded General Douglas MacArthur as chief of staff of the U.S. Army on October 2, 1935, and held that post until his retirement on August 31, 1939. As chief of staff, Craig sought to convince Congress of the army's great weaknesses in manpower and material, and he did what he could, given severe budgetary and other constraints, to reform

the army. His efforts, although largely unheralded at the time, were extremely important in preparing the army for World War II. Craig modernized army equipment, and he introduced realistic training maneuvers that involved large numbers of troops. General George C. Marshall succeeded Craig on his retirement.

Recalled to head the War Department's Personnel Board in September 1941, Craig died in Washington, D.C., on July 25, 1945, following a prolonged illness.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; United States Army

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Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham (1888–1965)

Canadian Army general. Born on April 28, 1888, at Hamilton, Ontario, Henry Crerar served with distinction in the artillery during World War I, ending the war as counterbattery staff officer for the Canadian Corps. During the interwar years, he remained in the small Permanent Force (regular army), primarily in staff appointments, and attended both the British Staff College (1923–1924) and the Imperial Defence College (1934–1935).

A brigadier at the onset of World War II, Crerar was promoted to major general in January 1940 and appointed chief of the Canadian General Staff six months later. In that capacity, he played a central role in dispatching two ill-trained Canadian battalions to Hong Kong—and Japanese captivity—in 1941, but he also built up a solid training establishment. Crerar, promoted to lieutenant general in November 1941, was ambitious, ruthless, and jealous of rivals. Posted overseas to command the I Canadian Corps that year, he spent much of his time intriguing against Lieutenant General Andrew McNaughton

and had a major role in planning the disastrous Dieppe Raid (August 19, 1942). Crerar subsequently commanded the I Canadian Corps in Italy from November 1943 until he was recalled to England in March 1944 to lead the Canadian First Army in the Normandy Invasion. With that appointment, Harry Crerar had reached the pinnacle for a Canadian officer. He was promoted to general in November 1944.

Canadian lieutenant general Henry Crerar (right) shown here with British field marshal Bernard Montgomery, in the Netherlands, 1945. (Corel)

Although historians have acknowledged his obvious administrative abilities, the excessively cautious and uninspiring Crerar was, at best, a pedestrian field commander. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, under whose command Crerar served in the campaign in Northwestern Europe, had little confidence in him. Crerar's bitter rivalry with the abler Lieutenant General Guy Simonds was unjustified on any military grounds, and there is little doubt, for this and other reasons, that the latter would have replaced him had the war continued much longer. Operation VERITABLE, the assault on the Reichswald region in Germany in February 1945, was an unmitigated disaster. Crerar accumulated vast resources, but his rigid planning forced them into a narrow bottleneck and produced massive casualties.

Crerar nevertheless deserves much credit for effectively representing Canadian interests in Allied councils and for building an overseas

headquarters. He retired from the army in 1946 and died in Ottawa on April 1, 1965.

PATRICK H. BRENNAN

See also

Canada, Army; Dieppe Raid; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Foulkes, Charles; Hong Kong, Battle of; McNaughton, Andrew George Latta; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Rhineland Offensive; Simonds, Guy Granville

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Crete, Battle of (May 2–June 1, 1941)

Largest German airborne assault of the war. This German victory, however, also marked the end of major German airborne operations. Between April 20 and 26, 1941, British forces evacuated Greece. Crete had become a vital British logistical base, and many of the troops evacuated from Greece landed there.

This alone would have made the island a target for the Germans, but there were other good reasons for a German assault. Located in the eastern Mediterranean, Crete was its fifth-largest island and could be used as an air base for attacking British positions in North Africa and for protecting Axis Mediterranean shipping, especially oil supplies. It might even become a stepping-stone on the route to the Suez Canal. More important, Adolf Hitler saw its capture as necessary to secure his vital southern flank against air attack (especially on the oil fields of Ploieşti) before launching Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union.

British major general Bernard Freyberg commanded the British corps on Crete, centered on the 2nd New Zealand Division. The Allied garrison numbered some 27,550 men and was a mixed group of British, Australian, New Zealander, and Greek forces. Most had only recently arrived, and the

defenders were hardly a cohesive force. Equipment—even basic weaponry—was in short supply. Air support was provided by only a few dozen aircraft. Unlike the Germans, the British did not have air bases within fighter range of the island, which left the Luftwaffe free to operate virtually unopposed, especially since the defenders had few antiaircraft guns.

The German plan for the invasion, code-named Operation MERKUR (MERCURY), centered on parachute drops on the three main airfields of Máleme, H'ráklion, and Rétimo. The Germans planned to hold these and local beaches, especially Souda Bay, until reinforced. Freyberg had been alerted by Ultra intercepts as to the German invasion plans, and he established defensive positions at these obvious targets, but lack of transport meant that his divided forces could not support one another. The Ultra information also worked against the defenders, as Freyberg did not know that the naval assault was small, and he therefore allocated considerable assets to protect against that threat—assets that would have been used to far better purpose to defend the vital airfields.

MERKUR began on May 20, 1941. The operation ultimately involved some 22,000 soldiers—paratroops and mountain forces—and was supported by more than 500 combat aircraft, 700 transport planes, and 80 gliders. The Royal Navy halted the seaborne invasion. Airborne forces at Rétimo were crushed by the few tanks available to the British, and the landings at H'ráklion were also defeated. The key to the battle, however, proved to be at Máleme and nearby Canea and Souda. Luftwaffe bombing at Máleme was particularly effective, and the attackers arrived before the defenders had regained their equilibrium. The British were also surprised by the use of gliders, which landed significant numbers of troops. The fighting was desperate and in some doubt, but the Germans were able to bring in just enough resources to beat back the British counterattacks; the Luftwaffe then ferried in additional supplies to the German troops.

On the night of May 21–22, British warships intercepted an Axis troop convoy consisting of 21 small coastal vessels packed with 2,330 German troops and escorted by a single Italian torpedo boat. In a one-sided engagement, British cruisers and destroyers sank 8 ships in this convoy. At 8:40 a.m. another cruiser force intercepted a second convoy of 30 small steamers and caiques, also escorted by only a single torpedo boat. After a short engagement and with the convoy covered by a smoke screen and

undamaged, the British commander decided to head south because he feared air attacks. The surviving ships of both convoys returned to Greece. Some 400 German soldiers were lost in this effort, and the Germans thereafter relied entirely on air supply and reinforcement in the invasion.

Souda Bay nonetheless became untenable for the British, and the Germans began to land reinforcements. On May 24, Freyberg informed London that German seaborne landings could not be stopped without unacceptable naval losses that would put the entire eastern Mediterranean at risk. Three days later, with the Germans expanding their area of control and Italian troops landing at Sitia on the eastern end of the island, the British ordered an evacuation.

Once again, the Royal Navy rushed to rescue Commonwealth and Allied soldiers (wags said that "BEF" stood for "Back Every Fortnight"). The Royal Navy was able to rescue almost 18,000 men but at considerable cost: three cruisers and six destroyers. The Germans also inflicted damage to the aircraft carrier *Formidable*, the battleships *Barham* and *Warspite*, three cruisers, and numerous other warships. Allied personnel losses in the battle and evacuation were 3,990 dead, 2,750 wounded, and 11,370 captured. The Germans won a victory but lost 220 aircraft and had another 150 damaged. Their casualties totaled 6,698 (3,300 dead), although some British sources reported much higher totals.

The German attack on Crete was audacious and innovative. Hitler, however, refused pleas by Lieutenant General Kurt Student for the airborne forces to next assault Malta; indeed, he removed Student from command of operations on Crete during the battle. In effect, the Battle of Crete was Germany's last real airborne operation of the war, for the German forces that participated were used as elite infantry thereafter. Ironically, the Allies then embraced paratroop operations themselves.

FRED R. VAN HARTESVELDT

See also

Airborne Forces, Axis; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Freyberg, Bernard Cyril; Löhr, Alexander; Parachute Infantry; Student, Kurt

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Crimea Campaign (April–May 1944)

Two-month campaign in April and May 1944 that resulted in the Soviet liberation of the Crimean Peninsula, which dominates the northern Black Sea and is connected with Ukraine by the four-mile-wide Perekop Isthmus. As Soviet operations around Kursk drew to an end, Soviet Army generals Fedor I. Tolbukhin and Rodion Malinovsky received instructions to prepare an offensive for mid-August 1943 to clear the Donets Basin region of German troops.

By the winter of 1943, German Army Groups South and A (together numbering 93 divisions) still held a line along the Dnieper River. The German Seventeenth Army held the Crimea but had been isolated from other Wehrmacht units north of it since October. The isolation of the Seventeenth Army was accomplished by Major General Nikolai I. Trufarov's Soviet Fifty-First Army of Tolbukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front, which was at Perekop and along the Sivash, and General Andrei Yeremenko's Independent Coastal Army in Kerch. The plight of German forces in the south was such that Army Groups South and A had to be re-formed. On April 5, 1944, they were redesignated as Army Groups North Ukraine and South Ukraine, respectively.

Malinovsky's 3rd Ukrainian Front recaptured Niklolaev on March 28 and then drove toward Odessa, which it retook on April 10. Meanwhile, on March 22, Romanian dictator General Ion Antonescu had flown to Berlin to persuade Adolf Hitler to allow his Romanian forces to withdraw from the Crimea. As might have been expected, the mission was futile. Hitler was determined to hold the Crimea, for in Soviet hands it would serve as a base from which Soviet aircraft could attack the Romanian oil fields at Ploieşti.

Tolbukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front was assigned the task of destroying Colonel General Erwin Jänecke's Seventeenth Army, a mixed force of 11

German and Romanian divisions totaling some 150,000 men. In March, Tolbukhin had been summoned to meet with Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin and the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, to discuss the plan. The Crimean operation would involve the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Independent Coastal Army, the Azov Flotilla, and the Black Sea Fleet. Tolbukhin would attack across the Perekop Isthmus and through the Sivash lagoon using Lieutenant General Georgii F. Zakharov's Second Guards Army and Lieutenant General Iakov G. Kreizer's Fifty-First Army. Follow-up attacks would target Simferopol and Sevastopol. Simultaneously, Yeremenko would establish a bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula and block the German escape route as well as German attempts to reinforce against Tolbukhin. Colonel General T. T. Khryukin's Eighth Air Army would support Tolbukhin, and Colonel General Konstantin A. Vershinin's Fourth Air Army would back Yeremenko. The operation involved some 450,000 Soviet personnel.

On April 8, Tolbukhin's artillery opened the attack at Perekop, followed by an artillery barrage at Sivash. Soviet engineers, working waist-deep in icy water, constructed a pontoon bridge. The next day, Yeremenko attacked from Kerch. On April 11, Soviet forces reached the railroad junction at Dzhankoy, behind the Perekop Isthmus.

On April 12, Jänecke ordered his divisions to retreat toward Sevastopol from two prepared lines of defense stretching some 20 miles. This step occurred without Hitler's formal approval. Jänecke's forces reached Sevastopol in surprisingly good order, and he hoped to hold there until his forces could be evacuated by sea. By April 13, Tolbukhin's troops had captured Simferopol, and Yeremenko had secured Feodosiya and Yalta.



Soviet troops in the fight for the city of Sevastopol in the Crimean Peninsula, May 1944. (Yevgeny Khaldei/Corbis)

In the meantime, from April 18, the Soviets built up their forces and artillery in preparation to storm the fortress defenses of Sevastopol, which stretched some 25 miles. These preparations were completed by May 5, the starting date of the final battle to liberate the Crimea. At the end of April, Hitler had decided that Sevastopol had to be held, but its defenses were much weaker than they had been in 1941 when the Germans had attacked there. Also, Jänecke had only five weak divisions and little equipment. Because of Jänecke's repeated requests that his forces be evacuated, Hitler replaced him on May 2 with General of Infantry Karl Allmendinger.

On May 5, the Soviet Second Guards Army attacked from north of Sevastopol via the Belbel Valley. This attack was diversionary, however; the main Soviet attack occurred on May 7, pitting the Fifty-First Army and the Independent Coastal Army against the Sapun Ridge separating Sevastopol from the Inkerman Valley. Soviet forces broke through the German lines, forcing the defenders from the old English cemetery. The Germans then retreated to the Chersonese subpeninsula.

Only on May 9, with both the city and the harbor in Soviet hands, did Hitler authorize an evacuation. The remnants of the German-Romanian force attempted to hold a dock at Kherson. Any German hopes for a final evacuation by sea were dashed by Soviet air and naval operations. Consequently, on May 13, the remaining Axis troops surrendered to the Red Army. Soviet authorities put total German losses in the Crimea Campaign at 50,000 killed (most of them Germans) and 61,000 taken prisoner (30,000 of them at Chersonese). The Germans admitted to having lost 60,000 men; regardless, another German army had been destroyed.

NEVILLE PANTHAKI

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Antonescu, Ion; Hitler, Adolf; Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich; Petrov, Ivan Yefimovich; Ploieşti, Raids on; Sevastopol, Siege of; Stalin, Joseph; Tolbukhin, Fedor Ivanovich; Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich; Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich

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Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford (1889–1952)

British lawyer, politician, ambassador, and cabinet minister. Born in London on April 24, 1889, Richard Stafford Cripps was educated at both Winchester and Oxford University. He studied chemistry and then law, becoming a lawyer in 1913.

Physically unfit for military service, Cripps drove an ambulance in France during World War I. In 1918 he returned to the legal profession, in which he made a fortune. During the Great Depression, he began to shed his Christian Socialist views. He also became involved in Labour Party politics and was elected to Parliament in 1931. Cripps was briefly solicitor general before refusing to serve in the National Government of 1931. Over time, he became more involved in left-wing causes and increasingly opposed to fascism. In 1939, he and Aneurin Bevan were expelled from the Labour Party because their demands for a popular front were regarded as excessively procommunist. Cripps remained in Parliament as an independent through the war.

In 1940, Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill sought to encourage Soviet entry in the war. Hoping that Cripps's left-wing reputation would give him some leverage in Moscow, Churchill appointed him ambassador to the Soviet Union. The experiment failed, however, and Cripps was recalled. Churchill then moved to bring him into the government, and in February 1942, Cripps became lord privy seal and leader of the House of Commons. That summer, he was sent to India to offer that country dominion status in hopes of rallying its people against Japan. Divisions in India were too great for this approach to be effective, though, and Cripps returned to London. His dissatisfaction with the British war effort and with Churchill in particular led to his removal from the War Cabinet in October 1942, but the next month he was appointed minister of aircraft production, a post he held for the remainder of the war.

In July 1945, Cripps was readmitted to the Labour Party and was appointed president of the Board of Trade. In 1947, he became chancellor of the exchequer in the new Labour government. Through moral suasion, he mounted an austerity campaign, even convincing unions to accept a voluntary wage freeze. His dominance was challenged in September 1949 when he devalued the pound, and just a year later, exhausted and ill, he resigned. Cripps died in Zurich, Switzerland, on April 21, 1952.

FRED R. VAN HARTESVELDT

See also

Aitken, William Maxwell; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere; India

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Croatia

In 1939, Croatia was not an independent nation; it was part of the polyglot Yugoslavia and had a population of some 3.8 million. Situated in western Yugoslavia, Croatia covered about 21,000 square miles and had a long border along the Adriatic Sea. The peace treaties ending World War I created the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, soon known as Yugoslavia (South Slavs). However, ethnic and religious diversity in the new country led to instability and strife. Serbia, around which the new nation was formed, had been on the Allied side in the war; Croatia had been part of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Croats had fought for the Central Powers. Although both peoples were Slavs, there were significant differences: Croatians used the Roman alphabet and were Roman Catholic; Serbs utilized the Cyrillic alphabet and were Orthodox Christians.

With some justification, Croats in particular believed they were discriminated against in the new Serb-dominated state, which imposed

political, social, and economic restrictions on Croatia. In response to these policies, Croats formed a separatist right-wing group known as the Ustaše, which was supported by fascist Italy. Many Croats were pro-Italian and pro-German.

Croats generally supported the Yugoslav government's initial March 25, 1941, decision, admittedly taken under heavy German pressure, to join the Axis alliance in World War II. The coup in Belgrade two days later that reversed this course alienated many Croats, and when the German Second Army and the Italian Second Army marched into Slovenia and Croatia on April 6, they received an enthusiastic welcome from many inhabitants. Croat units in the Yugoslav Army mutinied, and on April 10, Ustaše activists proclaimed an independent Croatia and began negotiations with the Germans. Italy and Hungary each annexed parts of Croatia; what remained was combined with Bosnia-Herzegovina to form the Independent State of Croatia, or Nezavisna drava Hrvatska (NDH), with Ante Pavelić as president. Croatia adhered to the Tripartite Pact in June 1941.

The leaders of the NDH supported a policy of ethnic cleansing, and the Ustaše forcibly converted to Roman Catholicism tens of thousands of Orthodox Serbs and Jews. Orthodox Serbs were subject to racial laws. Serbs had to wear blue armbands with the letter P for "Pravoslav" (Orthodox); later they were deported to death camps. The Catholic Church, led by Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, acquiesced in this and refused to speak out against the murder of Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies (Romas). These groups faced execution at various concentration camps, of which the most infamous was Jasenovac, or they were transported to German death camps such as Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen. Of an estimated 40,000 Croatian Jews, 32,000 died. Some 26,000 Romanis and between 330,000 and 390,000 Serbs also were executed. There are no reliable estimates as to the number of Muslims killed.

Croat army forces defended the new state's borders and assisted the Germans and Italians in securing the Balkans. Some Croat units were even deployed to defend Nazi-occupied France. Although there were antifascist groups in the Independent State of Croatia, such as the Council for the National Liberation of Croatia (Zemaljsko antifaisti√ko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske), these groups were largely ineffective. Many Croats did join the Partisans, led by Tito (Josip Broz), to fight the Axis occupiers.

At the end of the war as Tito's Partisans pushed north, NDH forces and

Ustaše supporters fled to Austria. What remained of the NDH army surrendered in May 1945, and British military authorities returned many NDH officials and soldiers hiding in Austria to Yugoslavia.

Croatia was then reintegrated into a communist Yugoslavia, and Tito took his vengeance. Within weeks of the war's end, the Partisans executed, without trial, perhaps a quarter million people who had sided with the Germans, most of them Croats.

ROBERT W. DUVALL

See also
Pavelić, Ante; Tito; Yugoslavia

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CROSSBOW, Operation (November 1943–May 1945)

Code name for the Anglo-American air operations against the German long-range weapons program. British intelligence knew about German attempts to create a long-range military rocket within months of the war's beginning. In April 1943, Duncan Sandys, a member of Britain's War Cabinet, conducted a study of German weapons research and declared the rocket program a serious threat. Discovering more about these new "V," or "Vengeance," weapons became a priority. Approximately 40 percent of all Allied reconnaissance flights from Britain between May 1, 1943, and March 31, 1944, sought information concerning Germany's V programs. The Royal Air Force (RAF) then began operations against such targets.

Two main types of V weapons were developed by Germany. First was the V-1, commonly referred to as the buzz bomb, the flying bomb, and the doodlebug. This was an unmanned flying bomb powered by a pulse-jet engine and developed by the German Air Force. Initially, V-1s were to be launched from fixed sites, but as those sites came under Allied attack, the Germans developed simpler prefabricated launch rails that could be set up

faster than the Allies could find and destroy them. The second type was the V-2, a rocket that reached the edge of Earth's atmosphere and flew at supersonic speeds. Developed by the German Army, the V-2 was much more difficult for the Allies to attack because it used a mobile launching platform mounted on a truck.

On the night of August 17–18, 1943, 597 RAF bombers left Britain to strike Peenemünde, the center of German rocket research on the Baltic coast. More than 700 people died in the attack, most of them forced laborers.

In November 1943, the CROSSBOW committee was formally established to coordinate all information concerning Germany's missile program as well as implement appropriate countermeasures. The most important CROSSBOW sites were the launch complexes for V weapons located in northern France. Two kinds of sites were under construction: (1) seven "large sites," massive concrete bunkers for the storage and assembly of V-1s and V-2s, and (2) numerous "ski sites," so-called because of the large curved structures designed to launch V-1s.

American tests indicated that the most effective assaults against these sites were made from minimal altitude using fighter-bombers. British commanders, however, had little faith in the American tests and insisted that heavy bombers should continue against CROSSBOW targets, despite the growing diversion of resources from the combined bomber offensive and preparations for the Allied invasion of France. The dispute was never satisfactorily resolved.

On June 12, 1944, the first V-1s struck Britain. Initially, Allied commanders did not divert resources from OVERLORD, the June 6, 1944, invasion of France, to attack the V-1 launch sites, but within two weeks the number of V-1s reaching Britain forced a response. On average, 97 V-1s struck Britain daily between June 12 and 26, 1944. The largest attack was on the night of June 15–16, when 151 flying bombs reached Britain, of which 73 hit London. By July 15, 2,579 V-1s had struck Britain, 1,280 of which fell within the London area.

As a result, supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force General Dwight Eisenhower gave priority to CROSSBOW sites above all other targets except for "the urgent requirements of the battle." During the next two months, operations against these sites consumed half the energies of Bomber Command, and some 3,000 Allied aircrew were lost in Operation CROSSBOW.

At its peak, the defense of the British Isles against the V-1s included an antiaircraft belt along the coast of 1,000 guns using the new proximity fuze, more than 2,000 barrage balloons, and 21 fighter squadrons.

By September 1944, the Allied advance in France had pushed the Germans beyond the range from which V-1s could reach Britain. But after a brief respite, attacks continued from the Netherlands, either launched in midair by obsolete bombers or from newly constructed launch rails. The last V-1 reached England on March 28, 1945. One day earlier, the last V-2 had struck Britain. Casualties from the V-1s amounted to 6,139 killed and 17,239 seriously wounded; the V-2s accounted for 2,885 deaths and 6,268 seriously wounded.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Peenemünde; Peenemünde Raid; V-1 Buzz Bomb; V-2 Rocket

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Cruisers

Class of warships that in the World War II era possessed moderate armor and armament and were capable of high speed. These ships were the successors of the 18th-century frigates in the age of fighting sail. Frigates were primarily employed in reconnaissance duties for the main battle fleet. They also served in commerce protection, commerce raiding, surface combat against enemy vessels of similar strength, and blockades. Technological innovations in the

mid-19th century, such as steam power and iron armor, led to the development of the first modern cruiser, the U.S. Navy's *Wampanoag*, commissioned in 1867.

By World War I, the major naval powers of the world had produced six different types of cruisers charged with the tasks formerly assigned to frigates. They also were given a new task that resulted from technological change—protecting the capital ships of the fleet from torpedo attack. These warships were primarily armored cruisers, protected cruisers, light cruisers, and scout cruisers. Also in production was the battle cruiser—a warship that incorporated battleship armament on a cruiser-sized hull and was capable of high speed. It, however, was viewed largely as a capital ship rather than a cruiser. The final type was the armed merchant cruiser, a civilian-owned merchant ship or passenger liner converted to carry weapons in time of war.

In the years immediately following World War I, most of the armored, protected, and scout cruisers were considered obsolete and scrapped. The major maritime powers, primarily Great Britain, also largely discarded battle cruisers because their light armor did not adequately protect them against heavily armed enemy warships. Britain retained three (the *Hood*, *Renown*, and *Repulse;* the *Tiger* was decommissioned in 1930), whereas Japan had four Kongo-class ships that were modernized and reclassified as battleships.

The interwar years produced many of the cruisers that participated in World War II. Military and diplomatic developments directly affected their design, although technologically they were almost the same as those of World War I. Many naval officials viewed the continued construction of cruisers as a dubious endeavor, partly because of the increasing ability of aircraft to perform reconnaissance, the primary duty of cruisers up to that time. Construction, however, did not diminish, as the major maritime powers still desired a warship that was capable of protecting trade routes and providing support for amphibious operations—a relatively new role that had surfaced in World War I. Cruisers also proliferated as part of a new worldwide naval arms race.

Following World War I, the great powers attempted through international agreements to prevent an arms race in warships, which many politicians believed had been a factor in the tensions that had led to war. The resulting 1922 Washington Naval Conference produced the situation that diplomats had sought to avoid when it placed restrictions on the tonnage of cruisers but

not on the numbers allowed to each naval power. The nations that signed the 1922 agreement tried to correct this problem at the 1930 London Conference, which separated cruisers into two basic types: those mounting 8-inch guns (heavy cruisers) and those with 6-inch or smaller guns (light cruisers). Building ratios between the signatory powers based on total tonnage of cruisers restricted the numbers of each type, and a clause from the Washington Treaty stating that no warship could displace more than 10,000 tons or carry guns larger than 8-inches governed their size. Even so, cruisers continued to be the largest surface warships built, as restrictions on battleship construction that had been set out at the Washington Naval Conference remained in place.

The 8-inch-gunned heavy cruisers were built primarily in the years before the 1930 London Conference, because most of the world's major maritime powers had already built up to the tonnage limit set for these ships by the Washington Agreement. Although the United States and France managed to produce some vessels that were well-balanced designs, the majority were generally unsatisfactory, as armor was sacrificed to meet the 10,000-ton restriction of the Washington Treaty. An example of this imbalance was the U.S. heavy cruiser *Portland.* This ship measured 610 feet long by 66 feet in beam, displaced 10,258 tons, and mounted a primary armament of nine 8-inch guns. It had a maximum speed of 32.5 knots, but its armor protection consisted of a belt only 2.5 inches thick and an armored deck that was 2.5 inches deep. This armor was generally effective only against opposing destroyers armed with 5-inch guns. Larger shells could easily penetrate the protection.

Japan and Italy, each of which had signed one or both of the treaties, built heavy cruisers that solved this problem of protection through subverting the terms of the agreements. Germany, which was restricted by the Treaty of Versailles, nonetheless built heavy cruisers that violated this agreement: the heavy cruisers of the Prinz Eugen class and the more powerful Deutschland class originally classified as a Panzerschiff, or armored ship. The latter class of ships mounted six 11-inch guns and displaced 11,700 tons, in contravention of the 10,000-ton limit set out in the treaty.

The naval powers also produced large numbers of 6-inch-gunned light cruisers, particularly after the 1930 London Conference, as each built up to the construction limit for the type. Many of these vessels also suffered from

inadequate armor protection as a result of the restrictions of the naval treaties. An example was the British light cruiser *Arethusa*, which measured 506 feet by 51 feet and displaced 5,270 tons. It mounted six 6-inch guns and was protected primarily by an armored belt with a maximum thickness of 3 inches that only covered its machinery and ammunition spaces.

These ships were charged with the same duties as the cruisers of the World War I era, with the notable exception of reconnaissance, as airplanes now fulfilled that role. Reconnaissance duty was replaced by a new task resulting from the threat posed by airplanes to surface warships. Most interwar cruisers, particularly light cruisers, were built with large antiaircraft batteries to enable them to help protect battleships and aircraft carriers against enemy aerial attack. Some light cruiser designs were purpose-built for this role. In 1937, Great Britain built the first units of the Dido class, which became known as antiaircraft cruisers. These ships mounted 10 5.25-inch guns in dual-purpose turrets that could either be trained on surface targets or elevated to an extreme angle for use against aircraft.

By the beginning of 1940, four months after the start of World War II, interwar cruiser construction, in combination with some battle cruisers retained from World War I, had created a large world cruiser force. Great Britain maintained 3 battle cruisers, 18 heavy cruisers, and 50 light cruisers; the United States had 18 heavy cruisers and 19 light cruisers; Japan operated 18 heavy cruisers and 19 light cruisers; Italy had 7 heavy cruisers and 14 light cruisers; France maintained 7 heavy cruisers and 12 light cruisers; Germany operated 6 heavy cruisers (3 Deutschland-class Panzerschiffe and 3 Admiral Hipper-class) and 6 light cruisers; and the Soviet Union possessed 5 medium cruisers and 2 old light cruisers. These numbers were augmented by wartime construction.

Cruisers in World War II fulfilled all of the roles that naval officers in the interwar years believed to be important. These ships were particularly valuable on the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939. The German Navy, being much smaller than it had been in World War I, was not powerful enough to face the British Royal Navy in open combat. As a result, the German Navy was given the task of waging a commerce war on Great Britain’s overseas trade routes in an effort to deny that country war materials and supplies.

British cruisers were deployed to protect against these raiders. This

situation resulted in the December 13, 1939, Battle of Río de la Plata, the first naval engagement between German and Allied warships in the conflict. The battle pitted the German pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* against one British heavy cruiser and two light cruisers. The German vessel retreated to Montevideo, Uruguay, where its commander scuttled his ship rather than renew battle. British cruisers also served in the 1941 hunt for the German battleship *Bismarck* and the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen*, which had been dispatched into the Atlantic to prey on shipping. Although commerce warfare by surface warships declined somewhat after the sinking of the *Bismarck* because of the restrictions Adolf Hitler placed on their use, British cruisers continued to guard merchant convoys in the Atlantic Ocean against the occasional sortie of German warships.

The Royal Navy heavy cruiser *Exeter* took part in the Battle of the River Plate (Rio de la Plata) against the German pocket battleship *Graf Spee* on December 13, 1939, but was sunk in the Second Battle of the Java Sea on March 1, 1942. (Albert Harlingue/Roger Viollet/Getty Images)

In June 1940 with Italy's entry into the war, this duty expanded to the Mediterranean. British cruisers escorted convoys and attacked Axis shipping. Allied cruisers also performed commerce protection duties in the Arctic Ocean following Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Armed merchant cruisers on the Allied side were involved in blockade duty as well from the opening days of the war in the Atlantic. This effort was not very

effective, however, because after occupying Norway and France in 1940, the Germans had access to goods beyond those from the Soviet Union.

Cruisers also provided gunfire support for amphibious invasions not only in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Arctic theaters but also in the Pacific, following U.S. entry into the war in December 1941. Germany employed cruisers in the 1940 invasion of Norway, and the Allies utilized them during the 1942 amphibious assault in North Africa and the invasions of Sicily and Italy in 1943. They were also used to bombard and to direct fire during the June 1944 invasion of Normandy, France, Operation OVERLORD. The role of cruisers in supporting amphibious invasions proved particularly important in the Pacific, where mostly U.S. cruisers bombarded Japanese island possessions in preparation for the landing of amphibious forces.

Arguably the greatest use of cruisers in the Pacific theater was in their new role as antiaircraft protection for aircraft carriers. Throughout the conflict, cruisers received upgrades to their antiaircraft weaponry as a response to the extreme threat of air attack. New antiaircraft light cruisers augmented this force. Allied cruisers provided vital cover in operations across the Pacific theater. In the March–June 1945 battle for Okinawa, for instance, cruisers formed part of the defensive screen to prevent Japanese suicide aircraft (kamikazes) from crashing into Allied ships.

The valuable duties performed by cruisers in World War II resulted in a heavy toll of ships sunk. Japan lost 39 light and heavy cruisers. Great Britain had 27 vessels sunk, and Italy and the United States lost 13 and 12, respectively. France lost 10 cruisers, the majority scuttled to prevent their capture by the Germans following the surrender of France in 1940. The Germans lost 7 cruisers, the majority of these sunk early in the war in commerce raiding or during the invasion of Norway.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Battle Cruisers; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Caroline Islands Campaign; Central Pacific Campaign; Destroyers; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; *Indianapolis*, Sinking of; Kamikaze; Leyte Landings; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; North Cape, Battle of; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for;

Rawalpindi, Loss of; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Versailles, Treaty of

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CRUSADER, Operation (November 18–December 30, 1941)

Successful British North Africa military operation. The failure of Operations BREVITY and BATTLEAXE, the British efforts in Libya during the summer of 1941 to relieve the siege of Tobruk, spurred British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill's determination to gain a decisive victory over German general Erwin Rommel in North Africa. Disregarding advice to improve the defense of the Far East, particularly the British garrison in Singapore, Churchill rushed reinforcements to Egypt.

By November 1941, Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham's Eighth Army was significantly stronger than Rommel's Panzer Gruppe Afrika in every category. It had more than 700 tanks plus 500 in reserve and in shipment, as compared with Rommel's 174 German and 146 obsolete Italian tanks; it also had almost 700 aircraft, against 120 German and 200 Italian aircraft on Rommel's side. Moreover, Rommel had not received any German reinforcements, and the Italian infantry divisions that had been transferred to Africa lacked transport, which seriously restricted their movement in desert conditions. Rommel had, however, received large numbers of 50mm antitank guns. He had carefully husbanded all his supplies and planned to launch

another offensive to capture Tobruk, but he was preempted by General Claude Auchinleck, Allied commander in chief for the Middle East, who launched Operation CRUSADER on November 18.

Auchinleck planned for Lieutenant General A. R. Godwin-Austin's XIII Corps to pin down the Axis outposts on the Egyptian frontier at Bardia and Sollum, while Lieutenant General Willoughby Norrie's XXX Corps, comprising the mobile armored regiments, would sweep south of these fortified positions through the desert "to seek and destroy" Rommel's armored force. Auchinleck firmly believed that the backbone of Rommel's army had to be destroyed before the Eighth Army linked up with the Tobruk garrison, which would break out from the fortress. Therefore, from the outset the two corps would be operating independently.

A huge storm the night before the attack turned the desert into a quagmire and grounded Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights. The element of surprise was soon wasted, however, as the British attack became disjointed and the armored brigades became involved in piecemeal battles. The majority of the fighting took place around the escarpment of Sidi Rezegh, with the Italian-built road on which Rommel's supplies were transported at the bottom and a German airfield on top. But in a repeat of the summer offensives, the British failed to combine their armor in a concentrated blow.

The first phase of the battle, from November 18 to 23, saw hard confused fighting in which British and German tank formations were habitually intermingled in the highly fluid battle and often found themselves behind what would have been the enemy's lines had they existed. Events culminated on Sunday, November 23, aptly known in the German calendar as Totensonntag, or "Sunday of the Dead," the name by which the Germans remember this battle. Up until that day, Rommel's skillful tactics had decimated the attacking British force, which had just 70 tanks remaining in the end. But in a concentrated attack launched on November 23, Rommel lost 70 of his remaining 160 tanks.

At the end of this phase of the battle, Rommel nevertheless believed that the British armor had been smashed and was spread in disorganized chaos across the desert. Yet he knew that the British were able to sustain greater losses because they had a large reserve. He therefore decided to exploit the British confusion by striking at their vulnerability—their supplies and lines of communication. By launching a lightning thrust to the frontier, he also

planned to strike at the morale and confidence of the British troops and their commanders, as he had successfully done in the past.

Lieutenant General Ludwig Cruewell, commander of Deutsches Afrika Korps, suggested that it would be better to reorganize and salvage the vast stocks of German and British matériel abandoned on the battlefield. But on November 24, ignoring this sound advice, Rommel personally led the deep thrust with the mobile 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the Ariete Armored Division to the frontier and into the rear of the Eighth Army; he hoped this would cause panic, result in the capture British supplies, and relieve his garrisons on the border. Rommel's "dash for the wire" nearly succeeded, as he almost overran the two main British supply dumps and created a stampede among the British. Cunningham pessimistically sought permission to withdraw from the battle, but Auchinleck held command with a firm grip and replaced him as commander of the Eighth Army with Major General Neil Ritchie on November 26.

Rommel managed to link up again with his forces surrounding Tobruk, and he inflicted additional heavy losses on XIII Corps, which had advanced in an attempt to relieve Tobruk. But his losses and the strain on his supplies became too great, and on December 7, Rommel began to withdraw. Ultimately, he had to abandon his garrisons in the frontier outposts at Bardia and Sollum, with the loss of 14,000 troops, yet he withdrew with as much skill as he had shown on the battlefield and escaped, with his army still intact, from Cyrenaica back to El Algheila, where he had started nine months earlier.

For the first time in the war, the British had defeated a German army. They achieved much success in the battle, finally raising the siege of Tobruk and inflicting 33,000 casualties at a cost of only 18,000 British and Commonwealth casualties. But most of the Axis losses were Italian troops or German administrative staff who surrendered in mid-January in the border posts, whereas the British casualties were predominantly desert veterans who could not be easily replaced. Moreover, the British had failed in their principal objective of destroying Rommel's armored forces, and he was again recuperating on secure supply lines while the British attempted to prepare for the next offensive over extremely long lines of communication.

The concurrent resurgence of Axis naval power in the central Mediterranean enabled the Italians to send more supplies and reinforcements to Rommel. With additional tanks and fuel, he launched an attack on January

21, 1942, and the next day his force, which now included more Italian divisions, was renamed Panzer Armee Afrika. Rommel's probing raid again precipitated a hasty British withdrawal, and he recaptured Benghazi, but his forces were still too weak to advance beyond the British defensive positions on the Gazala Line, which ran from Gazala (35 miles west of Tobruk) 50 miles south into the desert to Bir Hacheim. There, both sides paused, recuperating and preparing for the next round of the "Benghazi Handicap" in the North African Campaign.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Afrika Korps; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon; Dorman-Smith, Eric "Chink"; Egypt; Gott, William Henry Ewart "Strafer"; North Africa Campaign; Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tobruk, Second Battle of

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Crutchley, Sir Victor Alexander Charles (1893–1986)

Royal Navy vice admiral. Born on November 2, 1893, in London, Victor Alexander Charles Crutchley served at sea in World War I and won the Victoria Cross for heroism during the action at Ostend, Belgium, in May 1918. He commanded the light cruiser *Diomede* between 1935 and 1936 and was captain of the battleship *Warspite* during 1937–1940, seeing action during the Norwegian Campaign. On April 13, 1940, he led the *Warspite* and

nine destroyers into Narvik Harbor and sank the eight German destroyers trapped there.

Crutchley next commanded the Royal Navy barracks at Devonport before being transferred to the Pacific as a rear admiral in June 1942 to take command of a squadron of Australian and U.S. ships that had recently participated in the May 7–8, 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea. His forces supported the U.S. invasion of Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. However, Crutchley's dispositions contributed to the subsequent Japanese victory in the August 8–9 Battle of Savo Island, which saw one Australian and three U.S. cruisers sunk with no Japanese losses.

Crutchley avoided official censure for the defeat and went on to participate in further operations in the Pacific, mostly in support of various amphibious landings. Promoted to vice admiral, he assumed command of Gibraltar in 1945 and remained in that post until his retirement two years later. Crutchley died in Nettlecombe, Dorset, England, on January 24, 1986.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Great Britain, Navy; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Savo Island, Battle of

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Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon (1887–1983)

British Army general. Born on May 1, 1887, in Dublin, Ireland, Alan Gordon Cunningham was the younger brother of future admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham. Alan Cunningham was commissioned in the army on graduation from the British Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1906. Decorated for his service in World War I as a member of the Royal Horse

Artillery, he was a General Staff officer at the Straits Settlements in Southeast Asia between 1919 and 1921. As a brigadier, he commanded the 1st Division of the Royal Artillery from December 1937 until September 1938, when he took command of the 5th Anti-Aircraft Division.



General Sir Alan Cunningham, British High Commissioner for Palestine, during 1945–1948. (Bettmann/Corbis)

For most of 1940, Cunningham commanded, in succession, the 66th, 9th, and 51st Infantry Divisions in Britain before assuming command of forces in Kenya in October. He was assigned the mission of conquering Italian Somalia from the south with his African 11th and 12th Divisions and the South African 1st Division. Now a major general, Cunningham led his forces in an invasion of Somalia in January, taking Kismayu on February 14 and Mogadishu on February 25, 1941. He then drove northward to Harar and on to the capital of Addis Ababa, which fell on April 6. Coordinating with

General William Platt's forces from the Sudan, Cunningham pinned Italian forces at Amba Alagi and forced their surrender. The campaign was a great success for Cunningham, who was knighted and then transferred to command the British Eighth Army in Egypt on September 10, 1941.

Beginning on November 18, the Eighth Army launched Operation CRUSADER, General Claude Auchinleck's offensive to relieve the siege of Tobruk. With scant time to prepare and as a stranger to armored warfare, Cunningham found himself outmaneuvered by Afrika Korps commander General Erwin Rommel at Sidi Rezegh, 20 miles from Tobruk. In what became known to the Germans as the Battle of Totensonntag (Sunday of the Dead), British forces suffered heavy losses, and Cunningham was forced to evacuate by plane. On November 26, Auchinleck relieved him and replaced him with General Neil M. Ritchie. Cunningham then commanded the Staff College at Camberley (1942–1943) and the Eastern Command (1944–1945).

Promoted to general, Cunningham retired in October 1946. Between 1945 and 1948, he served as the last British high commissioner to Palestine and Transjordan. Knighted a second time on his return to Britain, Cunningham died on January 30, 1983.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; CRUSADER, Operation; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; North Africa Campaign; Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Somalia; Tobruk, Second Battle of

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Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne (1883–1963)

British admiral of the fleet and first sea lord from 1943 through 1945. Born in Dublin January 7, 1883, Andrew Browne Cunningham enrolled at Stubbington House near Portsmouth to prepare for entry into the Royal Navy.

Rated a midshipman in 1898, he saw action with the Naval Brigade in the 1899–1902 South African (Second Boer) War. Although Cunningham later served in a variety of warships, he was happiest in destroyers and torpedo boats. In 1911, Cunningham took command of the destroyer *Scorpion*, remaining with it until early 1918 and spending most of World War I in the Mediterranean, the theater that became inseparably identified with his career.

Promoted to captain in 1920, Cunningham thereafter held staff positions in the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the West Indies. After being promoted to rear admiral in 1934, he commanded the destroyer flotilla in the British Mediterranean Fleet from 1934 to 1936. He then commanded the battle cruiser squadron and was second-in-command of the Mediterranean Fleet during 1937–1938. From September 1938 until June 1939, he was deputy naval chief of staff. Promoted to vice admiral and universally called "ABC," Cunningham assumed command of the Mediterranean Fleet in June 1939.

The military collapse of France and Italy's entry as an Axis belligerent in June 1940 prompted Cunningham's first significant actions in the war—the peaceful neutralization of the French fleet at Alexandria and an engagement with the Italians on July 9, 1940, off Calabria; in the latter, he pursued a powerful force returning from North Africa into Italian home waters, damaging its flagship. Four months later on November 11, 1940, with his fleet strengthened by the addition of the carrier *Illustrious*, Cunningham launched a night air attack on the Italian base at Taranto, sinking three battleships, two of which were later raised and repaired. On March 28, 1941, he fought the Italians off Cape Matapan, sinking three heavy cruisers and two destroyers and damaging a battleship. Soon afterward, however, British armies in Greece and Crete required evacuation, and Cunningham's full support of them brought severe losses to his ships from German air attacks.

British admiral of the fleet Andrew Browne Cunningham, commander of Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean. (Edward Miller/Fox Photos/Getty Images)

In June 1942, Cunningham became the Admiralty's representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Promoted to admiral of the fleet, he became Allied naval commander in chief in the Mediterranean in October 1942 and oversaw the naval aspects of Operation TORCH, the Allied landings in North Africa on November 8, 1942, as well as the Allied assaults on Sicily in July 1943 (Operation husky) and at Salerno five months later, followed by Italy's surrender and internment of the Italian fleet at Malta.

When First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound died in October 1943, Cunningham succeeded him and served in that post for the rest of the war. Often at odds with Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, Cunningham also faced growing U.S. naval dominance and a very different war in the Pacific. Ennobled in September 1945, he retired in June 1946, recognized as one of the last British admirals in the Nelson tradition. Cunningham died in London

on June 12, 1963. His younger brother, Alan Gordon Cunningham, was a much-decorated British Army general.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Calabria, Battle of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Crete, Battle of; Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of; Taranto, Attack on

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Cunningham, Sir John Henry Dacres (1885–1962)

British Royal Navy admiral of the fleet. Born on April 13, 1885, at Demerara, British Guiana, John Henry Dacres Cunningham joined the British Royal Navy in 1900 and specialized in navigation. During World War I, he served in the West Indies, in the Mediterranean, and with the Grand Fleet. Promoted to captain in 1924, Cunningham held a variety of staff and seagoing positions between the wars, acquiring an intimate knowledge of Mediterranean waters while serving there during the Abyssinian crisis (1934–1935). In 1938, he became fifth sea lord and chief of naval air services. He was promoted to vice admiral in 1939.

In early 1940, Cunningham's squadron took part in the Norway Campaign and then participated in the ill-fated Anglo-French expedition to Dakar (September 23–25). In early 1941, Cunningham was appointed fourth

sea lord, responsible for supplies and transport—a vital position in which he remained for two years, winning a knighthood in 1941. In June 1943, he became commander in chief of the Levant, one of the two Mediterranean commands; later that year, he was made commander in chief and Allied naval commander of both commands, directing British, U.S., French, and Greek vessels. Cunningham's forces were responsible for amphibious assaults at Anzio (Operation ANVIL, January 22–May 25, 1944) and in the south of France (Operation DRAGOON, August 15, 1944).

In May 1946, Cunningham took over as first sea lord from Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope (the two men were not related), thereby becoming the first navigation officer to attain the navy's highest position. As part of the British postwar economy drive, he supervised drastic cuts in the wartime fleet, including the scrapping of many serviceable vessels. In January 1948, he was promoted to admiral of the fleet, retiring in September 1948 to become chairman of the Iraq Petroleum Company, where he remained for 10 years. He died in London, on December 13, 1962.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Dakar, Attack on; DRAGOON, Operation; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Cunningham, Winfield Scott (1900–1986)

U.S. Navy rear admiral. Born in Rockfield, Wisconsin, on February 16, 1900, Winfield Scott Cunningham entered the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1916. His class graduated in 1919 because of World War I, and Cunningham was commissioned an ensign. He then held a variety of sea assignments. In 1924, Cunningham was accepted for flight training. His aviation career began

in scout planes and culminated with command of VF 5 (Fighting Five) Squadron aboard the carrier *Yorktown.*

On November 28, 1941, Commander Cunningham took charge of the naval air station under construction at Wake Island in the Pacific. His command consisted of 500 marines from the 1st Defense Battalion, 12 F-4F Wildcat aircraft of marine fighter squadron VMF 211, and various support personnel. There were also more than 1,100 civilian contractors assisting in the construction.

The Japanese attacked Wake Island beginning on December 8 (December 7 in Hawaii). For 15 days, the defenders held them off, but faced with overwhelming odds and concerned about the fate of the civilians on the island, Cunningham chose to surrender. He and his men spent the next four years in Japanese captivity. During this time, Cunningham twice attempted escape.

Cunningham was freed at the end of the war. In 1946, he took command of the seaplane tender *Curtiss.* From June 1947 until his retirement from the navy as a rear admiral in June 1950, he commanded the Naval Technical Training Center, Memphis, Tennessee. Cunningham died on March 3, 1986, in Memphis, Tennessee.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Wake Island, Battle for

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Currie, Lauchlin (1902–1993)

Economist, diplomat, and adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Born on October 8, 1902, in West Dublin, Nova Scotia, Canada, Lauchlin Currie studied at the London School of Economics and Harvard, where he taught for several years. He moved to Washington, D.C., in 1934 to work at the U.S.

Treasury and Federal Reserve Board and was Roosevelt's White House adviser on economic affairs from 1939 to 1945.

Sent to Chongqing (Chungking) in January 1941, Currie met there with Chinese leaders. He recommended that China be added to the Lend-Lease program, despite the fact that Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) was more interested in building up his strength vis-à-vis the communists than in fighting the Japanese. He helped set up the American Volunteer Group (AVG, the Flying Tigers) under Brigadier General Claire Chennault as well as a training program in the United States for Chinese pilots, and he expanded the China National Aviation Corporation.

Currie's paper to the Joint War Board in May 1941 on Chinese aircraft requirements stressed the role a Chinese air force could play in defending Singapore, the Burma Road, and the Philippines against Japanese attack and pointed out China's potential for air strikes on Japan. Currie recommended Owen Lattimore as political adviser to Jiang and argued against concessions to Japan.

In 1942, when British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill diverted supplies from China to North Africa and Jiang threatened to discontinue the war with Japan, Roose-velt dispatched Currie to Chongqing to assuage the generalissimo and to patch up strained relations between Jiang and his chief of staff, U.S. lieutenant general Joseph W. Stilwell. Currie recommended Stilwell's recall, but this action was delayed until 1944.

By 1943, when he moved to the Foreign Economic Administration, Currie had come to share Churchill's view of China as a relatively unimportant theater. In early 1945, Currie headed the Allied delegation to Bern to persuade the Swiss to block Nazi bank balances and halt the flow of German supplies through Switzerland to Italy.

Part of Currie's work involved negotiating with the Soviets on wartime and postwar loan agreements and other matters. When his name appeared in partially decrypted Soviet cables between Moscow and Washington—the so-called Venona Papers—some believed that Currie was a Soviet agent. He appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee in August 1948 to deny these allegations. Although no charges resulted, U.S. authorities refused to renew Currie's passport in 1954 because he had taken up residence in Colombia following his appointment as the head of a World Bank mission there between 1949 and 1950 and his subsequent marriage to a Colombian. In

1958, Currie became a Colombian citizen; he was that government's chief economic adviser until his death in Bogota on December 23, 1993.

ROGER J. SANDILANDS

See also

Chennault, Claire Lee; China; Flying Tigers; Jiang Jieshi; Lend-Lease; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Curtin, John Joseph (1885–1945)

Australian politician and prime minister (1941–1945). Born at Creswick, Victoria, Australia, on January 8, 1885, John Joseph Curtin became a printer and trade union activist. During World War I, he was imprisoned for his activities as secretary of the Anti-Conscription League. In 1917, Curtin switched to journalism, editing the Perth-based weekly *Westralian Worker*. Eleven years later, he was elected a Labour Member of Parliament from Fremantle, a position he held with only one break—between 1931 and 1934—until his death; he also became head of the Labour Party in 1935.

In the crisis-ridden late 1930s, Curtin's party split over foreign policy, but he favored extensive rearmament and closer alignment with the United States. When World War II began in 1939, he refused to join the coalition government headed by Sir Robert Menzies but pledged his party's support for the war effort. On October 3, 1941, Curtin became prime minister; he remained in that post until his death almost four years later.

Curtin emphasized his country's growing autonomy from Britain by making a separate Australian declaration of war on Japan following that country's attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941). Curtin infuriated both Winston L. S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt by refusing to allow Australian troops returning from the Middle East to divert to Burma. He called for greater Australian reliance on the United States and, from the

spring of 1942, worked closely with U.S. commander in the South Pacific General Douglas MacArthur in demanding more British and U.S. resources for the Pacific theater. Curtin nonetheless resented Australia's exclusion from many critical wartime decisions. He died at Canberra, Australia, on July 5, 1945.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Australia; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; MacArthur, Douglas; Menzies, Robert; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Document 139

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Curzon Line

Boundary between Poland and Russia drawn after World War I that figured in discussions during and after World War II concerning Poland's eastern frontier. The Curzon Line was a major factor in the tangled issue of Poland's post–World War II borders.

In the fluid situation in the east following World War I, leaders of the Big Four powers of Britain, France, Italy, and the United States decided to leave the boundary between Poland and Russia to subsequent demarcation. In December 1919, a commission headed by British foreign secretary Lord Curzon proposed a boundary line. Known as the Curzon Line, in the north it divided Suvalki Province between Poland and Lithuania, then extended southward toward Grodno before running west to the Bug River. It followed the Bug past the great city of Brest-Litovsk to Sokoly, then ran west around the fortress city of Przemysl before heading south to the Carpathians and the border of the new state of Czechoslovakia.

Neither Poland nor Russia accepted the Curzon Line. Poland won the Russo-Polish War (1919–1921) and, in the resultant Treaty of Riga of March

1921, pushed its border well to the east of the Curzon Line, near to what had been the Polish-Russian frontier of 1792. Recovering territory to the Curzon Line was a major goal of post–World War I Soviet diplomacy.

In late August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a nonaggression pact that made it possible for Germany to invade Poland, beginning World War II. The treaty also included a territorial division of Poland and the Baltic states, in which the Soviet Union received much of eastern Poland. Soviet troops invaded and seized this territory in mid-September 1939, but the Germans took it themselves during their June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.

In subsequent discussions between the Soviet Union and its Western allies, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin insisted that the Curzon Line be the western boundary for the Soviet Union. It was difficult for the Western powers not to agree with this, for the line had been drawn by the Western powers, but such an agreement would sanction Soviet incorporation of its 1939 gains at the expense of Poland. At the Tehran Conference of November–December 1943, there was much discussion of Poland's borders. Stalin, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt all agreed on the Oder River as the future boundary of Poland with Germany.

There was, however, no agreement by the Western leaders on a tributary of the Oder, the Western Neisse River, as the southern demarcation line. Nor did the West sanction Poland taking from Germany the important port of Stettin on the west bank of the Oder. The three did agree that Poland would receive most of East Prussia, although the Soviet Union claimed the Baltic port of Königsberg (later renamed by them Kaliningrad) and land to the northeast. There was no major opposition from Western leaders to the Curzon Line as the eastern boundary of Poland, although the British did object to Soviet seizure of the predominantly Po-lish city of L'viv (Lvov, Lwow, Lemberg).

Stalin insisted that the Soviet Union required security against a future German attack. Obviously a Poland that would be compensated for the loss of eastern territory to the Soviet Union by being given German territory in the west would necessarily have to look to the Soviet Union for security, and Churchill had the difficult task of having to sell all these arrangements to the Polish government-in-exile in London. Stalin refused normal diplomatic

relations with the so-called London Poles, because no independent Polish government could ever concede changes that put the country at the mercy of the Soviets. A Polish government subservient to Moscow thus proved inevitable.

The Yalta Conference of February 1945 confirmed the decisions reached early at Tehran regarding Poland's eastern border, with but slight modification. This meant the loss to Poland of some 52,000 square miles of territory in the east. The Allies were more strenuous in objecting to the Oder-Neisse line as its western boundary, and there was no agreement on this matter at Yalta.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Poland; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; Yalta Conference

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Czechoslovakia

Central European nation established in late 1918 after the defeat of the Hapsburg Empire in World War I. In the years leading up to World War II, Czechoslovakia bordered Germany to the west and north, Poland to the north, Romania to the east, and Austria and Hungary to the south.

In 1938, the Republic of Czechoslovakia had the highest standard of living and was the only democracy in Central Europe. It also had an intractable minorities problem that made it vulnerable to neighboring states, especially Germany. Czechoslovakia had a population of about 15 million, but only about 7 million—not even a majority—were Czechs. Three million were Germans, 2.5 million were Slovaks, and 1 million were Hungarians. In

addition, there were about half a million Ukrainians living in Ruthenia and a number of Poles.

Czechoslovakia had been formed from a union of Bohemia and Moravia, which had long been part of the Hapsburg and Holy Roman Empires, and Slovakia, which had been part of the Kingdom of Hungary. The 1919 Paris Peace Conference also awarded it Ruthenia to provide a land connection with Romania. With Romania and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia formed the so-called Little Entente. The Czechs had a firm alliance with France as well as one of Europe's most important arms-manufacturing centers in the Skoda Works at Pilsen. It also had an excellent 400,000-man army. These facts, however, counted for little when the French and British, under heavy pressure from German leader Adolf Hitler at the September 1938 Munich Conference, forced the Czech government headed by President Edvard Beneš to yield to Germany the Sudetenland, with its largely German population. This area contained the natural defenses of the new state. Hungary and Poland also seized territory, and Slovakia proclaimed its independence on March 14.

German troops entering Waldhaeusl in Czechoslovakia, October 3, 1938. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Then, on March 15, 1939, Hitler broke his pledge to respect what remained of Czechoslovakia and occupied the remainder of the state. Acquiring it was a tremendous boost to the Germans militarily, for 35 highly trained and well-equipped Czechoslovak divisions disappeared from the anti-German order of battle. Hitler had also eliminated the threat from what he had referred to as “that damned airfield,” and the output of the Skoda arms complex would now supply the Reich’s legions.

In Bohemia and Moravia, the Wehrmacht absorbed 1,582 aircraft, 2,000 artillery pieces, and sufficient equipment to arm 20 divisions. Any increase in armaments that Britain and France achieved by March 1939 was more than counterbalanced by German gains in Czechoslovakia. There, the Germans secured nearly a third of the tanks they deployed in the west in the spring of 1940, and between August 1938 and September 1939 Skoda produced nearly as many arms as all British arms factories combined.

The Germans organized their new acquisition as the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. The Slovak lands became the Republic of Slovakia, a vassal state ruled by the Slovak People’s Party headed by Roman Catholic priest Monseigneur Jozef Tiso. The eastern province of Ruthenia (Trans-Carpatho-Ukraine) was ceded to Hungary.

The Germans immediately disbanded the Czech military, allowing President Emile Hácha only a small ceremonial guard. Although long-term German plans for the protectorate included the removal of the Slavic population and its replacement by Germans, initial German occupation policies were much more lenient than in the remainder of Central and Eastern Europe, inspired by the goal of exploiting Czechoslovak industry and resources without inciting revolt. Student protests against German rule in October 1939, on the anniversary of the independence of Czechoslovakia, did bring closure of the universities and the execution of nine students.

On April 16, 1940, Baron Konstantin Hermann Karl von Neurath became reichsprotector of Bohemia-Moravia after the departure of the military governor, Colonel General Johannes von Blaskowitz. Berlin became dissatisfied with Neurath’s lack of harsh measures to curb protests, however, and on September 27, 1941, he was replaced by head of the Reich Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) Reinhard Heydrich. The latter declared martial law and carried out a series of arrests that destroyed the leadership of the student protests and other Czechoslovak national opposition.

On March 27, 1942, a group of British-trained Czechoslovak commandos ambushed Heydrich's car in Prague and mortally wounded him. He died on June 4. The German Gestapo (secret police) then instituted a wave of terror during a period of martial law that lasted until July. Acts included the destruction of the villages of Lidice and Lezaky and the murder of most of their inhabitants.

On August 20, 1943, Wilhelm Frick was appointed reichs-protector. Hans Frank, minister of state for Bohemia and Moravia, exercised real authority. The level of active Czech resistance remained relatively low and consisted chiefly of providing intelligence information.

Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš had gone abroad in October 1938, and he established a Czech government-in-exile, first in Paris and then in London. In the summer of 1942, he secured official British and Free French repudiation of the 1938 Munich Agreement. But Beneš stressed accommodation with the Soviet Union. Thus, he traveled to Moscow to sign a formal treaty of alliance with the Soviets on July 18, 1941. He sought a democratic, independent Czechoslovakia that would be a bridge between East and West.

During the war, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile contributed an armored brigade to the Allied cause—some 5,000 men who fought with British forces in the Normandy Campaign. Czechoslovak pilots participated in the 1940 Battle of Britain, and four Czechoslovak squadrons (three fighter and one bomber) served with the Royal Air Force during the war. Czechoslovak military units were also formed on Soviet territory, including by the summer of 1943 the 1st Czechoslovak Parachute Brigade of some 2,500 men. The 2nd Czechoslovak Parachute Brigade was formed in 1944, and it participated in an uprising in Slovakia against the government there in August 1944. Czechoslovak military units in the Soviet Union ultimately established the I Czechoslovakian Corps, which distinguished itself in the fighting to cross the Carpathian Mountains. The Soviets also formed the 1st Czechoslovakian Fighter Regiment, which evolved into the 1st Czechoslovakian Air Division by the end of the war.

On May 5, 1945, a general uprising occurred in Bohemia and Moravia against the Germans, centered on the city of Prague as Soviet marshal Ivan Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front approached from the east and U.S. lieutenant general George S. Patton's Third Army drove on the capital from the west.

The Czechoslovak government-in-exile appealed to supreme commander of Allied Expeditionary Force General Dwight D. Eisenhower for assistance, but he refused to allow Patton to intercede. The Germans reinforced with two divisions, but they had no tanks or artillery and were halted by General Andrei Vlasov's 1st Division, which had deserted from the Germans. On May 9, Vlasov's troops cleared the remaining Germans from Prague, taking some 10,000 prisoners. The next day, Konev's troops entered the city. The Germans formally surrendered on May 11. During the war, an estimated 350,000 people in the protectorate died as a result of the German occupation.

Meanwhile, Tiso's Slovak People's Party ruled Slovakia. Tiso's wartime independent Slovak government was dominated by fascist, anti-Czech, anti-Semitic elements, represented by personalities such as Karol Sidor and Alexander Mach, who were supported by a paramilitary organization known as the Hlinka Guards. The war stimulated economic growth in Slovakia, and on November 24, 1940, Slovakia signed the Anti-Comintern and Tripartite Pacts. Its military commitment to the Axis was two divisions, comprising some 50,000 men. Slovakia adopted a resettlement program for its Jewish population in August 1940, and it enacted a Nuremberg-type anti-Jewish code on September 10, 1941.

An uprising by Slovaks against the Tiso government was crushed by German military intervention in the form of 40,000 troops by October. The Soviets were unable to provide military assistance to the resistance. At the end of the war, Tiso's government retreated with German forces into Austria in April 1945, and Tiso surrendered there to U.S. forces on May 8, 1945.

Beneš's cherished hopes of an independent democratic Czechoslovakia after the war were not realized. In 1948, the communists seized power in the country.

NEVILLE PANTHAKI AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Beneš, Edvard; Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von; Britain, Battle of; Collaboration; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Frick, Wilhelm; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Lidice Massacre; Munich Conference and Preliminaries; Neurath, Konstantin Hermann Karl von; Partisans/Guerrillas; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Resistance; Tiso, Jozef; Vlasov, Andrei Andreyevich

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D

Dai Li (1896–1946)

Chinese Nationalist chief of intelligence and security. Born in Jiangshan (Kiangshan), Zhejiang (Chekiang), on May 28, 1896, Dai Li (Tai Li) spent his 20s with the Green Gangsters in Shanghai, where he met Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). In September 1926, Dai enrolled at the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy. Expelled in June 1927 for corruption, Dai returned to Shanghai and continued to serve Jiang as an intelligence officer, ensuring the success of the Nationalists' Northern Expedition of 1926–1928 through his connections with the gangsters.

In December 1931, following the September 18 Japanese invasion of Shenyang in Liaoning Province, Jiang appointed Dai as director of the newly created Second Department of the Investigation and Statistics Bureau under the Guomindang Military Affairs Commission. The agency engaged in anti-Japanese espionage, counterespionage, and clandestine operations against domestic opponents, including the Chinese Communists.

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), Dai was in complete control of the Nationalist government's intelligence apparatus, earning the nickname "China's Himmler." In March 1938, Dai was invited to join the GMD. He became director of the Second Bureau of Investigation and Statistics under the Military Affairs Commission. In 1940, Dai also directed the Bureau of Control for Communications, the Anti-Smuggling Bureau, and the Commodity Transport Control Bureau. In these capacities, he had charge of the training of secret police and special agents, guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines, infiltration into the Japanese puppet regime in Nanjing (Nanking), and subversive activities in Japanese-occupied areas as well as assassinations of Japanese agents and Chinese traitors.

Dai's other important duty was to continue anti–Chinese Communist operations. In the summer of 1939, he ordered the murder of a Chinese

Communist general stationed in the Eighth Route Army's office in Xi'an (Sian), Shaanxi (Shensi). He also ordered Ye Ting's detention after the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941.

Meanwhile, Dai opened contact with the Americans; this action led to the establishment of the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO) in April 1943. Dai served SACO as commander. Captain Milton E. Miles, U.S. Navy observer at Chongqing (Chungking) in Sichuan (Szechwan) and director of the operations of the Office of Strategic Services in China, was deputy commander, specializing in intelligence and security works. SACO established 12 training camps and 14 weather stations in China, which substantially aided the Allied military effort against Japan.

Following the war, Dai was responsible for the persecution of more than 3,000 former Japanese puppet officials and national traitors. On March 17, 1946, Dai died in a plane crash near Nanjing. Jiang ordered a day of national mourning on May 30, reflecting Dai's important status.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; New Fourth Army Incident; Sino-Japanese War; Ye Ting

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Dakar, Attack on (September 23–25, 1940)

The Allied effort to capture the Vichy-held West African port of Dakar. Following the defeat of France by the Germans in June 1940, the French government, now based in the spa town of Vichy, retained control of the French colonial empire. On August 26, however, the governor of French Equatorial Africa, Félix Eboué, proclaimed his allegiance to General Charles de Gaulle's Free French, based in London. Shortly thereafter, Free French agents secured the Middle Congo. Encouraged by these events, de Gaulle

convinced British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill that he could occupy Dakar, the capital of French West Africa, with little or no bloodshed.

Strategically located in the most westerly part of Africa, Dakar boasted an excellent deepwater port and was equidistant from Europe and Brazil. The British feared that the Germans might pressure the Vichy French to allow them to use Dakar as a base to attack British shipping. De Gaulle pressed for an attack, eager to expand his power base in Africa, show himself a key Allied leader, and encourage other French African territories to rally to his cause. The resulting joint British–Free French plan was named Operation MENACE.

Previously on July 8, British aircraft flying from the carrier *Hermes* had attacked and immobilized the modern French battleship *Richelieu* at Dakar. This operation followed the British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria on July 3–4 and caused great bitterness, particularly within the French Navy. Despite these aggressive actions, both Churchill and de Gaulle believed that the French authorities at Dakar were sympathetic to their cause.

Operation MENACE involved 24 warships, including the battleships *Barham* and *Resolution*, the aircraft carrier *Ark Royal*, 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 5 sloops, 3 of which were Free French. These warships escorted 11 transports carrying 7,900 troops, 3,600 of whom were Free French. If the authorities at Dakar failed to rally to the Free French, the Free French troops would go ashore; British forces were to be employed only in an emergency.

Soldiers in the ruins of a government building in Dakar, after the Allied attack of September 23–25, 1940. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Operation MENACE was plagued with problems from the beginning. The Allies lacked a clear picture of the strength of the Dakar defenses, which included the battleship *Richelieu*, 2 light cruisers, 3 large destroyers, 1 fleet destroyer, 6 sloops, and 3 submarines. The cruisers and large destroyers had sailed from Toulon to put down the rebellion in French Equatorial Africa and arrived at Dakar just in advance of the Allied force.

On September 23, the French administrator at Dakar, Pierre Boisson, refused to talk to the Free French negotiators, and the French coastal batteries at Dakar opened fire on the British ships when they came into view. The British ships returned fire. The shore batteries inflicted heavy damage on one cruiser and light damage on another and on two destroyers. The heavy cruiser HMAS *Australia* disabled the large French destroyer *L'Audacieux*, and

destroyers sank the French submarine *Persée.* The defenders repulsed a halfhearted landing attempt by Free French troops.

The British resumed their bombardment on the second day, September 24, but despite the heavy shelling, the *Richelieu* took only one light hit; in return, shore batteries landed four shells on the *Resolution.* The French submarine *Ajax* was sunk.

In the battle's third day, the French submarine *Beveziers* torpedoed and severely damaged the battleship *Resolution.* After the *Australia* and *Barham* suffered hits, the British commander called off the attack. Demonstrating that there was a danger of all-out war against Vichy, French bombers raided Gibraltar on September 24 and again the next day—dropping 105 tons of bombs but causing little damage.

The failure of Operation MENACE was a blow to British and Free French prestige and demonstrated British inexperience in combined operations. It also revealed that the French did not believe that the British cause was their own and severely damaged the relationship between de Gaulle and Churchill. The Vichy French government regarded Dakar as a great victory. As a result of Operation MENACE, Adolf Hitler saw some utility in Vichy France's assistance. It also convinced him that Vichy would defend French Africa against the Allies and the Free French.

C. J. HORN

See also

Africa; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; France; France, Navy; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Vichy France

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Daladier, Édouard (1884–1970)

French politician and premier. Born on June 18, 1884, at Carpentras, Department of Vaucluse, Édouard Daladier was educated at the École Normale and at the Sorbonne before becoming a history teacher at the Lycée Condorcet in Paris. He served in the French Army during World War I and fought at Verdun.

In 1919, Daladier was elected to the Chamber of Deputies from the Vaucluse as a radical socialist. He was minister of colonies in 1924 and premier from January to October 1933. Daladier formed another cabinet in January 1934 but resigned the next month over the Stavisky Scandal.

Daladier helped bring the Radicals into the leftist Popular Front coalition with the socialists and communists during the 1936 national elections. On the collapse of the Popular Front, he again became premier in April 1938. Under heavy pressure from British prime minister Neville Chamberlain and despite France's treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, Daladier agreed at the September 1938 Munich Conference to Adolf Hitler's demands for the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. Unlike Chamberlain, he had no illusions that the agreement had secured peace.

Daladier then did what he could to prepare France for war. On the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, he led France into war against Germany. Angered by the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, he reacted by outlawing the Communist Party and arresting its leaders. Criticized for France's military inaction during the so-called Phony War and its failure to assist Finland in that nation's war against the Soviet Union, Daladier was forced to resign on March 20, 1940, replaced by Paul Reynaud. Daladier remained in the cabinet, however, as minister of war until the defeat of France in June 1940.

On June 21, 1940, Daladier and other cabinet ministers sailed from Bordeaux for North Africa in an effort to set up a government-in-exile, but new chief of state General Henri Pétain ordered them arrested. Daladier was among those brought to trial at Riom in 1942 by the collaborationist Vichy government on charges of having caused the French defeat. The trial turned

into an embarrassment for the government and was suspended, but Daladier remained in custody. In 1943 he was removed as a prisoner to Germany.

Released in April 1945, Daladier was one of the few leaders of the Third Republic to continue in politics during the Fourth Republic. Reelected a deputy, he served in the National Assembly from 1946 until 1958. Daladier died at Paris on October 10, 1970.

WILLIAM L. KETCHERSID AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; France; Munich Conference and Preliminaries; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul; Document 45

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d'Aosta, Duca

See Savoia, Amedeo Umberto di

D'Aquino, Iva Ikuko Toguri

See "Tokyo Rose"

Darby, William Orlando (1911–1945)

U.S. Army officer credited with establishment of the U.S. Rangers. Born on February 9, 1911, at Fort Smith, Arkansas, William Orlando Darby graduated

from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1933 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of field artillery. During the next seven years, he held several routine assignments and was promoted to captain in October 1940. He then commanded a battery of the 99th Field Artillery Regiment (1941–1942).

In June 1942, Brigadier General Lucian K. Truscott Jr. selected Darby to put together an elite force similar to the British commandos. The name "Rangers" derived from the force of the same name led by Major Robert Rogers during the French and Indian War (1754–1765). Promoted to temporary major, Darby trained his men at Achnacarry, Scotland, under the guidance of British commandos.

The U.S. Rangers were seen as elite troops to be employed in hit-and-run commando raids. A charismatic person, Darby believed in leadership by example, from the front. Officially, he commanded only the 1st Ranger Battalion, but he also trained and led the 3rd and 4th Battalions. In December 1943, Darby was promoted to colonel and given command of all three battalions.

Darby's Rangers, as his force came to be known, were first committed in combat during the ill-fated August 19, 1942, raid on Dieppe. In November 1942, six companies performed well in Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of French North Africa, then under Vichy control. The companies also participated in Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily. In the September 9, 1943, invasion of Italy at Salerno, four U.S. Ranger battalions and the British 41st Commando secured the coast at Maiori. After the destruction of the 1st and 3rd Battalions at Anzio (January 22–May 25, 1944), Darby was assigned to the Operations Division of the War Department's General Staff.

Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby (right) congratulated by Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr., in Gela, Sicily, August 1943. (Bob Landry/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Darby returned to Italy in March 1945 as deputy commander of the 10th Mountain Division. On April 30, 1945, only a week before the end of the war in Europe, he was struck and killed in northern Italy by a German shell fragment. Darby was posthumously promoted to brigadier general.

ROY B. PERRY III

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Dieppe Raid; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.; United States Army

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Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François (1881–1942)

French Navy admiral. Born on August 7, 1881, in Nérac, Lot-et-Garonne Department, France, Jean Louis Xavier Darlan graduated from the École Navale in 1902. A specialist in naval gunnery, he served in the Far East on cruisers and then in the Mediterranean. Promoted to commander in 1912, Darlan was then an instructor on the training cruiser *Jeanne d'Arc*. During World War I, Darlan commanded heavy naval artillery on land. He was promoted to commander in July 1918 and took charge of the Rhine Flotilla.

Promoted to captain in August 1920, Darlan was assigned to the Far East, where he commanded cruisers. He was promoted to rear admiral in November 1929 and played an important role in the reorganization of the navy. He next commanded naval forces in Algeria and then a cruiser division in the Mediterranean. Promoted to vice admiral in December 1932, Darlan took charge of the Atlantic Squadron during 1934–1936. He was then chief of the French naval staff.

Darlan was promoted to admiral of the fleet in June 1939 and took command of the French Navy. Following the June 1940 defeat of France, he joined the collaborationist Vichy government of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain as navy minister. In February 1941, Darlan also became vice premier and minister of the interior, and in August 1941 he was made minister of defense. He was also Pétain's designated successor.

An Anglophobe, especially after Operation CATAPULT (July 1940) and the killing of French sailors by the British at Mers-el-Kébir on July 3, 1940, Darlan hoped to win concessions for France through military agreements with the Germans. His May 1941 meeting with Adolf Hitler led to an agreement with German ambassador Otto Abetz. In the Paris Protocols, France granted major concessions to Germany in Africa and the Middle East, but the Germans gave little in return.

By April 1942, Darlan's rival Pierre Laval forced him to relinquish his cabinet posts, except that of commander of the armed forces. Darlan traveled frequently to North Africa and was in Algiers when, on November 8, the Allies invaded in Operation TORCH. Darlan agreed to cooperate with the

Allies and to order a cease-fire on November 10 in return for recognition of his authority. The deal was confirmed on November 11 with U.S. major general Mark Clark and Ambassador Robert Murphy. President Franklin D. Roo-se-velt approved it, although some Allied leaders denounced the agreement as an immoral act that gained little.

Many people, including Allied leaders, wanted to see Darlan removed, and on December 24, 1942, 20-year-old French royalist Fernand Bonnier broke into Darlan's office in Algiers and shot him twice with a pistol. Darlan died two hours later. Bonnier was captured, tried, and executed two days afterward. The assassination of Darlan is shrouded in mystery and has been variously attributed to the United States, Britain, the Free French, French monarchists, and even the Germans.

WILLIAM P. HEAD AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

CATAPULT, Operation; Clark, Mark Wayne; France; France, Navy; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Pétain, Henri Philippe; TORCH, Operation; Vichy France

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Darwin, Raid on (February 19, 1942)

First direct Japanese attack on Australia during the war. In early 1942, Japanese forces moved inexorably down through the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula and into the Netherlands East Indies. To secure Java and protect landings at Timor, the Japanese high command decided to attack Darwin, a port city on Australia's north coast used by the Allies to ferry aircraft, troops, and equipment to the East Indies. Commander Fuchida Mitsuo planned the raid, centered on the four aircraft carriers of Vice

Admiral Nagumo Chūichi's First Air Fleet and a covering force of two battleships and three heavy cruisers under Vice Admiral Kondō Nobutake. It was the most powerful Japanese strike force since the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor.

On February 19, 1942, the Japanese carriers in the Timor Sea launched 188 aircraft against Darwin in two waves. Fifty-four land-based bombers joined them. A U.S. Navy PBY Catalina radioed a warning of the first wave but was then shot down. News reached Darwin just as 10 U.S. Army Air Forces P-40s of 33rd Pursuit Squadron returned following an aborted attempt to reinforce Java. Five P-40s remained airborne to face the Japanese. The remaining five attempted to take off just as the Japanese planes arrived at about 10:00 a.m. Japanese Zeros claimed 9 of the P-40s in the air; the survivor landed with severe damage. The second Japanese raid occurred two hours later.

The aftermath of a raid by Japanese aircraft on Darwin, Australia, February 19, 1942.

(Bettmann/Corbis)

The Japanese sank eight ships, including the U.S. destroyer *Peary*, and damaged another nine. Wharves and jetties suffered extensive damage, and 18 Allied aircraft were destroyed. The human toll was also high: some 500 to 600 people were killed or wounded. The Japanese accomplished all this at a cost of only 10 aircraft lost. This raid succeeded in its objective of assisting the Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies. Japanese attacks on Darwin continued during the next several months.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Australia; Fuchida Mitsuo; Kondō Nobutake; Nagumo Chūichi; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of

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Davis, Benjamin Oliver, Jr. (1912–2002)

U.S. Air Force general. Born on December 18, 1912, in Washington, D.C., Benjamin Oliver Davis Jr. was the son of Benjamin O. Davis Sr., the first U.S. African American general officer. The younger Davis attended Western Reserve University and the University of Chicago. He then secured an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he endured four years of isolation because of racial discrimination. He graduated in 1936 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry.

In July 1941 as a captain, Davis was one of the first members of a new pilot training program for African Americans at Tuskegee, Alabama. He completed training in March 1942. Tuskegee graduates formed the basis for Lieutenant Colonel Davis's 99th Pursuit Squadron, which flew Curtiss P-40N

Warhawks. Following four months of combat in the Mediterranean theater, Davis returned to the United States to assume command of the 332nd Fighter Group with North American P-51 Mustangs, which he led in Italy in January 1944. Davis flew 60 missions and was promoted to colonel in March 1944.

After the war, Davis returned to the United States to command the racially troubled 477th Composite Group at Godman Field, Kentucky. In 1949 he attended the Air War College, and he was then assigned to Washington, D.C., as deputy chief of operations in the Fighter Branch. In October 1954 Davis was promoted to brigadier general, the first African American U.S. Air Force officer to hold that rank. He served as vice commander, Thirteenth Air Force, and then headed the Twelfth Air Force in Germany from 1957 to 1959. Promoted to major general in June 1959, Davis returned to Washington in July 1961 as the director of Manpower and Organization. In April 1965 he was promoted to lieutenant general and became chief of staff of U.S. forces in Korea and the United Nations Command. He then became deputy commander of the U.S. Strike Command.

Davis retired in February 1970. In 1971 he became assistant director of the Department of Transportation to establish the Sky Marshals program until 1975. He then served on various corporate boards. Promoted to general on the retired list in December 1998, Davis died in Washington, D.C., on July 4, 2002.

TROY D. MORGAN

See also

African Americans in World War II; Davis, Benjamin Oliver, Sr.; Tuskegee Airmen; United States Army Air Forces

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Davis, Benjamin Oliver, Sr. (1877–1970)

U.S. Army brigadier general and the first African American general in the U.S. military. Born on July 1, 1877, in Washington, D.C., Benjamin Oliver Davis enrolled at Howard University in 1897 but left school the next year to join the U.S. 8th Volunteer Infantry Regiment. As a lieutenant during the Spanish-American War in 1898 he saw no action, but in 1899 he enlisted as a private in the regular army. Davis was commissioned a second lieutenant in the 10th Cavalry in 1901. He was military attaché to Liberia (1909–1911), professor of military science at Wilberforce University (1906–1911, 1915–1917, 1929–1930, and 1937–1938), supply officer for the 9th Cavalry in the Philippines (1917–1920), instructor with the Ohio National Guard (1924–1928), and professor of military science at Tuskegee Institute (1921–1924 and 1931–1937).

At the beginning of World War II, Davis was one of only two African American officers in the combat arms branches of the U.S. Army. The other was his son, Benjamin O. Davis Jr. In October 1940 on the recommendation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Davis Sr. was promoted to brigadier general, the first African American in U.S. military history to reach general officer rank.

Davis retired from the army in 1941 but was recalled to active duty as an assistant to the inspector general of the army, serving in the European theater of operations as an adviser on race relations. At the same time, he fought to end segregation and discrimination within the armed forces. Davis remained in the inspector general's office until his final retirement in 1948. He continued to urge desegregation in the military, which was achieved when President Harry S. Truman ordered full integration of the U.S. armed forces in July 1948.

In the years following his retirement, Davis served on numerous civilian boards and the Battle Monuments Commission. He died in Chicago on November 26, 1970.

NICHOLAS W. BARCHESKI

See also

Davis, Benjamin Oliver, Jr.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; United States Army

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Da Zara, Alberto (1889–1951)

Italian Navy admiral. Born in Padua on April 8, 1889, into a family of Jewish background, Alberto Da Zara entered the Italian Naval Academy in 1907 and was commissioned in 1911. He participated in the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War and in World War I, earning promotion for his service and two Silver Medals for bravery as commander of motor torpedo boats.

Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1923, Da Zara commanded a naval detachment in China from 1924 to 1925 and then served in the headquarters of the Venice Naval Command. In 1927 he was promoted to commander, and in 1930 he was appointed deputy commander of the battleship *Duilio.* Later he commanded other warships, including the cruiser *Montecuccoli*, in which he made a long cruise in the Far East during 1933 and was promoted to captain. He commanded the cruiser *Aosta* during its February 12, 1937, shelling of Republican positions at Valencia during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War.

Promoted to commodore in 1939, Da Zara then commanded the Albanian Naval Command. When Italy entered the war in June 1940, Da Zara commanded the *Di Giussano* group of the IV Division, in which he participated in the Battle of Calabria on July 9, 1940. Da Zara then received command of the Venice Arsenal, and from August 1941 to March 1942, he headed the Anti-Submarine Inspectorate.

Promoted to division admiral (rear admiral), in March 1942, Da Zara took command of the VII Division with his flag in the cruiser *Eugenio di Savoia.* He commanded the Italian forces in the Battle of Pantelleria on June 15, 1942, during Operation HARPOON, for which he was awarded the Military Order of Savoy. He then carried out several actions with light vessels.

In August 1943, Da Zara became commander of the V Division, with his flag in the battleship *Duilio.* He held the command during the armistice with the Allies, and, upon receiving orders from the Italian naval command, he

proceeded to Malta with his division. On March 10, 1944, Da Zara was promoted to vice admiral and became inspector of naval forces, with his flag in the battleship *Giulio Cesare.*

With his notable service at sea and his recognized bravery under fire, Da Zara was arguably the most effective Italian admiral of the war. He retired in September 1946, wrote his war memoirs, and died in Foggia on June 4, 1951.

ALESSANDRO MASSIGNANI

See also

Calabria, Battle of; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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De Bono, Emilio (1866–1944)

Italian marshal and government figure. Born on March 16, 1866, at Cassano d'Adda, Emilio De Bono graduated from military schools in nearby Milan and in 1883 began a long army career, which he chronicled in many diaries. A self-styled warrior, De Bono sought challenging commands in the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War and during World War I. He was promoted to major general and twice decorated for valor in 1916. Friction with a superior led to an inactive posting in Albania until he was recalled to corps command in Italy. He turned back an Austrian attack at Grappa in 1918.

Restive after the war, De Bono, who had never evinced interest in politics, was tempted by the bombast of Gabriele D'Annunzio's nationalistic expedition to occupy Fiume in 1919 to join that campaign. However, ambivalent careerist instincts held him in check. Still lacking any warrior role or prospects, by 1921 De Bono settled for membership in the Fascist Party as a vehicle for self-promotion. Although his military skills were pivotal in organizing the October 1922 March on Rome, they did not advance him politically, despite his appointments as chief of public security in November 1922 and commander of the fascist militia in January 1923.

After his perceived failure to prevent the June 1924 murder of socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti by the militia, De Bono was indicted but refused to implicate his superiors. Acquitted in 1925 and rewarded with the governorship of Tripolitania, by 1928 De Bono was planning the eventual war with Ethiopia. He had some success early in that war, including a victory at Adowa, but his slow pace irked Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who replaced him in November 1935 with his rival, Pietro Badoglio. De Bono demanded and received promotion to marshal immediately thereafter.

Serving ignominiously in largely ceremonial or honorary posts for the remainder of his career, De Bono soon soured on Mussolini, decried Italian-German war plans, and eventually joined in the fascist Grand Council's July 1943 ouster of Il Duce, for which he was arrested by the German occupiers October 4, 1943. Tried at Verona, the old general was sentenced to death with, among others, Mussolini's son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano, whom De Bono joined before a firing squad on January 11, 1944.

GORDON E. HOGG

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; Ciano, Galeazzo, Conte di Cortellazo; Italo-Ethiopian War; Italy; Mussolini, Benito

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Deception

A long-established and often essential element of warfare, deception consists of actions designed to deliberately mislead enemy decision makers as to one's capabilities, intentions, and operations. Deception causes an enemy to take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission and weaken the enemy's strategic or tactical position. All major participants carried out deception operations during World War II.

Deception supports military operations by causing adversaries to misallocate resources in time, place, quantity, or effectiveness. A deceptive operation generally appears to be real to make the enemy believe that pretended hostile activities are genuine. By inducing a false sense of danger in one area, an enemy is forced to strengthen defenses there, weakening them where the real assault is intended to occur.

Deception theorists cite these overarching principles: the decision maker is the target; the deception must cause a specific action (simply having an enemy believe something is not sufficient); centralized control avoids self-confusion and conflict with other friendly operations; security is required so that the enemy does not discover the ruse; timeliness is key, as an enemy requires time to collect and analyze the deception-supporting signs; and friendly intelligence must confirm the desired enemy actions. Finally, integrating the deception with an actual operation adds credibility and enemy uncertainty.

A cover operation is a form of deception that leads the enemy to decide that genuine hostile activities are harmless. Cover induces a false sense of security by disguising the preparations for the real attack so that when it comes, the enemy will be taken by surprise. A rumor campaign suggesting to the enemy that troops embarking to invade a tropical country are in fact bound for the Arctic is a simple example of a cover operation.

At the other end of the complexity spectrum, a deceptive plan may involve months of careful preparation and the movement of thousands of troops, hundreds of aircraft, and scores of warships—all to convince an enemy that a major assault is being mounted. If an enemy believes that an amphibious assault is planned against beachhead A, for example, gathering ships within striking distance of beachhead A will reinforce this perception, while the ships are also within range of the true objective at beachhead B. A cover plan may be on the same scale, designed to conceal real preparations for a massive assault.

Preparations for the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion were surrounded by an extensive and detailed deception operation plan. The overall deception scheme, known as BODYGUARD, consisted of 36 subordinate plans designed to convince Adolf Hitler that the Allies were going to continue with peripheral attacks until at least July 1944, beyond the actual invasion date. The key suboperation FORTITUDE SOUTH was intended to draw attention away from

NEPTUNE, the actual Normandy Invasion. Operation FORTITUDE NORTH suggested an invasion of Norway by combined American, British Commonwealth, and Soviet forces, which kept 27 German divisions in Norway and idle. Once it became obvious that France, not Scandinavia, was the objective, Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH was designed to convince the Germans that the Allied invasion of northern France would come in the Pas de Calais area. This required the creation of a fictitious 1st U.S. Army Group in the Dover region under Lieutenant General George S. Patton, with bogus radio traffic, dummy equipment, and supporting hearsay evidence.

Operationally, the deception included more actual aerial bombardment of Calais than the actual target. Little was beyond the scope of the deception planners. On one occasion before the Normandy Invasion, for example, Lieutenant Clifton James, a British Army Pay Corps officer who bore a striking resemblance to General Bernard Montgomery, met with troops in Gibraltar and Algeria dressed in Montgomery's uniform so German intelligence would believe that the real general was in the Mediterranean instead of in London.

Large-scale defensive decoys were also employed during the war, particularly in Britain during the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain and thereafter. These decoys fell under the purview of the Air Ministry's Colonel J. F. Turner under the anonymous name "Colonel Turner's Department" (CTD). Thirty-six daytime airfield decoys called "K sites," with mowed runways, wood and canvas aircraft, and dummy trenches, each a decoy for a particular Royal Air Force (RAF) station, were completed by the summer of 1940. A German reconnaissance plane shot down in October 1941 contained a map that identified 50 percent of the decoy sites, however, and they were all subsequently closed by June 1942.

In tandem with K sites, nighttime Q sites were constructed using deceptive airfield lighting that was occasionally augmented by hand-moved lights to simulate taxiing aircraft. Q sites proved much more successful. Eventually, 171 Q sites were constructed throughout Britain, with 359 of 717 Luftwaffe bomber attacks targeting these decoys by 1942. The success of the Q sites led to variations: QL sites (L for lighting) simulated the presence of marshaling yards, naval installations, armament factories, and so on. Various devices emitted sparks to resemble electric train flashes; orange lights shone down onto sand, conjuring furnace glows; and doors opened and closed. QF

sites (F for fire) were created in response to the knowledge that a fire in the target area often drew more bombers to it. Thus, several important factories were provided with their own decoy installation. Oil QF, an effort to protect oil reserves by simulating a refinery fire, foundered under the combined difficulties of excessive oil consumption (up to 2,500 gallons of oil per hour were needed to keep the fires going realistically) and lack of support by the oil companies, which believed that the decoys would attract bombers.

After the German raid on Coventry, large urban decoys called Starfish sites appeared. These were the war's largest and most sophisticated decoys. Assorted fire-producing decoys were produced, soaked variously with boiling oil, paraffin, or creosote to create convincing fire effects. Depending on the fires' color and intensity, burning houses, factories, and power stations were accurately simulated. The Starfish sites were immediately successful, and by January 1943 more than 200 had been built. By June 1944, British decoy sites had drawn 730 attacks that otherwise would have killed British people or destroyed valuable infrastructure.

The Soviets routinely emphasized deception in military operations and often in political operations. The military staffs incorporated the complementary concepts of *maskirovka* (deception and camouflage) and *khitrost* (cunning and stratagem) into all planning levels. Although deception had been doctrinally accepted since the early 1920s, the shock of the rapid German advance to the outskirts of Moscow and Leningrad painfully reinforced its practical utility.

The Soviets crudely but successfully hid the creation and deployment of three small armies during their Moscow counteroffensive, although this was due more to poor German intelligence and bad weather than skillful deception operations. However, the Soviets soon learned the requirements of integrating tactical deception (such as having individual tank units adhere to radio silence) with operational deception (such as moving several units to an unexpected front, creating new corps to attack where no Soviet formations had been reported).

By 1944, deception planning had evolved so that strategic capabilities were possible. For example, by conducting numerous operations toward western Ukraine, the Soviets habituated the Germans into believing that the Soviet Union's strategic axis was through Ukraine into southern Poland and Romania. The spring of 1944 saw an elaborate *maskirovka* operation that

concealed the redeployment of actual forces while surreptitiously creating forces for the major offensive through Belorussia, progressing against German Army Group North and eventually dislocating the entire front. By this point, Soviet use of secrecy, ruses, and disinformation provided the Soviet Union with an operational advantage for the remainder of the war. Even when the Germans did detect the deception, it was usually too late to counter the Soviet moves.

Deception was not limited to the European theater. The Japanese supported their initial strategic campaign through deception. Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), Allied military attachés and other sources were shown only antiquated aircraft and were intentionally misinformed regarding pilot proficiency at night flying and shallow-water torpedo attacks. This depicted incompetency readily reinforced preconceptions that Western attachés and intelligence analysts held regarding the Japanese.

Early Japanese parachute operations, such as the capture of Menado airfield on Celebes on January 11, 1942, succeeded superbly, but these actions informed the Allies of Japanese paratroop procedures and allowed the Allies to develop ways to counter Japan's weaker airborne forces. The Japanese responded with deception. Thus, the Japanese February 21 airborne assault on Timor commenced with a feigned paratroop assault several miles from the actual drop zones. With the Dutch defenders reacting to the deceptive attack, the main body of paratroops easily secured and held the Allied communications lines.

The Americans routinely used deception in their fight in the Pacific theater. For example, before the United States attacked Tinian Island on July 24, 1944, two dozen warships of Carrier Task Force 58 targeted Tinian Town and nearby road junctions with naval gunfire. This misled the Japanese as to the actual amphibious sites, allowing the assault ashore with greatly reduced casualties. Such deception operations played a major role in World War II.

ROBERT B. MARTYN

See also

Britain, Battle of; Camouflage; FORTITUDE, NORTH and SOUTH, Operations; Manado, Battle of; MINCEMEAT, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law;

Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of

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Declaration on Liberated Europe (February 1945)

Declaration issued by leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—the so-called Big Three—during the February 4–11, 1945, Yalta Conference. At Yalta, the bargaining position of the Western Allies was weak. They had recently suffered a major embarrassment in the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), while Soviet armies were poised to drive on Berlin. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin seemed to hold all the cards, at least as far as Eastern and Central Europe were concerned. Soviet troops occupied most of that territory, including Poland. Stalin's goal was to secure control of a belt of East European satellite states, both to provide security against another German invasion and to protect a severely wounded Soviet Union against the West and its influences.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill pointed out at Yalta that the United Kingdom had gone to war to defend Poland, and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt was influenced by the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration but also by a large Polish constituency at home. Roosevelt pressed Stalin to agree to applying the Atlantic Charter to the limited area of "liberated Europe." This, of course, excluded both the British Empire and the Soviet Union.

Stalin agreed to the resulting Declaration on Liberated Europe. It affirmed the right of all peoples "to choose the government under which they will live" and called for the "restoration of sovereign rights and self-government" to peoples who had been occupied by the "aggressor nations." The Big Three

pledged that in the liberated nations, they would work to restore internal peace, relieve distress, form governments that were “broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population,” and ensure that there would be “free elections” that were “broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population” as soon as possible. But such lofty phrases were subject to different interpretations.

No institutional arrangement was established to enforce the ideas embodied in the declaration. As it transpired, the Soviets chose to regard “democratic elements” as meaning all communist and procommunist factions and “free elections” as excluding all those they regarded to be fascists. The result was Soviet control over much of Eastern and Central Europe—at first indirect, then, with the development of the Cold War, direct. The Soviet Union did pay a price for the declaration in the court of world opinion, as Stalin’s promises to respect human rights were proven utterly false.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic Charter; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; United Nations Declaration; Yalta Conference

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de Courten, Raffaele (1888–1978)

Italian Navy admiral. Raffaele de Courten was born in Milan on September 23, 1888. He became a midshipman in 1910 and volunteered for the naval air branch. During World War I on August 5, 1915, his airship, the zeppelin *Città di Jesi*, was shot down over Pola, and de Courten became a prisoner of war. He was exchanged in June 1917.

De Courten remained in the navy after the war, and in 1923 he was assigned to submarines, where he developed a reputation for expertise in that branch. Promoted to captain, he served as naval attaché in Berlin from July 1933 until February 1936. He had a German mother and spoke the language fluently and enjoyed good relations with German chancellor Adolf Hitler. From December 1937 to May 1938, de Courten was special naval liaison officer with the Imperial Japanese Navy in Tokyo.

Promoted to rear admiral in June 1938, de Courten was appointed head of the newly created Ispettorato Armi Subacquee (Inspectorate of Underwater Weapons), tasked with increasing the efficiency of submarines, torpedoes, and mines. He was also responsible for developing the special attack craft and selecting the personnel for Italy's naval commandos. In May 1940, he was reassigned to Supermarina, the naval headquarters, and was promoted to admiral in October 1940. In August 1941, de Courten assumed command of the VIII (light cruiser) Division where he gained a reputation for luck, not losing a single freighter under his escort.

In March 1943, de Courten became deputy chief of staff, the number three posting in the Supermarina after Admirals Arturo Riccardi and Luigi Sansonetti. De Courten assumed administrative responsibilities so that Sansonetti, the number two, could concentrate on naval operations.

On July 25, 1943, King Victor Emmanuel III appointed de Courten naval minister. De Courten asked for and received the post of chief of staff two days later and thus assumed full command of the navy. Although he did not participate in the negotiations leading up to the Italian armistice of September 8, 1943, he ensured that the navy followed government policy and that it remained a cohesive force, much to the disappointment of the Germans, who had considered him their most reliable member of the Italian high command. In October 1943, de Courten signed an accord with British admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham for Italian naval cooperation against Germany.

On December 31, 1946, de Courten resigned from the navy to protest the insistence of the Allied powers in claiming Italian ships as war reparations. In 1947, de Courten became president of the Navigazione Generale Italiana shipping company. He died at Frascati, near Rome, on August 23, 1978.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Hitler, Adolf; Human Torpedoes; Italy, Navy; Riccardi, Arturo; Sansonetti, Luigi

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Decoy Ships

Special ships deployed specifically to operate against enemy submarines. During World War I, the British deployed such decoys as part of their response to German submarine warfare. The first were trawlers armed with concealed weapons that sailed with the fishing fleet, but the vast majority of the decoys were deployed in the Western Approaches and based at Queenstown, Ireland (hence the designation "Q-ships").

Posing as merchant ships and assigned to areas where U-boats were known to be operating, the decoys sought to persuade submarine captains to engage them on the surface with their deck guns rather than having to fire expensive and limited torpedoes. The Q-ships mounted several guns, concealed behind false works and so arranged that they could be put into action quickly at the right moment. Their "cargoes" might be light wood (balsa or cork) so that the ships could stay afloat if torpedoed. The ships also made use of false national colors until they were ready to fire, when the White Ensign (Royal Navy flag) would be hoisted. Q-ships might also use "panic parties" of supposedly fleeing crewmen to distract a U-boat crew until they were themselves ready to strike.

Although the British may have operated as many as 400 mercantile conversions and 60 purpose-built decoys during the war, their success was limited. One authority claims that only 11 U-boats were sunk by Q-ships, although other authors claim up to 30 submarines. Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the United States also operated limited numbers of these ships.

Because decoy ships were not cost-effective in an environment of unrestricted submarine warfare, far fewer numbers of them were employed

during World War II. The Royal Navy deployed 10 such ships during the war. Ranging from 510 to 5,119 tons displacement, they included the *Chatsgrove, Maunder, Prunella, Lambridge, Edgehill, Brutus, Cyprus, Looe,* and *Antoine.* The *Edgehill* and *Prunella* were both sunk in June 1940, and the remainder were paid off in March 1941.

The last British Q-ship of the war was the 2,450-ton *Fidelity.* Converted in September 1940, it carried an antitorpedo net, four 4-inch guns, four torpedo tubes, two OS2U Kingfisher float planes, and a motor torpedo boat. Sailing with a French crew, the *Fidelity* was sunk in the course of a North Atlantic convoy battle on December 30, 1942.

When the Germans initiated Operation PAUKENSCHLAG (DRUMBEAT), concentrating submarines off the Atlantic U.S. coast with ensuing heavy U.S. merchant ship losses, the U.S. Navy converted five ships into decoys at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. These were the *Eagle* (subsequently the *Captor*), *Asterion, Atik, Big Horn,* and *Irene Forsyth.* The *Eagle*, a former fishing trawler, 133 feet in overall length, was armed with one 4-inch gun, two .50-caliber machine guns, four depth charge launchers, two .30-caliber machine guns, and a number of small arms to include hand grenades. It had a crew of 47. The *Atik* and *Asterion* were larger. These former cargo ships were of 3,209 tons displacement and 318 feet in overall length. They carried four 4-inch guns, four .50-caliber machine guns, six depth charge launchers, and an assortment of small arms.

The decoy ships were not successful. The *Atik* was sunk on its first patrol by *U-101*, and patrols by the others were uneventful. All such efforts ended in 1943.

Several U.S. Q-ships also operated in the Pacific, one being the *Anacapa.* While it did not sink any Japanese submarines, the *Anacapa* is believed to have damaged two U.S. submarines with depth charges. It was withdrawn from service in 1943.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation

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Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships

Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships (DEMS) was the name of a British program to arm and man the armament on British merchant ships during World War II. The program was established in June 1939, just before the start of the war, with the goal of arming some 5,500 British merchant ships. A total of 3,400 ships had been armed by the end of 1940; all were armed by 1943.

At the beginning of World War II, most merchant ships equipped with guns carried obsolete weaponry left over from World War I. In time, the equipment was upgraded to include an antisubmarine gun (usually a 3-inch or 5-inch) on the stern and, in many cases, a second gun of similar caliber on the bow. Several antiaircraft guns were provided elsewhere. A typical Liberty ship carried four .50-caliber machine guns on the flying bridge, in addition to two on the foredeck and two on the afterdeck. DEMS and Armed Guard crews were usually service personnel, although they were frequently augmented by members of the ship's merchant crew.

Neutrality legislation prevented the arming of U.S. merchant ships until November 17, 1941. The United States began supplying Armed Guard personnel and weapons to the merchant ships of other nations on January 24, 1942. The United States followed the British practice of mounting a large gun at the stern (at first 4-inch guns removed from obsolete destroyer classes, then 5-inch guns on ships of more than 10,000 tons). Most Victory ships were armed with one 5-inch gun mounted at the stern for antisubmarine use, with antiaircraft armament of a single bow-mounted 3-inch gun and eight 20mm cannon. These weapons were manned by U.S. Navy Armed Guard personnel.

The effectiveness of DEMS and the U.S. program are difficult to assess, but they did reduce the number of German submarine attacks and added to the number of aircraft shot down.

WALTER W. JAFFEE

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Liberty Ships

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de Gaulle, Charles (1890–1970)

French Army general, the leader of Free French forces, and the president of France. Born on November 22, 1890, in Lille, Charles de Gaulle demonstrated from an early age a keen interest in the military. He graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in 1913 and was commissioned a lieutenant.

De Gaulle's first posting was with Colonel Henri P. Pétain's 33rd Infantry Regiment. During World War I, de Gaulle was promoted to captain, exhibiting a high degree of leadership and courage. Wounded twice, he was captured by the Germans at Verdun in March 1916 after being wounded a third time. Later he received the Legion of Honor for this action. Despite five escape attempts, he remained a prisoner of war until the end of the war.

After the war, de Gaulle returned to teach history at Saint-Cyr, and in 1920 he was part of the French military mission to Poland. He returned to France to study and teach at the École de Guerre. De Gaulle then served as an aide to French Army commander Marshal Pétain, but the two had a falling-out, apparently because Pétain wanted de Gaulle to ghostwrite his memoirs. De Gaulle also became an important proponent of the new theories of high-speed warfare centered on tanks. In his 1934 book *Vers l'armée de métier* (published in English as *The Army of the Future*), de Gaulle proposed formation of six completely mechanized and motorized divisions with their own organic artillery and air support. Another book, *Le fil de l'epée* (The Edge of the Sword) revealed much about de Gaulle's concept of leadership

and his belief that a true leader should follow his conscience regardless of the circumstances.

Promoted to major and then to lieutenant colonel, de Gaulle served in the Rhineland occupation forces, in the Middle East, and on the National Defense Council. Although he was promoted to colonel in 1937 and had important political friends such as future premiere Paul Reynaud, de Gaulle's views placed him very much on the outside of the military establishment.

When World War II began, de Gaulle commanded a tank brigade. His warnings about the German use of tanks in Poland fell on deaf ears in the French high command. De Gaulle commanded the French 4th Armored Division in the 1940 Battle for France. Although the division was still in formation, he secured one of the few French successes of that campaign. Promoted to general of brigade on June 1, 1940, five days later de Gaulle was appointed undersecretary of defense in the Reynaud government. De Gaulle urged Reynaud to fight on, even in a redoubt in the Brittany Peninsula or removing the armed forces to North Africa. De Gaulle's resolve won the enthusiastic support of British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill.

De Gaulle and Jean Monnet visited London and suggested to Churchill a plan for an indissoluble Anglo-French union that the French government had rejected. Returning to Bordeaux from the mission to London, de Gaulle learned that the defeatists had won, and France would sue for peace. On June 17, he departed France on a British aircraft bound for England. The next day, this youngest general in the French Army appealed to his countrymen over the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to continue the fight against Germany.

From this point forward, de Gaulle was the most prominent figure in the French Resistance. With Churchill's support and because no prominent French politicians had escaped abroad, de Gaulle then set up a French government-in-exile in London and began organizing armed forces to fight for the liberation of his country. The Pétain government at Vichy declared de Gaulle a traitor and condemned him to death in absentia.

Initially, de Gaulle's position was at best tenuous. Most French citizens did not recognize his legitimacy, and relations with the British and Americans were at times difficult. De Gaulle insisted on being treated as head of state of a major power, whereas American leaders, especially President

Franklin D. Roosevelt, and even Churchill persisted in treating him as an auxiliary and often did not consult him on major decisions.

The British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir (July 3, 1940) further undermined de Gaulle's credibility. Relations with the United States were not helped by a Free French effort to secure Saint-Pierre and Miquelon off Canada. The United States recognized the Vichy government and continued to pursue a two-France policy even after the United States entered the war in December 1941.

With time, de Gaulle solidified his position as leader of the Resistance in France. Bitter over British moves in Syria and Lebanon and not informed in advance of the U.S.-British invasion of French North Africa, de Gaulle established his headquarters in Algiers in 1943, where he beat back a British and American effort to replace him with General Henri Giraud. De Gaulle's agent, Jean Moulin, secured the fusion of Resistance groups within France. The French Resistance rendered invaluable service to the British and Americans during the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, and French forces liberated Paris that August.

De Gaulle then returned to Paris and established a provisional government there. Full U.S. diplomatic recognition came only with the creation of the new government. De Gaulle secured for France an occupation zone in Germany and a key role in postwar Europe. But with the return of peace, the former political parties reappeared, and hopes for a fresh beginning faded. De Gaulle's calls for a new constitutional arrangement with a strong presidency were rejected, and he resigned in January 1946 to write his memoirs.

A revolt among European settlers and the French army in Algeria, who feared a sellout there to the Algerian nationalists, brought de Gaulle back to power in 1958. A new constitution tailor-made for de Gaulle established the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle's preservation of democracy was his greatest service to his country, but he also brought an end to the Algerian War, and he worked out a close entente with Konrad Adenauer's Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). De Gaulle was also controversial, removing France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's military command, creating an independent nuclear strike force, encouraging Quebec to secede from Canada, and lecturing the United States on a wide variety of issues. He remained president until 1969, when he again resigned to write a new set of

memoirs. Unarguably France's greatest 20th-century statesman, Charles de Gaulle died at his estate of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises on November 9, 1970.

THOMAS LANSFORD AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Armored Warfare; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dakar, Attack on; France; France, Battle for; France Campaign; Free French; Giraud, Henri Honoré; Maginot Line; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Moulin, Jean; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; TORCH, Operation; Vichy France

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Degrelle, Léon (1906–1993)

Belgian fascist leader and Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) commander. Born in Bouillon on June 15, 1906, Léon Degrelle attended the University of Louvain, where he became interested in journalism and was active in student politics. Invited by Catholic authorities to take over a small Catholic publishing house, Christus Rex, in Louvain, Degrelle produced a series of successful mass-circulation magazines combining popular articles with short stories on Catholic themes. Soon Christus Rex was publishing pamphlets about major news events.

In 1933, Degrelle assumed sole control of the firm and soon was holding political rallies marked by his own powerful oratory promoting both a populist program and a purge of corrupt officials. The Catholic Church

disassociated itself from the movement, which became a political party, Rex, by 1934. It remained for several years a dissident movement within the Catholic Party of Belgium.

In 1936, Degrelle broke with the Catholic Party. Rex contested the Belgian elections that year and touted itself as an independent party and a haven for those unhappy with the status quo. Degrelle attempted to appeal to the Belgian middle class and spoke of emphasizing Catholic values of solidarity and community.

Degrelle's praise of Adolf Hitler brought his arrest and that of other potential fifth columnists by Belgian authorities in May 1940, when the Germans invaded. On his release in France in July, Degrelle promptly proclaimed to German authorities his wish for a greater Belgium to include parts of the Netherlands and northern France. In July 1941, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Degrelle founded the Walloon Legion, although few Belgians were attracted to join.

Listed on the Waffen-SS order of battle as the 28th SS Division, the legion actually numbered no more than 2,000 men. Degrelle led the Walloon Legion in fighting in the Soviet Union. Awarded the Iron Cross Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, he was the highest-decorated foreigner in German service.

Degrelle was in Belgium from December 1942 to January 1943. Although he claimed that he and his legionnaires were Belgian patriots fighting to secure a place for their country in Hitler's New Order, in discussions with SS leaders he expressed a commitment to restoring the Walloons (as opposed to the Flemish) to their "rightful" place as a Germanic people within the Reich.

More than half of the men of the Walloon Legion died in the war. Degrelle abandoned the survivors in the defense of Berlin. In late April 1945, he fled north to Oslo, Norway, which was still under German control and where he commandeered an aircraft. He and five others then flew to San Sebastian in northern Spain, where they crash-landed. Negotiations for Degrelle's extradition to Belgium foundered on Spanish demands for a quid pro quo.

In 1946, Degrelle vanished from the hospital where he had been recuperating. The Spanish government denied knowledge of his whereabouts, but he was protected by influential Spaniards. A decade later, Degrelle

resurfaced in public but did not leave Spain. He remained an unabashed admirer of Adolf Hitler until his death in Malaga on April 1, 1993.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Belgium; Hitler, Adolf; Waffen-SS

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De Guingand, Sir Francis Wilfred (1900–1979)

British Army major general. Born at Acton, Middlesex, England, on February 28, 1900, Francis Wilfred de Guingand joined the West Yorkshire Regiment in 1919 following graduation from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He first met Bernard Montgomery (then a brigade major) while serving as a second lieutenant in southern Ireland in 1921. Following a regimental depot tour at York from 1922 to 1925, de Guingand served in Africa with the King's African Rifles (Canal Brigade, Ismailia), and he commanded troops in Nyasaland (Malawi) from 1930 to 1931.

De Guingand then returned to regimental duties, graduating from the Staff College, Camberley, in 1935. In 1939, he was appointed military assistant to Leslie Hore-Belisha, the secretary of state for war. On the latter's removal in 1940, de Guingand was virtually banished from major assignments. He was then instructor at Haifa Staff College, with a short interregnum as the commandant of the new Combined Operations School.

In December, de Guingand joined the Joint Planning Staff at Cairo, where he was intimately involved in operational planning and early reconnaissance for the April 1941 Greece Campaign. De Guingand remained a lower-level staff officer until he was appointed director of military intelligence for the Middle East in February 1942. In August when General Montgomery assumed command of the Eighth Army, de Guingand became chief of staff. He remained with Montgomery in this capacity for the rest of the war.

Although the two men were opposites in temperament, they worked well together, and de Guingand labored to remove points of friction between Montgomery and other Allied leaders. More important, de Guingand functioned as a real chief of staff, as in the German Army and the U.S. Army, rather than as a more narrowly focused senior operations officer, as was typical of the British staff system. Thus, de Guingand is considered the British Army's first modern chief of staff.

Promoted to acting major general in April 1943, de Guingand commenced planning for the Sicily Campaign (July 9–August 22). He supported Montgomery throughout the campaign and during early Allied operations in Italy. De Guingand returned to Britain as chief of staff of Montgomery's 21st Army Group on January 10, 1944, and served in that position throughout the Northern Europe campaigns. A falling out with Montgomery began in late 1944 when Montgomery claimed all the credit for Allied successes and treated General Dwight D. Eisenhower poorly. The loyal de Guingand worked hard to maintain good relations with his American counterparts and to smooth over hard feelings caused by Montgomery's abrasiveness. At one point when Eisenhower was seriously considering Montgomery's relief, de Guingand managed to patch this up. On May 6, 1945, de Guingand escorted Colonel General Alfred Jodl to Rheims to formalize the German surrender.

De Guingand retired from the army in May 1946. He moved to Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1947, where he became active in international finance. He wrote several books during his retirement and died near Harare, Rhodesia, on June 29, 1979. Although largely unremembered today, de Guingand was one of the key figures cementing the U.S.-British Grand Alliance.

ROBERT B. MARTYN

See also

Greece Campaign, German; Hore-Belisha, Isaac Leslie; Jodl, Alfred; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Sicily, Invasion of

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De Havilland, Sir Geoffrey (1882–1965)

British aircraft designer and manufacturer. Born on July 27, 1882, near High Wycombe, England, Geoffrey De Havilland trained at the Crystal Palace Engineering School and then worked for several transportation companies. He built his first airplane in 1909. Although it crashed, he flew an improved design a year later. From 1911 to 1914, De Havilland was employed at the Balloon Factory at Farnborough designing aircraft. He began working at the Aircraft Manufacturing Company (Airco) in August 1914 and designed several two-seat day-bombers (the DH4, DH9, and DH9A) and a trainer (DH6) that were manufactured in the thousands. Some remained in service for a decade.

De Havilland formed his own company in September 1920 and was soon manufacturing light civil aircraft and airliners. In 1934, the company's main headquarters were relocated to Hatfield north of London. De Havilland built some of the fastest interwar aircraft, including the DH 88 Comet racer and DH 91 Albatross four-engine airliner, learning in the process the value of streamlining and improved airframe design.

During World War II, the De Havilland Company manufactured more than 14,000 aircraft, of which by far the most famous was the Rolls-Royce Merlin–powered twin-engine wooden DH98 Mosquito. This airplane first flew November 25, 1940, and eventually served as a fighter, reconnaissance aircraft, and bomber. During much of the war it was the fastest aircraft, with a maximum speed of 425 mph. More than 7,700 had been manufactured by the time production ceased in November 1950.

In addition, the company manufactured more than 11,500 engines and 100,000 aircraft propellers during the war. De Havilland designed and built one of the earliest British jet fighters, the DH100 Vampire, powered by the pioneering DH Goblin engine. It first flew in September 1943.

De Havilland's company developed more than 50 basic types of aircraft in its 39 years as an independent firm, manufacturing a total of 31,000 airplanes. As the British industry contracted, the firm became part of

Hawker-Siddeley in 1959 and eventually part of British Aerospace. De Havilland was knighted in 1944 and received the Order of Merit in 1962. He died on May 21, 1965, at Watford, England.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Reconnaissance and Auxiliary

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De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel (1889–1952)

Marshal of France, commander of Free French forces in World War II, and one of France's greatest soldiers. Born in Mouilleron-en-Pareds in the Vendée, France, on February 2, 1889, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in 1911 and was commissioned in the cavalry. In September 1914, he received the first of six wounds he suffered during World War I. He fought the remainder of the war in the infantry, ending in command of a battalion. He was cited eight times for bravery.

De Lattre subsequently served four years in Morocco in pacification campaigns and was again wounded. In 1932, he was selected to join the staff of the Supreme War Council and promoted to lieutenant colonel. In 1935 he was promoted to colonel and took command of a regiment at Metz. In March 1939, de Lattre commanded the 14th Infantry Division, which acquitted itself well during the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940), at Sedan (May 14), at Rethel, on the Marne, and on the Loire, ending the campaign near Clermont-Ferrand.

De Lattre continued in command of the 14th Division in the Armistice Army before becoming commandant at Puy-de-Dôme Depot. He then

commanded the 13th Military Region and worked to retrain what was left of the French Army. In September 1941, de Lattre was posted to command French forces in Tunisia. In fighting between British and Free French forces and the Germans in Libya, de Lattre maneuvered his own troops so as to cut off the German retreat. Alarmed, the Vichy government ordered his return to France, where he took command of the 16th Military District at Montpellier in January 1942.

When the Germans entered unoccupied France in November 1942, de Lattre contravened Vichy orders and began defensive operations, allowing many anti-German French to escape to the Mediterranean coast. Subsequently arrested, he was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. In September 1943, de Lattre, with the aid of his son Bernard, escaped from Riom Prison, evading capture with the help of the Maquis (guerrillas), until he was evacuated to England on October 17.

On reporting to General Charles de Gaulle, head of the Free French government in Algiers, de Lattre took command of training French forces in North Africa. He then commanded French troops in the June 1944 invasion of Elba before leading the Free French First Army into southern France in Operation DRAGOON (August 15, 1944). His subsequent capture of the fortified ports of Toulon and Marseille proved to be a brilliant feat of arms. He was awarded the American Distinguished Service Cross. The First Army fought on the Allied right flank through Alsace. By occupying territory technically within the Allied boundaries, de Lattre reached the Franco-German border abreast of the Americans, rather than behind them as he had been ordered. Among his successes was the capture of the fortress of Belfort at a cost of only 1,000 French casualties. He pushed nine divisions into Germany by the armistice, helping to secure for France a substantial role in the postwar occupation of Germany.

Following the armistice, de Lattre served on the Allied Control Council for Germany. He then was inspector general of the French Army, overseeing its modernization and retraining. From 1948 to 1950, he commanded the land forces of the Western European Union.

In December 1950, as a gesture of its determination, the French government sent de Lattre, its greatest living soldier, to Indochina as high commissioner as well as commander of French military forces. De Lattre infused new vigor in the French military effort and won a series of pitched

battles against the Viet Minh. His son Bernard was killed in action during one of de Lattre's successful battles for the Red River Delta. Consumed by cancer, de Lattre returned to Paris in December 1951 and died there on January 11, 1952.

ROBERT B. MARTYN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; DRAGOON, Operation; Elba, Recapture of; France, Battle for; France Campaign; Maquis; Sedan, Battle of; Vichy France

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de Lattre de Tassigny, Jean. *The History of the French First Army.* Translated by Malcolm Barnes. London: Allen and Unwin, 1952.

Delestraint, Charles Georges Antoine (1879–1945)

French Army lieutenant general. Born in Biache-Saint-Waast (Pas-de-Calais) on March 12, 1879, Charles Delestraint graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in September 1900 as an infantry officer. He transferred to a cavalry unit in 1910. Delestraint was taken prisoner early in World War I and spent four years in captivity, during which time he learned German, English, and Russian. In the years after the war, he became an outspoken advocate of tank warfare along with Charles de Gaulle, with whom he shared many discussions. A critical, tradition-bound military leadership forced Delestraint into the reserves in March 1939, but he was almost immediately recalled to active duty.

In early 1940, Delestraint took command of an armored group of three tank divisions that included Colonel de Gaulle's own. Delestraint directed the French counterattack at Abbeville of June 3–4, 1940. His exemplary leadership brought him a promotion to major general. Rejecting the armistice with Germany, Delestraint resigned from the army on July 8, 1940, settling in unoccupied Bourg en Bresse. There he headed an association of former armor officers.

Delestraint secretly organized a military headquarters complete with staff sections, and he settled on the Vercors Plateau as a site for a national redoubt. On the recommendation of Resistance leaders Henri Frenay and Jean Moulin, de Gaulle selected his former commander to head the Armée Secrète (Secret Army) in France. Under the code name Vidal, Delestraint made significant progress in amalgamating diverse Resistance groups into a military force. Internal disputes remained, notably with the communists over issues of weapons distribution and support for de Gaulle's overall strategy.

Learning of Delestraint's activities, Gestapo chief in Lyon Klaus Barbie engineered a trap for him in Paris, and the Gestapo arrested him outside La Muette subway station on June 9, 1943. Under Barbie's interrogation, Delestraint admitted his position. Shortly thereafter, Moulin was also taken, and the organization was bereft of its leadership just as it was gathering strength.

Delestraint arrived in Dachau in September 1944 following 15 months' questioning and internment in a series of camps. He was shot on April 19, 1945, two weeks before the end of the war.

ROBERT B. MARTYN

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; Frenay, Henri; Moulin, Jean; Resistance

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Del Valle, Pedro Augusto (1893–1978)

U.S. Marine Corps major general. Born in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on August 28, 1893, Pedro Augusto Del Valle was commissioned a second lieutenant in the marines on graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1915. He served in Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic, and then

with the marine detachment on the battleship *Texas* in European waters after U.S. entry into World War I.

After the war, Del Valle held a variety of assignments, and from 1935 to 1937 he was the naval attaché in Rome. In this capacity, he was the only official U.S. military observer of the Italian invasion and conquest of Ethiopia (1935–1936). In 1937, he returned to the United States to attend the Army War College, and in 1940 he published a book, *Roman Eagles over Ethiopia.*

Promoted to colonel, Del Valle took command of the 11th Marine Regiment. Promoted to brigadier general in August 1942, he deployed that month to Guadalcanal with the 1st Marine Division under Major General Alexander Archer Vandegrift. He commanded the divisional artillery until the end of December. Del Valle then commanded the ground forces during the final stages of the Solomon Islands Campaign (August 1942–February 1943). He also led the III Amphibious Corps artillery during the invasions of Guam (July 21–August 10, 1944) and Tinian (July 24–August 1, 1944). Promoted to major general in January 1945, he then commanded the 1st Marine Division in operations on Okinawa from March to June.

After the war, Del Valle served as inspector general of the Marine Corps until his retirement in 1948. He became a vice president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) and then the president of IT&T in South America. Del Valle died in Annapolis, Maryland, on April 28, 1978.

BERRYMAN E. WOODRUFF IV

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guam, Battle for; Okinawa, Invasion of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of; United States Marine Corps; Vandegrift, Alexander Archer

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Dempsey, Miles Christopher (1896–1969)

British Army general. Born in New Brighton, Cheshire, on December 15, 1896, Miles Christopher Dempsey graduated from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1915. He saw action on the Western Front and in Iraq in World War I. He served at Sandhurst from 1923 to 1927. Dempsey was on the staff of the War Office from 1932 to 1934 and at Aldershot from 1934 to 1936. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1938.

In 1940, Dempsey commanded the 13th Infantry Brigade (Royal Berkshires) in France as an acting brigadier, leading it with distinction during the retreat to and evacuation from Dunkerque (Dunkirk, May 26–June 4). Dempsey then helped train new British forces, was promoted to major general in January 1941, and was assigned command of the 42nd Armoured Division. In December 1942 at the request of Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery, Dempsey took command of XIII Corps of the British Eighth Army and was promoted to lieutenant general. Dempsey helped plan the invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY, July 9–August 22, 1943) and then commanded his corps in the assault. He also directed the assault crossing to Italy of the Canadian 1st Infantry and 5th Armoured Divisions.

By January 1944, Dempsey had returned to Britain to command the British Second Army, and with his staff he helped develop the OVERLORD plan for the invasion of northern France. Dempsey is credited with the decision for and planning of Operation GOODWOOD (July 18–20, 1944). In the fall of 1944, the Second Army participated in the breakout from the Normandy beachhead and the campaigns for France and Belgium, liberated Brussels and Antwerp, and penetrated into Holland in Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26), which was a failure. Dempsey had opposed the Eindhoven-Arnhem route, preferring instead an offensive closer to the U.S. First Army near Aachen. He was created knight commander of the Bath (KCB) in June 1944 and knight commander of the British Empire (KBE) in July 1945. In March 1945, the Second Army crossed the Rhine and then pushed to the Baltic. Dempsey personally took the surrender of Hamburg on May 3, 1945.

British Army general Miles Dempsey. (Corbis)

Dempsey kept close control of his subordinates, often placing his tactical headquarters close to theirs and keeping reserves under his own control in the early phases of a battle. He sought to avoid high casualties, arranging maximum fire support and emphasizing the use of tactical airpower. Many scholars consider Dempsey's influence in the war to be minimal, dismissing him as Montgomery's cipher. Dempsey's introverted nature and his shunning of both publicity and self-promotion aided this impression. The close working relationship between Montgomery and Dempsey obscures the latter's authorship of operational decisions, as does their shared tendency to rely on verbal orders. They worked together for so long that they thought along similar lines and anticipated each other's reactions and decisions.

In August 1945, Dempsey succeeded General Sir William Slim as commander of the Fourteenth Army for the reoccupation of Singapore and Malaya. Dempsey followed Slim again as commander in chief of Allied Land

Forces in Southeast Asia. Dempsey was promoted to full general on leaving that post and was commander in chief in the Middle East during 1946–1947. He retired at his own request in July 1947 and entered the private sector. Dempsey died in Yattendon, Berkshire, on June 5, 1969.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

Dunkerque, Evacuation of; GOODWOOD, Operation; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Sicily, Invasion of; Slim, Sir William Joseph

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Demyansk Pocket (February 8, 1942–February 28, 1943)

Following the failed German effort to capture Moscow in December 1941, Adolf Hitler ordered in his Führer Directive 39 that the Wehrmacht consolidate a defensive position along the entire Eastern Front. Before defensive positions could be stabilized, Marshal Georgi Zhukov launched a massive attack against Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center, sending the Germans reeling. In January 1942, to prevent a rout, Hitler issued another order to his forces to "stand their ground regardless of consequences." Commanders who disobeyed or disagreed with this ordered were cashiered. These included Generals Wilhelm von Leeb, Fedor von Bock, Gerd von Rundstedt, Heinz Guderian, and Erich Hoepner. Hitler's order did stabilize the line and brought Zhukov's counteroffensive to a halt.

The Soviets quickly recovered, and on January 7, 1942, they deployed the Eleventh, Thirty-Fourth, and First Shock Armies against the German Sixteenth Army south of Lake Ilmen. At the same time, the Third Shock

Army coming from Lake Seliger swung north, and by February 8 the Red Army had completed the pocket, trapping the Sixteenth Army's II Army Corps and much of X Corps. Surrounded in the Demyansk pocket were the 12th, 30th, 32nd, 123rd, and 290th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd SS Division (Totenkopf), in all more than 90,000 troops.

Assured by Reichsmarshall Hermann Göring that the Luftwaffe would resupply the entrapped Germans at Dem-yansk, Hitler ordered II and X Corps to hold their ground, forbidding any retreat westward. X Army Corps command staff was outside the pocket; II Army Corps commander General of Infantry Walter von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt assumed command of all divisions within the pocket. Brockdorff deployed 3rd SS Division commander Gruppenführer Theodor Eicke with a mixture of his own Waffen-SS troops and other divisional units toward the west to shore up the 290th Infantry Division while he led a battle group northeastward against the Soviet Thirty-Fourth Army.

Meanwhile, the First Air Fleet launched a massive aerial resupply operation. This was the first time an army was resupplied entirely by air. The airlift was largely successful, although the Luftwaffe lost 265 aircraft against 408 lost by the Soviets.

By February 12, the Soviets launched attacks on the pocket against X Army Corps, commanded by General of Artillery Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach. Determined German resistance, coupled with successful aerial resupply, prevented collapse of the pocket. Eicke's forces, holding high ground, stabilized Army Group North's right flank, preventing a major breach between it and Army Group Center.

On March 21, the first day of spring, the Germans launched Operation FALLREEP (GANGWAY). X Army Corps drove the Soviet Eleventh Army east over the Lovat River to Ramushevo. Stiff Soviet resistance then stalled the German offensive, yet X Army Corps captured Ramushevo on April 14. At the same time Eicke's forces attacked from the east, with one 3rd SS Division tank unit reaching the Lovat River on April 20. By April 22, the remainder of Eicke's battle group had reached the river and established a secure bridgehead. After 73 days the pocket was opened, and Seyd-litz dispatched fresh troops and supplies. Two days later, the three-mile-wide Ramushevo corridor was established along the Demyansk–Staraya Russa road.

On May 5, to secure the corridor and keep it open, Hitler placed 14,000

troops within the Demyansk area under Eicke to defend a 40-mile front along the corridor. Beginning in May, Red Army infantry units attacked the corridor in increasing frequency and ferocity through June, pointing to an imminent major assault. That began on July 17, with Soviet forces capturing Vasilyevschina. Brockdorff then committed his 8th Jäger Division and recaptured the village. The German line held, and the Soviets broke off their assault on July 30. On August 6, with fresh troops, tanks, and artillery supported by the Red Air Force, the Soviets renewed their assaults on the corridor, extracting a heavy German toll. Only bad weather on August 15–16 halted this and allowed the Germans to reinforce the corridor. By August 19, Soviet momentum had again been lost.

Fighting continued until the end of February 1943, however. On March 1, the Soviets retook Demyansk following the withdrawal of German forces. The German unit most responsible for preventing the collapse of the Demyansk Pocket was Eicke's 3rd SS Division. Many of the Waffen-SS units had fought to the last man, and Eicke's division sustained an astonishing 80 percent casualty rate at Demyansk. When the remnants of the division were finally pulled from the Eastern Front in October 1942, the division required a complete reconstitution.

One legacy of Demyansk was that the equivalent of a reinforced corps could be resupplied by air. This led Hitler to believe that encircled pockets could hold out and be sustained until relieved through aerial resupply. This proved disastrous in Hitler's calculations at Stalingrad when the Luftwaffe was unable to save the Sixth Army. Indeed, II Army Corps at Demyansk required 265 metric tons of supplies per day, and toward the end before the breakout that amount could not be met. To resupply the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, at a much greater distance than Demyansk, required 800 tons per day.

WILLIAM H. VAN HUSEN

See also

Bock, Fedor von; Eastern Front; Eicke, Theodor; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Guderian, Heinz; Hitler, Adolf; Hoepner, Erich; Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Denmark

Small nation located in Northern Europe encompassing 16,639 square miles. Mainland Denmark borders Germany to the south, the Baltic Sea to the east, and the North Sea to the west and north. Also within the Kingdom of Denmark were the Faroe Islands (540 square miles), Iceland (39,770 square miles) and Greenland (836,330 square miles). Denmark, a constitutional monarchy, had a total population of some 5 million people in 1939 and had since 1815 sought security in neutrality. Indeed the country was neutral during World War I. As additional insurance, it signed a non-aggression pact with Germany on May 31, 1939.

Although Denmark's chief trading partner was Great Britain, which received Danish chief exports of dairy products, geographically Denmark lay within Germany's sphere of influence. Its conquest by Germany was a natural extension of Operation WESERÜBUNG, Adolf Hitler's plan to take Norway in April 1940. German occupation of Denmark was essential if Germany was to control Norway.

At the time of the German invasion, Denmark had an army of 14,000 men, 8,000 of whom had been recently drafted. The small navy had only 3,000 men and 2 coast-defense warships (built in 1906 and 1918). The air force, split between the army and navy, had 50 obsolete aircraft. The German invasion, mounted before dawn on April 9, 1940, was over in only two hours. The government ordered a cease-fire after the occupation of Copenhagen, leaving insufficient time for the government or King Christian X to escape abroad.

Germany initially employed a soft approach in Denmark, reaching an accord with the Danish government wherein most governmental functions remained under Danish control. Denmark provided important military bases to Germany and exported essential foodstuffs, such as dairy products and

meat, to Germany. These latter amounted to some 10 percent of German requirements. This arrangement worked well for three years, 1940–1943, with only sporadic resistance. The official Danish policy was to collaborate with Germany to the extent necessary, a policy supported by most of the population.

Danish collaboration was predicated on the assumption that the Germans would honor their pledge not to interfere in Danish internal affairs, but time and again the Germans broke the agreement, demanding certain military equipment and insisting on the removal of specific government officials. The Germans also demanded that Denmark make a greater contribution to the German war effort, and Danish authorities urged some 100,000 of Denmark's citizens to work in Germany to prevent them from being conscripted.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Germans forced the Danish government to ban the Communist Party and accept German recruitment of a Danish Free Corps to fight on the Eastern Front. In November 1941, Germany insisted that Denmark join the Anti-Comintern Pact.

There were Danes who took up cause against Germany from the beginning. On the German conquest of Denmark, 232 Danish merchant ships were at sea with some 6,000 seamen. Most of the latter helped to crew ships in the Atlantic and Arctic convoys. Ultimately, 1,500 of these men lost their lives, and 60 percent of the fleet was lost. By 1944, Danes formed the crews of 2 British minesweepers. Another 1,000 Danish nationals served with various Allied forces fighting the Axis powers.

In 1940 a Danish Council was formed in London, which in 1942 became the Free Danish Movement. Henrik Kauffmann, Danish ambassador to the United States, disassociated himself from the Danish government and signed a treaty in 1941 granting the United States military bases in Greenland. British forces also occupied the Faroe Islands in April 1940. In May 1940, the Allies also occupied Iceland, which declared itself independent in 1944.

In the spring of 1942, Berlin appointed Werner Best as Reich commissioner for occupied Denmark. A hard-line German officer, Lieutenant General Hermann Hanneken, took command of German troops in Denmark and was encouraged by Hitler "to rule with an iron hand." Such actions infuriated the Danes and led to an uprising in August 1943. The changing

German military fortunes, British radio broadcasts, and the Danish illegal press all helped shift public opinion away from collaboration to resistance.

The occupying Germans did not confiscate radio sets, and many Danes listened to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) daily. The August demonstration and associated strikes demanded an end to collaboration. Attempts by Danish authorities to crush the demonstrations ended in fatalities and were unsuccessful. There were also violent clashes between Danes and German soldiers in some provincial cities. Consequently, the Germans declared a state of emergency on August 29, arrested most members of the Danish military, and in effect took over rule of the country.

In September 1943, the Gestapo arrived in Denmark and initiated a reign of terror that lasted to the end of the war. Some 6,000 Danes were sent to concentration camps, and hundreds more were executed outright. Many Danes sought refuge in Sweden. The Danish Freedom Council became the de facto clandestine government, an underground army was formed, and more than 2,000 acts of sabotage were carried out, some 30 percent of these in Copenhagen. The Danish Freedom Council divided the nation into six regions, exercising central authority through its Command Committee. By the end of the war, the Danish Resistance numbered about 40,000 people. The sabotage acts had little effect on the German war effort, although news of them had a positive psychological impact on the Danish population as proof that Denmark was no longer collaborating with Germany.

Danes of all walks of life actively resisted German efforts to round up Jews. Although Best ordered the arrest of all Jews in Denmark, more than 7,000 escaped the Nazi net; 5,500 were transported to Sweden by boat. Only 472 were caught and sent to Theresienstadt. Danes did not forget those who had been sent there; they regularly sent packages of foodstuffs and clothes, and only 52 of the Danish Jews there perished.

The Germans surrendered Denmark on May 4, and the Danish Resistance took control of the country the next day. On May 5, a company of the British 13th Battalion, Parachute Regiment, arrived in Copenhagen by plane along with Major General R. H. Dewing, head of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), mission to Denmark. British infantry troops marched into Denmark on May 7. The following day, troops from the British 1st Parachute Brigade took the formal surrender of all German forces.

When the German commander on the island of Bornholm refused to

surrender, Soviet aircraft on May 7 and 8 bombed the towns of Rønne and Neks, causing great damage but few deaths. On May 9, Soviet ships arrived at Rønne, and the Germans there surrendered. However, Soviet troops occupied the island until April 1946. Following the war, the Danish government ordered the arrest and punishment of some 34,000 Nazi collaborators.

After the war, the Danes would have preferred establishing a league of armed neutrality with Norway and Sweden, but they reluctantly followed Norway into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1951, the Danes agreed without particular enthusiasm to having U.S. naval and air bases in Greenland. Whatever hesitancy the new Danish policy might have indicated, it was a major switch from prewar neutrality and the feeling that no amount of military preparation on their part would deter their much more powerful neighbors.

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See also

Anti-Comintern Pact; Denmark Campaign; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Document 88

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Denmark Campaign (April 9, 1940)

Code-named Operation WESERÜBUNG SUD (WESER EXERCISE SOUTH), the German invasion of Denmark began at approximately 4:15 a.m. on April 9, 1940. It formed an integral part of the much larger German assault on Norway (Operation WESERÜBUNG) that began the same day. German units

quickly overran the Danish Peninsula, abrogating a nonaggression pact signed between Germany and Denmark in May 1939.

Although Danish intelligence learned of the German plans to invade as early as April 4, the accounts were contradictory and in any case were not believed. Certainly, the Danes had no chance whatsoever of defeating the German invaders. The poorly trained and inadequately equipped Danish Army numbered only some 14,000 men, 8,000 of whom had enlisted within eight weeks prior to the German attack. The Danish Navy consisted of just two small vessels and approximately 3,000 men. The navy surrendered without going on alert, allowing a German troopship to arrive at Copenhagen. The air force had only 50 obsolete planes and a handful of pilots, no match for the vaunted Luftwaffe.

On April 9, German seaborne forces moved into the capital of Copenhagen and secured the city by 6:00 a.m. Meanwhile, German paratroopers conducted the first airborne operation of the war when they seized the undefended fortress of Madnedø and, shortly thereafter, the airport at Aalborg in north Jutland. At the same time, German Army units raced across the Jutland Peninsula in motorized columns.

Although Danish Army units briefly contested the Germans in northern Schleswig, the outcome was never in doubt.

German minister to Denmark Cecil von Renthe-Fink presented an ultimatum to the Danish government, demanding surrender and threatening the destruction of Copenhagen by Luftwaffe squadrons already en route if it refused. There was absolutely no chance of victory over the Germans, and eager to avoid further loss of life, King Frederik IX and Premier Thorvald Stauning believed they had no choice but to order surrender at 7:20 a.m. The campaign for Denmark was over. Danish casualties amounted to 26 dead and 23 wounded; the Germans lost 20 dead or wounded.

The German invasion provided the excuse for the Allied occupation of Iceland, which then belonged to Denmark. Allied possession of strategically located Iceland proved vital in the Battle of the Atlantic. German forces occupied Denmark until the end of the war in May 1945.

LANCE JANDA

See also

Airborne Forces, Axis; Denmark; Norway, German Conquest of

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Dentz, Henri Fernand (1881–1945)

French Army general. Born in Roanne on December 16, 1881, Henri Fernand Dentz entered the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in 1900. On graduation he was assigned to Tunis, and later (1920–1923) he headed the army's Information Services in Syria. In December 1927 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and in June 1931 to colonel. From 1934 to 1937, Dentz commanded the 54th Brigade, earning promotion to general of brigade in December 1935. He was then vice chief of the General Staff the following two years and was promoted to major general in December 1937. In September 1939, he was promoted to general of corps and commanded first XV Corps and then XII Corps. On June 14, 1940, as military governor of Paris, Dentz surrendered the city to the Germans.

In December 1940, the collaborationist Vichy government appointed Dentz high commissioner of the Levant (Lebanon and Syria). On May 11, 1941, Adolf Hitler met with French admiral Jean François Darlan and General Maxime Weygand to demand use of Syrian airfields. Acting on orders from Darlan, Dentz permitted German aircraft to fly from Syrian airfields to support the uprising of Rashid Ali in Iraq against the British. He also allowed the Germans to use Syrian ports, roads, and railroads to move supplies. Dentz rejected Allied appeals that he switch sides and receive their military support. British and Free French forces under Lieutenant General Maitland Wilson counterattacked on June 8, 1941. Lacking reinforcements, Dentz was obliged to ask for an armistice.



On July 14, 1941, Dentz signed terms at Saint Jean d'Acre that allowed Vichy forces to evacuate without their equipment. Dentz returned to France with 33,000 men, including some 1,400 injured; about 1,000 others had been killed during the month of fighting. British forces had lost 3,600, while Free French casualties were some 800 men in one of the fiercest fraternal struggles of the war between French forces.

Promoted to full general by Vichy in June 1941, Dentz retired from the army, primarily because of his age, in June 1943. Brought to trial after the war on charges of collaboration with the enemy, Dentz was found guilty by the High Court of Justice on April 20, 1945, and condemned to death. In October, Charles de Gaulle commuted this sentence to life in prison. Dentz died in prison at Fresne near Paris on December 13, 1945.

JOHN MACFARLANE

See also

Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; France; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Syria; Syria and Lebanon, Campaign in; Vichy France; Wilson, Henry Maitland

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Depth Charges

Explosive devices designed to sink a submarine by detonating in its vicinity when triggered by water pressure, the target's magnetic or acoustic signature, or a variety of timers. From 1916 until 1943, the depth charge was the principal antisubmarine weapon of all navies, after which more sophisticated weapons with greater range came to the fore.

In 1939, most navies used weapons similar to the British Type D Mark III (which entered service in 1916). The Mark III had a charge of approximately 200 pounds and a sink rate of 6–10 feet per second and was triggered hydrostatically to explode at depths between 25 and 300 feet. Such charges had a lethal radius of 20 feet and, exploding at 40 feet, could force a submarine to surface.

Antisubmarine vessels discharged depth charges from roll-off racks and mortars (launchers) that projected them some 40 yards to the side. At the beginning of the war, the normal procedure for antisubmarine attacks was to use depth charges in patterns of five—three dropped in a line using gravity from the roll-off racks at the stern and two fired (one to each side) by launchers to produce a diamond-shaped pattern intended to bracket the target submarine.

Development during World War II concentrated on four main areas: larger charges, faster sink rates, greater fuzed depths, and more effective patterns. More powerful explosives such as Minol and Torpex, which were

50 percent more effective than TNT, replaced guncotton, and charges also increased. The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy introduced weapons with 600-pound explosive charges in 1941. In 1942, the Royal Navy introduced the massive Mark X weapon, with a 2,000-pound charge. It was so large that it was fired from 21-inch torpedo tubes retained on destroyers and escorts for this specific purpose.

Sink rates rose to 22 to 50 feet per second, either by adding weights to conventional charges (heavy charges) or by streamlining the cases. Modified fuzes also allowed depth charges to explode deeper, doubling the maximum depth to 600 feet (at 50-foot intervals). The modified Mark X* sank faster because one buoyancy chamber was deleted and could be fuzed to explode down to 900 feet, while the Mark X** (which did not enter operational service) could be set to explode as deep as 1,200 feet.

Equally important were more effective dropping patterns. Modified casings resulted in more reliable and predictable underwater trajectories, newer projectors that increased surface ranges to 150 yards, and mathematical analysis that generated patterns having greater kill probabilities. First, the addition of another launcher on each beam allowed for the use of a seven-charge pattern in the form of a hexagon, increasing the danger zone. Mixing standard and heavy charges created a new highly effective 10-charge pattern that layered 2 diamond-shaped five-charge patterns, one above the other.

The final development was a three-layer 14-charge pattern using four launchers on each side and six charges dropped from the stern racks. Operational experience, however, demonstrated that although the pattern was theoretically much more lethal than the 10-charge pattern, in practice the explosion of the first charges countermined the later charges and rendered them ineffective. Therefore, the antisubmarine force reverted to the 10-charge pattern and replaced the additional launchers with stowage for extra charges.

Air-dropped depth charges played an important role during and after World War II. First designs were modifications of existing surface types, which limited their efficacy, since their weight reduced the number that could be carried and they were also subject to restrictions on dropping height and speed. The purpose-designed types that followed were lighter and less subject to dropping restrictions. Scientific analysis of attack camera records contributed mightily to the effectiveness of air-dropped depth charges.

Scientists learned that charges were dropped too low and with depth fuze settings that were too deep to be effective. The ultimate fuze setting for aerial depth charges of 25 feet and new bomb sights and tactics transformed the weapons' effectiveness.

During 1944, newer weapons such as the Hedgehog, the Squid, and homing torpedoes surpassed depth charges in the sinking of submarines. Nevertheless, the depth charge was still an important antisubmarine weapon until after the war's end.

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See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Hunter-Killer Groups; Sonar; Submarines

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Destroyer Escorts and Frigates

Warships smaller than regular destroyers and designed primarily for antisubmarine warfare. Great Britain first built this type of warship to address the shortage of regular destroyers engaged in the defense of its shipping lanes against German submarines, as they were cheaper to construct and shipyards could produce them more rapidly than larger warships. After entering the war in December 1941, the United States also built both types for use in the Battle of the Atlantic.

The destroyer escort, being the more capable of the two designs, first appeared in 1939 in the British Hunt class. The Hunt-class escort destroyer displaced 1,175 tons and was 296 feet in overall length with a beam of 33 feet 4 inches. Its engines were capable of producing a speed of 26 knots. Armament consisted of 6 4-inch quick-firing guns, 4 2-pounder pom-pom

guns for antiaircraft defense, 3 21-inch torpedo tubes, and up to 70 depth charges. It had a crew of 170.

By the end of the war and owing to its far greater industrial capacity, the United States had built far more of these ships than had Britain. The last American variants, built during 1943 and 1944, were the DET and FMR classes, designed primarily for antisubmarine warfare but also capable of antiaircraft defense. The DET and FMR classes displaced 1,253 tons, were 306 feet in overall length by 36 feet 7 inches in beam, and were capable of 20.2 knots. Armament consisted of 3 3-inch guns, 3 21-inch torpedo tubes, and an antisubmarine battery of 1 Hedgehog, 8 depth charge launchers, and 2 depth charge racks. These classes also mounted 2 40mm Bofors and between 8 and 10 20mm Oerlikon guns for antiaircraft defense. These ships had a crew of 186.

As with destroyer escorts, Great Britain also pioneered the design of frigates, which were ships solely for use against submarines while escorting merchantmen. The first frigates were those of the River class, launched beginning in 1942. A River-class frigate displaced 1,310 tons and was 301 feet 4 inches in overall length and 36 feet in beam. It was capable of a speed of 21 knots. Its armament consisted of only 2 4-inch guns, but it possessed a large antisubmarine warfare battery of a Hedgehog and 126 depth charges mounted in racks. Britain subsequently built several classes of frigates based on the River class, while the United States built one class of the same design but armed with 3 3-inch guns, 4 40mm, and 9 20mm antiaircraft guns. Antisubmarine armament consisted of 1 Hedgehog, 8 depth charge launchers, and 2 depth charge racks.

By the end of the war, the numbers of escorts, being primarily destroyer escorts and frigates, eclipsed that of conventional destroyers. Great Britain commissioned 349 of them, while the United States produced 499 escorts.

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See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Corvettes and Sloops; Destroyers

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Destroyers

Small warships that are lightly armed and protected and capable of high speed. The destroyer originated in connection with the self-propelled torpedo, which was introduced in the late 1860s, and the consequent construction in the following decade of torpedo boats to carry the new weapon. These small, inexpensive warships offered the potential to destroy battleships, which were then the most powerful and most costly vessels afloat. Most naval powers of the age, as they based their fleet strength on the battleship, endeavored to devise a defense against the torpedo boat.

In 1893, Great Britain produced an answer in the *Havock*, the first modern torpedo-boat destroyer. Torpedo-boat destroyers were essentially enlarged torpedo boats that carried light guns and torpedoes. They were charged with hunting down and destroying enemy torpedo boats before the latter could launch their weapons against the capital ships of a battle fleet. Development in all maritime nations yielded vast improvements over the first torpedo-boat destroyers. By World War I, there were more of these warships (known by this time simply as destroyers) than of any other ship type in the world's navies.

The role of destroyers changed because of their increasing design capabilities in the years before World War I and from wartime experience. Destroyers became superior in all respects to the torpedo boats they were designed to destroy. As a result, naval powers in the prewar years largely discontinued the production of torpedo boats in favor of destroyers. The destroyer assumed the offensive role of torpedo boat while retaining the role of defending against torpedo attacks launched by enemy destroyers.

World War I added extensively to the duties of these vessels. By the end of that conflict, destroyers had acted not only in the roles envisioned for their type but also as surface combatants and bombardment ships in amphibious

operations. More important than these uses, however, was their use by Great Britain, France, and later the United States as convoy escorts to defend against submarine attack. Destroyers were particularly effective in this capacity after the wartime introduction of depth charges and underwater listening devices such as hydrophones and sonar.

World War I demonstrated the importance of destroyers, and the same basic types continued during the interwar years. Great Britain had such large numbers of the craft that fresh designs were not initiated immediately after the close of the war in 1918. However, destroyer construction in Italy led France to respond, because French politicians and naval officials viewed Italy as France's principal naval competitor in the Mediterranean. In 1923, France built large vessels that began a trend toward superdestroyers in the world's navies. Great Britain and Japan returned to destroyer production in the late 1920s; the United States did not initiate new construction until the early part of the next decade. Germany, although restricted by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, began building new vessels at the same time as the United States.

This destroyer construction took place in an era of naval disarmament as the world's great powers sought to limit production as a means to prevent future wars. Unlike most other warships, few restrictions were put on the design and number of destroyers during the naval disarmament talks of the period. The 1930 London Conference limited destroyers to a maximum displacement of 1,850 tons and their guns to 5 inches or smaller, but these stipulations meant little. Until the late 1930s, the largest and most heavily armed designs met these requirements, and the limit was increasingly ignored after 1934, when the Japanese withdrew from the Washington Treaty and declared that they would not support future arms limitations discussions.

The U.S. Somers class is an example of destroyer design in the years immediately before the outbreak of World War II. Completed in 1937, the *Somers* measured 381 feet in length by 36 feet 11 inches in beam and displaced 2,047 tons. It had exceptionally heavy armament: 8 5-inch guns, 8 1.1-inch guns, 2 half-inch weapons, and 12 21-inch torpedo tubes. The *Somers* had no armor protection and could steam at a maximum speed of 37 knots. The largest destroyers belonging to other naval powers loosely approximated the size, displacement, and armament of this class. France remained the exception, as it continued to design destroyers that dwarfed

those of other nations. The *Mogador*, launched in 1937, measured 451 feet 1 inches by 41 feet 7 inches, displaced 2,884 tons, and carried no armor protection. It was armed primarily with 8 5.5-inch guns and 10 21.7-inch torpedo tubes and was capable of 39 knots.



The USS *Cassin*, one of the three destroyers sunk at Pearl Harbor during the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Despite the increase in the size and armament of destroyers, they were, in most respects, technologically the same as their World War I predecessors—although in some destroyer classes, the largest guns were mounted in gun houses rather than open mounts to provide protection for crews. Another difference from the past was the incorporation of antiaircraft guns to fend off air attack.

By 1940, as during World War I, destroyers were the most numerous warships in the world's navies. Great Britain operated 247 destroyers of varying types and ages. The United States counted 149, and Japan had 116. Italy operated 90 destroyers. The other naval powers of the world also possessed large fleets: France maintained 66, the Soviet Union had 62, and Germany, through a naval policy that had violated the Treaty of Versailles, possessed 32.

World War II proved the continued importance of the roles destroyers had performed in the previous world conflict and introduced a new vital duty. In the Atlantic theater, the primary task of British and Canadian destroyers was as convoy escort to guard against attack of merchant vessels by German submarines. This effort proved so important that the destroyer formed the basis for one of the first diplomatic agreements between Great Britain and the United States during the war. This 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement transferred 50 aging World War I–era U.S. destroyers to Great Britain in return for basing rights in the Western Hemisphere.

Throughout the war, destroyers fought and helped to win the Battle of the Atlantic. Despite heavy losses in merchant vessels, ultimate Allied success in this effort allowed Great Britain to continue in the war. In addition, it enabled the transport of U.S. troops to the European and Mediterranean theaters after 1941.

Destroyers also served as escorts for fleet units, as surface combatants, in support of amphibious operations, as troop transports, and as resupply ships. An example in the Atlantic theater of the first four of these roles is Germany's April 1940 invasion of Norway. Destroyers escorted the German battleships and cruisers involved in the operation and not only bombarded areas earmarked for the landing of troops but also attempted to fend off attacks from opposing British warships, and they transported a portion of the German ground force. The same roles existed for destroyers in the Mediterranean, where they routinely bombarded enemy ports and troop positions, and Allied units supported all the major amphibious operations starting with Operation TORCH, the November 8, 1942, Allied invasion of North Africa. British vessels also acted as resupply ships for Tobruk. and Italian destroyers acted as fast emergency transports for North Africa.

These same roles were prevalent in the Pacific theater, involving largely the forces of the United States and Japan. The Japanese used the destroyers both as surface combatants and resupply vessels. Destroyers armed with the Long Lance torpedo were a key element of Japanese tactical operations and proved their effectiveness, especially in early night actions. The best example of a resupply effort was the famous Tokyo Express, which supplied Japanese troops during the August 1942–February 1943 contest for Guadalcanal. Destroyers were well suited for this resupply role because they were fast enough to make the voyage to Guadalcanal and depart while still under cover

of darkness. Early U.S. deficiencies in night fighting were overcome, and U.S. destroyers soon matched their Japanese counterparts in surface combat. In the August 6–7, 1943, Battle of Vella Gulf, U.S. destroyers sank three Japanese destroyers with no losses. The Japanese also used destroyers to protect convoys that supplied the home islands with war matériel.

In addition, use of destroyers in an antiaircraft role was widespread in the Pacific theater. Both the Japanese and the United States sought ways to effectively defend their most important capital ships, the aircraft carriers. Destroyers partly filled the need for antiaircraft defense. This critical duty was reflected in the significant increase in the antiaircraft gun batteries of both Japanese and U.S. destroyers during the war.

The 12 Japanese Akitsuki-class ships, launched between 1941 and 1944, mounted only 4 25mm guns in addition to their primary armament of 8 3.9-inch guns, which could be used against surface targets or elevated and used against aircraft. By the end of the war, the complement of 25mm guns had risen to 40 to 51 each for the surviving ships of the class. U.S. destroyers showed the same shift to greater antiaircraft armament over the course of the war based on combat experience. By 1944, the 58 vessels of the Allen M. Sumner class mounted a primary armament of 6 5-inch guns that could be used for surface combat or against aircraft and a smaller battery of 12 40mm guns specifically devoted to antiaircraft defense.

The large number of critical roles performed by the destroyers and their consequent frequent use led to wartime construction that yielded an additional 633 destroyers among the principal naval combatants. The vast majority of these vessels were produced in the United States and Great Britain, which completed 392 and 165 ships, respectively. An example of wartime construction is the 150-ship U.S. Navy Fletcher class. Launched between 1942 and 1944, these ships measured 376 feet 5 inches in length by 39 feet 7 inches in beam, displaced 2,325 tons, and were protected by light side and deck armor. They were armed with 5 5-inch guns, 4 1.1-inch weapons, 4 20mm guns for antiaircraft defense, and 10 21-inch torpedo tubes. They could make 38 knots.

The necessity for vessels to fulfill convoy escort roles also led to the production of a new type of destroyer that was cheaper and faster to build. Known as the destroyer escort, this ship was an essentially smaller, less capable destroyer with greater antisubmarine warfare capability. An example

is the U.S. TE-class escort, which measured 306 feet by 37 feet and displaced 1,432 tons. These were armed with three 3-inch guns and an assortment of antisubmarine weaponry.

During the war, the belligerent powers constructed 915 destroyer escorts. The United States and Great Britain accounted for the majority of this production with 499 and 349 ships, respectively. The design of both the destroyers and destroyer escorts of the Allies and Germany and Italy benefited from the incorporation of radar, which was retrofitted to vessels produced before the war.

World War II exacted a heavy toll of destroyers lost. By the end of the conflict, the belligerents had suffered a combined loss of 490 destroyers of varying types: among these, Japan lost 147; Great Britain suffered 133 sunk, largely in the Battle of the Atlantic; Italy lost 69 vessels; the United States counted 68 destroyers sunk; the Soviet Union lost 26; and France lost 14.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Central Pacific Campaign; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Convoys, Axis; Depth Charges; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; *Greer*, Attack on; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Hunter-Killer Groups; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Radar; *Reuben James*, Sinking of; Savo Island, Battle of; Sonar; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; TORCH, Operation; Torpedoes; United States Navy; Vella Gulf, Battle of; Versailles, Treaty of

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Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement (September 2, 1940)

An agreement between U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill in September 1940 that provided Great Britain with World War I–vintage U.S. destroyers, in return giving the United States access to British bases in North America and the Caribbean.

Following the May 26–June 4, 1940, evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkerque (Dunkirk), Britain was virtually naked militarily, and the nation awaited a German attack. When Churchill appealed to Roosevelt for military assistance, the U.S. reaction was immediate and extraordinary. Within days, 600 freight cars were on their way to U.S. ports filled with military equipment to be loaded aboard British merchant ships. These included half a million rifles and 900 old 75mm field guns.

On June 15, Churchill directly appealed to Roosevelt for 35 old U.S. destroyers. With Germany controlling both the English Channel ports and Norway, Britain faced the prospect of defending against German invasion with only 68 destroyers fit for service, a stark contrast to the 433 destroyers possessed by the Royal Navy in 1918. Britain's shipping lanes were even more vulnerable to German submarines with the fall of France in June 1940, and Italy's entry into the war had made the Mediterranean an area of difficult passage. As Churchill put it to Roosevelt, "We must ask therefore as a matter of life or death to be reinforced with these destroyers."

During the course of the next days and weeks as the number of these British warships continued to dwindle, Churchill's appeal grew to 50 to 60 destroyers. Roosevelt's insistence on proceeding with the aid went against the advice of army chief of staff General George C. Marshall and chief of naval operations Admiral Harold Stark, who believed that Britain was doomed and that such a step would strip the United States bare militarily before new production could materialize.

With U.S. public opinion still strongly opposed to U.S. intervention, Roosevelt masked the transfer in a deal announced on September 3, 1940, in the form of an executive order, not subject to congressional approval. Britain received 50 World War I–vintage destroyers from the United States, in return granting the United States rights of 99-year leases to British bases in North America and the Caribbean Islands. The United States claimed that the

agreement did not violate U.S. neutrality because the British were providing access to naval bases and facilities deemed essential for U.S. defense, including those in Newfoundland, Bermuda, British Guiana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad. The Roosevelt administration maintained that the deal was an important step in ensuring national security and preventing the spread of the European war to the Americas.

Actually, the United States got far more than it gave. The destroyers were in wretched condition; some barely made it across the Atlantic. But the deal gave a tremendous boost to British morale at a critical juncture, and Churchill viewed this as another step by the United States toward outright participation. Privately, German leader Adolf Hitler saw this in much the same light. Anxious to unleash Japan in Asia to occupy the United States, he ordered talks opened with Japan that culminated in the Tripartite Pact of September 27.

The long war, a clash involving continents that would give advantage to nations with superior sea power, drew closer to realization. One of the destroyers, HMS *Campbeltown* (formerly USS *Buchanan*) played a major role in the British destruction of the dry dock at Saint-Nazaire, France, on March 28, 1942.

JAMES T. CARROLL AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Battle for; Hitler, Adolf; Marshall, George Catlett; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Saint-Nazaire, Raid on; Stark, Harold Raynsford "Betty"; Tripartite Pact; Document 71

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DETACHMENT, Operation

See Iwo Jima, Battle for

Devereux, James Patrick Sinnott (1903–1988)

U.S. Marine Corps brigadier general. Born on February 20, 1903, in Cabana, Cuba, to a military family, James Patrick Sinnott Devereux attended numerous preparatory schools and studied in Switzerland before enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1923. Commissioned a second lieutenant in 1925, he served in a variety of assignments afloat and ashore, including in Nicaragua and Cuba. Promoted to captain in 1935, he was assigned to the Base Defense Weapons School, where he assisted in writing the basic doctrine for defense battalions.

Promoted to major, in October 1941 Devereux arrived on Wake Island to assume command of some 450 marines there under the overall command of U.S. Navy commander Winfield S. Cunningham. The marines were still in the process of improving their defenses when the Japanese attacked on December 8 (December 7 in Hawaii). For 15 days, the defenders held off the Japanese, sinking two destroyers (the first being the first Japanese warship sunk by the Americans in the war) and two patrol boats and damaging a Japanese cruiser as well as shooting down 28 Japanese aircraft and killing some 820 Japanese and wounding another 1,000.

Finally overcome by sheer force of numbers, Devereux and his marines were forced to surrender on December 23, 1941. Devereux and the other survivors spent the next four years in captivity. Although a defeat for the United States, the heroic example of the defenders of Wake Island nonetheless served as a great boost to American morale.

All of the surviving Wake Island prisoners of war were released in September 1945. While in captivity, Devereux had been promoted to lieutenant colonel, and he was promoted to colonel in January 1946. After some time in rehabilitation, Devereux attended the Senior Amphibious Warfare School. He ended his military career with the 1st Marine Division. He was promoted to brigadier general on his retirement in August 1948. Devereux served eight years as a U.S. congressman from Maryland and ran

unsuccessfully for governor. He died on August 5, 1988, in Baltimore, Maryland.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Cunningham, Winfield Scott; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Wake Island, Battle for

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Devers, Jacob Loucks (1887–1979)

U.S. Army general. Born on September 8, 1887, in York, Pennsylvania, Jacob Loucks Devers graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1909 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the field artillery. During 1912–1916, he returned to West Point as an instructor.

During World War I, Devers was assigned to the School of Fire (later the Field Artillery School), Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as a staff officer, attaining the temporary rank of colonel. In 1919, he served in the occupation of Germany and attended the French artillery school at Treves before again teaching at West Point (1919–1924). Devers graduated from the Command and General Staff School (1925) and the Army War College (1933). From 1936 to 1939 he was again assigned to West Point as an instructor and was promoted to colonel.

After World War II began in Europe in September 1939, U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall selected Devers to place the Panama Canal Zone on a wartime footing. In May 1940 he was promoted to brigadier general. He was promoted to major general in October 1940 and commanded the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from November to July 1941. When Major General Adna R. Chaffee Jr. was fatally stricken with cancer, Marshall named Devers—then the youngest army major general but well recognized in the army for his organizational and training ability—to

replace Chaffee in August 1941 as commander of the Armored Force at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

There Devers supervised the rapid expansion of U.S. armored forces from 2 to 16 divisions and 63 separate tank battalions. He soon became an enthusiastic advocate of mobile combined-arms warfare. One of his innovations was the addition of light aircraft to field artillery battalions to enhance the firepower of armored divisional artillery. Devers was promoted to lieutenant general in September 1942.

In May 1943, Devers took command of U.S. Army ground forces in the European theater of operations. In this role he supervised the rapid buildup of U.S. forces and their training in Britain for the invasion of France, which he hoped to lead. Instead, in January 1944 he was assigned to the Mediterranean theater as deputy supreme Allied commander there, replacing General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who took his place in Britain.

On September 15, 1944, Devers finally received the combat command he had long sought: the 6th Army Group of 23 divisions, consisting of Lieutenant General Alexander Patch's Seventh Army and General Jean de Lattre de Tassi-gny's French First Army, which had invaded southern France in Operation DRAGOON. With his 12 American and 11 French divisions he cleared German forces from Alsace and reduced the Colmar Pocket. In March 1945, Devers was promoted to general, and that same month his 6th Army Group crossed the Rhine and drove into southern Germany and Austria, where he accepted the surrender of German forces on May 6.

Devers commanded U.S. Army Ground Forces from 1945 to 1949. He retired from the army on September 30, 1949. Devers died in Washington, D.C., on October 15, 1979.

BRENT B. BARTH JR.

See also

De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; DRAGOON, Operation; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Marshall, George Catlett; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.

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Dewey, Thomas Edmund (1902–1971)

U.S. politician and twice Republican Party candidate for president. Born on March 24, 1902, in Owosso, Michigan, Thomas Dewey graduated from the University of Michigan in 1923, received his law degree from Columbia University in 1925, and in 1926 was admitted to the New York bar. Dewey launched his government career five years later as chief assistant to the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. He became U.S. attorney for the Southern District in 1935. Between 1935 and 1937, he garnered national attention as special prosecutor in an investigation of organized crime in New York, securing 72 convictions out of 73 prosecutions of long-established racketeers.

Dewey was district attorney of New York County in 1937 and 1938. Unsuccessful as the Republican candidate for governor of New York in 1938, Dewey won the state office for three successive terms beginning in 1942. As governor, he earned a reputation for political moderation and administrative efficiency, putting the state on a pay-as-you-go basis for capital building, reorganizing departments, and establishing the first state agency to eliminate racial and religious discrimination in employment.

The Republican nominee for U.S. president in 1944, Dewey was not able to overcome the enormous prestige of incumbent president Franklin D. Roosevelt, nor had he been expected to. Dewey refused to make an issue of the Pearl Harbor disaster of December 1941, but he charged the Democrats with inefficiencies in rearmament, an antibusiness stance, extravagance, and corruption. He also condemned Roosevelt's support of the Soviet Union. Roosevelt won the 1944 election with 25.6 million popular votes and 432 electoral votes to Dewey's 22.3 million popular votes and 99 electoral votes.

Dewey ran again for the presidency in 1948 against Roo-se-velt's successor, incumbent Harry S. Truman. Although the pollsters predicted victory for Dewey, Truman won. Dewey then returned to private law practice. He died on March 16, 1971, in Bal Harbor, Florida.

JOHN A. KOMAROMY

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; United States

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Dhistomo Massacre (June 10, 1944)

Located in central Greece some 85 miles northwest of Athens, the small village of Dhistomo was one of many villages during World War II that suffered reprisals for providing aid and cover to guerrillas fighting the German occupying forces. On June 10, 1944, Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) soldiers under the command of SS-Hauptsturmführer Fritz Lautenbach entered Dhistomo and systematically put the villagers to death. A total of 214 people, from babies only a few months old to men and women in their 80s, were killed. Lautenbach reported that his troops had first come under fire from the village, but agent Georg Koch of the Geheimfeldpolizei (secret field police, a branch of the SS), who was also present, filed a conflicting report stating that these were reprisal killings. Nonetheless, a subsequent investigation by German authorities cleared Lautenbach of wrongdoing.

The brutality of this particular attack, during which the village priest was beheaded and infants were reportedly bayoneted in their beds, is widely acknowledged. It is also representative of other German attacks, such as those on the village of Kalavrita and on Kondomari, Crete. The Dhistomo Massacre is commemorated in the village by a monument that lists the names and ages of all those killed. Their bones were collected and rest within the monument.

The current inhabitants of Dhistomo, including families of survivors, have made repeated attempts to gain reparations in German, Greek, French, and international courts. Those efforts are ongoing, but the German government has to date refused to pay any reparations for the incident.

TIMOTHY F. WINTERS

See also

Crete, Battle of; Greece; Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian; Waffen-SS

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Diégo-Suarez, Battle of (March 5–7, 1942)

British operation designed to capture Diégo-Suarez (now Antsiranana), the main French sea and air base on Madagascar. In early 1942, the British government feared that the Japanese might occupy Vichy French–administered Madagascar as they had occupied Indochina. Sea and air forces stationed on that island would be in a position to cut the only available shipping routes to Egypt and India. At the urging of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, the British Chiefs of Staff decided on March 7 to proceed with Operation IRONCLAD.

Major General R. C. Sturges of the Royal Marines commanded the land force of three infantry brigades and No. 5 Marine Commando. The British refused Free French assistance. The escorting naval force was drawn largely from Force H at Gibraltar. Ships there were replaced by others from the Home Fleet, which in turn received a loan of U.S. Navy warships. Convoys carrying the invasion force sailed on March 13 and 23 from Great Britain. Rear Admiral Edward Neville Syfret of Force H had overall naval command of a force that included the aircraft carriers *Illustrious* and *Indomitable*, the battleship *Ramillies*, and the cruisers *Devonshire* and *Hermione*.

The invasion force was staged from Durban, East Africa. The center of French strength was Diégo-Suarez, at the northern tip of Madagascar. To avoid French defenses there, the British planned to land on the west coast of the Andrakaka Peninsula, 10 to 12 miles from their objective of Diégo-Suarez. The approach occurred in the predawn darkness of May 5. The large liners carrying the assault troops safely anchored, having managed to avoid

both the reefs and mines in the channels. Several mines were detonated by sweepers, but the defenders failed to notice the explosions.

At 4:30 a.m. on May 5, elements of the 29th Independent Brigade and No. 5 Marine Commando went ashore, quickly overcoming light resistance. To distract the French, the *Hermione* mounted a noisy but harmless display east of Diégo-Suarez. At dawn on May 6, aircraft from the British carriers attacked French aircraft on the ground. They also sank a French submarine in the harbor and disabled other warships.

Most of the invading troops and their supplies were unloaded by the end of May 5, although a rising wind hampered efforts. By the afternoon of May 6, the advance was stopped just short of Antsirane. The destroyer *Anthony* landed 50 marines on the quay at Antsirane at 8:00 p.m., and the Vichy defenders quickly surrendered, ending resistance at Diégo-Suarez early on May 7. Further operations on Madagascar continued until November, but the occupation of Diégo-Suarez effectively ended the threat to Allied supply lines.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Indian Ocean Campaign; Madagascar; Vichy France

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Diégo-Suarez, Japanese Raid on (May 30, 1942)

Japanese midget submarine attack on shipping in the harbor of Diégo-Suarez (now Antsiranana), Madagascar. At the time, the British were in control of

the harbor, having seized it from the Vichy French in early March 1942 to protect shipping routes to the Middle East and India.

During March 1942, the Japanese planned a two-part operation by midget submarines in Australian waters and the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean operation was to be carried out by the 8th Submarine Group, commanded by Commodore Ishizaki Noboru. Ishizaki sortied from Penang, Malaysia, on April 30 with five submarines. Two carried one reconnaissance seaplane each, while the other three each carried one Type A midget submarine. After refueling from the armed merchant cruiser *Hokoku Maru* on May 5, the submarines searched for shipping up and down the African coast.

Following their successful invasion of Madagascar, the British fleet had dispersed. Only the battleship *Ramillies*, three destroyers, and two corvettes remained at Diégo-Suarez. On the night of May 29, one of the Japanese seaplanes flew over Diégo-Suarez and reported the presence of a Queen Elizabeth–class battleship in the harbor. The British spotted the plane but could not intercept it. They believed that it was a Vichy French aircraft scouting for French submarines known to be in the area.

The *Ramillies* was ready to get under way by 5:00 a.m. on May 30 and sailed around the bay to foil an expected attack. During daylight, Fleet Air Arm planes flew antisubmarine patrols over Diégo-Suarez. At dusk, the *Ramillies* again anchored.

Ishizaki, meanwhile, ordered the midget submarines, which were 10 miles out to sea, launched at dusk on May 29. Only two were launched, and only one entered the harbor. At 8:34 p.m. on May 30, Lieutenant Saburo Akeida and Petty Officer Masami Takemoto fired a single torpedo that struck the *Ramillies*, blowing a large hole in the battleship's port bulge and causing it to immediately sink by the bow. An hour later, Saburo and Masami launched their remaining torpedo at the oil tanker *British Loyalty*, sinking it. The corvettes dropped depth charges throughout the night, damaging the submarine, which ran aground.

Saburo and Masami made it ashore and began walking across northern Madagascar toward a prearranged rendezvous. The British believed that a French submarine had attacked them. Not until three days later, when a British patrol encountered and killed both Saburo and Masami, did the British realize who had attacked them.

The *Ramillies* was the largest victim of any Japanese midget submarine

attack. Temporarily repaired, on June 3 it sailed for Durban, where complete repairs took nearly a year.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Diégo-Suarez, Battle of; Submarines; Submarines, Midget

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Dieppe Raid (August 19, 1942)

Abortive World War II Allied raid against the northern French port of Dieppe. From a British perspective, there were good reasons for such a raid. In early 1942 Prime Minister Winston Churchill was under heavy political pressure as a result of a series of major military reverses. Churchill hoped that such a raid might provide a convincing military success and blunt Soviet and U.S. criticism of the failure to open a second front in Europe. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had dropped not-so-subtle hints that his country might leave the war, and German chancellor Adolf Hitler was certain that Churchill would try to bolster Stalin's resolve by attempting a raid against the northern coast of France. The range of British fighter aircraft determined the likely point of attack.

Dieppe was strongly defended. German colonel general Kurt Hesse was in overall command. Dieppe was held essentially by the 57th Infantry Regiment. While this was not a top unit, its men nonetheless took full advantage of the terrain.

In planning the operation, chief of Combined Operations Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten modified it without formal approval from Churchill and the British chiefs of staff. Later Mountbatten was able to mask his personal responsibility in the disaster. Minesweepers cleared a path across the English

Channel for the sizable naval forces committed to the operation. Commanded by Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, it consisted of 237 vessels of all types, 179 of them landing craft. These transported some 6,100 Allied troops (4,963 Canadians, about 1,075 British Army commandos, and 50 U.S. Army rangers). Some 730 aircraft, the majority of them Spitfire fighters, provided air cover and ground support.

Just before dawn on August 19, 1942, the troops came ashore. Code-named JUBILEE, the operation may have been the largest raid in history. The initial landing began at 4:50 a.m., and the attackers withdrew by 2:00 p.m. Some German coastal guns were destroyed but at prohibitive cost. The Allies suffered 3,367 casualties, including 1,946 captured and 907 killed. German losses were 314 killed and 294 wounded. The Canadians suffered the worst. Their high casualty rate led to much bitterness afterward. Overall, casualties were the highest in the war for any major offensive involving all three services. In addition to vehicles and tanks destroyed, the Allies also lost 98 aircraft; Luftwaffe losses totaled 48. The Royal Navy also lost 34 vessels: 33 landing craft and the destroyer *Berkeley*, which was scuttled to prevent it from being taken by the Germans.

The Dieppe Raid led to bitter recriminations between Britain and Canada and further strained relations with the United States and Soviet Union. It also produced its share of historical controversies and myths, including the belief, since disproved, that the Germans were aware of it in advance.

One of the chief mysteries surrounding Dieppe is why the raid was even attempted. The evidence that it had virtually no hope of success was subsequently concealed under the patent lie that it provided vital future lessons. The raid did serve to convince even diehards among the Americans that the Western Allies were not ready to assault Festung Europa (Fortress Europe) in 1942 and demonstrated the need for strong naval and air preliminary bombardment along with thorough training of assault forces. The raid also demonstrated the difficulty of attacking ports and led to the decision to develop artificial harbors (Mulberries) for the eventual cross-Channel invasion (Operation NEPTUNE). Even today, the Dieppe Raid remains a useful lesson on how not to conduct military planning.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Mulberries; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Stalin, Joseph

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Dietl, Eduard (1890–1944)

German Army general. Born on July 21, 1890, at Bad Aibling (Bavaria), Eduard Dietl served as a lieutenant in the German Army during World War I and joined the *Freikorps* in 1919. He remained in the army after 1918 and was the first officer who permitted Adolf Hitler to speak to his soldiers, in June 1919.

After the Nazi assumption of power in 1933, Dietl took command of the 3rd Mountain Division. During April 24–June 7, 1940, he was assigned the task of capturing Narvik in northern Norway, the most difficult aspect of the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. Dietl's troops occupied Narvik, but a few days later Allied forces began the reconquest of the area. Allied superiority forced him to withdraw, but he continued resistance even when Hitler was willing to accept surrender.

Shortly before a likely German defeat at Narvik, the Allies recalled their troops from Norway to France because of the German offensive there. Nazi propaganda made Dietl a hero. In July 1940, Hitler awarded him the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. On June 29, 1941—one week after the beginning of Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union—Dietl's division drove toward Murmansk. Dietl's task was to cut the railway connecting the Murmansk harbor with the interior of the Soviet Union, but this effort failed.

In June 1942, Dietl was promoted to colonel general and given command of the Twentieth Mountain Army in Finland. On June 23, 1944, after visiting

with Hitler, Dietl died when his airplane crashed near Hochwedel (Austria). Hitler delivered the funeral oration for Dietl, one of his most devoted followers within the Wehrmacht.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; Finland; Hitler, Adolf; Narvik, Operations in; Norway, German Conquest of

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Dietrich, Josef "Sepp" (1892–1966)

German Schutzstaffel (SS) general and commander of Leibstandarte, a bodyguard unit responsible for Chancellor Adolf Hitler's personal safety. Born on May 28, 1892, in Hawangen, Bavaria, Josef Dietrich volunteered for the army in 1914 and became a crewman in one of Germany's first tanks. After the war, he was active in the Freikorps before joining the National Socialist Party and the SS in 1928. He was selected as one of Hitler's bodyguards and was in charge of the buildup of the Leibstandarte. In the Blood Purge of July 1934, Dietrich led an execution squad in the elimination of the Sturmabteilung (SA, Storm Troopers) leadership.

German generals Josef Dietrich, former commander of the Sixth SS Panzer Army (11); Fritz Kraemer, chief of staff to Dietrich (33); and Herman Priess, former commander of the I SS Panzer Corps of the Sixth Panzer Army (45), and others on trial at Dachau for the massacre of American troops at Malmédy, Belgium. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In early 1940, Dietrich was assigned command of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH), which became a Panzergrenadier division in 1942. With it he took part in the invasions of France, Greece, and the Soviet Union. When the Western Allies landed in Normandy on June 6, 1944, Dietrich commanded I SS Panzer Corps, and in September Hitler gave him command of the Sixth Panzer Army. Dietrich was awarded the Reich's highest decoration, the Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, and in August 1944 he was promoted to the rank of Oberstgruppenführer. His Sixth Panzer Army was the designated main effort in the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), but it was unable to realize Hitler's far-reaching expectations.

Dietrich then fought on the Eastern Front. His last operation, in Hungary during March 1945, failed. To that point the prototype of the National Socialist soldier, Dietrich lost Hitler's confidence because he questioned Hitler's directives and ordered the retreat of his exhausted troops.

After the war, Dietrich was found guilty of being responsible for the

execution of U.S. prisoners of war (the December 17, 1944, Malmédy Massacre) and was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. He served only 10 years but was later arrested again and charged for murders committed in 1934. He was sentenced to only 18 months in prison. Dietrich died in Ludwigsburg, Bavaria, on April 21, 1966.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Allied Military Tribunals after the War; Ardennes Offensive; France, Battle for; France Campaign; Greece Campaign, German; Hausser, Paul "Papa"; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Malmédy Massacre; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Peiper, Joachim; Waffen-SS

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Dill, Sir John Greer (1881–1944)

British Army field marshal, chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), and Churchill's personal representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Born in Belfast, Ireland, on December 25, 1881, John Greer Dill was commissioned in the British Army on graduation from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1901. He fought in the latter stages of the 1899–1902 South African (Second Boer) War.

On the outbreak of World War I, Dill was a student at the Staff College of Camberley. He then held staff positions with units on the Western Front, but he also saw action and was wounded. Considered an exceptional staff officer, Dill was transferred to the Operations Branch, General Headquarters, and he ended the war as the head of that branch and a temporary brigadier general.

Dill served in a variety of posts after the war. In 1930 he was promoted to major general, and the next year he was appointed to head the Staff College. In 1934, he became director of operations and intelligence at the War Office. At the outset of World War II in 1939, Dill received command of I Corps but

did not see action. In April 1940, he was appointed vice chief of the Imperial General Staff and succeeded Field Marshal Sir Edmund Ironside as CIGS in late May 1940. His term as CIGS was a rough one. He presided during the British military withdrawal from continental Europe and the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), when the United Kingdom seemed on the brink of destruction.

Dill never got along well with Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who regarded him as overly cautious. In November, the government announced that Dill would retire the next month when he reached age 60 and be named governor-designate of Bombay, India. In recognition of his services, he was promoted to field marshal. This was done to make room for General Alan Brooke to become CIGS. As CIGS, Brooke was Dill's staunch supporter and friend. He convinced Churchill in a meeting on December 11, 1941, that Dill should accompany the prime minister to the United States and then remain for duty with the British Joint Staff Mission.

As the Combined Chiefs of Staff were formed in January 1942, Dill became the available man to chair the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, a new strategic organization charged with coordinating British and American strategy and logistics within the CCS. Despite his poor health, Dill soon found his way into the hearts and minds of his American colleagues, and he succeeded in a demanding assignment. He got along well with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall. Dill became the resilient link—and the buffer—between two nations joined in a sometimes uneasy partnership at war.

Dill died in Washington on November 4, 1944, and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery, the only foreign officer ever afforded that distinction. The U.S. Congress honored him with a joint resolution in December 1944. On November 1, 1950, a magnificent equestrian statue of Dill was dedicated in Arlington Cemetery. He was awarded the American Distinguished Service Medal posthumously and had been knighted in 1937 by his own nation.

JOHN F. VOTAW

See also

Britain, Battle of; Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Combined Chiefs of Staff; Marshall, George Catlett; Roosevelt, Franklin

D.

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Displaced Persons

The term "displaced person" (DP) was often used for refugees who at the end of the war in Europe were living outside their prewar national boundaries and needed assistance. In 1942, Great Britain and the United States solicited support from the other Allied powers for help in dealing with the expected masses of slave laborers, prisoners of war, and political prisoners in Germany and its conquered territories. These efforts culminated in November 1943 when 44 nations signed the Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the first international organization created to help wartime refugees. As the United States would be contributing about 40 percent of the UNRRA's budget, an American, former New York governor Herbert Lehman, became its first director.

The UNRRA planned to provide DPs with housing, food, clothing, and other necessities until each person could be repatriated to his or her home nation. This did not take into account the fact that many DPs, especially Jews and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, could not safely return home. Others, particularly Poles and Czechs, did not want to return to home nations occupied by the Soviet Army. The estimated two-year time frame for the UNRRA to carry out its tasks was also wildly optimistic.

UNRRA field teams for dealing with DPs were made up of multinational groups of about a dozen men and women per team. They were selected for language skills and backgrounds in administration, social work, medicine, or various mechanical abilities. In 1944, these teams began to assume administration of refugee camps that Allied military forces had established in North Africa and Italy. Teams had to rely on the Allied military for additional

personnel, transportation, and assistance in enforcing UNRRA regulations at the camps. Some local commanders were quite helpful; others were indifferent or even hostile to the UNRRA. This problem was addressed to some extent when the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), named U.S. major general Allen Gullion, former provost marshal general of the army and an efficient organizer, as the head of its own DP branch.

By the end of the war in Europe, SHAEF and the UNRRA had identified more than 10 million refugees in and around Germany. Others in Soviet-controlled areas were never accurately counted. Most DPs, primarily the former prisoners of war and slave laborers from Western Europe, were repatriated before the end of 1945. But nearly 800,000 others remained and were housed in DP camps across occupied Germany.

DP camps were built from German Army barracks, depots, and even some former concentration camps. In some areas, neighborhoods and entire villages became “DP towns.” The UNRRA organized most camps by nationality, having learned that mixed camps too often led to violence. Because DPs were permitted to move freely, over time camps took on specific national and cultural identities. This ethnic concentration was reinforced by the practice of allowing each camp to elect a governing council and maintain its own police force. The UNRRA and the military enforced occupation regulations against black marketing and the like.

Throughout 1946, the DP population fluctuated; many Poles and others returned to their home countries. There were still several hundred facilities housing DPs in 1947, when the International Refugee Organization replaced the UNRRA as the administrator of refugee matters. Conditions in the camps were crowded—an average of 100 square feet or less of space was allotted to families of five or more people. Food remained scarce, and daily diets in the camps seldom exceeded 2,000 calories and were often less. Food packages from America and the International Red Cross helped somewhat. As the Cold War intensified, DP populations grew again when individuals and families fled Poland and the other East European nations for the west.

Finding permanent homes for these masses of men, women, and children taxed the energies of Europe and the world well into the 1950s. At first, nations such as Belgium, Australia, and Canada accepted only single men who were willing to work in mining, forestry, and other heavy-labor jobs.

Great Britain, albeit with some reluctance, permitted Jewish survivors of the Holocaust into Palestine and made room at home for Polish soldiers who had fought with the United Kingdom during the war.

The United States moved slowly in passing legislation to accept DP immigrants. The resulting 1948 law had long waiting periods, quotas, and other restrictions similar to those of the 1930s, but through it increasing numbers of former DPs came to the United States. Ethnic Germans obtained a plurality of American visas because they received considerable help from American church groups. Ultimately, more than 580,000 DPs settled in the United States between 1949 and 1957—more than half of the total number of DPs who went to some 113 countries by the end of the 1950s. The last DP camp closed in 1957. Those who had not found a home elsewhere, mostly the old and infirm, then became the responsibility of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The DP program was an extraordinary experiment in international cooperation to salvage wrecked lives. At the camps, many refugees received the first decent treatment they had known in years. Some were able to take advantage of educational opportunities and learn new trades that increased their chances for immigration. Most of these men, women, and children eventually found new homes somewhere in the world. But it took far longer to achieve this than the originators of the program had expected, and by then new struggles had been ignited in the Middle East and in Korea that produced new refugee populations. These made it clear that the world had not seen the end of the problem of DPs.

TERRY SHOPTAUGH

See also

Holocaust; United Nations, Formation of; Document 64

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Dixie Mission to Yan’an (July 1944–March 1947)

U.S. Army Observer Group sent to Yan’an (Yenan), China, to establish a liaison with Chinese Communist forces. The Dixie Mission began in July 1944 when a nine-man U.S. Army team flew to the headquarters of Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) at Yan’an in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province in north-central China. Colonel David D. Barrett, a “China hand” who had studied the language and served as a military attaché to China, headed the mission, which would continue through 1947. It included officer and enlisted personnel from all three services as well as representatives of the U.S. State Department. Barrett’s mission was to collect information about Japanese and their puppet Chinese forces order of battle and operations. He was also to determine the extent of the Communist military effort in the war against Japan and to coordinate the search and rescue of downed Allied pilots in Communist-controlled areas.

A U.S. military mission to the Communists had first been suggested in mid-1943. Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell’s political adviser, John Paton Davies, believed strongly that U.S. advisers to Mao’s headquarters could make a difference by coordinating with Chinese Communists who were fighting the Japanese. Davies drew parallels to the effort of the Allies to assist the Partisans of Tito (Josip Broz) in Yugoslavia. Fearing that American supplies and equipment would be diverted to the Communists and that U.S. leadership might develop a more favorable view of the Chinese Communist movement and operations in the territories held by them, Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) strongly opposed the mission to Yan’an. During the next year, the United States continued to pressure Jiang to allow this mission to go forward, but not until after the June 1944 visit of U.S. vice president Henry A. Wallace could sufficient pressure be exerted on Jiang to allow the liaison mission to begin.

Communist official representative to the national government at Chongqing (Chungking) Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), who saw potential in a future collaboration between the United States and the Red Army in the fight against the Japanese, supported an increase in American presence and the liaison effort. By August 1944, Barrett and a team that eventually numbered more than 20 people, including State Department officials John S. Service

and Raymond P. Ludden, began to meet with the most senior political and military leadership of the Communist movement and gather information about the Japanese and their allies as well as the Chinese Communists. The mission also provided the opportunity in November for Major General Patrick J. Hurley, in his capacity as a special emissary of U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, to begin an effort to get the two Chinese factions to focus their efforts on fighting the Japanese rather than each other. During the course of the mission, the Dixie group secured the rescue and return of more than 100 American pilots.

The mission served perhaps its most important function after the war as a bridge between the United States and the Chinese Communists. A mission headed by General George C. Marshall brought the two sides to the negotiating table in an effort to secure a solution to the infighting in China that had been going on for decades. The collapse of the Marshall mission in January 1947, however, led to the end of the observer mission.

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See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Zhou Enlai

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Dodecanese Islands Campaign (September–November 1943)

The islands of the southern Aegean Sea off the southwest coast of Anatolia were known through much of their history as the eastern or southern Sporades (meaning "scattered"). The islands include Rhodes, Karpathos, Kassos, Haliki, Kastellorizo (Castlerosso), Alimia, Tilos, Symi (Simi), Nissyros, Kos (Cos), Pserimos, Astypalea, Kalymnos, Telendhos, Leros,

Lipsi, Patmos, Arki, and Agathonissi. Early in the 20th century, the Young Turks revoked the historic privileges enjoyed by the islanders, who were part of the Ottoman Empire. Twelve islands (*dhodkeka nisia;* i.e., *dodecanese*) joined in a failed protest against the loss of these privileges, and the name "Dodecanese" stuck as a term for all these islands, even though they exceeded 12 in number.

In 1912 as a consequence of the Italo-Turkish War, the Dodecanese Islands passed to Italian control. In 1941, the Germans joined their Italian allies in garrisoning the islands, which were inhabited chiefly by Greeks. The Italians had naval and air bases on Rhodes, the strategic key to the area. There was also an airfield on Kos, a seaplane and naval base and naval batteries at Leros, and an air base on Scarpanto.

When Italy signed an armistice with the Allies on September 8, 1943, the Dodecanese were occupied by two poorly equipped Italian divisions; along with air force, naval, and auxiliary troops, the Italian garrison totaled 37,000 men, but their morale was low. The Germans had one division of 7,000 men, which was well equipped with tanks and artillery. The local Greek population, meanwhile, was excited at the prospect of liberation by the Allied powers.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill ordered that operations be conducted against the Dodecanese Islands. He believed that success there would open the way to the Dardanelles and the Balkans. He also sought to induce Turkey to join the war and to remove the stain of Britain's defeat in World War I at Gallipoli. The original plan for an invasion of the Dodecanese, prepared by the Middle East Command, was known as Operation MANDIBLES, but it was subsequently renamed Operation ACCOLADE. Churchill appealed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for aid to liberate the Dodecanese. The Americans, who were preparing a landing on the Italian Peninsula at Salerno, rebuffed him. Roosevelt also suspected that the British hoped to open a new front in the Balkans. Coincidentally, the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in Quebec ordered most of the landing ships in the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, which starved the operation of needed assets.

On September 9, 1943, three British operatives led by Major Lord George Jellicoe parachuted onto Rhodes. They contacted Italian authorities there and urged them to take the Germans prisoner. The governor, Admiral Inigo

Campioni, hesitated. The Germans, meanwhile, acted swiftly, and on September 11 the Italians on Rhodes surrendered to the Germans.

The British nonetheless proceeded with some landings, and by October 1943—deploying a force of 5,000 men, six Royal Air Force squadrons, a destroyer flotilla, and six submarines—they secured several islands, among them Kos, Samos, Patmos, and Leros. They were not able to either gain air superiority or take Rhodes, however, and as long as the Germans were secure at Rhodes, the British could not hold the Dodecanese.

On October 3, 1943, the Germans went on the offensive, landing a force on Kos. Supported by heavy bombing of the island by Stuka aircraft, German troops quickly reduced the defenses, and the British and Italian forces there surrendered the same evening. Churchill refused to consider a withdrawal, instead ordering that Leros and Samos be held at all costs. Indeed, the British reinforced Leros. On November 12, the Germans attacked Leros with overwhelming force, taking it four days later. British troops remaining in the Dodecanese then withdrew.

Among British units involved were the Long Range Desert Group, the Special Boat Squadron, the Raiding Forces' Levant Schooner Flotilla, the King's Own, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the Durham Light Infantry. The Greek Navy provided seven destroyers to assist the more numerous British ships. In the campaign, the British lost 4 cruisers damaged and 2 submarines, 6 destroyers, and 10 small coastal vessels and minesweepers sunk. The Royal Air Force flew 3,746 sorties and lost 113 aircraft out of 288 involved. The British Army lost in all about 4,800 men, while the Italians lost 5,350. German casualties totaled some 1,184 men, 35,000 tons of shipping (between late September and late November 1943), and 15 small landing craft and ferries. The operation failed as a consequence of Campioni's hesitation, German aggressiveness and air superiority, lack of cooperation by the Americans, and the inadequacy of British resources. Holding the islands, however, stretched German resources, ultimately tying down some 60,000 troops who might have been better employed elsewhere.

After the war, the British governed the Dodecanese until 1947. The islands were then turned over to Greece.

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY

See also

Campioni, Inigo; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Greece; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Doihara Kenji (1883–1948)

Japanese Army general. Born in Okayama Prefecture on August 8, 1883, Doihara Kenji graduated first in his class from the Japanese Military Academy in 1904 and from the Army Staff College in 1912. Posted to China in 1913, Doihara served there as an intelligence officer. He was promoted to major in 1919 and returned to Japan in 1920. In 1922, Doihara again went to China to serve in military intelligence and as an adviser to Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin) until the latter's assassination in June 1928.

In 1931 Doihara, now a colonel, became the head of Japan's military intelligence bureau in Shenyang (then Mukden), the capital of Manchuria. In that capacity, Doihura played a major role in planning and executing the Mukden Incident of 1931, which led to the Japanese seizure of Manchuria by the Guandong (Kwantung) Army, the Japanese garrison force stationed in south Manchuria. During the "Manchurian Incident" (the Japanese takeover of Manchuria), Doihara engaged in several covert activities, the most significant of which was arranging to bring the last Qing (Ch'ing) emperor, Aixinjueluo Puyi (Aisingioro P'u-i/P'u-yi, known to the Americans as Henry

Pu-yi), to Manchuria to be installed as puppet emperor of the Japanese-controlled state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) in 1933.

Doihara's accomplishments earned him promotion to major general in 1933 and the nickname "Lawrence of Manchuria." Doihara continued to play a major role in the Japanese Army's expansion on the Asian continent. In June 1935, he concluded a local agreement with Chinese general Qin Dechun that led to the withdrawal of Chinese troops and subsequent entry of the Japanese army into northern China.

Promoted to lieutenant general in 1936, Doihara commanded an infantry division in China until 1940, when he was recalled to Japan. During the Pacific war, Doihara served in several senior posts in the home islands and overseas. After Japan's surrender in August 1945, Doihara oversaw the army's demobilization. In 1946 he was arrested and brought to trial by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Convicted of war crimes, Doihara was hanged in Tokyo on December 23, 1948.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Aixinjueluo Puyi; China; Guandong Army; Japan; Manzhouguo

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Dollman, Friedrich (1882–1944)

German Army general. Born on February 2, 1882, at Würzburg, Bavaria, Friedrich Dollman joined the Bavarian Army as an officer candidate in 1899, and in 1901 he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 7th Field Artillery Regiment. During World War I, he served as a captain on the General Staff. Dollman continued in the Reichswehr after the war, and between 1932 and 1936 he rose from colonel to general of artillery. In late August 1939, he took command of the Seventh Army, a post he held until his death.

The Seventh Army did not participate in the 1939 campaign against Poland and played only a minor role in the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940). Nevertheless, Dollman was promoted to colonel general. The Seventh Army occupied France from 1940 to 1944.

Dollman did not get along with Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who had charge of the defenses against an Allied invasion. In early June 1944, both men expected that poor weather conditions would postpone the Allied invasion of France. Dollman was at Rennes; he had ordered a map exercise there and required all divisional and regimental commanders to attend. Rommel was also away when the Allies invaded Normandy on June 6. Dollman unwisely ordered the Panzer Lehr and 12th SS Panzer divisions to the front in broad daylight. This exposed them to relentless Allied air attack and delayed any effective German armored counterattack until June 9.

On June 26 Dollman learned that Allied forces had penetrated Seventh Army defenses at Saint-Lô. Dollman was far to the rear in a château at Le Mans. In a panic he ordered II SS Panzer Corps commander SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser to launch an immediate counterattack. Hausser asked for time to prepare, but Dollman refused the request. Dollman died on June 29, 1944, either of a heart attack or of self-inflicted poison. Hausser succeeded him in command of the Seventh Army.

BRANDON SCOTT BOOR

See also

France, Battle for; Hausser, Paul “Papa”; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen

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Dönitz, Karl (1891–1980)

German Navy grand admiral who commanded the U-boats and later the entire Kriegsmarine and then succeeded Adolf Hitler as president of the Third

Reich. Born in Grünau-bei-Berlin on September 16, 1891, Karl Dönitz joined the German Navy in 1910. During World War I, he served on the cruiser *Breslau*, but he transferred to U-boats in 1916, commanding several submarines in the Mediterranean. In October 1918, his *U-68* attacked an Allied convoy, sinking one of the ships. The submarine was forced to the surface when it developed mechanical problems, and Dönitz was taken prisoner.

Released after the end of the war, Dönitz continued in the navy. He held a variety of shore and sea assignments, including command of a torpedo-boat flotilla, during which he experimented with tactics that he would later develop into the *Rudeltaktik* (wolf pack) concept. German chancellor Adolf Hitler named Dönitz commander of the fledgling German submarine force in 1935. As captain and commodore, Dönitz sought to build additional submarines to expand the fleet to 300 boats. He believed that this number would be decisive in winning the next war.

Dönitz's passionate advocacy of submarines led to friction between him and the commander of the navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who preferred to allocate scarce naval resources to a long-range program of conventional large surface ships. Their differences became moot when World War II began before either type was fully ready for decisive employment.

Promoted to rear admiral in October 1939, Dönitz struggled to overcome the problems of insufficient numbers of U-boats and ineffective torpedoes, difficulties that nearly wrecked his operations. To combat Allied convoys, Dönitz implemented wolf pack tactics: centralized control over groups of U-boats that struck Allied convoys at night in surface attacks. In January 1943, Hitler, frustrated by the performance of his surface navy, removed Raeder and replaced him with Dönitz as head of the navy with the rank of grand admiral. Dönitz endeavored to continue the U-boat war, but during "Black May" in 1943, his U-boats were essentially defeated through Allied antisubmarine countermeasures, including aircraft, convoys, searchlights, radar, sonar, and the ability to read Germany's encoded radio messages.

Unlike virtually all other senior German military officers, Dönitz managed to retain Hitler's confidence and favor. Dönitz's final military success was the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of Germans from the Baltic states by sea. As the Allied armies entered Germany on April 15, 1945, Hitler appointed Dönitz as commander of all forces in northern Germany. On

April 30, the day that Hitler committed suicide, Dönitz was informed that Hitler had appointed him to serve as president of the Reich and supreme commander of the armed forces. Dönitz then led the crumbling Third Reich, hoping to delay Soviet advances to allow millions of German troops and civilians to flee westward to British and U.S. lines to avoid falling into Soviet hands. Dönitz surrendered Germany unconditionally to Allied representatives on May 7, 1945.

The British arrested Dönitz on May 23. Tried by the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg, Dönitz was found guilty of crimes against peace and violation of the rules of war and was sentenced on October 1, 1946, to 10 years in Spandau Prison. He was released in 1956 and later wrote several books about his career and about submarine warfare. Unrepentant about his role in the war, Dönitz died in Aumuhle, Federal Republic of Germany, on December 24, 1980.

STEVEN J. RAUCH

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Hitler, Adolf; Raeder, Erich; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Donovan, William Joseph (1883–1959)

Head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. Born on January 1, 1883, in Buffalo, New York, William Joseph Donovan graduated from Columbia University with a law degree in 1907 and afterward practiced law in Buffalo. He also served as a captain in the New York National Guard. Donovan was stationed along the Mexican border in 1916 when the guard was called up to

assist in the unsuccessful effort to capture notorious Mexican bandit and revolutionary leader Pancho Villa.

After the United States entered World War I, Donovan was sent to Europe with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). As a major, he commanded the 1st Battalion of the 165th Infantry Regiment (formerly the 69th New York Infantry Regiment) in the 45th Infantry Division. Donovan took part in the September 1918 Saint-Mihiel offensive. Then a lieutenant colonel, he was wounded but refused evacuation and stayed to lead his men. His actions brought him the Distinguished Service Cross and the Medal of Honor and the nickname of “Wild Bill.”

After the war, Donovan returned to Buffalo to practice law. From 1924 to 1929, he was an assistant U.S. attorney general. He ran unsuccessfully for state political office and in 1929 moved to New York City. Much interested in international affairs, Donovan undertook several overseas missions for the Rockefeller Foundation and the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. Donovan tried to convince Roosevelt and others that the United States needed a centralized intelligence-gathering organization similar to that run by the British. His efforts finally led to his appointment, in July 1941, as head of the Office of Coordinator of Information, which after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS gathered intelligence, conducted propaganda and sabotage, and assisted partisans. Donovan finished World War II with the rank of major general.

Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) William Joseph Donovan. The OSS was the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (Library of Congress)

Following World War II, Donovan lobbied President Harry S. Truman to set up a permanent intelligence organization. Truman initially rejected this step, but the coming of the Cold War led in 1947 to the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), loosely modeled on the OSS. Donovan's hope of heading the CIA was not realized, although he briefly returned to government service as ambassador to Thailand during 1953 and 1954. Donovan died on February 8, 1959, at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.

GRAHAM T. CARSSOW

See also

Office of Strategic Services; Partisans/Guerrillas; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; Document 93

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Doolittle, James Harold "Jimmy" (1896–1993)

U.S. Army Air Forces (later U.S. Air Force) general. Born on December 14, 1896, in Alameda, California, James Harold Doolittle grew up in Nome, Alaska. He attended Los Angeles Community College and the University of California, Berkeley, where he studied in the School of Mines, but he left school following the entry of the United States into World War I and enlisted as a flying cadet in the Signal Corps Reserve. He attended flight school, became a pilot, and was commissioned a second lieutenant. He then served as a flight-gunner instructor at Rockwell Field in San Diego, California. His request for assignment to France was denied because of the armistice of November 1918.

In 1920 Doolittle secured a regular army commission, and on September 4, 1922, he made the first transcontinental flight in less than 24 hours. He then studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he received MA and ScD degrees in aeronautical engineering. A pioneer in both military and civilian aviation, Doolittle helped develop horizontal and directional gyroscopes and perfected instrument flying.

Doolittle gained prominence through stunt flying, racing, and demonstrating aircraft. In 1930, he left the army to become aviation manager for Shell Oil, where he helped develop new high-octane aviation fuels that greatly benefited the United States in World War II. He won the Harmon (1930) and Bendix (1931) trophies, and in 1932 he broke the world airspeed record.

In July 1940, Doolittle returned to the army as a major. Following U.S. entry into World War II, in January 1942 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. On April 18, 1942, Doolittle commanded the first American air strike on the Japanese mainland, flying U.S. Army Air Forces B-25 medium

bombers off the flight deck of the aircraft carrier *Hornet.* The raid was a great boost for U.S. morale, and for it he was awarded the Medal of Honor and promoted to brigadier general.

In July 1942, Doolittle took command of the Twelfth Air Force in Britain, which he led in Operation TORCH in North Africa (November 8, 1942). In November 1943, he was given command of the Fifteenth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater, directing raids against German-held Europe. In January 1944, he assumed command of the Eighth Air Force in the European theater, and that March he was promoted to temporary lieutenant general. On Germany's surrender in May 1945, Doolittle moved with the Eighth Air Force to Okinawa, although the Eighth Air Force arrived in the Pacific theater too late to see much action.

In May 1946, Doolittle returned to the civilian sector as a vice president for Shell Oil, and later he became its director. He also served on the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Air Force Science Advisory Board, and the President's Science Advisory Committee. In June 1985 by act of Congress, Doolittle was promoted to general on the retired list. He died on September 27, 1993, in Pebble Beach, California.

SEAN K. DUGGAN

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Tokyo Raid; TORCH, Operation; United States Army Air Forces

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Doolittle Raid

See Tokyo Raid

Doorman, Karel Willem Marie (1889–1942)

Dutch admiral. Born on April 23, 1889, in Utrecht, the Netherlands, Karel Doorman entered the Royal Netherlands Naval College in Den Helder in 1906. Commissioned in August 1910, he then served on several ships in the Far East and at home. In 1915, he joined the air division of the navy at Soesterberg and served at the De Kooy Naval Airfield from 1918 to 1921. After attending the Higher Naval School in The Hague, Doorman became one of the first flying instructors in the Netherlands naval air service.

Doorman returned to the Far East at the end of 1923, and from 1928 to the end of 1931 he was the first officer at De Kooy. He began his third tour in the Far East in 1932 and served as a commanding officer on destroyers and cruisers. He held several positions in the naval department in Batavia (now Jakarta) in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI).

Doorman served in the Netherlands from June 1934 to September 1937 as chief of the naval staff and then returned for his fourth tour in the Far East, where he commanded a cruiser. He then headed the Royal Netherlands Naval Air Service in the NEI from August 1938 to May 1940. Promoted to rear admiral in May 1940, Doorman was appointed commander of the Netherlands Squadron in the East on June 17. Because of his close connection with the naval air service, he was well aware of the importance of aircraft and aerial reconnaissance.

To try to stop the Japanese forces moving toward Singapore and the NEI, the Allies formed the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command in mid-January 1942. Dutch vice admiral Conrad E. L. Helfrich took overall command of the naval elements on February 14, and Doorman held tactical command of the naval strike force. As Japanese intentions became clearer, Helfrich combined the naval elements available to him into the Combined Striking Force under Doorman. The fleet departed Surabaya on the evening of February 26 following reported sightings of Vice Admiral Takagi Takeo's Eastern Invasion Force as it approached Java.

The Combined Striking Force consisted of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and nine destroyers. Outgunned by Takagi's ships, Doorman's command faced heavy odds even before it entered battle. It had never trained

together as a unified force and lacked a common doctrine and common communication system. The men were also suffering from fatigue the day of the battle, and the command had nothing to match the excellent Japanese Long Lance torpedo. More important, although Doorman had requested aerial reconnaissance, none was available.

As a consequence, Japanese reconnaissance aircraft discovered Doorman's fleet first. In the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, 1942, the Japanese sank the light cruisers *De Ruyter* (flagship) and *Java* and three destroyers. Three cruisers and five destroyers (four of them U.S.) survived. The Japanese lost no ships. Doorman perished aboard the *De Ruyter*.

Although some have criticized Doorman for his tactics in the battle, no one can question his bravery or his decision to attack. In order to defend Java, his fleet had to give battle. Doorman was posthumously awarded the Militaire Willemsorde 3rd class, the highest Dutch military decoration during the war. Two Netherlands aircraft carriers were later named for him.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

ABDA Command; Balikpapan, Battle of; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of; Madoera Strait, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Takagi Takeo

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Dorman-Smith, Eric "Chink" (1895–1969)

British Army major general. Born at Bellamont Forest, Cootehill, Ireland, on July 24, 1895, Eric Dorman-Smith entered the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and graduated at the beginning of 1914 as a lieutenant in the 1st

Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers. Dorman-Smith was nicknamed “Chink” after the regimental mascot, the Chinkara antelope. He served throughout World War I, during which he was wounded three times and was awarded the Military Cross. He had attained the rank of major by the end of the war, when in Italy he met American writer Ernest Hemingway. They became close friends, and Hemingway based many of his characters on Dorman-Smith.

After the war, Dorman-Smith served in Ireland when the British Army was involved in the political turmoil concerning Irish independence. He expressed the view that the professional soldier should be removed from politics, however, even those of his own country. He also was an instructor at Sandhurst and director of military training in India.

Dorman-Smith was unorthodox and controversial and possessed a cutting wit. He had a fertile and original mind and was widely considered to be one of the best military thinkers in the British Army, though his rabbit teeth and soft mustache made him the caricaturist’s dream of a languid British officer. When World War II began, Dorman-Smith was a brigadier and deputy chief of the General Staff in India, but in 1940 he became commandant of the Middle East Staff College in Haifa. From there he gave invaluable tactical advice to Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor that helped bring the sensational defeat of the Italians at Beda Fomm. General Claude J. Auchinleck valued Dorman-Smith’s perceptive and analytical appreciations of the Eighth Army’s operations and appointed him director of military operations in April 1941 and deputy chief of the General Staff in May 1942.

When Auchinleck assumed direct command of the Eighth Army in June 1942, he appointed Dorman-Smith, promoted to major general, as his personal chief of staff. Dorman-Smith was responsible for planning the fluid, mobile defense strategy of the first battle of El Alamein in July 1942 that stopped the Axis advance. Dorman-Smith then wrote a study that outlined the tactical situation and recommended a period of training for battle. This was adopted by Auchinleck’s successor, Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery, as the basis for his operations at Alam Halfa (August 31–September 7, 1942) and in the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942).

Just a week later, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill sacked Dorman-Smith as part of his change of the Middle East command structure. The great controversy surrounding this issue resurfaced after the war when

Dorman-Smith forced the publishers of Montgomery's memoirs to include acknowledgments crediting Auchinleck. He also sued Churchill for libel, forcing him to publish an acknowledgment in his memoirs absolving Dorman-Smith of responsibility for the defeats at Gazala (May 26–June 13, 1942) and Tobruk (June 20–21, 1942).

Dorman-Smith's career had always been sufficiently contentious to make him enemies, but after his dismissal he was treated disgracefully for reasons that have never been properly explained. Reverting to his permanent rank of colonel, he was assigned command of an infantry brigade and ended up fighting in Italy, where he was involved in the capture of Rome. Although Dorman-Smith's command was faultless, he was soon removed from his post because of friction with his subordinate commanders and was retired involuntarily in November 1944, disillusioned and bitter.

After the war, Dorman-Smith retired to the family estate at Bellamont Forest, where he took the name O'Gowan, the Irish version of the surname Smith; began a new career as a lawyer; and assumed the persona of country gentleman and military adviser to the Irish Republican Army. He died on May 11, 1969, in Cavan, Ireland. No representative of the British government or army attended his funeral.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Alam Halfa, Battle of; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; El Alamein, Battle of; Gazala, Battle of; Mersa Matrûh, Second Battle of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; North Africa Campaign; O'Connor, Richard Nugent; Ruweisat Ridge, Battles of; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Dornberger, Walter Robert (1895–1980)

German Army major general. Born in Giessen, Germany, on September 6, 1895, Walter Robert Dornberger was studying to be an architect when World War I began. He entered military service in August 1914 as an officer candidate with a foot artillery regiment and was commissioned a second lieutenant in December 1915. During the war, he was both a platoon and battery commander until he was taken prisoner by the French in October 1918.

Released in March 1920, Dornberger remained in the Reichswehr and was promoted to first lieutenant in 1925. He held various assignments related to artillery during the early 1920s and studied mechanical engineering at the Technical University in Berlin, where he received his engineering degree in 1930. Dornberger was promoted to captain in March 1930 and in April 1931 was appointed to the Ballistics and Munitions Branch of the Army Weapons Department, which oversaw development of liquid-fuel rockets for military use.

Dornberger received an honorary doctorate in engineering in 1935. Promoted to major in November 1935, he then commanded the army experimental facilities at Kummersdorf. In July 1936, he became department chief in the Army Weapons Department with responsibility for special experiments at the Army Experimental Station at Peenemünde. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in June 1938 and to colonel in August 1940.

At Peenemünde, work on the A-Series of rocket missiles resulted in the V-2 (A-4), which made its first successful test flight on October 3, 1942. Dornberger was promoted to major general in June 1943. A British air raid on the night of August 17–18, 1943, destroyed part of Peenemünde and forced dispersal of the project, which Dornberger estimated set back production six months. The first V-2 hit London on September 8, 1944.

By early February 1945, the Schutzstaffel (SS) controlled the entire V-2 program. The SS evacuated Dornberger and some 450 others from Peenemünde on April 6, 1945. Dornberger was taken prisoner by U.S. forces on May 3, 1945, and turned over to the British, who imprisoned him at the Island Farm prisoner-of-war camp in Wales until 1947. Dornberger was charged as a war criminal for launching the V-2s against London, but he was never brought to trial.

Following his release in 1947, Dornberger immigrated to the United States and became a U.S. citizen. He first worked for the U.S. Air Force’s Air

Material Command as a consultant on rocket programs. He joined Bell Aircraft Corporation in 1950 as a missile-design consultant and participated in work on the Rascal air-to-surface guided missile and the Dyna-Soar project, which evolved into the space shuttle program.

Dornberger's wartime memoirs, *V-2*, were published in 1954. Dornberger never wavered from his belief that the V-2 program was a more effective use of scant resources than jet aircraft. Albert Speer, on the other hand, maintained that production of the Me-262 and the "Waterfall" ground-to-air antiaircraft rocket would have given Germany a better chance.

Dornberger became vice president of Bell Aircraft in 1959, and in 1960 he held the same office with Bell Aerosystems Company. He retired in 1965. Dornberger died in Obersasbach, Baden-Württemberg, West Germany, on June 27, 1980.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Braun, Wernher von; Himmler, Heinrich; Peenemünde; Pee-ne-münde Raid; Speer, Albert; V-2 Rocket

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Douglas, William Sholto (1893–1969)

British marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Born on December 23, 1893, at Headington, Oxfordshire, William Sholto Douglas was raised in London. He attended Oxford University but left to join the Royal Field Artillery at the start of World War I. Douglas soon transferred to the Royal Flying Corps, where he qualified as a fighter pilot. By the end of the war he rose to squadron commander.

In 1919, Douglas left the military to become a test pilot with the Handley Page Aircraft Company. Dissatisfied with civilian life, he returned to the

RAF in 1920 as a squadron commander. He then attended the Imperial Defense College. In 1936, Douglas was named director of staff studies at the Air Ministry as the only fighter pilot on the senior staff. Promoted to air vice marshal, in 1938 he became assistant chief of the air staff with responsibility for training.

Douglas was a leading critic of the tactics employed by head of Fighter Command Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding. On November 25, 1940, Douglas succeeded Dowding as head of Fighter Command as air marshal. Among innovations was his "Big Wing" concept of large formations of fighters employed in massive sweeps. Douglas also encouraged development of night-fighting equipment and techniques. Although his new tactics enjoyed some success, critics complained that they left much of the British homeland unprotected.

In December 1942, Douglas was promoted to air chief marshal and assigned to the Middle East Air Force (MEAF) as deputy to Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder. With the reorganization of Allied air forces in April 1943, Douglas assumed command of the MEAF. During the June 6, 1944, Allied landings in Normandy, Douglas was chief of the Coastal Command and commander of the British Expeditionary Air Force with the mission of securing control of the English Channel.

With the return of peace, Douglas commanded the British Air Forces of Occupation. He was knighted in 1941, when he received the KCB. In 1946 he received the GCB. Promoted to marshal of the RAF, in June 1946 he followed Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery as commander of British forces in Europe and military governor of the British occupation zone in Germany.

Douglas retired from active duty in 1948 and was awarded a peerage as First Baron Douglas of Kirtleside. He assumed a seat in the House of Lords and served on the boards of the two British state airlines. He also wrote two autobiographies. Douglas died in Northampton on October 29, 1969.

PAMELA FELTUS

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Britain, Battle of; Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere; Great Britain, Air Force; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Tedder, Sir Arthur William

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Douhet, Giulio (1869–1930)

Italian Air Force general and pioneer of strategic air doctrine. Born on May 30, 1869, in Caserta, Italy, Giulio Douhet was commissioned in the Italian Army in 1892. An early advocate of military aviation, he led Italy's first air bombardment unit during the Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912). During World War I, his unbridled criticism of Italy's General Staff led to his court-martial and dismissal. Recalled to active service after the defeat at Caporetto, which vindicated much of his comment, Douhet took charge of the Central Aeronautical Bureau (1918). After the war he retired, and in 1921 he wrote *Il dominio dell'aria* (Command of the Air), a seminal work on airpower strategy. That same year he became a brigadier general. A strong supporter of fascism, Douhet was appointed in 1922 by Benito Mussolini as chief of Italy's aviation program.

Having witnessed Italy's costly and futile World War I campaigns on the Isonzo and in the Alps, Douhet argued that strategic bombing attacks by heavily armed and armored "battleplanes" promised quick and decisive victories in future wars. Such a thrusting and offensive-minded approach conformed well to fascist beliefs. Douhet believed that civilian populations would panic under sustained attack.

Disregarding the legality and morality of sneak attacks and the utility of graduated approaches to warfare, Douhet called for all-out preemptive air strikes to destroy an enemy's air force and bases, followed by concerted attacks on industry and civilians. Douhet concluded that a combination of high-explosive, incendiary, and poison gas bombs would generate psychological uproar and social chaos, fatally weakening the enemy's will to resist.

In arguing that airpower was inherently offensive and uniquely efficacious, Douhet dismissed escort planes as superfluous enemy interceptors as ineffectual and interservice cooperation as unnecessary because "battleplanes" would render navies and armies obsolete. Results of the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive, however, proved Douhet wrong. He had vastly overestimated the destructive power and accuracy of bombing, the ability of bombers to fight their way unescorted to targets, and the fragility of democratic populations, who proved resilient under attack. Nevertheless, Douhet's call for independent air forces and offensive-minded strategic bombing proved influential, especially in Britain and the United States. Douhet died in Rome on February 15, 1930.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Mussolini, Benito

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Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere (1882–1970)

British air chief marshal. Born on April 24, 1882, in Moffat, Scotland, Hugh Caswall Tremenheere Dowding was educated at Winchester and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Commissioned a second lieutenant of artillery in 1900, he then served in India and the Far East. He attended the Royal Staff College, Camberley (1910–1912), and learned to fly. Dubbed "Stuffy" for his seemingly aloof manner, Dowding switched to the Flying Corps in 1914, rose to become a squadron commander in World War I, and was promoted to brigadier by war's end.

After the war and command of No. 1 Group in southern England (1922–1925), Dowding served in the Middle East. Promoted to air vice marshal in 1929 and air marshal in 1933, from 1930 to 1936 he was a member of the Air Council, which was concerned with supply and research (including fighter aircraft design and planning for radar installations). He became the first chief of Fighter Command in July 1936 and worked from his Bentley Priory headquarters to integrate fighter pilots, radar, and ground control facilities. Scheduled for retirement in June 1939, Dowding stayed on when his designated successor was injured.

Air Chief Marshal Dowding's fighter aircraft were heavily outnumbered by the German Luftwaffe when active fighting began in France and the Low Countries on May 10, 1940. Dowding stoutly resisted calls by the French and Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill to send additional fighter squadrons to support the doomed Allied effort to halt the German invasion, knowing that they would soon be needed for the defense of Britain itself. Thus, when the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940) began, he was able to maintain the narrow margin of air superiority over the British Isles that prevented implementation of the planned German invasion, Operation SEELÖWE (SEA LION).

British air chief marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. As the head of Fighter Command, Dowding played a pivotal role in the Battle of Britain. (Library of Congress)

Dowding tried to overcome a growing conflict between his two most important commanders, Keith Park at 11th Fighter Group in the southwest of England and Trafford Leigh-Mallory at 12th in the Midlands. Leigh-Mallory favored the Big Wing concept of using fighters to overpower the Germans, whereas Park and Dowding insisted on smaller group formations and more flexible tactics.

At the same time, Luftwaffe attacks on British airfields, radar, and manufacturing centers were taking a growing toll on the thinly spread defense forces. Dowding was fortunate when Adolf Hitler turned the Luftwaffe against London—and thus away from the Royal Air Force (RAF) ground facilities—in reprisal for an RAF bombing raid on Berlin. By the end of October the battle was largely over, won by Dowding's "few" for "so many."

Dowding was now well past normal retirement age. He was relieved of command in a poorly handled fashion, for which he felt understandably aggrieved, in November 1940 and replaced by William Sholto Douglas. Dowding retired in 1942 and was made a baron the next year. He died at Tunbridge Wells, England, on February 15, 1970.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Britain, Battle of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Douglas, William Sholto; Hitler, Adolf; Leigh-Mallory, Sir Trafford; Park, Sir Keith Rodney; Radar; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for

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DOWNFALL, Operation

U.S. plan for the invasion of Japan. On May 25, 1945, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington provided a general outline of a plan to invade Japan but left the details to the two Pacific theater commanders, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. MacArthur issued his plan, code-named DOWNFALL, three days later. It foresaw two operations. The first, to be initiated following "extensive air preparation," had the code name OLYMPIC. It consisted of a landing on the southern part of the island of Kyushu by the 14 to 17 U.S. divisions already available in the Pacific theater. The second invasion, code-named CORONET, would begin with a landing on the main island of Honshu and have as its objective the capture of Tokyo and the Yokohama areas as a base for further operations.

X-day, the invasion of Kyushu, was scheduled for November 1, 1945, and was to involve some 766,700 men lifted in 1,315 amphibious vessels. Before the actual invasion, beginning on X-5, the Japanese offshore islands of Tanegashima, Yakushima, and the Koshikijimas would be taken to secure nearby anchorages for ships not needed in the actual landing and those that

had become damaged. The Sixth Army would be the principal ground element. For the invasion of southern Kyushu, MacArthur envisioned four corps of three divisions each. The follow-on force would add another two divisions. Three other divisions would be the strategic reserve.

Nimitz saw aircraft carriers as the principal naval strike weapon and envisioned using 16 fleet and 6 light carriers of the U.S. Navy and 6 fleet and 4 light carriers of the British Pacific Fleet embarking a total of some 1,914 aircraft. Once southern Kyushu was secured, MacArthur planned to turn it into a gigantic naval and air base for 40 air groups with approximately 2,800 aircraft.

Both OLYMPIC and CORONET faced daunting problems. The invasion of Kyushu was predicated on the assumption that the invaders would encounter only three Japanese divisions in southern Kyushu and three more in the northern part of the island. Yet Purple signal intercepts by the early summer of 1945 revealed that the Japanese were substantially reinforcing Kyushu. MacArthur dismissed out of hand intelligence estimates based on Purple intercepts of a higher Japanese troop strength on Kyushu. He claimed such evidence was “erroneous” and suggested that the Japanese had managed to hoodwink Purple.

Historian Edward Drea has pointed out that MacArthur routinely dismissed Purple evidence that “failed to accord with his own preconceived strategic vision.” The last estimate by MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Charles Willoughby, of Japanese troop strength on Kyushu was 195,000 men (up from an initial estimate of 137,400), whereas actual Japanese strength was 287,000.

Y-day, the invasion of Honshu in Operation CORONET, was scheduled for March 1, 1946. MacArthur planned to command CORONET in person. The invading force would consist of the Eighth and Tenth Armies with a total of 14 divisions, 3 of which would be marines. The First Army of 10 divisions from Europe would be the follow-on force. MacArthur planned to hold one airborne division of his own, presumably the 11th, in strategic reserve, augmented by a corps of 3 divisions deployed from Europe. In all, CORONET was projected to involve 1,036,000 personnel. As the date for the projected invasions drew closer, plans changed. For example, the Tenth Army, formed for the conquest of Okinawa, was dropped from CORONET and replaced by the First Army.

Estimates of casualties from the invasions, had they gone forward, vary considerably. Historian Ray Skates has concluded that Operation OLYMPIC alone would have taken two months and resulted in 75,000 to 100,000 U.S. casualties. This estimate, which approximates the figure presented by MacArthur based on casualties taken in the securing of Luzon in the Philippines, may have been low. Others then and since have postulated a much higher figure on the basis of the March–June 1945 Battle of Okinawa, in which 130,000 Japanese defenders inflicted some 66,000 casualties on attacking American forces, not counting Allied naval personnel losses to kamikazes.

In addition to the much higher troop strength on Kyushu than on Okinawa, Japanese authorities were assembling thousands of kamikaze aircraft and watercraft and mobilizing the civilian population for a fanatical defense. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had been reduced to an operational force of 1 battleship, 6 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, 20 destroyers, and perhaps 40 submarines. But there was insufficient fuel to put the capital ships to sea, and the best the IJN could hope for was several days of operations for the destroyers and submarines. The Japanese had readied large numbers of what were essentially suicide craft: some 100 Kairyū-class midget submarines, 250 smaller Kairyū-class midget submarines, 1,000 Kaitens (manned torpedoes), and 800 Shin'yō suicide boats.

It would seem logical that the Japanese would have fought even more fiercely for their home islands than they did for Okinawa. Although heavy U.S. losses would not have affected the ultimate outcome of the war, they might have brought some modification in U.S. conditions for peace.

MacArthur's revised plan of August 15 for CORONET also would have faced problems. It called for an assaulting force of 20 divisions, including 2 armored and 3 marine. Five divisions would be in immediate reserve, with 3 others in the Philippines in strategic reserve. The total troop commitment came to 1,171,646 men.

Even this revised plan faced problems. The assault would be beyond the range of most land-based aircraft, and MacArthur estimated defending forces of seven army divisions, 160,000 naval troops, and supporting units and civilian volunteers. But the contemporary Joint Intelligence Committee estimated actual Japanese forces at perhaps double that figure, or 560,000 men.

In any case, MacArthur's plans were never tested. Operation DOWNFALL proved unnecessary, for on August 15, 1945, after the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito announced to the Japanese people the decision to surrender.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Japan; Kamikaze; MacArthur, Douglas; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Nimitz, Chester William; Okinawa, Invasion of

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DRAGOON, Operation (August 15, 1944)

Allied amphibious operation in southern France. Commencing on August 15, 1944, Operation DRAGOON was originally intended to support and coincide with OVERLORD, the June 6, 1944, invasion of northern France, but it could not be mounted until August 1944. Operation DRAGOON had its genesis under the code name ANVIL during strategic planning in 1942, as the Allies considered operations to invade continental Europe. Tied to operation SLEDGEHAMMER, a contingency cross-Channel plan for 1942, ANVIL was to be a diversionary attack on the Mediterranean coast of France to either draw German forces there or, at a minimum, hold those already there so they could not reinforce the defense against an attack on the Channel coast.

Operation DRAGOON was also entangled in European strategic discussions related to Allied planning, which involved the direct route across the Channel pressed by the Americans or the peripheral approach through North Africa and Southern Europe urged by the British. When British Eighth Army forces

were defeated at the Battle of Gazala (May 26–June 13, 1942) and the Third Battle of Tobruk (June 20–21, 1942), pressure built to act against the immediate threat. Thus, the Western Allies decided on Operation GYMNAST (later renamed TORCH), the Allied assault on North Africa that began on November 8, 1942. This decision canceled SLEDGEHAMMER and delayed planning and consideration for Operation ROUNDUP, the autumn 1943 cross-Channel operation with which ANVIL was still loosely associated.

Debate continued between the Americans and British over the timing and even the feasibility of a cross-Channel attack into northwest France, to which ANVIL was always linked. As operations first in Sicily and then in Italy evolved from TORCH and as Operation ROUNDUP gave way to OVERLORD, debate continued as the British pressed to reinforce Italian operations at the expense of ANVIL and delay OVERLORD. Finally, at Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions in the Cairo Conference in late November 1943, the decision was made to take Soviet views into account.

At the November 28–December 1, 1943, Tehran Conference, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin argued forcefully for a cross-Channel attack against Germany in northwest France. Stalin believed that ANVIL, considered a diversionary attack in southern France by the Western Allies, was an integral part of the overall pincer movement against German forces. When British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill suggested that operations in the eastern Mediterranean might take immediate pressure off the Soviets even if it meant delaying OVERLORD, Stalin replied that it was not worth scattering British and American forces. Before leaving Tehran, the Allies committed themselves to mounting OVERLORD with a supporting operation against southern France during May 1944. The problem then became how to conduct both OVERLORD and ANVIL with the resources available.

As planning proceeded, it became apparent that the limiting factor would be the shortage of landing craft. Seizing the opportunity, the British again pushed for cancellation of ANVIL not only to provide landing craft for OVERLORD but also to divert manpower to the Italian campaign, which had bogged down. So severe was the landing craft shortage that supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower found himself in favor of at least postponing ANVIL until after OVERLORD. This weakened the U.S. argument that ANVIL was necessary to divert German troops from Normandy’s beaches. But the British argument for needing

additional forces in Italy evaporated with the Allied liberation of Rome. The Americans still argued that they required the major Mediterranean port of Marseille to bring resources ashore for the drive against Germany.

On August 10, 1944, the British reluctantly agreed to give ANVIL the go-ahead. Renamed because of security problems, DRAGOON (Churchill said the name was apt because he had been dragooned into agreeing to it) began five days later on August 15. Vice Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, commander of the Eighth Fleet, commanded the landing, and four naval task forces supported the invasion. Participating ships included 5 battleships (the British *Lorraine* and *Ramilles* and the U.S. *Texas, Nevada*, and *Arkansas*), 24 cruisers, 7 escort carriers, and numerous smaller ships from the navies of Britain, the United States, France, and Greece. A total of 881 ships took part, along with 1,370 landing craft. In the skies, 4,056 Allied aircraft provided support.

At dawn, contingents of the U.S. 3rd, 45th, and 36th Infantry Divisions and a French armor task force came ashore on beaches between Saint-Tropez and Cannes on the French Riviera. Meanwhile, a combined British and American airborne task force landed to seize bridges and cut roads inland. U.S. Seventh Army commander Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch Jr. led the Allied force. Major General Lucian Truscott Jr., VI Corps commander, was the ground force commander. Seven Free French divisions under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny came ashore within the next several days and headed west to seize the ports of Toulon and Marseille.

Although DRAGOON was dwarfed by the Normandy Invasion two months earlier, the Allies nonetheless ultimately landed 250,000 American and French ground troops. German forces in southern France amounted to no more than 210,000 troops in eight and two-thirds divisions, and these were mostly second-rate formations. By the end of the first day, all three Allied divisions had secured their beachheads, and 86,000 men, 12,000 vehicles, and 46,000 tons of supplies had come ashore.

By August 17, the Allied advance had reached 20 miles inland. Facing the possibility of substantial Germany Army units being trapped in France, German leader Adolf Hitler ordered Army Task Group G commander General Johannes Blaskowitz to withdraw, leaving sufficient troops behind to deny the major ports to the Allies. The most serious fighting took place at the two ports of Toulon and Marseille. Within two weeks, on August 28 both fell

to the French divisions of General de Tassigny's newly designated French First Army.

Operation DRAGOON cost the Allies more than 13,000 casualties (more than half of them American). Nevertheless, it resulted in a 400-mile advance that liberated virtually all of southern France. It also hurried the introduction of Free French troops into combat and opened additional ports for supporting the drive across France into Germany. In addition, it netted 79,000 German prisoners and sped the collapse of the Third Reich.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von; Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Cairo Conference; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; France Campaign; Italy Campaign; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; ROUNDUP, Operation; SLEDGEHAMMER, Operation; Tehran Conference; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.

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Dresden, Air Attack on (February 13–15, 1945)

Allied strategic bombing raid against the German city of Dresden. This operation, conducted on February 13–15, 1945, has become the most commonly evoked image to illustrate the excesses and horror of conventional bombing of cities. The firestorm caused by Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber

Command on the night of February 13 rivaled that of the raid on Hamburg of July 27, 1943. The immediate controversy about the raid contributed to the end of Allied strategic bombing. Cold War rhetoric and sensationalist presentations in history books and movies have clouded the facts ever since.

At the Yalta Conference on February 4, 1945, the Soviets asked for Allied air attacks on communication centers to prevent the shifting of German troops to the Eastern Front. They specifically mentioned Berlin and Leipzig, but Allied planners also identified Dresden and Chemnitz as appropriate objectives to meet Soviet needs. On February 8, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), instructed RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Strategic Air Forces to prepare an attack on Dresden because of its importance in relation to movements of military forces to the Eastern Front.

Contrary to later reports, Dresden did contain many important industrial and transportation targets, and it was defended, although many of its guns had been sent east to fight the Soviets. The allocation of effort was also shaped by the prodding of British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, although he later tried to distance himself from the operation and the atmosphere engendered by the pursuit of Operation THUNDERCLAP.

The latter was a British plan to break German morale with a massive Allied assault on the German capital of Berlin and on refugee centers. The attack on Berlin was conducted on February 3 over the protests of U.S. Eighth Air Force commander James Doolittle. Other Americans in the U.S. Strategic Air Forces headquarters and in Washington were also uneasy over concentrating on cities such as Dresden, but that did not stop the operation from proceeding.

The operation opened on the night of February 13 with two separate British raids. The first blow was delivered by 244 Lancasters dropping more than 800 tons of bombs. This attack was moderately successful. The inhabitants of the city were surprised with a second attack three hours later, this time by 529 Lancasters delivering a further 1,800 tons of bombs. The concentrated accuracy of the bombing against so many wooden structures and during ideal weather conditions produced a terrible conflagration. The smoke and flames made aiming difficult the next day for the more than 300 American B-17s attempting to drop another 700 tons of bombs on the city’s

marshaling yards. Obscuration of the target area was even worse for a similar attack on February 15.

When news of the destruction of Dresden reached Britain, there was considerable public outcry over the destruction of such a beautiful city when the war seemed to be virtually won. American air leaders were worried by similar reactions in the United States, especially after careless remarks by a SHAEF briefing officer inspired such nationwide newspaper headlines as "Terror Bombing Gets Allied Approval as Step to Speed Victory." Secretary of War Henry Stimson ordered an investigation of the "unnecessary" destruction but was satisfied by the resulting report explaining the background of the operation. Public reaction in the United States was muted. The controversy contributed to the Allied decision to suspend strategic bombing in April.

The casualty figures reported by German fire and police services ranged between 25,000 and 35,000 dead. Thousands more were missing, and there were many unidentified refugees in the city. It is probable that the death total approached the 45,000 killed in the bombing of Hamburg in July–August 1943. Some careless historians, encouraged by Soviet and East German propaganda, estimated figures as high as 250,000. Although David Irving later recanted his claim of 135,000 dead, one can still find that number cited in many history books. Public impressions of the excesses of Dresden were reinforced by Kurt Vonnegut's novel *Slaughterhouse Five* and the movie it inspired.

CONRAD C. CRANE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Doolittle, James Harold "Jimmy"; Hamburg, Raids on; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Tokyo, Bombing of; Document 211

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Driscoll, Agnes Meyer (1889–1971)

U.S. cryptographer. Born in Geneseo, Illinois, on July 24, 1889, Agnes Meyer moved to Westerville, Ohio, as a young girl. She graduated from Ohio State University in 1911 with a triple bachelor's degree in mathematics, languages, and music. She taught math and music in Amarillo, Texas, at the Lowry Philips Military Academy from 1911 to 1917. She then enlisted in the U.S. Navy as a chief yeoman, serving from July 1917 to September 1919. Meyer's fluency in German, French, and Japanese and her mathematical skills proved invaluable to the process of cryptography, and she was asked to remain in the Code and Signal section of the Department of Naval Communication as a civilian clerk.

From 1921 to 1922, Meyer worked at the Riverbank Laboratories in Chicago in the Cipher Department and probably attended training at the "Black Chamber" at New York Laboratories. She codeveloped a cipher machine in 1922, for which she was later paid $15,000. During 1923 and 1924, Meyer acted as liaison to the navy and technical adviser to the Hebern Electrical Code Company. When that company went bankrupt, she returned to the Cryptographic Research Desk (OP-20-G) under U.S. Navy lieutenant Laurence Safford. Meyer married lawyer Michael Bernard Driscoll in 1924.

Driscoll, known as "Miss Aggie," trained many of the U.S. Navy's top cryptanalysts. She also excelled at breaking Japanese ciphers, in 1925 accomplishing the initial solution of the "Red Book" codes used for Japanese fleet maneuvers until 1930. In 1931, she used IBM machines to crack the "Blue Book," a breakthrough that revealed Japanese battleship speed in 1936 as well as the identities of two Pacific Fleet moles working for the Japanese, Harry Thompson and John Farnsworth.

In 1940, Driscoll's recognition that the Japanese code JN-25 was generated by a machine (M-1) gave the United States a head start in building its own decryption machine (M-3). Although briefly assigned to the Enigma codes, Driscoll concentrated on Japanese cipher traffic throughout World War II, providing crucial information in the days leading to the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway and training most of the U.S. Navy's cryptographers.

Driscoll moved to the Armed Forces Security Agency in 1949 and to the National Security Agency in 1957, from which she retired in 1959. She died in Fairfax, Virginia, on September 16, 1971.

MARGARET SANKEY

See also
Signals Intelligence

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Drum, Hugh Aloysius (1879–1951)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born on September 19, 1879, at Fort Brady, Michigan, Hugh Aloysius Drum was attending Boston College when his father, an army captain, was killed in the 1898 Spanish-American War. Drum left school that year and joined the army. He was commissioned from the ranks and served in the Philippines.

Drum graduated from the General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1912 and then saw service on the Mexican border. In May 1917, he joined General John J. Pershing's staff in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France, assigned to the Operations Division. In July 1918, Pershing named Drum, then a major, chief of staff of the nascent American First Army. For his outstanding performance, Drum was promoted to temporary brigadier general.

After the war, Drum reverted to his regular grade as major. In 1922, he was promoted to permanent brigadier general. He then commanded an infantry brigade and the 1st Infantry Division (1927–1930). Inspector general of the army in 1930 and 1931, he was promoted to major general in December 1931. Drum commanded the First Army from 1931 to 1933. He was deputy chief of staff of the army (1933–1935) and then commanded both the Hawaiian Department (1935–1937) and the Second Army (1937–1938).

He then resumed command of the First Army, headquartered on Governors Island, New York. He was promoted to lieutenant general in August 1939.

Drum expected to have field command of the army if the United States entered World War II. Offered the post of adviser to the Nationalist government of China, he declined (the post ultimately went to Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell). His refusal and his criticism of his superiors, notably of Generals George C. Marshall and Lesley J. McNair, led to Drum remaining on Governors Island and his retirement from the army in October 1943.

Following his retirement, Drum headed the New York National Guard until 1948. He was also president of the Empire State Corporation, which owned and operated the Empire State Building, and he served as military adviser to Thomas E. Dewey during Dewey's 1944 presidential campaign. Drum died in New York City on October 3, 1951. Pine Camp, home of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division in upstate New York, was renamed Fort Drum in 1951.

DEREK J. BROWN

See also

Dewey, Thomas Edmund; Marshall, George Catlett; McNair, Lesley James; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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DRUMBEAT, Operation

See PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation

Dulles, Allen Welsh (1893–1969)

U.S. Office of Strategic Services operative and director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Born on April 7, 1893, in Watertown, New York, Allen Welsh Dulles earned both a bachelor's degree and a master's degree in international law from Princeton University, and in 1916 he joined the U.S. foreign service. His first assignment was in Vienna, Austria. By the time the United States entered World War I, Dulles was in Berne, Switzerland, where he acquired an early baptism in espionage, nurturing embassy contacts with anticommunist Austro-Hungarian and Balkan exiles. Dulles was a member of the U.S. delegation at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and held various posts overseas in the early 1920s. In 1926, financial constraints led him to join the prominent New York law firm Sullivan and Cromwell, of which his brother John Foster Dulles, the future secretary of state, was a leading partner.

Dulles remained deeply interested in foreign affairs, focusing on international business and becoming active in the New York–based Council on Foreign Relations. In the 1930s, he coauthored two books with Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of the council's journal *Foreign Affairs*, in which a dominant theme was that the United States could not hold aloof from European and world affairs.

In 1942, Dulles joined the newly created American intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), headed by Colonel William J. Donovan. Dulles spent most of the war based in Berne, in neutral Switzerland. Here he ran a network of German intelligence agents, who brought him clandestine copies of numerous secret German documents. He was privy to—and encouraged—the failed German effort in July 1944 to assassinate Adolf Hitler. In early 1945, Dulles obtained copies of the diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, son-in-law of Italy's dictator, Benito Mussolini, giving important insight into the workings of the fascist regime.

In the spring of 1945, Dulles helped to negotiate the surrender of Germany's remaining forces in northern Italy. The independent initiation of this option by the U.S. and British forces alarmed Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, who feared that his allies intended to negotiate a separate peace with Germany, and this situation has sometimes been perceived as the opening move of the Cold War. By 1944, the prospect of communist and Soviet expansion in Europe greatly disturbed Dulles.

Shortly after Dulles returned to the United States in the summer of 1945,

President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS. Dulles remained a strong advocate of a permanent foreign intelligence service and helped to draft the 1947 National Security Act, which created the Central Intelligence Agency. From 1950 Dulles was its deputy director, and from 1953 to 1961 he served as the agency's third director, his record including both triumphs and fiascos. Dulles died in Washington, D.C., on January 29, 1969.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Ciano, Galeazzo, Conte di Cortellazo; Donovan, William Joseph; July Bomb Plot; Mussolini, Benito; Office of Strategic Services; Stalin, Joseph; Truman, Harry S.

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Dumbarton Oaks Conference (August 21–October 7, 1944)

Conference held in Washington, D.C., to decide on specifics in connection with the creation of a postwar international security organization. In the last half of 1944, as the Allies began to anticipate victory, representatives of 39 nations met in the U.S. capital to devise detailed plans for creation of the United Nations (UN), a security organization the assorted states opposing the Axis powers had committed themselves to forming. In recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union had not yet entered the Far Eastern war against Japan, the conference took place in two stages. From August 21 to September 28, 1944, Soviet delegates attended, but for the final 10 days, September 28 to October 7, the Soviets left the gathering, yielding their place to a Chinese delegation.

The Big Three Allied powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—dominated the conference, as they did the wartime coalition.

This was reflected in the blueprint for the new UN that the meeting produced. The draft proposals were heavily influenced by the view of U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, which British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin effectively shared, that agreement among the Big Four Allied powers (“the four policemen”) must be the foundation of postwar international security. In obeisance to international public opinion and to adhere to their more idealistic pronouncements about the rights of all nations and peoples to determine their own governments, the conferees decided on a scheme that showed some respect for more idealistic visions of a world in which all powers, great and small, enjoyed equal status and protection.

After lengthy deliberations, the Dumbarton Oaks delegates agreed to create a bipartite UN organization modeled on the earlier League of Nations but reserving ultimate authority to the dominant Allied states. All member states were entitled to representation in the General Assembly, which would debate, discuss, and vote on issues that came before it. Executive authority rested with the 11-member Security Council, which had 5 permanent members: Great Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The remaining Security Council representatives, selected from among other member states of the UN, served two-year terms in rotation. The 5 permanent Security Council members therefore could effectively dominate the new organization, and their position was enhanced by the organization’s dependence on their financial contributions. Besides providing an international security mechanism to mediate and settle disputes among member states, the UN was also expected to promote international cooperation on economic, social, and humanitarian issues.

The Dumbarton Oaks conference left several important issues still unsettled, largely because these were so sensitive that they were deferred for personal decision by the Big Three leaders: Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill. Among such matters were Soviet requests for independent representation in the General Assembly for Belorussia and the Ukraine and a Soviet suggestion that each separate permanent Security Council member should enjoy veto power over any UN decision.

Participants in the August 21–October 7, 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference meeting, held in Washington, D.C., to create a post-war international security organization, which became the United Nations. (Iconic Archive/Getty Images)

Dumbarton Oaks also neglected to establish appropriate mechanisms to administer former League of Nations mandatory territories and those areas seized from the Axis powers, an omission repaired at Yalta, where the Big Three agreed to establish a trusteeship system for the purpose. Existing colonies of Allied nations fell outside this mechanism's purview unless the imperial power itself chose to hand the colonies over to UN administration.

From May to July 1945 the Allies held another conference at San Francisco, which drafted the actual charter of the UN. Although this gathering made some minor modifications granting slightly more power to small nations, the Dumbarton Oaks conference had already effectually settled the fundamental operational structure of the new international organization.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atlantic Charter; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Hull, Cordell; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; United Nations, Formation of; Yalta Conference

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Dunkerque, Evacuation of (May 26–June 4, 1940)

Extraction of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and some French forces from the English Channel port of Dunkerque (Dunkirk), France. After the German invasion of France and the Low Countries and the rapid collapse of Allied forces there, contingency planning was begun in Britain on May 19, 1940, under the supervision of Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay, naval commander of Dover, for the possible evacuation of British forces from France. By May 25, the Germans had already taken the French port of Boulogne, leaving only Dunkerque and Calais among the channel ports from which an evacuation might be attempted. Calais fell the next day. Naval planners hoped that they might be able to extract 40,000 members of the BEF, but in Operation DYNAMO they actually evacuated 364,628 troops, of whom 224,686 were British.

On May 26 as the German armored thrust from the south was closing in on Dunkerque, the commander of German Army Group A, Colonel General Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, ordered it halted, believing that the panzers were overextended. German leader Adolf Hitler made this into a hard-and-fast order and kept the panzers in place until May 29 to allow the German infantary to join them. Hitler's stop order was critical, allowing the BEF to escape and Britain to continue in the war. Head of the Luftwaffe Marshal Hermann Göring, who believed that the German Air Force had not received sufficient credit for its role in the war to date, then secured Hitler's permission to destroy the British forces on the ground with his dive-bombers. Göring even requested that the panzers be moved back several miles. The dive-bombing was not effective; the German bombs burrowed deep into the soft sand before exploding.

Meanwhile, the evacuation, Operation DYNAMO, began. All manner of vessels, including a number manned by civilian volunteers, participated in the

evacuation. Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter pilots flying from bases in southern England did what they could to protect the evacuation and disrupt the Luftwaffe, and they probably made the evacuation possible.

Among the evacuation ships, British and French destroyers rescued the most men, but they were also the chief targets for Luftwaffe attacks. By the fourth day of the evacuation, 10 destroyers had been sunk or put out of action. This led the Admiralty to take the difficult decision to remove all of its modern destroyers from the operation. The same reasoning limited the number of fighter aircraft that were available. In addition, head of Fighter Command Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding refused to sacrifice valuable aircraft in a battle already lost, believing that the planes would soon be required for the defense of Britain, which was certain to be the next target.

The Dunkerque evacuation was assisted by bad weather and fires from burning equipment on the beaches that inhibited Luftwaffe operations. The BEF lost more than 2,000 men during Operation DYNAMO. RAF Fighter Command lost 106 aircraft and 80 pilots, and Bomber Command lost an additional 76 aircraft. Of 693 British vessels of all types that took part in the operation, one-third (226) were sunk, including 6 destroyers; 19 other destroyers were put out of action.

Other nations also participated; France provided the most vessels (119), and Belgium, Norway, Poland, and the Netherlands also provided assistance. The other Allies lost 17 of their 168 vessels taking part. The BEF lost 30,000 men, including prisoners, to the Germans, and was forced to abandon virtually all of its equipment in France. The 50,000-man French First Army had played a key role, holding the advancing Germans from the beaches and allowing the British to get away. The French contested every bit of ground, and ultimately between 30,000 and 40,000 men of their troops were forced to surrender.

The evacuation was hardly a victory, but it did sweep away the halfheartedness that had marked the British war effort to that point. It also elevated the stature of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who in a speech to Parliament on June 4 as the last British troops were being evacuated vowed that come what may, Britain would continue the fight.

DAVID M. GRILLI AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home

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DYNAMO Operation

See Dunkerque, Evacuation of

Dzhugashvili, Iosif Vissarionovich

See Stalin, Joseph

WORLD WAR II

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E

Eaker, Ira Clarence (1896–1987)

U.S. Army Air Forces general who assumed command of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) in 1944. Born on April 13, 1896, at Field Creek, Texas, Ira Clarence Eaker graduated from Southeastern State Normal School in Durant, Oklahoma, in 1917 and enlisted in the army. He completed officer training camp and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1918. He then transferred to the Signal Corps and underwent aviation training. From 1919 to 1922, he was stationed in the Philippines.

In 1923, Eaker received permission from the army to attend law school. He studied law at Columbia University while also serving as post adjutant at Mitchell Field, Long Island, New York. In 1926, he was selected among 10 pilots to fly on a goodwill tour of South America.

Eaker took a leading role in the development of a long-range bomber for the army. In 1928, he made a record-breaking flight from Texas to the Panama Canal Zone in the new Boeing P-12. During these early years, he also became friends with fellow officers Henry "Hap" Arnold and Carl A. "Tooey" Spaatz. In January 1929, Captain Eaker flew in the Fokker C-2A *Question Mark* with Major Spaatz (mission commander), Second Lieutenant Elwood Quesada, and two others to set a world endurance record and pioneer in-flight refueling. The next year, Eaker piloted the first transcontinental flight to be refueled in the air.

From 1933 to 1935, Eaker commanded the 34th Pursuit Squadron. Promoted to major in 1935, he graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama, in 1936 and from the Army Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1937. As a colonel, he commanded the 20th Pursuit Group from 1940 to 1941. He was then sent to Britain as a liaison to the Royal Air Force.

In February 1942, Eaker was promoted to brigadier general and sent back to Britain to command the VIII Bomber Command of Lieutenant General

Spaatz's Eighth Air Force; Eaker was soon conducting strategic bombing of German-occupied France. On August 17, 1942, he led the first mission in person, against Rouen, France. The attempt to conduct daylight precision bombing did not go as well as hoped, but Eaker's B-17s struck vital targets. Promoted to temporary major general, he took command of the Eighth Air Force in December and directed attacks against Schweinfurt and Regensburg in August 1943.

Publicity over high casualty rates in such raids, caused by a lack of long-range fighter protection, led to his reassignment. Promoted to temporary lieutenant general, Eaker took command of the MAAF, consisting of the U.S. Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces, in January 1944. He led the MAAF with great success in a variety of missions.

At the end of the war, Eaker returned to Washington to become deputy commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces. He retired in August 1947 after helping plan the formation of an independent air force. He was then a consultant for Douglas Aircraft, and in 1972 he became president of the U.S. Strategic Institute. Eaker remained active in the promotion of airpower through numerous books and lectures. In 1985, he was promoted to full general on the retired list by an act of Congress. Eaker died on August 6, 1987, at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

RUTH J. JUN

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"; United States Army Air Forces

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East Africa Campaign (January–May 1941)

British Commonwealth campaign to defeat Italian forces in East Africa. Italian East Africa was formed after the 1936 Italian conquest of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), which combined with the colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland into a single entity. When Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940, the governor-general of Italian East Africa, Amedeo Umberto di Savoia, Duca d'Aosta, commanded some 350,000 troops in the colony, vastly outnumbering the 40,000 British levies available. Aosta easily captured British outposts on the borders of Sudan and Kenya, and in August he occupied British Somaliland, the first British colony to fall into Axis hands.

The Italians beat back British brigadier William J. Slim's counterattack from Sudan on November 6, but Aosta was demoralized by a lack of supplies and Italian defeats in the Western Desert. He was also occupied suppressing Abyssinian rebels, known as the Patriots. At the moment of Britain's greatest weakness, he failed to take the initiative and unwisely adopted a defensive posture.

On January 19, 1941, Major General William Platt launched an offensive into Eritrea with the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions. Aided by intelligence from Italy's broken army and air force codes, Platt captured Keren on March 27 after hard fighting, in the decisive battle of the campaign. He entered Massawa on April 8. There, the Italians scuttled one destroyer, and five others sortied into the Red Sea for an attack on Port Sudan. In the ensuing actions, the Italians had four of their destroyers sunk; the fifth was scuttled.

Meanwhile, on February 11, Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham drove into Italian Somaliland from Kenya using the 11th and 12th African and 1st South African Divisions with startling success. After capturing Mogadishu, the capital of Italian Somaliland, on February 25, he struck north and took Harar in Abyssinia on March 26. A small force from Aden also captured Berbera on March 16 and quickly reoccupied British Somaliland, with little opposition, to shorten the supply line. It then joined with Cunningham's force to capture Addis Ababa on April 6. In just eight weeks, Cunningham's troops had advanced over 1,700 miles and defeated the majority of Aosta's troops, at a cost of 501 casualties.

Even more spectacular were the achievements of Lieutenant Colonel Orde Wingate, who commanded a group of 1,600 Patriots christened the "Gideon Force." Through a combination of brilliant guerrilla tactics, great daring, and sheer bluff, he defeated Italian forces at Debra Markos on April 6

and returned Emperor Haile Selassie to his capital, Addis Ababa, on May 5. British troops pressed Aosta's forces into a retreat at Amba Alagi until he finally surrendered on May 16, ending Italian resistance in that theater, apart from two isolated pockets rounded up in November 1941.

The campaign in East Africa was important, because for the first time, a country occupied by the Axis had been liberated; another 230,000 Italian and colonial troops had been taken prisoner, and British forces were released for vital operations in the Western Desert. It was also the first campaign in which the code breakers at Bletchley Park played a decisive role, providing an invaluable lesson on the contribution intelligence could make to an operation. Success in East Africa also had an important strategic consequence, as U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to declare, on April 11, that the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden were no longer war zones. U.S. ships could thus deliver supplies directly to Suez, relieving the burden on British shipping.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Bletchley Park; Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon; Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia; Italo-Ethiopian War; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Savoia, Amedeo Umberto di; Signals Intelligence; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Somalia; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Wingate, Orde Charles

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Eastern Front

On June 22, 1941, German forces invaded the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA. The two states then became locked in a death struggle raging on a front of more than 1,800 miles, involving millions of men and tens of thousands of tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft and resulting in the deaths of tens of millions of combatants and civilians.

In the fall of 1940, following the German Luftwaffe's failure to drive the Royal Air Force from the skies over Britain, Adolf Hitler ordered plans drawn up for an invasion of the Soviet Union. He postulated a quick, three-month campaign. "You have only to kick in the door," he told Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, "and the whole rotten structure will come tumbling down." Defeat the Soviet Union, he reasoned, and Britain would have to sue for peace.

Overconfidence marked German planning. The Germans had little accurate intelligence on the Soviet Union, including few adequate maps. They also had little concern for the impact on the fighting of winter weather and little understanding of the influence of the great distances and how these would render blitzkrieg, at least as it was practiced in Poland in 1939 and against France and the Low Countries in 1940, wholly impractical.

German resources were certainly inadequate for the task that lay ahead, and in the Soviet Union, Hitler's strategic overreach at last caught up with him. On June 22, 1941, the German Army deployed 205 divisions, but 60 of these were in garrison or fighting elsewhere: 38 in France, 12 in Norway, 1 in Denmark, 7 in the Balkans, and 2 in North Africa. This left just 145 divisions available for operations in the east. The Germans invaded the Soviet Union with 102 infantry divisions, 19 armored divisions, 14 motorized divisions, and 1 cavalry division. In addition, the Germans deployed 9 divisions to maintain lines of communication as the invasion progressed. There was virtually no strategic reserve. Finland, Romania, and Hungary supplied perhaps 705,000 men in 37 divisions.

The disparity in military hardware was even more striking. The Luftwaffe, still waging operations against Britain and also supporting the Afrika Korps in North Africa, was forced to keep 1,150 combat aircraft in these theaters, leaving only 2,770 available for use against the Soviet Union. By contrast, the Soviets had 18,570 aircraft, 8,154 of which were initially in the west. The bulk of these were tactical aircraft. Germany had some 6,000 tanks, the Soviets 23,140 (10,394 in the west), and even in 1941, the Soviets possessed some of the best tanks of the war. Their T-34 was the top tank in the world in 1941.

The German invasion plan called for three axes of advance. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South of four armies (one Romanian) and one panzer group would drive on Kiev and the Dnieper to destroy Soviet

armies between the Pripet Marshes and the Black Sea. Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center of two armies and two panzer groups was to strike east, taking Smolensk and Moscow. Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb's Army Group North of two armies and one panzer group would thrust north, capture Leningrad (St. Petersburg), and pin the Soviet forces there against the Baltic Sea. Finland would act in concert with the Germans, reentering the war to reoccupy the Karelian isthmus and threatening Leningrad from the north. Farther north, German colonel general Nikolaus von Falkenhorst's Norway Army would carry out an offensive against Murmansk to sever its supply route to Leningrad.

Hitler had intended to invade in May, but circumstances caused him to put off the attack until late June. In the spring of 1941, German forces invaded Yugoslavia, went to the rescue of Italian troops in Greece, and drove British forces from Crete. In the process, Hitler secured his southern flank against the possibility of Allied air strikes during the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Historians have argued about the impact of this on delaying the invasion of the Soviet Union. In any case, rainy weather and appalling road conditions in the western Soviet Union imposed delay. The tanks required firm, dry ground.

The invasion commenced at 3:00 a.m. on June 22, 1941, the longest day of the year, with only two hours of total darkness. The Germans and their allies moved into the Soviet Union along a 2,000-mile front. The bulk of the Red Army's western forces were in forward positions, where they were cut off and surrounded. On the first day alone, 1,200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, most of them on the ground. Within two days, 2,000 Soviet aircraft had been lost. Within five days, the Germans had captured or destroyed 2,500 Soviet tanks. Within three weeks, the Soviets had lost 3,500 tanks, 6,000 aircraft, and 2 million men, including a significant percentage of the officer corps. Army Group North broke through the frontier defenses, wheeled left to trap and destroy many Soviet divisions against the Baltic, and appeared to have an open route to Leningrad.

Meanwhile, Army Group Center, with the bulk of German tanks, attacked north of the Pripet Marshes, completed two huge encirclements, and destroyed vast amounts of Soviet war matériel while taking hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Unexpectedly strong Soviet defenses slowed the advance of Army Group South to Kiev, the Crimea, and the Caucasus.

This revealed a great problem in German invasion planning. Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Franz Halder and many senior generals wanted to concentrate German resources in the center for a drive on Moscow, with supporting movements to the north and south. A thrust there would mean a shorter front, and its advocates believed that Moscow was so important that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin would commit many troops to its defense and thus make it easier for the German Army to locate and destroy the remaining Soviet military formations before the onset of winter. Hitler was fixated on taking Leningrad, though, and, more important, the vast resources of the Ukraine. The compromise solution was to make a decision after the pause in August to refit and rest.

German military intelligence, meanwhile, underestimated Soviet military strength. In December 1940, it had estimated 150 Soviet divisions in the

western Soviet Union; by June 1941, that estimate had grown to 175; and now, in late summer, German intelligence concluded that the Soviets still had 250 divisions, despite their huge losses. Moreover, Soviet soldiers did not give up when surrounded. Nazi racism and German violence made them realize that capture meant death, so many Soviet troops fought to the last bullet and attempted to break free rather than surrender.

The vast distances and the onset of a severe winter also posed tremendous logistical challenges for German Army planners because their army had only a small mechanized/motorized force and largely relied on human and animal muscle power. While leaders at home prepared for the Soviet collapse, troops on the front lines gained a grudging respect for their Soviet adversaries.

In August the Germans paused, and Hitler ordered the tank units of Army Group Center to help with the attack on Leningrad and to complete the encirclement of Soviet forces defending Kiev. Finally, in October, Army Group Center began Operation TAIFUN (TYPHOON), the attack on Moscow. By November it had come close to success, but few tanks were still operational. There was little fuel, and the men lacked winter clothing in one of the coldest Soviet winters of the 20th century.

During the fall campaigning, Stalin prepared to defend Moscow. While troops defended a series of lines on the way to the capital, Moscow's citizens were organized to construct antitank ditches and concentric defenses. Secure in the information that Japan would not take advantage of Soviet weakness but intended to move into South Asia, the Red Army brought divisions from Asia and, having studied German tactics, prepared a counterblow against Army Group Center.

On December 5, 1941, the Soviet attack began, stunning the tired, cold, and hungry German troops. Some German generals wanted to retreat all the way to the preinvasion borders, but Hitler insisted that the troops remain in place; his resoluteness and the limited capacity of Soviet logistics helped stem the Soviet winter offensive. Then came the spring thaw and a temporary lull in the fighting.

The relative force ratio had changed in a year of fighting. A summer, fall, and winter had weakened the German Army so that it no longer had the striking power of a year before. The Red Army, on the other hand, encouraged by its winter victories, was preparing to take the offensive in 1942.

Hitler believed that the Soviet state could not afford another year of manpower losses like those of 1941. He thought that if German forces could drive a wedge between the Dnieper and Don Rivers, using the Volga River as a shoulder, they could interrupt Soviet supplies moving up that broad transit way and fight their way to Soviet oil resources in the Caucasus region and the Caspian Sea. The German high command estimated that it would need 80 new divisions to replace losses and provide the striking power for a summer offensive, but Germany could only supply 55 divisions. Hitler obtained troop contributions from reluctant Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian allies, but it was unclear how these troops would perform in the desperate fighting conditions of the Eastern Front. To meet the requirements for mechanized equipment, the German Army refitted Czech tanks taken in 1938 and French tanks seized in 1940.

Consequently, the German supply system had to carry spare parts for hundreds of truck models and tens of tank models, greatly complicating logistics. The Soviets had no such problems. Finally, the panzer units had to move fast enough to fight around defenders and once again surround and capture huge numbers of Soviet troops. Otherwise, the Germans would have to travel as much as 1,200 miles from the offensive's jumping-off point to reach the most productive oil-producing area around Baku.

The Soviets struck first. The Red Army launched an attack in the Southern Front that coincidentally exposed its flank to Germans massed for the drive to the southeast. Stalin initially refused to end the attack, and losses were heavy. The German summer offensive that finally began in late June 1942 never captured the vast numbers of Soviet soldiers of 1941. Hitler kept reassigning units and thereby violating the principles of mass and economy of force. He sent key elements of the Eighteenth Army on the Crimean Peninsula north to Leningrad, he routed and rerouted the Fourth Panzer Army, and in September, when it was clear that Germany could not achieve its overarching goal of seizing the Soviet oil fields, he ordered the Sixth Army to batter its way into Stalingrad against three defending armies.



The desperate battle for Stalingrad, a major industrial city on the Volga, captured the world's imagination. Stalin was as determined to hold his namesake city as Hitler was to take it. The fighting was a block-by-block, house-by-house, and room-by-room affair, with the Soviets sometimes defending from across the river. As Lieutenant General Vasily I. Chuikov's Sixty-Second Army held, the Soviets prepared a massive counterstroke, building up armies of troops and many tanks and artillery pieces against the weakly defended flanks held by Romanian and Hungarian troops.

On November 19, in Operation URANUS, the Soviets attacked and quickly broke through. Within days, the Soviet pincers met at Kalach, and more than 300,000 German troops were trapped. The German commander, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, did not attempt to break out, and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein failed to break through and relieve the Sixth Army. With only three divisions, Manstein managed to get within 35 miles of the trapped

Sixth Army but could move no farther. German troops held on until the end of January, when 90,000 survivors marched off into captivity. The long battle did at least provide time for the Germans to extricate forces that had penetrated deep into the Caucasus.

The Soviets then followed this great victory with a winter offensive, but eventually their goals outran their logistical capacity, and there was the typical pause forced by the spring thaw in 1943. As summer approached, Hitler approved a plan to pinch off a huge bulge in German lines north of Kharkov near Kursk, destroy Soviet armies trapped there, and restore the balance on the Eastern Front.

The Germans postponed the attack on the Kursk salient, Operation CITADEL, again and again into May, June, and eventually early July. Hitler wanted more of the new models of heavy German tanks, especially the Tiger, but as Germany delayed, the Soviets acted, bringing up reinforcements and constructing extensive, deep defenses, including wide belts of minefields, that were up to 60 miles deep. They also positioned reserve armies on the shoulders of the bulge and additional tanks and artillery behind them.

Finally, on July 5, the long-awaited attack began. Although German units made little progress in the north, the attacking force from the south bludgeoned its way forward. But on July 10, British and American forces invaded Sicily, clearly threatening to drive Italy from the war. This forced Hitler to end the offensive at Kursk—the greatest tank battle in history.

Within a few weeks, the Soviets began their late-summer offensive in the south, which they followed up with a winter offensive that drove German forces out of the eastern Ukraine and trapped German troops on the Crimea. As the spring mud in 1944 brought the usual pause in operations, the German lines stretched from near Leningrad in the north, and along the southern edge of Army Group Center, the lines curved inward. The Soviets achieved a great tactical surprise, as they fooled the Germans into expecting a summer attack against positions in the Ukraine. The Soviets then repositioned their tanks and artillery and prepared for a massive offensive against Army Group Center in Operation BAGRATION, which would coincide with the Allied invasion of France.

On July 20, 1944, the Soviets struck, and within weeks, they had largely destroyed Army Group Center. The Soviets followed this up with attacks to end the siege of Leningrad and to expel German troops from all Soviet

territory. Pausing in the center before Warsaw—which allowed the Germans to destroy the Polish underground army that had joined the fighting—Soviet forces moved into the Balkans as Romania and Bulgaria desperately sought to avoid Soviet vengeance.

The end was drawing near, and the Soviets continued to advance. One axis aimed at Berlin, while the other struck through Hungary. By January 1945, the Soviets had secured most of East Prussia, and in the south, they were at the gates of Budapest. In April, they brought up supplies and reserve troops for the final drive into Germany proper. The Germans conducted a desperate defense of Berlin, using old men and young boys, and the Soviets took huge casualties as Marshal Georgii Zhukov and Colonel General Ivan Konev fought for the honor of liberating the city. On April 25, Soviet and American troops met at Torgau on the Elbe, and several days later, Soviet forces occupied Berlin while Hitler committed suicide in his underground bunker.

Finally, on May 7, 1945, Germany signed a surrender document that went into effect on all fronts the next day. The Eastern Front had absorbed the lion's share of German military resources from 1941 onward, and the Soviet ability to stave off defeat and then achieve victory there was critical to the war's outcome.

CHARLES M. DOBBS AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bock, Fedor von; Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Falkenhorst, Nikolaus von; Halder, Franz; Hitler, Adolf; Kursk, Battle of; Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von; Manstein, Erich von; Moscow, Battle of; Paulus, Friedrich; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad, Battle of; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich



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Eastern Solomons, Battle of the (August 22–25, 1942)

Naval battle fought off Guadalcanal. Henderson Field, captured by U.S. marines following their surprise landing on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, was the only U.S. air base in the Solomon Islands chain. The Japanese were determined to retake the field, and they subjected the U.S. marines there to ground attacks and to frequent night bombardment from destroyers offshore. Japanese admiral Yamamoto Isoroku devised Operation KA, a plan to land reinforcements on Guadalcanal and at the same time eliminate the defending U.S. carriers. As in the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), however, Japanese forces failed to concentrate on a single objective.

On August 19, the Japanese launched a major ground attack against Henderson Field but failed to take it. The next day, a convoy from Rabaul with 1,500 reinforcements sailed for Guadalcanal, escorted by the light cruiser *Jintsu* and six destroyers, all commanded by Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo. To provide air cover for the landing, Yamamoto ordered Admiral Kondō Nobutake to steam from Truk with a task force centered on the fleet carriers *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku* and the light carrier *Ryūjō.* Also on August 20, the marines at Henderson Field received 31 aircraft from the escort carrier *Long Island.*

Although Japan had changed its codes after Midway, its radio traffic indicated that something was in the offing, and on August 21 Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, ordered Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher, commanding the *Wasp, Saratoga,* and *Enterprise* carrier task forces, to oppose the Japanese operation. On August 22, U.S. patrol bomber (PBY) Catalina aircraft spotted Japanese submarines, prompting an air strike from the *Saratoga,* which, however, failed to locate the Japanese fleet. The following day, Nimitz received faulty intelligence indicating that the Japanese attack force remained at Truk, and Fletcher released the *Wasp* to refuel.

On August 24, a PBY spotted the *Ryūjō,* and Scout Bomber Douglas (SBD) dive-bombers from the *Enterprise* reported 15 Zeros and 6 Kate torpedo planes from the carrier headed toward Guadalcanal. The *Saratoga* then launched a strike on the *Ryūjō.* The SBDs located the carrier and scored three hits, setting it on fire. During the attack, a PBY located the main

Japanese task force, centered on the aircraft carriers *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku* under Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi.



The explosion of a Japanese bomb striking the flight deck of the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier *Enterprise* during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, August 24, 1942. The photographer was killed while taking this picture. (Underwood Archives/Getty Images)

Fletcher then ordered the planes attacking the *Ryūjō* to strike instead the larger Japanese carriers, but this message never reached the attacking aircraft, which went on to sink the *Ryūjō.* They also badly damaged the Japanese heavy cruiser *Tone*, a specially modified aircraft cruiser armed with eight 8-inch guns and carrying eight seaplanes.

Meanwhile, U.S. radar revealed the incoming strike of aircraft from the *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku* heading toward the U.S. carriers. The *Enterprise* and *Saratoga* were operating independently, and the Japanese first located the *Enterprise*, which launched its Grumman F-4 Wildcat fighters in defense. Soon, 30 Japanese Val dive-bombers began attacks on the *Enterprise.* Their bombs pierced its flight deck in three places, seriously damaging it. Fires soon raged belowdecks as the crew of the *Enterprise* fought valiantly to save their ship. The *Saratoga* escaped, in part thanks to highly effective antiaircraft fire provided by the battleship *North Carolina.*

On August 25, Tanaka's convoy bound for Guadalcanal came under attack by U.S. Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers from Espiritu Santo and aircraft from Henderson Field. U.S. dive-bombers scored two hits on one of the transports, which later sank. For the first time in the campaign, the B-17s also scored a hit on a Japanese escorting destroyer and sank it. The convoy, far from its objective and vulnerable, now returned to Rabaul.

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was a U.S. victory, securing, for the time being, the U.S. position on Guadalcanal. Japan lost one light carrier, one destroyer, and one transport along with 75 aircraft; the United States lost 25 planes. The *Enterprise* returned to Pearl Harbor and was repaired within a month. Fletcher was slightly wounded, and Nimitz selected Vice Admiral William Halsey to replace him.

One of the great what-ifs of the Pacific war involves Yamamoto's decision not to commit the giant battleship *Yamato* off Guadalcanal. It was available, and its guns might have made a difference in the fight for Henderson Field, but Yamamoto was unwilling to risk such a powerful national symbol.

ROBERT W. SERIG

See also

Fletcher, Frank Jack; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Kondō Nobutake; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chūichi; Nimitz, Chester William; Southeast Pacific Theater; Tanaka Raizo; Yamamoto Isoroku

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East Indies Fleet

See British Eastern Fleet

Eben Emael, German Capture of (May 10–11, 1940)

Belgian frontier fort and site of a German special operation to seize the Belgian frontier defenses at the opening of Germany's campaign in the west on May 10, 1940. FALL GELB (CASE YELLOW) involved three army groups poised to split the British, Belgian, and French forces and gain the English Channel coastline for continuing operations against Great Britain.

Eben Emael was a reinforced concrete-and-steel bunker system located on the Albert Canal at its junction with the Meuse River north of Liège, Belgium, and about three miles south of Maastricht in the Netherlands. The fort's plateau top was wedge-shaped, 1,100 yards long on its north-south axis and 800 yards across the southern baseline. The entrance was at the southwest corner at Casemate Number 3. The fort guarded the bridges over the canal and the routes to the interior of the Low Countries and France beyond.

At the time of the attack on May 10, about 700 soldiers manned the fortress bunkers, which were designed for a detachment of 1,200. Belgian regular army officer Major Jean Fritz Lucien Jottrand was in command. The garrison of Fort Eben Emael had been alerted to activity across the German border shortly after midnight on May 9–10, but it took several hours to put things in order. Alerts were common, and the troops were quartered in villages near the fort.

The Germans, already skilled in assault tactics from their World War I experiences, had developed special teams to reduce fortifications. The secret operation against the fort, code-named GRANITE, had Adolf Hitler's personal interest. Captain Walter Koch, an officer in Major General Kurt Student's airborne forces, was chosen to lead the attack. Artillery preparations cratered the ground around the fort to provide cover for the advancing German troops, and they suppressed the fire of the fort's guns.

The glider attack was to occur at the same time as other events on the ground, but flight problems required the Junkers Ju-52 tow planes to penetrate Dutch airspace to get to the required release altitude. The Dutch were alerted and commenced antiaircraft fire.

On the early morning of May 10, 10 DFS-230 gliders, each carrying a squad of seven or eight men, landed silently on top of the fort. Lieutenant Rudolf Witzig's command glider had prematurely disconnected and landed in a field near Köln (Cologne). Sergeant Helmut Wenzel took charge, until Witzig's arrival at 6:30 a.m.

The assault force used shaped-charge explosives to penetrate the casemates and cupolas. Throughout the afternoon and night of May 10, the Germans and Belgians fought inside the dank passageways of the fort. Rubber assault boats and the employment of flamethrowers helped the attack group cross the canal and close on the fort. While the engineers of the assault detachment kept the bunker garrison occupied, Koch's other airborne forces attacked the bridges over the Albert Canal.

The next day, a German division arrived to complete the capture of the remaining bridges and forts. Witzig's assault force suffered only 26 casualties in the mission. After resisting for just more than one day, Jottrand and his captured Belgian soldiers were marched off to a prison camp in Germany to sit out the war. Vital bridges at Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven were also secured, and the German Sixth Army was able to advance. Its tanks took Liège the next day.

JOHN F. VOTAW

See also

Airborne Forces, Axis; Belgium, Army; Belgium Campaign; Engineer Operations; Flamethrowers; Parachute Infantry; Student, Kurt

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Eberstadt, Ferdinand (1890–1969)

Wall Street financier, U.S. mobilization official, and influential adviser to several U.S. presidents. Born in New York City on June 19, 1890, Ferdinand

Eberstadt graduated from Princeton University in 1913 and served in the U.S. armed forces during World War I. In 1923 he began what would become a legendary career in investment banking by joining Wall Street's most prestigious investment firm, Dillon, Read & Company. In 1929 Eberstadt served as assistant to Owen D. Young on the War Reparations Committee that convened in Paris. Eberstadt continued his investment work during the Great Depression, garnering acclaim for his attempts to keep smaller businesses afloat. He is credited with establishing one of the first successful Wall Street investment funds, the precursor to today's popular mutual funds. During his many years on Wall Street, Eberstadt came to know future high-level government officials such as Paul Nitze and James V. Forrestal. Eberstadt remained a close and lifelong friend of Forrestal.

An uncanny problem solver, Eberstadt joined the World War II mobilization effort in September 1942 at the request of Donald M. Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board (WPB). Eberstadt held the dual—and critically important—positions of chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board and vice chairman of the WPB. He excelled in these positions and devised the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), a successful and ingenious scheme whereby military production could be prioritized according to need and then synchronized with private industry. This was achieved by carefully controlling and allocating according to need the three most important raw materials for military production: steel, copper, and aluminum. The result was a boom in military production that many observers of the day claimed had shortened the war by many months.

The CMP was announced in November 1942 and implemented on July 1, 1943. It was so successful that the Harry S. Truman administration resurrected it in 1951 for the Korean War mobilization program. In spite of Eberstadt's organizational successes, some mobilization officials, including Nelson himself, came to believe that Eberstadt had become too close to military planners, thus endangering civilian control of the economy.

As World War II drew to a close, Forrestal, at the time secretary of the navy, urged Eberstadt to draft a memorandum for the president that outlined the many deficiencies in U.S. intelligence and military operations. Eberstadt correctly understood that the lack of a centralized intelligence agency was a significant detriment to U.S. defensive capabilities. Thus, he proposed a single agency to coordinate military intelligence with domestic intelligence

and State Department directives. He also suggested that the military services be better coordinated and supervised. The resulting 1945 report provided the framework for the 1947 National Security Act, which incorporated many of Eberstadt's suggestions, including the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In 1946 Eberstadt served as Bernard Baruch's assistant on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and in 1948 he authored another influential report on the deficiencies of the National Security Resources Board, an arm of the National Security Council. Eberstadt's recommendations fostered revisions to the agency within months. That same year, he became chairman of the Commission on National Security Organization, part of the Hoover Commission. Thereafter, Eberstadt continued to work on an ad hoc basis for subsequent administrations and remained one of the nation's most respected financiers. Eberstadt died in Washington, D.C. on November 11, 1969.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Baruch, Bernard Mannes; Forrestal, James Vincent; Nelson, Donald Marr; United States War Production Board

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Eden, Sir Robert Anthony (1897–1977)

British politician and foreign secretary who served as a cabinet minister during World War II. Born in Windlestone, England, on June 12, 1897, Anthony Robert Eden served in France during World War I as a brigade major. He then took a degree in Oriental languages at Cambridge University. He entered Parliament in 1924 and became Stanley Baldwin's foreign secretary at age 38, in December 1935. A staunch supporter of the League of

Nations, Eden resigned in February 1938 in disagreement over Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

With the outbreak of war, Eden returned to Chamberlain's cabinet as Dominions secretary (September 3, 1939) and helped to develop the Empire Air Training Scheme that trained thousands of pilots and aircrew in Canada and Africa. When Winston L. S. Churchill became prime minister, he named Eden war minister (May 10, 1940); shortly thereafter came the disastrous British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and its Dunkerque evacuation as well as British setbacks in the Middle East.

Eden again became foreign secretary (on December 23, 1940) and attended virtually all the Allied wartime conferences. Patient and urbane, he was a superior diplomat who effectively represented British interests to the other Allies—especially the often difficult Charles de Gaulle, whose Free French cause Eden often defended. Churchill appointed Eden leader of the House of Commons in November 1942, a role he played well but at a cost to his health. Churchill also named Eden, by now part of his inner circle, his successor in the event of his death. Eden worked hard on the formation of the United Nations, and he left office only when the Labour Party won the British elections (July 27, 1945). He retained his seat in the House of Commons, though.

Eden served a third time as foreign secretary in Churchill's second government (1951–1955) but never fully recovered from abdominal surgery in 1953. He was knighted in 1954 and, on Churchill's retirement, served as prime minister (April 6, 1955–January 9, 1957), resigning after the mishandled 1956 Suez Crisis. Eden was made Earl of Avon in 1961 and died on January 14, 1977, in Alvediston, England.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; de Gaulle, Charles; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Great Britain; League of Nations; Mussolini, Benito; United Nations, Formation of

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Egypt

Strategically located in Northeast Africa, Egypt had a 1939 population of some 16 million people. Encompassing 387,048 square miles, Egypt borders the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Red Sea to the east, Libya to the west, and Sudan to the south. Egypt was vital to the British effort in World War II to protect the Suez Canal and lines of communication to Middle East oil fields.

The British had taken control of Egypt in 1882 to secure the Suez Canal. Supposedly, they had intervened to "restore order," but the British stayed. London ended its protectorate in 1922 and granted Egypt independence as a constitutional monarchy with adult male suffrage, but it did not relinquish authority in key areas. Great Britain retained control over defense, imperial communications (the Suez Canal), protection of foreign interests and minorities, and the Sudan. In August 1936, the same year King Farouk came to the throne, Britain signed a treaty with Egypt whereby it retained the right to defend the Suez Canal until the Egyptian Army could do so. The Egyptian government also agreed that in the event of war, it would grant the British full use of Egyptian facilities.

Throughout World War II, Port Said and Alexandria remained major British bases for operations in the eastern Mediterranean. As headquarters of the Middle East Supply Center, the Egyptian capital of Cairo was the transit point for half a million British and Commonwealth troops. Cairo was also the headquarters of the Middle East Command, and the city remained a haven for agents and spies. Egyptian nationalists were active, with many Egyptians, including Farouk and Prime Minister Ali Mahir, hoping for an Axis military victory in the war and full independence for Egypt.

Although Farouk was the constitutional monarch, British ambassador Miles Lampson exercised real power. At the beginning of the war, the British insisted on the imposition of martial law, strict censorship, and the arrest of German nationals. The Egyptian government ended diplomatic relations with

Germany, but Egypt did not declare war against Germany or, later, Italy. Only reluctantly did Ali Mahir allow the confiscation of Italian property in Egypt. He also refused permission for border guards to fire on Italian troops. In June 1940, the British insisted that Farouk replace Ali Mahir. His replacement was Hasan Sabri, a moderate.

On September 17, 1940, Italian forces invaded Egypt. Despite a pledge that it would declare war if this happened, the Egyptian government merely declared a state of nonbelligerency. In November 1940, Prime Minister Sabri died and was replaced by Husayn Sirry, who headed a coalition government. Axis air attacks on Cairo in June 1941 killed some 600 people, but Egyptian sentiment remained heavily anti-British. That winter, conditions in Egypt worsened with severe shortages of many goods, including food. Bread riots occurred in Cairo in January 1942. With German general Erwin Rommel's forces closing on Cairo, nationalist demonstrations in favor of an Axis victory occurred in the capital, and Sirry resigned in early February.

The British then insisted that Farouk appoint as prime minister Mustafa Nahas, the pro-British head of the Wafd nationalist party. When Farouk hesitated, British armored cars and troops surrounded the palace, and Lampson demanded his abdication. Farouk acquiesced, and Nahas formed a government.

Throughout 1942, pro-Axis sentiment remained strong, even among the elites and the Egyptian Army. Following the October 23–November 4, 1942, Battle of El Alamein, both the Axis threat to Egypt and British authority subsided. Despite Farouk's repeated efforts to remove him from office, Nahas remained as prime minister until October 1944, when the British allowed Farouk to replace him with Saadist leader Ahmad Mahir. The new prime minister secured Egyptian declarations of war against Germany and Japan, but he was assassinated shortly thereafter, in February 1945. The declarations of war were formally proclaimed on February 26, 1945, allowing Egypt to become a founding member of the United Nations.

As elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East, World War II heightened nationalism and anticolonialism in Egypt. Following Farouk's abdication in 1952, the last British troops departed the country in 1954. Egypt did not gain its full sovereignty, however, until 1956 and the Suez Crisis debacle.

ROBERT W. DUVALL, JACK VAHRAM KALPAKIAN, AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

El Alamein, Battle of; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; United Nations, Formation of

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Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence (1886–1961)

U.S. Army general. Born on March 9, 1886, in Urbana, Ohio, Robert Lawrence Eichelberger attended Ohio State University for two years before attending the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1909. He served in a variety of assignments before becoming assistant chief of staff of the Siberian Expeditionary Force (1918–1919), where he was promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel.

Eichelberger served in the Philippines and in China and then on the War Department General Staff (1921–1924). He graduated from the Command and General Staff School (1926) and the Army War College (1930). Eichelberger then served at West Point (1931–1935), where he was promoted to permanent lieutenant colonel (1934). He became secretary to the General Staff (1935–1938), and after promotion to colonel (1938), he commanded the 30th Infantry Regiment. Promoted to brigadier general in 1940, he was appointed superintendent of West Point.

Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, one of the more capable U.S. Army commanders in the Pacific Theater in World War II. He is shown here as a brigadier general. (Library of Congress)

In March 1942, Eichelberger became a temporary major general and took command of the 77th Infantry Division. He commanded XI Corps and then I Corps, in Australia, and then led I Corps in New Guinea in September 1942. Promoted to temporary lieutenant general the next month, he directed the successful assault of Buna-Gona (November 16, 1942–January 22, 1943) and then operations in New Guinea and New Britain (January 1943–July 1944).

Eichelberger assumed command of the Eighth Army in September 1944 and led it to Leyte Island in the Philippines that December. He directed operations on Luzon (January–April 1945), including the liberation of Manila, and his forces also liberated the southern Philippine Islands, including Mindanao. He assumed command of all Philippine operations in July. His Eighth Army carried out 14 major and 24 smaller landings.

Between 1945 and 1948, Eichelberger commanded the Eighth Army in Japan. He returned to the United States in September 1948 and retired from the army. Two years later, he published a book titled *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*. During the 1950–1953 Korean War, he was briefly a special adviser in the Far East. Eichelberger was promoted to full general on the retired list in July 1954 and died in Asheville, North Carolina, on September 26, 1961.

ALEXANDER D. SAMMS

See also

Buna, Battle of; New Britain, Landings on; New Guinea Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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Eichmann, Karl Adolf (1906–1962)

German Schutzstaffel (SS) Obersturmbannführer and major figure in the destruction of European Jewry during World War II. Born on March 19, 1906, in Solingen in the Rhineland, Germany, Karl Adolf Eichmann moved with his family to Linz, Austria, in 1914. He left the Linz Higher Institute for Electro-Technical Studies after two years and became a salesman. In 1932, he joined the Austrian National Socialist movement but fled to Germany in 1934 when it was outlawed. Sent to Berlin, he joined the SS Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) and was assigned to its Jewish Office. There, he became the Nazi expert on Jewish affairs and handled negotiations concerning the immigration of German Jews to Palestine, which he visited briefly in 1937. Following the Anschluss (union) with Austria and the absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, he headed the Office for Jewish Emigration.

With the beginning of World War II in 1939, Eichmann transferred to the Gestapo (secret police) and created the Reichzentralstelle für Jüdische Auswanderung (Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration) to handle the

relocation of European Jews to Poland. That office was then combined with the Jewish Affairs Office to form Department IV-A-4B, known as the Dienststelle Eichmann (Department Eichmann). He helped organize the Wannsee Conference of January 1942 that coordinated the mechanics of the "Final Solution" and was put in charge of the transportation of Jews to the death camps of Poland. Eichmann later told an associate that he would "die happily with the certainty of having killed almost six million Jews."

After the war, Eichmann lived in various places under aliases until he escaped to Argentina, where he lived and worked near Buenos Aires under the name Ricardo Klement. On May 11, 1960, the Israeli Mossad captured him and smuggled him from the country illegally to stand trial in Israel. Eichmann claimed that he was only following orders and in any case could be accused only "of aiding and abetting" the annihilation of the Jews, not killing them. Found guilty by an Israeli court on December 15, 1961, he was sentenced to death. Unrepentant, he was hanged at Ramleh Prison on May 31, 1962. His body was cremated, and the ashes were scattered.

DOUGLAS B. WARNER

See also

Holocaust; Wannsee Conference

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Eicke, Theodor (1892–1943)

German Waffen-SS general. Born in Hampont in Alsace (then in Germany) on October 17, 1892, Theodor Eicke served in World War I as a paymaster. After the war, he joined the border police and served in the Freikorps before entering the police force in Thuringia in 1920. Active in right-wing politics, Eicke joined the National Socialist Party in December 1928. He initially

achieved prominence in Adolf Hitler's Third Reich as a member of the Schutzstaffel (SS), serving as commandant of the Dachau concentration camp in 1933 and 1934 and as inspector of concentration camps and leader of SS guards formations between 1934 and 1939. Eicke played a leading role in the Blood Purge of the party, when he and a subordinate shot to death storm troop (Sturmabteilungen) leader Ernst Röhm on July 1, 1934.

Eicke set ruthless standards in the concentration camps, warning guards that they would be punished for showing any compassion for the inmates. He centralized SS control of all concentration camps, established uniform regulations for the treatment of inmates, and organized the elite guard formations known as the Totenkopfverbände (Death's Head units). He also oversaw their expansion into five battalions, which became the Obeybayern, Brandenburg, and Thuringian regiments. With the beginning of World War II, he formed the SS-Totenkopf (Death's Head) unit for service in Poland.

In November 1939, Eicke took command of the 1st SS-Totenkopf Division, a motorized unit and one of three original Waffen-SS (armed SS) divisions. He personally led it in combat in both France and the Soviet Union. Brutal, fanatical, and violently anti-Semitic, Eicke molded the Death's Head Division in his own image, a development that helps explain both its military effectiveness and its perpetration of numerous atrocities. His unit committed the first SS atrocity in France—the May 27, 1940, murder of 100 British prisoners of war at Le Paradis. During the German invasion of the Soviet Union that began on June 22, 1941, his division served with Army Group North. Eicke died when an aircraft in which he was flying was shot down behind Soviet lines in Mikhailovka, Ukraine, on February 26, 1943.

BRUCE J. DEHART

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; France, Battle for; Waffen-SS

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Einsatzgruppen

German special extermination units deployed on the Eastern Front during World War II. In June 1941, the German Army invaded the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA. Following closely behind the main fighting force were four small units known as Einsatzgruppen (Special Task Forces). Their assignment was the extermination of Jews, communists, Gypsies, and anyone else deemed racially or politically undesirable.

Einsatzgruppen were divided into four units (A, B, C, and D) that were attached to the army groups involved in the invasion (except D, which operated independently of all army groups). Each Einsatzgruppe numbered between 600 and 1,000 men drawn from the Waffen-SS, the Gestapo, the Sicherheitsdienst, and the regular police. Membership was voluntary, and any member could be reassigned if requesting a transfer.

The Einsatzgruppen were established by and subordinate to director of the Reich Main Security Office Reinhard Heydrich. His Commissar Order of July 17, 1941, commanded the Einsatzgruppen to execute any captured communists and to "further treat" all Jews.

The commandos operated by moving into a recently captured area and issuing orders for all Jews or Gypsies to assemble in the main town square early the next morning for resettlement. The victims were then loaded into trucks and transported to an area outside of town that had already been prepared with large trenches. They were then shot, either individually or as a group, and their bodies were buried. Each unit was required to keep an exact record of its activities and report regularly to Heydrich. These "Situation Reports" were captured intact at the end of the war and provide a precise record of Einsatzgruppen activities. According to these documents, almost 1.5 million men, women, and children were executed, the vast majority of them Jews.

The emotional strain on the killers was considerable. Many performed their duties drunk, with liquor freely provided. This convinced Heydrich and Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer of the Schutzstaffel (SS), that another way had to be found to solve the "Jewish problem." This led to the

extermination camps of Auschwitz, Treblinka, Chelmno, Sobibor, and Belzec.

Following the war, Einsatzgruppen leaders who could be found were brought to trial. Of 24 defendants, 14 were sentenced to death and 8 to prison. Only 4 individuals, including Otto Ohlendorf, who headed one group and provided compelling testimony regarding the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, were actually executed, on June 7, 1951; the others had their sentences reduced. Four other Einsatzgruppen leaders were later tried and executed by other nations.

LEE BAKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Commissar Order; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; Waffen-SS

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Einstein, Albert (1879–1955)

Physicist, Nobel laureate, and pacifist who urged the United States to begin research into the feasibility of constructing atomic bombs. Born in Ulm, Germany, on March 14, 1879, Albert Einstein renounced German citizenship in 1896 and became a Swiss citizen in 1901. While working as a patent clerk, he developed his special theory of relativity and the famous equation $E = mc^2$ that demonstrated the equivalency of mass and energy. In 1914, he returned to Germany after being appointed director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics and a professor at Humboldt University, Berlin. With the rise of Nazism and Jewish persecution, he left Berlin in 1933 for the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey.

In 1939, leading physicists, including Hungarian émigrés Leo Szilard and Eugene P. Wigner as well as Italian expatriate Enrico Fermi, concluded that

Germany was working on an atomic bomb. Szilard approached Einstein with a letter for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, urging that the U.S. government begin an atomic bomb project of its own to deter Adolf Hitler (assuming German efforts succeeded).



Albert Einstein was one of the most renowned scientists of the twentieth century. Convinced of the viability of an atomic bomb, he urged President Franklin Roosevelt to have the United States take the lead in its development. (Library of Congress)

Einstein was apotheosized as perhaps the world's greatest physicist since Isaac Newton, and his signature on this letter carried considerable weight. Dated August 2, 1939, the letter warned that it was now likely that scientists would establish and sustain a chain reaction in uranium, which could lead to the construction of "extremely powerful bombs of a new type." Einstein urged the president to form a partnership among government officials, industry specialists, and scientists to conduct feasibility studies; he also recommended securing supplies of uranium ore.

Alexander Sachs, economist and presidential confidant, delivered the letter on October 11, 1939. Sufficiently alarmed by Sachs's précis of its contents, Roosevelt appointed the Uranium Committee to begin preliminary

studies, which became the basis for the Manhattan Project organized in 1942 to build atomic bombs.

Einstein's letter served as the catalyst for the Manhattan Project, but Einstein himself was excluded from the project. His pacifism, his Zionism, and a supposedly lackadaisical attitude regarding military secrecy made him suspect to army intelligence. After the war, he campaigned unsuccessfully for a "world government" consisting of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union that would restrict further development and construction of atomic weapons. Einstein died in Princeton, New Jersey, on April 18, 1955.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Bush, Vannevar; Fermi, Enrico; Groves, Leslie Richard; Manhattan Project; Nuclear Weapons; Oppenheimer, Julius Robert; Document 34; Document 50

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Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890–1969)

U.S. Army general and supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, European theater of operations, and later president of the United States. Born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890, Dwight David "Ike" Eisenhower grew up in Abilene, Kansas. Graduating from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1915 as a member of the "class the stars fell on," he was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry. His first posting was Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Eisenhower commanded the fledgling tank corps training center at Camp Colt outside Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, during World War I. Following service in Panama, he graduated first in his class at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926. He also graduated from the Army War College in 1928. During the interwar period, Eisenhower

served under a number of the army's finest officers, including Generals Fox Conner, John J. Pershing, and Douglas A. MacArthur. Following his return from the Philippines in 1939, Eisenhower served successively as chief of staff of the 3rd Infantry Division, IX Corps, and the Third Army, where he was promoted to temporary brigadier general in October 1941 and captured U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall's attention for his contributions to the Third Army's "victory" in the Texas-Louisiana war maneuvers of 1941.

Assigned to the War Department in the aftermath of the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Eisenhower headed the War Plans Division and then the Operations Division of the General Staff before being promoted to major general in April 1942. Marshall then appointed Eisenhower commanding general of the European theater of operations in June 1942. Promotion to lieutenant general followed in July 1942. His appointment was met with great skepticism from senior British military officers because of his lack of both combat and command experience.

Eisenhower commanded Allied forces in Operation TORCH (the invasion of Northwest Africa) in November 8, 1942, and in Operation HUSKY (the invasion of Sicily) during July 9–August 22, 1943. In the interim, he was promoted to full general in February 1943. The efficient operation of his headquarters—Allied Forces Headquarters—became a model of Allied harmony and led to increased responsibilities in the Mediterranean theater of operations. In September 1943, his forces invaded the Italian mainland.

Eisenhower's generalship during this phase of the war has long been the subject of controversy, but his adept management of diverse personalities and his emphasis on Allied harmony led to his appointment as supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, for the invasion of Northwestern Europe.

As commander of Operation OVERLORD, the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944, Eisenhower headed the largest Allied force in history. Following the expansion of the lodgment area, he took direct command of the land battle on September 1, 1944. As the Allied forces advanced along a broad front toward the German border, he frequently encountered opposition from senior Allied generals over command arrangements and logistical support. He displayed increasing brilliance as a coalition commander, but his operational decisions remained controversial. His support of British field marshal Bernard L.

Montgomery's abortive Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944) is evidence of Eisenhower's unflinching emphasis on Allied harmony in the campaign in Northwestern Europe. In mid-December 1944, Eisenhower was promoted to general of the army as his forces stood poised to strike into the heartland of Germany.

When Adolf Hitler launched the Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes Offensive) on December 16, 1944, it was Eisenhower, among senior Allied commanders, who first recognized the scope and intensity of Germany's attack and also the key vulnerability in the German scheme of maneuver. Marshaling forces to stem the German advance, he defeated Hitler's last offensive in the west. By March 1945, Eisenhower's armies had crossed the Rhine River and encircled the Ruhr industrial area of Germany. As Soviet armies stood on the outskirts of Berlin, Eisenhower decided to seek the destruction of Germany's armed forces throughout southern Germany and not to launch a direct attack toward the German capital. On May 7, 1945, the mission of the Allied Expeditionary Force was fulfilled as he accepted the unconditional surrender of Germany's armed forces.

Following the war, Eisenhower succeeded General Marshall as chief of staff of the U.S. Army. In February 1948, Eisenhower retired from the military and assumed the presidency of Columbia University before being recalled to active duty by President Harry S. Truman in 1950 to become the first supreme Allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), in the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1952, Eisenhower resigned from active military service and accepted the Republican Party's nomination for president.

Elected by a wide majority in 1952 and again in 1956, Eisenhower stressed fiscal restraint and nuclear over conventional forces, supported expanded U.S. military commitments overseas so long as they did not involve unilateral commitment of American forces, and warned of the dangers of a military-industrial complex. He left office in 1961 as one of this nation's most popular chief executives. His two administrations were marked by peace, although the U.S. economy suffered three recessions in less than eight years. After Eisenhower left the White House, his successor, John F. Kennedy, restored him to the Army List as a five-star general. In 1961, Eisenhower retired to his farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. He died in Washington, D.C., on March 28, 1969.

COLE C. KINGSEED

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Cairo Conference; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Hitler, Adolf; Italy Campaign; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; North Africa Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rhine Crossings; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation; West European Theater of Operations; Document 181; Document 187; Document 191; Document 201; Document 206; Document 209; Document 212; Document 218; Document 221

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El Alamein, Battle of (October 23–November 4, 1942)

Major Allied victory against German and Italian forces in Egypt. By the fall of 1942, there were signs that the war in North Africa was turning in favor of the British. Axis forces under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had failed to break through the British lines at Ruwiesat Ridge in July and at Alam Halfa Ridge in September. British Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery gradually built up his forces' strength to strike an offensive blow. Although Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill repeatedly pressed for an earlier attack, Montgomery set the operation, code-named LIGHTFOOT, to begin on the night of October 23–24 under a full moon. General Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General Harold Alexander, British commander in chief in North Africa, managed to placate Churchill.

By late October, Montgomery's Eighth Army numbered 195,000 men and had 1,029 tanks (including 300 U.S.-built M-4 Sherman mediums), 2,311 artillery pieces, and some 750 aircraft. Ranged against them were 104,000 Axis troops (50,000 Germans and 54,000 Italians), 489 tanks, 1,219 guns, and 675 aircraft. The Germans had, however, faced worse odds and won in North Africa. The Axis defense was based on some 450,000 mines laid from the sea to the Qattara Depression, including corridors designed to funnel attackers into traps, although Rommel had no confidence that he could hold against a determined British attack.

Montgomery planned to feint an attack to the south while Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese's XXX Corps delivered the major blow in the north against the strength of the Axis positions. The elaborate British deception efforts convinced Axis intelligence that the main blow would occur in the south.

Montgomery planned to use armor to blast his way through the German positions and then carry out an envelopment of Axis forces. His own armor commanders, particularly Lieutenant General Herbert Lumsden of X Corps, thought that this was a misuse of tanks. Montgomery adapted his plan so the armor would cover an initial infantry attack and then seize defensive ground. The infantry would "crumble" the German line, and when panzers moved forward to assist, the British armor would strike.

The attack commenced at 9:40 p.m. on October 23, 1942, almost totally surprising the Germans. (Rommel was in Germany at the time, recuperating from an illness.) British air attacks and artillery fire from 1,000 guns disrupted Axis communications and rained down on a six-mile front in the Axis lines near the Mediterranean coast. Then XXX Corps began its attack in the north, while Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks's XXX Corps began the southern attack near the Qattara Depression to fix German forces there.

XXX Corps opened two corridors through the Axis minefields, and Lumsden's X Armoured Corps then moved through them. Italian forces holding this sector fought well, however, and the 15th Panzer Division's counterattack almost halted the British advance. Montgomery found that reports of progress had been overly optimistic. The commanders of his armored divisions feared that crossing the key Miteiriya Ridge would expose their tanks to the deadly fire of German 88mm antitank guns, and they had not moved. The Germans were busy extending and reinforcing their

minefields. An angry Montgomery now halted the southern thrust and concentrated his resources in the north. He also stated that he would relieve commanders who failed to advance.

Progress resulted, and by late afternoon on October 24 the 1st Armoured Division reported one of its brigades on and around Kidney Hill, part of Miteiriya Ridge. Once again, however, reports were overly optimistic, and the 7th Armoured Division bogged down entirely at Himeirat.

Montgomery was awakened at 2:00 a.m. on October 25 with the bad news and quickly saw that his whole plan was threatened. With British forces holding only part of Kidney Hill to the north and making no progress at Hineimat in the south, the Germans would have little reason to launch counterattacks, and thus the British armor would have no chance to destroy the panzers. Montgomery's infantry, although more successful than the armor, was also taking heavy casualties, and only his Australian division had replacements. Montgomery began to revise his plan again—the first of several changes made over the next few days. Ultimate success came, in part, from his flexibility during the battle.

The first effort was on the British far right at midnight on October 25, but although the Australian infantry did well, the 1st Armoured Division again failed to move beyond Kidney Hill. This time, the problems were map reading and failure to coordinate with the artillery. Thus far Rommel, who had returned earlier on October 25, continued to hold his ground, which was what Montgomery wanted. Then because of casualties, Montgomery shifted the offensive burden to Lumsden's X Armoured Corps, which was to move west and northwest from Kidney Hill. Not completely trusting Lumsden, Montgomery stayed in close touch with the operation and found that his corps commander was not keeping his artillery commander informed of plans and operations. Not wishing to risk his armor by leaving it unsupported, Montgomery again changed plans.

His new approach was to create an armored reserve to use for a decisive thrust, although the infantry would have to do the initial fighting with even less shield available than previously. At least Montgomery knew from Ultra intercepts that even though Rommel was thinking about breaking off, fuel shortages would not allow the Axis side to seek a battle of movement. Meanwhile, Churchill was more worried about winning a victory over all of Panzerarmee Afrika before the Allied landings in western North Africa

(Operation TORCH). The Vichy French were more likely to stand aside or even cooperate in these attacks if Axis forces in eastern North Africa were on the run. Churchill was thus not pleased to learn that armored units were being withdrawn from the Battle of El Alamein.

As the fighting evolved, the target shifted from the northern coast road, where German troops were being brought in, to the Miteiriya Ridge area, where the attack would hit mostly Italian units. Again, the start was delayed when the armor commanders failed to coordinate plans. The basic idea now called for two regiments of armored cars to drive behind the Axis defenders and envelop them.



Early on November 2, the attack began. Again the infantry did well, quickly gaining 4,000 yards, but the armor failed to advance. Although slow to react because he was convinced that the main attack would come farther north, Rommel organized a full-scale counterattack. This played into the hands of the British, for their armor and antitank weapons could now take defensive positions and destroy the panzers. By the evening of November 2, Rommel had only 35 German and 20 Italian tanks capable of combat.

Montgomery, however, had two armored divisions in reserve and spent November 2 gathering infantry reserves. He used this reserve force to break

out to the southwest. By the evening of November 2, Rommel was planning to fall back—news made available to Montgomery via Ultra intercepts. When Hitler learned of Rommel's plan, however, he ordered his North African forces to fight to the death. Rommel later claimed this order resulted in the destruction of his army, but since it reached him more than half a day after his withdrawal started, it had little effect on the outcome.

In any case, British attacks continued, and Allied air bombardment added a new destructive element. By the afternoon of November 4, the victory was clearly won. The Italian XX Corps had been destroyed, and the Afrika Korps on its left had been shattered. On the afternoon of November 4, Rommel ordered a retreat. Several days later, the Allies landed in western North Africa.

Casualty figures for the Battle of El Alamein vary widely. The British claimed to have inflicted 50,000 casualties, but the actual number is probably closer to 2,300 killed, 5,500 wounded, and 27,900 captured. Rommel had also lost almost all his tanks and artillery. Eighth Army casualties amounted to 4,600 killed and 9,300 wounded. The British also lost 432 tanks destroyed or disabled.

Despite the battle's outcome, historians have been critical of Montgomery for attacking the strength of the Axis line; his subsequent claim that everything had gone according to plan is simply not true. Although Africa was not cleared of Axis forces for another six months, the end was plainly in sight.

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See also

Afrika Korps; Alam Halfa, Battle of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Horrocks, Sir Brian Gwynne; Leese, Sir Oliver William Hargreaves; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; North Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Ruweisat Ridge, Battles of; TORCH, Operation

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Elba, Recapture of (June 17–18, 1944)

Following Italy's surrender to the Allies in September 1943, German forces seized the Italian island of Elba, located between Corsica and the western coast of Italy. The Germans then used the island as a screen for their coastal traffic. Following the recapture of Corsica by Italian and Free French forces in October 1943, the Allies developed Operation BRASSARD, which assigned French forces to take Elba. With the fall of Rome on June 5 and the Allied advance north of the Eternal City, the chief justification for the operation disappeared. Free French leaders were determined to proceed with BRASSARD nonetheless, because it would serve as a useful rehearsal for the subsequent Allied invasion of southern France and would prove the worth of their forces to the Allied cause.

Three days before the planned invasion, French commander General Jean De Lattre de Tassigny received word that no air transport would be available for the French commandos; he decided to proceed nonetheless. British rear admiral Thomas H. Troubridge had charge of the naval forces, which included some 220 vessels, including landing craft. French lieutenant general Henri Martin commanded the land forces. The French attackers included the 9th Colonial Infantry Division, Goumiers (North African troops); the Shock Battalion; and commandos. Some 2,700 German troops under Lieutenant General Franz Gall defended the island.

The invasion began at 1:00 a.m. on June 17, 1944, when French commandos stormed ashore at six different points and swiftly seized the major German shore batteries. The main landing followed in Campo Bay. Although there was some intense fighting, the entire island was in French hands by the evening of June 18. The battle for Elba cost French forces 201 dead, 51 missing, and 635 wounded. The Germans lost several hundred dead and 2,300 prisoners. Although it was of questionable military value, the

operation heightened German fears of another Allied landing in northern Italy.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Free French; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; Italy Campaign

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Electronic Intelligence

The collection and analysis of electromagnetic emissions that provide insight into an enemy's technological capabilities. The broader category of signals intelligence (SIGINT) includes both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). COMINT encompasses the monitoring of radio and telephone traffic, the decryption of coded messages, and the analysis of the contents contained in those messages. ELINT is the collection and analysis of electromagnetic emissions, such as telemetry and radar signals, with the expectation that the successful analysis of ELINT will provide information about enemy technology and lead to the development of effective countermeasures.

During World War II, signals intelligence played an important role in strategic decision making. Its best-known successes were in COMINT and included breaking the Japanese and German codes in Magic and Ultra. The Axis powers also had some success in breaking Allied codes, especially those regarding the Atlantic convoys.

Signals intelligence activities during World War II were not limited to intercepting and reading communications, however. ELINT activities during the war included monitoring radar signals to determine the transmitting power, range, and accuracy of the air defense systems built by both the Allies and the Axis powers. In the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Great Britain and

the United States used sophisticated radio receivers to approximate the positions of submarines, merchantmen, and surface warships by means of triangulation (interpreting the strength and point of origin of radio transmissions). As the war progressed, ELINT techniques became more sophisticated. Because of the role played by both COMINT and ELINT in the conflict, World War II has sometimes been referred to as the SIGINT war.

SHANNON A. BROWN

See also
Signals Intelligence

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El Guettar, Battle of (March 23–April 7, 1943)

Battle during the Tunisian Campaign pitting U.S. forces against those of Germany and Italy. The U.S. Army II Corps had been badly mauled in its initial encounters with the Afrika Korps, culminating in the Battle of Kasserine Pass (February 19–22, 1943). In the aftermath of this U.S. defeat, on March 6, 1943, Major General George S. Patton Jr. replaced Major General Lloyd Fredendall as commander of II Corps. Patton immediately began reorganizing his new command for an offensive toward the Eastern Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains to threaten the right flank of the Axis Mareth Line against the British Eighth Army.

On March 17, against only light opposition from Italian troops in the area, Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen's 1st Infantry Division took the town of Gafsa, while the next day Colonel William O. Darby's 1st Ranger Battalion occupied El Guettar Oasis. The Italians withdrew into the mountain passes, defending access to the coastal plain. On the night of March 20, the

rangers scaled the cliffs and secured one of the key Italian positions, taking 700 prisoners.

German colonel general Hans Jürgen Dieter von Arnim, commander of Army Group Africa, held a low opinion of American fighting abilities and assigned the task of clearing out the U.S. units to the 10th Panzer Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Friedrich Freiherr von Broich. The Germans launched their attack at 6:00 a.m. on March 23. Fifty tanks, followed by tank destroyers and Panzergrenadiers, moved through the pass into the El Guettar Valley, sweeping aside the American frontline positions. However, the Germans were slowed by a minefield. As they paused to clear it, American artillery and antitank guns, including those of 31 M10 tank destroyers, opened up on the German armor, destroying or disabling 30 of the tanks. By 9:00 a.m. the Germans had withdrawn from the valley. Late that afternoon the Germans mounted a second attack, but it too was broken up. Part of the 10th Panzer Division then took up defensive positions in the hills, while the remainder withdrew to Gabès.

Already on March 19, the British Eighth Army had commenced an assault on the Mareth Line. While this attack initially was unsuccessful, on March 26 an Allied flanking attack to the north of the line rendered that line untenable, and the Axis troops withdrew to Wadi Akarit, north of Gabès.

II Corps units, meanwhile, succeeded in securing the remainder of the interior plain, although Axis resistance was pronounced and fighting was heavy. By March 30, however, American forces were in position to launch an offensive. Attacking forces consisted of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions and Benson Force, a Combat Command of the 1st Armored Division.

To break free, the Americans first had to seize the Italian strongpoints of Hills 369 and 772. The attack began on the afternoon of March 30 with an assault on Hill 369. After some success, the Americans were driven back. An attempt on March 31 also failed. Patton then shifted the attack to Hill 772. On April 3 the 1st Infantry Division finally took Hill 369, but fighting on Hill 772 continued, the effort slowed by the arrival of elements of the 21st Panzer Division.

On April 6 the Eighth Army broke through the new Axis lines, causing a full retreat. The next day, Benson Force moved through the positions held by the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions and raced down the road to Gabès, where late that afternoon it linked up with the lead elements of the Eighth Army.

The fighting from March 23 to April 7 had cost the Americans some 4,000–5,000 casualties and 35–55 tanks lost; the Germans and Italians had suffered 4,000–6,000 casualties and 40 or more tanks lost. Although U.S. forces had demonstrated their ability to defend against German armor, they had been less successful in showing effective offensive capabilities.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Allen, Terry de la Mesa; Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; Darby, William Orlando; Fredendall, Lloyd Ralston; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Patton, George Smith, Jr.

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ELINT

See Electronic Intelligence

Ellis, Earl Hancock “Pete” (1880–1923)

U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who laid the foundations for modern amphibious doctrine. Earl Hancock “Pete” Ellis was born in Iuka, Kansas, on December 19, 1880. He enlisted in the Marine Corps as a private in 1900 and in December 1901 was commissioned a second lieutenant. Ellis served at the naval base at Cavite on Luzon during the Philippine-American War and was posted to the West Indies and to Guam before serving as aide to Marine Corps major general Commandant George Barnett.

Ellis was promoted to first lieutenant in 1903 and to captain in 1908. During 1911–1913 he was first a student and then a faculty member at the Naval War College. Ellis became closely associated with Colonel John A. Lejeune in the Philippines in 1908. Promoted to major in 1916, during World War I Ellis served as a principal staff officer to Brigadier General then Major General Lejeune when the latter commanded first the 4th Marine Brigade and then the U.S. Army's 2nd Division in France. Ellis took part in the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives in late 1918. Then a lieutenant colonel, Ellis was awarded the French Croix de Guerre with gold star for exemplary combat service.

Following World War I, Ellis reverted to his permanent rank of major. He served in the Dominican Republic during 1920 with the 4th Marine Brigade and was awarded the Navy Cross.

In the 1920s many, especially army leaders, thought that the Marine Corps was superfluous and wanted it disbanded. But with the belief that Japan and the United States were on a collision course and that defense of the Philippines and war with Japan would necessitate amphibious operations, commandant of the Marine Corps Major General Lejeune saw the future of the corps in such operations and entrusted Major Ellis with the job of translating concepts into concrete plans.

The single-minded Ellis, whose entire life revolved around the corps, immediately plunged into the task, often working on little or no sleep and until physically and mentally exhausted. His work habits, and alcoholism, put him in the hospital with mental breakdowns on more than one occasion.

Because the largest amphibious operation of World War I, the Allied invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula in Turkey in 1915, had been a failure, many observers concluded that assaults of fortified positions from the sea were over. Ellis disagreed, stressing that the key to winning a Pacific war would be base seizure and defense. War with Japan meant that the marines would have to fight their way back across the Pacific, retaking outpost bases. Ellis believed that the marines should prepare to "execute opposed landings and attacks on denial positions … with the greatest rapidity."

By 1921 Ellis had outlined the problems of conducting assaults in the Marshall and Caroline islands, but he was also confident that with proper training the Marine Corps could storm defended beachheads. Opposed landings could succeed if ship-to-shore movement by assault craft was rapid

and supported by concentrated naval gunfire and airpower. Securing the beach would be the key, and Ellis recommended special teams to remove underwater obstacles before the landing. Assault troops would require high-firepower weapons and also new landing craft or amphibious vehicles armed with machine guns and light artillery. Close-in naval gunfire could help neutralize enemy shore positions.

Ellis disagreed with those who advocated night assaults to minimize casualties. He believed that attacks would have to occur in the daytime to minimize confusion. To be successful the assaults would require careful planning, preparation, and coordination. All this was summed up in his "Operations Plan 712-H: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia" (1921). It essentially laid the foundations for U.S. Marine Corps amphibious warfare.

Ellis then submitted an undated resignation to the Marine Corps and embarked on a secret map-making, intelligence-gathering mission to Papua New Guinea. While in Papua, he married a Papuan woman. The Japanese subsequently announced that he had died on the Micronesian island of Koror on May 12, 1923. The mysterious circumstances of his death have led some to conclude that he was assassinated on the orders of Japanese officials, but most probably the cause was alcohol-related and may have been cirrhosis of the liver. The Japanese confiscated his maps and papers. Ellis had provided the doctrine. All that was now required by the Marine Corps was the will to implement it, proper training, and new specialized landing craft.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; United States Marine Corps

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Emilia Plater Independent Women's Battalion (1943–1945)

First Polish all-female combat unit to fight as a cohesive group. Consisting of volunteers forcibly resettled in the Soviet Union and, ironically, named after a leader of an insurrection in 1830 directed against Russia, the Emilia Plater Independent Women's Battalion fought against the Germans. Initially attached to the 1st Tadeusz Ko¥ciuszko Division, the battalion swore the oath of allegiance on July 15, 1943. It was directly subordinated to the Polish I Corps in August 1943 and to the Polish First Army in July 1944. Unlike women's auxiliary units in the West, the battalion lacked special military regulations. Its command personnel were men, and its political officers were women.

In August 1943, the battalion included five companies (two infantry and one each of fusiliers, machine guns, and handheld antitank grenade launchers) and six platoons (mortar, reconnaissance, signals, medical, engineer, and logistics). In late 1943, one transport platoon was added. Because the battalion also provided basic training to women subsequently assigned elsewhere, its strength fluctuated.

Women subsequently trained at the Infantry Officers' School in Ryaza», and they commanded companies and platoons of the new Polish Army because of the drastic shortage of male Polish officers (15,000 had been killed in the Katyn Forest Massacre alone). Among these women was Second Lieutenant Emilia Gierczak, platoon commander of the 10th Infantry Regiment. She distinguished herself in the fighting on the Pomeranian Rampart while leading an assault group in Kołobrzeg (Kolberg).

About 70 women in the battalion died in the war. In May 1945, its strength of roughly 500 women was only a small percentage of the total number of women serving in two Polish armies formed in the Soviet Union, with estimates ranging from 8,500 to 14,000.

KAZIMIERA J. COTTAM

See also

Katyn Forest Massacre; Poland; Poland, Army; Women in World War II

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Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of (November 2, 1943)

Naval battle between U.S. and Japanese naval forces during the November 1, 1943–August 15, 1945, Bougainville Campaign. On November 1, 1943, Major General Alan Hal Turnage’s 3rd Marine Division, which had been reinforced, landed at Empress Augusta Bay, about halfway up the west coast of Bougainville Island in the northern Solomon Islands. The landing was part of Operation CARTWHEEL, which was designed to neutralize the major Japanese air and naval base at Rabaul, on New Britain Island to the north.

In addition to air attacks from Rabaul, which were thwarted by Allied fighter aircraft, the Japanese dispatched a scratch naval task force to attack the Torokina beachhead on Bougainville. Commanded by Rear Admiral Omori Sentaro, the force consisted of the heavy cruisers *Myoko* and *Haguro,* two light cruisers, six destroyers, and five destroyer transports carrying 1,000 troops to be landed on Bougainville. Rear Admiral Ijuin Matsuji commanded Destroyer Squadron 3, the left flank screen with the light cruiser *Sendai* and three destroyers, and Rear Admiral Osugi Morikazu had the right with Destroyer Squadron 10, the light cruiser *Agano* and three destroyers.

The transports turned back late in the evening on November 1 after Omori concluded that the task force had been sighted by U.S. planes. Omori, however, continued to Bougainville with his other ships in the expectation that he could destroy the Allied transports and cargo vessels in a night battle. Unknown to him, the transports had been quickly unloaded and had left Empress Augusta Bay earlier that day.

Learning of Omori’s task force from U.S. Army reconnaissance aircraft, Rear Admiral A. Stanton Merrill, whose Task Force 39 had been providing bombardment support for the Bougainville landing force, moved to intercept the Japanese about 20 miles north of Empress Augusta Bay. Task Force 39 was centered on Merrill’s Cruiser Division 12, consisting of the light cruisers

Montpelier (flagship), *Cleveland, Columbia*, and *Denver*. Captain Arleigh Burke's Destroyer Division 45 made up the van, and Commander B. L. Austin's Destroyer Division 46 comprised the rear. Merrill hoped to engage the Japanese ships at long range to avoid a torpedo attack while making use of his radar-controlled 6-inch guns.

The two task forces encountered each other at 2:27 a.m. on November 2 and fought a complicated battle that was really three engagements in one: Merrill's cruisers against Omori's cruisers and individual battles waged, respectively, by the two destroyer divisions. Although the Japanese were superior in gunfire and torpedoes and although Omori thought he had inflicted serious losses on the Americans, he broke off the battle after an hour, at 3:27 a.m.

Merrill's cruisers sank the Japanese light cruiser *Sendai,* and Destroyer Division 46 sank the Japanese destroyer *Hatsukaze,* which already had been badly damaged in a collision with the cruiser *Myoko,* Omori's flagship. Task Force 39 suffered damage to six ships, most seriously to the destroyer *Foote,* which had its stern blown off by a torpedo. Merrill abandoned pursuit of the Japanese ships at dawn to await the inevitable Japanese air response from Rabaul.

It came at about 8:00 a.m. in the form of 100 Japanese aircraft, which were met by a smaller number of Allied fighters. The Japanese planes inflicted only minor damage, with the cruiser *Montpelier* taking two bomb hits on its starboard catapult. Omori was subsequently relieved of command for failing to carry out his orders.

The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay did not end the Japanese naval threat to the Allied lodgment on Bougainville. The prompt U.S. Navy reaction prevented Japanese disruption of the landing and, along with massive air raids against Rabaul over the next days and the naval battle of Cape St. George on November 25, helped ensure the success of the Bougainville Campaign.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Burke, Arleigh Albert; Cape St. George, Battle of; Ijuin Matsuji; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater

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Engineer Operations

Like earlier conflicts, World War II revealed the multiple roles that military engineering plays in war, both in direct support of combat operations and in engineering and construction activities. The war saw engineering operations on a scale theretofore unrealized.

As it had for centuries, the thrust of military engineering during World War II focused essentially on breaching and building. There are two types of military engineers. The function of construction engineers is construction (building), either vertical or horizontal. The functions of combat engineers are mobility and countermobility, which include far more than simply breaching operations.

Combat engineers engaged in a variety of offensive tasks, such as conducting river-crossing operations, breaching minefields, and countering other enemy defensive measures. They also provided defensive support to combat elements by laying minefields and other obstacles to hamper or channel enemy troop movements; on occasion, they performed the secondary mission of fighting as infantry. Construction engineers were involved in larger and more permanent projects—roads, railroads, airfields, pipelines, depots, camps, training facilities, and other works designed to sustain their nations' war efforts at home and elsewhere.

For the most part, all nations recruited military engineers from the experienced civilian sector whenever possible, but they also counted heavily on induction pools, after which active military engineers trained inductees to needed skill levels. The efforts of the military engineers of belligerent nations other than the United States were considerable, and those engineers also

played key roles in supporting their nations' war aims and fighting forces. Their activities were on a much smaller scale, in terms of both volume and geographic setting, compared with those of U.S. military engineers. In this effort, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was the most important. It conducted operations on a worldwide stage from the Arctic to the tropics in terrain that included jungles, deserts, and mountains.

The Axis Powers

Germany's march to war saw the formation of the Todt Organization in 1933, named for its head, Fritz Todt. Initially, the organization constructed the Third Reich's Autobahn road system and provided the German Army with engineers and construction specialists to support the country's war aims. In 1938, it worked on Germany's West Wall (Siegfried Line) defenses, designed to hold back any French Army attack so that Germany could concentrate its military resources in the east against Poland.

Among its World War II missions, the Todt Organization built and repaired bridges, railroads, dams, airfields, and fortifications as well as factories. It had charge of exploiting the minerals of the Balkans and shipping them to the Reich and assumed responsibility for the reconstruction and maintenance of the Soviet Union's transportation network. The Todt Organization made use of vast numbers of conscript laborers throughout German-occupied Europe, mobilizing almost 1.5 million persons, 80 percent of whom were non-Germans and many of whom were prisoners of war (POWs). The organization's most ambitious task was constructing, together with German Army engineer troops, the Atlantic Wall from Norway to the Bay of Biscay, which constituted the German defenses designed to prevent the Allied invasion of France.

Engineer troops were key elements in the German Army's planning for the September 1, 1939, invasion of Poland as well as Germany's other blitzkrieg campaigns. They were organized into infantry-engineer assault teams in the attacking divisions. German pontoon bridge units and sappers were especially active in offensive operations. Special engineer staffs were established at the army and army group levels to provide technical direction for bridging and other engineer work, including placing captured rail lines back in operation. Defensively, the Germans used extensive minefields in the

fighting in North Africa as well as on the Eastern and Western Fronts, and German sappers were on point in clearing minefields during offensive operations. Typical of German engineering's defensive design prowess, the Normandy beaches provided an imposing array of multiple belts of obstacles (including millions of mines) that were covered at high tide and exposed at low tide as well as extensive minefields inland.

Italian military engineering played a vital role in that nation's invasion of Ethiopia, moving men, equipment, and supplies across difficult terrain. Japan also employed military engineers extensively. Japanese expansion brought about airfield construction and the heavy fortification of occupied areas, and airfields and naval base facilities on Formosa, Truk, and Rabaul were important in supporting Japanese island operations elsewhere in the Pacific. Japanese engineers were also active in defensive operations in the Pacific islands. In addition to constructing beach obstacles, they designed blockhouses, pillboxes, and other defensive works. They utilized reinforced concrete, coral, coconut logs, caves, and tunnels dug into volcanic formations with great effectiveness against bombing, naval gunfire, and infantry assaults in the Marshall, Gilbert, and Solomon Islands as well as at Okinawa and Iwo Jima. The Japanese frequently used forced labor and prisoners of war in these efforts.

Japan's principal supply route to its armies in Burma was the railway across the Dawna Range from Thailand to Burma. In a vast construction effort, the Japanese Army employed thousands of Allied POWs and local nationals. A large number of the workers died when they were forced to hack a path through the jungle, utilizing the most primitive of tools and working with little food and virtually no medical care.

The Allied Powers

In mid-1939 when Adolf Hitler was pressing his territorial demands in Central Europe and the Japanese were already at war in China, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had about 800 officers and 6,000 enlisted men in active service, with eight to nine combat engineer regiments, two engineer squadrons, and a topographic battalion staffed at some 70 percent of authorized strength. During the 1920s and 1930s engineer officers spent most of their time involved in the branch's civil works program in districts that

were aligned geographically with the nation's major watersheds. Regular army engineer officers were limited in their troop experience, but for those in the corps, the large civil works projects and contract construction experiences would stand them and the army in good stead in planning for and meeting the engineering and construction demands during mobilization and the succeeding war years. To support amphibious operations in the war, the army formed six engineer amphibious brigades. Three served in the Pacific, and three operated in Europe (two of these brigades later participated in the March–June 1945 invasion of Okinawa in the Pacific). By the spring of 1945, the engineers numbered more than 500,000 officers and enlisted men, comprising 8 percent of U.S. Army strength.

In January 1941, the Corps of Engineers undertook, in addition to ongoing civil works missions, all construction for the army's war effort, including military as well as industrial projects. The corps oversaw "construction of a wide range of factories, most notably for aircraft and tank assembly and the production of ammunition. Military installations included camps for 3.5 million soldiers, depots, training facilities, ports, and the Pentagon. All told, the wartime mobilization program involved more than 27,000 projects and cost $15.3 billion" (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998). Perhaps the crown jewel for the corps was the Manhattan Project, under the leadership of Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves.

By the summer of 1941, large naval bases were under construction at Guam, Midway, Wake, Pearl Harbor, Iceland, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Trinidad, and many other places, carried out by civilian contractors under the engineering supervision of the navy's Bureau of Yards and Docks. Following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it became impractical to use civilian labor in war zones, and there was a need for a militarized naval construction force to build advance bases in the war zone. This situation resulted in the establishment of the Seabees (whose name was derived from the acronym for "construction battalions," CBs).

The Seabees quickly made their mark, particularly in the Pacific theater but also in the Atlantic theater of operations. They constructed over 400 advanced bases along five strategically important routes beginning in the continental United States. The South Atlantic route went through the Caribbean Sea to Africa, Sicily, and up the Italian Peninsula; the North Atlantic route went through Newfoundland to Iceland, Great Britain, France,

and Germany; the North Pacific route went through Alaska and along the Aleutian Island chain; the Central Pacific route went through the Hawaiian, Marshall, Gilbert, Mariana, and Ryukyu Islands; and the South Pacific route went through the South Sea islands to Samoa, the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. All the Pacific routes converged on the final destination of the Japanese home islands.

The standard Seabee unit was the construction battalion, but special units were formed, such as stevedores and longshoremen as well as maintenance, dredging, trucking, and pontoon assembly. At war's end, the Seabees were organized into 151 regular construction battalions, 39 special construction battalions, 164 construction battalion detachments, 136 construction battalion maintenance units, 5 pontoon assembly detachments, 54 regiments, 12 brigades, and (under various designations) 5 naval construction forces.

In recognition of airpower's impact on modern warfare, the Army Corps of Engineers developed the concept of an engineer aviation regiment to construct airfields that would be needed for any foreign deployment by the army air forces. By the time the war was over, engineer aviation units had built untold numbers of airfields in every theater. Critical to this effort was airfield construction throughout the United States. By mid-1943, the corps had completed some 1,100 domestic military and civil airfield projects. Between 1940 and 1941, engineer aviation units as well as corps districts were involved in construction in Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, Bermuda, and the Azores (the North Atlantic air routes) that provided the means to ferry aircraft to Britain. The South Atlantic air route from Miami, Florida, to the Middle East utilized airfields in the Caribbean, Brazil, and Africa. It began operations in September 1941, and following the U.S. entry into the war, it became the preferred all-weather route to theaters of operation in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and Asia.

Beginning in 1941 in the Middle East, British and U.S. Army engineers constructed a road and rail supply line to the Soviet Union through Iran, including port expansion in the Persian Gulf. This supply route, which provided a steady flow of Lend-Lease aid, was instrumental in the Soviet Union's victory on the Eastern Front. Soviet engineers were masters of minefield operations and accomplished all the usual combat engineer tasks. For example, they built corduroy roads (a roadway built of logs or wood laid

perpendicular to the direction of the road, usually covered with sand or dirt) as alternate means to support frontline troops along the Stalin Line.

In the Allied invasion of Normandy that commenced on June 6, 1944, France saw the result of imaginative Allied planning in the construction, principally by U.S. and British engineers, of Mulberries (artificial harbors) together with bombardons and phoenixes (floating steel and concrete caissons); there were also pier heads—platforms that raised and lowered mechanically with the tide and provided still-water conditions around the clock, enabling supplies and equipment to be moved across the beach to support the advancing troops in the absence of available ports. U.S., British, and Canadian engineers in the initial assault waves cleared routes through minefields and fought as infantry to secure avenues of advance through the German positions overlooking the beaches. As combat moved inland, Allied engineers rehabilitated damaged port facilities, such as that at Le Havre, and repaired the railroads as well as the roads and bridges to enable supplies to move from other French and Belgian ports to the front.

In the Pacific, U.S. Army and Canadian engineers built the 1,450-mile Alaska-Canada (ALCAN) Highway, which went through British Columbia and the Yukon Territory to Alaska as a counter to potential Japanese control of the North Pacific; it was completed in November 1942. The airplane played a vital role in the Pacific campaigns, where existing facilities were few, and engineers carved airfields out of jungle and coral. In the Mariana Islands, for example, they provided bases for the Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers to conduct the strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands and drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The U.S. Pacific strategy called for an abundance of facilities (in addition to airfields) that did not exist, such as ports, huge logistical depots, camps, and roads. American engineers, both army and navy, provided the needed military infrastructure that the island-hopping Pacific campaigns demanded. The engineering effort was so important that Southwest Pacific theater commander General Douglas MacArthur, himself a serving engineer officer for many years, referred to the fighting in his theater as an engineer’s war.

In the China-Burma-India theater, the Burma (Ledo) Road was another joint Allied engineering project. After the Japanese capture of Rangoon in March 1942 cut off the last Allied land route to China, the British and Americans developed a plan to build a new resupply route from Assam,

India, across northern Burma to a junction with the old Burma Road. U.S. Army engineers, together with Chinese and Indian labor, began construction in December 1942, crossing 430 miles of jungle, mountains, and rivers. The road was formally completed on May 20, 1945, the longest invasion pipeline ever built.

Not to be overlooked, the U.S. Corps of Engineers' long-standing civil works responsibility to develop, operate, and maintain the inland waterway system played a key role in the war effort within the United States. Barge traffic carried petroleum products and other strategic materials. The improved waterways of the Mississippi River system provided a highway for thousands of vessels, including the destroyer escorts, submarines, frigates, minesweepers, landing craft, and small cargo vessels that would be built at inland shipyards, thus enabling the large coastal shipyards to focus on building the larger combatant and merchant vessels.

Military engineering was a vital component of the war effort on both sides. Without doubt, engineering operations, particularly those of the United States, played an important role in the Allied victory in the war.

C. ERNEST EDGAR III

See also

Alaska-Canadian Highway; Atlantic Wall; Burma Road; Groves, Leslie Richard; Hitler, Adolf; Lend-Lease; MacArthur, Douglas; Manhattan Project; Mulberries; Okinawa, Invasion of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Todt, Fritz

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England, U.S. Navy Destroyer Escort

A Buckley-class destroyer escort credited with sinking six submarines, the most of any U.S. warship during World War II. USS *England* (DE-635) was built at Bethlehem Shipbuilding, San Francisco, and commissioned on December 10, 1943. It was of flush-deck design with a high, open bridge. The *England* was 306 feet in overall length with a beam of 37 feet. Its turboelectric power plant was capable of driving it at 24 knots. It was armed with 3 3-inch single guns, 1 1.1-inch quadruple machine cannon, 8 (later 10) 20mm guns, 2 21-inch torpedo tubes, 8 depth charge launchers, 2 depth charge racks, and a British-designed Hedgehog ASW mortar.

The *England* arrived in the Pacific war zone in March 1944, and in May it was assigned to a hunter-killer group ordered to intercept a Japanese submarine scouting line, revealed through U.S. code breaking, north of the Admiralty Islands. During May 19–31, the *England* sank five submarines (the *I-16*, *RO-106*, *RO-104*, *RO-116*, and *RO-108*) with hedgehog patterns and administered the hedgehog coup de grace to a sixth (the *RO-105*), shattering Japanese attempts to reconnoiter U.S. movements in the Central Pacific. For this achievement, the *England* received a Presidential Unit Citation.

The *England* returned to convoy duty throughout the balance of 1944 and into early 1945 until assigned to Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa (March–June 1945). While patrolling off Kerama Retto on May 10, 1945, the *England* was struck by a kamikaze, which killed 37 men. After receiving temporary repairs, it steamed to the United States. Plans to convert it into a high-speed transport were canceled; the ship was decommissioned on October 15, 1945, and sold for scrap.

BRUCE HAMPTON FRANKLIN

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Depth Charges; Destroyer Escorts and Frigates; Destroyers; Hedgehog; Hunter-Killer Groups; Kamikaze; Okinawa,

Invasion of; United States Navy

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English Channel

A shallow sea, part of the Atlantic Ocean, that separates France and Great Britain and connects the Atlantic with the North Sea. The French refer to the English Channel as La Manche (The Sleeve). The waterway is approximately 350 miles long. Its width varies from about 150 miles at its widest point to just 21 miles at the Strait of Dover, which separates Dover, England, from Calais, France. In all, the English Channel encompasses some 29,000 square miles.

The boundary of the Channel begins at Land's End to the far west (southwestern England) and stretches to the Strait of Dover to the east. Water depth is relatively shallow, averaging about 350 feet. The deepest point is an underwater trough known as Hurds Deep, about 30 miles northwest of the Isle of Guernsey, where the water is approximately 600 feet deep. There are numerous islands located within the Channel, the most significant of which are the Isle of Wight and the Channel Islands.

The English Channel is strategically significant because it controls ingress and egress to the North Sea and has long borders along southern England and northern France. Indeed, control of the English Channel could easily serve as a blockade of much of Western Europe.

Tides and currents within the English Channel can be treacherous and are subject to frequent changes of direction and intensity, depending upon weather conditions. This makes the waterway a particularly challenging one to navigate. Tidal ranges between low and high tides can be extreme, as high as 42 feet in some locations during the spring equinox. Westerly winds prevail, and gales—some of which rise suddenly and can be highly destructive—are frequent occurrences, particularly from October to February.

The frequency of gales is at its low ebb during May to July, which explains in part why the Allies chose to launch the 1944 Normandy Invasion on June 6. Some of these storms and squalls can reach the intensity of low-level hurricanes.

The English Channel played a pivotal role in World War II. It saw numerous attacks on ports along the Channel as well as German attacks on civilian shipping. German submarine activity remained high, and for much of the conflict the waterway proved too dangerous for surface ships. Realizing that the Allies would have to mount an invasion of France via the English Channel to dislodge them from French soil, the Germans erected stout defenses along France's northern and western coasts. During most of the war, the Germans occupied the Channel Islands, the only part of the British Commonwealth to be controlled by Germany. In June 1944, the Allies launched Operation OVERLORD—the invasion of Normandy via the English Channel. Today, France and England are connected via tunnels under the Channel that link Folkestone and Calais.

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See also

Dieppe Raid; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for

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Enigma Machine

The Enigma was an encoding machine invented by a German, Dr. Arthur Scherbius. He demonstrated it at the 1923 International Postal Congress as a commercial encoding device. The Enigma resembled a typewriter in appearance and had a series of rotors or wheels, the settings of which could

be changed. Early versions of the device enabled the operator to encode a plain text in any of 150 million possible ways. An operator with a second Enigma machine identical to the sending machine read the encoded radio message and decoded it. Settings were changed regularly according to a prearranged schedule to confound any interception and decoding.

The Germans sought a secure means of military communications, and they assumed that messages encoded by Enigma were unbreakable. By 1928 the German military was using the Enigma machine. Japan and Italy also bought and utilized it. Other countries, such as the United States, purchased the Enigma but did not attempt to unlock its secrets.

The Poles, concerned about a resurgent Germany as a threat to their own security, in 1928 formed a special cryptography group at the University of Poznan. They also purchased the commercial model of Enigma, and by 1935 they had broken into the German radio codes, information that they largely shared with the British and French in 1938. Late that same year, however, the Germans added a sixth rotor, which helped to convince the Poles that the Germans were about to make an aggressive military move. The Poles modified their own machines to keep up with the German advances and continued to break into the German codes, but the defeat of their country in September 1939 came too quickly for Enigma to be of utility to them.

On the defeat of Poland, the Polish code breakers and their machines were spirited out to France and to England. At Bletchley Park outside of Buckingham, the British assembled a mixed group of experts to continue the work begun by the Poles, and over time they developed additional devices that could sort through the possible variations of an encoded text, although the Enigma's changeable settings meant that most messages could not be read in real time. Intelligence gathered from Enigma traffic was given the code name Ultra.

The Germans continued throughout the war to make refinements to the Enigma machine. Secure in their belief that its messages could not be read, they continued to rely on Enigma throughout the war. Obviously, land-line communication was even more secure, and Adolf Hitler's proscription on radio communication concerning the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes Offensive) and Allied complacency led to its concealment from the Allies until the attack began. One of the great myths of the war, however, was that British prime minister Winston Churchill knew

from Ultra intercepts that the Germans intended to bomb the city of Coventry but did not act to prevent it for fear of making the Germans aware of the successful code-breaking operation.

Ultra intelligence proved invaluable in the Allied military effort on a variety of fronts and undoubtedly shortened the war. Information on Ultra was not made public until 1974, when Group Captain Frederick William Winterbotham published *The Ultra Secret.* Its revelations forced the rewriting of many earlier histories of the war.

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See also

Bletchley Park; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Counterintelligence; Electronic Intelligence; Signals Intelligence

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Eniwetok, Capture of (February 17–22, 1944)

Eniwetok Atoll lies on the northwestern edge of the Ralik chain in the Marshall Islands, some 2,000 miles west of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Thirty small islands comprise this coral atoll, mostly on the western edge of a circular lagoon. The three major islands are Eniwetok to the south, Parry to the southeast, and Engebi to the north. Following the capture of islands in the Gilbert chain in November 1943, U.S. vice admiral Raymond A. Spruance took command of operations against the Marshalls.

Because of the rapid success in securing Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls, American planners decided to proceed with Operation CATCHPOLE to take Eniwetok. The assault force of just under 8,000 men centered on the 22nd Marine Regiment and soldiers of the army's 27th Infantry Division and attached troops. Brigadier General Thomas Eugene Watson was in overall command, with Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill commanding the landing group. Unlike assaults in the Gilberts, adequate numbers of LVTs (landing vehicles, tracked) were available, and this operation saw the first extensive use of the

DUKW amphibious trucks. Initially, fewer than 60 naval personnel defended Eniwetok Atoll, but on January 4, Major General Nishida Yoshimi's 1st Amphibious Brigade, a veteran fighting unit, arrived, bringing total Japanese strength on the atoll to nearly 3,500 men.

The Eniwetok Expeditionary Group sortied from Kwajalein Lagoon on February 15, covering the 326 miles to Eniwetok by two different routes. Engebi was the main U.S. objective because it had the atoll's only airfield. Including soldiers of the 27th Infantry Division and attached units, there were fewer than 8,000 men in the assault force. The invasion began at 8:44 a.m. on February 17, 1944, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 22nd Marine Regiment, landing on the southeastern beach. The attackers were supported by medium tanks of the 2nd Separate Tank Company. Initial Japanese resistance was light, and the only organized resistance occurred near Skunk Point. By 2:50 p.m., the island was declared secured, although mopping up continued into February 18.

Operations against Parry and Eniwetok Islands would be more difficult. At 7:19 a.m. on February 19, U.S. naval gunfire pounded Eniwetok Island, which was defended by 808 Japanese troops. The fire expended was minimal compared with that on the other islands, and few Japanese positions were damaged. At 9:17 a.m., the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the army's 106th Infantry Regiment landed. Things went badly from the start. The terrain prevented many of the LVTs from moving inland, and the Japanese covered the beach with automatic weapon and mortar fire.

At midday on February 19, the Japanese launched a spirited counterattack with 300 to 400 men. The 106th was able to defeat the counterattack but at heavy cost. Shortly after 12:00 p.m., the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, was committed but failed to influence the course of the battle. An hour later, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines, was ordered ashore and directed to support the army's left flank. That night, the American units completed the capture of the western edge of the island and consolidated a defensive line near the beach.

The battle to secure the eastern side of Eniwetok was similar to the western battles. The 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, landed on Yellow Beach 1 beginning at 9:17 a.m. on February 19. Many of the Japanese beach defenses had been destroyed by naval gunfire, but once they were inland, the attackers were delayed by bunkers, pillboxes, and spider holes. Supported by carrier aircraft, the attacking troops secured the island on February 21.

Parry Island was defended by 1,347 Japanese. Fortunately for the attackers, prisoner interviews and intelligence material captured on Engebi and Eniwetok revealed the Japanese defensive positions and provided U.S. planners a framework for a detailed preinvasion bombardment. Beginning at 10:00 p.m. on February 20 and continuing until the landing two days later, the battleships *Tennessee, Pennsylvania,* and *Colorado,* assisted by two heavy cruisers, pounded the island. Aircraft from three escort carriers also joined the assault.

Beginning at 9:08 a.m. on February 22, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 22nd Marines, landed abreast and were met by Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire at the water's edge. At 10:00 a.m. the Japanese opened up with 77mm field guns, which were quickly silenced by naval gunfire. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines, went ashore. The marines fought to the ocean side of the island and then formed two lines. Each line battled to the opposite end of the island. By 7:30 p.m. that day, Parry was declared secure.

The battles to capture Eniwetok Atoll were the last major battles of the Eastern Mandates Campaign. Although planners expected this effort to be easy, stiff Japanese resistance from well-prepared positions slowed the progress of the U.S. forces. American casualties were 195 killed or missing and 521 wounded. Of the total Japanese force of some 3,431 men, only 64 prisoners were taken. No American ships were lost during the operation, although there was some damage from friendly fire. No Japanese surface ships contested the landing, but four submarines were sunk, along with a number of small supply ships and patrol craft.

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See also

Kwajalein, Battle for; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Spruance, Raymond Ames

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Escape and Evasion

Efforts of uniformed military personnel to return to friendly forces after being captured by the enemy or to avoid capture when isolated in enemy-controlled territory. The Geneva Convention defined an evader as an uncaptured military member, isolated in enemy territory, trying to find his way back to friendly control. Under the convention, he was a legal combatant, subject to being interned by a neutral country for the war's duration; an escapee who had been captured, had escaped, and had then evaded was regarded as a noncombatant who could be returned home.

Escape and evasion (E&E) and related activities became a major focus of British and then American intelligence organizations early in the war. Escaped prisoners of war (POWs) and returned evaders could serve as intelligence assets, morale boosters for friendly forces, and a nuisance to the enemy, who would have to divert troops from normal duties to look for them. The British MI-9, established in 1939, and the American MIS-X, begun in 1942, each supported essentially the same E&E-related mission.

Both Allied units functioned in strict secrecy while providing training and E&E kits for servicemen whose missions made them particularly susceptible to capture. MI-9 and MIS-X were also involved in interrogating enemy POWs and maintaining clandestine networks of agents in Axis-occupied territory to assist evaders in reaching home. They built an impressive array of covert devices designed to help with E&E, including compasses built into uniform buttons, hacksaws hidden in shoelaces, and clandestine radios concealed in baseballs.

The Allied covert E&E networks in Europe and the Far East eventually assisted in returning to Allied control more than 35,000 officers and enlisted men who might otherwise have spent the remainder of the war behind barbed wire or never returned at all. By 1944, MI-9 ran four different escape lines in France alone, returning hundreds of Allied aircrews at tremendous cost to the French Resistance. Similarly, American agents in China organized "safe

areas" in extremely difficult terrain, despite Japanese occupation. Official efforts notwithstanding, an escapee's initiative, courage, and simple luck all played important roles.

One of the most famous escapes of the war was that organized by the prisoner escape committee in Germany's Stalag Luft III at Sagan, Poland. In this "Great Escape," 76 Allied POWs escaped in one night. Adolf Hitler later ordered 50 of the recaptured POWs shot. Despite terrible circumstances, many POWs considered it their duty to escape and continued trying to do so throughout the war.

World War II E&E laid the groundwork for current Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) programs in the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), designed to help future escapees and evaders "return with honor."

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See also

Office of Strategic Services; Prisoners of War; Special Operations Executive

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Essex Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers

Essex-class aircraft carriers formed the major carrier element of the U.S. Navy task forces in the Pacific theater during World War II and served well into the postwar period. Part of the Two-Ocean Navy building program passed by Congress in 1940 and the first U.S. aircraft carriers to be built freed from post–World War I naval treaties restrictions, these ships were essentially improved and enlarged versions of the Yorktown-class carriers. They boasted improved underwater protection, enhanced antiaircraft

armament, an improved power plant, more powerful catapults, and a second armored deck on the hangar-deck level to prevent enemy armor-piercing bombs from passing into the ship's vitals below.

The fourth U.S. warship to bear that name, the *Essex* (CV-9) was laid down at the Newport News Shipbuilding Company on April 28, 1941; launched on July 31, 1942; and commissioned on December 31, 1942. Twenty-six Essex-class ships were ordered, but only 24 were commissioned (the *Reprisal* [CV-35] and *Iwo Jima* [CV-46] were never completed). Other Essex-class carriers included the *Yorktown* (CV-10), *Intrepid* (CV-11), *Hornet* (CV-12), *Franklin* (CV-13), *Ticonderoga* (CV-14), *Randolph* (CV-15), *Lexington* (CV-16), *Bunker Hill* (CV-17), *Wasp* (CV-18), *Hancock* (CV-19), *Bennington* (CV-20), and *Boxer* (CV-21). The Essex class was the largest class of capital ships ever built, at least in modern times.

The *Essex* displaced 27,208 tons at standard load and 34,881 tons at full load. It was 820 feet in overall length and 93 feet in beam (147 feet 6 inches in maximum width on the flight deck). It had a top speed of 32.7 knots. The ship's armor belt was 2.5 to 4 inches, and hangar deck armor was 2.5 inches. Although armament for the class varied somewhat, the *Essex* had 12 5-inch guns (4 more than the Yorktown-class ships) as well as 32 40mm and 46 20mm antiaircraft guns. It could carry 91 aircraft (later upgrade allowing it to carry 100) and a crew of 2,682.

The *Essex* and others of its class spent most of World War II supporting the U.S. campaigns in the Pacific. For the *Essex*, these included Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Peleliu, Leyte, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, during which time it weathered three typhoons and numerous air attacks. In late October 1944, while covering the Leyte landings, it was struck by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft on the port edge of its flight deck and suffered extensive damage as well as 16 killed and 44 wounded. In December, following quick repairs, it rejoined the Third Fleet off Luzon. Returning to the United States in September 1945, it was deactivated on January 9, 1947.

With the Korean War of 1950–1953, the *Essex* and some of its class were renovated, receiving new and better antiaircraft armaments, hydraulic catapults for jet aircraft, and new jet-capable arresting gear. In the upgrade, the *Essex* received a new deck and a streamlined island superstructure. Recommissioned in January 1951, it served effectively during the Korean War supporting United Nations Command ground forces and launching air

strikes against North Korea. On October 1, 1952, the *Essex* was reclassified CVA-9.

Undergoing a second overhaul at Bremerton Navy Yard from July 1955 to January 1956, the *Essex* received a new hydraulic/steam catapult and an angled flight deck. During 1956–1957, it served with the Pacific Fleet. Transferred to the Mediterranean, it supported the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958. In March 1960, the *Essex* was converted into an antisubmarine support carrier. Redesignated CVS-9, it operated from Quonset Point, Rhode Island, as the flagship of Carrier Division 18 and Anti-Submarine Carrier Group 3. It was decommissioned to reserve status on June 30, 1969, and designated for disposal on June 1, 1973. The last Essex-class ship stricken was the *Lexington*, which continued in service until the 1990s as CVT-16 at Pensacola, Florida. The Essex-class carriers *Intrepid* and *Yorktown* are today preserved as museum ships.

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See also

Aircraft Carriers; Kamikaze; Leyte Landings; Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers; United States Navy

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Esteva, Jean-Pierre (1880–1951)

French Navy admiral and colonial administrator in North Africa. Born in Reims, France, on September 14, 1880, Jean-Pierre Esteva entered the École Naval in 1908 and was commissioned an ensign in 1903. He then held a number of assignments aboard ships in the Far East and the Mediterranean. When World War I began, Esteva was a professor of navigation in the cruiser

school's ship *Jeanne d'Arc* and participated in the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign, during which he was wounded. He then commanded an antisubmarine vessel. In 1918, he was promoted to lieutenant commander and named an ordnance officer.

In September 1919 Esteva was promoted to commander, and the next year he attended the École Supérieure de la Marine. In 1922 and 1923 he commanded a cruiser in the Far East. Promoted to captain in 1924, he commanded a cruiser in the Mediterranean Squadron. In 1927, he was named deputy head of naval aviation. Promoted to rear admiral in 1929, Esteva held a succession of commands, including that of French naval forces in the Far East in 1935. Promoted to vice admiral in February 1935 and full admiral in May 1937, he was inspector general of the French Navy. In September 1937, Esteva was appointed admiral south—that is, commander of French naval forces in the Mediterranean at Toulon.

With the beginning of World War II, Esteva worked closely with his British counterpart, Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham. Under the threat of Italy's entry into the war, Esteva moved his headquarters to Bizerte in French North Africa in May 1940. Although initially eager to continue fighting Italian forces, he acquiesced, albeit reluctantly, in France's June 1940 armistice arrangements with Germany and Italy and supported the Vichy government. Appointed resident general of the North African French protectorate of Tunisia, a strategically critical area further complicated by the growing strength of Arab nationalism, the politically inexperienced Esteva initially tried to maintain neutrality in the face of both Allied and Axis demands.

Despite his personal detestation of German and Italian meddling in North Africa, Esteva reluctantly permitted the limited Axis passage of military supplies through Tunisia to General Erwin Rommel's forces. In early November 1942, however, following the November 8 Anglo-American landings (Operation TORCH) in North Africa, he followed Vichy orders and permitted the landing of German and Italian troops, equipment, and aircraft at Tunis and Bizerte, canceling orders by his colleague Admiral Louis Derrien that French troops should welcome the Americans but forcibly oppose any Axis landing. This vacillation also permitted German forces to capture those vessels of the French Mediterranean fleet in Bizerte harbor.

When Allied forces neared Tunis in May 1943, the Germans flew Esteva

back to France, where he was placed on the list of inactive officers. After the liberation of Paris in June 1944, he became the first French military commander arrested for collaboration, charged with failure to resist the Germans in 1942. In September 1944, he was dishonorably dismissed from the navy and his pension rights were revoked. Six months later, the High Court of Justice sentenced him to "military degradation" and life imprisonment. Esteva remained in prison until August 1950, when he was released for health reasons. He died at Reims on January 11, 1951.

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See also

Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; France, Navy; Juin, Alphonse Pierre; Noguès, Charles Auguste Paul; TORCH, Operation

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Estonia

Small Baltic state bordered by the Gulf of Finland to the north, the Baltic Sea to the west, Latvia to the south, and Russia to the west. Estonia had a 1939 population of approximately 1.134 million. Estonia received its independence as a consequence of World War I but feared both Germany, because of dispossessed German landowners, and Russia. On February 2, 1920, however, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic recognized Estonia as an independent country. The Estonian government in Tallinn subsequently negotiated nonaggression pacts with the Soviet Union in June 1932 and Germany in June 1939. In 1939, the country was ruled by the nationalist

Peasant Party, headed by Konstantin Päts. Estonia was a member of the League of Nations.

Another nonaggression pact, this one between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939, proved to be Estonia's downfall. Arrangements under this pact consigned the country to Soviet influence. After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Soviet Union increasingly encroached on Estonian sovereignty. On September 28, Estonian officials reluctantly signed a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, which allowed the Soviets to station troops and establish naval and air bases on Estonian soil.

By June 17, 1940, Estonia was occupied by Soviet troops, and the process of Sovietization began. Soviet officials then managed, through coercion and violence, to secure the election of favorable candidates to the legislature, which then voted to make Estonia a Soviet republic. On August 6, 1940, the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic was formally admitted to the Soviet Union. The Estonian government also nationalized industry and large banks and collectivized land. It also imposed censorship and restructured the schools. The Soviet regime dealt brutally with any opposition, executing more than 2,000 Estonians and deporting 19,000 others to isolated areas of the Soviet Union.

Adolf Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941 brought the German occupation of Estonia. German troops were on Estonian soil by July 5, 1941, and they controlled the majority of the country by August. Stiff resistance by Soviet troops in northern Estonia devastated the region.

German efforts to recruit an Estonian Schutzstaffel (SS) division had only limited success, as did attempts to convince Estonians to volunteer for labor in Germany. German racial policies also impacted Estonia: the vast majority of the country's small Jewish population was murdered. The Germans requisitioned much of Estonia's food and livestock, causing great hardship among the Estonian population. German occupation forces also maintained the strict control over industry and land that had been imposed by the Soviets.

The westward advance of the Soviet army in February 1944 again turned Estonia into a battleground, and tens of thousands of Estonians fled to Western Europe. During the war, the country lost approximately 20 percent of its prewar population. After the war, Soviet officials deported some 31,000 others suspected of opposition to communist rule. This loss of population was

made up by an influx of more than 500,000 Soviet citizens. Estonia did not regain its independence until August 1991.

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See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

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Euthanasia, Nazi Program

Euthanasia normally refers to the inducement of death at the request of, or with the consent of, someone who is chronically or terminally ill. The Nazi euthanasia program did not comply with this accepted definition of euthanasia, however. Rather, in Germany "euthanasia" was used as a cover to commit murder. The Nazi euthanasia program, known as T-4, took its name from the address of the building where the program's offices were housed, Tiergartenstrasse 4, in central Berlin.

The T-4 program was a part of the Nazi government's centralized public health administration established under the Law for the Consolidation of the Health System, which went into effect on July 3, 1934. The T-4 program evolved out of racial and bureaucratic initiatives that first legalized forced sterilization of the mentally and physically disabled under the July 14, 1933, Law for the Prevention of Progeny with Hereditary Diseases. While this law did not establish the euthanasia program, it legalized euthanasia sterilization of parties deemed likely to produce "diseased progeny." In May 1938 following a personal request from a German father to Chancellor Adolf Hitler that his deformed child's life be mercifully ended, Doctor Karl Brandt, of the notorious Schutzstaffel (SS), was sent to assess the case with the authority to end the child's life if he deemed it in the public interest. Brandt carried out the father's request.

Several months later, sensing a greater need to institutionalize such a program, Brandt teamed with Philipp Bouhler, head of the Reich Chancellery, to form an ad hoc group known as the Reich Committee for the Scientific Registration of Serious Hereditarily and Congenitally Based Illness. This group collected reports of deformed births and forwarded them to one of three pediatricians, who determined whether or not the child would live. In communicating their assessments, the pediatricians marked the top of the report with either a red plus sign if the child was to die or a blue minus sign if the child was to survive. The children who received a positive mark were transferred to a special pediatric clinic, where they were killed. There are indications that Hitler was interested in clearing hospital beds for wounded soldiers by mid-1939; he had made several comments to that effect earlier.

After the start of World War II, in October 1939 Hitler formally established an adult euthanasia program administrated by Bouhler and his deputy, Viktor Brack. It was at this point that the euthanasia program was given its code name T-4. An assessment process similar to the children's program was implemented, with projected 65,000–70,000 killings to be administered annually. Careful attention was given to the program's administration so that there were few traces of its existence. Physicians used false names, and a bogus transportation company was established to transfer the patients to the designated death asylums located in five remote communities: Grafeneck, Sonnenstein, Brandenburg, Hadamar, and Bernberg.

Once inside the asylums, the victims received a medical examination, had their photo taken, and were killed by injection, deliberate overdoses, or, for children especially, starvation. Later the standard procedure was death in either a gas chamber disguised as a shower room or in a van, where the victims were subjected to carbon monoxide poisoning. The Nazis then burned the corpses in a crematorium. The victims' families received a deceiving string of letters beginning with one outlining their loved one's safe transfer, followed by a notice of condolence regarding the sudden or unexpected death of the individual. According to the letters, those victims with prior medical complications usually suffered sudden death resulting from the condition. Other victims were said to have died of illnesses with unrecognizable symptoms.

It is important to note that German euthanasia was not based on any kind of benevolent concern for an individual's condition. Rather, it was based on Nazi ideology that crudely and bizarrely identified racial hierarchies and genetics founded not in science but rather in pseudoscience that bolstered Nazi ideology. It should be noted, however, that many countries, including the United States, carried out sterilization programs based on the same pseudoscience. Furthermore, euthanasia was seen strictly as the purview of the state. Individuals were to have no say in which persons lived or died. That decision was to be made exclusively by the government in an effort to purge all "impure" elements from society.

The program's secrecy did not last. The entire program became the source of public debate and outcry on August 3, 1941. In a sermon delivered that day, Catholic bishop of Münster Cardinal Clemens August Count von Galen denounced the euthanasia program on the grounds of "inhumanity." Copies of the sermon were widely distributed, forcing Hitler to abandon the program. By the time the euthanasia program officially ended on August 24, 1941, 70,273 patients had been subjected to involuntary extermination.

Despite Hitler's public order to end the euthanasia programs, it continued surreptitiously. What began as a request for mercy from a disfigured child's father evolved into a systematic program of extermination. It is estimated that over 160,000 people died in the Nazi euthanasia program, most of them in the concentration camps.

STEPHEN BURGESS-WHITING

See also

Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust

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F

Fair Employment Act, U.S.

Executive order signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 25, 1941, that forbade racial discrimination among defense industries that received federal contracts. Executive Order 8802 created the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), which was empowered to investigate complaints related to discrimination in defense-related hiring. The committee would also recommend corrective or punitive action against employers who violated the spirit of the order. It is important to note that neither the Fair Employment Act nor the FEPC had any jurisdiction over companies or employers involved in non–defense-related work.

In technical terms, the act was not a piece of legislation passed by Congress; Roosevelt in all likelihood would not have been able to persuade Congress to pass such a law at that time. Instead, he acted by issuing an executive order, arguing that such a step was essential for preparing the United States for war. The act was the first step ever taken at the federal level to address discrimination in the United States.

In reality, however, Roosevelt's action was not taken solely on his own initiative. In early 1941, several African American labor leaders—including A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Walter White, executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); and Mary McLeod Bethune, minority affairs director of the National Youth League—met with the president to express their concern about employment discrimination toward African Americans in defense industries. They also urged the president to desegregate the U.S. armed forces. Roosevelt was initially noncommittal, although he privately acknowledged the group's concerns.

When it appeared that Roosevelt was not prepared to act, Randolph began planning a massive march on Washington during the summer of 1941 in which thousands of African Americans would descend upon Washington and

protest for their employment rights. Randolph and others also engineered a highly effective publicity campaign, which put considerable pressure on Roosevelt to act. Even First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt inserted herself into events, meeting with the march's organizers and urging her husband to accede to African American demands because it was the right thing to do.

Roosevelt narrowly averted the march by issuing his executive order, although he knew that he would face a storm of controversy if he attempted to desegregate the armed forces at the same time. Randolph agreed to cancel the march, although he continued in private to counsel the president to deal with discrimination in the armed forces. Desegregation of the armed forces would not be implemented until 1948.

The FEPC, which began its operations in the summer of 1941, included various African Americans, labor leaders, and industry representatives and several at-large "public" members. It operated within the Office of Production Management. Although the committee was not entirely successful in eliminating all discrimination in defense industries, its existence buoyed the hopes of many African Americans who hoped to find better-paying factory jobs in the North and Midwest.

It is estimated that between 1941 and 1945, some 1.5 million African Americans moved from the South to the North, West, and Midwest, the largest internal migration in American history. African Americans made up 3 percent of the workforce in defense plants in 1942; by 1945, that number had increased to 8 percent. It is important to note, however, that African Americans were not usually paid the same amount of money as whites for the same work, and their access to jobs was still quite limited. Most were not, for example, given supervisory or managerial positions, regardless of their experience or talent.

In 1943, Roosevelt increased the FEPC's budget to allow it to investigate more discrimination claims; the committee's part-time staff also became a full-time one. In 1946, about a year after Roosevelt's death and with the war over, the FEPC was disbanded because Congress refused to continue funding it. Two years later, President Harry S. Truman tried to persuade Congress to fund a permanent FEPC, pass an antilynching law, and eliminate the poll tax, but his efforts were rebuffed, chiefly by white southerners in Congress. Truman did, however, issue an executive order in 1948 that called for the desegregation of the armed forces, which would not be fully implemented

until the early 1950s. Roosevelt's initial order also set the stage for Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Executive Order 11246 of 1965, which put into place permanent antidiscrimination policies for all government contractors.

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See also

African Americans in World War II; Randolph, Asa Philip; Roosevelt, Anna Eleanor; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Document 96; Document 150

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Falaise-Argentan Pocket (August 1944)

Failed attempt of Allied forces in France to trap a significant portion of retreating German forces. During July 25–31, 1944, U.S. Operation COBRA broke the monthlong stalemate in Normandy and shattered the German defensive lines, creating a war of movement. Third Army commander Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. envisioned a drive on the Seine River and the liberation of Paris, but a politically less dramatic and strategically more important opportunity soon developed: trapping German forces west of the Seine. If this could be accomplished, the Allied advance east to Germany would be greatly eased and the war shortened.

On August 7, 1944, German forces counterattacked with elements of four panzer divisions at the express order of Adolf Hitler and against the recommendation of Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge, commander of Army Group B and commander in chief, west. Kluge was convinced that the attack was doomed from the start. It would drive German forces into the heart of the planned Allied envelopment. Unfortunately for the Allies, it did slow the Canadian push to Falaise.

At this point, however, Allied planning began to break down. Patton suggested a deeper envelopment that would net all the Germans west of the Seine. However, his superior, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, rejected this and insisted on a shorter hook. On August 10, Patton then turned units north from Le Mans, and by August 12 he had taken Alençon. The speed of Patton's movements surprised all concerned. The opportunity to close the Falaise Pocket seemed in the offing.

Excluding forces in the Brittany Peninsula, there were then some 350,000 German troops west of the Seine. About half were caught in the Falaise Pocket, their only route of escape the 15-mile-wide Falaise gap. If Allied forces could close this, the envelopment would be complete.

With success apparently in hand, the cautious Bradley ordered Patton to hold at Argentan. Officially, this was to avoid a chance head-on meeting between the two converging Allied armies. But Bradley was clearly concerned about Patton's willingness to leave his flanks open. Patton regarded the risk as both limited and worth taking. Continued slow movement by British and Canadian forces from the north left the pocket open. Allied ineptness, more than German courage and skill, was the primary reason the trap was not closed in time.

Primary responsibility for this failure rests with Bradley, 21st Army Group commander General Bernard L. Montgomery, and supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Bradley wanted to take no chances, and Eisenhower preferred to let his subordinates work out operational and tactical decisions on their own. Eisenhower failed to step in and bring the three competing generals—Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton—to consensus or to order a common plan. Montgomery failed to push his subordinate commanders hard enough, but there were also logistical problems. Other Allied military leaders, including commander of the British Second Army Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey, Canadian First Army commander Lieutenant General Henry Crerar, and Free French 2nd Armored Division commander Major General Jacques Leclerc, contributed to the disjointed nature of the Allied operation. A subsequent proposal by Patton to turn from his drive to the east and make a deeper envelopment was slow to reach Bradley, who ultimately rejected it.

Operation COBRA and the Falaise-Argentan Pocket, 1944



U.S. soldiers pose in front of a wrecked German tank at Chambois, France, the last German stronghold in the Falaise Gap area, August 20, 1944. (National Archives)

In the Falaise Pocket, the Germans lost approximately 200 tanks, 300 heavy guns, 700 artillery pieces, 5,000 vehicles, and a great many carts and horses. But German personnel losses were considerably less than hoped for—no more than 10,000 killed and 50,000 captured. Some 115,000 well-trained German troops escaped the pocket. More important, almost all of the key higher level staff managed to get out, which made it possible for the Germans to reconstitute their devastated units faster than the Allies believed possible.

In all, 240,000 German soldiers crossed the Seine in the last week of August and established a solid defensive line protecting the western approaches to Germany. The Allied Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26), a combined-arms assault to cross the lower Rhine River into Germany, was stymied by German units that had escaped from Normandy.

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See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; COBRA, Operation; Eisenhower, Dwight David; France Campaign; Free French; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Leclerc, Jacques Philippe; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.

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Falkenhorst, Nikolaus von (1885–1968)

German Army general. Born as Nikolaus von Jastrzembski on January 17, 1885, in Breslau, Germany, Nikolaus von Falkenhorst was commissioned in a West Prussian infantry regiment in 1904. In 1911, the family changed its name to Falkenhorst. During World War I, Falkenhorst served on the Western Front, but he spent the last months of the conflict in the German expedition to Finland. He remained in the Reichswehr after the war and served in the War Ministry from 1925 to 1927. Colonel Falkenhorst was German military attaché in Prague, Belgrade, and Budapest in the mid-1930s. He then commanded a division, and just before World War II, as a general of infantry, he took command of XXI Army Corps.

Falkenhorst led his corps in the invasion of Poland in September 1939. In February 1940, Adolf Hitler assigned him the task of planning the German invasion of Norway and Denmark, partly because of the general's earlier experience in Finland. Told he would have five divisions and to produce a plan in four hours, Falkenhorst used a commercial travel guide in his preparations.

On the success of that operation during April–June 1940, Falkenhorst was promoted to colonel general and made commander of all German forces in Norway, where he became known for brutal occupation policies. In the summer of 1941, Falkenhorst planned and attempted an invasion of the Soviet port of Murmansk on the Barents Sea. Following a disagreement with commissioner of the Nazi Reich Josef Terboven in Norway, Falkenhorst was relieved of his command in December 1944 and assigned to the Führer Reserve the following month.

Captured by the British and placed on trial for war crimes in July 1946, Falkenhorst was found guilty of ordering the deaths of prisoners of war and sentenced to death by firing squad. The sentence was subsequently commuted to life in prison. Falkenhorst was released on July 23, 1953, for health reasons. He died at Holzminden, Germany, on June 18, 1968.

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See also

Norway, German Conquest of; Poland Campaign

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Far East Fleet

See British Eastern Fleet

Fast-Attack Craft

Small warships armed with torpedoes (usually) and light machine guns or automatic cannon and largely powered by internal combustion engines or by diesel engines (as with most German models). Many navies during World War II operated fast attack craft, but only the fleets of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, and the United States deployed them in large numbers.

Most fast-attack-craft designs employed planing hulls—either hydroplane forms with one or more steps—or hard chine V-bottom shapes. A significant minority employed round-bottom displacement hull forms capable of planing when given sufficient power. Planing hulls required less power to achieve high speed but were appreciably less seaworthy and could not carry heavy armaments without sacrificing speed and sea keeping.

Both Italy and the Soviet Union devoted considerable effort to developing fast-attack craft before World War II, focusing their efforts mainly on small hydroplanes. The Soviet design derived from captured World War I–era British coastal motor boats. They had high speed (49–56 knots) but limited sea-keeping qualities. One unusual feature of the Soviet boats was their all-aluminum construction. The Type G5 remained in production from 1934 to 1945 (more than 400 were built). It was 56 feet in length and displaced 14–16 tons. It was armed with two 21-inch torpedoes, launched from rails over the stern, and light machine guns. The Soviets also introduced a large wooden hard chine design (Type D3) in 1941. Some 130 were built during 1941–1945. The D3 was 71 feet in length and displaced 32 tons. It carried two 21-inch torpedoes, one or two 20mm cannon, and up to four light machines

guns. Capable of 32–39 knots, it could operate in conditions up to Force 6 on the Beaufort Scale.

Until the mid-1930s, Italian production of fast-attack boats (*motobarca armata siluranti* or *motoscafo anti sommergibili* [MAS]) concentrated on small hydroplanes developed from the type introduced in 1915 that had achieved some spectacular successes during World War I. These boats were 52 feet 6 inches in length and displaced 13–15 tons. Capable of 40 knots, they carried two 450mm torpedoes and light machine guns. A new series of hard chine stepped hull boats entered service during 1936–1941. Most were 61 feet 4 inches in length and displaced 25–27 tons. They carried two 450mm torpedoes and a 20mm cannon and were capable of speeds up to 44 knots.

Efforts to develop larger, more capable models were advanced by exposure to captured Yugoslav Lürssen-type boats. These led Italy to construct similar high-speed displacement hull *motosiluranti* (MS) boats from 1942. These more seaworthy craft were 91 feet 10 inches in length, displaced 63–67 tons, and carried two 533mm torpedo tubes, two to four 20mm cannon as well as light machine guns and sometimes two additional 450mm torpedoes (in dropping cradles), operating at speeds of 31–32 knots.

Germany began building fast-attack boats in 1930. Unlike all other navies, the Kriegsmarine considered its Schnellboote (S-boats) as significant surface warships rather than expendable craft. Built by Lürssen, the unique design was a large planing displacement hull of composite construction (aluminum framing with a wooden skin) powered by three high-speed diesel engines. By 1940 a standardized type emerged. These boats were 114 feet 8 inches in length, displaced about 95 tons, and were capable of 40 knots. They were armed with two 533mm torpedo tubes (with reloads) and two 20mm cannon. Later series boats (and wartime upgrades) added armored bridges and a heavier gun armament of up to one 40mm and three to four 20mm cannon. Germany also built many experimental boats (including several radical hydrofoil types), but all operations were conducted by the 240 Lürssen-type S-boats commissioned between 1933 and 1945.

The Royal Navy’s first new fast-attack craft (motor torpedo boats [MTBs]) entered service in 1936. This British Power Boat design was a planing hull of double diagonal plywood construction 60 feet 4 inches in length, displacing 18 tons and armed with two 18-inch torpedoes (launched from stern troughs) and four light machine guns. It was followed by a new

design from Vosper (but also built by White) for a planing hull of 71 feet 9 inches in length, displacing 37–40 tons standard load (46–53 tons deep load) and capable of 40 knots. It became the standard British short-hull type. Most were armed with two 21-inch torpedo tubes and light weapons—initially .50-caliber and 0.303-inch machine guns but later two or three 20mm cannon and, on some examples, a single 6-pounder gun.

The British quickly discovered that German S-boats heavily outgunned their MTBs. In response, the British developed motor gunboats (MGBs). British Power Boat produced the standard MGB. With a planing hull 71 feet 9 inches in length, displacing 37–46 tons, and capable of 38 knots, it was armed with one 2-pounder power-operated gun, two 20mm cannon, and two .303-caliber machine guns. Later in the war, these boats added up to two 20mm cannon, two .303-caliber machine guns, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes as combined MTB/MGBs.

A separate line of development was the long-hull type MGB. These evolved from a Fairmile design for a highly prefabricated wooden displacement hull motor launch for harbor and coastal defense. The Fairmile Type “C” was an MGB 110 feet in overall length. It displaced 69 tons standard load (75 tons deep load) but was capable of only 27 knots. It was armed with two 2-pounder guns and two twin .50-caliber machine guns on power-operated mounts (the latter subsequently replaced by six 20mm cannon) and four light machine guns. The following Fairmile Type “D” was an innovative design combining a hard chine fore body with a displacement hull after body. With a hull 115 feet long and displacing 102 tons standard load (118 tons deep load), it was only capable of 29 knots but was heavily armed. Initial boats were MGBs, but most were completed as combined MTB/MGBs armed with two 21-inch or four 18-inch torpedo tubes, two 6-pounder guns, and two twin .50-caliber machine guns on power-operated mounts; two to three 20mm cannon; and four light machine guns.

The United States became interested in fast-attack craft in the late 1930s. In 1939 the U.S. Navy held an open competition for a patrol-torpedo (PT) boat prototype, which was won by a 70-foot British Power Boat design. The type was put into production by Elco of Bayonne, New Jersey. A small group of 70-foot boats was followed by a larger series of 77-foot craft and, finally, by the definitive 80-foot type displacing 38 tons, with a speed of 39 knots.

Initially, armament was four 21-inch torpedo tubes and two twin .50-caliber machine guns.

Later, lighter aircraft type torpedoes discharged from launching racks replaced the tubes, and a 37mm and a 40mm cannon were fitted fore and aft. Many boats added 20mm cannon, either in addition to or in place of the machine guns, and other weapons such as rocket launchers and mortars were added as PT boats assumed antibarge operations in the South Pacific and Mediterranean theaters.

In addition to the Elco boats, Higgins of New Orleans produced a 78-foot hard chine type for the navy. It was actually 78 feet 6 inches in length, displaced 35 tons, and attained 39 knots. The armament of Higgins PT boats matched that of the Elcos. The United States also produced quantities of Vosper-type MTBs of 72 feet 6 inches, displacing 39 tons, with a speed of 38 knots, almost all of which were transferred to other navies under Lend-Lease.

Fast-attack craft operated extensively in European and Mediterranean waters. Most operated in night attacks on enemy merchant shipping, served as convoy escorts and naval auxiliaries (such as minelayers, minesweepers, and patrol craft), and operated against their counterparts. These operations required both sides to devote considerable resources to countermeasures, and there were some notable successes: Italian MS boats sank the British cruiser *Manchester*, and both Allied and Axis fast-attack craft sank several enemy destroyers and other small warships; German S-boats caused havoc with one of the preinvasion convoys prior to D-day. Nevertheless, actual results were limited to losses of roughly 250,000 tons of merchant shipping apiece.

The U.S. Navy made considerable use of PT boats in the Pacific, especially in the Solomons and New Guinea campaigns. Here their primary mission rapidly evolved from attacking surface warships to interdiction of Japanese barge traffic engaged in delivering supplies and reinforcements to their scattered garrisons.

Fast-attack craft in World War II brought together visions of stealthy attack, powerful offensive punch for limited resource investment, and rapid egress. In the event, 40 to 60 percent of each navy's force became casualties, accomplishments were relatively limited, and the glamour of fast-attack craft far outweighed the reality.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Air-Sea Rescue; Borghese, Junio Valerio; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Higgins, Andrew Jackson; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Lend-Lease; Norway, Navy; Saint-Nazaire, Raid on; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Soviet Union, Navy; United States Navy

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Fechteler, William Morrow (1896–1967)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in San Rafael, California, on March 6, 1896, William Morrow Fechteler graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1916. Following U.S. entry into World War I, he served on the battleship *Pennsylvania* as an aide to the Atlantic Fleet commander. After the war, Fechteler held seagoing assignments and staff and administrative assignments in Washington and was an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy.

When World War II began, Fechteler was operations officer for Destroyer Command. From 1941 to 1943, he served as assistant director of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and from 1943 to 1944 he commanded the battleship *Indiana* in the Pacific. In January 1944, Fechteler was promoted to rear admiral and took command of Amphibious Group 8 of the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force. During the New Guinea Campaign (March 8, 1942–September 13, 1945), he directed amphibious operations in Biak (May 1944) and Sansapar (July 1944), and he oversaw the landings on Luzon and Palawan during the campaign to recapture the Philippines (October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945).

Promoted to vice admiral after the war, Fechteler served from 1946 to 1947 as commander of battleships and cruisers in the Atlantic Fleet. He then

spent three years in Washington as deputy chief of naval operations for personnel. Appointed commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet in 1950, the following year he unexpectedly became chief of naval operations and subsequently was promoted to full admiral when the incumbent, Admiral Forrest Sherman, suffered a fatal heart attack. From 1953 until he retired in July 1956, Fechteler was commander in chief of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Forces Southern Europe. He died at Bethesda, Maryland, on July 4, 1967.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

New Guinea Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Sherman, Forrest Percival; United States Navy

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Fedorenko, Yakov Nikolayevich (1896–1947)

Soviet Army marshal who established the first Soviet tank armies. Born in the village of Tsareborisovo, Kharkov Oblast, on October 22, 1896, Yakov Fedorenko was drafted into the navy in 1915 during World War I. He took part in the October 1917 revolt at Odessa and joined both the Red Guard and the Bolshevik Party that same year.

During the Russian Civil War, Fedorenko commanded Red forces' armored trains. He then graduated from the Kharkov Higher Artillery School and the Frunze Military Academy and commanded a tank regiment in 1934. He next commanded the 15th Mechanized Brigade. Fedorenko commanded armor formations in the Kiev Military District from 1937 to 1940 before becoming chief of the Main Armored Directorate in Moscow in June 1940.

During that period, production increased of the new T-34 medium tank and the KV-1 heavy tank.

Following the June 22, 1941, German invasion of the Soviet Union, Fedorenko took command of Soviet armored and mechanized troops and was deputy commissar of defense. He showed great understanding of armored warfare, in 1942 establishing the first Soviet tank armies for deep-penetration operations. In August 1944, he and Pavel Rotmistrov became the only Soviet marshals of armored troops. Fedorenko held his posts until his death in Moscow on March 26, 1947.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Armored Warfare; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Rotmistrov, Pavel Alekseyvich; Soviet Union, Army; Tanks, All Powers

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Fedyuninsky, Ivan Ivanovich (1900–1977)

Soviet Army general. Born in Gilevo, Sverdlovsk Oblast, on July 30, 1900, Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky joined the Red Army in 1919. He fought in the Russian Civil War, completing training at the Vladivostok Infantry Academy in 1924, and commanded an infantry company during the 1929 Soviet-Chinese conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Next he commanded first a battalion, then two regiments. He joined the Communist Party in 1930.

While commander of the 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment, Fedyuninsky distinguished himself in fighting in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan Incident) in August 1939 during the Soviets' undeclared war with Japan. As a colonel, he took command of the XV Rifle Corps at Kovel in April 1941. Promoted to major general soon after the June 22, 1941, German invasion of the Soviet Union, Fedyuninsky commanded the Thirty-Second Army.

Fedyuninsky served as General Georgii Zhukov's deputy in the defense of Leningrad in September, where he assumed command of the Forty-Second Army. Briefly head of the Leningrad Front that October until succeeded by General Mikhail Khozin, Fedyuninsky took over Khozin's Fifty-Fourth Army. He went to the Moscow sector in April 1942 to command the Fifth Army and in June was promoted to lieutenant general.

One of the most effective Soviet field commanders of the war, Fedyuninsky served as senior deputy commander at the Volkhov Front from October 1942 to May 1943. He held the same position at the Bryansk Front from May through July 1943. Fedyuninsky commanded the Eleventh Army and then the Second Shock Army in December 1943—helping to break the siege of Leningrad in January 1944—and then he drove with this unit into East Prussia. He was promoted to colonel general in October 1944. His army then joined General Konstantin Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front, which attacked north into Pomerania.

After the war, Fedyuninsky was deputy commander of Soviet occupation forces in Germany from 1945 to 1952 and then commander of the Transcaucasian and Turkestan military districts. He was promoted to army general in October 1955. Fedyuninsky died in Moscow on October 17, 1977.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Khozin, Mikhail Semenovich; Leningrad, Siege of; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Soviet Union, Army; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Fegen, Edward Stephen Fogarty (1891–1940)

British naval captain. Born at Southsea, Hampshire, on October 8, 1891, Edward Stephen Fogarty Fegen joined the Royal Navy as a cadet at Osborne

in 1904. He served in World War I, commanding a torpedo boat and destroyers. Between the wars, Fegen commanded a training ship and several destroyers and cruisers, served in both British and Chinese waters, headed the Naval College at Jervis Bay in Australia, and held various staff positions.

At the beginning of World War II, Fegen became an acting captain and took command of the 14,000-ton armed merchant cruiser *Jervis Bay*, which had been converted from a passenger liner. It had a crew of 254 seamen drawn from the Royal Navy, the Naval Reserve, and the merchant marine. The *Jervis Bay* mounted seven 6-inch guns, adequate to tackle submarines and other armed merchant cruisers and perhaps to ward off destroyers.

On October 28, 1940, the *Jervis Bay* was serving as escort for convoy HX 84, a group of 38 merchant ships bound from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to Britain. Three German capital ships were then loose in the Atlantic, and German naval intelligence informed Captain Theodor Krancke, commander of the pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer* (with six 11-inch guns), of HX 84's departure, ordering him to attack it. Krancke hoped to surprise and destroy the entire convoy, thereby justifying German naval demands for construction of more battleships rather than submarines.

On November 5, the *Admiral Scheer* made contact with the convoy. The merchant ships promptly scattered, and Fegen immediately attempted to lay a smoke screen from his ship and close to gunnery range with his powerful adversary. The *Admiral Scheer* concentrated its guns on the *Jervis Bay*, but Fegen kept his own ship on collision course toward its opponent. He maintained command even when he had one arm blown off, but he died when the bridge took a direct hit.

The battle lasted 22 minutes, giving the convoy vital time to disperse before the *Jervis Bay* sank. A total of 189 of its crew died. Although the *Admiral Scheer* did sink 6 merchant ships in the convoy with the loss of 251 more lives, 32 ships escaped. Fegen was posthumously awarded a Victoria Cross, the highest British award for gallantry in battle.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied

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Feng Yuxiang (1882–1948)

Chinese warlord and Nationalist Army general. Born in Qianxian (Ch'ing-hsien), Hebei (Hopeh) Province, on November 6, 1882, Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yü-hsiang) joined Yuan Shikai's (Yuan Shih-k'ai) army in his native province in 1902. In 1914, Feng became commander of the 16th Mixed Brigade, an independent unit receiving orders directly from the Beijing (Peking) government. This arrangement enabled Feng to establish his regional power in Henan (Honan), Shaanxi (Shensi), Gansu (Kansu), and Shandong (Shantung) during the decade-long contest for power between Beijing and the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists) in the south and among the warlords following Yuan's death in 1916.

In September 1926, Feng declared his allegiance to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and joined the GMD. He was commander of his forces, which were reorganized as the National revolutionary army's Second Group Army. Feng and his army participated in the 1926–1928 Northern Expedition to reunite China.

In May 1929, upset over what he perceived as Jiang's concentration of power in his own hands, Feng declared his independence of the Nationalist government. In February 1930, Feng and another warlord, Yan Xishan (Yen Hsi-shan), known as the northern coalition, rebelled against Jiang. They received support from the so-called Guangxi (Kwangsi) clique of Bai Chongxi (Pai Ch'ung-hsi), Li Zongren (Li Tsung-jen), Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei), and Zhang Fakui (Chang Fa-k'uei) from Guangdong (Kwangtung). Defeated in October, Feng was forced to relinquish control of his forces, which came under the Nationalist government, and he went into seclusion.

After the September 1931 Mukden (Shenyang) Incident in Liaoning, Feng returned to public life, denouncing Jiang's failure to resist the Japanese

advance in northern China. In 1933 Feng commanded a voluntary army to fight the Japanese, but it was quickly disbanded because of Jiang's opposition and increased Japanese military pressure. Feng retired to Shandong until 1936, when he was appointed vice chairman of the GMD's Military Affairs Commission, serving in Nanjing (Nanking), Jiangsu (Kiangsu).

With the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Feng became commander in chief of the Third War Zone (southern Jiangsu and Zhejiang [Chekiang]), defending Shanghai, which fell at the year's end. In February 1938, Feng became commander of the Sixth War Zone to defend the communication route between Nanjing and Hebei's Tianjin (Tientsin), which the Japanese took that autumn. In October, Feng followed the Nationalist government to Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan), where he remained militarily inactive until the war's end.

In September 1946, Feng was sent to the United States to study irrigation and conservation facilities. He then took up residence in Berkeley, California, giving public lectures in which he held Jiang responsible for the Chinese Civil War. On September 1, 1948, Feng died in a fire aboard a ship in the Black Sea while returning to China to serve the newly established Communist government.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

Bai Chongxi; Jiang Jieshi; Li Zongren; Sino-Japanese War; Wang Jingwei; Yan Xishan; Zhang Fakui

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Fermi, Enrico (1901–1954)

Nuclear physicist, atomic scientist, and one of the lead scientists involved in the Manhattan Project. Enrico Fermi was born in Rome, Italy, on September 29, 1901. His great aptitude for mathematics and physics manifested itself at

an early age, and encouraged by his father, he received a scholarship at the age of 17 to the University of Pisa. In 1922, the brilliant Fermi earned a doctorate in physics from the University of Pisa.

Fermi went to work in Germany until 1924, then took a position as a lecturer at the University of Florence. In 1926 he discovered the statistical laws governing particles, also known as "Fermi Statistics." In 1927 he was elected to the prestigious post of professor of theoretical physics at the University of Rome. He stayed in that post until 1938, when he won the Nobel Prize in physics. By then, Fermi was the world's undisputed expert on neutrons. That same year, he fled fascist Italy for the United States and took a professorship at Columbia University, which he held from 1939 to 1942.

In 1942 Fermi began work on the top-secret Manhattan Project, which produced the world's first atomic bomb in 1945. Under Fermi's direction, the first controlled nuclear chain reaction was achieved at the University of Chicago in December 1942. Fermi went on to help lead the quest for an atomic weapon, which was finally achieved on July 16, 1945, when the United States detonated the world's first atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Less than a month later, the United States dropped two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9), hastening the end of World War II.

In 1946 Fermi accepted a faculty position at the University of Chicago and turned his attention to high-energy physics. In 1946 he was appointed to a panel charged with advising the newly established Atomic Energy Commission. In 1949 he joined a number of other scientists in voicing opposition to the development of a hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb, but a year later he assisted in that project, although continuing to raise concerns about the efficacy of employing such a weapon. Fermi died on November 28, 1954, in Chicago.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Manhattan Project; Nuclear Weapons

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Festung Europa

Festung Europa is German for “Fortress Europe,” the generic term for the fortifications ringing German-occupied Europe, especially the massive defenses erected on the Atlantic coast from Norway to Spain, the so-called Atlantic Wall. Designed to guard against the possibility of an Allied amphibious invasion, these static defenses stretched from Norwegian outposts on the Arctic Ocean all the way to the more integrated beach and harbor defenses along the Bay of Biscay. In modern military terms, this series of engineering works was an exercise in force multiplication in that by constructing strong defensive works, the Germans expected to be able to use inferior military units to man them, freeing up more capable troops for open warfare elsewhere.



Enrico Fermi, winner of the 1938 Nobel Prize in physics, seated at control panel of a particle accelerator, the “world’s most powerful atom smasher.” (Library of Congress)

The Germans built the defenses largely by forced and conscripted labor. Under the control and direction of Fritz Todt, German minister of armaments

and munitions (and Albert Speer, Todt's successor after February 1942), hundreds of thousands of workers labored to build the fortified positions. The work began slowly, however, only gaining momentum after the tide of war had definitively shifted against the Germans. The plans originated at the direction of Adolf Hitler, who ordered the construction of some 15,000 defensive positions to be defended by 300,000 men.

Although Hitler's construction objective was never reached, the numbers were nonetheless impressive. By the time of the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, the Germans had placed 6.5 million mines, erected 500,000 beach obstacles, and expended 1.2 million tons of steel to reinforce 13.3 million tons of concrete in the thousands of positions that were completed.

When Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was assigned to command the likely invasion area, however, he decried the state of the defenses as he found them. Doubling and tripling the workload, Rommel greatly strengthened the defenses. Nevertheless, his professional opinion was that these works would never be sufficient to keep the Allies off the beaches. He believed that if the Allies came ashore and could establish a lodgment, there would be no way to defeat them. Recognizing the threat not only of amphibious assault but also of parachute and glider-borne attacks, Rommel seeded the open fields and meadows behind the beaches that the Allies might use as landing zones with stout iron bars linked with barbed wire. These obstacles became known as "Rommel's asparagus." In the end, the static defenses erected by the Germans proved no more effective than the French Maginot Line had been four years earlier.

ROBERT BATEMAN

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Maginot Line; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Organization Todt; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Speer, Albert; Todt, Fritz

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Fight for Freedom (1940–1942)

Interventionist, pro-Allied U.S. lobbying organization established before the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Fight for Freedom was formally launched in New York City on April 19, 1941, by prominent Americans who believed that the United States was effectively already at war with Germany and should behave accordingly. Its members found insufficiently forthright the noninterventionist stance adopted by the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), the leading pro-Allied group. Fight for Freedom advocated measures liable to cause outright war with Germany, such as attacks by American ships on German naval patrols.

Fight for Freedom developed from an earlier amorphous group of about 30 well-connected Americans who, from June 1940, met irregularly, their attendance shifting somewhat, at the Century Club in New York and were known as the Century Group. Among them were Francis Pickens Miller of the New York–based Council on Foreign Relations; Whitney H. Shepardson, also prominent in the council; Lewis W. Douglas, a former congressman; Admiral William H. Standley, a past chief of naval operations; and William Joseph Donovan, who would later head the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). After the defeat of France in June 1940, several of these people publicly demanded American intervention. Century Group adherents spearheaded the public campaign favoring the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement, which would exchange obsolete American destroyers for British naval bases in the Caribbean.

Allegations are exaggerated that British officials effectively created and manipulated Fight for Freedom and, subsequently, the U.S. government’s Office of War Information. Nevertheless, Century Group members undoubtedly enjoyed close ties with representatives of the New York–based British Information Service, the intelligence organization British Security Coordination, and Britain’s Washington embassy, enabling them to synchronize their own and British efforts. As the United States moved closer to war with Germany in 1941, Fight for Freedom initiatives overshadowed CDAAA ventures, and the two organizations discussed a merger. After the

Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Fight for Freedom's members accepted a wide variety of wartime assignments, and the organization, its mission accomplished, soon disbanded.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

America First Committee; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Donovan, William Joseph; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Film and the War

While film was still a relatively new technology during World War I, the years before, during, and after World War II saw movies and films rise to a new level of importance and sophistication. In a sense, World War II has never ended, for its themes and scenes are constantly resurrected, particularly in light of newer conflicts. Film played four major roles during the war: first, as propaganda that spurred sentiments of national unity and patriotism; second, as a means to train and educate the military and public; third, as a vehicle to inform filmgoers—albeit in strongly censored ways—of war developments; and fourth, as diversion to boost the public spirit. During the postwar era, World War II topics have served mainly as entertaining plots for suspenseful blockbusters but also as a means of questioning and reassessing the conflict, particularly as hitherto unknown details of the war have emerged and as the global public becomes increasingly aware of its immense and long-lasting repercussions as a prelude to later conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries.

An overview of films addressing the complexities of World War II can hardly do justice to the depth and breadth of the subject matter. It can only aim at presenting the most important cinematic landmarks from two periods:

first, films produced shortly before and during the conflict, and second, postwar films from the immediate aftermath until the present. Films designed to increase morale and unit cohesion played a major role in military training on all sides of the conflict, ranging from shorts on hygiene, literacy, and knowing the enemy to detailed elucidations of artillery, aircraft, or naval operation and maintenance.

A number of American training films, geared to soldiers with little formal education, were written by famous children's author Theodore "Dr. Suess" Geisel and voiced by Mel Blanc, known for his Looney Tunes characters; Private Snafu, the main character, was created by Frank Capra. Others informed the infantry on German small arms, while the Germans released extensive film instructions on topics such as sniper training. Addressing the civilian workforce, films such as Great Britain's *A Call for Arms* (1940) inspired women to work for the war effort, while *Miss Grant Goes to the Door* (1940) was designed to educate the public about the threats of invasion and espionage.

In the years leading to war, most of the United States tended toward isolationism. A significant change thus occurred when Hollywood, with its influential Jewish contingent, reflected a concern with the growing Nazi and fascist threat in Europe. For instance, Charles Chaplin portrayed a buffoonish Adolf Hitler–like character in *The Great Dictator* (1940), and the horrors of life in Nazi Germany were revealed in Sherman Scott's *Beasts of Berlin* (1939), which harked back to a sensationalist World War I–era film, *The Kaiser, Beast of Berlin.* Hollywood's anti-Germany/pro-Britain stance is most clearly seen in Henry King's *A Yank in the RAF* (1941), starring Tyrone Power as an American who joins the Royal Air Force.

After the United States entered the war in December 1941, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration mobilized Hollywood with the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI) in 1942. Directors and movie stars alike assisted the war effort in a wide variety of ways, from producing training films to making an increasing number of war epics for the general viewer. Frank Capra created an important seven-part documentary series intended for both military and civilian audiences, *Why We Fight* (1942–1944). Films portrayed the heroic efforts of the American armed services, including John Farrow's *Wake Island* (1942), Ray Enright's *Gung Ho!* (1943), Lloyd Bacon's *Action in the North Atlantic* (1943), Tay Garnett's *Bataan* (1943),

Lewis Seiler's *Guadalcanal Diary* (1943), Delmar Daves's *Destination Tokyo* (1943), Zoltan Korda's *Sahara* (1943), John Stahl's *Immortal Sergeant* (1943), and Mervyn Le Roy's *Thirty Seconds over Tokyo* (1944). The studios also raised American audiences' spirits with patriotic comedies and musicals, including Michael Curtiz's *Yankee Doodle Dandy* (1942), Charles Vidor's *Cover Girl* (1944), Bruce Humberstone's *Pin-Up Girl* (1944), and George Sidney's *Anchors Aweigh* (1945).

While Disney produced training films, it also released a popular cartoon in 1943 called *Der Führer's Face or Donald Duck in Nutzi Land.* Similarly, Warner Brothers released many propaganda cartoons featuring Bugs Bunny and Daffy Duck. Other films explored the war's personal impact, such as Curtiz's *Casablanca* (1943) and Alfred Hitchcock's *Lifeboat* (1944). As the war ground toward its end, grimmer depictions of real combat emerged from Hollywood, among them John Ford's *They Were Expendable* (1945), William A. Wellman's *The Story of GI Joe* (1945), Edward Dmytryk's *Back to Bataan* (1945), and Lewis Milestone's *A Walk in the Sun* (1946).

In the United Kingdom, the film industry's response to the war mirrored its American counterpart. Before 1937, mainstream British cinema addressed little in the way of international politics or foreign policy, but with the onset of war in 1939—and under heavy government censorship from the Ministry of Information—Britain began one of the most aggressive propaganda film efforts of any warring power. Newsreels abounded, and dramatized documentaries such as *Target for Tonight* (1941), *Coastal Command* (1942), *Fires Were Started* (1943), and *Western Approaches* (1944) had widespread and enthusiastic audiences.

Feature films such as Penrose Tennyson's *Convoy* (1941), Anthony Asquith's *Freedom Radio* (1941) and *The Demi-Paradise* (1943), Bernard Miles's *Tawny Pipit* (1944), David Lean's *This Happy Breed* (1944), Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger's controversial *The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp* (1943) and the morality story *A Canterbury Tale* (1944), and Asquith's RAF tribute, *The Way to the Stars* (1945), personified the resolute British determination to see the war through to victory.

James Cagney (front) performing in *Yankee Doodle Dandy*. Movies proved to be an important propaganda vehicle during the war. (Silver Screen Collection/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Heroic acts of British warriors—not always in World War II—were portrayed in numerous movies, including Powell's *The Lion Has Wings* (1939) and *One of Our Aircraft Is Missing* (1942), Harold French's *The Day Will Dawn* (1942), Charles Friend's *The Foreman Went to France* (1942), Noel Coward's *In Which We Serve* (1942), Frank Launder and Sidney Gilliat's *Millions Like Us* (1943), Sergei Nolbandov's *Undercover* (1943), Carol Reed's *The Way Ahead* (1944), and Sir Laurence Olivier's *Henry V* (1944). Michael Powell's *49th Parallel* (1941) served as a special call for American involvement by moving the Nazi threat in a fictional context to the American border in Canada.

The Soviet film industry, under the firm grip of Stalinist censors by the mid-1930s, produced a string of propaganda works preceding the war that glorified traditional Russian and Soviet heroes. Director Sergei Eisenstein anticipated the coming war with Germany in his epic *Alexander Nevsky* (1938) and obliquely depicted Joseph Stalin's dictatorship in his sprawling two-part *Ivan the Terrible* (1944–1946).

Most wartime films, however, were documentaries or fiction with strong documentary elements. Newsreels were released every three weeks: for

instance, *Our Moscow* (1941) and *Moscow Fights Back* (1942). Fridrikh Ermler directed *She Defends the Motherland* (1943), which, along with Mark Donskoi's *The Rainbow* (1944), celebrated Soviet women partisans. Ukrainian Mark Dovzhenko confined his output to *Battle for Our Soviet Ukraine* (1943) and *Victory in Right-Bank Ukraine* (1945). Vsevolod Pudovkin addressed the war with *In the Name of the Motherland* (1943).

With the German occupation of France in 1940, directors and actors who did not emigrate (many went to the United States) were able to find work in the Vichy-governed free zone or with the German-controlled industry in Paris. Production by the latter rapidly outstripped that of the cash-strapped south. Continental Films, established in 1940 under the leadership of Alfred Greven, served as the central producer. Free from Hollywood competition, the French film industry thrived during the occupation, but to escape censorship it produced much escapist fare, including Marcel Carne's *Evening Visitors* (1942) and *Children of Paradise* (1943–1945) and Jean Cocteau's *Eternal Return* (1943).

"Women's films," mostly melodramas such as Gance's *The Blind Venus* (1940), Jean Gremillon's *The Sky Is Yours* (1943), and *The Well-Digger's Daughter* (1942) were ambiguous, on the one side reinforcing ideals of womanhood touted by fascists but, on the other, portraying powerful female characters. More controversially, Henri-Georges Clouzot's *The Raven* (1943) enjoyed popularity among Occupation filmgoers but was immediately banned after the liberation, with punishments for most of the people involved in the film—this in spite of many thematic ambiguities.

The Italians also made a number of notable war-related films. Francesco de Robertis' *Alfa Tau* (1942) detailed the attack on and sinking of the British submarine *Triad* in the Mediterranean on October 15, 1940; the same year, Carmine Gallone's *Odessa in Flames,* a joint Italian-Romanian production, featured the fighting at Odessa in 1941, and Roberto Rossellini's *A Pilot Returns* detailed a young Italian pilot's escape from a British prison camp in Greece. Piero Costa's *Aeroporto* (1944) is a profascist film about a fighter pilot who, after Otto Skorzeny's rescue of the imprisoned dictator on July 27, 1943, flies his fighter plane to Mussolini's puppet state in the north of Italy. On a less jingoist note, Rossellini's *Paisan* (1946) consists of six vignettes of the Allied invasion from July 1943 to the winter of 1944. Further reflecting Italy's complex shifts during the war years, Pietro Francisci's *Christmas at*

Camp 119 (1947) reflects the reminiscences of Italian prisoners of war in an American camp.

It is not surprising that the German Third Reich, which American film critic Eric Rentschler has described as a "sustained cinematographic event," relied heavily on the power of the cinema to sway public opinion. By 1937, the National Socialist Party exercised total control over the German film industry. Joseph Goebbels took charge of monitoring production, advising executives about what constituted a "good" film and banning those he believed ran counter to Third Reich values. Of the more than 1,000 films made in Germany under the Nazi regime, however, fewer than 15 percent constituted pure propaganda. Some of these were powerfully conceived, such as Leni Riefenstahl's prewar *Triumph of the Will* (1935) and *Olympia* (1938). The ubiquitous newsreels were designed to promote the Nazi Party as Germany headed toward war. Fritz Hippler's overtly anti-Semitic pseudodocumentary *The Eternal Jew* (*Die ewige Jude,* 1940), filmed shortly after the occupation of Poland, focused on Jews as parasites; similarly, Veit Harlan's *Jude Süss* (1940) continued the anti-Jewish campaign, enjoying considerable box office success throughout Europe and becoming a staple film viewed by the Hitler Youth, SS conscripts, and others.

The Nazis also made use of the militarist past in films such as Wolfgang Liebeneier's *Bismarck* (1940), which lionized the Prussian spirit, and Hans Steinhoff's *Uncle Kruger* (1941), about the nobility of the Afrikaner resisting British dominion in South Africa. Other prominent films included Kurt Hoffmann's *Quax, der Bruchpilot* (1941), a comedy about a fool who eventually becomes an accomplished pilot, and Rabenalt's *Riding for Germany* (1941), about an equestrian wounded during World War I but determined to prepare himself for new conflicts. Eduard von Borsody's *Request Concert* (1940) presented a cavalcade of German musical figures in support of the war effort.

As the tide of war turned against the Third Reich, audiences were entertained by fantasy in Josef von Báky's *Münchhausen* (1943). Harlan's *Kolberg* (1945), the most expensive German film of World War II, harked back to the conquest of Breslau in 1813. Ironically, this tale of victory premiered amid the steady bombing of Berlin, and shortly after its release, Soviet forces encircled and captured the eponymous town in Pomerania.

Scores of Japanese films lionized the military after that nation's early

conquests. As in other states, the Japanese government acted to control media so that by 1936, the film industry operated under the Media Section of the Japanese Imperial Army. Strict laws enacted in 1939 governed the production of films to ensure that they reflected national policy.

Films designed to portray the dedication and bravery of Japanese warriors and their supporters on the home front included Tomotaka Tasaka's *Mud and Soldiers* (1939), Naruse Mikio's *The Whole Family Works* (1939), Ozu Yasujiro's *Brothers and Sisters of the Toda Family* (1941), Tetsu Taguchi's *Generals, Staff, and Soldiers* (1942), and Yamamoto Kajiro's *The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaya* (1942). Kurosawa Akira's debut *Sanshiro Sugata* (1943) was followed by his industrial paean *The Most Beautiful* in 1944. Period epics such as Uchida Tomu's *History* (1940) and Kinugasa Teinosuke's *The Battle of Kawanakajima* (1941) bolstered reverence for Japanese tradition, and Uchida's *Earth* (1939) portrayed simple farmers. Kurosawa's *They Who Tread on the Tiger's Tail* (1945) inspired criticism from both Japanese and U.S.-occupation censors and was not officially released until 1954.

Films Released after World War II

Immediately after the war, films such as William Wyler's *The Best Years of Our Lives* (1946) and Fred Zinnemann's *The Men* (1950) depicted the trauma of servicemen returning to civilian life in the United States. Heroism and bravery characterized William Wellman's *Battleground* (1949), Allan Dwan's *Sands of Iwo Jima* (1949), and Henry King's *Twelve O'Clock High* (1949). More complex in tone were Zinneman's *From Here to Eternity* (1953) and David Lean's *Bridge on the River Kwai* (1957). The 1960s and 1970s brought several epic historical dramas to the screen, including *The Longest Day* (Andrew Marton, Ken Annakin, and Bernhard Wicki, 1962), Otto Preminger's *In Harm's Way* (1965), Annakin's *The Battle of the Bulge* (1965), Franklin Schaffner's *Patton* (1970), and the Japanese and American collaboration *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (Masuda Toshio, Fukasaku Kinji, Ray Kellogg, and Richard Fleischer, 1970).

American and British audiences also responded favorably to cinematic war stories such as J. Lee-Thompson's *The Guns of Navarone* (1961), John Sturges's *The Great Escape* (1963), Robert Aldrich's *The Dirty Dozen*

(1967), Guy Hamilton's *Battle of Britain* (1969), Brian G. Hutton's *Where Eagles Dare* (1969), Mike Nichols's irreverent *Catch-22* (1970), and Richard Attenborough's *A Bridge Too Far* (1977). Two films revealed an increasing awareness of the German experience: Sirk's *Time to Love and a Time to Die* (1958), based on a sentimental novel by Erich Remarque, and Sam Peckinpah's *Cross of Iron* (1977), based on German writer Willi Heinrich's 1956 novel, *Days of Glory*.

As the 21st century approached, the horrors of combat were startlingly revisited to great realistic effect, notably in Terrence Malick's *The Thin Red Line* (1998) and Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* (1999). Overblown and historically inaccurate blockbusters such as Michael Bay's *Pearl Harbor* (2001) and Jeran-Jacques Aemand's *Enemy at the Gates* (2001) have contributed little to the cinematic record of the war.

Other more recent blockbusters include Hemingway's *Redtails* (2012) and the British documentary *Age of Heroes* (2011), featuring the formation of elite UK commando forces. On a farcical level, Tarantino's *Inglourious Basterds* (2009) tells a bizarre tale of Jewish American soldiers who plan to assassinate Nazi leaders.

Even though film memorialized the Soviet experience during the Great Patriotic War, as it was known by the Soviets, with ravaged cities and perhaps 27 million deaths, Soviet studios were hamstrung by ideology that slowed film production during the immediate postwar period. In Mikhail Chiaureli's two-part *The Fall of Berlin* (1949–1950), for instance, the Stalinist cult of personality blended with the glory of the recent victory over Germany. In the years after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, a cultural thaw gradually yielded more expressive and complex war films such as Mikhail Kalatozov's *The Cranes Are Flying* (1957), Grigorii Chukhrai's *Ballad of a Soldie*r (1959), and Andrei Tarkovsky's *Ivan's Childhood* (1962).

The stagnant Leonid Brezhnev years of the late 1960s to the early 1980s produced a string of mostly forgettable panegyrics to the war's memory, most significantly Iurii Ozerov's *Liberation* (1972). Yet the war still loomed large in Ozerov's *Stalingrad* (1989) and Mikhail Ptashuk's *August 1944* (2000).

With the artistic freedom afforded them beginning in the late 1980s by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies, Soviet directors indulged in social and cultural criticism as never before. Elem Klimov's *Come and See* (1985) presaged this new openness by addressing

the 1943 Nazi occupation of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. More recently, Nikolai Lebedev's massive production *The Star* (2002) is about Soviet scouts working behind enemy lines during the Belorussia Offensive (Operation BAGRATION). In 2012, Sergei Loznitsa's *In the Fog* dealt with themes of collaboration on the Belorussian front.

In France, postwar films tended to ignore collaboration and to promote themes of the resistance. For instance, René Clement's *The Battle of the Rail* (1946) shows self-sacrificing railway workers combating the Nazi stranglehold. Only in the 1960s did the French cinema try to tackle the many facets of the occupation with Marcel Ophuls' *The Sorrow and the Pity* (1969), a two-part documentary that involves participants from all sides.

Acknowledgment of the German occupation and the Vichy era further emerged in the work of French directors, including Claude Chabrol's *Line of Demarcation* (1966), Louis Malle's *Lacombe Lucien* (1974), François Truffaut's *The Last Metro* (1980), Malle's *Au Revoir les Enfants* (1987), Ophuls's *Hotel Terminus* (1987), and Chabrol's *The Story of Women* (1988) and *Eye of Vichy* (1993). Other films that explore countermyths of the occupation include Malle's *Lacombe Lucien* (1974), Jean-Pierre Melville's *Army of Shadows* (1969), and Alain Resnais' *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1959). More recently, Rachid Bouchareb's French-Algerian *Days of Glory* (2006) addresses the discriminatory treatment meted out to colonial troops during World War II.

Similarly, the Italian cinema initially propagated a resistance myth in films such as Carlo Lizzani's *Attention! Bandits*! (1951) and Roberto Rosselini's *Open City* (1945), *Paisa* (1946) and *Germany, Year Zero* (1948). The urban and economic ruins of postwar Italy informed classics such as Vittorio de Sica's *Shoeshine* (1946), *The Bicycle Thief* (1947), and *Umberto D.* (1952). The fascists and the war receded from mainstream cinematic view until renewed interest was revealed in such films as Bernardo Bertolucci's *The Conformist* and *The Spider's Strategem* of 1970, de Sica's *Garden of the FinziContinis* (1971), Federico Fellini's nostalgic *Amarcord* (1973), Ettore Scola's *A Special Day* (1977), Paolo and Vittorio Taviani's *The Night of the Shooting Stars* (1982), Gabriele Salvatore's *Mediterraneo* (1991), and Guido Chiesa's *Johnny the Partisan* (2000). Enzo Monteleone's *El Alamein—The Line of Fire* (2002) takes the war to North Africa in 1942.

After a faltering start with filmmaking firmly controlled by postwar

occupation forces, World War II gradually assumed its present-day importance on the German screen. Initially, East Germany was the base of the film industry: for instance, Wolfgang Staudte depicted the postwar situation in *The Murderers Are Among Us* (1946), while Slatan Dudow offered tribute to the new socialist order in *Our Daily Bread* (1949) and Gerhard Klein offered a study of love divided by politics in *Berlin Romance* (1956).

In West Germany, Peter Lorre directed *The Lost Man* (1951), Robert Siodmak exposed the Gestapo in *The Devil Strikes at Midnight* (1957), and Bernhard Wicki questioned the war in *The Bridge* (1959). From the 1980s onward, more and more films by leading directors probed both the German military and civilian experience. István Szabó's *Mephisto* (1982), based on Klaus Mann's eponymous novel, traces the fortunes of a German stage actor who sells out to the Nazi state. Perhaps the most outstanding film ever produced about submarine warfare was the German film *Das Boot* (1982), directed by Wolfgang Petersen, and in 1984 Schirk's *Wannsee Conference* traced the infamous conference that decided the fate of European Jewry. In 1993, Joseph Wilsmeier produced *Stalingrad*, a harrowing depiction of the great military debacle. More recently, Max Färberböck's *A Woman in Berlin* (2008) relates the story of a woman desperately trying to survive the Soviet invasion during the last days of the war. Also worthy of mention are Margarethe von Trotta's *Rosenstrasse* (2003), depicting the Rosenstrasse protest of 1943; Oliver Hirschbiegel's 2004 film *Downfall* (German, *Der Untergang*), depicting the last days of Adolf Hitler; and a film directed by Marc Rothemond, *Sophie Scholl, The Final Days* (2005).

In Japan, copies of more than 200 films on topics forbidden by the Americans were rounded up and burned in 1946, creating almost a tabula rasa for film. Ichikawa Kon directed moving Japanese war stories in *The Burmese Harp* (1956) and *Fires on the Plains* (1959), Kumai Kei explored Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war in *The Sea and Poison* (1986), and Japan's nuclear trauma was expressed in Imamura Shohei's *Black Rain* (1989). *Spy Sorge* (2003), about a Soviet spy and directed by Masahiro Shinoda, enjoyed only modest success. Themes of Emperor Hirohito and his confrontation with General Douglas MacArthur emerge in the Japanese-made *The Sun* (2005), the fourth part of Aleksandr Sokurov's tetralogy.

Polish filmmaker Andrzej Wajda directed significant films about the war: *Generation* (1955), *Kanal* (1957), and *Ashes and Diamonds* (1958). Janusz

Zaorski's *Mother of Kings* (1976) examined Poland's history from the period of World War II to Stalinist times. The effects of the war on India were explored in Satyajit Ray's *Distant Thunder* (1973). In presenting the theme of a controversial romance between a Thai woman and a Japanese officer in wartime Thailand, director Euthana Mukdasanit's *Sunset at Chaopraya* (1996) moved almost full circle in echoing the similar tension of Japanese director Fushimizu Osamu's notorious propaganda film of 1940, *China Nights.* A recent Czech film, Ondrej Trojan's *Zelary* (2003), concerns a nurse and a surgeon who are part of a resistance movement in the 1940s.

Whether triumphant, tragic, sentimental, dispassionate, or cynical in tone, these postwar films bear witness to the persistence of World War II in collective human memory and the questions the war continues to provoke.

Finally, while space in the present essay does not permit a full exposition of the subject, no history of the war would be complete without some treatment of the leading films that the Holocaust has inspired. Among the hundreds of films, Alain Renais's documentary *Night and Fog* (1955), made 10 years after the liberation of the concentration camps, focuses on the lives of prisoners in Auschwitz and Majdanek. Not surprisingly, another early movie is George Stevens's *The Diary of Anne Frank* (1959), an Academy Award–winning movie based on the most famous diary of the Holocaust era. *The Night Porter* (1974), directed by Italian director Liliana Cavani, figures as one of the most controversial films on the topic, featuring the ambiguous relationship between a Nazi prison guard and a female inmate. Also portraying ambiguous relationships between oppressor and the oppressed, Alan Pakula's *Sophie's Choice* (1982), based on William Styron's eponymous novel, relates the story of a Polish immigrant tormented by her Auschwitz past.

In an interesting twist of plot, German director Agnieszka Holland's *Europa Europa* (1990), based on the biography of Solomon Perel, deals with a Jewish boy who escapes the Holocaust by pretending to be a non-Jew who joins the Nazi Party. In another controversial film, Constantinos Gavras's (Costa-Gavras) *Amen* (2002), a Waffen-SS officer tries to inform Pope Pius XII about the Holocaust, only to have his message fall on deaf ears. Coming from a nation that has produced a host of Holocaust films, Polish director Roman Polanski created one of the all-time classics with *The Pianist* (2002), about the tribulations of a Polish Jewish musician who struggles to survive in

Warsaw under Nazi occupation. Other Holocaust films have met with popular reception but have been criticized for historical inaccuracies. These include Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* (1993), perhaps the largest cinematic blockbuster to date, that relates the activities of German industrialist Oscar Schindler, who saved the lives of some 1,200 Jews by employing them in his factories, and a juvenile favorite, Mark Herman's *The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas* (2008), which explores the friendship between the son of a Nazi prison guard and a Jewish inmate. Another recent movie, Lajos Koltai's *Fateless* (2005), is based on the semiautobiographical novel *Fatelessness* by Hungarian Nobel Prize winner Imre Kertész, who relates the experiences of a teenage boy in various concentration camps.

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See also

Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Literature and the War; Propaganda; Resistance; Women in World War II

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Finland

Nation situated in Northern Europe (Scandinavia) encompassing 136,596 square miles. Finland borders Sweden to the west, Russia (Soviet Union in 1939) to the east, Norway to the north, and the Gulf of Finland to the south. The country's 1939 population was approximately 3.7 million. Finland had secured its independence from Russia in 1917, but the Finns had to fight to maintain it. Concerned about the growth of German military power, in the late 1930s Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin applied pressure on Finland for territory in the Karelian Isthmus and for the naval base of Hanko on the Gulf of Finland to provide protection for Leningrad, the Soviet Union's second-largest city. In return, Stalin was prepared to yield more territory than he sought, but it was far to the north. The Finnish leadership, believing that the Soviets were bluffing, rejected the demands.

Soviet forces invaded Finland on November 30, 1939, and the First Finnish-Soviet War (known as the Winter War) lasted until March 13, 1940. The governments of both Great Britain and France discussed the possibility of military intervention, in large part to cut Germany off from Swedish iron ore, but both Norway and Sweden denied transit rights to the Allies. Commander of Finnish armed forces Marshal Carl Mannerheim led a spirited Finnish defense. However, the Finns were overwhelmed by sheer weight of Russian numbers and military hardware.

On March 12, 1940, the Finns signed the Treaty of Moscow. Under its terms, which went into effect at noon the next day, Finland lost one-tenth of its territory, including the entire Karelian Isthmus. The country then had to absorb 400,000 refugees, as virtually all the Finns moved out of the surrendered territory rather than live under Soviet rule.

New Soviet pressure angered the Finns, who signed a secret transit agreement with Germany in August 1940 allowing German troops to pass through Finland to northern Norway. Discussions began between the German and Finnish staffs regarding Operation BARBAROSSA, the German June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union, but the Germans never told the Finns details of the plan until the invasion was about to commence. The Germans began arms shipments to Finland in 1941, particularly artillery and antitank weapons. By June 1941, the Finnish government of President Risto Ryti committed to the plan but resisted a formal alliance with Germany,

maintaining that the Finns were merely fighting a defensive war against Soviet aggression and were a cobelligerent. The Finns managed to evade every request for such an alliance throughout the war.

Finland never defined war aims for this Second Finnish-Soviet War, known as the Continuation War. The clearest statement of its aims was a self-imposed halt in Finnish offensive military operations 50 to 90 miles beyond the 1939 borders, with the additional territory taken for defensive reasons. Mannerheim hoped that by limiting its advance into Soviet territory, Finland might retain its friendship with the United States and Great Britain. The Finnish government endeavored to convey the impression that Finland had been drawn into the conflict, although this was hard to accomplish with German troops in Finland before the commencement of BARBAROSSA, with naval cooperation between Finland and Germany and with the German Air Force flying in Finnish air space and refueling at Finnish airfields. Britain warned Finland at the end of September to advance only to the 1939 frontiers and declared war on Finland on December 6, 1941, the same day Finland halted its advance into Soviet territory.

The front with the Soviet Union was stable from May 1942 until June 1944, when the Soviets launched a powerful offensive with vastly superior manpower and firepower. The Ribbentrop-Ryti Agreement between the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Ryti was signed in late June 1944, promising that in exchange for weapons, Finland would not seek a separate peace. Finland had earlier in the year rejected peace terms from the Soviet Union because of their harshness and because Finland hoped that an Allied invasion of Germany would cause the Red Army to race to Berlin.

By July, the Red Army was doing exactly that; President Ryti resigned, and Mannerheim assumed office. Mannerheim repudiated Ryti’s agreement and negotiated a cease-fire with the Soviet Union. As part of the cease-fire, concluded on September 19, 1944, Finland had to expel or intern all German troops on its soil. This went peacefully until the Germans tried to seize Suursaari Island, which led to bitter fighting there and in Lapland in northern Finland. Although the campaign was virtually over at the end of November 1944 (the date established by the cease-fire agreement for Finnish demobilization), the last German troops did not depart Finland until April 1945.

The cease-fire and later armistice with the Soviet Union reaffirmed the 1940 borders, accepted Soviet reparations demands for raw materials and machinery, and limited the Finnish military in numbers and types of weapons. Finland suffered nearly 92,000 dead (including 2,700 civilians) during World War II. Soviet forces did not occupy Finland, and Finland's political institutions were left intact—the only eastern enemy of the Soviet Union so treated.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Finland, Air Force; Finland, Army and Navy; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von; Stalin, Joseph; Document 54; Document 51

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Finland, Air Force

In the 1930s, two controversies hindered Finnish aircraft acquisition. The first was whether fighters or bombers should have priority (the need for fighters seeming paramount). The second was from which country to purchase aircraft. The head of the Defense Council, Carl Mannerheim, favored Germany, and the air force commander, Colonel Jarl Lundquist (later a lieutenant general), favored Britain. Mannerheim stressed the danger of air attacks on Finnish cities when arguing for more funds for the air force, but he gave priority to air support for ground forces when war came.

In September 1939, the Finnish Air Force (FAF) had only 36 modern interceptors (Dutch Fokker D-XXIs) and 21 bombers (14 Bristol Blenheims and 7 Junkers K430s). Lundquist deployed his limited fighter assets forward to protect the army and defend as much Finnish air space as possible. Following the Soviet invasion of Finland on November 30, 1939, Finnish bombers attacked airfields and supported ground forces. In late December

1939, the FAF was able to purchase additional Fokker fighters, but its best aircraft came in the form of Morane-Saulnier MS-406s purchased from France. The Finns purchased additional Blenheims, U.S. Brewster F2A Buffalos (the Finns enjoyed considerable success with this much-maligned aircraft), Italian Fiat G-50s, and MS 406s. Most arrived too late for the war.

During the First Finnish-Soviet War of 1939–1940, also called the Winter War, the FAF supposedly accounted for some 200 Soviet aircraft, and more than 300 others were destroyed by antiaircraft fire or on the ground. Finnish losses during the war totaled 62 aircraft.

On June 25, 1941, when Finland again went to war with the Soviet Union (the Second Finnish-Soviet War of 1941–1944, also called the Continuation War), the FAF had increased substantially. It possessed 144 modern fighters (a mixture of U.S., British, French, Dutch, and Italian planes), 44 British and ex-Soviet bombers, and 63 mostly British and German reconnaissance planes. Once the Continuation War began, Finnish access to aircraft from other nations except Germany was cut off. The Finns did have their own aircraft industry, which produced limited numbers of aircraft including the VL Myrsky II fighter.

FAF strategy stressed aggressiveness; isolated fighters usually attacked no matter the number of Soviet aircraft. The FAF employed a blue swastika marking (no relation to the Nazi version) for national identification. The Luftwaffe and the FAF cooperated in this conflict, although neither could prevent Soviet air raids into Finnish territory or completely screen the Finnish Army from air attacks.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Finland; Finland, Army and Navy; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Germany, Air Force; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von

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Finland, Army and Navy

In September 1939, Finland had a small military establishment. The nation's war mobilization plan dated from May 1934 and divided the country into nine military regions. Depending on its size and population density, each region had two or three districts. Each district furnished one infantry regiment of three battalions and a field artillery battalion of 12 guns. The more populous districts provided additional support troops or regiments. On full mobilization, Finland could call up some 337,000 men. Carl Gustav Mannerheim, commander of the Finnish armed forces, designed the mobilization plan. Despite his best efforts, however, the military services were constantly underfunded, underequipped, and plagued by a government that insisted on relying on domestic sources that often did not exist.

When the First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War) began on November 30, 1939, the Finns concentrated their forces in key areas along the Soviet border, much of it impassable wilderness. The army fought hard and well, uninhibited by any rigid military doctrine or tactical theory. It used initiative and guile in exploiting terrain to its advantage—making fierce, sudden attacks according to *motti* tactics (*motti* is the Finnish word for a pile of logs held together by stakes ready to be chopped into firewood) to ambush and destroy road-bound Soviet columns. Finnish military thought had stressed encirclement tactics since the 1930s. The *motti* tactics were highly successful, involving mobile Finnish ski troops trained to fight in winter conditions who took advantage of their familiarity with the terrain.

By February 1940, however, in consequence of Soviet air supremacy, the Finns could hold their lines only by withdrawing during the day and counterattacking at night. Finally, the Finnish Army was ground down by vastly superior Soviet numbers and firepower. During the Winter War, which ended on March 12, 1940, the Finnish military sustained 22,425 killed, 1,424 missing, and 43,557 wounded.

On the conclusion of peace, Mannerheim immediately began making plans to rebuild the military. His new mobilization plan provided for 16 divisions with a total strength of 475,000 troops, or 13 percent of the entire population. Because of the limited Finnish economic base, any future war

would have to be concluded speedily. Mannerheim also increased the amount of artillery in the army, forming a tank battalion equipped with tanks captured from the Soviets and acquired from Britain, plus a heavy-tank platoon and seven independent-tank platoons.

The Second Finnish-Soviet War (June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944), known as the Continuation War, began in late June 1941. In this war, the Finns took back their 1939 borders and a slight amount of additional territory. The Soviets fought stubbornly, and the Finns suffered unexpectedly high casualties. After reaching those borders in late September, the Finns advanced into Soviet territory to shorten their three front lines on the Karelian Isthmus, but they refused to take part in operations against Leningrad as the Germans wished.

Finnish infantry in action during World War II. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

A lull in the fighting allowed 20 percent of the troops to be demobilized and returned to industry and agricultural pursuits in the early months of 1942. When the tide of war on the Eastern Front turned decisively against Germany, the Soviets renewed their attacks against the Finns in June 1944, and with vastly superior resources they soon overwhelmed the Finnish positions. Fighting was concluded by a cease-fire in early September. During the Continuation War, the Finns suffered approximately 65,000 military dead

against the Soviets and a further 2,000 against the German forces following the end of fighting with the Soviets.

The Finnish Navy was quite small, and its activities were largely limited to mine laying. At the start of the Winter War, Finland had 5 submarines, 2 armored coastal vessels, 4 gunboats, and 10 motor torpedo boats. Operations in the Gulf of Finland halted in the winter when it froze. The Finnish Navy cooperated with German naval units during the Continuation War to confine the Soviet Baltic Fleet to the eastern end of the gulf and mined the Soviet coast. Throughout the Continuation War, Finnish naval strategy was defensive, designed to prevent the Soviets from interfering with trans-Baltic shipping or intervening in the land battles.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Finland; Finland, Air Force; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von

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Finnish-Soviet War, First (November 30, 1939–March 13, 1940)

Regional conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union, also called the Winter War (1939–1940). In late 1939, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was concerned with the sharp increase in German power following the conquest of Poland, and he sought to acquire additional territory to protect portions of the Soviet Union from a possible German attack through Finland. He was especially anxious to protect approaches to Leningrad, which was only 20 miles from the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus. These security concerns prompted Stalin to demand that Finland cede much of the isthmus,

destroy all fortifications there, and cede certain islands in the gulf as well as grant the Soviet Union land for a naval base to the west on the Hanko Peninsula. Stalin was prepared to grant more territory than he demanded—2,134 square miles in return for 1,066—although the Soviet territory offered was in the less desirable north, in East Karelia above Lake Ladoga.

In 1941 Finland had a population of only some 3.7 million people, while the Soviet Union's population was some 197 million. Finland thus hardly seemed in a position to reject Stalin's demands. Although the Finns were open to some compromise regarding territory above Leningrad, they were upset about demands for the destruction of their fortifications and for a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. Tough negotiations continued for two months without result. Finnish leaders believed that Stalin was bluffing, but after a contrived border incident on November 26, 1939, Stalin ordered an invasion, which began on November 30, 1939. It was not one of Stalin's finer military exploits.

Despite overwhelming superiority in manpower, resources, and equipment, it took the Red Army nearly four months to crush its tiny opponent. About the only advantages for Finland were the harsh climate, soldiers' familiarity with the area, superior leadership and training, and high morale; after all, the Finns were fighting for their homeland. The abundant forests provided good cover and concealment amid sparse settlements and poor trails. Only the Karelian Isthmus had developed towns and farming areas with roads. This environment worked against mechanized operations and gave the advantage to mobile forces equipped with skis. Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, commander of the Finnish forces, possessed keen insight regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the Red Army (having served in the prerevolutionary Russian Army), and Finnish commissioned and noncommissioned officers were well trained and demonstrated considerable initiative.

In all the Finns fielded about 300,000 men, but they had only 422 artillery pieces, 32 tanks, and just a few aircraft. Many independent battalions and separate companies were dispersed throughout the country. The Finns lacked equipment of all sorts, and what they had was a variety from different countries. The soldiers were well acclimated and wore white camouflage uniforms to facilitate swift movement. The Finns also did what they could to

strengthen their natural defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus by constructing obstacles, trenches, and bunkers.

For the initial invasion, Stalin employed only 20 Soviet divisions against 16 Finnish divisions, and he must bear responsibility for the initial Soviet military failure in Finland. Fresh from the Red Army's relatively bloodless triumph in Poland, Stalin personally intervened to reject the plan advanced by his chief of staff, Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov, which entailed a careful buildup and use of the best Soviet troops, even those from the Far East. Stalin rebuked Shaposhnikov for overestimating the Finns and underestimating the Red Army. The new plan, worked out on Stalin's orders and confirmed by him, led to the fiasco of the early Soviet defeats, leaving Shaposhnikov to remedy the situation.

The Soviet military was in wretched shape. Recent purges had decimated the officer corps and had left in command unqualified men who were reluctant to take the initiative. The soldiers were poorly trained in winter fighting and breaching fortified lines. The standard Soviet rifle division was well manned and well equipped, but the heavy material was not suited to such a primitive operational environment. The Soviets did have an advantage in heavy artillery, but little coordination had been developed between the arms, so attacks were not synchronized for effectiveness. A severe lack of communications equipment added to the problems of coordination and tactical flexibility. Among the rank and file, morale was poor. These factors mitigated overwhelming Soviet advantages in manpower and quantities of equipment.

In December 1939, the Finns halted the main Russian thrust across the Karelian Isthmus at the so-called Mannerheim Line. The Finns gained an early advantage when they obtained the Soviet tactical codes through the corps level. Thus, they could monitor Soviet radio communications and decrypt Soviet units' locations. This intelligence became a force multiplier and helped the Finns to detect, outmaneuver, and defeat far larger Soviet formations. The Finns would cut off the enemy line of communications, separate the road-bound columns into pockets called *mottis* (*motti* is the Finnish word for a pile of logs held together by stakes ready to be chopped into firewood), and then destroy them piecemeal. By moving quickly, firing from concealed positions, and rapidly eliminating Soviet patrols, the Finns produced fear that reduced the ability of Soviet forces to react. The Finns also

showed great ability in improvisation (as with the gasoline bomb in a bottle hurled at Russian tanks and dubbed the “Molotov cocktail”), by their effective use of ski troops, and by fitting largely antiquated biplane aircraft with skis so they could operate in snow.

After major defeats destroyed several of their divisions at Tolvajärvi and Suomussalmi, the Soviets brought in new divisions and spent almost a month training intensively in tactics to develop better coordination among infantry, tanks, and artillery. In addition, they focused on better close air support and the development of mobile reserves to exploit breakthroughs. At the small-unit level, special assault groups were organized to destroy Finnish bunkers efficiently.

Not until February 1940 did Soviet forces mount an effective assault on the Mannerheim Line. They doubled their strength against the Mannerheim Line with the Northwest Front, commanded by Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko, and concentrated more than 35 divisions, which included heavy artillery and new-model tanks, against the weakened Finns. Sheer weight of numbers enabled the Soviets to break through the Finnish line at Summa on February 11, and by March 8 they had captured part of the key Finnish defensive anchor at Viipuri (Vyborg).

Stalin then dictated a peace settlement. He did not annex Finland or even Helsinki, but he exacted territorial concessions well in excess of those sought before the war. The Finns were forced to yield some 25,000 square miles of territory, including the Karelian Isthmus. The war also displaced some 400,000 Finns, for virtually all left the territory ceded to the Soviet Union.

Although Soviet terms were regarded as harsh by the Finns and by Finland’s many international supporters, they were mild compared with those the Soviet Union imposed on the three Baltic countries. In the case of Finland, Stalin may have been deterred by the strong anti-Soviet sentiment that the invasion had aroused throughout the world. Indeed, 11,500 volunteers went to Finland to fight against the Soviets. Britain and France actually considered military intervention against the Soviet Union, including bombing strikes against the Caucasian oil fields and an “uninvited landing” in Norway as a preliminary step to sending troops to Finland. Seen in retrospect, such a step would have been disastrous to the Allied war effort.

Stalin may also have been restrained by his desire to keep open the option of a possible alliance with the West against Hitler and to minimize the many

disadvantages resulting from the Soviet aggression. One consequence for the Soviet Union of its invasion—expulsion from the League of Nations—was not a major blow.

Ultimately, the Soviets had hurled 1.5 million men (almost half their army in Europe), 3,000 aircraft, and nearly as many tanks against Finland. The Soviets suffered 230,000 to 270,000 dead—many the result of the cold and because of poor Soviet medical services—and a comparable number of wounded. They also lost 1,800 tanks and 634 aircraft. The Finns sustained far fewer casualties (22,425 killed and 43,557 wounded), and 62 of the 162 planes of their largely antiquated air force were lost.

One of the war's most important effects was the damage to Soviet military prestige. Many observers, including Hitler, believed that the Soviet Union was incapable of waging a large-scale war. Another consequence was the Soviet decision to adopt the Finnish automatic sidearm, which saw extensive use during World War II and the Korean War. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland waged war against the Soviet Union as a cobelligerent of Germany, a decision that led to Finland unfairly being branded as an Axis power and to its second defeat in 1944.

STEVEN J. RAUCH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Finland; Finland, Air Force; Finland, Army and Navy; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von; Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich; Soviet Union; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Document 55

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Finnish-Soviet War, Second (June 25, 1941–September 4, 1944)

Renewal of warfare between Finland and the Soviet Union, also called the Continuation War (1941–1944), with the fighting occurring mainly northwest and northeast of the Soviet city of Leningrad. Finland's rejection of Soviet demands for territory and bases to protect access to Leningrad—including the cession of Viipuri (Vyborg), Finland's second-largest city, and the surrounding Karelian Isthmus—had led to the First Finnish-Soviet War, known as the Winter War. That war began in November 1939, and although the Finns fought well, the odds against them were hopeless. In March 1940, Finland was obliged to sue for peace, in which it had to cede even more territory than the Soviets had originally demanded.

Fearing additional Soviet demands and resenting Soviet interference in its policies, Finland aligned itself with Germany. In the fall of 1940, chief of the Finnish General Staff Lieutenant General Erik Heinrichs held talks in Berlin with German leaders, who requested Finnish assistance during Operation BARBAROSSA, the planned German invasion of the Soviet Union (chiefly in operations against Leningrad and Murmansk) that would begin on June 22, 1941. The Finnish government welcomed this as an opportunity to recover territory lost to the Soviet Union in the Winter War.

As planning progressed, the Germans and Finns agreed that German forces would secure the nickel-rich Petsamo region and attack Murmansk in the far north, while the Finns would be responsible for operations in the southeast toward Leningrad and Soviet Karelia, centered on Petrozavodsk. General Carl Mannerheim (promoted to field marshal in 1942) commanded the Finnish forces, as he had in the Winter War of 1939–1940. Mannerheim had 16 divisions: 11 along the frontiers, 1 opposite the Russian base at Hanko, and 4 in reserve.

On June 22, 1941, the Germans launched their massive invasion of the Soviet Union. Finland had already secretly mobilized its forces and declared war on June 25, but as a cobelligerent of Germany rather than as an ally. The German drive in the far north from Petsamo eastward fell short of both Murmansk and the large Soviet naval base at Polyarny. German forces also had little luck driving east from the northern city of Rovaniemi, failing to cut the Soviet rail line running from Murmansk south along the White Sea coast.

In the south, however, the Finns made much better progress. Preoccupied with the massive German onslaught, Red Army forces north of Leningrad were outnumbered.

Mannerheim divided his forces into two armies: one drove down the Karelian Isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga; the other marched southeast between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega toward the Svir River to take Petrozavodsk, capital of Karelia. On June 29, the Finnish Karelian Army (II, IV, VI, and VII Corps) attacked to the west and east of Lake Ladoga, crossing the Russo-Finnish border of 1940, recapturing Finnish Karelia, and driving on Leningrad. Aided by German contingents, Army Group Mannerheim attacked Soviet Karelia. Farther north, combined Finnish and German forces recaptured lost Finnish territory around Salla while the German mountain troops, coming from Norway, reached as far as the Litsa River on their drive toward Murmansk.

The Finns had originally planned to unite their troops with German Army Group North around Leningrad. On September 1, the Finns reached the old Russo-Finnish border. Despite heavy fighting, the Soviets were able to withdraw, but by late August the Finns had recovered all territory lost to the Soviet Union in the Winter War. The Finnish attacks stalled north of Lake Ladoga in September.

Although the Finns were not eager to take non-Finnish land, they did advance somewhat beyond the pre–November 1939 borders for defensive purposes. Much to Germany’s displeasure, however, they refused to cooperate with German troops against the city of Leningrad. Finnish and German commanders disliked each other, and the Luftwaffe failed to provide as much air cover as had been promised. German troops did not perform well in the northern part of the front. In the dense forests and swamps that marked the terrain in the north, tanks, heavy artillery, and aircraft were often ineffective. Finnish casualties were not light, and Finland had a small population and insufficient resources for a long war. Given these points, the Finns only undertook those operations that suited them, and that did not include Leningrad. The Finns were nonetheless disappointed that the German Army was unable to secure a rapid defeat of the Soviet Union.

After capturing Petrozavodsk and Medweschjegorsk on the western and northern shore of Lake Onega, in December the Finns established a defensive position somewhat inside Soviet territory and about 20 miles from Leningrad.

Had the Finns advanced farther, Leningrad would probably have fallen to the Germans, with uncertain consequences for the fighting on the Eastern Front. The Finnish Front remained largely static from early 1942. Despite some Soviet counterattacks toward Petsamo, the battle lines changed little in the months to follow.

In August 1942, Moscow offered the Finns extensive territorial concessions in return for a separate peace, but the Finns, confident of an ultimate German victory, refused. In September 1941, London and Washington made it clear to Helsinki that any Finnish effort to advance beyond its prewar frontiers would mean war. Indeed, Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941.

As the war continued into 1942 and then 1943, the Finns lost enthusiasm for the struggle, especially when German military fortunes changed. In

January 1944, a Soviet offensive south of Leningrad broke the blockade of that city. With the tide fast turning against Germany, the Finns asked the Soviets for peace terms, but the response was so harsh that Finland rejected it. Not only would Finland have to surrender all its territorial gains, but it would have to pay a large indemnity.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin then decided to drive Finland from the war. The Soviets assembled some 45 divisions with about half a million men, more than 800 tanks, and some 2,000 aircraft. Using these assets, in June 1944 the Soviets began an advance into Finland on both flanks of Lake Ladoga on the relatively narrow Karelian and Leningrad fronts. While the Finns were well-entrenched along three defensive lines, they could not withstand the Soviet onslaught. Viipuri fell on June 20 after less stubborn resistance than during the Winter War. Heavy fighting also occurred in eastern Karelia. Although they failed to achieve a breakthrough, Soviet forces caused the Finns to retreat and took the Murmansk Railway.

After the fall of Viipuri, the Finnish government requested German assistance. The Germans furnished dive-bombers, artillery, and then some troops, but it demanded in return that Finland ally itself firmly with Germany and promise not to conclude a separate peace. Finnish president Risto Ryti, who had been forced to provide a letter to that effect to German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (which bound him, but not his country, to such a policy), resigned on August 1 in favor of Marshal Mannerheim.

On August 25, 1944, Helsinki asked for terms. Moscow agreed to a cease-fire to take effect on September 4, but Soviet forces actually fought on for another day after that. Among the cease-fire terms were that the Finns should break diplomatic relations with Berlin and order all German troops from Finnish soil by September 15. German leader Adolf Hitler refused the Finnish request for an orderly departure of his forces and ordered German troops in northern Finland to resist expulsion and, if forced to retreat, to lay waste to the countryside. The German troops followed this order to the letter. Because there were 200,000 Germans in Finland, the damage to Lapland, where they were located, was considerable. During October, the Russian Fourteenth Army threw back German forces at Liza, supported by a large amphibious landing near Petsamo, and by the end of the month the Germans had withdrawn completely into Norway.

The war ended for Finland on October 15, 1944. The Continuation War

cost Finland some 200,000 casualties (55,000 dead)—a catastrophic figure for a nation of fewer than 4 million people. Finland also had to absorb 200,000 refugees. Finland agreed to withdraw its forces back to the 1940 frontiers, placed its military on a peacetime footing within two and a half months, granted a 50-year lease of the Porkkala District, allowed the Soviets access to ports and airfields in southern Finland, and provided the Soviet Union use of the Finnish merchant navy while the war continued in Europe. Finland also paid reparations of U.S. $300 million in gold over a six-year period. Stalin did refrain from absorbing the entire country, but in the coming decades Western-oriented democratic Finland was obliged to follow policies that would not alienate the Soviet Union.

MICHAEL SHARE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Finland; Finland, Air Force; Finland, Army and Navy; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Hitler, Adolf; Leningrad, Siege of; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von; Northeast Europe Theater; Ribbentrop, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim von; Soviet Union; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph

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Fiske, William "Billy" Meade Lindsley, III (1911–1940)

Olympic gold-medal bobsled driver and perhaps the first American killed in combat during World War II. William ("Billy") Meade Lindsley Fiske III was born on June 4, 1911, in Brooklyn, New York, the son of a wealthy New England banking tycoon. After attending boarding school in Chicago, Fiske took up studies in France, where he became interested in bobsledding. In 1928, he entered Trinity Hall, Cambridge University, while training for the bobsledding competition at the 1928 Winter Olympics. Representing the

United States, Fiske and his team won the gold medal at the St. Moritz, Switzerland, games. At age 16, Fiske held the record as the youngest winter-sport gold medalist until 1992. He and his team repeated their performance at the 1932 Winter Games in Lake Placid, New York.

Fiske chose not to participate in the 1936 games, instead beginning a career with the investment firm of Dillon, Reaed & Co. in London. In mid-1939, Fiske returned to the New York headquarters, but in late August, just days prior to Germany's invasion of Poland, he boarded a ship bound for England.

Hitler's Polish invasion triggered World War II in Europe, a development that caused Fiske much concern. Determined to help the British, he entered the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve on March 23, 1940, masquerading as a Canadian. He began pilot training almost immediately, and by all accounts he was a quick and eager study. The Battle of Britain commenced on July 10, 1940; two days later, Fiske was assigned to 601 Squadron at Tangmere, West Sussex. He undertook his first flying mission against the Germans on July 20, when he engaged in patrol sorties.

On August 16, 1940, Fiske's squadron was scrambled to intercept German dive-bombers. Piloting a Hawker Hurricane fighter, Fiske had his fuel tank punctured, and part of the plane caught on fire. Fiske did not bail out and landed his crippled aircraft at Tangmere. Having received serious burns to his hands and legs, he was transported to a hospital in Chichester, where he died on August 17. Fiske was interred in England. On July 4, 1941, the British government unveiled a plaque in his honor in St. Paul's Cathedral, London. Fiske had claimed that he was the first U.S. citizen to serve in the Royal Air Force, and he is believed to have been the first American killed in World War II.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Britain, Battle of

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Fitch, Aubrey Wray (1883–1978)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Saint Ignace, Michigan, on June 11, 1883, Aubrey Wray Fitch graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1906. Commissioned an ensign in 1908, he ended World War I as a temporary commander. During the 1920s, Fitch specialized in naval gunnery and torpedoes. He served as executive officer on a battleship, was a member of a naval mission to Brazil, and held various ship commands.

Fitch became a naval aviator in 1930. Promoted to captain in 1931, he commanded three naval air stations and also the aircraft carriers *Langley* and *Lexington.* He graduated from the Naval War College in 1938. In April 1940, Fitch took command of Patrol Wing 2 at Pearl Harbor and was promoted to rear admiral that July. In November, he assumed command of Carrier Division 1, with his flag in the carrier *Saratoga.*

Fitch served under Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher in the aborted Wake Island relief expedition. Transferring his flag to the carrier *Lexington* in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942), Fitch exercised tactical control over U.S. carriers. He then took command of U.S. Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, and in September he commanded all ground-based naval and marine aviation in the Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942–February 1943). As such, he played an important role in the U.S. victory in the Solomon Islands Campaign (August 1942–February 1943).

Promoted to vice admiral in December 1943, Fitch became deputy chief of naval operations for air in August 1944. In 1945, he was the first naval aviator to serve as superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy. Fitch retired as a full admiral in July 1947. He died in Newcastle, Maine, on May 22, 1978.

NATHAN L. GILBERT

See also

Air Warfare, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Wake Island, Battle for

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Flamethrowers

Modern flamethrowers were first employed by the German Army in World War I. A flamethrower is a pressure-operated device that shoots a stream of combustible liquid. The liquid is ignited as it leaves a nozzle, which can be placed at the end of a handheld tube or mounted on a tube projecting from an armored fighting vehicle. Flamethrowers consist of four elements: the fuel container, a mechanism to force the fuel from the container, a projecting tube and nozzle, and an igniting system that will set the stream of fuel on fire. Ignition systems are based on powder cartridge, electric coil, and electric spark designs.

Flamethrowers can be used in both antimatériel and antipersonnel roles. Typically, they are used in complex terrain with short standoff distances, such as in trench, city, and jungle fighting. They are used against hard targets such as bunkers, pillboxes, and mobile and dug-in tanks. German forces also used flamethrowers as defensive mines. Although these weapons possess combat advantages, these are balanced by disadvantages including short burn times, the fact that the user immediately becomes a priority target, and the vulnerability of their fuel cylinders, which can explode if struck by a bullet or shell fragmentation.

U.S. military forces used the 70-pound M-1 model fielded in 1942 and also used the M1-A1 model. The M-1 could generate a 10-second stream of fire, carried four gallons of fuel, and was man-portable. It had a range of 82 feet. The improved M1-A1 model had a range of 131 feet.

In addition to using flamethrowers in infantry assault forces and ad hoc mechanized forces, the U.S. Army established the 713th Tank Battalion (Armored Flame Thrower) in November 1944. It consisted of 54 M-4 Sherman tanks. Each Sherman was retrofitted with a Ronson flamethrower gun and had a 300-gallon fuel capacity and a flame-throwing range of 75–100 yards. The unit saw action during the invasion of Okinawa (March–June 1945) and reportedly killed more than 4,500 Japanese soldiers.

British man-portable flamethrowers were based on the 1940 No. 1 Mk-II “Marsden” and 1942 No. 2 Mk-II “Lifebuoy” models. The Marsden was an 85-pound unit with a 98-foot range. The Lifebuoy (also called the “ack-pak” unit) was a 64-pound doughnut-shaped device with a 131-foot range. The British also fielded a flamethrower tank built on the tank chassis of a Churchill tank. Known as the Crocodile, it carried 10 minutes’ worth of fuel and could tow a trailer holding fuel for an additional 30 minutes. The tactical disadvantage of the trailer was that if hit by enemy fire, it could explode like a massive bomb, killing the tank crew. Crocodile tanks were organized in three battalions of the 79th Armored Division and operated in platoons attached to other military units.

French flamethrowers were incidental to the war, given France’s early defeat. They were based on the World War I man-portable Schilt model. Early Soviet models were variants of German designs, but the Soviets introduced improved flamethrowers in 1943 with the 50-pound ROKS-2 and 75-pound ROKS-3 man-portable models. They had effective ranges of 115 feet and 230 feet, respectively. A triple-tank man-portable model known as the LPO-50 also existed. The Russians used numerous armored fighting vehicle–mounted flamethrowers during the war. Typically, they were retrofitted to the turrets and chassis of older tanks.

German forces employed a wide variety of flamethrowers. Man-portable systems were the Model 35, Model 40, Model 41, and Model 42. They ranged in weight from 35 to 79 pounds and projected a stream of fire about 25–35 yards. A lighter and highly accurate paraflamethrower used by Schutzstaffel (SS) troops and a “field gun” trailer flamethrower with a weight of 900 pounds also emerged.

The Germans placed flamethrowers on the Sd Kfz 251 3-ton half-track, the Panzerjäger 38 chassis, and the Pz. Kpfw. II and III tank series. Typical fuel capacity was 150 to 200 gallons with flame-throwing ranges out to 65 yards. The static flamethrower (Abwehrflamenwerfer 42) was used as a defensive mine and fired by electrical squibs. It shot a flame 5 yards wide by 3 yards high out to 30 yards.

Italian flamethrowers were the Lanciaflamme Models 35 and 40, introduced in 1935 and 1940, respectively. Guastori (Italian combat engineers) employed them in fighting in Ethiopia, North Africa, and the Soviet Union. The Italian flamethrowers lacked the range of German

flamethrowers, but these manpacks were simple in design and effective. A larger version built for the small Italian L3 tank pulled a fuel wagon.

Japanese flamethrowers were based on the Type 93 and Type 100 man-portable models. The Type 93 had a weight of 55 pounds and a range of 25–30 yards. It could shoot a stream of fire lasting 10–12 seconds and relied on a revolving 10-cylinder blank cartridge ignition system. The Type 100 was a shorter and lighter variant of the Type 93, with a removable, rather than a fixed, nozzle outlet tip. Flamethrowers were not normally mounted in Japanese armored fighting vehicles.

ROBERT J. BUNKER

See also

Okinawa, Invasion of; Tanks, All Powers

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Fleet Train

One of the greatest advantages possessed by the U.S. Navy in the final years of World War II was its fleet train—the assortment of auxiliary vessels that made possible the wide-ranging forays of the Pacific Fleet. Although the limelight never fell on the fleet train, these unsung forces demonstrated once again the primacy of logistics in modern warfare.

On oceans, as on land, logistical considerations have always dictated the pace of operations. In the days of sail, ships could remain at sea for extended periods—sometimes as long as a year. With the introduction of steam propulsion, warships found themselves on a shorter tether. Both the Russian Baltic (Second Pacific) Fleet in 1905 and America’s Great White Fleet of

1907–1909 made their epic voyages fueled by coal and supplied with stores bought from friendly powers.

Given the need to operate during World War I in European waters, the U.S. Navy experimented successfully with colliers and destroyer tenders. When the fleet moved to San Diego in 1919, the Base Force was formed to support the combatant craft. By 1925 this flotilla, numbering 75 ships, included fleet tugs, colliers, storeships, a hospital ship, and tankers. The last category became increasingly important as the navy made the transition from coal to oil. At-sea refueling, at first experimental and labeled “an emergency stunt,” became routine. By 1940, the Base Force had grown to 120 auxiliaries.

Long-distance replenishment of the fleet became increasingly important in planning as the possibility of war with Japan loomed. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the command was renamed in March 1942 the Service Force, under the command of Vice Admiral William L. Calhoun. His sailors soon developed mobile service squadrons, the first (Service Squadron 4) being based at Funafuti in the Ellice Islands. As the drive across the Central Pacific gained momentum, the new Service Squadron 10 set up at Majuro in the Marshalls but soon moved to Eniwetok, then to Ulithi, and finally, at the end of 1944, to Leyte. By this stage of the war, the Service Force consisted of 30 different types of auxiliaries, to include repair ships, submarine tenders, salvage ships, floating dry docks, ammunition ships, and seaplane tenders.

The numbers of ships also rose markedly, with oilers increasing from 14 in 1940 to 62 by 1945; 19 repair ships joined the original 2, while hospital ships went from 1 to 6. In aggregate, the Service Force counted 324 ships assigned in September 1943. By March 1944, the figure was 990. In February 1945 it was 1,432, and by the end of the war it was 2,930. The personnel manning this armada grew proportionally. By the end of the war in August 1945, crew members of the Service Force numbered 456,314. One out of every 6 sailors in the U.S. Navy served in the arm.

The Service Force enabled the Pacific Fleet to advance on the Japanese home islands. Replenishment groups and escorts, remaining always out of reach of enemy airpower, trailed the task forces by a few hundred miles. Every few days, the combatants would drop back to refuel and take aboard the myriad items necessary for continued operations. Then the replenishment

group would return to a forward base to replenish from merchant ships while another group took its place. Thus, the Service Force conferred on Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's warships the ability to remain at sea almost indefinitely and to engage in prolonged offensives without returning to port.

Additionally, repair ships could often return damaged warships to service without their visiting a yard. At Ulithi, Service Squadron 10 counted 9 destroyer tenders, 14 floating dry docks, and 13 repair ships, along with many other craft. As one example, the new battleship *Iowa*, continuously at sea from January to December 1944, was forced by a machinery failure to Ulithi, where a floating dry dock made the necessary repairs and thereby quickly returned the battleship to its task force.

In 1945, the Service Force was tasked with the additional responsibility of assisting the Royal Navy in supporting its British Pacific Fleet. Until this point in the war, British warships had usually operated within easy range of the many shore establishments maintained in Britain's overseas empire. These had sufficed in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean, but as Britain assembled its largest naval force of World War II for the drive on Japan, its logistical shortcomings became quickly apparent.

By agreement with the U.S. Navy, the British Pacific Fleet was to be self-sufficient, which meant that it would require 158 supporting ships. However, some of the auxiliaries on hand proved unsuitable for the purpose, the tankers being ill-equipped for alongside refueling, to give one example. Fortunately, U.S. logisticians in the theater interpreted the requirement for British self-sufficiency with considerable latitude and rendered great assistance in the establishment of a forward British base at Manus in the Admiralty Islands. In return, the British Pacific Fleet afforded substantial reinforcement to the U.S. Fleet in the closing months of the war.

In contrast to these Allied efforts, the Japanese never developed a logistical arm adequate to support the excellent warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Factors contributing to this surprising oversight include the Japanese supposition that any war would be short as well as the samurai disdain for the mundane matter of supply as not worthy of a warrior. In consequence, the Japanese conducted even their earliest offensives on a logistical shoestring. In telling contrast to the mobility of the most powerful U.S. warships, the giant battleship *Yamato* spent the crucial six months of the Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942–February 1943) anchored at Truk, in

large part because of the Japanese inability to satisfy its prodigious appetite for fuel. By 1944, the Japanese were forced to base the bulk of the Combined Fleet in the East Indies to keep their major warships close to their oil supply.

MALCOLM MUIR JR.

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Iowa-Class U.S. Navy Battleships; Nimitz, Chester William; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Fleischer, Carl Gustav (1883–1942)

Norwegian Army general. Carl Gustav Fleischer was born on December 28, 1883, at Bjørnør Rectory (Sør-Trøndelag), Norway. His ancestors had immigrated to Norway from East Prussia beginning in the 17th century. Fleischer graduated from the Norwegian Military Academy in 1905, and by 1917 he had been promoted to captain. From 1919 to 1923, Fleischer was chief of staff of the 6th Division. He took command of the 14th Regiment in 1934 and commanded the 6th Military District in 1939 and 1940. He made major in 1930 and colonel in 1934.

In April 1940 when German forces invaded Norway, Fleischer, now a major general, was commanding the 6th Infantry Division. Ordered to lead Norwegian ground troops against German forces at Narvik in northern Norway, Fleischer managed to contain the Germans in the mountains north of the town. Although suspicious of Britain and France, Fleischer operated in conjunction with the British naval bombardment of German forces and with French and Polish land forces on the coast. Fleischer finally defeated the Germans at Narvik, forcing their withdrawal. After the fall of Norway, Fleischer was appointed commander in chief of the Norwegian army-in-exile, now in Great Britain. Later in 1940, he was made chief of the army high command.

Angry at the British for their withdrawal from Norway, Fleischer found himself in constant disagreement with London over military policy. In 1942 he was sent to Ottawa, Canada, as military attaché. On December 14, 1942, severely discontented with Norwegian military policy and dejected over his perceived shabby treatment by the Norwegian government-in-exile, Fleischer committed suicide in Ottawa.

BRANDON SCOTT BOOR AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Narvik, Operations in; Norway; Norway, German Conquest of

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Fletcher, Frank Jack (1885–1973)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Marshalltown, Iowa, on April 29, 1885, the son of Rear Admiral Thomas Jack Fletcher, Frank Jack Fletcher graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1906. Commissioned an ensign in 1908, Fletcher commanded the destroyer *Dale* in the Asiatic Torpedo Flotilla in 1910. Fletcher saw action in the 1914 U.S. intervention at Veracruz, Mexico. For overseeing the movement of more than 350 refugees to safety, he was awarded the Medal of Honor. Lieutenant Fletcher then served in the Atlantic Fleet.

Following U.S. entry into World War I in 1917, Fletcher was promoted to lieutenant commander and commanded the destroyer *Benham* on convoy escort and patrol operations. Fletcher's postwar commands included submarine tenders, destroyers, and a submarine base in the Philippines, where he helped suppress an insurrection in 1924.

Fletcher attended both the U.S. Naval War College (1929–1930) and U.S. Army War College (1930–1931). From 1933 to 1936, he served as aide to the secretary of the navy. From 1936 to 1938, Fletcher commanded the battleship *New Mexico* and then served in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Following his

promotion to rear admiral, Fletcher commanded Cruiser Division 3 in the Atlantic Fleet.

U.S. Navy vice admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. (Corbis)

On December 15, 1941, Fletcher took command of the Wake Island relief force centered on the carrier *Saratoga,* but he moved cautiously, and the island fell on December 23, before he arrived. In January 1942, Fletcher assumed command of Task Force 17, centered on the carrier *Yorktown.* He participated in carrier raids on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands and joined Task Force 11 in attacks on Japanese shipping in the Solomon Islands. Fletcher commanded U.S. forces in the May 7–8, 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea. Following his return to Pearl Harbor for hasty repairs to the *Yorktown,* Fletcher raced back with the carrier to join U.S. forces near Midway, where he helped orchestrate the dramatic U.S. victory on June 3–6, 1942, in which the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers and the Americans only one, the *Yorktown.*

Fletcher then commanded the three-carrier task force supporting 1st Marine Division assaults on Tulagi and Guadalcanal (Operation WATCHTOWER). Unwilling to risk his carriers, Fletcher took the controversial decision to withdraw them before the transports had completed unloading supplies to the marines, forcing the transports to depart as well. He then

committed his forces against the Japanese counterattack toward Guadalcanal, resulting in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (August 22–25, 1942). Wounded when his flagship, the carrier *Saratoga*, was torpedoed, Fletcher returned to the United States.

Upon his recovery, Fletcher commanded the 13th Naval District and the Northwestern Sea Frontier. Fletcher's reputation for caution led chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King in 1943 to assign him to command the North Pacific area. Following Japan's surrender in August 1945, Fletcher participated in the occupation of Japan, overseeing northern Honshu and Hokkaido.

In 1945, Fletcher was assigned to the navy's General Board, which advised the secretary of the navy; he served as its chairman from May 1946 until May 1947, when he was promoted to full admiral and retired. Fletcher died in Bethesda, Maryland, on April 25, 1973.

STEPHEN PATRICK WARD

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft Carriers; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; King, Ernest Joseph; Midway, Battle of; United States Navy; Wake Island, Battle for

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Fluckey, Eugene Bennett (1913–2007)

U.S. Navy officer, submariner, and recipient of the Medal of Honor and four Navy Crosses. Eugene Bennett Fluckey was born in Washington, D.C., on

October 5, 1913. Commissioned an ensign upon graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in June 1935, Fluckey served in the battleship *Nevada* and the destroyer *McCormick* before being assigned to the Submarine School at New London, Connecticut. Upon completion of the course there, he was assigned first to *S-42* and then to the submarine *Bonita* (SS-165), in which he completed five World War II patrols. In August 1942, he returned to Annapolis, where he completed graduate instruction in naval engineering.

In November 1943, Fluckey reported to the submarine base at New London, where he graduated from the Prospective Commanding Officer's School. Following one war patrol as prospective commander of the submarine *Barb* (SS-220), Fluckey assumed command of that submarine on April 27, 1944. He soon established himself as one of the most effective submarine commanders of all time. Fluckey revolutionized submarine tactics and he carried out the single U.S. landing in the Japanese home islands during the war. While cruising off Otasamu on the east coast of Karafuto, Fluckey noted a railroad on the coast and sent ashore a landing party with demolition charges, who then blew up a 16-car Japanese train. He also fired what he termed "ballistic missiles"—5-inch rockets—into the towns of Shiritori and Kashiho and bombarded two other towns, destroying a lumberyard and sampans.

Fluckey was awarded four Navy Crosses, one each for his 8th, 9th, 10th, and 12th war patrols. On his 11th war patrol of December 19, 1944, to February 15, 1945, he attacked two convoys, sinking a large ammunition ship in the first. The second convoy, which he attacked on January 25, 1945, consisted of 30 Japanese ships anchored in Nankuan Chiang (Mamkwan) Harbor in only five fathoms of water. Despite knowing full well that his escape would entail a risky passage through shallow, mined waters, he attacked and obtained eight direct hits on 6 of the merchant ships. He then cleared the area in a high-speed run and escaped 2 pursuing Japanese destroyers. Fluckey was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor for this daring attack.

Known as the "Galloping Ghost of the China Coast," Fluckey was fourth on the list of most Japanese ships sunk (16 and one-third) but first in shipping tonnage sunk, at 95,360 tons. This latter figure is more than any other U.S. warship captain achieved during the war.

In August 1945, Fluckey returned to Groton, Connecticut, to oversee completion of the submarine *Dogfish* (SS-350) and become its commanding officer, but on its commissioning he was ordered to the office of Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal. In December 1945, Fluckey became the personal aide to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. In June 1947, Fluckey assumed command of the submarine *Halfbeak* (SS-352) before helping establish the Submarine Naval Reserve Force. During 1950–1953, he was U.S. Naval Attaché in Portugal. In September 1953, he took command of the submarine tender *Sperry.* He commanded Submarine Flotilla 7 during 1955–1956 before becoming chairman of the Electrical Engineering Department at the Naval Academy. In July 1960, Fluckey was promoted to rear admiral and then assumed command of Amphibious Group 4. During 1966–1968, he was director of Naval Intelligence before heading the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Portugal.

Fluckey retired from the navy as a rear admiral in 1972. He later ran an orphanage in Portugal for a number of years. Fluckey died in Annapolis, Maryland, on June 28, 2007. On January 24, 2008, his remains were buried in the South China Sea from the U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarine *Pasadena*, near the site of his daring rescue on September 17, 1944, of 14 Australian and British prisoners of war who were being transported to Japan when their ship sank. Some 450 miles distant at the time of the sinking, the crew of the *Barb* managed to locate and rescue these survivors despite a typhoon.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Nimitz, Chester William; Submarines; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan

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Flying Tigers

Group of American volunteer pilots officially named the American Volunteer Group (AVG) who flew for China in the early months of 1942. The Flying Tigers were commanded by Claire Lee Chennault, who, after retiring from the U.S. Army Air Corps as a captain in 1937, went to China as an aviation adviser to Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Chennault also served as a colonel in the Chinese Air Force. Following several frustrating years of trying to build up a Chinese air force while China was fighting one war against Japan and a civil war against the Communist forces of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), Chennault finally developed a plan to form a volunteer group of American pilots and ground crews to be recruited directly from the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy.

Chennault overcame great obstacles to implement his plan. He was aided by the fact that China had powerful friends within the U.S. government, including Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. On April 15, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an unpublished executive order authorizing reserve officers and enlisted men to resign from the U.S. military for the purpose of joining the AVG. In another deal, the British government agreed to waive its rights to a production run of 100 almost obsolete Curtiss P-40B fighters in exchange for guaranteed priority on another order of a later model. The tiger-shark jaws that AVG pilots painted on the noses of their P-40s contributed to their nickname, which was bestowed on them by *Time* magazine in its December 27, 1941, issue.

Members of the AVG signed a one-year contract with the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company, a U.S. firm that had the contract with the Chinese government to provide pilots, planes, and crews. Pilots' salaries ranged from $250 to $750 per month. Not part of the written contract was an agreement that pilots were also to receive $500 for each Japanese plane shot down.

The first contingent of AVG pilots departed for China by ship in July 1941. The next month, they commenced training at the British air base in Toungoo, Burma. Training focused on air-combat theories, then somewhat unconventional, that Chennault had developed during his years in the U.S. Army Air Corps and tested in China after 1937. Chennault's tactics were built on the two-plane element and a careful analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the opposing aircraft. Chennault stressed, for example,

that his pilots should never try to turn with the more maneuverable Japanese aircraft. Instead, they should take advantage of the P-40's heavier weight to attack from above and then dive to break contact with the enemy. Chennault insisted that his pilots learn their enemy's fighter tactics better than the Japanese pilots themselves.

When the entire contingent arrived in Asia, the AVG was organized into three squadrons: the 1st ("Adam and Eves"), the 2nd ("Panda Bears"), and the 3rd ("Hell's Angels"). The AVG first went into combat over Yunnan Province in China on December 20, 1941, almost two weeks after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The AVG then had 82 pilots and 79 operational P-40s.

As soon as the United States entered World War II, plans were developed to bring the AVG personnel back into the U.S. military. Chennault returned to active duty in the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) on April 7, 1942, as a colonel. The AVG was to be reintegrated by July 4, 1942, to become the 23rd Fighter Group, which would be commanded by Colonel Robert L. Scott, newly arrived from India. The 23rd would be part of the larger China Air Task Force (CATF), which would be commanded by Chennault as a brigadier general and subordinate to the U.S. Tenth Air Force in India. The CATF later grew to become the Fourteenth Air Force, commanded by Chennault as a major general.

The pilots and ground crew of the AVG were offered assignments in the USAAF and were strongly encouraged to accept them or face the draft board back home. Many objected to the strong-arm tactics. In the end, only 5 AVG pilots agreed to rejoin the U.S. military and fly for the CATF. Another 19 stayed in China and continued to fly for China National Airways. To help Chennault with the transition, however, 20 pilots and 24 ground crew agreed to serve two weeks beyond July 4. Two of those volunteer pilots were killed during that period. Other AVG pilots who did not stay in China later made significant contributions in other theaters of war. They included James Howard, who flew with the 354th Fighter Group in Europe, and Gregory Boyington, who flew with the marines in the Pacific. Both subsequently earned the Medal of Honor.

A Chinese soldier guards a line of American P-40 fighter aircraft, painted with the shark-face emblem of the Flying Tigers, at an airfield in China, ca. 1942. (National Archives)

Although some military experts predicted at the time that the AVG would not last three weeks, it achieved one of the more impressive records in air warfare. In less than seven months in combat, the unit certainly destroyed 299 Japanese aircraft and probably destroyed another 153. The AVG lost only 12 P-40s and 4 pilots killed in air-to-air combat. It lost another 6 pilots to ground fire: 3 were captured and 3 were killed on the ground by enemy bombs. Another 10 pilots died in flying accidents.

Despite the fact that most members of the AVG came from the U.S. military (and many returned to the military to serve in World War II), they were branded as mercenaries for many years following the war. In 1991, a U.S. Air Force panel concluded that all members of the AVG had been fighting for the United States at the time and were eligible for veterans' benefits on the basis of that service. On December 8, 1996, the air force further recognized the AVG by awarding the Distinguished Flying Cross to the pilots and the Bronze Star Medal to the ground crews.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Boyington, Gregory “Pappy”; Jiang Jieshi; Knox, William Franklin “Frank”; Mao Zedong; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Sino-Japanese War

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Forbes, Sir Charles Morton (1880–1960)

British admiral and commander of the Home Fleet. Born in Colombo, Ceylon, on November 22, 1880, Charles Morton Forbes joined the Royal Navy as a cadet at age 14 and graduated two years later. A gunnery specialist, he received advanced training on HMS *Excellent,* the Royal Navy’s gunnery school. He favorably impressed one of the officers, Sir Roger Blackhouse, a future first sea lord, who furthered his career. During World War I, Forbes was a staff officer to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who commanded the Grand Fleet at the 1916 Battle of Jutland, where, as Jellicoe’s flag commander on the *Iron Duke,* Forbes won the Distinguished Service Order. From 1917 to 1919, Forbes commanded the light cruiser *Galatea.*

Following two years at the Royal Staff College at Greenwich, in 1923 Forbes became director of naval ordnance. In October 1928 he was promoted to rear admiral, and in 1932 he was appointed third sea lord and controller, a post that gave him responsibility for naval warship design and construction. Two years later, he became a full admiral, commander of the 1st Battle Squadron, and second-in-command of the Mediterranean Fleet. In 1938, Forbes took command of the Home Fleet.

Forbes’s leadership came under much scrutiny during the Norwegian Campaign of April 1940. He and a divided Admiralty could not decide whether the Germans were more likely to invade Norway or attempt to move their capital ships into the Atlantic. Forbes ordered the battleship *Rodney* and battle cruiser *Repulse* to sea, hoping to match the German battle cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau,* but this move left the southern North Sea

unguarded and the Home Fleet unable to check the German invasion of Norway. The entire Norwegian Campaign was plagued by indecision and inadequate forces, and his actions earned Forbes the nickname "Wrong-Way Forbes."

Although Forbes was promoted to admiral of the fleet in May 1940, he was removed from command of the Home Fleet in December in favor of Admiral John Tovey following a dispute over the transfer of fleet assets to England's southern coast. Forbes thought an invasion unlikely and suggested that German U-boats presented a graver threat. Forbes then commanded the Portsmouth navy base, overseeing planning and assaults against German shipping along the French coast and the U-boat pens at Brest and at Saint-Nazaire. Forbes retired from the navy in August 1943. He died in London on August 28, 1960.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Great Britain, Navy; Tovey, Sir John Cronyn; WESERÜBUNG, Operation

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Force H

British naval task force established at Gibraltar in late June 1940, created in an effort to offset the loss of French naval power in the Mediterranean occasioned by the German defeat of France and the entry of Italy into the war. For obscure reasons it was named Force H, and it was something of an anomaly in command structure, as it reported directly to the first sea lord in London rather than to the flag officer commanding in the North Atlantic, already at Gibraltar.

Commanded first by Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville (July 1940–January 1942), then Rear Admiral Edward Neville Syfret (January 1942–January 1943), Vice Admiral Sir Harold Burrough (January 1943–March 1943), and Vice Admiral Algernon Usborne Willis, Force H initially consisted of the aircraft carrier *Ark Royal*, the battleships *Resolution* and *Valiant*, the battle cruiser *Hood*, and a small number of cruisers and destroyers. During the next three years, it was the chief British naval force in the western Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.

The first principal engagement for Force H was the July 1940 Operation CATAPULT, the British attack on French naval units at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria. Force H also played a leading role in numerous engagements in the Mediterranean, particularly the resupply operations to Malta, during which it fought the Battle of Cape Spartivento on November 27, 1940. Its ships also took a leading role in the operation to hunt down the German battleship *Bismarck*, and they bombarded Genoa in February 1941. Force H participated in the May 5, 1942, invasion of Madagascar, and it provided cover for the Allied landings in North Africa (Operation TORCH) on November 8, 1942; Sicily (Operation HUSKY) during July 9–August 22, 1943; and Salerno, Italy (Operation AVALANCHE) in September 1943. For all practical purposes, Force H ceased to exist after the surrender of the bulk of the Italian fleet that September and the dispersal of its assets elsewhere.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Calabria, Battle of; Cape Spartivento, Battle of; CATAPULT, Operation; Great Britain, Navy; Harwood, Sir Henry; Malta, Convoy Battles; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Taranto, Attack on

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Force K (1941)

British Royal Navy Mediterranean task force based at Malta. In November 1941, with events in North Africa reaching a climax and the British Eighth Army preparing to attack Axis forces there, London dispatched additional naval units to harass German and Italian cross-Mediterranean supply efforts. Known as Force K and commanded by Commodore William Gladstone Agnew, it consisted of the light cruisers *Aurora* and *Penelope* from the Home Fleet and the destroyers *Lance* and *Lively* from Gibraltar.

Force K reached Malta on October 21, 1941, and, early on the morning of November 9, 1941, it scored a great success against a Brindisi-to-Benghazi convoy (the Beta or Duisburg Convoy). Force K sank one of four escorting Italian destroyers, damaged another, and sank all seven of the merchant ships. The British submarine *Upholder,* which had closed during the night, sank another of the Italian destroyers.

Force K registered other successes on November 24, when it sank 2 important supply ships, 1 German and 1 Italian. Indeed, Force K accounted for 10 of the 12 Axis resupply ships lost in November. On December 1, it sank 2 more Axis ships also bound for Africa, an Italian supply ship and a tanker. Meanwhile, Force K was strengthened by the addition of the cruiser *Neptune.*

Force K provided security for British supply efforts to Malta, most notably by the fast supply ship *Breconshire* in mid-December. On its safe arrival, Force K immediately departed to attack another reported convoy. But on the night of December 18 off Tripoli, Force K ran into a minefield recently laid there by Italian destroyers. The cruiser *Neptune* hit four mines and went down; only one man of its crew was saved. The cruisers *Aurora* and *Penelope* hit one mine each. Damaged, they managed to regain Malta safely. The destroyer *Kandahar* also struck a mine and was badly damaged and had to be scuttled.

Force K continued to operate from Malta with the *Penelope* and five to six destroyers, but it mostly escorted empty transports from Malta and met full ones coming in. It achieved its last success against Axis shipping on February 7, 1942, when two of its destroyers sank a pair of small Italian

coasters. It also participated in the Second Battle of Sirte on March 22, 1942. Finally, in April 1942, intensified air attacks on Malta forced all surface ships to withdraw from Malta.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Beta Convoy Battle; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Sirte, Second Battle of

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Formosa

See Taiwan

Forrestal, James Vincent (1892–1949)

U.S. Secretary of the Navy and later secretary of defense. Born in Beacon, New York, February 15, 1892, James Vincent Forrestal entered Dartmouth College in 1911. The next year he transferred to Princeton, but he left school without graduating in 1914. Two years later, Forrestal secured a position with the investment-banking corporation of William A. Read and Company (later known as Dillon, Read & Company). When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, Forrestal enlisted in the navy. Soon afterward, he transferred to the aviation branch; he trained in Canada with the Royal Flying Corps but never saw combat. At the end of the war, he left the navy as a lieutenant and returned to Dillon, Read & Co., becoming its vice president in 1926 and president in 1938.

In 1940, Forrestal resigned his position to join the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration as undersecretary of the navy. His primary role was in procurement, which was vital in preparing the U.S. Navy for World War II. Forrestal worked closely with his army counterpart, Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson, to streamline contracting and purchasing policies. Forrestal oversaw the rapid expansion of the navy in the early years of the war, including not only number of ships but also facilities and training. On the sudden death of Secretary of the Navy William F. Knox, Forrestal succeeded to the post in May 1944 and continued in the position until 1947.

In September 1947, Forrestal became the first secretary of defense. In this capacity he is sometimes referred to as the "godfather of the national-security state." Forrestal was a staunch proponent of efforts to halt what he saw as Soviet expansionist policies, and he lobbied hard for George F. Kennan's containment doctrine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Forrestal also supported the concept of a balanced military establishment.

The immense strain of his position weighed heavily on Forrestal and led to irrational behavior. In January 1949, President Harry S. Truman informed Forrestal that he was replacing him as defense secretary with Louis Johnson. On March 1, 1949, Forrestal resigned his post. Admitted to Bethesda Naval Hospital, Maryland, for psychiatric care, on May 22, 1949, Forrestal leaped to his death from the 16th floor of that facility.

TODD M. WYNN

See also

Knox, William Franklin "Frank"; Patterson, Robert Porter; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; United States Navy

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Fort Drum, Manila Bay

The U.S. Army's "concrete battleship," part of the Corregidor (Philippines) fortifications guarding Manila Bay. The unique shape of this coastal fortification, which indeed resembles a dreadnought battleship, was dictated by the narrow island on which it rests. With a length of 350 feet and a maximum width of 144 feet, Fort Drum's main deck towered 44 feet above low water. The exterior walls were some 20 feet thick. Fort Drum was armed with four twin-turret–mounted 14-inch rifles in a superfiring configuration. Secondary armament was four 6-inch rifles in two double-decked steel casemates.

When Japan invaded the Philippines on December 8, 1941, Fort Drum's guns swung into action. The fort's effectiveness was limited by the fact that it was primarily stocked with armor-piercing shells to fight enemy battleships that never came. Nonetheless, Drum's batteries fired continuously at the Japanese invaders; until late 1942, Fort Drum had the largest guns on land or sea on any front firing at America's enemies. On one occasion, the guns of Fort Drum were supposed to have broken up a Japanese division-sized assault on U.S. forces dug in on Bataan.

During the Japanese attack on Corregidor (April–May 1942), not a man of the Fort Drum garrison was killed, and only one was slightly wounded, although the fort was pounded steadily by Japanese shells that ranged up to 240mm howitzers. The great concrete structure shook under Japanese pounding, but it suffered no major damage.

On May 6, 1942, as a part of the general U.S. capitulation in the Philippines, Fort Drum was ordered to surrender along with the remainder of the Corregidor forts. Filipino American forces on Bataan had already surrendered the previous month. Fort Drum's garrison had just 20 minutes to disable the fort but did it so well that the Japanese were never able to put it back into commission, even though one of the main batteries still had its carriage and recoil system intact and its breechblock lying on the turret floor.

With the return of the Americans to the Philippines, Fort Drum became a major target. After intense U.S. air bombardment and one repulsed reconnaissance by a U.S. Navy party that thought the fort was abandoned, an American landing party poured diesel oil into the structure and touched it off.

The resulting explosion killed the entire Japanese garrison of 70 survivors of the Japanese superdreadnought *Musashi*.

Fort Drum still exists, the victim more of inveterate scrap-metal merchants (although the fort is a protected landmark for both the Philippines and the United States) than of the weather or World War II.

STANLEY SANDLER

See also

Bataan, Battle of; Corregidor, Battle of; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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FORTITUDE, NORTH and SOUTH, Operations (1944)

Deception operations in support of Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of Normandy that began on June 6, 1944. Operation OVERLORD was a vast operation that was impossible to conceal. It involved more than 150,000 troops and 5,000 ships. Operation FORTITUDE was the elaborate deception plan designed to mislead the German defenders as to the timing and location of the Allied invasion.

Operation FORTITUDE had two components: FORTITUDE NORTH and FORTITUDE SOUTH. Operation FORTITUDE NORTH was designed to convince the Germans that the Allies planned to invade Norway in cooperation with a Soviet offensive designed to drive Finland from the war. It also tried to deceive the Germans into thinking that the Norwegian invasion would take place prior to an invasion in France. The intent was to cause the Germans to shift divisions from France to Norway or to have these forces in transit so they could not take part in the battle. To achieve this, the British in Scotland

employed dummy vehicles, inflatable tanks and aircraft, fake radio transmissions, and dummy subordinate headquarters simulating the Fourth Army Group in "preparations" for an invasion of Norway. German reconnaissance aircraft were allowed to fly over the "assembly points" and report this information to Berlin. Operation FORTITUDE NORTH worked, as the Germans actually reinforced Norway.

As the time for Operation OVERLORD approached, the second component of the deception plan, Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH, became critical. Knowing that the Allied buildup in southern England could not be kept hidden, the British and Americans planned to persuade the Germans that the chief Allied assault would fall in the Pas de Calais (across the English Channel from Dover) rather than in Normandy (the actual landing area). The Pas de Calais was the most obvious choice for a major amphibious operation. It was the closest point on the French coast to England and would minimize the length of Allied supply lines as well as offer an extensive road network that could be exploited in follow-on attacks through the Low Countries toward Germany once the beaches were taken.

The first step was to leak plans of the sham invasion of Calais. This was done, as during Operation FORTITUDE NORTH, through the British secret services, which planted stories and documents with double agents. Incredibly, the British seem to have identified or turned (recruited as a double agent) every German agent in Britain during the war. Double agents were particularly useful for providing small bits of information, which the Germans could then piece together. The British also arranged to leak sham information through neutral diplomats with Axis sympathies.

To build the desired perception on the part of German intelligence, a fictitious First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed directly across from Calais in Kent and Sussex. Lieutenant General George S. Patton, whose reputation as a hard-driving army leader was well known by the Germans, was repeatedly identified as FUSAG's commander. This fictitious force was composed of the U.S. Fourteenth Army and British Fourth Army. With the exception of three real British divisions included in the fictitious British army, all of these formations were bogus. The ghost divisions had elaborate stories woven around them to make their existence more believable. The Allies even created shoulder patches for the nonexistent FUSAG and its subordinate divisions. The Allies also had real soldiers wear the ghost

division patches in case enemy agents were in a position to report their existence.

Special Allied signal units were used to transmit false radio transmissions from FUSAG and to simulate division, corps, and other army-level communications; these were transmitted in easily breakable ciphers so the Germans could decode the messages. In addition, false references to the fake headquarters were mentioned in bona fide messages.

As in Operation FORTITUDE NORTH, dummy tanks and airplanes built of inflatable rubber were placed in realistic-looking "camps" where German aerial reconnaissance was bound to see them. The deception was made even more believable by FUSAG troop movements in southeast England. Some were elaborate hoaxes, but in most cases they corresponded to actual preinvasion movements by real British and Canadian divisions. Even though the "real" movements were being made to support the Normandy Invasion, they were close enough to the FUSAG area to convince German aerial photo interpreters that they were seeing the imminent invasion of Calais.

A fleet of landing craft deemed unseaworthy but still usable bobbed in British ports across from Calais. Instructions for acts of sabotage were radioed to the French Resistance in the Calais area. In addition, to reinforce the notion that FUSAG would debark on the short route to Calais, the Allied air forces in their program of bombardment prior to OVERLORD dropped three times the tonnage east of the Seine as they did to the west.

In all these activities, Allied intelligence, knowing what picture it wanted the Germans to see, had carefully taken apart FUSAG and sent bits and pieces about it where they knew the German intelligence services would pick them up. The Allies relied on the Germans to put the pieces of the puzzle together for themselves.

Soon it became apparent that the deception was bearing fruit. Ultra signals intercepts of German classified message traffic made reference to FUSAG. This was the proof the FORTITUDE operators needed. They could not expect to fool the Germans forever, but they hoped to minimize German anticipation of a Normandy landing until it was actually under way—and thereafter to keep alive anxiety that the "real" invasion would follow in the Pas de Calais at a later stage.

German intelligence arrived at the desired conclusion. German Army maps captured following the Normandy Invasion indicated the presence of

FUSAG in southeast England. Division areas and corps headquarters corresponded almost exactly with the areas indicated by the Allied deception plan. However, Adolf Hitler was only partly deluded. On March 4 and 20 and April 6, he alluded to the likelihood of a Normandy landing in messages to his senior commanders. Still, apart from allocating the Panzer Lehr and 116th Panzer Divisions to Normandy in the early spring, he made no decisive alteration of German defensive dispositions. Indeed, until he allowed divisions to cross the Seine into Normandy from the Pas de Calais at the very end of July, he himself remained prisoner to the delusion of a second "main" invasion in the Calais area throughout the critical weeks following the initial landings at Normandy.

JAMES H. WILLBANKS

See also

Deception; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hitler, Adolf; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Signals Intelligence

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Foulkes, Charles (1903–1969)

Canadian Army general. Born on January 3, 1903, at Stockton-on-Tees, England, Charles Foulkes grew up in Canada and enlisted in the Permanent Force (army) in 1926. There he amply displayed both the administrative and political skills necessary to win promotion in the cash-strapped, minuscule Canadian regular army of the interwar years.

Foulkes was a major when Canada declared war on September 10, 1939. As an officer trained primarily in staff work, his rise was little short of

meteoric, from brigade major of 1st Division to brigadier, general staff, with the First Army by August 1943. Promoted to major general in January 1944, by June 6, 1944, Foulkes commanded the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division at Normandy, where his performance was less than stellar. Lieutenant General Guy Simonds wanted to replace Foulkes after Operation SPRING in July. This failed Allied effort to capture high ground south of Caen resulted in heavy Canadian casualties.

But Lieutenant General Henry Crerar, who admired Foulkes and feared Simonds as a rival, balked. When Crerar's illness led to his temporary replacement by Simonds during the Battles of the Scheldt (October–November 1944), Foulkes assumed command of II Corps, again with mixed results. But Foulkes was a survivor, and when Lieutenant General Eedson Louis Millard "Tommy" Burns was finally sacked as commander of I Corps in Italy in November 1944, it was Foulkes whom Crerar and Simonds sent to assume command. Perhaps they made this decision because until younger divisional commanders had gained more experience, there was no one better.

Foulkes continued to command I Corps after its move to Holland in March 1945, and it was he, after Crerar's blunt refusal to be present, who accepted the surrender of German forces in Holland at Wageningen on May 5, 1945. (Crerar had fought the Germans in both world wars and had an intense dislike of senior German officers and the regime; he did not wish to acknowledge them in any formal way.)

Although a mediocre field commander, Foulkes was nonetheless an able administrator, skilled at influencing military superiors and politicians. He became the first postwar Canadian Army chief of staff and, in 1951, the first chairman of the newly formed chiefs of staff committee. In the latter post, he oversaw the rebuilding of the Canadian armed forces during and after the 1950–1953 Korean War, and he successfully advocated close military ties with the Americans. Foulkes retired from the army in 1960 and died in Ottawa, Ontario, on September 12, 1969.

PATRICK H. BRENNAN

See also

Burns, Eedson Louis Millard; Canada, Army; Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Scheldt, Battles of the; Simonds, Guy Granville

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Fourcade, Marie-Madeleine Bridou (1909–1989)

French Resistance leader. Born in Marseille on November 8, 1909, Marie-Madeleine Bridou married in 1929, had two children, and was divorced by the time World War II began. She sent her children to safety in Switzerland shortly after she became involved in the Resistance movement in June 1940.

Fourcade was recruited for the French Resistance by Georges Loustaunau-Lacau, the leader of the Navarre network, which was primarily involved in gathering information for the British. When he was arrested in May 1941, Fourcade assumed command under the code name POZ 55. She was the only woman to run a major resistance network in France during the war. The Navarre network later became known as the Alliance. The Germans knew it as Noah's Ark, for its members were assigned animal names. Fourcade was then known as Hedgehog.

The Alliance reported German troop movements and monitored submarine activities and German military operations within France. It also published propaganda tracts and journals. Members of the network also helped identify launch facilities for V-1 buzz bombs and V-2 rockets. Under Fourcade's guidance and supported by British money and equipment, the network grew to more than 3,000 members. Arrested by the Gestapo twice, Fourcade escaped each time. The first time she was caught because a wireless operator sent by the British turned out to be a double agent working for the Germans.

In 1941 and 1942, Fourcade's network helped conceal British airmen who had been shot down and then smuggle them out to Spain and safety. In July 1943 after 30 months of leading the Navarre network, Fourcade was evacuated by the British along with some of the downed airmen. She continued to run the network from a house in Chelsea until July 1944, when

she returned to France. During the course of the war, 438 members of her network were caught and executed.

After the war, Fourcade was active in organizing the Union for the New Republic, the political party of Charles de Gaulle. She also championed recognition for former Resistance members. Fourcade died in Paris on July 20, 1989.

LAURA J. HILTON

See also

France; Resistance; Vichy France; Women in World War II

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France

Located in Western Europe, metropolitan France today encompasses 260,558 square miles and had a 1939 population of approximately 41.75 million. On the eve of World War II, France also possessed a large overseas empire, including sizable portions of North Africa as well as Indochina. France borders Spain and the Mediterranean Sea to the south; Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Luxembourg to the east; Belgium and the English Channel to the north; and the Bay of Biscay (Atlantic Ocean) to the west.

On September 3, 1939, for the second time in a generation, France found itself at war with Germany. In sharp contrast to August 1914, this time the mood in the Third Republic was one of somber resignation. Although France was among the victors in World War I, it had been devastated by the war, with 1,385,300 dead and 4,329,200 wounded (690,000 permanently disabled). One-quarter of all French males of military age lay dead. Much of the fighting had been on French soil, and large stretches of northeastern France had been scarred by the fighting. Buildings and railroads had to be rebuilt and farms put back in cultivation. The costs were staggering, and

finances remained a major problem for French governments of the 1920s. Political instability caused by frequent changes of cabinet and the lack of a strong executive were other major problems.

Denied the genuine national security in terms of protection from Germany that it had sought in the Paris Peace Conference following World War I, France played a Cassandra role in the 1920s and 1930s, warning of the German threat and finding little support in this from Great Britain and the United States, its World War I allies. When the German government defaulted on war reparations, in 1923 French troops occupied the Ruhr. Although this action forced the German government to live up its treaty obligations and French troops then departed, the financial cost of the operation was high, and it brought condemnation of France from Britain and the United States. It also brought the Left to power in France in 1924.

The Ruhr occupation was the last such independent French action before World War II. Thereafter, France followed Britain's lead regarding Germany in return for a guarantee of Britain's support in the event of a German invasion. Successive British governments, however, refused to commit themselves to collective security arrangements regarding Eastern Europe that might have prevented war.

Meanwhile, German leader Adolf Hitler tore up the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pacts, the latter of which Germany had voluntarily signed. In 1936, Hitler sent German troops into the Rhineland. The French Army was then regarded as the world's most powerful military force, and France might have acted unilaterally and halted this step, which could have meant the end of Hitler. When the British refused to support military intervention, however, French leaders took this as an excuse to do nothing.

In September 1938, France and Britain permitted Hitler to seize the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, a French military ally. In March 1939, Hitler secured the whole of Czechoslovakia, prompting Britain, in the worst possible circumstances, to extend a guarantee to Poland—Germany's next target and already a French ally—that Britain would defend it against attack. Following the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, the French government joined Great Britain in declaring war two days later.

The Popular Front that had come to power in France in 1936 had launched a major disarmament program, but on the eve of war France had begun to rearm. It made substantial outlays in arms expenditures and sharp

increases in weapons, especially tanks, of which the French Army had more than the German Army. Time was vital if France (and Britain) were to catch up with German rearmament. The most glaring French military weaknesses, even by May 1940, were in modern aircraft and in antiaircraft guns.

Both London and Paris were confident of military victory, but both governments and their military establishments embarked on the war in leisurely fashion. While the French called up reservists and retrieved artillery from storage, the German Army rolled over Poland. The French Army carried out only a halfhearted offensive in the Rhineland. Had the offensive been on a larger scale and more forcefully prosecuted, it would have carried to the Rhine. Britain was even slower to mobilize and dispatch the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to the continent. France and Britain expected to blockade Germany and use their control of the seas to secure the means to match the Germans in terms of their military establishment, especially in numbers and quality of aircraft. The seven months of inactivity after the German conquest of Poland—known as the Sitzkrieg or Phony War—seemed to suggest that time was on the side of the Allies.

Meanwhile, there was sharp dissension on the French home front. From 1935 to 1939, the French Communist Party had been in the forefront of the antifascist crusade and urged rearmament. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, however, converted the French communists overnight into advocates of neutrality. The government of Premier Édouard Daladier then unwisely moved against the French Communist Party, outlawing it and interning many of its leaders, including those in the National Assembly. Communist agitation against the war continued, however, helping produce doubt and defeatism, particularly among industrial workers conscripted into the army.

This led to the myth that a fifth column had been responsible for the French military defeat in 1940. Dissatisfaction concerning the lack of aggressive military activity also led to a cabinet crisis and change of premier in March 1940; Paul Reynaud replaced Daladier. The new premier projected energy and optimism, but politics forced Reynaud to keep Daladier as minister of war, and the continuing rivalry between the two men handicapped the war effort.

The Phony War ended on April 9, 1940, when German forces invaded Denmark and Norway. The French joined the British in sending troops to

Norway, but these troops could not halt the German conquest and were withdrawn on the opening of the May 10–June 25 Battle for France. On May 10, 1940, German forces invaded the Low Countries and France. The French Maginot Line, built at great cost beginning in 1929, served its intended purpose of channeling the German invasion to the north through Belgium. However, several elements led to disaster: the failure of France and Britain to work out detailed plans with Belgium, which had declared its neutrality and was fearful that cooperation with the Allies would be the excuse for a German invasion; serious flaws in the Allied command structure; inept French senior military leadership; the inability of the Allies to understand the changed tempo of battlefield conditions that represented the German blitzkrieg; and the misuse of superior armor assets.

British and French military deficiencies, especially in the air, were soon all too evident. Too late, the French attempted major command changes. Only a month after the start of the campaign, on June 10, 1940, the French government abandoned Paris for Bordeaux. To spare the city destruction by the German Luftwaffe, the government declared Paris an open city; four days later German troops moved in. On June 16 at Bordeaux, Reynaud suggested that the government and its armed forces move to French territory in North Africa and continue the fight from there. His vice premier, 84-year-old Marshal Henri Phillipe Pétain, opposed this step, as did the new commander of the French Army, 73-year-old General Maxime Weygand. Both men considered the war lost and sought to end fighting that they believed could only lead to additional lives lost for no gain. When a majority of the cabinet voted to ask the Germans for terms, Reynaud resigned on June 16.

Ironically, Reynaud had brought Pétain, hero of the World War I Battle of Verdun, into the government on May 18 to stiffen French resolve following initial Allied setbacks in the campaign for France. On June 16, Pétain became premier and immediately opened negotiations with Germany to end the fighting. The Germans delayed to improve conditions, but the French government signed an armistice with Germany on June 22 and another with Italy on June 24. Fighting ceased on the battlefields of France on June 25. The campaign had lasted but six weeks. Never before in its military history had France been as broken militarily and psychologically.

The armistice of June 25, 1940, divided France into occupied and unoccupied zones. A pass was necessary for French citizens who desired to

move between the two. German forces occupied three-fifths of the country, including northern and western France and the entire Atlantic coast. France had to pay “administrative costs” to the Germans at the absurdly high sum of 20 million reichsmarks a day, calculated at a greatly inflated rate of exchange of 20 francs per reichsmark. This amounted to some 60 percent of French national income. Except for a few units to maintain order, all French military formations were disarmed and demobilized. Ships of the French Navy were to assemble in designated ports and be demobilized. The armistice also called for all German prisoners of war to be immediately released, whereas Germany would retain until the end of the war the 1.5 million French prisoners it had captured. France was also forced to surrender German refugees on French territory.

A new French government was then established at Vichy in central France under Pétain to administer the remaining two-fifths of metropolitan France, which included the Mediterranean coast. Vichy France was left with control of its colonies, although Japan sent in troops and established de facto authority over French Indochina during 1940 and 1941. France then played a schizophrenic role until the end of the war. Most French citizens, convinced that for the indefinite future Germany would rule Europe and disgusted with the infighting and weak leadership that had characterized the Third Republic, rallied to the Vichy regime and its calls for a conservative revolution.

Meanwhile, young Brigadier General of Brigade Charles de Gaulle, the only figure of some consequence to escape abroad following the defeat, sought to rally the French to the then dim hope of eventual victory. He called on French people in Britain, or those who could reach there, as well as the French Empire to join him in continuing the fight. De Gaulle’s Free French, soon recognized by the British government, slowly grew in numbers and support as the war wore on and as Germany failed to defeat Britain and suffered rebuff in its invasion of the Soviet Union. The Resistance was an amalgamation of several diverse groups that finally coalesced in May 1943 as the Conseil National de la Résistance (National Resistance Council), headed by Jean Moulin. Its military arm was the Forces Françaises de l’Interieur (French Forces of the Interior, FFI).

Although some French men and women were active in the Resistance, most of the population simply tried to endure the German occupation. Many actively collaborated with the German occupiers for financial gain, and a few

fervently supported the Nazi policies opposing communism and persecuting the Jews. The Vichy government organized a force known as the Milice to combat growing numbers of the FFI.

Soldiers and civilians celebrate the liberation of the important French port city of Marseille by the Allies, August 29, 1944. (Photo12/UIG/Getty Images)

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill's government recognized de Gaulle's government as the legitimate representative of France, but Churchill also created strong Anglophobia in France by his decision to move to secure the French fleet, most notably at Mers-el-Kébir, where fighting occurred with considerable loss of French life. This affair still rankles the French today, as the French government had promised that it would not let the Germans seize the fleet and ultimately scuttled its main fleet to honor that pledge, even after the events of Mers-el-Kébir.

U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt strongly distrusted de Gaulle, and the United States maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy until the Allied invasion of North Africa—Operation TORCH—in November 1942. French resistance to the Allied landings and devious dealings by Vichy representatives ended Allied attempts to negotiate with Pétain's government.

De Gaulle's Free French forces greatly expanded after the Allied invasion of North Africa. Rearmed and reequipped by the United States, a French Expeditionary Corps of five divisions was sent to Italy in late 1943, and it made a major contribution to the Allied military efforts there. What became

the French First Army landed in southern France in August 1944 as part of Operation DRAGOON. Its 10 divisions fought through France into Germany and Austria. Meanwhile, Allied forces had come ashore in Normandy, and the French Resistance played a key role in isolating the beachheads and preventing German resupply. Everywhere, French men and women assisted the Allied armies. Paris was liberated on August 25, with the 2nd French Armored Division leading the Allied units into the city to join with those fighting the Germans and saving the city's honor.

De Gaulle soon established his government in Paris, and French troops continued with the liberation of French territory. Following the war, nearly 40,000 French citizens were imprisoned for collaboration, including Marshal Pétain and his vice premier, Pierre Laval. Both men were sentenced to death, although de Gaulle commuted Pétain's sentence to life imprisonment in recognition of his World War I service. At least 10,000 people were executed for collaborating with the Nazis. Collaboration was then and still is a highly sensitive topic in France.

The high hopes and idealism of the Resistance were soon dashed. Although an overwhelming 96 percent of Frenchmen voting in an October 1945 referendum rejected the constitutional structure of the Third Republic, sharp political divisions ensured that the Fourth Republic that followed it was virtually a carbon copy. Not until 1958, when the Fourth Republic was overthrown and de Gaulle returned to power, would France have a constitution that ensured a strong executive and avoided political deadlock. Despite de Gaulle's wartime promises of a new relationship with the colonies, the government in Paris pursued a short-sighted policy of trying to hold on to its major colonies, believing that only with its empire could France still be counted as a great power. Such grandiose and outdated notions led to disastrous wars in Indochina and later in Algeria, ultimately toppling the Fourth Republic.

DANA LOMBARDY, T. P. SCHWEIDER, AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Blitzkrieg; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Daladier, Édouard; de Gaulle, Charles; DRAGOON, Operation; France, Battle for; France Campaign; Free French; Laval, Pierre; Moulin, Jean; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Resistance;

Reynaud, Paul; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Saar, French Invasion of the; TORCH, Operation; Vichy France; Versailles, Treaty of; Weygand, Maxime; Document 63; Document 143

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France, Air Force

Recriminations over the poor performance of the French Air Force (Armée de l'Air) in 1940 began even before the armistice with the Germans and were a key element in the notorious Riom Trial held by the Vichy authorities in 1942 to prosecute the alleged saboteurs of France's war effort. Postwar historiography was scarcely less politically charged, and it is only with the passage of more than half a century that the history of France's wartime air force can be examined with some detachment. Whatever the cause, the air service's accomplishments in the May 10–June 25, 1940, Battle for France were extremely disappointing, and its contribution to the national catastrophe was significant.

Why this should have been so, when France in 1940 boasted an experienced cadre of fighter and bomber pilots and many aircraft comparable in quality to the best fielded by the German Luftwaffe and British Royal Air Force, will probably always remain something of a mystery. It can be better

understood, however, by looking at the air service's convoluted and often tempestuous development between World War I and World War II.

In many respects, France led the world in aviation technology in the 1920s and 1930s. Its aircraft manufacturers produced many combat machines, and half of the world's airspeed records were set in French-built planes. But the country did not establish an independent air service until 1928, and the motivation for its creation was more political than strategic. From its inception, the Armée de l'Air was a pawn in the long-standing intrigue between the Third Republic's political class and its generals, many of whom had never reconciled themselves to civilian authority. The air force was intended as a counterweight to the war ministry, and this atmosphere of interservice rivalry was exacerbated by the country's most influential prewar air minister, Popular Front appointee Pierre Cot, who served from 1933 to 1940. For all his undoubted administrative skill, Cot's overbearing style only deepened military suspicions that the Armée de l'Air was "the armed service of the Left," with all the ideological contamination that implied.

As with many of their contemporaries, the French air chiefs between the wars were intrigued by the strategic bombing theories of Giulio Douhet and other airpower advocates. Not only was an independent strategic role a fashionable concept in aviation circles, but it also entrenched the Armée de l'Air's autonomy from the War Ministry. Cot was an enthusiast, but in trying to simultaneously placate both the strategic bombing advocates and army commanders who urged him to create a tactical support arm for the ground forces, he proposed the ill-fated BCR (Bomber Combat Reconnaissance) aircraft, a multirole fighter-bomber aircraft that was necessarily mediocre in all its capacities and a waste of much time and money. After Cot's replacement by Guy La Chambre in 1938, the strategic bombing plan was theoretically sidelined, but its influential proponents within the air service felt betrayed by the government and began a policy of tacit noncooperation with both state and army. Despite official doctrine, little or no progress was made on genuine collaboration between the ground and air forces prior to the outbreak of World War II.

In principle, neither supply nor quality of aircraft was a key problem. By May 1940, the Armée de l'Air possessed no fewer than 4,360 machines, of which approximately 2,900 were modern combat aircraft, with 67 fully equipped fighter squadrons, 66 bomber squadrons, and 30 observation

squadrons (escadrilles). Some 619 new aircraft were arriving from French factories each month, and there were regular shipments of Curtiss 75A (export version of the Curtiss P-36 Hawk) fighters from the United States. The chief problem lay in lack of pilots, technical support, and trained ground crews rather than lack of aircraft.

The best of France's own fighters, in particular the brand-new Dewoitine 520 (which went into service a few days after the German assault in the west), were on a par with their chief adversary, the Messerschmitt BF-109E. But scarcely one-quarter of this force was deployed on the crucial Northeastern Front. Explanations for this critical waste of resources have frequently focused on accusations of personal incompetence or even treachery, but the real culprit appears to have been France's inadequate supply of pilots. The aviation training program had not kept pace with the expansion in combat machines, so that even by calling up middle-aged reservists, the service's wartime commander, General Joseph Vuillemin, was unable to crew nearly the number of planes that were available. Far too many excellent aircraft remained uselessly crated up in storage while the air battle over France intensified.

Nor were the aircraft committed to France's defense well used. In February 1940, Vuillemin had relented to a demand that his frontline units be subordinated in command to General Alphonse Georges's individual army groups, maintaining for Vuillemin's personal direction only the strategic bomber reserve. Neither the airmen nor their peers in the land forces were properly trained in close-support techniques, and the resulting air/ground "cooperation" proved tragically inept: aircraft and pilots were wasted in piecemeal assaults on the German spearheads that lacked any coherent choreography with the army's counterattacks. Individual skill and bravery could not overcome such clumsy organization, and the withdrawal of the best squadrons to North Africa, which started five days before the armistice, indicates how profoundly the air force had lost confidence in its own ability to resist.

In the Vichy settlement, the army took its revenge on the Armée de l'Air, stripping it of its ministerial independence and reducing it once more to a branch of the regular ground forces. The surviving 19 metropolitan squadrons were equipped with obsolescent machines; the superior escadrilles were posted mostly to Algeria and Morocco, where in time they would be absorbed

into Free French leader Charles de Gaulle's forces after the November 8, 1942, Operation TORCH Allied landings in North Africa.

Despite its undoubted weaknesses, the air force's contribution to the Allied war effort should not go unrecognized. The 600–1,000 German aircraft it destroyed in May and June 1940 were sorely missed by the Luftwaffe during the ensuing Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940). But perhaps Cot's postwar eulogy concludes the story best: "The French did not lose the air battle; bad organization did not even let them fight it."

ALAN ALLPORT

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Production of; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Britain, Battle of; Douhet, Giulio; France; France, Army; France, Battle for; Georges, Alphonse Joseph; TORCH, Operation

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France, Army

The "strange defeat" of the French Army in the May–June 1940 Battle for France invites some of the most intriguing counterfactual assumptions of World War II. Was France's enervated and demoralized military fated to suffer catastrophe against the German Ardennes Offensive, or could sounder deployment, more energetic leadership, and a little more luck in the field have forestalled the sudden German victory? When did the slow decay within the antebellum army become truly critical? To address such questions, one must acknowledge the dual importance of contingency and determinism in matters of war.

Certainly the success of German leader Adolf Hitler's May 1940 CASE YELLOW (FALL GELB), the assault on France and the Low Countries, relied to some extent on specific errors of judgment by the French and British political-military leadership that greater forethought might well have prevented. However, the collapse of the Third Republic was symptomatic of deep and profound flaws within its army's prewar preparations that would have inevitably compromised France's defense no matter how spirited or ingenious its commanders had been in 1940.

The dilemma for France's military planners in the 20 years after the World War II armistice of 1918 was how to provide effective national security from a resurgent Germany when France faced a now permanently weakened manpower base and diminishing prospects of allied support. The horrific casualties of World War I began their demographic payoff in the mid-1930s as the "hollow classes" of conscripts fell 140,000 people short of target each year. At the same time, political considerations demanded the reduction of the traditional three-year draft into the army regiments to a single year, and although the draft was increased to two years in 1935, the new law was not uniformly enforced.

One option was to consider a smaller but better-equipped and better-trained army of career professional soldiers. Such was the case sketched by young Major Charles de Gaulle in his provocative 1934 work *Vers l'armée du métier* (The Army of the Future), in which he proposed the creation of six heavily armored divisions that would form an elite cadre for future offensive operations. Quite apart from cost, the civilian ministers recoiled at the thought of this potential Praetorian Guard; relations between the army and the Republican political class were still bad enough in the 1930s for the possibility of a military coup to be taken seriously.

The army, then, would remain a mass conscripted force. France's deficiency in manpower would be made up by defensive works, applying the lessons of Verdun—however incompletely understood—to the Maginot Line, a series of sophisticated frontier fortifications along the Franco-German border named for Minister of War André Maginot. The line was designed to canalize any German attack to the north, and it accomplished this in 1940. Comfortably ensconced behind this apparently impregnable fortress wall, the field army's task would be to stand in reserve and repel intrusions between the main Maginot forts while thrusting into Belgium to engage any German

assault north of the Ardennes. With a heavy concentration on defense and a battlefield this time mercifully removed from France's industrial heartland, the hope was to oppose and halt a westward attack despite the significant numerical advantage the Germans would enjoy.

At the outbreak of war, the Armée Metropolitaine mobilized 94 frontline and reserve divisions for the defense of France, with 215 infantry regiments all told—less than two-thirds the number mustered in August 1914. These divisions were organized into nine field armies and four army groups, with supreme command vested in General Maurice Gamelin, chief of staff of national defense. Gamelin's authority was, however, compromised by the unclear chain of responsibility between him and General Alphonse Georges, his commander on the crucial Northeast Front. Personal antagonism between the two men did nothing to dispel this ambiguity.

Georges's 1st and 2nd Army Groups of three armies apiece were disposed along the Franco-Belgian border along with the newly arrived British Expeditionary Force (BEF), while the 3rd Army Group under General Antoine Besson kept watch in Alsace-Lorraine. General René Henri Olry's Army of the Alps commanded the mountainous frontier against Italy. As it turned out, it accomplished this task magnificently after Italy's clumsy offensive in June 1940, the only redeeming chapter in France's agony that year. Scattered units of General Henri Honoré Giraud's Seventh Army guarded the French coasts.

A quartet of bureaus administered this great force: 1st (personnel and organization), 2nd (intelligence), 3rd (operations), and 4th (transport and services). Their staffs were located with neither Gamelin nor Georges, a characteristic multiplicity of headquarters that abetted the natural confusion caused by the commander in chief's refusal to take wireless communications seriously. The delays in transmitting and receiving messages to and from the respective commands—messages usually dispatched by motorcycle courier—would have been tardy by World War I standards; they were inexcusable in a war of portable radios and high-speed maneuver.

General Lattre de Tassigny, commander in chief of the French armies in France, inspecting Allied M4 Sherman tanks that liberated the French city of Colmar, February 11, 1945. (Horace Abrahams/Keystone/Getty Images)

A typical infantry division out of the 63 at Gamelin's disposal would consist of 17,500 men: 9 battalions of infantry (870 men each); 2 regiments of artillery, many of them equipped with the famous but now obsolete 75mm World War I field gun; and individual companies of antitank, reconnaissance, pioneer, engineer, signals, transport, medical, and supply troops. *Divisions légères mécaniques* (DLMs, light mechanized divisions), created in the scramble after the BEF evacuation at Dunkerque, had only six battalions and a single artillery regiment each. About half of this force was reserve divisions, divided into type A and type B according to age. There were also several miscellaneous reserve units judged unfit for combat duty that performed light communications and security duties behind the line.

As part of War Minister (from 1936 to 1938) Édouard Daladier's massive rearmament program from 1936 onward, a small number of modern armored divisions (*divisions cuirassées de réserve* [DCRs]) were planned, which would each boast four battalions of more than 150 heavy and light tanks. The most powerful of France's armored vehicles, such as the 30-ton Char B1 bis with 75mm and 47mm armament, could comfortably outgun any German tanks of the period and were generally better armored, although they tended

to lack speed, range, and radio equipment. Supply shortages and ministerial penny-pinching meant that the first two DCRs were not, however, created until January 1940, and only then at half strength. A third division appeared in March, while the fourth, commanded by Colonel Charles de Gaulle, did not make its entrance until the Battle for France was well under way.

Partly compensating for this shortfall were the three DLMs, former cavalry divisions that had been totally upgraded with Somua and Hotchkiss medium tanks as well as motorized dragoon and reconnaissance elements. Three *divisions légères de cavalerie* were a less successful variant on this. They were hybrid formations consisting of one mounted brigade and two battalions of motorized dragoons each. Those vehicles operated by the *chars de combat,* the army's tank arm, that were not delegated to one of the armored or mechanized divisions—more than half of France's tanks—were instead scattered across the various army groups in small packets for infantry support, sometimes at battalion level but more often to companies or platoons.

In addition to its metropolitan army, France could also call on its two imperial forces: the Armée d'Afrique, raised in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, and the Troupes Coloniales, who guarded France's sub-Saharan territories, Madagascar, and Indochina. Each force was a combination of European French–only *zouave* and African *tirailleur* infantry regiments. The Tirailleurs Sénégalais of the Troupes Coloniales were especially prized for their fearsome reputation. The Armée d'Afrique also included *spahis*—irregular mounted troops and the 12-regiment-strong French Foreign Legion. Many colonial units were shipped to France at mobilization so that by May 1940 there were 21 regiments of Algerian and Tunisian Tirailleurs at the front line and several brigades of African cavalry.

Following the armistice with Germany, the rump Vichy regime was allowed only 100,000 men for metropolitan defense (presumably in conscious mimicry of the allowance given the Reichswehr in the Treaty of Versailles following World War I). This Armée de l'Armistice was organized into eight divisions, which because of the army's modest size were quite well provided with personal infantry weapons but lacked all motorized transportation and heavy equipment. By contrast, the Germans were sufficiently impressed by the vigorous defense of Dakar by Free French forces in late 1940 that they allowed the two imperial armies to expand. The

Armée d'Afrique grew first to 127,000 and later to 225,000 men and was allowed the use of tanks, heavy guns, and other modern weaponry.

Unfortunately for their German sponsors, however, neither of Vichy's colonial armies was willing to use its windfall of hardware when it encountered more substantial opposition, such as the Anglo-American TORCH landings on November 8, 1942. It was these landings that precipitated the winding up of the Vichy independent government and the final dissolution of the vestiges of the Third Republic's army. France's military future then lay elsewhere.

ALAN ALLPORT

See also

Besson, Antoine Marie Benoit; Dakar, Attack on; de Gaulle, Charles; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France; France, Air Force; France, Battle for; France, Navy; Free French; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Georges, Alphonse Joseph; Hitler, Adolf; Maginot Line; Saar, French Invasion of the; Sedan, Battle of; TORCH, Operation; Versailles, Treaty of; Vichy France

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France, Battle for (May 10–June 25, 1940)

Germany's sudden strike west in May 1940 through neutral Holland and Belgium caught the Allies by surprise, leading to military defeat and the collapse of the French government. Despite Germany's successful April 1940 invasions of Norway and Denmark, France remained committed to the defensive posture it had assumed on mobilization. The French and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), increased to nearly 400,000 men, could not

occupy their intended defensive positions in neutral Belgium until events forced that nation into the war. When the blow came, the Allied failure to prepare a realistic defense strategy, France's weak government, Germany's blitzkrieg tactics, and the lingering influence of the Phony War (Sitzkrieg) period combined to produce a rapid German victory.

The Germans did not have significant numerical or technological superiority over their opponents. Against Adolf Hitler's 141 divisions of some 3.35 million men, the French, British, Belgians, and Dutch could field 144 divisions of 3.3 million men. The Allies and neutral powers also had more tanks (perhaps 3,600, compared with 2,500 for the Germans). The Allies were sadly deficient, however, in numbers of antiaircraft guns and aircraft. Against 1,444 German bombers, the Allies could send up only 830 fighters. These would have to cope with 1,264 German fighter aircraft, more than 1,000 of which were Bf-109s. Overall, the German air fleets deployed in the west numbered 3,226 combat aircraft, whereas the British and French had half that number.

Well aware of this rough parity, the German General Staff was reluctant to undertake any assault in the late fall of 1939, instead producing the Phony War, when both sides were largely idle. Hitler's insistence on striking into France forced the issue, producing a series of changing operational plans that eventually invalidated the assumptions underlying the French defensive strategy. That strategy, and France's ability to execute it, suffered substantial defects by May 1940.

The prolonged period of inactivity along the front since the fall of Poland had seriously eroded both Allied military morale and confidence in France's military and civilian leadership. Defeatism and internal political struggles divided Premier Paul Reynaud's government. The French high command deliberately overestimated German strength in its pronouncements to provide an excuse in the event of disaster, and bureaucratic inertia and stubbornness hampered efforts by Colonel Charles de Gaulle and others to concentrate France's greater number of tanks into armored units capable of opposing Germany's panzer divisions. The first three French tank divisions did not assemble until January 1940, and they lacked radios. Most of France's tanks were parceled out in small packets along the front to act in support of infantry.

Allied strategy predicted that any German assault would bypass the

fortified Maginot Line by moving through the neutral Low Countries and then pivoting north of Liège to fall upon the English Channel ports and move against France from the north. But following the January 1940 compromise of the original German plan, which would have met Allied strength, Generals Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian convinced Hitler to abandon this approach in favor of concentrating the bulk of the resources on a more southern axis. Under the new plan, while other units extended the line to the sea, the main German force would drive through the Ardennes Forest south of Liège to strike the French army as it moved to defend Belgium.

General Fedor von Bock's Army Group B, charged with invading Belgium and Holland, was downgraded from 37 divisions in the original plan to only 28 in the Manstein plan and to 3 rather than 8 armor divisions. General Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group A, which was to move through the Ardennes, was upgraded from 17 to 44 divisions, including 7 rather than a single armor division. Thus, at the point of the breakthrough, the Germans would outnumber the French 44 divisions to 9.

By early May, the signs of an impending attack were obvious, but its direction, speed, and success caught the Allies by surprise. French intelligence services, usually among the world's best, completely misread German intentions and strengths. Manstein's plan capitalized on the French tendency to anticipate a repetition of the World War I offensive inspired by the Schlieffen Plan. Therefore, the operation began on May 10 with an attack into Holland by Bock's Army Group B. Although some positions held for two or three days, German blitzkrieg tactics drove the bulk of the Dutch army back in short order. The French Seventh Army raced across Belgium to the rescue, arriving on May 12 only to join the retreat.

The great fortress of Eben Emael anchored Belgium's defenses on the south. A German glider assault took the allegedly impregnable position in just 28 hours, opening the path for German tanks. Similar airborne assaults carried bridgeheads and lesser defensive positions, overwhelming Belgian defenses. There, too, help arrived on May 12. British and French forces executing the planned strategy managed to slow the German advance through Belgium by May 14, but the concurrent German strike through the Ardennes obliterated that strategy.

Quickly overrunning Luxembourg, Rundstedt's Army Group A advanced through the Ardennes to reach the main French line along the Meuse River on

May 12. French Army commander General Maurice Gamelin's belated efforts to stem the tide with reinforcements came too late to prevent German forces from crossing the Meuse. The Germans took Sedan and punched a 50-mile gap in France's defenses. By May 16, they were on the Aisne River in open country.

The BEF and many French armor forces were already committed to battle in the north. Gamelin now ordered up reserves and formed the new Sixth Army under General Robert Auguste Touchon to try to seal the gap. General Henri Giraud took over command of the Ninth Army, but his forces were badly mauled by the Germans on May 17, and Giraud was captured. From May 17 to 19, Colonel Charles de Gaulle scored the only French successes of the battle when he flung his 4th Armored Division in three successive thrusts against the southern flank of the German advance from Laon. Aided by airpower, the Germans blunted the Allied attacks and swept on.

The speed of the German advance caught even Rundstedt by surprise, as his armor commanders subverted instructions to slow down, slipped around areas of heavy resistance, and reached the English Channel by May 21. Germany's spectacular success broke General Gamelin's ability to respond. French communications were abysmal, and there was no strategic reserve. Convinced of France's inevitable defeat, Gamelin ceased to exercise effective command. Premier Reynaud dismissed him on May 19 and replaced him with General Maxime Weygand, but the situation was too far gone for Weygand to stave off disaster.

The BEF was trapped in the north, and cooperation between it and the French First Army broke down. Forced to choose between supporting an increasingly unlikely French breakout (which both Weygand and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill ordered) or maintaining his line of retreat to the sea, on May 24 BEF commander General Sir John Gort ordered the BEF to withdraw to the north and the port of Dunkerque.

This proved to be one of the important decisions of the war, for it saved the BEF to fight another day. Hitler now committed his first major military mistake of the war, which allowed the BEF to escape. On May 26, Rundstedt, worried about the speed of the advance, halted the panzer divisions when they were within striking range of the last Channel ports open to the British. Hitler then converted this temporary halt into a firm order. He wanted to allow time for the infantry to come up and was convinced by Luftwaffe commander General Hermann Göring that the Luftwaffe could destroy the

British on the beaches, preventing their escape. Not until May 29 did Hitler release the tanks again, and by that time the BEF was in place, protected in large part by the French First Army. In the weeklong Operation DYNAMO, the British evacuated some 365,000 men from France, of whom nearly 225,000 were British.

Reynaud's new cabinet proved to be unable to deal with the deteriorating situation. The French government disintegrated into rival factions and descended into defeatism. Although much of the army was still intact, it was bereft of leadership and sound strategy and was psychologically defeated. Although Churchill proposed a union of Britain and France to keep the latter in the war, he refused, under pressure from the RAF, to commit the remainder of his fighter aircraft to the Battle for France. It appeared to Paris that Britain was withdrawing from the war, leaving France to fight alone.

By June 5, the Germans had repositioned the bulk of their forces in preparation for the final conquest of France. France opposed the onslaught with a greatly weakened military and an already defeated government. On June 8, Bock's Army Group B reached the Seine. One of his generals, Erwin Rommel, pushed on to Rouen before turning back up the coast, encircling the remaining British and French units along the seashore. East of Paris, French forces held out, perhaps in response to Weygand's futile (and foolish) June 8 order to hold without thought of retreat. But on June 12, Rundstedt's forces broke through the French line at Châlons. That same day, the French government abandoned Paris for Bordeaux in the southwest. On June 13, the government declared Paris an open city to spare it the fate of Warsaw and Rotterdam, and the next day German troops took peaceful possession of the capital.

For a full week, the French government struggled to find a solution while its demoralized forces fought an unorganized withdrawal without any clear strategy. The cabinet rejected alternatives ranging from a retreat to North Africa and the still-secure resources of the colonies to the outright union of France and Britain. The premier summoned Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, hoping he could restore morale and reinvigorate resistance. Unfortunately, the aged hero believed that the war was lost and added his voice to the defeatists opposing Reynaud. On June 10, Italy entered the war on Germany's side, although Italian forces did not attack France in the southeast until June 20.

Late on the evening of June 16, with the Germans having taken Verdun and beginning to cut off the Maginot Line from the rear, Reynaud resigned. With his departure, any hope of France remaining in the war disappeared. Pétain succeeded him as premier, proclaiming in a radio address to the French people the next day that the country had lost the war and "the fighting must stop." Many army commanders interpreted this as an order, and the German advance continued largely without resistance. General of Brigade de Gaulle and a few other Frenchmen escaped to Britain.

France and Germany signed a cease-fire on June 22, 1940, but operations continued at Hitler's insistence until the Italians agreed to the armistice on June 25. Signed at Compiègne—at the same site and in the same railway carriage that had witnessed the signing of the armistice with Germany in 1918—the 1940 armistice allowed Germany to occupy northern France and the Atlantic coastal regions to the Spanish border, with France to pay for the German costs of administration. French prisoners of war remained under German control. The French fleet, much of which had escaped to North Africa, would remain under French control but be demobilized. The French government, having fled Paris, continued to rule the unoccupied zone from Vichy under the leadership of Pétain.

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See also

Blitzkrieg; Bock, Fedor von; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; de Gaulle, Charles; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Eben Emael, German Capture of; France; France, Air Force; France, Army; France, Navy; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Giraud, Henri Honoré; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Guderian, Heinz; Hitler, Adolf; Laon, Battle of; Maginot Line; Manstein, Erich von; Norway, German Conquest of; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Vereker, John Standish Surtees Prendergast; Weygand, Maxime; Document 61

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France, Navy

In September 1939 France possessed a powerful battle fleet. The navy had been largely rebuilt beginning in the 1920s and was generally regarded as the world's fourth most powerful maritime force. Georges Leygues, a National Assembly French deputy who had served as minister of marine, was a chief architect. Admiral Jean Darlan, the personification of a political admiral, commanded it. The navy was undoubtedly the most pro–United States and anti-British of the three French services during World War II.

In the pre–World War II era, French naval planning was guided by the formula that the navy should be equal in strength to the combined German and Italian navies. In addition, while the bulk of the French fleet was stationed in the Mediterranean, the navy was to be capable of operating elsewhere in the world, primarily in the Atlantic. Between 1925 and 1937, the French laid down new warships at the rate of 32,426 tons a year. With the approach of war, however, this increased to 41,000 tons annually, severely straining France's shipyard capacity.

The French fleet was centered on the battleship. France's two oldest battleships were seized by the British in July 1940 during Operation CATAPULT, but they were of so little worth that they would not see further naval action. Its next three older—but slow—battleships of the Bretagne class had been reconstructed in the interwar period. The *Bretagne* was sunk at

Mers-el-Kébir during CATAPULT, and the *Provence* was damaged there and later scuttled at Toulon. The *Lorraine* joined the Free French fleet in 1943.

In the 1930s, the French built two fast battleships, the *Dunkerque* and *Strasbourg.* Displacing 35,500 tons fully loaded, they were rated at 29 knots and were armed with eight 13-inch guns in the distinctive French quadruple turrets. Under construction the French had two of the best battleships in Europe in armor design, the *Jean Bart* and *Richelieu.* Both were armed with eight 15-inch guns in two quadruple turrets. Both would see action as Vichy and Free French warships and would survive the war. France also had one aged aircraft carrier, the *Béarn,* that would remain idle in the West Indies for most of the war. Two aircraft carriers were under construction but were never completed.

France maintained a cruiser force centered on 7 heavy ships. With the exception of the *Algérie,* they were probably the worst-armored heavy cruisers of any major navy. France also possessed 12 modern light cruisers, of which 6 were Gloire-class ships: fast, well armed, and well armored. France also developed a unique destroyer force. It had built 32 large destroyers of a type designated as *contre-torpilleurs.* Fast, long-ranged, and almost light cruisers in concept, the best known were the 6 ships of the Le Fantasque class. Capable of maintaining 37 knots at full load, they were for the whole of their careers the fastest flotilla craft afloat (*Le Terrible* made 45 knots in its trials). Displacing 2,800 tons (3,400 tons fully loaded), they were armed with five 5.5-inch guns. These superdestroyers were designed to operate in squadrons of 3 ships each. France also had 26 destroyers designed for fleet operations (*torpilleurs d'escadre*) and 12 light destroyers, the latter being 610-ton torpedo boats similar to the Italian Spica-class vessels. A total of 23 destroyers of all types were under construction in 1940, but none would be completed.

With the exception of the legendary monster submarine *Surcouf,* France's submarines consisted of three types. France had 38 first-class submarines of 900 to 1,800 tons displacement, 32 second-class submarines of approximately 600 tons displacement each, and 6 mine-laying submarines. Rounding out the fleet were numerous sloops, patrol boats, and other small craft; many trawlers and similar small vessels were requisitioned during the war for coastal work.



Three cruisers of the French navy at sea: the *Diadem*, *Cleopatra*, and *Dido*, 1941. (Keystone/Getty Images)

The French Navy did not have sonar until after the outbreak of the war in 1939, and during the Vichy era, there was only limited introduction of radar. Free French naval units were dependent for advanced equipment on Great Britain and the United States, chiefly the latter. Meanwhile, the greatest gift by Vichy France to the Axis war effort may have been Darlan’s presentation to the German Navy of the Metox device for detection of radar.

The French Navy had no role during the 1939 Poland Campaign that began the war, but it did participate in the Norway Campaign (1940). The latter included a destroyer raid into the Skagerrak, an arm of the North Sea between Norway and Denmark. The navy also conducted convoy and antisubmarine operations as well as operations in the Atlantic against German raiders. French naval units also participated in the Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation (May 26–June 4, 1940), losing several destroyers to German aircraft.

With the fall of France, the majority of the ships passed to Vichy government control. After the British attack at Mers-el-Kébir (July 3, 1940),

most of the now-truncated fleet was relocated at Toulon, where virtually all were lost in a mass scuttling on November 27, 1942. Seventy-seven ships went down: 3 battleships (the *Strasbourg*, the *Dunkerque*, and the old *Provence*), 7 cruisers, 32 destroyers, 16 submarines, and 19 other craft. A few destroyers and smaller ships were raised and towed to Italy, but the Axis powers gained little from them. Five submarines escaped; 1 was badly damaged by bombing and had to be scuttled, another was interned in Spain, and 3 arrived in Algeria.

Some Vichy warships participated in actions against the Allies, primarily off Syria, Madagascar, and Dakar and during Operation TORCH (November 8, 1942). The French warships also conducted convoy operations to France. The successful Vichy defense of Dakar on September 23–24, 1940, was an important factor in Adolf Hitler's decision to continue backing the Vichy regime in 1940–1941.

Charles de Gaulle placed the few mostly smaller warships of the Free French under Vice Admiral Émile Muselier. As late as January 1943, this modest force had only 5,314 men, but it would expand as the war progressed to include several small British- and U.S.-built warships. They would operate in all oceans, participate in operations against the Vichy territories, and later take part in Operation OVERLORD (June 6, 1944) and in Pacific Ocean battles with Japan.

Major wartime losses for French ships were 4 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 58 destroyers and large torpedo boats. Unfortunately for France, its navy was little able to influence events at the beginning of the war, and the defeat of France in June 1940 came too soon for the navy to contribute in a meaningful way.

JACK GREENE

See also

CATAPULT, Operation; Dakar, Attack on; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France; Free French; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Muselier, Émile Henri Désiré; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Norway, German Conquest of; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Radar; Sonar; TORCH, Operation; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at; Vichy France

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France Campaign (1944)

Allied campaign to liberate France from Axis control. The campaign to drive the Germans out of Western Europe began with the June 6, 1944, Allied landing in Normandy, the largest amphibious operation in history. U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower had overall command; British general Bernard L. Montgomery commanded the landing force of the 21st Army Group, which consisted of Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey's British Second Army and Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley's American First Army.

Even with stiff resistance by German defenders, especially the German 352nd Infantry Division at Omaha Beach, Allied forces expanded the beachhead from 5 to 20 miles inland and joined all five beaches into a single continuous front by June 12. French Resistance forces supported the Allied effort by providing intelligence, sabotaging bridges and railways, and conducting harassment operations. Dempsey's Second Army began the drive toward Caen but met heavy resistance from German forces, including two panzer divisions. Meanwhile, Bradley's First Army moved up the Cotentin Peninsula toward the important port city of Cherbourg. Units of the U.S. VII Corps assaulted Fort du Roule and, guided by the French Resistance, scaled the cliffs. By June 27 Cherbourg was secure, but the Germans had heavily damaged the port facilities there, and they were unusable for more than a month.

By the beginning of July, Allied progress in Normandy had been slowed by the hedgerows of the bocage country, strong German positions at Caen, and the logistical challenges of supplying the Allied forces over the beaches. Enjoying the advantage of overwhelming air superiority, the eight corps of the 21st Army Group pushed south, seizing Caen on July 10 and Saint-Lô on July 18. The capture of these two important cities set the stage for the Allied breakout west into the Brittany Peninsula and east toward Paris.

The slow pace of their advance in France concerned Allied commanders, who feared that fighting would bog down, resulting in trench warfare resembling World War I. Bradley believed that the weak link in the German Army defenses was General Paul Hausser's Seventh Army, south of Saint-Lô. Bradley's breakout plan, code-named Operation COBRA (July 25–31), was temporarily put on hold so vital supplies could be sent to support the British Second Army's July 18–20 Operation GOODWOOD, an attempt to penetrate German lines outside of Caen. Although GOODWOOD did not achieve a breakout, it assisted COBRA by holding two German panzer divisions in place and preventing their redeployment to the Saint-Lô area.

Heavy saturation bombing along a four-mile corridor preceded COBRA, as elements of Major General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps attacked west of Saint-Lô on July 25. Concurrently, Major General Troy H. Middleton's VIII Corps, located west of VII Corps, struck toward Countances. Within two days, VII Corps had pushed the German defenders back 10 miles, and on July 28 elements of the 4th Armored Division secured Countances. Sensing that the breakthrough was decisive, Bradley ordered Collins to continue the drive south toward the strategic city of Avranches. By the end of July it too was in Allied hands, and the German Seventh Army was in a precarious position, with its left flank exposed.

The capture of Avranches opened the Brittany Peninsula to the Allies. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General George S. Patton's U.S. Third Army became operational on August 1 as part of an overall restructuring of the Allied command. Montgomery's 21st Army Group was now composed of the British Second Army and Lieutenant General Henry Crerar's Canadian First Army. Bradley assumed command of the new 12th Army Group composed of the American First and Third Armies. Patton's Third Army gained the greatest success, and Patton was certainly the outstanding general of the campaign for France.

France, 1944

IRELAND
GREAT BRITAIN
North Sea
N
London
NETHERLANDS
GERMANY
English Channel
Operation OVERLORD June 6
Antwerp
Brussels
BELGIUM
Cherbourg
Dieppe
Amiens
Channel Islands (held by Germany)
Le Havre
Rouen
Sedan
LUXEMBOURG
Caen
St.-Malo
Brest
Paris
Reims
Metz
Rennes
Nancy
Le Mans
Lorient
Troyes
Orléans
Epinal
Strasbourg
St.-Nazaire
Belfort
Nantes
Tours
Sombernon
Dijon
La Rochelle
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
Vichy
Geneva
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Lyon
Bordeaux
Grenoble
Montelimar
ITALY
Toulouse
Front Lines
August 15
August 26
September 3
September 14
Allied Army advancement
Cannes
Nice
Marseille
Toulon
Operation ANVIL-DRAGOON Aug. 15
Mediterranean Sea
SPAIN
0 50 100 mi
0 50 100 km
© ABC-CLIO

Men of the U.S. Army 28th Infantry Division march down the Champs Elysées in Paris, during the "Victory" Parade held in the French capital on August 29, 1944. (National Archives)

The Third Army displayed instant efficiency and turned Operation COBRA, a local breakthrough, into a theater-wide breakout. The Third Army immediately exploited the opening at Avranches: Patton sent his VIII Corps to clear the Brittany Peninsula, XX and XII Corps south to the Loire River, and XV Corps east toward Le Mans. These objectives were secured by August 13.

While the Third Army moved against limited opposition, the German Seventh Army hastily reorganized to launch a counterattack toward Avranches, hoping to cut off the Third Army. Not only did this attack fail, but it also put the Seventh Army in a position where it might be surrounded by the Allies. To accomplish this, Montgomery, who was still overall ground commander, ordered the Canadian II Corps to attack south as Patton's XV Corps drove north.

The objective for both corps was the town of Argentan. Major General Wade Haislip's XV Corps reached Argentan on August 13, but the Canadian II Corps progressed slowly and was more than 20 miles from the objective. Patton pleaded with Bradley to allow XV Corps to press northward, but the 12th Army Group commander refused, fearing that XV Corps might be cut

off or that excessive casualties from friendly fire might result from XV Corps moving into a zone reserved for the Canadian II Corps.

Even though the gap between the towns of Falaise and Argentan was not closed until August 19, the area was turned into a killing ground by constant Allied air attack, artillery bombardment, and direct ground fire from armored and infantry units. Although the German Seventh Army was savaged in these attacks, a great many German soldiers escaped. Failure to close the gap was one of the major mistakes of the war. Had the gap been sealed and the Seventh Army annihilated, the Western Allies would have faced far less resistance as they pushed east toward Germany. Operations following COBRA were so successful that most German forces in northwest France had to retreat to the Seine River. Paris was liberated on August 25.

German garrisons doggedly held out in the northern port cities of Saint-Malo, Brest, Lorient, and Saint-Nazaire. Combat commands from the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were insufficient to secure these heavily fortified ports quickly. Repeated assaults supported by air attacks and naval bombardments failed to dislodge the defenders. Saint-Malo was not taken until September 2, and Brest fell on September 19. In both cases, the Germans had demolished their port facilities. On the basis of these experiences, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), canceled planned assaults on Lorient and Saint-Nazaire, and German garrisons there held out until the end of the war.

The Western Allies addressed concern about the exposed southern flank of their armies, the need to secure a large functioning port, and interest in cutting off what German forces remained in southern France in Operation DRAGOON, the invasion of southern France. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill strongly opposed the plan because Operation COBRA had proven such a huge success, but Eisenhower prevailed, and DRAGOON commenced on August 15.

Lieutenant General Alexander Patch’s American Seventh Army landed in southern France just east of Toulon. Major General Lucian Truscott’s VI Corps spearheaded the landing and by August 17 had established a 20-mile beachhead. The French II Corps followed with the task of driving west to secure Toulon and Marseille, which it accomplished by August 28.

VI Corps moved rapidly west and then north up the east side of the Rhône River—except for an armored group, Task Force Butler, that moved east of

the Rhône River Valley in an effort to envelop German forces gathering at Montelimar. By this time, the German Nineteenth Army, led by General of Infantry Friedrich Wiese, was pulling out of southern France. Truscott's corps inflicted severe material damage on the retreating Germans, however, capturing 57,000 of them and liberating Montelimar by August 28.

By September 3, the Seventh Army had driven north almost 250 miles up the Rhône River. The 1st Airborne Task Force was used to seal the Swiss border; the French I Corps took up a position to the right of Truscott's VI Corps, and the French II Corps flanked the left. On September 14, Patch's Seventh Army linked up with Patton's Third Army, sealing the open southern flank. On September 15 the 6th Army Group was formed, with Lieutenant General Jacob Devers commanding. It was composed of the American Seventh Army and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny's French First Army. Besides securing the Allied southern flank, DRAGOON greatly aided the logistical situation by making available the large port at Marseille. Finally, southern France was cleared of German forces.

By the middle of September 1944 France had been liberated, and German forces had withdrawn into the Netherlands and to the West Wall, along the western German border. Although it had been severely bloodied, the German army in the west was not annihilated but was reorganizing and entrenching for a long fight. Unfortunately, the Allied drive east was so fast that lines of communication and supply could not keep up with the tactical advance. With insufficient supplies to advance all his army groups at once, Eisenhower now decided to support Montgomery's plan to cross the lower Rhine into Germany, Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26).

ROBERT W. DUVALL

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Cherbourg, Capture of; COBRA, Operation; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; Dempsey, Miles Christopher; Devers, Jacob Loucks; DRAGOON, Operation; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; France; GOODWOOD, Operation; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Middleton, Troy Houston; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Paris, Liberation of; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Document 201

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France, Vichy

See Vichy France

Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo (1892–1975)

Spanish Army general and dictator. Born into a middle-class family in El Ferrol in Galicia on December 4, 1892, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo Franco-Bahamonde did not enter the navy, as was family tradition, because budget cuts had led to the closing of the Naval Academy following the 1898 Spanish-American War. Rather, in 1907, Franco entered the Infantry Academy at Toledo, graduating in 1910. Commissioned a second lieutenant, he refused a comfortable posting in El Ferrol for one in Spanish Morocco.

Franco's leadership, courage, and ruthlessness, demonstrated during the Riff Rebellion in Morocco, brought rapid promotion, and in 1920 he became deputy commander of the Spanish Foreign Legion in Morocco. In June 1923, King Alfonso XIII personally promoted him to lieutenant colonel and gave him command of the Spanish Foreign Legion. That same year, the young colonel married María del Carmen de Polo, from one of Spain's most influential families; the king served as best man by proxy. In 1926, Franco was promoted to brigadier general, the youngest soldier to hold that rank in any European army at that time.

An archconservative, Franco was closely identified with General Miguel Primo de Rivera, who governed Spain in the name of Alfonso XIII from 1923 to 1930 and appointed Franco commander of the General Military Academy of Zaragoza (Saragossa). In 1931, on the proclamation of a republic, the Left came to power and transferred Franco to the Balearic Islands, where he served from 1931 to 1934. He returned to Spain to play a role in crushing a revolt by miners in Asturias in 1935. Later that year, he accepted the post of chief of staff of the army offered him by the conservative government.

The leftist Popular Front won the hotly contested national elections of February 1936, and the new government sent Franco to command the Canary Islands garrison. As expected, the conservative Nationalists defied the mandate, and Franco was in the forefront of the revolt that began in July 1936. The untimely deaths of Generals José y Sacanell Sanjurjo and Emilio Mola Vidal left Franco as the military leader.

Thanks to German assistance, Franco was able to airlift units of the Spanish Foreign Legion from Morocco to Spain, and he launched a drive on Madrid. In September 1936, Franco became chief of the Nationalist government, and in April 1937 he assumed leadership of the Falange Party. Franco was de facto head of Spain on the fall of Madrid in March 1939, marking the end of the civil war. Franco then carried out a ruthless purge of the opposition. Throughout his long years in power, he remained undeviatingly true to his mission of preserving traditional Spain.

When World War II erupted in 1939, Franco openly sided with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. The Caudillo (leader), as he became known, met with Hitler at Hendaye, France, on October 23, 1940. He pledged his loyalty to Hitler but then refused to bring Spain into the war because he believed that his cause was better served in "nonbelligerency" (not neutrality), a stance that

infuriated Hitler. Franco did send troops—the well-equipped 18,000-man Blue Division—to fight in the Soviet Union. Throughout the war, Franco provided the Germans with observation posts in Spanish Morocco for use in monitoring Allied ship movements, and he allowed German submarines to be serviced in Spanish ports. After the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, Franco shifted to a strictly neutral stance. But when the war was over, Spain became a primary refuge for leading Nazis and Quislings (Nazi collaborators).

After the war, the Allies punished Franco's wartime conduct with quarantine treatment. Spain was kept out of the United Nations and condemned for its nature and for its close association with the Axis states. With the coming of the Cold War, however, the United States came to regard Franco's Spain as a bulwark against communism. In the revisionist version, Franco became the shining knight who had saved Europe from atheist communism. The United States established air and naval bases in Spain, and U.S. aid propped up the Franco regime, a position remembered with bitterness by many Spanish democrats.

Franco declared Spain a monarchy in 1947 but remained its leader until his death in 1975. Franco relaxed his authoritarian regime somewhat in the 1950s, but unrest in the 1960s led to renewed repression. Having selected Prince Juan Carlos de Bourbon, grandson of Alfonso XIII, as his heir, Franco died in Madrid on November 20, 1975. The new king presided over the transition to democracy in Spain.

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See also

Blue Division; Hitler-Franco Meeting at Hendaye; Spain; Spanish Civil War; Stalin, Joseph; TORCH, Operation

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Franco-Thai War (November 1940–January 1941)

Undeclared war between Thailand and Vichy France. Thailand began the Franco-Thai War to regain the three rich rice-growing provinces of Battambang, Siemréap, and Sisophon, which the Thais had annexed in 1862 from Cambodia but the French had forced them to restore in 1907. Thailand also claimed territory in Laos, which the French had forced it to return in 1904.

In early June 1940, Thailand concluded a nonaggression pact with France. After Germany defeated France, however, the Thais lost interest in ratifying the pact. The pro-Japanese military government of Marshal Pibul Songgram saw an opportunity to capitalize on French weakness, and in October it called up military reservists.

The Thai Army numbered 26,500 men, but reservists brought it to nearly 50,000. The Thai Air Force had about 270 aircraft, of which 150 were combat types mostly of U.S. manufacture. The Thai Air Force also had several dozen obsolete land-based aircraft, but in December 1940 Japan delivered 93 modern aircraft. The Thai Navy had 10,000 men who manned royal yachts, a British-built World War I destroyer, and two British-built small gunboats and eight motor torpedo boats (MTBs). Italy supplied nine small torpedo boats, two minesweepers, and nine minelayers. Two light cruisers under construction in Italy for Thailand were not available for the war and were indeed sequestered by Italy in 1941. Japan also delivered two armored coastal defense antiaircraft vessels, four small submarines, two escort/training ships, and three small torpedo boats. The Thai Navy suffered from serious shortcomings. Its sailors were poorly trained, the older vessels were of limited value, the modern Italian torpedo boats were too flimsy for service in rough seas, and the Japanese submarines could not dive.

The French army in Indochina was comparable in size to the mobilized Thai force: 50,000 men. But 38,000 of these were Indochinese troops of questionable loyalty. The heart of the French military was the 5,000-man 5th Foreign Legion Regiment. The French possessed 30 World War I–vintage tanks. Much of their artillery was also outdated, and they were short of

artillery ammunition. The French had fewer than 100 aircraft. French naval units in Indochinese waters were old and for the most part poorly armed. They consisted of the light cruiser *La Motte-Picquet,* two gunboats, two sloops, two auxiliary patrol craft, and several noncombatants.

France was extremely vulnerable. It had already been defeated by Germany in Europe, and Japan was applying pressure in Indochina. In September 1940 Japanese troops invaded Tonkin, killed 800 French troops, and secured concessions and airfields. Bangkok decided to take advantage of these circumstances to reassert its claims.

In mid-November 1940, the Thais sent military units across the Mekong River into Cambodia, producing immediate military skirmishes with French troops. The French military was temporarily sidetracked by the November 22 Indochinese Communist Party uprising in Cochin China, which it crushed in the first week of December. French high commissioner of Indochina Admiral Jean Decoux then decided to go on the offensive.

On land, a mixed French brigade attacked Thai positions at Yang Dom Koum on January 16, 1941. The assault failed because of insufficient manpower and heavy weapons. The Thais, who had planned their own offensive for the same day, then counterattacked. French Foreign Legionnaires beat back this attack, which included tanks. Both sides then withdrew from the immediate area, although Bangkok claimed victory.

At the same time, the French took the offensive at sea. The French Navy planned an assault on the Thai naval detachment at Koh Chang and the principal Thai Navy base at Sattahib. The initial strike was to be carried out by virtually the entire French flotilla: the cruiser, two gunboats, and two sloops. On January 16, the fleet sailed for the Gulf of Siam to Koh Chang, which guarded the passage to Sattahib. Early on January 17, the French surprised the Thais. In the ensuing 90-minute action at Koh Chang, the French sank two Thai torpedo boats; they also sank a Thai coastal defense vessel and mortally damaged another. With no direct hits or losses to their own ships, the French then returned to Saigon on January 19.

There was little air action during the war, although the Thais did use their Curtiss Hawk III biplanes in a dive-bombing role. The French also had a plan, which they did not implement, to firebomb Bangkok from the air.

The indecisive land and naval actions of January 1941 did not end the war. The Japanese then applied diplomatic pressure on France, threatening to

intervene on the side of Thailand. On January 31, 1941, at Saigon, French and Thai officials signed a Japanese-dictated armistice aboard the Japanese cruiser *Natori.* In March the Vichy government, which was also being intimidated by Germany, accepted Japanese mediation. Under Japanese pressure, on May 9, 1941, France signed a peace treaty with Thailand in Tokyo whereby France transferred to Thai control three Cambodian and two Laotian provinces on the right bank of the Mekong River—about 42,000 square miles in area.

After the end of World War II, France forced the Thais to return this territory in September 1945 and to accept the Mekong as the boundary separating Thailand from Laos and Cambodia to the east. But border clashes along the Mekong occurred in 1946 and with Cambodia as late as the 1980s.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

French Indochina; Vichy France

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FRANKTON, Operation

See COCKLESHELL, Operation

FRANTIC, Operation

See Shuttle Bombing, Soviet Union

Fraser, Bruce Austin (1888–1981)

British Royal Navy admiral of the fleet and first sea lord. Born into a military family (his father was an army general) at Molesey, Surrey, on February 5, 1888, Bruce Austin Fraser was educated at Bradfield Junior School. He entered the fleet training school of HMS *Excellent.* His early service was in battleships and destroyers, and he became known as a gunnery officer, holding that post on the cruiser *Minerva* in the Mediterranean during World War I.

In the following years, Fraser served as gunnery officer for the Mediterranean Fleet. From 1929 to 1932, he commanded the cruiser *Effingham* and then served as director of naval ordnance, playing an important role in helping to design the King George V–class battleships. Following command of aircraft carrier *Glorious* in 1936 and 1937, Fraser was promoted to rear admiral in 1938 and became chief of staff of the Mediterranean Fleet. In March 1939, Fraser was appointed controller of the navy and third sea lord. Early in World War II, he was responsible for the development of a new class of corvettes. In May 1940, Fraser was promoted to vice admiral, and a year later he was knighted. Fraser was appointed second-in-command of the Home Fleet in June 1942, and in May 1943 he assumed its overall command.

In his position, Fraser oversaw the adoption of new antisubmarine tactics against German U-boats and increased cooperation with U.S. naval forces during the height of the Battle of the Atlantic. In December 1943, he commanded British Task Force 2, which engaged and sank the German battleship *Scharnhorst* during its sortie against an Allied Arctic convoy.

The Allied successes in the Atlantic and the resultant reduction of the German U-boat and surface raider threat led British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill to assign Fraser to command the Pacific Fleet in late 1944. Fraser led the return of British naval units to the Pacific with a force built around aircraft carriers. For the remainder of the war, he maintained excellent relations with U.S. commanders and led British forces in support of U.S. amphibious and naval operations. Fraser was the British representative at the formal Japanese surrender aboard the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945.

Rewarded with the title of First Baron Fraser of North Cape, in 1948 Fraser was promoted to admiral of the fleet and appointed first sea lord and chief of naval staff. He held this post until his retirement in 1951. Fraser died in London on February 12, 1981.

THOMAS LANSFORD

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Convoys, Allied; Great Britain, Navy; North Cape, Battle of

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Fredendall, Lloyd Ralston (1883–1963)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Cheyenne, Wyoming, on December 28, 1883, Lloyd Fredendall attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1902 and 1903 but dropped out because of poor grades. He next attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In 1907, he obtained a direct commission as a lieutenant of infantry and then served in the Philippines and Hawaii. Following U.S. entry into World War I, Fredendall commanded a training center in France.

Fredendall was an instructor at the Infantry School from 1920 to 1922. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1923 and the Army War College in 1925. Following a tour as professor of military science and tactics at the University of Minnesota, Fredendall commanded the 57th Infantry Regiment in the Philippines during 1936–1938. From August 1938 to December 1939, he served in the office of the chief of infantry.

Promoted to brigadier general in December 1939, Fredendall served with the 5th Infantry Division. In October 1940, he was promoted to major general. He then commanded the 4th Infantry Division from October 1940 to

July 1941. Known as an effective troop trainer, he took command of II Corps in August 1941 and XI Corps on its activation in June 1942.

Again commanding II Corps that October, Fredendall commanded the U.S. landing at Oran, Algeria, on November 8, 1942. Reportedly, he did not leave his command ship until the fighting was over. By early 1943, elements of his corps held the exposed right flank of a combined British, French, and U.S. force facing eastward into Tunisia. Short of troops, Fredendall foolishly ignored the advice of Major General Orlando Ward, commander of his 1st Armored Division, with whom he was barely on speaking terms; Fredendall widely scattered the combat elements of Ward's division. Fredendall himself remained some 70 miles behind the front at his fortress-like command post.



Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall, shown here in 1941. Removed from command of II Corps following the debacle of the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Fredendall was replaced by Major General George S. Patton, Jr. (Library of Congress)

On February 19, 1943, German columns under Colonel General Hans von Arnim and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel initiated an offensive against Fredendall's forces that resulted in the Battle of Kasserine Pass. This first major clash for the Americans with German troops resulted in a major U.S. defeat. Fredendall apparently suffered a temporary breakdown during the battle. The Allied forces rallied, however, and the Germans were unable to exploit their victory and soon withdrew.

This defeat, combined with Fredendall's abrasive manner and his habitual absence from the front, cost him the confidence of subordinates and superiors alike. On March 6, General Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Fredendall with Major General George S. Patton Jr. Sensitive to public opinion, the War Department decided not to disgrace Fredendall. Instead, he was recalled to the United States, promoted to temporary lieutenant general in June 1943, and assigned first as deputy commanding general and then commanding general of the Second Army from March 1943 until his retirement in March 1946. Fredendall died in La Jolla, California, on October 4, 1963.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; TORCH, Operation

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Frederick, Robert Tryon (1907–1970)

U.S. Army major general. Born in San Francisco, California, on March 14, 1907, Robert Tryon Frederick graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1928 and was commissioned in the Coast Artillery Corps.

Prewar postings included stints in the Panama Canal Zone and Hawaii and study at the Coast Artillery School. Frederick graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1939.

Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1941, Frederick was assigned to the War Plans Division of the War Department. In 1942, he was appointed to prepare and lead the 1st Special Service Force (SSF), an elite unit composed of specially selected U.S. and Canadian soldiers and trained for mountain, amphibious, and airborne operations. Later dubbed the "Devil's Brigade" by its German adversaries (and made legendary as the subject of a 1968 Hollywood motion picture starring William Holden as Frederick), the 1st SSF became the model for modern special forces.

After receiving intensive training in often harsh conditions, the 1st SSF's initial assignment came during the Aleutian Islands Campaign in 1943. Transferred to the Italian Front, the brigade participated in a series of impressive mountain engagements, which highlighted its special training and resulted in Frederick's promotion to brigadier general in January 1944. During January 22–May 25, 1944, the brigade participated in the stalemate at Anzio, again drawing praise for its outstanding performance in an otherwise dismal episode.

In July 1944, Frederick took command of the 1st Airborne Task Force (promotion to major general followed the next month), which jumped during Operation DRAGOON, the August 15, 1944, invasion of southern France. In December, at age 37, Frederick assumed command of the 45th Infantry Division, which he led into Germany and until the end of the war. In addition to being one of the youngest division commanders in the U.S. Army, Frederick was also the most frequently wounded of any American general officer of the war, receiving eight Purple Hearts. He also earned two Distinguished Service Crosses, the Silver Star, and the British Distinguished Service Order. Throughout the war, Frederick's force was never defeated in battle.

During the postwar years, Frederick commanded occupation forces in Europe and later the 4th and 6th Infantry Divisions. In 1951, he led U.S. support efforts in Greece, retiring because of disability in March 1952. Frederick died in Palo Alto, California, on November 30, 1970.

DAVID COFFEY

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Anzio, Battle of; Clark, Mark Wayne; DRAGOON, Operation; Gavin, James Maurice; Italy Campaign; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.

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Free French

On June 18, 1940, French Army general of brigade Charles de Gaulle—until the previous day undersecretary of war in the Paul Reynaud government—appeared before the microphones of the British Broadcasting Corporation in London and broadcast an appeal for Frenchmen to rally to him and continue the fight, saying that "France has lost a battle, but France has not lost the war."

Of nearly 100,000 French troops in England at that time—most of whom had been evacuated from the area around Dunkerque—only 1,300 volunteered to stay in England and join de Gaulle; the remainder returned to France. Of the volunteers, 900 were Foreign Legionnaires of the 13th Demi-Brigade who had recently been evacuated from Norway. Undeterred by the limited response, de Gaulle recruited forces and established the "Fighting French" (Free French forces). On August 2, a court-martial initiated by Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain's Vichy French government sentenced de Gaulle to death in absentia for treason. On August 7, de Gaulle signed an agreement with the British government regulating the French forces and placing them under the "general directives of the British High Command."

General Charles de Gaulle inspecting members of the newly formed Free French command unit at Wellington Barracks in England in 1942. (Keystone/Getty Images)

During the next year, de Gaulle's small force steadily increased in number. In August 1940, sufficient troops to form four battalions joined from Equatorial Africa (Chad, Cameroon, Middle Congo, and Gabon). Hoping to enlist units in West Africa, de Gaulle mounted a 1,445-man expedition with British naval support against Dakar in West Africa, but the city remained loyal to Vichy France and the operation failed.

Other Free French forces served abroad. Volunteers from Syria were formed into the 1st Marine (Naval) Infantry, which was attached to the British 7th Armoured Division. These troops assisted in the capture of Tobruk, Libya, during January 6–22, 1941. In December 1940, Colonel Raoul-Charles Magrin-Vernerey (aka Monclar) formed the Brigade d'Orient of 1,200 men from several units of infantry (including the 13th Demi-Brigade) and a horse cavalry squadron. The brigade fought in Eritrea from January to May 1941, the cavalry unit making the last French cavalry charge in history (against Italian cavalry).

On May 25, 1941, Major General Paul Louis Legentilhomme formed the 5,400-man 1st Free French Light Division from several units of French Legionnaires, Africans, and Arabs. On June 8, operating with British

Commonwealth forces, the division invaded Syria, meeting bitter resistance from Vichy forces there. The campaign ended on July 11. Of the 38,000 Vichy troops in Syria, 5,331 (including 1,000 Legionnaires) joined the Free French; the remaining soldiers were allowed to return to France. On August 20, 1941, the Light Division was disbanded; with additional reinforcements, it became several independent brigade groups, some of which remained in Syria for garrison duties.

The French 1st Brigade, commanded by General of Brigade Marie Pierre Koenig, was formed in December 1941. It consisted of the 13th Demi-Brigade and several naval infantry battalions. These Fusiliers-Marins provided a bit of color, as the sailors retained their red pom-pom naval caps, and the chief petty officers wore their peaked caps. Assigned to the British XIII Corps, the 1st Brigade was posted to the "box" at Bir Hacheim at the left end of the Gazala Line in Libya.

Attacked by the Italian Ariete Division and elements of the German 90th Light Division on May 27, 1941, the 1st Brigade held, despite continuous combat and constant Luftwaffe attack. Ordered on June 11 to withdraw, it broke through to British lines. Bir Hacheim was the defining battle for the Free French. Prior to it, British support had been lukewarm. After the brigade withstood German Afrika Korps assaults longer than any of the Commonwealth boxes on the Gazala Line, however, there were no longer any doubts that the Free French would fight and fight well.

By the time of the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942), Free French units were fighting with the British 7th Armoured Division, 50th Infantry Division, and the Long-Range Desert Group. The 1st Free French Division was formed on February 1, 1943, for the campaign in Tunisia under Koenig, who was now a major general. After a brief resistance to the Allied landings on November 8, 1942 (Operation TORCH), eight divisions of the French North and West African Armies went over to the Allied side. The XIX Algerian Corps under Major General Alphonse Pierre Juin fought alongside the British First Army in Tunisia, although Juin refused to take orders from the British commander. Additional political problems arose when some elements of the Free French forces refused to associate with the North African ex-Vichy troops.

On August 4, 1943, a new French army came into being, consisting of eight infantry divisions, four armored divisions, four regiment-sized groups

of French North African troops, six commando battalions, and one parachute regiment. Under the terms of an inter-Allied agreement, the United States assumed responsibility for rearming, reequipping, training, and supplying the French forces. Language problems and the emphasis on fielding the greatest number of combat units possible at the expense of support units were the most prominent obstacles encountered. Other problems arose over weapons (the French never received the excellent U.S. M1 Garand rifle) and supplies (the French never received tanker jackets and, more seriously, initially received a smaller ration scale than American troops). Eventually, most problems were resolved.

A French Expeditionary Corps of five divisions was formed on May 18, 1943. Commanded by Juin and sent to Italy in late 1943 and early 1944, it was instrumental in winning the Fourth Battle of Cassino, outflanking the German position by moving through the mountains as Juin suggested. A reinforced Free French division liberated the Mediterranean islands of Corsica (September 8–October 4, 1943) and Elba (June 17–18, 1944).

On August 15, 1944, what became the French First Army under Major General Jean Marie Gabriel de Lattre de Tassigny landed in southern France as part of the U.S. Sixth Army in Operation DRAGOON (August 15, 1944). Its eight divisions and 200,000 men fought their way up the Rhône Valley, arriving on the right flank of U.S. lieutenant general George S. Patton's Third Army. The French First Army advanced into southwest Germany, and by the end of the war it had reached the Tyrol in western Austria. In addition, Major General Philippe Leclerc's Free French 2nd Armored Division served with the U.S. First Army; liberated Paris during August 19–26, 1944; and joined the French First Army in February 1945.

By the end of the war, the rebuilt French Air Force consisted of 25 fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance squadrons equipped with American and British aircraft. The Free French Navy, which initially consisted of only three ships, had grown by war's end to a total of 240 warships.

At a cost of 23,500 killed and 95,500 wounded, Free French forces demonstrated a will to fight that impressed their Allied counterparts. Although it was significant, the Free French contribution to the Allied victory in Europe is not generally recognized.

DANA LOMBARDY AND T. P. SCHWEIDER

See also

Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Corsica, Recapture of; Dakar, Attack on; de Gaulle, Charles; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; DRAGOON, Operation; El Alamein, Battle of; Elba, Recapture of; France; France, Air Force; France, Army; France, Navy; Gazala, Battle of; Juin, Alphonse Pierre; Koenig, Marie Pierre Joseph François; Leclerc, Jacques Philippe; Legentilhomme, Paul Louis; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Paris, Liberation of; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul; Tobruk, First Battle of; TORCH, Operation; Tunisia Campaign; Vichy France; Document 62; Document 143

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Frenay, Henri (1905–1988)

French Army officer and Resistance leader. Born in Lyons on November 19, 1905, Henri Frenay graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr. A captain in 1940, he fought and was captured by the Germans in the Battle for France (May 10–June 15, 1940) but escaped on June 27, 1940, and made his way to Marseilles, where he became a Vichy garrison officer.

Regarded as an expert on the Third Reich because of his studies at the Centre d' Études Germaniques at Strasbourg, Frenay was attached to the military intelligence division. He soon came to realize that the Vichy regime, headed by Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, was intent on collaboration with the Germans. By early 1941, Frenay had become involved in the Resistance, creating the Mouvement de Libération Nationale, which produced three clandestine newspapers.

In November 1941, Frenay merged both his publications and Resistance organization with those of François de Menthon, to become *Combat,* the name of both publication and the largest Resistance group in France. Frenay, code-named "Charvet," went on to pioneer most of the techniques used within the French Resistance. A staunch anticommunist who had little time for any prewar French political grouping, Frenay was initially suspicious of the directing role that London-based Free French leader Charles de Gaulle claimed within the Resistance. Although Frenay eventually accepted de Gaulle's authority, his relationship with Jean Moulin, de Gaulle's representative in France, was strained. He distrusted Moulin's achievement in creating a fusion of the French Resistance groups, the National Council of the Resistance, although he eventually joined it.

In June 1943, the German military arrested most of the top French political and military Resistance leadership, including Moulin. Frenay fled to Algiers on June 19 to request additional support from the newly created Comité français de Libération nationale (French Committee of National Liberation). Concerned for his safety, Free French representatives persuaded him to remain, and in November 1943 Frenay became Free French minister of prisoners, deportees, and refugees, a position he retained for a further year after returning to Paris with de Gaulle in 1944.

In 1945 Frenay entered business, representing the French film industry until 1958 and holding various directorships. Frenay was a legendary figure in France, and his memoir, *The Night Will End*, not published until 30 years after the war, was a best seller in France. Frenay died at Porto Vecchio, Corsica, on August 6, 1988.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; France; Free French; Moulin, Jean; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Resistance; Vichy France

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French Indochina

On the outbreak of World War II in Europe in September 1939, France ruled Indochina. Strictly speaking, only Cochin China (southern Vietnam) was an outright colony; Annam (central Vietnam), Tonkin (northern Vietnam), Laos, and Cambodia were officially protectorates. For all practical purposes, however, France completely controlled all five entities that constituted French Indochina. In 1939, Indochina was France's richest overseas possession, producing rice, rubber, and other important raw materials.

When war broke out in Europe, Governor-General Georges Catroux, who came to favor a more liberal policy toward nationalism in the French colonies, ordered a general mobilization throughout Indochina and outlawed the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), arresting several thousand suspected communists. The Sixth Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee, meeting secretly outside Saigon, proclaimed a new anti-imperialist National United Front to struggle for independence.

Following the defeat of France in Europe in June 1940, French Indochina came under pressure from Japan and Thailand. Although France had 50,000 troops in Indochina, 38,000 of these were poorly trained indigenous troops of questionably loyalty. Japan had been at war with China since 1937 and was anxious to secure bases from which to strike the Burma Road and cut off assistance to China's Nationalist government. Tokyo now brought heavy pressure on Catroux to close the Sino-Vietnamese border and halt shipment of supplies to China. Catroux tried to stall for time, but he had no bargaining strength and was forced to accede to Japanese demands.

Japanese troops advancing through the port of Haiphong in Tonkin (northern Vietnam), French Indochina, November 24, 1940. (Weltbild/Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Catroux's protest of Vichy France's armistice with Germany and his independence in dealing with the Japanese led the Vichy government to replace him with Vice Admiral Jean Decoux, French commander of naval forces in the Far East. On September 24, 1940, Decoux was forced to grant Japan three air bases in Tonkin and the right to station 6,000 troops there. Then in July 1941, similarly pressed by the Japanese, France yielded bases and concessions in southern Indochina. This placed Japanese long-range bombers within striking range of Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. This action, however, brought economic pressure on Japan by Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States that resulted in the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

Soon the Japanese had 35,000 men in Indochina. Although Tokyo left the French administration intact, it was clear to the Vietnamese that Japan was calling the shots. The result was an irreparable blow to the French position in Indochina.

Bangkok also sought to take advantage of French weakness to secure several provinces it claimed in Laos and Cambodia. From November 1940 to January 1941, Thailand and France fought a war on land and sea that France largely won. Tokyo, then influential in Bangkok, interceded to impose a

settlement. In May 1941, France agreed to turn over to Thailand three Cambodian and two Laotian provinces on the right bank of the Mekong River —some 42,000 square miles of territory. This settlement did not last, however. In September 1945, when the French returned in force to Indochina, they demanded and secured from Thailand the seized provinces, forcing Thailand to recognize the Mekong River as the boundary separating Thailand from Laos and Cambodia.

The French had to address Vietnamese nationalism. In 1940, French authorities crushed abortive rebellions led by local communists in the area bordering China and in Cochin China. Then in February 1941, Ho Chi Minh, a member of the executive committee of the Communist International (Comintern), returned to northern Vietnam after 13 months' imprisonment in southern China, bearing with him financial support from Chinese authorities in return for his pledge to cooperate against the Japanese.

Ho now presided over the Eighth Plenum of the ICP at Pac Bo. Here on May 19, the communists established another front organization—Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (League for Independence of Vietnam, or Viet Minh)—to fight both the Japanese and French. Although their tactics led Viet Minh leaders to conceal their communist goals and focus on national liberation to secure the widest possible support, the organization was led and dominated by the ICP. Former schoolteacher Vo Nguyen Giap became the Viet Minh's military leader.

The Chinese Nationalist government grudgingly provided limited support for the Viet Minh, as did the United States through the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency). The OSS gave the Viet Minh some light weapons, medical supplies, communications equipment, and training in return for Viet Minh aid in saving downed U.S. pilots and cooperation against the Japanese. By 1945, the Viet Minh had secured control over northern Tonkin.

Until nearly the end of World War II, the French authorities and army still were in place in Indochina, the Japanese exercising only indirect control. That changed in March 1945. French authorities, anxious to liberate Indochina themselves, began active plotting to that end. The Japanese learned of the French plans, and on March 9, 1945, they arrested all the French officials and military personnel they could find. By announcing on March 11 the independence of Vietnam under previously French-controlled Emperor

Bao Dai of Annam, Tokyo exacerbated the postwar situation. This was the situation when Japan surrendered in August 1945.

Ho Chi Minh then stepped into the vacuum. At the end of the war starvation gripped much of Vietnam, and as many as 2 million Vietnamese died, chiefly in the north. The Viet Minh made great strides with the people by seizing rice stocks held by the Japanese and distributing them to the people. Then, on August 16, Ho proclaimed the independence of Vietnam, and three days later the Viet Minh took power in Hanoi, capital of Tonkin. On September 2, Ho announced establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Decisions taken during the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 had the Nationalist Chinese receiving the Japanese surrender in northern Vietnam and the British doing the same in the south. Ho appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union for assistance, but he received no response and was forced to negotiate first with the Chinese to secure their withdrawal and then with the French. Meanwhile, the British in the south let the French out of prison. A Viet Minh uprising there was soon crushed, and French control was reestablished in the south and then in Laos and Cambodia.

The north was another matter, however. On March 6, 1946, French representative Jean Sainteny negotiated the Ho-Sainteny Agreement, in which France recognized Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam within the French Union and promised a plebiscite in the south to see whether the south also wanted to join. The agreement also allowed the return of some French troops to the north. The failure of the French government to implement the provisions of this agreement led directly to the First Indochina War, which began in November 1946.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Catroux, Georges Albert Julien; France; Franco-Thai War; Ho Chi Minh; Japan; Office of Strategic Services; Potsdam Conference; Thierry d'Argenlieu, Georges Louis Marie; Vichy France; Document 100; Document 102

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Freyberg, Bernard Cyril (1889–1963)

New Zealand Army lieutenant general. Born in Surrey, England, on March 21, 1889, Bernard Cyril Freyberg moved with his family in 1891 to New Zealand. In 1911, Freyberg qualified as a dentist, a profession he rarely practiced. A few years later, he served as a volunteer for Pancho Villa during the revolutionary upheaval in Mexico. By August 1914, Freyberg was in London, where he met First Lord of the Admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill. Through Churchill, Freyberg obtained a commission as a temporary lieutenant in the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve.

During World War I, Freyberg commanded a company in the Hood Battalion of the Royal Naval Division during the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign. In November 1916, he led the battalion in the last major attack of the Somme Campaign. Although wounded four separate times, Freyberg refused to relinquish command. For his actions, he was awarded the Victoria Cross. Wounded at least six times during the war, Freyberg also received the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) with two bars.

Following World War I, Freyberg remained in the British military, transferring to the army. In 1937, a heart condition resulted in his medical discharge as a major general. When World War II began in September 1939, Freyberg was recalled and given a training command. That position was too tame a job for Freyberg, who offered his services to New Zealand. With Churchill's support, Freyberg was appointed commander of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.

Freyberg commanded Commonwealth forces on Crete in 1941, conducting the fighting withdrawal from the north to the south coast and then the evacuation. Freyberg then commanded the New Zealand Division in North Africa, where he often clashed with General Sir Claude Auchinleck, commander in chief of British Commonwealth forces in the Middle East.

Following a short mission to Syria, Freyberg and his New Zealanders returned to face German general Erwin Rommel at Minqar Qaim (June 27, 1942), Alam Halfa (August 31–September 7), and El Alamein (October 23–November 4). During the pursuit across Africa following El Alamein, Freyberg's New Zealanders—reinforced with armor to corps size—swung wide to the left of the Mareth Line to hit the Germans at the Tebaga Gap. Throughout most of these actions, Freyberg was at the front in his mobile tactical headquarters, an M3 Stuart tank with a dummy wooden gun.

In 1942, Freyberg was promoted to lieutenant general, which was almost unprecedented for an Allied divisional commander. Freyberg continued to lead the New Zealand Division through Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and the landings on the Italian mainland. In January 1944, the New Zealand Division came under the U.S. Fifth Army. Freyberg received control of two additional British divisions and a U.S. armored regiment to become the commander of the New Zealand Corps—while simultaneously retaining command of his own division. His mission was to break through at Cassino, which led to one of the most controversial Allied actions of the war, the bombing of the medieval monastery known as Monte Cassino. Cassino and Crete were regarded as Freyberg's two major "failures" in World War II, but it is doubtful that any other general could have done better in either case. Freyberg probably saw more direct combat than any other Allied senior commander. Churchill once called him "the salamander of the British Empire."

During the war, Freyberg won an almost unprecedented fourth DSO. He was knighted in 1942 and raised to the peerage in 1951 as 1st Baron Freyberg. His identification with his New Zealanders was so strong that he was appointed governor-general of New Zealand in 1945. In 1950, his term in office was extended another two years at the request of the government in Wellington. In 1952, Freyberg became the lieutenant governor of Windsor Castle. He died at Windsor on July 4, 1963.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Alam Halfa, Battle of; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Crete, Battle of; El

Alamein, Battle of; Italy Campaign; New Zealand; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Sicily, Invasion of

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Frick, Wilhelm (1877–1946)

German minister of the interior. Born on March 12, 1877, in Alsenz, Wilhelm Frick studied law from 1896 to 1901 at Göttingen, Munich, Berlin, and Heidelberg (where he received his doctorate). From 1904 to 1924, Frick worked in the Munich police department, heading the political police section after 1919. An early adherent of Adolf Hitler, Frick participated in the 1923 Munich Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler's abortive effort to seize power in Munich, and was arrested, tried, and sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment. He was able to avoid a prison term when the newly renamed National Socialist Freedom Party picked him as one of its representatives to the Reichstag in 1924. He served in the Reichstag from that point forward.

On January 23, 1930, Frick became the first National Socialist minister in a provincial government, responsible for education and the Ministry of the Interior in Thuringia. Under his administration, the Thuringian police force was purged of officers who supported the Weimar Republic; Nazi candidates for office were illegally favored; the antiwar film *All Quiet on the Western Front* was banned, as was jazz music; and rabidly militaristic, anti-Semitic propaganda was allowed to flourish unchecked. On Frick's instruction, special German freedom prayers were instituted in Thuringian schools, glorifying the German *Volk* and German national honor and military power while denouncing "traitors." Frick used his influence as interior minister to grant Hitler German citizenship by implementing a provision of the law that extended citizenship to anyone named to an official post in Germany. Frick managed to have Hitler named a councilor for the state of Braunschweig.



Wilhelm Frick, German politician and participant in Adolf Hitler’s Munich putsch of November 1923. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

When the Nazis came to power in Germany in January 1933, Frick was appointed minister of the interior, a key position that he held until August 1943. In this post, he was directly responsible for many measures taken against Jews, communists, Social Democrats, dissident churchmen, and other opponents of the regime. Frick also had charge of drafting and then administering the laws that gradually eliminated the Jews from the German economy and public life, culminating in the Nuremberg race laws that reduced Jews to second-class status in the Reich. It was Frick who framed the extraordinary law that declared all Hitler’s actions during the Blood Purge of the Sturmabteilung (SA, storm troops) in June 1934 to be legal and statesmanlike. Although nominally Heinrich Himmler’s superior, Frick singularly failed to impose any legal limitations on the power of the Gestapo

and the Schutzstaffel (SS). Nor did he seriously interfere with their encroachment on his area of jurisdiction.

On August 24, 1943, Frick was appointed Reichsprotektor (administrative head) of Bohemia and Moravia, a position he held until the end of the war, although real authority was concentrated in the hands of his subordinate, Karl-Hermann Frank. At the Nuremberg Trials, Frick was charged with and found guilty of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in concentration camps in the Protectorate (Bohemia and Moravia). The dedicated Nazi bureaucrat and loyal implementer of Hitler's ruthless aims was hanged at Nuremberg on October 16, 1946.

JOSEPH C. GREANEY

See also

Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Nuremberg Laws

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Friedeburg, Hans Georg von (1895–1945)

German admiral and commander of the German Navy. Born on July 15, 1895, in Strassburg (then Germany; now Strasbourg, France), Hans Georg von Friedeburg joined the German Navy in 1914 and became a submariner. He participated in World War I and was promoted to lieutenant in 1917. Friedeburg continued in the navy after the war, and from 1932 to 1934 he was a military adviser to General Kurt von Schleicher, who was German chancellor in 1932–1933. Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1933, Friedeburg in June 1936 assumed command of the light cruiser *Karlsruhe.* He then was assigned to the staff of Minister of War General Werner von Blomberg.

In 1939, Friedeburg became an assistant to commander of German submarines Commodore Karl Dönitz. From 1939 to 1941, Friedeburg was in

the Operations and Organization Department of the German submarine forces. He then took command of *U-27*, and in February 1943 he succeeded Dönitz as commander of all German submarine forces. In May 1945, Friedeburg was promoted to general admiral (full admiral).

Friedeburg assumed command of all German naval forces on May 1, 1945. On May 7, he signed the instrument of surrender of German forces in northern Germany. Friedeburg committed suicide in Flensburg, Germany, on May 23, 1945.

KYLE D. HAIRE

See also

Blomberg, Werner von; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy

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Friessner, Johannes (1892–1971)

German Army general. Born in the Saxon city of Chemnitz on March 22, 1892, Johannes Friessner joined the German Army in March 1911 as an officer candidate and was commissioned a lieutenant of infantry in August 1912. He fought in World War I and thereafter continued in the army, with promotions to lieutenant colonel in April 1935 and colonel in March 1938. He was appointed chief inspector of military schools in March 1938 and then inspector for education and training of the army in September 1939. Promoted to major general in August 1940 and lieutenant general in October 1942, he was assigned to command the 102nd Infantry Division in May 1942.

Friessner commanded the XXIII Army Corps from January to December 1943 and was promoted to general of infantry in April 1943. He briefly commanded Army Group Friessner in February 1944 and Army Detachment Narva later that month before assuming command of Army Group North at the beginning of July 1944, when he was promoted to colonel general. Friessner's forces soon came under heavy Soviet attack; the manpower odds

against it were as great as eight to one. His sensible request to withdraw his exposed forces angered Adolf Hitler. Colonel General Heinz Guderian, chief of the army General Staff, then proposed that Friessner and Colonel General Ferdinand Schörner, a favorite of Hitler, switch assignments.

On July 25, 1944, Friessner went south to command Army Group South Ukraine. Although Guderian's calculated move helped shield Friessner from Hitler's wrath, Friessner received the worst of the deal. Army Group South Ukraine consisted of four armies: the German Sixth and Eighth (23 divisions) and the Romanian Third and Fourth (23 divisions). Together they totaled about 600,000 men, of whom some 340,000 were German. Twenty-one of the German divisions were infantry, however, and the Romanian units lacked the will to fight.

The massive attacks by the Soviet 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts on August 20 quickly smashed the two Romanian armies, isolating the German Sixth Army under General of Artillery Maximilian Fretter-Pico in the Kishinev area. As with its predecessor at Stalingrad, the reconstituted Sixth Army suffered a disastrous encirclement. Soviet spearheads penetrated miles behind the German lines before Hitler gave permission for a withdrawal. It was far too late.

Within a few days the Romanian government, headed by Ion Antonescu, was overthrown, and Romania left the war—its armies opening their remaining lines to the advancing Soviets. Few German units, many of them rear-area troops, escaped. The new Romanian government declared war on Germany on August 25, and Romanian troops joined the Red Army against the Germans. German casualties (killed and captured) numbered about 250,000 men. By the end of September, the Germans retained only a part of Transylvania, and by the end of October the Red Army had cleared the mountains and entered the Hungarian plain, overrunning the major eastern Hungarian cities of Debrecen and Szeged.

Friessner several times reconstituted his forces and stabilized his lines, even launching a successful counterattack at Nyiregyháza in late October. By late December, the Red Army was approaching Budapest. On December 23, Friessner recommended its abandonment to Hitler, whereupon the führer sacked both him and Fretter-Pico that same day. Friessner did not again hold a command. He briefly served as chairman of the Verband Deutscher

Soldaten (German Soldiers' Association) in 1951 and wrote his memoirs in 1956. Friessner died at Bayrisch-Gmain, Bavaria, on June 26, 1971.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Antonescu, Ion; Budapest, Battle of; Guderian, Heinz; Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós; Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich; Romania Campaign; Schörner, Ferdinand; Skorzeny, Otto; Tolbukhin, Fedor Ivanovich; Vörös, János

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Fritsch, Werner Thomas Ludwig von (1880–1939)

German Army general. Born on August 4, 1880, at Benrath, near Düsseldorf, Werner Thomas Ludwig von Fritsch was educated at Düsseldorf, Posen, and Hanau. In January 1900, he received a commission in the army as a lieutenant. Fritsch attended the War Academy (Kriegsakademie) in Berlin from 1907 to 1910 and qualified as a General Staff officer. A highly regarded officer, Fritsch served as a General Staff officer to various armies and divisions during World War I. He was promoted to major in 1917.

Following the war, Fritsch continued as a General Staff officer, including service with General Rudiger von der Goltz in the Baltics. Fritsch became part of the Reichswehr Ministry in 1920, there attracting the attention of chief of the German command General Hans von Seeckt. Commander of a battalion of the 5th Artillery Regiment in 1922, Fritsch was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1923. He served as chief of staff to the 1st Division at Königsberg from 1924 to 1926 until he became director of operations in the Truppenamt (the disguised General Staff). Fritsch was promoted to colonel in 1927; to major general in 1930, when he took command of the 1st Cavalry

Division; and to lieutenant general in October 1932 as commander of Wehrkreis III, the Berlin area military district.

On February 1, 1934, Fritsch was promoted to general of artillery when he became commander in chief of the army. He was promoted to colonel general in April 1936. Fritsch was not Adolf Hitler's choice; aging president Paul von Hindenburg selected him. Fritsch strengthened and expanded the army but sought to avoid conflict with Britain and France. He made no effort to conceal his disdain for the Nazis, the Schutzstaffel (SS), and even Hitler. Fritsch had only limited contact with Hitler; he had no right of direct access, and meetings with the führer were usually in the company of minister of war Field Marshal (from April 1936) Werner von Blomberg.

When in November 1937 Hitler laid out his plans for further territorial expansion, Fritsch and Blomberg expressed their opposition. By this time, Hermann Göring, Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich were all actively plotting to remove Blomberg and Fritsch. Blomberg was forced to resign in January 1938. This left the honorable and respected Fritsch as the remaining obstacle to Hitler's control of the army.

Himmler then trumped up charges of homosexuality against Fritsch, who did not help his case by remaining silently indignant as opposed to mounting a vigorous defense of his innocence. Fritsch chose to resign and demanded a court-martial. With Blomberg and Fritsch removed, Hitler then established the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) to replace the former War Ministry. Hitler became commander in chief of the armed forces and appointed the more pliable General Walther von Brauchitsch as new commander of the army.

Fritsch finally received his desired military court hearing and was acquitted on March 18, 1938, with witnesses confirming that he had been framed. Formal rehabilitation came on August 18, 1938, with reinstatement of his rank of colonel general and an appointment as honorary colonel in chief of his old unit, the 12th Artillery Regiment. Fritsch accompanied his old regiment during the 1939 Poland Campaign. He died on September 22, 1939, from a bullet wound as his unit was approaching Praga, a suburb of Warsaw. Rumors that he deliberately sought death or was murdered by the SS have since been discounted.

JON D. BERLIN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Blomberg, Werner von; Brauchitsch, Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von; Germany, Army; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Keitel, Wilhelm; Poland Campaign

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Frogmen

Popular term for members of underwater demolition teams (UDTs), which played an important role in World War II. Italy was at the forefront in training combat swimmers; the Italian 10th Light Flotilla was composed mostly of sailors who manned small surface and underwater craft with explosive warheads. Their mission was to sink Allied warships and merchant shipping, a role in which they enjoyed some success.

The United States also devoted attention to such activity, training and deploying frogmen in demolition and commando tactics. The first unofficial U.S. frogmen were organized in September 1942 as a detachment of sailors who received a week of training in underwater demolition tactics before being sent to North Africa as part of Operation TORCH (November 8, 1942). They destroyed nets blocking the entrance to the Sebou River in Morocco, allowing U.S. assault ships to enter the river and offload rangers to assault Vichy-held Port Lyautey Field.

This success led chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King to issue orders on May 6, 1943, for the formation of UDTs. The first Naval Combat Demolition Unit consisted of 13 volunteers who trained at the Naval Amphibious Unit at Solomon Island, Maryland. They were instructed in the

destruction of underwater obstacles and use of explosive charges to make channels through sandbars.

These newly designated frogmen took part in the invasion of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943). They destroyed roadblocks near the coast, used Bangalore torpedoes to remove barbed wire along the beach, salvaged stranded boats, and cleared channels through sandbars. On completion of their mission, most of the frogmen were sent back to the United States to work as instructors following further training at the Naval Amphibious Training Base at Fort Pierce, Florida. In the European theater, frogmen also participated in the June 6, 1944, invasion of Normandy, where they were tasked with the destruction of steel girders and heavy timbers on the Omaha and Utah Beaches, clearing the way for the landing craft.

Frogmen also played a key role in the war in the Pacific, participating in the many amphibious operations in that theater. The British also employed frogmen in the war. In the United States, frogmen were the forerunners of the U.S. Navy SEAL (sea, air, land) elite special-operations commando teams.

GREGORY C. WHEAL

See also

Borghese, Junio Valerio; Italy, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of; Submarines, Midget; TORCH, Operation

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Fromm, Friedrich (1888–1945)

German Army general. Born in Berlin on October 8, 1888, Friedrich Fromm joined the German Army and served as a lieutenant during World War I. He

remained in the Reichswehr after the war, holding a series of staff positions. Promoted to colonel in February 1933, Fromm headed the General Army Office in the Reich War Ministry. On July 13, 1939, Fromm was promoted to colonel general and named commander of the Ersatzheer (Replacement Army) and chief of army equipment. In his posts, Fromm worked closely with Albert Speer and promoted research into new weapons that might win the war.

Fromm is best remembered for his role in the July 20, 1944, plot against Hitler. From late 1941, Fromm believed that the war was lost and urged negotiations to end it. When he was approached by his chief of staff, Colonel Count Klaus von Stauffenberg, Fromm agreed to join the conspiracy against Hitler. When he learned that Hitler had survived the bomb blast of July 20, Fromm lost his nerve and promptly ordered the arrest and execution of Stauffenberg and other conspirators. This action, designed to conceal his own participation in the conspiracy, failed to save Fromm from Nazi vengeance. He was arrested the next day on orders of Schutzstaffel (SS) chief Heinrich Himmler and was imprisoned. Fromm was subsequently brought before the People's Court on a charge of failing to reveal what he knew of the conspiracy. Found guilty, he was executed at the Brandenburg-Görden Prison, Berlin, by firing squad on March 12, 1945.

JOSEPH C. GREANEY

See also

Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Speer, Albert; Stauffenberg, Claus Philipp Schenk von

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Frost, John Dutton (1912–1993)

British Army major general. Born on December 31, 1912, at Poona, India, the son of an army general, John Dutton Frost returned to England with his

family in 1921. Graduating from the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, Frost was commissioned a lieutenant in the infantry in 1932. Assigned to the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), he served in Britain and Palestine and later with the Iraq Levies. As a captain with homeland units, Frost tired of monotonous duties and volunteered for the new Special Air Service Brigade, becoming one of Britain's first airborne soldiers. As a major, he commanded the newly formed Parachute Regiment's 2nd Battalion.

In February 1942, Frost led 120 men in a daring night parachute jump against the German radar installation at Bruneval in Normandy, France. Dismantling key components of the radar unit, the force then evacuated by sea. Frost subsequently commanded a parachute battalion in Tunisia and then in Sicily and Italy. However, he is best remembered for his role as a lieutenant colonel in command of a parachute battalion at Arnhem during the failed September 17–26, 1944, Operation MARKET-GARDEN. His battalion of 600 men suffered heavy casualties in fighting at Arnhem while resisting German attacks on four consecutive nights and three days. Frost, who was severely wounded, was taken prisoner. During the war he received the Distinguished Service Order and Bar and the Military Cross.

Freed in March 1945, Frost continued in the British Army after the war and retired as a major general in 1968. He then raised cattle. Frost died in West Sussex, England, on May 12, 1993.

JAMES M. BATES

See also

MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Sosabowski, Stanisław; Urquhart, Robert Elliot

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Urquhart, Robert E. *Arnhem.* London: Cassell, 1958.

Fuchida Mitsuo (1902–1976)

Japanese Navy officer and aviator. Born at Nagao in Nara Prefecture on December 3, 1902, Fuchida Mitsuo graduated from the Japanese Naval

Academy in 1924 and completed flight training in 1927. While he was posted to the Yokosuka Kokutai (Air Corps), he developed the coordinated dive-bombing techniques intended to saturate target defenses that subsequently became standard Japanese tactics.

In 1939, Fuchida became the bomber group leader of the 1st Carrier Division aboard the aircraft carrier *Akagi*. He was a major participant in planning for the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack and was selected as overall strike commander for that mission, commanding the 330-plane force from Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi's First Air Fleet. Fuchida also participated in the attacks on Rabaul and Port Darwin (February 19, 1942) and the devastating raid by the First Air Fleet into the eastern Indian Ocean during the spring of 1942. Fuchida was incapacitated by appendicitis during the June 3–6, 1942, Midway operation. When the *Akagi* was attacked and sunk by U.S. Navy dive-bombers he was severely wounded, barely managing to survive.

Following his recovery, Fuchida was posted as a staff officer and undertook a series of planning assignments before transferring to operational posts in the Mariana Islands and the Philippines. He returned to Japan with the rank of captain to participate in planning for the final defense of the home islands. Fuchida claimed to have escaped death at Hiroshima by leaving the city the day before the atom bomb was dropped. He also claimed to have attended the surrender ceremony aboard the U.S. battleship *Missouri* on September 2, 1945, although some historians consider this a fabrication.

Japanese Navy captain Fuchida Mitsuo, photographed here in 1945. Fuchida was the strike force flight commander of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. After the war, Fuchida emigrated to the United States and became an American citizen. (AP Photo)

After the war, Fuchida took up farming and converted to Christianity with such fervor that he became a globe-circling evangelist. He immigrated to the United States in 1966 and became a citizen. Fuchida died while visiting Osaka, Japan, on May 30, 1976.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Air Warfare, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Genda Minoru; Indian Ocean Campaign; Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chūichi; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Rabaul

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Fukutome Shigeru (1891–1971)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Tottori, Japan, on February 1, 1891, Fukutome Shigeru graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in July 1912 and later from the Naval War College. He became a specialist in navigation. Fukutome's various posts included vice chief of staff of the China Expeditionary Fleet (1938) and captain of the battleship *Nagato* (1938–1939). He was promoted to rear admiral in November 1939, and until March 1941 he was chief of staff of the Combined Fleet. In this position, he supported Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. In April 1941, Fukutome was appointed head of the operations planning section of the navy General Staff, and until April 1943 he took part in most of the strategic planning for the war.

In November 1942, Fukutome was promoted to vice admiral, and in May 1943 he again became chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, this time under Admiral Koga Mineichi. In March 1944, the Combined Fleet headquarters staff left Palau for Davao in two flying boats. On March 31, 1944, they were caught in a typhoon. The first plane, with Koga on board, was lost; the second plane crashed into the sea with Fukutome, who was badly injured. Local Filipino guerrilla forces took Fukutome and some of his staff prisoner. Although Fukutome and his staff were later rescued by the local Japanese Army garrison, the guerrillas had taken the codebook and operation plans of the Combined Fleet and sent them to the United States. For whatever reason, Fukutome did not report this loss to the authorities, a failure that contributed to the Japanese defeat in the June 19–21, 1944, Battle of the Philippine Sea.

After recovering from his injuries, Fukutome commanded various air fleets until the end of the war. He was arrested as a war criminal in October

1947 but was later released. Fukutome died in Tokyo on February 6, 1971.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Koga Mineichi; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Fushimi Hiroyasu (1872–1946)

Japanese imperial prince and admiral. Born in Kyoto on October 16, 1872, Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu studied in Germany from 1890 to 1895. He entered the German Naval School (Marineschule) in 1892, and in 1895 he graduated from the Marineakademie (German Imperial Naval Academy). Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1903, Fushimi served in the battleship *Mikasa* during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War and was in the flagship during the October 1905 Battle of Tsushima, when he was wounded in action.

Fushimi held various line and staff duties, and he was promoted to full admiral in 1922. He occupied the post of chief of the navy General Staff from 1932 to 1941. Fushimi opposed the naval tonnage ratio fixed at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922. His support of the so-called Fleet Faction encouraged the hard-liners to push to increase their influence in the navy during the late 1930s.

During this period, Fushimi took over many of the functions traditionally under the jurisdiction of the navy ministry. He also saw to it that many high-ranking naval officers who had supported the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 were dismissed from the service. Replaced by Nagano Osami in April 1941, Fushimi thereafter had no practical influence on affairs of state or the war. He died in Tokyo on August 16, 1946.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Japan, Navy; Nagano Osami

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G

Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand (1912–1996)

German Air Force pilot and lieutenant general. Born on March 19, 1912, in Westerholt, Westphalia, Adolf "Dolfo" Joseph Ferdinand Galland began flying gliders at age 19. In 1931, he was accepted to train as a pilot at the Deutsches Verkehsflieger Schule. As a Staffelkapitan (squadron leader), Galland flew 300 ground-support missions in the Kondor Legion during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War.

Galland commanded a ground-attack squadron during the September 1939 invasion of Poland but transferred to fighters in the spring of 1940. During Germany's invasion of France (May 10–June 25, 1940), Galland was the adjutant for Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing) 27 (JG-27). Although his opportunities for combat were limited, he ended the campaign with 17 victories and the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Major Galland commanded III.JG-26 (Third Group, JG-26) in the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940). At the end of that campaign, he had a total of 40 victories, the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross, and command of JG-26. The majority of the Luftwaffe transferred to the east for Operation BARBAROSSA, but Galland and JG-26 remained on the English Channel coast to defend the homeland.

Following the death of Galland's friend and rival Werner Mölders in November 1941, Galland was named to replace him as general of fighters (an office, not a rank). Promoted to major general in 1942, he was the youngest general in the German armed forces. Although Galland commanded German fighter defenses against the bombing campaign of the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Forces, he remained at odds with Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring and Chancellor Adolf Hitler on how to prosecute the air war. He was relieved of his command in January 1945, but his reputation was such that he was allowed to form his own Jagdverband 44 (JV-44). It was

known as the “squadron of experts,” because “expert” was the German term for what the Allies called an ace.

Shot down and seriously wounded, Galland ended the war in a hospital. His official tally was 104 kills. Taken prisoner at the end of the war, he was released in 1947. Galland served as adviser to Argentina’s air force, but returned to Germany in 1955 to run an aerospace consulting firm. He died in Oberwinter, Germany, on February 9, 1996.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Britain, Battle of; France, Battle for; Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Hitler, Adolf; Kondor Legion; Mölders, Werner; Poland Campaign; Spanish Civil War

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Gallery, Daniel Vincent, Jr. (1901–1977)

U.S. Navy rear admiral. Born in Chicago, Illinois, on July 10, 1901, Daniel Vincent Gallery Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1920. Following service on several ships, he underwent pilot training and was certified a naval aviator in 1927.

Gallery was a flight instructor and then commanded a scouting squadron. From 1938 to 1941, he was chief of the aviation section of the Bureau of Ordnance. Gallery next participated in antisubmarine patrols in the North Atlantic as commander of the U.S. Fleet Air Base, Reykjavik, Iceland, from 1941 to 1943. In mid-1943, Captain Gallery took command of antisubmarine Task Group (TG) 22.3 operating out of Norfolk, Virginia, a hunter-killer

force consisting of the escort carrier *Guadalcanal* (CVE-60) and five destroyer escorts. TG 22.3 sank several German U-boats while providing protection for Allied Atlantic convoys.

While he was in command of TG 22.3, Gallery developed a plan for capturing a German submarine intact. That plan was executed to perfection on June 4, 1944, when the German submarine *U-505* was forced to the surface and captured with valuable cryptographic materials. Following the war, the *U-505* was placed at the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago, where it is still on display. When the actions of Gallery and TG 22.3 were made public at war's end, the navy emphasized that the *U-505* was the first enemy vessel captured on the high seas by the U.S. Navy since the War of 1812. In 1944, however, the navy worried that Gallery's exploit would cause the Germans to change the radio codes, but the Germans never learned of the capture.

Following the war, Gallery was chief of the navy's Guided Missile Division. He became involved in the so-called Revolt of the Admirals in 1949 and publicly argued the navy's case in the mass media. Retiring as a rear admiral in 1960, Gallery wrote numerous books and articles. Two of his brothers also retired from the U.S. Navy as rear admirals. Gallery died at Bethesda, Maryland, on January 16, 1977.

EDWARD F. FINCH

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied

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Gamelin, Maurice Gustave (1872–1958)

French Army general and commander in chief at the beginning of the 1940 Battle for France. Born in Paris on September 20, 1872, Maurice Gustave Gamelin was commissioned in the army in 1893 on graduation from the

French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr. His rise in the army was closely linked to French commanding general Joseph Joffre. Gamelin was serving as Joffre's operations officer at the beginning of World War I and remained with him until the latter's dismissal in 1916. During the rest of the war, Gamelin served with distinction as a brigade commander (1916) and then a division commander (1918). After the war, Gamelin commanded French forces in the Middle East, where he helped pacify the Druze in Lebanon. He became chief of the General Staff in 1931 and commander in chief designate in 1935, replacing Maxime Weygand.

Gamelin benefited from the patronage of Radical Party politician Édouard Daladier, who was three times premier in the 1930s. The two men, both veterans of the Battle of Verdun, agreed on the need to modernize French forces. Gamelin supported both mechanization and investments in airpower. Against his wishes, the French government proceeded with the construction of the Maginot Line, leaving little money for the reforms he championed.

As with his mentor Joffre, Gamelin isolated himself and had little contact with his men, refusing even to have a telephone installed at his headquarters at Vincennes. Gamelin urged France to fund emergency modernization measures in 1938, but French politicians, including Daladier, disagreed. In the first months of World War II, Gamelin advocated waiting for the British to rearm fully before assuming the offensive. He assumed (correctly) that Germany would not attack the Maginot Line. He also assumed (incorrectly) that the Germans would not attempt to cross the Ardennes Forest, believing they would attack through Belgium as they had done in 1914.

Gamelin bears primary responsibility for the disastrous Dyle Plan, which called for Allied forces to move into Belgium to meet an anticipated German invasion. This plan underestimated the strength of the Maginot Line, devoting half of French effectives there. It also left 100 miles of the Ardennes virtually unguarded. Gamelin learned nothing from the September 1939 Polish campaign and thus failed to fully appreciate the speed and strength of the German army. The Dyle Plan placed French troops in an untenable position in Belgium and northeastern France. Worse, the Germans anticipated its broad outlines and planned to defeat it by moving through the Ardennes and then north and west toward the English Channel ports.

Maurice Gustav Gamelin (1935), French army general and chief of staff of the army, 1935–1940. (Library of Congress)

On March 21, 1940, Paul Reynaud replaced Daladier as premier. Daladier remained in the government, first as defense minister and then as foreign minister, but his patronage could not save Gamelin. On May 10, the day of the German invasion of France, Reynaud was involved in discussions designed to remove Gamelin, in whom he had little confidence. Reynaud finally replaced him on May 19 with General Maxime Weygand, the man Gamelin had succeeded in 1935. Following the defeat of France on June 25, the Vichy government arrested Gamelin and brought him to trial at Riom, where he refused to defend himself. Deported to Germany in 1943, Gamelin was released by the Allies at the end of the war.

After the war, Gamelin wrote his three-volume memoir, *Servir*. He died at Paris on April 18, 1958.

MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

See also

Daladier, Édouard; France; France, Army; France, Battle for; Maginot Line; Poland Campaign; Reynaud, Paul; Weygand, Maxime

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Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)

Indian nationalist and spiritual leader, known as Mahatma meaning "great soul." Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, a thin, short man with bowed shoulders and thick spectacles, was more than any other single individual responsible for bringing an end to the British Empire. Born on October 2, 1869, in Porbandar, Kathiawar, India, Gandhi went to England at age 19 to study law at University College, London. On being admitted to the bar, he returned to practice in India but had only modest success.

In 1893, Gandhi left India to practice law in South Africa. There he encountered strong racial prejudice against the Indian population that had settled in Natal. The mild-mannered, passive Gandhi became an activist, protesting unjust laws through a nonviolent campaign of civil disobedience and noncooperation with the authorities. Gandhi eschewed his social position and lived a life of poverty and self-denial. During both the Second Boer War (1899–1902) and the Natal revolt of 1908, Gandhi organized and served with Red Cross units.

Gandhi returned to India in July 1914. He supported the British recruitment of Indian soldiers for World War I, but in 1919, with the passage of antisedition laws (the Rowlatt Acts), he began a protest against British rule. He called off the campaign, however, when violence flared. By 1921, Gandhi was the acknowledged leader of the Indian National Congress (INC), which he transformed from a party of the upper class into a mass movement. Meanwhile, Gandhi was jailed numerous times.



Indian nationalist leader Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, popularly known as Mahatma Gandhi, whose policy of peaceful protests led India from British rule to independence after World War II. (Library of Congress)

In 1930, Gandhi launched a campaign against the hated salt tax, and he also campaigned against prejudices toward the lowest social caste, the "untouchables." His program of passive resistance was a brilliant move because although the British had ample power to crush any armed rebellion, they were never able to devise an answer to nonviolent resistance. British rule in India and elsewhere rested primarily on the consent of the governed.

Gandhi dressed in a simple loincloth (*dhoti*) and worked at his spinning wheel daily, stressing his devotion to a life of simplicity. Although Gandhi condemned Adolf Hitler and fascism as well as the persecution of the Jews, he hated war more, and he naively advised nonviolent protest as the best course of action even in the event of a Japanese invasion of India. He broke with more pragmatic INC leaders over the degree to which India should

support the Allied effort in World War II. But after a March 1942 British mission headed by Stafford Cripps failed to agree on a program that would secure Indian independence in return for support against the Japanese, most INC leaders supported Gandhi.

On August 8, 1942, the INC passed a resolution calling on Britain to "quit India," which prompted British authorities to arrest Gandhi and other INC leaders. Following considerable violence, in which some 2,500 people were killed or wounded and considerable property was damaged, the British managed to restore order. Gandhi, in poor health, was held under house arrest near Poona for two years, but with doctors reporting him to be near death, the authorities released him on May 6, 1944. He had spent a total of 2,089 days in Indian prisons and another 249 in prisons in South Africa.

Gandhi recovered and took a leading role in negotiations with Clement Attlee's Labour Party in Britain at the end of World War II. Attlee appointed Lord Louis Mountbatten to carry out the unwelcome task of ending British rule. The intransigence of Muslim leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah over the creation of a Muslim state led to the partition of India, despite Gandhi's great opposition. India and Pakistan were proclaimed independent states on August 14, 1947.

Independence brought near anarchy in both India and Pakistan. The problems of partition were staggering, and millions of people were uprooted and forced to move from one state to another. Religious hatred mingled with sheer greed, and perhaps a quarter of a million people died in the violence. In volatile Calcutta, Gandhi kept the peace but only by offering his own person as a hostage and by beginning a fast unto death. Gandhi's reward for telling Hindus and Muslims that they had to learn to live together as brothers was his assassination by a young Hindu fanatic in Calcutta on January 30, 1948. Fortunately, Gandhi's death marked the end of the insensate communal killings.

A prolific writer, Gandhi influenced many others through his teachings of nonviolence. He inspired many activists, including Martin Luther King Jr., leader of the civil rights movement in the United States.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Attlee, Clement Richard; Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford; Great Britain; India; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Document 147

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Garand, John Cantius (1883–1967)

Inventor of the U.S. Garand rifle. John Cantius Garand was born on January 1, 1883, near Saint Remi, Quebec, Canada, and moved to Connecticut in 1894. He dropped out of school to work in a steel mill and by 1897 had filed for his first patent for a new type of jack screw. Garand became a machinist at the mill in 1901.

Helping his father at a shooting gallery led to Garand's interest in firearms. A few years later, he moved to Providence, Rhode Island, where he worked for the Federal Screw Corporation. He took up motorcycling and designed his own engine. Firearms, however, became his passion.

Garand then moved to New York City, where he worked in a micrometer plant and continued his education via correspondence courses. In 1917, Garand learned that the U.S. Army was searching for a reliable machine gun, and he designed such a weapon and sent the plans for it to the U.S. Bureau of Standards. By 1919, Garand was the consulting engineer for the army's arsenal in Springfield, Massachusetts. He became a U.S. citizen in 1920.

In the 1920s, the Ordnance Department wanted to develop a semiautomatic rifle to replace the superb but difficult-to-master M-1903 Springfield bolt-action rifle. In 1923, Garand submitted his design for Bureau of Standards testing, and over the next 11 years he refined and improved the design until it met army standards for field testing. In 1936, the U.S. Army adopted Garand's weapon, describing it as "Rifle, Semi-Automatic, M1." The United States became the only country in World War II to have a semiautomatic rifle as a standard infantry weapon. The Garand, 43.6 inches long and weighing 9 pounds 8 ounces (unloaded), was a gas-operated, air-

cooled, semiautomatic shoulder weapon that fired .30-06 ammunition from an 8-round clip. It had an effective range of 440 yards and a maximum range of 3,200 yards. A total of 4,040,000 M1s were produced, and it was the standard U.S. infantry firearm from 1936 to 1957.

The M1 had many advantages, including its accuracy, superior rate of firepower, and user-friendly sights. The Garand fired 40 rounds a minute in the hands of the average rifleman. It had 40 percent less recoil than the bolt-action Springfield it replaced and only 72 parts. The Garand could be entirely broken down using only one tool, a .30-caliber round.

Although Garand never received what many believe to be his financial due for the M1, he was awarded the Government Medal of Merit in 1944. He retired as chief ordnance engineer in 1953 and died in Springfield, Massachusetts, on February 16, 1967.

SCOTT R. DIMARCO AND GORDON E. HOGG

See also
Rifles

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Gavin, James Maurice (1907–1990)

U.S. Army lieutenant general, airborne pioneer, and statesman. Born on March 22, 1907, in Brooklyn, New York, James Maurice Gavin was abandoned by his biological mother and subsequently adopted. At age 16, he enlisted in the army and eventually earned an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Graduating in 1929, he was commissioned in the infantry.

Gavin attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia; served in the Philippines; and then was an instructor at West Point. He transferred to duty with parachute troops and, promoted to colonel in July 1942, rose to command the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which eventually became part of the 82nd Airborne Division. In 1943, Gavin's 505th jumped into

Sicily, where Gavin led elements of his regiment during a fight on Biazza Ridge and stopped troops of the Hermann Göring Panzer Division from breaking through to the invasion beaches. After Sicily, Gavin led the 505th in another combat jump into Salerno on September 14, 1943. Promoted to brigadier general in October, he was appointed assistant division commander.

Gavin left Italy for Britain in November 1943. There he headed the airborne planning effort for Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of France. He then rejoined the 82nd Airborne Division and made his third combat jump—into Normandy on June 6, 1944, as commander of Task Force A.

In August 1944, Gavin assumed command of the 82nd and led it on its fourth combat jump in September into Nijmegen, Holland, during Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26). He continued in command of the division for the remainder of the war, fighting through the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes) and the subsequent drive into Germany. By the end of the war, Gavin had made more combat jumps than any other general in history.

U.S. Army major general James Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, in February 1945. (MPI/Getty Images)

Gavin continued to command the 82nd Airborne Division until March 1948. He was then, in succession, chief of staff of the Fifth Army; chief of staff, Allied Forces South; commander of VII Corps; and deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Army. Promoted to lieutenant general in March 1955, Gavin was in line for promotion to general when he retired in 1958 because of differences with the defense policies of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration—specifically what he regarded as its overreliance on nuclear forces. Gavin returned to public life during the John F. Kennedy administration, serving as ambassador to France (1960–1961). He died in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 23, 1990.

GUY A. LOFARO

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Ardennes Offensive; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of

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Gazala, Battle of (May 26–June 13, 1942)

Key North African battle between Axis and Allied forces. The Battle of Gazala of May 26–June 13, 1942, sprang from Operation VENEZIA, in which Adolf Hitler sought to tie down as many Allied troops as possible in North Africa while German forces fought the decisive battle in the Soviet Union. Hitler also wanted to capture Allied forward airfields so that Axis forces might reduce Malta. Axis forces for VENEZIA, formed into Panzerarmee Afrika or Armata Corazzata Africa, consisted of two Italian infantry corps, one Italian armor corps, and the German Afrika Korps.

The Afrika Korps had recently received reinforcements and new equipment, and Italy had sent some of its best units and equipment to North Africa. It had also retrained its units and altered some of their structures to replicate German tactics. An Italian infantry division now numbered only 7,000 men, but it had a heavier artillery component. Although its tanks were still of limited value, Italy sent some self-propelled artillery armed with 75mm guns, and some Italian divisions boasted both 90mm and German 88mm antitank guns.

German Afrika Korps commander General Erwin Rommel, nominally under Italian general Ettore Bastico, head of Comando Superiore Forze Armate Africa Settentrionale (Supreme Command Armed Forces in North Africa), planned to attack the Allied forces entrenched with the protection of heavy minefields along the Gazala Line. Rommel hoped to outflank the line from the south and then drive on and capture Tobruk, all within 10 days. He

could call on 332 German and 228 Italian tanks. Rommel also had the advantage in the air.

Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie commanded the British Eighth Army. Ritchie had an armored corps of two divisions and an infantry corps built around three divisions. Another division was in reserve, attached to army headquarters. All were numerically larger then the Axis divisions. The Eighth Army had recently received 242 U.S.-built M3 Grant tanks as well as improved 6-pounder antitank guns. Ritchie could call on 839 Allied tanks, with a further 145 moving up. Both sides added tanks during the battle. Each side also had a small amphibious element, but neither was deployed in that capacity during the battle.

Ritchie had hoped to mount an attack to relieve Axis pressure on Malta, but Rommel struck first. On May 26 while Axis infantry held the line, Axis motorized units poured around the southern Allied flank. Achieving some small successes, they stalled at the Free French fort of Bir Hacheim. Positioning themselves in the Allied rear, the Axis motorized units then took up defensive positions while also operating against Bir Hacheim, which fell on June 11 after a heroic French defense. Meanwhile, Eighth Army tanks mounted a series of assaults against Axis armor in the so-called Cauldron, but the British were repulsed with heavy losses from Axis antitank artillery guns.

The Axis forces having opened a supply line and the Eighth Army reeling from heavy tank losses, Rommel resumed the offensive on June 12. At Knightsbridge, he ambushed British armor, destroying 120 tanks and forcing a general Allied retreat. In less than three weeks, the Axis offensive had forced the Allies to withdraw into Egypt, paving the way for a third assault on the port of Tobruk during June 20–21, 1942. Ritchie was relieved of command, and General Claude Auchinleck took command of the withdrawal.

JACK GREENE

See also

Afrika Korps; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Bastico, Ettore; Free French; Hitler, Adolf; Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Gehlen, Reinhard (1902–1979)

German Army general. Born on April 3, 1902, at Erfurt, Germany, Reinhard Gehlen completed his secondary education in Breslau, and in 1921 he joined the 6th Light Artillery in Schweidnitz as an officer candidate. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1923. From 1933 to 1935, he attended the Army Staff College; promoted to captain, he was posted to the General Staff and held a series of staff positions. In 1942, Gehlen was promoted to colonel.

Despite his lack of experience in intelligence, Gehlen was assigned as head of Fremde Heere Ost (FHO, Foreign Armies East), the Wehrmacht's Eastern Front intelligence service. In that capacity, he supervised German Army intelligence operations on the Eastern Front and recruited more than 100,000 Soviet prisoners of war into the anti-Soviet "Russian Liberation Army." Gehlen's unit worked separately from the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD), collecting information on Soviet partisans and regular troops, and on Soviet intelligence methods of infiltration and interrogation.

Gehlen cultivated an extensive network of spies, mostly recruiting Soviet citizens with German ethnic backgrounds. Soviet codes and ciphers were also broken. Gehlen's intelligence reports were accurate and dependable, and they helped the German Army, especially in the period after the August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943, Battle of Stalingrad.

Adolf Hitler tersely commended Gehlen's precision but was constantly annoyed by his dim view of prospects for the conquest of the Soviet Union. In December 1944, Gehlen was promoted to major general, but in April 1945 Hitler dismissed him as head of the FHO, telling his generals that Gehlen was "an unreliable defeatist." As early as 1943, Gehlen had planned to offer his information and expertise to the United States. Predicting a U.S.–Soviet Union rupture, he microfilmed all his files.

In May 1945, Gehlen surrendered to U.S. forces. Generals Edwin Sibert and Walter Bedell Smith developed a relationship with him without

informing General Dwight D. Eisenhower. After the war, the "Gehlen Organization" subsequently became the most effective agency of the Central Intelligence Agency in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In April 1956, it was transferred to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Gehlen became the head of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (German Federal Intelligence Service) until his retirement in April 1968. He died in Berg am Starnberger See, Germany, on June 8, 1979.

PETER OVERLACK

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hitler, Adolf; Rote Kappelle; Smith, Walter Bedell; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Geiger, Roy Stanley (1885–1947)

U.S. Marine Corps general. Born on January 25, 1885, in Middleburg, Florida, Roy Stanley Geiger earned a law degree from Stetson University in DeLand, Florida, but he only briefly practiced law. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in November 1907 and received a commission in 1909. Geiger first served with marine detachments aboard battleships and then saw constabulary duty ashore in Panama, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and China.

In 1916, as a captain, Geiger became the fifth Marine Corps aviator. Following U.S. entry in World War I, as a major he commanded Bomber Squadron A of the 1st Marine Aviation Force in France. After the war,

Geiger's career centered on marine aviation and advanced schooling. He served with Marine Corps air units, and from 1931 to 1935 he headed Marine Corps aviation, playing a major role in its development.

Geiger was promoted to colonel in 1935. He graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (1925), the Army War College (1929), and the Naval War College (1941). Promoted to brigadier general in 1941, Geiger took command of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, that September.

From September 1942, Geiger led the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. He returned to the United States in May 1943 to direct Marine Corps aviation. Promoted to major general, in November 1943 he assumed command of the I Marine Amphibious Corps on Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, which he led—following its redesignation as III Amphibious Corps—in fighting on Guam, Peleliu, and Okinawa. Following the death of Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner in the Okinawa Campaign (March–June 1945), Geiger briefly (June 18–23) commanded the Tenth Army on Okinawa, the first Marine Corps officer ever to head a numbered field army. Following promotion to lieutenant general in June 1945, Geiger became commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force in the Pacific. He returned to Headquarters Marine Corps in November 1946 and died on January 23, 1947, in Bethesda, Maryland. By act of Congress in July 1947, Geiger received posthumous promotion to full general.

BRANDON H. TURNER

See also

Bougainville Campaign; Buckner, Simon Bolivar, Jr.; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guam, Battle for; Okinawa, Invasion of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Genda Minoru (1904–1989)

Japanese Navy captain and aviator and postwar general and chief of staff. Born in Hiroshima on August 16, 1904, Genda Minoru graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1924. Following sea service, he took flight training at Kasumigaura in 1928 and 1929, graduating at the head of his class. He served with the Yokosuka Kokutai (Air Corps) and aboard the carriers *Akagi* and *Ryujo* before becoming a fighter flight instructor at Yokosuka in 1934. There he gained national fame as leader of the Genda Circus, an aerobatics team. While at Yokosuka and subsequently at the Naval Staff College in 1937, Genda developed and expounded on his concepts of massed air attacks under fighter umbrellas and the central role of naval aviation in future warfare. Following combat service in China and command of the Yokosuka Kokutai, he became assistant naval attaché in London from 1938 to 1940.

When Genda returned to Japan in 1940, he joined the staff of the 1st Carrier Division. On its formation in April 1941, he became chief air officer of the First Air Fleet, which concentrated all of Japan's carriers into a single force to maximize their combat effectiveness, much as he had advocated since the mid-1930s. In February 1941, Genda drafted an aggressive plan for an air assault on Hawaii, expanding on Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku's initial tentative suggestion for a preemptive strike to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Genda played a leading role in designing the tactical plan for the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack. Although Genda's demands for concentration of force and surprise were heeded, his emphasis on destroying the U.S. carriers and following up with an invasion to eliminate Hawaii as a U.S. forward base were not part of Yamamoto's eventual plan.

During the Pacific war, Genda served in carriers in the Pearl Harbor attack, in the Indian Ocean, in the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), and in the Solomon Islands Campaign (August 1942–February 1943). He was on the staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet at Rabaul until his promotion to captain in late 1944, when he became senior aviation officer in the Naval General Staff. In 1945, Genda was charged with the air defense of the Japanese home islands as commander of Kokutai 343, a large formation equipped with the best navy

interceptor aircraft that were flown by the most experienced available crews. He served in this capacity until Japan's surrender.

Following World War II, Genda was first in private business; he then headed the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces from 1955 to 1962, retiring as a full general. He was elected to the upper house of the Japanese Diet in 1962, serving there until 1982. Genda died in Tokyo on August 15, 1989.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Air Warfare, Naval; Fuchida Mitsuo; Indian Ocean Campaign; Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chūichi; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Yamamoto Isoroku

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General von Steuben, Sinking of

See *Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben,* and *Goya,* Sinking of

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George II, King of Greece (1890–1947)

Greek monarch who reigned from 1922 to 1924 and again from 1935 to 1947. King George II was born on July 20, 1890, in Tatoi Palace, near Athens, the eldest son of King Constantine I and Princess Sophia of Prussia. Like many future Greek kings, George entered the military and received training in the Prussian Guard, and he saw action during the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars.

In 1913, upon the assassination of his grandfather, George became crown prince. During World War I, Constantine was deposed because of his alleged

pro-German sentiments, and George followed him into exile in 1917. George's brother Alexander was then installed as king. After Alexander's untimely death in 1920 and a national plebiscite, Constantine was returned to the throne. Crown Prince George remained in the military, eventually rising to major general. When the Greeks were defeated in the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922), Constantine was again deposed, and George now became king.

King George's first reign was not a happy one. In 1923, a coup nearly deposed him, and a Revolutionary Committee requested that he leave Greece so that the future of the Greek government could be determined. Although George II left the country, he would not abdicate. In 1924, while in exile in Romania, the new Greek republic formally deposed him. George II and his family eventually took up residence in London.

Greece was plagued by political chaos in the succeeding years. Between 1925 and 1935 alone, there had been 23 different governments, including a dictatorship, and 13 coups d'état. In November 1935, a plebiscite indicated overwhelming support for a reinstatement of the monarchy, so George II returned to Greece within days of the vote. A year later, however, George II essentially underwrote Ioannis Metaxas's attempt to establish a rightist, quasi-fascist dictatorship. By the time Italian troops invaded Greece in October 1940, though, the king had expressed pro-British sentiments. When the Germans came to the aid of the Italians in Greece in April 1941 and occupied that country, George II was again driven out. He eventually resettled in London.

Between the time of his departure and the end of World War II, George II remained the internationally recognized head of the Greek state. As the liberation of Greece appeared imminent in 1944, the king shrewdly denounced Metaxas's regime and called for the restoration of a republican monarchy. Many Greeks, however, distrusted the king because of his earlier support of Metaxas. This began a period of great political contention, and the decision to return the king to his throne was a contributing factor to the Greek Civil War of 1946–1949.

A March 1946 plebiscite supported a return of the monarchy, and George II returned to Greece in September. The embattled king faced an economically prostrate nation being torn apart by a civil war and under siege by communist partisans. He was unable to restore stability to Greece before dying of a heart attack in Athens on April 1, 1947.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Greece; Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian; Metaxas, Ioannis

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George VI, King of England (1895–1952)

King of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and constitutional head of the British Empire (1936–1952). Born on December 14, 1895, at Sandringham, England, the second son of King George V and Queen Mary, George was by nature unpretentious and modest. He also suffered from a severe stammer. No intellectual, he was educated by private tutors. Following family tradition, he entered the navy at 13 and attended the Royal Navy College at Dartmouth. George saw action in the 1916 Battle of Jutland, and in 1918 he joined the Royal Flying Corps and became a wing commander.

George married Lady Elizabeth Angela Marguerite Bowes-Lyon in 1923. They had two daughters, the future Queen Elizabeth II and Princess Margaret. As Duke of York, George helped set up summer camps for young men in industrial slums in the cities.

George succeeded to the throne on December 12, 1936, following the abdication of his brother, King Edward VIII. George made numerous state visits in 1938 and 1939, including to the United States, which cemented valuable friendships. He was the first British monarch to visit the United States.

Despite the fact that military personnel swore allegiance to him and that military orders were issued in his name, George VI had no real powers as king. His role in World War II was to provide an example to the nation. In frequent radio broadcasts, George VI encouraged his people to remain calm, firm in resolve, and united behind the war effort. His popularity soared because he refused to leave London, despite the fact that Buckingham Palace

was hit by German bombs. He also toured the bombed areas. George VI had an excellent relationship with Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill.

George VI established the George Cross, for both wartime and peacetime heroism, the civilian equivalent of the Victoria Cross. His frequent wartime visits to factories and hospitals and to the troops boosted morale. He also strongly supported monarchs in exile in Britain. At the end of the war, the popular bond with the monarchy had never been as strong in modern times. George VI lived to see dramatic changes in Britain's world position at the end of the war and the breakup of the British Empire, especially the independence of India in 1947. He died at Sandringham, England, on February 6, 1952, and was succeeded by his daughter, crowned queen as Elizabeth II, who continues as monarch.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain

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Georges, Alphonse Joseph (1875–1951)

French Army general. Born on August 19, 1875, at Montluçon, Alphonse Joseph Georges graduated third in his class in 1897 from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr and was posted to Algeria. During World War I, he was seriously wounded in 1914 while commanding a battalion. Following his recovery, he was posted to the army General Staff. Georges ended the war as chief of operations for Marshal Ferdinand Foch.

After the war, Georges served as chief of staff to Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain during the Rif War in Morocco. Georges was a division commander in Algeria from 1928 to 1932 and was then assigned to the Supreme War

Council in Paris. He was wounded during the assassination of both King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French foreign minister Louis Barthou at Marseille in 1934. This aggravated the wound he had received in 1914.

Georges's physical condition may have played a critical role in his deteriorating abilities during the late 1930s. He expected to be named chief of staff of the French Army in 1935, but the French premier, Édouard Daladier, suspected him of right-wing tendencies. Georges was also closely linked to Paul Reynaud, Daladier's political rival. Daladier thus named General Maurice Gamelin to the position instead and installed Georges as Gamelin's assistant.

The troubled professional and personal relationship between Gamelin and Georges severely weakened French preparations for war during the last half of the 1930s. Georges assumed responsibility for northeast France, placing him in direct command of the units most likely to meet a German invasion. In 1940, these units included two French Army groups and the British Expeditionary Force. Fully confident of the abilities of his force, Georges was stunned by its subsequent poor performance.

French general Alphonse Georges. (March of Time/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Georges bears partial responsibility for the decision to implement the Dyle Plan, which placed substantial Allied units on the road to Belgium rather than in the Ardennes, the main axis of German attack. As the military situation collapsed, so did any semblance of professionalism between Georges and Gamelin. On May 17, 1940, both men were relieved of command in favor of General Maxime Weygand.

Georges refused to play any role in the subsequent collaborationist Vichy government, but he also had no real role in the French Resistance because he did not enjoy the confidence of Charles de Gaulle. Georges briefly served as minister without portfolio in the French Committee of National Liberation in 1943. Georges died in Paris on April 24, 1951.

MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

See also

Daladier, Édouard; de Gaulle, Charles; France, Army; France, Battle for; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul; Weygand, Maxime

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German Armed Merchant Ship Commerce Raiders

At the beginning of World War II, the Germans converted selected merchantmen into armed commerce raiders. These were charged with sinking enemy ships, laying mines, upsetting British merchant shipping schedules, and forcing the Royal Navy to shift assets from more vital theaters, dissipating and wearing out machinery and ships.

The first of these raiders, and the most successful, was the *Atlantis.* It departed Germany on March 31, 1940. Five other raiders followed by early July and one more in December. There were nine in all: the *Atlantis, Orion, Wilder, Thor, Pinguin, Komet, Kormoran, Stier,* and *Michel.* The *Komet* reached the Pacific through the Northeast Passage, thanks to the assistance of two Soviet icebreakers, for which service the Soviet Union was paid some $300,000. The others all broke out through the Denmark Strait. The ships ranged in displacement from 3,300 to 8,800 tons.

Painted gray, brown, or black to render them less visible at night, these ships would sail under whatever flag was convenient at the moment. Their raked bows hinted at additional speed if required, but that was the only indication that they were not innocent merchantmen. Hidden behind hinged steel ports, however, were six 5.9-inch guns, the raiders' primary weapons. They also carried torpedo tubes, both above and below water. False topside works concealed lighter guns, searchlights, range finders, and smoke generators.

The raiders also had float aircraft for reconnaissance purposes. None of the ships had catapults, so these aircraft could only be used in calm seas. Two of the raiders carried small motor torpedo boats. Most of the raiders also

carried mines, which were laid in widely scattered areas of the world, including off the Cape of Good Hope and Auckland, New Zealand.

Some of the prizes taken were valuable, and a number of these were gotten safely back through the British blockade to France. The prizes also provided fuel and supplies, enabling the raiders to extend their cruising time.

The raiders were hard to locate, and the Germans shifted them around and altered their appearance. Because of their heavy armament, only cruisers were sufficiently armed to deal with them. Although most of the raiders remained in the Atlantic, some reached the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

The raiders had their greatest success in 1940. Gradually thereafter they were hunted down and destroyed or succumbed to mechanical problems. The *Michel* was the only raider left at sea at the beginning of 1943. It continued to sink Allied shipping through most of that year. On October 18, 1943, it was about 60 miles from its new base of Yokohama, Japan, when it was attacked at night by the surfaced U.S. submarine *Tarpon.* The *Michel* tried to ram the submarine but was in turn torpedoed and sunk.

In all, the German raiders sank some 129 ships totaling more than 800,000 tons, a figure equal to a year's normal British peacetime construction. This figure does not include an unknown tally of ships sunk by mines or the indirect cost to the British war effort and the value of the prizes sent to Germany for its war economy.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantis, KMS; Germany, Navy; *Sydney*, HMAS, Sinking of

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German-Soviet Peace Feelers

Even as Germany and the Soviet Union were locked in their death struggle on the Eastern Front, there were those who urged—and others who feared—a separate peace between the two nations. U.S. and British leaders were afraid that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin might decide that the cost of expelling the German invader from the Soviet Union and the long delay by his Western Allies in opening a second front justified a separate peace, much as Bolshevik Russia had concluded a separate peace with Imperial Germany during World War I in March 1918. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt hoped that substantial Lend-Lease shipments would convince the Soviet ally to remain in the war.

Italian and Japanese leaders repeatedly tried to convince Adolf Hitler and other German officials to seek a separate peace with the Soviet Union. They pointed out that peace with the Soviet Union would permit Germany to reallocate resources against the Western Allies in North Africa and in the Atlantic and thus shore up the flagging Italian and Japanese war efforts. After all, some three-quarters of the German Army and two-thirds of Luftwaffe strength were assigned to the Eastern Front, sharply limiting German military efforts elsewhere. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini made the case strongly with Hitler during meetings held between December 18 and 20, 1942, after the Allied invasion of French North Africa the previous November and again after the Axis surrender in Tunisia in May 1943. The Japanese became increasingly convinced of the need for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union following their defeat at Midway (June 3–6, 1942). Because Japan was allied with Germany and had a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, Japan was an ideal intermediary. The United States was able to read Japanese diplomatic traffic, and U.S. and British strategists followed Japanese peace efforts with great concern.

It is not clear that Stalin or Hitler ever seriously entertained thoughts of a separate peace. Some scholars believe that in the winter of 1941–1942, Stalin authorized secret police head Lavrenti Beria to sound out Germany on peace terms. Historian Gerhard Weinberg believes that Stalin may have considered the possibility of peace after the end of the Soviet winter offensive in early 1942. Weinberg and other scholars believe that Stalin may have been interested in such discussions up to the conclusion of the Battle of Kursk

(July 5–13, 1943), when he became convinced that the Soviet Union could defeat Germany with or without the long-sought second front.

There are also indications of informal contacts between German and Soviet intermediaries in Stockholm, Sweden. Although Soviet leaders believed that the war had turned in their favor, they were worried by the German counterattack to regain Kharkov (March 1–14, 1943). Stalin may also have wished to use peace feelers to impel his U.S. and British allies to expand matériel aid and become more accommodating in meeting Soviet territorial demands. Moreover, Soviet officials did not offer Germany a generous peace, at one time indicating that they would only guarantee Germany's 1937 borders—namely, those prior to the 1938 Anschluss (union) with Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

Hitler also resisted the entreaties of his Italian and Japanese allies. Despite the surprising power of the Soviet winter offensive in 1941–1942, Hitler believed that heavy Soviet casualties had brought the Soviet Union near the breaking point, and he refused suggestions from many of his generals that he switch to defensive warfare. At least until after the Battle of Kursk, Hitler believed that he could defeat the Red Army, and therefore he opposed any negotiated peace. Some generals and several of Hitler's closest advisers, including Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, urged Hitler to investigate the possibility of a separate peace, but he never encouraged such talk.

In the fall of 1944 following the destruction of German Army Group Center in the Soviet Union and the Western Allies' breakout from Normandy, Japanese officials again tried to convince Hitler to seek peace. Even though Germany had already yielded its 1941 gains to the Soviet Union, Hitler decided instead to build new divisions, equip them with new Tiger tanks, and attack the Western Allies in the December 16, 1944–January 15, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge).

CHARLES M. DOBBS

See also

Germany; Germany, Army; Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Hitler, Adolf; Kharkov, Battles of; Kursk, Battle of; Lend-Lease; Midway, Battle of; Mussolini, Benito; Ribbentrop, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim von; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Soviet Union; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph

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Germany

Nation located in North-Central Europe with a 1939 population of 69.6 million (not including Austria and Czechoslovakia, both of which had been annexed in 1938). Germany proper encompassed approximately 137,000 square miles. Germany bordered Denmark, the North Sea, and Baltic Sea to the north; Switzerland and Austria to the south; Czechoslovakia and Poland to the east; and Belgium, France, and Luxembourg to the west.

The popular assumption that Nazi Germany was a well-organized war machine on the eve of World War II is patently false. It is true, however, that no time was likely to be as favorable as September 1939 for German leader Adolf Hitler to go to war with the Western powers. Britain and France were only then rearming, and Germany had a larger population than its western neighbors, a strong industrial base, and the world's most powerful army and air force. The economy was unbalanced, however, with imports running well in excess of exports, but Hitler planned to redress the imbalance by seizing in war all that the Reich required.

The National Socialist state controlled the media, with Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels adroitly manipulating the press, radio, film, and party rallies. Informers on every block and the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei or State Secret Police) kept a close watch on activities, but most Germans accepted the führer's policies. Sullen resignation over the start of the war in September 1939 turned to euphoria after Germany's victories over France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940. In the winter of 1941 when the military situation began to deteriorate on the Russian plains, Germans settled into a sort of stoic determination that lasted until near the end. Most Germans were aware of the price their nation was exacting from

the rest of Europe and thus could believe that the Allies would repay them in kind.

To ensure the loyalty of the Reich's citizens, however, Hitler ordered that judges ignore established law and procedure and dispense only "National Socialist justice." Hitler expressly approved the Gestapo's use of torture. The complete subversion of the German legal system to Nazi rule came with the appointment in August 1942 of Roland Freisler as president of the Volksgerichthof (People's Court).

Once he had secured power in 1933, Hitler sought to harness the German economy for war preparation. He well understood that his desire for new lands in the east (*Lebensraum*, or living space) had to be realized through a series of swift and decisive military victories. The German economy could not sustain a long, drawn-out war. Thus, the blitzkrieg (lightning war) was born of economic necessity.

In 1936, Hitler instituted his Four-Year Plan for the economy under Reichsmarshal Herman Göring. The idea was designed to centralize the economy. As with everything else in the Third Reich, however, the rivalry of higher-ranking officials, encouraged by Hitler, meant that the economy remained a battlefield for various competing interests, even within the armed forces. Despite these inefficiencies, the German military was rebuilt. Spending on the armed forces, however, consumed 50 percent of the budget, or approximately 60 billion reichsmarks, per year. Hjalmar Schacht, head of the Reichsbank, pointed out that this level of expenditure could not be sustained.

Besides military growth, another goal of the Four-Year Plan was German economic autarky in such key areas as the petrochemical industry and reduction of imports of other raw materials necessary for war production, including rubber and minerals. From 1936 to 1938, the Four-Year Plan concentrated on production of raw materials; after 1938, attention was focused on production of finished goods such as tanks, aircraft, and artillery pieces for immediate war use. Between 1936 and 1942, the Four-Year Plan represented 50 percent (13.25 billion reichsmarks) of total German industrial investment.

Memories of World War I, when the British naval blockade starved Germany of raw materials and foodstuffs, underpinned German planning. The August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, however, removed

much of the impact of the blockade during World War II, as did the addition of Romania—with its important oil fields of Ploieşti to the Axis alliance after the war began.

Despite emphasis on military production, the Nazi hierarchy feared the impact on home front morale of shortages of consumer goods. Production of consumer goods from 1936 to 1939, when Germany was straining to increase its armaments, actually went up by 25 percent. This continued during the war; thus Germans enjoyed both "guns and butter" and a relatively high standard of living until 1944. After the successful military campaigns of 1939 and 1940, Hitler recommended a reduction in arms production in order not to affect civilian morale. The government sought to pacify the population with incentives such as bonuses for night shifts and overtime pay on holidays. Despite an official decree to freeze salaries, average wages from September 1939 to March 1941 rose by 10.4 percent.

Even in 1942, consumer expenditures were maintained at about the 1937 level, and few new economic restrictions were imposed. Raw materials were in short supply, but these were deliberately depleted in the expectation of a quick victory over the Soviet Union. This optimistic outlook changed with the German reverses in the winter of 1941–1942. In February 1942 when Fritz Todt, minister of armaments and production, died in a plane crash, Hitler named Albert Speer as Todt's replacement.

An organizational genius with a keen interest in efficiency rather than ideology, Speer created a centralized machinery of control in the Central Planning Board. By 1943, Speer had nearly complete control of the national economy and was able to substantially boost production. He also enacted industrial policies to standardize production by limiting the number of different types of armaments produced and promoting efficient factory assembly-line methods. In fact, German war production was at its height in 1944, despite Allied bombing, and production of consumer goods dropped only slightly. In March 1944, German aircraft plants went on double shifts and a seven-day workweek. Thus, Germany attained its highest levels of aircraft, tanks, and munitions production in late 1944 while bearing the full brunt of Allied bombing. By then it was too late. When the Allies shifted their bombing emphasis to lines of communication and petroleum production, the transportation system collapsed, and there was no fuel to operate the tanks and new jet aircraft.

Speer might have accomplished more had he not been handicapped by jealous rivals, such as Göring and Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. Himmler was a major hindrance. Constantly scheming to enhance the power of the SS within the Reich, he actually undermined the economy. The SS grew to be a state within a state, and Hitler even approved Himmler's proposal to build an SS-owned industrial concern to make it independent of the state budget.

Major factors in Speer's success, of course, were the substantial territory and resources that Germany had acquired by 1942. Germany could exploit the resources of this new empire—skilled labor, industry, and metallurgical resources from France and Belgium and foodstuffs and other resources from Denmark, Norway, and the Balkans. There were also substantial resources in the vast stretches of the Soviet Union occupied by the German Army from June 1941 onward, although many of these resources were simply those that Germany had depended on in the past.

Spain was a friendly neutral country, and Sweden, Portugal, and Switzerland continued to trade with the Reich and conduct its business abroad. In addition, ruthless German economic exactions helped finance the war. German-occupied Western Europe provided substantial raw materials and money to fuel the German war machine. Of the total German war expenditure of 657 billion reichsmarks, the German people paid only 184.7 billion. France alone paid "administrative costs" to Germany at the absurdly high sum of 20 million reichsmarks a day, calculated at the greatly inflated rate of exchange of 20 francs per reichsmark and amounting to some 60 percent of French national income.

The National Socialist regime failed to use two readily available sources of labor, however. The Nazis had done all in their power to reverse the emancipation of women during the Weimar Republic. Restricting women to the "three Ks" of *Kinder, Kirche,* and *Küche* (children, church, and kitchen) meant that during the Great Depression jobs were secured only for men. This system carried forward into the war with serious implications for the war economy. Speer claimed that mobilizing the 5 million women capable of war service would have released 3 million German males for military service. Such a step might have altered the results of battles and campaigns, although it probably would not have affected the overall outcome of the war.

As early as 1942 Speer recommended that women be recruited for

industry, but Hitler rejected this advice. Not until 1943 were women between 17 and 45 years of age required to register for compulsory work. Later the upper age limit for women was raised to 50, and the age span for men was set at 16 to 65. By 1944, German women actually outnumbered men in the civilian labor force at 51.6 percent.

Jews were another available source of skilled labor that had served the Fatherland well during World War I. Numbering about 600,000 when Hitler came to power, many German Jews soon escaped abroad. Virtually all who remained and were identified perished in the "Final Solution." Not only was this valuable labor pool lost to the Reich, but the systematic extermination of European Jewry took its toll on the war effort, as considerable manpower was absorbed simply in rounding up and transporting European Jews to the death camps.

The Third Reich sought to compensate for labor shortages by using foreign workers. In March 1942, Fritz Sauckel became general Reichsdirektor for labor, or minister of labor. In 1942, there were 3.8 million fewer people employed in the German economy than in 1939. The Germans tried to attract foreign skilled workers with financial incentives. When this approach failed, the occupiers simply rounded up those they thought necessary and shipped them to Germany to work in appalling conditions. By the end of 1942, the total number of people working in the German arms industry had risen by 1.3 million. By September 1944, there were 7.5 million foreign and 28.4 million German workers, and at the end of the war there were upwards of 10 million foreign workers in the Reich.

Such labor was hardly efficient. Speer noted that in October 1943, some 30,000 prisoners working in armaments production produced during a seven-month period only 40,000 carbines, whereas 14,000 U.S. workers turned out 1.05 million carbines in the same amount of time. Until 1944 most German factories ran only a single shift per day, and only 10 percent of employees were working a second or third shift.

Only at the end of the war, when it was clear even to the German leadership that the war was lost, did the regime risk disrupting the German home front. By then, of course, German cities were being devastated by Allied strategic bombing. The suffering of his people did not disturb Hitler, though. He held that Germans had proven "unworthy" of him and thus deserved to perish.

See also

Aircraft, Production of; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Armaments Production; Conscript Labor; Germany, Air Force; Germany, Army; Germany, Navy; Germany, Collapse of; Germany, Surrender of; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Organization Todt; Sauckel, Fritz; Speer, Albert; Todt, Fritz; Women in World War II; Document 72; Document 125; Document 159

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Germany, Air Force

The German Air Force, the Luftwaffe, existed officially for barely a decade, but during that time it was the pride of Nazi Germany. Before the war, the Luftwaffe proved useful in coercing concessions from other countries. It was the world's most powerful air force in 1939, and once World War II began, it became an essential element of blitzkrieg, or lightning war. The Luftwaffe was, however, basically a tactical force, and it came apart under the strain of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which began on June 22, 1941.

The Versailles Treaty after World War I denied Germany an air force. Nevertheless, the Germans continued experimenting with aviation, and the military developed air doctrine and training programs, monitored technological developments, and built an industrial infrastructure for civilian

aviation. At the same time, the German military established clandestine air facilities in the Soviet Union to build and test aircraft and train personnel. When Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933, he pushed development of aviation and in 1935 openly began building an air force. The Western Allies were reluctant to employ force to halt this development, even though it was in direct violation of German treaty obligations.

A formation of Luftwaffe Junkers Ju-87D Stuka dive-bombers during the war. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Unlike the army and navy, the Luftwaffe was purely a Nazi creation and became the primary focus of Hitler's rearmament program. He was much impressed with theories, notably those of Italian Giulio Douhet that future wars could be won by air forces alone. Hitler selected Hermann Göring, a World War I ace pilot, as minister of aviation and Luftwaffe commander in chief.

In 1936, Hitler sent the Kondor Legion, essentially a Luftwaffe force, to fight in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. Here the Germans gained invaluable experience in testing aircraft, in tactical concepts, and in strategic bombing (as at Guernica). Hitler's boasts about German airpower, although many of them were empty, helped face down the French and British in his

March 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland and in the 1938 crisis over Czechoslovakia.

As with so many other agencies in the Reich, the Luftwaffe suffered from organizational weaknesses and overlap at the top. Göring, one of Hitler's inner circle from the early days, was Hitler's designated successor, and Hitler allowed him to run the Luftwaffe without any real interference. The Reich Air Ministry consisted of the office of state secretary for air Field Marshal Erhard Milch; it supervised aviation matters apart from operations. Milch was also inspector general of the Luftwaffe. In addition, there was chief of staff Colonel General Hans Jeschonnek. Until his suicide in 1943, Jeschonnek headed the air force's organization, operations, intelligence, training, quartermaster, and signal branches. Milch and Jeschonnek did not get along, however, and Jeschonnek only had access to Göring on operational matters and no control over personnel, which Göring made his own province.

Colonel General Ernst Udet, chief of the Technical Office and World War I ace, proved to be an incompetent administrator. Udet reported to Milch, who took over Udet's office after his 1941 suicide. Too late, in May 1944, the administrative structure was streamlined with the creation of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force Supreme Command, OKL). Also in 1944, Albert Speer's Armaments Ministry gained control of all German aircraft production, and Milch's ministry was abolished.

The Luftwaffe, the newest of the military services, was the least professional and suffered the most from promotions not based on merit. Göring surrounded himself with advisers whose principal qualification was that they were Nazis, as opposed to experienced aviation military officers. Many times they either offered poor advice or, not wishing to anger him, agreed with whatever ideas he developed. Increasingly, Göring, who held numerous offices in the Reich, largely abandoned his command of the Luftwaffe, intervening only in fits and starts, and often with disastrous results, as during the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain. During the war, the Luftwaffe was also the agency least conscious of communications security.

The Luftwaffe controlled all air services but had little interest in naval aviation. Airborne troops were Luftwaffe personnel, and the air force also had charge of antiaircraft artillery. Eventually, it even fielded 22 ground divisions, including the Hermann Göring Panzer Division.

The Luftwaffe was organized into Luftflotten (Air Fleets), constituted so as to perform a variety of roles and consisting of a wide variety of aircraft types. At the beginning of the war, Germany had four Luftflotten, and during the course of the conflict three more were added. The next operational division was the Fleigerkorps (Flier Corps), and below that was the Fleigerdivision (Flier Division). These last two each contained several Geschwader (Squadrons) that were designated as to types (including fighters, bombers, night fighters, training, and so on). Each division controlled three to four Gruppen (Groups) comprising three or four Staffeln (Flying Teams). In September 1939, the Luftwaffe had 302 Staffeln.

At the start of the war, Germany's chief advantage was in the air, for the Luftwaffe was then certainly the world's most powerful air force. In September 1939, Göring commanded more than 3,600 frontline aircraft. The death on June 3, 1936, of strategic bomber proponent Lieutenant General Walther Wever, however, had brought a shift in emphasis to tactical airpower. This remained the case throughout the war. Although Germany developed four-engine bomber prototypes, these were never placed in production. It could be argued, however, that a tactical air force was the best use of Germany's limited resources.

The German Air Force was essentially built to support ground operations. It suited ideally the new blitzkrieg tactics, and the Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber was a highly accurate form of "flying artillery." Impressed by U.S. Marine Corps experiments with precision dive-bombing, the Germans embraced this technique; indeed, all German bombers had to be capable of dive-bombing. This entailed considerable aircraft structural change with attendant production delays and a decrease in bomb-carrying capacity. The flying weight of the Junkers Ju-88 twin-engine bomber went from 6 to 12 tons, sharply reducing both its speed and its bomb-carrying capacity.

Nonetheless, the Germans developed some exceptional aircraft. They had a superb air-superiority fighter in the Messerschmitt Bf-109, certainly one of the best all-around aircraft of the war. And before the end of the war, the Germans had introduced the Messerschmitt Me-262, the world's first operational jet aircraft. But Hitler also wasted considerable resources on the development of terror or "vengeance" weaponry, the V-1 and V-2.

The Luftwaffe played key roles in the German victories over Poland in 1939 and over France and the Low Countries in 1940. Its limitations first

became evident during the Battle of Britain, when Göring attempted to wage a strategic bombing campaign with a tactical air force. Germany's defeat in this battle was its first setback of the war. The Luftwaffe was also impressive in the fighting against the Soviet Union, at least until the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943).

But in the fighting on the Eastern Front, the superb combined-arms instrument that had been the German military to that point began to come unhinged. By the fall of 1941 Germany was overextended, and the Luftwaffe's small airlift capacity of Junkers Ju-52 trimotor transports was unable to fulfill all the missions required of it.

Although Germany increased its aircraft production during the war, as the conflict continued and under relentless Allied bombing, it suffered from lack of aviation fuel. This was the key factor in the defeat of the Luftwaffe rather than inferior or too few aircraft.

By 1944, the Luftwaffe was feeling the effects of the Allied bomber offensive. In the first half of the year, pilot losses were averaging 20 percent a month, and the scarcity of fuel forced the routine grounding of aircraft not only for operations but also for training. In a period when replacement aircrews were desperately needed, flight time for trainees had been reduced to less than half that for their Allied counterparts. This in turn led to increasing numbers of accidents. By the time of the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, the much-vaunted Luftwaffe had been largely silenced.

PAMELA FELTUS AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Airborne Forces, Axis; Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Gliders; Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Aircraft, Production of; Aircraft, Transport; Airlift; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Antiaircraft Artillery and Employment; Armaments Production; Baby Blitz; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Barrage Balloons; "Big Week" Air Battle; Blitz, The; Blitzkrieg; BODENPLATTE, Operation; Britain, Battle of; Crete, Battle of; Douhet, Giulio; France, Battle for; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Guernica, Kondor Legion Attack on; Hamburg, Raids on; Hitler, Adolf; Jeschonnek, Hans; Kammhuber, Josef; Kesselring, Albert; Kondor Legion; Malta; Messerschmitt, Wilhelm Emil; Milch, Erhard; Parachute Infantry; Poland

Campaign; Richthofen, Wolfram von; Rotterdam, Destruction of; Speer, Albert; Sperrle, Hugo Walter; Stalingrad, Battle of; Student, Kurt; Udet, Ernst; Versailles, Treaty of; V-1 Buzz Bomb; V-2 Rocket; Wever, Walter; Wilhelmshaven, Raid on

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Germany, Army

At the tactical level of warfare, the German Army—the Reichsheer—of World War II may well have been the best ground force in the history of warfare to that time. On the strategic level, though, the Germans had major blind spots that go a long way toward explaining why they lost two world wars despite having the best army in the field. At the middle level of warfare—that of operations—historians continue to argue. One school holds that the German doctrine of blitzkrieg was the most sophisticated example of the operational art to that time. The other school holds that what passed for operational art in the German Army was little more than tactics on a grand scale.

The Reichsheer of World War II (the Wehrmacht was the entire German military, not just the army) grew out of the 100,000-man Reichswehr that was allowed to Germany following World War I under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. On October 1, 1934, Adolf Hitler ordered the threefold secret expansion of the Reichswehr. Conscription was reintroduced in March 1935, establishing a further increased objective base strength of 38 divisions and approximately 600,000 troops.

By 1939, the two main components of the German Army were the field army (Feldheer) and the replacement army (Ersatzheer). The field army had more than 2 million soldiers and was organized into 120 divisions—99

infantry, 9 panzer, 6 motorized, 1 cavalry, 3 mountain, and 2 parachute. The replacement army consisted of a force of approximately 100,000 men in training or transit. From 1942 on, the numbers of replacements became progressively insufficient to keep frontline units up to authorized strength levels.

The infantry division was the primary tactical element of the German Army. In 1940, the standard German infantry division had 17,200 troops, 942 motor vehicles, and 5,375 horses. By 1944 there were 226 infantry divisions, but the size of each had shrunk to 12,352 troops, 615 motor vehicles, and 4,656 horses. Despite its reputation as the master of mechanized and mobile warfare, the German Army relied heavily on horses right up until the end of the war. Almost all field artillery in the infantry divisions was horse-drawn.

The German divisions were organized according to a triangular structure, with three infantry regiments of three battalions of three companies each; a divisional artillery command with a field artillery regiment of three battalions of three batteries each, a heavy artillery battalion, and an observation battalion; reconnaissance, engineer, signals, and antitank battalions; and the divisional (supply) trains. Each division also generally had an antiaircraft battalion attached to it from the Luftwaffe.

The Germans did, however, field various forms of motorized or mechanized units. By 1941, they had a total of 10 motorized infantry divisions and light infantry divisions. Later in the war, these units were redesignated as Panzergrenadier divisions. Germany ultimately fielded 22 of these units. They were organized along the general lines of the infantry divisions, but they had more motor vehicles and an organic tank regiment. In 1940, the standard motorized/light division had 14,000 troops, 3,370 motor vehicles, 158 tanks, and more than 1,500 horses. The 1944 Panzergrenadier division had 13,833 soldiers, 2,637 motor vehicles, 48 tanks, and more than 1,400 horses.

The Germans had several specialized divisions. Mountain divisions were essentially smaller and lighter versions of the infantry division. Germany had 3 mountain divisions in 1940 and 13 in 1944. Fortress divisions and security divisions were divisions in name only; they could not be seriously equated with other divisions in the army’s order of battle. The fortress divisions were little more than stationary garrisons, seldom larger than a regiment in strength. The security divisions were used to secure rear-area lines of

communication and to conduct antipartisan operations on the Eastern Front. In a last act of desperation late in the war, Germany created Volksgrenadier (people's grenadier) divisions for defense of the Reich itself. Heavily manned by old men and young boys with almost no military training, these units were armed with a high proportion of automatic and antitank weapons. Because of the weapons' high firepower and the fact that the units were defending their home ground, these units sometimes gave a surprisingly good account of themselves.

The Germans began the war with one (horse) cavalry division, which fought in the Poland Campaign in 1939. By 1944, Germany actually had four such divisions, all operating on the Eastern Front. Late in the war, Germany fielded its single artillery division, which was based on the Soviet model. The Red Army, which had hundreds of thousands of artillery pieces, fielded almost 100 artillery divisions. But for the Germans, who were chronically short on artillery throughout the war, fielding an artillery division was an almost pointless exercise. The Germans did not have sufficient artillery to equip their infantry and panzer divisions, let alone form more artillery divisions.

Organizationally, all German parachute divisions were part of the Luftwaffe, but operationally they fought under army command. The Germans had 2 parachute divisions in 1940 and 11 in 1944. After the near-disaster on Crete in May 1941, German parachute divisions never again jumped in combat. They spent the remainder of the war fighting as light infantry, but their traditional paratrooper élan remained, and they were fierce opponents, especially in Italy.

The German Air Force also fielded land divisions that operated under army command. The formation of these air force field units was another desperate measure. As attrition ground down the Luftwaffe's aircraft, especially on the Eastern Front, excess personnel were hastily grouped into these field divisions. Often, the new ground soldiers had little or no infantry training. Germany had 19 such divisions in 1944.

The panzer division was the mailed striking fist of the German Army. The first three panzer divisions were raised as completely new units in the fall of 1935, but they were not fully operational until September 1937. Thereafter, new panzer divisions were created by converting infantry or other divisions. There were 9 panzer divisions by 1939 and 26 by 1944. From 1941, the

panzer divisions were in action almost constantly and continually being ground down by attrition. A panzer division in 1940 had some 14,000 troops, 1,800 motor vehicles, and 337 horses. The standard panzer division had 324 tanks, and a variation known as a light panzer division had 219 tanks. By 1944, the typical panzer division had 13,700 troops, but the number of motor vehicles had decreased to 48, whereas the number of horses had increased to almost 1,700. On paper, at least, a 1944 panzer division had 150 tanks; however, in the last year of the war many panzer divisions could only field a handful.

The Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) was separate from the army and even from the Wehrmacht. It was essentially the Nazi Party's army, and it fielded combat divisions that fought under army command and control, much like the Luftwaffe's field and parachute divisions. By 1944, there were seven SS panzer divisions and 11 SS Panzergrenadier divisions. The organization of the Waffen-SS divisions was similar to the organization of their Reichsheer counterparts, but because of their unquestioning loyalty to Hitler they were often better equipped.

The echelon of command above the division was the corps, which consisted of two or more divisions and additional corps support troops and artillery. The two basic types of corps were the army corps, consisting primarily of infantry divisions, and the panzer corps, consisting primarily of panzer divisions. The XCI Armeecorps was the highest-numbered corps. The next-higher echelon of command was the field army, comprising two or more corps. Field armies normally were designated by numbers, but in a few instances they were designated by a name. Field armies also had their own pools of combat assets such as artillery and separate heavy tank battalions.

The German Army's largest operational unit was the army group (Heeresgruppe), which controlled several field armies or corps directly. The army group also was responsible for providing support to all units in its area as well as for the rear-area lines of communication and logistical services. Army groups were designated by their locations, by their commander's name, or by a letter.

The Germans had several elite units designated only by their name. Grossdeutschland (greater Germany)—also called "the bodyguard of the German people"—was first formed in 1938 as a ceremonial battalion. By 1939 it had expanded to the size of a regiment, and by 1942 it was an

oversized division. At the end of the war, Panzerarmee Grossdeutschland commanded five divisions under two corps. The Panzer Lehr Division, which was the most powerful German armored division in Western Europe at the time of the June 6, 1944, Allied landings in Normandy, was formed in the winter of 1943–1944 with instructors and troops from the German armored school. The Infantrie-Lehr Regiment was an elite unit formed from instructors and infantry school troops. In 1944, Hitler personally ordered the Infantrie-Lehr to Anzio to block the Allied landings there. The result was the January 22–May 25, 1944, Battle of Anzio.

Army command and control suffered from a confused structure at the top, which only compounded the German weaknesses at the strategic and operational levels. Three different high command headquarters were seldom in agreement and often in competition. The Oberkommando des Heeres (army high command, OKH), the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (armed forces high command, OKW), and the supreme commander (Hitler) and his staff often issued conflicting orders to the same units. In theory, the OKH ran the war in the Soviet Union, and the OKW ran the war everywhere else. Hitler's Führerhauptquartier (headquarters) issued all the key strategic orders.

Despite the popular stereotypes, reinforced by countless Hollywood movies and television programs, the common German soldier of World War II was anything but stupid and unimaginative, and his officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were neither machinelike nor inflexible autocrats. Rather, the German Army encouraged initiative among its subordinate leaders and stressed flexibility and creativity to a degree far greater than any other army prior to 1945. This was the key to its tactical excellence. German combat orders, rather than dictating detailed and rigid timelines and specific instructions on how to accomplish missions, tended to be short and as broad as possible. The principle under which the German command system operated was called *Auftragstaktik*, which can only loosely be translated into English as "mission orders."

For *Auftragstaktik* to work, a subordinate leader had to understand the intent of his higher commander at least two echelons up. This meant that the subordinate had the right to ask his superior why something was being done, and the superior was obliged to explain. Such a practice was virtually unheard of in almost all the other armies of World War II.

Despite superb organization and tactical tools at the lower levels, the

confused high command structure and Germany's incoherent strategy doomed the German Army over the long run. Hitler did a great deal personally to subvert solid military command and control. He distrusted his generals, and for the most part they distrusted him. During the early years of the war, 1939 and 1940, Hitler was the beneficiary of outrageously good luck and inept opponents. This only served to reinforce his belief in his divinely inspired military genius. When the commander in chief of the German Army, General Walther von Brauchitsch, retired for medical reasons in late 1941, Hitler—the former World War I lance corporal—assumed direct command of the army. By that time, however, Hitler had led Germany once again into its worst strategic nightmare, a two-front war.

The German Army also suffered from several internal and external handicaps that were beyond its ability to control. Germany was chronically short of virtually every vital resource necessary for modern warfare. A panzer division in 1940 still had more than 300 horses, and four years later that number had risen to 1,700. Roughly only 10 percent of the army was ever motorized. In 1940, OKH planners estimated that it would require at least 210 divisions to execute the invasions of France and the Low Countries while simultaneously garrisoning Poland and Norway. At the time, they were 20 divisions short. The chronic shortages of manpower and motorized transport only worsened as the war progressed. The situation did not improve even after German industry was mobilized in 1944. By then, of course, it was far too late.

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See also

Anzio, Battle of; Armaments Production; Artillery Doctrine; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Blitzkrieg; Brauchitsch, Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von; Cavalry, Horse; Crete, Battle of; Germany; Germany, Air Force; Germany, Navy; Hitler, Adolf; Infantry Tactics; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Poland Campaign; Versailles, Treaty of; Waffen-SS; Document 6

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Germany, Collapse of (March–May 1945)

Adolf Hitler's failed Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) during December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, far from stalling the Western Allies as Hitler had hoped, actually hastened the German military collapse. By March 1, 1945, Allied supreme commander in the west General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower had assembled sufficient forces for a full frontal assault. By April, it would be the largest coalition army ever assembled in war. Several hundred miles to the east, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had massed three fronts (army groups) for the final drive on Berlin. The Soviets were consolidating their positions for a final assault and ensuring that their Baltic flank was not exposed. Supporting the Allied armies were their air forces, which now had complete control of the skies. Large numbers of British and U.S. aircraft continued the strategic bombing campaign against the German heartland. During the period March 1–21, more than 10,000 American and British bombers dropped in excess of 31,000 tons of bombs on the industrialized Ruhr area alone.

Undaunted by the overwhelming odds, German leader Adolf Hitler conducted operations from the troglodyte atmosphere of his Berlin bunker, surrounded by sycophants. The führer relied on his so-called V (for "vengeance") weapons—the V-1 buzz bomb and V-2 rocket—as well as new jet aircraft. He also hoped for some miracle, such as Allied dissension, to turn the tide. The only military realist in headquarters was army chief of staff

General Heinz Guderian. Clashes with Hitler, however, led to his departure at the end of March.

The onslaught from the west began with a drive to the Rhine River. From north to south, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery commanded the 21st Army Group. It consisted of General Henry Crerar's Canadian First Army, Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey's British Second Army, and Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's U.S. Ninth Army, temporarily assigned to Montgomery's command from that of General Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group. In the center was Bradley's 12th Army Group, the largest American field force ever commanded by a U.S. general. Bradley's army group comprised the U.S. First Army under Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, Lieutenant General George S. Patton's U.S. Third Army, and Major General Leonard Gerow's U.S. Fifteenth Army, whose forces were engaged in occupation duty and the elimination of bypassed pockets of German resistance. In the south was the 6th Army Group of Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, which consisted of Lieutenant General Alexander Patch's U.S. Seventh Army and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny's French First Army. The 6th Army Group eliminated the Colmar pocket and advanced toward the Rhine between the Belgian and Swiss borders.

Elements of Hodges's First Army discovered the railroad bridge at Remagen intact and pushed forces across it to establish a bridgehead on the eastern side of the Rhine. German troops were everywhere withdrawing toward the Rhine. In typical fashion, Hitler replaced his commander in the west, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, with Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. The Western Allies then launched Operation UNDERTONE, an assault on the Saar-Palatinate region wherein the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies broke through the German Siegfried Line and destroyed Schutzstaffel Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser's German First Army. On March 22–23, Montgomery launched Operation PLUNDER, a large-scale attack on the lower Rhine. Meanwhile, Patton's troops crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim on March 22. All along the front, Allied forces moved relentlessly eastward.

In April, the XVIII Airborne Corps encircled Field Marshal Walther Model's Army Group B, resulting in the surrender of 300,000 German troops. German cities capitulated rapidly; many streets were lined with white flags. On April 20, Nuremberg fell to Patch's U.S. Third Army.

On March 31 on the Eastern Front, three Soviet fronts (army groups)

opened the Berlin Campaign to take the German capital. They were Marshal Ivan Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Georgii Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, and Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front. Konev's troops, supported by massive artillery barrages, cut across the Neisse River, destroying the German Fourth Panzer Army. Zhukov faced stiff German resistance and sustained heavy casualties, although his forces wore down the defenders. By this time, the German armies were only shadows of their former selves and included many young untrained draftees. The Soviets steadily drove Army Group Vistula back near Berlin.

Hitler, meanwhile, insisted on a scorched-earth policy; he also called on German citizens to act as "werewolves." He dared to hope that the miracle of the House of Brandenburg of the Seven Years' War—in which the coalition against Prussian king Frederick II came undone on the death of Russian

czarina Elizabeth—might be repeated. He even seized on the death of U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, as an omen that Germany would yet survive. As propaganda minister Josef Goebbels exhorted the people of Berlin to defend their city, Hitler called up Volkssturm troops (the largely untrained older civilian militia) and the Hitler Youth to defend his dying Third Reich.

At the same time, millions of German refugees were fleeing westward to avoid falling into the hands of the Soviets. The German Navy evacuated hundreds of thousands of Germans from the Baltics. Many others made their way west on foot. Ultimately, perhaps 20 million Germans were displaced from their homelands in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere. More than 2 million may have been killed in the exodus that followed. Those who escaped or were forced to leave added yet another burden on already-strained German social services.

On Hitler's birthday, April 20, 1945, Zhukov's troops pierced through three German defensive lines defending Berlin. On April 22, Soviet troops were fighting in the city itself, and three days later they had surrounded Berlin. That same day, April 25, elements of Bradley's 12th Army Group linked up with Soviet troops of Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front at Torgau on the Elbe River.

The last significant German counterattack of the war occurred on April 25–26, when General of the Waffen-SS Felix Steiner's Eleventh Army struck at Soviet forces driving on Berlin near Oranienburg, to no avail. Almost 500,000 Soviet troops were now battling for Berlin. Hitler refused to leave his capital and committed suicide in his bunker on April 30. To the end, he refused to accept responsibility and blamed others for Germany's defeat. Hitler's designated successor as chief of state, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, then took over what remained of German forces. Meanwhile, the Allies had overrun northern Italy. Remaining German forces there surrendered on May 2.

In the west, Lieutenant General Walton Walker's XX Corps of Patton's Third Army reached the Austrian border opposite Braunau. Then on May 2, Lieutenant General Helmuth Weidling, commander of Berlin, surrendered the German capital to Soviet colonel general Vasily Chuikov. On May 3, elements of Montgomery's 21st Army Group linked up with Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front at Wismar. Marshal Rodion Malinovsky's 2nd

Ukrainian Front moved from Hungary into Austria and Czechoslovakia and prepared to link up with Patton's Third Army, which was advancing down the Danube near Linz.

Remaining German forces under Dönitz still controlled Norway, Denmark, western Holland, and portions of Germany, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Although Dönitz realized that defeat was certain, he briefly stalled for time to rescue additional German refugees fleeing westward. On May 7, Dönitz surrendered all German forces unconditionally to the victorious Allies. A formal ceremony was held the next day, and the guns finally fell silent. Germany lay prostrate and in ruins, its social services a shambles and its cities great wastelands of twisted girders and rubble.

GENE MUELLER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Ardennes Offensive; Berlin, Land Battle for; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; Devers, Jacob Loucks; Dönitz, Karl; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Germany; Germany, Army; Gerow, Leonard Townsend; Guderian, Heinz; Hausser, Paul "Papa"; Hitler, Adolf; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Jodl, Alfred; Keitel, Wilhelm; Kesselring, Albert; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich; Model, Walther; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Simpson, William Hood; Stalin, Joseph; Steiner, Felix; Walker, Walton Harris; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Germany, Navy

After Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933, Germany embarked on a major program to rebuild its navy. The German Navy (Kriegsmarine) began this major effort after the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty in June 1935. The goal was the creation of a balanced fleet that would serve as the core of a future blue-water navy dominated by battleships. This so-called Z Plan envisioned a powerful fleet that would one day challenge Great Britain and the United States for world naval mastery.

In 1938, Hitler's increasingly aggressive foreign policy forced the navy to consider the possibility of a future naval war against Great Britain. The navy's commander, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, designed a strategy to attack the British sea-lanes. His proposal to build ships more suited to a commerce war, including additional U-boats, was rejected by Hitler, who was intent on building a battleship-dominated navy that would serve as an instrument of political and military force commensurate with a world power. Shortages of resources contributed to delays in naval construction, and Raeder's blind confidence in the führer's diplomatic successes and promises that war would not come before 1942 or 1943 found the navy unprepared for war in September 1939.

At the beginning of the war, the German Navy numbered 79,000 men. It possessed 2 battleships, 3 pocket battleships or *Panzerschiffe* (small, fast, strongly constructed armored ships later reclassified as heavy cruisers), 1 heavy cruiser, 6 light cruisers, and 32 destroyers and torpedo boats. Fewer than half of the 57 U-boats available were suitable for Atlantic operations. Despite Raeder's initial pessimism that the navy could only "die gallantly," thereby creating the foundations for a future fleet, he intended to carry out an aggressive naval strategy that would attack British sea communications on a global basis using his concept of diversion and concentration in operational areas of his choosing and timing. Raeder persistently argued with Hitler that only total economic warfare against the British could have decisive impact.

Hitler's restrictions on naval operations, particularly on those of the U-boats, frustrated Raeder's attempts to seize the initiative and achieve early successes. In late 1939, concerned that the British were planning to invade Norway, Raeder instigated planning for the successful German occupation of Norway and Denmark (Operation WESERÜBUNG). This April 1940 operation was for the navy its "feat of arms"—justifying its contribution to the war effort and future existence. Although the navy did secure important port

facilities for surface raiders and U-boats in Norway as well as the shipping route for iron ore from Sweden, it also suffered substantial losses in the operation in the form of 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers. In June 1940, with the defeat of France, the navy acquired additional ports on the Atlantic and the Bay of Biscay for surface ships and submarines. But the navy also now had to protect an extended coastline from occupied France to Scandinavia. From 1940 to 1943, Germany also sent to sea 9 armed auxiliary cruisers.

Raeder's intent to prove the worth of the surface fleet—in particular, the battleships—led him to demand of his commanders that they take risks yet avoid unnecessary combat that could lead to losses. Two fleet commanders lost their jobs when they failed to exhibit the necessary aggressiveness. The scuttling of the pocket battleship *Graf Spee* in December 1939 and Hitler's displeasure over this loss further reinforced the inherent contradictions in Raeder's orders to strike boldly but avoid damage to the navy's ships.

With new battleships *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz* joining the fleet, Raeder envisioned a new phase of the Atlantic surface battle, with task forces that would engage Allied convoys protected by capital ships. In an effort to prove the value of the battleships, Raeder pressed the *Bismarck* into service before the other battleships were available for action. Its loss in May 1941 represented the end of the surface war in the Atlantic and Hitler's increasing interference in the use of Germany's remaining capital ships.

Unable to achieve the conditions for a cross-Channel invasion (Operation SEE LION) in September 1940, Raeder tried to divert Hitler from his plans to attack the Soviet Union. Raeder advocated an alternative strategy in the Mediterranean to defeat Britain first, especially given the growing cooperation between that nation and the United States. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), Raeder saw an opportunity to link up with the Japanese in the Indian Ocean and use the French African colonies and the Atlantic islands of Portugal and Spain to expand the bases for a long-term war against the Anglo-American naval forces in the Atlantic. These plans never materialized, as Germany was forced to come to the aid of Italy and secure its southern flank in the Balkans, and then the invasion of the Soviet Union faltered.

Nervous about British threats to Norway and Allied support to the Soviets in the north, Hitler ordered that the two battleships in Brest—the *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst*—and the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen* be either moved to

Norway or scrapped. The “Channel Dash” during February 11–13, 1942, was a tactical success but a strategic defeat for the navy. With the fleet relegated to Norway as a fleet-in-being, the U-boat arm, under the command of Admiral Karl Dönitz, continued its role as the navy’s primary weapon. The lack of Luftwaffe support, however, continued to seriously hamper all operations. The navy never resolved the issue of whether the U-boat war was a tonnage war or a commerce war in which U-boats attacked targets that had the greatest potential for a decisive impact. Dönitz continued to argue that all resources should go to the U-boat war and disagreed with the diversion of U-boats to other theaters such as the Mediterranean or to the defense of Norway.

In late December 1942, the failure of the *Hipper* and *Lützow* to close with a weakly defended convoy in the Barents Sea (Operation RAINBOW) led an angry Hitler to attack Raeder and the surface fleet. Raeder resigned, and Dönitz succeeded him. Although Dönitz was determined to prosecute the submarine war ruthlessly, as with the surface fleet, the defeat of the U-boats in May 1943 resulted from Allied technology and successes in code breaking that reflected the shortcomings in the naval leadership and military structure of the Third Reich. As the military situation of Germany deteriorated, the navy provided support to the army, particularly in the Baltic, where it conducted a massive and highly successful evacuation effort of troops and civilians.

In sharp contrast to the navy’s collapse after World War I, the German Navy during World War II enforced strict discipline until the end. In April 1945, Hitler named the loyal Dönitz as his heir and successor.

KEITH W. BIRD

See also

Aegean Sea Naval Operations; Atlantic, Battle of the; Baltic Sea, Naval Operations in; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bay of Biscay Offensive; *Bismarck,* Sortie and Sinking of; Black Sea, Area of Operations; CERBERUS, Operation; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Axis; Crete, Battle of; Dönitz, Karl; Friedeburg, Hans Georg von; Germany; Germany, Air Force; Germany, Army; Hitler, Adolf; Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm; Lütjens, Günther; Narvik, Naval Battles of; North Cape, Battle of; Norway; Norway, German Conquest of; PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Prien,

Günther; Raeder, Erich; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Rogge, Bernhard; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; Signals Intelligence; *Tirpitz,* Attacks on; WESERÜBUNG, Operation; Z Plan

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Germany, Postwar Occupation of

Admiral Karl Dönitz, who succeeded Adolf Hitler as head of the German state after Hitler's suicide on April 30, 1945, surrendered unconditionally to the Allies on May 7, 1945. The task of governing Germany fell to the occupying armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain, which were soon joined by France's army. The Allies retained the Dönitz government until May 23 to facilitate the transfer of power and to fulfill a pledge that the Germans be forced to dissolve the Nazi regime themselves.

The Allied powers assumed extraordinary authority in Germany. The Hague Convention of 1907 had limited occupiers to the maintenance of law and order, but the Allies went far beyond that, attempting a complete reorientation of German thinking—in what would come to be called "nation building." The Allied powers' European Advisory Commission (EAC) had recommended that Germany's postwar government be an Allied Control

Council in Berlin composed of commanders of the occupying forces of the various powers.

At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin accepted that recommendation. Occupation zones were also set. At the suggestion of Churchill and Roosevelt, France was allowed a zone, although Stalin insisted that it be carved from that area already assigned to Britain and the United States. The three leaders also agreed on steps to demilitarize Germany, dissolve the National Socialist Party, and punish war criminals. In May 1945, however, the military establishments of the occupying powers were in charge, and each occupying nation had a different notion of how occupation policies should be implemented.

Germany was devastated. Its cities were piles of rubble, bridges had been blown up, and rolling stock had been destroyed. Inland shipping was blocked, and the merchant marine was down to only 100,000 tons from a prewar total of 4 million tons. In 1946, industrial production was only one-third the volume of a decade earlier. Large numbers of Germans were homeless and out of work. The population was also swollen by Allied prisoners of war, foreign laborers forced to work in the Reich, and a great influx of refugees from the east, many having little more than the clothes on their backs. Although the Allies agreed that there was to be equitable distribution of German refugees coming from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and other states, this did not occur. The British and French zones absorbed the majority of refugees. Simply feeding the population was a tremendous problem, and shortages of fertilizer exacerbated the loss of key food-producing areas taken by Poland.

For several years the problems centered on food, housing, and employment. As it turned out, war damage was not as extensive as had initially been thought. Much factory machinery was still operational once the rubble was removed, and modern techniques and systems were employed in rebuilding the cities that had been subjected to Allied bombing. Full public disclosure of the Holocaust, meanwhile, lessened compassion for the German civilian population and led Allied occupation authorities to proceed rapidly with denazification. The first Allied directives forbade fraternization between soldiers and civilians, set living standards quite low, and provided for full disarmament.

According to Allied agreements reached during the war, Germany lost some 40,000 square miles of territory in which before the war 9.5 million people had lived. Most of this area became part of Poland. The 138,000 square miles of territory of Germany that remained were divided for occupation purposes as follows: the Soviet Union's section had some 20 million people in 43,000 square miles, including all or part of Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia; Great Britain had 42,000 square miles and 12 million people in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, the Ruhr, and the lower Rhineland; the United States had 36,000 square miles and 17 million people consisting of Bavaria, Hesse, and parts of Württemberg-Baden; and France had 17,000 square miles and 6 million people in the Palatinate and the Upper Rhine Valley. As U.S. lieutenant general Lucius D. Clay put it, the Soviets received the agriculture, the British the industry, and the Americans the scenery. The German capital of Berlin was also divided into four Allied zones.

In 1946, the U.S. Army formed three constabulary brigades of three regiments each and one separate regiment specifically for occupation duties. To a considerable degree, a civil affairs function for the U.S. military began in connection with the occupation of Germany after World War II.

Although the Allied Control Council met regularly, there were sharp disagreements on policy. The Soviet Union and France, for example, sought to keep German industrial production low, whereas Britain wanted it set high so the occupation would not burden already stressed British taxpayers. In the spring of 1946, the Allies agreed on a level of industrial production of 50–55 percent of the 1938 level except for the building industry, which was critical to recovery.

Efforts at central planning for the economy ran afoul of Soviet exactions. Soviet authorities, stymied in their effort to secure agreement on a precise reparations figure, had ordered that entire industrial plants and virtually everything else movable be removed from its zone and shipped back to the Soviet Union. The refusal of the Soviet Union to treat Germany as an economic unit ultimately led the Western Allies to decide to move toward a unified administration for their zones. The French also sought to detach the Ruhr and integrate the Saar into France. Work did proceed on denazification. Its centerpiece was the International War Crimes Tribunal (the Nuremberg Tribunal).

American occupation policy in Germany was governed by Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067. It prohibited any fraternization between U.S. military personnel and civilians and denied food distribution to the civilian population except in extraordinary circumstances. The directive remained in effect until 1947. It took Soviet policies and the harsh winter of 1946–1947 to change this. British occupation policies were less doctrinaire and considerably easier on the civilian population. The British took the lead, for example, in organizing their zone into Länder (states), although they were slower than the Americans in granting self-government. The French had major problems of their own and so did not devote too much attention to Germany. The chief French interest, which remained in force for a decade, was the economic integration of the Saar into the French economy. The French government also worked to try to prevent German reunification. The Soviet Union was determined to extract reparations from its zone and also sought to carry out land reform and try to sovietize its zone. The latter effort, however, was more than countered by the brutal behavior of the Red Army toward the German civilian population.

Signs of frustration by the Western Allies concerning the control machinery and the failure of the Soviet Union to treat Germany as an economic unit were obvious by 1946. That September, the British and Americans merged their zones economically to form Bizonia. The same month, U.S. secretary of state James Byrnes announced at Stuttgart the U.S. intention to restore self-government in its zone of Germany.

The culmination of inter-Allied tension concerning Germany occurred during the 1948–1949 Soviet blockade of Berlin. A number of items helped precipitate this crisis. They included acute German suffering during the harsh winter of 1946–1947, the obvious need for currency reform (the Western powers were merely subsidizing the Soviet financial system in eastern Germany), the formation of Trizonia (France reluctantly joined the economic zone in the summer of 1947), efforts of the Western powers to move toward German self-government, and finally the announcement by the Western Allies that they intended to introduce a new currency in their zones. This in turn sped up the creation of a West German government in May 1949. Under the terms of an Occupation Statute, Allied military forces remained in the new Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Soviet troops

remained in the new German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Berlin and Germany remain divided between east and west.

JOSEPH G. D. BABB AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Byrnes, James Francis; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Clay, Lucius DuBignon; Dönitz, Karl; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Germany; Germany, Collapse of; Germany, Surrender of; Holocaust; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Soviet Union; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Yalta Conference

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Germany, Surrender of (May 8, 1945)

German leader Adolf Hitler resolutely refused appeals from his subordinates for an end to the war. Claiming that the German people were unworthy of him, Hitler asserted that they must suffer the consequences. On April 30, 1945, with much of Germany in ruins and Berlin under siege, Hitler committed suicide in his underground bunker. His handpicked successor, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, assumed the office of president of the Reich. Dönitz established a new government at Flensburg in Schleswig-Holstein.

This administration, dedicated to preserving the Third Reich, was compelled by the sharply deteriorating military situation to surrender German forces to the Allied powers. Dönitz's chief consideration at the beginning of May was to negotiate an armistice with only the Western Allied powers in order for German forces in the east to conduct a fighting withdrawal that would save them from Soviet captivity. This goal, however, was frustrated by the insistence of the Western Allies that Germany surrender unconditionally to all of the Allied powers.

Dönitz tried to stave off absolute capitulation through the piecemeal surrender of portions of the Third Reich and occupied Europe. On May 3, Admiral Hans-Georg von Friedeberg surrendered German forces in Denmark, Holland, and northern Germany to British field marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery. Dönitz was able to avoid complete surrender for several additional days after Friedeberg's action, which allowed 3 million German troops to escape the Soviets. Unable to postpone action any longer, however, on May 7, 1945, Colonel General Alfred Jodl signed a surrender document at supreme commander of Allied Expeditionary Force General Dwight D. Eisenhower's headquarters in Rheims, France. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith and Major General Ivan Susloparov represented the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, respectively. Also in attendance was Major General François Sevez of the French Army. The agreement specified the unconditional surrender of all German land, sea, and air forces to the supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and also to the Soviet high command.

The terms of the German surrender stipulated that all German military forces would cease fighting at 11:01 p.m. Central European time on May 8, 1945. The final terms of the agreement stated that the surrender could be superseded by any similar legislation passed by the United Nations and promised swift retaliation if any German forces resumed combat operations. This document signaled the end of fighting, but the actual surrender of German troops in German-occupied regions stretched until a capitulation on May 11 at Heligoland, an island located in the North Sea off the coast of Germany.

At the insistence of Soviet premier Joseph Stalin, a second formal surrender instrument containing largely the same stipulations was signed in Berlin just after midnight on May 9, despite the fact that the cease-fire had

already gone into effect. Acting on behalf of the German high command were Admiral Hans-Georg von Friedeburg, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, and Colonel General Hans Jürgen Stumpff. Marshal Georgii Zhukov and Air Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder represented the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, respectively. Also in attendance were French general Jean de Lattre de Tassigny and U.S. Army Air Forces general Carl Spaatz.

Although the agreement signed at Rheims signaled the end of Germany's participation in World War II, it did not terminate the Third Reich. The Allies retained Dönitz's government initially to deal with the immediate postwar problems of food distribution to German citizens and refugees. On May 23, 1945, however, Dönitz and his cabinet were removed and arrested by the Allies. The new rulers of Germany, as of June 5, were the Allied powers. They soon implemented plans for postwar Germany determined during wartime diplomatic conferences.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Berlin, Land Battle for; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; Dönitz, Karl; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Friedeburg, Hans Georg von; German-Soviet Peace Feelers; Germany; Germany, Postwar Occupation of; Hitler, Adolf; Jodl, Alfred; Keitel, Wilhelm; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Smith, Walter Bedell; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"; Tedder, Sir Arthur William; Tehran Conference; Unconditional Surrender; Yalta Conference; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Gerow, Leonard Townsend (1888–1972)

U.S. Army general. Born in Petersburg, Virginia, on July 13, 1888, Leonard Townsend Gerow graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1911 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry. He took part in the 1914

occupation of Veracruz, Mexico. Following U.S. entry into World War I, Gerow served in France from April 1918 with the Signal Corps, fighting in the Second Battle of the Marne and the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives.

After the war Gerow served on the staff of the Signal Corps in France (1918–1920). He was promoted to permanent major in June 1920 and alternated staff assignments in Washington, tours in Shanghai and the Philippines, and training courses at Fort Benning, Georgia and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he excelled. From 1935 onward, Gerow served in the War Department's War Plans Division. Promoted to brigadier general in October 1940, he became chief of the War Plans Division in December 1940. From December 1941, he served simultaneously as assistant chief of staff.

In February 1942, Gerow was promoted to major general and took command of the 29th Infantry Division, which began advanced training in Britain the following October. Gerow was a leading member of the talented group of top American officers whom General Dwight D. Eisenhower gathered around himself when he was supreme commander in Europe. In July 1943, Gerow assumed command of V Corps in what became Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley's First Army, which experienced heavy fighting in the Normandy Campaign commencing on June 6, 1944.

On August 25, 1944, Gerow was the first Allied general to enter Paris. He then led V Corps in campaigns through northern France and the Rhineland. In January 1945, Gerow was promoted to lieutenant general and took command of the new Fifteenth Army, which secured the western French coast, taking the ports of Saint-Nazaire and Lorient. The area was also a staging ground for training and equipping units to join the 12th Army Group, which carried the battle into Germany.

From October 1945 to January 1948, Gerow was commandant of the Command and General Staff College. He then commanded the Second Army at Fort Meade, Maryland, retiring in July 1950. A special Act of Congress promoted Gerow to general on July 19, 1954. He died in Petersburg, Virginia, on October 12, 1972.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; France Campaign; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Gervais de LaFond, Raymond-Émile (1890–1968)

French Navy rear admiral. Raymond-Émile Gervais de Lafond was born at Felletin in central France on October 31, 1890. He entered the French Naval Academy in October 1907 and was commissioned an ensign in October 1909. Assigned to the cruiser *Iberville* in the Far East Division in 1910, he took part in operations ashore in defense of French interest at Hankou, China. In 1917 following additional service in the Atlantic and as second-in-command of a torpedo boat, he participated in the protection of Allied convoys in the English Channel against German submarines. In March 1918, he was promoted to lieutenant.

In March 1919, Gervais de Lafond was assigned to the French naval mission to Romania and was subsequently named assistant to the French naval attaché. Returning to France in 1921, he was assigned to the Intelligence Section of the French Navy. In December 1923, he took command of the dispatch boat *Agile* in the Levant Division. He returned to the Intelligence Section in 1925.

Promoted to lieutenant commander in January 1927, Gervais de Lafond commanded a squadron of torpedo craft in the Mediterranean. He again returned to the Intelligence Section in January 1931 and was promoted to commander that April. After other assignments afloat and study at the French Naval War College, in August 1936 he became French naval attaché in Rome. He was promoted to captain in April 1937.

In August 1939, Gervais de Lafond took command of the 3rd Scout Division. His ships participated in the French naval bombardment of Genoa in June 1940. During the Allied June 8–July 14, 1941, invasion of French Syria, the 3rd Scout Division, which then consisted of the large destroyers *Valmy* and *Guépard,* was based at Beirut along with three submarines and a sloop. Gervais de Lafond's division, which faced an Allied naval force of three cruisers and eight destroyers, proved to be an effective nuisance, shelling Allied positions on the coast. Gervais de Lafond also fought surface engagements against heavy odds, disabling the British destroyer *Janus* off Sidon, Lebanon, on June 8, 1941.

Promoted to rear admiral in August 1941, Gervais de Lafond commanded the Vichy France 2nd Light Squadron of 1 cruiser and 7 destroyers at Casablanca. He took part in the defense of Casablanca against vastly superior U.S. invasion forces on November 8–9, 1942, leading his squadron in a desperate attack against the U.S. landing site at Fédala, in what has been described by one historian as "the last sally of the French navy against ships at sea." Gervais de Lafond was among the wounded, and only the destroyer *L'Alcyon* remained operational after a seven-hour battle against 1 battleship, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 14 destroyers.

Named commander of French naval forces at Algiers in May 1943, Gervais de Lafond was furloughed in October 1945 and retired from the navy altogether in March 1946. He died in the priory at Remeneuil-par-Usseau on March 11, 1968.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Casablanca, Naval Battle of; France, Navy; Sidon, Engagement off; Syria and Lebanon, Campaign in

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Ghormley, Robert Lee (1883–1958)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born in Portland, Oregon, on October 15, 1883, Robert Lee Ghormley graduated from the University of Idaho in 1902 and from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1906. Ghormley's first assignments were in cruisers. During World War I, he served as aide to the commander of the Battleship Force, Atlantic Fleet. He was then assistant director of the Overseas Division, Naval Overseas Transportation Service.

Between the wars, Ghormley held a variety of staff positions. In 1935 and 1936, Captain Ghormley commanded the battleship *Nevada*. He then directed the War Plans Office and, in 1939, became assistant to the chief of naval operations. In August 1940, now a rear admiral, Ghormley was sent to London as a naval observer and to recommend possible U.S. naval aid to Britain.

U.S. vice admiral Robert L. Ghormley. (Keystone/Getty Images)

In June 1942, newly promoted to vice admiral, Ghormley was named commander to the South Pacific Area and Force. He assumed this new command as plans for the invasion of the U.S. Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943) were in progress. Believing his forces to be unready, he requested a postponement in the operation, which was denied. He then seems to have distanced himself from the operation, while tensions between his subordinate commanders were left unresolved.

After the Allied defeat in the Battle of Savo Island (August 9, 1942), Ghormley feared that the entire Guadalcanal operation would fail. As a result, he continued to maintain strong garrisons on other islands in the event of future Japanese advances rather than using those forces to assist in the protracted struggle on Guadalcanal. Ghormley suffered from a severely abscessed tooth at the time, which may have interfered with his decision

making. In October 1942, following the Battle of Cape Esperance (October 11–12, 1942), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, replaced Ghormley with Vice Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., who infused an offensive spirit into the campaign that Ghormley seemed incapable of maintaining.

In 1943 Ghormley commanded the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and in 1944 he took charge of the 14th Naval District, Hawaii. At the end of the war, Ghormley assumed command of U.S. Naval Forces in Germany (Task Force 124), which was charged, among other things, with demobilizing the German Navy. Ghormley retired from the navy as a vice admiral in August 1946 and died in Bethesda, Maryland, on June 21, 1958.

EDWARD F. FINCH

See also

Cape Esperance, Battle of; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Nimitz, Chester William; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Savo Island, Battle of

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Gibbs, William Francis (1886–1967)

U.S. naval architect. Born in Philadelphia on August 24, 1886, William Francis Gibbs grew up fascinated with ship design and marine engineering, but at his father’s insistence he studied economics and law at Harvard and Columbia Universities. During two years of unsatisfying legal practice, he joined his younger brother, Frederic Herbert Gibbs, in speculative plans for a fast, 1,000-foot transatlantic liner. In 1915 Gibbs abandoned the law to pursue this project, winning financial backing from John Pierpont Morgan Jr. American involvement in World War I prevented the ship’s construction, but the proposal and Morgan’s support attracted attention from both military and

civilian shipping authorities, leading to Gibbs's service as a shipping expert in the War Department and an adviser to the United States Shipping Board.

In 1922, Gibbs and his brother organized a company to recondition the 54,300-ton *Leviathan,* formerly the German liner *Vaterland.* Success in this difficult undertaking made the firm's reputation, and in 1929 the brothers joined another naval architect, Daniel H. Cox, to form Gibbs and Cox. The new company became noted for its yachts and passenger ships, but it also profoundly influenced naval design through development of high-pressure, high-temperature propulsion systems, which were first used in 16 Mahan-class destroyers ordered by the U.S. Navy in 1933.

World War II prompted Gibbs and his company to phenomenal productivity; 63 percent of oceangoing merchant ships and 74 percent of naval vessels constructed in the United States during the war were built to Gibbs and Cox specifications.

Resuming government work, Gibbs served as controller of shipbuilding for the War Production Board in 1942 and 1943 and subsequently as chairman of the Combined Shipbuilding Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He simplified and standardized shipbuilding through economies of scale and a relentless emphasis on time saving and efficiency. From 1943, he also represented the Office of War Mobilization on the U.S. Navy's Procurement Review Board. His most striking single accomplishment was his dominant role in designing the Liberty ship, a basic cargo vessel derived from British precedents, of which more than 2,700 examples were built under his direction.

Following the war, Gibbs returned to his early vision of an American superliner, finally realized in the construction of SS *United States* in 1952. Gibbs died in New York City on September 6, 1967.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Liberty Ships; Logistics, Allied; United States Navy

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GI Bill of Rights

U.S. social welfare program for World War II veterans. Officially known as the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, the GI Bill of Rights (commonly referred to as just the GI Bill) remains one of the most popular and effective government programs in American history. Although federal law protected the right of veterans to return to their prewar jobs, many wanted and expected more than a return to their 1941 positions. The GI Bill was born partly out of a desire to reward the men of America's military for their service. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had originally envisioned a much larger program that included job retraining. However, he agreed to a slightly less ambitious plan that was advanced by an alliance of Democrats and progressive Republicans.

Signed on June 22, 1944, the GI Bill paid for college tuition and vocational training and provided students with housing and medical benefits. Other aspects of the bill made available low-interest loans guaranteed by the federal government for mortgages and business ventures. Unemployed veterans received cash payments. Supporters sought to use the program to empower veterans through education and training, thus making them less dependent on corporations, unions, or—in the long run—the federal government. The bill had the support of veterans' groups such as the American Legion, which helped draft the legislation, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. The Hearst newspaper group also lent its support.

The GI Bill had motives beyond showing the nation's gratitude to returning veterans. Remembering the plight of World War I veterans and the ignoble episode of the 1932 Bonus Army—when some 20,000 World War I veterans converged on Washington in the hope of collecting their adjusted compensation bonuses immediately rather than in 1945 as legislated—the bill aimed to ease veterans into the workplace slowly. Many economists and politicians feared that if 12 million veterans descended on the job market at the same time, the United States would plunge into an economic depression.

By placing some veterans in schools and supporting the desires of others to start small businesses, the GI Bill sought to lessen these pressures.

The GI Bill had a long and lasting influence on American society. More than 1 million veterans attended colleges and universities using the bill's benefits, and more than 8 million used one or more of its programs. The bill underwrote more than 3.5 million mortgages, and in 1947 it funded almost 40 percent of all housing starts in the United States. The GI Bill thus helped fuel the postwar economic boom by stimulating the construction industry and all of its subsidiaries. It also provided enormous cash infusions for American colleges and universities. Since World War II, the U.S. government has enacted various legislation offering GI Bill–type benefits to veterans of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars as well as to some members of the peacetime military.

MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States; Document 189

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Gibraltar

Key British naval base that guarded the strait between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Gibraltar, a 2.5-square-mile promontory attached to the southern coast of Spain, has as its most distinctive geographic feature a formation of limestone 1,396 feet high known as "The Rock." The British seized the area from Spain in the early 18th century, and its possession was formally recognized as British in the 1714 Treaty of Utrecht ending the War of the Spanish Succession. The British subsequently began construction of fortifications on The Rock and also harbor facilities, but the latter were of poor quality in comparison to the Mediterranean base of Malta. In the early

20th century, the British installed breakwaters to improve the harbor as well as three dry docks. Shortly after the beginning of World War II, the British also built an airstrip and further fortified The Rock through the inclusion of miles of tunnels along with barracks and offices within the limestone structure.

Gibraltar was vastly important during the war, mostly because of its strategic position. Because it guarded the entrance to the Mediterranean, the British were able to control naval traffic entering and leaving the sea. The base was consequently essential as a staging point for convoys to supply and maintain Malta—the island base in the central Mediterranean that suffered frequent air attacks from Axis forces. Gibraltar became the base for Force H, initially commanded by Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville, which escorted convoys to Malta and also was responsible for operations in the Atlantic, such as the search for and destruction of the German battleship *Bismarck.* Gibraltar also served as a command post for General Dwight D. Eisenhower during Operation TORCH, the November 8, 1942, Allied invasion of North Africa.

The Axis powers were fully aware of the importance of Gibraltar to the Allied war effort. In late 1940, German planners formulated a plan code-named Operation FELIX that called for two German Army corps to move through Spain and seize Gibraltar. Opposition from Spanish dictator Francisco Franco led to the plan being dropped, however. Attacks to disrupt operations there did take place, among the first of these an air raid by Vichy French aircraft following the British attack on ships of the French Navy in Operation CATAPULT (July 1940). In 1942, Italian Air Force planes also bombed Gibraltar with limited effect, and between 1940 and 1943, the Italians maintained a commando unit in the Spanish port of Algeciras that sank or damaged 14 ships in Gibraltar's harbor over a two-year period.

Following the completion of the North African Campaign and the invasion of Italy in 1943, Gibraltar's importance diminished, although it continued to be a major base for Mediterranean operations.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; CATAPULT, Operation; Italy Campaign; Malta; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Somerville, Sir James

Fownes; TORCH, Operation

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Gibraltar, Strait of

Narrow channel of water that connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea and separates Spain from Morocco. At its narrowest point, the passageway between Europe and Africa is just 7.7 nautical miles, although its waters are deep, ranging from 985 feet to nearly 3,000 feet. Ferries and relatively swift craft can cross the Strait of Gibraltar in about 35 minutes. The two points of land flanking the entrance to the Gibraltar Strait (one of which is the Rock of Gibraltar in southern Spain) have been known since antiquity as the "Pillars of Hercules." There are several small islets within the channel. The strategic importance of the strait cannot be overemphasized, as it provides the only entrance into and exit out of the Mediterranean in the west and is the only direct link between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

The waters within the strait move in both an eastward and westward direction, although there is more aggregate movement to the east (into the Mediterranean) because the waters of the Atlantic are cooler and less saline than those of the Mediterranean. Wave action at the surface tends to be moderate, but shipping interests using the strait must nevertheless be careful, as water moving over a shallow underwater sill that separates the two bodies of water can create unpredictable currents. The climate of the region tends to be warm and arid, meaning that the strait is not usually subjected to severe storms or unpredictable weather.

The British bastion at Gibraltar was a critically important stronghold for the Allies during World War II. The Allies, especially the British, struggled mightily to keep the strait open to shipping, no easy task given German submarine warfare during 1941–1944, repeated Italian attempts to wage

underwater warfare and harass Gibraltar during 1942–1943, and a Vichy French attack of July 3, 1940.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Gibraltar; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918–1944)

Royal Air Force (RAF) officer. Born in Simla, India, on August 12, 1918, Guy Gibson traveled to England at age six for schooling and later entered St. Edward's, Oxford. He left school early and joined the RAF in November 1936. Promoted to acting pilot officer in January 1937, Gibson joined Bomber Command No. 83 Squadron. With the start of World War II, he took part in the July 1940 strike against the Kiel Canal and went on to fly 172 missions and be awarded the Distinguished Service Order.

Following the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, Gibson transferred to Fighter Command as a night-fighter pilot. He flew 99 missions and was credited with 6 enemy aircraft downed. In 1943, Gibson was selected to train a new unit for "special duties." The unit became No. 617 Squadron, popularized as the "Dam Busters" and formed to drop Sir Barnes Wallis's skip-bombs on the Möhne, Eder, Schwelme, and Sorps dams in Germany. On May 16, 1943, Gibson personally led the first squadron of 19 Lancaster aircraft in five attempts to breach the Möhne River dam. He made his bomb run first and then descended low, circling to draw German antiaircraft fire. Only 11 of the bombers survived this mission and another mission the following day, and only two of the dams were destroyed, but Gibson became an international celebrity and was awarded the Victoria Cross.

Beginning in August 1943, Gibson promoted the British war effort in a four-month publicity tour of the United States. He returned to No. 5 Bomber Group, Bomber Command, in June 1944. On September 19, 1944, Gibson was piloting a de Havilland Mosquito on a pathfinding mission when he was shot down and killed in action near Bergen-op-Zoom, the Netherlands.

Enemy Coast Ahead, Gibson's account of the Dam Busters, was published in 1946 and sold hundreds of thousands of copies. That book and the 1954 motion picture *The Dam Busters*, based on the book by Paul Brickhill, further enhanced Gibson's reputation as an effective and resourceful commander.

GARY KERLEY

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Great Britain, Air Force; Wallis, Barnes Neville

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Giffen, Robert Carlisle "Ike" (1886–1962)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born on June 29, 1886, in West Chester, Pennsylvania, Robert Carlisle "Ike" Giffen graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1907. During World War I, he commanded a destroyer on antisubmarine patrols in the North Atlantic. After the war Giffen alternated seagoing commands with shore assignments. In 1940 and 1941, he served on the staff of the chief of naval operations.

Assigned as commander of Cruiser Destroyer Division 7 in March 1941 and promoted to rear admiral in October, Giffen escorted supply convoys between Britain and the Soviet Union. He then commanded a naval task force in Operation TORCH, the November 8, 1942, invasion of North Africa. Transferred to the Pacific, Giffen took part in the battle for Rennell Island (January 29–30, 1943) and then in the Aleutian (1942–1943) and Marshall Islands (January 29–February 22, 1944) campaigns. Giffen's command

provided fire support in the invasions of Makin Island (November 20–23, 1943) and Kwajalein (January 19–February 6, 1944). He was promoted to vice admiral in March 1944. From February to August 1944, he commanded Cruiser Division 6 during the bombardments of Truk (February 17, 1944), Saipan (June 25–July 13), Guam (July 21–August 10), and Tinian (July 21–August 10). He took command of the Caribbean Sea Frontier in the autumn of 1944 and of the Atlantic Fleet Service Force in 1945, retiring in September 1946. Giffen died in Annapolis, Maryland, on December 10, 1962.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Guam, Battle for; Kwajalein, Battle for; Makin Island, Battle of; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Nimitz, Chester William; Rennell Island, Battle of; Saipan, Battle of; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of; TORCH, Operation; Truk, Raid on

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Gilbert Islands Campaign (November 1943)

U.S. amphibious campaign in the Central Pacific (November 1943) and an important advance toward the Japanese home islands. The 16 atolls that constitute the Gilbert Islands lie astride the equator. The Americans invaded the Gilbert Islands in late November 1943. Approximately 200 ships and more than 30,000 troops seized the atolls of Makin, Tarawa, and Abemama in Operation GALVANIC. Fifth Fleet commander Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance had overall command of the operation, and Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall commanded Task Force 50.

Following preparatory air strikes against Rabaul, the 11 fleet carriers in Task Force 50, which was divided into four different carrier groups,

neutralized Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands and pounded Makin and Tarawa in preparation for landings there. At the latter two atolls, seven battleships and accompanying cruisers bombarded the shore for more than an hour the morning of the invasion. On November 20, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner's Task Force 54 landed elements of the army's 27th Infantry Division on Butaritari Island while 2nd Marine Division troops landed on Betio Island.

At Butaritari, four battalions from the army's 27th Infantry Division assaulted Beach Yellow in the lagoon and Beach Red on the western face of the island. Although the reef line forced the men in the lagoon to wade the last 300 yards to shore, initial resistance was light because only 300 Japanese combat troops defended the island. The attack became bogged down by enemy snipers and small counterattacks, however, and it took three days to secure the island. The army suffered 64 killed and 150 wounded.

Resistance was heavier on Betio, a small but well-fortified island defended by 4,000 Japanese troops. Initially, three marine battalions landed on Beach Red along the wide lagoon side of the island. These troops ran into heavy fire, and as low tide prevented heavy equipment from crossing the reef line, the attack stalled in the face of determined Japanese resistance. Two additional battalions landed as reinforcements later that day, and a sixth battalion landed the following morning. All suffered heavy casualties in the process.

The situation improved late on the second day when destroyers and aircraft supported the landing of a seventh battalion at the narrow western end of Betio. Using tanks, grenades, TNT blocks, and flamethrowers, the marines secured most of the island by November 22. Two Japanese counterattacks were repulsed that evening, and the entire atoll was cleared six days later. The United States lost 980 marines and 29 sailors killed, while 2,106 troops were wounded. Only 17 Japanese survived the battle. They were taken prisoner along with 129 Korean laborers.

Although the Japanese surface navy did not intervene, Japan's air and submarine units did strike the American invasion force. At dusk on November 20, 16 twin-engine "Betty" bombers attacked a carrier group off Tarawa and torpedoed the light carrier *Independence.* The explosion killed 17 sailors and wounded 43. It also forced the carrier to retire for repairs. At least three similar raids followed over the next week, although none scored hits

because American air cover—including the first use of night-combat air patrols—broke up the attacks. More deadly were Japanese submarines, one of which torpedoed and sank the escort carrier *Liscombe Bay* on November 24, killing 642 sailors.

Overall, the Gilbert landings cost the lives of roughly 1,800 Americans and 5,000 Japanese, including the crews of four lost Japanese Navy submarines. The Gilbert Islands Campaign provided important lessons in amphibious operations and paved the way for the next U.S. amphibious operation, which was conducted against the Marshall Islands in January and February 1944.

TIMOTHY L. FRANCIS

See also

Central Pacific Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Rabaul; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tarawa, Battle of; Turner, Richmond Kelly

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Gillars, Mildred Elizabeth

See "Axis Sally"

Giraud, Henri Honoré (1879–1949)

French Army general. Born in Paris on January 18, 1879, Henri Honoré Giraud graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in 1900. During World War I, he fought on the Western Front. Captain Giraud was taken prisoner by the Germans near Guise in late August 1914, but he escaped that October and returned to France in February 1915. Giraud

distinguished himself in later fighting and, at the end of the war, commanded a battalion.

Giraud was stationed in Turkey from 1918 to 1922 and in Morocco from 1922 to 1934. He played an important role in the Rif Wars in Morocco, and his forces captured Moroccan nationalist leader Abd-el-Krim in 1926. Giraud was promoted to colonel in 1927, to general of brigade in 1930, to general of division in 1934, and to general of corps in 1936. He commanded the VI Military Region at Metz from 1936 to 1939. On the French military mobilization for World War II on September 2, 1939, he took command of the Seventh Army as a general of army. He had little comprehension of the new theories of high-speed warfare with tanks operating en masse.

When the Germans invaded France and the Low Countries in May 1940, Giraud led the Seventh Army into Belgium in accordance with the Allied plan. On May 15, he assumed command of the collapsing Ninth Army. Captured on May 18 at Wassigny, he was imprisoned at Königstein in Saxony. Giraud escaped on April 17, 1942, and crossed Germany to Switzerland and then to Vichy France, embarrassing Vichy officials, who had been attempting to improve relations with the German occupiers. At a meeting on May 2, 1942, attended by Admiral Jean François Darlan and Pierre Laval, Giraud refused German ambassador Otto Abetz's invitation to return to prison.

In November 1942, Giraud was spirited out of France and transported by the British submarine *Seraph* to North Africa. (An Anglophobe, Giraud had insisted on an American boat, but none was available, and so he was tricked into believing that the *Seraph* was a U.S. submarine.) U.S. and British officials, hoping that Giraud might replace Charles de Gaulle as leader of the Free French forces, made him commander of French forces in North Africa in December 1942. On May 30, 1943, de Gaulle arrived in Algiers, and on June 3 agreement was reached whereby Giraud became copresident with de Gaulle of the French Committee of National Liberation. De Gaulle was easily able to elbow the politically inept Giraud aside, and the arrangement only lasted until November 9, 1943, when Giraud resigned.

As commander in chief of French armed forces until April 4, 1944, Giraud continued to play an important role in rebuilding the French military forces before being forced to retire. In June 1946, he won election to the French National Assembly from Moselle, and he continued to serve as vice

president of the Supreme War Council until 1948. Giraud died at Dijon on March 11, 1949.

JOHN MACFARLANE

See also

Casablanca Conference; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; France; France, Army; France, Battle for; Free French; Laval, Pierre; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; TORCH, Operation; Vichy France

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Glide Bombs

Precursor to modern-day precision-guided munitions. First developed by the Germans, glide bombs were used primarily against Allied warships. The Germans developed two types, the first of which was the free-fall FX-1400 bomb. Designed by Max Kramer of the Ruhrstahl AG, it weighed 3,460 pounds and had a 771-pound warhead. The FX-1400 had 5-foot 3-inch wings to enable it to glide, and it was radio controlled by means of an electrical tail unit. Glide bombs were carried by such German aircraft as the Dornier Do-217, Heinkel He-117, and Junkers Ju-88 and Ju-290.

On September 9, 1943, after Italy had announced an armistice with the Allies, the Germans used FX-1400 glide bombs to sink the Italian battleship *Roma;* 1,252 members of its crew were lost. Another bomb exploded off the bow of the battleship *Italia*, causing minor flooding. The FX-1400 could be dropped from an altitude of 18,500 to 22,700 feet and at a distance of up to three miles from the target.

The second glide bomb was the Hs-293, designed by Herbert Wagner of the Henschel Company. It was a rocket-assisted guided winged bomb initially designed for use against ships. It was fitted with a Walter 109–507B rocket motor with 1,323 pounds of thrust, giving it a speed of about 360 mph. The Hs-293 was 13 feet 4 inches long with a wingspan of 10 feet 7 inches. It

weighed about 2,140 pounds, of which about 165 pounds were in the rocket and 1,124 in the warhead—a substantial ratio of warhead to delivery system. The Hs-293 employed a Dortmund/Duisburg wire-guided system for control, and it had an effective range of almost 10 nautical miles.

Modifications to the Hs-293 included the Hs-294 (16 feet 5 inches in length with a 14-foot 2-inch wingspan), Hs-295, Hs-296, Hs-297, Hs-298, and Hs-344. The Hs-298, a smaller version of the Hs-293, was designed to be launched from night fighters against Allied bombers. It had a two-stage rocket motor and could operate at heights up to 20,000 feet. Its warhead weighed about 150 pounds. The Hs-344 was another lightweight version designed for use by fighters against other aircraft. These versions were largely just tested.

The Germans first used the Hs-293 on August 24, 1943, in the Bay of Biscay. During Allied Operation PERCUSSION, an antisubmarine air and surface attack on German U-boats, the Canadian 5th Support Group came under air attack from 14 Dornier Do-217 and 7 Junkers Ju-88C bombers. The attackers employed Hs-293s to damage the sloop *Landguard* in four near hits and the sloop *Bideford* in one near hit. On August 28, 18 Do-217s attacked the relieving 1st Support Group, sank the British sloop *Egret,* and heavily damaged the Canadian destroyer *Athabaskan.*

Kampfgeschwader 100 mounted further attacks with the Hs-293 in the Mediterranean in September 1943. During the U.S. landing at Salerno on September 11, Kampfgeschwader 100's Do-17s attacked and heavily damaged the cruiser *Savannah* and narrowly missed the cruiser *Philadelphia.* On September 13, the British cruiser *Uganda* was hit and heavily damaged, while the *Philadelphia* and the British destroyers *Loyal* and *Nubian* were both damaged. The hospital ship *Newfoundland* was sunk, probably by an Hs-293. On September 16, the British battleship *Warspite* sustained heavy damage from two Hs-293 hits. Among other Allied warships that were struck and sunk were the British destroyer *Intrepid* and the Greek destroyer *Vasillissa Olga* on September 26, the Italian destroyer *Euro* on October 1, and the British destroyer escort *Dulverton* on November 13, 1943.

During the landing at Anzio on January 22, 1944, Do-217s and Ju-88s again attacked Allied ships with Hs-293 glide bombs. On January 23, these glide bombs sank the British destroyer *Janus* and damaged the destroyer

Jervis. On January 29, Hs-293s sank the British cruiser *Spartan,* and on February 25 they sent to the bottom the British destroyer *Inglefield.*

Some 2,300 glide bombs were used in combat, but production was limited by the many other demands on the German armaments industry at the time. The Germans claimed that the glide bombs sank or damaged 400,000 tons of Allied shipping, but this was an exaggeration. The Germans also sent plans for their rocket motors by submarine to the Japanese, who used these to develop their Oka manned rocket bomb.

Late in the war, the United States tested several types of air-to-surface missiles, including the Fletcher XBG-1, Fletcher XBG-2, Cornelius XBG-3, Pratt-Reed LBE, Piper LBP, and Taylorcraft LBT. The term "glomb" was employed as shorthand for "glide bomb." The Eighth Air Force used the GB-1 series of glide bombs beginning on March 28, 1944. Some 1,000 were launched, but they lacked accuracy. Later versions incorporated television guidance, but only one version (Project Batty, a GB-4) was used in combat. Instead, bombs without wings but with a guidance system were employed. One was the Azon (for "azimuth only"); another was the Razon (azimuth and range guidance). Azons were used successfully in combat. A later version, the Tarzon, was employed successfully during the 1950–1953 Korean War.

The most advanced winged missile of World War II was the Bat, a glide bomb with a 1,000-pound bomb and semiactive radar homing. Employing PBY-42s Privateer aircraft, the U.S. Navy used the Bat with great success against Japanese shipping. The Bat had a 10-foot wingspan, was a little longer than 11 feet, weighed 1,880 pounds, and achieved 300 mph in the glide. Range depended on the release height; a Bat sank a Japanese destroyer 20 miles distant from the drop aircraft.

DAVID WESTWOOD, WALTER J. BOYNE, JÜRGEN ROHWER, AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Bay of Biscay Offensive; V-1 Buzz Bomb; V-2 Rocket

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Glubb, Sir John Bagot (1897–1986)

British soldier. Born on April 16, 1897, in Preston, Lancashire, John Bagot Glubb graduated from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, in 1915 and served on the Western Front during World War I and was wounded. After the war he served in Iraq during the Arab revolt there in 1920, and in 1926 he left the British Army for a civilian position with the Iraqi government.

In 1930, Glubb left his Iraqi government post and served as brigadier (second-in-command) of Transjordan's Arab Legion. He was promoted to command this 1,350-man internal constabulary in 1939 and made it into a well-disciplined, modern military force. During World War II, the Arab Legion was a source of support for the Allies in the volatile Middle East and took part in Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Wavell's invasion of Syria and Lebanon during June 8–July 14, 1941.

Following World War II and the emergence of the state of Israel, Glubb built the Arab Legion into a 6,000-man motorized force. It was by far the most effective of Arab units fighting in the 1948–1949 Israeli War of Independence. Bias against the lingering British presence in the region led to Glubb's dismissal in 1956. He then returned to Britain and was knighted. Glubb was the author of numerous historical and autobiographical works and was widely known as "Glubb Pasha." He died in Mayfield, East Sussex, on March 17, 1986.

FRED R. VAN HARTESVELDT

See also

Syria and Lebanon, Campaign in; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Godfrey, John Henry (1888–1971)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born in Handsworth, Birmingham, on July 10, 1888, John Henry Godfrey entered the Royal Navy in 1903. During World War I, he served with distinction in the Mediterranean. Between the wars, seagoing duty—including cruiser commands on the China Station and in the Mediterranean—alternated with appointments at the Staff College, Greenwich, and in the naval plans division.

Promoted to rear admiral, Godfrey was named director of naval intelligence in February 1939. He energetically set about remedying two decades of neglect. He expanded the division tenfold, enrolling numerous talented civilians. He also integrated intelligence with the conduct of the war at sea; took full advantage of the Ultra cryptographic breakthrough and established the decoding center at Bletchley Park; introduced procedures to facilitate intelligence analysis, evaluation, and distribution; and established the Joint Intelligence Committee. Unfortunately, Godfrey's inflexibility caused frequent confrontations with Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill and other colleagues, and in December 1942 he was relieved of his post.

Godfrey then took command of the Indian Navy (vastly expanded since 1939), improving its training, recruitment, infrastructure, and staff and enabling the force to contribute substantially to the fighting in Asia. When World War II ended in August 1945, mutiny broke out in the Indian Navy and other military forces, which Godfrey, with Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, suppressed within a few days. Neither the British Labour government nor Indian nationalists applauded his achievement. Admiral Godfrey retired in March 1946 and for 15 years chaired a group of London hospitals. He died at Eastbourne on August 29, 1971.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain, Navy; India; Signals Intelligence

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Godfroy, René Émile (1885–1981)

French Navy admiral. Born in Paris on January 6, 1885, René Émile Godfroy attended the École Navale and was commissioned an ensign in 1904. He served in various ship assignments and participated in a scientific expedition to the South Pole from 1908 to 1910. During World War I, he served first as a gunnery officer aboard cruisers in the Mediterranean. In 1920, he commanded a dispatch boat.

Promoted to commander in 1921, Godfroy developed an interest in naval aviation and secured his observer's license in 1923. He then commanded the Naval Aviation Center at Saint-Raphaël and headed a commission to study the practical application of aviation. Promoted to captain in 1931, Godfroy commanded cruisers in the Mediterranean. In 1936, he headed French naval aviation, and he was promoted to rear admiral that February.

Godfroy assumed command of the 4th Cruiser Division in the Far East in 1937. In January 1940, he was named naval commander at Marseille and charged with the defense of the Mediterranean coast of France. In April, he took command of Force X in the eastern Mediterranean to cooperate with British forces. In June, he was promoted to vice admiral.

When France and Germany signed an armistice on June 22, 1940, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill was determined to prevent French naval vessels from falling into German hands and thereby augmenting Germany's ability to harass the Royal Navy. He therefore insisted that British naval commanders offer their French counterparts the choice of continuing the fight against Germany, taking their ships to a neutral port they would not be permitted to leave, or having them sunk.

At the time the Royal Navy launched this plan, code-named Operation CATAPULT (July 1940), Godfroy was with Force X at Alexandria, Egypt, along with British ships commanded by Admiral Andrew Cunningham.

Cunningham had no wish to preside over bloodshed and loss of life resembling that which had occurred the same day (July 3) at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria. He therefore exercised exceptional tact in presenting Churchill's ultimatum to Godfroy, who agreed to permit British forces to demobilize and demilitarize his ships and leave them in Alexandria Harbor.

After the November 1942 Allied liberation of North Africa, Godfroy joined the Free French forces, but he was not trusted by them. In December 1943, he was removed from command and retired. He was not rehabilitated until April 1955. Godfroy died at Fréjus in southern France on January 16, 1981.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

CATAPULT, Operation; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; France, Navy; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on

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Goebbels, Paul Joseph (1897–1945)

German minister of propaganda. Born on October 29, 1897, at Rheydt in the Rhineland, Paul Joseph Goebbels (he went by Joseph) was physically small with a clubfoot. He grew up in a deeply Catholic setting, but on graduation from the University of Heidelberg with a doctorate in literature in 1921, he renounced his faith.

Unsuccessful in his desired literary career, Goebbels temporarily worked in a bank. In 1924, he formed a close association with Adolf Hitler. After spreading Nazi propaganda as the editor of the *Völkische Freiheit* (People's Freedom) at Elberfeld, "the Little Doctor," as he came to be called, moved up in the Nazi Party hierarchy.

Hitler recognized Goebbels's abilities and appointed him Nazi Gauleiter (regional leader) of Berlin in November 1926, charging him with rebuilding the party organization there. From 1927 to 1935, Goebbels edited the weekly newspaper *Der Angriff* (The Attack), which eventually became a daily and a financial success. Goebbels displayed considerable organizational skill and ability as a motivational speaker. He also ordered the Sturmabteilungen (Storm Troops, SA) to use physical force in the streets against the leftist opposition.

In 1928, Goebbels won election to the Reichstag (parliament), and in 1929 he took charge of Nazi Party propaganda, playing an important role in building Nazi political strength throughout Germany. Goebbels successfully used American advertising tools, psychology, and modern propaganda techniques to spread the message of Nazism. He made Horst Wessel, a thug who was killed in a barroom brawl, into a Nazi martyr, and he pushed the use of the Nazi stiff-arm salute and of "Heil Hitler" as a mandatory greeting. Goebbels also advanced new slogans and myths, including the *Führermythos*, which held that Hitler was the one savior of the German nation. Goebbels also engaged in rabid anti-Semitism.

German Nazi propagandist and politician Paul Joseph Goebbels. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Hitler rewarded Goebbels in March 1933 by appointing him to the cabinet as minister of propaganda. Goebbels exercised complete control over mass communication—the press, films, theater, radio, and sports—organizing all of it to work for the Nazi cause and later the war effort. He lived up to his own slogan, “Propaganda has nothing to do with truth.” Throughout the war, Goebbels worked to buoy the confidence of the German people. He trumpeted claims of a “final victory” and in a speech in February 1943 invoked “total war.” Appointed plenipotentiary for total war in July 1944, Goebbels called on the German people for more and more sacrifices, imposing longer working hours and reducing benefits. He also proclaimed the advent of German “miracle weapons” that would win the war.

At war’s end, Goebbels and his family joined Hitler in the *Führerbunker* in Berlin. On May 1, 1945, a day after Hitler’s suicide, Goebbels and his wife Magda also committed suicide, having first poisoned their six small children.

Goebbels's diaries are an important source of information about the National Socialist regime.

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY

See also

Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Propaganda; Unconditional Surrender

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Goerdeler, Carl Friedrich (1884–1945)

German political figure and opposition leader. Born in Schneidemühl, Pomerania, on July 31, 1884, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler studied law and entered the civil service. An army officer in World War I, he became deputy mayor of Königsberg in 1922 and lord mayor of Leipzig in 1930. In 1932, German chancellor Heinrich Brüning appointed Goerdeler commissioner of prices, a post he held until July 1935.

After Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933, the traditionalist Goerdeler initially supported the new government, especially its centralization of authority. Goerdeler believed that Hitler might solve Germany's pressing economic problems. However, it soon became apparent that the new government insisted on total submission. In protest, Goerdeler resigned as mayor of Leipzig in 1937. He was troubled not only by the regime's domestic policies but also by its aggressive foreign policy, which he feared would lead to a general European war. Goerdeler became one of the first to publicly speak out against the Nazi government and soon emerged as one of the leaders of the German opposition to Hitler.

Once war began in September 1939, Goerdeler became a leading member of a conspiracy to overthrow Hitler. Goerdeler wrote documents spelling out the goals of the opposition and what should take place politically following Hitler's removal from office. Throughout, Goerdeler maintained a close relationship with General Ludwig Beck, leader of the army officers who opposed Hitler. Although Goerdeler vigorously urged Hitler's removal from office, he initially opposed an assassination that might make Hitler a martyr. Goerdeler argued that the führer should be arrested and his guilt exposed in a public trial. Others in opposition, however, believed that assassinating Hitler was the certain course of action, and by early July 1944 Goerdeler reluctantly agreed. According to opposition plans, Goerdeler was to become the chancellor in a post-Hitler Germany.

On the failure of the July 20, 1944, bomb plot against Hitler, Goerdeler went into hiding. Arrested on August 12, he endured lengthy interrogation and was then sentenced to death. Goerdeler wrote several essays and letters before his execution at Plötzensee Prison, Berlin, on February 2, 1945.

GENE MUELLER

See also

Beck, Ludwig; Germany; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Resistance; Stauffenberg, Claus Philipp Schenk von

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Golikov, Filip Ivanovich (1900–1980)

Soviet Army marshal. Born in Borisovo (Kurgan Oblast), east of the Ural Mountains, on July 29, 1900, Filip Ivanovich Golikov joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party in 1918. He underwent political indoctrination in Petrograd in 1919 and from that August served as a political officer in the

51st Infantry Division to the end of the Russian Civil War. By 1919, he had completed advanced leadership training. He was involved primarily in political work until 1931, when he assumed command of an infantry regiment. Golikov graduated by correspondence from the Frunze Military Academy with a specialty in armor in 1933. He commanded the 8th Mechanized Brigade during 1936 and 1937 and the Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Military District during 1937 and 1938.

Golikov held commands in the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939 and perhaps that of Finland (Winter War). He was promoted to major general in May 1940 and assigned as deputy chief of the General Staff and chief of military intelligence. Reporting only to Joseph Stalin, Golikov passed along information from Russian spy Richard Sorge that Japan would strike south in 1941 rather than drive north into the Soviet Union. Shortly after Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Golikov led missions to London and Washington to negotiate aid.

Golikov took command of the Tenth Army in October 1941 in the defense of the city of Moscow, participating in the desperate fighting there in December. He headed the Fourth Shock Army in the winter counteroffensive of February and March 1942 and then commanded the Bryansk Front opposing German Army Group South's summer offensive in June 1942. During the August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943, Battle of Stalingrad, Golikov commanded first the Voronezh Front and then the First Guards Army. He was also deputy commander of the Southeast and Stalingrad Fronts. He commanded the Voronezh Front from October 1942 to March 1943 and took part in the Soviet push through Kharkov (March 1–14, 1943) and Kursk (July 5–13, 1943).

Promoted to colonel general in January 1943, Golikov was deputy commissar of defense for cadres and chief of the personnel directorate of the Red Army from 1943 to 1950. In 1945, he was promoted to army general. Golikov was then commander of the Special Mechanized Army from 1950 to 1956 and commandant of the Military Academy of Armored Troops in 1956. From 1957 to 1962, he was chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces. In 1961, he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union. Following disagreement with Nikita Khrushchev over the latter's handling of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Golikov was quietly relieved of his posts and shunned by his fellow officers. He served out his remaining

active duty in a succession of administrative positions until 1966. Golikov died in Moscow on August 8, 1980.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Kharkov, Battles of; Kursk, Battle of; Sorge, Richard; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad, Battle of

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GOODWOOD, Operation (July 18–20, 1944)

British Second Army attack in an attempt to break out of the Normandy beachhead near Caen, France. Operation GOODWOOD was originally suggested as an operation supporting Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's July 25–31 Operation COBRA, the breakout of his American 12th Army Group from Saint-Lô. British general Bernard Montgomery later saw GOODWOOD as an opportunity for his 21st Army Group to achieve a breakthrough or even perhaps a double breakout by both U.S. and British forces. Operation GOODWOOD involved three corps: three armored divisions of the British VIII Corps in the east provided the main effort to gain the rolling plain southeast of Caen rising toward Falaise, the Canadian II Corps was to secure the southern half of Caen, and the British XII Corps would conduct diversionary attacks on the right several days before the July 18, 1944, kickoff.

The concept for GOODWOOD, developed by commander of the British Second Army lieutenant general Miles Dempsey, was to use massed airpower and artillery followed by an armor breakthrough of the German defensive crust. Prior to the ground attack, 1,700 heavy bombers from the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force plus nearly 400 medium bombers and fighter-bombers of the U.S. Ninth Air Force

dropped 7,700 tons of bombs on the German defenses. Only fighter-bombers attacked in the zone of the main effort to prevent the massive cratering that had slowed British armor in its earlier attacks to seize Caen.

The air and ground bombardment began at 5:30 a.m. on July 18, and the ground attack by the three armored divisions of VIII Corps occurred on schedule at 7:30 a.m. The effects of the bombardment and tactical surprise allowed the ground elements to advance more than three miles in slightly over an hour. In only about three hours, VIII Corps was nearing a clean breakthrough when it encountered the final German defensive line of antitank and flak guns. In an oversight, this defensive line had not been targeted for air bombardment, and it, combined with dogged German defense, brought the advance to a halt. Limited local attacks continued on July 19 and 20, but a heavy thunderstorm on July 20 turned the landscape into a quagmire, and GOODWOOD came to an end.

During the four-day operation, the Canadian II Corps captured the rest of Caen and part of the plain to the southeast, and the British VIII Corps secured nearly 35 square miles of terrain. However, the operation cost VIII Corps more than 4,000 casualties and the loss of 500 tanks—36 percent of all British armor on the continent at that time. Although General Montgomery declared that the purposes of GOODWOOD had been achieved, the results were disappointing. Some in the higher levels of Allied command, even on the British side, hinted that it might be time for Montgomery's removal. The failure of GOODWOOD focused Allied hopes for a breakout in Normandy on Operation COBRA.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Carpet Bombing; COBRA, Operation; Dempsey, Miles Christopher; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Göring, Hermann Wilhelm (1893–1946)

German Reichsmarshal and commander of the German Air Force, the Luftwaffe. Born on January 12, 1893, in Rosenheim, Bavaria, Hermann Wilhelm Göring was educated in the cadet school in Karlsruhe. He then entered officers' training school at Gross Lichterfelde, and on graduation in 1912 he was commissioned in the infantry. He served in the German Army and fought in World War I with the infantry until 1915, when he joined the air service. Göring succeeded Baron Manfred von Richthofen on the latter's death as commander of the Richthofen Squadron in July 1918. Credited with 22 aerial victories in World War I, Göring was awarded the coveted Pour le Mérite. After the war, he moved to Scandinavia, where he took up show flying and married a Swedish baroness.

Göring returned to Germany in 1921 and became a close associate of Adolf Hitler. In 1922, Hitler gave him command of the Sturmabteilungen (SA, Storm Troopers), which grew dramatically in strength. Seriously injured in the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, Göring fled Germany but returned in 1927. In 1928, he was elected to the Reichstag (parliament), and in 1932 he was its president. Göring had easy access to influential individuals in industry, banking, and the military, and he acted as liaison between them and Hitler, playing a key role in the Nazi accession to power.

German reichsmarshall Hermann Göring. One of the most powerful figures of the Third Reich, Göring was found guilty of war crimes by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg but cheated the hangman by committing suicide only hours before his planned execution. (Library of Congress)

After Hitler became German chancellor in January 1933, Göring secured even more power and influence. Among his many offices were minister without portfolio, minister of the interior for the state of Prussia, and minister of the air force (Luftwaffe). Göring soon began rebuilding the Luftwaffe, and he was instrumental in all major policy decisions affecting its composition and training. In April 1933 Göring established the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo, Secret Police), a force designed to crush all resistance to Nazism. In 1936, he was appointed to oversee the Four-Year Plan, which gave him virtual control over the economy. As far as the Luftwaffe was concerned, Göring supported the notion of a tactical air force at the expense of strategic bombing, arguably the correct decision given the heavy military demands on Germany's industrial base.

In 1938, Hitler promoted Göring to field marshal and designated him as his heir. Göring was also instrumental in the development of concentration camps, and he worked with Reinhard Heydrich, chief of Reich security, in formulating an Endlösung, or "Final Solution," to the "Jewish question." Göring also amassed a large fortune and, especially during World War II, indulged his passion for collecting fine art.

Göring's Luftwaffe was influential in the early Nazi victories in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940. Following the German victory over France, Hitler promoted Göring to the rank of Reichsmarshall, the first officer to hold that rank since the time of the Holy Roman Empire. His interventions in the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), however, negatively affected the German effort and led to a loss of his influence with Hitler.

Göring opposed Operation BARBAROSSA, Hitler's June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union, favoring a Mediterranean strategy instead. He was blamed, probably falsely, for having suggested that the Luftwaffe, with only a limited transport capacity, could supply the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Popular opinion also turned against him as Allied air raids on the Reich became increasingly effective. Increasingly marginalized, Göring spent more time at his estate of Karinhall, where he indulged his interests in hunting and art collecting.

Although Hitler had designated Göring as his successor, the latter's impatience at the end of the war—portrayed by Martin Bormann, head of the Party Chancery, and others as an attempt by Göring to wrest power from Hitler—led the führer to order that Göring be stripped of his posts and arrested. Göring surrendered to elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division on May 9, 1945. He was tried at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Unrepentant, he was found guilty and sentenced to death. Göring committed suicide by swallowing poison on October 15, 1946, only hours before his planned execution.

WENDY ADELÉ-MARIE MAIER

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; BARBAROSSA, Operation; France, Battle for; Germany; Germany, Air Force; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Poland Campaign; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Gorshkov, Sergei Georgievich (1910–1988)

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union. Born in Kemenets-Podolsky, Ukraine, on February 16, 1910, Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov entered the Russian Navy in 1927 and graduated from the Frunze Naval Academy in 1931. His early service was with the Black Sea Fleet. In 1939, Gorshkov took command of a cruiser squadron in the Pacific Fleet.

Gorshkov undoubtedly benefited in his rise in the service from the purges of the Soviet military in 1937 and 1938. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Gorshkov, only 31 years old, was a rear admiral in command of the Sea of Azov Flotilla. He then became deputy commander of the Novorossisk Defense Area, where he was placed in the unusual circumstance of commanding the Forty-Seventh Army in defense of the Caucasus. Gorshkov then resumed command of naval forces in the Sea of Azov, assisting in the liberation of the Taman Peninsula and Crimea. Gorshkov next commanded the Danube Flotilla and played an active role in the liberation of Ukraine and the Soviet invasion of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria. He ended World War II in command of the Black Sea Fleet.

Following the war, Gorshkov became chief of staff and then commander of the Black Sea Fleet until 1955, when he was appointed deputy commander of the Soviet Navy. Gorshkov was a close associate of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who appointed him commander in chief of the Soviet navy in 1956, a post he held until his death. Khrushchev initially charged Gorshkov with carrying out reductions in defense expenditures, but this policy ended

with the intensification of the Cold War following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, one of the great lessons of which for the Soviet leadership was the inadequacy of Soviet naval power. Khrushchev and his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, embarked on a considerable increase in defense expenditures, especially in the naval sphere, allowing Gorshkov to transform the Soviet Navy from essentially a coast-defense and submarine-centered force into one capable of projecting naval power around the globe. In 1967 Gorshkov was promoted to admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union, the naval equivalent of marshal of the Soviet Union.

Gorshkov oversaw construction of the Soviet Navy's first aircraft carriers and of new nuclear submarines and battle cruisers comparable to Western designs. His theories of naval tactics and strategy were embodied in his major book, *The Sea Power of the State*, in 1976. Gorshkov died in Moscow on May 13, 1988.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Crimea Campaign; Soviet Union; Soviet Union, Navy

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Gort, Lord

See Vereker, John Standish Surtees Prendergast

Gott, William Henry Ewart "Strafer" (1897–1942)

British Army general. Born on August 13, 1897, in Leeds, England, William Henry Ewart Gott was educated at Harrow and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. Commissioned into the King's Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC) in February 1915, Gott fought in France during World War I, where he was wounded, awarded the Military Cross, and taken prisoner. Gott continued in the army after the war, serving in the 13th London Regiment. He was promoted to major in January 1934 and saw service in India. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1938, Gott commanded a battalion of the KRRC.

In 1940, Gott was promoted to brigadier and appointed as a staff officer in Major General Percy Hobart's Mobile Force in Egypt, which was rapidly developed into an armored division. As commander of the Support Group of the 7th Armoured Division, Gott took part in Operation COMPASS (December 7, 1940–February 7, 1941), and in May 1941 he led the composite armored strike force for Operation BREVITY, the first Allied attempt to relieve Tobruk (April 1941–January 1942). Gott was then promoted to major general and given command of the 7th Armoured Division, which he led with great daring during the November 18–December 30, 1941, Operation CRUSADER.

As with most other British officers, Gott—an infantry officer—initially failed to comprehend the concept of mobile mechanized warfare. However, on the basis of his experience fighting the Germans, who coordinated antitank guns, artillery, and infantry with their tanks, Gott suggested using 25-pounder field artillery to support British tanks. He was primarily responsible for the belated British policy of breaking down the traditional and rigid divisional organization into combined all-arms brigade groups, which became standard throughout the British Army.

Gott built a reputation as a brilliant and energetic armored commander, and he was widely recognized as knowing more about the desert than any other senior British officer. Certainly he was one of the most inspiring commanders in the Middle East theater. Gott had an unrivaled knowledge of the exigencies and possibilities of desert warfare and a reputation for a lightning-quick grasp of a situation and a faculty for making rapid decisions. A legend in the desert fighting, Gott was known as a "British Rommel," tirelessly roaming the battlefield to rally and drive on the shaken troops.

Promoted to lieutenant general in 1942—one of the youngest officers of that rank in the British Army—Gott took command of XIII Corps and led it through the battles at Gazala (May 26–June 13, 1942) and Mersa Matrûh

(November 7, 1942). His reputation was not tarnished during the British withdrawal to El Alamein. In August 1942, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill selected Gott to replace General Sir Claude Auchinleck as commander of the Eighth Army. Although Gott protested that he was tired and depressed by fatigue and defeat and would like nothing more than three months' leave in England to recuperate, he agreed to take on the new assignment.

On August 7, 1942, Gott flew to Cairo to assume his command. His aircraft was intercepted and attacked by a lone German fighter. Although his plane managed to land safely, Gott had been shot and killed. Churchill then appointed his second choice, Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery, as commander of the Eighth Army. Gott's death therefore had a great impact on succeeding events in the desert and subsequently in Europe.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Alam Halfa, Battle of; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; COMPASS, Operation; CRUSADER, Operation; El Alamein, Battle of; Gazala, Battle of; Mersa Matrûh, Second Battle of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; North Africa Campaign; Ruweisat Ridge, Battles of; Tobruk, Second Battle of

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Govorov, Leonid Aleksandrovich (1897–1955)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in the village of Butyrki, Kirov Oblast, on February 22, 1897, Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov was drafted into the Russian Army in 1916 during World War I. Commissioned from the Konstanin Artillery School in 1917, Govorov was then drafted into anti-Bolshevik forces commanded by Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak but deserted and joined the Red Army in 1920. During the Russian Civil War, Govorov

commanded an artillery battalion, but because he had served in Kolchak's forces, he was denied membership in the Communist Party until 1942.

Govorov attended staff schools, the Frunze Military Academy, and the General Staff Academy. He commanded an artillery corps in 1936 and, during the 1939–1940 First Finnish-Soviet War, served as the artillery commander of the Seventh Army. There he initiated the technique of using heavy guns for direct fire against fortifications. Govorov then commanded the Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy.

Following the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, Govorov commanded the Fifth Army in October 1941 in the defense of Moscow and was promoted to lieutenant general in November. He played an important role in the counterattack around Moscow of December 1941. Govorov then commanded the Leningrad Front from June 1942 to July 1945.

Promoted to colonel general in January 1943, to army general in November 1943, and to marshal of the Soviet Union in June 1944, Govorov broke the German siege of Leningrad, pursuing the Germans through the Baltic states. In February 1945, he took command of the 2nd Baltic Front. After the war, he headed the Leningrad Military District, and he was chief inspector of the Soviet Army from 1946 to 1947. Govorov later commanded the Air Defense Forces and became deputy minister of defense in 1954. He died in Moscow on March 19, 1955.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Finnish-Soviet War, First; Leningrad, Siege of; Soviet Union, Army

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Goya, Sinking of

See *Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben,* and *Goya,* Sinking of

Graziani, Rodolfo, Marchese di Neghelli (1882–1955)

Italian Army marshal. Born at Filettino near Rome on August 11, 1882, Rodolfo Graziani joined the Italian Army and served in Libya in 1914 before being posted to the Italian front during World War I. There he commanded a brigade, was wounded twice, and was promoted to major. A colonel at the end of World War I, Graziani earned a reputation as Italy's most successful colonial general.

Distinguishing himself in Tripolitania in the 1920s, for which he was promoted to brigadier general in 1923, Graziani was dispatched to Cyrenaica, where he conducted a brutal but effective pacification campaign against the Senussi during 1930–1932. Promoted to major general in 1930 and to lieutenant general in 1932, Graziani commanded a corps and then was appointed governor of Somalia in 1935. Graziani participated in the attack on Ethiopia in 1936 and destroyed the remnants of the Ethiopian army in February 1937.

Graziani's successes earned him promotion to marshal and viceroy of Ethiopia on the departure of Marshal Pietro Badoglio. His savage rule provoked a widespread insurgency, however. Graziani was severely wounded in an assassination attempt on February 29, 1937, and the Italian Army crushed the uprising only with great difficulty. The Italians employed poison gas and were guilty of other atrocities.

Graziani left Ethiopia in January 1938 and was made honorary governor of Italian East Africa. In October 1939, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini appointed Graziani army chief of staff, then ordered him to Libya to replace Italo Balbo, who was killed in an airplane crash on June 28, 1940.

Although the 250,000 Italian forces in North Africa vastly outnumbered the small British troop deployment there, Graziani refused to launch an offensive into Egypt, citing serious deficiencies in supplies and equipment. Infuriated by Graziani's timidity, Mussolini ordered him to attack. The subsequent tentative Italian offensive sparked a devastating British counteroffensive that drove the Italians from Cyrenaica in February 1941, and Graziani returned to Italy in disgrace and resigned from the army.

Because Graziani was the only general of note to remain loyal to the fascist regime after its collapse in 1943, that September Mussolini appointed him defense minister and chief of staff of the rump Italian Social Republic. Graziani spent the remainder of the war attempting unsuccessfully to rebuild the army in an atmosphere of intensifying civil warfare and German domination. In 1950, Graziani was sentenced to 19 years in prison for war crimes, but he was released after only a few months. He then headed the neo-fascist Italian Socialist Movement. Graziani died in Rome on January 11, 1955.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; Balbo, Italo; Italo-Ethiopian War; Italy, Army; Mussolini, Benito; North Africa Campaign

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Great Britain

Island nation situated off the northwestern coast of continental Europe. The British Isles (which included England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) encompass some 95,000 square miles of land; however, on the eve of World War II, the British also reigned over a far-flung empire that encompassed many thousand more square miles in various portions of the world. The metropolitan population (British Isles) in 1939 was approximately 47.76 million. Great Britain borders the English Channel to the South (immediately beyond which lies France), the Atlantic Ocean to the west and north, and the North Sea to the east.

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain headed a coalition republican government on the outbreak of war; Great Britain was then, as it is now, a constitutional monarchy.

When Britain declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, the public mood was one of resignation rather than the enthusiasm that had greeted entry into World War I. Indeed, during the period September 1939–May 1940, the so-called Phony War, there was a rather nonchalant attitude toward the war. The nation had been battling the worldwide economic depression, and although the government had belatedly begun rearmament, much of the economy remained stagnant, and unemployment was high. Britain sustained few casualties in the early fighting, although the war was brought home by the mass evacuation of children from the cities, especially London, and the imposition of blackouts at night. On the whole, however, domestic life was not much disturbed.

Although Parliament passed an Emergency Powers Act in September 1939 granting the government control of the economy, Chamberlain sought a more limited effort than was essential to bring victory. Aerial attack was a great concern, and the government endeavored to relocate families, especially those in London, to rural areas of the country. But Britain was slow to mobilize its assets for the war, especially its land forces. In the spring of 1940, Britain was still producing civilian automobiles, and unemployment was at 1 million people. Not until the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940 did the government and the people discover the true seriousness of the situation.

The Allied debacle in Norway precipitated a political crisis. Despite the fact that the Conservatives held a large majority in Parliament, Prime Minister Chamberlain was forced from office on May 10, 1940, the same day the German Army invaded France and the Low Countries. Former first lord of the admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill became prime minister.

Completely committed to total victory, Churchill was one of history's great war leaders. Perhaps more at home in the 19th century as far as spheres of influence and his attitude toward colonialism were concerned, Churchill was both eloquent and effective in rallying the British people behind the war effort. Flashing his famous "V for victory" sign, he later took it on himself to visit the bombed-out areas of London. To the rest of the world, Churchill was the embodiment of British pluck and resolve.

Despite the efforts of his service chiefs to keep him at arm's length, Churchill insisted on a hands-on approach to the war, often intervening in military matters. The one sin for Churchill was inaction, but his decisions

often had deleterious effects. Churchill also took a lively interest in scientific developments, in code breaking, and in a wide range of schemes and gadgets that might be employed against the Axis powers.

Early on, Churchill developed a close relationship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, but the British leader's vision of the world, in which Britain was a major imperial power, was fading. Churchill's influence over strategy also waned in the course of the war as the military strength of the United States grew dramatically vis-à-vis that of Great Britain.

With the German invasion of the west in May 1940, all the "phoniness" of the war disappeared. The government rapidly expanded the Emergency War Powers Act of the year before, giving it "complete control over persons and property." The nation survived the debacle of the German conquest of Western Europe and the subsequent Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), thanks to the English Channel, the Royal Navy, and the Royal Air Force (RAF). Citizens were proud of their defiant stand against Germany—what Churchill referred to as the nation's "finest hour." Despite depredations by Axis submarines, Britain continued to access world resources, and the next year both the Soviet Union and the United States entered the war on its side, ensuring an eventual Allied victory.

With the nation at last committed to total war, economist John Maynard Keynes supervised a survey of British resources. Completed in 1941, it greatly aided the government in assuming the direction of the entire economy. The government introduced strict price controls and rationing and mobilized its civilian population fully for the war effort. The National Service (Armed Forces) Act of December 2, 1941, authorized conscription of all males ages 18 to 50 for the military, industry, or other national service. In June 1944, some 22 percent of adults were in the military and another 33 percent were in civilian war work. Women also played a key role; by 1944 they comprised 37.9 percent of the civilian labor force.

The British government enjoyed great success in increasing its production of armaments. In 1940, for example, Britain produced more aircraft than Germany (15,049 to 10,249). Labour Party member Ernest Bevin was a highly effective minister of labor. There was little unrest among British workers, especially as burdens were seen to be shared and the standard of living was not seriously depressed.

A Women's Voluntary Services stall in Kingston upon Thames, Surrey, in southeast England, where scrap metal was turned in to be melted down for use in Britain's war industry, June 1940. (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

About half of national resources went into the war effort as exports dropped off and imports, especially of food, rose. The government sharply raised taxes to avoid as much borrowing as possible. The basic tax rate was 50 percent, whereas excess business profits were taxed at 100 percent. Some called this tax policy "war socialism." Without Lend-Lease aid from the United States and assistance from Commonwealth nations, however, it would have been difficult for Britain to survive.

Britain suffered far less material damage than most other warring states. It sustained in the war 244,723 military and 60,595 civilian deaths. But Britain's massive wartime effort, the expenditure of capital at home, the recall of overseas investment, the disruption of trade, and deficit spending all hastened a national economic decline already in progress. The hardships of war that imparted the sense of a shared national effort also heightened interest in reform at the end of the war. As early as 1942, the Beveridge Report called for establishment after the war of a minimum income level, medical

insurance, and cradle-to-grave security for all citizens. Even during the war, Parliament extended to the entire population the right to a secondary school education.

Popular interest in wide-ranging reform was not understood by Churchill, who focused almost exclusively on the war, but this mood led the Labour Party leadership to demand elections after the defeat of Germany in May 1945. Held in July 1945 while the war against Japan was still in progress, the elections produced a surprising Labour upset; the party won 393 of the 640 seats in the House of Commons. In a nearly seamless transition, Labour leader and Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee replaced Churchill in the midst of the Potsdam Conference.

Although the United Kingdom experienced the exhilaration of victory, the country was hard-hit economically and socially. Indeed, to finance long overdue social legislation, the Labour government was forced to cut many other areas. The government also began a program of retrenchment abroad, and this meant giving full independence to much of the British Empire—India being the most dramatic example. The Labour government also soon determined that Britain could no longer continue as the world's policeman, and by 1947 it had largely passed that burden to the United States.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Armaments Production; Attlee, Clement Richard; Bevin, Ernest; Blitz, The; Britain, Battle of; Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; France, Battle for; Great Britain, Air Force; Great Britain, Army; Great Britain, Navy; Lend-Lease; Norway, German Conquest of; Potsdam Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Document 3; Document 154

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Great Britain, Air Force

The future of the Royal Air Force (RAF) appeared bleak at the end of World War I. With extensive personnel and aircraft reductions, the RAF's existence as an independent service remained in doubt until the appointment of Major General Sir Hugh Trenchard as chief of the Air Staff in January 1919. As dogged as he was visionary, Trenchard proved the viability of the third service, and by the mid-1920s he secured the RAF's future. In search of a mission, the RAF proved invaluable in imperial policing, especially in Somaliland, Aden, Palestine, India, and Iraq.

Growth in force size was slow, however, because of economic difficulties and an ever-shrinking defense budget. Of the 52 squadrons approved in 1923, only 42 had been established by 1934. In 1935 the transition to monoplane designs began, a process resulting in the most successful British fighter aircraft of the early war years. They were the Hawker Hurricane designed by Sydney Camm, which entered service in 1937, and the Supermarine Spitfire, designed by Reginald Joseph Mitchell, which appeared in 1938. In 1936, future manpower needs were addressed with the establishment of the RAF Volunteer Reserve. By January 1939, the RAF numbered 135 squadrons.

Despite advancements in fighter types as defense against strategic bombers, the prevailing attitude throughout European air services reflected the airpower theories of such visionaries as Brigadier General Billy Mitchell in the United States and Giulio Douhet in Italy, both of whom argued the primacy of the bomber. To overcome the loss of strategic mobility, a difficulty that was suffered by the armies of the Western Front in World War I, Britain embraced the concept of strategic bombing. This concept was based on the theory that long-range bombing would inevitably undercut an opponent's will and civilian morale as well as cripple his economic ability to wage war.

The beginning of World War II in September 1939 found the RAF considerably better prepared than it had been only four years earlier. The Bomber Command order of battle included 54 squadrons equipped with Bristol Blenheims, Vickers Wellingtons, Armstrong Whitleys, and Handley Page Hampdens. The critical weakness lay in the match between air strategy and the instruments of war available in 1939. The RAF had no heavy bomber capable of delivering the crippling physical and economic blows necessary for strategic bombing success. Not until the Handley Page Halifax heavy bomber entered service in late 1940 did Bomber Command possess a heavy bomber that could carry the air war deep into enemy territory.

Fighter Command entered the war considerably better prepared in terms of equipment capability. The 35 home-based fighter squadrons with first-line Hurricanes and Spitfires were enhanced by a series of coastal radar stations known as Chain Home. Although relatively primitive, the radar network soon proved robust and difficult for the German Luftwaffe to destroy. Thus, with a total of 1,466 aircraft, of which roughly 1,000 were first-line aircraft, the RAF faced Reichsmarshal Hermann Göring’s Luftwaffe.

A Royal Air Force Handley Page Halifax III heavy bomber, January 28, 1944. Flown by other air forces during the war as well, the Halifax served in a variety of roles and could carry 13,000 pounds of bombs. (Charles E. Brown/Royal Air Force Museum/Getty Images)

The first months of the war can best be characterized as a sparring match of mainly frustrated attempts by the RAF to attack German Navy warships. In

France, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, commander in chief of Fighter Command, insisted on sending only squadrons for the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) that were equipped with older, less robust aircraft such as the Gloster Gladiator. He feared losing first-rate aircraft and stripping home defense of fighting capability. Despite Dowding's conservatism, the RAF lost nearly 1,000 aircraft in the Battle for France, half of them fighters.

The Luftwaffe had high hopes of quickly dispatching the undermanned and outgunned RAF when, as a precursor to invasion, it launched Operation ADLERANGRIFF (EAGLE ATTACK), Germany's main air offensive against Britain, on August 8, 1940. However, Dowding's prewar innovations soon showed their worth. Fighter Command employed the group/area command-and-control system, in which each group was subdivided into sectors encompassing forward and primary airfields. Initially, Groups 11 and 12 covered the country. They were later further divided into four groups. Within each sector and group, an operations room controlled activities; the whole enterprise was coordinated at Fighter Command Headquarters.

Connected by telephone to the Chain Home system and the Observer Corps, the command-and-control system allowed for a reaction to a raid in a matter of minutes, with an appropriate number of aircraft being vectored to target. The system allowed Fighter Command to husband resources, identify incoming raids, scramble appropriate units, vector aircraft to target, and essentially ambush incoming German raids. This combination—all due in large measure to the prewar efforts of Dowding—proved to be the decisive factor that led the United Kingdom to win the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain.

In the first phase of the Battle of Britain, the Germans sought to draw the RAF into the air and destroy its fighting strength by attrition. By late August that strategy had failed, and the Germans turned to destroying British airfields south of the Thames. This far more dangerous threat to RAF viability took a great toll on RAF men and machines by early September. Dowding estimated that three more weeks of such assaults would destroy Fighter Command's ability to mount any viable defense.

Then on the night of August 24, German bombers were dispatched to strike an oil storage depot near London. Their navigation was faulty, and they dropped their bombs on London. Churchill immediately ordered the bombing of Berlin on the night of August 25. One hundred three British aircraft took

off that night for Germany, 89 of them for Berlin. Only 29 bombers actually reached Berlin because of clouds and poor navigation equipment. The raid was certainly not a success, but it led Adolf Hitler to order a concentration on London. The Luftwaffe's primary target became the destruction of London rather than the vastly more important RAF airfields and production facilities.

The shift to bombing London on September 7 allowed Fighter Command to repair airfields and facilities. For the next several months, British cities suffered through an almost nightly bombing campaign dubbed "The Blitz," a failed strategy to attack civilian morale. Although the Chain Home radar network did not operate especially well at night, improved radar and night fighters, including the Bristol Beaufighter, proved capable of challenging German night bombing, and German losses mounted. On September 17, 1940, Hitler canceled Operation SEE LION (the cross-Channel invasion of England), and by May 1941 the air assault abated. Of the more than 3,000 pilots who flew in the RAF in the Battle of Britain, some 500 died in combat.

In the initial stages of the war, the RAF had been loath to attack German industrial targets, despite the doctrine of strategic bombing. During the battles for France and Britain, Bomber Command had been reduced to attacking German shipping and to invasion force transport. Some successful raids against Luftwaffe airfields occurred with good results. The turning point for the strategic air campaign occurred on the night of September 23, 1940, when 84 bombers attacked Berlin. Although bomb damage and RAF losses were minimal, RAF's practice had commenced night bombing first industrial (especially oil) and infrastructure and later civilian targets.

In 1942 the Avro Lancaster heavy bomber arrived in numbers. Having a range of more than 1,600 miles and capable of carrying 22,000 pounds of bombs, the Lancaster was Britain's mainstay heavy bomber of World War II and enabled Bomber Command to carry the air war deep into Germany. The Lancaster Mark II, which appeared in 1943, had a range of 2,250 miles and could carry 14,000 pounds of bombs. However, night navigation and target identification proved highly problematic. With no visual reference aids at night, bomber crews relied on Pathfinders. First fielded in August 1942, Pathfinder aircraft flew ahead of the formations, identified targets, and dropped color-coded marker flares.

As the war progressed, electronic navigation improved, including the relatively primitive radio set known as Gee, followed by the more

sophisticated blind-bombing device called Trinity. The latter was a precursor of the advanced Oboe system, which employed a ground-distance measuring station. The H2S system provided a radar display indicating prominent geographic features such as rivers, coastlines, and urban structures, thus providing the hitherto missing navigational landmarks.

Night-bombing accuracy always suffered compared with the daylight assaults carried out by the B-17s and B-24s of the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) Eighth Air Force beginning in 1943. To counter the night bombing, the Luftwaffe developed efficient night fighters and relied on massed antiaircraft artillery. When the Blitz ended, Bomber Command increased the intensity of night strategic bombing. Three hundred bombers took part in a night raid on Hamburg on May 8, 1941.

On February 22, 1942, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris assumed command of Bomber Command. An energetic and enthusiastic advocate of terror bombing, Harris resolved to bludgeon Germany into submission. Night bombing of industrial targets increased immediately. To underscore the new attitude (and the advantage of the Lancasters with improved electronic navigation and targeting gear), Harris ordered the first 1,000-bomber raid, an attack on the German city of Köln (Cologne) on May 30, 1942.

Simultaneously, the newly fielded and capable De Havilland Mosquito quickly established itself as an extraordinary melding of mission capabilities, including reconnaissance, bomber, fighter-bomber, and night fighter aircraft. Under Harris, British strategic night bombing increased in intensity, capability, and destructive force for the next three years.

Italy’s entry into the war on June 10, 1940, found the RAF in the Middle East and Mediterranean dispersed over 4 million square miles of mainly desolate and hostile terrain. Its 300 first-line aircraft were organized into 29 operational squadrons. Most of the aircraft represented previous generations of fighters. Whereas this was suitable for imperial policing against tribesmen and ill-organized rebels, the Italian Air Force and later the German Air Force presented a difficult problem. The Italians could send up to 1,200 additional aircraft from Sicily and Italy to augment the 500 already in Africa.

With imperial strategic interests threatened, notably the tenuous India–Far East supply line through the Suez Canal, Britain embarked on rapid air and troop reinforcement. Because few aircraft could make the journey completely by air, a scheme developed for shipping aircraft by sea to the Gold Coast.

The planes then made a difficult flight across Africa to Egypt. Gradually, the Desert Air Force established air superiority in North Africa and aided Field Marshal Archibald Wavell's advance through Libya. Additionally, Malta, a linchpin of British Mediterranean power, was heavily reinforced. The island and its RAF garrison withstood furious, concerted Axis air assaults.

With the injection into North Africa in February 1941 of German ground forces supported by the Luftwaffe, the air advantage temporarily swung back to the Axis. As more Hurricanes, Spitfires, and American-made Curtiss P-40E Kittyhawks arrived, the Desert Air Force slowly overwhelmed the Axis air forces. By the time of the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942), RAF aircraft outnumbered Axis aircraft by 1,200 to 690. Because it had more aircraft and was reinforced by top-of-the-line fighters and because many of its pilots were veterans of the Battle of Britain, the RAF gained air superiority and contributed heavily to the eventual Allied North African victory.

The war effort of the RAF Coastal Command is often overlooked, yet it played a tremendous part in subduing the submarine threat and keeping the sea lifeline open. In the early months before Germany could mount a credible U-boat threat, the RAF concentrated maritime defense efforts against enemy commerce raiders. With only 19 home-based squadrons operating outdated aircraft, Coastal Command could do little more than close-in coastal patrol. As equipment and numbers improved, particularly with the arrival of the Short Sunderland and the American B-24 Liberator, Coastal Command's reach extended to practically the entire world. By late 1940, Coastal Command aircraft had begun mine-laying operations and raids on the coast of France and in the North Sea.

By 1941 the German submarine threat intensified, and Coastal Command took up the challenges of shipping protection in the approaches and submarine hunting. The most dangerous area lay in a reconnaissance gap halfway across the Atlantic that land-based aircraft could not reach. In this area, U-boats inflicted great casualties until the wide-scale employment of the Liberator, which operated from bases in Scotland, Iceland, and Canada and closed the gap in aerial coverage. Additionally, new airborne radar, the ASV, improved air-dropped depth charges, and the organization of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces into hunter-killer groups of combined air and ship units all contributed to the growing effectiveness of ASW air operations.

By late 1943 the Battle of the Atlantic had been won, and Coastal Command had played a major role in that victory. Of German U-boat losses in the Atlantic, 55 percent are believed to have been the result of air attack (although many of these losses were to aircraft flown from escort carriers). A further 19 percent of U-boat losses were the result of combined aircraft-warship actions.

In short, the RAF grew from a relatively small force wedded to strategic bombing and imperial policing in the early 1930s to a highly capable multimission force by the end of the war. Aircraft design advanced measurably with attendant gains in effectiveness and lethality. By 1943, the RAF deployed thousands of aircraft to every theater of operations and simply wore down the enemy through superior technology and weight of numbers. Advances in technology—particularly bomber navigation, targeting, and ASW radar—far outstripped Axis technological development, giving the RAF not only a decisive quantitative advantage but also a qualitative advantage by 1943.

In many respects, the RAF had established itself by 1945 as a coequal partner with the Royal Navy in defense of the British Empire and home islands. Certainly, the RAF consumed a huge portion of Britain's war economy, and its role and sacrifice in the war cannot be discounted. Fighter Command saved the nation in 1940, and Coastal Command challenged and eventually helped nullify the U-boat maritime trade threat. Although the effectiveness and morality of the strategic bombing offensive may be debated, its destruction of key German industrial targets, notably those of oil production and transportation, contributed significantly to the eventual Allied victory.

From an initial 175,692 personnel in the RAF, including the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), on September 1, 1939, the RAF reached a peak of 1,079,835 personnel of all ranks, branches, and nationalities (including Allied personnel serving in the RAF and imperial/dominion forces) by May 1, 1945. Of that number, 193,313 served as aircrew. The RAF had 9,200 aircraft of all types in all theaters in an operational status as of May 1, 1945.

The cost was high, however. Relative to all other British services and branches, the RAF suffered the greatest personnel losses. From 1939 to 1945, the RAF lost 70,253 personnel killed or missing. Bomber Command flew 372,650 sorties, losing 8,617 aircraft and 47,268 men killed in combat or

taken prisoner and a further 8,305 killed in training accidents. Deaths from other causes cost Bomber Command ground crews and WAAFs a further 1,570 deaths. Fighter Command lost 3,690 aircrew killed in action and 1,215 seriously wounded.

STANLEY D. M. CARPENTER

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Production of; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Atlantic, Battle of the; Blitz, The; Britain, Battle of; Camm, Sir Sydney; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Convoys, Allied; Depth Charges; Douhet, Giulio; Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere; Dresden, Air Attack on; El Alamein, Battle of; Egypt; Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Harris, Sir Arthur Travers; Hunter-Killer Groups; Köln, Raid on; Malta; North Africa Campaign; Pathfinders; Radar; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Great Britain, Army

For many of the British Army's commanding officers who had served as infantry subalterns during World War I some 20 years earlier, the events of September and October 1939 must have conjured up a powerful sense of déjà vu. Then, as in 1914, a small expeditionary force of two corps assembled to

take up position on the left of the French line in Flanders, awaiting the inevitable German advance across the Belgian plain. Decades-old plans for entrenchment and the tactics of a static war of attrition were dusted off and reissued.

However familiar the first months of World War II may have been to these veterans, though, their army's war was to take a dramatically unexpected turn less than a year later when the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was ignominiously ejected from the continent after only a few weeks of sharp, mobile combat. They were not to return for another four years. Of the seven army-strength formations raised by Britain during the period 1939–1945, only one, the Second Army, was to fight in Northwestern Europe again. The bulk of Britain's land operations were conducted far from northwestern France—in the Western Desert of North Africa; in Sicily and Italy; in the Balkan Peninsula; in Norway, Malaysia, Burma; and on the northeast frontier of India. Such a fast-paced global struggle required a different kind of army from that of World War I, with much greater technical specialization and more attention paid to the thorny problems of supply, communications, and control.

Although many key aspects of army life, such as the centuries-old regimental system, were carried forward mostly unaltered into World War II, the British Army of 1939–1945 was to a large degree a hurriedly reinvented institution. This ad hoc metamorphosis was a necessary reaction to the new conditions of warfare, for which the interwar years had inadequately prepared the army's leaders and structures.

After the demobilization that followed the 1918 armistice, the British Army had quickly returned to its traditional role as a small imperial security force made up of long-service regulars, the part-time home reserve of the Territorial Army, and a variegated auxiliary of colonial troops overseas. The problems of policing such trouble spots of the empire as Palestine and India were far removed from the new theories of mechanized breakthrough warfare being discussed by forward-thinking military strategists in Europe, and the army languished in its attachment to the bayonet and the quick-firing rifleman—important for crowd control in overseas colonies but less useful on the modern battlefield.

There were, in spite of this, significant attempts to bring the army up to date. Captain Basil Henry Liddell Hart's revised infantry manual stressed the

“expanding torrent” tactics of mobility and exploitation, and Colonel John Frederick Charles Fuller called for fresh thinking on tank warfare. The Experimental Mechanized Force established briefly in the late 1920s was the world’s first prototype for the armored division. But a combination of Treasury parsimony and knee-jerk opposition from the “Colonel Blimps” who dominated the army’s upper echelons prevented any profound reform until the eve of war, when—prompted by the dynamic but ill-fated Minister of War Leslie Hore-Belisha—the government finally accepted the need for rearmament funding and a peacetime conscription bill. The doubling in size of the Territorial Army in March 1939 and passage of the National Service Act a month later provided for hundreds of thousands of new recruits, but in the short term these developments only added to the administrative confusion of a force hurriedly trying to reequip for a new continental commitment in alliance with France.

At the outbreak of war, the army’s manpower stood at 897,000, the regular army and the Territorial Army having merged by government decree. Five regular infantry divisions were available in the United Kingdom for transportation to France. Two infantry divisions were deployed in Palestine suppressing the Arab revolt, the Western Desert Force (WDF) in Egypt had a fledgling armored division (another was forming in the United Kingdom and would eventually join the BEF), and the remainder of the empire was garrisoned either by individual battalions of regulars, units from the 300,000-strong Indian Army, or indigenous militia like the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in Kenya and Uganda.

From these modest beginnings, the government of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain proposed to recruit an army of 55 divisions (32 British, the remainder Indian and Dominion) for what it suggested would be at least a three-year war. There was as yet little clear plan as to where these divisions would be employed or when.

Political control of the armed forces was exercised during hostilities through the War Cabinet, a subset of the full cabinet that liaised with the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) representing the uniformed heads of the army, the Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force (RAF). The chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) was the army’s representative on the COS and, after the appointment of General Sir Alan Brooke in 1941, its permanent chairman.

The CIGS had a vice chief responsible for operations, plans, intelligence,

and training and a deputy chief in charge of general organization. With the adjutant general (personnel), quartermaster general (logistics), and master general of ordnance, these men collectively made up the Army Council, which was chaired by the secretary of state for war. The War Office retained nominal ministerial responsibility for the army. However, Winston L. S. Churchill, appointed prime minister and minister of defense in May 1940, preferred to deal with the uniformed chiefs directly, and so Whitehall was relegated to a purely administrative function.

Operational control in the United Kingdom was vested in General Headquarters (GHQ) Home Forces, and the country was divided into a series of command districts: Southeastern, Southern, Western, Northern, Scottish, Eastern, London, and Northern Ireland. Various overseas GHQs were established in the Middle East, East Africa, Persia, and Iraq and in other theaters according to the vagaries of war; the commander in chief of the Indian Army held sway across the Indian subcontinent. In 1939 and 1940, there was an unsuccessful attempt to create a viable Anglo-French Supreme War Council, but as the multinational character of the war developed with the entry of the United States in December 1941, command of British forces was increasingly delegated to Pan-Allied authorities such as the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the strategic level and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), and South-East Asia Command (SEAC) at the operational level.

The spiritual core of the army remained 5 guard and 64 line infantry regiments that performed a unique administrative, but nontactical, function. Following the pattern established in World War I, the army expanded not by creating new regiments but by adding battalions to existing regiments, some of which traced their origins to the 17th century. The heart of the regiment was an organizational depot located at the home barracks, while its component field battalions served scattered across the world in various brigade formations. It was uncommon for two or more of the same regiment’s battalions to serve closely together at the front.

Regimental tradition was a powerful reinforcement of esprit de corps, particularly as most regiments had a regional recruitment base. As the war progressed and manpower became scarcer, the territorial associations of each regiment were weakened, with a corresponding loss of group identity. The

remainder of the army was similarly divided into administrative units with regimental or corps-level designations but no tactical roles.

The Royal Armoured Corps was a composite of the old cavalry regiments, now mechanized, and the Royal Tank Regiment. The Royal Corps of Signals handled communications for the entire army down to individual battalion levels, where company signalers took over. Some of the services, such as the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, had traditions and battle honors every bit as distinguished as those of the infantry; others, such as the Reconnaissance Corps, were newly created and short-lived. The most important noncombat services were the Royal Army Service Corps, which carried supplies to troops in the field; the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC), responsible for the procurement and maintenance of equipment; and the Royal Army Medical Corps, which handled the sick and wounded.

The greater emphasis in World War II on technical and logistical matters caused a much larger proportion of manpower to be allocated to the "tail" (as opposed to the "teeth") of the army than was the case during World War I. Some support formations became so unwieldy that they gave birth to spin-off services of their own, such as the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, which was formed from the RAOC in 1942. Other notable services handled pay, military policing, spiritual affairs (the Royal Army Chaplains), intelligence, catering, physical training, and education—the last being accused by many conservative officers of foisting socialist ideology onto the rankers, precipitating the Labour Party's 1945 election victory. Eventually, the General Service Corps was created to process incoming recruits and to provide basic training and ultimate service allocation. The all-women's Auxiliary Territorial Service played an increasingly critical role in support of the regulars, as did the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Nursing Service and the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry on the medical front.

Tactically, each late-war British army was divided into four corps, each with two infantry divisions and one armored division. An infantry division of 18,000 men consisted of three brigades of three battalions apiece, an independent machine-gun battalion, three Royal Artillery (RA) field regiments, and an antitank and antiaircraft regiment plus the usual supporting attachments of signalers, engineers, and so on. Tank brigades were often temporarily attached to infantry divisions on an as-needed basis. The full-

strength infantry battalion had four rifle companies of three platoons apiece, a headquarters company, and a support company.

The structure of armored divisions changed markedly throughout the war as experiments to find the best mixture of tanks to other services evolved. In 1939, there were two armored brigades per division, each of three regiments, with a motorized infantry battalion, a field artillery regiment, and accompanying support units. By D-day (June 6, 1944), this had changed to a single armored brigade of three tank regiments (78 tanks per regiment) plus a fully mechanized infantry battalion in armored personnel carriers, a motorized infantry brigade in trucks, an armored reconnaissance regiment, one or two RA field regiments, and a plethora of antitank, antiaircraft, and other support formations, for a total of 343 armored vehicles at full strength.

Two forces existing out of the standard army structure, special services and the Home Guard, deserve mention. The special services or commando brigades were established after the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940) as Britain's only way of directly striking back at the Germans on the European continent. Although their hit-and-run tactics were of limited utility in the absence of an Allied second front, they played an important propaganda role in the testing years before Operation OVERLORD and later became a useful auxiliary to the conventional armies fighting in France and the Low Countries. Certain theaters of war spawned their own commando-like units, such as the Special Air Service in the Western Desert and Orde Wingate's Chindits in Burma. The Parachute Regiment, which by the end of the war was two divisions strong, was originally a part of special services.

The Home Guard, formed by a call for underage and overage volunteers after Dunkerque (May 26–June 4, 1940), was originally intended as a last-ditch militia in the event of a German invasion of the British Isles. As the threat of attack receded, the Home Guard's function adapted to take over security and antiaircraft duties in the home islands from the regular army and to act as a training service for those about to be conscripted. At its peak in 1943, there were 1.7 million home guardsmen in 1,100 battalions.

By the end of the war, more than 3.5 million men and women had served in the regular forces, with the peak of 2.9 million reached in 1945. Eleven armored, 34 infantry, and 2 airborne divisions had been created. Other imperial forces had expanded at an even greater rate: the Indian Army was over 2.5 million men strong by V-J day (August 15, 1945). Despite its early

muddles and campaign disasters, the army had matured to become one of the world's preeminent fighting forces and a signal contributor to the ultimate Allied victory. It had accomplished this with casualties of 264,443 killed, 41,327 missing, and 277,077 wounded.

ALAN ALLPORT

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Armored Warfare; Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Chindits; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Combined Chiefs of Staff; Commandos/Rangers; Dill, Sir John Greer; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Battle for; Great Britain; Great Britain, Air Force; Great Britain, Navy; Hore-Belisha, Isaac Leslie; Ironside, Sir William Edmund; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Vereker, John Standish Surtees Prendergast; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Wingate, Orde Charles

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Great Britain, Auxiliary Territorial Service

Women's unit of the British Army that provided ancillary and support services. The origin of the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) can be traced to the World War I Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), a quasi-military female support unit created in January 1917 with the aim of freeing

more men for fighting. Its 57,000 members served in clerical positions and as telephone operators, cooks, and waitresses, but its women “officers” were not granted military commissions or titles. It disbanded in 1921.

In September 1938 as European war seemed ever more likely, the British government decided to establish a women’s auxiliary army to be attached to the existing territorial army. The new ATS incorporated the venerable First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY), formed by Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener in 1907, whose members constituted most of the ATS Transport Section. ATS recruits received two-thirds of the pay of men. Initially, numbers were small, and most new enlistees served as cooks or storekeepers or in clerical positions. In the spring of 1940, 300 volunteered to accompany the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France, and ATS telephonists were among the last British service personnel evacuated from Dunkerque (Dunkirk), France (May 26–June 4, 1940).

With the April 1941 introduction of national civilian or military service for all childless and single British women aged between 18 and 30, ATS numbers rose dramatically, reaching 65,000 within six months. Only women between the ages of 17 and 43 were eligible to enlist, a provision waived for female WAAC veterans of the previous war. In July 1941, ATS enlistees were granted full military status, although no woman could be compelled to serve in situations where she might be subject to physical attack or to operate a weapon without her prior consent.

The range of ATS duties also expanded enormously. Among other duties, women functioned as mechanics, drivers, stevedores, orderlies, dental clerks, masseuses, photographers, munitions inspectors, and military police. They administered postal services and operated antiaircraft batteries, guns, and radar installations. Women were banned from active combat duty, but their ancillary functions were often physically hazardous, especially when they took part in overseas campaigns in Egypt, North Africa, Italy, France, and Asia.

A total of 198,000 women joined the ATS, of whom 335 were killed on duty. Another 302 were wounded, 94 went missing in action, and 22 became prisoners of war, a rate proportionately higher than that in either the women’s naval or aviation auxiliary services. In part, these figures reflected the fact that appreciable numbers of ATS women were recruited as agents for the

dangerous Special Operations Executive, which mounted covert operations in occupied Europe and elsewhere.

Although the ATS continued in existence after 1945, its numbers fell precipitously as all British armed forces experienced substantial postwar demobilization. In 1949 the ATS was disbanded, and its remaining members were absorbed in the new Women's Royal Army Corps, which in 1992 finally amalgamated completely with the British army. Among prominent British women who served in the ATS during World War II was the oldest daughter of King George VI, the future Queen Elizabeth II.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Great Britain; Great Britain, Army; Great Britain, Women's Auxiliary Air Force; Great Britain, Women's Royal Naval Service; Special Operations Executive; Women in World War II

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Great Britain, Navy

The somewhat disappointing performance of the Royal Navy during World War I led to considerable improvements in many tactical and operational areas by 1939. In that year, despite the treaty limitations of the interwar years, the Royal Navy was widely regarded as the world's dominant naval force. Significant improvements in tactical and operational doctrine occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, especially in surface action and night-fighting techniques. In contrast to the lack of offensive-mindedness with a reluctance to risk assets that characterized the Royal Navy in World War I, the Royal Navy of 1939 was imbued with a reinvigorated offensive spirit.

Weaknesses did hamper operations, notably the poor state of naval aviation, particularly when compared with naval aviation in the United States and Japan. Of the seven aircraft carriers in service at the start of 1939, only

the *Ark Royal* (laid down in 1935) could be considered modern. Four of the other six had been modified earlier from battleship or battle cruiser hulls. The five new fleet carriers under construction would not begin operational service until well into 1940.

Despite the lessons of antisubmarine warfare learned by 1918 and the need to protect merchant shipping and convoys, the Royal Navy had relatively poor commerce protection capabilities in 1939. Warship design had primarily emphasized coastal protection and submarine hunting, resulting in the short-range corvette ship type, which first came into service in 1939, and small escort destroyers. Although these ships had long-endurance capabilities, they proved unsuitable for open-ocean convoy escort primarily because of their size. Open-ocean convoy protection had been neglected, especially in training programs, and larger destroyers capable of transatlantic convoy protection were in short supply.

Despite the drawbacks, Britain managed to improve antisubmarine warfare capability and assets fairly quickly in response to the German U-boat threat. Although the smaller corvettes proved minimally effective for long-range midocean operations, their successor—the larger, more seaworthy frigate, particularly the River class dating from the 1940 building program—proved especially effective for convoy escort after 1942.

The initial German threat came from a three-part German offensive against commerce (*Handelskreig*) based on submarines, mines, and surface raiders. The Royal Navy quickly and effectively addressed each threat, although significant casualties did occur. Germany began the war with not many more submarines than it had at the start of World War I—just 51 operational U-boats, about half of them coastal vessels. The organization of British convoys in the Western Approaches, combined with the Straits of Dover mine barrage, resulted in 9 U-boats sunk by the end of 1939.

Although some vessels were lost to German mines, the navy reduced this menace with new technology, including degaussing against magnetic mines. Surface raiders threatened British commerce, particularly in the remote waters of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. Although Germans raiders such as the *Atlantis* and the pocket battleship *Graf Spee* provided some tense moments early in the war, by late 1941 most had been hunted down and sunk.

In April 1940, Germany attacked Norway primarily to secure its northern flank and the vital iron ore trade with Sweden. The Royal Navy opposed the

German landings, but a daring run of 10 German destroyers into Narvik subdued the Norwegian defenses. The combination of the entire German surface fleet with German land-based airpower quickly resulted in the occupation of Norway. Reacting to the German moves, a Royal Navy force of destroyers attacked the Germans at Narvik, but it suffered heavy losses. A follow-on attack three days later by a large force centered on the battleship *Warspite* devastated the Germans and severely hampered future German surface operations. Ultimately, however, the Royal Navy could not prevent German victory, especially in the face of effective enemy airpower. Additionally, the German fast battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* sank the fleet carrier *Glorious.*

The fall of France on June 25, 1940, and the loss of French ports heralded a realignment of Royal Navy forces, because prior to World War I, Britain had relied on France for the bulk of Mediterranean sea power. With the appearance of a hostile Vichy government, however, the navy established Force H based at Gibraltar under Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville and charged him with controlling the western Mediterranean. Force H carried out a distasteful duty in the bombardment of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kébir on July 3, 1940. Force H also played a central role in the destruction of the German battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941 as well as in hunting down and destroying Atlantic commerce raiders. But the defeat of France and the German occupation of much of that country allowed Germany to base long-range U-boats in Bay of Biscay ports such as Brest and Lorient. The toll on British and Imperial shipping dramatically increased by the autumn of 1940 as Adolf Hitler declared (on August 17, 1940) a total blockade of the British Isles.

By the autumn of 1941, the tide in the commerce war had turned in favor of Britain. Escort ships provided by the United States (50 World War I–era destroyers), and the increasing number of Royal Canadian Navy escorts, improved detection equipment (including radar, high-frequency direction-finding sets, and asdic, the latter named for Anti-Submarine Detection Investigating Committee of the British Naval staff and also known as sonar), implementation of a cohesive and effective enemy submarine tracking system based on radio intercepts and code breaking, and better cooperation with Royal Air Force Coastal Command all contributed to the reduction of the German submarine threat and effectiveness.

The British aircraft carrier *Ark Royal,* seen from an accompanying destroyer, ca. 1940. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Additionally, Germany's loss of the *Bismarck* and the relatively ineffective German effort to use heavy surface units to interdict the convoys to the northern Soviet Union across the Arctic above Norway all helped to lessen the threat to British maritime commerce by the middle of 1943. The Soviet convoys began receiving more robust escort following the destruction of the PQ 17 convoy in the summer of 1942. This enhanced escort included greater destroyer strength and escort carriers. The destruction of the battleship *Scharnhorst* off the Norwegian North Cape in December 1943 by a British battleship and cruiser force essentially ended the German surface threat to British and Allied maritime shipping.

Finally, despite a high number of U-boats operating in the Atlantic by March 1943 (up to 70 at any given time), the increasing skill of Allied submarine hunters and the closing of the "black hole" area south of Greenland, where air cover had not been previously available, meant a diminishing submarine threat and higher German losses in U-boats. Escort carriers provided air cover, while long-range maritime patrol aircraft (primarily modified B-24 Liberator bombers) made U-boat operations less effective. Additionally, hunter-killer escort groups attached to vulnerable convoys mauled the Germans.

In the Mediterranean, Italy's entry into the war in May 1940 required reinforcement of the theater naval forces under Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham. With some modernized older battleships and the new carrier *Illustrious,* Cunningham defeated the Italians in fleet engagements at Calabria on July 9, 1940, and Cape Matapan on March 28, 1941, and raided the Italian anchorage at Taranto on November 11, 1940, with naval aircraft. Cunningham stressed the improvement of antiaircraft protection, which paid off as the naval war in the Mediterranean increasingly devolved into attacks on shipping and naval vessels by Axis aircraft.

Faced with substantial damage to their supply convoys by British destroyers and submarines, the Germans dispatched U-boats to the Mediterranean in October 1941, resulting in the sinking of the battleship *Barham* and the carrier *Ark Royal.* At the fleet anchorage in Alexandria, the battleships *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant* were sunk at their moorings by Italian Maiale human torpedoes.

Faced with the loss of capital ships and the threat of enemy aircraft and submarine attack, British resources in the Mediterranean were stretched dangerously thin. Malta, the linchpin of Britain's efforts to hold the Mediterranean, came under horrendous air attack. Convoys to resupply and reinforce the island suffered substantial casualties, among them the aircraft carrier *Eagle.*

The entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 had a profound impact on the Mediterranean theater. Operation TORCH, the Allied landings in North Africa on November 8, 1942, resulted in the eventual destruction of Axis forces in North Africa. Reinforced and reconstituted, the Mediterranean Fleet conducted an ambitious and destructive assault on Italian shipping throughout 1942 and 1943 that crippled enemy resupply efforts. Cunningham admonished his sailors and airmen to "sink, burn and destroy: let nothing pass." By the end of 1942, Britain had again established maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean, despite substantial losses.

In the Pacific theater, Japan entered the war against Britain concurrent with the December 7, 1941, assault on the United States. Quickly overrunning Hong Kong, the Japanese Army forced the capitulation of Singapore, Britain's "Gibraltar of the Pacific." Faced with the loss of basing facilities, the Royal Navy withdrew from Southeast Asian waters, particularly after the loss of the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse*

to air attack on December 10, 1941 (Force Z under Admiral Sir Tom Phillips). The admiral's disregard of the air threat coupled with woefully inadequate antiaircraft protection greatly aided the land-based Japanese aviators, who easily sank both capital ships.

Following the crippling of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Japan's main striking force—Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi's First Air Fleet—wreaked havoc on the remnants of British sea power in the Indian Ocean in the spring of 1942. In carrier-based air attacks against British surface units, the veteran Japanese naval aviators sank detached portions of Admiral Sir James Somerville's forces based in Ceylon, including two cruisers and the carrier *Hermes.* However, Somerville avoided a general action and preserved his force as the Japanese withdrew to support their thrust into New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Naval action in the Pacific theater after May 1942 involved mainly U.S. and Australian naval units, but with the defeat of Germany in May 1945, the Royal Navy again engaged Japan with substantial forces.

Under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, the Pacific Fleet of four carriers (later joined by two additional carriers) and two battleships with substantial escort destroyers and cruisers arrived in the Pacific in March 1945, where they joined the Americans in the assault on the Japanese home islands and Okinawa (March–June 1945). Equipped with the U.S. F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair fighters, Royal Naval aviators did great destruction to the Japanese. U.S. aircraft proved greatly superior to earlier British Seafire (modified from the Spitfire), Martlet, Fulmar, and Sea Hurricane models. The heavily armored British carrier decks proved worthwhile as a defense against Japanese kamikaze aircraft (the lightly armored U.S. carriers suffered more extensive damage).

From strategic and operational viewpoints, the Royal Navy performed exceptionally well in the war. Although losses were heavy (1,525 warships of all types, including 224 major surface units of which 5 were battleships or battle cruisers and 5 were fleet carriers, and some 50,000 personnel dead), the aggressiveness and risk-taking nature of senior and individual ship commanding officers overcame the tenacious and highly competent Axis opponents.

In the Atlantic, the Axis commerce warfare offensive failed to starve the country into submission or impede the arrival of overwhelming U.S. forces

and personnel. In the Mediterranean, the Royal Navy kept British and Imperial ground and air forces supplied and reinforced while simultaneously attacking the Axis supply lines to North Africa. In the Pacific, despite initial defeats by the Japanese, British sea power returned late in the conflict and helped the U.S. Navy carry the fight to the Japanese home islands.

As it had not done in the previous war, the navy at all levels showed exceptional ability to rapidly adapt to technological and methodical innovations and advances in doctrine, organization, and training. To man the new ships of more than 900 major combatants and the supporting shore establishment (training, research, logistics, support, and administration), by war's end Royal Naval personnel had increased from the prewar 129,000 to 863,500, which included 72,000 women in the Women's Royal Naval Service. In short, the navy vindicated itself following the disappointments of World War I. British sea power both kept Britain in the fight until the United States arrived in force and subsequently provided the domination needed to attack the Axis powers at all vulnerable points with little interference.

STANLEY D. M. CARPENTER

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Air Warfare, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Calabria, Battle of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; CATAPULT, Operation; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Crete, Battle of; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Depth Charges; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Dönitz, Karl; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Great Britain; Great Britain, Air Force; Great Britain, Army; Hunter-Killer Groups; Indian Ocean Campaign; Kamikaze; Malta; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Mine Laying, Sea; Nagumo Chūichi; Narvik, Naval Battles of; North Cape, Battle of; Norway, German Conquest of; Phillips, Sir Thomas "Tom" Spencer Vaughan; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Sinking of; *Royal Oak*, HMS, Sinking of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Sonar; Southwest Pacific Theater; Taranto, Attack on; TORCH, Operation; Two-Ocean Navy Program; WESERÜBUNG, Operation; Document 78

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Great Britain, Women's Auxiliary Air Force

Women's arm of the Royal Air Force that provided support services. The Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), an auxiliary branch of the Royal Air Force (RAF) with a mission to provide support services tailored to RAF needs, was established in September 1939. Its precedent was the Women's Royal Air Force (WRAF), which came into existence on April 1, 1918, during World War I and was disbanded exactly two years later.

Personnel of the British Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) performing maintenance work on a Westland Lysander liaison aircraft. (Getty Images)

On April 10, 1941, the WAAF was formally incorporated as an official part of the armed services of the British Crown. Theoretically, only women

aged between 18 and 43 could serve in the WAAF, but some members, especially those with World War I service credentials, were older, and in one case a young woman who managed to join at the age of 14 was allowed to remain. A total of 171,200 women served in the WAAF, 187 of whom were killed in service. Another 420 were wounded, and 4 went missing while on duty.

Although British women aged between 18 and 30 were subject to conscription for war work from 1941 onward, they were permitted to choose agriculture, industrial work, or the armed services. Even in the women's auxiliary units of the armed forces, moreover, no woman could be compelled to serve in a situation in which she might have to wield a weapon. As with their female naval counterparts, members of the WAAF had a particularly glamorous reputation, which their relatively smart uniforms and association with the much-admired pilots enhanced.

Although supposedly restricted to noncombat roles, WAAFs often had important responsibilities, especially when functioning either as radar plotters to track incoming hostile airplanes and warn of forthcoming air raids or as radar controllers directing formations of British fighters and bombers. Many young women relished the independence and freedom that such employment conferred on them. WAAFs also served in a wide variety of clerical and other support roles—as drivers and mechanics, for example—freeing up men for active duty. A small minority of women became pilots, although to do so they had to join the Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA) and become civilians. They were also restricted to ferrying and delivering airplanes and could not undertake combat duties.

Thousands of WAAFs served overseas in the Egyptian and North African campaigns and in Europe, controlling air operations as Allied forces advanced. Some WAAFs were also recruited for dangerous clandestine work in the Special Operations Executive, which mounted covert operations in countries occupied by Axis powers. Others took part in Ultra code-breaking operations at Bletchley Park. The British Dominions, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia all established similar women's auxiliary air forces.

In recognition of WAAF wartime contributions, the service remained in existence after World War II, although by 1950 only 517 of the wartime recruits remained in the service. In 1948, however, 14 WAAFs who were ex-ATA members became flying officers. In February 1949, the WAAF reverted

to its old name and once again became the WRAF, and in 1994 it finally merged completely with the RAF.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Bletchley Park; Great Britain, Air Force; Great Britain, Auxiliary Territorial Service; Great Britain, Women's Royal Naval Service; Special Operations Executive; Women in World War II

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Great Britain, Women's Land Army

The Women's Land Army (WLA) was a British wartime program to provide female laborers to help overcome labor shortages in agriculture. As war clouds gathered in the 1930s, British government officials realized that if war should occur, the country would require numerous additional workers. For agricultural work, officials made plans to find more laborers from a variety of sources including older and younger workers, seasonal labor from nearby towns, and, as the war progressed, prisoners of war. The most widely publicized effort, however, was the WLA.

In April 1938, the government asked Lady Gertrude Denman, the dynamic head of the Women's Institutes, to lead the new organization. Using the Women's Land Army formed in World War I as a guide, Lady Denman, her coworkers, and local authorities were able to launch a national recruiting campaign in the spring and summer of 1939. By the time the call came in September, more than 1,000 volunteers had signed up, and soon afterward WLA recruits began arriving at British farmsteads.

The "land girls," as they were called, had to be at least age 17 to join. They were primarily from cities and underwent four weeks of training. They

were then sent to individual farms or lived under supervision in hostels. They were given uniforms consisting of a green sweater, brown knee-length trousers, high black boots, a light brown overcoat, and a brown felt hat. The women usually worked 11-hour days and were to have half a day per week and Sundays off, but often that was impossible because of the nature of their jobs. They did all kinds of work, from weeding and threshing to cleaning ditches and milking cows. Some eventually became tractor drivers. They were paid the equivalent of about $3.50 per week, half of it for room and board.

Farmers at first were reluctant to hire WLA workers. By the spring of 1940, however, with the labor market tighter, farmers became more receptive. By the end of the year, 6,000 women were working in rural areas. The number reached a peak of 87,000 in July 1943, and a total of 250,000 had enrolled by war's end.

Shirley Joseph has written movingly about her life as a land girl. She recalled being interviewed and asked, among other things, whether she realized that cows had to be milked every day. She was then trained and sent out to work. Her first job was at Warborough farm in Oxfordshire, where she worked from 6:15 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and her most important task was to assist with morning and late-afternoon milking. On Wednesdays, she received a half day off and often used the time to hitchhike to her home nearby. She lived part of the time in a cottage with no electricity and no running water. Later she worked out of three different hostels, and although she did some milking, her main jobs were threshing and hoeing crops, which she described as hard work. Her experiences were probably typical.

The WLA gained increasing acceptance from the public, partly because it was well organized. Lady Denman and other WLA leaders gave talks over the radio about the WLA's service, kept local supervisors informed, and even published a magazine, *The Land Girl*, that was distributed to the workers. Denman was also able to enlist influential patrons. Queen Mary, for example, was a major supporter, and she employed land girls at one of her country estates. Although the WLA may not have played as large a role in solving the agricultural labor problem as its backers have claimed, it did help.

ALAN F. WILT

See also

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Great Britain, Women's Royal Naval Service

Women's arm of the British Royal Navy, reconstituted in 1939. The Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS) was first established in 1917 during World War I. Before the organization was disbanded on October 1, 1919, 6,000 British women had undertaken naval support duties, during the course of which 23 died.

In 1938, on the approach of another war, planning began to reestablish the WRNS. The organization was reconstituted in April 1939 under the direction of Vera Laughton Mathews. Enlistment was initially voluntary, but under the April 1941 Registration of Employment Order, all single and childless British women between ages 19 and 30 and not yet engaged in work "essential to the war effort" became subject to conscription and were offered the choice of factory work, service in one of the auxiliary service units, or enrollment in the Women's Land Army.

As with the other female auxiliary services, especially the Women's Auxiliary Air Force, the WRNS (its members were called "Wrens") constituted something of a prestigious and elite service. In the course of the war, 74,620 women enlisted in the WRNS; 102 were killed and 22 wounded. Government regulations prevented female civilian volunteers and military personnel from serving without their consent in hazardous circumstances in which they were liable to come under physical attack—manning antiaircraft guns, for example—nor could they be compelled to operate weapons. Even in the auxiliary armed forces, women were restricted to noncombat roles, and the primary function of WRNS members was perceived as releasing male naval personnel from shore jobs. As the war progressed, however, the WRNS

and other female auxiliary military units undertook an increasingly wide range of duties—more than 200 jobs by 1944.

Many served in clerical positions or as wireless telegraphers, electricians, fitters, radio mechanics, photographers, technicians, cooks, stewards, gardeners, dispatch riders, or stokers; others helped to plan and organize naval operations. Thousands served overseas, often in hazardous conditions. A small minority qualified as naval pilots, although, as with those in the quasi-civilian Air Transport Service, they were normally barred from combat duties and restricted to ferrying planes.

Thousands of women also enlisted in associated naval units, including the Fleet Air Arm, Coastal Forces, Combined Operations, and the Royal Marines. In all, 303 British women died during World War II while on active duty in the various naval services. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand established similar women's naval auxiliary services. British women's naval contributions were highly respected, and the WRNS became a permanent service arm in February 1949. In 1993, the WRNS disappeared as a separate unit when it became fully integrated into the Royal Navy.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Great Britain; Great Britain, Auxiliary Territorial Service; Great Britain, Navy; Great Britain, Women's Auxiliary Air Force; Women in World War II

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Greater East Asia Conference (November 5–6, 1943)

Conference convened by the Japanese government in Tokyo during November 5 and 6, 1943, which included representatives from China, the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, the Philippines, Burma, and Thailand. The “liberation” of Asian nations from Western colonial rule and the creation of a Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken, or Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was the official Japanese rationale for going to war with the United States and Britain in 1941. Suffering military reversals during World War II, the Tokyo government sought a political manifesto to secure the support of populations under Japanese military occupation. The Dai Tōa Kaigi, or Greater East Asia Conference, was intended as a counter to the Allied Cairo and Tehran conferences that took place around the same time.

Japanese foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru conceived the idea for the conference. He believed that Japan needed a powerful statement of policy goals to compete with British and American statements regarding the future of Asia. This explains the extent to which the declaration that conferees approved resembled the Allied Atlantic Charter.

The conference gathered leaders from throughout Japanese-occupied territory in Tokyo. Official delegates were Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei) from China; Zhang Qing-hui (Chang Ching-hui), president of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo); José Laurel, leader of the Philippines; Ba Maw, leader of Burma; and Prince Wan Waithayakon, representing Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram of Thailand. Subhas Chandra Bose, head of the Japanese-sponsored Free India Provisional Government, was also present as an observer. National leaders from Indonesia and Malaya were not invited because Japan secretly planned to annex these territories.

With Japanese prime minister General Tōjō Hideki chairing the proceedings, the delegates discussed the general war situation and political agenda. At the conference’s conclusion, the delegates adopted Dai-tōa kyōdō sengen, the Greater East Asia Declaration, which called for the establishment of a regional order based on the principles of coexistence and coprosperity, respect for mutual autonomy and independence, mutual respect of traditional cultures, promotion of economic interdependence, the abolition of racial discrimination, and open access by member nations to natural resources.

Although Japan granted Burma and the Philippines nominal independence, Japan’s continued occupation of Southeast Asia and its harsh exploitation of both the local populations and natural resources undermined

the Pan-Asiatic ideal of the declaration. A second conference was planned in 1944, but the deteriorating Japanese military situation rendered it impossible.

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See also

Atlantic Charter; Ba Maw; Bose, Subhas Chandra; Burma Theater; Cairo Conference; India; Japan; Manzhouguo; Netherlands East Indies; Shigemitsu Mamoru; Tehran Conference; Tōjō Hideki; Wang Jingwei

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Great Purges

Ostensibly an internal "cleansing" of the Soviet hierarchy in the middle to late 1930s, the Great Purges were in fact repressive measures taken to remove any and all potential threats to the continuance of the Communist Party and to control by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

Periodic purges were not unheard of in Soviet Russia after the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917. Most were directed at subordinate officials and low-ranking party members, who bore the brunt of policy failures, and they usually ended with expulsion from the party. The Great Purges (Yezhovshchina in Russian), however, were characterized by their focus on party and state elites, mass terror, and dramatic public show trials and "confessions" by the accused. Those purged were either executed or sentenced to hard labor in the Soviet gulag.

The Great Purges began in earnest with the assassination on December 1, 1934, of Sergei M. Kirov, Stalin's chief lieutenant in Leningrad. Kirov, it is alleged, received more votes than Stalin in the Central Committee elections during the Seventeenth Party Congress of 1934, as many party members desired Stalin's removal from his post as secretary-general. Kirov's assassin, Leonid V. Nikolaev, and 13 so-called accomplices were arrested, given a

sham trial, and executed on December 30. Eventually, 49 people were directly implicated in the alleged plot; all were shot. Supposedly these individuals implicated others, who implicated still others. Although never proven, there is considerable evidence that Stalin arranged Kirov's murder and then had those who carried out the deed executed to cover his tracks. In any case, Kirov's assassination became the justification for the Great Purges.

Beginning in 1936 in a series of show trials held in Moscow, numerous leading communists and old Bolsheviks—members of the former so-called Left and Right oppositions—were tried, convicted, and sentenced either to execution or to hard labor in the gulags (concentration camps). The spillover effect on the general population was horrendous, and the purge soon extended to the Red Army.

In June 1937, the secret summary arrest and trial of several Red Army leaders took place. Charged with Trotskyism and with conspiring with Germany and Japan, three of the five marshals of the Soviet Union—Michael N. Tukhachevsky, chief of the Soviet General Staff; Alexander I. Yegorov; and Vasily K. Blücher—were summarily tried and executed. The purges then descended to the lower echelons of the Soviet armed forces. In addition to the marshals, they claimed 14 of 16 army commanders, all 8 admirals, 60 of 67 corps commanders, 136 of 199 division commanders, and 221 of 397 brigade commanders. All 11 vice commissars of defense and 75 of 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, all military district commanders, and all air force commanders also were executed.

This devastating decapitation of the Soviet armed forces eliminated more than 75 percent of the senior officer corps, including the most aggressive, outspoken, and capable. Some observers consider the purge of the officer corps the chief cause of the disastrous performance of the Red Army early in the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which began on June 22, 1941.

Not all were executed or died in the gulags, however. Many survived to be rehabilitated in the wartime emergency. Some, such as Konstantin Rokossovsky, later a marshal of the Soviet Union, became national heroes. For others, the path to prominence was opened by the purges. Little-known regional commander Georgii K. Zhukov became chief of the Soviet General Staff in three years; during the same period, Nicholas G. Kuznetsov rose from cruiser commander to chief of the Soviet Navy.

At the same time that the great show trials were going forward, millions

of ordinary Soviet citizens simply disappeared without benefit of trial in what became known as the "Deep Comb-Out." Approximately 8 million people were arrested; 1 million were executed, and the rest were sent to the gulags.

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See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Stalin, Joseph; Soviet Union; Soviet Union, Air Force; Soviet Union, Army; Soviet Union, Navy; Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Grechko, Andrei Antonovich (1903–1976)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in the village of Golodayevka, Ukraine, on October 17, 1903, Andrei Antonovich Grechko joined the cavalry of the Red Army in 1919 and fought in the Russian Civil War. He joined the Communist Party in 1928 and graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1936. He then commanded a cavalry regiment and was chief of staff of the 36th Cavalry Division. He participated in the September 1939 invasion of Poland, and as a colonel he was assigned to the General Staff in Moscow just before Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, German invasion of the Soviet Union. Grechko next commanded the 34th Cavalry Division at Kharkov.

Promoted to major general, Grechko headed the V Cavalry Corps beginning in January 1942 and then the Eighteenth Army from October 1943 to January 1943, both on the Southern Front. Promoted to lieutenant general, he commanded the Fifty-Sixth Army in Ukraine until October 1943 and then was second-in-command of 2nd Ukrainian Front, where he developed

friendships with future Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. In December 1943, Grechko took command of the First Guards Army. Promoted to colonel general, he led this army for the rest of the war, helping liberate Kiev, the remainder of Ukraine, and Prague.

After the war, Grechko commanded the Kiev Military District from 1945 to 1953. Promoted to army general in March 1953, he was made commander in chief of Soviet troops in East Germany from 1953 to 1955, where he was in charge of putting down the June 1953 Berlin Uprising. Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955, he was then commander in chief of Soviet Ground Forces (1957–1960). Grechko was next first deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of Warsaw Pact Armed Forces from 1960 to 1967, when he became minister of defense. Grechko orchestrated the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. He died in office in Moscow on April 26, 1976.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Soviet Union, Army; Ukraine Campaign

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Greece

South European nation with a 1939 population of approximately 7.2 million. At that time, Greece was bordered to the northwest by Albania, to the north by Yugoslavia, to the northeast by Bulgaria, and by Turkey to the east. The Ionian Sea lies to the west of Greece, the Mediterranean to its south, and the Aegean Sea to the east. Much of mainland Greece is mountainous. Greece also includes a great many islands (today some 1,400, of which only 227 are populated), the largest of these being Crete.

Greece was drawn into World War II by Italy's invasion from Albania on October 28, 1940. Greek dictator General Ioannis Metaxas had sought to

maintain his nation's neutrality, but that policy ended when an Italian invasion began a Balkan campaign that drew in Britain as well as Germany and other Axis powers. The result of these developments was Axis control of the Balkans until the last months of the war. Greece suffered horribly in the war and continued to suffer during a costly civil war from 1946 to 1949.

In October 1940, without informing his ally Adolf Hitler, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini launched an invasion from Albania. Having both superior numbers and greater military hardware, Mussolini expected to complete the conquest before winter set in. The Greeks, however, resisted valiantly. They not only held the Italians but also went on the offensive and drove them back, while the British bombed Albania and neutralized the Italian Navy. Mussolini's invasion of Greece turned into a disaster from which neither he nor his regime recovered.

Determined to shore up his southern flank before he began an invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler stepped in. Metaxas died at the end of January 1941, and in April the führer sent the German Army against both Greece and Yugoslavia, quickly overwhelming both. Neither the courage of the Greeks nor British Army reinforcements sufficed to withstand the Luftwaffe and the panzers.

The Axis occupation of Greece involved German, Italian, and Bulgarian troops and lasted three years. It was a dark period in the history of a nation that had undergone much suffering since Roman times. The Germans set up a puppet government and insisted that the Greeks pay the full cost of the occupation, which resulted in catastrophic inflation. The Germans also requisitioned resources and supplies, with no concern for the fate of a population that, even in the best of times, was obliged to import most of its food. Famine and disease decimated Greece and killed perhaps 100,000 people in the winter of 1941–1942 alone. The suffering was such that British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill agreed—under pressure from the Greek government-in-exile and the United States—to partially lift the blockade so the International Red Cross might bring in food supplies. Greeks living in Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia also had to undergo forced Bulgarianization.

The flourishing Jewish community in Salonika was devastated in the Holocaust; fewer than 10,000 of an estimated 70,000 Greek Jews survived the war. The Greek underground fought back with sabotage and ambush and

tied down 120,000 Axis troops. In reprisal, the Germans and Italians burned whole villages and executed large numbers of Greek hostages for every Axis soldier slain.

Greek king George II and his ministers went into exile in Egypt with the retreating British forces in 1941. Almost immediately, Greek resistance groups formed. Of the various resistance movements that had appeared during the German occupation, the largest was the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, EAM), with the Greek People's Liberation Army (Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós, ELAS) as its military wing. Relations were strained between it and the National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos, EDES). Actual fighting broke out between the two groups in the winter of 1943–1944, although a truce was arranged in February 1944.

The communist-dominated EAM apparently enjoyed wider support than the nationalist underground. When the Germans pulled out of Greece, the EAM held the vast majority of the country. Greek society was now fractured into three factions: the monarchists, republicans, and communists.

At approximately the same time, in October 1944 Churchill journeyed to Moscow to meet with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Churchill struck a bargain with Stalin concerning predominance in various Balkan states, under the terms of which Britain was to have 90 percent predominance in Greece. The Greek communists, who had carried the brunt of resistance against the Axis and now controlled the majority of territory, understandably resented this imperial arrangement struck in Moscow and were unwilling to submit to it.

When the Nazis withdrew, George Papandreou, a left-of-center statesman, headed a government of national unity. Fearing the communist underground, however, he requested British troops, who began arriving early in October 1944. When the British called on the guerrilla forces to disarm and disband, the EAM quit the cabinet, called a general strike, and held protest demonstrations. In this serious situation, Churchill took the impetuous decision to fly with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to Athens on Christmas Day 1944. Although the government and the EAM reached accord early in 1945, it quickly broke down, and EAM members took to the hills with their weapons.

Civil war raged in Greece from 1946 to 1949 and was as costly as the tormented years of World War II. Although the communists were defeated,

unfortunately for Greece, further upheaval fanned by other nations and dictatorship lay ahead before true democracy could be achieved.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Balkans Theater; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; Greece, Air Force; Greece, Army; Greece, Navy; Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian; Metaxas, Ioannis; Papagos, Alexandros; Truman, Harry S.; Document 185

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Greece, Air Force

In 1940, Greece's Air Ministry administered the Royal Hellenic Air Force (Vassiliki Aeroporia). The navy controlled the naval cooperation squadrons, and the army controlled fighters, bombers, and ground-support squadrons. The Greek Air Force's modern aircraft were grouped into four fighter squadrons and three bomber squadrons. At the start of the war with Italy in October 1940, Greece deployed 216 first- and second-line aircraft of all types, including liaison. Greece also had about 60 obsolete aircraft dating back to World War I.

At the beginning of its invasion of Greece, Italy operated 187 modern aircraft from Albania, and it could also draw on hundreds of aircraft operating from Italy. The Greek Air Force was composed of a mélange of Czech, Polish, German, French, and later British aircraft. Greece had no reserves and was totally dependent on the British for resupply. Securing replacement parts was a nightmare, and the lack of parts meant that many aircraft became inoperable.

During 1940 and 1941, the Greek Air Force aggressively operated with some success in support of army operations on the Albanian front. As the

army advanced into mountainous Albania, however, flying distances became longer and more problematic, whereas Italian aircraft were able to operate closer to their bases. By the time Germany invaded Greece in April 1941, the Greek Air Force was down to 41 operational aircraft. Following the Axis victory at the end of April, the Greek government-in-exile maintained an air force of two fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron in the Mediterranean under British control.

JACK GREENE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Greece; Greece, Army; Greece, Navy; Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian

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Greece, Army

In October 1940, at the time of the Italian invasion, the Greek Army, commanded by General Alexandros Papagos, numbered some 430,000 men in 18 divisions. By April 1941, when the Germans invaded Greece, army strength was some 540,000 men. Each division numbered at full strength approximately 18,500 men, formed in three regiments of three battalions each.

Most of the divisions were organized along World War I lines and were lightly armed mountain divisions. The army had almost no tanks, although in the course of the fighting the Greeks captured some Italian L3 tankettes and formed a weak motorized division. The Greeks also had little in the way of antiaircraft artillery, and much of the army's equipment was also antiquated. Although the Greeks had few mortars, they possessed more machine guns and more effective heavy artillery than did the Italians. Greek supply services were poor, leading to much hardship among the troops in the mountains and during the winter.

In October 1940, when the Italian Army invaded from Albania, the Greek Army had four first-line divisions on the Albanian frontier. The Greek Army fought well against the Italians; in its counterattack, it expelled the Italian Army from Greece and penetrated into Albania. The Greeks were overwhelmed when the German Army entered the fighting in April 1941, however. During the 1940–1941 campaign, the Greek Army sustained 13,408 killed and 42,485 wounded. Some 9,000 soldiers were evacuated to Crete, and others escaped through Turkey to Egypt. Ultimately, the Greeks formed the 18,500-man Royal Hellenic Army, which fought under British command in the Middle East. It consisted of three infantry brigades, an armored car regiment, an artillery regiment, and the Greek Sacred Regiment, composed entirely of officers.

One brigade of the Royal Hellenic Army fought in the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942), but most of the force saw little action, the consequence of political infighting. A mutiny in 1944 led to the internment of much of the army, although part of it was used in nonoperational duties. A newly formed unit, the 2,500-man Third Mountain Brigade, did fight with distinction in the 1943–1945 Italian Campaign, where it was known as the Rimini Brigade.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

El Alamein, Battle of; Greece; Greece, Air Force; Greece, Navy; Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian; Italy Campaign; Papagos, Alexandros

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Greece, Navy

In late 1939, the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) was a relatively small force of mostly obsolescent warships, some of which dated to before World War I. The navy consisted of the armored cruiser *Giorgios Averoff* (built in Italy in 1910), 10 destroyers (6 modern and 4 outdated), 6 modern submarines, 1 old cruiser/minelayer, 10 old torpedo boats, and an assortment of auxiliary vessels. No warships were under construction, although the RHN planned to take delivery of two additional (British-built) destroyers. As well as possessing generally obsolete equipment, the RHN suffered from the national political schism of the 1930s that brought purges of the officer corps.

In the mid-1940, Italy began a period of harassment that included air attacks on Greek ships at sea and the sinking by the Italian submarine *Delfino* of the anchored cruiser/minelayer *Helle* on August 15, 1940. Once Italy declared war on Greece on October 28, 1940, the RHN was active in supporting the army and in conducting destroyer sweeps in the Ionian Sea.

The RHN experienced serious losses from air attacks following the April 1941 German invasion. The surviving Greek ships, their bases seized by German troops, withdrew first to Crete and then to Egypt, where they were integrated into the British Royal Navy. The Royal Navy had operational control of the Greek ships, and the RHN was responsible for their administration. The Greek ships were in need of refit and modernization, and they received from the Royal Navy modern fire-control systems and antiaircraft and antisubmarine armaments. The British also transferred to the RHN a variety of destroyers, corvettes, submarines, and smaller craft, including minesweepers.

RHN ships then served throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Beginning in 1942, the RHN experienced nearly continual political unrest concerning the composition of the Greek government-in-exile. This culminated in the April 1944 mutiny of virtually the entire RHN at Alexandria and Port Said. Although the mutiny was crushed, the Greek ships were out of action for some four months while units were purged of mutineers.

Following the German retreat from the Balkans, in October 1944 the RHN returned to Greek waters. It spent the remainder of the war reestablishing itself in its home territory, opening ports, engaging communist

groups that resisted the return of the government from Egypt, and containing German garrisons on the larger Aegean islands.

MARK C. JONES

See also

Greece; Greece, Air Force; Greece, Army; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Greece Campaign, German (April 6–30, 1941)

Important Balkan theater campaign that pitted Greek and British Empire forces against German and Italian forces. In the spring of 1941, German leader Adolf Hitler sent forces into Greece. His decision was prompted by his desire to eject the British from the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean; protect his southern flank—especially the Romanian oil fields at Ploieşti—before launching the June 22, 1941, Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union; and assist Italy, his faltering ally. During the winter of 1940–1941 and into March 1941, German troops were stationed first in Romania and then in Bulgaria, threatening the Greek Second Army. Greece was led by General M. Alexander Koryzis, who succeeded dictator General Ioannis Metaxas on the latter's death in late January 1941. General Alexander Papagos commanded the Greek Army.

Greece was already at war, having been invaded by Italy in October 1940. The Greeks had not only repelled that invasion but had launched a counterinvasion of Albania. Papagos had committed the majority of the Greek army on that front in the northwest, where Lieutenant General Georgios Tsolakoglou's First Greek Army of 16 divisions faced 28 Italian

divisions of the Eleventh and Ninth Armies in Albania and had repulsed a large Italian offensive in March.

Lieutenant General K. Bacopoulus's weaker Second Greek Army held the Greek frontier, with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to the northeast. However, the army was dangerously split. Three divisions were strung out along the Metaxas Line of defensive works east of the Struma River in Macedonia facing Bulgaria. Three other Greek divisions were with the British contingent, including the weak 19th Division, the Greek army's only motorized division. The 19th Division was equipped with a few captured Italian L3 tankettes, some worn-out British Bren carriers, and trucks.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill had ordered to Greece from North Africa some of the best British Empire troops there, commanded by Lieutenant General Henry Maitland Wilson. Known as Force W, they took up position along the Aliakmon Line, named for the Greek river just southwest of Salonika. Force W consisted of a New Zealand division, an arriving Australian division, and a British armor brigade. Royal Air Force (RAF) units had been fighting in Greece from early November 1940. Altogether, slightly more than 60,000 British Empire forces were in Greece when the Germans struck.

The German invasion of Greece from Bulgaria began on April 6, 1941. Field Marshal Wilhelm List had command. His Twelfth Army was made up of the equivalent of six corps (a seventh was transferred to the Second Army, which invaded Yugoslavia on April 12) and included three panzer divisions. Leading the assault were the 2nd Panzer Division (known as the "Vienna Division" for the number of Austrians in it), the 9th Panzer Division, and the 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions. List's aim was to smash through the Metaxas Line and drive on Athens.



Because the bulk of the Greek army was located on the Albanian front, the highly trained, much stronger, and more technologically advanced German army sliced through Greek forces to the east without much difficulty. The Axis powers enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. Italian Air Force units operating from Albania alone were equal to the total Allied air strength in Greece, and the German Air Force had as many Stuka dive-bombers in the theater as the total number of Allied first-line aircraft.

One of the most dramatic attacks of the campaign occurred on the morning of April 7, when German aircraft bombed the Greek port of Piraeus and hit two freighters loaded with ammunition. The resulting blasts, heard 150 miles away, destroyed 41,942 tons of shipping and demolished docks. Axis air superiority confined most Allied movements to nighttime and was perhaps the key factor in the Axis victory.

Within three days of the start of their offensive, German forces had seized the port city of Salonika and breached the Metaxas Line. They also had taken 60,000 Greeks prisoner. On April 12, the Greek high command ordered General Tsolakoglou to withdraw his First Army from Albania. Lacking mobility and with much of its equipment worn out, the First Army fell back slowly, only to surrender on April 23 to a joint German-Italian military commission.

The 2nd Panzer Division, meanwhile, was advancing along the Greek eastern coast toward the British forces, which were only just arriving and taking up defensive positions. The 2nd Panzer Division engaged the 2nd New Zealand Division and forced it to retreat. Additional German forces advanced through Yugoslavia and into central Greece from Bitolj, isolating eastern Greece. The Greeks fought hard with what resources they had, but they were simply overwhelmed. General Papagos promised Wilson that the Greeks would do their best to protect the British forces while they evacuated.

With the defeat of his country imminent, Greek prime minister Alexandros Koryzis committed suicide on April 18. His successor, Emanuel Tsouderos, pledged to assist British Empire troops in evacuating Greece. On April 23, the same day the Greek army surrendered, King George II fled Greece for Egypt and there set up a government-in-exile.

On April 24, the British abandoned Thermopylae and began withdrawing into the Peloponnesus. Royal Navy ships, meanwhile, braved Luftwaffe attacks to carry out night evacuations of British forces from ports in eastern Greece. On April 26, the Germans carried out a daring paratroop operation to cut off the British withdrawal. Using gliders, they successfully seized the only bridge over the Corinth Canal. Although the British destroyed part of the bridge with artillery fire, the Germans quickly rebuilt it and used the bridge to press into the Peloponnesus. Wilson managed to fight his way through, however, evacuating most of his troops.

More than 50,000 British Empire forces were evacuated in Operation DEMON, although most of their equipment had to be abandoned. The last formal evacuation took place on April 30; many of the troops were then sent to Crete. Some resistance continued in the Greek islands until May 4. British naval losses were 2 destroyers and 4 merchant ships; the Greeks lost in the campaign 3 destroyers and a torpedo boat as well as 43 merchant ships of 63,975 tons.

In the entirety of the Greek Campaign, the Germans lost 2,559 killed (including 200 aircrew) and 5,820 wounded. The Greek Army sustained 13,408 killed, 42,485 wounded, and 270,000 prisoners. Italian losses during April were 13,775 dead, 54,874 wounded, and 25,067 missing. The British suffered 5,100 dead, wounded, or missing and some 7,000 taken prisoner.

General Tsolakoglou then headed a collaborationist Greek government in Athens, with Greece divided into German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupation

zones. In May, the Germans took Crete by airborne assault. German troops then controlled that island as well as Lemnos, Lesbos, and Chios; some smaller islands in the Aegean; the Turkish border region; Salonika; and the port of Athens and its surrounding area. Bulgarian forces occupied much of Macedonia, and Italy controlled the remainder of the Greek mainland as well as most of the Greek Mediterranean islands.

Some historians have suggested that Germany's invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia delayed Operation BARBAROSSA. Other factors, though, especially the need to wait for dry weather for the panzers, were more important. Nonetheless, the panzer divisions that had seen service in Greece had to undergo refit and were thus not immediately available for BARBAROSSA. The campaign also exacted a toll in equipment and in precious stocks of fuel.

JACK GREENE

See also

Albania; Balkans Theater; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Crete, Battle of; Dodecanese Islands Campaign; Greece; Greece, Air Force; Greece, Army; Greece, Navy; Greece Campaign, Italian; List, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter; Metaxas, Ioannis; Papagos, Alexandros; Wilson, Henry Maitland; Yugoslavia

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Greece Campaign, Italian (October 28, 1940–March 1941)

In April 1939, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ordered the Italian Army to invade Albania and secure control of the Adriatic Sea. On taking over

Albania, Italy began a major engineering project there to improve roads to the Greek border. This was accompanied by assurances that Italy would not attack Greece. Simultaneously, on April 13, Britain and France extended territorial guarantees to both Greece and Romania.

Italy was planning an invasion. Code-named CASE G, the plan received major impetus from Mussolini's son-in-law, Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, who was much involved in Albanian affairs and sponsored this operation to expand his influence over Greece. Mussolini also resented Adolf Hitler's decision to send German troops to Romania to protect the Ploieşti oil fields, a move destroying Italian influence in Romania. Mussolini was determined to redress the Balkan balance.

On October 15, 1940, Mussolini met in Rome with his military leaders, including chief of the General Staff Marshal Pietro Badoglio and deputy chief of the army staff General Mario Roatta, to discuss the attack on Greece. Also present was General Sebastiano Visconti-Prasca, commander of the Eleventh Army in Albania and author of the invasion plan, a much-reduced CASE G. Although questions were raised during the meeting, none of those present seriously opposed the decision to begin the invasion in a few days. At this time Mussolini wrote to Hitler seeking advice and informing him of his intentions, but by delaying sending this letter, Mussolini hoped to surprise his ally, just as Hitler had surprised him with his timing of the invasion of France. Hitler, who had accurate information about Italian intentions, made no effort to restrain his ally.

Before dawn on October 28, 1940, the Italian ambassador in Athens presented an ultimatum to Greek prime minister and dictator General Ioannis Metaxas accusing Greece of allowing British ships to use Italy's territorial waters and demanding free passage of Italian troops on Greek soil. Athens rejected the ultimatum, and at 5:30 a.m. that same day Italian forces began the invasion.

The Italians had deployed in Albania six infantry divisions (two regiments each, reinforced with a lightly armed Blackshirt Legion, with a total of 12,500 to 14,500 men in each division). These were the Siena, Ferrara, Piemonte, Parma, Venezia, and Arezzo divisions. In addition, the Italians had the Centauro Armored Division and the 3rd Alpine Division Julia. In all, the army deployed some 150,000 men—giving them only a

slight numerical superiority over the Greek army before mobilization, instead of the two-to-one advantage that Visconti-Prasca claimed.

The weather was poor, with torrential fall rains. The main body of Italian troops, consisting of the Ferrara, Centauro, and Siena Divisions, advanced near the Adriatic coast, where the terrain was more favorable, trying to push across the Kalamas River and reach Janina. The Julia Division attacked toward Metsovon Pass to penetrate between Epirus and Macedonia. To the extreme Italian left, the Parma and Piemonte Divisions were on the defensive at Korcë.

In defense along the Albanian border, the Greeks had deployed four infantry divisions of three regiments each. These resisted the invaders while King George II of Greece appealed to Britain for assistance. His request won friendly reception from British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill. Although Metaxas, not wanting to offend Hitler, requested only weapons and equipment, Churchill favored sending an expeditionary force. In any case, London immediately dispatched five Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons and an interservice mission.

On October 31, British forces arrived on the islands of Crete and Lemnos, placing British bombers within range of the Ploieşti oil fields. In response, on November 4, Hitler ordered his army high command to begin preparations for a German attack on Greece.

The same day that the Italian invasion began, on October 28, Mussolini met with Hitler in Florence and proudly informed him of the event. Mussolini’s triumph was short-lived, however, as the Greek army, commanded by General Alexandros Papagos, offered stiff resistance. By the end of the month, the Italian offensive had ground to a halt. The Greeks mobilized reserves for a total force of 18 divisions, with French-supplied artillery superior to that of the Italians. They were, however, inferior in air assets.

By November 1, the Greeks had launched a series of counterattacks that stopped the Italians on the Kalamas River. The Italians made no progress on the Epirus Front, whereas the Julia Division arrived at the Metsovon Pass, only to be counterattacked and cut off as the Greeks advanced toward the Korcë basin, there overrunning the Parma and Piemonte Divisions. The Italian high command ordered the Venezia and Arezzo infantry divisions, deployed on the Yugoslavian border, to reinforce the front.

On arrival, however, they were obliged to retreat in chaos before a spirited Greek advance that aimed to cut the road from Korcë to Perati and envelop the invaders-turned-defenders. The only option for the Italians was to withdraw their entire line into Albania. This took place on November 8, a bleak time for the Italian Army in the campaign. The following day, Visconti-Prasca was replaced by deputy chief of the Italian high command General Ubaldo Soddu, who then formed the Italian forces into the Albanian Army Group.

Although Mussolini boasted on November 19 that he would "break Greece's back," a day later he received a sharply worded letter from Hitler that criticized Mussolini's move, which had opened a new front that allowed the British to operate in the Balkans. The Germans were already preparing Operation BARBAROSSA, an invasion of the Soviet Union, for June 22, 1941, and for security reasons did not wish to disclose their plans to the Italians.

As a consequence of the Italian failure, on November 26 Marshal Badoglio and other military leaders were forced to resign. On December 4, General of the Army Ugo Cavallero replaced him. Cavallero demanded more power for the chief of the General Staff and directly helped facilitate the crisis on the Albanian Front. Cavallero would shortly take over command of the Albanian Army Group from Soddu, who retired in disgrace.

In early December, the Italian retreat from Greece back into Albania continued, forcing Mussolini to seek assistance from Hitler. The Italian "parallel war" now came to an end, along with the illusion that Italy was a great power. With the help of German transport aircraft, the Italians flew in reinforcements and shipped equipment to Valona, but this caused great confusion; units that had hurried to the front quickly disintegrated under Greek pressure and the effects of the winter weather. Moreover, it was difficult for the Italians to transport supplies to the front lines, as all had to be shipped from Italy, and there were not enough pack mules. To make things worse, on December 9 British Commonwealth units under Lieutenant General Archibald Wavell launched a successful offensive in North Africa that overran the more numerous Italian troops. By January 6, 1941, the British had seized the Libyan border town of Bardia.

The British now faced the strategic problem of having to choose between exploitation of their North African successes and stiffening Greek resistance. On January 6, 1941, Churchill told the chiefs of staff that it would be better to

delay exploiting the situation in North Africa in order to help Greece seize Valona and avoid military defeat. Churchill therefore informed Wavell that Tobruk would be taken, but follow-up operations would depend on the situation in Greece, which would be the priority. This was also partly because intelligence revealed that German forces were concentrating for a possible offensive in the Balkans. Apparently the Greeks did not need much outside assistance, as they attacked Klisura and forced the Italians to abandon it. At that point the Greek drive died, meeting stiffening Italian resistance, which successfully defended Berat and therefore Valona but at a high price.

On January 19, 1941, Mussolini met Hitler and asked him for assistance to check the British Commonwealth advance in North Africa. Mussolini did not, however, request any help in the Greek theater of operations. Meanwhile, for propaganda purposes, Mussolini demanded that senior Fascist Party leaders join Italian troops at the front. Thus, Foreign Minister Ciano took command of a bomber group, and the ideologue Bruno Bottai joined an Alpini battalion.

A British military mission arrived in Athens on February 22 to study the situation and propose shipment by sea of an expeditionary corps to Greece. The following day the Greeks accepted the offer, whereon Britain dispatched some of its best North African forces to Greece: 60,000 men with 240 field artillery pieces, 32 medium artillery guns, 192 antiaircraft guns, and 142 tanks under Lieutenant General Henry Maitland Wilson.

Under German pressure, Bulgaria signed the Tripartite Pact on March 1, and German Army units began to flow in force into Bulgaria to deploy for the future campaign. A few days later the first British convoy to Greece sailed from Alexandria, and by March 7 British troops began to disembark at Piraeus.

The Italians tried to force the situation to avoid the impression that they had been “saved” by the Germans. In March, General Cavallero launched 27 divisions in an offensive to reach Klisura. It failed and cost 12,000 Italian casualties. On March 28 in an effort to check the British convoys bringing military aid to Greece, the Italian Navy suffered an important naval defeat at the Battle of Cape Matapan.

Meanwhile, on March 25 under heavy pressure, Yugoslavia adhered to the Tripartite Pact. But on the night of March 26–27, a military coup d’état forced Prince Regent Paul into exile, and General Dušan Simović formed a

new government. This event prompted German military intervention. On April 6 with Italian and Hungarian assistance, German forces invaded both Yugoslavia and Greece.

During the Italo-Greek War of October 1940–April 1941, the Greek Army suffered 13,408 killed and 42,485 wounded. The Italians lost 13,775 dead, 50,874 wounded, and 25,067 missing. In addition, the campaign cost Italy reinforcements to North Africa, especially in equipment, which went instead to Albania. Thus, the British successes in North Africa in large part resulted from the Italian invasion of Greece.

ALESSANDRO MASSIGNANI

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bulgaria; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Cavallero, Ugo, Conte; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Ciano, Galeazzo, Conte di Cortellazo; Greece; Greece, Air Force; Greece, Army; Greece, Navy; Hitler, Adolf; Italy, Air Force; Italy, Army; Italy, Navy; Mussolini, Benito; Paul, Prince Regent of Yugoslavia; Simović, Dušan; Visconti-Prasca, Sebastiano; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Wilson, Henry Maitland; Yugoslavia

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Greer, Attack on (September 4, 1941)

The attack by the German submarine *U-652* on the U.S. Navy destroyer *Greer* in the North Atlantic on September 4, 1941, marked the beginning of a de facto naval war between the United States and Germany. The *Greer* (DD 145) was built in 1918 in Philadelphia, one of a class of 21 flush-deck, four-funnel destroyers displacing 1,165 tons, with a length of 314 feet, and armed with four 4-inch guns, one 3-inch gun, and 12 torpedo tubes. It was rated at

35 knots and carried a crew of 133. After initial service in the Atlantic, from November 1919 until June 1936 the *Greer* served in the Pacific. In reserve at Philadelphia after January 1937, it was recommissioned in October 1939 and assigned in February 1940 to the Neutrality Patrol to protect U.S. shipping.

At 8:47 a.m. on September 4, 1941, while proceeding independently from Argentina to Reykjavik, Iceland, the *Greer,* captained by Lieutenant Commander Laurence H. Frost, was about 175 miles from Reykjavik when it was signaled by a British plane that a German submarine was 10 miles ahead in the *Greer*'s path. This was the *U-652.* The *Greer* made sound contact at 9:20 a.m. At 10:32 a.m., having been informed by Frost that the *Greer* did not intend to attack, the British aircraft dropped four depth charges in the vicinity of the submarine and then departed to refuel. The *Greer* maintained contact, possibly for practice or possibly to mark the U-boat's location pending arrival of other British forces.

At 12:48 p.m., its commander probably having identified the *Greer* as similar to 50 destroyers recently transferred by the United States to Britain, the submarine fired a torpedo, prompting the *Greer* to drop eight depth charges. At 1:00 p.m., the *Greer* evaded a second torpedo. The Americans lost sound contact, and although a British destroyer appeared, the *Greer* continued searching. It regained contact at 3:07 p.m. and dropped 11 more depth charges before finally disengaging at 6:40 p.m.

On September 11, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made this encounter the subject of a fireside chat on U.S. radio, calling the German action "piracy" and issuing a shoot-on-sight order for U.S. ships on North Atlantic convoy duties as far as Iceland against German submarines. The *Greer* incident thus brought the United States and Germany substantially closer to war.

In October 1941, the *Greer* escorted the U.S. destroyer *Kearny* to Iceland after the latter had been torpedoed by *U-568* and suffered the war's first U.S. casualties at German hands. The *Greer* continued convoy and patrol duties in the Atlantic and the Caribbean until February 1944 and provided training and plane guard service in home waters until June 1945. The ship was decommissioned in July 1945 and sold for scrap the following November.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; *Kearny*, USS, Torpedoing of; *Reuben James*, Sinking of; United States Navy; Document 107

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Greim, Robert Ritter von (1892–1945)

German Air Force field marshal and last commander of the Luftwaffe. Born on June 22, 1892, in Bayreuth, Robert Ritter von Greim joined the Bavarian artillery in October 1912 and transferred to the air service in August 1915. In June 1917 he took command of Jagdstaffel 34 (Fighter Squadron 34), a Bavarian fighter squadron of single-seated aircraft, winning 28 aerial victories and the Pour le Mérite.

From 1924 to 1927, Greim was an adviser and instructor to the Chinese Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) air force. On his return to Germany, he became director of the Bavarian gliding federation. Greim joined the German Air Force in 1934 as a major and was appointed inspector of fighters and dive-bombers. Colonel Greim headed the Personnel Section of the Air Ministry in 1937. In 1938 he was promoted to major general and assigned command of Jagdgeschwander 132 Richthofen, named for the World War I expert (ace).

In 1939, Greim became commander of V Flieger Korps as a lieutenant general, leading it in the invasion of Poland (September 1, 1939), the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940), and the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940). He was promoted to lieutenant general on January 1, 1940, and six months later to general of flyers. Greim's unit was then sent to the Eastern Front. From February 1943 to April 1945 as a colonel general, Greim commanded Luftflotte (air fleet) 6 on the Eastern Front.

On April 24, 1945, Adolf Hitler summoned Greim to the besieged city of Berlin. Greim flew into the city with test pilot Hanna Reitsch two days later. Their plane was hit by antiaircraft fire, and Greim was badly wounded in the right foot, although Reitsch landed the plane safely. Hitler then met with Greim, promoting him to field marshal (the last so appointed) and head of the Luftwaffe, replacing the dismissed Hermann Göring. Hitler then ordered Greim and Reitsch to leave Berlin, despite their stated wish to remain with the führer. On April 28 the two flew out of the city in a training plane.

Following capture by the Americans, Greim, a rabid Nazi who feared he would be handed over to the Soviets for trial, committed suicide on May 24, 1945, in Salzburg, Austria.

SPENCER E. ROBBINS III

See also

Britain, Battle of; France, Battle for; Germany; Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Hitler, Adolf; Poland Campaign; Reitsch, Hanna

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Grew, Joseph Clark (1880–1965)

U.S. diplomat and undersecretary of state. Born on May 27, 1880, in Boston, Massachusetts, into a prominent family, Joseph Clark Grew attended Harvard University and then joined the U.S. diplomatic service, transferring from the consular to the foreign service in 1904. Grew's influential contacts, including Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt, facilitated his career.

Grew's postings included Cairo, Mexico City, Russia, Berlin, Vienna, and Denmark. After serving as undersecretary of state from 1923 to 1927, in which capacity he helped to implement the reorganization of the Foreign Service, Grew became ambassador to Turkey. In 1932, he was appointed the

first career U.S. ambassador to Japan, remaining in Tokyo until Japan declared war on the United States in December 1941.

Grew's wife, Alice Vermandois Perry, was descended from Commodore Matthew Perry, who had opened Japan to Western influence in 1853. She had spent her youth in Japan and knew many of its leading figures. Grew firmly hoped that Japan's growing antagonism toward the United States might be reversed. He urged greater American sympathy for Japan's economic problems and sought more latitude as ambassador in handling U.S.-Japanese relations. Grew's regular swings from optimism to pessimism during successive Japanese governments and his eagerness to conciliate the Japanese brought clashes with Stanley K. Hornbeck, head of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs.



Acting U.S. secretary of state Joseph C. Grew, 1943. (Marie Hansen/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Seeking to avoid what increasingly seemed to be an inevitable conflict, in October 1939 Grew publicly warned Japan that if it wished to avoid serious American retribution, it must alter its increasingly bellicose international stance. This precipitated harsh Japanese press attacks on him. Grew subsequently unsuccessfully urged a personal meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Japanese premier Prince Konoe Fumimaro, which he later unconvincingly claimed might have averted war.

Interned after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) and repatriated to the United States in the spring of 1942, Grew returned to Washington as a special assistant to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, becoming director of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in 1944. As undersecretary of state from December 1944 to August 1945, Grew opposed

further collaboration with Soviet Russia, unsuccessfully sought to prevent the use of nuclear weapons against Japan by urging American acceptance of a negotiated peace settlement rather than unconditional surrender and helped to preserve the Japanese emperor's status as nominal head of state. Grew retired in August 1945 and died at Manchester-by-the-Sea, Massachusetts, on May 25, 1965.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Hull, Cordell; Japan; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Griswold, Oscar Woolverton (1886–1959)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Ruby Valley, Nevada, October 22, 1886, Oscar Woolverton Griswold graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1910 and was commissioned in the infantry. He served in China from 1914 to 1917. As a major in the 84th Division in World War I, Griswold fought in the 1918 Meuse-Argonne Offensive and was wounded. He then served in the postwar occupation of Germany until 1919.

Griswold graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1925 and the Army War College in 1929. He served with the War Department General Staff (1929–1931), was a member of the Infantry Board (1932–1936), served in the office of the chief of infantry (1936–1939), and commanded the 29th Infantry Regiment (1939–1940).

Promoted to brigadier general in October 1940, Griswold served with the 4th Infantry Division (1940–1941). Promoted to major general in August 1941, he commanded the Infantry Replacement Training Center at Camp Croft in South Carolina in 1941. Griswold then commanded first the 4th

Motorized Division (1941–1942), then IV Corps (1942–1943). In 1943 he was assigned to command XIV Corps in the South Pacific. Griswold then became the senior army ground officer in the Solomon Islands.

In July 1943, with U.S. forces stalled during the July–October 1943 Battle of New Georgia, Griswold took personal command of the assault force. Bringing in substantial reinforcements, he soon secured the island. In December, his XIV Corps replaced a marine landing force at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, and built a strong defensive perimeter there. In March 1944, his men successfully repulsed strong Japanese attacks during the Bougainville Campaign (November 1, 1943–August 15, 1945).

Turning over their base to Australian troops beginning in March 1944, Griswold and his corps were absorbed into General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific command. Assigned to Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army, Griswold's corps was one of two landing on Luzon in the Philippines on January 9, 1945. After a lengthy battle and at heavy cost to combatants and civilians alike, XIV Corps liberated Manila that March. Griswold's command then cleared the southern part of Luzon. Promoted to lieutenant general in April 1945, Griswold was MacArthur's choice in June to replace the slain Lieutenant General Simon Buckner in command of the Tenth Army on Okinawa, an assignment that went instead to Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell.

Returning to the United States, Griswold commanded the Third Army from 1945 to 1947. He retired from the army in October 1947. Griswold died in Colorado Springs on September 28, 1959.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Bougainville Campaign; Buckner, Simon Bolivar, Jr.; Krueger, Walter; MacArthur, Douglas; Manila, Battle for; New Georgia, Battle of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Grizodubova, Valentina Stepanovna (1909–1993)

Russian Air Force colonel and sole woman commanding officer of a men's wing during World War II. Born in Kharkov (Kharkiv) on May 10, 1909, the daughter of an aircraft designer, Valentina Stepanovna Grizodubova graduated from the Penza Flying Club in 1929, the Kharkov Flying School, and the Advanced Flying School in Tula in 1933. She mastered many types of aircraft, setting seven world records in the process. On September 24–25, 1938, Grizodubova flew nonstop from Moscow to the Pacific in an ANT-37 aircraft. For this pioneering flight she, her copilot, and her navigator—both also women—received the award of Hero of the Soviet Union, the highest Soviet decoration. They were the first Soviet women thus honored.

In May 1942, Grizodubova was appointed commanding officer of the 101st Long-Range Air Regiment (renamed the 31st Krasnosel'sky Guards Bomber Regiment in 1944). She successfully demonstrated the suitability of the Li-2 (modified DC-3) for use as a night bomber. In June 1942, Grizodubova led her unit in delivering supplies to the besieged city of Leningrad (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944). She was noted for flying more than her male colleagues and sometimes flew as copilot to monitor her pilots' performance.

In September 1942, Grizodubova's unit was placed at the disposal of Central Partisan Headquarters. Overcoming dense flak and engaging German fighters, her aircrews flew more than 1,850 supply missions, also evacuating wounded partisans and children. In 1943, Grizodubova prevailed on her superiors not to decrease these flights.

Grizodubova flew some 200 wartime missions and was awarded many prestigious decorations. A senior civil aviation official after the war, she was also the sole woman on the Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes of the Fascist German

Invaders and Their Accomplices, and of the Damage They Caused to Citizens, Collective Farms, Public Organizations, State Enterprises, and Institutions of the Soviet Union. She also served on the executive board of several veterans' organizations, assisting numerous former prisoner-of-war camp inmates who were persecuted by Soviet authorities. Grizodubova died in Moscow on May 1, 1993.

KAZIMIERA J. COTTAM

See also

Leningrad, Siege of; Raskova, Marina Mikhailovna; Soviet Union, Air Force; Soviet Women's Combat Wings; Women in World War II

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Groves, Leslie Richard (1896–1970)

U.S. Army general who oversaw the Manhattan Project. Born in Albany, New York, on August 17, 1896, Leslie Richard "Dick" Groves attended the University of Washington and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He secured an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1918, and entered the Army Corps of Engineers.

After initial training at the Engineer School at Fort Humphreys (later Fort Belvoir), Virginia, Groves served in Hawaii; Texas; Nicaragua; Washington, D.C.; and Missouri. Assigned to the War Department in 1939, he became chief of the Corps of Engineers Operations Branch and in 1941 deputy head of the Construction Division. In these capacities, Groves oversaw the vast expansion of military camps and training facilities across the United States. He then supervised construction of the Pentagon, the world's largest office building.

Major General Leslie Groves, who was in charge of the MANHATTAN Engineer District and oversaw the building of facilities for testing the first atomic weapons. (National Archives)

Success in a variety of engineering projects led to Groves's promotion to brigadier general and assignment in September 1942 to head the Manhattan Project, charged with development and construction of an atomic bomb. Groves controlled 129,000 personnel and $2 billion in spending. He was promoted to major general in March 1944. This vast effort resulted in the explosion of the first atomic device at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945. Groves advised President Harry S. Truman to employ the bomb and assisted in the selection of Japanese target cities.

After the war, Groves sought international control over atomic energy. When this did not occur, he organized the Army Forces Special Weapons Project to study military uses of atomic energy. Promoted to lieutenant general in January 1948, Groves retired from the army that same month and

became vice president for research of the Rand Corporation. He retired altogether in 1961. Groves died in Washington, D.C., on July 13, 1970.

RYAN E. DOLTZ

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Manhattan Project; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Nuclear Weapons; Truman, Harry S.

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Guadalcanal Land Campaign (August 1942–February 1943)

Bitter contest between Japanese and American forces that marked a turning point in the Pacific theater. The struggle on Guadalcanal was protracted and between August 1942 to February 1943 saw some of the most intense fighting of the war. In all, there were some 50 actions involving warships or aircraft, 7 major naval battles, and 10 land engagements.

Guadalcanal is an island in the Solomon chain northeast of Australia. It lies on a northwest-southeast axis and is 90 miles long and averages 25 miles wide. Guadalcanal's southern shore is protected by coral reefs, and the only suitable landing beaches are on the north-central shore. Once inland, invading troops faced dense jungle and mountainous terrain, crisscrossed by numerous streams. The Guadalcanal Campaign encompassed not only Guadalcanal but also Savo and Florida Islands as well as the small islands between Florida and Guadalcanal: Tulagi, Tanambogo, and Gavutu.

In January 1942, Japanese amphibious forces had landed in the Bismarck Archipelago between New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. They quickly wrested Kavieng on New Ireland Island and Rabaul on New Britain from the Australians. The Japanese consolidated their hold and turned Rabaul into their principal Southwest Pacific base. By early March, they landed at

Salamaua and Lae in Papua and on Bougainville. Their advance having gone so well, the Japanese decided to expand their defensive ring to the southeast to cut off the supply route from the United States to New Zealand and Australia. On May 3, the Japanese landed on Tulagi and began building a seaplane base there. Between May and July, the Japanese expanded their ring farther in the central and lower Solomons. These operations were carried out by Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi's Eighth Army from Rabaul. The first Japanese came ashore on Guadalcanal on June 8. On July 6, their engineers began construction of an airfield near the mouth of the Lunga River.

The discovery of the Japanese effort on Guadalcanal led to the implementation of Operation WATCHTOWER. Conceived and pushed by U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King, it called for securing Tulagi as an additional base to protect the U.S.-Australian lifeline and as a starting point for a drive up the Solomons to Rabaul. On April 1, 1942, the Pacific was divided into two commands: U.S. vice admiral Robert L. Ghormley, commanding in the South Pacific, was to take the southern Solomons, including Guadalcanal, and General Douglas MacArthur's forces were to secure the remainder of the Solomons and the northwest coast of New Guinea, the final objective being Rabaul.

If the Japanese were allowed to complete their airfield on Guadalcanal, they would be able to bomb the advanced Allied base at Espiritu Santo. U.S. plans to take the offensive were now stepped up, and a task force was hurriedly assembled. From Nouméa, Ghormley dispatched an amphibious force under Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, lifting Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift's 19,000-man reinforced 1st Marine Division. A three-carrier task force under Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher provided air support. This operation involved some 70 ships.

On August 7, 1942, the marines went ashore at Tulagi, Florida, Tanambogo, Gavutu, and Guadalcanal, surprising the small Japanese garrisons (2,200 on Guadalcanal and 1,500 on Tulagi). On the same day, the marines seized the harbor at Tulagi, and by the next afternoon they had also secured the airfield under construction on Guadalcanal, along with stocks of Japanese weapons, food, and equipment. Supplies for the marines were soon coming ashore from transports in the sound between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands, but this activity came under attack by Japanese aircraft based at

Rabaul. Vandegrift told Fletcher he would need four days to unload the transports, but Fletcher replied that he was short on fuel and in any case could not risk keeping his carriers in position off Guadalcanal for more than 48 hours.

Stakes were high for both sides. The fiercest fighting occurred for the airfield, renamed Henderson Field for a U.S. Marine Corps aviator killed in the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway. Vandegrift recognized its importance and immediately established a perimeter defense around it. Eating captured rations and using Japanese heavy-construction equipment, the U.S. 1st Engineer Battalion completed the airfield on August 17. As early as August 21, the day the Japanese mounted a major attack on the field, the first U.S. aircraft landed there. The Japanese now found it impossible to keep their ships in waters covered by the land-based American aircraft during the day, and they found it difficult to conduct an air campaign over the lower Solomons from as far away as Rabaul.

The lack of a harbor compounded U.S. supply problems, as did Japanese aircraft attacks. Allied coast watchers on islands provided early warning to U.S. forces of Japanese air and water movements down the so-called Slot of the Solomons. The battle on Guadalcanal became a complex campaign of attrition. The Japanese did not send their main fleet but rather vessels in driblets. American land-based airpower controlled the Slot during the day, but the Japanese initially controlled it at night, as was evidenced in the August 8 Battle of Savo Island. Concern over the vulnerability of the U.S. transports led to their early removal on the afternoon of August 9 along with most of the heavy guns, vehicles, construction equipment, and food intended for the marines ashore. The Japanese sent aircraft from Rabaul, while initially U.S. land-based aircraft flying at long range from the New Hebrides provided air cover for the marines as fast destroyer transports finally brought in some supplies. American possession of Henderson Field tipped the balance, and U.S. air strength there gradually increased to about 100 planes.

At night the so-called Tokyo Express—Japanese destroyers and light cruisers—steamed down the Slot and into the sound to shell marine positions and deliver supplies. The latter effort was haphazard and never sufficient; often, drums filled with supplies were pushed off the ships to drift to shore. One of the great what-ifs of the Pacific war was the failure of the Japanese to

exploit the temporary departure of the U.S. carrier task force on August 8 by rushing in substantial reinforcements.

Actions ashore were marked by clashes between patrols of both sides. Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao, who had arrived with his battalion on Guadalcanal in early August, planned a large-scale attack that took little account of U.S. marine dispositions. His unit was effectively wiped out in the August 21, 1942, Battle of the Tenaru River. Ichiki's men refused to surrender, and they and their commander were killed in the fighting. Marine losses were 44 dead and 71 wounded; the Japanese lost at least 777 killed. From September 12 to 14, strong Japanese forces attempted to seize U.S. marine positions on Lunga Ridge overlooking Henderson Field from the south. The Japanese left 600 dead; American casualties were 143 dead or wounded. Both sides continued building up their strength ashore as naval and air battles raged over and off Guadalcanal.

From October 23 to 25, the Japanese launched strong land attacks against Henderson Field. Fortunately for the marine defenders, the attacks were widely dispersed and uncoordinated. In these engagements, the Japanese suffered 2,000 dead, while U.S. casualties were fewer than 300.

Immediately after halting this Japanese offensive, Vandegrift began a six-week effort to expand the defensive perimeter beyond which the Japanese could not subject Henderson to artillery fire. Meanwhile, Admiral Kond Nobutake's repositioning of vessels and Vice Admiral William F. Halsey's instructions to Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid to seek out the Japanese fleet resulted in the October 26 Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

Fighting on land continued on Guadalcanal. On December 8, Vandegrift turned command of the island over to U.S. Army major general Alexander M. Patch, who organized his forces into XIV Corps, including the 2nd Marine Division, replacing the veteran 1st Marine Division, which was withdrawn, and the 25th Infantry Division. At the beginning of January 1943, Patch commanded 58,000 men, whereas Japanese strength was then less than 20,000.

Ultimately, the Americans won the land struggle for Guadalcanal thanks to superior supply capabilities and the failure of the Japanese to throw sufficient resources into the battle. The Americans were now well fed and well supplied, but the Japanese were desperate, losing many men to sickness

and simple starvation. At the end of December, Tokyo decided to abandon Guadalcanal.

Meanwhile, on January 10, Patch began an offensive to clear the island of Japanese forces, mixing army and marine units as the situation dictated. In a two-week battle, the Americans drove the Japanese from a heavily fortified line west of Henderson Field. At the end of January, the Japanese were forced from Tassafaronga toward Cape Esperance, where a small American force landed to prevent them from escaping by sea. Dogged Japanese perseverance and naval support, however, enabled some defenders to escape. The Japanese invested in the struggle 24,600 men (20,800 troops and 3,800 naval personnel). In daring night operations during February 1–7, 1943, Japanese destroyers evacuated 10,630 troops (9,800 army and 830 navy).

The United States committed 60,000 men to the fight for the island; of these, the marines lost 1,207 dead and the army 562. U.S. casualties were far greater in the naval contests for Guadalcanal; the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps lost 4,911 and the Japanese at least 3,200. Counting land, sea, and air casualties, the struggle for Guadalcanal had claimed 7,100 U.S. dead or permanently missing. The Japanese advance had now been halted, and MacArthur could begin the long and bloody return to the Philippine Islands.

TROY D. MORGAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Cape Esperance, Battle of; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Hyakutake Haruyoshi; Ichiki Kiyonao; Imamura Hitoshi; King, Ernest Joseph; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kondō Nobutake; MacArthur, Douglas; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; Rabaul; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Savo Island, Battle of; Tassafaronga, Battle of; Turner, Richmond Kelly; Vandegrift, Alexander Archer

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Guadalcanal Naval Campaign (August 1942–February 1943)

Significant and prolonged South Pacific sea-land-air campaign. The campaign for Guadalcanal comprised a number of separate naval engagements and land battles fought from August 1942 to February 1943. On Guadalcanal (an area 90 miles by 25 miles) in the Solomon Islands, U.S. marines and army troops attacked Japanese land forces, while the U.S. Navy battled the Japanese Navy offshore.

Before the battle, U.S. planners were able to build up Pacific theater resources more quickly than anticipated and take the offensive against the Japanese. This campaign, Operation WATCHTOWER, was the brainchild of U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King. It had as its objective the seizure of the islands of Tulagi and Gavutu as a preliminary step in securing the Solomons and then the recapture of the Philippines and the eventual defeat of Japan.

These plans changed when intelligence revealed that the Japanese were building an airstrip on the nearby island of Guadalcanal. Such a base would pose a serious threat to Allied operations in the South Pacific, and its seizure became the primary objective of the campaign.

Although hamstrung by a lack of resources because of the sealift required for Operation TORCH (November 8, 1942), Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley pieced together forces from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for the invasion. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift commanded the 1st Marine Division landing force, and Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher commanded the naval support element.

The U.S. Navy’s tasks were to sustain forces ashore and to provide naval and air protection for the marines defending the airfield, which was captured shortly after the landing and renamed Henderson Field in honor of U.S. Marine Corps major Lofton Henderson, killed during the Battle of Midway.

The lack of a harbor compounded supply problems. The Japanese operated aircraft from Rabaul and later from other closer island airfields, but Allied coast watchers on islands provided early warning of many Japanese air and naval movements.

The marines went ashore beginning on August 7, but the sealift was so limited that they were without much of their heavier equipment and heavy artillery. The first naval engagement with the Japanese occurred on the night of August 8–9, 1942, in the Battle of Savo Island. A Japanese cruiser squadron overwhelmed an Allied force of equal size, sinking one Australian and three U.S. cruisers and damaging several destroyers, losing none of its own ships. The battle was the worst defeat ever suffered by the U.S. Navy in a fair fight, but it was only a tactical success, because the Japanese failed to go after the vulnerable U.S. troop transports off Guadalcanal and Tulagi.



Nonetheless, the Battle of Savo Island and Japanese air attacks led Fletcher and Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner to withdraw supporting naval forces from Guadalcanal, leaving the marines ashore isolated, bereft of naval support, and short of critical supplies. Long-range aircraft and destroyers did bring in some resources. The Japanese made a critical mistake in not capitalizing on the U.S. vulnerability to commit their main fleet assets. For the most part, they sent only smaller units in driblets, chiefly in the form of fast destroyers. The so-called Slot (New Georgia Sound, the water supply route to Guadalcanal) was controlled by the United States during the day, but the Japanese owned it at night.

The next major confrontation at sea off Guadalcanal came on the night of August 24–25 in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Fletcher's carrier-based aircraft intercepted and attacked the covering group for a Japanese convoy of destroyers and transports carrying 1,500 troops to Guadalcanal. The Americans sank the Japanese light carrier *Ryujo* and damaged another ship, but the U.S. fleet carrier *Enterprise* was located and attacked by Japanese aircraft and badly damaged. The Japanese destroyers and transports delivered the reinforcements and the destroyers and then shelled Henderson Field, although a U.S. Army B-17 sank one of the Japanese ships.

On August 31, a Japanese submarine torpedoed the U.S. carrier *Saratoga*, putting it out of action for three months. That left only the carrier *Wasp* available for operations in the South Pacific. On September 15, the *Wasp* was in turn torpedoed and sunk while it was accompanying transports lifting the 7th Marine Regiment to Guadalcanal from Espiritu Santo. A Japanese torpedo also damaged the battleship *North Carolina.* Nonetheless, Turner continued to Guadalcanal, delivering the 7th Marine Regiment safely three days later.

Heavy fighting, meanwhile, was occurring on Guadalcanal. The next big naval encounter off Guadalcanal was the Battle of Cape Esperance during the night of October 11–12. The Japanese sent in their supply ships at night (the so-called Tokyo Express). U.S. ships equipped with radar detected a Japanese convoy off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. In the ensuing fight, the Japanese lost a cruiser and a destroyer, with another cruiser heavily damaged. The Americans lost a destroyer and had two cruisers damaged. This first Allied success against the Japanese in a night engagement was a great boost to U.S. morale. A few days later, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz replaced the

methodical Ghormley with the offensive-minded Vice Admiral William "Bull" Halsey.

A major engagement occurred on October 26–27 in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid and his Task Force 16, centered on the carrier *Enterprise,* followed Admiral Halsey's instructions to engage Japanese forces under Admiral Kondō Nobutake. Each side conducted carrier strikes against the other. U.S. aircraft inflicted severe damage on the heavy carrier *Shōkaku,* putting it out of action for nine months, and damaged the light carrier *Zuihō.* On the U.S. side, the heavy carrier *Hornet* was badly damaged and had to be abandoned while under tow; it was soon sunk by Japanese destroyers. Kondō then withdrew. In the battle, Kondō had also lost 100 aircraft and experienced pilots, half again as many as the Americans.

During November 12–15, a series of intense sea fights occurred in what became known as the Naval Battles of Guadalcanal. These took place near the entrance to Iron Bottom Sound (so named for being the resting place of many Allied and Japanese ships) off Savo Island between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. In the first, U.S. ships and aircraft fought to block reinforcement of the island by 13,000 Japanese troops in 11 transports escorted by destroyers, all commanded by Admiral Tanaka Raizō. At the same time, a powerful squadron under Abe Hiroaki arrived to shell Henderson Field.

In a confused engagement, both sides suffered heavily. The Japanese lost the battleship *Hiei* and two destroyers sunk; four other Japanese destroyers were damaged. The Americans lost two cruisers and four destroyers. A cruiser and a destroyer were close to sinking, and all other ships except one were damaged. Among those killed were Rear Admirals Daniel Callaghan and Norman Scott and the five Sullivan brothers, killed in action aboard the same ship, the light cruiser USS *Juneau.*

On November 13–14 the Japanese returned, and their heavy cruisers shelled Henderson Field. But the Americans sank seven Japanese transports and damaged two cruisers. During the third phase near Savo Island on November 14–15, U.S. warships under Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee met and defeated yet another Japanese force under Kondō. The Americans lost two destroyers, while the Japanese lost the battleship *Kirishima* and a destroyer. The net effect of the engagements was that Tanaka landed some 4,000 troops, whereas the Americans regained control of the waters around the island.

The last major naval battle for Guadalcanal occurred on November 30 at Tassafaronga Point. The Japanese again attempted to land reinforcements on Guadalcanal and were surprised by a larger U.S. Navy task force. However, the Japanese once more demonstrated their superior night-fighting ability. In the exchange Japan lost a destroyer, and the United States lost a cruiser and had three more cruisers severely damaged.

Japanese leaders now concluded that they could no longer absorb such losses in trying to hold on in Guadalcanal. The final battle of the campaign was a skirmish off Rennell Island on January 30, 1943. In early February 1943, the Japanese evacuated their remaining ground forces from Guadalcanal.

The United States won the naval campaign for Guadalcanal thanks largely to its superior supply capability and Japan's failure to throw enough resources into the battle. The campaign for Guadalcanal proved to be as much a turning point for the United States as the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942). The Japanese advance had been halted, opening the way for the long island-hopping advance toward Japan.

Overall, the Japanese lost 1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 14 destroyers, and 8 submarines. Particularly serious was the loss of 2,076 aircraft (1,094 to combat) and many trained pilots. U.S. Navy losses were 2 heavy carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 15 destroyers, but new U.S. naval construction more than offset the losses. The campaign also destroyed the myth of Japanese naval superiority.

WILLIAM P. MCEVOY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Abe Hiroaki; Callaghan, Daniel Judson; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Japan, Navy; Kawaguchi Kiyotake; King, Ernest Joseph; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kondō Nobutake; Lee, Willis Augustus "Ching"; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Rabaul; Rennell Island, Battle of; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Savo Island, Battle of; Tanaka Raizo; Tassafaronga, Battle of; Turner, Richmond Kelly; United States Navy; Vandegrift, Alexander Archer

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Guam, Battle for (July 21–August 10, 1944)

U.S. invasion and recapture of the largest of the Mariana Islands. Some 100 miles south of Saipan, Guam is at its greatest extremity some 34 miles long and 7 miles wide. The only one of the Marianas group controlled by the United States before the war, Guam had been acquired in 1898 as a consequence of the Spanish-American War. Little had been done to prepare the island against attack, and its 200-man U.S. Marine Corps garrison, supported by Guamanian police and volunteers, was overwhelmed on December 10, 1941, following three days of fighting by a 5,500-man Japanese brigade.

U.S. admiral Ernest King, chief of naval operations, argued as early as January 1943 for an invasion of the Mariana Islands. Although originally planned for June 18, 1944, the invasion of Guam was delayed by more than a month because operations against Saipan took longer than anticipated, and the task force reserve of the 27th Division had to be ordered there. Consequently, commander of the Fifth Fleet Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance rescheduled the operation for July 21. Marine Corps lieutenant general Roy S. Geiger commanded the landing force of the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and the army's 77th Infantry Division.

Its limestone terrain veiled in labyrinthine vegetation, Guam was well suited for defense. The island's numerous ridges, hills, valleys, and caves allowed Lieutenant General Takashina Takeshi's 18,500 defenders to magnify their limited artillery resources. In close proximity to one another on

the western shore were the two most important military installations: the fortified air base on Chote Peninsula and the navy yard at Apra Harbor.

The invasion was preceded for two days by the longest sustained naval bombardment of the Pacific Islands campaigns to that point. The invasion force came ashore on the morning of July 21 in a two-pronged assault five miles apart. The 3rd Marine Division landed on the beach north of Apra Harbor to capture the nearby navy yard; the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade joined with the foremost elements of the 77th Infantry Division below the harbor to take the large airfield on the Orote Peninsula. Poor maps and stiff Japanese resistance prevented an advance of more than a few miles beyond the two designated American beachheads for four days. Enough Japanese guns survived the preliminary naval bombardment to inflict numerous casualties on the exposed American troops.

Late in the afternoon of July 25, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade finally seized the road bisecting the neck of the Orote Peninsula, severing Japanese access to the island's interior. That night, the trapped Japanese troops attempted to escape via Takashina's ill-conceived banzai attack, only to be shattered by concentrated marine artillery fire. Surviving Japanese were gradually eliminated over the next few days.

In an attempt to splinter the American beachhead north of Apra Harbor, at about 3:00 a.m. on July 26 Takashina mounted a well-planned 3,900-man counterstrike against the unsuspecting 3rd Marine Division. Exploiting an unintended gap between two marine regiments, the attackers swiftly penetrated the American position. Heavy fighting ensued, involving support personnel as well as frontline defenders. Despite initial gains and having inflicted 800 marine casualties, after three hours the Japanese attack ground to a complete halt. It had cost an astounding 3,500 (95 percent) of the attacking force dead.

Takashina's expensive counterattack proved catastrophic to his already inadequate force. Intermittent fighting continued for several weeks across much of the island's thickly forested interior as organized Japanese resistance slowly dissolved in the face of the Americans' steady northward advance. With the bulk of the island under American control, on August 10 Geiger pronounced active combat operations on Guam at an end.

The loss of Guam and the remainder of the Marianas deprived the Japanese Navy of airfields and anchorages and cut Japan's major supply

artery with the South Pacific and its large air and naval base at Truk in the Caroline Islands.

WILLIAM B. ROGERS AND PHILLIP M. SOZANSKY

See also

Geiger, Roy Stanley; King, Ernest Joseph; Mariana Islands Campaign; Spruance, Raymond Ames

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Guandong Army

Elite Japanese military force in Manchuria comprising Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang), Jilin (Kirin), and Liaoning Provinces. The Guandong (Kwantung) Army was formed in April 1919 to protect Japanese interests in the part of southern Manchuria that Japan had leased from China after the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Japan stationed one division there to defend the so-called Guandong Leased Territory and the South Manchurian Railway zone. For several years, the territory had been administered by the Guandong governor-general, who also commanded Japan's expeditionary forces. In April 1919, a new joint civil/military administration was instituted, and the Guandong Army was charged with maintaining security. The Guandong Army consisted of an independent garrison of six battalions, along with a division rotated every two years.

Facing a rising tide of Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria, a handful of activist Guandong Army staff officers undertook unauthorized initiatives, such as the assassination in June 1928 of Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin). Also, on September 18, 1931, Lieutenant Colonel Ishihara Kanji and Colonel Itagaki Seishiro arranged to blow up a section of Japanese railway track outside Mukden

(Shenyang), Liaoning Province, which they then falsely blamed on the Chinese. This became the excuse for the Guandong Army to initiate fighting with local Chinese forces.

In this so-called Mukden Incident, the Guandong Army (without the approval of the Tokyo government) embarked on the conquest of most of the rest of Manchuria, leading to the establishment on March 1, 1932, of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo), a puppet Japanese state. In 1934, the Japanese installed as ruler Aixinjueluo Puyi (known to Westerners as Henry Pu-yi), the last emperor of China's Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty.

The leaders of the Guandong Army regarded the Soviet Union as Japan's chief enemy. Throughout the 1930s, the two sides increased their forces in the border area of Korea, Manchuria, and the Soviet Far East, and border clashes between Japanese and Soviet troops increased. These confrontations included some heavy fighting in the Changkufeng Incident (Battle of Lake Khasan, July 29–August 11, 1938) and the Nomonhan Incident (Battle of Khalkhin Gol, May 11–September 16, 1939).

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Guandong Army expected a German victory. It conducted a mobilization exercise to prepare for an attack on the Soviet Union between August and October, as soon as the Soviets had transferred forces from Manchuria to the European front. Twelve Japanese divisions in Manchuria, two in Korea, and two from Japan participated in this exercise. Much to the disappointment of Guandong Army leaders, however, Tokyo decided instead to move into resource-rich South Asia. Supreme Headquarters in Tokyo enjoined Guandong Army leaders to avoid all border conflicts. Following Japan's string of early victories in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and again anticipating a German victory, Japan withdrew forces from the Pacific theater to reinforce the Guandong Army for war against the Soviet Union.

In conjunction with U.S. advances in the Pacific from February to July 1944, however, Supreme Headquarters withdrew 10 army divisions and 2 air divisions from Manchuria to the Pacific. The Guandong Army became a hollow force and fell easy prey to Soviet forces, which invaded Manchuria at the end of the war. Within two weeks of the Soviet strike into Manchuria, commander of the Guandong Army General Yamada Otozō surrendered, and the Guandong Army was disarmed. Some 60,000 men of the Guandong Army were killed in the fighting. After the cease-fire, another 185,000 died in

Manchuria. About 600,000—including Japanese troops from North Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands—were detained in prisoner-of-war camps, where they were forced to work as slave labor through 1950. The last group of prisoners was not released until 1956. In the labor camps, more than 55,000 died of illness or malnutrition.

ASAKAWA MICHIO

See also

Ishiwara Kanji; Itagaki Seishirō; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Manchuria Campaign; Yamada Otozō

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Guderian, Heinz (1888–1953)

German Army general. Born in Kulm, Germany, on January 17, 1888, Heinz Guderian attended cadet schools and was commissioned a lieutenant in the Hanoverian 10th Jäger Battalion in January 1908. During World War I he became a communications specialist, serving as assistant signals officer in Fourth Army headquarters until 1918, when he was appointed to the General Staff.

Guderian served in a Freikorps unit during 1919 and as chief of staff of the "Iron Division," and he was later selected to be retained among 4,000 officers in the 100,000-man Reichswehr. He was assigned to the transport troops in 1922. Returning to the General Staff in 1927, he became an advocate of mechanization based on British and French theories.

Guderian was given command of an experimental motorized battalion in 1931 with which he demonstrated armored reconnaissance techniques. He was promoted to colonel in 1933, and in October 1935 he took command of the 2nd Panzer Division, one of only three being formed. He was promoted to major general in August 1936.

In 1937 Guderian published *Achtung-Panzer!*, a treatise on armored warfare that espoused the combination of tanks, dive-bombers, and motorized infantry that is characterized as blitzkrieg (lightning war). Rapid promotion followed as Guderian helped expand Germany's armored forces. As a lieutenant general he participated with his division in the 1938 occupation of Austria. In October, Guderian was promoted to general of panzer troops and appointed chief of mobile troops with direct access to Adolf Hitler.

During the September 1939 invasion of Poland, Guderian commanded the XIX Panzer Corps. During the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940), he led his panzer corps across the Meuse River at Sedan and raced to the English Channel to cut Allied forces off in Belgium.

During Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union, Guderian, now a full general, commanded the Second Panzer Group in Army Group Center, where he coordinated with General Hermann Hoth's Third Panzer Group to encircle large Soviet forces at Minsk on July 10. Guderian then was ordered south to support General Paul Ewald von Kleist's Fourth Panzer Group, encircling more than 600,000 Russians in the Kiev pocket in September. Guderian's short temper and disdainful disposition toward superiors, however, eventually led him to be relieved of command in December concerning tactical disputes.

German General Heinz Guderian, regarded by many as the father of German armored warfare. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Following a year of inactivity, Guderian was recalled to duty by Hitler as inspector general of panzer troops in March 1943. Guderian made great efforts to rebuild the worn panzer forces. After the assassination attempt against Hitler in July 1944, Guderian was appointed chief of the General Staff. He stood up to Hitler on numerous occasions, leading to his dismissal on March 28, 1945.

Taken prisoner by U.S. forces at the end of the war, Guderian was not prosecuted for war crimes, although he remained a prisoner until June 1948. Guderian died at Schwengen, Bavaria, on May 14, 1953. A headstrong and aggressive battlefield commander, Guderian turned mechanized theory into practice and established a somewhat overstated legacy as the father of blitzkrieg warfare.

STEVEN J. RAUCH

See also

Armored Warfare; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Blitzkrieg; France, Battle for; Germany, Army; Hitler, Adolf; Hoth, Hermann; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Poland Campaign

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Guernica, Kondor Legion Attack on (April 26, 1937)

German and Italian aircraft attack on the town of Guernica, located in the Basque region of northern Spain, during the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939. When the Nationalists rebelled against the Republican government of Spain in July 1936, Germany and Italy sent aid to the Nationalist side. Chancellor Adolf Hitler provided aircraft collectively known as the Kondor Legion, commanded by Major General Hugo Sperrle.

By early 1937, the Nationalists' failure to capture Madrid shifted attention to the Basque provinces in the north. Spanish general Emilio Mola commanded the assault on the ground, promising to raze the region if it did not surrender. The air component was largely independent, under German control. By late April 1937, Sperrle's chief of staff, Colonel Wolfram von Richthofen, discerned an opportunity to cut off the Republican retreat by bombing the Renteria bridge at Guernica. Guernica was the spiritual center of the Basques—a distinct ethnic group with their own language, customs, and tradition of representative government. It was also the home of their parliament and of El Árbol, a sacred oak under which Spanish kings had traditionally promised to respect Basque rights.

On April 26, 1937, Richthofen ordered air assaults on the Renteria bridge as well as the surrounding suburbs to block the retreat of Basque troops. At approximately 4:40 p.m., the first German bomber appeared over Guernica and dropped its payload on a plaza near the bridge. Some 25 minutes later

three more bombers arrived, followed by fighters that strafed the panicked population. Shortly after 6:00 p.m., waves of German and Italian bombers reached the town. Because crews had primitive bombsights and smoke and dust blanketed the target, the aircraft simply dropped their bombs randomly into the city. More than 100,000 pounds of high explosives and incendiaries rained down on Guernica.

Normally Guernica numbered 5,000 permanent inhabitants, but uncounted refugees and soldiers had swollen the population. As a result, exact casualty figures remain elusive, but the dead certainly numbered in the hundreds. Although the raid razed more than half of the town's structures, the Renteria bridge survived, as did the Basque parliament and El Árbol. Even so, Richthofen expressed pleasure with the results.

That evening, press reports reached the major European capitals concerning the bombing, many depicting it as a premeditated terror attack. The Nationalist press claimed that the city was burned by the Republicans to discredit the Nationalist cause. Not until the 1970s did the Spanish government admit Nationalist involvement in Guernica's destruction.

Learning of the tragedy in Paris, Spanish artist Pablo Picasso began work on a mural depicting the anguish and devastation. Scholars often credit this work, *Guernica,* for connecting the Basque town with the indiscriminate destruction of modern war.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Germany, Air Force; Hitler, Adolf; Italy, Air Force; Kondor Legion; Richthofen, Wolfram von; Spanish Civil War; Sperrle, Hugo Walter

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Guerrillas/Partisans

See Partisans/Guerrillas

Guisan, Henri (1874–1960)

Swiss Army general and commander of the army during World War II. Born on October 21, 1874, in Mézières, Switzerland, Henri Guisan was educated at Swiss and foreign universities and earned a degree in agriculture. He joined the Swiss Army in 1894 and was promoted to captain in 1904. During World War I, he was an observer on both the Eastern and Western Fronts.

Promoted to colonel in 1921, Guisan took command of the 1st Division in 1926. In 1932, he took command of II Corps, and the following year he became commander of I Corps. In August 1939, Guisan was promoted to general (only the fourth Swiss to hold that rank) and became commander in chief of the army, a force that would come to number 800,000 men and women.

On July 25, 1940—with Italy in the war on the side of Germany, France defeated, and the possibility of an Axis invasion looming—Guisan rallied the nation in a speech at Rutli Meadow, the site of the 1291 Swiss pact of confederation. To meet the threat of an invasion, Guisan strengthened the natural Swiss defensive system of the Alps and the plateau between Lakes Constance and Geneva by mining bridges, roads, and highways. He also ordered military training expanded and arms stockpiled. The Germans knew that an invasion would be costly and did not attack. In 1945 Guisan retired from active service. He died at Lausanne, Switzerland, on April 8, 1960.

KATHLEEN GASTON HITT

See also

Switzerland

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Gustav Gun

The German Krupp 80cm K(E), known as the Schwere Gustav (Heavy Gustav), was the largest artillery piece ever built. A railway gun that had to move over a specially laid double track, it was supported by two bogies, each with 20 axles. The gun weighed 1,344 tons and had a bore diameter of 31.5 inches. Using a 3,000-pound propellant charge, it fired two different types of projectiles. The 10,560-pound high-explosive round had a maximum range of nearly 30 miles. The 15,600-pound concrete-piercing shell had a maximum range of 23 miles.

The German Army ordered three 80cm K(E) guns in 1937 for the specific mission of demolishing the French forts on the Maginot Line. By the time the first gun was delivered in late 1941, though, France had long since fallen.

In January 1942, Heavy (Railway) Artillery Unit 672 was formed to man the gun; the unit moved to the Crimea in April. The gun, nicknamed "Dora" by the crew, was not ready to fire its first round in the siege of Sevastopol until June 5. Between then and June 17, it fired a total of 48 rounds in combat. The rounds landed anywhere from 197 feet to 2,400 feet from their targets. Nonetheless, the shells were large enough that their destructive power contributed to the fall of Forts Stalin, Lenin, Siberia, and Maxim Gorki.

After the fall of Sevastopol, the Gustav gun returned to Germany to receive a new barrel. Plans to send the gun to Leningrad were preempted by the Soviets having raised the siege. Some sources report that the gun fired against the Poles during the Warsaw Rising in August 1944, but that has never been confirmed.

The second 80cm K(E) was completed and delivered, but the crew was never raised. The third gun was still incomplete when the war ended. In April 1945, the German Army destroyed both completed weapons.

The Gustav gun was a technical masterpiece but a tactical white elephant. Under the best of conditions, it never fired more than seven or eight rounds per day. Once the gun reached its designated firing position, it required three

to six weeks to assemble and place into battery. Its entire detachment numbered 1,420 men, commanded by a colonel with his own headquarters and planning staff. The main gun crew numbered 500, most of whom moved, prepared, and serviced the ammunition. The remainder of the unit consisted of an intelligence section, two antiaircraft artillery battalions, and two guard companies.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Artillery Doctrine; Artillery Types; Leningrad, Siege of; Maginot Line; Sevastopol, Siege of

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Gyro Gun Sight

A computing gun sight that calculates the correct amount of deflection to allow for a crossing target. Air-to-air gunnery is a difficult art to master, as it involves shooting projectiles that are constantly decelerating and subject to gravity from a moving platform at a moving target. The pilot or gunner must aim ahead of the target by some angle (the deflection angle) and allow for gravity drop, wind, and so on, so that bullets and target arrive at the same point simultaneously. The required deflection angle reduces with crossing speed and range and increases as muzzle velocity reduces. With a few exceptions, the average World War II pilot was not a good shot, and many aces closed to point-blank range before firing to reduce deflection to a minimum.

In 1936, Dr. Leslie Bennet Craigie Cunningham, a scientist at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) Farnborough, suggested a “predictor” gun sight using the principle that a gyroscope resists any rotation of its axis. If the device is attached to a normal gun sight, any attempt to follow a crossing target will be resisted with a force proportional to the crossing speed. This

idea was not adopted until World War II, when scientists at RAE Farnborough were ordered to produce such a device.

The first preproduction Mark I Gyro Gun Sights (GGSs) were installed on Spitfire and Defiant aircraft for trials in 1941. The tests on the resulting GGS Mark I were satisfactory, but there were several operational problems; a redesigned Mark II GGS went into production late in 1943. The pilot selected the type of enemy aircraft on a dial and then adjusted the size of the sighting reticule to match the target's wingspan. This gave an estimate of range, and while the pilot tracked the target, an analog computer in the sight calculated target range and offset the reticule to give the correct deflection. A Mark IIC was employed in bomber turrets.

The GGS was an important technology. Operational experience showed that it approximately doubled the effectiveness of the average squadron; some pilots were five times more likely to score a kill. The GGS Mk II was used by the U.S. Army Air Forces as the K-14 and by the U.S. Navy as the Mk 18.

ANDY BLACKBURN

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics

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H

Haakon VII, King of Norway (1872–1957)

Born on August 3, 1872, at Charlottenlund Castle near Copenhagen, Denmark, Prince Carl was the second son of the future King Frederik VIII of Denmark. Carl was educated by private tutors and entered the Danish Navy at age 14. In 1893 he became an officer, and in 1896 he married Princess Maud of Great Britain, daughter of King Edward VII. They had one son, Alexander, later renamed Olaf. Norway declared independence from Sweden in 1905, and Carl was elected its constitutional monarch, choosing the Norwegian title of Haakon VII.

Haakon worked to establish a modern monarchy. His motto was “All for Norway.” He hoped that Norway could remain neutral during World War II, and when the Germans invaded in April 1940, Haakon rejected demands that he appoint pro-Nazi Vidkun Quisling as premier and urged his people to resist. Haakon reluctantly left Norway aboard a British warship on June 7, 1940, with his son Olaf and members of the Storting (parliament) for exile in Britain.

As head of the Norwegian government-in-exile, Haakon spoke to his people via radio, explaining that the Norwegian Constitution allowed him to wage war against the Germans from abroad and refusing to abdicate. Haakon strongly supported he Norwegian resistance to Nazi rule; he became both Norway’s symbol of resistance and its rallying point.

Haakon was warmly welcomed on his return to Oslo on June 7, 1945, exactly five years from his departure and the 40th anniversary of Norway’s independence. His spirited wartime activities had created a strong bond with his people. Haakon spent the immediate postwar years helping with reconstruction. He also dispensed with the formalities of court life, endearing himself further to the Norwegians. This beloved “people’s king” died at Oslo on September 21, 1957. He was succeeded by his son, who reigned as Olaf V.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

Norway; Norway, German Conquest of; Quisling, Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonsson; Resistance

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Haguro, Japanese Navy Cruiser, Sinking of (May 16, 1945)

The Imperial Japanese Navy cruiser *Haguro* was the fourth and last of the Myōkō class of heavy cruisers. Constructed at the Mitsubishi Shipyard in Nagasaki, it was laid down in March 1925 and commissioned on April 25, 1929. All four ships of the class were extensively refitted during 1934–1936. They were 661 feet 9 inches in length with a beam of 68 feet. They displaced 13,300 tons and were fast, at 36 knots. They were armed with 10 8-inch guns (five double turrets), 6 4.7-inch guns, and 12 24-inch torpedo tubes and carried two float planes. The ships had a crew complement of 773 officers and men.

During World War II, the *Haguro* took part in the Battle of the Java Sea (February 27, 1942) and in the sinking of the cruisers HMS *Exeter* and HNLMS *De Ruyter* and the destroyer HMS *Encounter* off South Borneo on March 1. The *Haguro* participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7, 1942) and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (August 22–25, 1942) as well as the evacuation of Japanese forces from Guadalcanal in January 1943. It was slightly damaged in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay (November 2, 1943). The *Haguro* also took part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19, 1944) and in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–25, 1944), when it again sustained damage.

Commanded by Captain (promoted to rear admiral on May 1, 1945) Sugiura Kaju from December 1, 1943, the *Haguro* was on its way from

Singapore to evacuate the Japanese garrison in the Andaman Islands in the company of the destroyer *Kamikaze* when it was spotted in the Malacca Strait on May 16, 1945, and attacked by a Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bomber from the escort carrier *Shah*, without effect. In Operation DUKEDOM, British vice admiral Harold T. C. Walker dispatched Captain Manley L. Power and his 16th Destroyer Flotilla to ambush the Japanese ships. The *Haguro* and its escort were located and attacked just after midnight on May 16 by the British destroyers *Saumarez* (flagship), *Venus*, *Verulam*, *Vigilant*, and *Virago*. Power sought to offset the speed and superior hitting power of the *Haguro* by attacking the Japanese ship from different directions simultaneously. Although the *Kamikaze* was only lightly damaged in the engagement, the *Haguro* was hit both by gunfire and three torpedoes.

The *Haguro* began to go down about 2:32 a.m. The *Kamikaze* picked up 320 members of its crew, but some 900 men perished, including Admiral Sugiura and Vice Admiral Hashimoto Shintarō. Sugiura was honored with a posthumous promotion to vice admiral. The sinking of the *Haguro* was the last naval surface action of the war.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Japan, Navy; Java Sea, Battle of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the

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Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia (1892–1975)

Haile Selassie was emperor of Ethiopia (also known as Abyssinia) from 1930 until 1974. He was born at Ejersagoro on July 23, 1892, as Tafari Makonnen,

the son of Ras Makonnen, a Coptic Christian and leading general and political figure. Tafari was a grandnephew of Emperor Menelik II (r. 1889–1913).

An excellent student, Tafari attended both the Capucin school and the palace school. From age 13, he governed Harer, Selale, and Darass. On Menelik's death, his grandson Lij Iyasu succeeded to the throne, but he Islamized the government. The Christians denounced this policy, and Iyasu was deposed. Menelik's daughter, Empress Sawditu I (r. 1916–1930), made the progressive-minded Tafari regent and heir. From 1917 to 1928 he traveled in the West to absorb the culture and ideas. Tafari was proclaimed emperor on Sawditu's death in 1930.

Declaring himself a direct descendant of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, Tafari adopted the name Haile Selassie, meaning "might of the trinity." His suppression of slavery was a matter of personal pride, and he established the Bank of Ethiopia and promulgated a new criminal code. Selassie soon earned a worldwide reputation as a humanitarian, although he centralized power in his person and was in fact a royal dictator.

During the 1930s, Selassie took his country's disputes with Italy to the League of Nations. Italy's invasion in 1935 found the Ethiopians no match for the invaders, who had complete air supremacy and employed poison gas. Selassie fled to Britain in 1936, appealing for support in a masterful but unsuccessful address to the League of Nations. Following Italy's entry into World War II in June 1940 and the extension of the fighting to Africa, British forces liberated Ethiopia, and Selassie returned to his capital in triumph in 1941.

Selassie's progressive policies after the war included political and social reforms and the establishment of a national assembly in 1955. His focus in the 1960s and 1970s was Pan-African. In 1960, he crushed a revolt of army officers and intellectuals who advocated further reforms. Selassie was overthrown on September 12, 1974, and placed under palace arrest. He died on August 17, 1975.

Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia (1930–1936 and 1941–1974). (Library of Congress)

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

East Africa Campaign; Italo-Ethiopian War

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Halder, Franz (1884–1972)

German Army general. Born on August 30, 1884, in Würzburg, Germany, Franz Halder joined a Bavarian field artillery regiment in 1902 and attended the Bavarian Kriegsakademie in Munich before the outbreak of World War I and then served throughout the war as a General Staff officer at the division through army group levels on both the Western and Eastern Fronts. His performance during World War I secured him a position in the postwar

Reichswehr. Serving in both command and staff positions, he was promoted to colonel in December 1931, to major general in October 1934, to lieutenant general in August 1936, and to general of artillery in February 1938. In October 1938, Halder was appointed chief of the army General Staff.

Halder played a crucial role in the planning and execution of Germany's military campaigns before World War II and during its first years. By the end of the 1939 Poland Campaign, he had convinced German army commander in chief Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch to place overall responsibility for operations in his hands. Halder's claims to sole authorship of the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940) were unjustified, although he was at the center of the campaign's successful execution. Halder was promoted to colonel general in July 1940.

As chief of the German army's general staff, General Franz Halder played a key role in the planning and execution of Germany's military campaigns before and during the early years of World War II. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Anticipating future operations in the east, Halder established a planning group in the summer of 1940 to develop a campaign against the Soviet Union. His lack of vision and unwillingness to encourage innovation among his subordinates, however, resulted in a plan that did not fully address the Red Army's capabilities or clearly identify the campaign's objectives. Failing to defeat the Red Army in the summer of 1941 in Operation BARBAROSSA, which had begun on June 22, Halder maintained his belief that the German Army would decide the campaign at the gates of Moscow.

Through the spring of 1942, Halder became increasingly disillusioned with Adolf Hitler's conduct of operations, particularly the 1942 offensive on the Eastern Front. By September 1942, the führer had had enough of the army chief of staff's intransigence and summarily relieved him on September 24.

Halder remained on the inactive list, keeping in contact with Colonel General Ludwig Beck, former chief of the General Staff and a leader of the opposition to Hitler. As a result of these exchanges, Halder was imprisoned in the Flossenbürg concentration camp in the aftermath of the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life. After the war, Halder's association with Beck was sufficient to prevent his conviction at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Halder then spent 14 years with the U.S. Army Historical Division and received the Meritorious Civilian Service Award in 1961. Halder died on April 2, 1972, in Aschau, West Germany.

DAVID M. TOCZEK

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Beck, Ludwig; Brauchitsch, Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von; Caucasus Campaign; France, Battle for; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Poland Campaign; SICHELSCHNITT, Operation; Zeitzler, Kurt von

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Halifax, Lord

See Wood, Edward Frederick Lindley

Hall, Charles Philip (1886–1953)

U.S. Army general. Born in Sardis, Mississippi, on December 12, 1886, Charles Philip Hall graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1911 and was commissioned in the infantry. During World War I, he served with the 2nd Division in France.

Between the world wars, Hall earned an excellent reputation as an officer while serving with the Infantry Board and as an instructor at the Infantry School. He also graduated from the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College. Promoted to brigadier general in January 1941, he served as assistant divisional commander of the 3rd Infantry Division during 1941 and 1942. In March 1942, promoted to major general, he took command of the 93rd Infantry Division.

In October 1942, Hall was named commander of XI Corps in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). His first major operation in the war came in New Guinea. The Japanese Eighteenth Army, which had been bypassed by the fast-moving offensive of SWPA commander General Douglas MacArthur, advanced on the U.S. base at Aitape in July 1944 to divert men and supplies from MacArthur's drive toward the Philippines. Fighting for six weeks along the Driniumor River to the east of Aitape, Hall's XI Corps defeated the Japanese, ending the threat to Aitape. Later in 1944, Hall established a lodgment on Morotai, providing flank protection for MacArthur's Philippines invasion.

During 1945, Hall participated in the liberation of Luzon in the Philippines. Landing on Luzon on January 29, XI Corps helped clear the Manila Bay area by seizing the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island. From March into the summer of 1945, Hall fought in the mountains east of Manila to neutralize the Japanese Shimbu Group.

After the war, Hall, promoted to lieutenant general in June 1945, served with the U.S. occupation force in Japan. He returned to the United States in 1946 to take charge of the army training program, a post he held until his retirement in December 1948. Hall died in San Antonio, Texas, on January 26, 1953.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Krueger, Walter; MacArthur, Douglas; New Guinea Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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Halsey, William Frederick, Jr. (1882–1959)

U.S. Navy admiral of the fleet. Born in Elizabeth, New Jersey, on October 30, 1882, William Frederick Halsey Jr. was a naval officer's son. Halsey graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1904 and was commissioned an ensign in 1906. He served in the Great White Fleet that circumnavigated the globe during 1907–1909 and was then assigned to torpedo boats. When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, Halsey was a lieutenant commander and captain of a destroyer. He then commanded destroyers operating from Queenstown, Ireland.

Following World War I, Halsey's service was mostly in destroyers, although he also held an assignment in naval intelligence and was a naval attaché in Berlin. Promoted to captain in 1927, he commanded the *Reina Mercedes*, the Naval Academy training ship, and became fascinated by naval aviation. Halsey attended both the Naval War College and the Army War College, and in 1935, despite his age, he completed naval flight training and

took command of the aircraft carrier *Saratoga.* Promoted to rear admiral in 1937, Halsey assumed command of Carrier Division 2 of the *Enterprise* and *Yorktown.* He was promoted to vice admiral in 1940.

Halsey was at sea on December 7, 1941, when Japanese aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor. In early 1942, Halsey's carriers raided Japanese Central Pacific installations and launched Colonel James Doolittle's raid on Tokyo on April 18. Acute skin disorders requiring hospitalization removed Halsey from participation in the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942).

In October 1942, Halsey replaced Admiral Robert Ghormley as commander of the South Pacific and began the most successful phase of his career. Halsey was promoted to admiral in November. Despite severe tactical losses, he retained strategic control of the waters around Guadalcanal in late 1942, and during 1943 he supported operations in the Solomon Islands and into the Bismarck Archipelago. Halsey came to be known as "Bull" for his pugnacious nature.

U.S. Navy admiral William Frederick Halsey, Jr. A controversial figure, Halsey also epitomized the aggressive spirit of the U.S. Navy in World War II. (Library of Congress)

In March 1943, Halsey took administrative command of the Third Fleet, although he continued his command in the South Pacific until June 1944. In the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese battle plan and the flawed U.S. command system combined with Halsey's aggressiveness to shape one of the more controversial episodes of the war. On October 24–25, a Japanese force under Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo centered on four fleet aircraft carriers that were largely bereft of aircraft decoyed Halsey and his entire Task Force 38 away from the U.S. landing sites, leaving the sites vulnerable to a powerful Japanese surface force under Kurita Takeo.

Although Halsey destroyed most of Ozawa's force in the Battle of Cape Engaño, disaster for the support ships off Leyte was only narrowly averted when Kurita, affected by fatigue and poor intelligence, prematurely withdrew his strike force. Widely criticized for not coordinating his movements with Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, who commanded the Seventh Fleet invasion force, Halsey never admitted responsibility. He instead blamed the system of divided command.

Halsey endured further condemnation when he took the Third Fleet into damaging typhoons in December 1944 and June 1945. Still, his flagship, the *Missouri*, hosted the formal Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945. Promoted to admiral of the fleet in December 1945, Halsey retired in April 1947. He then served on the boards of several large corporations. Halsey died at Fisher's Island, New York, on August 16, 1959.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR. AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Air Warfare, Naval; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Central Pacific Campaign; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Japan, Surrender of; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kolombongara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Kurita Takeo; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nimitz, Chester William; Ozawa Jisaburo; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tassafaronga, Battle of; Tokyo, Bombing of; United States Navy; United States Navy Carrier Raids; Vella Gulf, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Battle of

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Hamburg, Raids on (July 24–August 3, 1943)

The air battle of Hamburg, Operation GOMORRAH, consisted of a series of six raids in July and August 1943 that destroyed a large portion of the city and killed more than 45,000 people. Most of them died in the horrendous firestorm of the night of July 27, the first such conflagration induced by bombing. More than half of the residential units in the city were destroyed, and 900,000 people lost their homes. The Americans and British bombed the city many times later in the war, but none of those raids approached the results or notoriety of the July attack.

Four of the attacks were mounted at night by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and two in daylight by the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) Eighth Air Force. The initial British operation, which began the night of July 24, featured the first use of chaff, code-named Window, in combat. The cloud of metallic strips blotted out large segments of enemy radar screens and provided cover for aircraft that stayed within the pattern, cloaking the bomber stream. This helped keep losses relatively low during RAF operations; only 87 British bombers were lost out of more than 3,000 sorties.

The USAAF sent 252 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses over Hamburg on July 25 and 26 but lost 17 aircraft. In addition, the American bombing accuracy was poor, because primary targets were often obscured by smoke from the earlier RAF raid. The Americans dropped only about 300 tons of bombs on the city, whereas RAF bombers delivered more than 8,000 tons.

The second British attack combined concentrated bombing with ideal weather conditions of high temperature and low humidity to produce an unexpected firestorm, which was helped along because most of Hamburg's firefighters were in distant sectors of the city dealing with the results of the earlier attacks.

Most of the dead had heeded the advice of local authorities to stay in basement shelters, where they were asphyxiated by carbon monoxide or crushed by collapsing buildings. However, taking to the streets was no guarantee of safety. Those who fled the shelters sometimes met even more horrible deaths, sucked into fires by high winds or caught in molten asphalt.

German armaments minister Albert Speer feared that if the Allies could quickly follow up with six similar devastating firestorms, the German economy might collapse. Although RAF Bomber Command tried, it could not achieve the same result until its February 1945 assault on Dresden. Hamburg itself recovered surprisingly quickly, and the Luftwaffe changed its defensive tactics to counter the RAF night-bombing campaign.

Research conducted 50 years after the bombing of Dresden has considerably lowered the casualty figures from that bombing; it appears that the July 27 attack on Hamburg, not the Dresden bombing, was the deadliest air raid in the European theater. The raids on Hamburg set a standard that RAF Bomber Command found difficult to duplicate and still provide a vivid symbol of the horrors of bombing cities and of total war.

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See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Dresden, Air Attack on; Radar

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Hanaya Tadashi (1894–1957)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Okayama Prefecture on January 5, 1894, Hanaya Tadashi graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1916 and from the Army War College in 1922. Promoted to major in 1929, he commanded an infantry battalion. In 1930, he was assigned to the Special Services Agency at Mukden (now Shenyang) of the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria. Hanaya was involved in planning the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, which the Guandong Army used as the pretext for taking the remainder of Manchuria in 1931 and 1932. When Japanese military operations were criticized, Hanaya developed a plan for provoking a riot in Shanghai (the First Shanghai Incident) to divert attention there.

Assigned as resident officer in Jinan (Tsinan), China, in 1933, in 1935 Hanaya joined the staff of the Guandong Army Headquarters. Promoted to colonel in 1937, he commanded the 43rd Infantry Regiment. In 1939, he was assigned as military adviser to the Japanese puppet state of Manzhoudiguo (Manchoutikuo or Manchukuo).

Promoted to major general in 1940, Hanaya took command of the 29th Infantry Brigade. In 1941, he was chief of staff of the First Army in China. Promoted to lieutenant general in October 1943, he assumed command of the 55th Division in Burma.

In Burma, Hanaya's division defended the port of Akyab on the Bay of Bengal and supported the Imphal operations. Hard on his subordinates but an effective commander, Hanaya had great success in the Second Arakan Campaign (December 1943–July 1944). His troops defeated British forces at the Indian border and then laid siege to Shinzeiwa, but efforts to take that place by storm failed against the strong British defensive line, and a lack of supplies and ammunition for his forces and superior British air resupply forced Hanaya to lift the siege.

Hanaya's attacks along the Sittang River in south Burma in May and June 1945 allowed the Japanese Twenty-Eighth Army to escape. Following this operation, in July 1945 Hanaya was appointed chief of staff of the Thirty-Ninth Army and then chief of staff of the 18th Army Group on Rabaul in the same month. He was in Thailand when the war ended. Hanaya retired from the army in 1946 and died in Tokyo on August 28, 1957.

KITA YOSHITO

See also

Guandong Army; Ishiwara Kanji; Itagaki Seishirō; Japan, Army; Sakurai Seizo

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Hand Grenades

Hand grenades are small bombs thrown by hand. Numerous types of hand grenades were used by military forces during World War II. The U.S. military used offensive, defensive, and special-use grenades. The MkIII A1, a can-shaped grenade filled with 8 ounces of flaked TNT, was used for offensive purposes because no fragmentation took place after the initial explosion. The MkII "pineapple" grenade was for defensive use and was based on the old British Mills bomb design. Troops could not assault forward because of the fragmentation of its serrated shell, which created a 10-yard killing radius. The M15 WP white phosphorous (WP for "Willie Pete") grenade, used for smoke generation and the assaulting of caves and pillboxes, saw limited use. In tight quarters, the almost 2-pound M15 WP created severe eye, respiratory, and skin injuries.

The standard hand grenade for British forces was the revised M36 Mills bomb. It had a serrated cast-iron body filled with TNT and was used defensively. Of note was the screw-in fuze, which was put in place prior to combat. To use the grenade, the user pulled the pin and then threw the grenade. When the grenade left the user's hand, the spring-loaded lever was released, activating the fusing sequence. A more specialized grenade was the Gammon bomb (No. 82), a 20-ounce cloth bag filled with plastic explosive. It had an attached screw-off metal cap that was removed to arm the device. The Gammon bomb was effective against pillboxes and bunkers.

The French military relied on the venerable F1 defensive grenade. This grenade had a serrated body and used a five-second delay fuze activated by a

pin-and-lever system similar to that found in the British M36.

The standard German hand grenades were the high-explosive stick grenade (Stielhandgranate 24) and the high-explosive hand grenade (Eierhandgranate 39). The offensive Stiel. 24, universally known as the "potato masher" grenade, contained a bursting TNT charge and could be fitted with a fragmentation sleeve for defensive use. The igniter was activated by pulling the porcelain bead found in the handle behind the metal cap. A heavier Stiel. 43 variant existed; it contained almost twice the TNT charge and could also be fitted with a fragmentation sleeve. The offensive Eier. 39 was egg-shaped, and its older and newer designs differed slightly. The TNT filler was initiated by a detonator and a friction igniter. More specialized German grenades were the offensive wooden and concrete improvised hand grenades (Behelfshandgranate-Holz and -Beton) and numerous forms of smoke grenades (Nebelhandgranate) based on stick, conventional, egg, and glass body designs.

The Italian Army used three main types of grenades, known as "Red Devil Grenades" for their color. All used a pull firing pin. The Breda Model 35 (introduced in 1935) weighed 7 ounces and had only 2 ounces of TNT; the SRCM Model 35 also weighed 7 ounces but had only 1.5 ounces of TNT. The OTO Model 35 weighed 7.4 ounces and had 2.5 ounces of TNT. Italian grenades tended to have too little explosive filler and broke into large fragments, so they often did little damage to their targets. The Breda Model 42 with a handle (potato-masher style) was developed to attack enemy tanks and contained 1.5 pounds of TNT.

Hand grenades in use by Japanese forces were the Model 91 (1931), Model 97 (1937), Model 99 (1939), and Model 23. The Model 91 had a serrated body and was for defensive use. Its fuze had to be struck against a hard object, such as a helmet, to ignite it. The Model 97 was a newer variation of the Model 91. It had a shorter fuze delay time of 4–5 seconds rather than 7–8 seconds, could not be fired from a discharger, and was carried by all frontline troops. The lighter Model 99 Kiska had a smooth, cylindrical body and a flange at either end. It also used an impact fuze, and because it was smaller, it could be used for offensive purposes. The Model 23 looked like the Model 91 but had two lugs and rings on the side for mooring so it could also be used in booby traps. It had a pull-type friction igniter fuze and was filled with granular TNT.

Other more specialized grenades included the 18-ounce incendiary grenade, the incendiary stick grenade, and the high-explosive stick hand grenade.

Soviet hand grenades were based on the Type-1933, Type-1942, and F-1 models. The Type-1933 (RGD-33) was composed of a grenade head and a throwing handle. It could be used in either a defensive or an offensive mode, depending on whether the fragmentation jacket (normal and lightened types) was used over the grenade head. Detonation time was 3.2 to 3.8 seconds after fuze ignition. The can-shaped Type-1942 (RG-42) was for offensive and defensive use. Its lethal bursting radius was somewhat smaller than average because of the lighter scored squares found in its internal metallic belt. The F-1 was for defensive use. Externally it resembled the U.S. MkII pineapple grenade, but it was based on either the standardized (UZRG) or Koveshnikov fuze. Because it expelled heavy fragments out to 656 feet, the F-1 was only thrown from trenches or other covered positions.

ROBERT J. BUNKER

See also

Infantry Tactics

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Harmon, Ernest Nason (1894–1979)

U.S. Army major general. Born in Lowell, Massachusetts, on February 26, 1894, Ernest Nason Harmon attended Norwich University in Vermont for a year before being accepted to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, from which he graduated in 1917. Commissioned a second lieutenant of cavalry,

Harmon served in France as a captain during World War I and fought in the 1918 Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives.

After the war, Harmon graduated from the Cavalry School (1921), served as an instructor at West Point (1921–1925), and competed in the pentathlon at the 1924 Summer Olympics. After service as plans and training officer for the 6th Cavalry Regiment (1925–1927), he taught military science at Norwich University (1927–1931). In 1931 he was selected to attend the Command and General Staff School (CGSS). Promoted to major in 1932, he graduated from the CGSS (1933) and then the Army War College (1934). Harmon spent a year commanding the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, at Fort Bliss, Texas, then served on the War Department General Staff as assistant chief of staff for supply (1935–1939). Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1939, he assumed command of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment (mechanized), in the new Armored Force at Fort Knox, Kentucky, where he fell under the tutelage of brigade commander Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee. In the spring of 1941 Harmon was assigned to the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Following Chaffee's death in August 1941, the new chief of the Armored Force Major General Jacob L. Devers requested Harmon as his chief of staff. Harmon was promoted to brigadier general in March 1942.

In July 1942, Harmon took command of the 2nd Armored Division. Promoted to major general the next month, he led the division in the invasion of French Morocco in November 1942. Following the American defeat at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia (February 14–22, 1943), General Dwight D. Eisenhower sent Harmon to advise Major General Lloyd Fredendall at II Corps. Harmon recommended that Eisenhower relieve Fredendall, but Harmon turned down, on ethical grounds, the opportunity to assume command of the corps, which went to Major General George S. Patton Jr. In April, Harmon returned to Tunisia to command the 1st Armored Division, which he led both there and in the landing at Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE) in Italy (September 9, 1943).

In Italy, weather and terrain initially prevented Harmon from using his tanks effectively. Beginning on January 22, 1944, the division redeployed to the Anzio beachhead, where it shored up Allied defenses. When the Battle of Anzio ended on May 25, the division led the Allied breakout and drive on Rome (May–June). In July, Harmon rotated back to the United States, but in

September he received an unexpected summons to Northwestern Europe to head the 2nd Armored Division again. In the German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945), Harmon's division helped turned the tide by smashing the German spearhead 2nd Panzer Division at the Battle of Celles. Harmon then took command of XXII Corps, which saw no significant action. Three times previously he had been passed over for corps command, apparently because of his reputation for tactlessness. Nonetheless, Harmon ranks among the finest U.S. armor commanders of World War II.

After the war, Harmon assumed occupation duties in the Rhineland and in Czechoslovakia as commander of XXI Corps (April 1945 to January 1946), and from 1946 to 1948 he commanded VI Corps—which became known as the U.S. Constabulary—in the U.S. occupation zone of Germany. He was deputy commander of Army Ground Forces, 1947–1948. Frustrated by his career prospects, Harmon chose to retire as a major general in March 1948. He was president of Norwich University from 1950 to 1965. Harmon published his memoirs, *Combat Commander,* in 1970. He died in White River Junction, Vermont, on November 13, 1979.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Chaffee, Adna Romanza, Jr.; Devers, Jacob Loucks; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Fredendall, Lloyd Ralston; Italy Campaign; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rome, Advance on and Capture of; Salerno Invasion; TORCH, Operation

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Harpe, Josef (1887–1968)

German Army colonel general. Born on September 21, 1887, in Recklinghausen, Westphalia, Josef Harpe joined the army as an officer candidate in 1909 and served in the infantry in World War I. He remained in the German Army after the war and became interested in mechanized warfare. In 1931, he was assigned to direct the Reichswehr's clandestine tank training center in the Soviet Union. In April 1934, Harpe set up a gunnery training course that soon evolved into the Panzer Gunnery School. Harpe was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1935 and commanded the 12th Cavalry Regiment, which evolved into the army's first motorized infantry regiment (later, with the addition of tanks, it became the 3rd Panzer Regiment).

Harpe was promoted to colonel in January 1937 and commanded the 1st Panzer Brigade at the outbreak of the war in September 1939. He was promoted to major general in August 1940 and commanded the newly formed 12th Panzer Division from its creation in 1940 to 1942. In July and August 1941 during the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA), the division participated in the great encirclement operations at Minsk (June 27–July 9, 1941) and Smolensk (July 10–August 5, 1941). Harpe's division was transferred to the Leningrad front in September 1941 and suffered heavy losses.

Harpe was promoted to lieutenant general in January 1942 and was assigned command of the XLI Army Corps. Six months later, he was promoted to general of panzer troops. In October 1943, he succeeded General Walther Model in command of the Ninth Army southeast of Minsk. Promoted to colonel general in April 1944, Harpe took command of the Fourth Panzer Army (Model's Army Group South) in May 1944. The next month, he succeeded Model as commander of Army Group South, renamed Army Group Northern Ukraine. It was renamed again as Army Group A in August 1944. To defend a long, thin front from the Carpathians in northeast Hungary to north of Warsaw, Harpe had only 400,000 troops and 1,136 tanks and assault guns.

The Red Army's massive Vistula-Oder Offensive that opened on January 12, 1945, quickly smashed through Harpe's overextended lines. Warsaw fell on January 17, and Adolf Hitler, seeking a scapegoat, replaced Harpe with Colonel General Ferdinand Schörner, one of his favorite officers. Harpe was recalled to duty on March 9, 1945, and assigned command of the Fifth Panzer Army, recently commanded by General of Panzer Troops Hasso E. von

Manteuffel. This marked the only time Harpe did not have a command on the Eastern Front. The Fifth Panzer Army, a skeleton of its former self, was entrapped in the Ruhr Pocket, and the Americans captured Harpe on April 17, 1945. He was released from captivity in 1948 and died in Nuremberg on March 14, 1968.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Kharkov, Battles of; Manteuffel, Hasso Eccard von; Minsk, Battle for; Model, Walther; Poland–East Prussia Campaign; Schörner, Ferdinand; Smolensk, Battle of

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Harriman, William Averell (1891–1986)

U.S. businessman, financier, and key U.S. diplomat posted to Great Britain and the Soviet Union during World War II. William Averell Harriman was born on November 15, 1891, in New York City. He was the son of Edward Henry Harriman, owner of the Union Pacific Railroad and one of the wealthiest men in the United States. The younger Harriman initially pursued a career as a venture capitalist and with Union Pacific. In 1920, he invested in German shipping, Soviet manganese mine concessions, and aviation. In 1931, he merged his investment firm with an established merchant bank to form Brown Brothers Harriman. From the late 1920s onward, a burgeoning interest in politics caused Harriman to support the Democrats and back President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies. Harriman held several posts in the National Recovery Administration and sought a World War II government job.

In March 1941, Roosevelt sent Harriman to London as a "defense expediter" to coordinate and facilitate the anticipated flood of American wartime supplies to Britain under the new Lend-Lease program. Harriman quickly established a warm and confidential relationship with Britain's wartime prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill. Harriman often bypassed U.S. ambassador John G. Winant to report directly to White House aide Harry Hopkins and serve as an unofficial liaison between Churchill and Roosevelt. In London, Harriman, although married, began a clandestine love affair with Churchill's daughter-in-law, Pamela Digby Churchill, who become his third wife in 1971.

When Germany invaded Russia on June 22, 1941, the United States extended Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, and dealings with Moscow likewise fell within Harriman's purview. In 1943, Harriman replaced Admiral William H. Standley as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, where he remained until 1946. He attended the major wartime Allied conferences at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. In late 1944, when Soviet troops allowed occupying German forces to suppress Polish rebels in Warsaw before themselves mopping up the remaining Germans, Harriman sent diplomatic dispatches to Washington sounding one of the earliest official warnings against future Soviet designs for the nations of Eastern Europe. The Soviet move was clearly deliberately designed to eliminate future opponents of a Soviet-backed Polish regime.

Harriman subsequently held numerous other government positions under Democratic presidents. Over the years, he gained the reputation of advocating a firm but flexible and nonalarmist stance toward the Soviet Union. Harriman died in Yorktown Heights, New York, on July 26, 1986.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Hopkins, Harry Lloyd; Lend-Lease; Potsdam Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; Warsaw Rising; Yalta Conference

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Harris, Sir Arthur Travers (1892–1984)

Royal Air Force (RAF) air chief marshal and commander of RAF Bomber Command. Born on April 13, 1892, in Cheltenham, England, Arthur Travers Harris joined a Rhodesian regiment at the beginning of World War I. In 1915, he transferred to the Royal Flying Corps and became a pilot, and by the end of the war he commanded the 44th Squadron. After the war, he served in India and Iraq and commanded a training school. He completed the Army Staff College (1927), again served in the Middle East, and then held posts at the Air Ministry (1933–1937).

On the outbreak of World War II, Harris commanded Number 5 Bomber Group. He then was deputy chief of the Air Staff and headed a mission to Washington. Dissatisfaction with the course of British strategic bombing led to his appointment in February 1942 as head of Bomber Command and his promotion to air chief marshal.

Harris committed himself to maintaining Bomber Command as an independent strategic arm. During May 30–31, 1942, he launched the first of the thousand-plane raids against Köln (Cologne), which did much to raise morale at home. Harris, who was nicknamed “Bomber,” maintained that massive bombing would break German civilian morale and bring about an end to the war. He ordered Bomber Command to conduct massive night raids against German cities. Among other missions, Harris directed the May 1943 raid on the Ruhr dams by the 617th Squadron; the July 24–August 3, 1943, raids against Hamburg; attacks against German rocket factories at Peenemünde during August 17–18, 1943; the November 1943 attacks against Berlin; and the destruction of Dresden (February 13–15, 1945).

Sir Arthur Harris, Royal Air Force air chief marshal and commander of Bomber Command. “Bomber Harris” argued that the Allied bombing of German cities would shorten the war. (Library of Congress)

Harris remains a controversial figure, especially because of his seeming lack of concern over collateral bomb damage. He was at odds with his superior, chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Charles Portal, and others who sought to target specific industries considered essential to the Nazi war effort. What appeared to be indiscriminate bombing of cities also brought harsh criticism on Harris at the end of the war. His aircrews, however, remained fiercely loyal to him.

Harris retired from the RAF in September 1945 and headed a South African shipping company. His memoir, *Bomber Offensive*, was published in 1947. Made a baronet in 1953, Harris died on April 5, 1984, at Goring-on-Thames, England.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Berlin, Air Battle of; Dresden, Air Attack on; Hamburg, Raids on; Köln, Raid on; Peenemünde; Portal, Sir Charles Frederick Algernon

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Hart, Thomas Charles (1877–1971)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Davison, Michigan, on June 12, 1877, Thomas Charles Hart graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1897 and was commissioned an ensign in 1899. He served during the 1898 Spanish-American War and commanded a force of seven submarines based in Ireland during World War I.

After the war, Hart commanded submarine and cruiser forces and the battleship *Mississippi.* He graduated from the Naval War College in 1923 and the Army War College in 1924. In 1929, Hart was promoted to rear admiral and took command of submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets from 1929 to 1931. He was superintendent of the Naval Academy from 1931 to 1934. He commanded a cruiser division of the Scouting Force from 1934 to 1936 and served as a member of the navy's General Board from 1936 to 1939.

U.S. admiral Thomas C. Hart. (Bernard Hoffman/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

In June 1939, Hart was promoted to full admiral and given command of the small U.S. Asiatic Fleet. During the next years, he accelerated fleet training and drills and made plans to defend the Philippine Islands and to cooperate with the British and Dutch in the event of war with Japan. Lacking the resources to counter the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 and denied air support from the U.S. Army's Far East Air Force, Hart sent his surface units to the Netherlands East Indies at the end of the month and moved his headquarters to Java.

In January 1942, Hart was appointed commander of the naval forces of the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, which was charged with defending the Netherlands East Indies. With his resources limited and no prospect of reinforcements, Hart had no chance of success. Moreover, the British and Dutch disagreed with his plans for using his ships.

At the end of January, Hart sent his cruisers and destroyers against Japanese forces in the Battle of Makassar Strait (February 4, 1942), but the Dutch wished to concentrate the ABDA Command's ships for the defense of Java. As a result, in February 1942, Hart relinquished his command to Vice Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich of the Netherlands navy and returned to the United States. Most of ABDA Command's ships were soon lost in the February 27, 1942, Battle of the Java Sea.

Hart served with the General Board until his retirement in February 1945, when he was appointed a U.S. senator from Connecticut, a position he held until 1947. Hart died in Sharon, Connecticut, on July 4, 1971.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

ABDA Command; Balikpapan, Battle of; Java Sea, Battle of; United States Navy

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Hartmann, Erich Alfred (1922–1993)

Luftwaffe fighter pilot, captain, and highest-scoring ace of all time. Born in Weissach, Germany, on April 19, 1922, Erich Hartmann grew up in an aviation-minded family. His mother learned to fly in 1929, and Hartmann was an avid glider pilot as a young man.

Hartmann joined the Luftwaffe in October 1940 and began his flight training in March 1941. At the time, the Luftwaffe was not desperate for pilots, and Hartmann was the beneficiary of nearly 19 months' training before his first posting. In October 1942, he reported to Staffel (squadron) 7, III Gruppe (group), Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing) 52 (7.III/JG52) on the

Eastern Front. The veterans nicknamed the youthful Hartmann “Bubi” (lad). Hartmann spent the next two and a half years in various units in JG52.

On his 19th sortie, Hartmann scored his first victory. He continued to score steadily, although he was shot down and captured after his 19th victory. He managed to escape and return to German lines. Hartmann continued to run up his score, and he was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross in October 1943 after 150 victories. By August 1944, he had doubled his total. He was awarded every level of the Knight’s Cross—Oak Leaves, Swords, and eventually Diamonds, Germany’s highest military award.

Known as the “Black Devil of the Ukraine” by his Soviet opponents in recognition of his skill and the paint scheme of his aircraft, Hartmann scored his 352nd and last victory on May 8, 1945. He surrendered his fighter group to a U.S. Army unit but was handed over to the Soviets. Tried and convicted as a war criminal, Hartmann was imprisoned until his repatriation in late 1955.

Hartmann joined the Federal Republic of Germany’s new Bundesluftwaffe in 1956 and was appointed commander of the newly formed JG71 Richthofen. He retired in 1970 as a colonel. In retirement, Hartmann remained active in German civilian aviation. He died on September 19, 1993, at Weil im Schönbuch.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Germany, Air Force

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Harwood, Sir Henry (1888–1950)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born in London on January 19, 1888, Henry Harwood joined the Royal Navy in 1903 and quickly distinguished himself academically. A torpedo specialist, between the wars he held numerous staff posts, studied at various service schools, and was fleet torpedo officer in the Mediterranean. In 1936 Harwood, who was promoted to captain in 1928, became commodore in chief of the South American division of the fleet's America and West Indies station.

When World War II began in 1939, the Admiralty sent Harwood additional ships and ordered him to seek out the German pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee,* which was raiding British merchant shipping in the South Atlantic. On December 13, 1939, Harwood located the German raider off the Uruguayan coast in the Río de la Plata estuary, and his ships—the heavy cruiser *Exeter* and the light cruisers *Ajax* (flagship) and *Achilles*—closed in from different directions. Although theoretically outclassed, in 20 minutes the British attackers scored more than 20 hits on the *Admiral Graf Spee,* causing more than 100 casualties, including 37 dead. Harwood's ships sustained major damage, particularly the *Exeter,* and the British lost 71 men.

German captain Hans Langsdorff then took the *Admiral Graf Spee* into the neutral Uruguayan port of Montevideo to effect repairs. Bluffed into believing that a larger British force awaited him, a few days later Langsdorff scuttled his ship and committed suicide.

Harwood was promoted to rear admiral on December 13, 1939, and knighted for this action. A year later, he returned to Britain as assistant chief of naval staff. He impressed British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who in April 1942 appointed him—above his rank—to commander in chief of Mediterranean naval forces. Harwood provided aggressive flank cover and logistical support to the British Eighth Army in North Africa in its campaigns against German field marshal Erwin Rommel's forces, on occasion entering and occupying ports abandoned by German troops even before the arrival of Allied land forces.

Harwood was promoted to vice admiral in February 1943. By that time his health was fragile, and the Admiralty transferred him to the less demanding Orkney Islands and Shetland command. Invalided from the navy in 1945 with the rank of admiral, Harwood died at Goring-on-Thames on June 9, 1950.

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm; North Africa Campaign; Río de la Plata, Battle of

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Hasbrouck, Robert Wilson (1896–1985)

U.S. Army major general. Born in Kingston, New York, on February 2, 1896, Robert Hasbrouck graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1917 and was commissioned in the coast artillery. He served with the American Expeditionary Forces in France in 1918. Hasbrouck was an instructor at the Field Artillery School from 1921 to 1924 and a professor of military science and tactics at Princeton University from 1927 to 1932. He graduated from the Army Command and General Staff School in 1934 and from the Army War College in 1937. He then served on the War Department General Staff (1937–1941).

Assigned to the 1st Armored Division, Hasbrouk was promoted to brigadier general in September 1942. He served with the 8th Armored Division at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and at Fort Polk, Louisiana (1942–1943). He was then deputy chief of staff of the 12th Army Group in Britain in 1943 and 1944.

Hasbrouck then commanded the 7th Armored Division, which he led in the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). On December 16, Hasbrouck was ordered to move his division some 60 miles southward to reinforce Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges's First Army. The following day, Hasbrouck's division reached the village of Saint Vith, a strategic crossroads near the Belgian-German border and on the

northern shoulder of the bulge created by the German thrust. Junior to two other officers in the area, Hasbrouck nevertheless stepped forward to take de facto command of a force composed of his own division and elements of the 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions and the 9th Armored Division. During the next several days, his skillful defense of Saint Vith greatly impeded the German westward advance. But Hasbrouck also reminded his superiors that his beleaguered troops needed to be either strongly reinforced or withdrawn before they were overwhelmed. Eventually, Hasbrouck secured approval to evacuate Saint Vith on December 23.

Promoted to major general in January 1945, Hasbrouck led the 7th Armored Division in the recapture of Saint Vith, the Remagen bridgehead breakout, the reduction of the Ruhr Pocket, and the advance from the Elbe River to the Baltic.

Hasbrouck returned to the United States after the war and became deputy chief of staff for Army Ground Forces (1945–1946). He retired in 1947 and died in Washington, D.C., on August 19, 1985.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the; Ruhr Land Campaign

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Hasegawa Kiyoshi (1883–1970)

Japanese admiral. Born on May 7, 1883, in Fukui Prefecture on Honshu, Hasegawa Kiyoshi entered the Japanese Naval Academy in 1900. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, he served in the battleship *Mikasa* (flagship) and took part in the Battle of Tsushima. Hasegawa graduated from

the Naval War College in 1914 and was appointed captain of the destroyer *Mikazuki.* He was then a staff officer of the Second Fleet, a member of the Personnel Section in the Naval Ministry, adjutant to the minister of the navy, and a secretary to Prime Minister Katō Tomosaburō.

From 1917 to 1920 and from 1923 to 1925, Hasegawa was a naval attaché in the Japanese embassy in Washington. After serving as captain of first the cruiser *Nisshin* and then the battleship *Nagato,* he became chief of staff of the Yokosuka Naval District in 1927.

In 1937, Hasegawa assumed command of the Third Fleet. When in July the Sino-Japanese War began, he held the dual command of the Third Fleet and the China Area Fleet. His forces took a leading role in the August 13–November 9, 1937, Battle of Shanghai. In 1938 he was assigned as commander of the Yokosuka Naval District. He was promoted to full admiral in 1939.

From 1940 to 1944, Hasegawa served as governor-general of Formosa (now Taiwan). In this post, he promoted Kominka-Kyoiku (Japanization) in an effort to assimilate the Taiwanese into Japanese culture. In 1944 he became a member of the Gunji Sangikan (the Supreme War Council advising the emperor) and inspector of the navy. In this position in February 1945, Hasegawa undertook a detailed study of navy morale and resources. His bleak report, presented to Emperor Hirohito that June, is believed to have greatly influenced the latter's decision to surrender.

Hasegawa was arrested with the end of the war. Initially charged as a Class A war criminal, he was soon released. Hasegawa died in Tokyo on September 2, 1970.

HASEGAWA REI

See also

Japan, Navy; Shanghai, Battle of

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Hashimoto Kingoro (1890–1957)

Japanese Army colonel. Born in Okayama City on February 19, 1890, Hashimoto Kingoro joined the army in 1911 and graduated from the Army Staff College in 1920. He then served in Manchuria with the Guandong (Kwantung) Army from 1922 to 1925. Hashimoto believed that Japan's future demanded territorial expansion, and he was attracted to nationalist organizations promoting that cause. While in Manchuria, Hashimoto helped to plan the Mukden Incident, in which elements of the Japanese military staged an attack on their own interests, then used it as an excuse to seize most of Manchuria. This led to the establishment by Japan of the puppet state of Manzhoudiguo (Manzhouguo, Manchukuo).

Hashimoto held various regimental assignments in Japan between 1931 and 1935. During this time, he continued his extremist nationalist activities. In 1930, Hashimoto and Captain Isamu Cho founded the Sakurakai, or Cherry Blossom Society, to promote Japanese imperialism. Hashimoto also published widely; his writings became the philosophical basis for most Japanese extreme nationalists. Hashimoto attracted many followers, especially among midlevel army officers. He was cashiered from the Japanese Army for his involvement in the attempted coup on February 26, 1936.

When war with China began in July 1937, Hashimoto was recalled to active duty. Promoted to colonel, he received command of the 13th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. Hashimoto was implicated in atrocities committed in Nanjing (Nanking) during December 13, 1937–January 22, 1938. He also ordered his troops to fire on the British gunboat *Ladybird* and on the U.S. Navy gunboat *Panay*. Despite Western protests, Hashimoto retained his command until 1939.

On his retirement from the army, Hashimoto dedicated himself to political activities. He organized and led the Dai Nippon Seinen-to (Great Japan Youth Party), later known as the Dai Nippon Sekisei-kai (Great Japan Sincerity Association). Hashimoto also became executive director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in 1940. He was elected to the Diet (parliament) in 1944.

After World War II, Hashimoto was tried as a war criminal for his part in atrocities in China and in promoting aggressive war. Sentenced to life imprisonment, he was paroled in 1954. Hashimoto died in Tokyo on June 29, 1957.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Japan; Japan, Army; Nanjing Massacre; *Panay* Incident

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Hashimoto Mochitsura (1909–2000)

Japanese Navy officer who rose to the rank of commander. Born in Kyoto, Japan, on October 14, 1909, Hashimoto Mochitsura graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1931. His first assignment to submarine duty came in 1934, followed by tours in destroyers and escort vessels. Hashimoto attended torpedo school in 1938 and submarine school in 1939. He served as torpedo officer in the *I-24*, one of Japan's newest ocean-cruising submarines.

On November 18, 1941, the *I-24* sailed under secret orders. Arriving off Hawaii on December 6, it launched its midget submarine early on December 7 as part of the Pearl Harbor attack force. The crew of the *I-24* spent the following days looking unsuccessfully for targets and then returned to Japan.

Hashimoto next attended advanced courses at the Submarine School. On his graduation in July 1942, he took command of the *RO-31*, a coastal defense submarine. He spent the next two years in training and other noncombat duties. In May 1944, Hashimoto was given command of the *I-58*, a new boat that was modified in the fall of 1944 to carry six Kaitens (manned torpedoes). Commissioned on September 13, 1944, the *I-58* then commenced sea trials. Hashimoto's first war patrol was in January 1945. Along with other Japanese submarines, the *I-58* attacked U.S. shipping off Guam on January

11, 1945. Following the launch of four Kaitens, Hashimoto claimed a tanker sunk, although the attack had in fact failed.

Hashimoto's next patrol was off Okinawa. His submarine was unable to attack U.S. shipping because of the many U.S. planes, but the *I-58* was the only Japanese submarine to return from Okinawa. The *I-58*'s final patrol began on July 16. With six Kaitens, Hashimoto was ordered to harass U.S. communications. He patrolled along the Guam-Leyte shipping routes, and on July 30 he spotted what turned out to be the heavy cruiser *Indianapolis,* commanded by Captain Charles McVay III. It was steaming unescorted after delivering parts of atomic bombs and was not zigzagging. Hashimoto launched six torpedoes and scored three hits. The *Indianapolis* sank quickly. Of 1,200 men in its crew, more than 900 survived the sinking; but they were not discovered by rescuers for four days, by which time 600 more had died, largely from shark attacks. Hashimoto later testified at McVay's court-martial that he would have been able to sink the *Indianapolis* even if it had been taking evasive action.

Hashimoto retired from the navy at the end of the war and became a Shinto priest. He died at Kyoto on October 25, 2000.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Indianapolis, Sinking of; Japan, Navy; Submarines; Submarines, Midget

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Hata Shunroku (1879–1962)

Japanese Army field marshal. Born in Fukushima Prefecture on July 26, 1879, Hata Shunroku was at age 14 accepted into the prestigious First Tokyo Middle School, but when his father died that year, the family was unable to afford the tuition, and Hata transferred to the Army Cadet School. In 1901 he

graduated from the Japanese Military Academy as a second lieutenant of artillery.

Hata saw service in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and graduated with honors from the Army War College in 1910. Assigned to Germany in 1912 as a military attaché, Hata remained in Europe throughout World War I as a military observer. He was promoted to major in 1914 and to lieutenant colonel in 1918. He was then a member of the Japanese delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

Returning to Japan, Hata was promoted to colonel in 1921 when he took command of the 16th Field Artillery Regiment. Promoted to major general in 1926, he took command of the 4th Heavy Field Artillery Brigade. In 1927 he joined the Imperial General Staff as chief of the Fourth Bureau, then headed the First Bureau in 1928. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1931, when he became inspector general of army artillery training. In 1933 he assumed command of the 14th Division, and in 1935 he headed the Army Air Service before taking command of Japanese forces in Taiwan in 1936.

Hata played a prominent role in the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945. Promoted to full general in late 1937, he assumed command of the Central China Expeditionary Army in February 1938 following the Nanjing Massacre. In May 1939 he became senior aide-de-camp to Emperor Hirohito before serving as minister of war from August 1939 to July 1940, when by his resignation he brought down Prime Minister Yonai Mitsumasa's cabinet.

In March 1941 Hata assumed command of the China Expeditionary Army. Promoted to field marshal in June 1944, Hata assumed command of the Second General Army headquartered at Hiroshima, charged with preparing for the anticipated Allied invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. Hata was a key figure in supporting Hirohito's decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender. Hata informed the imperial conference of August 9, 1945, that he had no confidence in being able to repulse an Allied landing. He also requested to be removed from the rank of field marshal because of the army's failures in the war.

Arrested after the war by U.S. authorities and charged with war crimes, Hata was tried in 1948 and sentenced to life imprisonment but paroled in 1955. From 1958 he headed a charitable foundation established to aid former Japanese soldiers. Hata died in Tokyo on May 10, 1962. He was the last

surviving Japanese field marshal. His brother, Hata Eiraro, was also a general and commanded the Kwantung Army.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Potsdam Conference; Sino-Japanese War

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Haushofer, Karl Ernst (1869–1946)

German geopolitical theorist. Born in Munich on August 27, 1869, Karl Haushofer was the son of a university professor of political economy. He joined the army in 1887 and attended the Bavarian Kriegsakademie, eventually becoming an instructor there. In 1899, he was appointed to the Bavarian General Staff. Four years later, he went to Tokyo as an artillery adviser to the Imperial Japanese Army. Haushofer earned his doctorate from the University of Munich in 1913 with a dissertation based on his analysis of Japanese military expansion. In doing so, he virtually created the field of geopolitics, which examines the influence geographic factors exert on national power.

Haushofer commanded a reserve division during World War I, attaining the rank of major general. After the armistice, he resigned from the army, and in 1921 he became a professor of geography at the University of Munich. Within two years, he had established the Institute for Geopolitics, which published several internationally respected journals.

In 1924, Rudolf Hess, one of Haushofer's former students, convinced him to visit Adolf Hitler, who was serving a prison term in Landsberg Fortress for his leadership of the abortive 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. Throughout the summer and fall, Haushofer repeatedly met with Hitler, educating him in the nuances of geopolitics. Hitler directly incorporated these ideas into his book *Mein*

Kampf, especially the notion that Germany needed to acquire *Lebensraum* (living space) to ensure its national survival.

With Hitler's rise to power, however, professional geographers at the Institute for Geopolitics were replaced by political hacks, and its scientific journals were transformed into mouthpieces for Nazi propaganda. Haushofer became increasingly disenchanted as his discipline was hijacked. The final break occurred in 1941, when Hitler ordered an invasion of the Soviet Union before Britain was defeated, violating Haushofer's sternest admonition against fighting a two-front war.

As the war turned against Germany, Haushofer's son Albrecht became involved with the secret opposition movement against Hitler. When the July 20, 1944, assassination attempt failed to kill Hitler, the Gestapo executed Albrecht and sent most of the Haushofer family to the Dachau concentration camp. Grief-stricken over the loss of their son, guilt-ridden for his role in causing Germany's destruction, and fearing punishment in a war crimes trial, Haushofer and his wife committed suicide at Hartschimmelhof, Bavaria, on March 10, 1946.

JOHN P. VANZO

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Hess, Walter Richard Rudolf; Hitler, Adolf

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Hausser, Paul "Papa" (1880–1972)

German Schutzstaffel (SS) general. Born on October 7, 1880, in Brandenburg, Paul Hausser joined the army and was commissioned a lieutenant in 1899. He served during World War I as a staff officer on both the Western and Eastern fronts and rose to the rank of major in 1918. Hausser joined the Reichswehr after the war but retired in 1932 as lieutenant general.

He joined the Nazi SS in 1934 and, as an inspector for its academies, helped train the armed SS units, the nucleus of the Waffen-SS.

In October 1939, Hausser commanded one of the two new SS combat divisions (Waffen-SS) and led this division, known as Das Reich, in campaigns in France (May 10–June 25, 1940) and Yugoslavia (1941) and on the Eastern Front in the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA), where he was wounded and lost an eye. Returning to active duty, from June 1942 to June 1944 he commanded the first SS corps formation, I SS Panzer Corps (later II Panzer Corps). During the Third Battle of Kharkov (March 1–14, 1943), Hausser ignored Adolf Hitler's directives and ordered a retreat. Hausser was criticized for this decision, but was able to save his troops from annihilation and then retake Kharkov, which contributed significantly to the stabilization of the German front. He also participated in the July 5–13 Battle of Kursk.

Transferred to France in June 1944, Hausser took command of the Seventh Army, which defended against the Allied invasion of Normandy (June 6). Hausser was seriously wounded in August during the desperate escape of his army at Falaise. He was promoted to Oberstgruppenführer and full general of the Waffen-SS in January 1945.

Hauser's last command, dating from January 28, was of Army Group G in the southern part of the German Western Front. He tried to organize an effective resistance against the advancing Allies, but it was impossible to meet Hitler's expectations, and the führer removed him from command on April 4, 1945. Hausser spent the remainder of the war on the staff of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, commander in chief, west. Hausser is generally regarded as the most militarily accomplished of the Waffen-SS generals.

Imprisoned in May 1945, Hausser was not released until 1948. In the postwar Federal Republic of Germany, he became the leader of Waffen-SS veterans. An author, Hausser insisted in his books that his men had been "soldiers as any others." Hausser died at Ludwigsburg, Germany, on December 21, 1972.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Alsace Campaign; Avranches, Battle of; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Dietrich, Josef "Sepp"; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; France, Battle for; France

Campaign; Germany, Collapse of; Hitler, Adolf; Kesselring, Albert; Kharkov, Battles of; Kursk, Battle of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Waffen-SS; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of

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Hauteclocque, Count Philippe de

See Leclerc, Jacques Philippe

Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Erik (1917–2007)

Highly decorated Dutch soldier and best-selling author. Born in Surabaya, Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), on April 3, 1917, Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema later moved with his family to the Netherlands. Days after the German invasion in May 1940, Hazelhoff Roelfzema was on a freighter bound for New York. When his ship was a stopped by a British warship, he persuaded its captain to allow him to go to Britain instead. There he volunteered for the Dutch section of MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service and was soon assigned to lead a series of 15 highly dangerous small-boat missions off the Dutch coast that inserted and extracted Allied agents. In the summer of 1942 Queen Wilhelmina, head of the Dutch government-in-exile in Britain, awarded Hazelhoff Roelfzema the Militaire Willemsorde (the Military Order of William), the highest Dutch award for valor.

Hazelhoff Roelfzema then joined Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF), attended flight school in Canada, and learned to fly the wooden construction twin-engine De Havilland Mosquito, piloting this aircraft beginning in 1944

on 72 Pathfinder missions over Germany. The Pathfinder missions involved firing rockets to illuminate targets for British bombers. Twenty-five of these missions were over Berlin. For this work, he received the RAF's Distinguished Flying Cross.

In April 1945, Hazelhoff Roelfzema became aide-de-camp to Queen Wilhelmina. He moved to the United States in the early 1950s. Becoming a citizen, he wrote for both the National Broadcast Corporation (NBC) and Radio Free Europe before moving to Hawaii, where in 1977 he joined the board of Barnwell Industries, an oil and gas exploration company.

In 1971 Hazelhoff Roelfzema published a book on his wartime experiences that included information on turmoil within the Dutch government-in-exile. Titled *De Soldaat van Oranje zwaait af* (Soldier of Orange) and so named for the ruling House of Orange, the book made him an instant celebrity and became an international best seller, with more than 1 million copies printed. Later it was made into a movie of the same title. Hazelhoff Roelfzema died in Anualoa, Hawaii, on September 26, 2007.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Netherlands; Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands

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Hedgehog

Antisubmarine weapon. The hedgehog was an important British development in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II between the Allies and German U-boats. Instead of depth charges being dropped astern of a warship at the point where sonar contact with the U-boat was lost, the hedgehog was installed ahead of the bridge. Much thought had been given to the possibility of a forward-throwing depth charge launcher, and the Department of

Miscellaneous Weapons Development eventually came up with a multiple mortar to project 24 bombs, each with a 31-pound high-explosive charge. The projectiles were fired electrically from a platform on the ship's deck from inclined spigots; it was the appearance of the 24 spigots that gave the weapon its nickname.

When fired, the bombs spread out in a circular arc about 130 feet in diameter over the bows of the launching ship and fell into the water some 215 yards ahead. The bombs were fitted with contact fuzes so that only a submarine hit would produce an explosion. The remaining bombs sank to the bottom of the sea.

Conceived by Royal Navy commander Charles Goodeve, the hedgehog was pushed by a group of young British naval officers and scientists. Neither the director of naval ordnance nor the director of naval construction was enthusiastic about the new weapon. The hedgehog finally went to sea operationally in January 1942. For security reasons, it was first known as "anti–dive-bombing equipment."

Early hedgehogs had problems. The charges of one exploded prematurely, heavily damaging a British ship. On occasion a projectile would not fire, presenting a potential danger for crewmen trying to remove it. For sailors used to the explosion of depth charges the new weapon was a disappointment, since even depth charges that missed shook the morale of U-boat crews and bolstered that of merchant seamen and naval personnel. Escort captains were so reluctant to use hedgehogs in early 1943 that the Royal Navy was forced to issue an order instructing captains to report why they did not use the weapon on an underwater contact.

Based on British 1943–1945 experience in the Atlantic, a single hedgehog salvo had a 20 percent chance of sinking a U-boat. Hedgehogs claimed 50 submarine kills by 1945. In the Pacific theater, the U.S. destroyer escort *England* sank 6 Japanese submarines with 12 hedgehog salvos.

COLIN F. BAXTER

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; *England,* U.S. Navy Destroyer Escort

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Heinrichs, Axel Erik (1890–1965)

Finnish Army general and chief of staff of the armed forces. Born on July 21, 1890, at Helsinki, Axel Heinrichs was selected in 1915 for infantry training with the Finnish Jäger Battalion in Germany. In 1918 Heinrichs joined others at Vaasa, Finland, and fought in the Russian Civil War on the side of the Whites. As a major, Heinrichs commanded an infantry battalion that captured Tampere and Viipuri (Vyborg). After the civil war, Heinrichs held several administrative positions including command of a regiment in central Finland, commander of the Savo Brigade, head of the War College in Helsinki, governor of Vaasa Province, and commander of the 1st Division.

At the start of the Winter War with the Soviet Union (the First Finnish-Soviet War of 1939–1940), Heinrichs commanded III Corps and helped to stop the invading Red Army at Taipale. In February 1940, he assumed command of the Karelian Army and liberated the Karelia-Ladoga region. The next month he was promoted to commander of Finnish land forces. In January 1942, Heinrichs was promoted to chief of the General Staff for the Second Finnish-Soviet War (Continuation War, the resumption of fighting with the Soviet Union that lasted from 1941 until 1944). In 1944, he was awarded the Mannerheim Cross and promoted to general of infantry.

In August 1944, Marshal Carl G. Mannerheim became president of Finland. At the end of 1944, he gave Heinrichs complete charge of military affairs as commander in chief of Finnish armed forces. Heinrichs served in that post for less than a year before being forced to resign in the summer of 1945, accused of hiding significant weaponry and creating an organization for guerrilla war as part of the “underground defense policy” immediately after the war.

Closely associated with Mannerheim, Heinrichs was the ghostwriter for the marshal’s memoirs covering the civil war, the 1930s, and the

Continuation War. He also wrote two books on the Napoleonic Wars. Heinrichs died in Helsinki, Finland, on November 16, 1965.

SPENCER E. ROBBINS III

See also

Finland; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von

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Heinrici, Gotthard (1886–1971)

German Army general. Born in Gumbinnen, East Prussia (today Gusev, Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia), on December 25, 1886, Gotthard Heinrici entered the German Army with the Thuringian 95th Infantry Regiment and was commissioned a lieutenant in August 1906. He was promoted to senior lieutenant in 1914 and to captain in 1915. During World War I, he served on both the Eastern and Western Fronts in both line and staff duties.

Following the war, Heinrici remained in the army, and he returned to East Prussia as a company commander in the 13th Infantry Regiment. He was promoted to major in 1926, to lieutenant colonel in 1932, to colonel in March 1933, and to major general in January 1936. He commanded the 16th Infantry Division at Münster from October 1937 to February 1940 and was promoted to lieutenant general in March 1938. The division fought in the invasion of Poland in September 1939.

Heinrici was promoted to general of infantry in April 1940 and commanded XII Army Corps from April to June 1940, participating with his unit in the May 10–June 25 Battle for France. He then commanded XLIII Army Corps (June 1940–January 1942), first on the Western Front and then in Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union that began on June 22, 1941.

In January 1942, Heinrici replaced Field Marshal Günther von Kluge as commander of the Fourth Army when Kluge was elevated to command Army

Group Center. Promoted to colonel general in January 1943, Heinrici commanded the Fourth Army until June 1944. Heinrici's forces held a line from Orsha to Rogachev, and between October and December 1943 he successfully halted several Soviet offensives, bringing in a fresh battalion every day to an endangered area. Heinrici was considered a master of defensive warfare, and his army is believed to have withstood forces six times greater in size.

Heinrici contracted hepatitis in May 1944 and was transferred to the Führer Reserve in June, escaping the disaster that befell Army Group Center during Operation BAGRATION. On his return to active service in mid-August 1944, he took command of the First Panzer Army. The so-called Army Group Heinrici consisted of this unit and the Hungarian First Army. Heinrici quickly put his defensive stamp on events and kept the Red Army from capturing Dukla Pass until October 6, 1944, by which time the Germans had crushed a Slovak uprising and stabilized the front. During the next few months, Heinrici withdrew his forces in good order into Silesia during the Vistula-Oder Campaign.

Heinrici replaced SS chief Heinrich Himmler as commander of Army Group Vistula on March 20, 1945, following Himmler's brief but disastrous tenure. With the decimated Third Panzer Army and Ninth Army, Heinrici held the Oder River line and masterfully defended Seelow Heights against overwhelming odds, but he was unable to stem the Soviet tide. He disagreed with Adolf Hitler's führer order to hold at all costs and, following an unauthorized withdrawal of forces, was dismissed on April 29, 1945.

Heinrici surrendered to British forces. Released from imprisonment in May 1948, he contributed two reports in the postwar German Military History Program. Many regarded him as one of the best German generals of the war. Heinrici died in Waiblingen, Baden-Württemberg, on December 13, 1971.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Berlin, Land Battle for; France, Battle for; Germany, Collapse of; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von

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Heisenberg, Werner (1901–1976)

German nuclear physicist. Born in Würzburg, Germany, on December 5, 1901, Werner Heisenberg graduated from the University of Munich in 1923 with a doctorate in physics. Heisenberg subsequently established a reputation as a talented scientist. One of his greatest accomplishments was his theory of quantum mechanics, for which he won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1932. By the late 1930s, despite being an opponent of the Nazi regime, Heisenberg was the leader of the German project to manufacture an atomic weapon.

This endeavor, known as the Uranverein, occupied Heisenberg throughout the war. The project was not successful, but the cause of its failure is still a matter of debate. Heisenberg claimed after the war that he had tried to impede the project to deny Germany an atomic bomb, which many scholars contest. A principal cause of the project's failure was a lack of resources. The dearth of material and the resulting slow progress in research led to a mid-1942 report to Adolf Hitler that projected the development of a German atomic bomb as several years in the future. Convinced that Germany would not be able to deploy such a weapon during the war, Hitler took little interest in the project.

German physicist Werner Heisenberg directed the German World War II effort to build an atomic bomb. (Library of Congress)

Following the defeat of Germany, Heisenberg was among those German physicists briefly imprisoned in Britain by the Allies. In 1946 he was allowed to return to Germany and resume his scientific endeavors at the Institute for Physics (Göttingen), later known as the Max Planck Institute for Physics (Munich). Heisenberg died in Munich on February 1, 1976.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Nuclear Weapons

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Helicopters

Helicopters are a type of aircraft supported by the aerodynamic lift created by one or more engine-driven rotors, essentially rotating wings or blades that allow the craft to take off and land almost vertically. The interest in helicopters came about because of their highly valued ability to ascend and descend in relatively small areas.

A canteen worker handing a cup of tea to the pilot of a Sikorsky R-4 helicopter hovering overhead at the RAF Helicopter School in Andover in January 1945. (Fox Photos/Getty Images)

Certainly one of the first designs for a helicopter-like craft was by artist and inventor Leonardo da Vinci in the 15th century. Three hundred years later, in 1783, inspired by a "flying top" toy brought from China, two Frenchmen—Christian de Launoy and his mechanic—built a working model

of a vertical-flight machine. In the mid-19th century, British nobleman Sir George Cayley built a full-size, unpowered heloglider that flew a few feet with his coachman aboard.

These early designs had two problems: their flight was uncontrolled, and they lacked a source of power for sustained flight. With the advent of gasoline engines and shortly after the first heavier-than-air flight of Orville and Wilbur Wright, French inventor Charles Renard built a small helicopter that flew pilotless. He was followed in 1907 by Louis Breguet and Paul Cornu, who each built a manned machine that lifted off the ground, but both suffered from control problems. In 1909, before turning his inventive powers to producing large fixed-wing aircraft for the Russian czar, Igor Sikorsky experimented with rudimentary helicopters, but he was unable to solve control and stability problems.

Between 1916 and 1918, Austrian lieutenant Stefan Petroczy and Theodore von Karman designed and built two prototype vertical-lift machines for the Central Powers during World War I. The second made more than 30 successful flights before it crashed. The war ended before a third could be built. The designers of these machines handled problems of control and stability by tethering the machines to cables anchored to the ground.

During the 1920s, a Frenchman named Douhéret, the American father-and-son team of Emile and Henry Berliner, and George de Bothezat, a Russian under American contract, all produced vertical-lift machines. Their efforts were disappointing because of stability and control problems. In 1923, Spanish engineer Juan de la Cierva solved one instability problem—caused by the retreating blade producing less lift than the advancing blade—by hinging the blades for more flexibility. Although Cierva’s invention was a rotary-wing aircraft, it was not a true helicopter. It was an autogiro or gyroplane that depended on a propeller to provide horizontal movement while the unpowered rotating wings provided the lift. As working rotary-wing aircraft, autogiros held the field through the late 1920s and early 1930s.

The first true helicopters appeared in the 1930s in the United States, France, and Germany. In France, Louis Breguet and René Dorand built a twin-rotor helicopter that set the speed record in 1935 and the endurance and distance records in 1936. In 1937, Heinrich Focke’s helicopter set new records for time aloft, speed, distance, and altitude. Igor Sikorsky, who had

immigrated to the United States in 1919, made his maiden helicopter flight in a craft of his own design in 1939.

Despite these successes, more autogiros than helicopters were used during World War II. Japan and the Soviet Union used autogiros in a limited role in support of their ground forces, and the Japanese employed some in service with their navy for antisubmarine warfare and liaison. Britain deployed a few to France for observation and communications duties in 1939, but the defeat of France ended those activities.

The U.S. military program to develop helicopters began in the late 1930s and fell under the direction of the Army Air Corps. While other services—primarily the navy—looked into the possibility of helicopter use, in May 1942 the Army Air Forces took delivery of the first practical helicopter put into military service, a Sikorsky R-4.

Helicopters had no real impact in World War II. The German Army used a small number of them for reconnaissance, supply, transport, and casualty evacuation, and the navy employed them for shipboard reconnaissance and antisubmarine patrol. By the end of the war, more than 100 Sikorsky R-4 helicopters had been delivered to the U.S. Army Air Forces, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Coast Guard and to Britain's Royal Air Force and its Fleet Air Arm. These were used in experiments, primarily antisubmarine warfare, and for search-and-rescue operations. In April 1944, one of the four U.S. Army Air Forces R-4s sent to India for experimentation rescued four men from an airplane crash site in Burma behind Japanese lines.

By the end of the war, many believed that the helicopter was too fragile and vulnerable for the battlefield and too difficult to maintain. Despite its tentative beginnings, in later wars the helicopter would revolutionize military operations by providing entrance to and exit from the battlefield by air while nearly uninhibited by terrain.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Air-Sea Rescue; Antisubmarine Warfare

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Hell Ships (1944–1945)

Japanese ships used to transport U.S. and other Allied prisoners of war at the end of World War II. Although the Japanese had previously transferred prisoners by ship, in the fall of 1944, U.S. forces led by General Douglas MacArthur invaded the Philippine Islands, and the Japanese dispatched ships to remove the Allied prisoners of war (POWs) from the islands to concentration camps in Japan, Manchuria, Taiwan, and Korea. These prison ships, referred to later by the Americans as hell ships, were but one example of the inhumane conditions in which the Japanese kept Allied POWs during the war.

In violation of the rules of war, Japanese troop- and weapons-carrying ships often were marked with a red cross to shield them from attack. The hell ships, which should have been so marked, carried no designation that they were transporting prisoners of war, and consequently several of them fell victim to Allied submarine and aircraft attack.

Conditions on these ships were indeed hellish. In many instances, the Japanese packed as many as 1,000 prisoners into a ship that should have carried perhaps 250. The holds were so crowded that it was impossible to lie down, and there was insufficient fresh air, food, and water. The heat in the holds was often unbearable, and the small number of buckets allotted for human waste quickly overflowed, causing hundreds of cases of dysentery. In these circumstances, many prisoners suffocated or went insane. The Japanese often refused to allow the prisoners to bury their dead at sea.

Casualties on the unmarked hell ships were often horrendous, the consequence of Allied attacks. Only 8 men out of 1,782 survived the October 24, 1944, torpedo attack on the *Arisan Maru.* Prisoners attempting to swim away from the sinking ship were shot by their Japanese captors from above decks. On September 18, 1944, only 200 prisoners of 750 survived a British submarine torpedo attack on the *Shinyo Maru.* In the autumn of 1944, more

than 4,000 Allied prisoners were killed or drowned aboard hell ships sunk by Allied submarines.

JOHN O. NOONAN

See also

Japan, Navy; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Prisoners of War

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He Long (1896–1969)

Chinese Army general. Born in Sangzhi (Song-chih), Hunan Province, on March 22, 1896, He Long (Ho Lung) began his military career in 1914 by raising a voluntary revolutionary army in his native province. In 1920 the personal army became a part of the National Revolutionary Army and participated in the Northern Expedition. In late 1926 He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and in April 1927 took command of a corps in the Red Army. In July 1927 He attended a meeting in Jiujiang (Kiukiang) in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province with Zhu De (Chu Teh), Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), and others to plan a response to the anti-Communist program begun by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). They planned the unsuccessful Nanchang Uprising in Jiangxi, which marks the beginning of an independent Chinese Communist military tradition.

After suffering defeat in the Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) Fourth "Encirclement Campaign," He's forces belatedly joined the Long March to northwest China in 1935, a year after Zhu and Mao had broken out. When the Eighth Route Army was formed in 1937, He commanded its 120th Division. During the Second Sino-Japanese War his command responsibilities grew steadily. In 1943 He was named commander

of the United Defense Headquarters at Yan'an (Yenan) in Shaanxi (Shensi) province and given overall responsibility for the defense of the Shaanxi-Gansu (Kansu)-Ningxia (Nainghsia) and the Shanxi (Shansi)-Suiyuan (an old province constituting today's central Inner Mongolia) border areas. He was concurrently commander of the 120th Division and the Yan'an Garrison Army.

As with many Communist military commanders in the 1930s and 1940s, He came to question Mao's emphasis on ideological guerrilla warfare in the face of the conventional tactics of both GMD and Japanese opponents. He was able to expand Communist control of territory by taking advantage of the confusion brought about by the Japanese ICHI-GO offensive of 1944. More frequently, however, expansion was achieved by alliance with local guerrillas.

In 1945 He was elected to the Party Central Committee and served as commander of the First Field Army in southwest China during the civil war. He rose in both the political and military hierarchies of the new regime and in 1955 was named a marshal of the People's Republic of China. He retired in January 1967 and died in Beijing (Peking) on June 9, 1969.

ERROL MACGREGOR CLAUSS

See also

China; China, Army; ICHI-GO, Operation; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Sino-Japanese War

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Hermann, Hans-Joachim "Hajo" (1913–2010)

German Air Force colonel. Born in Kiel on August 1, 1913, Hans-Joachim Hermann grew up with an interest in sailing but was unable to secure a naval commission. He then turned to the army and began training as an infantry officer before transferring to the newly formed Luftwaffe in 1935. His first

combat experience was with the Kondor Legion flying Junkers Ju-52s during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. He returned from Spain in 1937 and joined Kampfgeschwader (bomber wing) 4 (KG4). During the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, Hermann was promoted to captain and took command of Staffel (squadron) 7 KG4 (7.KG4). He was then promoted to major and took command of III Gruppe (group) KG30 (III/KG30).

By the summer of 1943, the Royal Air Force Bomber Command had discovered how to jam German radar and in consequence had gained the upper hand in the night skies over Germany. Hermann suggested that the Germans counter this by allowing single-engine fighters, without benefit of radar, to attack the bombers over the cities where searchlights would illuminate the bombers. Hermann called his unit the Wilde Saus (Wild Boars) for its slashing, aggressive attacks. These proved so successful that Reich Marshal Hermann Göring authorized the formation of three Jagdgeschwaders (fighter wings) of Wilde Saus. This change in tactics could not turn the tide of the air war, however.

Hermann ended the war in command of Rammkommando Elbe, an experimental organization intended to ram bomber formations. Taken prisoner by the Soviets at the end of the war, he was held by them until 1955. Hermann earned a law degree in 1965 and became a prominent lawyer in Düsseldorf, where he died on November 5, 2010.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Berlin, Air Battle of; Britain, Battle of; Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Kammhuber, Josef; Kondor Legion; Spanish Civil War

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Hershey, Lewis Blaine (1893–1977)

U.S. Army general and director of the Selective Service System. Born in Angola, Indiana, on September 12, 1893, Lewis Blaine Hershey graduated from Tri-State College in Angola in 1914. He was then principal of Flint High School in Indiana. Hershey had joined the National Guard in 1911, and he was promoted to first lieutenant in 1916. After the United States entered World War I, Hershey was mobilized and served on the Mexican border and then in France but too late to see combat. Promoted to captain, he returned to the United States in September 1919 and received a regular army commission in July 1920.

During the next decade, Hershey held a variety of routine assignments. He was left permanently blind in his left eye from a polo accident in 1927. Hershey graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1931 and the Army War College in 1933. Promoted to major in 1935, Hershey was assigned to Washington that September as secretary of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee of the War Department General Staff, tasked with developing a system for raising military manpower in the event of need. This undertaking led to the Selective Service Act.

Hershey became deputy director of Selective Service in 1940. In July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him the director. During World War II, Hershey oversaw the mobilization of more than 10 million men for the U.S. armed forces gathered from a network of 6,400 local draft boards. He was promoted to major general in April 1942.

The original Selective Service Act expired in 1947, but with the coming of the Cold War, Congress reinstated it the next year, and President Harry S. Truman reappointed Hershey the director of Selective Service. The system functioned effectively during the Korean War and again during the Vietnam War. President Richard M. Nixon pledged to dismiss Hershey; Nixon favored centralized and nationalized draft classifications, which ran counter to Hershey's locally run system. Nixon relieved Hershey in 1970, promoting him to full general in compensation and reassigning him as presidential adviser on manpower. Hershey retired from the army in April 1973 and died in Angola, Indiana, on May 20, 1977.

P. ROBB METZ

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Selective Service Act; Truman, Harry S.

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Hess, Walter Richard Rudolf (1894–1987)

German deputy führer. Born on April 26, 1894, in Alexandria, Egypt, to a German merchant family, Walter Richard Rudolf Hess volunteered for the 1st Bavarian Infantry Regiment in August 1914 during World War I, but in the last weeks of the war he became an officer pilot. Following the war, Hess settled in Munich and began university studies in history, economics, and geopolitics. An early member of the National Socialist Party, he became a close associate of Adolf Hitler and participated in the abortive Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923. Hess was sentenced to prison for 18 months, during which time he acted as private secretary to Hitler, working on *Mein Kampf.* On his release, Hess secured a position with the geopolitician Karl Haushofer.

In December 1932, Hess became head of the Central Political Committee of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party, already having the reputation of a slavish follower of Hitler. Power mattered little to Hess; Hitler's approval was all. In April 1933 three months after becoming German chancellor, Hitler named Hess deputy führer. Although a member of the Nazi inner circle, Hess was not up to the tasks demanded of him. Traces of mental illness surfaced, and he was not well physically.

On May 10, 1941, six weeks before the June 22 German invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA), Hess, having learned to pilot the Messerschmitt Bf-110 long-range German fighter, flew solo from Germany to Scotland. In a rather extraordinary feat of navigation, he piloted the aircraft to within 10 miles of his objective, the estate of the Duke of Hamilton, where he bailed out and was taken prisoner.

Much speculation remains as to the reason for Hess's flight. Most likely, Hess hoped to broker a peace agreement between Britain and Germany, but this had no authority from Hitler. The German government admitted the

event but denied any official backing. In any case, Hess was immediately imprisoned by the British.

Hess remained in prison in Britain for the rest of the war. One of the major defendants before the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg, he was found guilty of conspiracy to wage aggressive war and crimes against peace and was sentenced to life in prison. During his trial, Hess revealed to the world the secret agreements of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, that had provided for the partition of the Baltic states and Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union. The Soviets never forgave Hess for this and refused repeated British requests that he be released on medical grounds, especially when he was the only inmate of Spandau Prison in Berlin. Hess served the longest time of any of the Nuremberg defendants, dying at Spandau on August 17, 1987.

EUGENE L. RASOR AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Hitler, Adolf; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

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Hewitt, Henry Kent (1887–1972)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Hackensack, New Jersey, on February 11, 1887, Henry Kent Hewitt graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1906. He then joined the global cruise of President Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet (1907–1909). During World War I, Hewitt commanded destroyers in European waters. Between the wars, he alternated shore duty as an instructor at the Naval Academy, battleship tours, staff assignments, and study at the Naval War College (1929).

In 1933, Hewitt took command of Destroyer Division 12. He was promoted to captain the next year. Hewitt then commanded the cruiser *Indianapolis.* In December 1939, he took over Cruiser Division 8. He was promoted to rear admiral in December 1940 and commanded task groups on neutrality patrols in the Atlantic. Following U.S. entry into the war in December 1941, in April 1942 Hewitt assumed command of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. As such, he was responsible for U.S. amphibious forces in the Atlantic and Europe. Hewitt was the U.S. naval officer most involved in the development of amphibious doctrine in the Mediterranean and European theaters during the war. He commanded every major Allied amphibious operation in the Mediterranean theater during the war.

Hewitt was promoted to vice admiral in November 1942, and in March 1943 he assumed command of the U.S. Navy Eighth Fleet. Working within an Allied command structure in which he was subordinate to British admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham and forced to coordinate military and naval operations and deal with such forceful individuals as Major General George S. Patton, Hewitt demonstrated considerable diplomatic ability. Hewitt's skills were tested in planning and directing complicated large-scale landing operations, reinforced by naval gunfire support, in North Africa (November 8, 1942), Sicily (July 9, 1943), Salerno (September 9, 1943), and southern France (August 15, 1944). His most difficult decision was whether to go forward with Operation TORCH, the North African landings, despite adverse weather conditions. He elected to proceed, a difficult choice that led to military success.

Promoted to full admiral in April 1945, shortly afterward Hewitt assumed command of the Twelfth Fleet, U.S. naval forces in European waters. He returned to the United States in October 1946 and took a special assignment at the Naval War College in Rhode Island before becoming naval representative to the United Nations Military Staff Committee. Hewitt retired in March 1949 and died in Middlebury, Vermont, on September 15, 1972.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; DRAGOON, Operation; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation; United States Navy

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Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen (1904–1942)

Chief of the German security police and Sicherheitsdienst (SD, Security Service). Born in Halle, Germany, on March 7, 1904, Reinhard Tristan Eugen Heydrich believed in the stab-in-the-back legend that the German Army had not been defeated militarily in World War I but instead had been undone by the collapse of the German home front and the myth of Aryan supremacy. He joined a Freikorps unit at age 16 and the German Navy in 1922.

Planning to make the navy his career, Heydrich was forced to resign in 1931 following an indiscretion with another officer's daughter. That same year, Heydrich joined the National Socialist Party and became active in the Sturmabteilung (SA, Storm Troops) in Hamburg. Heydrich's managerial abilities and Germanic appearance led Schutzstaffel (SS) chief Heinrich Himmler to appoint him as head of the SD. Heydrich soon built the SD into a powerful organization, and by 1933 he was an SS-Brigadeführer.

After directing the opening of Dachau, the first of many Nazi concentration camps, Heydrich helped to organize the 1934 purge ("Night of the Long Knives"), in which the SA leadership was liquidated. Feared even within party ranks for his ruthlessness and known as the "Blond Beast," Heydrich helped create the Nazi police state. He also played a leading role in the November 9, 1938, Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass), an orgy of violence against the German Jewish community.

Following the invasion of Poland, Heydrich assumed command of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA, Reich Main Security Office), which was responsible for carrying out Hitler's extermination of the Jews. Heydrich

established the Einsatzgruppen, killing squads charged with executing Jews and members of opposition groups in German-controlled Poland and later in the Soviet Union. Heydrich was also a leading participant at the Wannsee Conference on January 20, 1942, when top Nazis planned the extermination of European Jewry.

Although he still retained his other duties, Heydrich in late 1941 became the Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia. On May 27, 1942, British-trained Czech commandos ambushed Heydrich's car, seriously wounding him. Heydrich died on June 4, 1942. In retaliation for his death, the Germans destroyed the village of Lidice and murdered most of its inhabitants.

CULLEN MONK

See also

Concentration Camps, German; Czechoslovakia; Germany; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; Lidice Massacre; Wannsee Conference

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He Yingqin (1890–1987)

Nationalist Chinese Army general. Born into a landowning family in Xinyi (Hsing-i), Guizhou (Kweichow) Province, on April 2, 1890, He Yingqin (Ho Ying-ch'in) received a thorough military education in both Chinese and Japanese military schools. With the beginning of the 1911 Revolution, he returned to China and joined the revolutionary forces in Shanghai. Following the ill-fated Second Revolution in 1913, he returned to his studies in Japan which he completed in 1916.

Chinese Nationalist general He Yingqin (Ho Ying-Ch’in). (Leonard McCombe/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty Images)

In 1924 He was appointed chief instructor at the newly founded Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy and participated in the Northern Expedition. He became a close associate of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and directed military operations against dissident Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) forces as well as the Red Army in the Extermination Campaigns of the 1930s.

He was ordered to appease the Japanese in the humiliating Tanggu (Tangku) Truce of 1933 and the He-Umezu Agreement of 1935, resulting in widespread student demonstrations against GMD policy. After the Lugougiao (Lukou-ch’iao) Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the onset of a full Sino-Japanese War in 1937, He was appointed chief of staff of the Chinese Army. Between 1942 and 1944 he had a prickly rivalry with U.S. lieutenant general Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of forces in the China-Burma-India theater

and Allied chief of staff to Jiang. He also clashed with General Chen Cheng (Ch'en Ch'eng), Stilwell's choice for Chinese commander. When Stilwell was relieved of command in 1944, He was relieved of his war portfolio but not his military position.

On September 9, 1945, He formally received the Japanese surrender in Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu from General Okamura Yasuji, commander of Japanese forces in China. During the civil war period He's political fortunes waned. In 1949 he joined the Nationalists on Taiwan and served as chief Chinese delegate to the United Nations Military Advisory Committee (1946–1948) and then as chairman of the Strategy Advisory Committee in Taiwan (1950–1958). He died in Taipei on October 21, 1987.

ERROL MACGREGOR CLAUSS

See also

Chen Cheng; China; China, Army; Jiang Jieshi; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Okamura Yasuji

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Higashikuni Naruhiko, Prince of Japan (1887–1990)

Japanese Army general, politician, and member of the imperial family. Born in Kyoto on December 3, 1887, Prince Higashikuni was a younger brother of Prince Asaka Yasuhiko. Higashikuni graduated from Tokyo Army Cadet School in 1908 and the Military Academy in 1914. He then studied at the French Defense Academy from 1920 to 1922. Following various staff and line posts, Higashikuni was promoted to lieutenant general in 1933. He was appointed commander of the 2nd Division in 1933 and of the 4th Division in 1934.

Promoted to full general in 1939, Prince Higashikuni served as commander in chief of the Home Defense Command between December 1941 and April 1945. Higashikuni was one of the pivotal figures opposing the Tōjō Hideki cabinet and in favor of an early peace with the Allies. Following the resignation of the Suzuki Kantarō cabinet, in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender Higashikuni led a transitional Japanese cabinet between August 17 and October 9, 1945. He then retired from politics altogether. Higashikuni died in Tokyo on January 20, 1990.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Asaka Yasuhiko; Japan; Suzuki Kantarō; Tōjō Hideki

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Higgins, Andrew Jackson (1886–1952)

U.S. businessman and naval constructor. Born on August 28, 1886, in Columbus, Nebraska, Andrew Jackson Higgins moved to Alabama in 1906, where he worked in the timber industry, becoming familiar with shallow-draft boats. In 1923, he started the Higgins Lumber and Export Company in New Orleans. By 1926, Higgins had moved away from timber and was focused on manufacturing boats.

During the 1930s, Higgins Industries built a variety of shallow-water boats. Higgins sold vessels to the Coast Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers, and in 1939 he received contracts to build a boat for amphibious operations and to manufacture fast patrol-torpedo boats.

Higgins Industries designed and manufactured for the U.S. armed forces in World War II the LCP (landing craft, personnel), LCPL (landing craft personnel, large), LCVP (landing craft vehicle, personnel), and LCM (landing craft, mechanized). Higgins also oversaw the construction of other products, including an airborne droppable lifeboat and secretly manufactured

items required by the Manhattan Project. During the war, Higgins Industries expanded to eight plants around New Orleans. The firm built more than 20,000 vessels for the Allies. General Dwight D. Eisenhower said of Higgins, "He is the man who won the war for us."

Following the war, Higgins's company experienced financial difficulties, but during the 1950–1953 Korean War, it again thrived. Andrew Higgins died in New Orleans on August 1, 1952.

R. KYLE SCHLAFER

See also

Air-Sea Rescue; Amphibious Warfare; Landing Craft; Manhattan Project; Patrol-Torpedo Boats

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Higuchi Kiichiro (1888–1970)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Mihara County, Hyogo Prefecture, on August 20, 1888, Higuchi Kiichiro was the son of Hisahachi Okusawa but was adopted by Higuchi Yuuji. Higuchi Kiichiro graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1909 and from the War College in 1918. Following service on the General Staff, Higuchi undertook duties as staff officer in the Korean Army (Japanese forces in Korea), military attaché to Poland, and chief of staff of the 3rd Division. In 1937, Higuchi was assigned as a major general with the Guandong (Kwantung) Army headquarters in Manzhoudiguo (Manchoutikuo), the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, and as chief of the secret military agency in Harbin.

As a consequence of anti-Semitic activities undertaken in Europe, chiefly by Germany, Jews living in the Far East organized a conference in Harbin, Manzhoudiguo. The Japanese military supported this effort. Higuchi not only participated in the conference but also made a speech supporting the Jewish people. Although it delighted Jews, his speech angered the German

government, which registered a formal protest. Higuchi was not disciplined, however.

In 1938, Higuchi was assigned as chief of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff, and the next year he was promoted to lieutenant general. He then commanded in succession the 9th Division, the Northern District Army, and the Northern Army. In 1943, Higuchi assumed command of the Fifth Army (the upgraded Northern Army), and later that year he commanded the operation evacuating Kiska Island in the Aleutian chain. After the war, Higuchi retired from public life and wrote his memoirs. He remained in seclusion after 1947 and died in Tokyo on October 11, 1970.

MASAAKI SHIRAISHI

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Guandong Army; Japan; Japan, Army

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Himmler, Heinrich (1900–1945)

German political figure and leader of the Schutzstaffel (SS). Born on October 7, 1900, in Munich, Heinrich Himmler attended secondary school in Landshut. During World War I, he progressed from clerk to officer candidate in the 11th Bavarian Infantry Regiment. He then studied agriculture at the Munich Technical High School from 1918 to 1922. Himmler joined the National Socialist Party and played a small role in the abortive 1923 Munich Beer Hall Putsch. He then married and purchased a farm but remained politically active.

In January 1929, Adolf Hitler appointed Himmler as head of the SS, which at the time was Hitler's personal security detail and part of the Sturmabteilung (SA, Storm Troops). Within a few years, Himmler enlarged it from 200 men into an organization of 50,000 men, with its own distinctive black uniform, ethos, and personal devotion to Hitler. In 1934, Reichsführer (leader) of the SS Himmler gained control of the Gestapo (secret police).

Hitler rewarded him for his active role in the 1934 Blood Purge of the SA by making the SS an independent organization subject only to his own immediate authority. In June 1936, Himmler also gained control of all the police forces of Germany.

Although he was physically far removed from the ideal Aryan type, Himmler was a fanatical adherent of Nazi racial theories. He busied himself with far-fetched schemes to breed a new race of "pure Aryans"—an SS version of the medieval knights—who would rule Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Despite his promise to the German Army, Hitler allowed Himmler to establish armed SS formations, known as the SS Verfügungstruppen (emergency troops), from which came the divisions of the Waffen-SS (Armed SS) during World War II. The SS also came to have considerable economic interests, including armaments factories. By 1939, Himmler's influence overshadowed the Nazi Party; thus, many high-ranking officials, even in the military, found it prudent to hold SS ranks. Himmler was one of the most important figures in Germany, and perhaps the most dreaded.

Controlling Germany's racial policies, Himmler directed the "Final Solution"—the extermination of the Jews along with the incurably ill, the disabled, Gypsies, and homosexuals. The SS already ran the concentration camps. It now established and ran the death camps as well.

After the failed July 1944 bomb plot against Hitler, Himmler took command of the Ersatzheer (Replacement Army). In November 1944, Hitler gave Himmler command of Army Group Rhine, and during January–April 1945 he commanded Army Group Vistula—two positions for which he was utterly unqualified. In April 1945, Himmler attempted to negotiate a surrender with the Western Allies. A furious Hitler stripped him of his posts. Himmler attempted to flee but was captured by British troops. Identified on May 23, 1945, Himmler committed suicide by means of a hidden cyanide capsule.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; July Bomb Plot; Waffen-SS; Document 51

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Hirohito, Emperor of Japan (1901–1989)

Japanese emperor. Born at the Aoyama Palace in Tokyo on April 29, 1901, the oldest son of Emperor Taisho, Japan's future emperor was named Hirohito by his grandfather, Emperor Meiji. His imperial title was Michinomiya. During a six-month period in 1921, Hirohito traveled in Europe, and his meeting with Britain's King George V profoundly shaped his view of constitutional monarchy.

On December 25, 1926, Hirohito acceded to the throne on the death of his father, ushering in the Shōwa period in Japanese history. His reign spanned more than six decades. The new emperor's close advisers included political moderates who desired close relations with Britain and the United States. They also hoped that Hirohito might reverse the decline in popular reverence for the imperial throne that had occurred under his father.

In his early years as emperor, Hirohito and his imperial entourage found Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi's hard-line China policy at best problematic. This was one reason why Hirohito harshly reprimanded the military officer turned politician over his response to the June 1928 assassination of Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin) in Manchuria. When Tanaka's successor Hamaguchi Osachi was placed in a politically untenable position over the 1930 London Naval Disarmament Treaty, Hirohito did voice unequivocal support for cooperation with Britain and the United States and threw the weight of his support behind the beleaguered civilian prime minister. Although these actions no doubt illustrated Hirohito's desire for peace, they inexorably enmeshed him in the rough-and-tumble political process and made his entourage vulnerable to attack by hard-liners.

Hirohito was emperor of Japan from 1926 until 1989, the longest-reign in Japanese history. Certainly, as a head of state, he acted to try to win the war. In August 1945, he decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration, risking a possible coup d'état in his decision to surrender. (Library of Congress)

These experiences in the early years of his reign and his observations of European governments led Hirohito to conclude that he must defer to cabinet decisions. On the basis of this particular understanding of his constitutional function, Hirohito chose, despite personal reservations, to accept policies presented to him by the cabinet at key historical junctures, such as the outbreak of the military conflict with China in 1937 and the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Hirohito rendered an independent political judgment only twice: when the cabinet was unable to act effectively on the attempted coup by army junior officers on February 26, 1936, and when Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and Hirohito called on the Japanese people to surrender at the end of World War II. Such studied self-restraint did not make him a hapless

stooge. As head of state under the Meiji constitutional system, Hirohito often expressed his concerns and opinions to those who made policy recommendations to him, but he usually upheld the cabinet's decision.

After the war, some Western historians, notably David Bergamini, alleged that Hirohito had been deeply in sympathy with Japanese expansionist policies, but the available documentation largely contradicts this. During the war, Hirohito's role as commander in chief became more pronounced, but his reprimands and exhortations to the military during the conflict should be understood in their proper historical context. As a wartime head of state, he acted to try to win the war. Although threatened with military revolt, Hirohito decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration, risking a possible coup d'état when he made the decision to surrender.

In the new postwar Japanese constitution, the emperor became the symbol of the nation. In keeping with the new constitutional principle of popular sovereignty, the emperor carried out certain ceremonial duties with the advice and approval of the cabinet. Hirohito died in Tokyo on January 7, 1989.

KUROSAWA FUMITAKA

See also

Japan; Japan, Army; Potsdam Conference; Sugiyama Hajime; Document 119; Document 232

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Hiroshima, Bombing of (August 6, 1945)

The U.S. bombing of the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, was the first combat use of the atomic bomb. On July 25, 1945, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces General Carl Spaatz received orders to employ the

509th Composite Group, Twentieth Air Force, in a “special bomb” attack on selected target cities in Japan, specifically Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki. Following rejection of conditions promulgated by the Potsdam Proclamation on July 26, a declaration threatening Japan with total destruction if unconditional surrender was not accepted, President Harry S. Truman then authorized use of the special bomb.

Assembled in secrecy and loaded on the Boeing B-29 Superfortress *Enola Gay,* the bomb consisted of a core of uranium isotope 235 shielded by several hundred pounds of lead, encased in explosives designed to condense the uranium and initiate a fission reaction. Nicknamed “Little Boy,” the bomb possessed a force equivalent to 12,500 tons of TNT (12.5 kilotons).

The *Enola Gay,* commanded by Colonel Paul Tibbets, departed Tinian at 2:45 a.m. on August 6. Two B-29s assigned as scientific and photographic observers followed, and the three aircraft rendezvoused over Iwo Jima for the run over Japan. Captain William Parsons of the U.S. Navy completed the bomb’s arming in the air shortly after 6:30 a.m. The flight to Japan was uneventful, and Tibbets was informed at 7:47 a.m. by weather planes over the targets that Hiroshima was clear for bombing. Japan’s eighth-largest city (it had about 245,000 residents in August 1945), Hiroshima was an important port on southern Honshu and headquarters of the Japanese Second Army.

The *Enola Gay* arrived over the city at an altitude of 31,600 feet and dropped the bomb at 8:15:17 a.m. local time. After a descent of some nearly 6 miles, the bomb detonated 43 seconds later some 1,890 feet over a clinic and about 800 feet from the aiming point, Aioi Bridge. The initial fireball expanded to 110 yards in diameter, generating heat in excess of 300,000 degrees centigrade, with core temperatures over 50 million degrees centigrade. At the clinic directly beneath the explosion, the temperature was several thousand degrees. The immediate concussion destroyed almost everything within 2 miles of ground zero. The resultant mushroom cloud rose to 50,000 feet and was observed by B-29s more than 360 miles away. After 15 minutes, the atmosphere dropped radioactive black rain, adding to the death and destruction.

The ruins of the Japanese city of Hiroshima after the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945. (Library of Congress)

Four square miles of Hiroshima's heart disappeared in seconds, including 62,000 buildings. More than 71,000 Japanese died, another 20,000 were wounded, and 171,000 were left homeless. Some estimates place the number of killed at more than 200,000. About one-third of those killed instantly were soldiers. Most elements of the Japanese Second General Army were at physical training on the grounds of Hiroshima Castle when the bomb exploded. Barely 900 yards from the explosion's epicenter, the castle and its residents were vaporized. Also killed was an American prisoner of war in the exercise area. All died in less than a second. Radiation sickness began the next day and added to the death toll over several years.

Following three observation circuits over Hiroshima, the *Enola Gay* and its escorts turned for Tinian, touching down at 2:58 p.m. The bombing mission, 12 hours and 13 minutes long and covering 2,960 miles, changed the nature of warfare but did not immediately end the war. Truman released a statement on August 7 describing the weapon and calling on Japan to surrender, but his message was ignored by most Japanese leaders as propaganda. The United States dropped another atomic bomb on August 9, this time on Nagasaki.

MARK E. VAN RHYN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Japan, Surrender of; Manhattan Project; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Nuclear Weapons; Potsdam Conference; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"; Truman, Harry S.; Document 240

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Hirota Kōki (1878–1948)

Japanese diplomat and politician. Born on February 14, 1878, in Fukuoka, Japan, Hirota Kōki graduated from the law faculty of Tokyo Imperial University and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1906 to pursue a career as diplomat. He was posted to China, Great Britain, and the United States before becoming ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1930. During the 1931–1933 Japanese takeover of Manchuria, Hirota worked to prevent Soviet intervention in the Sino-Japanese dispute.

Between 1933 and 1936, Hirota was foreign minister in the Saitō and Okada cabinets. During his tenure Hirota made concessions (Hirota's Three Principles) to army hard-liners who sought to pursue annexationist policies in northern China, thus paving the way for the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945. Following the attempted army coup of February 26, 1936 (the 226 Incident), which brought the resignation of Prime Minister Okada and his entire cabinet, Hirota was appointed prime minister in March 1936. Although he yielded to hard-liners in the military and the cabinet and approved additional expansionist policies, Hirota was forced to resign after a clash between a Diet member and war minister in a Diet session in January 1937.

In the first cabinet of new prime minister Konoe Fumimaro of June 1937–May 1938, Hirota was once again foreign minister but failed to prevent the

outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. After the infamous Nanjing Massacre of December 1937, Hirota resigned in May 1938.

Thereafter, Hirota only held nominal posts as a senior politician. In the final stage of the Pacific war, Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori asked Hirota to sound out the possibility of a negotiated peace with the Allies through Soviet mediation. However, Hirota's meetings during June and July 1945 with Soviet ambassador to Tokyo Yakov Malik resulted in deadlock.

Former Japanese prime minister Hirota Kōki listens to his death sentence being handed down by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East on November 12, 1948. Hirota was prime minister during 1936–1937. A trained diplomat, he also served as foreign minister. (National Archives)

In the aftermath of the war, Hirota was arrested and brought to trial by the International War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo. He was found guilty of helping to cause the war with China and the atrocities committed by the Japanese

Army in China. Among seven sentenced to death, Hirota was the only civilian. He was hanged in Tokyo on December 23, 1948.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

International Military Tribunal, Far East; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Manchuria Campaign; Sino-Japanese War; Tōgō Shigenori

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Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945)

Leader (führer) of Germany. Born on April 20, 1889, in Braunau am Inn, Austria, Adolf Hitler had a troubled childhood. He was educated at primary school and Realschule in Linz, but he dropped out at age 16. Hitler aspired to become an artist, and on the death of his mother Klara in 1907 (his father Alois had died in 1903), he moved to Vienna. He attempted to enroll at the Viennese Academy of Fine Arts but was unsuccessful. Hitler lived in flophouses and made some money selling small paintings of Vienna scenes to frame shops. It was in Vienna that Hitler developed his hatred of Jews, who had assimilated into Viennese society. But he also developed an aversion to internationalism, capitalism, and socialism. He developed an intense sense of nationalism and expressed pride in being of German descent.

Probably to avoid compulsory military service, Hitler left Austria in May 1913 and settled in the south German state of Bavaria. On the outbreak of World War I in 1914, he enlisted in the Bavarian Army and served with distinction. Here he found the sense of purpose he had previously lacked. He saw extensive military action, was wounded, and served in the dangerous position of *meldegänger* (dispatch runner). Temporarily blinded in a British gas attack, Hitler ended the war in a military hospital. He had risen to the rank of lance corporal and won the Iron Cross First Class, an unusual distinction for someone of his rank.

After the war, Hitler returned to Munich and remained in the military as a counterintelligence agent, reporting on political groups, and he then became involved in politics full time. In the summer of 1919 and on the order of his commanding officer, Hitler joined the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (German Worker's Party), later known as the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP, National Socialist German Workers' Party or Nazi Party). His oratorical skills, combined with generous financial support from the German Army, soon made him one of its leaders. Disgruntled by Germany's loss in the war, Hitler became the voice of the dispossessed and angry. He blamed Germany's defeat on the "November criminals"—the communists, the Jews, and the Weimar Republic.

Taking a cue from Benito Mussolini's march on Rome the previous year, on November 8, 1923, Hitler and his followers attempted to seize power in Bavaria as a step toward controlling Germany. This Beer Hall Putsch was put down by the authorities with some bloodshed. Hitler was then arrested and brought to trial for attempting to overthrow the state. He used his trial to become a national political figure in Germany. Sentenced to prison, he served only nine months (1923–1924). While at the Landsberg Fortress, he dictated his stream-of-consciousness memoir, *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle). Later, when he was in power, royalties on sales of the book and his images made him immensely wealthy, a fact he deliberately concealed from the German people.

Hitler formed few female attachments during his life. He was involved with his niece, Geli Raubal, who committed suicide in 1931, and later with Eva Braun, whom he hid from the public. Deeply distrustful of people, Hitler was a vegetarian who loved animals and especially doted on his dogs. He was also a severe hypochondriac, suffering from myriad real and imagined illnesses.

Hitler restructured the NSDAP, and by 1929 the party had emerged as a political force in Germany, winning representation in the Reichstag. In April 1932, Hitler ran against Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg for the presidency of Germany. Hitler railed against the Weimar Republic for the Versailles Treaty at the end of World War I, the catastrophic inflation of 1923, the alleged threat posed by the communists, and the effects of the Great Depression. Hindenburg won, but Hitler received 13 million votes in a

completely free election, and by June 1932 the Nazis were the largest political party in the Reichstag.

German chancellor Adolf Hitler in a 1939 photograph. (Roger Viollet/Getty Images)

On January 30, 1933, Hindenburg appointed Hitler chancellor. Hitler quickly acted against any political adversaries. Fresh elections under Nazi auspices gave the Nazis in coalition with the Nationalists a majority in the Reichstag. An Enabling Act of March 1933 gave Hitler dictatorial powers. On the death of Hindenburg in August 1934, Hitler amalgamated the office of president and chancellor, with the combined title of führer. He also took direct control of the armed forces. In the “Night of the Long Knives” of July 1934, Hitler purged the party and especially the SA and removed several political opponents. Hitler also reorganized Germany administratively, dissolving political parties and labor unions and making Germany a one-party state.

Opposition to the Nazis soon was crushed, and many dissidents were sent to concentration camps. The ubiquitous Gestapo kept tabs on the civilian population, but the state was not characterized solely by repression by any means. In the first several years, Hitler was carried forward on a wave of disillusionment with the Weimar Republic, and a plebiscite showed that a solid majority of Germans approved of his actions.

On assuming political power, Hitler initiated actions against and introduced legislation to isolate the Jews. They were turned into a race of "untouchables" within their own state, unable to pursue higher education, certain careers, or a full public life. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 defined as Jewish anyone with at least one Jewish grandparent and classified them as noncitizens, without rights. Hitler remarked that war in Europe would lead to the "extinction of the Jewish race in Europe."

In 1934, Hitler took Germany out of the League of Nations and the Geneva disarmament conference. Germans were put back to work, and rearmament, albeit at first secret (it was announced in 1935), began. Hitler's most daring gamble was in March 1936, when he marched German troops into the Rhineland and remilitarized it. He sent German forces to aid the Nationalist insurgency in Spain during 1936–1939 and formed an alliance with Mussolini's fascist Italy. In November 1937, he announced plans to his top advisers and generals for an aggressive foreign policy and war, and in March 1938 he began his march of conquest with the Anschluss (union) with Austria. That fall, he secured the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, and in March 1939, he took over the remainder of Czechoslovakia. Poland was the next pressure point. To secure his eastern flank, in August 1939 Hitler concluded a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). On September 1, 1939, German forces invaded Poland, touching off World War II in Europe.

Applying new tactics of close cooperation between air and ground elements centered in a war of movement that came to be known as blitzkrieg (lightning war), the German military enjoyed early success on the battlefield. Poland was taken within one month. When Britain and France, which had gone to war with Germany on the invasion of Poland, rejected peace on a forgive-and-forget basis, Hitler invaded the west. Norway and Denmark were taken beginning in April 1940. France and the Low Countries fell in May and June. Hitler's first rebuff came in the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of

Britain, when the Luftwaffe failed to drive the Royal Air Force from the skies, a necessary precursor to a seaborne invasion. After next securing his southern flank in the Balkans by invading and conquering Greece and Yugoslavia in April 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. When the United States entered the war against Japan in December 1941, Hitler declared war on the United States, in keeping with agreements he had made with Japan.

Increasingly, Germany suffered the consequences of strategic overreach: German troops not only had to garrison much of Europe, but they also were sent to North Africa. Hitler's constant meddling in military matters, his changes of plans, and his divide-and-rule concept of administration all worked to the detriment of Germany's cause. On Hitler's express (but rarely written) orders, millions of people, mainly Jews, were rounded up and systematically slaughtered.

On July 20, 1944, Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg, a leader of the German opposition to Hitler, placed a bomb in the Wolfsschanze, Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia. Although Hitler survived the blast, he was thereafter a physical and psychological wreck.

From mid-January 1945, Hitler took up residence in Berlin. He refused negotiation to the end, preferring to see Germany destroyed and claiming that the German people did not deserve to continue. He married Eva Braun on April 29, 1945, and—rather than be taken by the Russians, who were closing in on Berlin—he and his new wife committed suicide in the bunker of the Chancellery on April 30, 1945. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russians confirmed that they had his remains, ending myths that Hitler had escaped to South America.

WENDY ADELÉ-MARIE MAIER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Britain, Battle of; France, Battle for; Germany; Mussolini, Benito; Poland Campaign; Stauffenberg, Claus Philipp Schenk von; Document 1; Document 5; Document 33; Document 79; Document 94; Document 122; Document 159; Document 224

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Hitler-Franco Meeting at Hendaye (October 23, 1940)

The only meeting between German dictator Adolf Hitler and Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, it took place on October 23, 1940, at Hendaye, a small French town on the Atlantic coast near the border with Spain. The meeting occurred at Hitler's instigation following Germany's June defeat of France but with Britain stubbornly holding out against German air attacks. It resulted from a proposal put forward to Hitler by German Navy commander Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and others for a Mediterranean option.

Correctly predicting that British and U.S. forces would land in Northwest Africa, Raeder proposed that Germany and Spain seize Gibraltar and close the western entrance to the Mediterranean. With the assistance of Vichy France and Italy, Germany could then seize British interests in the eastern Mediterranean, cut the British lifeline to India through the Suez Canal, and gain control of the Persian oil fields. According to Raeder, at least, Hitler agreed but said that he would have to meet first with Franco, Vichy leader Henri Philippe Pétain, and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

Hitler was to meet with Franco on October 23 and with Pétain the next day. Hitler had high hopes for the meeting, especially as the Germans had provided critical military assistance to Franco during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War in the form of the Kondor Legion. On the German defeat of France, Franco had assured Hitler that Spain would enter the war in return for

much of the French African empire, including Morocco and western Algeria, as well as substantial supplies of food, arms, and gasoline.

Hitler arrived at Hendaye in his special train, and the meeting between the two leaders took place over some nine hours. Hitler opened it with a monologue trumpeting Germany's successes in the war and claiming that Britain was "decisively beaten." The führer explained that securing the support of Vichy France on the Axis side would ensure a quick, decisive campaign and the France would thus have to receive territorial compensation. He was quite vague over Franco's demands for French Morocco, and Franco was infuriated by this attitude. Hitler wanted Spain to enter the war in January 1940 with an attack to take Gibraltar, promising to send German forces to assist Spanish forces.

Franco responded with his own monologue, emphasizing the historical Spanish presence in Morocco. He rejected German assistance in the taking of Gibraltar, which he said Spain could accomplish alone. Franco also cited a long list of aid requirements that would have to be met before Spain could consider joining the war. What particularly irritated Hitler was the caudillo's assertion that even if Germany occupied England, the British fleet could continue the war from America and Canada. Such impertinence upset Hitler so much that the meeting almost ended at that point. However, following a break for dinner in Hitler's special dining car, discussions continued well into the night.

Hitler left the meeting frustrated and without a commitment from Franco and later told Mussolini that he would rather have several teeth pulled than endure another meeting with Franco. Hitler's conversations with Pétain the next day went better. The French leader agreed to go to war against Britain in return for a place in the "New Europe" to which France was "entitled." Hitler used the excuse of the failure of the meeting with Franco to push his own plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union.

GENE MUELLER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Britain, Battle of; Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Hitler, Adolf; Kondor Legion; Mussolini, Benito; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Raeder, Erich; Spain; Spanish Civil War

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Hitler Youth

German paramilitary organization for German boys age 10–18; a girls' counterpart organization, which did not stress military affairs, was developed several years after the founding of the organization for boys. The Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend) traces its origins to 1922, when it became the youth section of the German Workers' Party and a sort of junior grouping of future storm troopers.

Adolf Hitler was influential in the formation of the Hitler Youth, the original name of which was the Jungsturm Adolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler's Young Storm Troopers). After Hitler's abortive Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, the group was officially dissolved, although that did not stop its work—many cells continued to operate throughout Germany as underground organizations. By the late 1920s, the youth group, which underwent numerous name changes, had rebuilt its numbers and essentially reconstituted itself; in 1928, a separate girls' group, the League of German Girls (Bund des deutschen Mädels) was established.

The chief purpose of the boys' section of the Hitler Youth was indoctrination in Nazi ideology, including the cultivation of hyperpatriotism, racial pride, and the teaching of military principles. Part of this ideology stressed rabid anti-Semitism. The Hitler Youth was organized along military lines, and its members routinely wore military-style uniforms. Organizationally, it also followed military prescriptions by being divided into squads, platoons, and companies. The boys' section was further divided into groupings of 10–14-year-olds and 14–18-year-olds. Many viewed membership in the Hitler Youth as a precursor to military service. The largest gathering in one place of the Hitler Youth occurred at the yearly Nuremberg Rally.

The young women's section of the Hitler Youth was similarly divided according to age, although its focus was quite different. German girls were instructed to follow the traditional gender values of the era, which stressed duty, obedience, self-sacrifice, and physical and emotional discipline. During World War II, the girls' section of the Hitler Youth was more overtly ideological than that for boys and was enlisted in propaganda work.

After Hitler came to power in 1933, the Hitler Youth underwent enormous growth. In 1932, its membership was some 108,000; just a year later, its numbers had swelled to 2.3 million. This had been achieved in part by outlawing other youth organizations and merging them with the Hitler Youth. By 1936, membership had crossed the 5 million mark, at which time all "Aryan" German youths were compelled to join.

For some German boys, their training in the Hitler Youth proved invaluable to their future military careers, and a sizable number of those serving in the elite Schutzstaffel (SS) had been full participants in the Hitler Youth. As the war progressed, especially after 1943, when German military fortunes were plummeting, the government began directly drafting Hitler Youth members, some of whom had not yet reached age 18.

With the end of the war in 1945, Allied leaders began the denazification of Germany, and what remained of the Hitler Youth was officially disbanded. Some adult leaders of the movement, including the organization's head, Baldur von Schirach, were tried for war crimes.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Nazi Racial Policies; Propaganda

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Hobart, Sir Percy Cleghorn Stanley (1885–1957)

British Army major general. Born in Naini, India, on June 14, 1885, Percy Cleghorn Stanley Hobart excelled in studies at Clifton College, then graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. He was commissioned in the engineers in 1904 and posted to India in 1906, where he distinguished himself. Sent to France with the Indian Expeditionary Force during World War I in January 1915, Hobart fought on the Western Front and in Mesopotamia, where he was wounded in April 1916. By the end of World War I, he was a major. Hobart next graduated from the Staff College, Camberley, and then returned to India in 1921.

Convinced that the future of ground warfare lay in tanks, Hobart joined the Royal Tank Corps in 1923. An instructor at the Staff College at Quetta from 1923 to 1927, he was brevetted lieutenant colonel in 1922 and colonel in 1928. In 1927 and 1928, he was second-in-command of 4th Battalion, and in 1931 and 1932 he commanded the 2nd Battalion of the Tank Corps. First inspector and then commander of the corps in 1933 and 1934, Hobart raised the 1st Tank Brigade and commanded it during 1934–1937. Promoted to major general and assigned to head military training in 1938, he went to Egypt to raise what became the 7th Armoured Division, championing its use apart from infantry formations.

Hobart retired from the army in 1939, largely because of his outspoken nature and zealous championing of tanks in armored doctrine and tactics. Early in World War II, Hobart was serving as a colonel in the Home Guard when Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill recalled him to active duty to command first the 11th Armoured Division in England in 1941 and 1942 and then the 79th Armoured Division, with its unique engineering equipment. These assignments gave Hobart the opportunity to showcase his innovative talents. Equipment included forerunners to the modern combat engineer vehicle, specialized vehicles for mine laying and clearing, an amphibious tank, and a flamethrower tank (the Crocodile). Such special tanks were known as “Hobart’s Funnies” or “Hobo’s Funnies,” playing on Hobart’s nickname of “Old Hobo.”

Hobart commanded his division in the 21st Army Group through the campaign in Northern Europe to the end of the war. He retired for a second

time in 1946 but served as lieutenant governor of the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, during 1948–1953. Hobart died at Farnham, Surrey, on February 19, 1957.

ROBERT BATEMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Armored Warfare; Engineer Operations; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Tanks, All Powers

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Hobby, Oveta Culp (1905–1995)

U.S. Army colonel and commander of the Women's Army Corps. Born on January 19, 1905, in Killeen, Texas, Oveta Culp attended Mary Hardin Baylor College in Killeen and then studied law at the University of Texas at Austin. From 1925 to 1931 and from 1939 to 1941, she was parliamentarian of the Texas House of Representatives. In 1931, Culp married *Houston Post* publisher and former Texas governor William P. Hobby.

During the 1930s, Oveta Hobby was an editor for the *Houston Post.* In June 1941, she was appointed head of the Women's Activities Section of the U.S. Army to coordinate matters concerning the wives and dependents of army personnel. She then became director of the subsequent Women's Interest Section, War Department Bureau of Public Relations.

Following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hobby was asked to head a task force to determine how a possible volunteer women's corps could assist the army. U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson supported her work, and after Hobby recommended establishment of the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC), Marshall asked her to command it.

Hobby had to overcome numerous problems, such as lack of funds and supplies and lack of cooperation from other army organizations, particularly the engineers. Hobby and staff members drew barracks plans and attempted to redesign the standard-issue WAAC uniform to be more appealing to women, but the Quartermaster Corps rejected the design as too wasteful. Hobby was successful, however, in securing equal pay for women. In July 1943, the WAAC received full army status, and "Auxiliary" was dropped from the name, making it the Women's Army Corps (WAC). Hobby also oversaw the integration of female African American officers and became the first woman colonel in the U.S. Army.

During Hobby's tenure, the number of jobs approved for WACs expanded from 54 to 239. Hobby traveled to Europe and Africa to inspect WAC units, and she traveled with Eleanor Roosevelt to England to review Great Britain's women's auxiliary forces. Hobby's WACs proved their competence doing military work that freed men for frontline service.

Hobby resigned her post in the summer of 1945 and was hospitalized for exhaustion. Among her many honors, she was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the first woman to receive this highest noncombat decoration.

Hobby continued to support civil rights and humanitarian issues. A lifelong Democrat, she nonetheless backed Dwight D. Eisenhower for president, and in 1953 he named her the first secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. She resigned the position in 1955 and returned to help her husband with the *Houston Post.* Hobby died in Houston, Texas, on August 16, 1995.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Marshall, George Catlett; Roosevelt, Anna Eleanor; Stimson, Henry Lewis; United States; Women in World War II

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Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)

Revolutionary Vietnamese leader who aided the Allies against the Japanese in World War II. Born Nguyen Sinh Cung on May 19, 1890, in the Annam region of French Indochina, Ho Chi Minh was the son of a scholar and government official; he would use some 100 different aliases. After graduation from high school, Nguyen became a teacher. In 1911 he hired on as cook's assistant on a French merchant ship. He then held a variety of jobs, finally settling in London.

When World War I began, Nguyen moved to Paris. There he changed his name to Nguyen Ai Quoc ("Nguyen the patriot") and busied himself organizing the Vietnamese community in France, which had swollen in numbers during the war. Nguyen joined the French Socialist Party and became its spokesman in colonial matters. Ignored in his efforts to secure a hearing for Vietnamese independence at the Paris Peace Conference (1919), Nguyen was one of the founders of the French Communist Party in 1920. He then participated in the Vietnamese underground independence movement and in activities of the Communist International (Comintern) in the Soviet Union and China. In 1930, he helped fuse various Vietnamese communist groups into the Indochinese Communist Party.

Vietnamese Nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh, who led the Viet Minh against the Japanese during World War II and then the French and Americans afterward. (Library of Congress)

In the 1940s, Nguyen took the name Ho Chi Minh (“he who enlightens”). During World War II, Ho fought against both the French and the Japanese (who had arrived in Indochina in 1940). In 1941, Ho founded the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam), a nationalist front organization to end foreign control of Vietnam. In 1942, he was arrested in China by the Nationalist government but was released in 1943 to organize anti-Japanese intelligence activities throughout Indochina.

Ho’s Viet Minh worked with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to supply intelligence on Japanese activities, provide tactical support to Allied operations, and rescue downed American pilots. By war’s end, the Viet Minh had succeeded in liberating much of northern Vietnam from Japanese control. The Japanese had arrested the French officials and military

personnel in March 1945, so when Japan surrendered in August, the Viet Minh was the only effective organized force in the northern part of Vietnam. The Viet Minh then seized control of Hanoi, where Ho proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on September 2, 1945.

Despite an arrangement worked out with Ho by French representative Jean Santigny, Paris persisted in attempting to reestablish French control over all of Vietnam, and fighting broke out in November 1946. In 1954, following its military defeat in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the French government agreed at the Geneva Conference to recognize the independence of the DRV in northern Vietnam, with a plebiscite to be held in 1956 in the southern part of the country on the issue of independence. With the failure to hold the plebiscite, fighting resumed, this time involving the United States, which supported the southern Republic of Vietnam government. Ho died in Hanoi on September 3, 1969, not living to see the DRV victorious and Vietnam reunited in 1975.

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

French Indochina; Office of Strategic Services; Partisans/Guerrillas; Document 92; Document 238

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Hodges, Courtney Hicks (1887–1966)

U.S. Army general. Born in Perry, Georgia, on January 5, 1887, Courtney Hicks Hodges attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point for one year but dropped out for academic reasons and enlisted in the army. In 1909, Hodges earned a commission. He then served in the Philippines and in the 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico. During World War I, he fought in France, ending the war as a temporary lieutenant colonel.

Hodges attended the Field Artillery School in 1920 and then served as an instructor at West Point. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1925, taught at the Infantry School, and graduated from the Army War College. In 1938, he was assigned as assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Promoted to major general in May 1941, Hodges was assigned as chief of infantry. He assumed command of X Corps in May 1942. In February 1943, he was promoted to lieutenant general and took command of the Southern Defense Command and the Third Army. In January 1944, Hodges joined the First Army in Britain, which was then preparing for the Normandy Invasion, as deputy commander under Lieutenant General Omar Bradley.

In August 1944, Hodges succeeded to command of the First Army when Bradley moved up to command the 12th Army Group. The First Army then defended against the German counterattack at Mortain, reduced the Falaise-Argentan Pocket (August 1944), helped in the liberation of Paris (August 19–26, 1944), penetrated the Siegfried Line (October–December 1944), captured Aachen (September 13–October 21, 1944), and suffered heavy casualties in the Hürtgen Forest (September 12–December 16, 1944).

In December 1944, the First Army bore the brunt of the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge). To deal with the crisis, General Dwight D. Eisenhower temporarily reorganized his command structure and placed a portion of the First Army—and Hodges—under British field marshal Bernard Montgomery, who thought that Hodges was at his breaking point. Eisenhower refused any suggestion that Hodges be relieved, and Hodges's performance in the Battle of the Bulge vindicated Eisenhower's view. The First Army rallied to hold the northern shoulder of the Bulge and then played an important role in the successful counterattack. First Army soldiers crossed the Rhine at Remagen (March 7, 1945), joined in the closing of the Ruhr Pocket (March 25–April 18), and, at the end of the war, linked up with Soviet forces on the Elbe River.



General Courtney Hodges commanded the U.S. First Army during the Battle of the Bulge in 1945. (Gabriel Benzur/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty Images)

In April 1945, Hodges was promoted to general. Following V-E day, he and the First Army were under orders for the Pacific theater to lead the invasion of Honshu when the Japanese surrendered. After the war, Hodges remained in command of the First Army until his retirement in 1949. He died in San Antonio, Texas, on January 16, 1966.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Aachen, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Hürtgen Forest Campaign; Paris, Liberation of; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the; Rhine Crossings; Ruhr Land Campaign; Siegfried Line, Breaking the

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Hoepner, Erich (1886–1944)

German Army general. Born in Frankfurt an der Oder on September 14, 1886, Erich Hoepner was commissioned in the army in 1906. He fought in World War I as a company commander and served as a General Staff officer. He remained in the army after the war and participated in the 1920 Kapp Putsch. He then served in different troop and staff commands. In 1933, Hoepner became chief of staff in the I Military District, continuing in the military despite his opposition to Adolf Hitler and National Socialism. Promoted to major general in 1936, Hoepner was part of a plot by the German opposition during the 1938 Czechoslovakian crisis to remove Hitler from power. His orders were to lead his 1st Light Division to prevent Schutzstaffel (SS) troops from reaching Berlin, but the plot collapsed with the signing of the Munich Agreement.

Taking command of the XVI Army Corps, Hoepner led his men in the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. Promoted in April to general of cavalry, he led XVI Corps in the September 1, 1939, invasion of Poland as part of the Tenth Army, advancing 140 miles to Warsaw in only a week. In the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940, his corps spearheaded the advance of the Sixth Army to Liège and then on to Dunkerque, later taking Dijon. Hoepner was promoted to colonel general in July 1940.

Hoepner commanded the Fourth Panzer Group in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union. A leading exponent of armored warfare, Hoepner favored a bold thrust to seize Leningrad during the 1941 advance, but Hitler ordered his forces to join Army Group Center under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock with the mission of taking Moscow from the north. Hoepner's panzers got to within 20 miles of the city when they were stalled by Soviet resistance and the onset of winter.

Following the December 1941 Soviet counterattack, Hoepner put his career in jeopardy when in early January he began withdrawing some of his

units to save them from certain annihilation. Hitler removed several of his generals on the Eastern Front, but he made a special example of Hoepner, who was court-martialed and cashiered. Publicly humiliated, Hoepner was denied the right to wear a uniform or his decorations, turning him into an active conspirator against the Nazi regime.

Hoepner was deeply involved in the failed July 20, 1944, plot against Hitler, and he was designated to take command of the Replacement Army should General Friedrich Fromm prove unreliable. Hoepner was also considered as a possible minister of war. With the failure of the plot, he rejected an opportunity to commit suicide, preferring to go on trial. Arrested and tried by the People's Court, Hoepner, having been tortured by Gestapo interrogators, appeared uncertain during the trial before Judge Roland Freisler. Found guilty, Hoepner was hanged by wire suspended from meat hooks at Plotzensee Prison in Berlin on August 8, 1944.

JOSEPH C. GREANEY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bock, Fedor von; France, Battle for; Fromm, Friedrich; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Munich Conference and Preliminaries; Poland Campaign

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Hoge, William Morris (1894–1979)

U.S. Army general. Born on January 13, 1894, in Booneville, Missouri, William Morris Hoge was commissioned in the engineers on graduation from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1916. During World War I, he served with the 7th Engineer Regiment in France, rising to command a battalion.

After the war, Hoge served in engineering assignments in the United States. He was also an instructor at the Engineer School and the Infantry School. He graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1922 with a bachelor's degree in engineering and from the Command and General Staff School in 1928, and he organized the Corps of Engineers for the Philippine army in 1937.

Following U.S. entry into World War II, Hoge was charged with constructing the northern segment of a highway across northwestern Canada to Alaska, the ALCAN Highway. By September 1942 when he left that post, he and his engineers had cut a road through 1,030 miles of uncharted wilderness, and supplies had begun to move along it to Alaska.

Hoge then transferred to the armored training force at Fort Knox, Kentucky. In late 1943, he was again assigned to the engineers, and in the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944, he commanded the Provisional 1st Engineer Special Brigade, which landed with the invasion forces and cleared beachhead obstacles. Later that year, Hoge took command of Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division, leading it through heavy fighting around Saint Vith during the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). On March 7, 1945, his units seized the Ludendorff Railroad Bridge across the Rhine River at Remagen, Germany, just minutes before it could be destroyed by the retreating Germans, thus providing the Allies with a vital bridgehead across Germany's last major defense line. Hoge ended the war commanding the 4th Armored Division as a major general, spearheading the U.S. Third Army's drive into Czechoslovakia.

During the postwar years, Hoge commanded the Engineer Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; IX Corps in Korea in 1951; the Seventh Army; and U.S. ground forces in Europe before retiring as a full general in January 1955. Thereafter he was chairman of the board for Interlake Iron Company in Cleveland, Ohio. Hoge died at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on October 29, 1979.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Alaska-Canadian Highway; Ardennes Offensive; Engineer Operations; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the

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Holcomb, Thomas (1879–1965)

U.S. Marine Corps general and commandant. Born on August 5, 1879, in New Castle, Delaware, Thomas Holcomb joined the U.S. Marine Corps in 1900, serving with the North Atlantic Fleet, at Beijing, and in the Philippines in the early 20th century. An excellent instructor, he always emphasized marksmanship training, reflecting his own skills as a world champion in long-range shooting and a member of the Marine Corps Rifle Team and contributing to his unit's success in World War I. From November 1917 to August 1918, Holcomb commanded the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, in France, fighting at Belleau Wood in 1918. As executive officer of the 6th Marine Regiment, he took part in other combat actions.

After the war, Holcomb was assigned to Germany, Cuba, and Beijing. He graduated from the Army Staff College, the Naval War College, and the Army War College; served in the Office of Naval Operations; and was promoted to brigadier general in 1935. The following year, he was promoted to major general and assigned as commandant of the Marine Corps above more senior officers.

As commandant, Holcomb undertook initiatives that would bear fruit during the Pacific war. He greatly enhanced the marines' growing capacity for amphibious warfare, developing several new types of landing craft. He supervised Marine Corps expansion from 16,000 officers and men in 1936 to 50,000 in mid-1941, 143,000 six months later, and more than 300,000 by 1945, comprising six combat divisions and four air wings.

In December 1940, Roosevelt appointed Holcomb to a second term as commandant, and in February 1942, Holcomb was promoted to lieutenant general. But while he trained and equipped the marines, he had no

operational control over their operations in the field. After disputes in 1942 at Guadalcanal between Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner and Marine Corps commander Major General Alexander Vandegrift, Holcomb insisted on the definition of clear lines of authority in joint amphibious operations. He won the decision that navy and Marine Corps commanders would enjoy equal authority and that superior officers would resolve any disputes. He resisted racial integration of the Marine Corps, however, on the grounds that it would detract from combat efficiency.

Holcomb reached mandatory retirement age in August 1943, but Roosevelt retained him in the post. Holcomb insisted on making way for a younger successor and retired on January 1, 1944, when he was promoted to full general on the retired list, the first Marine Corps officer to hold that rank. He then spent four years as ambassador to South Africa, seeking modest mitigation of that nation's regressive racial policies and returning to the United States in 1948. Holcomb died in New Castle, Delaware, on May 24, 1965.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Turner, Richmond Kelly; United States Marine Corps; Vandegrift, Alexander Archer

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Holland, Lancelot Ernest (1887–1941)

British Royal Navy vice admiral. Born on September 13, 1887, Lancelot Ernest Holland entered the Royal Navy and trained as a gunnery specialist. He was promoted to captain in 1926 and to rear admiral in January 1938.

From 1930 to 1931, Holland headed the British naval mission to Greece. During 1937 and 1938, he served as assistant chief of the naval staff, in which position he was responsible for naval doctrine and strategy.

In 1939 and 1940, Vice Admiral Holland was the Admiralty's representative to the Air Ministry and commanded the Home Fleet's 2nd Battle Squadron from January through August 1939. In November 1940, Holland commanded cruisers attached to Force H during Operation COLLAR, and he participated in the November 27, 1940, Battle of Cape Spartivento.

In May 1941, Holland was assigned as commander of the Battle Cruiser Squadron and second-in-command of the Home Fleet. His force comprised his flagship and the navy's largest capital ship, the battle cruiser *Hood*, along with the new battleship *Prince of Wales* and six destroyers. Holland's squadron was deployed in the North Atlantic, where British convoys between Britain and North America faced German U-boats, mines, and surface vessels.

On May 24, 1941, Holland's force engaged the German battleship *Bismarck* in the Northeast Atlantic. A 15-inch shell from the *Bismarck* hit and ignited a magazine and blew up the inadequately armored *Hood*, killing Holland and all but 3 of the *Hood*'s crew of 1,418 men, an enormous blow to British morale. The *Bismarck* temporarily drove off the *Prince of Wales* and eluded pursuing British ships, but three days later additional units of Admiral Sir John Tovey's Home Fleet battered it into a wreck.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Cape Spartivento, Battle of; Tovey, Sir John Cronyn

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Hollandia, Battle of (April 22–26, 1944)

Allied amphibious landing at New Guinea. In early 1944, General Douglas MacArthur's Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) were advancing along the northeastern coast of New Guinea. Following the capture of Saidor, MacArthur planned to seize Hansa Bay, about 120 miles to the northwest. But after the seizure of the Admiralty Islands in early March, he decided to bypass Hansa Bay and leap nearly 600 miles northwest to Hollandia in New Guinea.

Hollandia (now Sukarnapura), a major Japanese air and supply base, held two crucial advantages for the Allies. The port of Hollandia in Humboldt Bay was the best-sheltered anchorage along a lengthy stretch of the New Guinea coast, and the surrounding area had four airstrips. These assets could provide a major staging base for future operations in western New Guinea and the Philippine Islands. In addition, SWPA's intelligence determined that Hollandia was garrisoned only by a small force of 11,000 Japanese troops from the 6th Air Division, most of them service personnel. By attacking Hollandia, MacArthur could avoid potentially bloody battles to the east at Hansa Bay and Wewak, both of which were more strongly defended.

MacArthur and his staff were compelled to include a simultaneous attack at Aitape, 140 miles east of Hollandia. Airstrips there would provide a permanent staging area within range of Hollandia, enabling the Allies to seize command of the air. The Hollandia and Aitape invasions together required a flotilla of more than 200 ships and 80,000 personnel.

During late March and early April 1944, Allied pilots destroyed most of the 6th Air Division's aircraft, paving the way for the landing of ground troops on April 22. At the same time, Japanese lieutenant general Adachi Hatazō, commander of the Eighteenth Army headquartered on Rabaul, regrouped his battered forces near Hollandia. U.S. forces, meanwhile, carried out a remarkable counterintelligence scheme to divert Adachi. False radio transmissions, decoy raids, patrols, and bombing convinced the Japanese that an Allied assault at Hansa Bay was imminent.

The landing, dubbed Operation RECKLESS, was entrusted to Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger's I Corps. One regiment from the 24th Infantry Division went ashore at Tanahmerah Bay, and another regiment from the 24th Division and two regiments from the 41st Infantry Division

landed at Hollandia about 25 miles to the east. Simultaneously, a regiment from the 41st Division and a regiment from the 32nd Infantry Division landed at Aitape, 125 miles to the southeast, to secure a fighter strip. Their chief opposition came in the form of the marshy beaches themselves. Later that day, the 163rd Regimental Combat Team took Aitape against only limited resistance, demonstrating the effectiveness of the Hansa Bay ruse. With Aitape in hand, the ground forces at Hollandia trudged through trackless marsh and bog to encircle the three main Japanese airfields. Confusion, fear, and lack of weaponry prompted a large-scale Japanese retreat west.

Suppressing remaining resistance, U.S. forces secured Hollandia on April 26, 1944, only four days after the initial landings, although mopping-up operations continued for several weeks. The most telling evidence of the Allied air attacks before the landings was the wreckage of more than 340 Japanese aircraft on Hollandia’s runways. Allied casualties were 159 killed and 1,100 wounded. The Japanese lost 3,300 dead and 600 prisoners. At Aitape, all objectives were secured by April 25 at a cost of 3 American dead. About 600 Japanese were killed, and 27 were taken prisoner. Another 6,000 Japanese were either killed by units from the 24th Division or died from starvation and disease as they retreated from Hollandia to Wadke-Sarmi, 140 miles to the west.

U.S. Army Fifth Air Force planes attacking the Japanese base at Hollandia (now Jayapura) in New Guinea, 1944. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Operation RECKLESS was a major triumph for MacArthur. It split the Japanese forces defending New Guinea in half, leaving the Eighteenth Army isolated in eastern New Guinea. It also gave MacArthur a superb base from which to increase the tempo of operations in the Southwest Pacific theater, and before long U.S. engineers had turned Hollandia into a vast complex of military, naval, and air facilities occupied by 140,000 men.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL AND BRYAN JOSEPH RODRIGUEZ

See also

Adachi Hatazō; Admiralty Islands Campaign; Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Krueger, Walter; MacArthur, Douglas; New Guinea Campaign; Rabaul; Signals Intelligence; Document 184

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Holocaust

Nazi effort to exterminate the Jews of Europe during World War II. Historians have developed several interpretations of the Holocaust. While some see it as the last most horrible manifestation of historical anti-Semitism, others view it as the outcome of factors inherent in Western civilization, such as economic rationalization, technocracy, and the eugenics movement. Intentionalists see Adolf Hitler as the crucial factor in the Holocaust, determined on the destruction of the Jews from the beginning. A straight line supposedly runs from his earliest anti-Semitic comments through World War II and his final testament of April 1945. Functionalists, on the other hand, see the persecution of the Jews as a slowly developing process, exhibiting no overall plan. This debate has now largely been settled in favor of the intentionalists by research during the last decade. Attempts have been made to reconcile these positions, for example, emphasizing the fusion of anti-Semitism with bureaucratic techniques of mass extermination.

Although it began in 1938 either with the Anschluss or (more commonly) Kristallnacht, not until after the beginning of World War II, when the Nazis found themselves in control of well more than 3 million Jews, did the full implementation of the Holocaust occur. The French Revolution of 1789 saw the beginning of the process of emancipation of the European Jews and their increasing assimilation into European society. As the century progressed, traditional Christian anti-Judaism gave way to modern racial anti-Semitism, fostered by hypernationalism, social Darwinism, and pseudoracial "science." Anti-Semites made the Jews the scapegoat for all the supposed ills of the modern world, including capitalism, socialism, and the press.

Anti-Semitism was a Pan-European phenomenon, as is exemplified by the Dreyfus Affair in France. Eastern Europe (especially Russia) was the scene of violent pogroms and ritual murder trials into the 20th century. In about 1900, agents of the czarist secret police, the Okhrana, wrote the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, stemming from an earlier French play, a forgery proclaiming a Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world.

By 1900, there were some 600,000 Jews in a German population of 60 million. Jews were prominent in such areas as banking, journalism, and medicine. Some 85 percent were assimilationists and enthusiastically supported Germany during World War I. Nonetheless, Germany's defeat in World War I and the accompanying economic turmoil of the early 1920s allowed extremist right-wing groups such as the National Socialist German Workers' Party, led by Adolf Hitler, to spread. These groups held Jews responsible for everything from betraying Germany on the home front during World War I to causing the evils of urban life. Whether it stemmed from his Vienna years, as portrayed in *Mein Kampf,* or developed essentially after his entry into politics at the end of World War I, Hitler's obsessive and pathological anti-Semitism, its identification with Bolshevism, and a crude social Darwinism became the core of his and Nazism's ideology.

Hitler's overall role and guilt in fostering the persecution of the Jews is clear. After 1934, however, he gradually withdrew from domestic politics, fostering power struggles among various party agencies. In this atmosphere, his lieutenants attempted to anticipate his wishes—a process that led to increasingly radical anti-Jewish measures.

The Nazis' assumption of power in 1933 led to increased random attacks on Jews. The Nazis did not appear to have a coordinated plan to deal with the "Jewish question." Indeed, the years 1933 to 1938 saw tension between party radicals such as Joseph Goebbels and Julius Streicher and moderates such as Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath and Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, who feared that anti-Semitic actions would damage Germany's international position and economic recovery. Some level of anti-Semitism was common among many Germans, but there is little evidence that most Germans were imbued with an eliminationist anti-Semitism, ready to murder Jews once they were given the opportunity, as some scholars have argued.

The opening of the Nazi attack included a one-day largely unsuccessful boycott of Jewish stores on April 1, 1933, and the April 7 Law for the

Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, which dismissed non-Aryans from government service. Although the boycott was unpopular with large sections of the public and the civil service law included exemptions such as World War I veterans, these actions began a gradual process that by 1939 would lead to the exclusion of Jews from German life.

On July 14, 1933, the Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring was promulgated. By 1937 it had led to the sterilization of some 200,000 people. Although the Nazi eugenics program was not aimed specifically at Jews and indeed was influenced by the general European and American eugenics movement, it ran on a parallel track with the anti-Jewish legislation. During World War II, the two tracks would merge in a program of euthanasia and mass murder.

Other legislation withdrew the voting rights of Jews, their access to education, and their ability to own businesses and to hold particular jobs. In 1934 Jews were banned from university examinations; in 1936 they were forbidden from using parks or public swimming pools and from owning electrical equipment, typewriters, and bicycles. Jews were also subject to cultural and artistic restrictions, forcing many to leave their jobs in the arts.

In September 1935, the so-called Nuremberg Laws were passed by a special session of the Reichstag convened during the Nazi Party rally of that month. The laws were drawn up in great haste during the rally itself, indicative of the unsystematic nature of Nazi policy concerning the Jews during the 1930s. Jews became subjects, not citizens; it became illegal for Jews to marry or have extramarital relations with non-Jews. On November 14 a supplementary law was enacted, defining a “full Jew” (having three or four Jewish grandparents) and the categories of first-degree and second-degree *Mischling* (mixed race).

In 1938 there was another major escalation of anti-Jewish persecution. In Austria after the Anschluss in March, a wave of humiliations, beatings, and murders occurred that were worse than anything else seen so far in Germany. The Nazis quickly set up agencies to forcibly expropriate Jewish businesses and expedite emigration, the latter effort led by Adolf Eichmann, Zionist expert of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD, Security Service). Some scholars see this sequence of violence, expropriation, and emigration as a model for how the Nazis would later attempt to handle the “Jewish question,” with emigration replaced by something far worse.

During the spring and summer of 1938, violent attacks on Jews in Germany increased, culminating in the pogrom of November 9–10. In retaliation for the murder of the third secretary of the German embassy in Paris, Ernst von Rath, committed by a Jewish youth by the name of Herschel Grynspan, Jews were attacked all over Germany, businesses were vandalized, and synagogues were burned. The streets were so covered with glass that they appeared to be made of crystal, hence the term Kristallnacht, or "Night of Broken Glass," to describe the event. Party, police, and governmental offices all were complicit in the pogrom. Estimates hold that some 91 Jews died, 30,000 were arrested, and a like number were sent to concentration camps. A total of 267 synagogues were burned, and 7,500 businesses were vandalized. The Jews received no insurance payments and in fact were fined more than 1 billion reichsmarks for "damage to the German economy."

The period from November 1938 to the outbreak of World War II saw the removal of Jews from virtually all aspects of German society. During a Reichstag speech in January 1939, Hitler made his infamous threat that if international Jewry succeeded in starting another world war, the result would not be its victory but "the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe."

By the time the war began, more than half of German and Austrian Jews had departed Germany, the official policy of which still promoted emigration. Emigrants were subject to expropriation and payment of flight taxes. Few countries were willing to increase their quota of Jewish immigrants, however. International conferences such as that held in Évian, France, in July 1938 proved fruitless. The United States, which had convened the conference hoping to find an outlet for Jewish emigration, refused to increase quotas for Jews; only the Dominican Republic offered to take any German Jewish immigrants.

After their conquest of Poland in the fall of 1939, the Nazis found themselves in control of some 2 million additional Jews. Another million were in the Soviet sphere of occupation. Nazi treatment of Poles and Jews, considered inferior races, was brutal. Western Poland was annexed to Germany, and the eastern part was turned into the General Government under Nazi lawyer Hans Frank. To facilitate the implementation of Nazi policies, head of the Schutzstaffel (SS) Heinrich Himmler on September 27 amalgamated all police and security services in the

Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office, RSHA) under Reinhard Heydrich.

On September 21, Heydrich issued instructions to Einsatzgruppen (mobile strike forces) leaders in which he distinguished between the "final aim" (*Endziel*) of Jewish policy and the steps leading to it. Jews were to be moved from the countryside and concentrated in cities near rail lines, implying the ghettoization of Polish Jews. Each ghetto was to elect a Jewish Council (Judenrat) that would be responsible for carrying out Nazi orders. In October, Jews were expelled from the annexed area of Poland, called the Warthegau, into the General Government. In addition, Frank ordered that all Jews must perform compulsory labor and wear a Star of David on the right sleeve of their clothing.

Despite the mention of the "final aim" and the brutality of these measures, most scholars do not believe that the Nazis had yet adopted the idea of mass extermination. Their main goals during 1940 were either fostering emigration by Jews or deporting them to a colony in Africa (they had a plan to use Madagascar as a huge prison for Jews) or the Near East.

The first major ghetto was established in Lodz in February 1940. The Warsaw ghetto, the largest, was established in October 1940. Ghettos were in older sections of cities, with inadequate living space, housing, and food. They were surrounded by walls and barbed wire, and attempts to leave were punished by death. Disease and starvation were common. Jewish Councils had their own police forces, which were often brutal in enforcing Nazi orders. The 1940 Nazi film *Die Ewige Jude* (*The Eternal Jew*) cynically portrayed these conditions as normal Jewish living habits.

Despite the terrible conditions, Jews secretly practiced their religion, educated their children, and maintained cultural activities. In Warsaw, the historian Emmanuel Ringelblum started Oneg Shabbat (meaning "in celebration of the Sabbath"), a secret organization that chronicled life in the ghetto. Its records, partly recovered after the war, are an invaluable picture of ghetto life. Many Jews kept diaries, and the Nazis thoroughly documented the ghettos.

In a speech to senior army officers on March 30, 1941, preceding the June 22 invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA), Hitler maintained that in contrast to war in the west, the war against the Soviet Union would be a war of annihilation, a brutal campaign to subjugate inferior Slavs and to

exterminate Jewish Bolshevism. Hitler's Barbarossa Decree of May 13, 1941, and the Commissar Order of June 6, 1941, as well as orders issued by various generals called for liquidation of the Bolshevik leadership without trial, reprisals against whole villages for partisan actions, and the freeing of military personnel from prosecution for crimes against civilians. These orders paved the way for military complicity in war crimes against Russian soldiers and civilians and especially against the Jews.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, four Einsatzgruppen (deployment groups), each numbering 600–1,000 men, swept through the conquered territories in the wakes of the invading armies, shooting Communist Party functionaries and especially male Jews. The Einsatzgruppen were drawn primarily from various security and SS units. The German army provided no obstacles to their actions and in some cases actively cooperated with them. After their numbers were augmented in August, the Einsatzgruppen rapidly expanded their killing of Jews, including women and children. Between June and August the Einsatzgruppen killed approximately 50,000 Jews; in the next four months some 500,000 would perish. On October 29 and 30 alone at Babi Yar near Kiev, some 33,000 Jews were shot, and their bodies were dumped in a ravine. Hitler had undoubtedly given the overall approval to widen the killing in August, and he regularly received reports of Einsatzgruppen activities.

Collaborators throughout Eastern Europe actively aided—and in some cases outdid—the Nazis in mass killings. For example, the German invasion of Lithuania was accompanied by horrendous butchery of Lithuanians against Lithuanians. Germany's Romanian allies actively murdered Jews. On October 22, the Romanian military headquarters in Odessa was blown up and 60 lives were lost. In reprisal, Romanian Army units massacred 19,000 Jews and locked another 20,000 in warehouses in a nearby village, which were then set on fire and machine-gunned. Babi-Yar and Odessa were perhaps the two worst massacres of the war.

Although no written order has come to light and Hitler confined himself to murderous ranting about the Jews, there can be no doubt that the Holocaust proceeded with his express knowledge and desire. Scholars are divided, however, about when exactly the "final solution" (*Endlösung*) was put into effect. Some authorities place the decision as early as the spring of 1941 during the planning for Operation BARBAROSSA, and others argue that there

was a gradual escalation of measures throughout the summer and fall of 1941. Hitler's final decision may have come on December 12, 1941, in a talk to party leaders at the Reich Chancellery, one day after his declaration of war on the United States. Hitler now saw the events he had described in his speech of January 30, 1939, as coming to pass: the Jews had started a world war, and now they would perish.

On January 20, 1942, the much-postponed Wannsee Conference, held for the purpose of coordinating activities by various agencies with regard to the "final solution," took place. Chaired by Reinhard Heydrich, it included major SS and government agency representatives. Europe's Jewish population was set at an exaggerated figure of 11 million. The Jews—even those not under Nazi control—were to be "evacuated" to the east. This "final solution to the Jewish question" would be implemented first in the General Government. Hitler's hatred of the Jews, the realization that the war against the Soviet Union would not be over quickly, the huge number of Jews in Eastern Europe augmented by deportations from the west, and killing actions initiated by local commanders all combined to replace deportation with systematic mass murder.

Since execution by shooting was too inefficient and was stressful for the executioners, the Nazis began gassing victims. The model for mass murder came from the euthanasia program, which had been ordered by Hitler on September 1, 1939, and officially ended in August 1941, after strong protests from German churches. Known as the T-4 program (named after its headquarters at Tiergartenstrasse 4 in Berlin), it had been responsible for killing some 5,000 children and 70,000 to 80,000 adults, at first by starvation, then by lethal injection, and finally with carbon monoxide and other poison gasses. Several T-4 staff members were transferred to the extermination program of Eastern Europe.

In December 1941, Chelmno, near Lodz in the Warthegau, was the first extermination center to begin operation. Between March and July 1942, in connection with Operation REINHARD (the plan to kill the Jews of the General Government), three more death camps were set up: Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. Deportations to these camps from Polish ghettos took place throughout 1942 and into the fall of 1943.

As Jews were rounded up, they were told that they were being resettled to labor camps in the east. When the Jews arrived in the camps, their belongings

were confiscated, and they were then forced to undress and move down a ramp (“the tube”) into gas chambers falsely labeled as showers. The Jews were then killed with gas fed into the chamber. Special units of Jewish prisoners called Sonderkommandos removed the dead from the gas chambers, collected their possessions, and then buried the corpses in mass graves or incinerated them in crematoria. Eventually, the Sonderkommandos too were killed. Jews from all over occupied Europe as well as Romas (Gypsies) were killed in these camps. Authorities estimate the approximate death toll at 1.9 million.

Majdanek (near Lublin in the General Government) and Auschwitz (in a section of southern Poland annexed to Germany) operated as concentration, extermination, and forced-labor camps. Exterminations in gas chambers began in Majdanek in the fall of 1942 and greatly increased in November 1943, when the Nazis launched Operation ERNTEFEST (HARVEST FESTIVAL) to kill off the remaining Jews in the General Government. By the time Soviet forces overran Majdanek in July 1944, some 360,000 people had died.

Auschwitz I was established as a concentration camp in May 1940. Here the Nazis brutally murdered thousands at the “Black Wall” and carried on gruesome pseudoscientific medical experiments, including sterilization, castration, and hypothermia. Auschwitz II, or Auschwitz-Birkenau, was essentially an extermination camp. It began operations on September 3, 1941, when 900 Soviet prisoners of war died after being gassed with Zyklon B, crystallized hydrogen cyanide. By 1943, four large gas chamber/crematoria were at work as Jews from all over Europe were brought to Auschwitz. Work to expand the facility continued essentially until the summer of 1944. During the spring and summer of 1944, more than 400,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz and gassed. A conservative estimate puts the overall death toll here at 1.1 million Jews, 75,000 Poles, 21,000 Romas, and 15,000 Soviet prisoners of war.

Prisoners destined for the camps were packed into unheated and unventilated cattle cars with no food and, perhaps, one bucket for a toilet. Many died before reaching the camp. Upon arrival, prisoners underwent “selection”: those unfit for work were immediately sent to the gas chambers, which were disguised as showers. Sonderkommandos cleaned the gas chambers, cremated the corpses, and collected valuables.



Slave laborers in the Buchenwald concentration camp near Jena, Germany, April 16, 1945. Many had died from malnutrition by the time U.S. troops of the 80th Division entered the camp. (National Archives)

In the fall of 1941, I. G. Farben decided to build a Buna (synthetic rubber) plant at Auschwitz to exploit cheap slave labor. The so-called Auschwitz III expanded into a 40-square-mile area with numerous subcamps. Periodic selections singled out weak and sick workers for extermination.

Numerous survivors, including Elie Wiesel and Primo Levi, have described the brutal Auschwitz camp regime, which was intended to dehumanize its victims. “Kapos”—usually incarcerated criminals—enforced order. Hunger was all-pervasive. Finally, on January 27, 1945, Soviet forces liberated the few remaining prisoners in Auschwitz. Some 60,000 had been forced on death marches to camps in Germany. Many died on the marches or before the German camps were liberated.

Between 1942 and early 1945, the Nazis extended the Holocaust to occupied Western, Central, and Southern Europe. Researchers have now identified some 42,500 Nazi ghettoes and camps throughout German-controlled areas of Europe. Numerous government agencies including the RSHA, the Transport Ministry, and the Foreign Office lent their assistance.

Adolf Eichmann, head of RSHA Jewish Affairs and Evacuation Affairs (coded IV-B-4), coordinated the deportations. The European rail system was taken over and used to move Jews east to the killing sites.

In many places the Nazis were assisted by collaborationist authorities, but elsewhere, such as in Denmark and in Italian-held areas, they were actively resisted by local officials. The result was that thousands of Jews went into hiding or were assisted in escaping the Nazi dragnet. Although exact numbers will never be known, it is estimated that 3.5 million to 4 million people died in the six death camps. When victims of pogroms, the Einsatzgruppen, and those who died of overwork, starvation, and disease in the camps and ghettos are added, the Holocaust claimed some 6 million lives.

Resistance was made difficult by numerous factors—the impossibility of believing the reality of what was happening, the hostility of local populations, the difficulty of obtaining weapons, the deception of the Nazis, and the decision of Jewish councils to obey Nazi demands in hopes of saving the lives of the remnant Jewish population that worked in defense industries.

Most Jews who were rounded up for execution or transport to a camp went without resistance. In some cases, however, open rebellion occurred. The most famous example is the Warsaw Rising, beginning on April 19, 1943, in which 700 to 1,000 resistance fighters in the Warsaw ghetto held off several thousand heavily armed German and Baltic auxiliaries under SS-Brigadeführer Joseph (Jürgen) Stroop for almost four weeks. Revolts in Treblinka in August 1943 and in Sobibor in October 1943 led to the closing of these camps. On October 7, 1944, the Sonderkommando at Auschwitz revolted, killing several SS men and blowing up one of the crematoria. All were killed in the ensuing escape attempt. In several cases, Jews were able to escape the ghettos and either join or form their own partisan groups that fought against the Nazis.

Allied officials were clearly aware of the Holocaust by late 1942, but like the Jews themselves, they had difficulty believing what they were hearing. In addition, anti-Semitism was still strong in many countries. U.S. State Department official Breckinridge Long worked actively to keep Jewish refugees out of the United States. In the Allied countries, winning the war was the first priority, and American Jewish organizations were hesitant to make waves or press President Franklin D. Roosevelt for fear of stirring up even more anti-Semitism. In a still-controversial decision, the Allies refused

to bomb the Auschwitz camp or the rail lines leading to it. Not until early 1944 did Roosevelt create the War Refugee Board, after the Treasury Department had exposed the State Department's duplicity in trying to keep Jews from immigrating to the United States.

Some governments or individual diplomats resisted the Nazis. The Danish people ensured the rescue of more than 95 percent of Danish Jews. The Bulgarian government refused to give over its native Jews, although it handed over Jews in occupied territories. The Italian fascist government refused cooperation with the Nazis, and Francisco Franco's government allowed Jewish refugees to travel through Spain. Diplomats defied their orders by issuing visas to Jews. The Swede Raoul Wallenberg and other diplomats in Budapest rescued thousands of Jews in the summer and fall of 1944 by issuing false papers and setting up safe havens. Citizens from France to Poland sheltered Jews, in some cases for years, at tremendous risk to themselves. In 1940, Chiune Sugihara, a minor diplomat in the Japanese consulate in Kaunas, Lithuania, quietly defied his government's orders and issued illegal visas to more than 2,000 Jewish families.

In the case of the churches, it was more often individuals than institutions that did rescue work. Numerous Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, and Catholic clergy and laymen intervened to help Jews, whereas others remained silent or backed Nazi actions. Controversy still surrounds the role of Pope Pius XII, who never publicly condemned the Holocaust even when the Jews of Rome were being rounded up in October 1943.

As the Nazi empire crumbled in late 1944 and early 1945, Himmler and others carried out increasingly desperate negotiations, attempting to trade Jewish lives for ransom. As the Soviet Army moved westward, hasty attempts were made to dismantle camps and burn victims' bodies. Prisoners were forced on death marches back to camps within Germany. By May 1945, the last of the camps had been overrun. Some 50,000 prisoners were liberated, but many were so sick and emaciated that they died soon after. In his political testament of April 29, 1945, Hitler blamed the war on the Jews and called on Germans to continue the struggle against international Jewry.

The pre–World War II Jewish population of Europe had been approximately 9 million. At the end of the war, only 3 million remained. In Poland, some 45,000 survived out of a prewar population of 3 million, many of whom were Hasidic Jews. In the words of the sect's founder, Israel Ba'al

Shem Tov: “In forgetfulness is the root of exile. In remembrance the seed of redemption.”

DONALD E. THOMAS JR.

See also

Allied Military Tribunals after the War; Babi Yar Massacre; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Catholic Church and the War; Collaboration; Commissar Order; Concentration Camps, German; Eichmann, Karl Adolf; Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Jewish Resistance; Pius XII, Pope; Resistance; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stroop, Jürgen; Wannsee Conference; Warsaw Ghetto Uprising; Document 64; Document 115; Document 117

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Ho Lung

See He Long

Homma Masaharu (1887–1946)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Niigata Province, Sado Island, on November 27, 1887, Homma Masaharu graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1907 and the War College in 1915. In 1918, during World War I, he was posted as an observer with the British Army on the Western Front. During the 1920s, Homma was an instructor at the War College, resident officer in India, General Staff officer, and aide-de-camp to Prince Chichibu, Emperor Hirohito's younger brother.

Promoted to colonel in 1930, Homma served as military attaché to Great Britain from 1930 to 1932. On his return to Japan, Homma authored Tokyo's response to the Lytton Commission's report on Japanese aggression in Manchuria. He subsequently held regimental, brigade, and divisional commands. Promoted to major general in 1935, Homma headed the army's Intelligence Bureau in 1937 and 1938. In 1938 he was promoted to lieutenant general, and in December 1940 he assumed command of the Formosa Army.

On November 2, 1941, as war against the Western powers loomed, Imperial Headquarters entrusted Homma with the 43,000-man Fourteenth Army and the task of conquering the Philippines in only 50 days. Although the Fourteenth Army achieved victory, a variety of factors—including U.S. and Filipino resistance, Homma's failure to anticipate an American-Filipino withdrawal into the Bataan Peninsula on Luzon, and his hesitancy to push his forces—resulted in the campaign lasting four months longer than anticipated.



Japanese Army general Homma Masaharu commanded Japanese forces in their conquering of the Philippines in World War II. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Homma's inability to conclude the Philippine Campaign within the established time frame and his leniency toward the Filipino people discredited him in the eyes of his superiors, who relieved him of command in August 1942. Transferred to Tokyo, Homma spent the rest of the war on the reserve list.

At the war's conclusion, U.S. authorities arrested Homma and charged him with war crimes, including the Bataan Death March. Tried and convicted by the U.S. Military Commission in Manila, he was sentenced to death. Homma was executed by firing squad at Los Baños in the Philippines on April 3, 1946.

BRUCE J. DEHART

See also

Bataan, Battle of; Bataan Death March; Corregidor, Battle of; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew

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Honda Masaki (1889–1964)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born on May 17, 1889, in Nagano Prefecture, Honda Masaki attended the Military Academy and the Army Staff College. He was an army attaché in France from 1921 to 1924 and was assigned to the Army Ministry from 1927 to 1929. Honda was assigned to the Infantry School during 1930–1932 and 1936–1937. In 1937 he was promoted to major general, and in 1939 he became the commandant of the Infantry School.

Honda then was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed chief of staff of the China Expeditionary Army in Manchuria. In 1940, he took command of the 8th Infantry Division. He continued to be involved in training as chief of the Armored Warfare Division of the Military Education Department in 1941. In April 1943, he assumed command of the Twentieth Army in Manchuria.

In April 1944, Honda took command of the newly formed Thirty-Third Army in north Burma (present-day Myanmar). By this time, the Japanese position in Burma was deteriorating under Allied attacks. Honda's outnumbered forces were nearly destroyed by troops under U.S. general Joseph Stilwell in October 1944. In January 1945, Honda made a desperate attempt to prevent the Allies from seizing the Burma Road, but his army was defeated, and Burma was lost to the Japanese. The remnants of Honda's army continued to fight on sporadically until their formal surrender on August 28, 1945. Honda retired after the war and died in Tokyo on July 17, 1964.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also
Burma Theater; China-Burma-India Theater; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Hong Kong, Battle of (December 8–25, 1941)

Battle for the British Asian colony of Hong Kong whose capture by Japan symbolized the defeat of Western imperialism in Asia. The colony of Hong Kong, 400 square miles of islands and an adjacent peninsula on the coast of Guangdong, southern China, was both the headquarters of the Royal Navy's China Squadron and a significant entrepôt and commercial center. From the mid-1930s onward, the British Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that in the event of attack by Japanese forces, Hong Kong would be indefensible.

In 1935, Major General Sir John Dill, director of military operations, ranked Hong Kong's strategic significance far below that of Singapore, Britain's other naval base. A 1939 strategic review also assigned Britain's interests in Europe much greater importance than those of Hong Kong. British leaders nonetheless feared that a failure to defend Hong Kong or even the evacuation of civilians would signal their country's intention of abandoning its Asian position and damage the morale of the embattled Chinese Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) government in its struggle to resist Japanese invasion.

By June 1940, sizable Japanese forces blocked Hong Kong's access to the Chinese mainland. That August, Dill—now chief of the Imperial General Staff—recommended the withdrawal of the British garrison. Although Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill accepted this recommendation, it was not implemented. Some women and children were evacuated to Manila in the Philippines, and in October 1941 Britain accepted the Canadian government's ill-considered offer to send two Canadian battalions to reinforce the two Scottish and two Indian battalions already manning Hong Kong's defenses.

Even with this assistance, Hong Kong's defenses remained decidedly inadequate: 12,000 troops, augmented by the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery and the civilian Hong Kong Volunteer Defense Force, were too few to man the colony's lengthy main defense line (Gin Drinker's Line), which ran three miles north of Kowloon in the New Territories. Air and naval forces comprised a pitiable seven airplanes, eight motor torpedo boats, and four small gunboats. It was generally known that many Japanese civilians in the colony were fifth columnists, agents only awaiting the opportunity to facilitate a Japanese assault. London had no intention of sending any further assistance and merely expected its defenders to stave off inevitable defeat as long as possible.

British prisoners of war departing Hong Kong for a Japanese prison camp, December 1941. (Keystone/Getty Images)

On December 8, 1941, as Japanese forces simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor (December 7 in Hawaii), a surprise raid on the Kai Tak airfield by Taiwan-based Japanese bombers destroyed all seven British airplanes. Twelve battalions of the 38th Division of the Japanese Twenty-Third Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Sano Tadayoshi, crossed the Shenzhen

River separating the New Territories and mainland China. Churchill urged Hong Kong's defenders to resist to the end, but within 24 hours Japanese forces had breached Gin Drinker's Line. British commander Major General Christopher M. Maltby ordered a retreat to Hong Kong island, and by December 12, Japanese troops held Kowloon.

Sano's artillery began heavy bombardments of British positions on Victoria, the central district, but Maltby refused a December 14 ultimatum to surrender and the following day repulsed a Japanese attempt to land troops on Hong Kong island. A second attempt three nights later succeeded, and Japanese forces swiftly advanced across the island to its southern coast, splitting British forces. Despite heavy losses, British troops fought fiercely, on December 20 compelling Sano to halt temporarily to regroup. The advance soon resumed, however, and by December 24 Japanese units had destroyed the water mains, leaving their opponents as short of water as they were of ammunition. On December 25, 1941, the British governor agreed to an unconditional surrender.

The Japanese victors treated their defeated foes with great brutality, massacring many of the defending forces, Chinese and Western, including hospitalized wounded men. They raped and sometimes killed hospital nurses and other captured women. Surviving prisoners of war and Allied civilians were interned for the duration of the war, often in severe conditions, while the supposedly liberated Chinese population likewise experienced harsh and arbitrary rule and numerous atrocities.

Hong Kong remained under Japanese occupation until August 1945 when, despite the hopes of Chinese Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) that it would revert to China, British forces reestablished control. Hong Kong subsequently remained a British colony until its 1997 reversion to China.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

China; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dill, Sir John Greer; Jiang Jieshi; Pearl Harbor, Attack on

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Hopkins, Harry Lloyd (1890–1946)

U.S. diplomat and influential presidential adviser to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Born on August 17, 1890, in Sioux City, Iowa, Harry Hopkins graduated from Grinnell College in 1912. He subsequently became a social worker in New York City and then joined President Roosevelt's New Deal administration first as head of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (1933–1935) and then, from 1935 to 1938, as head of the Works Progress Administration. Hopkins also supervised the Civil Works Administration (CWA). His visions of social justice and structural economic reforms made him one of the chief architects of the New Deal. He was a great proponent of the creation of government-sponsored jobs as a means to mitigate unemployment and help American workers retain their dignity and self-reliance. Roosevelt named Hopkins secretary of commerce in 1938.

Stomach cancer and ill health forced Hopkins to leave the Department of Commerce in 1940. He then became a trusted adviser to the president, with whom he had great influence. Hopkins also served as an intermediary between Roosevelt and other Allied leaders. In January 1941, Hopkins flew to Britain as Roosevelt's personal envoy to coordinate the Lend-Lease Act. He also convinced the president to ignore U.S. ambassador to Great Britain Joseph P. Kennedy's pessimistic reports regarding Britain's ability to remain in the war. Hopkins prevailed upon Roosevelt to deploy navy ships to undertake convoy duty in the North Atlantic prior to the American entrance into the war in December 1941.

To secure an agreement in discussions about the Atlantic Charter on August 14, 1941, Hopkins helped smooth over differences between Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill on the issue of colonialism. Another example of Hopkins's influence was his ability in 1944 to convince chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Leahy to continue supplying British forces in Greece, even though the United States

disagreed with London's policy toward communist rebels there. Hopkins was not always successful in his diplomatic efforts, as in Moscow in June 1945, when he failed to secure Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's support for democratic reforms in Poland that had been agreed to at the Yalta Conference the previous February.

After Roosevelt's death in April 1945, Hopkins assisted the new president, Harry S. Truman, in arrangements for the July–August 1945 Potsdam Conference. Hopkins also played a leading role in the formation of the United Nations. Forced by ill health to retire from public life in the fall of 1945, Hopkins died in New York City on January 29, 1946.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM

See also

Atlantic Charter; Casablanca Conference; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Lend-Lease; Potsdam Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; United Nations, Formation of; Yalta Conference; Document 158

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Hore-Belisha, Isaac Leslie (1893–1957)

British Liberal politician and secretary of state for war. Born on September 7, 1893, in Kilburn, London, Isaac Leslie Hore-Belisha was from a prominent British Sephardic Jewish family. His father died before Leslie reached his first birthday, and he later added the surname of his stepfather, Sir Adair Hore, to his own. Hore-Belisha attended Saint John's College, Oxford, becoming president of the Union. He won military distinction in World War I. In 1923, he was called to the bar and also won parliamentary election as a Liberal from Devonport, Plymouth, which he represented until 1945. In 1931,

he became chairman of the National Liberal Party, which supported the national government.

In 1934, Hore-Belisha became minister of transport, and in 1937 he succeeded Alfred Duff Cooper, 1st Viscount Norwich, as secretary of state for war. Instructed by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to introduce "drastic changes"—as war seemed increasingly likely—Hore-Belisha improved conditions and training for ordinary soldiers, raised soldiers' pay, retired many inefficient senior officers, upgraded officer training, and enhanced the army's mechanized warfare capabilities and its ability to resist air attack. In April 1939, he prevailed on a reluctant Chamberlain to introduce conscription and to prepare a British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to fight in France if necessary. Although Hore-Belisha demonstrated innovation, decision, and vision within the army and outside it, his tactless style alienated many who essentially shared his views.

When war began in September 1939, Hore-Belisha criticized the hesitant preparations and progress of the BEF under the leadership of General Lord John Gort, chief of the Imperial General Staff. Hore-Belisha accurately predicted that unless weak spots on the front were reinforced, Germany would probably attack successfully in the Ardennes sector. Gort and his allies, who included French Army commander in chief General Maurice Gamelin, complained to King George VI, and in January 1940 Chamberlain reluctantly decided to remove Hore-Belisha from office. Hore-Belisha preferred to resign, however.

For the duration of the war, Hore-Belisha was one of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill's strongest backbench critics, unsuccessfully urging Churchill's resignation after the fall of Tobruk in June 1942. From May to August 1945, Hore-Belisha served briefly as minister of national insurance, but he lost his seat in that year's elections. In 1954, he accepted a peerage, and his incisive parliamentary speeches regained him some political influence. Hore-Belisha died suddenly on February 16, 1957, while leading a British parliamentary delegation in Reims, France.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Great Britain, Army; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Vereker, John

Standish Surtees Prendergast

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Hori Eizo (1913–1995)

Japanese Army major general. Born in Nara on October 16, 1913, Hori Eizo graduated from the Army Cadet School in June 1934 and the War College in November 1942. He was originally trained as a cavalry officer. Promoted to major in October 1943, Hori was appointed as a staff officer in the Intelligence Section of the Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ).

Through his thorough analysis of the facts, Hori demonstrated his outstanding talent in predicting American offensive moves in the Pacific theater. However, operational planners in the IGHQ ignored Hori's assessments. Sent to the Philippines in October 1944 as a staff officer of the Fourteenth Area Army, Hori assisted General Yamashita Tomoyuki. Hori returned to Tokyo in early 1945 on the staff of the Intelligence Section of the IGHQ. He accurately predicted the scheduled dates and locations of Allied plans to invade the Japanese home islands. Since June 1945, Hori had even detected the unusual activities of some U.S. air units in the Marianas. These subsequently turned out to be training activities in preparation for the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Because he was able to predict the American moves, Hori became known in the IGHQ as "MacArthur's staff officer." Hori ended the war as a major.

In postwar Japan, Hori served in the Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) from 1954 to 1957. As an intelligence specialist, his posts included military attaché to West Germany and head of the Intelligence Section of the Combined General Staff. He retired in 1967 as a major general. Thereafter, he taught German and also served as head administrator of his native village of Nishiyoshino. Hori died in Nara on June 5, 1995.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Hiroshima, Bombing of; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Horii Tomitaro (1890–1942)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Hyogo Prefecture on November 7, 1890, Horii Tomitaro was commissioned in the Imperial Japanese Army in December 1911. Following several staff and line postings, Horii commanded a battalion beginning in August 1932. He was promoted to colonel in August 1937, and in July 1938 he was attached to headquarters of the 8th Depot Division. Horii then took command of the 82nd Infantry Regiment. By August 1940, he was a major general commanding the 55th Regimental Group. This formation consisted principally of the reinforced 144th Infantry Regiment and was better known as the South Seas Detachment.

At the start of World War II, Horii's force quickly captured Guam. On January 4, 1942, Imperial General Headquarters ordered Horii to prepare to take Rabaul. Escorted by the aircraft carriers *Kaga* and *Akagi*, the invasion force landed in the predawn darkness of January 23. The Australian garrison there was quickly overwhelmed, and Horii's soldiers then tortured and executed many of the prisoners.

The South Seas Detachment formed most of the Japanese invasion force for the planned capture of Port Moresby in May 1942. This operation triggered the May 7–8 Battle of the Coral Sea, the first naval battle fought only with carrier aircraft. To Horii's disappointment, the transports carrying his soldiers turned back to Rabaul on May 9.

Horii's South Seas Detachment was then ordered to advance by land southward over the Owen Stanley Mountains to Port Moresby. Japanese forces went ashore at Buna beginning on July 20. The Japanese drove off the few defenders and soon reached Kokoda. Horii reached Buna by mid-August. By August 21, he had more than 8,000 combat troops and 3,000 construction workers under his command. Riding his white horse, Horii was soon at the

head of the Japanese advance, and by mid-September the Japanese had pushed to within 30 miles of Port Moresby.

The American landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942 drew away Japanese reinforcements intended for New Guinea. At the same time, disease, malnutrition, and combat severely reduced Horii's command. The terrain also proved to be a formidable obstacle. In addition, a Japanese supporting attack on Milne Bay (August 25–September 6) was defeated, allowing the Allies to pour reinforcements into Port Moresby. On September 24, 1942, Horii was ordered to withdraw toward Buna. An Allied counterattack soon turned the retreat into a rout. Horii was inspecting rearguard positions on November 12 when his party was cut off by an Australian attack near Wairopi. That night, Horii and his aides tried to cross the Kumusi River on a raft of logs, which came apart in the turbulent water. Horii, his chief of staff, and two others were drowned. His death was confirmed 10 days later.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; Milne Bay, Battle of; New Guinea Campaign; Rabaul

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Horrocks, Sir Brian Gwynne (1895–1985)

British Army lieutenant general. Brian Gwynne Horrocks was born on September 7, 1895, in Ranikhet, India. Educated at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, he was commissioned in 1914. Wounded at Ypres in October 1914, Horrocks was captured and spent the next four years as a prisoner of the Germans. He then volunteered to take part in a mission to support White forces in Siberia. Taken prisoner by the Red forces, he was held from January to October 1920. An outstanding athlete, Horrocks competed in the 1924 Olympic Games in the pentathlon.

In the 1930s, Horrocks attended the Staff College of Camberley and was subsequently an instructor there. In 1939, he commanded a battalion in the 3rd Division in France, where he made an excellent impression on his commander, Bernard Montgomery. Promoted to brigadier in June 1940 during the May 26–June 4 Dunkerque Evacuation, Horrocks then commanded the 9th Armoured Division. In August 1942 when Montgomery took over the Eighth Army, he named Horrocks, now a lieutenant general, to head XIII Corps. It played a key role in repelling the Afrika Korps attack in the crucial Battle of Alam Halfa (August 31–September 7) and fought against the 21st Panzer Division at El Alamein (October 23–November 4). Horrocks then took command of X Corps and led it during the successful flanking maneuver at Mareth during March 20–26, 1943. During April and May 1943, he commanded IX Corps during the final drive against Tunis.

In June 1943 while preparing for the invasion of Italy, Horrocks was badly wounded during an air raid on Bizerte. This kept him out of action for a year. In August 1944 Horrocks took command of XXX Corps, which he led until the end of the war in General Miles Dempsey's Second British Army. Accomplishments of XXX Corps included the capture of Amiens, Brussels, Antwerp (September 4–October 2, 1944) and Bremen and helping to reduce the Ardennes salient (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). Horrocks is best remembered for his role during Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944), when XXX Corps failed to relieve the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Horrocks called this "the blackest moment of my life."

After the war, Horrocks commanded the British Army of the Rhine before his war wounds forced his retirement in 1949. He later wrote his autobiography, *A Full Life* (1960), and became a television commentator. Horrocks died in Fishbourne, England, on January 4, 1985.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Afrika Korps; Alam Halfa, Battle of; Antwerp, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Dempsey, Miles Christopher; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; El Alamein, Battle of; Mareth, Battle of; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law

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Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós (1868–1957)

Hungarian admiral, last commander of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet, and regent of Hungary during 1920–1944. Born in Kenderes, Hungary, on June 18, 1868, into a family of landed gentry, Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya entered the Naval Academy at Fiume (now Rijeka, Croatia) at age 14. Upon graduation in 1886, he was commissioned a sublieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian Navy, where he served for the next 32 years. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1900, to lieutenant commander in January 1909, and to commander in November 1911. During 1909–1914 he was at the court in Vienna as naval aide-de-camp to Emperor Franz Joseph. On January 20, 1914, Horthy was promoted to captain. He held a series of high-profile commands during World War I and was wounded in May 1917 during a raid on the Otranto Barrage. The success of that operation brought him fame in Austria-Hungary, and new emperor Karl I promoted Horthy to rear admiral on February 27, 1918.

Naval unrest and mutiny at Cattaro in February 1918 served to discredit the commander of the navy, Maximilian Njegovan, and on February 27, 1918, Emperor Karl named Horthy commander in chief of the fleet over 11 other admirals. Horthy received promotion to vice admiral on October 30, 1918, shortly before the end of the war, and it was his task to preside over the end of the Austro-Hungarian Navy. On November 1, 1918, Karl ordered him to hand over the entire fleet to control of the Yugoslav National Council. Horthy then retired from the navy.

Horthy soon entered politics as the leader of the conservative "White" forces against the communist government of Béla Kun. On March 1, 1920, Horthy became regent of Hungary and head of the executive authority. At first he had little power, but this increased sharply after 1937 when he refused to be bound by decisions of the Hungarian parliament. In domestic policy, Horthy rejected universal and secret suffrage, and land reform. In foreign policy, his chief aim was revision of the Treaty of Trianon of 1920, by which

Hungary had lost two-thirds of its territory and population. For this reason, although he was strongly antifascist, Horthy sought the support of, and an alliance with, Germany and Italy. His diplomatic efforts were successful in that between 1938 and 1940, Hungary recovered some of its former territory.

Horthy successfully managed to avoid involvement in World War II in September 1939. By April 1941, however, pressure from Adolf Hitler, coupled with promises of additional territory and access to the Adriatic, led to Hungarian military operations against Yugoslavia on the Axis side. Horthy was also forced to send troops to fight on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union, but he resisted German efforts to deport Hungarian Jews.

In 1943 Horthy was already considering escaping from Hitler's grasp and negotiating with the Allied powers. Aware of this activity and determined to keep Hungary in the war on his side, Hitler sent German troops to occupy the country on March 19, 1944, although Horthy was allowed to remain in his post.

In September Soviet troops invaded Hungary from Romania, and on September 28, Horthy dispatched representatives to Moscow, where they signed a preliminary armistice agreement on October 11, which Horthy announced four days later. A lack of coordination with army chief of staff General János Vörös led to a continuation of the fighting. The German Army then occupied Budapest, and, taking his son hostage, the Germans forced Horthy to appoint Ferenc Szálasi, head of the Hungarian Arrow-Cross (fascist) Party, as "Leader of the Nation."

The Germans then removed Horthy to Bavaria, where he was captured by the Americans. In 1946 Horthy appeared as a witness at the postwar Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. The Yugoslav government requested his extradition so that he might be tried there for war crimes, but U.S. authorities refused. Horthy then moved to Portugal. The Soviet occupation and subsequent communist government of Hungary made it impossible for him to return there. Horthy wrote his memoirs in 1953, but they were not published in Hungary until 1990. He died in Estoril, Portugal, on February 9, 1957.

ANNA BOROS-MCGEE

See also

Hungary; Hungary, Army; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Jány, Gusztáv; Vörös, János

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Horton, Sir Max Kennedy (1883–1951)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born in Anglesey, Wales, on November 29, 1883, Max Kennedy Horton entered the Royal Navy in 1898. He joined the fledgling submarine service in 1904, acquiring a reputation for both technical expertise and independence of mind. Horton's first command was the submarine *A-1,* in 1907.

Horton played a considerable role in developing British submarine doctrine before World War I. On September 13, 1914, he became the first British submarine commander to sink an enemy ship when the *E-9* torpedoed the German cruiser *Hela* near Heligoland. In October, his was one of two British submarines in the Baltic operating successfully from Russian bases against ships carrying iron ore from Sweden to Germany. After his return in December 1915, Horton commanded submarines in the North Sea before taking over a submarine flotilla in 1919.

Promoted to captain in 1920, Horton acquired a reputation for ruthless efficiency as he assumed increasingly senior posts. In 1932 he was promoted to rear admiral; in 1936 he was a vice admiral and took command of the Mediterranean Fleet's 1st Cruiser Squadron during the Spanish Civil War.

In 1938, Horton led the Northern Patrol, which was charged after the start of World War II with sealing the northern exit from the North Sea as part of Great Britain's economic blockade of the European Axis powers. He was then flag officer, submarines, from January 1940 until November 1942. Horton directed submarine operations during the Norwegian Campaign and deployed his forces in the Atlantic Ocean, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Sea to support the blockade of Germany. After Italy joined the war, he provided maximum possible support to British Mediterranean submarine forces in their assault on Italian and German supply lines to North Africa, operations that played a crucial role in the ultimate defeat of Axis forces there.

Horton was promoted to full admiral on January 9, 1942. In November, he became commander of the Western Approaches, leading the fight against German submarines that resulted in their defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic. Horton benefited greatly from the valuable work of his precursor, Sir Percy Noble. Horton efficiently integrated and deployed his growing forces of well-trained convoy escorts, roaming support groups, and hunter-killer groups centered on escort carriers, all supported by shore-based very long-range aircraft. Technological advances in radar, high-frequency direction finding, and antisubmarine weaponry increased his forces' effectiveness, while Ultra intelligence greatly aided both offensive and defensive strategic deployments.

Horton retired in August 1945. He died in London on July 30, 1951.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Great Britain, Navy; Hunter-Killer Groups; Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam

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Hosogaya Boshiro (1888–1964)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born at Nagano on June 24, 1888, Hosogaya Boshiro graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1908. After World War I, he held a variety of cruiser and then battleship commands. In 1934, Hosogaya was the captain of the battleship *Mutsu,* and the following year he was promoted to rear admiral. He then commanded first the Naval Communications School and then the Torpedo School. In 1939, Hosogaya was promoted to vice admiral and took charge of the Port Arthur naval base in China. He commanded Japan's Central China Fleet beginning in November 1940.

During the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway, Hosogaya commanded the diversionary force that attacked the Aleutian Islands. His assaults, beginning on June 3, the day before the strike on Midway, were successful, and

Japanese troops occupied Attu and Kiska islands. This occupation of U.S. territory had little more than propaganda value, however.

In July 1942, Hosogaya's command became the Fifth Fleet with responsibility for protecting the North Pacific. The Japanese increased their garrisons on Attu and Kiska to more than 8,000 men, and Hosogaya was responsible for their resupply. During the winter of 1942–1943, however, U.S. forces began making offensive moves toward these Japanese bases.

At the end of March 1943, the Fifth Fleet undertook the escort of an important convoy to Kiska. On March 26, Hosogaya's force, consisting of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and four destroyers, was escorting two transports near the Komandorski Islands when they were intercepted by a U.S. Navy task force commanded by Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris of one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and four destroyers.

In the ensuing Battle of the Komandorski Islands, one of the last daytime surface battles not involving naval aviation, Hosogaya failed to press his advantage in numbers. The U.S. heavy cruiser *Salt Lake City* was hit several times, but the Japanese cruiser *Nachi* was hit twice, and Hosogaya broke off the action and ordered his transports to return home. The next month, Hosogaya was relieved of duty for lack of aggressiveness.

Hosogaya was later recalled from retirement to serve as governor of the South Seas Agency at Truk. Hosogaya died at Atami in Shizuoka Prefecture on February 8, 1964.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Komandorski Islands, Battle of the; Midway, Battle of

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Hospital Ships

The world's major navies had used ships to house and transport wounded for a century and a half prior to World War II, but there were relatively few of them in commission in 1939. Geographic differences between the European and Pacific theaters dictated quite different roles for hospital ships in the two areas. Transports were used to move wounded soldiers from France to England in May 1940 and were again employed in North Africa and Italy and after the D-day landings. The fact that battles in the Pacific were fought in areas with no resident medical facilities and the great distances between those areas and fixed base hospitals created immense difficulties in transport and often necessitated treatment on the spot. Medical ships had to be able to serve as both ambulances and floating hospitals. The United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Japan, and the United States all deployed hospital ships.

Germany commissioned eight Lazarettschiffe vessels during World War II. All were converted merchant ships designated alphabetically from A to H, and all were deployed in the Baltic. The first of these was the converted passenger liner *Berlin*, commissioned as Lazarettschiff A in 1939 and stationed off Norway. It had a crew of 165 and carried 400 beds. It remained in commission until January 31, 1945, when it struck a mine while transferring patients from the eastern Baltic to Germany. While under tow to Kiel, it struck another mine and was abandoned. Salvaged by the Soviet Navy in 1949, it returned to passenger service and was employed as a troop transport during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The renamed *Admiral Nakhimov* sank after a collision at sea in 1986 in which 423 passengers and crew were lost.

Two of the greatest marine disasters of the war involved former German hospital ships and occurred within days of each other. The *Wilhelm Gustloff* and the *General von Steuben* both had been converted to hospital ships early in the war and then reconverted to personnel transports later. In 1945, they were employed transporting personnel from East Prussia to Germany in Operation HANNIBAL, when both were torpedoed by the Soviet submarine *S-13*. The *Wilhelm Gustloff* was sunk on January 30 and the *General von Steuben* on February 10. As many as 10,000 lives may have been lost in the two sinkings.

Italy deployed 12 hospital ships during the war. These included the *Aquileia, Gradisca, Arno, Città di Trapani, California, Po, Principessa Giovanna, Sicilia, Tevere, Virgilio,* and *Toscana* in the Mediterranean and the *Ramb IV* in the Red Sea. All were attacked at least once. Torpedo bombers sank the *Po* and *California* in port at night when the ships had their lights switched off. The *Città di Trapani* was mined, while the sinking of the *Sicilia* occurred during a high-altitude attack against Naples by U.S. Army Air Forces bombers. The *Arno,* however, was sunk and the *Principessa Giovanna, Virgilio,* and *Toscana* were damaged in daylight air attacks conducted in good weather off Tunisia during April and May 1943. Italy protested these attacks, which the British and Americans denied, each blaming the other.

The Royal Navy deployed a number of ships dedicated primarily to transport of wounded, although they were staffed by naval physicians and nurses from Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service. They transported wounded from France and then moved wounded from Tobruk to Alexandria. They were again used to treat and move wounded at Anzio and transported wounded from Normandy after D-day (June 6, 1944). The *Oxfordshire* not only served in the Mediterranean but was loaned to the U.S. Navy and cared for wounded during the invasion of Okinawa (March–June 1945). Despite the fact that they carried clear markings (white hulls with a circumferential green stripe and red crosses that were illuminated at night), the Royal Navy lost 10 hospital ships to mines, torpedoes, and Luftwaffe bombs during the war.

Australia operated three hospital ships. The *Manunda* was converted in 1940 and served in the Middle East and New Guinea. It was damaged in the February 19, 1942, Japanese attack on Darwin. The ship lost 13 crew members in that attack but was repaired and returned to duty. It reverted to passenger service in 1946. The *Wanganella* was converted from passenger service in 1941 and transported 13,385 wounded personnel before returning to civilian service in 1946. The *Centaur* was converted in 1943 but was torpedoed and sunk on its second voyage after only two months of service. The sinking of the obviously marked hospital ship and the resulting loss of 268 medical personnel caused outrage, especially in Australia. Attempts to prosecute those involved for a war crime were rendered moot when the *I-177* that sank the *Centaur* was itself sunk before the war ended.

Five Royal Netherlands Navy hospital ships operated under Australian command, although with Dutch and Javanese crews. The Dutch government-in-exile placed the *Oranje* in the Netherlands East Indies under Australian control in February 1942. It operated in the South Pacific through the end of the war. The *Maetsuyker* also joined the Australians, although the ship continued to fly the Dutch flag. The *Tasman* was, like the *Maetsuyker,* the property of KPM Lines before its conversion to a hospital ship. The *Tasman* escaped from Singapore and was converted at U.S. expense. Although the ship served with the Australian Navy, it carried U.S. Army nurses in its complement and was crewed by Dutch and Javanese. As with the other Dutch ships, it served in the South Pacific. Two other KPM ships, the *Ophir* and *Melchoir-Treub,* were also turned into hospital ships and served primarily in the Indian Ocean.

Although it had deployed two sophisticated hospital ships in the 1904–1905 war with Russia, the Imperial Japanese Navy never built dedicated hospital ships. Instead, it relied on 19 converted merchant ships and the *Op Ten Noort,* a Dutch ship captured in the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, 1942, and refitted as the hospital ship *Teno Maru.* An artificial second smokestack was added to disguise the ship in 1944, and its name was changed to *Hikawa Maru No. 2.* Late in the war the ship was used to transport mines, in violation of the Hague Convention protecting hospital ships. It was scuttled in 1945. The Japanese government paid the Dutch 100 million yen in damages after losing a lawsuit over the ship's ownership in 1977.

The *Asaki Maru,* a former Italian passenger liner, was converted to hospital duty in 1937 and served until 1944, when it was irreparably damaged in a collision with an oiler. The *Tachibana Maru* was converted in 1938 and served throughout the war. The *Hikawa Maru* served through the war and is currently a floating restaurant in Yokohama. The *Takasago Maru* served in Rabaul, Truk, and other parts of the South Pacific and was stopped and boarded several times by the U.S. Navy but always released under terms of the Hague Convention. Once, the *Takasago Maru* was attacked by a U.S. submarine; a torpedo struck the ship but failed to explode. The *Muru Maru* was not as fortunate. It was sunk in Manila Harbor in November 1944 by U.S. aircraft.

The U.S. Navy entered World War II with only two hospital ships in

commission: the *Relief* (AH-1) and *Solace* (AH-2). The *Relief,* launched in 1919, was the first U.S. vessel specifically designed as a hospital ship and was intended to be as much a floating hospital as a floating ambulance. Both ships were deployed in the Pacific throughout the war. In all, nine dedicated hospital ships were built during the war: the *Comfort*, *Hope,* and *Mercy* (the Comfort class, AH-6 to AH-8) and the *Repose*, *Consolation*, *Tranquility*, *Benevolence*, *Sanctuary*, and *Haven* (Haven class, AH-12 to AH-17). This class carried between 750 and 802 beds and complete surgical and X-ray facilities and was air-conditioned. Construction of the new ships was delayed, and they entered service during 1944–1945. Initially they operated primarily as hospitals, but by the time of the Iwo Jima invasion (February 10–March 26, 1945), the volume of casualties overwhelmed their capacity, and they were again forced to move wounded to base hospitals for treatment. At the end of the war, they were employed as transports for repatriated prisoners of war. In addition to the *Solace,* the *Rescue* (AH-18), *Refuge* (AH-11), *Samaritan* (AH-10), and *Bountiful* (AH-9) were conversions from either commercial or troop transport service.

Following the Allied invasion of France in June 1944, ships were employed as cross-Channel transports rather than to provide on-site treatment of the wounded. The U.S. Navy converted a class of large LSTs (landing ship, tanks) and redesignated them as LST(H). Each was staffed with 4 surgeons and 27 corpsmen and could carry up to 350 wounded.

JACK MCCALLUM

See also

Landing Craft; *Wilhelm Gustloff*, *General von Steuben*, and *Goya*, Sinking of

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Hossbach, Friedrich (1894–1980)

German Army general of infantry. Born at Unna in Westphalia on November 21, 1894, Friedrich Hossbach joined the German Army in 1913 and served on the Eastern Front during World War I. He remained in the Reichswehr after

the war and, as a captain, was assigned to the General Staff in 1927. As a major, in August 1934 he became adjutant to Chancellor Adolf Hitler while continuing his position as chief of the Central Section of the General Staff. Promoted to colonel in March 1937, Hossbach is chiefly remembered for his notes—what became known as the "Hossbach Memorandum"—during a key meeting between Hitler and his military chiefs in Berlin on November 5, 1937, in which the führer spelled out his plans for an aggressive foreign policy leading to war. This became important evidence at the postwar Nuremberg trials. Immune to intimidation, Hossbach also warned commander of the armed forces General Werner von Fritsch of impending charges of homosexuality against him. Refusing to go along with the plot against Fritsch, Hossbach was dismissed from his adjutant post in February 1938, although he retained his staff position.

Hossbach commanded the 82nd Infantry Regiment of the 31st Infantry Division in the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940. Promoted to major general in March 1942, Hossbach the next month commanded the 82nd Division and then briefly in May 1943 the 31st Division on the Eastern Front. That August, he took over the LVI Panzer Corps as a lieutenant general. Promoted to general of infantry in November 1943, he commanded the Fourth Army in July 1944. Hitler relieved him from command on January 30, 1945, when, in East Prussia and under Russian pressure but without authority, Hossbach withdrew his forces. He was captured in Göttingen by U.S. forces on April 8, 1945. Only an hour earlier Hossbach had engaged in a shootout with Gestapo agents who had tried to arrest him. Hossbach published his memoirs in 1949. He died in Göttingen on September 10, 1980.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Fritsch, Werner Thomas Ludwig von; Hitler, Adolf; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Document 24

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Hoth, Hermann (1885–1971)

German Army general. Born in Neuruppin near Berlin on April 12, 1885, Hermann Hoth joined the army in 1904. He graduated from the Prussian Kriegsakademie in 1913 and became an intelligence officer. A General Staff officer during and after World War I, Hoth became a specialist in armored warfare.

In 1935, he took command of the 18th Division and was promoted to major general. Promoted to lieutenant general, in November 1938 he commanded the XV Motorized Corps and distinguished himself in the invasion of Poland in September 1939.

With his panzer group, Hoth also distinguished himself in the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940. In this campaign, he pushed through the Ardennes Forest to the English Channel and then into Normandy and Brittany. Hoth was promoted to colonel general in July.

Hoth's formation was redesignated the Third Panzer Group in November. He led it in the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Hoth commanded the Seventeenth Army in Ukraine from October 1941 to June 1942, when he informed his men of the need for "harsh punishment" of Jews. He next commanded the Fourth Panzer Army. Hoth's mission was to encircle Voronezh and then drive south to the lower Don River. He led this army across the Don and toward the Caucasus and lower Volga.

Although Hoth subsequently failed to break through Soviet defenses to Stalingrad, he subsequently carried out a successful counteroffensive that helped open an escape route around Rostov for Army Group A. The Fourth Army helped restore the German lines and participated in the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. That November, Adolf Hitler dismissed the capable and well-liked Hoth for his "defeatist attitude."

Tried by a U.S. military court after the war for crimes against humanity committed by subordinates, Hoth was found guilty and sentenced at Nuremberg in October 1948 to 15 years in prison. He was released in 1954 and then wrote on armored warfare. His memoir *Panzer-Operationen* was published in 1956. Hoth died at Goslar/Harz on January 25, 1971.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; France, Battle for; Kursk, Battle of; Poland Campaign; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Ho Ying-ch'in

See He Yingqin

Hsu Hsung-ch'ien

See Xu Xiangqian

Hull, Cordell (1871–1955)

U.S. secretary of state from 1933 to 1944. Born in the community of Star Point in Pickett County, Tennessee, on October 2, 1871, Cordell Hull studied law at the National Normal University in Lebanon, Ohio, and the Cumberland Law School in Lebanon, Tennessee. In 1892, he entered Tennessee state politics as a Democrat. During the 1898 Spanish-American War, Hull volunteered and spent several months in the army. He was elected to Congress in 1903, and in 1930 he became U.S. senator for Tennessee until 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him secretary of state.

An old-fashioned Jeffersonian Democrat and progressive, Hull had greatly admired President Woodrow Wilson and had supported U.S. membership in the League of Nations following World War I. As secretary of state, Hull favored free trade, peace agreements, international conferences,

and reliance on legal principles and institutions. During the 1930s, Hull negotiated numerous reciprocal trade agreements with other nations. He also devoted particular attention to revitalizing U.S. relations with Latin America through the “Good Neighbor” policy, whereby the United States renounced the right to intervene in Latin America and instead sought to negotiate hemispheric security agreements.

President Roosevelt, who preferred to retain personal control of American foreign policy, frequently bypassed Hull. This tendency became more pronounced as World War II approached, and Hull found it both irritating and frustrating. Even so, because the two men fundamentally shared the same perspective on international affairs, Hull chose not to resign. He believed that the European dictators posed a dangerous threat to all free nations, and believing that arms embargoes were ineffective and generally favored aggressors, he opposed the various neutrality acts passed by Congress between 1935 and 1939. He was inclined to be slightly less conciliatory than Roosevelt and was unenthusiastic toward Roosevelt’s 1938–1939 peace messages to European powers.

Once war began in Europe, Hull staunchly supported Great Britain and France against Germany and Italy. However, he was virtually excluded from the Anglo-American Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement of the summer of 1940 and the drafting of Lend-Lease legislation some months later. Nor did he attend the Anglo-American military staff conversations held in Washington early in 1941 or the mid-August 1941 Argentia Conference that drafted the Atlantic Charter.

Roosevelt, preoccupied with European affairs from April to December 1941, delegated to Hull responsibility for protracted American negotiations with Japan. The objective of the negotiations was to reach a modus vivendi in Asia, where Japan had been at war with China since 1937. In the negotiations, Japan also sought further territorial gains from British, French, and Dutch territorial possessions. Despite the expressed concern of American military leaders that the United States was unprepared for a Pacific war, by late November 1941 Hull—who was privy to intercepted Japanese cable traffic—believed that war was inevitable, and he refused to contemplate further American concessions.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), Hull was often excluded from major meetings, including the 1942 Casablanca

Conference, the 1943 Cairo and Tehran Conferences, and the 1944 Quebec Conference, a summit meeting of Allied leaders. Hull opposed Roosevelt's decision, announced at Casablanca, to demand unconditional surrender of the Axis nations, believing that this would encourage them to continue the war. Hull also opposed the 1944 Morgenthau Plan to partition a defeated Germany and eradicate its industrial capacity, and with the assistance of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, he succeeded in obtaining the scheme's ultimate rejection.

Hull put great effort into establishing the 1942 United Nations alliance of anti-Axis nations. Following his Wilsonian instincts, he then concentrated on planning for the postwar United Nations, an international security organization that would replace the defunct League of Nations. Under Hull's guidance, the State Department drafted the proposals for the United Nations Charter accepted at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference and adroitly won bipartisan congressional support for these. Addressing Congress in late 1943, Hull optimistically stated that the projected new organization would eliminate spheres of influence, the balance of power, and international alliances and rivalries. He shared Roosevelt's anticolonial outlook and his belief that the United States should treat China as a great power and thereby encourage it to become one.

Increasingly poor health led Hull to resign after the November 1944 presidential election. Consulted on the terms of the July 1945 Potsdam Declaration urging Japan to surrender, he insisted that it include no promise to retain the emperor. Hull was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945 and lived quietly in retirement, producing lengthy memoirs. Suffering from strokes and heart problems, he died in Bethesda, Maryland, on July 23, 1955.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Casablanca Conference; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Dumbarton Oaks Conference; Lend-Lease; Morgenthau, Henry, Jr.; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Quebec Conference, Second; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Tehran Conference; United Nations, Formation of; Document 87; Document 120

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Human Torpedoes

Torpedoes ridden by humans to their targets. In the 1890s, U.S. submarine pioneer John P. Holland envisioned midget submarines, but the first to submit plans for human torpedoes were the Italian naval engineers Teseo Tesei and Elios Toschi in October 1935. Although the Italians were the first to develop them, human torpedoes were also employed by the British, Germans, and Japanese.

The Italian 22-foot human torpedo was known as the Maiale (pig) because of its unruly behavior and the difficulty steering it. The torpedo was taken to the vicinity of the target by specially equipped submarines. Its two-man crew, wearing rubber suits and using oxygen breathing equipment, sat astride the torpedo. After directing the torpedo to its target vessel, they detached the torpedo's explosive nose, secured it to the target, and set a timing device to cause the nose to explode after their departure. On December 19, 1941, Italian Maiales crippled the British battleships *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant* at Alexandria, putting them out of action for many months. The Italians also used Maiales to attack Allied shipping at Algiers, Gibraltar, and Malta.

The British 25-foot Chariot was modeled on a Maiale captured at Gibraltar, although it was not until after the Italian attack at Alexandria that the British undertook serious study of it. It had a 700-pound detachable warhead and was developed specifically to attack the German battleship *Tirpitz* at Norway. This operation in October 1942 failed. The two Chariots, towed across the North Sea by the Shetland fishing boat *Arthur,* broke free in a sudden storm just as their crews were preparing to board them. The British did have some success, however, in subsequent attacks with Chariots against Palermo and Sicily and elsewhere, sinking two Italian cruisers and damaging a third.

The Germans also developed a 25-foot human torpedo. Known as Mohr (moor), it consisted of two electrically propelled torpedoes fastened together vertically. The top torpedo had a small Plexiglas cockpit instead of a warhead. Released close to its target, the Mohr was used with little success against the 1944 Allied landings at Anzio (January 22, 1944) and Normandy (June 6, 1944).

Japanese human torpedoes, known as Kaitens (meaning "divine faith"), were modified Type 93 Long Lance torpedoes 24 inches in diameter and fitted with a cockpit. Some 300 Type I Kaitens were produced. Launched from special submarines, they were used for the first time on November 20, 1944, against U.S. Navy ships at Ulithi Atoll, and one hit the fleet tanker *Mississinewa*, detonating its cargo of aviation gasoline. Wild claims of its success led the Japanese to mount eight other such operations, but only one other ship was sunk by a Kaiten, the U.S. Navy destroyer escort *Underhill.* They were also employed later with little success at Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945) and Okinawa (March–June 1945).

The unmanned torpedo fired from a submarine at periscope depth was a more effective and inexpensive weapon. It could be released from distances of more than 10,000 yards and did not involve risking a human crew.

M. TAYLOR EMERY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kaitens; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of; Sicily, Invasion of; Submarines; Torpedoes

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Hump, The

Allied air transport route supplying China from India. With Japanese forces controlling all of coastal China even before the U.S. entry into World War II, supplies to the Nationalist Chinese trickled along the Burma Road into western China. Recognizing this inadequate rate of supply, in November 1941 the Chinese National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) successfully devised a route through the Himalaya Mountains between Kunming, China, and Assam, in upper India.

In 1942, the Japanese captured Burma (present-day Myanmar), thereby cutting off all overland access to the Nationalist government headed by Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt believed it vital to support Jiang, and military planners wanted to use China as a base for strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands as well as the jumping-off point for their eventual invasion. The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) used the route pioneered by the CNAC to accomplish these tasks, although it was not ideal. A single narrow-gauge railroad connected Assam to the Indian coast.

The air route itself was more than 500 miles and very dangerous. Japanese air activity, unpredictable weather, the lack of navigational aids, unmapped territory, and peaks rising above 20,000 feet all made flying especially treacherous. Conflicting demands by U.S. generals Claire Chennault and Joseph Stillwell—and also from Jiang—confused the supply situation. The deployment of B-29s to China in 1944 further strained the logistical chain, but the aircraft available were inadequate.

Initially, the twin-engine Douglas C-47 Skytrain was the main aircraft used, but it could only carry 2.5 tons of supplies. The twin-engine Curtiss C-46 Commando entered service before it had been fully tested. It could carry 5 tons of supplies, but early mechanical problems led to numerous accidents. Finally, late in the war the Douglas C-54 Skymaster, a four-engine transport capable of carrying 10 tons of cargo, became available.

Infrastructure also had to be created from scratch. Thousands of laborers built crushed-rock runways in China by hand. Trucks were scarce, so fuel was often transported in cans, and aircraft were fueled by lines of people passing these containers. In July 1942 only 85 tons of supplies were delivered. Not until 1944 did transport over the Hump become rationalized,

when that September Major General William Tunner assumed command of the China-India Air Transport Command, directly answerable to U.S. Army Air Force commanding officer General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold in Washington.

The Hump operation marked the first time air transport was autonomous from the local or theater commander. Tunner regularized crew rotation, aircraft maintenance, and loading and unloading procedures. Largely through his work, during July 1945 Allied aircraft flew more than 70,000 tons of cargo over the Himalayas. The Hump route was costly, however. More than 500 aircraft were lost, and more than 1,300 pilots and crewmen were killed or missing in action in the course of the Allied operation, which ended in September 1945.

A Curtiss U.S. C-46 Commando military transport flying over “the Hump,” the name given by the Americans to the Himalayan Mountains during World War II. This dangerous air route from India was essential for the supply of Chinese forces against the Japanese during World War II. (William Vandivert/Life Magazine/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Aircraft, Transport; Arnold, Henry Harley “Hap”; Burma Road; Chennault, Claire Lee; China; China-Burma-India Theater; Jiang Jieshi; Lend-Lease; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Tunner, William Henry

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Hungary

Nation located in Central Europe encompassing some 35,900 square miles. Hungary, which had a 1939 population of approximately 10 million people, bordered Yugoslavia to the south, Romania to the southeast and east, Austria to the west, and Czechoslovakia to the north. On the eve of World War II, at least half of Hungary's population still made a living from agriculture. The government—headed by Regent Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya, who had wide powers—steadfastly rejected calls for land reform, and more than half the arable land of Hungary was owned by some 10,000 landowners. Horthy, who remained head of the government from 1920 to 1944, also beat back proposals for universal suffrage.

The chief Hungarian foreign policy objective between the two world wars was revision of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. Virtually all Hungarians saw the treaty as a national humiliation. It had destroyed the economy and the national territorial integrity of Hungary by stripping away some two-thirds of the national territory and population. It also consigned 3 million Hungarians to foreign rule.

Revisionist sentiment meant that the Horthy government became easy prey to German promises of territorial aggrandizement if Hungary joined the Axis. As a result of the Munich Conference and the First Vienna Decision in the autumn of 1938, the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, and the Second Vienna Decision in August 1940, Hungary received some of the territories lost after World War I without having to take part in any military operations. In return, Hungary provided Germany with increasing amounts of raw materials and food. During the war, Hungary also emerged as a major source of oil for the Reich, ultimately surpassed only by Romania.

In December 1940, the Hungarian government concluded a friendship agreement with Yugoslavia. A few months later, however, Adolf Hitler decided to attack Yugoslavia, and he insisted that Hungary participate in the military operations. Rather than dishonor himself with such an act, Hungarian prime minister Pál Teleki committed suicide. Regent Horthy, new prime minister László Bárdossy, and chief of staff of the army General Henrik Werth were all committed to Hungarian participation, however. They hoped thereby to gain additional territory and to cement the alliance with Germany. Hungary formally entered the war on April 11, 1941.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, it called on

Hungary to participate fully in the war effort. Hungary suspended diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and on June 27 after a northern Hungarian city was bombed by aircraft identified as Soviet (but were in fact of unknown origin), Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union. Hungarian Army leaders expected a rapid German victory over the Soviet Union.

By the end of June, Hungarian troops were deployed on the Eastern Front. Hungarian forces were split: offensive units advanced with German forces into Soviet territory, and an occupying force provided security for the German rear areas. Much to its chagrin, Hungary ultimately found itself at war with Britain and the United States. The United States declared war on Hungary on June 5, 1942.

In January 1942 under heavy German pressure, Bárdossy promised to send additional troops to the Eastern Front. On March 9, 1942, largely because the Germans had failed to secure a quick victory over the Soviets, Horthy replaced Bárdossy as prime minister with Miklós Kállay. The new prime minister sought to continue his predecessor's policy of open cooperation with Germany while also conducting secret negotiations with the Anglo-Saxon powers in the hope of extricating Hungary from the war.

Meanwhile, between April and June 1942, the Second Hungarian Army of 200,000 men was sent to the Eastern Front to bolster German forces there. Hungarian forces in the Soviet Union suffered from obsolete and insufficient equipment, poor logistics, and insufficient ammunition. The tragic defeat of the Second Hungarian Army near Voronezh in the Battle of the Don River during the winter of 1943 was a catastrophe for Hungary that resulted in the deaths of some 120,000 troops.

Following this loss, Kállay was more determined than ever to extricate Hungary from the war. This angered Hitler, who demanded nothing less than full Hungarian participation in the war. Hitler was also upset by secret Hungarian negotiations with the Western Allies to withdraw from the war, an activity about which pro-German individuals within the Budapest government kept him well informed. On March 19, 1944, Hitler therefore sent German troops to occupy the country and force its continued participation on the German side. Under German pressure, Horthy also appointed Döme Sztójay, a pro-German former Hungarian ambassador to Berlin, as the new prime minister. Anti-Nazi parties were banned, and politicians opposed to German policy were arrested. The Hungarian

government was also forced to deploy additional soldiers to the Eastern Front to fight against the Soviets. One irony of the German occupation was the reduced economic value of Hungary to the Reich, thanks to the occupation costs, the mass arrests and deportation of Jews, and increased Allied bombing.

In an attempt to decrease German influence, on August 29, 1944, Horthy appointed a new prime minister, Géza Lakatos, who ordered Hungarian Army units to attack southern Transylvania to halt a Soviet-Romanian invasion. Understanding that the war was lost, Horthy dispatched a delegation to Moscow to negotiate an armistice with the Soviet Union, the terms of which were agreed to on October 11, 1944.

On October 15, 1944, Horthy announced over the radio Hungary's unconditional surrender. Because of a lack of coordination with Hungarian Army chief of staff János Vörös, the army continued to fight, and Horthy's attempt at surrender failed. The Germans then took over Budapest and forced Horthy to step aside in favor of Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the Arrow-Cross, the Hungarian fascist party, as prime minister and head of state. Horthy was then arrested by the Gestapo and removed to Germany with his family. During Szálasi's brief tenure, a reign of terror swept Hungary. Thousands of people, including many Jews who had sought refuge in Budapest, were arrested and executed or sent to concentration camps.

Meanwhile, the Soviet army continued to advance, and by December 1944 it laid siege to Budapest. Two and a half months later, the remaining German forces in Buda (the western mountainous side of the city) surrendered. Meanwhile, Hungarian representatives signed an armistice in Moscow on January 20, 1945. Most fighting in the country ended in February 1945, and the last German troops were forced from Hungarian soil on April 13, 1945. The country then passed from German to Soviet Army control.

ANNA BOROS-MCGEE

See also

Budapest, Battle of; Eastern Front; Hitler, Adolf; Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós; Hungary, Air Force; Hungary, Army; Ukraine Campaign; Vörös, János; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of

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Hungary, Air Force

Under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon following World War I, Hungary was forbidden to maintain a military air service. Between the two world wars, however, the Hungarian government secretly worked to establish, develop, and modernize an air force. The Hungarian Air Force came into being as an independent arm on January 1, 1939. For financial reasons but also because it lacked the industrial infrastructure (especially machine tools) and raw materials required, Hungary did not attempt to produce its own combat aircraft but purchased them from abroad, chiefly from Italy. In the late 1930s, however, it did begin production of an excellent short-range biplane reconnaissance aircraft, the Weiss Manfred 32 Sólyom (Hawk).

The Hungarian Air Force was first deployed in April 1941 during the invasion of Yugoslavia. At the time, it had on paper 302 aircraft, but only 189 of them were operational, and most were obsolete. After Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union in late June 1941, the air force was deployed to the Eastern Front. In 1942, the 2nd Air Force Brigade was established with 76 aircraft to support operations of the Second Hungarian Army in the Soviet Union. Almost half of its aircraft were gone by early 1943, and those that remained were integrated into German squadrons.

In 1943 under terms of an agreement with the German government, Hungary began production of the Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighter to offset production from German factories destroyed by Allied bombing. Hungary also produced the Messerschmitt Me-210. The terms of the agreement provided that 40 percent of aircraft production was to remain in Hungary, but this pledge was not kept. Nonetheless, Hungary was able to add some 170 modern aircraft to its inventory by 1944.

The revitalized Hungarian Air Force suffered devastating air raids by the Allied powers beginning in 1944. Remaining aircraft were then removed to

Austria. Ammunition and fuel shortages meant that no Hungarian aircraft participated in the last weeks of the war. Those that remained were either destroyed by their crews or handed over to Allied forces.

During the war, Hungary produced 1,182 aircraft and 1,482 aircraft engines. Among the aircraft were 488 Bf-109s and 279 Me-210s. Of these, Hungary received only 158.

ANNA BOROS-MCGEE

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Germany, Air Force; Hungary; Hungary, Army; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of

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Hungary, Army

The Treaty of Trianon between the Allied powers and Hungary following World War I limited both the quantity and quality of Hungary's armed forces. The army was restricted to a maximum of 35,000 officers and men and was not allowed any heavy artillery, tanks, or military aircraft. Hungary was also forbidden to organize and train reservists. The armed forces, consisting of seven mixed brigades and a river flotilla, could take up arms only for the maintenance of internal order or to oppose a foreign invasion of Hungary. Having been stripped of two-thirds of its territory and population following World War I, Hungary was also deficient in war-related industry and resources.

Hungarian army soldiers attempting to recover a disabled Soviet tank. It had been captured by Hungarian forces fighting alongside the Germans on the Eastern Front. (Corbis)

In 1938, an agreement between Hungary and the neighboring “Little Entente” states of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia recognized Hungary’s right to rearm. The Hungarian government increased the military budget, but in September 1939 the army numbered only 9 light divisions or brigades. In 1941, it had 27 light divisions or brigades of 2 regiments each. Each regiment numbered about 4,000 men, so the effective size of the infantry force was only 216,000 men. There were also 2 cavalry brigades and 2 motorized brigades. Most of the equipment was obsolete; its rifles were old and frequently jammed, and the army had no antitank guns.

Although Hungary produced its own tanks, it had only 190 of these, and they were too light for combat operations on the Eastern Front, where the army would do most of its fighting. Even by 1943, the army had only one-third of the motor transport required and had to use civilian vehicles.

In the spring of 1941, Hungary conducted its first military operation since World War I when it sent a mechanized army corps to support the German invasion of Yugoslavia. The army was still underequipped when Hungary officially entered the war on June 26, 1941, with a declaration of war on the Soviet Union.

For operations in the Soviet Union, the army assembled an expeditionary force designated the Mobile Corps and commanded by General Ferenc Szombathelyi. Numbering some 44,000 men, it consisted of 2 infantry brigades (a mountain brigade and a border guard brigade), a cavalry brigade, and 10 Alpine battalions, 6 of which used bicycles. Nonetheless, the Mobile Corps contained the army's best-trained and best-equipped troops. The Mobile Corps was assigned to the German Seventeenth Army, and partly because Soviet forces were then retreating, the Mobile Corps reached the Donets River. In the autumn of 1941, some Hungarian Army light infantry divisions were assigned the task of guarding German rear areas in the central part of the front. Although poorly armed and equipped, these divisions effectively carried out their assignment and were not withdrawn until the autumn of 1944.

Under heavy German pressure, Hungary made a major military effort in 1942, deploying Gusztáv Jány's Second Hungarian Army to the Eastern Front. Consisting of three army corps, an armored division, and a mixed air force regiment and numbering about 200,000 men overall, the Second Army fought with General Maximilian von Weich's Army Group B in the Ukraine. Between June and September 1942, the Second Army helped drive back Soviet forces behind the Don River, suffering losses of nearly 22,000 men in the process.

Although the Germans provided the Second Army with some equipment, including tanks, much of this was obsolete and, in any case, inadequate in quantity. The Germans supplied only a few antitank guns, and the Hungarians did not have the heavy-caliber guns necessary to stop Soviet tanks. Opposing Soviet forces enjoyed a vast superiority in manpower, guns, tanks, artillery, and stocks of ammunition. Moreover, there had been no effective resupply since the summer campaign of 1942. Weapons and equipment would not work in the bitter cold of winter, there was no winter clothing, and even food was in short supply.

On January 12, 1943, Soviet forces—which outnumbered Hungarian forces by three to one in manpower and had a decided edge in military equipment, including tanks, aircraft, and artillery—launched a massive offensive across the Don River and pushed the Hungarians back, causing heavy casualties and material losses. Perhaps 160,000 men in the Second Army died in the battle or the subsequent retreat. The Don catastrophe

confirmed the Hungarian government's worst fears, and the government used the excuse that its war industries were unable to manufacture new equipment and arms fast enough to equip additional troops to avoid dispatching the men to the Eastern Front. The light divisions in occupation duties remained, however.

In March 1944, German forces occupied Hungary and put additional pressure on Hungary to assist with the war. As Soviet forces advanced west, the government deployed the First Hungarian Army to the Ukraine. Part of the German Army Group South, it consisted of four infantry divisions, one light division, one armored division, and two mountain brigades. The First Army held its positions until the end of July 1944, when it was forced to withdraw to the Carpathian Mountains. By early autumn, it became obvious that the weak Hungarian forces would be unable to stop Soviet and Romanian troops from invading the country. Army morale plummeted, especially when the Germans took control in Budapest and the fascist Arrow-Cross Party seized control of the government. Whole Hungarian units melted away.

Planned new military units were not organized in time to see action. The leaders of the army hoped to be able to hold out until they could surrender to U.S. and British forces, but this proved impossible. For most of the Hungarian military the war ended in February 1945, although some Hungarian formations withdrew with German units into Austria and Germany.

ANNA BOROS-MCGEE

See also

Eastern Front; Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós; Hungary; Hungary, Air Force; Jány, Gusztáv; Ukraine Campaign; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of

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Hungerford, First Viscount Portal of

See Portal, Sir Charles Frederick Algernon

Hunter, Charles Newton (1906–1978)

U.S. Army colonel. Born in Oneida, New York, on January 11, 1906, Charles Newton Hunter graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1929. Commissioned in the infantry, he served with the 20th Infantry Regiment and then with the 4th Infantry Regiment of the Philippine Scouts. He graduated from the Infantry School and then served with the 7th Infantry Regiment and with the 14th Infantry Regiment in Panama.

Shortly after the United States entered World War II, Hunter was assigned to the Infantry School. In 1943, he was promoted to colonel and sent to India, where he helped organize and train the 5307th Composite Unit (code-named GALAHAD), a force of 3,000 army volunteers trained for deep-penetration operations in Burma. Hunter was executive officer to GALAHAD commander Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill. Because his chief was ill, Hunter in effect commanded "Merrill's Marauders" much of the time.

Hunter led GALAHAD's operations in the Hukwang Valley in conjunction with Chinese General Li Jen's New First Army from January to August 1944. Hunter took actual command in April when Merrill suffered heart problems, leading GALAHAD in a deep-penetration operation over difficult terrain that culminated in the capture of Myitkyina in August 1944. This fighting nearly destroyed his force. Hunter then trained replacements.

From 1945 to 1947, Hunter served in the G3 Section of Army Ground Forces in Washington. He then was assigned to Third Army Headquarters, attended the Armed Forces Staff College, served in Korea and Japan as regimental commander and chief of staff of the 7th Infantry Division, and served as chief of staff of IX Corps. Hunter subsequently attended the National War College, served on the faculty of the Armed Forces Staff College, and was deputy chief of staff of the Sixth Army. He was chief of the Army Branch Military Assistance Division of the U.S. European Command from 1954 to 1958 and then deputy chief of staff of the Fourth Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, before retiring in August 1959 as a colonel. In

retirement, he wrote a book about his wartime experiences. Hunter died in Cheyenne, Wyoming, on June 14, 1978.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Burma Theater; Commandos/Rangers; Merrill, Frank Dow; Myitkyina, Siege of

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Hunter-Killer Groups

Specialized antisubmarine units formed to hunt and destroy submarines before they could attack and to provide support for convoy escort groups. In late 1942 as production and delivery of antisubmarine vessels increased, the British began forming support groups—permanently established formations charged with reinforcing hard-pressed convoy escorts. Unlike escort groups, these units trained and exercised intensively to develop and master techniques for hunting and destroying Axis submarines. Their existence and the imminent arrival of large numbers of escort carriers from U.S. shipyards spurred the deployment of specialized hunter-killer units in the navies of the British Commonwealth and the United States.

The Atlantic Convoy Conference of March 1–12, 1943, mandated the formation that year of 10 hunter-killer groups, each centered on an escort carrier. Five British and Canadian groups would support operations in the North Atlantic, and five U.S. groups were to attend to the needs of the Middle Atlantic.

Although convoy support was a significant role, the most important mission of these groups was to locate, intercept, and destroy German U-boats before they could attack the slow merchantmen. Central to implementation of this mission were advances in three areas: code breaking, high-frequency direction finding (HF/DF, or "huff-duff"), and radar. By mid-1943, even though significant changes had occurred in the German naval cipher, Allied

decoders were able to read 80 percent or more of the U-boat arm's traffic. Furthermore, the British and U.S. submarine tracking rooms were able to predict submarine movements with a fair degree of accuracy on the basis of types of traffic, even if the message itself was unreadable.

HF/DF also was important in tracking and locating submarines. Shore-based installations became sufficiently sophisticated to give close fixes, whereas advances in miniaturization produced sets suitable for installation aboard ships. From late 1942, half of all U.S. destroyer and escort production was fitted with HF/DF. The British followed suit in the spring of 1943.

Code breaking, direction finding, and tracking ashore provided the hunter-killer groups with close approximations of the positions of U-boats at sea. Shipborne HF/DF, the new centimetric radar sets, and improved sonar equipment and procedures, together with the groups' organic aircraft, substantially enhanced their location rates. Better depth charges, ahead-throwing weapons, and aircraft-launched rockets or homing torpedoes eased the task of sinking the target. Hunter-killer groups trained together thoroughly, developed new coordinated tactics, and, above all, focused on locating and destroying U-boats rather than protecting convoys.

From the time of their deployment, Allied hunter-killer groups played a major role in the destruction of Germany's U-boats. For example, between May and December 1943, the group formed around the U.S. escort carrier *Bogue* sank 10 U-boats in the Atlantic; between June 1943 and January 1944, the Royal Navy's 2nd Support Group destroyed 14 submarines. The attack on *U-358* illustrates the significance of persistent attack made possible by adherence to a single mission: the British 1st Support Group maintained continuous contact for 38 hours and expended 530 depth charges before forcing the submarine to the surface and destroying it.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Depth Charges; Horton, Sir Max Kennedy; Radar; Sonar; Submarines; Walker, Frederick John

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Huntziger, Charles Léon Clément (1880–1941)

French Army general and minister of war. Born in Lesneven near Brest, Brittany, France, on June 25, 1880, Charles Léon Clément Huntziger graduated from the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr in 1901 and joined the colonial infantry. He served in Madagascar (1902–1904), in Senegal (1905–1907), and in Tonkin (1912–1914). Huntziger attended the École de Guerre (War College) from 1909 to 1911. During World War I, he fought chiefly on the Western Front, but in 1918 he was sent to the Balkans and ended the war in command of a battalion in Bulgaria.

Huntziger served in Asia from 1918 to 1920. He studied at the Centre des Hautes Études Militaires (Center for Advanced Military Studies) in 1921 and was promoted to colonel in 1922. He then served in China during 1924–1928 and was promoted to general of division in 1926. He was chief of the French military mission to Brazil during 1930–1934. Promoted to general of corps in 1933, he commanded French troops in the Levant (1934–1938).

Huntziger was recalled to France as a member of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre (Higher War Council) in 1938 and was designated to command an army in time of war. He was regarded as one of France's most promising general officers. On the outbreak of World War II, he commanded the Second Army.

In May 1940, the Second Army was part of the 1st Army Group, holding a front that ran from the end of the Maginot Line north to the junction of the Bar and Meuse Rivers at Mézières west of Sedan, where the Ninth Army's front began. French planning had envisioned a German Army sweep from Belgium into the area behind the Maginot Line. In this situation, Huntziger's forces formed the first line of defense. Following the Polish Campaign of

September 1939, however, the French command followed the Dyle Plan, with British and French forces advancing into Belgium and the Netherlands.

With the Second Army now assigned a less important role, it received less qualified reservists to fill its ranks. On May 10, 1940, Huntziger's forces consisted of two active infantry divisions, two low-grade reserve (Series B) infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, and one Spahi cavalry brigade. Not only did Huntziger consider these forces inadequate in overall numbers, but he was less appreciative of some of the reservists and draftees. None of his units were motorized, and he considered his armament inferior. He was also short equipment. Although he requested 10,000 land mines, he received only 200.

When the Germans began their invasion, the preponderance of their forces operated against Huntziger's Ardennes sector. Moreover, the main blow of the German armored attack, which began on May 13, fell on the boundary between the Ninth and Second Armies. Huntziger knew little of mechanized warfare, and he made his situation worse by parceling out his few tanks to act in support of infantry. Huntziger's forces were shattered by the German armor formations around Sedan.

On June 3, Huntziger took command of the newly established French 4th Army Group, which met defeat around Châlons-sur-Marne. In early June, undersecretary of war General of Brigade Charles de Gaulle urged Premier Paul Reynaud to replace General Maxime Weygand (who had succeeded General Maurice Gamelin as supreme commander) with Huntziger.

Huntziger, however, headed the French delegation that concluded an armistice with Germany on June 22, 1940, and another on June 24 with Italy. His only guidance from the French government was to refuse dishonorable terms and not to surrender the fleet or any colonial territory.

Following the armistice, Huntziger commanded the French Army, limited by the Germans to 100,000 men. In September 1940, he was appointed minister of defense in the new collaborationist Vichy government of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain and played a key role in policy decisions. Huntziger appears to have favored closer contacts with the British, and he supported the mission of Georges André Groussard to Britain in June 1941. Huntziger inherited the newly created post of minister of war in August 1941.

Huntziger died in a plane crash in Le Vignan (Gard Departement, near Nîmes), France, on November 12, 1941.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; France; France, Army; France, Battle for; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Maginot Line; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul; Sedan, Battle of; SICHELSCHNITT, Operation; Vichy France; Weygand, Maxime

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Hürtgen Forest Campaign (September 12–December 16, 1944)

Although little remembered today, the Battle of Hürtgen Forest was one of the worst defeats ever suffered by the U.S. Army. In three months of combat operations, the Americans sustained almost 33,000 casualties while accomplishing almost nothing tactically or operationally.

By late August 1944, the apparently defeated German Army had been pushed out of France and back to the borders of the Reich. Many believed that the war would be over by Christmas. But the situation changed as the Allies reached German territory and the defenses of the German West Wall (called the Siegfried Line by the Americans). In the central sector of the West Wall defensive line lay the dark and almost impenetrable Hürtgen Forest.

At that point in the war, the Allied logistics system was stretched to the breaking point, and the advancing armies were on the verge of running out of ammunition and fuel. Allied military planners were faced with the two strategic options of attacking Germany—on a broad front or on a narrow front. Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. and Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery were the two leading advocates of the narrow-front approach, but each general thought his forces should execute the "dagger thrust" into the heart of the Reich.

Pressed hard by Montgomery, supreme commander of Allied Expeditionary Force General Dwight D. Eisenhower agreed in September 1944 to support the British plan for a combined ground and airborne thrust into Holland and then across the Rhine River at Arnhem. Launched on September 17, Operation MARKET-GARDEN soon failed. With supplies now dwindling, the Western Allies had no real choice other than to revert to the broad-front strategy of applying even pressure against the Germans all along the line.

Just prior to the start of MARKET-GARDEN, the U.S. First Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges, breached the West Wall in two places and attacked the city of Aachen immediately north of the Hürtgen Forest. Hodges's 250,000-man force consisted of eight veteran divisions in the U.S. VII, V, and VIII Corps. After taking Aachen, Hodges planned to attack around the north end of the Hürtgen Forest across the flat open Rhine plain toward the city of Köln (Cologne). But Hodges also believed that he had to first secure the Hürtgen Forest to avoid dangerously exposing his southern flank.

The Hürtgen Forest is a classic piece of defender's terrain. It is an interlaced network of bald, exposed ridgelines and deeply wooded ravines, with the Roer River running through the middle of the forest and then out across the Rhine plain. The small river itself was not a significant military obstacle, but a series of dams high in the forest had created a huge artificial lake holding millions of gallons of water. By releasing that water at the right moment, the Germans could flood the Rhine plain, which would slow, disrupt, and channelize Allied military movement for weeks. Those dams, in the vicinity of the town of Schmidt, were the one significant military operational objective in the Hürtgen Forest, but ironically, neither side appeared to recognize that significance until the battle was almost over.

Although the German Army had a reputation as the master of mobile, offensive warfare, it also was tenacious and resourceful in the defense. The army group commander in that sector, Field Marshal Walther Model, was a master defensive tactician.

The Hürtgen Forest campaign began on September 12 when the veteran 9th Infantry Division attacked the southern end of the forest in an attempt to move through a passage known as the Monschau Corridor. The 9th Infantry Division took the town of Lammersdorf in the south, but it was stopped just

short of Germeter in the center of the forest. In late October, the 9th Infantry Division was withdrawn from the line after suffering 4,500 casualties. The 28th Infantry Division replaced it.

U.S. tanks moving up to the front lines in the Hürtgen Forest, November 1944. (US Signal Corps/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

The U.S. First Army planned another attack, this time with VII Corps, commanded by Major General J. Lawton Collins. It was to move through the northern passage called the Stolberg Corridor. As a diversionary effort to draw off German forces, Major General Leonard Gerow's V Corps to the south would attack with one division against Schmidt on the far side of the Kall River gorge. The supporting attack was scheduled for November 2, and the main attack was to follow on November 5. VII Corps could not get ready in time, though, and the main attack was postponed—first until November 10 and then until November 16. For some reason, the timing for the supporting attack never changed.

The 28th Infantry Division launched the attack toward Schmidt with all three of its infantry regiments attacking in diverging directions, which dissipated rather than concentrated its combat power. The most notable feature of that battle was the struggle to get a handful of M-4 Sherman tanks

and M-10 Wolverine tank destroyers down the steep and narrow forest trail into the Kall River gorge and back up the other side to the open ground near the towns of Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. The 112th Infantry Regiment took Schmidt on November 3. The Germans counterattacked immediately, supported by PzKpfw-V Panther tanks.

Despite a gallant fight against superior odds, in which antitank platoon leader Lieutenant Turney Leonard earned a posthumous Medal of Honor, all American armor east of the Kall River was destroyed. By November 8, the 28th Infantry Division was pushed back almost to its starting positions, having sustained 6,184 casualties in only seven days of fighting. Major General Norman Cota, the 28th Infantry Division commander, was widely criticized for the tactically stupid offensive scheme, a plan that actually had been imposed on him by V Corps. Cota had protested it.

The 28th Infantry Division was relieved in the line by the 8th Infantry Division on November 13. Three days later, the Americans launched the postponed main assault, with VII Corps' 104th, 1st, and 4th Infantry Divisions attacking through the north of the forest. South of VII Corps and just to the north of where the 28th Infantry Division had been mauled, V Corps' 8th Infantry Division launched a supporting attack. Once again, the Americans encountered determined and skillful German defenses. The attackers suffered heavy casualties in exchange for mere yards of ground. The GIs fought under terrible conditions of snow, rain, mud, cold, and almost impenetrable woods in fierce infantry combat reminiscent of World War I.

The Americans were still trying to punch their way through the Hürtgen Forest and making almost no progress when, on December 16, the Germans launched their Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) to the south. The almost complete tactical and operational surprise the Germans achieved brought the Hürtgen Forest campaign to a halt, as all Allied forces focused on containing the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge.

Even after the major German offensive was turned back, the Americans did not take Schmidt and the Roer River dams until early February 1945. Just before the Germans withdrew, they managed to blow up the valves controlling the spillway of the Schwammenauel Dam, the major dam in the system. The resulting flooding downstream delayed the U.S. Ninth Army's crossing of the Roer River to link up with the Canadian First Army, which in

turn contributed to the bloody (albeit successful) Canadian-British Battle of the Reichswald in February and early March 1945.

The Hürtgen Forest campaign was a brilliantly executed economy-of-force operation by the Germans. Most of the German records from that period did not survive, but Germany probably suffered more casualties than did the United States. Nonetheless, the Germans held the vastly better-supplied and -equipped attackers to a dead standstill for three months, while just a few miles to the south three German field armies assembled in almost complete secrecy for the Ardennes Offensive.

The Hürtgen Forest area today is little different than it was in late 1944 before the battle started. Very few markers or memorials exist to indicate the prolonged and savage fighting there.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Cota, Norman Daniel "Dutch"; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Gerow, Leonard Townsend; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Model, Walther; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Document 206

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HUSKY, Operation

See Sicily, Invasion of

Hu Tsung-nan

See Hu Zongnan

Hu Zongnan (1896–1962)

Chinese Nationalist general, known as the "King of the Northwest." Born in Zhenhai (Chenhain), Zhejiang (Chekiang), on May 16, 1896, Hu Zongnan (Hu Tsung-nan) received a primary education in the Confucian classics and became a teacher. In 1924, he studied at the newly founded Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy. As a Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) loyalist, Hu participated in the 1926–1928 Northern Expedition and continued to fight warlords and Communist forces through the 1930s.

On the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Hu participated in the defense of Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province as commander of the First Army. In 1938, he received command of the Seventeenth Army Group and was responsible for military training in northwest China, with headquarters at Xian (Sian), Shaanxi (Shensi). He was assigned the dual task of resisting the Japanese in northern China and containing the Communists in northern Shaanxi, where he became the center of the powerful Huangpu Clique in Chinese military politics. In 1939, he commanded the Thirty-Fourth Group Army. In 1943 he received command of the First War Area comprising Hebai (Hopei), Northern Shandong (Shantung), Henan (Honan), Anhui (Anhwei), and Shaanxi.

In April 1944, the Japanese began their ICHI-GO Campaign, which was aimed at removing China from the war. Hu's forces were hit hard but prevented the Japanese from entering Shaanxi Province. In 1945, at war's end, Hu traveled to Zhengzhou (Chengchow) in Henan Province to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces.

After the war and Jiang's order to go on the offensive against the Communists, Hu marched into northern Shaanxi and captured Yan'an (Yenan) in March 1947. This victory marked the high-water mark of Nationalist achievement in the civil war. As his forces became isolated from other GMD troops and supplies, they were eventually routed and then wiped out during 1949 by the Communists. Hu and a small group of advisers

escaped to Hainan Island and eventually made their way to Taiwan. He served the Nationalist government in Taiwan as commander of the guerrilla forces on Dachen (Tach'en) Island and ended his career commanding Nationalist forces in the Penghus (Pescadores). Hu retired in late 1959 and died in Taipei on February 14, 1962.

ERROL MACGREGOR CLAUSS

See also

China; China, Army; ICHI-GO, Operation; Jiang Jieshi; Sino-Japanese War

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Hyakutake Haruyoshi (1888–1947)

Japanese Army general. Born in Saga Prefecture on May 25, 1888, Hyakutake Haruyoshi was commissioned in the army in December 1909 and became one of its leading signal communications specialists. Colonel Hyakutake commanded the 78th Infantry Regiment beginning in March 1935. He was promoted to major general in March 1937, and the following August he was appointed superintendent of the Army Signal School. After commanding the 4th Independent Mixed Brigade, Hyakutake, who had been promoted to lieutenant general in August 1939, accepted a two-year posting as inspector general of signal training in 1940.

Hyakutake assumed command of the Seventeenth Army at Rabaul on May 18, 1942. His new command consisted of scattered infantry regimental groups in that area. Hyakutake was to work with the navy to establish new airfields and positions in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and points east. The Japanese canceled their seaborne attack on Port Moresby after the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942). Instead, in July 1942, Hyakutake ordered Major General Horii Tomitaro to advance overland with his South Seas Detachment in New Guinea to capture Port Moresby.

Hyakutake's attention was diverted to the Solomons when U.S. marines landed on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. Hyakutake underestimated both the number and fighting abilities of the Americans, and he continued to feed in units on a piecemeal basis. When Major General Kawaguchi Kiyotake's 6,000 men came to grief on Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal during September 13–14, Hyakutake at last realized his error and put a hold on further operations on New Guinea.

Hyakutake then built up a force of 30,000 men on Guadalcanal and left Rabaul on October 8 to take personal command. His complicated plan involved separate columns intended to concentrate near American positions. This offensive opened on October 24. Despite the bravery of the attackers, superior U.S. firepower inflicted heavy losses and drove off the Japanese. By early November, the Japanese on Guadalcanal were desperately short of supplies.

The Japanese now reorganized their command in the South Pacific. General Imamura Hitoshi took command of the new Eighth Area Army. Hyakutake's forces in the Solomons remained the Seventeenth Army; those on New Guinea were renamed the Eighteenth Army. Although Imamura promised Hyakutake two fresh divisions, he was unable to deliver because the Japanese Navy could not control the sea around Guadalcanal.

After Imperial General Headquarters decided to evacuate Guadalcanal, in February 1943 Hyakutake assumed command on Bougainville. The Americans invaded that island on November 1, 1943, forcing Hyakutake's men into defensive positions, especially around Buin. To support the isolated garrison, Hyakutake spent much time organizing vegetable gardens. His attempt to break out during March 8–24, 1944, was unsuccessful. Imamura then ordered Hyakutake to adopt a live-and-let-live attitude toward the Americans.

Hyakutake's remaining forces on Bougainville surrendered at the end of the war. Hyakutake had been disabled by a stroke in early 1945. He returned to Japan in February 1946 and died in Hiratsuka on March 10, 1947.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Bougainville Campaign; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Horii Tomitaro; Imamura Hitoshi; Kawaguchi Kiyotake; New

Guinea Campaign; Rabaul; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Hyndhope, First Viscount Cunningham of

See Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne

I

Iachino, Angelo (1889–1976)

Italian Navy admiral. Born on April 24, 1889, in San Remo, Italy, Angelo Iachino graduated from the Italian Naval Academy in 1908. A specialist in naval gunnery, he commanded a torpedo boat in the Adriatic during World War I. Iachino was naval attaché to Britain from 1931 to 1934, and in 1936 he commanded Italian naval forces in Spain.

In June 1940, when Italy entered World War II, Iachino commanded the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. A month after the British raid on Taranto on November 11, 1940, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini made the fleet commander, Admiral Inigo Campioni, deputy chief of staff and named Iachino to replace Campioni. Iachino, who in 1938 had supported Mussolini's "Italy as aircraft carrier" arguments against proponents of Italian naval aviation, backed such development in later years, particularly after his country's grievous losses (three cruisers and two destroyers sunk and 2,300 dead) during the Battle of Cape Matapan (March 28, 1941). The near total lack of Italian Air Force support and of Luftwaffe air cover transformed an offensive Italian naval venture against the British into a defensive retreat that, because of miscalculations on Iachino's part, precipitated a confused, one-sided night battle.

The Matapan disaster haunted Iachino. Despite his superb theoretical grasp of naval strategy and tactics, he had proved irresolute in this and other encounters with the Royal Navy, notably the two battles in the Sirte Gulf on December 17, 1941, and March 22, 1942. Relieved of fleet command in April 1943, Iachino served without further command until retiring as a full admiral in 1954. He died in Rome on December 3, 1976.

GORDON E. HOGG

See also

Cape Matapan, Battle of; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Mussolini, Benito; Sirte, First Battle of; Sirte, Second Battle of; Taranto, Attack on

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Iba Field, Attack on (December 8, 1941)

Japanese air attack in the Philippines Islands, simultaneous with their raid on Clark Field. The Japanese planned to fly at night from Formosa (Taiwan) to avoid interception, arriving at first light to strike Nichols and Clark Fields, the main U.S. fighter and bomber bases in the Philippines. Early-morning fog on Formosa, however, grounded the aircraft of the Japanese Navy's Eleventh Air Fleet. With no prospect of surprise, planners decided to ignore Nichols Field in favor of Iba, a pursuit-aircraft base northwest of Manila on Luzon's west coast. An attack on Iba would cover the flank of the Japanese force attacking Clark. When the fog lifted on the morning of December 8, 54 twin-engine navy Mitsubishi G4M1 Type medium bombers (Allied code name Betty) of the Takao and Kanoya Air Groups and 50 Mitsubishi A6M Reisen (Zero) fighters of the 3rd Air Group took off from Formosa for the Philippines.

At Iba, the U.S. 3rd Pursuit Squadron flew 16 Curtiss P-40E Kittyhawks off the grass strip about 11:45 a.m. to intercept the Japanese planes, reportedly heading for Manila. This action was the Americans' second scramble of the morning. Failing to encounter the Japanese, the planes raced back when they heard Iba Field's radio warn of a hostile force approaching from the sea. The American fighters reached Iba low on fuel and, in any case, failed to locate the Japanese aircraft. The squadron entered the landing pattern at 12:45 p.m. Six aircraft landed just as the Japanese bombers and fighters struck. Japanese bombs tore into barracks, service buildings, and

maintenance equipment. A bomb also destroyed Iba's radar, a fatal blow to subsequent U.S. air-defense efforts.

A few American pilots turned their aircraft against the Zeros, despite nearly empty fuel tanks. The nimble Japanese shot down 5 P-40s, and swirling dogfights ran 3 more Americans out of gas. These desperate American attacks prevented the Zeros from strafing Iba. Ultimately, however, the 3rd Pursuit lost 16 P-40s in the air and on the ground—nearly the entire squadron—as well as 45 trained pilots and mechanics. Damage to the field and equipment was also significant.

The unexpected success of the Japanese raids on Clark and Iba stunned both the Japanese and the Americans. The attacks crippled General Douglas MacArthur's air force and made possible the safe approach of the Japanese invasion convoys.

JOHN W. WHITMAN

See also

Brereton, Lewis Hyde; Clark Field, Japanese Raid on; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Sakai Saburo

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ICEBERG, Operation

See Okinawa, Invasion of

ICHI-GO, Operation (April–December 1944)

Last major Japanese offensive in China during the war. In the spring of 1944, the war was going badly for the Japanese. With Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell's forces progressing in northern Burma (present-day Myanmar), the Japanese launched their last offensive in China. Known as Operation ICHI-GO (VICTORY NUMBER ONE), it was aimed primarily at China's Nationalist forces and the American air bases in eastern China.

The Japanese strategic objectives were to destroy those forces, capture air bases in southeast China, consolidate control over eastern China, and secure control of the Beijing-Hankow-Canton railroad line. The Japanese also hoped to relieve some of the pressure on their forces in Burma and establish a stronger base in China from which to resist any potential Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands.

The first phase began in March and lasted until July 1944, with the offensive being mounted on a broad front across central and southern China. Japanese aims were to press toward the Nationalist capital of Chongqing (Chungking), open up direct communications with French Indochina, and capture airfields in southeast China being used by U.S. aircraft to attack Japanese ground forces and shipping. From the beginning the operation went well for the Japanese, with Nationalist forces quickly collapsing. This ended whatever hopes remained among Western leaders that China might play a major role in the defeat of Japan.

In northern China during April and May, the Japanese cleared the Beijing-Hankow railway and took Henan Province, even though they had to move at night to avoid constant attacks from Major General Claire Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force. Despite their air superiority, the Chinese Nationalist forces lost almost every time they met the Japanese. Some Chinese soldiers were even attacked by their own people, enraged by earlier mistreatment, and on occasion, starving peasants actually killed retreating Chinese troops and welcomed the Japanese.

Nationalist military failures exacerbated the already rocky relationship between Nationalist Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and Stilwell as well as that between Chennault and Stilwell. Stilwell was convinced that the key to restoring China lay in reopening a land supply route to Chongqing through Burma, whereas Chennault feared for the preservation of his airfields in eastern China. Jiang, realizing that the Americans were going to defeat the Japanese in due course, seemed more concerned with the

threat posed to his regime by the Chinese Communists. In fall 1944, the rift led to Stilwell's dismissal.

Phase two of Operation ICHI-GO began in July with a pincer movement by two Japanese armies, one from Wuhan and one from Canton, attempting to take Guilin and open a land route between central China and Southeast Asia. By November, all of Guangxi and eastern Hunan had been overrun, and the Japanese were threatening Guiyang, the capital of Guizhou Province. In the process, the Japanese captured all but three U.S. airfields in southern China. The Allies feared that if Guiyang fell, the Japanese might capture Kunming and Chongqing. But the Japanese were not able to advance farther, and in December they attacked Guiyang but were repulsed. ICHI-GO was over.

In early 1945, the Japanese began limited offensives to consolidate the gains of 1944, but these failed to accomplish much, because the threat of war with the Soviet Union forced them to transfer several divisions to defend Manchuria and the Japanese mainland. Between May and July, the Nationalist Chinese used this situation to recover Guangxi and western Guangdong, but most Chinese lands captured by the Japanese during ICHI-GO remained in their hands until the end of the war. The Japanese offensive also greatly benefited Communist forces in China, who took advantage of the Nationalist defeats to occupy more territory and greatly expand their army.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Chennault, Claire Lee; China; Jiang Jieshi; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Ichiki Kiyonao (1892–1942)

Japanese Army major general. Born in Shizuoka, Japan, on October 16, 1892, Ichiki Kiyonao graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1916 and was commissioned in the infantry. In 1927, he took command of an infantry company. Between 1928 and 1931, Ichiki was a drill instructor at agricultural and trade schools. In 1935, he was appointed an instructor at the Army Infantry School and studied infantry tactics that might be applied in the event of war with the Soviet Union.

In May 1936, Ichiki took command of an infantry battalion in the 1st Regiment of the China Garrison Army. When a company of his battalion held an exercise near Beijing (Peking) on the night of July 7, 1937, it was fired on by the Chinese. The 1st Regiment's commander, Colonel Mutaguchi Renya, then ordered Ichiki to take his entire battalion to the spot and attack the Chinese. The resulting clash, known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, marked the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Promoted to colonel in 1941, Ichiki took command of a regiment just before the beginning of the Pacific war. His regiment was to have been a garrison force on Midway Island, but when the Japanese Navy lost the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway, Ichiki's unit was sent to Guadalcanal in August 1942. In planning to attack U.S. marine positions, Ichiki developed tactics that took little account of U.S. troop dispositions, and his unit was annihilated in the August 21, 1942, Battle of the Tenaru River. Ichiki's men refused to surrender, and they and their commander were killed in the fighting. Marine losses were 44 dead and 71 wounded, whereas the Japanese had at least 777 killed. Ichiki was posthumously promoted to major general.

TOBE RYOICHI

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Mutaguchi Renya

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Ichimaru Rinosuke (1891–1945)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born on September 20, 1891, in Saga Prefecture on the island of Kyushu, Ichimaru Rinosuke entered the Japanese Naval Academy in 1910. In 1919, he joined a naval aviation unit and underwent pilot training. In 1926, when he was testing an experimental aircraft as commander of the unit, the plane crashed and he sustained serious injuries, leaving him with a limp and forcing his resignation from the navy. He then became president of the Yokaren, a naval aviation academy for high school students established in 1930 in Oppama.

Ichimaru proved to be a capable administrator, and the Yokaren produced well-trained pilots who established an enviable reputation during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II in the Pacific. Returning to active service, Ichimaru commanded a succession of naval aviation training units.

In 1939, Ichimaru was in command of the bombing of Wuhan in China. During the Pacific war, he saw action in the South Pacific, particularly in the Solomon Islands (August 1942–February 1943) and the bombing of U.S. positions on Guadalcanal. In 1943, Ichimaru returned to Japan and, now a rear admiral, assumed command of the 13th Aviation Wing.

In August 1944, Ichimaru was assigned to the island of Iwo Jima as the commander of some 2,000 naval personnel, but his men of the 27th Naval Aviation Wing had no aircraft. Although he believed that he would die on the island, Ichimaru gladly accepted the assignment. During the subsequent Battle of Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945), Ichimaru's men fought alongside the Japanese Army troops on the ground. Ichimaru was killed, presumably by U.S. machine gun fire, while leading a charge of his men, on March 17, 1945.

Before his death, Ichimaru wrote a letter to U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was discovered on March 26 and published by the *New York Herald Tribune* on July 11, 1945. In it, Ichimaru sought to explain the Japanese point of view on the causes of the Pacific war. He claimed that the Japanese drive for the Daitoa Kyoeiken (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) did not threaten the United States and that Japan did not want war but was forced into it by the economic sanctions imposed by the United States.

HASEGAWA REI

See also

Air Warfare, Naval; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Identification, Friend or Foe

As radars moved from prototype to production, designers immediately began to consider ways to give the new sensor the ability to identify the targets it detected. The British adopted the term "identification, friend or foe" (IFF) to define the system incorporated in aircraft to enable radar operators to separate enemy from friendly aircraft. "Fratricide"—also known as "amicide" and commonly, if incorrectly referred to as "friendly fire"—has been a recurrent problem since the beginning of organized military conflict, and the increasingly accelerated pace of aerial operations made it especially critical for air defense personnel to identify incoming aircraft rapidly. The same applied to naval operations, where the first to open fire enjoyed a tactical advantage, but a friend-on-friend engagement could be costly and give the advantage to the enemy.

Thus, during World War II, German and Allied navies and air forces dedicated extensive training and technical research to ensuring their personnel could identify enemy aircraft and ships before their opponents. The radar-deficient Japanese and Italians focused on visual identification training. To this end, military trainers employed models, printed silhouettes, and even playing cards (with vehicle profiles printed on the faces) as training aids. Special focus was often placed on distinguishing Allied and Axis craft with similar visual characteristics, such as the early models of the Grumman F-6 Hellcat and the Japanese A6M2 Zero.

During the North African (1940–1943) and Sicilian (July 9–August 22, 1943) campaigns, there were a large number of fratricides. This occurred especially in surface-to-air situations, as in the Allied invasion of Sicily,

when nervous antiaircraft gunners in the invasion fleet, having earlier suffered a German air attack, shot down 23 Douglas C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft carrying the second wave of Allied paratroopers. To ensure that nervous friendly air-defense gunners on the ground or in ships would not shoot at Allied planes during the cross-Channel invasion of France on June 6, 1944, Allied planners decided to forgo some elements of camouflage. The so-called invasion stripes were a series of broad bands of alternating black and white paint applied to the wings and fuselages of U.S. and British fighters, tactical bombers, and transport aircraft operating in support of the invasion.

IFF was also a device fitted to aircraft and ships to prevent attacks on other friendly units and to let radar stations identify them as friendly. The British initially employed a shaped dipole mounted in the aircraft to enhance the radar return, but this passive system proved unreliable, so they resorted to a repeater that retransmitted the radar pulse. The resulting stronger echo made friendly aircraft appear larger on the scope than enemy aircraft. Introduced into service in November 1939, the Mark I IFF proved quite successful during the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, although its limited range and other shortcomings often caused problems.

The more flexible Mark II IFF, which was designed to respond to naval and mobile radars, was introduced in May 1940. It utilized a separate transceiver that operated on its own frequency separate from that of the individual radar. Therefore, the Mark III could be mounted on any Allied air or naval platform, while its related interrogation system could be added to any radar system as a kit. It was installed on all Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command aircraft by that October and was shared with the United States. Production of its successor, the Mark III, began in March 1941; it quickly became the standard Allied IFF system employed in the war. It was installed on all Allied aircraft, ships, and submarines beginning in late 1941.

The Germans developed IFF systems that were unique to each radar, resulting in a plethora of IFF systems that would identify the aircraft only if it was detected by a specific radar system. More important, German airborne radars never acquired IFF equipment and therefore were not capable of aircraft-to-aircraft IFF interrogation. Nor were German ships and submarines equipped with IFF.

The Allies’ standardization in IFF equipment and cross-service identification training did not eliminate friend-on-friend engagements in the

war at sea, particularly at night, but it did give their navies and air forces an advantage over their Axis counterparts in most naval theaters of war by reducing their detection to identification times of any contacts they encountered.

Japanese and Italian air force and naval personnel were trained only to recognize their own service's equipment. This and the refusal of their military services to share operational information or coordinate activities led either to confusion or attacks on their own forces during key points in battles in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters. Thus, Japanese ground defenses on Iwo Jima could not identify their own aircraft by their signals. Similarly, German naval forces also suffered losses as a result of their country's shortcomings in identification procedures. Their ships and submarines lacked onboard IFF systems, and the Luftwaffe's ship identification training was limited and inadequate.

As the pace of naval warfare accelerated and battles came to be fought under all-weather and limited visibility conditions, crews came increasingly to rely on electronic IFF systems. Superior IFF equipment, training, and employment were major contributors to the Allied success in the war at sea. The basic procedures and technological principles developed during the war dominated postwar IFF developments until the 20th century's final decade.

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See also

Britain, Battle of; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; North Africa Campaign; Radar; Sicily, Invasion of

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I-400–Class Japanese Submarines

Japan's largest submarines, produced between 1944 and 1945. The I-class submarines were 296 feet 6 inches in length and displaced about 5,223 tons. They were the world's largest submarines until the U.S. Navy's *Triton* nuclear submarine of 1959.

Designed in 1942, the I-400–class submarine was to carry three to four light Aichi Type 17 Special Fighter aircraft (M6A1) to strike the U.S. mainland. The idea of a submersible aircraft carrier was unique to the Japanese Navy of World War II. The I-400–class submarines were powered with four diesel engines, generating 7,700 horsepower. Their maximum speed was 18.7 knots on the surface and 6.5 knots submerged, with a cruising radius of 42,000 nautical miles at 14 knots. An I-400–class submarine was thus capable of steaming around the world without refueling.

The I-400s carried a standard armament of one 144mm gun and three 25mm machine guns. It took 30 minutes to catapult an airplane from the submarine. Each aircraft could carry two 550-pound bombs or one 1,760-pound bomb. This type of submarine and the Japanese balloon bombs were the only real means available for Japan's military to attack the mainland United States during the Pacific war.

The development concept behind the I-400 was similar to that of the superbattleship *Yamato,* in which the Japanese Navy pursued the goal of having the largest guns and ships rather than the greatest number of vessels. However, the I-400 could not be mass-produced. In 1942, the Japanese Navy planned to build 18 I-400s, but only three were completed during the war. Nor could the Japanese Navy use them effectively, given Allied control of the Pacific.

In 1945, the navy developed a plan to utilize the I-400s in an attack on the Panama Canal. The attack was scheduled for August 25, 1945, but canceled with Japan's surrender. After the war, two I-400 submarines were handed over to the U.S. Navy, examined, and later sunk as targets off the coast of Hawaii. The remaining I-400 was broken up for scrap by the Japanese in 1946.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Japan, Navy; Panama Canal; Submarines; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Iida Shōjirō (1888–1975)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Yamaguichi Prefecture, Japan, on August 8, 1888, Iida Shōjirō joined the army in 1908. He graduated from the War College in December 1915 and was promoted to captain in December 1918. Iida participated in Japan's Siberian Intervention and served two terms as an instructor at the Infantry School between postings to infantry regiments. By August 1934 he commanded 4th Infantry Regiment, Guards Division.

Promoted to lieutenant general in August 1939, Iida then commanded the Guards Division. In July 1941, his Twenty-Fifth Army occupied French Indochina. He then established his headquarters in Saigon and prepared for an invasion of Thailand.

In December 1941, Iida took command of the newly formed Fifteenth Army, consisting of the 33rd and 55th Infantry Divisions, charged with occupying Thailand. Beginning on December 8, his superior forces easily overcame light Thai resistance. The Thai government then accepted occupation and signed a mutual defense pact with Japan.

On January 20, 1942, Iida's divisions crossed into Burma (today Myanmar). Iida had only 35,000 men and limited supplies. The terrain sharply circumscribed Japanese operations, forcing the troops to abandon most of their heavy weapons and vehicles and utilize animals to carry their provisions. Although Japanese air attacks on the capital city of Rangoon (today Yangon) failed to close that port, Iida quickly outmaneuvered British forces. The Japanese force-marched along jungle trails, often outdistancing the motorized British.

On March 8, his men took Rangoon, and Iida immediately used that port to receive reinforcements and supplies. The fall of Rangoon also cut the

Burma Road and isolated China from Western aid. By May, British and Chinese forces in Burma had been driven back to India and China, respectively. The Japanese had inflicted some 30,000 casualties, with their own ground force losses numbering only some 7,000.

In April 1943, Iida was assigned to the General Defense Command. He retired in December 1944 but was recalled to command the Thirtieth Army in Manchuria in July 1945. He had barely taken up his post before his army was overrun by the Red Army in August. Iida was taken prisoner and not released until 1950. He died in Tokyo on January 23, 1975.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Burma Theater; Japan, Army; Manchuria Campaign

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Ijuin Matsuji (1893–1944)

Japanese Navy rear admiral. Born in Tokyo on April 21, 1893, Ijuin Matsuji was the son of a future commander of the Combined Fleet. He joined the navy in December 1915 and served on a number of destroyers before commanding a destroyer flotilla in the years preceding World War II. In 1932, Ijuin was an aide-de-camp to the puppet emperor of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo), Aixinjueluo Puyi (Henry Puyi). During the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on August 22–25, 1942, Ijuin was captain of the heavy cruiser *Atago.*

In October 1943, Ijuin was promoted to rear admiral and assumed command of 3rd Destroyer Squadron at Rabaul. His early skirmishing with U.S. Navy forces while supplying isolated Japanese garrisons proved inconclusive. On October 6–7, 1943, Ijuin led nine destroyers to evacuate Vella Lavella. Intercepted by an inferior U.S. naval force, he completed his

mission. Each side lost one destroyer, and two U.S. destroyers were damaged.

On November 1, 1943, U.S. marines landed at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville. A Japanese force sortied from Rabaul, with Ijuin commanding the left flank of the screen made up of the light cruiser *Sendai* (flagship) and three destroyers. Altogether, the Japanese had two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers. A slightly larger U.S. Navy force defended the U.S. transports. In the early morning of November 2, the two sides collided near Empress Augusta Bay, and the *Sendai* was sunk. Ijuin was rescued by a submarine and returned to Rabaul. He was not criticized for his role in the battle. He was then assigned to Singapore. He died when his escort ship *Iki* was torpedoed by an American submarine north of Saipan on May 24, 1944.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Japan, Navy; Vella Gulf, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Battle of

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Ilyushin, Sergei Vladimirovich (1894–1977)

Soviet general and aeronautical engineer. Born in the village of Dilyalevo in the lower Vologoda region of Russia on March 30, 1894, Sergei Vladimirovich Ilyushin served in the Russian Army during World War I as an aircraft mechanic and learned to fly. He joined the Red Army in 1919 and commanded an aircraft maintenance unit during the Russian Civil War.

Ilyushin graduated from the Zhukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy in 1926 and became an aircraft designer. In 1931, he was chief of the Central Design Office and a colonel general. Ilyushin's two-engine bomber, the DB-3F, entered service in 1937. Redesignated the Il-4, it was the mainstay of the Soviet Union's medium bomber fleet in the early years of World War II. The

first Soviet bomber to reach Berlin, it was employed as both a torpedo bomber and a strategic bomber.

Ilyushin is also credited with designing the superb Il-2 Shturmovik. Appearing in March 1941, it was a highly effective, well-armored (about 15 percent of empty weight) ground-attack aircraft known to the Germans as "the black death." Armed with two 30mm cannon (and later, a 37mm gun), the Il-2 was a most successful tank killer. The Soviets manufactured some 36,000 Il-2s through 1955, more than any other wartime aircraft. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin described the Shturmovik as being "as essential to the Red Army as bread and water," and Ilyushin received the Hero of Soviet Labor award for its design. In 1943, Ilyushin developed the Il-10, a smaller but faster and more aerodynamic bomber based on the Il-2. It saw service well past the war, including in many Soviet satellite states. He also developed a four-engine bomber, the Il-20.

Ilyushin continued to design aircraft after the war, when he also taught at the Zhukovsky Academy. He developed the jet ground-attack Il-40 aircraft and, in 1948, the twin-engine Il-28 attack bomber, the Soviet Union's first jet bomber. He also designed the Il-38, the Soviet Union's first long-range antisubmarine aircraft. Among his civilian aircraft designs were the four-engine Il-12 in 1946 and the Il-14 in 1954. In 1957, Ilyushin developed the large turboprop Il-18. He also designed the intercontinental passenger jet known as the Il-62 and the larger transport aircraft Il-76 and Il-86 that served in both the Soviet Air Force and Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline. Ilyushin died in Moscow on February 9, 1977.

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See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Soviet Union, Air Force

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Imamura Hitoshi (1886–1968)

Japanese Army general and commander of the Eighth Area Army at Rabaul. Born in Miyagi Prefecture, Japan, on October 4, 1886, Imamura Hitoshi was commissioned in the Imperial Japanese Army in December 1907. He graduated from the War College in 1915 and then was an observer in Britain and India. In April 1932, Imamura took command of the 57th Infantry Regiment, followed in March 1935 by command of the 40th Infantry Regiment. He served as deputy chief of staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria and then was commandant of the Army Infantry School. Imamura commanded the 5th Infantry Division in China during November 1938–March 1940. He returned to China as commander of the Twenty-Third Army in June 1941.

In December 1941, Imamura took command of the Sixteenth Army, which was intended to conquer the Netherlands East Indies. During the invasion of Java on March 1, 1942, the transport that was carrying him, the *Rujo Maru,* was sunk in the Battle of Sunda Strait (February 28–March 1). Clinging to a piece of wood, Imamura managed to reach shore. His force soon after overran the Dutch defenders on Java, and on March 9, Imamura accepted the surrender of all remaining Allied forces in the Netherlands East Indies. As military governor of the former Dutch colony, he established a liberal occupation policy and freed Indonesian dissidents from prison.

In November 1942, Imamura took command of the new Eighth Area Army at Rabaul, Imperial General Headquarters, having realized that General Hyakutake Haruyoshi could not adequately direct operations on both Guadalcanal and New Guinea. Hyakutake thus took direct control of the Seventeenth Army on Guadalcanal, and General Adachi Hatazō took over the units on New Guinea, now designated the Eighteenth Army. Imamura was unable to deliver two new divisions to Hyakutake when the Japanese Navy failed to control the sea around Guadalcanal. Instead, he had to order Hyakutake to evacuate Guadalcanal.

Imamura’s efforts to reinforce New Guinea were also hampered by growing Allied airpower. The complete destruction of a Japanese convoy in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea during March 2–5, 1943, convinced Imamura that New Guinea would also be lost. Within weeks, operations on New

Guinea were transferred to the Second Area Army, and Imamura was left with only the Seventeenth Army.

Hyakutake and his Seventeenth Army were cut off on Bougainville by an American invasion in November 1943. On March 25, 1944, Imamura ordered the aggressive Hyakutake to cease offensive operations and adopt a purely defensive stance. Imamura himself was isolated at Rabaul with 70,000 troops when Australian forces captured the rest of New Britain. He hoped his presence would provide a strategic benefit to Japan, and he surrendered in 1945 only after Emperor Hirohito ordered him to do so. Tried and convicted of war crimes after the war, Imamura was imprisoned until 1954. He died in Tokyo on October 4, 1968.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Adachi Hatazō; Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Bougainville Campaign; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Hyakutake Haruyoshi; International Military Tribunal, Far East; New Guinea Campaign; Rabaul

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Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of (March–July 1944)

Crucial battles that marked the turning point in the British defense of India. In February 1944, Lieutenant General Mutaguchi Renya, commander of the Japanese Fifteenth Army in Burma, undertook an invasion of eastern India, partly in response to raids by the British. Mutaguchi hoped to forestall a British offensive and perhaps spark a revolt against British rule in India. He mustered about 220,000 men for the campaign, but his effort was hampered by a lack of heavy artillery and a tenuous supply line. The campaign was made more difficult by the mountainous terrain of eastern India, where the towns and villages were usually situated on saddles connecting high, rugged ridges.

Mutaguchi's plan was to cut the road running south to Imphal from the supply depot at Dimapur. Then, after his troops had infiltrated the British-Indian positions, he planned to seize the high ground, force his opponents to retreat, and utilize captured supplies to march farther west.

The Japanese offensive opened in earnest on March 11–12, 1944, after Mutaguchi feinted south of Imphal and then surrounded it with his 33rd and 15th Divisions, cutting off supplies and laying siege to 150,000 British and Indian defenders. British lieutenant general William Slim, commander of the defending Fourteenth Army, had expected an attack but was surprised by the speed of the Japanese advance. He countered by flying ammunition, provisions, fuel, and the 5th Indian Division into Imphal to reinforce the defenders. The British also benefited from having the 254th Tank Brigade at Imphal. The only armor in the battle, the British tanks played a decisive part in reopening the road and placing the Japanese infantry around Imphal on the defensive by the beginning of the monsoon season in May.

Meanwhile, Japanese lieutenant general Satō Kōtoku's 31st Division had surrounded the key village of Kohima, north of Imphal. If Kohima fell, all British units to the south would have been forced to withdraw. But the 161st Indian Brigade at Kohima held, and once again, Slim turned to his air transports, flying the 2nd Infantry Division into Dimapur; that unit then pushed down the road to relieve Kohima. When the troops broke the circle around the village on April 18, Slim went over to the attack.

Satō held his ground, forcing the British and Indian troops to evict the Japanese from their positions yard by yard. Finally, on June 2, ignoring orders from Mutaguchi to stand to the last man, Satō withdrew his battered division. Mutaguchi ordered the remainder of his army to retreat a month later.

British and Indian casualties in the campaign were about 15,000 men, but Japanese losses exceeded 90,000. The latter included several thousand troops of Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army. The Japanese defeat at Imphal and Kohima paved the way for the British and Chinese offensives into Burma the next year.

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See also

Bose, Subhas Chandra; India; Mutaguchi Renya; Slim, Sir William Joseph

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Incendiary Bombs and Bombing

Air-delivered ordnance used to damage or destroy physical structures by means of fire and a form of strategic bombing intended to cause widespread damage to industrial and population centers. Incendiary bombing is often referred to as firebombing.

During the early days of World War II, proponents of strategic bombing advocated large-scale air attacks against vital enemy military and industrial targets. These air raids were to be carried out during the day to facilitate precision bombing and maximize damage. However, both the Luftwaffe during the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain and the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command during raids over Germany suffered such great losses of men and material that both turned to night area attacks. To compensate for the inherent loss of accuracy, they also turned to the use of incendiary bombs. In addition to the physical destruction these bombs caused, the use of incendiaries was calculated to have a devastating effect on civilian morale.

The Luftwaffe employed chiefly the 2.2-pound B1 El, containing a mixture of magnesium and thermite, in raids against Great Britain. One of the most infamous Luftwaffe firebombing raids was conducted against the city of Coventry on November 14–15, 1941. In that one raid, the Germans dropped more than 56 tons of incendiaries, causing extensive damage and casualties.

RAF Bomber Command began experimenting with incendiary bombing in the early months of 1942, and on May 2, 1942, the head of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, ordered the first thousand-plane raid against the German city of Köln (Cologne). Using a mixture of high-explosive and incendiary bombs, the attack on May 30–31 destroyed over eight square miles of the city. Assessment of these early attacks convinced Harris that widespread devastation could be achieved with the

right combination of ordnance in strikes conducted over several successive days and nights.

The RAF would launch the night attacks, with high explosives creating the fuel for the incendiaries that followed. The British 4-pound magnesium and 30-pound phosphorous incendiary bombs would then begin the fires. More high explosives would follow to disrupt firefighting and rescue units, concluding with another round of incendiaries.

The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) Eighth Air Force would also participate with "precision" (actually, area) daylight bombing on areas missed by the previous night's raid. The most famous of these perfected raids were against the cities of Hamburg and Dresden. Beginning on the night of July 24, 1943, and lasting until August 2, the attack on Hamburg, code-named Operation GOMORRAH, created a firestorm that destroyed over 6,000 acres of the city and killed at least 40,000 Germans. Then, on February 13–14, 1945, 1,400 RAF bombers attacked the city of Dresden at night, with 1,350 U.S. bombers following the next day. The resulting firestorm destroyed much of the city and killed tens of thousands of people. Following the Dresden raid, firebombing came under close scrutiny by the British and American governments and was suspended for the remainder of the European conflict.

In the Pacific theater, the USAAF began experimenting with incendiary bombing in early 1945. Major General Curtis LeMay, who took over command of the Marianas-based bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands in January 1945, was under pressure from Washington to reduce the loss rates for the Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers in missions over Japan and increase the effectiveness of the high-altitude, daylight, precision-bombing attacks against major Japanese cities. LeMay decided on low-level night bombing runs with aircraft stripped of much of their protective armament to maximize bomb loads.

On the night of March 9–10, 1945, 334 B-29s dropped more than 2,000 tons of incendiaries on central Tokyo. Unlike the magnesium-thermite and phosphorous bombs commonly used in Europe, the B-29s carried 100-pound, oil-gel M47 bombs and 6-pound, gelled-gasoline M69 bombs, calculated to be most effective against the wood and paper building materials so common in Japanese cities. The resulting firestorm destroyed 16 square miles of the city and killed an estimated 100,000 Japanese. During the next weeks, B-29s firebombed the major Japanese cities except the shrine city of Kyoto. The

damage to Japan's major industrial cities was so extensive that LeMay was convinced he had found the means to end the war in the Pacific without an invasion of Japan itself.

The tactical potential of incendiary bombing was only beginning to be realized. Allied aircraft employed napalm—jellied gasoline ignited by thermite—against Japanese positions throughout the island-hopping campaigns. Incendiary bombing continued to be used on a wide scale in the Korean and Vietnam wars.

STEPHEN L. GIBBS

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Britain, Battle of; Dresden, Air Attack on; Harris, Sir Arthur Travers; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Tokyo, Bombing of

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India

South Asian nation currently encompassing 1,269,219 square miles. India is bordered by the Indian Ocean to the south, the Arabian Sea to the southwest, and the Bay of Bengal to the southeast. India presently shares land borders with Pakistan to the west; China, Nepal, and Bhutan to the northeast; and Burma and Bangladesh to the east. With an estimated population of approximately 311.82 million people in 1939, India was then still part of the British Empire. The territory under British control, commonly known as India, included those areas directly administered by the British government (known as British India) as well as princely states ruled by individual rulers under the paramountcy of the British Crown. After 1876, the political entity officially known as the Indian Empire included present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (formerly Burma).

India’s location, population, vast extent, and resources all made it vital to the Allied war effort. India became the base for British operations against Burma and for resupply efforts to China. It was also a key source of manpower, important raw materials, and finished goods.

In September 1939, Lord Linlithgow (Victor Alexander John Hope, 2nd Marquess of Linlithgow), the viceroy of India from 1936 to 1943, declared war on Germany and Italy on behalf of India and suspended the Government of India Act of 1935. Although this move was constitutionally correct, Linlithgow’s failure to consult with the Indian legislature proved politically disastrous, as the British government had been endeavoring to encourage representative government by Indian elites. In response to Linlithgow’s action, a large number of Congress Party members resigned their government posts. This was ironic, as most Indians, including many princes and Congress Party leader Jawaharlal Nehru, opposed the Axis. A small number of Indian politicians, most notably Mohandas K. Gandhi, opposed all wars as a matter of principle.

In March 1942, Sir Richard Stafford Cripps arrived in India with a proposal for granting immediate self-rule after the war ended. The Congress Party rejected this offer and answered with the Quit India movement, announced on August 8, 1942. The movement called for an immediate end to British rule in India and involved mass struggle by nonviolent means. The British responded by arresting 60,000 members of the Congress Party, including both Nehru and Gandhi. Although the Muslim League also rejected the Cripps Plan, it benefited from its more moderate stance, and the influence of its leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, grew.

The rapid acceleration of the Indian war effort, especially following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), spurred tremendous economic growth and led to a major expansion of India’s industrial base. India contributed vast amounts of material to the British Empire’s war effort, including raw materials, steel, locomotives and rolling stock, assault craft, and electrical components. Batteries produced in India were a vital component of air-to-ground communications, and India took the lead in manufacturing parachutes and uniforms and in assembling tens of thousands of armored vehicles from Canadian and U.S. components.

India also supplied more than 50,000 stretchers, in excess of 1 million blankets, 250,000 mosquito nets, 1.5 million water-testing tablets, and 160

tons of mosquito-repellent cream. To cope with the Allied rubber shortage, India established rubber plantations, experimented with reclaimed rubber, and produced considerable quantities of tires and hoses. It also produced alloy steels for guns and small arms, bayonets, shells, primers, and explosives as well as steel for the manufacture of antiaircraft guns, antitank shells, and light machine guns.

In addition, Indian princes contributed on an individual basis to the war effort, donating material goods such as blankets, woolen cloth, silk for parachutes, and rubber products. Hamidullah Khan, the nawab (Muslim leader) of Bhopal, liquidated his investments in the United States and used the money to purchase a squadron of Spitfire aircraft.

The war brought restrictions on movement, civil rights, and food supplies. As the threat of a Japanese attack increased, the viceroy ordered a scorched-earth policy that mandated the confiscation of all bicycles and boats in major coastal cities such as Calcutta. These seizures threatened the livelihood of many Indians and made food distribution more difficult. Between 1940 and 1942, prices of basic consumer goods increased an average of 250 percent, and the government began rationing grain, sugar, and cloth.

Bengal was especially hard-hit, for a famine there in 1943 claimed between 700,000 and 1.5 million lives; it was brought on, in part, by Japanese attacks against shipping along India’s east coast. In addition to the high prices for food, India was unable to secure food imports from Burma after it was controlled by the Japanese.

Once the war had ended, it was apparent that the British could not long retain their control of India: the war had strengthened indigenous nationalist movements. Consequently, on February 20, 1947, the Labour Party government in London announced that it would transfer power to India no later than June 1948. Despite Gandhi’s pleas, religious animosity led to the partition of India. The Muslim eastern and western portions became Pakistan on August 14, 1947; a day later, the remainder of India became independent. Since then, tensions have run high between India and Pakistan, including several wars.

LAURA J. HILTON

See also

China-Burma-India Theater; Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; Hore-Belisha, Isaac Leslie; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; India, Army; India, Navy; Document 47; Document 135; Document 170

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India, Army

India was an important source of manpower for the Allied war effort. In 1938, British war secretary Leslie Hore-Belisha recommended that the Indian Army be reorganized, since he believed that too many British soldiers were deployed there. But in June 1939, the Chatfield Commission held that a wholly Indian military was not feasible. The commission members believed that British troops were necessary to keep peace between Muslims and Hindus—and, not incidentally, to maintain British control.

In consequence, no major reorganization or modernization of the Indian Army occurred. In 1939, the army numbered 189,000 men, of whom 65,000 were in administrative or communication positions. Much of the army's equipment was obsolete. Moreover, the army had no antitank units and only eight antiaircraft guns; there was also a serious shortage of artillery, let alone modern types.

The British government in India believed that the country would not be heavily involved with the war, especially overseas. Consequently, in the first eight months of the conflict, the government accepted only 53,000 volunteers to supplement existing forces. Even so, two brigades of the Indian Army were deployed to Egypt in October 1939. In 1940, Indian troops were dispatched to the Afghan border, Iraq, Malaya, Burma, and East Africa.

In the Japanese capture of Singapore in February 1942, 60,000 Indian troops became prisoners of war. Radical Indian nationalist politician Subhas Chandra Bose and the Japanese convinced some 25,000 of them to join the

Indian National Army (INA, Azad Hind Fanj) and fight to end British rule in India. The Japanese viewed this force as an effective tool against British power, whereas its members saw themselves as an army of national liberation. Ultimately, some 7,000 INA troops were attached to Japanese units and fought in the Imphal Offensive into India. The remainder were used as auxiliaries. Most of the poorly trained and poorly equipped INA forces were either taken prisoner or deserted.

In April 1942, to counter a possible Japanese invasion of India from Burma, the British commander in chief, General Archibald P. Wavell, reorganized the Indian Army structure of independent commands and formed it into Central Command and three armies: Northwestern, Central, and Eastern. In December 1942, the Eastern Army attacked into the Arakan in Burma, and the next year, it became General Sir William J. Slim's Fourteenth Army. In 1943, the British command placed more emphasis on jungle training, which stood Indian forces in good stead when they engaged the Japanese.

The Indian military grew considerably during the war. Defense spending increased from 49.5 million rupees in 1939–1940 to 395.3 million in 1945–1946. The army also expanded apace. A total of 2,644,323 men served in the Indian Army during the war, of whom approximately 2 million were combatants. Indian forces fought in Syria, North Africa, East Africa, the Middle East, Malaya, Greece, Sicily, and Italy. Indian casualties would total 179,935, including prisoners of war. Indians formed the bulk of Allied fighting troops in Southeast Asia; of 1 million British troops in the region, more than 700,000 were Indian. Although Muslims were only 27 percent of the total Indian population, they formed two-thirds of the Indian troops in North Africa, Italy, Malaya, and Burma.

LAURA J. HILTON

See also

Bose, Subhas Chandra; China-Burma-India Theater; Hore-Belisha, Isaac Leslie; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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India, Navy

The Royal Indian Marine became the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) in 1934, and its ships were identified with the prefix of HMIS, for His Majesty's Indian Ship. The RIN grew rapidly in the course of the war, from 1,708 men manning 8 small coastal sloops in September 1939 to 30,478 men with 7 sloops, 5 frigates, 2 corvettes, 16 minesweepers, and numerous small warships to include 41 landing craft in July 1945. From 1939, the navy took responsibility for Indian coast defense, and during World War II, it was involved in convoy duty as far as the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Two Indian sloops, the *Sutlej* and *Jumna,* took part in Operation HUSKY, the Allied invasion of Sicily during July 9–August 22, 1943.

Although the RIN was the most neglected of the armed forces following independence in 1947 because the military threats to the new nation were land-based from Pakistan and China, it is today the world's fifth-largest naval establishment.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Convoys, Allied; India; Sicily, Invasion of

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Indianapolis, Sinking of (July 30–August 2, 1945)

The sinking of the U.S. heavy cruiser *Indianapolis* by a Japanese submarine in the Philippine Sea two weeks before the end of the war remains controversial. Built in Camden, New Jersey, and commissioned in 1932 at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, the *Indianapolis* (CA-35) carried President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a passenger during three cruises in the 1930s and served with distinction in the Pacific theater throughout the war.

While shelling Okinawa prior to the invasion of the island, the *Indianapolis* was severely damaged by a Japanese bomber in late March 1945, necessitating repairs at Mare Island, California. After the work was completed, the ship, under the command of Captain Charles B. McVay III, was ordered to carry to the island of Tinian the internal components of the two atomic bombs to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The *Indianapolis* arrived at Tinian on July 26. It next stopped at the island of Guam and departed on July 28 with orders to proceed to Leyte. While traveling without escort, under radio silence at 17 knots in moderate seas with good visibility, the *Indianapolis* was torpedoed by the Japanese submarine *I-58,* under Lieutenant Commander Hashimoto Mochitsura, in the early morning hours of July 30; it sank in only 12 minutes.

Survivors were spotted by a U.S. Navy aircraft on August 2. Of some 800 members of the 1,199-man crew that initially survived the sinking, only 316 were eventually rescued. The vast majority of those who died fell victim to sharks and exposure. The incident remains the worst case of shark attack in history.

Following a court of inquiry into the loss of the *Indianapolis,* Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz proposed reprimanding McVay. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, however, followed the advice of the chief of naval operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest King, and ordered McVay court-martialed. Hashimoto testified at McVay's court-martial that he would have been able to sink the *Indianapolis* even if it had been taking evasive action. Despite this, McVay was subsequently found guilty of an error of professional judgment in unreasonably placing the *Indianapolis* at risk by failing to steer a zigzag course; he was acquitted of inefficiency in ordering his crew to abandon ship. The court unanimously recommended clemency, and Forrestal remitted the sentence of the court-martial. McVay retired as a rear admiral in 1949; he committed suicide in 1968.

In recent years, crew members of the *Indianapolis* have endeavored to

clear McVay's name. They have pointed out the poor visibility at the time the ship was sunk, the ship's engine problems, and the fact that McVay had not been informed of Japanese submarine activity. Also, McVay's request for escorts had been refused, even though the *Indianapolis* lacked antisubmarine detection devices. In 2001, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution exonerating McVay of any wrongdoing.

GLENN E. HELM

See also

Battle Cruisers; Cruisers; Forrestal, James Vincent; Hashimoto Mochitsura; King, Ernest Joseph; Nimitz, Chester William; Okinawa, Invasion of; Submarines

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Indian Ocean Campaign (March–May 1942)

By late March 1942, the Japanese had placed primary importance on the elimination of British naval forces in the Indian Ocean that might threaten the oil-rich East Indies. Imperial Headquarters therefore decided to attack Colombo and Trincomalee on Ceylon (Sri Lanka), off India. The Japanese hoped that this would force the British westward, spread panic in India and cause the British to divert resources there from Burma, and open the way to the conquest of Madagascar, which would enable them to cut Allied supply lines to the Pacific, Egypt, and the Soviet Union.

British vice admiral James Somerville commanded the Eastern Fleet, with 29 ships. He split his ships into Force A and Force B. The main body, Force A, consisted of his fastest ships: 2 fleet aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 6 destroyers. Force B consisted of 1 light carrier, 4 old R-class battleships, and a hodgepodge of 11 old cruisers and destroyers. Somerville faced a superior Japanese force under Vice Admiral

Nagumo Chūichi. His First Air Fleet consisted of 5 large aircraft carriers (the *Kaga* remained in Japan), 4 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 11 destroyers.

En route to Ceylon, the Japanese attacked Port Darwin in Australia and, on February 27, sank the U.S. seaplane tender *Langley*, bound for Java with aircraft. On March 23, the Japanese took the Andaman Islands, securing the sea route to Rangoon from Singapore. Two days later, Nagumo's ships entered the Indian Ocean.

Earlier, on March 7, the battleships *Haruna* and *Kongo* had shelled Christmas Island, located 190 miles southwest of Java and considered important for its phosphate resources. A Japanese task force, commanded by Rear Admiral Kyuji Kubo and consisting of three cruisers, two destroyers, and transports, then arrived, and Japanese troops forced the island's surrender on March 31. The U.S. submarine *Seawolf* scored a hit on Kubo's flagship, the light cruiser *Naka,* which had to be towed to Singapore for repairs. Several months later, Japan withdrew from Christmas Island because it was unsuitable for any military facilities.

The attack on Ceylon, code-named Operation C, consisted of a strike against Colombo on April 5 and another on Trincomalee on April 9. The British believed that the Japanese planned to attack Ceylon beginning on April 1, and Somerville stationed his ships south of Ceylon on March 31.

Late on April 2, however, Somerville, who feared a Japanese submarine attack and a daylight air attack on his ships, split his fleet. He sent the majority to Addu Atoll, a small refueling base in the Maldives some 600 miles southwest of Ceylon. He also dispatched the cruisers *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall* to Colombo and the light carrier *Hermes* and the destroyer *Vampire* to Trincomalee.

Immediately after the British ships reached Addu Atoll on April 4, the Japanese were sighted 360 miles south of Ceylon. The main British force was now too far away to attack the Japanese, but bases on Ceylon were put on high alert. Somerville realized that he had blundered and recalled the two cruisers to Addu Atoll. The *Hermes* and *Vampire* were to rendezvous once they were finished fueling.

At 8:00 a.m. on Easter, April 5, Japanese aircraft struck Colombo. Forty-two British fighters met the attackers, which were protected by escorting fighters. The Japanese planes destroyed shipping and paid particular attention

to shore installations: railroad yards, repair shops, and the airfield. High-altitude Japanese bombers sank an immobilized armed merchant cruiser and a destroyer, and they severely damaged a submarine tender. The raid, completed by 8:35 a.m., cost the Japanese 7 aircraft, whereas the British lost 25.

Once the Japanese had recovered their planes, a floatplane spotted the *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall* at sea, and Nagumo launched 88 aircraft against them. The Japanese sank both British heavy cruisers in short order. Somerville had set out from Addu Atoll to engage the Japanese but failed to locate them. When Force B joined him the next day, he regarded it as a liability and promptly dispatched it to Kenya.

Nagumo, meanwhile, moved his ships toward Trincomalee. Believing that the Japanese were next going to attack Addu Atoll, Somerville positioned his ships off the atoll, 1,000 miles from the Japanese fleet. With the threat to India's coast and the sinking of merchant ships, the British decided to cede the eastern Indian Ocean to the Japanese and sent Force A to the western coast of India. The *Hermes* and *Vampire* were ordered to hug the coast and join Force A.

The Japanese raid on Trincomalee, beginning at 7:25 a.m. on April 9 and conducted by 91 bombers and 38 fighters, was met by 23 British aircraft. The Japanese planes found no warships in the harbor, but they did sink a merchant ship there. They concentrated on the shore installations and airfields and shot down 9 British Hurricane fighters as well as 5 Blenheim bombers sent against the Japanese carrier *Akagi* as it retired (the British bombers scored no hits). That afternoon, Japanese aircraft spotted the *Hermes* and *Vampire* at sea. Nagumo sent 90 aircraft against them, and the *Hermes,* with no planes aboard, and its escorting destroyer were promptly sent to the bottom.

As part of this same operation, the Japanese convoyed their 18th Infantry Division to Rangoon without incident. It arrived there on April 7. Also, a Japanese raiding force attacked the sea-lanes off India's east coast. This Malaya Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo, consisted of the light carrier *Ryujo,* 5 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 4 destroyers. Between April 5 and 6, it sank 19 merchant ships (92,000 tons) and damaged 3 others. Air strikes by Japanese aircraft flying from Burma brought this total

up to some 185,000 tons of shipping sunk, and Japanese submarines operating off India's west coast sank an additional 32,000 tons.

By April 10, the Japanese had pushed the Royal Navy out of most of the Indian Ocean, created a buffer against British naval raids on the East Indies and other Japanese possessions, and destroyed significant British military assets. Nagumo concluded that he had achieved his objectives and ordered the First Air Fleet to return to Japan. His fleet had been at sea for many months, and its ships badly needed refitting.

Ultimately, their Indian Ocean victory fueled a belief in their invincibility among the Japanese and led to the overexpansion of their empire. The extended Japanese Indian Ocean operation also meant that many of the ships were unavailable for the next big sea fight, the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 7–8, 1942.

BENJAMIN E. NEHRKE

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Great Britain, Navy; Japan, Navy; Nagumo Chūichi; Ozawa Jisaburo; Somerville, Sir James Fownes

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Infantry Tactics

Firepower and maneuver are the two primary elements of applied combat power. Firepower delivers the destructive force necessary to defeat an enemy's ability and will to fight. Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually to deliver or threaten to deliver fire by direct or indirect means. Artillery and aircraft deliver fire on the

modern battlefield. The tank, although considered a maneuver weapon, really combines both elements: firepower and maneuver. The infantry is primarily a maneuver force.

Infantry is defined traditionally as the branch of an army made up of units trained to fight on foot. Despite the appearance of large-scale mechanization in World War II, infantry dominated the battlefield as it has since the dawn of human history—and as it is likely to do so well into the high-tech future.

The World War II infantryman had much in common with his counterpart in the Roman legions 2,000 years earlier. In both eras, the individual infantryman lived and fought on the ground, day or night, in all weather, on all types of terrain. In both eras, he carried almost everything he needed on his back; he fought with handheld weapons, and his primary mission was to close with and destroy an enemy. The World War II infantryman, however, had far greater destructive power, reach, and staying power than his ancient counterpart. A World War II infantry company was more lethal than an entire infantry regiment of Napoleon's era. This advance resulted not only from the reach and rate of fire of modern weapons but also from communications technology that allowed an infantry company commander or even a platoon leader to call in the fire of an entire divisional artillery or air force fighter-bombers.

American infantrymen were the best equipped of World War II. The German infantrymen arguably were the best trained and best led. Soviet infantrymen were probably the toughest and most inured to physical hardship. The question of which army fielded the best infantrymen overall is open to debate, but the battlefield performance of the Australians, the New Zealanders, and the Gurkhas was consistently outstanding.

As with the tactics of the other arms, infantry tactics have always been a function of the technology and culture of the times. Most armies entered World War I with tactical doctrines that assumed mobile operations would be the norm. But infantrymen on both sides of the front lines in 1914 encountered previously unimaginable levels of firepower delivered by the new technologies of quick-firing artillery, the magazine-fed rifle, and especially the machine gun. Unable to survive the withering fire at ground level, the troops dug in.

With the onset of trench warfare, the military planners on all sides spent the rest of the war searching for the tactical methods that would break the

deadlock and restore mobility to the battlefield. They were close to achieving the solution by the time the war ended in 1918.

Contrary to popular belief, most armies did not spend the period between the two world wars training and organizing for a repetition of trench warfare. The majority of professional soldiers concluded soon after World War I that positional warfare had been an anomaly. But during the 1920s and the early part of the 1930s, an almost universal revulsion to all things military combined with the social, political, and economic factors of the era to retard advancements in military technology and doctrine. France, which had suffered more than any other of the Western Allies, especially adopted a defensive strategy and entrenched behind the Maginot Line.

The Allied armies ended World War I with massive stockpiles of weapons and equipment, which also tended to retard advancements in military technology. For economic reasons, political leaders insisted that the existing stocks be consumed before new weapons were developed and fielded. Germany, however, was in a different situation. The draconian provisions of the Versailles Treaty ironically worked to Germany's longer-term military advantage. Deprived of virtually all its armaments in 1919, the German military was forced to make a fresh start, both technologically and doctrinally.

Many of the technologies that had their primitive origins in World War I matured in the interwar years and radically altered the face of ground combat in World War II. Doctrinally, the modern concept of combined-arms operations also emerged in World War I. Combined-arms operations are those in which the effects of infantry, artillery, armor, air support, engineers, communications, and the like are all brought to bear on an objective in a coordinated and synchronized manner that produces a multiplier effect greater than the sum of its parts.

Each of the combat arms has particular strengths and weaknesses. In a combined-arms effort, the strength of one arm compensates for the weakness of another. Tanks, for example, are vulnerable to light infantry armed with antitank weapons such as the bazooka or the Panzerfaust. By combining infantry with tanks, the infantry protects the tanks from enemy infantry, while the tanks provide their own infantry with increased firepower and mobility.

Motorization was one of the major technological differences between World War I and World War II. During the earlier conflict, the primary

source of battlefield motive power was human and horse muscle, as it had been for thousands of years. By the start of World War II, however, the U.S. Army and the British Army were completely motorized. The Soviet Army and the German Army were partially motorized, but they—and the Japanese and Italian forces—continued to use horses and mules on a large scale. Despite the popular image of Germany's fast-moving mechanized armies, the Germans' field artillery and much of their infantry supply trains were horse-drawn right up to the end of the war.

The requirement for infantry to keep up with armored vehicles in fast-paced combat led to the development of motorized infantry and then mechanized infantry, also called armored infantry. Motorized infantry units, which first appeared near the end of World War I, were transported in trucks to assembly areas, where they dismounted and then deployed for combat. Mechanized infantry troops moved in various types of armored personnel carriers that usually were tracked or half-tracked. The armored personnel carriers mounted machine guns and heavier weapons that provided additional firepower. Mechanized infantry units usually dismounted from their vehicles to fight but sometimes fought from them. German mechanized infantry troops, known as Panzergrenadiers, were an integral element of their panzer divisions.

German commanders always tried to avoid launching set-piece frontal attacks, the most costly form of combat. They preferred, wherever possible, to attack around an enemy's flanks, using the operational principles articulated by Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke in the late 19th century: *Umfassen, Einschliessen, Vernichten* (fix, encircle, destroy). When a deliberate attack was unavoidable, the Germans usually opted for a penetration with conventional infantry, supported closely by engineers, artillery, and tactical air support.

Once a penetration or flanking movement succeeded, the German panzers exploited by encircling the enemy, from two directions in a pincer if possible. After the jaws of the pincer closed, the attacking force formed two concentric rings, one facing inward to hold and destroy the trapped enemy force and the other facing outward to prevent any relief efforts. The Germans called this tactic a *Kesselschlacht*—a cauldron battle—and used it successfully and on a large scale in many of the early battles in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. Later on the Western Front, the Germans themselves fell victim to the

Kesselschlacht at Falaise (August 1944) and the Ruhr Pocket (March 25–April 18, 1945).

A key element of German tactics was the concept of *Auftragstaktik,* which loosely translates into English as "mission tactics." Despite the popular stereotypes, reinforced by countless Hollywood movies and television programs, the common German soldier of World War II was anything but stupid and unimaginative, and his officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were neither machinelike nor inflexible autocrats. German leaders, down to the most junior officers and NCOs, were encouraged to be flexible and innovative in their approach to accomplishing their assigned missions. German operations orders generally described what subordinate units had to accomplish and the time in which it needed to be done. The question of how to carry out the task was left to the subordinate leaders, who were supposed to understand the overall intentions of their commanders at least two levels up. The result was that German units, even large units such as divisions, could react quickly to changes in the tactical situation, often acting on only verbal, fragmentary orders.

The primary document for German operations and tactics was a manual called *Truppenführung* (Unit Command), which was issued in 1934 and remained in force until the end of the war. It remains to this day one of history's most influential milestones in the development of tactical doctrine. Yet for all its tactical sophistication, the German Army became overextended and ground down by the demands of waging a two-front war.

To maintain their massive armies in the field, the Germans were forced to decrease training times progressively and even to commit training units to combat during emergencies. The decline in infantry quality meant that infantry units survived for shorter periods in combat and thus had to be replaced at a faster rate. It was a vicious cycle. In response, German commanders tried to rely more heavily on firepower as the conflict wore on, but the German Army was chronically short of artillery throughout the war.

Combat in the Soviet Union was more infantry-intensive than in North Africa or in Western Europe. After the initial successes of 1941, the Germans' so-called blitzkrieg began to fail because the panzer forces and even more so the Luftwaffe became more and more thinly spread over the vast spaces in the east. As that happened, the advantage slowly shifted to the Soviets, with their vast numbers of infantry divisions and their overwhelming

superiority in artillery tubes. Although some battles, such as Kursk (July 5–13, 1943), were classic clashes of armor, the foot soldier dominated the set-piece urban fight for Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943).

Early in the war, Soviet attacks had great difficulty breaking through German defenses. The Soviet solution was to put the bulk of a unit's combat power as far forward as possible, with as many as 19 of a division's 27 infantry companies in the front line for a typical divisional deliberate attack. Later in the war, the German defenses developed much greater depth as they were being pushed back from Soviet territory. In response, the Soviets developed echeloned attack tactics.

German infantry supported by three infantry fighting vehicles (Sd.Kfz.251) advance on a village in the Soviet Union in July 1941. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Infantrymen do not fight as individuals. They fight as part of a carefully synchronized team, and each member of that team performs a specialized function. The basic infantry tactical unit is a squad—or section—of 8 to 15 soldiers commanded by a junior-ranking NCO. The squad is the largest unit that a leader can command by direct personal influence on the individual soldier. As the building blocks of larger combat units, the squads' organization and structure were a direct reflection of the tactical doctrine of the larger army.

At the start of World War II, the German infantry squad consisted of 10 men organized into two groups. The 4-man machine-gun group (gunner, assistant gunner, and 2 ammunition bearers) was armed with the excellent MG-34 light machine gun. The 5-man rifle group supported the machine-gun group. The two groups advanced by mutually supporting fire and movement, coordinated and synchronized by the squad leader. The Germans placed particular emphasis on selecting and training squad leaders. But by 1943, manpower shortages forced the Germans to reduce the infantry section to 9 men.

The organization of the French infantry squad was superficially similar to that of the Germans, but its method of maneuvering reflected the overwhelming defensive mentality of the French Army. The Germans believed that fire and movement complemented each other, but the French thought that movement was only possible once fire superiority was established. The French squad had 12 men, organized into a 6-man light machine gun or automatic rifle team, and a 5-man rifle team, plus the squad leader. Rather than maneuvering individually and providing mutual support to each other, the two teams were linked rigidly to the machine gun. The function of each member of the squad was defined in terms of the gun—fire it, move it, feed it, and protect it.

The Soviets and the British had the smallest infantry squads. The Soviet squad had 9 men and a light machine gun. The British infantry squad consisted of a corporal, 7 men, and the Czech-designed Bren gun as the automatic weapon. The Bren, which was much lighter than the Lewis gun it replaced, facilitated an increased emphasis on fire and movement within the British infantry.

The U.S. Army did not become involved in ground combat operations until late 1942. The American infantryman, armed with the outstanding semiautomatic Garard M1 rifle, could produce a far greater rate of fire than either his Axis enemies or his Canadian and British allies, all of whom generally were armed with bolt-action rifles. The 12-man American infantry squad was organized into three teams. The squad leader (a sergeant) usually moved with the 2-man scout (Able) team.

Once an enemy objective was located, the squad leader ordered the four-man fire (Baker) team, which was based on a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), to lay down a base of fire. The five-man maneuver (Charlie) team

then attacked the objective in short rushes. In practice, the unbalanced teams and especially the low rate of fire of the BAR made the American infantry squad particularly vulnerable to casualties. After World War II, American infantry squads were reconfigured into two evenly balanced teams.

Many popular beliefs about the infantry and infantrymen are false. Infantrymen, for example, are not the intellectual underclass of an army. Modern infantry combat has become so technical, so fast-paced, and so lethal that only the quick-witted, physically fit, and highly trained can survive it. Nor did the infantry suffer the highest casualty rates in World War II. Combat aircrews and, above all, submarine crews had higher rates. Few would argue, however, that the "poor bloody infantry"—as the British called them—led the hardest lives in the war. Regardless of the overall scheme of maneuver of the larger unit, every attack is a frontal attack at the level of the individual infantry soldier.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Antitank Guns and Warfare; Armored Warfare; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Kursk, Battle of; Maginot Line; Mines, Land; Ruhr Land Campaign; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Ingersoll, Royal Eason (1883–1976)

U.S. Navy admiral whose logistical skills contributed to the success of the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion. Born in Washington, D.C., on June 20, 1883, Royal Eason Ingersoll was the son of a distinguished admiral. Graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1905, he participated in the final portion of the Great White Fleet's voyage around the world. Quietly intellectual, unobtrusive, and a superb administrator and skilled seaman, Ingersoll filled assorted staff, teaching, and seagoing assignments. Heading the Navy Department Communications Office during World War I, he ably directed its enormous wartime expansion and subsequently directed U.S. communications at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

Following tours as the executive officer of two battleships, Ingersoll headed the branch of naval intelligence responsible for code-breaking efforts against the Japanese. In 1927, he graduated from the Naval War College and was promoted to captain. He then held staff assignments and commanded cruisers. For three years, from 1935 to 1938, Ingersoll headed the Navy War Plans Division, where he helped revise Plan Orange against Japan. In 1937, he launched informal discussions with Great Britain on potential Anglo-American cooperation in any future conflict with Japan.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1938, Ingersoll commanded Cruiser Division 6. He was recalled from sea duty in 1940 to become assistant to chief of naval operations Admiral Harold R. Stark. Ingersoll played a crucial role in helping prepare the U.S. Navy for war. In January 1942 as a vice admiral, he took command of the Atlantic Fleet, based at Norfolk, Virginia; his mission was to counter the German U-boat campaign, thereby safeguarding Atlantic lines of communication and protecting convoys bound for Europe, and to secure the Western Hemisphere. His only son and namesake, a naval lieutenant, died in action at the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942). Ingersoll was promoted to full admiral the following month. That November, he organized the movements of the ships that transported the U.S. Western Task Force to Morocco in Operation TORCH (November 8, 1942).

U.S. Navy admiral Royal E. Ingersoll. (Planet News Archive/SSPL/Getty Images)

From May 1943, Ingersoll worked closely with the new Tenth Fleet, established under the direct command of chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King (he relieved Stark on March 18, 1942). Ingersoll's logistical and managerial skills proved particularly valuable in deploying U.S. forces to maximum effect and, by substantially neutralizing German submarine forces, greatly facilitated the June 1944 Normandy landings.

In November 1944, Ingersoll became commander, Western Sea Frontier, to implement the complex transfer of U.S. naval forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific for the projected invasion of Japan, a task effectively obviated by the sudden end of the war in August 1945. He retired one year later. Ingersoll died in Washington, D.C., on May 20, 1976.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Convoys, Allied; King, Ernest Joseph; Midway, Battle of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Stark, Harold Raynsford "Betty"; TORCH, Operation

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Ingram, Jonas Howard (1886–1952)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Jeffersonville, Indiana, on October 15, 1886, Jonas Howard Ingram graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. A gunnery specialist, he served at sea in the Atlantic during World War I on Admiral Hugh Rodman's staff. Between the wars, Ingram held seagoing commands, taught football and athletics at Annapolis, directed naval public relations in Washington, learned to fly as a naval aviator, and took staff courses.

In 1940, Rear Admiral Ingram assumed command of Cruiser Division 2, subsequently redesignated Task Force 23 and then the Fourth Fleet, stationed in Brazilian waters to secure the South Atlantic against Axis ships and submarines. Promoted to vice admiral in 1942, he worked closely with Brazilian officials, winning their consent to the construction of U.S. air, naval, and military facilities on Brazilian territory while helping to upgrade Brazilian naval and air capabilities. Under Ingram's supervision, Ascension Island, 1,000 miles from Brazil's coast, became one of the largest air bases in existence, supporting naval operations and aerial attacks on German U-boats.

In late 1943, Ingram declared the South Atlantic secure from Brazil to West Africa. In November 1944, he was promoted to full admiral and took command of the Atlantic Fleet, protecting shipping routes between North America and the European theater—and especially troop convoys—against the final German submarine sorties.

Ingram retired from the navy in 1947 to become commissioner of the short-lived All-American Football Conference and a vice president of Reynolds Metal Company. He died in San Diego, California, on September 10, 1952.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied

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Inland Sea, U.S. and British Carrier Operations in (July 1945)

In July 1945, Admiral William F. Halsey Jr.'s Third Fleet, supported by Admiral Bruce A. Fraser's British Pacific Fleet, carried out attacks on the Japanese home islands. On July 1, Task Force (TF) 38, commanded by Vice Admiral John H. Towers and organized into three task groups of four fast carriers each, sortied from Leyte. After refueling east of Iwo Jima on July 8, Halsey launched the first strikes against Tokyo on July 10.

Although there was heavy antiaircraft fire, U.S. aviators were surprised to find no opposition from Japanese aircraft over the capital. The Japanese leadership had concluded that it could not destroy the fast carriers and should husband its remaining available aircraft for an anticipated October invasion of Japan. Although most aircraft had been widely dispersed from the Tokyo area, Allied aviators claimed to have caught and destroyed 100 Japanese planes on the ground.

Moving north, TF 38 carried out attacks in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, although bad weather prevented strikes until July 15. With no aerial opposition, the planes sank more than 50,000 tons of coastal shipping and small warships. At the same time, battleships and cruisers shelled the Kamaishi and Muroran iron factories.

After refueling on July 16, the Third Fleet was joined by the British Pacific Fleet TF 37 under Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, with two task groups of four carriers each, which had sailed from Sydney on June 28. Although the British lacked the logistical support of the U.S. Navy and Halsey expected them to be able to launch only two strikes for every three by the United States, the British matched the Americans strike for strike.

On July 24, 25, and 28, Halsey mounted the last carrier air strikes of the war against the Imperial Japanese Navy's remaining large warships located at Kure Naval Arsenal, where the Japanese Mobile Fleet was in fact

immobilized from lack of fuel and functioning as a stationary antiaircraft platform. The last strike, on July 28, was accompanied by 79 Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers flying from Okinawa.

Although Admiral John S. McCain Sr., commander of the Far East Carrier Task Force, opposed the strike at Kure as unnecessary, Halsey was determined to proceed. In his memoirs, Halsey claimed that it would be a boost to U.S. morale and payback for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, would ensure that the Japanese fleet would not interfere with a planned U.S. invasion, and would prevent the Japanese from using its remaining capital ships as bargaining chips to secure better peace terms and that Pacific Fleet commander Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had ordered it. Halsey was also determined that this final destruction of the Japanese fleet would be accomplished by the Americans alone, so he directed that British aircraft attack airfields and the port of Osaka, while the Americans moved against Kure alone.

The U.S. Navy attacks on Kure, which were among the largest of the war, resulted in the sinking of the aircraft carrier *Amagi;* the battleships *Ise, Hyuga,* and *Haruna;* five cruisers (including the heavy cruisers *Tone* and *Aoba*); and several smaller warships. Damage was also inflicted on three uncompleted Japanese carriers. The British, meanwhile, damaged the escort carrier *Kaiyo* and sank three frigates and several smaller ships. These carrier strikes in effect removed the remaining Japanese capital ships. They also enabled the Soviet Pacific Fleet to operate with far greater freedom in the Sea of Japan when the Soviet Union entered the war.

Japanese antiaircraft fire and Japanese fighter aircraft defending Kure nonetheless inflicted heavy U.S. aircraft losses. Two B-24s were shot down, and 14 others were damaged. Although no Japanese aircraft reached the Allied ships, the attacks of late July claimed 133 Allied carrier aircraft (102 aircrew lost) lost in combat and in accidents.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft Carriers; British Pacific Fleet; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; McCain, John Sidney, Sr.; Nimitz, Chester William; Towers, John Henry; United States Pacific Fleet

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Inouye Shigeyoshi (1889–1975)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born in Miyagi Prefecture, Japan, on December 9, 1889, Inouye (Inoue) Shigeyoshi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1909. His early career included both sea duty and staff assignments. Inouye attained flag rank in 1935. Two years later, he was appointed chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau. Inouye shared Japanese Navy minister Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa's belief that radical elements in the officer corps posed a threat to Japan's future. In 1939, Inouye was promoted to vice admiral and appointed chief of staff of the China Area Fleet.

Convinced that naval aviation would play a vital role in any future conflict, Inouye successfully lobbied for appointment as chief of the Naval Aeronautics Bureau in 1940 to gain practical experience. In that position, he drafted a memorandum titled "Modern Weapons Procurement Planning" in which he attacked the construction of battleships and called for greater emphasis on aircraft carriers and naval aircraft.

Inouye's views caused him to lose favor. In August 1941, he was transferred to command the Fourth Fleet on Truk, a backwater assignment. When the Pacific war began, he led the forces that captured Guam and Wake Island from the United States. As other islands fell to the advancing Japanese, Inouye's area of responsibility expanded to include Rabaul and the Gilbert Islands.

In April 1942, Inouye was charged with planning and executing the invasion of Port Moresby. He remained in Rabaul while in early May seven naval task forces, as well as land-based naval aircraft, moved against Tulagi,

Guadalcanal, and Port Moresby. The resulting Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942) was a Japanese tactical victory, but the unavailability of close air support due to the loss of an aircraft carrier in the battle led Inouye on May 8 to postpone the landing at Port Moresby. The commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, was furious at this decision but was unable to reverse Inouye's orders.

Inouye's Fourth Fleet was then largely relegated to logistical duties, and operations in the South Pacific were turned over to the Eighth Fleet. Inouye was relieved in October 1942 and took command of the Japanese Naval Academy. He was recognized as an advocate of peace, and when Admiral Yonai was recalled as navy minister after Tōjō Hideki's fall from power in August 1944, Inouye became vice minister. In May 1945, he was promoted to full admiral and became a member of the Supreme War Council. He spent the next months working for an end to the war. Inouye died in Miyagi on December 15, 1975.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Air Warfare, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Japan, Navy; Rabaul; Southwest Pacific Theater; Yamamoto Isoroku; Yonai Mitsumasa

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International Military Tribunal, Far East

U.S. general of the Army Douglas MacArthur, heading the military occupation of Japan, established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, popularly known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. It held sessions in Tokyo from May 3, 1946, to November 12, 1948. Trials conducted by the tribunal were similar to those held at Nuremberg, Germany. The defendants

were 28 senior Japanese military and civilian leaders, chosen from among 250 Japanese officials originally accused of war crimes. General Tōjō Hideki, who held various posts including prime minister and chief of the General Staff, was the best-known defendant among the 18 military officers and 10 civilians charged.

MacArthur, with President Harry S. Truman's support, exempted Emperor Hirohito from trial because of concerns over potential Japanese resistance to military occupation. More than 2,200 similar trials, including some held in Tokyo that preceded the tribunal, were conducted in areas formerly occupied by Japan, ranging from China to Pacific islands including Guam. The trials generated strong emotions and remain controversial to this day.

The Tokyo tribunal consisted of 11 judges, 1 each from Australia, Canada, China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, the United States, France, India, and the Philippines. The Philippine justice was a survivor of the April 1942 Bataan Death March. The tribunal's chief prosecutor, Joseph B. Keenan, was appointed by Truman. Keenan's staff included 25 lawyers. The tribunal was not bound by technical rules of evidence normally observed in a democracy and could admit any evidence it chose, including purported admissions or statements of the accused.

The tribunal sought to clearly establish the principle that aggressive war was a crime and prevent or deter future crimes against peace. Those who planned and initiated aggressive war in contravention of treaties, assurances, and international agreements were to be considered common felons. The tribunal also claimed jurisdiction over conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as murder, mass murder, enslavement, deportation of civilian populations, and persecutions based on political or racial grounds in connection with other crimes under tribunal jurisdiction.

Some defendants were accused of being responsible for the actions of personnel under their command who had committed crimes against prisoners of war and civilian internees. These offenses included murder, beatings, torture, ill treatment (including inadequate provision of food and clothing, and poor sanitation), rape of female nurses and other women, and the imposition of excessive and dangerous labor. Charges of murder were also leveled in cases involving the killing of military personnel who had

surrendered, laid down arms, or no longer had means of defense, including survivors of ships sunk by naval action and crews of captured ships.

Seeking to conduct a fair trial, the tribunal gave each of those accused a copy of his or her indictment in Japanese, and trial proceedings were conducted in both English and Japanese. Defendants had a right to counsel, and the defense could question witnesses. Subject to court approval, the defense could also request the appearance of witnesses and the provision of documents. The mental and physical capacity of the accused to stand trial was also considered. After a conviction, the tribunal had the power to impose a death sentence or other punishment on a defendant.

Of the 28 original defendants, 25 were convicted. Seven (including Tōjō) were sentenced to death by hanging, 16 to life imprisonment, 1 to 20 years of incarceration, and 1 to 7 years in prison. Of the 3 not convicted, 1 was declared mentally unstable, and 2 died before their trials ended.

As with the Nuremberg trials, the tribunal has been accused of promulgating "victors' justice," and some have called the proceedings racist. But fueled by horror at continuing military atrocities in places such as Bosnia and Cambodia, the chief legacy of the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials has been the widespread international support for a permanent war crimes tribunal.

GLENN E. HELM

See also

Bataan Death March; Hell Ships; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Japan; Japan, Air Forces; Japan, Army; Japan, Navy; Japanese Surrendered Personnel; MacArthur, Douglas; Tōjō Hideki; Truman, Harry S.

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International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials (October 16, 1945–November 20, 1946)

The Allied governments were determined to hold German leaders, civilian and military, accountable for the war and the mass killings that had taken place in German-occupied Europe. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin agreed in 1941 to try those guilty of war crimes. The logistics and framework needed to carry out this policy were discussed throughout the war. At Moscow in October 1943, a declaration signed by British, Soviet, and U.S. representatives stated that war criminals would be brought to trial. Such a procedure was further discussed at important meetings at Tehran (November–December 1943), Yalta (February 1945), and Potsdam (July 1945). Finally, the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, set forth the method—a court trial—and identified jurisdiction. Although the Soviets proposed that the trials be held within their zone of occupation, in Berlin, the Western Allies insisted on Nuremberg.

Nuremberg was selected because the Palace of Justice there had received only minimal damage during the war. The large stone structure had 80 courtrooms and over 500 offices and thus offered sufficient space for a major international legal proceeding. An undestroyed prison was part of the justice building complex, so all prospective defendants could be housed on-site. Moreover, the proclamation of the Third Reich's racial laws against the Jews had been made at Nuremberg, so the city had symbolic importance. U.S. Army personnel prepared the Palace of Justice for the trial, repairing damage and laying thousands of feet of electrical wire.

Broadly speaking, the Nuremberg proceedings fell into two categories. The first set—and the subject of this entry—took place between November 1945 and October 1946 and involved the trial of 22 defendants before an international military tribunal (IMT) established by Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Subsequently, a series of other trials were held at Nuremberg until the spring of 1949 before U.S. tribunals in the American zone of occupation involving nearly 200 other defendants.

The Nuremberg IMT opened on October 8, 1945. Judges from France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States presided. The Western judges dressed in traditional robes, whereas the Soviet judge wore a military

uniform. Judge Iola T. Nikitschenko, a Russian, presided during the first session.

The prosecution presented indictments against 24 major criminals and 6 organizations. The individuals were Martin Bormann, deputy führer after 1941 (tried in absentia); Karl Dönitz, admiral and commander of the navy from 1943 to 1945; Hans Frank, governor-general of Poland; Wilhelm Frick, minister for internal affairs; Hans Fritzsche, head of the Radio Division of the Ministry of Propaganda; Walther Funk, minister of Economic Affairs; Hermann Göring, Reichsmarshal and commander of the Luftwaffe; Rudolf Hess, deputy führer until May 1941; Alfred Jodl, army general and head of Operations, Army Supreme Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW); Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, SD); Wilhelm Keitel, army field marshal and chief of the OKW; Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, industrialist and head of Krupp Armaments; Robert Ley, head of the Labor Front (he committed suicide on October 26, 1945); Konstantin Neurath, protector of Bohemia and Moravia from 1939 to 1943; Franz von Papen, former vice chancellor and ambassador to Turkey; Erich Raeder, grand admiral and commander of the navy until 1943; Joachim von Ribbentrop, foreign minister; Alfred Rosenberg, minister for the Occupied Territories in the East until 1941; Fritz Saukel, plenipotentiary for the mobilization of labor; Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank from 1933 to 1939 and minister of economics from 1934 to 1937; Baldur von Shirach, leader of the Hitler Youth and Gauleiter (area commander) of Vienna; Arthur Seyss-Inquart, commissioner for the Netherlands from 1940 to 1945; Albert Speer, minister of armaments from 1942 to 1945; and Julius Streicher, publisher of the newspaper *Der Stürmer*.

The indicted organizations were the Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei), the Schutzstaffel (SS), the SD, the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo), the General Staff, and Hitler’s cabinet.

The charter governing the proceedings declared that the IMT’s decisions would be made by majority vote. British lord justice Geoffrey Lawrence, president of the court, would cast the deciding vote in the event of a tie among the four sitting judges. The charter identified four categories of crimes:

(1) conspiracy to wage aggressive war: planning and/or preparing a war of aggression and violating international agreements;
(2) crimes against peace: participating in a conspiracy to plan a war of aggression;
(3) war crimes: a violation of custom and laws of war, use of slave labor, and killing of hostages; and
(4) crimes against humanity.

The trial itself lasted 218 days, and some 360 witnesses gave either written or verbal testimony. A new simultaneous translation system allowed the trial to proceed efficiently and swiftly in four languages. Although the defense was given the right to call its own witnesses, it was not allowed to bring forth any evidence against the Allies.

The 21 defendants at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial in the dock awaiting sentencing, Nuremberg, Germany. Among the defendants are (front row; left to right): Hermann Göring, who received the death penalty; Rudolf Hess, life imprisonment; and Joachim von Ribbentrop, who also received the death penalty. (Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

The proceedings at Nuremberg laid bare before the world the horrific crimes committed by the Third Reich. Most revealing were testimonies regarding the brutalities of the death camps. When shown German films of concentration camps, some of the defendants wept or became noticeably upset.

One aspect of the trial that caused debate at the time was the legality of trying military officers. Some suggested that it was the role of military officers to carry out orders, but this defense was disallowed at Nuremberg. The prevailing view held that German military leaders had knowingly approved and planned aggressive war and had sanctioned war crimes.

On October 1, 1946, U.S. Army colonel Burton Andrus led 21 defendants into the somber courtroom. (Martin Bormann was tried in absentia, Robert Ley had committed suicide, and Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was too weak to be present.) Sir Geoffrey Lawrence announced that the verdicts would be delivered first, followed by the sentencing. Twelve defendants were sentenced to death by hanging (the counts on which they were found guilty

are in parentheses): Hans Frank (3 and 4), Wilhelm Frick (2, 3, and 4), Hermann Göring (all four), Alfred Jodl (all four), Ernst Kaltenbrunner (3 and 4), Wilhelm Keitel (all four), Robert Ley (all four), Joachim von Ribbentrop (all four), Alfred Rosenberg (all four), Fritz Saukel (3 and 4), Arthur Seyss-Inquart (2, 3, and 4), and Julius Streicher (1 and 4).

Göring escaped the hangman's noose by committing suicide with poison smuggled into the prison. Franz von Papen, Hans Fritzsche, and Hjalmar Schacht were the only defendants to be acquitted. Charges against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach were dropped on the grounds that he was physically unable to stand trial. The remaining defendants received various terms, ranging up to life in prison: Karl Dönitz, 10 years (counts 2 and 3); Walter Funk, life imprisonment (2, 3, and 4); Rudolf Hess, life imprisonment (1 and 2); Konstantin Neurath, 15 years (all four); Erich Raeder, life imprisonment (1, 2, and 3); Baldur von Schirach, 4 to 20 years (1 and 4); and Albert Speer, 4 to 20 years (3 and 4). Of those imprisoned, Rudolf Hess lived the longest. He died in Spandau Prison in 1987 at age 93.

Even before the trial ended in 1946, debate began on the validity of the tribunal. Although some have argued that the IMT was merely a case of the victor trying the vanquished, it nonetheless exposed the horrors of the Third Reich, most especially the Holocaust, the use of slave labor, and the heinous war crimes.

GENE MUELLER

See also

Bormann, Martin Ludwig; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dönitz, Karl; Frick, Wilhelm; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Hess, Walter Richard Rudolf; Hitler Youth; Holocaust; Jodl, Alfred; Kaltenbrunner, Ernst; Keitel, Wilhelm; Moscow Conference; Neurath, Konstantin Hermann Karl von; Papen, Franz von; Potsdam Conference; Raeder, Erich; Ribbentrop, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim von; Rosenberg, Alfred; Sauckel, Fritz; Seyss-Inquart, Arthur; Speer, Albert; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; Yalta Conference

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Iowa-Class U.S. Navy Battleships

Last class of U.S. Navy battleships to be commissioned and among the most famous of all warships. Since construction of the five 60,000-ton Montana-class battleships was canceled in July 1943, the four Iowa-class vessels remain the largest battleships in U.S. history. Six were originally scheduled: the *Iowa* (BB-61), *New Jersey* (BB-62), *Missouri* (BB-63), *Wisconsin* (BB-64), *Illinois* (BB-65), and *Kentucky* (BB-66).

The Iowa-class ships were the finest U.S. battleships ever built. Their design was similar to the South Dakota class except that the hull was lengthened 200 feet to improve hydrodynamics and provide more space for machinery to gain higher speeds. They were designed to confront the fast Japanese Kongo-class battleships. Their main armament was 3 16-inch .50-caliber guns in each of three turrets. They also had 20 5-inch dual gun turrets.

The Iowa-class ships provided highly effective service with the Fast Carrier Task Force in the Pacific theater in the last years of the war. With their excellent communications capabilities, modern radars, and spacious command facilities, they frequently served as flagships. Their powerful antiaircraft armament provided close-in support for aircraft carriers, and with their large oil bunkers, the battleships kept destroyers topped off in contested waters. Although smaller than the Yamato-class Japanese battleships (57,540 tons versus 69,990 tons full load), the Iowa-class ships were faster (33 knots to 27 knots) and fully a match for the largest Japanese battleships.

The keel for the battleship *Iowa*, the third U.S. warship of that name, was laid at the New York Navy Yard on June 27, 1940. It was launched on August 27, 1942, and commissioned on February 22, 1943. With minor

variations, all four Iowa-class ships had a 45,000-ton design standard but displaced about 48,000 tons standard and 57,540 tons fully loaded. They measured 887 feet 3 inches (overall length) by 108 feet in beam by 38 feet in draft and had a top speed of 33 knots and crews of 1,900 to 2,900 men.

In the fall of 1943, the *Iowa* carried President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Casablanca Conference and then on the first leg of his journey to the Tehran Conference. The *Iowa* joined the fighting in the Pacific on January 2, 1944, as the flagship of Battleship Division 7. As with other U.S. battleships, it participated in all campaigns from the Marshalls to the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. During the September 2, 1945, surrender ceremony, it served as the flagship of Admiral William F. Halsey.

The *Iowa* sailed to Seattle in October, only to return to Japan in January 1946 as flagship of the Fifth Fleet. It returned to the United States in March and was decommissioned in March 1949. It was reinstated in August 1951 to support U.S. operations in Korea. The *Iowa* spent April–October 1952 in Korean waters, returning to Norfolk for an overhaul. From July 1953 until its decommissioning in February 1958, it served in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and in cadet training.

In the early 1980s all four Iowa-class ships were modernized with antiship and shore-attack cruise missiles and new electronics and support systems. The *Iowa* was back in service in April 1984. High operating costs eventually sent them back into reserve. The *Iowa* sustained a serious turret accident on April 19, 1989, in which 47 crewmen were killed. It was placed in reserve in October 1990 and stricken for disposal in January 1995 but retained for parts. In January 1999, it was reinstated and returned to reserve status at Newport, Rhode Island. In 2001 the *Iowa* was relocated to San Francisco. It is now a museum ship at Los Angeles.

The *New Jersey* was laid down on September 16, 1940. It was launched on December 7, 1942, and commissioned on May 23, 1943. It spent World War II in the Pacific. It was decommissioned in June 1948 and reinstated for Korea in November 1950. The *New Jersey* deployed to Korea twice. It was again decommissioned in August 1957 but overhauled and recommissioned in April 1968 for a tour in Vietnam, which ended with its decommissioning in December 1969.

Modernized at Long Beach, the *New Jersey* returned to service in December 1982 and conducted operations off Lebanon in 1983–1984. The

ship returned to reserve status in September 1991. Donated for preservation in January 1997, the *New Jersey* was towed to Camden, New Jersey, later that year and in early 2000 became a museum ship.

The *Missouri* (nicknamed "Mighty Mo") was laid down at the New York Navy Yard on January 6, 1941. Launched on January 29, 1944, it was commissioned on June 11. The formal Japanese surrender was signed aboard the *Missouri* on September 2, 1945. In a much-publicized event and considerable embarrassment for the navy, the *Missouri* ran aground near Hampton Roads, Virginia, in 1950. It participated in the Korean War, playing a diversionary role during the September 15, 1950, Inchon Landing. Decommissioned in February 1955, it was modernized at Long Beach in the 1980s and recommissioned in May 1986. It served during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 and participated in the Pearl Harbor 50th Anniversary ceremonies. Stricken for disposal in January 1995, it was donated as a museum ship to Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, in May 1999.

The *Wisconsin* was laid down on January 25, 1941, at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. It was launched on December 7, 1943, and commissioned on April 16, 1944. It too spent the remainder of World War II in the Pacific. Decommissioned in July 1948, it returned to service during the Korean War in March 1951. Following a collision in May 1956, it was repaired using the bow of its sister ship, the unfinished *Kentucky*. Decommissioned in March 1958, it was modernized and returned to duty in October 1988, joining the *Missouri* in the Persian Gulf War. It was decommissioned again in September 1991 and scheduled for disposal in January 1995 but was returned to reserve status in February 1998. It is berthed at Norfolk, Virginia, as a museum ship, although still in reserve status.

The two remaining ships of the class were never completed. The *Illinois* was laid down on December 6, 1942, at Philadelphia, but canceled on August 11, 1945, and scrapped. The *Kentucky* was laid at the Norfolk Navy Yard on June 12, 1942, but work was soon suspended until December 1944. With the ship 72 percent complete, work was again halted in February 1947. Work resumed in August 1948, and the hull was launched in January 1950 to make room for repair work on the *Missouri.* Although thought was given to turning the *Kentucky* into a missile ship, in May 1956 its bow was removed to repair the *Wisconsin.* The *Kentucky* was canceled in June 1958, sold in September 1958, and scrapped in February 1959.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also
Battleships

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Iran

Middle Eastern nation with a 1939 population of 14.34 million. On the eve of World War II, Iran bordered the Soviet Union to the north, Turkey and Iraq to the northwest, the Persian Gulf to the southwest, the Arabia Sea to the south, and India and Afghanistan to the east.

During World War II, Iran was occupied by British and Soviet troops, with the United States becoming an important new factor in Iranian politics. Germany had a significant economic influence and presence in Iran prior to the outbreak of the war, for in the 1930s, Reza Shah Pahlavi, founder of the new dynasty, had turned to Germany for economic assistance. The shah's sympathy toward Germany, which had no tradition of imperial intervention in Iran or the Middle East, was well known, along with his distrust of Britain and the Soviet Union, both of which had dominated Iran in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

U.S. fighters and bombers intended for delivery to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease program at a depot in Iran. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

When the war began in Europe in September 1939, Reza Shah declared Iran's neutrality. After the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, however, Iranian involvement became inevitable. The Soviet Union and Great Britain again formed an alliance. As German troops pushed eastward and threatened the Caucasus, the strategic significance of Iran for the Allies grew. The Allied objectives in Iran were to protect the British-controlled oil fields in Khuzestan Province; employ Iran and, in particular, its newly built Trans-Iranian Railroad to channel military supplies to the Soviet Union; and curb the activities of German agents in Iran.

The British and Soviet representatives in Iran demanded that the government expel German nationals and allow the Allies to utilize the railroad to transport war materials. When Reza Shah refused to comply on grounds of Iran's neutrality, the Allies invaded and occupied the country.

On August 25, 1941, Soviet forces entered Iran from the northwest, and the British entered from Iraq. The Allied forces suppressed Iranian military and naval resistance in just three days. Left with no choice, Reza Shah abdicated on September 1941, and his 22-year-old son, Muhammad Reza,

succeeded him. Reza Shah was sent into exile and died in 1944 in South Africa.

The Soviet and British zones of occupation were consistent with the spheres of influence into which Iran had been divided by the humiliating Anglo-Russia Convention of 1907. The Soviets occupied the north, the British took control in the south, and Tehran and other central areas were put under joint Anglo-Soviet protection. In January 1942 Iran, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain signed the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, whereby the great powers promised to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran; safeguard the Iranian economy from the effects of the war; and withdraw from Iranian territory within six months of the cessation of hostilities.

By the spring of 1942, Iran had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan and expelled their nationals. On September 9, 1943, Iran declared war on Germany. Two months later, one of the most important Allied meetings of the war, the Tehran Conference, was held, with the participation of U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Recognizing the help provided by Iran to their war effort, the three Allied leaders promised during the meeting to provide economic assistance to Iran and address its problems after the war.

The war had a devastating impact on Iran. It lost effective sovereignty to the domination of the occupying powers, and the central government that had been strengthened by Reza Shah became ineffective. Political instability and social disintegration grew, and economic hardship developed. Further, the use of major roads and the Trans-Iranian Railroad for the transport of supplies to the Soviet Union disrupted Iranian trade, the demands of Allied troops aggravated inflation, and a poor harvest in 1942 led to widespread famine. Short-lived cabinets were unable to deal with the emergency situation, resulting in social unrest and the rise of separatist movements.

All of these factors and the new political freedom resulting from the paralysis of a dysfunctional government led to a surge in political activity by various groups and parties. Political conflict among them was encouraged by the occupying powers.

During the course of their involvement, the Soviet Union and Britain revived and intensified their rivalry in Iran, a contest that was an integral part

of what had been known as the “Great Game” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Each side tried to expand its own influence and limit the other’s. The Soviets closed their zone of occupation to free entry. They supported left-wing trade unions in the north and the Communist Party, which had been banned in 1937 but was revived in 1941 under the new name of Tudeh (Masses).

The Soviets also patronized the separatist leftist movements in Iranian Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. One result of these Soviet activities was the establishment of an autonomous state of Azerbaijan in December 1945. Meanwhile, the British in the south supported conservative elements, including the tribes, Muslim clerics, and the proponents of monarchy. They also sponsored the right-wing, pro-Western, and anticommunist National Will Party.

Washington was aware of the economic importance of Iran stemming from its oil and its strategic location. After the United States entered the war, American troops arrived in Iran. The Persian Gulf Command, which eventually numbered 30,000 men, helped orchestrate the movement of supplies from the gulf to northern Iran, where they were handed over to the Soviets. American financial and military advisers were also sent to Iran at the request of the Iranian government. Between 1942 and 1943, a financial mission headed by Arthur Millspaugh worked on reorganizing Iran’s finances. A mission headed by Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf (father of the 1991 Persian Gulf War joint commander of the same name) took charge of the reorganization of the Gendarmerie (rural police).

In the first half of 1944, two American oil companies and then the Soviet government attempted to receive oil concessions from the Iranian government and undermine the monopoly of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Majles (parliament), however, passed a bill, authored mainly by Mohammad Mossadeq, that prohibited oil-concession agreements with any foreign company until after the end of the war.

British and American troops withdrew from Iran in January 1946, whereas the Soviet occupation of the northern provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan lasted until May 1946 when, under pressure from the United Nations, the Soviets also withdrew.

ELENA ANDREEVA

See also

Caucasus Campaign; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference

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Iraq

Middle Eastern nation with a 1939 population of 3.7 million. On the eve of World War I, Iraq bordered Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia to the south, and Transjordan and Syria to the west. Iraq encompasses 169,234 square miles.

By 1941, Iraq had become the object of a peripheral but critical struggle between Great Britain and the Axis powers. Iraq was a major oil producer (2.5 million metric tons in 1940), and were that nation to side with the Axis, its location on the Persian Gulf would also have enabled Germany to threaten British trade, supplies, and troop movements to and from India. Granted nominal independence by Britain in 1930, Iraq was a Hashemite monarchy. The 1930 treaty that established Iraq's de jure independence also protected British oil interests there and granted Britain military bases at Habbaniya, about 55 miles west of Baghdad.

Iraqi artillery shelling a British military position near Ramadi during the Nationalist and pro-Nazi coup d'état in Iraq of April 1941. (Laux/ Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Iraq was unstable, and there were numerous coups and coup attempts. In December 1938, pro-British general Nuri al-Said came to power as prime minister. Instability in Iraq increased, however, when King Ghazi I died in an accident in April 1939. As the new king, Faisal II, was only four years old, his uncle Abdul Illah acted as regent.

Meanwhile, Nuri put down an attempted coup by a group of army officers in March 1939 and another in February 1940. He wanted to declare war on Germany but encountered opposition from Iraqi nationalists who sought concessions from Britain first. In consequence, Nuri followed Egypt's lead and declared Iraq's neutrality, severing relations with Germany but not with Italy.

Axis successes in the Mediterranean beginning in the fall of 1940 encouraged Iraqi nationalists, who believed that the circumstances were right for Iraq to end British control. Another issue involved the long-standing Iraqi opposition to British policies in Palestine.

In March 1940, Rashid Ali replaced Nuri, although Nuri remained in the government as foreign minister. Rashid Ali now came under the influence of four nationalist, pro-Axis Iraqi Army generals who called themselves the "Golden Square." In March 1941, however, the regent secured Rashid Ali's

resignation because of the latter's pro-Axis connections and reluctance to break relations with Italy. Taha al-Hashimi then became prime minister. Axis military successes emboldened the Golden Square, which staged a coup on April 2 that reinstated Rashid Ali. He immediately formed a cabinet that contained a number of individuals known to have Axis connections. The regent and Nuri fled.

Encouraged by hints of Axis aid, Rashid Ali refused to honor British demands to enforce provisions of the 1930 treaty that allowed the transportation of British troops from Basra across Iraq. The Iraqi government also positioned troops and artillery around the British bases in Iraq. Fighting broke out at the British air base at Habbaniya on May 2, 1941, when Iraqi troops opened fire. The Royal Air Force immediately went into action, and Britain dispatched some 5,800 troops, including the 1,500-man Arab Legion from Transjordan under the command of Major General John B. Glubb. It was soon obvious that the British would triumph over the poorly trained and inadequately equipped Iraqi Army unless the Axis powers immediately dispatched assistance.

The German government now brought pressure to bear on the Vichy government of France, which then ordered French high commissioner of the Levant General Henri Dentz to allow the transit of Axis aid through Syria. Axis arms and equipment then began to be transported via Aleppo to Mosul to assist Rashid Ali, albeit it in insufficient quantities to affect the outcome of the fighting.

Meanwhile, British forces broke the siege at Habbaniya. The British occupied Fallujah on May 20 and surrounded Baghdad by the end of the month. Rashid Ali, some supporters, and the German and Italian ministers then fled to Iran. In deference to Nuri and Regent Abdul Illah, the British did not enter Baghdad. This allowed the remnants of the Golden Square to attack Baghdad's Jewish community and kill some 150 Jews there.

Nuri again became prime minister, with a pro-British administration. Following its return to the British side, Iraq became an important supply center for Allied assistance to the Soviet Union until the end of the war. The government broke diplomatic relations with Vichy France on November 18, 1941, and declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan on January 16, 1943.

JACK VAHRAM KALPAKIAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Dentz, Henri Fernand; Egypt; Glubb, Sir John Bagot; India; Nuri al-Said Pasha; Syria; Vichy France

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Ireland

Island nation immediately west of Great Britain and separated from it by the Irish Sea. Ireland, which encompasses 31,520 square miles, had a 1939 population of approximately 2.9 million. Irish nationalists had long demanded independence from Great Britain. Following bloodshed and the passage of home rule legislation in Britain, the Irish Free State came into being in December 1921. In 1937, with the promulgation of a new constitution, the new state became known as Eire (Gaelic for "Ireland"). Not included in this sovereign nation were the six largely Protestant counties in the north; these are collectively known as Northern Ireland or Ulster, and they remained part of the United Kingdom.

Parliamentary elections in 1932 had brought the Fianna Fáil Party to power, and Eamon de Valera became president of the executive council. In April 1938, de Valera negotiated agreements with London that removed British naval installations and troops from the republic, making Eire responsible for its own defense. Other agreements provided for Ireland to pay a final settlement of the land annuities as well as annual payments to compensate Britain for losses sustained in the violence of the 1920s. Each nation was also accorded favored-nation status in trade with the other. All causes of difference between Great Britain and Eire were thus removed except the vexing question of partition. Benefiting from popular support for

the diplomatic agreements, de Valera won the elections of June 1938, giving Fianna Fáil a decisive majority.

The outbreak of World War II provided de Valera an opportunity to show that Eire was independent of Great Britain. In contrast to other members of the British Commonwealth, Eire at once declared its neutrality, a stance supported by the majority of its people. In any case, the country was in no position to make a major military contribution in troops. In September 1939, its army numbered about 7,500 men, its navy consisted of two patrol boats, and its air service had only four effective fighter aircraft. However, the inability of the Royal Navy to use the ports returned to the Irish in 1938 was a serious handicap for the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. During the war, de Valera steadfastly rejected British government offers, tendered even by Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, to resolve partition in return for an end to Irish neutrality.

There was also some pro-German sentiment among the Irish. Anti-Semitic bills were brought before the Dail (the Irish lower house of parliament), and de Valera refused to expel Axis diplomats. Further, on Adolf Hitler’s 1945 death, de Valera went in person to the German embassy to express his condolences.

Eire did allow British overflights of its territory and returned downed Allied pilots to Northern Ireland instead of interning them; it also allowed British patrol craft in its waters. Thousands of Irish also volunteered for service in the Allied armies. During the war, more than 180,000 people left Eire for Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom; 38,544 Irishmen volunteered for service with the British armed forces, including some 7,000 deserters from the Irish Army and several thousand Irish citizens living in the United Kingdom.

The arrival of the first U.S. troops in Northern Ireland, January 24, 1942. (Getty Images)

Acts of violence by the illegal Irish Republican Army (IRA) were a problem for the Eire government, which feared that the British might use them as an excuse to intervene. During the war, de Valera sharply increased the size of the Irish Army and auxiliary forces to some 250,000 men (albeit poorly armed and trained) to forestall this possibility. Ireland suffered economically during the war, but de Valera doggedly pursued his policies. In 1948, Eire became the Republic of Ireland.

Northern Ireland was an important base for Allied operations during the war. Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that Northern Ireland and Scotland would provide bases for the Allied troop buildup for the invasion of France. The Americans agreed to take over the defense of Northern Ireland, thus allowing British soldiers to be deployed elsewhere. Ireland officially protested this agreement.

The first of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers arrived in Northern Ireland in late January 1942. During the course of the war, the United States constructed new bases and airfields and improved the naval facilities at Derry. Troops deployed to Northern Ireland trained and took part in the November 8, 1942, Operation TORCH and the North Africa campaigns.

Northern Ireland also played a major role in the massive buildup for the Normandy Invasion (June 6, 1944). U.S. troops at bases in Armagh, Cookstown, Lurgan, Newcastle, Newry, and Omagh trained for the D-day landings, and units of the Eighth Air Force of the U.S. Army Air Forces operated out of the air base at Greencastle. Aircraft assembly, testing, service, and repair stations were also built in Langford and Lodge. Airfields and ports were also used to protect the convoys ferrying troops and materials across the Atlantic Ocean.

Recognizing the importance of Northern Ireland to Allied plans, the German Luftwaffe bombed targets in Belfast as well as the Greencastle airfield. Throughout the war, however, the people of Northern Ireland accommodated American soldiers by building cinemas and clubs. As in Britain, local groups arranged entertainment and hospitality events. Unfortunately for the people of Ireland, sectarian violence continued on the island after the war, as the IRA sought to bring about the union of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland.

ROBERT W. DUVALL AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; TORCH, Operation

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IRONCLAD, Operation (May 5, 1942)

With Japanese submarines operating freely in the Indian Ocean and Japanese carriers raiding into the Indian Ocean, the British Eastern Fleet was driven from the northeastern Indian Ocean. Royal Navy units were forced to relocate

to a new base at Kilindini (Mombasa), Kenya. The Japanese carrier foray into the Indian Ocean also raised alarm bells in London that Tokyo might mount an operation to seize the island of Madagascar, which had declared for Vichy France, and use bases there for attacks against the British Eighth Army's vital supply route from the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt. In any case, if the British could secure Madagascar themselves, this would enable them to base ships there and provide better protection for their convoys.

Major General Robert Sturges of the Royal Marines commanded the expeditionary force of British, British East African, and South African troops. Rear Admiral Edward Neville Syfret commanded the naval forces. Some 8,000 Vichy troops, 27 aircraft, 2 armed merchant cruisers, 2 sloops, 5 submarines, and 8 coastal batteries defended the island

The invasion force and its equipment departed England in March for Durban, South Africa. Covering warships were drawn largely from Force H at Gibraltar, along with some ships from England and others from the Eastern Fleet. Syfret was appointed combined commander of all naval forces. These consisted of the battleship *Ramillies,* the aircraft carriers *Illustrious* and *Indomitable,* the cruisers *Hermione* and *Devonshire*, and 13 destroyers (2 of them Australian) as well as frigates, corvettes, and transports. Everything was in place at the end of April, but the British cabinet did not give final approval for the assault until May 1, when the expeditionary forces had already sailed from Durban for their objective.

The chief British objective was the northern port city and naval base of Diégo-Suarez (now Antsiranana). The British decided to approach it from the rear by landing on the west coast of the island. The invasion, the first major British amphibious assault of the war, began before dawn on May 5, 1942.

Although the invasion achieved surprise, the French resisted. Fleet Air Arm aircraft flying from the carriers *Indomitable* and *Illustrious* attacked and neutralized French airfields and warships, and the expeditionary forces went ashore. Diégo-Suarez was secured on May 7, but fighting to secure the entire island continued for some months.

On May 30, a Japanese midget submarine attack sank a tanker and badly damaged the battleship *Ramillies,* putting it out of action for nearly a year. On September 10, another British landing took place, at Mahajanga (Majunga). An armistice was arranged with Vichy French authorities on November 5.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Diégo-Suarez, Japanese Raid on; Force H; Madagascar; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on

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Ironside, Sir William Edmund (1880–1959)

British Army general. Born on May 6, 1880, in Edinburgh, William Ironside graduated from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1899. He served in the Second Boer War (1899–1902) and on the Western Front in World War I, commanding a brigade by 1918. Ironside commanded British forces in Arkhangelsk, Russia, during 1918–1919 and was knighted. A large man (6 feet 4 inches), he was widely known as "Tiny."

British general William Edmund Ironside, 1940. (Corbis)

After the war Ironside served in India and was named to command the Eastern District of Britain in 1936. Early in 1938, Ironside became governor of Gibraltar, but he was called home as inspector general of Overseas Forces in May 1939.

On September 3, 1939, Secretary for War Leslie Hore-Belisha named Ironside Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), despite the fact that Ironside had never held any staff position in the War Office. Although convinced that the Middle East would be the critical theater of war, Ironside understood the need to bolster French defenses. However, his impatient and brusque manner limited his effectiveness during the trying period of the "Phony War." In early 1940, he worked closely with First Lord of the Admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill to promote a Scandinavian strategy to outflank the Germans. The relationship between the two men cooled when the Norwegian Campaign ended in disaster.

On May 27, 1940, as the Germans swept through northern France, Ironside was replaced as CIGS and shifted to command the Home Forces. He readily admitted that he had been ill-suited for the CIGS post and welcomed a return to a real command. Less than two months later, however, Alan Brooke replaced him, and Ironside retired. He was promoted to field marshal and created Baron (Lord) Ironside of Archangel in 1941. Ironside died on September 22, 1959, in London.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; France, Battle for; Great Britain, Army

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Ishiwara Kanji (1889–1949)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Akita Prefecture, Japan, on January 18, 1889, Ishiwara Kanji graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1909. Following routine service in Korea, he entered the Army Staff College and graduated second in his class in November 1918. He spent the years from 1922 to 1924 in independent study in Germany, which exposed him to European military thought and gave him an opportunity to observe the results of World War I.

Ishiwara's experience in Europe as well as his adherence to the Nichiren sect of Buddhism led him to theorize that in the future, Japan would engage in an apocalyptic war with the United States. This struggle, which he dubbed "the Final War," would be a protracted total war in which airpower would play a decisive role. Ishiwara believed, however, that Japan could overcome its material inferiority by harnessing the economic resources of the Asian

mainland, especially Manchuria and Mongolia. He published his theories in a book titled *Thoughts on the Final Global War.*

In 1928, Ishiwara was posted to Manchuria, where he served as chief of operations for the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army. Impelled by his sense of the urgency of preparing for the Final War, Ishiwara played a major role in planning and carrying out the Japanese Army's seizure of Manchuria beginning in 1931. Shortly before the establishment of the puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) in 1932, he returned to Japan. Promoted to colonel, he headed the Operations Section of the army General Staff.

After becoming a major general, Ishiwara was in charge of the General Staff's Operations Division. Nonetheless, Ishiwara's considerable earlier influence as a military theorist waned during the 1930s. Marginalized for his tacit support of a failed officers' rebellion in February 1936 as well as for his increasingly outspoken criticism of Japan's war with China (he was chief of staff of the Guandong Army in 1937 and 1938), he was promoted to lieutenant general in 1939 but also forced into retirement in 1941.

Ishiwara headed the Toa Remmei (East Asian League), which opposed Premier Tōjō Hideki's policies during the war. Ishiwara briefly returned as an adviser to the "Surrender Cabinet" and urged that Japan conclude peace.

Following the war, Ishiwara was investigated by the Allied occupation authorities, who briefly considered trying him as a war criminal. Instead, he testified as a prosecution witness at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials in 1947. Ishiwara died in Akita Prefecture on August 15, 1949.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Guandong Army; Japan; Manzhouguo; Tōjō Hideki

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Ismay, Hastings Lionel (1887–1965)

British Army general. Born on June 21, 1887, in Naini Tal, India, Hastings Lionel Ismay graduated from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and was commissioned in the British Army in 1905. He was then posted to the cavalry in India. During World War I, Ismay served in British Somaliland. He returned to India between 1922 and 1925 and again as military secretary to the viceroy, from 1931 to 1933.

Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, secretary-general of NATO (1952–1957), with the newly adopted NATO emblem behind him. During World War II, General Ismay served as chief of staff to British prime minister Winston Churchill. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Ismay served in the War Office in Britain as assistant secretary (1925–1930), deputy secretary (1936–1938), and secretary (1938–1939) of the Committee of Imperial Defense. He was then named deputy military secretary to the War Cabinet (1939–1940). When Winston L. S. Churchill became prime minister on May 10, 1940, Ismay served as his military chief of staff. Ismay was promoted to lieutenant general in 1942 and to general in 1944. All with whom he worked during the war attested to his invaluable and essential efforts as well as his administrative efficiency and ability to keep channels of communication open.

Ismay attended virtually all the summit conferences and acted as the primary channel between the service chiefs of staff and the cabinet. Both

patient and informed, he was also not afraid to express the truth and could be critical when necessary and supportive at other times. Ismay admired Churchill greatly but could disagree with him; similarly, Ismay was evenhanded with the chiefs of staff, sometimes adopting their viewpoints and at other times disagreeing or suggesting alternatives.

Retiring from the army in 1946, Ismay served as chief of staff to the viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, from March to November 1947 and was then made a peer (becoming First Baron Ismay of Wormington). In Churchill's second government, Ismay served as secretary of state for Commonwealth relations (1951–1952). He became the first secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, retiring five years later. Ismay died in Broadway, England, on December 17, 1965.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain, Army

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Isogai Rensuke (1883–1967)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Hyogo, Japan, on September 3, 1883, Isogai Rensuke graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1904 and from the Army War College in 1915. He served on the General Staff from 1916. In 1920, he was appointed military attaché in Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, China. One of the few pro-Chinese officers in the Japanese Army, he worked with Chinese Nationalist leader Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen), who influenced his view of China. Isogai sympathized with Chinese nationalism but did not support the government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and his Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD).

Isogai was promoted to major general in 1933. In March 1936, he was appointed head of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of War, and he was promoted to lieutenant general in December. After the outbreak of the 1937–1945 Second Sino-Japanese War, Isogai was sent to China in August 1937 to command the 10th Infantry Division. He paired with Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishiro's 5th Infantry Division for an offensive along the Tianjin (Tientsin)-Shanghai railroad. The 10th Division was ambushed at Taierzhuang (T'ai-Erh-Chuang) in April 1938. Itagaki's division broke through and relieved Isogai but at a heavy cost in lives and prestige. Isogai took the blame for the debacle and never again held combat command.

In June 1938, Isogai was appointed chief of staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army. In December, following the defeat of the Guandong Army by Soviet forces, Isogai was dismissed. In January 1942, he was appointed governor of Japanese-occupied Hong Kong. After the war, Isogai was tried as a war criminal at Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu and was sentenced to life imprisonment on July 22, 1947. He was released in August 1952. Isogai died in Chiba on June 6, 1967.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Itagaki Seishirō; Jiang Jieshi; Sino-Japanese War

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Itagaki Seishirō (1885–1948)

Japanese Army general. Born in Iwate Prefecture, Japan, on January 21, 1885, Itagaki Seishirō graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1904 and served in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. After graduating from the army's General Staff College in 1916, he was posted to China, where he served most of his career as an attaché or in staff positions.

In 1929, Itagaki was attached to the operations planning staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army, the Japanese garrison force in southern Manchuria. After joining the Guandong Army, he and a fellow staff officer, Ishiwara Kanji, became the main instigators of a plot to manufacture an incident to use as a provocation to seize all Manchuria for Japan. On September 18, a section of Japanese-owned railroad track was sabotaged just outside Shenyang (Mukden), the capital of Manchuria. Although Japanese officials on the spot immediately blamed local Chinese troops, the Guandong Army itself had sabotaged the track. This "Mukden Incident" provided the pretext for the Guandong Army to conquer Manchuria and establish the Japanese puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo). In March 1936, Itagaki became chief of staff of the Guandong Army. He was promoted to lieutenant general in April.

Itagaki remained in Manchuria until March 1937, when he took command of the elite 5th Infantry Division at Hiroshima, leading it in fighting against the Chinese in northern China. In June 1938, he was recalled to Japan and served as war minister from January to August 1939. Itagaki then became chief of staff of Japanese forces in China. In 1941, he was promoted to full general and assumed command of Japanese forces in Korea. He remained in Korea until the last few months of the war, when he took command of the Seventh Area Forces in Singapore. On September 12, 1945, Itagaki formally surrendered Singapore and all Japanese southern armies to the British. Charged with war crimes, he was brought to trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, found guilty of conspiracy to wage aggressive war and wartime atrocities, and executed in Tokyo on December 23, 1948.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Guandong Army; Ishiwara Kanji; Japan, Army; Manzhouguo

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Italian Social Republic, Navy

The Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social Republic, RSI) was proclaimed on September 23, 1943, with Benito Mussolini as head of state. Its territory corresponded to German-occupied Italy, with the exception of several provinces such as Trento and Trieste, which the Germans administered or annexed outright. The new government had little independence and served chiefly as an instrument of German occupation. Its formal capital was Venice, but the little spa town of Saló on Lake Garda, between Milan and Venice, was the actual seat of most of the ministries.

The RSI's naval service, called the Marina Repubblicana (Republican Navy), was officially founded on October 27, 1943, but was active from September 10, 1943. Its first secretary and chief of staff was Admiral Antonio Legnani, the Regia Marina's former commander of submarine forces.

Most of the Regia Marina obeyed the orders of the royal government and honored the terms of the armistice reached between Italy and the Allies on September 3, 1943, by seeking refuge in Allied ports and joining the fight against the Germans, but some Italian naval units, particularly in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, followed locally negotiated agreements to cooperate with the Germans.

The principal arrangement for Italo-German cooperation was reached by Commander Julio Valerio Borghese, leader of Italy's naval special forces, the Decima MAS (Mezzi d'Assalto). He brought his force largely intact into the German camp as volunteers and proceeded to recruit thousands of additional men (and women) in the months following the armistice. After the Germans postponed early plans to commission a destroyer and three torpedo boats in the Marina Repubblicana, these volunteers mostly served in land units that fought first at Anzio (January 22–May 25, 1944) and, after July 1944, mostly in an antipartisan role.

Although the Decima MAS was not under the direct command of Mussolini's navy because Commander Borghese's special relationship with the Germans allowed him to act as an independent warlord, it formed that service's principal strength. On February 15, 1944, the navy was reorganized,

and Borghese became the deputy chief of staff and effectively the navy's head as the nominal chief of staff, with Admiral Giuseppe Sparzani limiting himself to administrative matters.

The Germans assigned units to the Marina Repubblicana at their whim, and Germany's needs always took priority. The Decima MAS began with three MAS boats (a 28-ton motor torpedo boat [MTB] smaller and faster than those operated by the Allies and Germans) and later received another six MTBs (two large and four small) on November 8, 1943. Between December 1943 and May 1945, the Decima MAS commissioned dozens of new MTSMs (Motoscafo turismo silurante modificati, motor tourism torpedo boat) and MTSMAs (Motoscafo turismo silurante modificato allargato, modified and enlarged tourism torpedo boat), small eight-ton truck-transportable two-man torpedo boats armed with a single torpedo, and MTM (Motoscafo turismo modificato, modified tourism torpedo boat) explosive boats; a dozen 30-ton midget submarines were added in 1944–1945, all except one in the Adriatic Sea.

In the Adriatic, the Marina Repubblicana operated old torpedo boats, MAS boats, minesweepers, armed freighters, and minor vessels. Through December 1943, these played a decisive role in the Axis recovery of most of the Dalmatian islands seized by Yugoslavian partisans. The first major area of operation for the Decima MAS (and consequently the Marina Repubblicana) was the Tyrrhenian Sea. Here it manned from late December 1943 the only Axis fast coastal forces in the western Mediterranean.

The Marina Repubblicana claimed a number of successes. On February 20, 1944, Decima MAS MTSMs sank the British *LST-305* and damaged a U.S. minesweeper; on August 19, 1944, an Italian MTSM damaged the large French destroyer *Le Fantasque;* and on April 15, 1945, an explosive motorboat crippled the French destroyer *Trombe.* Overall, the Decima MAS undertook 111 patrols and republican naval units engaged Allied forces 38 times.

Although the Marina Repubblicana fought until May 1945, no more than 10,000 sailors ever served under Italian (RSI) colors. Excluding auxiliary escorts, it never operated surface warships larger than MTBs; although some conventional submarines were assigned to the Marina Repubblicana to ferry attack craft and frogmen, they were sunk in bombing raids shortly before entering service. Nonetheless, the Marina Repubblicana played a significant

role within the context of Germany's Mediterranean Campaign. It supplemented the Reich's overstretched naval forces, engaging in mundane but necessary tasks such as minesweeping; coastal escort work; training; manning batteries and auxiliary vessels; and handling many logistical and service tasks. Italian naval personnel also supplemented German crews aboard the ex-Italian torpedo boats and corvettes that Germany completed or repaired after the armistice and placed in service.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Borghese, Junio Valerio; Contre-Torpilleurs; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Italo-Ethiopian War (1935–1936)

Major colonial conflict leading to World War II that demonstrated the impotence of the League of Nations in collective action to preserve international security. It was also known as the Second Italo-Ethiopian War and the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.

Italy had a long-standing interest in colonizing Ethiopia (Abyssinia), and in 1896, a sizable Italian army was defeated at Adowa by the Ethiopians. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini took advantage of this humiliating event in his country's history to stir nationalist sentiment against Ethiopia and endeavor to make Ethiopia part of a greatly expanded Italian African empire.

On December 5, 1934, Italian and Ethiopian border patrols clashed at Walwal (Ualual), an oasis in a disputed area between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Ethiopia immediately filed a protest with Italy and requested that the affair be arbitrated under terms of an Italo-Ethiopian treaty from 1928. Italy refused and demanded a formal apology, an indemnity, and the arrest and punishment of the Ethiopians involved.

On January 3, 1935, Ethiopia formally appealed to the League of Nations under Article 11 of its covenant. This action probably sealed Mussolini's intention to invade. In its January meeting, the League Council postponed consideration of the incident, hoping that it might in the meantime be settled by an arbitration commission, and urged direct negotiation between the two governments. The arbitration commission's unanimous decision, announced on September 3, 1935, found that neither side was to blame for the Walwal clash because each believed it was fighting on its own soil. Meanwhile, the British and French governments began negotiations with Italy to reach a solution, but Mussolini rejected the Anglo-French proposal that would have secured for Italy an economic mandate under the League of Nations for the financial and administrative organization of Ethiopia.

Italy instead proceeded to build up its troops and supplies in Africa, and on October 3, 1935, the Italians invaded Ethiopia. Adowa fell to them on October 6. The next day, the League Council declared Italy an aggressor state in violation of Article 12 of the covenant, marking the first time the league had applied this provision to a European great power. The council's decision was then referred to the League of Nations Assembly for action. That body concurred in the verdict and appointed a committee to consider appropriate measures under Article 16, which treated sanctions.

The sanctions selected, which were adopted by most states, included an immediate arms embargo against Italy, financial sanctions, a ban on the importation of Italian goods, a ban on the exportation to Italy of key war materials, and a call on member states to try to replace imports from Italy by imports from states that normally had profitable markets in Italy. The assembly committee eventually decided that all sanctions against Italy would go into effect by November 18, 1935.

These sanctions were never applied with full force, and a ban on oil imports, the one export commodity that might have halted Italy, was approved but held in abeyance. Indeed, French foreign minister Pierre Laval and British foreign secretary Sir Samuel Hoare agreed to limit the sanctions even before they were applied. The two were, in fact, playing a double game, hoping not to drive Mussolini into the arms of Adolf Hitler. Publicly, the diplomats argued that sanctions on oil, which probably would have brought the Italian war machine to a halt, would not be effective because Germany and the United States were not bound by them. Most Italians did not

comprehend their new status as an outlaw nation, and they instead rallied behind Mussolini.

While incomplete sanctions were being applied to Italy, the French and British governments tried to appease Mussolini. The result was the notorious December 1935 Hoare-Laval Proposals, which planned the cession to Italy of areas in Ethiopia in the vicinity of Eritrea and Somaliland and the establishment of an extensive zone of expansion and colonization in southern Ethiopia in which Italy should have a monopoly of economic rights. In effect, Hoare and Laval were prepared to cede most of Ethiopia to Italy. Public condemnation of the plan was so widespread and vigorous in Britain and France, however, that both men were forced to resign.

With the League Council again considering the adoption of oil sanctions, Adolf Hitler sent German troops into the Rhineland in March 1936. His decision to violate the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pacts further complicated the situation and definitely ended the possibility that France would support an oil embargo.

While the diplomats talked, Italian forces had been carrying on military operations in Ethiopia. Before the war, Emperor Haile Selassie had done what he could with limited resources to improve his army, but his air force consisted of only 12 aircraft on the outbreak of the war. Belgian military advisers worked to train the army, and Swedes ran an Ethiopian officer cadet school, but time was too short for them to accomplish much. What few radios the Ethiopians had worked to their disadvantage in that the Italians intercepted their communications and were thus aware of all their tactical moves. More than any other single factor, this helped win the war for the Italians.

Complete Italian command of the air was another decisive factor. The Italians also employed mustard gas, which, because it was absorbed through the skin, severely affected the Ethiopian soldiers, most of whom went barefoot. Italian military engineering was another key, overcoming considerable natural obstacles in advancing the Italian war machine. The Italians also exploited the tribalism and factionalism of Ethiopia. Neither side was eager to take prisoners.

General Emilio De Bono commanded Italian troops in East Africa. However, he refused to advance beyond Makele to Amba Alagi as Mussolini had demanded, and as a result, on November 17 Marshal Pietro Badoglio

took over for De Bono and reorganized the Italian forces. General Rodolfo Graziani commanded the southern prong of the Italian offensive from Italian Somaliland. His motorized column, including tanks, took Ethiopia's second city, Harar. He too was made a marshal for his actions, and he replaced Badoglio as viceroy of Ethiopia in late May 1936.

Following a lull, fighting was renewed on a more intense scale, and in April 1936, the primitive Ethiopian resistance collapsed before the modern Italian military. Emperor Haile Selassie, his armies demoralized and his retreat to the west cut off by disaffected tribal chiefs, fled on May 2 to French Somaliland, where he boarded a British warship.

Meanwhile, 30,000 Italian troops, in what was perhaps the greatest motorized column yet organized, moved by two main routes toward the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, which they entered on May 5. In Rome that same day, Mussolini announced that "Ethiopia is Italian." On May 9, Il Duce decreed that all of Ethiopia was under Italian sovereignty and that King Victor Emmanuel III was now the emperor of Ethiopia. On June 1, 1936, Italian East Africa was reorganized as Africa Orientale Italiana, an area of some 666,000 square miles and a population estimated at some 12 million people in 1939.

The one-sided nature of the conflict was shown in the casualty totals. In the war, Ethiopia lost 760,000 dead, both military and civilian, whereas the Italian government claimed losses of some 2,000 dead, with another 1,600 lost from among its Eritrean allies. In postwar fighting and the Italian pacification effort, Ethiopia suffered an additional several hundred thousand killed.

In June 1936, Britain took the lead in dismantling the sanctions, despite the fact that the small neutral states wished to continue them. British prime minister Neville Chamberlain described the continuance of a policy of sanctions as the "very midsummer of madness." This pronouncement was followed on June 18 by a statement from Foreign Minister Anthony Eden confirming the cabinet's decision to propose to the League of Nations that sanctions should be abandoned. Other nations followed suit, and after a polished and moving address on June 30 by Haile Selassie, pleading his cause in person before the league, the assembly adopted a resolution on July 4, 1936, recommending the ending of sanctions. Italy had won: none of the big powers was prepared to use force to preserve Ethiopian independence, and

another crushing blow had been dealt to the belief in the efficacy of collective action to halt aggression. The war also served to give Mussolini an exaggerated sense of Italy's military effectiveness.

Ethiopian resistance to Italy continued nonetheless and, in July 1936, Ethiopian patriots attacked Addis Ababa. Their attempt to seize power failed, and most of them were executed. Intermittent Ethiopian resistance continued, and in 1941, British Commonwealth troops liberated the country.

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See also

Badoglio, Pietro; Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; De Bono, Emilio; East Africa Campaign; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; Graziani, Rodolfo, Marchese di Neghelli; Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia; Italy; Italy, Army; Laval, Pierre; Mussolini, Benito; Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy; Document 11

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Italo-Greek War

See Greece Campaign, Italian

Italy

South-Central European nation. Italy, with a 1939 population of 44.4 million, encompassed 116,346 square miles, not including its overseas possessions, chiefly in North Africa. Italy borders the Mediterranean Sea to the west, France to the northwest, Switzerland and Austria to the north, the Adriatic

Sea to the east, and the Ionian Sea to the south. Italy also possesses Sicily and Sardinia, the two largest islands in the Mediterranean.

After Benito Mussolini became premier in 1922, Italy was a constitutional monarchy in name only. Mussolini and his Fascist Party exercised de facto power, which became increasingly dictatorial as time went on. Adolf Hitler would later copy many of Mussolini's political arrangements.

In foreign affairs, Mussolini took a belligerent stance early, openly pursuing a nationalist and imperialist course. As early as 1923 he threatened war with Greece over Corfu, and he strongly supported Austria against Germany in 1934. Mussolini also sought expansion of Italy's overseas empire, which he claimed would be an outlet for the large number of Italians immigrating abroad and would also furnish strategic raw materials. Although Italy went to war with and conquered Ethiopia in 1936, no material benefits flowed from this. Indeed, it has been observed that the Italian empire was a "splendid collection of deserts" (Libyan oil having not yet been discovered).

Mussolini's aggressive policies served only to drive a wedge between Italy and its erstwhile allies of Britain and France. His decision to support the nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) helped bring Italy and Germany together in what was later called the Pact of Steel (1936). Mussolini also sent Italian troops into Albania in April 1939 who took over that country, but he held back at the last minute from joining Hitler in a general European war in September 1939.

Mussolini claimed a shortage of raw materials and made impossible demands on Germany to avoid having to go to war, but in truth he was uncertain as to the outcome and was hedging his bets. Only with the defeat of France certain did Mussolini join Hitler and declare war, on June 10, 1940, in the expectations of joining in the spoils, especially in North Africa.

There was little enthusiasm among the Italian people when Italy entered the war. At the same time, there was little opposition. During the nearly two decades that Mussolini had held power, his fascist secret police and judicial system of special courts had silenced the internal opposition. The minority of Italians who opposed war were mostly abroad.

Initial Italian military failures in France but also in an invasion of Greece later in 1940 were offset in the public eye by the overall Axis successes that extended into the fall of 1941. Weekly propaganda newsreels trumpeted Axis

battlefield victories. Such claims were tempered in October 1942, however, when the Western Allies began bombing northern Italian cities.

At the same time, the tide clearly was turning against the Axis powers in North Africa. The war at last became a grim reality in urban Italy, with many people forced to abandon the cities. The destruction of the Italian Eighth Army in the Soviet offensives in the Stalingrad area during the 1942–1943 winter only strengthened the public mood. Despite the fascist regime's eavesdropping and censorship, opposition to Mussolini's policies grew. Strikes in the northern industrial cities in March 1943 surprised the authorities.

For political reasons, Mussolini sought to maintain, insofar as possible, the appearance of normalcy on the domestic front. Morale plummeted, however, with the introduction of rationing in 1941. Coffee, sugar, and soap had already been rationed since 1939. But with the war, the Italian average daily caloric intake progressively declined because Italy was not self-sufficient in food, especially wheat. Per capita daily calorie intake went from 2,100 in 1943 to 1,800 in 1944–1945, although some Italians were able to supplement this with black market purchases. Only those who worked in heavy labor might have more. These conditions further depressed morale, especially because rations for nonworking Italians, primarily the elderly and disabled, were well below the national average and totally inadequate. The overall situation deteriorated thanks to an inefficient distribution system and increased Allied bombing of railroad lines.

By 1942, newspapers were reduced to four pages (and later to two). Essentials were in short supply. Rationing meant that one might purchase one pair of new shoes or a few articles of clothing per year. Repeated increases in wages were more than offset by inflation, which, although rampant, was not so severe as to wreck the economy. Government deficits ballooned, and the government printed money; circulation of paper money quadrupled between 1940 and 1943, and a lively black market flourished, thanks to the fact that farmers refused to bring their food products to the government collection points. Following the Allied invasion of Italy proper in September 1943 and German occupation of much of the country, the food situation worsened for most Italians, especially in the more populous urbanized northern part of the country, where the standard of living fell back to the levels of 1861.

Labor was in short supply, given the country's needs for military

manpower. Agricultural requirements compelled Mussolini to recall 600,000 soldiers from the front on the eve of the October 28, 1940–March 1941, Greece Campaign to assist with the harvest, with obvious military consequences.

In three years of war, Italy mobilized some 5 million men for military service, and an additional 3.85 million workers of military age were employed in war production at the end of 1941. In 1943, this figure was reduced to 3.638 million, but it was still high.

Italy was handicapped by having few natural resources; its industry lacked even the most basic raw materials. The nation consumed 12 million tons of coal per year, but only 1 million tons came from domestic production. Iron ore was scarce, and Italy had no oil of its own, being forced to rely on Germany, where supplies were also short. Civilian automobile travel was largely forbidden, and Italy had to make do with a limited quantity of natural gas from the Po River Valley.

Despite problems, Italian industry managed to produce 7,000 artillery pieces, although half of these were of 47mm or smaller caliber; 10,545 aircraft; and some 60,000 trucks of rather high quality. This last figure may be compared with a total of 71,000 private and commercial vehicles produced in 1939. Much of this military equipment, however, was obsolescent. Industry emphasized quantity and older designs rather than switching to newer designs with potential dips in production. Thus, in 1943, Italy continued to produce biplanes at the expense of modern aircraft designs. The same approach was followed in Italy’s rather small production run of some 2,500 tanks. The country never attempted to produce under license the far better German models. In sum, Italy’s war industry was less effective than it had been in World War I.

Homeland defense was organized in 15 corps areas and centered on coastal batteries manned by the Milizia Artiglieria Maritima (MILMART, naval artillery militia) and Guardia alla Frontiera (GAF, border guards). Along its Alpine border, Italy already maintained an old fortified line. Between 1938 and 1943 it added a new one, which could only have been directed against its German ally.

Protection against amphibious assault was difficult, given the country’s long coastline. When Italy entered the war, it had only 200 modern antiaircraft batteries (all lacking fire-direction systems) with which to defend

the cities and industrial areas as well as strategic targets such as bridges, rail lines, and the like.

For defense against invasion, Italy also fielded some 400 battalions of territorial units of various types, but they were poorly armed; some were equipped with 19th-century Vetterli rifles. During the war, a few mobile units were added. Regular army units resting or training in Italy were also available. The government sought to counter the threat of paratroopers and saboteurs by the formation of some 350 platoon-level army units, often motorized or equipped with bicycles. These were reasonably successful in tracking down British paratroops dropped in Calabria on February 10, 1941. To these forces should be added the three main police corps—the police, the military police (the Carabinieri), and the Financial Guard.

A U.S. soldier shares his food rations with hungry villagers in the Cassino area of Italy in 1944. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Mussolini’s disastrous policies and the Allied invasion of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) brought about the dictator’s fall, engineered not by outside pressures but within his own party from the fascist Grand Council, which deposed him on July 25, 1943. The new government, headed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, signed an armistice with the Allies, which was announced

on September 8, after Allied forces invaded Italy itself. The Germans then occupied much of the country and disarmed many Italian military units that were left without orders. Italy became the battleground for outside powers, with bitter fighting persisting until May 2, 1945.

After the armistice, there were several different administrations: the Allied military government in the south (which printed its own occupation money); the Italian government under King Victor Emmanuel III, which became a cobelligerent from October 1943 on and took over many liberated areas from the military; and German-occupied Italy to the north. The Germans rescued Mussolini from imprisonment and installed him in the north as head of the puppet Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, RSI). Some provinces of northern Italy, however, were directly controlled by the Third Reich. The German Armaments Ministry took control of northern industries, which produced surprisingly well, given the difficult conditions.

As the Allies struggled with the Germans in Italy, Italian Resistance fighters also fought the Germans and other Italians. The Resistance in the north liberated some mountainous territories and proclaimed them to be independent. The north suffered from the civil war, hunger, and Allied bombing. The south was far better off. Although it had little in the way of industry, it could at least rely on Allied help in the form of food and goods.

Italy entered the war hoping to expand its overseas empire and win military glory. Instead, the nation lost its existing empire, was invaded, and became a battlefield and the scene of a civil war. The prolonged fighting and the slow Allied advance up the length of the Italian Peninsula severely damaged Italy. The war destroyed some 8 percent of the nation's industrial plants, demolished a considerable amount of housing (mostly in the cities), and severely dislocated the railroads (60 percent of the nation's locomotives were lost, along with half of the rolling stock). Some 5,000 bridges were also destroyed, and agricultural production fell by 60 percent. Nonetheless, by 1948 the nation was able to regain the economic levels of 1938, and it experienced considerable growth in the 1950s and 1960s.

ALESSANDRO MASSIGNANI

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; Italy, Air Force; Italy, Army; Italy, Navy; Italy Campaign; Mussolini, Benito; Resistance; Sicily, Invasion of; Victor Emmanuel III,

King of Italy; Document 60; Document 163

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Italy, Air Force

In the period between World War I and World War II, the Royal Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) was regarded as one of the world's most advanced, winning 96 international aviation awards. In 1939, Italy also had the third-largest European commercial air fleet, behind only Germany and the United Kingdom. Moreover, with the possible exception of Japan, Italy had more interwar combat experience than any other nation, from the suppression of the Senussis in Libya to the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935–1936) and culminating in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, where the Italians contributed more aircraft than did Germany. Between 1935 and 1939, Italy expended 1,500 aircraft in combat, and an additional 925 planes were exported. The Royal Italian Air Force was also the most fascist of the three Italian armed services and the favorite of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and the Fascist Party.

Yet in World War II, the Italian Air Force was found wanting. When Italy entered the war in June 1940, its air force had almost 1,000 frontline aircraft, backed by about 2,000 second- and third-line aircraft. But these figures were deceptive. Italy had a few high-performance planes—those that had set a number of aviation records—but most of its aircraft were, in fact, obsolete.

Chief of staff and undersecretary of the Regia Aeronautica General Giuseppe Valle commanded the air force. Italy was organized into three air zones, with several regional commands and army-air cooperation units and land- and sea-based naval reconnaissance units. The air force retained control

of all pilots, and coordination among the three military branches was poor at best. The lack of a coherent air philosophy and an effective building program compounded problems. Valle was relieved of his command on October 31, 1939, charged with responsibility for the poor state of the air force when it was mobilized at the beginning of the war. He was placed on trial, and although he was later freed, the public held him responsible for the state of unpreparedness. General Francesco Pricolo commanded the air force from October 31, 1939, to November 14, 1941, when he was replaced by General Rino Corso Fougier until July 26, 1943.

Italy fought in the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940) for several weeks, after which it received some French aircraft. Later, Mussolini insisted on sending aircraft to Belgium to assist in the July 10–September 30 Battle of Britain. The Germans thought the planes would be far more useful in North Africa, and indeed they proved hopelessly inadequate in the skies over Britain and had to be withdrawn. In 1941, Italy sent a more effective air contingent to fight in the Soviet Union.

In the Mediterranean theater, the Italian Air Force was employed for air strikes against Malta and targeted British merchant ships and naval units operating near Italy. It also conducted raids against Gibraltar and Palestine and even as far afield as the Persian Gulf. However, the Italians soon learned that aircraft that had been successful against stationary merchant ships docked in harbors during the Spanish Civil War were ineffective in high-altitude bombing attacks against warships. Indeed, early in the war, the aircraft occasionally attacked Italian warships by mistake, although recognition improved as the war unfolded. Not until March 1941 did the air force place liaison officers on board warships at sea.

The Italian Air Force was more successful in the Balkan fighting against Greece and Yugoslavia. It also fought in the Western Desert from 1940 to 1943 as well as in Ethiopia. When fielding modern machines—the later models with German engines—the air force was effective. But despite the fact that the Italian Air Force had operated in Libya since 1911, on the eve of war its aircraft still lacked dust filters, and its tactics were reminiscent of the acrobatics of World War I.

With the exception of three fighters embarked on two battleships late in the war, the only sea-based air effort (apart from ship-launched reconnaissance aircraft) involved the crash conversion of two passenger ships

into aircraft carriers. Neither was completed by the armistice. The failure to develop aircraft carriers seriously affected Italian naval operations in the war, largely because of the short range of Italy's land-based fighters.

On the whole, Italy's aviation industry was badly organized and inefficient, producing a wide variety of aircraft types in small numbers. The various companies involved resisted manufacturing each other's more successful designs, and the almost artisan production methods resulted in production times that were more than 50 percent longer than for comparable German aircraft. The Italian Air Force largely depended on radial engines, but these low-powered machines seldom exceeded 1,000 horsepower. Adoption of the bulkier but much more powerful German-designed Daimler-Benz in-line engine helped solve that problem.

The fact that the Fiat CR-42, a wood-and-canvas biplane fighter with nonretractable landing gear, was still in production in 1944 (and a serious candidate for the Daimler-Benz engine) reveals the sad state of Italian aircraft production. Italian fighters were almost all underarmed because of financial considerations and were poorly designed, with weak wings. Radios were not installed in all aircraft until 1942. Fuel was stored in thinly lined, leaking tanks; most airfields were dirt runways, and pilots were slow to adapt to closed canopies. On any given day, operational efficiency was rarely higher than 70 percent. Ground-support aircraft, based on precepts developed by General Amedeo Mecozzi, were so poorly designed that early in the war, Italy simply retired its ground-attack planes and purchased 159 Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers from Germany.

One area in which the Italian Air Force excelled was the torpedo bomber. Although use of this plane was hindered by interservice rivalry before the war, the torpedo bomber was deployed to units by late 1940. German air units later successfully emulated Italian torpedo-bombing tactics and purchased torpedoes from Italy. Yet the Italians chose to simply adapt a three-engine Savoia-Marchetti SM-79 level bomber for torpedo-bombing rather than design a true torpedo bomber.

Although Italy formally embraced the concept of strategic bombing developed by General Giulio Douhet, it did not practice it. Ironically, Douhet had more influence on British and U.S. air policies than at home. Italy did produce a partially successful four-engine bomber, the Piaggio P-108, but only in small numbers.

With the armistice in September 1943, there were two Italian air forces. One was for the fascist state in the north. The other, utilizing many different Allied aircraft, fought for the Allied government in the south.

JACK GREENE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Balbo, Italo; Britain, Battle of; Douhet, Giulio; France, Battle for; Italo-Ethiopian War; Malta, Air Battles of; Mussolini, Benito; Spanish Civil War

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Italy, Army

When Italy entered World War II on June 10, 1940, the Regio Esercito (Royal Army) had 1,630,000 men under arms. This figure would rise during the war to 2,563,000. King Victor Emmanuel III was nominal commander in chief, with the title of *comandante supremo delle Forse Armato dello Stato* (supreme commander of the Royal Army of the Kingdom of Italy), but Italian dictator Benito Mussolini exercised actual authority.

Contrary to popular misconceptions, some units of the army fought well in World War II, but the army itself was basically a light infantry force lacking in equipment and poorly prepared for a modern European war. In 1940, it numbered 73 divisions—43 infantry, 5 Alpine, 3 light, 2 motorized, 3 armored, 12 “self-transportable” with a regiment of truck-drawn artillery, 3 militia, and 2 Libyan. Many military formations were understrength, and much of the army’s equipment was obsolete at best. Morale was not always optimal, for many Italians thought that their nation was on the wrong side in the war. The men were often indifferently led, as many officer appointments were made on the basis of party loyalty rather than ability.

An Italian infantry division was composed of two infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, an engineer company, and occasionally an attached Blackshirt (Voluntary Militia for National Security [MSVN], or Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionaleor) legion. The “binary” division had only about 10,000 men at full strength. The royal infantry regiments pledged allegiance to the king, but the highly motivated Blackshirt legions, which numbered about 1,300 men each, swore loyalty to Mussolini.

Many regular army officers deeply resented the inclusion of Blackshirt regiments in the army. In 1940, the equivalent of four MSVN divisions were destroyed in fighting in North Africa. Eventually, “M battalions” made of Blackshirts fought in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. They also manned antiaircraft artillery batteries throughout the Italian Empire.

In 1940 the Italian Army had more than 8,000 artillery pieces, which were classified as divisional (field), corps (medium), and army (heavy). Much of the artillery was left over from World War I, and some guns were modernized World War I prizes, such as pieces manufactured at Skoda. In 1940 Italy had more than 1,200 tanks, but most were only two-man light tankettes. Many of the larger models were too thinly armored to stop armor-piercing bullets, let alone stand up to North European armor.

On June 20, 1940, Mussolini entered the war by attacking France in the western Alps with 32 divisions. The Italians did poorly, being largely held at bay by 5 French divisions. When the leaders in Paris surrendered on June 24, the Italians took a small portion of southeastern France. The French admitted to having 37 soldiers killed in the campaign; Italian losses were 631.

On October 28, 1940, on short notice, Mussolini sent Italian troops into Greece from Albania. The invasion involved fewer than 100,000 Italian troops, and by late November, the Greek army had driven the Italian army back into Albania, where both forces suffered heavily in a bloody stalemate during the winter. Hitler came to the rescue of his ally on April 6, 1941, when German forces invaded Greece and conquered it in a few short weeks. Italian forces, chiefly the Second Army, also participated in the invasion and conquest of Yugoslavia that same month.

Italy’s subsequent occupation of portions of Yugoslavia, France, Corsica, and Greece tied down numerous divisions. Resistance efforts created an ever-growing list of casualties. During their occupation of Yugoslavia, the Italians

raised a number of units usually organized on religious lines—Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Muslim—from men seeking to fight the Partisans.

After Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Mussolini eagerly offered Italian forces. Eventually, Italy sent more than 250,000 men to the Soviet front. Most of the Italian Eighth Army was lost in the August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943, Battle of Stalingrad. Included in Italian forces operating mainly in the Ukraine was a Croatian legion raised in Croatia. The Italians also helped organize a small Cossack anticommunist volunteer group. If the units sent to the Soviet Union had been added to forces in North Africa, they might well have affected the outcome of the struggle there.

Italy made a major military effort in North Africa to fulfill Mussolini's dream of establishing a great Italian empire. Before the war, Italy had colonized Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia (Abyssinia). Italian forces there were, however, underequipped and undergunned compared with the British.

Amedeo Umberto di Savoia, the duke of Aosta, commanded forces in Italian East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea). Of his 256,000 men, 182,000 were "indigenous" levies. European colonists, including some Blackshirt troops, formed part of the units under the duke's command. Fighting there began in early July 1940 when the Italians captured a number of small British posts, but they halted their offensive in the Sudan when intelligence estimates magnified the actual British forces arrayed against them.

On August 4, the Italians invaded British Somaliland from Ethiopia. They were able to overwhelm the small British forces defending that colony. The British withdrew to Aden, and their losses were only one-tenth those of the Italians. During the winter of 1940–1941, the British built up their resources, and beginning on January 19, 1941, they went on the offensive. By the end of 1941, the British had secured control of Italian East Africa.

In North Africa, Field Marshal Rodolfo Graziani commanded some 236,000 Italian troops. After the defeat of France, Italian forces were shifted to eastern Libya to face the British in Egypt. British commander in Egypt Major General Richard O'Connor had only 31,000 men—largely from the 4th Indian Division and the 7th Armoured Division, later reinforced by the 6th Australian Division. Graziani appeared to be in position to overwhelm the outnumbered British; however, his troops were short of heavy artillery, tanks,

and antitank and antiaircraft weapons as well as transport and logistical support. A shortage of radios often reduced communications to relaying information by messenger.

An Italian Carro Armato MII/39 medium tank during the fighting in Egypt. (Keystone/Getty Images)

On September 13, 1940, pressed to act prematurely by Mussolini, Graziani launched an offensive against the British. The Italians fared badly, and by December the British had penetrated the Italian chain of forts protecting the Libyan border but set too far apart to be mutually supporting. Many Italian units fought effectively but to no avail. By January 1941, the British had taken some 100,000 Italian prisoners.

In February 1941, General Erwin Rommel arrived in Libya with his Afrika Korps (Africa Corps). Although smaller in number than the Italian force and officially under Italian control, the Afrika Korps quickly became the dominant partner. The Germans were far better equipped and more effectively organized and led. The Italians lacked mobility, adequate staffing, and an effective system of command and control.

The Italians fought back and forth across Northern Africa until they were finally defeated at Tunis in May 1943. A major factor in the Axis defeat was Britain’s control of Malta, which enhanced the British ability to intercept by sea and air supplies destined for Axis troops in North Africa. British communications intelligence, notably Ultra intercepts, also played a role in the Allied victory.

On July 9, 1943, the British and Americans invaded Sicily, held by 190,000 Italians and 40,000 Germans. The performance of Italian units varied widely. The newly formed and indifferently equipped coastal divisions, composed of middle-aged home guards, often surrendered without a fight. Certain defeat in Sicily led the fascist Grand Council to strip Mussolini of power in July. Marshal Pietro Badoglio then formed a new government, and on September 3 he signed a secret armistice with the Allies, to go into effect five days later.

The Germans, well aware of Italian efforts to switch sides, immediately implemented plans to take control of Italy. When the Germans occupied Rome on September 10, King Victor Emmanuel III and Badoglio fled south and made Brindisi the new seat of government. Meanwhile, German troops arrested and disarmed Italian Army units. More than 600,000 Italians were deported to labor camps in Germany.

German commando units rescued Mussolini on September 12, 1943, and set up the Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, RSI), with its capital at Saló in the north. Many fascists joined the new RSI Army. New units and those from the former Italian Army that remained loyal to fascism were formed into various bodies. The first of these was the Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano (National Republican Army, ENR), arranged into four divisions composed of formations newly raised by officers still loyal to Mussolini and mixed with some autonomous older units. Many men were recruited into the ENR divisions from among Italian soldiers interned by the Germans. These formations were usually trained in Germany and then deployed to Italy. They fought chiefly against partisans.

The Guardia Nazionale Repubblicano (National Republican Guard, GNR) replaced the old Blackshirts. Basically a policing unit, it ultimately numbered 80,000 men. It was assigned to local security duties and fighting the partisans. Some GNR units in occupied France and Yugoslavia continued occupation duties in cooperation with the Germans.

As the struggle with the partisans intensified, all able-bodied fascists were organized into a new militia, the Brigate Nere (Black Brigades). Formed in June 1944 as an armed branch of the RSI’s new Fascist Party, this militia eventually numbered some 30,000 men. Composed of fanatical fascists, it engaged in a no-holds-barred struggle with the partisans. The members of the

Black Brigades were motivated by the belief that they would be killed in the event of a fascist defeat.

The X MAS (Decima Mas) unit was an autonomous force organized by Prince Julio Valerio Borghese. Composed of 25,000 volunteers, it gained a reputation for effective and hard fighting against the partisans, primarily Tito's Yugoslav Partisans in Istria. It also included a women's unit. In addition, the Germans recruited Italian volunteers into the Waffen-SS. These units had both Italian and German names and usually were commanded by German officers. They performed well on the Anzio front and against partisans.

In the south of Italy, the newly reorganized government led by King Victor Emmanuel III and Badoglio established the Army of the South, with the status of a cobelligerent force. It was organized as the Corpo Italiano di Liberazione (Italian Liberation Corps, CIL). Composed of old Italian Royal Army men and units to which new recruits were added, the CIL was formed into six weak divisions, known as combat groups. With the transfer of some Allied units to participate in the Riviera landings in France, four of these divisions were brought into the line and saw combat. They fought well and sustained casualties of 1,868 dead and 5,187 wounded.

Many Italians also served with the Allied forces in support units, handling transportation and ammunition and other supplies. Some of these units were muleteers working in the rugged mountain tracks. Partisan forces also fought in the north, behind German lines. As the war drew to a close, thousands joined partisan groups in order to sanitize their pasts or ensure their futures.

The Italian Army suffered substantial casualties in the war. The total of those in the army who died fighting the Allies, in German reprisals following the armistice with the Allies, and in fighting the Germans probably exceeded 300,000 men. In addition, an unknown but large number were wounded, and some 600,000 were taken as prisoners.

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY

See also

Afrika Korps; Albania; Artillery Doctrine; Badoglio, Pietro; Balkans Theater; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Cephalonia Island Massacre; De Bono, Emilio; El Alamein, Battle of; France, Battle for; Graziani, Rodolfo, Marchese di Neghelli; Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian; Italo-

Ethiopian War; Italy; Italy, Air Force; Italy, Navy; Italy Campaign; Mussolini, Benito; North Africa Campaign; O'Connor, Richard Nugent; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Savoia, Amedeo Umberto di; Sicily, Invasion of; Somalia; Stalingrad, Battle of; Tanks, All Powers; Tripartite Pact; Tunis, Battle of; Tunisia Campaign; Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy; West European Theater of Operations; Yugoslavia

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Italy, Navy

In the period after World War I, the Royal Italian Navy (Regia Marina) planned for warfare against the French Navy with surface naval battles similar to the 1916 Battle of Jutland. On the eve of World War II, the navy began transforming itself, albeit unsuccessfully, into an oceanic navy that would not be confined by the British-controlled Mediterranean choke points of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. In the unlikely event that funding and resources were made available, the Italian Navy by 1942 would include 9 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 36 cruisers (including 12 small Capitani Romani–class vessels, of which 3 were completed before the armistice), and 84 oceangoing submarines. The navy had 5.4 officers for every 100 sailors (France had 7.5 and Britain 9.2 per 100). Many of the sailors were volunteers.

On the eve of Italy's June 10, 1940, entry into the war, the navy's percentage of the annual military budget had dropped to 12 percent, well behind the army's 74 percent and the air force's 14 percent. The core of the

navy was built around the new massive 30-knot Littorio-class battleships armed with nine 15-inch guns. Two were being completed when war was declared, and a third was added during the war. Italy also had two small older completely rebuilt and speedy World War I–era battleships ready for sea and two others that were almost ready. Although they were the weakest Axis battleships of the war, they were more powerful than any cruiser.

Italy also had 7 heavy cruisers, 12 modern and 2 old light cruisers (adding 3 during the war), 59 destroyers (adding 12), 67 large torpedo boats (adding 17), and 115 submarines (adding 32). Major fleet units also included escorts, raiders, MAS motor torpedo boats, and successful war-built corvettes—the 700-ton Gabbiano class, of which 28 were completed before the armistice.

Although it was a substantial force on paper, the Italian Navy suffered from fundamental problems. Italy lagged in several key areas of naval technology. One area was sonar, which was just beginning to be introduced at the start of the war. Then, in the disastrous March 28, 1941, Battle of Cape Matapan, the Italians discovered to their dismay that the Allies had deployed radar on their warships. The Italians did not deploy their first warship radar until a year later, in March 1942. Ironically, Italy's scientific community had been working on radar in the mid-1930s, but the Italian government did not fully support its efforts. Of Ultra intercepts the Italians knew nothing, although they assumed that the Germans were letting the Allies know about Italian operations, and the Germans assumed that the Italians were doing the same.

Italian ship armor plate was inferior by Allied standards. Italian heavy ships relied on long-range gunnery, but guns in cruiser and destroyer turrets were mounted too close to each other, thus interfering in the flight of shells. Also, in an attempt to outrange the ships of their potential opponents, the Italians initially sought high muzzle velocities. These factors resulted in high salvo spreads, compared to the much tighter British salvos.

The Italians sought to avoid night fighting by their heavy ships, and the navy lacked flashless night charges for ships with 8-inch or larger guns, an error not rectified until 1942. The navy dropped night-fighting training for large ships in the 1930s, precisely when the Royal Navy was adopting such tactics for its large ships, including battleships. Italian losses in night surface actions during the war would be heavy and almost completely one-sided.

Italy also experienced problems with its submarines. There were three

classes of subs. The large oceangoing submarines were part of the new oceanic navy. Many were based out of Bordeaux, France. In 189 patrols, they sank more than 500,000 tons of Allied ships, with another 200,000 tons damaged. They also carried out mostly ineffective runs to Japan for key war supplies, and they operated in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

Medium and small submarines hunted closer to home. In the Mediterranean Sea, these classes conducted 1,553 patrols with dismal results when contrasted to the successes tallied by far fewer German submarines dispatched to that theater. This outcome was, in part, due to the Italian doctrine that called for submarines to submerge during daytime and wait for a target to come within range. The Italians eschewed attacks on the surface in wolf packs at night. Their torpedoes were reliable but had smaller warheads than those of most other nations, thus causing less damage. Despite its long coastline and overseas colonies, Italy had only 25,000 mines in 1939, and most of these dated from World War I.

In the 1920s, the Italians experimented with the snorkel, a tube to the surface that allowed submarines to secure air while submerged, but they ultimately dropped its development as a dead end. Their submarines also suffered from slow submerging speeds—they were two or three times slower than German boats. Italy also had to rebuild many of its submarines during the war because their large sails (the superstructure where the surface bridge and periscope were located) were easily picked up by radar. Italian periscopes were too short, and the Mediterranean itself was a much clearer sea then the Atlantic, which made it easier for Allied pilots to locate submerged submarines.

Italy failed to develop the aircraft carrier. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and the navy high command believed that the country’s long coastline and the many Italian islands and bases in the central Mediterranean rendered aircraft carriers unnecessary. But the slow communication and response between the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force, fueled by interservice rivalries, meant that too few planes arrived too late too often: early in the war, Italian aircraft actually attacked Italian ships several times. High-level bombing of warships under way also proved to be ineffective. Mussolini changed his mind about the aircraft carrier, and during the war, he twice intervened personally to secure the conversion of two passenger ships to carriers, although neither was completed before the end of the war.

Italy also failed to develop torpedo bombers before the war, in large part because of interservice jealousy. The air force, with only limited funds, opposed development of torpedo bombers, preferring to use the money for high-altitude bombers. So although the Italian Navy developed a torpedo for air launch, it was not until several months into the war that the air force carried out its first torpedo attack. In the course of the war, the Italians achieved several successes with these airplanes.

The most innovative naval arm was the Decima MAS. This unit was made up of midget submarines, underwater swimmers trained in sabotage, surface speedboats filled with explosives and piloted by crewmen who jumped off shortly before the vessels hit their targets, and the slow-moving torpedo, or SLC, which was ridden by two men underwater into enemy harbors. The most successful of these weapons was the SLC, directly developed from a World War I weapon that was employed against Austria-Hungary with good results; it was usually launched from a submarine. The most spectacular success for the SLCs occurred on December 18, 1941, when three of them entered Alexandria Harbor and crippled the British battleships *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant.*

With the exception of the midget submarines, the naval high command ignored these weapons until 1935 and then only grudgingly supported junior officers involved in innovative development. A more forceful development program begun after World War I might well have made an important difference in World War II.

Despite these limitations, the fuel-strapped Italian Navy fought bravely during the war and transported to Africa the vast majority of the supplies and troops that left port. In numerous battles above, on, and below the seas, the navy sank many Allied warships and forced the British to maintain a powerful naval force at both ends of the Mediterranean. In September 1943, when Italy switched sides in the war, the bulk of the Italian fleet joined the Allies.

Italian naval losses before the armistice consisted of 1 battleship, 11 cruisers, 44 destroyers, 41 large torpedo boats, 33 MAS boats, 86 submarines, and 178 other vessels. After the armistice, Italy lost 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, 5 large torpedo boats, 25 MAS boats, 3 submarines, and 23 other vessels. Germany, which took over or completed many Italian warships after the armistice, also assigned some ships to the navy of Mussolini’s

Italian Social Republic, organized in northern Italy—the largest being the damaged heavy cruiser *Bolzano.* Most of these were subsequently sunk.

Total wartime personnel losses for the Italian Navy came to 28,837, with 4,177 of this number occurring after the armistice. Up to the armistice, Italy also lost 2,018,616 tons of merchant shipping.

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See also

Adriatic Sea, Naval Operations in; Aegean Sea Naval Operations; Battleships; Bergamini, Carlo; Beta Convoy Battle; Borghese, Junio Valerio; Calabria, Battle of; Campioni, Inigo; Cape Bon, Battle of; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Cape Passero, Action off; Cape Spada, Battle of; Cape Spartivento, Battle of; Cavagnari, Domenico; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; de Courten, Raffaele; Great Britain, Navy; Iachino, Angelo; Italian Social Republic, Navy; Italy; Italy, Air Force; Italy, Army; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Mussolini, Benito; Radar; Red Sea, Naval Operations in; Sansonetti, Luigi; Skerki Bank, Battle near; Signals Intelligence; Sirte, First Battle of; Sirte, Second Battle of; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Sonar; Submarines; Submarines, Midget; Torpedoes; Vian, Sir Philip Louis

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Italy Campaign (1943–1945)

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, with a cross-Channel invasion of France no longer an option for that year, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and their military staffs agreed to follow the Axis defeat in North Africa with an invasion of Sicily. Several weeks later, the Americans also agreed to a subsequent invasion of the Italian Peninsula. This campaign would allow the Allies to retain the strategic initiative, expand their control in the Mediterranean, open a second front on the mainland of Europe to relieve pressure on the Soviets, and provide air bases closer to strategic bombing targets in Austria, Romania, and parts of Germany.

In a six-week campaign commencing on July 9, 1943, in their largest amphibious assault in the war to date, Allied troops defeated Axis forces in Sicily. The Allied conquest of Sicily had a profound effect in Italy, where, faced with growing unrest and the reluctance of Italian forces to oppose the Allies, the fascist Grand Council carried out a coup d'état that overthrew Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and installed a new government led by Marshal Pietro Badoglio. Secret negotiations between the Allies and the new Italian government for an armistice began immediately but soon became bogged down by the Allied insistence on unconditional surrender. A short military armistice was eventually signed on September 3. Adolf Hitler used the interlude, however, to move another 16 German divisions to Italy, including the crack 1st SS Panzer Division from the Soviet Union.

The Germans then occupied the entire country and took control of most of the Italian Army. Much of the Italian fleet escaped to Malta. On September 12, 1943, German commandos led by Schutzstaffel (SS) standartenführer Otto Skorzeny rescued Mussolini from captivity in the mountains at Grand Sasso in a daring airborne raid. Hitler then installed Mussolini as head of the puppet Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, or RSI) in northern Italy.

The strategic logic for continuing the Allied campaign in the Mediterranean appeared obvious to the British chiefs of staff, who saw an invasion of Italy as an opportunity to accomplish several goals: to continue the ground war against Germany utilizing experienced troops who would otherwise remain idle for a year, to draw Axis troops away from France and the Soviet Union, and possibly to create opportunities elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. The members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,

however, were far less convinced and believed that Allied efforts should be directed to the cross-Channel invasion of France, now sanctioned for the spring of 1944. They were also skeptical of British motives, fearing that the postwar preservation of colonial interests was a high priority for Britain—a goal they vehemently opposed.

A final decision to invade the Italian mainland was not made until the Trident Conference in Washington in May 1943, but there was no strategic plan other than to continue the existing operations. The Americans were reluctant to commit to a new Italian campaign, and there was no new large-scale amphibious landing in northern Italy. Any such operation would have been beyond the range of Allied fighter aircraft, and it is an open question whether that type of operation and an airborne raid to capture Rome would have brought the campaign to a rapid conclusion.

The Allied invasion plan envisaged a pincer movement across the Straits of Messina by General Sir Harold Alexander's 15th Army Group, with the first objective being the important southern Italian port of Naples. In Operation BAYTOWN, Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army crossed from Sicily to Reggio di Calabria on September 3, 1943, followed by the British 1st Airborne Division, which landed by sea at Taranto six days later. The main assault, by 165,000 troops of the Anglo-U.S. Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, went ashore at Salerno in Operation AVALANCHE, 35 miles south of Naples, on September 9. Salerno was chosen chiefly because it was the farthest point in the north for which air support could be provided from Sicily. The Allies hoped that once ashore, their invading forces would somehow find a way to open the road to Rome before the end of the year.

German field marshal Albert Kesselring had convinced Hitler that Italy could be easily defended because of its ideal terrain. The central mountainous spine of the Apennines rises above 10,000 feet and has lateral spurs that run east and west toward the coast, between which are deep valleys containing wide rivers flowing rapidly to the sea. The north-south roads were confined to 20-mile-wide strips adjacent to the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts, where the bridges that carried them were dominated by natural strongpoints.

Kesselring formed the six divisions in the south of Italy into the Tenth Army under General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, but he had anticipated a landing at Salerno and stationed the 16th Panzer Division in the area. At

Salerno, the Fifth Army attacked with two corps abreast: the U.S. VI Corps and the British X Corps. Initial resistance was light, but the Germans reinforced by September 11 and, despite their weakness, launched a counteroffensive that almost split the Fifth Army between the two invading corps. By September 15 the beachhead was secure, in large part because of an overwhelming weight of firepower in the form of accurate naval gunfire and massive air support and because more reserves were landed. The Fifth Army then began an advance on Naples, 30 miles away. Montgomery, disappointed that he had only been assigned a secondary role, was needlessly cautious in his advance—so much so that a group of war correspondents drove themselves through German-occupied territory to contact the Fifth Army more than a day before Montgomery's advanced units managed to do so on September 16.

U.S. soldiers come ashore at Salerno, Italy, in Operation AVALANCHE, part of the Allied invasion of Italy, September 1943. (Sem/UIG via Getty Images)

Two days later, Kesselring ordered a fighting withdrawal to the first of the series of mountainous fortified defensive lines, from which the Germans planned to defend the approaches to Rome. On October 1, the Fifth Army captured Naples while the Eighth Army advanced up the Adriatic coast and captured the airfields at Foggia; there, the Allies installed the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force to launch strategic bombing raids against the Reich. By early October, the two Allied armies had formed a continuous 120-mile line across

the peninsula running along the Volturno and Biferno Rivers. But in the previous three weeks, the Fifth Army alone had taken 12,000 casualties.

Henceforth, the campaign in Italy became a slow, remorseless, and grinding battle of attrition, and as the rain and snow turned the battlefield into a muddy quagmire, the appalling struggles resembled battles of World War I. Kesselring had fortified a series of defensive lines, known collectively as the Winter Line, between Gaeta and Pescara. The western end based on the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, known as the Gustav Line, was particularly strong and hinged on the great fortress of the Benedictine abbey at Monte Cassino.

On October 12, the Allies began the Volturno River Campaign, with the objective of seizing the approaches to Rome. The plan was too ambitious, given the Germans' skill at defending the mountainous terrain. Between the Volturno and Rome lay 120 miles of rugged country. The Fifth Army's VI Corps successfully attacked across the line of the Volturno River, and X Corps seized two crossings. To exploit the success, Clark ordered an advance across the entire Fifth Army front. Particularly in the VI Corps area, poor roads, demolished bridges, and the difficulties of bringing supplies forward combined with German resistance to slow the advance.

Meanwhile, in a series of bitterly contested actions, the Eighth Army crossed the Trigno River and advanced to the Sangro River. By November 15, however, the Germans had stopped the advance along the Winter Line, a position that extended along the Garigliano River to Mount Camino, the Mignano gap, the mountains to the northeast, and the Sangro River to the Adriatic Sea.

The Winter Line Campaign, from November 15, 1943, to January 15, 1944, marked the failure of the Allied plan for a major winter offensive. The Eighth Army was to break through on the Adriatic coast and then swing left behind the Germans, at which time the Fifth Army would advance. When the two came within supporting distance, the Fifth Army was to launch an amphibious operation south of Rome.

Although its efforts to break into the German position were initially successful, the Eighth Army fell victim as much to weather as to the German defense. In early December, the Sangro River, vital to Eighth Army communications, rose eight feet, and bridges were underwater or washed away.

By mid-December, it was clear that the efforts to break through the German defenses were futile. Meanwhile, the Fifth Army successfully cleared the heights dominating the Mignano gap after much hard fighting but was stopped at the Rapido River. Allied forces had reached the defensive position of the Gustav Line, which generally ran along the Garigliano, Rapido, and Sangro Rivers. One of the key points was the town of Cassino on the Rapido. However, four successive attacks by the Fifth Army failed to make any significant headway. The winter campaign had degenerated into a situation in which two separate armies were attempting to penetrate the Gustav Line.

In four months, the Allies had slogged just 70 miles from Salerno and were still 80 miles from Rome. The Fifth Army alone had incurred 40,000 casualties, far exceeding German losses, and a further 50,000 men were sick; meanwhile, six experienced divisions were withdrawn for the June 6, 1944, cross-Channel invasion of France, Operation OVERLORD. Montgomery and supreme Allied commander of the European theater of operations and U.S. forces in Europe General Dwight D. Eisenhower also departed to lead the cross-Channel invasion. In recognition of British predominance in Italy, General Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson was appointed to head the Mediterranean Command, and Lieutenant General Oliver Leese became commander of the Eighth Army.

Kesselring, who was appointed commander of Army Group C on November 21, now had 15 (albeit weakened) divisions in the Tenth Army vigorously holding the Gustav Line. On January 22, 1944, in an attempt to unhinge this force, the Allies launched another amphibious landing, Operation SHINGLE, at Anzio, 30 miles south of Rome. The U.S. VI Corps, under Major General John Lucas, achieved complete surprise and safely landed 70,000 troops within a week but failed to exploit the advantage. Churchill later wrote, “I had hoped that we were hurling a wild cat on to the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale.”

Kesselring hastily improvised eight divisions into the Fourteenth Army, commanded by General Eberhard von Mackensen. This force resolutely counterattacked at Anzio, employing Goliath remote-controlled, explosive-filled miniature tanks for the first time in the war. The beachhead was saved only by the excellent tactical use of intelligence in one of Ultra’s most

important triumphs. Major General Lucian K. Truscott replaced Lucas but for three months could do no more than hold the defensive ring.

Meanwhile, Allied forces to the south were unable to break through the Gustav Line. Losses were heavy on both sides as the Allies battered against the line. VI Corps held on at Anzio but was unable to break out of the beachhead. A stalemate persisted until spring.

On January 17, 1944, V Corps launched an attack on the Gustav Line but was forced to call it off within a month after the badly exhausted troops had advanced just seven miles, at a cost of 17,000 casualties. The New Zealand Corps then attempted a direct assault on Monte Cassino, preceded by the questionable bombing by 145 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses that destroyed the famous and ancient monastery. The 1st Parachute Division troops defending the heights were some of the German Army's finest, and they did not flinch. They now took up positions within the ruined monastery. A third attack by New Zealand and Indian infantry, using even heavier air and artillery bombardments, also failed to break through, not least because the rubble created an impregnable defensive position.

On May 11 the Allies launched a fourth attack, Operation DIADEM, in which General Harold Alexander coordinated the Fifth and Eighth Armies as an army group for the first time. The aim was to destroy the German armies. In an astonishing feat of arms, Polish and Free French troops seized Monte Cassino, and XIII Corps broke the Gustav Line in a set-piece battle. Moreover, Kesselring, who had been duped into expecting another amphibious landing farther north, was slow to send reinforcements southward.

Alexander was alerted to the German movements through Ultra intelligence, and when victory seemed complete, he ordered the Anzio breakout on May 23. He planned for the U.S. VI Corps to strike directly inland to encircle the German Tenth Army. Rome would thus be ripe for the taking, but more important, the Germans would be unable to form any organized defenses in the rest of Italy, enabling the rapid occupation of the country right up to the Alps. However, Clark, perhaps the most egocentric Allied commander in the war, was enticed by the glory of capturing Rome and altered the direction of his thrust toward the city. The Fifth Army linked up with VI Corps on May 25 and made the triumphant march into Rome on

June 4, but the spectacle of the first capture of an Axis capital was eclipsed by the Allied invasion of France two days later.

Clark's change of objective from Alexander's intent enabled Kesselring to withdraw to the Pisa-Rimini Line, 150 miles north of Rome. This line was the first of the next series of defense lines across the peninsula that were known collectively as the Gothic Line, which the Allies reached in August. Alexander still hoped to make for Vienna, but the Italian Campaign had assumed a definite secondary status to the invasion of France. Six divisions were withdrawn in the summer, and when the autumn rains and mud forced operations to be suspended at the end of the year, another seven divisions were withdrawn.

A prolonged Allied tactical air-interdiction program during the autumn and winter of 1944 effectively closed the Brenner Pass and created an acute German fuel shortage that drastically reduced the mobility of Army Group C in northern Italy (commanded by Vietinghoff after Kesselring was severely injured in a road accident in October). Although the Germans still had over half a million men in the field, the Allies had been invigorated in both spirit and outlook by substantial reinforcements, including the Brazilian Expedition Force, and an abundant array of new weapons.

On April 9 after the ground had dried, Alexander launched his spring offensive, with the Eighth Army attacking through the Argenta gap. The Fifth Army struck on April 15, and just 10 days later both Allied armies met at Finale Nell'Emilia, after having surrounded and eliminated the last German forces. The Allies then advanced rapidly northward, the Americans entering Milan on April 29 and the British reaching Trieste on May 2. The Fifth Army continued to advance into Austria, linking with the U.S. Seventh Army in the Brenner Pass on May 6.

The isolated and hopeless position of German and RSI forces led Waffen-SS general Karl Wolff, military governor and head of the SS in northern Italy, to initiate background negotiations for a separate surrender as early as February 1945. The talks, facilitated by Allen Dulles, head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland, held much promise, although they were complicated and took place in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust. Wolff wished to avoid senseless destruction and loss of life and to repel the spread of communism; he also hoped to ingratiate himself with the West in case war crimes trials were held in the future.

From the Allied perspective, Wolff offered the prospect of preventing the creation of a Nazi redoubt in the Alps. The head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, halted the talks in April, before the Allied spring offensive, but by April 23, Wolff and Vietinghoff decided to disregard orders from Berlin. Wolff ordered the SS not to resist the Italian partisans on April 25, and an unconditional surrender was signed four days later, to be effective on May 2, six days before the German surrender in the West.



The Italian Campaign gave the Allies useful victories in the interval between the reconquest of the Mediterranean and the reconquest of Northwestern Europe. In a theater of increasingly secondary importance, Kesselring’s position was merely a defensive one, and the best the Allies could claim was that they kept 22 enemy divisions from fighting in another theater. Allied casualties came to 188,746 for the Fifth Army and 123,254 for

the Eighth Army, whereas German casualties were about 434,646 men. The Italian Campaign did, however, afford the Allies experience in amphibious operations and the stresses of coalition warfare, all of which proved invaluable during the invasion of France.

PHILIP L. BOLTÉ AND PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Amphibious Warfare; Anzio, Battle of; Badoglio, Pietro; Cairo Conference; Carpet Bombing; Casablanca Conference; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Clark, Mark Wayne; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Freyberg, Bernard Cyril; Germany, Collapse of; Harmon, Ernest Nason; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Italy; Italy, Army; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Juin, Alphonse Pierre; Kesselring, Albert; Keyes, Geoffrey; Leese, Sir Oliver William Hargreaves; Lucas, John Porter; Mackensen, Eberhard von; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Mussolini, Benito; Office of Strategic Services; Rome, Advance on and Capture of; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Salerno Invasion; Senger und Etterlin, Fridolin Rudolf von; Sicily, Invasion of; Skorzeny, Otto; Trident Conference; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.; Unconditional Surrender; Vietinghoff genannt Scheel, Heinrich Gottfried von; Wilson, Henry Maitland; Wolff, Karl Friedrich Otto

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Itō Seiichi (1890–1945)

Japanese Navy admiral who ordered the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor and later commanded Japan's Second Fleet. Born in Fukuoka, Japan, on July 26, 1890, Itō Seiichi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1911 and the Naval War College in 1923. After study at Yale University in the United States in 1928, he was promoted to captain in 1930. Itō held cruiser commands before assuming command of the battleship *Haruna* in 1936. Promoted to rear admiral in 1937, he became chief of staff of the Second Fleet. Itō was assigned to the Navy Ministry during 1938–1940. In November 1940, he took command of Cruiser Division 8.

In April 1941 Itō became chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, and in September he was appointed vice chief of the navy General Staff under Admiral Nagano Osami. Itō was promoted to vice admiral that October and played a key role in the development of Japanese naval strategy in the Pacific war. Reluctant to see Japan go to war against the United States, he opposed the Pearl Harbor attack, but Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander of the Combined Fleet, urged Nagano to authorize the plan. On December 1, 1941, with the fleet already at sea, Itō ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor to proceed. He held his staff post for more than three years but desired a naval command.

In December 1944, Itō was appointed to command the Second Fleet. The Japanese Navy had already been crushed in the Battle of Leyte Gulf the previous October, and Itō's fleet was the only operative Japanese Navy force. On April 5, 1945, Admiral Toyoda Soemu ordered Operation TEN-GO, whereby the Second Fleet would join the March–June 1945 Battle for Okinawa, which had recently been invaded by U.S. forces. This operation was so reckless that Itō refused the order. His fleet lacked both aircraft carriers and aircraft, essential to protect its ships from air attack. Moreover, the fleet would be provided only enough fuel for a one-way trip from Kyushu to Okinawa. It was obvious to Itō and others that Toyoda intended to send the 7,000 men of the fleet on a suicide mission.

Ultimately, Vice Admiral Kusaka Ryūnosuke prevailed on Itō to obey the order, and on April 6 Itō set out with the battleship *Yamato* and eight destroyers. The plan called for the *Yamato* to fight its way to the U.S.

invasion site, destroy as many U.S. ships as possible, and then be beached as a stationary battery.

On April 7, 1945, the Second Fleet ships were attacked by U.S. vice admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force 58 in the East China Sea, and the *Yamato* was sunk. Itō perished along with 3,700 of its crew.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Kusaka Ryūnosuke; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nagano Osami; Okinawa, Invasion of; Toyoda Soemu; Yamamoto Isoroku; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Iwabuchi Sanji (1893–1945)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Niigata Prefecture, Japan, on March 2, 1893, Iwabuchi Sanji graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1915. Trained as a pilot, he then became a gunnery specialist and entered gunnery school in 1923. Between 1930 and 1933, he served as a gunnery officer on cruisers and battleships.

Promoted to captain in 1937, Iwabuchi was assigned to command the training cruiser *Kashii* in 1941, then the battleship *Kirishima* in April 1942. His ship took part in the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway and the campaign for the Solomon Islands during August 1942–February 1943. On November 15, 1942, in the naval battle at Guadalcanal, the *Kirishima* was hit by gunfire from the U.S. battleship *Washington* and had to be scuttled.

Promoted to rear admiral in May 1943, Iwabuchi was appointed commander of the 31st Naval Special Base Force in Manila. In November 1944, he was also assigned 4,000 army personnel and named commander of

the Manila Naval Defense Force. General Yamashita Tomoyuki, commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines, ordered Iwabuchi to evacuate Manila and conduct a protracted struggle in the mountainous regions of northern and central Luzon as well as east of Manila, but Iwabuchi refused to carry out the order.

Commanding 15,000 navy and 4,000 army personnel, Iwabuchi was determined to defend Manila to the last. During three weeks in February 1945, there was fierce house-to-house fighting in Manila, and most Japanese forces chose to fight to the death rather than surrender. Iwabuchi died near the end of the battle, on February 26, at Intramuros; he received a brevet promotion to vice admiral after his death.

Iwabuchi's decision resulted in the deaths of some 16,000 Japanese troops, 1,000 U.S. forces, and perhaps 100,000 civilians. Some of the latter were deliberately massacred by Japanese troops, but most were killed by U.S. artillery fire. Iwabuchi's actions also resulted in the trial and execution of Yamashita, who was convicted of being a war criminal for the actions of his subordinate, Iwabuchi.

KITA YOSHITO

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Manila, Battle for; Midway, Battle of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Iwakuro Hideo (1897–1970)

Japanese Army major general. Born in Hiroshima, Japan, on October 10, 1897, Iwakuro Hideo graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1918. He served in the Expeditionary Forces sent to Siberia in 1919 and 1920

and was promoted to captain in 1927 and to major in 1933. Iwakuro became a staff officer in the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria in 1933 and was promoted to colonel in 1939. He was one of the founders of the Nakano School, the Japanese Army institution that trained intelligence and sabotage operatives.

Prior to the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese ambassador to the United States Nomura Kichisaburo asked Minister of War Tōjō Hideki to send him an officer who was familiar with Chinese affairs to assist in negotiations with the United States. Tōjō sent Iwakuro to Washington in March 1941. Iwakuro negotiated with two Catholic priests, James E. Walsh and James M. Drought, in an effort to ease tensions between the United States and Japan. This attempt failed, and after the outbreak of the Pacific war, Iwakuro was appointed commander of the 5th Imperial Guards Regiment in Malaya.

In February 1942, Iwakuro became the liaison officer to the Indian National Army, which the Japanese were encouraging to take up arms against the British. He established the Iwakuro Kikan (later known as the Hikari Kikan), an organization to subvert British rule in India. Major Fujiwara Iwaichi also ran F Kikan (Special Branch) to encourage Indian nationalism. Both officers assisted Subhas Chandra Bose as leader of the Indian national movement.

In March 1944, Iwakuro was promoted to major general and appointed chief of staff of the Twenty-Eighth Army in Burma, where he helped to plan operations after the Imphal debacle. Iwakuro retired from the army at the end of the war and died in Tokyo on November 22, 1970.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Bose, Subhas Chandra; Japan; Nomura Kichisaburō; Tōjō Hideki

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Iwo Jima, Battle for (February 19–March 26, 1945)

The invasion of Iwo Jima, code-named Operation DETACHMENT, was the penultimate test of the U.S. Marine Corps World War II amphibious doctrine and practice. By the end of 1944, American forces had secured from Japan control of the Mariana Islands to provide air bases for Boeing B-29 Superfortress strategic bombers that could strike Japan. En route to Japan, these bombers flew over Iwo Jima (Sulphur Island). Located in the Japanese Bonin Islands, halfway between the Marianas and Japan, the pork chop–shaped volcanic island of Iwo Jima is from 800 yards to 2.5 miles wide and 5 miles long, with a total area of some 8 square miles.

Iwo Jima housed a large radar facility that gave Tokyo advance notice of impending air attacks as well as three airstrips for fighter aircraft that harassed the U.S. bombers. As a consequence, U.S. commanders formulated Operation DETACHMENT to seize Iwo Jima. In American hands, the island's airstrips would provide emergency landing facilities for U.S. bombers raiding Japan and allow fighters stationed there to escort bombers the entire length of their missions.

Japanese leaders understood the strategic importance of Iwo Jima and began reinforcing it a year prior to the American invasion. Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, the island's commander, disregarded the traditional Japanese defensive doctrine of meeting the enemy at the shoreline and implemented a new strategy that relied on 1,500 interlocking strongpoints inland, designed for a battle of attrition. His 21,000-man force dug out thousands of yards of tunnels in the soft volcanic rock to connect natural caves, underground bunkers, and man-made "spider traps" from which concealed defenders could infiltrate and attack any enemy positions. These extensive subterranean complexes would also shield the defenders from extensive preliminary air and naval bombardment by U.S. forces. Japanese artillerymen also preregistered the beachheads to maximize their artillery effectiveness.



Kuribayashi ordered the defenders to die in place and to kill at least 10 Americans before dying themselves. He was, however, handicapped by a lack of potable water. The absence of a natural harbor also limited Japanese reinforcement, and U.S. submarines sank a number of Japanese supply ships, including one transport with a regiment of Japanese tanks.

Beginning in August 1944, U.S. Army aircraft in the Marianas subjected Iwo Jima to air strikes, and from December 8, the island came under daily attack. Three heavy cruisers bombarded Iwo Jima three times in December and twice in January. Then, for two weeks beginning in late January, the Seventh Air Force bombed Iwo Jima day and night, and B-29s struck it twice. In all, U.S. forces dropped 6,800 tons of bombs prior to the invasion.

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet, cut back the naval bombardment of the island, begun on February 16, 1945, to only 3 days. This was a far shorter period than the 10 days sought by V Marine Amphibious Corps commander Lieutenant General Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith. Spruance concurred with invasion commander Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner that he lacked both ships and ammunition for the longer bombardment.

Smith led a force of 80,000 men, supported by Spruance’s Fifth Fleet. Turner had overall command of the invasion.

The bombardment force included 6 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and 16 destroyers, while the invasion force totaled 880 ships of all types. Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy had command of the Amphibious Support Task Force (TG 52), charged with all prelanding activities, including shore bombardment, minesweeping, and underwater demolition. In all, the navy fired 22,000 rounds of 5- to 16-inch shells prior to the invasion, the heaviest bombardment of the Pacific war.

The American flag being raised on Iwo Jima, February 23, 1945. The Marine Corps Memorial in Arlington, Virginia, is based on this iconic image. (National Archives and Records Administration)

On February 19, 1945, 30,000 U.S. marines from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions stormed ashore, only to encounter Iwo Jima's coarse, black volcanic sand. Heavy surf smashed the landing craft against the island's shelf, and the deep sand immobilized many vehicles on the beach. The resulting logjam of men and equipment on the beachhead provided prime targets for highly accurate Japanese artillery fire. With little or no cover, the marines had no choice but to fight their way inland. One group wheeled south, toward the island's most prominent terrain feature, the 556-foot Mount Suribachi, while the majority of the marines attacked northward toward the first airfield.

On the fourth day after the initial landing, marines reached the crest of Mount Suribachi, and although still under fire, they raised a small American flag. A few hours later, another group raised a second larger flag as Associated Press reporter Joe Rosenthal impulsively snapped a photo. Rosenthal's picture of these five marines and one navy corpsman planting the second flag became a Marine Corps icon and the symbol for American victory in the Pacific. The photograph remains one of the most widely reproduced images of all time.

Marines assaulting the main line of resistance to the north waded through rain-soaked sand into a maze of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and caves. Using flamethrowers, demolition charges, bazookas, tanks, and air support, they pushed their way through Kuribayashi's defenses for 36 days, sometimes advancing only a few feet per day. By March 26, nearly 70,000 marines had conquered most of the island, at a cost of approximately 6,500 dead and 20,000 wounded. More than 95 percent of the Japanese defenders died during the same period, and pockets of Japanese resistance continued as individual defenders emerged from concealed cave complexes throughout April and May, resulting in 1,600 additional Japanese deaths. Fewer than 300 Japanese were taken prisoner.

Was the capture of Iwo Jima worth the high cost? With the island firmly in U.S. possession, U.S. bombers pounded the Japanese homeland unabated. In the midst of the heaviest fighting on March 4, U.S. bombers made emergency landings on the island. In addition to serving in this capacity, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) VII Fighter Command moved to Iwo Jima and sent its long-range Republic P-47 Thunderbolts and North American P-51 Mustangs as escorts with the B-29s to Japan. The bombers now mixed medium-level daytime raids with the low-level night attacks. With the USAAF fighters along, losses of Japanese planes mounted rapidly, while those of the B-29s continued to decline.

The struggle for Iwo Jima epitomized the courage and esprit of the Marine Corps during the war. Twenty-two marines, four navy corpsmen, and one navy officer on Iwo Jima earned the Medal of Honor (almost half of them posthumously), accounting for one-third of all such medals earned by marines during the entire war. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz testified to the level of courage and bravery among the Americans fighting on Iwo Jima in

stating that “Among the Americans who served on Iwo Jima, uncommon valor was a common virtue.”

DEREK W. FRISBY

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Central Pacific Campaign; Flamethrowers; Kuribayashi Tadamichi; Mariana Islands Campaign; Nimitz, Chester William; Smith, Holland McTyeire; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly; Vandegrift, Alexander Archer

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J

Jány, Gusztáv (1883–1947)

Hungarian Army general. Born in Rajka, Hungary, on October 21, 1883, Gusztáv Jány graduated from the Hungarian Military Academy as a lieutenant in 1905. He was promoted to major in 1919, to lieutenant colonel in 1921, and to colonel in 1925. Assigned to duties with the General Staff, he commanded the 2nd Brigade at Szombathely in 1929 and then, during 1932–1936, the Ludovika Military Academy in Budapest. In 1937 and 1938, he commanded II Corps at Szombathely, and from February 1939 to March 1940, he commanded I Corps in Budapest as a major general.

In 1940, Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy appointed Jány commander of the Second Hungarian Army, with the rank of full general. In May 1942, the Second Army was sent to the Eastern Front to participate in fighting against the Soviet Union. Jány had only limited authority while under German command. His troops were ordered to defend the front along the Don River, an unrealistic assignment given the army's small size (200,000 men) and inadequate equipment. Jány repeatedly requested additional resources, but none came. He informed the Hungarian political and military leadership about the potential for disaster, but there was neither support from home nor authorization to withdraw if necessary.

Jány's exhausted and poorly supplied soldiers simply could not hold back Red Army forces, which broke through their lines on January 14, 1943. In spite of considerable losses and the catastrophic circumstances, Jány never was allowed to withdraw, and on January 24, he issued a general order blaming his soldiers for the tragedy. Six weeks later, he admitted that his officers and men had done their best, but this was kept from many of his soldiers and the public. In the Battle for the Don, Jány's army suffered 120,000 killed, captured, or missing.

Jány returned to Hungary with his staff on May 1, 1943. That August, he was relieved of command and retired from the army. When Soviet troops

reached Hungary, he moved to Bavaria, where he was taken prisoner by U.S. forces. In October 1946, Jány was returned to Hungary, arrested, and charged with war crimes. Tried, he was found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed in Budapest on November 26, 1947. In 1993, the Hungarian Supreme Court annulled the charges against Jány and rehabilitated him.

ANNA BOROS-MCGEE

See also

Eastern Front; Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós; Hungary; Hungary, Army

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Japan

East Asian nation with a 1939 population of 71.3 million. The Japanese home islands encompass approximately 145,925 square miles and border the Pacific Ocean to the east, the Sea of Japan to the west, and the East China Sea to the southwest. To Japan's north is the Soviet Union; to the west is the Korean Peninsula and China. The population of the home islands has remained remarkably homogenous, and on the eve of World War II more than 95 percent of Japan's inhabitants were of Japanese descent. Highly mountainous, the islands were also largely bereft of natural resources.

Japan's governmental arrangement was complex and often contradictory. Technically a constitutional monarchy under the Meiji Constitution of 1899, Japan in theory invested all sovereignty with the emperor; this made the executive and legislative branches as well as the military subordinate to him. In practice, however, the emperor did not possess absolute powers. The constitution diluted his prerogatives by delegating much of his authority to an executive cabinet, the bicameral Diet (parliament), and to the supreme military command and its administrative bureaucracy. Thus, Emperor Hirohito had little to do with the direct establishment of foreign, domestic, or military policies and little say over the execution of those policies. National

policies were set by the cabinet, which was beholden only to the emperor. Cabinet officials and advisers were responsible for appointing prime ministers and key government and military officials.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the conservatives and ultranationalists came to dominate the cabinet and military, and coups against and assassinations of uncooperative prime ministers became almost routine. After 1932, governments could only be formed with the assent of the military. As the military—especially the army—accrued more control over Japan's governmental apparatus, it became clear that conservative officers and commanders sought to impose a de facto military dictatorship on Japan. By the late 1930s, moreover, the navy had succeeded in propelling Japanese influence southward, into Southeast Asia.

By the end of the decade, the army and navy were essentially setting all Japanese policies, and military officials had absolute veto power over both the cabinet and legislature. By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Japanese military had largely transformed Japan into a perpetually mobilized, highly nationalist and militarist nation bent on controlling large swaths of East Asia.

Japan experienced the demands of total war as intensely as any principal combatant in World War II. In 1931, the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army had staged an incident and used this as the excuse to conquer Manchuria, and in 1937, the Sino-Japanese War began. It has become customary among Japanese to associate the era of total war for their country with the decade preceding World War II.

Although Japan was a major industrial nation in 1939, it was decidedly deficient in natural resources and not even self-sufficient in food. Virtually everything Japan needed had to come by sea, a vulnerability the United States was quick to exploit during the Pacific war. Deficiency in raw materials drove Japan's expansionary policies. The men who took Japan into the Pacific war believed that the conflict afforded the opportunity to redress the geographical accident of a paucity of natural resources. These could be found in Southeast Asia, especially the Dutch East Indies.

Japan also lacked the industrial base of its Western enemies. In 1941, for example, it produced 6.7 million tons of steel, whereas the United States produced 73.9 million tons. To some extent, too, Japan was already

exhausted by years of fighting in China when its government undertook yet another war with an even more formidable opponent in the United States.

As during World War I, the world's preoccupation with European events allowed Japanese leaders an opportunity to expand their power in the Far East. In October 1938, Tokyo announced its intention to create a New East Asian Order that would end Western colonialism in the region and replace it with Japanese leadership. Already in the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), Japan had aligned itself with Germany against the Soviet Union, and in 1938 and 1939 Japanese and Soviet forces clashed in Manchuria and Mongolia, culminating in August 1939 in a major Soviet victory at the Battle of Khalkin Gol (Nomonhan Incident) on the Manchurian border.

On September 27, 1940, Japan allied itself with Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact. This recognized Japanese leadership in "Greater East Asia" and German-Italian leadership in establishing "a new order" in Europe. Aimed directly at the United States, the pact pledged mutual assistance if any of the signatories was attacked "by a power at present not involved in the European war or the Sino-Japanese conflict." Thus, it did not obligate Japan's partners to go to war should Japan attack the United States.

When Germany defeated France in June 1940, Japan demanded and obtained military bases in Indochina. The United States—the one power that stood in the way of Japanese expansion—responded by applying crippling economic sanctions, to include freezing credit and embargoing scrap metal and—especially important—oil, of which Japan had only a limited supply. Washington also demanded that Japan quit both Indochina and China. Tokyo refused.

On April 13, 1941, Japan and the Soviet Union concluded a neutrality pact, although the treaty did not prevent Tokyo from contemplating an attack on the Soviet Far East after the German invasion of that country in June. For a time Japan's military leaders debated whether to attack the Soviet Union or the United States, but the weather and lack of the resources Japan most needed (i.e., oil) as well as the military rebuff suffered by Japan at the hands of the Soviets in the earlier fighting all inclined Japan toward war with the United States.

Japan hoped in going to war against the United States to mount a preemptive strike and cripple the U.S. Pacific Fleet sufficiently that it would provide time to secure the desired essential resources, including the oil of the

Dutch East Indies, and then establish a defensive ring sufficient to hold the U.S. Navy at bay. Army leaders were confident of victory; navy leaders were not.

This was the situation when Tōjō Hideki, premier since October 17, 1941, took Japan into war. Japan attacked the U.S. Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941, but Japan simply lacked the resources to wage war in China while also defending the territories it would acquire in Southeast Asia. Fanaticism in battle was insufficient to overcome shortages in matériel.

The period of warfare from at least 1937 to 1945 is customarily referred to by the Japanese as a "dark valley" of unrelieved misery and pain. The Great Depression of the 1930s had brought widespread hardship to Japan, exacerbated by sharp increases in military expenditures even prior to 1937 that created a serious balance-of-payments problem and an inflationary crisis. Between 1937 and 1940, real wages fell by 17 percent. By 1939, Japan was spending about 36 percent of its gross national product (GNP) on the military, as opposed to only 23 percent in Germany and 8 percent in Britain.

The Japanese government took early action to control and allocate its dwindling resources effectively. In preparation for total war, it instituted full-scale mobilization measures, whereby it directed systematic programs to put more people to work in agriculture and in ammunition plants. One way to facilitate this was by employing women. Initially the government rejected this as a sign of national weakness, but it had no other choice. By 1945, women constituted nearly 42 percent of the labor force, a figure higher than that in the United States. By the 1940s, girls as young as 12 were deemed eligible for the workforce.

Japan did have some success in increasing industrial production. From 1940 to 1944, production increased 25 percent, although much of this occurred because the government consolidated production in larger firms. Even so, Japanese efforts in this regard paled beside the achievements of the United States.

The demands of total war went beyond economics to include a variety of efforts to strengthen the national will. The nation underwent political restructuring that brought both the dissolution of political parties and the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) in October 1940. Although the IRAA failed to achieve its goal of restructuring Japanese society along the lines of the European fascist states, its establishment

symbolized increasing domestic repression. Simultaneously, governmental monitoring of dissidents increased. The Special Higher Police and the Military Police carefully monitored religious sects, Koreans, and suspected leftists and pacifists.

The Japanese people fully supported war with the United States, which they believed had been forced on their nation by American economic policies designed to cripple Japan. Nonetheless, the government instituted rigid censorship and used propaganda and the state-controlled education system to strengthen national spiritual mobilization. As the diarist Kiyoshi Kiyosawa noted, the Japanese were bombarded with appeals to remember their "spiritual" superiority over their enemies.

Ultranationalist societies, all to some extent proclaiming Japan's destiny to expand its territory on the Asian continent, proliferated. In addition, the government established several women's patriotic societies designed to improve civil defense, welcome soldiers home from the battlefront, visit hospitals to comfort the sick and wounded, and raise money for the relief of bereaved families. Small communities were also organized so that everyday life was systematized to impose a shared social unity in which people might monitor their neighbors; privacy became a thing of the past.

Perhaps the saddest manifestation of Japan's response to total war was the decision late in the war to utilize suicide missions. The so-called kamikaze played on the courage and fatalism of young men who believed that their country faced destruction and hoped their deaths would serve family and country.

Food shortages became apparent early, and in December 1940 the government began food rationing on a ticket system. Often, basic necessities such as cotton and soy sauce were also strictly rationed. The scarcity of food encouraged black markets and caused serious malnutrition.

Even while Japanese society was reorganizing, actions by Japan's military enemies forced increasing disruptions of the emerging total war system. One particular concern was the vulnerability of Japan's major cities to aerial attack, as the strategic bombing of civilian centers became part of the new era of total war. Doolittle's April 18, 1942, Tokyo Raid first demonstrated this vulnerability to the Japanese people. Although the raid inflicted little physical damage, it had a pronounced psychological effect.

From June 1944, the United States began a strategic bombing campaign

directed against Japanese industry, the bulk of which was located in the cities. Constructed largely of wooden buildings, the cities were appallingly vulnerable to firebomb attack, as shown in the great March 9–10, 1945, raid on Tokyo, probably the most destructive in the history of air warfare; it claimed some 120,000 lives and was followed by other attacks. One by one, the Japanese cities became burned-out shells. Americans justified these attacks as essential to reach and destroy the largely dispersed Japanese industrial base, but civilians paid a horrific price. By the time Japan surrendered in August 1945, every major city except the shrine city of Kyoto had been torched, and some 10 million Japanese had fled the cities to escape the raids.

The government began this resettlement in August 1944 by moving 350,000 urban schoolchildren between the ages of 8 and 12 into village temples, shrines, and inns. In 1945, a further 450,000 elementary school students were evacuated. Although Germany's surrender in May 1945 seemingly offered Japan a chance to extricate itself from a clearly worsening situation, the government refused to take the initiative, and U.S. forces stepped up their firebombing of what was left of Japan's major cities. In some cases, this bombing merely rearranged the rubble. Meanwhile, submarine attacks on Japanese shipping and aerial mining of Japanese harbors and coastline destroyed the already marginal Japanese shipping capacity, cutting off the flow of vital imports of food and oil and further damaging the economy.

Finally, in August 1945 the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the same time, the Soviet Union honored its pledge at Yalta and declared war on Japan. Hundreds of thousands of lives were lost as a result of this twin shock, and Japan finally surrendered. The nation was devastated both physically and psychologically.

MAJIMA AYU AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Anti-Comintern Pact; B-29 Raids against Japan; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Japan, Air Forces; Japan, Army; Japan, Navy; Japan, Occupation of; Japan, Surrender of; Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act; Kamikaze; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Potsdam Conference; Tōjō Hideki; Tokyo, Bombing of; Tokyo Raid; Tripartite

Pact; Women in World War II; Yalta Conference; Document 75; Document 101; Document 103; Document 106; Document 108; Document 112; Document 113; Document 118; Document 119; Document 121; Document 126; Document 225

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Japan, Air Forces

During World War II, Japan did not possess an independent air force; the army and navy each had its own air service. In the interwar period, the two had different hypothetical enemies. The army planned to fight against the Soviet Union, and the navy expected to fight the United States and Britain in the Western Pacific. As a consequence, each service developed its own air arm, tailored to meet its particular needs.

Unfortunately for the Japanese war effort, neither service cooperated with the other. Army and navy aircraft employed different electrical systems. When the Japanese developed an identification, friend or foe (IFF), capability, army operators on Iwo Jima in 1944 could not identify Japanese Navy aircraft as friendly. Aircraft factories were divided between those areas that made army planes and those producing naval aircraft, with each keeping design developments secret. There was no exchange of data. The navy's Zero fighter was superior to the army's Hayabusa, but the navy did not want to share the Zero with the army. If the army had adopted the Zero, the number of Japanese fighter aircraft produced during the war would have been greatly increased. There was also little standardization between the Zero and the Hayabusa, even in small screw parts.

Japan also failed to develop heavy bombers comparable to those of Britain and the United States. Not until January 1944 did the army and navy agree to develop a joint six-engine heavy bomber, dubbed the “Fugaku,” but this project came too late and had to be abandoned. Finally, each service concealed its weaknesses from the other. Thus, it was 1945 before army leaders discovered how catastrophic the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway had been for the Japanese naval air arm.

At the beginning of the Pacific war, in December 1941, the Japanese Army possessed 4,800 aircraft. Most army fighters were of the obsolete Nakajima Ki-27 Type 97 (“Abdul” in the Allied recognition system). The army had just 50 first-class fighters, the Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa (“Oscar”), which made its debut over Malaya in December 1941. The Ki-43 gradually became the army’s most numerous fighter; 5,751 were built during the war.

Later, the army introduced new fighters: the Nakajima Ki-44 Shoki (“Tōjō”), with initial deliveries in September 1942; the Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien (“Tony”), in August 1942; and the Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate (“Frank”), in April 1944. The best of Japan’s wartime army fighters to reach mass production, the Ki-84 was superior to the North American P-51 Mustang and Republic P-47 Thunderbolt in certain respects. The Japanese Army had no heavy bombers or dive-bombers and only three medium types: the Mitsubishi Ki-21 Type 97 (“Gwen”), the Nakajima Ki-49 Donryu (“Helen”), and the Mitsubishi Ki-67 Hiryu (“Peggy”).

As of December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy air arm, which played a major role in the early battles in the Pacific, possessed 3,000 airplanes, 1,300 of which were with the fleet in 1941. Most numerous of its aircraft was the excellent highly maneuverable Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter (“Zeke”). Others included the Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bomber and light bomber (“Kate”), the Aichi D3A Type 99 carrier dive-bomber (“Val”), and two twin-engine, land-based medium bombers, the Mitsubishi G3M (“Nell”) and the G4M Type 1 (“Betty”). Zero fighters took part in every major Japanese operation of the war. In the first six months of the war, the Zero was superior to any Allied fighter aircraft. Japan produced a total of 10,370 Zeros during World War II. As new Allied aircraft were introduced, the Japanese Navy developed new aircraft, such as the Kawanishi NIK2-J Shiden (“George”) and the Nakajima B6N Tenzan (“Jill”).

In the 1937–1945 Sino-Japanese War and the first stage of the 1941–1945

Pacific war, Japan's air forces enjoyed considerable success. They dominated the skies over China and instituted strategic bombing of Chinese cities in 1938. The Japanese naval air arm was undoubtedly the best in the world, and Japanese pilots were among the best trained. In 1941, first-line Japanese pilots had 500 to 800 flying hours, and 50 percent of army pilots and 10 percent of navy pilots had combat experience against China and/or the Soviet Union.

On December 7, 1941, the naval air arm executed the attack on Pearl Harbor, conclusively demonstrating the supremacy of airpower in modern naval warfare and establishing the effective combination of carriers and aircraft. A few days later, navy land-based aircraft sank the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse* off Malaya. For the first time, a self-defending battleship had been sunk while under way by aircraft, which showed that in the future, ships would require air protection. In 1942, however, Japan's air forces suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Midway and the Battle of Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943). These battles spelled the ruin of the fine Japanese naval air arm and revealed the serious flaw of an inadequate pilot replacement system. The army also sustained heavy aircraft and pilot losses over New Guinea in 1943, and navy air squadrons were badly hurt at Truk and the Caroline Islands from February to April 1944.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea (the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot") on June 1–21, 1944, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf on October 23–26, 1944, finished off the Japanese naval air arm as an effective fighting force. The army and navy delivered new planes, such as the Hayate and Tenzan, but shortages of adequately trained pilots and fuel negated any advantage. By 1944, Japan was so short of aviation fuel that it could scarcely train its pilots; Japanese aviators had only about 120 hours of flying time before combat.

Japan produced some excellent highly maneuverable aircraft during the war, but they tended to be lightly armored and caught fire easily. The Zero fighter was essentially unarmored, and Allied pilots dubbed the G4M Type 1 ("Betty") bomber "the flying cigarette lighter" because it so readily caught fire. Japanese aircraft simply could not sustain heavy damage. The planes also tended to be more lightly armed than their U.S. counterparts. When the Boeing B-29s began the strategic bombing of Japan, Japanese fighters had

difficulty shooting them down. The Japanese planes also lacked airborne radar.

As Japan faced overwhelming Allied forces by late 1944, the military instituted kamikaze attacks. Such strikes were ordered by Vice Admiral Ōnishi Takijirō during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and they reached their culmination in the Battle of Okinawa between March and June 1945. The kamikaze strikes proved highly effective. The U.S. Navy sustained greater personnel losses from these attacks during the Battle of Okinawa than in all its previous wars combined.

Yet even this new tactic could not turn the tide for Japan. Between 1940 and 1945, the United States produced 297,199 aircraft. During the same period, Japan produced 74,656. In the Pacific war, the Japanese Army lost 15,920 planes, and the Japanese Navy lost 27,190.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Genda Minoru; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Japan, Army; Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Kato Takeo; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Okinawa, Invasion of; Ōnishi Takijirō; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse,* Sinking of; Sakai Saburo; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Japan, Army

The Imperial Japanese Army (Dai Nippon Teikoku Rikugun) defies easy or simple recounting, in no small measure because Japanese official histories of World War II begin in September 1931 with the start of the Manchurian

Campaign. Thus, any account of the Japanese Army and the war really has to cover a 14-year period and be divided into two parts. The first part concerns the process by which the army came to dominate the political process in Japan and, in effect, control the Japanese state. The second part treats military campaigns both on the ground and in the air because the army, as with the navy, had its own air force. Also, the army was involved in two wars, one in East Asia and the other in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, that were largely separate; both contained a number of campaigns that again were largely separate. Thus, the war in East Asia divides into the campaign in Manchuria, 1931–1932; the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945; and the final phase of the war, after December 1944, which saw major Japanese withdrawals throughout southern China and then defeat at Soviet hands in August 1945 in northern China and Manchuria.

The process by which the military came to dominate the Japanese state is the most important dimension of Imperial Japanese Army activity. It was the product of developments that reached back into the 1920s. In the course of these two conflicts, Japanese military formations undertook operations without direct control and guidance from authorities in Tokyo. This bred a habit of independent action, which came to be identified with the belief that action could and would not be repudiated by Tokyo.

The first real example of this came in 1928, when Japanese military personnel from the Guandong (Kwantung) Army, the garrison force in Manchuria, murdered the local warlord, but the Army Ministry blocked all moves to have those responsible tried by courts-martial, on the grounds that such proceedings would be damaging to the army’s prestige. The cabinet gave way and, having surrendered on such a crucial matter, had no real basis to oppose deliberate insubordination when events revealed powerful support within Japan for the Guandong Army’s action in 1931 and 1932 in overrunning Manchuria.

The Manchurian episode was crucial to the process whereby the Imperial Japanese Army effectively came to control the state. Officers of the Guandong Army staged the Mukden (Shenyang) Incident on September 18, 1931, and what followed amounted to a coup by the Guandong Army. After an emergency cabinet meeting in Tokyo, the Japanese government announced that it was committed to a policy of nonaggression in Manchuria,

but the Army Ministry declared that it would not consult the cabinet about policy but would be bound by the Guandong Army's decisions.

The cabinet immediately denied the Guandong Army's request for three divisions and ordered the Korean command not to provide reinforcements, whereupon the Korean command did just that on September 21. The government found itself confronted with a fait accompli and outmaneuvered at every turn by a military that played the card of public opinion against any attempt to halt proceedings inside Manchuria. The government fell in December; then on May 15, 1932, the new premier, Inukai Tsuyoshi, was assassinated by a group of naval officers and army cadets.

This marked the beginning of the military's domination of the political process within Japan, because in its aftermath, governments could only be formed with the assent of the military and only if they were prepared to accede to the military's demands. When Hirota Kōki became prime minister in July 1936 in the wake of the army mutiny on February 26, 1936, he found that the army minister had effective veto power over all appointments. In practice, the army could refuse to appoint an army minister or use the threat of resignation to ensure compliance. There was no basic change in such arrangements until Japan was overwhelmed by national defeat in 1945.

In terms of the major military commitments in this 14-year period, the Manchurian Campaign was of minor importance. There was no serious, sustained, or coherent resistance within Manchuria, set up by the Japanese as a puppet state known as Manzhouguo (Manchukuo and after 1934 Manzhoudiguo [Manchoutikuo], the Manzhou [Manchu] Empire).

The Sino-Japanese War, which began in 1937, was another matter altogether. The ease with which Japanese forces overran northern China after July 1937 was testimony to the extent of Japanese success over the previous five years, but the real point was that the Imperial Japanese Army found itself involved in a protracted war it had not sought that tied down its resources. As in 1932, the Japanese Navy instigated fighting in Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, and again, the army had to be deployed to rescue its sister service; it could only do so by extensive mobilization and escalation of a crisis it would have preferred to resolve through threat, intimidation, and a series of piecemeal Chinese surrenders.

The Japanese military effort quickly widened. There were some defeats along the way, the most notable being in front of Tai'erzhuang (Tai'erh-

Chuang) on April 6–7, 1938. The next day, Imperial General Headquarters formally sanctioned an escalation by ordering the capture of Xuzhou (Hsuchow), Jiangsu Province. This enabled the Japanese military to link what had been separate efforts in northern and central China and develop the offensive that would result in the capture of the Wuhan cities of Hubei (Hupeh) Province in October.

The period after 1938 was notable for the rice raids that began in Hubei Province in late 1940 and the "Three Alls"—"Kill All, Burn All, Destroy All"—campaigns in Communist-dominated areas in northern China. In the course of this and subsequent Japanese operations, the population of Communist base areas was reduced from an estimated 44 million to 25 million by a policy of mass deportations, murder, and deliberate starvation. The Communists were neutralized as a threat, with no major guerrilla activity in northern China for the remainder of the war, but as in all matters Japanese in this war, success was an illusion.

By 1938, if not before, the Japanese Army, with 1 million troops in China, found itself learning again the truth of the Clausewitzian dictum that it is easy to conquer but hard to occupy. The reason was the adoption by the Chinese of a policy of protracted resistance that precluded negotiations. The Japanese countered with a strategic bombing offensive, but this did not bring the Nationalist (Guomindang, GMD) leadership to surrender. Perhaps the only point of real interest in these campaigns was the first attempt by any armed force to use airpower to kill a head of state. On August 30, 1941, army bombers attacked a villa in Chongqing (Chungking) in Sichuan (Szechwan), where Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) was known to be taking part in staff talks.

These efforts ran concurrently with defeats at Soviet hands. Japanese commitments in China dictated a cautious policy in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, but in 1938 and 1939 several small and two major clashes occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. The first major clash took place between July 11 and August 10, 1938, in the area around Zhanggufeng (Chang-ku-feng) where Manchuria, Korea, and the Maritime Provinces met; the second occurred between May and September 1939 in the area between the River Halha and Nomonhan.

In both cases, single Japanese divisions attempted to clear Soviet forces from their territorial holdings, but in the first action the Japanese were

checked, and in the second they were subjected to attack by an enemy possessing overwhelming numerical superiority in aircraft, tanks, and artillery. Beginning on August 20, the Soviets undertook an offensive that shredded the Komatsubara Force and then destroyed one infantry regiment on the banks of the Halha. By mid-September, the Japanese had brought three fresh divisions to Nomonhan, but by this stage, both sides had little interest in continuing, and a local truce was arranged. the Zhanggufeng and Nomonhan disputes were resolved in June 1940.

The defeat at Nomonhan coincided with the 1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, and this, together with the Anglo-French declaration of war on Germany, caused Japan to adopt a cautious policy. The German victory in Northwestern Europe in the spring of 1940 was immediately followed by a change of government. On July 21, Prince Konoe Fumimaro replaced the more circumspect Yonai Mitsumasa as prime minister. The two services' precondition for allowing Konoe to form a government was his prior acceptance of their demands for a treaty with Germany and Italy, additional credits for the army, a nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union, and the adoption of a forward strategy in southeast Asia.

In the China theater, however, the international situation offered the army the means to isolate the Chinese Nationalist regime by intimidating the British and French colonial authorities in Southeast Asia. The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the U.S. embargo of various goods, which was drastically extended that July, placed Japan in a situation where a choice had to be made. At the navy's insistence, Japan's leaders decided to move into Southeast Asia to ensure access to raw materials. Without these assets, Japanese leaders believed that their nation could not survive as a great power, even if this move meant war with the United States.

The army's role would be to provide garrisons in the islands marking the defensive perimeter where the Americans would be fought to a standstill. The navy's belief was that the fleet and land-based aircraft would meet the Americans more or less on the basis of equality and fight them to exhaustion, forcing the United States to reach a negotiated settlement.

Although this has been overlooked, the role of the army in the Pacific war was therefore limited; even in the initial phase when Southeast Asia was overrun, the commitment of the Imperial Japanese Army remained modest. The campaigns in Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the

Philippines involved only 11 Japanese divisions, the equivalent of a single army, and after these conquests were completed, no single campaign, whether in the Southwest, Central, or North Pacific, involved a corps equivalent or more in the field until that in the Philippines in 1944 and 1945.

Admittedly, the defeats that Japan incurred in eastern New Guinea (March 1942 to December 1943) and thereafter along the northern coast of the island (December 1943 to May 1944) and in the central and upper Solomons (February to November 1943) did involve more than a corps equivalent, but these were local defeats largely separated from one another. Probably no single reverse, even Guadalcanal (August 1942 to February 1943) at the beginning of second-phase operations, involved more than two divisions.

The only defeat of corps-sized proportions incurred prior to the Philippines Campaign in Burma at Imphal and Kohima during the 1943–1944 campaigning season was the so-called March on Delhi that went disastrously wrong. The origins of this defeat lay in the ease with which the Japanese, with just one division, had frustrated a corps-sized British offensive in the Arakan in 1943.

In these 1941–1942 campaigns, the Japanese had no military margin of superiority, but they outfought individual enemies who were defensively dispersed and subjected to amphibious assaults by Japanese forces enjoying local air and naval superiority. The campaigns, conducted across a frontage of more than 3,000 miles, were characterized by economy of effort and an almost aesthetic quality as successive landings penetrated to the depth of Allied defenses.



Japanese army tanks approaching the Singapore Causeway during the Japanese drive on the city in February 1942. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Thereafter, the problem for Japan and the Imperial Japanese Army was threefold. First, once they were no longer taking the initiative in the Pacific, Japanese garrisons were subjected to attack by massively superior Allied assets. No force could sustain itself against such an attack, and no resistance, however protracted and effective in terms of tying down U.S. military assets, could alter a pattern of defeat that brought American forces astride Japanese lines of communication to the south and took the war to the home islands.

Second, the Imperial Japanese Army deployed formations to the Pacific at the expense of garrison forces in Manchuria and China, where these formations were not easily replaced. By 1944, ammunition shortages precluded live-fire training. By August 1945, the class of 1945 was basically untrained, and the 1944 class was little better. The army, which had numbered some 24 divisions in the mid-1920s and 51 divisions in December

1941, raised 3 armored and 107 infantry divisions for service overseas; 1 tank division and 55 infantry divisions remained in the home islands.

Despite these numbers, the quality of the army was declining because Japan lacked adequate industrial capacity to meet the requirements of total war. Japanese output in 1944 was equivalent to 4 percent of the American production of mortars, 4.7 percent of tanks, 8 percent of antiaircraft ammunition, perhaps 10 percent of all ordnance, and 6.5 percent of small-arms ammunition. With minimum capability, the divisions in the home islands in 1945 were singularly ill-prepared to resist assault landings.

The Japanese Army never experienced defeat in the home islands, but it faced defeat repeatedly on the continental mainland. Japanese forces were defeated throughout Burma (with the exception of Tenasserim) in 1945 and also in August throughout Manchuria, northern China, and Korea, on Sakhalin and in the Kuriles, when Soviet forces put together a masterly short campaign. The Japanese forces numbered some 750,000 troops, but of these, some 300,000 were Manchurians suited only to garrison duties.

Japanese troops were mustered in 17 infantry divisions, equipped with 1,155 tanks, 5,360 artillery pieces, and 1,800 aircraft, but these were utterly routed by an enemy force consisting of 1 tank army and 11 infantry armies. Seeking to consolidate and allow removal of formations to more important theaters, the Japanese had begun major withdrawals within China, ending the period of Japanese successes that had begun in the spring of 1944. The conduct of these operations resembled previous Japanese efforts in brutality.

In July 1945, the Japanese Army had 26 infantry divisions in China and another seven in Korea, but even so, its position was hopeless. The extent of failure can be gauged by the fact that Japan managed to conjure into existence an alliance that included the world’s most populous country; the greatest empire; the greatest industrial power, naval power, and airpower; and the greatest military power. However unintentional, this was a formidable achievement, but it was combined with fundamental failure by the army leadership to comprehend the nature of the war in which it was involved.

Drawing on its highly selective interpretation of Japanese history and hobbled by the fact that never having been defeated it could not understand defeat, the army was dominated by an ethos that stressed reverence for rank. A formal organization, it had no real capacity for flexibility and initiative at the lower levels. Its broad distaste for political and economic liberalism

coexisted with its belief in what it deemed traditional Japanese martial values—specifically, its willingness to die "honorably." The war proved, however, that sacrifice could not confound superior enemy industrial output and matériel.

H. P. WILLMOTT

See also

Arakan Campaign, First; China; China, Army; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guandong Army; Hirota Kōki; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Jiang Jieshi; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Manchuria Campaign; Manzhouguo; New Guinea Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Sino-Japanese War; Yonai Mitsumasa; Zhanggufeng/Khasan, Battle of

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Japan, Navy

By the 1920s, the Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kaigun (Imperial Japanese Navy, IJN), which dated only from the late 1860s, ranked as the third-largest navy in the world. By then, it had fought three wars, and at the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905, it won one of the most comprehensive victories in the long history of naval warfare. The IJN was to fight two more wars, one in the Western Pacific, directed against China, and the other throughout the Pacific,

Eastern and Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. The latter resulted in utter and total national defeat and the destruction of the Kaigun as a service.

From 1907 onward, IJN leaders identified the United States as the enemy against which preparations had to be made. Yet the Kaigun faced a basic and insoluble problem, namely Japan's acceptance of the limitation of its navy to three-fifths those of the United States and Great Britain, as agreed at the 1921–1922 Washington Naval Conference. This resulted from the conviction of minister of the navy Admiral Kato Tomosaburo that the only thing worse for Japan than an unrestricted naval construction race would be war against the United States. Kato believed that Japan therefore had to seek security through peaceful cooperation and diplomatic arrangements. Kato and others viewed the navy as a deterrent and, in the event of war, a defense; however, they also believed that Japan's best interests would be served by arrangements that limited U.S. naval construction relative to Japan and so provided the basis of U.S. recognition and acceptance of Japan's regional position. The problem was that events unfolded in a manner that forced the IJN into planning for a war that, by its own calculations, it was certain to lose.

The basis of this position was twofold. First, the Kaigun found itself obliged to fight not one but two wars. It would have to confront a U.S. enemy that would seek battle and carry out major amphibious undertakings across the Western Pacific to bring the war to Japanese home waters. The Kaigun would also be obliged to fight a maritime war to defend Japanese shipping and seaborne trade. Losing either would result in Japan's defeat. In the event, the Kaigun suffered both naval and mercantile defeats.

The maritime defeat could have been predicted. Four Shimushu- or Type A–class escort warships were ordered under the 1937 naval estimates, but none was begun before November 1938, to be completed between June 1940 and March 1941. In December 1941, these four ships were the only purpose-built escorts in service with the IJN, and all lacked underwater detection gear (sonar).

Quite simply, Japanese industry did not have the capacity to build and service both warships and merchantmen or to build both fleet units and escorts (see Table 1). Japan's limited industrial capacity forced it to choose between warships and merchantmen, between building and refitting. Moreover, the Kaigun had no real understanding of trade defense and the

principles of convoy. Not until November 1943 did the navy institute general convoy, and lacking sufficient escorts and integrated air defense, this merely concentrated targets rather than protecting shipping.

Here too lay the basis of Japan's naval defeat in the Pacific. In order to fight and defeat the U.S. attempt to carry the war across the Pacific, the Kaigun developed the *zengen sakusen* (all-out battle strategy), which envisaged the decisive battle in five phases. Submarines gathered off the Hawaiian Islands would provide timely reports of U.S. fleet movements and, with top surface speeds of 24 knots, carry out a series of night attacks on U.S. formations. It anticipated that the United States would suffer losses of one-tenth of strength in this phase and the same in the next, when Japanese shore-based aircraft, specially built for superior range and strike capability, would engage the U.S. formations. The U.S. ships would then be subjected to night attack by massed destroyer formations, Japanese battle cruisers, and cruisers being used to blast aside escorts. The Japanese anticipated massed scissors attacks using as many as 120 Long Lance torpedoes in a single effort.

Thereafter, with U.S. formations losing cohesion and organization, Japanese carriers would join the battle—employed in separate divisions rather than concentrated—to neutralize their opposite numbers. Finally, Japanese battleships would engage the U.S. battle line in what Japanese planners expected to be the decisive battle. In the 1930s, when these ideas were formulated, the Japanese expected that the main battle would take place around the Marianas.

The Kaigun organized its formations and building and refitting programs accordingly. Destroyers featured torpedo armaments, and battleships and cruisers emphasized armament, speed, and armor rather than range. The Yamato-class battleships, at their full displacement of 71,659 tons, carried a main armament of nine 18.1-inch guns. They had a top speed of 27.7 knots and a range of 8,600 nautical miles at 19 knots or 4,100 nautical miles at 27 knots. These ships were deliberately conceived as bigger and more formidably armed and protected than any U.S. battleship able to use the Panama Canal. The Japanese quest for qualitative superiority extended through the other classes of warships.

As part of this process, the Kaigun developed the famous Long Lance torpedo, land-based and carrier-based aircraft such as the A6M Zero-sen and the long-range Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bomber, and long-range submarines,

one type equipped with seaplanes to extend scouting range. Individually and collectively, these were unequaled in 1941 and 1942, and in terms of night-fighting capability in 1941, the Kaigun had no peer.

Despite these advantages, the Japanese naval battle plan represented an inversion of what was required. By December 1941, the Kaigun had basically secured parity in the Pacific with the United States, with warships, carrier air groups and aircraft, and a pool of trained manpower that was probably the best in the world. The problem was that the perimeter along which the Japanese planned to fight the Americans to a standstill largely consisted of gaps. Japan had neither the shipping nor the base organizations to transform the island groups into the air bases essential to the fleet. The latter, moreover, could not be permanently ready to meet any U.S. move, which would, by definition, be made in a strength and at a time that all but ensured U.S. victory.

Table 1. Wartime Commissioning and Completion of Major Units by the Japanese and U.S. Navies

	CV	*CVL*	*CVE*	*BB*	*CB*	*CA*	*CL*	*DD*	*Esc/DE*	*CD/PF*	*SS*
December 1941											
Imperial Japanese Navy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Navy	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	2
1942											
Imperial Japanese Navy	2	2	2	2	0	0	1	10	0	0	20
U.S. Navy	1	0	11	4	0	0	8	84	0	0	34
1943											
Imperial Japanese Navy	0	1	2	0	0	0	3	12	18	0	36
U.S. Navy	6	9	24	2	0	4	7	126	234	65	56
1944											
Imperial Japanese Navy	5	1	0	0	0	0	3	7	20	72	35
U.S. Navy	7	0	33	2	2	1	11	78	181	8	80
January to September 1945											

Imperial Japanese Navy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	20	39	20
U.S. Navy	4	0	9	0	0	8	6	61	5	0	31
Wartime totals											
Imperial Japanese Navy	7	4	4	2	0	0	7	32	58	111	116
U.S. Navy	18	9	77	8	2	13	33	349	420	73	203

Note: The drawing of direct comparisons between different types of warships, specifically escorts, is somewhat difficult. Counted under the heading Esc in the Japanese listings are named escorts and patrol boats; under the heading CD are the *kaiboken*, or coastal defense ships. These types were not the direct equivalents of U.S. destroyer escorts and frigates, respectively, but diversity precludes these types of U.S. and Japanese ships being compared with anything but one another. U.S. figures exclude Lend-Lease vessels.

Note: Dashes = zero; CL = light cruiser; CV = fleet carrier; DD = destroyer; CVL = light carrier; Esc = escort; CVE = escort carrier; DE = destroyer escort; BB = battleship; CD = coastal defense ship; CB = battle cruiser; PF = frigate; CA = heavy cruiser; and SS = submarine.

Individual Japanese bases, or even several bases within a group or neighboring groups, could be overwhelmed by an enemy free to choose when and where to mount offensive operations, a second flaw within the *zengen sakusen* concept. By 1942, the Kaigun was only prepared to win the battle it intended to fight; of course, the battle it was called on to fight was not the one for which it had prepared.

The IJN, moreover, faced not one enemy but two. It opened hostilities with a total strength of 10 battleships, 6 fleet and 3 light fleet carriers and 1 escort carrier, 18 heavy and 20 light cruisers, 111 destroyers, and 71 submarines. A token of its future problems lay in the fact that only 1 fleet unit, a destroyer, was not in service on December 6, 1941. Even when it went to war, the Kaigun faced a U.S. Navy that, between May 1942 and November 1943, fought it to a standstill. After that date, the Kaigun faced a wartime U.S. Navy, virtually every ship of which had entered service after Pearl Harbor.

Table 2. The State of Japanese Shipping, 1941–1945 (in Tons)

Year	*Built*	*Captured and Salvaged*	*Total Acquisitions*	*Lost*	*Net Lossin Year*	*Shipping Available on*		*Tonnage*		*Percent Laid Up*
								Afloat	*Laid up*	
						March 31, 1942	6,150,000	5,375,000	775,000	12.61

1942	266,000	566,000	832,000	1,065,000	–233,000	December 31, 1942	5,942,000			
						March 31, 1943	5,733,000	4,833,000	900,000	15.70
1943	769,000	109,000	878,000	1,821,000	–943,000	December 31, 1943	4,999,000			
						March 31, 1944	4,352,000	3,527,000	825,000	18.96
1944	1,699,000	36,000	1,735,000	3,892,000	–2,157,000	December 31, 1944	2,842,000			
						March 31, 1945	2,465,000	1,659,000	806,000	32.70
1945	559,000	6,000	565,000	1,782,000	–1,217,000	August 15, 1945	1,625,000	948,000	677,000	41.66

Note: The figures presented in this table are based on my own calculations. These, however, are not complete and differ in virtually every detail from figures generally given in Western histories, the sources of which are normally U.S. and date from the period immediately after the end of the war. The figures here have been taken from such a source. I would advise that a certain caution be exercised with respect to the detail of these figures and calculations and would note that Japanese merchant shipping losses in this table include ships of unknown ownership and one Thai ship but not foreign ships under charter. These caveats noted, I vouch for the general accuracy of the figures and the conclusions that have been drawn from them.

The Japanese shipbuilding effort from 1942 to 1944, though substantial, was simply overwhelmed by a truly remarkable U.S. industrial achievement: 18 U.S. fleet carriers to 7 for Japan, 9 light fleet carriers to 4, 77 escort carriers to 4, 8 battleships to 2, 13 heavy and 33 light cruisers to 4 light cruisers, 349 destroyers and 420 destroyer escorts to 90, and 203 submarines to 116. U.S. superiority was not simply numerical; radio, radar, and diversity of weaponry were all areas in which the Kaigun could not match its U.S. enemy but was systematically outclassed as the war progressed.

During 1943 and 1944, the United States acquired such overwhelming numerical superiority that the Kaigun was denied not merely any chance of victory but even any means of effective response. Between December 26, 1943, and October 24, 1944, Japanese warships and aircraft destroyed no U.S. fleet units, if submarines are excluded. Events in 1945 conspired to demonstrate the singular ineffectiveness of such a course of action, as Japanese losses between July 1944 and August 1945 reflected both this dilemma and the wider national defeat. Overall, the Kaigun lost 1,028 warships of 2,310,704 tons, of which 631 warships of 1,348,492 tons were destroyed in the last 13 months of the war (see Table 2). The wartime losses

incurred by the merchant fleet—not the service auxiliaries—told the same story, totaling 1,181.5 merchantmen (there were navy, army, and civilian ships and, occasionally, shared ships, which are here calculated as half a ship) of 3,389,202 tons, of which 811 vessels of 2,077,249 tons were lost in the period after the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944). Losses of this order reduced the Kaigun to no more than an ever less effective coastal defense force.

By August 1945, Japan had been pushed to the edge of comprehensive defeat, losing all semblance of strategic mobility. Its industry was in end-run production; its people would have died by the millions from disease and starvation had the war lasted into the spring of 1946. For all intents and purposes, the Kaigun had by then ceased to exist, as U.S. carrier air groups flew combat air patrols over Japanese airfields. A remarkable U.S. achievement had reduced the Kaigun to irrelevance. States, especially great powers, are rarely defeated by naval power, but in this case, the Kaigun had been powerless to prevent such an outcome.

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See also

Air Warfare, Naval; Battle Cruisers; Battleships; Destroyers; I-400–Class Japanese Submarines; Japan; Japan, Air Forces; Japan, Army; Naval Armament; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Submarines; Torpedoes; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Japan, Occupation of

On August 14, 1945, the Japanese government formally accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration for the surrender of Japan. The next day, Emperor Hirohito broadcast the news to the Japanese people. From then to April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect and Japan recovered its full sovereignty, the country was under Allied control.

The occupation can be divided into two periods. The first began with the Japanese surrender in August 1945 and lasted until the Cold War spread into East Asia around 1948. It was characterized by faithful implementation of the Potsdam Declaration, which emphasized the complete democratization and demilitarization of Japan. The second period, which lasted until the restoration of Japanese sovereignty in 1952, was marked by economic renovation and rearmament.

Occupation policies stipulated by the Potsdam Declaration called for the loss of territory, the elimination of militarism, the disbandment of the Japanese armed forces, the punishment of war criminals, and the creation of democracy. Japan was to be placed under military occupation until these goals were achieved.

On August 30, U.S. general of the Army Douglas MacArthur arrived in Japan to assume his duties as supreme commander of the Allied occupation forces, and soon the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers was established in Tokyo. The official Japanese surrender occurred on board the U.S. battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. By the end of September, the U.S. military had occupied all of Japan.

The Far Eastern Commission, representing 11 nations, was vested with control over the occupation, and the U.S. government was supposed to implement its decisions. Given sharp disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, however, Washington was determined to conduct the occupation with as little interference as possible by the commission.

Consequently, the Harry S. Truman administration set out to establish the occupation regime and implement basic reforms before the Far Eastern

Commission officially began its work. Not until February 26, 1946, was the commission officially established in Washington, D.C., and by that time, most basic reforms in Japan were in place. The Allied Council for Japan was an advisory body to the supreme Allied commander, established in Tokyo; the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union were members. Because of the Soviet presence, MacArthur was determined to minimize the council's involvement.

The drastic reforms of Japan ordered by General Headquarters (GHQ) were implemented by the cabinet of Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro, established on October 9, 1945. When Shidehara visited MacArthur on October 11, the general informed him of the main points of reform he was to carry out. These measures included the emancipation of women, protection of workers, reform of the educational system, abolition of the feudal system, and democratization of the economy. MacArthur pushed for immediate reform before the Far Eastern Commission could begin functioning.

Meanwhile, intense debate took place in the United States on the continuation of the emperor system. MacArthur strongly favored retaining the emperor, since he believed that this would ease the occupation and reform process. Were the emperor system to be abolished, he feared Japanese anger might cause acts of terrorism against the numerous U.S. soldiers in Japan. MacArthur, however, viewed the emperor only as a figurehead, symbolizing the unity of the Japanese nation.

By the end of 1945, Japanese charged with war crimes had been arrested and detained in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo War Crimes Trials) opened at Ichigaya, Tokyo, on May 3, 1946. On November 12, 1948, 25 of 28 Japanese classified as Class A war criminals were found guilty. Seven who received death sentences were executed on December 23, 1948.

The GHQ took particular interest in democratization and demilitarization provisions in the new constitution, promulgated on November 3, 1946. Article 9 renounced war as an instrument of state policy and denied the government the right to declare war. Japan was also completely disarmed, with no military establishment. The new constitution formally went into effect on May 3, 1947.

During 1946 and 1947, meanwhile, the Cold War began in Europe, precipitated by the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and disagreements

over the future of Germany. In Asia, the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and Communists resumed in January 1946, with the Communists eventually gaining the upper hand. In these circumstances, by 1948 the Truman administration moved to review its policies toward Japan. Increasingly, Washington saw Japan as the chief bastion of anticommunism in East Asia. The administration began to strengthen the Japanese economy, which would reduce the cost of the occupation.

In October 1949, the Communists won the Chinese Civil War. On June 25, 1950, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) invaded the U.S.-supported Republic of Korea (South Korea). A major part of the U.S. occupation forces in Japan were immediately sent to Korea, leaving Japan suddenly vulnerable to attack. The Korean War thus brought the militarization of the U.S. strategic doctrine of containing communism and also a decision to rearm and rehabilitate Japan.

Article 9 represented a real stumbling block to Japan's rearmament, but the GHQ found a loophole in the formation of the Japanese National Police Reserve Forces. On July 8, 1950, MacArthur sent Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru a note requesting him to form such a force. The National Police Reserve Forces came into existence on August 10. The Korean War marked a key turning point in postwar Japanese history, as the Americans and their allies utilized Japanese industry to produce numerous military end items between 1950 and 1953; by the end of the conflict, Japanese economic growth was robust and would continue to expand exponentially over the succeeding decades.

On September 8, 1951, Yoshida and a Japanese government delegation concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty with 48 nations, not including the Soviet Union. Japan formally renounced all claims to territories formerly under its rule, including Korea, Taiwan, south Sakhalin Island, and the Kurile Islands. When the treaty went into effect on April 28, 1952, Japan recovered its full sovereignty, and the U.S. occupation formally came to an end.

A U.S.-Japan security treaty was also signed on September 8, 1951. Under its provisions, the United States undertook to defend Japan, and Japan agreed to the stationing of U.S. forces on Japanese land.

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See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; International Military Tribunal, Far East; Japan; Japan, Surrender of; MacArthur, Douglas; Potsdam Conference

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Japan, Surrender of (August 15, 1945)

By early 1945, it was clear to most observers that Japan could not hope to win the war. U.S. forces captured Iwo Jima in February, and Okinawa, secured in June, could be used as a staging area for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. Germany, Japan's only remaining ally, had been defeated in May. Meanwhile, Boeing B-29 Superfortresses flying from the Marianas were destroying Japan's cities, while submarines cut off Japanese seaborne trade and B-29 aerial mining eliminated much of the important coastal trade, raising the specter of starvation for the Japanese people. Still, Japan fought on.

Revisionist historians have held that since the Japanese government was by this time seeking desperately to leave the war, employing the atomic bomb against Japan was unnecessary. Intercepts of diplomatic messages, however, indicate that Japan had not reached the decision to surrender when the first bomb was dropped. Although Emperor Hirohito and his principal advisers had concluded that Japan could not win the war, they hoped for a last "decisive battle" that would force the Allies to grant more favorable peace

terms. On July 28, the Japanese government formally refused to accept the Potsdam Declaration, as demanded by U.S. president Harry S. Truman two days before—a refusal that led Truman to decide to employ the atomic bomb.

On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. About 100,000 people perished outright or died later from radiation effects; another 40,000 were injured, and most of the remaining population suffered some long-term radiation damage. Even so, this carnage was less than that inflicted in the firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945. Meeting with the emperor, the army leadership still strongly opposed accepting the Potsdam Declaration.

On August 8 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, with Joseph Stalin honoring his pledge at Yalta to enter the war against Japan "two or three months after the defeat of Germany." One day later, Soviet troops invaded Manchuria in force. That same day, a B-29 dropped a second atomic bomb, this one on Nagasaki. The blast claimed about 70,000 dead, either killed outright or dying later from radiation, and injured as many more.

Following prolonged meetings with his top advisers, Emperor Hirohito made the decision for peace on August 14. He stated that as onerous as it would be to order the surrender, have the Japanese homeland occupied, and see loyal servants face possible trial as war criminals, these considerations had to be weighed against the devastation facing the Japanese people in a continuation of fighting.

Braving possible assassination by fanatics determined to stage a coup d'état and fight to the end, Hirohito communicated this decision over the radio on August 15 at noon Tokyo time, the first occasion on which the Japanese people had heard his voice. In the course of his remarks, Hirohito said, "We have resolved to pave the way for a general peace for all generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable." He referred specifically to the atomic bombs when he said, "Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and more cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives."

On September 2, the final terms of surrender were signed aboard the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay, and the Japanese islands came under the rule of a U.S. army of occupation.

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See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Japan, Surrender of; Manchuria Campaign; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Potsdam Conference; Truman, Harry S.; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan; Document 228; Document 236; Document 237

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Japan, U.S. Navy Carrier Raid against

See United States Navy Carrier Raid against Japan

Japanese Americans

After the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was tremendous paranoia in the United States regarding Japanese Americans and a general belief among the U.S. counterintelligence community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), that Japanese Americans were engaged in widespread spying for Japan. Certainly racism played a role. During the conflict, the U.S. government treated Japanese Americans very differently from German Americans and Italian Americans.

On December 11, 1941, the FBI ordered the detention of 1,370 Japanese classified as "dangerous enemy aliens." By early January 1942, many notable American politicians were calling for the complete removal of Japanese immigrants and many Japanese American citizens from the entire West Coast. Later that year, the California State Personnel Board voted to remove all "descendants of natives with whom the United States is at war" from civil service positions. Although this act clearly included German Americans and

Italian Americans, it was only enforced en masse against Japanese. Almost simultaneously, the U.S. Army created 12 West Coast “restricted zones,” in which enemy aliens were confined to a five-mile radius around their homes and subjected to a curfew; again, this measure pertained almost exclusively to the Japanese.



Japanese American school children at the Manzanar Relocation Center in California during World War II. The internment of Japanese Americans during the war was both unnecessary and a major wrong. (Library of Congress)

Then, on February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order (EO) 9066, authorizing the secretary of war to define military areas “from which any or all persons may be excluded as deemed necessary or desirable.” Secretary of War Henry Stimson ordered Lieutenant General John DeWitt, commander of the Fourth Army and the Western Defense Command, to enforce EO 9066. On March 2, DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1, creating military areas in Washington, Oregon, California, and parts of Arizona and declaring the right to remove German, Italian, and Japanese aliens and anyone of “Japanese ancestry” living in specified military areas should the need arise.

In March, the government opened its first concentration camp, Manzanar, in Owens Valley, California. That same month, the government began the forced removal of Japanese Americans from the military zones. By August 7, eight months after Pearl Harbor, General DeWitt announced the complete evacuation of 111,000 Japanese (64 percent of whom were U.S. citizens) from two of the major military zones to army concentration camps. Included in the removal were West Coast Japanese and those having at least one grandparent who had emigrated from Japan. Forced to settle their personal affairs immediately, the Japanese were removed to 10 camps located in California, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Utah.

Ultimately, the government did allow 35,000 Japanese to leave the camps in return for loyalty oaths and pledges not to settle on the West Coast. Japanese living in the Hawaiian Islands were untouched. That U.S. territory contained the nation's largest concentration of Japanese Americans: 150,000 people, representing 37 percent of the islands' population, but deporting them would have destroyed the islands' economy.

Despite its actions in forcibly relocating Japanese Americans, the U.S. government began recruiting American-born Nisei (second-generation) Japanese for the armed forces in 1943. The Nisei 442nd Regimental Combat Team (RCT), recruited from Japanese American volunteers from the mainland concentration camps and from Hawaii, fought with distinction in the European theater of operations and became the most highly decorated unit in U.S. military history. Twenty-one Medals of Honor were bestowed on members of the 442nd, one of whom was the late Senator Daniel Inouye from Hawaii. Additionally, an unprecedented eight Presidential Unit Citations were awarded to the 442nd RCT. Nisei also proved to be an invaluable asset in the Pacific theater, decoding communications, interrogating prisoners, and broadcasting propaganda. In June 1943 while the Nisei were fighting and dying in the Pacific and European theaters, California governor Earl Warren signed a proclamation forbidding Japanese Americans from filing for fishing licenses.

By 1945, the U.S. government began authorizing the return of Japanese Americans to their homes. Racism continued, however; in that same year, Hood River, Oregon, removed the names of 17 Nisei soldiers from its community roll of honor because they were Japanese. During the four years the United States was at war, even as thousands of Japanese were detained in

military camps, only 10 people were convicted of spying for Japan; all were Caucasian. Not until a half century later did the U.S. government admit its mistake and make partial restitution.

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See also

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Document 134; Document 138

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Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act (April 13, 1941)

Important treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan signed on April 13, 1941. The failure to coordinate policy and exchange information was typical of the Axis powers in World War II. When the Soviet Union and Germany concluded their nonaggression pact on August 23, 1939, the Japanese were caught by surprise, and when Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka Yōsuke visited Berlin in March 1941, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered that he not be informed about Operation BARBAROSSA, Germany's plan to invade the Soviet Union, that would begin on June 22, 1941.

On his way back to Tokyo, Matsuoka stopped in Moscow, where he concluded the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. This agreement guaranteed territorial inviolability as well as neutrality in case either power became involved in hostilities with a third nation. The agreement had far-reaching consequences, as it provided for Japanese neutrality when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. The treaty was to be valid for five years, with an automatic extension for an additional five years.

Since 1939, Tokyo had sought an agreement with the Soviet Union to remove a threat from the north as it attempted to conquer China. The Japanese first raised the idea of a nonaggression pact in May and June 1940 when the fall of France allowed Tokyo to contemplate a move against the European colonies in Southeast Asia, in which Soviet neutrality would be essential.

Negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow began in August 1940. During the ensuing negotiations, the Soviets pursued a cautious approach, suggesting a neutrality agreement instead of a nonaggression pact to avoid straining relations with the Western powers. The Japanese urged a more binding treaty modeled after the German-Soviet pact of 1939, with the undisguised goal of Japanese expansion southward. The Japanese memorandum resembled the content of the secret protocol of the German-Soviet pact, calling on the Soviet Union to recognize the traditional interests of Japan in Outer Mongolia and the three provinces of northern China (Manchuria) and to agree that French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies lay within the Japanese sphere of influence. In return, Japan agreed to look favorably on a Soviet advance into Afghanistan and Persia (Iran).

The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact greatly facilitated Japanese expansion in the Southeast Pacific and its attack on the United States. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s policy toward Japan in the summer and fall of 1941 resembled his attitude toward Germany before June 1941. He ordered his generals in the Soviet Far East to avoid any hostilities with Japan along their common border in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Despite this treaty, Japan contemplated attacking the Soviet Union in the fall of 1941. Leaders of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria especially supported such a move, but Tokyo decided in favor of a move south into the vacuum created by the temporary weakness of the European powers in Southeast Asia. Tokyo reached its decision on the basis of the outcome of earlier fighting with the Soviets, the difficult weather in Siberia, and the absence from that region of oil and rubber, the two natural resources Japan needed most critically.

The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941 was of immense assistance to the Soviet Union in its war with Germany. Thanks to Japan’s neutrality, the Soviet Far East provided the Soviet Western Front with 250,000 men

between 1941 and 1944. The pact also allowed the Soviet Union to benefit from substantial and vital U.S. Lend-Lease aid.

Japan gained immensely from the pact as well. During its war with the United States, Japan received from the Soviet Union 40 million tons of coal, 140 million tons of wood, 50 million tons of iron, 10 million tons of fish, and substantial quantities of gold from Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Soviet trade helped make possible Japan's war with the United States.

The Soviet Union ultimately broke the nonaggression pact with Japan in 1945. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, the Soviets promised that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan "two or three months" after the end of the war in Europe in return for territorial concessions in the Far East. Three months to the day, on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan.

EVA-MARIA STOLBERG

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Hitler, Adolf; Matsuoka Yōsuke; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Stalin, Joseph; Yalta Conference; Document 89; Document 97

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Japanese Surrendered Personnel

Term used to describe Japanese forces surrendered to the British at the end of World War II. Japanese surrendered personnel (JSP) comprised some 633,000 Japanese officers and men surrendered to the largely British South-East Asia Command (SEAC). The British treated these servicemen as JSP rather than prisoners of war (POWs) under international law, an unprecedented and special status that differed in terms of the protection of conventional international law.

According to the SEAC order of August 28, 1945, those POW officers under full British control would be isolated from their men and interned. They would, however, be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention in every respect, including the provision of subsistence based on the high British levels of supplies allocated for POWs. The JSP, in contrast, remained under the authority of their own officers and in their original units. Japanese commanders were held responsible for maintaining discipline and proper conduct among their subordinates.

Because of these differences, the British did not treat the JSP according to the Hague Convention regulations relative to the laws and customs of land warfare and the Geneva POW Convention. Furthermore, British forces failed to fulfill Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration, which stated that Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, should be permitted to return to their homes. After July 1946, when most of the Allied powers (with the notable exception of the Soviet Union) had returned Japanese military personnel to Japan, British forces continued to detain about 106,000 JSP throughout Southeast Asia, demanding various services of them to facilitate the postwar recovery and to increase food production. Only at the end of October 1947 were the last JSP repatriated from Singapore.

Compulsory labor for JSP included much dangerous and unhealthy work, including disposing of ammunition stocks, quarrying, cutting trees, doing sewage work, and guarding British quarters from bandits. Moreover, rations for JSP were limited, and the diet was monotonous. JSP received only about half of the standard ration for British military personnel.

The British paid no wages for the work done by JSP. Indeed, from the beginning the British announced that they would not pay wages because JSP were not POWs. Poor sanitary conditions, malnutrition, and forced labor in difficult conditions led to outbreaks of tuberculosis, beriberi, and other diseases. By October 1947, 8,971 JSP had died and 20,084 had been injured or fallen ill. In French Indochina and Netherlands Java and Sumatra, the SEAC rearmed the JSP and commanded them to maintain order and forcibly suppress nationalist uprisings. As a result, nearly 1,000 JSP were killed in action in these operations. Such SEAC treatment of Japanese servicemen violated international law.

KITA YOSHITO

See also

Potsdam Conference; Prisoners of War

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Java Sea, Battle of (February 27, 1942)

Naval battle marking the end of organized Allied resistance at sea in the Netherlands East Indies. By January 1942, the Allied defense of the Southwest Pacific was collectively organized in the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command.

On February 24, two Japanese invasion forces set sail for Java. A Dutch patrol plane discovered the eastern force some 50 miles north of Surabaya on February 27. Rear Admiral Takagi Takeo commanded a force of 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 14 destroyers covering 41 transports. Dutch rear admiral Karel Doorman commanded the ABDA striking force of 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 8 destroyers, representing all four ABDA nations.

In the ensuing engagement, the lack of coordination limited Allied effectiveness. There was no plan of attack, and each nationality used different radio frequencies, signals, and tactics. Furthermore, the Allied crews were exhausted, and many ships were in need of either maintenance or repair.



The British heavy cruiser *Exeter* sinking during the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, 1942. (Corbis)

At 4:16 p.m., the Japanese opened the battle. Soon thereafter, the heavy cruisers USS *Houston*—its aft turret inoperable from earlier battle damage—and HMS *Exeter* returned fire. The Japanese scored the first hit when a dud shell struck Doorman's flagship, the Dutch cruiser *De Ruyter*. At 4:35 p.m., the Japanese launched a mass torpedo attack, without success. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., Japanese ships made another torpedo attack, this time sinking the Netherlands destroyer *Kortenaer*. Concurrently, a Japanese shell knocked out most of the *Exeter*'s boilers, which disrupted Doorman's formation. Further adding to the disarray, HMAS *Perth* made smoke to protect the disabled British cruiser.

The Allied force was now in confusion. Two British destroyers covering the *Exeter*'s withdrawal engaged the Japanese ships, and during this engagement, shells from HMS *Electra* hit the Japanese light cruiser *Jintsu*,

flagship of Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo's destroyer squadron. Several Japanese destroyers pounded the *Electra* in return until it sank at 6:00 p.m. U.S. destroyers made a torpedo and gun attack shortly thereafter, holing but not sinking the Japanese destroyer *Asagumo.*

Under cover of darkness, Doorman futilely attempted to reach the Japanese transports. He tried a run along the Java coast, during which HMS *Jupiter* struck a Dutch mine and eventually sank. HMS *Encounter* lingered to pick up survivors. Being low on fuel and having no remaining torpedoes, the U.S. destroyers also withdrew. That left Doorman with only four cruisers, which the Japanese detected just after 11:00 p.m. A Japanese torpedo struck the *De Ruyter* aft, and the ship sank. Doorman perished with his flagship. A torpedo hit also doomed the *Java.* Before losing contact, Doorman had ordered the *Houston* and *Perth* to withdraw to Batavia.

In the engagement, the Allies lost two light cruisers and three destroyers. Three cruisers and six destroyers (four U.S.) survived. The Japanese lost no ships, although one destroyer suffered moderate damage and other units light damage. The battle was the last major naval engagement preceding the Japanese conquest of the Netherlands East Indies.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

ABDA Command; Doorman, Karel Willem Marie; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Southwest Pacific Theater; Sunda Strait, Battle of; Takagi Takeo; Tanaka Raizo

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Jeep

U.S. World War II military vehicle. The jeep was developed in answer to the army's need for a rugged, fast, and small motorized vehicle designed for reconnaissance and utility uses and capable of operating cross-country. At Fort Benning, Georgia, in the late 1930s, Captain Robert G. Howie and Master Sergeant Melvin C. Wiley built a machine-gun carrier made of parts from junked automobiles. It was not sufficiently rugged to be used as a multiterrain military vehicle. In 1940, however, Howie was detailed to the American Bantam Car Company in Baltimore, Maryland, to help produce a more robust design. The president of Bantam, Harry Payne, had previously developed a small truck for logging camps and construction sites. He set about, with Howie's assistance, modifying this vehicle for sale to the army.

Four Japanese American U.S. Army servicemen in a jeep towing a supply trailer on a rural road in France during World War II. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Army Ordnance Department sent invitations to 135 companies to bid on a quarter-ton 4-by-4 truck. Only Bantam and Willys Overland submitted bids. In short order, Bantam produced 70 small trucks. Although enthusiastically received, the vehicles suffered from numerous mechanical problems. Willys meanwhile developed two prototype test vehicles at its own expense and independent of the contract. The

company ignored some of the army specifications, which had stressed lightness, and concentrated instead on performance and ruggedness.

Meanwhile, the secretary of the General Staff, Major General Walter Bedell Smith, interceded, touting the Bantam version to the army chief of staff, General George C. Marshall. In November 1940, Bantam received a contract for 1,500 trucks. Doubts persisted that the company could fulfill its contract, so the government also ordered 1,500 of the Willys version. Also, the Ford Motor Company was talked into building 1,500 of its own design. The vehicle weight specification was also increased to 2,160 pounds. Tests of the three vehicles were then conducted. Both the Ford and Bantam versions contained smaller engines, and the Bantam proved unreliable mechanically. The Willys was over the weight limit, but engineers managed to pare it down to meet the requirement.

The new vehicle had a 60-horsepower engine and was capable of a top speed of 55 mph. It could climb steep grades and ford streams up to 18 inches deep. Willys engineers called it the "jeep" after a popular cartoon character, although almost until the end of the war, soldiers generally referred to it as a "peep." "Jeep" was the term used by Willys, civilians, and the newspapers, and it stuck.

The jeep was remarkably successful. It could easily transport four men and 800 pounds of equipment and even trail a 37mm antitank gun. Wartime production amounted to some 650,000 units. The jeep, with some modifications, remained in the army inventory until the mid-1980s. In the meantime, civilian versions of the jeep gained in popularity so that by the 1980s they had become the prototype of the immensely popular sport utility vehicle (SUV).

KEITH L. HOLMAN

See also

Logistics, Allied; Marshall, George Catlett; Red Ball Express; Smith, Walter Bedell

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Jeschonnek, Hans (1899–1943)

German Air Force general. Born in Hohensala, Prussia, on April 9, 1899, Hans Jeschonnek volunteered for military service during World War I. Accepted as a cadet to the military school at Berlin-Lichterfeld, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1915. Two years later, he completed flight training and was posted to the Western Front. By the end of the war, he had two victories, or kills, to his credit.

Jeschonnek continued in the Reichswehr after the war, serving in the Ordnance Department from 1923 to 1928. He graduated at the top of his class from the General Staff College in 1928. In September 1933, he became adjunct to Aviation Minister Erhard Milch and played an important role in the secret building of the Luftwaffe. Jeschonnek was next assigned as Luftwaffe chief of operations in 1937, and a year later, he was promoted to colonel. Appointed chief of staff of the Luftwaffe in February 1939, he was promoted to major general that August and to colonel general in 1942.

An ambitious and hardworking officer, Jeschonnek was totally dedicated to Adolf Hitler and National Socialism. Jeschonnek never questioned policies and took Hitler at his word. Informed by the führer that he intended to wage a short war, Jeschonnek never prepared the Luftwaffe for a protracted struggle, nor did he mobilize the production assets to ensure an adequate number of replacement aircraft. Devoted to tactical aviation, he insisted that all bombers be able to dive-bomb, which increased the weight of aircraft and reduced bomb loads.

As the war progressed and Germany's fortunes turned, the head of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarshal Hermann Göring, shifted more and more blame on his young chief of staff. Eventually, the burdens of the war and the bickering and backstabbing at the higher levels of command overcame Jeschonnek. Made a scapegoat by Göring for the Luftwaffe's failure to stop the Allied bombing of Germany and to supply the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Jeschonnek committed suicide at Rastenburg, Germany, on August 18, 1943.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Milch, Erhard

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Jewish Resistance

The Nazis exterminated some 6 million Jews during World War II. Those who claim that Jews went as sheep to the slaughter ignore the many instances of remarkable courage in the face of this crime against humanity. Jewish resistance took many forms. That it often proved futile reflects the poignant vulnerability of Jews rather than any lack of bravery or courage.

Resistance can be divided into the general categories of passive and active. Passive resistance took the form of cultural and spiritual endurance and assertiveness. Jews confined to ghettos such as Warsaw continued to practice their culture and religion despite prohibitions. They organized symphonies, drama clubs, schools, and other voluntary and educational associations. They risked their lives by trading across ghetto walls, despite threats of torture and execution.

Passive resistance drew on a long and esteemed Jewish tradition of outlasting the persecutor. Initially believing that the Nazis and their various European sympathizers wanted to put Jews in their place, not in their graves, Jewish leaders sought to endure discriminatory laws, pogroms, and deportations, hoping for an eventual relaxation of anti-Semitic policies or perhaps even a defeat on the battlefield.

Thus, Jewish resistance remained largely nonviolent until 1943, in part because the Germans succeeded in deceiving the Jews. They were helped by the fact that the German soldiers of World War I had generally behaved decently, treating Jewish noncombatants humanely. Jews in Poland and the east initially expected similar behavior from the Nazi invaders. Even after it became apparent that Nazi soldiers and especially police were intent on human butchery on a scale previously unimaginable, Jewish cultures that

embraced the sanctity and sheer joy of life found it difficult to comprehend a culture built on hate and murderous brutality, especially one that continued to worship civilized icons such as Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Ludwig van Beethoven. Many Jews put their faith in God—hoping for the best, preparing for the worst, yet not daring to think the unthinkable.

When Jewish communities and individuals recognized that the Nazis and their European allies wanted to systematically exterminate all Jews in Europe, active and armed resistance increased. Active resistance included acts of industrial sabotage in munitions factories and isolated bombings of known Nazi gathering spots. One must recognize, however, the near utter futility of such efforts, given the impossibility of Jews winning pitched battles against their killers. The Nazis had machine guns, dogs, and usually superior numbers, and they could call on tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The Jewish resisters were often unarmed. At best, some might have had pistols or rifles with limited ammunition, perhaps supplemented by a few hand grenades. Such unequal odds often made the final result tragically predictable, yet many Jews decided that it was better to die fighting than face extermination in a death camp.

When it became apparent that they were being deported to Treblinka to be gassed, the Jews of Warsaw at first refused to assemble and then led a ghetto uprising in April 1943, the ferocity of which surprised the Germans. More than 2,000 German soldiers, supported by armored cars, machine guns, flamethrowers, and unlimited ammunition, faced approximately 750 Jews with little or no military training. Schutzstaffel (SS) Brigadeführer Jürgen Stroop estimated that he would need two days to suppress the uprising. In fact, he needed a full month, as Jews, armed mainly with pistols, homemade grenades, and Molotov cocktails, fought frantically and ferociously from street to street and bunker to bunker. The Warsaw Uprising was only the most famous example of nearly 60 other armed uprisings in Jewish ghettos.

Resistance was less common in death camps such as Chelmno, Sobibor, and Treblinka, mainly because there was not sufficient time for resistance networks to form. Resistance requires leaders, organization, and weapons. These elements cannot be improvised and employed in a few hours or even days; months of planning and training are required. Despite nearly insurmountable difficulties, however, Jews did revolt at all 3 of these death camps as well as at Auschwitz-Birkenau and 18 forced-labor camps.

One of the most extraordinary acts of Jewish resistance took place at Treblinka. On August 2, 1943, a group of Jewish prisoners rose up, killed their guards, burned the camp, and escaped. Of 600 prisoners who got away, only about 40 survived the war.

Jews also participated actively in resistance networks in Poland, the Soviet Union, France, and other countries. Their plight was difficult in the extreme, because anti-Semitism within these networks often required Jews to hide their ethnicity. In some cells of the Polish resistance, Jews were killed outright. Many Soviet partisans distrusted and exploited Jews; nevertheless, between 20,000 and 30,000 Jews fought as partisans in the Soviet Union against Nazi invaders. In France, Jews made up less than 1 percent of the population but 15 to 20 percent of the French underground. In 1944, nearly 2,000 Jewish resisters in France united to form the l'Organisation Juive de Combat (Jewish Fighting Organization), which supported Allied military operations by attacking railway lines and German military installations and ordnance factories.

Impressive as it was, Jewish resistance was always hamstrung for several reasons. In general, Jews lacked combat experience, as many countries forbade Jewish citizens from serving in the military. As with Soviet prisoners of war taken by the Germans, many Jews, especially those confined in ghettos, were weakened by disease and deliberate starvation. Under these conditions, trained Soviet soldiers died with hardly a murmur of protest, so it is not surprising that Jewish families who had never been exposed to the hardships of war would likewise succumb.

The Nazis succeeded in creating a Hobbesian state of nature in which people were so focused on surviving from hour to hour that their struggles consumed virtually all their energy and attention. Dissension within Jewish communities also inhibited resistance, with older Jews and members of the Judenrat (Jewish Council) tending to support a policy of limited cooperation with the Nazis, hoping that by contributing to the German war effort, they might thereby preserve the so-called productive elements of Jewish communities.

More controversially, Jewish resistance was hampered by weak and irresolute international support. Although Western leaders often condemned Nazi actions, they took little action. Official Catholic and Protestant statements were equally tentative. Irresolute and sporadic support

unintentionally played into the hands of the Nazis as they planned for Jewish extermination.

Observant Jews were people of God's law, the Torah, who put their faith in God, with Jewish culture in general tending to disavow militant actions. Confronted by murderous killing squads possessing all the tools of industrialized mass warfare, some Jews nevertheless resisted courageously, both passively and actively. That their resistance often ended tragically does not mean that it failed. Indeed, Jewish resistance was the genesis of the Israel Defense Forces.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Babi Yar Massacre; Concentration Camps, German; Holocaust; Partisans/Guerrillas; Prisoners of War; Resistance; Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

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Jiang Jieshi (1887–1975)

Chinese general and Guomindang (Nationalist, GMD) politician and president of China from 1928 to 1949 and of the Republic of China on Taiwan from 1949 to 1975. Born on October 30, 1887, in Zhejiang Province, China, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) entered the Chinese military as a career officer in 1908. After joining a revolutionary organization that sought to overthrow the Qing government, Jiang welcomed the successful 1911–1912 Chinese Revolution. In 1920, he allied himself with Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-

sen), the head of the GMD and president of China from 1920 until his death in 1925. In Guangzhou (Canton), where he became commandant of the Guomindang Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy in 1924, Jiang rapidly developed his power base.

After Sun's death, Jiang undertook the 1926–1927 Northern Expedition, suppressing the Communist movement and subjugating warlords to Nationalist rule. In December 1927, he consolidated his power by marrying Song Meiling (Soong May-ling), daughter of an influential Shanghai Christian family.

In 1928, Jiang became head of the Nanjing-based Guomindang government, continuing his ferocious anti-Communist campaigns. Antiforeign and authoritarian in outlook, he promoted a revival of Confucian social and political values. When Japanese forces seized China's northeastern province of Manchuria in 1931 and established the puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo), he protested to the League of Nations but received little concrete assistance. In 1933 and 1935, Jiang signed agreements with Japan whereby he acquiesced, at least temporarily, to Japan's domination of northern China.

Although Jiang began building up and modernizing Chinese military forces, his drive to eliminate the Chinese Communist Party aroused serious discontent. In 1935, his northern warlord ally Zhang Xueliang and his troops broke off an anti-Communist military campaign. In the December 1936 Xi'an Incident, Zhang kidnapped Jiang and forced him to agree to join an anti-Japanese united front with the Communists.

On July 7, 1937, Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at the Marco Polo railway bridge near Beijing, an incident that quickly escalated into full-scale war between Japan and China. From August to November, Jiang staunchly resisted Japanese assaults on Shanghai, but he eventually abandoned that city and in quick succession also lost Nanjing (Nanking), his capital, and Wuhan (Hangzhou or Hankow). Fighting at Changsha and other cities, Jiang nonetheless gradually fell back westward. In late 1938, he established his capital in Chongqing (Chungking) in the southwestern province of Sichuan. Jiang's overall strategy was to wage a war of attrition, forcing Japanese troops to overextend their lines and occupy territory they could never fully control.

Jiang repeatedly sought assistance from Western powers (especially the

United States and Britain), but until 1940 he only received modest American financial and military aid and the imposition of limited economic sanctions on Japan. Japan's formal alignment with Germany and Italy in the Axis Tripartite Alliance (September 1940) brought increased aid from the United States, including some airplanes. In response to Japanese demands on the Vichy government for air bases in Indochina and other concessions, American policy toward Japan hardened, and sanctions were tightened beginning in the summer of 1940. In the autumn of 1941, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt repeatedly demanded that Japanese forces withdraw from Chinese territory. He also permitted volunteer American aviators to fight under Colonel Claire Lee Chennault, Jiang's American air adviser.

After the sudden Japanese attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), China formally declared war on Japan, and the Allies appointed Jiang supreme commander in the China theater. When dealing with his Allied partners, he uncompromisingly defended China's interests, demanding, for instance, the end of Western colonialism and special privileges in China, together with additional wartime assistance to China. At the 1943 Cairo Conference, the Allies also accepted Jiang's demand that China regain all territories ceded to Japan since the 1890s.

Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) inspecting high-ranking officers of Officers Training Corps at Lushan, Kinkiang, Jiangxi Sheng Province, China. (Library of Congress)

Chennault and Jiang enjoyed good relations, sharing the ill-founded faith that airpower alone could win the war against Japan. Jiang sought to conserve his best forces for the postwar struggle he anticipated with the Communists, who consolidated their power at their wartime base at Yan'an (Yenan) in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. His attitude provoked acerbic disputes with General Joseph W. Stilwell, the American commander of the China-Burma-India theater, who sought to build up a strong Chinese Army, preferably under his own command, to mount a large anti-Japanese ground campaign. Stilwell's plans implied major reforms to upgrade the Chinese Army.

Although Jiang was not personally corrupt, many of his military and civilian associates were. Measures to end corruption would have jeopardized his tenuous hold on the loyalties of a large number of his semi-independent military field commanders, at least some of whom deliberately embezzled part of the funding intended to support their troops and thereby fielded poorly equipped and understrength units. On Jiang's insistence, in 1944 Roosevelt withdrew Stilwell from China.

Jiang enjoyed better relations with Stilwell's successor, General Albert Wedemeyer. The China theater stalemated, and neither Jiang nor the Japanese ever won a decisive victory over the other.

As the war ended, Jiang faced renewed threats from the Communists who, with Soviet assistance, quickly took control of much of northern China. In late 1945 and 1946, lengthy American mediation efforts headed by the wartime chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, failed to avert civil war between Guomindang and Communist forces. In 1949, Jiang fled to the island of Taiwan; he served as president of the Republic of China until his death in Taibei (Taipei) on April 5, 1975. On numerous occasions, he fruitlessly attempted to persuade the United States to restore his rule over the Chinese mainland, whose legitimate government he still claimed to head.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Chennault, Claire Lee; China; China-Burma-India Theater; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Nanjing Massacre; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Shanghai, Battle of; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Wedemeyer, Albert Coady; Document 215; Document 231

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Jodl, Alfred (1890–1946)

German Army general and chief of the armed forces operations staff during World War II. Born on May 10, 1890, in Würzburg, Germany, Alfred Jodl joined a Bavarian field artillery regiment in 1910 and served in World War I, finishing the war as a General Staff officer. His superior performance secured him a position in the postwar Reichswehr.

Serving primarily in staff positions during the interwar years, Jodl was assigned in 1939 as a major general to the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, or Armed Forces Supreme Command) as chief of the Wehrmachtführungsamt (Armed Forces Operations Office, renamed in 1940 Wehrmachtführungsstab, or Armed Forces Operations Staff). Promoted to general of artillery in 1940, he held his OKW position until the German surrender in May 1945.

Despite his position as chief of operations, Jodl had little direct influence on the planning and execution of Germany's military campaigns. This was primarily a result of German chancellor Adolf Hitler's unwillingness to delegate authority. He was an admirer of the führer's successes in 1939 and 1940, but Jodl was not slavish in his devotion to Hitler. After investigating Army Group A's lack of progress during the Caucasus Campaign of 1942, Jodl returned to endorse the commander's actions, thus contradicting Hitler. In the inevitable tirade that followed, Jodl stood his ground, reportedly giving as good as he got. Even though he was disillusioned with his commander in chief and with the conduct of the war, he held true to his belief in obedience

and duty and remained at his post for the rest of the war. He was promoted to colonel general in January 1944.

Brought before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg after the war, Jodl was tried as a war criminal. Found guilty, he was condemned to death and hanged in Nuremberg on October 16, 1946.

DAVID M. TOCZEK

See also

Caucasus Campaign; Germany; Germany, Army; Hitler, Adolf

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Joint Chiefs of Staff

Ad hoc organization composed of the chiefs of the U.S. military services, formed to coordinate strategic planning with the British chiefs of staff during World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was originally formed in January 1942, soon after the United States entered World War II, when the British chiefs went to Washington to reaffirm earlier informal agreements. One proposal upon which the Anglo-American chiefs agreed was the establishment of a permanent organization for collaboration—the Combined Chiefs of Staff, defined as the British chiefs of staff and their opposite numbers from the United States. It was primarily to provide these opposite numbers to the British membership in the Combined Chiefs that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was established.

Initially, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of the army chief of staff, General George C. Marshall; the commanding general of the army air forces and deputy chief of staff for air, Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold; the chief of naval operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark; and the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King. In March 1942, the positions held by Stark and King were combined under King, and Stark was sent to London to command U.S. naval forces in Europe. In July, U.S. president

Franklin D. Roosevelt brought the former chief of naval operations, Admiral William D. Leahy, out of retirement and appointed him chief of staff to the president. This position was the forerunner of today's chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Throughout the war, the U.S. joint chiefs followed the British lead and established their primary subordinate organization, the Joint Planning Staff, along the British pattern. In early 1942 most U.S. planning was done by the War and Navy Departments, which focused primarily on Europe and the Pacific, respectively. By 1943, however, the practice of joint and combined planning was carried out by joint committees and coordinated by the Joint Planning Staff and then submitted to the joint chiefs for approval. The National Security Act of 1947 finally codified the permanent establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Combined Chiefs of Staff; King, Ernest Joseph; Leahy, William Daniel; Marshall, George Catlett; Stark, Harold Raynsford "Betty"

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Journalism and the War

Recognizing that mass popular support was fundamental to the prosecution of a total war by their entire societies, Western democracies and totalitarian regimes in the war co-opted their various media resources to support their war efforts. Manipulation of the press for wartime state propaganda first became prevalent during World War I, when the major combatants employed a combination of comprehensive censorship, coercion, and legislation to ensure that the mass media printed only officially sanctioned versions of events relating to the war. During the interwar period, however, these tactics

produced a severe backlash, which was particularly pronounced in the United States.

In the totalitarian states, including all three Axis nations and also the Soviet Union and China, state control of the media was already well established when the war began. These countries had no long-standing tradition of a free press as a voice against government encroachments on the rights of the people, and throughout the war their mass media functioned primarily as outlets through which governments could present their preferred version of reality. Until August 1945, for example, the press and radio told the Japanese people that their armies were still winning glorious victories overseas. In those territories occupied by Axis armies, the press was quickly reduced to a similar condition. In both Axis and occupied states, however, some clandestine publications circulated—at great danger to their authors and distributors, who ran the risk of arrest and imprisonment or execution, fates that frequently befell them.

The United Kingdom and the United States each had a strong free press tradition, and in these states, government control over the press in wartime was more restrained. With the onset of World War II, Great Britain and France again placed restrictions on their media, which applied to both radio and print journalism. Some of these constraints affected not only their citizens but also foreign journalists reporting from Allied countries, who could be denied access to sensitive areas and to the facilities they needed to transmit their stories. In practice, many leading American correspondents were staunchly pro-Allies, and the Allied censors therefore granted them considerable latitude. Edward R. Murrow of the Columbia Broadcasting Service (CBS), for example, transmitted radio broadcasts from the London Blitz that gave the American people a sense of the war’s immediacy and helped to generate popular support for Britain.

The United States, a neutral during the first two years of the war, retained its tradition of independent journalism based on the foundation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This ended, however, when that country entered the war after Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In part because the nature of the Japanese attack struck almost all Americans as the epitome of duplicitous and dishonorable behavior, U.S. media representatives immediately acceded to their government’s requests that they submit to censorship, engage in self-

censorship, and submit any questionable materials to the government and the military for vetting prior to their release.

Even movies were expected to showcase the official view of the war—that all American soldiers were patriotic and honorable and that their enemies were evil, untrustworthy, and despicable. The media also presented a sanitized, even glamorized view of war, playing down its horrific aspects and ensuring that only enemy soldiers were seen to suffer gruesome deaths.

Before the advent of television, straight battlefield reporting was highly restrained, emphasizing the heroism of commanders and troops on one's own side and omitting the filth, foul language, and other unsavory aspects that formed part of the combat experience. As in other nations at war, censorship in the United States created a public perception that all its fighting men and women were brave and patriotic, that the home front was united behind the war effort, and that government decisions were wise and just.

Press censors at work in the British Ministry of Information, 1940. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

If reported at all, military disasters were presented as minor reverses. One exception was that the press was encouraged to pillory fraudulent activities or overly opportunistic "war profiteering." In both Britain and the United States, criticism of governmental incompetence, especially instances where officials had allegedly been inefficient in prosecuting the war, continued to appear, often as part of the normal political process, which was by no means suspended during the war.

Military commanders expected war correspondents accredited to their forces to function primarily as adjuncts to their own efforts, disseminating only those messages and images acceptable to the government. Only occasionally, as when Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. slapped a hospitalized soldier who had suffered a nervous breakdown, did correspondents report news that was unflattering or discreditable to the military. These policies brought a near-total suspension of in-depth investigative journalism over a wide range of topics. The complete censorship of communications coming from military units (extending even to the personal correspondence of soldiers) made reporters doubly dependent on the goodwill of the armed forces. One by-product was to preclude the publication of critiques of military operations or strategy.

As a result, in almost all combatant nations the bulk of World War II military journalism consisted of variations on the personal interest or feature story. Generally, these stories eschewed hard facts (who, what, when, where). In the United States, the recognized master of this format was the military journalist Ernie Pyle, whose affinity for the common infantryman won him the label “friend of the dogface.” Pyle produced classic pieces that became more realistic over time and, as he moved to the Pacific theater, grew increasingly honest and made less effort to minimize the misery and deprivation the fighting troops experienced. Even today, his famed dispatch titled “The Death of Captain Wasko” remains a staple for American soldiers. Like a number of other war correspondents, Pyle paid the ultimate price for his efforts to accompany soldiers to the front when a Japanese sniper killed him on the island of Ie Shima off Okinawa in the closing days of the war.

Together with many other well-known American journalists, among them the young Walter Cronkite, Pyle often wrote for the *Stars and Stripes,* a four-page (later eight-page) daily newspaper produced by the armed forces and widely circulated among the troops. This journal first appeared during the American Civil War and reappeared in World War I; in 1942, the U.S. military resumed its publication in London, with the first issue carrying an article by army chief of staff General George C. Marshall lauding its contributions to morale in World War I. The paper’s editors and correspondents accompanied U.S. forces through their various campaigns and had to locate suitable publication facilities as they moved.

In 1945 *Stars and Stripes* also began to issue a Pacific edition, and from

World War II onward it appeared without a break. Unlike publications designed for a civilian audience, *Stars and Stripes* could afford to be more frank about the rigors and dangers of combat. Both Marshall and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, took pride in the fact that this newspaper belonged to the "free press" and instituted a hands-off policy forbidding military censorship of its contents.

Although its articles were far more honest than those in similar Axis publications designed for the troops, contributors to *Stars and Stripes* were usually, in practice, military employees who firmly supported the overriding wartime objective of victory. On those occasions when the newspaper criticized military practices it considered unfair or inefficient, it did so from the perspective of the insider who sought to improve an institution he fundamentally supported.

Throughout World War II, the media in all belligerent countries were expected to support their own nation's war effort. Although press controls were far more stringent in totalitarian countries, even democracies with a traditionally strong free press exercised a substantial degree of censorship and demanded that print and broadcast outlets alike publish nothing potentially detrimental to the war effort. Bulky equipment often made live newsreel coverage from the front impracticable, and except when the intention was to stir up popular feeling against the enemy, newspapers were forbidden to disturb the public by featuring overly graphic photographs of bodies of soldiers or civilians who had suffered particularly horrific deaths. Even where censorship was relatively restrained, the home front media usually presented a simplistic and sanitized view of the experience of combat troops in fighting that deliberately minimized brutality, dirt, and bodily discomforts; omitted the mention of savage fighting tactics or atrocities unless these were committed by the enemy; and tended to present all soldiers from their own country as invariably brave, heroic, steadfast, and patriotic. Although there were other reasons for such sentiments, practices of this type undoubtedly contributed to the continuing popular view of World War II as a "good war."

ROBERT BATEMAN AND PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Blitz, The; Censorship; Film and the War; Literature and the War; Murrow, Edward Roscoe; Pyle, Ernest “Ernie” Taylor

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Joyce, William Brooke

See “Lord Haw Haw”

JUBILEE, Operation

See Dieppe Raid

Juin, Alphonse Pierre (1888–1967)

French Army marshal. Born at Cape Rosa near Bône, Algeria, on December 16, 1888, Alphonse Juin joined the French Army and completed two years of obligatory enlisted service. He then entered the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in 1910 and was commissioned two years later. His classmate Charles de Gaulle became a close friend. Juin first served in Morocco with the 1st Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs, undertaking large-scale pacification operations under General of Division Louis Hubert Lyautey, who would

become his long-term patron. During World War I and in North Africa, where he served both before and after the war, the highly decorated Juin demonstrated almost foolhardy courage, together with unconventional tactical military brilliance.

Juin studied and taught at the École Supérieure de la Guerre (1919–1921, 1933–1935). He also attended the Higher Command Course in Paris (1938–1939), but he spent most of the interwar period with the French North African Army in staff assignments, participating in pacification campaigns. By 1935, he was a colonel commanding a regiment in Algeria.

In December 1939, Juin took command of the 15th Motorized Infantry Division in France. From May 10 to 29, 1940, during the Battle for France, he and his troops performed well in Belgium and northern France, covering the Allied retreat to Dunkerque and helping to make possible the evacuation there (May 26–June 4). On May 30, German troops captured Juin; at the insistence of General Maxime Weygand, he was repatriated in June 1941. Sent by the French Vichy government as a major general to North Africa, Juin commanded French troops in Morocco and, from November as lieutenant general and then general, French troops in Algeria and Tunisia as well.

Juin worked to build up his forces so they could defend North Africa against any invader. He had no advance knowledge of the Anglo-American North African landings (Operation TORCH) on November 8, 1942, but later that month, he was instrumental in persuading Admiral Jean Darlan to order a cease-fire.

Briefly heading the French Army detachment on the Tunisia front (1942–1943), Juin was soon occupied with the preparation of the French Expeditionary Corps (Corps Expéditionaire Français, CEF), which deployed to Italy in November 1943. To command this corps, he accepted a voluntary reduction in rank to lieutenant general. In Italy, he established a good working relationship with the U.S. Fifth Army's temperamentally difficult commander, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark. Juin convinced Clark and his superior, British general Sir Harold Alexander, to take advantage of his colonial North African troops' expertise in mountain warfare. The CEF displayed its mettle from January 1944 and played a decisive role in the Allied breakthrough of the German Gustav Line to Rome in May. Outflanking the Germans in the Apennines, the CEF enabled the Allied

capture of Monte Cassino in May 1944 and Siena and Florence that July. Juin was arguably the ablest Allied commander in the 1943–1945 Italian Campaign.

In 1944, Juin favored reinforcing Allied troops in Italy, but General de Gaulle, head of the Fighting French government-in-exile, insisted on French participation in the scheduled Allied landings in southern France and ordered Juin to relinquish his troops to General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny for that purpose. De Gaulle later wrote that de Lattre was better suited than the colonial Juin to lead soldiers in metropolitan France, but there has been speculation that he preferred that no single general save himself emerge from the war as France's principal military hero.

General Alphonse Juin, chief of staff of the French Committee of National Defense, in England to meet the chiefs of staff of the three British services. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Juin served as chief of the French defense staff (1944–1947), resident general in Morocco (1947–1951), inspector general of the armed forces (1951), and commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) land forces in Central Europe (1951–1956). Made a marshal of France in 1952, he outspokenly opposed Algerian nationalism and was embittered by de Gaulle's decision to grant Algerian independence in 1962. Juin died in Paris on January 27, 1967.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS AND RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Battle for; Italy Campaign; TORCH, Operation; Weygand, Maxime

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July Bomb Plot (July 20, 1944)

Assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler's life. The effort to kill Hitler on July 20, 1944, was, however, only the most visible sign of resistance to the führer and the last in a string of assassination plots. Many prominent Germans were involved in this activity. The plot included Foreign Ministry officials Adam von Trott zu Solt, Ulrich von Hassell, and Count Friedrich von Schulenberg. Carl Goerdeler, the former mayor of Leipzig, was perhaps the most prominent civilian involved. Military leaders included Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, Generals Ludwig Beck and Friedrich Olbricht, and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr. Opposition to Hitler within the military crystallized after Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

Disillusioned by the brutal actions carried out by Germany in the Soviet Union, a group of young officers made several attempts to kill Hitler. They planted bombs on his airplane and in the pockets of his overcoat and carried them into meetings with the führer. Incredibly, fate foiled each attempt.

Killing Hitler would exempt members of the Wehrmacht from their oath of allegiance and make a coup d'état possible. Even if this would not secure better terms from the Allies, at least there would be a moral victory. In early 1944, a new leader instilled the movement with renewed hope. Count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg became disillusioned with Nazi occupation policies on the Eastern Front. He had been badly wounded in Tunisia that year, losing his left eye, right hand, and two fingers on his left hand. While recovering in Germany, he dedicated himself to the task of killing Hitler. Appointed chief of staff of the Replacement Army in July, Stauffenberg developed a daring scheme to assassinate the führer.

Stauffenberg openly developed a plan, under the code name VALKYRIE, for the Berlin garrison to impose military control on the city in case of a rebellion by the millions of foreign workers employed there. This provided cover for the plot to suppress the Schutzstaffel (SS) after Hitler had been removed. The police chief and commandant of Berlin supported the plan, and Stauffenberg carefully coordinated with sympathetic military officials in Paris and Vienna. He hoped to carry off the coup before any Allied invasion could occur and then negotiate an end to the war.

D-day, the June 6, 1944, Allied invasion of Normandy, occurred before an attempt could be made, however, and many conspirators argued that the invasion rendered the question of assassination moot. Stauffenberg remained determined. Twice he carried explosives to meetings where Hitler was to appear; twice circumstances stayed the event. Then on July 20, 1944, at a meeting of Hitler and the General Staff near Rastenburg, East Prussia (Ketrzyn, Poland), Stauffenberg armed the bomb concealed in his briefcase, set it down six feet from the führer, and slipped from the meeting to signal the start of the coup d'état.

Through an accident, the bomb-laden briefcase was moved behind a heavy wooden table leg, and it only wounded Hitler when it went off. Meanwhile, waiting for confirmation that the führer was dead, Stauffenberg's coconspirators hesitated and then divided. When news came that Hitler was still alive, the plot collapsed as SS leader Heinrich Himmler and the head of

the Armed Forces Supreme Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW), Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, moved quickly to crush it.

Troops loyal to Hitler arrested the leading conspirators. Beck was permitted to commit suicide, whereas Stauffenberg and Olbricht were shot out of hand. Further investigation by the Gestapo revealed the breadth of the activity, which came as a surprise to the regime. Ultimately, some 7,000 people were arrested. The leaders were tortured and subjected to farcical "trials" before the People's Court and then executed in the most hideous fashion, with the event filmed for the amusement of Hitler and other Nazi leaders. In all, perhaps 5,000 opponents of the regime, no matter what the level of their involvement in the plot, were executed.

As the best-known act of resistance in Nazi Germany, the unsuccessful attempt of military leaders to kill Hitler remains controversial. Some scholars hail it as an act of conscience that laid the foundations for a new Germany, but others note that the attempt did not come until Germany was on the brink of defeat. They interpret it, moreover, simply as repudiation of Hitler himself and not of Nazi principles in general.

TIMOTHY C. DOWLING

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Beck, Ludwig; Canaris, Wilhelm Franz; Germany; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Keitel, Wilhelm; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Stauffenberg, Claus Philipp Schenk von; Witzleben, Erwin von; Document 193

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K

Kaiser, Henry John (1882–1967)

American industrialist whose shipbuilding activities were vital to the U.S. war effort. Born in Sprout Brook, New York, on May 9, 1882, Henry John Kaiser left school at age 13 and worked at various odd jobs. He then turned to wholesale hardware and construction. He established his own construction company in 1914 and built roads in the United States and abroad. Kaiser was also involved in the construction of the Hoover, Shasta, Bonneville, and Grand Coulee Dams as well as levees on the Mississippi River. His factories produced steel, cement, and aluminum.

With the great demand for merchant ships in World War II, Kaiser turned to shipbuilding, beginning with a British contract for 30 merchant vessels. During the war, he came to own seven shipyards in California and Oregon that constructed both cargo vessels and warships. He helped revolutionize shipbuilding by introducing assembly-line practices that drastically cut construction time; his Richmond, California, shipyard set a record by launching the 441.5-foot-long Liberty ship *Robert E. Peary* in only 111.5 hours. In World War II, Kaiser's shipyards produced 1,490 vessels, including 50 small escort aircraft carriers, and they also turned out almost one-third of all the merchant ships built in the United States through the war years. His other wartime construction projects included aircraft, vehicle, and munitions manufacture.

Kaiser also established the Kaiser Permanente Foundation, which provided hospital and health facilities to all workers in his industrial empire, a development that was several decades ahead of its time. By 1967, the Kaiser Permanente Health Plan was the largest health-maintenance organization in the United States.

Following the war, Kaiser remained in shipbuilding and repair but also expanded into housing and automobiles. He died on August 24, 1967, in

Honolulu, Hawaii. Many of his companies and business practices survive today.

NICHOLAS W. BARCHESKI

See also
Liberty Ships

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Kaitens

Japanese suicide submarines. By late 1944, the situation for Japan in the Pacific had deteriorated to the point that its leaders turned to extraordinary measures in an attempt to stem the tide of Allied victories. Already employing kamikaze suicide pilots, the Japanese also focused on developing the Kaiten (meaning "turning the heavens") suicide submarine, which was really nothing more than a Type 93 Japanese torpedo with a small compartment for a pilot.

The individual Kaiten torpedo was lashed to the deck of a submarine and transported underwater to the approximate location of a U.S. ship or naval anchorage. Following the appropriate ceremony, the pilot would leave the submarine and enter the Kaiten while it was submerged. The Kaiten would then be released and propelled at high speed by its oxygen-fueled engine to smash into the enemy ship. Capable of sustaining a speed of 40 knots for one hour, the Kaiten could outrun any U.S. warship.

There was no provision for the Kaiten to be recovered by the launching submarine. Although the Japanese Naval General Staff had insisted that a means be provided for the pilot to be ejected from the Kaiten about 150 feet from impact, no pilot is known to have attempted to escape from his speeding torpedo as it approached the target. The first group of Kaiten pilots began training in August 1944, and several submarines were modified to carry the submersibles. All Kaiten pilots were volunteers.

The first Kaiten mission occurred in November 1944, when three submarines, each carrying four Kaitens, departed Japan to attack U.S. fleet anchorages in the Caroline Islands. The Kaitens were launched on the morning of November 20. Although three Kaitens could not get under way because of mechanical difficulties, five others set off for anchored U.S. warships in Ulithi Lagoon. Explosions followed, with the Japanese later claiming three aircraft carriers and two battleships sunk. In reality, one U.S. tanker, the *Mississinewa*, was sunk. One submarine, still carrying its four Kaitens, was detected by U.S. warships and sunk in turn.

More Kaiten missions followed. A Kaiten unit composed of three submarines sailed for Iwo Jima on February 22, 1945. One was sunk by the U.S. destroyer escort *Finnegan,* which was escorting a convoy from Iwo Jima to Saipan when it happened on the submarine. The surviving submarines inflicted no damage on the U.S. anchorage at Iwo Jima.

The last Kaiten operation saw six submarines sortie between July 14 and August 8, 1945, each carrying five or six Kaitens. Again, mechanical problems plagued the operation, and three submarines had to turn back to Japan. The Kaitens from the others attacked U.S. ships off Okinawa in the most successful of the suicide missions. On July 24, a Kaiten from *I-53* sank the destroyer escort *Underhill*, with a loss of 114 officers and men.

The Kaiten effort had failed. Only two U.S. ships had been sunk, one each on the first and the last Kaiten mission, but eight of the carrying submarines were sunk, with almost 900 crewmen lost. The Kaitens, as with the kamikaze pilots, were an indication that the Japanese had run out of alternatives to counter the rapidly advancing Allied forces on their march toward Japan.

JAMES H. WILLBANKS

See also

Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Submarines

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Kalinin, Recapture of (December 15, 1941)

Major battle during the Soviet counteroffensive to reverse the German Army's drive to Moscow. Kalinin (now Tver), situated some 100 miles northwest of Moscow, served as the northern linchpin in the defense of the Soviet capital. Retreating to within 40 miles of Moscow, the Soviets brought up 100 fresh divisions, including 34 from Siberia specially trained for winter warfare. From mid-November to December 4, German casualties reached some 85,000 in the Moscow area alone. The unusually early and harsh winter, with temperatures as low as –31°F, had brought most motorized transport to a halt. The German Army, unlike its Soviet counterpart, was ill-prepared to fight in such conditions.

Complicating the situation, German leader Adolf Hitler had issued orders on December 1 that threw the German high command into disarray. On that date, Hitler relieved Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt as commander of the Fifth Panzer Army and personally took command of this crucial sector of the front before Moscow. That same day, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, commanding Army Group Center (Heeresgruppe Mitte), relayed the message that German troops were completely exhausted. The German drive against Moscow had ground to a halt.

On November 30, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had agreed to plans drawn up by the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov, and the next day the General Staff made final preparations for the offensive. On December 5, Soviet commander on the Moscow front General GeorgiiK. Zhukov began the first great Soviet counteroffensive in the Kalinin sector. Siberian troops, who were extremely effective in cold-weather operations, were used for these actions. The next day, Zhukov ordered a general offensive against German forces west of Moscow—Army Group Center. Some 88 Soviet divisions with 1,700 tanks and 1,500 aircraft attacked 67 German divisions (many of them understrength) on a 500-mile front between Kalinin and Jelez. They pushed back the completely exhausted Germans, encircling them where possible and forcing a general retreat.

Hitler, however, forbade anything but the shortest withdrawals. On December 8, with the Red Army achieving many breakthroughs, he ordered

his troops to go over to purely defensive operations and hold their positions at all costs. This decision, though helping to ensure that the retreat did not turn into a general rout, condemned thousands of Germans to death. On December 13, Soviet forces moved to relieve Leningrad, extending the counteroffensive to the northwest. On December 14, German troops departed Kalinin, which the Soviets entered the next day. Hitler assumed command of the German Army on December 19, and German forces managed to establish a stable front line some 55 miles west of Moscow one day later. The Red Army's winter counteroffensive continued into February 1942, although its greatest gains were registered at its beginning.

THOMAS J. WEILER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bock, Fedor von; Hitler, Adolf; Kaluga, Battle of; Moscow, Battle of; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Glantz, David M. *Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia, 1941.* Stroud, UK: Tempus, 2001.

Kaltenbrunner, Ernst (1903–1946)

Leader of the Austrian Schutzstaffel (SS) and later chief of the Reichssicherhauptamt (RSHA). Born in Ried/Innkreis, Austria, on October 4, 1903, Ernst Kaltenbrunner earned a doctorate in law at the University of Graz in 1926 and entered practice in Linz. Joining the Austrian Nazi Party in 1930, he worked to destabilize the Austrian Republic. He became head of the SS at Linz in 1934 but was arrested and accused of being involved in the assassination of Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss on July 25, 1934.

Following the Anschluss (the union between Germany and Austria) in March 1938, Kaltenbrunner became minister for state security as well as police chief in Vienna. During the next three years, he served as commander of the SS in the Ostmark (former Austria).

Kaltenbrunner impressed SS chief Heinrich Himmler, who on January 30, 1943, appointed him to succeed Reinhard Heydrich as head of the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office) and SS intelligence. Kaltenbrunner not only controlled the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo, the secret police) but was also responsible for carrying out the "Final Solution" (the Holocaust).

Kaltenbrunner held his position until the end of the war and was promoted to SS-Obergruppenführer and general of police on June 21, 1943. He took personal interest in the different methods used to kill the inmates in the extermination camps. Besides supervising the hunting down of Jews, he was also responsible for the murder of some Allied prisoners of war.

Kaltenbrunner's power increased greatly after the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life. Kaltenbrunner directed the Gestapo's investigation into the plot and was in charge of administering Hitler's policy of retribution against the conspirators. When the Allies were closing in on Germany, Kaltenbrunner gave orders for all prisoners to be killed. Then he fled south. He was captured in the Austrian mountains on May 15, 1945. Charged with conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Kaltenbrunner was found guilty and was hanged on October 16, 1946, in Nuremberg.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Austria; Concentration Camps, German; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; July Bomb Plot

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Kaluga, Battle of (December 26–30, 1941)

Culmination of the Soviet winter offensive in December 1941 that halted the German drive on Moscow. Kaluga is situated some 90 miles southwest of

Moscow; the Germans had taken it on October 12, 1941.

Reinforced by 100 fresh divisions, the Soviets launched a massive counteroffensive to save Moscow on December 5–6, 1941. The action took place in subzero temperatures and with German forces exhausted and strung out along a front of 560 miles, from Kalinin in the north to Yelets in the south. During the first days of their offensive, the Soviets registered significant progress. Where possible, Red Army troops avoided frontal assaults, endeavoring to flank and get behind the German positions and cut them off. Partisans also struck the overextended German communication and supply lines.

Fearful of encirclement, the Germans destroyed what they could and withdrew. On December 13, the Soviet government issued a communiqué announcing that the German effort to take Moscow had failed. On December 14, Soviet general Ivan Zakharin's Forty-Ninth Army went on the offensive north of Tula against Army Group Center. Despite Adolf Hitler's order of December 16 calling for "fanatical resistance," the right wing of the German Fourth Army on the east bank of the Oka collapsed, and on December 17, Aleksin fell. The offensive continued in the direction of Tarusa, which was taken the next day.

A special mobile group under Lieutenant General V. S. Popov, including cavalry, infantry, and tank units, then moved in deep snow on the southern bank of the Oka. The offensive to recapture Kaluga began on December 17. In three days, Popov's troops covered nearly 60 miles, and by the evening of December 20, they had Kaluga in sight. The Germans there were taken completely by surprise. During the morning of the next day, the 154th Rifle Division, supported by the 31st Cavalry Division and tanks, attacked the railway station.

On December 26, German resistance in the Nara-Fominsk area broke, and the city was retaken. Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets soon fell. On December 28, Hitler issued a new order calling for every hamlet and farm to be turned into a defensive position and held at all costs. Counterattacks could not be realized, however. German tanks were no longer capable of offensive operations but could only cover retreating infantry units.

Much more adept at fighting in winter conditions, the Soviets threw back every German attempt to stop their advance. Unable to cover and plug the ever-increasing number of holes appearing in their front line, the Germans

had to withdraw even farther west. On December 30, Soviet forces completely secured Kaluga. The Soviet offensive ended on January 5, 1942. The Soviet Army had established a line between Uhnov, Kirov, and Ludinovo and completed the encirclement of Army Group Center. The German Army had lost 25 percent of its original strength and been handed its first strategic defeat.

THOMAS J. WEILER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; Germany, Army; Kalinin, Recapture of; Soviet Union, Army

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Kamikaze

Japanese suicide pilot. The special corps of suicide aviators was organized by Rear Admiral Arima Masafumi in 1944 to compensate for the critical shortage of skilled Japanese pilots and the increasingly desperate situation of the Japanese forces after the June 19–21, 1944, Battle of the Philippine Sea. The term "kamikaze" means "divine wind" and derives from two legendary Japanese victories over invading Mongol forces in the 13th century when a typhoon—or kamikaze—destroyed the Mongol fleet as it lay off Japan in preparation for invasion. The Japanese had long believed that this kamikaze was a divine intervention, and over many centuries they had come to accept the proposition that Japan was shielded from calamity by a supernatural force. Japanese leaders hoped that the kamikaze pilots, like the wind that had saved their land seven centuries earlier, would spare Japan an Allied victory in the 20th century.

Arima had little trouble in recruiting pilots for his suicide missions. Thousands of young Japanese volunteered. A last-ditch defensive measure, the kamikaze missions succeeded in wreaking havoc on Allied warships

without sapping Japan's other resources. The first kamikaze missions were flown during the Battle of Leyte Gulf on October 23–26, 1944, when 24 volunteer pilots of the Japanese Navy's 201st Air Group on Leyte attacked a force of U.S. escort carriers. During this action, one escort carrier, the *St. Lô*, was sunk, and two others were heavily damaged.

The kamikaze plane operated as a kind of guided missile with human control, as the pilots tried to crash them into enemy ships. Most kamikaze aircraft were ordinary fighters or light bombers, often loaded with bombs and extra gasoline tanks. Many of the aircraft were old (some were biplanes with nonretractable gear), but later, the Japanese also used a new aircraft, which was a piloted rocket. Specifically developed for suicide missions, this aircraft, called "Baka" (the Japanese word for "fool") by the Allies, was carried to the target area by a medium bomber. Dropped from an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, the rocket would glide to about three miles from its target before the pilot turned on the three rocket engines, accelerating the craft to more than 600 mph in its final dive.

Determination and pride show in the faces of these young Japanese kamikaze pilots in 1945. They will attempt to crash their aircraft into Allied ships. Kamikaze, meaning "divine wind," refers to two massive typhoons in 1274 and 1281 that wrecked Mongol invasion fleets and forced the Mongols to quit Japan. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

After nearly securing Leyte, the Allies prepared to land on Luzon in the Philippines. With the loss of Leyte, there was little the Japanese could do to stop the U.S. advance, but they were determined to make the October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945, Luzon Campaign a costly one for their adversaries. Having suffered the loss of the bulk of their fleet in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese turned to kamikazes. One estimate holds that 1 out of every 4 kamikazes hit its target and that 1 out of every 33 sank a ship.

During the February 19–March 26, 1945, Battle of Iwo Jima, the kamikaze threat was lessened because of the distance between the island and the nearest Japanese air bases. However, there were still kamikaze attacks. On February 21, 1945, kamikazes sank the escort carrier *Bismarck Sea* and damaged the fleet carrier *Saratoga* (with the loss of some four dozen of its aircraft) as well as the escort carrier *Lunga Point*, a cargo ship, and two LSTs (landing ships, tank).

The kamikaze effort reached its zenith during the battle for Okinawa (March–June 1945), when the Allied task force was repeatedly attacked by waves of suicide planes. Their tactics were new. Previously, kamikazes had operated in separate and individual attacks. During this operation, however, the fleet was subjected to massed kamikaze raids. These *kikusui* (floating chrysanthemum) attacks, as the Japanese called them, were far more devastating than single kamikazes and took a heavy toll of Allied ships. In several of the raids, more than 350 planes were sent against the ships. Often, these suicide missions occurred simultaneously with conventional air attacks.

By the end of the Okinawa campaign, at least 1,450 kamikaze pilots had lost their lives, sinking or damaging 263 Allied ships, resulting in the deaths of 5,000 men. These were the greatest losses ever suffered by the U.S. Navy in a single battle.

The effect of the kamikaze attacks, particularly during the Okinawa operation, had a major impact on Allied strategic planners as they contemplated an invasion of the Japanese home islands and played a role in the decision to employ the atomic bomb in August 1945.

JAMES H. WILLBANKS

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Arima Masafumi; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kaitens; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Okinawa, Invasion of; Philippines, U.S.

Recapture of; Document 217

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Kammhuber, Josef (1896–1986)

German Air Force general. Born in Burgkirchen, Upper Bavaria, Germany, on August 19, 1896, Josef Kammhuber enlisted as a private in the army at the beginning of World War I. Ending the war as a second lieutenant, he continued in the Reichswehr thereafter. Between 1926 and 1928, he qualified as a General Staff officer in the Reichwehr's clandestine training program, and from 1929 to 1930 he took pilot training at the secret Luftwaffe training facility at Lipetsk.

Kammhuber joined the Luftwaffe in 1933 and then held a variety of staff and command positions, including chief of staff of Luftflotte 2 (Second Air Fleet). During the May 10–June 25, 1940, Battle for France, he commanded 51st Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Wing) and was shot down and taken prisoner.

Following his release, Kammhuber was ordered to organize the primitive German night defenses, developing them into a highly efficient system that came to be known as the "Kammhuber Line," an interlocking system of radar, aircraft, and ground controllers stretching from the North Sea to southern France. With advances in radar technology, the line was effective, but it was a defense in width rather than depth. The Royal Air Force Bomber Command eventually exploited this weakness by blinding the German radars with strips of foil called "Window" (known as "chaff" by the Americans). Following several devastating British raids, Kammhuber was relieved as general of night fighters in the autumn of 1943 and posted to Norway.

Following the war, Kammhuber passed on his night-fighting experiences to the U.S. Air Force. In 1956, he was named the inspector (chief of staff) of the air force of the new Federal Republic of Germany, a post he held until his

retirement as a full general in 1962. Kammhuber died in Munich, Germany, on January 25, 1986.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also
Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; France, Battle for; Germany, Air Force; Radar

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Kan'in Kotohito, Prince (1864–1945)

Japanese field marshal and member of the imperial family. Born on September 22, 1864, in Kyoto, Japan, Prince Kan'in Kotohito received the title of Imperial Prince Kan'in in 1872. Educated at the Japanese Army Cadet School, he studied in the French Army Cadet School and the French Cavalry School from 1878 to 1882. Following his return to Japan, he served in almost all major cavalry army posts.

During the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Major General Prince Kan'in served in the headquarters of the Manchuria Expeditionary Army. Promoted to lieutenant general, he commanded both the 1st Division and the Imperial Guards Division. Kan'in was promoted to field marshal in 1919.

As a "grand old man" of the Imperial Army, Kan'in occupied the post of chief of staff of the army between December 1931 and October 1940. His age made him a mere figurehead, allowing radical midrank officers to increase their influence in army decision making. Prince Kan'in died in Tokyo on May 20, 1945.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also
Japan, Army

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Kasserine Pass, Battle of (February 14–22, 1943)

Axis counteroffensive in Tunisia and an operational defeat for the Allies. On November 8, 1942, U.S. and British forces invaded Vichy-held French North Africa (Operation TORCH) while the British Eighth Army pushed Italian and German forces from Egypt into Libya. Italy and Germany then rushed reinforcements to Tunisia, but Axis forces there soon found themselves sandwiched between two Allied armies. Victory for the Allies seemed only a matter of time, but the friction of logistics, poor weather, and overconfidence provided the Axis an opportunity to seize the initiative and launch a counterstroke.

Hindering any Axis operation was the issue of who controlled the two armies in Tunisia. German field marshal Albert Kesselring in Italy was the theater commander of German forces in the Mediterranean. Under him, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel commanded Panzerarmee Afrika in southern Tunisia, and Colonel General Hans Dieter Jürgen von Arnim commanded the Fifth Panzerarmee in the north. The Axis plan called for Arnim's 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions to move through the Faid Pass and destroy American forces at Sidi Bou Zid. Rommel was to seize Gafsa on the Allied right flank and then move north to link up with Arnim. Although the Axis forces had combat experience, effective air support, and better equipment, the murky command arrangement mitigated against decisive success on the battlefield.

Men of the U.S. Army 33rd Field Artillery Battalion and their artillery pieces set in an Arabic mud-block abode for firing in defense of Kasserine Pass during the Tunisian Campaign in February 1943. The battle here was a major defeat for the inexperienced Americans. (Library of Congress)



For the Allies in Tunisia, the embryonic nature of coalition operations manifested itself at all levels, to include integrating French forces into the operational structure. The major U.S. element was Lieutenant General Lloyd Fredendall's II Corps, which held the southern flank between Faid and Meknassy passes.

Fredendall, overconfident yet overly cautious, deployed his inexperienced troops in unsupportable positions and unnecessarily complicated the command-and-control structure. His main battle element, the 1st Armored Division, was scattered into small detachments and could not fight as a complete unit. Fredendall directed operations from an elaborate underground command post some 70 miles from the front in Tebessa, which caused both superiors and subordinates to question his competence.

During a raging sandstorm on February 14, 1943, more than 200 of Arnim's tanks, supported by aircraft, began an attack reminiscent of the early

blitzkriegs. The Americans' inexperience and poor leadership proved no match for the veteran panzer divisions, which quickly bypassed and cut off more than 2,500 Americans near Sidi Bou Zid. In two days, the Allies lost six battalions of infantry, armor, and artillery, leaving the 1st Armored Division in shambles. As Axis forces attacked toward Sbeitla, the demoralized Americans began a general retreat, during which they destroyed supplies to prevent their capture.

As the Allies rushed reinforcements forward to stabilize their defense, the German command debated the objective. Rommel wanted complete operational control in order to cut Allied lines of communications and capture the logistics base at Tebessa. Kesselring refused to grant Rommel's request and subsequently ordered an attack toward the Le Kef and Allied reserves. This command disagreement diluted the Axis attack and provided the Allies valuable time to recover and rest their disorganized forces.

On February 19 Rommel struck at Kasserine Pass, a constricted defile 800 yards wide between 4,000-foot hill masses. The pass was guarded by a mixed force of more than 2,000 U.S. infantrymen and engineers as well as French artillery, including a battalion of tank destroyers, all commanded by Colonel Robert Stark. Fredendall ordered Stark to "pull a Stonewall Jackson." Stark's command held until the next day, when an Axis attack broke through his defense. Deterred from gaining Tebessa by a strong Allied defense, Rommel ordered his forces toward Thala, where they swept through a British armor rear guard. An apparent Axis victory was blunted by a dramatic reinforcement of U.S. artillery on February 21. Frustrated by stiffening Allied resistance and an inability to gain firm control of all the Axis forces, Rommel withdrew on February 22 to face General Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army along the Mareth Line to the east.

Aided by Axis indecision, the Allies had held just long enough, but the cost was high. Records on both sides are fragmentary, but the Allies sustained nearly 4,000 casualties, with 60 artillery pieces and 64 armored vehicles captured; II Corps probably lost 20 percent of its engaged forces as well as up to 400 armored vehicles and more than 200 artillery pieces. Kasserine Pass was a serious defeat for the inexperienced Americans. U.S. commander in North Africa General Dwight D. Eisenhower quickly took steps to shuffle his command, including the replacement of Fredendall by Major General George S. Patton Jr.

STEVEN J. RAUCH

See also

Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Fredendall, Lloyd Ralston; Kesselring, Albert; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; TORCH, Operation; Tunisia Campaign

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Kato Takeo (1903–1942)

Japanese Army major general and fighter ace. Born in Hokkaido, Japan, on September 28, 1903, Kato Takeo graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1925. Promoted to captain in 1933, he took command of the 2nd Air Squadron in 1937. The next year, he fought in northern China during the Sino-Japanese War.

During the Pacific war, Kato commanded the 64th Air Squadron, flying the Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa ("Oscar" in the Allied identification system) and smashing British air units in the Battle of Palembang in Sumatra on February 14–16, 1942. Promoted to lieutenant colonel, Kato shot down British lieutenant Martin Huggard's Blenheim bomber off Akyab, Burma, on May 22, 1943. Kato's own aircraft was damaged in the exchange of fire, however, and shortly thereafter he ditched his plane into the sea. At the time of his death, Kato was a multiple ace, credited with shooting down 26 enemy aircraft. Promoted posthumously to major general, he became a legend in the Japanese Army.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Japan, Air Forces; Palembang, Battle of

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Katyn Forest Massacre (1940)

World War II Soviet atrocity in Poland. On April 13, 1990, the Soviet news agency TASS announced that a joint commission of Polish and Soviet historians had found documents proving the involvement of personnel from the Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, NKVD) in the deaths of some 15,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest of eastern Poland in 1940. The secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, handed over a list of the victims to Polish president Wojciech Jaruzelski. In October 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin produced more archival documents, helping to determine the burial sites of missing officers not found near Katyn.

Until 1990, the Soviet Union had consistently denied murdering captured Polish Army officers after its occupation of eastern Poland ever since Radio Berlin announced on April 13, 1943, that German troops, tipped off by local inhabitants, had discovered mass graves near Smolensk. That June, the German Field Police reported that 4,143 bodies had been found in the Katyn Forest, all clothed in Polish Army uniforms. Some 2,815 corpses were later identified by personal documents in their pockets. Without exception, all the officers, ranking from general to noncommissioned, had been killed by shots in the back of the head. Medical examination later showed that a few bodies had jaws smashed by blows or bayonet wounds in their backs or stomachs, probably sustained when the individuals resisted.

A German doctor performing an autopsy on the body of a Polish soldier selected at random from a mass grave in the Katyn Forest, Poland. This photo, subsequently shown at congressional hearings probing the massacre by the Soviets of Polish officers in 1940, was taken in 1943 when American and British POWs held by the Germans were taken to view the massacre site. (Corbis)

The Germans predictably tried to exploit the Katyn murders for propaganda purposes, pointing out to their wartime enemies that any alliance with the perpetrators of this atrocity was too dangerous to continue. By then, General Władysław Sikorski's London-based Polish government-in-exile and General Władysław Anders, commander of the Polish forces in the Soviet Union and the Middle East, had been worrying for a considerable time over the fate of the missing officers. Following the Soviet-Polish agreement in the summer of 1941, a small but steady trickle of Poles arrived at the reopened Polish embassy in Kuibyshev. These individuals, from prison camps scattered over the western parts of the Soviet Union, agreed that their fellow servicemen had been transferred to unknown destinations when the NKVD liquidated the camps in April 1940. The arrivals at Kuibyshev turned out to be the few survivors of the Katyn Forest Massacre. The massacre was apparently a Soviet effort to deprive the Poles of their natural leaders, who would undoubtedly oppose a Soviet takeover.

After numerous fruitless discussions on the subject with Soviet authorities, the Polish government-in-exile came to believe the German

announcement of April 1943 and demanded an independent investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This caused the Kremlin to accuse the Polish government-in-exile of siding with the "fascist aggressors" and break off diplomatic relations. The ICRC, pursuant to its policy of neutrality, could take no action without Soviet consent. London, although embarrassed by this development, made it plain that it was unwilling to risk an end to the alliance with the Soviet Union over such an investigation. The United States took a similar stance.

When the Red Army finally drove the German armies westward, Moscow determined that it needed to present its own investigation results in 1944. A Soviet special commission pointed out that the bullets found on the crime scene were manufactured in Germany and concluded that the Germans had killed the Polish officers in 1941. British and American protests notwithstanding, the Soviet prosecution raised the Katyn affair at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, but because the Soviets were unable to prove German guilt, the tribunal simply dropped the case. Throughout the Cold War, the issue of the Katyn Forest Massacre resurfaced time and again, partly because of the efforts of the Polish émigré community. However, it remained unresolved until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

PASCAL TREES

See also

Anders, Władysław; Poland; Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz

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Kawabe Masakazu (1886–1965)

Japanese Army general and older brother of General Kawabe Torashirō. Born in Tokyo on December 5, 1886, Kawabe Masakazu was commissioned in the 35th Infantry Regiment in December 1907. His assignments included postings to Switzerland and Germany, and staff duties. In the 1930s, he spent

most of his time in the Infantry Training Inspectorate. In July 1937, Kawabe was assistant chief of staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria, and he supported Japanese attacks on Chinese troops following the July 7 Marco Polo Bridge Incident. In February 1938, as a major general, Kawabe was appointed chief of staff of the Central China Expeditionary Army and saw action in China over the next five years. Promoted to lieutenant general in March 1939, he commanded the 12th Division from March 1940 to March 1941, after which he took command of the Third Army.

In March 1943, Kawabe assumed command of the Burma Area Army from Iida Shōjirō. Impressed by Major General Orde Wingate's success in using large formations in the jungle, he reviewed and endorsed Lieutenant General Mutaguchi Renya's plan for a large-scale offensive against the British in northeastern India. Kawabe believed that Japanese success would provoke a widespread uprising against the British.

A diversionary attack in Arakan in February 1944 drew off British reserves, and in early March Japanese soldiers from the 33rd and 15th Divisions crossed the Chindwin River and surrounded the British base of Imphal. They were accompanied by 7,000 men of the Indian National Army.

The 31st Division attacked Kohima, the gateway to Imphal. Kawabe refused to let Mutaguchi advance against Dimapur, an important supply base on the railroad to Ledo. Had Dimapur been captured, the Allies would not have been able to fly supplies from Ledo to China.

British and Indian reinforcements broke the siege of Kohima by April 18, but they could not drive off the 31st Division until June. Imphal was relieved on June 22, and the Japanese finally withdrew to Burma. In this campaign, Mutaguchi lost nearly 100,000 men, making it one of the worst defeats in Japanese history. Both Kawabe and Mutaguchi were removed from their posts in August 1944.

Kawabe returned to Japan, where he headed the Central District Army Command, and in March 1945, he was promoted to full general. A month later, he assumed command of the Air General Army, with responsibility for the air defense of the Japanese homeland. After the Japanese surrender, he succeeded Marshal Sugiyama Hajime in command of the First General Army. Kawabe died in Tokyo on March 2, 1965.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Burma Theater; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Wingate, Orde Charles

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Kawabe Torashirō (1890–1960)

Japanese Army general and younger brother of General Kawabe Masakazu. Born in Tokyo on June 25, 1890, Kawabe Torashirō served in the Operations Division of the army General Staff as a young officer. From 1926 to 1928 he was in Riga as resident officer, studying Soviet military plans and capabilities. He was military attaché in Moscow between 1932 and 1934. As chief of the intelligence section of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army, Kawabe was involved in efforts to gain control over Chahar Province in Inner Mongolia. Because of his concern with Soviet intentions, he was one of the few senior Japanese officers hoping to limit Japan's involvement in China after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937.

Kawabe spent October 1938 to February 1940 as military attaché to Germany, and from August 1939, he was concurrently attaché in Hungary. In September 1940, he assumed command of the 7th Air Brigade in Manchuria. His unit relocated to Guangzhou (Canton) in February 1941.

Just before war with the United States began, Kawabe was promoted to chief of the General Affairs Department of the Japanese Army Air Force Inspectorate General. In May 1943, he commanded the Second Air Army in Manchuria. He returned to Japan in August 1944 and was promoted to deputy chief of the army General Staff in April 1945.

Following the Japanese government's decision to surrender, Kawabe was selected to head the team that would work out the details of the capitulation. On August 19, 1945, he and his 16-man team flew to Ie Shima, near Okinawa. An American transport plane then carried them to General Douglas

MacArthur's headquarters in Manila. There, Kawabe received the American demands for the surrender arrangements and the initial occupation of Japan. The firm but fair attitude of the Americans greatly impressed him. He secured agreement that the Japanese would disarm their own troops prior to the arrival of the U.S. forces.

The Japanese government accepted the terms negotiated by Kawabe, which provided for the peaceful U.S. military occupation of Japan. Following the war, Kawabe served on an advisory commission to the Japanese government on armaments. He died in Tokyo on June 25, 1960.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Japan, Army; Japan, Surrender of; MacArthur, Douglas

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Kawaguchi Kiyotake (1892–1961)

Japanese Army major general. Born in Kōōchi Prefecture, Japan, on December 3, 1892, Kawaguchi Kiyotake graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1914 and was commissioned in the infantry. He also graduated from the Military Staff College in 1922. Kawaguchi then served on the General Staff from 1923 to 1925, as a staff officer with the 4th Division from 1925 to 1928, in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, and as an aide to the minister of the army from 1930 to 1933. Between 1933 and 1939, he served with the China Garrison Army and North China Area Army as a staff officer, then as director of the Public Liaison Office.

In December 1940, Kawaguchi was promoted to major general and took command of the 35th Infantry Brigade. On the outbreak of the Pacific war, his unit took part in amphibious operations resulting in the capture of Borneo (December 1941), Cebu (March 1942), and Mindanao (April 1942). In late August 1942, he landed on Guadalcanal from Rabaul, in charge of some

3,500 reinforcements. He then commanded some 6,000 troops in their efforts to retake Henderson Field. His men participated in the September 13–14 Battle of Bloody Ridge, taking heavy casualties during their attempt to penetrate the U.S. defensive perimeter.

Prior to another major Japanese attack on October 24–25, 1942, Kawaguchi opposed Seventeenth Army commander Lieutenant General Hyakutake Haruyoshi's plan for a frontal assault, arguing for a flanking movement instead. On the day of the assault, Hyakutake removed Kawaguchi from his command and dismissed him.

Kawaguchi returned to Japan and was attached to the headquarters of the Eastern District Army. In March 1943, he was relegated to the unassigned list and, the next month, the reserve list. Kawaguchi remained there until March 1945, when he was reactivated as commander of the Tsushima Island Fortress Zone. In February 1946, he was arrested on war crimes charges for the execution of the Philippines' minister of justice. Tried and convicted, Kawaguchi was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor from 1946 to 1953. He died in Tokyo on May 16, 1961.

ASAKAWA MICHIO

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of

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Kearny, USS, Torpedoing of (October 17, 1941)

The destroyer *Kearny* was the first U.S. warship to be torpedoed in World War II, bringing the United States, which was not a belligerent at the time, one step closer to joining the conflict. Under its captain, Commander Anthony Leo Danis, the *Kearny* was one of a number of destroyers on Atlantic convoy duty as part of the Northeastern Escort Force assigned to

escort convoys as far east as Iceland and as far west as the United States. A new Benson-class destroyer, the *Kearny* had been completed only in 1940; with a displacement of 1,630 tons and a main armament of four 5-inch guns, along with four 40mm Bofors and seven 20mm Oerlikon antiaircraft guns, it was capable of 36.5 knots.

The *Kearny* was at Reykjavik, Iceland, with a destroyer division that had just made the run from the United States when news arrived of attacks by German U-boats on convoy SC.48 of 50 merchantmen, about 400 miles west of Iceland. On October 15, a German wolf pack had sunk three of the merchantmen. The *Kearny* was one of a half dozen escorts dispatched to SC.48's assistance. The *Kearny* and four other destroyers from Iceland joined up with the convoy about 350 miles southwest of Iceland early on October 16 and immediately took up station screening it. With the destroyers only 1,000 to 1,500 yards from the convoy, the German submarines were able to take up longer-range firing positions undetected.

That night in three separate waves of attacks, the German wolf pack struck again, sinking seven more merchant ships. In the last of these attacks, around 2:00 a.m. on October 17, the *Kearny* was searching for U-boats on the surface when it came under attack by *U-569*, which fired three torpedoes against it. One of these struck home, hitting the *Kearny* on its starboard side amidships.

Through valiant effort, the crew managed to save their ship, although 11 sailors were killed and 24 wounded. Miraculously, given the extensive damage and the hole in its side, the *Kearny* made it to Iceland under its own power, escorted by the destroyer *Greer*. Eventually, the *Kearny* rejoined the fleet.

The attack on the *Kearny* came in the middle of debate over the repeal of the Neutrality Acts in the United States. President Franklin D. Roosevelt took to the airwaves, telling the American people, "We have wished to avoid shooting. But the shooting has started. And history will record who fired the first shot." A few days later, a German submarine torpedoed and sank the destroyer USS *Reuben James*, also on convoy duty in the Atlantic. By then, it seemed as if U.S. entry into the war had become only a matter of time, although Americans were shocked to see the final provocation come from another quarter—the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, halfway around the globe.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Destroyers; Lend-Lease; Submarines; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Keitel, Wilhelm (1882–1946)

German Army field marshal and chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). Born on September 22, 1882, in Helmscherode, Germany, Wilhelm Keitel joined a Prussian field artillery regiment in 1901 and served as its staff captain during the early months of World War I. He was then posted to the German General Staff. His demonstrated abilities there secured him a position in the postwar Reichswehr.

Chosen to head the Wehrmachtamt (Armed Forces Office) in 1935, Keitel became chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Wehrmacht. When Adolf Hitler assumed command of the Wehrmacht in 1938, Keitel remained as chief of staff, although with the new title of OKW chief, and he maintained that position until Germany's surrender in 1945. Keitel was promoted to major general in April 1934, to lieutenant general in January 1936, to general of artillery in August 1937, and to colonel general in November 1938. He became a field marshal in 1940.

Although competent as a staff officer, Keitel maintained his position as a direct result of his personal loyalty to Hitler. With his headquarters responsible for only one operation during World War II (the 1940 Denmark-Norway Campaign), German commanders and staffs consistently bypassed him and the OKW and went directly to Hitler. Privately, they referred to Keitel as "Lakeitel" (a play on the German word for lackey, *Lakai*), a

reference to his relationship to Hitler and his limited influence on Germany's military operations. More than any other act, his work in the promulgation of the Commissar Order of 1941, a decree mandating the immediate execution of all captured political officers on the Eastern Front, led to his classification as a war criminal. Brought before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg after the war, he pleaded not guilty to all charges, citing his responsibility to carry out superiors' orders as his defense. Convicted and condemned to death, Keitel was hanged in Nuremberg on October 16, 1946.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel signing, for the Germans, the ratified surrender terms at Soviet Army headquarters in Berlin, May 7, 1945. (National Archives)

DAVID M. TOCZEK

See also

Commissar Order; Denmark Campaign; Germany, Army; Hitler, Adolf; Norway, German Conquest of; Document 85

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Kellogg-Briand Pact (August 27, 1928)

International agreement signed in Paris on August 27, 1928. The Kellogg-Briand Pact sought to outlaw wars of aggression. It was named for its two principal negotiators—U.S. secretary of state Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand. The pact grew out of the French desire for a mutual security arrangement with the United States. American leaders opposed this, and the subsequent negotiations led to an innocuous treaty outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. Ultimately signed by most nations, it won Kellogg and Briand the Nobel Prize for Peace.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact forbade the use of force to resolve disputes among the signatory nations. It also forbade its signatories from waging war against another nation for the purpose of acquiring or annexing new territory. The original signatories included France, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Canada, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, British India, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and the Irish Free State. The Kellogg-Briand Pact went into effect on July 24, 1929. In all, 62 nations became signatories to the agreement.

There are a number of notable points to be made in relation to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. First, it was negotiated and concluded entirely outside the context of the League of Nations, to which several signatories—most notably the United States—did not belong. Second, the agreement lacked any monitoring program and, more critically, had no enforcement power whatsoever. Third, the pact did not include any collective security arrangements and did not oblige any signatories to come to the aid of another in the event of a war of aggression. Kellogg-Briand may be viewed as a multilateral effort in the aftermath of World War I to avoid a similar conflagration in the future by co-opting nations into an international agreement prohibiting the use of war as a means of national policy. For the French, the pact helped solidify the ongoing Franco-German rapprochement that had been a goal of Briand’s since the mid-1920s.

In the end, the lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms rendered the pact virtually useless as a tool for international diplomacy. It did nothing to stop the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of

Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939, the German invasion of Poland that same year, or even U.S. armed intervention in Central America. Nevertheless, at the time it was promulgated, many nations were buoyed by the illusion that states would not wage war to advance their interests.

Although the Kellogg-Briand Pact proved unsatisfactory at preventing war, it did serve as the legal foundation for the idea of "crimes against peace," and the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg convened after World War II was premised partly on the precedent set by Kellogg-Briand. Also, the prohibition of wars of aggression became the basis for part of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945, although this time the UN put in place specific enforcement mechanisms. Although rarely invoked in modern times, the Kellogg-Briand Pact continues to be a binding international treaty.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Finnish-Soviet War, First; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Italo-Ethiopian War; League of Nations; Manzhouguo; Poland Campaign; United Nations, Formationof

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Kennedy, Joseph Patrick, Sr. (1888–1969)

Investor, businessman, influential U.S. government official, and ambassador to the United Kingdom. Joseph "Joe" Patrick Kennedy Sr. was born on September 6, 1888, in Boston, Massachusetts, the son of a successful Boston businessman and Irish American leader. Kennedy graduated from Harvard University in 1912 and entered the banking industry. In 1914, he married Rose Fitzgerald, daughter of Boston mayor John F. "Honey Fitz" Fitzgerald. There is little doubt that the marriage was a significant boost to Kennedy's financial and political aspirations.

Kennedy soon began to make substantial sums of money investing in commodities, real estate, and stocks. In 1917, in a move designed chiefly to increase his visibility, he took a position as assistant general manager of a shipyard in Quincy, Massachusetts. Notably, Kennedy dealt extensively with a young Franklin D. Roosevelt, then assistant secretary of the navy. The two men thereafter became political allies.

Kennedy managed to avert major losses in the stock market crash of 1929, chiefly through insider trading. He also made a considerable fortune in the illicit alcohol business after Prohibition was instituted in 1920, and he invested considerable sums in the burgeoning film industry in Hollywood. An uncannily shrewd man, Kennedy's many business ventures seemed calculated as much to increase his personal visibility and social standing as to make money. For many years he harbored presidential aspirations, and when those did not bear fruit, he groomed his sons for the presidency.

In 1934, as the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration tackled the economic crisis of the Great Depression, the president tapped Kennedy to head the new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), designed to impose order and discipline in securities trading and eliminate corruption and fraud. This appointment was largely payback to Kennedy, who had raised funds for Roosevelt's 1932 presidential bid. Kennedy had hoped for a cabinet-level position, but he eagerly accepted the SEC challenge and did a fine job organizing and staffing it. From 1936 to 1938, he headed the U.S. Maritime Commission.

In 1938 Kennedy was named ambassador to Britain. He relished the role, although his tenure would be rife with controversy. On several occasions, both before and after the start of World War II, Kennedy attempted unsuccessfully to arrange a meeting between himself and Adolf Hitler in an attempt to broker an understanding between the United States and Germany. This he did without State Department or presidential approval. Kennedy also went on record as opposing military and financial aid to the British, which alarmed the Roosevelt administration and outraged many Britons. As time went on, Kennedy became ever more isolationist and defeatist in his sentiments, admitting privately to many that the United States should avoid the conflict at virtually all costs.

Kennedy's biggest blunders came after the beginning of the German bombing of London in September 1940. At a time in which most British

officials—including the royal family—stayed in London despite the air raids and bombings, Kennedy vacated the London embassy and took refuge in a country estate. In early November 1940, Kennedy publicly asserted that democracy was not driving the British war effort; instead, he argued, it was simply self-preservation. He also stated that the United States should aid Britain, but only because it would give the Americans more time to prepare for a potential Axis move against them. This not only shocked and outraged the Roosevelt administration but led many Englishmen to demand Kennedy's recall. Under heavy pressure from the State Department and the British government, Kennedy tendered his resignation in late November 1940 and returned home. This marked the effective end to Kennedy's political aspirations.

Kennedy strongly opposed Roosevelt's bid for a third term in 1940, believing that it would ultimately lead to war. Kennedy now focused on grooming his four sons—Joseph Jr., John, Robert, and Edward—for high political office. Unfortunately, Joseph Jr. was killed in action in August 1944. John was elected president in 1961 but assassinated in November 1963; Robert, a sitting senator from New York, was assassinated in June 1968 as he ran for president; Edward, a longtime senator from Massachusetts, died in 2009 of cancer.

Kennedy continued to work behind the scenes to help his sons' political careers after leaving his ambassadorship, sometimes forging odd alliances, as with Republican senator Joseph R. McCarthy, the perpetrator of McCarthyism, in the early 1950s. Kennedy suffered a debilitating stroke in 1961 and died at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, on November 18, 1969.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Blitz, The; Great Britain; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Kenney, George Churchill (1889–1977)

U.S. Army general. Born on August 6, 1889, in Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, George Churchill Kenney studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and worked as an engineer for several years. Following the U.S. entry into World War I, he joined the Aviation Section of the Army Signal Corps, becoming a fighter pilot in the World War I American Expeditionary Forces Air Service. After the war, Kenney continued in what became the Army Air Corps in 1926. In 1938, Major General Henry Harley Arnold, the new Air Corps chief, appointed Kenney as chief of the Production Engineering Sections of the Matériel Division. In January 1941, Kenney, promoted to brigadier general, became head of the Air Corps Experimental Depot. He then briefly commanded the West Coast Fourth Air Force.

From July 1942, Kenney commanded Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area; later that year, he was promoted to lieutenant general. In June 1944, he also took command of the new U.S. Far East Air Force, and he became a full general in March 1945. Kenney's boldness and his efficiency and drive in introducing innovative aircraft, equipment, and tactics and inspiring his subordinates helped transform U.S. airpower in the Pacific.

Kenney oversaw the transformation of the U.S. air service from a primarily defensive arm of the military to a powerful offensive force that wrested control of the skies from the Japanese. Between 1942 and 1945, his U.S. Fifth Air Force provided invaluable strategic and tactical air support to Southwest Pacific theater commander General Douglas MacArthur's operations, transporting troops and supplies, destroying enemy shipping, and supporting 56 amphibious operations by Australian and U.S. ground forces. Kenney was the Pacific theater's most distinguished air commander.

After the war, Kenney headed, in succession, the Pacific Air Command, the Strategic Air Command, and the Air University before retiring in 1951. Kenney died in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida, on August 9, 1977.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; MacArthur, Douglas; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; United States Army Air Forces

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Kerr, Philip Henry (1882–1940)

British ambassador to the United States (1939–1940). Born in London on April 18, 1882, Philip Henry Kerr graduated from New College, Oxford, in 1904. Immediately afterward he went to South Africa, where he worked on its post–Boer War reconstruction. Returning to Britain in 1910, Kerr became editor of the *Round Table*, a quarterly established to encourage closer union among the British Dominions.

In late 1916, Kerr joined British prime minister David Lloyd George's personal secretariat. As the prime minister's private secretary from late 1918 to 1921, Kerr attended the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, drafting the Allied letter of response to German protests over the peace terms. A dedicated advocate of closer Anglo-American relations, Kerr was secretary of the Rhodes Trust from 1925 to 1939.

In 1930, Kerr inherited the title Lord Lothian. In the early 1930s, he served briefly as chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and as undersecretary of state for India. Although Kerr publicly advocated the appeasement of Germany in the 1930s, Adolf Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia convinced him that his pro-German sympathies had been mistaken. Kerr thereafter publicly advocated the pooling of national sovereignty among the Western democracies, including the British Empire and the United States.

In the late summer of 1939 shortly before Britain declared war on Germany, Kerr became British ambassador to the United States. He soon delivered a series of widely reported public speeches that were highly effective in expounding Britain's perspective on the war. Kerr argued that U.S. security had always depended on the protection of the British fleet and that any German victory over Britain would therefore jeopardize vital American national interests. His numerous contacts among the northeastern

American elite proved particularly useful, as he maintained unofficial contacts with such staunchly pro-Allied organizations as the Century Group and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.

One of Kerr's major accomplishments was the negotiation of the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement in the summer of 1940. The following December as British supplies of dollar exchange diminished, he also laid the groundwork for what would become the Lend-Lease program. In addition, he supervised what was a highly effective, although low-key, British propaganda effort in the United States. Kerr died suddenly in Washington, D.C., on December 12, 1940.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Great Britain; Lend-Lease

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Kesselring, Albert (1885–1960)

German Air Force field marshal. Born in Marksheft, Bavaria, on November 20, 1885, Albert Kesselring joined the Bavarian Army as an officer candidate in the 2nd Regiment of Foot Artillery in 1904 and was commissioned in 1906. A trained balloon observer, he served with his battery on the Western Front during World War I. Soon, he was on the staff of a regiment and then a division and finally with the II Bavarian Army Corps until the armistice.

Kesselring continued in the postwar Reichswehr and secured his reputation as a superb administrator. Colonel Kesselring transferred to the still-secret air force in 1933 as chief of administration and military assistant to Luftwaffe state secretary Erhard Milch. There, he helped direct the secret expansion of the air force, for which he deserves considerable credit. In June 1936, he became the Luftwaffe chief of staff as a lieutenant general.

Unable to work with Milch, Kesselring applied for retirement. Instead Luftwaffe chief Reichsmarshal Hermann Göring gave him command of the Third Air Region and promotion to general of aviation. Later, he commanded the 1st Air Group, which was upgraded to Luftflotte 2 (Second Air Fleet), composed of 20 bomber and fighter groups. Kesselring led this fleet in the invasion of Poland in September 1939.

He also commanded Luftflotte 2 in the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940, his aircraft striking both Rotterdam and Dunkerque. Promoted to field marshal in July 1940, Kesselring continued to command Luftflotte 2 in the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), when he advised Adolf Hitler to concentrate on London to bring up the Royal Air Force (RAF) so that it might be destroyed. Kesselring also commanded Luftflotte 2 in the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. With some 1,000 aircraft, this force was the largest German air fleet in the invasion.

In December 1941, Kesselring went to Italy as commander in chief, south, a post he held until March 1945. His command encompassed the Mediterranean Basin, and there, he won the nickname “Smiling Albert” for his ability to get along with Italian leaders. Kesselring believed that the key to the supply situation in North Africa was control of Malta, and he urged Hitler to take the island by airborne assault. Hitler pledged to do so but never acted.

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, one of the most capable German military commanders of the war. (Library of Congress)

Kesselring won admiration for the skillful Axis evacuations of Tunis in May 1943 and Sicily in August 1943 as well as the defense of Italy. Badly injured in a car accident in October 1944, he underwent successful brain surgery and returned to his command the following January. On March 8, 1945, he succeeded Field Marshal Karl R. Gerd von Rundstedt as Oberbefehlshaber West (commander in chief, west).

On April 15, Hitler divided the remaining Reich into two defensive zones. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz took command of the north, and Kesselring received command of the south. Kesselring surrendered his forces to the Western Allies on May 7, 1945.

Tried after the war for his role in the March 24, 1944, Ardeatine Massacre, Kesselring was sentenced to death in 1947, but his sentence was reduced to life in prison. He was released in October 1952 as “an act of

clemency" when he developed cancer. Kesselring then wrote his memoirs (published in English as *A Soldier's Record*), which criticized Hitler only for certain military decisions. Kesselring also headed the Stahlhelm, a right-wing German veterans' organization. He died in Bad Nauheim on July 20, 1960.

SPENCER C. TUCKER AND JOHN P. VANZO

See also

Ardeatine Massacre; Britain, Battle of; Dönitz, Karl; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Hitler, Adolf; Italy Campaign; Malta; Milch, Erhard; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Sicily, Invasion of; Tunis, Battle of

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Keyes, Geoffrey (1888–1967)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Bayard, New Mexico, on October 30, 1888, Geoffrey Keyes graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1913 and was commissioned in the cavalry. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School (1926) and taught tactics at the Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas (1933–1936). He then graduated from the Army War College (1937) and headed the Supply and Transportation Branch, Supply Division, War Department General Staff (1939–1940), as a colonel.

Assigned in 1940 as chief of staff of the new 2nd Armored Division, Keyes became a close personal friend and protégé of Major General George S. Patton Jr. Promoted to brigadier general in January 1942 and to major general that June, Keyes was Patton's deputy in the Western Task Force

invading North Africa on November 8, 1942. Between 1943 and 1945, Keyes commanded II Corps. In Sicily with Patton's Seventh Army, he directed the provisional corps that captured Palermo in late July 1943.

With II Corps in Lieutenant General Mark Clark's Fifth Army in Italy, Keyes's first major action was a failure—the poorly planned and badly executed attack across the Rapido River in January 1944. Fortunately for Keyes, most of the blame for the debacle was assigned to Major General Fred L. Walker, commander of the 36th Infantry Division. Although not assigned a prominent role in either the May 1944 drive on Rome or the April 1945 final offensive into the Po Valley, II Corps usually performed competently under conditions that were anything but conducive to maneuver and rapid movement.

Throughout the 1943–1945 Italy Campaign, Keyes got along reasonably well with the often difficult Clark. Keyes made numerous tactical suggestions, most of which Clark ignored. Keyes might have taken over the Fifth Army in December 1944 when Clark moved up to 15th Army Group had not Lucian Truscott, already a lieutenant general, been available. Keyes was promoted to lieutenant general in April 1945.

Keyes took command of the Seventh Army in 1945 and the Third Army in 1946 in Germany. The following year, he succeeded Clark as U.S. high commissioner on the Allied Council for Austria. Retiring from the army in 1950, Keyes died in Washington, D.C., on September 17, 1967.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Clark, Mark Wayne; Italy Campaign; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.

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Keyes, Roger John Brownlow (1872–1945)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born in Tundiani, India, on October 4, 1872, Roger John Brownlow Keyes joined the Royal Navy in 1887. He took part in anti–slave trade campaigns and distinguished himself during the 1900 Boxer Uprising in China. By 1905, he was a captain and was regarded as one of the most promising Royal Navy officers. In 1912, Keyes was appointed as commodore in charge of the submarine service. In 1917 he became chief of staff to Admiral Sackville Carden, commander of the Dardanelles Campaign. In October 1917, Keyes became director of plans for the Admiralty. Promoted to vice admiral, he was made commander of the Dover Patrol in January 1918. Rewarded with a baronetcy and promotion to admiral of the fleet, he became the Conservative member of Parliament for North Portsmouth in 1934 and retired from the navy in 1935.

When World War II began, Keyes staunchly supported First Lord of the Admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill's ill-considered efforts in Norway in 1940, and his parliamentary speech of May 7, 1940, criticizing the government's record, helped cause the fall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his replacement by Churchill. Three days later, Keyes became British liaison officer to King Leopold III of Belgium until the latter signed an armistice with Germany on May 27, 1940.

In July 1940, Churchill appointed Keyes director of combined operations. As such, he was responsible for the early planning of British efforts to return to continental Europe, including organizing a special force of commandos intended to mount unconventional secret raids against enemy targets. He expanded this organization substantially and won it considerable independence from supervision by the army, navy, marines, and air force. In the autumn of 1941, however, Churchill's decree that Keyes should not direct commando operations but simply organize and train the units and advise on their use led the admiral to resign. Lord Louis Mountbatten replaced him. In late November, Keyes's son Geoffrey died in an unsuccessful commando raid intended to assassinate German general Erwin Rommel, for which he won the Victoria Cross.

Although Keyes criticized in Parliament the government's handling of the war, he was made a peer, Baron Keyes of Zeebrugge and Dover, in January 1943. He undertook minor government assignments thereafter and lectured

widely in the summer of 1944. Keyes died in Buckingham, England, on December 26, 1945.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain, Navy; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Norway, German Conquest of

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Khalkhin Gol, Battle of (May–September 1939)

A large-scale border clash from May to September 1939 between Japanese (including Manchurian) and Soviet (including Mongolian) forces around Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan) on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. Small skirmishes between Manchurian and Mongolian border guards escalated in May 1939 into a clash between Japanese and Soviet forces supporting their respective satellite states of Manzhoudiguo (Manchuko) and the Mongolian People's Republic. In late May, a Japanese reconnaissance unit of the 23rd Division that had crossed the Khalkha River was encircled and annihilated by a Soviet mechanized battalion and Mongolian cavalry.

Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army leaders were determined to repel the Soviets and settle the border dispute in Japan's favor. They ordered in Lieutenant General Komatsubara Michitarō's 23rd Division, committing its infant tank corps of approximately 100 tanks and armored vehicles. In the resulting fighting, Japan lost more than 40 tanks within a week, and the remainder were withdrawn. Thereafter, the only antitank weapons available to the Japanese infantry were 37mm antitank guns and improvised gasoline bombs—what would become known as Molotov cocktails.

Meanwhile, in June, General Georgii K. Zhukov was appointed commander in chief of the Soviet LVII Special Army Corps in the battle. He

held the front line until the Japanese offensive lost its steam by mid-July. Both sides then began preparations for the next phase. As the Japanese contemplated a prolonged winter operation, the Soviets secretly assembled a massive force of two infantry divisions, tank and armored brigades, and more than 550 aircraft for a general offensive. Zhukov mobilized several thousand trucks to maintain the 390-mile supply line between the railway terminal depot and the front line.

The Soviets launched their counterattack on August 20, and within a week all of the Japanese front line had been cut off, encircled, and destroyed. The battle was virtually a fight between tanks and artillery on the Soviet side and small arms and bayonets on the part of the Japanese.

Although the Japanese achieved a minor tactical success in the final stage of the conflict (a night attack by Colonel Miyazaki Shigesaburo's regiment that pushed back a portion of the Soviet line), overall the battle was a shattering defeat for the Imperial Army. Its 23rd Division sustained a casualty rate of more than 70 percent. Total Japanese casualties came to 19,904 killed or wounded. Soviet and Mongolian casualties were even higher: 7,974 killed or missing and 15,925 wounded, for a total of 23,899. The Soviets lost some 350 aircraft and more than 300 tanks and armored vehicles during the fighting. However, the border dispute was settled in favor of the Soviets and Mongolians in an armistice arranged in Moscow in September 1939 between Soviet commissar of foreign affairs Vyacheslav Molotov and Japanese foreign minister Tōgō Shigenori.

This battle demonstrated Japanese backwardness in artillery doctrine, armored warfare, and logistics. The Japanese Army, hampered by the continuing fighting in China, lacked the will, time, and resources to correct these defects before the start of the Pacific war in December 1941. In contrast, the fighting increased Soviet confidence in their integration of armor, artillery, and infantry, supported by in-depth logistical systems.

Politically, the Japanese Army lost its confidence in a "northern advance" strategy into the Soviet Union and began seeking an alternative in expansion to the south, which inevitably led to increased friction with Britain and the United States. The Japanese military reversal at Khalkhin Gol also induced Tokyo to sign a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941. The Soviet Union, which concluded its own nonaggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939, in the final stage of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, was now

able to concentrate its attention on the partition of Poland between itself and Germany.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Guandong Army; Itagaki Seishirō; Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act; Komatsubara Michitarō; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Kharkov, Battles of (1941–1943)

Three separate battles were fought for control of the key Ukrainian city of Kharkov, an important rail and manufacturing center producing aircraft, tanks, and small arms. During Operation BARBAROSSA, the initial German invasion of the Soviet Union, Kharkov lay in the path of Army Group South's Sixth Army, commanded by Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau. During October 20–24, 1941, Kharkov was taken by Major General Anton Dostler's 57th Infantry Division attacking from the south and Lieutenant General Josef von Haydringen's 101st Light Division moving from the north. The city was defended by the Red Army's 216th Rifle Division, part of Major General Aleksei Maslov's Thirty-Eighth Army.

During the Red Army's Winter Offensive from December 6, 1941, to May 7, 1942, the Ninth and Fifty-Seventh Armies pushed across the Izium River and drove a salient deep into the sector of Colonel General Hermann Hoth's Seventeenth Army, threatening to envelop Kharkov from the south. The Second Battle of Kharkov began on May 12, when units of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko's Southwest Front tried to break out of the Izium bridgehead and continue the offensive against the German Sixth Army, now commanded by Colonel General Friedrich Paulus. Timoshenko intended to

recapture Kharkov, and initially his forces made good progress, penetrating up to 60 miles west of the Izium.

On May 17, Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist's First Panzer Army and the Seventeenth Army, now commanded by Colonel General Hans von Salmuth, broke into the Soviet southern flank. At that point the Germans had a local superiority of 4.4 to 1 in tanks, 1.3 to 1 in infantry, and 1.7 to 1 in artillery. Timoshinko requested permission to withdraw, but by the time Soviet premier Joseph Stalin had responded, the Sixth Army penetrated the salient from the north and sealed the pocket. By the time the battle ended on May 22, German forces had suffered some 20,000 casualties and lost 38 aircraft. The Red Army sustained 277,000 casualties and lost 1,250 tanks, 2,080 artillery pieces, and 540 aircraft.

The Third Battle of Kharkov was fought between February 19 and March 15, 1943. Following their victory at Stalingrad in early February 1943, the Soviet Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts under Generals Filipp Golikov and Nikolai Vatutin drove to the Donets River and recaptured Kursk, Rostov, and Kharkov. During a visit to the front on February 17–19, 1943, Hitler ordered a counterattack. In the resulting offensive action, Field Marshal Eric von Manstein's Army Group South struck the Soviet flank with an attack from the south by Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen's First Panzer Army. Army Group South had only 350 operational tanks at that point, but the Germans managed to achieve a seven-to-one superiority over the Soviets at the point of the main effort.

German soldiers, dislodged from a house on the outskirts of Kharkov, taking cover outside a building that has been set on fire, February 23, 1943. (Keystone/Getty Images)

During a running battle from Krasnoarmeiskaia to the northern Donets River, the Fourth Panzer Army's XL Panzer Corps encircled and destroyed what was left of Mobile Group Popov. On February 22, the Fourth Panzer Army's SS Panzer Corps and LVIII Panzer Corps attacked Vatutin's Southwest Front, the leading XXV Tank Corps of which was within 12 miles of Zaporozhye. Having run out of fuel, the men of the XXV Tank Corps abandoned their equipment and attempted to escape to the north. For the most part this was successful, as the Germans took only 9,000 prisoners.

On March 1, Manstein began an advance on Kharkov, attempting to get behind the Red Army forces west of that city. The Soviets were then driving against Army Detachment Kempf, commanded by General of Panzer Troops Werner Kempf. A five-day battle for the city raged, with the Fourth Panzer Army getting the better of Lieutenant General Pavel S. Rybalko's Third Tank

Army, which had been sent to reinforce the hard-pressed Southwestern Front but had gone on to Kharkov only to be cut off there with the start of the rainy season. By March 5, the Germans had mauled the units of the Third Tank Army on the Berestovaya River southwest of the city, capturing 61 tanks, 225 guns, and 600 motor vehicles in a small pocket at Krasnograd.

Manstein wanted to proceed west to attack the rear of the Soviet Voronezh Front, forcing it to fight simultaneously in two directions near Poltava, but rain and mud forced the Germans to resort to a strike on the Soviet flank from the south on March 7. This had some success and resulted in a wedge between the Soviet Third Tank and Sixty-Ninth Armies, with pressure from the west as Army Detachment Kempf was freed for action. Meanwhile, the Soviets brought up the II Guards Tank Corps from the east. The SS Panzer Corps, apparently intending to present the trophy city of Kharkov to Hitler, had to be restrained to prevent it from launching a frontal assault on the city, which Manstein feared could produce another Stalingrad.

Hitler's visit to Manstein's headquarters on March 10 probably inspired SS Panzer Corps commander SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser to disobey orders and commit the 2nd SS Panzer Division ("Das Reich") and the 1st SS Panzer Division ("Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler") to three days of house-to-house battles, bringing a German recovery of Kharkov on March 14, 1943. At the same time, to the north of Army Detachment Kempf the Gross Deutschland Division moved rapidly on Belgorod. At Gaivoron, the Germans wiped out Soviet armored forces that tried to defend Belgorod.

The captures of Kharkov and Belgorod marked the end of the German counteroffensive that reestablished the Donets-Mius Line. The German suffered some 11,500 casualties. The two Soviet fronts sustained together 86,000 casualties and lost more than 1,200 tanks and 900 artillery pieces. The Soviets finally retook Kharkov for good on August 23, 1943, following their victory at the Battle of Kursk.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Hausser, Paul "Papa"; Hoth, Hermann; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Kursk, Battle of; Mackensen, Eberhard von; Manstein, Erich von; Paulus, Friedrich; Reichenau, Walther von; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Kholm Pocket (January 23–May 5, 1942)

With the German failure to capture Moscow in December 1941, Chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to hold in place along the entire Eastern Front. Before the Germans could stabilize these, Soviet Army general Georgi Zhukov launched an offensive against German field marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center. Although many German military leaders favored a withdrawal, Hitler ordered the army to stand in place regardless of the cost, and the Germans held.

On January 7, 1942, the Red Army launched a pincer drive south of Lake Ilmen that resulted in the Demyansk Pocket on February 8 containing almost 100,000 Germans. On January 9, the Soviets began their Toropets-Kholm Offensive of a southern pincer. The Red Army's objective was to penetrate deeply into Army Group Center. On January 16, their Third Shock Army captured Andreapol, some 18 miles north of Kholm, destroying the German 189th Infantry Regiment of the 81st Infantry Division. On January 19, the Soviet Third and Fourth Shock Armies pushed toward Kholm, catching the Germans by surprise. Though they were only lightly equipped, Soviet forces managed to overrun the 123rd Infantry Division. On January 20 the Fourth Shock Army captured the large German supply dump at Toropets, providing needed fuel and ammunition. Then on January 22, the Third Shock Army engaged the 218th Infantry Division at Kholm.

The next day, January 23, the Soviets succeeded in surrounding 5,500 German soldiers, most of them from the 218th Infantry Division of II Corps, which itself would soon be entrapped at Demyansk. This created what

became known as the Kholm Pocket. In addition to the 218th Infantry Division, those caught in the pocket included elements of the 123rd Infantry Division; the 553rd Infantry Regiment of the 329th Infantry Division; the 3rd Battalion, 1st Luftwaffe Field Regiment; and the 65th Police Battalion.

On February 2, the Third Shock Army attacked the pocket, but the German defenses held. The attack was not sustained, as the Soviets were more interested in destroying the German forces now encircled at Demyansk. All the Red Army had to do was keep the pocket intact. As in the case of the Demyansk Pocket, the Germans at Kholm were resupplied by air. However, as the pocket was relatively small and aircraft landing was difficult, much of the airborne resupply was through airdrops, many of which fell outside the pocket. Also, as at Demyansk, the airdrop supplies could not keep up with consumption. By the middle of March German forces were dangerously low on rations and ammunition.

German major general Theodor Scherer commanded at Kholm. With virtually no heavy weapons and German artillery support some 10 miles distant, Kampfgruppe Scherer held off more than 100 Soviet infantry attacks, many with tank support, during a span of 105 days. Understanding Soviet tactics, Scherer was able to determine when and where the assaults were likely to occur and employed mortar and machine-gun fire to defeat the infantry assaults, resulting in heavy Soviet losses.

One particularly significant Soviet attack began on February 13, when 23,000 troops in two assault groups attacked the southwest and east sectors of the German defenses at Kholm. One body supported by T-34 and T-60 tanks and artillery and rocket launchers struck Kholm’s southwest sector. Farther to the east, a second Soviet infantry assault group supported by British-made Matilda II tanks hit the 218th Infantry Division’s 386th Infantry Regiment. The Soviets made deep advances into the pocket and actually attacked Scherer’s headquarters. Scherer’s troops were able to close the breech after five days of hard fighting but suffered 550 casualties in the process. Severe cold and frostbite also exacted a toll of the German defenders, while poor weather conditions severely limited Luftwaffe support.

The Germans made three attempts to relieve the pocket. The first came in late January, immediately after its formation. The second began on March 6 but was broken off on the 31st. The third attempt on May 5 by the 411th Grenadier Regiment of the 122nd Infantry Division finally breached the

pocket. Only 1,200 of the original 5,500 German defenders remained. Hitler awarded Scherer the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Upon Scherer's recommendation, the Kholm Shield was awarded to all those German soldiers who had been trapped in the Kholm Pocket. Kholm was held by German forces until February 21, 1944.

WILLIAM H. VAN HUSEN

See also

Bock, Fedor von; Demyansk Pocket; Hitler, Adolf; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Khozin, Mikhail Semenovich (1896–1979)

Soviet Army general. Born in the village of Skachikha, Russia, on October 22, 1896, Mikhail Khozin served as a junior officer in the Russian Army during World War I before joining the Red Army and the Communist Party in 1918. He held a variety of assignments, and by the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Khozin was a lieutenant general heading the Frunze Military Academy.

In October 1941, Khozin took command of the Leningrad Front. Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin demoted him after he promised but failed to save General Andrei Vlasov's Second Shock Army. Between June and October 1942, Khozin commanded the Thirty-Third Army. He briefly commanded the Twentieth Army (from December 1942 to January 1943). Khozin died in Moscow on February 27, 1979.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Leningrad, Siege of; Vlasov, Andrei Andreyevich

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Kiev Pocket, Battle of the (August 21–September 26, 1941)

Significant German encirclement of Soviet forces on the Eastern Front in 1941. Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, began on June 22. A month later, sharp disagreements developed between German chancellor Adolf Hitler and his senior generals concerning strategy. The generals—led by the army chief of staff, Colonel General Franz Halder, and the army commander, Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch—pointed out that not all German Army groups would be able to accomplish their assigned tasks. Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center was advancing faster than the weaker Army Groups North and South. At the same time, Hitler was preoccupied with securing the industrial and agricultural heartland of Ukraine and the Crimea and linking up with the Finns at Leningrad.

As a result, Hitler decided on July 19, in Führer Directive 33, to divert substantial panzer units from Army Group Center, thereby postponing the drive on Moscow. He sent Colonel General Hermann Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group north to assist in the drive to Leningrad and Colonel General Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group south to deal with the bulge created by Soviet colonel general Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos's Southwestern Front, with its mechanized corps. The German generals argued against this decision, pointing out that Moscow was the more important objective. Not only was Moscow the political capital of the Soviet Union, but it was also a major industrial area and transportation nexus. Attempts to convince Hitler that the advance on Moscow was more important failed, and he issued a final directive on August 21 for a major encirclement operation, with the goal of destroying Soviet forces in northern Ukraine.

On July 10, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budenny to command the Southern and Southwestern Groups. German forces advanced under the capable leadership of Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South. Stalin poured troops into the new command, amounting ultimately to almost 1 million men, insisting that the Dnieper River Line be held at all costs.

In Uman, the Germans encircled Budenny's forces of the Sixth, Twelfth, and Eighteenth Armies. He remained stationary as Colonel General Ewald von Kleist's 1st Panzer Group drove around his flank to the southeast. Kleist's panzers advanced north even as Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group attacked south through the weakly held northern flank of the Southwestern Front, aiming for a linkup east of Kiev. When Soviet Army chief of staff General Georgii Zhukov tried to point out the dangers of encirclement to Stalin on August 5, the latter sent him to Leningrad's defense and appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov in his stead.

By early September, Kiev was a salient endangered by advancing German troops to the north and the south. An attempt by Lieutenant General Andrei Ivanovich Yeremenko's newly formed Bryansk Front to halt Guderian's push south failed on September 2, and by September 11 the German pincers were closing on Kiev. Budenny requested authority to retreat, but Stalin preferred to replace him with Marshal Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko. On September 12, Kleist's panzers broke through the Soviet Thirty-Eighth Army, attacking north from bridgeheads at Cherkassy and Kremenchug.

Despite the onset of the rainy season, the 1st and 2nd Panzer Groups linked up at Lokhvitsa, 125 miles east of Kiev, on September 16. Timoshenko and Nikita Khrushchev, representing the War Council of the Southwestern Direction, authorized a Soviet withdrawal, but Kirponos feared Stalin's reaction and refused to move until Moscow confirmed the orders near midnight the next day.

The encirclement was still sufficiently porous to allow some Soviet forces to escape, including Timoshenko, Khrushchev, and Thirty-Seventh Army commander Andrei Vlasov (whose forces had defended Kiev skillfully), but Kirponos was among the dead. The Soviet Fifth and Twenty-First Armies were destroyed, along with major portions of the Thirty-Seventh and Fortieth Armies. Army Group South also claimed 665,000 Soviet prisoners taken,

along with 3,500 guns and 900 tanks. For all practical purposes, the Soviet Southwestern Front ceased to exist. It had to be entirely reconstructed from the nucleus of 15,000 men who escaped the disaster.

This was one of the greatest German tactical victories of the war. Yet despite opening a 200-mile gap in Soviet defenses and permitting the investment of the eastern Ukraine, it had negative strategic consequences for Germany. Senior German commanders, including Halder and Guderian, concluded that it had been a major blunder, ultimately dooming the German attempt to take the Soviet capital in 1941.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Brauchitsch, Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von; Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich; Guderian, Heinz; Halder, Franz; Hitler, Adolf; Hoth, Hermann; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Leningrad, Siege of; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Stalin, Joseph; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich; Vlasov, Andrei Andreyevich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Kikkawa Kiyoshi (1900–1943)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born on November 3, 1900, in Hiroshima Prefecture on Honshu, Kikkawa Kiyoshi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1922 and from gunnery school in 1924. From that time to 1939, he captained a succession of destroyers. In 1940, he was promoted to commander and assigned as captain of the destroyer *Oshio* in the 8th Destroyer Flotilla of the Second Torpedo Fleet.

During the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies, Kikkawa particularly distinguished himself in the Battle of Lombok (Badeong Strait) on the night of February 19–20, 1942, when his ship sank the Dutch destroyer *Piet Hein* by gunfire and torpedoes. Assigned to command the destroyer *Yudachi* in May, on the night of September 4–5 he successfully carried out a resupply mission to Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, also shelling Henderson Field and sinking the U.S. destroyer-transports *Little* and *Gregory*.

Kikkawa was active through the August 1942–February 1943 Guadalcanal Campaign and especially in the fighting on November 12–15, during which the *Yudachi* was sunk. Wounded but rescued, Kikkawa returned to Yokosuka to recover.

Offered the position of instructor at the Japanese Naval Academy, he refused the assignment, insisting that he return to battle as a destroyer captain. In 1943 he took command of the newly constructed destroyer *Onami*.

Kikkawa was eager for battle, and his destroyer was one of five returning from a supply run to Buka Island north of Bougainville when the Japanese force was intercepted by five U.S. destroyers commanded by Captain Arleigh Burke on the night of November 24, 1943. In the Battle of Cape St. George the next day, the *Onami* was hit by U.S. torpedoes, the first of three of the Japanese destroyers sunk in the battle for no U.S. losses. Kikkawa was among the more than 640 Japanese to die in the battle. His superiors were unstinting in their praise, and he was posthumously promoted two grades, to vice admiral.

HASEGAWA REI

See also

Burke, Arleigh Albert; Cape St. George, Battle of; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Lombok, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Kimmel, Husband Edward (1882–1968)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Henderson, Kentucky, on February 26, 1882, Husband Edward Kimmel graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1904 and was commissioned an ensign in 1906. During the next years, Kimmel served on battleships; participated in the 1914 intervention at Veracruz, Mexico; served as a naval aide to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt; and was staff gunnery officer for the U.S. battleship squadron, attached to the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet during World War I.

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Kimmel, a highly regarded gunnery expert, rose to the rank of rear admiral in 1937 and served at the Naval Gun Factory; he also commanded a destroyer squadron, attended the Naval War College, commanded the battleship *New York*, and served as chief of staff of the battleships in the

Battle Force. From 1937 to 1939, he was budget officer of the navy, and following command of a cruiser division and of cruisers in the Battle Force, Pacific Fleet, he was named commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in February 1941 as a full admiral.

During the next months, Kimmel put the Pacific Fleet through a vigorous training program in preparation for a possible war with Japan and refined plans for offensive operations in the Western Pacific. Following the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which put all of the Pacific Fleet's battleships out of commission, he was relieved of his command.

Kimmel has been the subject of considerable controversy for his actions preceding the Japanese attack. Several investigations and historians determined that he was too lax in his command and not sufficiently prepared for the possibility of war. His defenders—and Kimmel himself—believed that he was made a scapegoat for the failures of Washington officials, arguing that he was denied both crucial intelligence about deteriorating Japanese-U.S. relations and adequate numbers of long-range reconnaissance aircraft. Pearl Harbor had a narrow mouth, and Kimmel's decision not to deploy torpedo nets so the ships could exit more quickly added to the destruction of the Japanese attack.

On March 1, 1942, Kimmel retired in disgrace. Thereafter, he was employed by an engineering consulting firm until 1947. He died in Groton, Connecticut, on May 14, 1968.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States Navy

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Kimura Heitaro (1888–1948)

Japanese Army general. Born in Tokyo on September 28, 1888, Kimura Heitaro joined the army in December 1908. Although trained in the artillery, he held a number of unusual positions, including that of resident officer in Germany during 1922–1925. By 1938, Kimura was a lieutenant general. After commanding the 32nd Division, he served as chief of staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria.

Kimura sided with those who favored Japanese expansion, and from April 1941, he was vice minister of war and a close adviser to General Tōjō Hideki, helping develop the Japanese military strategy for war with the United States. When Japanese efforts to secure Guadalcanal failed, Kimura became the scapegoat, and he was removed from his post in March 1943.

Kimura returned to active military duty in August 1944, succeeding Kawabe Masakazu as commanding general of the Burma Area Army; Kawabe had been sacked as a result of the disastrous Imphal Campaign (March–July 1944). Kimura commanded three armies of 250,000 men in 10 divisions. Expecting an attack by the British Fourteenth Army during the dry season, along the lines of earlier attacks, he planned to withdraw behind the Irrawaddy River and counterattack when British supply lines were overextended. But British commander Lieutenant General William Slim learned of Kimura's intention and revised his own plan. Employing aerial resupply, Slim was able to move forces through difficult terrain to Meiktila and Mandalay.

Kimura was surprised and outmaneuvered. In fighting between February 21 and March 31, 1945, the British effectively destroyed the Fifteenth Army. Kimura then precipitously abandoned Rangoon, leaving behind much equipment and many troops. Occupying the city on May 2, the British improved their supply lines and were in a position to continue their advance when weather permitted.

Kimura was promoted to full general in May 1945. Following the war, he was arrested and tried for war crimes. Convicted of mistreating prisoners of war during the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railroad, he was executed in Tokyo on December 23, 1948.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Burma Theater; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Kawabe Masakazu; Meiktila, Battle of; Tōjō Hideki

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Kimura Masatomi (1891–1960)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan, on December 6, 1891, Kimura Masatomi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1913. He spent virtually his entire naval career in smaller surface vessels. He specialized in mine warfare between 1923 and 1925 and then commanded destroyers. Kimura commanded several cruisers in the late 1930s and was promoted to rear admiral in November 1942.

The navy recognized Kimura's outstanding leadership qualities when he received command of the 3rd Destroyer Squadron in the South Pacific on February 14, 1943. At the end of that month, his eight destroyers escorted eight Japanese transports carrying reinforcements to Lae, New Guinea. Allied aircraft discovered the convoy soon after it left Rabaul on February 28, and on March 3 Allied bombers attacked and sank two of the transports. Kimura then detached two destroyers to pick up survivors and rush them to Lae. He and the remaining six destroyers continued doggedly on course at the best speed the transports could make.

On March 4, U.S. and Australian aircraft again attacked, this time at low level, strafing and skip-bombing and sinking the six remaining transports and four of the destroyers. More than 3,000 Japanese died in what became known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 2–5). Kimura was among the many wounded.

The outcome of the battle was not held against Kimura. When he recovered from his injuries, he assumed command of the 1st Destroyer Squadron, part of the Japanese Fifth Fleet in the North Pacific. His major task was to evacuate Kiska Island in the Aleutians. Skillfully utilizing a bad-weather advantage, he took two cruisers and six destroyers into Kiska Harbor

on July 28 at 5:40 p.m. In only 55 minutes, they embarked 5,183 troops and departed. He did not lose a man or a ship in the operation.

Kimura's last surface action came in December 1944. The Battle of Leyte Gulf on October 23–26 had destroyed the Japanese fleet as a fighting force, and Kimura led two cruisers and six destroyers from Camranh Bay in Indochina against the U.S. beachhead at San Jose on Mindoro. The ships sortied on December 24 and were not discovered until they were within 200 miles of their destination. Despite Allied air attacks against his ships, Kimura shelled the U.S. positions ashore for a half hour. In the operation he lost one destroyer, but the other ships returned to Camranh Bay.

In the final months of the war, Kimura held several senior staff positions. He was promoted to vice admiral in November 1945 and retired that month. He died in Tokyo on February 14, 1960.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Japan, Navy; Leyte Gulf, Battle of

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King, Edward Postell, Jr. (1884–1958)

U.S. Army major general. Born in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 4, 1884, Edward Postell King Jr. received a law degree from the University of Georgia in 1903. He began his military career with the Georgia National Guard. In 1908, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army and assigned to the 6th Field Artillery Regiment. In the following years, King served in the Philippines, did three tours in the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, and was both a student and an instructor at the Command and General Staff

School and the Army War College. He also graduated from the Naval War College.

In September 1940, Brigadier General King returned to the Philippines to command Fort Stotsenburg. Later, he supervised artillery training for the Philippine Army. During the first months of World War II, King, now a major general, was artillery officer for General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Far East. On March 21, 1942, Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright, commander of all U.S. forces in the Philippines, appointed King to head the Luzon Force, which was responsible for defending the Bataan Peninsula, the last major piece of territory on Luzon still in American hands.

King had more than 80,000 men under his command, but their situation was hopeless. Short of food, wracked by disease, exhausted from months of fighting, and cut off from any reinforcement, they were unable to stop the Japanese offensive launched on April 5 to complete the conquest of the peninsula. King had orders from Wainwright and MacArthur to counterattack; however, he was fearful that his men would be massacred by the advancing Japanese and, on his own initiative, surrendered his force on April 9, the greatest capitulation in U.S. military history.

King spent the remainder of the war in Japanese prison camps in the Philippines, Formosa, and Manchuria. After the war, he served on the secretary of war's personnel board until his retirement in November 1946. King died in Brunswick, Georgia, on August 31, 1958.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Bataan, Battle of; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew

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King, Ernest Joseph (1878–1956)

U.S. Navy fleet admiral and chief of naval operations. Born in Lorain, Ohio, on November 23, 1878, Ernest Joseph King graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1901. He subsequently served in a variety of assignments on cruisers and battleships and at the Naval Academy, where he was an instructor of ordnance and gunnery from 1906 to 1908. King commanded a destroyer in 1914. Between 1916 and 1919, he served on the staff of the commander of the Atlantic Fleet.

In 1919 King, now a captain, headed the naval academy's postgraduate school. During the next seven years, the ambitious, hard-driving King specialized in submarines. In 1926, he took command of an aircraft tender and was senior aide to the commander of Air Squadrons, Atlantic Fleet. In 1927 King underwent flight training, and the next year he became assistant chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. In 1929 he commanded the Norfolk Naval Air Station, and from 1930 to 1932 he commanded the aircraft carrier *Lexington.*

After graduating from the Naval War College and being promoted to rear admiral, King served as chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics from 1933 to 1936. He spent the next five years in senior naval aviation assignments, including a tour as commander of the Aircraft Base Force. In 1938, he was promoted to vice admiral. Appointed to the Navy General Board in 1939, King criticized the lack of war preparations, recommending that should the United States go to war with Japan, it had to follow an offensive Pacific naval strategy. He also proposed measures for the better integration of aircraft, submarines, and small fast ships with battleships and aircraft carriers.

U.S. admiral of the fleet and chief of naval operations Ernest Joseph King. (Library of Congress)

In February 1941, King was promoted to admiral and appointed commander of the Atlantic Fleet. On December 30, 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he became commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet. The following March, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed King as chief of naval operations, making him the only U.S. Navy officer ever to hold both positions concurrently.

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, King was a major architect of wartime strategy. He vigorously prosecuted a two-front war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific but consistently gave higher priority to operations utilizing naval forces. He was committed more to extensive Pacific operations, which relied heavily on naval power, than his colleague General George C. Marshall, the army chief of staff, who generally followed a Europe-first strategy.

King forcefully directed a strategy of aggressive advance against Japan through the Central Pacific, later modified to include a second, southwestern, offensive by way of the Philippines and Taiwan. Despite feuds over authority with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and his successor, James Vincent Forrestal, King successfully built up U.S. naval forces, introduced tactical and technological innovations, and contributed heavily to the Allied victory in the Pacific.

In October 1945 King abolished the position of commander in chief of naval forces, and in December he retired, succeeded as chief of naval operations by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Over the next decade, King served as a special adviser to the secretary of the navy and also headed the Naval Historical Foundation. He was one of the few naval officers in history fully qualified in all three of the modern U.S. Navy's combatant communities —surface warfare, submarines, and aviation. King died in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on June 25, 1956.

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See also

Central Pacific Campaign; Forrestal, James Vincent; Knox, William Franklin "Frank"; Nimitz, Chester William; United States Navy

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King, William Lyon Mackenzie (1874–1950)

Wartime prime minister of Canada. Born on December 17, 1874, at Berlin (now Kitchener), Ontario, Canada, Mackenzie King graduated from the University of Toronto and did graduate work at the University of Chicago. He was appointed Canada's first deputy minister of labor and then served as minister of labor (1908–1911). King spent the war years in the United States as the chief labor mediator for the Rockefellers, but in 1919 he returned to Canada to seek the leadership of the Liberal Party, which had been shattered by the 1917 conscription crisis. King revived the Liberals, becoming the Canadian prime minister in 1921 and winning subsequent elections in 1925, 1926, and 1935. During the 1920s, he played the central role in Canada's transition to an autonomous dominion.

A skillful administrator and consensus builder and an astute politician, King deserves much of the credit for Canada's remarkable economic and military mobilization during World War II. In September 1939, French Canadian support for the war was lukewarm at best, and a great many among the English Canadian majority questioned their fellow citizens' loyalty. King forged a precarious unity by promising his Liberal government would emphasize war production rather than expeditionary forces. This policy of "limited liabilities" did not, however, survive the defeat of France in June 1940. King also promised not to impose conscription for overseas service. Luck—the Canadian army saw little combat until mid-1943—combined with a sincere political effort not to isolate the people of Quebec and simultaneously to reach out to moderate English Canadians almost got the country through unscathed. With the Allies facing a desperate shortage of infantry reinforcements in the autumn of 1944 and with his own leadership at stake, King reluctantly implemented limited overseas conscription that November. In retrospect, his deft handling of the explosive conscription issue was a singular political achievement.

Although Canada's international stature and national pride grew dramatically during the war years, the ever-cautious King was content for the country to continue playing the role of a loyal subordinate. His relationship with British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill was often strained, but his government still provided enormous military, economic, and financial assistance to the mother country, most of it ultimately at no cost. In contrast, King's relationship with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt was warm.

Common sense dictated that King encourage closer ties with the United States. The wartime advantages of this policy were immeasurable for Canada.

Canadian prime minister Mackenzie King during the Quebec Conference, August 19, 1943. (National Archives)

In the June 1945 election, running on a platform of progressive social and economic measures for the postwar era, King's government won a slender majority. Worn out by his wartime exertions, King retired in October 1948. He died in Ottawa on July 22, 1950.

PATRICK H. BRENNAN

See also

Canada; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin (1888–1972)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Hanover, New Hampshire, on April 3, 1888, the son of U.S. Navy rear admiral Thomas W. Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin Kinkaid graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1908, then served in the Great White Fleet during its circumnavigation of the globe. Kinkaid first served in ordnance capacities and aboard battleships. During World War I, he was assigned as a naval envoy at the British Admiralty. From 1929 to 1930, he attended the Naval War College. Promoted to captain in 1937, he commanded a cruiser, and two years later, he was assigned as naval attaché to Italy and Yugoslavia.

Promoted to rear admiral in late 1941, Kinkaid took command of Cruiser Division 6. In March 1942, he led his ships in raids on Rabaul and New Guinea, then participated in the May 7–8, 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea and the June 3–6 Battle of Midway. In August 1942, Kinkaid assumed command of Task Force 16, centered on the carrier *Enterprise*, and took part in the invasion of Guadalcanal and the battles of the Eastern Solomons (August 22–25) and the Santa Cruz Islands (October 26–27). In January 1943, Kinkaid assumed command of the North Pacific Force in Alaskan waters, his ships participating in the recapture from the Japanese of the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska.

Promoted to vice admiral, Kinkaid assumed command of the Seventh Fleet, "MacArthur's Navy," in November 1943, with the mission of providing amphibious lift and protection to General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area forces on their approach to the Philippines. The Seventh Fleet then participated in the defense of landings at Leyte by destroying attacking Japanese forces in Surigao Strait. In January 1945, Kinkaid led the Seventh Fleet in the invasion of Luzon at Lingayen Gulf. Promoted to admiral in April, he took the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea in September 1945.

Following World War II, Kinkaid briefly commanded the Eastern Sea Frontier and then the Sixteenth (Reserve) Fleet. He retired in May 1950 and died in Bethesda, Maryland, on November 17, 1972.

LANDON WINKELVOSS

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Central Pacific Campaign; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; Midway, Battle of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; United States Navy

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Kirk, Alan Goodrich (1888–1963)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on October 30, 1888, Alan Goodrich Kirk graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1909 and then specialized in gunnery and served in the Asiatic Fleet. During the period of U.S. involvement in World War I, Kirk was stationed at the Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Virginia.

In the 1920s Kirk was executive officer of the presidential yacht and served as presidential naval aide. He was then gunnery officer for the battleship *Maryland.* He graduated from the Naval War College in 1929 and then was an instructor there for two years. In 1931 Kirk assumed his first command, a destroyer, and during 1933–1936 he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He was then executive officer of the battleship *West Virginia* before taking command of the light cruiser *Milwaukee* and serving as operations officer to the commander of the U.S. Fleet.

In 1939 Kirk became American naval attaché in London, where he familiarized himself thoroughly with Royal Navy procedures, which he strongly admired even though British condescension occasionally irked him. Kirk's forceful advocacy of greater Anglo-American cooperation and urgent warnings in 1940 of Britain's extreme danger helped persuade President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration to assist Britain with measures potentially liable to precipitate conflict with Germany.

In March 1941 Kirk became director of naval intelligence, but fierce bureaucratic infighting with the War Plans Division was one reason why, despite clues that Japan planned to attack American forces, his office failed to produce any specific warnings of Japanese intentions. In October 1941 Kirk returned to sea duty as commander of a division of destroyer escorts in the Atlantic Fleet, fortuitously escaping responsibility for the failure to predict the Pearl Harbor raid.

Promoted to rear admiral in November 1941, in March 1942 Kirk became chief of staff to Admiral Harold Stark, commander of American naval forces in Europe. In London, Kirk contributed substantially to Allied strategic planning. In February 1943 he took command of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, and that July he led an amphibious naval task force in the Sicily landings (July 9, 1943). Kirk's outstanding success in the face of unexpectedly difficult conditions brought him command of all U.S. naval forces for the June 6, 1944, Normandy landings. Later that year he commanded all U.S. naval forces in France. Kirk was promoted to vice admiral in May 1945.

Kirk retired with the rank of admiral in March 1946. He then served as ambassador to Belgium and minister to Luxembourg until 1949 and spent a further two years as ambassador to the Soviet Union (April 1949–October 1951) and the Republic of China (May 1962–April 1963). Kirk died in New York City on October 15, 1963.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of; Stark, Harold Raynsford "Betty"

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Kirtleside, First Baron Douglas of

See Douglas, William Sholto

Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von (1881–1954)

German field marshal. Born in Braunfels an der Lahn, Germany, on August 8, 1881, Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist entered the army in 1900 and rose to the rank of captain by 1914. During World War I, he fought on both the Eastern and Western Fronts. Following the war, he served in artillery and cavalry assignments. Although he was promoted to lieutenant general in August 1936, he retired in February 1938 during German chancellor Adolf Hitler's purge of the army.

Recalled to active duty in August 1939, Kleist commanded the XXII Panzer Corps in the Fourteenth Army during the invasion of Poland. He then assumed command of the army-sized Panzer Group Kleist in the May 1940 invasion of France and the Low Countries, spearheading Army Group A's advance. Promoted to colonel general in July 1940, Kleist commanded the First Panzer Group in the April 1941 invasion of Yugoslavia, then the First Panzer Army in Army Group South in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22 invasion of the Soviet Union. His forces pushed into Ukraine and devastated nearly 20 Soviet divisions, assisting in the encirclement of Kiev (August 21–September 2) and establishing a bridgehead west of Rostov (November 17–30) before being forced to retreat that winter.

German field marshal Paul Ludwig von Kleist. (Hulton Archive/ Getty Images)

Kleist's First Panzer Army carried out a decisive counterstroke in the Second Battle of Kharkov (May 1942). Ordered to take the Caucasus oil fields, Kleist saw his forces drained away for the cauldron of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943). He commanded Army Group A in November 1942 and proved adept at defensive operations.

Promoted to field marshal in February 1943, Kleist carried out an orderly withdrawal of German forces from the Crimea that October. He then withdrew his force, now designated Army Group South Ukraine, into Romania. Having lost confidence in Kleist, Hitler relieved him of command in March 1944, whereon Kleist was assigned to the Führer Reserve.

Kleist was taken prisoner by the U.S. 26th Infantry Division on April 25, 1945. He was then turned over to Yugoslavia, where he was tried for war crimes, found guilty, and sentenced in 1948 to 15 years in prison. Extradited to the Soviet Union, he was sentenced there to an additional term of

imprisonment. Kleist died at Vladimir Prison Camp in the Soviet Union on October 15, 1954.

ROY B. PERRY III

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; Hitler, Adolf; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Rostov, Battle for; Stalingrad, Battle of; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of

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Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von (1882–1944)

German Army field marshal. Born in Posen, Prussia (now Poznan, Poland), into an old aristocratic family on October 30, 1882, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge joined the army as an artillery officer in 1901. During World War I he served on the General Staff (1916–1918) and was wounded in fighting at Verdun in 1918.

Selected to continue in the Reichswehr after the war, Kluge was promoted to major general in February 1933 and named inspector of Signal Troops. He became a lieutenant general in April 1934 and commanded the 6th Division in Münster. With German chancellor Adolf Hitler's expansion of the army, Kluge commanded VI Corps in 1936. In 1938 Hitler purged Kluge, along with other German generals, for supporting General Werner von Fritsch, who had opposed Hitler's plans for war.

With war looming, Hitler recalled Kluge from retirement in October 1938 and gave him command of the newly established 6th Army Group. Later, the unit was redesignated the Fourth Army. Kluge led it during the invasion of Poland in September 1939. An innovative commander, he won Hitler's admiration and promotion to colonel general.

Kluge led the Fourth Army against France and the Low Countries in May 1940. Promoted to field marshal in July, he went on to command the Fourth Army in the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and Army Group Center from December 1941 to October 1943, again proving to be an effective field commander.

Injured in a car accident in October 1943, Kluge went on prolonged medical leave. In July 1944, he replaced Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt as commander in chief, west, and commander of Army Group B in Normandy. Kluge was aware of the plot to assassinate Hitler but wavered in his support and finally declined to participate. He also failed to report it. Following the bomb attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944, Kluge came under increased suspicion.

Kluge led the German counterattack at Avranches in August but, on its failure, was relieved of command on August 17, 1944, by Field Marshal Walther Model. Kluge wrote to Hitler, urging him to make peace and end the suffering for the German people. Aware that he would be implicated in the conspiracy against Hitler and depressed by the military situation, Kluge committed suicide in Valmy, France, on August 19, 1944.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Fritsch, Werner Thomas Ludwig von; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Poland Campaign

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Knox, William Franklin "Frank" (1874–1944)

U.S. secretary of the navy during much of World War II. Born on January 1, 1874, in Boston, Massachusetts, William Franklin (Frank) Knox followed his political idol and role model, Theodore Roosevelt, and joined the 1st Volunteer U.S. Cavalry (the Rough Riders) in 1898 to fight in Cuba during

the Spanish-American War. After mustering out, Knox became a highly successful newspaper editor and publisher, acquiring papers in Michigan and New Hampshire.

A strong supporter of U.S. intervention in World War I, Knox served in the artillery in France in 1917 and 1918, rising from private to major. After the war, he returned to the newspaper business and was active in Republican politics, running unsuccessfully as the Republican vice presidential candidate in 1936.

Knox firmly believed in the late 1930s that the United States could not remain aloof from the increasingly critical situation in Europe. Thus, although unsympathetic toward President Franklin D. Roosevelt's domestic policies, he strongly endorsed the president's interventionist and pro-Allied international outlook. In 1940, Roosevelt persuaded Knox, together with former Republican secretary of state Henry L. Stimson, to join his cabinet, with Knox serving as secretary of the navy—a step clearly designed to win support from nonisolationist Republicans.

Knox quickly recruited as assistants various able young businessmen and lawyers, such as James V. Forrestal (whom he appointed undersecretary), Ferdinand Eberstadt, and Adlai E. Stevenson. Knox utilized their industrial and organizational skills to carry out a massive naval expansion as the U.S. Navy prepared for war. He also introduced modern business and management methods to the Navy Department's administration.

Knox helped to devise and lobby for the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement of 1940, whereby Britain acquired American warships in exchange for leases to Caribbean naval bases, and the 1941 Lend-Lease program to aid the Allies. Like other Roosevelt administration officials, Knox did not predict the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941, and he rather ascribed responsibility for the U.S. defeat almost solely to the unpreparedness of the base's naval and military commanders.

Knox welcomed the American entrance into World War II. During its course, he traveled extensively to the various theaters of war. As a former newspaperman, he emphasized the importance of good public relations, holding frequent press conferences. He stalwartly supported the abortive National Service Act of 1944, which would have imposed the obligation of national service on all Americans, military and civilian.

Knox died suddenly of heart failure in Washington, D.C., on April 28,

1944.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Eberstadt, Ferdinand; Forrestal, James Vincent; Lend-Lease; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stimson, Henry Lewis; United States Navy; Document 77

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Knudsen, William S. (1879–1948)

American industrialist and war production manager. Born in Copenhagen, Denmark, on March 25, 1879, Signius Wilhelm Poul Knudsen was educated in Denmark and worked as a merchant's clerk and bicycle assembler. At age 21, he immigrated to the United States, Anglicized his name, and found work in a succession of manufacturing industries, thereby acquainting himself with modern production techniques.

While working at the John R. Keim Mills in Buffalo, New York, Knudsen introduced many innovations in the manufacture of bicycle and automobile parts. The Keim firm was bought out by Henry Ford in 1913, and Knudsen then ran assembly lines for the Ford Motor Company from 1913 to 1921. Following a dispute with Ford, Knudsen was hired by the Chevrolet division of General Motors in 1922, and by 1927 Chevrolet had outpaced Ford in sales. Knudson became president of General Motors in 1937 and achieved international renown as a mass-production manager.

In May 1940, Knudsen resigned his position to serve on the National Defense Advisory Commission appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Knudson was instrumental in convincing American automobile manufacturers to take up the wartime manufacture of military aircraft. On January 7, 1941, he became director-general for production in the newly

created Office of Production Management (OPM) and was involved in expediting U.S. war manufacturing efforts.

By a presidential executive order of January 16, 1942, the War Production Board headed by Donald M. Nelson superseded the OPM, and on January 28, 1942, Knudsen accepted a wartime commission as a lieutenant general in the U.S. Army; he served as director of production for the War Department until June 1945. He settled labor disputes and expedited the manufacture of war matériel, especially aircraft, becoming known as a master troubleshooter. Knudsen was twice awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his contributions to the war effort.

After the war, Knudsen served for a time on the General Motors board of directors and also worked for the Hupp Corporation. He died in Detroit, Michigan, on April 27, 1948.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Aircraft, Production of; Armaments Production; Nelson, Donald Marr; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States War Production Board

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Koenig, Marie Pierre Joseph François (1898–1970)

French Army general. Born in Caen, Normandy, France, on October 10, 1898, Marie Pierre Joseph François Koenig volunteered for service in the army during World War I after obtaining his baccalaureate in 1917. He ended the war as a temporary second lieutenant.

After the war, Koenig served with the French army of occupation in Germany. Promoted to lieutenant in 1920, he participated in the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 and then served with occupation forces in the Rhineland between 1923 and 1929. From 1931, Koenig was assigned to the

French Foreign Legion in Morocco. Promoted to captain in 1932, he participated in pacification campaigns.

With the start of World War II, Koenig departed Morocco in February 1940 and, as a major in the legion's 13th Demi-Brigade, fought in the Norway Campaign at Narvik (April 24–June 7, 1940). In June 1940, he joined the Free French forces of General Charles de Gaulle and commanded a battalion, fighting Vichy French forces in Africa and the Middle East in 1940 and 1941.

Koenig's advance was rapid. He made colonel in June 1941 and became chief of staff of the 1st Free French Division in the Sudan, taking part in the Syria and Lebanon Campaign. Promoted to temporary general of brigade that August, he commanded the 1st Free French Brigade in Egypt.

Koenig won renown for leading his brigade in the Battle of Bir Hacheim, a critical point in the British Eighth Army's defensive line against the Afrika Korps. Koenig's men held Bir Hacheim from May 27, 1942, refusing to withdraw until ordered to do so on the night of June 10–11. Their epic stand restored French military honor after the Battle for France debacle of May–June 1940 and established the Free French as an effective fighting force.

Koenig was promoted to general of corps in May 1943, and that July he became deputy chief of staff of the French Army. In April 1944, he was named commander of Free French forces in Britain. On June 25, he was promoted to general of the army, and as a member of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's staff, he commanded Free French Forces of the Interior (FFI) following the June 6 Normandy Invasion. The FFI made a substantial contribution to Allied success by disrupting German lines of communication and tying down German military assets in Brittany and elsewhere. In August 1944, Koenig became military governor of Paris.

French general Marie Pierre Koenig, commander in chief of French forces of the interior from June 1944 and military governor of Paris following the Allied liberation that August. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Between 1945 and 1949, Koenig commanded the French zone of occupation in Germany. Promoted to general of the army in 1946, he retired in 1951 and was elected as a Gaullist deputy to the National Assembly. Koenig served as minister of defense in 1954 and 1955 but resigned in opposition to the government's Moroccan policies. Retiring from politics in 1958, Koenig died in Neuilly, a suburb of Paris, on September 2, 1970. He was posthumously promoted to marshal of France in 1984.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Free French; Gazala, Battle of; Narvik, Operations in; Norway, German Conquest of; Syria and

Lebanon, Campaign in

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Koga Mineichi (1885–1944)

Japanese Navy fleet admiral. Born in Saga Prefecture, Kyushu, Japan, on April 25, 1885, Koga Mineichi graduated from the Japanese naval academy in 1906. A specialist in naval gunnery, he also graduated from the naval war college four years later. He served on the staff of the Second Fleet and took part in the Japanese capture of Qingdao (Tsingtao) at the beginning of World War I.

From 1916 to 1922, Koga held a number of administrative assignments ashore, including that of resident officer in France. Promoted to commander in 1922 and to captain in 1926, he was naval attaché to France between 1926 and 1928 and attended the 1927 Geneva Arms Limitation Conference. Returning to Japan in 1928, he was then secretary to the minister of the navy and a member of the Japanese delegation to the London Naval Conference of 1930. From 1930 to 1932, he commanded first the heavy cruiser *Aoba* and then the battleship *Ise.* Promoted to rear admiral in 1932, Koga next held a number of staff positions, including head of the Intelligence Division (1933) and vice chief of the Naval General Staff (1937). He was promoted to vice admiral in 1936.

Koga commanded the Second Fleet from 1939 to 1941. He strongly opposed the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. In 1941, he assumed command of the China Area Fleet, supporting naval operations against Hong Kong at the beginning of the Pacific war. Promoted to full admiral in May 1942, Koga then commanded the Yokosuka Naval Station (1942–1943).

In May 1943, Koga succeeded Yamamoto Isoroku as commander in chief of the Combined Fleet following the latter’s death on April 18, 1943. By mid-1943, Japan had lost Guadalcanal as well as Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians

to Allied counteroffensives. Koga worked to rebuild Japanese naval air strength and sought to retrieve the situation before it became irreversible by a decisive naval action employing the Combined Fleet. In October 1943, Koga ordered Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo to launch Operation RO-GO to attack U.S. naval forces in the Solomons, but Ozawa suffered a major reversal in the operation, losing 120 of 170 aircraft in November.

Koga then planned Operation O-GO to smash U.S. naval forces in the Marshall Islands in February 1944. In the process of relocating his headquarters from Palau to Davao in the southern Philippines for this operation, Koga's plane was lost in a severe storm on March 31, 1944. He was posthumously promoted to admiral of the fleet. Admiral Toyoda Soemu succeeded him as commander of the Combined Fleet.

Japanese Navy admiral Koga Mineichi. (Corbis)

KOTANI KEN

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Japan, Navy; Ozawa Jisaburo; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Toyoda Soemu; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Kohima and Imphal, Sieges of

See Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of

Koiso Kuniaki (1880–1950)

Japanese Army general and prime minister (1944–1945). Born in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan, on March 22, 1880, Koiso Kuniaki graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1900 and saw combat during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Graduating from the General Staff College in 1910, he was posted to the General Staff in 1913. While still a junior officer, Koiso associated himself with elements in the Japanese military seeking to pursue expansion on the Asian continent. In 1916, he played a role in the Japanese Army's unsuccessful attempt to foster an independence movement in Manchuria and Mongolia and detach those areas from China.

As he advanced in rank, Koiso continued to support not only the expansionist aims of the Japanese military but also its attempts to dominate the government. He joined the Kokuhonsha (National Foundation Society), a right-wing political organization formed in 1924, and in March 1931, he lent his support to an unsuccessful military coup attempt staged by a group of junior officers. Despite his involvement in the affair, Koiso continued to advance. In 1937, he was appointed governor-general of Korea and promoted

to full general. Koiso returned to Japan in 1939 to serve as minister of colonies.

From 1942 to 1944, Koiso again served as governor-general of Korea, where his second term was characterized by a brutal attempt to eradicate the cultural identity of the Korean people. He was recalled to Japan in July 1944 to succeed Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, who had been forced to resign. Although Koiso believed that the war was lost, he attempted to bolster Japan’s deteriorating war effort. He lowered the draft age, established the Supreme War Leadership Council as a liaison between the military and the cabinet, and attempted to coordinate munitions production. He could not, however, produce any victories, and he was forced to resign in April 1945.



Japanese Army general Kuniaki Koiso. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Following the war, Koiso was tried and convicted of war crimes by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Sentenced to life

imprisonment, he died in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo on November 3, 1950.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Japan; Japan, Army; Korea; Tōjō Hideki

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Kokoda Trail Campaign (July 1942–January 1943)

Land battle fought on New Guinea. The naval battles of the Coral Sea in May 7–8, 1942, and Midway on June 3–6 placed the Japanese Navy on the defensive in the Central and South Pacific and altered Japanese plans to take the key Allied base at Port Moresby, from which they could strike Queensland, Australia, by air. The upcoming battles for Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby in New Guinea were critical to the Allies in gaining and maintaining the offensive in the Pacific theater. The Americans struck first in the Solomons (August 1942–February 1943), but the Japanese took the initiative in New Guinea (March 9, 1942).

While U.S. Navy and Marine Corps elements prepared for operations in the Solomons, supreme Allied commander in the South Pacific General Douglas MacArthur and his Allied Land Force commander, Australian general Sir Thomas Blamey, began a series of actions to strengthen Allied defensive positions in New Guinea, including the August 1942 deployment of two brigades of the Australian 7th Division to Port Moresby and one to Milne Bay. These moves were the prelude for a bloody six-month campaign in some of the world's most difficult terrain, with far-reaching strategic consequences.

In early July 1942, the 39th Infantry Battalion of the Australian militia was sent to reinforce local Papuan infantry at Kokoda Pass in the Owen Stanley Mountains. The area was a critical terrain feature that the Japanese

would have to secure before assaulting Port Moresby from the north. Denied an invasion of Port Moresby by sea as a consequence of the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese endeavored to take it by land, working southwest along the treacherous Kokoda Trail that crossed the east-west Owen Stanley Mountains. The trail was as high as 8,000 feet in places and as low as 1,000 feet, with slopes as great as 60 degrees.

On July 21, the Japanese Yokohama Force of engineer, infantry, and marine units landed at Buna on the north side of New Guinea to prepare the way for the follow-on South Sea Detachment commanded by Major General Horii Tomitaro, who arrived himself in mid-August. Horii pushed a force inland from Gona, drove back local Allied troops, and moved up the rugged and treacherous track of the Kokoda Trail that ran south to Port Moresby. By mid-August, the Japanese had seized the passes over the Owen Stanley Mountains that ran across the island.

During the march, Japanese forces quickly fixed and bypassed the detachments of Australian and Papuan forces guarding several key areas, including Kokoda. The 21st Brigade of the Australian 7th Division was then sent to relieve the elements that had borne the brunt of the fighting. The Japanese, however, outflanked the 21st Brigade and forced it to withdraw, a maneuver repeated several times over the next few weeks.

In early September, the 25th Brigade arrived to reinforce the 21st, and in mid-September, it joined in the unsuccessful defense at Ioribaiwa, some 30 miles from Port Moresby. The Japanese entered that village on September 16 in what was their last land victory of the Pacific war. There, Australian and U.S. forces under Major General Edmond F. Herring, benefiting from Allied air superiority, helped contain the Japanese advance.

On August 25, the Japanese landed 1,900 men at Milne Bay, at the eastern tip of Papua. This force planned to make its way west and support Horii's drive on Port Moresby. Australian forces, not greatly superior to the Japanese in size but with the advantage of air support, contained the landing and then mounted a counterattack. On the nights of September 5 and 6, the Japanese evacuated 1,300 survivors, half of them wounded.

The Australian victory in the Battle of Milne Bay was extremely important. Both a humiliation for the Japanese and a lift for the Allies, it proved that the Allies could defeat the Japanese in jungle warfare. And its outcome isolated the Japanese coming off the Kokoda Trail.

The Japanese engineers at Buna had hoped to construct a small road along the Kokoda Trail. When this proved impossible, the engineers fortified an area about 10 miles long and several miles deep between Gona and Buna on the Solomon Sea. There 7,000 Japanese, half of them survivors of the Kokoda Trail march, awaited an Allied attack.

Fighting on Guadalcanal deprived the Japanese of resources for Papua, and during October, Allied pressure and orders from General Imamura Hitoshi on Rabaul to withdraw caused Horii to fall back over the Owen Stanley Mountains. The Australian 7th Division followed. But instead of withdrawing to the coast at Buna, Horii decided to make a stand near the Kokoda Trail between the settlements of Oivi and Gorari, a few miles east of Kokoda.

He was confident of victory, but by early November, the Allies had learned much about jungle warfare, and in the Battle of Oivi-Gorari, the Australians flanked the Japanese position, driving Horii's men off the trail and into a river. Taking advantage of the dense jungle, many Japanese managed to reach the coast. Horii was not among them; he drowned a week later while crossing the Kumusi River.

In late November 1942, the Australians approached Buna from the Kokoda Trail. Meanwhile, the U.S. 32nd Division advanced up the Papuan coast in a strange collection of fishing boats and coastal vessels. Because the coast was poorly charted and there were numerous reefs as well as concerns about Japanese aircraft, the U.S. Navy did not support the operation with transports or warships, which adversely affected its progress.

The Kokoda Trail was far too rugged to move artillery and significant quantities of supplies by that route, nor could artillery be brought in on the small U.S. Army vessels. Thus, the 32nd Division, unprepared for the jungle conditions in any case, had to go into battle without artillery support against Japanese machine-gun nests that were well dug in and concealed in the dense jungle.

The Australian-U.S. advance against the Buna-Gona fortified zone began on November 18. Progress in the jungle and swamps was slow, and many of the troops were incapacitated by disease. Fortunately for the Allies, fighting on Guadalcanal meant that the Japanese on Papua received few supplies. The Japanese had to deal not only with disease but also with malnutrition.

Displeased, MacArthur brought in U.S. Army lieutenant general Robert

L. Eichelberger to command I Corps, ordering him to take Buna or not come back alive. Eichelberger flew to Dobodura on December 1, 1942, to take command of the American sector. An effective commander, he soon restored Allied morale. In early December, U.S. engineers were able to open an airfield near Buna, significantly improving the Allied supply situation. On December 9, the Australians took Gona. The more heavily fortified Buna resisted U.S. pressure, but on January 23, 1943, a concerted attack by Australian and U.S. forces secured it as well.

JOSEPH G. D. BABB AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Blamey, Sir Thomas Albert; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Horii Tomitaro; Imamura Hitoshi; MacArthur, Douglas; Midway, Battle of; Milne Bay, Battle of

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Köln, Raid on (May 30–31, 1942)

City targeted for the first thousand-plane air raid in World War II. Although the British had first bombed German industry in 1940, their successes until 1942 had been minimal. The British strategic bombing campaign suffered from a lack of bombers (prior to 1942, the Royal Air Force [RAF] Bomber Command never possessed more than 400 bombers) and an inability to hit targets with any accuracy at night. In the spring of 1942, the war was going badly for the Allies, and the Soviet Union was pressing for a second front. As the only alternative for direct offensive action against Germany, the British changed their policies on strategic bombing.

With the accession of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris as commander of Bomber Command in February 1942, the British began a deliberate program of targeting built-up areas instead of industries. In desperate need of

a boost to morale at home and to demonstrate the increasing capabilities of Bomber Command, Harris proposed to Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill the idea of a thousand-plane raid. The plan immediately received Churchill's approval. By temporarily stripping Training Command of aircraft and securing other planes from Coastal Command, Harris assembled 1,086 aircraft, more than enough to cover any aborted takeoffs. The Admiralty then withdrew the 250 Coastal Command aircraft, but Harris was determined to reach the thousand-plane figure, even though it meant sending some crews who were not yet fully trained.

Köln (Cologne) and Hamburg were the two possible targets. They were selected over the more valuable Essen because each was located on a large body of water and could be readily identified by Gee (for "G," or grid), a new navigational aid. On the day of the raid, bad weather ruled out Hamburg, but Köln was clear. Known as Operation MILLENNIUM, the raid occurred on the night of May 30–31, 1942. As it worked out, Harris got 1,046 bombers aloft, 600 of them Wellingtons. His goal was to pass all aircraft over Köln in only 90 minutes.

The air raid on Köln, Germany's fifth-largest city, lasted approximately 100 minutes, with the British bombers passing over the city at an average of 11 per minute. A total of 890 bombers reached Köln and dropped more than 1,455 tons of bombs on the city, two-thirds of them incendiaries. The bombing resulted in the destruction of an estimated 13,000 homes and the razing of almost 600 acres of the city. Casualties amounted to 469 dead and over 5,000 wounded on the German side, with another 45,000 left homeless. The British lost more than 300 crewmen in the 41 bombers that failed to return, a rate of just 3.8 percent. The large number of bombers overwhelmed the German fighter defenses. The considerable destruction of this raid captured the imagination of the British public amid a series of Allied defeats in North Africa and East Asia.

Following the Köln raid, the British also launched thousand-plane raids against Essen and Bremen in June 1942. The Köln raid confirmed to Harris and Bomber Command the viability and effectiveness of night area bombing. The raid also shattered German illusions about who was winning the war and caused Chancellor Adolf Hitler to lose confidence in the Luftwaffe. But instead of accepting the need to strengthen Germany's air defenses, Hitler ordered retaliatory German air attacks.

C. J. HORN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Harris, Sir Arthur Travers

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Kolombongara, Battle of (July 13, 1943)

Naval engagement between Allied and Japanese forces off the coast of Kolombongara, a small island north of New Georgia in the Solomon Islands. U.S. Navy rear admiral Walden Ainsworth commanded a force of three cruisers, reinforced by five destroyers under Captain Francis McInerney and another five under Captain Thomas Ryan. Rear Admiral Izaki Shunji led the Japanese squadron of one cruiser and five destroyers. Izaki's squadron was protecting transports carrying 1,200 Japanese soldiers to Vila.

At 12:35 a.m. on July 13, a "Black Cat" PBY reconnaissance aircraft spotted Izaki's ships heading southeast toward Kolombongara. Ainsworth ordered his squadron into a single column and headed west on a closing course with McInerney's squadron pushed out ahead. At 1:01 a.m., the U.S. destroyer *Nicholas* made radar contact, followed by visual contact two minutes later. Ainsworth assumed that he would achieve complete surprise because the Japanese ships lacked radar. However, the Japanese had received some minutes earlier a radio warning from one of their seaplanes of an enemy force and were expecting contact.

At 1:08 a.m., Izaki's squadron came within 10,000 yards of Ainsworth's forces and launched torpedoes. The U.S. destroyer vans launched their own torpedoes two minutes later. Izaki then turned his column directly north, and the Japanese cruiser *Jintsu* turned its searchlights on the destroyer *Nicholas.*

While the *Jintsu* fired both guns and torpedoes, Ainsworth waited until all three of his cruisers had closed the range before opening fire.

By 1:17 a.m., the *Jintsu* was dead in the water. Ainsworth then ordered his whole squadron to turn away, but some ships did not receive the order, and the formation became disordered. Then the New Zealand cruiser *Leander* was struck by a torpedo. Severely damaged, it was nonetheless able to retire.

Black Cat aircraft then reported that two Japanese ships were escaping to the north, leaving the impression that four ships had been crippled. In reality, only the *Jintsu* had been damaged; the rest of Izaki's squadron had retired north to reload their torpedo tubes. In just 18 minutes, they reversed course again to reengage.

Meanwhile, Ainsworth headed northeast to chase what he thought were fleeing Japanese ships. As he pursued, he was unable to locate his destroyers by radio and ordered his two cruisers to illuminate unidentified targets on radar with star shells to see if they were McInerney's destroyers. Rather than U.S. destroyers, the unidentified ships turned out to be Japanese warships that had just fired 31 reloaded torpedoes. At 2:08 a.m. Ainsworth ordered fire opened, but before this order could be followed, the cruisers *St. Louis* and *Honolulu* took torpedoes in their bows and the destroyer *Gwin* was hit amidships.

The *Gwin* was scuttled the next morning. The Allies thus had three cruisers badly damaged in exchange for the *Jintsu,* which went down with its entire crew. Personnel losses numbered 482 Japanese, 61 Americans, and 28 New Zealanders. Because the Japanese were able to land all 1,200 reinforcements at Vila, Kolombongara was a strategic Japanese victory.

LANDON WINKELVOSS

See also

Ainsworth, Walden Lee "Pug"; Southeast Pacific Theater

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Komandorski Islands, Battle of the (March 26, 1943)

Concluding naval battle of the 1942–1943 Aleutian Islands Campaign in the North Pacific and the last major daylight naval action in which aircraft played no role. The Aleutian Campaign began in June 1942 with the Japanese occupation of the islands of Attu and Kiska. To protect their northern flank, the Japanese held these islands into 1943, while U.S. bombers and submarines from Dutch Harbor, enduring terrible weather conditions, slowly cut off Japanese supplies.

To break this tightening noose and reinforce Attu, Japanese vice admiral Hosogaya Boshiro led a task force of the heavy cruisers *Nachi* and *Maya*, the light cruisers *Tama* and *Abukuma*, and four destroyers escorting the armed 7,000-ton converted merchant cruisers *Asaka Maru* and *Sakito Maru*, which were acting as transports. Acting upon intelligence that the Japanese might be sending a convoy, the theater commander dispatched Rear Admiral Charles McMorris to intercept them. The Americans underestimated the size of the Japanese fleet, and McMorris had a much smaller force consisting of the heavy cruiser *Salt Lake City*, the light cruiser *Richmond* (flagship), and four destroyers. The Americans encountered the Japanese force near the Komandorski Islands.

Before dawn on March 26, 1943, U.S. radar picked up the approaching Japanese ships. McMorris, expecting only lightly escorted supply ships, made for the Japanese and closed to gun range, only to discover that he was both outnumbered and outgunned. He then attempted to maneuver, hoping to draw the Japanese eastward toward U.S. air support and perhaps slip past their warships to attack the supply vessels.

The two task forces engaged in a running duel for four hours. With more ships, more guns, and superior torpedoes, Hosogaya could have closed on the Americans and won a decisive victory. But his ships lacked effective radar, and he hesitated to press his advantage. Late in the battle, the *Salt Lake City* was struck by shells fired by either the *Maya* or the *Nachi* and lost steam. McMorris then ordered his destroyers to carry out a torpedo attack while he moved the *Richmond* in to cover the stricken *Salt Lake City*.

Crew members manning an antiaircraft gun on a U.S. Navy warship near Attu Island in the Aleutians. (Horace Bristol/Corbis)

Although the U.S. destroyers scored no hits and the destroyer *Bailey* was damaged by Japanese fire, the attack gave the *Salt Lake City* time to again get under way. At that point, Hosogaya broke off the action and withdrew without delivering the vital supplies to Attu. Hosogaya explained his decision on the grounds that he was low on ammunition and fuel and worried about U.S. air attacks; he was subsequently relieved of his command.

Although several of his ships had sustained damage, McMorris had lost none, and he had won a strategic victory. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division landed on Attu in May, securing that island after a hard fight against the isolated Japanese defenders. The Japanese evacuated Kiska a month later, ending the Aleutian Campaign.

TERRY SHOPTAUGH

See also

Aleutian Islands Campaign; Hosogaya Boshiro; McMorris, Charles Horatio "Soc"

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Komatsubara Michitarō (1886–1940)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Kanagawa, Japan, on July 20, 1886, Komatsubara Michitarō graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1905 and from the Army War College in 1915. He was a resident officer in Russia in 1909 and 1910 and took part in the capture of Quindgao (Tsingtao), China, in 1914.

Komatsubara was an assistant military attaché in Russia between 1919 and 1925, then military attaché there from 1927 to 1929. Promoted to colonel in 1929, he commanded a regiment. In April 1932, he became director of the Harbin Special Service Agency in northern Manchuria, charged with gathering intelligence concerning Soviet activities. Promoted to major general in 1934, he commanded infantry brigades. In March 1937, he was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of the Second Independent Garrison in Manchuria, and in July 1938, he took command of the 23rd Division in Manchuria.

While Komatsubara was commanding the 23rd Division, a clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces in the border area between Manzhoudiguo (Manchoutikuo) and Mongolia. In initiating the fighting, the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army underestimated Soviet strength and disregarded instructions from Tokyo. Komatsubara did not accurately estimate the Soviet forces led by Soviet lieutenant general Georgii Zhukov; his division was newly organized, and although mobile, it was only lightly armed.

Komatsubara began the May–September 1939 Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan Incident), and his division was annihilated by Soviet tanks and artillery: of some 15,975 men in the 23rd Division, 11,230 were casualties. Made the scapegoat for the Japanese defeat, Komatsubara was removed from command. He retired from the service and died of stomach cancer on October 6, 1940.

TOBE RYOICHI

See also
Guandong Army; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Komura Keizo (1896–1978)

Japanese Navy vice admiral who took part in numerous key battles in the Pacific theater. Born in Nagano, Japan, on July 20, 1896, Komura Keizo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1917. Promoted to lieutenant in 1923, he graduated from the Naval College in 1929. Promoted to lieutenant commander, he commanded the destroyer *Kuretake* that year and was appointed assistant naval attaché to Britain in 1933.

Promoted to captain in 1936, Komura participated in the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor and the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway as the captain of the seaplane heavy cruiser *Chikuma.* In June 1942, he took command of the new battleship *Musashi.* Promoted to rear admiral and appointed chief of staff of the Third Fleet in December 1943, Komura assisted Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo in the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19–21, 1944, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26). In the latter engagement, Ozawa and Komura drew Admiral William Halsey's U.S. Third Fleet away from Leyte and completed their mission as a decoy, although at considerable cost in Japanese ship losses.

On April 5, 1945, Admiral Toyoda Soemu ordered Operation TEN-ICHI (HEAVEN NUMBER ONE) in which the Second Fleet—consisting of the flagship *Yamato,* the light cruiser *Yahagi,* and eight destroyers—was to steam to Okinawa in an attempt to destroy U.S. support ships off the landing sites. The ships only had fuel for a one-way voyage, for the plan called for *Yamato* to inflict as much damage as possible and then be beached as a stationary battery. The operation was a suicide mission, but Komura joined it aboard the *Yahagi.*

In the East China Sea on the early morning of April 7, the *Yahagi* was attacked and sunk by planes of U.S. vice admiral Marc A. Mitscher's fast carrier Task Force 58, but Komura survived. The *Yamato* was sunk the same day. That evening, Admiral Toyoda ordered the remaining destroyers of the task force to return to Japan.

In May 1945, Komura was appointed commander of the Yokosuka Naval Station. After the war, in 1948 Komura was hired by the U.S. occupation forces at Yokosuka to manage 27 patrol vessels at the naval station. He also helped establish the Japanese Naval Self-Defense Force on the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. He did not join that force but worked with the U.S. Navy for 11 years. Komura died in Tokyo on February 7, 1978.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Ozawa Jisaburo; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Toyoda Soemu; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Kondō Nobutake (1886–1953)

Japanese Navy admiral who commanded the China Sea Fleet. Born in Osaka Prefecture, Japan, on September 25, 1886, Kondō Nobutake graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1907 and became a gunnery officer. Graduating from the Naval War College in 1919, he was promoted to lieutenant commander. He was a resident officer in Russia in 1919 and 1920 and in Germany from 1921 to 1923 and was appointed aide to the imperial prince in 1924. Kondō was then assigned as a staff officer in the Grand Fleet. Promoted to captain in 1927, he was an instructor at the Naval War College. He then commanded the cruiser *Kako* and the battle cruiser *Kongo.*

Promoted to rear admiral in 1933, Kondō became vice president of the Naval War College, and in 1935 he was chief of staff of the Grand Fleet. One year after being promoted to vice admiral in 1937, he took command of the Fifth Fleet. In 1939, he became vice chief of the Naval General Staff.

In September 1941, Kondō took command of the Second Fleet, and at the outbreak of the Pacific war, he provided support for the Japanese force invading Malaya. On December 10, 1941, Kondō's aircraft sank the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse.* His fleet then provided cover for Japanese forces occupying the Philippines and Java in the Netherlands East Indies.

At the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway, Kondō commanded the Midway Invasion Force comprised of 12 transports carrying 5,000 troops with four cruisers in support. His force did not see action, however. He then took a leading role in the long-running naval struggle for control of Guadalcanal.

Kondō was unsuccessful in luring the U.S. naval forces into a trap in the Eastern Solomons during August 22–25, 1942, and in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 16–27, his units provided gunfire support for the Japanese land effort to retake Henderson Field. This action also led to the crippling and eventual loss of the U.S. carrier *Hornet.* In naval actions off Guadalcanal from November 12 to 15, Kondō's forces were defeated, losing the battleship *Kirishima.* Their withdrawal sealed the fate of Guadalcanal. Kondō then supervised the successful evacuation from the island of Japanese ground-force survivors.

In April 1943, Kondō was promoted to admiral, and he was appointed commander in chief of the China Sea Fleet the following December. In May 1945, he became military adviser to Emperor Hirohito. Kondō died in Tokyo on February 19, 1953.

KITA YOSHITO

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Nagumo Chūichi; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse,* Sinking of; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the

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Kondor Legion

German Luftwaffe unit that fought on the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). The Kondor (Condor) Legion was instrumental in the eventual Nationalist victory over the Republicans. At the same time, it provided a laboratory for the tactics, technology, and organization that the Luftwaffe would employ in World War II.

The beginning of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 found the Nationalist side with many of its troops stationed in Spanish Morocco and the Republican side controlling the sea via the Spanish Navy. The Nationalists sought German dictator Adolf Hitler's support, and on July 26, 1936, he ordered clandestine military aid to them by airlifting troops to Spain from North Africa. Initial support included 10 Junkers Ju-52 transports, a handful of obsolete biplane fighter aircraft, some 88mm antiaircraft artillery, and crews.

The Ju-52s soon began the first major military airlift in history, and together with Italian aircraft, they transported more than 13,000 troops of General Francisco Franco's Army of Africa from Spanish Morocco to Spain between July and October 1936. The German biplane fighters, however, proved no match for the Republican side's Soviet fighter aircraft. In October, Hitler decided to increase the Luftwaffe presence in Spain, resulting in the official formation of the Kondor Legion in October 1936. Eventually the legion numbered more than 5,000 "volunteers" and fielded more than 100 aircraft of various types. A total of 19,000 men and 300 to 400 planes served in the Legion during the course of the war, and the Kondor Legion was made up of regular German military units, not volunteers.

The relatively poor performance of the legion's biplanes against the Republican fighters led the Germans to employ them in a ground-support role, essentially as flying artillery. This move was instrumental in the development of Luftwaffe doctrines of close air support for ground

operations. Kondor Legion aircraft hammered Republican troop lines just before Nationalist troops assaulted; the Germans then struck enemy rear areas to prevent reinforcement. These tactics proved key to a number of Nationalist ground victories.

Men of the German Kondor (Condor) Legion arriving in Gijo Harbor, Spain, 1939. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The Kondor Legion used the most advanced German aircraft as they became available, including the Heinkel He-111 bomber and the Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighter. The legion also field-tested new aircraft, such as the first Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber, and it experimented with new combat techniques. The legion became notorious on April 26, 1937, for its terror bombing of the Basque city of Guernica.

By 1938, the Nationalists secured air superiority. The Kondor Legion quickly appeared on any front required, with its support relocated via train and air transport. Its 88mm flak guns, originally sent to provide air defense, eventually became the backbone of Nationalist artillery batteries, serving as highly mobile field artillery. Certainly, the Kondor Legion was an important factor in the Nationalist victory. Success, however, did not come without cost. Some 330 members of the legion died in Spain, and approximately 1,000 were wounded.

Some of the Luftwaffe's leading fighter aces, such as Adolf Galland, received their baptism of fire with the Kondor Legion. The Luftwaffe adopted much of the legion's organization and tactics for World War II, particularly in ground-support and psychological operations.

JEFFREY W. STAMP

See also

Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Germany, Air Force; Guernica, Kondor Legion Attack on; Hitler, Adolf; Spanish Civil War

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Konev, Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born near Kirov, Russia, on December 28, 1897, and schooled to age 12, Ivan Konev initially became a lumberjack. Conscripted into the Russian Army in 1916, he served in the artillery on the Galician front, achieved officer rank, and was demobilized in November 1917. Konev joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party in 1918, rising to divisional commissar by 1920.

Konev played a notable role in crushing the Kronstadt Rebellion of March 1921. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy six years later and switched to the command side. He was given divisional command and attended special courses at the Frunze during 1934–1935. He went on to serve as commander of the Special Red Banner Army in the Far East and then as head of the Transbaikal Military District (1938–1941). His presence in the Far East and his political acumen helped him survive the 1936–1938 purge of the Soviet Army officer corps. In the course of fighting against the Japanese in 1939, he developed a bitter rivalry with Georgii Zhukov.

Promoted to lieutenant general, Konev assumed command of the North Caucasus Military District in January 1941. On June 22, 1941, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, he received command of the Nineteenth Army. That September, he was promoted to colonel general and succeeded Semen Timoshenko as commander of the Western Front.

Terrible Soviet defeats followed, with five Soviet armies encircled and half a million men taken prisoner. Responsibility for the defeat lay with Konev and Joseph Stalin, as the large encirclement could have been prevented. Zhukov then replaced Konev. In an appeal to Stalin, however, Zhukov saved Konev and made him his deputy—a favor that Konev would not repay.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

When the Kalinin Front was formed in October, it was commanded by Konev as colonel general. In that post, he successfully defended the northern

approaches to Moscow, and in mid-December he drove the German Army from Kalinin.

In August 1942, Konev again secured command of the Western Front when Zhukov returned to duty with Stavka. He halted the last German drive toward Moscow and was shifted to command the Northwestern Front (February–June 1943). During the critical July 5–13, 1943, Battle of Kursk, Konev commanded the strategic reserve Steppe Front, the powerful armor forces of which blunted the German panzers at Prokhorovka.

Konev secured promotion to general of the army in August 1943. In October, his front, now known as the 2nd Ukrainian Front, played a key role in the encirclement of German forces at Korsun-Shevchenko (January 25–February 17, 1944), earning him promotion to marshal of the Soviet Union in February 1944. Taking command of the 1st Ukrainian Front that May, Konev swept through southern Poland and captured the Silesian industrial region. Zhukov was initially assigned the honor of taking Berlin, while Konev moved south of the German capital to the Elbe. But heavy German resistance allowed Konev to propose that his armor be diverted north to the city, and Stalin agreed. Thus, on April 25, 1945, Konev's tanks linked up with those of Zhukov, isolating Berlin. That same day, Konev's patrols made contact with the U.S. First Army on the Elbe at Torgau, in effect splitting Germany. Konev then commanded Soviet occupation forces in Austria.

By July 1946, Konev had succeeded Zhukov as commander of occupation and ground forces in Germany, having provided "evidence" against Zhukov during Stalin's inquiry of the latter's "improper behavior." He would go on to serve as chief inspector of Soviet Forces (1950–1952), commander of the Transcarpathian Military District (1952–1955), and commander in chief of Soviet Ground Forces (1955–1956).

On the formation of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev named Konev commander of its forces (1956–1960) in time to crush the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Konev again turned on Zhukov when Khrushchev removed him in 1957. Ironically, Konev's Zhukov-like objections to the move from conventional forces to missiles resulted in his "voluntary" retirement to the Inspectorate. During the Berlin crisis of 1961, he was called on to head Soviet forces in Germany again, through April 1962. Konev went into active retirement in 1963 as a Ministry of Defense inspector. He died in Moscow on May 21, 1973.

CLAUDE R. SASSO

See also

Berlin, Land Battle for; Kalinin, Recapture of; Korsun Pocket, Battle of the; Kursk, Battle of; Smolensk, Battle of; Stalin, Joseph; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan (1891–1946)

Japanese politician and prime minister (1937–1939, 1940–1941). Born in Tokyo on October 12, 1891, Konoe Fumimaro was a member of one of the five highest-ranked aristocratic families in Imperial Japan. His father, Prince Atsumaro, was a renowned Pan-Asia movement leader. A graduate of the Department of Law of Kyoto Imperial University, Konoe pursued a career in diplomacy and attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. There he observed the reality of international power politics, in which the defeated became prey to the victors. Japan's failure to secure a statement on racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant disillusioned the young diplomat. Highly critical of the Anglo-American domination of the peace conference, Konoe published an article in 1920 attacking the hypocrisy of the postwar settlement.

Having served some years as a member of the House of Peers in the Japanese government, Konoe was appointed prime minister in 1937. Konoe's popularity was immense, and he enjoyed widespread support from both the military and the general public. Following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, Konoe permitted the hard-liners in his cabinet to pursue an all-out war against China, thus making a fateful choice for Japan. In January 1938, he vowed that he would not negotiate with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-

shek). With the military stalemated in China, though, Konoe resigned in January 1939.

Konoe was once again called to the premiership in July 1940. In his second cabinet, a drastic political restructuring was carried out in the dissolution of existing political parties and the establishment of the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association). Konoe became the first president of this organization, which was modeled on the one-party systems of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. While preparing for a total war at home, he agreed to the army's strategy of sending troops into French Indochina in September 1940. That same month on the initiative of Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. These actions further worsened already declining U.S.-Japanese relations. Faced with a diplomatic stalemate with the United States, Konoe resigned in July 1941 and was succeeded by General Tōjō Hideki.

After the tides of war turned, Konoe maneuvered carefully to rally anti-Tōjō elements in Japan and secure a negotiated peace with the Allies. In early 1945, he was designated as a special envoy to the Soviet Union to seek peace through a Soviet intermediary, which did not materialize. These actions did not, however, save Konoe from prosecution by the International War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo after the war. Rather than face trial, he committed suicide on December 16, 1946, in Tokyo.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

International Military Tribunal, Far East; Japan; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Matsuoka Yōsuke; Sino-Japanese War; Tōjō Hideki; Tripartite Pact

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Korea

East Asian nation encompassing 84,610 square miles with a 1939 population of approximately 23.8 million. Korea is a large peninsula that borders China to the north and Russia (then the Soviet Union) to the northeast. To the west lies the Yellow Sea; to the east lies the Sea of Japan. Japan is located to the east.

Caught between three powerful neighbors—China, Russia, and Japan—Korea experienced a stormy history. The nation was long dominated or controlled by China, but Japanese leaders saw Korea as a "dagger" pointed at their country and believed that control of the peninsula was a necessary step to dominating Manchuria and China. After defeating China during 1894–1895, Japan went to war against Russia in 1904. In the resulting Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, Japan gained control of Korea. Five years later, Japan forced the Korean king to abdicate and then formally annexed Korea.

Korean nationalists were buoyed by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's World War I call for the "self-determination of peoples," but demonstrations in March 1919 were met with severe Japanese repression. Some Korean nationalist leaders fled abroad and established a Korean provisional government at Shanghai. In 1925, a communist movement was formally organized within Korea. It had ties to the Communist International (Comintern).

Japanese rule in Korea was both oppressive and exploitive, a poor advertisement for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere the Japanese government proclaimed in the late 1930s in the hope of winning support from Asian nationalist movements. Japan built highways and railroads, but they were designed for military use and to consolidate the Japanese position. It also industrialized Korea, but the economy was completely integrated with that of Japan. In 1937 Governor-General Koiso Kuniaki, a Japanese Army general, began a process of cultural assimilation for the 24 million Koreans, banning the Korean language and literature and insisting that all education (fewer than 20 percent of Koreans were literate) be conducted in Japanese. In 1939 the Japanese began employing Korean labor in other parts of their empire, and in 1942 they introduced conscription in Korea for the Japanese army.

Meanwhile, Korean nationalists and communists organized military formations in China to fight the Japanese. In 1941, these were integrated into a single military force under Yi Pom-sok, and troops of this force fought the

Japanese in Burma. Communist units also formed in Siberia under the young communist leader Kim Il-sung.

During World War II, the Koreans suffered extensively. Japan ruined many of the country's industrial plants by overworking the machinery without providing adequate maintenance. It expropriated most chemical products, especially nitrogen, causing near total soil depletion in Korea. Japan also stripped the country of much of its rice production and cattle. Unrest in Korea increased, forcing Japan to increase its military presence; by 1945, 300,000 Japanese troops were in Korea. By the end of the war, Japan had also sent 723,000 Koreans as laborers to other parts of its empire, including Japan itself. Tens of thousands of Korean women were forced into prostitution as "comfort women" for Japanese troops.

Korea became a focus of Allied attention only as World War II was ending in Europe. The December 1943 Cairo Conference resulted in a joint statement, involving leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and China, that called for a "free and independent" Korea in "due course." But as one of many countries being freed from German or Japanese control, Korea became a focal point for clashing U.S.-Soviet interests.

At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Premier Joseph Stalin touched on the postwar status of Korea. Roosevelt advocated a 20- to 30-year trusteeship to be administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Stalin suggested that Great Britain should also be a trustee. Following Roosevelt's death in April 1945, Stalin informed President Harry S. Truman's special envoy, Harry Hopkins, that the Soviet Union was committed to a four-power trusteeship for Korea.

Agreement regarding the extent of advance into Korea of Soviet and American military forces was not reached until the July 1945 Potsdam Conference of the great powers, following the end of fighting in Europe and before the August declaration of war against Japan by the Soviets. There, the United States proposed—and the Soviets accepted—a demarcation line along the 38th parallel to separate the different Allied forces. Soviet troops were to occupy the northern part of the country and U.S. forces the southern part. The Soviet Twenty-First Army invaded Korea at the end of the war, and U.S. lieutenant general John Hodge's XXIV Corps occupied southern Korea beginning in early September 1945.

This occupation was supposed to be temporary, but as in the case of

Germany, efforts to create a unified country foundered. Occupation lines became permanent, and two states appeared, the northern one under communist control and bound to the Soviet Union and the southern state supported by the United States. In 1950 North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, with the support of the Soviet Union and China, invaded South Korea in an effort to unify Korea under communist rule. The 1950–1953 Korean War prevented him from realizing this goal, but unlike Germany, which reunified at the end of the Cold War, Korea remains divided and is a world flash point today.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Cairo Conference; Hopkins, Harry Lloyd; Japan; Koiso Kuniaki; Potsdam Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Truman, Harry S.; Yalta Conference; Document 207

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Korsun Pocket, Battle of the (January 25–February 17, 1944)

Important Eastern Front battle. The Battle of the Korsun Pocket, known to the Soviets as the Korsun Shevchenkovsky Operation and to the Germans as the Cherkassy Pocket Engagement, pitted Russian marshal Georgii K. Zhukov against German field marshal Fritz Eric von Manstein. Zhukov was supervising elements of General of the Army Nikolai F. Vatutin's 1st

Ukrainian Front and General of the Army Ivan S. Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front; Manstein was leading Army Group South. The Battle of the Korsun Pocket, the first successful large-scale Soviet encirclement combat since Operation URANUS in the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943), became known as "little Stalingrad on the Dnieper."

Unlike previous major Soviet offensives, Korsun Shevchenkovsky did not result from weeks or months of careful planning and force buildup. Rather, Stavka and the two Ukrainian fronts organized it opportunistically. The battle demonstrated a Soviet operational adaptability comparable to that shown by the Germans between 1941 and 1943.

On January 28, 1944, converging attacks by the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the Sixth Tank Army cut off and isolated the bulge in the Germans' line that was their last toehold on the Dnieper River. The Soviets trapped at least 60,000 German soldiers, including the XI and XLII Army Corps, and the 5th SS Panzer Division, known as "Viking." In response, employing the Eighth Army's XLVII Panzer Corps and the III Panzer Corps of First Panzer Army, Manstein sought to punch through the Soviet siege ring, relieve the trapped German troops, and in turn encircle the surrounding Soviet armies.

On the Soviet side, the Battle of the Korsun Pocket included six tank corps, a mechanized corps equipped with Sherman tanks, and a cavalry corps. They opposed eight German panzer divisions, a heavy tank regiment equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks, and a reinforced Schutzstaffel (SS) Panzergrenadier division. Substantial amounts of infantry, artillery, and air units on both sides were also involved. The Soviets halted two German armored relief attempts and simultaneously endeavored to crush the German pocket.

When it became obvious that the German counterattacks had failed, troops in the pocket were told that they would have to save themselves. An initially successful breakout on the night of February 16–17, obscured by a blizzard, turned into a massacre as day broke. The desperate German columns were beset by everything from air attacks to saber-swinging Soviet cavalrymen. The battle ended on February 17.

Soviet and German claims about the number of troops lost in the pocket are contradictory, but at least half of the German forces trapped there were killed, wounded, or captured, and even the survivors were in no shape to fight again for weeks or months. Six German divisions were destroyed. When the

battle ended, Soviet forces were poised to complete the liberation of the western Ukraine.

DANA LOMBARDY

See also

Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Manstein, Erich von; Stalingrad, Battle of; Ukraine Campaign; Vatutin, Nikolai Fedorovich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Kozhedub, Ivan Nikitovich (1920–1991)

Soviet Air Force marshal of aviation and leading Soviet ace of the war. Born in Obrzheyevka, Russia, on June 8, 1920, Ivan Kozhedub completed chemical engineering school in 1940 and immediately joined the air force. After graduating from the Aviation School for Pilots in 1941, he was a pilot instructor until the end of 1942.

Kozhedub saw combat on the Eastern Front during World War II, assigned to the Voronezh, Steppe, 2nd Ukrainian, and 1st Belorussian Fronts between March 1943 and May 1945. During this period, piloting LA-5s and LA-7s, Kozhedub flew 330 combat missions and was credited with 62 air-to-air kills in 120 dogfights, making him the leading Soviet ace of the war. He was awarded Hero of the Soviet Union three times. He commanded a squadron and then was deputy commander of a fighter wing.

Kozhedub remained in the service, and he led the 324th Fighter Air Division during the 1950–1953 Korean War and graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1956. He was then inspector of flight

training between 1956 and 1966. As a colonel general, he was first deputy commander of aviation for the Moscow Military District in 1964. Promoted to marshal of aviation, he was a member of the Group of Military Inspectors from 1978 to 1985. Kozhedub died at his dacha in Mnino, outside Moscow, on August 8, 1991.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Soviet Union, Air Force

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Krebs, Hans (1898–1945)

German Army general of infantry. Born in Helmstedt, Germany, on March 4, 1898, Hans Krebs entered the German Army in August 1914 as an officer candidate and was commissioned a lieutenant in June 1915. By the end of the war, he was a regimental adjutant. Krebs continued in the army during the interwar period. Given his intelligence and gift for staff work, the remainder of his career was spent in General Staff assignments. He was assistant military attaché in Moscow in 1933 and 1934. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in February 1938, Krebs was sent to Moscow in September 1939 to assist the German embassy in negotiations with the Kremlin concerning the partitioning of Poland. He was appointed chief of staff of the VII Army Corps in December 1939.

Promoted to colonel in October 1940, Krebs returned briefly to Moscow in March 1941 as deputy military attaché to General of Cavalry Ernst August Kostring. Because of Kostring's illness, Krebs was acting attaché until the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22. In January 1942, he became chief of staff of the Ninth Army. He held the same post in Army Group Center (under Field Marshal Günther von Kluge) beginning in March

1943 and Army Group B (under Field Marshal Walther Model) in September 1944.

Krebs was promoted to major general in February 1942, lieutenant general in April 1943, and general of infantry in August 1944. In February 1945, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered Krebs assigned to Berlin, where he succeeded Colonel General Heinz Guderian as acting German Army chief of staff following the latter's dismissal on March 27. With Hitler's suicide on April 30, 1945, Krebs's final duty was to act as the liaison with the Soviets regarding the surrender of the Berlin garrison. Krebs crossed their lines on May 1 to inform the Soviets of Hitler's death and to attempt to negotiate an armistice. His hopes were quickly dashed by commander of the Eighth Guards Army General Vasily Chuikov, who insisted on unconditional surrender. Krebs returned to Hitler's bunker and then committed suicide on May 1 or 2, 1945. His body was never found.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Berlin, Land Battle for; Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich; Guderian, Heinz; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Model, Walther

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Kretschmer, Otto August Wilhelm (1912–1998)

German frigate captain and submarine commander. Born at Heidau, Liegnitz, Silesia (now Hajduki Nyskie, Poland), on May 1, 1912, Otto August Wilhelm Kretschmer joined the German Navy in April 1930 and entered the officer training program. He subsequently served in the light cruisers *Emden* and *Köln.* In January 1936, he volunteered for submarine service and took up his

first command, the *U-35,* in July 1937, in which he conducted a patrol in Spanish waters during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. In September 1937, Kretschmer assumed command of the *U-23,* a Type II coastal U-boat.

Otto Kretschmer was the most successful German U-boat commander of World War II. He was later an admiral in the Bundesmarine, the Federal Republic of Germany navy. (Heinrich Hoffmann/Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

During the first eight months of World War II, Kretschmer conducted eight patrols in *U-23* in the North Sea near the coast of Great Britain but achieved little success due to the limited capabilities of the submarine. His most notable achievements were sinking a tanker in January 1940 and the destroyer HMS *Daring* in February 1940. In April 1940, Kretschmer took command of *U-99,* a much larger and more capable Type VII submarine. After two months of intensive training with his crew, he began the first of eight patrols into the Atlantic in June 1940.

During these patrols, Kretschmer refined his tactics of slipping into the middle of convoys at night and torpedoing ships from the surface, often at close range. The success of these attacks spawned his motto: “one torpedo, one ship.” He also earned recognition for sinking three British armed merchant cruisers in November 1940, including two on the night of November 3–4 in a running surface engagement in which he utilized his 88mm deck gun. This action helped to convince the British Admiralty to discontinue the use of such ships. Kretschmer was the first German submarine commander to sink 250,000 tons of Allied shipping.

The most successful U-boat commander of the war, Kretschmer was known as “the tonnage king” because of his exploits. From September 1939 to March 1941, he sank 47 merchant ships totaling 273,503 tons and earned the Knights Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords to the Iron Cross. Kretschmer, however, eschewed efforts to propagandize his accomplishments, earning another nickname, “Silent Otto.”

On March 17, 1941, Kretschmer successfully attacked the 10-ship HX.112 convoy south of Iceland. After expending his torpedoes, he was returning to base in France when two British destroyers attacked and sank his boat. He and 40 of his 43-man crew were rescued and taken prisoner.

Kretschmer spent the remainder of the war as a prisoner of war in Canada, returning to Germany in December 1947. In 1955, he joined the navy of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundesmarine, and in 1965 he became chief of staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Baltic Command, a position he held for four years. He retired in 1970 with the rank of flotilla admiral. Kretschmer died at Straubing, Germany, on August 5, 1998.

C. J. HORN

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Submarines

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Krueger, Walter (1881–1967)

U.S. Army general who commanded the Sixth Army in the Pacific theater. Born in Flatow, West Prussia, on January 26, 1881, Walter Krueger immigrated to the United States in 1889. He enlisted in the army during the 1898 Spanish-American War, earning a commission in 1901. He graduated from the Infantry and Cavalry School in 1906 and the School of the Line in 1907. He was a faculty member at the army's School of the Line between 1909 and 1912. Captain Krueger participated in the 1916–1917 Punitive Expedition into Mexico. Sent to France during World War I, he rose to be chief of staff of the Tank Corps of the American Expeditionary Forces as a temporary colonel. He was then chief of staff for VI Corps in France and IV Corps in Germany.

Krueger graduated from the Army War College in 1921 and the Naval War College in 1926 and later taught at both schools before serving with the Army War Plans Division for three years. He was promoted to colonel in 1932 and brigadier general in 1936 and then headed the Army War Plans Division from 1936 to 1938. He next commanded a brigade and was promoted to major general in February 1939, thereafter taking command of the 2nd Division at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He went on to command VIII Corps, and in May 1941, he took command of the Third Army as a temporary lieutenant general.

When the United States entered World War II, there seemed little chance that Krueger would receive a battlefield command because of his advanced age and his skill as a trainer of soldiers. In January 1943, however, General Douglas MacArthur personally requested Krueger and the Third Army for deployment to the Southwest Pacific. Instead, the War Department transferred Krueger and some of his staff to Australia to activate the Sixth Army.



U.S. Army lieutenant general Walter Krueger (left) and Navy vice admiral Thomas Kinkaid observing the U.S. landing on Leyte in the Philippines, October, 1944. (Corbis)

Krueger commanded the Sixth Army in a series of widespread combat operations across the Southwest Pacific until the end of the war, beginning with the occupation of Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands in June 1943. He headed operations against New Britain, the Admiralty Islands, New Guinea, Biak, and Morotai. By the midsummer of 1944, New Guinea was in Allied hands, and MacArthur was ready to return to the Philippines. Krueger led the landings at Leyte (October 20, 1944) and the Lingayen Gulf. In the ensuing campaign, the Sixth Army captured Manila and cleared most of Luzon Island. Promoted to full general in March 1945, Krueger was scheduled to lead the invasion of Kyushu Island when Japan surrendered.

Critics thought Krueger too slow and methodical, but few have complained about his low casualty rates relative to his successes. Although MacArthur may have been displeased at Krueger’s slowness on Luzon, he

still selected him to lead the planned invasion of Japan. Rarely seeking the limelight, Krueger enjoyed MacArthur's full confidence. After the war, Krueger remained with the Sixth Army during the occupation of Japan. He retired in July 1946 and died on August 20, 1967, in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Admiralty Islands Campaign; Hollandia, Battle of; Leyte Landings; MacArthur, Douglas; Manila, Battle for; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Krug, Julius Albert (1907–1970)

Engineer, chairman of the War Production Board (WPB) from 1944 until 1945, and secretary of the interior during 1946–1949. Julius Albert Krug was born on November 23, 1907, in Madison, Wisconsin. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin–Madison with an undergraduate degree in 1929 and a master's degree in 1930. He thereafter worked for several Wisconsin utility companies, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Kentucky Public Service Commission before securing a job with the Tennessee Valley Authority, where he served as chief power engineer.

In 1941, Krug was named director of the power division at the Office of Production Management, which became part of the WPB in January 1942. The following year, he was appointed director of the Office of War Utilities. In April 1944, Krug enlisted in the U.S. Navy, but in August he was named chairman of the WPB; he succeeded Donald M. Nelson.

Krug's tenure at the helm of the WPB was an unremarkable one, chiefly because most of the problems associated with mobilization and military

procurement had already been resolved. Krug remained with the WPB until that body was disbanded by executive order on October 4, 1945.

Named secretary of the interior by President Harry S. Truman, Krug served in the position from March 18, 1946, until December 1, 1949. Krug proved to be an activist secretary, opposing lumber companies' attempts to log the vast forests of the state of Washington and the construction of unnecessary and unsightly dams. In 1946, he unsuccessfully tried to avert a strike by the United Mine Workers. In the summer of 1949, Krug presided over a United Nations conference on conservation and resource-management issues at Lake Success, New York. Krug resigned his post effective December 1, 1949.

Krug thereafter worked as a utilities consultant, served as chairman of the board of Brookside Mills (Tennessee), and later cofounded the Volunteer Asphalt Company in Knoxville, Tennessee. Krug died on March 26, 1970, in Knoxville.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Nelson, Donald Marr; United States War Production Board

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Küchler, Georg von (1881–1968)

Germany Army field marshal who took command of Army Group North in 1942. Born near Hanau, Germany, on May 30, 1881, Georg von Küchler entered the German Army in 1900 and was commissioned a lieutenant the next year. Promoted to captain, he took command of an artillery battery on the outbreak of World War I, distinguishing himself in combat on the Western Front and in General Staff service.

Küchler continued in the German Army after the war, advancing steadily in rank. He was promoted to major in 1924, to lieutenant colonel in 1929, and

to colonel in 1932. By 1934, he was a major general commanding the 1st Infantry Division in East Prussia. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1935, Küchler was appointed inspector general of the service academies.

In April 1937, Küchler was promoted to general of artillery, commanding the I Army Corps at Königsberg. In March 1939, his forces participated in the incorporation of Memel into the Reich. In the German invasion of Poland (September 1, 1939), Küchler commanded the Third Army, which struck south from East Prussia as part of Colonel General Fedor von Bock's Army Group North. During the Polish Campaign, Küchler directed the northern portion of the envelopment of Warsaw. Seen as a favorite of Adolf Hitler, Küchler defied Schutzstaffel (SS) leader Heinrich Himmler and ordered the courts-martial of German soldiers guilty of committing atrocities against Poles.

During the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940, Küchler commanded the Eighteenth Army, consisting of 11 divisions in Bock's Army Group B. He had responsibility for the invasion of the Netherlands and the linkup with highly vulnerable German airborne forces holding key bridges, cities, and installations. Following the surrender of the Netherlands on May 15, Küchler's forces occupied Antwerp, then forced the Scheldt and drove on Ghent in Belgium. His forces mopped up the remaining resistance following the British evacuation at Dunkerque (May 26–June 4) before driving south toward Amiens and taking Paris on June 14.

Promoted to colonel general in July 1940, Küchler then led his Eighteenth Army as part of Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb's Army Group North in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 21, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union. The Eighteenth Army held the north flank in the advance toward Leningrad. In addition to forcing prisoners of war to clear mines, Küchler also enforced Hitler's Commissar Order, and he ordered the execution of both partisans and Gypsies.

In January 1942, Küchler took command of Army Group North from Leeb. He was promoted to field marshal in June 1942. When the Soviets launched their great counteroffensive at Leningrad on January 28, 1944, Küchler was forced to withdraw to the Luga River. Hitler made him the scapegoat for the reversal and, on January 29, temporarily replaced him with Field Marshal Walther Model. On January 31, Hitler assigned Kuchler to the Führer Reserve.

Arrested after the war, Küchler was tried and convicted of war crimes at the American Military Tribunals in Nuremberg in October 1948 and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. Freed in February 1955, he died in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, on May 25, 1968.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Commissar Order; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Battle for; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von; Leningrad, Siege of; Model, Walther; Netherlands Campaign; Poland Campaign

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Kula Gulf, Battle of (July 6, 1943)

Pacific theater naval battle, the first of two night surface actions fought for control of the major deepwater entrance to New Georgia Island. Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth, with a light cruiser task group, had been in the gulf on the night of July 5, 1943, on a bombardment mission and was southeast of Guadalcanal when he received orders to return and intercept a Japanese transport group believed to be making for Vila.

Joined by two destroyers from Tulagi, Ainsworth arrived off the gulf entrance an hour after midnight. The sky was overcast, with passing showers and visibility 2,000 yards or less. Radar contact was made at 1:36 a.m. on July 6 with three warships some 22,000 yards distant, standing out of the gulf 5,000 yards off the Kolombongara shore. Ainsworth immediately assumed battle formation: two destroyers in column ahead; the light cruisers *Honolulu*, *Helena*, and *St. Louis* behind them; and two destroyers astern. At the same time, Ainsworth turned to port to close with the Japanese, and then, at 1:49 a.m., he came back right to unmask all guns. Radar then picked up a second

Japanese group astern the first, and Ainsworth delayed opening fire as he pondered this new situation.

The Japanese were, in fact, in three groups. The first, with which Ainsworth had made contact, was Rear Admiral Akiyama Teruo's covering force of the destroyers *Niizuki* (flagship), *Suzukaze,* and *Tanikaze.* The second group was made up of four destroyer-transports that Akiyama had first ordered to make for Vila; when contact was made with Ainsworth, Akiyama directed them to reverse course and join in the battle. The third group of three destroyer-transports was already unloading at Vila.

Ainsworth opened fire on Akiyama's group at 1:57 a.m., and the rapid-firing, radar-directed 6-inch guns in which the Americans put their faith quickly hammered the *Niizuki* into a wreck. But the gunfire lit up the U.S. battle line, and almost immediately, the *Suzukaze* and *Tanikaze* launched 16 torpedoes and escaped to the northwest. Believing he had accounted for all three ships of Akiyama's group, Ainsworth countermarched at 2:03 a.m. to deal with the transport group. Seconds later, three Japanese Long Lance torpedoes struck the *Helena.* It sank at about 2:25 a.m. At 2:18 a.m. Ainsworth had taken the transport group under fire, scoring some hits, but the four destroyers scattered and headed for Vila, the only casualty resulting when the *Nagatsuki* ran hard aground on Kolombongara.

Finding no targets to the west and convinced that he had accounted for many more Japanese ships than the *Niizuki,* Ainsworth, whose own ships were low on both fuel and ammunition, ordered his force to head for Tulagi, leaving the *Nicholas* and *Radford* to pick up the *Helena*'s survivors. Three times during the early morning hours, the two destroyers interrupted their work to engage Japanese ships. Although gunfire and torpedoes were exchanged, there was no major damage to either side, and by daylight Kula Gulf was clear of the Japanese.

RONNIE DAY

See also

Ainsworth, Walden Lee "Pug"; Kolombongara, Battle of; New Georgia, Battle of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Vella Gulf, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Battle of

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Kuribayashi Tadamichi (1891–1945)

Japanese Army general. Born in Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan, on July 7, 1891, to a family of samurai descent, Kuribayashi Tadamichi graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1914. After serving in the cavalry, he was admitted to the General Staff Academy, from which he graduated in 1923, second in his class. In 1928, he was posted to the United States as a deputy military attaché, and between 1931 and 1933, he served as military attaché to Canada. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1933, Kuribayashi commanded a cavalry regiment in 1936 and 1937, followed by promotion to major general in 1940, and a series of brigade commands and promotion to chief of staff of the Twenty-First Army in China in 1941. In 1943, he returned to Japan, where he commanded the 1st Imperial Guards Division until 1944.

In May 1944, Kuribayashi took command of the 109th Infantry Division and was assigned the defense of Iwo Jima, part of the Volcano Island chain located approximately 700 miles from Tokyo. Kuribayashi arrived on Iwo Jima in June and began preparing the island to meet an anticipated U.S. amphibious assault. Disregarding the advice of his subordinates and ignoring the protests of the commander of Iwo Jima's contingent of naval troops, he decided not to attempt to hold the island's beaches. Instead, he ordered his troops to construct deep and heavily fortified positions inland, centered on the 556-foot Mount Suribachi. Kuribayashi's aim was to exact as heavy a toll as possible on the invaders after they landed.

Iwo Jima's defenders dug in accordingly, which allowed them to withstand over two months of U.S. air strikes and naval bombardment before the American landing on February 19, 1945. Although Kuribayashi's plan succeeded in inflicting heavy casualties on the attacking Americans, he and his men were inexorably ground down. On March 17, Kuribayashi, who had been promoted to full general, made a farewell radio broadcast to Japan. He

died in action during the last few days of organized resistance, sometime between March 21 and 24. His body was never recovered.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Iwo Jima, Battle for

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Kurita Takeo (1889–1977)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born in Ibaragi, Japan, on April 28, 1889, Kurita Takeo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1910. In the 1920s, he held a number of destroyer commands. Promoted to commander, Kurita was an instructor at the Torpedo School between 1928 and 1934 and again between 1935 and 1937. He was promoted to captain in 1932. Kurita commanded the cruiser *Abukuma* in 1934–1935 and then the battleship *Kongo* during 1937–1938. Promoted to rear admiral in 1938, he commanded destroyer squadrons over the next two years.

Promoted to vice admiral in May 1942, Kurita commanded the Close Support Group in the June 3–6 Battle of Midway. In August 1943, he took command of Second Fleet. In the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf, Kurita commanded the 1st Strike Force (the central force) in executing Operation SHō-GO (VICTORY ONE). Kurita's force was the most powerful of those that were to converge on the U.S. landing site on Leyte Gulf; it was to proceed through San Bernardino Strait and then join up with the 3rd Force under Vice Admiral Nishimura Shoji, which would pass through Surigao Strait to the south. Kurita's force had five battleships, including the *Yamato* and *Musashi*. The two forces were to come together at the U.S. landing site

and destroy the support ships there, while the U.S. covering force was drawn off by a decoy Japanese carrier force under Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo.

As it turned out, Nishimura's force was destroyed, Kurita's ships were discovered and attacked by U.S. aircraft, and the *Musashi* was sunk. Kurita then reversed course, but, unknown to the Americans, he turned around again. Meanwhile, U.S. admiral William F. Halsey took his entire covering Third Fleet to engage Ozawa's decoy force, as Kurita's force issued from San Bernardino Strait to engage U.S. vice admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet in Leyte Gulf.

In the early morning of October 25, Kurita's ships approached the unprotected U.S. transports and their weak support force off Leyte. Kurita was on the verge of being able to annihilate them when he decided to withdraw. He never explained his decision publicly, but apparently, he mistakenly believed that the aircraft attacking his ships were from Halsey's force. Several days of near-incessant air attacks on his ships may also have affected the exhausted Kurita, but the reasons for his decision are still debated. Not censured for the "mysterious U-turn," as his action is known in Japan, Kurita subsequently returned to Japan. He commanded the Japanese Naval Academy from January 1945 until the end of the war. Kurita died in Hyogo, Japan, on December 19, 1977.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Nishimura Shoji; Ozawa Jisaburo; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Kursk, Battle of (July 5–16, 1943)

Major Eastern Front battle and the largest tank engagement in history. The Battle of Kursk demonstrated the end of German dominance on the Eastern Front. The 1942–1943 winter campaign had left a 120-mile-wide bulge around Kursk, an important rail junction north of Belgorod and Kharkov protruding 75 miles deep into German-held territory. German dictator Adolf Hitler saw the salient as an opportunity. By reducing it, his army could regain prestige lost by previous setbacks.

By April, plans to blast the Soviets from Kursk were under discussion, and they were solidified into Operation ZITADELLE (CITADEL) by early May. The plan was to reduce the salient with two armor-led pincer attacks at the northern and southern shoulders that would meet in the middle, surrounding all of the forces in the pocket. From the north near Orel, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's Army Group Center would launch General Walther Model's Ninth Army, led by two panzer corps. The main thrust, however, would come in the south from Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South, with Colonel General Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army moving north from near Belgorod.

Hitler left the start date for the operation open to sometime after May 1. He then delayed it to June and again to July in order to build up the panzer forces with newly developed heavy Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand 88mm self-propelled assault guns, although they had been rushed into production and suffered from design flaws.

The Soviets knew of the plans for the impending German offensive through reconnaissance and intelligence agents. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wanted a preemptive spoiling attack, but Stavka representative Marshal Georgii Zhukov convinced him that within the Kursk salient, the Central Front, under General Konstantin Rokossovsky, and General Nikolai Vatutin's Voronezh Front would be able to absorb the initial German blows with the defenses they had established, and to the rear, General Ivan Konev's Steppe Front could then counterattack.



Katyusha multiple rocket launchers during the battle of Kursk in July 1943. (Slava Katamidze Collection/Getty Images)

Both sides built up armor and troop concentrations for the coming battle. The Germans amassed 900,000 men in 50 divisions, of which 19 were panzer and motorized, with 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 10,000 artillery pieces, and 2,000 aircraft. The delay, however, allowed the Soviets to assemble 1.3 million men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, and 2,400 aircraft. Some 300,000 local civilians joined the Red Army in laying a massive array of tank traps, minefields, and dug-in antitank guns designed to channel the German armor into kill zones for Soviet artillery.

The German attack commenced on July 5. In the north, the Ninth Army assaulted on a narrow 30-mile front but managed to penetrate only 6 or 7 miles in seven days of fierce fighting. The fighting resembled some of the fierce attrition battles of World War I. The Fourth Panzer Army in the south did slightly better, pushing to the third Soviet defensive belt about 20 miles deep. The critical stage of the battle came between July 11 and 12, when Hoth turned his panzer spearhead northwest to envelop the Soviet 1st Tank Army, and with about 400 tanks, his forces reached Prokhorovka Station. Zhukov responded with a counterattack of five tank armies, two coming from the Steppe Front.

This engagement was a cauldron embroiling more than 1,200 tanks from both sides (three-quarters of them Soviet) in the largest tank battle of the war. By the end of July 12, Prokhorovka lay littered with the burned-out hulks of German and Soviet tanks.

At that point, on July 13, Hitler called off the offensive in order to withdraw panzer forces to reinforce units in Sicily, where the Allies had landed three days earlier. The German commanders had no choice but to conduct a fighting retreat in the face of a Soviet counteroffensive that began on July 12. By August 5 the Soviets had retaken Orel and Belgorod, and they retook Kharkov by August 23, an action that the Soviets consider to be part of the Battle of Kursk. By that reckoning, Kursk involved 4 million men, 13,000 armored vehicles, and 12,000 aircraft, making it one of the largest battles of the war.

In the Battle of Kursk, the Germans lost an estimated 70,000 men killed, 2,900 tanks, 195 self-propelled guns, 844 artillery pieces, and 1,392 planes. More important, the battle cost the German Army the strategic initiative. The Germans were now forced over to the defensive, leading to an almost continuous retreat that ended in Berlin.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

Armored Warfare; Eastern Front; Hoth, Hermann; Kharkov, Battles of; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Manstein, Erich von; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Sicily, Invasion of; Tanks, All Powers; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Kusaka Ryūnosuke (1892–1971)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Tokyo on September 25, 1892, Kusaka Ryūnosuke graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1913. He was one of the early specialists in naval aviation in the Japanese Navy and served as an instructor at the Kasumigaura Naval Air Station and the Naval War College in 1924. He served on the Navy General Staff in 1929 and was promoted to commander in 1930. Promoted to captain in 1934, he commanded the aircraft carriers *Hosho* in 1936 and *Akagi* in 1939.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1940, Kusaka served as chief of staff of the First Air Fleet and helped to plan the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. He also assisted the commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, in planning the attack on Midway (June 3–6, 1942). Kusaka participated in this operation as chief of staff of the First Air Fleet.

Kusaka fought in the October 26–27, 1942, Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands as chief of staff of the Third Fleet. In 1944, he was promoted to vice admiral and appointed chief of staff of the Combined Fleet under Admiral Toyoda Soemu, participating in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21)

and the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26). At the very end of the war, in August 1945, he was appointed commander of the Fifth Air Fleet. Kusaka died at Hyogo, Japan, on November 23, 1971.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chūichi; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Toyoda Soemu; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich (1904–1974)

Soviet Navy admiral of the fleet, minister of the navy, deputy minister of Soviet armed forces, and commander of Soviet naval forces. Born in the Arkhangelsk Oblast of northern Russia on July 24, 1904, Nikolai Kuznetsov joined the Red Navy in 1919. After service in the Russian Civil War, he graduated from Leningrad Naval College in 1926 and from the Voroshilov Naval Academy in 1932. During 1936–1937, he served as the Soviet adviser to the Republican navy during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. The Great Purges orchestrated by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin exacted a frightful toll on the Soviet Navy leadership, and as a consequence, Kuznetsov was named people's commissar of the navy (minister of the navy) in 1939 at age 37.

In August 1939, Kuznetsov submitted an ambitious naval construction plan designed to produce 2 aircraft carriers, 18 battleships, 48 cruisers, 198 flotilla leaders and destroyers, and 433 submarines. However, the demands and costs of overseeing widely dispersed Soviet naval actions during World War II prevented any meaningful result.

Promoted to admiral in 1940 and to admiral of the fleet in May 1944, Kuznetsov commanded the Soviet Pacific Fleet that supported the Red Army's operations against the Japanese at the end of the war. Kuznetsov's

postwar shipbuilding plan was far beyond the means of the Soviet Union's war-ravaged industries and did not reflect Stalin's expectations.

Kuznetsov was named deputy minister of the Soviet Union's armed forces and commander in chief of naval forces in 1946, minister of the navy in 1951, and first deputy minister of defense of the Soviet Union and commander in chief of naval forces in 1953. Stripped of these titles in December 1955, Kuznetsov was demoted to vice admiral in February 1956 and forcibly retired, apparently because of the October 1955 explosion and sinking of the battleship *Novorossiysk* (formerly the Italian *Giulio Cesare*) while it was moored at Sevastopol. His immediate subordinate, the more progressive Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, assumed Kuznetsov's post and led the Soviet Navy to unprecedented prominence over the next three decades. Kuznetsov was posthumously restored to his rank of admiral of the fleet by the Supreme Soviet in 1988, nearly 14 years after his death in Moscow on December 6, 1974.

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See also

Great Purges; Soviet Union, Navy

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Kwajalein, Battle for (January 9–February 6, 1944)

Battle for a strategic Japanese logistics base in the Marshall Islands. Kwajalein, the world's largest atoll and among 32 separate atolls that comprise the Marshall Islands, was a primary target of the U.S. Navy's Central Pacific Campaign. As a consequence of its participation in World War I, Japan had secured the Marshalls, located approximately halfway

between Pearl Harbor and the Mariana Islands. Control of the Marshalls allowed the Japanese to extend their power southeast to the Gilbert Islands. These island bases also protected their fleet anchorage to the west at Truk and the airfields to the northwest on the Marianas, which lay close enough to Japan to be within the range of U.S. strategic bombers.

Following their bloody initiation in the opposed amphibious landing on Tarawa, American military planners devised Operation FLINTLOCK to bypass the heavily defended eastern atolls and strike directly at the administrative and communication complexes centrally located on Kwajalein. A secondary assault on Eniwetok (Operation CATCHPOLE) to the west would follow. FLINTLOCK incorporated lessons learned from the Tarawa experience. The Marshalls landings benefited from a sharp increase in the quality and quantity of naval gunfire support, large-scale air bombardments of the target prior to D-day, and land-based artillery prepositioned on adjacent atolls to provide additional fire support. Frogmen of the newly created navy underwater demolition teams scouted the beaches for potential obstacles and marked the lanes for the landing craft. Requirements and procedures for landing assault troops were revamped to increase speed and efficiency in getting ashore, and the assaulting troops would have greatly increased firepower, including more automatic weapons, flamethrowers, and demolition charges.

An unprecedented two-day aerial and naval barrage preceded troop landings by the 4th Marine Division and the army's 7th Infantry Division on February 1, 1944. The marines stormed Roi-Namur, two islands linked by a causeway on the atoll's northern tip, while the army took responsibility for seizing the main island of Kwajalein at the southern end. Although confusion plagued the marines' initial ship-to-shore movement, the assault on Roi met with light resistance and secured the island's airfield in a single day.

The attack on Namur's supply facilities encountered heavier opposition, and only a portion of the island had been taken by nightfall. At least 120 American casualties occurred on Namur when engineers unknowingly detonated a bunker containing torpedo warheads. Just before daybreak on February 2, the marines repelled a counterattack by the remaining Japanese defenders and secured the island.

The more orderly landings on Kwajalein met with substantial opposition, and it required four days of intense fighting to clear the island. Nearly the entire garrison of 8,675 Japanese soldiers on Roi-Namur and Kwajalein

perished in these battles, with half of these casualties resulting from the preliminary bombardment. U.S. forces took only 265 prisoners, including 165 Korean laborers. U.S. losses were 372 dead and 1,582 wounded.

Operations FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE validated the American revised doctrine of amphibious warfare employing massive fire support and speed to achieve victory with minimum casualties. The success in the Marshall Islands actions also confirmed the wisdom of the Central Pacific island-hopping campaign, which called for bypassing and isolating Japanese strongpoints to move within striking distance of the Japanese home islands.

DEREK W. FRISBY

Men of the 7th Division employ flamethrowers to drive Japanese soldiers from a block house during fighting on Kwajalein Island, February 4, 1944. (National Archives)

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; Eniwetok, Capture of; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Tarawa, Battle of; Truk, Raid on

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Kwantung Army

See Guandong Army

L

Laborde, Jean Joseph de (1878–1977)

French Navy vice admiral. Born on November 29, 1878, at Chantilly, Oise, France, Jean Joseph de Laborde graduated from the École Navale in 1895. He first served on a cruiser in the Mediterranean before beginning a long period aboard cruisers in the Far East until 1901. He then served in torpedo boats and cruisers in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Assigned to the Far East again, he became interested in aviation and learned to fly while in Saigon. He served on a cruiser in the Atlantic in 1912 and earned his pilot's license in April 1914. During World War I, he commanded bomber squadrons and was charged with creating the French naval aviation center at Dunkerque. He was promoted to commander in January 1917.

Following the war, Laborde commanded the naval aviation center at Saint-Raphaël in 1919 and presided over a commission charged with developing French carrier aviation. In 1922, he took charge of the aerial defense of southern France. He was promoted to captain in January 1923. Named head of French naval aviation in November 1924, Laborde oversaw construction of France's first aircraft carrier, the *Béarn*, completed in 1926, which he then commanded. He went on to develop French Navy air doctrine and strategy.

Although Laborde lacked a certain political suppleness, he was clearly destined for high rank. He was promoted to rear admiral in August 1928 and commanded the 2nd Squadron in 1930. He became a vice admiral in October 1932 and was appointed maritime prefect of Bizerte. Promoted to full admiral in 1938, he took command of the French fleet in the Atlantic in April 1939. An admitted Anglophile, he conducted joint maneuvers with the Royal Navy and was well respected by British naval officers.

At the beginning of World War II, Laborde oversaw the French Navy's antisubmarine efforts against German U-boats and planned French naval efforts in the Norwegian Campaign. When France and Germany signed an

armistice in June 1940, he initially ordered his ships to take refuge in British ports, until French premier Henri Philippe Pétain and navy commander Admiral Jean Darlan prevailed on him to honor the naval paragraphs of the armistice agreement. In September, Laborde was named commander of the Vichy French high seas fleet at Toulon.

After U.S. and British forces invaded French North Africa in November 1942 (reaching an accommodation with the Vichyite Darlan) and after the Germans occupied southern France, both sides sought to secure the Toulon fleet. Darlan invited Laborde to bring the ships to North Africa to join the Allies, but Laborde detested Darlan and flatly refused, stating that he would defend his Toulon base against all threats. Incredibly naive, he believed that Adolf Hitler would honor his pledge not to take the French fleet; thus, he did nothing to prepare Toulon's land defenses, which enabled the Germans to launch a successful surprise attack on the morning of November 27, 1942.

Laborde had, however, made plans for scuttling the fleet, and he now ordered them carried out. The operation was abetted by German incompetence, and the French successfully sent to the bottom 77 ships, including 3 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 32 destroyers. Although Laborde's critics argued that he should have braved German retribution and fought his way out, German air assaults would have wreaked havoc on his ships.

When the war ended, Laborde was first denied his pension and then, in 1947, condemned to death, a sentence later reduced to 15 years of imprisonment. Freed in 1951, he was pardoned 8 years later. He died in Castillon-la-Bataille, Gironde, France, on July 30, 1977.

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See also

Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at

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Laconia Incident (September 12–16, 1942)

Incident in the Atlantic Ocean involving RMS *Laconia* that brought unrestricted submarine warfare in World War II. Early in 1942, the Cunard luxury liner *Laconia* underwent conversion into a troopship. On September 12, 1941, the 18,700-ton *Laconia* was steaming alone off the coast off West Africa between Ascension Island and Liberia. With a crew of 463 officers and men, it was transporting 1,800 Italian prisoners of war from the fighting in Egypt, along with 103 Polish soldier guards, 286 mostly severely wounded British military personnel, and 80 civilians. At 10:00 p.m., the ship was struck by two torpedoes from the German submarine *U-156.* The *Laconia*'s captain ordered the ship abandoned, and it sank an hour and a half later. Far from the West African coast, there appeared to be little chance of rescue.

The *U-156*'s captain, Captain Lieutenant Werner Hartenstein, ordered his submarine to surface, hoping to take the senior officers of the *Laconia* prisoner. Discovering the many Italian soldiers struggling in the water, he immediately commenced rescue operations and sent a signal to German submarine command that caused commander of submarines Admiral Karl Dönitz to order other German U-boats to the area.

Soon *U-156* had some 200 survivors, including 5 women, aboard and was towing another 200 in four lifeboats. Realizing that the deaths of so many Italian soldiers could be a major blow to German-Italian relations, at dawn on September 13 Hartenstein broadcast a cease-fire message in the clear in English and radioed Berlin for approval for his actions. The German naval command rejected the cease-fire order but requested that the Vichy France government order warships from its West African bases to the scene.

The British intercepted Hartenstein's message. Assuming that it could be a ruse, they nonetheless passed it on to the Americans. The Allies had secretly established an airfield on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic to protect the important air route to West Africa.

The *U-156* remained surfaced for the next two and a half days. It was joined by *U-507* on the morning of September 15 and that afternoon by *U-*

506 and the Italian submarine *Cappellini*. All four submarines, surfaced, headed for the African coast to rendezvous with the French cruiser *Gloire* from Dakar and two sloops from French Guinea and Dahomey.

On the morning of September 16, a U.S. Army Air Forces Consolidated B-24 Liberator flying from Ascension came on the scene. U.S. Army captain Robert C. Richardson III, the senior officer then on duty at the Ascension base, ordered the B-24 to attack, despite the report from the pilot of Red Cross flags draped on the Axis vessels. Hartenstein ordered the lifeboats cast adrift and those who had been rescued and standing on the deck of the submarines into the water and ordered the submarines to submerge. Although the B-24 dropped bombs and depth charges, the four submarines escaped without damage. The French ships arrived on the scene later and rescued many of the survivors. In all about 1,600 people from the *Laconia* perished, among them about 1,000 Italians.

The incident led Dönitz to issue his "Laconia Order," which ordered U-boat crews to end the practice of attempting to rescue civilian survivors of submarine attacks at sea. Following the war, at Nuremberg Dönitz was brought to trial on war crimes charges, including that he had ordered his crews to fire on survivors of U-boat attacks. He was acquitted on this charge but was found guilty on other charges.

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See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl

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Landing Craft

Both the Axis and Allied powers utilized amphibious warfare during World War II, but especially the Allies (Table 1). Landing craft were widely employed in the Mediterranean, European, and Pacific theaters. The Italians

employed amphibious warfare in the Adriatic and the Aegean and in Africa, and the Germans used it in Norway and Denmark and in the Greek islands and the Adriatic.

Early landing craft were usually improvised from conventional vessels such as barges and ferries, but World War II saw the development of purpose-built craft to land troops and equipment on a hostile shore. Such specialized craft allowed an attacker to land a larger number of men and their equipment and to do so faster and in a smaller area than would otherwise be possible. Modified craft continued to be used during the war, however; for example, in 1940, the Germans assembled such vessels for Operation SEA LION, their planned cross-Channel invasion of Britain, and between 1942 and 1944, General Douglas MacArthur's forces used modified craft in the Southwestern Pacific.

During the years before the war, the U.S. Marine Corps embraced amphibious warfare as its raison d'être. This doctrine was spelled out in its *Tentative Landing Operation Manual* (1935). The marines also developed a prototype for the landing vehicle, tracked (LVT). However, it took the practical demands of World War II to force mass production of landing craft and amphibious tractors. Only the United States built large numbers of amphibious wheeled and tracked vehicles that allowed the transport of men and equipment from ship to shore and then inland.

Landing craft came in a wide variety of forms. They were armored and unarmored and were designed to transport both personnel and vehicles. Some had bow ramps, and others had a fixed-bow configuration. Most landing craft, however, had a blunt bow, were powered by diesel engines acting on twin screws, were anchored at the stern, and had a shallow draft forward, a flat bottom, and a bow ramp. This ramp allowed the rapid unloading of men or cargo.

Table 1. German, British, and U.S. Landing Craft

Type	*Year First Built*	*Number Built*	*Displacement (light)(in tons)*	*Maximum Speed(in knots)*	*Dimensions (overall)*
Germany:					
SF	1940	50+	143	7.5	106′ × 48′
MFP 1-626	1942	200+	200	10.0	163′ × 22′

MFP 627-2000	1942	150+	280	8.0	163′ × 22′
MNL	1942	100+	154	10.0	131′ × 27′
Britain and the United States:					
LSD	1943	27	4,032.0	15.6	457′9″ × 72′2″
LSV	1944	6	5,875	20.3	455′6″ × 60′3″
LST	1942	1,040	1,625	12.0	328′0″ × 50′0″
LSM	1944	539	520.0	12.0	203′6″ × 34′6″
LCI(L)	1942	920	246.0	15.0	158′6″ × 23′8″
LCS(L)	1944	130	380.0	15.0	158′0″ × 23′8″
LCT	1942	1,465	283.0	8.0	119′1″ × 32′8″
LCM	1941	11,350	23.3	8.0	50′0″ × 14′1″
LCVP	1941	23,358	8.0	8.0	36′0″ × 10′6″

Source: Data from A. D. Baker III, *Allied Landing Craft of World War Two* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Merrill L. Bartlett, ed., *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983); Enrico Cernuschi, *Le Navi da Guerra Italiane, 1940–1945* (Parma, Italy: Ermanno Albertelli Editore, 2003); Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1968); Roger Chesneau, ed., *Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1922–1946* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980); Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War* (New York: Galahad Books, 1963); David Zabecki, ed., *World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Garland, 1999), 1045–1046.

U.S. Navy LSTs landing much needed supplies and equipment on Leyte Island in the Philippines, 1944. (National Archives)

German *Wasser-Pionieren* (water engineers) developed small landing craft before the war, but the senior German leadership had little interest in these. Landing craft became a priority only in 1940, with the planning for Operation SEA LION. During the war, the Germans built slightly more than 1,000 landing craft of all types; the largest of these had a displacement of 280 tons. The Germans utilized their landing craft chiefly to resupply their Mediterranean island garrisons and for operations in the Aegean, Adriatic, Black, and Baltic Seas. At the end of the war, these vessels were utilized to evacuate forces pressed by the Soviet advance.

Italy built approximately 100 landing craft based on German models. The first 65 of these were roughly 154 feet long and could carry up to 65 tons of cargo at a speed of 11 knots for some 800 miles. Known as the *mule de mare* (mule of the sea), this landing craft was armed with a 76mm antiaircraft gun and two machine guns and had a crew of 13.

The standard Japanese landing craft was known to the navy as the Daihatsu (the army designation was LB-D). It had a length of 47 feet 11 inches, a beam of 11 feet, and a draft of 2 feet 6 inches. Displacing in excess of 20 tons and capable of carrying 10 tons of cargo, it had a crew of 12 men and was armed with two 7.7mm machine guns (two or three 25mm antiaircraft guns in later versions). It had a speed of 7.5 to 8.5 knots. The Japanese built 3,229 of them between 1935 and 1945. In addition, they built small numbers of landing craft that were roughly 33 feet, 43 feet, and 56 feet long. Beginning in 1944, they also built 1,140 49-foot Moku Daihatsu landing craft of wood. Japanese amphibious doctrine developed during the war with China that began in 1937.

The Western Allies and especially the United States built by far the largest number of landing craft during the war to meet needs in both the European and Pacific theaters. Allied troops had to invade and secure areas in the Mediterranean and then invade Northwestern Europe, and in the Pacific, they had to recapture the various islands held by the Japanese. Many Allied landing craft were quite large and carried smaller landing craft on their decks. The craft were identified not by name but by numbers appended to the

general designation. The most common types of landing craft are listed in Table 1.

In 1941, the British pioneered development of the LST (landing ship, tank) and the LCT (landing craft, tank). Both were intended to be seagoing craft to deliver vehicles and bulk supplies directly to the shore. The United States altered the original British design and produced them for both nations. The British later modified some of the designs for their own use.

The LST was undoubtedly the most widely known larger landing vessel of the war, a staple of later landings in the Pacific theater. The most common version of the LST was 328 feet in overall length with a beam of 50 feet and displacement of 4,080 tons, fully loaded. LSTs were unarmored or only lightly armed (with 8 40mm and 12 20mm antiaircraft guns). The bow of the ship opened, allowing the front ramp to drop and the crew to land cargo directly on a shore. The LST could carry smaller LCTs and was configured with davits to lower personnel landing craft (LCVPs) over the sides. Some LSTs carried only two LCVPs in this fashion; others carried six. The LST crew complement was 111 officers and men.

The LCS(L) (landing craft, support [large]) was developed to provide support to amphibious landings. With a crew of 71, it was armed with one 3-inch .50-caliber gun, four 40mm guns (two by two), four 20mm guns, and 10 rocket launchers.

The smaller LCT carried trucks, tanks, or cargo directly to an invasion beach. The LCVP, developed by New Orleans entrepreneur Andrew J. Higgins and popularly known as the Higgins boat, was made of wood. With a crew of three men, it was designed to land 36 troops (or one 6,000-pound vehicle or 8,100 pounds of cargo) directly on the beach. The vessel was developed for ease of mass production, and more than 23,000 had been manufactured by the end of the war.

The Allies also developed true amphibians capable of transporting men and equipment from ship to shore and then inland. Of these, the best known is undoubtedly the DUKW (an administrative code for a 1942 model amphibious four-wheel-drive truck). The DUKW had both a propeller and wheels that moved it at 5.5 knots in the water and up to 50 mph on land. It carried 25 troops or 5,000 pounds of cargo and was particularly useful for transporting litters of wounded. A number of the popular DUKWs remain in service today as tourist attractions.



Sailors aboard an LCM (landing craft, mechanized) returning from liberty to the USS *Casablanca* from Rara Island, off Pitylieu Island, Manus, Admiralty Islands, April 19, 1945. (National Archives)

Landing craft were immensely important to the Allies in the war, so much so that U.S. Army chief of staff George C. Marshall stated in 1943, “Prior to the present war I never heard of landing craft except as a rubber boat. Now I think of nothing else.” The availability of landing craft dictated timetables for Allied amphibious actions, and the shortage of them precluded simultaneous landings in northern France (in the June 6, 1944, Operation OVERLORD) and southern France (in the August 15, 1944, Operation ANVIL-DRAGOON).

Some historians have argued that the U.S. chief of naval operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, placed too many landing craft in the Pacific, thus hindering Allied efforts in Europe. Current scholarship has concluded that the major problem was over commitment within the European theater itself. Far less glamorous than combatant vessels, landing craft were nonetheless an essential element in the Allied victory in World War II, just as they continue to be an integral part of naval operations today.

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See also

Amphibious Warfare; France Campaign; Higgins, Andrew Jackson; King, Ernest Joseph; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for

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Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm (1890–1939)

German Navy captain. Born on March 20, 1890, in Bergen, Germany, Hans Wilhelm Langsdorff joined the Imperial Navy in 1912 and experienced his first action in the 1916 Battle of Jutland. Through the remainder of World War I, he commanded minesweepers.

Langsdorff remained in the navy after the war and commanded a half flotilla (four vessels) of torpedo boats. From 1931 to 1935, he was an adjutant in the Ministry of Defense, and he then served as a staff officer. Promoted to captain in January 1937, Langsdorff assumed command of the pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* in November 1938.

With German leader Adolf Hitler having decided on an invasion of Poland for September 1, 1939, the *Graf Spee* and its sister ship, the *Deutschland,* were ordered to sea in advance of hostilities. The *Graf Spee* departed German waters on August 21.

Langsdorff's orders were to operate against Allied commerce in the southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and his ship sank 10 merchant vessels for a total of 50,000 tons by December. The British dispatched a number of ships to intercept the *Admiral Graf Spee* off South America, including Commander Henry Harwood's Force G of four cruisers. The Battle of Río de la Plata on December 13, 1939, between the *Admiral Graf Spee* and the

heavy cruiser HMS *Exeter* and the light cruisers HMS *Ajax* and HMNZS *Achilles* resulted in damage to all but the last of these vessels. Langsdorff took refuge in the port city of Montevideo, Uruguay, going ashore there to bury crewmen killed in the battle.

Because Uruguay was a neutral country, combatant ships from belligerent nations could remain in port only for 72 hours. The British bluffed Langsdorff into believing they had gathered a superior force off Montevideo, centered on the battle cruiser *Renown*, and on December 17 he ordered his ship out of port and scuttled it at the mouth of the Río de la Plata. Langsdorff then took a hotel room ashore. On December 20, 1939, he wrote a letter explaining his actions, wrapped himself in his ship's ensign, and shot himself.

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See also

Germany, Navy; Río de la Plata, Battle of

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Laon, Battle of (May 17–19, 1940)

Engagement during the May 10–June 25, 1940, Battle for France. On May 15, French commander in chief on the Northeast Front General Alphonse Georges ordered Colonel Charles de Gaulle to buy time while the Sixth Army established a defensive line on the Aisne and Ailette Rivers. De Gaulle was to employ the 4th Armored Division, a newly created force gathering some 120 miles northeast of Paris at Laon on the southern flank of the invading German armies.

Since 1933, de Gaulle had argued that France needed a modern mechanized force, but this would be his initial experience commanding tanks

in battle. He met most of his troops for the first time on the day of the battle. After reconnoitering, de Gaulle chose as his objective the crossroads at Montcornet on the Serre River, 20 miles northeast of Laon. Units dribbled in on May 17. The tank crews had fired guns of the most modern tanks only once, if at all. The drivers were equally inexperienced.

Almost immediately, de Gaulle dispatched the 46th Battalion to Montcornet. The battalion operated the Char Bs, France's most modern heavy tank. The 46th was joined by a company of SOMUA D-2 tanks from the 6th Demibrigade. Both tank models had firepower and frontal armor superior to those of the German tanks. The 2nd and 24th Battalions operated R-35s, obsolete tanks but comparable to Germany's older models. However, the Germans had the advantage in training, experience, communications ability (by radio), tactical doctrine, and integration of combined arms.

The French force shot up two columns of soft-skinned vehicles from General of Panzer Troops Heinz Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps and knocked out a few light panzers before fighting its way into Montcornet around 3:00 p.m. Meanwhile, the French 4th Battalion of Chasseurs eliminated a threat to the French rear from German infantry concealed near Chivres. For three hours, the 4th Armored Division endured German artillery and air strikes with no means of responding. Finally, it fell back to Laon, harassed by Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers. At least two Char Bs and about 200 infantrymen were lost in combat.

On May 19, de Gaulle attacked again, this time northwest of Laon toward bridges at Crécy, Mortiers, and Pouilly. Although his troops were reinforced to about 30 Char Bs, 40 SOMUAs, and 80 R-35s, plus 75mm guns from the 332nd Artillery Regiment and additional infantry, de Gaulle still lacked adequate artillery and air support. His troops were unable to fight their way across the Serre. The Sixth Army had completed its defensive deployment on the Aisne by this time. Ordered to add his tanks to those defenses, de Gaulle lingered another day and then withdrew his troops in good order, fending off attacks by German armored cars along the way.

Although ballyhooed at the time, de Gaulle's counterstrikes had no effect. Guderian had been ordered to halt before de Gaulle attacked, a pause that lasted only 24 hours, and he did not even report the impotent French counterattacks to army headquarters until the following day. Regardless, the actions around Laon became one of the pillars of the de Gaulle pantheon. The

others were his prewar advocacy of a mechanized army, his leadership of the Free French during the war, and his postwar political career.

GERALD D. SWICK

See also

Armored Warfare; Blitzkrieg; de Gaulle, Charles; France, Battle for; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Georges, Alphonse Joseph; Guderian, Heinz; Tanks, All Powers

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Latin America and the War

After World War II began in Europe, representatives of the United States and Latin American nations convened in Panama in September 1939 and issued a "general declaration of neutrality," indicating that it was the intention of all the American republics to remain neutral in the European conflict. In the event that the United States and Latin America were drawn into the war, U.S. strategic planners did not envision an important military role for Latin American armed forces beyond defense of their own countries. However, the United States did want the Latin American nations to furnish bases for U.S. operations, increase the flow of strategic materials, and take action to curb Axis subversive and intelligence activities.

The United States engaged in negotiations with the Latin American nations concerning closer military cooperation and the acquisition of bases. Washington signed a series of bilateral "staff agreements" promising military aid in return for the Latin American nations' promise to call for assistance if attacked, combat subversive activities, exchange intelligence, and permit the transit of U.S. forces going to the aid of another Latin American country.

In response to the request for bases, Latin American leaders expressed concerns about jurisdiction and access. The United States responded by offering to provide financing and technical assistance for bases, with the host country retaining jurisdiction and administration. Moreover, the bases would be open not only to the United States but also to all other Latin American nations. The United States signed staff agreements with every Latin American nation except Argentina and signed base agreements with 16 countries.

The U.S. Lend-Lease Act, which went into effect in March 1941, authorized the president to lend, lease, or sell military items to any country whose defense was deemed vital to the defense of the United States. In April, Roosevelt certified that Latin America came under the provisions of the act, and in October 1941, the U.S. Congress approved funding for Latin America. Washington eventually provided $475 million in Lend-Lease aid to Latin America, with some $348 million of that amount going to Brazil.

When the United States officially entered the war in December 1941, all of the Latin American nations made some positive response. Nine countries declared war on the Axis powers in December 1941: Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Colombia and Mexico broke diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru declared their solidarity with the United States, and the remaining countries granted the United States nonbelligerent status, giving it greater freedom of action within their national territories.

A meeting of the American republics called by the United States and Chile convened in Rio de Janeiro on January 15, 1942. Washington was not seeking a joint declaration of war because of the military demands that would result. Instead, it supported a joint declaration calling for a break in relations with the Axis powers. The conference approved a resolution that “recommended” a break in diplomatic relations as well as in commercial and financial connections. Those countries that had not already broken diplomatic relations quickly did so, except for Argentina and Chile. The conference also established the Inter-American Defense Board, made up of military and naval representatives from each country to coordinate hemispheric defense.

The fact that the consultative conference was held in Rio de Janeiro indicated the special role that the United States assigned to Brazil. U.S.

planners believed that the most likely scenario for an Axis attack on the Western Hemisphere was a German assault launched from Africa against Brazil's northeastern "bulge." The United States wanted to send U.S. troops to defend the bulge, but the Brazilians were unwilling to accept U.S. ground forces and wanted U.S. arms instead. Both sides eventually accepted a trade-off between U.S. troops and arms for the Brazilians. Brazil received a large increase in military aid in return for permitting unrestricted U.S. air operations in the Brazilian northeast and even the stationing of U.S. troops. In August 1942, Brazil declared war on the Axis after German submarines attacked Brazilian shipping. Brazil also became the only Latin American country to provide a major military force for combat. (Mexico provided one fighter squadron.) With the United States furnishing training, supplies, and transport, the Brazilian Expeditionary Corps of approximately 25,000 men participated in the 1943–1945 Italian Campaign.

The United States recognized early on that it had to address the economic as well as military consequences of war. Even in the summer of 1940, Washington planners were already thinking in terms of a "hemispheric economic policy" that called for much closer economic relations with Latin America. Strategic metals were of particular interest to the United States; in November 1940, the U.S. government contracted to purchase virtually the entire Latin American production of copper and tin. The United States also developed a blacklist of firms and individuals operating in Latin America who were considered pro-Axis or anti–United States. U.S. firms were prohibited from dealing with anyone or any firm on this "Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals," and Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration attempted, with considerable success, to get Latin American governments to enforce this blacklist. The United States also dramatically increased its lending to Latin America, mainly to finance the purchase of U.S. products.

U.S. entry into the war led to even greater efforts at economic cooperation between the United States and Latin America. As mentioned, the Rio Conference in January 1942 approved a resolution recommending a break in commercial and financial relations with the Axis powers. The conference also called for a complete economic mobilization of the American republics to provide an adequate supply of both military and civilian goods. U.S. purchases of Latin American commodities continued to be at the center of U.S.–Latin American economic relations.

Washington stepped up its purchases of strategic metals, reaching agreements with 12 Latin American nations to buy metals. Cut off from its principal source of natural rubber in Asia, the United States also entered into contracts with 16 Latin American nations to promote the production of rubber. In addition, actions were taken to improve transportation within the hemisphere. An inter-American technical commission was established to improve maritime transportation, and the United States tried to improve land transportation by reviving construction on the Inter-American Highway, concentrating on the Central American section of the road.



Brazilian president Getulio Vargas addresses delegates at the Conference of American Foreign Ministers in historic Tiradentes Palace, Rio de Janeiro, January 20, 1942. (Corbis)

Axis-connected firms operating airlines in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru were forced out of business and replaced by U.S. firms or locally controlled operations. The United States even provided aircraft for local airlines in Brazil and Chile. The net effect of all of these actions was to create an even greater economic interdependence between the United States and Latin America. From 1941 to 1945, the United States purchased more than 50 percent of Latin America's exports and provided more than 60 percent of its imports.

Wartime themes and postwar plans came together at the Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City in February and March 1945. The Latin American nations were concerned that the United States might relegate the

inter-American system to a lesser role once it had served its wartime purposes. They also hoped that the United States would facilitate the transition to a peacetime economy and would aid in Latin America's postwar development. When the United States finally agreed to the Chapultepec Conference, it sent an impressive delegation, including the new secretary of state, Edward Stettinius, who was returning from the Yalta Conference.

The Latin American nations wanted to put the inter-American system on a more formal basis, but the United States delayed action until the next regular inter-American conference. Latin American demands for a strengthening of the inter-American security system led to the Act of Chapultepec, which classified an attack against any American state as an attack against all American states and required consultation on the measures to be taken in response, including the use of force. Although the act applied only for the duration of the war, it was to be incorporated in a permanent treaty once the war concluded.

On the question of economic relations, the United States agreed to aid in the transition to a peacetime economy by gradually reducing its purchases of strategic raw materials; it also indicated, in general terms, its support for economic development in Latin America but did not commit itself to any specific programs of assistance.

The warm glow of the Chapultepec Conference soon faded. The meeting scheduled for Rio in October 1945 to place the Act of Chapultepec into treaty form was postponed, and there were repeated delays in holding the technical conference to deal with inter-American economic problems. The war had put the Latin American nations in the role of principal supporters of the inter-American system at the very time that the United States was shifting its emphasis to global organization. Latin America wanted to enlist U.S. support in dealing with its growing social and economic problems; the United States, however, was preparing for another struggle: the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

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See also

Brazil; Lend-Lease; Mexico; Stettinius, Edward Reilly, Jr.; Yalta Conference; Document 49; Document 66

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Latvia

Baltic nation with an estimated 1939 population of 1.994 million. Encompassing 24,938 square miles, Latvia is located in Northeastern Europe. It borders the Baltic Sea to the west, Estonia to the north, Lithuania to the south, Russia (the Soviet Union in 1939) to the east, and Belarus to the southeast. Between 1918 and 1934, Latvia was a constitutional republic. In 1934, Karlis Ulmanis seized power and established a nationalist, quasi-fascist regime there, which endured until 1940.

Along with the other Baltic states of Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia had the unfortunate fate to be occupied by both the Soviet Union and Germany during World War II. The initial Soviet occupation was presaged by the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, which had a secret additional protocol stipulating that Latvia and Estonia would be under Soviet control and Lithuania would be under German control. In October 1939, Latvia was forced to agree to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow, which permitted the stationing of Soviet troops.

Latvian representative in Great Britain Karlis Zarins was given authority to handle national affairs overseas should contact with the home country be broken. In June 1940, following the German invasion of France, the Soviet Union activated the pact, and its troops invaded Latvia. Threats by Moscow to bomb Latvian cities ended preparations for armed resistance, and Moscow established a puppet “people’s government” in the country. On August 5, 1940, the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic was formally admitted into the Soviet Union.

In June 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and the German Army occupied the Baltics. The German blitzkrieg moved with great speed, and some 15,000 men in Latvian defense battalions surrendered to German

forces. Certainly, an element of the population strongly favored the Nazi cause.

German plans called for annexing the Baltic states, expelling approximately two-thirds of their populations, and integrating the remainder with German immigrants. Nazi leader Alfred Rosenberg, a Baltic German, proposed a substantial expansion of Latvia and the other republics with land from Belorussia and the Soviet Union. The harshness of the occupation was reflected in the confiscatory devaluation of the Latvian currency, the seizure of private property, and the forced conscription of citizens into labor and military units, including deportations. Property that had been expropriated by the Soviets was not returned but instead was turned over to specially created German companies.

Censorship and a strict regulation of formal education were also features of the occupation. Riga University and Tartu University were closed and then reluctantly reopened in early 1942. Kaunas University and Vilnius University were opened in the fall of 1941 following Soviet closure, then closed again early in 1943. Nazi principles were integrated into school textbooks on biology and history. The burden of censorship, combined with paper shortages, forced newspapers out of print. Certain books were also banned.

Administrative directorates implemented German instructions but provided for some informal independence and resistance to the occupation as well. The directorate of Latvia successfully opposed a conscription of 13,000 women from Estonia and Latvia that was announced in the spring of 1943. Bribery and promises of a smooth administration of the economy were useful tools in persuading the occupiers to be more flexible in their policies.

Nonetheless, the German occupation steadily grew harsher, with the directorates bypassed in the drive for laborers and other assets. The total number of Latvian people killed or deported by the Nazis has been estimated at 120,000, approximately half of them Jews. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union reestablished its control and replenished the loss with Soviet immigrants, who soon threatened to become an absolute majority. Latvia remained under the Soviet yoke until it declared its independence in 1991, a prelude to the end of the Cold War.

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See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Holocaust; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Northeast Europe Theater; Rosenberg, Alfred

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Laval, Pierre (1883–1945)

French politician and premier. Born in Châteldon, Puy-de-Dôme, France, on June 28, 1883, Pierre Laval was trained as a lawyer. In 1914, he won election to the Chamber of Deputies of the French National Assembly as a socialist and a pacifist. Despite frequent policy shifts in other matters, he consistently promoted his policy of peace at any price—a policy that led directly to his collaborationist platform during World War II.

Laval served in the National Assembly from 1914 to 1919 and again from 1924 to 1927. Following the split in the Socialist Party at Tours in 1920, he became a political moderate, eschewing party affiliation. He gradually moved to the Right politically, in the process acquiring a reputation as an unprincipled political manipulator.

Laval held important positions from 1925 to 1936, including that of premier in three successive governments between January 1931 and February 1932 and then again from November 1934 to January 1936 (when he was also minister of foreign affairs). As foreign minister, he played an important part in developing the Rome Accords of January 1935 with Benito Mussolini’s Italy. Evidence suggests that Laval offered Italy a free hand in Ethiopia. Certainly, he and British foreign minister Sir Samuel Hoare sought to arrange an economic protectorate for Italy in Ethiopia, even after the Italian invasion of that country. Public outcry over this situation led to the resignation of both men. Laval then remained something of a political outcast until World War II.

Laval’s strong opposition to the war in September 1939 helped his political career the following June when he actively supported an armistice

with Germany, along with Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain and General Maxime Weygand. On June 21, Laval helped lead the opposition to removing the government to North Africa, and two days later he joined the Vichy government as minister of state. On July 1, he played the key role in removing the government to the resort town of Vichy in central France.

Vichy France political leader Pierre Laval, shown here in 1942. Tried after the war and found guilty of collaboration with the Germans, he was executed in 1945. (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

Laval's intervention helped convince leaders in the National Assembly to accept constitutional changes on July 10, 1940, that gave Pétain sweeping powers as the head of state. As vice president of the Council of State and Pétain's designated successor, Laval encouraged active collaboration with the Germans. After meeting with the German ambassador, Otto Abetz, in July, Laval visited with Adolf Hitler at Montoire-sur-le-Loir on October 22 to prepare an encounter between Pétain and the German leader two days later.

His role of matchmaker was, however, less appreciated by Pétain and the Vichy ministers. Following considerable intrigues by the latter, Pétain dismissed Laval from his posts and had him arrested on December 13, 1940, on suspicion of planning a coup d'état. The Germans secured his release.

During the next year and a half, Laval remained near German-occupied Paris, barely surviving an assassination attempt on August 27, 1941, at Versailles. He continued criticizing Pétain for not collaborating sufficiently with the Germans before he returned on April 18, 1942, to play the leading role in the Vichy government as minister of foreign affairs, information, and the interior, largely on German insistence. He purged the government of his enemies and continued collaborating with the Germans, as evidenced in his declaration of June 22, 1942, expressing hopes for a German victory to prevent the spread of communism.

Laval sought to win concessions from the Germans in return for supplying them with French workers; his La Relève (Relief) system involved the exchange of French workers for prisoners of war. This system was soon replaced by Le Service de Travail Obligatoire (Obligatory Labor Service). Laval agreed to having French Jews in both zones of France rounded up and shipped to Germany, and he created the French Milice (Militia) to secure internal order and repress the French Resistance.

As the tide of war turned, however, Laval sought to play a double game, trying to hold off on some of Hitler's demands for increased French assistance. In the fall of 1943, Germany again intervened to prevent the firing of Laval, who had been joined by even more extreme collaborators in the government. In August 1944 following the Allied landing in Normandy on June 6, Laval moved the government to Belfort; one month later, he moved with Pétain and the Vichy government to Sigmaringen in Germany. At the end of the war, Laval sought asylum in Spain, which refused to accept him.

Laval was returned to France for a controversial and particularly rapid trial before the High Court of Justice in Paris. Found guilty of collaboration on October 9, he was sentenced to death. After a failed attempt to kill himself with poison, Laval was shot by a firing squad at the prison of Fresnes on October 15, 1945.

JOHN MACFARLANE

See also

Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France; Mussolini, Benito; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Vichy France; Weygand, Maxime

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League of Nations

Supranational peacekeeping organization formally established in January 1920, the structure of which was drawn up at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The League of Nations was perhaps most ardently championed by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, who played a significant role in shaping its ideology and organization. The League of Nations was the first international organization in world history dedicated to promoting peace among all nations, and Wilson had made it a priority since at least 1916, when he ran for reelection promising American participation in an international league of nations dedicated to the pursuit of world peace, disarmament, and international arbitration of member disputes.

The covenant (i.e., constitution) of the League of Nations was drafted during the Paris Peace Conference. Produced in less than two weeks and presented to a plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference on February 14, 1919, it closely reflected Wilson's desires. Containing 26 articles, it provided for an organizational framework that included a Secretariat (the executive), a Council (France, Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States as permanent members, with four nonpermanent members selected by the League of Nations Assembly); and an assembly representing all member states. A novel creation was a Mandates Commission, which would supervise treatment of the inhabitants of the former German and Ottoman/Turkish colonies, which were to be parceled out to the victorious powers.

The League of Nations Covenant became Article I of the Treaty of Versailles, formalized in April 1919. It had been Wilson's insistence that the covenant be a part of the treaty, meaning that any nation that agreed to and

signed the treaty also gave de facto support to the establishment of the League of Nations. The covenant was concerned with three basic ideas. First, the League of Nations would require members to demur from hostilities and submit disputes for league arbitration. Second, the League of Nations was to draw up plans for—and supervise—a general arms reduction program so that no nation possessed significant military advances over another. Third, the covenant embraced the concept of collective security, binding all members to eschew all relations—including commercial—with an aggressor nation and to unite in military opposition against any aggressor nation, using any force necessary. This last point, which was encapsulated in Article 10 of the covenant, became highly controversial in the United States, as many senators —mainly Republicans—saw in it an unnecessary giveaway of America's prerogative to decide on or wage war. Wilson's refusal to compromise on this point doomed the treaty to failure in the United States.

The covenant took effect in January 1920 but with no U.S. participation. The League of Nations was seriously weakened at the onset by the refusal of the United States to join, and the covenant's strongest enforcement weapon was the threat of sanctions. The League of Nations proved ineffectual during the crises of the 1930s precipitated by Italy, Germany, and Japan, who essentially ignored the organization and pursued their own plans for conquest.

Although the League of Nations had serious shortcomings, it was a novel creation and sparked great interest and enthusiasm. One problem with this, as French premier Georges Clemenceau was quick to point out, was that many people would place their confidence in the new League of Nations, assuming that it would solve all of the world's security problems. The League of Nations ultimately proved entirely incapable of doing so, to which the outbreak of World War II in 1939 grimly attested. The United Nations, created in the immediate aftermath of World War II, was modeled directly on the League of Nations but without some of its ineffectual mechanisms. The United States also took a central role in the creation and organization of the United Nations.

ANTOINE CAPET, PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR., AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

United Nations, Formation of; Versailles, Treaty of; Document 4; Document 5; Document 168

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Leahy, William Daniel (1875–1959)

U.S. Navy admiral of the fleet. Born in Hampton, Iowa, May 6, 1875, William Daniel Leahy graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1897. He first served aboard the battleship *Oregon,* taking part in the 1898 Spanish-American War. From 1899 to 1907, Ensign Leahy saw service in the Pacific, including during the Boxer Uprising in China and in the Philippines. He also served in Panama. During World War I, he formed a friendship with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, and in 1918 he was promoted to captain.

Leahy then served at sea and held important posts ashore. Promoted to rear admiral in 1927, he headed the Bureau of Ordnance (1927–1931) and then the Bureau of Navigation (1933–1935). He was promoted to vice admiral in 1935. In January 1937, Leahy was promoted to admiral and appointed by President Roosevelt as chief of naval operations (CNO). As CNO, he argued for naval expansion. After retiring from the navy in August 1939, he served as governor of Puerto Rico (September 1939–November 1940). Roosevelt next named him U.S. ambassador to Vichy France.

In May 1942, Roosevelt recalled Leahy to active duty and made him presidential chief of staff and de facto chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Leahy also presided over the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings when the United States was the host. Throughout the war years, he was an adviser and confidant to Roosevelt, especially during meetings with Allied heads of state at places such as Casablanca, Cairo, Tehran, and Yalta. A strong nationalist,

Leahy did not put much credence in Roosevelt's cherished United Nations. On December 15, 1944, Leahy was promoted to fleet admiral, becoming the first American military officer to hold five-star rank.

U.S. Navy admiral of the fleet and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William D. Leahy. (Library of Congress)

When Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, Leahy became one of President Harry S. Truman's closest advisers, playing an important role at the Potsdam Conference of July and August 1945. He opposed dropping the atomic bomb on Japan, urging Truman to continue conventional bombing and to tighten the naval blockade in the belief that Japan was ready to sue for peace. He also feared that the atomic bomb might not work.

After the war, Leahy played a major part in the formation of the National Security Act of 1947. His advice helped lead to the subsequent establishment of the National Military Establishment, later known as the Department of

Defense, and the Central Intelligence Group, later known as the Central Intelligence Agency. He continued to play vital roles in the formation and expansion of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Leahy was an ardent anticommunist who shared Truman's abiding distrust of the Soviet Union. He retired from government service in March 1949 but continued to act as a key adviser to the secretary of the navy. He also helped establish the Naval Historical Foundation and served as its first president. Leahy died on July 20, 1959, in Bethesda, Maryland.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Cairo Conference; Casablanca Conference; Potsdam Conference; Tehran Conference; United States Navy; Yalta Conference

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Lebanon and Syria, Campaign in

See Syria and Lebanon, Campaign in

Leclerc, Jacques Philippe (1902–1947)

French Army marshal. Born on November 28, 1902, into a distinguished and ennobled military family near Amiens, France, Count Philippe de Hauteclocque would take the nom de guerre of Leclerc during World War II to avoid reprisals against his family in France. Too young to have fought in World War I, he graduated from the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr

in 1924 and distinguished himself in combat against insurgents in Morocco. He then taught at Saint-Cyr.

While fighting as a captain during the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940), Leclerc was wounded and captured by the Germans. They thought he was too weak to move and placed him at a château belonging to some of his friends, from which he managed to escape. After a perilous journey through Spain and Portugal, he arrived in London in July to join General Charles de Gaulle's Free French forces. Following Leclerc's recuperation and promotion to major, de Gaulle sent him to French Equatorial Africa to organize Free French forces.

Starting with only about 20 men, Leclerc defeated Vichy French forces and won control of Gabon and the Cameroons during October and November 1940. By 1942, Free French forces controlled all of French Equatorial Africa. Leclerc, now a colonel, commanded the Desert Army and conducted raids against Italian outposts in the Sahara. In December 1942, he led a march from Lake Chad to Tripoli, covering 2,000 miles in 39 days. Leclerc's actions guaranteed the safety of the Takoradi air route used to ferry supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union. In January 1943, his forces linked up with the British Eighth Army outside Tripoli.

In June 1944, Leclerc assumed command of the French 2nd Armored Division as a general of division. He and his unit fought in the Normandy Campaign and in the drive across France. On August 23, on General Dwight D. Eisenhower's approval, his unit was the first Allied formation to enter Paris. Promoted to general of corps, he then helped liberate both Strasbourg and Bordeaux.

After the Allied victory in Europe, de Gaulle appointed Leclerc to command the French Expeditionary Force sent to restore French control in Indochina; on the way there, Leclerc represented France in the formal Japanese surrender.

Despite having only 40,000 men, Leclerc speedily restored French authority in Vietnam and Cambodia. Aware of the great difficulties of engaging in jungle warfare against nationalist guerrillas, he was not optimistic about his country's long-term prospects in the area, and he informed the government in a secret report that there would be no victory through force in Indochina. Undercut by French nationalists, Leclerc asked for and received a transfer. In July 1946, he was promoted to general of the

army and appointed to command French forces in North Africa. Leclerc died in a plane crash in Algeria on November 28, 1947. He was posthumously promoted to marshal of France.

French general Jacques Philippe Leclerc. (Keystone/Getty Images)

MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

See also

Africa; de Gaulle, Charles; France, Army; France, Battle for; Free French; North Africa Campaign; Paris, Liberation of

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Lee, John Clifford Hodges (1887–1958)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Junction City, Kansas, on August 1, 1887, John Clifford Hodges Lee graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1909 and was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. During World War I, he served as aide to Major General Leonard Wood, commanding general of the 89th Division and then chief of staff of the 89th Division. Lee graduated from the army General Staff training course at Langres in 1918 and was actively involved with the planning of the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. He ended the war as a temporary colonel.

During the interwar years, Lee graduated from the Army War College (1932) and the Army Industrial College (1933). He oversaw numerous harbor and river projects and commanded the San Francisco Port of Embarkation (1940). Promoted to brigadier general in October 1940, the arrogant Lee, whose initials were J. C. H., came to be known as "Jesus Christ Himself." In November 1941, he assumed command of the 2nd Infantry Division, and in February 1942, he was promoted to major general.

That May, Lee took command of the Services of Supply (SOS) in the United Kingdom to oversee the greatest engineering project of the war: the massive buildup of men and supplies for the invasion of occupied Europe, code-named bolero. In addition to commanding the SOS (designated the Communications Zone [COMMZ] on June 7, 1944) and acting as the G-4 (assistant chief of staff for logistics) for the European theater of operations, U.S. Army Headquarters, Lee served as deputy theater commander, with special responsibility for administration and supply, from January to July 1944. He was promoted to lieutenant general in February 1944.

With the dissolution of the COMMZ at the end of the war, Lee took charge of the successor command, Theater Service Forces, European theater. In January 1946, he was assigned as commanding general of the Mediterranean theater and deputy supreme commander of Allied Forces, Mediterranean. Lee retired from the army in December 1947 and died in York, Pennsylvania, on August 30, 1958.

STEVE R. WADDELL

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Logistics, Allied

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Lee, William Carey (1895–1948)

U.S. Army major general, considered the father of U.S. airborne forces. Born in Dunn, North Carolina, on March 12, 1895, William Carey Lee graduated from North Carolina State University and was commissioned a second lieutenant in August 1917. He served with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France during World War I, where he commanded an infantry platoon. He then served on occupation duty in Germany through most of 1919.

Lee taught military science with the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program at North Carolina State University from 1922 to 1925. Between 1926 and 1929, he served in Panama. He then attended the Tank School at Fort Meade, Maryland, and later became an instructor. Major Lee graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1938. Assigned to the army's Airborne Project in June 1940, he became the foremost proponent of U.S. parachute and glider-borne infantry formations.

In July 1940 Lee formed the Parachute Test Platoon, and within three months this organization had grown into a parachute infantry battalion. Following Germany's successful, albeit pyrrhic seizure of Crete with airborne forces in May 1941, the British and Americans developed large airborne formations. Lee, promoted to lieutenant colonel in February 1941 and colonel that December, had a major role in that effort.

In March 1942, the army established the Airborne Command headed by Lee, who was promoted to brigadier general that April. The Airborne Command consisted of two airborne divisions: the 82nd and 101st. Lee was promoted to major general in August 1942, and he took command of the "Screaming Eagles," the 101st Airborne Division, and accompanied it to Britain for the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion. Lee—the oldest parachute-qualified officer among U.S. forces—did not accompany the 101st into battle.

He suffered heart attacks in February and March 1944. Medically retired in December 1944, he died in Dunn, North Carolina, on June 25, 1948.

JAMES M. BATES

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Crete, Battle of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Lee, Willis Augustus "Ching" (1888–1945)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born on May 11, 1888, in Natlee, Kentucky, Willis Augustus Lee graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1908. An early gunboat billet with the Asiatic Fleet and a fondness for China earned him the sobriquet "Ching." Lee advanced steadily through the various ranks before World War II and served in numerous capacities, both at sea and ashore, including four tours with the Division of Fleet Training. He returned to that organization as its director during 1941–1942.

Promoted to rear admiral in January 1942, Lee subsequently took command of the Pacific Fleet's Battleship Division 6, composed of the recently commissioned fast battleships *Washington* and *South Dakota.* At Guadalcanal, he repulsed a superior Japanese force on the night of November 14–15, 1942. Despite losing his destroyer screen, Lee engaged the Japanese. Through the judicious use of radar, he identified and targeted the battleship *Kirishima,* which fell victim to devastatingly accurate gunfire from the *Washington*'s 16-inch main batteries. With *Kirishima* mortally damaged, the Japanese ships withdrew. Lee's victory effectively ended Japan's efforts to dislodge U.S. forces from Guadalcanal and was thus a turning point in the Pacific theater fighting.

Although promoted to commander of the Pacific Fleet's battleships in 1943, Lee never again engaged the Japanese in a decisive surface battle. Eclipsed by naval airpower, his battlewagons were reduced to providing

antiaircraft screens for the fast carrier task forces, for which he nevertheless earned recognition. Selected to develop kamikaze countermeasures in July 1945, Lee, who had been vice admiral in March, had just formed his task group when the war ended. He died shortly thereafter, on August 25, 1945, of a sudden heart attack, off the coast of Maine.

Although Lee was a hero of the fighting at sea, his efforts at the Division of Fleet Training remain his greatest contribution to victory. Improving the equipment of combat ships and spearheading the drive to outfit vessels with radar, Lee prepared the U.S. Navy for a two-ocean war.

DAVID R. SNYDER

See also

Battleships; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Kamikaze

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Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von (1876–1956)

German Army field marshal. Born on the family estate in Landsberg-am-Lech, Bavaria, on September 5, 1876, Wilhelm von Leeb began his military career as an officer candidate in the Bavarian Army in 1895. Commissioned a lieutenant in 1897, he saw action in the 1900 Boxer Uprising in China. He attended the Bavarian Kriegsakademie (War College) in Munich, then served on the Bavarian General Staff (1907–1909) and on the Great General Staff in Berlin (1909–1911).

Promoted to captain in 1912, Leeb was serving on the General Staff of the I Bavarian Army Corps in Munich when World War I began. During the war, he was a staff officer with the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division on the Western, Galician, and Serbian fronts. He was awarded the Bavarian Military Order of Max Joseph for exceptional bravery and, as a member of the

knighthood, could add the title “Ritter” to his name. He ended the war as a major.

Selected for retention in the postwar Reichswehr (German Army), Leeb was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1920. Six years later, he took command of the 7th Artillery Regiment, and in 1928, he was one of two deputy commanders of the 5th Infantry Division at Stuttgart. In 1929, he was deputy commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Munich, and in February of that year, he was promoted to general. In 1930, he commanded the VII Military District in southern Germany.

Considered an expert on defensive warfare, Leeb wrote extensively on that subject. The Soviets incorporated many of the principles espoused in his prewar publications into their 1936 field regulations. In that regard, Leeb helped shape the Soviet Army tactics and operational art that cost the Germans so heavily in World War II. Leeb stressed that in a new war, Germany should initially maintain a strategic defense, force the numerically superior enemy to attack, and reduce its forces through attrition warfare, only then going over to offensive operations centered on armor.

Leeb was not fooled by Adolf Hitler, who branded him an “incorrigible anti-Nazi.” A thinker rather than a man of action, Leeb was never active in the anti-Hitler opposition. Promoted to general of artillery in 1934, he assumed command of the 2nd Army Group at Kassel. Leeb headed the list of senior officers retired on Hitler’s insistence after the 1938 Fritsch-Blomberg Affair, being promoted to temporary colonel general.

Recalled to active duty in August 1938 during the crisis over Czechoslovakia, Leeb commanded the newly established Twelfth Army. When Germany secured the Sudetenland without war, Leeb’s forces occupied it peacefully, and he then returned to Bavaria and retirement.

In 1939 as Hitler prepared to attack Poland, Leeb was again called to active duty, taking command of Army Group C to defend against a possible Allied attack in the west while the German army invaded (September 1) and absorbed Poland. Leeb contained the weak French advance into the Saar region and launched a counteroffensive there in mid-October.

Leeb opposed Hitler’s plans to invade Western Europe and especially neutral Belgium, which he objected to on moral grounds. He circulated a memorandum among other generals, but many of them, intoxicated by the success of the invasion of Poland, regarded him as too cautious and behind

the times. Army Group C played a supporting role in the May 10–June 25, 1940, Battle for France, but Leeb's feints against the French Maginot Line were so successful that the French held many units there until it was too late to commit them to meet the main German thrust to the north. In the subsequent fighting during the British evacuation at Dunkerque (May 26–June 4), Leeb's forces took 250,000 French prisoners. In July 1940, Leeb was among the generals rewarded by Hitler with promotion to field marshal.

Leeb commanded Army Group North in the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941) for the first time directing a large number of panzer formations, with which he had no experience. In less than 90 days, his force drove to within 20 miles of Leningrad. The Soviets successfully rallied and held the city, though, resulting in a siege that would last for three years. Leeb was one of the senior German officers who recommended withdrawing to more defensible positions and resuming the offensive later, and his comments about whether Hitler was actually allied with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin against the German Army were known to the führer.

Frustrated with Hitler's micromanagement of his forces, Leeb asked to be relieved of his command on January 16, 1942. He retired to Bavaria for a third and final time, never again serving in an active capacity. Arrested by the Allies at the end of the war, he was tried and sentenced to three years of imprisonment as a minor war criminal, a severe sentence given his military record. On his release, he lived quietly in retirement. Leeb died in Hohenschwangau, Bavaria, on April 29, 1956.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; France, Battle for; Leningrad, Siege of; Maginot Line; Saar, French Invasion of the

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Leese, Sir Oliver William Hargreaves (1894–1978)

British Army lieutenant general. Born in London on October 27, 1894, Oliver Leese was educated at Eton. In 1914, after the start of World War I, he joined the Coldstream Guards and served with the regiment in France. Wounded three times during the war, he won the Distinguished Service Order as a platoon commander in the 1916 Battle of the Somme.

In 1940, Leese was appointed deputy chief of the General Staff of the British Expeditionary Force in France. Following the evacuation from Dunkerque (May 26–June 4), he took command of an infantry brigade in England.

Promoted to major general in 1941, Leese was later appointed to form and train the Guards Armoured Division. In September 1942, he was sent to Egypt to command XXX Corps in General Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army. Montgomery held a high opinion of Leese, assigning him to achieve the breakthrough in the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942). Leese subsequently served in the advance across Libya to Tripoli, the 1943 Tunisia Campaign, and the invasion of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943).

In December 1943, Leese succeeded Montgomery as commander of the Eighth Army. In that post, he participated in two major offensives: the Fourth Battle of Cassino in May 1944 and Operation OLIVE in August 1944. OLIVE, planned by Leese, achieved considerable success, as it forced the Gothic Line and brought an Allied breakout into the Po Valley. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1944.

In November 1944, Leese was appointed Eleventh Army Group commander in Southeast Asia under supreme commander South East Asia, Lord Louis Mountbatten. In this position, Leese provided direction to Lieutenant General William Slim's Fourteenth Army in Burma. Following the fall of Rangoon in May 1945, Leese attempted to dismiss Slim, believing him both worn out after several years of service in Burma and inexperienced in the amphibious warfare required in the proposed campaign in Malaya. Leese attempted to assign Slim to a less important command but did not have the authority to do so. As a result of this blunder, Leese was himself dismissed in July 1945. He took the sacking with aplomb and returned to

England to briefly lead the Eastern Command before retiring in 1946. Leese died in Cefn Coch, Wales, on January 22, 1978.

BRADLEY P. TOLPPANEN

See also

Burma Theater; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; El Alamein, Battle of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Sicily, Invasion of; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Tunisia Campaign

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Legentilhomme, Paul Louis (1884–1975)

French Army general and colonial administrator who served with the Free French forces. Born at Valognes, near Cherbourg, France, on March 26, 1884, Paul Legentilhomme graduated from the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr in 1907. Following his commissioning, he served in Tonkin in French Indochina until 1912.

During World War I, Legentilhomme fought on the Western Front and rose to captain. After the war, he served in the Far East and then in Madagascar between 1922 and 1931. Promoted to general of brigade in 1938, he commanded French forces in French Somaliland and then French and British forces in Somaliland (1939–1940). Following Italy's entry into the war in June 1940, Legentilhomme led forces into Ethiopia along the Djibouti–Addis Ababa Railroad. He continued the advance even after France signed the armistice with Italy.

Legentilhomme and Georges Catroux were the only French generals initially rallying to General of Brigade Charles de Gaulle. Uncertain of support from his subordinates, Legentilhomme departed Djibouti secretly on the night of August 1–2, 1940, and made his way to London. Promoted to general of division in the Free French forces in January 1942, he joined British units in the Sudan. In April, he assumed command of the French

forces in the Middle East being formed into the 1st Free French Division. Legentilhomme's division participated in the invasion of Syria (June 8–July 14, 1941), entering Damascus on June 22. Although seriously wounded in the fighting, he kept his command.

Court-martialed by the collaborationist Vichy French government, Legentilhomme was sentenced to death in absentia in September, the same month he was appointed commander in chief in Free French Africa. In December 1942, he was named commissioner of French possessions in the Indian Ocean area. In November 1942, Legentilhomme took administrative control of Madagascar following the British capture of that island.

Promoted to general of corps on March 1943, Legentilhomme was assistant commissioner and then commissioner of national defense. At the end of June 1944, he took command of the 3rd Military Region of France, which included Normandy. Following its liberation, he became the military governor of Paris. Legentilhomme retired after being promoted to general of army in January 1947. He died in Nice on May 23, 1975.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Catroux, Georges Albert Julien; de Gaulle, Charles; East Africa Campaign; Syria and Lebanon, Campaign in

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de Gaulle, Charles. *The Complete War Memoirs.* Translated by Jonathan Griffin and Richard Howard. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968.

Leigh Light

Powerful airborne searchlight installed on Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command aircraft to illuminate German U-boats at night. Employed in conjunction with the aircraft's air-to-surface search radar, which actually located the target, the Leigh Light illuminated the submarine only immediately prior to an attack, thus preserving surprise and maximizing the chances of success.

The minimum range of early airborne search radars would not allow their use to guide a night attack; the ASV (air-to-surface vessel) Mk II set was only effective between 1 and 36 miles. Dropping flares gave a submarine sufficient warning to escape before the aircraft could attack.

Squadron Leader Humphrey de Verde Leigh, together with the firm of Savage & Parsons, developed a 24-inch, 22-million-candlepower searchlight that could be switched on just before losing the target on radar, giving the submarine only 15 to 20 seconds to evade attack. Initial testing began in March 1941, but operational aircraft equipped with Leigh Lights did not enter service until mid-1942 because the Air Ministry initially preferred the Turbinlite, an existing but less powerful (and less effective) airborne searchlight.

Leigh Light–equipped aircraft over the Bay of Biscay greatly increased their contact rate but sank only two submarines during 1942, largely because the U-boats began carrying radar-warning receptors. Nevertheless, the ease with which the Leigh Light–equipped aircraft intercepted submarines led Admiral Karl Dönitz to order U-boats in transit to remain submerged even at night, greatly reducing their operational effectiveness. Moreover, the combination of Leigh Lights and centimetric radars, which entered service in 1943, subsequently proved deadly to Germany's U-boats, most notably during the Biscay Offensive that summer.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Depth Charges; Great Britain, Air Force; Hunter-Killer Groups; Radar; Sonar

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Leigh-Mallory, Sir Trafford (1892–1944)

British air chief marshal. Born in Mobberley, Cheshire, England, on July 11, 1892, Trafford Leigh-Mallory graduated with honors from Cambridge

University. He served in the British Army in the infantry during World War I but transferred to the Royal Flying Corps in 1916. By war's end, he commanded a fighter squadron.

Leigh-Mallory remained with the Royal Air Force (RAF) after the war and graduated from both the RAF Staff College and the Imperial Defence College. He also taught at the Army Staff College. He was promoted to air commodore in 1936 and to air vice marshal in 1938.

In 1937, Leigh-Mallory assumed command of Number 12 Fighter Group, a post he held when the war started. During the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, his primary responsibility was defense of the Midlands industrial area and reinforcing Number 11 Fighter Group over southeastern England. He disagreed with his counterpart at Number 11, Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, and the head of Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, concerning which fighter tactics best opposed the Luftwaffe.

British air chief marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, August 1941. (Davis/Topical Press

Agency/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Leigh-Mallory favored the so-called Big Wing tactic involving multiple squadrons striking the attacking Luftwaffe with all available air assets at once, which, because of the assembly required, meant that the defenders were sometimes slow to respond. Park and Dowding supported repeated single-squadron attacks with quicker response times. In actions that bordered on insubordination, Leigh-Mallory boasted that he would secure Dowding's removal. That prediction became reality when Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal backed Leigh-Mallory, which led to Dowding's dismissal in November 1940 and Park's transfer the next month. Air Marshal William Sholto Douglas, the new Fighter Command chief, named Leigh-Mallory to command Number 11 Fighter Group.

Under his command, Number 11 Group instituted his Big Wing tactics, but with only marginally greater success than previously experienced. Leigh-Mallory began offensive air operations against Luftwaffe airfields in France, and he commanded the air support for the ill-fated August 19, 1942, Dieppe Raid. In November 1942, he assumed leadership of RAF Fighter Command. He emphasized operations known as "rhubarbs," "circuses," and "beehives"—hunter-killer flights of hundreds of fighter aircraft, often combined with bombers, that flew at low level over France in search of Luftwaffe targets of opportunity. Such operations were considered ineffective by many, and they incurred grievous losses.

In November 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff named Leigh-Mallory commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces for Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Normandy that began on June 6, 1944. Promoted to air chief marshal in December 1943, Leigh-Mallory directed Allied fighter attacks in his "Transportation Plan" against railroad marshaling yards in an effort to disrupt German reinforcement efforts against the Normandy beachhead. On D-day, he commanded 9,000 aircraft, and his pilots swept the skies over the beaches to clear them of German fighters.

Leigh-Mallory's job of coordinating Allied tactical air forces was largely completed by October 1944, when he was named to command all Allied air forces in the Far East. En route to his new post, he and his wife were both killed when the airplane in which they were passengers crashed near Grenoble, France, on November 14, 1944.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Britain, Battle of; Douglas, William Sholto; Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Park, Sir Keith Rodney; Portal, Sir Charles Frederick Algernon; Tedder, Sir Arthur William

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LeMay, Curtis Emerson (1906–1990)

U.S. Army Air Forces (later U.S. Air Force) general. Born on November 15, 1906, in Columbus, Ohio, Curtis Emerson LeMay graduated from Ohio State University in 1928 with an engineering degree. Completing pilot training at Kelly Field, Texas, he secured a commission in October 1929 as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army Air Corps Reserve and a regular commission in January 1930.

U.S. Army Air Forces major general Curtis Emerson LeMay. (Library of Congress)

LeMay spent four years with the 27th Pursuit Squadron and then served with other fighter squadrons before being assigned to the 49th Bomb Squadron in 1937. In June 1942, he assumed command of the 305th Bomb Group, flying the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress. That unit's fourth commanding officer within four months, LeMay became known as "Iron Ass" for the relentless pressure he placed on his men. In May 1943, he took command of the 3rd Bombardment Division, and he was promoted to temporary brigadier general that September. On August 17, 1943, LeMay piloted the lead bomber in the 3rd Air Division's bombing raid on Regensburg, Germany. That day, the 3rd lost 24 of 127 planes, but the raid inflicted heavy damage on the aircraft factory that produced nearly 30 percent of Germany's Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighter aircraft.

Promoted to temporary major general in March 1944, LeMay became head of the XX Bomber Command in China. In January 1945, he took over

the XXI Bomber Group in Guam in the Mariana Islands. LeMay stressed extensive training and instituted new tactics that included low-level night attacks in the firebombing of Japanese cities. On the night of March 9–10, his Boeing B-29 Superfortresses struck Tokyo in what was the single most destructive bombing raid in history. That July, LeMay assumed command of the Twentieth Air Force, composed of the XX and XXI Bomber Commands.

From 1945 to 1947, LeMay was deputy chief of the Air Force Staff for Research and Development. In September 1947 when the air force became a separate military branch, LeMay, a temporary lieutenant general, took command of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and helped organize the 1948–1949 Berlin Airlift.

In October 1948, LeMay became head of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). He was promoted to general in October 1951, America's youngest four-star general since Ulysses S. Grant. LeMay commanded SAC until July 1957, when he was appointed air force vice chief of staff. In May 1961, he became chief of staff of the air force, remaining in that post until his retirement in February 1965.

LeMay published his autobiography in 1965 and was chairman of the board of Network Electronics from 1965 to 1968. In October 1968, he entered politics as George Wallace's vice presidential running mate on the American Independent Party ticket. LeMay was an outspoken proponent of the bombing of North Vietnam, and his campaign generated a firestorm of controversy. He died on October 1, 1990, at March Air Force Base, California.

ARTHUR A. MATTHEWS

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Guam, Battle for; Mariana Islands Campaign; Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of; Tokyo, Bombing of; United States Army Air Forces

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Lend-Lease

U.S. military aid program begun during World War II. Designed originally as a means for the United States to assist Great Britain without becoming a belligerent itself, the Lend-Lease program provided more than $50 billion in aid to 38 nations between March 1941 and June 1947. The British Empire received the most aid under the program ($31.4 billion), followed by the Soviet Union ($11 billion).

The immediate impetus for Lend-Lease was the fall of France in June 1940, which left Great Britain fighting Germany and Italy alone. Strapped for cash, Britain could no longer afford to purchase supplies from the United States. Britain's economic crisis notwithstanding, President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that the United States had to find ways to maintain the resolve of the British, thereby allowing them to continue in the war.

British fiscal problems were not the only barrier to be overcome. U.S. firms were hampered from trading with Britain because of restrictions included in the Neutrality Acts that were passed in the late 1930s. These measures required that trade be conducted on a cash-and-carry basis, meaning that American firms could neither extend credit nor transport materials across the U-boat–infested Atlantic Ocean. With Britain nearly out of hard currency, trade under the cash-and-carry provisions was virtually impossible. The original Lend-Lease authorizations specified that the funds were to be given only to democracies that agreed to pay the loans back in full at the earliest possible opportunity.

From the start, however, Roosevelt envisioned that Lend-Lease would operate much as his domestic New Deal did. It would be a practical and flexible program that was able to meet changing demands. It would also be centrally controlled from the executive branch, leaving Roosevelt the options of deciding which nations would receive aid and what forms that aid would take. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the program was more realistic than ideological.

Roosevelt also promoted Lend-Lease as being in the direct strategic interests not only of Great Britain but also of the United States. He compared Lend-Lease to lending a neighbor a fire hose when his house was in flames. This act would help save the lender's house from destruction as well, and once the fire was out, the hose would be returned.

To answer the charge of critics who believed that the impoverished British government would never repay Lend-Lease obligations, Roosevelt said that he expected Britain to honor a gentleman's agreement to eventually repay the United States in kind. He linked Great Britain's war to the United States in compelling rhetoric that helped to overcome abiding strains of American isolationism. Roosevelt reinforced these points in a series of fireside chats that led to widespread public acceptance of the program.

On January 6, 1941, supporters introduced the Lend-Lease bill, which they patriotically numbered H.R. 1776, in Congress. In a speech delivered soon afterward, Roosevelt connected Lend-Lease to the famous Four Freedoms that defined America's global goals: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Lend-Lease, Roosevelt argued, promised to further those aims without putting American lives at risk. After an amendment stipulating that the U.S. Navy would not convoy supplies to Britain directly, the bill passed both houses of Congress by large majorities on March 8, 1941. It authorized the president to "sell, transfer to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of" property to any nation whose defense the president deemed "vital to the defense of the United States." As the program's success became more manifest, public opposition to Lend-Lease, always in the minority, became even less vocal.

American-made .38 caliber revolvers shipped to Britain from the United States under Lend-Lease are unpacked at an English ordnance depot. (Library of Congress)

The emergency faced by the Soviet Union after the German invasion of June 22, 1941, required a reconsideration of the specific provision that Lend-Lease applied only to democracies. In August, Roosevelt had declared that Lend-Lease did not apply to the Soviets, but he was even then accepting a 29-page list of Soviet requests. Despite serious misgivings from anticommunist members of Congress, where the extension was debated over a four-month span, the United States finally added the Soviet Union to the program in November 1941. Roosevelt agreed with British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill that whatever the ideological conflict, the Soviets had to be supplied if they were to remain in the war against Germany. Sensitive to the tensions involved in extending Lend-Lease aid to a communist nation, Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins, his most trusted adviser, to Moscow to coordinate Lend-Lease assistance there.

The U.S. Office of Lend-Lease Administration worked to overcome myriad complex problems of logistics. Until the Allies gained the upper hand in the Battle of the Atlantic, supplying Britain proved difficult, and supplying the Soviet Union necessitated air routes over Africa, sea routes along the Arctic Ocean, and land routes across Persia. Complications with flying supplies over "the Hump"—as the Himalaya Mountains were known—limited U.S. aid to China, although that country still received almost $2 billion in assistance. Because of the immense logistical difficulties, the vast majority of Lend-Lease aid to China comprised light weapons systems that could be flown in.

Lend-Lease worked in reverse as well. Thus, Britain shared with the United States radar technology, in which it then led the world. The British also provided technology on jet engines and rocketry. Reverse Lend-Lease of all types amounted to some $7.8 billion during the war.

Lend-Lease provided a wide range of arms, equipment, food, and raw materials to nations fighting the Axis powers. In the end, munitions formed almost half of the total aid package. Although the British Empire received more than 60 percent of the aid distributed under the program, Lend-Lease assistance proved to be critical to the Soviet Union. The Americans provided the Soviet Union with 34 million sets of uniforms, 15 million pairs of boots, 350,000 tons of explosives, 3 million tons of gasoline, 1.75 million tons of food, 12,000 railroad cars, 375,000 trucks, and 50,000 jeeps. American vehicles and petroleum supplies allowed the Red Army to develop a deep-offensive doctrine in 1943 that enabled Soviet units to go greater distances. The Soviet Union could also concentrate on the production of tanks and artillery because of the steady supply of trucks and jeeps arriving from the United States. In all, some 17.5 million tons of Lend-Lease aid was shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the Soviet Union, with 94 percent of this from the United States. One estimate holds that American deliveries to the Soviet Union through Persia alone were sufficient, by U.S. Army standards, to maintain 60 divisions in the field.

Roosevelt and his closest advisers sought to employ Lend-Lease to open the Soviet system to American ideas. In a similar vein, they insisted that any nation receiving Lend-Lease assistance had to agree to open its markets to U.S. products. Thus, Washington finally forced Great Britain to abandon the

Imperial Preference System that had provided more favorable trade terms to members of the British Empire.

Lend-Lease paid important dividends on the strategic level as well. U.S. aid helped to fend off Soviet demands for a second front in Western Europe. It also helped the Americans convince Chinese generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) that he must at least appear to accept the counsel of his American advisers—most notably, the reform-minded Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell. The United States later extended Lend-Lease aid to many Latin American nations, prominently Mexico and Brazil. The program brought these nations closer to the Allies and ensured that the Axis powers would not be able to establish important connections there.

Lend-Lease thus served many key roles during the war. Most critically, it unquestionably shortened the conflict and relieved the suffering of millions. As Allied armies advanced across Western Europe, Lend-Lease funds paid for food and livestock shipments to France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Churchill called Lend-Lease the most unsordid act in history. Although Soviet historians later discounted its value, Joseph Stalin himself said that the Soviet Union could not have won the war without Lend-Lease.

MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Hopkins, Harry Lloyd; Jiang Jieshi; Logistics, Allied; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Document 80; Document 86

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Leningrad, Siege of (July 10, 1941–January 27, 1944)

The longest and most devastating siege of a major urban center in the history of modern warfare. The nightmare that engulfed the population of the Soviet Union's second-largest city lasted from July 10, 1941, until January 27, 1944. The once vibrant city had been built by Peter the Great and was considered Russia's window to the West, but by March 1943 Leningrad and its 3.2 million people had been reduced to a militarized fortress of some 700,000 inhabitants.

Inhabitants of the city of Leningrad (today Saint Petersburg), including women of all ages, use shovels and picks to help construct antitank ditches during the lengthy German siege of that city. (Library of Congress)

The Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The capture of Leningrad—a city described by Adolf Hitler as the "hotbed of Communism"—was one of the major strategic goals of Operation BARBAROSSA. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb commanded Army Group North, charged with taking Leningrad. He believed that his troops would soon take the city in cooperation with the Finns, who had now reentered the war. As Leeb's forces moved northeast, Finnish forces drove south, both to the east and the west of Lake Ladoga, toward the Svir River and Leningrad.

On July 8, the German Fourth Panzer Army reached the old fortress of Shlisselburg east of Leningrad, guarding the point at which the Neva River flows out of nearby Lake Ladoga. This cut off Leningrad from the Soviet

interior. The siege, which was actually a blockade, officially began on July 10. Leeb's hopes for a quick victory were dashed, however, when the Finns merely reoccupied the territory taken by the Soviets in consequence of the 1939–1940 First Finnish-Soviet War (also known as the Winter War), thus halting some 26 miles north of Leningrad. The refusal of the Finns to push beyond the Svir or their pre-1940 borders was a major factor in Leningrad's survival. Leeb also lost much of his Fourth Panzer Army, which Hitler diverted to the drive on Moscow.

Hitler ordered Leningrad obliterated through artillery fire, air attack, and blockade; moreover, he prohibited any acceptance of a surrender were one to be offered. In mid-October, he ordered Leeb to make a wide sweep of some 150 miles around Lake Ladoga to link up with the Finns on the Svir River. On November 8, the Germans took the vital rail center of Tikhvin, about halfway to the Svir. Joseph Stalin then shifted major reinforcements north, and in mid-December Hitler authorized Leeb to withdraw. Soviet troops reoccupied Tikhvin on December 18.

Authorities in Leningrad had done little to prepare the city for a blockade. Although the city was believed to be a major German military objective, efforts to evacuate part of the population suffered from bureaucratic delays. The party boss in Leningrad, Andrei Zhdanov, second only to Stalin in the party hierarchy, and Marshal Kliment E. Voroshilov, appointed by Stalin to defend the city, were reluctant to order any measures that might be branded defeatist.

On July 11, the Leningrad Party Committee ordered the civilian population to take part in the construction of tank traps and other defensive positions in front of the city. Between July and August, nearly half of the population between the ages of 16 and 55 engaged in this effort, which proceeded under constant German artillery and air attack. The city government also ordered the establishment of some civilian combat units made up of workers, men and women alike, but they were poorly trained and had virtually no weapons.



In normal circumstances, Leningrad was entirely dependent on outside sources for its food and fuel and for the raw materials used in its factories. Now it had to find food for some 2.5 million civilians as well as the forces of the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Fleet in the Baltic. By November, rations had been cut to the starvation level. The soldiers and sailors received priority in the allocation of food, and rationing authorities held the power of life and death.

Rations were cut again and again, beyond the starvation level. People tried to survive any way they could, whether on stray animals or on glue from wallpaper. Hunger even led to instances of cannibalism. The hardships were not, however, evenly shared, for communist officials ate well throughout the siege.

Lake Ladoga was the only means of accessing the rest of the Soviet Union. In winter, trucks were able to travel across the ice, and in summer, some boats got through. But this route was insufficient to overcome the fuel shortage. The Soviets rebuilt the rail line from Tikhvin, but the Germans bombed and shelled it as well as the Lake Ladoga route.

In January 1942, Stalin ordered General Kirill A. Meretskov’s Volkhov Front to strike the German lines from Lake Ladoga to Lake Ilmen, but after punching a narrow gap in them, the Soviet offensive faltered. When Stalin

refused to allow a withdrawal, the Germans cut off the Soviet forces in June and restored their own lines. Between January and July 1942, Soviet authorities meanwhile managed to evacuate 850,000 people from Leningrad, including a large number of children.

Hitler's plans for the summer 1942 campaign called for the destruction of Leningrad and the occupation of the area between Lake Ladoga and the Baltic to free up the Finns for operations against Murmansk. In August, Meretskov carried out another attack against the eastern part of the German lines. Field Marshal Fritz Eric von Manstein, sent to Leningrad by Hitler, replied with a counterattack in September.

That summer, the Soviets managed to lay both pipelines and electric cables under Lake Ladoga. The Germans brought in E-boats, and the Italians also operated some midget submarines in the lake. In January 1943, in Operation SPARK, Red Army troops in Leningrad (which the Soviets had managed to reinforce and were now commanded by General Leonid A. Govorov) and Meretskov's forces to the east struck the Germans from the north and east. The offensive was successful, with the two Soviet armies meeting at Shlisselburg on January 19, thus breaking the siege and opening a 10-mile corridor. On February 7, a Soviet train reached Leningrad through the corridor and across the Neva River on tracks over the ice. Although this line came under constant German attack and had to be repaired daily, it operated continuously thereafter.

On January 14, 1944, Govorov and Meretskov struck German positions, with their forces outnumbering the Germans by a ratio of 2:1 in men and 4:1 in tanks and aircraft. Yet Hitler refused to authorize a withdrawal, and bitter fighting ensued. Ultimately the Soviets were successful, driving the Germans back. On January 27, 1944, with the Leningrad-to-Moscow railroad line reopened, Stalin declared the "900-day" siege at an end.

During the blockade, perhaps 1 million people in Leningrad—40 percent of the prewar population—died of hunger, the majority of them in the winter of 1941–1942. The entire city was within range of German artillery fire, and the bombing and shelling claimed many of the city's buildings and architectural and art treasures, including works from the Hermitage Museum. The travails of Leningrad became the chief subject of Soviet war literature. Similar to the bombings of Dresden and Hiroshima, the siege of Leningrad became a national and even worldwide symbol of the horror of war.

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Govorov, Leonid Aleksandrovich; Hitler, Adolf; Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von; Manstein, Erich von; Meretskov, Kirill Afanasievich; Soviet Union; Stalingrad, Battle of; Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich

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Lent, Helmut (1918–1944)

German Air Force colonel. Born in Pyrehne, Germany, on June 13, 1918, Helmut Lent was introduced to military aviation through a glider club. He joined the Luftwaffe, trained to fly single-engine fighters, and was selected to join the more prestigious heavy fighter squadrons flying the twin-engine Bf-110. He was posted to 76th Zerstorer Geschwader (destroyer wing) (ZG-76) in 1939.

Lent scored his first victory a day after the German invasion of Poland on September 2, 1939, followed by two more in December. Before transferring to night fighters in 1940, his total score stood at eight, an exceptional feat given the limitations of the Bf-110 as a fighter.

Joining Nacht Jagdgeschwader 1 (night-fighter wing) (NJG-1) as a squadron commander in 1941, Lent found scoring at night to be an even tougher proposition, and in frustration, he requested reassignment to day fighters. His request was postponed for one month, and he scored his first

night victory in May 1941. By August, he had downed 14 British bombers and was awarded the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross. Lent was the first night-fighter pilot to achieve 100 kills and the first awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds. He received the award personally from Adolf Hitler in July 1944.

On October 5, 1944, at Paderborn, Germany, Lent crashed his Ju-88 while landing. He and three others on the aircraft died of their injuries. Lent's final tally was 102 night and 8 day victories.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Germany, Air Force

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Léopold III, King of the Belgians (1901–1983)

King of the Belgians (1934–1951). Born on November 3, 1901, in Brussels, the son of King Albert and Queen Elisabeth of Belgium, Léopold was educated at Eton in Britain and served in the Belgian Army. He succeeded his father to the throne in 1934 after marrying Princess Astrid of Sweden in 1926. They had three children, but a car accident, with Léopold driving, claimed Astrid's life in 1935. Many Belgians never forgave him for this.

Léopold was heavily influenced by the German invasion of his country in 1914 and sought to avoid its repetition by taking refuge in neutrality. After the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936, he withdrew Belgium from its military alliance with France and pursued a neutral stance. When war began in September 1939, Léopold rejected appeals from Britain and France for discussions of war plans, fearful of giving Adolf Hitler a pretext to invade his country.

Léopold's policy did not spare Belgium from German invasion, which occurred in May 1940. British and French forces then moved into Belgium to

support that country. However justified in terminating hopeless resistance, Léopold's surrender of the Belgian Army on May 28, 1940, after only a brief stand was a violation of pledges given to Britain and France, and it made inevitable the Dunkerque evacuation (May 26–June 4). Even more dubious was the king's failure to go abroad with his ministers to support a government-in-exile in London. Many Belgians suspected him of both German sympathies and authoritarian preferences. He then compounded his unpopularity by marrying a commoner—his children's governess, Liliane Baels—in 1941.

Removed from Belgium by the Germans in 1944, Léopold was freed by U.S. troops in Austria at the end of the war. Because he was being held in Germany when Belgium was liberated in the fall of 1944, his brother, Prince Charles, the count of Flanders, assumed the title of regent. Léopold, meanwhile, resided in Switzerland.

After the war, the question of the monarchy remained in abeyance for several years. There was strong socialist opposition to the monarchy, and so it was not until a referendum in March 1950 gave him a 58 percent favorable vote that Léopold attempted to regain his throne. His return precipitated such a major crisis that he then relinquished control of affairs to his son Baudouin. When Baudouin reached majority age, Léopold abdicated in his favor, in 1951. Léopold died in Brussels on September 25, 1983.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Belgium; Belgium, Army; Belgium Campaign; Dunkerque, Evacuation of

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Les Sept Iles, Action off (October 23, 1943)

Engagement between the British and Germans in the English Channel on October 22, 1943. The importance of the Channel as a transit route for British

and German shipping made it one of the war's most bitterly contested bodies of water. When the German blockade-runner *Münsterland* and its escort of six minesweepers and two patrol boats departed Brest on October 22, 1943, the Royal Navy's Plymouth Command ordered the antiaircraft light cruiser *Charybdis* (senior officer, Captain George Arthur Wallis Voelcker), the fleet destroyers *Grenville* and *Rocket,* and the escort destroyers *Limbourne, Wensleydale, Talybont,* and *Stevenstone* to intercept. Because Plymouth was a transit point, it often tried to maximize resources by using ships that were passing through, such as the *Charybdis,* but this practice had its dangers, as became clear in execution.

The British warships arrived off the Breton coast shortly after midnight on October 23 and, with the cruiser in the lead, began sweeping west. Meanwhile, the German 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, *T23* (commanded by Corvette Captain Franz Kohlauf), *T26, T27, T22,* and *T25,* reinforced the escort. Based on past operations, the Germans had a good idea when and how the British would come. When *T25*'s hydrophone detected ships to the northeast, the 4th Flotilla turned toward the contact.

At 1:30 a.m., the *Charybdis*'s radar detected the Germans 14,000 yards ahead. As the columns rapidly converged, Voelcker ordered his column to come to starboard and increase speed, but there was confusion, and only the rear ship received his signal. A minute later at 1:43 a.m., the German commander saw the cruiser's large silhouette illuminated against the lighter northern horizon only 2,200 yards distant, and he ordered an emergency turn to starboard. As they came about, the *T23* and then the *T26* emptied their torpedo tubes toward the enemy.

The *Charybdis* fired star shell, but the rockets burst above the clouds and only brightened the overcast sky. The *Limbourne,* which had lost touch with the flagship, plotted a contact off its port bow and, unsure whether it was hostile, likewise fired rockets. The fleet destroyers came to port and crossed ahead of *Limbourne,* then lookouts aboard the *Charybdis* reported the tracks of torpedoes.

The *Charybdis* came hard to port, but at 1:47 a.m. a torpedo struck it on the port side. As this happened the German column was still turning, and both the *T27* and *T22* fired full torpedo salvos as they came about. Only the *T25* failed to launch. At 1:51 a.m., the German column withdrew on an easterly heading.

Another torpedo struck the *Charybdis,* and within five minutes its deck was underwater. A minute later, a torpedo slammed into the *Limbourne* and detonated its forward magazine. The *Grenville* and *Wensleydale* barely avoided the massive explosion. The *Charybdis* sank at 2:30 a.m. Attempts to tow the *Limbourne* failed, and it was scuttled.

An improvised British force following a scripted plan had blundered into a massed close-range torpedo salvo. Indeed, the British were fortunate in only losing two ships. It was the last clear victory that German surface forces would win during the war.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Bay of Biscay, Battle of; Blockade-Running; Convoys, Axis; Destroyers

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Leyte Gulf, Battle of (October 23–26, 1944)

Pacific war naval battle and history's largest naval engagement in terms of the amount of ships, personnel, and area involved. The battle engaged 284 ships (216 U.S., 4 Australian, and 64 Japanese) and nearly 200,000 men and took place over an area of more than 100,000 square miles. It saw all aspects of naval warfare—air, surface, submarine, and amphibious—as well as the employment of the largest guns ever at sea, the last clash of battleships, and the introduction by the Japanese of kamikaze aircraft. The engagement also involved excellent planning and leadership, deception, failed intelligence, and great controversies.

The battle resulted from U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to follow the conquest of the Mariana Islands with the recapture of the Philippines. This idea was proposed by the commander of Southwest Pacific Forces, General Douglas MacArthur; the chief of naval operations, Ernest J.

King, wanted to land on Formosa instead. The latter move made sound military sense, the former political sense.

On October 20, the U.S. Sixth Army began an invasion of Leyte, with more than 132,000 men going ashore the first day. Alerted by the preliminary bombardment, the Japanese put into effect their overly complicated contingency plan. As early as July 21, 1944, the Naval General Staff in Tokyo had issued a directive for an operation in which the Combined Fleet would seize the initiative "to crush the enemy fleet and attacking forces."

On July 26, the General Staff informed the Combined Fleet commander, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, that the "urgent operations" would be known by the code name shō (victory). The Japanese had four of these operations to combat the next U.S. offensive; SHŌ ICHI-GO (VICTORY NUMBER ONE) covered defense of the Philippine archipelago, to which the Japanese decided to commit the entire Combined Fleet. Toyoda knew it was a gamble but believed that the chance had to be taken. Should the United States retake the Philippines, it would be in a position to cut Japanese access to oil from the Netherlands East Indies.

Prior to the battle, Japanese naval air strength had been severely reduced in the June 19–21, 1944, Battle of the Philippine Sea (the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot"), and between October 12 and 14, U.S. carrier planes and army B-29 bombers struck Japanese airfields on Formosa, Okinawa, and the Philippines. These strikes denied the Japanese Navy badly needed land-based air support and alone doomed the Japanese plan. The Japanese did add extra antiaircraft guns to their ships in an attempt to offset the lack of aircraft, but offensively they had to rely on naval gunnery and some 335 land-based planes in the Luzon area.

The Japanese plan was to destroy sufficient U.S. shipping to break up the Leyte amphibious landing. There were four prongs in the Japanese attack. A decoy force would draw U.S. naval covering forces north, while two elements struck from the west on either side of Leyte to converge simultaneously on the landing area in Leyte Gulf and destroy Allied shipping there. At the same time, shore-based aircraft were to attack U.S. naval forces offshore.

On October 17 upon receiving information that U.S. warships were off Suhuan Island, Toyoda alerted his forces. The next day, he initiated SHŌ ICHI-GO. The original target date for the fleet engagement was October 22, but

logistical difficulties delayed it to October 25. Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo's decoy Northern Force (Third Fleet) consisted of the heavy carrier *Zuikaku*, three light carriers, two hybrid battleship-carriers, three cruisers, and eight destroyers. Ozawa had only 116 aircraft, flown by poorly trained pilots. His force sortied from Japan on October 20, and on the evening of October 22 it turned south toward Luzon. At the same time, Japanese submarines off Formosa were ordered south toward the eastern approaches to the Philippine archipelago, and shortly before October 23 what remained of the Japanese Second Air Fleet began to arrive on the island of Luzon.

The strongest element of the Japanese attack was the 1st Diversion Attack Force, which reached Brunei Bay in northwest Borneo on October 20, refueled, split into two parts, and resumed its movement two days later. The Center Force under Admiral Kurita Takeo had the bulk of the Japanese attack strength, including the giant battleships *Musashi* and *Yamato* with their 18.1-inch guns; Kurita also had 3 older battleships, 12 cruisers, and 15 destroyers. Center Force sailed northeastward, up the west coast of Palawan Island, and then turned eastward through the waters of the central Philippines to San Bernardino Strait.

Meanwhile, the Southern Force (C Force) of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Nishimura Shoji, struck eastward through the Sulu Sea in an effort to force its way through Surigao Strait between the islands of Mindanao and Leyte. The Southern Force was trailed by Vice Admiral Shima Kiyohide's 2nd Diversion Attack Force. Shima had two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers. Shima's warships left the Pescadores on October 21, steamed south past western Luzon, and refueled in the Calamian Islands. Late in joining Nishimura's ships, Shima's force followed them into Surigao Strait.

Opposing the Japanese were two U.S. Navy fleets: Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, operating under General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Command, and Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet, under the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, at Pearl Harbor. Leyte was the first landing to involve two entire U.S. fleets and also the first without a unified command, which would have unfortunate consequences.

The Seventh Fleet was divided into three task groups. The first consisted of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf's 6 old battleships, 16 escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 10 destroyer escorts. The

other two elements were amphibious task groups carrying out the actual invasion. The Seventh Fleet had escorted the invasion force to Leyte and now provided broad protection for the entire landing area. Because most of Halsey's amphibious assets had been loaned to Kinkaid, the Third Fleet consisted almost entirely of Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force (TF) 38 of 14 fast carriers, with more than 1,000 aircraft, organized into four task groups containing 6 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, and 57 destroyers. The Third Fleet had the job of securing air superiority over the Philippines and protecting the landings. If the opportunity to destroy a major part of the Japanese fleet presented itself or could be created, that was to be Third Fleet's primary task.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was actually a series of battles, the first of which was the October 23–24 Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. Early on October 23, the U.S. submarines *Darter* and *Dace* discovered Kurita's Center Force entering Palawan Passage from the South China Sea, and they alerted Halsey, whose Third Fleet guarded San Bernardino Strait. The submarines sank two Japanese heavy cruisers, the *Atago* (Kurita's flagship) and the *Maya*, and damaged a third. Kurita transferred his flag to the *Yamato*, and his force continued east into the Sibuyan Sea where, beginning in the morning of October 24, TF 38 launched five air strikes against it. The first wave of carrier planes concentrated on the *Musashi*, which absorbed 19 torpedoes and nearly as many bombs before sinking, taking down half of its 2,200-man crew. Several other Japanese ships were also damaged.

In midafternoon on October 25, U.S. pilots reported that Kurita had reversed course and was heading west; Halsey incorrectly assumed that this part of the battle was over. He did issue a preliminary order detailing a battle line of battleships known as TF 34 to be commanded by Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. Kinkaid was aware of that signal and assumed that TF 34 had been established.

Meanwhile, Japanese land-based planes from the Second Air Fleet attacked a portion of TF 38. Most were shot down, but they did sink the light carrier *Princeton* and badly damaged the cruiser *Birmingham*. Also, unknown to Halsey, Kurita's force changed course after nightfall and resumed heading for San Bernardino Strait.

The Casablanca-class escort carrier *St. Lô* suffers a major explosion on October 25, 1944; during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The *St. Lô* was the first major ship to be sunk by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft during the war. (US Navy/National Archives/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Warned of the approach of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Kinkaid placed Oldendorf's 6 old Seventh Fleet fire-support battleships (all but 1 a veteran of Pearl Harbor), flanked by eight cruisers, across the mouth of Surigao Strait to intercept it. He also lined the strait with 39 patrol-torpedo (PT) boats and 28 destroyers. In terms of naval warfare, the October 24–25 Battle of Surigao Strait was a classic case of crossing the T. The PT boats discovered the Japanese moving in line-ahead formation, but Nishimura's force easily beat them back.

Although the battleships often get the credit for the Surigao Strait victory, it was U.S. destroyers that inflicted most of the damage. Their converging torpedo attacks sank the battleship *Fuso* and three destroyers. The Japanese then ran into the line of Oldendorf's battleships, which sank all the Japanese warships except the destroyer *Shigure.* Nishimura went down with his flagship, the battleship *Yamashiro.*

Shima's force, bringing up the rear, then came under attack by the PT boats, which crippled a light cruiser. Shima's flagship collided with one of Nishimura's damaged vessels. Oldendorf's ships pursued the retreating Japanese. Another Japanese cruiser succumbed to attacks by land-based planes and those of Admiral Thomas L. Sprague's escort carriers. The rest of

Shima's force escaped when Oldendorf, knowing that his ships might be needed later, turned back. The battle was over by 4:30 a.m. on October 25.

Meanwhile, during the night of October 24–25, Kurita's force moved through San Bernardino Strait, issued from it unopposed, and turned south. In the most controversial aspect of the battle, Halsey left San Bernardino Strait unprotected near midnight to rush with all available units of the Third Fleet after Ozawa's decoy fleet, which had been sighted far to the north. Several of Halsey's subordinates registered reservations about his decision, but he would not be deterred. Compounding the error, Halsey failed to inform Kinkaid, who in any case assumed that TF 34 was protecting the strait.

Halsey's decision left the landing beaches guarded only by the Seventh Fleet's Taffy 3 escort carrier group, commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague. It was one of three such support groups operating off Samar. Sprague had six small escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts.

Fighting off Samar erupted at about 6:30 a.m. on October 24, as Taffy 3 found itself opposing Kurita's 4 battleships (including the *Yamato*), 6 heavy cruisers, and 10 destroyers. The aircraft from all three of the Taffy groups now attacked the Japanese. The planes carried only fragmentation bombs for use against land targets, but they put up a strong fight, harassing the powerful Japanese warships. Sprague's destroyers and destroyer escorts also joined the fight. Their crews courageously attacked the much more powerful Japanese warships, launching torpedoes and laying smoke to try to obscure the escort carriers. These combined attacks forced several Japanese cruisers to drop out of the battle.

Kurita now made a poor decision. By 9:10 a.m. his warships sank the *Gambier Bay*, the only U.S. carrier ever lost to gunfire, as well as the destroyers *Hoel* and *Johnston* and the destroyer escort *Samuel B. Roberts.* But Kurita believed that he was under attack by aircraft from TF 38 and that he had inflicted more damage than was the case. At 9:11 a.m. just at the point when he might have won a crushing victory, he ordered his forces to break off the attack, his decision strengthened by news that the southern attacking force had been destroyed. Kurita then exited through San Bernardino Strait. The four ships lost by Taffy 3 were the only U.S. warships sunk by Japanese surface ships in the entire battle.

At 9:40 p.m., Kurita's ships reentered San Bernardino Strait. As the

Japanese withdrew, they came under attack by aircraft from Vice Admiral John S. McCain's task force from Halsey's fleet, losing a destroyer. Meanwhile, Sprague's escort carriers and Oldendorf's force returning from the Battle of Surigao Strait came under attack from land-based kamikaze aircraft, the first such attacks of the war. These attacks sank the escort carrier *St. Lô* and damaged several other ships.

At about 2:20 a.m. on October 25, Mitscher's search planes, from Halsey's force, located Ozawa's northern decoy force. At dawn, the first of three strikes was launched in what became known as the Battle of Cape Engaño. Ozawa had sent most of his planes ashore to operate from bases there and thus had only antiaircraft fire with which to oppose the attack. While engaged against Ozawa, Halsey learned of the action off Samar when a signal came in from Kinkaid at 8:22 a.m., followed by an urgent request eight minutes later for fast battleships. Finally, at 8:48 a.m. Halsey ordered McCain's Task Group (TG) 38.1 to make "best possible speed" to engage Kurita's Center Force.

The task group was en route from the Ulithi to rejoin the other elements of TF 38. Because it had more carriers and planes than any of the three other task groups in Halsey's force, it made good sense to detach this unit. Several minutes later, Halsey was infuriated by a query from Nimitz at Pearl Harbor: "WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS." (The last three words were simply what was known as "padding," drawn from the poet Alfred Lord Tennyson's "Charge of the Light Brigade," but Halsey took them to be an integral part of the message and believed that they were a reproach delivered in an insulting manner.)

At 10:55 a.m., Halsey ordered all six fast battleships and TG 38.2 to turn south and steam at flank speed, but they missed the battle. After the war, Kurita admitted his error in judgment; Halsey never did. In fact, Halsey said that his decision to send the battleships south to Samar was "the greatest error I committed during the Battle of Leyte Gulf."

By nightfall, U.S. aircraft, a submarine, and surface ships had sunk all four Japanese carriers of Ozawa's force as well as five other ships. In effect, this blow ended Japanese carrier aviation. But the battle of annihilation that would have been possible with the fast battleships had eluded Halsey. Still, of Ozawa's force, only two battleships, two light cruisers, and a destroyer escaped.

Including retiring vessels sunk on October 26 and 27, Japanese losses in the Battle of Leyte Gulf came to 29 warships (4 carriers, 3 battleships, 6 heavy and 4 light cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 1 submarine) and more than 500 aircraft; in addition, some 10,500 seamen and aviators were killed. The U.S. Navy lost only 6 ships (1 light carrier, 2 escort carriers, 2 destroyers, and 1 destroyer escort) and more than 200 aircraft. About 2,800 Americans were killed and another 1,000 were wounded. The Battle of Leyte Gulf ended the Japanese fleet as an organized fighting force.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Kamikaze; King, Ernest Joseph; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kurita Takeo; Lee, Willis Augustus "Ching"; McCain, John Sidney, Sr.; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nimitz, Chester William; Nishimura Shoji; Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett; Ozawa Jisaburo; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick; Sprague, Thomas Lamison; Toyoda Soemu

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Leyte Landings (October 20, 1944)

In July 1944, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt met with his Pacific theater commanders General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz to determine the next U.S. military objective. MacArthur argued for a return to the Philippines, whereas Nimitz and the navy wanted to bypass those islands entirely in favor of securing Formosa. Ultimately, because

sufficient resources were available, Roosevelt decided on both the Philippines and Okinawa in the Ryukyus.

The U.S. Philippine invasion had three main phases: first, the capture of Leyte Island, between the big island of Luzon to the north and Mindanao to the south; then, the capture of Luzon; and finally, the clearing of other Japanese-held islands to the south. A precondition to such an undertaking was the neutralization of Japanese airpower. In wide-ranging preinvasion operations between October 7 and 16, Admiral William Halsey's Third Fleet and Lieutenant General George C. Kenney's Far East Air Force struck all Japanese bases within range, while XX Bomber Command Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers attacked Formosa from bases in China, decimating the rebuilt Japanese naval air arm and destroying some 700 Japanese planes and 40 ships.

Japanese leaders knew that they would have to hold the Philippines to prevent the severing of the supply route between Japan and the vital oil and other resources of the Netherlands East Indies. Tokyo was thus prepared, once U.S. forces committed themselves, to gamble what remained of the Japanese fleet on a vast and complex naval operation. This action would culminate in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26).

Japanese commander in the Philippines General Yamashita Tomoyuki had some 350,000 troops to defend the islands. But Yamashita believed that the U.S. effort would be against the big island of Luzon, where he placed his Fourteenth Area Army and prepared defensive positions. Meanwhile, U.S. invasion forces headed for Leyte.

U.S. planners assembled a vast amphibious force. The 700 vessels of Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet transported Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's 194,000-man U.S. Sixth Army, consisting of Major General Franklin C. Sibert's X Corps and Major General John Hodge's XXIV Corps. Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague's air-support escort carrier group consisted of 16 escort carriers, 9 destroyers, and 11 destroyer escorts. Rear Admiral Russell Stanley Berkey commanded a close covering group of 4 cruisers (2 of them Australian) and 7 destroyers (2 Australian). Admiral William Halsey's Third Fleet was to provide covering protection and engage the Japanese fleet should it decide to do battle.

Landing craft loaded with U.S. soldiers sweep toward the Leyte invasion beaches. The men watch American and Japanese planes duel overhead as the landing craft approach the shore, October 1, 1944. (National Archives)



On October 20 following a heavy naval bombardment, four divisions assaulted Leyte's east coast on a 10-mile front. By nightfall, some 132,400 men were ashore, along with 200,000 tons of supplies and equipment.

Immediately on learning of the landings, the Japanese Navy initiated the SHŌ ICHI-GO (VICTORY ONE) plan, and during October 23–26, the U.S. Navy won a decisive victory, defeating the Japanese effort to attack the landing site from the sea. The naval Battle of Leyte Gulf ended the days of the Japanese Navy as a major fighting force. U.S. land forces continued their advance as Kenney's and Halsey's aircraft choked off the stream of Japanese reinforcements. On November 11, attacks by Third Fleet aircraft decimated a Japanese convoy with 10,000 troop reinforcements.

Although the unexpected Japanese reinforcements and heavy rains had delayed the conquest of Leyte, the outcome was never in doubt. In the battle for the island, the Japanese lost some 70,000 men, most of them dead. U.S.

losses were about 3,500 killed and 12,000 wounded. In late October, U.S. forces landed on the adjoining Samar Island, and in mid-December, they seized Mindoro in the northern Visayas, just south of Luzon, as an air base for the coming assault on Luzon.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Kamikaze; Kenney, George Churchill; Krueger, Walter; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; MacArthur, Douglas; Nimitz, Chester William; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Sprague, Thomas Lamison; Terauchi Hisaichi; Yamashita Tomoyuki; Document 203

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Liberty Ships

The U.S. Maritime Commission's mass-produced emergency cargo vessels, whose construction comprised the largest single shipbuilding program of World War II. Eighteen shipyards, using assembly-line methods, completed 2,710 Liberty ships, beginning with the *Patrick Henry*, launched on September 27, 1941 (only eight months after the groundbreaking at the new Bethlehem-Fairfield yard), and ending with the *Albert M. Boe*, which was launched in October 1945 by New England Shipbuilding.

The British ship *Dorington Court* of 1939 was the basis for the Liberty ship design, adapted for welded construction and with improved crew accommodation. Liberties were 441 feet 6 inches in overall length and 57 feet in beam, and they registered 7,176 tons gross and 10,865 tons deadweight. Two oil-fired boilers provided steam for a three-cylinder, triple-expansion engine of 2,500 indicated horsepower that propelled the ship at 11 knots. The commission was criticized for specifying such old-fashioned machinery. As it worked out, however, there was a critical shortage of more modern turbine

machinery because of the demands of other wartime expansion programs; moreover, the engines were thoroughly reliable, and there was a substantial force of engine-room crewmen who were familiar with this type of plant.

Speedy construction and delivery was central to the Liberties' contribution to the war effort. An overwhelming majority of the yards in which they were constructed were newly created facilities purpose-built by either the Maritime Commission or the contractors. Initially, the vessels required around 250 days for completion, but within a year, this was reduced to fewer than 50 days. The Richmond Shipbuilding Corporation, a subsidiary of Henry J. Kaiser's Permanente Metals Corporation located in Richmond, California, broke all records by assembling the *Robert E. Peary* in just over 4 days between November 8 and 12, 1942, and delivering the ship 3 days later. More important, U.S. shipyards delivered 93 new ships in September 1942, totaling more than 1 million deadweight tons, of which 67 were Liberties.

Liberty ships proved to be very adaptable. Although intended to operate as freighters, they were modified for service as troop transports, tankers, aircraft transports, depot ships, and an array of naval auxiliaries. Liberty ships were tough, even though they were classified as expendable war materials. Some problems were encountered with unexpected stress fatigue, but the ships often survived considerable combat damage and served successfully throughout the world in all types of weather. Many continued in postwar commercial service for 25 years or more. Two are preserved as tributes to the type's crucial contribution to the Allied victory: the *John W. Brown* in Baltimore, Maryland, and the *Jeremiah O'Brien* in San Francisco.

PAUL E. FONTENOY



The launch of the Liberty Ship *Robert E. Peary*, which was fitted and delivered in a record four days (the hull and keel took seven days), in the Richmond Shipyards in California, November 12, 1942. (Corbis)

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Kaiser, Henry John

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Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry (1895–1970)

British military journalist, strategist, and historian. Born on October 31, 1895, in Paris, Basil Henry Liddell Hart studied at Cambridge University before serving in the British Army on the Western Front in World War I, where he saw action and was twice wounded. By 1918, he was a company commander.

After retiring on half pay in 1924, he was invalided out of the service as a captain in 1927.

Liddell Hart served as the military correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph* (1925–1935), the (London) *Times* (1935–1939), and, during World War II, for the *Daily Mail* (1939–1945). His columns were highly influential in both military and political circles. He served briefly (1937–1938) as an adviser to War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha but so angered top generals with his ideas (which they considered radical) and his personal attacks that he had to resign.

In his many articles and eventually more than 30 books, Liddell Hart continually advocated the benefits of military surprise, mobility, mechanization (he became the leading exponent of using tanks to strike deep into enemy territory), indirect approach, and the effective use of airpower to cut enemy troops off from their supplies and commanders. German generals such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian would make good use of his ideas, but to his extreme frustration, Liddell Hart was largely ignored in Britain and France.

In the postwar years Liddell Hart wrote extensively, including histories of both world wars, a historical analysis of changing thoughts on military strategy (*Strategy*, first published in 1957, is perhaps his best-known work), and a review of German strategic planning during the war. He also argued strongly for reliance on conventional forces in a nuclear age. Liddell Hart was knighted in 1966 and died on January 29, 1970, in Marlow, England.

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See also

Guderian, Heinz; Hore-Belisha, Isaac Leslie; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen

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Lidice Massacre (June 9–10, 1942)

Atrocity in Czechoslovakia on June 9–10, 1942. On June 4, 1942, SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the German Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, sd) and acting Reichsprotektor (administrator) of Bohemia and Moravia, died of wounds suffered when his car was attacked with grenades in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on May 27, 1942. The attack was carried out by two agents of the London-based Czech government-in-exile, Jan Kubis and Jozef Gabcik.

German reprisals were swift and deadly. Ultimately, the Germans raided 5,000 towns and villages. In the process, some 3,180 persons were arrested, and 1,344 were sentenced to death. German dictator Adolf Hitler ordered additional severe reprisals against the Czechs, threatening to kill 30,000 of them. Although this threat was not carried out, the mining community of Lidice near Kladno, 11 miles northwest of Prague, was chosen for a conspicuous reprisal, presumably because some villagers there had sheltered Heydrich’s assassins and had been otherwise identified with the Czech Resistance.

Ruins of Lidice, Czechoslovakia, following destruction of the village and the killing of most of its inhabitants, part of the German reprisal for the assassination by the Czech resistance of Reinhard Heydrich. (Library of Congress)

The German operation against Lidice was carried out during two days, June 9 and 10, by German police and SD personnel led by SS-Hauptsturmführer Max Rostock. They surrounded the village on the evening of June 9, and the action began the following morning. First, the police and SD men rounded up and took away the town's children and most of the women. Then, an execution squad of 3 officers and 20 men methodically killed 172 males over the age of 16. Later that day, another 11 workers from the late shift at the Lidice mine were also executed, as were 15 relatives of Czech soldiers serving in Britain who were already in custody, bringing the total number of men murdered to 198.

The Germans also executed 71 women in Lidice, and another 7 were taken to Prague, where they too were shot. Of the 184 Lidice women transported to Ravensbrück concentration camp and the 11 already in prison, 143 eventually survived. The 98 children in the village were transported to a camp at Gneisenau. Eighty-two of the children were gassed at Chelmno, and 8 are known to have been given to Schutzstaffel (SS) families to raise. In any event, only 16 surviving Lidice children could be identified in 1945. The village of Lidice itself was burned to the ground. The site was then dynamited and bulldozed, and the ground was sowed with grain.

A similar reprisal was carried out on the village of Lezaky, east of Prague, where the radio transmitter used by the Czech agents was discovered. All of the village's adult inhabitants were killed, and only 2 Lezaky children survived the war. On the direct orders of SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, 252 friends and relatives of the Lidice inhabitants were gassed at the Mauthausen concentration camp on October 24, 1942. So severe were these reprisals that the British suspended any further targeting of high Nazi officials.

No link between Lidice and the Heydrich assassination was ever proven. The village was rebuilt nearby after the war and renamed Nove Lidice. Rostock was executed in 1951 for his part in the Lidice Massacre, which came to symbolize the Nazi oppression of Czechoslovakia.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Czechoslovakia; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen

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Ligurian Sea, Battle of the (March 18, 1945)

Destroyer action between British and German forces and the last naval surface battle fought in the Mediterranean Sea. Even after the Allies landed in southern France in Operation DRAGOON on August 15, 1944, Germany retained a portion of the Mediterranean coast stretching from the Franco-Italian border to a point south of La Spezia. Captured Italian and French warships that Germany had refurbished or finished constructing formed the backbone of a small but active fleet that fought small craft, special forces, and surface actions against the vastly superior Allied navies. By the beginning of 1945, the Kriegsmarine still possessed 3 torpedo boats, 2 minelayers, 9 submarine chasers, 10 motor minesweepers, and 35 armed barges in the Ligurian Sea. They were supported by 6 Motoscafo Armato Silurante (MAS) motor torpedo boats of the fascist Italian Republic Navy.

On the night of March 17, 1945, the last three operational ships of the German 10th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, the destroyer *TA32* and the torpedo boats *TA24* and *TA29,* conducted an offensive mining operation northwest of Corsica. After dropping 132 mines, the flotilla united for the return to Genoa, with the *TA24* and *TA29* preceding the *TA32.* They were 20 miles north of Cape Corse when Allied shore radar at Livorno detected their presence. Four Allied destroyers were patrolling in the vicinity: the French *Basque* and *Tempete* and the British *Meteor* and *Lookout.* Captain A. Morazzani, the *Tempete*'s captain and the senior officer, ordered the British ships to intercept the intruders while he led the slower French ships southeast to cover a convoy nearing Cape Corse.

The *Lookout* made radar contact at 3:01 a.m. The German column was steaming north at 20 knots. The British destroyer approached at high speed and surprised the enemy force, opening fire at 3:10 a.m. from 5,000 yards.

Two minutes later, it swung around and launched torpedoes. The *Lookout*'s radar-directed gunfire slammed into the *TA24* and *TA29.* The *TA29* dropped out of the line while the other two ships fled north. The *Lookout* let them go and circled the *TA29,* firing continuously from 2,000 yards. The *TA29* fought back, but the only damage the German warship inflicted occurred when a burst of 20mm shells hit some smoke floats and ignited a small fire on the British ship. The *TA29* sank at 4:20 a.m., riddled by more than 40 shells.

The *Meteor,* meanwhile, found the other German ships at 3:52 a.m. and engaged at 8,000 yards, hitting the *TA24* almost immediately—highly effective shooting for such a long range, especially at night. The *Meteor* followed up its gunnery attack with a torpedo salvo that scored one hit on the *TA24.* The German torpedo boat exploded and sank at 4:05 a.m. The *TA32,* although damaged, escaped after firing a few broadsides and an ineffective torpedo barrage.

The British destroyers achieved decisive results against a German unit that had effectively harassed the Allies for more than a year, and their victory ended the Kriegsmarine's ability to undertake deepwater offensive operations in the Ligurian Sea.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

DRAGOON, Operation; Germany, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Li Kenong (1899–1962)

Chinese Communist intelligence and security chief. Born in Chaoxian (Ch'ao-hsien) in Anhui (Anhwei), China, on September 15, 1899, Li Kenong (Li K'o-nung) spent his youth spreading revolutionary ideas in his native province. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in late 1926. In

1928, Li went to Shanghai in Jiangsui (Kiangsu), where he received intelligence training, developed a close relationship with Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), and infiltrated the organs for intelligence collection and subversive activities of the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD).

In late 1931, Li arrived at the central Soviet base in Ruijin (Juichin), Jiangxi, continuing his intelligence and security work, first as director of the Administrative Department of the National Political Security Bureau; then, in late 1933, as chief of the Political Security Bureau under the First Front Army; and finally as the overall security chief during the 1934–1935 Long March. After reaching Yan'an (Yenan), Shaanxi (Shensi), in October 1935, Li became head of the CCP Central Committee's Liaison Bureau, also known as the Northwestern Liaison Bureau, which was responsible for united front external communications. He also assisted Zhou's Northeastern Work Committee. As a result of Li's efforts throughout 1936, Zhou successfully secured an agreement from Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang), commander of the Nationalist Northeastern Army, on a GMD-CCP united front against the Japanese, which became official after the Xi'an (Sian) Incident at the year's end.

While continuing his GMD-CCP liaison responsibilities during the 1937–1945 Sino-Japanese War, Li also served as director of the Eighth Route Army's offices in various places, first in Shanghai and Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu (Kiangsu); there, he conducted intelligence collection and helped secure the Nationalists' release of the Chinese Communist political prisoners. After Nanjing's fall in late 1937, Li went to Wuhan in Hubei (Hupeh) and then, in October 1938, to Guilin (Kweilin) in Guangxi (Kwangsi). The Guilin office was of more significance, as it was the CCP's communication center with eastern and southern China and with overseas Chinese as well as the command post for directing cultural and united fronts in China. When it was closed after the January 1941 New Fourth Army Incident, Li returned to Yan'an, serving as deputy director of both the Social Affairs Department and the Central Committee Intelligence Bureau throughout the remainder of the war.

During the Chinese Civil War, Li worked in the northwest. After the birth of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, he became the vice minister of foreign affairs until 1954. The next year, Li was made deputy

chief of staff and colonel general of the People's Liberation Army. Li died in Beijing (Peking) on February 9, 1962.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

China; China, Army; New Fourth Army Incident; Sino-Japanese War; Zhou Enlai

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Lin Biao (1907–1971)

Chinese Communist marshal. Born in Hubei Province, China, on December 5, 1907, Lin Biao (Lin Piao) was the son of a factory owner. In 1925, he moved to Shanghai in Jiangsu Province, where he joined the Socialist Youth League and the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD). At the Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou (Canton), Kwangdong (Kwangtung) Province, where he graduated in 1926, Lin met Communist leader Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), deputy director of the school's Political Department. Lin served with GMD forces in the 1926–1927 Northern Expedition, rising to the rank of major, but in the summer of 1927, he defected with his troops to assist the unsuccessful Jiangxi (Kwangsi) Communist uprising.

Lin then joined communist leaders Zhu De (Chu Teh) and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) in the 1927–1928 Jiangxi Soviet, commanding Communist troops. In 1934 and 1935, Lin led the Communist I Corps in its breakout from GMD encirclement in Jiangxi on the Long March to Yan'an (Yenan), in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province.

Appointed commander of the Eighth Route Army's 115th Division in 1937, Lin gradually expanded his forces into what became the Fourth Field

Army after the Communist-Nationalist anti-Japanese rapprochement. In September 1937, his troops ambushed a Japanese regiment, and Lin figured prominently in the unsuccessful autumn 1940 "Hundred Regiments" offensive. From then until Japan surrendered in August 1945, Lin concentrated on building up Communist bases and forces behind Japanese lines in northern China, facilitating the communist position in that region during the postwar conflict between GMD and Communist forces.

From November 1950 to April 1951, after the Communists had prevailed in the civil war, Lin's Fourth Army spearheaded the Chinese forces that entered the Korean War. In 1955, he became one of the 10 marshals of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and in 1959 minister of defense. In 1969, Communist Party chairman Mao named Lin—his supporter from 1966 to 1969 during the Cultural Revolution—as his heir. But for reasons that remain obscure, Mao apparently broke with him in 1971. Subsequently, Lin was alleged to have mounted an unsuccessful coup or assassination attempt against Mao, and on September 13, 1971, he died with his family in an airplane crash near the Mongolian frontier while fleeing for asylum to the Soviet Union.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De

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Lin Piao

See Lin Biao

Lindbergh, Charles Augustus (1902–1974)

U.S. aviation pioneer and isolationist leader. Born on February 4, 1902, in Detroit, Michigan, Charles Augustus Lindbergh attended the University of Wisconsin but left school to study flying in Minnesota in 1922. He was commissioned in the Army Air Service Reserve Corps in 1924, and two years later, he became an airmail pilot. On May 20, 1927, Lindbergh took off in the *Spirit of St. Louis* from Long Island, New York, on the first successful solo transatlantic flight, landing in Paris 33.5 hours later.

Charles A. Lindbergh beside his plane, *The Spirit of St. Louis*. Lindbergh was a staunch advocate of isolationism early in World War II and openly critical of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy of aiding the Allies. (Library of Congress)

Lindbergh returned to the United States a national hero. Awarded the Medal of Honor, he carried out a goodwill tour of North and South America. He and his wife, Anne Morrow Lindbergh, then pioneered air routes that would later be used by commercial airliners.

Four years after the kidnapping and death of his infant son (1932), Lindbergh moved his family to Europe to escape the press. The "Lone Eagle," as Lindbergh was known, was invited to inspect the German Luftwaffe, and he came away convinced of the Germans' air superiority.

Returning to the United States in 1939, Lindbergh became one of the chief advocates of U.S. neutrality after Germany invaded Poland on September 1, and he was openly critical of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to support the Allies. In a series of speeches, Lindbergh became the leading spokesperson for the Committee to Defend America First. The animosity between Roosevelt and Lindbergh was acute, and Lindbergh resigned his Air Corps reserve commission. A Madison Square Garden speech he gave on May 23, 1941, produced a popular backlash; however, threats were made against his life, and his books were removed from library shelves. In a speech in Des Moines, Iowa, Lindbergh claimed that the Roosevelt administration, the British, and the Jews were drawing the United States into the war.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), Lindbergh urged support for the war effort, and in late December 1941, he offered his services to the military but was rejected because of his prewar position. Seeking to become part of the war effort, he joined the Ford Company to assist in production of the Consolidated B-24 Liberator bomber. Lindbergh then joined United Aircraft, and in 1944, he helped to test fighter aircraft in the Pacific and teach fuel economy techniques. He also flew some 50 combat missions and shot down at least one Japanese plane. Returning to the United States, he spent the remaining years of his life championing conservationist causes. He won the 1953 Pulitzer Prize for his autobiography, *The Spirit of St. Louis*, and in 1954 his Air Force Reserve commission was restored at the rank of brigadier general. Lindbergh died on August 26, 1974, in Hana, Maui, Hawaii.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM

See also

America First Committee; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Document 90

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Lindemann, Frederick Alexander (1886–1957)

British physicist. Born on April 5, 1886, in Baden-Baden, Germany, Frederick Alexander Lindemann earned a doctorate in physics from the Sorbonne (1910). During World War I, he served as a civilian expert at the Royal Aircraft Establishment in Farnborough, England, studying means of overcoming otherwise fatal aircraft spins. He obtained a pilot's license in 1916.

Lindemann became a professor of experimental philosophy (physics) at Oxford University in April 1919 and first met Winston L. S. Churchill in August 1921, becoming friends with the whole Churchill family, thanks in part to his ability to explain abstruse scientific facts or theories in language that could be understood by a layperson.

Lindemann entered government as Churchill's adviser at the Admiralty in September 1939. A month later, Lindemann established a statistical section. In 1942, he was named paymaster general, a cabinet position that he held until 1945. But his primary focus was on advising Churchill (in the course of the war, he sent the prime minister some 2,000 memos, about a third of them concerned with weapons or the armed forces) and heading the Statistical Branch, which reduced as many aspects of the conflict as possible to quantitative terms to allow easier assessment of what was working and what was not.

Arguing from the data developed by his statisticians, Lindemann strongly supported strategic bombing (although he deliberately overestimated its likely impact), and he backed development of the proximity fuze. Unfortunately, he retained grudges, had an acidic personality, appeared aloof, offered opinions on subjects about which he was not an authority, and was all too easily critical of others.

Lindemann was named a peer in 1941, becoming Lord Cherwell, and was made a viscount in 1956. He taught at Oxford after the war and then briefly joined Churchill's second government, until he resigned due to ill health (in October 1953) and returned to Oxford. Lindemann died there on July 3, 1957.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Proximity Fuze

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List, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter (1880–1971)

German Army general. Born on May 14, 1880, in Oberkirch, Germany, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter List joined the army in 1898. During World War I, he was a General Staff officer and became an expert on the Balkans. After the war, List served in a Freikorps unit and then joined the Reichswehr, eventually becoming a tank specialist.

List was made chief of the Army Organization Department in 1930 and was promoted to major general. In 1932, he was promoted to lieutenant general, and in 1934 he took command of the 4th Infantry Division at Dresden. In 1935, he commanded the IV Army Corps. Although he was anti-Nazi, List failed to speak out against Adolf Hitler's dishonorable treatment of Generals Werner von Blomberg and Werner von Fritsch. Escaping the generals' purge of 1938, List assumed command of the 5th Infantry Division in Vienna.

In the September 1, 1939, attack against Poland, List, now a colonel general, commanded the Fourteenth Army in General Karl Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South and captured Kraków. In the May 10–June 25, 1940, Battle for France, List again served under Rundstedt, commanding the Twelfth Army, primarily an infantry force. He impressed his peers by the speed with which he maneuvered his troops and in penetrating the Maginot Line. Hitler promoted him to field marshal in July 1940.

List then returned to the Balkans, concluding a secret agreement with Bulgarian minister of war General Teodossi Dascaloff to allow German troops safe passage through that country to Greece. List and his forces helped conquer Greece by April 23, 1941, and he then commanded all German

forces in the Balkans. Directly subordinate to Hitler, List was responsible for the German-occupied areas of the Balkans as well as liaison with Italian and Bulgarian forces there.

In July 1942, List took command of Army Group A in the Soviet Union, with the task of securing the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Sochi, Sukhumi, and Batumi to take the Soviet naval bases and oil fields there. His forces were insufficient for the task and were halted at the Terek River at the end of August. List wanted to fall back and regroup, but Hitler insisted that he continue offensive operations and secure the oil fields of Baku, Tiflis, and Batumi, but he was unable to do so. List fell ill and was removed from command on September 9, 1942, and Hitler then took personal command of Army Group A.

In February 1948, List was tried at Nuremberg on war crimes charges, found guilty, and sentenced to life in prison. He was released in December 1952. List died in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, on August 17, 1971.

M. DAVID YAMAN

See also

Blomberg, Werner von; France, Battle for; Fritsch, Werner Thomas Ludwig von; Hitler, Adolf; Poland Campaign; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von

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Literature and the War

While military action involving a given war has a relatively restricted timeline, the literature of a war has no such limits. Wars are routinely reanalyzed and refought in the context of literary works, and World War II continues to loom over the global consciousness well into the 21st century and particularly in the wake of later conflicts such as the Cold War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and a host of other military confrontations that demonstrate that World War II has never truly ended. A survey of World War II literature can hardly hope to do justice to this complex area, but it can

highlight major works from three areas: first, literary works immediately before and during the conflict; second, literature from the end of the war to the present; and third, the literature of the Holocaust, an event that preceded armed conflict but has left perhaps the most indelible mark on the modern consciousness.

Concurrently, since World War II was indeed a global war, this overview will focus on national literatures that demonstrate how their respective publics tried—and continue to try—to deal with the developments of the era.

Literature Written on the Eve of World War II and during the Conflict

The 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War

This conflict served in many ways as a preliminary staging ground for World War II, and a number of writers dealing with it reflect an awareness that Bolshevism and fascism were counterpoised, in spite of the apathy of Western governments. Foremost among French left-wing writers is André Malraux, who published his *L'Espoir* (Man's Hope, 1938), a novel influenced by his Spanish war experiences. In contrast, Robert Brasillach, later executed as a collaborationist at the end of World War II, voiced fascist sentiments in his fictional works and his writings in the journal *Je suis partout* (I Am Everywhere) from 1937 to 1943. Among the members of the American "Abraham Lincoln Brigade," writers such as Ernest Hemingway, Herbert Matthews, Martha Gellhorn, and Lillian Hellman strengthened antifascist opinion in the United States; in this context, Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* (1940) has become a classic. In a British context, George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* (1938) is based on his experiences during the Spanish Civil War.

Germany and Italy

Not surprisingly, Nazi propaganda dominated German literary output before and during the war. Most notably, Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle, 1925–1926) expanded upon earlier racist theories and anti-Semitism. Moreover, it clearly identified what Hitler viewed as the twin evils of Judaism and communism and, prefiguring the Reich's later military moves,

called upon Germany to fulfill its destiny of moving eastward to achieve *Lebensraum* (living space). In addition, Nazi propaganda relied heavily on the press, censored from 1933 onward. Party mouthpieces included the *Völkischer Beobachter* (People's Observer) and the even more virulent *Der Stürmer* (Storm Trooper), controlled by Julius Streicher, who later founded a publishing house under the same name. This prolific writer produced a host of overtly anti-Semitic works, including books for children. Other pro-Nazi writers invoked the fearless, pure-blooded Germanic archetype: for example, Hanns Johst in his novel *Undying Mother* (1933) and a host of short stories and poems.

A prominent group of German writers (many in internal and external exile), however, voiced resistance to the Nazi regime. In *The World of Yesterday* (1942), published in the year of the writer's suicide, Stefan Zweig views World War I and the rise of Hitler as "the fist shattering the continent." Other prominent writers in exile included Thomas Mann (whose *Lotte in Weimar*, published in 1939, offers a subtle critique of German militarism) and his brother, Heinrich Mann. Klaus Mann, son of Thomas, published his *Mephisto,* a portrayal of a famous actor who, as a modern-day Faust, sells his soul to fascism, only to be destroyed by it. Other writers such as Bertolt Brecht and Anna Seghers offered a socialist alternative to fascism, including Brecht's drama *Fear and Misery of the Third Reich* (1938) and Seghers's *Seventh Cross* (1942), a novel about a successful escape from a concentration camp.

Among other Axis allies, little of import evolved from fascist Italy before or during the war years. A notable exception is Giuseppe Antonio Borghese's *Goliath: The March of Fascism* (published in English in 1937 but not translated into Italian until 1947). Another exile writer, novelist Ignazio Silone, published *Fontamara* in 1933 and *Bread and Wine* in 1936. Curzio Malaparte's *Kaputt* (1944), a novel by a war correspondent, a onetime fascist who was later to become a Marxist, spans Axis Europe and darkly portrays the Jewish genocide. In Japan as in the Third Reich, propaganda served as literature, as reflected in newspapers and magazines. Pamphlets abounded, including *Read This and the War Is Won* (1937?).

France

As in Germany, the literary world in France was divided between collaborators and resistors—many of whom emigrated. Among collaborators, Louis-Ferdinand Céline published anti-Semitic material such as *Trifles for a Massacre* (1937) and *School for Corpses* (1938); others, such as Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Robert Brasillach (*Our Prewar,* 1941), and Lucien Rebatet also made no secret of their fascist persuasions. In contrast, the poetry of two Marxists, Paul Éluard and Louis Aragon, had extensive clandestine circulation, as did Jean-Marcel Bruller's (aka Vercors) *The Silence of the Sea* (1941). Albert Camus's significant novel *The Plague* (1947) uses the metaphor of a plague epidemic to probe the issues of resistance and collaboration. Romanian French writer Eugène Ionesco was to return to this motif of political "infection" as an epidemic in his powerful drama *Rhinoceros* in 1959. To a lesser extent, Jean-Paul Sartre's wartime writings such as *The Flies* (1943) and *No Exit* (1944) also probed the conflicts of individual and collective responsibility. In addition, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's poetic *Wartime Pilot* (1942) was based on the author's wartime mission as a pioneer aviator.

Soviet Union

Soviet writers were directed to promote public readiness for an eventual conflict with Nazi Germany, although this changed to some extent after the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939. For instance, Ilya Ehrenburg, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, found that *Izvestia* no longer published his articles when he returned to the Soviet Union from France in 1940, even though Joseph Stalin grudgingly approved his novel *The Fall of Paris* after the first part appeared in 1941.

After the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, however, Ehrenburg became a weapon of war, publishing more than 2,000 articles, many of them ferociously anti-German, chiefly in the paper *Red Star.* In 1943, in conjunction with fellow journalist Vasily Grossman, Ehrenburg began editing *The Black Book,* a record of depredations against Soviet Jewry on the basis of firsthand testimony from newly liberated areas; Stalin, however, was to prevent its postwar publication. Even more than Ehrenburg, Grossman's *Red Star* reporting led him to the front lines, where he based his

stories on extensive interviews with men of all ranks and even accompanied Stalingrad sniper Anatoly Chekhov to his post.

Among writers in other genres, poets such as Aleksey Surkov, Konstantin Simonov, and Semyon Gudzenko reflected the pain of separation and the harrowing experiences of combat. In particular, Olga Berggolts's voice was familiar to radio listeners during the Siege of Leningrad (July 10, 1941–January 22, 1944), especially with her poem "February Diary" (winter of 1941–1942), written while her husband was dying of starvation. In addition, Aleksandr Tvardovsky's long narrative poem, *Vasily Tyorkin: A Book about a Soldier* (1942–1945), follows its hero through battles, convalescence from wounds, and the advance on Berlin. Novelists were less prolific during the war years; the one work that stands out is Victor Nekrasov's *In the Trenches of Stalingrad* (1945).

Great Britain

During World War II, prose in Great Britain was the predominant genre. Representations of the Blitz are vivid in James Hanley's novel *No Directions* (1943), William Sansom's firefighting stories, and Henry Green's novel *Caught* (1943). Similarly, Elizabeth Bowen's collection of short stories, *The Demon Lover and Other Stories* (1945), reflects the psychological disorientation that results from war. In Patrick Hamilton's novel *Hangover* (1941), the heroine is traumatized by her lover, who turns out to be a fascist. In contrast, Evelyn Waugh's *Put Out More Flags* (1942) is a satirical representation of the inability of upper-class Britons and other groups to deal seriously with the fascist threat during the onset of the war. Among poets, Alun Lewis, Sidney Keyes, and Keith Douglas died in service; the most eloquent poetic voice of the generation, however, may well have been T.S. Eliot in *The Four Quartets* (1935–1942), which represents a search for significance in the midst of destruction and strident nationalism.

United States

The number of American literary works written during World War II is fairly limited. Among poets, John Gillespie Magee wrote his poem "High Flight" (1941) as a pilot in the Royal Canadian Air Force shortly before the United

States officially entered the war. Other major poets included Randall Jarrell, whose experience in the air forces inspired a series of bitter poems, *Little Friend, Little Friend,* in 1945, and Archibald MacLeish, whose poetic drama *The Fall of the City* (1937) is a parable of Adolf Hitler's rise. Another major American poet, Ezra Pound, was notorious for his support of Benito Mussolini and his propaganda broadcasts from Italy; tried for treason after the war, Pound was declared insane and confined to a mental hospital.

Other American works during the war include Lillian Hellman's play *Winged Victory* (1941), reprised as a film in 1943. Gertrude Stein's journals of her war years in France appeared as *Wars I Have Seen* (1945). John Steinbeck, who worked as a correspondent, brought forth his propagandistic side in *The Moon Is Down* (1942), a novel about Norwegians under the Nazis. As in the Soviet Union, however, the United States produced a constellation of war correspondents, among whom Pulitzer Prize–winner Ernie Pyle is perhaps the best known for his vivid reports from Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific; he died in sniper fire on a small island near Okinawa in 1945. A number of collections of his reports appeared during the war: *Ernie Pyle in England* (1941), *Here Is Your War* (1943), and *Brave Men* (1944). Other prominent war correspondents include William L. Shirer, Edward Murrow, Bill Mauldin, and John Hersey.

Literature Written from 1945 to the Present

United States

Shortly after war's end, a number of major American novels emerged, including Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* (1948), Irwin Shaw's *The Young Lions* (1948), and James Jones's *From Here to Eternity* (1951), followed by *The Thin Red Line* (1962). Herman Wouk gained extensive popularity with his *Caine Mutiny* (1951), *Winds of War* (1971), and *War and Remembrance* (1978), all of which inspired successful movies.

Thomas Heggen's *Mister Roberts* (1946), based on the writer's memories as a sailor aboard a navy cargo ship in the Pacific, probes the daily boredom and hijinks of a crew that sees no combat. Eventually Roberts transfers to a destroyer, where he is killed. Originally a novel, the work later became a successful Broadway production and, later still, a movie starring Henry Fonda. James Michener's *Tales of the South Pacific* (1948) is a series of

loosely connected stories based on the writer's experiences with the U.S. Navy; this later became famous in its musical adaptation by Rogers and Hammerstein (*South Pacific*).

Among ground-breaking works using postmodernist techniques, Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* (1961) follows a fictional American squadron on the Mediterranean front in a chronologically truncated series of episodes that reflect the group's often futile attempts to maintain their sanity amid chaos and existential uncertainty. Another significant novel is Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse Five* (1969), which takes its title from the writer's experiences as a prisoner of war in a German slaughterhouse. Billy Pilgrim and his fellow prisoners of war undergo an apocalyptic experience during the Allied firebombing of Dresden (February 13–15, 1945) and are forced to excavate corpses from the rubble of the ruined city. An even more complex work, Thomas Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* (1973), is set in Europe during the final days of the war; highlighting a quest to decipher the secret of a mysterious "black device" for a rocket, the novel, hailed as an American masterpiece, weaves together nonsense, history, science, and philosophy.

Fictional and nonfictional treatment of World War II has remained a constant in American literature up to the present. In a gripping plot, Richard Wiley's novel *Soldiers in Hiding* (1986) is about a group of Japanese American jazz musicians stranded in Japan after the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Feminist writer Marge Piercy published her acclaimed *Gone to Soldiers,* a novel intertwining the stories of six women and four men, in 1988, and in 1992 well-known historian Stephen Ambrose published *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest.* More recently, Joseph Bruchac's *Code Talker: A Novel about the Navajo Marines of World War Two* (2006) features Native Americans, while David Robbins's *Liberation Road: A Novel of World War II and the Red Ball Express* (2004) deals with the 23,000 men —mostly African Americans—who supplied American forces during the liberation of France.

Great Britain

In a time of postwar exhaustion, economic problems, and the dissolution of its colonial empire, it is not surprising that few significant works about World

War II emerged in the United Kingdom during the first decades after the war. After focusing on the war-ravaged city of Vienna in *The Third Man* (1950), Graham Greene's *The End of the Affair* (1951) uses the London Blitz as a backdrop for the story of an adulterous affair, infused with fervent Catholicism. Evelyn Waugh, another convert to Catholicism, wrote *Men at Arms* (1952), the first novel in his *Sword of Honor* trilogy; the hero, Guy Crouchback, hails from a decadent British family and, during his involvement with the army, experiences recurrent chaos before he is sent home. Mary Renault's *The Charioteer* (1953) takes up a daring topic for its time when a young soldier, recuperating from an injury, falls in love with a ward mate. Another controversial novel, Muriel Spark's *The Prime of Miss Jean Brody* (1961), deals with a jealous student who accuses her teacher of fascism.

More directly related with combat, Peter Towry's *Trial by Battle* (1959), which concerns a young British officer in Malaya during the Japanese advance there, is possibly the best British novel that emerged from the war, alongside J. G. Ballard's *Empire of the Sun* (1984), set in occupied China. In the popular press, Ken Follett's spy thriller *Eye of the Needle* (1978) and his more recent *Jackdaws* (1996), about female saboteurs behind enemy lines in France, have been best sellers. Also, Alastair Maclean deserves mention for his books, including *HMS Ulysses* (1955), *The Guns of Navarone* (1955), *Force 10 from Navarone* (1968), and *Partisans* (1982).

The onset of the 21st century demonstrates that World War II is still very much a presence in the British imagination, and here the focus has been on the female experience. Sebastian Faulks's *Charlotte Gray* (1998) is the romantic tale of a Scottish woman parachuted into France. In contrast, *Nella Last's War: A Mother's Diary, 1939–45* (2006) takes the war to the home front, as does Angela Huth's *Land Girls* (1994), a novel about three women who form a strong friendship during a summer of land service. Also set on the home front, Robert Radcliffe's *Under an English Heaven* (2002) deals with the apprehensions of villagers in East Anglia as American airmen take off on daytime assaults on industrial targets in Germany.

Germany

In the rubble of its defeat, Germany faced a particular conundrum. Not only was the country divided into east and west zones, but Germans had to come to terms with the atrocities of the past, a huge influx of ethnic German deportees, and their own substantial losses. Not surprisingly, major works on the war emerged relatively late. In the Soviet Zone, little was done to raise the public consciousness of the past, for the conversion to a Marxist regime had ostensibly obliterated all remnants of capitalist Nazism. In the Western Zone, nevertheless, memoirs and pseudobiographical works abounded, often published by private presses.

In addition, the 1950s saw an influx of novels probing the trauma of conflict, such as Gert Ledig's *Stalin Organ* (1958), which portrays unexceptional men thrust into the vicious futility of the Siege of Leningrad. Also, Willi Heinrich achieved considerable popularity with his racy, candid war novels, of which *Cross of Iron* (1955), originally published in English as *The Willing Flesh*, is the best known. On a more serious level, Heinrich Böll probed World War II in such works as *The Train Was on Time* (1949), about a German soldier traveling by train from Paris, and *Billiars at Half-past Nine* (1959), which traces a family history and shows Böll's opposition to Nazism and to war in general. More confrontationally, Günther Grass offers a biting allegory of the rise of Nazism in *The Tin Drum* (1959) in the person of the dwarf Oskar Matzerath, who decides that his "spiritual development is complete at birth and only needs to affirm itself," so long as he can use noise as a weapon. Grass demonstrated, however, a different view of the war in his later work, *Crabwalk* (2002), focusing on thousands of ethnic German refugees on the *Wilhelm Gustloff*, sunk by a Russian submarine in January 1945. Similarly, Siegfried Lenz's *Heritage* (1978) tells the story of the flight of a peaceful group of Mazurian Prussians in the face of the Red Army.

More controversially, Martin Walser, whose drama *Black Swan* (1964) has been hailed for dealing with the guilt of the past, later created a public outcry in 1998 when, accepting the Frankfurt Book Fair Peace Prize, he stated that while no reasoning person can deny the Holocaust, it is currently being used as a "routine threat" or "moral cudgel."

Former Luftwaffe lieutenant Hans Helmut Kirst was a post–World War II German novelist who wrote 46 books, many of them dealing with military and political themes. During the 1960s he was the most widely published modern German author in English. One of his most successful books was the

1962 *Die Nacht der Generale.* In 1967 the book was turned into a successful film starring Peter O'Toole and Omar Sharif. Kirst's 1962 book, *Fabrik der Offiziere* (*Officer Factory*) is a gripping murder mystery set in a German officer candidate school in 1944. It is also a penetrating analysis of the moral rot and political corruption of the Wehrmacht during the Third Reich.

Kirst's most famous books are the *Gunner Asch Trilogy,* originally published in German as the *Null-Acht-Fünfzehn* series. The main character, clearly based on Kirst, starts as an enlisted soldier in the prewar German military, serves throughout World War II, reaches the rank of lieutenant, and returns to a shattered Germany in 1945. Increasingly, German literature marks a determination to come to terms with the past, a move that also includes, as W. G. Sebald states in his controversial *On the Natural History of Destruction* (1999), overcoming the "self-imposed silence" on the destruction that Germans experienced during the final months of the war.

Italy

Italian literature reveals a spectrum of trauma and loss. In a memoir of 1953, *The Sergeant in the Snow,* Mario Rigoni Stern tells the harrowing story of 200,000 Italian troops involved in the advance on and retreat from the Soviet Union between mid-1941 and early 1943, while Alberto Moravia's *Two Women* (1958) details the abuse of a mother and daughter during the final year of the war from their Italian compatriots, occupying Germans, and then the Allied liberators. In a similar vein, Elsa Morante's *History: A Novel* (1974) deals with a part-Jewish mother trying to protect her family in the Roman slums during the German occupation. Also with a civilian focus, Cesare Pavese's *House on the Hill* (1948) describes an Allied bombing raid on Turin. Deflating the myth of the Resistance, Italo Calvino's *The Path to the Nest of Spiders* (1947) centers on a boy and his prostitute sister in a partisan group composed of criminals; similarly, Luigi Meneghello's *Outlaws* (1964) and Beppe Fenoglio's *Johnny the Partisan* (1968) tend to debunk the myth of the partisan. More recently, Alessandro Portelli's *The Order Has Been Carried Out* (1999) concerns the Nazi massacre of 335 Roman hostages in the Fosse Ardeatine on March 24, 1944, in reprisal for a Resistance attack that killed 33 German soldiers.

Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia

Stalinist propaganda at the beginning of the Cold War hampered Russian literature dealing with World War II. Grossman's *For a Just Cause* (1952) incited criticism for failing to acknowledge the Communist Party's role in the Great Patriotic War; similarly, Aleksandr Fadeyev's *Young Guard* (originally written in 1945 but published with extensive revision in 1951), based on the activities of an underground resistance group, was heavily censored. Vasily Grossman's *Life and Fate,* an epic novel that sweeps from Stalingrad to Soviet prisoners to Jewish ghettos, had to be published in Switzerland in 1980; it did not appear in the Soviet Union until 1988, during the perestroika era of Mikhail Gorbachev. Boris Vasilyev, another writer who capitalized on his wartime experiences, produced *The Dawns Here Are Quiet* (1969), a tale of female heroism, followed by major stories: "Not on the Active List" (1974) and "Tomorrow There Came War" (1984). Other works by soldiers turned writers include Boris Nikolaevich Polevoy's *Story of a Real Man* (1952) about fighter pilot Alexei Petrovich Maresiev; Victor Astafyev's *Jolly Soldier* (1999); and the novellas of Vasil Bykaŭ, "The Dead Feel No Pain" (1965), "The Ordeal" (1970), and "Wolf Pack" (1975).

Japan

The best-known World War II novel from the Japanese point of view remains Sholei Ooka's *Fires on the Plain* (1957), which describes a warrior devastated by the collapse of his country; as a prisoner of the Americans, he acknowledges the futility of all sacrifices in war. Akira Yoshimura's powerful novel *One Man's Justice,* although originally published in 1978, did not become available in English translation until early in the 21st century. It contained no mention of Pearl Harbor or the atrocities committed by the Japanese against the Chinese and other peoples who fell under their control, but it did movingly capture the thoughts and emotions of its hero, a Japanese soldier.

On the run from a U.S. military tribunal, the soldier feels no guilt for having beheaded an American prisoner of war after the end of hostilities. He has witnessed the sufferings of Hiroshima and does not believe that Americans have the moral authority to judge him. They have exterminated

his countrymen “as if they were vermin” and, he learns, listened to jazz while returning from their murderous bombing raids.

Considering the magnitude of the event, there are relatively few fictional treatments of the beginning of the atomic age and the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One well-known novel is, however, based on diaries and interviews with survivors of Hiroshima, Masuji Ibuse’s *Black Rain* (1985).

France

After the liberation of France, there was freedom to reflect on the national humiliation. Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Blood of Others* (1948) placed ill-fated lovers adrift in wartime France. Henri Troyat’s 1958 novel, *The Encounter,* examined the German occupation through the eyes of a woman who kept a music shop and loved American jazz. Jean Paul Sartre’s *Troubled Sleep* (1959) tried to suggest reasons for the ignoble capitulation of France. The short stories, novels, and plays of both Sartre and Albert Camus—and the existentialist philosophy they expressed—were likewise products of occupation and experiences of the Resistance. The most curiously disturbing French writer during the period was Louis-Ferdinand Céline, who vacillated between admiration for and abhorrence of Hitler, between French patriotism and denunciation of his countrymen. His last important works, *Castle to Castle* (1957) and *North* (1960), described the Nazi nightmare world that France became in the war.

Perhaps the best-loved World War II novel from a French writer was Pierre Boulle’s *The Bridge over the River Kwai* (1954), with its generally admiring view of the professionalism of British servicemen, its exploration of the moral ambiguities of wartime, and the humor and irony with which it examined relationships between Japanese officers and British prisoners of war. Another popular work is Guy Sajer’s *The Forgotten Soldier* (1965), originally published in French, an account of an Alsatian soldier’s vicissitudes on the Eastern Front as a member of the Grossdeutschland Division.

Other Nations

Of the many war novels written in the less widely known languages of other participants, several have been translated and merit mention. Tage Skou-Hansen's *The Naked Trees,* translated from Danish and first published in 1959, was a love story from occupied Denmark. The best-known Finnish novel from the war was Paavo Rintala's *The Long Distance Patrol* (1967), detailing the experiences of Finnish soldiers caught between two oppressors, the Soviets and the Germans. A powerful Dutch novel was Hugo Claus's *The Sorrows of Belgium* (1990), which viewed the trauma of a complex society in wartime and the collaboration of certain Flemish nationalists with invading Nazis.

Two Czech novels that have received international acclaim are Josef Bor's *The Therezin Requiem* (1963) and Bohumil Hrabal's *Closely Watched Trains* (1968). Bor fictionalized an actual event, performances of Verdi's *Requiem* for an audience of Nazi officials, including the notorious Adolf Eichmann. The musicians, all prisoners of the Theresienstadt camp, were exterminated after their last concert. Hrabal's novel pictured life in a small depleted Czech village in the last days of the occupation.

Other East European writers have left unique records. Constantin V. Gheorghiu's *Twenty-Fifth Hour* (1950) is a picaresque tale of the misadventures of a Romanian peasant held for 13 years in different work camps, caught up in the various bureaucracies, and perplexed in turn by fascists, communists, and democratic governments. Another Romanian novel of note is Zaharia Stancu's *The Gypsy Tribe* (1971) about the Nazi persecution of Romany peoples.

The Polish writer Monika Kotowska, in *The Bridge to the Other Side* (1963), provided a sensitive rendering of the sufferings of children during the war and its aftermath. The better-known Polish novelist Stanislaw Lem employed the image of a mental hospital to convey the insanity of the Nazi subjugation of Poland in *Hospital of the Transfiguration* (1975).

Istvan Orkeng, a Hungarian, wrote *The Toth Family* (1966), a black comedy indicting the general compliance of his countrymen with Nazism. Danilo Kis's *Hourglass* (1984) displayed a Kafkaesque world on the multiethnic borders of Hungary and Yugoslavia, where suicide, murder, and instant disappearance became mundane events. The most acclaimed Serbo-Croatian novel was Miodrag Bulatovic's *A Hero on a Donkey* (1965), set in Montenegro under the Italian fascist military presence. With a lighter touch,

Bulatovic reinforced the common perception that an Italian occupation was the least of many possible misfortunes. Statis Tsirkas's *Drifting Cities* (1974) was the most notable Greek novel of the war, with its mysterious locales of Cairo, Jerusalem, and Alexandria and its celebration of the Greek struggle against both fascism and communism.

Two books with special exotic appeal came from Indonesia and Iran, respectively. Ismail Marahimin's *And the War Is Over* (1977) was set in fabled Sumatra, among Dutch prisoners of the Japanese. The book won the highest literary prize offered by Indonesia. *Savushun: A Novel of Modern Iran* (1969) by Simin Daneshvar described Iran during the British and Soviet occupations. Although protection of the oil fields is the official concern, one simple family struggles to maintain honor and dignity, despite disease, famine, and the assassination of their patriarch. The book was also notable for its feminine point of view; it was the work of an accomplished Iranian woman novelist.

Holocaust Literature

Of all the many atrocities of the 20th century, the Holocaust stands out most vividly in the Western collective memory, and an abbreviated overview cannot do more than scratch the surface. Most famous is, of course, *The Diary of Anne Frank*, a coming-of-age memoir of years in hiding from the Nazis. This focus on adolescence continues in a host of biographies and memoirs written for a juvenile audience: for example, Judith Kerr's *When Hitler Stole Pink Rabbit* (1987), Uri Orlev's *The Island on Bird Street* (1984), and Ida Fink's *A Scrap of Time* (1989).

Foreign editions of *The Diary of Anne Frank*. (Todd A. Gipstein/Corbis)

On an adult level, Tadeusz Borowski's *This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen: And Other Stories* (1948), written by a non-Jewish member of a work commando unit, probes the minds and behaviors of both victims and perpetrators. Elie Wiesel's *Night* (1982), a memoir of Auschwitz, remains one of the most compelling works in the area, as does Charlotte Delbo's *None of Us Will Return* (1968), written by a member of the French Resistance arrested alongside her husband in 1942. Although plagued with personal controversy, Bruno Bettelheim offers considerable insight into the psychology of victim and perpetrator in his *Surviving and Other Essays* (1980). With a similar aim, Victor Frankl's renowned *Man's Search for Meaning* (1984) uses personal experience to arrive at a philosophy of survival.

Another biographical novel that has achieved prominence through the Nobel Peace Prize, *Fateless* (1992), by the Hungarian writer Imre Kertesz, describes the experiences of a 15-year-old sent to Auschwitz and Buchenwald among other Hungarian Jews. The poetry of another Hungarian writer, poet Miklos Radnóti, underlies one of the most striking stories of the Holocaust. Evacuated from a Serbian labor camp, Radnóti collapsed on the forced march near the Austrian border, whereupon he was shot and interred in a trench. When his body was exhumed in 1946, his final poems were found

sewn into the coat in which he was buried. Similarly, French writer Irène Némirovsky's *Suite Française* (2004) appeared posthumously. Italian Primo Michele Levi's *If This Is a Man* (1947, published in the United States as *Survival in Auschwitz*) treats the year he spent in Auschwitz. In Art Spiegelman's *Maus* (1991), cartoon characters represent people, portraying the Jews as mice and the Nazis as cats.

Other notable Holocaust writings were not by survivors but rather by novelists who had lived among survivors: for example, *The Shawl and Rosa* (1989) and William Styron's *Sophie's Choice.* Leon Uris's *Mila 18* (1961) and John Hersey's *The Wall* (1950) are novels about the Warsaw ghetto.

ALLENE PHY-OLSEN AND ANNA M. WITTMANN

See also

Ardeatine Massacre; Art and the War; Babi Yar Massacre; Dresden, Air Attack on; Eichmann, Karl Adolf; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; Literature and the War; Mussolini, Benito; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Stalin, Joseph; *Wilhelm Gustloff*, *General von Steuben*, and *Goya*, Sinking of; Women in World War II

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Lithuania

The largest and most southerly of the Baltic states. Occupied by both the Germans and the Soviets during World War II, Lithuania had a 1939 population of approximately 3 million. Located on the southeast coast of the

Baltic Sea, Lithuania borders Latvia to the north, Poland to the south, and Kaliningrad Oblast, an ethnically Russia exclave, to the southwest. Encompassing 25,212 square miles, Lithuania had secured independence from Russia on February 16, 1918, as a consequence of World War I and Russian revolutions. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic recognized this independence in a bilateral treaty in July 1920, and this was confirmed in a nonaggression pact with a term of 5 years between Lithuania and the Soviet Union on September 18, 1926, extended to a 10-year period in 1934.

In 1939, Antanas Smetona ruled Lithuania as dictator from the capital of Kaunas. Unlike the other Baltic states, Lithuania enjoyed satisfactory relations with the Soviet Union. The nation's vulnerability to its more powerful neighbors was shown in the 1920 Polish seizure of Wilno (Vilnius, Vilna), the old medieval capital of Lithuania. Then in March 1939, Germany seized Memel (Kaunus).

Lithuania remained independent until implementation of the terms of the nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union of August 23, 1939. Under the terms of this agreement, Lithuania was originally assigned to Germany, but in return for additional territory in Poland, Germany ceded Lithuania to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence on September 28.

German forces landing with their equipment at Memel in Lithuania, May 1939. (Central Press/Getty Images)

After the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Lithuania declared its neutrality. On October 10, its leaders signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union. The Soviets then returned Wilno to Lithuania from Poland in exchange for permission to station Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil. The Soviet Union also promised not to interfere in Lithuanian internal affairs.

On activation of this treaty in June 1940, Soviet troops entered Lithuania, and pledges to the contrary notwithstanding, the Soviet government carried out subversive activities, arrested several thousand Lithuanians, and subverted the election process, which brought the communists to power and resulted in the proclamation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. The new government then voted to join the Soviet Union, as announced by Moscow, on August 5, 1940.

The process of the sovietization of Lithuania then commenced. Lithuanian institutions were done away with, and Soviet laws replaced Lithuanian ones. Soviet authorities abolished religious teaching in the schools, seized private lands, and nationalized industries. At least 40,000 Lithuanians believed to be in opposition to these policies were deported to remote portions of the Soviet Union in early June 1941, just before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA (June 22, 1941).

The German Army soon occupied Lithuania and subjected the country to its own control. Industries nationalized by the Soviets now came under Third Reich control, and food and basic goods were rationed. The Germans also attempted to recruit a Lithuanian Schutzstaffel (SS) division, but few responded, and the effort failed. Tens of thousands of Lithuanians were deported to Germany to serve there as slave laborers. The Germans also encouraged the settlement of native Germans in Lithuania, and efforts to secure “racial purity” led to the killing of some 170,000 Lithuanian Jews, chiefly from the ghettos of Wilno and Kaunas.

The reoccupation of Lithuania by the Soviets, beginning in April 1944, brought the flight of tens of thousands of Germans and Lithuanians westward and a new wave of terror. Once the Soviets had control, they reintroduced the

communist leaders from 1940 and Sovietization, including collectivization in land, deportation of remaining Poles, and persecution of the Catholic Church.

The war claimed at least 25 percent of the population of the country through deportations and the loss of virtually all its minorities, including at least 135,000 Jews as well as the Germans and Poles. Between 1947 and 1950, Soviet authorities ordered the deportation of some 350,000 additional Lithuanians. The country did not regain its independence until 1991.

LAURA J. HILTON AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

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Li Tsung-jen

See Li Zongren

Litviak, Lidiia Vladimirovna (1921–1943)

Soviet Air Force officer and first woman fighter pilot to shoot down an enemy aircraft in daytime. Born in Moscow on August 18, 1921, Lidiia (Lilia or Liliia) Vladimirovna Litviak became a flying instructor after graduating from the Kherson Flying School. By mid-1941, she had trained 45 pilots. That fall, she joined Major Marina Raskova's 122th Group. Litviak's 586th Fighter Regiment, which flew Yak-1 fighters, became operational in April 1942 and was assigned the defense of military and civilian installations in Saratov.

In September 1942, Litviak was sent with her squadron to Stalingrad. With fighter pilots Raisa Beliaeva, Ekaterina Budanova, and Mariia

Kuznetsova, Litviak joined the 437th Fighter Regiment, scoring her first two victories on September 13, 1942. As her new wing did not fly Yaks, she soon transferred with Budanova to the 9th Guards Fighter Regiment.

In January 1943 when this wing began acquiring American Bell P-39 Cobras, Litviak and Budanova transferred to the 296th Fighter Regiment (renamed the 73rd Stalingrad-Vienna Guards Fighter Regiment) of 6th Fighter Division, Eighth Air Army, to continue flying Yaks. Both women were commissioned as junior lieutenants on February 23, 1943. Litviak and Budanova both became "free hunters," searching for targets of opportunity. Litviak's final score stood at 12 autonomous and 3 group victories.

Outnumbered in a dogfight, Guards Senior Lieutenant Litviak was killed on August 1, 1943. Because her Yak was missing, rumors persisted that she had gone over to the Germans. Her loyalty to the Soviet regime was suspect, as her father, the former deputy minister of transportation, had been executed in 1937 in the Great Purges. After her remains were found in 1979, Litviak was rehabilitated in March 1986. She was posthumously awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union award by Mikhail Gorbachev on May 5, 1990.

KAZIMIERA J. COTTAM

See also

Raskova, Marina Mikhailovna; Soviet Women's Combat Wings; Women in World War II

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Litvinov, Maxim Maksimovich (1876–1951)

Soviet foreign minister and diplomat. Maxim Maksimovich Litvinov was born Meir Henoch Mojszewicz Wallach-Finkelstein July 17, 1876, in Bialystok, in the Jewish "Pale of Settlement" in what is now Poland. Litvinov

joined the Russian Army in 1893 and was there exposed to Marxism. In 1898, he refused to fire on strikers at a factory in Baku, and while this insubordination was covered up, he was soon dismissed for other violations of army regulations. That same year, Litvinov joined the Russian Social Democratic Party.

Litvinov eventually settled in Kiev, where he managed a sugar factory by day and worked for the underground Social Democratic Party at night. Arrested in 1901, he was sentenced to two years in prison but escaped and fled to Berlin and then to Britain. In 1903, when the Social Democratic Party split into the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, Litvinov sided with the Bolsheviks and worked to promote revolution in Russia.

In November 1917 the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, and Litvinov, who had been living in Britain for a decade, became the Russian diplomatic representative in London. Expelled from Britain in 1919, he returned to Russia and began working in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. During the Russian Civil War, Litvinov was the Russian government's only official diplomat. He became commissar for foreign affairs in July 1930, and in February 1932 he led the Russian delegation to the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where he proposed general and complete disarmament.

When Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, Litvinov championed ties with Western Europe and collective security. Diplomatic relations were also established with the United States in November 1933. In 1935, Litvinov signed mutual assistance pacts with both France and Czechoslovakia directed against Germany.

Following the appeasement of Germany over Czechoslovakia by Britain and France at the September 1938 Munich Conference, Joseph Stalin began to reverse Russian foreign policy to secure time to rearm. Litvinov was dropped as foreign minister in May 1939, replaced by hard-liner Vyacheslav Molotov. Hitler said that this step of dropping an internationalist and a Jew helped convince him that Stalin was serious about a rapprochement. On August 23 in Moscow, the Soviet Union and Germany concluded a nonaggression pact that also secretly partitioned much of Eastern Europe between them.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA on June 22, 1941, Stalin appointed Litvinov as Soviet

ambassador to the United States. He held this post from November 1941 to August 1943 and greatly assisted in the inclusion of the Soviet Union in Lend-Lease assistance.

Litvinov then returned to the Soviet Union to serve as deputy commissar for foreign affairs until he retired in August 1946. He died in Moscow on December 31, 1951.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Hitler, Adolf; Lend-Lease; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich; Munich Conference and Preliminaries; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Stalin, Joseph

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Li Zongren (1891–1969)

Chinese Nationalist general. Born in Lingui (Linkwei), Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province, China, on August 13, 1891, Li Zongren (Li Tsung-jen) graduated from the Guangxi Short-Course Military Academy in 1913. For the next 10 years, in cooperation with another Guangxi officer, Bai Chongxi (Pai Ch'ung-hsi), Li fought against the warlords for control of his native province, which came under his control in December 1924. Around this time, Li joined the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and was appointed pacification commissioner of Guangxi and commander of the First Guangxi Army.

In 1926, Li participated in the 1926–1928 Northern Expedition, with his forces reorganized as the GMD National Revolutionary Army's Seventh Army and himself as commander. In 1929, Li and Bai, known as the Guangxi Clique, rebelled against Jiang to protest his concentration of power, receiving

support from Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yü-hsiang), Yan Xishan (Yen Hsi-shan), and Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei). The resulting struggle ended in a stalemate, as national unity against the Japanese seemed more important after the September 18, 1931, Mukden (Shenyang) Incident in Liaoning Province. In late 1931, Li rejoined the GMD and resumed the post of Guangxi's pacification commissioner, preparing for the forthcoming anti-Japanese war. In mid-1936, he resolved his differences with Jiang and had his forces reorganized as the Fifth Route Army, with himself as commander in chief.

After the Sino-Japanese War began in July 1937, Li became commander in chief of the Fifth War Zone, comprising northern Jiangsu (Kiangsu), northern Anhui (Anhwei), and southern Shandong (Shantung); he was concurrently governor of Anhui. Li established his headquarters in Xuzhou (Hsuchow) in Jiangsu Province, engaging the Japanese in the Battle of Xuzhou at Taierzhuang (T'ai-Erh-Chuang) in March 1938. In May, he moved to Hubei (Hupeh) to defend Wuhan, which fell to the Japanese at year's end. In early 1939, Li confronted the Japanese at another Hubei city, Hankou (Hankow), successfully holding them there and preventing them from advancing westward until early 1945, when he was sent to Shaanxi (Shensi) to head the GMD's Military Affairs Commission.

After the war, Li became director of the presidential headquarters at Beijing (Peking), Hebei (Hopeh), until April 1948, when he was elected vice president. On January 21, 1949, he became acting president. In that capacity, he made a last attempt to negotiate with the Chinese Communists to settle the Chinese Civil War. Because Jiang continued to rule behind the scenes while preparing his way to Taiwan, Li failed to prevent the GMD's defeat. In November 1949, he went to the United States for medical treatment, where he stayed until July 1965. Li then returned to Beijing, receiving a warm reception from the Chinese Communist leaders. He died in Beijing on January 30, 1969.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

Bai Chongxi; China; Feng Yuxiang; Jiang Jieshi; Sino-Japanese War; Wang Jingwei; Wei Lihuang

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Lockwood, Charles Andrew, Jr. (1890–1967)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born on May 6, 1890, in Midland, Virginia, Charles Andrew Lockwood Jr. graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1912. He commanded submarines during World War I and after the war evaluated captured German U-boats. Lockwood spent most of the interwar years in the submarine service. He taught at the Naval Academy from 1933 to 1935 and was chief of staff to the U.S. Fleet submarine commander between 1939 and 1941.

When the United States entered World War II, Lockwood was serving as U.S. naval attaché to Great Britain, a post he retained until March 1942, when he was promoted to rear admiral and became commander of U.S. submarines in the Southwest Pacific. Lockwood assumed command during a difficult time. The navy had recently reorganized his command and relocated it to Australia. In addition, U.S. submarine commanders were experiencing serious problems with unreliable torpedoes. Lockwood led the way in ordering tests to determine the cause of torpedo failure. These experiments eventually resulted in securing properly functioning weaponry for the submarines.

In February 1943, Lockwood became commander of submarines in the Pacific Fleet, and that October he was promoted to vice admiral. Under his direction, the U.S. Pacific submarines became the most effective submarine force in history, utilizing radar, signals intelligence, improved torpedoes, and more aggressive tactics to sink two-thirds (5.3 million tons) of Japanese merchant ships and a third of Japanese warships, at a cost of 52 U.S. submarines sunk.

Lockwood also played an important role in developing procedures to rescue aircraft personnel. In 1943, he adopted a plan that posted submarines in various locations to retrieve downed pilots. This program, dubbed the Lifeguard League, led to the safe return of more than 500 Americans shot down over the Pacific.

After the war, Lockwood went on to serve as navy inspector general in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He served in that assignment until his retirement in September 1947. He then wrote several books about his experiences. Lockwood died in Monte Serena, California, on June 6, 1967.

R. KYLE SCHLAFER

See also

Central Pacific Campaign; Convoys, Axis; Radar; Signals Intelligence; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Submarines; Torpedoes; United States Navy; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan

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Lofoten Islands Raid

See CLAYMORE, Operation

Logistics, Allied

Logistics—the ability to procure, maintain, and transport military matériel, facilities, and personnel—was one key to the Allied victory in World War II. The war required the procurement and transportation of vast quantities of materials to locations thousands of miles distant, with climates as varied as the frozen Aleutian Islands, the tropical jungles of New Guinea and Burma, and the deserts of North Africa. The service troops not only had to deliver the goods but also usually had to develop the transportation infrastructure to enable large quantities of materials to flow efficiently. The Allied powers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States proved adept at solving most logistical challenges and getting the required materials to the locations where they were most needed.

The production of war matériels is ultimately dependent on resources. Although the Axis powers were short of many strategic materials from the beginning of the war, the Allies were fortunate to have adequate supplies of the most vital war resources. The United States and the Soviet Union were especially well placed as far as natural resources were concerned, with sufficient supplies of such resources as coal, oil, iron, copper, lead, and zinc. Shortages of tin, nickel, manganese, tungsten, and magnesite were made up from other Allied powers or neutral states.

These resources were available as long as the Allies controlled the seas and had sufficient merchant shipping to move them where needed. Latin America produced tin, Canada supplied nickel, and India, South Africa, and Latin America had supplies of manganese. Latin America had tungsten, and the Soviet Union and Australia had magnesite. What one country lacked, another often had in surplus.

No single resource proved more important than oil, and the Allies had adequate supplies of that vital commodity. In 1937 the United States produced 60 percent of the world's oil, and Latin America produced 15 percent. Germany, by contrast, produced just 0.2 percent and depended on Romanian oil, which accounted for 2.4 percent of the world's production in 1937. The Allies drew on American domestic production along with oil from Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East.

The only petroleum problems experienced by the Allies involved the production of sufficient high-octane aviation fuel and the general distribution of petroleum products. The United States eliminated the shortage of high-octane fuel by implementing a major construction program to build additional refineries. The construction of oil tankers, the defeat of the U-boat menace, and the development of pipelines to move fuel—such as the "Pipeline under the Ocean" (PLUTO) for the Normandy Invasion and the petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL) pipeline system across France—all were key to solving the transportation problems. Some campaigns were affected by fuel shortages, such as Lieutenant General George Patton's drive across France in the summer of 1944, but the Allies usually had ample supplies of fuel with only occasional spot shortages, whereas major fuel shortages hindered the Axis powers throughout most of the war.

The four major Allied powers each had special logistical requirements and problems during the war, which they confronted with varying degrees of

success. In the end, the combined logistical effort enabled the Allies to defeat the Axis powers.

In the Far East, the Chinese—both the Nationalists led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the Communists led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung)—had large numbers of ground forces in the field and millions of troops during the war but limited industrial capability to support them. By 1941, most of China's industrial areas had been overrun by the Japanese following their invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and China proper in 1937. The Chinese needed whatever aid the other Allies could spare, but geography imposed serious limitations on transporting that aid into the country.

Prior to December 1941 and the U.S. entry into the war, Western aid to China was limited to a trickle of supplies arriving through Burma or was primarily symbolic, such as that provided by the famed Flying Tigers (the American Volunteer Group) commanded by Claire Chennault.

Construction of the Burma Road and later the Ledo Road and the establishment of an air bridge over the Himalaya Mountains enabled greater quantities of aid to reach China, but these provisions were limited in comparison to materials going to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Japan's invasion of Burma and its subsequent drive toward India imposed further difficulties on providing aid to China. Indeed, getting military assistance there remained a daunting task throughout the war. The success of the air bridge and the Burma and Ledo Roads helped keep the Chinese in the war, thereby tying down the majority of the Japanese Army.

The British mobilized when war broke out in September 1939, but they were dependent on their overseas empire and trade for foodstuffs and war materials. The timely arrival of merchant ships loaded with fuel and raw materials was crucial to the long-term survival of the British Isles in the war. If resources could not reach the homeland and British troops overseas expeditiously, then the war would be lost. Thus, the Battle of the Atlantic proved to be the most important campaign of the war for Britain. Maintaining the sea-lanes to its overseas empire, along with securing massive amounts of aid from the United States in the form of Lend-Lease assistance, enabled Britain to remain in the war.

The Soviet Union, which joined the Allied camp in June 1941 after it was invaded by Germany, faced some of the most difficult logistical challenges. With millions of military and civilian casualties and much of its European

territory occupied by the German Army, the Soviet Union had to fully mobilize its remaining population and endure sacrifices at levels not known in the West. The Soviet logistical effort relied on the complete mobilization of the Soviet citizenry and the use of Siberian resources, supplemented by Lend-Lease materials from the Western Allies.

During the initial campaign of the summer of 1941, the Soviet Union evacuated entire industries, moving factory machinery from the path of the advancing Germans to safety behind the Urals. Workers were also relocated in large numbers so they could put the machinery back into production, often in the dead of winter. The sacrifices of the Soviet people were extraordinary, but by the end of 1942, the Soviet economy was outproducing that of Germany in nearly all key areas of armaments production, such as tanks, aircraft, and artillery.

Recognizing that it was vital to keep the Soviet Union in the war, the United States extended Lend-Lease to that country in November 1941, sending large quantities of weapons, trucks, and equipment to the Red Army and also sending food. Aid to the Soviet Union was sent by one of three routes: by ship to Murmansk, by ship to the Persian Gulf and then by rail to the Soviet Union, or by ship across the Pacific to Vladivostok in Soviet hulls. U.S. shipments of tanks and aircraft equaled less than 10 percent of the total produced by the Soviets, but additional items such as trucks (over 400,000), boots, sugar, foodstuffs, and communications equipment played important roles in helping Soviet forces survive and then take the offensive against the Germans.

In the United States, the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940, the expansion of the army and its burgeoning need for weapons, and armaments orders from France and Great Britain all promoted the growth of military industries. The Lend-Lease Act, passed by Congress in March 1941, provided for the shipment of goods and war materials to nations fighting the Axis powers and helped make the United States the “arsenal of democracy.”

During the war, the United States produced vast quantities of goods for the war effort, including aircraft, tanks, trucks, warships, merchant ships, oil, and agricultural products. Henry J. Kaiser mastered the art of mass-producing merchant ships, and in 43 months of operation, Henry Ford’s Willow Run, Michigan, factory turned out 8,685 B-24 bombers, 1 every 102 minutes. Its

industrial might enabled the United States not only to arm its allies but also to field the best-supplied and most mobile force to that point in military history.

In March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall's reorganization of the army into the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces (ASF). Headed by Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, the ASF was responsible for supplying, quartering, and transporting the ground and air forces. It provided the myriad services required by an army in the field. Meeting the logistical requirements for an expanding military within the continental United States was, in itself, a daunting task, not to mention the job of supporting forces in the European and Pacific theaters.

Although the Allied invasion of France did not take place until June 6, 1944, the buildup for the invasion began in May 1942. Then on November 8, 1942, Allied forces invaded North Africa in Operation TORCH. In the Mediterranean theater of operations, Services of Supply Command oversaw the American logistical effort in the Mediterranean.

To ensure the safe buildup of supplies in Britain and the continued support of Allied forces in the Mediterranean, winning the Battle of the Atlantic was critical. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and Roosevelt met at Casablanca in January 1943 and decided that battle and the bombing of Germany would have the highest priority. The accomplishment of both goals reflected the importance of logistics: the first ensured the safe and timely arrival of war matériels from North America, and the second hindered the German and Italian logistical efforts by round-the-clock bombing of Axis industry.

The Normandy Invasion required an immense logistical effort, ultimately involving the transportation of hundreds of thousands of troops and millions of tons of cargo. Allied planners knew that they could not count on using French ports, so to ensure that matériels could be gotten ashore, the Allies constructed two artificial harbors known as Mulberries and then moved them to the invasion area. The Mulberries were truly an engineering marvel, but they failed to meet expectations because one was destroyed and the other was severely damaged by an English Channel storm in late June 1944. To ensure the rapid delivery of gasoline, the Allies laid a pipeline under the English Channel that allowed fuel to be pumped from England to Normandy, where it

was decanted into five-gallon cans or pumped into large storage tanks until the pipeline could be extended across France.

Once Allied forces were ashore in France, the European theater Services of Supply Command—known after June 1944 as the Communications Zone (COMMZ)—oversaw the supply and administration needs of the U.S. Army in France. Commanded by Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, COMMZ played a vital role in keeping the army moving forward. When the Allies broke out of Normandy in Operation COBRA in late July 1944, the First and Third U.S. Armies moved so quickly across northern France that they outran their supply lines.

As an emergency measure, the Red Ball Express was activated—a circular truck route on which vehicles moved around the clock to transport fuel, ammunition, and food to the forward units. The route helped fill the gap until French rail lines could be restored. Toward that end, the Allies transported locomotives and rolling stock to France aboard ships. In sum, the Allied logistical effort in the Mediterranean and in Western Europe made the defeat of Germany in May 1945 possible. Without adequate logistics support, Allied forces would have been unable to pressure the Germans on multiple fronts and destroy the ability of the Axis states to wage war.

A key to victory in the Pacific theater was the transportation of men and matériel across the ocean to newly created bases. Units such as the Seabees carved air and naval bases out of tropical islands in record time. Marines and army units secured suitable islands, and fleet anchorages and depots ashore were established. Before the war, naval leaders assumed that the U.S. Navy would have to fight at vast distances in the Pacific, and they developed the fleet train concept, one of the most important factors in the Allied victory in the Pacific.

A great fleet of merchant ships, fleet oilers, tenders, and support vessels of all kinds kept the supply lines open and the fleet functioning for long periods at considerable distances from the nearest bases. The U.S. Navy mastered the art of midocean refueling and provisioning. U.S. ships were thus able to remain at sea for extended periods, only calling at a fleet anchorage for major repairs or crew rest and relaxation. The ability of the navy to bring everything it needed to establish a fleet anchorage turned peaceful lagoons such as Ulithi into bustling major port facilities.

Logistics proved essential in the China-Burma-India theater as well.

Although low on the overall priority list, the movement of supplies over the Burma Road and the aerial resupply of China over the Himalaya Mountains from bases in northern India helped keep China in the war and tie down the bulk of the Japanese Army.

Throughout the war, the use of aircraft to haul supplies to advancing armies or forces cut off from the more conventional forms of resupply became increasingly important. Whether bearing supplies or paratroopers, the cargo planes—the Curtiss C-46 Commando and the Douglas C-47 Skytrain—were vital additions to the overall logistical effort. During the war, both sides learned the limitations in the use of aircraft for resupply, but the Allies had far more transport aircraft than the Axis powers and were able to use them more effectively. Allied aircraft supported airborne operations, supplied troops, evacuated the wounded, and transported high-priority supplies to advancing units of Patton's Third Army during its drive across France. Transport aircraft were valuable assets, provided their limitations were understood.

In all theaters of the conflict, logistics proved critical to Allied successes in World War II. When the Axis powers failed to achieve a quick victory in the war, the initiative passed to the Allies, with their far greater collective economic strength. This, together with their ability to get these resources to the fighting fronts, helped ensure the Allies' victory.

STEVE R. WADDELL

See also

Aircraft, Production of; Aircraft, Transport; Armaments Production; Atlantic, Battle of the; Burma Road; Casablanca Conference; Cash-and-Carry; Chennault, Claire Lee; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; COBRA, Operation; Convoys, Allied; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Hump, The; Kaiser, Henry John; Lee, John Clifford Hodges; Lend-Lease; Liberty Ships; Logistics, Axis; Marshall, George Catlett; Mulberries; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Red Ball Express; Somervell, Brehon Burke; Stalingrad, Battle of; TORCH, Operation; Document 136

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Logistics, Axis

World War II required the procurement and transportation of vast quantities of materials over considerable distances and in climates as diverse as the Arctic, jungles, and deserts. The inability of the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan to procure, maintain, and transport military matériel, facilities, and personnel in sufficient quantities played a key role in their eventual defeat. The Axis logistical effort was handicapped from the beginning by a combination of factors, including limited resources and production capacity, mismanagement, and transportation difficulties.

As long as they could successfully conduct short or decisive campaigns and avoid protracted conflicts, the Axis powers could compensate for most logistical shortfalls. But when forced to conduct a lengthy war of attrition against the economic giants—the United States and the Soviet Union—the Axis powers discovered that their logistical shortcomings continually limited their military options and led directly to their eventual defeat.

Germany began the war with an economy mobilized unlike any other in Europe. Fortunately for the Allies, however, Germany had neither the centrally planned and centrally commanded economy of the Soviet Union nor the free enterprise, capitalist-driven economy of the Western Allies. In the

end, the German economy, along with the economies of Italy and Japan, suffered from poor management, which resulted in inefficient production and the misuse of valuable resources. For example, whereas the Allies standardized weapons to speed up mass production, the Luftwaffe at one point was producing 425 different aircraft models and variants. Such diversity made it difficult to mass-produce war matériels.

Germany began the war with serious shortages of strategic resources. It imported oil, iron ore, copper, tin, nickel, bauxite, manganese, tungsten, chromium, molybdenum, sulphur and pyrites, phosphates, rubber, rice, maize, wheat, and meat. Some of the shortages could be made up by prioritizing the use of resources and by acquiring new supplies through conquest.

The vital resource in shortest supply in Europe was oil. Germany produced only 0.2 percent of the world's oil in 1937. Romania, its chief supplier of oil, produced just 2.4 percent. The Allies, by contrast, had access to nearly all the world's oil production; the Soviet Union had 10.6 percent, the United States had 60.4 percent, and Latin America had 15.3 percent. Germany had experimented with synthetic fuel production in the interwar years and had some success, but without imports of oil from Romania throughout the war and from the Soviet Union prior to the German invasion of that country in 1941, the German war machine would have ground to a halt.

Italy and Japan were in even worse shape with regard to oil. The Axis powers were desperately short of oil throughout the war, which severely limited their mobility, the training of their armed forces, and the overall production of war matériels.

Logistical support for the German military improved greatly with the appointment of Albert Speer as the minister of armaments in 1942. Speer led an effort to centralize the German economy, reduce the number of weapon types, and maximize production. Weapons production trebled in three years. Just when the efforts to centralize production in large assembly plants began to result in increased output, however, the Allied bombing campaign began in earnest, and the large production facilities were bombed repeatedly by Allied aircraft.

Speer's efforts to boost production could have been even more successful had Adolf Hitler approved the large-scale use of German women in the war

economy. Unlike the situation in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, only a small percentage of German women were engaged in manufacturing work at the beginning of the war. Instead of mobilizing women for the factories, Germany relied on the use of millions of slave laborers to meet the ever-increasing demand for workers. Speer's efforts most certainly prolonged the war, but they came too late to bring Germany victory.

The lack of resources affected German strategy during the war. Supplies of iron ore from Sweden were secure when the Baltic Sea was open, but during the winter, the ore had to be shipped through Narvik in Norway. Keeping that supply route open was a prominent factor in the German decision to invade Norway in April 1940. Similarly, the invasion of the Soviet Union, which ultimately proved to be a logistical disaster, was partially prompted by logistics. The wealth of resources there, both agricultural and mineral, would have gone a long way toward making Germany self-reliant in most areas.

Hitler's decision to turn the armored forces south to envelop Kiev in August 1941 not only resulted in the surrender of a large Soviet force but also secured the Ukraine, the breadbasket of the Soviet Union. The German 1942 campaign that culminated at Stalingrad was the result of Hitler's attempt to capture the Caucasus oil fields. In 1944, the German Army used all available resources in its attempt to keep the Red Army from seizing the Ploieşti oil fields in Romania. The loss of Romanian oil, along with the Allied bombing of the German synthetic fuel plants, helped bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany in many ways; for example, it sharply reduced training time for pilots.

Once matériels were produced, the sinews of war had to reach the armed forces at the front. Despite the popular image of panzer divisions slicing their way across Europe, the German Army was basically a force of foot soldiers supported by horses, wagons, and railroads. Throughout the war, 80 to 85 percent of the army moved on foot and received supplies by wagon from the nearest railhead, and Germany actually used more horses in World War II than it did in World War I. Indeed, the German logistical system for supplying the armed forces had advanced little since World War I, except for the use of trucks by some units.

To motorize only 15 percent of its forces, Germany confiscated trucks from the occupied countries whenever possible. As a result, the German

military eventually had 151 different types of trucks in service, and it proved virtually impossible to get the right spare parts to the right trucks expeditiously. The Americans, by contrast, had one primary truck—the rugged 2.5-ton “deuce-and-a-half,” of which over 2 million were produced.

The most important element of the German supply system was the railroads. When the Luftwaffe had air superiority early in the war, the railroads were secure. But by 1943 the Allies were gaining control of the air, and the resulting fighter-bomber and bomber strikes on the German transportation system began crippling the German logistical effort. By the end of the war, German production, even though maximized by Speer’s reforms, was rendered nearly useless when the matériels that were produced could not be transported to the front for use by the troops.

The Italian logistical situation was even worse. Italy entered the war unable to support its armed forces in a long conflict. In fact, the nation lacked all the vital resources necessary to fight a major war, regardless of duration. Oil was in short supply, as were most strategic metals. Benito Mussolini’s drive for empire—the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 as well as the invasions of France, Greece, and Egypt in 1940—failed to improve Italy’s logistical situation. These campaigns actually did more harm than good because they taxed Italy’s limited resources, and the resulting supply lines to its far-flung empire were virtually insupportable. Long and tenuous supply lines to Italian forces in Ethiopia, for example, could not be sustained, and the Italians there fell victim to a British offensive in 1941. Support of Italian forces in Libya required control of the central Mediterranean Sea. Yet by late 1942, the Allies, operating from Malta and bases at Gibraltar and Alexandria, had gained effective control of the Mediterranean Sea.

Italy had too little fuel to produce additional war matériels or even to support the tanks and aircraft it already possessed. The navy lacked the fuel to sortie, so it remained largely in port. The army, as with the German military, was dependent on horses, mules, and wagons as well as the railroads and a few trucks.

Japan, an island nation, suffered from the same logistical problems. Largely bereft of natural resources, it had to import nearly all its strategic materials in merchant ships. The quest for resources was an important factor in the Japanese moves into Korea in 1904, into Manchuria in 1931, and into China in 1937. The main goal of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

was the economic independence of Japan. When the United States embargoed scrap metal and then oil following Japan's move into French Indochina between 1940 and 1941, Japan found itself in the awkward situation of having to back down and withdraw from the occupied territory or go to war to solidify its hold on the needed resources. The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, covered the Japanese drive to seize Southeast Asia to acquire the oil fields of the Netherlands East Indies and the rubber and tin of Malaya as well as other strategic resources.

Unfortunately for Japan, the country did not have enough time to develop its newly acquired resources, nor did it have the sealift capacity to transport the materials that were produced. In December 1941, Japan had only 49 tankers totaling 587,000 tons. By contrast, Britain, which was also dependent on foreign oil, had 425 tankers of 2,997,000 tons in 1939, and the United States had 389 tankers of 2,836,000 tons.

The marginal Japanese sealift was steadily reduced during the course of the war by U.S. submarines and airpower. By late 1944 and into 1945, Japan was almost completely cut off from imports, and the overall lack of petroleum products crippled the Japanese war effort even more severely than was the case for Germany. Aerial mining by Boeing B-29s Superfortresses also disrupted or destroyed much of the Japanese coastal trade.

Growing Allied air superiority, increasing shortages of merchant ships, the failure to convoy (there were scarcely any escorts available) or implement an effective antisubmarine effort until late in the war, limited resources within Japan itself, and the U.S. strategic-bombing campaign against Japan all but doomed the Japanese supply system to failure. By the last years of the war, bypassed Japanese forces in the Pacific were starving for lack of logistical support. All that the Japanese could do was convert some of their submarines to transports and deliver small quantities of supplies to isolated garrisons. Such stopgap measures only briefly prolonged the war.

For the Axis powers, logistical factors were always a major concern. German mechanized warfare was ultimately limited by the lack of motor transport available to the German military. But even if Germany had been able to produce more vehicles, the limited availability of fuel would have sharply restricted their use. By 1944, when German single-engine fighter production peaked, the lack of high-octane aviation fuel so limited training that the pilots quickly fell victim to the better-trained and more experienced

Allied pilots. The Italians also suffered from a lack of oil from the beginning of the war, and their inability to transport gasoline and replacement weapons and personnel across the Mediterranean in sufficient numbers proved to be a major factor in the Axis defeat in North Africa. Japan's inability to protect its merchant fleet and ensure delivery of fuel and other resources from Southeast Asia ultimately destroyed the Japanese economy in 1945 and left the nation on a starvation diet. Axis victories on the battlefield became fewer and farther between as the logistical situation of the Axis powers deteriorated during the course of the war.

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See also

Aircraft, Production of; Airlift; Armaments Production; Convoys, Axis; Logistics, Allied; Norway, German Conquest of; Speer, Albert

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Löhr, Alexander (1885–1947)

German Air Force general. Born in Turnu-Severin (in today's Romania) on May 20, 1885, Alexander Löhr joined the Austro-Hungarian Army and became a lieutenant in 1906. He contributed greatly to the buildup of the Dual Monarchy's air service during World War I. In the interwar period, he

served in the Austrian War Ministry and commanded the aviation branch as a major general in 1934.

After Germany's annexation of Austria in March 1938, Löhr joined the German Luftwaffe, and in 1939, he commanded its Luftflotte 4 (Fourth Air Fleet). During the invasion of Poland in September 1939, his aircraft destroyed Polish communications and traffic lines. In early April 1941, Löhr was assigned a similar task against Yugoslavia, with the additional charge of paving the way for advancing army units. On the morning of April 6, 1941, without a declaration of war, Löhr's bombers attacked Belgrade. They destroyed the Yugoslav command structure but also killed 1,500 civilians.

Promoted to colonel general on May 9, 1941, Löhr was the overall commander of the bloody German airborne assault of Crete, beginning on May 20, 1941. After the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, he commanded 4th Air Force Group in the southern part of the front. In July 1942, Adolf Hitler appointed him to command the Twelfth Army in the Balkans (renamed Army Group E in January 1943). From 1943, Löhr additionally acted, with several interruptions, as commander in chief, southeast. His task was to suppress the resistance movements and defend Greece against Allied landings.

In the summer of 1944, Soviet forces advanced toward Bulgaria and Hungary and threatened to cut off German units in the Balkans. Therefore, Hitler authorized a withdrawal through Yugoslavia to Hungary. Under constant partisan attacks, Löhr's army nonetheless slowed the Soviet advance until the end of the war. A prisoner of war of the Yugoslavian government from May 11, 1945, Löhr was tried for war crimes by a Yugoslav military court. Convicted and sentenced to death, he was executed in Belgrade on February 26, 1947.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Balkans Theater; Crete, Battle of; Germany, Air Force; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of; Yugoslavia Campaign

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Lombok, Battle of (February 19–20, 1942)

Pacific naval battle, also known as the Battle of Badeong Strait, fought between Japanese and Allied forces on the night of February 19–20, 1942. It followed the Japanese effort to isolate the important Netherlands East Indies island of Java by an amphibious assault on Bali on the morning of February 19.

As soon as he received word of the Japanese landing on Bali, Dutch rear admiral Karel Doorman, commander of the American-British-Dutch-Australia (ABDA) surface force, ordered a naval attack into Lombok Strait in hopes of destroying the Japanese invasion force. U.S. submarine attacks had earlier failed, largely because of faulty torpedoes, although Allied air strikes had damaged one Japanese transport that was escorted by two Japanese destroyers of Captain Abe Toshio's Destroyer Division 8.

Three waves of Allied warships attacked the two Japanese destroyers. Doorman led the first, consisting of the Dutch light cruisers *De Ruyter* and *Java,* and three destroyers (one Dutch and two U.S.) in a lengthy line-ahead formation at approximately 11:00 p.m. on February 19. The two Japanese destroyers returned fire, disabling by gunfire the Dutch destroyer *Piet Hein* and then sinking it with torpedoes. After the first Allied attack had passed through the strait, the Japanese destroyers exchanged fire with one another, although without damage.

The second Allied attack wave arrived at about 1:30 a.m. on February 20. It consisted of four U.S. destroyers followed by the small Dutch light cruiser *Tromp.* An exchange of gunfire and torpedoes at ranges as close as 2,000 yards resulted in damage to several Allied ships, including the *Tromp* and both Japanese destroyers. The remaining two destroyers of Abe's Division 8 now arrived in Lombok Strait to reinforce.

Abe steamed in the opposite direction among three of the Allied destroyers and the *Tromp.* The Japanese destroyer *Michishio* was heavily damaged in the exchange of fire, with 96 killed or wounded. Both sides then disengaged. The third attacking Allied wave arrived in the strait about 5:30

a.m. It consisted of seven Dutch motor torpedo boats, but these failed to locate the Japanese.

The Battle of Lombok forced the *Tromp* to steam for Australia and repairs, and the two Japanese destroyers returned to Japan for the same purpose. The damaged U.S. destroyer *Stewart* would enter dry dock at Surabaya in the Netherlands East Indies, where it was captured by the Japanese and recommissioned in their navy as a patrol ship.

The mix of Allied ships manned by exhausted crews was insufficient to deter the Japanese from their advance on Java. Insufficient Allied training, faulty tactics that did not allow for a coordinated attack, and poor luck accounted for this Allied defeat.

JACK GREENE

See also

ABDA Command; Doorman, Karel Willem Marie

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"Lord Haw Haw" (1906–1946)

Supposed British citizen who broadcast propaganda for Germany during the war. Born on April 24, 1906, in Brooklyn, New York, William Brooke Joyce was the son of a naturalized U.S. citizen. He grew up in Ireland (from 1909) and then England (from 1921) and obtained a British passport in 1938 and claimed British citizenship. He earned a first-class degree in English literature at Birkbeck College, London University (1927), and began work on a PhD.

By the late 1920s, Joyce was active in fascist organizations. He joined Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists in 1933 and rose in the hierarchy. Four years later, the two men fell out, and Joyce founded a parallel

organization. Fearing arrest as war neared, he left England for Germany in August 1939.

On September 6, 1939, Joyce first appeared on a German broadcast that became known as *Germany Calling*. His British listeners dubbed the unknown voice "Lord Haw Haw" for its affected, sneering tone and laugh. On September 26, 1940, Joyce became a naturalized German citizen. By April 1941, he was using his own name as well as the common appellation.

Praise for his work showed up regularly in Josef Goebbels's diaries, which were published after the war. Joyce's broadcasts became more extreme (and his English audiences smaller) as the war continued. Some were from so-called secret stations that supposedly broadcast from within Britain but were, in fact, based in Berlin. He broadcast his anticommunist and anti-Semitic rants on *Germany Calling* largely from Berlin but from a rural area in the last few weeks of the war.

At the end of the war, Joyce attempted to escape to Sweden but was captured on May 28, 1945, by British forces, and in June he was sent to Britain. He was charged with treason on September 17, 1945. After considerable discussion about his citizenship status, he was found guilty just three days later in a trial heavily covered by the press. Several failed appeals followed before Joyce was executed by hanging on January 3, 1946, in London, still an ardent believer in the Nazi cause.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

"Axis Sally"; Propaganda; "Tokyo Rose"

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Lorraine Campaign (September 1–December 18, 1944)

Fall 1944 offensive by the U.S. Third Army in the European theater. The Lorraine Campaign of September 1–December 18, 1944, followed the successful Allied breakout from the Normandy beachhead and the rapid pursuit of the retreating German forces across France to the Meuse River between July and September 1944.

After a brief pause at the Meuse to allow their supply lines to catch up, the Allies resumed their advance to the Rhine River in early September. The main effort was an attack through Belgium and Holland toward the Rhine and the Ruhr industrial area by Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery's British and Canadian 21st Army Group, supported by the U.S. First Army of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's U.S. 12th Army Group. Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.'s U.S. Third Army, also a part of the 12th Army Group, was assigned the mission of conducting a secondary offensive through Lorraine and across the Moselle River to occupy the Siegfried Line sector covering the Saar and then to seize Frankfurt.

The initial plans for the Third Army's operations envisioned a rapid, continuous action spearheaded by armored units to occupy Lorraine, penetrate the West Wall, and cross the Rhine. However, difficult terrain, bad weather, logistical shortages, and a tenacious German defense delayed the Third Army's arrival at the West Wall until December 16, 1944, at which time several of its key units had to be diverted to block an unexpected German counteroffensive in the Ardennes.

Lorraine sits astride the traditional invasion route between France and Germany. A plateau ranging from 600 to 1,300 feet in elevation, it has many rivers and ridges that provide natural lines of defense. Its rolling farmlands are frequently broken by dense woods or towns that limit observation and fields of fire in combat situations. Moreover, Lorraine was heavily fortified. The French Maginot Line ran through the province, and the city of Metz had been strongly fortified since Roman times. In 1944, two high-speed highways led from Lorraine into Germany: the first from Metz via Saarbrücken to Mannheim and the second from Nancy through the Vosges Mountains to Strasbourg.

The fall climate of Lorraine is foggy and rainy. Rainfall in the autumn of 1944 was two to three times above average, with seven inches of rain falling in November alone. Flooded streams and oceans of mud hampered the mobility of the heavily mechanized American forces, and poor flying weather

limited Allied air support. At the start of the campaign, Patton's Third Army had only two available corps: the XII Corps under Major General Manton S. Eddy and the XX Corps under Major General Walton H. Walker. Patton's VIII Corps, under Major General Troy H. Middleton, remained tied down clearing German units from the Brittany ports. For the first phase of the campaign, however, Major General Wade Haislip's XV Corps was available, thus giving the Third Army a force of three armored and six infantry divisions, supported by the usual array of nondivisional combat and logistical units.

Patton's combat power was limited by the fact that his forces were at the far end of a fragile logistical line. Priority for logistical support had been assigned to Montgomery's 21st Army Group, and the French ports had not yet been fully cleared. Moreover, the U.S. Army was already beginning to run short of infantry replacements.

German forces were in even worse shape, having been badly battered on the Eastern Front and in Normandy. The principal German units facing the Third Army were the LXXXII Corps and the XLVII Panzer Corps of the German First Army under General of Infantry Kurt von der Chevallerie, which on September 8 was joined with the German Nineteenth Army in Army Group G, commanded by Colonel General Johannes von Blaskowitz. Many of the German combat units were seriously understrength in both men and horses, their primary means of mobility. Elite units, such as the Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe parachute divisions, were in better shape, but many of the German defenders were in newly formed Volksgrenadier divisions manned by poorly equipped troops of low quality. Although German lines of communications were shorter, Allied air interdiction made it difficult to move men and supplies to the front.

The U.S. campaign opened in early September with only limited success. In the north, the 90th Infantry Division of XX Corps suffered heavy casualties in unsuccessful efforts to cross the Moselle near Metz, but south of Metz, the 5th Infantry Division gained a limited bridgehead over the river. Farther south, XII Corps had better luck after a few setbacks. On September 13, the 4th Armored Division conducted a double envelopment around Arracourt, 20 miles beyond the Moselle, and forced the German First Army to evacuate the city of Nancy on September 14.

A German counterattack from the south designed to destroy the Third

Army before it could link up with the 6th U.S. Army Group advancing from southern France failed when Haislip's newly assigned XV Corps hit and shattered the German left flank. In the center, a German attempt between September 19 and 29 to squeeze out the U.S. 4th Armored Division's Arracourt salient also failed. As a result, Blaskowitz was replaced as commander of Army Group G by General of Panzer Troops Hermann Balck. On the northern side of XII Corps' salient in the forest east of Nancy, a weak German force almost broke through the 35th Infantry Division in confused forest fighting between September 27 and October 1, but the front was restored when Patton committed his army-level reserve, the 6th Armored Division.

On September 22, supreme Allied commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower reaffirmed the logistical priority of Montgomery's 21st Army Group and ordered Patton to restrict his offensive operations. In addition, Patton had to relinquish the 7th Armored Division and eventually the entire XV Corps. Despite serious shortages of gasoline and other supplies, the always-aggressive Patton continued local attacks during October, the most important of which was a vain effort to capture Fort Driant on the west bank of the Moselle facing Metz, an attempt that cost the U.S. 5th Infantry Division some 500 casualties.

The October pause was also costly for the Germans. Balck had to transfer two divisions, and several of his higher headquarters, including that of the Fifth Panzer Army, were moved north for the planned Ardennes Offensive. This situation left the German First Army with approximately 87,000 men and 130 tanks to oppose the 250,000 men and 700 tanks of the Third Army.

The Allied logistical situation improved at the end of October as the port of Antwerp was put back in operation. Commander of the 12th Army Group General Bradley planned a new offensive, but the First Army on Patton's left was unable to meet the schedule, and the Third Army attacked alone on November 8. Using skillful deception techniques, XX Corps on the left took Metz in a double envelopment between November 8 and 19. Some of the Metz forts were captured by surprise; others were neutralized and bypassed. North of Metz, in only five days the Americans constructed the longest Bailey bridge in Europe, allowing the commitment of the new 10th Armored Division to pursue the Germans back to the Saar River.

The XII Corps attacks east of Nancy did not go as smoothly. The 26th

Infantry Division suffered more than 6,000 casualties in heavy fighting between November 18 and 28. The 4th Armored Division passed through the 26th Division on November 22 and seized a crossing over the Saar the next day. By accident, the 4th Armored ran into and halted the German Panzer Lehr Division, which was moving to attack XV Corps, then part of the Seventh Army to the south. On the left of XII Corps, both the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions used artillery and close air support to reduce German outposts in the old Maginot Line. The 6th Armored Division passed through the 35th Infantry Division on November 25, but its advance was limited by mud and German fortifications.

The slow advance of the Third Army in November was mainly the result of poor weather and a lack of mass, for its nine understrength divisions were spread along a 62-mile front. Nevertheless, by December 2 the Third Army had reached the West Wall along the Upper Saar. Under cover of fog, a battalion of the 95th Infantry Division crossed the river on the morning of December 3 and seized the bridge at Saarlautern (modern-day Saarlouis) intact. Intense fighting followed as the American troops inched their way through a maze of houses and pillboxes. Heavy battle and nonbattle casualties, plus the declining availability of infantry replacements, limited the American advance. Just as Patton's infantry began to make progress, the Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive.

Between December 16 and 18, Patton halted his advance, spread his divisions to cover wider frontages, and turned the 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divisions 90 degrees to the left and rushed to attack the left flank of the German advance in the Ardennes, thereby ending the Lorraine Campaign after three and a half months of heavy fighting under trying logistical and climatic conditions.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Balck, Hermann; Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Chevallerie, Kurt von der; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Maginot Line; Metz, Battle of; Middleton, Troy Houston; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Siegfried Line, Breaking the; Walker, Walton Harris; West European Theater of Operations; West Wall, Advance to the

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Lothian, Lord

See Kerr, Philip Henry

Louisiana Maneuvers

U.S. Army training exercises conducted in the state of Louisiana during September 1941. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, chief of the newly organized General Headquarters, was tasked with preparing a large and inexperienced force for war. In 1939 the U.S. Army numbered only 190,000 men, but in less than two years it had expanded to nearly 1.6 million men through the activation of reserve components and a peacetime draft. Also, the army had added tanks and tactical aircraft, requiring extensive training to overcome two decades of stagnation.

McNair was a master organizer who greatly influenced how the U.S. Army would fight during World War II. Faced with a cadre of leaders previously experienced with leading small units but now leading divisions and corps, McNair organized a series of large-scale maneuvers as a laboratory to test the commanders as well as new doctrines, procedures, and equipment. These maneuvers were the largest training exercises in U.S. Army history and would pit field armies against each other in mock battle.

A 30,000-square-mile area of northwest Louisiana was chosen for the exercise, to be followed by further maneuvers in North and South Carolina. The Second Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Ben Lear, fought against the Third Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Walter Krueger. McNair served as the exercise's director to give each army its objectives for the two-week war. With journalists recording the event, more than 400,000 soldiers engaged in mock warfare, overseen by umpires who adjudicated the outcome of each action. More than 300 aircraft conducted mock bombardments of ground units and fought other air units in simulated dogfights high above the battlefield. Supporting arms such as engineer, signal, and medical corps attended to simulated and real tasks, which provided valuable knowledge about what equipment or procedures worked or failed.

In the first engagement, the Third Army was judged the winner after forcing the Second Army to retreat or face envelopment from the flanks. A few days later, the Second Army defended Shreveport against the Third Army. As the Second Army skillfully avoided contact, a frustrated Krueger ordered the 2nd Armored Division, commanded by Major General George S. Patton Jr., to attack through east Texas and cut off the Second Army from Shreveport. This successful attack ended the Louisiana Maneuvers, and the exercise shifted to the Carolinas. Only nine days after completion of that exercise, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

During the course of both maneuvers, more than 740,000 men underwent training. The largest U.S. Army training maneuvers ever conducted, the Louisiana Maneuvers cost more than $20 million and 61 men killed in accidents. Although only 11 of its 42 commanders would go on to command in combat, the Louisiana Maneuvers provided a new generation of soldiers some experience in moving, sustaining, and fighting large units, with real tanks and aircraft. The maneuvers also helped prepare the American public psychologically for the coming demands of World War II.

STEVEN J. RAUCH

See also

Armored Warfare; Krueger, Walter; McNair, Lesley James; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; United States Army

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Love, Nancy Harkness (1914–1976)

Squadron commander of the U.S. Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS). Born on February 14, 1914, in Houghton, Michigan, Nancy Harkness developed an interest in aviation early in life. At age 16, she earned her pilot's license, and while a student at Vassar College, she began a flying school. Harkness earned an air transport rating in 1933. In 1936, she married Robert McClure Love, who owned Inter-City Aviation, an aircraft sales and service company in Boston.

On September 10, 1942, Nancy Love, with the support of Colonel William H. Tunner, head of the Ferrying Division's Domestic Wing of the U.S. Air Transport Command, organized 25 women pilots into the WAFS. Headquartered at New Castle Army Air Base in Delaware, the WAFS was formed to deliver planes from factories to military bases.

On August 5, 1943, the WAFS and the Women's Flying Training Detachment (WFTD) merged to form the Women Air Force Service Pilots (WASP), with Jacqueline Cochran as director of the WASP and its Training Division and Love as director of the Ferrying Division. Love's duties included the administration of six WASP ferrying squadrons and the planning of operational and training procedures.

Love was the first woman to be qualified to fly the North American P-51 Mustang fighter, and by March 1943, she was also proficient in the North American A-36 Apache dive-bomber and 14 other types of military aircraft. She was also the first woman to fly the North American B-25 Mitchell bomber, piloting it coast to coast in record time. Accompanied by Betty Gillies, Love was one of the first two women qualified to fly the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bomber. She was also the first woman to deliver a Douglas C-47 Skytrain and to qualify in the Douglas C-54 Skymaster transport.

Nancy Harkness Love, director of the U.S. Women's Auxiliary Ferry Squadron, in the cockpit of her plane before taking off from an eastern U.S. base. The women under her command ferried aircraft from factories to coastal airports, from which they were flown to overseas battle fronts during 1942–1945. (National Archives)

At the end of the war, Love and her husband, a major in the Army Air Forces, were each awarded the Air Medal for their leadership and service in World War II. After the war, Love continued as an aviation industry luminary and became a champion in the fight to have the women who served in the WASP recognized as military veterans, a status they received in 1977 shortly after Love's death in Sarasota, Florida, on October 22, 1976.

AMY GOODPASTER STREBE

See also

Aircraft, Transport; Cochran, Jacqueline; Tunner, William Henry; United States Army Air Forces; United States Women's Air Force Service Pilots; Women in World War II

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Lovett, Robert Abercrombie (1895–1986)

U.S. assistant secretary of war for air. Born on September 14, 1895, in Huntsville, Texas, Robert Abercrombie Lovett attended Yale University. He served as a naval aviator during World War I, and in the early 1920s he joined the investment bank Brown Brothers, where he soon became a partner.

In 1940 his continuing interest in aviation led Lovett, who had traveled extensively in Europe, to tour American aircraft factories and to submit to new secretary of the army Robert P. Patterson a report highlighting their inability to produce aircraft in the vast quantities modern warfare demanded. After reading this report, Patterson promptly made Lovett his assistant, and four months later Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson made Lovett assistant secretary of war for air. Lovett then supervised the immense World War II buildup of U.S. airpower. He also helped the Army Air Forces retain some autonomy, facilitating its subsequent evolution into an independent service after the war.

Following World War II, Lovett served as undersecretary of state under George C. Marshall from 1947 to late 1948, supervising the evolving Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In September 1950 during the Korean War, Lovett became undersecretary of defense, succeeding Marshall (who was defense secretary in September 1950) as secretary in September 1951. Lovett left office in 1953, but successive presidents repeatedly consulted him on assorted foreign policy issues, regarding him as one of the key "Wise Men," the establishment figures who presided over the mid-20th-century expansion of American international power. Lovett died in Locust Valley, Long Island, New York, on May 7, 1986.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Marshall, George Catlett; Patterson, Robert Porter; Stimson, Henry Lewis; United States Army Air Forces

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Lucas, John Porter (1890–1949)

U.S. Army major general. Born in Kearneysville, West Virginia, on January 14, 1890, John Porter Lucas graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned a second lieutenant of cavalry. He served in the Philippines and in the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916. Promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel, he served in France during World War I with the 33rd Infantry Division and was wounded.

Reverting to his permanent rank of captain after the war, Lucas taught military science at the University of Michigan. He transferred to the field artillery and was promoted to major on graduation from the Field Artillery School (1921), where he then taught for two years. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School and then taught military science at Colorado Agricultural College (1924–1929). Following a command assignment at Fort Bliss, he graduated from the Army War College (1932). Lucas then served on the War Department General Staff. Promoted to lieutenant colonel (1935), he commanded the 1st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (1936–1937). He next served on the Field Artillery Board (1937–1940) and was promoted to brigadier general (1940).

After briefly commanding the 2nd Infantry Division, Lucas assumed command of the 3rd Infantry Division (July 1941) and was promoted to major general (August 1941). He then commanded III Corps in Georgia (1942–1943).

Sent to the Mediterranean in mid-1943, Lucas served as observer and deputy for General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Following the Allied conquest of Sicily, Eisenhower selected Lucas to command VI Corps in Lieutenant General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army, although Lucas was not Clark’s choice. Lucas’s corps was the Fifth Army’s principal U.S. Army formation during its slow northward advance from Naples to the German Gustav Line at Cassino.

On January 22, 1944, Lucas commanded an uncontested amphibious landing at Anzio behind the German lines. Mounted with insufficient manpower and logistical support, the effort was undertaken in response to insistent pressure from Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill and theater land forces commander General Sir Harold Alexander, who anticipated that it would compel a precipitous German retreat from the formidable Gustav Line and open the way to Rome. Instead of striking immediately to the interior and securing the Alban Hills, Lucas consolidated the beachhead. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring rushed reserves there, and the Germans staged a powerful counterattack. Alexander blamed Lucas for the resultant stalemate, describing the cautious, pessimistic American general as "an old woman." Lucas was relieved on February 22, 1944, replaced by Major General Lucian K. Truscott.

Lucas commanded the Fourth Army in Texas (1944–1946) and the Army Advisory Group in China (June 1946–January 1948) and was then deputy commander of the Fifth Army in Chicago, where he died on December 24, 1949.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Anzio, Battle of; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Italy Campaign; Kesselring, Albert; Sicily, Invasion of; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.

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Lütjens, Günther (1889–1941)

German Navy admiral. Born in Wiesbaden, Germany, on May 25, 1889, Günther Lütjens joined the navy in 1907 and served on torpedo boats during World War I. In 1937, he commanded the torpedo boat arm of the Kriegsmarine.

With the beginning of World War II, in October 1939 Lütjens was appointed commander of Scouting Forces. In June 1940, he was named fleet commander after Grand Admiral Erich Raeder had sacked the first two fleet commanders for not taking aggressive action. On June 20, Raeder ordered Lütjens to take out the battleship *Gneisenau* and the heavy cruiser *Admiral Hipper* in a foray, but a British submarine torpedoed and badly damaged the *Gneisenau,* forcing a postponement in battleship operations. Raeder was determined to send the battleships into the North Atlantic to demonstrate their value before Germany had won the war, which led him to take the gamble of deploying the new battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941 when only the new heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen* was available as a consort. Lütjens commanded the force.

Lütjens disagreed with Raeder's piecemeal approach to battleship operations and urged postponing Operation RHEINüBUNG (RHINE EXERCISE) until the other battleships were ready for action. He loyally supported Raeder's decision, however, and defended the mission when questioned by Adolf Hitler. Both Raeder and Lütjens were aware that the *Bismarck* departed Bergen, Norway, after refueling, on May 22, 1941, with weapons and equipment cannibalized from other ships and an incomplete antiaircraft fire-control system.

Lütjens's ineffective leadership and pessimism, along with his rigid adherence to his orders to avoid risks, hindered his ability to objectively analyze either his options or his opportunities. He declined to exploit his victory over the British battle cruiser *Hood* and finish off the battleship *Prince of Wales.* Influenced by his belief that the British were employing new radar, he gave his position away by radioing for instructions from Berlin and failed to recognize that he had actually eluded his pursuers. His decision to steam directly for Saint-Nazaire, instead of withdrawing to a more remote area or even returning to Norway, exposed the *Bismarck* to the British Force H from Gibraltar and the carrier *Ark Royal.* Following damage by a lucky torpedo that jammed the *Bismarck*'s twin rudders, Lütjens resigned himself to carrying out Raeder's instructions to fight "to the last shell" and was lost when the *Bismarck* went down on May 27, 1941.

KEITH W. BIRD

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Germany, Navy; Radar; Raeder, Erich

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Luxembourg

Diminutive constitutional grand duchy located in West-Central Europe with a 1939 population of just 293,000 people. Encompassing only 998 square miles, Luxembourg is surrounded by France to the south, Belgium to the north and west, and Germany to the east. Luxembourg enjoyed a high standard of living, the consequence of its rich deposits of iron ore. Although Luxembourg declared its neutrality, the German Army invaded the country on May 10, 1940, in its campaign against the Low Countries and France. Grand Duchess Charlotte and her government escaped to London, where they established a government-in-exile.

On July 29, 1940, the Germans replaced the military occupation with a civil administration, and on August 14, Berlin decreed an end to Luxembourg's independence, abolishing its constitution, laws, and governmental institutions. Although the vast majority of Luxembourgers were hostile to the German occupation, some chose to join the German People's Movement. In an effort to Germanize the country, the authorities forbade Luxembourgers from speaking French, using French names, and even wearing berets.

Beginning in April 1941, the Germans deported some 12 percent of Luxembourg's population to Germany. A number of citizens joined one of the five separate resistance movements that sprang up in response to the German occupation.

The Belgian Resistance played an important role in rescuing downed Allied airmen. The Germans executed those who offered direct resistance and also suppressed a general strike in 1942 protesting conscription into the German military. More than 25 percent of Luxembourg's men who were

drafted refused to report for duty, but a total of 2,848 Luxembourgers died in German uniform, including some shot for desertion. A number also served on the Allied side, both in the Belgian Brigade and with British military formations.

Allied troops entered Luxembourg on September 10, 1944, driving the Germans eastward. Extremely heavy fighting took place in Luxembourg during the German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) of December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, and Luxembourg was not finally liberated until February 1945. It then became an important Allied staging and supply area until the end of the war.

Houses in Mondorf, Luxembourg, destroyed during the first day of the German invasion, May 10, 1940. (Library of Congress)

Luxembourg was hard-hit by the war. The country had been stripped of important resources of food, raw materials, and finished goods, and the fighting destroyed or seriously damaged a third of the country's dwellings. During the war, 5,159 civilian Luxembourgers were killed. Afterward, the government punished some 10,000 people for collaboration with the Germans.

LAURA J. HILTON

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Resistance

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Lyme Bay, Battle of (April 28, 1944)

In preparation for their invasion of Normandy, some 30,000 U.S. troops were to participate in Exercise TIGER, consisting of practice landings at Slapton Beach on the coast of Devon in southeastern England. The area had been selected for its resemblance to the designated invasion site of Utah Beach on France's Normandy coast. Exercise tiger was to last from April 22 to 30.

The first practice assault, on April 27, 1944, proceeded smoothly, but the next, on the morning of April 28, became a nightmare for those involved. The troops were embarked on nine tank landing ships (LSTs), which were to have been protected by a Royal Navy force of the destroyer the *Scimitar*, the Flower-class corvette the *Azalea*, three motor torpedo boats, and two motor gunboats patrolling the entrance to Lyme Bay where the exercise was to occur. In addition, other motor torpedo boats were to have under surveillance the French port of Cherbourg, where German motor torpedo boats (S-boats) were based. However, the *Scimitar* had been rammed the previous day and was at Portsmouth for repairs, while its replacement did not sail because of a mix-up in the shore command. The U.S. commander learned of this only after the operation was under way.

On the morning of April 28, nine German S-boats of the 9th Flotilla (*S-100, 130, 136, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145,* and *150*) that had departed on patrol from Cherbourg crossed the channel. They were engaged by British destroyers and *Azalea*'s commander received an enemy alert shortly after midnight. He continued to lead the LSTs in a straight line formation, however, making them an easy target, and did not attempt to warn the American vessels.

The German S-boats spotted the convoy of LSTs in Lyme Bay and, after tracking it for a half hour, attacked it with torpedoes, hitting *LST-507* at 2:03

a.m. A large fire broke out and quickly spread amid the stored vehicles and ammunition, forcing the embarked soldiers and crew to abandon ship. Many soldiers panicked and put on their life belts incorrectly and were drowned in the frigid 42-degree water. More than 260 of the vessel's crew and passengers perished.

At 2:17 a.m. *LST-531,* in the middle of the American column, exploded under the impact of two torpedoes. It sank within six minutes with the loss of 467 men. A torpedo also hit *LST-289,* but it remained afloat and lost only 13 men in the explosion. Friendly fire damaged *LST 511.*

The escort HMS *Azalea* returned up the column after the first explosion, but its crew could not determine the source of the attack. The corvette's crew was unable to seek information because, due to a typographical error in their orders, the Americans and British were using different radio frequencies and could not communicate.

After the Germans had expended their torpedoes, several LSTs returned and rescued survivors. They were joined by HMS *Saladin,* the relief escort for the *Scimitar.* Eyewitnesses reported that sections of the sea were covered with corpses. Although figures vary, deaths caused by the German attack probably totaled 198 sailors and 551 soldiers. Another 200 personnel were wounded. The German S-boats returned to Cherbourg unscathed.

Official embarrassment and concern that disclosure might compromise the Normandy landings led to the order that the events of April 28 be kept secret. Indeed, 10 officers killed in the action had detailed knowledge of the forthcoming invasion that they could have revealed had they been captured, and the invasion was on hold until their bodies were located and identified. Exercise TIGER did not become public until after the end of the war. Even today, there is little documentation available about events on April 28. The events of that day did lead to better coordination of more extensive training in life belt use and the inclusion of more small craft in the actual Normandy landings to pick up men in the water.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Landing Craft; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for

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WORLD WAR II

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MacArthur, Douglas (1880–1964)

U.S. general of the army and, during World War II, supreme commander of Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. Born on January 26, 1880, in Little Rock, Arkansas, the son of Major General Arthur MacArthur, Douglas MacArthur graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1903 as first captain. Following service in the Philippines and Japan, he became an aide to President Theodore Roosevelt (1906–1907). MacArthur took part in the 1914 occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, where he was nominated for the Medal of Honor, and served on the General Staff (1913–1917).

After the United States entered World War I in April 1917, MacArthur went to France as chief of staff of the 42nd Division. Promoted to temporary brigadier general, he fought with the division in the Second Battle of the Marne. MacArthur then led the 8th Infantry Brigade in the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. He commanded the 42nd Division at the end of the war.

Following occupation duty in Germany, MacArthur returned to the United States as superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy (1919–1922), carrying out much-needed reforms. He again served in the Philippines and claimed that his extensive service there gave him special insight into the "Oriental mind."

MacArthur was then chief of staff of the army (1930–1935), but his reputation suffered in the 1932 Bonus Army Incident when he employed force to oust a protest by World War I veterans in Washington, D.C. In 1935, MacArthur returned to the Philippines as adviser to the Philippine government in establishing an army capable of resisting a Japanese invasion. He retired from the U.S. Army in 1937 and became field marshal of Philippine forces.

Recalled to active duty with the U.S. Army in July 1941 as a lieutenant general (he was promoted to full general on December 22), MacArthur

assumed command of all U.S. forces in the Far East. Believing that his forces could defend the islands, he scrapped the original, sound plan to withdraw into the Bataan Peninsula. His refusal to allow Major General Lewis Brereton to launch an immediate retaliatory strike against the Japanese on Formosa following the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor meant that most of his air force was caught and destroyed on the ground.

Although the Japanese force invading the Philippines numbered only 57,000 men, half that of MacArthur's own force, many of the general's men were poorly trained (some were recent inductees), and they were thinly spread. The Japanese had little difficulty taking Manila and much of the island of Luzon. MacArthur then ordered his forces to follow the original plan for withdrawing into the Bataan Peninsula. Unfortunately, the bases there were not ready, and the retreating troops had to abandon precious stocks of supplies and ammunition in the process. Over the next months, MacArthur spent most of his time on Corregidor.

Rather than see him become a prisoner of the Japanese, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to Australia on February 22, 1942, where he became supreme commander of Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. MacArthur also was awarded the Medal of Honor, which many defenders of Bataan and Corregidor believed was undeserved. Officials in Washington were also miffed by MacArthur's acceptance of a $500,000 payment from his friend Manuel Quezon, the Philippine president.

U.S. Army general Douglas MacArthur, one of the most controversial figures in U.S. military history, commanded the South West Pacific Theater during World War II. (National Archives)

From Australia, MacArthur initially developed a deliberate strategy to return to the Philippines. The slow pace of the Allied advance led Washington to insist on a leapfrogging approach that would bypass strongly held Japanese islands and positions, such as Rabaul on New Britain Island and Truk. In the spring of 1944, MacArthur's troops invaded New Guinea and isolated Rabaul. By September, they had taken Morotai and the rest of New Guinea.

In a meeting with Roosevelt in Hawaii in July 1944, Admiral Chester Nimitz, who commanded forces in the Central Pacific, proposed moving against Formosa, whereas MacArthur sought to retake the Philippines. The goal of both approaches was to deny Japanese forces access to supplies in the south. The upshot was that Roosevelt agreed MacArthur would be allowed to retake the Philippines, and Nimitz shifted his resources against Okinawa.

MacArthur commanded the ground forces in the liberation of the Philippines (October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945). In October, U.S. troops landed on Leyte. They then secured Luzon between January and March 1945, followed by the southern Philippines. An invasion of Japan proved unnecessary, and MacArthur, one of those promoted to the new rank of general of the army, presided over the formal Japanese surrender ceremony on the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2 in his capacity as supreme commander of the Allied powers in Asia.

President Harry S. Truman then named MacArthur commander of Allied occupation forces in Japan. In this position, the general in effect governed Japan as a benevolent despot, presiding over the institution of a new democratic constitution and domestic reforms. On the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950, Truman appointed MacArthur commander of the United Nations (UN) forces sent to prevent a North Korean victory. During the perilous UN withdrawal into the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur husbanded his resources, and on September 15, 1950, he launched a brilliant (but also lucky) invasion at Inchon that cut North Korean supply lines to the south.

He then oversaw the United Nations Command invasion of North Korea, but his faulty troop dispositions and his disdain for possible Chinese intervention nearly led to disaster. His increasingly public disagreement with Truman over the course of the war—which the administration in Washington sought to limit and MacArthur wanted to widen by attacking China proper—led to his removal from command in April 1951.

MacArthur returned to the United States a national hero. He then retired from the military, accepting the position of chairman of the board of Remington Rand Corporation. His attempt to run for the presidency as a Republican in 1952 quickly collapsed, and the nomination and office went to another general, whom MacArthur held in great disdain—Dwight D. Eisenhower. MacArthur died in Washington, D.C., on April 5, 1964.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Brereton, Lewis Hyde; Eisenhower, Dwight David; New Guinea Campaign; Nimitz, Chester William; Okinawa, Invasion of; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Quezon, Manuel Luis; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Southwest Pacific Theater; Truman, Harry S.;

Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew; Document 132; Document 139; Document 155; Document 164; Document 167; Document 182; Document 183; Document 184; Document 186; Document 195; Document 199; Document 200; Document 203; Document 214

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Machine Guns

Relatively small-caliber, automatic-fire, crew-served weapons. The machine gun of World War II was a weapon class in itself. In World War I, machine guns were mainly heavy water-cooled, belt-fed weapons mounted on heavy tripods and used for trench defense or for long-range suppressive fire. The need for machine guns in aircraft and the invention of the British Lewis gun during World War I, however, created a new form of machine gun.

Germany and the United States were the first nations to develop the light machine gun (LMG) for infantry assault use. The Germans stripped down their Machinengewehr 08/15 (MG-08/15), fitted it with a bipod and a rudimentary stock, and reduced the operational weight to 28 pounds. The resulting MG-34 with its 75-round drum magazine could be carried by a man on the battlefield. It was produced in large numbers throughout the war. In 1942, the Germans introduced the MG-42.

The French World War I M-1914 Chauchat machine gun remained in service. It came in 7.65mm, 7.92mm, and 8mm models but was of questionable tactical value.

Machine guns of the period operated either by recoil or by gas. Recoil-operated machine guns, such as the German MG-34 and MG-42, often had high rates of fire. When the cartridge was fired, the recoil was used to eject the spent cartridge by pushing the breechblock rearward against a spring,

after a safety delay. The spring then forced the breechblock forward again and in so doing reloaded the weapon, which fired as soon as the breech was locked. Gas-operated weapons used gas from the cartridge discharge, which was bled off from a gas port in the barrel. This operated a gas piston, which interacted with the breechblock to extract and reload the weapon.

Machine guns were classified in the period after World War I as heavy or light. The heavy versions were still mounted on tripods, equipped with both direct and indirect sighting methods and used for direct shooting and long-range interdictory fire. The LMGs, however, were the weapons used prolifically by the infantry. These weapons were often but not always fed by magazines or cartridge strips. They were fitted with bipod legs and could be carried in battle by one man. Normally, because of the high rate of ammunition expenditure, one or two other men accompanied the light machine gunner, carrying spare ammunition and sometimes spare barrels.

Ammunition for the machine gun was supplied in various ways. One method was the strip, in which a number of rounds were held on a metal base that was fed through the gun and then reloaded when empty. This method was employed in the French Hotchkiss, the Italian Breda, and the Japanese heavy machine gun. Another method was the magazine, which was a spring-loaded box or drum fitted to the gun that could be replaced when empty. Magazines held about 30 rounds of ammunition, and weapons so fitted included the British Bren, the French M-1931A, the Soviet DP (Degtyarev Pekhotniya [Obratsa] or Degtyarev Infantry [Pattern]) (as a drum), and the Japanese type-96 and similar weapons.

Belt feeds, which allowed sustained long-range fire, were found, for example, on the Browning M-1917AI and M-1919A4 .30-caliber machine guns, the German MG-34 and MG-42, the British Besa 7.92mm gun (mainly used as coaxial tank armament), and the Italian 8mm Fiat Model 35 machine gun.

One other method was used—the clip box. This box, which held ammunition in rifle clips that were fed automatically into the gun, was a rarity. It was seen on the Japanese Nambu 6.5mm and the Italian Revelli 6.5mm Feed; supply problems rendered these weapons inefficient, however, and they were soon phased out.

The LMG was issued on the basis of one weapon to every 7 to 10 men, meaning that every infantry platoon had three or four of them, though this

varied from army to army; U.S. infantry platoons, for instance, were armed only with the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) and not light machine guns. Infantry usually could also call on support from the heavy machine guns if needed. World War II infantry tactics were based on fire and movement, with the LMG firing and the riflemen of a section moving or vice versa. In the British Army during the war, the LMG was considered a support weapon, allowing the riflemen to close on the enemy and to attack with the bayonet. The Germans saw the LMG as the main weapon with which to win a firefight with the enemy, who was then to be rolled up by the infantrymen in the section.

U.S. Army Air Forces gunner Sergeant William Watts firing his machine gun at a German aircraft during a bombing mission in 1942. (National Archives)

U.S. Army infantry companies were equipped with LMGs. The M-1917 series water-cooled, .30-caliber Browning LMG was used by U.S. units throughout the war. It was belt-fed and could be carried in the company as well as fitted to just about every vehicle in or near the front line. It led to the M-1919 series of .30-caliber, air-cooled machine guns that were the principal U.S. machine guns of the war. They were only moderately accurate, as they

had no butt stock to allow effective fire control but instead were fired with a pistol grip at the rear of the gun body. The M-1919A6, based on the same receiver, did have a butt stock and was fired from a bipod.

Backing up these weapons was the .50-caliber Browning. The M-1921 series was originally a water-cooled weapon developed to attack aircraft and observation balloons. Its air-cooled offspring, the M-2 series ("Ma Deuce"), was used by every U.S. branch in every environment and theater of the war. It could be fired from a tripod mount or fixed on vehicles and could be set for single-shot fire, although it was not intended for use against personnel. The M-2 .50-caliber was also fitted in a number of aircraft, equipped with a lighter barrel and often with a solenoid firing mechanism. It is still in service in many armies today, including the U.S. Army.

British infantry used the Lewis gun initially, but this weapon was rapidly replaced by the Enfield version of an LMG produced on license from the Brno arms firm of Czechoslovakia. Known as the Bren gun, it was regarded by many as the finest LMG ever made. The Bren was a .303-caliber, detachable-box, magazine-fed, gas-operated weapon with a rate of fire of 450 to 540 rounds per minute. It was accurate and had a quick barrel-change system that coped with rapid firing. The Bren gun served throughout World War II and was well respected, although its rate of fire and the tactical restrictions placed on it meant that it was no match in a firefight with its German equivalent. The British also used the famous Vickers .303 machine gun in a support role.

The Soviets began the war with heavy wheel-mounted and shield-protected Maxim M-1910 machine guns, but experience with the Germans led to the rapid development of the DP, a section automatic weapon, fed with 7.62mm rounds from a top-mounted round drum with a capacity of 47 rounds. This weapon was increasingly backed up by the submachine gun, which meant that the firepower of a Soviet section began to approximate that of a German infantry section, although weight and rate of fire figures were still lower.

Machine guns were not only used by the infantry, however. They were also mounted in tanks for protection against infantry and for air defense, although the Germans' self-propelled Ferdinand gun was not so fitted; as a consequence, German troops suffered greatly from Soviet infantry attacks during the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943). Most tanks had a coaxial rifle-

caliber machine gun fitted in the turret and another in the hull, the latter operated by the driver, codriver, or radio operator. These machine guns were of great value in suppressing enemy machine guns and artillery when use of the main armament was ineffective or impossible.

The Americans and Germans also linked two or more machine guns for antiaircraft use. Early in the war, the Germans had a small infantry cart fitted with two MG-34 machine guns and the appropriate sights for antiaircraft defense; it was soon found, however, that the cart was too easy a target for the aircraft, and the idea was discontinued. U.S. tanks were equipped with .50-caliber machine guns for antiaircraft defense, the gun being fitted above the commander's cupola on the tank and capable of a 360-degree traverse and a 90-degree elevation. Although the .50-caliber machine gun was a formidable weapon, it had few antiaircraft successes and was often used in a ground role for attacking soft-skinned vehicles and buildings.

Aircraft were also fitted with machine guns. The British Spitfire, for example, carried eight .303-caliber machine guns, but these were short-ranged and relatively ineffective against German aircraft. The British also employed the .303-caliber machine gun for bomber defense. The Americans entered the war with the .50-caliber weapon in their aircraft, which could inflict great damage on German and Japanese fighter aircraft. The Germans, however, were using 20mm and 30mm cannon from the start, and they soon learned that one hit from such a weapon was worth more than any number of .303 rounds and better than a burst of .50-caliber ammunition (which is roughly 12.7mm).

The British turned to the 20mm cannon for later versions of their fighter aircraft, and the weapon proved singularly effective. The smaller caliber also meant that more ammunition could be carried per gun as compared with the German 30mm cannon, but the Germans turned to another air weapon—the antiaircraft rocket. American fighter aircraft, however, continued to utilize the .50-caliber gun.

Naval use of machine guns was limited, although early World War II warships carried some machine guns for local protection. It was soon found, however, that much heavier weapons were needed for antiaircraft protection, and in most cases, the light and heavy machine guns went into lockers. Naval aircraft reflected their ground-based counterparts in terms of the weapons fitted on them.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Antiaircraft Artillery and Employment; Kursk, Battle of; Rifles; Submachine Guns; Tanks, All Powers

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Mackensen, Eberhard von (1889–1969)

German Army general. Born in Bromberg (today Bydgoszcz, Poland) on September 24, 1889, Eberhard von Mackensen was part of a distinguished military family. His father was General (later Field Marshal) August von Mackensen. The younger Mackensen entered the army in October 1908 as an officer candidate. He was commissioned as a lieutenant two years later. During World War I, he earned the Iron Cross First and Second Classes and other awards for valor.

Mackensen remained with the army after the war and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1932. The next year, he became chief of staff of the cavalry inspectorate. He was promoted to colonel in September 1934, major general in January 1939, and lieutenant general in January 1940. He briefly served as chief of staff of the Fourteenth Army (from September to November 1939) and then as chief of staff of Colonel General Siegmund Wilhelm List's Twelfth Army (from November 1939 to January 1941). Mackensen participated in the invasion of France (May 10–June 25, 1940) and was promoted to general of cavalry in August 1940.

In January 1941, Mackensen took command of the III Corps (Motorized). His seizure of bridgeheads at Dnepropetrovsk during the invasion of the Soviet Union, which began on June 22, 1941, assisted Colonel General Ewald von Kleist's breakthrough. Mackensen's troops captured and briefly held Rostov (November 17–30, 1941). In January 1942, the III Corps was redesignated the III Panzer Corps. It remained engaged in the Ukraine and

Caucasus areas. Mackensen's forces crossed the Terek River in late 1942 before having to withdraw in consequence of the Soviet offensive at Stalingrad.

Mackensen assumed command of the First Panzer Army in November 1942 and was promoted to colonel general in July 1943. His army took part in Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's counteroffensive and recapture of Kharkov (March 1–14, 1943) and pushed to the Donets River in the area east of Petrovskoye. During the summer, the First Panzer Army was gradually forced from the Donets Basin and back toward the Dnieper River at Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. Mackensen was compelled to give up the German bridgehead on the Dnieper at Zaporozhye by mid-October 1943.

That November, Mackensen assumed command of the reconstituted Fourteenth Army in Italy. His forces engaged the Allied landing at Anzio on January 22, 1944, and contained the Allies there for several months. Mackensen did not get along well with Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, though, and Hitler blamed Mackensen for the loss of Rome, relieving him of command in June 1944. Makemsen did not again hold a command in the war.

Following the war, Mackensen was tried for the March 24, 1944, Ardeatine Caves Massacre and sentenced to death on November 30, 1945; the sentence was then commuted to life imprisonment. He was released from Werl Prison in October 1952. He later published a book on the 1941–1942 Eastern Front campaign of the III Panzer Corps. Mackensen died in Altmühlendorf, Schleswig-Holstein, Germany, on May 19, 1969.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Ardeatine Massacre; Caucasus Campaign; Italy Campaign; Kesselring, Albert; Kharkov, Battles of; List, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter; Rome, Advance on and Capture of; Rostov, Battle for; Ukraine Campaign

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Maczek, Stanisław (1892–1994)

Polish Army lieutenant general. Born on March 31, 1892, in Szczerzec near Lviv (Lvov) in Ukraine, Stanisław Maczek served during World War I as an infantry officer of the Austrian-Hungarian Army. In November 1918, he joined the armed forces of the newly formed Polish Republic. He first served as commander of the Special Storm Battalion on the Volhynian Front.

Following the 1919–1920 Russo-Polish War, Maczek commanded a battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment stationed in Lviv. After studies at the Staff College in Warsaw in 1923, he served as intelligence officer of the Lviv Military District. Between 1927 and 1938, he commanded various infantry units.

In 1938 when Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły began to modernize the Polish Army, Maczek was put in charge of the first of the two armored brigades. The training of his brigade was barely finished when Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. Maczek's units did what they could against overwhelming German armored strength on the southern sector of the front. When the Soviet Union also invaded Poland from the rear on September 17 and the struggle on two fronts became hopeless, Maczek crossed with his brigade into Hungary; there, he and the bulk of his brigade were interned. Thanks to the friendly attitude of the Hungarian authorities, most of the personnel of the brigade managed to reach France by 1940, where General Władysław Sikorski was forming a new Polish army. Maczek's brigade was ready just in time to take part in the May 10–June 25, 1940, Battle for France.

After the French capitulation, most of Maczek's officers and men escaped to Britain, where Maczek was put in charge of reestablishing his unit; by 1942, it became the Polish 1st Armored Division. Maczek commanded the division in the campaign across Western Europe in 1944 and 1945. His division was instrumental in closing the Falaise-Argentan gap (August 1944). After that, as a part of 21st Army Group, commanded by Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, it continued its victorious march through northern France, Belgium, Holland, and northwestern Germany until the end of the war in May 1945.

After the demobilization, Maczek settled in Edinburgh, Scotland. He published his memoirs in 1961 and died in Edinburgh on December 11, 1994.

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI

See also

Falaise-Argentan Pocket; France, Battle for; Poland, Army; Poland Campaign; Rydz-Śmigły, Edward; Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz

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Madagascar

A French colony since 1896, Madagascar is located off the East African coast in the Indian Ocean. A thousand miles in length, Madagascar is the world's fourth-largest island. In 1939 its population numbered 4,000,000 people, and 34,000 Malagasy troops participated in fighting preceding the defeat of France.

In 1940, the Nazi regime in Germany tried to create a settlement colony there for European Jews. Plans to resettle Jews there had been advanced in the late 1930s by the Polish and German governments, but after the defeat of France in June 1940 the plan gained wider support from Nazi leaders. The so-called Madagascar Plan involved the relocation of 4 million Jews to the island, which France would transfer to German control. Nothing came of the plan, which was soon superseded.

Following the Royal Navy's attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir, Madagascar's administration proclaimed its allegiance to the Vichy government, headed by Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain. Meanwhile, with Japanese submarines operating freely in the Indian Ocean and Japanese carriers raiding there, the British Eastern Fleet was driven from the northeastern Indian Ocean. Royal Navy units were forced to relocate to a new base at Kilindini (Mombasa), Kenya. The Japanese carrier foray into the Indian Ocean in March–April 1942 raised alarm bells in London that Tokyo

might mount an operation to seize Madagascar and use bases there for attacks against the British Eighth Army's vital supply route from the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt. In any case, if the British could control Madagascar, this would enable them to base ships there and provide better protection for their convoys.

Major General Robert Sturges of the Royal Marines commanded the expeditionary force of British, British East African, and South African troops. Rear Admiral Edward Neville Syfret had charge of the naval forces. Some 8,000 Vichy troops, 2 armed merchant cruisers, 2 sloops, 5 submarines, 8 coastal batteries, and 27 aircraft defended the island

The Allied invasion force departed England in March for Durban, South Africa. Covering warships were drawn largely from Force H at Gibraltar, along with some ships from England and others from the Eastern Fleet. Syfret was appointed combined commander of all naval forces. These consisted of the battleship *Ramillies,* the aircraft carriers *Illustrious* and *Indomitable,* the cruisers *Hermione* and *Devonshire,* and 13 destroyers (2 of them Australian) along with frigates, corvettes, and transports. Everything was in place at the end of April, but the British cabinet did not give final approval for the assault until May 1, when the expeditionary forces had already sailed from Durban for their objective.

The chief British objective was the northern port city and naval base of Diégo-Suarez (now Antsiranana). The British decided to approach it from the rear by landing on the west coast of the island. The invasion, the first major British amphibious assault of the war, began before dawn on May 5, 1942.

Although the invasion achieved surprise, the French resisted. Fleet Air Arm aircraft flying from the carriers *Indomitable* and *Illustrious* attacked and neutralized French airfields and warships, and the expeditionary forces went ashore. Diégo-Suarez was taken on May 7, but fighting to secure the entire island continued for some months.

On May 30, a Japanese midget submarine attack sank a tanker and badly damaged the battleship *Ramillies,* putting it out of action for nearly a year. On September 10, another British landing took place at Majunga. An armistice was arranged with Vichy French authorities on November 5. The fighting had claimed some 1,200 casualties, including 600 Malgache. In January 1943 the British handed over Madagascar to the Free French.

In 1947–1948 there was a major uprising on the island against French

rule, resulting in the deaths of between 11,000 and 80,000 people. Madagascar became independent in June 1960.

GARY KERLEY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Diégo-Suarez, Japanese Raid on; Force H; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Vichy France

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Madagascar, Allied Invasion of

See IRONCLAD, Operation

Madoera Strait, Battle of (February 4, 1942)

Naval battle between Japanese and Allied forces in the Netherlands East Indies. On January 10, 1942, responding to the deteriorating situation in the Far East, the Allies established the joint American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command. The next day, the Japanese began their conquest of the Netherlands East Indies by invading Tarakan in Borneo and Menado in Celebes. This move was followed by the Japanese capture of Balikpapan in Borneo and Kendari in Celebes (January 24) and Ambon in the Moluccas (January 27). The ABDA Command retaliated with its aircraft and an inconclusive naval strike against Balikpapan (January 24).

On February 2, ABDA naval commander U.S. admiral Thomas Hart formed the Combined Striking Force to concentrate his naval resources to meet the next Japanese move. When a Japanese convoy was spotted assembling at Balikpapan, he ordered a sortie. Hart wanted his warships to strike the Japanese as the convoy approached either Makassar in Celebes or

Bandjermasin in Borneo. Already assembled at Madoera Island, near Java's naval base of Soerabaja, were the ABDA cruisers USS *Houston* and *Marblehead* and HMNS *Tromp,* supported by seven destroyers: USS *Barker, Bulmer, John D. Edwards,* and *Stewart* and HMNS *Banckert, Piet Hein,* and *Van Ghent.* When their air reconnaissance sighted these vessels on February 3, the Japanese gathered 36 Mitsubishi G4M (known as "Betty" in the Allied recognition system) and 24 Mitsubishi G3M ("Nell") bombers, along with 7 Mitsubishi CSM2 ("Babs") reconnaissance aircraft to seek out and destroy this threat.

On the morning of February 4, Dutch rear admiral Karel Doorman led the Combined Striking Force north. No ABDA air cover was available except for the *Houston*'s three floatplanes. Doorman's concern that his force would be spotted by Japanese aircraft was confirmed at 9:49 a.m., when nine Japanese bombers found his ships passing through the Madoera Strait. For the next two hours, the Japanese concentrated their air attacks on the U.S. cruisers. The Japanese had only one plane shot down and two damaged.

Although the Japanese failed to sink any of the ABDA ships, they did inflict serious damage. The *Houston*'s after-turret was knocked out, and the *Marblehead* was so badly damaged that it was forced to steam to the United States for repairs. Doorman was obliged to withdraw his force to Tjilatjap on Java's southern coast. U.S. casualties in the battle totaled 63 dead and 84 wounded. Hollywood treated the story of the wounded sailors in the 1944 propaganda film *The Story of Dr. Wassell,* starring Gary Cooper.

JONATHAN (JACK) M. FORD

See also

ABDA Command; Balikpapan, Battle of; Doorman, Karel Willem Marie; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Sunda Strait, Battle of

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Maginot Line

Massive French defensive fortifications built between 1929 and 1938 along both the German and Italian frontiers. Bled white by huge losses in World War I, France resolved in the 1920s to defend its borders with an efficient fortified wall to make up for its lack of manpower. The maxim of French defense became “Stingy with manpower, extravagant with steel.” In part based on the effective resistance of Verdun’s ferro-concrete forts in 1916, the building of the line became the driving passion of Defense Minister André Maginot, who had fought at Verdun as an enlisted soldier and was seriously wounded.

The Maginot Line was conceived as a self-contained system, eventually consisting of two distinct geographic regions. The main part of the line protected Alsace-Lorraine along the Rhine frontier. The Thionville-Metz region was the most heavily fortified and included the huge Hackenberg fortress, with more than six miles of underground galleries separated into sectors by heavy antiblast doors, connecting 17 combat blocks.

Less known even today was what some sources call the Little Maginot Line. This protected the French Alpine provinces facing Italy, including important mountain passes, with about 25 miles of continuing fortification down to the Mediterranean at Menton. One of these forts, Rimplas was the first of the entire system to be built, beginning in 1928.

In each region, the Maginot Line was made up of advance posts, major forts, support facilities, and lines of communication—all built to a standard plan and widely dispersed to withstand modern artillery attack. Located three to six miles behind the frontier, major (*gros*) and smaller (*petit*) infantry or artillery forts (*ouvrages*) were built to make effective use of terrain to control transportation routes. Artillery pieces—mortars and howitzers—were especially designed for Maginot Line use and were housed in huge casemates, some with retractable turrets. The largest howitzers were 135mm weapons. Each fort had its own diesel power supply and storage deep underground. The largest forts were served by up to 1,000 men moved from one part of a fort to another by underground electric trains (*métro*) and were capable of operating without resupply for a month.

Forts were positioned so that troops had the ability to fire on their neighbors to fend off surface enemy attacks (which did not happen at Eben Emael) without harming the occupants (casemate reinforced concrete was more than 10 feet thick and then further protected with many feet of earth). Command-and-control facilities were often buried 60 or more feet deep, relying on input from fortified observation cupolas, an extensive buried telephone network, and radio links. All entrances (usually one for provisions and another for men) were heavily fortified, featured retractable drawbridges (or lifting bridges), and were made airtight against gas attack. There were also emergency entrances for all forts.

The Germans knew quite a bit about the Maginot Line before the war, much of it learned from the captured Czech border forts that were closely modeled on Maginot examples. Aerial surveys just before the war, intelligence agents, and interviews with many who had helped to construct the forts (some of them German) gave the German military a good sense of where the Maginot Line forts were and what they could offer in resistance. The Germans began work on the Gustav gun in 1937 with the intention of using it to crack the Maginot Line.

The Germans were also well aware of the fatal flaw in the Maginot Line’s geographic conception. Persuaded that no sizable military force could penetrate the dense Ardennes Forest region of southern Belgium, the line of forts stopped at that point, and only light fortifications (dubbed the Maginot Extension) were built along the Belgian frontier to the English Channel. The French plan was to advance into Belgium and assist their allies at the Belgian border fortresses. The plan depended on having enough time to move the requisite armies.

American soldiers inspecting the Maginot Line in eastern France, 1944. (National Archives)

When the German attack finally came on May 10, 1940, of course, blitzkrieg tactics did not prevail that time. The German panzers and infantry broke through the Ardennes and turned the flank of the Maginot Line while other forces drove toward the Channel, cutting off British forces. The French, who could barely advance, were rapidly overwhelmed. German attacks never breached the structures of any of the *gros ouvrages,* although some of the smaller outlying facilities were taken in fierce fighting because the interval troops supporting them had been withdrawn.

Despite the German use of huge siege mortars and cannon, no major fort fell. The Germans took only a few *petits ouvrages* on the far western end and directly along the Rhine, even though they expended considerable effort and usually greatly outnumbered the defenders. To the south, the Italians never broke through the Alpine defenses, although they did directly assault the *gros*

ouvrage of Cap Martin overlooking the sea in a failed attempt to gain control of the coast road.

In the end, the Maginot Line accomplished exactly what it was designed to do—protect Alsace-Lorraine and the French provinces facing Italy. It did not fail, despite the fact that some of its forts had not yet been fully armed. The existence of the line, originally designed to give the army time to mobilize and attack, had lulled France into complacency in the face of a rearming Germany and Italy. The French Army succumbed to a defensive stance and ignored mobile warfare, as the high command was convinced that the line could contain any enemy attack. Only after the Germans occupied two-thirds of the nation did Maginot Line forces surrender with the rest of France.

Forces stationed at many of the forts (e.g., Hackenberg and Simershoff) fought again in 1944 as the Allies neared the German frontier, and some of the fortifications were heavily damaged as they had not been in 1940. After the war, the French reoccupied and partially rearmed the Maginot Line, maintaining some forts into the 1960s; then, they were finally abandoned for good. A few facilities, such as a part of Hochwald, are still used by the French Army or the French Air Force, generally for storage or communications. A number of *ouvrages* have been opened as museums. Others are used to grow mushrooms or store wine.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Blitzkrieg; Eben Emael, German Capture of; France, Battle for; Gustav Gun

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Magwe, Battle for (March 8–22, 1942)

Air battle in Burma pitting Japanese aircraft against American and British aircraft. On February 28, 1942, remaining American Volunteer Group (AVG) Curtiss P-40B Tomahawks of the "Adam and Eve" Squadron were forced to abandon Mingaladon Airfield near Rangoon and evacuate to Magwe. Between March 8 and 13, they were reinforced by 10 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses from the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) Tenth Air Force that flew in 474 men of the British Innishilling Fusiliers and 29 tons of supplies from New Delhi, India. On the return flights, these aircraft evacuated 423 civilians. On March 15, Royal Air Force (RAF) Blenheims of Number 113 Squadron from Calcutta flew to Magwe to use it as an advanced base for raids on Japanese Fifteenth Army troop concentrations and supply areas in the Irrawaddy Valley.

On March 19, 2 AVG P-40s armed with fragmentation bombs flew from Magwe to sweep the Japanese Air Force's 5th Air Division airfield at Moulheim. The airfield was 250 miles by air from Magwe, and the Japanese believed that they were beyond the range of P-40s and had made no effort to either camouflage or disperse the 20 fighters on the ground there. The 2 P-40s destroyed 15 of the 20 Japanese aircraft on the ground without a shot fired in return. On March 20, 9 Bristol Blenheim bombers of Number 113 Squadron, escorted by 10 Hawker Hurricanes of Number 67 Squadron, mounted an attack on Mingaladon and destroyed 16 Japanese aircraft on the ground and 11 others that took off, of the 50 Japanese aircraft based there. Although some of the British aircraft were damaged, all returned safely to base.

In turn, the Japanese attacked Magwe Airfield. The 98th Sentai (attack group) sent 27 Mitsubishi Ki-21 ("Sally") bombers, escorted by 20 Nakajima Ki-27 "Nates" from 1st Sentai, destroying 6 AVG P-40s and 2 Hurricanes of Number 67 Squadron and 3 Blenheims of Number 113 Squadron. However, 5 AVG P-40s and 2 RAF Hurricanes of Number 67 Squadron shot down 5 of the Japanese bombers.

On March 22, Ki-27 "Nates" of the 1st Sentai, escorting Kawasaki Ki-32 "Mary" light bombers of the 31st Sentai, attacked Magwe Airfield. Only three AVG P-40s and four RAF Hurricanes of Number 67 Squadron remained operational. With Magwe's position compromised and the airfield in poor condition, the four flyable RAF Hurricanes were shifted to Akyab Airfield near the India-Burma border and the three AVG P-40s were moved

to Laiwing on the Burma-China border, where five damaged aircraft were also transported by truck. The evacuation of Magwe left the British Imperial and Chinese troops in Burma devoid of air cover.

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See also
Burma Air Campaign; Flying Tigers

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Makassar Strait, Battle of

See Balikpapan, Battle of

Makin Island, Battle of (November 20–23, 1943)

Makin Atoll is part of the Gilbert Island chain in the Central Pacific. It was the site of two World War II battles, both of which occurred on Butaritari, the largest island. Makin is shaped like a long, crooked hammer; the head is 3.5 miles long, and the handle about 11 miles long. In the first battle on August 17 and 18, 1942, the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion destroyed the Japanese seaplane base there and decimated the garrison. This outcome had an unfortunate effect for the Americans, because it caused the Japanese to strengthen their defenses in the Gilberts.

On Butaritari, they constructed bunkers, trenches, machine-gun nests, gun emplacements, and two deep tank traps; the traps each ran shore to shore across the central part of the handle of the island to defend a 3,000-yard-long area known as the Citadel, where the Americans had landed in 1942. Japanese Navy junior grade lieutenant Seizo Ishikawa commanded some 500

Japanese military personnel, and there were 79 Japanese and 200 Korean construction workers.

The invasion of Makin was part of the U.S. campaign against the Gilberts, which included the bloody struggle for Tarawa (November 20–24, 1943). The Makin assault force numbered 6,471 men: the 165th Regimental Combat Team and a battalion of the 105th Infantry Regiment of Major General Ralph C. Smith's 27th Infantry Division, originally a National Guard unit. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner directed operations from the battleship *Pennsylvania*. The navy supported the landing with 3 battleships, 5 cruisers, 13 destroyers, and planes from 5 aircraft carriers.

Beginning at 5:40 a.m. on November 19, 1943, naval gunfire, including 14-inch shells from the battleships *Pennsylvania, New Mexico,* and *Mississippi,* pounded Makin. Carrier planes followed a half hour later. The Japanese had no effective means of response.

On November 20, beginning at 8:30 a.m., the navy's Northern Attack Force put the troops ashore on two beaches on the western part of the island. Later, another force went ashore on the lagoon side. The attackers met little opposition, pushing east toward the Citadel and taking the western Japanese tank barrier by the end of the day.

Here the attack bogged down, as the troops were pinned down by Japanese snipers. On the night of the third day, the Japanese mounted a counterattack, during which they lost more than 50 men. But at 10:30 a.m. on November 23, the army declared Makin secured. The attackers had suffered 64 men killed in action and another 150 wounded. V Amphibious Corps commander U.S. Marine Corps major general Holland Smith regarded the four days it had taken to secure the island, despite the army's overwhelming superiority in manpower, as "infuriating slow." During the invasion of Saipan the next year, he removed General Ralph Smith from command. Following Makin's capture, army engineers built an airstrip to allow further attacks on nearby Japanese forces.

The capture of the island proved far more costly for the U.S. Navy. During the preliminary bombardment, a turret explosion on the *Mississippi* killed 43 men and wounded 19. Also, the delay in taking Makin caused the supporting warships to remain close by, where they were vulnerable to attack by Japanese submarines sent there from Truk. On November 24, *I-175*

torpedoed the escort carrier *Liscombe Bay*. A terrific explosion tore apart the entire aft third of the carrier, and 640 sailors died.

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See also

Gilbert Islands Campaign; Makin Island Raid; Tarawa, Battle of

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Makin Island Raid (August 17–18, 1942)

U.S. Marine assault on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands group in the Central Pacific. This operation by the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion was designed to divert Japanese attention from the Solomons Campaign and to boost American morale. U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz decided to employ Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson's 2nd Raider Battalion. Specific plans called for the two large 2,700-ton mine-laying submarines *Nautilus* and *Argonaut* to land two companies of 221 raiders on Butaritari Island of Makin Atoll just before dawn on August 17 to wipe out the Japanese garrison there. Withdrawing that evening, they were to land the next day on Little Makin Island and destroy its installations. The stated goals were to gather intelligence and take prisoners, destroy Japanese supplies and installations, and distract Japanese attention from the U.S. reinforcement of Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

U.S. soldiers on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands. (Library of Congress)

The submarines arrived off Makin early on August 16 and put the raiders ashore early the next morning. Unfortunately for the Americans, the premature discharge of a rifle by one of the marines destroyed the element of surprise. Carlson's raiders then moved inland and engaged the Japanese troops on Makin Island, virtually wiping them out. Following Japanese air strikes, Carlson decided to withdraw, but rough seas and the failure of outboard engines capsized a number of the boats and stranded Carlson and some 120 raiders ashore, most of them without their weapons. Fearing that he was surrounded, Carlson considered surrender and even sent out a patrol with a surrender note.

On the morning of August 18, Carlson led a patrol inland and discovered 83 Japanese bodies. Utilizing rubber boats and dugouts made by local peoples, most of the remaining raiders had returned to the submarines by 11:00 that night. In the raid, the Japanese lost perhaps 160 dead; the marines had 19 killed and 9 missing. The 9 marines evaded capture with help from locals until their food ran out. They surrendered on August 30. The Japanese took these men to Kwajalein and beheaded them as war criminals. The raiders had fought well, and Sergeant Clyde Thomason, who sacrificed his life to save several comrades, became the first enlisted marine in World War II to earn the Medal of Honor.

Although the raid did divert attention from Guadalcanal, it also taught the Japanese that they needed to strengthen their defenses. As a result, they heavily fortified Tarawa, which witnessed one of the bloodiest marine landings of the Pacific war 16 months later.

In 2000 and 2001, the remains of the 19 dead raiders were returned to the United States.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Carlson, Evans Fordyce; Makin Island, Battle of; Tarawa, Battle of

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Malaya Campaign (1941–1942)

Malaya comprises the 700-mile-long Malay Peninsula and Singapore. The British took Malaya from the Dutch in 1810 and established political and administrative control over four of the sultanates. Protectorate status was extended to the remaining five sultanates by 1914. During the mid-19th century, Malaya's economic value grew following the discovery of significant tin deposits there, and after the turn of the century the rubber industry underwent considerable development. These two resources made Malaya strategically important to the British.

Following World War I, the British government decided to develop Singapore into a large naval base, intended to defend against Japanese expansionism, although construction was never completed. During the 1930s, the British built a series of airfields on the peninsula in the belief that Singapore and Malaya could best be defended from the air.

In October 1940, Air Chief Marshal Sir Henry Robert Brooke-Popham was appointed commander in chief, Far East, with his headquarters in Singapore. Brooke-Popham had never served east of Suez and was unfamiliar with the political and military forces girding for war in Southeast Asia.

Below him were Sir Shenton Thomas, governor of the Straits Settlements and high commissioner of the Malay States, and the individual service commanders. The senior of these—the general officer commanding, Malaya, Lieutenant General Arthur Ernest Percival—arrived in May 1941. London rejected Brooke-Popham's requests for more resources and a preemptive strike in southern Thailand against the mounting Japanese threat.

When the Japanese finally began their invasion of Malaya with landings along the northeastern coast on the night of December 7–8, 1941, the British thus were caught unprepared. With insufficient ships and aircraft to create a simultaneous presence in all theaters, Britain had been forced to establish priorities, and the theaters receiving most of the naval and air assets were the Atlantic and North Africa. Consequently, the defense of the peninsula was left to the army, which numbered some 88,600 Australian, British, Indian, and Malay troops. The principal ground units were the understrength Indian 9th and 11th Divisions and two brigades of the Australian 8th Division as well as the 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigades at Singapore. The British had only 158 aircraft, mostly obsolete types, and no tanks. They also suffered a severe blow when Japanese aircraft sank Admiral Sir Tom Phillips's new battleship, the *Prince of Wales,* and the battle cruiser *Repulse* on December 10 when they attempted to oppose the Japanese landings.

The Japanese had devoted extensive planning to the Malayan operation, and the occupation of southern Indochina earlier in 1941 had formed part of their preparation. Malaya would provide them with tin and rubber resources, a strategic naval base at Singapore, and a jumping-off point for further expansion into the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies and the Indian Ocean.

The invading Japanese forces, commanded by General Yamashita Tomoyuki, went ashore beginning on the night of December 7–8. Some 60,000 men were centered in three divisions, supported by Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo's Malay Force, 158 naval aircraft, and 459 aircraft of the 3rd Air Division as well as 80 tanks, 40 armored cars, and several artillery regiments. The Japanese quickly gained air superiority and began a rapid move southward. On December 15 in a desperate move, Governor Thomas accepted an offer of cooperation from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and lifted the official proscription on both it and the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD). Many members of these two parties

would now be trained in guerrilla warfare and sabotage at the 101st Special Training School, which had been hastily created at Singapore.

In late December, Brooke-Popham was recalled and blamed, unjustly, for the Japanese successes. Kuala Lumpur fell on January 11. British, Australian, and Indian reinforcements, most of them poorly trained, were sent in through Singapore Harbor to the retreating front but could do little to stem the Japanese advance. In a series of short battles in mid-January, the remaining British defenses in southern Malaya were broken, and on January 31 the defenders blew the causeway linking Singapore with the mainland.

Soon after the invasion had begun in December, General Sir Archibald Wavell, commander of Allied forces in the Far East, had visited Singapore and warned that the island's defenses had to be prepared should mainland units eventually be compelled to withdraw to it. Unfortunately, little serious effort was made in this regard. On February 9, the Japanese landed on the island's northwest coast. Singapore was now crowded with refugees, its inhabitants demoralized and its facilities stressed.

On February 15 the British commander, Lieutenant General Percival, surrendered his remaining 70,000 troops. Most of the surviving graduates of the 101st Special Training School took to the jungles to carry on the fight, forming the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in March 1942.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill described the loss of Malaya as the greatest disaster in British military history. The loss clearly demonstrated that the British had grossly underestimated Japanese capabilities. Furthermore, their commanders had done a poor job in handling the ill-trained and inadequately equipped force they had sent to meet the invasion. The larger lesson of Malaya was that for commitments to be realistic, they had to be supported with sufficient resources.

GEORGE M. BROOKE III

See also

Brooke-Popham, Sir Henry Robert Moore; Ozawa Jisaburo; Percival, Arthur Ernest; Phillips, Sir Thomas "Tom" Spencer Vaughan; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse,* Sinking of; Singapore, Battle for; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born near Odessa, Russia, on November 23, 1898, Rodion Malinovsky enlisted in the Russian army at the outbreak of World War I. Badly wounded in 1915, he spent several months recuperating before being reassigned as a machine gunner in April 1916. Malinovsky was decorated for bravery and again wounded. His unit mutinied in the spring of 1917, however, and he was transported to North Africa.

Malinovsky returned to Russia in August 1919, joining the Red Army at Omsk and fighting against the White forces. He then served as chief of staff of the III Cavalry Corps. In 1926, Malinovsky joined the Communist Party, and a year later, he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He then went to Spain as a military adviser to the Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War between 1937 and 1938. Returning to the Soviet Union, he served on the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy.

In March 1941, Major General Malinovsky assumed command of the new XLVIII Rifle Corps on the Romanian border. In August, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he commanded the Sixth Army in Ukraine, where he had no choice but to withdraw before the advancing Germans. Promoted to lieutenant general that November, Malinovsky assumed command of the Southern Front one month later. Following the ill-fated Kharkov Offensive in June 1942, for which he shared blame, he was reassigned to rear-echelon duty.

During July and August 1942, Malinovsky headed the Don Operational Forces Group before being named to command the Sixty-Sixth Army in August. Malinovsky next commanded the Voronezh Front in October and the Second Guards Army in November. In the latter capacity, he played a key role in the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943),

defeating Army Group Don, the German relief force under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, in December.

Malinovsky was promoted to colonel general in February 1943, commanding the Southern Front that month and the Southwest Front in March. In April, he was promoted to army general. He played a major role in the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943) and then spearheaded the drive across Ukraine, taking Odessa in April 1944. His command was redesignated the 3rd Ukrainian Front in October 1943 and the 2nd Ukrainian Front in May 1944. From Ukraine, Malinovsky led Soviet forces into Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. In September 1944, he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union.

When the war in Europe ended, Malinovsky commanded the Trans-Baikal Front in the Far East, pushing into Japanese-held Manchuria. A prominent member of the Soviet military hierarchy after the war, he headed the Far East Command between 1947 and 1953 and the Far East Military District from 1953 to 1956. He was then deputy minister of defense from 1956 to 1957, when he succeeded Marshal Georgii Zhukov as minister of defense. In this post, Malinovsky introduced strategic missiles into the Soviet arsenal and oversaw Soviet military modernization. Malinovsky died in Moscow on March 31, 1967.

MICHAEL SHARE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Kharkov, Battles of; Kursk, Battle of; Manstein, Erich von; Soviet Union, Army; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Malmédy Massacre (December 17, 1944)

Notorious incident involving the murder of unarmed American prisoners of war during the German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December

16, 1944–January 25, 1945). In the offensive, I Panzer Corps had the task of breaking through Allied lines in the Monschau-Losheim sector and advancing to the Meuse. The 1st SS Panzer Division was on the left wing of the corps, and SS-Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper commanded the division's spearhead, known as Kampfgruppe Peiper.

On December 17, the second day of the offensive, the 1st SS Panzer Division broke through the Allied lines between the Belgian towns of Malmédy and Saint Vith. At the village of Baugnez, Peiper's unit encountered a small group of trucks and jeeps belonging to Battery B of the U.S. 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. In the ensuing fight some 20 U.S. soldiers were killed, and Peiper's force took 125 prisoners. Peiper left behind some men to guard the prisoners before moving on to his next objective. A few hours later, another 1st SS Panzer Division column arrived at Baugnez, adding some additional prisoners.

The Germans herded the Americans into a snowy field, where they were held under guard. Meanwhile, another group of separated Americans who had previously escaped from the Germans moved toward the crossroads, and a firefight broke out in which more Americans were killed. This engagement led the guards in the field to fire on their prisoners, perhaps believing that they would try to escape. The Germans then moved among the wounded, executing them with bullets to their heads. Most of those shot were unarmed. At least 72 men were killed, although some 30 others feigned death and later escaped to American lines.

The incident was the worst atrocity against Americans in the European theater during the war. News of the event, which became known as the Malmédy Massacre, quickly circulated among Allied troops, and the U.S. Army made the most of it for propaganda purposes, even including civilians who had died in the fighting in the total of persons killed, although many were actually victims of U.S. bombing.

Bodies of U.S. Army personnel slain by the Germans after they were taken prisoner near Malmédy, Belgium, December 17, 1944. (National Archives)

In May 1946, Peiper and 73 members of the 1st SS Panzer Division, a number of them selected randomly, were brought to trial by a U.S. military court for the Malmédy killings and the murder of soldiers and civilians elsewhere during the offensive. Army prosecutors presented testimony from massacre survivors and civilian witnesses, captured German documents indicating that German troops had been urged to be “ruthless” with prisoners during the offensive, and confessions from some of the accused. In response, the defense argued that pretrial investigations had not been thorough and that confessions had been extorted by mock trials and threats of summary execution. The court dismissed these complaints and convicted all of the defendants. Peiper and 42 others were sentenced to death, and the rest were given lengthy prison sentences.

Questions about the trial results were raised almost immediately, and review boards cited errors in the court's procedural rulings. Several defendants claimed that their confessions had been extracted by physical force, charges that the original prosecutors angrily denied. The army reduced the death sentences to long prison terms, but ultimately all the defendants, including Peiper, were released from prison within a few years.

TERRY SHOPTAUGH

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Peiper, Joachim

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Malta

British island in the central Mediterranean some 60 miles from Sicily. This archipelago of 122 square miles, with a 1939 population of 270,000 people, played a crucial role in the struggle to control the Mediterranean. Just as Malta had been a key location for forces traveling to the Near East in support of the Crusades and during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, it proved to be a vital link in the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa. Formally a British possession since 1814, Malta had the only British port facilities between Alexandria, Egypt, and Gibraltar. Because Malta was 1,000 miles from the nearest British base, it was difficult both to defend and to resupply.

The governor of the island—Lieutenant General William Dobbie and then, from May 1942, General Lord John Gort—also acted as its military commander. The British used Malta as an air and naval base to interdict Axis supply lines between Italy and Libya. In October 1941, British ships and

planes operating from Malta sank two-thirds of the Axis supplies sent to Libya.

Both sides recognized the importance of Malta to operations in the Mediterranean theater. When Italy declared war on the Allies in June 1940, it immediately began air attacks on Malta, and initially the British had only a handful of Sea Gladiator biplanes to meet these attacks. The Germans increased the pressure on the island by sending the Fliegerkorps X to Sicily to neutralize Malta so that Axis supplies and men might reach North Africa. Beginning in January 1941, Fliegerkorps X struck both the island and the British supply convoys in what became a furious two-year aerial campaign.

Sustaining Malta became a top priority for the Allies in the Mediterranean theater. From August 1940 until January 1943, the British pushed 13 convoys through to Malta, all of which sustained losses to Axis naval and air attacks. Critical to Malta's survival was the resupply of fighter aircraft, sent to the island via aircraft carrier. The situation became so desperate and British naval forces were stretched so thin that the United States employed the fleet carrier *Wasp* to fly in Spitfire aircraft during April and May 1942. This was at a time when the U.S. Pacific Fleet desperately needed every available carrier in the Pacific to stem the Japanese advance there.

Despite Allied efforts, the situation in Malta remained precarious for much of 1942. The largest effort to resupply the island came in Operation PEDESTAL (August 3–15, 1942), when the British sent 4 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 7 cruisers, and 24 destroyers to escort a convoy of 14 merchantmen to the island. After numerous air and U-boat attacks, the convoy limped into Malta's harbor on August 12 with just 5 merchant ships, 3 of them damaged. The Royal Navy lost 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and 1 destroyer, with another carrier and 2 cruisers damaged. However, Operation PEDESTAL was sufficient to allow operations from Malta to continue.

In the spring of 1942, Axis leaders discussed employing Italian and German paratroopers, supported by a sea invasion, to seize the island, but the Italians' lack of preparation, the desire to move German air units to the Eastern Front, General Erwin Rommel's recent success in Libya, and the memory of the costly Crete operation all led Adolf Hitler to cancel the operation. By the time the siege of Malta had been lifted in December 1942, more than 1,500 Maltese had died from Axis air attacks. In recognition of their stoutness and to improve their morale during the bleakest of times,

Britain's King George VI bestowed on the entire nation of Malta the George Cross for valor.

C. J. HORN

See also

Malta, Air Battles of; PEDESTAL, Operation; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Vereker, John Standish Surtees Prendergast

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Malta, Air Battles of (1940–1942)

The island of Malta in the central Mediterranean was critically located to interdict Axis lines of communication to Libya and was an important way station for Allied aircraft in transit to North Africa. The air attacks on Malta by the Axis powers were initially intended to reduce the disruption of Axis lines of communications to North Africa by Malta-based bombers and submarines. However, they were also to be the precursor to a planned Axis invasion of the island, code-named Operation HERKULES (the Italian name was C-3).

At the start of World War II, Air Commodore Forster Herbert Martin "Sammy" Maynard was the air officer commanding (AOC) Malta. He developed a reputation for hanging on to any useful aircraft that happened to land on the island. Initially, Malta's fighter defense consisted of four antiquated Gloster Sea Gladiator biplanes. Three of them were popularly known as "Faith," "Hope," and "Charity."

The first Italian bombing attack on Malta occurred on June 11, 1940. Bombing continued throughout the summer and autumn, but reinforcements continued to arrive on the island, including a few Hawker Hurricane fighters. From mid-February 1941, the Luftwaffe deployed large numbers of fighters to the battle, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) began to take heavier losses among its Hurricanes.

Bombing attacks eased off during May 1941 as the Luftwaffe concentrated on Crete. Then on June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA, and many of the Luftwaffe units were diverted to the Soviet front. As a result, defense and interdiction forces on Malta could be strengthened. Supply convoys arrived, and attacks on Axis shipping intensified. Also in June, Air Vice Marshal Hugh Lloyd replaced Maynard as AOC Malta.

Inhabitants of Valletta, Malta, salvage their belongings from a bombed building. The island of Malta sustained extensive Axis air raids during World War II. (Corbis)

Malta had become the most important British overseas base in the world, and from the Axis point of view, corrective action was required. In December 1941, Oberbefehlshaber Süd (OB-Süd), Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 of more than 600 aircraft was transferred to Sicily with orders to neutralize Malta. Between December 1941 and April 1942, Kesselring mounted sustained heavy attacks on the island, and as a result, the activities of its bomber force were drastically curtailed. In January 1942, no Axis ship supplying North Africa was sunk, and the February Allied supply convoy to

Malta was forced to turn back. The total tonnage of bombs dropped on Malta in March and April 1942 was more than that expended on London during the whole of 1940.

After February 1942, the British adopted more effective fighter tactics, and 31 Supermarine Spitfires were delivered from the aircraft carrier HMS *Eagle* during March 1942. Hurricanes were good dogfighters, but given the short distance from Italian airfields (60 miles), they lacked the climb performance to gain an altitude advantage before attacking. With the advent of Spitfires, the defending fighters were able to gain sufficient altitude to attack from above. Malta pilots became adept at high-speed dive and zoom attacks.

The March 1942 Allied supply convoy to Malta nonetheless suffered heavy losses, and many ships were sunk; only 5,000 tons of supplies got through. By April, food, fuel, spare parts, and ammunition were all in short supply. Rationing was severe and disease rife; the situation was becoming critical. On April 15, 1942, King George VI took the highly unusual step of awarding the George Cross to the entire island. During April and May 1942, the aircraft carriers USS *Wasp* and HMS *Eagle* delivered a total of 132 Spitfires to Malta. On May 10, 1942, Kesselring, following a particularly poor intelligence assessment, reported to the German high command that the neutralization of Malta was complete.

Renewed Axis attacks against the island in June were timed to coincide with the advance of the Afrika Korps to Egypt. Italian warships forced back an Allied supply convoy from Alexandria, and another convoy from Gibraltar was heavily attacked. But two merchantmen reached Grand Harbor, preventing starvation on the island for another two or three months.

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park was appointed AOC Malta in July 1942, and he instituted an aggressive forward-interception policy to attack Axis raiders as they were forming up. Within a few weeks, this policy had dramatically reduced the effectiveness of the bombing and inflicted increasingly severe losses on the Luftwaffe. During July and August, bombers from Malta again inflicted heavy damage on Axis convoys, greatly assisting the British Eighth Army during the Battle of Alam Halfa (August 31–September 7, 1942) and the Battle of El Alamein (October 24–November 4). During August, Operation PEDESTAL (August 3–15) delivered 53,000 tons of supplies to Malta.

Axis forces made one last series of heavy attacks between October 10 and 20. After that, most transferred to North Africa. Raids on the island were gradually reduced. The siege was lifted altogether on November 20 when Operation STONEAGE delivered another 35,000 tons of supplies, and a further 55,000 tons were delivered in December. The battle officially ended on December 31, 1942.

ANDY BLACKBURN

See also

Afrika Korps; Aircraft, Fighters; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Alam Halfa, Battle of; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Crete, Battle of; El Alamein, Battle of; Kesselring, Albert; Malta; Park, Sir Keith Rodney; PEDESTAL, Operation

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Malta, Convoy Battles (June 12–16, 1942)

A series of aero-naval actions fought in the Mediterranean in June 1942 resulting from a British effort to run convoys to Malta from both Egypt and Gibraltar.

During the spring of 1942, British warships withdrew from Malta because of the pressure of Axis air attacks and the failure of a convoy in March 1942 to deliver a meaningful amount of supplies and fuel. By June, Malta's civilians were reduced to a daily diet of 1,500 calories, and Governor-General Lord John Gort warned that starvation could force the island's surrender by August.

In response, the British Admiralty planned a massive double convoy operation to relieve Malta and restore its ability to function as a base. The convoy from the east, code-named Operation VIGOROUS, was commanded by Rear Admiral Philip Vian and included 11 transports escorted by 8 light

cruisers, 26 destroyers, 4 corvettes, 2 minesweepers, and an old dreadnought disguised as a modern battleship.

The western convoy, code-named Operation HARPOON, consisted of five transports and one tanker. Force X, commanded by Captain Cecil Campbell Hardy, provided the close escort, with an antiaircraft cruiser, five fleet destroyers, four Hunt-class destroyer escorts, and four fleet minesweepers. The distant escort, Force W, commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Alban T. B. Curteis, consisted of a battleship, two aircraft carriers, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers.

Both convoys got under way on June 12, 1942. VIGOROUS lost two transports in the first two days, one to bomb damage and the other to straggling. On June 14, Italo-German air strikes sank another transport; then at 2:30 p.m. that day, Italian admiral Angelo Iachino sailed from Taranto with 2 modern battleships, 2 heavy and 2 light cruisers, and 12 destroyers, planning to intercept the convoy the next morning.

The Mediterranean Fleet's new commander, Admiral Henry Harwood, ordered Vian to reverse course at 2:00 a.m. on April 15, and during this revolution German motor torpedo boats attacked, sinking one destroyer and damaging a cruiser. At 5:25 a.m., Harwood ordered Vian to return to his original course, hoping that air attacks and a submarine picket line would take care of the Italian fleet. British and U.S. pilots delivered four separate attacks and claimed more than a dozen hits on the Italian battleships. In fact, they torpedoed the heavy cruiser *Trento,* while a bomb bounced off one of the *Littorio*'s turrets.

Harwood instructed Vian to reverse course again from west to east at 8:28 a.m., and then, based on the overly optimistic reports from the airmen, from east to west at 11:51 a.m. Vian knew that the Italian battleships were pressing forward, however, and he held steady for Alexandria despite his orders. Meanwhile, further Axis air strikes sank two destroyers and damaged a cruiser, and a German submarine accounted for another cruiser. In the return to base, a British submarine finished off the *Trento,* and a torpedo bomber hit the *Littorio,* putting it into dock for repairs for three months. Nonetheless, Operation VIGOROUS was a major Italian victory because no British ships made it to Malta.

Operation HARPOON, which also got under way on June 12, was spotted by Axis aircraft the next day. It suffered its first air attack on June 14, when

Italian bombers sank one freighter and severely damaged a light cruiser. Subsequent air strikes failed to score, and at 8:15 p.m. the distant escort, Force W, turned back, while the convoy, four freighters and a tanker, and Captain Hardy's close escort of an antiaircraft cruiser, five destroyers, four destroyer escorts (one Polish), and four fleet minesweepers began the dash through the Sicilian narrows.

That same evening, the Italian Navy's 7th Division, commanded by Rear Admiral Alberto Da Zara and consisting of two light cruisers, set sail from Palermo intending to intercept the British force at dawn. Da Zara was accompanied by five destroyers.

The Italians intercepted the British convoy on June 15 at 5:30 a.m., 25 miles southwest of the island of Pantelleria. The 12th Flotilla made smoke, while the 11th Flotilla interposed itself between the Italian cruisers and the convoy. A British destroyer and a destroyer escort sustained heavy damage from Italian cruiser gunfire. Two of the Italian destroyers attacked independently and engaged the British destroyer escorts, one of which received a disabling hit.

While the British ships kept the enemy cruisers away from the convoy, German Junkers Ju-88 bombers struck at 6:15 a.m., taking the opportunity presented by the lack of opposition to sink one freighter and damage the tanker. The warships continued to spar from long ranges for two and a half hours until the presence of a minefield caused the Italian admiral to break off action and seek a better location to renew the battle. During this time, the Italian cruisers were each hit by shells, while the British cruiser was moderately damaged and a destroyer lightly damaged.

At 10:20 a.m. another Axis air attack damaged a transport. The British force already had two ships under tow, and Captain Hardy decided to cut his losses and make a run for Malta with his undamaged ships. He ordered the damaged transport and tanker scuttled, but the 4-inch guns of the two warships assigned to accomplish this task proved insufficient and only ignited fires that cast huge plumes of smoke. These unintentional beacons attracted Admiral Da Zara, who had lost the British location. By 12:15 p.m. the Italian squadron was back in action, damaging a minesweeper that had stayed behind to sink the stragglers. They also finished off the cripples and chased off a destroyer that had been towing its damaged sister, which was torpedoed and sunk by an Italian bomber at 1:25 p.m.

At 2:40 p.m. Admiral Da Zara broke off the chase and headed for home after an effective intervention that saw, in cooperation with aerial units, a destroyer, two transports, and a tanker sunk and two destroyers, a cruiser, and a minesweeper damaged. The Italians suffered one destroyer heavily damaged and two cruisers lightly damaged. As the British convoy approached Malta, it ran into a minefield laid the month before by Italian destroyers. The Polish destroyer was sunk, while one of the transports, two destroyers, and a minesweeper were heavily damaged.

Of the 17 transports and tankers involved in the twin operations, only 2 arrived. Overall British losses consisted of 6 transports, a tanker, a light cruiser, and 5 destroyers; also, 4 cruisers, 4 destroyers, and a minesweeper had been significantly damaged. The Italians lost 1 heavy cruiser and had significant damage to 1 battleship and 1 destroyer. Rome rightfully celebrated the mid-June convoy operations as a major victory, while the British immediately began planning another operation to relieve Malta.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Convoys, Allied; Harwood, Sir Henry; Malta; Malta, Air Battles of; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Vian, Sir Philip Louis

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Manado, Battle of (January 11–12, 1942)

Initial Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies that featured the first Japanese use of paratroopers. The ultimate prize for the Japanese in the South Pacific was Java, the most developed island of the Netherlands Indies. To reach Java, the Japanese seized several intermediate locations so that their

subsequent advances would be covered by land-based aircraft. Manado (or Menado), located on the northernmost peninsula of the island of Celebes, met Japanese needs because it had both a good harbor and a nearby airfield.

On January 9, 1942, the First Eastern Invasion Force departed Davao in the southern Philippines for Manado. Ten transports carried 2,500 marines of the 1st Sasebo Special Landing Force. This naval force consisted of two reinforced battalions. Among the supporting units was a tank company equipped with Model 95 light tanks. Five minesweepers and two submarine chasers provided close support. Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo commanded a covering force of one light cruiser and eight destroyers, and stronger Japanese naval forces provided distant cover.

The Dutch defenders on Celebes were heavily outnumbered. The garrison numbered 1,500 men, but fewer than 400 were regular soldiers; the remainder were local militia troops and retired soldiers. Heavy weapons were limited, along with communications equipment.

The Dutch were surprised when the Japanese came ashore at Manado beginning at 4:00 a.m. on January 11. The defenders fell back toward the city but were hampered by poor communications. The Japanese quickly took the key road centers, and Dutch forces near the beach were overwhelmed, unable to oppose the light Japanese tanks. Soon, the Japanese controlled both the harbor area and the town.

Shortly after 9:00 a.m., the Japanese inserted into the battle the 1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force, a battalion-sized naval parachute unit under Commander Toyoaki Horiuchi, to seize the nearby airfield at Langoan. Twenty-seven Mitsubishi G3M1-L transports (“Nell” in the Allied code system) flying from Davao dropped 334 men onto the field. The Japanese made many mistakes in their first combat airdrop. The altitude was too high and the winds too strong, scattering men and equipment over a wide area and allowing the Dutch defenders to inflict heavy casualties. The Japanese commander and 34 of his men were killed, and 90 others were wounded. The paratroopers were largely ineffectual.

On January 12, an additional 185 paratroopers were dropped at Langoan in reinforcement. The airfield fell the same day, although the Dutch were able to sabotage it somewhat during the fighting. The field was not restored to service until January 24.

Following the surrender, the Japanese executed a number of the

surrendered Dutch defenders by beheading or bayoneting. After the war, Captain Toyoaki was tried for this war crime and executed in September 1948.

Many of the Dutch defenders of Manado attempted to escape into the jungle to wage guerrilla war against the Japanese invaders, but most were caught and executed. By January 12, the Japanese had secured both the harbor and the airfield, which were then used as staging areas for subsequent Japanese moves farther south.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Tanaka Raizo

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Manchuria Campaign (August 9–September 5, 1945)

Soviet conquest of Manchuria. At the Yalta Conference (February 11–14, 1945), Soviet leader Joseph Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan "two to three months" after the conclusion of fighting in Europe. The Soviets began serious preparations for this eventuality in April 1945, when they initiated the transfer of the equivalent of 12 army corps and tremendous amounts of supplies from Eastern Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway, headed east to three commands fronting Manchuria: the Trans-Baikal Front to the northwest, the 2nd Far Eastern Front to the northeast, and the 1st Far Eastern Front on the east.

For this campaign, Stavka (the Soviet high command) established the first Soviet theater-level command, under Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky. Against the Japanese, the Soviets amassed 1.5 million men, 28,000 guns and mortars, 5,500 tanks, and 4,370 aircraft; they faced the defending Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army, which (although it contained 1.2 million men, including

forces in Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuriles) was a shell of its former self. Many of its units had been transferred to Japan for the defense of the home islands. The Guandong Army commander, General Yamada Otozō, called up 250,000 reservists for new units, pulled back his border forces, and planned a defense of central Manchuria, where the bulk of the population was located.

Japanese military intelligence, however, failed to ascertain the extent of the Soviet buildup and believed that the terrain in the Trans-Baikal, where the Soviets planned their main attack, would be impenetrable to armor. Fearing Japan's use of biological agents, the Soviets vaccinated their troops against plague and other diseases and issued masks to them.

The Soviets presented their declaration of war to Japanese ambassador Satō Naotake in Moscow only minutes before they attacked. Soviet plans called for nearly simultaneous night attacks from the three fronts beginning after midnight on August 9, 1945, all to converge on the central plain of Manchuria. Vasilevsky later acknowledged that U.S.-supplied trucks and fuel landed at Vladivostok were vital in the Soviets' ability to launch this campaign as rapidly as they did.

The main attack was delivered by the Trans-Baikal Front of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, operating from Mongolia. The Sixth Guards Tank Army, with 1,019 tanks and self-propelled guns, acted, in effect, as a forward detachment. The intent was to bypass Japanese strongpoints where possible to preempt the defenses of the Japanese Third Area Army. The Soviets raced for the 6,600-feet-high passes of the Greater Khingan Mountains and managed to cover 300 miles in only three days, encountering more problems from the terrain and fuel shortages than from the Japanese. The Japanese forces held on to Haliar until August 18. Changchun and Mukden (Shenyang) fell on August 21. Meanwhile, air-landed troops entered Darien and Port Arthur on August 19, followed by forces sent via rail.

Driving from the Soviet Maritime Provinces, Marshal Kirill Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front had to overrun or bypass seven fortified districts held by the Japanese First Area Army. Attacking in a torrential thunderstorm, the Soviets skirted around most fortified areas, leaving their reduction to follow-on forces. Mutanchiang was held by Japanese forces until August 16. Soviet aircraft dominated the skies, with the few Japanese planes seeking refuge in Korea or Japan.

Although considered of secondary importance to the deeper pincerlike thrusts of the other fronts, the efforts of the 2nd Far Eastern Front in northern Manchuria, supported by the Amur River Flotilla, tied down some of the best-prepared Japanese forces by crossing the Amur and moving up the Sungari River toward Harbin. Although the Japanese emperor had signed the Imperial Rescript of Surrender on August 14 and the Guandong Army's commander, General Yamada, had accepted it on August 18, the Soviets were determined to regain the territories lost in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Thus, Soviet forces continued combat operations in Korea until the armistice on September 2, by which time they had reached the 38th parallel, and in the Kuriles until September 5. The Soviets subsequently turned over a huge cache of Japanese weapons to the People's Liberation Army of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), including 3,700 guns, 600 tanks, and 861 aircraft.

During the campaign, the bulk of the Guandong Army was not committed to battle, but the Soviets estimated that 83,737 Japanese were killed compared with Soviet casualties of more than 12,000 dead and nearly 25,000 wounded. More than 100,000 Japanese in Manchuria died after the cease-fire, and an estimated 594,000 Japanese prisoners were taken back to forced-labor camps in the Soviet Union.

CLAUDE R. SASSO

Soviet troops of the Second Far Eastern Front in Manchuria. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also

Guandong Army; Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich; Meretskov, Kirill Afanasievich; Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich; Yalta Conference; Yamada Otozō

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Manhattan Project

Crash program led by the United States to develop an atomic bomb. The discovery of fission in uranium by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman in 1938 led physicists such as Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard to suggest the feasibility of sustained nuclear chain reactions, promising a quantum leap in destructive

power if harnessed in “atomic” bombs. Szilard approached Albert Einstein in 1939 with the idea of writing a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt warning of this possibility and of German research into nuclear fission. Szilard and Einstein’s letter prompted Roosevelt to appoint the Uranium Committee to explore the feasibility of developing an atomic bomb. In the spring of 1940, a British memorandum by Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch, titled “On the Construction of a ‘Super-bomb’; Based on a Nuclear Chain Reaction in Uranium,” concluded that “a moderate amount of Uranium 235 would indeed constitute an extremely efficient explosive.” On the U.S. entry into the war in December 1941, British and American cooperation increased.

Recognizing that a project to build atomic bombs would require immense industrial resources, the Americans took the lead. They organized the Manhattan Engineer District of the Army Corps of Engineers in 1942. Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), appointed Brigadier General Leslie Richard Groves, who had overseen construction of the Pentagon, to direct the Manhattan Project.

Sustaining and controlling a nuclear chain reaction was the first crucial technical step. Fermi’s team accomplished this at the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago on December 2, 1942. Fermi thus proved that a larger reactor could produce enough of a highly fissionable isotope of plutonium (^{239}Pu) to make a bomb. Work began on a reactor complex at Hanford, Washington, to produce the required plutonium.

The uranium 235 (U-235) isotope mentioned in the Frisch-Peierls memorandum also held considerable promise as bomb material and was pursued simultaneously. Separation of U-235 from U-238 was accomplished at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, by gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic separation in an immense plant that covered 43 acres and employed 31,000 people. As work progressed, Groves recognized that a central laboratory was needed to design, develop, and assemble the bombs. He chose Julius Robert Oppenheimer to direct what became known as Los Alamos (New Mexico) Laboratory. Work began there in the spring of 1943.

Intense secrecy and compartmentalization characterized the Manhattan Project, but at Los Alamos, Oppenheimer fostered a spirit of collaboration, camaraderie, and open communication. Design and assembly of the ^{235}U bomb was straightforward in that a gun-type method could be used to initiate

the explosion. The time-consuming process of separating U-235 was the chief difficulty, but Oak Ridge eventually succeeded in isolating enough U-235 for Oppenheimer's team to assemble "Little Boy," the bomb used on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.

By mid-1945, Hanford had produced enough ^{239}Pu for three bombs, but they required a complex implosion device with multiple detonators firing simultaneously to create compression waves that would initiate a core explosion. In 1944, to tackle the implosion design challenge, Oppenheimer called on George Kistiakowsky to head the effort to produce the necessary shaped charges. His design was successfully tested at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, and used in "Fat Man," the plutonium bomb that devastated Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. At a cost of $2 billion, Manhattan Project scientists and engineers had achieved the seemingly impossible—producing three atomic devices by August 1945 that fundamentally changed the nature of warfare, vastly enlarging humanity's capacity for mass destruction.

Debate about whether the atomic bomb attacks were justified or needed to end the war continues. Certainly, even after it became apparent by 1944 that Germany had abandoned its effort to produce atomic bombs, nearly all members of the Manhattan Project team continued to press ahead. The ultimate decision to use the bombs rested with President Harry S. Truman, who never doubted that they were a major factor in Japan's decision to surrender, thereby saving tens of thousands of Allied lives.

The project's technical success strengthened an emerging military-industrial complex in the United States and led to the formation of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. Further research into nuclear weapons production led to the successful test of a hydrogen bomb in 1952, ushering in a new and frightening thermonuclear age.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Alamogordo; Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Bush, Vannevar; Einstein, Albert; Fermi, Enrico; Groves, Leslie Richard; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Nuclear Weapons; Oppenheimer, Julius Robert; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; Document 50; Document 241

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Manila, Battle for (February 3–March 3, 1945)

Battle for the capital of the Philippines. Located on the island of Luzon, Manila was one of the largest cities of Southeast Asia, with a population of more than 800,000 people. The Japanese commander in the Philippines, General Yamashita Tomoyuki, had 250,000 men on Luzon, a figure that General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence chief, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, had grossly underestimated.

Beginning on January 9, 1945, General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army assaulted the western coast in the Lingayen Gulf. The Japanese made no effort to contest the landing, and that first day 68,000 men went ashore. They then drove southward toward Manila. Major General Oscar W. Griswold's XIV Corps had the right flank, and Major General Innis P. Swift's I Corps was on the left. I Corps had the more difficult going.

Beginning on January 30, units of Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger's Eighth Army began landing north and south of Manila. Major General Charles P. Hall's XI Corps landed in the Subic Bay area, helping to seal off the Bataan Peninsula and preventing the Japanese from repeating the American defense of 1942. Meanwhile, on January 31 two regiments of Major General Joseph M. Swing's 11th Airborne Division went ashore at Nasugbu, about 45 miles southwest of Manila. On February 3, the division's remaining regiment was air-dropped on Tagaytay Ridge, 30 miles south of the city. The next day, elements of the 11th Airborne Division reached Paranaque, just south of Manila.

MacArthur urged a rapid advance. While the 37th Infantry Division of Griswold's corps pushed toward Manila from the north, the lighter and more mobile 1st Cavalry Division also drove on the city. It had just landed to reinforce Griswold's corps, and MacArthur ordered the cavalry division to

advance as fast as possible. Elements of the 1st Cavalry reached the northeastern outskirts of Manila on February 3, the first U.S. unit to do so. As darkness fell, one of its tanks smashed through the gates of Santo Tomas University, releasing 4,000 American prisoners held there.

Rear Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji now defied Yamashita's orders to withdraw from the city and utilized his 18,000 men, mostly naval personnel, to stage a fanatical monthlong block-by-block and house-by-house defense of the city. As units of the 1st Cavalry and 37th Divisions closed on Manila, Iwabuchi's forces withdrew across the Pasig River, destroying its bridges and setting fire to the highly flammable residential areas. For the next several days, American forces battled these flames.

General MacArthur had hoped that Manila would fall without significant damage to the city. On February 6, he announced in a communiqué that the complete destruction of the Japanese in Manila was "imminent." To save civilian lives, he ordered that no air strikes be utilized. This order did not pertain to artillery fire, however, and its heavy use by both sides produced many civilian casualties. The doomed Japanese defenders also went on an orgy of murder and rape, killing thousands of innocent Filipinos.

Smoke and flames pour from the old walled city section of Manila as American forces shell the Japanese garrison holding out in that part of the city. (Keystone/Getty Images)

By February 22, the 37th Division had driven the Japanese defenders into the old walled portion of the city (Intramuros) and the modern business district. In the Intramuros, U.S. troops had to fight the Japanese, who were well dug in, one building at a time. Many buildings were simply turned into rubble by the unrestricted support fire, as breaching the buildings with infantry was virtually impossible.

By February 26, 1945, the remaining Japanese resistance was compressed into the three Philippine Commonwealth government buildings off the southeast corner of the walled city. The last organized Japanese resistance was in the Finance Building. Late on March 3, 1945, General Griswold reported that all organized resistance in the Manila area had ended.

The Battle for Manila cost the Americans 1,010 killed and 5,561 wounded. The Japanese lost perhaps 16,000 men in and around the city. In addition, more than 100,000 Filipino civilians were killed in the battle, and perhaps 70 percent of Manila was leveled. Thirty-nine bridges, including the six major bridges over the Pasig River, were destroyed, and port facilities were badly damaged.

ANDREW J. ONELLO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bataan, Battle of; Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Griswold, Oscar Woolverton; Hall, Charles Philip; Iwabuchi Sanji; Krueger, Walter; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Swift, Innis Palmer; Swing, Joseph May; Willoughby, Charles Adolphe; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von (1867–1951)

Finnish field marshal and president of Finland (1944–1946). Born in Louhisaari, Finland, then part of the Russian Empire, on June 4, 1867, Carl

Gustav Emil von Mannerheim graduated from the prestigious Nikolaevsky Cavalry School in Saint Petersburg in 1889. Initially commissioned into a dragoon regiment based in Poland, he transferred to the Chevalier Guards Regiment in Saint Petersburg in 1890. Following a posting to the Cavalry School, Lieutenant Colonel Mannerheim saw combat in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War and was promoted to colonel.

Between 1906 and 1908, Mannerheim led a special mission for the Russian government, collecting intelligence along Russia's border areas in the Far East. Mannerheim's excellent reports made a favorable impression on Czar Nicholas II, whom he met in 1908. Mannerheim then commanded cavalry units in Poland and was promoted to major general. He saw considerable combat during World War I, was promoted to lieutenant general in June 1917, and then commanded VI Cavalry Corps.

Mannerheim opposed the March 1917 revolution that deposed the czar and, following the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, retired from the Russian Army and returned to Finland. He then commanded the White Army in Finland, defeating the Red Guards and freeing Finland of Russian troops. Thereafter, he resigned his command and traveled in Western Europe. Appointed regent in December, he returned to Finland. After being defeated in the presidential election of July 1919, he retired from public life and traveled widely.

Field Marshal Carl Gustav Emil von Mannerheim commanded Finnish forces during World War II and was president of Finland from 1944 to 1946. (Library of Congress)

Mannerheim returned to public service as minister of defense in 1931. As part of a program of bolstering Finland's defenses, he oversaw construction of what became known as the Mannerheim Line, which held invading Soviet troops at the beginning of the 1939–1940 First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War). He commanded Finnish forces in the Winter War and in the renewal of fighting with the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944 (the Continuation War). Promoted to field marshal in 1942, Mannerheim became president of Finland in 1944 and negotiated the armistice with the Soviet Union. He retired because of ill health in 1946 and moved to Switzerland to write his memoirs. Mannerheim died in Lausanne, Switzerland, on January 28, 1951.

MICHAEL SHARE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Finland; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second

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Manstein, Erich von (1887–1973)

German Army field marshal. Born in Berlin on November 24, 1887, of military stock, Fritz Erich Georg Eduard von Lewinski took the name Manstein from his uncle, who adopted him after his father's death in 1896 (he also dropped the name Fritz at this time). Manstein received a commission in 1906, serving in his uncle Paul von Hindenburg's regiment. World War I interrupted his studies at the War Academy. Manstein participated in the capture of Namur in Belgium and then served on the Eastern Front, where he was wounded in November 1914. Thereafter, he held staff assignments.

Manstein continued in the army after the war, and in 1919, he was chief of staff of the Berlin Military District, helping to draw up plans for the new 100,000-man army. In October 1920, he commanded a company of the 5th Infantry Regiment in Pomerania.

German field marshal Erich von Manstein, a masterful tactician and one of the leading German generals of World War II. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Promoted to major in 1927, he held staff positions; in September 1929, he was in the Operations Branch of the Truppenamt (the clandestine General Staff). Promoted to lieutenant colonel, he commanded a battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment in October 1932. In December of the next year, he was promoted to colonel. In July 1935, he was assigned as chief of the Operations Branch of the General Staff, and in October 1936, he was promoted to major general. In February 1938, Manstein became deputy to the chief of staff of the army, General Ludwig Beck, but his opposition to Adolf Hitler's rearmament program led to his reassignment as commander of the 18th Division in Silesia. That August, he was reassigned as chief of staff in General Wilhelm von Leeb's Army Group South. Promoted to lieutenant general in April 1939, Manstein was named chief of staff of Arbeitsstab Rundstedt (Working Staff Rundstedt) and helped plan the invasion of

southern Poland and the capture of Warsaw. In August, he was named chief of staff to General Karl Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South, a post he held through the Polish Campaign. In October 1939, Manstein was appointed chief of staff of Army Group A under Rundstedt in the west and helped develop an alternative to the plan for the invasion of France (the Sickle Cut, Sichelschnitt), which Hitler adopted.

In February 1940, Manstein took command of XXXVIII Corps, which he led during the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940). Promoted to general of infantry in June 1940, he assumed command of the LVI Panzer Corps in East Prussia assigned to Colonel General Erich Hoepner's Panzer Group, Army Group North, in May 1941. Manstein advanced over 100 miles in the first two days of Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22 invasion of the Soviet Union, and seized the key bridges at Dvinsk. When the commander of the Eleventh Army, Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert, was killed, Manstein was transferred to Army Group South in September to take command and began the conquest of the Crimea. After hard fighting, Manstein's forces managed to secure Sevastopol on July 2, 1942, the day after his promotion to field marshal.

In August 1942, Manstein was ordered to take a stripped-down Eleventh Army to relieve the Eighteenth Army south of Leningrad. He fought a series of costly battles with some success, suffering 60,000 casualties in the process. He urged Hitler to concentrate in the center part of the Eastern Front, without success. Briefly moved into Army Group Center's sector, Manstein was ordered by Hitler, in November 1942, to assume command of the newly formed Army Group Don on both sides of Stalingrad, between Army Group A in the Caucasus and Army Group B. Assigned the mission of rescuing the Sixth Army in Stalingrad and working with only three panzer divisions, Manstein's Operation WINTER STORM fought his way to within 35 miles of the German perimeter before being halted. He did succeed in preventing the Soviets from taking Rostov and trapping German Army Group A.

In February 1943, the Soviets drove to the Donets River and recaptured Kursk, Rostov, and Kharkov to the west, leading Hitler to approve a counterattack. Manstein exploited Soviet fuel shortages with a panzer attack from the south that resulted in the recapture of Kharkov and Belgorod in March 1943. He attempted to entice the Soviet Army's South and Southwest Fronts into a similar indiscretion near Odessa, but Hitler insisted instead on

Operation CITADEL to reduce the Kursk Salient. Although the Germans made some headway in the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13), their offensive soon ground to a halt in what was the largest tank battle of the war.

Hitler's policy of refusing to allow withdrawals frustrated Manstein's approach based on an elastic defense, and Manstein's frankness did not ingratiate him with the German dictator. Manstein fought to prevent a Soviet encirclement after being forced to cross the Dnieper. The Soviets finally succeeded in encircling Manstein's forces in the Cherkassy pocket, but he managed to extract the bulk of two corps.

Manstein never could convince Hitler to allow the appointment of a chief of staff for the Eastern Front. A March 1944 conference with the führer at Berchtesgaden led to a heated exchange and Manstein's relief as commander of Army Group South in April. Manstein declined to participate in the July 1944 putsch against Hitler.

Manstein was arrested in May 1945 at the end of the war and held in Great Britain. Tried and convicted in 1949 for war crimes involving the executions of Jews, Romas (Gypsies), and Crimean Tartars in his rear areas and enforcement of the Commissar Order, he was sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment in February 1950. He was freed in May 1953 for medical reasons. Between 1955 and 1956, Manstein headed a committee to advise the government on the creation of a new German Army. Manstein died in Irschenhausen, Bavaria, on June 11, 1973. British military historian Basil Liddell Hart called Manstein the ablest German general of the war.

CLAUDE R. SASSO

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Beck, Ludwig; Germany, Army; Hitler, Adolf; Hoepner, Erich; Hoth, Hermann; July Bomb Plot; Kharkov, Battles of; Kursk, Battle of; Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von; Leningrad, Siege of; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Manteuffel, Hasso Eccard von (1897–1978)

German Army general. Born on January 14, 1897, in Potsdam, Germany, into an old aristocratic Prussian military family, Hasso Eccard von Manteuffel saw action as a cavalry officer on the Western Front during World War I. He remained in the regular army after the war.

Manteuffel transferred to the armored forces in 1934 and then taught at the Panzer Training School at Wünsdorff; thereafter, he served in the Inspectorate of Panzer Troops, helping to carry out the motorization of four infantry divisions. In February 1939, Manteuffel became head of the staff of the Panzer Troops Training School II in Berlin-Kramprintz. He was a regimental commander in the 7th Panzer Division during the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940) under major general Erwin Rommel and during Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union. On November 27, 1941, Manteuffel's unit captured a key bridge across the Volga-Moscow Canal north of Moscow, about 20 miles from the capital. He was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for this exploit.

Ordered to North Africa in July 1942, Manteuffel commanded a collection of units known as Division Manteuffel. In the final days of the 1940–1943 North African Campaign, he collapsed from exhaustion and was evacuated. Promoted to major general in May 1943, Manteuffel assumed command of his old unit, the 7th Panzer Division, in August 1943.

Manteuffel's division distinguished itself in the recapture of Zhitomir that November, an action for which he became known as the "Lion of Zhitomir"; he was promoted to lieutenant general in February 1944. That same month, he took command of the elite Panzergrenadier Grossdeutschland Division. At one point Soviet forces surrounded the division, but Manteuffel extricated his entire force and later inflicted heavy losses on the Soviets near Jassy, Romania. The Grossdeutschland Division was transferred to East Prussia in August 1944.

Adolf Hitler promoted Manteuffel to general of panzer troops in September 1944 and placed him in command of the Fifth Panzer Army,

which was engaged against U.S. forces in eastern France and Lorraine. Manteuffel was one of the few general officers who went directly from divisional to army command and completely bypassed corps command.

Manteuffel's army was assigned to support Josef "Sepp" Dietrich's Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). Manteuffel agreed with Field Marshal Walther Model that Hitler's plan was too ambitious for the forces available and instead advocated Model's proposed "small solution." Hitler refused to accept Model's plan, however. During the offensive, Manteuffel's forces were active at Saint Vith, Clervaux, and Bastogne.

Despite the failure of the offensive, Manteuffel retained Hitler's confidence and was awarded the Diamonds to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. In March 1945, Manteuffel took command of the battered Third Panzer Army, defending the Oder River below Stettin. Although continually pushed back by superior Soviet forces, Manteuffel maintained unit cohesion and was able to retreat and surrender to the Western Allies on May 3.

After the war, Manteuffel spent two years as a prisoner of war. Released in December 1947, he engaged in business and joined the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in 1949. From 1953 to 1957, he was an FDP deputy in the Bundestag. Manteuffel was a popular guest lecturer for American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) groups and at Battle of the Bulge commemorations. He also wrote about the war. Manteuffel retired in Diessen am Ammersee, Germany, where he died on September 28, 1978.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Ardennes Offensive; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bastogne, Battle for; Dietrich, Josef "Sepp"; Moscow, Battle of; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tunisia Campaign; Vosges, Advance to

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Manzhouguo

Name meaning “state of the Manzhus (Manchus),” given by the Japanese to Manchuria (Manchukuo) after their occupation of that Chinese territory in 1931. The Japanese began establishing a significant military presence on mainland Asia with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. In 1900, Japanese forces took part in suppressing the Boxer Uprising and remained in China as one of the occupying powers thereafter. At the end of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Japan controlled Korea and had large numbers of troops in Manchurian China. Its Guandong (Kwantung) Army was formed from these occupying forces, with the mission of supporting Japanese interests in China and Manchuria. In 1928, Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin) was assassinated in a Guandong Army plot to gain greater control of the region. Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang) replaced his father and quickly became an ally of the Nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek).

Amid tensions between the military and political leadership of Japan, the increasingly independent Guandong Army began a military campaign to regain control of Manchuria. On September 18, 1931, its staff officers in southern Manchuria set off an explosion close to the main line of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden (Fengtien after 1932 and Shenyang today), blaming the act on nearby Chinese soldiers. Guandong Army leaders used the Mukden Incident (or Manchurian Incident) as the excuse to take control of Mukden and mount a campaign to conquer all Manchuria. Presented with a fait accompli by its own military, Tokyo nonetheless supported the action.

By October 1931, Japanese forces controlled all of Manchuria. The Japanese falsely claimed that they had acted only in self-defense and insisted that the crisis be resolved through direct negotiations with China. The Chinese government, however, appealed to the League of Nations; this was the first major test involving aggression for that organization. The League Council was reluctant to initiate tough action against Japan without the assurance of support from the United States, which was not forthcoming. The British also opposed strong action.

In February 1933, the League Assembly voted to approve the report of its investigating committee, which blamed Japan. It also approved a resolution that called on League of Nations states to adopt a doctrine of nonrecognition of Manchukuo. Japan alone among the 42 member states voted no. The Japanese delegation then walked out, and Tokyo gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw from league membership.

In March 1932, meanwhile, the Japanese established Manchukuo. Larger than France and Germany combined, this puppet state of Japan had a population of some 34 million people. In March 1933 Japan added to it the Chinese province of Jehol, and in 1935 it added eastern Chahar.

The Chinese people deeply felt the loss of their five “eastern provinces,” and this led to strong anti-Japanese nationalism in China, especially among the educated classes and students. In 1936 in the aftermath of the Xi’an (Sian) Incident, a united front of Nationalists under Jiang Jieshi and Communists under Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) was formed to oppose Japanese imperialism in China. Tensions continued to mount, and in July 1937 an incident at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing (Peking) between Japanese and Nationalist forces precipitated the Second Sino-Japanese War, marking the effective beginning of World War II in Asia.

Nominally independent, Manchukuo had a Chinese dynastic figurehead in the last Qing (Ch’ing) emperor, Aixinjueluo Puyi (Aisingioro P’u-i, known to Westerners as Henry Puyi), after which the state became known as Manzhoudiguo (Manchoutikuo), but Japanese officials controlled its affairs and instituted an immigration policy that brought in thousands of Korean and Japanese settlers. Some 240,000 Japanese in Manchuria increased to 837,000 by the end of the war. Japan maintained its control of Manchuria until the last weeks of World War II.

On August 9, 1945, the Soviets launched a three-pronged offensive designed to capture Manchuria and destroy the vaunted Guandong Army. The Soviet’s bold operation ended by August 16. The experienced Soviet commanders and their battle-tested formations quickly defeated the defending Japanese forces and gained control of Manchuria.

Soon after the end of the war, U.S. forces acted to support the large-scale redeployment of Nationalist troops to accept the surrender of Japanese forces and regain control of the lost territory. Jiang utilized some of the surrendered

Japanese forces in northeast China to fight the Communists in the opening rounds of the Chinese Civil War.

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See also

China; Guandong Army; Jiang Jieshi; Manchuria Campaign; Mao Zedong; Document 4

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Mao Tse-tung

See Mao Zedong

Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

Chinese political and military leader. Born on December 26, 1893, into a prosperous peasant family in Shaoshan (Shao-shan), Hunan Province, in central China, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) graduated from the Fourth Teacher's Training School in Changsha, Hunan, and also read extensively in both Chinese and Western literature, philosophy, politics, and economics, including Marxist theory. Like many other young Chinese intellectuals of his time, Mao embraced revolutionary thinking, and in July 1921, he attended a meeting in Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded.

Mao became a labor organizer. In the mid-1920s, following Soviet instructions, he and other Chinese Communists cooperated with the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—of President Sun Yixian's (Sun Yatsen). Mao held several posts in the Guomindang, and in

1925, he was appointed secretary of its propaganda department. After Sun's death that year, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)—head of the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy in Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, which had been cofounded by Communists and Nationalists two years earlier—won control of the GMD.

In 1926, Jiang began to eliminate rival political groupings, purging Communists from GMD positions and launching the 1926–1927 Northern Expedition against assorted warlords. In 1927, he turned against Communists who had escaped his purge and proceeded to establish a base in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province, suppressing several Communist insurrections that year, including the Autumn Harvest Uprising of peasants and guerrillas led by Mao.

Joined by renegade GMD army officers Zhu De (Chu Teh) and Lin Biao (Lin Piao), who took their troops to join him, Mao founded the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, a communist redoubt in the province's southeast area. Mao became chairman of the organization in October 1931. At that time, Mao and Zhu elaborated theories of relying on peasant warfare and guerrilla tactics to win control of China, rejecting orthodox Marxist teachings that the urban proletariat had to be the driving force of revolution. By 1933, their base harbored an army numbering 200,000.

The Communists launched several uprisings in major Chinese cities, posing a threat to the authority of Jiang, who took Beijing (Peking) in Hebei (Hopeh) Province in 1928, unifying all China south of the Great Wall, and headed a new GMD government beginning in October. From 1930 onward, Jiang mounted annual campaigns against the Soviet republic, and eradicating it apparently ranked higher in his priorities than opposing Japan's 1932 establishment of a puppet government in China's northeastern region of Manchuria.

In 1934, GMD forces encircled the Jiangxi Soviet. Mao and Zhu broke out, leading over 100,000 followers on the epic 6,000-mile Long March to Yan'an (Yenan) in northern Shaanxi (Shensi); during this march, heavy fighting and harsh conditions reduced their numbers to 7,000, and Mao was forced to abandon two of his own children. In 1935, he was elected CCP chairman. That same year, Jiang ordered troops under Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang), a prominent northern Manchurian warlord who had pledged allegiance to him, to attack the Communists—orders they rejected,

urging all Chinese to join forces against the Japanese. In the December 1936 Xi’an (Sian) Incident in Shaanxi, Zhang kidnapped Jiang and forced him to form a united anti-Japanese front with the Communists.

Mao Zedong (old spelling Mao Tse-tung) led the communist side in the civil war against the Nationalists in China and was the leader of the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1976. Although remembered as a key figure in making China a major player on the world stage, he was also responsible for the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution that brought the deaths of tens of millions of Chinese. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

In July 1937, the Battle of Marco Polo Bridge in Lugou-qiao (Lukouch'iao) sparked full-scale war between Chinese and Japanese troops, and in 1938, GMD forces retreated to Chongqing (Chungking) in the southwestern Province of Sichuan (Szechwan). From their Yan'an base, the Communists effectively controlled northwestern China, and the GMD controlled the southwest. Mao's Red Army, rechristened the Eighth Route Army, participated in fighting against Japanese troops, and Communist guerrilla forces operated in Henan (Honan), Zhejiang (Chekiang), and Shandong (Shantung) Provinces. Mao still anticipated that the communists would eventually gain control of China; meanwhile, he consolidated his

authority within his own party, which adopted a constitution accepting his teachings as its official ideology in 1945.

By early 1941, the Communist-Nationalist front had largely broken down after Nationalist units defeated the Communist New Fourth Army near the Changjiang (Yangtze) Valley. From then until 1945, Communists concentrated their energies on establishing guerrilla bases and securing peasant support behind Japanese lines, efforts that harassed the enemy and also helped to assure them ultimate postwar control of these areas. When the war ended in August 1945, incoming Soviet troops facilitated Chinese Communist moves to take control of much of Manchuria. In early 1946, GMD and Communist forces resumed fighting each other, and U.S. attempts in late 1945 and all of 1946 to negotiate a truce foundered due to both sides' deeply rooted antagonism.

Civil war continued until January 1949, and the following October, Mao proclaimed the new People's Republic of China, which the United States only recognized in January 1979. Until his death, Mao remained China's supreme leader, dominating the country's politics. He was responsible for several controversial policies, including the November 1950 decision to attack U.S.-led United Nations forces during the Korean War, the economically disastrous Great Leap Forward between 1958 and 1962, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966, a socially divisive campaign designed to induce a state of permanent revolution in China. Mao died in Beijing on September 9, 1976.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Lin Biao; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De; Document 18; Document 56; Document 76; Document 231

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Maquis

Term describing French guerrilla units that fought as part of the French Resistance. The word “maquis,” which means “scrub” or wild brushy land, originated with 18th-century guerrilla fighters on Corsica. In World War II, the term identified French men and women who fled to the brush or hills instead of reaching accommodation with the occupying Germans. These resisters formed armed camps to fight the Germans. As the Maquis grew, arms, food, leadership, and training were required. Ultimately, the Maquis became affiliated with the Mouvements Unis de la Résistance, under its military chief, Henri Frenay. Frenay appointed Michel Brault, who is said to have originated the term “maquis,” as head of the Service Maquis.

Maquis membership was diverse and included those determined to fight the Germans and those escaping the Service de Travail Obligatoire (STO), the German compulsory labor service. Its members came from all walks of life; students, workers, and farmers were included. Although these Resistance groups were scattered and disconnected, the Western Allies provided some assistance through the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and especially the British Special Operations Executive.

The Allies provided some arms, money, supplies, and training for specialists to the many Resistance groups, including the Maquis. Such U.S. and British assistance was limited, however, in part from the fear that the Maquis might complicate or even compromise the well-organized invasion plans of the United States and Britain.

Initially, the Maquis was based in Vichy France, but after the Germans occupied that area in November 1942, Maquis units appeared throughout France. Even some Spanish Republicans formed Maquis units. The Maquis assisted in rescuing downed Allied airmen and smuggling them out of France so they might return to Britain. These units also conducted limited sabotage attacks against German forces from 1940 to 1943; they stockpiled weapons, explosives, and supplies dropped by the Allies in order to play a role in the liberation of France. In 1944, all French Resistance groups, including the Maquis, were merged to form the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior, FFI).

Prior to the June 6, 1944, Normandy landings, Resistance units throughout France, including the Maquis, gathered intelligence on German

dispositions. During Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of Normandy, Maquis units in northwestern France conducted sabotage operations and destroyed key bridges, rail lines, and communication centers to isolate the Allied landing sites from German reinforcement. Supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force General Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that this support was invaluable and worth an estimated 15 extra divisions to the operation. No doubt, this assessment was exaggerated, but the French Resistance contribution was important.

German reprisals against Maquis units were swift and often bloody, and many Maquis groups operating far from Normandy were hunted down. Between July 18 and 23, 1944, German forces encircled and wiped out nearly 3,000 Maquisards on the natural defensive position of the Vercors Plateau in southern France. The Germans also carried out reprisals against French civilians in the area. During the 1944 campaign for France, Germans retreating from the Allied advance or trapped behind enemy lines willingly surrendered to British and American forces to avoid the ferocity of the Maquis. Regardless of their exact contribution to the Allied victory, members of the Maquis helped to restore French national pride, especially after the debacle of the defeat of the French Army in June 1940.

ROBERT W. DUVALL

French Maquis resistance fighters wait in ambush on the island of Corsica, 1944. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

See also

France; France, Battle for; France Campaign; Frenay, Henri; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Resistance

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Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of (July 7, 1937)

Armed clash between Japanese and Chinese troops in northern China at Lugouqiao (Lukouch'iao) in July 1937 that sparked full-scale warfare between the two countries. From at least 1894–1895 and the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan and China had poor diplomatic relations. Japan sought to increase its influence in northern China, holding Hebei (Hopeh) Province, administering much of the Shandong (Shantung) Peninsula as a virtual protectorate, and claiming special rights over various strategic railway lines.

During the mid-1930s, Chinese resentment of Japanese incursions grew dramatically. In 1935, troops commanded by Marshal Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang), a leading Manchurian warlord who had sworn allegiance to Guomindang (GMD) leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the president of China, defied the latter's orders to launch another campaign against the Chinese Communists. Marshal Zhang contended that all Chinese political factions should unite against the Japanese invaders, not fight each other. In December 1936, Zhang kidnapped Jiang at a spa in Xi'an (Sian) in China's far west Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, not releasing him until he agreed to an anti-Japanese rapprochement with Communist leaders. Jiang also probably agreed to take a harsher line toward future Japanese incursions.

On July 7, 1937, a skirmish occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops stationed near the historic Lugouqiao (Lukouch'iao) Marco Polo Bridge in the vicinity of Peking (Beijing). Japanese forces on night

maneuvers fired blank cartridges, prompting nearby Chinese soldiers to retaliate with live fire, although without injuring anyone. At the next day's roll call one Japanese soldier was missing, and his commander assumed that he had been taken captive by Chinese units based in nearby Wangping (Wangp'ing). On July 8, the Chinese commander refused entry to Japanese forces seeking the missing soldier, whereupon the Japanese unsuccessfully attacked the town. The missing soldier, who apparently had never been in Chinese custody, reappeared the following day, and both sides began negotiations intended to resolve the dispute, which initially involved only 135 Japanese troops.

Although Japanese officials undoubtedly sought to increase their influence in Wangping and the neighboring Lugouqiao area, the initial incident was, in all probability, a spontaneous accident, not a premeditated effort to provoke a broader crisis. Such minor incidents were not uncommon. In this case, however, officials in both governments seized on the event as a pretext to demand a broader comprehensive settlement of outstanding issues dividing Japan and China. Japanese military commanders in Manzhouguo and northern China sought extensive concessions from China, whereas Jiang feared that further acquiescence in Japanese demands would irretrievably damage his political standing.

On July 20 Jiang sent several Chinese divisions to reinforce northern China, and Japanese forces quickly seized control of the entire Beijing-Tianjin (Tientsin) area, transferring 15 additional divisions there and killing several thousand Chinese. Japan sought outright control of northern China, whereas Jiang insisted on maintaining full Chinese sovereignty there. Both Chinese and Japanese policies hardened until no compromise was possible, although neither side formally declared war. On August 7, however, Jiang and his advisers decided to wage a full-scale war of resistance against Japan, beginning eight years of bitter and brutal warfare between the two countries that ended only when Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies in August 1945.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Document 20

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Mareth, Battle of (March 20–26, 1943)

North African battle that sealed the fate of Axis forces in Tunisia. Following the February 14–22, 1943, Battle of Kasserine Pass, units of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika turned to face General Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth Army, then preparing to attack the German Mareth Line. The latter, built on a French defensive belt that stretched more than 20 miles from the Mediterranean to the Matmata Hills, anchored Axis defenses in southern Tunisia.

Rommel ordered his panzer divisions south to force the Eighth Army to retreat. Montgomery, warned of the impending attack by Ultra intercepts, reinforced around Medenine and defended in depth. On March 6, Rommel attacked on a wide front, his advance spearheaded by the 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions, but Montgomery's defense forced Rommel against the strengthened center of the Eighth Army.

His offensive halted by antitank fire, Rommel renewed his attacks, which were repulsed with costly panzer losses. Because of his own deteriorating physical and mental condition, Rommel departed for Germany on March 9, leaving command to Colonel General Hans Jürgen Dieter von Arnim.

Montgomery now went on the offensive, ordering XXX Corps to advance directly against the Mareth Line. Its task was to create a gap that would allow the armor of X Corps to advance through the Gabès Gap along the coast toward Sfax and eventually Tunis. Montgomery also ordered the New Zealand Corps wide around the west flank of the Mareth Line. This column swung west and then north in an attempt to break through at the Tebaga Gap and reach the El Hamma Plain and envelop Army Group Afrika.

On the night of March 20, the 50th Division launched the main frontal assault on the Mareth Line. A foothold established on the morning of March

21 was lost the next day to counterattacks by the 15th Panzer Division. Meanwhile, on the evening of March 20, the New Zealand Corps reached Tebaga Gap, which forced Arnim to shift the 164th Light Division and eventually the 21st Panzer Division to meet this threat to his flank.

A formation of British Supermarine Spitfire fighters on patrol over De Djerba Island, off Gabès, Tunisia, in 1943. (Library of Congress)

Montgomery now altered his plan and ordered the 1st Armoured Division to follow the path of the New Zealand Corps to the Tebaga Gap, while the 4th Indian Division took a shorter swing left around the Mareth Line. On March 26, Montgomery's forces breached the Tebaga Gap and threatened the continuity of the German defenses. Arnim temporarily saved his deteriorating situation by creating a defensive line at El Hamma. When the 4th Indian Division turned the Mareth Line, though, Arnim disengaged the bulk of his forces on March 27, escaping the envelopment.

In the battle, Montgomery demonstrated his ability to improvise, although Army Group Afrika managed to escape his trap. Combined with the successful Operation TORCH landings (November 8, 1942), these developments meant that the die was now cast for the Axis powers in North Africa. Rommel had predicted that a failure to seize Medenine would be fatal; the collapse of the Mareth Line signaled the beginning of the final chapter in North Africa, which ended with the Allied capture of Tunis on May 7, 1943.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Afrika Korps; Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; North Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Signals Intelligence; TORCH, Operation

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Mariana Islands Campaign (June–August 1944)

Military campaign in the Central Pacific. After securing the Marshall Islands in early 1944, U.S. military planners decided that the next step would be to bypass the Japanese-held Caroline Islands (including the stronghold of Truk) and seize the Mariana Islands. Equidistant from the Marshalls and the Japanese home islands, the 15 islands of the Marianas are spread over 400 miles, with the largest, Guam, located at the southern end of the chain. Two other large islands, Tinian and Saipan, are 100 miles north. In U.S. hands, the Marianas would offer a base for a subsequent assault on the Philippine Islands to the west and a strike at the Bonin Islands to the north (only 700 miles from the Japanese home islands) as well as a location for air bases from which B-29 strategic bombers might raid the Japanese home islands.

Japanese military leaders knew that holding on to these islands was essential to their control of the shipping routes to Southeast Asia, retention of the Philippines, and the defense of Japan itself. In consequence, the Marianas would prove much more difficult to seize than were the Gilberts and Marshalls.

For the U.S. commander of Central Pacific forces, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the primary objectives in Operation FORAGER were to secure Guam,

Saipan, and Tinian. Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance's Fifth Fleet would conduct FORAGER. The main naval component was Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58 of four fast carrier battle groups. Also under Spruance was Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner's V Amphibious Force. Its task was to put ashore the ground force of nearly six marine and army divisions under Lieutenant General Holland Smith. The forces involved in FORAGER deployed from as far away as Hawaii, 5,000 miles from the Marianas.

Beginning on February 23, 1944, Mitscher's carrier aircraft repeatedly attacked Japanese air bases in the Marianas, virtually wiping out Japanese airpower. On June 15, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions went ashore on Saipan. Despite intense naval bombardment that pounded the island for two days in advance of the invasion, the Japanese defenders held fast. The marines did not consolidate their beachhead until late that night, and with army reinforcements, they pushed inland over the next two weeks.

A Japanese aircraft is shot down while attempting to attack the U.S. Navy escort carrier *Kitkun Bay*, off the Mariana Islands in June 1944. (National Archives)

The Japanese had anticipated the U.S. invasion, and on its execution, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet,

ordered the 1st Mobile Fleet to launch Operation A-GO, an effort to destroy the Fifth Fleet. The heavily outnumbered Japanese naval forces were supported by land-based aircraft from the Marianas and nearby islands. To meet this Japanese attack, Spruance delayed the amphibious assault on Guam scheduled for June 18.

From June 19 to 21, U.S. and Japanese naval forces met in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, essentially a contest of naval airpower and one of the largest and most decisive battles of the war. Superior numbers and pilot proficiency as well as radar carried the day for the Americans. The three-day engagement cost the Japanese three large carriers and more than 480 aircraft, in what came to be known as the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot." U.S. losses came to 130 aircraft, with light damage to the battleship *South Dakota*. Spruance then ordered Task Force 58 to fall back on the Marianas to protect the U.S. shipping there. Spruance was criticized at the time and has been since for his failure to pursue the Japanese fully, but his primary mission was to cover the assault in the Marianas.

Meanwhile, the struggle for Saipan raged. The Japanese commanders on the island, Lieutenant General Saitō Yoshitsugu and Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi, both committed suicide on July 6 as the remaining Japanese defenders launched wave after wave of suicide charges, the largest of the war; this accelerated the U.S. victory. Because of Japan's effective anti-American propaganda, more than 8,000 civilians committed suicide, many by throwing themselves off cliffs on the northernmost end of the island.

Bombardment of Tinian commenced before Saipan fell on July 13. The landings on Tinian occurred on July 24. Marines stormed Tinian's northern coast and encountered little opposition. The situation soon changed, however, when the Japanese defenders regrouped and attacked the marines in fanatical but futile suicide charges. Tinian was secured by August 2.

Guam, the most important of the Marianas, had been a U.S. possession for 40 years prior to the war. Actual fighting for Guam began on July 21, when three U.S. divisions executed near perfect amphibious landings following two weeks of preinvasion bombardment. The ground troops, commanded by U.S. Marine Corps major general Roy Geiger, faced difficult terrain that favored the fanatical Japanese resistance. The Americans secured Guam by August 10, although mopping-up operations continued in some areas until the end of the war.

The capture of the Marianas accomplished five key objectives of the Pacific Campaign. The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot ended the threat from Japanese carrier-based aviation. Additionally, Guam became one of three major western bases for the Pacific Fleet, and the United States established several air bases on these islands from which to launch massive raids against Japan. U.S. forces were now in position to strike at the Philippines and cut off Japan's oil supply from the East Indies. The U.S. victory in the Marianas also prevented any further Japanese resistance to Allied operations in New Guinea. Finally, the loss of Saipan led to the collapse of Tōjō Hideki's government and his replacement as premier by Koiso Kuniaki.

WILLIAM P. MCEVOY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Central Pacific Campaign; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nagumo Chūichi; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Toyoda Soemu; Turner, Richmond Kelly

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MARKET-GARDEN, Operation (September 17–26, 1944)

Anglo-American offensive that included history's largest airborne operation. The brainchild of British field marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, Operation MARKET-GARDEN was designed to catapult the 21st Army Group across the Rhine River into the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland, and win the war in 1944. The plan called for three airborne divisions to establish a 64-mile-

long corridor through which an armored spearhead would pass, ending with Montgomery's forces vaulting the lower Rhine at Arnhem, Holland.

Montgomery conceived this daring plan in the full flush of victory. During the first week of September 1944, Allied intelligence reports painted a picture of a German Army that had lost all semblance of cohesion. In light of these reports and having been granted operational control of the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army as well as the U.S. First Army, Montgomery broke with his usual cautious battlefield demeanor and hastily devised MARKET-GARDEN.

Paratroopers, planes, and gliders fill the skies during Operation MARKET-GARDEN in September 1944, during which the Allies dropped more than 20,000 paratroopers and landed more than 13,500 glidermen behind German lines in the Netherlands. (Corbis)

The plan called for the establishment of an airborne corridor (MARKET) that would run in a northeasterly direction and comprise, from south to north, Major General Maxwell D. Taylor's U.S. 101st Airborne Division, dropping

near Eindhoven, Holland; Brigadier General James Gavin's U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, dropping near Nijmegen, Holland; and Major General Robert "Roy" Urquhart's British 1st Airborne Division, reinforced by Major General Stanisław Sosabowski's Polish 1st Separate Parachute Brigade, dropping outside Arnhem. All airborne forces were to be under the command of British I Airborne Corps commander Lieutenant General Frederick "Boy" Browning.

Lieutenant General Brian G. Horrocks, British XXX Corps commander, led the ground (GARDEN) component and was expected to pass approximately 20,000 vehicles over bridges seized by the 101st and 82nd Divisions and get to Arnhem within 60 hours. Prior to the operation, Montgomery's army group had taken Antwerp but had failed to secure the islands commanding the Scheldt Estuary to the west. This oversight not only negated use of the port at Antwerp but also allowed the Germans to evacuate elements of nine divisions, totaling over 65,000 men, before they could be cut off and destroyed.



Meanwhile, Hitler had appointed Colonel General Kurt Student to form the First Parachute Army from these withdrawing German forces, with the mission of stopping any further Allied advance. Student's force was subordinated to Field Marshal Walther Model's Army Group B. Model, meanwhile, also had at his disposal SS-Gruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps, comprising the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. These panzer divisions were refitting in the vicinity of Arnhem. The Dutch resistance warned of the presence of the German armor, but this was discounted.

Operation MARKET-GARDEN began with the simultaneous drop of elements of the 101st, 82nd, and British 1st Airborne Divisions in their respective areas during daylight on September 17. Shortly thereafter, Horrocks's XXX Corps jumped off from its line of departure, the Albert Canal, driving northward toward Arnhem.

Although taken by complete surprise, the Germans reacted quickly. They used the restrictive terrain to their advantage, slowing the Allied armor thrust while denying to the airborne elements the swift capture of their respective assault objectives. The Germans were aided by having secured the entire Allied operational plan, carried in defiance of orders by an officer who was killed in the crash of his glider during the initial assaults.

Although both the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions encountered unexpected resistance, they were able to secure the bridges in their areas by September 18, with the exception of two: the railroad and highway bridges over the Waal at Nijmegen. Meanwhile, XXX Corps had fought through tough German resistance to link up with the 82nd by the morning of September 19. On the next day, however, the 3rd Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment conducted a daylight river crossing and secured the two Waal bridges, opening the way for XXX Corps to continue its advance to Arnhem. However, elements of Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps had taken up defensive positions between Nijmegen and Arnhem and blocked any further advance by XXX Corps. German strength continued to increase throughout the battle.

At Arnhem, Urquhart's paratroopers and glidermen landed more than eight miles from their primary objective, a highway bridge over the lower Rhine in the heart of the city. They succeeded in getting only one battalion, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Frost's 2nd Parachute Battalion, to the northern terminus of the bridge. The two SS panzer divisions in the city, reinforced by hundreds of German soldiers garrisoned throughout the area, were able to cut off Frost's battalion from the rest of the lightly armed parachute division to the west as well as from relief from the south. Holding out for three days and four nights, Frost's men were finally overrun by an all-out armor-infantry assault on their positions. The remainder of Urquhart's division, surrounded in the suburb of Oosterbeek to the west, was finally withdrawn to the south of the lower Rhine on September 26, bringing the operation to a close.

During MARKET-GARDEN, the Allies dropped more than 20,000 paratroopers, landed more than 13,500 glidermen, and air-delivered some 5,200 tons of equipment, 1,900 vehicles, and 560 guns. They were hampered for several days by cloud cover in England, which forced the delay of follow-on drops, including Sosabowski's Polish paratroopers, leaving the British paratroopers at Arnhem especially short of water, ammunition, and needed

reinforcements. British airborne casualties numbered more than 7,200 men, and the 82nd and 101st lost some 1,400 and 2,100, respectively. Horrocks's XXX Corps sustained 1,400 casualties. There is no listing of German casualties throughout the battle area, although they suffered more than 3,000 in Arnhem alone.

GUY A. LOFARO

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Bittrich, Wilhelm; Browning, Frederick; Frost, John Dutton; Gavin, James Maurice; Horrocks, Sir Brian Gwynne; Model, Walther; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Sosabowski, Stanisław; Student, Kurt; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Urquhart, Robert Elliot

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Marschall, Wilhelm (1886–1976)

German admiral. Born in Augsburg, Germany, on September 30, 1886, Wilhelm Marschall entered the Imperial German Navy as a naval cadet in 1906. He was a submarine commander during World War I. Continuing in the German Navy after the war, in 1934 Marschall took command of the pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer*. Promoted to rear admiral in 1936, he headed the operations division of the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (Supreme Command of the Navy). Between 1937 and 1938, Marschall commanded German naval forces off Spain during the Spanish Civil War. He then was chief of the navy's operations staff just before the start of World War II, with responsibility for wartime planning.

Appointed fleet commander in October 1939, Vice Admiral Marschall sortied with the battle cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* that November. On June 8, 1940, Marschall and the two battle cruisers encountered the British aircraft carrier *Glorious* and destroyers *Acasta* and *Ardent* some 280

miles west of Harstad, Norway. The three British ships were evacuating Allied forces from Norway and headed for Scapa Flow. In the ensuing two-hour engagement, all three British ships were sunk, but a torpedo from the *Acasta* badly damaged the *Scharnhorst*, and both German ships received a number of hits from 4.7-inch shells fired by the destroyers. The damage was sufficient to cause the Germans to retire to Trondheim, which allowed the safe passage of the evacuation convoy through the area later that same day. While escorting the damaged *Scharnhorst*, the *Gneisenau* was in turn badly damaged by a torpedo from the British submarine *Clyde*. Both German capital ships required extensive repair.

Commander of the navy Grand Admiral Erich Raeder relieved Marschall from his post for not strictly following the operational plan, which had called on him to avoid such action. Marschall believed that a commander at sea had to have freedom of action. Admiral Günther Lütjens replaced Marschall as fleet commander.

Given command of Navy Group West in the summer of 1942, which he considered vindication of his earlier ideas, Marschall was promoted to general admiral in February 1943. Raeder's successor, Admiral Karl Dönitz, preferred others in command positions, and Marschall then held posts ashore. He was held as a prisoner of war during 1945–1947. Marschall died in Mölln, Schleswig-Holstein, on March 20, 1976.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Lütjens, Günther; Raeder, Erich

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Marseille, Hans-Joachim (1919–1942)

Luftwaffe captain and leading German ace on the Western Front. Born in Berlin on December 13, 1919, Hans-Joachim Marseille joined the Luftwaffe

in 1938. Although he was a gifted flyer, he chafed at military discipline. This fact, coupled with his "playboy" attitude, landed him in trouble numerous times. Following the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), Marseille was transferred to Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing) 27 in North Africa.

Sometimes called the "Star of North Africa," Marseille was noted for his uncanny ability at deflection shooting and achieving multiple victories, or kills, in a single day. His best day was September 1, 1942, when he was credited with shooting down 17 British aircraft during three sorties. He died shortly thereafter, in a flying accident over Alam Halfa on September 30. His final tally was 158 victories. Just before his death, he was promoted to captain and awarded the Diamonds to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Afrika Korps; Germany, Air Force

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Marshall, George Catlett (1880–1959)

U.S. Army general, chief of staff of the army, secretary of state (1947–1949), and secretary of defense (1950–1951). Born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on December 31, 1880, George Catlett Marshall graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1901. Commissioned in the infantry in 1902, he then held a variety of assignments, including in the Philippines. He attended the Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, in 1907 and was an instructor at the Staff College between 1907 and 1908.

After the United States entered World War I, Marshall went to France with the American Expeditionary Forces as training officer to the 1st Division in June 1917. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1918, he became chief of operations of the U.S. First Army, winning admiration for his

logistical skills in directing the repositioning of hundreds of thousands of men quickly across the battlefront for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. After working on occupation plans for Germany, Marshall became aide to General John J. Pershing, who was named chief of staff of the army in 1921.

Beginning in 1924, Marshall spent three years in Tianjin (Tientsin), China, with the 15th Infantry Regiment and then five years as assistant commandant in charge of instruction at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, where he helped to train numerous future U.S. generals. He was promoted to colonel in 1932, holding assorted command posts in the continental United States. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1936.

In 1938 Marshall became head of the War Plans Division in Washington and then deputy chief of staff with promotion to major general that July. President Franklin D. Roosevelt promoted Marshall over many more senior officers to appoint him chief of staff of the army as a temporary general on September 1, 1939, the day that German armies invaded Poland. As war began in Europe, Marshall worked to revitalize the American defense establishment. Supported by pro-Allied civilians such as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Marshall instituted and lobbied for programs to recruit and train new troops; expedite munitions production; assist Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union in resisting the Axis powers; and coordinate British and American strategy. After the United States entered the war in December 1941, Marshall presided over an increase in the U.S. Army from a mere 200,000 troops to a wartime maximum of 8 million men and women. For this he became known as the “Organizer of Victory.”

Marshall was a strong supporter of opening a second front in Europe, a campaign ultimately deferred until June 1944. Between 1941 and 1945, he attended all the major wartime strategic conferences, including those at Placentia Bay, Quebec, Cairo, Tehran, Malta, Yalta, Potsdam, and Washington, D.C. Marshall was the first to be promoted to the newly authorized five-star rank of general of the army in December 1944. Perhaps his greatest disappointment was that he did not exercise field command, especially command of the European invasion forces. Roosevelt and the other wartime chiefs wanted him to remain in Washington, and Marshall bowed to their wishes. He was a major supporter of the U.S. Army Air Forces, and in 1945 he advocated use of the atomic bomb against Japan.

On the urging of President Harry S. Truman, Marshall agreed to serve as

special envoy to China (1945–1947). As secretary of state, he advanced the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, and he then served as president of the American Red Cross (1949–1950). Truman persuaded him to return to government service as secretary of defense in September 1950. In that capacity, Marshall worked to repair relations with the other agencies of government that had become frayed under his predecessor and to build up the U.S. military to meet the needs of the Korean War and commitments in Europe while at the same time maintaining an adequate reserve. Marshall opposed General Douglas MacArthur's efforts for a widened war with China and supported Truman in his decisions to fight a "limited war" and to remove MacArthur as commander of United Nations forces.

General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army chief of staff, known for his important role in World War II as "the Organizer of Victory." (Library of Congress)

Marshall resigned in September 1951, ending 50 years of dedicated government service. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 for the Marshall Plan, he was the first soldier so honored. He was certainly one of the nation's greatest military leaders and one of the most influential figures of the 20th century. Marshall died in Washington, D.C., on October 16, 1959.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Joint Chiefs of Staff; MacArthur, Douglas; Potsdam Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Sherman, Forrest Percival; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Tehran Conference; Truman, Harry S.; United States Army; Yalta Conference; Document 128; Document 191; Document 201; Document 206; Document 209; Document 212; Document 218; Document 221; Document 234; Document 235

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Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood (1900–1977)

U.S. Army Reserve brigadier general and noted military historian for World War II theaters. Born on July 18, 1900, in Catskill, New York, Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall (known as "Slam") enlisted in the army in 1917. He then saw extensive combat in France, where he was promoted to second lieutenant, the youngest U.S. Army officer in the conflict. Leaving active duty at the end of the war, Marshall pursued parallel careers as a journalist and a reserve army officer. In 1943, he became chief combat historian in the Pacific theater, and just before the June 6, 1944, Allied invasion of Normandy, he became chief historian for the European theater of operations.

As the chief combat historian of the U.S. Army in World War II, Marshall recruited many of the other combat historians and initiated work on the *U.S. Army in World War II* series of combat histories. In his long career, he wrote nearly 30 books and hundreds of articles and reviews. His volumes about World War II included *Island Victory, Men against Fire,* and *Bastogne*. He emphasized personal interviews with participants as soon after battle as possible.

Marshall wrote *Men against Fire,* which analyzed small-unit combat and effectiveness, in 1947; the work pointed out many problems, which the army then sought to correct. During the Vietnam War, as a retired brigadier general, he coauthored with the controversial Colonel David Hackworth *Vietnam Primer,* and the army published it as a training manual. Marshall died at Fort Bliss, Texas, on December 17, 1977.

ANDREW W. LANDER

See also
United States Army

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Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign (January 29–February 22, 1944)

U.S. amphibious assault on Japanese-held territory in the Central Pacific in the drive toward the Japanese home islands. This campaign came after the U.S. seizure of Tarawa (November 20–24, 1943) and Makin (November 20–23, 1943) in the Gilberts.

The Marshall Islands are two parallel coral atoll chains, located within a 400,000-square-mile area. They are about 4 degrees above the equator and 2,000 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. At the beginning of 1944, the Marshall Islands formed the outermost Japanese defensive barrier in the

Central Pacific. The Japanese had received the islands from Germany as a consequence of World War I and thus had ample opportunity to fortify them.

Initially, U.S. planners intended to capture the Marshalls and bypass the Gilbert Islands immediately to the south, but in mid-1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to secure the Gilberts first and then use them as a base to attack the Marshalls. In developing the attack plan, which was completed in early December 1943, the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, overrode his own staff by insisting on bypassing the more heavily fortified outer islands of the atoll.

Aerial photography revealed an airstrip under construction on Kwajalein Island, the hub of Japanese operations in the Marshalls; because that airstrip would be capable of handling bombers, it became the priority. The adjacent islands of Roi and Namur were also to be taken. The final objective was Eniwetok Atoll. Kwajalein is in the center of the Marshalls, just south of Roi and Namur, whereas Eniwetok is located at the northwestern end of the islands and 300 miles closer to Tokyo. The first step, however, would be to secure Majuro, an undefended atoll. Its lagoon would provide anchorage for support vessels.

Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet (and Central Pacific Force), was in overall command of the operation. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner commanded the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51) of transports and landing craft, and U.S. Marine Corps major general Holland M. Smith would command the assault once troops were ashore. The attacking forces were arranged in three groups: Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly commanded the Northern Attack Force, charged with taking Roi and Namur in Kwajalein Atoll; Turner retained command of the Southern Task Force, with the objective of Kwajalein Island; and Captain Donald Wood Loomis commanded a reserve force that would stand by during the capture of Kwajalein. Later, this force secured Eniwetok. The assault force, not counting the fast carrier task groups of submarines, numbered 197 ships, lifting a total of 54,000 assault troops, double the number in the Gilberts operation; on Kwajalein, there would be 41,000 U.S. troops versus 8,000 Japanese.

U.S. pilots, pleased with their success, along the tail section of a Grumman F6F Hellcat on the carrier *Lexington*, after they had shot down 17 out of 20 Japanese planes headed for Tarawa, November 1943. (National Archives)

Learning from the experience at Tarawa, U.S. planners provided for a much heavier air and naval bombardment. On January 29, U.S. carrier aircraft began hitting Japanese positions. Roi was the center of Japanese airpower in the Marshalls, with almost 100 aircraft based there. Its aircraft were obliterated in the sky and on the ground, ending any Japanese air threat that same day. U.S. aircraft and ships pounded Mili, Kwajalein, Roi, Maloelap, Taroa, Jaluit, and Wotje simultaneously with bombs and naval gunfire. Majuro Atoll, composed of 56 islands, was secured between January 31 and February 8 and perfectly served the needs of the mobile supply system.

The primary target was Kwajalein Atoll (Operation FLINTLOCK). On January 31, troops of the 4th Marine Division landed on Roi and Namur. Unlike operations in the Gilberts, FLINTLOCK had a sufficient number of tracked amphibious landing vehicles (amtracs, or LVTs) available for the forces, and it also saw the first large-scale use of DUKW amphibian trucks. The prolonged preinvasion bombardment was also effective. Once ashore, the marines progressed rapidly across the small islands. Japanese resistance ceased by the end of February 2.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division landed on Kwajalein Island. Turner decided first to subject the island to an extensive bombardment from battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and carrier aviation. The preliminary bombardment lasted from January 30 to February 1. The troops went ashore early on February 1 in textbook fashion, and Kwajalein was taken on February 5. After seizing a few smaller islands, Kwajalein Atoll was declared secure two days later, at a cost of 372 Americans killed and 1,582 wounded. The Japanese suffered 7,870 killed and 265 taken prisoner.

At the far northwestern edge of the Marshalls lay Eniwetok Atoll, only 1,000 miles from the Marianas. Eniwetok, whose name translates as "Land between West and East," came to serve as the staging point for U.S. military operations against the Mariana Islands. Nimitz had not planned to take it until May, but the surprisingly easy victory at Kwajalein emboldened his commanders to move the attack up to February, fearful that a delay would allow the Japanese time to reinforce.

However, Eniwetok lay within striking distance of the massive Japanese base at Truk in the Caroline Islands. This bastion had to be eliminated before operations against Eniwetok could commence. Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher led Task Force 58 to neutralize Truk. His carrier aircraft destroyed more than 200 Japanese aircraft, sank 8 warships and 24 merchant vessels, and damaged an aircraft carrier. Mitscher's raids effectively ended Truk's value as a major Japanese base.

Code-named CATCHPOLE, the operation against Eniwetok was carried out by the 22nd Marine Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and the 106th Infantry Regiment. The invasion of Eniwetok Atoll began on February 17 with an assault on Engebi Island at the northern end of the atoll. This tiny island was secured by early the next day, but the Japanese defenders who were well dug in on the southern islands of Parry and Eniwetok offered stiffer opposition. Eniwetok Island was secured on February 21, and Parry Island was declared secure on February 22. Operations against Eniwetok Atoll claimed 195 American dead and nearly 2,700 Japanese. Only 64 Japanese were taken prisoner.

The fighting ashore had not been easy, but no U.S. ships were sunk and only a few were damaged, although several grounded in the channels between islands. Imperial Japanese Navy surface ships did not contest the landings, but submarines were present, four of which were sunk. A number of

Japanese supply ships, auxiliaries, and patrol ships were also sunk by U.S. forces during the operation.

The U.S. success here neutralized Japanese bases on other islands in the Marshalls group, which remained isolated for the rest of the war. The Marshalls operation saw the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps perfect their amphibious assault techniques. More important, the operation enabled U.S. forces to bypass Truk and the other Caroline Islands and leap 1,000 miles forward to the Mariana Islands, from which U.S. bombers would be able to strike Japan.

WILLIAM P. MCEVOY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; Conolly, Richard Lansing; Eniwetok, Capture of; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Kwajalein, Battle for; Makin Island, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nimitz, Chester William; Smith, Holland McTyeire; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tarawa, Battle of; Turner, Richmond Kelly

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Martel, Sir Giffard Le Quesne (1889–1958)

British Army lieutenant general. Born in Millbrook, Southampton, on October 10, 1889, Giffard Le Quesne Martel graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in 1909 and was commissioned in the Royal Engineers. During World War I, he pioneered the training of tank crews, serving on the staff of the new Tank Corps from 1916 to November 1918.

Between the wars Martel remained with the Royal Engineers, but believing that future wars would depend heavily on massive armor forces, he

pursued his interest in tank warfare and doctrine, developing—often at his own expense—prototypes of light tanks and machine-gun carriers and writing prolifically on the subject. After several years in India, Martel became assistant (and later deputy) director of mechanization in 1936, attempting to prepare the British Army for a potential war with Germany.

In September 1939, Major General Martel took command of the 50th Northumbrian Motorized Division of the Territorial Army, which fought fiercely on the Meuse against German major general Erwin Rommel's 7th Panzer Division; Martel's forces temporarily checked the panzer advance to the English Channel until limited numbers compelled Martel to withdraw.

In December 1940 after returning to Britain, Martel became commander of the Royal Armoured Corps, which initially controlled all British armored forces, and in 1942 he was promoted to lieutenant general. He resented the establishment of the British Tank Parliament in 1942, a grouping of divisional commanders and tank experts that he felt weakened his authority. In autumn of that year during his absence in Burma and India, the position of commander, Royal Armoured Corps, was abolished.

Martel subsequently spent a frustrating year heading the British military mission in Moscow. In 1944, he lost an eye during a bombing raid on London, and he was invalided out of the army in 1945. In retirement, Martel wrote his memoirs and several controversial books on armored warfare and on relations with the Soviet Union, including *Our Armoured Forces* (1945), *The Russian Outlook* (1949), and *East versus West* (1952). He died in Camberley on September 3, 1958.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Armored Warfare; France, Battle for; Tanks, All Powers

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Martinengo, Federico Carlo (1897–1943)

Italian Navy rear admiral. Born in Rome on July 18, 1897, Federico Carlo Martinengo followed a family tradition in joining the navy in 1911. In 1915 as a midshipman he volunteered for the naval air service and achieved his first aerial victory as a gunner on an FBA flying boat in October 1916. In November he was promoted to sublieutenant and given command of the 1st Squadriglia Idrovolanti (Seaplane Squadron) in the newly created Italian naval air service. By June 1918 he had earned five confirmed victories in 172 combat missions.

In 1923 Martinengo refused the opportunity to join the new Regia Aeronautica. By 1939 he was captain of the cruiser *Attendolo* and in October of that year became chief of staff of the Ionian Naval Department. He remained in that role until April 1943, when he was appointed rear admiral and general inspector of the Regia Marina's coastal antisubmarine flotillas at Spezia. On September 9, 1943, after the conclusion of the armistice between Italy and the Allies, Martinengo died in a surface engagement off Gorgona Island. Martinengo was posthumously awarded the Medaglia d'Oro al Valor Militare, Italy's highest medal for gallantry.

ENRICO CERNUSCHI

See also

Italy, Navy

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Matsui Iwane (1878–1948)

Japanese Army general and commander of forces involved in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Born in Aichi Prefecture, Japan, on July 27, 1878, Matsui Iwane graduated from the Military Academy in 1898. He fought in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War as a captain and was awarded the Military Cross. He was a resident officer in China (1907–1912, 1915–1919) and in France and Indochina between 1914 and 1915. Promoted to colonel in

1918, he commanded the 29th Infantry Regiment in Japan from 1919 to 1921, then served as a staff officer in the Siberian Expeditionary Force at Vladivostok between 1921 and 1922.

Matsui served as a staff officer in the Guandong (Kwantung) Army from 1922 to 1924 and was promoted to major general in 1923. Between 1924 and 1925, he commanded a brigade, and he was then chief of the Intelligence Division of the army General Staff (1925–1928).

Promoted to lieutenant general in 1927, Matsui commanded the 1st Division (1929–1931) and served as a delegate to the 1931–1933 Geneva Disarmament Conference, after which he was promoted to full general in 1933. In semiretirement, he served on the Supreme War Council between 1934 and 1935. Matsui then retired from the army.

Matsui thereafter traveled widely in China and met with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), head of the Nationalist Party—the Guomindong (Kuomintang, GMD); he hoped to reconcile Japan and China.

Ordered back to duty with the Japanese Army in 1937 following the start of the Sino-Japanese War, he commanded the Japanese forces sent to capture Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu). Following heavy fighting, his forces took the city. In October 1937, Matsui was appointed to command the Central China Area Army.

Japanese general Matsui Iwane salutes his victorious troops upon entering Nanjing (Nanking), China. The Japanese captured the city on December 13, 1937. (Paul Popper/Popperfoto/Getty Images)

In November 1937, Matsui's forces began their advance on Nanjing (Nanking), in Jiangsu. On December 1, Matsui demanded that the Chinese commander, General Tang Shengzhi (T'ang Sheng-chih), surrender the city to the Japanese, but Tang refused. On December 10, Matsui ordered an attack on Nanjing, which fell three days later. During this period and afterward, Japanese troops killed thousands of prisoners of war and civilians in what became widely known as the Rape of Nanjing. Although Matsui did not issue an order for his troops to kill civilians, he was held responsible as the overall Japanese commander at Nanjing.

Matsui returned to Japan in 1938 and was a cabinet adviser from 1938 to 1940, when he retired for a second and final time. Following the war, he was brought before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East on war

crimes charges stemming from the atrocities at Nanjing. Found guilty, Matsui was sentenced to death and hanged on December 23, 1948, in Tokyo.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Jiang Jieshi; Nanjing Massacre

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Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946)

Japanese diplomat and foreign minister (1940–1941). Born in the village of Morozumi in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan, on March 4, 1880, Matsuoka Yōsuke went to the United States at age 13, working his way through and graduating from the University of Oregon in 1900. Returning to Japan, he became a diplomat in 1904, and between 1904 and 1921 he developed close ties with the Japanese business community and military.

Matsuoka left the diplomatic service in 1921 to become a director of the South Manchurian Railroad and was its vice president from 1927 to 1929. The following year, he entered the Japanese Diet (parliament) as a representative of the conservative Seiyūkai Party. In July 1932, he became Japan's representative to the League of Nations, where he led the Japanese delegation in walking out following the league's acceptance of the Lytton Commission report on February 24, 1933.

A staunch conservative, Matsuoka left the Seiyūkai Party in December 1933, advocating the abolition of political parties. In 1935, he rejoined the South Manchurian Railroad Company, serving as its president until 1939. He was also an adviser to the Japanese cabinet between 1937 and 1940.

From July 1940 to July 1941, Matsuoka was the Japanese foreign minister, taking a strongly pro-Axis position. Outspoken and garrulous, he was known to his friends as “Mr. 50,000 Words.” During his time as foreign minister, Japan joined Italy and Germany in the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. In March 1941, Matsuoka traveled to Berlin, where he held talks with Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop. Hitler tried to turn the Tripartite Pact into an offensive alliance by convincing Matsuoka that Japan should join Germany in war against Britain, whereas Ribbentrop advocated a Japanese attack on Singapore. Matsuoka was noncommittal.

Matsuoka then traveled on to Moscow to meet with Soviet leaders. There, on April 13, he signed a five-year nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Following the June 22, 1941, German invasion of the Soviet Union, Matsuoka advocated that Japan join Germany in war against the Soviets, in violation of its neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. He also urged an end to negotiations with the United States. In speeches in Japan, Matsuoka argued for Japanese control of the entire Western Pacific.

Matsuoka alienated other members of Japan’s cabinet not by his anti-American stance but by his ambition, his obnoxious behavior, and his flouting of the prime minister’s position by holding unauthorized talks with the Germans. Indeed, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro and the entire cabinet resigned on July 16, 1941, so that the government could be reorganized without Matsuoka. The next day, Konoe again became prime minister—but with Vice Admiral Teijiro Toyoda as foreign minister.

Tuberculosis forced Matsuoka to retire from the political scene. At the end of the war, he flirted with the possibility of heading a military government, installed by a coup d’état and committed to a last-ditch resistance to any Allied invasion. He was arrested after the war and brought to trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo as a Class A war criminal. Matsuoka died in Tokyo on June 27, 1946, before a verdict could be rendered on his guilt or innocence.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Hitler, Adolf; International Military Tribunal, Far East; Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Ribbentrop, Ulrich

Friedrich Willy Joachim von; Tripartite Pact; Document 83

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McAuliffe, Anthony Clement (1898–1975)

U.S. Army general. Born on July 2, 1898, in Washington, D.C., Anthony Clement McAuliffe attended West Virginia University for one year before entering the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he graduated and was commissioned a second lieutenant of field artillery in 1919. Following a variety of routine assignments, McAuliffe graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1937 and from the Army War College in 1940. Promoted to major in 1940, he served on the General Staff. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1941 and to colonel the following year.

On August 8, 1942, McAuliffe was promoted to brigadier general and assigned as divisional artillery commander of the 101st Airborne Division. He parachuted into Normandy with the division in June 1944 and took part in Operation MARKET-GARDEN during September 17–26. McAuliffe was serving as acting commander of the 101st Airborne Division when the German Ardennes Offensive began on December 16, 1944. His division's defense of the strategic town of Bastogne (December 20–26) was important in disrupting the German attack. The unit was surrounded by advancing German troops, but McAuliffe replied to the German demand of surrender with the classic message: "To the German Commander. Nuts! The American Commander." His men held out until relieved by elements of the Third Army. Promoted to major general in March 1945, McAuliffe commanded first the 103rd Infantry Division and then briefly the 79th Infantry Division, which he led into Austria by the end of the war.

Following the war, McAuliffe commanded the Airborne Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (1945–1946). He then held staff positions in Washington; in 1951, he was promoted to lieutenant general. Two years later,

McAuliffe took command of the Seventh Army in Germany, and between 1955 and 1956, he commanded the U.S. Army in Europe. He retired from the army in 1956 as a full general and became a senior executive at American Cyanamid Company in New York City (1956–1963). McAuliffe died in Washington, D.C., on August 11, 1975.

DARIUS BERNOTAS

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Ardennes Offensive; Bastogne, Battle for; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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McCain, John Sidney, Sr. (1884–1945)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Teoc in Carroll County, Mississippi, on August 19, 1884, John Sidney "Slew" McCain attended the University of Mississippi and the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, where he graduated in 1906. Commissioned an ensign, McCain embarked on a career as a surface warfare officer, during which he commanded two ships and rose to the rank of captain. In 1936, McCain qualified as a naval aviator. His audacious decision to become a pilot led to his command of two naval air stations (Coco Solo and San Diego) and the aircraft carrier *Ranger* (May 1937 to July 1939).

Promoted to rear admiral in February 1941, McCain commanded the Aircraft Scouting Force, Atlantic. In May 1942, he took command of all land-based naval aircraft in the South Pacific in the Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942–February 1943). That October, he was assigned to Washington as chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. He was promoted to vice admiral and assigned as deputy chief of naval operation for air in August 1943.

In August 1944, McCain returned to the Pacific theater to command a carrier task group under Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher and participated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944) and the Battle of Leyte Gulf

(October 23–26). In October, he took command of Carrier Task Force 38 from Mitscher, who in turn relieved him in January 1945. McCain returned to the same command in May 1945. He coordinated the highly effective air campaigns at Peleliu (September 15–November 27, 1944) and Okinawa (March–June 1945) and several carrier raids into Japanese home waters, and he also developed tactics to deal with Japanese kamikaze attacks. In only one month, his planes sank 49 Japanese ships and destroyed more than 3,000 aircraft on the ground. Although in failing health and hurt by the finding of a court of inquiry into his actions during a typhoon in December 1944, McCain remained aboard the battleship *Missouri* to witness the formal Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945, before returning home to Coronado, California.

McCain died on September 6, 1945, of a heart attack. Congress promoted him to full admiral posthumously. McCain was the father of four-star admiral John S. McCain Jr. and the grandfather of John S. McCain III, a navy pilot who spent six years as a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War and later became a U.S. senator and Republican presidential nominee (2008).

BRADFORD WINEMAN

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Okinawa, Invasion of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the

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McCloy, John Jay (1895–1989)

U.S. Assistant Secretary of War. Born in Philadelphia on March 31, 1895, John Jay McCloy attended Amherst College and Harvard Law School. During World War I, he interrupted his studies to serve in the U.S. Army and

acquired an internationalist outlook. In 1924, McCloy joined a prestigious New York corporate law firm, rising to partner within five years.

In the 1930s, McCloy headed the Paris office and spent several years representing Bethlehem Steel in the “Black Tom” case, in which the company sought and eventually obtained $20 million in damages from the German government for sabotaging an American munitions plant during World War I. The case enhanced McCloy’s interest in international politics.

In 1940, McCloy became a consultant to U.S. secretary of war Henry L. Stimson, and in 1941 he became assistant secretary of war. Immensely energetic and personable, McCloy was involved in virtually every major political and military wartime decision. In 1941, he and his French friend Jean Monnet devised the phraseology used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in announcing that the United States would serve as the “arsenal of democracy,” furnishing Lend-Lease aid to its Allies.

McCloy staunchly advocated the wartime internment of Japanese Americans, citing national security reasons, and for the rest of his life would claim that adequate justification existed for the consequent infractions of civil liberties. In 1944, on the advice of various Jewish associates who believed that reports of concentration camp atrocities must have been exaggerated, McCloy advised against aerial bombing of the railway lines leading to the Auschwitz camp on the grounds that this would divert scarce resources from the main war effort. He supported War Department proposals envisaging Germany’s economic reintegration into Europe, in opposition to Treasury Department plans to break that country into smaller states and destroy its industry. In 1945, McCloy attempted to persuade other American officials to seek a peace settlement with Japan rather than using atomic weapons against Japanese cities—a move he always believed was unnecessary.

McCloy left the War Department in 1945, but from 1949 to 1952, he served as the U.S. high commissioner in the Federal Republic of Germany, responsible for gradually implementing its return to independence. Controversially, he decided to pardon various German industrialists convicted of wartime crimes.

McCloy staunchly backed Monnet’s efforts for West European political and economic integration. From 1961 to 1974, he was a presidential adviser on arms control. Until the 1980s, he remained one of the “wise men”—the recognized foreign policy experts with whom successive presidents consulted

on a wide range of international issues. McCloy died in Stamford, Connecticut, on March 11, 1989.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Holocaust; Japanese Americans; Lend-Lease; Monnet, Jean Omer Marie Gabriel; Stimson, Henry Lewis

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Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.

McConnell, John Paul (1908–1986)

U.S. Army Air Forces general. Born in Booneville, Arkansas, on February 7, 1908, John Paul McConnell graduated from Henderson Brown College in 1927. He then graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point with a commission as a second lieutenant in 1932. The next year, he underwent flight training at Randolph and Kelly fields in Texas.

Following a variety of routine assignments, McConnell was promoted to major in July 1941 and to lieutenant colonel in January 1942, when he was assigned to the office of the chief of the Army Air Forces (AAF). He was promoted to colonel that December and became deputy chief of staff of the AAF Training Command at Fort Worth, Texas. In November 1943, McConnell was named chief of staff of the China-Burma-India Air Force Training Command, located at Karachi, India (now Pakistan). In August 1944, he was promoted to brigadier general and served as senior air staff officer, Air Command Southeast Asia, and also deputy commander of the Third Tactical Air Force in India and then the Southeast Asia Air Command in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) during 1944–1945.

After the war McConnell was senior air adviser to the Nationalist government of China, and in 1947 he headed the Reserve and National Guard Division at air force headquarters, Washington, D.C. He was promoted to major general in December 1950. Other postwar assignments included

commanding general of the Second Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana (1957–1961), as a lieutenant general; vice commander of the Strategic Air Command (1961–1962); and, as a full general, deputy commander in chief of the U.S. European Command (1962–1964). He became vice chief of staff of the air force in August 1964, and in February 1965 he became chief of staff, holding that post until his retirement in July 1969. McConnell died in Bethesda, Maryland, on November 21, 1986.

SHELLEY K. COX

See also

United States Army Air Forces

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McCreery, Sir Richard Loudon (1898–1967)

British Army general. Born on February 1, 1898, at Harcourt in Leicestershire, England, Richard McCreery was educated at Eton and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He was commissioned to the 12th Lancers in 1915 and served in France during World War I.

In 1935, McCreery took command of the 12th Lancers, and in 1938, he was appointed as staff officer 1 (GSO1) of the 1st Infantry Division. He served with this division in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France during the so-called Phony War from September 1939 to May 1940. He commanded with distinction an armored brigade in the subsequent fighting around Dunkerque in May 1940.

Evacuated to Britain with the BEF, McCreery then commanded the 8th Armoured Division in England. In 1942, McCreery was posted to Cairo to act as an armored adviser to theater commander General Claude Auchinleck. McCreery's advice was unappreciated, and he was dismissed in July 1942. His career quickly revived, however. The next month, he was appointed chief

of staff to Lieutenant General Sir Harold Alexander, who had arrived in Egypt to take over from Auchinleck.

Promoted to major general in mid-1943, McCreery took command of X Corps, leading it in the September 9, 1943, Salerno landing; the crossing of the Garigliano River; the 1944 Cassino battles; and the attacks on the Gothic Line. He achieved success during the Italian Campaign, despite serving under U.S. lieutenant general Mark Clark, an Anglophobe who disliked him.

In September 1944, McCreery was appointed commander of the British Eighth Army. Promoted to lieutenant general in December 1944, he commanded the army through the 1944–1945 winter stalemate in Italy and in the successful spring offensive of April 1945 that ended the war in Italy.

McCreery held several noteworthy postwar appointments, including commander of British occupation forces in Austria and commander in chief of the British Army of the Rhine. Promoted to general in 1948, he retired in December 1949. In 1959, he created a great deal of controversy by writing an article for his regimental journal that was highly critical of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's tactics in Egypt. McCreery died in London on October 18, 1967.

BRADLEY P. TOLPPANEN

See also

Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Clark, Mark Wayne; Italy Campaign; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Salerno Invasion

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McGrigor, Sir Rhoderick Robert (1893–1959)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born in York, England, on April 12, 1893, Rhoderick Robert McGrigor graduated from the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, in 1909 and was assigned to a cruiser. Between the wars, he

became a torpedo specialist. Following a number of routine assignments, McGrigor was promoted to captain in December 1933.

When World War II began, McGrigor was chief of staff to Sir Percy Noble on the China station, but he returned to Britain in late 1940 to command the battle cruiser *Renown*, part of Force H, protecting convoys to Malta and joining in the bombardment of Genoa and the 1941 pursuit of the German battleship *Bismarck*.

Promoted to rear admiral in July 1941, McGrigor was assistant chief of naval staff for weapons for 18 months, a position in which he brought into service many naval innovations, such as radar. In 1943, he became a force commander in the Mediterranean, training crews in the new landing craft and taking part in assaults on Pantelleria and Sicily. After some months as naval commander in southern Italy, McGrigor returned to Britain, leading the Home Fleet's 1st Cruiser Squadron in numerous successful attacks on German vessels in the North Sea and in escorting Allied convoys to the northern Soviet Union.

Promoted to vice admiral in April 1945, McGrigor was vice chief of the naval staff from 1945 to 1948. Promoted to full admiral in September 1948, he served as commander in chief of the Home Fleet from 1948 to 1951. As first sea lord from 1951 to 1955, McGrigor tried to mitigate the worst of the postwar budgetary defense cuts. He insisted on maintaining high training standards, and in the 1950s he fought hard and successfully to retain aircraft carriers. Promoted to admiral of the fleet in April 1953, McGrigor retired in April 1955. He died in Aberdeen, Scotland on December 3, 1959.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Convoys, Allied; Great Britain, Navy; Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam; Radar

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McIndoe, Sir Archibald Hector (1900–1960)

New Zealand–born plastic surgeon who pioneered burn treatments. Born on May 4, 1900, in Dunedin, New Zealand, Archibald Hector McIndoe was educated at Otago University, and in 1924, he pursued postgraduate training in surgery at the Mayo Clinic in the United States. Arriving in Britain in 1930, he specialized in plastic surgery, a field developed by his cousin, Sir Harold Gillies. McIndoe simultaneously worked as a general surgeon at the London Hospital for Tropical Diseases.

In 1939, McIndoe, one of only three experienced plastic surgeons in Britain, became consultant in plastic surgery to the Royal Air Force and established a treatment center at Queen Victoria Hospital, East Grinstead, to handle facial injuries and burns inflicted in air raids. Under McIndoe's forceful leadership, this facility became a model for burn treatment for the entire country. McIndoe treated several hundred badly burned fliers, battling with the government to win them better pay, conditions, and rehabilitation facilities, and he succeeded in abolishing the rule that after 90 days, such patients would be invalided from the military. He also paid great attention to the psychological well-being of his patients, who formed a club that continued to meet after the war. Skillful publicity enhanced the reputations of both McIndoe and his center, which improved his success in confrontations with civil servants, as did his refusal to compromise his independence and subject himself to military authority by entering the armed services.

After the war, McIndoe served on the council of the Royal College of Surgeons and developed the training of plastic surgeons. He also traveled and wrote extensively in his field. McIndoe died in London on April 12, 1960.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Medicine and the War

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McLain, Raymond Stallings (1890–1954)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Washington County, Kentucky, on April 4, 1890, Raymond Stallings McLain grew up in Oklahoma, attended Hills Business College in 1909, and achieved success in banking. He joined the National Guard in 1912 and was commissioned a lieutenant of infantry in 1916. McLain served with the National Guard along the Mexican border that year and was called up again during World War I, when he commanded a machine-gun company in France.

Following the war, McLain returned to his banking career but remained in the National Guard, and in June 1937, he was promoted to brigadier general. The next year, he completed an abbreviated course at the Command and General Staff School. He was mobilized with the National Guard 45th Infantry Division in September 1940 and commanded its artillery. During the July 9–August 22, 1943, invasion of Sicily, he attracted the attention of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley and Major General George S. Patton Jr. McLain then fought with the 45th in Italy, including at the Anzio landing (January 22, 1944). He was assigned to command the 30th Division Artillery in England in April 1944. In late July, McLain assumed command of the 90th Infantry Division, rated a "problem" division. He was promoted to major general the next month.

McLain was the 90th Infantry Division's third commander in three months. Both of his predecessors had been inadequate leaders, and battlefield challenges in Normandy were extraordinarily severe. Leading by example, McLain and his assistant, Brigadier General William G. Weaver, transformed the 90th into one of the best divisions in Lieutenant General Patton's Third Army. In October, McLain took command of XIX Corps, partly because he had earned the assignment and partly because the army found it politically expedient to recognize an outstanding National Guardsman. He was the first citizen-soldier to command a corps since the American Civil War and the only National Guardsman ever to command a corps in combat.

Despite his civilian background, McLain earned the respect of his regular army subordinates. His corps spent the remainder of the war in Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's Ninth Army. In March 1945, XIX Corps spearheaded the northern pincer in the encirclement of the Ruhr, and in April,

it led the Ninth Army's push to the Elbe. McLain was promoted to lieutenant general in June 1945, the first National Guardsman to achieve that rank.

McLain remained in the army after the war, serving as its chief of information (1946–1949) and as comptroller of the army (1949–1952). He retired in March 1952. McLain died in Washington, D.C., on December 14, 1954.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Ruhr Land Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of

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McMorris, Charles Horatio "Soc" (1890–1954)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born on August 31, 1890, in Wetumpka, Alabama, Charles Horatio McMorris graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1912. Nicknamed "Soc" or "Socrates" for his intelligence, he took part in the 1914 U.S. Navy landing at Veracruz, Mexico, and served on destroyers in the North Atlantic during World War I.

McMorris then held a variety of assignments, including instructor in seamanship and history at the Naval Academy (1925–1927, 1930–1933). In the interval, he commanded destroyers. From 1933 to 1935, he was a navigator on the battleship *California*. McMorris graduated from the Naval War College in 1938, served as operations officer for the Scouting Force (1938–1939), and then served in the same capacity with the Hawaiian Department (1939–1941).

In January 1941, promoted to captain, McMorris became war plans officer on the staff of Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. In April 1942, he took command of the heavy cruiser *San Francisco*. Promoted to rear admiral, he assumed command of Task Force 8 that December and provided gunfire support for the 7th Infantry

Division as it retook Attu Island in the Aleutians. On March 26, 1943, some 200 miles west of Attu and without air support, he fought the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, repelling a stronger Japanese naval force under Vice Admiral Hosogaya Boshiro.

In June 1943, McMorris became chief of staff to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area. McMorris helped plan the Central Pacific offensives of the war's final two years and remained in his post until February 1946. Promoted to temporary vice admiral in September 1944, he took command of the Fourth Fleet in 1946. He served on the General Board from 1947 to 1948. In June 1948, he became a permanent vice admiral, commanding the 14th Naval District and Hawaiian Sea Frontier until he retired in September 1952. McMorris died in Honolulu, Hawaii, on February 11, 1954.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Central Pacific Campaign; Kimmel, Husband Edward; Komandorski Islands, Battle of the; Nimitz, Chester William; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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McNair, Lesley James (1883–1944)

U.S. Army general. Born in Verndale, Minnesota, on May 25, 1883, Lesley James McNair graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1904 and was commissioned in the artillery. He served in the Mexican Punitive Expedition in 1916 and then deployed to France with the 1st Division as a lieutenant colonel in June 1917, where he served with George C. Marshall as an assistant chief of staff. That August, McNair transferred to the training section of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) General Staff, where he was promoted to colonel (June 1918) and to brigadier general (October), the youngest in the U.S. Army.

Reverting to his permanent rank of major after the war, McNair held a succession of routine assignments and graduated from the Army War College in 1929. He was again promoted to colonel in May 1935 and to brigadier general in March 1937, commanding an artillery brigade. McNair had already come to the notice of his friend Marshall as a talented organizer and trainer of soldiers. In 1939, McNair became commandant of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Marshall then placed McNair in charge of organizing and training all of the army's ground forces in World War II. McNair was promoted to major general in September 1940 and to lieutenant general in June 1941. He became chief of army ground forces in March 1942.

The training assignment was a task for which McNair was perfectly suited and one that he performed brilliantly. He insisted on rigorous and realistic training, and he set high standards for officers. He often went into the field to gauge the results of his training programs. During one inspection trip to see the 1st Infantry Division in Tunisia in the spring of 1943, he was wounded. While substituting for General George C. Patton Jr. as commander of the fictitious First U.S. Army Group in the United Kingdom, McNair visited Normandy, France. He was killed there on July 25, 1944, by U.S. bombs that fell short near Saint-Lô. McNair was promoted to full general posthumously in July 1954.

JOHN F. VOTAW

See also

Marshall, George Catlett; Saint-Lô, Battle of; United States Army

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McNaughton, Andrew George Latta (1887–1966)

Canadian Army general. Born on February 25, 1887, at Moosomin, Saskatchewan, Andrew George Latta McNaughton served with distinction in World War I. In October 1918, McNaughton was promoted to brigadier general and given command of the Canadian Corps heavy artillery. After the armistice, McNaughton remained in the Permanent Force (Canadian Army). While serving as chief of staff from 1929 through 1935, he pioneered many modernizing innovations.

Major General McNaughton was chosen to command the Canadian 1st Division in September 1939. Thereafter, his rise was rapid: Canadian Corps commander and lieutenant general in July 1940, and Canadian First Army commander in April 1942. During the early war years, McNaughton's public reputation was unchallenged.

In reality, McNaughton's prickly temperament, poor judgment in selecting subordinates, administrative deficiencies, and obsession with technology made it clear to most insiders that he was unfit to command a large force in the field. A consensus that his performance during Exercise SPARTAN in England in 1943 was a disaster proved to be the final straw for his many British critics, especially Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke. The Canadian government agreed, and McNaughton was relieved in December 1943 and replaced by Lieutenant General Kenneth Stuart.

An embittered McNaughton returned to Canada. When a conscription crisis erupted in the autumn of 1944 and Prime Minister Mackenzie King sacked Minister of National Defence James Layton Ralston, McNaughton—the only senior general still favoring voluntary enlistment—entered the cabinet as Ralston's replacement. Within a month, however, the government enacted limited overseas conscription, and McNaughton's political career fizzled.

In contrast to the turmoil of his World War II service, McNaughton enjoyed a highly successful postwar career as a diplomat, serving as Canada's representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (1946–1948), the International Joint Commission (1950–1962), and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (1950–1958). McNaughton died in Montebello, Quebec, on July 11, 1966.

PATRICK H. BRENNAN

See also

Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Canada, Army; King, William Lyon Mackenzie

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Medical Experimentation

During World War II, a number of heinous crimes were committed in the guise of medical experimentation. Such experimentation usually involved the use of concentration camp prisoners as subjects. While the Germans committed the majority of the most infamous medical experiments, the Japanese also conducted highly destructive and unethical medical experiments on prisoners of war. Other countries also engaged in unethical medical experiments. Even the U.S. government conducted unethical experimentation, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study of 1932–1972, which was conducted without the subjects' knowledge or consent. However, these studies did not involve the acute brutality and massive loss of life that characterized both German and Japanese medical experimentation.

Approximately 200 German doctors coordinated at least 70 medical experimentation projects during the Nazi era. However, the number of medical and academic professionals actually involved in such projects was probably much higher. The exact number of individuals involved remains unknown, because the Germans destroyed most of the records toward the end of the war.

Medical experimentation by the Germans during the war was conducted primarily for military, biomedical, and ideological reasons. National Socialist Party leaders such as Heinrich Himmler ordered the military application experiments. The Nazis conducted the most infamous of these studies at the Dachau concentration camp just north of Munich. These included hypothermia, high-altitude, and seawater projects. Dr. Sigmund Rascher, an SS-Untersturmführer who also played a major role in perfecting the gas chambers utilizing Zyklon-B gas, was the primary physician responsible for these studies.

The hypothermia studies simulated conditions experienced by aviators who ejected from their planes into freezing seawater. The aim was to find the best means possible for resuscitating and rewarming pilots following exposure to intense and prolonged cold. For the experiment, prisoners were submerged under varying conditions (e.g., amount and type of clothing, fully submerged vs. partially submerged, length of exposure) in water with temperatures ranging from 37 to 54 degrees. Varying methods of rewarming and resuscitation (e.g., slow vs. rapid rewarming, type of rewarming) were tried after the prisoner's body temperature reached 80 degrees. These studies resulted in extreme pain, serious injury, or death to the prisoners used as subjects.

The high-altitude studies examined the effects of altitudes on pilots in relation to new jet technology and the impact of ejection at high altitudes on aviators. Those conducting the experiments placed prisoners in specially designed and sealed sub–atmospheric pressure chambers. Pressure levels were slowly lowered to simulate a gradual rise in atmosphere, and the impact of varying levels of oxygen was studied. All the subjects died in these experiments, and the doctors involved then performed autopsies to document the degree of air embolism damage caused within the arteries and brains of the subjects.

Between July and September 1944, the Germans conducted additional military/medical tests involving seawater. These tests were designed to benefit both the Luftwaffe and the German Navy. They were part of an effort to make seawater potable for military personnel lost at sea. Prisoners were starved and then forced to drink seawater treated with various chemicals. The result was acute illness, permanent injury, or death.

Biomedical research was the second rationale for research, and the Nazis conducted experiments in concentration camps such as Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Sachsenhausen, and Ravensbrück. These studies included infectious disease studies, pharmacological studies, surgical experiments, and traumatic injury studies. In relation to infectious disease studies, those conducting the experiments injected prisoners with various diseases (e.g., typhus, tuberculosis) and observed the course of the disease. The prisoners were then killed, and autopsies were performed to examine the impact of the disease on specific body organs. For the traumatic injury studies, German doctors inflicted wounds on prisoners and rubbed foreign

substances such as dirt, glass, wood, or rusty nails into them. The course of infection and possible treatments were then studied. Other biomedical research did not involve direct experimentation but rather the removal of specimens such as brains or other organs for university and institute collections.

The final explanation for German medical experimentation was ideological, specifically the pursuit of "racial purity" or "racial hygiene." The Holocaust and many of the activities of the Nazis such as the T-4 or Euthanasia Project were eugenic in nature. The goal was to purify the so-called Aryan race through the elimination of individuals with genetic abnormalities as well as the destruction of "inferior" races. While most individuals considered inferior (e.g., Jews, the mentally ill) were simply killed, experimentation was undertaken to find a means of cheap, efficient, and effective mass sterilization that could be completed without an individual's knowledge. Prisoners at Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, Auschwitz, and other sites were exposed to radiation, underwent surgery, or had caustic substances injected internally. The notorious Block 10 at Auschwitz was the site of much of this research at the hands of Dr. Carl Clauberg, aka "The Beast."

Under the guise of genetic research, Dr. Josef Mengele (aka "Angel of Death") conducted his infamous twin studies. Mengele's capricious and extremely cruel experiments with children ranged from attempts to change eye color by injecting dye chemicals into the eye to experiments with blood transfusions. Mengele regularly conducted ghastly experiments and infectious disease studies by injecting one twin with a disease such as typhus and then killing both twins to examine the differences upon autopsy.

All of the research conducted in the concentration camps violated the rights of participants in experiments and fundamental human rights standards. Sixteen doctors were brought to trial and found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in 1947 in the Nuremberg Trials. The resulting Nuremberg Laws, some of which outlined 10 directives related to experimentation with humans, were written because of the abuses committed by the Nazis in the name of medical research.

The Japanese also engaged in extensive biological warfare research on humans during World War II in China. Unit 731 of the Japanese Army, under the leadership of Lieutenant General and microbiologist Shiro Ishii, was the

primary research group located out of Harbin, China. The Japanese experimented on prisoners at a disguised "water purification" plant. After the experiments, there were no survivors. The Japanese also conducted field trials across the Chinese countryside to test various disease (e.g., anthrax, small-pox, cholera) delivery systems. These experiments killed or made seriously ill tens of thousands of Chinese villagers. The individuals involved with Unit 731 and the other biological warfare units were never brought to trial following the war. Instead, the United States granted them immunity in exchange for access to their biological warfare data.

LINDA M. WOOLF

See also

Concentration Camps, German; Euthanasia, Nazi Program; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Mengele, Josef; Nazi Racial Policies; Nuremberg Laws

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Medicine and the War

Medicine during World War II was marked by advances in triage and transport, management of shock, and treatment of infectious diseases. The war also witnessed the emergence of aviation and submarine medicine and the misuse of human experimentation, resulting in new standards for medical research.

Better transportation and triage were made possible by improved triage systems dating to World War I. By 1939, military surgeons recognized the importance of early management of battlefield trauma. Medics trained and equipped to control blood loss and administer analgesics at the initial site of

injury were attached to individual combat units. Injectable morphine dispensed on the battlefield lessened both pain and shock during evacuation. Taking the model developed by the Royal Army Medical Corps, transport from the field was organized in stages, with each step assigned a specific range of duties.

The first stop after field stabilization was the regimental collecting station, where hemostatic bandages and splints could be applied. The collecting stations also had plasma or blood available to manage shock, and staff there could secure adequate ventilation, including tracheotomies if needed. From the collecting station, men could be moved to semimobile field hospitals equipped to perform emergency surgery. The field hospitals were the first stage fully staffed with physicians. From the field hospital, men could be moved to fixed-station or general hospitals, where more complex procedures (neurosurgery, chest surgery, orthopedic reconstructions, and the like) could be performed and where men expected to return to duty could convalesce. General and rehabilitation hospitals in the zone of the interior could provide major reconstruction (predominantly orthopedic and plastic surgical procedures) and long-term rehabilitation if necessary. Depending on the severity of the injury, a wounded man could exit the system and return to duty at any point in the chain.

Semimobile medical units were linear descendants of the French *auto-chir*, a World War I attempt to create motorized field hospitals. A high level of mobility was less important in that relatively stationary war, and development of the freely movable hospital only blossomed in World War II. These auxiliary surgical teams remained somewhat difficult to transport and were limited in the services they could provide, but they were an important interim step toward the mobile army surgical hospitals (MASH units) of the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

Aeromedical evacuation, although tried in a crude way in World War I, came into its own in World War II. The process largely involved the use of fixed-wing aircraft (for U.S. forces, mostly C-47s, C-54s, and C-54As) to move men from field or general hospitals to facilities in the zone of the interior. Medical air transport became especially sophisticated in the long distances of the Pacific war, where the U.S. Army Nurse Corps developed the expertise in managing patients during prolonged transit that engendered current civilian and military flight nurses.

The island war in the Pacific presented unique problems in medical evacuation: the distances were inordinately long, and there was almost never an accessible general hospital to augment basic field hospital care. Although hospital ships had been used since the mid-1800s and had reached a high degree of sophistication under the Japanese in their 1904–1905 war with Russia, the U.S. Navy employed them to unprecedented advantage in World War II.

At the beginning of the war, the navy had only two hospital ships (the *Relief* and the *Solace*), and only one of these was in the Pacific. During the war, the United States commissioned an additional eight hospital ships and developed an entire class of troop transports equipped to provide limited hospital services. The navy also deployed a series of adapted landing craft—LST(H)s (landing ships, tank [hospital])—manned with 4 surgeons and 27 corpsmen and capable of serving as a field hospital for up to 350 wounded. Hospital ships, required by the navy to be held well back from areas of direct combat, served essentially the same role as land-based general hospitals.

Although some new surgical techniques, particularly in vascular surgery, were developed during the war, the primary advances were in the early management and treatment of physiologic effects of trauma. As noted, medics made almost immediate hemostasis and pain management a standard. Understanding of the mechanisms and treatment of shock came early in the war. Shock is clinically characterized by a fall in blood pressure, a rise in the pulse, coolness and discoloration of poorly perfused extremities, and mental changes ranging from anxiety through confusion to coma. The syndrome’s common denominator is failure of the heart and the circulatory system to supply adequate blood to the body’s organs.

In the early years of the war, clinicians first realized that poor perfusion was the common factor in various types of shock. Blood loss, loss of body fluid such as that caused by weeping burn wounds, sepsis with its toxic bacteriologic by-products, and extreme cold can all cause the circulatory system to fail. The physiologic effects of that failure can (at least temporarily) be ameliorated by increasing the amount of fluid in the system.

Soviet scientists in the 1930s had shown that plasma—blood with the red cells removed—could be effectively used to treat shock. Plasma had two signal advantages: unlike whole blood, it was not type-specific, and it could

be readily stored for long periods. Plasma could be started by medics at the front, and it was widely administered from the early days of the war.

Recognizing the need for blood and plasma, the British started a national blood-banking program early in the war, a collection and storage system the Americans later adopted, enlarged, and improved. As the war progressed, plasma's limitations as a replacement for lost blood became evident, and the use of whole blood to treat shock became more prevalent. Although civilian donors played a major role in supplying the blood banks, most donations came from combatants themselves, with medics providing a disproportionate share. In addition to whole blood, military surgeons had cardiac stimulants and vasoconstrictors, such as adrenaline and ephedrine, to augment perfusion.

Military medicine also saw significant advances in the management of infectious diseases during World War II. These improvements primarily involved the treatment and control of tropical diseases, control of diseases resulting from poor sanitation aggravated by dietary deficiency, and chemical treatment of infections.

The Pacific war forced Japanese and Allied soldiers to fight in areas where tropical infections, especially malaria, were endemic. In the latter part of 1942 and in early 1943, American soldiers in the Solomons were hospitalized for malaria at a rate of 970 per 1,000 per year, with 100,000 men ultimately contracting the disease. The unacceptable loss of fighting men led General Douglas MacArthur to form the Combined Advisory Committee on Tropical Medicine, Hygiene, and Sanitation. The committee used preventive measures to bring an 85 percent decrease in the hospitalization rate within six months.

When World War II began, quinine was the agent of choice in treating malaria, but the Japanese captured the drug's major sources of supply. The antimalarial Atabrine was developed as a synthetic substitute, and although soldiers had to be forced to take it because of its bitter taste and tendency to turn the skin yellow, 2.5 billion doses had been dispensed by war's end.

Vigorous efforts were used to control the anopheles mosquito that carried the disease, including oil coating of breeding ponds and spraying with the newly developed chemical insecticide, DDT. As a result of these preventive measures, less than 1 percent of hospitalized American personnel had malaria by the end of 1943. The Japanese did not do as well. They had access to quinine but were ineffective in distributing it. In addition, their soldiers were

often underfed, and their rice-based diet resulted in vitamin deficiencies—particularly B1 deficiency or beriberi—that increased susceptibility to infectious disease.

Besides malaria, soldiers in the Pacific theater suffered from dengue fever (an untreatable, incapacitating, but usually self-limited viral disease), various forms of infectious diarrhea, and fungal skin diseases (collectively termed "jungle rot").

Typhus, a louse-borne *rickettsia* disease, was the most threatening infectious disease in the European theater. When the Western Allies landed in French North Africa in November 1942, the area was in the midst of a typhus epidemic that ultimately infected over 500,000 civilians. The U.S. Army received a vaccine mass-produced by a process developed in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and only 11 men from a force of nearly half a million contracted typhus. Allied troops arrived in Europe vaccinated against typhus, typhoid, paratyphoid, and smallpox, but malaria remained a significant problem, especially in Italy, because Allied soldiers resisted taking Atabrine.

An American soldier wounded by shrapnel being given a blood plasma transfusion during the Sicily Campaign, July 1943. (Wever/US Navy/National Archives/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

In addition to preventative vaccination, DDT was used to kill body lice that carried the infection. The new chemical agent stayed in clothes, so people could be dusted without removing their garments (an important factor in the North African Muslim culture), and the clothing no longer had to be sterilized or destroyed. Effective delousing was also important in limiting typhus outbreaks in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Germany as the war ended; it was especially useful in controlling epidemics among concentration camp survivors when those facilities were liberated.

One of the most important advances in the treatment of wartime trauma was the use of antibiotics. German scientist Gerhard Domagk, working at I. G. Farbenindustrie, had synthesized Prontosil in 1935, and scientists at the Pasteur Institute in Paris had adapted that chemical to the more effective sulfanilamide, an antimicrobial that could be applied directly to a wound or taken orally. Sulfa drugs were used prophylactically and therapeutically from the first months of the war. Sir Alexander Fleming had accidentally discovered the antibacterial properties of penicillin in 1929, but the drug was difficult and expensive to make and was not widely used until 1940, when scientists at Oxford produced a concentrated form suitable for clinical application. The drug remained so expensive that it was routinely recovered from patients' urine, purified, and reused.

Improvements in aviation and submarine technology outstripped the ability of humans to adapt to newly accessible environments. Frenchman Paul Bert had described the physiologic effects of extreme altitude on balloonists in the previous century, but the extremes of temperature, pressure, and oxygen tension became acute concerns as great depths and nearly stratospheric altitudes were reached. Warplanes had service ceilings well beyond the survival capabilities of humans without artificial pressurization. Supplemental oxygen was required above 10,000 feet, and daytime bombing missions at altitudes in excess of 25,000 feet were often the rule. At these altitudes, temperatures ranged as low as 50 degrees below zero, posing significant risk of frostbite or even hypothermic shock. A dive-bomber could descend at 30,000 feet per minute (compared with a commercial airliner's usual rate of 400 feet per minute), a rate that introduced serious risk of barotrauma to the middle ear, sinuses, or intestines. Pooling of blood in the extremities due to extreme gravitational forces from rapid acceleration caused loss of vision and unconsciousness. Allied pilots taped their legs and

abdomens to protect against blackouts, and the Germans manufactured the first pressurized body suit with the same goal. Rapid ascent either from the ocean to the surface or the surface to high altitudes produces intravascular nitrogen bubbles, leading to the syndrome of joint pain and stroke collectively referred to as the bends.

Human experimentation carried out by the German and Japanese military medical establishments led to permanent changes in standards for scientific research. The Japanese used Soviet and Chinese prisoners of war and civilians in biowarfare experiments in Manchuria and performed anatomy experiments on living American prisoners in Japan. The Germans used concentration camp inmates to perform experiments on pressure and cold tolerance that, although undeniably inhumane, provided information that remains unique. Allied military surgeons were called on to help assess the Axis physicians' behavior after the war, and the resulting Nuremberg Code still sets the standards for ethically appropriate human experimentation.

JACK MCCALLUM

See also

Combat Fatigue; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Medical Experimentation

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Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

The Mediterranean Sea extends 2,000 nautical miles from the Levant to Gibraltar and varies in width from 700 miles to 80 miles. A great many nations depended on maritime traffic through the Mediterranean to sustain

their economies. Italy, for example, received 86 percent of its prewar imports by sea, and 75 of that total came through Gibraltar or Suez. For Great Britain, the Suez Canal cut 4,500 nautical miles from the journey between Bombay and London, and before the war, nearly 200 British merchant ships sailed the Mediterranean on any given day. France's economy and its imperial connections likewise depended on the Mediterranean.

Upon Italy's declaration of war in June 1940, the following forces were in the Mediterranean: Italy had 2 battleships, 7 heavy and 14 light cruisers, 52 destroyers, 69 torpedo boats, and 105 submarines; France had 5 battleships, 7 heavy and 7 light cruisers, 38 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, and 40 submarines; Great Britain had 4 battleships, 1 battle cruiser, 2 aircraft carriers, 13 light cruisers, 36 destroyers, and 12 submarines; Spain had 6 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, and 5 submarines; Greece had 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 13 small torpedo boats, and 6 submarines; Turkey had 1 old battle cruiser, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 4 small torpedo boats, and 8 submarines; Yugoslavia had 1 old cruiser, 4 destroyers, 6 small torpedo boats, and 4 submarines.

In the war's first two weeks, the major operation was an ineffectual bombardment near Genoa by French naval forces. After France signed an armistice with the Axis powers, the disposition of its fleet became a critical concern for the British—one the Royal Navy attempted to resolve by attacking the French squadron demobilizing at Mers-el-Kébir. This sparked a semiwar between the French—who maintained a credible fleet in being—and British forces that complicated operations in the western Mediterranean.

Contrary to prewar plans, Italian leader Benito Mussolini decided to reinforce Africa shortly before war started, which presented the Regia Marina with the unanticipated mission of escorting convoys. For offensive operations, Italy planned to use light forces and bombers to wage a low-risk, high-return campaign. However, poor tactics, unsuitable submarines, and the air forces' reliance on inefficient high-altitude bombing led to low returns and the rapid loss of 10 submarines.

Great Britain, meanwhile, decided to hold Malta as an outpost, and most of the early operations revolved around British convoys to Malta or Italian convoys to Africa. London also expected to win its first significant victories of the war against Italy. The opportunity for such a victory coincided with

Italy's first large convoy to Africa. The result was an inconclusive engagement off Calabria on July 9, 1940.

The Battle of Calabria set the naval status quo, which consisted of an Italian blockade of the Sicilian narrows by mines and light forces backed up by the battle fleet. With the Mediterranean's central basin closed to all but occasional and heavily protected convoys, Britain was forced to maintain its Middle Eastern position from around Africa and up the Red Sea, a four-month voyage for a slow convoy. This required the withdrawal of shipping from the North Atlantic and contributed to a 35 percent decline in British imports between June and December 1940.

In August 1940, Italy commissioned two modern battleships, the *Littorio* and *Vittorio Veneto,* giving its battle line superiority to that of Great Britain. In September, Italian forces invaded Egypt from Italy. Italy also invaded Greece on October 28 over the objections of the naval leaders, who were rightfully concerned that this action would complicate the naval war and provide the British with strategic bases.

In November during the course of a Malta supply operation, the Royal Navy launched an air strike on the Italian Navy's base at Taranto and there damaged three battleships—the *Littorio*, *Duilio,* and *Conte di Cavour,* the latter being knocked out of the war permanently. As a result, the Regia Marina temporarily pulled back from Taranto and the Ionian Sea, but the Taranto attack did not eliminate Italy's ability to dispute the through passage of the Mediterranean, as indicated by the Battle of Cape Spartivento (November 27, 1940), an indecisive battleship action fought two weeks later.

In December 1940, British and British Empire forces routed Italy's North African army and, by the beginning of February 1941, had advanced all the way to the borders of Tripolitania. This, along with the occupation of Crete, improved the Allied position in the eastern Mediterranean. During the war's first seven months, the Italians ran 331 transports to Africa, losing 0.6 percent of the men and 2.2 percent of the matériel en route. The British brought 7 convoys with 27 merchant ships into Malta, yet only 1 British merchant ship successfully made the passage from Gibraltar to Egypt.

Germany deployed air units in Sicily in December 1940. This was done in accordance with plans developed as early as July 1940 and to advance the Reich's own war aims rather than to prop up Italy. German dive-bombers proved more effective than Italian high-level bombers in action against

British ships off Pantelleria on January 10 and 11, when they sank a light cruiser and severely damaged the carrier *Illustrious* during a Malta operation.

In early 1941, Britain decided to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece in accordance with its treaty with that nation. This led to London's questionable decision to strip North Africa of its best forces. The Regia Marina, under heavy German pressure, attempted to raid convoys bringing troops to Greece with surface forces, but the British, who received hints of an operation from decrypts of German Enigma air force communications, dispatched the Mediterranean Fleet to intercept the sortie. The result was a night ambush by the fleet's battleship division and the loss of an Italian cruiser division in the Battle of Cape Matapan (March 28, 1941).

Events on land rather than the sea shaped the course of naval operations during the next several months. In Africa, Axis forces rolled the British back to Egypt and invaded Greece, expelling the Allies from the mainland and forcing a massive naval evacuation. The decision to hold Crete proved costly for the Royal Navy. Convinced that the island could only be taken by sea, it sent cruiser/destroyer task forces north, and although one convoy was turned back and another largely destroyed, German paratroopers took the island anyway. Another evacuation followed, and the Royal Navy suffered grievous losses in the process. Combined with an Axis advance into Egypt, the pendulum in the eastern Mediterranean now swung against Great Britain, and its convoys had to face a longer passage through waters dominated by Axis air forces.

In the spring of 1941, Malta also experienced intensified air attacks, and the British squadron based at Gibraltar focused on bringing aircraft to reinforce the island. During May and June 1941, 60 Axis transports and freighters arrived in Africa, and just 1 was lost en route. However, the Regia Marina had depleted much of its fuel reserves by this point, and the naval command had to be selective in its use of large warships.

In the eastern Mediterranean, the Royal Navy devoted a destroyer squadron to keeping the besieged port of Tobruk supplied, and after British and other Allied forces invaded Syria in June, the Royal Navy committed cruisers and destroyers to counter a pesky Vichy French flotilla that inflicted a sharp defeat on British destroyers off the Lebanese coast on June 9.

During the second half of 1941, the convoy war intensified. The Germans transferred their air corps from Sicily, and on June 23 the British broke the

cypher used by the Italian Navy for administrative purposes. This intelligence coup gave the British advance notice of most convoys to Africa.

As Malta-based submarines and bombers inflicted greater losses on Axis convoys, the British successfully brought a large convoy to Malta from the west in July. Italy's special forces attempted to attack the convoy after it had docked but suffered a stinging defeat. On the occasion of another major convoy from the west in September, Italy decided to spend much of its remaining oil reserves to seek a strategic victory employing its fleet in conjunction with strong air attacks. The plan failed due in large part to Italian commander Angelo Iachino's mistaken belief that the British had stronger forces and were trying to lure him into a trap.

German submarines entered the Mediterranean in September, following complaints by German commander in North Africa General of Panzer Troops Erwin Rommel that the Italians were not doing enough to protect convoys. The U-boats sank the British aircraft carrier *Ark Royal* and the battleship *Barham* before the end of the year.

With Malta's supply position improving, the Royal Navy based a cruiser/destroyer force there, and this, along with submarines, aircraft and the advantage of Ultra intelligence, allowed several impressive sea denial victories, the most notable being against the seven-ship Beta convoy on November 9. This was followed by other British victories against small Italian one- and two-ship convoys and against two light cruisers in the Battle of Cape Bon on December 13. In November, only 38 percent of the Axis supplies shipped by sea reached Africa (for the six months ending in December, only 73 percent arrived). Just two days after the Battle of Cape Bon, the Italo-German armies in North Africa were in retreat and facing a supply crisis.

The Italian Navy made strenuous efforts to restore the situation, and it won three important victories in mid-December. The First Battle of Sirte on December 17 allowed a major convoy to reach North Africa. On December 19, a British cruiser/destroyer force blundered into a minefield off Tripoli and lost one cruiser and one destroyer sunk and had two cruisers damaged. The same day, Italian commandos attacked the Mediterranean fleet's main base at Alexandria and disabled two battleships, the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Valiant*. Meanwhile, the Germans redeployed air units to Sicily and began, once again, to hammer Malta.

In the first half of 1942, the Allied position steadily deteriorated. In the short term, Japan's entry into the war offset the advantages Britain gained by U.S. participation. Small convoys from the east proved insufficient to maintain Malta's position, and as food stocks there fell, the Mediterranean Fleet mounted a major operation to succor the island. This led to the Second Battle of Sirte on March 22, 1942. The convoy did not deliver sufficient supplies to relieve the situation, however, and following the intensification of the Axis air campaign against Malta, the British attempted a larger resupply operation from both the east and the west. This led to the convoy battles of mid-June and a defeat for the Royal Navy as only 2 of 17 merchant ships got through at great cost. The Axis leaders canceled plans to conquer Malta using paratroopers and an amphibious landing in the belief that their siege of the island had neutralized it.

On June 21, the Axis armies took Tobruk and drove into Egypt before being halted 60 miles short of Alexandria. This caused the Mediterranean Fleet to withdraw into the Red Sea and Palestine. Two months later, the Royal Navy mounted another Malta operation, this time only from the west, sending 14 freighters and tankers supported by 4 carriers, 2 battleships, 7 cruisers, and 32 destroyers. Five ships from the convoy eventually reached their destination. In contrast, 94 percent of the matériel shipped by Italy to North Africa from January through June arrived safely.

In the latter half of 1942, the British reverted to a blockade-running strategy to keep Malta alive. They made great efforts to chip away at the Axis North African sea-borne traffic with some success, as only 74 percent of Axis shipments arrived. The major naval event was Operation TORCH on November 8. The Allied invasion and subsequent conquest of Morocco and Algeria and the partial occupation of Tunisia finally relieved the siege of Malta and also saw the end of French naval power with the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon, which greatly simplified matters for the Allies. Operation TORCH also introduced massive U.S. strength into the Mediterranean, and this—not the British victory at El Alamein (October 23–November 4)—marked the beginning of the end of Axis power in the region.

The Axis fought to maintain a bridgehead in Africa centered on Tunis, and the focus of the naval war now shifted to the Sicilian Channel. Once again, small Italian convoys ran through heavily mined waters in the face of Allied air, submarine, and surface naval power, and losses were heavy.

Tunis finally fell on May 8, 1943, and in the face of Allied naval strength, the Axis made no effort to evacuate their African army by sea. Another consequence of this victory was the arrival in Egypt that month of the first convoy from Gibraltar since early 1941. The breaking of the Italian blockage of the Sicilian narrows freed an estimated 1 million tons of shipping.

The Anglo-American invasion of Sicily (July 9) in Operation HUSKY—which followed on July 10—faced minimal and ineffective interference from Axis submarines and motor torpedo boats. On July 25, Italy had a change in government. Mussolini was arrested, and on September 8 the new government signed an armistice with the Allies. This armistice caught the Italian Navy by surprise—in fact, the fleet was sortieing to attack the Allied beachheads at Salerno—and it was swept up in a campaign against the Germans that cost it a battleship and several destroyers while en route to the port of La Maddalena in Sardinia. After German forces captured La Maddalena and threatened Taranto, the naval command ordered the battle fleet to concentrate at Malta but to not lower their flag or surrender control to the Allies. At the time of the armistice, the Regia Marina had operational 6 battleships, 9 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 33 torpedo boats, 17 corvettes, and 42 submarines. The navy had 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 10 torpedo boats, 6 corvettes, and 17 submarines under repair.

Following the Italian armistice, Germany proceeded to collect a surface fleet that deployed at one time or another 63 warships displacing more than 500 tons, mostly from captured Italian or French ships that were repaired or completed by the Germans. Germany fought several distinct naval campaigns. The Reich held the Aegean to keep Turkey neutral and deny the Allies access to the Black Sea. Germany had to protect the Balkans, and it needed the Adriatic Sea as a supply corridor to import raw materials and support its Balkan and Italian armies. In the western Mediterranean, German flotillas of torpedo boats and motor torpedo boats, supported by a new Italian fascist navy, fought in the Tyrrhenian Sea to protect the seaward flanks of their armies, transport supplies, and maintain imports from Spain. The Allies tried to break the stalemated land campaign on the Italian Peninsula with Operation SHINGLE, an amphibious assault at Anzio on January 22, 1944. This operation, however, only resulted in an isolated beachhead that required support from the sea.

Giant U.S. convoys now traversed the Mediterranean. Between the Italian

armistice and December 1944, 50 Allied convoys averaging 69 ships each entered the Middle Sea. German submarines were foiled by the strength of their escorts, and their last submarine success occurred on May 18, 1944.

In Operation DRAGOON on August 15, 1944, the Americans and French landed in the south of France. An Allied armada of 9 escort carriers, 5 battleships, 24 cruisers, and 111 destroyers supported this massive operation. However, even the conquest of southern France did not end naval operations in the Mediterranean, as fighting continued in the Adriatic and Ligurian Seas up to the end of the war. The last surface action fought in European waters pitted British destroyers against German torpedo boats in the Ligurian Sea on March 18, 1945.

Overall, operations in the Mediterranean proved long and bitter. More surface actions were fought there than anywhere else in the war. Submarine operations were costly for both sides. There were five Allied major multidivisional landings and dozens of smaller ones by the Allies and Axis both. For the first three years Italy largely realized its naval objectives, and not until the capture of Tunisia did the Allies gain control of the Mediterranean. Germany's final campaigns in the Adriatic, Tyrrhenian, and Ligurian Seas were instrumental in preventing the Reich from ever being threatened from the south.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Adriatic Sea, Naval Operations in; Aegean Sea Naval Operations; Anzio, Battle of; Beta Convoy Battle; Black Sea, Area of Operations; Borghese, Junio Valerio; Calabria, Battle of; Campioni, Inigo; Cape Bon, Battle of; Cape Spartivento, Battle of; CATAPULT, Operation; Convoys, Allied; Crete, Battle of; Dakar, Attack on; Dodecanese Islands Campaign; France, Navy; Gibraltar; Great Britain, Navy; Greece, Navy; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy; Ligurian Sea, Battle of the; Malta; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; PEDESTAL, Operation; *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant,* Sinking of; Red Sea, Naval Operations in; Sicily, Invasion of; Sidon, Engagement off; Signals Intelligence; Sirte, First Battle of; Sirte, Second Battle of; Skerki Bank, Battle near; Suez Canal; Taranto, Attack on; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at

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Meiktila, Battle of (February 28–March 28, 1945)

Important and hard-fought battle in Burma (Myanmar). By mid-1944, the tide in Burma had turned, and it was the Japanese who were on the defensive. In the first half of that year, British lieutenant general William Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army, blunted Japanese general Mutaguchi Renya's U-GO Offensive before Kohima and Imphal, then liberated northern Burma by the end of the year. Early in 1945, Slim's forces went on the offensive in central Burma. Utilizing new techniques of aerial resupply, Slim directed a drive against the Japanese geographic defense line of the Irrawaddy River.

Meiktila, the center of Japanese logistical infrastructure in the area, was also a gateway to the cities of Rangoon (Yangon) and Mandalay and an equally important center of communication for the entire Burma theater. Meiktila's airfields were key. Capture of these would allow aerial resupply of Allied ground operations throughout the entire theater of operations.

In an effort to trap and destroy Japanese lieutenant general Katamura Shihachi's Fifteenth Army at Meiktila, Slim resorted to an elaborate deception plan. Code-named CLOAK, it involved sending radio signals from a nonexistent headquarters at Shwebo on his left flank to convince Katamura that Slim's IV Corps was about to drive on Mandalay from that direction. At the same time, Slim secretly moved IV Corps, made up of the Indian 17th Division and the 225th Tank Brigade, south down the Myittha Valley and then across the Irrawaddy River near Pakokku, 100 miles south of Mandalay.

On February 13, IV Corps made a surprisingly easy crossing of the Irrawaddy. The tanks then dashed to cut off Meiktila, easily sweeping aside Japanese-puppet Indian National Army forces.

The Battle of Meiktila opened on February 28. Major General David Tennant Cowan, commander of the 17th Division, had charge of the attack. Meiktila was basically a logistics and medical center, and the Japanese had few fighting units there other than battalions for airfield defense. In all, there were only 4,000 men. Organized Japanese resistance soon collapsed, but the defenders then broke into small bands, forcing the British to clear the town street by street and house by house. This bloody task was carried out by ruthlessly efficient Gurkha troops.

Meiktila was secured on March 3, with more than 2,000 Japanese dead and 48 taken prisoner, along with 48 guns. Slim called the capture of Meiktila in only four days "a magnificent feat of arms" and immediately rushed in supplies by air from India to prepare for the inevitable Japanese counterattack.

The Japanese response was not long in coming. Burma area commander Lieutenant General Kimura Heitaro had already ordered Lieutenant General Takehara Saburō's 49th Division to Meiktila. Other Japanese units also were committed, including regiments from the 2nd, 18th, and 33rd Divisions. The battle was renewed on March 6. Although the Japanese managed to cut off the Indian 17th Division at Meiktila and for a time threatened the airfields, Slim was able to bring in a brigade by air.

On March 16, Thirty-Third Army commander Lieutenant General Honda Masaki took command of the 18th and 49th Divisions, with orders to retake Meiktila. But with XXXIII Corps and the remainder of IV Corps coming up, Honda halted the Japanese counterattack, and on March 28 he ordered Japanese forces to withdraw.

Slim's plan had succeeded brilliantly. The capture of Meiktila opened the way for the British to take Rangoon. Mandalay fell in March and Rangoon fell in May, but Meiktila was the key to the campaign.

JOHN O. NOONAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

China-Burma-India Theater; Honda Masaki; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Kimura Heitaro; Mutaguchi Renya; Slim, Sir William Joseph

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Mellenthin, Friedrich-Wilhelm von (1904–1997)

German Army general. Born in Breslau, Germany, on August 30, 1904, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Mellenthin grew up in a military family. Mellenthin joined the Reichswehr in 1924, received his commission in the cavalry, and was a master horseman. Between 1935 and 1937, he attended the War Academy and qualified as a General Staff officer. Virtually all of his subsequent assignments were in General Staff positions, where he specialized first in intelligence and then in operations.

Mellenthin served for 15 months on General Erwin Rommel's staff in North Africa. After Mellenthin was medically evacuated back to Germany for amoebic dysentery, he was posted to the Eastern Front. As the chief of staff of XLVIII Panzer Corps, he worked for the first time with Major General Hermann Balck, who was the commander of the subordinate 11th Panzer Division. Balck later assumed command of the corps, and the Balck-Mellenthin partnership lasted for almost the rest of the war. In August 1944, Balck and Mellenthin moved to the Fourth Panzer Army, which halted the Soviet offensive at the great bend in the Vistula. Just four weeks later, Mellenthin and Balck transferred to the Western Front to take charge of Army Group G in Lorraine.

In November 1944, Mellenthin had a run-in with the German Army's high command, which led to his recall and eventual assignment to the front as a regimental commander. Nonetheless, by March 1945, Mellenthin was a major general and was once again given a chief of staff posting, this time with the Fifth Panzer Army. Following the German defeat in the Ruhr Pocket, he and other staff officers tried to escape but were captured on May 3.

Released from U.S. captivity in 1947, Mellenthin became a businessman in the airline industry and immigrated to South Africa in 1950. Mellenthin wrote two significant books after the war, including the highly regarded

Panzer Battles. In the early 1980s he and Balck participated in a series of symposiums at the U.S. Army War College with senior U.S. Army officers. The symposiums contributed significantly to the development of America's AirLand Battle doctrine. Mellenthin died in Johannesburg, South Africa, on June 28, 1997.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Balck, Hermann; Lorraine Campaign; Ruhr Land Campaign

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MENACE, Operation

See Dakar, Attack on

Mengele, Josef (1911–1979)

Nazi physician who became infamous for his nonchalant cruelty and human experimentation during 1943–1945 at the Auschwitz and Birkenau concentration camps. Josef Mengele was born on March 16, 1911, in Günzburg, Bavaria. He received a PhD in anthropology from the University of Munich in 1935; he then became interested in genetics, taking a special interest in human twins. Three years later, he received a medical degree from Frankfurt University. Meanwhile, in 1937 he joined the Nazi Party.

In 1940, Mengele was conscripted into the German Army Medical Corps, and saw service on the Eastern Front where, in 1942, he was credited with saving two German soldiers from certain death. Wounded during operations there, he received a medical furlough and in early 1943 became a member of a human genetics and eugenics center in Berlin. In April 1943, Mengele was promoted to captain in the Schutzstaffel (SS); a month later, he was named chief medical officer at the notorious Auschwitz death camp.

Mengele remained at the Auschwitz facility until early 1945. Once there, he was nicknamed the “Angel of Death” and the “White Angel” because he always wore a pristine white lab coat as he greeted new internees and conducted various—and horrific—experiments. Mengele decided which arriving prisoners were to become laborers and which were to be sent promptly to the gas chambers. Mengele’s cruelty seemingly knew no bounds. When a women’s cell block became infested with lice, no doubt because of the appalling living conditions mandated by Mengele, he ordered all prisoners—some 750 women—exterminated by gassing.

Perhaps nothing surpassed Mengele’s treatment of children and his “experiments” on living human beings, scores of whom perished because of mistreatment. Mengele took a special interest in young twins and those who exhibited some sort of physical abnormality. He would often ingratiate himself to children by offering them sweets and then perform inhuman experiments on them. One experiment witnessed the injection of different chemicals into children’s eyes to see if their eye color could be altered. Other children underwent bizarre amputations and other “experimental” surgeries, often without proper anesthesia.

One particularly grotesque experiment involved sewing together two Roma twins to create conjoined twins. They eventually died of gangrene and massive infections. Young girls were routinely sterilized and given shock treatments to gauge their reactions to such stimuli. One night saw the rounding up of 14 pairs of Roma twins; they were taken to a lab, killed by the injection of chloroform into their hearts, and meticulously dissected by Mengele.

There is no accurate tally as to the number of people Mengele killed or tortured, but it is assumed that he was directly or indirectly responsible for the murder of perhaps several thousand people during his 21 months at Auschwitz. Mengele fled in January 1945 when the Germans closed

Auschwitz. He then served as a physician in several other camps. After the war, he remained in Germany after assuming an alias and worked as a farmhand until 1949, when he fled to Argentina. He remained there for some time, leading a privileged life until he learned that Israeli agents were in pursuit of him.

Sometime in 1962, he fled to Paraguay. In the meantime, he steadfastly denied his heinous crimes, even in the face of eyewitness testimony from dozens of individuals. Mengele then moved to Brazil, once again to escape capture. He died in Bertioga, Brazil, on February 7, 1979. In 1985, Mengele's presumed remains were located in Brazil and exhumed; in 1992, DNA testing proved that the bones were indeed those of the "Angel of Death." Mengele was thus never brought to justice for his horrific crimes.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Holocaust; Medical Experimentation; Medicine and the War

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Menzies, Robert (1894–1978)

Australian politician and prime minister (1939–1941, 1949–1966). Born on December 20, 1894, at Jeparit, Victoria, Australia, Robert Menzies attended Wesley College in Melbourne and the University of Melbourne, where he graduated in 1916. Admitted to the bar two years later, he became a successful lawyer and entered Victoria's state legislature in 1928. He became deputy premier of Victoria in 1932, resigning to enter the federal Parliament in Canberra in 1934; there, he served as attorney general and became the leader of the United Australia Party (UAP). Because of his activity in battling dockworkers, who refused to load scrap metal for Japan in 1938, he acquired the nickname "Pig-iron Bob." He was also known as "Ming the Merciless."

Following the death of Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, Menzies assumed that office on April 26, 1939, at the head of a minority government. He supported British prime minister Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Germany but immediately led Australia into World War II after the British declaration of war. Menzies introduced compulsory military service and then sent three Australian divisions to the Middle East. He barely survived the national election of September 1940.

In early 1941, Menzies went to London to alert the British government to the threat posed by Japan, but his efforts had no effect. He did, however, develop a close relationship with British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and attended a number of cabinet meetings, including those where it was decided to dispatch troops to Greece—a decision for which he was roundly criticized in Australia. Menzies also toured the war zone of the Middle East before returning to Australia in May 1941. He had sought an imperial war cabinet that would include the Dominion prime ministers, but Churchill strongly opposed this concept.

Australian military defeats under British leadership sharply divided the UAP, and pressure from various quarters forced Menzies to resign in August 1941. He was replaced by his deputy, Arthur Fadden, but continued as minister of defense. In October 1941, however, the Labour Party, headed by John Curtin, was voted into power. Menzies's wide unpopularity led him to resign the UAP leadership.

Menzies showed a remarkable ability to learn from his mistakes, and from the remnants of the UAP he put together a new party, the Liberals, which he led to a landslide victory in 1949. He courted the middle class and, under the slogan "Populate or perish," encouraged European emigration to Australia. Knighted in 1963, he was known as the "Queen's man" because of his loyalty to the British royal family. Menzies retired in 1966, having led the Liberals to seven electoral victories. He died on May 15, 1978, in Melbourne.

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See also

Australia; Australia, Army; Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Curtin, John Joseph

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Merchant Aircraft Carrier Ships

British ships that superseded the earlier CAM (catapult-assisted merchant ships) ships in providing emergency air cover for World War II convoys in the North Atlantic Gap, the area then beyond the range of shore-based aircraft. Unlike escort carriers, the merchant aircraft carrier (MAC) ships retained most of their cargo-carrying capacity and operated as normal merchant vessels with merchant service commanders and crews. Only the aircrews and necessary aviation maintenance staff were naval personnel.

The initial MAC ship design added a flight deck above a grain carrier hull because its cargo handling gear was unaffected by the change. There was a small hangar aft with an elevator. Each ship carried three to four obsolescent Fairey Swordfish biplanes, the performance of which allowed safe operation from a deck just more than 400 feet long. Tankers also were suitable for conversion but could not incorporate a hangar without interfering with cargo discharge pipework, so these ships parked their aircraft on a flight deck extended by 100 feet.

The Burntisland Shipbuilding Company received two contracts in June 1942, and the first MAC ship entered service in April 1943. By May 1944, 19 ships (6 grain ships and 13 tankers) were operational out of some 30 originally envisioned, but by then the ready availability of far superior escort carriers terminated the program.

MAC ships used their aircraft primarily to prevent U-boat attacks on convoys. Their Swordfish carried out 12 direct attacks in all but sank no enemy submarines. The true measure of their effectiveness is that no U-boat successfully attacked a convoy that included a MAC ship.

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See also

Aircraft, Naval; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; CAM Ships; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Meretskov, Kirill Afanasievich (1897–1968)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in Nazaryevo, near Moscow, on June 7, 1897, Kirill Meretskov was a factory worker and joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917, entering the Red Guard. Wounded twice during the Russian Civil War, he decided to make the army a career and was among the first class of Red Army officers produced by the newly established General Staff Academy (later the Frunze Military Academy).

Meretskov rose rapidly through the ranks, serving mostly in staff positions. By 1922, he was a major general and chief of staff of a cavalry corps in the Belorussian Military District. During the next decade, he held a variety of posts in the Chief Personnel Directorate and the North Caucasus and Moscow military districts.

Meretskov was selected for secret training in Germany in 1931. After a tour in the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (1935–1936), he went abroad, first as an observer of Czechoslovakian military maneuvers and then as a military adviser to the Republican side in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. Returning to the Soviet Union, he was assigned as deputy commander of the General Staff.

In 1938, Meretskov commanded the Leningrad Military District. When Joseph Stalin decided on war with Finland, Meretskov was given only three days to prepare an attack by four armies. The attack was a disaster, and he lost his command. Meretskov nonetheless participated in the successful phase of the Finnish (Winter) War and was promoted to general of the army in June 1940. He became chief of the General Staff in August 1940, but his tenure was again short-lived. General Georgii Zhukov succeeded him in January 1941.

Meretskov was subsequently arrested on false charges but was released in September 1941 and assigned as the Stavka (Soviet high command) representative in Leningrad. He then commanded the Volkhov Front between the Leningrad and Northwest Fronts until April 1942, when he was transferred to the Western Front as Zhukov's deputy commander. Stalin restored Meretskov to command of the Volkhov Front, which helped break the siege of Leningrad in early 1944.

Meretskov assumed command of the Karelian Front in February 1944 and forced Finland from the war that October. Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union that same month, he received command of the 1st Far Eastern Front in Manchuria, which carried out a supporting attack in the most heavily fortified Japanese-held area and helped crush the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army in a nine-day campaign in August.

Given assignments to keep him out of the limelight, Meretskov finally served as an assistant minister of defense from 1955 until his retirement in 1964. He died in Moscow on December 30, 1968.

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See also

Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Guandong Army; Leningrad, Siege of; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Merrill, Frank Dow (1903–1955)

U.S. Army general and leader of the famed Merrill's Marauders. Born in Hopkinton, Massachusetts, on December 4, 1903, Frank Dow Merrill enlisted in the army in 1922. In 1925, he received an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1929. Merrill also earned a BS degree in military engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In 1938, Captain Merrill was assigned as assistant military attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo. Fascinated by East Asian culture, he studied both the history and languages of Japan and China. In early 1941, Major Merrill was transferred to Manila as an intelligence officer on the staff of General Douglas MacArthur. Merrill was in Burma on a mission that December when the Japanese attacked the Philippines and was then reassigned to the China-Burma-India theater.

In the spring of 1942, Merrill was promoted to lieutenant colonel, but he was wounded in action in May when the Japanese pushed Allied forces out of Burma. In October 1943, Merrill became operations chief for Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell and in India organized the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), modeled after British brigadier Orde C. Wingate's Chindits. This regimental-size infantry formation of nearly 3,000 men was designed for long-range penetration operations and relied entirely on airdrops for supplies; it was the first U.S. ground unit to fight on the Asian mainland since the Boxer Uprising of 1900. Merrill assumed command of the 5307th in January 1944 and led Merrill's Marauders, as the outfit became known.

Named Task Force Galahad, the 5307th took part in operations in north Burma during late February 1944, first in conjunction with two Chinese divisions and later with British Chindits. Over the next four months, the Marauders marched more than 1,000 miles through some of the densest jungles and over some of the highest peaks in Asia.

U.S. Army brigadier general Frank D. Merrill, at his headquarters behind Japanese lines in Burma. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Although consistently outnumbered, they participated in 5 major battles and 30 minor engagements against the veteran Japanese 18th Division. The 5307th sustained significant losses due both to the fighting and to disease. By August, the unit was at one-third strength, and Stilwell decided to disband it.

Merrill suffered a heart attack in the middle of Galahad's actions and was replaced. Promoted to major general in September 1944, Merrill became chief of staff of the Tenth Army and fought in the conquest of Okinawa in 1945. In March 1947, Merrill was part of the U.S. military advisory group sent to the Philippines as it gained full independence. He retired from the army in 1948 and then became highway commissioner for the State of New Hampshire. Merrill died on December 12, 1955, at Fernandina Beach, Florida.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Burma Theater; Chindits; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Wingate, Orde Charles

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Mersa Matrûh, First Battle of (June 28, 1942)

Ground battle in which an Egyptian fortress was seized by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps. Mersa Matrûh is located approximately 60 miles from Egypt's border with Libya. With Tobruk captured on June 21, 1942, Rommel decided on an immediate advance into Egypt. This approach abandoned the original Axis plan calling for a halt at the border to await the reduction of Malta, which would have ensured Axis supply lines on the drive toward the Suez Canal.

In spite of severe fuel shortages and mechanical breakdowns, Rommel's forces pushed eastward in hopes of enveloping and destroying the British Eighth Army. The Afrika Korps spearhead entered Egypt with fewer than 50 operational tanks, and its speedy advance outstripped fighter coverage, which brought vicious attacks by the Allied Desert Air Force. Nonetheless, on June 25, advanced elements of the Afrika Korps reached the outskirts of Mersa Matrûh.

The Eighth Army's commander, Lieutenant General Neil N. Ritchie, hoped to make a stand at Mersa Matrûh rather than withdraw to Alamein. On June 25, General Sir Claude Auchinleck relieved Ritchie and assumed command of the Eighth Army. He decided to fight using Ritchie's plan, with two strong wing elements of X and XIII Corps and a weakened center. He also instructed his corps commanders to withdraw rather than risk envelopment.

Rommel resumed his advance on June 26 by ordering his Italian infantry to fix X Corps inside Mersa Matrûh's defenses while his armor swung east on

the escarpments south of the city, hoping to envelop all British forces to his front. The Afrika Korps now found itself heavily engaged with the New Zealand 2nd and 1st Armoured Divisions of XIII Corps and unable to advance. Rommel's 90th Light Division overran Auchinleck's weakened center and, by the afternoon of June 27, was in striking distance of the coast behind Mersa Matrûh.

Following Auchinleck's orders not to become decisively engaged, XIII Corps commander Lieutenant General William H. Gott broke off the battle and withdrew toward Alamein, not realizing that he had the Afrika Korps in a precarious situation. The withdrawal enabled the 90th Light Division to reach the coast at 7:00 p.m. on June 27. This move cut off X Corps, which was unaware that XIII Corps had retired.

Rommel besieged Mersa Matrûh on June 28. X Corps commander Lieutenant General William George Holmes ordered his units to break out of the city that night and escape to Alamein. In spite of bitter fighting, much of the corps reached friendly lines because of the weakened condition of Rommel's forces. Axis troops entered Mersa Matrûh on June 29, capturing 8,000 British personnel and quantities of weapons and supplies. The Afrika Korps then continued its pursuit, reaching Alamein on June 30.

Mersa Matrûh was Rommel's last victory in the Libyan-Egyptian theater. The battle exhausted much of what little strength was left in Rommel's dash into Egypt after the seizure of Tobruk. On the British side, the defeat at Mersa Matrûh sent the Eighth Army to its final defensive barrier at El Alamein, but Auchinleck had preserved most of his command.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Afrika Korps; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; North Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Mersa Matrûh, Second Battle of (November 7, 1942)

Battle in Egypt in which Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika eluded capture by Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery's pursuing Eighth Army. The battle followed shortly the October 23–November 4, 1942, Battle of El Alamein. Mersa Matrûh is located about 60 miles from the border with Libya. Montgomery planned to pursue the beaten Rommel and envelop Axis forces before they could escape westward, but he had not allocated any particular forces for this effort prior to the Battle of El Alamein. Rommel's temporary halt at Mersa Matrûh offered the Eighth Army a chance to surround and destroy Panzerarmee Afrika.

Rommel, who hoped to delay his retreat long enough to allow his infantry an opportunity to avoid capture, ordered his armored forces to fall back to Matrûh on November 5. Montgomery sent the 1st Armoured Division on a wide sweep to the southwest to try to reach Matrûh from the rear. Heavy rains affected the movement of both armies. Despite poor road conditions and resupply problems, much of Rommel's remaining mechanized forces made it to Matrûh. Both the 15th Panzer Division and the 90th Light Division reached Matrûh safely, but the 21st Panzer Division, short on fuel, was surrounded by the 22nd Armoured Brigade. The 21st Panzer Division then took up a hedgehog (circular) defense, eventually abandoning most of its remaining tanks.

Heavy rains, minefields, and undelivered fuel supplies prevented Montgomery's armor from advancing farther, saving Panzerarmee Afrika from encirclement. Certainly the poor weather hampered air strikes by the Desert Air Force, which had been virtually unchallenged by the Luftwaffe. On November 7, with three pursuing divisions halted, the 1st Armoured Division slowly moved forward along the coast road. But not until the evening of November 8 did the division's patrols enter Matrûh, well after Rommel's departure.

Rommel believed that Montgomery's caution allowed him to escape at Mersa Matrûh, whereas Montgomery blamed it on the heavy rains. Because the weather affected both sides equally, it was not the sole determinant.

Montgomery had not prepared for a pursuit, and he failed to press his advantage by striking deeper into the desert behind Rommel. Further, the El Alamein victory may have so exhausted the Eighth Army that an effective pursuit was impossible.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

El Alamein, Battle of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen

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Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on (July 3, 1940)

Naval engagement between British and Vichy French warships. This battle, which took place on July 3, 1940, at the naval harbor outside Oran in French Algeria, was the most dramatic part of Operation CATAPULT, the British effort to secure the French Navy or at least keep it from falling into German hands during July 1940. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill ordered Vice Admiral James Somerville's newly formed Force H to steam to Oran and deliver an ultimatum to Vice Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul. The French commander was offered the choice of joining his ships with the British and continuing the fight against the Germans and Italians; sailing them with reduced crews to a British port, with the crews to be promptly repatriated; sailing them with reduced crews to a French port in the West Indies; or scuttling them. If Gensoul refused all these options, Somerville would open fire and sink the French ships.

Somerville had the battle cruiser *Hood* and the battleships *Resolution* and *Valiant* (all 3 with a main armament of eight 15-inch guns), the aircraft

carrier *Ark Royal,* 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. Gensoul commanded the modern fast battle cruisers *Strasbourg* and *Dunkerque,* 2 older modernized battleships, 6 superdestroyers, and a seaplane tender, along with some small craft. Additional French warships were at nearby Oran.

Somerville arrived at Mers-el-Kébir early on July 3. Gensoul tried to stall negotiations as he signaled for help from nearby French naval forces, while the *Ark Royal*'s aircraft dropped five magnetic mines in the harbor entrance. The mining occurred at about 1:30 p.m. After the French signal was intercepted by the British and decoded, London insisted that Somerville act quickly. At 5:54 p.m., the *Hood* led the *Resolution* and then the *Valiant* in a battle line and opened fire, utilizing spotting aircraft. The French ships were covered in smoke as they attempted to raise steam and leave the harbor. The range fell to about 15,300 yards.

As both sides had been observing each other for hours and taking the range, and with the French ships initially stationary, British fire was quite accurate. The confined waters, the process of getting under way, and the location of the Mers-el-Kébir fort on a ridge overlooking the harbor between the opposing ships all conspired to make it difficult for the French ships to return fire accurately. The French managed to straddle the *Hood* with shells once or twice, and some shell fragments hit it and wounded two men, but no other damage was inflicted on the British ships.

The British fired 36 salvos of 15-inch shells. The *Dunkerque,* hit four times and forced to beach, nonetheless managed to fire 40 13-inch rounds. These rounds and the increasing accuracy of the 9.4-inch and 7.6-inch guns of the French coastal batteries forced the British battle line to the west, away from the harbor entrance. On July 6, British torpedo planes attacked the *Dunkerque,* further damaging it and taking it out of the war for two years.

The French battleship *Bretagne* on fire and sinking following the British shelling of French Navy ships at Mers-el-Kébir, Algeria, July 3, 1940. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The *Bretagne* sustained the worst damage. The second British salvo of several shells hit and penetrated its thin deck armor, causing a massive magazine explosion and capsizing it, resulting in the death of its captain and 976 men out of a crew of 1,012. The battleship *Provence* was hit several times and damaged. The vessel later steamed to Toulon for extensive repairs. The French destroyers, meanwhile, proceeded independently to sea; all escaped except the *Mogador*. That ship was hit on the stern and disabled. The others joined the *Strasbourg*, which fled the harbor and, although chased by the *Hood*, made it to Toulon.

The *Ark Royal* lost three planes during the battle, and 2 of its men were dead. The French had 1,297 men killed and another 351 wounded. Cheering French sailors met the *Strasbourg* at Toulon, although it had lost 5 men because of an engineering accident during its voyage. Two light destroyers from Oran also steamed to Toulon, and the seaplane tender *Commandant Teste* (undamaged in the action) and six Gloire-class light cruisers from Algiers made Toulon on July 5. The light destroyers and small craft from Mers-el-Kébir had withdrawn to Algiers, and one sloop, the *Rigault de Genouilly*, was sunk by a British submarine. The battle was so one-sided because the French were surprised and their ships were at anchor without having steamed up.

The fight at Mers-el-Kébir ruptured Anglo–Vichy French relations and almost brought a Vichy declaration of war against Britain. Despite this episode, which still rankles the French, the French Navy honored its pledge not to surrender its ships to the Germans. In November 1942, it scuttled its ships at Toulon rather than see them fall into German hands.

JACK GREENE

See also

CATAPULT, Operation; Somerville, Sir James Fownes; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at

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Messe, Giovanni (1883–1968)

Italian Army general. Born at Mesagne (Apulia), Italy, on December 10, 1883, Giovanni Messe volunteered for the Italian Army in 1902 as a private. In 1910, he entered the Modena Military School and was commissioned on graduation, thereafter taking part as a lieutenant in the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War. During that conflict, he was promoted to captain.

In World War I, Messe was a battalion and Arditi (shock troops) unit commander. In 1920 he fought in Albania as an assault unit commander. Promoted to colonel, he was assigned to the War Ministry, and from 1935, he commanded the Celere Brigade. He took part in the 1935–1936 Ethiopian War as a brigadier general and deputy commander of the Cosseria Division, and on his return to Italy he was named deputy commander of mobile troops. In April 1938, Messe took command of the 3rd Celere Division. He was then sent to Albania as deputy commander of occupation troops. On December 21, 1940, following Italy's invasion of Greece, Messe was assigned command of the Special Army Corps.

In July 1941, Messe was promoted to temporary lieutenant general and assigned as commander of the Corpo di Spedizione in Russia (CSIR,

Expeditionary Corps in Russia). In July 1942, Messe's unit was renamed XXXV Corps, and he continued as its commander. Promoted to full general on January 31, 1943, he was assigned to Tunisia as commander of the First Italian Army, which included the Italian units formerly under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's command. On May 8, 1943, following a number of defensive battles, the First Army surrendered to the Allies. Messe had been promoted to marshal a few days earlier.

Repatriated on his demand in November 1943 following Italy's armistice, he was appointed chief of staff of the new Italian Army on the Allied side. He held this post until 1945. Probably the best Italian Army senior commander of the war, Messe was widely respected by his own troops and his German allies.

In 1953, Messe entered the Italian parliament as a senator in the Christian Democratic Party. Two years later, he founded and became the head of the Unione Combattenti d'Italia (UCI, Italian Veterans Association), which had a strong monarchist bent. In 1957, he was elected to parliament as a member of the Monarchical Party, and in 1963, he was elected to the same body as a representative of the Liberal Party. Messe died in Rome on December 18, 1968.

ALESSANDRO MASSIGNANI

See also

Eastern Front; Italy, Army; Tunisia Campaign

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Messerschmitt, Wilhelm Emil (1898–1978)

German aircraft designer and developer of the most widely produced World War II aircraft. Born in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, on June 26, 1898, Wilhelm (Willy) Messerschmitt developed a relationship with early German glider pioneer Friedrich Harth. Together, they designed and built numerous

gliders before Harth was mobilized for World War I. In 1916, Messerschmitt was drafted for military service but was discharged for medical reasons a year later. Following the war, he continued his engineering studies and graduated from the Technische Hochschule in Munich.

German aviation designer and production chief Wilhelm Messerschmitt, ca. 1940. (Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Endeavoring to capitalize on the growing glider craze in Germany, Messerschmitt founded his own company, Flugzeugbau (aircraft construction) Messerschmitt. After some success with powered designs, he entered into a partnership with Bayerische Flugzeugwerke (BFW) in 1927. BFW's big opportunity came in 1934 after Nazi leader Adolf Hitler rose to power and began to rearm Germany. Messerschmitt's low-wing monoplane, the Bf-109, won a competition that also involved German aviation giants Heinkel, Arado, and Focke-Wulf. The Bf-109 became the most widely

produced fighter of World War II. Between 1939 and 1945, more than 33,000 were built.

Messerschmitt's company also pioneered developments in jet- and rocket-propelled aircraft. The Me-163 Komet rocket-powered fighter was the first of its type in the war. On July 28, 1944, it attacked U.S. Army Air Forces Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses over Merseburg, beginning a new phase of air warfare. Much more successful was the Me-262. Entering service in the autumn of 1944, it was the world's first operational jet fighter. However, this plane appeared too late in the war and in insufficient quantity to have had a major impact.

After the war, Messerschmitt was arrested and imprisoned for employing slave labor. Released after two years in prison, he began to rebuild his business, beginning with sewing machines, housing, and a compact car. In 1968, he resumed work in aviation, combining with two other manufacturers to form Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm. Messerschmitt was honorary chairman of this company until his death in Munich, Germany, on September 15, 1978.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Germany, Air Force

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Metaxas, Ioannis (1871–1941)

Greek Army general and dictator of Greece (1936–1941). Born on the island of Ithaca on April 12, 1871, Ioannis Metaxas was commissioned in the army on graduation from the Greek Military Academy in 1890. Following service in the 1897 Greco-Turkish War, he studied in Berlin. Metaxas served on the Greek General Staff during the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars. He became army chief of staff in 1913.

Ioannis Metaxas was a Greek general and also premier of his country from 1936 until his death in 1941. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

At the beginning of World War I, Metaxas favored an alliance with the Central Powers. A staunch monarchist, he left Greece following the forced abdication of King Constantine in 1917 and returned with the king three years later. Metaxas entered the Greek parliament in 1926, and in 1936 he seized power and became dictator, with the justification of preventing a communist takeover. During his rule, the Greeks successfully repelled the Italian invasion that began in October 1940 and indeed went on the offensive the next month, occupying much of Albania. Metaxas died on January 29, 1941, before the German military intervened in Greece.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Greece; Greece Campaign, Italian

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Metz, Battle of (September 19–November 22, 1944)

One of the few siege-warfare battles of the Western Front in Europe during World War II and the most costly single battle of the war for the U.S. Third Army. Lying in the Moselle River Valley in Lorraine, Metz was in the path of Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s U.S. Third Army in its quest to reach the Rhine. Bypassing Metz would lengthen the Third Army supply lines by some 100 miles. Furthermore, Metz lay astride one of the principal invasion routes between Germany and France and would be an important staging point for an Allied drive into Germany through Trier, the Kaiserslautern corridor, and the Saverne Gap.

Metz had long been a key fortress, and its defenses faced in both directions. The strongest defenses actually faced west, because that had been built prior to World War I, when Metz was German territory. As part of the prewar French Maginot Line fortress system, Metz had an inner circle of 15 forts and a perimeter defense of 28 steel and cement bastions. The Germans had added a number of 210mm and 105mm guns in revolving steel turrets, which could withstand direct fire. Defense of Metz was entrusted to Major General Heinrich Kittel’s 14,000-man 462nd Volksgrenadier Division.

On September 10, 12th Army Group’s commander, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, ordered Patton’s Third Army to advance toward Mainz and Mannheim, Germany. With little knowledge of the fortifications in his path, Patton assigned the capture of Metz to Major General Walton Walker’s XX Corps. Walker ordered the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, supported by the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion, to take the fortress. The American attack on the outer ring of the German defenses began on September 27, with 5th Infantry Division carrying the brunt of the attack.

Without major preparations, the Americans mounted a frontal assault into the area of greatest German strength and were repulsed. Even the addition of a combat command of the 7th Armored Division failed to dislodge the defenders. The battle then disintegrated into a protracted siege, similar to the static warfare of World War I. Fall rains worsened conditions, turning the ground to mud. Although air support was called in, 500-pound bombs had little effect on the German fortifications. The Americans utilized smoke screens as they moved to take the villages around the forts, but all attempts in September and early October to take the fortress failed, and the rains continued amid mounting American casualties. Patton's efforts were also handicapped by the shift in logistics support to the north for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, the September 17–26 failed effort to secure a crossing over the Rhine at Arnhem.

Between October 3 and 15, the 5th Infantry Division again tried to take the forts through direct assault but failed. The centerpiece of that effort was Fort Driant, the newest and most powerful of the Metz forts. In addition to infantry and tank destroyers, Walker committed 23 battalions of artillery. The assaulting infantry battalion took 50 percent casualties before the attack was canceled.

The Third Army was reequipped and resupplied for the November general offensive, and XX Corps was reinforced by the addition of the 95th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions. The offensive opened on November 9 with a diversionary attack by the 95th Infantry Division on Maizières-lès-Metz, distracting the German defenders. Walker then slipped his 90th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions farther north and crossed the Moselle River, taking Fort Königsmacker. The forces then captured forts at Volstroff and Distroff. The 90th Infantry Division now closed on Metz from the north, the 95th Infantry Division from the west and northwest, and the 5th Infantry Division from the south and southwest. This time, the Americans abandoned costly frontal assaults in favor of bypassing strongpoints and then reducing them with demolition charges.

The first American troops entered Metz on November 17. Defying Adolf Hitler's orders that the city be held to the last, the Germans managed to withdraw some of their defenders until the escape hatch was closed by the linkup of the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions east of Metz on November 19. Although Metz surrendered two days later, some Germans chose to obey

Hitler and fight on. The last Metz fort, Jeanne d'Arc, did not surrender until December 13.

GENE MUELLER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Maginot Line; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Walker, Walton Harris

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Mexico

Latin American nation covering 769,000 square miles. Mexico, which had a 1914 population of 19.3 million people, is bordered by the United States to the north and Guatemala and Belize to the south. Its east coast is on the Gulf of Mexico; its west coast is on the Pacific Ocean.

When World War II began in Europe, the controversial administration of Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) was coming to an end, and there was considerable uneasiness over the approaching presidential elections. Mexico's new president following the 1940 elections was moderate General Manuel Avila Camacho, who had served as Cárdenas's minister of war. Avila Camacho's presidency (1940–1946) encompassed the entire wartime period.

Although the Mexican people were initially divided over which side to support, Avila Camacho followed a strongly pro-Allied course from the

beginning of his administration. After the U.S. entry into the war in December 1941, Mexico quickly broke diplomatic relations with Germany, Japan, and Italy. The Mexican government also froze Japanese assets and ordered all Axis nationals out of coastal and defense areas. There was, however, little domestic support for a declaration of war. It was not until German submarines sank two Mexican oil tankers that Mexico declared war in May 1942.

Mexico's involvement in the war meant closer relations with the United States. Washington wanted bases for U.S. troops in Mexico, whereas Mexico sought economic and military aid. The United States never attained the type of base agreement it sought, but there was close cooperation between the two countries in military matters. Mexico received military aid under the U.S. Lend-Lease program, and the two nations established a joint defense committee to coordinate military activities. Mexico also established an obligatory military service law, affecting men between the ages of 18 and 45.

Mexico was one of only two Latin American countries (Brazil being the other) to furnish combat forces during the war; Mexico provided the 201st Fighter Squadron, which was equipped with U.S. aircraft and trained in Texas. The 201st served in the Philippines and had 2 men killed in training and 5 killed in combat. A more important form of military cooperation was the U.S.-Mexico agreement permitting the United States to draft Mexican citizens residing in the United States and even to recruit in Mexico. As a result, some 250,000 Mexicans served in the U.S. armed forces during the war, with 14,000 seeing combat. Mexican combat veterans received some 1,000 Purple Hearts and 1 Medal of Honor.

Mexico's wartime response also involved internal security measures. Mexico adopted a program of surveillance, relocation, and deportation aimed at Axis nationals. The Mexican government forcibly relocated Japanese and Japanese Mexicans living in coastal areas and along the U.S. border. Several German agents were detained, and Axis nationals who could not prove Mexican citizenship were deported.

Mexico's greatest contribution to the war came in the economic sphere. The country provided a variety of strategic materials needed for the war effort: copper, oil, lead, mercury, and zinc. Agricultural products also figured prominently in exports, even though Mexico experienced problems feeding its own people during the war. Mexico helped to relieve labor shortages in

the United States by agreeing to the bracero (day laborer) program, a government-regulated system of contract labor under which Mexican workers found employment in the United States.

Originally intended to meet the need for agricultural laborers in the U.S. Southwest, the program was expanded in 1943 to include nonagricultural workers as well. Some 300,000 Mexicans worked under the program during the war years. The war had negative economic consequences for Mexico as well; austerity measures, inflation, and rationing affected the daily lives of its citizens. In June 1944, the Avila Camacho administration even suspended the traditional siesta, the afternoon closing of offices and businesses.

World War II had a profound and long-term impact on Mexico's domestic and foreign policies. The war was particularly important in promoting the government's new development approach, with its emphasis on rapid industrialization based on import substitution. The close military ties between Mexico and the United States did not continue after the war, but the already intimate economic connection became even more pronounced. The bracero program—conceived to meet a wartime need—continued until 1964. World War II confirmed and increased the dominant role played by the United States in the Mexican economy.

Mexican laborers harvesting carrots in the state of Arizona in 1942 as part of the Bracero guest worker program. (National Archives/Corbis)

DON M. COERVER

See also

Brazil; Latin America and the War; Lend-Lease; Document 141

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Meyer, Kurt (1910–1961)

German Waffen-SS general. Born in Jarxhelm, Brunswick, Germany, on December 23, 1910, Kurt Meyer became a policeman. He joined the Schutzstaffel (SS) in 1932 and the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) in 1934. During World War II, Meyer fought with distinction in the September 1939 invasion of Poland and received command of the LAH Motorcycle Reconnaissance Battalion. Known for his aggressive and resolute command style, he participated in the invasions of France and the Low Countries (May 1940) and Greece (April 1941). He then fought in the Soviet Union for three years as a regimental commander.

Meyer commanded the 25th Panzergrenadier Regiment of the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitlerjugend) when the Allies invaded Normandy on June 6, 1944. He took over the division on June 17 following the death of its commander. During the campaign, the 12th SS Panzer Division fought hard along the British-Canadian front, particularly frustrating the Canadians.

An effective commander, Meyer excelled in relentless, close-quarters combat, and his division was known for its refusal to surrender. It played a key role in holding the northern shoulder of the Falaise Pocket (August) long enough to allow much of the German Seventh Army to escape to the east. By the time the division broke free of the pocket, it had been reduced from 20,000 men with 150 tanks on D-day to fewer than 300 men and 10 tanks.

Belgian partisans captured Meyer and turned him over to American forces in September.

In December 1945, Meyer was tried and convicted for the mid-June 1944 execution of 40 Canadian prisoners of war at Château Audrieu in Normandy. Although no direct evidence linked him to the crime, there was strong circumstantial evidence. A sentence of death was commuted to life in prison in New Brunswick, Canada. In October 1951, Meyer was transferred to a prison in Werl, Germany, from which he was released because of poor health in September 1954. He died at Hagen, Germany, on December 23, 1961.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Middleton, Troy Houston (1889–1976)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born near Georgetown, Mississippi, on October 12, 1889, Troy Middleton graduated from Mississippi A&M College (now Mississippi State University) in 1909 and enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1910. He received a commission in 1912. Middleton served on the Mexican border in 1916, and during World War I, he became the youngest colonel in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).

Following the war, Middleton served in the U.S. occupation forces in Germany. Reverting to his permanent rank of captain on his return to the United States, he taught at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. He graduated from the Infantry Advanced Course in 1922, the Command and General Staff School in 1924, and the Army War College in 1929. Forced to retire from the army in 1937 because of an irregular heartbeat, Middleton became the dean of administration at Louisiana State University (LSU).

Because of physical problems, including an arthritic knee, Middleton was not recalled to active duty with the army as a lieutenant colonel until January 1942. In June, he was promoted to brigadier general and became assistant commander of the 45th Infantry Division. In October 1942, he took command of the division, leading it in the invasions of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and Salerno (September 9).

Middleton was then appointed to command VIII Corps of General Omar N. Bradley's First Army in March 1944 and led it until the end of the war. His corps played a significant role in the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). Later, suspecting that the Germans had few men in Koblenz, he mounted a successful surprise attack on the city. His corps crossed the Rhine near the massive Lorelei rock structure—something no other invader had ever attempted because of the unfavorable terrain.

Despite being one of the best U.S. corps commanders in the European theater, Middleton was not promoted to lieutenant general until June 1945. Retiring from the army that August, he returned to LSU as comptroller, then served as the university's president from 1951 to 1962. Middleton died in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 9, 1976.

UZAL W. ENT

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Rhine Crossings; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of

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Midget Submarines

See Submarines, Midget

Midway, Battle of (June 3–6, 1942)

The Battle of Midway was the decisive naval engagement during the war between the United States and Japan. With their amazing run of successes in the first months of the Pacific war, the Japanese were understandably reluctant to go on the defensive. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commanding the Combined Fleet, and his staff wanted to secure Midway Island, 1,100 miles west of Pearl Harbor.



The half dozen U.S. carrier raids from February to May 1942—especially the April 18 raid on Tokyo—helped silence Yamamoto's critics and produce approval for his Midway plan. Under the revised plan, the Japanese first move would be to advance deeper into the Solomons and take Port Moresby, on the south coast of New Guinea. Yamamoto's Combined Fleet would then occupy Midway Island, which Yamamoto saw as a stepping-stone toward a possible Japanese invasion of Hawaii. In any case, Midway could be used for surveillance purposes. After the Midway operation and the anticipated destruction of the U.S. fleet, the Japanese would resume their southeastern advance to cut off Australia.

In the May 8, 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea, however, U.S. carriers caused the Japanese to call off the invasion of Port Moresby. In that battle, the

Japanese lost the light carrier *Shōhō,* and the fleet carriers *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku* were damaged. The Americans lost the fleet carrier *Lexington,* and the *Yorktown* was damaged. It was a plus for the United States strategically, however. Both Japanese carriers in the battle failed to participate in the subsequent fight at Midway (one from damage and the other for lack of aircraft), while superior repair facilities and superhuman efforts made it possible for the heavily damaged *Yorktown* to join that fight.

Meanwhile, planning for the Midway attack went forward. Yamamoto's plan was both comprehensive and complex. For the Midway invasion, Yamamoto deployed an advanced submarine force to savage U.S. ships on their way to Midway; an invasion force under Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake of 12 transports with 5,000 troops supported by 4 heavy cruisers and a more distant covering force of 2 battleships, 1 light carrier, and 4 heavy cruisers; Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi's First Carrier Force of the fleet carriers *Hiryū, Sōryū, Kaga,* and *Akagi,* with 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, and a destroyer screen; and the main battle fleet under Yamamoto of 3 battleships (including the giant *Yamato,* his flagship), a destroyer screen, and a light carrier. The total was 8 carriers, 11 battleships, 22 cruisers, 65 destroyers, 21 submarines, and more than 600 aircraft—some 200 ships, constituting almost the entire Japanese Navy.

For the Aleutians, Yamamoto allotted an invasion force of three escorted transports carrying 2,400 troops, with a support group of two heavy cruisers, two light carriers, and a covering force of four older battleships. Apart from its tie-in with Midway, this force was to enable the Japanese to occupy Attu and Kiska, thus blocking a supposed U.S. invasion route to Japan.

The battle was to begin in the Aleutians, with air strikes on June 3, followed by landings on June 6. On June 4, Nagumo's carrier planes would attack the airfield at Midway. On June 6, the cruisers would bombard Midway and troops would be landed, covered by the battleships. The Japanese expected there would be no U.S. ships in the Midway area until after the landings, and their hope was that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would hurry north to the Aleutians, enabling the Japanese to trap it between their two carrier forces.

Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific Admiral Chester W. Nimitz could only deploy 76 ships; he had no battleships and only 2 carriers, the *Enterprise* and *Hornet,* fit for action. By an astonishing effort, the *Yorktown,*

heavily damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, was readied in 2 days instead of the estimated 90 and was sent to join the other 2 carriers. Nimitz did have the advantage of an accurate picture of the Japanese order of battle, and thanks to code-breaking, he was reasonably certain that Midway was the Japanese objective. By contrast, the Japanese had virtually no information on the Americans, but at this point in the war the Japanese tended to dismiss the Americans and exaggerate their own abilities.

Nimitz packed Midway with B-26 and B-17 bombers. He positioned the three U.S. carriers, with 233 planes, some 300 miles to the northeast. He hoped that the carriers would remain hidden from Japanese reconnaissance planes while counting on information on Japanese movements from Consolidated PBY Catalina aircraft based on Midway. He hoped to catch the Japanese by surprise, their carriers with planes on their decks.

Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance had tactical command of U.S. naval forces in the battle. The Japanese deployed 86 ships against 27 U.S. ships and had 325 planes against 348 (including 115 land-based aircraft) for the United States. Carrier strength was 5 for Japan and 3 for the United States.

On June 3, the day after the U.S. carriers were in position, U.S. air reconnaissance detected the Japanese transports some 600 miles west of Midway. A gap in the search pattern flown by Japanese aircraft allowed the U.S. carriers to remain undetected. In any case, the Japanese did not expect the U.S. Pacific Fleet to be at sea yet.

Early on June 4, Nagumo launched 108 aircraft against Midway, while a second wave of similar size was prepared to attack any warships sighted. The first wave did severe damage to Midway at little cost to itself, but the pilots reported the need for a second attack. Because his own carriers were being bombed by planes from Midway, Nagumo ordered the second wave of planes to change from torpedoes to bombs and to focus on the airfields.

Shortly thereafter, a group of U.S. ships was spotted about 200 miles away, but the Japanese at first thought it was only cruisers and destroyers. Then at 8:20 a.m. came a report identifying a carrier. Most of the Japanese torpedo bombers were now equipped with bombs, and most fighters were on patrol. Nagumo also had to recover the first wave of aircraft from the strike at Midway.

Nagumo accordingly ordered a change of course to the northeast. This helped him avoid the first wave of U.S. dive-bombers. When three waves of

U.S. torpedo bombers attacked the Japanese carriers between 9:00 and 10:24 a.m., 47 of 51 were shot down by Japanese fighters or antiaircraft guns. The Japanese now believed they had won the battle.

Two minutes later, however, 37 U.S. dive-bombers from the *Enterprise* swept down to attack the Japanese carriers, while the Japanese fighters that had been dealing with the torpedo bombers were close to sea level. Soon the *Akagi* and *Kaga* were flaming wrecks, with the torpedoes and fuel on their decks feeding the fires. The *Sōryū* took three hits from the *Yorktown*'s dive-bombers that had arrived on the scene, and soon it too was abandoned.

The *Hiryū*, the only Japanese fleet carrier still intact, then sent its planes against the limping *Yorktown*, forcing the Americans to abandon it. Then 24 U.S. dive-bombers, including 10 from the *Yorktown*, caught the *Hiryū*. It went down the next day. Yamamoto now suspended the attack on Midway, hoping to trap the Americans by drawing them westward. Spruance, however, refused to take the bait.

The Battle of Midway was a crushing defeat for Japan. The Americans lost the carrier *Yorktown* and about 150 aircraft, while the Japanese Navy lost four fleet carriers and some 330 aircraft, most of which went down with the carriers, and a heavy cruiser. The loss of the carriers and their well-trained aircrews and support personnel was particularly devastating. The subsequent Japanese defeat in the important land battle of Guadalcanal was principally due to a lack of naval airpower.

The Battle of Midway also provided the Americans a respite until, at the end of 1942, the new Essex-class fleet carriers began to come on line. In Nimitz's words, "Midway was the most crucial battle of the Pacific War, the engagement that made everything else possible."



U.S. Navy Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers shown during the attack on the Japanese fleet off Midway, June 4–6, 1942. Visible in the center of the photograph is a burning Japanese ship. (National Archives)

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Japan, Navy; Kondō Nobutake; Nagumo Chūichi; Naval Warfare; Nimitz, Chester William; Spruance, Raymond Ames; United States Navy; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Mihailović, Dragoljub "Draža" (1893–1946)

Yugoslavian Army general and guerrilla leader. Born at Ivanjica, Serbia, on April 27, 1893, Dragoljub Mihailović, nicknamed "Draža," entered the military academy in Belgrade in 1908 but interrupted his studies to serve with distinction in the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars and World War I. Mihailović rose to the rank of colonel and was, for a time, inspector general of fortifications. When the Germans invaded Yugoslavia in April 1941, he organized resistance to the Axis occupation forces in the mountains of western Serbia.

Mihailović's Četniks (Chetniks), named after the Serbian guerrillas who had fought the Turks, were mostly promonarchist Serbs. Mihailović was promoted to general in December 1941, and in June 1942, he became minister of war in King Peter II's Yugoslav government-in-exile.

Already reluctant to pursue a vigorous campaign against the Axis occupation forces lest he provoke reprisals against Yugoslav civilians, Mihailović believed that a rival resistance group, the procommunist Partisans led by Josip Broz (Tito), posed a greater threat to the restoration of a Serb-dominated monarchy than did the Axis powers, especially as Tito and most of his followers were Croats, the Serbs' traditional rivals for power. Accordingly, Mihailović and Tito focused on fighting each other rather than the Germans and Italians, with whom they both also collaborated when it suited their purposes.

At first, the četniks enjoyed Allied support, but Mihailović was systematically discredited by communist sympathizers among the British. Pressured by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin at Tehran, the Allies agreed to shift their support to Tito. In December 1943, the British halted all aid to the Četniks, and in May 1944, King Peter formed a new government and named Tito as minister of war.

Abandoned by the Allies, the Četniks were soon overpowered, and Mihailović went into hiding. He was captured by the communists on March

13, 1946; tried for collaboration with the Axis powers; and, despite protests by Western governments, executed in Belgrade on July 17, 1946. In March 1948, U.S. president Harry S. Truman secretly awarded Mihailović the Legion of Merit for rescuing some 500 Allied airmen and for his role in helping to defeat the Axis powers.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Balkans Theater; Partisans/Guerrillas; Tito; Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of; Yugoslavia Campaign

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Mikawa Gunichi (1888–1981)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan, on August 29, 1888, Mikawa Gunichi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1910 and the Naval War College in 1924. A specialist in navigation, he served on several ships as a navigation officer. Promoted to commander, Mikawa also served as a member of diplomatic missions to Paris and Geneva between 1928 and 1930. Promoted to captain in 1930, he was then naval attaché in France (1930–1931).

Returning to Japan in 1931, Mikawa taught briefly at the Naval Academy before he took command from 1931 to 1936 of the cruiser *Aoba*, then the cruiser *Chōka*, and finally the battleship *Kirishima*. Promoted to rear admiral in 1936, Mikawa was appointed chief of staff of the Second Fleet. In 1937, he became chief of the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and in 1940, he took command of the 5th Cruiser Squadron. Promoted to vice admiral in November 1940, Mikawa assumed command of Battleship Division 3 in September 1941 and had charge of the Support Force of

Battleship Division 3 and Cruiser Division 8 for the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

In July 1942, Mikawa received command of the newly formed Eighth Fleet and Outer South Seas Force at Rabaul. He thus was in charge of Japanese naval forces during the prolonged naval struggle off Guadalcanal, and in the course of this campaign, he administered the worst defeat ever suffered by the U.S. Navy in a stand-up fight in the August 9, 1942, Battle of Savo Island. Mikawa sank four Allied heavy cruisers and one destroyer, with no ships of his own lost in the battle (a U.S. submarine torpedoed and sank the heavy cruiser *Kako* on the return to Rabaul), but he also withdrew without attacking the vulnerable Allied transports in the sound, for which he was later criticized by naval historians.

Mikawa commanded the covering force for Japanese carriers in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on August 22–25, 1942. In June 1944, he took command of the Southwest Area Fleet and the Thirteenth Air Fleet at Manila. Concurrently commander of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet (from August to November 1944), he was attached to the Naval General Staff before he was transferred to the reserves in May 1945. Mikawa died in Kamagawa Prefecture, Japan, on February 25, 1981.

HIRAMA YOICHI

See also

Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Rabaul; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Mikołajczyk, Stanisław (1901–1966)

Polish politician and premier of the Polish government-in-exile in London. Born on July 18, 1901, at Holsterhausen in Westphalia, Germany, Stanisław Mikołajczyk was an active member of the insurrectionist Sokoly movement during the 1918–1919 uprising against the Germans in Wielkopolska (Greater Poland). In 1920, he graduated from agricultural secondary school and became a private in the Polish Army, participating in the Russo-Polish War (1919–1921). In 1922, he joined the large moderate-rightist Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), and in 1927 he helped found the Wielkopolska Union of Rural Youth in Poznan.

Mikołajczyk emerged as a major figure in Polish politics as he rose through the ranks of the PSL, serving as a parliament member from 1930 to 1937 and leading peasant strikes in 1937. He fought as a private in the Poland Campaign of September 1939, after which he was interned in Hungary before escaping to France. From December 1939, he was vice president of the Polish National Council in Paris (the parliament-in-exile) until his evacuation to London on Germany's occupation of France.

In 1941, Mikołajczyk was appointed deputy premier and minister of the interior in General Władysław Sikorski's Polish government-in-exile in London (the London Poles). One of Mikołajczyk's principal tasks was to maintain ties with the resistance in Poland. On Sikorski's death in July 1943, Mikołajczyk replaced him as premier. Mikołajczyk lacked the national prestige of his predecessor but also inherited an impossible political situation, with the Soviet Union demanding that the Curzon Line set by the Allied powers after World War I be made the new eastern border of Poland.

In October 1944, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill traveled to Moscow and met with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. They invited a delegation from the London Poles, including Mikołajczyk, to join them for discussions with Soviet leaders and members of the rival Soviet-sponsored Lublin Polish Committee (the Lublin Poles) in what was to be a final opportunity for reconciliation. Mikołajczyk was open to some compromise, but his colleagues among the London Poles were not. Frustrated by his own increasingly fractious government and the lack of Allied support for the Warsaw Rising, Mikołajczyk resigned on November 24, 1944. Moscow then broke off relations with the London-based government-in-exile.

Stanisław Mikołajczyk, leader of the Polish government-in-exile in London, shown here in 1948. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Probably no genuinely representative Polish government would have been prepared to yield the concessions or exhibit the spirit requisite for Soviet security. Strong British and U.S. pressure, especially at the February 1945 Yalta Conference, induced the communists to admit Mikołajczyk (as deputy premier) and three other representatives to the government, and the West then reluctantly recognized the Lublin Poles as the legal government.

Not until January 1947 was the Polish regime confident enough to call elections. The old Polish Peasants' Party had been so completely infiltrated that on his return to Poland, Mikołajczyk established a new peasant organization, known as the Polish People's Party. The government directed its full attention against it and Mikołajczyk, branding him a British agent. Given the circumstances, no one was surprised when the government bloc,

which included the nominal participation of several captive parties, won 394 out of 444 seats in the parliament.

In October 1947 Mikołajczyk fled Poland, which was by then completely dominated by the communists. Mikołajczyk settled in the United States in late 1947, continuing to champion the Polish cause in exile. He died in Chevy Chase, Maryland, on December 13, 1966.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Poland; Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz; Stalin, Joseph; Warsaw Rising; Yalta Conference

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Milch, Erhard (1892–1972)

German Air Force field marshal. Born on March 30, 1892, in Wilhelmshaven, Germany, Erhard Milch enlisted in the German Army in 1910, rising to the rank of lieutenant in the artillery. He became an aerial observer in 1915, and although not a pilot, he assumed command of a fighter squadron as a captain in October 1918.

Milch resigned from the army in 1921 to pursue a career in civil aviation and rose to be the chief executive of Lufthansa, the German national airline. He became close friends with Hermann Göring in the process, and when the latter was appointed Reich commissar for air, Milch followed as his secretary of state. Milch is widely credited for laying the organizational groundwork for the Luftwaffe during this period. In many ways, he was the man who built the Luftwaffe into the world's most powerful air force by 1939, but he also shared responsibilities for its shortcomings during the war. Although not technically a member of the armed forces from 1921, Milch was made a

major general in 1934, a lieutenant general in 1935, and a colonel general in 1938.

Milch became inspector general of the Luftwaffe in 1939. His lone field command of the war was in 1940 when he commanded the Fifth Air Fleet in Norway. For this service, he earned the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and was promoted to field marshal in July 1940. Milch recommended an immediate descent on Britain following the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkerque (May 26–June 4, 1940), but the idea was rejected by Adolf Hitler. Milch also expressed grave reservations about attacking the Soviet Union but was again ignored.

Following the suicide of Ernst Udet in 1941, Milch took over his position as director of air armament. He then tripled aircraft production and improved aircraft maintenance procedures. Milch found himself increasingly estranged from both Göring and Hitler, who disliked his realistic assessments. They also rejected his belief that Germany's survival lay in having large numbers of fighters to protect industrial production.

Milch pushed development of new aircraft, but Göring removed him from his posts in July 1944. Taken prisoner by the British in May 1945, Milch was sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes, chiefly the use of forced labor in production. He was released from prison in 1954 and died on January 25, 1972, in Wuppertal-Barmen, Germany.

MATTHEW ALAN MCNIECE

See also

Britain, Battle of; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Udet, Ernst

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Miles, Milton Edward (1900–1961)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born in Jerome, Oklahoma, on April 6, 1900, Milton Edward Miles joined the U.S. Navy as an apprentice seaman in 1917. Commissioned an ensign on his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1922, Miles was promoted to lieutenant (junior grade) in 1927. Assigned to the U.S. Naval Academy, in 1928 he was promoted to lieutenant. In 1929 he earned a master of science degree at Columbia University.

During 1929–1932, Miles was assigned to the carrier *Saratoga* and in 1932–1934 was a member of the Navy Department's Bureau of Engineering. From 1934 to 1939, he served on destroyers with the U.S. Pacific and Asiatic fleets, and in 1937, he was promoted to lieutenant commander. From 1939 to 1942, Miles was a member of the Interior Control Board of the Navy Department. In 1942, he received promotion to commander and to captain.

In 1942, Miles was assigned as a U.S. naval observer at Chungking (now Chongqing), China, and as chief of the Office of Strategic Services for the Far East. Promoted to commodore in 1943, he was deputy director, Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) from 1943 to 1945, and in 1944–1945, he commanded the U.S. Navy Group, China. He was promoted to brevet rear admiral in 1945. SACO consisted of 3,000 U.S. Navy personnel and some 100,000 Chinese guerrillas operating behind Japanese lands from the Gobi Desert to Indochina to relay vital weather data and other intelligence to U.S. Navy and Chinese forces. They also conducted sabotage operations against Japanese forces in the coastal areas and along the rivers of China.

In 1946, Miles took command of the heavy cruiser *Columbus*, and the next year he was a staff officer with the Atlantic Fleet. Promoted to permanent rear admiral in 1948, he commanded in succession Cruiser Division 1, Cruiser Division 6, and Cruiser Division 4. During 1950–1954, Miles was director for American affairs and U.S. naval missions in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation and the senior naval delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board. During 1954–1955, he commanded the Fifteenth Naval District in the Panama Canal Zone and in the latter year commanded Operation FRIENDSHIP, a flood relief effort in Tampico, Mexico. During 1956–1958, he commanded the Third Naval District in New York, and in 1956 he was the senior officer of the board that investigated the grounding of the battleship *Missouri* in Chesapeake Bay.

Miles was promoted to vice admiral on his retirement from the navy in

1958. He died in Bethesda, Maryland, on March 25, 1961.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
China, Navy; United States Navy

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Milne Bay, Battle of (August 25–September 6, 1942)

Important Pacific theater battle on New Guinea involving Australian, U.S., and Japanese troops. In late August 1942, the Japanese continued their advance southeastward down New Guinea's northern coast. Their destination was Port Moresby, initially denied to them by the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942). Milne Bay, on New Guinea's southeast tip, offered a harbor and good sites for airfields. The Australians and Americans had already built there one airfield, and two more were under construction, all part of the Allied defense of Port Moresby.

On August 24, 1942, the Japanese light cruisers *Tenryu* and *Tatsuta*, three destroyers, two submarine chasers, and two transports departed Rabaul transporting 612 naval troops of the Kure 5th Special Naval Landing Force and 197 men of the Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force. Another 362 navy cadre and civilians of the 16th Naval Construction Unit were also aboard. These troops were to take the Allied airfields.

The Japanese landed at Milne Bay on the night of August 25 and ran into trouble in the form of torrential rains, swamps, mud, and flooded streams. They also encountered many more Allied troops than anticipated. The Japanese Navy had estimated Australian forces at Milne Bay at about a battalion, but the Australians had recently reinforced their garrison and had six battalions present from the 7th and 18th Australian Infantry Brigades

under Major General Cyril A. Clowes. In and around the airfields were 9,458 Australians and Americans. The Australians also had 34 Curtiss P-40 Warhawk fighter aircraft.

The Japanese landed five miles from the beaches where they had planned to land and eight miles from their objective. They had no useful maps, nor did they have mechanized equipment to haul supplies inland. The Australian P-40s bombed and strafed beached supplies, oil drums, and barges and thereby destroyed most of the Japanese food stocks. Bombs from a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bomber also damaged a Japanese transport unloading supplies.

Another Japanese landing unit, actually part of the initial effort, never made it to shore. Some 350 Kure 5th Special Naval Landing Force troops aboard seven powered barges stopped at Goodenough Island for a break. Nine P-40s attacked and sank all seven barges, stranding the men. Japanese reinforcements (568 men of the Kure 3rd and 200 men of the Yokosuka 5th Special Naval Landing Forces) arrived on August 29 aboard three destroyers and three patrol boats.

Despite an early setback, the Australians fought the Japanese to a standstill at the edge of the easternmost airfield. By August 30, the Japanese at Milne Bay were short of supplies. Rain, mud, malaria, air attacks, and infantry combat wore them down. A final Japanese assault on the airfields during the night of August 30 failed. The Australians then counterattacked and drove the Japanese back toward their landing sites.

The Japanese then decided to cut their losses and evacuate the survivors. As a consequence of the Allied air threat and because the Japanese needed only to evacuate men and not equipment or supplies, they employed two light cruisers and destroyers in the evacuation effort. They removed their wounded on the night of September 4–5; the main body of the force departed the next night. One Japanese destroyer was lost during the withdrawal, sunk by U.S. aircraft.

The Battle of Milne Bay was a tremendous psychological boost for the Allies. Until then, the Japanese had repeatedly defeated Allied ground forces. Japanese aggressiveness and spirit had previously triumphed over Allied soldiers and matériel—but not at Milne Bay. The Allied repulse administered to crack special naval landing forces helped convinced Allied soldiers that they could defeat the Japanese.

JOHN W. WHITMAN

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; New Guinea Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater

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Minakami Genzō (1888–1944)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Yamanashi, Japan, on September 26, 1888, Minakami Genzō joined the army and was trained as an infantry officer. As a young lieutenant between 1919 and 1920, he took part in the Japanese intervention in Siberia during the Russian Civil War.

After combat and garrison duties in China in the 1930s, Minakami was promoted to major general in October 1941. He then served on the staff of the 54th Division headquarters. In June 1943, he was assigned to command the 56th Infantry Brigade Group, the core of the 56th Division that fought in northern Burma near China's Yunnan Province.

In the summer of 1944, Minakami was sent to Myitkyina in northern Burma to inspect the garrison there. At that time, overwhelmingly superior U.S. and U.S.-trained Chinese forces were driving south from Yunnan in an attempt to reopen the Burma Road. After a fierce resistance in the encircled Myitkyina, Minakami allowed the remaining garrison troops to break out of the siege. He then committed suicide on August 4, 1944.

Twenty-Eighth Army headquarters had ordered Minakami to defend Myitkyina to the last man, but the order was given to him personally and not in formal fashion to his unit. This loophole allowed the remaining garrison forces to attempt an escape from Myitkyina when, in such circumstances, the battle code of the Imperial Army was to fight to the last. In that sense, Minakami sacrificed his life to save his men.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also
Burma Theater; Myitkyina, Siege of

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MINCEMEAT, Operation (1943)

Major British deception preceding Operation HUSKY, the Allied assault on Sicily during July 9–22, 1943. Even as Allied forces cleared Tunisia of Axis troops, their leaders were debating their next target in the Mediterranean. Although British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill wanted a thrust into the Balkans, the Allies settled on Sicily, to be followed by an assault on southern Italy. Operation MINCEMEAT was a British deception to convince the Germans and Italians that the invasion would instead occur in the Greek Isles and Sardinia.

Intelligence officer Lieutenant Commander Ewen Montagu of the Royal Navy conceived the idea of using the corpse of a man who had died of pneumonia, a disease that has all the physical characteristics of a drowning. He would be given a false military identity to convey papers that would reach the Germans. On April 18, 1943, at Greenock, Scotland, the British submarine *Seraph* took on board a specially constructed steel container weighing about 400 pounds and marked "Handle with Care—Optical Instruments."

Eleven days later, early on April 30, the *Seraph* surfaced off the southern coast of Andalucia, Spain. Officers sworn to secrecy then opened the container and removed a soggy corpse dressed in the uniform of an officer of the Royal Marines. The body, which had been preserved in ice, had a briefcase affixed with the royal seal chained to one wrist. The officers then inflated the "Mae West" life jacket worn by the corpse, offered a few prayers, and pushed "Major Martin" overboard to drift inland with the tide. Later, a half mile to the south, the same officers turned an inflated rubber life raft upside down and pushed it and a paddle off the submarine.

A Spanish fisherman recovered the body off Huelva and turned it over to the authorities. The British had chosen this location because a German intelligence officer was known to be in the area. The Spanish identified the corpse from its papers as that of Major William Martin of the Royal Marines. It appeared from the condition of the body that it had been in the water for several days, and the Spanish concluded that the death resulted from an airplane crash at sea. They then allowed German intelligence to examine the body and the attaché case. To keep up the ruse, the British demanded that the case be returned without delay. The Spanish finally turned it over on May 13, and subsequent tests in London revealed that it had indeed been tampered with, its contents in all probability passed on to the Germans.

The briefcase contained presumably sensitive papers and private letters from British leaders in London to theater commanders in North Africa. The Germans could only conclude from the contents that operations against Sicily were only a feint and that the Allies would next invade the Greek islands (Operation BARCLAY) with 11 British divisions. A few days later, a large U.S. force was to invade Sardinia, Corsica, and southern France.

The deception confirmed what the Germans already believed, but there is no evidence that the Italians were deceived. Adolf Hitler, however, sent reinforcements, including the 1st Panzer Division from southern France, to Greece. This unit might have been decisive had it been dispatched to Sicily. Clearly, the invading forces of Operation HUSKY benefited immensely from the MINCEMEAT deception.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Deception; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Sicily, Invasion of

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Mindanao, Campaign for (April 17–June 30, 1945)

Major campaign in the recapture of the Philippines in the closing months of World War II. The battle was code-named Operation VICTOR V. The island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines is the second-largest and most easterly Philippine island. It is also the only island in the Philippines with a significant Muslim presence. Since early March 1945, some 24,000 Moro guerrillas under Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, an American mining engineer before the war, had been actively engaging Japanese forces on the island and receiving some support from U.S. Army Air Forces Thirteen Air Force aircraft.

The 43,000 Japanese troops in Mindanao were concentrated in the eastern part of the island. There were also some 13,000 noncombatant Japanese civilians. Lieutenant General Morozumi Gyosaku, commander of the 30th Division, had nominal command, but with communications a problem, he elected to remain with his own division and let Lieutenant General Harada Jiro, commander of the 100th Division, and Rear Admiral Doi Naoji, commander of the 32nd Naval Special Base Force, exercise independent command. The strongest Japanese defenses were around the Davao Gulf area in eastern Mindanao, which was heavily mined to counter an anticipated American amphibious landing, and in Davao, the island's largest city.

Believing that the Americans would attack from Davao Gulf and eventually drive them from Davao City, the Japanese prepared defensive bunkers inland, where they planned to regroup. They had no offensive plans but simply operated in accordance with Japanese commander in the Philippines General Yamashita Tomoyuki's directive that they delay and tie down as many U.S. troops as possible. Morozumi hoped to take advantage of the island's inhospitable terrain to hold their organized defensive positions for two months. Once these were overrun, he planned to withdraw and fight to the end in the rugged interior mountain region.

Japanese forces were, however, isolated from resupply and short of almost everything, including ammunition. Also, a significant number of them were Koreans, with little desire to fight to the death for the Japanese cause. The Filipino guerrillas further inhibited the defenders, destroying supply dumps and attacking the few Japanese truck convoys.

On February 28, 1945, elements of Major General Jens A. Doe's 41st Infantry Division landed on Palawan Island to the west of Mindanao and immediately commenced construction there of airfields to support the planned landing on Mindanao. At the same time, Filipino guerrillas seized a makeshift airfield at Dipolog, on the long, narrow Zamboanga Peninsula of Mindanao that reaches to the southwest. On March 8 the Americans airlifted to Dipolog two reinforced companies of the 21st Infantry Regiment and the 24th Infantry Division, and shortly thereafter U.S. Marine Corps aircraft were flying sorties from that place to cover naval bombardment and landing preparations off Zamboanga City, situated at the end of the peninsula.

Following a naval bombardment, on March 10 Rear Admiral Forest B. Royal's Task Group 78.1 landed elements of the 41st Infantry Division at Zamboanga City, which was quickly taken. During the next two weeks the 41st Infantry Division, supported by marine aviation and naval gunfire, experienced heavy fighting in difficult terrain inland against some 8,900 men of the Japanese 54th Independent Mixed Brigade. On March 23, however, the Japanese defenders here began to withdraw up the peninsula. Operations here claimed 220 Americans killed compared with 6,400 Japanese dead.

Meanwhile, Filipino guerrillas enjoyed success in Malabang Province in western Mindanao. By late March the guerrillas had taken the Malabang airstrip, and by April 5 U.S. Marine Corps aircraft were operating from there. This being the case, American planners now decided not to assault the Japanese strength in eastern Mindanao over the beaches but instead to land at Illana Bay in Malabang, then push eastward more than 100 miles across difficult terrain to take the principal Japanese defenses from the rear. American planners assumed that the campaign would take four months.

The task of securing Mindanao was assigned to the 35,000 men of Major General Franklin C. Sibert's X Corps of two reinforced infantry divisions—the 24th under Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff and the 31st under Major General Clarence A. Martin. Rear Admiral Albert G. Noble, commander of Amphibious Task Group 78.2, had charge of transporting the initial landing force of the 24th Division and X Corps headquarters to Malabang. The first troops in Operation VICTOR V came ashore on schedule on the morning of April 17 in Illana Bay and quickly proceeded inland. Their assignment was to advance up Highway 1 (little more than a trail) to Digos and then seize Davao.

Meanwhile, a small flotilla of gunboats proceeded up the Mindanao River. Roughly paralleling Route 1, it was navigable for some 35 miles and became the main supply line for the advancing U.S. forces. On April 22 Noble's ships returned with the 31st Division, which came ashore at Parang, also in Illana Bay. It was to proceed to Kabacan and then attack north toward Macajalar Bay.

The Americans moved so rapidly that they were almost on top of the Japanese around Davao before General Morozumi realized that the western landing was not a diversion. The Americans secured Digos on April 27, overwhelming the Japanese there who were defending against an attack from the other direction. The 24th Infantry Division then turned north toward Davao. The last major Philippine city under Japanese control, it was taken on May 3 after the Japanese withdrew, having destroyed much of it.

The fighting now entered its most difficult phase as the Japanese mounted a tenacious defense in fields of thick-stemmed abaca plants. Mandong fell to the 24th Infantry Division on May 29. The 31st Infantry Division proceeded to Kibawe. On May 6, the most difficult combat of the campaign began when General Morozumi ordered a Japanese battalion to delay the Americans at Maramag so that he might reorganize the shattered 30th Division. A six-day fight here ended in a Japanese banzai charge on May 14 that killed 73 Japanese.

Morozumi and the remnants of his 30th Division continued their retreat up the Agusan Valley, and after a vicious encounter with the pursuing 31st Division on June 5, they dispersed into the jungles. To the south, meanwhile, smaller X Corps units seized Sarangani and Balut islands off the southern tip of Mindanao, and on July 12 U.S. troops came ashore in Sarangani Bay.

Although Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger declared on June 30 that organized resistance on Mindanao was at an end, mopping-up operations continued in its jungles until the end of the war, when some 22,000 Japanese surrendered. The fight for Mindanao cost some 10,000 Japanese killed in combat; another 7,000 were lost to starvation and disease, and 7,000 were wounded. American losses were 820 men killed and 2,880 wounded. The American success in Mindanao and relatively light casualties for the U.S. forces involved owed much to the support of Filipino guerrillas, who had supplied critical intelligence and fought alongside American forces.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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Mindoro, Invasion and Battle of (December 13–16, 1944)

The first step toward the U.S. invasion of the big Philippine island of Luzon was securing the island of Mindoro. Some 58 by 110 miles in area, Mindoro is located in the northern Visayas immediately to the south of Luzon. American planners wanted to secure the island as an advanced air base for the upcoming invasion of Luzon. The Japanese garrison here numbered about 1,000 men, including some 200 survivors of Japanese ships sunk off the island.

Rear Admiral Arthur D. Struble commanded the Mindoro Attack Group consisting of the light cruiser *Nashville* (flagship), 8 destroyer transports, 30 LSTs (landing ship, tank), 12 LSMs (landing ship, medium), 31 LCI (landing craft, infantry), 20 large and 7 small minesweepers, and 14 other small craft, all escorted by 14 destroyers. Rear Admiral Russell S. Berkey commanded the Close Covering Group of 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and 7 destroyers. There was also a motor torpedo boat group of 23 PT boats under Lieutenant Commander N. Burt Davis.

Brigadier General William C. Dunckel commanded the Western Visayan Task Force. Its principal components were the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and the 19th RCT of the 24th Infantry Division. The 503rd was to have made an airborne assault, but this was called off because of insufficient space on the airfields at Leyte for the troop-carrying aircraft required. Instead, the 503rd RCT joined the 19th RCT in the amphibious

landing. Air support both for the invasion and to neutralize Japanese aircraft on Luzon was provided by the Fifth and Seventh Air Forces and Third Fleet carrier aircraft.

The invasion force staged off Leyte on December 12 and then proceeded to Mindoro. On the afternoon of December 13, a single kamikaze aircraft, flying low across the Mindanao Sea, crashed into the superstructure of the cruiser *Nashville*. Losses were heavy, with 131 killed and 158 wounded. Dunckel was slightly wounded. The *Nashville* was forced to return to Leyte, and Dunckel and members of his staff transferred to the destroyer *Dashiell*. Later that afternoon another kamikaze crashed into the destroyer *Harden*, killing 15 and wounding 25. The *Harden* too was forced to return to Leyte.

The invasion occurred on schedule on the morning of December 15 in Mangarin Bay. Destroyers provided fire support for the troop landings and antiaircraft protection for the landing ships. The chief threat remained kamikaze aircraft. Although Lockheed P-38 Lightnings and carrier aircraft shot down 8 of 15 kamikazes, two LSTs were struck by the Japanese suicide aircraft and badly damaged. Later they had to be scuttled. The destroyer *Moale* was damaged by exploding ammunition in an attempt to rescue crew members of one of the LSTs. One LSM, the destroyer *Howerth*, and the escort carrier *Marcus Island* all received light damage from kamikazes but were able to continue operations. Casualties totaled 7 killed and 20 wounded.

There was little initial resistance by the vastly outnumbered and outgunned Japanese defenders on Mindoro. No Americans were killed in the initial landing, and the town of San Jose and its airfield, about five miles inland, were secured that afternoon. Some 300 Japanese at an air raid warning station at the northern tip of the island put up a stiff fight against a company of the 503rd, but except for mopping up, the island was secured within 48 hours.

In the fighting for Mindoro the Japanese suffered some 200 killed and 375 wounded. American losses were 18 killed and 81 wounded. By the end of the first day, army engineers were at work preparing airfields for the invasion of Luzon, two of which were completed in 13 days.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Kamikaze; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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Mines, Land

Two basic forms of land mines existed in World War II: antipersonnel and antitank mines. Antipersonnel mines are primarily based on static omnidirectional (360-degree), static directional (180-degree), and bounding omnidirectional (360-degree) models. Often injury rather than death was viewed as a more desirable outcome from the use of land mines because of the logistical strain it could impose on an opposing force. For this reason, many mines were developed and placed to maim rather than kill.

Antitank mines were used either in an antimobility or a catastrophic-kill function. Beyond their destructive effects, land mines were also useful to channel enemy forces into kill zones, create barriers to maneuver, engage in the area denial of key points, deny matériel resources via booby-trapping, and psychologically affect opposing troops. Almost all land mines of World War II had igniters based on one of four principles: pressure, pressure-release, pull, and pull-release.

A Canadian Army soldier clearing a mine in 1943. Such work was extraordinarily dangerous. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

U.S. land mines were based on both antipersonnel and antitank requirements. The two standard U.S. antipersonnel mines were the M-2 and the M-3. The M-2 was a 6.5-pound bounding mine based on a modified 60mm mortar shell. When the mine was triggered, a small secondary charge propelled the main charge into the air, where it then exploded. The resulting fragmentation pattern caused more casualties than a ground burst. It had a 30-foot casualty radius. The M-3 was a larger 10-pound mine made out of cast iron and filled with TNT. It could be buried or used in an aboveground booby-trap mode. It also had a 30-foot casualty radius.

At the start of World War II, the standard U.S. antitank mine was the M-1. This simple mine used a cross-shaped metal pressure detonator, known as a “spider,” that fit over the mine. The M-1 was later replaced by the heavier M-5, which weighed 14.5 pounds. The additional weight allowed for a greater explosive charge to be packed in the mine, which then could better disable a tank tread or destroy a lighter vehicle. The even more effective M-6 was developed next. It weighed 20 pounds. A lighter M-7, weighing 4.5 pounds, was also fielded against lighter vehicular threats.

British forces used both antipersonnel and antitank mines. The British No. 75 “Hawkins,” an antipersonnel mine shaped like a rectangular food tin, was carried by paratroopers and U.S. forces. British forces also utilized U.S. land mines as part of the American aid effort. British minefields were used extensively in North Africa.

French mines were based on World War I and interwar designs. One example was the 14.5-pound light antitank mine. This pressure-sensitive mine had a rectangular steel body and was filled with 5.12 pounds of high explosives. It was employed in defensive mine belts to help protect the Maginot Line.

Soviet and German military forces were the principal innovators in land mines during the war. Soviet mine advances were primarily antitank in nature because of the continued operational encirclement threat posed by German panzer divisions. The 1941 AKS was likely the first full-width–attack, tilt-rod–actuated mine. The Red Army employed fuzing based on both seismic (VZ-1) and magnetic devices and deployed the first radio-controlled mines in 1942. At Kursk (July 5–19, 1943), the first use of a flame mine took place. Calling on their harsh experiences in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939, Soviet forces also utilized stake mines (based on improvised grenade booby traps), mine daisy chaining, low metal mines, and well-defined countermine assault techniques. The Soviets also employed antitank dog mines during the war. Specially trained dogs carrying explosive mine packs were taught to run under German tanks. The mines were then detonated on the command of the dog handler or set off by a timing mechanism. The technique was not very effective.

German innovations in land mines included the bounding antipersonnel mine of the 1930s. This was known as the “S” mine or the “Bouncing Betty” mine. Scatterable antipersonnel mines, such as the SD-2B Schmetterling (butterfly), were first used in Poland in 1939 and dropped by fixed-wing aircraft. Side-attack mines based on the Panzerfaust (armored fist) antitank rocket grenade were employed on the Eastern Front in 1943. Booby-trapped antihandling devices, attached to land mines, were also developed by German forces in the war. A chemical mine, known as the “Bounding Gas Mine 37” and based on the mustard gas agent, was developed, but it was never fielded.

About 40 types of German antitank mines existed, with the Tellermine 42, Tellermine 43, and Tellermine 35 (two variants) being the most common.

The name derived from the fact that the circular mine was about the same diameter as a dinner plate (*Teller*).

The Japanese were not known as innovators in land mines, but they fielded both land mine types and were adept at booby traps. The Model 93 (1933) "tape-measure mine" was an antipersonnel device that weighed 3 pounds. The mine had four metal rings on the side for carrying it and for emplacement and a brass dome fuze. The Model 99 (1939) armor-piercing mine was developed for use against tanks and the iron doors of pillboxes. This 2.11-pound mine was carried in a stiff canvas pouch and had four permanent magnets attached via khaki webbing to the outer edge of the mine body. It was carried by individual soldiers and was usually coupled with another for greater armor penetration by placing the opposite magnetic poles of the four outer-edge magnets together.

The fielding of a Japanese antitank "satchel charge–like" mine, rather than a traditional antitank mine, represents a tactical limitation. This limitation was somewhat made up for by the existence of the Model 96 (1936) dual-use land and water mine and the Bangalore torpedo. The Model 96 carried a 46-pound explosive charge, and the Bangalore torpedo had sections weighing 10 pounds each (most of that a TNT-cyclonite explosive mixture).

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See also

Antitank Guns and Warfare; Chemical Weapons and Warfare; Maginot Line; Mines, Sea; Tanks, All Powers

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Mines, Sea

As a result of the experiences of World War I, combatants were much better prepared for mine warfare in 1939 than they had been in 1914. All belligerents expected to be committed to a mining campaign. Major advances in mine warfare before and during World War II included the widespread use of influence (i.e., acoustic, magnetic, and pressure-actuated) mines and large-scale aerial mining and the broad application of antisweeping devices. In moored mines, the trend, except in Germany, was to replace the acid-filled Hertz horns with electric switch horns.

Despite prewar financial limitations and errors in judgment, Great Britain entered the war with an adequate stock of mines—both technically and quantitatively. These included some 1917 H.II Hertz horn-type moored contact mines, but the standard moored contact mine was the switch-horn-type Mark XVII. It could be configured to take a charge of 320 or 500 pounds and could be laid with a depth setting of up to 303 feet. In 1939, Great Britain had both moored (M Mark I) and air-laid ground magnetic mines (A Mark I) available for deployment. Both were based on the magnetic induction principle (the horizontal magnetic field of a ship induced an electric current in a coiled rod) and proved so satisfactory that they remained in service throughout the war. The airborne ground mine was subsequently modified to conserve scarce materials (A Mark II, III, and IV), to improve compatibility with bomb gears (A Mark V, 1940), and to include acoustic actuation (A Mark VI, 1944).



Arming German UMB-mines. Snaglines with cork floats are attached to the mines' Herz horns (1941). (Naval Historical Center)

The majority of the mines laid by Great Britain were dropped by aircraft; hence, the British effort for a ship-laid ground mine was confined to the magnetic M Mark III, a cylindrical device that was introduced in April 1941. The charge weight was increased from 1,500 pounds to 1,600 pounds of amatol (or 1,750 pounds of minol) in 1942, and in 1943 acoustic mechanisms were added. An upgraded model with improved sensitivity and a pressure firing unit was canceled in 1944. Owing to the wartime shortages of TNT and RD (cyclonite), most British mines had 50/50 ammonium nitrate/TNT (amatol) explosive charges. This low-quality explosive was later improved by the addition of around 20 percent aluminum powder (minol).

Germany displayed the greatest creativity and activity in the field of mine technology. It developed a large number of sophisticated mines before and during World War II, with a focus on influence mines. The intense rivalry between Germany's navy and air force severely hampered the development of airborne mines, although ultimately the project was successful. For moored contact mines, the German Navy relied on the successful EM designs of World War I, the most common being the EMA (331-pound charge), the EMB (497-pound charge), and the EMC (661-pound charge). The Germans

also perfected the art of sweep obstruction. Many of the EM-type mines were fitted with chains (to resist wire cutters) and *Kontaktauslösung* (KA, contact deflection) gear, comprising a 98-foot Tombac tube over the upper part of the mooring wire that, when subjected to the upward drag in sweeping, closed a switch and fired the mine.

The best-known German influence mine was probably the LMA airborne parachute magnetic ground mine; when one was retrieved on November 22, 1939, the British were alerted to the fact that the Germans too had a capability in noncontact mines. Unlike the British magnetic mines, the German mines were actuated by a change in the vertical component of the magnetic field (the dip-needle principle). The LMA had a 661-pound charge and a practical depth limit of 130 feet. It was superseded by the larger (1,554-pound charge) LMB with magnetic (1939), acoustic (1940), and combined magnetic/acoustic and magnetic/pressure (1944) firing.

The development of the BM 1000 (1,500-pound charge) greatly improved the efficacy of German aerial mining. That mine was dropped without parachute from altitudes of up to 19,700 feet in water depths up to 115 feet, and it was regularly equipped with a variety of antisweeping and antilifting devices. For mine laying from torpedo tubes of submarines and E-boats, the Germans produced the TMA (moored magnetic) and TMB (ground magnetic and acoustic) mines. Both weapons suffered from serious construction defects that limited their endurance on the seabed to 6 to 12 months.

The construction of the Atlantic Wall, Germany’s seaward defense against the Allied invasion, inspired the KMA anti-invasion mine. This was a shallow-water ground mine with a 165-pound charge set in a rectangular concrete block anchor and surmounted by a steel tripod frame with a single Hertz horn on top. The total height of the mine was 8 feet 10 inches, and it could be fitted with a snag line for depths of 16 to 33 feet. German charge weights in general were conspicuously heavy by international standards to compensate for the generally poor quality of the explosive fillings, usually made up of a mixture of ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, cyclonite, ethylinediamine dinitrate, and aluminum—TNT being an exception.

Many of the mines employed by Italy during the war were left over from World War I, some of them from the Austro-Hungarian Empire service. Some Italian mines were specifically built for deployment in warm-water

conditions, such as off Libya. The P200 appeared in 1936. It weighed about 2,244 pounds and had an explosive charge of 441 pounds.

The Soviet Navy relied mainly on material developed before 1917, such as the M06, M08, and M12. Conditions in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1941 had stifled mine development, yet the Soviet Navy put to use a handful of mines developed in the interwar period.

Notably, Italy and the United States distinguished themselves as substantial mine producers, the latter with an emphasis on submarine and air-laid mines such as the Mk 12/3 and the Mk 12/4 (1,200-pound Torpex charges). Japan, as during World War I, neglected mine development and relied solely on a handful of obsolescent moored contact mines.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Atlantic Wall; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Minesweeping and Mine Laying, Sea; Mine Warfare Vessels; Soviet Union, Navy; United States Navy

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Minesweeping and Mine Laying, Sea

The mine war at sea between 1939 and 1945 was a vast enterprise in terms of men and matériel that dwarfed the already quite considerable efforts made during World War I. The aim of mining was either tactical, by sinking specific enemy ships, or strategic, by assisting in dislocating enemy war efforts in general and contributing to the security of friendly sea lines of communications through the destruction or threat of destruction of enemy forces. The aim of mine countermeasures, in turn, was to permit warships and merchant vessels to use the seas and enter and leave ports as necessary for the

furtherance of the war effort and the support of the population, without unacceptable damage or losses from mines.

A grand total of 636,000 mines and sweep obstructers were laid in European waters between 1939 and 1945. Some 95,400 more were laid in the Western Pacific between 1941 and 1945. On balance, both sides laid roughly the same number of mines. The Allies lost a total of 1,406,037 tons of merchant shipping to mines—almost exclusively in European waters—representing 6.5 percent of their entire merchant ship losses. The Axis powers lost 660,533 tons of merchant shipping in the European theater and 397,412 tons in the Pacific.

Strategically, the Allies were more effective than the Axis powers in disrupting and obstructing the enemy's seaborne traffic. This was particularly true in the Pacific theater of operations, where Japanese mine-laying operations had virtually no impact on Allied naval operations. By contrast, a well-conceived U.S. aerial mining operation, in which 15,800 mines were laid in Japanese and Korean waters between December 1944 and July 1945, all but paralyzed Japanese coastal traffic and hastened the collapse of the Japanese Empire's tottering economy.

Several factors affected mine laying and minesweeping in World War II. First, mines were increasingly of the influence type; second, aircraft emerged as an effective means of delivery; and, third, the use of sweep obstructers and evaders and antilifting devices became commonplace, to the point where mine forces deliberately targeted enemy countermeasure forces and aimed to tie down valuable resources. Again, the Allies had comparatively better success in this respect: throughout the war, the German Navy employed about twice as many minesweepers and about 1.5 times as many personnel in the war against sea mines in European waters as its adversaries.

Mine laying distinguished between the two fundamental principles of offensive and defensive mining. Both sides expended a considerable part of their stock for the latter purpose. Great Britain alone laid 185,000 mines in defensive minefields in all theaters of war. Defensive minefields were usually laid by surface craft. Their purpose was to augment coastal defenses by providing operational depth seaward against maritime incursions and invasions. Frequently, a channel between the coast and the minefields was kept open for coastal traffic, thus offering a certain degree of protection to

shipping while freeing flotilla craft from tedious coastal escort and patrol duties.

Offensive minefields were ideally laid covertly, inviting the use of aircraft and submarines. The former offered an additional advantage because they could penetrate deep into enemy-controlled sea spaces in great numbers and even attack inland waterways. Famous aerial mining operations included those by the Royal Air Force (RAF) against the Kiel Canal on May 12–13, 1944 (11 mines), and against the German oil shipments on the Danube between May and October 1944 (1,200 mines). Both operations caused significant economic disruptions of the German war machine. Of the 76,000 mines laid offensively by Great Britain in European waters, 55,000 were laid by aircraft, mostly by the RAF's Bomber Command.

A variant of both the defensive and the offensive minefield was the tactical minefield. This minefield was usually laid on the basis of tactical intelligence reports or educated guessing in what was assumed would be the probable path of a specific target. During their advance through the Baltic states in August 1941, for instance, the Germans laid a tactical minefield off Juminda, Estonia, knowing that a heavily escorted Soviet troop convoy from Tallinn had to take that route. On August 28–29, 25 Soviet troop transports out of 29 within the targeted convoy foundered on the minefield. Additionally, because the Germans had deliberately also targeted escorts and minesweepers with shallow-depth mines, the Soviets lost two destroyers, nine minesweepers, and several small patrol craft. This was the largest single tactical success in the history of mine warfare.

The minesweeping effort on all sides necessarily rose to the enormous challenge posed by the extensive mine-laying campaigns—both quantitatively and qualitatively. Great Britain had built only 21 fleet minesweepers between 1933 and 1939. During the war years, these were augmented by a further 283 minesweepers. To this substantial minesweeping fleet came hundreds of motor minesweepers and auxiliary minesweepers. By May 1944, the Royal Navy had more than 650 trawlers on sweeping duties alone. The Germans entered the war with a number of World War I–vintage sweepers as well as a dozen sophisticated 784-ton M-35–type minesweepers under construction and dozens of cheap but capable *Räumboote* (motor minesweepers), the numbers of which would total 300 at the end of the war. Despite the eventual mass production of over 400 simplified M-type

sweepers, the German Navy too had to expand its capabilities further, and it requisitioned hundreds of civilian ships for minesweeping duties. As with Great Britain, Germany also built commercial trawlers for minesweeping duties.

In 1939, most minesweeping forces were geared for operations against moored contact mines. To that end, the minesweepers carried an Oropesa gear, or A-sweep, consisting of a steel wire (up to .5 inches in diameter and 1,500 feet long), which was streamed behind the minesweeper. The end of the sweep wire was fitted with wire cutters and supported by a float known as an Otter. The sweep was held at a predetermined depth by a horizontal kite near the stern of the towing vessels, and the angle to the ship's course was maintained by a vertical kite beneath the Otter. The A-sweep could be streamed on one or both sides of the ship. Minesweepers so equipped steamed in a diagonal formation on overlapping tracks. Small A-sweeps streamed from the stem post provided bow protection. Mine cases that rose to the surface after the mooring wires had been cut were usually destroyed by gunfire.

To protect fields of moored mines from sweepers, minefield planners frequently resorted to sweep obstructers such as chains on mooring wires, fuze settings that exploded the mines when swept, and other gear that would destroy or foul the sweeps or endanger the minesweepers. The Germans earned a particular reputation for indulging in this type of warfare, and they deployed minefields that contained up to 30 percent sweep obstructers. Sweep evaders, such as sprocket wheels that would let the sweep wire pass through the mine's mooring wire, and delayed-rise or multiple-rise mines additionally thwarted sweeping efforts.

The advent of ground-influence mines required different sweeping techniques. For sweeping magnetic mines, navies developed a towed current-bearing cable, called the L-sweep. This equipment consisted of two cables streamed behind the minesweeper that generated a pulsating electric current, which, when passed through the cables and the seawater, produced a magnetic tow. To overcome dependence on the seawater's conductivity and improve the individual ship's sweep efficiency, the Royal Navy and later the German Navy introduced the closed-loop system. The loop shape of the current-bearing cable was maintained by attaching it to A-sweep wires. Acoustic influence mines required the use of noisemakers. The Allied Pipe

Noise Maker ("Foxer"), originally developed as a decoy for the German T-5 homing torpedo, was well suited to that task. Noisemakers were usually streamed in conjunction with the magnetic sweep.

The improvement in sweeping techniques quite naturally called for responses by minefield planners and mine designers. An easy way to delay any sweeping attempt was to increase the sweep effort necessary to clear a given sea space by laying combined fields of moored contact and ground-influence mines. Ship counters that ignored a certain amount of passes were an even better way to achieve the same effect. This concept was perfected by the British MX organization, which specialized in the modification of standard mines. The MX-modified mine was only actuated when first influenced by a strong magnetic field (i.e., a sweeper) and then by a weaker one within a certain time span. The Germans countered by preceding their U-boats with two minesweepers or *Sperrbrechers* (barrage breakers), to which the MX organization in turn responded by setting the counters to allow the passage of two strong minefields before it detonated the mine under a third, weaker, magnetic field. The Germans then adopted the rather wasteful measure of employing three mine-countermeasures vessels.

The ultimate hurdle for mine countermeasures during the war, the pressure mine, was never mastered satisfactorily. For this reason, both sides hesitated to employ it for fear that it would be captured and used by the enemy. The Germans waited until June 1944 before desperation drove them to lay that type of mine. When the Allies responded with like devices, the Germans used their *Sperrbrechers* as expendable decoy ships against the pressure mines. Short of crawling through a minefield at speeds of less than four knots, this was the only viable method of countering pressure mines.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Auxiliary Vessels; Mines, Sea; Mine Warfare Vessels

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Mine Warfare Vessels

At the start of World War II in 1939, mine warfare vessels were not substantially different in design from those of 1918. Indeed, many countries, such as Germany and the United States, still operated large numbers of World War I minesweepers. New commissions of minesweepers were few and unspectacular. The most significant prewar designs were the German *Minensuchboote* (minesweepers) laid down in 1936 and 1937 and the French Elan class. The German ships displaced about 600 tons, were armed with two 10.5cm (4.1-inch) and two 37mm guns, and could be driven by their powerful turbines at 17 knots. The Elan-class ships were similar in performance, if slightly larger. They were armed with two 3.5-inch, one 40mm, and six 20mm antiaircraft guns. As with other Allied designs, they doubled as escorts. The Soviets, well versed in mine warfare, opted for a somewhat smaller design with a shallow draft. The 490-ton Tral class was optimized for the confined waters of the eastern Baltic. Italian minesweepers were built before the war and displaced between 240 and 255 tons. They were armed with two 20mm antiaircraft guns.

Before the war, neither Great Britain nor the United States had devoted significant resources to mine warfare. The Royal Navy had adhered to the fleet sweeper design and hastily commissioned the somewhat inadequate Bangor-class minesweepers in 1940 to replace the unsuitable Halcyon-class fleet sweepers. The new challenges posed by mine warfare soon required design changes. The German prewar designs proved inadequate and too complicated for mass production. Like the Bangor-class ships, they soon turned out to be too cramped to accommodate the extra sweep gear for use against influence mines. New minesweeper designs also required more powerful auxiliary engines that could produce the necessary current for the magnetic-influence sweeping gear.

The Germans responded by building the 1940- and 1943-type minesweepers. Although similar in appearance to the 1935-type, those vessels were simplified to the point where their sections could be largely prefabricated by specialized yards and assembled by others. The turbines were substituted by coal-fired, triple-expansion engines for cost reasons and

to conserve the navy's oil fuel stocks. Otherwise, except for the improved sweeping facilities, added antiaircraft armament, and minor details, the layout of the German minesweepers remained unchanged.

The British substituted for their Bangor-class ships the larger 1,200-ton Algerine-class vessels, of which nearly 100 were built. The concept was a return to the fleet sweeper, and with their armament of one 4-inch gun, four 40mm guns, and 92 depth charges, the Algerines easily outclassed the smaller Flower-class corvettes in their escort role.

The United States responded late to the Japanese mine threat, which turned out to be a minor irritant at most. Many U.S. minesweepers subsequently saw heavy action in the Normandy landings and in the preparation for them. Apart from the 1918-vintage Bird-class minesweeper, the U.S. Navy commissioned nearly 200 minesweepers. Most were of three main types: the big Raven and Auk classes; two-funneled diesel vessels of 810 and 890 tons, respectively, with a speed of 18 knots and one or two 3-inch guns; and the diesel-powered Admirable-class of 650 tons and 15 knots.

For economic reasons and for inshore sweeping, all navies took to building motor minesweepers as a cheap alternative to the fully fledged minesweepers. These boats, produced by the hundreds, ranged from the British 80-foot motor launches and the German 120-foot *Räumboote* (motor minesweepers) to the somewhat understated U.S. yard minesweepers that, at 136 feet in length, displaced 215 tons. Nearly all of the motor minesweepers, except the smallest, eventually assumed duties beyond inshore or harbor sweeping.

The explosive growth of the minesweeping forces in World War II contrasted with that of the dedicated mine-laying forces. As in the years from 1914 to 1918, most navies were content to rely on converted civilian vessels or regular combatants, such as destroyers, submarines, and patrol boats, for the bulk of their mine-laying activities. Few purpose-designed minelayers, such as the British Abdiel class, were built before and during the war. At 37 knots, these 4,000-ton vessels were exceptionally fast. The advent of large-scale aerial offensive mining, however, rendered them largely obsolete. The Abdiels eventually ended up as fast blockade-runners to Malta and elsewhere.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Auxiliary Vessels; Mines, Sea; Mine-sweeping and Mine Laying, Sea; Submarines

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Minsk, Battle for (June 27–July 9, 1941)

Large German encirclement operation on the Eastern Front. Under Adolf Hitler's Führer Directive 21 for the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA), Army Group Center had responsibility for the destruction of Soviet forces in Belorussia. The Germans considered this an essential prerequisite to subsequent drives on Leningrad and Moscow. Toward that end, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center was the most powerful of the three German army groups.

Bock commanded three field armies, along with two of the four available panzer groups. His southern wing, charged with advancing just north of the Pripet Marshes, consisted of Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's Fourth Army of 21 infantry divisions and Colonel General Heinz Guderian's Second Panzer Group of 1 cavalry, 5 panzer, and 3 Panzergrenadier divisions. In the north, attacking from East Prussia, Colonel General Adolf Strauss's Ninth Army had 12 infantry divisions and Colonel General Hermann Hoth's Third Panzer Group had 4 panzer and 4 Panzergrenadier divisions. In reserve, Bock had Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs's Second Army. To support his ground effort, Bock could rely on the largest German air fleet on the Eastern Front at the time, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's 1,000-aircraft Second Luftflotte.

Bock's invading German forces were actually matched in terms of numbers and matériel by the Soviet Western Front, consisting of four armies commanded by Colonel General Dmitry G. Pavlov. Unfortunately for the

Soviets, three of these armies—the Third, Fourth, and Tenth—were positioned in the westward-protruding Bialystok salient, which turned into a trap. The Soviet Thirteenth Army was more to the east, near Minsk.

Pavlov, however, was handicapped not only by manpower dispositions that had been forced on him but also by defense commissar Marshal Semen Timoshenko's Directive No. 3 that required all fronts, regardless of circumstance, to take the offensive. In the event of a German invasion, the Northwestern and Western Fronts were to launch coordinated attacks from Kaunas and Grodno, respectively. But the front commanders, despite having two mechanized corps each, were unable to mount a coordinated offensive. Still, Pavlov appointed Lieutenant General Ivan Boldin to form a "shock group" and attack south of Grodno, near Brest. But Boldin soon found promised support unavailable and a German encirclement of his forces a distinct possibility.

Disgusted with Pavlov, Timoshenko sent Lieutenant General Andrei I. Yeremenko to replace him. In the meantime, Timoshenko ordered Pavlov to hold Minsk and the Slutsk Fortified District with the Thirteenth Army and his second-echelon mechanized corps.

Pavlov was then ordered to withdraw his armies from the Bialystok salient, where they were now threatened by Hoth's Third Panzer Group sweeping around Minsk from the north through Vilnius-Molodechno, while Guderian's Second 2nd Panzer Group drove around the city from the southwest through Baranovichi. On the night of June 25–26, Pavlov ordered his four armies to withdraw east, but this plan succeeded no better than his earlier offensive. Hoth had torn a 60-mile gap between the retreating Eleventh Army of the Soviet Northwest Front moving to the northeast and the Third Army of the Western Front retreating southeast by attacking along the frontal boundary.

Boldin's force, aiding Major General Konstantin Dmi-trievich Golubev's Tenth Army, pleaded for an airdrop of fuel and ammunition. By June 26, it had withdrawn into thick forest south of Minsk. Pavlov had assigned the Fourth Army the task of holding at the Shchara River and defending the Slutsk Fortified District in the southwest, only to discover that Slutsk had sent all its weapons to Brest.

The Battle for Minsk was joined by June 26 as Pavlov withdrew with his staff to Mogilev, leaving the weak Thirteenth Army to defend Minsk, even as

the inner encirclement progressed as part of the "double battle of Bialystok-Minsk." Slutsk fell to the Germans the next day as the German spearheads raced toward the Berezina River. Pavlov's Third and Tenth Armies were withdrawing toward Minsk, hoping to break the inner encirclement despite having little ammunition, but both were cut off by June 28, along with Thirteenth Army. Pavlov's pride, the VI Mechanized Corps—a unit that began the campaign with more than 1,000 tanks—was shattered and its commander killed.

On June 29, Yeremenko took command from Pavlov, who was sent to Moscow. Meanwhile, Yeremenko lost the race to the Berezina to the German panzers. The savaged Soviet Western Front was scattered over a 200-mile area, as Minsk had fallen on June 29. By July 9, German mopping-up operations ended. In the operation, the Germans claimed to have destroyed five Soviet armies and taken nearly 324,000 prisoners, 1,809 guns, and 3,332 tanks.

The Soviets, led by surviving commanders such as Boldin, took advantage of the spring rains and managed to break out about 300,000 men. Although Joseph Stalin's inept decisions had contributed greatly to the Soviet military failures to that point, Pavlov was made the scapegoat for the Minsk disaster and shot, along with Fourth Army commander General Aleksandr Korobkov and XLI Rifle Corps commander General I. S. Kosobutsky, both of whom had managed to escape the German trap. Smolensk was the next German objective.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bock, Fedor von; Guderian, Heinz; Hoth, Hermann; Kesselring, Albert; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Pavlov, Dimitri Grigorevich; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich; Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von; Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich

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Miquelon, Free French Seizure of

See Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Free French Seizure of

Mitscher, Marc Andrew (1887–1947)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born on January 26, 1887, in Hillsboro, Wisconsin, Marc Andrew Mitscher grew up in Washington, D.C., and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1910. He then served with the fleet until 1915, when he seized an opportunity to enter naval aviation, becoming naval aviator number 33.



U.S. Navy vice admiral Marc A. Mitscher, a leading advocate and practitioner of naval aviation during World War II. (PhotoQuest/Getty Images)

In 1919, he participated in the U.S. Navy's first attempted transatlantic flight, although his own aircraft only reached the Azores. Between the wars, Mitscher remained in aviation through a variety of administrative and operational postings, including assignments aboard the carriers *Langley* (1929–1930) and *Saratoga* (1934–1935) as well as with the Bureau of Aeronautics (1930–1933 and 1935–1937).

In 1938, Mitscher was promoted to captain. Three years later, he was the first commanding officer of the carrier *Hornet*. His ship launched Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle's raid on Tokyo on April 18, 1942. Promoted to rear admiral, Mitscher commanded all air operations in the Solomon Islands in 1943. In 1944, he assumed command of Fast Carrier Task Force 58/38 (38 if William Halsey commanded the Third Fleet, 58 for Raymond Spruance when it was designated the Fifth Fleet). In March 1944, Mitscher was

promoted to vice admiral. Excluding a brief period from October 1944 to January 1945, he remained with Task Force 58/38 for many of the great Pacific battles.

In July 1945, Mitscher became deputy chief of naval operations for air. In March 1946, he commanded the Eighth Fleet, then assumed the post of commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, in September. Mitscher died in Norfolk, Virginia, on February 3, 1947.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Nimitz, Chester William; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Spruance, Raymond Ames; United States Navy

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Miyazaki Shigesaburō (1892–1965)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Gifu Prefecture, Japan, on January 4, 1892, Miyazaki Shigesaburō graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1914 and the Army War College in 1929. He was a member of the army General Staff from 1925 to 1929. In 1938, he was promoted to colonel and became a staff officer in the Taiwan Army.

In August 1939, Colonel Miyazaki commanded the 16th Infantry Regiment in the May–September Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan Incident) against Soviet forces in Mongolia, executing the final successful night attack against Hill 997 on September 8. Promoted to major general in 1943, Miyazaki assumed command of the 26th Brigade fighting in China. In early 1944, he had charge of the 31st Division in the struggle for Imphal in Burma (Myanmar), the climax of his military career. Miyazaki's forces occupied Kohima, north of Imphal, on April 6, 1944. He then defended it against British attack for two months without resupply. Finally, his division

was surrounded by British troops, but Miyazaki was able to extract his men, including the wounded.

Promoted to lieutenant general in June 1944, Miyazaki took command of the 54th Division of the Twenty-Eighth Army in Burma, where he enjoyed several tactical successes. He was able to escape entrapment by British forces, but by early August, only about 4,000 of his 9,000-man division remained. Nonetheless, many regarded the five-foot-tall Miyazaki as one of the most skillful and tenacious Japanese generals of the war. He died in Tokyo on August 30, 1965.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Burma Theater; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of

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Model, Walther (1891–1945)

German field marshal. Born in Genthin, Germany, on January 24, 1891, Walther Model joined the army in 1909 and served during World War I, rising to captain. He remained in the Reichswehr after the war, and in 1935 he was appointed head of its Technical Warfare Section.

Promoted to major general in March 1938, Model served as chief of staff of the IV Army Corps in the September 1939 invasion of Poland. He was promoted to lieutenant general in April 1940 and led the 3rd Panzer Division in the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940. He next participated in the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA) and was promoted to general of panzer troops in October 1941 and given command of the XLI Panzer Corps. In January 1942, Model took over the Ninth Army; the next month, he was promoted to colonel general. An aggressive, capable commander, Model helped convince Hitler to delay plans for Operation CITADEL, leading to the German defeat in the July 5–13, 1943, Battle of Kursk.

Model became commander of Army Group North in January 1944 and was promoted to field marshal that March. The same month, he took over an army group in the southern Soviet Union. Again and again, he proved his talent in defensive warfare, hampering the Soviet advance. Hitler sent his expert in defensive warfare to various places where an Allied breakthrough was imminent. Model became known as “Hitler’s Fireman.”

Transferred to the Western Front in August 1944 as supreme commander (Oberbefehlshaber West) and simultaneously commander of Army Group B, Model initially believed that he could replicate his successful defensive tactics developed in the east. Enormous Allied superiority, however, disabused him of this notion. After only 18 days, he reverted to command of Army Group B only. During September 17–26, Model blunted the Allied drive in Operation MARKET-GARDEN. In December 1944, he was increasingly drawn into planning the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive.

German field marshal Walther Model proved himself a master at defensive warfare on the Eastern Front. (Keystone/Getty Images)

In 1945, Model was charged with defending the Ruhr, clashing with Hitler when the latter refused to allow him to retreat. On the destruction of his encircled army group, Model issued official discharge orders to all of his troops to facilitate their reintegration into postwar Germany. He then committed suicide on April 21, 1945, in Lintorf near Duisburg, Germany.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Ardennes Offensive; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; France, Battle for; Kursk, Battle of; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Ruhr Land Campaign; Scheldt, Battles of the

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Mölders, Werner (1913–1941)

German Air Force colonel. Born on March 18, 1913, in Gelsenkirchen, Germany, Werner Mölders was commissioned in the army in 1934 after two years at the Dresden Military Academy. He applied for flight training but failed the centrifugal chair test. Through sheer force of will, Mölders overcame his motion sickness and earned his pilot's badge in 1936. Two years later, he replaced Adolf Galland as the leader of the fighter squadron of the Kondor Legion during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939).

Mölders's greatest contribution to aerial combat occurred during his service in Spain. He realized that the tactics of World War I were obsolete and ineffective with high-speed modern aircraft. Rather than keeping his planes in a tight three-plane "V" formation, he experimented with flying them widely spaced and paired in four-plane flights. This formation has been called the "Finger Four" and is still used by air forces to this day. The formation allowed the wingman to cover the lead pilot as he made his attack, without trying to maintain formation. This tactical innovation would eventually be adopted by every air force. Such tactics enabled Mölders to emerge from the Spanish Civil War as its leading ace, with 14 victories.

After the start of World War II, Mölders rose rapidly through the Luftwaffe ranks, culminating in September 1941 with his appointment as general of fighters. Along the way, he had been awarded the Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and had scored 115 victories. Summoned back to Berlin from the Eastern Front to attend the funeral of Ernst Udet, Mölders was killed in a plane crash at Breslau-Hundsfeld Airfield (Germany) on November 22, 1941.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Germany, Air Force; Spanish Civil War; Udet, Ernst

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Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich (1890–1986)

Soviet foreign minister (1939–1949). Born Vyacheslav Skriabin in the village of Kukarka, Viatsk Province, Russia, on March 9, 1890, Molotov became involved in underground revolutionary activities, and in 1906, he joined Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party. In 1909, Molotov was arrested and exiled. On completion of his sentence in 1911, he moved to Saint Petersburg, where he joined the staff of the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda*. While there, he met Joseph Stalin, who was one of the editors. By the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, Molotov had become one of Stalin's most loyal followers, and as Stalin's star ascended in the 1920s, so did that of Molotov.

In 1926, Molotov became a full member of the Politburo, where he led attacks on Stalin's political adversaries. During the 1930s, he faithfully assisted Stalin in carrying out agricultural collectivization and the massive purges of the party and armed forces, for which Stalin rewarded his diligent henchman with a succession of increasingly important positions.

Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov signing the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow, August 23, 1939. German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Soviet leader Josef Stalin look on. (National Archives)

In May 1939, Molotov replaced the internationalist Maxim Litvinov as foreign minister. Although Molotov had no diplomatic experience, his appointment served as a signal that Stalin was seeking to reach accommodation with Germany. Accordingly, on August 23, 1939, Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow. In November 1940, Molotov went to Berlin to confer with Adolf Hitler about further defining German and Soviet spheres of influence, but the negotiations failed, and Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union.

When the German invasion commenced on June 22, 1941, it was Molotov, not Stalin, who informed the nation in a radio broadcast; Stalin apparently was incapacitated by shock. During the war, Molotov dealt

extensively with the Soviets' Western allies, but by the end of the war, his stubborn pursuit of Soviet goals and disagreeable demeanor made him one of the symbols of the emerging Cold War. His diplomatic counterparts nicknamed him "Iron Bottom" for his obstinacy.

After World War II, Molotov went into political eclipse. He stepped down as foreign minister in 1949, and he was expelled from the Communist Party in 1962 following a dispute with Nikita Khrushchev. Rehabilitated in 1984 after spending two decades in political obscurity, Molotov died in Moscow on November 8, 1986.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph

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Monitors

Monitors were specialized shore bombardment warships. Heavily armed for their size and armored, the ship type evolved from John Ericsson's iron turreted *Monitor* of the American Civil War. Monitors generally mounted their main guns in a turret amidships and, because of their large guns and armor, were quite slow. Of broad beam and shallow draft, they were designed to operate in coastal waters and rivers and were not intended for sea service. The U.S. Navy especially but also the Royal Navy built a number of these ships.

Monitors saw service in World War I in a shore bombardment role. The British had 35 monitors in service by 1916, mounting main batteries of 12-, 14-, or 15-inch guns. Three of them mounted single 18-inch guns. The monitors saw action in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the English Channel and were used to destroy enemy forts and provide support for troops ashore.

A few monitors remained to see service in World War II. The British monitor *Terror* defended Malta against possible attack by the Italian Navy and also provided shore bombardment to support operations in North Africa. HMS *Erebus* and *Terror* (both launched in 1916) mounted a main armament of two 15-inch guns and displaced 8,450 tons at deep load.

Both ships received additional armor and antiaircraft gun protection during World War II, increasing their deep load displacement to some 9,400 tons in the *Terror* and 9,800 tons in the *Erebus*, although they were capable of a speed of 12 knots. Based at Singapore when the war began, the *Terror* was dispatched to the Mediterranean, where it played an important role in Operation COMPASS (December 7, 1940–February 7, 1941), conducting numerous fire missions in support of British and British Empire troops ashore. The *Terror* was slightly damaged by a mine on February 22, 1941, and heavily damaged by near misses from German bombs in an air attack on February 23. It went down off Derna, Libya, on February 24. The entire crew got off without loss.

The *Erebus* helped protect Britain from German invasion in 1940 and then was moved north to defend the base at Scapa Flow. In 1942 it acted as a guard ship for the port of Trincomalee, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where it was damaged in a Japanese air attack that April. Repaired in India, it took part in the invasion of Madagascar and then in the invasions of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and Normandy (June 6, 1944). It survived the war and was broken up in 1947.

The last of the British monitors were the *Roberts* (commissioned in 1941) and *Abercrombie* (commissioned in 1943). Mounting two 15-inch guns, they had a deep load displacement of 9,500 to 9,900 tons. The *Roberts* was badly damaged when it was hit by two 1,100-pound German bombs, while the *Abercrombie* was badly damaged by a mine on September 9, 1943, during the Allied invasion of Italy and spent considerable time in dry dock at Taranto.

Significant repair did not begin until January 1944, so the *Abercrombie* missed the Normandy Invasion. The *Abercrombie* was again damaged, this time by two mines, off Malta on August 24, 1944. The *Roberts* took part in the Normandy Invasion. The *Abercrombie* was broken up in 1954, the *Roberts* in 1965.

The Romanian Navy also operated seven old river monitors during the war, all of which had served in World War I. Four were built for the

Romanian Navy in 1907–1908, and three had seen service with the Austro-Hungarian Navy during World War I and had been acquired with the defeat of the Central Powers. The monitors operated on the Danube, were heavily armored and yet of light draft, and were designed to provide fire support to troops ashore. The four original Romanian monitors were the *Ion Bratineau*, *Alexandru Lahovary*, *Lascar Catargia*, and *Mihail Kogalniceanu*. Displacing 670 tons and 208 feet 3 inches in length, they drew only 5.5 feet of water. During World War II, they were each armed with three 4.7-inch (120mm) guns and one 3-inch and two 47mm antiaircraft guns. The three ex–Austro-Hungarian monitors were smaller; they displaced 443 to 541 tons and were 183 feet 6 inches to 203 feet 3 inches in length and were each armed with two or three 4.7-inch (120mm guns). All three also mounted 37mm and 20mm antiaircraft guns.

WILLIAM L. PADGETT AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Great Britain, Navy; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Romania, Navy; Scapa Flow; Sicily, Invasion of

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Monnet, Jean Omer Marie Gabriel (1888–1979)

French diplomat. Born in Cognac, France, on November 9, 1888, Jean Omer Marie Gabriel Monnet was the son of a prosperous vintner. At age 16 he joined the family firm, traveling extensively on its business affairs in Great Britain, Europe, North America, and the Middle East. In the autumn of 1914, Monnet used his business connections to assist French government officials in establishing a unified purchasing system for war supplies in Canada, and he later represented France in the inter-Allied economic bureaucracy established in 1917 to rationalize Allied purchasing and shipping.

From 1919 to 1922, Monnet was deputy secretary-general to the new League of Nations and was instrumental in raising an international loan that facilitated Austrian postwar economic reconstruction. From 1923 until the late 1930s, he was a partner in various American financial firms, raising further international European reconstruction loans in the 1920s and attempting to do the same in China for much of the 1930s.

Monnet was an early opponent of Adolf Hitler, and after the 1938 Munich Agreement, he believed that massive French rearmament and the rapid expansion of his country's air capacity were essential. Monnet represented France in the United States, attempting to facilitate major French purchases of American warplanes. After Britain and France declared war on Germany in September 1939, Monnet was the French member on the joint Allied purchasing commission that sought to unify Allied overseas war purchases and finance. Before France signed an armistice with Germany in June 1940, Monnet and General of Brigade Charles de Gaulle were instrumental in persuading British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill to offer the French, albeit unavailingly, an indissoluble Anglo-French union should they continue the fight.

After the fall of France, Monnet unobtrusively became a key member of the British Supply Commission based in Washington. There, his prewar links with numerous influential Americans, many in crucial positions within the wartime bureaucracy, proved invaluable. Monnet relentlessly lobbied the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration for exponential increases in industrial war production and for enormously expanded aid to Great Britain, playing significant roles in devising the details both of Lend-Lease aid to Britain and of the January 1942 Victory Program, which vastly expanded American wartime industrial output.

Monnet spent most of 1943 in Algiers, helping effect a united front for France's liberation between Vichy and Gaullist Free French forces in Algiers, an organization that General de Gaulle soon dominated. Monnet returned to the United States in October 1943 as France's commissioner-at-large to negotiate presidential recognition of de Gaulle's position, a formal Lend-Lease agreement, and relief and reconstruction aid for liberated France.

Monnet returned to France in November 1945, where, as commissioner general for planning, he speedily devised the Monnet Plan for French economic revival and modernization—a scheme driven by a mixture of

democratic planning and foreign economic assistance. A brilliant success, the Monnet Plan became a model for economic planning through the democratic process.

The major architect of the European Coal and Steel Community of 1950, Monnet became the president of its High Authority. He remained a passionate advocate for and driving force behind greater European unity and is widely considered the father of the European Common Market of 1957. Monnet died at Montfort-l'Amaury, France, on March 16, 1979.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; France; Lend-Lease; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Montélimar, Battle of (August 21–28, 1944)

Key battle following Operation DRAGOON, the Allied invasion of southern France. The battle around Montélimar saw the heaviest fighting of the northerly advance. DRAGOON, delayed by a shortage of landing craft, began on August 15, 1944. Lieutenant General Jacob Devers commanded the 6th Army Group, composed of U.S., French, Canadian, and British troops. Landing initially at Saint-Tropez, the Allies quickly secured the ports of Marseille and Toulon.

Having failed to stop the Allies, the Germans made the logical decision to withdraw. On the night of August 17, the German Armed Forces Supreme Command ordered Colonel General Johannes Blaskowitz's Army Task Group G to evacuate southern France. German forces then began to move to the northeast.

To cut off the Germans and capture as many as possible, VI Corps commander Major General Lucian K. Truscott organized a mobile task force under his chief of staff, Brigadier General Frederick B. Butler, on August 17.

Its job was to drive north, link up with the French Resistance, and cut off General Friedrich Paul Wiese's retreating German Nineteenth Army. It set out on August 18.

Task Force Butler advanced north along the Rhône River, and on the night of August 20, Truscott ordered it to move the next morning to the town of Montélimar east of the Rhône, through which Highway 7 and a railroad line ran north. It was to set up blocking positions up the Rhône River Valley in that vicinity.

Truscott guessed correctly that the Germans intended to use the valley as their major escape route north. Major General John E. Dahlquist's 36th Infantry Division would then come up in support. Task Force Butler began arriving in the area on August 21. As most bridges across the Rhône had been destroyed, the Americans hoped to trap Lieutenant General Wend von Wietersheim's 11th Panzer Division at Montélimar.

The eight-day battle there took place beginning on August 21 in a rough quadrilateral area about 15 miles north and 10 miles east of Montélimar. Despite Truscott's repeated orders to move as quickly as possible, the 36th Infantry Division was handicapped by an acute shortage of gasoline. The 141st Infantry Regiment of the 36th Infantry Division did not begin arriving at Montélimar on August 23. Repulsed by German artillery, it had to settle for securing positions north of the town and east of Highway 7. Dahlquist, meanwhile, believed that his men held the town itself and the highway.

Most German units were still south of Montélimar, and by August 24, the American units had set up blocking positions. The Germans were now forced to find other escape routes east of Montélimar. Three German divisions, the 198th Infantry, 337th Infantry, and 11th Panzer, were ordered to hold off the 36th Infantry Division to the south while opening escape routes north. The Germans captured an American operations order, and on August 25, they struck at the hinge between the 141st and 142nd Infantry Regiments at Bonlieu. After two assaults, they breached the American line there. A substantial number of Germans troops and tanks escaped north through this opening toward the Drôme River before it was closed on August 27.

Other German troops managed to push up Highway 7, although they were subject to heavy artillery fire. Still others made their way west across the Rhône bridges, usually at night to avoid American artillery and aircraft strafing attacks. Not until August 28 did the 141st Infantry Regiment finally

gain full control of the heights north of Montélimar, allowing the remainder of the 36th Infantry Division to enter the town and conduct mopping-up operations.

Although the Americans failed to trap the Germans, they did inflict losses of 2,000 motor vehicles, 1,000 horses, 5 railroad guns, and 40 other artillery pieces. They also took more than 3,000 prisoners. Unfortunately for the Allies, most of the Germans had escaped north to continue the fight.

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See also

Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von; Devers, Jacob Loucks; DRAGOON, Operation; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.

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Montgomery, Alfred Eugene (1891–1961)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born in Omaha, Nebraska, on June 12, 1891, Alfred Eugene Montgomery graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1912. He briefly served aboard cruisers before transferring to submarines and commanded the *F-1*, which was lost in a collision in December 1917. As a lieutenant commander, Montgomery commissioned and commanded the submarine *R-20* between 1918 and 1920.

Montgomery earned his pilot's wings in 1922 and was closely identified thereafter with naval aviation. In the late 1920s, he was the air officer of the aircraft carrier *Langley*. Montgomery commanded the Seattle Naval Air

Station during 1930–1932. He was executive officer of the carrier *Ranger* in the Pacific from 1934 to 1936 and its captain in the Atlantic from 1940 to 1941. Montgomery remained on board as chief of staff and aide to the commander of aircraft in the Atlantic Fleet in 1941 and 1942. In June 1942 as a rear admiral, he took command of the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas.

From August 1943, Montgomery commanded Carrier Division 12 and later Carrier Division 3 in the Pacific theater. He was almost continually engaged in operations until December 1944, commanding task groups that were usually composed of four fast carriers with escorting vessels. He participated in nearly all of the major Pacific engagements of that period, including the major fleet actions in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944) and the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944), gaining a reputation as an aggressive, forceful leader.

Rotated back to the United States, Montgomery commanded the air component of the West Coast Fleet (1945) and, as a vice admiral, the Pacific Fleet Air Forces (1945–1946), rising by 1947 to command of the Fifth Fleet and then the First Task Fleet. Reverting to his permanent rank of rear admiral, he held commands in Alaska and Bermuda before retiring in June 1951 as a vice admiral, leaving his final assignment as commander of fleet air at Jacksonville, Florida. Montgomery died in Bremerton, Washington, on December 15, 1961.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; United States Navy

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Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law (1887–1976)

British Army field marshal. Whether considered a latter-day Marlborough or Wellington or “the most overrated general of World War II,” Bernard Law

Montgomery remains the most controversial senior Allied commander of World War II. Montgomery was born in Kennington, London, on November 17, 1887. He entered the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1907 and the next year was commissioned into the Royal Warwickshire Regiment. Montgomery served in India, and in World War I he fought on the Western Front, where he was wounded. Montgomery ended the war as a division staff officer.

Following occupation duty in Germany after the war, Montgomery graduated from the Staff College at Camberley in 1921 and returned there as an instructor five years later. In 1929, he rewrote the infantry training manual. He then served in the Middle East, commanded a regiment, and was chief instructor at the Quetta Staff College from 1934 to 1937. Between 1937 and 1938, he commanded the 1st Brigade.

Montgomery then took command of the 3rd Infantry Division, which he led in France as part of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) after the start of World War II. He distinguished himself in the British retreat to Dunkerque (May 26–June 4, 1940), and in July he took command of V Corps in Britain, protecting the English southern coast.

In April 1941 Montgomery assumed command of XII Corps, which held the crucial Kent area in England. He established himself as a thoroughly professional soldier; he was also very much the maverick. Montgomery helped plan the disastrous Dieppe Raid (August 19, 1942) but left to command the First Army in the planned Allied invasion of North Africa. On August 13 following the death of General William Henry Ewart Gott, Montgomery took command of the Eighth Army in Egypt, repulsing Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s attack at Alam Halfa (August 13–September 7, 1942).

General Bernard L. Montgomery, commander of the British Eighth Army in Egypt, observes his tanks moving forward, November 1942. (National Archives)

Montgomery rebuilt the Eighth Army's morale. Known for his concern for his men's welfare, he was also deliberate as a commander. In the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942), his superior forces defeated and drove westward German and Italian forces under Rommel. Montgomery's less than rapid advance, however, allowed the bulk of the Axis forces to escape. Montgomery was promoted to full general that November.

Following the Axis surrender in the May 3–13, 1943, Battle of Tunis, Montgomery played an active role in the July 9–August 22 invasion of Sicily, and he led the Eighth Army in Italy in September, where his forces again carried out a leisurely advance, this time north to Naples. He returned to Britain to assist in planning for the June 6, 1944, Allied invasion of Normandy, then temporarily commanded its ground forces in the landing until General Dwight Eisenhower moved his headquarters to France in September.

Promoted to field marshal in September 1944, Montgomery commanded the British 21st Army Group. He sought to finish the war by the end of the year with a daring invasion of Germany across the Rhine at Arnhem in Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26), a surprise from the conservative Montgomery. The plan, however, failed. Montgomery's forces

defended the north shoulder in the German Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). His claim in a press conference that British troops had in effect rescued the Americans caused considerable acrimony. Montgomery then directed the drive into northern Germany.

Following the war, Montgomery commanded British occupation troops in Germany between May 1945 and June 1946. From 1946 to 1948, he was chief of the Imperial General Staff. He next served as chairman of the West European commanders in chief from 1948 to 1951 and as commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe and deputy supreme commander between 1951 and 1958. He retired in September 1958. A prolific writer, he drafted his memoirs that same year. Montgomery died at Isington Mill, Hampshire, England, on March 24, 1976.

COLIN F. BAXTER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Alam Halfa, Battle of; Ardennes Offensive; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dieppe Raid; El Alamein, Battle of; Italy Campaign; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Sicily, Invasion of; Tunis, Battle of

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Moreell, Ben (1892–1978)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born on September 14, 1892, in Salt Lake City, Utah, Ben Moreell was raised in St. Louis, Missouri. After graduating from Washington University with a degree in civil engineering and spending four years with the Engineering Department of the city of St. Louis, Moreell was commissioned a lieutenant (junior grade) in the Civil Engineer Corps of the U.S. Navy in 1917. He spent World War I in the Azores.

After the war, Moreell remained with the navy. He then served in the United States and in Haiti. From 1926 to 1930, he was with the Bureau of Yards and Docks. After a period in France studying European engineering techniques, Moreell returned to the bureau. In 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and chief of the Civil Engineers of the U.S. Navy, as a rear admiral.

In his new position, Moreell oversaw the construction of U.S. bases around the world. To build the infrastructure required by the navy during the war, he spent $9.25 billion. By the time the United States entered the war in 1941, Moreell had 70,000 men engaged in construction projects worldwide. All bases were built by private firms employing civilian laborers, and wherever possible, Moreell worked on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract basis rather than cost-plus-percentage contract basis. Worried that construction would stop in the event of war because civilians were prohibited by international law from carrying weapons, Moreell recommended the creation of a militarized construction battalion.

Following the capture of U.S. construction workers by the Japanese, Moreell received authorization from the Bureau of Navigation on January 5, 1942, to recruit a naval construction regiment composed of three battalions. Taking their name from “c” and “b,” the initials for “construction battalions,” the Seabees greatly aided the naval war effort by building many naval facilities around the world. During the war, the Seabees constructed 40 domestic bases and 600 advanced bases in the Pacific and Atlantic. In 1945, Moreell received the Distinguished Service Medal for his work.

Moreell was promoted to vice admiral in February 1944, the first Civil Engineer Corps officer to hold that rank, and then to admiral in June 1946. He retired from active duty that September and then headed a number of construction and steel businesses. Moreell died in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on July 30, 1978.

PAMELA FELTUS

See also

Seabees; United States Navy

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Morgan, Frederick Edgeworth (1894–1967)

British Army general. Born on February 5, 1894, in Paddockwood, Kent, in England, Frederick Morgan graduated from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, in 1913 with a commission in the artillery. He served with the Canadian Corps in World War I, in India from 1919 to 1935, and later in the War Office. A logistician, Morgan commanded support forces for the 1st Armoured Division beginning in 1938, and he fought with that division in the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940). He then commanded the 55th Division and I Corps.

Morgan next held various staff positions, including that of assistant to U.S. Army lieutenant general Dwight D. Eisenhower in planning the November 8, 1942, invasion of North Africa (Operation TORCH). Promoted to temporary lieutenant general in 1942, Morgan was named chief of staff to the supreme Allied commander (COSSAC) in March 1943 and charged with developing the plans for the cross-channel invasion of Normandy (June 6, 1944).

The most significant aspect of Morgan's assignment was that the supreme Allied commander would not be appointed for another nine months. Working without standard command guidance, Morgan and his staff planned a three-division initial landing and the use of artificial harbors (Mulberries). In 1944 when U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower was designated supreme Allied commander and British general Bernard Montgomery was designated land forces commander, Montgomery criticized the landing plan as too narrow, and Eisenhower agreed. The plan was then expanded to a five-division front. It was possible to do so in a relatively short period because Morgan and his staff had done most of the detailed staff work on the potential lateral landing beaches. It was one of the most brilliant pieces of operational staff work in all military history.

Eisenhower nonetheless insisted on bringing along his existing chief of staff, Major General Walter Bedell Smith. Morgan agreed to step down and serve as Bedell Smith's deputy chief of staff, a post he filled effectively until the end of the war. His unselfish action made it possible for the COSSAC staff to accept the changes and then complete the necessary staff work on time.

Morgan retired in 1946 and served briefly as head of the United Nations Relief and Recovery Administration (UNRRA) in Germany. Between 1951 and 1956, he played an important role in the development of British atomic energy. He died in Northwood, Middlesex, England, on March 19, 1967.

JOHN F. VOTAW AND DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Mulberries; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; TORCH, Operation

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Morgenthau, Henry, Jr. (1891–1967)

U.S. secretary of the treasury (1934–1945) and friend and adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Born in New York City on May 11, 1891, the son of a prominent and politically active Jewish real estate speculator, Henry Morgenthau Jr. chose to become a gentleman farmer on an estate in Dutchess Country, New York. There, a neighbor, the rising young Democratic politician Franklin Roosevelt, soon became his close friend.

From 1929 to 1932, when Roosevelt was governor of the State of New York, Morgenthau was his commissioner of conservation.

In 1933, Roosevelt became president of the United States and appointed Morgenthau to head the Farm Credit Association. A year later, Morgenthau became secretary of the treasury, serving as one of the president's most trusted advisers on both domestic and international affairs.

An early opponent of National Socialism and militarism, Morgenthau argued from the mid-1930s that the United States could not remain aloof from international affairs, and he urged forceful U.S. action in both Europe and Asia. He supported economic sanctions against aggressor nations, and in 1937, he prevailed on Roosevelt to assist China financially against Japan. In 1941, when Japan occupied bases in southern French Indochina, Morgenthau advocated a complete American economic embargo of Japan. He likewise urged the imposition of economic sanctions on Germany. Understandably, Morgenthau was also a leading advocate of massive increases in U.S. defense spending.

Almost a year before Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), the Treasury Department was heavily involved in developing the Lend-Lease program to assist Great Britain and other nations, which had been passed by Congress in the spring of 1941. Morgenthau successfully financed the extremely costly U.S. war effort while keeping inflation and interest rates low. Under his direction, well-organized campaigns persuaded the American public to purchase over $12.9 billion in war bonds.

Morgenthau headed the U.S. delegation to the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, where proposals were drafted for two financial institutions to fund postwar reconstruction—the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He also strongly supported the creation of the United Nations.

In early 1944, Morgenthau complained to Roosevelt of the State Department's disinterest in assisting Jewish Holocaust survivors in Europe, impelling Roosevelt to create the War Refugee Board. Later that year, hoping to destroy defeated Germany's future war-making potential, Morgenthau drafted a harsh proposal to divide that country into separate states and dismantle its industrial capacity. This plan was ultimately reversed by the State and War Departments.

After Roosevelt's death in April 1945, Morgenthau's influence declined.

Three months later, he resigned. For the next decade, he chaired Jewish philanthropic organizations, raising funds for Israel. Morgenthau died at Poughkeepsie, New York, on February 6, 1967.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Lend-Lease; Morgenthau Plan; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United Nations, Formation of; Document 196

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Morgenthau Plan (1944)

Abortive plan first conceptualized by U.S. secretary of the treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. in 1944 that called for the de-industrialization, pastoralization, and partitioning of Germany after World War II. At the time Morgenthau presented his plan to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, he was perhaps the president's closest and most influential adviser. By the spring of 1944, Morgenthau had virtually all of his plan in place; its goal, quite simply, was to penalize the Germans for their behavior prior to and during the war and to ensure that the nation would never again be able to menace any other state in the international community by force of arms. Roosevelt was initially supportive of the plan, which also would play well with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

In a nutshell, the Morgenthau Plan called for the division of Germany into two states—north and south. An "international" zone would be established in the west (chiefly the Ruhr Valley), where occupying nations could control the region's raw materials and remaining factories. The Saar would be handed over to France, while East Prussia and Upper Silesia would be given to Poland. All heavy industry would either be dismantled and divided among the victors or destroyed. Reparations would not be demanded of the Germans,

who would essentially have to adjust to farming and shop-keeping. Losses incurred before and during the war by Germany's neighbors would be partially covered by the sale or transfer of German industry and heavy equipment.

In September 1944, Morgenthau traveled with Roosevelt to the Second Quebec Conference, where Morgenthau presented his plan to British prime minister Winston Churchill, who was less than enamored of it. Churchill, however, was seeking a large American loan and so ultimately signed off on it. Churchill did demand one major change: although he backed the pastoralization of Germany, he did not agree that partitioning Germany was a wise idea. Clearly, he was already concerned that the Soviets might take advantage of this and annex what they could before the war was over.

Later that autumn, news of the plan was leaked to the American press. Roosevelt denied its existence, but the damage was done. The U.S. State Department strongly objected to Morgenthau's plan, and the German government used the scheme for propaganda purposes, urging the German people to fight on lest they be eviscerated by the Allies. Nevertheless, parts of the plan remained part of Allied policy toward Germany until early 1946.

The problems with enforcing such a harsh postwar settlement on Germany were multifold. First, the considerable suffering of a sizable number of Germans between 1945 and 1947 greatly destabilized the country, making communism seem palatable. The Soviets appealed to the German people with offers of a higher standard of living. Their ulterior motive, however, was to control all of Germany. Also, a prostrate Germany, which had historically been the engine of economic growth in Europe, made the reconstruction of all of Europe far slower and more problematic.

By early 1947, the Harry S. Truman administration had virtually abandoned the Morgenthau Plan amid widespread hardship and criticism throughout Europe. The Marshall Plan, a massive economic scheme to stabilize and rebuild Europe that was announced in June 1947, specifically included the western zones of Germany as a potential recipient nation. The growing Cold War convinced policy makers that a stable, prosperous Germany was essential to the reconstruction of Western Europe and would thus provide a bulwark against Soviet adventurism from the east. The western zones of Germany, which became the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, became an integral part of Marshall Plan funding, and by the early 1950s it

had become fully reintegrated into the Western orbit. This included membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the rearming of the country.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Germany; Germany, Postwar Occupation of; Morgenthau, Henry, Jr.; Quebec Conference, Second; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Morison, Samuel Eliot (1887–1976)

Noted U.S. naval historian and reserve rear admiral who chronicled the naval events of World War II. Born on July 9, 1887, in Boston, Massachusetts, Samuel Eliot Morison attended Harvard University from 1904 to 1908. After one year spent studying at the École des Sciences Politiques in Paris, he returned to Harvard, where he completed his doctorate in 1913. He taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley, and then joined the history faculty at Harvard in 1915, where he remained until his retirement 50 years later.

Morison spent three years at Oxford (1922–1925) as the first Harmsworth Professor of American History, and he retraced Columbus's voyages (1937–1940) in preparation for his biography of the Italian explorer, *Admiral of the Ocean Sea* (1942), for which he received the Pulitzer Prize. Morison's love of the sea, so evident in his early work *The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783–1860* (1921), and his belief in Francis Parkman's participatory style of history led him to undertake his most difficult project after the United States entered World War II.

Too old to receive a commission, Morison lobbied President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who appointed him the navy's official historian in 1942.

Commissioned a lieutenant commander in the naval reserve and authorized to travel at will, Morison obtained berths on combat vessels ranging from patrol boats to heavy cruisers, and he witnessed several pivotal battles. Given complete access to files, Morison also attended planning sessions for crucial operations such as TORCH, the November 8, 1942, Allied invasion of North Africa, and conducted after-action interviews with commanders. The resulting *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* appeared in 15 volumes between 1947 and 1962.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1951, Morison also received the Medal of Freedom in 1964, the highest civilian decoration that the president of the United States can bestow. Although *John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography* (1957) won Morison a second Pulitzer, biographer Gregory Pfitzer identified *The Oxford History of the American People* as Morison's crowning glory. Morison died in Boston on May 15, 1976.

DAVID R. SNYDER

See also

TORCH, Operation; United States Navy

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Morshead, Sir Leslie James (1889–1959)

Australian Army lieutenant general. Born in Ballarat, Victoria, Australia, on September 18, 1889, Leslie James Morshead was educated at the Teachers' Training College, Melbourne. His military career began when, as a schoolteacher, he had responsibility for a school cadet unit; this led to service in the militia and the army during two world wars.

Following Britain's declaration of war against Germany in 1914, Morshead enlisted as an officer in the newly raised Australian Imperial Force

(AIF) and served at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. He ended the war as a lieutenant colonel. Following the war, Morshead entered business as the Sydney manager for the Orient Steam Navigation Company but also served in the reserves. In October 1939, Morshead returned to active duty as a brigadier in command of the 18th Brigade of the 2nd AIF.

Posted with his brigade to the Middle East, Morshead was promoted to major general in January 1941 and took command of the newly formed 9th Division. Soon afterward, he was confronted in Libya by the advance of Axis forces under German lieutenant general Erwin Rommel. He withdrew his force into the former Italian fortress at Tobruk and was appointed fortress commander on April 9. Surviving a 242-day German siege, Tobruk's tenacious defense presented a threat to Rommel's flank and prevented an Axis advance into Egypt. Promoted to lieutenant general in February 1942 and knighted that same year, Morshead commanded all Australian forces in the Middle East and played an important role in the Battle of El Alamein (October 23-November 4, 1942).

In early 1943, Morshead returned to Australia with his 9th Division, leading it to New Guinea in September 1943 for the Huon Peninsula Campaign. In November 1943, Mors-head became general officer commanding (GOC) of the Second Australian Army and GOC of the New Guinea Force. In July 1944, he assumed command of I Australian Corps, which eventually liberated Borneo.

Morshead retired from the army in January 1946 and returned to the Orient Steam Navigation Company, becoming its Australian general manager in 1948. He is considered Australia's greatest field commander of the war. Morshead died at Sydney on September 26, 1959.

DAVID M. GREEN AND PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

El Alamein, Battle of; North Africa Campaign; Tobruk, First Battle of; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Mortars

The mortar began as a short high-angle-fire weapon used in siege warfare. During World War I it was well adapted to static trench warfare, and all participants employed some version of it. Mortars were an excellent infantry weapon, and their plunging fire rendered them most effective in trench warfare. Proper trench mortars, for which the two chief criteria were ease of use and portability, appeared in 1915. Most mortar crews were infantrymen trained to use the weapon. This meant that each unit could call for fire support when it was needed.

The mortar evolved from the heavy trench mortar of World War I into the Brandt- and Stokes-type mortars of the 1930s. The latter were battlefield weapons served by a team that delivered an effective shell when conventional artillery was unavailable. Setup and firing was a quick process, and in view of the short range of mortars, fire control and correction were relatively easy for trained crews.

The mortar, in comparison with artillery, has the benefit of simplicity, and it is cheaper to manufacture than a gun or howitzer. As with the howitzer, it has a high angle of fire. Its shell has excellent antipersonnel characteristics. As it descends from the near vertical, the shell, when detonated, produces a 360-degree blast and shrapnel effect, unlike the less effective low-angle gun shell. The mortar also can be used to overcome obstacles to direct fire, such as buildings, trenches, and hills. Lighter mortars are mobile, especially in terrain into which guns have difficulty penetrating, such as mountainous and wooded ground.

Unlike the gun, the mortar has a low chamber pressure and a smooth barrel, factors that reduce wear on the barrel and thus prolong the effective accuracy and life of the weapon. As a tactical weapon, it is easy to conceal, and it can be fired from a trench, making it possible, although not desirable, to have mortars in the front line.

In World War II, participants used light and medium mortars at the beginning, with much heavier mortars appearing later, particularly on the Eastern Front in the Soviet Union (see Table 1). Light mortars, of approximately 5cm or 2-inch caliber, were used by, among others, the

Germans, British, Japanese, and Americans. They were issued at the platoon level, the idea being to provide every platoon with a short-range weapon for immediate support. The mortar proved of some value for laying a smoke screen, but the high-explosive content of the shell was effective only for suppressive fire. The illumination shell, however, proved to be of great value at night, enabling a platoon to light up its front in an instant.

Table 1. Mortar Statistics

	United Kingdom	*Germany*	*United States*	*USSR*	*Japan*	*Italy*
Light mortars						
Caliber	2-inch	5cm	60mm	50mm	50mm	45mm
Shell weight (in pounds)	2.25	1.98	3–4	1.9	1.75	1.025
Range, maximum (in yards)	500	550	2,000	800	700	585
Medium mortars						
Caliber	3-inch	8cm	81mm	82mm	80mm	81mm
Shell weight (in pounds)	10	7.72	7–15	6.72	7.4	6.9
Range, maximum (in yards)	2,800	2,625	3,290	3,400	3,100	4,430

British Army airborne troops training in the United Kingdom with a 3-inch mortar, December 1942. (Lt. E. G. Malindine/IWM via Getty Images)

The Germans developed their World War I mortars along both the Brandt and the Stokes patterns to produce the 8cm Granatwerfer 34, which was issued to all German Army battalions in the support or heavy weapon companies that also controlled the heavy machine guns. The German employment of mortars in World War II was closely linked to their use of machine guns in both attack and defense, and their medium mortar teams gained a solid reputation for their work in supporting their infantry.

The Germans, however, regarded the Soviets as the masters of the mortar. The Soviets issued a series of 5cm mortars, but these were overshadowed by their larger-caliber weapons. The 82mm mortar Type M36 (and later, its successors) was the main infantry mortar, and although it fired only a 6.7-pound projectile, the number of mortars available in the Soviet battalion was so high that the effect on German forces was often catastrophic.

The Soviets had an affinity for the mortar, and they began to bring in heavy mortars, increasing in caliber to 160mm. These large-caliber weapons did not so much outrange their smaller brethren as outweigh them in the amount of explosive they could drop onto a target. Whereas the 82mm shell weighed less than 6.71 pounds, the 160mm shell weighed 89.7 pounds. Explosive fillers were 4.5 and 62 pounds, respectively, which meant that the explosive content of the latter was 14 times that of the former.

Development of the mortar in World War II followed two diverse paths. The first was the Allied weapons, whereby range, bomb, and accuracy improvements were seen as most important. These developments led to rifled-barrel mortars, proximity-fuzed and rod-detonated shells, and sighting systems nearly as complex as artillery. The conflict on the Eastern Front, however, led to greatly increased calibers and multibarreled mortars, essential against large masses of attacking infantry.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also
Artillery Doctrine; Artillery Types

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Moscow, Battle of (September 30, 1941–April 1942)

Second major German offensive to seize the Soviet capital following the initial efforts of Operation BARBAROSSA, which began on June 22, 1941. After initial successes in Operation BARBAROSSA, the Wehrmacht appeared to have unimpeded routes to Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. However, the second phase proved to be more difficult for several reasons. Soviet defenses were stiffening after the initial shock of the invasion, and an additional 5 million men in the reserve forces were mobilized and thrown into battle. Also, German leader Adolf Hitler and his generals debated over the next objectives.

The generals considered Moscow the main goal, because it was a vital communication and industrial center and the Soviet capital and because a battle for it offered the best chance of destroying the Red Army and ending the campaign. Hitler, however, initially thought that taking Leningrad and linking up with the Finns should have priority in order to secure the Baltic completely. By mid-August, though, Hitler had changed his mind and focused the main effort on gaining the resources of the Ukraine and the Caucasus, relegating both Leningrad and Moscow to secondary status. He even reinforced his Army Group South, stripping panzer forces from the other two army groups.

Phase two finally began with an assault on Kiev, which fell to the Germans on September 19 and netted 650,000 prisoners. Then, fall rain and mud slowed the German advance in the south. Progress toward Leningrad also ground to a halt, partly because of increased resistance but also because Hitler conceived a new plan. On September 6, he directed that Leningrad was to be encircled, put under siege, and starved into submission, and the Crimea, the Donets Basin, and the Caucasus were to be taken for their coal and oil resources. The encirclement and capture of Moscow received highest priority, with panzer forces previously transferred to the other army groups now returned to Army Group Center; operations began on September 30. Commencement of the new plan, Operation TAIFUN (TYPHOON) effectively brought to an end Operation BARBAROSSA.

The Battle for Moscow breaks generally into three phases: the first German offensive encompassed the period from September 30 to nearly the end of October, the second German offensive took place between November 17 and December 5, and the Soviet counteroffensive lasted from December 6 to the spring of 1942.

General Heinz Guderian’s Second Panzer Group of Army Group Center spearheaded the first German offensive. It took Orel on October 3 and then 17 days later captured 665,000 Soviet prisoners around Vyazma and Bryansk. On October 6, the Germans broke through the Rzhev-Vyazma Line and advanced toward the Mozhaisk Line, an improvised system of fortifications thrown up by the Soviets 50 miles west of Moscow during the summer of 1941. The Germans bypassed the Mozhaisk Line on the south and captured Kaluga on October 12 and Kalinin two days later. On October 18, the Soviets abandoned Mozhaisk after heavy fighting.

Also on October 6, the *rasputitsa* (literally “time without roads,” caused by the fall and spring rain and mud in the Soviet Union) began with the first wet snow, and alternating rain and snow fell almost continuously. At the same time, reinforcements from the Far East Command were on their way to the Moscow Front. These troops had been freed when the Japan-based Soviet spy Richard Sorge assured Joseph Stalin that the Japanese were going to strike south and not attack the Soviet Union, thus honoring their nonaggression pact.

On October 10, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, pulled from commanding the defense of Leningrad, where he had been sent only weeks before, assumed command of Moscow’s defense. With the help of the weather and with the defenders’ backs pressed against the capital, Soviet resistance solidified as the Germans advanced. For the first time in the war, the Soviets were able to confront the Germans head-on and force them to fight for every mile.

On October 15, with the Germans having reached within 50 miles of the capital, the Soviet government and diplomatic community were evacuated from Moscow to Kuibyshev on the Volga. This caused a panic among the Muscovites the next day, who believed they had been abandoned. The announcement on October 17 that Stalin was in the Kremlin, where he remained throughout the war, returned the city to relative calm. On October 20, the State Defense Council declared the capital under a state of siege in order to deal swiftly with any acts of civil disorder.

By October 18, local Soviet counterattacks and the weather slowed the German advance, and between then and the beginning of November, the Germans made little progress. It was in this context that on November 7, ceremonies commemorating the 24th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution were held in Red Square and Stalin made his “Holy Russia” speech, seeking to mobilize resistance to the invaders.

The German failure to capture Moscow with the October offensive raised Soviet civilian and military morale and gave the Soviet high command time to assemble large strategic reserves to the east. At the beginning of November, however, everything pointed to the Germans’ preparation for another all-out attack.

That blow fell on November 16 in the Kalinin-Volokolamsk sector, and in two days the Germans entered Klin, north of Moscow, and Istra, only 15 miles west—the closest the Germans were able to get to Moscow in force. To

the south, Tula, which had been connected to Moscow by a narrow bottleneck, was encircled on December 3 for a short time, but the Soviets counterattacked and quickly reopened the Moscow highway. On December 4, temperatures fell to well below freezing and remained there, stalling the German offensive.

On December 6, the Soviets launched their winter counteroffensive along the Moscow front from Kalinin in the north to Yelets in the south. By December 1, 70 Soviet Far East divisions and another 27 from Central Asia had been transferred to the west. Approximately 20 of these entered the fight around Moscow in December. Although the German offensive, after heavy fighting in December and the first half of January, made fairly good progress on the northern and southern flanks of the front, the advance due west of Moscow was much less successful.

The Soviets' plan had been to encircle the Germans west of the capital, but Hitler had purged some of his generals in Army Group Center and taken supreme command; he ordered a stiffening of the defense east of the Rzhev-Vyazma-Gzhatsk-Yukhnovo Line. By the end of January 1942, the Red Army's counteroffensive came to a virtual standstill. Fierce combat in the Moscow area continued from January until the end of April 1942, by which point the German army had been driven back up to 160 miles from the Soviet capital.

The German failure to take Moscow within six months of its invasion of the Soviet Union was as important symbolically as militarily. It demonstrated both the Soviet determination and ability to defend the capital city and the inability of Hitler to conquer the Soviet Union as he had Western Europe. Apart from being a substantial propaganda blow to Germany, the Battle of Moscow proved that there were definite limits to German military power and marked the end of the German blitzkrieg on the Eastern Front.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; Guderian, Heinz; Stalin, Joseph; Vyazma-Bryansk, Battle for; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Moscow Conference (October 19–30, 1943)

First meeting of the Big Three Allied foreign ministers, yielding the Four-Power Declaration. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt prodded Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1943 for a meeting of the Allied heads of state, and the Soviet leader reluctantly agreed but suggested that their foreign ministers get together in advance. Hoping to enlist the Soviets in the general American plans for postwar cooperation, U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull flew to Moscow. Hull understood that Roosevelt intended to resolve the thorniest questions with Stalin at their subsequent meeting. British foreign minister Anthony Eden generally favored broad American internationalist ideas but also hoped to forestall Soviet expansionism and protect the interests of the exiled Polish government in London, recently infuriated by stories of mass Soviet executions of Polish military officers in the Katyn Forest.

Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov chaired the 12-day meeting in the old Spiridonovka Palace, intent on burnishing the image of Allied cooperation, securing firmer assurances regarding the timing of Operation OVERLORD, and asserting the Soviet Union's right to play some role in Italy. (Moscow had loudly complained that the Anglo-Americans had made a separate peace after Benito Mussolini's collapse.) Hull and Eden affirmed that OVERLORD, the invasion of northern France, would commence in the spring of 1944, although Eden shared British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill's hints of possible modest delays.

Hull's crowning achievement was the acceptance of the statement of general principles regarding postwar cooperation and creation of the United Nations. For Hull, it was particularly important that the Soviets and the British accept the Chinese among the signatories, thereby acknowledging China's status as a major power—one of the "Four Policemen," in Roosevelt's view. The Soviets agreed to the declaration but only after

revising it so as to retain greater freedom in how they might use military or political forces in Eastern Europe after the war. Perhaps naively, Hull and Roosevelt thought that Moscow's commitment to the general principles of cooperation, embodied in the United Nations, outweighed resolving any specific problems at that stage.

Conversely, Eden sought a self-denying pledge from the Soviets regarding future conduct along their western borders and suggested a statement affirming nations' rights to self-determination, similar to the Declaration for Liberated Europe that emerged from the Yalta Conference some 15 months later. But Eden, receiving little support from Hull, failed to budge the Soviets, who would go no further than stating their desire to see an independent Poland—but one favorably disposed toward Moscow.

The conferees set up two joint commissions to address postsurrender issues in Italy and the rest of Europe and proclaimed their intent to punish Nazi war criminals. After agreeing on some general principles and setting the stage for later more substantive discussions, the diplomats concluded their work on October 30. At the closing banquet, Stalin unambiguously volunteered to join the war against Japan after Hitler was defeated. Hull left feeling tremendously pleased by this and by Soviet support for the United Nations. Roosevelt pronounced the spirit of the conference to have been "amazingly good," but Eden and new U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, among others, were already worried about Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe.

MARK F. WILKINSON

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; Hull, Cordell; Katyn Forest Massacre; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Poland; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Document 169

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Moskalenko, Kirill Semenovich (1902–1985)

Soviet Army marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in Grishino in the Donets region of Russia on May 11, 1902, Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko joined the Red Army as a cadet in 1920 and became a battery commander that same year. He joined the Communist Party in 1926 and, following routine military assignments, commanded a mechanized brigade in the Far East in 1935. Moskalenko fought in the 1939–1940 Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War) as an artillery commander in a rifle division.

Promoted to major general in June 1940, Moskalenko commanded the 1st Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade at Kiev at the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. As commander of the XV Rifle Corps, he managed to escape the Kiev encirclement that September and fought in the counteroffensive that saved Moscow in December. From March to July 1942, Moskalenko commanded the Thirty-Eighth Army of the Northern Attack Group on the north Donets River. During July and August, he commanded the First Tank Army and was engaged in heavy fighting along the lower Don River.

During August and September, Moskalenko led the First Guards Army in counterattacks in the August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943, Battle for Stalingrad, then took over the Fortieth Army of the Voronezh Front in October. Promoted to lieutenant general in January 1943 and colonel general that September, he assumed command of the reconstituted Thirty-Eighth Army in Ukraine in October 1943. His forces liberated Kiev and then helped smash German Army Group South, driving the Germans back through the Carpathian Mountains.

After the war, Moskalenko commanded the Moscow Air Defense District. A protégé of Soviet leader Nikita Khru-shchev, he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955. Moskalenko then wrote his memoirs. He died in Moscow on June 17, 1985.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Moscow, Battle of; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Mosley, Sir Oswald Ernald (1896–1980)

British fascist political leader. Born in Mayfair, London, on November 16, 1896, and heir to a wealthy baronetcy, Oswald Ernald Mosley attended the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He served with distinction during World War I until he was invalided in 1916.

After the war, Mosley entered politics, winning a Conservative seat in December 1918 and marrying a wealthy heiress. Mosley became a prominent supporter of the League of Nations but broke with the British government on military expenditure, foreign involvements, and its policy toward Ireland. Arguing that domestic affairs deserved a higher priority, he became an Independent in 1922, winning reelection. Two years later, Mosley stood unsuccessfully for the Labour Party, but he returned to Parliament in 1926. When Labour formed a government in 1929, Mosley became chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. In May 1930, however, the cabinet rejected his radical proposals for economic recovery, and he resigned to establish the New Party.

In the 1931 general election, all 24 New Party candidates were defeated, and Mosley turned to extraparliamentary opposition. After visiting Italy in 1932, he began to establish a British fascist movement, arguing that the future lay with politicians who rejected democracy in favor of efficient economic management and mass political participation. A charismatic and inspiring orator who emphasized patriotic themes, Mosley initially attracted substantial support to the British Union of Fascists, much of it from respectable center-rightists. Mass violence at a huge meeting at Olympia on June 7, 1934, however, repelled many of its early middle-class adherents. So,

too, did the movement's growing anti-Semitism and rough tactics and Mosley's increasing identification with the totalitarian governments in Italy and Germany, which assisted him financially, even though he publicly denied receiving any such subsidies.

With World War II, the British government interned Mosley and his wife in May 1940 for more than three years. Mosley vociferously opposed war with the European dictatorships, the possibility of which he claimed arose only from a conspiracy orchestrated by influential international Jews. After his release for reasons of health in November 1943, he wrote extensively, justifying his prewar policies and advocating a politically and racially united Europe as a means of preserving Western supremacy. Late-20th-century historians admired the innovative economic policies he advocated during the 1920s and early 1930s but condemned his poor political judgment. After the war, Mosley lived primarily in France. He died in Orsay, France, on December 3, 1980.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also
Great Britain

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Moulin, Jean (1899–1943)

French Resistance leader. Born in Béziers (Hérault), France, on June 20, 1899, Jean Moulin was educated as a lawyer. A promising politician, Moulin was France's youngest prefect in 1940, in charge of the Department of Eure-et-Loire. After the armistice, he refused a German order to sign a document falsely accusing Senegalese troops of atrocities. Imprisoned and tortured, Moulin tried to commit suicide.

Ordered by the Germans to remove several leftist mayors in his department, Moulin instead fled France and arrived in London in October

1941. There he became connected with several key resistance groups, most notably those with leftist inclinations. The leader of the Free French, General Charles de Gaulle, soon recognized Moulin's value. At de Gaulle's urging, Moulin parachuted with two assistants into southern France in January 1942 with instructions to unite the fractured Resistance groups.

Jean Moulin united the Resistance groups opposing the Germans in France. Betrayed to the Germans by an informant, he died after undergoing torture and while being transported to Germany. The charismatic Moulin is regarded as a hero of the French Resistance. (Keystone/Getty Images)

In early 1943, Moulin established the Mouvements Unis de la Résistance, an umbrella organization for Resistance groups in the south. Moulin returned briefly to Britain to arrange with the Special Operations Executive for airdrops of arms, radios, and propaganda material.

Back in France in May, Moulin presided over the first meeting of the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR) in Paris on May 27. The meeting

brought together Resistance groups from all regions and ideological perspectives, including the anti-Gaullist communists.

Shortly after the founding of the CNR, Moulin was betrayed by an informer and arrested by the Gestapo near Lyon on June 21. Aware that he had vast knowledge of the French resistance, the Gestapo chief in Lyon, Klaus Barbie, personally oversaw the torture of Moulin during five days, but Moulin revealed nothing. He died on a train on July 8, 1943, probably at Metz, while being transported to Germany. The charismatic Moulin is regarded as the greatest hero and martyr of the French Resistance and one who prevented the various groups from engaging in internecine warfare. Today, the Gestapo headquarters in Lyon where he was tortured is a museum of the French Resistance. In 1964, his remains were reinterred in the Pantheon in Paris.

MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

See also

de Gaulle, Charles; Free French; Resistance; Special Operations Executive

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Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas (1900–1979)

British admiral of the fleet. Born at Frogmore House on the grounds of Windsor Castle, Berkshire, England on June 25, 1900, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas (“Dicky”) Mountbatten was the second son of Admiral of the Fleet Prince Louis of Battenberg (the family adopted the less Germanic name of Mountbatten in 1917, during World War I). Educated at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, and Cambridge University, Mountbatten then accompanied his cousin Edward, the Prince of Wales and future King Edward VIII, on a tour of the Far East.

Mountbatten entered the Royal Navy in 1916 during World War I and served in the Grand Fleet. He rose rapidly in rank, gaining expertise in communications. His first command was the destroyer *Daring* in 1934, and he was promoted to captain in 1937. In June 1939, he took command of the destroyer *Kelly,* and in September he was appointed captain of 5th Destroyer Flotilla. The *Kelly* was mined once, torpedoed twice, and finally sunk off Crete on May 23, 1941.

Mountbatten's exploits, dash, and popularity brought him to the attention of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who selected him to be director of Combined Operations, with the rank of vice admiral. While he was director, several important raids were conducted, most notably against the French seaport of Dieppe on August 19, 1942. This operation was a costly failure, and Mountbatten bears much responsibility for this. The reverse did not affect his popularity, however, and it did provide lessons for future amphibious operations, particularly the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944 (Operation OVERLORD).

British admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, commander of the South-East Asia Command, reads a dispatch at Gatow Airport in Berlin, Germany, before the Potsdam Conference, July 24, 1945. (National Archives)

In August 1943, Churchill convinced U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt to make Mountbatten supreme commander of the South-East Asia Command (SEAC). He took up his post in October, first at Delhi in India and later at Kandy in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). As SEAC commander, he made a number of important decisions, including that to continue fighting during the monsoon season, which resulted in the defeat of the Japanese Fifteenth Army. He took steps to reduce the impact of malaria, and he restored Allied morale. He also played a key role in the defense of Imphal by diverting air assets there. Mountbatten personally took the Japanese surrender at Singapore on September 12, 1945.

The British government did not wish to inflame nationalist sentiment in Burma (Myanmar). As the war ended, Mountbatten therefore ordered that Burmese who had previously collaborated with the Japanese occupation should not suffer reprisals unless they had been personally involved in atrocities. Mountbatten remained at his post until May 1946.

Appointed the last viceroy and first governor-general of India, Mountbatten presided over the independence and division of India into the two states of India and Pakistan. He received an earldom in 1947. Mountbatten was first sea lord between 1955 and 1959, helping to carry out a restructuring of the British armed forces. He then became chief of the Defence Staff in 1960, retiring as an admiral of the fleet five years later. On August 27, 1979, Mountbatten and several other members of his party were assassinated by the Irish Republican Army by means of a radio-controlled bomb set off on his boat, which was en route to Donegal Bay (Republic of Ireland).

EUGENE L. RASOR

See also

Burma Theater; China-Burma-India Theater; Crete, Battle of; Dieppe Raid; Great Britain, Navy; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of

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Mulberries

Artificial harbors constructed to support the Allied invasion of France in June 1944. Early invasion planning for the Allied assault on occupied Europe quickly revealed the need for securing a major port to support the invasion forces and ensure the operation's success. The Dieppe Raid of August 19, 1942, by British and Canadian forces demonstrated to the Allied planners that ports were too difficult to assault directly. It also validated fears that German defenders would be able to destroy vital facilities before a port could be captured.

If the Allies could not capture a major port, they would have to bring their own with them. The British War Office began the planning and construction of two artificial anchorages and ports to support the upcoming Allied invasion of France. The Combined Chiefs of Staff officially approved the artificial port concept at Quebec in August 1943. The project was code-named Mulberry. The Allies would fabricate the two artificial ports in England, tow them across the English Channel, and establish them off the French coast. Mulberry A would support the U.S. invasion beaches, and Mulberry B would support the British beaches.

The prefabricated ports incorporated numerous components that had code names of their own. The first step in the process involved the creation of artificial anchorages known as Gooseberries. Engineers accomplished this feat by positioning and sinking a number of blockships on D-day, June 6, 1944, to create Gooseberries. Five such anchorages were created, two off Omaha Beach for the Americans and three off the British and Canadian beaches. The ships utilized were obsolete U.S., British, Dutch, and French warships and merchant vessels.

Two of the anchorages served as the foundation for the two Mulberries. The outermost breakwater consisted of Bombardons, large floating constructions that were 200 feet in length and 25 feet across and weighed 1,500 tons. These were located approximately 5,000 feet out from the high-water line. They enclosed an outer harbor, and 1,000 to 1,500 yards closer to shore, a row of sunken ships known as Corncobs and large concrete caissons known as Phoenixes created another breakwater to shelter the inner harbor.

The floating and sunken breakwaters protected a series of piers, pier heads, and moorings for large vessels, such as Liberty ships, and smaller landing craft.

Plans called for Mulberry A to have three pier heads, two pontoon causeways, and moorings for seven Liberty ships and five large and seven medium coasters. It was to have a capacity of 5,000 tons of cargo and 1,400 vehicles per day. Construction began on June 7, 1944, with a planned completion date of June 24. On June 10, the engineers completed the Omaha Beach Gooseberry, followed on June 13 by the Utah Beach Gooseberry.

On June 16, the first LST (landing ship, tank) pier went into operation at Omaha Beach, with one vehicle landing every 1.6 minutes. By midnight on June 17, U.S. Navy engineers working on Mulberry A had placed all 24 Bombardons and 32 of 52 Phoenixes, along with mooring facilities for two Liberty ships. They also had completed the western LST pier, with work on the eastern pier under way.

As that work progressed, construction on pontoon causeways at both beaches continued. The first and second pontoon causeway at Omaha entered service on June 10 and 20, respectively. At Utah, the first opened on June 13 and a second on June 16. The initial concept of the artificial port appeared to be proving its worth. Work on the British Mulberry B proceeded at a similar pace.

Unfortunately for the Allies, the worst storm in the English Channel in half a century hit the Normandy coast on June 18, halting all landing operations for three days and, more important, destroying Mulberry A and forcing the Americans to abandon the artificial port. This made capture of the port of Cherbourg all the more important. As feared, however, the German defenders put up a stiff resistance, and the port did not fall until June 27, and only after it had been effectively destroyed. The first Allied cargo did not arrive through Cherbourg until July 16 and even then only in small amounts. By the end of July, cargo arriving in Cherbourg constituted only 25 percent of the total arriving over the beaches at Omaha and Utah.



Supplies being unloaded at the U.S. Mulberry at Omaha Beach off Celleville, France. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The great storm also seriously damaged Mulberry B off the British beaches, but it could be repaired. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, ordered that Mulberry A not be rebuilt and that parts from it be used to complete Mulberry B to the original specifications. When completed, Mulberry B became known as the Harbor at Arromanches. By October, the port enclosed two square miles of water and could berth 7 Liberty ships and 23 coasters at the same time. Intended for use only until French ports were repaired and put back into operation, the artificial harbor remained in service until November 19. By the end of December, disassembly had begun.

While the contribution of the Mulberries did not meet preinvasion expectations because of the storm destruction, the artificial harbors proved invaluable in the Allied supply effort. Fortunately for the Allies, DUKW amphibious trucks and LSTs proved more effective in moving supplies over the beaches than expected and were able to compensate for the shortfalls from the Mulberries. The combination of tonnage delivered over the beaches, through the Mulberries, and through captured French ports enabled Operation OVERLORD to succeed, leading to the victory in France.

STEVE R. WADDELL

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Cherbourg, Capture of; Dieppe Raid; Liberty Ships; Logistics, Allied; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Munich Conference and Preliminaries (1938)

International conference at which the major powers agreed to the territorial dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, yielding the Sudetenland to Adolf Hitler. Hitler's expansion of power both domestically and internationally in the late 1930s was predicated on a mixture of belligerence, bluff, bullying, and inspired political insight. His theme of incorporating all Germans into a greater Germany allowed him to move east, where he believed the Western democracies would not make a stand. In March 1938, he assimilated Austria (the Anschluss), but he claimed to have no interest in Czechoslovakia.

The Czech government in Prague was not particularly concerned. Unlike Austria, the Czechs had strong military and defensive alliances with France and the Soviet Union. The Sudetenland was an industrial area and was hurt by the world economic depression, which only worsened discontent created by the sense that the Czech government discriminated against its German citizens. Encouraged by Berlin, a Nazi movement emerged in the largely German Sudetenland of western Bohemia, and its leader, Konrad Henlein, met with Hitler in late March 1938 and called for immediate justice for his people. The führer, well aware of Czech advantages, preferred what he called a more "evolutionary" arrangement.

Nonetheless, only a month later, Henlein made a speech at Karlsbad demanding autonomy and other concessions for the Sudetenland. Disturbances and clashes between German Czechs and the police followed. The French government openly said that France would fight if Germany

intervened. British prime minister Neville Chamberlain had previously warned that such a conflict would draw in other nations.

Chamberlain did not, however, believe that the Czech situation justified war. He questioned the viability of an artificial multinational state created only as a consequence of World War I. He convinced French premier Édouard Daladier to join in pressing Prague to make a deal, while at the same time hinting to Berlin that intervention could lead to war.

Czech president Eduard Beneš offered a conciliatory approach to meeting the Sudeten German demands, and on May 18, there were talks between representatives of the Sudeten Germans and the Czech government. The next day, however, reports of German troop movements caused widespread confusion. During the next few days, Prague ordered partial mobilization, Sudeten Germans clashed with police, and France and Britain warned Germany about intervention. Hitler, outraged by press implications that he had been forced to back down, told German military leaders on May 28 that he would finish with the Czechs by 1 October.

With tensions growing, French foreign minister Georges Bonnet told Chamberlain that he was prepared to force concessions from Prague, although officially, France stood by its commitments to defend Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain was determined to avoid war, although he remained committed to supporting France.

Chamberlain then received Czech permission to send Lord Walter Runciman as mediator while continuing to warn Hitler of the threat of war. Runciman had about six weeks until Nazi Party meetings in the second week of September, where Hitler was expected to publicly demand concessions. Bonnet assured Chamberlain that if Runciman’s efforts led to a British proposal, Paris would support it, and Prague could go along or stand alone. On September 4, Runciman informed Beneš that the Czechs would have to accept Henlein’s Karlsbad points, and two days later, Beneš yielded. Then talks broke down, however, after reports that Czech police had abused a Sudeten official.

On September 12, Hitler spoke at the annual Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg, demanding redress for the Sudetenland but suggesting no specific remedy. Riots followed immediately thereafter in the Sudetenland, raising the specter of insurrection, which the Germans had long said would provoke their intervention.

On September 13, Chamberlain requested a meeting with Hitler, which took place three days later at Berchtesgaden; Hitler posed as a moderate, calling only for self-determination for the Sudeten Germans. Although he could secure no specifics, Chamberlain decided that annexation of areas with populations that were 50 percent or more German would satisfy the führer. Hitler then agreed not to act unless there was a major incident, and Chamberlain returned to London to consult colleagues and allies. Once the French agreed to the 50 percent plan, Beneš was told to accept it or face German invasion.

On September 22, Chamberlain again met Hitler, this time at Godesberg, only to find that the führer now had upped the ante. He had a map showing areas Germany would occupy by October 1, and he demanded that all Czech officials be withdrawn from them by that date and that all military, economic, or traffic establishments be removed. The Sudeten Free Corps was already occupying towns. Chamberlain then balked, asserting that this was neither self-determination nor what had been agreed on. London and Paris reluctantly decided to withdraw their advice to Prague not to mobilize, and the Godesberg Conference ended on September 24. War seemed inevitable.

During the next few days, the British and French looked for a solution. Although they continued to warn Hitler in rather vague terms, they also made clear to Beneš that the only way to avoid a German attack was to accept the German demands. Hitler continued to insist on concessions. It thus appeared that he might carry out his threat to use force and that a general European war might result.

U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt then made a direct appeal to Hitler, urging an international conference. On September 28, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini talked to Hitler and secured his agreement for such a meeting. Perhaps Hitler’s acceptance was prompted, in part, by the unenthusiastic reception Berliners accorded a German motorized division moving through Berlin on September 27, which left the German leader in a rage.

Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini met with Hitler in Munich on September 29. The Soviet Union was not invited, and Czechoslovakia was not officially represented; the object was to give Hitler the Sudetenland and avoid war. At Munich, Hitler was on his worst behavior, treating Chamberlain in the most brusque and disdainful fashion. After the conference, Hitler vowed to his confidants he would never again be cheated

out of a military victory and that he would attack and destroy the British and the French. This astonishing reaction to his diplomatic triumph showed clearly that Hitler sought war.

The Munich Agreement, dated September 30 but actually signed just after midnight on October 1, gave Hitler everything he demanded: evacuation would take place between October 1 and 10 under conditions arranged by an international commission, which would also determine plebiscite areas. Early on the morning of October 1, 1938, German troops marched across the frontier, and two days later, Hitler made a triumphal entry into Eger, the unofficial capital of the Sudeten Germans.

Other nations of Central Europe also joined in the division of Czechoslovakia. Poland demanded and received some 400 square miles around Teschen with roughly 240,000 people, only 100,000 of whom were Poles. Then in November, Hungary annexed some 4,800 square miles of Czechoslovakia with a population of about 1 million people.

Seen in retrospect—and psychological and morale factors notwithstanding—the West, unprepared as it was, would have been better off fighting in September 1938 than capitulating at Munich. Britain and France might have secured as allies the Soviet Union and Poland, but even discounting them, the German Army would have been forced to fight on two fronts: against both France and Britain and also against Czechoslovakia. Despite Hitler’s boasts, Germany was unprepared for war in September 1938, as both air and land forces were deficient.

Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (left) and German deputy führer Rudolf Hess (right) arrive at the Führerhaus for the Munich Conference, September 1938. (Library of Congress)

Of course, the Western democracies were also weak militarily. Britain's rearmament program had begun only in 1937. France had many more artillery pieces than Germany, but it was deficient in aircraft. If the Allies had fought Germany in 1938, however, they could have counted on 35 well-armed and well-equipped Czech divisions, supported by substantial numbers of artillery pieces and tanks and perhaps 1,600 mixed-vintage aircraft.

Those responsible for the Munich debacle later claimed that it bought time for the Western democracies to rearm. Winston Churchill noted in his memoirs that British fighter squadrons equipped with modern aircraft rose from only 5 in September 1938 to 26 by July 1939 (and 47 by July 1940), but he also observed that "The year's breathing space said to be 'gained' by Munich left Britain and France in a much worse position compared to Hitler's Germany than they had been at the Munich crisis."

The Munich Conference had far-reaching international influence. Chamberlain and Daladier were warmly received by welcoming crowds when they returned home, especially the British prime minister when he reported that he believed he had achieved "peace in our time." The Munich Agreement, however, effectively ended the French security system. Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia now all doubted French commitments to defend them, and Stalin was further alienated from the West. He told associates that Chamberlain and Daladier had given in to Hitler in order to facilitate Germany's *Drang nach Osten* (drive to the east) and bring about a war between Germany and the Soviet Union. For the German opposition, Munich was also a disaster. Even the most diehard of plotters realized that the opportunity to eliminate Hitler had vanished.

Despite Hitler's pledges that the Sudetenland was his last territorial demand in Europe, events soon proved the opposite. The day after Munich, Hitler told his aides that he would annex what remained of Czechoslovakia at the first opportunity. Within a few months, he took advantage of the internal situation in that country. In March 1939, he supported the leader of the Slovak Popular Party, Jozef Tiso, who sought complete independence for Slovakia. On March 14, Slovakia and Ruthenia declared their independence from the rest of Czechoslovakia.

Hitler summoned Czech president Emil Hácha to Berlin that very day. One day later, Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring threatened the immediate destruction of Prague unless Moravia and Bohemia were made Reich protectorates. Hácha fainted. When he was revived, he signed a communiqué placing "the fate of the Czech people and country in the hands of the Führer of the German Reich." On March 15, Nazi troops occupied what remained of Czechoslovakia.

FRED R. VAN HARTESVELDT AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Beneš, Edvard; Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Czechoslovakia; Daladier, Édouard; Hitler, Adolf; Document 28

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Murphy, Audie Leon (1924–1971)

U.S. Army soldier and officer who was awarded the Medal of Honor. Audie Leon Murphy was born near Kingston, Texas, on June 20, 1924, the 7th of 12 children in a poor sharecropper family. Murphy attempted to enlist in the U.S. Marine Corps following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but he was turned down because he was both too small and too young. He enlisted in the army on his 18th birthday and was assigned to the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division.

U.S. Army lieutenant Audie Murphy, ca. 1945. (Library of Congress)

Murphy first came under enemy fire in Sicily in July 1943. He then fought in Italy, France, and Germany. Murphy became one of the most decorated U.S. soldiers of the war, earning 33 medals and being wounded three times. As a staff sergeant, he received a battlefield commission to second lieutenant in October 1944. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions at the Colmar Pocket on January 26, 1945, during a German attack on his position. He called down artillery fire on his own location, jumped onto a burning tank destroyer, and manned its .50-caliber machine gun. Despite being wounded, he then led a counterattack.

Murphy left the service in September 1945 as a first lieutenant. Thereafter, he parlayed his fame and youthful good looks into a movie career. He played himself in the 1955 movie based on his 1949 autobiography, *To Hell and Back*. He starred or appeared in some 40 other films.

Murphy suffered from what is now called post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—then called battle fatigue or shell shock. He was plagued with bouts of depression, insomnia, and nightmares. He was addicted to sleeping pills until the mid-1960s, and after freeing himself from addiction, he broke the veterans' taboo of publicly discussing his war-related mental conditions. Nearly bankrupt, Murphy died in an airplane crash near Roanoke, Virginia, on May 28, 1971. He was a major in the Texas Army National Guard at the time of his death.

JAROD V. PARKER

See also

Colmar Pocket, Battle for the; Italy Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of

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Murrow, Edward Roscoe (1908–1965)

Pioneering broadcast journalist whose reports during World War II made him a household name in the United States. Edward Roscoe Murrow was born

Egbert Murrow on a small farm outside Greensboro, North Carolina, on April 25, 1908. He later changed his first name for professional reasons. When he was six years old, Murrow moved with his family to Washington State. In 1930, he earned a bachelor's degree in speech from Washington State College (now Washington State University). He worked for the Institute of International Education before joining CBS Radio in 1935; he would remain at CBS nearly his entire career. In 1937, Murrow became director of CBS Europe, headquartered in London.

The following year, Murrow and a colleague, William L. Shirer, began broadcasting European events from London that were aired in the United States. The first significant event covered was Germany's annexation of Austria (the Anschluss) in the early spring of 1938. Shirer's reports were frank and uncensored, capturing an ever-increasing audience. Meanwhile, Murrow began broadcasting from Vienna, offering firsthand accounts of the Anschluss. Both Murrow and Shirer pioneered the live radio broadcast, which was considered revolutionary at the time.

During the bombing of London, known as the Blitz (August 1940–May 1941), Murrow broadcast hundreds of reports—many of them live—as German aircraft attacked the British capital and other cities. Opening his reports with "This is London calling …," Murrow became the most celebrated and well-known journalist in the United States. His dramatic, detailed, yet calmly dispassionate reports of the bombings garnered atmospheric ratings, and many have since asserted that Murrow's reporting likely tipped U.S. public opinion toward aiding the British well before the nation entered World War II. When Murrow returned to the United States in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent him a telegram lauding his service.

Murrow continued his wartime reporting in Europe, and his April 1945 report on the liberation of the Buchen-wald concentration camp is considered among the best work ever by a broadcast journalist. He remained at CBS, alternately holding both management and journalism positions, although his first love was always reporting. He had a popular radio show, which in 1951 was converted to the new medium of television. In March 1954, Murrow's *See It Now* show covered Senator Joseph McCarthy, in the process laying bare much of that senator's bombast and pointless and inaccurate accusations. Murrow allowed McCarthy a rebuttal on national TV, but the senator only

dug a deeper hole for himself. Many laud Murrow's coverage for paving the way for the eventual censure of McCarthy, which came in December 1954.

Murrow left CBS in late 1960 over an increasingly acrimonious relationship with William Paley, head of the CBS network. From 1961 until 1964, Murrow headed the U.S. Information Agency. In failing health with lung cancer, Murrow died on April 27, 1965, in Pawling, New York.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Blitz, The; Journalism and the War

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Muselier, Émile Henri Désiré (1882–1965)

French Navy admiral. Born at Marseille (Bouchres-du-Rhône Department) on April 17, 1882, Émile Henri Désiré Muselier graduated from the French Naval Academy in 1902 and served in the Far East between 1903 and 1905. He then held ship assignments in the Mediterranean and attended the Gunnery School at Toulon before serving aboard cruisers in the Mediterranean. In 1911, he became a gunnery instructor at Toulon.

Muselier served as the gunnery officer on the armored cruiser *Edgar Quinet* in the Mediterranean, where he took part in the first actions in the Adriatic during World War I. He commanded a battalion of marines ashore, distinguishing himself in fighting at Nieuport. He next commanded a battalion of naval artillery on the Western Front before service with the government agency overseeing naval inventions. In April 1918, Muselier assumed command of the dispatch boat *Scarpe*. Promoted to lieutenant commander in July, he participated in operations first in the Atlantic and then in the Black Sea, aiding anti-Bolshevik forces during the Russian Civil War.

In 1920, Muselier joined the French delegation to the Allied Control Commission in Germany. Promoted to commander in July 1922, he served briefly in the military cabinet of the government, then commanded the

torpedo boat *Ouragan*. He was promoted to captain in July 1926 and assumed command of the armored cruiser *Ernest Renan* in 1927. Following service ashore at Cherbourg, Muselier commanded the old semidreadnought *Voltaire* in 1930. He then served ashore at Toulon before taking command of the battleship *Bretagne* in September 1931.

Promoted to rear admiral in July 1933, Muselier commanded at Cherbourg and then the arsenal at Sidi-Abdallah and, in 1934, French Navy units in Tunisia. Muselier had charge of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron during 1937 and 1938, with his flag in the *Suffren*. In September 1938 he headed the Marseille Defense Zone, and in October 1939 he joined the 2nd Section and was promoted to vice admiral.

Muselier rallied to General Charles de Gaulle in July 1940 and created the Free French Navy, of which Muselier was named commander in chief that October. His principal assistant in London was Captain Thierry d'Argenlieu. Muselier commanded Free French naval units in the December 1941 seizure of the Vichy-controlled islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland. Muselier's relations with de Gaulle were stormy, however.

Muselier collaborated with the British in an attempt to oust de Gaulle as head of the Free French, and in March 1942 Muselier was replaced by Captain Philippe Auboyneau. In May, Muselier became inspector general of the Free French Navy, and in 1943, he transferred to Algiers and that June was named deputy commander in chief of French Maritime Forces. Suspended from his duties the following August, he then served as chief of the naval section of the French military commission dealing with German affairs.

Muselier retired in June 1946. He wrote two books, *Marine et Résistance* and *De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme* (1946), in which he discussed the history of Free French naval forces as well as infighting among the Free French and his differences with de Gaulle. Muselier died in Toulon on September 2, 1965.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Auboyneau, Philippe Marie Joseph Raymond; France, Navy; Free French; Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Free French Seizure of; Thierry d'Argenlieu, Georges Louis Marie

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Music and the War

Several musical trends defined themselves in the years between the world wars. Some composers emphasized the sounds of their respective ethnic cultures through the use of folk music and folklore. Others, concerned by the widening rift between composer and audience, created what was called in Germany *Gebrauchsmusik* (utility music), music intended for students and amateurs as opposed to music for its own sake. Neoclassicism remained an influential style (particularly in the United States), the composers of which retained aspects of past musical forms while incorporating new and unfamiliar elements. There were also more and more composers who espoused a radical aesthetic that broke with European tradition. This radicalism led to the evolution from about 1908 of atonality (a free chromaticism that avoided the traditional tonal hierarchy used throughout the 18th and 19th centuries) and serialism (music written using a systematic ordering of the 12 pitches, also without regard to a tonal center).

In many respects, a great deal of the music that predated the war was written in reaction to World War I, although the responses could be quite subtle. (The moving *Cello Concerto* of Sir Edward Elgar [1857–1934] is essentially a war memorial, for instance.) Nationalism took on a political aspect during the years between the wars and was seen as a means of establishing an ethnic identity in an increasingly intolerant world. Composers such as the Hungarians Béla Bartók (1881–1945) and Zoltán Kodály (1882–1967) used folk songs and folk instruments in their music. Kodály's *Háry János Suite* (1926) and Bartók's *Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta*

(1936) showed the influence of regional music that they collected in the early years of the century.

Nationalism surfaced in the United States as well, perhaps best exemplified by Aaron Copland (1900–1990), whose ballets *Billy the Kid* (1938) and *Appalachian Spring* (1944) drew on uniquely American themes. Two of his works directly connected with the war were the *Fanfare for the Common Man* (1942), the result of a commissioning project in which composers wrote fanfares for brass and percussion on patriotic themes, and *Lincoln Portrait* (1942), for narrator and orchestra. Both received numerous performances during the war years.

Soviet composer Dmitri Shostakovich (1905–1975) composed his *Symphony No. 7* (1941) as a musical response to the heroic defense of Leningrad. Shostakovich had served briefly in the Leningrad Volunteer Home Guard before being evacuated. This work had no fewer than three major conductors (Leopold Stokowski, Artur Rodzinski, and Serge Koussevitsky) fighting over American premier rights. The numerous performances the symphony received were a propaganda boon for both Soviet and American audiences.

Austrian composer Arnold Schoenberg (1874–1951) was forced into exile during the war years. After immigrating to the United States, he took a teaching position at the University of California, Los Angeles. Schoenberg composed two important responses to the war: *Ode to Napoleon Buonaparte* (1942), a setting of the poem by Lord Byron that in Schoenberg's hands became a not-so-veiled reference to Hitler, and the terrifying *Survivor from Warsaw* (1947), ostensibly based on events that took place in the Warsaw ghetto.

There were also composers who responded to the war from the concentration camps: *Quartet for the End of Time* (1941) by Olivier Messiaen was premiered on January 15, 1941, in Stalag VIIIA at Görlitz before an audience of fellow prisoners of war. Composers Pavel Haas (1899–1944), Hans Krása (1899–1944), and Viktor Ullmann (1898–1944) were among many who were incarcerated at Terezín (Theresienstadt) and who ultimately would die in the gas chambers. Ullmann's opera *Der Kaiser von Atlantis* (1944) was composed at Terezín and was in rehearsal before the Nazis shut the performance down shortly before deporting the composer to Auschwitz.

The end of the war saw a complete break from 19th-century romanticism.

Although the newer musical languages were often not conducive to conventional memorials, there were some significant responses. The *War Requiem* by English composer Benjamin Britten (1913–1976), using the text of the requiem mass and the poetry of World War I poet Wilfred Owen, was written for the reconsecration of Coventry Cathedral in 1962 and is one of the most powerful antiwar statements in the history of music. There was also the brilliant *Threnody for the Victims of Hiroshima* (1960) by Polish composer Krzysztof Penderecki. The war marked the end of an era for art music, and the postwar world would ultimately demand a different kind of music.

The war years were a time when jazz and popular music were essentially identical (compare this with the Vietnam War years, when there was a clear distinction between jazz and popular music, that is, rock and roll). Jazz had begun to surface as a major musical force in the United States in the years immediately following World War I, and by the late 1920s, it had evolved beyond its Dixieland roots into something new and original. This new form at first came mainly in the form of the big bands, which proliferated during the 1930s and 1940s. Throughout the 1930s, a wide range of these bands worked to solve the problems of getting a large ensemble to "swing," and by 1938, they were appearing at such august venues as Carnegie Hall. The new swing music was performed by popular bands led by Glenn Miller, Tommy Dorsey, Harry James, Count Basie, Duke Ellington, Benny Goodman, and countless others. Big band music was melodic and often upbeat in tempo.

The popular songs of the time were closely associated with these bands. Important vocalists, including Bing Crosby, Dinah Shore, Frank Sinatra, Ella Fitzgerald, and the Andrews Sisters, recorded many of these songs. The influence of this music was enormous. In a very real sense, American popular music was *the* popular music of World War II.

The U.S. Army, recognizing the importance of this music, entered the business of providing music for the troops in both European and Pacific theaters through the Special Services Division of the Army Service Forces. Many of the bands ultimately ended up in uniform performing overseas, sometimes in circumstances of great danger. Band leader Glenn Miller was killed in 1944 when his plane went down in the English Channel en route to a performance in France.

Jazz was almost exclusively an American phenomenon. In Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler's Germany, jazz was prohibited and actively disparaged. In a

now notorious exhibition in 1938, jazz was labeled *Entartete Musik* (degenerate music). Jazz was "degenerate" because it was associated with Negroes and miscegenation. As a result, "popular" music in Germany consisted largely of official patriotic songs associated with the Reich, folk songs, and some sentimental ballads.

Strangely enough, one of these sentimental ballads had the unusual distinction of being popular on virtually every front in Europe. "Lili Marlene," originally written by German soldier Hans Leip in 1915 and set to music by Norbert Schultze in 1938, was as popular with Allied troops as it was with the Germans. An English version was devised shortly after the song became popular in Germany and was made famous by Marlene Dietrich in 1943. There was even a version in French.

Because the musical cultures in Europe all stemmed from the same musical roots, this "sharing" of songs is perhaps not surprising. Of course, no such sharing was possible in the Pacific, although Allied troops were kept current with the latest popular songs by broadcasters such as "Tokyo Rose."

The range of popular songs was enormous. There were patriotic songs, designed to inspire support for the war effort as well as for the realities of day-to-day life during the war ("Cowards over Pearl Harbor," "America Calling," "There'll Always Be an England," and "Rosie the Riveter"). There were songs directly related to military service, some with specific references to the commanding officers ("Keep Your Powder Dry," "Nimitz, Halsey and Me," "Here's to You, MacArthur"). Sentimental songs of love and separation were particularly popular ("We'll Meet Again"; "White Cliffs of Dover"; "In the Mood," made popular by the Glenn Miller Band; "Cleanin' My Rifle [And Dreamin' of You]") as well as novelty songs ("Lalapaluza Lu," "Little Bo Peep Has Lost Her Jeep," and "Boogie-Woogie Bugle Boy").

Some songs made unmistakably violent and disparaging references to the enemy (which read somewhat awkwardly in light of modern sensibilities). They included "Mow the Japs Down!"; "Der Fuehrer's Face," popularized by Spike Lee; "Hey, Tojo! Count Yo' Men!"; and "You're a Sap, Mister Jap." World War II also witnessed the spread in the United States of country and western music, taking it well beyond its Appalachian and western roots. Young soldiers took this largely rural music into the military camps and urban defense plants, which contributed to its growing popularity not only in the more urban northern United States but ultimately overseas as well.

Dinah Shore and Bing Crosby entertaining U.S. troops at a USO show in France, October 1944. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The end of the war essentially spelled the beginning of the end of the big band and swing eras. Jazz moved on to a grittier, more improvisational style known as bebop, which eschewed large bands and orchestras for trios, quartets, and quintets, and in the mid-1950s popular audiences would turn to another form of music that began to rise from its roots in rhythm and blues: rock and roll. This would become the music of future wars.

JEFFREY WOOD

See also

Art and the War; Propaganda; “Tokyo Rose”

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Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945)

Italian fascist dictator (1922–1943). Born in Predappio, near Forli in Romagna, Italy, on July 29, 1883, Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini was named after the Mexican revolutionary and president Benito Juárez. Mussolini earned a teaching diploma in 1901. His mother wanted him to be a schoolteacher, but Mussolini found the profession too boring.

As an adolescent, Mussolini had joined the syndicalist branch of the Italian Socialist Party. He soon found that he enjoyed the role of agitator, fomenting strikes and establishing unions. At age 19, he fled to Switzerland to avoid compulsory military service. He stayed there for three years, doing odd jobs and living on money sent by his mother. He intermittently attended some university classes and served time in jail. An amnesty caused Mussolini to return to Italy and perform his military service. He then edited a socialist newspaper, *La Lotta di Classe* (The Class Struggle), at Forli and was secretary of the local Socialist Party there. His opposition to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1911 and 1912 earned him national prominence, and he was now one of the leaders of the left wing of the Italian Socialist Party. In 1913, he became editor of the socialist daily *Avanti,* published in Milan.

On the outbreak of World War I, however, Mussolini abruptly modified his socialism by embracing Italian nationalism and urging intervention on the Allied side. This interventionist position caused his expulsion from the Socialist Party. Mussolini then founded a French-financed daily, *Il Popolo d'Italia* (The People of Italy). In October 1914, he also founded the prowar group Fasci Rivoluzionario d'Azione Internazionalista (Revolutionary Fasci for International Action) to bring about intervention in the war. In December

of that year, the group became the Fasci di Azione Rivoluzionaria (Fasci for Revolutionary Action).

The word *fascio* recalled the bundle of sticks carried by the lictors of ancient Rome, representing state power; one stick might be broken, but fastened together, the sticks were unbreakable. Mussolini liked to call up ancient Italian glories, and this bundle of sticks later became the emblem of fascist Italy. His belief that the proletariat should unite and create a formidable organization before seizing power was the germ of the Italian fascist movement. Following Italy's entry into the war on the Allied side in May 1915, Mussolini was called up for the army and served until 1917 on the Austrian front, reaching the rank of corporal. He was wounded slightly and discharged.

On the return of peace, the Socialist Party resumed its agitation. Mussolini's reaction to this was to organize ex-soldiers in the Fascio di Combattimento (Combat Bands) in March 1919. Mussolini carefully built the fascist organization, paying special attention to the Blackshirt squads, militia supported with financial contributions (not always voluntary) from businessmen and landlords. Distinguished by their black shirts and Roman salute, the Blackshirts were clashing with socialists and communist groups by the summer of 1919. Mussolini's policy was to meet every act of violence with greater violence, and between 1921 and 1922, a veritable civil war with the socialists raged the length of Italy.

The fascist political program was little more than devotion to their leader ("Il Duce"), Italian nationalism, "law and order," and opposition to communism. After they came to power, the fascists claimed they had saved Italy from communism. There is, however, little support for that in fact. Certainly, Mussolini did exploit middle- and upper-class fears of socialism and communism, though.

In the 1921 elections, the fascists gained less than 10 percent of the vote, but the size of the organization (300,000 members by the end of September 1922) made force—or the threat of it—a possible route to power. By September 1922, Mussolini was openly demanding that he be named premier. In late October, some 10,000 of his followers converged on Rome. During this "March on Rome," Mussolini remained safe in Milan until he was informed that it had succeeded, a fact carefully concealed by fascist historians.

When King Victor Emmanuel III refused to authorize martial law, Premier Luigi Facta resigned, and on October 29, 1922, the king called Mussolini as premier. It was all quite legal—or almost so. On November 25, threatened with new elections held under fascist supervision, Parliament conceded Mussolini full powers for 1 year; he held them for 20.

A new election law and the trampling of the rights of the opposition in 1924 gave the fascists 374 of 535 seats. Mussolini then proceeded to disband the opposition parties and secure complete power as Il Duce. He alone made the decisions, and he was not only head of state but also foreign minister, chief of the armed service branches, minister of the interior, and minister of the colonies. This concentration of authority produced chaos rather than efficiency, however. Restoring the economy also proved elusive. The only real domestic achievements of his regime were advances in literacy (fascist education was more formative than informative) and the 1929 accord with the Vatican (the Lateran Treaty).

Mussolini's dominant motivations were his personal vanity and desire for adulation; not surprisingly, flattery was a key factor in his undoing. He became captivated by his own myth of the invincible, irreplaceable leader and came to believe his own propaganda that only he could make the right decisions and that his intuition was always correct. Serious study and discussion were not Mussolini's style. He rushed to decisions, often with unfortunate results. He also changed his mind frequently and precipitously, and he was totally inept as a war leader. He ordered military campaigns begun on short notice, with no thought of the need for detailed planning.

The hallmarks of the Italian state and military under Mussolini were administrative confusion and incompetence.

Mussolini pursued an aggressive foreign policy, beginning with the Italian bombardment of the Greek island of Corfu in 1923. Alienation from the West over Italy's 1935 invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and support of the Nationalist side in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War led to a rapprochement with Adolf Hitler's Germany.

This Rome-Berlin Axis became a formal alliance in 1939. The year before, Mussolini had allowed Hitler to annex Austria; four years previously, he had helped uphold Austrian independence against an attempted Nazi coup. He also was a prime mover behind the agreement at Munich in September

1938 that led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. In April 1939, Mussolini ordered the invasion of Albania.

When the general European war began in September 1939, Mussolini, fearful that Germany would not win, declared Italy's nonbelligerency. With Germany about to defeat France and being anxious to join in the spoils, he declared war on France on June 10, 1940, and sent Italian divisions into southeastern France and into Egypt from Libya, with little military success. He also insisted on sending obsolete Italian aircraft to participate in the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain. In October 1940, without consulting Hitler, he ordered Italian forces to invade Greece from Albania. The Greeks promptly drove the Italian forces out, leading Hitler to come to the rescue of his hard-pressed ally in the spring of 1941. Mussolini also sent Italian forces to assist the Germans in their invasion of the Soviet Union, a step that was particularly unpopular in Italy.

Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, photographed on April 8, 1938. (AP Photo)

Following Allied victory in North Africa and the successful Allied invasion of Sicily, the fascist Grand Council voted to depose Mussolini on July 25, 1943. Hitler ordered him rescued by German commandos, and Mussolini was then installed as nominal leader of a puppet state in northern Italy, under complete German control. In September 1943, however, Italy switched sides in the war. As the end of the war approached, Mussolini and his mistress, Clara Petacci, attempted to flee northern Italy with a German convoy in April 1945. Partisans captured them on April 28 and shot both that same day. Their bodies and those of other members of Mussolini's government were taken to Milan and strung up there, upside down, in the great square, the Piazzale Loreto. Mussolini's body was later rescued and buried in the family mausoleum.

Mussolini never accepted responsibility for his failures but blamed others, when he alone was responsible. He claimed that the Italian people were not worthy of him. He may have been the least brutal of the major dictators of World War II, but he was bad enough. To the end, his chief motivation was personal power rather than the good of the Italian people.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Albania; Italo-Ethiopian War; Italy; North Africa Campaign; Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy; Document 2; Document 10; Document 39; Document 60; Document 94

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Mutaguchi Renya (1888–1966)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Saga, Japan, on October 7, 1888, Mutaguchi Renya graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1910 and the Army War College in 1917. An infantry officer, he served on the staff of the Siberian Expeditionary Force sent to Vladivostok between 1920 and 1921. Promoted to major in 1926 and to colonel in 1930, Mutaguchi headed the Military Affairs Section of the army General Staff from 1933 to 1936.

As commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the China Garrison Army in Beijing from 1936, Mutaguchi helped provoke the Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouch'iao) Incident of July 1937, which caused the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. He was promoted to major general in 1938 and assigned to the headquarters of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1940, Mutaguchi commanded the 18th Division in the Malaya Campaign of December 1941 to February 1942 under the overall direction of Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki.

In March 1943, Mutaguchi assumed command of the Fifteenth Army in northern Burma. On his urging, commander of the Burma Area Army General Kawabe Masakazu authorized him to carry out Operation U-GO, a reckless offensive against Imphal and Kohima. Although Mutaguchi achieved initial success in March and April 1944 and besieged both places, superior Allied firepower and air assets forced him into retreat in July. Some 50,000 of Mutaguchi's 65,000-man force died, most of them of starvation or disease. Relieved of command that August, Mutaguchi was assigned to staff duties until the end of the war.

After the end of the war, Mutaguchi was arrested and transported to Singapore, where he stood trial for war crimes and was convicted. Released from prison in March 1948, he returned to Japan. Mutaguchi died in Tokyo on August 2, 1966.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Burma Theater; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Kawabe Masakazu; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Mutō Akira (1892–1948)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Kumamoto, Japan, on December 15, 1892, Mutō Akira graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1913. He studied in Germany in 1923 and was promoted to major in 1929. Mutō was appointed a member of the army General Staff in 1935 and became chief of staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria in 1936.

As vice chief of the army General Staff and a major general, Mutō insisted in 1937 on an escalation of the Sino-Japanese War, whereas chief of the General Staff General Ishiwara Kanji sought to calm the situation. Mutō secured majority support in the General Staff, leading to a wider conflict with China. In 1938, Mutō was transferred to Beijing as deputy chief of staff of the China Army. Many hold Mutō responsible for the atrocities committed by Japanese troops under his overall command at Nanjing (Nanking) in December 1937.

Mutō was appointed head of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of War and adviser to Minister of War Lieutenant General Tōjō Hideki. He also supported Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke's policy of concluding the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, although he was eager to avoid war against the United States. In October 1941, Tōjō became prime minister, and Mutō was promoted to lieutenant general. As one of the most influential officers of the Japanese Army, Mutō tried to resolve the Sino-Japanese dispute and improve relations with the United States, but he failed in both endeavors.

In April 1942, Mutō was appointed commander of the 2nd Imperial Guards Division, fighting with it in Malaya and then, in October 1944, in the Philippines, where, as a lieutenant general, he was chief of staff of the Fourteenth Area Army under General Yamashita Tomoyuki. On September 3, 1945, Yamashita and Mutō signed the unconditional surrender of Japanese forces in the Philippines.

After the Japanese surrender, Mutō was arrested and charged by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East with war crimes in China and the Philippines. Tried and convicted, Mutō was sentenced to death and executed in Tokyo on December 23, 1948.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Nanjing Massacre; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Tōjō Hideki; Tripartite Pact; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Myitkyina, Siege of (May–August 1944)

The key military objective of the 1944 Allied Northern Burma (present-day Myanmar) Campaign in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater of operations. U.S. lieutenant general Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell had command of Allied forces in the battle and subsequent "siege." The action began in late April 1944 with attacks in the Mogaung Valley by predominantly Chinese troops, followed by a general Allied effort against the airfield and railroad center of Myitkyina. The aim of the campaign was to reduce Japanese pressure on the air resupply route from India to China over the Himalayas ("the Hump") and to clear a vital road link along the ground line of communications under construction along the Ledo Road, later known as the Stilwell Road. British, Chinese, Burmese, and U.S. troops (Merrill's Marauders, the 5307th Composite Unit [Provisional]) captured the airfield on May 17, but they could not eliminate stubborn resistance by elements of the Japanese 18th and 56th Divisions in the Myitkyina area until August 3.

The Allied operation, code-named END-RUN, was conducted by three separate combat brigade–sized elements organized around the battalions of Merrill's Marauders (code-named GALAHAD). H Force, consisting of the 1st Battalion, the 150th Regiment of the 50th Chinese Division, and a battery of

the 22nd Chinese Division artillery, moved south on April 30. M Force, the 2nd Battalion with attached Burmese Kachins, began its operations on the southernmost axis on May 7. K Force, consisting of the 3rd Battalion of GALAHAD and the 88th Regiment of the 30th Chinese Division, began the advance to Myitkyina on April 28. These three formations were accompanied by U.S. and Chinese support troops, including mobile hospitals, engineers, and animal transport units.

U.S. Army colonel Charles N. Hunter (center), commanding Merrill's Marauders, at Myitkyina airfield in Burma, with Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell (left). (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

The May 17 attack completely surprised the 700 to 800 Japanese troops defending Myitkyina Airfield. Spearheading the attack, Colonel Charles Hunter's H Force secured the field and supporting facilities. A U.S. engineer unit, a Chinese infantry battalion, and a British antiaircraft unit were quickly airlifted into the field. Allied reinforcements also arrived in preparation for

the difficult task of taking the town and supporting defensive positions. Initial attempts by Chinese forces to take the town were unsuccessful, and a stalemate ensued. Both sides sent in reinforcements and built strongpoints that were difficult to overrun.

British forces under General Sir William Slim, fully engaged against the Japanese in the west around the Imphal and Kohima area near the Burma-India border, were unable to provide major combat formations for the Northern Burma Campaign. Major General Orde C. Wingate died in a plane crash on March 25; his special forces, or "Chindits," were placed under the command of Major General Walter David Alexander Lentaigne. Elements of this force were put under Stilwell's direct command and fought their way north to support the effort around Myitkyina. Unable to quickly consolidate initial gains against stubborn Japanese resistance, Stilwell ordered the exhausted Marauders to continue the fight. He also brought in U.S. combat engineers working on the Ledo Road to serve as infantry, and he called for additional Chinese reinforcements.

During the next two months, both sides conducted small-scale attacks, with no significant change in the military situation on the ground. By late July, however, continued Allied efforts, supported by increased air sorties and added artillery, began to take their toll on the Japanese defenders. Determined and often bitter small-unit actions wore down the Japanese, and during the last three days of July, Allied forces made significant advances. On August 3, Myitkyina was declared secure.

The key U.S. formation, Merrill's Marauders, fought on doggedly and remained in the field until victory, despite being decimated by combat casualties and losses from sickness and disease. The unit ceased to exist as a viable combat formation and was eventually replaced by the Mars Force under the command of Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan. However, it was the Chinese units, which had shown that they could stand with veteran Japanese formations, that were the key to the eventual Allied victory in northern Burma.

Although delayed by stubborn Japanese resistance, the difficult terrain, and the challenges of coordinating Allied forces, Stilwell's Northern Burma Campaign was a success. With the fall of Myitkyina, the Allies were one step closer to opening a secure ground supply line to China and to setting the stage for a major offensive to drive the Japanese from Burma. Stilwell,

principal architect of the campaign, was relieved of his duties in the CBI in mid-October and replaced as commander of U.S. combat forces in Burma by Sultan.

JOSEPH G. D. BABB

See also

Burma Theater; Chindits; Hump, The; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Sultan, Daniel Isom; Wingate, Orde Charles

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N

Nagano Osami (1880–1947)

Japanese Navy fleet admiral. Born in Kōchi, Kōchi Prefecture, Japan, on June 15, 1880, Nagano Osami graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1900. Nagano participated in the siege of Port Arthur during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Promoted to lieutenant in 1905, he was an instructor at the Naval Academy in 1906, then served as chief gunnery officer in the cruiser *Itsukushima* during 1906–1908. He graduated from the Naval War College in 1909. Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1910, he was then chief gunnery officer in the battleship *Katori*. He studied in the United States at Harvard University from 1913 to 1915.

During World War I, Nagano served as executive officer of two cruisers. Promoted to captain in 1918, he commanded the cruiser *Hirado* during 1919–1920, his first (and only) ship command. Nagano was the naval attaché to the United States from 1920 to 1923.

Promoted to rear admiral in December 1923, Nagano was chief of Japanese naval intelligence in 1924. At the end of that year, he assumed command of the 3rd Battleship Division, and in 1925 he took command of the 1st China Expeditionary Force. Promoted to vice admiral in December 1927, Nagano commanded the Naval Academy from 1928 to 1930. He headed the Japanese delegation at the London Naval Conference of 1935–1936, where he presented the Japanese plan for parity in naval tonnage with the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy, which the Western powers rejected.

In 1936, Nagano became minister of the navy in the Hirota Kōki cabinet. In 1937, he was appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet. From April 1941 to February 1944, Nagano served as chief of the Navy General Staff.

Nagano, a generally weak leader, believed that war with the United States was inevitable, and he therefore had little interest in negotiations. At the same time, although Nagano believed that the Japanese Navy could not defeat the

U.S. Navy in war, he did not oppose the plans of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander of the Combined Fleet, to attack Pearl Harbor.

In April 1943, Nagano was promoted to admiral of the fleet. By 1944, however, with Japan having suffered major military reversals, Nagano was removed from his post. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Nagano was arrested and jailed in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. He was charged as a war criminal before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Nagano died on January 5, 1947, before the conclusion of the trial.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Japan, Navy; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Nagasaki, Bombing of (August 9, 1945)

Second U.S. atomic bombing of a Japanese city. Following the Japanese refusal to surrender following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, Twentieth Air Force headquarters on Guam issued Field Order 17 on August 8, directing that on the following day the second atomic bomb on Tinian Island be dropped on another Japanese city. Kokura was designated as the primary target, with Nagasaki, a city of some 230,000 persons, the alternate.

At 3:49 a.m. on August 9, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber *Bockscar* (sometimes written as *Bock's Car*), commanded by Major Charles Sweeney, departed Tinian. It was followed by two other B-29s as scientific observer and photographic observer aircraft. *Bockscar* carried a plutonium nuclear-fission bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" that was 10 feet 8 inches long and 5 feet in diameter, with a payload greater than that of the Hiroshima bomb. The plutonium 238 isotope core consisted of two melon-shaped hemispheres surrounded by a ring of explosive charges designed to drive the

sections together, achieving critical mass and a chain reaction releasing 22 kilotons of energy in one-millionth of a second.

Sweeney flew to Kokura but found it overcast and circled for 10 minutes. Despite the clouds, bombardier Kermit Beahan believed that they could bomb visually. Sweeney, concerned about a faulty valve that limited fuel, decided to divert to Nagasaki, which was also partly obscured by clouds. Beahan believed that he could bomb by radar, but a break in the clouds allowed him to bomb visually, using the Mitsubishi shipyards as his aiming point.

Nagasaki, Japan, showing damage from the atomic bomb dropped on that city, August 1945. (Andrew J. Waskey)

Bockscar released the bomb from 31,000 feet at 11:02 a.m. local time. The bomb detonated 53 seconds later, approximately 1,500 feet over the city, destroying everything within a 1,000-yard radius. An intense blue-white explosion pushed up a pillar of fire 10,000 feet, followed by a mushroom cloud to 60,000 feet.

Although the bomb missed its intended aiming point by 8,500 feet, it leveled one-third of the city. Called the “Red Circle of Death,” the fire and blast area within the Urakami Valley section destroyed more than 18,000 homes and killed 74,000 people. Another 75,000 were injured, with many of these dying from wounds or complications. Blast forces traveling in excess of 9,000 mph damaged buildings three miles away, and the concussion was felt

40 miles from the epicenter. “Ashes of Death” from the mushroom cloud spread radiation poisoning, killing all who were not killed outright within 1,000 yards of the epicenter. The bomb might have killed thousands more, but it detonated away from the city center in a heavy industrial area, vaporizing three of Nagasaki’s largest war factories but “minimizing” deaths.

Sweeney made one complete circle of the city to determine damage and then left after fuel concerns and heavy smoke made other circuits futile. Critically low on fuel, he flew to Okinawa, landing at Yontan Field at about 12:30 p.m., his gas tanks virtually empty. After refueling, he flew *Bockscar* on to Tinian, arriving there at 10:30 p.m. local time after a 20-hour flight.

Included in the instrument bundle dropped from the observation plane was a letter addressed to Japanese physicist Professor F. Sagane that urged immediate surrender and threatened continued atomic destruction of Japanese cities. Written by three American physicists, the letter was a bluff, as no other atomic bombs were then ready. Nonetheless, the second atomic attack, coupled with the August 8 declaration of war by the Soviet Union, provided Japanese emperor Hirohito with the excuse to end the war.

MARK E. VAN RHYN

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Japan, Surrender of; Manhattan Project; Nuclear Weapons

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Nagumo Chūichi (1886–1944)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born in Yamagata Prefecture on March 25, 1886, Nagumo Chūichi graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1908 and from the Naval Staff College in 1920. Promoted to commander in 1924 and known as a torpedo expert, Nagumo commanded several cruisers before

taking command of a destroyer squadron in 1930. He also became a strong advocate of naval airpower.

Promoted to vice admiral in 1939, Nagumo took command in April 1941 of the First Air Fleet, which concentrated Japan's six most powerful aircraft carriers into a single force. Although he opposed the Pearl Harbor operation, his carriers carried out the attack on December 7, 1941, crippling the U.S. Navy's Pacific battle fleet. Nagumo was, however, criticized in some quarters for his unwillingness to carry out additional air strikes against port facilities or attempt to locate and destroy U.S. aircraft carriers then at sea.

Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi, Commander of the Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. (U.S. Naval Historical Center)

Nagumo's First Air Fleet next undertook strikes on Rabaul and Port Darwin (February 19, 1942) before beginning operations in the eastern Indian Ocean that devastated Allied naval power in the region. The carriers *Shōkaku*

and *Zuikaku* were later detached to support the Port Moresby operation that ended with withdrawal after the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942). Following their refit, the other four carriers sortied as the principal striking force for the Midway operation (June 3–6), which ended in their loss.

The defeat at Midway ruined Nagumo's reputation. Afterward, he commanded carriers during the Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942–February 1943), and in August and October 1942 he inflicted losses on U.S. forces in the Solomon Islands, but his own air groups also sustained heavy damage. Regarded as excessively cautious, Nagumo was relegated to a series of second-line shore commands until recalled to frontline service in late 1943 as commander of the 6,000-member force assigned to defend Saipan against an impending U.S. assault. The invasion began on June 13, 1944, and Nagumo committed suicide there on July 6, 1944. He was posthumously promoted to admiral on July 8.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Air Warfare, Naval; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Rabaul; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Nakagawa Kunio (1898–1944)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Kumamoto Prefecture on January 23, 1898, Nakagawa Kunio graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1918 and was commissioned in the 48th Infantry Regiment. He graduated from the Military Staff College in 1939.

In March 1943, Nakagawa was promoted to colonel and assigned as commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army. In April 1944, his regiment was deployed to Peleliu Island in the Southwest Pacific, where he commanded some 6,000 defending troops. Nakagawa adopted new tactics for the island. With scant resources and lacking the firepower to prevent a U.S. landing, Nakagawa ordered construction of the main defenses in the island's interior to extract the highest possible cost in American lives. He also prohibited suicidal attacks as wasteful of manpower and unlikely to achieve satisfactory results.

Following the landing by U.S. marines on September 15, 1944, Nakagawa directed a protracted three-month defense of the island that cost U.S. forces some 9,600 casualties. Of the Japanese defenders, only 33 surrendered or were captured. Nakagawa committed *seppuku* (ritual suicide) on November 24, 1944, the same day he was promoted to brevet major general; he was posthumously promoted to lieutenant general for valor. The marines secured Peleliu three days later.

ASAKAWA MICHIO

See also

Guandong Army; Peleliu Island, Battle of

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Nanjing Massacre (December 13, 1937–January 22, 1938)

Six-week period of atrocities and terrorism after Japanese troops captured the Chinese capital of Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. In July 1937, outright war began between Japan and China after the Marco Polo Bridge/Lugouqiao (Lukouch'iao) Incident. Chinese Nationalist forces under Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) president Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) initially offered strong resistance to the Japanese invasion, holding

out at Shanghai—the country's greatest port city and the site of a major international settlement—from August 13 to November 9, 1937.

Nationalist troops then fell back, moving inland in a near rout to the Nationalist capital of Nanjing, a symbolic location home to more than 1 million Chinese. Jiang was not prepared to abandon it without a fight, but no defense or evacuation plans had been made. Another of Jiang's objectives in defending both Shanghai and Nanjing, home to numerous foreign embassies, was to attract worldwide attention and win foreign support for China's anti-Japanese war.

In early December, Japanese troops converged on Nanjing. After Chinese troops rejected Japanese demands to surrender, on December 9 the Japanese opened a massive assault. Three days later the Chinese defenders fell back across the Changjiang (Yangtze) River, and the following day the 6th, 9th, and 116th Divisions of the Japanese Army entered the city as two Japanese Navy flotillas arrived up the Changjiang River. During the ensuing six weeks the Japanese occupiers deliberately instituted a reign of terror, apparently designed to cow China's population into ready submission to Japanese invasion. Frustration over Jiang's refusal to surrender, which Japanese leaders had expected him to do before the end of 1937, might have been another factor.

Entering the city on December 13, Japanese forces fired on streets crowded with refugees, wounded soldiers, and civilians. They also fired on many thousands of refugees who were attempting to escape by swimming the river. The occupying forces used machine guns, swords, bayonets, fire, live burial, and poison gas to massacre captured Chinese soldiers and any young men suspected of being such. Scattered atrocities and murders, often marked by great brutality, continued throughout the city for six weeks, as did heavy looting. Counts of how many soldiers and civilians died in the Nanjing Massacre vary widely, ranging from 42,000 to 300,000. During this period Japanese soldiers raped an estimated 20,000 women, most of whom were then killed.

Chinese prisoners being buried alive by their Japanese captors outside the city of Nanjing, during the infamous rape of Nanjing, 1938. (Keystone/Getty Images)

The Nanjing Massacre shocked the West and generated extensive international sympathy for China, although this did not necessarily translate into tangible support and assistance. It was an early example of the use of organized brutality to cow and terrorize civilian populations characteristic of many World War II military occupations. As the 21st century began, memories of the Nanjing Massacre remained bitter in China; a major museum commemorating the event exists in Nanjing. In contrast, Japanese officials for many decades denied that the episode ever took place or at least minimized its scale, and it was omitted from official Japanese accounts of the war. In the late 1990s, however, several Japanese journalists and academics mounted dedicated efforts to bring the event to the attention of the Japanese people.

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See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Shanghai, Battle of

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Napalm

Incendiary material made from thickened gasoline. Napalm was developed by American scientists at Harvard University early in the war to improve the performance of petroleum-based incendiary weapons. It was available in late 1942. Napalm powder, an aluminum/soap mix, draws its name from the acidic components naphthene and palmitate combined and mixed with gasoline to create a gel that was then used in bombs or as an improved fuel for flamethrowers. Other nations developed similar materials; the British mix was named Perspex. Liquid napalm was a sticky compound with improved burning characteristics and good stability for safe handling.

Napalm was originally delivered in a 100-pound chemical-weapons bomb, the M47. In the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, napalm incendiaries were responsible for the significant destruction of Japanese cities by fire. Boeing B-29 Superfortress pathfinder aircraft dropped the M47, and the bulk of the following bombers dropped clusters of 6.2-pound M69 bombs. The M69 ignited and ejected the napalm fill from its tail after a delayed fuze allowed the bomb to penetrate the building it hit.

After mid-1944, the U.S. tactical air forces employed a wide variety of sizes of firebombs or napalm bombs against Japanese forces and defensive positions. These bombs were often auxiliary fuel tanks that were simply filled with the napalm mix and equipped with an igniter. Napalm attacks were often cited for their psychological value as well as for their physical destruction. After World War II, napalm continued to be used as a generic term for fire-producing weapons, even though the original components that provided the name were no longer used.

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See also

Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Incendiary Bombs and Bombing

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Narvik, Allied Evacuation of (June 5–8, 1940)

Although the Allies had retaken Narvik on May 28, overall the Norwegian Campaign was proceeding poorly for them, and, more important, the Germans had invaded the Low Countries and France on May 10 and were overrunning both. This prompted the Allied decision on May 24 for Operation ALPHABET, the evacuation of the 25,000 men remaining in northern Norway. The evacuation force included the British aircraft carriers *Ark Royal* and *Glorious*, the British cruisers *Southampton* and *Coventry*, 16 destroyers, and numerous other smaller warships, transports, and cargo vessels. The evacuation began on June 5 and was completed by June 8. Another British cruiser, the *Devonshire*, evacuated the Norwegian royal family and government and sailed under radio silence independently for Scapa Flow.

The *Glorious* had taken on board 20 Royal Air Force fighters for transport to Britain and also had on board 10 fighters and 5 torpedo bombers of the Fleet Air Arm. Captain Guy D'Oyly-Hughes of the *Glorious* requested and received permission to proceed independently at greater speed, with the justification that his ship was short of fuel. Unknown to the British, however, the Germans had powerful forces at sea. Escorted by the destroyers *Acasta* and *Ardent*, the *Glorious* was intercepted by the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* some 280 miles west of Harstad, Norway. The carrier had 6 Swordfish aircraft available for operations, but for reasons that will never be known, D'Oyly-Hughes did not have any on patrol and was thus caught by surprise.

Homing on smoke from its stack, the two German capital ships opened fire on the *Glorious* at a range of some 27,000 yards. Before any aircraft could be launched, a German shell hit the forward hangar, destroying the aircraft there. The *Glorious* was soon listing and went down within 20 minutes. Although the two British destroyers were also sunk, the *Acasta* heavily damaged the *Scharnhorst* with a torpedo and scored with one 4.7-inch shell. This damage caused the German commander, Vice Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, to order the two German battleships to steam for Trondheim, which allowed the safe passage of the *Ark Royal* and the remainder of the British evacuation transport and store convoys later that same day, sailing without battleship protection.

The eventual loss in lives from the three British warships was 1,519 men (1,207 in the *Glorious*, 160 in the *Acosta*, and 152 in the *Ardent*). Only 40 men survived, including 1 each from the *Acosta* and the *Ardent*. The remaining British forces made it safely to Scapa Flow.

One consequence of the evacuation was increased German pressure on both Sweden and Finland, leading to an agreement in June whereby the government in Stockholm permitted unarmed German troops to transit Sweden on its railroads, that country's major departure from neutrality during the war.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Marschall, Wilhelm; Narvik, Operations in

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Narvik, Naval Battles of (April 10 and 13, 1940)

Anglo-German naval battles during the Norwegian Campaign of 1940. The Battle of Narvik comprises two separate engagements in the area of that Norwegian port, the first on April 10 and the other on April 13.

On April 9, 1940, the Germans launched Operation WESERÜBUNG, their invasion of Norway. The operation involved six main invasion groups to take and hold the principal Norwegian ports. As part of WESERÜBUNG, they dispatched to the northern Norwegian port of Narvik under Commodore Friedrich Bonte a force of 10 large destroyers (*Wilhelm Heidkamp* [flagship], *George Thiele, Wolfgang Zenker*, *Baron von Arnim, Erich Giese*, *Erich Koellner*, *Diether von Roeder, Hans Lüdemann*, *Hermann Künne,* and *Anton Schmitt*) transporting some 1,900 ground troops. At Ofotfjord they captured three Norwegian patrol boats. The destroyers then landed their troops. Norwegian ships detected the German destroyers as they approached Narvik, and early on April 9, the Germans were intercepted by the old (1905) Norwegian coastal battleship *Eidsvold*, with a main armament of two 210mm (8.26-inch) guns and commanded by Captain Off Isaachsen Willoch. Willoch ordered the Germans to turn back.

The Germans refused, demanding in turn that the *Eidsvold* surrender. When Willoch rejected the German demands and prepared to ram the lead German destroyer, the Germans opened fire with torpedoes, sinking the *Eidsvold*, which lost all but 8 of its crew of 193. Willoch was among the dead. The Germans then torpedoed and sank the *Norge,* the sister ship of the *Eidsvold*, commanded by Captain Per Askim. It went down with 101 of its crew; another 90 men survived. No Germans were casualties in this battle.

That same day, British captain Bernard A. W. Warburton-Lee, commanding the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla of five destroyers, was ordered to sink or capture German ships and transports near Narvik and recapture the town at his discretion. His flotilla consisted of the *Hardy* (flagship), *Havoc, Hotspur, Hostile,* and *Hunter*. The British ships were smaller and with less armament than the German destroyers they were seeking (1,340 tons versus 1,625 tons each and four 4.7-inch guns versus five 5-inch guns each), but they arrived undetected off Narvik early on the morning of April 10, their approach concealed by a snowstorm.

Warburton-Lee ordered his flotilla to attack German ships in the harbor, and the British destroyers sank the *Wilhelm Heidkamp* (Commodore Bonte was among those killed) and the *Anton Schmitt*. They heavily damaged the *Diether von Roeder,* slightly damaged two other German destroyers, and sank six ore-laden cargo ships. The British destroyers also exchanged fire with German troops on shore before departing.

Wreckage from the naval battles that occurred off Narvik in Norway on April 10 and 13, 1940. The photo was taken following the German capture of Narvik on June 8, 1940. (Library of Congress)

As the British flotilla withdrew with only one ship slightly damaged, three German vessels emerged from an adjacent fjord and gave chase. Then, when it appeared that Hardy's force would successfully extract itself, two more German destroyers appeared from their anchorage farther down Ofotfjord and attacked on the flanks with guns and torpedoes. In the engagement that followed, the British destroyer *Hardy* was hit several times and beached, the *Hunter* was sunk, and the *Hotspur* was damaged but managed to escape.

The Germans then withdrew because of a shortage of fuel. On the way out of the Vestfjord to the sea, the *Havoc* and *Hostile* fired on the German ammunition ship *Rauenfels*, which exploded and sank. Warburton-Lee was

among the British dead in the battle; he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

British naval reinforcements, including the cruiser *Penelope*, now blockaded the fjord, and on April 11, the German destroyer *Erich Koellner* sustained additional damage when it ran afoul of uncharted rocks. The Royal Navy was determined to sink the remaining German destroyers at Narvik, and on April 13, the Admiralty dispatched Vice Admiral William J. Whitworth with the battleship *Warspite* and nine destroyers to the site. The battleship's reconnaissance Swordfish aircraft engaged and sank the German submarine *U-64* and warned of German destroyers lying in ambush positions in side fjords. A destroyer action then commenced outside Narvik Harbor in the early afternoon. Aircraft from the British carrier *Furious* tried to engage the German warships in advance of the *Warspite*'s arrival but were not successful, and two of them were lost.

In the ensuing fighting, the *Warspite*'s 15-inch guns proved especially effective against the German ships and shore installations. German submarines launched several torpedo attacks against the British battleship but were unsuccessful. With the German destroyers running low on ammunition, they retired up the Rombaks and Herjangs fjords, where they were pursued. In the engagement on April 13, the *Erich Koerllner* was sunk, followed by the *Hermann Künne, Diether von Roeder*, and *Erich Giese*. The remaining German destroyers were then scuttled.

The only German warships that survived in the area were four submarines and the tanker *Jan Wellem*. The British suffered serious damage to the destroyer *Eskimo*, which lost its bow but managed to stay afloat. Another British destroyer, the *Bedouin*, was slightly damaged. The Germans lost 316 men killed, the British lost 188, and the Norwegians lost 435 in both battles.

Although he had discretionary authority to do so, Whitworth declined to send his marines and sailors into action against the German soldiers ashore, but he recommended that a military force be dispatched forthwith to exploit the situation because the Germans had limited ammunition reserves and their motor transport had been captured at sea on April 11. No force was sent until May 28, however.

Combined with other losses sustained, the Germans paid a heavy price for their operations in Norway, especially in naval forces. Adolf Hitler considered the loss acceptable because taking Norway protected his northern

flank, secured continued access to vital Swedish iron ore, and provided bases for submarines and German surface raiders to operate in the north Atlantic.

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See also

Germany, Navy; Norway, Navy; WESERÜBUNG, Operation

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Narvik, Operations in (April 24–June 7, 1940)

The British naval victories off the northern Norwegian post of Narvik on April 10 and 13, 1940, cleared the way for an Allied amphibious assault. Narvik itself was important as the only winter transshipment point for high-grade Swedish iron ore to Germany. In executing such an operation, there was marked disagreement between the Admiralty, which pushed for an immediate landing, and more cautious army leaders, who realized the difficulties of a campaign in the late Norwegian winter. This clash of opposites was reflected in the two men selected to lead the campaign—Major General Piers Mackesy and Admiral William H. Boyle, Lord Cork and Orrery. The two were never briefed together, their instructions were contradictory, and they did not meet for the first time until April 15.

On April 24 in a blinding snowstorm, the Royal Navy bombarded Narvik. Poor visibility prevented observers from determining if German resistance had been broken, and the operation was aborted after three hours. Although the Royal Navy continued to bombard Narvik regularly, Mackesy refused to conduct a direct assault. By May 10, the Allies had assembled 30,000 Norwegian, British, Polish, and French mountain troops and two battalions of the Foreign Legion. Opposing them was a ragtag German force of

paratroopers, Austrian mountain troops, and seamen from the 10 sunken German destroyers of the previous naval battles off the port—in all, some 4,000 men under the command of Lieutenant General Eduard Dietl. Reinforcements and supplies were already coming in by rail via Sweden, though, and soon German troops and aircraft would be available from the south.

Commander of the Franco-Polish expeditionary force to Norway General of Brigade Antoine Béthouart was experienced in leading troops in rough terrain. He opposed both Lord Cork's boldness and Mackesy's caution, preferring to work his way up the peninsula in stages until he reached Narvik. The assault began at Bjervik on the night of May 13. Darkness minimized Luftwaffe interference in operations while allowing the Allies to make use of naval gunfire support. The success of this first attack led the British to remove the timid Mackesy from his post the next day and replace him with Lieutenant General Claude Auchinleck, a move that improved inter-Allied relations. It did not alleviate other problems faced by the multinational force, however, including shortages of supplies, winter equipment, and interpreters. Nevertheless, the Allied forces gradually closed on Narvik from its western approaches.

The impending defeat of the Allies in France on May 25 prompted the British War Cabinet to order that Narvik be captured and then Norway be evacuated. When the order was relayed to Lord Cork, he was not authorized to notify either the Norwegians or the French of the decision. Lord Cork disobeyed and told Béthouart but not the Norwegians.

On the night of May 27–28, the Allies launched their final assault on Narvik. Heavy resistance by the Germans gained sufficient time for Luftwaffe bombers to attack the naval flotilla and drive it from Narvik, depriving the attackers of heavy artillery support. Fierce German counterattacks nearly drove the invasion force back into the sea, but support from British Hurricane fighters, coupled with desperate assaults by Norwegian troops and French Foreign Legion troops, turned the tide. By the evening of May 28, Norwegian units entered the town.

Evacuation of the Allied force began almost immediately afterward, on June 1. Again disobeying orders, Lord Cork prevailed on the British ambassador to inform the Norwegian government of the evacuation. On the evening of June 7, the last Allied units reboarded their transports for the

journey to Britain. Two days later, the Norwegian forces disbanded and an armistice went into effect.

The struggle for Narvik demonstrated conclusively the importance of air supremacy, which was held throughout by the Germans. The Allied defeat there dashed any Allied hopes of maintaining a foothold in Norway.

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See also

Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Béthouart, Marie Émile Antoine; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Norway, German Conquest of

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National War Labor Board, U.S.

U.S. government agency established by executive order on January 12, 1942, to arbitrate disputes between labor and management, thereby ensuring that wartime production was not hindered by strikes, walkouts, or worker slowdowns. Later, the National War Labor Board (NWLB) was also empowered to set and review wages for most workers earning less than $5,000 a year. During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson had established an organization by the same name, although its purview was limited to mediation efforts alone.

The genesis of the NWLB can be found in a conference that President Franklin D. Roosevelt convened at the White House only days after America’s entrance into the war in December 1941. Meeting with representatives of organized labor as well as industry leaders and government personnel, the Roosevelt administration exacted a pledge from labor not to strike or stage lockouts for the duration of the war. The conferees also agreed that any labor disputes would be settled peaceably and that the administration would create a war labor board as soon as possible.

After the creation of the NWLB on January 12, 1942, Roosevelt promptly assembled a 12-person tripartite board made up of 4 individuals representing labor, 4 from industry, and 4 “public” members who represented neither labor nor management. Many wartime boards were constructed this way in an effort to involve all sectors of American society in the war and mobilization efforts. The tripartite arrangement also helped to blunt criticism that one side or the other was exerting too much influence on the process. The NWLB operated out of offices in Washington, D.C.

On October 3, 1942, Congress called for a full and integrated economic stabilization program to control wages and prices, mandating that prices and wages be frozen at the level that existed on September 15, 1942. On October 3, Roosevelt greatly expanded the NWLB’s powers by giving it the authority to set wages and salaries for all workers making $5,000 per year or less. The Internal Revenue Service would be responsible for stabilizing wages and salaries over $5,000 per year. With the exception of railroad employees and agricultural workers, the NWLB administered wage policies for all other workers. The NWLB’s initial wage guideline followed the so-called Little Steel Formula, which mandated that wage increases could not exceed 15 percent of the cost-of-living index as of January 1, 1941. By June 1943, the NWLB was employing a more equitable “bracket” formula to determine wage adjustments, wherein each occupation or labor group within a region was assigned minimum and maximum wage rates.

These changes resulted in Herculean workloads for the NWLB, which was expanded to include 12 regional tripartite boards that were empowered to set wages for specific geographic regions. The Washington office remained chiefly as a policy-making center and a place of last resort for arbitrating management-labor disputes. The board also worked closely with other agencies, including the National Labor Relations Board, the Bureau of Statistics, the Office of Price Administration, the War Production Board, the Department of Labor, and numerous other agencies. This was to ensure that wage guidelines were in harmony with overall economic stabilization and contributed to efficient industrial production.

At its peak of operations, the NWLB had 2,631 full-time employees at the national and regional levels. By August 1945, it had arbitrated 17,807 disputes involving nearly 12.3 million workers. Applications for wage adjustments averaged about 2,700 per week, and by August 1945 the board

had reviewed some 415,000 wage-adjustment requests involving nearly 26.3 million workers. The NWLB contributed significantly to the war effort by preventing labor problems, keeping wages (and therefore inflation) in check, and ensuring that war industries had a readily available labor supply. The NWLB was disbanded in 1946.

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See also

Office of Price Administration, U.S.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States; United States War Production Board

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Naval Armament

Naval guns are classified by width of bore, in inches, and by caliber (the length of the barrel expressed as diameter of the bore). Thus, the U.S. Navy 5-inch/38-caliber gun was 5 inches wide with a barrel length of 190 inches (5 times 38), or almost 16 feet. A gun's power and ability to penetrate armor are roughly proportional to its size.

Between the world wars, the Washington and London naval treaties defined warship types and sizes and influenced their design and armament. Most nations sought to build ships close to the limits of treaty-specified size and main armament: 16-inch guns for battleships, 8-inch guns for heavy cruisers, 6-inch guns for light cruisers, and 5-inch guns for destroyers. Although some ships straddled the treaty classifications (most notably Germany's Deutschland-class pocket battleships), most large warships fit within the treaty categories.

The German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* and the pocket battleships of the Deutschland class mounted 280mm (101-inch) guns, because the terms of the Versailles Treaty that ended World War II restricted Germany to that size of capital ship armament. Otherwise, battleship main

armament ranged from 12-inch guns in older battleships to 16-inch guns in the newer U.S. battleships and Britain's *Nelson* and *Rodney* and to the 18.1-inch guns of Japan's superbattleships *Yamato* and *Musashi* (the only battleships that exceeded the 16-inch Washington Treaty limit). Most British battleships, the Italian Littorio class, and the German *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz* battleships carried 15-inch guns, although Britain's King George V–class ships mounted only 14-inch guns because the failed 1936 London Treaty would have limited navies to 14-inch guns. Many older Japanese and U.S. battleships also carried 14-inch guns.

The battleship guns of the 1930s and 1940s were much more powerful than older guns of equivalent size. The U.S. battleship *Iowa*'s 16-inch/50-caliber guns, for example, fired a much heavier shell with greater penetrating power 2,000 yards farther than the 16-inch/45 caliber guns of the nation's older battleships. With a few exceptions, the power of guns of similar age and size was roughly comparable across different navies. The 2,700-pound shells fired by the 16-inch guns on the U.S. Iowa-class battleships were particularly powerful, whereas the 3,200-pound shells fired by the *Yamato* and *Musashi*'s 18.1-inch guns were of mediocre quality, making the two guns roughly equal in striking power.

Mounted in double or triple turrets—or in a few cases (Britain's King George V class and France's Dunkerque and Richelieu classes) in quadruple turrets—and firing a variety of high-explosive and armor-piercing ammunition, these heavy guns gave World War II battleships considerable striking power. Even at 20,000 yards, 11-inch guns could penetrate 8 inches of armor, and 16-inch guns could penetrate a foot of armor at 30,000 yards.

The range of guns varied depending on their age, size, shell design, propellant charge, and elevation. In the 1930s, most navies enlarged the gun ports of their older battleships to allow higher gun elevations and thus longer ranges. Most battleships could fire at ranges greater than 30,000 yards and some beyond 40,000 yards, but combat usually occurred at shorter ranges, even after the introduction of effective fire-control radar. On May 24, 1941, the *Hood* and *Bismarck* opened fire at one another at 26,500 yards, and on October 25, 1944, in Surigao Strait during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, U.S. radar-equipped battleships opened fire on the Japanese at 22,800 yards.

The 6-inch and 8-inch guns common to cruisers fired shells that ranged in weight from 100 to 300 pounds. The older 6-inch guns had ranges between

15,000 and 20,000 yards, and the superior 8-inch weapons sometimes managed 30,000 yards. Although they were unable to penetrate the thick armor of battleships, these weapons could wreak considerable damage on exposed and unarmored systems, as was seen when the three British cruisers with 6-inch and 8-inch guns engaged the lightly armored German pocket battleship *Graf Spee* at the Battle of Río de la Plata on December 13, 1939, knocking out ammunition hoists, fire-control, and other critical systems; however, their shells bounced off the *Graf Spee*'s turrets and heavily armored areas. Similarly, off Guadalcanal on the night of November 14–15, 1942, a barrage of 8-inch Japanese shells failed to penetrate the thick armor of the U.S. battleship *South Dakota*, but they did considerable damage to its exposed areas. These weapons, however, proved to be more than sufficient to penetrate the thinner armor of cruisers and destroyers. Combined with torpedoes, they made cruiser and destroyer actions particularly deadly, as was demonstrated in the Battle of the Java Sea on February 17, 1942, and the Battle of Savo Island on August 8–9, 1942.

Battleships generally carried secondary batteries of 5-inch or 6-inch guns, and cruisers carried secondary batteries of 3-inch to 5-inch guns for use against smaller ships, particularly attacking torpedo craft. All warships also mounted antiaircraft guns, and navies added more and more of these to their ships during the course of the war. When it was completed in 1941, for example, the *Yamato* mounted only 24 25mm antiaircraft guns, but by 1945, it carried 150 25mm guns and many 13mm machine guns in addition to its 5-inch and 6-inch secondary batteries. Late in the war, U.S. battleships similarly mounted more than 125 antiaircraft guns in addition to their 5-inch secondary batteries.

Several navies developed dual-purpose guns that proved to be effective against both ships and airplanes. The U.S. Navy's 5-inch/38-caliber gun was the best of these and helped make U.S. warships the most effective antiaircraft platforms of the war. U.S. battleships carried 16 to 20 of these in dual mounts. They formed the primary armament of U.S. destroyers and antiaircraft cruisers and made up the secondary battery of most U.S. heavy and light cruisers. The 5-inch gun fired 25 rounds per minute, had a range of 18,200 yards and a ceiling of 37,200 feet, and, in some mountings, could fire straight up. It earned a particularly deadly reputation among Japanese aviators even before proximity-fuze ammunition entered service. Only the 5-

inch/.38-caliber gun fired proximity-fuzed ammunition, because the fuzes were too large for smaller antiaircraft shells. The U.S. Navy developed a replacement, the even more powerful radar-controlled 5-inch/54-caliber gun, in 1945, but it came too late to see service in the war.

The German dual-purpose 4.1-inch/.65-caliber gun was comparatively ineffective, and German capital ships deployed 5.9-inch antiship secondary batteries in addition to antiaircraft armament. These crowded the decks and sometimes interfered with one another. Italian and some Japanese battleships also deployed 5-inch or 6-inch antiship secondary batteries in addition to dual-purpose and antiaircraft guns. Britain developed several dual-purpose guns in the 4-inch and 5-inch range but never settled on a standard or manufactured them in sufficient numbers to equip all ships in the fleet. Only a few British destroyers carried dual-purpose guns. Japan developed a good 4.7-inch dual-purpose gun in the 1930s, but it lagged behind similar U.S. and British guns in performance by 1941. Many Japanese ships also lacked the high-angle mounts to maximize effectiveness against enemy aircraft.

The increasing dominance of aircraft soon made antiaircraft weapons the most important and most often used warship armament, particularly in the Pacific theater, where U.S. battleships became valued for the tremendous quantity of antiaircraft fire they could generate rather than the striking power of their 16-inch guns. Most warships carried specialized antiaircraft guns that ranged from 40mm and 20mm cannon to smaller machine guns such as the American .50-caliber.

The United States and Britain adopted the excellent Swiss Oerlikon 20mm and the Swedish Bofors 40mm, which replaced the U.S. Navy's 1.1-inch machine guns and steadily displaced the Royal Navy's 2-pounder pom-poms. The Bofors fired 120 rounds per minute, and the shorter-ranged Oerlikon fired almost 500 rounds per minute. The Oerlikon accounted for one-third of the U.S. Navy's antiaircraft kills, but it lacked the power of the Bofors to shatter kamikaze aircraft before they hit their targets.

The Italian Navy relied on reasonably effective 37mm and 20mm Breda antiaircraft guns. The German Navy developed 37mm and 20mm weapons of its own but began replacing them with superior Bofors guns late in the war. Japan adopted a 25mm Hotchkiss weapon as its primary antiaircraft gun. Plagued with problems, it attained only half the Oerlikon's rate of fire and lacked the Bofors' hitting power. Poor sights, particularly in its double and

triple mountings, made it difficult to track the high-speed aircraft introduced later in the war, and this partly accounts for the Japanese Navy's poor air defense record. In a further demonstration of the changing face of naval warfare, both the Japanese Navy and the Royal Navy experimented with antiaircraft shells for their battleship main armament but with only limited success.

STEPHENM K. STEIN

See also

Battle Cruisers; Battleships; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Destroyers; Java Sea, Battle of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Naval Gunfire, Shore Support; Radar; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Savo Island, Battle of; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Naval Gunfire, Shore Support

Gunfire from ships offshore was one of the great assets making possible Allied amphibious landings in both the European and Pacific theaters. The traditional adage "a ship's a fool to fight a fort" had seemed borne out at Gallipoli in World War I. During the interwar years, most navies therefore neglected support of joint operations. The U.S. Navy developed no bombardment ammunition for its battleships until 1940; the Japanese did not do so until 1942. Thus, the amphibious landings of World War II supported by effective naval gunfire present one of the great, if unexpected, success stories of 20th-century military operations.

During the North African Campaign in 1941 and 1942, the British found most useful two old monitors, the *Erebus* and the *Terror,* that had been originally built to support British troops in Belgium in World War I. With the Allies trying to regain a foothold on the continent in 1943, naval gunnery assets proved to be one of their trump cards. In the invasions of French North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and finally Anzio, U.S. and British warships provided great assistance to Allied troops ashore.

Naval gunfire really came into its own on June 6, 1944, during the Normandy Invasion, Operation OVERLORD. Promises that heavy bombers would substitute for field artillery, unavailable until at least two days after the initial landings, proved hollow when most bombs fell behind the beaches. Fortunately, the Allies had mustered a strong bombardment force of 137 warships, including 7 battleships, 2 monitors, 23 cruisers, and 105 destroyers. At Omaha Beach, 9 U.S. and 3 British destroyers moved as close as 900 yards from shore to destroy German guns with counterbattery fire. U.S. lieutenant general Omar Bradley concluded that "The Navy saved our hides." He remarked on another occasion that "I would gladly have swapped a dozen B-17s for each 12-inch gun." At Normandy, Allied warships fired approximately 141,000 rounds of 4-inch and larger shells, a majority of which were controlled by aerial spotters.

In concluding that naval gunfire was approximately 10 times as accurate as bombing, the British also noted that casualties from friendly fire were rare. German field marshal Erwin Rommel reported to Adolf Hitler that Allied naval gunfire was so effective "that no operation of any kind by either infantry or tanks is possible in the area commanded by this rapid-fire artillery." Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt counted naval gunfire as one of the three principal factors in the German defeat at Normandy. Following the Saint-Lô breakout (July 11–19, 1944), British warships continued to assist Allied troops advancing along the coast into November 1944, with the veteran battleship *Warspite* shooting until its guns were worn out.

In the Pacific, naval gunfire support proved at least as important as in Europe. In their first test in this role, U.S. warships at Tarawa (November 20–24, 1943) destroyed nearly all the Japanese artillery positions and wire communications. Many enemy machine guns remained operational, however, and inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking marines. In consequence, naval gunfire preparation for the next landing, Kwajalein (January 19–February 6,

1944), was more extensive. The official report concluded that “The entire island looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000 ft., then dropped. All beach defenses were completely destroyed.”

The 6-inch guns of the U.S. light cruiser *Philadelphia* firing in support of the Allied landing in southern France, August 1944. (Corbis)

The Japanese increasingly sited their defenses specifically to avoid naval gunfire. At Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945), their deep tunnels enabled many soldiers to escape the extensive three-day bombardment, although the big naval guns, often firing at ranges of less than two miles, destroyed over 60 percent of the Japanese coastal artillery in the target area. The defending general, Kuribayashi Tadamichi, reported that “The firepower of the American warships and aircraft makes every landing possible.” In contesting the final Allied invasion of the war at Okinawa (March 1945), the Japanese command deliberately chose to burrow into the coral ridges in the southern portion of the island to escape the fury of naval gunfire. Still, U.S. warships fired in support of troops 23,210 battleship projectiles and 261,000 5-inch to 8-inch rounds.

During the war, the tonnage of ordnance laid down by Allied warships backing invasions totaled five or six times that delivered by aviation. The

Axis powers gave far less attention to naval gunfire support, although the Italians did build some coastal monitors. In the closing stages of the war, the Germans employed cruisers and the pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer* in support of retreating German units on the Courland coast.

Only once did Japanese battleships bombard Allied troops. On October 14, 1942, at Guadalcanal, the *Kongo* and *Haruna* fired nearly 900 14-inch projectiles, mostly at Henderson Field. Given the small size of the target area, this proved to be the most devastating bombardment fired against U.S. troops in any war.

MALCOLM MUIR JR.

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Battle Cruisers; Battleships; Cherbourg, Capture of; Destroyers; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kwajalein, Battle for; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of; Salerno Invasion; Tarawa, Battle of

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Naval Strategy, Allied

The successful execution of Allied naval strategies, especially those of Great Britain and the United States, proved decisive in the Allied victory in World War II. In the case of Britain, the effective use of naval power made possible its national survival, while that of the United States was responsible for the defeat of Japan.

Upon the outbreak of war in September 1939, the naval forces of Britain and France found themselves arrayed against those of Germany. Britain, possessing the larger of the navies, was chiefly responsible for the formulation of naval strategy. The plan was roughly the same as that in World War I. First, the British instituted a blockade of Germany. British warships stopped and searched merchantmen steaming into the North Sea to deny contraband goods from being utilized by Germany. Although effective in World War I, this effort in World War II met with only limited success owing to a sweeping economic agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union. The German conquest of much of Western Europe in the spring of 1940 further undermined the blockade.

The second portion of British strategy also mirrored World War I, as the Royal Navy was responsible for keeping open the seaborne lines of communication upon which Britain relied for the vast majority of its raw materials and food as well as manufactured goods for both the military and civilian sectors. To this end, the British promptly instituted a convoy system for the transport of supplies. The British concentrated on the Atlantic, although resources were also stretched to guard the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean, while the French Navy protected Allied interests in the Mediterranean. Later, Canada and the United States assumed major responsibility for convoy protection on the Atlantic run.

The ability of the British to protect their interests and remain in the war was greatly hampered with the June 1940 defeat of France and the loss of the powerful French Navy. Although Britain was able to secure a part of the French fleet through Operation CATAPULT (July 1940) and also garnered 50 destroyers through the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement with the then benevolently neutral United States, British forces were stretched thin, as they also had to dispute control of the Mediterranean owing to the June 1940 Italian entry into the war on the Axis side.

The U.S. practice, beginning in mid-1941, of employing U.S. naval forces to escort convoys from the U.S. East Coast to Iceland offset this problem somewhat, but the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union compelled the British to divert naval forces to the protection of Arctic convoys bound to this new Allied power. As of June 1941, British naval strategy appeared ineffective given that shipping losses to German

submarines by that date amounted to 5.7 million tons, while British shipyards could only replace a small fraction of that.

The entry of the United States into the war as an Allied power following the December 7, 1941, attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor greatly improved Britain's strategic situation at sea, despite the fact that the Japanese Navy was able in short order to sweep the British from most of their possessions in Asia. Unlike the Axis powers, Britain and the United States closely coordinated their efforts at sea to great advantage. While the European theater was not the primary one for the U.S. Navy, it did share in the protection of Allied supply lines to Britain, and by early 1943 U.S. and Canadian naval forces had assumed responsibility for safeguarding convoys in the Western and Central Atlantic.

The United States also contributed warships to the Allied war effort in Europe, particularly for operations in the Mediterranean, and offset merchant losses through its massive shipbuilding capacity. By the late spring of 1943, Allied naval strategy was successful in that the Axis submarine menace was contained. Great Britain's survival ensured a staging point for amphibious operations versus Axis Europe that resulted in the landings in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France, with subsequent drives into Germany by Allied ground forces.

While Britain was almost exclusively involved with the European theater of operations at sea, the United States directed its naval efforts at Japan in the Far East. Upon the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States and the Allies suffered a succession of defeats at the hands of the Japanese. By early 1942 Japan had invaded the Philippines, which ultimately fell in May 1942, and had conquered Malaya and taken the great British Pacific bastion of Singapore, while the ABDA Command—a collection of Australian, British, Dutch, and U.S. warships tasked with defending the Netherlands East Indies—had been destroyed, as the Japanese conducted operations to conquer that resource-rich area. Amid these events, in early 1942 U.S. and British leaders agreed that naval operations would be divided into strategic theaters. The United States would concentrate on the Pacific while Britain dealt with the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean.

U.S. strategists held to a plan that called for recapturing lost U.S. possessions and conquering Japanese Pacific holdings as forward bases to conduct fleet operations for an eventual invasion of the Japanese home

islands. Command of the Pacific was divided into two theaters—the Southwest Pacific under General Douglas MacArthur and the North, Central, and South Pacific under Admiral Chester Nimitz. MacArthur desired an advance of army and ground-based forces from Australia through the Dutch East Indies toward the Philippines.

Nimitz, however, argued for the execution of Plan Orange, the naval strategy for the defeat of Japan formulated in the interwar years that called for U.S. naval forces to drive through the Central Pacific and seize Japanese island possessions through amphibious operations while at the same time engaging and defeating the Japanese Navy. The ultimate goal was to cut off the resource-poor Japanese home islands from supply and destroy Japan's war-making capacity through strategic bombing from the captured islands. Because sufficient resources were available, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed both plans, although the bulk of naval assets were directed to Nimitz and his Pacific Fleet.

Pending the arrival of new naval construction to offset the Pearl Harbor losses, operations first centered on the use of submarines to attack Japanese shipping, a series of carrier raids, and arresting the expansion of the Japanese defensive ring. Although the submarine campaign got off to a slow start, due in large part to faulty U.S. torpedoes, in the spring of 1942, with the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8) and the Battle of Midway (June 3–6), U.S. naval forces decisively halted the Japanese advance and destroyed much of Japanese naval aviation.

U.S. industrial might, meanwhile, ultimately produced the world's most powerful navy—larger than all other navies in the world combined. Japan proved unable to halt subsequent U.S. assaults in the South and Central Pacific during 1943–1944, when the Americans replaced island-hopping with leapfrogging, in which some Japanese strongpoints such as Rabaul and Truk were bypassed, cut off from resupply, and allowed to wither on the vine.

In July 1944, U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt met in Pearl Harbor with MacArthur and Nimitz to discuss strategy. MacArthur argued that the next U.S. move should be the liberation of the Philippines; Nimitz, supported by chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King, wanted to bypass the Philippines and secure Formosa. With sufficient assets to accomplish both, Roosevelt agreed with MacArthur that the Philippines should be retaken. This

shifted Nimitz's operations farther north to Okinawa, which was to be the staging point for a projected eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands.

With the Japanese aware of U.S. plans to cut them off from the resources—especially oil—of the Netherlands East Indies, they gambled all in the war's largest naval battle, Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944). It ended with the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy as an effective fleet fighting force.

These offensives, combined with the devastating toll exacted on Japanese merchant shipping by U.S. submarines, starved Japan of resources. The conquest of the Mariana Islands in the summer of 1944 provided B-29 bomber bases from which to strike the Japanese home islands in a highly effective strategic bombing campaign. The conquest of Iwo Jima on March 6, 1945, and Okinawa in April—the latter being supported by the British Pacific Fleet, making it the first large-scale Allied operation in the Pacific since the opening of the war—virtually accomplished the goals of Plan Orange and ensured Japanese defeat.

Sustained heavy bombing missions from the Marianas coupled with carrier operations against Japan and aerial mine laying and submarines destroyed Japan's industrial centers, much of its transportation system, and the majority of its shipping. An invasion of Japan, planned for the fall of 1945, proved unnecessary following the Japanese surrender after the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9). The fact that the formal Japanese surrender took place on the decks of the battleship *Missouri* was a strong indication of the success of U.S. naval strategy and its place in the defeat of Japan.

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See also

Adriatic Sea, Naval Operations in; Aegean Sea Naval Operations; Amphibious Warfare; Arctic Convoys; Atlantic, Battle of the; Baltic Sea, Naval Operations in; Canada, Navy; CATAPULT, Operation; Central Pacific Campaign; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz,

Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Rabaul; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Truk, Raid on; United States Navy

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Naval Strategy, Axis

During World War II, Germany, Italy, and Japan pursued diverse naval strategies, usually without regard for those of their partners. The failure of the Axis powers, especially Japan, to win control of the seas had much to do with their defeat in the war.

Germany's naval strategy had been developed after Adolf Hitler's assumption of power in 1933. In 1935 Britain, much to the displeasure of France and in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, concluded a naval agreement with Germany that granted the latter the right to build up to 35 percent the size of the Royal Navy in surface ships and parity in submarines. Hitler had instructed his naval chief, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, not to expect war before 1943, and so Raeder had been busy building a balanced fleet that was to include aircraft carriers and would be able to project German power overseas. Both Hitler and Raeder envisioned the day when Germany might challenge Britain and the United States for world naval mastery. The ambitious German Z Plan, spelled out in 1938, was to be completed by 1948.

When war came in September 1939, this construction program was, of course, far from complete, and Germany found itself with the wrong type of navy with which to carry out a war against commerce. Raeder intended to employ such ships as he had to attack British commerce, using strong surface units as commerce raiders, since the navy in 1939 had available only 57 submarines, and half of these were not suitable for blue water operations. A

good bit of the German Navy—especially its destroyers—was also consumed in the successful German invasion of Norway in April 1940. Unfortunately for the German effort at sea, the defeat of France that June did not bring major naval acquisitions, for the armistice agreement left the fleet disarmed but in French hands. Then, in Operation CATAPULT (July 1940), the British acquired or neutralized as many of the French ships as they could reach.

German naval strength, apart from submarines, continued to diminish, and the use of German capital ships as surface raiders largely ended with the May 1941 sinking of the battleship *Bismarck* and Hitler's increasing reluctance to risk further loss of his surface units. Ultimately, most of the capital ships either lost their guns or served as stationary gun platforms.

For the remainder of the war, German strategy centered almost exclusively on the use of U-boats as commerce raiders in the Battle of the Atlantic, seeking to cut the lifeline to Britain and force that nation from the war. Although the submarines inflicted great damage on Allied shipping—particularly that of Britain—the Allies contained that threat by May 1943 through the use of convoys, technological innovations, aircraft, and code breaking. By war's end, little remained of the German fleet due to losses at the hands of the Allies, although the German Navy was able to accomplish a great success in the evacuation of personnel from the Baltic states late in the war.

With France near defeat, Italy entered the war in June 1940. Throughout the interwar period, Italian naval construction was based on the assumption that it would be deployed against France in the Mediterranean. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's concept of Italy as an aircraft carrier because of the relatively short distances in the Mediterranean meant that Italy did not commission such ships in the war. Italian naval strategy rested on the navy supporting operations in North Africa, disputing the Allies' use of the Mediterranean's central basin and blockading the Strait of Sicily so that Great Britain could not supply its Middle Eastern forces through the Mediterranean.

While the Italian Navy was on paper a substantial force and had some fine ships, it suffered heavily from technological deficiencies, such as the lack of radar and sonar at the opening of the war and poor coordination with land-based air assets. After the first year of war, fuel shortages severely limited operations. In naval engagements fought with the British, Italy suffered several major defeats and won few clear-cut victories, but the navy

did ensure that 86 percent of supplies and 92 percent of Italian and German troops it escorted to North Africa arrived safely. The navy also prevented Allied supply of the Middle East through the Mediterranean and maintained a blockade of Malta until November 1942.

Despite these successes, Italian naval operations were insufficient to bring victory. In 1943 Axis troops were cleared from North Africa, and Allied forces launched invasions of first Sicily and then Italy proper. In September 1943, Italy renounced its alliance with Germany, and most of the fleet went over to the Allies, although Germany acquired some ships and sank several others, including the new battleship *Roma*.

While the naval arm was important to both Germany and Italy in the war, it was essential to Japanese military strategy, for as an island nation, Japan required a powerful fleet to project its military power. By December 1941, the Japanese Navy possessed a number of modern ships (and soon the two largest battleships ever to go to sea), more aircraft carriers than any other power with pilots who had gained experience in the fighting in China, the superb Long Lance torpedo, and probably the best-trained ship crews of any navy in the world.

As in World War I, Japanese leaders saw the beginning of World War II as an opportunity to secure the natural resources that fate had denied their nation. But Japanese expansion in China and in French Indochina brought opposition from the United States in the form of economic sanctions, which were supported by both the British government and the Dutch government-in-exile. These economic sanctions—especially the cutoff of oil—threatened Japan's survival, and Tokyo decided on war rather than give up its hard-won China conquests and foothold in Indochina.

Japanese leaders realized that the far greater industrial capacity of the United States would make such a war difficult, so they opted for Combined Fleet commander Yamamoto Isoroku's plan of a preemptive strike on the U.S. Pacific Fleet, recently relocated to Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. The Japanese goal here was to cripple the Pacific Fleet sufficiently to purchase time for the Japanese fleet and army to conquer the areas containing the needed natural resources (especially oil from the Netherlands East Indies) and then construct a defensive ring.

The Japanese envisioned the U.S. fleet being savaged by submarines and surface ships with the Long Lance torpedo as it attempted to fight its way

west across the Pacific and then fight a great battle or series of battles ending in Japanese victory. Japanese leaders believed that ultimately the United States would tire of the war and acknowledge Japanese hegemony in Asia.

This strategy proved unworkable, and the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941, was a major mistake in that it unified the U.S. public squarely behind the war effort as nothing else could have. As it turned out, the Japanese lacked the industrial strength to fortify the islands of their defensive perimeter to the point where they could be effectively defended.

While Japan enjoyed initial successes versus the U.S. Navy, especially in night actions, the industrial power of the United States vastly outstripped that of Japan. Although Japan had more carriers than any other nation (thanks to Yamamoto), much of its naval airpower was smashed in the Battle of Midway of June 3–6, 1942, and an inadequate pilot replacement program hindered the fleet air arm thereafter. The Japanese also had only a limited merchant marine capacity, especially in tankers, and they lacked convoy escort ships and had largely neglected antisubmarine warfare. They also trailed in the development of radar. In the end, Japanese will and training were overcome by improved U.S. training, technological advances such as the variable-time fuze (proximity fuze), superior aircraft, better-trained pilots, and sheer numbers. The ability of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to operate at great distance through the fleet train concept and the acquisition of Japanese-held islands brought the eventual isolation of the Japanese home islands and that nation's defeat.

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See also

Adriatic Sea, Naval Operations in; Anglo-German Naval Agreement; Atlantic, Battle of the; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Central Pacific Campaign; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Italy, Navy; Japan, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Raeder, Erich; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; United States Navy; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan; Versailles, Treaty of; Yamamoto Isoroku; Z Plan

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Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater (September 1, 1939)

At the outbreak of World War II, the British naval forces in Atlantic home waters stood at 7 battleships (the *Nelson, Rodney, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign, Ramillies, Resolution,* and *Revenge*), 3 battle cruisers (the *Hood, Renown,* and *Repulse*), 3 aircraft carriers (the *Ark Royal, Courageous,* and *Hermes*), 18 cruisers, 35 destroyers, 7 fleet minesweepers, and 16 submarines. The British Mediterranean Fleet comprised 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 6 cruisers, and 44 destroyers. To bolster its forces in the Atlantic, especially in the escort of merchant shipping, the Royal Navy enjoyed the cooperation of the Royal Canadian Navy, which began the war with only 6 destroyers and 5 minesweepers but ended the conflict with more than 363 ships.

In 1939, the French Navy was the fourth largest and most modern in the world. France possessed 5 older battleships (the powerful new battleships *Jean Bart* and *Richelieu* were in the final stages of construction), 1 aircraft carrier, 2 modern battle cruisers (the *Strasbourg* and *Dunkerque*), 19 cruisers, 64 destroyers, and 77 submarines. In September 1939, much of this naval strength was deployed in the Mediterranean, the West Indies, and Indochina.

Poland had only a small navy in September 1939. It counted four destroyers, five submarines, one minelayer, and six modern minesweepers as well as several auxiliary and training ships.

Italy, neutral until 1940, had an impressive navy in September 1939 consisting of 4 reconstructed World War I–era battleships, 7 heavy cruisers,

12 light cruisers, 90 destroyers, and 97 submarines.

The Soviet Union, officially neutral until June 1941, had begun an ambitious naval construction program, but in September 1939 it operated 3 old battleships, 6 cruisers, 4 destroyer leaders, 30 destroyers, and 165 submarines.

The outbreak of war in September 1939 caught the German Navy in transition. Because Chancellor Adolf Hitler had said that war would not occur before 1943, German Navy commander Grand Admiral Erich Raeder had been building a balanced fleet to include aircraft carriers. In September 1939, the German Navy consisted of the battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* (the powerful battleships *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz* were under construction), 3 pocket battleships (the *Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee,* and the *Deutschland,* soon renamed *Lützow*), 1 heavy cruiser (the *Admiral Hipper*, with 4 additional heavy cruisers under construction), 6 light cruisers, 34 destroyers and torpedo boats, and 56 submarines.

In September 1939, the U.S. Navy may have been the world's most powerful. It maintained 15 battleships, 5 fleet carriers, 1 light carrier, 37 cruisers, 149 destroyers, and 71 submarines. Although officially neutral when the war in Europe began, the United States lent unofficial support to the Allies. The United States divided its ships between the Atlantic and the Pacific. In September 1939, U.S. forces in the Atlantic, commanded by Rear Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, consisted of 3 old battleships (the *New York, Arkansas,* and *Texas;* the battleship *Wyoming* was a training ship), the aircraft carrier *Ranger*, 8 cruisers, 43 destroyers, and 21 submarines. The United States had significant naval building programs under way centered on fast battleships and Essex-class aircraft carriers. In addition, Washington ordered 110 decommissioned World War I–vintage destroyers refurbished for service.

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See also

Canada, Navy; France, Navy; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Poland, Navy; Raeder, Erich; Soviet Union, Navy; United States Navy

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Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater (December 7, 1941)

On the eve of the Japanese attack on U.S. and British possessions in the Pacific on December 7–8, 1941, the Japanese Navy held a considerable advantage in terms of numbers of ships deployed by the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific. Possessing more aircraft carriers than any other power, and with the world's most experienced naval air arm as well as the excellent Long Lance torpedo, the superbly trained Imperial Japanese Navy was ready to run riot, at least in the short term.

In the Pacific and Indian Oceans in early December 1941, the Japanese counted 10 battleships (not including the *Yamato,* the largest battleship ever built, that entered service later that month), 11 aircraft carriers, 18 heavy cruisers, 23 light cruisers, 129 destroyers, and 67 submarines.

The Japanese ships were entirely in the Pacific, whereas the ships of the United States were split between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and Great Britain had most of its naval strength in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; even Australian and New Zealand ships were serving abroad. The U.S. Navy possessed in its Pacific and Asiatic fleets a total of 9 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 13 heavy cruisers, 11 light cruisers, 80 destroyers, and 56 submarines.

British Empire forces, including Australian and New Zealand ships still in the Pacific, numbered 1 battleship and 1 battle cruiser, 1 heavy cruiser, 7 light cruisers, and 13 destroyers. The Netherlands Navy added 3 light cruisers, 7 destroyers, and 13 submarines. Thus, the total Allied force was inferior to that of Japan in numbers in everything except battleships (where they were equal) and submarines (69 to 67). Also, most Japanese ships were newer, faster, and more heavily armed than their Allied counterparts. These figures do not take into account training or command and language difficulties experienced by Allied forces.

The naval strengths listed above are, however, misleading in the sense that they also do not take into account ships under construction or the potential for new construction, a function of industrial capability. Here, as thoughtful Japanese strategists had known all along, Japan was no match for

the United States, and the longer the war endured, the more likely Japanese superiority would disappear. Those in Tokyo supporting war believed that a preemptive strike would sufficiently cripple U.S. naval strength, allowing Japan time to secure its resource base (the reason for the war) and build a defensive ring to blunt U.S. attacks and force Washington to recognize Japanese hegemony in the region. This appraisal could not have been more incorrect.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Australia, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Japan, Navy; Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater; United States Navy; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Naval Warfare

Naval operations conducted on a truly global basis were critical in the outcome of World War II. In September 1939, Allied naval superiority was even more marked than in World War I. Britain had one of the world's two largest navies (the other being the United States), and France had the world's fourth-largest fleet. Although challenged by German U-boats and later by Japanese surface warships, Allied strength at sea enabled them to tap the world's resources, transport men and supplies vast distances, and provide naval bombardment and logistics support to amphibious operations while largely denying these capabilities to the Axis powers. Both sides resorted to convoys as protection against surface raiders and submarines.

Naval technology at the beginning of World War II was little changed from World War I. Warships of the 1920s and 1930s were larger and faster than in World War I, and surface ships boasted improved gunnery control.

With the exception of radar, however, there had been few technological breakthroughs. The aircraft carrier, which had appeared at the end of World War I, although it was regarded as an important ship type, was not yet seen as the new capital ship.

In 1939, the world's admirals still gave the battleship primary place. The Japanese hoped to secure a decisive edge in the war at sea with the powerful Yamato-class battleships. Their doctrine called for a decisive contest at sea, and the Yamato-class seemed to promise that. Built in great secrecy and displacing nearly 73,000 tons fully loaded and armed with nine 18.1-inch guns, the *Yamato* and *Musashi* (two others were projected, one was finished as an aircraft carrier, and the fourth was never completed) were the largest battleships ever built. The United States built 10 modern battleships, more than all three Axis nations combined. The 4 U.S. Navy Iowa-class battleships, although they displaced only 57,500 tons fully loaded and were armed with nine 16-inch guns, were faster and not that much off the Yamato class in capability. The great battleship confrontation at sea during World War II at Jutland never occurred.

The primacy of the battleship changed with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), especially when the Japanese sank the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and battle cruiser *Repulse* from the air off Malaya (December 10, 1941). Unlike the U.S. battleships at Pearl Harbor or the Italian battleships attacked by British aircraft in Taranto Harbor in November 1940, the two British capital ships were under way and firing antiaircraft weapons. From this point on, ships that ventured out without aircraft protection did so at their peril.

The once-mighty battleships never engaged one another in decisive fleet action (apart from the Battle of Surigao Strait during the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf), but the torpedoes fired from U.S. destroyers and torpedo boats probably inflicted the greatest damage. Battleships proved their usefulness in shore bombardment, as antiaircraft platforms (virtually all warships received increased numbers of antiaircraft guns), and as "armored oilers" to accompany the aircraft carriers, the new titans of the seas.

Britain's concern over operating its aircraft carriers in narrow seas such as the North Sea and the Mediterranean, which would subject them to attack from land-based aircraft, led to the introduction of an armored flight deck. The four-ship Illustrious class, which entered service in 1940 and 1941,

carried heavier antiaircraft protection, an armored flight deck, and an armored "box" protecting the aircraft hangar. These additions provided greater protection but also limited British carriers to fewer aircraft than their U.S. and Japanese counterparts.

British naval resources were stretched thin at the start of hostilities, and although duties and scope of operations roughly corresponded to those of World War I, ships were far fewer. Thus, instead of major surface actions, the majority of the fighting at sea in the European theater centered on the destruction and protection of seaborne trade, especially in the Atlantic Ocean, which was the critical area of operations. The Royal Navy's chief responsibility was to maintain Britain's seaborne lines of communication, on which the survival of the nation depended.

The Royal Navy transported the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France and then to Greece, and the BEF reinforced and supplied garrisons in North Africa, among other places. The Royal Navy also rendered invaluable service by extracting the BEF from France in 1940 and from Greece and Crete in 1941. Had the Royal Navy not been able to execute these operations, Britain could have been forced from the war.

Many of the French ships were modern, the result of a major building program undertaken in the years immediately before the war that had drained sizable resources from the army. French naval strategy at the beginning of the war centered on cooperation with the Royal Navy. The French North Atlantic Fleet had two principal missions: to work with the British in protecting merchant shipping and escorting convoys and to use its most powerful assets, built around the battle cruisers and organized in the *Force de Raid*, against German surface raiders.

For the German Navy, war came too early. When Adolf Hitler took power in 1933, the Kriegsmarine was basically a coastal defense force. Hitler wanted a powerful navy that might one day challenge Britain—or even Britain and the United States—for Atlantic mastery, but he assured German Navy chief Grand Admiral Erich Raeder that he had no intention of waging war with Britain. In November 1937, Hitler had stated that war would not occur before 1943 or 1945.

Raeder thus set out, in the Z Plan of January 1939, to construct a balanced fleet of battleships and battle cruisers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and a force of 249 submarines. He fixed 1948 as the date for its completion,

but Hitler gave him a deadline of six years (i.e., 1945). With a lead time on capital ship construction of as much as three or four years, the outbreak of the war thus caught the German Navy with the wrong mix of vessels. Germany's sole aircraft carrier, the *Graf Zeppelin*, was never completed. Italy, neutral until 1940, had an impressive medium-sized navy, but its operations, apart from submarines, were largely confined to the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Union projected by 1943 a powerful oceangoing fleet, but by the time of the German invasion in 1941, the largest surface additions were four Kirov-class cruisers. The Soviet naval minister in Moscow was subordinate to the army, and ships were under the control of front commanders; thus, the navy played little part in World War II.

When the war began, the overwhelming Allied naval superiority promptly drove German shipping into neutral or home ports. Except in the Baltic, the German flag disappeared from the seas. The British were content, however, to institute a naval blockade of Germany with the aim of denying Germany vital imports but also preventing sorties into the Atlantic of powerful German surface ships. Such a blockade, from 1914 to 1918, had been a key factor in the German defeat. The blockade of 1939 had little effect on Germany, however, given its economic arrangements with the Soviet Union and Italy. After Germany's victories of 1940 and 1941 in Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, moreover, Germany could tap the agricultural and industrial production of most of Europe.

Raeder pursued a commerce-raiding strategy, and he struck back with surface raiders, land-based aviation, mines, and, above all, submarines. His goal was to disrupt Britain's seaborne trade and starve Britain into submission. Germany had a submarine commander of genius in Karl Dönitz, who had assumed control of the U-boat program in 1935, but the paucity of U-boats made it impossible to wage any meaningful campaign against Allied shipping.

Dönitz believed that the only way Germany could pressure Britain was through interdicting its Atlantic shipping lanes, and he estimated that 90 submarines on station would ensure success. This meant that a force of some 300 submarines was required. At the start of hostilities, though, Dönitz had only 56 U-boats, of which 46 were ready for action; only 26 were suitable for Atlantic operations. Once the war began, Raeder suspended the Z Plan and

gave priority to submarine construction and a commerce-raiding strategy, but much valuable time had been lost.

The April 1940 Norwegian Campaign ended as a brilliant strategic success for Hitler, but it also ruined the German surface navy. The Kriegsmarine lost 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers, half the German total, as well as having several other ships damaged. On the plus side, the many Norwegian fjords provided additional bases for German surface raiders and submarines. The greatest gain for Germany in this regard came in the defeat of France in June 1940. The acquisition of the French Atlantic coastline immensely benefited the U-boat war in the Atlantic, and by early August 1940, German submarines were operating from Lorient on the Bay of Biscay. These bases provided easier access to the Atlantic shipping lanes, and the French repair facilities were superior to the overburdened shipyards in Germany, translating into more U-boats at sea.

After the defeat of France and the loss of its powerful navy, Britain found itself in desperate naval straits. A new naval threat now arose in the form of a belligerent Italy, opening the Mediterranean Sea as a major theater of war. The Italian fleet posed a severe strategic threat to the key British lines of communication through the Mediterranean. Italy had some excellent ships, and its navy, although far weaker in total strength than that of Britain, was concentrated, giving it what appeared to be local naval superiority. The Italian Navy, however, lacked radar until 1942, and it was deficient in night-fighting equipment, antiaircraft protection, and antisubmarine capabilities. The Italians also did not have a naval air arm, which Benito Mussolini and Italian admirals had opposed, claiming that Italy was itself an aircraft carrier. There was no doctrine, however, for employment of land-based aviation in concert with naval units.

Oil from the Persian Gulf and other resources vital to the British war effort passed through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean, then through the Strait of Gibraltar into the Atlantic and to Britain. Without this route, British shipping would have to go all the way around the Horn of Africa.

In the struggle in the Mediterranean, Allied code breaking was vital. Intelligence from Ultra provided information to the British about the timing of Axis convoys. Malta also proved critical. The British were able to hold it and use it to harry Axis reinforcement and resupply of North Africa. By the end of 1942, British aircraft were sinking many of the Axis ships involved in

supplying Axis forces in the Mediterranean, with a profound impact on the North African campaign.

Meanwhile, a grim struggle was under way in the Atlantic. The campaign here was certainly one of the key contests of the entire war, for without victory in the Atlantic theater, Britain would have certainly been forced to sue for peace. On the outbreak of war, the Allies had promptly resorted to convoys. The convoy system was predicated on reducing the number of targets and on the assumption that the more targets there were, the more likely they were to be found. Large numbers of merchant ships would steam together, protected by escort vessels. The U-boats might still sink some vessels, but the percentage of losses would be significantly less. Further, the submarines themselves ran the risk of being sunk by the escorting destroyers and destroyer escorts.

It was 1941 before the U-boat building program really emerged. Dönitz asserted that he would have won the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941 or 1942 had he possessed the 300 U-boats he deemed necessary at the beginning of the war. It is probably a false claim, as a higher rate of sinking of merchantmen would only have forced the Allies to shift assets earlier, including shifting long-range aircraft to Coastal Command. Dönitz's submarines lacked effective radar until near the end of the war, and they struggled—at least in the first year—with defective torpedoes, the same problem that plagued the Americans at the beginning of their submarine campaign against Japan.

To compensate for Allied superiority, Dönitz developed new tactics for his submarines, the most important of which was the *Rudeltaktik* (pack tactics, which the Allies referred to as the "wolf pack"). Groups of 15 to 20 submarines would spread out along the Atlantic sea-lanes. Merchantmen traveling alone would be immediately attacked, but in the case of a convoy, the submarine would shadow it and radio for reinforcements. The closest U-boats would then converge for a night surface attack, which would maximize confusion for the defenders and minimize the possibility of submarine detection. The submarines would then submerge and reorganize for a second attack.

To enable his submarines to remain on station for longer periods, Dönitz sent out supply submarines. The Germans also had success in code breaking. The German Navy's B-Dienst intelligence service listened to Allied radio

traffic and broke the British convoy codes, enabling Dönitz to direct his boats to where enemy ships would be. The Germans also used aircraft, particularly the long-range Focke Wulf Fw-200, with great effectiveness against Allied convoys in the Eastern Atlantic when they came within range of German air bases.

British defenses of the vital Atlantic trade routes were strengthened in May 1941 when the U.S. Navy began escorting convoys between the United States and Iceland. Then in June 1941, Canada created the Canadian Escort Force for the same purpose. The Royal Canadian Navy grew dramatically in size during the conflict and played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic.

By June 1941, however, the Germans had sunk some 5.7 million tons of Allied shipping. British shipyards were able to launch only 800,000 replacement tons. Large Italian submarines, several of them operating from Bordeaux, were also effective. The Germans virtually controlled the Atlantic for more than a year after America's entry into the war. By May 1943, half of the world's 5,600 merchant ships in 1939 had been lost. May was probably the month when the tide of battle turned and the Allies went on the offensive.

A combination of factors brought the Allies victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. The convoy system was important, but so too was technology, primarily 10cm radar sets that could be carried aloft in long-range aircraft, sonar, improved depth charges, rockets fired from aircraft, and forward-thrown antisubmarine "hedgehogs" or "mousetraps" (small depth charges known to the British as "squids"). The high-intensity Leigh light on aircraft illuminated the sea at night. Radio detection equipment was vital, and long-range aviation helped close the so-called Black Hole in the Middle Atlantic.

Intelligence also played a role, chiefly Ultra intercepts of U-boat communications that guided aircraft to the submarines. The creation of hunter-killer groups of escorts and escort carriers designed for 15 aircraft, each operating independently of the convoys, carried the war to the submarines. It is also true, however, that Allied and interservice cooperation was far too long in coming.

For the Allies, the Battle of the Atlantic was a close-run thing, and it claimed significant resources. German submarines sank 2,452 Allied and neutral ships, totaling 12.8 million gross register tons. During the war, the British merchant marine lost 40,248 men and the Royal Navy another 73,642. The Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command sustained losses of 5,866 men

and 1,777 aircraft. The Royal Canadian Navy lost 1,965 men, and U.S. Navy losses in the battle were 2,443 men.

The Germans also paid a high price. During the war, Germany built 1,162 submarines. Of 830 operational U-boats, 784 were lost (696 destroyed by enemy action). Of 40,900 Germans who served in submarines, 25,870 perished and more than 5,000 were taken prisoner. U-boat crew fatalities were thus 63 percent, and the overall loss rate was 76 percent, the highest for any service in the war.

In the vast Pacific theater, sea power was the most important element. The fight here was largely a U.S. Navy enterprise, and it ended in perhaps the most comprehensive victory in naval history. In going to war with the United States, Japanese leaders completely miscalculated in several key areas. They assumed that the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) could cripple the U.S. Pacific Fleet, carry out a series of conquests to secure desired natural resources, and build a defensive ring that would hold the U.S. Navy at bay until America recognized the inevitability of a new Japanese empire.

Yet the final defeat of Japan was almost certain. The key to victory in the Pacific lay in numbers of ships and planes—and Japan, with a vastly inferior industrial base, was bound to lose that race to the United States. Beginning in 1943, significant numbers of the new Essex-class carriers and accompanying vessels reached the fleet.

Another important factor in the U.S. Navy victory over Japan was the concept of the fleet train, which enabled carrier task forces to operate for extended periods of time and at great distances from their bases. The fleet train was a vast enterprise that included supply ships, tankers, repair vessels, dry docks, and tenders for seaplanes, destroyers, and submarines. As a result, the U.S. Navy enjoyed unparalleled mobility; its strategic reach in the war was unmatched by any other navy. It was this capability that made possible the recapture of Pacific islands that had been taken by the Japanese, from which long-range land-based strategic bombers could attack the Japanese mainland. It also enabled the navy to establish large fleet anchorages in remote locations such as at Ulithi.

An essentially defensive policy forced the IJN to disperse its assets. Japan’s navy was never able to support individual isolated Japanese strongholds before the Americans overwhelmed them. Japan’s leaders also miscalculated their vulnerability in a war against merchant shipping.

U.S. and British warships ride at anchor in the harbor at Hvalfjörður, Iceland, May–June 1942. (Corbis)

Obsessed with carrying out fleet actions against the U.S. Navy, the IJN gave scant consideration to the protection of Japan's highly vulnerable merchant trade. Antisubmarine warfare was all but ignored. In December 1941 the IJN had but four purpose-built escort vessels, and it was not until the autumn of 1942 that any escorts were equipped with sonar. The United States also led Japan by a wide margin in antisubmarine technology.

Japan was highly dependent on imports and yet boasted only a marginal shipping capacity. Even with their early successes, the Japanese would not be able to capture, build, or salvage the necessary tonnage to replace even modest losses. As it turned out, U.S. submarines devastated the Japanese merchant marine. The United States outbuilt Japan in submarines by a ratio of 2:1. The U.S. Navy entered the war with 114 submarines; Japan had 64. During the war, the United States built another 206, and Japan only built 116. In the entire conflict, the United States lost 52 submarines, and Japan lost 128.

During the Pacific war, the U.S. Navy became the most successful practitioner of the *guerre de course* (war against commerce) in history. One could argue that the submarine was the most important factor in the Allied

victory in the Pacific. In effect, the United States succeeded where Germany failed in both world wars.

The United States built long-range submarines of 2,000 tons with 10 torpedo tubes each. Although the Japanese produced some fine boats and actually built the largest submarines of the war (3,500 tons and carrying three disassembled planes) with exceedingly long range (in 1942, Japanese submarines shelled the Pacific U.S. coast), their submarine strategy was flawed. They directed their submarines against U.S. warships. Although the Japanese enjoyed some success, operating against enemy warships took a high toll. Later, the Japanese used their large submarines chiefly to supply isolated garrisons such as Rabaul. The obvious target for their submarines was U.S. cargo vessels, but the Japanese never went after the long and vulnerable U.S. supply lines.

U.S. submarines, moreover, had a deep-dive capability. The standard diving depth for submarines was 300 feet, but U.S. boats could reach 400 feet without stressing the hull and could go deeper if necessary. This was one of the best-kept secrets of the war, and enemy depth charges usually exploded above them. But for the first two years of the war, U.S. submarines suffered because they carried inferior torpedoes. The magnetic pistol to explode the charge under the target ship often did not function correctly. The torpedoes also circled, and at least one U.S. submarine, the *Tang*, was sunk by one of its own “fish.” In late 1943, however, new contact pistols were installed, and by 1944 the navy had a new magnetic pistol.

From the beginning of the war against Japan, the United States waged unrestricted submarine warfare. In December 1941, Japan had 5.4 million tons of merchant shipping—only a marginal capacity. The Japanese constructed or acquired another 3.29 million tons during the war, but U.S. submarines sank 6.9 million tons of merchant ships (1,113 vessels). U.S. submarines also extacted a heavy toll of Japanese warships, sinking 201 totaling 577,000 tons. The Japanese were so short of aviation fuel by 1944 they could scarcely train pilots. In American submarine successes, code breaking (Magic) played a major role.

The June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway marked the turning point of the war in the Pacific, but the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history, finished off the Japanese fleet as an organized fighting force. Japanese courage and tenacity were overcome by American

determination and numbers. In February 1945, the five carrier task groups operating against the Japanese home islands included 119 warships, yet only 4 had been in service before December 7, 1941. By 1945, the U.S. Navy counted 23 battleships, 19 fleet carriers, 1 light carrier, 108 jeep carriers, 351 destroyers, and 255 submarines. The U.S. Navy was, in fact, larger than all the other navies of the world combined.

SPENCER C. TUCKER AND THOMAS J. WEILER

See also

Air Warfare, Naval; Amphibious Warfare; Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Convoys, Allied; Convoys, Axis; Dönitz, Karl; Hunter-Killer Groups; Leigh Light; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Liberty Ships; Midway, Battle of; Naval Armament; Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Naval Warfare; Norway, German Conquest of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse,* Sinking of; Radar; Raeder, Erich; Signals Intelligence; Sonar; Taranto, Attack on; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Nazi Racial Policies

National Socialist (Nazi) ideology advocated all-embracing "scientific" solutions of social problems to the extreme in that entire peoples were to be incorporated into a bureaucratic racial-biological design and all sources of nonconformity were to be eliminated. The Nazis took a hierarchy of races for granted. They divided mankind into "culture founders," "culture bearers," and "culture destroyers." The bearers of cultural development in the modern world were the "Aryans." The great counterpart to "the Aryan" was "the Jew." Jews were the *Todfeind,* the mortal enemy. The concept of "Aryan" remained vague, however, and Nazi ideology failed to establish a hierarchy of nations within the so-called Aryan race.

Overt racism was accompanied by a collectivist creed. Establishment of the National Socialist utopia of Volksgemeinschaft (ethnic or racial community) entailed a dual approach: its internal aim was to engineer a society fostering loyalty, obedience, and self-sacrifice. Its external goal was to segregate and eventually eradicate those who were not part of the Volksgemeinschaft: aliens, political opponents, the asocial, and the Jews.

In Adolf Hitler's mind, at least, the Jews were the archenemy of civilization and the source of all evil in the world. The image of Jews as the root of misfortune, manipulating events, was an ideological synthesis of various anxieties about civilization and self-contradictory racial notions focused on political targets. Unlike traditional anti-Semitism of a religious or nationalist cast, Nazi anti-Semitism was directed not against selected characteristics of people but against an abstract object. "The Jew" was an artificial racial construct.

The idea was essential to the National Socialist ideology, and after Hitler took power, he established through decrees the so-called Nuremberg Laws that denied Jews basic rights. In speeches Hitler warned that if the Jews dared touch off another world war, it would mean the destruction of the Jewish "race" in Europe. When the war came, though, it mattered not at all who started it. For the Nazis, the time had come for what their official memoranda termed "the final solution of the Jewish question." Following attempts to exclude the Jews from everyday life and drive them abroad, every Jew they could lay their hands upon would now be killed. The all-encompassing image of "the Jews" required an all-encompassing "final solution."

Throughout the lands they came to rule, but especially in the Slavic nations east of the Reich, the National Socialist New Order meant total

subjugation to the German *Herrenvolk* (master race). Administered by the Schutzstaffel (SS), the New Order imposed a reign of terror designed to grind down the non-Aryans and advance the racial frontier eastward. While Hitler never drew up a detailed plan for his 1,000-year Reich, his speeches and orders indicate the sort of empire he had in mind. The Nazi leadership had long coveted the eastern expanses and dreamed of securing them for its *Lebensraum* (living space). These lands and their Slavic populations, which Hitler termed *Untermenschen* (subhumans), were to be ruthlessly exploited for the benefit of the Reich.

After the conquest of Poland in 1939, Hitler began to execute his plans. In October 1939, he appointed SS chief Heinrich Himmler to take charge of establishing the New Order in Eastern Europe. Special SS and Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei, or secret state police) units were set up to supervise the operations: rounding up and deporting men and women for slave labor in Germany, eliminating Poland's ruling gentry and intelligentsia, and herding the Jews of Warsaw and other cities into walled ghettos. In the summer of 1941 following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Himmler's deputy, Reinhard Heydrich, was instructed to draw up plans for the so-called Final Solution (Die Endlösung) of the Jewish problem. In the course of the next four years, some 6 million Jews were systematically slaughtered in the Nazi Holocaust.

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See also

Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust

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Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (August 23, 1939)

Pact that made possible the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. In March 1939 Adolf Hitler violated the pledge he had made at the Munich Conference only six months before and absorbed the Czech areas of Czechoslovakia. The British government then extended a guarantee to defend Poland, Hitler's presumed next target, which already had a mutual defense pact with France.

On May 23 Hitler met with his leading generals and informed them of the inevitability of war. He told them that he intended to expand Germany's frontier eastward to secure living space and food supplies and planned to attack Poland at the first opportunity.

That same month Britain and France initiated negotiations with the Soviet Union for a mutual assistance pact that would protect Poland and the Baltic states, but in sharp contrast to the negotiations by the Western powers with Germany that had involved heads of government, Britain and France sent only low-level delegations, and they traveled to the Soviet Union by ship. Although negotiations continued until August, they failed to produce agreement. As a consequence of the 1920 Polish-Soviet War, Poland's eastern border extended eastward almost to Minsk, and the Soviets claimed that the French and British simply wanted them to bear the brunt of any German attack. Another major reason was the attitude of the Poles.

Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were all unwilling to allow Soviet armies within their borders, even to defend against German attack. Many in these countries feared the Russians more than the Germans, and Polish leaders also refused to believe that Hitler would risk war with Britain and France.

The Poles also had an exaggerated sense of their own military power. Their plan if war came was to invade Germany. In any case, the Anglo-French negotiators refused to sacrifice Poland and the Baltic states to Stalin the way they had handed Czechoslovakia to Hitler.

While Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin negotiated more or less openly with Britain and France, he also sought an understanding with Germany, covertly dispatching several personal emissaries to Berlin. Stalin's overriding consideration was the best interest of the Soviet Union. Upset with the Western capitulation at Munich, which he regarded as an effort by British and French leaders to divert Hitler eastward, on March 10, 1939, Stalin had announced that the Soviet Union did not intend to "pull anyone else's

chestnuts out of the fire." He thus signaled to Hitler his readiness to abandon collective security. Within a week Hitler had annexed Bohemia and Moravia, confident that the Soviet Union would not intervene. Another consideration for Stalin was that the Soviets faced the potential of war on two fronts, as armed clashes had resulted in heavy fighting between Japanese and Soviet troops in the poorly defined triborder area where Siberia, Manzhouguo (Manchukuo), and Korea came together.

On May 3, 1939, Stalin gave further encouragement to Hitler when he replaced Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim M. Litvinov with Vyacheslav Molotov. Litvinov was both a champion of collective security and a Jew. Hitler later said that Litvinov's dismissal made fully evident Stalin's desire to transform its relations with Germany. At the end of May the German Foreign Office informed its Moscow embassy that Berlin wanted to make "a certain degree of contact" with the Kremlin. This led to negotiations, culminating in Stalin's invitation to German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to come to Moscow.

Ribbentrop arrived in the Soviet capital on August 23 and concluded final negotiations with Stalin personally. The Soviet-Nazi agreement was signed that night. Its frontispiece was a 10-year nonaggression pact, but there were two secret protocols, which did not become generally known until Rudolf Hess revealed them during proceedings of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg. These secret arrangements, not publicly acknowledged by the Soviet Union until 1990, partitioned Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union. Any future territorial rearrangement of the area would involve a sharing of territory. The Soviet sphere included eastern Poland, the Romanian province of Bessarabia, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Lithuania would go to Germany. A month later, Hitler traded Lithuania to Stalin in exchange for further territorial concessions in Poland. In addition, a trade convention accompanying the pact provided that the Soviets would supply vast quantities of raw materials to Germany in exchange for military technology and finished goods. This economic arrangement was of immense assistance to Germany early in the war.

Stalin personally guaranteed Ribbentrop that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner, and he lived up to his word, for the Soviet Union gave Hitler no excuse to turn on it. Stalin miscalculated, however, when he

assumed that Hitler would face a protracted ground war in the west that would allow the Soviet Union time to rebuild its military.

The Non-Aggression Pact shocked the world community. Communism and Nazism, supposed to be ideological opposites on the worst possible terms, had come together. A generation more in tune with ideology than power politics was dumbfounded.

On August 22, Hitler summoned his generals and announced his intention to invade Poland. Neither Britain nor France, he said, had the leadership necessary for a life-and-death struggle. British and French armament did not as yet amount to much. Germany therefore had much to gain and little to lose, for the Western powers probably would not fight. In any case, Germany must accept the risks and act with reckless resolution.

The German invasion of Poland, set for August 26, actually occurred on September 1. The delay was brought about by Italy's last-minute decision to hedge its bets and remain neutral. So little did Italy count in the German plans that the invasion was put off only until September 1. On that day, following false charges that Polish forces had crossed onto German soil and killed German border guards—an illusion completed by the murder of concentration camp prisoners in Polish military uniforms—German forces invaded Poland, beginning World War II.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Hess, Walter Richard Rudolf; Hitler, Adolf; Litvinov, Maxim Maksimovich; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich; Ribbentrop, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim von; Stalin, Joseph; Document 36

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Neame, Sir Philip (1888–1978)

British Army lieutenant general. Born on December 12, 1888, at Faversham, England, Philip Neame was educated at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Commissioned to the Royal Engineers in 1908, he served in France during World War I and won the Victoria Cross. In the 1924 Paris Olympic Games, Neame was a member of the British team that won the gold medal for shooting. After serving 12 years in India and Tibet, he was promoted to major general in 1937. He became commandant of Woolwich in 1938.

In 1939, Neame went to France as deputy chief of the General Staff in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Prior to the start of the fighting, he was appointed to command the 4th Indian Division in Egypt. In 1940 and 1941, Neame commanded British forces in Palestine and Transjordan. In February 1941, he was appointed to head the newly created Cyrenaica Command in Libya. In the previous months, British and Commonwealth forces under Major General Richard O'Connor had smashed the Italian army and advanced into Libya. However, O'Connor's advance was halted when British resources were diverted to Greece. With limited resources at his disposal, Neame was directed to remain on the defensive in Libya.

The British did not expect an Axis offensive for a considerable period, but German lieutenant general Erwin Rommel disrupted British plans by launching an offensive into Cyrenaica in March 1941. In quick order, Rommel defeated the weak British force and advanced toward Egypt. Theater commander General Archibald Wavell had little confidence in Neame and sent O'Connor forward to Neame's headquarters. O'Connor was not to relieve Neame but merely to be present to advise the battlefield commander. On April 7, 1941, Neame and O'Connor stumbled into a German patrol while traveling by car in the desert and were taken prisoner. They spent the next two years as prisoners of war in Italy. After the Italian armistice in 1943, Neame and O'Connor were released and escaped to the Allied lines.

After the war, Neame served as lieutenant governor of Guernsey (1945–1953). He retired from the army in 1947 and died in Kent on April 28, 1978.

BRADLEY P. TOLPPANEN

See also

North Africa Campaign; O'Connor, Richard Nugent; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Nearne, Eileen (1921–2010)

British secret agent. Born in London, England, into an Anglo-Spanish family on March 15, 1921, Eileen Nearne moved with her family to France when she was two. Growing up there, she was fluent in French. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Eileen and members of her family fled through Spain to England. She, her sister Jacqueline, and Francis, one of her two brothers, were all recruited by the British Special Operations Executive.

Following training, Eileen Nearne followed her sister in being inserted into France by a British Lysander aircraft along with another agent on March 2, 1944. Making her way to Paris by train with her radio transmitter in a suitcase, she worked from safe houses in Paris to transmit information back to London to organize British weapons drops to the French Resistance. She made 105 transmissions over a five-month span until July, when her transmissions were detected and she was arrested by the Gestapo. Sent to the Ravensbruck concentration camp near Berlin, she was beaten and tortured. Stripped naked, she was repeatedly submerged in freezing water until nearly drowned, but she refused to divulge any information and held to her cover story that she was simply a naive young woman hired by a local businessman to send coded messages she did not understand.

In April 1945, Nearne was transferred to Markleberg near Leipzig, where she worked on a road repair gang for 12 hours a day. While being transferred again, she managed to escape and hid in a church in Leipzig, Germany, until the city was liberated by the Americans, who then held her for a time as a suspected member of the Gestapo until London could verify her identity.

Returning to England, Nearne lived with her sister while suffering from psychological symptoms brought on by her wartime experiences. She never married and told few people of her wartime experiences, living alone after her sister died in 1982. Nearne died a recluse and in poverty in a flat in Torquay, England. Her body was discovered on September 2, 2010, and she was about to be buried in a pauper’s grave when her medals, including the

Croix de Guerre and Member of the Order of the British Empire, were found. It became front-page news in Britain, and a veterans' organization and anonymous donors paid for her funeral, which was attended by representatives of the British armed forces and the French consul general.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Special Operations Executive

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Nehring, Walther Kurt (1892–1983)

German Army general of panzer troops. Born on August 15, 1892, in Stretzin, West Prussia, Walther Kurt Nehring joined the 152nd Infantry Regiment at Marienburg as an officer candidate in 1911 and fought throughout World War I, winning the Iron Cross 2nd and 1st Class in 1915. Continuing in the postwar Reichswehr, Nehring was selected for General Staff training and was closely associated with Heinz Guderian in building the panzer forces.

On the outbreak of World War II, Nehring was a colonel and chief of staff of Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps. He served in that post during the German invasions of Poland in 1939 and France in 1940. Promoted to major general in August 1940, Nehring took command of the 18th Panzer Division and led it as part of Guderian's Second Panzer Group in the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA), winning the Knight's Cross for action around Borisov in July 1941.

In late May 1942, Nehring was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of the German Afrika Korps. He promptly launched the envelopment attack on the Gazala Line (May 26–June 13) that destroyed British armor and captured Tobruk (June 20–21). Promoted to general of panzer troops on July 1, Nehring was chiefly responsible for the fighting

during the Battle of Alam Halfa (August 31–September 7, 1941), but he was seriously wounded in an air attack on August 31.

While Nehring was convalescing in Germany, the Allies launched their invasion of Northwest Africa, but commander in chief, south, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring ordered Nehring to Tunisia on November 16 to form available troops into XC Corps and establish a beachhead while reinforcements arrived from Sicily. Nehring quickly organized the defenses and defeated Allied troops at the critical Battle of Medjez-el-Bab. By the end of the month, he had launched a counteroffensive that recaptured Djedeida and halted the Allied "race for Tunis" from the west. Kesselring was impressed with Nehring's performance but disliked his outspoken pessimism concerning problems facing the German army in North Africa. Nehring was replaced in December 1942 by General Hans Jürgen von Arnim.

Still highly regarded as a panzer commander, Nehring returned to the Soviet Union on February 9, 1943, to command the XXIV Panzer Corps. He then held a sequence of senior commands—Fourth Panzer Army (June to August 1944), the XLVIII Panzer Corps (August 1944), and then the XXIV Panzer Corps again. He was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross in February 1944 and the Swords in January 1945 for defensive action in Poland. Group Nehring was driven back into Silesia, where Nehring took command of the First Panzer Army on March 20, 1945.

Nehring surrendered to U.S. forces on May 9. After a brief period as a prisoner of war, he spent his retirement quietly in Düsseldorf, where he died on April 20, 1983.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Afrika Korps; Alam Halfa, Battle of; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Gazala, Battle of; Guderian, Heinz; Kesselring, Albert; Poland–East Prussia Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tobruk, Third Battle of; Tunisia Campaign

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Nelson, Donald Marr (1888–1959)

Industry executive, mobilization official, and chairman of the War Production Board (WPB) from January 1942 until August 1944. Donald Marr Nelson was born on November 17, 1888, in Hannibal, Missouri. After graduating from the University of Missouri in 1911 with a degree in chemical engineering, he joined Sears Roebuck and Company as a chemist in 1912. Nelson worked his way steadily up the corporate hierarchy, in the meantime taking primary responsibility for purchasing and procuring over 135,000 different products sold through the Sears catalog and its retail outlets. In 1930, he became the company's vice president, and in 1939 he was named executive vice president and vice chairman of the company's executive committee. Nelson's vast experience as a purchasing agent, coupled with his extensive contacts with business and industrial executives, made him a natural choice for a high-level mobilization job as World War II began.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Nelson to head the Treasury Department's procurement division in May 1940. Nelson was tasked with procuring and selling raw materials to the Allies. In January 1941, with World War II already under way for nearly a year and a half, the Roosevelt administration created the Office of Production Management (OPM) in an attempt to centralize material procurement, and Nelson now became head of the OPM's priorities division. In July 1941, Nelson was named chief of the newly created Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board. Nelson was stymied in his efforts to centralize priorities and allocation functions, however, and quit the board in frustration in the fall of 1941.

After the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and American entry into the war, the Roosevelt administration created the WPB, which was given sweeping powers to regulate and prioritize all industrial production, procure and allocate strategic and scarce raw materials, control prices and wages, and supply the nation's armed forces with armaments and supplies of every type. Nelson was named chairman of the new agency in January 1942. He immediately set to work to centralize and streamline the mobilization process.

One of his most notable early decisions was to bring Ferdinand Eberstadt on board as vice chairman of the WPB and chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board in the autumn of 1942. With Nelson's encouragement, Eberstadt established the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), which simultaneously prioritized the needs of military and civilian manufacturers so that the proper end items were produced at the right time and in the right quantity. The CMP proved to be highly effective and significantly enhanced wartime production.

Nelson soon found out, however, that military planners were all too eager to take control of the mobilization process themselves. He was engaged in near-constant turf wars that bred waste and duplication in the military procurement process. By early 1943, Nelson suspected that Eberstadt had become too cozy with the military. Military officials, meanwhile, complained that Nelson acted too slowly and was indecisive. Despite these problems, industrial output continued to increase, and Nelson remained with the WPB until August 1944, at which time he returned to his position with Sears. Julius S. Krug replaced Nelson as chairman.

In 1945, Nelson was named president of the Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers. His tenure there was a stormy one, abetted by personal problems including multiple high-profile divorces and poor health. In December 1947, Nelson tendered his resignation. He thereafter sat on numerous corporate boards. Nelson died on September 29, 1959, in Los Angeles.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Armaments Production; Eberstadt, Ferdinand; Krug, Julius Albert; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States; United States War Production Board

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Netherlands

Nation located in Western Europe that borders Germany to the east, Belgium to the southwest, and the North Sea to the west and north. In 1939, the Netherlands numbered about 9 million people. Although encompassing just 16,500 square miles, the Netherlands had important overseas possessions in the Netherlands West Indies and Netherlands East Indies. The overseas empire was rich in raw materials and provided rubber, coffee, tea, palm oil, metals, and many other products.

The Netherlands had not been at war with another state since 1815, and when World War II began, Queen Wilhelmina declared the nation's neutrality. Adolf Hitler sent the queen his personal assurances that he would respect Dutch neutrality. The Dutch government made no plans with other nations, not even with neutral Belgium, for a concerted defense. The Dutch strategy in case of war with Germany, known as Fortress Holland, called for blowing up bridges and dikes, but it failed to take into account the realities of modern warfare.

On paper, the Dutch Army appeared impressive. General Henri Gerard Winkelman commanded 400,000 men in eight divisions and four brigades plus several smaller units. The army was, however, poorly armed and trained. It had not a single tank and had only 26 armored cars and 656 obsolete artillery pieces. Its Military Aviation Division possessed only 175 aircraft, of which 132 were serviceable but only 72 were modern. The navy was modern but small. It consisted of 4 cruisers (another was almost complete), 8 destroyers, 16 minesweepers, 24 submarines, and several torpedo boats and auxiliary craft. Most of it, however, was in the Pacific to defend the Netherlands East Indies.

German paratroopers descending from Junkers Ju-72 transport aircraft over The Hague at the commencement of the German invasion of the Netherlands, May 10, 1940. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Beginning at 3:00 a.m. on May 10, 1940, German forces invaded the Netherlands in what Queen Wilhelmina characterized as a flagrant violation of international law. The Germans employed some 1,000 aircraft to attack Dutch airfields and military installations, and most Dutch aircraft were destroyed the first day. The Germans also used parachute and airborne forces effectively as well as their Eighteenth Army.

The Dutch put up stout resistance, especially along major rivers. Hitler ordered the capture of the Dutch royal family, but they escaped from The Hague to Britain aboard two British destroyers. With negotiations already in progress but as an inducement to bring about a speedy Dutch surrender so that their forces could be released for the fighting in France, on May 14 the Germans bombed Rotterdam, destroying much of the city center and causing considerable civilian casualties. Later that same day, Winkelman ordered Dutch forces to lay down their arms.

Also on May 14, Wilhelmina established a government-in-exile in London and announced in a radio broadcast to the Dutch people her determination to continue the fight. The government-in-exile secured most of the ships of the important Dutch merchant marine. Its 640 ships, not counting

200 smaller vessels, were of immense help to the Allies. The merchant marine played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic. Ultimately, half of the ships were lost in the war, and some 3,000 Dutch seamen were killed. In early 1942, the Japanese occupied the Netherlands East Indies, leaving only Suriname in South America and such islands as Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao in the Netherlands West Indies under the free Dutch government.

The Nazis held the Dutch to be fellow Aryans, and Hitler intended to incorporate the Netherlands into a greater Germany. To win the support of the Dutch, Hitler ordered that German occupying forces be on their best behavior. He also released Dutch prisoners of war as a conciliatory gesture. At the same time, the Germans worked to tie the economy of the Netherlands to that of Germany.

On May 26, Hitler established a government in the Netherlands with Arthur Seyss-Inquart as Reichskommissar. Hitler deliberately ignored Dutchman Anton Mussert, head of the small National Socialist Movement (Dutch Nazi Party) in the Netherlands, although he did grant him the honorific title *de leider* (leader) of Holland. Seyss-Inquart had full administrative authority.

In October 1941, Seyss-Inquart abolished the Dutch parliament and instituted the German judicial system. Labor unions lost their autonomy, and remaining political parties (the communist and socialist parties had been immediately banned) were forced into one political entity, the National Unity Party, although it too was disbanded within a year. Censorship was complete; Germany maintained control over the mass media and issued fines for municipal authorities that violated German rules. Education was reorganized along German lines, with the promotion of Nazi racial theories and the rewriting of textbooks.

The British naval blockade during the war cut off traditional markets and access to the Dutch colonies overseas, factories had difficulty securing materials for production, and there was rampant inflation. Rationing was enforced, but food and consumer goods became scarce. The Germans sought to exploit the Netherlands economically, and this agriculturally rich country was forced to deliver most of its produce to Germany. The economic situation worsened after 1943, as the Germans expropriated whatever they deemed useful to their war effort, including personal property. As early as

1941, skilled Dutch workers were transported against their will to the Reich to work in German factories. This practice intensified as the war continued.

Jews were a special German target. Legislation deprived 140,000 Dutch Jews of participation in Dutch society and then of their livelihoods. By 1944, some 110,000 Dutch Jews had been removed from the Netherlands altogether and sent to concentration camps; only 5,000 returned after the war. The other 30,000 survived by going into hiding. Jewish losses in the Netherlands were the highest, in terms of percentage, in Western Europe.

Dutch resistance was negligible during the first two years of the German occupation and mostly passive. But Nazi methods were abhorrent to the Dutch, and by 1943 resistance became active. Resistance groups robbed banks, conducted sabotage, and even assassinated Germans. Not until September 1944, however, were the resistance groups unified.

Some Dutch collaborated with the Nazis, revealing the location of Jewish hiding places, for example. After the war, more than 100,000 people were arrested for collaboration, and approximately half of them were brought to trial.

On September 17, 1944, when the Allies initiated Operation MARKET-GARDEN to secure a crossing over the Rhine River at Arnhem, Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, prime minister of the Dutch government-in-exile, called on Dutch railroad workers to strike, and they heeded the call. In response, Seyss-Inquart shut down shipments by rail and canal that were essential to feed much of the population. The winter of 1944–1945 is remembered as the Hunger Winter, and some 20,000 Dutch died of starvation. Misery was compounded by the intense cold. There was no access to coal, electricity, wood, or running water.

During the latter stages of the fighting, defensive flooding inundated large areas, with resultant damage from seawater. Many homes were also destroyed. Trade was at a standstill, and the economy was in a shambles. German occupation costs alone had robbed the economy of 8 billion guilders. The Netherlands was by far the worst affected by the war of any West European state.

After the war, the Dutch temporarily brought back the death penalty and executed the most blatant Nazi collaborators. Seyss-Inquart was tried at Nuremberg, found guilty, and executed. The war also caused the Netherlands to abandon its policy of neutrality in favor of a defensive pact with Belgium

and Luxembourg and later membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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See also

MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Resistance; Rotterdam, Destruction of; Seyss-Inquart, Arthur; Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands; Winkelman, Henri Gerard

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Netherlands Campaign (May 10–15, 1940)

In May 1940, the Germans launched FALL GELB (CASE YELLOW), their campaign against France and the neutral Low Countries. In the case of the Netherlands, the country was overrun in five days and suffered heavy losses. The German strategy to invade Western Europe called for an attack through neutral Belgium and the Netherlands as well as across the Franco-German border farther south to enable the German forces to carry out a grand sweeping movement. Known as Operation SICHELSCHNITT (CUT OF THE SICKLE), it was in effect a reverse of the World War I Schlieffen Plan designed to trap advancing British and French forces in Belgium.

General Henry G. Winkelman's Netherlands army of 8 infantry divisions, plus 2 in reserve, faced Colonel General Fedor von Bock's Army Group B, consisting of General of Artillery Georg von Küchler's Eighteenth Army of 11 divisions (9 infantry and 1 each of cavalry and tanks) and Colonel General Walther von Reichenau's Sixth Army, with 17 infantry and 2 panzer divisions. The Dutch forces were basically militia with little training and no fighting experience. They had no tanks and hardly any antitank weapons.

Although some Dutch units fought well, the army as a whole broke down rather rapidly.

The attack against Fortress Holland, as the defensive strategy was known, began in the early hours of May 10, 1940. As in the previous month's offensive against Norway, an air assault spearheaded Germany's operation. Most of these air assaults were successful, as with 12 seaplanes landing at Rotterdam and the 120 troops on board securing three important bridges. This was at some cost to German air assets. On May 10 alone, the Luftwaffe lost some 170 aircraft and had about the same number damaged.

Most key defensive installations were in German hands by the middle of the first day, however. Of the crucial bridges over the Juliana Canal, the Germans captured all but one completely intact. Although by May 12 Allied bombers began to target key bridges in the Netherlands, most bridges had already been secured by the Germans, allowing their forces to advance rapidly.

On May 13, Lieutenant General Alfred Ritter von Hubicki's 9th Panzer Division managed to achieve a breakthrough toward the bridges at Moordijk, 15 miles south of Rotterdam, captured intact by German paratroopers at the start of the operations. Two of these structures were then the longest road and rail bridges in the world. This enabled the Germans to advance to Rotterdam and split the Netherlands in two. Counterattacks by the French Seventh Army failed to retake the bridges and establish contact with Dutch forces. The French then were forced to fall back toward Antwerp, making the Dutch position untenable.

German soldiers observe burning buildings as their forces attack Rotterdam during their May 1940 invasion of the Netherlands. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Recognizing that further resistance would not reverse the situation, the Netherlands government considered capitulation. On May 13, Queen Wilhelmina, other members of the Dutch royal family, and the government fled to Britain, where a government-in-exile was quickly established.

The resistance of Netherlands forces had surprised the Germans, and they wanted to end the campaign quickly to enable forces there to be shifted to France. When on May 14 the Germans demanded the surrender of Rotterdam, the Dutch at first refused. In one of the most controversial decisions of the war, commander of the German Air Force Field Marshal Hermann Göring then decided to commit Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers of Fliegerkorps IV against the city to hasten Dutch capitulation. Talks began at noon, but faulty communications meant that the air attack went forward, and the city center was virtually destroyed. On May 15, the Netherlands surrendered.

In the five-day campaign, the Netherlands had lost 2,890 dead and 6,900 wounded. There are no separate German casualty figures for the Netherlands fighting. The Netherlands remained under German occupation for the next four years.

GERMAN INVASION OF FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES, 1940

THOMAS J. WEILER

See also

Belgium Campaign; Blitzkrieg; Bock, Fedor von; France, Battle for; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Küchler, Georg von; Netherlands; Reichenau, Walther von; SICHELSCHNITT, Operation; Sitzkrieg; West European Theater of Operations; Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands; Winkelman, Henri Gerard

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Netherlands East Indies

At the beginning of World War II, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI, today the Republic of Indonesia) was a colony of the Netherlands. The world's largest archipelago, it is located in Southeast Asia straddling the equator and sitting astride major strategic shipping routes from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. The NEI extends over a vast area some 2,275 miles wide by 1,135 miles long and comprises some 17,000 islands, 6,000 of which are inhabited. The largest of these islands are Java, Sumatra, Dutch Borneo, Dutch New Guinea, Celebes, western Timor, and the Moluccas. Their 1940 population was about 70 million people, of whom 1 million were Chinese; some 250,000 were of Dutch extraction. About 70 percent lived on Java. The islands had as many as 300 different ethnic groups speaking 365 languages.

The NEI was immensely rich in natural resources, including oil (more than 59 million barrels produced in 1940), tin, bauxite, and coal. It also produced rubber, copra, nickel, timber, quinine, and important foodstuffs such as rice, sugar, coffee, and tea. The NEI thus represented a major prize for Japan in World War II, especially as Japan had no oil of its own.

Dutch rule in the islands was paternalistic and exploitive; the Indonesians were treated as little more than children. Some 90 percent of the population was illiterate; only a minority attended school in 1940, and few jobs were available for educated Indonesians in a bureaucracy dominated by the Dutch. The authorities ruthlessly crushed any nationalist sentiment, and repressive measures in the 1930s created a wide psychological breach between rulers and ruled.

In May 1940, German forces quickly overran the Netherlands, although the Dutch royal family and some government officials escaped abroad and established a government-in-exile in London. The advisory Volksraad (People's Council) at Batavia, the NEI legislative body on Java, declared its loyalty to the London government but was soon virtually autonomous. It did

refuse Japanese trade demands and obeyed the decision by the Dutch government-in-exile in August 1941 to cut off the export of oil to Japan.

The Netherlands government-in-exile, acting in concert with the British and U.S. governments, declared war on Japan after Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941). Japan desperately needed the resources of the NEI and sought to add the NEI to its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Tokyo soon dispatched a large number of troops to secure the islands as soon as possible.

Beginning on December 20, 1941, units of Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi's Sixteenth Army landed on oil-rich Dutch Borneo as well as Celebes and the Moluccas. The poorly equipped Royal Netherlands East Indies Army resisted as best it could, supported by some British, Australian, and U.S. forces. With their few air assets soon destroyed, all the Allies could do was delay briefly the Japanese advance. The Japanese Navy crushed Allied naval forces in the Battle of the Java Sea (February 27, 1942), and on March 8 the Dutch surrendered on Java. Resistance continued in Dutch Borneo and Celebes until October 1942, and the Japanese never did conquer all the islands.

Following their victory, the Japanese sent the Indonesian soldiers home and arrested some 170,000 Europeans, including 93,000 Dutch soldiers. All were treated inhumanely on starvation diets, which caused the deaths of 40 percent of the adult males, 13 percent of the women, and 10 percent of the children. Under the Japanese administrative division of the NEI, Java and Madura came under the jurisdiction of the Sixteenth Army.

The Twenty-Fifth Army controlled strategically important Sumatra, while Celebes, the Moluccas, and Dutch New Guinea were under Japanese Navy administration. Japan's army and navy remained at odds, and there was no unified policy for the islands, which in any case differed sharply in size, population, and economy.

Many Indonesians initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators. Japanese rule was far more ruthless and exploitive than that of the Dutch, though. The Japanese took advantage of nationalist sentiment and worked with those leaders whose approach was to seek at least public accommodation with them.

An antitank gun crew of the Netherlands East Indies Army, December 9, 1941. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The systematic Japanese plunder of NEI resources began immediately after the invasion. Japan also mobilized as many as 2 million unskilled laborers. More than 270,000 of these were sent overseas, but only 50,000 to 70,000 of them returned.

Because of a shortage of labor and the arrest of Dutch administrators, production fell off sharply. By 1943, rubber production was at one-fifth and tea at one-third of pre-1941 levels. Rice output fell 25 percent. The occupation currency issued by the Japanese also rapidly declined in value. By 1945, it was only worth 2.5 percent of face value. Severe shortages and acute economic hardship resulted. The closing of the export market also hurt the economy. In any case, thanks to Allied submarines, shipment of NEI resources to the Japanese home islands, especially desperately needed oil, steadily declined during the course of the war.

Japanese authorities early on prohibited all political activities in the islands. They also banned use of Dutch and English and insisted on Japanese language instruction in the schools. Western symbols—statues, for example—were torn down, and streets were renamed. The Japanese ruthlessly crushed all dissent but worked with Indonesian nationalist leaders to help administer the islands under their “guidance.” Clearly, Japan’s leaders hoped to annex the islands outright. In January 1943, as a means of securing support for the Japanese war effort, Japanese prime minister Tōjō Hideki announced that Burma and the Philippines would be made independent within a year.

However, there was no such mention of independence for the NEI until September 7, 1944 (by Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki), and then only at some unspecified future date.

As the tide of war sharply turned, the Japanese sought to mobilize Indonesians against the Dutch. This included heavy use of propaganda, military training for the young, and the creation of a 25,000-man auxiliary military force, the Heiho, which served with the Japanese, and another volunteer force, the 57,000-man Fatherland Defense Force (Pembela Tanah Air), as a guerrilla operation under Indonesian command.

Support among Indonesians for Japan ebbed as the economy declined and as the Japanese seized rice stocks and requisitioned labor. In some cases, the Japanese army also treated the population brutally. The occupation had the effect of crystallizing Indonesian opposition to foreign rule, and at the end of the war the nationalists moved into the vacuum. On August 17, 1945, at Jakarta, they proclaimed the archipelago independent of the Netherlands and then promulgated a new constitution. The Dutch government in the Netherlands initially refused to accept these actions. Not until 1949 did it bow to the inevitable and agree to an independent Republic of Indonesia.

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See also

Imamura Hitoshi; Java Sea, Battle of; Koiso Kuniaki; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Tōjō Hideki

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Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of (1942)

The desire of Japanese leaders to secure the vast oil and mineral resources of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) was one of the principal reasons they took their country to war against the United States. Conquest of the NEI presented difficulties, as its 17,000 islands extended over a vast area some 2,275 miles wide by 1,135 miles long.

The Japanese planned a three-pronged semisimultaneous strategy to secure the archipelago's resources as quickly as possible. In the east, their forces would move from forward bases in the southern Philippines on the islands of Ambon and Timor to sever communications and reinforcements from Australia. In the center, forces from the Philippines would push southward through Borneo and Celebes. In the west, Japan forces would move against Sumatra as soon as Singapore was conquered. Finally, when all initial objectives were secured, the three forces would combine for an assault on Java, the center of Allied naval operations in Southeast Asia and headquarters of the joint Allied military command, the ABDA (Australian-British-Dutch-American) Command.

Formed on January 15, 1942, the ABDA Command was charged with the defense of Malaya, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, and the northwestern coast of Australia. British general Sir Archibald Wavell commanded from Lembang, Java. He did what he could to rally his defenders, but Japanese resources were vastly superior. On December 20, units of Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi's Sixteenth Army, having departed from Mindanao in the Philippines, landed on Dutch Borneo, Celebes, and the Moluccas. On January 11, Japanese paratroops saw their first action in the war when about 500 were dropped and secured an airfield on Celebes. Supported by the 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas, the Japanese also captured oil fields in Dutch Borneo and airfields at Kendari in Celebes and Ambon in the Moluccas. On February 16, 460 Japanese paratroopers assisted other Sixteenth Army forces in taking the major oil refinery at Palembang in southern Sumatra.

Japanese paratroopers also took part in the February 19 invasion of East Timor. Australian reinforcements bound for Timor turned back after Japanese

bombers from Kendari began attacking the transports. On February 19 and 27, Japanese raids destroyed much of the defenders' land-based aircraft fleet.

On the seas, the Allies had some success on the night of January 23–24, when U.S. destroyers sank three Japanese transports off Balikpapan. Wavell hoped to concentrate his isolated assets, but protection of convoys took most of his surface ships, leaving only submarines and a handful of destroyers to defend the whole of the Indies.

For the defense of Java, the last of the Japanese objectives, the Allies had 12 Dutch and 2 Australian infantry battalions, a U.S. artillery regiment, a home guard of 40,000 inexperienced volunteers, and some 90 aircraft. Land commander Lieutenant General Hein ter Poorten placed his best troops at the extremities of the islands, where he expected the Japanese to come ashore. On February 25, however, the ABDA Command was dissolved, and the Dutch governor-general on Java assumed command of the remaining forces.

Having secured their other land objectives, the Japanese dispatched two invasion forces for Java under Vice Admiral Ibo Takahashi. On February 27, 1942, the Japanese won a naval victory over Allied warships in the Battle of the Java Sea. Then on March 1, the Japanese landed in several locations on Java, with the capital of Bandung as their ultimate objective. These assaults met only minimal resistance. The 48th Division reached the capital by March 7, and the 56th Regiment broke off to assault Tjilatjap, the chief port on the southern coast.

On March 8, General ter Poorten surrendered the 93,000 men of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army. The Japanese also took as prisoners some 5,000 Australian, British, and U.S. military personnel. That same day, Japanese forces landed in northern Sumatra. By the end of the month, they had conquered all of Sumatra and begun an invasion of Dutch New Guinea. Resistance continued in Dutch Borneo and Celebes until October 1942 and on Timor until December 1942. Part of Dutch New Guinea continued under Dutch control, and the Japanese never did conquer all of the 1,300 islands constituting the NEI.

MATTHEW H. BURGESS AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Java Sea, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies; Palembang, Battle of; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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NEULAND, Operation (February 1942–September 1943)

German submarine campaign in the Caribbean. In the shadow of Operation PAUKENSCHLAG (DRUMBEAT, January 13–July 19, 1942) the German submarine offensive against the American East Coast, the German U-boat command conceived a second offensive against Allied shipping in American waters. This new operation was named NEULAND and was aimed at Allied oil and gasoline shipments in and from the Caribbean Sea. The destruction of large numbers of tankers had a serious impact on both the U.S. and British economies, because whereas the losses of dry-cargo tonnage were quickly replaced by new construction, tanker losses were not.

Operation NEULAND, as with DRUMBEAT, began against a poorly prepared enemy, even though Admiral Karl Dönitz had dispatched only five large Type IX U-boats to the Caribbean. On February 15, 1942, two U-boats entered the two most important oil ports of the Western Hemisphere, Saint Nicholas on Aruba and Willemstad on Curaçao, where they torpedoed several tankers and attempted to shell the refineries. Meanwhile, the other three U-boats created havoc along the crude oil routes from Lake Maracaibo (Venezuela) and in the anchorage of Trinidad, the main Allied base in the region.

Although the Caribbean had been formally integrated into the U.S. seaward defense organization in July 1941, the initial response to the German threat was completely uncoordinated and ineffective. Between February 1 and June 1, 1942, German and Italian submarines encountered only minimal resistance in the Caribbean and sank 52 tankers (out of a total of 114 Allied tankers sunk in that period). The results were devastating: oil imports to Great Britain, which had stood at 1.1 million tons in February 1942, dropped

to 623,000 in May. On May 2, the British government asked the U.S. government for a loan of 700,000 tons of tanker tonnage to avert fuel starvation of the British war effort. The United States complied by transferring a total of 854,000 tons to Great Britain and Canada. The measure incurred a temporary rationing of oil in the northeastern United States until sufficient tank car and pipeline capacity, a more efficient allocation of tanker tonnage, and, ultimately, new tanker construction alleviated the situation during the second half of 1942.

Neither did the introduction of convoys in the Caribbean bring instant relief. The largely American escort forces in the Caribbean were initially inadequately equipped and too inexperienced to take on the battle-hardened U-boat veterans.

Nevertheless, by September 1942, the convoy system had forced the U-boats to concentrate around Trinidad in search of prey. Since February, the antisubmarine forces had accounted for six U-boats and had damaged several more. For the Germans, however, this was still a favorable exchange rate, given the destruction of 187 Allied merchant ships in the Caribbean to that point.

Whereas the offensive against the U.S. East Coast fizzled out in August 1942, the offensive in the Caribbean continued in October when the boats of the first wave returned after the necessary rest and maintenance period. In spite of the stiffened resistance and ceaseless American air patrols, German U-boats sank another 160 Allied merchant ships in the Caribbean theater up to the end of the year. During the 319 days of the offensive, the U-boats had thus sunk a total of nearly 1.9 million tons of Allied shipping in the Caribbean, or 36 percent of all Allied merchant ship losses in 1942 worldwide.

The second part of the offensive came to a climactic end with the destruction of two tanker convoys: TM.1, bound from Trinidad to Gibraltar, and TB.1, bound from Trinidad to Bahia (Brazil). In a spectacular four-day action from January 8 to 12, 1943, five U-boats sank seven of TM.1’s nine tankers. The shadow of defeat that hung over the German U-boat campaign in early 1943, however, did not spare the Caribbean theater.

The reassignment of many boats to meet the Allied invasion fleet of North Africa (Operation TORCH, November 8, 1942) and the Allied air offensive in the Bay of Biscay, which forced many U-boats to abort their

missions, resulted in a lull in Caribbean activities. When the German U-boat command attempted to revive the Caribbean theater following the collapse of the main U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic in May 1943, the offensive ended in failure before it could begin in earnest. Of 44 U-boats assigned to the renewed operation, 7 were lost in the Caribbean, but even worse, 22 more —including 11 U-tankers and auxiliary U-tankers vital to the operation— were sunk during transit through the Bay of Biscay and across the Atlantic. The few fuel-starved U-boats that made it into the Caribbean were hastily recalled after the loss of the U-tankers, and from September 1943 onward U-boats ventured into Caribbean only occasionally to maintain a diversion of Allied antisubmarine assets.



Tankers from Convoy TM.1 ablaze following a German U-boat attack. (Dirk Steffen)

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Bay of Biscay Offensive; Black May; Convoys, Allied; PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation; TORCH, Operation

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Neurath, Konstantin Hermann Karl von (1873–1956)

German foreign minister. Born into a noble family in Klein Glattbach, Württemberg, on February 2, 1873, Konstantin von Neurath joined the German diplomatic service in 1901 and served in London from 1903 to 1908. During World War I, he served as a captain of grenadiers. Wounded, he was invalided to the diplomatic service and posted to Constantinople.

Neurath remained in the diplomatic service after the war and was ambassador to Denmark from 1919 to 1921, to Italy from 1922 to 1930, and to Great Britain from 1930 to 1932. In June 1932, Neurath became foreign minister. He joined the National Socialist Party in 1937. Adolf Hitler dismissed Neurath in February 1938 because of his opposition to the führer's aggressive foreign policies. Joachim von Ribbentrop succeeded him as foreign minister.

In March 1939, Neurath was appointed Reichsprotektor of Bohemia-Moravia, apparently to assure the Western powers of the benevolent nature of the German regime there. Neurath balked at instituting Nazi policies there, including rounding up the Jews, and he left Prague on extended leave in September 1941. Hitler did not officially accept Neurath's resignation until 1943.

Although he had contact with the German opposition to Hitler, Neurath opposed the plot to assassinate him. Neurath was tried at the International Tribunal at Nuremberg in November 1946 on four counts of war crimes, including planning wars of aggression and crimes against humanity. Convicted, he received a sentence of 15 years, regarded as a lenient punishment, because of his opposition to Nazi policies in Czechoslovakia. He was released from Spandau Prison, Berlin, on grounds of ill health (he had suffered a heart attack) in November 1954. Neurath died in Enzweihingen on August 15, 1956.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Czechoslovakia; Hitler, Adolf; Ribbentrop, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim von

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New Britain, Landings on (December 1943)

New Britain is an island in the northern Solomon Islands. Rabaul, the major Japanese air and naval base in the South Pacific, is located in East New Britain. New Britain is an island in the Bismarck Archipelago. In 1942 and 1943, the major Allied effort in the Pacific war was centered on Operation CARTWHEEL, which was designed to neutralize Rabaul. Operation CARTWHEEL began in August 1942 with an Allied landing at Guadalcanal in the southern Solomons.

During the next year, the Allies advanced up the Solomons and along the northern coast of New Guinea so that by the fall of 1943, they were approaching New Britain. At the same time, Allied air raids eliminated Rabaul as a significant threat to future operations. Even though there seemed no reason to capture Rabaul, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, intended to establish a presence on New Britain. An amphibious assault against the Japanese stronghold, which was defended by nearly 90,000 Japanese troops and naval personnel, was deemed too costly, but the western end of the island was defended by only 7,500 Japanese, who were cut off from reinforcements by a lack of roads and by rugged terrain and Allied air and naval superiority.

MacArthur planned a two-pronged attack. The 112th Cavalry Regiment would land at Arawe on the southwestern coast of New Britain to attract and pin down Japanese reserves, while the 1st Marine Division would land at Cape Gloucester on the northwestern coast, where the Japanese had two

airstrips. From these airstrips and a patrol-torpedo (PT) boat base at Arawe, MacArthur would complete the isolation of Rabaul.

The New Britain landings began on December 15, 1943, when the 112th Cavalry Regiment came ashore at Arawe and established a strong perimeter against little resistance. On December 26, two Japanese battalions launched a counterattack but were beaten back, and in mid-January 1944 the 112th Cavalry eliminated the last pockets of Japanese resistance.

The Cape Gloucester landing began on December 26. The marines easily overwhelmed local Japanese resistance, although Japanese bombers sank the destroyer USS *Brownson*. By December 30, the marines had captured Cape Gloucester; however, to secure the lodgment they had to expand their perimeter to two fortified hills on the western side of Borgen Bay. In fierce fighting made more difficult by swamps and heavy rains, they seized Hill 660 on January 14, 1944, ending any Japanese threat to Cape Gloucester.

New Britain now became a backwater as Allied forces moved west along the New Guinea coast. The Americans were content to protect their lodgments rather than mount an advance against Rabaul. But the Australian 5th Division, which replaced the Americans at the end of 1944, launched minor offensives against the Japanese that lasted until the end of the war. Total Allied casualties in the New Britain campaign were more than 2,000 killed or wounded. The Japanese lost more than 20,000 dead. In retrospect, given the air superiority the Allies had acquired over Rabaul by November 1943 and the seizure of the Huon Peninsula on New Guinea in early 1944, the New Britain landings were of little influence in the course of the war.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

U.S. troops come ashore at Cape Gloucester, New Britain Island, Papua, New Guinea. (US Navy/Getty Images)

See also

MacArthur, Douglas; Rabaul; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater

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New Fourth Army Incident (January 4, 1941)

Also known as the Southern Anhui (Anhwei) Incident, this military clash between Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) ended the anti-Japanese United Front established between the two

parties in 1937. The CCP New Fourth Army had enlarged its area of operations in the Changjiang (Yangtze) River delta area. GMD generals, who feared that the Communists would try to politicize the peasants as the Eighth Route Army had done in northern China, now sought to force the New Fourth Army and also part of the CCP Eighth Route Army, driven by the Japanese south of the Changjiang, back north of that river.

In response to pressure from the Nationalist generals, GMD officials issued a directive on December 9, 1940, demanding that the Communists withdraw their forces north of the Changjiang River by December 31, 1940. The Communists delayed executing this movement. Indeed, they attempted to win mass support to remain south of the river.

On January 4, 1941, seven Nationalist divisions surrounded and attacked the headquarters force of some 9,000 New Fourth Army troops near Maolin in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. In the course of heavy fighting during January 7–13, 1941, Nationalist forces killed about 3,000 New Fourth Army troops and captured the remainder. Among the dead was New Fourth Army general Xiang Ying (Hsiang Ying). General Ye Ting (Yeh T'ing) was captured and imprisoned. On January 17, 1941, the GMD government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) dissolved the New Fourth Army and closed CCP military liaison offices in many GMD-held cities.

Although this incident dealt a serious blow to the Communist effort in central China, it was also an advantage to the revolutionary cause. First, Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i), a member of the CCP Central Committee, was appointed political commissar of a revitalized New Fourth Army, and he promptly created a "post-Incident" line that urged mobilization of the masses. Despite brutal Japanese pacification campaigns in the region between 1941 and 1945, the New Fourth Army survived into the postwar period when it profited from its long familiarity with the region.

Also, the New Fourth Army Incident provided the Communists with a powerful propaganda tool by which they could present themselves as martyred patriots. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) proclaimed that key elements in Chongqing (Chungking) wanted to substitute civil war for the war of resistance against Japan. No single event during the entire Sino-Japanese War did more to elicit sympathy for the CCP and establish its patriotic credentials both at home and abroad than the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941.

ERROL MACGREGOR CLAUSS

See also
China; China, Army; Ye Ting

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New Georgia, Battle of (July–October 1943)

The New Georgias are an island group in the central Solomon Islands, which were occupied by Allied forces from the South Pacific Area Command in the summer of 1943. The Battle of New Georgia was part of Operation CARTWHEEL, the Allied campaign to neutralize the Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain Island at the northern end of the Solomons. At the end of June 1943, Major General John Hester's New Georgia Occupation Force (NGOF), which included Hester's 43rd Infantry Division, landed on islands in the New Georgia group to capture the airfield at Munda Point on the northwest coast of the main island of New Georgia. Major General Sasaki Noboru commanded 10,500 Japanese troops located on the island group.

The main U.S. advance toward Munda, assigned to the 43rd Infantry Division, started on July 5 from Zanana Beach five miles east of the airfield. It immediately stalled in the face of fierce Japanese resistance, a shortage of supplies, poor leadership and inexperience, forbidding terrain, and jungle conditions. As the advance sputtered, the 37th Infantry Division and units from the 25th Infantry Division were committed, and Major General Oscar W. Griswold, commander of XIV Corps, replaced Hester as commander of the NGOF. Griswold later replaced Hester as commander of the 43rd Infantry Division with Major General John Hodge.

Meanwhile, the Allied landings sparked a series of naval battles off New Georgia. On the morning of July 6 in the Battle of Kula Gulf, a U.S. Navy task force intercepted a Japanese squadron bringing reinforcements and supplies to New Georgia Island. The Americans lost a light cruiser while

sinking two Japanese destroyers. On July 13, in the Battle of Kolambangara, U.S. and Japanese task forces again battled, and the Japanese lost a light cruiser and the Americans a destroyer. Then in the Battle of Vella Gulf on August 6–7, a U.S. Navy task force of six destroyers smashed a Japanese squadron of four destroyers transporting 900 men and supplies to New Georgia. The Americans sank three of the Japanese destroyers, resulting in the deaths of some 1,000 Japanese. Thereafter, the Japanese gave up any hope of expelling the Americans.

Griswold launched a major offensive against Munda on July 25 supported by massive air, artillery, and naval bombardment. Initially the Americans gained little ground, but after days of brutal close-in fighting, Griswold's men slowly pushed the outnumbered Japanese from their positions. On August 5 following Noboru's decision to pull back because of heavy casualties, the 43rd Infantry Division captured Munda Airfield. During the next weeks, despite an aggressive pursuit, most of the remaining Japanese defenders escaped to nearby islands. In September, the Americans seized Baanga, Arundel, and Vella Lavella Islands. In early October, the campaign came to an end when the Japanese evacuated 9,000 defenders of Kolambangara Island to Bougainville Island 100 miles to the north.

The New Georgia operation provided the Allies with several good airfields and brought them closer to Rabaul. U.S. losses were 1,094 dead and 3,873 wounded as well as several thousand casualties from disease and battle fatigue. Japanese losses are not known, although XIV Corps reported 2,483 Japanese dead exclusive of those on Vella Lavella.

American soldiers cross a stream in the New Georgia Islands, 1943. (Interim Archives/Getty Images)

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Griswold, Oscar Woolverton; Kolombongara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Vella Lavella, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Land Battle of; Document 164

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New Guinea Campaign (March 8, 1942–September 13, 1945)

Important Pacific theater land campaign that became the focal point for Australia's military efforts. The northeastern corner of the island of New

Guinea and the whole of New Britain Island were granted to Australia as a League of Nations mandate after World War I. The southeastern corner of New Guinea contained the Australian colony of Papua.

On January 23, 1942, Japanese forces under Major General Horii Tomitaro invaded New Britain, capturing Rabaul from its Australian garrison, known as Lark Force. Moving into mainland New Guinea on March 8, Japanese forces then occupied Lae and Salamaua. The Australian defenders (code-named Kanga Force) retreated to the mountain town of Wau while the Japanese moved against the ports of Madang, Finschhafen, and Wewak. For the next 10 months, there was a stalemate as both sides poured resources into the Papuan Campaign.

When the Papuan Campaign ended on January 25, 1943, 1,000 Japanese survivors escaped into New Guinea. That month the Japanese dispatched to New Guinea Lieutenant General Adachi Hatazo's Eighteenth Army, including the 6th Air Division. The Japanese 41st Division deployed to Wewak, the 20th Division deployed to Madang, and part of the 51st Division went to Lae/Salamaua.

To oppose the Japanese, General Douglas MacArthur had at his disposal the U.S. 32nd and 41st Infantry Divisions, the Australian 6th and 7th Divisions, and a militia brigade. The 32nd Infantry Division was not immediately available as a consequence of battle losses, and two brigades of the Australian 7th Division were temporarily deployed to Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka). The remaining brigade was sent to New Guinea to reinforce the militia brigade there. Australia was raising more militia, and its veteran 9th Division returned from Egypt in February. MacArthur also had the U.S. Fifth Fleet as well as the Royal Australian Air Force and the small U.S. Seventh Fleet comprising U.S., Australian, and Dutch warships.

To regain the initiative, Adachi ordered his 102nd Regiment to attack Wau on January 16. By January 28 the Japanese had driven Kanga Force to the edge of Wau Airfield, but the Australian 17th Brigade then flew in under Japanese fire to reinforce Wau. The fighting lasted until January 30, when the Japanese retreated to Salamaua. This defeat depleted the Japanese forces available to defend Lae/Sala-maua, and on February 28 the bulk of the Japanese 51st Division boarded eight merchantmen at Rabaul and, escorted by eight destroyers, sailed for Lae.

On March 1, Allied aircraft spotted this convoy in the Bismarck Sea.

MacArthur's air commander, Lieutenant General George Kenney, sent 181 aircraft against the Japanese. Employing skip-bombing techniques, during March 2–5 Kenney's aircraft sank all eight Japanese transports and four of the destroyers, resulting in the loss of some 3,700 men. Only 850 Japanese soldiers reached Lae. In retaliation, the Japanese attempted to destroy Allied airpower in Papua and Guadalcanal. Between April 11 and 14, Japanese aircraft struck Oro Bay, Milne Bay, and Port Moresby, sinking two Dutch merchantmen and destroying 45 Allied planes. But Japanese aircraft losses were higher.

Both sides now slowly built up their forces. The Japanese used barges and submarines to bring reinforcements to Lae and Salamaua. MacArthur flew troops into Wau. During April, the Australian 3rd Division assembled at Wau and began to push toward Salamaua. MacArthur needed a coastal base for his twin offensives against Lae and Salamaua, and in the Seventh Fleet's first amphibious operation, the U.S. MacKechnie Force (named for Colonel Archibald R. MacKechnie) seized Nassau Bay on June 29, 1943. The Americans then moved up the coast toward Salamaua, linking up with the Australians on July 21.

U.S. infantrymen advance past the wreckage of a Japanese plane near the Kamiri airstrip in New Guinea. The island of Noemfoor was taken within two days, and the Americans moved on to Saipan to achieve the same result. (Getty Images)

Distracted by this threat, the Japanese were surprised by a U.S. airborne drop on Nazab in the Markham Valley on September 1. Allied forces quickly constructed airfields to receive the 7th Division, which began an inland advance on Lae. The 9th Division then landed north of Lae on September 4. The encircled Japanese abandoned Salamaua on September 17 and then Lae the next day and retreated into the interior.

Pursued by the 7th Division, the Japanese conducted a fighting withdrawal through the rugged terrain of the Markham and Ramu Valleys. It took the Australians a month to overcome a key Japanese position at Sattelberg. To prevent the Japanese from reaching Finschhafen on the coast, the Australian 20th Brigade landed farther west at Scarlet Beach on September 22.

Now isolated, the defenders of Finschhafen joined the Japanese exodus inland on October 2. Adachi tried to retake Finschhafen by counterattacking Scarlett Beach on October 20, but his forces were defeated. MacArthur had found a winning strategy. He used the Australians to engage the Japanese while his American forces bypassed Japanese strongholds.

On December 23, 1943, U.S. marines invaded New Britain Island. The Allies then constructed air bases there, enabling them to neutralize Japanese aircraft from Rabaul. On January 2, 1944, the U.S. 126th Infantry Regiment invaded Saidor and began a coastal drive on Madang. Meanwhile, the Australians pursued the Japanese overland toward Bogadjim, where a supply road led to Madang. Japanese defenses that were centered around Shaggy Ridge were taken on January 23.

On February 29, 1944, U.S. forces invaded the Admiralty Islands north of New Guinea, severing the Japanese Eighteenth Army’s lifeline to Rabaul. Then on February 10, the Australians linked up with the Americans at Saidor. The Japanese high command reacted to this by withdrawing its defense line to Wewak, supported by a new base at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea. The Japanese then sent their 6th Air Division from the Netherlands East Indies to defend these bases. Radio intercepts revealed these plans to MacArthur, who ordered an air offensive against Wewak and Hollandia. From March 30 to April 16, the Fifth Air Force obliterated the 6th Air Division, destroying 390 planes and killing 2,000 Japanese pilots and air personnel.

After the fall of Bogadjim on April 17, 1944, the road to Madang was open for the Allies. Adachi evacuated his Madang headquarters, intending to

fall back on Wewak and Hollandia. On April 24, the Australians entered Madang. Two days previously, U.S. forces had invaded Hollandia and Aitape. The Allied capture of Aitape 125 miles east of Hollandia blocked the escape of the Eighteenth Army. Now desperate, Adachi used his dwindling resources to transport three regiments to Aitape. Their unexpected attack on July 11 drove the U.S. 32nd Infantry Division to the Driniumor River. Fighting continued until August 25, when the Japanese retired to Wewak.

During October 1944, the Australians replaced the Americans at Aitape. MacArthur's return to the Philippines was to be an American operation, with the Australians assigned to containing the bypassed Japanese. But the Australian government wanted Wewak retaken. This pointless offensive had little air or naval support, because that had gone to the Philippines. On May 23, 1945, Wewak fell to the Australians, and Adachi withdrew into the Prince Alexander Range for a last stand. The remnants of the Eighteenth Army surrendered there on September 13, 1945.

JONATHAN (JACK) M. FORD

See also

Admiralty Islands Campaign; Australia; Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Blamey, Sir Thomas Albert; Buna, Battle of; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Curtin, John Joseph; Darwin, Raid on; Hollandia, Battle of; Horii Tomitaro; Kenney, George Churchill; Kokoda Trail Campaign; MacArthur, Douglas; Milne Bay, Battle of; New Britain, Landings on; Papuan Campaign; Rabaul; Southwest Pacific Theater; Document 195

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New Zealand

An island nation located in the Southwestern Pacific, New Zealand consists of the two large North and South Islands and numerous smaller islands. New Zealand covers 103,483 square miles and is situated some 900 miles east of Australian across the Tasman Sea and some 600 miles south of New Caledonia. With a population of only 1.6 million people in 1939, New Zealand made a major effort in World War II; it suffered the highest proportion of soldiers killed of any Commonwealth participant, and its expenditure on the war as a percentage of gross national product equaled that of Britain.

New Zealand declared war on Germany shortly before midnight on September 3, 1939 (the same date as Great Britain). Two days later, Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage affirmed his country's support for Britain: "Where she goes, we go; where she stands, we stand." The only real opposition to New Zealand's participation in the war came from the country's small Communist Party. Apart from mines laid off its ports by auxiliary cruisers, New Zealand never came under actual attack by Axis forces.

New Zealand immediately pledged to raise a division-strong expeditionary force to serve with Commonwealth forces, train pilots for the Royal Air Force (RAF), and expedite shipments of food—chiefly meat, butter, and cheese—to help feed Britain (before the war, 97 percent of New Zealand food exports went to the United Kingdom). Wellington (its capital) also released the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy for service at the discretion of the British government and transferred other assets, including aircraft and personnel, to British command. Finally, the government initiated programs to enhance New Zealand's own military capabilities.

In June 1940, the government introduced conscription. Price and wage controls as well as rationing were all gradually implemented to secure adequate supplies of food for export to Britain and help feed U.S. troops in the Pacific and to protect the economy. In July 1940 the General Assembly formed a war cabinet, and in 1942 a national unity government came into being. Also, for the first time in its history, New Zealand established diplomatic missions with non-Commonwealth nations, including the United States.

During the war, some 306,000 men were called up for military service. In June 1942, New Zealand had 157,000 in its armed services, 50,000 of them serving overseas. This represented half the adult male population aged 18 to 45 and 30 percent of the adult male workforce. One effect of this mobilization was a dramatic increase of women in the workforce, including in war-related industries. Also, at its peak in 1942, some 75,000 women served in organizations under the Women's War Service Auxiliary. Efforts were also initiated to mobilize the Maori population of some 90,000 people, including the formation of a Maori Battalion organized along tribal lines.

In 1939, the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) consisted of two bomber squadrons. During the war, the government maintained two reconnaissance squadrons in New Zealand and two in Fiji. New Zealand's main contribution early in the air war, however, was to train RAF aircrew. At the beginning of the war, more than 500 New Zealanders served in the RAF; at the end of the conflict there were more than 10,000, including those in seven New Zealand squadrons.

RNZAF servicemen were in Great Britain undergoing training when the war began. These crews and their planes fought with the RAF in the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, in which 129 RNZAF pilots died. RNZAF pilots also served on Malta and in Africa. By the end of the war, the RNZAF boasted 83 aces.

To protect against German raiders in the Pacific, the British turned over a variety of aircraft to New Zealand, including reconnaissance aircraft and bombers. Most of the planes were outdated, however, and the entry of Japan into the war necessitated the formation of New Zealand–based air squadrons. These fell under the operational command of the United States.

The RNZAF made a significant contribution to the air war in the Pacific; seven squadrons and a radar squadron supported the Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942–February 1943), and five fought in the battles for the Eastern Solomon Islands. Some 45,000 served in the RNZAF during the war, one-third of them in the Pacific. By the end of the war, the RNZAF had grown from 766 personnel and 102 aircraft to 42,000 personnel with 1,336 aircraft. One-quarter of pilots aboard British carriers at the end of the war were from New Zealand. The RNZAF recruited women, and by August 1943 the Women's Auxiliary Air Force numbered 4,000 personnel.

In 1939, the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy consisted of two

new light cruisers, the *Achilles* and *Leander;* a minesweeper trawler; and two British escort vessels. The *Achilles* participated in the December 13 Battle of the Río de la Plata against the German pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee*. Because the country's navy was initially part of the Royal Navy, some 7,000 New Zealanders who volunteered for service were assigned to British ships. Meanwhile, efforts were made to increase the nation's own naval resources. During the war, the navy added 2 corvettes, 16 minesweepers, 12 antisubmarine patrol boats, and more than 100 other craft. In October 1941, King George VI authorized the formal creation of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) with its own command structure, independent of the Royal Navy.

With a total population of less than 2 million, New Zealand was strained by wartime demands. Women worked on farms and in factories to ensure production of food and provide facilities for American soldiers stationed in the South Pacific. (Library of Congress)

RNZN forces concentrated on minesweeping and defensive mine-laying operations and provided convoy protection for merchant vessels in the Pacific. They also escorted troopships on their way to Europe and the Middle East and hunted German commerce raiders. When Japan entered the war, the RNZN vessels joined the British Far East Fleet, but after the sinking of the

Royal Navy battleship *Prince of Wales* and battle cruiser *Repulse*, the nation's naval assets in the Pacific were placed under the auspices of the U.S. forces until the return of the Royal Navy in 1944. Women also served in the RNZN; in 1944, there were 500 women in the New Zealand section of the Women's Royal Naval Service.

The initial New Zealand ground contribution came in the form of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2nd NZEF, so designated to distinguish it from the First Expeditionary Force of World War I). Major General Bernard Freyberg commanded the 2nd NZEF, whose members were commonly referred to as the "Kiwis." The New Zealand Division (designated the 2nd Division in June 1942) represented, in terms of percentage of population, the equivalent of 25 British divisions. In June 1940, the government began conscripting men, and over the next five years it called up 306,000 men. At the peak in September 1942, there were 157,000 New Zealanders in the armed services, of whom 50,000 were stationed overseas. This was an astonishing effort for such a small nation.

Troops from the New Zealand Division were sent to Egypt at the onset of the war and then fought in the Balkan Campaign in 1941. Following the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Greece, Freyberg was appointed commander on Crete with two New Zealand brigades. There the Kiwis lost almost half their number as casualties or prisoners of war. In New Zealand, the May 1941 Battle for Crete was seen as a testament to the toughness of the Kiwi troops. New Zealand troops also served in North Africa in 1942 and in the 1943–1945 Italian Campaign.

After Japan entered the war, public sentiment demanded the return of troops to protect New Zealand from Japanese invasion. To forestall the recall of New Zealand forces from the Middle East, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill called on Washington to take up the slack, and the U.S. government agreed, as in the case of Australia, to reinforce New Zealand. The soldiers intermingled with the local population, and by the end of the war there had been some 1,400 marriages between U.S. servicemen and New Zealand women.

The New Zealand government attempted to raise another division of troops to fight in the Pacific, but after two years it found that it could neither spare the manpower, nor did it have the financial resources. Consequently, the division was disbanded. In 1944 the government released more than 9,000

men from this 3rd Division for civilian work, half of whom went into agriculture.

Kiwi forces fought in several battles in the Pacific. They also relieved American units for service elsewhere, including on Vella Lavella. Royal New Zealand Army (RNZA) units also provided a variety of combat support functions, including engineering and logistics for Allied forces in the Pacific. Women served in the RNZA as well. Formed in 1941, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps had 4,600 members in July 1943.

In the war, New Zealand suffered 11,671 dead (6,839 in the army, 4,149 in the air force, 573 in the navy, and 110 in the merchant navy), 15,749 wounded, and 8,469 prisoners taken. This amounted to some 6.7 percent of the population.

THOMAS LANSFORD AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Australia; Britain, Battle of; Crete, Battle of; Freyberg, Bernard Cyril; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Italy Campaign; Río de la Plata, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Nieh Jung-chen

See Nie Rongzhen

Niemöller, Martin (1892–1984)

German clergyman and opponent of National Socialism. Born on January 14, 1892, in Lippstadt, Westphalia, Martin Niemöller joined the navy in 1910

and served with distinction as a U-boat captain during World War I. Following the war, Niemöller studied theology at the University of Münster and was ordained a Lutheran minister in 1924. In 1931, he accepted a pastoral post in Berlin-Dahlem.

Niemöller initially supported the National Socialists and voted for the party beginning in 1924. After Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933, however, Niemöller became concerned about Nazi attempts to control the churches, and he opposed government interference in religious matters. He helped lead religious opposition to the regime and also helped to found the Pastors' Emergency League in September 1933 and the Confessional Church, formed in opposition to Nazi-imposed church organization, in May 1934.

Following a verbal confrontation with Hitler during a meeting in January 1934, Niemöller found himself targeted by the Nazi regime. Arrested in July 1937 by the Gestapo and tried on charges of "attacks against the state" and "abuse of the pulpit," he received a sentence of seven months, but the court considered it already served. Immediately afterward, the Gestapo again seized Niemöller and sent him to Sachsenhausen concentration camp as the führer's personal prisoner. In 1941, Niemöller was transferred to Dachau, where he remained for the rest of the war.

Surviving the concentration camps, Niemöller helped draft the "Stuttgart Confession of Guilt." This document stated that German Protestant churches had been morally responsible for failing to resist the Nazis. He also opposed German rearmament in the 1950s and became a peace activist. Niemöller died in Wiesbaden on March 6, 1984.

R. KYLE SCHLAFER

See also

Concentration Camps, German; Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Religion and the War

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Nie Rongzhen (1899–1992)

Chinese Communist military general and later marshal of the People's Republic of China. Born in Jiangjin (Chiang-ching) in Sichuan (Szechwan), China, on December 29, 1899, Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-chen) went to France in late 1919, where he joined the Paris branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1923. Returning to China in 1925, Nie, together with fellow CCP member Ye Ting (Yeh T'ing), joined the staff of the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy as a political instructor and secretary-general of its Political Department. Nie left his post in early 1926 because its commander, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), was suspicious of the CCP. Nie next worked in the CCP Guangdong (Kwantung) Regional Commission, representing the party to cooperate with the Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) to launch the Northern Expedition of 1926–1928.

After the GMD-CCP split in mid-1927, Nie cooperated with Ye, who was a regimental commander of the Nationalist forces, in staging two abortive uprisings at Nanchang in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) and at Guangzhou (Canton) in Guangdong, in August and December, respectively. At year's end, Nie fled abroad. He returned to Shanghai in 1930, organizing efforts to educate the masses about communism. In December 1931, Nie went to the central Soviet base at Ruijin (Juichin) in Jiangxi, where he helped organize the Red Army and the Long March of 1934–1935.

After the Second Sino-Japanese War began in July 1937, Nie became deputy commander and political commissar of Lin Biao's (Lin Piao) 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, a product of the GMD-CCP united front, and he participated in the September Battle of Pingxing Pass (P'inghsingkuan) in Shanxi (Shansi). Nie was then sent to the Wutai (Wu'tai) mountain area to develop a guerrilla base behind Japanese lines.

Nie also cooperated with local leaders on the borders of Shanxi in Hebei (Hopeh) and Chaha'er (Chahar), a province comprising the northwestern part of today's Hebei and part of Inner Mongolia, in establishing a regional government in the summer of 1938. Through its participation in the August–December 1940 "Hundred Regiments" offensive and in anti-Japanese mopping-up operations since November 1940, the Shanxi-Chaha'er-Hebei border region helped restore Chinese administration to a considerable part of

northern China before the war's end. In August 1943, Nie returned to Yan'an, where he remained until the war's end.

After Japan surrendered, Nie moved into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, reestablishing Chinese Communist power in northern China, which ensured the CCP's victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. In 1955, Nie was rewarded by being named among 10 marshals of the People's Liberation Army. Nie died in Beijing (Peking) on May 14, 1992.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

Jiang Jieshi; Lin Biao; Sino-Japanese War; Ye Ting

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Nimitz, Chester William (1885–1966)

U.S. Navy fleet admiral and commander of the Pacific Fleet. Born on February 24, 1885, in Fredericksburg, Texas, Chester William Nimitz graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1905. He first served with the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. Promoted to lieutenant in 1910, he assumed command of the submarine *Skipjack* in 1912. He then studied diesel engine construction in Europe and supervised construction of the U.S. Navy's first diesel ship engine. On U.S. entry into World War I in April 1917, Lieutenant Commander Nimitz served as chief of staff to the commander of submarines in the Atlantic Fleet (1917–1919).

Following the war, Nimitz was appointed to the Navy Department staff in Washington, and in 1920 he transferred to Pearl Harbor to oversee construction of a new submarine base there. During the next 20 years, he served in a wide variety of submarine billets as well as in battleships and destroyers. Promoted to captain in 1927, he spent several tours in Washington and helped establish the first Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps programs

at U.S. universities. He was assistant chief of the Bureau of Navigation during 1935–1938 and was promoted to rear admiral in 1938.

Nimitz led a cruiser division and then a battleship division. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, he was serving as chief of the Bureau of Navigation. On December 31, 1941, on the recommendation of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, President Franklin D. Roosevelt secured the promotion of Nimitz to full admiral and appointed him commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, replacing Admiral Husband E. Kimmel at Pearl Harbor.

Although a single U.S. command in the Pacific would have been more satisfactory, General Douglas MacArthur would not agree to serve under a naval officer. As a result, two commands emerged. As commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Area, Nimitz directed all U.S. military forces in the Central Pacific and provided support to MacArthur and his forces in the Southwest Pacific.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Ocean Area during

World War II. (Naval Historical Society)

Although the Allies made the war against Japan secondary to their Europe First strategy, Nimitz did not delay his plans to halt Japanese expansion, retake territory lost to Japan, and bring the war to the Japanese homeland. Using information provided by U.S. code breakers about Japanese plans, Nimitz halted the Japanese invasion of Port Moresby in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942) and the Japanese effort to take Midway on June 3–6. The latter battle gave the United States the initiative.

Nimitz and MacArthur cooperated in a series of island-hopping campaigns that progressed closer and closer to the Japanese mainland. Nimitz's forces took the Gilbert Islands in November 1943, the Marshalls in February 1944, and the Marianas in August 1944. In October, he joined MacArthur's forces to retake the Philippines.

Nimitz's accomplishments were recognized in December 1944 by his promotion to the newly established five-star rank of fleet admiral. His forces were preparing to invade Japan when the Japanese surrendered. On September 2, Nimitz signed the formal Japanese surrender aboard the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay.

Nimitz returned to Washington in October and assumed the post of chief of naval operations. For the next two years, he supervised the postwar demobilization of men and ships and provided input into the development of nuclear-powered submarines. Nimitz retired in December 1947. In the following years, he briefly served as adviser to the secretary of the navy, and for two years (1948–1949) he was the United Nations commissioner for Kashmir. He also served for eight years as a regent of the University of California. Nimitz died on February 20, 1966, on Yerba Buena Island, California.

JAMES H. WILLBANKS

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Japan, Navy; Kimmel, Husband Edward; MacArthur, Douglas; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; United States Pacific Fleet; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Nishimura Shoji (1889–1944)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Akita Prefecture on November 30, 1889, Nishimura Shoji graduated from the Japanese naval academy in 1911 and specialized in navigation. After graduation from the naval war college in 1918, Nishimura served as a navigation officer on destroyers and cruisers. Promoted to commander, he captained several destroyers during 1926–1929. He then commanded destroyer squadrons (1931–1936). Promoted to captain in 1934, Nishimura commanded the 10th Destroyer Division. From 1937 to 1940, he commanded first the cruiser *Kumano,* then the battleship *Haruna,* and then the 4th Torpedo Flotilla. Promoted to rear admiral in November 1940, he took command of the 4th Destroyer Squadron.

Nishimura's 4th Destroyer Squadron participated at the beginning of the Pacific war in amphibious operations in the northern Philippines and Balikpapan and Borneo in the Netherlands East Indies, and it fought in the Battle of the Java Sea (February 27, 1942). In June 1942, Nishimura assumed command of the 7th Cruiser Division and fought in the naval battles off Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943). In 1943, he was promoted to vice admiral and assigned command of the 2nd Battleship Squadron. He commanded C Force, Southern Force, in the SHŌ-1 plan, an attempt to reach the U.S. landing beaches in Leyte Gulf through Surigao Strait in the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Nishimura's force was met in Surigao Strait by Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf's Task Group 77.2 of 6 old battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 28 destroyers, and 39 patrol-torpedo (PT) boats. Early in the morning of October 25, 1944, Nishimura's ships were first savaged by the U.S. PT boats and destroyers along the strait, with the U.S. battleships and cruisers athwart the end of the strait, in effect crossing the T of Nishimura's formation. In the ensuing battle, all of Nishimura's ships were sunk except

the destroyer *Shigure*. Oldendorf lost no ships, and only one destroyer was badly damaged when it was caught in the cross fire of Japanese and U.S. guns. Nushimura died during the battle.

HIRAMA YOICHI

See also

Balikpapan, Battle of; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Java Sea, Battle of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett

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Nishi Takeichi (1902–1945)

Japanese Army colonel. Born in Kagoshima on July 12, 1902, Nishi Takeichi graduated from both the Hiroshima Army Cadet School and the Japanese military academy. He was initially trained as a cavalry officer. A brilliant horseman, Lieutenant Nishi won an equestrian gold medal in the 1932 Olympic Games and became a national hero. He also took part in the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin.

After working in teaching and administrative posts, Nishi was transferred to a mechanized unit. In the late 1930s and early 1940s the cavalry was gradually abolished, and various cavalry units were reorganized as mechanized scout units and attached to infantry divisions. As a part of this program, in 1942 Lieutenant Colonel Nishi assumed command of the 26th Division Scout Regiment. In 1943 he took charge of the 1st Division Scout Regiment, and in March 1944 he commanded the 26th Tank Regiment. In late 1944 Nishi and his tank regiment were sent to Iwo Jima, but half of his tanks and equipment were lost en route to U.S. submarine attack.

On Iwo Jima, Nishi came under the command of Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi. Nishi dug in his 27 tanks and a small artillery unit. His unit fought tenaciously in the February 19–March 26, 1945, Battle of Iwo

Jima. Nishi died in the fighting on March 22 and was posthumously promoted to full colonel.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also
Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kuribayashi Tadamichi

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Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam (1880–1955)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born on January 16, 1880, into a military family stationed in India, Percy Noble entered the Royal Navy in 1894. Before and after World War I, the energetic and diplomatic Noble qualified as a signal specialist and served on a wide variety of destroyers and cruisers and on the royal yacht, often in staff positions.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1929 and to vice admiral in 1936, when he was also knighted, Noble became fourth sea lord in 1935 and commanded the China station from 1937 to 1940. Here he skillfully handled numerous Japanese threats against Hong Kong and Shanghai without provoking outright hostilities.

In February 1941, Noble became commander in chief, Western Approaches, based at Liverpool, with primary responsibility for interdicting U-boat attacks on British-bound convoys. Realizing that specialized antisubmarine training was the key to success, he instituted intensive programs and exercises to this end and also improved coordination within convoy escort groups, greatly enhancing the effectiveness of convoy protection. Noble frequently went to sea with ships under his command and flew with Coastal Command aircraft. His efforts laid the foundations for the eventual success of British antisubmarine efforts in the Atlantic.

In November 1942, Noble went to Washington as head of the British Admiralty delegation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. His qualities of tact, firmness, and common sense all proved valuable in planning smoothly

coordinated joint naval operations. In 1943, Noble became first and principal naval aide-de-camp to King George VI. Noble retired in January 1945 and died in London on July 25, 1955.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Combined Chiefs of Staff; Convoys, Allied

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Noguès, Charles Auguste Paul (1876–1971)

French Army general. Born in Monléon-Magnoac on August 13, 1876, Charles Auguste Paul Noguès graduated from the École Polytechnique in 1899 and was commissioned in the artillery. He served in Morocco and Tunisia before joining the staff of legendary colonial administrator General Louis Hubert Lyautey. During World War I, Noguès fought on the Western Front and rose to command his artillery regiment. After holding high staff positions in Paris, he returned to Morocco. In 1936, he became resident general and commander in chief of all Moroccan troops.

Appointed commander in chief, North African theater, in 1939, Noguès maintained order locally despite losing many of his forces to the Western Front. He initially urged the Vichy government to fight on in North Africa rather than sign an armistice with Germany, but he soon became less sanguine as to the practicability of such a course, whereupon he followed Vichy orders and arrested French officials who fled to his jurisdiction hoping to continue the fight against Germany.

Noguès reverted to his Moroccan position after the armistice, and in June 1941 he retired from the army, retaining only his civil position. Although anti-German, Noguès sought to observe the armistice terms, fearing any Allied liberation effort might provoke an uprising by the Moroccan people against French rule. In November 1942, General Antoine Béthouart informed

him that Allied forces would shortly land in Algiers and sought to win him over. Noguès ordered Béthouart's arrest, and only the timely arrival of the Allies saved him from execution. Noguès also ordered his forces to resist the Allies, which many did.

Following negotiations with Allied and Free French representatives, in December 1942 Admiral Jean Darlan took authority in Algiers, but later that month he was assassinated. Because the Allies initially needed his support, for several months Noguès retained his authority in Morocco and was also appointed deputy high commissioner for French North Africa. Predictably, Noguès was appalled when U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt promised Morocco independence. In June 1943 when Free French leader Charles de Gaulle bested General Henri Giraud in the internecine struggle for power in Algiers, Noguès lost his post and fled to Lisbon.

In November 1947, a French court sentenced Noguès in absentia to 20 years' hard labor, a sentence later confirmed but on his appearance in court immediately revoked in 1954, whereupon Noguès returned to Lisbon. He died in Paris on April 20, 1971.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Béthouart, Marie Émile Antoine; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; Giraud, Henri Honoré; Vichy France

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Nomonhan Incident

See Khalkhin Gol, Battle of

Nomura Kichisaburō (1887–1964)

Japanese Navy admiral and diplomat. Born in Wakayama on December 10, 1887, Nomura Kichisaburō graduated from the Japanese naval academy in 1898 and fought in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. He taught at the Japanese naval academy in 1905. Nomura then studied in Australia from 1908 to 1910 and in Germany during 1910 and 1911. Appointed naval attaché to the United States in 1914, Nomura was promoted to captain in 1917.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1922, Nomura became vice chief of the Navy General Staff in 1926, when he was also promoted to vice admiral. In 1927 Nomura assumed command of the Third Fleet. On April 29, 1932, Nomura lost his right eye in an attack by Chinese aircraft on his ship off Shanghai. Promoted to admiral in 1933, Nomura retired from the navy in 1937.

In 1939, Nomura was appointed foreign minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Abe Nobuyuki. In February 1940, he was appointed Japanese ambassador to the United States, in large part because he was acquainted with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt. Nomura negotiated with U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull and Roosevelt to ease tensions between the United States and Japan. In his negotiations with Hull, Nomura ran up against Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke's belief that the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy would deter the United States from entering the war.

In July 1941, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro dismissed Matsuoka as foreign minister but too late for Nomura to improve the situation. In addition, Nomura was not informed in advance of his government's decision to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

During the Pacific war, Nomura was an adviser to the Privy Council, and after the Japanese surrender, he was elected a member of parliament. Nomura died in Tokyo on May 8, 1964.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Abe Nobuyuki; Hull, Cordell; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Tripartite Pact; Document 120

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Norden Bombsight

Primary U.S. bombsight for precision daylight bombing. It was developed by Dutch-born U.S. immigrant Carl Lukas Norden, who was initially employed by Sperry Gyroscope Company designing bombsight equipment for the U.S. Navy. Norden left Sperry in 1915 to establish his own business, and by 1931 he had developed a sight that was superior to that of Sperry. The navy was interested in the sight to enable it to carry out bombing of enemy ships from 20,000 feet. The navy then discovered that it was virtually impossible to hit maneuvering ships from high altitude, regardless of the bombing device, and decided to concentrate on dive-bombing. The U.S. Army Air Corps remained interested in high-altitude, level-flight precision bombing, though, and in 1935 it purchased the sight for that purpose.

In the years before World War II, Army Air Corps engineers improved the Mark XV bombsight and the Army Type C-1 autopilot. During "undisturbed" runs, where speed and altitude were maintained for 15–20 seconds, bombardiers using the Norden could place their bombs within 200 feet of the target from altitudes of 12,000 to 15,000 feet.

The Norden was essentially an analog computer that addressed the problem of accurately hitting a target from an aircraft at high altitude. The sight had to compensate for flight speed, wind direction, and height. This was accomplished through a collection of gyros, motors, mirrors, gears, and cams. At the heart of the Norden was an autopilot device that allowed the bombardier to control the plane and line up the crosshairs on the target.

Bombardiers claimed that the Norden enabled them to place a bomb in "a pickle barrel" from 20,000 feet. But the Norden was accurate only under ideal conditions and with a long, level run to the target. Under combat conditions of flak, fighters, and clouds, results were not so effective. Still, no other country possessed anything comparable to the Norden, and it became one of the most guarded pieces of equipment during the war. The sight was under cover while on the ground, and bombardiers were required to take an oath to destroy the sight if they were shot down.

More than 40,000 Norden sights were built in World War II. It continued to be the primary daytime sight for the U.S. Air Force in the Korean War.

Some were recalled for service by the U.S. Navy during 1967–1968 for the Vietnam War.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing

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NORDWIND, Operation (December 31, 1944–January 25, 1945)

German code name for their 1944 New Year's Eve attack on Lieutenant General Alexander Patch's U.S. Seventh Army of the 6th Army Group. One hour before midnight on December 31, 1944, without artillery preparation, the German XIII SS Panzer Corps of Colonel General Johannes Blaskowitz's Army Group G, led by the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division, struck Major General William F. Dean's U.S. 44th Infantry Division in the center of Major General Wade H. Haislip's U.S. XV Corps, between Sarreguemines and Rimling, and headed for the Rohrbach road junction, which had previously been contested.

South and southeast from Bitche, a much less powerful German thrust by the 256th and 361st Volksgrenadier Divisions made deeper gains because that area of the Low Vosges was only lightly held by a cavalry task force of Major General Edward H. Brooks's VI Corps. This task force was composed of the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, part of Combat Command R, 14th Armored Division; a tank destroyer company; and a chemical mortar company. By dawn on January 1, 1945, the U.S. task force was in a hasty retreat, the 117th having to extricate itself from virtual encirclement.

By January 4, the German XC Corps of the German First Army had punched a hole some six miles deep into the Seventh Army front, reaching to the town of Wingen on the Moder River. The two German corps hoped to

reach the Saverne Gap, severing the Seventh Army's line of communication on the Rhine and in the Lauterbourg salient. If they could accomplish this, they would also envelop Major General Withers A. Burgess's U.S. 100th Infantry Division.

On January 4, General of Division Jacques Philippe Leclerc's French 2nd Armored Division moved into position to support XV Corps. That day, the Germans employed captured U.S. M4 Sherman tanks against the French in an unsuccessful effort to take Gros-Rederching, which lay on the border between the 100th and 44th Divisions.

Supreme Allied commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower had believed that Patch's extended line was dangerous and had so informed Sixth Army Group commander Lieutenant General Jacob Devers. When the Germans attacked Patch, Eisenhower ordered Devers to pull VI Corps back and hold the forward areas with reconnaissance units. He believed that the German offensive in the area would slow down and that light troops might stop a German reoccupation of Alsace. But when Devers announced the withdrawal, which would expose Strasbourg to recapture, French head of state General Charles de Gaulle vowed to withdraw all French forces from his command. Faced with an immovable de Gaulle, Eisenhower relented.

The Germans forced both VI Corps and XV Corps back to positions on or near the Moder River. The two corps completed forming the new line on the night of January 20–21. The Germans launched a six-division drive on January 24, but it was blunted by the following day, and German forces began to withdraw soon afterward.

UZAL W. ENT

See also

Alsace Campaign; Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von; de Gaulle, Charles; Devers, Jacob Loucks; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Leclerc, Jacques Philippe; Lorraine Campaign; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.

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Normandy Invasion (D-Day, June 6, 1944) and Campaign

The cross-Channel invasion of France. U.S. officials, principally U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, had long sought the earliest possible invasion of France as the way to win the war in the shortest possible time. They supported both GYMNAST, a British cross-Channel invasion contingency plan for late 1942, and ROUNDUP, a 48-division invasion of France projected to occur by April 1943. The failure of the Allied raid on Dieppe, France (Operation JUBILEE), on August 19, 1942, however, led the Americans to concede the British position that a cross-Channel invasion was many months, if not years, in the future. Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill and British planners meanwhile sought to interest the United States in a more opportunistic approach that would include operations in the Mediterranean theater, and the Americans reluctantly went along.

This led to Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa (November 8, 1942), and to subsequent British and U.S. landings in Sicily and Italy. The United States insisted, however, that the 1943–1945 Italy Campaign would be a secondary effort. At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had pressed President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill for the cross-Channel invasion. Stalin agreed to mount a major offensive by the Soviets on the Eastern Front to coincide with the landing. He also pressed Roosevelt to name the commander of the invasion force, and shortly after the conference Roosevelt appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the post of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Fortress Europe and its coasts of Holland, Belgium, and France bristled with all manner of German fortifications and booby traps. Organization Todt had begun erecting defenses there in mid-1942. Over the next two years, the

Germans used some 17.3 million cubic yards of concrete and 1.2 million tons of steel in thousands of fortifications. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who had command of Army Group B and the coastal defenses, disagreed with German field marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commander in chief, west.

Rommel, well aware from the campaign in North Africa what complete Allied domination of the air would mean, believed that if it was to be stopped at all, the invasion had to be defeated on the beaches. Rommel told Adolf Hitler, “If we don’t manage to throw them back at once, the invasion will succeed in spite of the Atlantic Wall.”

Rundstedt and Hitler placed their hopes in a large mobile reserve that would defeat the Allied forces once they were ashore. Hitler seems to have welcomed the invasion as a chance to engage and destroy the British and U.S. forces. In Britain, the Allied armies could not be touched; in France, they could be destroyed. Hitler was convinced that the Allied effort would result in another Dieppe. “Let them come,” he said. “They will get the thrashing of their lives.”

Rommel did what he could, supervising the construction of elaborate defenses, the placement of half a million foreshore obstacles, and the laying of some 4 million mines. Rommel had at his disposal the Fifteenth Army in northern France and the Seventh Army in Normandy—a total of 25 static coastal divisions, 16 infantry and parachute divisions, 20 armored and mechanized divisions, and 7 reserve divisions. The Germans were weak in the air and on the water, however. The Third Air Fleet in France deployed only 329 aircraft on D-day, whereas German naval forces in the area consisted of 4 destroyers and 39 E-Boats. Germany also deployed several dozen U-boats, most from French ports, during the campaign.

Meanwhile, U.S. and British aircraft worked to soften the German defenses and isolate the beachheads. Between April 1 and June 5, 1944, Allied aircraft flew 200,000 sorties in support of the coming invasion and dropped 195,000 tons of bombs. The Allies lost 2,000 aircraft in the process, but by D-day they had largely isolated the landing areas and achieved virtually total air supremacy.

The Germans also greatly strengthened the English Channel port defenses, which Hitler ordered turned into fortresses. All of this was for naught, because as German minister of armaments Albert Speer noted, the Allies came over the beaches and “brought their own port with them.… Our

whole plan of defense had proved irrelevant." In one of the greatest military engineering achievements in history, thousands of men labored in Britain for months to build two large artificial harbors, known as Mulberries A and B. Plans called for these, after the initial Allied landings, to be hauled across the Channel from Britain and sunk in place. Their importance to the Allied cause may be seen in that by the end of October, 25 percent of stores, 20 percent of personnel, and 15 percent of vehicles had passed through Mulberry B.

The Allies worked out precise and elaborate plans for the mammoth cross-Channel invasion, code-named OVERLORD, to occur on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy. British admiral Bertram H. Ramsay had overall command of the naval operation, code-named NEPTUNE, and British general Bernard Montgomery exercised overall command of the land forces. The object of the operation was "to secure a lodgement on the continent, from which further offensive operations can be developed."

The landing would be preceded by a night drop of paratroops. General Marshall, an enthusiastic supporter of airborne forces, urged the use of five airborne divisions, but Eisenhower had his doubts, and as it transpired, only three were used: the British 6th and the U.S. 82nd and 101st. The lightly armed paratroopers, operating in conjunction with the French Resistance, had the vital task of securing the flanks of the lodgment and destroying key transportation choke points to prevent the Germans from reinforcing their beach defenses. The German 21st Panzer and 12th Schutzstaffel (SS) Panzer Divisions were stationed just outside Caen. If they were permitted to reach the beaches, they could strike the amphibious forces from the flank and roll them up.

The amphibious assault would occur early in the morning after the airborne assault with five infantry divisions wading ashore along the 50-mile stretch of coast, divided into five sectors. The designated beaches were, from west to east, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division (Utah), the U.S. 1st Infantry and 29th Infantry Divisions (Omaha), the British 50th Infantry Division (Gold), the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division (Juno), and the British 3rd Infantry Division (Sword). Operation OVERLORD proved to be a vast undertaking. The airborne forces alone would require 1,340 C-47 transports and 2,500 gliders. Ten thousand aircraft would secure the skies. Naval support for the invasion would come from 138 bombardment warships, 221 destroyers and other

convoy escorts, 287 minesweepers, 495 light craft, and 441 auxiliaries. In addition, there were 4,000 landing ships and other craft of various sizes.

Eisenhower faced a difficult decision, given terrible weather in the days preceding the planned landing. Informed by his chief meteorologist that a break in the weather might occur, Eisenhower decided to proceed. This decision worked to the Allies' advantage, for the Germans did not expect a landing in such poor weather. The French Resistance was informed by radio code, and the airborne forces took off.

The airborne operation involving 23,400 U.S. and British paratroops and glider troops occurred on schedule on the night of June 5–6, but thick cloud banks over Normandy caused pilots to veer off course to avoid midair collisions. German antiaircraft fire, jumpy flight crews, and Pathfinders that were immediately engaged in firefights on the ground and unable to set up

their beacons led to premature drops and to paratroopers being scattered all over the peninsula. Some were even dropped into the English Channel, where they were dragged down by their heavy equipment. Gliders crashed into obstacles, and they and the paratroopers came down in fields that had been deliberately flooded by the Germans as a defensive measure. Much equipment was thus lost. Nonetheless, the wide scattering of forces caused confusion among the defenders as to the precise Allied plans. Officers collected as many men as they could, and improvised units were soon moving on the objectives, most of which were secured.

Success was likely if the Allies could establish a bridgehead large enough to allow them to build up their strength and overcome the German defenders. Once they broke out, the Allies would have the whole of France for maneuver, because their armies were fully mechanized and the bulk of the defending German forces were not. The only possibility of German success was for the defenders to rapidly commit panzer reserves, but this step was fatally delayed by two factors.

The first was Allied naval gunfire support and air superiority of 30 to 1 over Normandy itself (there were large numbers of ground-support aircraft, especially the P-47 Thunderbolt and the P-51 Mustang). The second was Hitler's failure immediately to authorize commitment of the armored reserves. Hitler was convinced that the invasion at Normandy was merely a feint and that the main thrust would come in the Pas de Calais sector. Allied deception measures played a key role in deluding him.

The British double-cross system worked to perfection. Every German agent in Britain was either dead, jailed, or working for British intelligence. The British actually controlled the entire German spy network in the United Kingdom and used it to feed disinformation to the Germans. Operations FORTITUDE NORTH and FORTITUDE SOUTH also deceived Hitler. Operation FORTITUDE NORTH caused him to believe that the Allies intended to invade Norway from Scotland, leading him to maintain and even reinforce substantial German units there; FORTITUDE SOUTH led Hitler to believe that the main Allied effort in France would be a subsequent landing in the Pas de Calais area, the narrowest point of the English Channel, and that the lodgment in Normandy was only a feint.

To this end the Allies created the "First U.S. Army Group" under Lieutenant General George S. Patton, still without command following an

incident in which he had slapped soldiers suffering from combat fatigue in Sicily. The Germans expected that the aggressive Patton would command any Allied invasion of the continent. The First U.S. Army Group, an imaginary formation of 18 divisions and 4 corps headquarters, contributed nothing to OVERLORD but did confuse the Germans.

Not until late July did Hitler authorize the movement of the Fifteenth Panzer Army from the Pas de Calais to Normandy. In effect, the deception totally immobilized 19 German divisions east of the Seine. Although units of the Fifteenth Army were moved west to Normandy before that date, this was done piecemeal, and hence they were much easier for the Allies to defeat.

Meanwhile, the actual Normandy Invasion began. In the days before the invasion, some 2,700 vessels manned by 195,000 men were on the move. In Operation NEPTUNE, the naval part of the invasion, they transported 130,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, 12,000 other vehicles, and 10,000 tons of supplies. At about 5:30 a.m. on June 6, 1944, the bombardment ships opened up against the 50-mile invasion front, engaging the German shore batteries. The first U.S. assault troops landed 30 to 40 minutes later, and the British landing craft were ashore two hours later.

The landing was in jeopardy only on Omaha Beach, where, because of rough seas, only 5 of 32 amphibious duplex-drive tanks reached the shore. Support artillery was also lost when DUKW amphibious trucks were swamped by the waves. Some landing craft were hit and destroyed, and those troops of the 1st Infantry Division who gained the beach were soon pinned down by a withering German fire. U.S. First Army commander Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley even considered withdrawal.

American soldiers going ashore from an LCI (Landing Ship Infantry) at Normandy, while under heavy German fire, during the D-Day invasion of June 6, 1944. (Universal History Archive/UIG via Getty Images)

At 9:50 a.m., the gunfire support ships opened up against the German shore batteries. Destroyers repeatedly risked running aground to provide close-in gunnery to assist the troops ashore; indeed, several destroyers actually scraped bottom. It was nearly noon before the German defenders began to give way. The 1st Infantry and 29th Divisions overcame German opposition with sheer determination reinforced by the knowledge that there was no place to retreat.

The landings on the other beaches were not as difficult. Overall, for the first day, the Allies sustained some 10,300 casualties—4,300 British and Canadian and 6,000 U.S. A recent study suggests that a night landing would have produced fewer casualties. The Allies had used night landings with great success in the Mediterranean, but Montgomery believed that overwhelming Allied air and naval power would make a daytime landing preferable. Still, the losses were comparatively light.

The Allies put ashore 75,215 British and Canadian troops and 57,500 U.S. forces on D-day and 1 million men within a month. Unfortunately for the Allies, during June 19–20 a Force 6–7 storm blew out of the northwest and severely damaged Mulberry A in the American sector. It also sank well

over 100 small craft and drove many more ashore, bringing to a halt the discharge of supplies. Vital ammunition stocks had to be flown in. Mulberry A was abandoned, but a strengthened Mulberry B provided supplies to both armies until the end of the war.

Eventually the United States committed 60 divisions to the battle for the continent. The British and Canadians never had more than 20, and as the disparity grew, so too did U.S. influence over military and political strategy. Churchill was understandably insistent that Montgomery exercise prudence and not sacrifice his men needlessly, which would reduce British influence.

U.S. infantrymen charge a German position during the Normandy campaign. The prone soldier in the foreground is preparing to fire a rifle grenade. (Getty Images)

The Allied ground offensive proceeded more slowly than expected. Hitler ordered his armies to fight for every inch of ground rather than withdraw along phase lines as his generals wanted. At first this delayed the Allied timetable; however, it also greatly accelerated the ultimate defeat and ensured that it would be costly. Complete Allied air superiority devastated the Germans by day and forced them to move largely at night. The French Resistance also played an important role, providing the invading Allied forces with intelligence information and impeding German resupply efforts through sabotage and the destruction of rolling stock and bridges.

The Normandy countryside proved to be ideal defensive terrain. Over the centuries, the dividing lines between individual fields had been allowed to

grow up into tangled hedgerows. This bocage resisted passage and slowed the Allied advance to a crawl. On June 17 and 18, the Germans blocked Montgomery's efforts to take the city of Caen. Major General J. Lawton Collins's U.S. VII Corps had more success on the Allied right, gradually pushing across the base of the Cotentin Peninsula. On June 18, it turned north to liberate the important port of Cherbourg, while the remainder of Bradley's army maintained an aggressive defense. Cherbourg fell on June 27, but its German defenders destroyed the harbor facilities, and it would take U.S. engineers under Major General Lucius Clay six weeks to get the harbor facilities back in operation.

Not until Operation COBRA on July 25–31 were the Allies able to break out. Bradley's U.S. First Army forced the German line west of Saint-Lô, and Collins's VII Corps made the main effort. All northern France was open for the highly mechanized Allied units to maneuver. On August 15, Allied forces also came ashore on the French Mediterranean coast in Operation DRAGOON. The German defenders were now in full retreat, but it remained to be seen if the Allies could maintain their fast-lengthening supply lines and end the war in the west before the Germans had a chance to recover.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Cherbourg, Capture of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Clay, Lucius DuBignon; COBRA, Operation; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Counterintelligence; Deception; Dieppe Raid; DRAGOON, Operation; Eisenhower, Dwight David; FORTITUDE, NORTH and SOUTH, Operations; Hitler, Adolf; Marshall, George Catlett; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Mulberries; Organization Todt; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; ROUNDUP, Operation; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Speer, Albert; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; Document 187; Document 188; Document 191

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Norstad, Lauris (1907–1988)

U.S. Army Air Forces general. Born on March 24, 1907, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Lauris Norstad graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1930. Commissioned in the cavalry, he was soon assigned to the Army Air Corps. After a series of operational assignments in the Air Corps, he graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School in 1939 and was promoted to captain the next year. In November 1940, he was a staff officer under the deputy chief of staff for air. He was promoted to major in June 1941 and to lieutenant colonel in January 1942.

In February 1942, Norstad served as a member of commander of Army Air Forces Lieutenant General Henry Arnold's personal advisory council and conducted studies on strategic issues. He was promoted to colonel in July 1942 and became the assistant chief of staff for operations of the Twelfth Air Force. In this capacity, he traveled to London and helped plan the air component of the November 8, 1942, invasion of North Africa, Operation TORCH.

Norstad then assumed broader responsibility as assistant chief of staff for operations for Northwest African Air Forces. Promoted to brigadier general in March 1943, that December he became director of operations of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. He helped plan and direct the air operations during the invasions of Sicily and Italy and air support for the campaign in Italy, including the interdiction efforts of Operations STRANGLE and DIADEM.

In August 1944, Norstad returned to Washington with dual responsibilities as chief of staff of the Twentieth Air Force and deputy chief of the air staff. His staff responsibilities changed when he was made assistant chief of the air staff for plans in May 1945. The next month, he was promoted to major general. In his Twentieth Air Force role, Norstad was directly involved in planning the final bombing campaign against Japan, including the dropping of the atomic bombs.

After the war, Norstad served as the director of plans and operations of the War Department, and in 1947 he became the first vice chief of staff for operations of the new U.S. Air Force. In October 1950, General Norstad began a series of senior European assignments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He initially served as commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (1950–1953) with combined responsibility as Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe. In July 1952, he was promoted to full general. He was then assigned as air deputy to the supreme Allied commander, Europe (1953–1956), and then to supreme Allied commander, Europe (and to commander in chief of the U.S. European Command when it was created). He served as supreme Allied commander, Europe, from November 1956 until he retired in January 1963. Norstad died in Tucson, Arizona, on September 12, 1988.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; B-29 Raids against Japan; Italy Campaign; North Africa Campaign; STRANGLE, Operation; TORCH, Operation

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North Africa and the War

In 1939 all the countries of the Maghreb—the Mediterranean coastal region of North Africa stretching from the Atlantic shoreline of Morocco to Libya's

border with Egypt—were under administration by one or more of the European colonial powers of France, Spain, and Italy. This was a relatively recent development: although Spain had possessed tiny island enclaves along the Barbary coast since the late Reconquista period, the first serious encroachment did not begin until 1830, when the French began their conquest in Algeria.

Morocco and Libya had not been incorporated into the European orbit until the eve of World War I. Although the Maghreb had a long history of previous colonial suzerainty from Ottoman Turkey, the problems of administering such a vast and forbidding region—1.8 million square miles spread over 38 degrees of longitude—meant that Constantinople's hold had been traditionally weak, and the indigenous peoples were conscious of their autonomous heritage. World War II was to provoke an even greater desire among the inhabitants for national independence, establishing the conditions for the tumultuous decolonization saga of the 1950s.

Each North African state was organized under unique constitutional arrangements, and the states' wartime experiences were a product of peculiar local circumstances and events, but several general conditions applied to some degree throughout the whole of the Maghreb. Geographically, the region was composed of a fertile coastal strip running along the Mediterranean shoreline that contained most of the farms and larger settlements and a barren desert hinterland broken by the Atlas mountain chain. The population was predominantly Arabic and Berber, the Berbers tending to live in semiautonomous nomadic tribes away from the coast. About 10 to 15 percent of the inhabitants were colonists, a heterogeneous mixture of South European stock—Spanish, French, Italian, and Maltese. This elite community owned most of the best land, controlled the local political and legal administrations, and was vociferously opposed to any attempt by their metropolitan governments to make concessions to the local population.

Resistance to the imperial regime usually came in three forms, either singly or in combination. If the Europeans had maintained a traditional client ruler, that ruler might—however complacent his manner—become the focus of patriotic opposition. Religious revivalists and unconquered tribal chieftains sometimes provided a premodern call to arms. Most significantly of all, the small class of local European-educated residents that had been nurtured to

serve in each colony's petty bureaucracy became politicized during the 1920s and 1930s, spawning nationalist parties that demanded civic rights and representative assemblies. These parties were typically banned and their leaders incarcerated in periodic bouts of imperialist repression.

The outbreak of the European war did not immediately disturb the Maghreb. The territories of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia sent regiments of indigenous and settler troops to man the Franco-German border, but their neighbors in Spanish Morocco and Italian Libya remained neutral. The swift French collapse following the German invasion of May 10, 1940, and Italy's entry into the war on June 10 transformed the situation. For the next two years, Libya was a fiercely contested battleground in the war between the British Western Desert forces and the Italians, later reinforced to spectacular effect by German general Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps. The French North African colonies spurned General Charles de Gaulle's entreaties to continue the war against the Axis powers, and Vichy administrators remained loyal to the Henri Pétain government—a decision made all the easier by the Royal Navy's preemptive strike on units of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir in northwest Algeria on July 3, 1940.

On November 8, 1942, the combined Anglo-American forces of Operation TORCH landed on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, with subsidiary operations around Oran and Algiers. These met scattered and indifferent resistance, and after a few days the local Vichy authorities—who had already seen their home government overrun by the Germans as a retaliatory measure—capitulated to the Allies. The subsequent inheritance of French North Africa was a matter of intrigue, with claimants including the former Vichy commander in chief Admiral Jean Darlan (assassinated a month after the landings) and the feuding Free French commanders de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud.

Despite American opposition, de Gaulle proved more politically adept than his rivals, and it was ultimately the Gaullist-dominated Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (French Committee of National Liberation) that secured power. During this period, the Axis forces had been defeated in Egypt, and with Libya secured for the Allies, the final military encounter took place in Tunisia. In May 1943, the Germans and Italians were expelled from the African continent. France's triumphant reconquest of the Maghreb was at best a partial victory; however, its humiliation in 1940 had not gone

unnoticed by the indigenous population, and the heady Allied rhetoric of liberation was seized on by local nationalists who saw little victory in a mere transition between imperial occupiers.

Each of the North African colonies was affected differently by the war. Algeria was the keystone of French North Africa, and uniquely among the Maghreb territories, it was administered as a metropolitan department with a governor-general answering to the Ministry of the Interior in Paris. Its 6.6 million Arabs and 1 million European settlers (colons) lived mostly along the Mediterranean shore, with the massive Saharan hinterland given over to army patrols and scarcely governed Berber nomads. Moderate assimilationist reformers such as the Young Algerians had given way by the 1920s to more radical nationalist campaigners, such as Ahmed Messali Hadj, who were subsequently persecuted by the colon-led authorities.

An attempt by the Popular Front government in 1936 and 1937 to grant full French citizenship to certain Algerians without stripping them of their Islamic property and marriage rights—a traditional bar to naturalization—met with such tenacious resistance from the settlers that it was abandoned. After the armistice in 1940, the colons accepted the new Vichy regime with little outward dissent, the appointment of the highly esteemed General Maxime Weygand as the new delegate general for North Africa helping to smooth the transition. Their focus of attention remained the crushing of nationalist activism. In March 1941, Hadj's Parti du Peuple Algérien was broken up and its leaders sentenced to long prison terms.

Following the TORCH landings and Algeria's reversion to the Allied cause, there were new nationalist initiatives, predominant among them the "Manifesto of the Algerian People" presented to the authorities in February 1943 by its author, Ferhat Abbas (later first president of the Algerian Republic). French governor-general Marcel Peyrouton provisionally accepted Abbas's manifesto, which called for wholesale reforms of the colony's legal and political structure and the end to the hegemony of the colon elite, but as French sympathies proved ever more lukewarm, Abbas's lobbying group, Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty), was suppressed on charges of sedition. The Free French government did make some effort to address the changing realities of imperial politics: in 1943, de Gaulle spoke of a new compact with the indigenous peoples as a reward for their loyalty during the war, and the following year the Brazzaville

Conference on colonial reconstruction expounded a new model of autonomous self-government, if not outright independence. But Algeria's wartime story ended disastrously on V-E day when a celebratory crowd in Sétif turned into a pronationalist demonstration and was fired on by troops; a cycle of reprisals and even greater counterreprisals ensued in which tens of thousands of people, mostly Algerians, were killed. This souring of the hopes for a postwar rapprochement prefigured the brutal civil war of a decade later.

Unlike its larger neighbor, Tunisia was a protectorate (established in 1881) with a ruling indigenous monarch, the bey of Tunis, who theoretically maintained absolute rule with only the "guidance" of the French resident general. Relations between the 200,000 settlers and 2.6 million indigenous people were somewhat less abrasive than in Algeria, but the colony had nonetheless gone through several political disturbances during the 1920s and 1930s. The most important nationalist force was the Destour (Constitution) Party, which lobbied without success for a greater Arab role in Tunisian affairs. In 1934, lawyer Habib Bourguiba created a radical breakaway party, the Neo-Destour; four years later, this splinter group was broken up in a repressive purge, and Bourguiba was transported to a French metropolitan prison.

Politics under the Vichy regime were complicated by the evident Italian desire to include Tunisia in its regional sphere of influence. In June 1942 a new bey, Sidi Mohammed el Moncef, took the throne; his obvious sympathy for the nationalists alienated the French authorities from him, but when Vichy fell in November 1942 he was feted by the Italians in the hope that they could win him over to their cause. Bourguiba and the other Neo-Destour leaders were also transferred to Italian custody as potential puppet rulers, but neither the monarch nor the attorney was persuaded by this line of reasoning. When Axis forces evacuated Tunisia in the spring of 1943, the bey was promptly deposed, and Bourguiba, who had returned to Tunis that March, fled into exile.

On the western edge of the Maghreb, Morocco was also under a protectorate established after the 1912 Agadir crisis by the Treaty of Fez. Nominally a united country under a single sultan, Morocco was in reality partitioned between French and Spanish zones, with the town of Tangier (the traditional diplomatic center) having international status. The French, who controlled 90 percent of the country, spent the interwar years developing the

cities of the Atlantic coastline, building a new administrative capital at Rabat, and expanding the port of Casablanca. By 1939, the population stood at 6.25 million, including about 190,000 European settlers. As with the other Maghreb colonies, Morocco had its persecuted nationalist parties such as the Comité d'Action Marocaine; there were also more traditional forms of interwar dissent, such as the so-called Rif Rebellion in 1926 and the Berber tribes' resistance to the "pacification" of the interior.

But it was Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef who was at the heart of anti-French loyalties, especially after the Vichy takeover. He objected to the repeal of the 1872 Crémieux decree that had given North African Jews rights of citizenship and refused to accede to Resident General Auguste Noguès' demand that he retire from the capital after the TORCH landings. Youssef's greatest coup was his private meeting with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1943 Casablanca Conference, in which the American leader expressed his sympathy for eventual Moroccan independence. The following year, the Independence Party formally petitioned the occupying Allied administration for the right to self-government. The French responded with some unconvincing accusations of collaboration between nationalists and the Axis forces, and in accompanying riots in Fes (Fez), several demonstrators were killed.

Libya, the second largest but most sparsely populated of the Maghreb states, was occupied by Italy in 1911 during its war with Ottoman Turkey. The coastal provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica fell relatively quickly, but pacification of the Berber hinterland continued for the next two decades and was accelerated with great brutality in the 1930s by generals such as Rodolfo Graziani and Pietro Badoglio. By the outbreak of war, Italian settlers made up about 10 percent of Libya's 900,000 people. The country's poverty and scattered population centers precluded the development of a strong nationalist movement before 1939, but the unpopularity of the Italian regime was made evident by the enthusiasm with which Libyans greeted their British "conquerors" during the war. After Italy's final ejection from its North African territory, few traces of colonial culture survived long.

ALAN ALLPORT

See also

Africa; Badoglio, Pietro; Casablanca Conference; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; France; Giraud, Henri Honoré; Graziani, Rodolfo, Marchese di Neghelli; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Noguès, Charles Auguste Paul; North Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; TORCH, Operation; Tunisia Campaign; Vichy France; Weygand, Maxime; Document 148

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North Africa Campaign (1940–1943)

The campaign in North Africa was fought largely over control of the Suez Canal. Great Britain depended on the canal for access to Middle Eastern oil and raw materials from Asia. The canal and the Mediterranean also formed the primary lifeline to Britain's overseas dominions. The ground campaign in North Africa and the naval campaign for the Mediterranean were therefore two sides of the same strategic coin.

The fight to control North Africa began in October 1935 when Italy invaded Ethiopia (Abyssinia). Britain, meanwhile, stationed a significant military force in Egypt to protect the Suez Canal. Britain and France also agreed to divide the responsibility for maintaining naval control of the Mediterranean, with the main British base in Egypt at Alexandria.

Italy was the unknown variable in the Mediterranean strategic equation. A neutral Italy would mean that British access to the vital sea-lanes would remain reasonably secure. However, operating from its main base at Taranto in southern Italy and supported by Italian Air Force bases on Sicily and Sardinia, the seemingly powerful Italian Navy had the potential to close off the Mediterranean. When Germany invaded France in June 1940, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini could not resist the opportunity to grab his share of the spoils. On June 10, Italy declared war on Great Britain and France.

The British and Italian armies initially faced each other across the Libyan-Egyptian border in an area known as the Western Desert. Italian marshal Rodolfo Graziani had some 250,000 ground troops in Libya, and General Sir Archibald Wavell, British commander in chief of the Middle East, had only 100,000 soldiers to defend Egypt, Sudan, and Palestine. The British Army, however, was far better organized, trained, equipped, and led.

Graziani reluctantly moved into Egypt on September 13, 1940, halting at Sidi Barrani just short of the British main positions at Mersa Matrûh. The Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940) was then reaching its climax, and the beleaguered British were facing a possible German invasion. By October, however, the threat from Operation SEA LION had eased, and the British began to reinforce Wavell. Through December, 126,000 more Commonwealth troops arrived in Egypt from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India. On December 9, the Western Desert Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Richard O'Connor, attacked at Sidi Barrani.

The British drove the Italian Tenth Army from Egypt and achieved a major victory on January 3, 1941, at Bardia, just inside Libya. Driving deeper into Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), the British captured the vital port of Tobruk on January 22. Continuing forward, O'Connor trapped the Italian Tenth Army at Beda Fomm on February 7, 1941. In just two months, two British divisions advanced 500 miles, destroyed 10 Italian divisions, and captured 130,000 prisoners. The British suffered only 555 dead and some 1,400 wounded.

Shortly after the British successes in North Africa, Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill decided on February 22 to send British troops to Greece. Most of those forces were withdrawn from Cyrenaica, leaving Wavell with only five brigades in Libya. But just a few weeks earlier, German leader Adolf Hitler had decided to reinforce the Italians in North Africa with German forces. On January 8, the Luftwaffe's Fliegerkorps X started operating from bases in Sicily against Allied shipping headed for Benghazi in Libya. The British forward units in Libya were forced to resupply through Tobruk, more than 450 miles away. Two German divisions and two additional Italian divisions were sent to Libya from Italy. On February 12, Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel took command of the German divisions. In short order, Rommel's force grew into the three-division-strong Deutsches Afrika Korps.

Rommel probed El Agheila on March 24, 1942, and continued driving rapidly to the east, despite Hitler's orders to maintain an overall defensive posture. The Germans surrounded Tobruk on April 10 but were unable to take the fortress by a coup de main. Rommel left a siege force of mostly Italian units and continued his drive toward the Egyptian border. But the Tobruk garrison held out for 240 days and tied down vital Axis manpower in Rommel's rear area. Rommel's main force, meanwhile, reached Sallum on the Egyptian border on April 14, and the Germans occupied the key terrain of the Halfaya Pass.

Churchill pushed for an immediate counteroffensive, but Wavell wanted to gain control of the Halfaya Pass first. On May 15, the British launched Operation BREVITY under the command of Brigadier William Gott. Rommel skillfully parried the thrust and then counterattacked. By May 27, the Germans recaptured the Halfaya Pass, but they then began to run out of supplies and had to halt. They dug in and reinforced their positions, using the 88mm antiaircraft guns in an antitank role. The British came to call the heavily fortified and fiercely defended pass "Hellfire Pass."

Churchill continued to pressure Wavell for action. Operation BATTLEAXE began on June 15, 1942, with a frontal attack through the Halfaya Pass toward Sallum. The German 88mm antiaircraft guns stopped the British armor, and the Germans then counterattacked. The British lost 91 tanks, and Operation BATTLEAXE was over by June 17. Churchill relieved Wavell four days later and replaced him the following month with General Sir Claude Auchinleck. General Sir Alan Cunningham (the brother of Admiral Andrew Cunningham) took command of the Western Desert Force, which had been redesignated the British Eighth Army.

Rommel's force in North Africa slipped to near last priority for logistical sustainment after Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941. By November 1941, Rommel had 414 tanks, 320 aircraft, and nine divisions (three German), four of which were tied down in the siege of Tobruk. The British had some 700 tanks, 1,000 aircraft, and eight (larger) divisions. Operation CRUSADER opened on November 18 with the British XIII Corps advancing on the Halfaya Pass and XXX Corps attempting to sweep around Rommel's southern flank to reach Tobruk. Following a string of fierce tank battles on November 22 and 23, Rommel drove deep into the British rear with two panzer divisions and the Ariete Armored Division in an attempt to

relieve the Axis forces at Halfaya and simultaneously cut off the Eighth Army.

As British tank losses rose, Cunningham wanted to halt the operation. Auchinleck relieved Cunningham and replaced him with Major General Neil Ritchie. The British finally broke through to Tobruk on November 29.

Overwhelmed by attrition to his forces, Rommel began to withdraw on December 7. The Germans retreated back across Cyrenaica, reaching El Agheila on January 6, 1942. Operation CRUSADER was a victory for the British, but they were unable to exploit it because of a lack of reinforcements.

Rommel launched his second offensive on January 21, 1942. Within days he drove the British back almost 300 miles, halting on February 4 between Gazala and Bir Hacheim. Both sides then concentrated on building up their strength for the next four months. Rommel resumed operations on May 26 with Operation VENEZIA, his attack against the Gazala Line. Both forces were roughly equal in strength, but Ritchie's armored units were widely dispersed, whereas Rommel kept his concentrated. Rommel swept his armor around the Free French Brigade at Bir Hacheim on the southern end of the line and turned north, cutting across the Allied rear. A secondary attack in the north by Axis forces pinned down the Allied forces there.

By May 28, the Axis armored units behind the Allied lines were in trouble. Rommel had lost more than one-third of his tanks, and the rest were short of fuel and ammunition. On May 29, the Italian Trieste Division managed to clear a path through the center of the Gazala Line, and that opening became a lifeline to Rommel's panzers. On May 30, Rommel consolidated his remaining armor in a defensive position that came to be called "the Cauldron."

German field marshal Erwin Rommel talks to Afrika Korps troops in the Libyan coastal town of Tobruk during the fighting in North Africa. (Heinrich Hoffmann/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

On June 5–6, 1942, Rommel successfully beat back Ritchie's series of piecemeal counterattacks against the Cauldron. On June 10–11, the Axis finally drove the Free French from Bir Hacheim, and on June 11, Rommel's panzers broke out of the Cauldron. The Eighth Army once more started falling back to the Egyptian border. On June 15, German tanks reached the coast, and Rommel shifted his attention to Tobruk, which fell on June 21. Along with the vital port, the Axis forces captured 2,000 tons of much-needed fuel and 2,000 wheeled vehicles.

The British fell back to Mersa Matrûh about 100 miles inside Egypt. Rommel, promoted to field marshal for his victory at Gazala, pursued. Auchinleck relieved Ritchie and personally assumed command of the Eighth Army. Rommel had only 60 operational tanks, but he still attacked at Mersa Matrûh on June 26 and routed four British divisions in three days of fighting. The British fell back again another 120 miles to the east to the vicinity of El Alamein, less than 100 miles from Alexandria.

Auchinleck was determined to hold near El Alamein. Although under constant pressure from Rommel's forces, Auchinleck improvised a fluid defensive line anchored on Ruweisat Ridge a few miles south of the El Alamein perimeter. Rommel attacked on July 1, intending to sweep around El Alamein, but Auchinleck skillfully battled Rommel to a standstill over the

course of three weeks of fighting. Auchinleck then launched a major counterattack on July 21–22 but made no progress. Exhausted, both sides paused to regroup.

Despite the fact the British had finally halted Rommel's advance, Churchill relieved Auchinleck in early August and replaced him with General Sir Harold Alexander as commander in chief of the Middle East. Sir William Gott was promoted to general and placed in command of the Eighth Army. On August 7 while flying to Cairo to take up his appointment, Gott was killed when a German fighter attacked his airplane. Churchill then selected Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery to succeed Gott in command of the Eighth Army.

On August 31, 1942, Rommel launched what he believed would be the final attack to carry the Axis forces to the Nile. Montgomery, however, had made extensive preparations around El Alamein, based on a plan developed by Auchinleck. Montgomery also had the advantage of knowing Rommel's plan through Ultra intercepts. Rommel intended to sweep around to the south of Ruweisat Ridge and cut off El Alamein from the rear. However, the British had laid extensive minefields and heavily fortified Alam Halfa Ridge behind and southeast of El Alamein. Rommel's attack ran short of fuel and stalled by September 3. Montgomery counterattacked immediately but halted as soon as the Axis forces were pushed back to their starting positions. Taken together, the battles at Ruweisat Ridge and Alam Halfa marked the real operational turning point of the war in North Africa.

Montgomery used the time after Alam Halfa to carefully plan a set-piece counterattack from El Alamein. Rommel, meanwhile, returned to Germany on sick leave. When Montgomery finally launched the attack, the British had an overall force superiority ratio of three to one. Rommel immediately returned from Germany when the Battle of El Alamein started on October 23, 1942. The Allies tried for five days to break through the Axis positions and took 10,000 casualties in the process. On October 31, Montgomery renewed the attack with strong support from the Royal Air Force. Critically short of fuel and ammunition, Rommel was forced to disengage on November 3. The following day, the 1,400-mile Axis withdrawal to Tunisia began.

For the next three months, Montgomery followed rather than aggressively pursued Rommel and the Axis forces across the northern coast of Africa.

Rommel reached the Tunisian border at the end of January 1943. By the time he got there, however, another Allied force was waiting for him.

On November 8, 1942, four days after Rommel began his long withdrawal, the British and Americans initiated Operation TORCH, the invasion of Northwest Africa. U.S. lieutenant general Dwight D. Eisenhower had overall command. In a coordinated series of landings, the Western Task Force under Major General George S. Patton Jr. landed on the Atlantic coast near Casablanca, the Center Task Force under Major General Lloyd Fredendall landed just inside the Mediterranean around Oran, and the Eastern Task Force under Major General Charles Ryder landed near Algiers. Although all the landing sites were in Vichy French territory, the ultimate objectives of the operation were the Tunisian city of Tunis and the port and airfield complex at Bizerte.

The Germans reacted by sending troops from Sicily to Tunisia on November 9. From the moment the Allies landed, the campaign in Northwest Africa and the race for Tunis were a logistical battle. The side that could mass forces more quickly would win. For the Germans, control of the Tunis complex was critical to prevent Rommel from being trapped between Montgomery in the east and the newly formed British First Army in the west. On November 28 the Allies reached Tebourba, 20 miles from Tunis, but an Axis counterattack drove them back 20 miles in seven days. In January 1943, the winter rains and resulting mud brought mechanized operations to a halt in northern Tunisia. The Axis side had temporarily won the race.

Waiting for better weather in the spring, the Allies continued to build up their forces. Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth Anderson's British First Army was organized into three corps—the British V Corps, the U.S. II Corps, and the French XIX Corps. The Axis forces in northern Tunisia now consisted of Colonel General Jürgen von Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army. Once Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika crossed into southern Tunisia, it occupied positions in the old French fortifications of the Mareth Line. Rommel's 10 divisions were well below half strength, with a total of only 78,000 troops and 129 tanks.

Before he had to face Montgomery, rapidly closing from the rear, Rommel intended to eliminate the threat of the British First Army to his north. On February 14, the Germans launched the first leg of a two-pronged offensive, with Arnim's forces attacking through the Faid Pass for Sidi Bou Zid. The following day, Rommel in the south attacked toward Gafsa. The

bulk of Rommel's forces, however, remained along the Mareth Line. By February 18, the Kasserine Pass was in Axis hands, and the U.S. Army had suffered its first major defeat at the hands of the Germans. Rommel tried to advance north through the Kasserine Pass on February 19, but he did not get the support he expected from Arnim. Hampered by a divided German command structure and the rapidly massing Allied reinforcements, the attack stalled.

The Allies recaptured Kasserine Pass on February 25. Rommel returned to the Mareth Line and prepared to face Montgomery. When the Eighth Army reached Tunisia, the Allies reorganized their command structure along the lines agreed to at the Casablanca Conference. General Eisenhower became the supreme commander of all Allied forces in the Mediterranean west of Tripoli. Alexander became Eisenhower's deputy and simultaneously commander of the 18th Army Group, which controlled the First and Eighth Armies, and the now separate U.S. II Corps commanded by Patton. On February 24, the Axis powers also realigned their command structure, with Rommel becoming the commander of Armeegruppe Afrika, which included the Afrika Korps, Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army, and the Italian First Army under General Giovanni Messe. For the first time, the Axis powers had a unified command structure in Africa.

Montgomery's units crossed into Tunisia on February 4, reaching Medenine on February 16. Hoping to catch the British off balance, Rommel on March 6 attacked south from the Mareth Line. Warned by Ultra, Montgomery was ready.



Immediately following the failure of the Medenine attack, Rommel returned to Germany on sick leave. Arnim assumed overall Axis command, and Messe took command in south Tunisia. On March 20, Montgomery attempted a night penetration of the center of Mareth Line. That attack failed, and on March 23 he shifted the weight of his main attack around the southwestern flank of the line through the Matmata Hills. By March 26, the British broke through the Tebaga Gap, forcing the Italian First Army and the remainder of the Afrika Korps back to the north. Under continuous pressure from the Eighth Army on one side and the U.S. II Corps on the other, the Axis forces withdrew north to Enfidaville.

On April 7, 1943, the Allied First and Eighth Armies linked up, squeezing the Axis forces into a tight pocket. On the east coast, the Eighth Army took Gabès on April 6, Sfax on April 10, Sousse on April 12, and Enfidaville on April 21. In the north, the U.S. II Corps, now under Lieutenant General Omar

N. Bradley, took Mateur on May 3 and Bizerte on May 7. Montgomery's 7th Armoured Division also captured Tunis on May 7. The remaining Axis forces in Tunisia were caught in two pockets, one between Bizerte and Tunis and the other on isolated Cape Bon.

Arnim surrendered his forces on May 12, 1943, and Meese surrendered his on May 13. The Royal Navy, waiting in strength offshore, made sure that few Germans or Italians escaped to Sicily by sea. Axis losses in the Tunisian Campaign totaled 290,000 to 362,000, including 238,243 prisoners. The Axis powers also lost 250 tanks, 2,330 aircraft, and 232 vessels. British (including losses in the First Army from November 8, 1942), American, and Free French casualties totaled 76,020. For the entire North African Campaign, the British suffered 220,000 casualties. Total Axis losses came to 620,000, which included the loss of three field armies. The losses were large for what amounted to a secondary theater for both sides.

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See also

Alam Halfa, Battle of; Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Anderson, Sir Kenneth Arthur Noel; Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Casablanca Conference; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon; Eisenhower, Dwight David; El Alamein, Battle of; Fredendall, Lloyd Ralston; Gazala, Battle of; Gott, William Henry Ewart "Strafer"; Graziani, Rodolfo, Marchese di Neghelli; Hitler, Adolf; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Mareth, Battle of; Mersa Matrûh, Second Battle of; Messe, Giovanni; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Mussolini, Benito; O'Connor, Richard Nugent; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Ruweisat Ridge, Battles of; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; Signals Intelligence; Tobruk, First Battle of; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of; TORCH, Operation; Tunis, Battle of; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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North Cape, Battle of (December 26, 1943)

Naval battle fought between British and German naval units on December 26, 1943, off Norway. In the autumn of 1943, the Western Allies agreed to send 40 merchant ships per month to the Soviet Union via the Arctic to Murmansk. The chief German reaction to this effort was expected to come from two German submarine flotillas in Norway, but German Navy commander Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz sought to employ German surface units as well.

Dönitz had planned to use the battleship *Tirpitz* for this purpose, but it had been damaged in a British midget submarine raid in September. Gaining permission from German chancellor Adolf Hitler also proved difficult, but Dönitz persevered, and in December 1943 he was ready. On December 19, he informed Hitler that the Germans would attack the next eastbound convoy. Ultra intercepts and increased German air, surface, and submarine activity provided advance warning to British Home Fleet commander Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser of the German plans.

On December 20, convoy JW 55B of 19 merchant ships sailed eastbound, and two days later the corresponding homebound convoy of 22 merchant ships departed Kola Inlet. Each convoy had a close escort of about a dozen

destroyers. Long-range protection of both convoys fell to Vice Admiral Robert Burnett with the cruisers *Norfolk*, *Belfast*, and *Sheffield*.

On December 22, Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft spotted the eastbound convoy JW 55B. The British deciphered this sighting report and orders for all U-boats in the area to close with the convoy. Fraser guessed that German surface units in Norway, led by the battleship *Scharnhorst*, would join the hunt, and he departed Iceland on December 23 with the battleship *Duke of York* (flagship), the light cruiser *Jamaica*, and four destroyers. Fraser's intention was to position his surface forces between the Germans and their base at Altenfjord.

On December 25 the homeward convoy had cleared the danger point, and four of its destroyers were therefore shifted over to the outward convoy. Meanwhile, Burnett's cruisers were closing from the southeast. As anticipated, German rear admiral Eric Bey led the *Scharnhorst* and five large fleet destroyers to sea on December 25 from Altenfjord. His orders were contradictory; he was to attack the convoy but not to engage heavy enemy units encountered. Early the next morning, the Admiralty signaled to Fraser that the *Scharnhorst* was most probably at sea.

Bey ordered his destroyers to fan out ahead and sweep for the British convoy. The conditions were appalling, marked by darkness and snow squalls. At 7:30 a.m. on December 26, Bey detached his destroyers to look for the convoy to the southwest. They must have come close but did not sight it, and in the process they lost touch with the *Scharnhorst*.

At 9:00 a.m., the *Belfast* secured a radar contact on what proved to be the *Scharnhorst* about 30 miles from the convoy. The range rapidly closed. At 9:24 a.m. the British cruisers fired star shells, and the *Scharnhorst* immediately turned away. The *Norfolk* hit with its second or third 8-inch salvo, which knocked out the battleship's FuMo27 radar. Bey replied with the ship's aft turret as he maneuvered to break off the action. The four British destroyers detached from the westbound convoy now reached Burnett. Rather than pursue the *Scharnhorst*—the traditional job for cruisers in a covering role—Burnett turned northwest to protect the convoy. He gave as his reasons poor visibility, the *Scharnhorst*'s superior speed in heavy seas, and his conviction that the Germans would renew the attack.

Bey did indeed return. Shortly after noon, the *Belfast* reported a radar contact. A second action ensued that involved all three British cruisers and

lasted about 20 minutes. Although the British claimed several hits, in fact the German ship went untouched, while it had inflicted heavy damage on the *Norfolk*. The four destroyers were unable to carry out a torpedo attack because they were on Burnett's port bow, and the *Scharnhorst* turned away in the opposite direction.

Bey now headed south. This time Burnett pursued, continuously supplying position, course, and speed information that allowed Fraser to intercept. Fraser's ships were closing from one side and Burnett's from the other. The *Duke of York* picked up the *Scharnhorst* on radar at 45,500 yards and locked in its gunnery radar at 25,800 yards. The *Duke of York* engaged when the range had dropped to 12,000 yards and hit the *Scharnhorst* with the first salvo; however, the *Scharnhorst* was a fast and well-armored ship, and Bey responded with a burst of speed. Returning fire, he tried to open the range. He was almost successful, but a British salvo disabled one of the *Scharnhorst*'s boiler rooms at a critical juncture, and Fraser's cruisers and destroyers fired from both flanks a total of 55 torpedoes, of which probably 11 hit.

The *Scharnhorst* went down at 7:45 p.m. The British ships searched for survivors, but only 36 members of the German battleship's 3,000-man crew were saved. The last capital ship duel in European waters had ended in a British victory.

JAMES LEVY

See also

Bey, Eric; Convoys, Allied; Dönitz, Karl; Fraser, Bruce Austin; Hitler, Adolf; *Tirpitz*, Attacks on

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Northeast Europe Theater

In August 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany concluded a nonaggression pact that allowed Adolf Hitler to begin his invasion of Poland without fear of Soviet intervention. In return, the Soviets acquired territory in the Baltic states and eastern Poland. With the defeat of France in June 1940, Soviet troops occupied the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and then incorporated them into the Soviet Union.

World War II operations in Northeastern Europe can be divided into three stages: the Russo-Finnish War of 1939–1940, the German invasion and conquest of Denmark and Norway in the spring of 1940, and the struggle in the Baltics, Finland, and northwestern Russia between the Soviet Union on the one side and Finland and Germany on the other from June 1941 until the fall of 1944. Sweden remained officially neutral during the war.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin initiated the Russo-Finnish War (also known as the Winter War) when Finnish leaders refused his demands for the Karelian Isthmus and bases. Although Stalin offered more territory than he demanded (albeit in the far north), the Finns believed that the Soviets were bluffing. On November 30, 1939, five Soviet armies crossed the border. The main attack came in the southeast from the Leningrad area in the direction of Finland's second-largest city, Viipuri (Vyborg).

The unprepared Soviet forces were soon halted by deep snow and dense woods but also by the fierce and stubborn Finnish resistance. A major share of blame for the failure of the Soviets to win the war quickly rested with Stalin, who had refused to take Finland seriously. Stalin personally intervened to reject the plan advanced by chief of staff Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov that entailed a careful buildup and employment of the best Soviet troops, even those from the Far East. Many of the Soviet units were poorly trained scratch formations. Worse, the Soviet troops were unprepared for winter fighting.

By January 1940, Soviet troops had moved deep into Finnish territory in the north. In the southwest, however, the Finns halted the main Soviet thrust at the so-called Mannerheim Line. After the Soviets regrouped and brought up reinforcements, it was only a matter of time before Finland was defeated.

At the beginning of February, the Red Army began another determined attack, managing to achieve a breakthrough after two weeks. Finland surrendered on March 12, 1940.

Under the peace terms, Finland was forced to surrender more territory than Stalin had originally demanded, including eastern Karelia and large areas in the northeast as well as a naval base at Petsamo. Although Finland lost 25,000 men killed and a comparable number wounded, the Soviets lost perhaps 250,000 killed and a comparable number wounded. One consequence of the war was that it convinced Hitler that his armed forces could defeat the Soviet Union easily.

Meanwhile, Hitler believed that the Allies intended to occupy Norway, and he was determined to beat them there. Securing Norway would guarantee the Germans access to vital Swedish iron ore, which in the winter came from the Norwegian port of Narvik. The many fjords along the Norwegian coast would also provide bases for German submarines and surface raiders into the north Atlantic, as well as airfields from which the Luftwaffe might attack Britain. Acquiring Denmark would mean additional foodstuffs, especially dairy products, for the Reich.

The German assault on Norway and Denmark began on April 9, 1940. With virtually no military means to defend itself, Denmark succumbed in less than a day. The occupation of Norway, spearheaded by air attacks, saw the first real employment of paratroopers near Oslo and the port city of Stavanger. At the same time, German amphibious landings took place at Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Kristiansand, and Oslo. Allied forces landed in Norway beginning on April 15. While British troops in the south had to be evacuated after two weeks, a combined Norwegian, British, French, and Polish force gained a foothold in the north, taking Narvik on May 28. The Germans sent reinforcements to the north to recapture it. This, combined with the German invasion of France, forced the Allied expeditionary force to withdraw on June 8. Norway capitulated two days later.

The Norwegian Campaign brought immense gains to Germany, but it also severely affected the German surface navy. Germany lost 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers, half of the navy total. Hitler had secured additional food production for the Reich and protection for his northern flank on the Baltic. Most important, the Kriegsmarine had locations for naval bases nearer to the Allied Atlantic convoy routes. From these bases, it would launch attacks into

the North Atlantic and later the Allied PQ Arctic convoys bound for the Soviet Union.

Both Norway and Denmark were under occupation until the German capitulation. The Germans established a puppet state in Norway headed by home-grown Nazi Vidkun Quisling, whose name became synonymous with "traitor." King Haakon VII escaped abroad on June 7, and after the Allies evacuated Narvik, he set up a government-in-exile in Britain. Most of the country's 4.7 million tons of merchant shipping now passed into Allied hands, an invaluable addition. In 1941, 40 percent of foreign tonnage destined for English seaports was Norwegian. By the end of the war, Hitler had some 400,000 men and major artillery assets in Norway, providing security and protecting it against invasion although it was a serious drain on stretched German resources.

British newspaper headlines in London announcing the German invasion of Norway, April 1940. (General Photographic Agency/Getty Images)

Operation BARBAROSSA, the attack on Soviet Russia, began in the early hours of June 22, 1941. Army Group North's 4th Panzer Group and Sixteenth Army advanced through Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia toward the Russian border. At the northern end of the line, German troops were aided by Finnish forces. Finland rejoined the war against the Soviet Union as a cobelligerent.

In the so-called Continuation War, 16 revamped Finnish divisions recaptured the territory lost earlier to the Soviet Union. The Finns refused, however, to shell Leningrad. In the winter of 1941, when Soviet lines were stretched to the breaking point, a determined Finnish assault would undoubtedly have given the Germans Leningrad, with uncertain consequences for the war in the east.

The Finns had originally planned to unite their troops with German Army Group North around Leningrad. On September 1, they reached the former Finnish-Soviet border. Mannerheim now essentially went over to defensive operations. Soviet resistance stiffened, and after capturing Petrozavodsk and Medweschjegorsk on the western and northern shore of Lake Onega, in December 1941 the Finns established defensive positions slightly inside Soviet territory.

To the south, German forces in Operation BARBAROSSA had come close enough to Leningrad by September 1 to start shelling the city. A week later, Leningrad had been cut off from the last land connection, and Hitler decided to starve the city into capitulation. Food supplies ran out after a month, and in November 11,000 people died. Even though the Soviets managed to supply the city via the frozen Lake Ladoga in winter, up to 20,000 people died each day of starvation, exhaustion, or disease.

Attempts to relieve Leningrad between August 19 and the end of September 1942 were defeated by the German Eighteenth Army. On January 11, 1943, the Soviets managed to establish a small corridor south of Lake Ladoga through which they could also deliver supplies. The siege ended in January 1944 after 900 days. Other than that, the northern sector of the Eastern Front saw only limited action between the fall of 1941 and January 1944.

Pressed by the Soviet Leningrad, Wolchow, and 2nd Baltic Fronts, German Army Group North then withdrew from the Leningrad area in January 1944 and fled toward the Baltic coast. By the end of April, the Soviets had recaptured most of their pre-June territory in the Baltics. As Army Group Center also had fallen back, Army Group North was now certain to be cut off. The 3rd Belorussian Front, the northern front of the Soviet drive on Army Group Center, took Vilnius on July 13.

In July and August 1944, the Red Army’s three Baltic fronts occupied the eastern parts of Latvia and Lithuania. German Army defensive positions fell

in succession. Tallinn (Reval) fell on September 22, and the Germans fled to the islands of Dagö and Ösel. The Red Army captured Riga on October 15. Already at the end of September, the whole of Army Group North was trapped in Courland, where it remained until the end of the war, although the German Navy carried out perhaps its most brilliant operation of the war, evacuating many troops and German civilians by sea.

By October 1944, Soviet forces had advanced into eastern Prussia, and fighting now took place inside Germany. After stopping at Memel, the 1st Baltic and the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts advanced on Königsberg (Kaliningrad) and the coast, trapping German troops and civilians against the Baltic Sea for the remainder of the war. Those who could not be evacuated surrendered on May 9, 1945, with the rest of the German Army.

In June 1944, the Soviet Karelian and Leningrad Fronts began an invasion of Finland on both flanks of the Ladoga Lake. West of the lake, they overwhelmed defenses at the Mannerheim Line. Vyborg was taken on July 20. To the north and east, even though they failed to achieve a breakthrough, the Soviets forced the Finns to retreat and took the Murmansk Railway. In northern Finland the Soviet Fourteenth Army threw back German forces at Liza, supported by a large amphibious landing near Petsamo.

In accordance with the September 19, 1944, armistice ending Finnish participation in the war, Finland had to help eject German forces from its soil, because Hitler refused to extract them. By the end of the month, the Germans had withdrawn completely into Norway. In late January 1945, the Soviets reached the coast west of Danzig and the mouth of the Vistula River. By the end of the month, the Soviets had passed Posen (Poznan). By early February, the Red Army had reached the Oder, within 40 miles of Berlin, surrounding large German troop concentrations at Posen and Breslau. Neither side gave quarter in the bitter fighting, and as they advanced, Soviet troops took their revenge on the Germans with as many as 3 million civilian casualties as well as looting and rapes.

THOMAS J. WEILER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Hitler, Adolf; Leningrad, Siege of; Norway, German Conquest of;

Quisling, Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonsson; Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich; Stalin, Joseph

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Norway

Scandinavian nation encompassing 148,746 square miles. Norway, which had a 1939 population of 2.9 million, borders Sweden and Russia to the east, the Norwegian Sea to the west, and Finland and the Skagerrak Strait to the south. Norway also includes several Arctic islands. German leaders expected little or no resistance to their surprise assault on Norway in April 1940. Against great odds, Norwegian king Haakon VII rallied his government and his people against the German invaders.

During the campaign, until he was removed to Great Britain by sea on June 7, 1940, Haakon become known for his sangfroid, decisiveness, and dry wit. The exiled king was no stranger to London; as a prince, he had married the daughter of Edward VII. Haakon soon established an effective government-in-exile. Free Norwegian forces, organized within the framework of the British armed forces, fought with distinction on the Allied side, losing some 1,100 killed in the war.

In occupied Norway, German authorities attempted to impose Norwegian traitor Vidkun Quisling on the Norwegians. In 1931, Quisling had been minister of defense in an Agrarian Party government. He founded his own fascist party in 1933, but it garnered only 1.8 percent of the vote in the general elections of 1936. Nevertheless, Quisling attracted the support of Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, who arranged for Quisling to meet German dictator Adolf Hitler. German leaders, hoping for a bloodless occupation of Norway, saw in Quisling a promising means to that end. Following the invasion, however, Norwegians overwhelmingly rejected

Quisling. Although Quisling was styled minister-president, the Germans treated him with scorn. After the war, Quisling was tried as a traitor and shot.

Resistance to German occupation began immediately after formal hostilities ended on June 10, 1940. Chief justice of the Supreme Court Paal Berg was the principal organizer of the resistance movement. Armed resistance was embodied in the Militär Organisasjon, or Milorg, recognized in October 1941 by the Norwegian government-in-exile as the Home Forces. Early in 1943, the exceptionally able Jens Christian Hauge thoroughly reorganized and unified the Milorg. He also brought the civilian and armed resistance movements together.

Seeking to avoid reprisals against the small population, the resistance emphasized civil disobedience. When in 1942 Quisling attempted to make the schools a tool for Nazi indoctrination, the teachers refused to bow to his demands. They endured miserable conditions in concentration camps from May to the fall of 1942, when Quisling relented and allowed the schools to reopen and the teachers regained their freedom. Although the resistance stressed nonviolence, 1,357 Norwegians lost their lives.

Norway made an immense contribution to the Allied war effort with its merchant fleet. With 4.8 million tons of shipping, the Norwegian merchant marine was the world’s fourth largest and among the most modern. The Norwegians possessed almost as much oil tanker capacity as the larger British merchant fleet.

Norwegian ships became an essential element in the Atlantic convoys, which were so vital to survival and victory in the Mediterranean and European theaters. In 1941, 40 percent of foreign tonnage destined for English seaports was Norwegian. In the course of the war, 706 Norwegian merchant vessels, almost half of the total tonnage, were sunk. Of the 25,000 Norwegian seamen, some 4,000 died during the war.

A coastal oil facility goes up in flames from a British attack on German-occupied Vaagso Island off the Norwegian coast, December 27, 1941. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Most military operations in Norway were executed within the framework of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). In March and December 1941, commando and SOE raids were unleashed against fish oil factories in the Lofoten Islands that produced glycerin, which is used for explosives. German reprisals against civilians were savage, and Norwegians held the raids responsible for these. A Norwegian section was then established in the SOE. This group was entrusted with joint British-Norwegian planning of future operations in Norway.

A key objective proved to be the hydroelectric plant of Norsk Hydro, at Vemork in the mountains of Telemark, that the Germans were using to produce heavy water, in which hydrogen atoms were replaced by atoms of deuterium. The Germans planned to use heavy water as a moderating agent for a nuclear reactor. At great risk, Norwegian scientists and engineers conveyed the information necessary to attack the installation.

On the night of February 27–28, 1943, a Norwegian team ably led by Lieutenant Joachim Rønneberg clambered down a steep ravine, crossed the frozen Maan River, and entered the plant by way of a tunnel. The group destroyed containers of heavy water and machinery and then escaped unscathed. Working strenuously, the Germans restored heavy water

production by June. The Germans then planned to transfer the heavy water and production apparatus to Germany, but this shipment had to traverse Lake Tinnsjå. On February 20, 1944, Lieutenant Knut Haukelid and his team sank the ferry in deep water. Ultimately, German nuclear research failed for many reasons, but delays caused by Norwegian sabotage put nuclear weapons out of German reach.

Following the conquest of Norway, Hitler remained deeply concerned about an Allied invasion of north and central Norway. The large-scale raids on the Lofotens greatly reinforced Hitler's fears. Indeed, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill throughout 1942 urged an Allied seizure of north Norway, which the British chiefs of staff wisely blocked. However, as Operation JUPITER, the plan was used as a cover for the real Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942, which began on November 8. Playing to Hitler's fears, JUPITER as a deception measure was a brilliant success.

By 1943, the Germans had 12 infantry divisions stationed in Norway and 250 batteries of heavy guns deployed at key points along the coast. Germany's steel and arms industry did depend heavily on high-quality Swedish iron ore sent in the winter months by rail to the ice-free Norwegian port of Narvik and then by ship through coastal waters to German ports. To protect this vital traffic, the German Army felt compelled to screen the coast with troops and guns.

Until the end of the war, however, Hitler expected a major Allied invasion of Norway. Consequently, approximately 400,000 German troops, among the best soldiers in the German Army, were stationed in Norway at the end of the conflict. The Germans also deployed to Norway some 1,000 guns of 100mm or larger caliber. These were manned by 13 naval artillery battalions and 12 army coast artillery regiments. Thus, Norway diverted a significant German force from the decisive Russian and European theaters of the war.

SHERWOOD S. CORDIER

See also

Haakon VII, King of Norway; Norway, Air Force; Norway, Army; Norway, German Conquest of; Norway, Navy; Quisling, Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonsson; Rosenberg, Alfred; Special Operations Executive

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Norway, Air Force

In 1940, the Norwegian military had on order 60 U.S. Curtiss Hawk 75A-6 and A-8 fighters, 36 Douglas 8A-5 attack aircraft, and 24 Northrop N-3PB torpedo seaplanes. Also on order were 20 twin-engine Italian Caproni light bombers and 12 twin-engine German Heinkel He-115 torpedo floatplanes. When it was invaded in April 1940, however, Norway had in service only 6 of the Heinkels and 4 of the Capronis. The Norwegians also had a collection of obsolete biplanes: Fokkers from 1935, MF.11 seaplanes from 1931, and 11 Gloster Gladiator fighters. Flying all these aircraft, Norwegian pilots fought gallantly but were overwhelmed by the Luftwaffe.

Following the German conquest of their country, Norwegian airmen in exile resumed combat, flying within the framework of the British Royal Air Force (RAF). New arrivals were trained at Island Airport near Toronto, Canada. In April 1941, the Norwegian Naval Air Service, based in Iceland, began operations as Squadron 330 of the RAF Coastal Command. Flying Northrop N-3PB single-engine seaplanes, the Norwegians flew convoy escort and antisubmarine patrols. In 1943, the squadron moved to the Shetland Islands and was equipped with long-range four-engine Short Sunderland flying boats.

A second naval squadron, Squadron 332, went into action in 1943. Based in Scotland, it flew Catalina flying boats and Beaufighter and Mosquito fighter-bombers. The Catalinas reconnoitered German shipping along the coast of Norway, which was then attacked by the Beaufighters and Mosquitoes.

In July 1941, Norwegian Army pilots formed RAF Squadron 331. Based in the Orkney and Shetland Islands, it flew Hurricane fighters in defense of

the major naval base at Scapa Flow. A second squadron, Squadron 332, was deployed in January 1942. That April, both units were equipped with Spitfire Vbs. Both formations were moved in May 1942 to North Weald air base outside London. Flying offensive operations across the English Channel, the Norwegians distinguished themselves in heavy fighting. Consequently, they were among the first to receive the formidable Spitfire IX in October 1942. In 1943, Squadron 331 ranked first and Squadron 332 third in German warplanes shot down by the RAF. The leading Norwegian ace—Svein Heglund—destroyed 17 enemy fighters. Fourteen other Norwegian pilots were also aces.

In November 1944, the army and naval air arms combined to form the Norwegian Air Force. By the end of the war, this Luftforsvaret numbered 2,600 men and 79 combat warplanes.

SHERWOOD S. CORDIER

See also

Norway; Norway, German Conquest of

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Norway, Army

The Norwegian Army of 1940 was an infantry force organized as a trained reserve within a framework of officer cadres. On mobilization, it fielded six divisions containing 16 infantry regiments, 4 artillery regiments, 3 mounted infantry regiments, and support units. Norwegian soldiers were armed with the 1894 model Krag-Jorgensen 6.5mm rifle and the Madsen light machine gun. Colt 7.92mm machine guns and 81mm mortars were in short supply. Artillery was of World War I vin tage: 228 77mm guns and 36 120mm howitzers. Possessing no antitank guns, the Norwegians had no effective defense against German light tanks.

Army supply depots were located in the major population centers along the coast. Unfortunately, the Germans seized many of these depots by

surprise when they invaded in April 1940. The swift German assault also disrupted Norwegian preparation for war, with the result that the army was only partly mobilized.

In these chaotic conditions and under unremitting German air attack, Norwegian Army commander General Otto Ruge waged a tenacious defensive campaign. Many Norwegian soldiers, cut off from their assigned units, joined any formation they could find. Their stubborn resistance enabled the royal family and the government to escape capture and sail to England, where a Norwegian government-in-exile was established. Abandoned by his British and French allies, Ruge surrendered his surviving forces on June 10, 1940.

Norwegians in exile mounted several commando operations against key objectives in Norway thereafter. However, most of these raids were undertaken within the framework of the British Special Operations Executive organization. Norwegian ground forces in exile were devoted to preparing a peaceful and stable liberation of the homeland. Based in Scotland, the Norwegian Brigade mustered 4,000 men organized in two infantry regiments and one artillery battalion. Under British command, the Norwegians were outfitted with English weapons and equipment.

Within Norway, resistance to German occupation began immediately. Demobilized veterans formed the Militär Organisasjon, or Milorg. Initially quite successful, Milorg was devastated by Gestapo infiltration of its ranks in 1942 and subsequent mass executions. An outstanding leader, Jens Christian Hauge, enabled Milorg to recover from this setback. Milorg grew from 20,000 men in 1941 to 40,000 by 1945. Between the fall of 1944 and the spring of 1945, Milorg trained and armed its formations in three secret mountain bases. During the war, many Norwegians fled across the border to neighboring Sweden, and beginning in 1943, Swedish authorities permitted the training of Norwegian “police” in special camps. By 1945, about 14,000 Norwegians had received military training in Sweden.

As the war drew to a close, German forces in Finland withdrew into northern Norway, leaving a charred wasteland down to Lyngen Fjord. Into this vacuum, 3,200 Norwegian troops were sent from Scotland and Sweden. When German forces in Norway capitulated on May 8, 1945, Milorg mobilized. On May 13, Crown Prince Olav, commander of all Norwegian

forces, returned to Oslo. On May 26, the rest of the Norwegian Brigade returned to Tromsö. Norway was liberated peacefully.

SHERWOOD S. CORDIER

See also

Haakon VII, King of Norway; Norway; Norway, German Conquest of

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Norway, German Conquest of (1940)

In 1929, German admiral Wolfgang Wegener argued in *The Sea Strategy of the World War* that in the event of future conflict with Great Britain, Germany should seize Norway, the Shetland and Faroe Islands, and Iceland. Only in this way could the ships of the German Navy escape the confines of the North Sea and gain a dominant strategic position in the North Atlantic. These arguments deeply influenced the leadership of the German Navy; Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, chief of the German Navy, repeatedly pressed them on German chancellor Adolf Hitler.

At the outset of World War II, Hitler supported neutrality in Scandinavia as ensuring a continued flow of Swedish iron ore to Germany. The Swedish ores had an iron content of 60 percent, permitting great economies in the production of steel. Low in phosphorus, Swedish ore produced high quality steel. Between December and April when the Baltic was frozen, iron ore from Swedish mines was sent by rail to the ice-free Norwegian port of Narvik and then through neutral Norwegian coastal waters to German ports.

British first lord of the admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill was keenly aware of the importance of this ore traffic and determined to halt it. The British and French planned an expedition to aid the Finns when the Soviet Union attacked Finland in November 1939, but in reality this plan was a cover for the Allied seizure of Narvik and the ore fields in northern Sweden. The end of the war in Finland compelled the Allies to abandon this plan.

Churchill now sought to mine Norwegian waters, forcing German ore ships to sea, where they could be taken. This violation of Norwegian neutrality would undoubtedly provoke a German reaction, allowing the British to land troops in Norway.

Convinced that the Allies were planning a Norwegian intervention, Hitler began in February 1940 to prepare for Operation WESERÜBUNG (WESER EXERCISE, the Weser being a German river), the German occupation of Denmark and Norway. The invasion was scheduled for March 20, but ice in the Baltic delayed it until April 9. Meanwhile, the British began their mine-laying operation in Norwegian territorial waters early on April 8.

Nonetheless, the timing and magnitude of the German invasion caught Churchill and the British by surprise. For the assault on Norway, Hitler committed five infantry divisions, two regiments of mountain troops, and a battalion of 66 light tanks. Operation WESERÜBUNG would also see the first use of paratroops (three companies) in combat. To seize six Norwegian coastal cities, the German Navy transported 8,850 soldiers in 2 battleships, a pocket battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 14 destroyers, and smaller vessels. The remaining 54,500 troops would be sent in once these objectives were secure.

The Luftwaffe amassed more than 1,000 aircraft for the operation. Fast heavily armed twin-engine Me-110 fighters possessed the range required to operate in this theater. Flying from captured airfields, Stuka dive-bombers proved devastatingly accurate. The most daring feature of German air operations was the first large-scale use of transport aircraft to deploy troops, support units, and supplies into the attack. More than 500 took part.

Norwegian defenses were woefully deficient. Of 63 warships in the Norwegian Navy, only four small destroyers and a minelayer were modern. All but 10 of the 150 Norwegian warplanes were obsolete biplanes. The Norwegian Army lacked sufficient numbers of heavy machine guns and artillery, and it possessed no antitank guns. Much of the Norwegian population lived in coastal cities where mobilization centers and arsenals were located. Surprise German attacks captured much Norwegian equipment and disrupted Norwegian mobilization.

German preparations for the invasion were noted by British and Norwegian authorities. While the British misread both the timing and the scale of the German attack, Norwegian government attention was riveted on

the British violation of Norway's neutrality. Thus, the Norwegian parliament authorized mobilization of the navy and air services but only 7,000 soldiers.

Norwegian soldiers handing over rifles and other firearms to German soldiers following their country's surrender, May 2, 1940. (Getty Images)

The Germans secured most of their immediate objectives. German paratroopers seized Sola, the largest Norwegian air base, and by April 11, 200 German warplanes, especially Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers, were flying from the airfield. The fortress of Oscarsborg commanded the water approach to Oslo. It mounted three 11-inch guns, installed in 1905, and a torpedo battery. Scorning the weaponry as antiquated, the Germans assumed that Oscarsborg was no longer manned. Firing at point-blank range and using torpedoes, the Norwegians sank the German heavy cruiser *Blücher* with heavy loss of life, and the German convoy it had been escorting was forced to withdraw. The Germans then took Oslo's Fornebu airport, and transport planes landed two battalions of troops who soon occupied the Norwegian capital. King Haakon VII and his family, the government, and the parliament had already departed.

The Royal Navy struck swiftly at the German ships. On April 10, British destroyers attacked German destroyers at Narvik. Backed by the old battleship *Warspite*, the British attacked again on April 13, sinking the last of the 10 German destroyers. British warships operating off the central Norwegian coast without fighter protection came under attack from

approximately 90 Luftwaffe bombers. The Royal Navy quickly decided not to risk major warships within range of German airpower.

German Army commander General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst organized his forces in highly mobile groups, effectively supported by light tanks, as ski troops from Bavaria and Austria repeatedly outflanked enemy defensive positions. Norwegian Army commander General Otto Ruge sought to delay the German advance until Allied forces could arrive. Norwegian troops, poorly trained and armed, were in disorder and came under heavy air attack. Ruge rallied his men, who fought tenaciously in the narrow mountain valleys of central Norway. Such delaying actions made Allied expeditions to Norway possible.

The Allies committed 12,500 soldiers to central Norway. By April 20, three battalions of British and three battalions of French mountain troops were at Namsos, 127 miles northeast of Trondheim, and two British battalions (later reinforced by three additional battalions) were at Åndalsnes, 100 miles southwest of the major Norwegian city and transport hub. In a pincer movement, the two forces were intended to recapture Trondheim.

Confusion in unit deployment led to chaos in logistical support in Britain. Allied troops arrived without necessary items, from ski bindings to artillery. The swift advance of the Germans forced the British at Åndalsnes to turn south and wage a series of defensive battles. Meanwhile, a Luftwaffe airlift reinforced the German Trondheim garrison, while Allied bases at Namsos and Åndalsnes were reduced to ashes by German bombing. Much to the disappointment of the Norwegians, the Allies abandoned central Norway by May 3.

German soldiers move heavy artillery forward during their April 1940 invasion of Norway. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Isolated at Narvik, the three battalions of German mountain infantry were supplied by Ju-52 transports and seaplanes flying at maximum range. On April 15, a British Guards brigade that included Scottish, Irish, and Welsh battalions arrived at Harstad, 70 miles from Narvik. Three battalions of French mountain infantry arrived later. But conflicting orders and clashing command personalities handcuffed Allied operations in the north.

Beginning on May 10, the Germans launched a massive attack against France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Compelled to consolidate their forces, the Allies decided to seize Narvik, destroy its ore-loading facilities, and then evacuate the royal family and government of Norway and Allied troops.

Disputes between the British Army and the Royal Navy were put aside, and a new army commander, Lieutenant General Claude Auchinleck, arrived on May 11. Reinforcements ably led by French general of brigade Antoine-Marie Béthouart included four battalions of Free Polish infantry and two battalions of the French Foreign Legion. Norwegian troops held the mountains ringing the town. Six hundred local Norwegians improved the air base at Bardufoss, and 14 Gladiator biplanes and 16 modern Hurricanes successfully covered the seizure of Narvik and the subsequent evacuation of Allied forces.

On May 28, French, British, Polish, and Norwegian troops ousted the Germans from Narvik and drove them to the Swedish border. The evacuation of 25,000 Allied soldiers then began and was completed by June 8. A British cruiser transported the Norwegian monarch and government to Britain. Ruge disbanded his forces, and hostilities ended in Norway on June 10.

In fighting on land, the Germans lost 3,692 men killed or missing, the Norwegians 1,335, and the French and Poles 530. The British lost 1,896 dead, missing, or severely wounded. The Luftwaffe lost 242 aircraft; the British 112. In fighting at sea, the British lost an aircraft carrier, 2 light cruisers, and 7 destroyers. The French and Poles each lost a destroyer. The Norwegian Campaign severely crippled the German surface navy; its losses included 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and 10 destroyers. It now had only 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers undamaged, although other damaged ships could be repaired.



After the Germans effected repairs at Narvik, the flow of Swedish iron ore resumed and continued without interruption to the end of the war. The strategic advantage of Norwegian bases came into play as the war unfolded. Based in Norwegian fjords, the battleship *Tirpitz* pinned down much of the battleship strength of the Royal Navy. Convoys to Russia were decimated by the Luftwaffe flying from northern Norway and by submarines. But Germany was never able to use Norway as a springboard to the Faroes, Shetlands, and Iceland. The British took the Faroes under their protection on April 12 and Iceland on May 10. The keys to the North Atlantic remained firmly in Allied hands.

An unforeseen result of the Norwegian fiasco was the resignation of British prime minister Neville Chamberlain on May 10 following the debacle in central Norway. Ironically, the architect of the disaster, Churchill, then became prime minister. His effective leadership would be amply demonstrated in the difficult summer and fall of 1940. Based in London, the indomitable King Haakon VII and his Free Norwegians continued the struggle to liberate their homeland.

SHERWOOD S. CORDIER

See also

Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Béthouart, Marie Émile Antoine; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Fleischer, Carl Gustav; Germany, Navy; Haakon VII, King of Norway; Narvik, Allied Evacuation of; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Narvik, Operations in; Norway; Norway, Army; Norway, Navy; Raeder, Erich; Ruge, Otto

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Norway, Invasion of

See WESERÜBUNG, Operation

Norway, Navy

The Norwegian Navy of 1940 consisted largely of obsolete warships and fishery protection ships. Norway had not fought since the Napoleonic Wars, and in 1933 the defense budget was the smallest in recent history. It grew in the late 1930s as world tensions increased, but the naval construction program was modest and, in any case, undertaken too late.

In 1940, the Norwegian Navy consisted of two armored coast-defense ships, the *Eidsvold* and *Norge*, with main armaments of two 210mm (8.26-inch) guns, launched in 1900 and forming the Panserskips Divisjon (armored ship division). Two other older coastal defense ships lay disarmed at Horten, a naval base outside of Oslo. The Germans sunk the first two at Narvik in their invasion of Norway in April 1940. They captured the latter two and rearmed them as antiaircraft guard ships.

In terms of modern ships, Norway had a minelayer and 4 600-ton torpedo boats. Several destroyers and torpedo boats were under construction at the time of the German attack. The remainder of the fleet consisted of 4 destroyers and 11 torpedo boats, all built before 1920; 9 submarines; and miscellaneous warships, 1 of which dated from 1858.

Commander of the navy Rear Admiral Henry E. Diesen was viewed as a political admiral. The officer corps had been gutted in the early 1930s as a consequence of budgetary constraints, and a substantial element within it supported Vidkun Quisling's Norwegian Nazi Party. However, most officers rallied to king and country when Germany invaded.

The dramatic event for the Norwegian Navy in the war was the German invasion of Norway in April 1940. It was a surprise on two levels. It was a strategic surprise because Norwegian leaders were more concerned by an invasion or limited naval action by the Allies, primarily the powerful British Royal Navy, and did not foresee an attack from the smaller German Navy, which presumably would not have command of the seas. The Germans also achieved surprise at the operational level, although a steady stream of

warnings of German warships and troopships moving north arrived in the hours before the attack.

After two months of fighting, 13 warships of the Norwegian navy and about 500 officers and sailors reached British ports. Only 1 of these ships was modern. The remaining Norwegian naval vessels were either sunk or incorporated into the German Navy. The Norwegian Navy used its older warships for training and patrol and minesweeping operations, and the Norwegian government-in-exile added to these more than 50 whaling ships that had been operating in the polar regions when Norway had been invaded. These 300- to 500-ton ships saw British and Norwegian service as minesweepers and in clandestine operations. More than 200 of the latter operations occurred in Norwegian waters as part of the "Shetland Bus," the clandestine special operations link between Shetland, Scotland, and German-occupied Norway.

During the war, the Norwegian Navy secured under Lend-Lease 5 U.S. World War I–era destroyers and 7 British-built destroyers. It obtained an additional 3 submarines, 7 corvettes, 3 submarine chasers, 1 patrol craft, and 29 motor torpedo and motor launches that saw much action in the English Channel and in Norwegian coastal waters.

Norwegian Navy ships participated in the Battle of the Atlantic, helped protect the convoys to Murmansk, and took part in Operations TORCH (November 8, 1942) and the Normandy Invasion (June 6, 1944). Of major combatants, Norway lost in battle one submarine while attempting to land agents in Norway as well as two destroyers and three corvettes in the Atlantic. The Norwegian Navy also operated a modest naval air arm from Scotland for patrols in the Norwegian and North Seas.

Norway's greatest contribution at sea during the war was its merchant marine, the fourth largest in the world with more than 1,000 ships totaling more than 4.8 million tons. By 1945, Norway emerged with an effective and sizable navy ready to help lead the way into collective military action under the future banner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

JACK GREENE

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Lend-Lease; Narvik, Naval Battles of

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Novikov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1900–1976)

Soviet Army chief marshal of aviation. Born in the village of Kryukovo, in Kostroma Province, on November 19, 1900, Aleksandr Novikov was called up for the Red Army in 1919, during the Russian Civil War (1918–1920). He joined the Communist Party in 1920 and took part in the bloody suppression of the Kronstadt Revolt in March 1921, where he was impressed with the role of aircraft in a ground-attack role.

In 1921, Novikov attended the field academy of the Red Army at Vystrel, and in 1927 he attended the Frunze Academy. In 1933, despite his defective eyesight, Novikov secured a transfer from the infantry to the air force and learned to fly. In 1935, he took command of the 42nd Light Bomber Squadron, and in March 1936 he won promotion to colonel.

Novikov managed to avoid the great purge of the military, although many of his colleagues were arrested and shot in 1937 and 1938. Novikov became chief of staff of the Karelian Front during the 1939–1940 First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War). As a major general, he commanded aviation in the Leningrad Military District, which became the Northern Front after the June 22, 1941, German invasion of the Soviet Union.

Novikov became deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force in February 1942. Promoted to lieutenant general in April, he assumed command of the Red Army Air Force, a post he held until March 1946. In this position, Novikov was responsible for coordinating Soviet air assets in Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943), Kursk (July 5–13, 1943), and during Operation BAGRATION (June 22–August 29, 1944). Promoted to colonel general in 1943, Novikov was the first Soviet marshal of aviation and one of only two officers to be made chief marshal of aviation during the war.

Following the defeat of Germany, Novikov directed air actions against the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria.

Arrested in March 1946 in a purge of the military as Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin removed war heroes, Novikov was held under strict confinement from 1946 to 1953, but he was released in May 1953 following Stalin's death. Rehabilitated the next month, he held a succession of important posts, including commander of long-range aviation units and deputy chief of staff of the now-independent Soviet Air Force in 1954–1955. Novikov retired in 1956 because of ill health. He died in Moscow on February 3, 1976.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BAGRATION, Operation; Kursk, Battle of; Manchuria Campaign; Soviet Union, Air Force; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Nuclear Weapons

Weapons using energy released from the nuclei of atoms to generate destructive power. Nuclear energy is created when atoms are split (fission) or when atoms are combined (fusion). During the 1920s and 1930s, scientists suggested that the energy within atoms could be used to produce incredible power, including the potential to create weapons significantly more destructive than any in existence. Early in World War II, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States had research programs examining the potential of nuclear weapons.

Although the German nuclear program had significant potential because of a strong prewar scientific community, it failed to produce a weapon. Historians debate the reason for the German failure, citing a lack of resources and high-level support, basic technological and scientific errors or failures,

and possible intentional slowdowns by German scientists. The Japanese program, with some assistance from Germany, made limited progress in basic research but did not come close to producing a viable weapon.

Soviet nuclear research activities were disrupted by the German invasion in June 1941 and the occupation of the Soviet industrial heartland. The Soviet research effort was reborn in late 1942, motivated by appeals from Russian physicists and reports of nuclear advances in Germany, Britain, and the United States. The Soviet nuclear weapons project continued throughout the war and afterward. Assisted by information provided by an active espionage network in the United States and Great Britain and the contributions of captured German scientists, the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device on August 29, 1949.

Only the Americans, assisted by British, Canadian, and émigré scientists, were successful in developing an atomic bomb during the war. The perception of a significant German scientific capability, reinforced by intelligence reports of progress in nuclear matters, was a strong motivation for the British and American research efforts. In the United States, émigré scientists including Leo Szilard and Enrico Fermi were key participants in and advocates of nuclear research. In August 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that drew attention to the potential of the concept and gained increased government support for the American scientific research effort.

The U.S. government accelerated its nuclear research activities in August 1942 by creating a highly secret top-priority program that was given the cover designation “Manhattan Engineer District,” normally shortened to “Manhattan Project.” Brigadier General (later lieutenant general) Leslie Groves, a U.S. Army engineer, directed the program. The central research facility was established at Los Alamos, New Mexico, with support provided by a nationwide network of facilities including university laboratories, industrial sites, and major new nuclear production sites at Hanford, Washington, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Manhattan Project was a massive undertaking that involved solving the theoretical foundations for nuclear fission and fusion designs and then the practical engineering challenge of creating a functional, deliverable weapon.

The Manhattan Project produced two successful atomic bomb designs. Both brought sufficient fissile material together quickly to create a

supercritical mass, which was triggered into a rapid fission chain reaction by an initiator that injected neutrons into the mass. The result was the explosive release of the binding nuclear energy. The simplest design used a gun assembly to fire one subcritical mass, termed a “bullet,” into a second subcritical mass, the target, to create a supercritical mass. The gun-assembly weapon used uranium-235 as fuel and was the design of the “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.

The second approach used an implosion technique and plutonium-239 as the fuel. The implosion design used shaped conventional high-explosive charges to compress a subcritical mass into a denser mass that became supercritical. The implosion design was used for the first atomic test explosion on July 16, 1945, when a device named “Gadget” was detonated at the Trinity site on the Alamogordo Bombing Range in New Mexico. The “Fat Man” bomb dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, was also an implosion design.

The two bomb designs included significant emphasis on safety. In addition to design safety and arming procedures, key parts of the bombs were not inserted until after the B-29s of the 509th Composite Group took off from their base on Tinian Island. This procedure was intended to prevent a full nuclear explosion if an accident occurred, although the “Little Boy” design still had significant inherent safety problems. Both bombs used radar altimeters for fuzing and had a barometric altimeter as a backup.

The effects of nuclear weapons are generally described in terms of a comparable amount of thousands of tons of conventional explosives, kilotons, of yield (usually TNT). The “Little Boy” bomb was estimated to have the explosive power of 15 kilotons, and the “Fat Man” bomb had 21 kilotons. This description does not fully describe the effects of these weapons, as in a normal bomb design approximately half of the yield was produced in blast energy, approximately one-third of the energy was thermal radiation, and the remainder was released in the form of radiation.



A dense column of smoke rises more than 60,000 feet into the air over the Japanese port of Nagasaki, the result of an atomic bomb. The second atomic weapon employed in warfare, it was dropped on that industrial center on August 9, 1945. (National Archives)

Although the atomic bombs developed by the Manhattan Project used nuclear fission, the fusion process had been considered in the theoretical discussions and was recognized as having even greater destructive potential. The fusion weapon design, often referred to as the “Super,” was not produced until after the war. Fusion weapons, known as thermonuclear weapons or hydrogen bombs, used a fission detonation to trigger the fusion reaction, which generated significantly higher destructive power.

The United States detonated the first fusion device, with a yield of 10 megatons (million tons), in October 1952 in a South Pacific test. The development and use of atomic bombs in World War II and the subsequent development of thermonuclear weapons had a significant effect on postwar

military forces and national security policies, especially in the form of deterrence doctrines that dominated the Cold War period.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Einstein, Albert; Fermi, Enrico; Groves, Leslie Richard; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Manhattan Project; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Oppenheimer, Julius Robert; Document 223

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Nuremberg Laws (1935)

Denaturalization laws passed in pre–World War II Germany designed to systematize discrimination against German Jews. The Nuremberg Laws on Citizenship and Race (Nuremberg Laws) were the most spectacular manifestation of Nazi-inspired anti-Semitism. From September to November 1935, German chancellor Adolf Hitler introduced the so-called Nuremberg Laws that defined citizenship and deprived noncitizens, including Jews, of rights. Special sessions of the Reichstag (parliament) were held at Nuremberg in 1935, at which legislation was passed that deprived Jews of citizenship and forbade intermarriage between Jews and non-Jewish Germans. This was the most prominent instance in modern times of the deliberate incorporation of prejudice and intolerance into the laws of a nation. Above all, the Nuremberg Laws officially attempted to define what being Jewish actually was.

The supplementary decrees specified the following:

> On the basis of Article 3 of the Reich Law of Citizenship of September 15, 1935, the following is hereby decreed:

ARTICLE 1 (1) Until further provision concerning citizenship papers, all subjects of German or kindred blood who possessed the right to vote in the *Reichstag* elections when the Law of Citizenship came into effect, shall, for the present, possess the rights of Reich citizens. The same shall be true of those upon whom the Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the deputy to the Führer, shall confer citizenship….

ARTICLE 2 (1) The provisions of Article 1 shall apply also to subjects who are of mixed Jewish blood.

(2) An individual of mixed Jewish blood is one who is descended from one or two grandparents who, racially, were full Jews, in so far that his is not a Jew.… Full-blooded Jewish grandparents are those who belonged to the Jewish religious community.

Jewish Germans were not permitted to employ non-Jewish maids under 45 years of age, were prevented from marrying non-Jews, and were excluded from citizenship, even if they had been born in Germany. They had to adopt Jewish first names, wear the yellow Star of David in public, and avoid public facilities where they might mix with gentiles. They could not teach, practice law or medicine, or perform/entertain in public. (Much of this had already been legalized in 1933–1934.)

The Nuremberg Laws set into motion a frightening series of measures that ultimately sought to destroy the Jews of Europe. After the racial laws came enforced concentration into ghettos or similar areas within cities. Finally came deportation to the concentration camps of eastern Germany or Poland, with death through overwork, starvation, or systematized extermination. The transition from deportation to mass murder did not occur until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.

DAVID M. KEITHLY

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Concentration Camps, German; Holocaust; Jewish Resistance; Nazi Racial Policies; Document 12

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Nuremberg Rallies

Massive national conventions held chiefly in Nuremberg and sponsored by the German Nazi Party between 1923 and 1938. The first such rally was actually held in January 1923 in Munich. In September 1923 another rally was held, this time in Nuremberg, which was selected because of its central location. By the late 1920s, all of the rallies were held in September, to coincide roughly with the autumnal equinox. The Nuremberg rallies were chiefly huge propaganda events that glorified the Nazi Party and its ideology. They grew in popularity and attendance each year, particularly after Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933.

Once Hitler had ensconced himself in the German psyche, the Nuremberg rallies were also used to augment his personality cult, portraying him as the selfless leader destined to be Germany's modern savior. Hitler routinely gave a major speech to the throngs at Nuremberg, where as many as 500,000 Germans gathered in an immense open-air arena. A number of Nazi propaganda films emerged from the Nuremberg rallies, the most notable being Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will* (1934). Usually, each rally followed several weeks of preparatory festivities, including sporting events, air shows, and music festivals featuring German composers.

Each Nuremberg rally had a theme, and all were carefully choreographed to match or magnify Nazi ideologies and policies. Thus, the 1935 rally was titled "Rally of Freedom," symbolizing the reintroduction of compulsory military service, which was meant to portray German's freedom from the Treaty of Versailles. The next year's rally celebrated the remilitarization of the Rhineland, which returned "honor" to the German nation. The 1937 rally, celebrating German laborers, was spectacular for the 150 giant searchlights designed by Albert Speer that sent vertical shafts of light into the night, designed to look like a huge floating building. The military also had a major presence at the rallies, especially during the mid and late 1930s. Thousands of German soldiers passed in review, goose-stepping with their weapons.

The Nuremberg rallies also served as the national convention for the Hitler Youth, comprised of German girls and boys ages 10 to 18. Hitler and other top Nazi officials took a keen interest in cultivating German youths and inculcating in them Nazi values. Thus, the rallies provided thousands of youths the opportunity to see their führer in person and to listen to his speeches. The rallies not only proved to be a propaganda bonanza in Germany but were also meant to impress and perhaps intimidate other nations. Newsreels filmed at the rallies made their way into movie theaters throughout Europe, the Americas, and elsewhere. The Nuremberg rallies were profoundly dramatic and symbolic, featuring trumpet fanfares, military parades, Wagnerian music, and massive torchlight parades.

The 1938 "Rally of Greater Germany" was the last rally ever held. Although a rally was planned for September 1939, it was canceled because of the German invasion of Poland on September 1, which began World War II.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Hitler Youth; Rhineland, Remilitarization of; Riefenstahl, Leni; Versailles, Treaty of

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Nuremberg Trials

See International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials

Nuri al-Said Pasha (1888–1958)

Iraqi political leader. Born in Kirkuk (Iraq) in 1888, Nuri al-Said (Nuri as-Said) Pasha received a military education. He graduated from a military academy in Istanbul in 1905 and the next year was commissioned an officer

in the Ottoman Army. He became active in politics and joined the Ahd Party in 1912.

During World War I, Nuri participated in military operations against the British but was captured. Nuri later distinguished himself in battle during the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule. After the revolt, he participated in the administration of a new Arab state with its capital in Damascus. He attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and was appointed chief of staff of the Iraqi Army in 1920. In 1922, Nuri became director-general of the Iraqi police, serving under King Faisal. Nuri became prime minister in 1930.

While prime minister, on June 30, 1930, Nuri signed a treaty with the British that granted independence to Iraq. Prime minister on 14 different occasions, Nuri remained pro-British. When Faisal died in 1933, much of the Iraqi population, especially the young, disagreed with Nuri's views. Conflicts arose at the start of World War II when Nuri supported the British and declared war on Germany in 1940.

In April 1941, Rashid Ali Gailani staged a coup and forced Nuri and his supporters into exile. While Rashid was in power, he ignored Italy's declaration of war against Britain and permitted anti-British propaganda and activities. In May 1941, however, the British sent in military forces and crushed the Rashid Ali regime. Nuri then returned to Iraq and served as prime minister with British sponsorship from 1941 to 1944. Nuri maintained political dominance and sought to create a union of Arab states with British support.



Iraqi political leader Nuri al-Said, shown here in 1957. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Iraq became a charter member of the Arab League in 1945. At the end of World War II, however, there was strong nationalist feeling in Iraq and resentment toward the West, while Nuri favored continued ties with the Western powers. In February 1958, Nuri sponsored a union with Jordan. On July 14, 1958, Iraqi Army units overthrew the monarchy and executed King Faisal II and most of his family. Nuri al-Said was killed by a mob in Baghdad the next day.

M. DAVID YAMAN

See also

Iraq

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O

Obata Hideyoshi (1890–1944)

Japanese Army general. Born in Osaka Prefecture on April 2, 1890, Obata Hideyoshi graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1911. A graduate of the Army War College in 1919, he also served as an instructor there. Obata was resident officer in Britain from 1923 to 1926, military attaché in India during 1927–1929, and on the staff of the War Ministry and the General Staff (1929–1930). Promoted to colonel in 1934, he was chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff in 1934 and 1935 and commanded the 14th Cavalry Regiment from 1935 to 1937. He became assistant director of the Akeno (Army) Air School in 1937 and then the director in 1938 as a major general. In 1940, he was promoted to lieutenant general and took command of the 5th Air Group.

At the beginning of the war, Obata's air group supported Japanese operations against the Philippines and Burma. As commander of the Third Air Army from 1943, Obata supported defensive operations in Burma. In February 1944, he became commander of the newly established Thirty-First Army, which was scattered over a vast area of the Northwest Pacific. Obata was at Palau on an inspection trip when U.S. forces attacked Saipan on June 15, 1944. He commanded his army from Guam, fighting directly against U.S. forces there from July. Obata was killed on Guam on August 11, 1944, and brevetted full general after his death.

NAKAYAMA TAKASHI

See also

Burma Theater; Saipan, Battle of

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OBOE, Operation

See Borneo Campaign

O’Connor, Richard Nugent (1889–1981)

British Army general. Born in Srinagar, Kashmir, on August 21, 1889, Richard Nugent O’Connor was educated at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and commissioned in the Scottish Rifles in 1909. In World War I, he was posted to the 7th Division on the Western Front. In June 1917, O’Connor assumed command of a battalion as a temporary lieutenant colonel but reverted to captain at the end of the war. Postwar service included attendance and an instructor assignment at the Staff College, Camberley. In 1931, he was again promoted to lieutenant colonel and commanded the 1st Battalion of The Cameronians.

Promoted to brigadier, O’Connor then commanded the Peshawar Brigade on the northwest frontier in India in 1936. After two years there, he was promoted to major general and took command of the 7th Division in Palestine, which meant that he was also military governor of Jerusalem.

In June 1940, O’Connor moved his division to Egypt, and as a lieutenant general, he took command of the small Western Desert Force in Egypt. When Italian forces invaded in September, O’Connor skillfully led his vastly outnumbered troops in Operation COMPASS (December 7, 1940–February 7, 1941) to destroy an Italian army; capture prisoners, equipment, and supplies; and secure the port of Tobruk on January 21–22, 1941. In 10 weeks, at a cost of fewer than 2,000 casualties, his forces inflicted 12,000 killed or missing and took 138,000 prisoners, including 5 generals, as well as 400 tanks and 850 guns.

Following the arrival of the German Afrika Korps in North Africa in February 1941, Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel launched a counterattack in March that achieved success in large part because much of the Western Desert Force had been sent to fight in Greece. O’Connor was then commanding British troops in Egypt, and he was ordered to the front to serve

as adviser to his successor, Lieutenant General Philip Neame. O'Connor and Neame were captured by a German patrol on April 6. Held as prisoners of war in Italy for the next two and a half years, both men managed to escape in September 1943 and return to Britain.

O'Connor returned to duty in January 1944 and commanded VIII Corps beginning in June but was posted to India in November to head first the Eastern Command and then the Northwestern Command. He was promoted to full general in April 1945. He later served as adjutant general to the forces in 1946 and 1947. O'Connor retired in September 1947. He died in London on June 17, 1981.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

COMPASS, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; North Africa Campaign

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O'Daniel, John Wilson (1894–1975)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Newark, Delaware, on February 15, 1894, John "Iron Mike" Wilson O'Daniel joined the Delaware National Guard while still a student at Delaware College. Mobilized with the guard in 1916, he served on the Mexican border. In 1917, he secured a commission in the regular army and fought in France during World War I. It was there that he received his nickname, the consequence of wounds received. O'Daniel served with the Civilian Conservation Corps from 1933 to 1938 and was then professor of military science at the Academy of Richmond County (1936–1938). He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1939 but had no General Staff service.

In World War II, O'Daniel became an expert on amphibious operations. Promoted to colonel, in July 1942 he commanded the American Invasion

Training School in Britain. In November 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and commanded a 34th Infantry Division regimental combat team that landed at Algiers, Algeria, as part of Operation TORCH, on November 8. In December 1942, O'Daniel organized the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center to prepare for the invasion of Sicily. He accompanied Major General Lucian Truscott's 3rd Infantry Division to its beachhead in Sicily (July 9, 1943), and he managed the American VI Corps landing area at Salerno, Italy, on September 9.

Truscott made O'Daniel his assistant division commander later in the Italian Campaign (1943–1945). At Anzio (January 22–May 25, 1944), O'Daniel took command of the 3rd Infantry Division when Truscott assumed command of VI Corps. Truscott claimed that O'Daniel "had no equal" as an infantry division commander. O'Daniel was promoted to major general in May 1944.

Following the capture of Rome early in June 1944, the 3rd Infantry Division was one of three American divisions selected for the Seventh Army landings in southern France on August 15. From there, O'Daniel led his command into Bavaria. The 3rd Infantry Division ended the war near Berchtesgaden on May 7, 1945.

After the war, O'Daniel commanded the Infantry School (1945–1948), served as army attaché in Moscow (1948–1950), and commanded I Corps in Korea (1951–1952), where he was promoted to lieutenant general in 1951. He was next commander of the U.S. Army, Pacific. He also directed the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam (1954–1955). O'Daniel retired in February 1956. He later founded the American Friends of Vietnam, a group that lobbied for support of the Republic of Vietnam government in South Vietnam. O'Daniel died in San Diego, California, on March 28, 1975.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Anzio, Battle of; DRAGOON, Operation; Italy Campaign; Rome, Advance on and Capture of; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation

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Oesch, Karl Lennart (1892–1978)

Finnish Army general. Born on August 8, 1892, in Pyhäjärvi (then part of the Russian Empire), Karl Lennart Oesch served in the German Finnish Jäger Battalion from 1915 to 1918. In the Finnish War of Independence he commanded a battalion. From 1923 to 1926, Oesch studied at the French Ecole Militaire. From 1930 to 1940, he was chief of the Finnish General Staff and served under Marshal Carl Mannerheim during the 1939–1940 Russo-Finnish War.

In March 1940, Oesch assumed command of forces at the Gulf of Viipuri (Vyborg), known as the Coastal Group, from Major General Kurt Wallenius, whom Mannerheim relieved from command. In short order Oesch achieved spectacular gains, reorganizing the Coastal Group into an effective command. The Gulf of Viipuri was the scene of some of the most bitter fighting of the war, and Oesch managed to hold Viipuri itself until the end of the war.

Oesch's forces retook the remainder of the territory in 1941 during the Continuation War. Oesch was chief of staff of the army in 1944. That November, Oesch commanded both the III and IV Army Corps in the defense of the Karelian Isthmus. Despite a tenacious Finnish effort, vastly superior Russian forces overran Oesch's defenders, resulting in the loss of Viipuri. Oesch, however, was able to save his force from complete annihilation. Following the war, Soviet pressure resulted in Oesch being sentenced by a Finnish military court to 12 years' imprisonment at hard labor on a charge of mistreatment of Soviet prisoners. Oesch died on August 8, 1978.

NATHAN L. GILBERT

See also

Finland, Army and Navy; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von

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Office of Price Administration, U.S.

U.S. government civilian agency charged with establishing price controls, controlling rents, and rationing scarce commodities. The Office of Price Administration (OPA) was formally created by executive order on August 28, 1941, and was headed by Leon Henderson; its predecessor agency was the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply. The OPA's first substantive action occurred on December 27, 1941, 20 days after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, when it mandated the rationing of rubber tires. The goals of the OPA were to control prices, thereby dampening inflation; to keep demand and supply in balance thereby mitigating shortages; to prevent excess profiteering; and to keep the American public tuned in and involved with the war effort.

On January 30, 1942, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act, which formally permitted the OPA to institute price controls on virtually all commodities and products with the exception of agricultural products, which were controlled by another government agency. The agency was also allowed to implement rent controls nationwide. The main pricing formula was set in May 1942 by the General Maximum Price Regulation, which set a ceiling on prices based on the level seen during March 1942. Producers and sellers wishing to exceed the price ceilings were obligated to apply for a price adjustment with the OPA; prices could not legally be raised beyond the ceiling price without official OPA authorization. Enforcement occurred mainly at the local and district levels, although serious violations made their way to the national level and were reviewed and pursued in Washington, D.C., where the OPA was headquartered.

To keep the OPA bureaucracy from becoming too large and to involve civilians in the economic stabilization process, the OPA decentralized its operations. It maintained eight regional offices, dozens of district offices, and dozens more at the local level. Thousands of civilian volunteers—many of

them women—helped establish prices and monitored enforcement. At the time, women were the main shoppers in a given household, especially for groceries, clothing, and other products that were particularly price-sensitive. The OPA also rationed commodities such as shoes, nylon, gasoline, fuel oils, coffee, and meats by issuing ration cards to each individual or household in the United States. The OPA also helped organize recycling drives for scarce commodities such as rubber and various metals.

In 1943, Prentiss Marsh Brown succeeded Henderson as the OPA's chief administrator; he was succeeded in turn by Chester Bliss Bowles, who headed the agency until it was organized out of existence in 1946. In October 1942, Congress created the Office of Economic Stabilization, which coordinated pricing policies with the OPA and wage policies with the National War Labor Board to ensure that all were working to prevent inflation and labor disputes.

Most Americans willingly complied with the OPA guidelines, and it did an adequate job of preventing runaway prices and profiteering. Between 1942 and 1945, aggregate retail prices rose by about 31 percent; this compared to a 62 percent increase during World War I, during which prices were not strictly controlled by the government. In 1943, the OPA reported some 280,000 violations; in 1944, 205,880 violations were reported. Most violations warranted only a warning letter; a small number required a fine. Only about 1.5 percent of all violations resulted in a jail sentence.

As early as August 16, 1945, the OPA had lifted the rationing of gasoline and oil as well as processed foods. De-control occurred at a rapid rate, and by year's end most controls had been lifted. In December 1946, most of the OPA's remaining functions were transferred to other agencies. It was liquidated entirely on May 29, 1947, by executive order.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

National War Labor Board, U.S.; United States; United States War Production Board; Document 145

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Office of Strategic Services

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was a U.S. foreign intelligence agency and the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. The OSS was established in June 1942 and disbanded on October 1, 1945. President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the OSS at the urging of Colonel William J. Donovan, a prominent lawyer and former U.S. assistant attorney general who had served in the army during World War I and then took an interest in intelligence matters.

At the beginning of World War II, Donovan, who had close connections with like-minded British intelligence operatives and with Roosevelt, persuaded the president that the United States needed a centralized, civilian-run intelligence agency that would report directly to the White House. In July 1941, before the United States entered the war, Roosevelt established for this purpose the Office of Coordinator of Information, headed by Donovan. A few months after the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, this agency became the OSS, which was to report directly to the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The OSS undertook a wide variety of activities during the war. In the United States, Donovan recruited academics for research and analysis functions. The OSS also mounted numerous covert activities in both the European and Pacific war theaters. It had particularly close links with British intelligence services, which Donovan regarded as providing a desirable model for a potential U.S. agency. OSS European operations were based in London and headed by Colonel David K. E. Bruce. OSS operatives infiltrated Axis-occupied territory, aiding resistance groups and providing the U.S. military with firsthand intelligence. In the Asian theater, OSS agents worked closely with nationalist forces in China and Indochina, and as the war drew to a close they reported favorably to Washington on both the Chinese Communist movement and its Vietnamese counterpart.

Despite its successes, the OSS attracted fierce criticism from the American military, particularly General Douglas MacArthur, commander of

U.S. forces in the Southwest Pacific; military intelligence operatives; and other rival intelligence agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Donovan's forthright style did little to allay such tensions. The OSS recruited its operatives disproportionately from the American social elite to which Donovan belonged, winning it the nickname "Oh So Social" and enabling detractors to denigrate its accomplishments.

In September 1945, President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS, ignoring Donovan's forceful pleas to establish a centralized U.S. intelligence agency. Within a few months, however, rising Cold War tensions led Truman to reverse this decision. The OSS was the de facto precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), established by presidential executive order in 1946 and, more formally, by the National Security Act of 1947. Many CIA operatives, including several influential directors, began their intelligence careers as OSS agents.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

Built for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), this tiny "M.B." camera—no larger than its namesake, a matchbox—could be easily hidden in a man's hand and used to take a picture under the cloak of such a simple gesture as lighting a cigarette or reading. Eastman Kodak designed and built 1,000 of these cameras for use by OSS agents and underground forces during the war. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also

Donovan, William Joseph; MacArthur, Douglas; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Special Operations Executive; Truman, Harry S.; Document 93; Document 233

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Office of War Information, U.S.

U.S. government agency created by executive order on June 13, 1942, designed to control and disseminate information on the war effort at home and abroad. Although the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration eschewed using the term "propaganda" to describe the agency's functions, the Office of War Information (OWI) did indeed engage in propagandistic activities, particularly in Europe and Japan.

Unlike its World War I predecessor (the Committee on Public Information), the OWI was not empowered with any censorship powers. Elmer Davis, a news reporter for CBS radio, headed the new agency. His mandates were to coordinate the production and dissemination of war news and information, aid in the recruitment of civilian workers for defense work (mostly women), promote patriotism, discourage activities that might hinder the war effort, and create an overseas component that would engage in propaganda and disinformation campaigns aimed at the Axis powers.

The OWI used a variety of media to advance its agenda. These included numerous radio broadcasts and radio shows, posters, leaflets, brochures, films and newsreels created by the agency, and Hollywood films. The agency also employed more novel approaches to propaganda, including the issuance of matchbooks, pocket sewing kits, seed packets, and other similar items. Matchbooks had the "Four Freedoms" printed on the inside covers, seed packets carried an American flag and a prowar message, and special soap

packets were inscribed with the message “Wash off the Nazi Dirt.” In addition, a small army of OWI photographers recorded factory workers, shipyard workers, and many others to document and encourage American participation in the war.

The OWI staff, which included journalists, writers, and academics, worked closely with U.S. broadcasting companies as well as Hollywood movie producers. Indeed, the Bureau of Motion Pictures, which operated under the aegis of the OWI, worked cooperatively with Hollywood producers and directors, who were generally supportive of the effort. The OWI staff believed that film was perhaps the most effective way to reach and inform audiences about the war effort. By the end of 1943, all film companies except for Paramount had agreed to permit OWI personnel to review scripts before production on a film commenced.

Perhaps one of the OWI’s best-known domestic efforts came in the numerous wartime posters designed for domestic consumption. The most popular of these were ones aimed at American women, exhorting them to actively join the war effort by taking jobs previously held by men in the nation’s war factories. “Rosie the Riveter” became an instantly recognized symbol of the centrality of women in the war effort.

Abroad, the OWI’s activities were numerous and clearly propagandistic in nature. The agency formed the Voice of America in 1942 (it still exists today), which produced and broadcast radio shows heard by millions around the world. The Psychological Warfare Branch engaged in producing both print and radio messages designed to demoralize enemy civilian populations and soldiers alike. This was accomplished chiefly by way of foreign-language newspapers and leaflets, which were frequently dropped by airplane. Between 1942 and 1945, the OWI dropped some 180 million leaflets over Japan; some 98 million were dropped over Japan during May–August 1945 alone.

By 1943, however, the OWI became embroiled in partisan politics. Many in the agency’s senior staff were avid supporters of Roosevelt and his New Deal, so this bias tended to come out in radio broadcasts. This rankled congressional opponents of the OWI, especially Republicans, who claimed that the OWI was engaged in activities that extolled Democratic virtues while ignoring Republican values. The House of Representatives refused to fund the OWI for 1944; the Senate reinstated the funding but at a much-reduced

level. Thus, between 1944 and 1945, the agency curtailed much of its domestic operations, including the Motion Picture Bureau. In the last 18 months of the war, the OWI focused chiefly on foreign activities and propaganda abroad. The OWI was abolished by executive order on September 15, 1945.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Propaganda; United States

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Oikawa Koshiro (1883–1958)

Japanese Navy admiral and minister of the navy. Born in Morioka, Iwate Prefecture, on February 8, 1883, Oikawa Koshiro graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1903 and became a torpedo specialist. He entered the Naval War College in 1913 as a lieutenant commander. During 1915–1922, he was aide-de-camp to Crown Prince Hirohito. Oikawa took command of the 5th Destroyer Squadron in 1922, and as a captain he commanded the cruiser *Kinu* followed by the cruiser *Tama*.

In 1924, Oikawa became the chief of the Operations Department of the Naval General Staff. After promotion to rear admiral in 1928, he was assigned to be chief of staff of the Kure Naval District. In 1932, he assumed command of the 1st Air Squadron.

Appointed superintendent of the Japanese Naval Academy in 1933, Oikawa assumed command of the Third Fleet in 1935. Continuing his rapid rise, he became director of the Air Command in 1936. Promoted to vice admiral in 1938, he assumed command of the China Fleet. On November 15, 1939, he was promoted to full admiral, and in 1940 he commanded the Yokosuka Naval District. On September 5, 1940, Oikawa was appointed minister of the navy.

As naval minister, Oikawa was involved in making two fateful decisions: the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy (September 27, 1940) and the declarations of war against the United States and the United Kingdom. Although many in the Imperial Japanese Navy, including commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, opposed the Tripartite Pact, Oikawa was pressured to approve it. He privately told Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro that he lacked confidence in the navy's ability to fight the United States, but he later refused to speak as plainly to other cabinet members.

Oikawa left his post in October 1941, conceding to General Tōjō Hideki's rejection of his choice of Admiral Toyoda Soemu, a well-known opponent of army policies, to be his successor. Oikawa next became superintendent of the Naval War College and military adviser to the emperor. In November 1943, he headed the new Grand Escort Command Headquarters, composed of four escort carriers and a naval air group, to protect Japanese convoys from U.S. submarine attack. In August 1944, Oikawa resumed his position as chief of the Naval General Staff, although mounting Japanese defeats led to his withdrawal in April 1945 and his retirement on September 5, 1945. Oikawa died in Tokyo on May 9, 1958.

KITA YOSHITO

See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Tōjō Hideki; Toyoda Soemu; Tripartite Pact; Yamamoto Isoroku; Document 82

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Okamura Yasuji (1884–1966)

Japanese Army general. Born in Tokyo on May 5, 1884, Okamura Yasuji graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1904 and the Army War College in 1913. He served on the army General Staff during 1914–1917,

1923–1925, and 1928. Promoted to major in 1919, he was resident officer in Europe during 1921–1922. Stationed in Shanghai during 1925–1927, he was promoted to colonel and commanded a regiment. As vice chief of staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army, Okamura helped plan the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931–1932. Promoted to major general and appointed deputy commanding general of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army in February 1932, Okamura was sent to break the boycott of Japanese goods following the takeover of Manchuria.

Okamura was military attaché to the puppet Japanese state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) during 1933–1934. He was then chief of the Intelligence Division of the army General Staff during 1935–1936. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1936, he commanded the 2nd Division in Manchuria during 1936–1938. Okamura played an important role in the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) as commander of the Eleventh Army in China during 1938–1940. Well-informed regarding Chinese affairs, especially the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), Okamura was reluctant to escalate the war. His forces fought the Chinese Communists who had launched their so-called Hundred Regiments Campaign against the Japanese in August 1940.

Promoted to full general in 1941, in July Okamura was appointed to command the North China Area Army. He carried out the Japanese Sankō Sakusen (Three Alls) policy of “Kill All, Burn All, Take All” designed to pacify northern China. Initiated in 1940 by Major General Tanaka Ryūkichi, Okamura intensified it in 1942, with the full support of Imperial General Headquarters and perhaps even Emperor Hirohito.

Northern China was divided into pacified, semipacified, and unpacified areas, and the program included burning villages, confiscating grain, and forcing the Chinese peasants to construct collective hamlets. It also included the construction of containment walls, moats, watchtowers, and roads. The program targeted for death “enemies pretending to be local people” and all males between ages 15 and 60 suspected of being “enemies.” Although no precise figures are available, it may have resulted in the death of some 1.7 million Chinese.

In 1944 Okamura became commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China and launched Operation ICHI-GO, a major offensive in central and southeastern China from mid-April to December 1944. Employing

410,000 troops, the Japanese made major territorial gains and realized their goals of eliminating U.S. air bases in China for the strategic bombing of Japan and opening land communications from northern China to French Indochina. Okamura halted the advance because he feared that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan.

Although Okamura and his 1 million Japanese soldiers in China were never defeated by the Chinese, he surrendered unconditionally in Nanjing (Nanking) on September 9, 1945. After the war, Okamura was brought to trial by the Nationalist government of China. Okamura had developed close ties with members of the government, so it came as no surprise when he was found innocent. He then worked with the Nationalist government during 1946–1948. The Chinese Communists tried to capture him, but Okamura escaped to Japan. In February 1950 Okamura arranged to send his former staff officers, known as the Pai Tuan (White Company), to Taiwan to assist the Nationalist government there. Okamura died on September 2, 1966.

KOTANI KEN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

ICHI-GO, Operation; Jiang Jieshi; Sino-Japanese War

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O’Kane, Richard Hetherington (1911–1994)

U.S. Navy rear admiral. Born in Dover, New Hampshire, on February 2, 1911, Richard Hetherington O’Kane graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1934 and began a series of tours aboard cruisers and destroyers. He entered the submarine service in 1938. After duty aboard the mine-laying submarine *Argonaut,* O’Kane reported to the submarine

Wahoo in early 1942. When Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Morton took command of the *Wahoo* after its second war patrol, O'Kane became its executive officer. Morton and O'Kane worked closely to develop more aggressive submarine tactics, which proved to be some of the most effective of the war. The *Wahoo* was soon the navy's most effective submarine, sinking 16 Japanese vessels totaling some 45,000 tons between May and July 1943.

In July 1943, O'Kane was ordered to fit out and take command of the new submarine *Tang*. He commanded the *Tang* throughout its career, implementing and improving the tactics that he and Morton had previously developed. On October 24, 1944, during its fifth war patrol in an attack on a Japanese convoy between Taiwan and the Philippines, one of the *Tang*'s Mark XVIII torpedoes malfunctioned, circled back, and sank the submarine. Only O'Kane and eight of his crew survived the sinking; they were picked up by Japanese ships. The *Tang* was credited with sinking 24 Japanese ships totaling 93,285 tons.

O'Kane spent the duration of the war in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp. For the *Tang*'s final patrol, O'Kane was awarded the Medal of Honor. O'Kane remains the highest-scoring submarine commander in U.S. naval history.

O'Kane held various commands after the war. In 1949, he commanded Submarine Division 32. Promoted to captain in 1953, he attended the Naval War College and then commanded Submarine Division 7 at Pearl Harbor, followed by the Submarine School at New London and Submarine Squadron 7. O'Kane retired from active duty as a rear admiral in 1957. He died in Petaluma, California, on February 16, 1994.

EDWARD F. FINCH

See also

Submarines; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan

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Ōkawa Shūmei (1888–1957)

Japanese right-wing political leader. Born in Yamagata Prefecture on December 6, 1888, Ōkawa Shūmei graduated from Tokyo University in 1911. He resided in Tokyo and worked as a translator for the Japanese Imperial Army. Having studied Indian philosophy, Ōkawa became interested in India's independence movement and contacted Indian activists in Japan who opposed Western colonialism in Asia.

In 1918, Ōkawa joined the South Manchurian Railway Company. He then earned his doctorate at Tokyo University and taught the history of colonialism at Takushoku University, proposing that Japan liberate Asia from Western imperialism. Ōkawa founded nationalist organizations such as Yuzonsha that were designed to preserve traditional Japanese values and promote the renovation of Japan.

In the first half of the 1930s, Ōkawa established connections with like-minded military officers and became involved in plans for a coup d'état. In 1932, Ōkawa was arrested for his involvement in the May 15 Incident—the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. Sentenced to five years in prison in October 1935, Ōkawa was released after serving less than two years.

Following his release, Ōkawa published numerous works on the history of Japan and on Western colonialism and expansionism in Asia. He advocated the necessity for Asian nations to cooperate and adopt common policies against the West. During World War II, Ōkawa argued for "Asia for the Asians" and called on all Asian peoples to join Japan in the "Great Asian War" against the Allied powers.

Following World War II, the Allied powers viewed Ōkawa's ideas as the foundation for Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that had led to the Pacific war. He was arrested as a Class A war criminal but was declared unfit to stand trial by reason of insanity. Ōkawa recovered in two years and continued to publish and promote his ideology until his death in Tokyo on December 24, 1957.

ASAKAWA MICHIO

See also
Japan

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Okinawa, Invasion of (March 16–June 21, 1945)

Last major battle of World War II in the Pacific and the largest and most complicated amphibious operation in the theater. Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands and only 350 miles from the Japanese home island of Kyushu, had long been regarded as the last stepping-stone before a direct Allied attack on Japan. The island is 60 miles long and at most 18 miles wide. Japanese leaders considered the defense of Okinawa as their last chance to hold off an invasion of the homeland, and they were prepared for their forces to battle to the death. Allied strategists decided that a major amphibious operation, code-named ICEBERG, would be mounted to take the island to secure harbor and air-base facilities for the projected attack on the Japanese home islands. Taking the island would also sever Japanese communications with southern China.

U.S. admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet, was in overall command of the invasion operation. The covering force included 18 battleships and 40 carriers in Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Fast Carrier Force (TF-58) and the British component commanded by Vice Admiral Henry Bernard Rawlings (TF-57, 1 battleship and 4 carriers plus supporting ships, 22 in all). The transport force of Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force, TF-51, comprised some 1,300 ships. Operation ICEBERG included the largest number of ships involved in a single operation during the entire Pacific war.

The land assault force consisted of U.S. Army lieutenant general Simon Bolivar Buckner's Tenth Army of some 180,000 men. The Tenth Army included Major General Roy S. Geiger's III Marine Amphibious Corps (1st, 2nd, and 6th Marine Divisions) and U.S. Army major general John R. Hodge's XXIV Army Corps (7th, 27th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisions).

The Japanese defenders were formed into the Thirty-Second Army (Ryukyu Islands). It comprised four divisions (9th, 24th, 62nd, and the 28th on Sakishima) plus additional units. Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru commanded about 130,000 men, including the 20,000-man Okinawan Home Guard. The Japanese had constructed a formidable defensive system, particularly on the southern part of the island.

The invasion was originally scheduled for March 1, 1945, but delays in the Philippines Campaign and at Iwo Jima caused ICEBERG to be postponed for several weeks. The operation began with the occupation of the Kerama Islets, 15 miles west of Okinawa, on March 16, 1945. Five days later, a landing was made on Keise-Jima, from which point artillery fire could be brought to bear on Okinawa itself. Then, on April 1, Easter Sunday, the landing began with a feint toward the southeastern shore of the island. The real assault was made by 60,000 U.S. troops landing on the central stretch of Okinawa's west coast. They quickly seized two nearby airfields and advanced east to cut the island's narrow waist. The marines and army troops attained most of their initial objectives within four days.

Ushijima had concentrated the bulk of his defenders out of range of Allied naval guns off the beaches and behind the strong Shuri Line at the southern end of the island. There, the Japanese planned to inflict as much damage as possible on the invaders, supported by the last units of the Imperial Fleet and kamikaze raids. U.S. forces encountered the Shuri Line for the first time on April 4. They fought for eight days to take a ridge and flush the Japanese from numerous caves. Fighting was intense as the Japanese defended every inch of ground. The 1st Marine Division finally took Shuri Castle on May 29.



The Japanese then withdrew to the south to establish another defensive line at Yaeju Dake and Yuza Dake. Fierce fighting continued until most Japanese resistance had been eliminated by June 21. During the battle for Okinawa, both commanders died within five days of each other. Buckner died of shrapnel wounds inflicted by Japanese artillery at a forward observation post on June 18, and Ushijima committed suicide on June 23.

While the battle had raged ashore, fighting in the waters around the island was just as intense. Japanese kamikaze attacks reached their highest level of the war as the suicide pilots flung themselves against the Allied fleet. Several thousand pilots immolated themselves against U.S. and British ships, sinking 36 and damaging another 368.

The largest kamikaze was the giant battleship *Yamato*, dispatched to Okinawa with sufficient fuel for only a one-way trip. It was to inflict as much damage as possible before being destroyed. The Japanese hoped that the

Yamato might finish off the Allied fleet after the latter had been weakened by kamikaze attacks, then beach itself as a stationary battery. This mission came to naught on April 7 when the *Yamato* was attacked by U.S. carrier aircraft. Hit repeatedly by bombs and torpedoes, the vessel sank long before reaching the invasion site.

Okinawa was officially declared secure on July 2. Both sides had suffered horrendous casualties. The Japanese sustained 92,000–94,000 military dead. Okinawans especially suffered. Of the preinvasion population of 450,000, perhaps 94,000 died. On the U.S. side, the army lost 12,520 dead and reported 36,631 wounded. The marines suffered 2,938 dead and 13,708 wounded. The navy lost 4,907 men killed with another 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks. The navy was the only service in which the dead exceeded the wounded. This figure was greater than the navy's casualties in all U.S. wars to that date.

The Battle of Okinawa was the costliest battle of the Pacific war for the Americans. Nevertheless, it was used to support the case for bringing the war to an end by means other than the invasion of Japan itself and certainly influenced the decision by the United States to use atomic bombs against the mainland of Japan in August 1945.

JAMES H. WILLBANKS

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Buckner, Simon Bolivar, Jr.; Geiger, Roy Stanley; Kamikaze; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly; Ushijima Mitsuru

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Oktyabrsky, Filip Sergeyevich (1899–1969)

Soviet Navy admiral. Born in the village of Lukshino, now in Kaliningrad Oblast, on October 23, 1899, Filip Oktyabrsky entered the Red Navy in 1918 and joined the Communist Party in 1919. After routine assignments, he commanded the Amur Military Flotilla in February 1938 and then the Black Sea Fleet (March 1939–May 1943). He was promoted to rear admiral in June 1940 and to vice admiral in June 1941.

Oktyabrsky directed the land defense of Odessa from July to October 1941 and executed a masterly evacuation of Odessa on the night of October 15–16. From November 1941 to June 1942, he commanded the defense of Sevastopol against German attack, being evacuated on orders from Moscow at the last moment. Oktyabrsky again commanded the Amur Military Flotilla (June 1943–March 1944) and then commanded the Black Sea Fleet as a full admiral.

Continuing as commander of the Black Sea Fleet after the war, Oktyabrsky was also first deputy commander in chief of the navy until 1950. His criticism of naval policy led to his retirement that year, but he reemerged in 1957 to head the Black Sea Higher Naval School. In 1959, he joined the General Inspector's Group. Oktyabrsky died in Sevastopol on July 8, 1969.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Sevastopol, Siege of; Soviet Union, Navy

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Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett (1887–1974)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Riverside, California, on February 16, 1887, Jesse Bartlett Oldendorf graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1909 and was commissioned an ensign two years later. During World War I, Lieutenant Oldendorf served on North Atlantic convoy duty. He next served as engineering officer on a cruiser and aboard a former

German transport. A series of shore billets followed. From 1924 to 1927, Oldendorf commanded the destroyer *Decatur*. He then attended both the Army and Navy War Colleges (1928–1930). Following service on the battleship *New York*, Oldendorf served as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy (1932–1935) and was then executive officer of the battleship *West Virginia*. Promoted to captain in March 1938, Oldendorf took command of the heavy cruiser *Houston* the next year. In 1941, he was assigned to the staff of the Naval War College.

Promoted to rear admiral in January 1942, Oldendorf held a series of commands in the Aruba-Curacao and Trinidad sectors of the Caribbean and then commanded a task force in the Atlantic Fleet. In January 1944, he was transferred to the Pacific in command of Cruiser Division 4, which supported U.S. operations in the Marshall Islands against Truk, in the Mariana Islands, and at Peleliu (September 15–November 27, 1944). In October 1944, Oldendorf commanded the Seventh Fleet's Fire Support Force of six prewar battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and numerous destroyers and patrol-torpedo (PT) boats, all supporting the U.S. amphibious landing on Leyte Island in the Philippines.

On the night of October 24–25, 1944, Oldendorf positioned his forces in Surigao Strait between Leyte and Mindanao to meet Vice Admiral Nishimura Shoji's Japanese Southern Force, part of the SHŌ-1 plan to destroy U.S. forces off the landing site. In a classic crossing of the T, Oldendorf placed his battleships across the mouth of the strait to rain shells on Nishimura's ships, which were proceeding in single-file line. At the same time, his destroyers and PT boats lining the strait launched torpedoes from the flanks. Oldendorf's ships also engaged a trailing Japanese force, the Second Diversion Attack Force, which was commanded by Vice Admiral Shima Kiyohide. Oldendorf's ships scored one of the most complete U.S. naval victories of the war—sinking both Japanese battleships, damaging 3 of 4 cruisers, and sinking 3 of 10 destroyers without U.S. loss.

Promoted to vice admiral in December 1944, Oldendorf then commanded Battleship Squadron 1 and Battleship Division 4 in support of landings in the Lingayen Gulf, Luzon. After recovering from an injury, he headed Task Force 95 at Okinawa from June to November 1945.

In November 1945, Oldendorf took command of the 11th Naval District and San Diego Naval Base. He ended his career in command of the Western

Sea Frontier and the “mothball” (reserve) fleet at San Francisco (1947–1948). Oldendorf was promoted to admiral on his retirement from the navy in September 1948. He died in Portsmouth, Virginia, on April 27, 1974.

EDWARD F. FINCH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Nishimura Shoji; Okinawa, Invasion of; Peleliu Island, Battle of; Truk, Raid on

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Ōnishi Takijirō (1891–1945)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born in Hyōgo Prefecture, Honshu Island, Japan, on June 2, 1891, Ōnishi Takijirō graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1912. Promoted to ensign in 1913, he studied at the Gunnery School in 1914 and 1915, and was assigned to Yokosuka Naval Station from 1916 to 1918. One of the pioneers of the Japanese naval air arm, Ōnishi learned to fly in 1915. He served as Japanese naval attaché in Britain and traveled in Britain and France from 1918 to 1922 to study naval aviation.

In the mid-1920s, Ōnishi served as an instructor in the Kasumigaura Air Training Corps under Captain Yamamoto Isoroku. In the 1930s, Ōnishi served in various staff and line positions in naval aviation, including heading the Training Section of the Naval Aviation Department. Promoted to rear admiral in 1939, Ōnishi took command of the 2nd Combined Air Corps, which flew shore-based, long-range Mitsubishi G3M (“Nell” in the Allied code system) bombers. Based in Hankow, he commanded strategic bombing operations in the Sino-Japanese War. In early 1941, Ōnishi was appointed

chief of staff to Vice Admiral Tsukahara Nishizo, commander of the Eleventh Air Fleet, the first entirely shore-based air fleet of its kind.

In January 1941, commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku ordered Ōnishi, then regarded as Japan's foremost expert on naval aviation, and Genda Minoru, commander of the naval air group at Yokosuka, to plan an attack by carrier-borne aircraft against the U.S. Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. At the outbreak of the Pacific war, the Eleventh Air Fleet based in Taiwan made a decisive contribution to the Japanese military effort by destroying U.S. airpower in the Philippines.

Ōnishi then held important administrative posts, including chief of the Naval Aviation Department and deputy chief of the Aerial Weapons Department of the Ministry of Ammunition. In the latter capacity, he had the unenviable task of trying to reconcile navy-army demands for resources in aircraft production.

In October 1944, Ōnishi was appointed commander of the First Air Fleet in the Philippines. Facing a desperate situation, he adopted the tactic of suicide air attacks against U.S. warships. On his order, the first kamikaze operation was implemented. Thereafter, Ōnishi commanded kamikaze attacks from the Philippines and then from Taiwan until he was recalled to become vice chief of the Navy General Staff in May 1945.

At the end of the war, Ōnishi strongly opposed Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. On learning of the surrender, he committed suicide in Tokyo on August 16, leaving behind a statement expressing deep gratitude to those who had sacrificed themselves in kamikaze missions.

KOTANI KEN AND TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Genda Minoru; Japan, Navy; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Oppenheimer, Julius Robert (1904–1967)

U.S. scientist who helped develop the atomic bomb. Born in New York City on April 22, 1904, Robert Oppenheimer was gifted and precocious. Graduating summa cum laude in three years from Harvard University, he did his graduate work at the Cavendish Laboratory (University of Cambridge) and at Göttingen under Max Born. A brilliant dissertation on quantum theory confirmed a vocation and his status as a leading theoretical physicist. In 1929, he accepted joint appointments in physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and at Caltech.

Ambitious and possessing an incredibly quick and agile mind, Oppenheimer attracted a coterie of stellar students at Berkeley. A chain smoker with a penchant for martinis, he stood six feet and weighed just 125 pounds. Economic depression and the rise of fascism piqued his interest in the Communist Party, and he later married a former party member. Yet his left-leaning political stance failed to deter Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves from recruiting Oppenheimer to lead a centralized laboratory for the construction of atomic bombs. Groves recognized Oppenheimer's genius for science, his extensive connections and ability to recruit talent, and, most important, his improvisational and organizational skills and his determination to prove his patriotism. Overriding objections from army counterintelligence, Groves appointed Oppenheimer in October 1942.

Oppenheimer assembled his initial team of approximately 30 scientists at Los Alamos in April 1943. Because Oppenheimer encouraged a sense of community and open communication, the team overcame seemingly intractable difficulties to produce a working nuclear device in just more than two years. Despite intellectual assertiveness that bordered on arrogance, Oppenheimer proved to be the indispensable man of the Manhattan Project. His unqualified success earned him the Presidential Medal of Merit in 1946.

In 1947, Oppenheimer became director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton and chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission. Initially entranced by the "technically sweet" challenge of building atomic bombs, he later remarked that, with Hiroshima, physicists "have known sin." His opposition to the hydrogen bomb within the

corrosive climate of McCarthyism in the early 1950s led to hearings in 1954 that stripped him of his security clearance. Rehabilitated by 1963, he received the Enrico Fermi Award. Oppenheimer died in Princeton, New Jersey, on February 18, 1967.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Alamogordo; Einstein, Albert; Fermi, Enrico; Groves, Leslie Richard; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Manhattan Project; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Nuclear Weapons

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Oradour-sur-Glane Massacre (June 10, 1944)

German atrocity against French civilians. During World War II, German armed forces—both Wehrmacht and Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS)—committed an untold number of atrocities. Although the vast majority occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Western Europe saw several notorious German war crimes, including the massacre of innocent men, women, and children at Oradour-sur-Glane.

Located 15 miles northwest of Limoges in central France, the village of Oradour-sur-Glane, although it lay within the German zone of occupation from June 1940, managed to escape the horrors of World War II for the better part of four years. This all changed, however, on June 10, 1944, when Sturmbannführer Otto Dickmann and troops from the 1st Battalion, 4th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, 2nd SS Panzer Division (Das Reich), entered the village, slaughtered its inhabitants, and looted and burned its houses and buildings.

Commanded by Brigadeführer Heinz Lammerding, Das Reich, one of the original Waffen-SS divisions, had been transferred from the Eastern Front to Montauban in southern France in early 1944. In the immediate aftermath of the Allied Normandy Invasion of June 6, Das Reich received orders to

redeploy to the Normandy front. As it made its way north, the division came under attack from French Resistance forces and engaged in several firefights. On June 9, the Resistance captured one of the division's officers, the popular Sturmbannführer Helmut Kämpfe. Possibly, the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane was in reprisal for this act.

On entering the village, the troops of the 4th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment's 1st Battalion forced the startled residents to assemble in the central square. Separating the men from the women and children, the Germans herded the former into barns and the latter into the village church. They then burned both barns and church, tossing in grenades for good measure and gunning down those who tried to flee. After plundering and setting fire to other buildings, the 1st Battalion withdrew. A total of 642 victims, including 207 children, lay dead. Only 7 villagers managed to escape.

At war's end, French authorities decided to maintain Oradour-sur-Glane as it had been left by Das Reich, transforming the remnants of the village into a national monument. As for the perpetrators, 7 Germans and 14 Alsatians were tried by a French military court at Bordeaux in 1953. The court found 20 of the defendants guilty and sentenced 2 to death and 18 to imprisonment at hard labor for terms ranging from 5 to 20 years. Amnesties and pardons, however, led to all 20 being freed within 5 years.

BRUCE J. DEHART

See also

Maquis; Waffen-SS

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Order 270

Issued by Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin on August 16, 1941, Order 270 classified as traitors all Soviet soldiers who were captured by the Germans

and held as prisoners of war. As further punishment, it also removed their families from ration lists. Many Red Army soldiers were captured through no fault of their own for lack of ammunition or because they had been surrounded, and leading figures such as General Georgii Zhukov pointed out the negative effect this would have on morale, but Stalin insisted on carrying it out.

Order 270 was first employed against Lieutenant General Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko, who retreated with his men east from the Bryansk front in late August 1941. This order was followed by Order 0064, which ordered execution for those "who did not do their duty," and Order 227, which insisted that the Red Army take "not one step further back."

Read to every Soviet soldier, because many were illiterate, these measures were bitterly resented by military commanders such as Zhukov, who not only realized the real situations in which Soviet soldiers had been forced to surrender but also believed that both Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had themselves collaborated with the Germans in the August 23, 1939, Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Despite wide knowledge of these orders within the Soviet Union, the documents concerning them were not made public officially until Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in power, nearly 50 years after the war.

MARGARET SANKEY

See also

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Organization Todt

Organization Todt (OT), named for German Minister of Arms and Munitions Fritz Todt, handled construction projects throughout territory occupied by the German Army during World War II. Formed in 1933 by Todt, then head of

technology and road construction, the OT was at first chiefly identified with construction of the great autobahn road system that was the pride of the Third Reich. In 1938, German leader Adolf Hitler assigned OT the task of quickly completing the West Wall (known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line), defenses in western Germany that were designed to hold back a French Army attack to allow Germany to concentrate its military resources in the east against Poland. Todt was an adroit manager, and in record time, some 500,000 workers constructed 5,000 concrete bunkers.

With the beginning of World War II, the OT provided the German Army with engineers and construction specialists involved in the building and repair of bridges, dams, airfields, and fortifications as well as factories. In March 1940, Todt became the Reich's minister of arms and munitions. The OT was the only organization in the Third Reich, apart from the Hitler Youth, that bore the name of a member of the governing elite.

Following the German invasion of the Balkans in the spring of 1941, the OT had charge of extracting minerals there and shipping them to the Reich. With the invasion of the Soviet Union, it took on the great responsibility of reconstructing and maintaining the Soviet transportation network. The OT also made use of vast numbers of conscript laborers throughout German-occupied Europe. In all, the OT mobilized some 1.4 million people, 80 percent of whom were non-Germans (many were prisoners of war).

The OT's most ambitious task was the construction of the Atlantic Wall, the German defenses against an invasion of France by the Western Allies; it ran from Norway to the Bay of Biscay. On this effort, the OT expended some 13.3 million tons of concrete and 1.2 million tons of steel in 3,000 fortifications. The ruins of many of these still may be seen today. The OT also built the submarine pens in France that proved so difficult for Allied aircraft to destroy.

Following Todt's death in an airplane crash on February 8, 1942, his assistant, Albert Speer, took over the organization, and under him, it reached its greatest extent. Increasingly, the OT was involved in cleaning up bomb damage from Allied air raids on Germany. In the autumn of 1944, the organization was renamed Front-OT, when it was armed and enlisted in the defense of German territory.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic Wall; Engineer Operations; Speer, Albert; Todt, Fritz

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Ormoc Bay, Battle of (December 3, 1944)

U.S. Navy raid on a Japanese anchorage conducted to interdict the delivery of supplies during the Leyte campaign (October 20–December 24, 1944). The U.S. Navy failed to secure control over the eastern approaches to Leyte immediately after the landings there, and this allowed the Japanese to ferry in reinforcements and attempt to fight a decisive battle on the island. Only in late November did U.S. minesweepers clear the passage around Leyte to allow the surface strike groups to proceed east into the Camotes Sea to cut this Japanese traffic.

On the afternoon of December 2, air reconnaissance reported a Japanese convoy en route to Ormoc, the main port on eastern Leyte. Naval command dispatched the freshly arrived Destroyer Division 120, commanded by Commander John Zahm, with the new large Sumner-class destroyers *Allen M. Sumner, Cooper,* and *Moale* to intercept.

The Japanese force, consisting of the destroyer-transport *T9,* two landing ships, and the destroyer escorts *Take* and *Kuwa,* slipped into Ormoc Bay on December 2 and began off-loading late that evening. A few minutes before midnight, Division 120 arrived after an approach marked by Japanese air attacks. The U.S. ships were in line abreast to maximize their heavy forward armament and present a smaller target.

At 11:55 p.m. on December 2, the *Sumner* detected contacts 20,000 yards to the north, and at 12:05 a.m. on December 3, Zahm ordered his ships to engage. U.S. radar had picked up the *Take* and *Kuwa,* which were standing

out of the bay. The U.S. destroyers severely damaged the *Kuwa*. The Japanese replied, supplemented by the dozens of 25mm guns arming the landing ships, and this intense opposition disrupted the U.S. formation. The *Sumner* turned west at 12:08 a.m. to put some distance between itself and the enemy guns.

Meanwhile, the *Moale* swerved in front of the *Cooper* to avoid torpedoes, forcing the *Cooper* to hold fire. After the *Moale* moved on, the *Cooper* engaged the *Take*, but the Japanese ship already had fired torpedoes. At 12:13 a.m., a Long Lance torpedo hit the *Cooper* amidships, and the U.S. ship sank in just 30 seconds. At the same time the *Kuwa*, torn apart by U.S. gunfire, followed the *Cooper* to the bottom of the bay.

The two surviving U.S. destroyers withdrew, shooting as they fled and moderately damaging the *Take*. When he learned that the *Cooper* had sunk, Zahm judged a rescue attempt too risky, and the U.S. destroyers turned for home.

The *Sumner* had suffered minor damage from aerial attacks and one small-caliber shell. Three rounds lightly damaged the *Moale*. Many near misses peppered both ships with splinters. Three hours after the Americans departed, the Japanese convoy weighed anchor. The *Take* limped along on one engine, but the landing ships escaped major harm.

The *Cooper* was the last large U.S. warship sunk in a surface naval action. The destroyer was a new ship with an untested crew fighting in bright moonlight, factors contributing to its loss. The Americans fought another minor action in Ormoc Bay on December 12, and although General Douglas MacArthur declared Leyte secure on December 25, Japanese resistance continued until May 1945.

VINCET P. O'HARA

See also

Destroyers; Leyte Landings

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Ortona, Battle for (December 5–28, 1943)

In 1943, the town of Ortona was a community of some 10,000 people on Italy's Adriatic coast. Ortona also anchored the Adriatic end of the German Winter Line, and in December 1943 it became the center point of the plans of British Eighth Army commander General Bernard Law Montgomery. He sought to break through the German lines at Ortona, opening the road to Rome and securing for his forces an Adriatic port by which supplies could be more easily distributed to his troops without the necessity of having them trucked north from southern Italian ports already in Allied hands.

Montgomery assigned the task of securing Ortona to the Canadian 1st Infantry Division. From December 5 to 20, the Canadians attacked the entrenched German lines south of Ortona. In the course of this fighting, they forced the Germans to relieve and replace the manhandled 90th Panzergrenadier Division with the 1st Parachute Division. This latter unit held the town when the Canadians finally approached its outskirts after more than two weeks of heavy combat.

With a deep ravine to the west and the sea to the east, Ortona was little more than 500 yards in width. The Germans had blocked the narrow side roads with rubble, channeling all traffic along the road that entered the town from the south. The Germans entrenched in the rubble and in buildings with commanding views, and across from their strongpoints they destroyed the fronts of many houses along the road to create a free field of fire into their interiors. They also mined and booby-trapped the rubble and many of the buildings they did not occupy.

Beginning on December 20, elements of the Canadian 2nd Infantry Brigade moved into Ortona. During the following week, the Canadians fought a house-to-house battle to take the town. Constrained by the geography, they were only able to move along a two-battalion front, limiting their ability to bring their superior numbers to bear. Nonetheless, by December 27, the Canadians had taken most of the town, and German resistance collapsed when elements of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade managed to outflank the town's defenses and cut the coastal supply lines.

German losses were heavy; intercepted messages revealed that the battalions of the 1st Parachute Division had been reduced to company strength. The battle for Ortona also claimed nearly 5,000 Canadian casualties, and the battered 1st Division was in no condition to move past to attempt the Rome-Pescara highway. The Allies had taken an excellent Adriatic port, but the fighting had left the town in such ruins that they were unable to exploit the victory. The victory thus did little to support Montgomery's ambitions to take Rome, and before the battle had ended he was moved to another command in Britain. Perhaps the only real victory in the battle was for Canadian morale, as the Canadians came to regard Ortona as revenge for their defeat during the disastrous August 19, 1942, raid on Dieppe, France.

DANIEL M. GERMAN

Canadian tanks and infantrymen advancing through the streets of heavily war-damaged Ortona, Italy, in 1944. (Library of Congress)

See also

Canada, Army; Dieppe Raid; Italy Campaign; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law

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Ōshima Hiroshi (1886–1975)

Japanese soldier and diplomat. Born in Gifu Prefecture, Japan, on April 19, 1886, Ōshima Hiroshi came from a prominent family. Following graduation from the Military Academy in 1905, Ōshima rose steadily in rank. As a major in the early 1920s, he served as an attaché in the Japanese legations in Germany, Austria, and Hungary. He was singularly unimpressed by these war-torn European societies and particularly detested the struggling democratic Weimar Republic.

The 1930s provided unique opportunities for Ōshima. Not long after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, largely through the influence of militarists and pro-Axis elements in the Japanese government, Colonel Ōshima was appointed senior military attaché in the Imperial Japanese embassy in Berlin. Ōshima was at once comfortable and effective in his new post, and he wholeheartedly approved of the Nationalist Socialist movement. With the aid of political and military contacts in both Tokyo and Berlin, he soon gained direct access to the upper echelons of the government and met privately with Hitler for the first time in the autumn of 1935. Ōshima progressed from the rank of colonel and attaché in 1934 to lieutenant general and ambassador by 1938.

Japanese ambassador to Germany Ōshima Hiroshi presenting his diplomatic credentials to Adolf Hitler at the Berghof, February 27, 1941. (National Archives)

The rabidly anticommunist Ōshima worked hard to conclude the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact, which would culminate in the Tripartite Pact of 1940. Hitler's rush to war in September 1939 triggered Ōshima's recall by the Tokyo government not long after the German invasion of Poland.

The Japanese government was impressed by German military successes during 1939–1940, and as a result, Ōshima was reappointed ambassador to Germany. He and Hitler widely agreed on political and military matters in their subsequent and numerous meetings, and Ōshima became something of a Hitler confidante.

By this time, however, the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Service had solved the most sophisticated of Japanese diplomatic ciphers, known as Purple. The circle was complete: Hitler and his senior assistants confided their strategic intentions and military thinking to Ōshima, who reported to

Tokyo by the supposedly secret Japanese diplomatic cipher, but his more than 2,000 reports were quietly intercepted, deciphered, and translated by the Allies. U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall regarded Ōshima's reports as his main basis of information for unmasking Hitler's intentions in Europe.

Ōshima escaped from Berlin in April 1945, soon to surrender in the Alps to U.S. forces. In July, he was interned in the United States until Japan's surrender. Afterward, he was taken to Japan, where he was indicted and tried as a war criminal at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Found guilty on November 12, 1948, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In December 1955, however, Ōshima was paroled from prison and then granted clemency in April 1958. He died in Chigasaki, Japan, on June 6, 1975, still unaware that his wartime correspondence was read in Washington and London.

CARL BOYD

See also

International Military Tribunal, Far East; Japan; Japan, Army; Signals Intelligence; Tripartite Pact

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Österman, Hugo Viktor (1892–1975)

Finnish Army general. Born on September 5, 1892, in Helsinki, Hugo Viktor Österman interrupted his studies at the University of Helsinki in 1915 to receive military training in Germany. He entered the Finnish army on its formation and, as a major in February 1918, began organizing its 5th Jaeger Battalion.

Österman commanded the Pori Regiment from 1919 to 1925, when he was reassigned to the 3rd Division. In January 1933, Major General Österman was appointed commander in chief of the Finnish armed forces, a

post he held until 1939. Österman was known as a tough, intelligent commander.

During the 1939–1940 First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War), Lieutenant General Österman held the most important command, the Army of the Karelian Isthmus of six divisions. As such he was chief of staff to overall commander Marshal Carl G. Mannerheim. The two men disagreed over the placement of light Finnish forces in the buffer zone between the Mannerheim Line and the frontier. Mannerheim wanted to pin down at least one large Soviet formation in that area and then attack it, but Österman thought this was too ambitious, particularly with largely untried troops against Soviet tanks. He envisioned a strictly delaying action. Mannerheim thought that Österman had yielded territory too easily and blamed him for the collapse of Mannerheim's "forward zone" strategy.

Österman, who had been cautious in his handling of the early border battles, then strongly advocated an ambitious counterattack to destroy three Soviet divisions entrenched before Summa. He proposed this on December 11, but Mannerheim initially rejected it as premature. The counterattack began, too late, on December 23, and enjoyed only limited success, delaying the start of the Soviet Isthmus Offensive by barely a week.

Finnish troops brought the Soviet advance to a halt in February 1940, but Soviet forces eventually broke through. On February 19, 1940, Österman resigned his post, citing health reasons. He then served as inspector general of Finnish infantry. At the beginning of the 1941–1944 Finnish-Soviet War (Continuation War), he sought frontline service but without success.

In February 1944, Mannerheim dispatched Österman as his representative to German military headquarters. Österman returned from that post in July 1944 and served the remaining weeks of the war as inspector of infantry. He retired from the army in December 1945. Österman then worked for almost 15 years as managing director of Electrical and Power Plant Employees until 1960. He died on February 17, 1975.

MICHAEL J. SCOTT

See also

Finland, Army and Navy; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von

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Ōta Minoru (1891–1945)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born on April 7, 1891, in Chiba Prefecture, Honshu Island, Ōta Minoru graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1913. He saw service in a cruiser and in battleships and was promoted to lieutenant in 1916. After a year's leave while he battled tuberculosis during 1917–1918, Ōta returned to active duty and completed courses in the Torpedo School and the Naval Artillery School. Following service on two battleships, he was an instructor at the Naval Engineering College.

An expert in amphibious operations, Ōta commanded a battalion of the Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF), the equivalent of the U.S. Marine Corps, in the 1932 First Shanghai Incident. Ōta was promoted to commander in 1934. He commanded SNLF units until, in 1937, he assumed command of the oiler *Tsurumi*. He was promoted to captain the same year.

In 1938 Ōta was assigned to Kure Naval Station, Japan, as commander of the 6th SNLF. In 1941 he was assigned to command the SNLF in the China Area Fleet at Wuhan, China.

Ōta returned to Japan in 1942 and took command of the 2nd Combined Special Naval Landing Force that was assigned to capture Midway Island. After the Japanese lost the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), he was assigned command of the 14th Naval Base at Kavieng in Papua New Guinea as a rear admiral in 1943. In 1944 he returned to Japan as commander of the Coast Guard at Sasebo.

In January 1945, Ōta was assigned to Okinawa. During the Battle of Okinawa (March 16–June 21, 1945), he commanded all Japanese naval forces on the island. Ōta took charge of the defense of the Oroku Peninsula, but on June 6 the Japanese position was surrounded by U.S. marines. On June 12, Ōta sent a farewell telegram to the Navy Department in Tokyo in which he praised the valor of his men and especially that of the Okinawan people

and asked that because of its sacrifices, Okinawa be granted special consideration from the Japanese government in the future. He committed suicide on June 13, 1945. Ōta was posthumously promoted to vice admiral.

HASEGAWA REI

See also

Midway, Battle of; Okinawa, Invasion of

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OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for

Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Normandy, France, on June 6, 1944, was the Western Allies' greatest operation of World War II and the finest hour of Anglo-American cooperation. Only the United States and the British Empire could have successfully undertaken the largest and most dangerous amphibious assault in history. The operation was so complicated that U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall said that it almost defied description. The Allies assembled 2 million troops of numerous nationalities, nearly 5,000 ships, and 11,000 aircraft without the Germans knowing where or when the invasion would take place.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, already thinking offensively, established the Office of Combined Operations to plan raids on Nazi-occupied Europe. A cross-Channel invasion became likely after the December 1941–January 1942 Arcadia Conference in Washington, which reaffirmed British-U.S. determination to defeat Germany first. Marshall flew to Britain in April to propose an early opening of the second front (code-named SLEDGEHAMMER), and although he returned to Washington in the belief that an invasion of the continent would take place within a year, the British sent Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, head of Combined Operations, to Washington in June to tell the Americans that a cross-Channel invasion

was not possible in 1942. This was confirmed in the disastrous Allied Dieppe Raid of August 19, 1942.

At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, where U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to exploit Allied success in North Africa, they also stipulated that preparations for a cross-Channel attack should continue. Shortly after Casablanca, General Frederick E. Morgan was appointed chief of staff to the supreme Allied commander (designated COSSAC), and a small Anglo-American planning group began work in Norfolk House, St. James's Square, London, on what would become the greatest military operation in history. Its objective was to mount an invasion with a target date of May 1, 1944, to secure a lodgment on the continent from which further offensive operations could be carried out.

By the end of July 1943, the Anglo-American COSSAC staff had produced a 113-page plan for OVERLORD. Limited by a lack of amphibious landing craft, the initial plan called for a three-division assault along a 30-mile front. After a weekend conference at Largs in Scotland, planners selected the Normandy coast as offering the best chance for success. An invasion there would be most likely to surprise the Germans, who would expect it to occur in the closed point to Britain, the Pas de Calais, and who concentrated their defenses on that stretch of the French coast. Normandy was within the maximum range of Allied air cover. The Allies hoped that it would result in early capture of the port of Cherbourg. The disastrous failure of the Dieppe Raid, in which the attacking Canadians suffered 60 percent casualties, appeared to rule out a direct attempt to seize a major port. The Allied answer was to build, tow across the Channel, and assemble their own artificial harbors, known as Mulberries.

COSSAC planners examined meticulously the requirements necessary for successful invasion. These included such variables as weather, tide and moon conditions, and sand on the landing-site beaches. All were designed to produce a solution to the ultimate question of where and how a cross-Channel invasion could be launched.

An essential part of planning for OVERLORD included an elaborate deception plan, the largest of the war by either side. Originally the brainchild of COSSAC staff, the operation, code-named FORTITUDE, involved a massive effort to deceive Germany about the date and place of the invasion. It saw the creation of a nonexistent U.S. army to mislead the Germans into believing

that the Normandy landings were merely a feint and that the main landing would be under the command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton in the Pas de Calais. The ruse reinforced the already existing German conviction that the main landing would indeed take place in that part of France closest to Britain. Another part of FORTITUDE was to draw off resources from France by convincing the Germans that the Allies also intended to invade Norway. Both aspects of FORTITUDE worked to perfection.

On December 6, 1943, Roosevelt named General Dwight D. Eisenhower as commander of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), which replaced COSSAC. Morgan continued on as deputy chief of staff, SHAEF. Both Eisenhower and British general Bernard L. Montgomery, who was designated ground forces commander for D-day, argued for a month's delay of the invasion until June in order to obtain another month's production of the critically important landing craft. Acquisition of these was necessary to increase from three to five the number of divisions in the initial assault. The delay would also allow increasing the number of airborne divisions to protect the flanks of the 50-mile beachhead from two to three.

The scale of preparations for OVERLORD was staggering. In the four months before D-day, plans poured forth from SHAEF and Allied armies. The U.S. First Army, in coordination with the Western Naval Task Force and the Ninth Tactical Air Force, planned the landings on Omaha and Utah Beaches. The British Second Army, in coordination with the Eastern Naval Task Force and the British Second Tactical Air Force, planned the landings on Sword, Juno, and Gold Beaches. The Ninth Air Force's plan for the invasion alone ran 847,500 words in 1,376 pages and weighed more than 10 pounds.

By June 1944, there were 1,536,965 U.S. troops in Britain. Stockpiles of equipment for the invasion came to 2.5 million tons and included everything from artillery and bulldozers to dental chairs and tanks. Wags remarked that only the barrage balloons overhead kept the British Isles from sinking under the weight of men and equipment. Administrators required each unit landing in France to carry a 30-day supply of blank forms and stationery. Approximately 7 million tons of oil were stored in the United Kingdom.

On the eve of D-day, 2,700 vessels (not counting the 1,897 smaller landing craft carried in the landing ships) were steaming toward Normandy. No fewer than 195,000 sailors manned the invasion fleet, carrying 130,000

troops, 12,000 vehicles, 2,000 tanks, and nearly 10,000 tons of stores. Overhead, thousands of Allied fighters provided a protective umbrella for the invasion force.

Fortunately, OVERLORD planners had the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy as well as amphibious operations in the Pacific as guides for their D-day planning. Allied planning for OVERLORD, based on honest debate, cooperation, and teamwork, laid the groundwork for the massive defeat of the German Army in the Battle of Normandy.

COLIN F. BAXTER

See also

Arcadia Conference; Cairo Conference; Casablanca Conference; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dieppe Raid; Eisenhower, Dwight David; FORTITUDE, NORTH and SOUTH, Operations; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Mulberries; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; ROUNDUP, Operation; SLEDGEHAMMER, Operation

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Ozawa Jisaburo (1886–1966)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Miyazaki Prefecture on October 2, 1886, Ozawa Jisaburo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1909. He served as a torpedo officer on several ships and as an instructor at the Torpedo School. He was assigned to destroyers from 1918 to 1921.

Promoted to lieutenant commander in 1921, Ozawa graduated from the Naval War College the same year. He commanded destroyers in 1924 and 1925 and then was assigned to the staff of the Grand Fleet as a specialist in torpedo tactics. Promoted to commander in 1926, he was an instructor at the

torpedo school and also traveled in Europe and the United States for nine months.

Promoted to captain in 1930, Ozawa commanded a destroyer division in 1930 and 1931 and next was an instructor of tactics at the Naval War College. In 1934 and 1935, he commanded first the cruiser *Maya* and then the battleship *Haruna*. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1936. In 1937 Ozawa was assigned as chief of staff of the Combined Fleet. He next commanded the 8th Cruiser Squadron and the 3rd Battleship Squadron, served as superintendent of the Torpedo School (1938), and commanded the 1st Fleet Air Group (1939).

Despite his lack of expertise in this area, Ozawa was a forceful advocate for naval aviation. Promoted to vice admiral in 1940, he was appointed superintendent of the Naval War College in September 1941. In 1941, he assumed command of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet. On the beginning of the Pacific war, from December 1941 to March 1942 his fleet supported the Japanese invasions of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. He also conducted a successful commerce raiding operation into the Indian Ocean during March and April 1942.

Japanese vice admiral Ozawa Jisaburo. (Naval Historical Center)

In November 1942 Ozawa took command of the Third Fleet, and in March 1944 he commanded the 1st Mobile Force (Carrier Force), which incorporated all remaining Japanese aircraft carriers. Ozawa suffered disastrous defeats in the June 19–21, 1944, Battle of the Philippine Sea (Operation A-GO) and in the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf (Operation SHŌ-1). In the latter, Ozawa's mission was to serve as bait, his carriers luring Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet north to leave the U.S. landing site in Leyte Gulf undefended. In the battle, Ozawa's force suffered heavy losses, although with few aircraft this was certainly not his fault.

From November 1944, Ozawa was simultaneously vice chief of the Naval General Staff and president of the Naval Staff College. In May 1945 when Toyoda Soemu assumed the office of chief of staff of the navy, Ozawa became the last commander of the Combined Fleet. He is remembered in

Japanese naval history as a brave and capable commander and a leading exponent of naval aviation. Ozawa died in Tokyo on November 9, 1966.

HIRAMA YOICHI

See also

Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Netherlands Campaign; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Toyoda Soemu

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P

Paget, Sir Bernard Charles Tolver (1887–1961)

British Army general. Born at Oxford on September 15, 1887, Bernard Charles Tolver Paget was educated at Shrewsbury and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He was commissioned in the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry in 1907. Paget served in France during World War I and was severely wounded in March 1918.

On his recovery, Paget held a series of instructional posts and staff positions. He assumed command of the Quetta Infantry Brigade in 1936. The next year, he was promoted to major general, and in 1938 he was posted back to England as commandant of the Staff College, Camberley. In the early stages of World War II, Paget commanded an infantry division in Britain.

In April 1940, Paget was ordered to central Norway and was given command of British forces opposing the German invasion there. On April 25, 1940, he arrived at Andalsnes, Norway, to assume command of his two-brigade formation. British forces in Norway were ill-equipped and severely outnumbered, and the Germans held air superiority. In these desperate circumstances, Paget was reduced to fighting a series of bitter rearguard actions until orders were issued to evacuate his force. The last contingent of Paget's command was evacuated from Norway on May 3, 1940. Despite the defeat in Norway, Paget's performance was praised in the House of Commons on May 8, 1940, by Winston L. S. Churchill. His short participation in the Norwegian Campaign was Paget's only battlefield command during the war.

In 1940, Paget served as chief of staff of the Home Forces, and the following year he became commander in chief of Southeastern Command. In late 1941, Paget succeeded General Sir Alan Brooke as commander in chief of Home Forces. Promoted to full general in 1943, he formed and commanded the 15-division 21st Army Group in mid-1943. He did much to train and prepare this formation for the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion but

turned over his command to General Sir Bernard Montgomery in December 1943.

In January 1944, Paget was appointed commander in chief of the Middle East Command. In 1946, he retired. Paget died in Hampshire on February 16, 1961.

BRADLEY P. TOLPPANEN

See also

Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Norway, German Conquest of

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Pai Ch'ung-hsi

See Bai Chongxi

Palatinate Campaign (March 1945)

Military engagement between the Western Allies and German forces west of the Rhine River. When German forces retreated from the West Wall (known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line) in February and March 1945, there were insufficient fortified positions between them and the Rhine. In spite of this fact, German oberbefehlshaber west (commander in chief, west) Field Marshal Albert Kesselring insisted on the principle of no retreat unless absolutely necessary. Thus, the Germans were driven back to the river by the advancing Allied armies at considerable cost to both the attacking and defending forces in terms of men and matériel.

In early March, Allied commanders carefully studied the area then known as the Palatinate (die Pfalz) as they consolidated their victories in the adjoining Rhineland and pummeled the West Wall in and around the Saarland. On March 17, supreme Allied commander General Dwight D.

Eisenhower decided to authorize Lieutenant General George S. Patton's U.S. Third Army to attack southeastward toward Kaiserslautern and the Rhine from the direction of Trier. Simultaneously, Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges's U.S. First Army, on Patton's left (northern) flank in the Rhineland, was spreading out from the initial bridgehead at Remagen.

Patton's line of advance was to go deep and cut across the axis of attack by Lieutenant General Alexander Patch's U.S. Seventh Army, which was on Patton's right and was still slugging its way through the West Wall but was headed northeastward, also toward Kaiserslautern. Patton was to cut off the Germans being driven backward by Patch before they could flee across the Rhine. The French First Army, under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, yet farther south, was on Patch's right flank and likewise was attacking northeastward toward Speyer and the Rhine from the Saar and Strasbourg regions.

From March 17 to 24, the Germans fought a desperate delaying action while the Western Allies marched inexorably onward. General of Infantry Herman Foertsch's German First Army, along with elements of General of Panzer Troops Erich Brandenburger's German Seventh Army, bore the brunt of the Allied two-pronged attack. The U.S. Army cut a swath of territory several miles wide across the northern half of the Palatinate and the southern Rhineland all the way to the Rhine. At the same time, the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army pushed through the West Wall and then chased the shattered defenders from their improvised fallback positions.

Allied forces crossing the Rhine River at Remagen, March 1945. (Corbis)

Amid these circumstances, large numbers of German soldiers discarded their uniforms and donned whatever civilian clothing they could find in an effort to escape. German officials directed the evacuation of the civilian population to the degree possible. Policemen and firemen disappeared too as did the civilian officials, and with their incriminating Nazi files.

German cities fell in rapid succession. Bad Kreuznach and Bingen capitulated on March 18. Worms fell into American hands on March 19, and the same fate befell Zweibrücken, Mainz, Idar-Oberstein, and Kaiserslautern on March 20.

As the situation unfolded, the only possible escape route for the Germans was through the heavily forested Haardt Mountains (Pfälzerwald) south of Kaiserslautern. That route had limited roads and trails, which soon were either blocked or covered by the pursuing American ground and air forces. Landau, Neustadt, Germersheim, and Dörrenbach surrendered on March 22. Bad Bergzabern surrendered on March 23; Speyer and Leimersheim did likewise on March 24.

Only mopping-up operations remained by March 25. Many German cities were badly damaged in the fighting. Bad Kreuznach, Kaiserslautern, and Ludwigshafen were more than 25 percent destroyed. Pirmasens and Worms lost at least 50 percent of their structures, and in Mainz and Zweibrücken more than 75 percent of the buildings were reduced to rubble.

The Palatinate Campaign saw elaborate, well-coordinated offensive maneuvers by the various U.S. ground and air forces and the French First Army. German forces, on the other hand, managed an improvised, stubborn delaying action until the very end in the face of overwhelming odds. Because military operations did not follow Germany's internal political boundaries, it is difficult to assign casualties on either side to specific geographic areas. In the combined Rhineland-Palatinate Campaign, however, there were 20,000 American and 60,000 German military dead or wounded. Additionally, the Americans took 250,000 German prisoners of war. By the end of March, the victorious combat forces were headed eastward at high speed, and U.S. Military Government detachments were left in charge throughout the Palatinate.

DEWEY A. BROWDER

See also

Brandenberger, Erich; De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Kesselring, Albert; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the; Rhine Crossings; Rhineland Offensive

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Palawan Massacre (December 14, 1944)

Japanese massacre of American prisoners on Palawan Island, located in the Sulu Sea, southwest of Luzon in the Philippine Islands. The 150 American prisoners of war there had been constructing an airfield for the Japanese. The

prisoners were subjected to brutal treatment by the men of the Japanese 131st Airfield Battalion, commanded by Captain Kojima Nagayoshi. In October 1944, American Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers began to attack the airfield, and as American morale in the camp soared, Japanese treatment of the prisoners worsened. The Japanese did reluctantly allow the Americans to construct three log and earthen shelters to provide limited protection during the air attacks, however.

On December 14, 1944, with air-raid sirens sounding and in the mistaken belief that American forces were about to land on Palawan, the Japanese herded the prisoners into their shelters, then doused the shelters with gasoline and set them on fire. When the prisoners attempted to escape, they were machine-gunned, bayoneted, and clubbed to death. Some of the prisoners managed to kill several of the Japanese, however, and 30–40 of them, many badly burned, managed to reach the beach area, where they sought to hide among the rocks. The Japanese then ferreted them out and tortured and executed them that day and night. Of the 146 enlisted men and 4 officers held in the camp, only 11 survived the massacre, most of them by swimming across the bay where they found refuge with Filipino guerrillas and were eventually taken to Leyte. The Palawan Massacre sparked a series of subsequent raids in an effort to liberate other American prisoners of war held by the Japanese in the Philippines.

In August 1948, 16 Japanese were brought to trial in Yokohama, Japan, for the Palawan Massacre, although few of them were actually members of the garrison. In the end, 6 of the defendants were acquitted of war crimes charges. The other 10 were given sentences ranging from 2 years' imprisonment to death. The death sentence for Sergeant Deguchi Taichi, who was actually involved in the massacre, was commuted to confinement at hard labor for 30 years on July 19, 1950, by General Douglas MacArthur. On March 23, 1949, Ogawa Toru, a company commander in the 131st, was sentenced to 2 years' hard labor, reduced for time served. All those convicted were released by a general amnesty in 1958. In 1952, meanwhile, the remains of 123 of the Palawan victims were transferred to the Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery near St. Louis, Missouri.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

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Palembang, Battle of (February 14–16, 1942)

In February 1942, Palembang, the center of oil production on Sumatra in the Netherlands East Indies, was one of the main targets for the invading Japanese. By the beginning of February, Singapore had been effectively neutralized, allowing the Japanese to attack Sumatra from French Indochina.

One regiment plus a battalion involved in the capture of Hong Kong formed the core of the Japanese invasion force, which departed from Cam Ranh Bay in Indochina in two convoys on February 9 and 11. Light escorting forces were supplemented by a distant heavier task force under Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo that included an aircraft carrier. During the voyage, the Japanese encountered a large number of British ships fleeing Singapore. One was the former Yangtze River steamer *Li Wo*. Although armed only with a 4-inch gun and two machine guns, the *Li Wo*’s scratch crew set one transport on fire and then rammed it.

Allied reconnaissance planes soon spotted the invasion convoys. Dutch rear admiral Karel Doorman, commander of the ABDA (Australian-British-Dutch-American) strike force, tried to intervene with his ships, but he was forced to return to Java with minor losses because he lacked air cover. By February 14, the invading Japanese force was proceeding up the Moesi River to Palembang.

The defenders on Sumatra included seven battalions of Dutch troops, but they had to cover an area larger than the Japanese home islands. Only 2,000 Dutch troops were positioned near Palembang. They were concentrated around the main targets, the Royal Dutch Shell refineries at Pladju and the main airfield at Pangkalanbenteng (known as P1), both near the city of Palembang itself. Although the refineries and oil storage tanks had been prepared for destruction, production continued up to the last minute.

On the morning of February 14, aircraft at P1 attacked the Japanese invasion convoys. As the aircraft returned home, they flew through formations of Japanese planes bound for the same destination. These included 34 Japanese Kawasaki Ki-56 ("Thalia" in the Allied code system) transport aircraft, which then dropped 270 paratroopers of Colonel Kume Seiichi's 2nd Parachute Regiment. They were accompanied by 18 Ki-21 ("Sally") bombers, which dropped antipersonnel bombs and equipment for the paratroopers. Japanese paratroopers, 180 of them, landed at P1. British planes trying to set down were taken under fire while the two sides also battled on the ground. Most of the British ground crew at P1 were unarmed and were sent to the backup airfield of P2 50 miles away. The remaining 90 Japanese paratroopers landed at the refineries, which they soon overran. The Japanese then disarmed the demolition charges. Although the Dutch were able to retake the refineries, they were not able to destroy them.

The Japanese were soon reinforced by another 60 paratroopers, who jumped onto P1 two hours after the original landing. Although armed only with light weapons, they managed to control the airfield through the remainder of the day and night. On the morning of February 15, the seaborne invasion force began coming ashore at Palembang, and another 100 paratroopers were also dropped.

Japanese sea and airborne forces linked up late on February 15. The Dutch ordered a retreat after setting the oil storage tanks on fire. The Japanese soon extinguished these fires and restarted the virtually undamaged refineries. By February 16 in only three days of fighting, the Japanese had secured one of their key war objectives.

TIM J. WATTS

See also

Airborne Forces, Axis; Doorman, Karel Willem Marie; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Ozawa Jisaburo

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Panama Canal

Major international shipping canal that links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and bisects the Panamanian isthmus in Central America. A major engineering feat, the Panama Canal was constructed by the United States between 1904 and 1913; it first was opened to commercial ship traffic in 1914. Approximately 41 miles in length, the Panama Canal utilizes an elaborate series of locks, channels, and man-made lakes. It takes about nine hours for a ship to traverse the entire canal.

The Panama Canal revolutionized shipping in the Western Hemisphere. Prior to its construction, a ship would have to cover some 14,000 miles, navigating around the entirety of the South American continent, to travel from New York to San Francisco. Once the canal was operational, the same journey entailed just 6,000 miles. Utilizing the canal, the U.S. Navy could move assets between the Atlantic and Pacific in a fraction of the time previously needed and at a much lower cost. The canal also ensured that the United States would be able to exert full control over the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

During World War II, the canal proved invaluable in the U.S. prosecution of a two-theater war and facilitated the movement of millions of troops and millions of tons of matériel and cargo to the Pacific theater. Fully aware of its importance, the Japanese developed plans to attack the canal utilizing giant I-400–class *Sen-tokus* (special submarines) 400 feet in length and displacing 6,500 tons submerged. The subs were capable of each carrying three Aichi M6A1 Sieran floatplane torpedo bombers. The war ended before the Japanese could bring the plan to fruition, however.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

I-400–Class Japanese Submarines; Naval Strategy, Allied; Naval Warfare; Submarines

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Panay Incident (December 12, 1937)

The Japanese attack and sinking of the U.S. Navy gunboat *Panay* in China's Chang Jiang (Yangtze River). On December 11, 1937, because of the advance of Japanese troops, the United States evacuated its consulate personnel from Nanjing (Nanking) in the U.S. Navy river patrol craft *Panay* (PR-5), captained by Lieutenant Commander James Joseph Hughes. The *Panay,* a flat-bottomed river patrol vessel, was part of the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet Chang Jiang patrol, charged with the protection of U.S. lives and property in China.

When the *Panay* set out, it had on board 5 officers, 54 seamen, 4 embassy personnel, and 11 civilians. The *Panay* was escorting three Standard Oil barges—the *Mei An*, *Mei Ping*, and *Mei Hsia*—up the Chang Jiang. Two British gunboats, the *Ladybird* and *Bee,* and other British craft joined the flotilla. As the ships proceeded upriver, Japanese artillery opened fire on them.

At 11:00 a.m. on December 12, the *Panay* and three barges anchored near Hoshien, upstream from Nanjing. Their crews hoisted U.S. flags on the ships and painted U.S. flags on the awnings and topsides. It was a clear, sunny day, and no guns on the *Panay* were manned or uncovered. At about 1:30 p.m., three Japanese Mitsubishi bombers flew over and dropped 18 bombs on the four vessels. One struck the forward section of the *Panay,* knocking down its foremast, disabling the forward 3-inch gun, and wrecking the pilothouse, radio room, sick bay, and fire room. The blast blew Commander Hughes across the pilothouse, breaking his thigh and incapacitating him. Executive officer Lieutenant Arthur F. "Tex" Anders was struck in the throat by a bomb fragment. Unable to speak, he nonetheless assumed command and issued orders by writing them on a bulkhead. Another officer was badly wounded, as were several crew members and two civilian passengers.

Immediately after the first Japanese strike, 12 additional Japanese aircraft arrived and dive-bombed the four ships, and nine other Japanese aircraft conducted repeated strafing runs for more than 20 minutes. The *Panay*'s crew

fought back with .30-caliber machine guns, four of which were mounted on each side of the vessel. The guns could fire horizontally and vertically but not straight forward or aft, the directions from which the Japanese strafing planes struck. By 2:04 p.m. the *Panay* was sinking, and Captain Hughes ordered the crew to abandon ship. The Japanese then strafed the ship's boats as they made their way to shore. In the attack, two of the three oil barges were also bombed and sunk.

Assisted by friendly Chinese, the survivors were taken aboard USS *Oahu,* HMS *Ladysmith* and HMS *Bee* two days later. In the attack, 43 sailors and 5 civilians were wounded. Two sailors and 1 civilian subsequently died of their wounds. Earlier in the day, a Japanese shore battery had fired on both the *Ladybird* and the *Bee,* and each sustained damage, but their commanders did not hesitate to go to the aid of the Americans.

Some of the U.S. Navy wounded sailors from the gunboat *Panay,* sunk by the Japanese on the Yangtze on December 12, 1937, being transported by litter through a Chinese village. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

The U.S. government formally protested the attack, leading Tokyo to issue a formal apology and to claim that the attack was accidental. U.S. radio intercepts revealed that the aircraft had attacked under orders and that it was not a mistake (information not revealed at the time for security reasons). Japan also agreed to pay reparations to the United States in the amount of

$2,214,007.36. Tokyo was no doubt surprised that Washington did not take an even tougher line, but as a result of the attack, U.S. public opinion became even more strongly pro-China and anti-Japan. The following month, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to raise defense spending substantially, specifically requesting a 20 percent increase in the existing shipbuilding and replacement program.

UZAL W. ENT

See also
China; Sino-Japanese War

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Pantelleria, Allied Occupation of (June 11, 1943)

Allied operation, code-named CORKSCREW, to secure the small (8.5 by 5.5 miles) Italian island of Pantelleria situated in the Sicily Strait some 60 miles from Sicily and 70 miles from the North African coast. In 1943 the Western Allies considered the capture of Pantelleria vital to the success of Operation HUSKY, the planned invasion of Sicily (July 9–August 22). The island lay astride the main invasion route from North Africa to Sicily, but the real prize was a large airfield there, which the Allies wanted to use for fighters supporting the Sicily invasion. Otherwise, these aircraft would have to operate from bases in North Africa.

CORKSCREW commenced in mid-May. In one of the outstanding examples of overwhelming force during the war, the Northwest African Air Force dropped 6,400 tons of bombs on Pantelleria during 4,218 bomber and fighter-bomber sorties. Airpower advocates hoped to demonstrate that bombing alone could force an enemy surrender. The 12,000-man Brigata Mista Pantelleria on the island also was subjected to naval gunfire.

The Italian garrison on Pantelleria and nearby Lampedusa Island surrendered immediately on the landing of British troops on June 11. The British took 11,399 prisoners. The sole British casualty was a soldier bitten by a mule.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
Sicily, Invasion of

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Papagos, Alexandros (1883–1955)

Greek Army field marshal and prime minister of Greece. Born on December 9, 1883, in Athens, Alexandros Papagos attended military academies in Athens and Brussels and was commissioned in the army in 1906. He fought in the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars and served in Anatolia in the 1919–1922 Greco-Turkish War, commanding first a battalion and then a regiment. Promoted to major general in 1927 and to lieutenant general in 1934, in 1935 Papagos became minister of war. The next year, he became army chief of staff under General Ioannis Metaxas when the latter seized power and became dictator.

Papagos took command of the Greek Army in September 1940 and prepared Greek forces for the anticipated Italian invasion of Greece, which began on October 28, 1940. Under his leadership, Greek forces halted the Italian invasion and then assumed the offensive. Papagos adroitly confined Greek military operations to the mountain areas, where the Italians could not exploit their technological advantage. Papagos's forces defeated the Italian Ninth Army and then invaded Italian-held Albania. He halted another Italian offensive in March 1941.

Following the German invasion of April 6, 1941, Greek forces fought bravely, but Papagos could not halt Field Marshal Wilhelm List's Twelfth

Army, even with British assistance. Taken prisoner, Papagos was sent to Germany and imprisoned at Dachau.

Papagos was released by U.S. troops in 1945 and returned to Greece. Recalled to active duty in 1947, he was promoted to full general and reappointed commander in chief of the army in January 1948. Papagos used American aid to defeat communist insurgents in the ensuing civil war. Hailed as the savior of democratic Greece, Papagos was promoted to field marshal in October 1949.

Papagos resigned his military posts in May 1951. He then formed the conservative Greek Rally Party, which he led to victory in the November 1952 elections. As prime minister, Papagos strengthened ties with the West, improved the Greek economy, and signed an alliance with Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1954. Papagos died in office in Athens on October 4, 1955.

DAVID M. BULL AND CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Greece; Greece, Army; Greece Campaign, German; Metaxas, Ioannis

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Papen, Franz von (1879–1969)

German politician and chancellor during 1932. Born on October 29, 1879, in Werl, Westphalia, Franz von Papen joined the German Army and was a captain on the General Staff in 1913. He then served as the German military attaché in Mexico City and in Washington. He was expelled from the United States in 1916 for directing sabotage activities and returned to Germany. During the rest of World War I, he served on the Western Front, in Turkey, and in Palestine.

Papen left the army after the war and entered politics, becoming a leader of the ultraconservative wing of the Catholic Center Party. From 1921 to 1932, Papen was a member of the Prussian Landtag (state parliament). He

was opposed to political ties with the socialists and liberals and urged restoration of the monarchy. Nationalist politician General Kurt von Schleicher, who did not yet seek the chancellorship himself, saw in Papen a useful puppet. Schleicher used his influence with President Paul von Hindenburg to secure the appointment of Papen as chancellor on May 31, 1932.

Papen formed a cabinet of prominent aristocrats and right-wing nationalists. Believing that the National Socialists could be controlled and exploited, Papen secured an end to the ban on the Sturmabteilung (SA, storm troops), providing the Nazis with increased power. Although Papen toed the Nazi line in foreign policy pronouncements, Adolf Hitler had no intention of sharing power and rebuffed his overtures. In late June, Papen deposed the Social Democratic government of Prussia and assumed direct control of Prussia as federal commissioner.

New elections for the Reichstag (federal parliament) occurred in November 1932, and Papen remained chancellor only until the next month. In December, Schleicher and his allies forced Papen's resignation, Schleicher becoming chancellor himself. Papen then allied himself with Hitler and played a key role in bringing him to power. Papen helped to convince a reluctant Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor on January 30, 1933, with himself as vice chancellor, claiming that he could "control" the Nazi leader.

As vice chancellor, Papen intrigued for a return of the monarchy, something he called for publicly in a sensational speech at Marburg University on June 17, 1934. Saved from death in the June 30, 1934, Blood Purge ("Night of the Long Knives"), Papen managed to restore himself to Hitler's good graces and served as German ambassador to Austria from 1934, where he played a key role in the German takeover of that country (the Anschluss) in 1938. He was then German ambassador to Turkey.

After the war, Papen retired to Westphalia. Arrested by Allied authorities, he was tried by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946 but found not guilty. Rearrested and tried by a German denazification court, he was found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison, after which his property was returned to him. Papen died in Obersasbach, Baden Württemberg, on May 2, 1969.

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See also
Austria; Germany; Hitler, Adolf

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Papuan Campaign (July 1942–January 1943)

Important Pacific theater land campaign and U.S. general Douglas MacArthur's first victory. Papua was Australian-controlled territory in the southeastern corner of the island of New Guinea. On March 8, 1942, the Japanese moved into New Guinea, occupying Lae and Salamaua. Engaged in their Philippines and Burma campaigns, the Japanese did not advance on Papua. Instead, they subjected its capital of Port Moresby to air attack. Having lost their 8th Division defending Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, the Australians were greatly alarmed. While veteran Australian troops were fighting in Egypt, their homeland was being defended only by militia, obsolete planes, and a few ships.

On March 17, 1942, General MacArthur reached Australia from the Philippines. He found that he had insufficient forces to defend his new command and none to spare for the relief of the Philippines. MacArthur's appointment as Southwest Pacific Area commander reassured the Australian government that U.S. aid would be forthcoming.

Australia was also already withdrawing two divisions from the Middle East. The 6th Division arrived during March, and the 7th Division returned in April. On April 6, the U.S. 41st Infantry Division reached Australia, followed by the U.S. 32nd Infantry Division by May 14. The Royal Australian Air Force reequipped while the U.S. Fifth Air Force formed in Australia. The U.S. Navy could spare few ships for MacArthur, however.

To isolate Australia from further reinforcements, the Japanese Navy tried to seize Port Moresby. But during the May 4–8, 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese suffered their first major naval defeat. The loss of four of

their aircraft carriers in the next large naval engagement, the June 3–6 Battle of Midway, prevented the Japanese Navy from attacking Port Moresby again. Subsequently, the Japanese initiated plans for an overland strike against the port.

Anticipating this Japanese move, MacArthur sent U.S. engineers and Australian troops to Milne Bay to construct a strategic airfield on Papua's eastern tip. MacArthur also ordered two Australian militia battalions, code-named Maroubra Force, to Buna, a possible north coast landing site. Commanded by Colonel Bill Owen, the Maroubra Force began its march on July 7, 1942, along the narrow track called the Kokoda Trail across the formidable Owen Stanley Mountain Range separating Port Moresby from Buna.

The Maroubra Force was spread along the track when Colonel Yokoyama Yosuke's 2,000 Japanese troops of the 144th Regiment invaded Buna and Gona on July 21. Two days later, Yokoyama attacked Owen's vanguard at Awala. A Papuan battalion fled into the jungle, and B Company of the 39th Battalion retreated to Oivi. Encircled on July 27, the Australians withdrew through the jungle around Kokoda Airfield, regrouping at Deniki.

Between July 28 and August 10, the Australians fought desperately. Kokoda was retaken twice, but Owen was among those killed. The Japanese had superior numbers and drove the Australians back to Deniki. The Australians lost that place on August 14 and retreated to Isurava. On July 29, Allied aircraft damaged the Japanese transport *Ayatozan Maru,* but Major General Horii Tomitaro and 11,450 reinforcements reached Buna by August 21. American landings at Guadalcanal on August 7, however, increasingly diverted Japanese resources there.

Concerned by Japanese progress, MacArthur ordered the Australian 7th Division to Papua on August 3. Its 18th Brigade went to Milne Bay, and the 21st Brigade started up the Kokoda Track on August 18. As few transport planes were available, Papuan carriers delivered supplies.

On August 25, the Japanese invaded Milne Bay as a flanking move against Port Moresby. Allied aircraft sank some barges at Goodenough Island, stranding some Japanese. The main Japanese force landed at Ahioma, however; spearheaded by two tanks, it drove the Australian forward units back toward the vital airfield.

Japanese reinforcements arrived on August 29. On August 31, the

Australians defeated the Japanese attacks across the airfield. By September 7, the Japanese had evacuated 1,300 survivors. It was their first land defeat of the war.

At Isurava, the exhausted Australian 39th Infantry Battalion was joined on August 25 by the 21st Brigade's lead battalion. Fresh Japanese troops supported by artillery attacked the next day. For four days, a crucial battle raged. Outflanked and then pursued by the Japanese, the Australians destroyed Myola supply dump and prepared to defend Efogi. Delivering reinforcements to Gona on September 2, the Japanese attacked with 5,000 troops on September 8. The exhausted, hungry, and malarial Australians retreated to Ioribaiwa Ridge on September 11.

Belts of cartridges hang over branches in the New Guinea jungle as American soldiers carry ammunition cases to the front for operations against Japanese in the Buna area in 1942. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Reinforced by two battalions of the 25th Brigade, the Australians then counterattacked. Defeated, they withdrew to Imita, the last ridge before Port Moresby, on September 17. Horii's troops, suffering from disease and starvation, were preparing to attack Imita when, on September 25, the Japanese high command made Guadalcanal its priority and ordered Horii to

withdraw. Two days later, Australian patrols found Ioribaiwa abandoned. The Australians then began the pursuit.

Horii's fighting withdrawal held the Australians for a week at Eora. On November 2, Australian troops entered Kokoda. At Oivi on November 10, the Australians drove the Japanese from the track, and Horii drowned crossing the Kumusi River. Few of his soldiers reached Buna, which was garrisoned by Japanese marines and base troops.

In late September, MacArthur ordered Major General Edwin Harding's 32nd Infantry Division to Papua. MacArthur wanted his Americans to use the Kapa Kapa Trail to take Buna from the rear. From October 6 their vanguard Medendorp Force spent two harrowing weeks crossing the mountains. Luckily, airfield sites were discovered on the north coast that enabled an airlift in of the remaining Americans.

On November 17, the Japanese landed 1,000 reinforcements, who moved into the formidable Buna and Gona defenses. These comprised a system of concealed log bunkers with cleared fields of fire covered by artillery and machine guns. Commencing on November 19, Allied attacks on Buna and Gona stalled before these bunkers.

Dissatisfied, MacArthur ordered I Corps commander Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger to assume personal command of the battle, telling him to "take Buna or die." Eichelberger relieved Harding as divisional commander and replaced him with the divisional artillery commander, Brigadier General Albert W. Waldron. Allied aircraft stopped four Japanese supply convoys reaching Buna, but 500 reinforcements landed on December 2 and another 800 arrived on December 14.

Disregarding the terrible conditions in Papua, MacArthur decided not to bypass the starving Japanese. A bloody battle of attrition followed. Artillery and aircraft could not neutralize the bunkers, so tanks were used instead. The Australians finally took Gona on December 9. The American Warren and Urbana Forces next invested Buna, which fell on January 2. Japanese resistance continued at Sanananda until January 18.

In the Papuan Campaign, the Australians lost 2,165 dead and 3,533 wounded, the Americans sustained 930 dead and 1,918 wounded, and the Japanese suffered some 12,000 dead and 2,000 wounded.

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See also

Admiralty Islands Campaign; Australia, Army; Buna, Battle of; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Darwin, Raid on; Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Hollandia, Battle of; Horii Tomitaro; Kokoda Trail Campaign; MacArthur, Douglas; Milne Bay, Battle of; New Guinea Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Document 155

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Parachute Infantry

Development of troop-carrying aircraft before and during the war allowed for the deployment of parachute infantry in cohesive units behind enemy lines to secure key objectives or to act in a reinforcing role. Noting that artillery observers had employed parachutes to escape from damaged balloons and then aircraft in World War I, American colonel Billy Mitchell envisaged parachuting infantry as an airborne assault force to break the stalemate of trench warfare. Mitchell suggested assigning the U.S. 1st Division in an air assault role to be carried to drop zones behind enemy lines by aircraft. Friendly aircraft would then provide subsequent air support. The war ended before such a plan could be tried.

The Soviet Union was the first to carry out extensive experiments with parachute troops. Beginning in 1922, Soviet troops were dropped successfully from aircraft. The Soviet Union made extensive progress by encouraging parachuting and gliding as national sports, and paratroopers captured a corps commander during a 1930 training exercise. By 1936, there were 115 parachute training schools in the Soviet Union at which civilians made 1.6 million jumps from towers and 30,000 jumps from aircraft. During a 1936 exercise, a group of 1,500 infantrymen parachuted onto an “enemy-held” airport, securing it before being reinforced by air-landed and then armored forces. Although foreign military observers were greatly impressed,

apathy on the part of Western governments precluded an equivalent effort in these states.

In 1927, Italy adopted the Salvator parachute. Unlike aircraft seat-mounted, ripcord-operated parachutes, it was carried on the individual's back and connected to the aircraft by a static line. Beginning in 1938, Italy trained two battalions in military parachuting. This force was expanded during the war and made several operational drops. The Italians adopted the German parachute as their standard because the Salvator caused too many injuries.

Germany was the first to use airborne troops effectively in battle. Through secret military agreements with the Soviets, German advisers attached to the Red Army took note of Red Army experiments, although the concept of parachute troops lagged until Adolf Hitler came to power. Large numbers of highly trained paratroops deploying rapidly behind enemy lines or smaller groups seizing key objectives proved ideal for the new practice of blitzkrieg.

Because Germany was surrounded by numerous linear defensive works, such as the Maginot Line, it encouraged the evolution of the concept of vertical envelopment. On January 29, 1936, some 600 German troops under Lieutenant Colonel Bruno Bräuer started parachute training at the Döberitz training area near Berlin. Political infighting dogged early training. The army wanted a battalion for rapid reinforcement, the air force desired troops for demolition tasks where air defense was too hazardous for bombers, and the Schutzstaffel (SS) sent a platoon to be trained without any specific rationale. Even the Nazi paramilitary force, the Sturmabteilung (SA), wanted two battalions: one parachute and one that would be air-landed.

On July 4, 1938, Colonel (soon major general) Kurt Student was ordered to fuse this disparate group into an airborne division by September 1. Student established the 7th Flieger Division of nine battalions: two parachute and seven air-landed. In all, there were 9,000 troops (minus aircrew). Despite having components stripped away that winter, by September 1939 Student rebuilt an airborne force of one parachute division (the Luftwaffe's 7th Flieger Division) and one air-landing division (the German Army's 22nd Infantry Division).

The effectiveness of this new form of waging war was demonstrated with the invasions of Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940. Incredibly, four objectives in two separate countries were assigned to only the 1st Parachute

Battalion. Despite high winds, low clouds, and confusing orders, these paratroopers took Norway's Fornebu Airfield (Oslo) and Sola Airfield (Stavanger), Denmark's Aalborg Airfield, and the Vordingborg Bridge to Copenhagen. German airborne forces subsequently secured bridges and routes across the Netherlands and the Belgian frontier in May 1940 on the occasion of Germany's invasion of France and the Low Countries. Although the Scandinavian operations had alerted the West to German capabilities, innovative techniques carried the day. These included attacking Eben Emael fortress (May 10–11) utilizing glider troops and securing a Rotterdam bridge by landing at its abutments in seaplanes.

That winter, the airborne force expanded into the XI Flieger Corps, adding supporting elements such as signals, medical and supply battalions, an assault engineer regiment, and a squadron of reconnaissance aircraft. In April 1941, the paratroopers contributed to victory in Greece by blocking the British retreat across the Corinth Canal.

In late May 1941, German forces carried out an airborne invasion of Crete. It was a close-fought battle, and many of the air-landing troops were killed when their gliders broke up on the rocky objectives. Through Ultra intercepts, the Allied defenders were aware of the German landing sites and planned accordingly. Although British and Commonwealth troops were defeated and driven from Crete, the operation cost the paratroopers some 5,000 dead and 2,500 wounded from an attacking force of 22,000. Adolf Hitler then decided that the days of paratroopers were over, and the German units fought as elite infantry for the rest of the war.

Early discussions between the Japanese and the Germans ensured that Japan was also aware of the potential of airborne troops. Japanese parachute training extended over a six-month period and produced few graduates. With the arrival of German instructors, the courses were shortened to approximately eight weeks, with slight variations between the army and navy schools. By late 1941, 100 German instructors were guiding the instruction of more than 14,000 men in nine training centers.

The army's airborne forces were contained in the 5,575-member all-ranks Raiding Group, consisting of the Raiding Flying Brigade with directly assigned aircraft and the Raiding Brigade of two parachute battalions, support elements, and two never-manned glider battalions. Assigning the aircraft directly avoided the problems experienced by some other armies in which the

airborne forces were members of the army and the aircraft belonged to the air force. This Raiding Group spent most of the war on home islands reserve. A second smaller Raiding Brigade was established to provide troops for operations in China.

The Japanese Navy created two special naval landing forces, each with a strength of 844 officers and men. Early naval paratroop operations all met with success but at varying costs. The 1st Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force secured the Menado Airfield on Celebes on January 11, 1942. The paratroopers were scattered, suffered losses, and required reinforcements. Fortunately for them, the Japanese enjoyed air superiority.

Three days later, however, because of the distance to the targeted oil fields at Palembang (Sumatra), there was inadequate air support, and the daytime preparatory bombing served merely to alert the defenders. With the Japanese approach route directly over several antiaircraft units, the drop was scattered. The oil fields were captured the next day with the aid of a reinforcing parachute drop, however.

The Japanese airborne assault on Timor on February 21, 1942, commenced with a feint assault by paratroops several miles from the actual objective's drop zones. With the Dutch defenders reacting to the deceptive attack, the main body of paratroops easily secured and held the Allied communications lines until follow-on amphibious forces overran the island. Although the Japanese did conduct several additional parachute operations during the war, these tended to be smaller-scale missions. The initiative passed to the Allied forces.

The Allied response to early parachute experiments was varied, although the underlying theme was usually neglect or hostility. The French, for example, began training airborne troops in 1937, but France's army was defeated before they could be used. On June 21, 1940, the British established the Central Landing School in Ringway to develop expertise in glider and parachute operations the day before Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill made his noteworthy call for the formation of a force of at least 5,000 parachute troops. Not until October 1941, however, was Major General Frederick Browning ordered to form the 1st Airborne Division; a second, the 6th Airborne Division, was authorized in April 1943.

A common problem for fledgling paratroopers was a lack of support in the form of aircraft and doctrine. British airborne forces, however, faced

special impediments, given the concentration of resources in home defense. At first, the British used obsolete bombers; the paratroopers jumped either from a platform where the tail turret was previously or through a hole cut in the aircraft's floor. The arrival of American Douglas C-47 Dakota aircraft by 1942 led to changes in many of the British techniques. By 1945 Britain fielded two airborne divisions, each consisting of two parachute brigades and an air-landing (glider) brigade.

As noted, the Soviet Union had been a leader in parachute operations, but during the war Soviet airborne forces usually dropped onto territory they already held or into partisan-prepared drop zones. Such missions stiffened partisan morale and reinforced ground troops already in location. This policy seems to have resulted from a disastrous three-brigade paratroop operation in June 1942 where the Germans destroyed the Soviet force.

The United States experimented with military parachuting on a small scale in the late 1920s, but the army largely ignored military parachuting until the German successes early in World War II. In August 1940 a test platoon of volunteers made a mass jump, and the next month the chief of infantry authorized the establishment of the 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion. U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall was profoundly impressed by the German success in Crete. Convinced that the concept of vertical envelopment was here to stay, he initiated plans to field substantial American airborne forces. With the subsequent expansion of airborne forces, the four American battalions established by February 1942 (the 501st, 502nd, 503rd, and 504th) each became parachute infantry regiments (PIRs) comprising three subordinate battalions.

The expansion also reinforced the requirement for higher command elements. The 82nd Infantry Division divided, becoming the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division, each equipped with two parachute regiments and one glider regiment for a total of 13,000 personnel. Further expansion provided the 17th (December 1942) and 13th airborne Divisions (August 1943), both destined for the European theater, and the Pacific theater's 11th Airborne Division (February 1943). In all, between 1941 and 1945 American airborne forces increased from 600 to more than 65,000 men.

The 503rd PIR made the first U.S. combat jumps, into Algeria and Tunisia on November 8 and 15, 1942. Almost a year later on September 5, 1943, the 503rd PIR also conducted the first U.S. Pacific theater airborne

assault at Markham Valley, New Guinea. For this operation it was augmented by an Australian artillery unit, which underwent a one-jump parachute qualification mere days before the combat jump. The 503rd PIR also carried out an airborne drop on Corregidor Island in the Philippines on February 16. The 503rd PIR was atypical of U.S. parachute units in that it operated independently of a higher airborne formation, although the Panama-based 550th and 551st PIRs were initially independent before being absorbed into the 82nd Airborne Division. They saw action in Italy and southern France and during the Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). On February 24, a parachute company from the 11th Airborne Division's 511th PIR jumped at Los Baños Prison in the Philippines in a coordinated operation to release 2,147 internees there.

As the war progressed, Allied airborne formations were committed in large-scale multinational operations. The June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, for example, used American, British, and Canadian paratroopers: the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions and the British 6th Airborne Division. Operations in the Netherlands committed American, British, and Polish troops. The parachute operations supporting the Sicily invasion (July 9–August 22, 1943) had convinced the U.S. Army of the requirement for integral combat support, such as artillery and engineers. This necessitated larger gliders, because parachuting artillery and jeeps in adequate quantities was not feasible until after the war.

Haphazard parachute drops often marked operations. During the Sicily invasion, for example, the 505th PIR was scattered over 65 square miles. Many of the planes bearing the 504th PIR were shot down by mistake by U.S. Navy and ground troops, who believed that they were German aircraft. The Normandy drops 11 months later proved to be no better organized, but this worked in their favor. German efforts to reinforce the beaches were hampered because they could not determine the extent of the threat, as the paratroopers were so widely scattered, thus allowing the amphibious foothold.

The most memorable parachute campaign was Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944), the planned effort to sweep across the Netherlands, outflank the Siegfried Line, and secure a Rhine River crossing at Arnhem. The U.S. 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions eventually secured bridges in the Eindhoven and Nijmegen areas, respectively, and the British 1st Airborne

Division and the Polish 1st Separate Parachute Brigade were virtually annihilated while attempting to seize the Arnhem Bridge. The plan was flawed from the start, given inadequate airlift, drop zones too distant from objectives, leadership's refusal to listen to intelligence reports about German strength, a narrow route susceptible to counterattacks, and inflexibility worsened by inefficient communications.

As part of their Rhine crossing operations, on March 24, 1945, the Western Allies mounted Operation VARSITY in the Wesel area east of the river. It involved 21,692 Allied paratroopers and glidermen of the British 6th Airborne and U.S. 17th Airborne Divisions of Major General Matthew B. Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps along with 614 jeeps, 286 artillery pieces and mortars, and hundreds of tons of supplies, ammunition, food, and fuel. A total of 1,696 transports and 1,348 gliders participated in the operations, and some 240 B-24 bombers were specially rigged to drop supplies and equipment. The airborne forces quickly secured most of their objectives, virtually wiping out the defending German 84th Division, with 3,500 Germans taken prisoner. Although VARSITY was a success, the airborne forces sustained higher casualties than did the Allied ground units in their Rhine crossings.

Paratroopers and gliders participating in Operation MARKET-GARDEN, a failed effort by the Western Allies to cross the Rhine at Arnhem and outflank the principal German defenses of the Siegfried Line. (Corbis)

Airborne forces played important roles in the war. Their success ensured that they would continue to be used by all the world's major militaries in the postwar period.

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See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Airborne Forces, Axis; Crete, Battle of; Eben Emael, German Capture of; Maginot Line; Manado, Battle of; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Parachutes; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Sicily, Invasion of; Signals Intelligence; Student, Kurt

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Parachutes

Means of delivering personnel safely from flying aircraft for the purpose of inserting individual agents surreptitiously behind enemy lines, landing large shock forces, or effecting the emergency evacuation of aircrew from damaged airplanes. Parachuting evolved slowly from Muslim cleric Armen Firman's recorded jump, using his billowing cloak (852 CE), and Leonardo da Vinci's sketches (ca. 1495) illustrating a parachute of taut cloth over a rigid pyramidal structure. Carnivals featured occasional "daredevil" balloon jumps dating from the 18th century.

U.S. Army captain Albert Berry is generally credited with the first descent from an aircraft, over Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, on March 1, 1912, pulling his parachute from a container attached to the plane's landing skid. After numerous somersaults during parachute deployment, Berry declined to repeat the performance. Early parachutes were made of canvas and later of silk, but the conventional round solid configuration remained unchanged because of its reliability.

Military circular parachutes had a 28- to 35-foot canopy. It was soon discovered that providing an 18-inch hole in the canopy apex (top center) allowed air to escape, reducing oscillation and injury to the parachutist on landing. Usually, 28 suspension lines running down to four cotton web risers attached the canopy to the jumper's harness. The harness held the jumper in place during descent and carried the parachute pack tray. In many aircraft, the parachute was automatically opened as the jumper fell away by means of a 16-foot static line attached to the airplane. Parachutes and their harnesses commonly weighed between 35 and 50 pounds and would allow for a rate of descent of 22 to 25 feet per second for a jumper with 100 pounds of equipment. Allied forces carried a smaller reserve parachute on the front of their body.

During World War I, parachutes were used by artillery spotters to escape from damaged observation balloons, but they were considered impractical for airplanes. During World War II, parachutes were used to deliver supplies and special assault troops with their equipment. Parachutes were used frequently during the war for resupply of ground troops, and they were also used in deception operations. By 1945, parachutes had also saved approximately 34,000 Allied aircrew forced to abandon disabled aircraft.

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See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Airborne Forces, Axis; Parachute Infantry

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Paris, Liberation of (August 19–26, 1944)

The Allied plan for the liberation of France called for the destruction of occupying German armed forces and rapid movement toward Germany to end the war in Europe as quickly as possible. The Allies planned to bypass the French capital of Paris on the assumption that once German forces had

been isolated there, they would soon surrender. Supreme Allied commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower issued orders to commander of French Forces of the Interior General Pierre Joseph Koenig that there be no uprising in the city with consequent diversion of Allied troops there, but political events dictated otherwise.

Beginning with a strike by French gendarmes (the civilian police) on August 15, 1944, two factions of the French Resistance movement vied for the credit of liberating the French capital. The well-organized and more numerous communist wing of the Resistance advocated a complete uprising in Paris, hoping that with popular credit for liberation of Paris they would have a significant advantage in taking power in France after the war. Gaullist Free French Resistance leaders in Paris were well aware of this plan, and although they feared destruction of the city by the Germans in any uprising, they grew increasingly concerned that an Allied failure to act would jeopardize future Gaullist control of the French government.

General of Infantry Dietrich von Choltitz had taken command of the greater Paris area on August 7, 1944. Choltitz had established his military credentials on the Eastern Front, especially in heavy fighting that led to the capture of Sevastopol in July 1942. He had a reputation of following orders to the letter, and these, delivered to him in a personal meeting with German leader Adolf Hitler, called for the destruction of Paris before allowing it to fall into Allied hands.

On August 19 when Allied forces were still more than 50 miles from the city to the north and south, Gaullist elements in Paris preempted their communist rivals by seizing the Paris prefecture of police. On learning this, the communist organization initiated a general uprising within the city. Choltitz immediately deployed infantry backed by tanks around the city, and the fighting spread. German tanks opened fire on the prefecture of police. The citizens of Paris were no longer intimidated by the Germans, however, and Resistance fighters fought the Germans with what weapons they possessed, mostly small arms and homemade gasoline bombs used against German vehicles. By August 23 more than 400 street barricades went up, and localized intense fighting occurred in many areas of the city.

Both Hitler and Eisenhower were soon aware of the fighting in the city. As the number of German casualties steadily mounted, Choltitz was faced with a dilemma. Plans were in place for the destruction of not only public

works and buildings but also monuments and museums in Paris. Swedish consul general in Paris Raoul Nordling pleaded with Choltitz to save the city and attempted on his own initiative to arrange a cease-fire. However, commander of communist forces Henri Tanguy (alias Colonel Rol) refused.

Crowds of French citizens line the Champs Élysées to view Allied tanks and half-tracks pass through the Arc de Triomphe on the liberation of Paris, August 25, 1944. (Library of Congress)

Choltitz had his orders; he also had serious doubts about Hitler's mental condition and did not wish to become notorious for all time as the destroyer of one of the world's most beautiful cities. Choltitz could not cede the city to the insurgent civilians without resistance, because his family members were in Germany; his not unreasonable fear of reprisals against them apparently had some bearing on his decisions. Choltitz, however, minimized the combat in various ways, especially by his decision to move the bulk of German combat forces outside the city and into formal tactical defensive positions oriented toward the approaching Allied armies in areas beyond the city limits. During the fighting, he also withheld the use of heavy artillery.

On August 21, Major General Philippe Leclerc, against Allied orders, turned his Free French 2nd Armored Division north toward Paris. Meanwhile, within the city, Resistance leaders met and decided to continue

fighting. Choltitz, now determined to spare the city, sent Nordling to the Allies to ask that they enter Paris. Choltitz pledged to hold off destroying the city until they arrived. Eisenhower then agreed that Leclerc's division should move into Paris. Choltitz rejected repeated orders from Berlin to begin the destruction of the French capital.

By August 23, fighting in parts of Paris was intense. That day, Nordling conferred with commander of U.S. 12th Army Group Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley. Impressed by what Nordling told him, Bradley ordered the U.S. 4th Infantry Division to move into Paris before Choltitz could change his mind.

By early August 24, Leclerc's tanks had reached Rambouillet, 20 miles south of Paris. De Gaulle arrived at the Château of Rambouillet that same day. Fighting was now raging in virtually every section of the city. Late on August 24, Leclerc's tanks arrived in Paris. Part of his division moved through the Porte d'Orleans, and the rest entered by the Porte de Vanves. By 11:30 p.m., Leclerc's tanks were in front of the Hôtel de Ville (city hall) in the center of Paris, and the bells of Notre Dame pealed out the good news to the populace.

On August 25, French and U.S. forces eliminated pockets of German resistance, and at 3:00 p.m. Choltitz and his staff surrendered to French officers. Many of the German troops, unaware of the surrender, continued to fight. De Gaulle arrived in the city that evening, and the next day he and the Resistance moved on foot from the Arc de Triomphe to Notre Dame Cathedral for a celebratory mass. Although there was sniper fire, both events proceeded.

It is impossible to accurately assess casualties in the liberation of Paris. Although the cost in casualties to Allied forces was slight, the liberation of Paris and the need to feed the city were heavy loads on an already overburdened Allied supply system. But the cost of a destroyed Paris would have been far higher, and the liberation of the French capital was a great psychological boost to the Allies in their effort to defeat the Third Reich.

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See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Choltitz, Dietrich von; de Gaulle, Charles; Eisenhower, Dwight David; France Campaign; Koenig, Marie Pierre

Joseph François; Leclerc, Jacques Philippe; Document 198

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Paris Peace Treaties (February 10, 1947)

Following preliminary draft treaties prepared by the deputy foreign ministers of the major Allied powers, the Council of Foreign Ministers met in the Luxembourg Palace in Paris in two sessions of several weeks each from July to October 1946. There were sharp exchanges and disagreements among the former allies, but after further discussions in New York City in November 1946, the peace treaties were signed at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris on February 10, 1947. The main provisions of the five peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria are as follows.

Italy

The most difficult of the territorial discussions centered on Italy. At the end of the war, Yugoslavia had attempted to secure land at the expense of Austria and Italy, and the conferees spent much time discussing the Italo-Yugoslav frontier. Ultimately, they adopted the compromise put forth by the French. The port city of Trieste, which was 80 percent Italian, became a Free Territory under the authority of the United Nations Security Council. Fiume (Rijeka), Istria (to include the Italian city and naval base at Pola), and most of the Julian March were awarded to Yugoslavia, as was Zadar, a partly Italian city in Dalmatia. Yugoslavia and Albania also secured from Italy some islands in the Adriatic. The status of Trieste was not finally resolved until

1954, when improved relations between the two states led to Italy receiving the city and Yugoslavia receiving the area around it.

France secured some strategic territory from Italy along their common frontier in the Tenda-Briga sector, and Greece obtained the Greek-inhabited Dodecanese Islands off southwestern Turkey, which the Italians had gained from Turkey after World War I. Italy did retain control of Tirol south of Brenner Pass, claimed by Austria. Ethiopia was recognized as independent, and Italy lost its overseas colonies of Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland, which were now under British control. There was no immediate agreement on their disposition, with the conferees agreeing that should there be no resolution within one year, their fate would be decided by the United Nations. This is indeed what happened, with all three states moving toward independence. Italian reparations were set at $360 million, and the Italian Army was limited to 250,000 men.

Finland

Finland was reduced to its borders following the First Finnish-Soviet War of 1939–1940, thereby losing the Karelian Isthmus and Vyborg as well as land north and east of Lake Ladoga and some of Lapland. In addition, Finland was now forced to yield Petsamo, its only Arctic port. The Soviet Union also secured a lease on the Porkkala Peninsula on the Gulf of Finland near Helsinki as a naval base in exchange for the return of Hanko.

Hungary

Hungary was obliged to return to Romania that portion of Transylvania it had occupied. Hungary was again reduced to the post–World War I borders of the 1919 Treaty of Trianon, with the exception that it was also forced to yield a small amount of territory to Czechoslovakia at Bratislava. Czechoslovakia, in turn, had to relinquish to the Soviet Union a portion of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which now gave the Soviet Union a direct border with both Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Hungary’s reparations were set at $300 million.

Romania

Romania was obliged to recognize as final its 1940 loss of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. Romania was also forced to cede the southern Dobruja to Bulgaria but regained the portion of Transylvania that Germany had forced it to cede to Hungary. Romania also had to pay reparations in the sum of $300 million.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria received the southern Dobruja, which Germany and Italy had insisted it give to Romania in 1940. Bulgaria was assessed $70 million in reparations.

All five states also agreed to restore the legal and property rights of the victorious powers, dissolve fascist organizations, and guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms. All treaties except that with Finland contained provisions that the occupying Allied nations would withdraw their troops, although the Soviet Union retained the right to maintain forces in both Hungary and Romania to safeguard its lines of communication to Austria until it concluded a peace treaty with that nation in 1955.

Because of sharp disagreements between the Western Allied powers and the Soviet Union and the coming of the Cold War, no formal peace treaties were agreed to by the former Allies with either Germany or Japan. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, negotiations on a treaty to "end" the war began. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bulgaria; Finland; Hungary; Italy; Romania

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Park, Sir Keith Rodney (1892–1975)

Royal Air Force air chief marshal. Born at Thames near Auckland, New Zealand, on June 15, 1892, Keith Park joined the New Zealand artillery during World War I and earned a commission. Park transferred to the Royal Flying Corps in 1916 and, as a pilot, scored some 20 aerial victories by war's end. Remaining with the new Royal Air Force after the war, Park joined Fighter Command Headquarters in 1938 as senior air staff officer under Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding.

In April 1940, Dowding named Park commander of Number 11 Fighter Group, which defended London and southeast England. After providing vital fighter coverage for the May 26–June 4 Dunkerque evacuation, Number 11 Group faced the onslaught of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30). Park clashed with his counterpart at Number 12 Fighter Group, Air Vice Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, over fighter tactics. Park believed in radar early warning and single-squadron intercepts of the German bombers before they could reach their intended targets, whereas Leigh-Mallory favored the slower-reacting, multiple-squadron Big Wing tactics. When the Air Ministry backed Leigh-Mallory, Park was relieved in December 1940, after the Battle of Britain had essentially been won.

Following assignments with Training Command and in Egypt, Park was ordered to Malta in July 1942 to organize air defenses on that crucial island. Park used the same fighter tactics at Malta that he had used with Number 11 Fighter Group. His air defenses caused the Luftwaffe to expend precious resources needed in North Africa. Park also counterattacked, hitting German supply convoys as they left Italy and striking Axis positions throughout the theater.

In January 1944, Park became air officer commanding in the Middle East, and in February 1945 he transferred to the South-East Asia Command as head of all Allied air forces there. Park was promoted to air chief marshal in August 1945 and played a key role in the Allied reconquest of Burma (today Myanmar).

Over Park's objections, the Air Ministry retired him from active duty in 1946. Entering private business with Hawker Siddley Aircraft, Park returned home to his native New Zealand in 1948. He died in Auckland on February 6, 1975.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Australia, Air Force; Britain, Battle of; Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Leigh-Mallory, Sir Trafford; Malta, Air Battles of

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Parker, George Marshall, Jr. (1889–1968)

U.S. Army major general. Born on April 17, 1889, in Sac City, Iowa, George Marshall Parker Jr. graduated from the Shattock School in 1909 and was commissioned in 1910. During World War I, he trained troops in the United States and ended the war as a major. He was a graduate of the Command and General Staff School in 1923 and of the War College in 1925. Promoted to colonel in January 1939 and to brigadier general in April 1941, Parker was assigned to the Philippine Islands as commander of the post of Manila. He arrived on Luzon on May 8, 1941.

Parker began organizing and training his Filipino infantry corps with just five U.S. officers and two enlisted men, and his Filipino soldiers were newly drafted and unfamiliar with all things military. On November 5, 1941, Parker assumed command of the South Luzon Force of two divisions, about 25 percent of the Luzon strength of U.S. Philippines commander General Douglas MacArthur. Parker was responsible for the defense of Luzon south of Manila. MacArthur incorrectly estimated that he had sufficient strength to defeat a Japanese invasion on the beaches, and he had scrapped the original plan of a concentrated defense in the Bataan Peninsula in favor of a defense of the entire island.

After hostilities began, and aware that the Japanese would soon invade, on December 8 Parker deployed his men for beach defense. He was promoted to major general on December 18. Parker commanded the South Luzon Force

during the Japanese landing at Lamon Bay on December 24 and then delayed the Japanese advance as he withdrew his men through Manila to Bataan. Renamed the II Philippine Corps on January 7, 1942, Parker's 25,000-man force of four divisions and one regiment defended the right of the Bataan Line east of Major General Jonathan Wainwright's I Corps. Parker commanded at Layac, Abucay, and his half of the Orion-Bagac Line.

Parker was then in poor health, lacking the vigor needed to motivate soldiers in a desperate situation, and he was relatively timid and averse to risks in war. Considering the poor training of his men, lack of weapons and supplies, rampant sickness, and starvation rations, Parker could do little more than react to Japanese initiatives.

From April 3 to April 9, 1942, the Japanese effectively destroyed the weakened Bataan force. Parker ordered several counterattacks to restore the broken corps line, none of which succeeded. He then fought a delaying action toward the southern tip of the peninsula, employing his few available regulars. Parker surrendered II Corps as ordered on April 9.

The Japanese sent Parker by vehicle to a prisoner-of-war camp, and he thus missed the April 1942 Bataan Death March. Surviving nearly four years of Japanese prison camps, he was repatriated on August 18, 1945. Parker retired from the army in September 1946 and died in Portland, Oregon, on October 24, 1968.

JOHN W. WHITMAN

See also

Bataan, Battle of; King, Edward Postell, Jr.; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew

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Partisans/Guerrillas

Indigenous combatants operating in enemy-held territory and conducting military and paramilitary operations. During World War II, numerous Allied partisan or guerrilla units operated in Axis-controlled areas, carrying out intelligence-gathering, sabotage, pilot-rescue, and harassment operations. Partisans worked together in organized units.

Motivations for joining partisan movements varied widely. Many became members as an act of survival; others joined from ideological motivations or to protect their families. Some groups were made up of escaped prisoners of war and political prisoners. Regardless of the reason, partisans assumed an incredible burden as well as the risk of being shot out of hand if they were apprehended.

Early on, partisans spent much of their efforts merely establishing their organizations and working to sustain them by securing food, supplies, weapons, and ammunition. Late in 1942 as Axis battlefield fortunes turned, the partisans began conducting raids against railways and supply depots. Some even participated in assassinations of Axis officials.

Life for the partisans was difficult. For their own security, they tended to live in, and operate from, inhospitable terrain such as mountains, swamps, and deep forests. Partisans had to endure primitive living conditions, malnutrition, lack of medical assistance, and enemy patrols. They took inspiration from successful operations of this type in the past, such as the guerrillas in Spain who fought against the French Army during the Napoleonic Wars.

The British Special Operations Executive and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) established contact with many partisan units, helping to coordinate their activities and to supply them with weapons and matériel. In return, the partisans provided intelligence, assisted Allied operatives and downed airmen, and conducted limited sabotage and assassination operations. In some cases, partisans found themselves pawns in the geopolitical contest by the various Allied powers during the war, as was the case in Yugoslavia and Greece.

Partisan units varied in strength and tactics from country to country. Space does not allow discussion of even a majority of such movements, but some of the most famous of partisans were the Polish Home Army, the French Maquis, the Greek ELAS (National People’s Liberation Army), the Yugoslavia Partisans, and fighters in the Soviet Union. Numerous other

partisan groups also operated in Europe and in the Pacific. As a rule, the more crucial the role that partisan groups played in liberating their country from occupation, the more likely they were to have a major part in establishing and running its postwar government.

Poland

Although Poland was defeated by Germany in September 1939, many Poles continued the fight. Resistance groups coalesced into the Polish Home Army, which sought to combat the occupation of the country by both German and Soviet troops. With nearly a fifth of the country in forests, the Poles had a natural base for unconventional warfare. The Polish Home Army did provide useful intelligence to the Western powers and, once the tide of war had turned, began to attack German supply trains and tie down German forces that might otherwise have been at the front.

Their most spectacular action by far, however, was the Warsaw Rising of August 1–October 2, 1944. When Soviet forces arrived at the city limits of the Polish capital, the Home Army came out in the open and battled the Germans for control. The Soviets refused for more than two months to move to assist the Poles. The Home Army fought on virtually alone until it was defeated. Warsaw was largely destroyed in the fighting. Some accurately viewed the Soviet refusal to act as a deliberate decision to effect the destruction of the natural Polish leadership and thus help ensure Soviet control of Poland in the postwar period.

France

Probably the best-known partisan efforts in the West were those in France, particularly the guerrilla units known as the Maquis. The French Resistance as a whole included everything from underground opposition newspapers to organized combat units; the Maquis carried out sabotage and harassment operations. Originally operating in southern France, the Maquis spread throughout the country. The Maquis provided immense assistance to the Western Allies in the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion when it conducted wide-scale sabotage operations against German lines of communication and

helped isolate the battlefield from German reinforcement. The Maquis also harassed small German units.

Yugoslavia

Following their conquest by the German Army, the Yugoslavs formed resistance movements. The two chief groups were bitter rivals: the Četniks (named after the Serbian guerrillas who had fought the Turks), who were loyal to the monarchy and were led by General Dragoljub “Draza” Mihailović, and the Partisan movement, led by veteran communist Josip Broz (Tito). These two organizations, often at odds with each other, fought the occupying Axis powers and the fascist Ustaše movement in Croatia.

Partisan activities here were among the most effective in Axis-occupied Europe and tied down a great many Axis troops, but they also exacted a high cost in the form of reprisals and casualties to the civilian population. During the course of the fighting, the British government, which was supplying aid to the Yugoslav Resistance, decided to back the Partisans exclusively because, unlike the Četniks, they did not hesitate to engage the Germans. At the end of the war, the Partisans were the dominant force in Yugoslavia and, in consequence, liberated much of the country themselves.

Yugoslav partisans, shown here in 1942. (Library of Congress)

Greece

In Greece, resistance to the Axis occupiers began almost immediately. The largest group was the leftist National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, EAM), with the Greek People's Liberation Army (Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós, ELAM) as its military wing. It had poor relations with the more conservative National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos, EDES), and the two groups fought each other during the winter of 1943–1944, although a truce was arranged in February 1944. When the Germans pulled out of Greece, the EAM held the vast majority of the country.

Italy

Following the September 8, 1943, armistice, Italian resistance began against the Germans and Benito Mussolini's subsequent Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, RSI) based in the northern part of the country. Early groups sprang up around former military units and were centered in the Alpine Valleys and the Piedmont. The partisan groups varied ideologically, but those in the cities tended to be largely socialist or communist. In turn, the RSI fielded groups to fight the partisans. Captain Junio Valerio Borghese headed an independent unit allied to the Germans. It numbered 10,000 men and fought against partisans in both Italy and the Yugoslav border area. The Italian Resistance claimed that in fighting from September 1943 to May 1945, it sustained 36,000 killed out of 250,000 participants. Some 10,000 civilians also died in reprisals.

Soviet Union

The rapid German advance through the Ukraine and White Russia led many Red Army stragglers and those opposed to the Nazis to find refuge in the forests. Only 11 days into the war, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin called for a partisan uprising to harass the Germans. Nazi occupation policies played a key role, driving many who had initially greeted the Germans as liberators over into the partisan camp.

Partisans operated extensively in the region of the Pripet Marshes south of Minsk. They formed around smaller cells known as Orgtroikas, consisting of officers and operatives from state, party, and Narodnyy Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, NKVD) sources. By the summer of 1943, about 17,000 partisans were conducting sabotage and harassment operations in the Pripet Marshes; at the time of Operation BAGRATION in 1944, these numbers reached 140,000 people. Despite the efforts of special German antipartisan units, Soviet partisans carried out some 40,000 railway demolitions alone, greatly aiding the Red Army offensive.

In the Ukraine, nationalist movements such as the Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya (Ukrainian Insurgent Army, UPA) formed, bent on driving out both the Germans and the Soviets. General Roman Shukhevich, leader of the UPA, controlled a wide swath of territory. Although conflicts between pro-Soviet partisans and nationalist partisans reduced the effectiveness of the movement, such activities forced the Germans to divert significant military resources to maintaining lines of communication. German general Heinz Guderian later wrote that this was one of the prime factors in the defeat of the German Army in the east.

Jews able to escape the German grasp also sought to organize. The Bielski Partisans were the most famous of the Jewish Resistance groups. The movement began as an act of simple self-preservation and the rescue of other Jews fleeing the Nazis, and eventually it grew to more than 1,000 people, including children and the elderly. Jewish partisans lived in constant danger because of rampant anti-Semitism among others apart from the Nazis.

The Germans did their best to crush the partisan movements. Their tactics included reprisals against villages aiding partisans and the taking and execution of hostages, often at the rate of 20 or more executed for every German killed. Regardless of the tactics used, and probably because of the Germans' ruthlessness, partisan numbers continued to grow.

In the Pacific, partisan movements were found in many locations, most notably in the Philippines. Following the Japanese victory at Corregidor in May 1942, some 260,000 Filipinos and Americans organized to oppose the Japanese occupiers. Most notable among these groups was the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon (The Nation's Army Against the Japanese), Hukbalahap or Huks for short. Communist Luis Taruc organized a Huk army

of 30,000 men that ultimately controlled much of Luzon. U.S. forces not captured by the Japanese attached themselves to Filipino partisan groups.

Groups in China, Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and some Pacific islands initiated intelligence-gathering and sabotage operations against the Japanese. One of the better known of the partisan groups was the Viet Minh, led by Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh. It helped rescue downed Allied pilots and conducted guerrilla operations against both the Japanese and the French.

ROBERT W. DUVALL AND BENJAMIN F. JONES

See also

Borghese, Junio Valerio; Greece; Guderian, Heinz; Ho Chi Minh; Maquis; Mihailović, Dragoljub "Draža"; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Resistance; Stalin, Joseph; Tito; Yugoslavia

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PASTORIUS, Operation (June 1942)

Planned German sabotage operation against industrial targets in the United States. Shortly after midnight on June 13, 1942, the German submarine *U-202* put ashore on a beach near Amagansett, Long Island, New York, a team of four saboteurs headed by George Dasch. The submarine also landed a considerable quantity of explosives, primers, timing devices, and incendiaries to support an anticipated two years of operations against American defense-related economic targets.

The four men were wearing German uniforms so if captured on landing they would be treated as prisoners of war. After coming ashore, the men buried their equipment. They had not yet completely changed into civilian

clothes, however, when they were spotted by a coastguardsman. They attempted to bribe him, but he subsequently reported their presence to his superiors. By the time armed coastguardsmen had arrived on the scene, however, the would-be saboteurs had taken a tram into New York City.

On June 17 another German submarine, the *U-584*, landed a second group of saboteurs, headed by Edward J. Kerling, at Ponte Vedra Beach, near Jacksonville, Florida. They were undetected. The two groups had been provided a total of $175,000 in U.S. currency to finance their operations. Rear Admiral William Canaris, head of Abwehr, the German military intelligence service, named the sabotage mission for Francis D. Pastorius, leader of the first German settlement in America.

All eight of the would-be saboteurs had lived in the United States, and two were U.S. citizens. Targets for their operation included hydroelectric plants at Niagara Falls, New York; aluminum plants; locks on the Ohio River; key rail centers and bridges; and a cryolite plant in Philadelphia.

Two of the members of the New York group, U.S. citizen Ernst Burger and George J. Dasch, decided to defect, however. Dasch traveled to Washington, D.C., and there turned himself in to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who initially refused to believe him until he showed them a large amount of cash. By June 27, all eight saboteurs had been arrested without having accomplished a single act of destruction.

Tried before a military commission of seven officers, the saboteurs were all found guilty and sentenced to death. President Franklin Roosevelt commuted Dasch's sentence to 30 years and that of Burger to life in prison. The remaining six were executed on August 8, 1942, by means of an electric chair in the District of Columbia jail. In 1948 President Harry S. Truman granted clemency to Dasch and Burger on condition that they be deported to the American occupation zone of Germany.

PASTORIUS is the only known organized sabotage attempt against the United States by German authorities during the war.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Canaris, Wilhelm Franz

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Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr. (1889–1945)

U.S. Army general. Born at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on November 23, 1889, Alexander Patch Jr. was the son of an army officer. Graduating from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1913, Patch was commissioned in the infantry. He served in the Punitive Expedition into northern Mexico in 1916 and 1917 with the 18th Infantry Regiment and deployed with his unit to France during World War I. There he commanded a machine-gun battalion, then served as director of the Machine Gun School. He ended the war as a temporary lieutenant colonel.

Following occupation duty in Germany, Patch returned to the United States in 1919 and reverted to his permanent rank of captain. Patch graduated from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1925. He next served as an instructor at the Staunton (Virginia) Military Academy (1925–1928 and 1932–1936). Patch then commanded a battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment at Fort Washington, Maryland, from 1928 to 1931. He graduated from the Army War College in 1932.

U.S. Army major general Alexander Patch, 1942. (Fox Photos/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Appointed to the Infantry Board at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1936, Patch helped develop and test the three-regiment “triangular” division. Between March 1939 and August 1941, Patch held several assignments, including command of the 47th Infantry Regiment. He was promoted to colonel in August 1939. Promoted to temporary brigadier general in August 1941, Patch took command of the Infantry Replacement Training Center, Camp Croft, South Carolina.

In March 1942, Patch, promoted to major general, commanded Task Force 6814, which was sent to New Caledonia. The task force was soon organized into the Americal (American, New Caledonian) Division, and it relieved the marines on Guadalcanal in December 1942. From January to April 1943, Patch commanded XIV Corps, including troops on Guadalcanal and the neighboring islands.

Returning to the United States, Patch took command of IV Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington. In March 1944, he was sent to Sicily to command the Seventh Army as a lieutenant general. On August 15, 1944, the Seventh Army invaded southern France in Operation DRAGOON. Part of the 6th Army Group, the Seventh was the first army to cross the Rhine, fighting in the Colmar Pocket and meeting up with General Mark Clark's Fifth Army at the Brenner Pass on May 4, 1945.

In July 1945, Patch took command of the Fourth Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and in October he headed a group assembled to make recommendations about the army's postwar organization and strength. Patch contracted pneumonia and died at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas, on November 21, 1945. He was posthumously promoted to general in 1954. Patch Barracks, the headquarters of today's U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, is named in his honor.

UZAL W. ENT

See also

DRAGOON, Operation; Germany, Collapse of; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; NORDWIND, Operation; Rhine Crossings; Southeast Pacific Theater

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Pathfinders

Specialized U.S. Army paratroopers who facilitated airborne operations. Developed in the European theater of operations during World War II, Pathfinders jumped ahead of the main assault and directed following planes to their specific drop zones. Their efforts increased accuracy of placement of airborne forces and hence the effectiveness of such operations.

The Allied invasion of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) was the impetus for the establishment of Pathfinders. Following the widely scattered airborne drops there, commanders sought a way to organize and deliver airborne

troops more accurately. The job fell to Colonel Joel Crouch of the Army Air Forces and Captain John Norton of the 82nd Airborne Division. Based at Biscari Airfield in Sicily, these men developed Pathfinder tactics.

In the first drops in the invasion of Italy, Pathfinders used colored lights, smoke pots, and vision panels to designate drop zones. These teams also used radio communication and a simple radar homing system consisting of two components, "Eureka" and "Rebecca," to aid in aircraft navigation. Once a ground team was positioned, it set up radios and activated the radar transmitter, the Eureka set. The Rebecca receiving device in the planes homed in on the signal produced by the ground team and used it to pinpoint the location for the drop. Pathfinder units were composed of a large squad of 9–14 men for signaling with two Eureka sets and nine Halifane (illuminating) lights and a 5-man security team. Squad members were volunteers from airborne units such as the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions.

Pathfinders jumped in Operations OVERLORD (June 6, 1944) and MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944), among others. After World War II, Pathfinder techniques continued to undergo refinement. Pathfinders today are also used to determine and mark helicopter landing zones for air assault operations.

The term "pathfinder" was also applied in strategic bombing. After the Luftwaffe employed a specially trained force to mark and illuminate targets during the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force formed a similar group for the strategic bombing of Germany. Special squadrons of highly trained crews flying Wellington and Stirling bombers (later mostly Mosquito bombers) flew in advance of the main bomber stream to mark targets for the less experienced bomber crews following them. Pathfinders also marked the route to the target, and a senior pathfinder known as the master bomber or master of ceremonies would fly above the target and provide advice to the main bomber force by radio.

BRANDON LINDSEY

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Sicily, Invasion of

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Patrol-Torpedo Boats

Known popularly as PT boats, World War II–era patrol-torpedo boats were the American equivalent of German E boats and British motor torpedo boats. They were small, fast, wooden-hulled, shallow-draft vessels that depended on surprise, speed, and maneuverability and thus did their best work in coastal waters.

During World War I, the Italian Navy built some 299 torpedo-armed motorboats and employed many of them against the Austro-Hungarian Navy in the Adriatic. From 1916, the Royal Navy used coastal motor boats in home waters and in the raids against Ostend and Zeebrugge, Belgium, in April 1918. Although the United States did not use such craft in World War I, the Electric Boat Company's Elco Division in Bayonne, New Jersey, constructed several hundred such vessels for Britain and Italy and gained expertise in designing and manufacturing this type.

In the late 1930s, the U.S. Navy was pushed toward the development of gasoline-powered motor boats by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison, both of whom were concerned about European interest in these craft. They secured a 1938 appropriation of $5 million for the construction of ships of fewer than 3,000 tons displacement. In June, the navy staged an American design competition, selecting seven winners for further testing, but Edison decided instead to put into limited production at Elco a 70-foot craft, with a crew of 10, from the British designer Hubert Scott-Paine. Elco's boat substituted Packard engines for those of Rolls-Royce.

By 1941, Elco had progressed to a 77-foot version that demonstrated an average speed of 27.5 knots in rough waters and mounted two 21-inch torpedo tubes and two 50-caliber machine guns in twin turrets. The boats also had the ability to lay smoke screens. Andrew Jackson Higgins, a Louisiana

shipbuilder, developed a similar 78-foot vessel. At 80 feet or less, the boats could be carried on long voyages by larger ships.

During World War II, the United States deployed in the Pacific 350 PT boats, mostly of the Elco and Higgins types, along with 42 in the Mediterranean and 33 in the English Channel. Together, they launched in combat a total of only 697 torpedoes, usually with minimal success. All too often, American torpedoes were defective, and firing them accurately from fast-moving vessels was problematic in any case. Nor were PT boats fortunate at antisubmarine warfare, being much too noisy to make effective use of sonar equipment.

The most memorable action in European waters by this type of craft came from the Germans when they sent their E boats in an attack on an American landing exercise (Exercise TIGER) at Slapton Sands, England, on April 18, 1944. The Germans sank two LSTs (landing ships, tank), damaged a third, and killed more than 700 Americans.

In the South and Southwest Pacific theaters, the most profitable service of American PT boats was in coastal work. Their speed made them difficult targets for shore batteries. With a 40mm gun and, perhaps, 4.5-inch barrage rockets or mortars replacing their torpedoes, they could attack Japanese landing barges (*daihatsus*), which, as the war progressed, were typically used to deliver reinforcements to forward positions. In one five-month period off New Guinea, PT boats claimed some 115 barges sunk with minimal losses of their own.

A U.S. Navy PT boat patrolling the waters along the coast of New Guinea in 1943. (National Archives)

Two PT boat events, because of the personalities involved, overshadowed all others in the war. The first, in the Philippines in the early weeks of the conflict, involved Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 3 under Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley. He and his men displayed great gallantry in various actions but achieved limited success against Japanese invading forces. Then, in March 1942, theater commander General Douglas MacArthur, under orders to leave the Philippines for Australia, selected Bulkeley and his four available boats to convey his party of 22 persons—including his wife, young son, housekeeper, and key staff members—more than 500 miles from Corregidor Island in Manila Bay through the Japanese blockade southward to Mindanao, from where MacArthur could complete the trip by air. At great risk, the journey was completed between March 11 and 13. MacArthur could have traveled much more easily and safely in a submarine but seemed to have been unwilling to be confined beneath the waves at such close quarters. As it was, his escape from Corregidor—and the PT boats' role in it—proved to be the stuff of legend and were recounted in W. L. White's 1942 book *They Were Expendable* and John Ford's 1945 film of the same name.

The second incident involved a confused night action. In Blackett Strait off Kolombongara in the Solomon Islands on August 1, 1943, Lieutenant John F. Kennedy's *PT-109* was struck and sunk by the Japanese destroyer *Amagiri*. Kennedy and other survivors then swam to a nearby Japanese-held

island, from which they were rescued after several days. Although written up in the *New Yorker* magazine by John Hersey during the war, the incident became widely known only after Kennedy launched his successful run for the presidency in 1960. By 1963, Kennedy's experiences had inspired several books, the film *PT 109*, and (at least indirectly) the television comedy series "McHale's Navy."

Overall, the PT boat proved to be a serviceable but not decisive weapon. The successors of such craft were later employed in riverine operations during the Vietnam War.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Kolombongara, Battle of; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of

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Patterson, Robert Porter (1891–1952)

U.S. undersecretary of war. Born in Glen Falls, New York, on February 12, 1891, Robert Porter Patterson attended Union College in Schenectady, New York and Harvard Law School. He then practiced law. Military service in Mexico in 1916 and in France in 1918, where he earned the Distinguished Service Cross, interrupted his legal career. In 1930, Patterson became a judge of the U.S. District Court, Southern New York District.

In the summer of 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Patterson assistant secretary of war under Henry L. Stimson. Patterson's mandate was to facilitate industrial procurement, manpower, and training as the U.S. military, much neglected during the 1930s, readied itself for possible entry into World War II. Patterson worked indefatigably, showing a mastery

of logistics, and in December 1940 earned promotion to undersecretary. Throughout the conflict, he made winning the war as expeditiously as possible his overriding goal, demanding that American industrialists and workers alike devote all their energies to this end. Patterson made a particularly effective team with his Navy Department counterpart, Undersecretary James V. Forrestal. Both men thought it essential that the United States should remain militarily strong and well prepared after the war.

After the war, President Harry S. Truman appointed Patterson to replace Stimson. Patterson, convinced that the developing Cold War demanded substantial increases in American military commitments and budgets, strongly supported aid to Greece, Turkey, and other countries facing communist threats. He also forcefully advocated unification of the three armed services under a single secretary of defense, returning to private life when this was implemented in late 1947. Patterson died in a plane crash in Elizabeth, New Jersey, on January 22, 1952.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Forrestal, James Vincent; Stimson, Henry Lewis

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Pattle, Marmaduke Thomas St. John "Pat" (1914–1941)

Leading Royal Air Force flight lieutenant and fighter ace. Born in Butterworth, Cape Province, South Africa, on July 3, 1914, Marmaduke Thomas St. John Pattle entered the South African air force as a cadet. Disappointed that he was not accepted for aircrew training, in 1936 he joined the Royal Air Force, demonstrating excellent flying aptitude. Once trained, Pattle was assigned to Number 80 Squadron.

In 1938, Pattle's squadron, in which he had risen to flight commander, was posted to Egypt. Against numerically superior and more modern Italian aircraft, British squadrons Numbers 80 and 33, in which Pattle served temporarily in 1940, provided air cover to British forces. The squadrons inflicted disproportionately heavy losses on the Italians, many of them because of Pattle's personal kills. Shot down over the Libyan desert in August 1940, Pattle managed to make his way safely back to British lines.

In November 1940, Italy invaded Greece, and Number 80 Squadron, under Pattle's command, moved to support the Greek Army. His command received some new Hurricane fighters in February 1941, but from April, 200 British aircraft faced 1,200 German planes. On April 20, 1941, Pattle's 15 remaining Hurricanes faced more than 100 German aircraft bound for Athens. Pattle shot down at least 2 German planes but fell victim to a Messerschmitt Bf-110 and died when his Hurricane crashed in Eleusis Bay.

Pattle personally shot down between 34 and 41 planes in combat, on several occasions 3 in one day, winning the Distinguished Flying Cross and Bar.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Greece Campaign, Italian

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Patton, George Smith, Jr. (1885–1945)

U.S. Army general. Born on November 11, 1885, in San Gabriel, California, George Patton Jr. attended the Virginia Military Institute for a year before graduating from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1909. An accomplished horseman, he competed in the 1912 Stockholm Olympic Games. He participated in the 1916–1917 Punitive Expedition into Mexico.

On U.S. entry into World War I, Patton deployed to France as an aide to American Expeditionary Forces commander General John J. Pershing, but he

transferred to the Tank Corps and, as a temporary major, commanded the first U.S. Army tank school at Langres, France. Patton then commanded the 304th Tank Brigade as a temporary lieutenant colonel. Wounded in the Saint-Mihiel Offensive, he was promoted to temporary colonel and took part in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

After the war, Patton remained an ardent champion of tank warfare. He graduated from the Cavalry School in 1923, the Command and General Staff School in 1924, and the Army War College in 1932. Returning to armor, Patton was promoted to temporary brigadier general in October 1940 and to temporary major general in April 1941, when he took command of the newly formed 2nd Armored Division. Popularly known as "Old Blood and Guts" for his colorful speeches to inspire the men, Patton commanded I Corps and the Desert Training Center, where he prepared U.S. forces for the invasion of North Africa.

In November 1942, Patton commanded the Western Task Force in the landing at Casablanca, Morocco, part of Operation TORCH. Following the U.S. defeat in the Battle of the Kasserine Pass (February 14–22, 1943), in March he was promoted to lieutenant general and assumed command of II Corps. He quickly restored order and morale and took the offensive against the Axis forces.

In April, Patton assumed command of the Seventh Army for the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. He employed a series of costly flanking maneuvers along the northern coast of the island to reach Messina ahead of the British Eighth Army on the eastern side. Patton, however, ran afoul of the press and his superiors when he struck two soldiers who suffered from battle fatigue in August. Relieved of his command, he was then used as a Trojan horse to disguise the location of the attack of Operation OVERLORD, the cross-Channel invasion of France (June 6, 1944). The Germans assumed that Patton would command any such invasion, but he actually remained in Britain in command of the Third Army while appearing to be in command of the fictional 1st U.S. Army Group, a successful ruse to trick the Germans into believing that the invasion would occur in the Pas de Calais area.

General George S. Patton Jr. at his headquarters at the last press conference held by him for war correspondents on completion of the fighting in Europe in 1945. (Time Life Pictures/Mansell/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Following the Normandy Invasion, Patton was at last unleashed in August when his Third Army arrived in France and spearheaded a breakout at Saint-Lô (July 11–19) and campaigned brilliantly across northern France. Moving swiftly, his forces swung west to clear the Brittany Peninsula and then headed east, although he was frustrated by the failure of General Omar Bradley and supreme commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower to recognize the importance of sealing the Falaise-Argentan gap. Patton's forces crossed the Meuse River in late August to confront German defenses at Metz, where the Germans held the Americans until December. During the German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945), Patton executed a brilliant repositioning movement and came to the relief of the hard-pressed American forces at Bastogne.

By the end of January, Patton began another offensive, piercing the Siegfried Line between Saarlautern (Saar Louis) and Saarbrücken. On March 22, the Third Army crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim. Patton continued his drive into Germany and eventually crossed into Czechoslovakia. By the end of the war, his men had covered more ground (600 miles) and liberated more territory (nearly 82,000 square miles) than any other Allied force.

Promoted to temporary general, Patton became military governor of Bavaria. He soon found himself again in trouble for remarks in which he criticized denazification and argued that the Soviet Union was the real enemy. Relieved of his post, he assumed command of the Fifteenth Army, a force that existed largely on paper. Patton suffered a broken neck in an automobile accident near Mannheim and died at Heidelberg on December 21, 1945.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Bastogne, Battle for; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Metz, Battle of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Rhine Crossings; Sicily, Invasion of; Tanks, All Powers; TORCH, Operation; Document 204; Document 208

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PAUKENSCHLAG, Operation (January 13–July 19, 1942)

German U-boat offensive conducted off the East Coast of the United States, in the Caribbean, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Brazil. Commander of German U-boats Vice Admiral Karl Dönitz welcomed the entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 as an opportunity to widen the U-boat

offensive in the Atlantic. In planning Operation PAUKENSCHLAG (DRUMBEAT), Dönitz intended to operate larger Type IX U-boats with greater range against the United States and into the Caribbean. He would employ shorter-range Type VII U-boats off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, which were much closer to his U-boat bases.

Dönitz requested 12 Type IX boats from the Naval War Command for the operation but was informed on December 10 that he would have only 6. Although submarine construction had accelerated, there were still too few U-boats available. Bad weather in the Baltic had also disrupted U-boat training, and the Naval War Command insisted on maintaining a large number of U-boats in the Mediterranean to assist Axis operations in North Africa. In the end, Type IX vessel *U-128* was not ready at the start of the operation, so Dönitz had less than half the force he had requested.

Operation DRUMBEAT began with only five Type IX U-boats from the Gulf of Saint Lawrence to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. Seven Type VII U-boats went to Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. All were in place by mid-January 1942, and DRUMBEAT never involved more than a dozen German submarines at any one time. To keep the Americans off balance, a month after DRUMBEAT was launched Dönitz switched its focus to the Caribbean, where several Italian submarines joined operations.

The first victim of DRUMBEAT, the British freighter *Cyclops,* fell victim to *U-123*, a Type IX boat, on January 12, 1942. Other sinkings quickly followed. The United States was totally unprepared for the U-boat attacks. Coastal cities were ablaze with lights at night, silhouetting the merchant ships plying the coast and making them easy targets. There were few escort vessels available, and merchant ships sailed independently in the hundreds because Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King refused to institute a convoy system, believing that an inadequately protected convoy system was worse than none. All of this meant that through April 1942, German submarines sank 216 vessels aggregating 1.2 million tons in the North Atlantic, the vast majority of these in waters for which the U.S. Navy was responsible.

This “American turkey shoot” for German submarines finally came to an end through a mandatory blackout of coastal U.S. cities, the instigation of convoys and antisubmarine training schools, the relocation of air assets to antisubmarine duties, and the addition of antisubmarine warships. Not only

did merchant shipping losses drop off, but increasing numbers of U-boats were sunk.

On July 19, 1942, Dönitz withdrew his last two U-boats from the East Coast of the United States, relocating his submarine assets back to the mid-Atlantic and signaling an end to the campaign. U.S. unpreparedness had a high price. Operation DRUMBEAT was arguably Germany's most successful submarine operation of the entire war, resulting in the sinking of some 3 million tons of shipping. Undoubtedly, Dönitz would have enjoyed even greater success had he been able to employ more U-boats at the beginning of the campaign.

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See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; King, Ernest Joseph; NEULAND, Operation; United States Navy

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Paul, Prince Regent of Yugoslavia (1893–1976)

Prince regent of Yugoslavia. Born on April 27, 1893, in Saint Petersburg, Russia, to Arsen Karadjordjević and Aurora Pavlovna Demidova, Paul was by nature withdrawn. He attended boarding school in Lausanne and was also educated by tutors in the royal palace in Belgrade and at Oxford. In 1923, he married Princess Olga of Greece.

On October 9, 1934, King Alexander of Yugoslavia was assassinated by Croatian terrorists. Alexander's son Peter was only a child, so as Peter's great-uncle, Paul became the principal regent. The problems then facing the country were virtually unsolvable. The deeply entrenched nationalist, political, and ethnic rivalries of Yugoslavia meant that it entered the war sharply divided.

Although Paul declared Yugoslavia neutral at the beginning of World War II, this did not spare the country from involvement in the conflict. Paul's anglophilia and over-whelmingly pro-Allied sentiment among the Serb population reinforced the belief that sooner or later Yugoslavia would enter the war on the Allied side. Adolf Hitler, mean-while, insisted that Yugoslavia declare for the Axis. Paul sought to delay that decision.

Finally, in early March, under a verbal onslaught from Hitler at Berchtesgaden, he concluded that not joining the Axis would bring about the end of his country. On March 25, 1941, Yugoslavian ministers traveled to Vienna to sign the Tripartite Pact. Anti-German Serbs, however, held Paul to be a traitor.

Anti-German demonstrations occurred in Serbia and Slovenia. Early on March 27, 1941, Yugoslavian senior army officers, who were Serbs, responded with a coup d'état, deposing Paul. The underage Peter was declared of age as King Peter II.

This infuriated Hitler, who took the coup as a personal insult. Beginning on April 6, 1941, German, Italian, Romanian, and Hungarian forces invaded Yugoslavia and occupied the country. Paul, who had been en route to Zagreb at the time of the coup, escaped to London. In 1943, he moved to South Africa. Paul's efforts to clear his name and reputation occupied much of his time until his death in Paris on September 14, 1976.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

Yugoslavia

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Paulus, Friedrich (1890–1957)

German Army field marshal. Born on September 23, 1890, in Breitenau, Friedrich Paulus joined the German Army in 1910 and was commissioned a second lieutenant the following year. He served on both fronts during World

War I. Paulus ended the war as a captain, winning the Iron Cross, First and Second Class. He continued in the Reichswehr after the war, was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1934, and succeeded Colonel Heinz Guderian as chief of staff of Germany's mechanized forces in 1935. Contemporaries viewed Paulus as stiff, methodical, and occasionally indecisive.

Paulus was promoted to major general in 1939 and was appointed chief of staff of General Walther von Reichenau's Tenth Army. Paulus participated in the conquest of Poland and the 1940 offensive into Belgium and France. When the invasion of Britain, Operation SEA LION (SEELÖWE) was canceled, Paulus became deputy chief of staff for the Supreme Army Command and helped plan Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union.

In January 1942 at Field Marshal Reichenau's request, Paulus was promoted to general of panzer troops and assigned command of the Sixth Army (formerly the Tenth Army), which was part of Army Group South. After an initial success at Dniepropetrovsk, he was forced to retreat to better defensive positions before counterattacking. The Sixth Army then advanced slowly on Stalingrad during the summer, reaching the Volga River north of Stalingrad on August 23, 1942. From August 23, a great battle raged over the city. Fighting was fierce, but Adolf Hitler ordered Paulus to take the city at any cost. In the end, the Sixth Army was trapped there.

German field marshal Friedrich Paulus at Red Army headquarters in Stalingrad after the surrender of his Sixth Army to the Soviets. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Paulus has been much blamed for refusing to disobey Hitler and taking the decision on his own to withdraw before it was too late, but his and Hitler's greatest failure lay in not anticipating the Soviet encirclement, Operation URANUS, begun on November 19. Although relief efforts failed, Hitler refused Paulus permission to try to break out, ordering him instead to hold all ground taken. On January 24, 1943, Hitler denied Paulus's request for permission to surrender and promoted him to field marshal. Paulus surrendered nonetheless on January 31, claiming that he was "taken by surprise" but refusing his men the same option. Paulus was the first German field marshal to be captured in battle.

In the aftermath of the failed July 1944 bomb plot intended to kill Hitler, Paulus made anti-Nazi broadcasts for the Soviets. Hitler ordered Paulus's entire family jailed. Paulus appeared as a witness for the prosecution at the

Nuremberg Trials, but he remained in a Soviet prison until 1953. On his release, he became an inspector in the East German Volkspolizei in Dresden. He died in that city on February 1, 1957.

TIMOTHY C. DOWLING

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Germany, Army; Guderian, Heinz; Reichenau, Walther von; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Pavelić, Ante (1889–1959)

Ruler of the puppet Croatian state (1941–1945). Born in Bradina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, on July 14, 1889, Ante Pavelić studied law at the University of Zagreb. Elected to the Yugoslav parliament in 1920, he represented the small nationalist party, the Croatian Party of the Right. Pavelić believed that violence and terrorism were legitimate means to achieve political ends. Following Yugoslav King Alexander's suspension of the constitution and a government crackdown on nationalist activities in 1929, Pavelić fled to Italy, where the following year he formed the Croatian Liberation Movement, known as the Ustaše.

With covert Italian support, Pavelić launched a terror campaign against the Yugoslavian state. In October 1934 Ustaše gunmen assassinated King Alexander and the French foreign minister at Marseille, for which a Yugoslav court sentenced Pavelić to death in absentia.

Upon the German invasion and defeat of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Pavelić and his supporters established the Independent State of Croatia with the backing of Italy, which in return annexed portions of the Dalmatian coast

and occupied the country. Following the Italian surrender in 1943, Pavelić's Ustaše regime transferred its allegiance to Germany and remained a German client until 1945.

Pavelić, who proclaimed himself *poglavnik* (leader), subjected Croatia to four years of terror. Bands of Ustaše militia roamed the countryside, expelling or executing hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Muslims, Jews, and other minorities in an attempt to create a purely Croatian state. Roman Catholic priests in the Ustaše forced the conversion of thousands of non-Catholics. Aping the Nazis, the Ustaše also established concentration camps in which tens of thousands of victims were exterminated. Ultimately, the lawlessness and violence of Pavelić's regime alienated it from the majority of Croatians and swelled the ranks of the Partisans. His rule even alienated the Nazis, who complained—ironically—that his measures hampered the war effort.

Pavelić escaped abroad to Argentina from Croatia in May 1945. He died in exile in Madrid, Spain, on December 28, 1959.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Balkans Theater; Croatia; Yugoslavia

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Pavlov, Dimitri Grigorevich (1897–1941)

Soviet Army general. Born in the village of Vonyukh, Kostroma region, on November 4, 1897, Dimitri Pavlov fought in World War I and was taken prisoner by the Germans. He joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party after the war. Commissioned in the cavalry, Pavlov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1928 and from the Military-Technical Academy in 1931. He then commanded the 4th Mechanized Brigade.

Pavlov next headed the Armored Directorate in 1937 and was chief of the Soviet tank advisers sent to assist the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Pavlov erroneously concluded as a result of that experience that there was no future for large armor formations. Although this decision was shared, such thinking helped bring the disbandment of the Soviet mechanized corps and at least until Joseph Stalin's death, Pavlov was blamed for it. In 1939, Pavlov became head of the Armed Tank Directorate.

As a colonel general, Pavlov was appointed to the Main Military Council in July 1940. Promoted to general of the army in February 1941, he received command of the Western Front on June 6 just prior to the German invasion of June 22. Facing German Army Group Center, Pavlov positioned three of his armies well forward and only one in reserve.

A week after the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the collapse of his sector of the front, Pavlov and his chief of staff Major General Vladimir Efimovich Klimovskikh and several others were ordered to Moscow. Pavlov was made the scapegoat for Soviet military failures. Falsely accused of collaboration with the Germans, he was tried, convicted, and shot on July 22, 1941. Also executed were Klimovskikh, Fourth Army commander General Aleksandr Andreevich Korobkov, and several divisional commanders and commissars.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Armored Warfare; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Stalin, Joseph

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Pearl Harbor, Attack on (December 7, 1941)

Japanese military attack against the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, which prompted the United States to declare war against Japan. By early 1941, tensions between Japan and the United States had

reached the breaking point. Japan's 1937 invasion of China and its occupation of French Indochina in 1940–1941 had led U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt to embargo scrap metal and oil and to freeze Japanese assets in the United States. The Japanese particularly resented the embargo on oil, characterizing it as "an unfriendly act." Japan had no oil of its own and limited stockpiles. Without oil, the Japanese would have to withdraw from China.

An army-dominated government in Tokyo now sought to take advantage of British, French, and Dutch weakness in Asia to push its own plans to secure hegemony and resources. Japan was determined to seize this opportunity, even if that meant war with the United States. The United States misread Tokyo's resolve, believing it could force Japan to back down.

Both sides visualized the same scenario for war in the Pacific. The Japanese would seize U.S. and European possessions in the Far East, forcing the U.S. Navy to fight its way across the Pacific to relieve them. Somewhere in the Far East, a great naval battle would occur to decide Pacific hegemony. In March 1940, commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku scrapped the original plan—which called for using submarines and cruisers and destroyers with the Long Lance torpedo and savaging the U.S. battle fleet as it worked its way west—in favor of a preemptive strike against the U.S. fleet, which Roosevelt had shifted from San Diego to Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. Yamamoto believed that such an attack, destroying the U.S. carriers and battleships, would buy time for Japan to build its defensive ring. Yamamoto also misread U.S. psychology when he believed that such an attack might demoralize the U.S. people and force Washington to negotiate a settlement that would give Japan hegemony in the Western Pacific.



With both sides edging toward war, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and U.S. Army lieutenant general Walter C. Short made their dispositions for the defense of Oahu. Both men requested additional resources from Washington, but the United States was only then rearming, and little additional assistance was forthcoming.

The Japanese, meanwhile, trained extensively for the Pearl Harbor attack. They fitted their torpedoes with fins so they could be dropped from aircraft in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor, and they also planned to use large armor-piercing shells to be dropped as bombs from high-flying aircraft. No deck armor would be able to withstand them.

Following the expiration of a self-imposed deadline for securing an agreement with the United States, Tokyo ordered the attack to go forward. On November 16, 1941, Japanese submarines departed for Pearl Harbor, and 10 days later the First Air Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi, sortied. This attack force was centered on six aircraft carriers: the *Akagi*, *Hiryū*, *Kaga*, *Shōkaku*, *Sōryū*, and *Zuikaku*. They carried 423 aircraft,

360 of which were to participate in the attack. Accompanying the carriers were two battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, and two tankers.

Surprise was essential if the attack was to be successful. The Japanese maintained radio silence, and Washington knew only that the fleet had sailed. A “war warning” had been issued to military commanders in the Pacific, but few U.S. leaders thought that the Japanese would dare attack Pearl Harbor. Nagumo planned to approach from the northwest, move in as close as possible before launching his aircraft, and then recover them farther out, forcing any U.S. air reaction force to fly two long legs. Nagumo ordered the planes to launch beginning at 6:00 a.m. at a point about 275 miles from Pearl Harbor.

Two events should have made a difference to the Americans but did not. Before the launch, U.S. picket ships off the harbor entrance detected one Japanese midget submarine. Then they sank another. There were five Japanese midget submarines in the operation. Carried to the area by mother submarines, they were to enter the harbor and then wait for the air attack. Probably only one succeeded.

Another warning was a radar report. At 7:00 a.m., a U.S. mobile radar station near Kahuku Point on the northern tip of Oahu detected the approach of a large number of aircraft about 130 miles out. However, personnel at the information center at Fort Shafter interpreted this as a flight of B-17s scheduled to arrive from California. The radar operator failed to report the key point that it was probably more than 50 aircraft; there were only 12 B-17s, which were in any case approaching from the east rather than the north.

At 7:50 a.m., the first wave of Japanese aircraft began attacking the ships at Pearl Harbor and air stations at Ewa, Ford Island, Hickam, Kaneohe, and Wheeler. Most U.S. planes were destroyed on the ground. They were easy targets because Short, to avoid sabotage by the many Japanese on the island, had ordered the planes bunched together and ammunition stored separately.

The Japanese achieved great success. In an attack of some 140 minutes, the Japanese sank four of the eight U.S. battleships in the Pacific and badly damaged the remainder. Seven smaller ships were also sunk, and four were badly damaged. A total of 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed, and 63 were badly damaged. The attack also killed 2,280 people and wounded 1,109. The attack cost the Japanese only 29 aircraft and fewer than 100 aircrew dead.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941. Prominent in this photograph are the battleships *West Virginia* and *Tennessee*. (Time Life Pictures/US Navy/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

The chief drawbacks in the raid from the Japanese point of view were that the U.S. carriers were away from Pearl Harbor on maneuvers and were not attacked. The Japanese also failed to hit the oil tank storage areas, without which the fleet could not remain at Pearl. Nor had they targeted the dockyard repair facilities. Nagumo had won a smashing victory but was unwilling to risk his ships in further strikes. The task force recovered its aircraft and departed.

Yamamoto's preemptive strike was a brilliant tactical success. Japan could carry out its plans in the South Pacific without fear of significant U.S. naval intervention. However, the Pearl Harbor attack also solidly united U.S. opinion behind a war that ultimately led to Japan's defeat.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Kimmel, Husband Edward; Nagumo Chūichi; Short, Walter Campbell; Torpedoes; Yamamoto Isoroku; Document 82; Document 118; Document 121; Document 123; Document 126

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PEDESTAL, Operation (August 3–15, 1942)

The last contested British Royal Navy operation to resupply Malta. Maintaining the effectiveness of the island's aircraft and warship strike forces against the long and vulnerable Axis supply routes to North Africa was crucial, especially as the Allies prepared for a new offensive in the Western Desert and the invasion of Vichy French North Africa. In June 1942, an effort to supply Malta with large convoys from both the east and west had led to the eastern operation, code-named VIGOROUS, of 11 merchant ships being turned back, while 3 of 5 freighters and the tanker SS *Kentucky* were lost in Operation HARPOON, the western operation. Malta thus faced a growing shortage of supplies, particularly of fuel, and despite the risks of heavy losses among the merchant vessels and their escorting warships, the Allies decided to mount another convoy operation.

Axis control of the North African coast ruled out a westbound convoy. An eastbound convoy would be vulnerable to attack from Sardinian and Sicilian bases for some 400 miles, requiring moonless nights, fast merchantmen, and a heavy escort for passage. Numbering 14 ships, including the tanker *Ohio*, the convoy carried 85,000 tons of supplies and 12,000 tons of fuel. Close escort to Malta was provided by the Royal Navy in the form of Force X of 4 cruisers and 11 destroyers. Additional cover as far as the Skerki Channel would come from Force Z of 2 battleships, 3 carriers with 100 aircraft, 3 cruisers, and 13 destroyers. Two oilers and a tug, escorted by 4 corvettes, accompanied the armada. The carrier *Furious*, escorted by 8 destroyers, used this opportunity to fly off 40 Spitfires to reinforce Malta before returning to Gibraltar. Nine submarines were deployed to counter possible movements by Italian surface forces.

On August 10, 1942, Axis forces received confirmation that the convoy had passed through the Strait of Gibraltar. Twenty submarines (18 Italian and 2 German) were deployed to intercept, and the convoy was shadowed from the air. At 1:15 p.m. on August 11, the German submarine *U-73* torpedoed and sank the carrier *Eagle* and escaped. Two hours later, the first Axis air attack in the form of 36 German aircraft from Sardinia arrived. It inflicted no damage to the convoy at the cost of two of its planes shot down.

Major air attacks from Sardinia commenced the next morning. Between 9:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., 134 Italian and 77 German aircraft made three attacks in five waves, slightly damaging the carrier *Victorious* and slowing the merchantman *Decaulion,* forcing it to proceed independently. Axis forces lost 12 aircraft. At 6:35 p.m., 95 aircraft attacked the convoy in six waves. They made a glancing hit on the battleship *Nelson,* torpedoed the destroyer *Foresight,* and hit the carrier *Indomitable* with three bombs, putting the last two out of action.

Force Z turned back to Gibraltar at 6:55 p.m., 20 minutes earlier than planned, but its carrier losses reduced the convoy's air cover to six Beaufighters from Malta. At 7:30 p.m., as the convoy entered the Skerki Channel, Italian submarines struck. The submarine *Axum* hit the British cruisers *Cairo* and *Nigeria* and the tanker *Ohio* with one spread of four torpedoes. The *Ohio* continued, but the *Cairo* was scuttled, and the *Nigeria* turned back to Gibraltar. A cruiser and two destroyers were detached from Force Z as reinforcements, but before they arrived, a German night attack by 37 aircraft caused the loss of three freighters (including the *Decaulion*) and seriously damaged a fourth; the destroyer *Ashanti,* the new flagship after the crippling of the *Nigeria,* was also damaged. The *Kenya* was torpedoed by the submarine *Alagi* at 9:12 p.m. but could still steam at convoy speeds and so continued.

On August 13 shortly after midnight, 19 Italian and 4 German motor torpedo boats commenced a series of attacks. The Italian boats sank the cruiser *Manchester* and three transports while the Germans accounted for one transport. Another freighter was damaged.

By dawn, the convoy was scattered and reduced to 7 merchantmen (3 damaged) escorted by 2 cruisers and 16 destroyers. A planned interception by 6 Italian cruisers and 12 destroyers was called off by the naval command shortly before midnight, after 1 of the British cruisers sent back to reinforce

the escort by Admiral Syfret was misidentified as a battleship. On their way back to base, the submarine *Unbroken* torpedoed 2 cruisers off Cape Milazzo.

Air attacks from Sicily recommenced at 9:15 a.m., sinking two merchantmen and further damaging the *Ohio*. By 11:00 a.m., however, Spitfire fighter cover from Malta effectively prevented further successful attacks. Four merchantmen (one damaged) and the *Ohio,* barely afloat, entered Valetta's Grand Harbor, bringing 32,000 tons of supplies and 11,500 tons of fuel to the garrison, sufficient for two months of operations. Force X successfully returned to Gibraltar through the gauntlet of Axis air, submarine, and motor torpedo boat attacks, losing only the damaged *Foresight*.

Operation PEDESTAL was an Axis tactical victory. The British lost eight freighters, one carrier, two cruisers, and a destroyer. One carrier, a cruiser, and a destroyer also suffered heavy damage. The Italians lost two submarines, and two cruisers and two submarines were heavily damaged. Aircraft losses on all sides were modest, considering the numbers engaged. Even so, the British, despite heavy merchant ship losses, had achieved a strategic victory by successfully resupplying Malta, which had an immediate serious impact on the Axis supply lines to North Africa at a critical moment.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Gibraltar, Strait of; Malta; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Peenemünde

Peninsula on the Baltic German coast that served as a German rocket manufacturing and test site during World War II. At Peenemünde, German

engineers designed and tested the V (for *Vergeltung*, or "vengeance") weapons with which Germany hoped to reverse the course of the war. In 1932, artillery captain Walter Dornberger established the Verein für Raumschiffahrt (VfR, Rocket Society) to build a military rocket. Soon Dornberger and VfR member Wernher von Braun gathered a group of some 80 engineers at Kummersdorf to construct rockets for artillery use. Braun also hoped to build both jet-propelled bombers and rocket fighters. Kummersdorf was not large enough for this work, so Peenemünde was selected. There in the summer of 1936, the German military developed a secret test site with restricted access. Dornberger, now a major general, headed the wartime program.

The V-1 flying bomb (known as the "buzz bomb" from its sound) was first test-fired at Peenemünde in December 1942. The second V weapon was initially designated the A-4. Renamed the V-2, it was a 12-ton, single-stage rocket fueled by alcohol and liquid oxygen. A true guided missile, it was the prototype of all such weapons to follow. Peenemünde engineers launched the first V-2 on October 3, 1942. Unlike the V-1 buzz bomb, which simply fell to earth when the engine cut off, the V-2 could be targeted accurately and directed against large cities, such as London. Adolf Hitler was determined that the V-1 and V-2 be used as terror weapons, especially following the destruction of German cities by Allied bombers.

Although reports reached Britain that Germany was developing secret weapons, Peenemünde was not specifically identified until members of the Polish underground provided specific confirmation. It was in 1943 that British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill ordered that a heavy Bomber Command strike be mounted against Peenemünde. That raid occurred on August 17–18.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Braun, Wernher von; Dornberger, Walter Robert; Hitler, Adolf; Peenemünde Raid; V-1 Buzz Bomb; V-2 Rocket

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Peenemünde Raid (August 17–18, 1943)

Information about German operations to build the V-2, a single-stage rocket, at Peenemünde on the German Baltic coast first reached the British in November 1939. In 1943, further information came to light, and reconnaissance missions were flown that produced photographic evidence of a rocket on a trailer. The Allies decided that Peenemünde had to be destroyed, and the task was assigned to the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command. The raid was launched on the night of August 17–18, 1943, and occurred only a few hours after the U.S. Army Air Forces had begun raids against Regensburg and Schweinfurt. There was also a diversionary raid against Berlin.

The British hoped that the raid would delay German rocket research by many months. This would entail destroying the facility and killing as many people working there as possible, especially the scientists. Head of Bomber Command Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris decided on a mix of precision and area bombing, and to achieve the maximum results he decided to employ the entire strength of Bomber Command. He would also use Pathfinder aircraft.

Peenemünde was 500 miles from the British bases, and the British would come under full German attack. The RAF strike on the night of August 17–18 used 596 bombers (324 Lancasters, 218 Halifaxes, and 54 Stirlings), of which 560 reached the target area. British losses were heavy, with 41 bombers shot down. The Germans lost 12 fighters.

The raid destroyed several facilities at Peenemünde and killed between 120 and 178 people working there, along with 600 inmates of a nearby forced-labor camp. Although it is impossible to judge this with any certainty, the raid probably retarded German V-2 production by up to six months. The first V-2s did not fall on London until September 8, 1944, three months after

the June 6 Allied invasion of Normandy. The raid is also notable as the first time the Germans used their Schrage Musik cannon, upward-firing 20mm guns that were mounted on Bf-110 aircraft and claimed six British bombers. Peenemünde would continue to take a heavy toll of Allied bombers for the remainder of the war.



A RAF reconnaissance photograph of the German research station at Peenemünde, site of German V-2 rocket tests. (Keystone/Getty Images)

The U.S. Army Air Forces also raided Peenemünde three times in 1944, causing the Germans to move much of their development work elsewhere. At the end of the war, the Americans secured most of the German rocket scientists as well as Peenemünde itself, from which they gathered V-2s and related equipment, filling 300 railroad cars before destroying the site. The personnel and material captured at Peenemünde became the foundation of the U.S. space program of the 1950s and 1960s.

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Harris, Sir Arthur Travers; Peenemünde; Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids; V-1 Buzz Bomb; V-2 Rocket

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Peiper, Joachim (1915–1976)

German Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) Obersturmbannführer. Born in Berlin on January 30, 1915, Joachim Peiper came from a military family; he was well educated and fluent in both English and French. Peiper joined first the Hitler Youth, then the SS. Commissioned in the SS in 1936, he served on Heinrich Himmler's personal staff but sought a combat command. He was a company commander in the elite SS Liebestandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) in the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940 and led an abortive effort to seize bridges over the Meuse. He served in the LAH in the invasion of the Soviet Union beginning on June 22, 1941. There his unit was noted for its military efficiency and extreme brutality; it was involved in massacring the inhabitants of several villages. Transferred to Italy, in September 1943 Peiper's troops destroyed the town of Boves and murdered 45 of its inhabitants.

After the LAH transferred to France, Peiper studied techniques for night movements that were later used effectively in the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). In that offensive, SS-Obersturmbannführer Peiper headed Kampfgruppe (battle group) Peiper, which was the lead element for the 1st SS Panzer Division, itself the main effort for the entire Sixth Panzer Army. Peiper's mission was to race ahead of the main body of the division, bypass all determined resistance, and capture

the bridges across the Meuse River at the small Belgian village of Huy. This would allow following forces to cross this major water obstacle en route to their planned envelopment of Allied armies to the north.

Kampfgruppe Peiper never achieved its objective, being thwarted in Huy on December 20. After several determined efforts to break through failed, on December 23 Peiper and his 800 remaining men abandoned their equipment and retreated on foot under cover of darkness. Before then, Peiper's unit had already committed one of the most infamous massacres of the war, at Malmédy on December 17.

SS colonel Joachim Peiper, who led the German unit that killed 83 unarmed U.S. soldiers taken prisoner near Malmédy, Belgium, on December 17, 1944. (Corbis)

There Peiper's lead elements had overrun a U.S. unit, Battery B of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. The lead element (with Peiper present) rapidly disarmed the Americans and passed them along to following forces. The soldiers of these trailing units within Kampfgruppe Peiper herded the roughly 150 prisoners into a field and then opened fire on them with machine guns and small arms, killing 83 and wounding others.

For this atrocity, Peiper and 69 others were tried before a U.S. military court at Dachau in the spring of 1946. On July 16, 1946, the tribunal condemned Peiper and 43 others to death, although the sentences were subsequently reduced to life in prison. Peiper was released in December 1956. Since 1972 Peiper had been living in France in the small village of Traves. In late June 1976 his presence there was revealed in the communist

newspaper *L'Humanité*. On July 14, 1976, Peiper's house burned in mysterious circumstances, reputedly firebombed. Peiper's body was discovered in the remains with a bullet hole in its chest. The perpetrators were believed to have been either communists or former members of the French Resistance. Peiper had begun writing a book about Malmédy and its aftermath.

ROBERT BATEMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Himmler, Heinrich; Malmédy Massacre; Waffen-SS

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Peleliu Island, Battle of (September 15–November 27, 1944)

Pacific island battle, one of the bloodiest of the war. Peleliu had been taken by Japan from Germany during World War I. Located about 2,400 miles south of Tokyo and having a land area of only about 7 square miles, Peleliu Island was largely blanketed by a tropical forest. Before General Douglas MacArthur's forces could retake the Philippines, he would have to neutralize the Palau Islands, and Peleliu specifically, to protect his right flank. Admiral Chester Nimitz also believed that Peleliu was needed as a staging area for the invasion of Leyte. Securing the island would ensure domination of all the Palaus and neutralize Japanese submarine facilities.

Beginning on September 12, 1944, the U.S. Navy began a three-day naval and air bombardment. The naval fire-support group included 5 battleships, 5 heavy and 3 light cruisers, and 14 destroyers. Between 7 and 11 escort carriers provided combat air and antisubmarine patrol. The ground force went ashore beginning at 8:32 a.m. on September 15. It consisted of the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marine Regiments of Major General William H. Rupertus's 1st

Marine Division. The assault was made in amphibious tractors (amphtracs and landing vehicles, tracked [LVTs]) across 600–800 yards of coral reef on the southwest corner of the island. Rupertus predicted victory in 4 days.

Two U.S. marines, one cradling a 30-caliber machine gun in his lap, during a break in fighting on Peleliu Island, 1944. (National Archives)

Colonel Nakagawa Kunio, commanding some 5,000 Japanese troops, had adopted new tactics. The Japanese did not defend at the beaches, but inland they were well dug in to make the attackers pay the highest possible price. The Japanese only had 13–15 light tanks. On the first afternoon, these were destroyed when they tried to break through the attackers' line. The marines' objective on the first day was to secure the high ground, soon known as "Bloody Nose Ridge," but that effort was only partly successful. On September 16, the advance resumed. On September 17, led by 1st Marine Regiment commander Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, the marines attacked the ridges and destroyed many Japanese strongpoints.

On September 22, the marines were reinforced by the U.S. Army 321st Regimental Combat Team of the U.S. Army's 81st Infantry Division, which was the floating reserve. The next day the Americans secured the airstrip, but the Japanese then retreated to prepared positions in caves on Umurbrogol Ridge. On September 26, the 5th Marines seized Radar Hill, the easternmost

and highest terrain on the island and site of a Japanese radar installation. By the end of September, the Japanese soldiers were compressed into a pocket only 90 yards long and 400 yards wide. In mid-October, the U.S. Army 81st Infantry Division replaced the marines on Peleliu, but the island was not declared secure until November 27, although some Japanese did not surrender until February 1945.

Even with total U.S. air and naval superiority, lavish naval gunfire and air support, and a ground manpower superiority of four to one, American forces paid a heavy price for the seizure of Peleliu. U.S. casualties totaled some 9,615, with 1,656 of them killed in action. Of 6,000 Japanese defenders, only 33 surrendered or were captured. The same Japanese tactics were replicated, more spectacularly, in their defense of Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945). The seizure of Peleliu, while costly, did neutralize some 25,000 Japanese troops on Babelthuap, the largest island of the Palaus.

JAMES ERIK VIK

See also

Iwo Jima, Battle for; MacArthur, Douglas; Nimitz, Chester William; Puller, Lewis Burwell

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Peng Dehuai (1898–1974)

Chinese Communist general. Born a peasant in Xiangtan (Hsinangt'an) in the southern province of Hunan on October 24, 1898, Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) enlisted in a warlord army in 1916. Military talent and an expanding social conscience inclined him first toward the Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) military, but ultimately he joined the Communist Party in 1928. Peng fought in early battles against GMD forces and survived the Long March (1934–1935).

In 1937, Peng was appointed second-in-command of the new Eighth Route Army, which although ostensibly under GMD control within the "United Front" was actually under Communist general Zhu De (Chu Teh). More conventional than Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), Peng favored professional soldiers over guerrillas or commissars as well as larger, more aggressive assaults against the Japanese. Initially, he also favored more genuine cooperation with the GMD.

In August 1940, Zhu ordered Peng to attack the Japanese in Shanxi (Shansi) and Hebei (Juprh) Provinces southwest of Beijing (Peking). In the largest Chinese offensive of the war, Peng amassed some 104 regiments, comprising 200,000 regulars and 200,000 guerrillas, who successfully destroyed blockhouses and rail lines. In October, strong Japanese counterattacks drove Peng westward into the mountains. Although successful in its initial phase and in countering claims that Communists were avoiding the Japanese, this "100 Regiments Campaign" cost at least 22,000 Chinese lives, compared with about 5,000 Japanese killed.

In retaliation, the invaders accelerated their "burn all, kill all, destroy all" campaign in northern China, killing tens of thousands more Chinese. By late 1941, Peng had returned to Yan'an (Yenan), Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. He spent more time on political work than military campaigning for the rest of the war, gravitating more toward Mao's ideas on politics and war. Peng mounted no more offensives against the Japanese.

Peng led the Northwest Field Army during the subsequent civil war and led all Chinese forces in the 1950–1953 Korean War. Promoted to army marshal and minister of defense in 1955, he was purged in 1959 for criticizing Mao's Great Leap Forward program. During the Cultural Revolution, Peng was vilified, jailed, and tortured. He died in a military prison outside Beijing on November 29, 1974.

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See also

China; Mao Zedong; Sino-Japanese War; Zhu De

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P’eng Te-huai

See Peng Dehuai

Penicillin

Antibiotic agent first discovered in 1928 by Alexander Fleming in London and made available for widespread use during World War II. Fleming discovered penicillin by happenstance as he was conducting research on staph infection, a potentially lethal malady spread by bacteria and that usually begins on the skin. Observing that a mold that had contaminated one of his cultures had caused the bacteria to stop growing, he transferred some of the mold to another culture, with the same result. The mold belongs to the genus *penicillium*, which prompted Fleming to name it penicillin.

Penicillin and its related products are effective mainly against gram-positive bacteria; the drug has shown to be largely ineffective for gram-negative bacteria. Since its discovery, many variations of penicillin have been produced, widening its appeal and therapeutic qualities. Penicillin also led researchers to develop other kinds of antibiotics, including those that effectively treat gram-negative bacteria.

By the late 1930s, research on penicillin at Oxford University proved that the mold was highly effective in treating a wide variety of bacterial infections in animals, principally mice. In the spring of 1941, the first trials on humans took place. Penicillin was administered to a number of patients who were desperately ill and in all likelihood would have died without the drug. The results were dramatic. At the same time, scientists and researchers in the United States were conducting their own research on penicillin, and with war looming, the U.S. government sped up patient trials on the drug. During 1942, 122 million units of penicillin were cultured and made available for clinical trials at the Mayo Clinic and at Yale University.

By the early spring of 1943, 200 patients in the United States had been given the drug, with results so impressive that U.S. surgeon general Thomas Parran Jr. ordered drug trials carried out at a military hospital. Soon, the drug was widely available in hospitals, including military hospitals in the United States and abroad.

While penicillin appeared to be a miracle drug, the manufacturing and administration of it were far from trouble-free. Early on, the mold had to be grown—or cultured—in a laboratory, a time-consuming and not at all efficient process. There were attempts during World War II to chemically synthesize the drug, but none proved successful. Another challenge the drug posed was that it was excreted in a patient's urine quickly, which necessitated frequent dosing. Up to 80 percent of penicillin is excreted from the body within three to four hours of administration. Because of this and the scarcity of penicillin at the time, the urine of patients on the drug was collected so the penicillin could be extracted and reused.

In time researchers overcame both problems, but only after many trials and much expense. By 1943, numerous manufacturing plants in the United States were churning out millions of doses of the drug; by war's end, 23 plants around the country were producing penicillin. Between 1943 and 1945, the U.S. military was consuming 85 percent of the nation's output of the antibiotic, which in 1943 alone accounted for 231 billion units.

Penicillin revolutionized medicine in the 1940s, particularly military medicine. Many soldiers stricken with communicable diseases or infections stemming from wounds or surgery who otherwise would have died were saved by penicillin. The incidence of death from disease and/or wounds during World War II was 0.6 per 1,000; during World War I, less than 30 years prior, the death rate for soldiers was 16.5 per 1,000. Only 4 percent of soldiers who were admitted to a hospital during World War II died; during World War I, the death rate for soldiers in hospitals was double that, at 8 percent.

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See also

Medicine and the War

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Pentagon

U.S. military headquarters located just outside Washington, D.C., in Arlington, Virginia. Constructed between September 11, 1941, and January 15, 1943, at an approximate cost of $83 million, the massive five-sided office building consolidated the 17 separate buildings of the War Department under one roof.

The U.S. Army grew from a force of approximately 190,000 men in the fall of 1939 to more than 1.4 million by the summer of 1941. Responding to international crisis and the outbreak of war in Europe, the War Department was growing exponentially to keep up with increasing responsibilities, and there would be a critical need for more space for war planning if the United States did indeed enter the war.

Brigadier General Brehon Burke Somervell was chief of construction for the War Department in 1941. He proposed that a single building should house the entire War Department, uniting all the military decision makers under one roof. Somervell's personal determination, his access to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and his highly competent engineers and architects, who developed the original Pentagon plans in one harried weekend, all contributed to the ultimate success of the project that some referred to as "Somervell's folly."

Aerial view of the Pentagon, headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense in Arlington County, Virginia, 1944. (AFP/Getty Images)

When Somervell took his plan to Congress for the necessary appropriations, many objected to the estimated cost of $35 million. Others were opposed to locating the building outside of Washington, D.C., and some believed that the building would be useless once the current war crisis passed. Even Roosevelt thought that the Pentagon would only temporarily house the War Department and would later be used mainly as a storage facility. Some in Congress observed that construction of such a massive building would use too many scarce materials, especially steel.

Engineers replaced steel frames with reinforced concrete made from sand and gravel dredged from the bottom of the nearby Potomac River. They also saved steel by constructing ramps instead of elevators from level to level within the building.

Construction got off to a slow start but speeded up considerably after the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor created a new urgency to occupy the building. Somervell brought in Colonel Leslie R. Groves, who would later head the Manhattan Project, to oversee construction. Two of the five building sections were completed by the following spring, and the first War Department employees, 300 Ordnance Department workers, moved into the first section at the end of April 1942.

In 1989, the Pentagon was placed on the National Register of Historic Places. Renovation and restoration, partly because of age and partly because of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, continues on the building, still a symbol of U.S. military power.

MOLLY M. WOOD

See also

Groves, Leslie Richard; Somervell, Brehon Burke

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Percival, Arthur Ernest (1887–1966)

British Army lieutenant general. Born at Aspenden, Hertfordshire, on December 26, 1887, Arthur Ernest Percival was educated at Rugby School. He was in business in London during 1907–1914 and joined the British Army as a private at the beginning of World War I. Percival fought in France in 1915, was wounded in 1916, and won two Distinguished Service Orders and the French Croix de Guerre. He was also promoted to captain.

After the war, Percival served in north Russia and in Ireland (1920–1922). He attended the Staff College at Camberley and served in Nigeria. He also attended the Imperial Defence College course in 1935. Percival was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1932 and to colonel in 1936. He then served in Malaya as a staff officer (1936–1938).

Percoval returned to Britain to take command of Aldershot in 1938 and 1939. Promoted to brigadier in 1939, Percival assumed command of the 43rd Division of the British Expeditionary Force in France. Following the Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation (May 26–June 4, 1940), he commanded the 44th Division in Britain.

Largely because of his previous service there, Lieutenant General Percival took command of British forces in Malaya in July 1941. British defenses in the area depended on controlling the sea and air. His defenses

inadequate, Percival requested six additional divisions and extra air support. He received only two and a half poorly trained divisions and therefore did little to prepare for an invasion.

Japanese forces commanded by Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki invaded Malaya in early December 1941, and on January 27, 1942, Percival ordered a general withdrawal from the Malay Peninsula to Singapore Island. Percival rejected suggestions that the British construct defensive positions on the northern side of the island because he feared this would adversely affect the morale of his troops and civilians. The Japanese invaded Singapore proper in early February 1942 and drove back the unprepared British forces. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill demanded that Percival hold the island to the last, but the water supply was dangerously low and defenses inadequate.

Although British troops outnumbered the Japanese forces on February 15, 1942, Percival was bluffed into surrendering, in large part to spare civilian casualties. In Britain's most humiliating defeat of the war, 130,000 British, Australian, Indian, Malay, and local troops became prisoners of the Japanese.

Percival spent the next four years as a prisoner of war. On the defeat of Japan, he was released and witnessed the formal Japanese surrender on board the battleship *Missouri* on September 2, 1945. Percival retired from the army in 1946 and died in London on January 31, 1966, a broken man.

MICHAEL G. URANKO JR. AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Malaya Campaign; Singapore, Battle for; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Pétain, Henri Philippe (1856–1951)

French Army general and chief of state of the Vichy government of France during the German occupation. Born on April 24, 1856, in Cauchey-à-la-Tour, Henri Philippe Pétain graduated from the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr in 1878 and was commissioned in the army. He served as an officer in a line regiment and then on the staff at the École de la Guerre (War College). His career was less than distinguished, and Colonel Pétain was nearing retirement age at the beginning of World War I.

Vichy chief of state Henri Philippe Pétain. A World War I hero, he was convicted after World War II of collaboration with the Germans and sentenced to life in prison. (Library of Congress)

One of the few experts in the French Army in defensive warfare and the effectiveness of modern firepower, Pétain advanced quickly in rank. His leadership in the 1916 Battle of Verdun won him hero status in France and, in April 1916, command of Army Group Center. In May 1917, he replaced General Joseph Joffre as commander in chief of the French Army. Promoted

to marshal of France in 1918, Pétain remained in command of the army until his retirement in 1931. He served briefly as minister of war in 1934.

During 1939–1940, Pétain was French ambassador to Spain. In the desperate circumstances of the Battle for France (May 10–June 25, 1940), Pétain was recalled to serve as vice premier to Paul Reynaud to lend his personal credibility to the war effort. He ended up moving the government in another direction. Believing that the situation was hopeless, he took over as the last premier of the Third Republic, determined to end the fighting on the best terms possible.

On the conclusion of an armistice with the Germans, Pétain became chief of state of the unoccupied part of the country with its capital at Vichy. Pétain, who at first enjoyed virtually unanimous French support, established an authoritarian government that accepted the principle of collaboration with the Germans. In October 1940, Pétain met with Adolf Hitler at Montoire-sur-Loire. Pétain consistently made concessions to Germany, including limited cooperation with the Germans in the deportation of Jews and hunting down anti-Nazi operatives in unoccupied France.

Following the Allied invasion of North Africa in Operation TORCH (November 8, 1942), German forces occupied the remainder of France, and Pétain's government lost what little authority it had enjoyed. He continued to urge his countrymen to follow a neutral course, even insisting that they not aid the Allies following the Normandy Invasion on June 6, 1944.

Removed to Germany in August 1944, Pétain voluntarily returned to France in April 1945 to defend his policies. He claimed that he had been trying to dupe the Germans and buy time for France to recover. Put on trial for treason, Pétain was convicted in August and sentenced to death. Head of the Provisional Government General Charles de Gaulle commuted the sentence to life imprisonment because of Pétain's contributions in World War I and the fact that Vichy had at least kept alive some French independence. Pétain died a prisoner on the Isle d'Yeu on July 23, 1951. He was buried there, because the French government refused permission for his remains to be buried in mainland France. Various groups have endeavored to remove his remains for burial at Verdun.

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See also

Collaboration; de Gaulle, Charles; France; Reynaud, Paul; TORCH, Operation; Vichy France

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Petlyakov, Vladimir Mikhailovich (1891–1942)

Soviet aircraft designer. Born at Sambek (now Novoshakhtinsk) near Taganrog on July 27, 1891, Vladimir Mikhailo-vich Petlyakov studied at Moscow Higher Technical School under Nikolai Zhukovsky, and while there he worked as a laboratory assistant at the Central Aerodynamics and Hydrodynamics Institute (CAHI), graduating in 1922.

After graduation, Petlyakov continued at CAHI as a structural designer. He became Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev's deputy (and head of the heavy airplane brigade) in 1931. Petlyakov's first independent design was the ANT-42 of 1934. It eventually entered production as the Pe-8, the Soviet Union's sole long-range heavy bomber of World War II. This excellent aircraft carried five tons of bombs, but because the Soviet military leadership had little interest in strategic bombing, only 79 Pe-8s were produced. Petlyakov became chief of CAHI's experimental aircraft factory in July 1936 and its chief designer a year later. He was arrested on July 20, 1937, during Stalin's purges and sent to a *sharashka*—a Soviet labor camp used for secret research and development.

At the *sharashka,* Petlyakov set up Special Technical Department 100, where he designed the Vi-100, a sophisticated prototype high-altitude fighter and dive-bomber. Although it was successful, the air force decided that the MiG-3 could better meet the high-altitude requirement. On May 25, 1940, the air force gave Petlyakov's team until June 1 to design a conversion to a three-seat attack bomber. The mock-up PB-100 passed inspection on June 1, 1940, and the type was approved for production on June 23.

Petlyakov's success led to his release from prison in July 1940 and his installation as head of his own experimental design bureau, the Opytnoe

Konstructorskoe Byuro (OKB), in Moscow. The production PB-100 was redesignated the Pe-2 and became the Soviet Air Force's most successful standard tactical bomber of World War II. The two-engine Pe-2 was the counterpart to the German Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber, U.S. A-20, and British Mosquito. With some 11,000 produced, the Pe-2 made up two-thirds of Soviet bomber production in World War II. The Pe-2 had a crew of three, was armed with five machine guns, and could carry 6,600 pounds of bombs. It was fast at a maximum speed of 360 mph, and even some fighters had problems keeping up with it.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941), the Petlyakov OKB was evacuated to Kazan in October 1941. Petlyakov was killed when the Pe-2 in which he was traveling from Kazan to Moscow caught fire and crashed on January 12, 1942.

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See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Soviet Union, Air Force; Tupolev, Andrei Nikolayevich

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Petrov, Ivan Yefimovich (1896–1958)

Soviet Army general. Born in the village of Trubchevsk, Bryansk region, on September 30, 1896, Ivan Yefimovich Petrov attended a theological seminary and was commissioned in the Russian Army from military school in 1917. He joined both the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party in 1918 and fought in the Russian Civil War as a platoon leader, rising to political commissar in a cavalry regiment. In the 1930s he commanded a cavalry regiment and a cavalry brigade, and he then headed the Tashkent Infantry College.

In March 1941 Petrov formed a mechanized corps in the Central Asian Military District, and in May he was promoted to major general. Following

the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941), Petrov served mainly in the Crimea and Caucasus regions. He first commanded the 2nd Cavalry Division before Odessa and then the Special Maritime Army in the Crimea from August to October 1941. Forced to withdraw to the Crimea, he commanded Sevastopol's land defenses, escaping at the end of June with other senior commanders just before Sevastopol fell to the Germans. In October, Petrov took command of the Forty-Fourth Army in the Crimea. Promoted to lieutenant general, he then served as chief of staff of the North Caucasus Front.

Promoted to colonel general in August 1943, Petrov led the Novorossiysk-Taman Offensive during September and October 1943 and was promoted to army general. Following command differences, he was demoted to colonel general and removed from his post in January 1944. That March, he took command of the Thirty-Third Army. He took command of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in August 1944, regaining the rank of army general.

Petrov led the Western Carpathian Offensive in January and February 1945, but he was removed following a failed offensive in March. At war's end, he was chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Berlin Offensive. Petrov was among the Soviet generals dispersed to distant posts after the war and headed the Tashkent Military District from July 1945 until 1952, when he retired. Petrov died in Moscow on April 7, 1958.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Berlin, Land Battle for; Sevastopol, Siege of

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Philippines

The Philippine Islands are strategically located between Formosa (present-day Taiwan) and the Dutch East Indies. In 1941, the nearly 7,100 islands that

comprise the Philippines had a population of some 17 million people speaking some 13 different languages. There are also many religions, although Catholicism predominates. The islands cover almost 115,831 square miles and are divided into three main groups: Luzon in the north, the Visayas in the middle, and Mindanao in the south.

The United States had acquired the Philippine Islands as a consequence of the 1898 Spanish-American War. Prior to that they were a Spanish possession since the late 16th century. The United States decided to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946 after an interim period, and under the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act of 1934 the government of the islands changed in 1935. In March 1935 President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved a new constitution for the islands, which the Filipinos accepted in May. In September, Manuel Quezon was elected president, and in November, when he was inaugurated, the Commonwealth of the Philippines was formally established. Quezon was reelected president in November 1941.

Quezon wished to strengthen the defenses of the Philippines against a possible attack by Japan. In 1935 he invited General Douglas MacArthur to the islands as his military adviser, and the following year Quezon appointed MacArthur field marshal of the Commonwealth forces.

Although U.S. war plans called for defense of the Philippines, the U.S. Congress had done little to provide funding. In 1941, the Philippine Army numbered only about 90,000 men. Four-fifths of them were Filipinos and the rest U.S. troops. The Philippine Navy consisted of two torpedo boats, and the air force had 40 aircraft. With war threatening, on July 26, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt federalized the Philippine Army and integrated it into the new U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, commanded by MacArthur, recalled to U.S. service as a lieutenant general (promoted to general on December 20). The principal ground element of this force was Major General Jonathan Wainwright’s Philippine Division, consisting of 8,000 Philippine Scouts commanded by U.S. officers, a U.S. infantry regiment of 2,000 men, and an artillery regiment. In August 1941, MacArthur began to mobilize and train the Philippine Army’s reserve forces of 10 lightly armed infantry divisions.

The Japanese attacked the Philippine Islands, beginning with air raids on Clark and Iba Airfields, on December 8, 1941, one day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japanese forces then landed and drove on Manila, forcing MacArthur to withdraw onto the Bataan Peninsula. U.S. and Filipino forces

fought surprisingly well, however, and delayed the Japanese timetable. Cut off from the outside and starved of resources, even food, the Americans were forced to surrender on April 9, 1942. The fortified island of Corregidor fell on May 6. President Roosevelt had already ordered MacArthur to Australia. Meanwhile, President Quezon established a government-in-exile in Washington.

Artillerymen of Battery C, 90th Artillery, firing on a Japanese position at Balete Pass on Luzon in the Philippine Islands, April 19, 1945. (National Archives)

Japanese claims of Asian solidarity rang hollow given their practice of treating the Filipinos with contempt and brutality. The Japanese were surprised to discover that most Filipinos remained loyal to the United States. As early as 1943, Tokyo announced its plans to grant independence to the Philippines. Japanese leaders hoped that this would diminish anti-Japanese sentiment and allow some Japanese troops to be shifted elsewhere. But the

Japanese also insisted that any grant of independence be accompanied by a declaration of war by the Philippines against the United States. Under Japanese pressure, in September 1944 the puppet Philippine government headed by José Laurel, former minister of the interior, declared war on the United States.

As elsewhere, there were Filipino collaborationist elements, but resistance activities also occurred. Resistance on the big island of Luzon was led by the Filipinos, Americans, and Hukbalahap ("Huks," People's Anti-Japanese Army) guerrillas. Although the fighters did not seriously disrupt the Japanese occupation, they proved to be an irritant to the Japanese, provided intelligence information, and greatly assisted in the reconquest of the islands by U.S. troops.

Following U.S. landings in the Philippines in October 1944, the Philippine government was reestablished in the islands at Tacloban, Leyte, on October 23. U.S. forces then invaded Luzon, and following two weeks of heavy fighting that devastated the city, retook Manila in February. Laurel and some other collaborators fled to Japan, where they eventually surrendered to U.S. authorities. On July 5, 1945, MacArthur announced that the Philippines had been liberated. The Philippine Congress met on June 9 for the first time since 1941, and in September it ratified the United Nations Charter.

Following the liberation, MacArthur, much to the surprise of many, adopted a lenient attitude toward the collaborators and personally pardoned Manuel Roxas, a prominent collaborator who won election to the presidency in 1946.

Sporadic violence continued in the Philippines after the war, fed by serious economic problems and separatism. Some guerrilla warfare occurred, led by the Huks. Full independence came to the islands on schedule on July 4, 1946. The Philippines then concluded free trade agreements with the United States, secured significant funding for reconstruction, and granted long-term leases on military and naval bases to the United States.

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See also

Bataan, Battle of; Clark Field, Japanese Raid on; Corregidor, Battle of; Iba Field, Attack on; MacArthur, Douglas; Manila, Battle for; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Quezon, Manuel

Luis; Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew; Document 132; Document 200; Document 214

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Philippines, Japanese Conquest of (December 8, 1941–May 8, 1942)

At the beginning of the Pacific war, Japanese leaders sought to capture the Philippine Islands to control the islands' resources and to protect the Japanese supply route to the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). In early December 1941, U.S. forces in the Philippines numbered 19,116 U.S. regulars, the excellent 12,000-man Philippine Scouts, a 3,000-man Philippine Constabulary, and 107,000 poorly trained and poorly equipped recently drafted Philippine army troops.

Much of Admiral Thomas C. Hart's U.S. Asiatic Fleet, already weak, had been withdrawn from the Philippines. Only 4 destroyers, 28 submarines, small vessels, and some torpedo boats remained. U.S. air assets and air warning capability in the islands were woefully inadequate. The Far East Air Force in the islands numbered about 277 aircraft, about half of which were obsolete. There were 35 B-17s and more than 100 modern P-40 fighters. U.S. commander in the Philippines General Douglas MacArthur hoped to use his limited air and naval assets to savage any Japanese seaborne attack and was confident that he could defeat any actual landing force should the Japanese get ashore.

The original U.S. plan for the defense of the Philippines was based on the premise that troops there could hold out against the Japanese until the Pacific

Fleet could force its way across the ocean to their relief. U.S. ground troops were to withdraw into the Bataan Peninsula and the fortified island of Corregidor until the fleet could arrive. The plan called for prepositioned depots on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor sufficient for 43,000 men on Bataan and 7,000 on Corregidor for 180 days.

MacArthur, convinced that he could defeat any Japanese invasion, scrapped this plan in favor of a forward defense, but resources scattered in this effort were insufficient to defend the entire islands. Most significant was Washington's realization that no relief expedition could be sent out immediately after the start of hostilities. The result was a great deal of confusion.

When word was received in the Philippines of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), MacArthur's air force commander, Major General Lewis H. Brereton, sought permission for a strike on Formosa. Brereton was refused permission to see MacArthur but received a message from MacArthur's chief of staff, Brigadier General Richard Sutherland, that he was to wait for an overt act by the Japanese. Brereton suggested that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was such an act.

Although MacArthur eventually granted permission for a strike on Formosa, it came too late. At 12:30 p.m. on December 8, 1941, Japanese aircraft from Formosa struck the Clark and Iba airfields. Without an effective air warning system in the Philippines, many U.S. aircraft, including about half of the B-17s and a third of the fighters, were destroyed, most of them on the ground, at a cost of only 7 Japanese aircraft. Unlike the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there never was an investigation into the attacks on the Clark and Iba airfields, despite a loss of life comparable to that at Pearl Harbor.

Tokyo assigned the task of conquering the Philippines to Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu's Fourteenth Army based on Formosa. Many of Homma's 43,100 men had fought in China, and Tokyo was optimistic that victory in the Philippines would be quick. The timetable for conquest of the islands was only 50 days. MacArthur's prewar goal, to be reached by April 1942, was 200,000 men under arms, but on December 15, 1941, he had only some 120,000 Philippine Army troops in all the Philippines and roughly 31,000 U.S. troops and Philippine Scouts. MacArthur had claimed that he could defend the entire Philippines against Japanese invasion. But most of the

regulars were kept back near Manila, with the result that likely landing sites along the extensive coastline were covered only by poorly trained Filipino troops. This meant that the Japanese would encounter little resistance in getting ashore.

On December 8, 1941, the first Japanese troops landed on Bataan Island. On December 10, Japanese forces invaded Aparri and Vigan on northern Luzon. Two days later, they came ashore at Legaspi in southern Luzon. The bulk of Homma's forces landed at Lingayen Gulf beginning on December 22. Homma commanded in the Philippines a force, at peak strength, of some 65,000 men.

With the Japanese troops ashore and moving on Manila, on December 23 MacArthur reverted to the original Bataan defense plan, without, however, adequate preparation for its implementation, especially in prepositioning supplies and food. MacArthur directed his North Luzon Force field commander, Major General Jonathan Wainwright, to stage a fighting withdrawal along five preplanned defensive lines into the Bataan Peninsula. On December 26, Manila was declared an open city. Japanese forces entered it on January 2, 1942.

MacArthur's troops executed an effective withdrawal and were established on the Bataan Peninsula by January 6. Japanese strength on Bataan was only about 30 percent of their own (some 23,200 Japanese to 80,000 defenders). The Bataan Peninsula is only about 20 by 25 miles in size. MacArthur was handicapped by having to feed more than 110,000 people there and on Corregidor, including civilians, rather than the 43,000 in the original plan. Supplies were entirely inadequate, with many dumps having been lost in the hasty withdrawal, so the defenders in the peninsula immediately went on half rations. Moreover, the peninsula was extremely malarial. By late March, barely a quarter of the defenders were able to fight.

Washington decided against attempting to relieve the position. Rather than yield a tremendous propaganda advantage to the Japanese with the capture of the U.S. commander in the Far East, on February 22 President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to Australia. He departed Corregidor on March 11. Derisively referred to by many of the defenders as "Dugout Doug" for his failure to leave Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor (he visited Bataan but once), MacArthur later received the Medal of Honor. Wainwright assumed the Philippines command.

By early April, conditions in the Bataan Peninsula for the defenders were desperate, prompting the commander on Bataan, Major General Edward P. King, to surrender the Filipino and American forces there against direct orders from Wainwright. After a major Japanese offensive that shattered his army—and facing widespread starvation, disease, and no hope for victory—King surrendered his 70,000 men on April 9.

The Japanese forced the weakened survivors of Bataan to march 55 to 60 miles to prisoner-of-war camps. Most of the prisoners were sick and hungry, and there was little food. In fairness to the Japanese, they were unprepared for the large influx of prisoners, but it is also true that they behaved with a shocking disregard for the norms of warfare and even denied the prisoners water. Up to 650 Americans and 5,000–10,000 Filipinos died in the Bataan Death March to Camp O'Donnell. Another 1,600 American and 16,000 Filipino prisoners died in the camp in the first six to seven weeks of their imprisonment.

The fight then shifted to Corregidor, with its fewer than 15,000 defenders. Only two miles separate the island from the Bataan Peninsula, enabling the Japanese to bombard it with artillery and attack it from the air. On the night of May 5–6, the Japanese staged a successful amphibious assault accompanied by tanks. On May 6 Wainwright, his resources exhausted and with less than three days of water remaining, ordered all U.S. forces throughout the Philippines to surrender to avoid unnecessary casualties. Formal resistance ended on May 8.

Japanese troops celebrate the capture of Bataan in the Philippine Islands, 1942. (National Archives)

The Japanese conquest of the Philippines was a major blow to American morale and assisted the Japanese in their effort to dominate the Southwest Pacific and control that region's resources. What was remarkable about the Philippine Campaign was not its conclusion but rather the skill and determination of the defenders, who held out for six months. Homma was called back to Japan in disgrace.

Perhaps the greatest surprise was the loyalty of the Filipinos to the United States. The Japanese expected the Filipinos to rally to them, leaving the Americans to fight alone. But after its first hasty retreats, the poorly trained and inadequately equipped Philippine Army settled down and fought well. That army and the vast majority of the Filipino people remained loyal to the United States during the campaign and the long Japanese occupation that followed.

See also

Bataan, Battle of; Bataan Death March; Brereton, Lewis Hyde; Clark Field, Japanese Raid on; Corregidor, Battle of; Hart, Thomas Charles; Homma Masaharu; Iba Field, Attack on; King, Edward Postell, Jr.; MacArthur, Douglas; Rainbow Plans; Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew

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Philippines, U.S. Recapture of (October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945)

In July 1944, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt met at Pearl Harbor with his two Pacific theater commanders, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. MacArthur insisted that the next U.S. move in the Pacific be the liberation of the Philippine Islands. The islands were, he argued, U.S. territory, and he had vowed that "I shall return." Nimitz, supported by chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest P. King, argued in favor of an assault farther north, on Formosa. The former made political sense, the latter military sense. Either move would, however, have the same advantage of cutting off the Japanese home islands from the oil of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). Roosevelt decided to approve two operations: the first would be against the Philippines; it would shift the second—Nimitz's invasion—farther north, to Okinawa.

Recapture of the Philippines would provide vital strategic bases for further Allied operations against Japanese forces to the north. The plan, as approved, called for MacArthur's forces to attack Mindanao, and those under Nimitz would strike Yap. The two would then combine for an assault on

Leyte. MacArthur's forces would next invade the big Philippine island of Luzon, after which Nimitz's forces would move against Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Unfortunately, there was no unity of command for the U.S. invasion of Leyte.

Japanese commanders recognized the vital importance of the Philippines, and they were prepared to commit the bulk of their remaining naval assets to thwart a U.S. effort to recapture the islands. The U.S. invasion of Leyte in fact prompted the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944), the largest naval battle in history.

The landings on Leyte began on October 20; 132,000 men of Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army put ashore the first day. MacArthur landed with the third wave, accompanied by members of the Philippine government and press. Japanese general Yamashita Tomoyuki, the conqueror of Malaya, had overall command of the defenders. Although some 350,000 Japanese Army troops garrisoned the Philippine islands, only the 16th Division of 16,000 men was on Leyte. The invaders had an accurate picture of Japanese strength and dispositions, thanks to Filipino guerrillas. Filipino support was a morale booster for U.S. forces.

General Douglas MacArthur (center) wades ashore following the successful U.S. initial landing at Leyte in the Philippine Islands, October 20, 1944. (National Archives)

The Japanese did not fight for the beaches. They chose instead to contest the advance inland and away from naval gunfire. The U.S. drive was slowed by heavy rains, skillful Japanese delaying actions, and rugged terrain. Yamashita also reinforced Leyte with some 45,000 additional troops sent from Luzon and the Visayas. U.S. aircraft and ships gradually severed this supply line, and the U.S. 77th Infantry Division also went ashore on the west coast of Leyte. Organized Japanese resistance ended on December 25. The United States had suffered 15,584 casualties; Japan's losses were more than 70,000. There were no survivors from the Japanese 16th Division, which had conducted the infamous Bataan Death March. On December 15, the Americans seized the island of Mindoro in the northern Visayas, just south of Luzon, for use as an advance air base for the strike against Luzon.

Yamashita had 250,000 troops on Luzon, but an Allied deception caused him to withdraw most of them south toward Manila. Meanwhile, kamikaze pilots took a heavy toll on Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf's gunfire-support group in Lingayen Gulf, sinking an escort carrier and damaging a battleship, an escort carrier, one heavy and four light cruisers, and other vessels. Nonetheless, on January 9, 1945, Krueger landed 68,000 men of his Sixth Army almost unopposed at Lingayen Gulf in northern Luzon. Then when Yamashita had committed his forces to the northern threat, Lieutenant General Robert E. Eichelberger's Eighth Army landed in southern Luzon and struck north. Handicapped by shortages of equipment, transport, and air support, Yamashita organized his forces on Luzon into three main groups and settled in for a static defense.

Japanese rear admiral Iwabuchi Sanji received Yamashita's order too late to withdraw from Manila and ordered his 17,000-man Manila Naval Defense Force to hold the capital to the last. The Battle for Manila lasted from February 3 to March 3, 1945, and saw the destruction of much of the city as well as an estimated 100,000 civilian casualties. Afterward, the United States held Yamashita responsible for Japanese atrocities committed in Manila and executed him as a war criminal. At least 16,655 Japanese were killed in the battle. Most of Luzon was secured by July.

With no hope of victory or rescue, most Japanese stoically fought on. With his force down to 50,000 men, Yamashita surrendered on August 15. The U.S. campaign for the Philippines was skillfully fought with proportionally few U.S. casualties, an exception to the general rule in warfare that attackers generally suffer higher losses than defenders. The Battle for

Luzon cost Japan some 205,535 killed and 9,050 captured. U.S. losses were 8,310 killed and 29,560 wounded.

Meanwhile, from February to August, Eichelberger's Eighth Army liberated the Visayas and southern Philippine Islands. Simultaneously, Australian troops took the remaining Japanese strongholds on New Guinea and in the Bismarcks and the Solomon Islands.

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See also

Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; Iwabuchi Sanji; Kamikaze; King, Edward Postell, Jr.; Krueger, Walter; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; MacArthur, Douglas; Manila, Battle for; Nimitz, Chester William; Oldendorf, Jesse Bartlett; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Philippine Sea, Battle of the (June 19–21, 1944)

Battle between the Japanese Navy and the U.S. Navy in the largest aircraft carrier engagement in history. The Battle of the Philippine Sea virtually destroyed what remained of Japanese naval aviation capability. In June 1944, U.S. forces launched Operation FORAGER to capture the Mariana Islands for use as bases for Boeing B-29 strategic bombing raids on Japan. On June 15, U.S. marines invaded Saipan, northernmost of the principal Marianas. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance had overall command. His Fifth Fleet and its main strike force, Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 58, provided support and protection. Task Force 58's assets included 7 fleet carriers, 8 light carriers, 7 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, 69 destroyers, and 956 aircraft.

Also on June 15, the Japanese First Mobile Fleet under Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo emerged from the Philippines through the San Bernardino Strait and headed northeast, a move intended to draw the U.S. fleet into a decisive battle that would reverse the course of the war in the Central Pacific. Assembled over the preceding month, Ozawa's force comprised 90 percent of Japan's surface naval strength and consisted of 5 fleet carriers, 4 light carriers, 5 battleships, 11 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 28 destroyers, and 473 aircraft. Ozawa believed that his inferior aircraft numbers would be offset by the greater range of his planes and by the presence of 90 to 100 land-based aircraft on the islands of Guam, Yap, and Rota, with which he planned to attack the U.S. carriers to initiate the battle. As Ozawa's carriers came into range, his planes would launch a second strike, refuel and rearm on the islands, and then attack the Americans a third time while returning to the Japanese fleet.

The U.S. submarine *Flying Fish* reported the Japanese sortie from the Philippines. Leaving his older battleships and several cruisers and destroyers to protect the Saipan beachhead, Spruance joined Mitscher's Task Force 58 on June 18 to search for Ozawa. Misled by the commander of the Japanese land planes and unaware that most of them had been destroyed by attacks from Mitscher's undamaged carriers, Ozawa launched four attack waves on the morning of June 19, only to lose 346 planes in what the victors called the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot." That same day, the U.S. submarine *Albacore* sank the *Taiho,* Japan's newest and largest carrier and Ozawa's flagship. Another submarine, the *Cavalla*, sank the Japanese fleet carrier *Shokaku*.

Spruance still did not know Ozawa's precise location, and he rejected Mitscher's urging that he move offensively toward the west for fear that the Japanese might flank him and get between him and the Saipan landing sites. Aerial night searches were deemed impractical because aircrews were exhausted and the moon was new. Although Mitscher dispatched extensive search missions through the morning and early afternoon of June 20, not until 4:00 p.m. were Ozawa's ships finally sighted, at the extreme range of the U.S. aircraft.

A Japanese heavy cruiser under attack by U.S. Navy carrier-based aircraft during the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944). The Japanese ship was sunk. (Corbis)

Despite knowing that his planes would return to their carriers in darkness and that many of them would probably exhaust their fuel beforehand, Mitscher ordered a massive strike. It found Ozawa's ships shortly before dark and sank another fleet carrier, the *Hiyo,* and two oilers. It also severely damaged three other carriers, a battleship, a heavy cruiser, and a destroyer and eliminated all but 35 of the remaining Japanese aircraft.

The return flight of the U.S. aircraft became one of the most dramatic episodes of the Pacific war. Only 20 of the 216 aircraft sent out earlier had been lost in action, but 80 were lost in ditchings or crash landings. Ignoring the risk of Japanese submarines, Mitscher ordered his carriers to turn on all their lights to guide his fliers. Efficient search-and-rescue work recovered all but 49 airmen. Spruance pursued the retreating Japanese from midnight to the early evening of June 21, but he was slowed by his destroyers' need to conserve fuel, whereas Ozawa accelerated the withdrawal begun after his losses on June 19.

Although it effectively destroyed Japanese naval airpower, the Battle of the Philippine Sea quickly became controversial. Members of Mitscher's staff condemned Spruance for not steaming farther westward on the night of June 18–19 to give Mitscher a more favorable launch position. Mitscher, for his part, was criticized for not sending out night searches on June 19–20 that might have found Ozawa sooner and allowed the Americans more daylight for their air attack on the Japanese fleet, perhaps even creating conditions for a surface engagement. Such a scenario, however, might have resulted in much greater losses for the U.S. side with no more strategic benefits than were actually gained.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Central Pacific Campaign; Kurita Takeo; Lee, Willis Augustus "Ching"; Mariana Islands Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Montgomery, Alfred Eugene; Ozawa Jisaburo; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Turner, Richmond Kelly

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Phillips, Sir Thomas "Tom" Spencer Vaughan (1888–1941)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born on February 19, 1888, in Falmouth, England, Tom Spencer Vaughan Phillips became a naval cadet in 1903. He joined the navigation branch of the service and saw action during the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign, but he spent much of the rest of World War I in the Far East.

Phillips attended the Naval Staff College (1919–1920); served on the Permanent Advisory Commission for Naval, Military, and Air Questions of the League of Nations (1920–1922); and was promoted to captain in June

1927. He ended a three-year tour on the operational staff of the Royal Navy Mediterranean command in May 1928. Phillips was assistant director of plans at the Admiralty from 1930 to 1932, served with the East Indies Squadron from 1932 to 1935, and was director of plans at the Admiralty from 1935 to 1938. In April 1938, Phillips commanded the Home Fleet destroyer flotillas. He was promoted to rear admiral in January 1939 and served as deputy chief of the Naval Staff during 1939–1941.

First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound, chief of the naval staff, selected Phillips as deputy chief over several more senior officers. At first, Phillips had the confidence of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who recommended him for the rank of acting vice admiral in February 1940. Rapport between the two men gradually eroded, and Phillips opposed Churchill's proposal in September 1940 for retaliatory bombings of German cities. He also opposed Churchill's decision in March 1941 to divert scarce forces from North Africa to bolster Greece. His personal contact with the prime minister practically ceased thereafter.

Phillips was appointed commander in chief of the Eastern Fleet in May 1941, but he retained his duties as vice chief of the naval staff until October, when he took up his new command with the acting rank of admiral. He sailed for the Far East on October 25 in the new battleship *Prince of Wales*, which was joined en route by the old battle cruiser *Repulse*. Phillips arrived in Singapore on December 2, only to face the Japanese attacks on Malaya on December 8. Intelligent, self-assured, and hardworking, Phillips also lacked combat experience and did not appreciate the need for air cover.

Phillips had a difficult choice. He could attempt to oppose the Japanese amphibious landings in Malaya, or he could remain in Singapore. Phillips gambled on the offensive, and his Force Z of the *Prince of Wales*, the *Repulse*, and four old destroyers sailed on December 8 with the hope that radio silence, bad weather, and the element of surprise might enable him to catch the Japanese transports. His plan had some merit, as the *Prince of Wales* was stronger than any Japanese ship. Phillips also knew that the Japanese had no aircraft carriers, and he observed that the Japanese were taking risks in pushing their troopships forward. An unknown factor remained the strength of Japanese land-based aircraft, their range from their recently captured airfields, and the availability of British air cover. On December 9, Phillips was advised that he would have no friendly air cover,

but he elected to press on. Phillips had great faith in the antiaircraft armament of the *Prince of Wales* and did not believe that land-based airpower could sink underway capital ships. No capital ship had yet been sunk at sea by aircraft.

Japanese reconnaissance aircraft discovered Force Z on December 9. Phillips finally opted to turn around, but his ships were attacked by a large formation of Japanese land-based naval aircraft on the morning of December 10. Within two hours, both capital ships were sunk in what was Britain's worst single naval defeat of the war. Phillips went down with his ship.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Malaya Campaign; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Sinking of

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Phony War

See Sitzkrieg

Photoreconnaissance

Photoreconnaissance refers to the use of cameras on aircraft to gather photographic information in support of planning and combat operations. It was an important source of intelligence for both sides in the war. Camera-carrying aircraft often provided commanders on the ground with a clear picture of enemy locations and strength. Photoreconnaissance also led to a simultaneous growth in deception operations to mislead intelligence collection by the opposing side.

Interest in aerial reconnaissance photography came with balloons, well before the first military aircraft. In 1911, the U.S. Army Signal Corps added aerial photography to the curriculum at its flight training school, and the Italians used aerial photography to assist their troops in Libya during the war with Turkey in 1911–1912. During World War I, two-man observation aircraft of all major warring powers produced aerial photography through handheld cameras. The low speed of such aircraft made them vulnerable to fighter aircraft, however. During the war, aerial photography developed significantly, and geographic survey work during the interwar years stimulated technological improvements in aerial cameras.

Photographic analysis was an important part of this process. It normally occurred at two levels—immediate exploitation at or near the airfield to identify information with time-sensitive value followed by in-depth study at a centralized facility serving the entire theater of operations. Centralized processing and analysis also allowed analysts to link the information from the photographs to information from other intelligence sources to create a more refined assessment.

In Britain, Royal Air Force (RAF) group captain Frederick William Winterbotham of MI-6 took a keen interest in photoreconnaissance. In September 1938, he approached Australian Sidney Cotton, who had developed a new type of film, and Cotton agreed to undertake high-altitude reconnaissance flights. Late that same year, the British initiated clandestine photoreconnaissance missions over Germany and over Italian territory in the Mediterranean. Cotton's missions acquired photographs of the area between Dusseldorf, Aachen, and Köln (Cologne) from an altitude of 32,000 feet. These flights confirmed the utility of aerial photography.

Pilots flying such missions, however, encountered high-altitude flying problems, and condensation trails gave away the presence of the aircraft. Such flights nonetheless provided the French with information about the Siegfried Line, which they had been trying to obtain since 1936. They also allowed Bomber Command to update its military and economic targeting files, and tactical units secured photographic images of bridges and road junctions along expected German invasion routes.

On the outbreak of war, aerial reconnaissance was transferred to the RAF. This entailed little change in personnel since, under now Wing Commander Cotton, most men were already RAF personnel. Cotton acquired two Spitfire

fighter aircraft and modified them by removing guns and radios and installing downward-facing stereoscopic cameras. The unit became the first of six strategic photoreconnaissance squadrons: four in Europe and two in Asia.

The United States readily adopted the British system. The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) also moved from slower and older aircraft for short-range reconnaissance and modified bombers for long-range missions to the fast Lockheed P-38 Lightning and North American P-51 Mustang.

The United States made extensive use of photoreconnaissance in both the European and Pacific theaters. One of the most prominent examples of the value of photoreconnaissance to the Allies came in the hundreds of thousands of photographs of France produced in the course of 4,500 photoreconnaissance sorties flown in the weeks and months leading up to the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion.

Although the Soviet Union had stressed the value of photoreconnaissance to military operations, after 1941 the Red Air Force proved sadly deficient in this area. Its aircraft, such as the Polikarpov Po-2, usually proved too slow and vulnerable. Soviet photoreconnaissance did register improvements, albeit at a slow pace, during the course of the war.

The Germans also appreciated the value of photoreconnaissance to military operations, and the Luftwaffe began the war with several dedicated reconnaissance squadrons. The Luftwaffe employed the Henschel Hs-126 as well as the Dornier Do-17F and Junkers Ju-88D. The Luftwaffe also modified for reconnaissance purposes fighter aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf-109 and Focke-Wulf Fw-189 and Fw-190 but never did adopt the Allied practice of removing aircraft armament to improve speed and range. Intelligence gained by aerial photography was an important factor in the early German successes during and after Germany’s June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union. In Western Europe, at least, Allied air superiority by 1942 enabled the British and Americans to restrict significantly the effectiveness of German photoreconnaissance, although the Germans continued to operate reconnaissance aircraft effectively on the Eastern Front for the remainder of the war.



Photo reconnaissance was extremely important during the war. Shown here is a Luftwaffe Dornier Do-17 on a reconnaissance mission during the Battle for France in 1940. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Photoreconnaissance was immensely useful in mapping, mission planning, and briefing. It could also be used to benefit the side being observed. For example, the Allies instituted an elaborate two-part deception plan to support the Normandy Invasion. Operation FORTITUDE NORTH was to convince the Germans that the Allies intended to invade Norway from Scotland; FORTITUDE SOUTH led the Germans to believe that the Pas de Calais rather than Normandy was the Allied objective in France. The plan made use of dummy tanks, landing craft, and airfields. The Allies allowed some German reconnaissance aircraft to fly over these areas and photograph them. The deception was entirely successful.

Aerial reconnaissance proved of great importance in the Far East, where Japanese movements and intentions were difficult to discern because of the vast areas. Although much information was gleaned from signals intelligence or long-range surveillance flights such as by Catalina flying boats, photo flights were required for intelligence purposes. The USAAF modified B-24 and B-29 bomber aircraft to undertake long-range photoreconnaissance missions. Increased Allied successes and air superiority reduced the ability of the Japanese to counter photoreconnaissance flights, forcing the Japanese increasingly to adopt decoys similar to the Normandy deceptions, such as straw aircraft dummies, to lure Allied attacks.

Advances in technology, specifically the use of smaller, more sophisticated cameras in higher-performance aircraft, revolutionized photoreconnaissance. Optics allowed for information collection at the greater safety of higher altitude and speed than physical observation. Acquiring such imagery for subsequent detailed analysis became a critical intelligence function for the world's military establishments. The importance of photoreconnaissance is reflected in the development of specialized high-altitude aircraft especially for this purpose.

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See also

Aircraft, Reconnaissance and Auxiliary; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Camouflage; Deception

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Pick, Lewis Andrew (1890–1956)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Brookneal, Virginia, on November 18, 1890, Lewis Andrew Pick graduated from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 1914 and served with the U.S. Army 23rd Engineers in France during World War I. Commissioned into the U.S. Corps of Engineers in 1917, Pick was stationed in the Philippines from 1921 through 1923, where he established a Filipino engineer regiment.

When Pick returned to the United States, he assisted with flood control work. From 1928 to 1932, he was on Reserve Officers' Training Corps duty at Texas A&M University. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1934 and taught tactics there until 1938. In 1939, he graduated from the Army War College and was assigned to the Corps of

Engineers' Ohio River Division. In December 1941, Pick was promoted to temporary colonel. He became the Missouri River Division engineer in April 1942. Working with W. Glenn Sloan of the Bureau of Reclamation, Pick sought ways to prevent the Missouri River from overflowing its basin. The Pick-Sloan plan that incorporated several of his ideas for the Missouri River basin went into effect in 1944.

In October 1943 Pick was deployed to the China-Burma-India theater, where he replaced Brigadier Raymond A. Wheeler in directing engineers who were building the Ledo Road, which came to be known as "Pick's Pike." This crucial land supply route extended from northern India through Burma to China and tied in with the old Burma Road to supplement the Himalayan air routes. The difficult jungle terrain seemed almost impossible for road construction, but Pick persevered. Although he and the majority of his workers were sickened by malaria, Pick pushed the main road ahead while also providing for construction of side roads for combat troops to pursue the Japanese. It took slightly more than two years to complete the route.

Promoted to brigadier general in February 1944, Pick led the first convoy into Kunming on February 4, 1945. Pick's men also built an airfield for Merrill's Marauders during the Siege of Myitkyina (May–August 1944). Pick was promoted to major general in March 1945.

Following the war, Pick resumed his peacetime position as division engineer in Missouri until March 1949, when President Harry S. Truman named him chief of the Army Corps of Engineers. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1951, Pick headed the Corps of Engineers until his retirement in November 1952. Pick died in Washington, D.C., on December 2, 1956.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER

See also

Burma Road; China-Burma-India Theater; Engineer Operations; Merrill, Frank Dow; Myitkyina, Siege of

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Pistols and Revolvers

Modern pistols are magazine-fed hand weapons that fire semiautomatically each time the trigger is pulled. Most pistols have a minimum capacity of at least eight rounds, although there are variations. A revolver has a rotating cylinder of chambers (normally six), which are each loaded with one cartridge. The action is fired by pulling on the trigger, which cocks the weapon and rotates the chamber to the next live round (double-action), or by cocking first and then firing (single-action).

The pistol, or revolver, is a single-handed weapon with a short barrel firing a low-energy cartridge. This means that it is largely inaccurate at ranges in excess of about 30 yards, and few soldiers can use it effectively except at the closest belt-buckle range. In the period prior to World War II, the pistol was the side arm of officers and cavalrymen and was regarded as a weapon of last resort.

Pistols have been used by soldiers since firearms were first invented, but the ineffectiveness of the weapon at any but the shortest range has always been its drawback. Long-barreled weapons of the 19th century suffered from loss of penetration power, as the cartridge was low-powered. Attempts have been made to increase accuracy by firing “super” or magnum cartridges, but the short barrel makes accuracy questionable.

In World War II, a development in firearms design reduced the importance of the pistol still further; this was the submachine gun, which fired the same cartridge as the pistol but from a heavier longer-barreled weapon, increasing rate of fire and effectiveness to about 100 yards. The Soviets adopted the submachine gun to good effect, arguing that a heavy weight of fire at short range was far more effective than single rifle shots at longer ranges.

A soldier holding a Colt .45 pistol, the standard sidearm for U.S. military personnel during World War II. (William Vandivert/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Nevertheless, the pistol was still issued. The U.S. Army employed the Colt M1911A1 .45-caliber pistol, which was carried by officers, noncommissioned officers, and air and tank crews. The pistol was intended to be an individual side arm that was easy to carry and use and was with the soldier at all times in a holster on his belt. The .45 ACP (Automatic Colt Pistol) cartridge had significant power, capable with one shot of disabling or killing the targeted individual. Lieutenant General George S. Patton's famed six-shooters were certainly never used in anger, but they perpetuated the American myth that the spirit of the frontier was alive and well and perhaps enshrined within the general himself. The Americans also used the Smith and Wesson M1917 revolver, derived from the British .38/200 revolver.

European forces primarily used the 9mm Parabellum cartridge, invented in Germany, that was fired by a variety of weapons, including the famous Luger Pistole '08 and the Walther P38. Most nations in Europe used this caliber and cartridge for the simple reason that it was effective and was a disabling cartridge, if not a true killer. The standard Italian-issue side arm was the well-made 9mm Beretta Model 1934 with seven rounds. The French used the old (1892) revolver, the so-called Lebel of 8mm, but in the 1930s they introduced two new 7.65mm pistols: the M1935A and M1935S each carried eight rounds. The British, idiosyncratic to the last, persisted in issuing

a rimmed .38-caliber cartridge-firing revolver to their officers and mechanized troops, although many were rearmed with the Sten (9mm) or the Thompson (.45-caliber) submachine gun.

On the Eastern Front, troops on both sides were armed with pistols as well as rifles or submachine guns, particularly when engaged in house-clearing or close-terrain operations because of the close-quarters element of such fighting. German medical troops (banned from carrying weapons by the Geneva Convention of 1929) carried pistols for close protection when it was found that Soviet troops did not always respect the Red Cross.

The principal Japanese side arm was the Taisho 04 (or 1915), known as the Nambu for its designer, Colonel Nambu Kirijo. An 8mm, it held eight rounds. The follow-on was the Taisho 14 (1925) Nambu. Nambus were never considered reliable firearms, especially those produced late in the war.

The reason for arming mechanized troops and officers with pistols was to ensure that they had some protection. This was despite the fact that officers had many other tasks to perform, among which fighting was less important; mechanized troops operated in confined spaces, into which a full-length rifle or even a submachine gun was difficult to fit. U.S. forces used the M1 carbine in preference to the pistol, but the weapon was not popular, as it lacked killing power.

Pistols were also carried by police units within armies as well as by secret police units and were issued to individuals in the secret services. Some of these latter were designed for concealment or to be one-shot weapons, for use only in emergency situations.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rifles; Submachine Guns

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Pius XI, Pope (1857–1939)

Roman Catholic prelate and pope (1922–1939). Pope Pius XI was born Ambrogio Damiano Achille Ratti on May 31, 1857, in Desio, Italy, and ordained a priest in 1879. He thereafter earned three separate doctorates from the Gregorian University (Rome) and became a professor in a seminary. He began his career at the Vatican in 1911, when he became its vice prefect. In 1918, Ratti began his diplomatic career when he was posted to the newly independent Poland. There he helped establish a working relationship with the Polish government and also sought an accommodation with the Bolsheviks in Russia. In 1921, he became archbishop of Milan, one of the most important posts in the Catholic Church at the time. He was then elevated to the College of Cardinals. After Pope Benedict XV died, Ratti was elected to the papacy on the 14th ballot on February 6, 1922, and took the name Pius XI.

Scholarly and bookish by nature, Pius XI was an activist pope who in many ways embraced modernity and did not shy away from using new media such as the radio to broadcast the church's message and teachings to a wide audience. He also greatly accelerated evangelism by sponsoring more missionaries throughout the world and by ordaining more priests and other religious personnel.

It was in the diplomatic realm, however, that Pius's reign had the most far-reaching effect. Although he deeply distrusted Italian fascism and eyed Benito Mussolini warily, in 1929 he signed the Lateran Treaty with Mussolini's government, which was an understanding between the church and the state in which both parties pledged not to interfere in the affairs of the other; Mussolini also agreed to recognize Vatican City as a sovereign state within Italy, something that had not existed since before Italian unification.

Pius soon ran afoul of Mussolini's regime. By the early 1930s Pius had denounced fascist youth groups in both Italy and Germany. In 1931, he authored a papal letter in which he stated that one could not be a fascist and a Catholic at the same time. Not surprisingly, the Vatican's relations with the Mussolini regime went into a tailspin. This did not stop Pius from negotiating a concordat with Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime in Germany in 1933.

Pius was later criticized for this, but to his way of thinking, communism was a worse scourge than fascism. Thus, he sought to protect Catholics and Catholic clergy in Germany while hoping that Hitler would continue to be a bulwark against Soviet-exported communism. In any event, Hitler largely

ignored the concordat, and by the late 1930s Pius had begun to denounce Nazi ideology—especially its rabid anti-Semitism. He also lambasted Mussolini for copying the Nazis' anti-Semitism beginning in 1938.

Pius XI continued to be outspoken in his dislike of fascism, communism, and nationalism. He was also the first pope to address seriously the subject of Christian ecumenism (interfaith dialogue ultimately resulting in cooperation among denominations and faiths) and issued a stinging indictment of racism of all kinds, which was clearly aimed at Germany and the Soviet Union. Pius's health began to deteriorate rapidly in late 1938, and he died in the Vatican on February 10, 1939, only months before World War II began.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Hitler, Adolf; Italy; Mussolini, Benito; Pius XII, Pope; Religion and the War; Soviet Union

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Pius XII, Pope (1876–1958)

Roman Catholic prelate and pope. Born in Rome on March 2, 1876, Eugenio Pacelli was ordained to the priesthood in 1899 and accepted appointment to the Secretariat of State for the Vatican in 1901. He served as papal nuncio to Germany from 1917 to 1929 and observed firsthand the early manifestations of Nazi ideology. He was probably the Vatican official most familiar with the goals of Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler. Pacelli was elevated to cardinal in 1929 and became secretary of state at the Vatican in 1930.

During Pacelli's tenure, the Vatican negotiated a concordat with Germany that formally separated religion and politics. Pacelli encouraged the German Catholic hierarchy and individual clerics to abide by the terms of the agreement and to seek accommodation with the National Socialist regime. In an effort to keep favorable diplomatic relations with the German government,

the Vatican never publicly challenged the ideology of the Nazi Party and punished clerics who spoke against some of the overtly racist policies that emerged in Germany during the 1930s.

On March 2, 1939, Eugenio Pacelli was elected pope, taking the name of Pius XII. He was soon confronted with the horrors of World War II, which began that September. Pius XII's challenges during the war included maintaining civil relations with extremist governments, responding to the pastoral needs of Catholic peoples facing the horrors of war, and managing a worldwide enterprise divided by civil loyalties. His skills as a lifelong diplomat and his understanding of the ideas of realpolitik characterized his papacy during the war.

Clearly, Pius XII preferred fascism and Nazism, which at least tolerated Christian churches, to godless communism. Pius attracted considerable criticism, both during and after the war, for his lack of response to the anti-Semitic policies of the Third Reich, especially the Holocaust. Although Pius XII made several oblique condemnations of deportations, racial laws, and the plight of Roman Jews, he never exposed Nazi policies or condemned them outright. Recent investigations reveal that he was aware of the extent of the Holocaust. Pius XII understood the dangers that condemnation of Nazi policies would bring, and although he apparently agonized long and hard over the matter, he came to the conclusion that strong condemnation would be counterproductive to the interests of the church.

Pius XII was also later criticized because the Vatican issued passports to many suspected war criminals, allowing them to secure safe haven in other parts of the world. Pope Pius XII died in Rome on October 9, 1958.

JAMES T. CARROLL

See also

Catholic Church and the War; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust

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Placentia Bay Conference (August 9–12, 1941)

The first wartime meeting between British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt. The meeting at Placentia Bay, sometimes called the Atlantic Conference, occurred off the coast of Argentia, Newfoundland, and evolved from the correspondence between the two leaders and a growing desire to meet face-to-face. The idea for a meeting was first raised in 1940, but it was delayed repeatedly by political and war events. Argentia was chosen as a rough midway point for the two leaders. A new U.S. base that could provide cover was located there, and the location was remote, ensuring secrecy.

Roosevelt left Washington on August 3, 1941, under the guise of a fishing trip, but instead he secretly boarded the heavy cruiser *Augusta* off Martha's Vineyard and steamed north. Likewise, Churchill had quietly crossed the North Atlantic in the new battleship *Prince of Wales*. Each leader traveled with a substantial entourage of military and political advisers.

On Saturday, August 9, both parties arrived, and Churchill boarded the *Augusta* for the first meeting of the two leaders, during which the respective staffs had the opportunity to get to know one another. On Sunday, August 10, a shared religious service was held on the quarterdeck of the *Prince of Wales,* where the attendees sang familiar hymns.

On August 11, the real work of the conference began with three parallel meetings: Churchill and Roosevelt, their diplomatic assistants, and the military chiefs of staff. As a result, the United States agreed to accelerate aid to both Britain and the Soviet Union and to increase naval patrols in the Atlantic. The two countries also agreed to a protective takeover of the Canary Islands (by Britain) and Azores (by the United States) if Germany invaded the Iberian Peninsula. But the Americans made it clear that they did not intend to intervene beyond these actions because of domestic isolationist political pressure and military unpreparedness. Among the controversies that arose, however, was one over the British plan to rely for victory on heavy bombing, whereas the Americans argued that an invasion by ground forces would be needed to overcome Germany.

August 12 was dominated by discussion of the forthcoming Anglo-American mission to Moscow and final amendments to the joint eight-point

statement of goals and aims, which became known shortly thereafter as the Atlantic Charter. Both leaders then departed Argentia.

Roosevelt and Churchill discussed the meeting and the Atlantic Charter with journalists in the days that followed. Disagreement resulted from the softening by Secretary of State Sumner Welles of a statement to which Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed concerning further Japanese intentions in the Pacific. Welles believed that American political opinion was not ready for too firm a stand against the Japanese, and Roosevelt agreed with the new version as opposed to the near ultimatum that had been penned in Argentia. Principles expressed in the Atlantic Charter lasted far longer.

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See also

Atlantic Charter; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Welles, Benjamin Sumner

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Ploieşti, Raids on (August 1, 1943–August 18, 1944)

Major and costly U.S. air raids against the refineries of Ploieşti, Romania, known as Operation TIDAL WAVE. The refineries there supplied almost one-third of Germany's oil requirements. A land invasion of Romania to seize the Ploieşti refineries was impractical, so on August 1, 1943, the United States launched a yearlong air campaign to destroy them.

The first raid on Ploieşti was conducted on June 1, 1942, by 13 Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers of Halverson Detachment, led by Colonel Harry A. "Hurry-Up" Halverson. The mission originated in Fayid, Egypt. Twelve planes reached the target and bombed it from high altitude,

escaping without loss. Damage to Ploieşti was negligible. Three times during that first week in June, the Soviet Air Force sent small numbers of bombers against Ploieşti. The last inflicted some damage but at the cost of several Soviet planes and airmen. This ended Soviet interest in the refineries.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill endorsed a plan to bomb Ploieşti from North Africa. Planners decided that a low-level attack would be safer and more productive than one from the traditional high level. Three U.S. B-24 bomb groups from England were added to the two in Brigadier General Uzal G. Ent's IX Bomber Command, which was already in North Africa.

After studying the plan (code-named TIDAL WAVE) with his commanders and staff, Ent wrote a note to his superior officer recommending against a low-level mission. He did not know that this had already been decided. Once informed, he began intensive training of the five groups.

On August 1, 1943, 178 B-24s departed for Ploieşti. Eleven bombers either aborted or were lost en route to the target. Unknown to the Allies at the time, the Germans detected and traced the air armada from takeoff all the way to the target. As a result, German air defense fighter squadrons and antiaircraft defenses were fully alerted, and the German fighters were particularly effective against the bombers during the return from the mission.

Because of a navigational error, the bomb runs could not all be made as planned. Nonetheless, substantial damage was inflicted on several refineries, although oil production was reduced only in the short term. The bombing results did prove that the low-level attack destroyed more of the target area than raids made from high altitudes. At this point in the war, however, the 2,700-mile round-trip raid by unescorted bombers was an epic. Losses, although heavy, were fewer than Ent had feared. American losses included 310 men killed and some 130 wounded (including those who crashed or landed in neutral territory). Eighty-eight aircraft returned to base, but only 33 were fit to fly, and Ent had just over half his original complement of airmen. For this raid, 5 men were awarded the Medal of Honor, 3 of them posthumously. Ent and several others were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, America's second-highest award for heroism.

Ploieşti had an impressive and deadly array of antiaircraft guns and fighter planes to defend the area during the August 1, 1943, raid. Following

that, German lieutenant general Alfred Gerstenberg, who commanded Ploieşti's defenses, improved the defenses with additional guns and planes and, as a final touch, smoke pots. These pots were scattered throughout the refinery area and could be lit to cover the targets. He also installed an oil pipeline system, linking all the refineries, so that oil could be diverted from more damaged refineries to those less damaged or undamaged, maintaining optimal output.

A U.S. Army Air Forces B-24 Liberator bomber during the raid on the important Axis oil refineries at Ploieşti, Romania, on August 1, 1943. Note the low altitude taken by the aircraft in the attack. (44th Bomb Group Photograph Collection/United States Army Center of Military History)

Between April 5 and August 19, 1944, the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force made 5,479 high-level sorties in 19 raids against Ploieşti, with a loss of 223 aircraft. On June 10, 1944, 46 P-38 fighters made a low-level attack, and 24 were lost. Some 2,829 American airmen were lost (killed or captured) during the entire campaign. During the summer of 1944, Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) flew 924 high-level sorties against Ploieşti, in which 38 planes were lost.

In the raids, the Fifteenth Air Force and the RAF destroyed nearly 1.2 million tons of Ploieşti oil production, amounting to 84 tons of oil lost for each ton of bombs dropped. When Soviet troops entered Ploieşti on August

30, 1944, they found five refineries producing just 20 percent of normal production.

UZAL W. ENT

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Casablanca Conference; Logistics, Axis

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PLUTO

PLUTO was the acronym/code word for "Pipe Line under the Ocean" or "Pipe Line Underwater Transport of Oil." It was designed to supply petroleum to France following the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944. A sustainable and considerable supply of petroleum was essential to maintain the highly mechanized and motorized Allied forces in their drive across France, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower identified PLUTO as second in importance only to the Mulberry artificial harbors for the success of the invasion and subsequent liberation of France.

A network of high-pressure pipelines, PLUTO carried vital petroleum products. The three-inch pipelines were of two types. The HAIS was of lead with an outer steel winding, and the HAMEL was of steel. Each mile of HAIS pipe incorporated 24 tons of lead, 7.5 tons of steel tape, and 15 tons of steel outer armor, in addition to other materials such as cotton tape and jute serving. In all, PLUTO incorporated nearly 800 miles of pipes, the vast majority of which came from British manufacturers. PLUTO pumping stations were carefully disguised as buildings and gravel pits; one was even disguised as an ice cream shop.

The pipe was laid from large floating steel bobbins known as "conundrums," for cone-ended drum. Each weighed 1,600 tons and carried 60 miles of pipeline. The first pipe-laying ship was the converted coastal

freighter HMS *Holdfast*. As it and the other three pipe-laying ships towed one of the five conundrums across the channel, the cable unrolled from its bobbin and sank to the seabed. In all, a total of 34 pipe-laying ships and 600 officers and men were involved in the operation.

The two principal pipelines were "Bambi," from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg, and "Dumbo," from Dungeness in Kent to Boulogne. Bambi ultimately had 4 lines totaling 280 miles, while Dumbo numbered 17 lines totaling 500 miles of pipeline capable of pumping 1,350,000 gallons a day. Supplementing these were Tambola ship-to-shore pipelines.

Although Bambi and Dumbo were ready by D-day, the pipeline operation was delayed by the prolonged German defense of Cherbourg and mining of that port. In the meantime, oil went ashore to the Normandy beaches directly from tankers via minipipelines.

By September 18, when both pipelines were working, Allied forces had already retaken Paris and broken the German army in France. Bambi closed on October 4 (U.S. tankers were then directly delivering fuel to Cherbourg and Le Havre), and Dumbo then supplied all the cross–English Channel pumping.

PLUTO made it possible to dispense with a large number of tankers and remove them as possible targets. It also sharply reduced congestion at Mulberry B and the French ports once the latter were back in operation. By the end of the war in Europe, PLUTO had delivered 172 million gallons of petroleum to France.

The vast majority of the PLUTO pipelines were salvaged during 1946–1949. Some of the pipe missed by the salvage operation can be seen in the Isle of Wight Shipwreck Centre and Maritime Museum at Arreton.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Auxiliary Vessels; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Poland

Nation located in East-Central Europe with a 1939 population of 34.774 million. In 1939, Poland bordered Romania, Hungary, Bohemia, and Moravia to the south; Germany to the west and northwest; Lithuania and Latvia to the north; and the Soviet Union to the east. Poland's interwar land area covered approximately 150,000 square miles. The Second Polish Republic, which did not come into being until 1918, governed Poland as an independent state until September 1939, although the Polish government had become increasingly repressive and authoritarian in the years leading into World War II.

On September 1, 1939, 1.8 million German troops moved into Poland from three directions. The Germans had more than 2,600 tanks to only 180 for the Poles and more than 2,000 combat aircraft for only 420 Polish planes. Furthermore, the Polish armed forces were only about one-third mobilized by the time the attack came. Britain and France had pressured Poland not to mobilize earlier to avoid provoking Germany with "aggressive behavior."

Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. Under the security guarantees that had been given to Poland, that nation was supposed to fight a defensive campaign for only two weeks, at which time the Allies would counterattack from the west. That Allied offensive never occurred. By September 14, the Germans had surrounded Warsaw. Three days later, Soviet forces invaded Poland from the east. The last Polish forces surrendered on October 5.

There are many myths about Germany's so-called blitzkrieg campaign against Poland. The Polish Air Force was not destroyed on the ground on the first day of the war, and Polish horse cavalry units never mounted wave after wave of suicidal attacks against the German panzers. Nor was the campaign a walkover. The Poles held out for twice as long as they were expected to. In six weeks of fighting, the Germans suffered 50,000 casualties and lost 697 aircraft and 993 armored vehicles.

Under a secret clause of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union participated in a fourth modern partition of Poland. The Soviets absorbed the eastern part of the country, including the great cultural centers of Lvov (L'viv) and Wilno. In the Soviet zone, 1.5 million Poles were deported to labor camps in Siberia. In a deliberate effort to exterminate the Polish intelligentsia and leadership

classes, Soviet authorities transported thousands of captured Polish officers, including many reservists from universities and industry, to the Katyn Forest of eastern Poland and other locations, where they were executed and buried in anonymous mass graves.

Of the territory they occupied, the Germans annexed Pomerania, Poznan, and Silesia in the west. What was left became the General Government, under the harsh rule of Hans Frank. The Germans then began a campaign to liquidate the Jews of Poland and grind down the rest of the Poles. The Polish Jews were first herded into ghettos while the Germans built more than 2,000 concentration camps in Poland, including the industrial-scale death centers at Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Treblinka.

A number of Poles, including many in the armed forces, managed to escape from the country before the Germans and Soviets tightened their viselike grip on it. Those who escaped established a government-in-exile in London, with Władysław Raczkiewicz as president and General Władysław Sikorski as prime minister. In Poland, meanwhile, the Polish Resistance established the Armia Krajowa (Home Army, AK), which became the largest underground movement in Europe, with 400,000 fighters.

Outside of Poland, the Polish Army, the Polish Air Force, and the Polish Navy reorganized themselves in Britain and continued the war. The Britain-based Polish Army eventually fielded a corps in Western Europe. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviets released several thousand Polish prisoners of war to establish another corps under General Władysław Anders. The Polish II Corps was allowed to leave the Soviet Union by way of Persia and Egypt, and it eventually fought with distinction in North Africa and Italy.

Prior to the start of the war, Polish intelligence had managed to duplicate a German Enigma cipher machine. Copies were turned over to both the French and British in July 1939 and were the starting point of the Allies' spectacular success with radio-derived communications intelligence. Later in the war, the intelligence service of the AK recovered a German V-2 rocket that had crashed in the Bug River after a test flight and sent the key components to London.

In 1943, the Soviets formed their own division of Polish troops to fight on the Eastern Front. That unit would eventually grow to field-army strength. But when the Germans later that year discovered the bodies of the Polish

officers executed at the Katyn Forest and broadcast this news to the world, it opened a rift in Polish-Soviet relations that remained until the end of the Cold War.

As the Red Army slowly pushed the Germans from the Soviet Union back to the west, the Soviet Union's postwar intentions for Eastern Europe began to unfold. At the November–December 1943 Tehran Conference, British and U.S. leaders agreed to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's demands that the Soviet Union be allowed to keep the Polish territory taken in September 1939—in effect, the old Curzon Line established by the Allied governments in the peace settlement following World War I. After the war, Poland was partially compensated for its territorial losses in the east with a strip of German land in the west to the line of the Oder and Neisse Rivers. In July 1944 after Lublin was liberated, the Soviets established their own Polish government, a direct rival to the one in London, which was now led by Stanisław Mikołajczyk.

By August 1, 1944, the Red Army reached the right bank of the Vistula River opposite Warsaw. Armia Krajowa units in the city rose up against the Germans, anticipating Soviet support against the common enemy. The Soviets did nothing. Not only did they not help the AK, but they also refused landing rights on Soviet-controlled airfields for any Allied aircraft that might attempt aerial supply missions. The Poles fought on alone, street by street and house by house, for 63 days, and in the end the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) destroyed virtually the entire city. When the Germans finally withdrew from what was left of Warsaw, the Soviets moved across the river.

The destruction of Warsaw eliminated the remaining political and military institutions in Poland still loyal to the London government and paved the way for a complete Soviet takeover. The final blows to a free Poland were delivered by the victorious Allies at the 1945 Yalta Conference. World War II ended, but Poland remained under the Soviet yoke until the end of the Cold War more than 40 years later.

Poland suffered as heavily as any nation in the war, losing an estimated 38 percent of its national assets. The country lost 22 percent of its population —some 500,000 military personnel and 6 million civilians. Roughly half the Poles who died between 1939 and 1945 were Jews. Most of the approximately 5.4 million victims died in concentration camps and ghettos or

by starvation, epidemic, or other causes resulting from the brutal occupation. One million of the survivors were war orphans, and another half million were invalids.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Anders, Władysław; Holocaust; Katyn Forest Massacre; Mikołajczyk, Stanisław; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Poland, Air Force; Poland, Army; Poland, Navy; Poland Campaign; Poland–East Prussia Campaign; Signals Intelligence; Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; V-2 Rocket; Yalta Conference; Document 32; Document 33; Document 35; Document 37; Document 38; Document 48

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Poland, Air Force

There were three separate incarnations of the Polish Air Force (PAF) in World War II: the force that fought the campaign in Poland in 1939, the reconstituted force that fought under Allied control in the west, and the Polish air units that fought under Soviet control on the Eastern Front. Nonetheless, the small PAF played a disproportionately significant role in World War II.

Poland produced some fine aircraft in the 1930s. The P7 parasol-winged fighter, which entered service in 1931, was built entirely of metal and covered with stressed skin. The follow-on version, P.11 Jedenastka (Eleventh), entered service in 1935. Ruggedly built, it was fast and maneuverable. As with many other countries, in the mid-1930s Poland shifted development priority to bombers. Poland had two primary bombers, the P.23 Karas single-engine light bomber and the P.37 twin-engine medium

bomber. The latter, which entered service in 1938, was a world-class aircraft, but Poland had only about 75 of them when the war began, and only half were fully equipped.

At the start of the war on September 1, 1939, the PAF contained a total of 397 combat aircraft, including 159 fighters, 154 bombers, and 84 reconnaissance craft. Prior to the German attack, almost all the operational aircraft were dispersed to outlying airfields in accordance with established plans. Despite the enduring but false myth of the PAF being destroyed on the ground on the first day of the war, most of the aircraft hit by the Luftwaffe were nonoperational aircraft used for spare parts. Even though the PAF was outnumbered more than four to one, it still inflicted surprisingly heavy losses on the Luftwaffe. During the monthlong campaign, the Germans lost 564 aircraft in Poland, at least 121 in air-to-air combat. The Poles lost almost all of their aircraft, 70 of them in aerial combat.

After the Soviets invaded Poland on September 17, the remainder of the PAF withdrew into Romania and Hungary. Many Polish pilots and ground crew made their way to France and reconstituted the PAF under the Polish government-in-exile. During the France Campaign (May 10–June 25, 1940), the PAF had almost 7,000 men, but they were equipped with only obsolete aircraft. Nonetheless, the PAF scored 56 aerial victories in May and June before withdrawing to Britain and reconstituting again.

Flying under the control of the Royal Air Force (RAF), the PAF finally came into its own, especially during the pivotal July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain. During the two and a half short months of history's first decisive air campaign, British airspace was stoutly defended by a razor-thin line of only 2,363 pilots—446 of whom were killed in action. Almost forgotten today is the fact that 487 of those pilots—some 21 percent of the total—were not British at all. They were a mixed assortment of volunteers from many nations, including contingents of various European air forces in exile. The 146 pilots of the PAF were by far the largest group of non-British pilots flying under RAF operational control. On September 11, 1940, one of the pivotal days of the battle, the Poles accounted for 18 percent of the Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed. On September 15, they accounted for 14 percent. On September 19, they shot down 25 percent, and on September 26, they shot down a staggering 48 percent.

The PAF's Number 303 "Kosciuszko" Squadron was the top-scoring

squadron in the entire Battle of Britain. The Number 303 Squadron downed three times the average RAF score while incurring only one-third the average casualties. The RAF as a whole lost 1 pilot for every 4.9 enemy kills. The Polish squadrons shot down 10.5 German aircraft for each of their pilots lost.

The PAF in Britain eventually numbered 20,000 airmen organized in 14 squadrons, including 3 bomber squadrons. By the end of the war, they had flown almost 90,000 combat sorties, had destroyed more than 500 Axis aircraft and some 200 V-1 flying bombs, and had flown 16,000 transport sorties.

The final Polish air element of the war fought on the Eastern Front. In the summer of 1943, the Soviets established Polish air units to support the Polish ground units then fighting under Soviet control. These began flying combat missions on April 23, 1944. By the end of the war, the Polish 1st Composite Air Division had flown almost 19,000 combat sorties, downing 20 German aircraft.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Poland; Poland, Army; Poland, Navy; Poland Campaign

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Poland, Army

Faced with growing German aggression in Eastern Europe, the Polish Army introduced a new mobilization plan on April 30, 1938. Plan W called for drafting 1.3 million new troops and raising a total of 39 infantry divisions, 9 reserve infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, 2 armored brigades, and 3 separate tank battalions. In the event of a national emergency, the Poles

planned to mobilize 28 of the divisions, with the remaining 11 called up only after the declaration of a general mobilization.

By September 1939, the Polish Army had some 500,000 men, 41,000 machine guns, 3,500 antitank rifles, 1,200 mortars, 1,200 antitank guns, 462 antiaircraft guns, and 3,388 artillery pieces of various sizes. The Poles, however, were poorly motorized, having fewer than 6,000 motor vehicles. Traditionally considered among the best military horsemen in Europe, the Poles continued to rely heavily on horses for economic reasons more than anything else.

The Poles had 887 tanks, but 550 of these were small two-man TK and TKS tankettes, mounting little more than machine guns. The Poles had only 170 larger tanks mounting guns up to 47mm in size, and they also had 102 obsolete French tanks of World War I vintage. Although this force was less than one-third of the nearly 2,500 tanks the Germans could field, the Polish armored force was larger than that of the contemporary U.S. Army. The Poles, however, made the mistake of adopting the flawed British and French armored doctrine, which regarded tanks as infantry-support weapons.

Under French and British pressure, the Poles delayed declaring a general mobilization until August 30. The Germans attacked two days later, and many of the Polish units never had the chance to reach their authorized strength. According to British and French assurances, the Poles were only supposed to fight a delaying defense for two weeks, until their allies could attack Germany from the west. That never happened, and when the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east on September 17, all hope of Polish survival disappeared. The last major Polish forces surrendered on October 5, 1939, having suffered 210,000 killed or wounded and 580,000 captured by the Germans and another 200,000 captured by the Soviets.

Some 100,000 Polish soldiers managed to evade capture and escaped through Romania, Hungary, and the Baltic states. Many eventually made their way to France and joined the Polish government-in-exile, which was headed by General Władysław Sikorski. Meanwhile, as early as May 1939, Polish and French officials had discussed the feasibility of forming military units manned by some of the half million Polish immigrants then living in France. By May 1940, the reconstituted Polish army in France had some 84,500 troops organized into two infantry divisions and a mechanized

brigade. In addition, the Podhale Rifle Brigade fought in Norway, and the independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade was formed in the Middle East.

During the May 10–June 25, 1940, France Campaign, the Polish 1st Grenadier Division was destroyed fighting in Lorraine. The 2nd Rifle Division escaped into Switzerland, and its soldiers were interned there for the remainder of the war. Only some 30 percent of the Polish army managed to escape to Britain, where it again reconstituted and formed the Polish I Corps. That unit eventually consisted of the 1st Armored Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 1st Independent Parachute Brigade. The parachute brigade's most celebrated battle was its doomed jump into Arnhem to support the British there in Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944).

Sikorski, meanwhile, had been negotiating with the Soviets to form another Polish unit from the prisoners of war (POWs) who had been imprisoned in the Siberian labor camps in late 1939. In August 1941, a Polish force of 96,000 men was formed under Soviet control to fight against the Germans on the Eastern Front. But there were conflicts and tensions between the Soviets and Poles from the start, and the British pressured Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to release the force to fight under their control in the Middle East.

A fanfare of trumpets salutes Polish army tanks as they move through the streets during a military parade in Warsaw, Poland, on May 11, 1939. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Therefore, in August 1942 General Władysław Anders led 74,000 Polish troops and many accompanying civilians from the Soviet Union through Iran to Palestine. After merging with the Carpathian Rifle Brigade already there,

the newly established Polish II Corps moved to Libya. By the end of 1943 the force moved to Italy, where it continued to fight under British control. II Corps eventually consisted of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division, the 5th Kresowa Infantry Division, the 2nd Armored Brigade, and an artillery group. II Corps suffered 17,000 casualties during the 1943–1945 Italian Campaign and distinguished itself during the fighting for Monte Cassino in 1944.

Thousands of Poles remained in Soviet captivity, however, even after Anders moved his corps to the Middle East. Soviet-Polish tensions reached a new high in May 1943 after the Germans discovered the mass graves of thousands of Polish POW officers murdered in the Katyn Forest in 1940. The Soviets used the rising tensions as a pretext to sever relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London and to establish their own government-in-exile composed of Polish communists. The Moscow-based Union of Polish Patriots raised the first units of what would become the Polish People's Forces (PPF), fighting under Soviet control.

The initial PPF unit, the 1st Infantry Division, was named after Polish national hero Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who ironically had led the Polish revolt against the Russians in the 1790s. The division first went into action at Lenino in October 1943. In 1944, the Polish force had grown to the size of a field army. Designated the First Polish People's Army, it was under the command of General Zygmunt Berling. It had some 107,000 troops and consisted of five infantry divisions, a tank brigade, and supporting artillery units.

After the Red Army entered Poland and began to push the Germans back to the west, the Soviets installed a communist provisional government at Lublin, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, also known as the "Lublin government" to distinguish it from the Polish government-in-exile in London, the "London government." That government expanded the PPF by adding another field army. By March 1945, the PPF numbered some 400,000 troops, which were under the command of Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski. The order of battle included 14 infantry divisions, an armored corps, and 16 artillery brigades. The Second Polish People's Army took part in the capture of Dresden, and the First Polish People's Army participated in the March 31–May 2, 1945, Battle for Berlin. The Poles suffered 30,500 casualties in that fighting.

The Poles were the first to fight the Germans. They fought the Germans

the longest and fought them on every major front: Norway, North Africa, Italy, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. At the end of World War II, more than 620,000 Poles were under arms in both the west and the east. The Polish armed forces in the west numbered close to 200,000 men, including 14,000 in the air force and 4,000 in the navy. Between 1940 and 1945, the exile force in the west sustained 43,500 casualties, including 7,600 dead. When the force in the west demobilized in 1946, only a small number returned to communist-dominated Poland.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Anders, Władysław; Berlin, Land Battle for; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; France, Battle for; Italy Campaign; Katyn Forest Massacre; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Poland; Poland, Air Force; Poland, Navy; Poland Campaign; Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz

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Poland, Navy

One of the smaller navies in Europe, the Polish Navy was the first Allied force to see combat in World War II. Navy commander Vice Admiral Jozef Unrug commanded 34 vessels, including 4 modern destroyers, a large minelayer, and 5 submarines.

The Polish Navy was unprepared for the scale of the German air and naval attacks launched on it beginning on September 1, 1939. Unrug, a former U-boat captain in the German Imperial Navy, foresaw the impending invasion and sent his three newest destroyers to Britain in late August. He knew that the lack of Polish antiaircraft defenses and the concentration of much more powerful German naval units in the southern Baltic made defeat inevitable.



Sailors manning an anti-aircraft gun on one of the two Polish destroyers operating with the British Navy, November 1939. (Fox Photos/Getty Images)

Those ships that remained behind at Gdynia and Gdansk endured two days of constant German air and naval attacks that damaged or sank all of them except the submarines *Orzel* and *Wilk,* which managed to escape. Unrug and his staff withdrew to the naval base on the Hel Peninsula after the invasion and were the last of the Polish military to surrender, on October 2, 1939. During the campaign, the Polish Navy lost 26 vessels. Personnel casualties amounted to 1,500–2,000 men killed and perhaps 3,500 wounded.

Some naval personnel escaped to Britain to serve with the remnants of their navy, reorganized under Royal Navy command. The Poles received two new destroyers from the British through the Anglo-Polish Naval Accord of November 18, 1939. The destroyer *Grom* and the submarine *Orzel* were sunk during the German invasion of Norway in 1940, and the destroyer *Burza* was heavily damaged during the Dunkerque (Dunkirk) evacuation (May 26–June 4, 1940).

The navy of the Polish government-in-exile remained active in the Allied war effort, thanks to a steady flow of recruits from Polish refugees in Britain and the addition of new British destroyers and gunboats. The Polish Navy participated in a wide range of actions, including the May 1941 sinking of the German battleship *Bismarck,* protection of transatlantic convoys, and the

amphibious assaults on Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and Normandy (June 6, 1944).

The 4,000 Polish Navy officers and sailors operating in conjunction with the British manned 47 warships (including 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 5 submarines). They sank 9 enemy warships and 39 transport vessels. The Polish Navy lost 3 destroyers and 2 submarines and suffered 404 dead and 191 wounded.

BRADFORD WINEMAN

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Convoys, Allied; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Poland; Poland, Army; Poland, Air Force; Poland Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of

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Poland Campaign (1939)

World War II began in Europe with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The Poland Campaign, however, was soon overshadowed by the campaigns and battles that followed. It is best remembered today in mythsand legends, almost all of them untrue. Polish horse cavalry units never mounted suicidal charges against German panzers, the Polish Air Force was not destroyed on the ground on the first day of the war, and the Polish Army was far from a pushover for the German Army.

Under the command of Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the Polish Army in the summer of 1939 had roughly 500,000 men, organized into 30 regular and 9 reserve infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, and 2 mechanized brigades. The Polish Army had 887 tanks, less than a third of the almost 2,500 tanks fielded by the Germans. When it became obvious they would be attacked by Germany, the Poles opted for a forward defense designed to withdraw slowly to the east to buy more time for mobilization.

Plan ZACHOD (WEST), issued on March 23, 1939, correctly assumed that the German main attack would come from Silesia in the direction of Warsaw, with supporting attacks from German Pomerania and East Prussia. The Poles therefore positioned four armies along Poland's western border. In north-central Poland, one army was positioned to defend Warsaw from a German thrust south from East Prussia. After the Germans moved into Slovakia, the Poles also established a weak army in the south to defend the passes through the Carpathian Mountains.

Plan ZACHOD was based on a fighting withdrawal, with armies Pomorze, Poznan, and Lodz all falling back to the west while pivoting on the strong Army Krakow, the southern anchor of the Polish line. Many military historians have been highly critical of the Polish plan, positing that Poland's armies were deployed too far forward and spread too thin. But the Polish Army by itself could have never beaten the Germans, regardless of its strategic plan. The Polish-German border was 1,250 miles long, and the German extension into Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia added another 500 miles. Plan ZACHOD was based on the assumption of a strong attack by Britain and France against Germany in the west. Unfortunately for the Poles, that promised attack never came.

In August 1939, the Wehrmacht had 51 active divisions, 51 reserve divisions, and 1 active cavalry brigade. All the reserve divisions were infantry units, and the active force included 6 panzer and 4 motorized divisions. The average panzer division had 310 tanks, most of which were the lightly armed PzKpfw-I and PzKpfw-II models. The Germans had a total of about 500 of the heavier PzKpfw-III and PzKpfw-IV tanks. They also made use of PzKpfw 35(t) and PzKpfw 38(t) tanks, redesignated Czech machines acquired in the March 1939 takeover of Bohemia and Moravia.

The Wehrmacht's active strength was roughly 730,000 men, and its reserve strength was about 1.1 million men. On April 3, 1939, Adolf Hitler's headquarters responded to British prime minister Neville Chamberlain's declaration of support for Poland by issuing FALL WEISS (CASE WHITE), the plan for the invasion. The success of FALL WEISS hinged on a calculated political risk that made most of Hitler's generals nervous. The Germans had to secure a quick victory in Poland in order to shift their forces rapidly back to the west to fend off any attack from the French and British.

The Wehrmacht of 1939 was neither large enough nor strong enough to

mount simultaneously a massive attack in the east and a strong defense in the west. Thus, the attack in the east could only be strengthened at the risk of weakening the defense in the west. Hitler was willing to gamble that the French and British would not act in time to save Poland. FALL WEISS then called for Germany's border with France to be guarded by the relatively weak Army Group C, which consisted of 21 active and 14 reserve divisions.

A total of 52 divisions, including all of the panzer and motorized divisions, were allocated for the attack on Poland. They were organized into Army Group North and Army Group South under Colonel Generals Fedor von Bock and Gerd von Rundstedt, respectively. The original plan did not include military operations east of the Vistula, on the assumption that Soviet forces would move rapidly into that area. The campaign would end with the Tenth Army linking up with Army Group North at Warsaw and then sealing off the Polish units in western Poland and preventing them from escaping east to the Narew–Vistula–San River line.

Beginning in July, 386,000 army and 55,000 Luftwaffe reservists were called to active duty under the guise of training maneuvers. By the end of August, Army Group North had 630,000 men, and Army Group South had 886,000. Hitler initially set August 26 as Y-day, the start of the attack. But then Hitler blinked when Britain and France, on August 24, responded to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of the day before by giving Poland written guarantees of military support, and Benito Mussolini backed off, bringing Italy into the war on Germany's side. Late on August 25, Hitler canceled the attack orders, but several small German units still crossed the frontier and clashed with Polish border guards before they could be recalled.

After a few more days of diplomatic cat-and-mouse games, Hitler on August 31 signed "Führer Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War." On August 30, Rydz-Śmigły ordered a general mobilization. That brought an immediate and sharp reaction from Britain and France, who were afraid of provoking Germany and remembered only too well the spiral of mobilizations that triggered World War I. Within three hours, the French government had pressured Rydz-Śmigły into revoking the mobilization order.

With the German forces in position and ready to move, Hitler needed only a provocation to provide a fig leaf of respectability. Leaving nothing to chance, the German Sicherheitsdienst (SD), dressed in Polish uniforms, "raided" the German Silesian town of Gleiwitz on the night of August 31.

They seized the local radio station and played a pre-recorded anti-German message in Polish. After firing off a few rounds for effect, the SD unit withdrew, leaving behind several “Polish casualties” as evidence. The bodies were actually prisoners from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp dressed in Polish uniforms and murdered specially for Hitler’s little charade.

According to the FALL WEISS plans, the invasion was to commence at 4:45 a.m. on September 1. The first shots were fired 15 minutes early, however, when three dive-bombers of the 3/1st Stuka Geschwader (Squadron) hit a Poznan air base, which turned out to be deserted. The Luftwaffe immediately followed through with attacks on Polish airfields and rail centers. For the most part, the attacks on the Polish airfields were failures. Anticipating the strikes against the bases, the Polish Air Force on August 31 dispersed its frontline aircraft to secret secondary bases to avoid having them caught and destroyed on the ground.

Soldiers of the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division, resting in a ditch alongside a road on the way to

Pabjanice, during the Polish Campaign of September 1939. (Library of Congress)

The Luftwaffe dwarfed the Polish Air Force, which had only 392 first-line combat aircraft. The Luftwaffe in March 1939 had 4,303 aircraft, including 1,180 bombers, 336 dive-bombers, and 1,179 fighters. In support of the German invasion, Army Group North was allocated Luftflotte 1 under General of Flyers Albert Kesselring; Army Group South was supported by General Alexander Löhr's Luftflotte 4. The combined force totaled 36 groups and included all of Germany's dive-bombers, 70 percent of its bombers, and 50 percent of its fighters.

Vastly outnumbered and technically outclassed, the Polish pilots put up a stiff resistance. The law of numbers, however, dictated that the Polish Air Force would play only a marginal role in the overall outcome of the campaign. By September 6, Polish fighter units were down to 50 percent of

their original strength. A few days later, the surviving fighters began withdrawing toward Romania with the rest of the Polish army.

In the end, the Poles lost almost 300 combat aircraft, and they evacuated 98 to Romania. But the Germans suffered heavy losses as well, with 285 aircraft destroyed and another 279 severely damaged. Despite the great technological disparity in aircraft, Polish fighter pilots scored at least 121 confirmed air-to-air kills for the campaign. German records indicate that the true number may have been closer to 160.

The Poles had no illusions about their strategic situation. On August 30, Vice Admiral Józef Unrug, commander of the Polish Navy, initiated Operation PEKING, ordering Poland's three modern destroyers to leave immediately for British ports. At 4:43 a.m. on September 1, the old German battleship *Schleswig-Holstein* opened fire on the Polish military supply base on Westerplatte Island in Danzig Harbor.

The ground war started within minutes of the *Schleswig-Holstein* opening fire. In the north, visibility was limited by heavy ground fog as Bock's units jumped off. The Third Army, under General of Artillery Georg von Küchler, attacked south toward Warsaw, and Lieutenant General Günther von Kluge's Fourth Army sliced into the Polish Corridor, which divided East Prussia from the rest of Germany. The Fourth Army's objective was to clear a path for the one panzer and two motorized divisions of General of Panzer Troops Heinz Guderian's XIX Corps to drive a pincer arm southwest toward Warsaw.

The weather in the south, meanwhile, was clear as Army Group South crossed into Poland. General of Infantry Johannes Blaskowitz's Eighth Army drove toward the Polish industrial city of Lodz. In Rundstedt's center, his Tenth Army, under General of Artillery Walther von Reichenau, struck from Opole toward Czestochowa, Piotrków, and Tomaszow to encircle Warsaw from the south. The Fourteenth Army, under Colonel General Wilhelm List, attacked from German Silesia and Slovakia to cut off Krakow. By September 4, the Germans had managed to drive a deep wedge between Army Lodz and Army Krakow.

On September 5, the first major clash between German and Polish tanks occurred at Piotrków. At the end of the day, the Germans penetrated Polish defenses and secured the key road links to Warsaw. The breakthrough at Piotrków marked the end of the first phase of the Poland Campaign.

By the evening of September 5, the Polish armies were retreating all

along the line. With his thin defensive shell cracked, no reserves to commit, and much of his army still mobilizing, Rydz-Śmigły believed that he had no alternative but to order a withdrawal to the line of the Vistula. Simultaneously, German field commanders such as Guderian sensed victory and pushed the German high command to authorize operations beyond the Vistula.

The Germans now directly threatened Warsaw. On September 7, Rydz-Śmigły compounded the Polish command-and-control problems by ordering the withdrawal of the high command eastward to Brześć (Brest). The Polish command-and-control infrastructure was primitive to begin with, but the move from Warsaw to Brześć virtually guaranteed that the Polish high command would no longer play any significant role in managing the campaign. In the north, meanwhile, the Fourth Army pushed Army Pomorze out of the Polish Corridor, bypassed Army Poznan, and was approaching Warsaw. On September 8, the 4th Panzer Division attempted to take the Polish capital by storm, but it was driven back and lost 60 armored vehicles after heavy street fighting.

In their rush to reach Warsaw, the Germans lost track of General Tadeusz Kutrzeba's bypassed Army Poznan. They assumed that it had been pushed back as well and was now incorporated into the Warsaw garrison. Kutrzeba's force, in fact, was entrenched behind a bend in the Bzura River about 30 miles west of Warsaw. Locally, Kutrzeba held a three-to-one superiority in infantry, and he decided to attack.

The ensuing Bzura River Offensive was the only major Polish counterattack of the campaign. On September 9, the Poles caught the German 24th and 30th Infantry Divisions by surprise, taking more than 1,500 prisoners from the 30th alone. But the Germans, with their far greater mobility and firepower, were able to shift other forces rapidly to contain this Polish offensive. Army Poznan finally surrendered on September 21, with the Germans capturing more than 100,000 Poles.

With the Bzura Offensive under control, the Germans turned their attention back to Warsaw to conduct a set-piece siege. On September 15, the German Third Army forced its way into Warsaw's Praga District, on the east side of the Vistula. By September 23, Warsaw's food and water were running out, and the city was completely ringed by 13 German divisions and more than 1,000 guns. On September 25, a day the Poles still call "Black Monday,"

Hitler personally ordered an armada of 420 German bombers to savage the capital with repeated sorties. Warsaw finally surrendered on September 27, after suffering some 2,000 military and 40,000 civilian dead.

It quickly became obvious to Rydz-Śmigły that his order to withdraw to the rivers had come too late. With their vastly superior mobility, the Germans were able to reach the river lines before the Poles could man them. Given approval by the high command, German field commanders now advanced their forces east of the Vistula. On September 9, the Fourth Army initiated a drive toward Brześć that was spearheaded by Guderian's XIX Corps. Two days later, Rydz-Śmigły ordered the surviving Polish units to withdraw toward the southeast, to the so-called Romanian bridgehead.

Plan ZACHOD had been based on holding until the French and British could attack Germany from the west. The Poles were promised that attack no later than September 16. It did not occur. On September 17, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin drove the final nail into the Polish coffin by invading Poland from the east. Hiding behind the excuse of occupying eastern Poland "to protect its fraternal Belorussian and Ukrainian populations," the Red Army marched in with two fronts (army groups). The Belorussian Front, under General Mikhail Prokofevich Kovalev, and the Ukrainian Front, under General Semen Timoshenko, had a combined strength of 24 infantry divisions, 15 cavalry divisions, and 2 tank corps.

The Soviet invasion caused immediate problems for the German field commanders, who already were operating well to the east of the demarcation line agreed to in the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. On September 20, Hitler ordered a withdrawal to the designated line, with movement to start the next day. The Soviets reached the Bug River on September 23.

On the diplomatic level, meanwhile, the Soviet government initiated negotiations to shift the line to the east in exchange for Lithuania. The Germans agreed, and on October 1 the new demarcation line was established along the general line of the Bug River. The result was to extend the German zone to the east by as much as 100 miles in some places.

Poland suffered staggering losses in the campaign, amounting to 66,300 killed, 133,700 wounded, 587,000 taken prisoner by the Germans, and another 200,000 taken prisoner by the Soviets. Polish civilian deaths were close to 100,000. Virtually all of Poland's military hardware was destroyed or

captured, with the exception of the handful of obsolete fighters that escaped to Romania.

Despite the claims of German minister of propaganda Josef Goebbels, the Germans paid a high price for such a short campaign. The Wehrmacht suffered 16,000 dead and 32,000 wounded. It lost 217 tanks and had another 457 so heavily damaged that most never returned to service. Thus, the Germans lost one-quarter of the tanks as well as one-fifth of the combat aircraft they committed to the campaign. On top of that, they expended eight months' worth of fuel, ammunition, and repair parts in an operation that lasted little more than one month.

The performance of the Polish military can perhaps be put into proper perspective by comparing it with that of the Western Allies in the spring of 1940. Only partly mobilized, vastly outnumbered, with obsolete weapons, and attacked from all sides, the Poles held out for 36 days and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans. The British, French, Belgians, and Dutch had almost nine months to mobilize and prepare. When war did come in the west, the Allies had near parity in ground and air forces, actual superiority in tanks, and outright supremacy at sea. Yet in a 39-day campaign, they inflicted fewer losses on the Germans than had the Poles.

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See also

Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von; Bock, Fedor von; Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Guderian, Heinz; Hitler, Adolf; Kesselring, Albert; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Küchler, Georg von; List, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter; Löhr, Alexander; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Poland; Poland, Army; Reichenau, Walther von; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Rydz-Śmigły, Edward; Stalin, Joseph; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich; Document 33; Document 35; Document 37; Document 38; Document 40; Document 41; Document 42; Document 43; Document 44; Document 46; Document 48

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Poland–East Prussia Campaign (July 1944–April 1945)

Important Eastern Front campaign. On June 22, 1944, the third anniversary of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army launched Operation BAGRATION, a massive offensive to drive German forces from western Belorussia. By mid-1944, the German Army was only a shell of what it had been in 1941, whereas the Soviets had superior numbers of artillery pieces, tanks, trucks, and aircraft as well as a four-to-one manpower advantage on the Eastern Front. The Soviets had also developed new tactical doctrines that took advantage of their improved mobility.

The great Soviet offensive involved 11 fronts (army groups) and stretched from the Baltic in the north to the Black Sea in the south. Within two months, the Red Army had liberated Belorussia and destroyed German Army Group Center, but even before the conclusion of BAGRATION, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin issued new orders through Stavka for the liberation of the Baltic states and Poland and a drive on Berlin. From north to south, this effort involved the 1st Baltic and 3rd, 2nd, and 1st Belorussian Fronts.

On July 20, 1944, units of the 1st Belorussian Front crossed the Bug River in three places and captured Lublin. There the Soviets established their own Polish government and army and declared open season on the London government's anticommunist Polish Home Army. On July 25, the Red Army reached the Vistula. The great city of Brest, encircled, fell on July 28 after a single day of fighting. Meanwhile, Lvov, the capital of Galicia, capitulated on July 27 as the other fronts, north and south, achieved their objectives against varying degrees of resistance. Some German Army units, cut off and isolated against the Baltic, did not surrender until the end of the war.

German colonel general Joseph Harpe, commander of Army Group A (the redesignated Army Group North), could do little more than delay the inevitable. Adolf Hitler's demand for "no retreat," when obeyed, resulted in the destruction of many German units in untenable positions, and static defense also brought the destruction of the few remaining German maneuver elements. Adding to Harpe's difficulties was Hitler's decision to withdraw units to prepare for the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (the Battle of the Bulge) in the west.

At the end of July, Stavka ordered the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts to drive to the Narew River and Warsaw. The 2nd Belorussian Front was to advance to Ostróda and Łomża. The 1st Belorussian Front drove on the Warsaw suburb of Praga, along the way seizing crossing points over the Narew and Vistula Rivers. Although these objectives were secured, the Red Army offensive had lost momentum. In the drive, the Soviets destroyed 28 German divisions, inflicting 350,000 casualties, but logistical problems—the consequence of the rapid advance and two months of solid fighting—forced a pause.

On August 29, Stalin ordered all Red Army fronts to dig in generally along the line of the Vistula and Narew Rivers. Although the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts continued limited attacks to strengthen their hold across the Narew, Soviet forces made no effort to cross the Vistula and move into Warsaw. This decision produced one of the most controversial episodes of the entire war, the Warsaw Rising of August 1–October 2, 1944.

With the rapid Soviet advance, Polish Home Army commander General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski ordered a general uprising in Warsaw, which brought quick German Army reaction. The Soviets made only halfhearted efforts to assist the Home Army in the form of air-dropped supplies. Although it is true that the Red Army suffered from genuine logistical problems, it is also quite true that Stalin was delighted to see the Germans eliminate the anticommunist Home Army forces, whose existence he correctly believed would hinder his postwar control of Poland. The Soviets not only refused to help the Poles in any meaningful way but also obstructed efforts by the Western Allies to air-drop supplies to the Polish fighters. The fighting brought the destruction of 90 percent of the buildings of Warsaw but also claimed 10,000 German casualties—a tribute to the ferocity of the two-month-long Polish Home Army resistance.

Stavka, meanwhile, laid plans for the final control of Poland in an offensive that would carry from the Vistula to the Oder. The massive offensive involved Marshal Georgii Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front, General Ivan Chernyakovsky's 3rd Belorussian Front, and Marshal Ivan S. Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front, all of which were on the Narew-Vistula Line. General Ivan Petrov's 4th Ukrainian Front occupied positions along the San River line in southern Poland and Galicia.

Stalin's orders were to destroy Army Group A, with the secondary objective of drawing off German reserves in response to Western appeals during the German Ardennes Offensive. Under Stavka's plan, the 1st Belorussian Front was to take Poznan and destroy forces cut off in the Warsaw area. The 2nd Belorussian Front would assist in surrounding Warsaw and also take Marienburg. The 1st Ukrainian Front, with five combined-arms armies, two tank armies, and four tank/mechanized corps, would carry the brunt of the offensive, breaking out of the Sandomierz bridgehead and driving to Breslau. The 4th Ukrainian Front would drive on Kraków. The Soviet offensive was massive. The 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian Fronts together contained 2.2 million ground troops (a six-to-one advantage over the defending Germans) in 163 divisions supported by more than 32,000 artillery pieces and almost 4,800 aircraft.

The second half of the offensive to clear Poland began on January 12, 1945. Radom fell on January 16. By January 17, Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front and the Soviet-controlled Polish First Army had liberated Warsaw. Within the next week, the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts had punched a 310-mile hole in the German lines and driven 100 miles. There was little that Harpe and the German forces could do to arrest the Soviet advance. Kraków and Poznań were taken in late January, and on January 22 Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front bridged the Oder. Zhukov also reached the river and got his troops across, although it took three weeks to close the 70-mile gap separating these two Red Army fronts. On January 28, forces of the 1st Belorussian Front entered German Pomerania, where they were met by the hastily formed Army Group Vistula, commanded by head of the SS Heinrich Himmler. Königsberg was surrounded and taken on April 9. Meanwhile, the 1st Ukrainian Front eliminated pockets of German forces in southwestern Poland.

Soviet forces had once again outrun their logistical support and were forced to halt. Nevertheless, the Red Army was now poised to begin its final offensive: the drive on Berlin to end the war.

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See also

Ardennes Offensive; BAGRATION, Operation; Bór-Komorowski, Tadeusz; Chernyakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich; Himmler, Heinrich; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Petrov, Ivan Yefimovich; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Warsaw Rising; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Popov, Markian Mikhailovich (1902–1969)

Soviet Army general. Born in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya, Volgograd Region, on November 15, 1902, Markian Mikhailovich Popov became an officer candidate in the Russian Army in 1916 and fought in World War I. He then joined both the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party. Chief of staff of a division during the Russian Civil War, Popov graduated from the Military Political Academy in 1931.

Popov was chief of staff of the First Special Red Banner Army in the Far East in 1938 and 1939. He assumed command of the Leningrad Military District in January 1941 and held a succession of commands there following the German invasion on June 22. Popov commanded the Sixty-First Army in the Bryansk Front from November to June 1942. Then, in succession, he commanded the Fortieth Army, the Fifth Strike Army, the Forty-Fifth Tank

Army, and the Reserve Front during 1942–1943. Promoted to colonel general, he directed the Bryansk Front from June 1943 until he was promoted to army general. He took command of the Baltic Front, which became the Second Baltic Front, in October 1943. He thus participated in the liberation of Leningrad, which was completed by January 27, 1944.

A cautious commander, Popov came under criticism for moving too slowly. When his forces failed to take Riga, he was removed from command, reduced in rank, and made chief of staff of the Leningrad Front and the Second Baltic Front during 1944–1945. After the war, Popov commanded various military districts. He was restored to the rank of army general in 1953 and was appointed to the military inspectorate in 1962. Popov died in an accident in Moscow on April 22, 1969.

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See also

Leningrad, Siege of

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Portal, Sir Charles Frederick Algernon (1893–1971)

Royal Air Force (RAF) marshal. Born on May 21, 1893, in Hungerford, England, Charles Frederick Algernon Portal joined the Royal Engineers during World War I. During World War I, in 1915 he was commissioned in the Royal Flying Corps, qualifying as an observer and then a pilot. He won the Distinguished Flying Cross for shooting down several German aircraft. Between the wars, his posts in the RAF included commander of British forces at Aden (1934–1935) and the Imperial Defence College (July 1937). Promoted to air vice marshal in July 1937, he became director of organization and was responsible for developing 30 new RAF bases around Britain.

Portal became chief of Bomber Command in April 1940, initiating the first RAF raids against Germany. He was knighted that July. On October 25, 1940, Portal was named chief of the air staff and air chief marshal (the highest RAF post). In addition to his Air Ministry duties directing the policy and operations of the RAF, Portal participated in all the summit conferences as a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He supported Sir Arthur Harris's controversial stewardship of Bomber Command and the policy of area bombing (until it was halted by Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill in March 1945). A strong believer in airpower, Portal saw the role of the RAF and its U.S. Army Air Forces ally as destroying Germany's ability to resist invasion. Portal was made a baron (Lord Portal of Hungerford) in August and served as RAF chief until December 31, 1945.

From 1946 (when he was raised to viscount) to 1951, Lord Portal was responsible for administering the atomic research facilities at Harwell. He served as chairman of the British Aircraft Corporation from 1960 to 1968. Portal died on April 23, 1971, in Chichester, England.

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See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Combined Chiefs of Staff; Great Britain, Air Force; Harris, Sir Arthur Travers

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Portugal

Portugal, located in the western Iberian Peninsula, borders the Atlantic Ocean to the west and south and Spain to the north and east. At the time of World War II, Portugal was dwarfed by its extensive overseas empire, which was chiefly in Africa. Portugal itself comprises only about 35,500 square miles and had a metropolitan population in 1939 of 7.7 million people.

A republic had been proclaimed in 1910, but the years that followed were turbulent; there were 40 cabinets in the first 14 years of the republic. Finally, in 1926 the military seized power and subsequently summoned a university economics professor, Antonio Salazar, as minister of finance to restore economic order. For the next 40 years, until 1968, Salazar completely dominated Portugal.

In 1932 Salazar became premier as head of an authoritarian government, and under a 1933 constitution, Portugal became a corporative republic. A national assembly elected by the heads of families served as the legislative body. A corporative chamber advised the assembly on social and economic matters; it represented syndicates of various corporations. The Catholic Church also maintained considerable influence. Salazar's National Union party was the political voice of the so-called *estado novo* (new state). This system came to be known as clerical fascism.

Salazar avoided Portuguese entanglement in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, and on March 31, 1939, he and Spanish dictator Generalissimo Francisco Franco signed a friendship and nonaggression treaty, which pledged both countries to mutual aid if either was attacked. Portugal was a long-standing ally of Great Britain and had entered World War I in 1916 as a result of British ties, but when World War II began, Salazar proclaimed Portuguese neutrality. He was convinced that although the war would be long, the Allies would eventually win. During the conflict, Salazar's policy of collaborative neutrality helped keep German troops out of the Iberian Peninsula.

Several consequences flowed from Portugal's neutral stance. From the beginning of the war, refugees flooded in and were given sanctuary in Portugal or allowed to transit the country. The wealthy political opponents of the Nazis, English and American expatriates, the homeless and displaced, and desperate Jews all found in Lisbon a travel terminus to North Africa or the Americas. At the same time, Portuguese neutrality provided a transit point for goods bound for the Axis powers.

At first the Salazar government ignored the Jews, but it then issued an order (Circular 14) to forbid the issuance of visas. Aristides de Sousa Mendes, Portuguese consul general in Bordeaux, France, not only ignored this order, but over a six-month period in 1940, he issued more than 30,000 visas to Jews and others, allowing them to escape the Nazis. Mendes was

dismissed and disgraced and eventually died in poverty. Not until 1987 did the Portuguese government honor his deed.

To meet the refugee problem, various charities operated in Portugal. The Red Cross headquarters for relief operations, prisoner-of-war packages, and the like in Europe during the war was centered in Portugal. Others also came to neutral Portugal to operate. As the war continued, shortages developed, unemployment rose, and the government ruthlessly crushed all strikes.

Spies from both sides made Lisbon a hotbed of intrigue and espionage during the war. Businessmen from both sides in the war sought Portuguese goods. The Axis side wanted Portuguese tin, cork, wool, fish, and especially tungsten for use in hardening steel.

Portugal in fact supplied tungsten to both sides. When the Germans insisted on increased deliveries, Salazar resisted, and on October 12, 1941, 80 miles from Lisbon, the crew of the German submarine *U-83* searched and then sank the Portuguese merchant ship *Corte Real* on the grounds that it was carrying contraband. Many believed that this was intended to intimidate the Portuguese. Salazar nonetheless refused to change his policy of evenhanded neutrality. He attempted to regulate the sale of tungsten; however, the Germans increased their share by smuggling it from private mines. Finally, in June 1944, with the tide of war having turned, Salazar agreed to impose an embargo on the sale of tungsten to the Axis side.

The Portuguese Azores in the Atlantic were islands of great strategic importance and figured in German invasion plans for the Iberian Peninsula, which were never implemented. To prevent the Azores from falling into Axis hands, in June 1943 the British invoked the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1373 and requested the use of bases on the Azores. Salazar, well aware of the change in Germany’s military fortunes, complied, and on October 8, 1943, Britain landed troops in the Azores to establish bases there.

Portugal retained its overseas colonies during the war, with the one exception of the island of Timor in the Indonesian archipelago. In late 1941, fearing a Japanese attack there, a combined Australian and Dutch force took control. In early 1942, the Japanese drove them from Timor.

Salazar’s policy of neutrality kept one of Europe’s poorer countries out of the conflict. Certainly Salazar emerged from the war in a much better position than Franco. Portugal was readily admitted to the United Nations and was later invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

See also

Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Salazar, António de Oliveira; Spain

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Potsdam Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945)

Final wartime conference involving the leaders of the major Allied powers. The conference was held in 1945 from July 17 to August 2 in the Cecilienhof Palace at Potsdam, near Berlin. Its code name, Terminal, signaled both the end of the war and the wartime alliance. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt had died in April 1945; President Harry S. Truman represented the United States, assisted by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Leahy.

The results of British elections were announced in the midst of the conference, and in one of the most stunning upsets in British electoral history, the Conservatives were ousted. Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill resigned, replaced by leader of the British Labour Party Clement Attlee, with Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. No elections disturbed the Soviet delegation, headed by Joseph Stalin, assisted by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Despite French leader Charles de Gaulle's appeals to Washington, France was not represented at Potsdam. The day before the conference formally opened, Truman received word of the first successful explosion of an atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

Among issues discussed at the conference were the future of Germany and Eastern Europe and involving the Soviet Union in the war against Japan.

On July 26, U.S. and British leaders issued a surrender ultimatum to Japan. Designed to weaken Japanese resistance to surrender, the Potsdam Declaration held out some hope to the Japanese for the future. Although their country would be disarmed, occupied, and shorn of its conquests, Japan would be allowed access to raw materials after the war and would have the opportunity for democratic development. If, however, Japanese leaders refused to surrender, the nation would be destroyed. The Soviet Union, several weeks away from a declaration of war against Japan, was not a party to this proclamation.

Stalin demanded heavy reparations from Germany for the vast damage suffered by the Soviet Union in the war. He held out for a firm figure, whereas Truman would agree only to the Soviet Union receiving a set percentage of a whole to be determined on the German capacity to pay. The U.S. delegation also disagreed with the Soviets over their loose interpretation of "war booty"—goods that could be confiscated without reference to reparations. Agreement was reached at Potsdam, however, that the Russians would receive 25 percent of plants and industrial equipment removed from the western zones. In return, the Soviets were to repay 15 of the total 25 percent in food and raw materials from their zone. The Soviets also received permission to seize German assets in Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, Romania, and their zone of Austria. No agreement on reparations was ever reached, but it is estimated that the Russians probably took about $20 billion (the total sum discussed at the Yalta Conference) from their zone of Germany alone.

The Allies also reached agreement on the "three Ds"—democratization, denazification, and demilitarization. German leaders were also to be punished as war criminals, and Germany's resources were to be used to repair the damages that had been inflicted in the war on its neighbors. German industrial production was set at a level no higher than the average for Europe as a whole.

British prime minister Winston Churchill, U.S. president Harry Truman, and Soviet premier Josef Stalin shake hands at the Potsdam Conference of July—August 1945, held to discuss postwar Germany and to plan the end of the war against Japan. (Harry S. Truman Library)

No peace treaty was signed between the Allies and Germany, so further "temporary" arrangements sanctioned by Potsdam became permanent. Following the war, East Prussia was divided according to agreements made at the Tehran Conference. Königsberg, Memel, and northern East Prussia were appropriated by the Soviet Union, and the remainder of East Prussia went to Poland. The conferees at Potsdam agreed on an "orderly and humane" transfer of the German population from this region. This did not occur. Perhaps 2 million Germans lost their lives in the forced reparations and exodus that followed.

Agreement was reached over the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea and Indochina. In the case of Korea, the Soviets were to be responsible for

their surrender north of the 38th parallel, and American forces were to be responsible south of that line. In Indochina, Chinese forces would take the Japanese surrender north of the 16th parallel, and British forces would take the surrender south of it. Never intended as political boundaries, these too became part of the Cold War.

The leaders at Potsdam also established a Council of Foreign Ministers to plan the preparation of peace treaties. Their discussions produced increasingly bitter exchanges that reflected the start of the Cold War.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Attlee, Clement Richard; Bevin, Ernest; Byrnes, James Francis; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Leahy, William Daniel; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Truman, Harry S.; Yalta Conference; Document 227

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Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers (1877–1943)

British admiral. Born on August 29, 1877, near Ventnor, Isle of Wight, Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers Pound entered the Royal Navy in 1891 and was commissioned as a sublieutenant in 1896. He qualified as a torpedo specialist in 1901. Promoted to captain in 1914, he was second naval assistant to First Sea Lord Admiral John Fisher (December 1914–May 1915). During World War I Pound was flag captain of the battleship *Colossus* (1915–1917).

After the war, Pound served on the Admiralty Staff (1917–1919), was head of the Royal Navy Plans Division (1922), served as aide-de-camp to the

king (1925), and commanded the battle cruiser squadron (1929–1932). He was knighted in 1930 and served as second sea lord (1933–1935). Pound returned to sea and served as commander in chief of the Mediterranean Fleet (1936–1939), training its personnel for the impending war.

On the eve of war, Pound was promoted to admiral of the fleet; he was named first sea lord and chief of the naval staff in June 1939. Under him, the navy planned and saw through the initial stages of the successful war at sea, although not without setbacks. Pound blamed himself for the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* to Japanese air attack on December 10, 1941. In July 1942, wanting to clear convoy escorts for expected German surface attack, Pound ordered the Russia-bound convoy (PQ-17) merchant ships to scatter, and 22 of 35 ships were subsequently lost to U-boat attack.

British admiral of the fleet Sir Alfred Dudley Pound, shown here in 1939, was first sea lord and chief of the Naval Staff. (Universal History Archive/UIG via Getty Images)

In an effort to lighten his load, Pound handed over chairmanship of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to General Alan Francis Brooke (Lord Alanbrooke) on March 9, 1942, and a deputy first sea lord was appointed to assist him two months later. Pound declined a peerage, but he was awarded the Order of Merit in 1943. Following the death of his wife in July 1943, his own health failed. Although the cause was not realized at the time, he was suffering from a brain tumor. Pound eventually suffered a stroke while accompanying Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill to the Quebec Conference and died on October 21, 1943, in London.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Great Britain, Navy; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse,* Sinking of

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Prestwood, Viscount

See Attlee, Clement Richard

Prételat, André Gaston (1874–1969)

French Army general. Born at Wassy in Champagne on November 14, 1874, André Gaston Prételat joined the French Army and from 1910 to 1912 served as military attaché in Tangier, Morocco. During World War I, he rose to command the French 159th Regiment in 1917 and held a staff position with General Henri Gouraud's Fourth Army in 1918. In 1919, Prételat was chief of staff of the French Army of Alsace. He also served as chief of staff under Gouraud in the Levant from 1920 to 1922.

From 1930 to 1934, Prételat commanded France's 2nd Military Region. In 1934, he began five years as a member of France's Supreme War Council. As commander-designate of the French Second Army, in 1938 he conducted exercises paralleling the May 1940 German attack, which revealed that the Ardennes were then virtually indefensible. Following the Munich Conference, in December 1938 Prételat issued a report warning that defensive fortifications in the northeast were inadequate. Four months later, he was asked to draw up a plan to improve the fortifications, although when war began in September 1939, little had been done to implement this.

In early September 1939, Prételat was one of two outright opponents of war on the 19-man war council. To demonstrate French support for Poland, as commander of the French Second Army Group, on September 8 he launched a halfhearted offensive against the German Siegfried Line in the Saar region. Prételat believed that he possessed inadequate air support for such an undertaking, and with Poland collapsing, French chief of staff Maurice Gamelin ordered the offensive halted on September 12. When Poland capitulated, Prételat pulled his troops back behind the Maginot Line.

When German forces invaded on May 10, 1940, Prételat's 2nd Army Group forces played little part in the initial fighting, sheltering behind the Maginot Line. Historians later alleged that in comparison with French units facing the brunt of the German attack, Prételat's sector was grossly overmanned. During two weeks, however, he released 20 of his 30 divisions to reinforce units facing the German assault in the northwest. By May 26, Prételat, conscious that the 1st and 4th Army Groups to his west were flagging, feared that the Germans would turn his left flank and sought permission to abandon the Maginot Line and retreat, but this was refused. Only on June 12, as a military debacle approached, was he ordered to withdraw. Despite his continuing desperate resistance, within a week German forces encircled the battered remnants of the 2nd Army Group, and France accepted German armistice terms on June 22. An embittered Prételat took no further part in the war. He died in Paris on December 6, 1969.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

France, Army; France, Battle for; Maginot Line; Saar, French Invasion of the

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Prien, Günther (1908–1941)

German naval corvette captain. Born on January 16, 1908, in Lübeck, Günther Prien joined the merchant marine at age 15 to help support his family. He impressed his superiors with his skill and graduated from captain's school in 1932. In 1933, he entered the German Navy. Commissioned an ensign, he volunteered for submarine school in 1935. During the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, he served in *U-26* off the coast of Spain.

In 1938, Prien was assigned command of *U-47*, one of Germany's new Type VIIB submarines. From the start of World War II, Prien's submarine patrolled the Atlantic shipping lanes. He logged his first kill, a merchantman, on September 5, 1939. The next month, commander of German submarines Admiral Karl Dönitz picked Prien for a daring mission to penetrate the principal anchorage of the British Home Fleet at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands. On October 13, Prien was able to pass *U-47* between sunken blockships in Kirk Sound and gain the harbor. At about 1:00 a.m. on October 14, Prien fired four torpedoes at the battleship *Royal Oak*, sinking it. The *U-47* managed to avoid detection in departing the harbor. This was a major propaganda coup for the German Navy, and German chancellor Adolf Hitler awarded Prien the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. Prien was also promoted to captain-lieutenant.

Adolf Hitler, accompanied by Admiral Erich Raeder (left edge) and Captain Günther Prien, decorates Prien's U-boat crew after they sank the British battleship *Royal Oak* at Scapa Flow, with the loss of 833 British sailors, Berlin, 1939. (Corbis)

Prien went on to sink 31 Allied ships and assisted in sinking 4 others, for a total of 213,283 tons. On March 8, 1941, the British destroyers *Verity* and *Wolverine* surprised Prien's *U-47* and *U-99* on the surface. The *U-99* reported a nine-hour attack with more than 50 depth charges. It is possible that Prien's *U-47* succumbed to this assault, although another theory suggests that Prien counterattacked and his submarine was struck by one of his own circling torpedoes. In any case, all contact with *U-47* was lost.

MATTHEW ALAN MCNIECE

See also

Royal Oak, HMS, Sinking of; Submarines; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Prince of Wales and *Repulse,* Sinking of (December 10, 1941)

Following World War I, British authorities decided to develop Singapore as the most important naval base in the Far East for British forces to protect the vast British imperial and commercial interests in the region. During the interwar period, a major base was created somewhat haphazardly, including land defenses and provisions for air support. Part of the plan involved deploying a large naval force to Singapore, a force as large as or larger than the Japanese battle fleet. The doctrine was called Main Fleet to Singapore.

By the late 1930s, however, naval commitments in home waters and in the Mediterranean Sea reflected increased threats from Germany and Italy so that at the beginning of World War II, the Royal Navy battle fleet was spread thinly. Finally, in October 1941Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill decided to deploy a squadron of capital ships to Singapore under new Eastern Fleet commander Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Some viewed this as the Main Fleet to Singapore force designed to overawe the Japanese from the seemingly impregnable base at Singapore.

Phillips flew his flag in the *Prince of Wales,* a King George V–class battleship that was completed in March 1941. Britain's newest capital ship, it had fought the German battleship *Bismarck* and carried Churchill to meet with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. The *Prince of Wales* mounted a main armament of 10 14-inch guns in two quadruple and one double turret, along with 16 5.25-inch quick-firing guns. It also was armed with 64 2-pounder pom-poms, 8 40mm Bofors, and 25 20mm Oerlikon antiaircraft guns.

The battle cruiser *Repulse,* completed in 1916 during World War I, accompanied the *Prince of Wales*. That ship mounted 6 15-inch and 15 4-inch guns plus 4 4-inch quick-firing antiaircraft guns. The aircraft carrier *Indomitable,* which was to have accompanied these two capital ships, ran aground off Jamaica and was undergoing repairs. The decision to send the two capital ships to the Far East without air cover was fateful, as it deprived the squadron of the means to defend against Japanese air attack. Land-based air forces at Singapore were also inadequate. Churchill and Phillips, however, both believed that capital ships could not be sunk by aircraft while the ships were under way and were defending themselves with antiaircraft guns.

The *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* arrived at Singapore on December 2. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, the two were the only Allied capital ships on station between Hawaii and the Mediterranean. On December 8, the Japanese invaded Malaya, and Phillips immediately took his ships to sea to intercept a Japanese convoy off of the Kra Isthmus of Malaya. His Force Z consisted of the two capital ships and the destroyers *Vampire, Tenedos, Electra*, and *Express*.

With no British air cover available and all hope lost of surprising the Japanese naval units, Phillips ordered his ships to return to Singapore. At this point, he received a report of another Japanese landing at Kuantan, closer to his position. He headed there but maintained radio silence so as to not alert the Japanese. This prevented the dispatch of British land-based aviation, which Phillips assumed would be forthcoming.

The British ships had been sighted by a Japanese submarine, and on the morning of December 10, the Japanese launched massive air attacks against them. The Japanese force consisted of 86 twin-engine bombers, 18 high-level bombers, and 25 torpedo bombers of the First Air Fleet at land bases in Indochina. The attacks began at 11:15 a.m.; Force Z was then about 50 miles off the east coast of Malaya. The *Repulse* was sunk first, then the *Prince of Wales*. Both ships were victims of air-launched torpedoes. The *Repulse* went down with 327 of its crew of 960; the *Prince of Wales* was struck by one or two 1,100-pound bombs and as many as six torpedoes. Of its 1,612 crew members, the destroyers rescued 1,285. Neither Admiral Phillips nor Captain J. Leach, captain of the *Prince of Wales*, was among the survivors. The Japanese lost only three aircraft in the battle.

The destruction of Force Z came as a great shock to the Royal Navy and the British government and public. It has been characterized as a sign of the end of the battleship era. No longer could capital ships operate alone without air and subsurface protection. The associated surrender of Singapore to inferior numbers of Japanese forces in February 1942, the greatest defeat suffered by Britain in its modern history, was seen as the end of British, even Western, dominance in East Asia.

EUGENE L. RASOR AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Great Britain, Navy; Phillips, Sir Thomas “Tom” Spencer Vaughan

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Prisoners of War

In 1929, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) replaced the Hague Convention of 1907 regarding protection of POWs. The Hague Convention had dealt primarily with the means of war (for example, it prohibited the use of exploding bullets), whereas the Geneva Convention dealt exclusively with the protection of victims of war. It held that POWs should be considered on a par with the detaining power's garrison troops as far as rations, living space, clothing, and access to medical care were concerned. It also addressed such issues as permissible work and punishment and access to letters and packages.

Allied soldiers stand guard over blindfolded German soldiers taken prisoner during the raid on Dieppe, France, on August 19, 1942. (Library of Congress)

Forty powers signed the Geneva Convention, but the Soviet Union did not, meaning that prisoners taken by its forces were not subject to Geneva Convention protection. Although the Japanese delegates at Geneva signed the POW convention, the Tokyo government never ratified it. Its military leaders assumed that no Japanese would be taken prisoner and that the convention would thus be applied unilaterally. Cultural attitudes also played an important role, and authorized punishments for POWs were much milder than those the Japanese meted out to their own soldiers. Although in 1942 the Japanese government pledged to live up to the spirit of the convention, its treatment of Allied POWs during the war clearly ran counter to its assurance.

Europe, Eastern Front

On September 1, 1939, German forces invaded Poland; two days later Britain and France declared war on Germany, igniting World War II. Two weeks later, Soviet forces invaded eastern Poland in accordance with the secret provisions of the August 1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Sometime in 1940, Soviet authorities executed perhaps 15,000 Polish officers

in the Katyn Forest of eastern Poland. Prisoners taken by the Germans were sent to slave-labor camps. The Poles thus did not benefit from the Geneva Convention.

On June 22, 1941, German forces invaded the Soviet Union. In response to inquiries by the U.S. government, Moscow had stated that the Soviet Union would observe the Hague Convention of 1907 regarding land warfare, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 regarding chemical and bacteriological warfare, and the Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding care for the wounded and sick of warring armies. However, the Soviets said that they would observe the agreements on POWs only as "they were observed by the Germans."

The German government was as obstinate on the issue as the Soviets, and the cost was ultimately very high for the POWs captured in the fighting. Both German and Soviet POWs suffered conditions that were approached only by treatment accorded prisoners of the Japanese. Of some 5.7 million Soviet soldiers taken prisoner by the Germans, at least 3.3 million died in captivity, a mortality rate of 57 percent. This compares with a mortality rate of only 3.5 to 5.1 percent for British and American POWs in German hands.

Many Soviet prisoners taken early in the fighting were simply starved to death. According to Adolf Hitler's notorious May 13, 1941, Commissar Order, political officers were to be shot on capture. Jewish soldiers taken prisoner were handed over to the Schutzstaffel (SS) to be executed.

Conditions were horrendous for the others. The Germans marched the prisoners for long distances to the rear. There was little food, and there was no prepared lodging or sanitary facilities when they reached the camp locations. As a result, POWs died by the hundreds of thousands. The leaders of the Reich regarded the prisoners as subhuman and treated them accordingly. Of 3.2 million Soviet soldiers taken prisoner by December 1941, 2 million were dead by February 1942.

As the German advance came to a halt and it became impossible to demobilize German soldiers, the Reich's leaders sought to make more effective use of the Soviet POWs by putting them to work under difficult conditions in road building, mining, and agriculture. Not until mid-1944, however, did food rations for Soviet POWs approach those of other Allied POWs in German captivity. So difficult was it for Soviet prisoners of war that at least a quarter million volunteered to serve as auxiliaries to the German Army, working as cooks, drivers, and the like, simply to stay alive.

Tens of thousands of others also agreed to serve in a German-sponsored Russian Liberation Army led by former Soviet lieutenant general Andrei A. Vlasov. Hitler, however, refused it any combat role, and it became simply a means to encourage desertions.

The plight of Soviet POWs in German hands did not end with the defeat of Germany. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's infamous Order 270 of August 1941 had branded as traitors all Red Army personnel who allowed themselves to be taken prisoner, regardless of circumstances. It also ordered rations cut off to their families. Of some 1.8 million Soviet POWs repatriated at the end of the war, at least 150,000 were sentenced to long prison terms of forced labor for having "aided the enemy."

On the other side, about a third of the nearly 3 million German and Austrian soldiers taken by the Soviets in the war died in captivity. Of some 91,000 Germans taken prisoner in the August 23, 1942–February 3, 1943, Battle of Stalingrad, fewer than 5,000 survived Soviet captivity. Death rates were comparable for the 2 million Axis soldiers taken prisoner by the Soviets.

The only difference in German and Soviet treatment of POWs was that for the Germans, it was systematic government policy to work the prisoners to death, whereas POWs in Soviet hands fell victim to the general inefficiency and indifference of the Soviet POW camp administrative system, the Main Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees; lack of resources in a country ravaged by war; and individual acts of reprisal. Rising numbers of German POWs after 1942 simply overwhelmed available Soviet means to care for them. The Soviets did not begin major repatriation of its POWs until 1947, and the last were not released until 1956.

Western Europe

During World War II in Western Europe and North Africa, the Axis powers captured some 3.5 to 4 million enemy soldiers. In turn, the Western Allies took some 5.25 million Axis soldiers captive, 3.4 million of whom surrendered with the end of hostilities on the Western Front.

Few problems were reported for POWs held by the Italian government. Experiences for POWs held by the Germans varied according to their citizenship. Treatment was decidedly better for West Europeans and North

Americans than for those from Eastern or Southern Europe. The Germans did not expend scarce resources on the prisoners, however. Thus, in consequence of the high number of parcels sent to Western Allied POWs, the German government decided to cut food rations to U.S. and British Commonwealth POWs by one-third, forcing these Allied governments to subsidize German Geneva Convention obligations. The Germans also employed many of their French and Belgian POWs in labor activities (such as the armaments industry) that directly benefited the German war effort.

The Germans organized their POW camps quite methodically. Internally, the camps were run by the prisoners. Generally there was a senior Allied officer or senior American officer, depending on the mix of prisoners. Officers were segregated from enlisted men. Stalags (Stammlager, main camp) were camps that held enlisted personnel as well as noncommissioned officers. Oflags (Offizierlager, officer's camp) were camps with only officers and some noncommissioned officers. In the Stalags, there was generally a "man of confidence" who was usually elected by his fellow POWs, although on occasion he was appointed by the Germans.

Camps usually contained more than one compound, and prisoners were segregated among the compounds by uniform, not by claimed citizenship. Hence, U.S. personnel who flew with the Royal Air Force (RAF) and were captured in RAF uniform were considered to be British and housed with British flyers. Compounds held French, Russians, British, Commonwealth, and various other nationalities. Some camps held only one nationality; some held many different nationalities.

There were also POW camps located in areas that held concentration camps. Auschwitz, which is known for being an extermination center, was actually a complex of camps comprising more than just the extermination center. French, Soviet, and other nationalities of POWs were held there. Two exceptions to the generally satisfactory German treatment of Western POWs came in Hitler's Commando Order of October 18, 1942, which allowed the killing out of hand of Allied commandos, and Berga, a Buchenwald sub-camp that held 352 U.S. "Jewish" POWs. Of that number, only 70 were actually Jewish, but the others were chosen by the Germans because they "appeared" Jewish. Prisoners were regularly beaten and starved, and several were murdered.

There have been unsubstantiated charges in recent years of British and

U.S. mistreatment of German POWs in the months immediately following the end of the war in Europe. There is, however, no proof of this or of any widespread mistreatment of Axis prisoners of war by British and U.S. authorities during the war itself.

Far East

Japanese cultural attitudes played an overwhelming role in Japanese treatment of POWs. The Japanese believed that soldiers should die in battle rather than surrender and that those who allowed themselves to be taken prisoner had dishonored themselves. Japanese treatment of POWs was atrocious. Prisoners were subject to torture, starvation, beatings, and denial of medical care. Most were required to perform slave labor, from building railroads to working in coal mines and factories, all of which were forbidden by the Geneva Convention. Mistreatment was rampant, as were disease and starvation, not only among military prisoners but also with civilian internees. Nor would the Japanese allow humanitarian aid to reach the prisoners.

The generally accepted figure for Allied POWs in Japanese hands is 320,000: 140,000 Europeans and North Americans and 180,000 Chinese, Filipino, Indian, and other Asian troops. Most of Japan's prisoners were taken during the successes of late 1941 and early 1942, especially in the Netherlands East Indies. Although the Japanese soon released many of the nonwhite prisoners, they held their white captives until the surrender in 1945.

The Japanese captured some 25,600 U.S. prisoners. Of these, 8,288 died, a rate of 35.6 percent. This was appreciably higher than the rate for all prisoners who died in Japanese hands: 37,800 or 26.9 percent. Part of this disparity was the result of the many American and Filipino POWs who died in the April 1942 Bataan Death March.

Prisoners of the Japanese received no medical care and little food, and they were seldom allowed to contact their families.

Many of the prisoners were transferred from the Philippines and other places to Japan or Manchuria to prison camps. Sent by ship, the prisoners were entombed belowdecks with little or no access to fresh air or water. Many hundreds of men died in these "Hell Ships," but the exact total is unknown. Several of the ships, unmarked by the Japanese as transporting POWs, were sunk by Allied planes or submarines. In addition, many POWs

who ended up in Manchuria were subjected to the horrors of biological warfare and vivisection experiments carried out by the infamous Japanese Unit 731.

Japanese military codes forbade surrender, and in consequence, the Western Allies took few Japanese prisoners. During the Battle of Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945), U.S. marines took fewer than 300 prisoners from the 21,000-man Japanese garrison, and only about 7,400 of nearly 115,000 Japanese soldiers during the Invasion of Okinawa (March–June 1945) surrendered. It is also true that once Allied soldiers learned of the barbaric treatment accorded by the Japanese to their prisoners, there was a tendency to decline to take prisoners, although this was never official policy.

Some 633,000 Japanese personnel were taken prisoner in Southeast Asia, and most of them surrendered to the British at the end of the war. Many of these were held well after the war and worked as laborers without pay. Only in October 1947 were Japanese released from Singapore. Some Japanese POWs were also rearmed and forced to serve with Dutch forces in the Netherlands East Indies in violation of international law, and nearly 1,000 died.

It is unclear how many Japanese were taken prisoner by the Soviet Union, which entered the war in the Pacific on August 9, 1945. The Soviets claimed to have captured 594,000 Japanese and claimed that upwards of 71,000 of these were immediately freed. Japanese scholars, however, insist that the number was much higher. Sent to Siberia, the Japanese worked there for several years before they were released. Because of the dishonor associated with being captured, few Japanese ex-POWs have left memoirs of their experiences. The record of Americans and Europeans held by the Japanese is, however, well documented.

North America

When the United States entered World War II, little thought had been given to the establishment of POW facilities. In March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the evacuation of Japanese Americans from “military areas,” especially on the West Coast of the United States. Ultimately some 120,000 Japanese Americans were affected. Although they were not called prisoners of war, they were interned in camps in Wyoming, California,

Colorado, Arizona, Idaho, and Arkansas. Early in the war, Italian nationals (non-U.S. citizens) were also interned in temporary camps in the U.S. West, although the Roosevelt administration reversed that policy within a year.

Following the Axis defeat in North Africa, large numbers of German and Italian POWs were brought to camps in the United States. Ultimately, some 425,000 Axis prisoners of war were held in the United States. By the end of the war, the United States had established 141 permanent base camps and 319 branch camps, each holding an average of about 2,500 prisoners.

Given the labor shortage in the United States because of the demands of the war, many of the POWs went to work, but they were paid for their labor according to rank. Officers were not required to work, although several did accept supervisory positions. Contractors who hired the POWs paid the U.S. government some $22 million for their services so that the program was nearly self-sufficient. By the end of the war, of 370,000 POWs in the United States, nearly 200,000 were employed in nonmilitary jobs, most of them in agriculture. Conditions in the U.S. camps were generally excellent. The major problem came from die-hard Nazi fellow prisoners, who had to be segregated in special camps.

Following the war, several U.S.-held POWs were turned over to France and Britain to work in mines and help clear bombed roads and cities. Most of these POWs were repatriated to Germany in late 1947 and early 1948, embittered over their postwar treatment.

SPENCER C. TUCKER AND PATRICIA WADLEY

See also

Bataan Death March; Commando Order; Commissar Order; Hell Ships; Japanese Americans; Japanese Surrendered Personnel; Katyn Forest Massacre; Manchuria Campaign; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Order 270; Unit 731, Japanese Army; Vlasov, Andrei Andreyevich; Document 146

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Propaganda

Organized and usually emotional government campaigns employing print, film, and especially radio designed to persuade audiences of nefarious enemy actions while supporting one's own war effort. Propaganda as a modern psychological weapon of war was first systematically applied by all major combatants in World War I. With more modern media available—and a far clearer ideological conflict between democracy and fascism—propaganda became much more pervasive in World War II. Some was aimed domestically to encourage support for the war; the best-known efforts were directed at opponents.

The Axis Powers: Germany, Italy, and Japan

Germany's highly effective propaganda efforts drew on Hitler's own experience of Allied propaganda during World War I. Recognizing the importance of a clear effort, Germany developed centralized control of all media from the beginning of the Nazi regime with the March 1933 creation of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by Dr. Joseph Goebbels. Initial efforts were largely domestic and soon included a steady beat of anti-Semitic and anticommunist content. Another theme was how World War I had been lost not on the battlefield but thanks to subversion and internal collapse. By the late 1930s, propaganda focused on how others

(such as Poland) had attacked Germany and on the “decadent” Slav people. There was also a steady building of the Hitler personality cult.

Two media were especially valuable to Goebbels—radio and dramatic films and newsreels. Epitomized by *The Triumph of the Will* (1935), Leni Riefenstahl’s heroic film portrayal of the Nazi Party’s 1934 Nuremberg Rally, sound, Wagnerian music, and dramatic photography combined to illustrate Germany’s growing might. Shortwave radio, including the use of turncoat broadcasters such as “Lord Haw Haw” and “Axis Sally,” was used in attempts to weaken enemy morale and soften up target countries before and during attacks. Film and radio helped promote the power of German arms on land, on the sea, and in the air, as did bright poster art and printed media.

Italian efforts were more for internal consumption and dated to the beginning of Benito Mussolini’s regime in 1922. Marshaling all media, the fascist movement was pictured as reviving the glorious days of Imperial Rome. Central to that message was (as in Germany) building a cult around the “maximum leader,” Mussolini.

Japan’s approach to propaganda, or what its leadership termed “thought war,” centered on the conception of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This economic empire backed by Japanese arms was described as liberating Asia for Asians as old colonial powers (Britain, France, the Netherlands) were beaten back. The glory of empire was personified again, this time in the role of the virtually godlike emperor.

Given the distances covered by Japan’s conquests, at their height stretching from the borders of India to the Central Pacific, Japan relied on extensive use of shortwave radio, and “Tokyo Rose” and others broadcast directly to American troops. Internal propaganda emphasized Japanese victories and expansion even when that was no longer true. Japanese listeners were thus stunned when they first heard Emperor Hirohito call for an end to hostilities in August 1945, having had no idea of the true direction of the war for the previous two years.

The Allies: Britain, United States, and Soviet Union

Allied propaganda efforts began as a response to Axis messages. The British drew lessons from their World War I experience and again divided internal and external propaganda operations. The former involved considerable

reliance on media cooperation with authorities rather than on government orders. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's government established the Ministry of Information (January 1940) under former British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) director-general Sir John Reith. Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill appointed Duff Cooper in May 1940 and then Brendan Bracken, a journalist and close political associate, in July 1941. Although there was some clumsy initial censorship, the ministry found its feet as the war took hold. Churchill also established the Political Warfare Executive (September 1941) to direct propaganda aimed at enemy countries. These efforts included massive leaflet drops from bombers and effective use of BBC news and other broadcasts.



This poster by J. Howard Miller is the quintessential image of the female defense worker during World War II. The image of the factory woman, depicted in many ways and popularized as "Rosie the Riveter," became a national symbol of American unity and patriotism. (National Archives)

Themes evident in print, film, and radio propaganda emphasized that all Britons were in the war together. “We” might be “standing alone,” but “London can take it.” These and similar themes helped to rally domestic support even during the Blitz (August 1940–May 1941). In its 4,000 theaters, Britain made excellent use of hundreds of motion pictures, including both features and short news items. Some were screened in the United States to encourage U.S. support of Britain’s fight. The BBC played a central role, including broadcasting Churchill’s persuasive and gripping speeches. Churchill and others made use of the “V for Victory” appeals from early 1941 to mid-1942 and succeeded in covering Europe with the painted sign or Morse code signal “…-.”

Through 1941, the United States remained isolationist and wary of foreign propaganda. After the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and several initial organizational attempts, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formed the Office of War Information (OWI) in June 1942 under respected radio news commentator Elmer Davis. The OWI established domestic and overseas sections, the latter eventually becoming the Voice of America.

American propaganda themes emphasized Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (of speech and worship and from fear and want). Messages promoted military victories combined with some censorship. That the efforts of women were needed to back the fighting men was evident in posters featuring “Rosie the Riveter” and in Hollywood films that presented a positive view of the war. Frank Capra’s seven-film *Why We Fight* series comprised some of the best wartime documentaries made. Films by John Ford and John Huston, among others, and wartime application of famous cartoon characters and comic book heroes all contributed to the effort. Commercial radio broadcasts incorporated the war effort in nearly all drama, variety, and music programs.

Soviet domestic propaganda had been pervasive. After the German invasion on June 22, 1941, propaganda messages focused on the Russian “motherland” and traditional values, historical victories (as over Napoleon), and the once-vilified Russian Orthodox Church. All were combined in propaganda depicting Joseph Stalin as architect of victory in the “Great Patriotic War.” Soviet authorities made good use of documentary and news film in major cities but relied on posters in rural regions.

See also

Art and the War; "Axis Sally"; Blitz, The; Capra, Frank Russell; Censorship; Film and the War; Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Journalism and the War; Literature and the War; "Lord Haw Haw"; Office of War Information, U.S.; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Psychological Warfare; "Tokyo Rose"; Women in World War II; Document 146; Document 159

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Proximity Fuze

An artillery fuze that uses radar to detonate the projectile at a preset distance from the target. Shells require fuzes to detonate them. Point-detonating fuzes detonate on contact; time fuzes can be set for airbursts. Until the middle of World War II, all time fuzes were mechanical. Time of flight and the altitude of the target in relation to the gun required precise calculation of the initial time setting, which then almost always had to be adjusted by a forward observer. This process, requiring anywhere from two to four adjustment rounds, sacrificed the element of surprise at the target.

The proximity fuze used a radar transmitter and receiver to detonate the projectile at the appropriate distance from an aerial target, or height of burst above a ground target (usually 65 feet above the target) on the first round. Proximity fuzes originally were developed for antiaircraft fire. During World

War II, British and American scientific research successfully combined to produce a new method of shell fuzing that enabled the shell to sense its target electronically and to explode when it was within lethal range.

The British began work on this in 1939, and by the summer of 1940 the United States was involved as well. The first work was carried out by the National Defense Research Committee (Section T). Other participants included the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism of the Carnegie Institute, the Sylvania Company, RCA, the University of Michigan, Johns Hopkins University, the National Carbon Company, Raytheon, and Eastman Kodak. At the end of the war, the Naval Ordnance Laboratory took over research and development, producing infrared proximity fuze systems.

Shells with proximity fuzes were in production by early 1942. The Americans knew it as the VT fuze, which stands for "variable time." The first successful action for the proximity fuze came in January 1943, when a 5-inch gun in the secondary battery of the U.S. cruiser *Helena* shot down an attacking Japanese bomber. Initially, use of the proximity fuze was limited for security reasons to overseas actions, and the fuzes were producing spectacular results by the time the Japanese mounted their kamikaze attacks. The fuze was also used for field artillery later in the war, and it was particularly effective against German troops in the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). It was also important in the gunnery battle against the German V-1 buzz bomb.

The proximity fuze was developed in total secrecy. It was perfected by the time it was issued, and it worked. Its successful and rapid development and procurement represent a rare accomplishment in the history of weapons development.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

Antiaircraft Artillery and Employment; Ardennes Offensive; Artillery Doctrine; Kamikaze; V-1 Buzz Bomb

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Psychological Warfare

Operations crafted to undermine an enemy force or to propagate a message to a civil population. The main objective of such activities is not necessarily to garner enemy defectors but to lower morale, military or civilian. World War II saw the most extensive use of psychological warfare (psywar) in history.

The Germans entered World War II with a reputation for propaganda success, orchestrated by Joseph Goebbels, the Third Reich's minister of propaganda. German propaganda was aided immeasurably by Germany's early military victories and throughout the war by technically excellent radio broadcasts and an impressive documentary film legacy going back to the 1920s. Of course, much German propaganda on the Eastern Front was quickly vitiated by the Germans' brutality toward their prisoners and the local populations.

Undoubtedly Germany's best psywar was to be found in its English-language radio broadcasts, the producers of which had the good sense to use up-to-date American and British popular music and to go lightly on the overt propaganda message. In the field, however, German psychological warfare leaflets tended toward "We Will Crush You" themes or heavy-handed humor with out-of-date English slang that never came off.

Soviet propaganda used such common themes as "Why Die in a Lost War?" and "Save Your Lives," but such leaflets were effectively countered by German propaganda that proclaimed, realistically enough, "Sieg oder Siberia" (Victory or Siberia). One useful Soviet tool for undermining German troop morale was simply broadcasting a metronome's ticking and the lugubrious occasional voice-over: "Every 10 seconds, a German soldier dies in Russia."

U.S. and British psywar was by far the most effective of World War II. Allied psywarriors eschewed political themes ("Hitler Is the Ruin of Germany!") and made impossible demands on their enemies ("Refuse to Fight in This Impossible War"). The best leaflets instructed German or Japanese soldiers how to get out alive from a bad situation. The most successful such leaflet, in this or any other previous war, was the well-known U.S. Army *Passierschein*, an effort that resembled an international treaty,

with a multilingual text and a display of the Allied flags. The leaflet was represented as an order to American soldiers to receive the bearer as an honorable prisoner of war; it concluded with the signature of General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

In the Pacific theater, American psywarriors learned the hard way that Japanese soldiers do not "surrender" but that a few (as well as many more who were likely to be Taiwanese or Korean) might be persuaded to "cease resistance" or "take the honorable path." The most successful U.S. propaganda of the Pacific war was directed toward the civilian population—the justly famous "city leaflets" listing the Japanese cities to be bombed and the dates of the bombings. The fact that U.S. Army Air Forces B-29 bombers duly appeared on the dates given and that the "ever-victorious" Japanese Air Force could do little to prevent these publicly scheduled mass incendiary raids had a devastating effect on Japanese morale, judging by postwar interrogations, whose subjects included Emperor Hirohito.

Japanese radio propagandists, like their German allies, did garner a wide Allied listenership simply by playing popular music. But Japanese leaflets were an art form in themselves. They featured hard-core pornography (much appreciated by Allied troops) or hilariously mangled English, and sometimes both.

By the close of World War II, British and U.S. military propagandists arrived at several battle-tested psywar truths: know your enemy or target audience, know their language and culture as much as possible, tell no lies, never denigrate or caricature the enemy, and steer clear of politics in favor of simple how-to-save-your-life suggestions. Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, more often than not, violated every one of these maxims.

STANLEY SANDLER

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Propaganda

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Puller, Lewis Burwell (1898–1971)

U.S. Marine Corps officer. Born in West Point, Virginia, on June 26, 1898, Lewis Burwell "Chesty" Puller attended the Virginia Military Institute, but anxious to fight in World War I, he left in 1918 to enlist in the U.S. Marine Corps. Puller did not, however, see overseas duty in the war. He then attended Officers' Training School, and in 1919, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. No officer slots were available in the military demobilization after the war, and Puller enlisted in the marines as a corporal. He then served in Haiti as an officer in the Gendarmerie (1919–1924).

Returning to the United States, Puller was recommissioned a second lieutenant in March 1924. He was stationed at Quantico, Virginia (1924–1926); in Hawaii (1926–1928); and in Nicaragua (1928–1931). In Nicaragua, he earned the first of his five Navy Crosses. In 1931, he attended the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Puller returned to Nicaragua in July 1932, where he received his second Navy Cross for his aggressive exploits in a patrol during which at least 30 rebels were killed. From 1936 to 1939, Puller was an instructor at the Marine Basic School in Philadelphia. He was promoted to major while serving from 1940 to 1941 with the 4th Marines in Shanghai, China, where he became a battalion commander. He then served with the 7th Marines at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, where he helped pioneer jungle training.

Following U.S. entry into World War II, Puller landed with the 7th Marines on Guadalcanal in August 1942. In the defense of Henderson Field, his battalion held off repeated Japanese attacks. Puller's men killed more than

1,400 Japanese during October 24–25, 1942, 20 Japanese for every American lost. For these actions, Puller was awarded his third Navy Cross. In February 1944, Puller was promoted to lieutenant colonel. That same year he earned his fourth Navy Cross during heavy fighting at Cape Gloucester, New Britain Island. He returned to the United States for training duty at Camp Lejeune in November 1944 and was promoted to colonel shortly thereafter.

During the 1950–1953 Korean War, "Chesty" Puller commanded the 1st Marine Regiment in the Inchon Landing and the subsequent capture of Seoul in September 1950. For this leadership in the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir withdrawal, he was awarded a fifth Navy Cross, the most in U.S. Marine Corps history. For an action one week prior to the Chosin battle, he also was awarded an Army Distinguished Service Cross, the same level of decoration as the Navy Cross. In January 1951, Puller was promoted to brigadier general. Promoted to major general in September 1953, he commanded the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune. Puller retired in November 1955 as a lieutenant general, the most decorated and certainly one of the best-known marines in the history of the corps. Puller died at Hampton, Virginia, on October 11, 1971.

BRIAN E. HALL

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; United States Marine Corps

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Puyi, Henry

See Aixinjueluo Puyi

Pyke, Geoffrey Nathaniel Joseph (1893–1948)

Eccentric British inventor. Born into a well-to-do family in London on November 9, 1893, Geoffrey Nathaniel Joseph Pyke studied at Pembroke College, Cambridge, but left school to pursue a career in journalism. As a Reuters correspondent in Denmark during the summer of 1914, Pyke reported on German military and naval movements until he was ejected from that country. He subsequently found work with the *Daily Chronicle* as a correspondent within Germany. Reaching Berlin in late September 1914, Pyke was soon jailed as a spy, but he escaped the following summer and returned to London. By the early 1920s, Pyke's passions turned to education, and he founded the Malting House School.

Pyke designed a modified Harley-Davidson motorcycle to help the Republican cause in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. After he became a scientific adviser to Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in British Combined Operations in March 1942, certain examples of Pyke's military-scientific ideas began to bear fruit, such as a prototype snowmobile known first as the "Plough" and then more commonly as the "Weasel." Pyke also proposed making ships of ice to serve as unsinkable aircraft carriers for antisubmarine warfare and amphibious operations support. Both Mountbatten and Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill supported the proposal and authorized development of the idea.

The project was code-named HABAKKUK. Pyke's group concluded that the ice ship would need to be half a mile long, with a hull 30 feet thick made of reinforced ice known as "Pykrete." This mixture of solidly frozen water and wood pulp was stronger and more stable than ice and less inclined to melt. Pipes circulating cold air would keep the hull permanently frozen.

A prototype 50-foot-long Pykrete ship was built at Patricia Lake in Alberta, Canada, in the spring of 1943 and proved successful. The British were enthusiastic and put forth plans to build a fleet of these vessels, but the price tag was a staggering $70 million. The British could not afford this, and the Americans thought the project impractical. None were built.

After the war, Pyke helped the fledgling National Health Service solve staffing problems. Pyke, who battled depression all his adult life, committed suicide on February 21, 1948.

C. J. HORN AND GORDON E. HOGG

See also
Aircraft Carriers; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas

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Pyle, Ernest “Ernie” Taylor (1900–1945)

Arguably the most beloved American journalist of World War II. Born on August 3, 1900, near Dana, Indiana, Ernest “Ernie” Taylor Pyle attended Indiana University (1919–1923), leaving just short of securing a degree in journalism to accept a job with a local newspaper. A few months later, he went to work for the *Washington Daily News*, a Scripps-Howard paper. During two stints with the paper, he wrote the first daily column about aviation news, and he later became managing editor.



Ernie Pyle, 1945. A journalist and correspondent, Pyle accompanied Allied troops in the field. His reporting focused on the grim realities facing individual soldiers. Probably the best-known American journalist of the war, Pyle was killed in the fighting for Okinawa in 1945. (Library of Congress)

Pyle found the lives of ordinary people fascinating. In 1935, he began a syndicated column for Scripps-Howard recounting his experiences as he drove across America. During the next four years, Pyle crossed the United States 35 times, chronicling the lives of everyday people doing sometimes extraordinary things.

In 1940, Pyle went to Britain to cover the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30) for Scripps-Howard. Like radio commentator Edward R. Murrow, Pyle became the eyes and ears of America in London. His description of the hardships and courage of the average Briton tugged at the conscience of a nation not yet at war. When the United States did go to war, Pyle joined American troops as they landed in North Africa. Later he

followed them through Sicily, Italy, and even to Normandy on D-day (June 6, 1944).

Always near the front, Pyle gained a reputation for understanding the drudgery and fear that the average GI had to endure. He focused his stories and reports on combat infantrymen and soon became loved by the regular soldier and the public back home.

By 1944, Pyle's columns were carried by more than 400 daily and 300 weekly newspapers. That same year, he won the Pulitzer Prize for Journalism and was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine. Pyle's wartime books, compilations of his wartime experiences, became best sellers.

In early 1945, at the request of the U.S. Navy, Pyle deployed to the Pacific theater to cover navy and marine operations. He accompanied a marine rifle company. On April 18, 1945, during the March–June 1945 Okinawa Campaign, Pyle was preparing a story on the island of Ie Shima, not far from Okinawa, when he was killed by Japanese machine-gun fire. Later in 1945, famed director William Wellman released a film about Pyle titled *The Story of GI Joe* and starring Burgess Meredith as Ernie Pyle.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Britain, Battle of; Journalism and the War; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of

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Q

Q-Ships

See Decoy Ships

Quebec Conference, First (August 14–24, 1943)

Allied planning conference held in Quebec, Canada, from August 14 to 24, 1943. Code-named Quadrant, this meeting included U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, Canadian prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, and Chinese foreign minister Tse-ven Soong as well as their staffs and military advisers.

Regarding military strategy in Europe, Churchill continued to argue for concentration on the Balkans. The U.S. military chiefs were strongly opposed to this; they reminded their ally that the invasions of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and Italy (September 9) had been based on the premise that the next major objective would be the cross-Channel invasion of France. The conferees then approved tentative plans for the cross-Channel invasion, now code-named Operation OVERLORD, and fixed May 1, 1944, as the target date for its execution.

Churchill had argued that the commander of OVERLORD should be British, and he initially proposed General Sir Alan F. Brooke, chairman of the Imperial General Staff. By the time of the Quebec meeting, however, Churchill realized that the United States would have the preponderance of troops employed after the initial landing, and he had therefore concluded that the commander should be an American. At Quebec, he therefore proposed and it was agreed that an American general would command OVERLORD and a British general would have charge of the Mediterranean theater.

The Allies also agreed to accelerate the strategic bombing offensive against Germany from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of the bombing campaign would be to destroy German air combat strength; dislocate the German military, industrial, and economic systems; and prepare the way for a cross-Channel invasion. The United States agreed to a large-scale buildup of its forces in the United Kingdom prior to the invasion of France. The Allies also agreed to vigorously press the war in the Mediterranean. The objective here was to drive Italy from the war and secure air bases for operations against Germany in Italy and in Sardinia and Corsica. The Allies discussed a second landing in France, code-named Operation ANVIL, on the Mediterranean coast.

Allied operations in the Balkans would be limited to the supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea, minor commando raids, and strategic bombing. The Allies then agreed to intensify the war against German submarines and to make greater use of the Azores as an Allied naval and air base.

In the Pacific theater, the Allies decided to establish a separate South-East Asia Command, with Lord Louis Mountbatten as its commander. They also agreed to accelerate operations against Japan. The goals in the Pacific were to exhaust Japan’s air, naval, and shipping resources; cut its communications; and secure bases from which to conduct strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Prime Minister MacKenzie King at a press conference following the Quebec Conference of September 1944. (Corbis)

There was some disagreement on the last point about whether to set up air bases in China or on the Japanese barrier islands in the Central Pacific. This effort would be borne principally by expanding U.S. naval power, with large armies required only at the end to invade Japan. The British promised to participate fully in this effort once Germany was defeated. Finally, the United States, although it was opposed to formal recognition of General Charles de Gaulle's French Committee of National Liberation as the French government-in-exile, did issue a statement extending limited recognition to de Gaulle's government.

JAMES ERIK VIK

See also

Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; King, William Lyon Mackenzie; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Document 165

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Quebec Conference, Second (September 12–16, 1944)

Allied summit held in Quebec, Canada. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill met in private conference and in plenary sessions with the Combined Chiefs of Staff to shape plans for the conclusion of the war in Europe, the defeat of Japan, and the governance of postwar Germany.

On September 12, the president met with his close friend, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. A plan for the administration of postwar Germany drafted for Morgenthau by his assistant, Harry Dexter White, became a topic of discussion at the conference and a source of continuing study and controversy. The Morgenthau Plan suggested that Germany should be transposed into an agrarian economy following the war. All heavy industry would be stripped from the country.

Secretary of War Henry Stimson strongly opposed the approach, as did Secretary of State Cordell Hull. A memorandum from Stimson to Hull, which was passed on to the White House, argued strongly that the Morgenthau approach lacked economic sense and would invite political difficulties. The argument was also made that trying to keep the Germans limited to a "subsistence level" was unwise and wrong as well as impractical, because the reconstruction of Western Europe could not be realized without a robust German economy.

Roosevelt initially pretended that he knew nothing of the Morgenthau Plan; then he raised objections. On October 20, he sent a memorandum to Hull questioning the idea of "making detailed plans for a country we do not yet occupy," and after that he let the initiative wither. Churchill initially supported the Morgenthau approach. Speculation suggested that the British leader was mindful of the importance of American economic assistance after the war and wanted the support of the U.S. secretary of the treasury on the

matter. In any case, Churchill knew that the War Department in Washington would ultimately veto the plan. The Quebec Conference also revealed Roosevelt to be in failing health, which fueled speculation about his capacity to continue to lead the war effort.

ARTHUR I. CYR

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Combined Chiefs of Staff; Hull, Cordell; Morgenthau, Henry, Jr.; Morgenthau Plan; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stimson, Henry Lewis

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Queen Elizabeth and *Valiant,* Sinking of (December 19, 1941)

The June 1940 German defeat of France and entry into the war of Italy as an Axis power were great blows to the British because they deprived them of the powerful French Navy, which had been charged with the defense of Allied Mediterranean interests. This duty now fell primarily to the British Mediterranean Fleet commanded by Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham and based at Alexandria, Egypt.

In late 1941, the Italians devised a night raid against the British Mediterranean Fleet involving the use of midget submarines, specifically human torpedoes. Italy had been in the forefront of the development of these during World War I. The craft for this operation was known as a Maiale (pig) because of its poor maneuvering ability. Electrically propelled, it had two crewmen in diving suits riding astride the torpedo who would steer it toward its target ship. The detachable warhead would then be employed as a limpet

mine, after which the crewmen would ride the torpedo away. The Maiale was 22 feet in length and 21 inches in diameter and had a 485 pound warhead.

The Italians launched their operation on the night of December 18, 1941, upon obtaining intelligence that the battleships *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant*, the two most powerful warships of Cunningham's force, were at Alexandria. The Italian submarine *Scire*, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Junio Valerio Borghese, surfaced about 1.3 miles off the entrance to Alexandria, then launched three Mailes. They were able to penetrate the harbor by following in the wake of three British destroyers. They subsequently sought out their targets in the early morning hours of December 19, as two attacked the battleships and the third concentrated on the Norwegian tanker *Sagona*, moored beside the *Queen Elizabeth.*

The Italians attacking the battleships made sure to place their explosive charges in areas of the hull that would produce the most damage. The British discovered the crew of the craft deployed against *Valiant,* captured them, and imprisoned them aboard the battleship for questioning. Their capture, however, did not enable the British to discover the placed charges, although one of the prisoners did warn the British about the possibility of an explosion.

The first charge to detonate was that attached to the *Sagona.* That blast, at 5:58 a.m., sank the tanker and damaged the bow of the nearby destroyer *Jervis.* The explosion of the next device, attached to the *Valiant,* occurred at 6:05 a.m., with all its men up from below and watertight doors closed. The blast flooded the battleship's forward magazine.

The last blast, at 6:16 a.m., opened to the sea the boiler rooms and engineering spaces of the *Queen Elizabeth*. Both battleships settled on the harbor bottom. Within 48 hours, the British had taken prisoner three of the men from the remaining two Italian teams, one having been killed. The *Scire* remained on station submerged for some 39 hours, then escaped.

The sinking of the *Valiant* and the *Queen Elizabeth* deprived the Royal Navy of its only battleships in the Mediterranean and shifted the balance of power in that theater. While both ships could be salvaged due to the shallow depth of the harbor, their temporary loss allowed the Italians to better supply their forces in North Africa in the opening months of 1942.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Borghese, Junio Valerio; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Human Torpedoes; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Quesada, Elwood Richard "Pete" (1904–1993)

U.S. Army Air Forces lieutenant general. Born in Washington, D.C., on April 13, 1904, Elwood Richard "Pete" Quesada attended the University of Maryland and Georgetown University. He enlisted in the U.S. Army Air Corps in September 1924 as a flying cadet and earned his wings and a commission in the Air Reserve in 1925. He briefly played professional baseball before going on active duty in September 1927. He flew as a crew member of the *Question Mark*, a modified Fokker C-2A trimotor monoplane that set a world record for airborne endurance in 1929. Quesada served in the 1930s as assistant military attaché to Cuba, personal pilot to the assistant secretary of war for air during an expedition to collect African wildlife, and technical adviser to the Argentine Air Force. Stints at the Air Corps Tactical School and the Army's Command and General Staff College led him to consider the problem of air-to-ground coordination.

After commanding the 33rd Pursuit Group at Mitchel Field, New York, in 1941, Quesada was promoted to brigadier general in December 1942 and deployed to North Africa. Taking command of the XII Fighter Command, he served as deputy commanding general of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force. Here he learned the tactical air doctrine developed by British air marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, which used air liaison officers (ALOs) to coordinate air-to-ground operations, colocated air and army command centers, and streamlined command-and-control procedures between ground units and supporting tactical air. Quesada adopted and improved upon all of these techniques in 1944.

Promoted to major general, Quesada commanded the IX Tactical Air Command in Europe for Operation OVERLORD (June 6, 1944). His support of Major General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps demonstrated brilliant innovative tactics. Recognizing that close air support (CAS) was a key Allied force multiplier, Quesada installed VHF (very high frequency) air force radios in tanks to enable ALOs in armored assaults to talk directly to pilots overhead. Deviating from accepted doctrine that air units sacrificed effectiveness if distributed in "penny packets," he allocated fighter-bombers in four-ship formations to provide constant reconnaissance and CAS to Collins's armored columns. Quesada's tactics proved crucial to the success of COBRA (July 25–31), the Allied Normandy breakout in July.

Throughout 1944, Quesada continued to innovate. During the Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945), he used radar to provide CAS in poor weather. Using modified Norden bombsights combined with radar, he enhanced navigation and bombing accuracy.

During 1946–1947, Quesada commanded the Third Air Force, and in 1947–1948 he commanded the Tactical Air Command. However, Quesada was marginalized within the newly independent U.S. Air Force, which stressed strategic nuclear bombing. After commanding Joint Task Force Three at Eniwetok (1948–1951), Quesada retired as a lieutenant general. Entering private industry, he served as the first head of the Federal Aviation Agency during 1958–1961. Quesada died in Washington, D.C., on February 9, 1993.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Ardennes Offensive; COBRA, Operation; Coningham, Sir Arthur "Mary"; Norden Bombsight; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; United States Army Air Forces

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Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944)

Filipino nationalist politician. Born at Baler in Tayabas (now Quezon) Province on August 19, 1878, Manuel Quezon studied law at the University of Santo Tomas in Manila. He interrupted his education in 1899 to join the forces of Emilio Aguinaldo fighting against U.S. rule in the Philippine-American War (1899–1902). After the U.S. victory, Quezon was briefly imprisoned. Upon his release, he resumed his legal studies and passed the bar in 1903.

Quezon began his political career in 1905 when he ran successfully for governor of Tayabas. In 1907, he was elected to the Philippine Assembly, where he became floor leader of the majority Nacionalista Party. In 1909, Quezon was appointed resident commissioner for the Philippines in the U.S. House of Representatives. During his years in Washington, he vigorously lobbied to secure passage of the Jones Act (1916), which pledged future independence of the Philippines. On this success, Quezon returned home a hero and became the first president of the new Philippine Senate.

In 1934, with Quezon's urging, the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which provided for independence 10 years after the adoption of a constitution and inauguration of a new government. On September 17, 1935, Quezon was elected president of the preindependence Philippine Commonwealth. Alarmed by the advance of Japan into Southeast Asia, in 1941 Quezon took several emergency steps that vested him with dictatorial powers. He was reelected president that November.

In December 1941, when Japanese forces invaded the Philippines and occupied Manila, Quezon accompanied U.S. commander General Douglas MacArthur to the fortified island of Corregidor in Manila Bay. He departed the islands by submarine on February 20, 1942, and formed a government-in-exile in Washington, D.C., in May. There he served as a member of the Pacific War Council and signed the United Nations Declaration. In November 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law a bill extending Quezon's term in office until the end of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Quezon died in Saranac Lake, New York, on August 1, 1944, only months before his country's liberation.



The first president of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon, with his wife, Dona, in 1942. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

HIRAKAWA SACHIKO

See also

MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines; Document 132

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Quisling, Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonsson (1887–1945)

Norwegian collaborationist. Born in Fyresdal, Norway, on July 18, 1887, Vidkun Quisling entered the army in 1911. By 1918, he was Norwegian military attaché in Petrograd, Russia. After holding several other administrative posts, in 1931 Quisling became minister of defense.

Known as a capable army officer and government official, Quisling became controversial through his support of the German National Socialist (Nazi) Party. In 1933, he helped found a Norwegian counterpart, the Nasjonal Samling Party. In 1939, on the failure of this party, Quisling met German dictator Adolf Hitler and argued for a German occupation of Norway with the object of placing the Nasjonal Samling in power. During the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, Quisling formed a government in which he was minister-president.

Quisling's government lasted only one week. The Germans installed a new ruling body, with Josef Terboven as Reich commissioner. On February 1, 1942, Quisling managed to attain greater political power as Norway's minister-president in a Nasjonal Samling government and subsequently embarked on a program of Nazification. His policies met opposition from most of the Norwegian population.

Quisling's government was also responsible for transporting more than 1,000 Norwegian Jews to German concentration camps. Quisling's government, however, was impeded by both interference from Berlin and Norwegian partisan resistance.

Following the liberation of Norway in May 1945, Quisling was imprisoned to await trial for war crimes. During the subsequent court proceedings, he claimed that he had acted for the greater good of Norway. Nonetheless, he was found guilty of high treason and executed by firing squad at Akershus Castle in Oslo, Norway, on October 24, 1945. His name has become synonymous with the term "traitor."

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Collaboration; Norway; Norway, German Conquest of

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R

Rabaul

Principal Japanese naval and air base in the Southeast Pacific during World War II. The port of Rabaul, with its superb natural harbor, was located at the eastern end of New Britain Island, one of the islands in the Bismarck Archipelago mandated to Australia as a consequence of World War I.

On January 24, 1942, the Japanese overwhelmed the Australian garrison of 1,500 men at Rabaul and soon began construction there of a large naval support facility protected by five airstrips and two air armies with more than 600 aircraft. Rabaul became the base of the Eighth Fleet, and from that port the Japanese could defend the approaches to New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and strengthen the southern flank of the region covered by their Central Pacific base at Truk in the Caroline Islands.

General Douglas MacArthur, Allied supreme commander in the Southwest Pacific Area, made reduction of Rabaul a major objective. However, the position's strength persuaded Allied leaders at the August 1943 Quadrant Conference in Quebec to cancel MacArthur's plans for a direct assault in favor of a strategy of circumvention. Island-hopping was replaced by leapfrogging.

On October 12, 1943, however, the U.S. Fifth Army Air Force operating from New Guinea launched massive air attacks on Rabaul, followed on November 5 by carrier raids mounted by the *Saratoga* and *Princeton*. These U.S. attacks forced the Japanese garrison into a network of tunnels and caves and effectively ended Rabaul's usefulness as a naval base. Operation CARTWHEEL saw continued Allied efforts to neutralize Rabaul from the air. Through the spring of 1944, 29,000 Allied sorties dropped more than 20,500 tons of bombs on the Japanese base. At the same time, the Allies seized positions to the southeast on the island of Bougainville, at Cape Gloucester on the western end of New Britain, and to the north in the Admiralty and Saint Matthias Islands.

By March 1944, the Japanese had withdrawn their major naval and air units, first to Truk and later to Palau, but 100,000 military and civilian personnel remained at Rabaul. Cut off from air or sea resupply, the Japanese garrison suffered increasing deprivation until its surrender in August 1945.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Admiralty Islands Campaign; Japan, Navy; MacArthur, Douglas; New Britain, Landings on; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Crewmen on board the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier *Saratoga* at dawn as the carrier moves into position for a strike against the Japanese at Rabaul, November 1943. (Wayne Miller/Corbis)

Radar

System used to detect the position, movement, and nature of distant objects. The term “radar” is an acronym that references the operating principles and function of this technology: radio detection and ranging. Radar systems transmit radio waves with the aid of a directional antenna, and they receive and process the radio emissions that reflect off distant objects. The range of target objects is determined by measuring the time it takes for the electromagnetic emission transmitted from the radar antenna to reach the object and return.

The theoretical foundation of radar was established through the work of 19th-century scientists James Clerk Maxwell and Heinrich Hertz. Maxwell developed equations governing the behavior of electromagnetic waves in 1864. Inherent in his equations are the laws of radio-wave reflection, which were demonstrated by Hertz between 1886 and 1888.

A number of early-20th-century scientists and engineers recognized the potential for radio-based detection systems. Radio direction-finding and distance-measuring experiments were conducted during World War I and in the 1920s. From these early efforts, several theoretical radar systems were proposed before World War II. Between 1934 and 1940, practical radar systems were developed independently in several countries as military instruments for detecting aircraft and ships. One of the first practical radar systems was devised in 1935 by Scottish physicist Sir Robert Watson-Watt. His success with this early system can be attributed to the fact that a number of critical technical components became available during the 1930s; it was Watson-Watt who integrated transmitters and receivers, modulators capable of generating microsecond pulses, and high-speed cathode-ray tubes to display search results. Much of this equipment was the by-product of civilian work on broadcast television.

By the late 1930s, laboratories in Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Italy, and the Soviet Union had all begun radar experiments on a modest scale. Japan did not take notice until 1941 but then hurried to catch up. Thus, all of the principal belligerents in World War II entered the conflict with some radar technology.

At the insistence of Air Vice Marshal Hugh Dowding, Great Britain adopted radar in the late 1930s to augment the defenses of the home islands.

Before the start of the war, Great Britain began construction of the Chain Home (CH) radar network, which was enhanced in 1939 with a number of Chain Home Low (CHL) stations, capable of detecting low-flying aircraft approaching the English coast. The CH and CHL stations were the first integrated radar defense system, staffed by crews who were trained to track incoming aircraft and relay tactical information to air defense control centers and air bases. The CH/CHL system played an important role during the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), giving British defenders valuable advance warning of the relentless attacks launched by the German Luftwaffe.

In September 1940, Britain provided the United States with examples of key radar components, including a magnetron, with the understanding that cooperation would lead to the further development of radar technology. The Americans moved quickly. The Radiation Laboratory was established in 1940 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under the leadership of Dr. Lee DuBridge. Other emergency radar research programs were created in 1940 and 1941, and the close cooperation of Bell Laboratories, the Army Signal Corps, and the Naval Research Laboratory led to substantial improvements in the accuracy and range of radar equipment. High-power microwave radar systems were among the important advances made by the United States.

Although Germany had the opportunity to exploit radar technology before World War II began, the indifference of the country's political leadership hindered the development of the technology. Before the war, Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring, chief of the Luftwaffe, were reportedly suspicious of radar's utility and antagonistic to the idea of adopting the technology as a defensive weapon. Later, interservice rivalries within Germany slowed the development of radar even further as resources for research and development became scarce. Germany did finally put into operation the Kammhuber Line, an interlocking system of radar, aircraft, and ground controllers that ran from the North Sea to southern France and went into full operation in September 1942. It was similar to the CH system in scale and purpose, but the Allied use of long-range fighter escorts for bombers limited its value. Italy had a limited radar capability on land and at sea by the middle of 1942. It utilized its own equipment and that of Germany.

Radar played a key role in World War II, with the Western Allies making the most effective use of this new technology. A radar array is shown in operation in Italy in 1944. (Library of Congress)

The Japanese were late in developing and adopting radar technology, a fact that greatly advantaged the Allies in the Pacific theater fighting. However, although U.S. radar identified the Japanese aircraft approaching Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the information was not utilized. Radar provided early warning of subsequent Japanese air strikes as well—for example, during the decisive Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), where the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers. Throughout World War II, continuous improvements to radar technology increased the accuracy of the U.S. Navy's tracking and intercept capabilities.

By 1943, thanks to aggressive research and development, the Allies had a wide variety of radar systems at their disposal. The technology evolved rapidly during the war, and specialized radar units were developed for early warning, battle management, airborne search, night interception, bombing, and gun aiming. Experiments with terrain-following radar for aircraft presaged the enhanced electronic avionics developed for jets and helicopters after the war. Air defense radar systems, which came to include gun-direction devices, proximity fuzes, and increasingly accurate direction-finding and ranging capabilities, had greatly enhanced the accuracy of antiaircraft fire by the end of the war.

In the postwar years as missiles replaced artillery as the backbone of air defense, radar technology improved still further, and radar systems were adapted for a number of useful purposes. As the systems became even more powerful and sensitive, radar was used in navigation, meteorology, and astronomy (the first radar emissions were reflected back from the moon in 1946).

SHANNON A. BROWN

See also

Britain, Battle of; Dowding, Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Hitler, Adolf; Midway, Battle of; Proximity Fuze

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Raeder, Erich (1876–1960)

German Navy grand admiral. Born in Wandsbek, Germany, on April 24, 1876, Erich Raeder joined the Imperial Navy in 1894. His abilities and ambition brought him into close contact with state secretary of the Imperial Naval Office Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II and the unique ideology that characterized German navalism. As Admiral Franz von Hipper's chief of staff, Raeder participated with the German battle cruisers in the major operations of the High Seas Fleet during World War I, including the Battle of Jutland.

In 1918, Raeder experienced the trauma of the naval mutinies and revolution, and he resolved never to see such events repeated. His role in the naval command's support of the abortive right-wing Kapp Putsch in 1920 threatened the future of the navy and his own career. Assigned to the naval archives, he wrote a two-volume study of Germany's cruiser warfare in World War I that defined his conception of naval strategy.

In 1925, Raeder was promoted to vice admiral and appointed chief of the Baltic Naval Station in Kiel. He attempted to keep the navy above politics despite charges that he and the navy were engaged in antirepublican activities. In 1928, he was promoted to admiral and appointed chief of the naval command. In 1935, he became commander in chief of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) and a general admiral. On April 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler promoted him to the rank of grand admiral.

To ensure support for the navy's rebuilding, Raeder established a firm, autocratic administration, demanding obedience and discipline. Initially skeptical about Hitler's support for an expanded navy, he found the führer receptive to building a fleet as an instrument of power for a "greater Germany," which reflected the legacy of the Tirpitz era. Given Hitler's support for a powerful navy, Raeder was willing to accept the criminal excesses of the führer and his regime. Raeder pressed hard for a greater share of resources in building a navy that was directed at Britain after 1938, but he soon found that an impatient Hitler was unwilling to delay the building of battleships rather than U-boats and other ships more suited for a war against merchant shipping.

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder visiting the crew of the battle cruiser *Scharnhorst* in April 1942 to express his appreciation after its escape from Brest through the English Channel. (Library of Congress)

Although the German Navy was unprepared for war in 1939 (Hitler had assured Raeder that there would be no war before 1944), Raeder was determined that the navy "die gallantly" for the future existence of the fleet. He called for a concentration of forces against Britain as the primary enemy and advocated a massive buildup of U-boat forces and intensification of the naval war, even if this meant fighting the United States. Raeder opposed the invasion of the Soviet Union until Britain was defeated and argued vigorously for an alternative Mediterranean strategy.

Following the loss of the battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941 and the failure of the German army in the Soviet Union, Raeder and the fate of his capital ships became increasingly irrelevant to Hitler. Raeder resigned in January 1943. Commander of U-boats Admiral Karl Dönitz replaced him.

Arrested at the end of the war, Raeder was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Nuremberg trials as a war criminal but was released on September 26, 1955. He spent his remaining years crafting his memoirs and attempting to justify his own actions and those of the navy in serving the Third Reich. Raeder died in Lippstadt on November 6, 1960.

KEITH W. BIRD

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; WESERÜBUNG, Operation

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Railroads

During the war, railroads were immensely important in supporting and sustaining military operations by moving troops and cargo from rear areas to

railheads behind the battlefronts. Railroads carried the bulk of the load in this regard because they could transport more cargo than trucks and used less fuel and manpower. During the course of the war, the Allied powers, particularly the United States, demonstrated superior techniques in managing their transportation resources, which, coupled with their superior industrial production, proved vital to victory. U.S. Army railroad troops shouldered a major portion of this Allied effort, ultimately operating railways in such areas as Alaska, the Yukon, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Iran, Burma, India, and Luzon and aiding in operations in states such as Egypt and Britain.

In the United States, commercial railroads transported most of the military cargo and personnel as well civilian goods. In January 1939, the American Military Railway Service (MRS) consisted of only a few reserve units. But the first three months of the Pacific and European conflicts brought about marked changes in the organization of army transportation and underscored its importance to eventual victory. In July 1942, the MRS organization, with the exception of major track and bridge construction, was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers to the army's newly formed Transportation Corps.

The MRS's wartime success can be attributed chiefly to two factors: first, in civilian life a large proportion of the officers and enlisted men had been railroaders, and second, American railroad companies had accepted sponsorship of or affiliation with MRS units and trained them following World War I. The troops were inducted and trained as compact operating units and were quickly readied for active duty in units that were up to battalion size, and the railways' existing civilian management structure became the unit's military chain of command as appropriate.

The first deployment of MRS units was in 1942 to Alaska. There they took over the rehabilitation, operation, and maintenance of the army-leased White Pass & Yukon Railroad. This 110-mile line was the only access to the subarctic areas along the Alaska-Canadian Highway (ALCAN). The line facilitated the completion of the highway on schedule and the construction/expansion of the strategic airfields linking Alaska to northern Canada.

MRS units followed Operation TORCH, the November 8, 1942, Allied landings in North Africa, operating railways in three nets conforming to the

boundaries of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. These lines were generally single-tracked, with the main lines being standard-gauge (4 feet 8½ inches, or 1.435 meters) and the branches usually being meter-gauge (3 feet 3 $^{3}/_{8}$ inches) along the 1,400-mile length of the system. Both steam- and electricity-driven locomotives were used, and the system was by and large undamaged prior to the invasion.

The North African Campaign served as a primer for solving the rail problems that would be encountered in future campaigns. Following the Axis surrender in North Africa, the Allies focused on rehabilitation of the Tunisian system, and France assumed control of civilian operations. Some MRS units continued to assist the French; others deployed to operations in Sicily, where the 750-mile Sicilian rail net played an important role in supporting the Allied advance, and from there to the European mainland in the September 1943 invasion of Italy.

Allied bombing and Axis demolition had left the Italian railways almost inoperable, but prompt temporary repairs enabled needed ammunition, rations, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to leave the port of Salerno three weeks after the initial Allied assault. MRS units, together with British railway units, restored operations that enabled combat units to receive the supplies they needed to push forward despite the extensive destruction of bridges and tunnels and the Germans' use of track destroyers. In October 1943, the MRS assumed control over all Allied railroad troops and the operation of all state and privately held railways in Italy. British and American railroad units were assigned separate zones to support their respective combat troops and worked together to rehabilitate the entire Italian system. Many of Italy's rail lines were operated electrically, with power coming from plants behind German lines, so those lines had to be converted to steam operation. Italy's lack of coal reserves required converting coal-burning locomotives to diesel, as the latter fuel was easier to import. The United States sent in additional diesel locomotives, and this dual system for fuel kept the railways operational. Repairing damaged rail yards was another major challenge.

In January 1943, the MRS took over from the British the operation of the 865-mile Iranian State Railway in order to substantially increase Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union via that route. This undertaking was a

challenge of major proportions, as the railway wound through 126 tunnels, crossed 3,000 bridges, ran through formidable canyons, and climbed to an altitude of 7,200 feet.

A key element of planning for Operation OVERLORD, the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, involved improving the national British railway system, which suffered greatly from a variety of problems during the war. Before D-day, thousands of MRS personnel, many of whom were veterans of other theaters of operation, arrived in England to take the first steps toward establishing railway service to support the Allied invasion. Some of these men helped assemble record numbers of rolling stock prefabricated in the United States and also conditioned American locomotives to run on British rails; others were trained to operate the French railway system, which was similar in structure compared to most European systems and operated over 26,000 miles of track. All of these preparations paid handsome dividends.

For Allied railway units, the major challenge of the invasion was to remedy the massive destruction of French ports, rail yards, and tracks west of Paris, which was caused by German demolition and Allied bombings. Allied railroad personnel made use of captured German and French equipment, and additional U.S. locomotives and rolling stock were shipped into the theater as the Allied front line advanced. Maintenance units worked continuously to reestablish track, living on trains and making repairs from well-equipped shops located on the trains. As the Allies moved forward through France, French railway workers cooperated with Allied railway units in clearing wreckage from yards and from rights-of-way and repairing roadbeds. Just three months after D-day, the rail lines were open to Paris, and in another month MRS railheads were established in Brussels and Liège, Belgium.

In Germany, the government closely controlled the operation of the German state railway, which was always a part of Berlin’s war planning; its personnel were highly trained, and German railway maintenance was effective throughout the war. The system continued to operate despite heavy Allied air attacks, enabling the German Army to prolong hostilities for many months.

Railroads—or the lack thereof—affected both sides involved in combat in the Pacific theater. Railways in China, Burma, and India were limited and not as robust as those in European countries. China had a simple rail net, and Japanese forces captured its rail centers early on; with the Japanese

occupation of northern Indochina, the Yunnan-Indochina railway was closed. Before and during World War II, the Japanese strategy in the Orient was designed to isolate China and deny its armies needed support from outside. The Japanese had great success in this effort in the early stages of combat, closing the Burma Road.

British army tank crews make their way to the train in Britain transporting their Churchill tanks, September 1942. (Fox Photos/Getty Images)

India was the arsenal for the Allied effort in the Middle East, and its rail system was heavily burdened by the demands of war, production, and the growing Indian economy. It also suffered from the handicap of having tracks of different gauges. For example, the rail line from Calcutta to Ledo went through some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world, and the line also switched from standard-gauge to meter-gauge track, which required double handling for all cargo. British and Indian railway personnel worked the standard-gauge portion, and the MRS assumed control of some 800 miles of meter-gauge track, including the branch lines. MRS personnel were superimposed over existing railway staff, ensuring that no one lost his job. Waging a constant battle against the elements and disease, the MRS team focused on railway improvements to meet increasing wartime demands. By

the end of 1944, more than 200 locomotives and 10,000 cars from the United States were in use in the Indian system.

The Japanese completed a railway across the Dawna Range from Thailand to Burma in 1943. The Burma-Siam railway was Japan's principal supply route to its armies in Burma. Lacking construction equipment, Japanese engineers forced some 61,000 Allied prisoners of war and more than 260,000 local nationals to hack a path through the steaming jungles with the most primitive of tools, without medical care and with little food. One estimate held that for every mile of track completed, 325 men died. During the Burma Campaign, the Japanese railways continued to operate, despite heavy Allied bombing. When the Japanese began to withdraw, British rail troops made the necessary repairs to support offensive operations. Although the terrain was difficult, the British imported light locomotives and other equipment from India and adapted the jeep to rail service.

Luzon in the Philippines was the only island in the Southwest Pacific Area where rail lines had any importance in military operations. The MRS took over railroad operations in the Lingayen Gulf area in January 1945, rehabilitating locally available equipment and track that had been severely damaged by the Japanese. American rail equipment was shipped in, and local nationals helped to repair track. By mid-May, eight trains arrived and departed Manila daily. By October 1945, approximately 3,200 MRS officers and men and 6,000 civilians were involved in the Luzon military railroad, and civilian management took over after hostilities ceased. Although railways did contribute substantially to logistical support operations in New Zealand and Australia, the lines were operated for the most part by local nationals who provided shipments on a commercial basis.

The Allied powers' effective worldwide use of rail lines for moving troops and supplies was a key factor to their victory in World War II. And the MRS was the critical element in this effort. The total strength of the MRS as of June 1945 was approximately 44,084 officers and men, which were broken down as follows: European theater, 28,828; Mediterranean theater, 3,207; Persian Gulf Command, 3,473; China-India-Burma theater, 4,036; Southwest Pacific Area, 2,772; and Alaskan Department, 915.

C. ERNEST EDGAR III

See also

Alaska-Canadian Highway; Burma Road; Burma Theater; China-Burma-India Theater; Engineer Operations; France Campaign; Italy Campaign; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Salerno Invasion; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation

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Rainbow Plans

Series of U.S. war plans immediately prior to World War II. Unlike the war plans of the 1920s, which were assigned one-color code names and had been developed for operations against another single nation, the Rainbow Plans anticipated conflicts against one or more opponents and with the cooperation or benevolent neutrality of other powers.

The Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee began work in November 1938 and established five basic scenarios by June 1939. Rainbow 1 provided for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and protection of U.S. territories and trade. Rainbow 2 in addition envisaged a concerted effort with Britain and France in which the United States focused its attention on Pacific Ocean operations while its allies addressed Eastern Hemisphere conflicts. Rainbow 3 entailed the defense of the Western Hemisphere and offensive operations into the Western Pacific by the United States alone. Rainbow 4 added to the defense of the Western Hemisphere the projection of troops as necessary into South America and the Eastern Atlantic. Rainbow 5 considered a substantial U.S. military commitment in Europe, the Eastern Atlantic, and/or Africa in concert with Britain and France.

Rainbow 2 became the focus of the planning effort when war began in Europe. Its parameters generated a far more complex military situation than

the old Plan Orange for a war between the United States and Japan had considered. The involvement of European nations made it highly probable that Japanese operations to the south would spread well beyond the Philippines into Southeast Asia, the East Indies, and the Southwest Pacific, and efforts to contain all of these would entail substantial American military commitments.

The success of the German offensive in Western Europe by June 1940 radically changed the planning situation. War planning was predicated on, at best, German neutralization of Britain. Planning for Pacific operations (Rainbows 2 and 3) was abandoned, and the Rainbow 4 scenario was modified to accommodate the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere and U.S. possessions in the Pacific as far west as Midway and the Aleutian Islands against German, Italian, or Japanese aggression.

Continued active British resistance prompted the initiation of strategic staff conversations between the United States and Britain that stretched from January 29 to March 29, 1941. From these emerged the parameters for Rainbow 5.

Rainbow 5 assumed a conflict between the United States, the British Commonwealth, and their associated powers, on the one hand, and Germany and Italy or Germany, Italy, and Japan, on the other. The basic defensive objectives were to secure the Western Hemisphere, Britain and the British Commonwealth, and U.S. possessions against attack. The offensive objective was the defeat of Germany and its allies. To this end, the Western Allies would use all available means to apply economic pressure, conduct a sustained air offensive against Germany and its allies, seek to eliminate Italy at the earliest opportunity, and conduct limited offensives while building up substantial forces for the eventual assault on Germany. In the Pacific and the Far East, Allied forces would conduct an active defense of their territories through attacks on enemy sea communications and offensives to secure the Caroline and Marshall Islands areas. Rainbow 5 was the basic American strategic plan when the United States entered the war, envisaging an active defense in the Pacific while focusing first on the defeat of Germany.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Gerow, Leonard Townsend; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stark, Harold Raynsford “Betty”

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Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home (1883–1945)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born at Hampton Court Palace in England on January 20, 1883, Bertram Home Ramsay joined HMS *Britannia* in 1898 and served on the North American and Red Sea stations and on Home Fleet destroyers before World War I. During that war, he held commands with the Grand Fleet and the Dover Patrol. Following World War I, Ramsay commanded cruisers and a battleship, and as a rear admiral, he was naval aide to King George V and Home Fleet chief of staff. Ramsey retired in December 1938 at the age of 55, his career apparently over.

When World War II began, Ramsay returned to active duty and was assigned to command the port of Dover. Following the German invasion of France on May 10, 1940, he organized and executed Operation DYNAMO, the successful evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dun-ker-que (May 26–June 4, 1940), for which he was knighted. Ramsay, now with the rank of acting admiral, was assigned to planning for Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa, and he directed the landings at Algiers and Oran on November 8, 1942. After the Axis collapse in North Africa, he planned the invasion of Sicily and commanded the eastern task force for the landings that began on July 9, 1943. Reinstated on the active list, he was appointed commander of British naval forces in the Mediterranean.

On December 29, 1943, Ramsay was appointed Allied naval commander in chief for the upcoming Allied invasion of Normandy (June 6, 1944). He planned and executed this huge undertaking—Operation NEPTUNE—that involved more than 2,700 warships and well over 4,000 minor vessels supporting the initial landing of troops on five beaches, plus subsequent

landings of troops and armor. Ramsay was criticized on occasion for his insistence on detailed planning, but he contended that it was necessary given the complexity of the task, and the outcome certainly justified this assessment. For his efforts, he was promoted to full admiral on the active list in June 1944.

Ramsay turned over control of the French ports from Le Havre southward, as they were captured, to the U.S. Navy while retaining responsibility for those to the north and east. He later directed amphibious operations to clear the South Beveland Peninsula and Walcheren Island in October and November 1944, which opened the port of Antwerp. Ramsay died on January 2, 1945, when his plane crashed on takeoff from the airfield at Toussus-le-Noble, near his headquarters at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, France.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Great Britain, Navy; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of

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Randolph, Asa Philip (1889–1979)

U.S. labor and civil rights leader who worked to end racial discrimination in the defense industry during the war years. Born in Crescent City, Florida, on April 15, 1889, A. Philip Randolph was raised in Jacksonville. After graduating from Cookman Institute in Jacksonville, he moved to Harlem, where he continued his studies at the City College of New York. Following the U.S. entry into World War I, he and a partner founded a magazine, *The Messenger*, that demanded more positions in the war industry and armed

forces for African Americans. Randolph ran unsuccessfully for offices on the Socialist Party ticket in the 1920s.

In 1925, Randolph began organizing the Pullman porters in the railroad industry into the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and succeeded in gaining that union's admission into the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Later, in protest of the AFL's racially discriminatory policies, he withdrew the brotherhood from the AFL and took it into the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

With the tremendous increase in defense contracts just prior to the U.S. involvement in World War II, Randolph protested racial discrimination in defense industry hiring practices, and he informed President Franklin D. Roosevelt that he was prepared to lead thousands of African Americans on a march to Washington, D.C. In response, the president issued Executive Order 8802, which barred racial discrimination in the defense industry and created the Fair Employment Practices Committee to ensure compliance with the law. Approximately 2 million African Americans ultimately obtained work in war industries.

After World War II, Randolph founded the League for Nonviolent Civil Disobedience against Military Segregation. The organization successfully pressured President Harry S. Truman to issue Executive Order 9981, which ended segregation in the U.S. military in 1948. Randolph spent the remainder of his life fighting workplace discrimination, and he was a director of the August 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. Randolph died in New York City on May 16, 1979.

MINOA UFFELMAN

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States; Document 95

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Rangers

See Commandos/Rangers

Rankin, Jeannette Pickering (1880–1973)

Pacifist, social reformer, women's rights advocate, the first woman to be elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, and widely known for her opposition to the U.S. entrance into World War I and World War II. Jeannette Pickering Rankin was born in Missoula County, Montana, on June 11, 1880. After graduating from the University of Montana in 1902, she became a schoolteacher before going into social work. Beginning in 1909, she pursued more studies at the University of Washington, where she became a women's suffrage proponent. Rankin was influential in getting legislation passed in Washington State in 1910 that permitted women to vote, and she also successfully led the women's suffrage effort in Montana and North Dakota.

Having gained a national following, Rankin ran for Congress in 1916 as a Republican, and she became the first women to be elected to the House. Already a pacifist, on April 6, 1917, she joined 56 congressmen in voting against the U.S. declaration of war against Germany. Rankin claimed that never before had an American woman had the opportunity to vote against a war, and she felt duty-bound to do so as a woman and a pacifist. Her position did not sit well with her constituents, who voted her out of office.

After leaving office, Rankin continued her social and political activism, and in 1919 she was a delegate to the Second International Congress of Women held at The Hague. During 1929–1939, she lobbied Congress on behalf of the National Council for the Prevention of War. Eyeing with suspicion President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies that seemed to presage American involvement in World War II, in 1940 Rankin again ran for Congress from Montana. She ran on a decidedly antiwar platform and won the contest. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, she cast the only vote against war in all of Congress. Her vote alienated many, and she did not seek reelection in 1942.

Thereafter, Rankin remained active in the international peace movement, speaking out against both the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Rankin died

on May 18, 1973, in Carmel, California.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States; Women in World War II

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Raskova, Marina Mikhailovna (1912–1943)

Soviet Air Force officer. Born in Moscow on March 12, 1912, Marina Raskova (née Malinina) mastered air navigation as a laboratory employee at the N. E. Zhukovskii Air Force Engineering Academy and was the first Soviet woman to qualify for a navigation diploma. She then taught navigation at the academy while training to fly and studying mechanical engineering at the Aviation Institute in Leningrad as an extramural student.

On September 24–25, 1938, Raskova, with pilot Valentina Grizodubova and copilot Polina Osipenko, took part in a nonstop pioneer flight from Moscow to the Pacific in an ANT-37 aircraft named *Rodina* (Homeland). The three aviators became the first women to receive the Hero of the Soviet Union, the highest Soviet decoration. As a major in the Soviet Air Force, Raskova persuaded Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin to form three women's combat wings at a time when there was no shortage of male aircrews. She then trained her new 122nd Air Group at Engels, near Stalingrad, in 1941 and 1942. In late 1942, she received command of the 587th Dive Bomber Regiment (which was renamed the 125th M. M. Raskova Borisov Guards Dive Bomber Regiment after her death).

Marina Raskova, shown here in 1936, was a pioneer woman aviator and created three women's dive bomber wings during World War II before her death in a plane crash in 1943. (Library of Congress)

On January 4, 1943, Raskova died in a plane crash at an undetermined location while making her way to the Stalingrad Front during a heavy snowstorm. Members of her unit pledged to make it worthy of bearing her name and qualify for the honorific "Guards" designation, attaining both that same year. The tactics of this wing's 2nd Squadron, applied in the air battle of June 4, 1943 (during which the unit shot down several German fighters), became a model for Soviet bomber aviation.

KAZIMIERA J. COTTAM

See also

Grizodubova, Valentina Stepanovna; Soviet Women's Combat Wings; Women in World War II

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Rawalpindi, Loss of (November 23, 1939)

British armed merchant cruiser sunk after single-handedly engaging the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* during their first wartime voyage into the Atlantic. The *Rawalpindi* was built in 1925 by Harland and Wolff of Belfast, Northern Ireland, for the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) service between Britain, India, and the Far East. At 16,697 tons, it was 568 feet long and could carry 600 passengers in two classes, along with 380 crewmen, at a maximum speed of 17 knots.

In August 1939, the Admiralty requisitioned the *Rawalpindi* as an armed merchant cruiser for use in Britain's naval blockade of Germany, equipping it with eight 6-inch guns. With a crew consisting primarily of naval reservists under the command of Captain Edward Coverley Kennedy, it was assigned to the Northern Patrol between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, there to intercept German merchant shipping and to escort convoys. In the late afternoon of November 23, its crew sighted what Kennedy identified as a pocket battleship of the Deutschland class, but in fact it was the *Scharnhorst,* with a main battery of nine 11-inch guns. The sighting was reported to the headquarters of the Home Fleet. The *Rawalpindi* was then ordered by the Germans to heave to and maintain radio silence, but Kennedy responded by turning toward the German ships and laying a smoke screen.

After the *Rawalpindi* ignored a warning shot across the bow, the *Scharnhorst* opened fire with its large guns at about 8,250 yards and was soon joined by the *Gneisenau*, setting the *Rawalpindi* on fire. Kennedy returned fire and scored one ineffective hit on the *Scharnhorst,* but the rest of his shots fell short by hundreds of yards. After 10 minutes, the Germans disengaged on receiving false reports of torpedo tracks, but the *Rawalpindi* was left burning fiercely. The ship remained afloat another three hours, during which time the Germans searched for survivors. Kennedy and 270

others were lost; of 38 survivors, 27 were rescued by the Germans and the remainder by the British cruiser *Newcastle*.

The *Rawalpindi*'s arrival on the scene reinforced the decision of German task force commander Vice Admiral Wilhelm Marschall to abandon his mission on grounds of poor visibility and British knowledge of his presence. He was criticized for that decision on his return to Germany.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Marschall, Wilhelm

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Red Ball Express (August 24–November 16, 1944)

U.S. Army Transportation Corps operation following the Allied breakout in Normandy. Commencing on August 24, 1944, the Red Ball Express was a massive road operation to resupply Allied forces advancing across France. Supplies carried by the Red Ball Express were essential to the continued movement of U.S. units.

After the Allied breakout at Saint-Lô, U.S. forces pushed across the Seine River. The original plan envisioned the supply of 12 U.S. divisions at the Seine by September 4, but by that date 16 divisions were already some 120 miles beyond the Seine. This presented a major logistics challenge. The ruined French port facilities were inadequate to support the Allied advance, and most supplies had to be transported over the beaches.

The main problem lay in getting the supplies forward to the advancing forces. The Allies had also counted on utilizing the French railroad system, but it had been severely damaged by Allied bombing, and parts of it remained

under German control. Most supplies thus had to come by vehicle from the beachheads at Normandy. The Red Ball Express was the truck supply line organized by the army's Transportation Corps to address the logistical shortfall.

Corporal Charles H. Johnson of the 783rd Military Police Battalion waves on a "Red Ball Express" motor convoy rushing material to the forward areas, near Alençon, France, September 5, 1944. (National Archives)

At its peak, the Red Ball Express involved 132 truck companies, composed of some 23,000 men operating 5,958 vehicles. The most common vehicle employed was the six-by-six, 2.5 ton General Motors truck known as the "deuce and a half" or "Jimmy." Trucks transported matériel to the front along French roads paralleling the French rail lines. They ran 20 hours out of 24 and operated at night without blackout lights.

U.S. forces moved so quickly that only the most important supplies, such as ammunition, rations, medical supplies, and gasoline, were carried forward; without these supplies, the Allied advance could not continue. Most truck runs were overnight operations that allowed the drivers little sleep. To ensure safety, rules mandated 60-yard intervals between trucks, 10-minute breaks at the top of the hour, and bivouac sites for long trips.

Nonetheless, the strain of the operation took a heavy toll on drivers and their vehicles. Supplies were also diverted by other U.S. units on the way to the front, and a portion ended up on the French black market. African Americans, who constituted only about 10 percent of the U.S. Army, made up three-quarters of the drivers on the Red Ball Express.

The Red Ball Express officially lasted for 81 days, until November 16, 1944, and in this time span, it transported 412,193 tons of matériel from Normandy to the front. It also met the gasoline demands of the First and Third Armies, a total of 800,000 gallons a day. The Red Ball Express was the lifeline of the most mobile and highly mechanized army the world had ever seen.

BRANDON LINDSEY

See also

COBRA, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Saint-Lô, Battle of

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Red Sea, Naval Operations in (1940–1941)

The Red Sea extends 1,200 nautical miles from the port of Suez in Egypt to Bab el Mandeb, its narrow outlet, into the Gulf of Aden. At its widest, the Red Sea is only 200 miles across. In peace all of the traffic between Europe and Asia via the Suez Canal traveled the Red Sea, making it one of the world's most strategic bodies of water. Italy's East African base at Massawa was situated astride this critical sea route, and with the Sicilian Channel

closed upon the outbreak of war, Italy theoretically possessed the ability to block maritime access to Egypt.

In June 1940 Italy's East African naval squadron consisted of seven destroyers, eight submarines, two old torpedo boats, five old motor torpedo boats (MTBs), and a large colonial sloop all concentrated at Massawa. Naval command considered that due to the squadron's limited stocks of fuel and ammunition, its mission was to survive and practice sea denial with its submarines for the duration of a six-month war. British Empire forces included three light cruisers, four destroyers, and three sloops. This Red Sea Squadron was tasked with blockading the Italian East African coast, preventing reinforcements from reaching there, and, most important, protecting Allied shipping lanes to Suez and Aden.

Hostilities opened with an Italian submarine offensive, but the British had suspended all shipping two weeks before war, and only one ship of 8,215 gross register tonnage (GRT) fell victim. In return, Allied antisubmarine forces sank four Italian submarines, losing a destroyer in the process.

Operations were complicated by what one participant described as the torture of the region's "blazing heat and incredible humidity" and even by periodic sandstorms in port and at sea. Two Italian submarines were lost as a direct consequence of malfunctions in their inadequate air-conditioning systems.

The first convoy, BN1 (BN for north-bound, while BS stood for south-bound), departed Aden for Suez on July 2, 1940. On six occasions in July, August, and September Italian destroyers made night sorties in response to reports of Allied ships passing Massawa, but they failed to make contact. Submarines and aircraft only sank two merchantman (one each), totaling 9,288 GRT, during this period.

On the night of October 20–21, 1940, four Italian destroyers operating in two sections intercepted Convoy BN7, numbering 34 ships of British, Norwegian, French, Greek and Turkish origin, which was escorted by the light cruiser *Leander*, 1 destroyer, 3 sloops, and 2 minesweepers hailing from the navies of Great Britain, New Zealand, India, and Australia. The convoy escaped damage, but the destroyer *Kimberley* sank the Italian destroyer *Francesco Nullo* on its return to base. An Italian shore battery disabled the *Kimberley*, but the *Leander* eventually towed it to safety.

Although its oil stocks were running short, the *Regia Marina* attempted to

intercept Allied convoys on December 3, January 24, and February 2, 1941. Only during the last sortie did two of three destroyers make contact with Convoy BN14, but all their torpedoes missed.

In March 1941, British forces invading Italian East Africa neared Massawa. On April 2 the five remaining Italian destroyers attempted a desperate raid against Port Sudan, but one dropped out en route because of engine problems, and the other four were intercepted at dawn on April 3 while 30 miles short of their objective by bomber squadrons disembarked from the British aircraft carrier *Eagle*. The aircraft sank two of the destroyers, while the other two were scuttled by their crews on the Arabian coast. The last significant Red Sea naval event of the war occurred on April 8 during the occupation of Massawa, when an Italian MTB severely damaged a British light cruiser.

The destruction of Italian naval forces in the Red Sea relieved the need for convoys, and the last BN convoy arrived in Suez on April 13. British forces captured Assab, Italy's final Red Sea outpost, on June 10. Suez continued to be a serious bottleneck, however, especially when German aerial mines caused its closure. In May 1941, for example, 117 ships waited outside Port Suez to be unloaded, providing rich targets for Axis aircraft. As late as October 1941, the Allied Suez escort force still retained 4 light cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 2 sloops.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Suez Canal

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Reeves, Joseph Mason "Bull" (1872–1948)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Tampico, Illinois, on November 20, 1872, Joseph Mason "Bull" Reeves graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis

in 1894. Beginning his naval career as an engineer, he became a gunnery officer. Reeves interspersed seagoing, staff, and teaching appointments, and he served a tour as naval attaché to Italy. Promoted to commander, Reeves's initial command was the navy's first electricity-driven ship, the *Jupiter*, an experimental collier; during World War I, he commanded the battleship *Maine*.

In 1925, Reeves volunteered to become an aviation observer and learned to fly. In October 1925, he became commander of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, including the navy's first aircraft carrier. He switched this force's emphasis from breaking records, performing stunts, and testing to intensive training in aviation warfare tactics, with a special focus on upgrading aircraft carrier capacities. Reeves was promoted to rear admiral in June 1927. In military exercises in 1928 and 1929, Reeves conducted successful mock air assaults on Hawaii and the Panama Canal, demonstrating the effectiveness of airpower and giving new impetus to developing a powerful carrier task force.

In 1933, Reeves commanded the U.S. Battle Fleet, and in 1934, he served as commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, the first aviation officer ever appointed to that post. As Japan abrogated the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and became increasingly assertive in Asia, he stressed fleet security and preparedness for war. Reeves ordered extensive naval maneuvers designed to test U.S. naval effectiveness under wartime conditions, including exercises near Pearl Harbor and Midway Island. Although Reeves retired from the navy in December 1936, his staunch support for naval aviation and efforts to prepare for conflict contributed substantially to his country's fighting success in World War II.

Recalled to emergency duty in 1940, Reeves served in the office of the secretary of the navy on the Roberts Commission that investigated the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor disaster. He was also the Navy Department's Lend-Lease liaison officer and a member of the Munitions Assignment Board. He retired for a second time in 1946 and died in Bethesda, Maryland on March 25, 1948.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Lend-Lease; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States Navy

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Regensburg and Schweinfurt Raids

See Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids

Reichenau, Walther von (1884–1942)

German Army field marshal. Born in Karlsruhe, Germany, on October 8, 1884, Walther von Reichenau joined the 1st Guards Artillery Regiment as an officer candidate in 1903 and became an officer in 1904. During World War I, he served as adjutant to the 1st Guards Reserve Artillery Regiment and then joined the General Staff.

Reichenau continued in the German Army after the war and worked in the General Staff. Promoted to colonel in 1929, he was chief of staff of the East Prussia Military District. After rising to lieutenant general in 1933, he headed the Reichswehr Chancellery. He was one of the few aristocratic officers to support Adolf Hitler and was partly responsible for the führer's selection of General Werner von Blomberg as minister of war. In 1935, he took command of VII Corps at Munich, and he played an important role in the staging of Berlin's 1936 Olympic Games. Promoted to general of artillery in 1938, he took command of the 4th Army Group at Leipzig.

Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau was one of the few aristocratic German army officers to support Adolf Hitler. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

Reichenau commanded the Tenth Army in the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, where he enveloped the Polish Kraków Army in Germany's first major encirclement battle of the war. The Tenth Army was then redesignated the Sixth Army, and Reichenau was promoted to colonel general. He led the Sixth Army in the May 10, 1940, invasion of France and the Low Countries, although his vocal protests over German atrocities in Poland and his opposition to the violation of the neutrality of Belgian and the Netherlands permanently alienated him from Hitler.

In the invasion of the west, Reichenau again demonstrated his effectiveness as a field commander. He was known for leading from the front and for his rapport with his men in operations in the Netherlands and northern Belgium. His troops took Paris in mid-June, and he was promoted to field marshal in July 1940.

Reichenau next led the Sixth Army in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union, operating in Ukraine and taking Kiev, Belgorod, Kharkov, and Kursk. He proved to be a master of armored warfare. Reichenau also supported both the execution of Red Army commissars and the killing of Jews. His name surfaced as a possible replacement for the commander in chief of the army, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, whom Hitler fired, but instead, Reichenau replaced Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt as commander of Army Group South in early December 1941. On January 15, 1942, Reichenau collapsed from a cerebral hemorrhage.

Hitler ordered him transported to a clinic in Leipzig, but Reichenau died of heart failure during the flight two days later.

GENE MUELLER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Belgium Campaign; France, Battle for; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Poland Campaign

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Reichswald, Battle of the (February 8–March 10, 1945)

West European land battle. In early 1945 German forces in the west defended the West Wall (known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line) against Allied attack. General of Paratroops Alfred Schlemm's First Paratroop Army of Army Group H held the line between the Rhine and Maas Rivers. The Allied attack here marked the opening phase of Operation VERITABLE, the advance of Lieutenant General Henry Crerar's Canadian First Army to the Rhine River. This Allied offensive saw the First Army pushing across the German-Dutch border, securing Kleve, and then turning south between the Rhine and the Maas to meet Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's U.S. Ninth Army as

it was driving northeast across the Roer River and toward the Rhine in Operation GRENADE. The Allies hoped to surround and destroy defending German units and secure crossing points over the Rhine. To accomplish this, Canadian forces, reinforced by the British Army's XXX Corps, would have to cross the heavily wooded Reichswald State Forest and eliminate the German pillboxes and bunkers of the West Wall. To this operation, the Allies eventually committed some 200,000 men. Schlemm commanded only 90,000 men. His task was to prevent the Allies from breaking through and seizing the bridgeheads over the lower Rhine.

The Allied attack here was hindered to some extent by the terrain. The land was heavily forested, which somewhat offset Allied advantages in mobility and manpower, and there were only two roads through the Reichswald Forest. The weather was also a significant factor. A thaw just before the attack turned the ground into mud, and the Germans opened floodgates on the Maas, overflowing the river and flooding the countryside. To the south, the Germans also blew the floodgates on the Schwammenauel Dam in the Hürtgen Forest, and the subsequent downstream flooding of the Roer River delayed Simpson's supporting attack by more than a week. As a consequence, the battle, planned to last only a few days, dragged on for several weeks.

The assault commenced on February 8, 1945, with a five-hour artillery barrage by 1,000 Allied guns against the German fortifications. British lieutenant general Sir Brian Horrocks's XXX Corps led the attack, which consisted of (from north to south) the Canadian 3rd and 2nd Divisions and the British 15th (Scottish), 53rd (Welsh), and 51st (Highland) Divisions. Delays in the advance, however, enabled Schlemm to bring up reserves as well as PzKpfw IV tanks and assault guns of the Panzer Lehr Division. The Germans fought with great tenacity in what was some of the most bitterly contested combat of the war.

By opening the gates of the Roer River dams, Schlemm forced Simpson to postpone the Ninth Army's attack for almost two weeks. By the time the Ninth Army launched what was to have been a supporting attack on February 23, the Canadian and British troops had already achieved almost all their objectives. Supported by massive artillery barrages and air support, they slowly forced the Germans from their defensive positions. The Germans fought particularly hard in and around the strategic towns of Kleve, Goch,

and Kalkar. The Canadian II Corps suffered heavy losses advancing east of Kleve, and the British XXX Corps sustained considerable casualties near Goch. Schlemm was able to get his paratroops and most of his heavy equipment across the Rhine before blowing its bridges. The last Fallschirmjäger (paratroops) crossed the Rhine at Bruedrich in boats on March 10, 1945.

British and Canadian forces suffered 15,634 casualties, nearly two-thirds of which were in XXX Corps. Horrocks later wrote that the brutal Reichswald fighting reminded him of the carnage in World War I. The operation had cost the Germans heavier losses, however. The 11 German divisions involved in the fighting lost between 22,000 and 75,000 men; some 16,000 Germans were taken prisoner. The commitment of so many German reserves to the fighting in the Reichswald helped to open the way for U.S. advances farther south.

TERRY SHOPTAUGH AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; Horrocks, Sir Brian Gwynne; Rhineland Offensive; Simpson, William Hood

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Reinhardt, Georg Hans (1887–1963)

German Army general. Born at Bautzen, Saxony, Germany, on May 1, 1887, Georg Hans Reinhardt entered the German Army in 1907 as an officer candidate. He fought in World War I and continued in the Reichswehr afterward. Between 1934 and 1937, Reinhardt headed the Army Training Section. Promoted to major general in 1937, he assumed command of the 4th Panzer Division in 1938 and led it in the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.

An outstanding panzer leader, Reinhardt was promoted to lieutenant general in October 1939. He then commanded the XLI Panzer Corps (6th and 8th Panzer Divisions) and led it ably in the May 10–June 25, 1940, French Campaign as part of Colonel General Günther von Kluge's Fourth Army.

In June, Reinhardt was promoted to general of panzer troops. He then led the XLI Panzer Corps in the Yugoslavia Campaign (April 1941) and in the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22). In the latter effort, the XLI Panzer Corps was part of Colonel General Erich Hoepner's Fourth Panzer Group in Army Group North. Reinhardt's corps participated in the drive on Leningrad, penetrating the city's outer defenses in July.

In October 1941, Reinhardt succeeded Colonel General Hermann Hoth as commander of the Third Panzer Army and led it to Kalinin (December 15) and to the Volga-Moscow Canal. In February 1942, Reinhardt was promoted to colonel general. The Third Panzer Army participated in fighting at Vitebsk, the counterattack through Vyasma, and actions in the Moscow sector of the Eastern Front.

Still in command of the Third Panzer Army, Reinhardt took over Army Group Center on August 15, 1944, from Field Marshal Walther Model. Soviet attacks pushed the front back into East Prussia near Königsberg, where Reinhardt denounced the local Gauleiter (Nazi Party regional leader) for not evacuating women and children. Reinhardt's forces were hopelessly outnumbered by the Soviets in terms of manpower and equipment.

Both the Soviet 3rd Belorussian Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front attacked in January 1945. Because Reinhardt's troops initially held their ground, Adolf Hitler transferred the Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland from Reinhardt's command to Army Group A. That move, along with clear weather that worked to the Soviets' advantage, doomed Army Group Center. With the Soviets advancing on both flanks, Reinhardt informed Hitler by phone that he intended to withdraw farther west. Hitler refused permission and dismissed Reinhardt on January 25, 1945.

Reinhardt then was assigned to the Führer Reserve. He was taken prisoner at the end of the war and brought to trial on war crimes charges. Convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison, he was released in 1952. Reinhardt died in Munich on November 22, 1963.

GENE MUELLER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; France, Battle for; Leningrad, Siege of; Poland Campaign; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of

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Reitsch, Hanna (1912–1979)

German test pilot. Born in Hirschberg, Silesia, on March 29, 1912, Hanna Reitsch mastered glider aviation skills as a young woman. She was one of the earliest pilots to soar over the Alps, and she flew a glider for 11.5 consecutive hours, setting a world record. In 1934, she piloted a glider to an altitude of 9,186 feet, the highest any woman had glided.

Adolf Hitler shaking hands with aviator Hanna Reitsch, recipient of the Iron Cross, as Hermann Göring and others look on, March 28, 1941. (Library of Congress)

Reitsch also mastered powered aircraft and became a valued test pilot, with the rank of flugkapitän (flight captain), testing experimental aircraft for the Luftwaffe. In 1937, she became the first woman to pilot a helicopter. During World War II, Reitsch tested a variety of aircraft, including fighter planes, dive-bombers, and the Messerschmitt Me-163 rocket aircraft. She also tested aerial methods to cut barrage balloon tethers. Reitsch was one of just two women to be awarded the Iron Cross First Class and the only civilian so honored.

A fervent supporter of Adolf Hitler, Reitsch proposed establishing a women's pilot squadron, an idea that German military leaders rejected. The incredibly brave Reitsch piloted the final German flight into Berlin, carrying Luftwaffe field marshal Robert von Greim to a meeting with Hitler and landing on a shell-pocked Berlin avenue on April 26, 1945. Reitsch offered to stay with Hitler and share his fate, but she was ordered to fly Greim from the city several days later.

Arrested after the war, Reitsch was held by U.S. authorities for 18 months. When freed, she went first to India and then to Ghana, where she opened an aviation school to teach gliding. She became the first female winner of the World Helicopter Championships in 1971. Many aviation historians consider her to have been the 20th century's most outstanding female pilot. Reitsch died at Frankfurt, Germany, on August 24, 1979.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER

See also

Aircraft, Gliders; Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Germany, Air Force; Greim, Robert Ritter von; Helicopters; Women in World War II

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Religion and the War

With World War II's casualty toll measured in scores of millions, one might initially imagine that the war brought a total eclipse of religious sentiment. Certainly, this partly occurred in both Europe and Asia, as war's barbarity ran to extremes in such atrocities as the systematic destruction of Jews in the Holocaust or the Nanjing (Nanking) Massacre. Yet at both institutional and personal levels, religion continued to shine forth—sometimes erratically, unpredictably, or fleetingly and not always for good but also not always for evil.

Both good and evil characterized the record of the Roman Catholic Church. Priests in Poland heroically resisted Nazi oppression and served with distinction as chaplains at the front, often ministering to both Protestants and Catholics. Churches, monasteries, and individual Catholics helped to shelter Jews from the Holocaust. Yet nationalistic Catholic priests in Slovakia and Croatia sanctioned or participated in ruthless persecutions of non-Catholics, especially Jews and Orthodox Serbians. Meanwhile, Pope Pius XII, elected to the papacy in March 1939, refused to publicly condemn Nazi atrocities against Poles, Jews, and other peoples. One might say charitably that Pius XII took the long view of the war, putting the survival of the apostolic episcopate and the Vatican ahead of the uncertain efficacy of protesting war crimes.

Certainly, the Catholic Church in Germany expressed nearly unqualified support for Adolf Hitler and the war, although these expressions mainly called for German men to serve the Fatherland at the front. Most Catholics agreed with the rhetoric of "crusade" that the Nazis employed against Bolshevism. Open opposition to Nazi policy, such as that in sermons delivered by Archbishop Galen of Münster in 1941 condemning Germany's euthanasia program, was decidedly uncommon. Those few Catholics who dared speak out sometimes paid with their lives, among them the Jesuit Alfred Delp, who, as a member of the Kreisau Circle, sought to define a new Germany after the Third Reich's anticipated demise.

German Protestant opposition to the Nazi war effort was equally rare and could prove just as deadly. Ludwig Müller, a devotee of Adolf Hitler, became Reich bishop of the German Lutheran Church. His plan to meld the church and National Socialism was supported by the Deutsche Christen (German Christians) but rejected by Hitler, who instead sought to curtail Christianity's influence throughout the Reich.

The less numerous Confessionals within the church were more critical of

Nazi policy. Among their members were Martin Niemöller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who founded the Pastors' Emergency League to resist Nazi interference in church activities, the subjugation of faith to Fatherland, and the unbending and unreflective obedience to duty.

Arrested in 1943 by the Gestapo, Bonhoeffer penned his famous *Letters and Papers from Prison*, calling for a "religionless" Christianity in which believers could profess the faith as a matter of individual conscience. They could thereby avoid religious institutions that had been irredeemably compromised by Nazism. Bonhoeffer paid for his elevation of individual conscience and his involvement in the July 1944 plot against Hitler's life with his own life in April 1945.

The de facto policy of Nazi Germany was essentially noninterference with organized Christianity as long as religionists supported or acquiesced in the activities of the regime. Those who refused to take oaths of loyalty, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, were sent to concentration camps, and many perished. (The United States also imprisoned Jehovah's Witnesses for refusing to register for the draft.) The Nazis themselves attempted to undermine Christianity with neo-pagan rituals and hypernationalism. Among more fanatical Nazis, the führer became a new messiah, *Mein Kampf* became a new bible, and iron crosses and swastikas became the new crucifixes. Yet most Christians in Germany experienced little distress in preserving traditional Christian symbols and beliefs while professing allegiance to Hitler and the Nazi Party. Opposition to the war became a force in Germany only after major military setbacks, notably the defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943.

In countries occupied by Germany, religion sometimes served to unify resisters to Nazi rule, as it did in Poland, Holland, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, and other nations. Yet the opposite could be true as well, at least initially. In France, the Catholic Church supported head of state Henri Philippe Pétain and his collaborationist Vichy government, because the latter drew its strength from conservatives sympathetic to Catholicism, a contrast to their republican or socialist counterparts in the interwar period. As Nazi occupation policy grew more oppressive, French Catholics such as Jacques Maritain began calling for heartfelt examinations of individual conscience and resistance to totalitarian forms of government. Maritain's *Christianity and Democracy* (1943) pointed the way toward the Christian Democratic parties of the postwar period.

Where religious identity mattered in deadly earnest, of course, was among Jewish communities scattered throughout Europe. Widespread European anti-Semitism, internecine struggles over the desirability and practicality of Zionism, and debates over orthodoxy and proper observance of Jewish law further fractured an already fragmented Jewish community, which was then systematically annihilated by the Nazis. Yet Judaism persisted. The Nazis could destroy the Jews' synagogues, cut off their beards, and even murder them but could not annihilate their faith. Despite Nazi prohibitions, many Jews practiced their faith surreptitiously in the ghettos, demonstrating fortitude and fidelity to their forefathers and precipitating acts of moral and violent resistance against their nominally Christian German persecutors. The Holocaust led some Jews to reject God, whereas others embraced him more closely. Few Jews were left unchanged by the war.

Chief rabbi Dr. J. M. Hertz preaches in the bombed-out Great Synagogue in Aldgate, London, during National Prayer Day, September 7, 1941. (Eric Harlow/Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 1930s and Zionist ambitions had provoked Arab revolts against British rule from 1936 to 1939. In 1939, attempting to appease Arab demands, the British limited Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 for the next five years. By quelling Arab dissent, the British were able to redeploy two divisions from Palestine to the home islands to resist the anticipated Nazi assault on Europe. Dissatisfied with the British response, Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, approached the Nazis, a move that compromised his moral authority and the political credibility of the Palestinian Arab cause. After fleeing to Germany to avoid British arrest, Husseini vocally supported the Holocaust and worked to recruit Muslims for the Waffen-SS.

Yet the Muslim-Jewish split in Palestine was arguably less significant during the war than the shared goal of checking Nazi aggression. Thus it was that the British Eighth Army, which included thousands of Indian Muslim troops, thwarted Nazi ambitions to conquer Palestine, thereby saving the tens of thousands of Jews residing there. After the war, Britain relinquished its mandate over Palestine to the United Nations, whose support of a Jewish state led to Israel's creation but also to inflammatory disputes over Jerusalem and other territories—disputes that remain unresolved to this day.

In Britain and the United States, organized religion lent its moral authority to the holy crusade against Nazi Germany. The Nazi combination of unrelenting territorial ambition suffused with genocidal racial ideology was so transparently evil that few people in the West objected to combating Germany after 1941. Such was not the case earlier in the war, when some viewed fascism as a dangerous but nevertheless more congenial alternative than communism.

In his Four Freedoms, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made it clear that democracy best preserved people's freedom to worship. The four chaplains—Catholic, Methodist, Reform Church, and Jewish—who together lost their lives in the torpedoing of the U.S. Army transport *Dorchester* in 1943 set a powerful example of ecumenism and religious unity that served the Western democracies well in prosecuting the war.

Joseph Stalin also recognized the importance of religion to fighting spirit. Soon after the German invasion of June 22, 1941, he suppressed the League of Militant Atheists (an organization founded in 1917). He then permitted the reappointment of a patriarch (Sergius) for the Russian Orthodox Church

(Peter the Great had eliminated the post in 1721). Orthodox priests—now freed from prison, with their rights to preach guaranteed and their churches reopened to the faithful—rewarded Stalin with calls for a holy war to defend the homeland against bloodthirsty and barbarous Nazi "jackals," a call that was answered with considerable enthusiasm by many Soviet citizens.

The Pacific theater witnessed even more intense expressions of religiously inspired nationalism. In Japan, the state Shinto religion merged with militant and nationalistic expressions of the Bushido warrior code to elevate emperor veneration and expansionist rhetoric to unprecedented heights. In such a setting, battle became a Shinto purification rite to cleanse Asia of corrupt, materialistic Westerners. Japan planned to incorporate Asia and the Pacific Basin into a coprosperity sphere ruled by its army and navy, agents of the divine emperor. Militarism extended even to Japanese Buddhist sects, such as the Nichiren sect, which aggressively sought to provoke incidents in China to justify Japanese expansionism and imperial exploitation.

Meanwhile, Western missionaries in China played pivotal roles as witnesses to Japanese war crimes, most notably the infamous Nanjing (Nanking) Massacre (1937). Faced with the fanaticism of Japanese soldiers, sailors, and aviators, the West responded with its own "war without mercy," in John W. Dower's memorable phrase, that caricatured the Japanese as irredeemable, inhuman vermin. With Shintoism viewed in the West as a debased form of primitive nature and ancestor worship, there was little room for Christian accommodation.

Whether it was Japan's divine sense of mission against Western domination or Nazi crusades against godless Bolshevism or Allied efforts against degenerate and murderous Nazism, World War II often became a moral and religious crusade with little tolerance for pacifists and conscientious objectors. Nevertheless, avoiding military service on religious grounds was possible, if suspect—a fact that cast a shadow over even long-term pacifists such as the Society of Friends (Quakers). Conscientious objectors were tolerated most in countries whose existence was threatened least, such as the United States and Canada.

Here, one must note the success of Mohandas Gandhi in pursuing a nonviolent protest against British rule in India. Its tragic denouement in Hindu-Muslim violence that led to Gandhi's assassination and the India-

Pakistan split in 1947 should not obscure the spiritual power of his war of ideas.

Religion was perhaps most crucial in the postwar world in helping to restore morality and human decency after the genocidal catastrophes and horrific casualties of the war. Ecumenicism was plainly more evident; the World Council of Churches, founded in 1948, brought together 147 different churches from 44 countries. Evangelism within Christianity also increased as resistance to communism became the new raison d'être of many European and American Christians. Meanwhile, Jews attempted to recover from the enormity of the crimes against them while simultaneously defending the State of Israel.

Many people, Jews and Christians alike, were left to ponder the question raised and the confession made by Christians such as Emmi Bonhoeffer, who asked how a German population consisting of 95 percent baptized Christians could have supported or acquiesced in unspeakable Nazi war crimes. Many believers confronted (or sometimes actively avoided) this and similar questions of conscience after 1945.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich; Catholic Church and the War; Chaplains; Conscientious Objectors; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; Holocaust; Jewish Resistance; Nanjing Massacre; Niemöller, Martin; Pius XII, Pope; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph

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Remagen Bridge, Capture of the (March 7, 1945)

In early 1945 as the Germans withdrew across the Rhine, they destroyed its bridges. Not expecting to find a bridge intact, American forces planned to pause along the Rhine while, to the north, Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's 21st Army Group drove between Düsseldorf and the Dutch frontier to secure the Ruhr. Such a delay was unacceptable to U.S. generals Omar N. Bradley and George S. Patton, who wanted to cross the Rhine as soon as possible and maintain pressure on the German Army. American forces had narrowly missed capturing several bridges over the Rhine.

At noon on March 7, 1945, Task Force Englemann (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Englemann), consisting of the U.S. 14th Tank and 27th Armored Infantry Battalions of Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division, reached the Ludendorff Railroad Bridge at Remagen, 20 miles upriver from Bonn. The bridge, the last still intact over the Rhine, had two rail tracks and a pedestrian walkway. When the French had occupied the region following World War I, they had poured large quantities of cement into the demolition chambers under the bridge, which made it difficult to destroy. Indeed, the Germans had failed to blow it twice before the Americans arrived. The bridge was held by an inadequate force of only a platoon of German soldiers.

On March 7, 1945, Task Force Englemann captured the Ludendorf Bridge. Spanning the Rhine at Remagen, it was at the time the only bridge left standing across that river. (Corbis)

At 4:30 p.m. on March 7, the lead U.S. units received orders to take the bridge at all costs. The Germans detonated charges that cratered the approach to the bridge, but a U.S. tank round had severed the power cables between the electrical source and the main charge on the bridge itself. As the Americans dashed forward, the Germans did detonate a low-quality backup charge, but the explosion only shook the bridge.

During the next 10 days, the United States rushed nearly 50,000 troops and dozens of vehicles across the bridge into Germany. Almost from the moment the bridge was captured, engineers began constructing supplementary crossings, including a large Treadway pontoon bridge. Begun on March 9, the auxiliary bridge was completed 80 hours later.

The Germans tried to destroy the Remagen Bridge with aerial bombing, V-2 rockets, jet aircraft, and even an assault by frogmen. On March 17, 1945, the bridge collapsed with little prior warning, killing 28 Americans. Studies revealed that it had given way due to overuse, especially by heavy vehicles.

The dramatic capture of the Remagen Bridge facilitated the infusion of Allied forces into Germany and likely shortened the war in Europe. Later, General Dwight D. Eisenhower declared that the bridge was "worth its weight in gold."

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Logistics, Allied; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.

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Rendulic, Lothar (1887–1971)

German Army general. Born at Wiener Neustadt, Austria, near Vienna, on November 23, 1887, Lothar Rendulic joined the Austro-Hungarian Army, became a lieutenant in 1910, and served during World War I. He then studied law at the University of Vienna, earning his doctorate in 1920. During the interwar years, he held several senior positions in the Austrian Army, but because of his membership in the Austrian National Socialist Party, he was dismissed in 1936.

After the German annexation of Austria in 1938, Rendulic joined the Wehrmacht as a major general. From September 1939, he served as a division and corps commander in Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. Between April 1943 and June 1944, he commanded the Second Panzer Army in the Balkans. In the course of conducting antipartisan warfare, Rendulic's army committed numerous war crimes against civilians.

At the end of June 1944, Adolf Hitler appointed Rendulic commander of Twentieth Mountain Army, with the rank of colonel general. He led his retreating army from Finland to Norway and commanded German forces in Norway from December 1944 to January 1945. In October 1944, Rendulic ordered the complete destruction of all means of subsistence and the evacuation of the entire civilian population of northern Norway. During October and November 1944, this order was ruthlessly carried out. Rendulic then demonstrated a remarkable administrative ability as he organized the retreat of 200,000 men across the Arctic, with few roads available.

In succession, Rendulic next commanded Army Group North (January to March 1945), Army Group Kurland (March to April), and Army Group South (April to May). At the end of the war, he fought the Soviets in Austria. Tried and convicted at the Military Tribunals at Nuremberg, he received a 20-year sentence but was released in December 1951. Rendulic died at Linz, Austria, on July 17, 1971.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Croatia; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Norway; Yugoslavia

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Rennell Island, Battle of (January 29–30, 1943)

Naval battle fought between U.S. and Japanese forces off Guadalcanal. At the beginning of 1943, the Japanese were gathering shipping at Rabaul, Buin, and Java for the evacuation of their forces from Guadalcanal, but the United States assumed that this buildup was a major Japanese effort to reinforce the island. U.S. Navy South Pacific commander Admiral William Halsey assembled substantial naval assets, and with relief of the last marine elements on Guadalcanal requiring the dispatch of a number of transports to the island, he decided to send five separate task forces with the transports in hopes that the Japanese would challenge the passage. Sufficient fuel was not available for the Japanese to make a major naval effort, but they did commit air units.

The U.S. ships assembled at different points and then moved north in six separate groups. Three of these did not participate in the subsequent battle: one force of four light cruisers and four destroyers, another of the battleships *North Carolina* and *Indiana,* and a third force around the carrier *Saratoga*. A fourth group, centered on the carrier *Enterprise,* did see action. These four trailed the two forward groups—the first consisting of three President-class transports and the *Crescent City* and the second being Task Force (TF) 18, a close-support group of cruisers, escort carriers, and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen.

TF 18 took the brunt of the subsequent fight. The force included the heavy cruisers *Wichita, Chicago,* and *Louisville;* the light cruisers *Montpelier, Cleveland,* and *Columbia;* the escort carriers *Chenango* and *Suwannee;* and eight destroyers. The transports departed Nouméa on January 27, the same day the support group left Efate. The ships were to rendezvous 15 miles off Cape Hunter on the southwest coast of Guadalcanal at 9:00 p.m. on January 30. To make the rendezvous on time, Giffen was forced to leave behind the two escort carriers with two destroyers at 2:00 p.m. on January 29.

Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and submarines had located Giffen's ships on the afternoon of January 27. The Japanese then sent out some 30 Mitsubishi G4M ("Betty") medium land-based bombers from Munda Field, Buka, and probably Rabaul. The last U.S. combat air patrol aircraft retired at sunset, leaving the six cruisers without air protection.

TF 18 was then about 50 miles north of Rennell Island, moving northwest toward the rendezvous point at 24 knots. Its ships were in a rivet-shaped formation, with the destroyers in a semicircle two miles in advance of the cruisers, which were steaming in two lines 2,500 yards apart. Before sunset, U.S. ship radars identified the approach of the Japanese bombers, but Giffen did not order either a change of course or a different formation to defend against air attack.

The Japanese torpedo bombers circled to the south of the U.S. formation and then split into two groups for a low-level attack. The first Japanese effort was futile and cost one aircraft, but attacks continued after dark, aided by air-dropped flares. The Mark-32 proximity fuze, employed in U.S. antiaircraft shells for one of the first times, helped claim a number of attacking aircraft, but Japanese torpedoes heavily damaged the *Chicago*.

At 10:00 p.m., Giffen ordered a change of course. The Japanese aircraft failed to detect the change, and most then departed for home. The *Louisville* took the stricken *Chicago* in tow and began to move it toward Espiritu Santo at a speed of four knots. Admiral Halsey in Nouméa ordered the escort carriers *Chenango* and *Suwannee* to provide combat air patrol to protect the two cruisers, and he diverted a tug and other vessels to assist. By 3:00 p.m., the tug *Navajo,* screened by six destroyers, had the *Chicago* under tow. There was as yet no combat air patrol when the Japanese struck with a dozen Bettys. Aware of their approach, the *Enterprise* had launched F-4F Wildcats to intercept them. U.S. aircraft shot down some of the Bettys, but nine survived to attack the crippled cruiser, while the *Navajo* made a futile effort to position the cruiser with its bow toward the attackers. Although seven of the last Bettys were shot down, four torpedoes struck the *Chicago*. It sank within 20 minutes, and the escorting ships collected 1,049 survivors.

Although the Battle of Rennell Island was a defeat for the United States and demonstrated Japan's success in night fighting, the Japanese concentration on TF 18 enabled the U.S. transports to continue on

unmolested and land their troops and supplies without incident, as did a second convoy of five transports arriving at Guadalcanal on February 4.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Giffen, Robert Carlisle "Ike"; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Proximity Fuze; Rabaul; Southeast Pacific Theater; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Resistance

Defined here as the act of opposing a foreign occupying power, resistance has existed since the beginning of warfare and conquest. There have always been citizens of an occupied nation who refused to accept the military verdict and attempted to continue the fight against the victor, sometimes with success. During World War II, there was some degree of resistance in every Axis-occupied country not only to the military conquest but also to Axis ideology. The degree varied sharply, depending on the nation and circumstances.

The word "resistance," in the sense of actions taken, encompasses everything from noncooperation to civil disobedience, conducting intelligence activities, committing sabotage and assassinations, running escape lines, and even carrying out hit-and-run raids against small enemy units. Resistance can also mean an organization or a particular movement, such as the Maquis in France. Resistance may be undertaken by individuals or by groups of people organized to work clandestinely against an oppressor. To the occupied people, those who engage in such activities are resisters and are often held up as heroes. To the occupying power, they are considered bandits, criminals, and even terrorists.

To exacerbate the confusion, most nations have created myths concerning their resistance activities. As a consequence, we will never know, even approximately, the numbers of people actually involved in such activities. After the war, for quite understandable reasons, the governments of many countries, including France, sought to magnify the numbers of citizens involved in resistance work and their contribution to victory.

Resistance movements during World War II were sharply fragmented along national lines, and there were even bitter rivalries within groups of resisters in individual nations that often led to bloodshed. These rivalries were the result of deep ideological and religious differences, long-standing ethnic feuds, fiefdoms, and petty jealousies among the leaders themselves.

In Czechoslovakia, Defense of the Nation and the Falcon Organization vied with one another. In the Netherlands, various religious and political groups emerged, but they did not work together until September 1944. In France, resisters were markedly divided at first: not until May 1943 was the National Resistance Council (CNR) formed, uniting all major French Resistance groups. In Greece, infighting among the National Popular Liberation Army (Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós, ELAS), the National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos, EDES), and the communist National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, EAM) led to a civil war after World War II had ended. In Albania, royalist Zogists fought a prorepublican group of resisters.

The Yugoslavia Resistance was polarized between the royalist Četniks under the leadership of Dragoljub “Draza” Mihajlović and communist Partisans led by Josip Broz (better known as Tito). The Ćetniks were promonarchy and conservative, whereas the Partisans were antimonarchy and sought a postwar communist state. The Četniks were also reluctant to embark on the types of operations that would bring reprisals against the civilian population, such as direct attacks on German troops. The Partisans felt no such compunction. Inside the Soviet Union, many resisters sought not only freedom from the Germans but also freedom from Soviet control as well.

Often, Allied agents who parachuted into an occupied state had difficulty sorting out all these rivalries and making the appropriate determinations as to where Allied financial and military assistance should be directed. Throughout the occupied countries, the communist resistance groups, although they were late to take the field (until the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June

22, 1941, Joseph Stalin advocated close ties with Nazi Germany), tended to be highly effective because they were better trained and organized; with strong ideological motivation, they had no reservations about the use of force.

Geography impacted resistance activities and determined the levels of action and participation. Mountainous, forested, or swampy terrain favored the guerrilla. It was thus easier to conduct resistance activities in Norway, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece, all countries with many hills, forests, and caves. In Asia, jungles often worked to the advantage of the resistance forces as well.

Resistance took many forms and was both passive and active. Passive resistance was generally nonconfrontational and a method of coping and asserting one's patriotism. Passive resistance involved many people in occupied Europe and in Asia. It encompassed a wide range of activities and might include nothing more than reading an illegal newspaper, selling or buying goods on the black market, or not handing in materials decreed necessary for the Axis war machine. It might also mean secretly listening to church sermons, praying for a royal family or leaders in exile, listening to broadcasts from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), leaving a public place when a German entered it, or other such actions. At the highest levels, passive resistance might include balking at anti-Jewish legislation or not handing over individuals sought by the occupier and seeking to evade the occupying power's exactions.

Active resistance included intelligence gathering; acting as couriers or radio operators; disseminating information or Allied propaganda, through such means as underground newspapers; printing false identification papers and ration cards; rescuing downed Allied pilots and assisting them to neutral nations; committing acts of sabotage; freeing prisoners; hiding Jews; and even carrying out assassinations of individuals and conducting military actions against small numbers of occupying troops. Active resistance was far more dangerous and often life-threatening, both to the individual involved and to his or her family. For that reason, those who engaged in it were always a minority. Considerable courage as well as clairvoyance were required for a Frenchman to see, in 1940, that Germany might indeed lose the war, let alone for him to be willing to risk all toward that end.

The British Special Operations Executive (SOE), established by Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill in 1940, helped finance and train agents

from the nations of Axis-occupied countries to carry out active resistance activities. Its U.S. counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), conducted similar activities. The SOE and the OSS enjoyed some successes, but they also experienced a number of failures leading to the deaths of agents. The most dramatic failure resulted from ENGLANDSPIEL (ENGLAND GAME), an elaborate German counterintelligence operation in the Netherlands during 1942–1944 that ended in the deaths of many Allied agents. Resisters had to exercise constant vigilance—and not only against the occupying forces. The governments of their own countries, working with the occupiers, often sent out forces (such as the Milice in France) to hunt them down.

One notable resistance success was the February 1943 strike executed by British-trained Norwegian resisters against the hydroelectric plant at Vemork, Norway. This raid and the subsequent sinking of a ferry delayed German production of the heavy water essential for the production of an atomic bomb.

The Poles, who suffered terribly at the hands of their German and Soviet occupiers during the war, immediately established active resistance operations. They provided immensely useful intelligence on the German development of V weapons, and they created the secret Home Army. Jews in the Warsaw ghetto employed active resistance as well, rising up against the Germans and providing a heroic example of courage against impossible odds.

The French Maquis also fought the Germans. Resistance activities mounted from the Vercors Plateau in the Alps of eastern France provoked a strong reaction in the form of 20,000 German troops who, in June 1944, decimated the Vercors Maquis and mounted savage reprisals against the civilian population. The Germans carried out ferocious reprisals elsewhere as well. Often, they executed innocent civilian villagers or hostages at the rate of 20 or more for each of their own slain. Reprisals were especially fierce after British-trained Czech commandos assassinated the Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia, Reinhard Heydrich. His death led the Germans to kill most of the inhabitants of Lidice and level the town. Communities in other parts of Europe suffered a similar fate.

Members of the Maquis, French Resistance fighters, moving on a mountain trail, September 18, 1944. The Resistance played an important role in the liberation of France. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Resistance activities sharply increased as the Axis powers suffered military reversals, especially when it became clear that they would lose the war. Resisters had to be constantly on guard and regularly change their modus operandi. They also had to contend with double agents, of whom there were a substantial number. For example, French Resistance leader Jean Moulin, head of the CNR, was betrayed to the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) by an informant.

The effectiveness of resistance activities during the war is difficult to gauge. Such activities may not have greatly sped up the end of the war, but they did affect events in that the occupiers were forced to divert many troops from the fighting fronts to occupation duties and to hunting down the resistance forces. Resistance in all its forms was a vindication of national identity and pride and a statement for freedom. Unfortunately for resistance leaders in many countries, their bright and idealistic hopes that the war would bring new political structures were, for the most part, left unfulfilled. In most nations, these individuals were thanked politely and then shown the door, as the old elites soon reestablished themselves in power.

Some resistance groups, of course, fought not only against the Axis powers but also against colonial forces. Thus, in Vietnam, the Viet Minh led

by Ho Chi Minh fought both the Japanese and the French. As a consequence, the resistance continued in a number of countries after World War II ended, utilizing the methods and weapons supplied to fight the Japanese. Such was the case in Vietnam, in the Philippines, and even in the Soviet Union.

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See also

Counterintelligence; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Jewish Resistance; Lidice Massacre; Maquis; Mihailović, Dragoljub "Draža"; Moulin, Jean; Office of Strategic Services; Partisans/Guerrillas; Special Operations Executive; Warsaw Ghetto Uprising; Warsaw Rising; Document 122

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Reuben James, Sinking of (October 31, 1941)

The loss of the U.S. Navy destroyer *Reuben James* (DD 245) to the German submarine *U-552* on October 31, 1941, helped move the United States closer to entering World War II. The *Reuben James* was a Clemson-class "Four Piper" destroyer, named for the U.S. sailor who, interposing his own body, had saved the life of Lieutenant Stephen Decatur during the Barbary Wars. Commissioned in 1920, "the Rube," as the destroyer came to be known,

displaced 1,200 tons, was capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots, and was armed with 4 4-inch guns and 12 21-inch torpedoes.

On the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939, the *Reuben James* was assigned to patrol duty off the East Coast of the United States. In March 1941, it joined Squadron 31 in the Atlantic as part of the Northeastern Escort Force assigned to escort convoys as far east as Iceland and as far west as the United States.

On October 31, 1914, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Heywood L. "Tex" Edwards, the *Reuben James* was some 600 miles west of Iceland, with 4 other destroyers escorting 44 merchantmen in eastbound convoy HX.156. It was steaming on the port beam of the convoy abreast of the last ship in the column that morning when it was hit without warning on the port side by a torpedo fired by the German *U-552*. The *U-552* was a Type VIIC boat, commissioned on December 4, 1920, and commanded by Corvette Captain Erich Topp. Displacing 1,070 tons and armed with 14 torpedoes, mines, and an 88mm deck gun, it had a crew of 44–52 men.

Evidently, the torpedo explosion touched off ammunition in the destroyer's forward magazine and split the ship in two. The stern remained afloat for about five minutes, and then it too sank. Only 45 men survived; 115 others, including Edwards and all the officers, went down with the ship.

Within days, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt had transferred the Coast Guard to the U.S. Navy. The next week, Congress amended the Neutrality Act by authorizing the arming of U.S. merchantmen and removing restrictions that denied European waters to U.S. shipping. The U.S. Navy could now convoy Lend-Lease goods all the way to British ports. The *Reuben James* was the only U.S. Navy ship lost to the German Navy before the United States entered World War II.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Destroyers; Lend-Lease

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Reynaud, Paul (1878–1966)

French premier early in World War II. Born on October 15, 1878, in Barcelonnette, Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, France, Paul Reynaud earned a doctor of law degree at the Faculté de Droit at the Sorbonne. He joined the bar and built a practice in civil and commercial law. During World War I, he served in the medical corps, winning the Croix de Guerre and the Legion of Honor. Reynaud secured election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1919. He failed to win reelection in 1924 but was again elected to the chamber four years later. He held this seat until the end of the republic.

A major political figure in the Third French Republic, beginning in the 1930s Reynaud was named to the cabinet eight times, three of them in the Ministry of Finance. A maverick on many issues, as early as 1935 he supported the reformist ideas of the army's Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Gaulle for the organization of a powerful armored force to confront the Germans.

As minister of justice from April 1938 in the government of Édouard Daladier, Reynaud opposed the Munich Agreement but then accepted the post of minister of finance. When Daladier was forced to resign as premier for failing to vigorously prosecute the war, Reynaud became the premier on March 20, 1940. He was saddled with having his political rival Daladier as his defense minister but proposed aggressive action against the Germans, including plans to intervene in Norway. Reynaud and British prime minister Neville Chamberlain also discussed means of aiding the Finns in their war against the Soviet Union.

Following the German invasion of France and the Low Countries on May 10, 1940, Reynaud tried to rally the French nation, announcing in a radio address that "The situation is grave; it is not desperate. The Maginot Line is there … intact, robust, unbreakable." He also sought to strengthen the government by bringing into it Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain and General Maxime Weygand.

Reynaud pledged to continue the fight, but by the end of May, with the military situation fast deteriorating, he met with British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and warned that he might be unable to keep his

pledge not to negotiate a separate armistice. The government fled to Bordeaux in southwest France, and defeatists in the cabinet gained strength. Reynaud favored continuing the fight, if necessary overseas. When Churchill proposed a merger of France and Britain, Reynaud agreed, but this union was disavowed by a majority of the cabinet.

On June 16, 1940, Reynaud resigned. Arrested by the Vichy government in August, he was held until November 1942, when he was handed over to the Germans. Taken to Germany, he remained a prisoner until he was liberated at the end of the war.

Reynaud returned to France and became a leading politician in the Fourth Republic from 1946. He headed the committee drafting the French Constitution that ended the Fourth Republic and began the Fifth Republic. Reynaud supported Charles de Gaulle until 1962 and was also an early advocate of the unification of Europe. Reynaud died in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, on September 21, 1966.

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See also

Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Daladier, Édouard; de Gaulle, Charles; Finnish-Soviet War, First; France, Battle for; Norway, German Conquest of; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Vichy France; Weygand, Maxime

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Rhine Crossings (March 7–24, 1945)

The Rhine River was a formidable defensive advantage for the German Army and the greatest natural obstacle in the path of the advancing Western Allies after their crossing of the English Channel. Ranging in width from 700 to 1,200 feet and at no point fordable, the river was at flood levels in early March 1945, thanks to spring rains and melting snow. The Rhine was also in

German territory and thus would be defended at great cost. Allied plans called for British field marshal Bernard Montgomery's 21st Army Group to cross the Rhine in the north, while U.S. general Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group would cross in the south. The majority of resources were to be assigned to Montgomery, whose forces were then to secure Germany's industrial heartland of the Ruhr Valley.

German defenders had already blown most of the bridges across the Rhine accessible to the advancing Allies when, on the afternoon of March 7, lead elements of the 9th Armored Division of Bradley's army group were able to secure the Ludendorff Railroad Bridge at Remagen. Troops and vehicles were rushed across as combat engineers hurried to construct other bridges. Meanwhile, DUKW amphibious trucks and engineer ferries supplemented the bridge.

Not to be outdone, U.S. lieutenant general George S. Patton sought to secure a crossing for his Third Army. He planned to make a feint at Mainz and then cross at Oppenheim. Late on the night of March 21, elements of the 5th Infantry Division crossed the river at Oppenheim without resistance. To secure surprise, there was no preliminary fire. South of the city, another assault company got across but then met heavy German resistance on the other bank. German artillery fire was only sporadic. Patton's sneak crossing worked well indeed.

Patton's forces then expanded the bridgehead, employing ferries, DUKWs, and landing craft known as LCVPs (landing craft, vehicle or personnel). By evening, the bridgehead was five miles deep. Patton's army made two other assault crossings of the Rhine. Lead elements of the 87th Infantry Division crossed in the early morning hours of March 25 at Boppard, and the following morning the 89th Infantry Division got across at Saint Goar.

Despite the good fortune of the Remagen crossing and Patton's crossing to the south, the Allied plan still called for the northern crossings, code-named Operation PLUNDER, to be the main attack. Montgomery massed nearly 1 million men along the lower Rhine: 21st Army Group units in the crossing included the 9 divisions of the British Second Army and the 12 divisions of the U.S. Ninth Army. The U.S. Navy's Naval Unit 3 supported the 21st Army Group and was the largest of three such supporting units for the Rhine

crossings. It was reinforced by a Transportation Corps harbor company and elements of the Royal Navy.

Operation PLUNDER began late on March 23, with units of the 21st Army Group getting across the Rhine between Wesel and Emmerich. Opposing Operation PLUNDER was General of Paratroops Alfred Schlemm's First Parachute Army of Army Group H. This formation had suffered heavy losses in the Battle of the Reichswald and had only some 85,000 men and 35 tanks. There was little artillery and no air support to speak of. Within one week of the start of the operation, the Allies had taken 30,000 prisoners.

On March 27, when Schlemm was wounded, command passed to General of Infantry Günther Blumentritt. Although under strict orders to stand and fight, beginning on April 1 heavy Allied pressure forced the First Parachute Army to begin to withdrew to the northeast, behind the Dortmund-Ems Canal to the Teutoburg Forest, opening a gap between it and the German Fifteenth Army in the Ruhr.

To support Operation PLUNDER at Wesel and impede any German reinforcement, the Allies planned a massive airborne assault. Operation VARSITY, mounted on March 24, involved 21,692 Allied paratroopers and glidermen of the British 6th Airborne and U.S. 17th Airborne Divisions of Major General Matthew B. Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps. The drop zones for Operation VARSITY were east of the Rhine in the Wesel area, close enough to the advancing ground forces to provide for a quick linkup but not deep enough to give any real additional depth to the operation. By March 25, the airborne forces had secured most of their objectives. The defending German 84th Division was virtually destroyed, with 3,500 Germans taken prisoner. Although Operation VARSITY was a success, it was a costly one; casualties were higher for the airborne forces in this operation than for the Allied ground units in their crossings.

Meanwhile, the Ninth Army's 90th Infantry Division crossed all three of its regiments near Wallach shortly after midnight on March 24. The 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie's British XII Corps got across the river west of Xanten, opposed only by sporadic artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. Then early on March 24, the 79th Infantry Division conducted the last amphibious crossing of the river, at points east and southeast of Rheinberg.

The initial assault crossings completed, engineers followed with

additional bridging, constructing in short order a variety of foot, vehicle, railway, and pipeline bridges. For generations, the Germans had considered the Rhine a natural barrier that would protect them from invasion, but superior resources at the points of attack and military engineering gave the Allies access to the German heartland.

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See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Engineer Operations; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen

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Rhineland, Remilitarization of (March 7, 1936)

One of the seminal events on the road to World War II in Europe. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany by the victorious Allies after World War I had demilitarized the entire Rhineland (the German territory west of the Rhine River) as well as a belt 30 miles east of the Rhine. Then in 1925, the German government voluntarily negotiated and signed the Locarno Pacts. Among their provisions was one guaranteeing continuation of the Rhineland demilitarization.

German chancellor Adolf Hitler chose to violate these treaties, however. Timed to occur in the midst of France's most bitterly contested election campaign after World War I, his move to do so was hastily mounted with the preliminary directive issued on March 2, 1936. On March 7, in Operation WINTER EXERCISE, Hitler sent across the Rhine bridges into the Rhineland 19 battalions of infantry and 13 artillery groups plus 2 antiaircraft battalions and

2 squadrons of 27 single-seat fighter planes without reserves, a total strength of 22,000 men, as well as 14,000 local police. The troops were armed with little more than rifles and machine guns.

To its credit, the weak French government was more inclined to fight than were its generals. Astonishingly, France had no contingency plans for such an eventuality. U.S. Army chief of staff General Maurice Gamelin informed the cabinet that the choices were to do nothing or mount a total mobilization.

The French intelligence services grossly overestimated the size of the German forces inside the Rhineland at 265,000 troops. The British more realistically believed that Hitler had sent in 35,000 men but erroneously accepted his boast that the Luftwaffe had achieved air parity with the Royal Air Force. In reality, the two squadrons of obsolete biplane Arado Ar-65 and Ar-68 and Heinkel He-51 fighter aircraft that Germany put aloft lacked guns as well as synchronization gear to enable them to fire through their propeller arcs and were no match for French aircraft. The sole Luftwaffe aircraft capable of reaching London, the Junkers Ju-52, could not have flown there carrying bombs and returned. But even this prospect was not a realistic one, as the Luftwaffe had few bombs available—a total of perhaps several hundred.

The most that France did was to mobilize 13 divisions and reinforce the Maginot Line. In a vain cover for its own inaction, Paris appealed to Britain for support, but Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made it clear that Britain would not fight for the Rhineland, which was, after all, German territory. Speaking for the cabinet, Eden announced in the House of Commons that although Germany's action was "inexcusable" as a breach of a freely signed international treaty, it in no way implied a hostile threat to France.

Had the French acted by themselves, their forces would have defeated the Germans. As Hitler later recalled, "We had no army worth mentioning. … If the French had taken any action, we would have been defeated; our resistance would have been over in a few days. And what air force we had then was ridiculous. A few Ju-52s from Lufthansa, and not even enough bombs for them." A French military move probably would have been the end of the Nazi regime. As Hitler noted, "retreat on our part would have spelled collapse."

Acquisition of the Rhineland fortified Hitler's popularity in Germany. It also ensured his ascendancy over his generals, who had opposed the move as

likely to lead to a war with France for which Germany was not prepared. Strategically, the remilitarization of the Rhineland provided both a buffer for the Ruhr and a springboard for invading France and Belgium. It also shook France's allies in Eastern Europe, who now believed that France would not fight to maintain the security system it had created against German aggression. The action had another important negative consequence for France as well, for on October 14, 1936, Belgian leaders denounced their treaty of mutual assistance with France and again sought security in neutrality. Germany promptly guaranteed the inviolability and integrity of Belgium so long as it abstained from military action against Germany. By his action, Hitler had effectively destroyed the post–World War I security system.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Belgium; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; France; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Maginot Line; Document 14

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Rhineland Offensive (February 8–March 23, 1945)

Allied eastward campaign to reach and cross the Rhine River. Actually a series of offensives—Operations VERITABLE, GRENADE, LUMBERJACK, and UNDERTONE—the Rhineland Offensive was designed to drive the German

Army from the area north of the Mosel River in preparation for the main Allied invasion of Germany by Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's 21st Army Group in the north, across the Rhine north of the Ruhr. The supreme Allied commander in the west, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, also wanted to occupy the Rhineland (the area of Germany west of the Rhine River) south of the Mosel River in order to protect Montgomery's right flank and to provide territory for a secondary invasion of Germany through the Kassel-Frankfurt corridor.

Eisenhower had pledged to Montgomery that his forces would make the primary thrust to the Rhine, and he left Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's Ninth Army under Montgomery's command. Eisenhower also allowed Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.'s Third Army to continue its drive toward the city of Trier and the Saar River basin. Ordering elements of Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges's First Army to seize the Roer River dams in support of Montgomery's northern thrust, Eisenhower also authorized Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley to make an additional strike northeast from Saint Vith toward the Rhine. This latter attack began on January 28, but the troops bogged down when confronted with poor weather and stiff German resistance.

Montgomery's attack in the north, Operation VERITABLE, began on February 8. Infantry and tanks of the Canadian I and II Corps, reinforced by the British XXX Corps, assaulted the German West Wall (known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line)—entrenchments in and around the Reichswald State Forest. Despite the attackers' greater numbers and air superiority, stubborn German resistance and poor weather slowed the advance. When the Germans breached the Roer River dams before the Allies could seize them, the flooding of that river postponed Operation GRENADE, a supporting attack by the U.S. Ninth Army, and allowed the Germans to concentrate their reserves against the British and Canadians.

However, having committed almost all their reserves against VERITABLE, the Germans could not hold back the Americans as the First and Third Armies involved in Operation LUMBERJACK began to penetrate the West Wall defenses. Patton, ignoring orders to halt his offensive, sent Major General Manton Eddy's XII Corps toward Bitburg and Major General Troy H. Middleton's VIII Corps on to the Prüm River. Steadily advancing through a heavily fortified German belt, the weary troops reached both objectives by

the end of February. The U.S. First Army north of Patton likewise pressed the defenders ever closer to the Rhine. Launching Operation GRENADE on February 23 after the Roer River flooding had receded, the U.S. Ninth Army broke through the thinned defenses and advanced toward the Rhine.

Operation UNDERTONE was the final stage of clearing the Rhineland, with the goal of removing German forces from the Saar and the Palatinate. Mounted by Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch's Seventh Army, it began on March 13.

Adolf Hitler's stubborn refusal to permit his armies to retreat or even maneuver contributed greatly to the subsequent German debacle. Standing in place, the German defenders were destroyed in detail or cut off and forced to surrender. Only a relative handful escaped east across the river. By March 24, German forces had been forced back across the Rhine.

The U.S. First Army secured the biggest prize of the campaign. No American commander had expected to capture an intact Rhine bridge, but on March 7 a unit from the U.S. 9th Armored Division took advantage of a confusion in the German defense to seize the Ludendorff Railroad Bridge at Remagen. General Hodges reinforced the coup by rushing divisions of his III Corps under Major General John Millikin over the river. The First Army's bridgehead over the Rhine, reinforced on March 22–23 by Patton's surprise crossing near Oppenheim and Montgomery's set-piece crossing on March 23, wrapped up the campaign.

British and Canadian casualties in these battles approached 16,000 men, and U.S. losses among all the armies engaged were almost twice that number. The collapse of the German defenses west of the Rhine began when pressure was applied at several points simultaneously. Lacking the reserves to meet so many attacks and forbidden by Hitler to fall back, the German armies suffered severely. In the Rhineland Campaign, the Allies took more than 200,000 German prisoners.

Massive Allied ground forces were now in place along the Rhine from Arnhem to Switzerland. The German Seventh Army had been destroyed, and the First Army, the only German force west of the Rhine, was in a desperate situation. Allied forces in the west were poised for the final drive into the Reich.

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See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Middleton, Troy Houston; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Reichswald, Battle of the; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the; Rhine Crossings; Simpson, William Hood

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Ribbentrop, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim von (1893–1946)

German diplomat and foreign minister (1938–1945). Born in Wesel, Westphalia, Germany, on April 30, 1893, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim Ribbentrop ended his education in Germany without taking the Abitur (a national exam to qualify for university study). He and his brother Lothar then studied at a boarding school in Switzerland, where they acquired an international outlook. Ribbentrop next traveled in England and worked for a time as a clerk in a German import firm in London. Between 1910 and 1913, he and his brother were in Canada, where they held a variety of jobs.

In 1914, Ribbentrop underwent surgery to remove a tubercular kidney and returned to Germany to recuperate. When he recrossed the Atlantic afterward, he visited the United States before joining Lothar in Ottawa, where they ran a wine import-export business.

When World War I began in 1914, Ribbentrop managed to return to Germany, where he joined the army and fought as a lieutenant until he was wounded in action. Invalided from line service, he was awarded the Iron

Cross. Later, he served on the staff of German military attaché Colonel Franz von Papen in the United States and followed the latter when he was posted to Turkey.

After the war, Ribbentrop married into the family of a prosperous champagne producer. Always a social climber, he purchased the aristocrat "von" in his name from a maiden aunt who adopted him in return for a cash settlement in 1925. A handsome man of considerable charm, he was also a parvenu and dilettante.

In January 1933, Ribbentrop helped arrange meetings at his villa in Dahlem between Adolf Hitler and Franz von Papen. Ribbentrop joined the Nazi Party relatively late, in May 1932. Although he paid lip service to the movement, he was actually a royalist and a conservative and seemed not to have realized Hitler's true aims. The urbane Ribbentrop never did fit in with old-guard Nazi leaders, who referred to him as "the champagne salesman." From 1934 to 1938, he advised Hitler on relations with Britain and played a key role in negotiating the 1935 naval accord with that country. Ribbentrop also served briefly as German ambassador in London (from 1936 to 1938) before succeeding Konstantin von Neurath as foreign minister on February 4, 1938.

Ribbentrop's great triumph was the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939. On the outbreak of World War II, Ribbentrop and diplomacy faded into the background. Hitler called Ribbentrop "the New Bismarck" but conducted his own foreign policy.

Ribbentrop held the third-highest Schutzstaffel (SS) rank during the war, and in a vain effort to regain influence, he adopted a rigorous anti-Semitic posture, ordering the Foreign Office to expedite deportations of Jews and others. He remained loyal to Hitler to the end, testifying at the Nuremberg trials that "I could never repudiate him now or renounce him. I don't know why." Found guilty by the International Military Tribunal on four counts of war crimes, most notably for his involvement in the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and instigating anti-Jewish measures, he was sentenced to death. Ribbentrop was hanged on October 16, 1946, at Nuremberg.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Hitler, Adolf; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Neurath, Konstantin Hermann Karl von; Papen, Franz von; Document 40

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Riccardi, Arturo (1878–1966)

Italian Navy admiral and naval chief of staff. Born in Pavia, Italy, on October 30, 1878, Arturo Riccardi enlisted in the navy in 1892 and was commissioned on graduation from the Naval Academy at Livorno (Leghorn) in 1897. In 1904, he distinguished himself in rescue operations following a fire on the transport *Marco Polo* and was decorated. Riccardi was aide-de-camp of the Duke of Genoa from 1910 to 1914. During World War I, Riccardi served in torpedo boats. Promoted to lieutenant commander, he was appointed deputy chief of staff of the battle fleet.

In 1924, Riccardi was made chief of staff and chief of operations of the Taranto Naval Command. In 1925, he was chief of the secretariat of the navy minister. He was promoted to commodore in 1931 and commanded the Taranto Navy Arsenal. Promoted to rear admiral in 1932, he next served as director of naval personnel until 1934. During 1934–1935, Riccardi commanded the 4th Division. He was promoted to vice admiral in 1935, and for the next two years he headed the Personnel and Military Service. During 1937–1938, he commanded the Upper Tyrrhenian Sea Naval Department.

During 1938–1939, Riccardi commanded the First Fleet, flying his flag in the battleship *Conte di Cavour*. In September 1939, he took command of a special escort command, Comando Difesa Traffico (Maricotraf). Because of his seniority and his position as a senator, he also served in a series of largely ceremonial posts, including president of the Navy Superior Council and the Admirals Committee and then, days before Italy entered the war, president of

the Technical Services Committee. When Admiral Domenico Cavagnari was relieved following the successful British air assault on Taranto (November 11–12, 1940), Riccardi replaced him as chief of staff of the Italian Navy. Promoted to full admiral on October 29, 1942, Riccardi retained his post until July 26, 1943, when Benito Mussolini was deposed.

There is disagreement about Riccardi's legacy. Some assert that he was not admired in the navy, where it was rumored that his career had benefited from connections and where he was seen as a bureaucrat rather than a commander. Others maintain that he was an excellent sailor and a harsh but fair commander. Riccardi died in Rome on December 26, 1966.

ALESSANDRO MASSIGNANI

See also

Cavagnari, Domenico; Italy, Navy; Taranto, Attack on

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Richardson, Robert Charlwood, Jr. (1882–1954)

U.S. Army general. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, on October 27, 1882, Robert Charlwood Richardson Jr. graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1904. Commissioned into the cavalry, he served in the Philippine Islands during the insurgency there. Until the early 1920s, he alternated between tours as an instructor at West Point and Philippine duty. During World War I, Richardson also served on the staff of American Expeditionary Forces commander General John J. Pershing, helping to plan offensives. After the armistice, Richardson served with the American army of occupation in Germany and at the Paris Peace Conference.

From 1926 to 1928, Richardson was military attaché in Rome, Italy. He also studied at the General Staff School, the École Supérieure de la Guerre

(War College) in Paris, and the U.S. Army War College. From 1929 to 1933, he was commandant of cadets at West Point. Promoted to brigadier general in June 1938, Richardson commanded the 2nd Cavalry Brigade at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 1938 and 1939 and, also at Fort Bliss, the 1st Cavalry Division in 1939 and 1940. After becoming a major general in October 1940, he was director of the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations from February to August 1941.

From 1941 to 1943, Richardson commanded VII Corps in the United States, where he trained troops. In mid-1942, as U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall's personal representative, Richardson made an inspection tour of the Pacific area. In June 1943, he was promoted to lieutenant general and became military governor of the Hawaiian Department, where he recommended a major military reorganization in the Pacific. When it was implemented in August 1943, he became commanding general of U.S. Army forces in the Pacific Ocean Area, including the Hawaiian Department.

Richardson had no operational responsibilities, but from then until the end of the war, he trained troops and helped plan all the major Pacific campaigns. Unlike General Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of the Southwest Pacific theater, Richardson enjoyed good relations with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, and also with Marshall. Richardson retired from the army in September 1946. He died in Upper Village, Bath, New Hampshire, on March 2, 1954, and was promoted posthumously to full general.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; Nimitz, Chester William

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Richthofen, Wolfram von (1895–1945)

German Air Force field marshal. Born in Barzdorf, Germany, on October 10, 1895, Wolfram von Richthofen was the cousin of Manfred von Richthofen, the "Red Baron" of World War I. Wolfram Richthofen joined the army in 1913 as a lieutenant in the 4th Hussars Regiment. During World War I, he saw action on both fronts before transferring to the Military Aviation Service. He was posted to his cousin's command, Jagdgeschwader 1 (Fighter Wing 1, or JG 1) in March 1918 and scored eight aerial victories before the end of the war.

Following the war, Richthofen studied engineering at the Hanover Technical Institute. He joined the Reichswehr in 1923 and proved to be a capable, intelligent staff officer. Within two years of Adolf Hitler's rise to power, Richthofen had transferred to the Luftwaffe and been promoted to lieutenant colonel. In 1936, he went to Spain as chief of the Development and Testing Branch to observe firsthand the performance of Luftwaffe equipment. Hugo Sperrle, commander of the Kondor Legion, asked Richthofen to remain in Spain, and he eventually became commander of the Kondor Legion as a major general. In Spain, Richthofen developed such close air support techniques by having air force officers serve with ground troops.

Richthofen departed Spain convinced that ground support should be the primary Luftwaffe role. He became the leading advocate in the Luftwaffe for air-ground cooperation. He commanded the VIII Air Corps in the invasion of Poland in September 1939, and he directed the aerial destruction of Warsaw (September 8–27, 1939). During the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940, Richthofen commanded three squadrons of Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers that provided effective aerial artillery support to the advancing German Sixth Army.

Promoted to lieutenant general in May 1940, Richthofen commanded the VIII Air Corps during the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30) and in the German invasions of Greece (April 1941) and Crete (May 1941). In 1942, he assumed command of Luftflotte 4 (Fourth Air Fleet), supporting German forces in the southern Soviet Union and at Stalingrad. Promoted to field marshal in February 1943 (the youngest in the German military), he took command of Luftflotte 2 in Italy in hopes that he could stem the Allied tide on that front.

In November 1944, Richthofen was diagnosed with a brain tumor and retired. After Germany surrendered in May 1945, he was held by the Americans in Austria. He died of his brain tumor on July 12, 1945, in Ischgl, Austria.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Britain, Battle of; Crete, Battle of; France, Battle for; Germany, Air Force; Greece Campaign, German; Hitler, Adolf; Kondor Legion; Poland Campaign; Spanish Civil War; Sperrle, Hugo Walter; Stalingrad, Battle of; Warsaw, Battle of

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Ridgway, Matthew Bunker (1895–1993)

U.S. Army general. Born on March 3, 1895, in Fort Monroe, Virginia, Matthew Bunker Ridgway graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1917 and was commissioned in the infantry and assigned to the border post of Eagle Pass, Texas. Promoted to captain, Ridgway returned to West Point and served as an instructor there from 1918 to 1924. In 1925, he graduated from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He then held a variety of overseas assignments. In 1932, he was promoted to major.

Ridgway graduated from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1935 and from the Army War College in 1937. Between 1939 and 1942, he was in the War Plans Division of the War Department's General Staff.

A protégé of U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, Ridgway was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1940, to colonel in December 1941, and to temporary brigadier general in January 1942. He was then assigned as assistant division commander of the 82nd Infantry Division assembling at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, under Major General Omar N.

Bradley. In June 1942, Ridgway assumed command of the 82nd, reorganizing it in August into an airborne division when he was promoted to temporary major general.

Ridgway commanded the 82nd in Sicily in July and August 1943 and in Italy from September to November 1943, during which time the unit captured Naples and fought in the drive to the Volturno River before returning to England to prepare for the Normandy Invasion. He made his only combat jump with his division on June 6, 1944, and he fought with it throughout the Normandy Campaign. In August 1944, he turned over command of the 82nd to Brigadier General James Gavin and subsequently took command of the newly formed XVIII Airborne Corps, leading it in Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944); during the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive; and throughout the drive into Germany.

Promoted to lieutenant general in June 1945, Ridgway briefly commanded the Mediterranean theater. From 1946 to 1948, he was U.S. representative to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, and from 1948 to 1949 he headed the Caribbean Defense Command. Appointed deputy chief of staff of the army in August 1949, Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army in Korea on the death of Lieutenant General Walton Walker in December 1950. In that post, Ridgway stopped its retreat before Chinese forces, restored its morale, and returned it to the offensive. He subsequently succeeded General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as United Nations commander, in April 1951. Appointed supreme Allied commander, Europe, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in May 1952, Ridgway was promoted to full general. In August 1953, he was appointed army chief of staff. Declining to serve his full four-year term because of his disagreement with some of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's defense policies that slighted conventional in favor of nuclear forces, Ridgway retired in June 1955. He then wrote his memoirs and served on various corporate boards. Ridgway died in Fox Chapel, Pennsylvania, on July 26, 1993.

GUY A. LOFARO

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Italy Campaign; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Marshall, George Catlett; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Sicily, Invasion of

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Riefenstahl, Leni (1902–2003)

German film director and actress. Born in Berlin on August 22, 1902, Leni Riefenstahl trained as a dancer, and her performances, beginning in 1923, made her a star. Hired by Max Reinhardt, director of the Deutsches theater, she performed throughout Europe. After sustaining a knee injury, Riefenstahl became the foremost actress in the troupe of Arnold Fanck, founder of the Freiburg Mountain and Sport Company. The film *Holy Mountain* launched her acting career in 1926, and she mastered the transition from silent films to sound, as evidenced in *Storms over Mount Blanc* (1930).

In 1931, Riefenstahl founded a film production company and began directing her own projects. *Blue Light: A Mountain Legend from the Dolomites*, the first film she directed, won a silver medal in Venice in 1932 and ran for more than a year in Paris and London.

In June 1933, Riefenstahl concluded an agreement to make films for the Nazi Party. Her first commission, *Victory of Faith*, dealt with the Fifth Party Congress. Renaming her company Reich Party Congress Film, she was assigned the following year to capture on film the Nuremberg party rally. *Triumph of the Will*, made in the style of a newsreel to enliven the endless columns of marching participants, displayed numerous artistic and technical innovations and became one of the most famous documentaries of the century.

Leni Riefenstahl, shown in the foreground (Adolf Hitler is at the rostrum in the background), directed and produced one of the greatest propaganda films ever made. Her *Triumph of the Will* dealt with the Nazi Party rally held at Nuremberg in 1934. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

In 1935, Riefenstahl produced a film about the German Army titled *Day of Freedom*. Consisting largely of scenes of military exercises, its first public showing was attended by Adolf Hitler and more than 200 high-ranking guests. The next year, on the occasion of the Olympic Games held in Berlin, she directed a film about conceptions of the Olympic ideal, *Olympia*, released in 1938. Her second great documentary, it was intended to be a bridge from antiquity to the present but was largely boycotted abroad as Nazi anti-Semitic policies became widely publicized.

During the war, Riefenstahl was expected to contribute to the propaganda offensive. Although she underwent training as a frontline correspondent, she showed little enthusiasm for the war effort. Widely denounced as a faithful

servant of Nazism, Riefenstahl became cinema's principal figure in the discord between morality and art.

After the war, Riefenstahl traveled frequently to Africa and lived for extended periods in the Sudan with primitive tribes. She attracted worldwide attention with her photography of the Nuba. At age 71, she learned to dive and thereafter became a renowned undersea photographer. Riefenstahl died on September 10, 2003, in Pocking, near Munich.

DAVID M. KEITHLY

See also

Film and the War; Propaganda

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Rifles

The nations that went to war in 1939 were all armed with rifles from World War I, although some modifications had been made during the 1919–1939 period. Germany commenced the war with a shortened, lightened version of the Gewehr 98, which had become the Kar(abine) 98k(urz). The cartridge it fired was virtually the same, the 7.92mm s.S.Patrone (*schweres Spitzgeschoss,* or "heavy-pointed bullet").

Great Britain also went to war with a World War I rifle, the modified Rifle No. 1, Short, Magazine, Lee Enfield in Marks III to V. The Mark VI had also appeared, which was the forerunner of the weapon introduced after the outbreak of war, the Rifle No. 4, Mark I, and its subsequent derivatives. This weapon fired the .303-inch Mark VI, Mark VII, and Mark VIII cartridges. Wartime shortages caused Great Britain to import many rifles from Canada and the United States, but these were issued to the Home Guard, not to regular troops. The British experimented with semiautomatic and self-loading rifles, but they did not bring any into service.

The French had changed their rifle design and were issuing the Fusil 34 and the Fusil 36. These rifles fired a 7.5mm rimless cartridge developed in

1929 for light machine guns. The weapon was bolt-operated and had a five-round magazine. Despite the development of the *Fusil semiautomatique* in 1918, the French Army had not made the change to this weapon by the end of operations in June 1940. The Italian Army chose rifles based on their 1891 design, often called the Carcano. The rifles were redesignated Model 38 and fired either 6.5mm or 7.35mm cartridges. These weapons were characterized by design flaws, and they bear no comparison with later Italian designs.

Japan went to war in 1941 with the type-38 Arisaka 6.5mm rifle. This old design was soon superseded by the type-99 (1939) 7.7mm rifle, which was put into service to overcome the weakness of the 6.5mm cartridge. Although it had strange appendages (to Western eyes), such as antiaircraft sights and a wire monopod, it was nevertheless a well-made and effective weapon although not up to British and U.S. standards. The Arisaka was also too large for the average Japanese soldier to use effectively.

At the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Soviet troops were armed with their M-1891/30 rifle, in 7.62mm. Various versions were available, including a special sniper version, but the Soviets soon realized that their massive conscript army needed firepower (rather than accuracy, the product of long periods of training), and the submachine gun rapidly overtook the rifle in both numbers and popularity. Nevertheless, research into automatic weapons produced the Tokarev M-1940 as well as its predecessors from 1936 onward. All were in the Soviet 7.62mm caliber and were well regarded by the Germans, who used the design principles in their own semiautomatic rifles later in the war.

The U.S. Army was still employing the Springfield Cal .30-06 M-1903A3 rifle. In 1936, the army adopted John Garand’s new rifle as the Rifle, Semi-Automatic, M1. The United States became the only country in World War II to have a semiautomatic rifle as a standard infantry weapon. The rugged Garand weighed 9 pounds 8 ounces (unloaded) and was a gas-operated, clip-fed, air-cooled, semiautomatic shoulder weapon that fired .30-06 caliber ammunition from an 8-round clip. It had an effective range of 440 yards and a maximum range of 3,200 yards. The M1 was the standard U.S. infantry firearm from 1936 to 1957. The one problem with this weapon was that it had an unpleasant recoil because it fired the same cartridge as the Springfield.

During the war, while the Soviets placed increased emphasis on the submachine gun, the Germans also made great strides in developing their

own semiautomatic assault rifles. This new genre in the rifle world was intended to provide increased firepower without sacrificing range. Submachine guns are excellent weapons at short (pistol) ranges of up to 50 yards, but beyond that there is a need for accurate and effective fire out to 300 yards. Machine guns were the mainstay of the German Army's infantry tactics, but the sheer weight of numbers in Soviet attacks made it imperative that every infantryman be able to put down effective defensive fire.

Mauser (the main German small-arms manufacturer) had been looking into semiautomatic rifles since the 19th century, but technical problems had ruled out its designs until the German Army began to collect Tokarev semiautomatic rifles on the battlefield. The Germans then went ahead wholeheartedly, seeing their previous mistakes and how the Soviets had avoided them. The first rifle in the new range was the Gewehr 41 W, a weapon with a gas blast cone at the muzzle. The gases trapped at the muzzle operated the action by means of a rod that extended to the rear to the breech mechanism. At the same time, the Germans "borrowed" the Degtyarev machine-gun locking system to close the bolt firmly for firing.

The U.S. Garand system worked by means of a gas port tapped into the barrel that allowed gases in the barrel to operate a rod, which in turn forced the bolt back against a spring. The first German system was much less sophisticated. The next German design was similar to the Garand but imported from the Soviets. Now there was a gas port some 12 inches along the barrel, allowing gas energy to operate the reloading mechanism of the rifle. This system was seen in the Gewehr 43.

The Germans also fielded a revolutionary weapon, the Fallschirmjäger Gewehr 42. This paratroop weapon had a folding bipod, and it was gas-operated and fired from a closed bolt when in single-round mode, which increased accuracy. In automatic mode (for it really was a light machine gun), it fired from an open bolt, allowing better cooling but making it far more dangerous to handle. This system was first seen in the U.S. Johnson light machine gun.

The modern assault rifle had its genesis in the German development of the Sturmgewehr rifles from 1943 onward. In 1938, development of the short 7.92mm cartridge began, and by 1942 both the Hänel and Walther companies were producing test weapons. In 1943 the first weapons were submitted for troop testing, and in 1944 the Sturmgewehr 44 was on limited issue to troops.

This weapon was the first true assault rifle, and it eventually led to the design of the Soviet AK-47 and the Czech Model 58.

Demands from the field led to the adaptation of many standard service rifles for sniping use. The No. 4 British rifle became the No. 4 Mark I(T) and was equipped with a No. 32 telescope. The German Kar 98k was also fitted with a telescopic sight, as was the Soviet M-1891/30. The United States issued the M-1903 in an A4 version, made by Remington. The M-1C and M-1D versions of the Garand were the sniper models but were issued only in limited numbers from 1944 on.

The Soviets adapted their semiautomatic Tokarev M-1938 and M-1940 rifles for sniping purposes. The weapons were sighted to 1,430 yards and weighed just over nine pounds. These were standard rifles, however, for weapons were not specifically designed for sniping until after the war.

The United States also produced the only true carbine of the war, the U.S. Carbine Cal .30 M1. This weapon fired a shortened .30-caliber cartridge, which was designed by Winchester and adopted in October 1941. The weapon was seen as a medium-range, medium-velocity arm, designed for use by junior officers and men who had heavy loads to carry. More accurate than the M-1911 pistol, it nevertheless did not receive unconditional approval from the troops, being considered too light in firepower. However, it was used widely and was even equipped with the first infrared sighting equipment to be fitted to a weapon (the M3). The Carbine was also issued in a fully automatic version (the M2), which was not widely used, and it had a paratroop version with a folding stock. Basically, the weapon did not have the killing power needed in a military weapon, and although it was a good design, it was not as valuable as a good submachine gun.

Rifles were also adapted to fire rifle grenades. The Germans developed their grenade attachment to fit the Kar 98k and fired high-explosive and smoke grenades as well as indicator bombs. The Americans fitted the Garand with the Grenade Launcher M-7, used with a gas propellant cartridge, which was loaded with black powder (the M3 cartridge).

World War II saw a number of extremely effective designs in service, but the days of the bolt action were ending, and the influence of the Sturmgewehr range of rifles in particular caused all nations to look to semiautomatic and assault rifle design. Since 1945, the gas-operated semiautomatic (and even fully automatic) rifle has taken over on the battlefield.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

Bayonet; Hand Grenades; Infantry Tactics; Machine Guns; Pistols and Revolvers; Snipers; Submachine Guns

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Río de la Plata, Battle of (December 13, 1939)

Naval battle in the South Atlantic and first major surface engagement of World War II. Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, commander of the German Navy, envisioned using his capital ships as commerce raiders and ordered his captains to avoid engaging enemy warships, even inferior forces, because even light damage could be fatal to a raider operating in distant waters, given Germany's lack of foreign bases. On September 1, 1939, the German pocket battleship *Graf Spee,* commanded by Captain Hans Langsdorff, was already at sea, cruising in the South Atlantic in company with the supply vessel *Altmark.*

The *Graf Spee* was one of the three-ship Deutschland class (the others being the *Deutschland* and the *Admiral Scheer*). These capital ships represented the design compromises faced by Germany as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty that ended World War I. Because of caliber and weight restrictions, the ships nominally displaced 10,000 tons and boasted a main battery of six 11-inch guns. Armor was equivalent to that of a typical cruiser, but these ships were slower than most in that class, possessing a top speed of 28 knots. In short, the Deutschland-class vessels were heavily armed, lightly protected warships designed primarily for commerce raiding.

During the course of three months, the *Graf Spee* sank 10 British merchantmen totaling 50,000 gross tons. To combat the German surface raiders, the Royal Navy positioned hunting groups in areas where German cruisers would likely search for prey. One such was Force G, commanded by

Commodore Henry Harwood, operating in the South Atlantic. Harwood's squadron included the heavy cruisers HMS *Exeter* (six 8-inch guns) and *Cumberland* (eight 8-inch guns) and the light cruisers HMS *Ajax* and HMNZS *Achilles,* each armed with eight 6-inch guns.

By early December, Langsdorff decided to return to Germany after one final victory. Intelligence indicated a valuable convoy sailing from the Río de la Plata (Plate River) under escort. Despite standing orders, he decided to engage this enemy force.

On December 13, 1939, lookouts aboard the *Graf Spee* spotted masts on the horizon. They were three of Harwood's cruisers (the *Cumberland* had remained in the Falkland Islands to undergo repairs). Langsdorff ordered his ship to close with the British ships and fired the first salvo at 6:17 a.m. while Harwood divided his force into two sections, with the light cruisers cooperating and the *Exeter* operating from a different quarter to complicate his enemy's targeting. The *Exeter* bore the brunt of the battle, because Langsdorff considered it to be the greatest threat. Langsdorff initially engaged the light cruisers with his 5.9-inch secondary armament, but throughout the battle, he switched the main battery's targets, complicating the *Graf Spee*'s fire control.

In the exchange of fire, the *Exeter* absorbed several 11-inch hits that eventually disabled its main armament. The *Ajax* and the *Achilles* also sustained damage, the former losing use of its aft turrets. Gunnery on both sides was adequate, although the British in particular suffered spotting problems. Nonetheless, the *Graf Spee* took its share of punishment. At least 18 shells caused damage that included a large hole in the ship's bow as well as destruction of the ship's galley and freshwater plant. At 7:40 a.m., Langsdorff disengaged and made for the neutral port of Montevideo, Uruguay.

Langsdorff hoped to make repairs at Montevideo, but Uruguayan officials would only allow the belligerent 72 hours in port. Ironically, the British also wanted to keep the *Graf Spee* there longer to allow time for reinforcements to arrive. Langsdorff despaired that he could not return to Germany, given the condition of the ship. His own expectations, along with British disinformation, led him to believe that the battle cruiser *Renown* and the aircraft carrier *Ark Royal* awaited him outside the harbor. Both were en route, but neither would arrive for several days. After discussions with Berlin, on

December 17, 1939, Langsdorff had the *Graf Spee* weigh anchor and sailed to just beyond Uruguay's territorial limit. There, in the Río de la Plata estuary, Langsdorff scuttled his ship rather than waste the lives of his crew. Tugs transported the Germans to Argentina, where most spent the war in internment.

Total human casualties in the Battle of the Río de la Plata were 37 German and 73 British dead. There was another casualty of the battle. On December 20, Captain Langsdorff took a hotel room in Buenos Aires. There he wrapped himself in his ship's ensign and committed suicide with a pistol.

The *Graf Spee* remains buried in the mud of the Río de la Plata. The battle was the first important victory won by the British in World War II.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Germany, Navy; Harwood, Sir Henry; Langsdorff, Hans Wilhelm; Raeder, Erich; Z Plan

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Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen (1897–1983)

British Army general. Born on July 29, 1897, in Georgetown, British Guyana, and educated at Lancing College and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, Neil Methuen Ritchie was commissioned in the Black Watch in December 1914. During World War I, he served in France, Mesopotamia, and Palestine; he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order in 1917 and the Military Cross in 1918.

Ritchie held several staff appointments during the interwar period. In 1939 and 1940, he was a brigadier and chief of staff of Lieutenant General Alan Brooke's II Corps with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in

France. Following the BEF evacuation from Dunkerque (May 26–June 4, 1940), Ritchie held the same post under Lieutenant General Claude Auchinleck in the Southern Command. Promoted to major general, Ritchie then served as deputy to Auchinleck when the latter took over the Middle East Command. Ritchie was the only feasible replacement for Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham when Auchinleck relieved Cunningham from command of the Eighth Army.

Ritchie was an able, vigorous, and cool-headed staff officer, but he was rather slow and unimaginative. He was also very junior to his corps commanders, Lieutenant Generals Charles Willoughby Norrie and Alfred Godwin-Austin, and had no experience in field command since leading a battalion in World War I. Auchinleck intended his appointment as commander of the Eighth Army to be temporary, but Ritchie was fortunate to reap the triumph of victory by relieving the siege of Tobruk (April 1941–January 1942) and driving General Erwin Rommel from Cyrenaica. With these two successes, Ritchie's appointment became permanent.

An unshakable optimist, Ritchie prepared to advance and neglected the defenses at Gazala and Tobruk. When Rommel attacked again in May 1942, Ritchie lost most of the Eighth Army's armor as well as control of the battle. Auchinleck belatedly relieved him from his command on June 25, four days after the fall of Tobruk.

The inexperienced Ritchie was unfortunate to be assigned a command at a desperate moment, but he retained his personal stature and survived this debacle. He was given another chance as commander of the 52nd Division in the United Kingdom, and he led XII Corps under Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery in Normandy and Northwestern Europe with some success. Ritchie was promoted to full general in April 1947 and was appointed commander in chief of Far East Land Forces and then commander of the British Army Staff in Washington. He retired in 1951 to become an insurance executive in Canada. Ritchie died on December 11, 1983, in Toronto.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon; France Campaign; Gazala, Battle of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; North

Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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River Plate, Battle of

See Río de la Plata, Battle of

Rogge, Bernhard (1899–1982)

German Navy vice admiral. Born in Schleswig, Germany, on November 4, 1899, Bernhard Rogge served in the merchant marine during World War I and continued in the merchant marine service after the war. Although he had a Jewish grandparent, he was exempted from Nazi racial laws and given command of the training vessel *Albert Leo Schlageter* in February 1938. In July 1939, he was promoted to captain and assumed command of the armed merchant cruiser *Atlantis*.

Designated *Ship 16*, the *Atlantis* began cruising as a commerce raider on March 11, 1940. Rogge sank his first ship on May 5 in the South Atlantic. He soon sailed to the Indian Ocean, where he met with great success. The *Atlantis* sank 22 ships weighing an aggregate 145,697 tons, the most of any commerce raider during the war. On November 22, 1941, while on its return to Germany, the *Atlantis* stopped for repairs and refueling from a U-boat in the South Atlantic; there, the raider was surprised by the British heavy cruiser *Devonshire* and sunk. Rogge and most of his crew survived, and their lifeboats were taken in tow by the *U-126*. The crew of the *Atlantis* set records for 622 continuous days at sea and for sailing more than 102,000 nautical miles.

Rogge made it back to Germany, where Adolf Hitler personally awarded him the Oak Leaves to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. In 1942, Rogge was appointed inspector general of training establishments and commander of

fleet training formations. In March 1943, he was promoted to rear admiral and given command of Kampfgruppe (Battle Group) Rogge. In 1945, he was promoted to vice admiral and commanded the 3rd Battle Group in the Baltic.

In 1955, Rogge joined the new West German Bundesmarine (navy) as a vice admiral. He died in Reinbek bei Hamburg, Germany, on June 29, 1982.

FRANK TOOMEY

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Germany, Navy

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Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in Velikiye Luki, Poland, on December 21, 1896, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky moved with his family to Warsaw in 1900. In 1914 he was drafted into the Russian Army, where he served with the 5th Kargopol Dragoon Regiment and rose to sergeant. He joined the Red Army in 1918 and fought in the Russian Civil War in Siberian Mongolia.

Rokossovsky completed the cavalry short course in 1923 and the Frunze Military Academy in 1929. He commanded the 5th Kuban Cavalry Brigade (1929–1930) and then the 7th Samara Cavalry Division (1930). Rokossovsky next commanded the 15th Cavalry in the Far East until 1935. In 1936 and 1937, he commanded the V Cavalry Corps. In August 1937 during the purge of the Soviet officer corps, Rokossovsky was arrested on a false espionage charge. He was subsequently tortured and twice taken into the woods to be shot. After being imprisoned near Leningrad, he was freed on March 22, 1940. Rokossovsky again commanded the V Cavalry Corps and took part in

the “liberation” of Bessarabia in the summer of 1940. He then assumed command of the newly formed IX Mechanized Corps in the Ukraine.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Rokossovsky commanded the Sixteenth Army in the defense of Moscow. The next year, he organized the reduction of the encircled German Sixth Army at Stalingrad with his Don Front. As a result of his success, he was promoted to colonel general in January 1943 and to army general that April. After a successful defense of the north side of the salient during the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13), his Central Front (later redesignated the 1st Belorussian Front) drove across the Dnieper River.

In Operation BAGRATION, Rokossovsky, promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in June 1944, led forces that defeated German Army Group Center in Belorussia. His troops captured Minsk (July 3) and Lublin (July 23) before halting at the Vistula River opposite Warsaw (August 1). He next commanded the 2nd Belorussian Front and conducted an effective campaign in East Prussia and Pomerania in 1945, aiding in the Berlin Campaign (March 31–May 2, 1945).

After the war Rokossovsky commanded Soviet forces in Poland from 1945 to 1949, and in November 1949 he was appointed commander in chief of the Polish Army and minister of defense. He remained in these posts until returning to the Soviet Union in 1956. From 1956 to 1962, he was deputy minister of defense of the Soviet Union except for a one-year break to command the Transcaucasus Military District between 1957 and 1958. Rokossovsky retired in April 1962 and died in Moscow on August 3, 1968.

CLAUDE R. SASSO

See also

Kursk, Battle of; Minsk, Battle for; Moscow, Battle of; Soviet Union, Army; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Romania

Romania (also spelled Rumania and, archaically, Roumania) is situated in the northeastern Balkan region of South-Central Europe. In late 1940, when it formally joined the Axis alliance, Romania's population was 15.91 million; this was almost 5 million less than its 1939 census, the result of several forced land cessions made to other powers over the course of 1940. Those powers included the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

Romania played an important role in World War II. A major producer of both oil and grain, it had the third-largest military establishment of the European Axis powers, and after it switched sides in August 1944, it became the fourth-largest Allied military presence. Romania entered the war for nationalistic reasons—to maintain its independence and reclaim territories lost in 1940.

Following the Balkan Wars and World War I, Romania secured territories from Hungary and Russia that united most Romanian peoples into a single country for the first time in centuries, a source of great national pride. In the acquisition of Transylvania from Hungary, it also secured a restive Hungarian population. Hungary was bent on the return of that territory. The Soviet Union also sought the return of Bessarabia. To shore up his southern flank, Adolf Hitler put heavy pressure on Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to join the Axis. On May 29, 1940, the Romanian government announced its acceptance of Hitler's plan for "a new European order." Bereft of French and British support, the Romanian government had no alternative. Under the terms of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union had been awarded Bessarabia. In the wake of the defeat of France in June 1940, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin cashed in his remaining chips. Both Germany and Italy pressured Romania to accede to the Soviet demands of June 28, 1940, and to cede to the Soviet Union Bessarabia and also northern Bukovina, which had not been Soviet territory before.

Hungary also secured German and Italian support for the return of territory lost to Romania following World War I. Under terms of the Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, dictated by Germany and Italy to stabilize the political situation between Romania and Hungary, Romania ceded to

Hungary north-central Transylvania and other Romanian territory north of Oradea. Also under German pressure, Romania ceded to Bulgaria the southern Dobruja in the September 7, 1940, Treaty of Craiova, thereby restoring the pre–World War I boundary between those two states. Almost overnight, Romania had lost half of its territory and a third of its population, greatly reducing its ability to defend itself.

Romanian marshal and dictator Ion Antonescu of Romania meets with German chancellor Adolf Hitler in November 1940 to sign the Tripartite Pact, which allied Romania with Germany, Japan, and Italy. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Romania's King Carol II never had popular support. Married to a Greek princess, he flaunted his longtime love affair with his mistress, Elena "Magda" Lupescu. His government was further destabilized by frequent cabinet turnovers and widespread corruption. National outrage over the loss of Romanian territories to the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria allowed the profascist, anti-Semitic Iron Guard to force Carol's abdication on September 6, 1940. He fled Bucharest with his mistress and nine train cars loaded with booty.

Carol's 19-year old son, Michael (Mihai), replaced him but was an impotent figurehead. Real power rested in the recently appointed prime minister and World War I military hero General Ion Antonescu, who proclaimed himself *conductãtor* (leader). Intensely nationalistic, Antonescu managed to maintain significant independence within the Nazi sphere. In October 1940, the first of 500,000 German "advisers" arrived in Romania,

ostensibly to protect Ploieşti, the site of Europe's second-largest oil fields. Romania proved to be an important source of natural (nonsynthetic) oil for Germany and supplied virtually all of fascist Italy's oil during the war.

On November 23, Romania officially joined the Axis powers. Antonescu declined to participate in the subjugation of Yugoslavia in April 1941, but he readily assisted with the invasion of the Soviet Union in order to reclaim Romania's lost territories to the east. When the invasion began on June 22, 1941, he called for a "holy war" against Bolshevism. On July 2–3, Army Group Antonescu, composed of Romanian and German troops, crossed the Prut River. By midmonth, Romania again controlled Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Most Romanians, including frontline troops, believed that their war was over.

It was not to be. Antonescu agreed to send Romanian troops to capture the Soviet Black Sea port of Odessa. In return, Hitler granted Romania all the territory between Bessarabia and the Black Sea, including Odessa. After taking Odessa at horrendous cost, increasingly demoralized Romanian soldiers fought in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the southern Soviet Union; their country furnished more troops to the war against the Soviet Union than all other German satellites combined. Antonescu vainly hoped that this effort would be rewarded with the return of Transylvania, as Hungary provided far less support for Hitler's war.

On June 12, 1942, American bombers based in North Africa struck Ploieşti. During the next two years no single raid did exceptional damage, but the cumulative effect significantly diminished the flow of oil.

The wartime anti-Semitic government sanctioned the mass killing of Jews. More than 40,000 Soviet Jews reportedly were killed near Odessa alone, yet about half of Romania's Jews survived the war. Antonescu protected many to utilize their experience in industrial and economic management. Additionally, a long-standing tradition of corruption among Romanian officials made buying fake identity papers and passports relatively simple.

Throughout 1942, Antonescu was under considerable pressure from other Romanian political leaders to withdraw the nation's troops from the Soviet Union, but he refused to do so. He pointed out that the army was more than 900 miles deep inside Soviet territory and that the Germans controlled the lines of communication and would surely wreak vengeance on Romania and

occupy the country. As the military situation deteriorated in 1943 following the Soviet victory in the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943), Antonescu explored peace feelers, but these foundered on Anglo-American insistence of unconditional surrender. On August 23, 1944, with Soviet forces having crossed the eastern border, young King Michael ordered the arrest of Antonescu and announced that Romania was withdrawing from the Axis alliance. Even Romanians were caught by surprise. Antonescu was later tried by the Soviets and was executed in June 1946.

Romania turned on its former allies in hopes of securing cobelligerent status, as Italy had been accorded, and maintaining its independence after the war. But such hopes proved illusory. On October 9, 1944, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would have 90 percent "predominance" in postwar Romania.

In February 1945, surrounded by Soviet tanks, King Michael had little choice but to create an essentially communist government. That government forced him to abdicate in December 1947, although Stalin and U.S. president Harry S. Truman both decorated him for personal courage in overthrowing Antonescu. Trapped between major powers, Romania had tried to hold on to its land, people, and independence by allying itself first with one side and then with the other. Instead, it became a communist puppet state. Of all its lost territories, only Transylvania was returned to Romania after the war. Romania remained in the Soviet orbit until the end of the Cold War in 1989.

GERALD D. SWICK

See also

Antonescu, Ion; Balkans Theater; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Carol II, King of Romania; Eastern Front; Holocaust; Hungary; Ploieşti, Raids on; Romania, Air Force; Romania, Army; Romania, Navy; Romania Campaign

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Romania, Air Force

The Fortele Aeriene Regale ale României (Royal Romanian Air Force [FARR], also known as Aeronauticã Regalã Românã, or Royal Romanian Aeronautics) was still rebuilding when war began in 1940. The Industria Aeronauticã Românã (Romanian Aeronautical Industry) works at Brasov produced several serviceable aircraft, notably the IAR-80 and IAR-80A. Based in part on the Polish PZL-24, the IAR-80 was among the best European fighters when it entered service in 1939 but soon lagged behind newer designs.

Romania reluctantly joined the Axis powers on November 23, 1940, and German Luftwaffe advisers trained and reorganized the FARR along German lines. Romania participated in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union, and in the August–October 1941 Odessa Campaign, fighter strength dropped by a fourth as spare parts for older British, French, and Polish aircraft were depleted. Planes of German or Romanian manufacture replaced them. FARR fighters and bombers aided the Romanian Army's victories against the Soviets in Bessarabia and at Odessa in 1941, losing 862 men in less than 10 months, including ground-support and antiaircraft crews. Romanian pilots flew some 4,000 sorties in the Battle of Stalingrad from October 23, 1942, to February 2, 1943. The FARR lost 79 planes, most of them abandoned when airfields were overrun, while destroying 61 Soviet aircraft. Romanian women pilots of the Escadrilla Aviatie Sanitare won Red Cross medals for braving Soviet fighters and intense flak to airlift out casualties during these campaigns.

FARR pilots blunted the Soviet bombing of Romania, but a stronger enemy appeared beginning on June 12, 1942, when, in Operation HALPRO, U.S. bombers struck Romania's Ploieşti oil fields. When 178 unescorted Consolidated B-24 heavy bombers swept over Ploieşti at low level on August 1, 1943, in Operation TIDAL WAVE, FARR pilots claimed 20 of the 54 bombers

shot down and lost just 2 fighters. Defending Romania's oil fields and cities then became the FARR's top priority.

After Romania changed sides in September 1944, FARR pilots flew 4,300 missions for the Allies and dropped more than 1,000 tons of bombs on its erstwhile Axis partners. Approximately 500 Romanian flyers died in the war, a proportionally heavy total.

Romania's top-scoring ace of the war was Cãpitan Aviator de Rezervã Constantin Cantacuzino, with 43 confirmed and 11 probable victories; FARR's practice of awarding additional points for shooting down bombers raised his total to 69. Despite limitations in both the quality and the quantity of its aircraft, the FARR had been one of the most powerful East European air forces. By August 1947, however, Soviet-imposed restrictions had reduced its postwar strength to fewer than 75 aircraft.

GERALD D. SWICK

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Caucasus Campaign; Crimea Campaign; Eastern Front; Ploieşti, Raids on; Romania; Romania Campaign; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Romania, Army

Romania provided more troops to the German cause than all other Axis satellites combined, and more than 1.2 million Romanian men served under arms by mid-1944. The Armata Românã (Romanian Army) fought first for the Axis powers and then for the Allies.

Most senior officers were political appointees who relied on outmoded tactics of massed frontal assaults—an approach that was reinforced both by the paucity of modern communications equipment and by the fact that the

army was composed primarily of uneducated peasants. Strict boundaries existed between officers and enlisted ranks, and punishments were brutal. Campaigns on foreign soil for dubious benefits diminished morale and efficiency, but the soldiers were tenacious when they believed they were fighting in the interest of Romania instead of for Germany.

The Frontier and Mountain Units were the elite troops, composed of experienced professional border guards. The Cavalry Corps also performed with skill and élan. In fact, Romania fielded the largest horse-mounted cavalry contingent in Europe, and half of the 8 million-head national herd was lost in the war.

Equipment was a hodgepodge, much of it of World War I vintage. Some 1,000 Romanian artillery pieces were fitted with barrel sleeves to standardize on 75mm ammunition. The frontline Romanian infantry was armed with Czechoslovakian ZB30 light machine guns and ZB24 rifles, the Czech version of the German Mauser, and Romania produced many weapons of its own, including the respectable Orita submachine gun. Although the Germans promised modern equipment, they generally delivered only older weapons.

On July 2–3, 1941, following the June 22 invasion of the Soviet Union, Romanian and German troops crossed the flooded Prut River to reclaim lands seized from Romania by the Soviet Union the previous year. The Soviet Ninth, Twelfth, and Eighteenth Armies opposed them. In northern Bukovina, elements of the Third Army encountered weak opposition, and by July 9, they secured that province, which had also been seized by the Soviet Union in 1940. To their southeast, the Romanian Fourth Army lost 9,000 men vainly trying to enlarge a bridgehead at Fălciu, but it successfully crossed into Bessarabia near Jassy and advanced on the capital of Kishinev (Chisinau to Romanians).

The Soviet II Cavalry Corps, led by tanks, counterattacked savagely in the Cornesti Massif highlands on July 10, smashing Romania’s 35th Reserve Division. Crack troops of the Frontier Division halted the breakthrough, and the 1st Armored Division turned the Soviet flank. By July 26, Romania again possessed Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, at a cost of 22,000 casualties. Most Romanians believed that their war was over.

Instead, the Romanian government dispatched 18 divisions to capture the Soviet Black Sea port of Odessa. The siege of Odessa, from early August to mid-October, cost 70,000 to 100,000 Romanian casualties, but it was the

most significant victory ever achieved independently by an Axis satellite. Romanian soldiers fought in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the southern Soviet Union. The Germans sometimes had to rescue their allies, but on other occasions, Romanians saved German troops, as at the Kuban bridgehead on April 7, 1943.

Romanian engineers helped build the bridge over the Dnieper at Berislav, the longest bridge ever constructed under fire. On September 1, 1942, the Romanian 3rd Mountain Division and the German 46th Infantry Division captured beachheads on the Kerch Peninsula in the largest amphibious assault undertaken by the European Axis powers during the war. Romanian brigadier general Ion Dumitrache won Germany's Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for capturing Nalchik on November 2, 1942, the farthest point of Axis advance in the Caucasus. At least 16 Romanian officers received the Knight's Cross, more than were awarded to any other non-German Axis power. Additionally, 25 soldiers won the Order of Michael the Brave, Romania's highest award for valor.

Performance declined as disgruntled soldiers increasingly believed that they were fighting Adolf Hitler's war. They failed to construct adequate defenses at Stalingrad, and the Soviet armored counteroffensives tore through their lines. Although they then repeatedly blunted the Soviet advance, they lacked the means to halt it. Flaws in the army had become glaringly apparent after Odessa. Its 75mm artillery and 37mm antitank guns lacked sufficient range and firepower. The infantry had not been trained to cooperate with the tanks, and it did not have motorized transport to keep up with them. The lack of a mobile reserve remained one of Romania's greatest military deficiencies throughout the war, and supplies and equipment were often carried by horses. Although obsolete Czech R-2 and French R-35 tanks were gradually replaced with upgraded German PzKpfw IIIs and a few PzKpfw IVs, plus captured U.S. Lend-Lease M-3 tanks and Soviet T-60s, virtually all were inadequate against Soviet heavy tanks.

Two-thirds of Romania's field army was lost at Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943). Demoralized replacements, many recruited from prisons, were pushed steadily back toward the Prut. On August 23, 1944, Romania renounced its membership in the Axis pact. Soon, more than half a million Romanian soldiers were fighting against their former allies.

Using outdated tactics and weapons against powerful modern enemies

cost Romania approximately 410,000 casualties, 120,000 of them during the war's final eight months. Another 130,000 troops disappeared into Soviet prison camps, where many died.

GERALD D. SWICK

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Caucasus Campaign; Cavalry, Horse; Crimea Campaign; Eastern Front; Romania; Romania Campaign; Stalingrad, Battle of; Tanks, All Powers

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Romania, Navy

When Romania began rearmament in the 1930s, Hungary was seen as the nation's most likely opponent in war, and Romanian land and air services were built up at the expense of the navy. In 1939, the Marina Regalã Românã (Royal Romanian Navy, RRN), numbered just 7 destroyers, 3 motor torpedo boats (MTBs), 4 escort and patrol craft, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 7 river craft, and 35 other unarmed ships. Few were of recent construction. Seven Savoia-Marchetti S-55 single-wing and 11 S-62 biplanes comprised the seaplane fleet.

During the war, Germany and Italy provided additional craft, including submarine hunters and 5 Italian Costiero B–class midget submarines. Romania also built 6 Dutch-designed torpedo boats and assembled 2 German-manufactured U-boats (the *Rechinul* and *Marsuinul*) at Galati during the war. By June 1941, the RRN had 40 warships. Its air support had similarly increased. Opposing the RRN was the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. It boasted 1 battleship, 7 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 84 MTBs, and 47 submarines plus 626 naval aircraft.

Outnumbered, outclassed, and outgunned at sea, Romania fought no major naval battles; most actions involved MTBs escorting convoys. Naval planners opted for a defensive strategy. Romania laid thick minefields around the ports of Sulina and Constanta. In the process, the 406-ton Romanian gunboat *Locotenent Lepri Remus* hit a stray mine and sank on January 11, 1940, the largest RRN ship sunk in the war.

The Sea Division guarded the coastline, supported by coastal artillery and 20 aircraft of the 102nd Sea Plane Flotilla. The Sea Division had two destroyers, the *Marasesti* and *Marasti*, built by Italy in 1918 and 1919, respectively, each with a main armament of four 4.7-inch guns. Its gunboats, the *Locotenent-Comandor Stihi Eugen* and *Sublocotenent Ghiculescu*, both of French origin, dated to 1916 and mounted two 3.9-inch main guns each. The Romanian Danube Division consisted of two sections. The River Naval Force had three monitors, two MTBs, a landing company, an underwater defense group, and a service group. The Tulcea Tactical Group had two monitors and four MTBs, an underwater defense group, and a supply convoy. The Sulina Naval Detachment protected the Danube Delta, and the Upper Danube Sector guarded the river from Cazane to Portile-de-Fier. Both depended on seven pre–World War I river monitors and a handful of smaller craft.

On September 1, 1942, on the Kerch Peninsula, RRN and German vessels successfully conducted the largest European Axis amphibious assault of the war. The evacuation of German, Romanian, and auxiliary troops from the Crimea during April and May 1944 earned a German Knight's Cross for the commander of the Black Sea Division, Rear Admiral Horia Marcellariu. Estimates of the number of soldiers saved in this operation vary from 25,000 to more than 118,000.

On the eve of the Soviet invasion of Romania in 1944, the RRN had 54 warships and auxiliaries in the Black Sea. An additional 37 warships and 100 auxiliary craft were in the Danube. On September 5, after the Romanians switched sides in the war, all ships were handed over to the Soviets. Most of the Sea Division was bottled up in port, but the river flotilla fought for the Soviet Union until war's end.

GERALD D. SWICK

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Air Warfare, Naval; Auxiliary Vessels; Convoys, Axis; Crimea Campaign; Romania; Romania Campaign

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Romania Campaign (August–September 1944)

With 1.2 million men under arms in 1944, Romania fielded the third-largest Axis military force in Europe. By mid-August 1944, Romania's battered troops held the Traian defensive line from the headwaters of the Sereth to the Dniester. The Fourth Army guarded the northern approaches to Bessarabia, and the Third Army defended the lower Dniester. On August 20, a 10-hour artillery barrage from 11,000 Soviet guns opened the Battle of Jassy-Kishinev. The Romanian 5th Infantry Division, pulverized by the bombardment, was quickly finished off by the Soviet Twenty-Seventh Army. Soviet tanks of the Fifty-Second Army annihilated the Romanian 7th Infantry Division and took Jassy. Romanian aircraft flew 161 sorties as ground troops counterattacked in futile efforts to stem the tide. Meanwhile, the German 20th Panzer Division fled, taking with it every Romanian tank it could locate.

Soviet troops with Romanian Army prisoners in Romania, August 1944. (Yevgeny Khaldei/Corbis)

On August 20, waves of Soviet planes broke through heavy antiaircraft defenses protecting Romania's harbor at Constanta, sinking the torpedo boat *Naluca* and damaging three other ships, including the destroyer *Marasesti*. Romania capitulated three days later, and by September 5, the entire Romanian Navy was in Soviet hands. In an attempt to maintain Romania's independence, its figurehead monarch, young King Michael (Mihai)—aided by several army officers and armed communist-led civilians—had staged a coup on August 23, arresting the head of government General Ion Antonescu. That same night, Michael announced by radio that Romania was withdrawing from the Axis alliance.

German troops tried to restore control by seizing the capital of Bucharest, but they were repulsed by the Royal Bodyguard supported by an armored platoon. The Ninth Army enveloped the remaining Germans outside Bucharest on August 27, taking 7,000 prisoners. An outraged Adolf Hitler ordered his top commando, Otto Skorzeny, to lead a parachute battalion in a rescue of Antonescu. The plan was foiled when Antonescu was handed over to the Red Army and hurriedly spirited off to Moscow. Some 20,000 Germans fought to hold the Ploieşti oil fields, but Soviet armor and Romania's 4th Parachute Battalion secured the area. Romanian pilots also shot down 24 German planes.

The Red Army entered Bucharest on August 31. On September 12, Michael signed a formal armistice in which he agreed to wage war on Germany and Hungary, repeal anti-Jewish laws, ban fascist groups, and pay $300 million in goods and raw materials to the Soviet Union. (Moscow calculated those goods at reduced 1938 prices, making the actual reparations closer to $2 billion.)

On August 28, Romania's 1st Armored Division fought its way through the Ghimes Pass, eliminated a German penetration, and seized a bridgehead for the Soviet XXIV Guards Corps near Reghin (Szászrégen). Romanian troops then blocked a Hungarian attempt to seize the Carpathian passes on September 7. A few days later, the First Army helped stop a German-Hungarian thrust out of Yugoslavia, but on October 26, the Soviets reduced the size of the Romanian army and ordered most of its divisions to be kept at the front outside the country, clearing the way for a communist takeover.

GERALD D. SWICK

See also

Antonescu, Ion; Romania; Romania, Air Force; Romania, Army; Skorzeny, Otto; Soviet Union, Army

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Rome, Advance on and Capture of (May–June 1944)

The Allies launched their invasion of Italy in September 1943 with high hopes for the speedy capture of Rome. These hopes were quickly dashed by Italy's poorly handled switch from the Axis side, fierce German resistance,

harsh mountainous terrain, and terrible weather. A renewed offensive in January 1944 to breach the Gustav Line by the British Eighth Army under Lieutenant General Oliver Leese and the U.S. Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Mark Clark, accompanied by a simultaneous amphibious landing at Anzio (January 22, 1944) by the U.S. VI Corps, also met with stubborn resistance from General Heinrich von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel's German Tenth Army, especially at the Benedictine abbey at Monte Cassino.

After three failed attempts to break through and the near annihilation of the Anzio landing, the last opportunity for a decisive victory in Italy was embodied in Operation DIADEM. On the Gustav Line, 16 Allied divisions faced 6 weakened German divisions. At Anzio, 6 Allied divisions faced 5 German divisions with 4 more in reserve, and the Allies were supported by more than 2,000 guns and overwhelming air superiority. For the first time, the Allied forces were used as a combined army group rather than discrete corps, with the aim of destroying the German army south of Rome. The plan entailed the Eighth Army striking the main effort at Cassino and thrusting through the Liri Valley, supported by the Fifth Army, including the French Expeditionary Corps (CEF), attacking across the Garigliano and the Anzio bridgehead to join with the other Allied forces.

The offensive opened on May 11, 1944, with a massive air and artillery bombardment, but initially, the Allies failed to make any headway. The CEF, which lay between the two fronts, was able to fight its way into the mountainous country behind the Garigliano, enabling the U.S. II Corps to push up the coastal road. In a set-piece attack, XIII Corps ruptured the German line, culminated by the extraordinary efforts of the Polish II Corps, which eventually captured Monte Cassino on May 18, and the French Moroccan Goums, who crossed the mountains to pierce the Hitler Line, in front of Rome, from the rear before it could be properly manned. Kesselring, who had been duped into expecting another amphibious landing farther north, was slow to send reinforcements southward to the Liri Valley.

General Harold Alexander, commander of 15th Army Group, was alerted to German movements through Ultra intelligence, and when victory seemed complete, he ordered the Anzio breakout on May 23. Alexander planned for the U.S. VI Corps to strike directly at Valmontone and cut Route 6, the main inland road, and thus trap the German Tenth Army holding the Gustav Line. Rome would thus be ripe for the taking, but more important, the Germans

would be unable to form further organized defenses, enabling the rapid occupation of Italy up to the Alps.

The Fifth Army linked up with VI Corps on May 25, but General Clark, perhaps the most egocentric Allied commander in the war, was enticed by the glory of capturing Rome. He was determined that Americans should be the first to enter the city and that this should be accomplished before the Allied landings in France dominated the headlines. He swung his drive directly to Rome, leaving a gap between the Allied armies through which the Germans escaped. Clark triumphantly entered Rome on June 4, but the spectacle of the first capture of an Axis capital was eclipsed by the Allied invasion of France at Normandy two days later. Clark's impetuous failure enabled Kesselring to withdraw to the Gothic Line, but thereafter, the campaign in Italy assumed a secondary status to the campaign in France.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Amphibious Warfare; Anzio, Battle of; Cassino/Rapido River, Battles of; Clark, Mark Wayne; Kesselring, Albert; Leese, Sir Oliver William Hargreaves

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Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen (1891–1944)

German Army field marshal. Born in Heidenheim, Württemberg, Germany, on November 15, 1891, Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel joined the German Army in 1910 as an officer candidate. He then attended the officers' training school at Danzig (present-day Gdansk, Poland) and was commissioned in January 1912.

During World War I, Rommel was wounded while fighting in France in September 1914. On his recovery, he won renown in service on the Italian and Romanian fronts. At Caporetto, he and his men took 9,000 Italian prisoners and captured 81 guns. Promoted to captain, he was also awarded the Pour le Mérite.

Rommel remained in the Reichswehr after the war and took charge of security at Friedrichshafen in 1919. In January 1921, he was posted to Stuttgart, where he commanded an infantry regiment, and then he was assigned to Dresden in 1929, where he was an instructor at the Infantry School until 1933. There, he wrote *Infantry Attacks*, a textbook on infantry tactics. In 1935, Rommel received command of a battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment. He taught briefly at the Kriegsakademie (War Academy) in 1938 and then commanded Adolf Hitler's army security detachment.

In 1940, Rommel used his access to Hitler to secure command of the 7th Panzer Division and led it in spectacular fashion in the invasion of France. Promoted to lieutenant general in February 1941, he assumed command of the Afrika Korps, German forces in Libya. An aggressive, bold commander who led from the front, Rommel employed daring attacks and was tenacious in battle. His skill as a field commander earned him the sobriquet "Desert Fox." He was promoted to general of panzer troops in July 1941, to colonel general in January 1942, and finally to field marshal in June 1942.

Rommel was defeated in the October 23–November 4, 1942, Battle of El Alamein, but he conducted a skillful withdrawal west into Tunisia. After returning to Germany for reasons of health, he was assigned as commander of Army Group B with responsibility for northern Italy. In November 1943, he became inspector general of coastal defense in France and worked to strengthen the so-called Atlantic Wall.

German field marshal Erwin Rommel, shown here in 1942. (Heinrich Hoffmann/Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

On January 1, 1944, Rommel became head of Army Group B in France, subordinate to German commander in chief, west (Oberbefehlshaber West), Field Marshal Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt. Based on his experiences in North Africa, Rommel believed that if an Allied invasion was to be stopped, it would have to be at the beaches. Rundstedt and Hitler, however, envisioned a cordon on the shoreline and large, mobile German forces inland that would destroy the Allies once they landed. Rommel believed that Allied air supremacy would render that outcome impossible.

Rommel did what he could to improve the coastal defenses, but when the invasion occurred he was in Germany, assuming that the Allies would not attempt a landing owing to marginal weather conditions. On July 17, 1944, he was badly wounded in an air attack that caught his staff car on the road.

Rommel, never a fanatical Nazi, grew despondent over Hitler's estrangement from reality but failed in his efforts to convince the German leader that the war was lost. When Rommel was approached about participating in a plot to overthrow the führer, he refused to join in, but he also failed to inform the authorities. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life, Rommel was given the choice of a trial for treason or suicide. He chose the latter. Rommel died of a cyanide capsule on October 14, 1944, near Ulm, and was accorded a state funeral. His death was officially announced as a heart attack brought on by his wounds.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

Afrika Korps; Armored Warfare; El Alamein, Battle of; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; North Africa Campaign; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Document 192

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Romulo, Carlos Peña (1899–1985)

Philippine journalist, nationalist, and brigadier general. Born in Manila on January 14, 1899, Carlos Peña Romulo graduated from Columbia University in New York City in 1921. A brilliant reporter, he rose to be editor in chief of the Philippine DMHM (Debate-Mabuhay-Herald-Monday) chain of newspapers. He also became a leading citizen of Manila and an unfailing supporter of Philippine president Manuel Quezon. He championed Filipino autonomy, and in 1941 he won a Pulitzer Prize for newspaper articles that warned of the Japanese threat. He stated that the peoples of Southeast Asia,

other than the Filipinos, would not fight the Japanese and in fact would welcome them.

Following the U.S. entry into World War II in late 1941, General Douglas MacArthur placed the then mobilized Major Romulo in charge of the Philippine press and radio. Romulo issued press releases and helped editors select headlines that would simultaneously calm and inform Filipinos, and he established a radio station, the Voice of Freedom, on Corregidor. He defined the war not as a fight for America but as a fight with America for freedom.

MacArthur later sent Romulo to the United States to tell the Philippine story. There, Romulo spoke to factory workers and to Congress, bringing the story of the Philippine resisters to life. Promoted to colonel in August 1942, Romulo embodied Filipino resistance and loyalty. One month after becoming a brigadier general in September 1944, he landed with MacArthur on Leyte. Romulo's stay in the Philippines was short, however, for he was ordered back to Washington, D.C., to talk to members of Congress about the situation in the Philippines.

In April 1945, Romulo went to San Francisco as chairman of the Filipino delegation to the United Nations. There, he became an impassioned champion of the small nations of Asia, especially those still striving for independence. He remained in the United States for 17 years. Between 1945 and 1954, he was the Philippine ambassador to the United Nations, and he was also ambassador to the United States from 1952 to 1953 and again from 1955 to 1962. Romulo was elected president of the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1949. He served as president of the University of the Philippines from 1962 to 1968 and was his country's foreign minister from 1950 to 1952 and from 1968 to 1984. He also wrote numerous books. Romulo died in Manila on December 15, 1985.

JOHN W. WHITMAN

See also

MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines; Propaganda; Quezon, Manuel Luis

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Roosevelt, Anna Eleanor (1884–1962)

First Lady of the United States from 1933 to 1945 and states-person before, during, and after World War II. Born on October 11, 1884, in New York City, a niece of U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt was orphaned at age 10 and raised by her maternal grandmother. Privately educated until age 15, she later studied at Allenswood, a British school. She taught at the Rivington Street Settlement House and later at Todhunter School, both in New York. In 1905, she married her fifth cousin, Franklin D. Roosevelt. They had six children.

First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt visiting the Japanese Internment Center at Gila River, Arizona. She is accompanied by Dillon S. Meyer, director of the War Relocation Authority, April 23, 1943. (PhotoQuest/Getty Images)

After nursing her husband through poliomyelitis in 1921, Eleanor encouraged Franklin to continue his political career. When he was elected governor of New York in 1928, she made suggestions for female appointees. An indefatigable volunteer, she was active in many organizations, including the League of Women Voters and the Democratic National Committee. The

political environment of the late 1920s and 1930s constantly encouraged her to question gender, racial, and social inequality.

Once Franklin became president in 1933, Eleanor traveled extensively representing the White House. She tirelessly championed the cause of the underprivileged, children, women, and minorities. Her interventions led to a number of social improvements. An inexhaustible writer, she also authored several books and articles, including the syndicated column "My Day." In 1940, she also developed the United States Committee for the Care of European Children.

During World War II, Eleanor visited Allied troops worldwide, and her steadfastness brought a level of comfort to many. Throughout the war, numerous social agencies sought her advice and intervention. After the president's death in April 1945, she remained politically active and continued her battle for human rights, especially for war refugees. In response to her universal recognition of human rights, President Harry S. Truman appointed her to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, a position she held from 1945 to 1953. She also served as chairman of the Human Rights Commission and was instrumental in passage of the Declaration of Human Rights. Additionally, she was actively involved with the Peace Corps under President John F. Kennedy. Eleanor Roosevelt died in New York City on November 7, 1962.

WENDY ADELÉ-MARIE MAIER

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United Nations, Formation of; United States; Women in World War II

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Roosevelt, Franklin D. (1882–1945)

U.S. politician and president from 1933 to 1945. Born on January 30, 1882, at his family's Hyde Park estate in Dutchess County, New York, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was educated at home until age 14. He then attended Groton Preparatory School, Harvard University, and Columbia University Law School. In 1905, Roosevelt married his fifth cousin Eleanor Roosevelt, President Theodore Roosevelt's niece.

After passing the bar examination, Franklin Roosevelt joined the law firm of Carter, Ledyard and Milburn. In 1910, he won a seat in the New York Senate, where he served two terms and was a strong advocate of progressive reform. In 1913, he was appointed assistant secretary of the navy, and he worked diligently and effectively in that post. A strong advocate of intervention on the Allied side and military preparedness, he helped prepare the navy for its role in World War I.

In 1920, Roosevelt ran unsuccessfully as the vice presidential candidate of the Democratic Party on the ticket headed by James M. Cox. During the campaign, Roosevelt advocated U.S. entry into the League of Nations. In 1921, he was stricken with polio. Although his suffering was acute and left him permanently disabled, he remained intensely interested in politics. In 1924, he attended the Democratic Convention and nominated Alfred E. Smith, governor of New York, for president. Four years later, Roosevelt was elected governor of New York. His efforts in seeking relief for suffering New Yorkers following the 1929 stock market crash and the onset of the Great Depression led to his reelection in 1930.

In November 1932, Roosevelt was elected president of the United States on the Democratic ticket, triumphing over incumbent President Herbert Hoover. Roosevelt promised the American people a "New Deal" and began regular radio broadcasts to the American people, the first U.S. president to do so. Known as "fireside chats," these addresses were designed to restore morale. Legislative products of his first frenzied hundred days in office included banking reform, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Congress allocated more than $3 billion under the NIRA for the Public Works Administration. The National Recovery Administration set minimum wages and limited hours for employees. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration provided funds to relief agencies

run by the state, and the new Civilian Conservation Corps employed thousands of young men to replant forests, build parks, and work on flood-control projects. During this time, Roosevelt also established the Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee stock trading.

In the second phase of the New Deal, the Works Progress Administration was established, extending employment to more than 2 million workers to construct bridges, roads, and buildings. Another measure, the 1935 Social Security Act, provided disability insurance as well as pensions for the aged. The American people welcomed Roosevelt's programs, and in 1936, they overwhelmingly reelected him to office. While Roosevelt's New Deal clearly helped mitigate the effects of the Great Depression and served as a considerable morale booster, in the end it failed to achieve a sustained or robust economic recovery; indeed, the American economy would not completely right itself until rearmament for World War II was under way.

With the beginning of World War II in Europe in September 1939, Roosevelt increasingly turned his attention to foreign affairs and military preparedness, despite strong isolationist sentiments in Congress and among many American voters. On September 8, 1939, he proclaimed a limited national emergency, which allowed expansion of the army from 135,000 men to 227,000. Believing that the security of the United States demanded the defeat of the Axis powers and sensing that Adolf Hitler was a mortal threat to the world, Roosevelt gradually moved the United States from its isolationist stance. Later in September, he called on Congress to amend one of the Neutrality Acts, which it did the next month, allowing the Allies to purchase arms in the United States on a cash-and-carry basis.

Following the defeat of France in June 1940, Roosevelt pledged to support Britain in every manner short of declaring war. In September, he concluded an agreement with Britain whereby that country would receive 50 World War I–vintage destroyers in return for granting the United States rights to bases located in British territory in the Western Hemisphere, chiefly the Caribbean. He also initiated a major rearmament program in the United States and secured passage of the Selective Service Act, the first peacetime draft in the nation's history.

By early 1941, Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill were coordinating their nations' policies toward the Axis powers. In the spring of 1941, Roosevelt ordered U.S. destroyers to provide

protection as far as Iceland for the North Atlantic convoys bound for Britain. In March 1941, on his urging, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, which extended U.S. aid to countries fighting the Axis powers.

Roosevelt also began pressuring Japan to leave China, which the Japanese had invaded in 1937. When Japanese troops occupied southern Indochina in the spring of 1941, he embargoed scrap metal and oil shipments to Japan. Roosevelt also ordered the Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Honolulu, Hawaii, in order to intimidate Japan, but the embargo caused Japanese leaders to opt for war with the United States. On December 7, 1941, Japanese aircraft attacked the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The following day, Roosevelt called for a declaration of war on Japan, referring to the Japanese attack as “a day which will live in infamy.” No reliable evidence exists to substantiate persistent allegations that the president set up the fleet at Pearl Harbor in order to bring about the U.S. entry in the war.

From 1941 to 1945, Roosevelt skillfully guided the United States through the war and worked to ensure a secure postwar world. During the course of the war, the United States fielded not only a navy larger than all the other navies of the world combined but also the largest air force and the best-armed and most mobile and heavily mechanized army in world history. It also provided the machines of war, raw materials, and food that enabled other nations to continue fighting the Axis powers. Amid these circumstances, full economic recovery was achieved in the United States.

In 1944, Roosevelt ran successfully for an unprecedented fourth presidential term against Republican candidate Thomas Dewey. In February 1945, Roosevelt met Churchill and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin at Yalta in the Crimea. The Yalta Conference built on decisions already reached at the prior Tehran Conference and was an effort to secure a stable postwar world. Roosevelt gambled that with his considerable charm, he could convince Stalin that he had nothing to fear from the United States and that Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States could cooperate to secure a peaceful postwar world. Although accused of making unnecessary concessions to the Soviet Union at Yalta, Roosevelt really had little choice in these, as the Red Army already occupied much of Eastern Europe, and the U.S. military wished to induce the Soviets to enter the war against Japan.



One of the greatest U.S. presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt is photographed signing the declaration of war against Japan, on December 8, 1941. (National Archives)

At Yalta, Roosevelt was already gravely ill, and shortly afterward, he sought rest at his second home in Warm Springs, Georgia. He died there of a massive cerebral hemorrhage on April 12, 1945. Vice President Harry S. Truman succeeded him as president. Franklin Roosevelt, one of the best-loved presidents in U.S. history, had successfully led the nation through two of its greatest trials—the Great Depression and World War II.

KATHLEEN GASTON HITT AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic Charter; Cairo Conference; Casablanca Conference; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; Lend-Lease; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Quebec Conference, First; Quebec Conference, Second; Roosevelt, Anna Eleanor; Selective Service Act; Tehran Conference;

United States; Yalta Conference; Document 31; Document 46; Document 65; Document 78; Document 80; Document 81; Document 91; Document 96; Document 98; Document 111; Document 119; Document 123; Document 134; Document 145; Document 148; Document 165; Document 180; Document 189

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Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr. (1887–1944)

U.S. Army general. Born in Oyster Bay, New York, on September 13, 1887, Theodore Roosevelt Jr. was the son of President Theodore Roosevelt. The younger Roosevelt graduated from Harvard University in 1908 and worked with his father in the preparedness campaign prior to World War I. In that conflict, he was wounded in action and received the Distinguished Service Cross.

Following the war, Roosevelt transferred to the Army Reserve as a colonel. He was one of the founders of the American Legion and was elected to the New York legislature. Roosevelt was assistant secretary of the navy from 1921, and he ran unsuccessfully for governor of New York State in

1924. In that year, he became the chairman of American Express. Roosevelt served as governor of Puerto Rico from 1929 to 1932 and governor-general of the Philippines from 1932 to 1933. He became an editor at Double-day, Doran and Company in 1935 and wrote or coauthored eight books.

Roosevelt returned to active military duty in April 1941, this time as commander of the 26th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division. He served in North Africa and Sicily, becoming assistant division commander of the "Big Red One" under Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen. In Sicily, II Corps commander Major General Omar Bradley relieved both Allen and Roosevelt because of the division's sluggish advance across central Sicily and the undisciplined conduct of many of its soldiers.

Roosevelt then served as a liaison officer for the U.S. Fifth Army. In 1944, he was assigned as assistant division commander of the 4th Infantry Division for the Normandy landings. On several occasions, he requested permission to go ashore with the first assault wave, but Major General Raymond O. Barton, the division commander, repeatedly refused because Roosevelt, who had a severe case of arthritis, limped and walked with a cane. Roosevelt finally prevailed when he threatened to put his request in writing and send it up the chain of command.



Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt Jr. standing by the door to his command post in Normandy, France, July 1944. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Roosevelt was not only the sole general officer to land on Utah Beach on D-day (June 6) but also the only general officer on any beach to land in the first wave. At age 57, he was one of the oldest soldiers there. His son Quentin II also landed on one of the beaches that day, making them the only father and son pair to have come ashore that day. Drifting tides caused the Utah Beach assault force to land in the wrong place, which proved to be fortunate for the Americans because the spot where they did land was far less well defended. Once on the beach, Roosevelt made the tactically correct decision not to try to shift to the planned landing point but rather to direct the follow-on waves to the new landing points. He is said to have stated, “We’ll start the war from right here.”

Roosevelt repeatedly led small groups across the beach and established them inland, and he was under constant enemy fire the entire day. Lieutenant

General Bradley later said that Roosevelt's conduct on Utah Beach was the bravest act he had seen in more than 40 years of military service. Roosevelt died in his sleep of a heart attack on July 12, 1944, most probably brought on in no small measure by the combat stress of D-day. At the time, he had been selected for command of the 90th Infantry Division and promotion to major general. Roosevelt was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously and was later buried at the World War II American Cemetery at Colleville-sur-Mer, Normandy. With the long-overdue award of the Medal of Honor to Theodore Roosevelt Sr. for his own actions in Cuba in 1898, the Roosevelts became only the second father-and-son pair to be Medal of Honor recipients, after Arthur and Douglas MacArthur.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of

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Rosenberg, Alfred (1893–1946)

German National Socialist Party publicist and "philosopher" of National Socialism. Born in Reval, Russia (today's Tallinn, Estonia), on January 12, 1893, Alfred Rosenberg graduated with a degree in architecture at Riga Technical University in 1918. He soon immigrated to Paris and at year's end settled in Munich. There he joined the German Workers' Party, which became the National Socialist Party. Rosenberg became a German citizen in 1920 and gradually assumed the position of the party's chief ideologist. He participated in the unsuccessful November 1923 Beer Hall Putsch and was Adolf Hitler's personal choice to serve as interim party leader while Hitler was in prison.

Rosenberg headed the new National Socialist Society for Culture and Learning from 1929 and was elected to the Reichstag as a Nazi Party deputy in 1930. In that year, he also published his major work, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, which became the most popular party work after Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. A turgid, racial, pseudoscientific study, it claimed that the Germans represented a pure Nordic race destined to rule Europe. It also attacked Jews, Free Masons, the Catholic Church, and others.

Rosenberg held numerous party posts and, after Hitler became chancellor, headed the foreign policy office of the party and was made Hitler's deputy for supervising the spiritual and ideological training of the Nazi Party. In January 1940, Rosenberg was tasked with founding the so-called High School, which was to have evolved into the postwar Central National Socialist University. One of the institutes within the High School was the Institute for Research of the Jewish Question, the libraries of which were filled with looted Jewish art, furniture, and other items.

The peak of Rosenberg's career came in 1941 when he was designated Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. In this position, he opposed genocide of the Jews and expulsion of populations, believing that it made more sense to utilize their support against the Soviet Union. Despite his party positions, Rosenberg never achieved the influence or recognition he believed he merited. He was disappointed when Joachim von Ribbentrop became foreign minister in 1938 and was upset with the August 1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which he believed sacrificed ideology to political motives. He was also an inept administrator.

Frustrated by his lack of influence, Rosenberg attempted to resign in October 1944, but Hitler never answered his letter. Arrested at the end of the war, Rosenberg was tried along with the principal Nazi leaders at Nuremberg. He remained unrepentant in his support of Hitler and National Socialism but argued that some of Hitler's intentions had been subverted by bloodthirsty officials. Convicted on all four counts of war crimes, Rosenberg was hanged at Nuremberg on October 16, 1946.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Hitler, Adolf; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

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Roslavl, Battle of (August 1–8, 1941)

The Battle of Smolensk ended on August 5, 1941, in a resounding German victory. At that point, however, German chancellor Adolf Hitler and his generals were divided on continuing Operation BARBAROSSA with a drive on Moscow or shifting the objective south to the Ukraine. Colonel General Heinz Guderian, commander of the Second Panzer Group, was one of the main advocates for continuing to Moscow. As early as July 27 at a conference at Army Group Center headquarters in Borisov, Guderian pushed for permission to move immediately to eliminate a large concentration of stragglers from some 21 Soviet divisions in the vicinity of Roslavl, on the Second Panzer Group's right. Roslavl also was an important communications and road center, and its capture would give the Germans control of the transportation network southwest of Moscow. Before Hitler had decided between Moscow and the Ukraine, Army Group Center commander Field Marshal Fedor von Bock approved Guderian's plan.

Army Group Center augmented Guderian's Panzer Group by attaching to it the VII Corps. The combined temporary formation, designated Army Task Group Guderian, had 14 divisions operating under the control of VII and IX Corps and the XXIV and XLVII Panzer Corps. General of Infantry Hermann Geyer commanded IX Corps. During World War I he had been one of the German Army's most important tactical innovators. Ironically, he had also been Guderian's superior on two different occasions during the interwar years.

Guderian launched the attack on Roslavl on August 1, with VII Corps and the XXIV Panzer Corps leading. Guderian was near the front with the 3rd Panzer Division when Luftwaffe aircraft mistakenly attacked. A bomb landed close to Guderian's command car, but he was uninjured. On August 2,

Guderian's two remaining corps joined the attack and completed the encirclement.

On August 4 Guderian returned to Army Group Center headquarters for his first direct meeting with Hitler since the start of Operation BARBAROSSA. Hitler still had not decided between the objectives of Moscow or Ukraine. Nonetheless, when Guderian returned to his own headquarters he ordered preparations begun for a drive on Moscow. On the following day Guderian was back at the front directing operations around Roslavl. The trapped Soviet forces made several unsuccessful attempts to break out but were progressively pinned against the swamps and town. The battle for Roslavl ended on August 8, with the Germans taking 38,000 prisoners, 200 tanks, and as many artillery pieces.

The road toward the northeast and Moscow was now open. On August 12, however, Hitler issued Führer Directive 34, ordering Army Group North to continue its push toward Leningrad and Army Group South to move into the Crimea and the Donets basin. Army Group Center was ordered to halt temporarily and provide support to the efforts on both of its flanks. The advance toward for Moscow now lost its momentum, and the Germans would never again recover it sufficiently.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bock, Fedor von; Crimea Campaign; Guderian, Heinz; Leningrad, Siege of; Smolensk, Battle of

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Rostov, Battle for (November 17–30, 1941)

Important Eastern Front battle. On clearing the Ukraine, German field marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South continued its advance east and south. Barring its way was the Soviet city of Rostov on the Sea of

Azov at the mouth of the Don River. Rostov was the gateway to the Caucasus Mountains, the Soviet oil fields to the south, and the road to Persia, through which Britain and the United States were to supply the Red Army.

Between September 29 and October 13, 1941, Rundstedt's armies overran the coal- and iron-rich Donets Basin region, where 20 percent of Soviet steel was produced. They also forced the Mius River and captured Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. General Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army captured Kharkov on October 24. Rain and mud slowed the German movement, however. The Soviets were then able to evacuate Rostelmash, a large agricultural machinery plant at Rostov, despite German bombing.

To counter the German advance, the Soviet Southern Front (army group) under Colonel General Yakov Cherevichenko had recently been reinforced. Cherevichenko had at his disposal the Thirty-Seventh Army and the Fifty-Sixth Independent Army. On November 9, he submitted a plan to Stavka (the Soviet high command) for an attack against the concentration of German forces in the Rostov area to take place on November 17. Joseph Stalin approved the plan but refused to commit the Southern Front.

On November 17 Cherevichenko's forces struck Rundstedt's spearhead, Colonel General Ewald von Kleist's First Panzer Army, some 40 miles north of Rostov. Timoshenko had hoped to create a diversion and draw the Germans away from Rostov, but this effort failed, and Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen's III Panzer Corps drove on Rostov, entering the city's northern suburbs on November 19. On November 21, the 1st SS Panzer Division captured Rostov. But a gap had opened between the German forces. Realizing that he was overextended, Kleist withdrew from Rostov on November 22, only to see his order to construct positions behind the Mius River, 45 miles west, countermanded by German Army commander Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, who insisted that Rostov be held.

On November 28, Colonel General Yakov T. Cherevichenko's Southern Front forces composed of 21 divisions of the Thirty-Seventh and Ninth Armies drove into the rear of III Panzer Corps, which was exhausted and seriously short of supplies, manpower, and equipment. Later that same day, Kleist ordered Mackensen to give up the city. The Soviets then succeeded at getting a bridgehead across the iced-over Don on the southern outskirts of Rostov. Night crossings reinforced the Soviet bridgehead, despite German

opposition. By November 29 Soviet units had cleared Rostov, which was heavily damaged and burning as a result of German demolitions.

On November 30 Kleist again ordered a withdrawal behind the Mius River, but this move was more than Adolf Hitler would tolerate, and he ordered Brauchitsch to have Rundstedt countermand the order. Rundstedt refused and offered his resignation. On December 1, Hitler replaced him with Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau, who was unable to influence events. The withdrawal, certainly the correct decision in the circumstances, was completed that night.

The battle marked the first serious setback for the Germans since the start of Operation BARBAROSSA (June 22). It also began the departure of all four of the German Army's top commanders. In December, both Brauchitsch and Army Group Center commander Field Marshal Fedor von Bock resigned, and the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, followed suit in January. Hitler did not replace Brauchitsch, choosing to take command of the German Army himself.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Bock, Fedor von; Brauchitsch, Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Leeb, Wilhelm Franz Josef Ritter von; Mackensen, Eberhard von; Paulus, Friedrich; Reichenau, Walther von; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Stalin, Joseph; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich

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Rote Kappelle

German opposition organization. A group of loosely affiliated intellectuals and civil servants united only by their opposition to Nazism, the Rote Kappelle (Red Orchestra) became a Soviet espionage tool. Many of the

members, such as Adam Kuckhoff, were longtime communists or communist sympathizers. Some, such as Arvid Harnack and his American wife, Mildred Fish, had previously been Soviet agents. Others, such as Harro Schulze-Boysen, merely opposed Nazism.

Schulze-Boysen's opposition to the Nazis dated from late 1932, and he was sent to a concentration camp in April 1933. Influential family contacts not only arranged his release but also secured him a position on the intelligence staff in the Air Force Ministry. In 1936, Schulze-Boysen passed information about Luftwaffe activities in Spain during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War to the Soviet embassy. Although the intermediary was arrested, the Gestapo found no evidence of the spy ring that Schulze-Boysen had created, and the group resumed copying and disseminating anti-Nazi leaflets in Germany. The group dissolved in 1938.

Harnack, who had spied for the Soviet Union from his post in the Economics Ministry since August 1935, broke contact during the Great Purges in the mid-1930s. In September 1940, however, he sent a message warning that an attack on the Soviet Union was imminent, and he established a network of some 60 agents. Harnack had also been in touch with U.S. intelligence since 1938. He insisted that resistance to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler had to take priority over ideology. Harnack's contacts included not only industrial leaders but also several military and political figures later involved in the July 1944 bomb plot against Hitler.

In early 1941, Harnack persuaded Schulze-Boysen to cooperate in passing information to the Soviet Union. Schulze-Boysen was then employed on the Luftwaffe operational staff engaged in planning Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, German attack on the Soviet Union. This recruitment completed the organizational triad that became the Red Orchestra.

Each man headed a separate network. Kuckhoff, an author, wrote pamphlets and served as liaison for the three groups. Most information gleaned concerned the impending attack on the Soviet Union. But as with the numerous other warnings that reached Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, this vital intelligence was ignored.

Operation BARBAROSSA forced the group to rely on wireless transmissions. None of the members had been properly trained in wireless techniques, however, so Moscow sent an agent to rectify the situation. The German

Sicherheitsdienst (SD, Security Service) intercepted his orders, and in June 1942, it broke the group's code. The Schulze-Boysen group, as it was also known, continued to send reports and also wrote and distributed anti-Nazi pamphlets. In August 1942 when it became apparent that Schulze-Boysen knew that the codes were compromised, the SD arrested 119 people connected with the Red Orchestra. Fifty-five of them, including Mildred Fish-Harnack and 18 other women, were executed for their activities.

Although the Red Orchestra had little immediate impact, it did prove that opposition to Hitler had existed in Germany. Fish-Harnack, though little known in the United States, became a heroine in the communist pantheon, and the Red Orchestra was a staple in the founding myth of the German Democratic Republic.

TIMOTHY C. DOWLING

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Germany; Great Purges; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Resistance

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Rotmistrov, Pavel Alekseyvich (1901–1982)

Soviet Army marshal. Born at Skovorovo in the Kalinin Oblast, Russia, on July 6, 1901, Pavel Alekseyevich Rotmistrov joined the Red Army in 1919, fought in the Russian Civil War, and graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1931. Promoted to major general in June 1940, Rotmistrov was chief of staff of the III Motorized Corps in the Baltic Military District when the German Army invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. In September 1941, he took command of the VII Tank Corps, attached to the Northwest Front, and participated in the defense of Moscow in October.

Rotmistrov was then transferred with his corps to the Leningrad area. As a result of its exemplary performance there, the VII Tank Corps was renamed

the III Guards Corps in January 1942. Promoted to lieutenant general, Rotmistrov commanded a tank corps in the August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943, Battle of Stalingrad, and in December 1942, he halted German major general Erhard Raus's attempt to reach the trapped German Sixth Army. In the subsequent Soviet counteroffensive, Rotmistrov commanded a mechanized group that outfought German colonel general Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army.

In February 1943, Rotmistrov assumed command of the newly formed Fifth Guards Tank Army. When Stavka (the Soviet high command) assembled a strategic reserve in April 1943, Marshal Ivan Konev's Steppe Military Front (army group), Rotmistrov's army was included. Thereafter, Stavka would utilize this force in crisis situations or as needed in preparation for Soviet offensives. Rotmistrov was a keen student of armored warfare tactics, and he also took on the responsibility of training all armored forces of this reserve.

Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army was part of Marshal Nikolai Vatutin's Voronezh Front. Rotmistrov then took part in the largest tank battle of the war, at Prokhorovka near Kursk. From July 10 to 12, 1943, Rotmistrov's 850 tanks held off attacks by German lieutenant general Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps of three divisions. Although many of his own tanks were outgunned by German armor with 88mm guns, Konev was able to offset this disadvantage by ordering that his crews close as far as possible before engaging the Germans.

In August 1943, the Fifth Guards Tank Army was redeployed to Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front to take part in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Rotmistrov was promoted to colonel general in October 1943. Then, at the beginning of 1944, the Fifth Guards Tank Army was transferred to the Soviet 2nd Belorussian Front, where it participated in the Kirovograd (January 8), Korsun-Shevchenkovsky (January 24–February 17), and Uman (March 5) operations.

In February 1944, Rotmistrov was promoted to the newly created rank of marshal of armored forces. Stavka placed his army at the disposal of Marshal Ivan Chernyakhovsky's 3rd Belorussian Front to take part in Operation BAGRATION. So vital was Rotmistrov to the successful outcome of this Soviet plan to destroy German Army Group Center that Joseph Stalin personally urged Lazar Kaganovich, head of railways, and Army General Andrei

Vasilevich Khrulev, head of home front services, to guarantee that the Fifth Guards Tank Army would be in position for the start date of June 22, 1944. At the end of the war, Rotmistrov's forces took part in the drive on Berlin from the south.

In 1953, Rotmistrov resigned from the General Staff, but he remained within that institution as a professor of war sciences and theory. Between 1954 and 1964, he was chief of the Military Academy for Armored Forces, and in April 1962, he was named the first chief marshal of Soviet Armored Forces. From 1964 to 1968, he was deputy minister of defense, and he was appointed inspector general for the Ministry of Defense in June 1968. He also wrote a number of studies on armored warfare. During ceremonies marking the 20th anniversary of the end of war, Rotmistrov was awarded his second decoration as Hero of the Soviet Union. He retired to his birthplace, where he died on April 16, 1982.

NEVILLE PANTHAKI AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Armored Warfare; Chernyakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Korsun Pocket, Battle of the; Kursk, Battle of; Leningrad, Siege of; Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich; Moscow, Battle of; Stalingrad, Battle of; Tanks, All Powers; Vatutin, Nikolai Fedorovich

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Rotterdam, Destruction of (May 14, 1940)

German Air Force attack and one of the most controversial actions of the war, undertaken to pressure the Dutch to capitulate. The Dutch military's stout resistance to the German invasion of May 10, 1940, surprised the Germans, who had expected little fighting. By May 13, Dutch resistance was almost at an end, but the defenders still held Rotterdam. With German forces in the Netherlands ordered to end the resistance quickly to allow ground troops

there to join those fighting in France, Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring decided to commit the Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers of Fliegerkorps IV to destroy the Dutch strongpoints guarding the approaches to Rotterdam. On the evening of May 13, Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch government departed The Hague aboard two British destroyers, beginning their wartime exile in Britain.

The next morning, a German staff officer entered Rotterdam under a flag of truce to demand the city surrender. Göring, meanwhile, decided against using the dive-bombers and instructed Luftflotte 2 commander General Albert Kesselring to carry out a saturation bombing. At noon, Dutch commander in chief General Henri Winkelman entered into negotiations through an emissary with the German military to prevent just such an attack, but because of faulty communications the air strike took place just as the Dutch were preparing to surrender.

Some 100 Heinkel He-111 medium bombers appeared over central Rotterdam at 2:00 p.m. on May 14. The Germans on the ground tried to signal the aircraft to abort the attack, and 43 of the bombers turned away and attacked other targets; the remainder, however, released their loads over Rotterdam. Their high-explosive bombs demolished the entire center of the city and touched off fires that created additional damage. Some 24,000 houses were destroyed, rendering 78,000 people homeless. In addition, the bombing resulted in the destruction of more than 2,500 shops, 1,200 workshops and small factories, 500 pubs, 70 schools, 21 churches, 20 banks, 12 cinemas, 4 hospitals, and 2 theaters. Some 900 civilians were killed, and thousands of others were wounded; many were children trapped in their schools. In the bombed area, little except the city hall and Laurens Church remained standing.

Early on the morning of May 15, with the Germans announcing that they would next bomb Utrecht, Winkelman issued an order for all Dutch soldiers to lay down their arms. He announced that he had taken the decision to prevent civilian casualties. A partial surrender that excluded the navy was signed that day.

At the postwar Nuremberg war crimes trials, both Göring and Kesselring denied knowledge of the surrender negotiations, but it seems clear that the bombing was undertaken as a deliberate act of force to hasten the surrender,

as had happened with the destruction of Warsaw in September 1939. In this, it succeeded.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

Rotterdam following the devastating German air attack of May 14, 1940. The terror attack set much of the city ablaze and killed nearly 900 people and left some 78,000 homeless. (National Archives)

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Kesselring, Albert; Netherlands; Netherlands Campaign; Winkelman, Henri Gerard

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ROUNDUP, Operation (1943)

Code name for a projected Allied cross-Channel invasion of France in the spring of 1943. Following the U.S. entry into World War II in December

1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed to concentrate U.S. military efforts on the defeat of Germany, the more formidable Axis power. The Arcadia Conference in Washington (December 22, 1941–January 14, 1942) confirmed this decision, with Roosevelt committing the United States to BOLERO, the rapid buildup of U.S. forces in Britain.

U.S. military planners and especially army chief of staff General George C. Marshall wanted an early U.S.-British invasion of France. They believed that a military diversion was necessary to keep the Soviet Union in the war and that the quickest way to end the war was to concentrate resources for a massive cross-Channel invasion. Toward that end, American planners wanted the earliest possible date for action. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who feared a repetition of the bloody stalemate in Flanders during World War I, preferred a gradual, more opportunistic approach that would commit major Allied military assets in the Mediterranean theater. Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir Alan Brooke supported Churchill.

General Marshall directed Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower and the War Plans Division to devise a cross-Channel invasion plan. Presented to Roosevelt as the Marshall Memorandum in March 1942, it considered two options: SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP. SLEDGEHAMMER was originally a British contingency cross-Channel invasion for late 1942, to be implemented only if the Soviet Union was in danger of collapsing or if German armies in the east were defeated and France became vulnerable. SLEDGEHAMMER would utilize whatever forces were available. ROUNDUP, another British plan, envisioned an invasion of France by 48 divisions.

It is not clear how seriously the planners regarded SLEDGEHAMMER, but ROUNDUP was actively considered. It called for 18 British and 30 U.S. divisions to invade the French coast somewhere between Le Havre and Calais in the spring of 1943. U.S. planners believed that 1943 was the earliest possible date for a large-scale invasion. They also thought it might be the only time such an invasion was possible, as by 1944, the Soviet Union might either have been driven from the war or else have been victorious and rendered unwilling to cooperate with an Allied invasion of France.

Under heavy U.S. pressure, Churchill agreed to carrying out ROUNDUP no later than April 1943. Privately, however, the British worked to scuttle the cross-Channel plan by diverting resources to more modest and, according to them, more realistic objectives. In the summer of 1942, with Roosevelt

unwilling to risk defeat in Europe, the Americans reluctantly agreed to Operation GYMNAST, a plan to invade French North Africa, supposedly without prejudice to the future of ROUNDUP. The Dieppe Raid of August 19, 1942, however, destroyed any illusions about ROUNDUP. The cross-Channel invasion of France was postponed; its final incarnation, Operation OVERLORD, did not occur until June 6, 1944.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Arcadia Conference; Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dieppe Raid; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Marshall, George Catlett; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; SLEDGEHAMMER, Operation

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Rowecki, Stefan (1895–1944)

Polish Army general. Born in Piotrków Trybunalski, Poland, on December 25, 1895, Stefan Rowecki was an active member in Polish paramilitary organizations. During World War I, he served as a platoon and battalion commander in the 1st Legionary Brigade of the Polish Legions and was wounded three times. In 1918, Rowecki accepted a commission in the Polish Army and participated in the 1919–1921 Polish-Soviet War. He remained in the army for the rest of the interwar period, eventually attaining the rank of colonel. During this time, he held several key staff positions, including deputy chief of the Scientific Military Institute and chief of the Publishing Department of the army; in the latter post, he published several periodicals.

In June 1939, Rowecki commanded the Warsaw Armored-Motorized Brigade, charged with defense of the middle Vistula, but he could not

organize it in time to defend effectively against the German invasion of September 1. After Warsaw capitulated, he received orders from General Juliusz Karol Rómmel to lead the Służba Zwycięstwu Polski (Service for Poland's Victory, later renamed the Związek Walki Zbrojnej, or Union for Armed Struggle, and then the Armia Krajowa, or Home Army, in 1942)—an underground force created by the Polish government-in-exile to disrupt the occupying Germans. Rowecki unified nearly all underground elements in Poland under his Armia Krajowa and developed it into a powerful resistance movement. His successful coordination of sabotage, intelligence gathering, and disruption of German lines of communication and war production earned him promotion to brigadier general.

Rowecki kept underground operations sporadic while waiting for the occupying German forces to weaken before launching a full uprising. Gestapo agents arrested him on June 30, 1943; tortured him; and sent him to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. He was murdered there on direct orders from Heinrich Himmler on the first day of the Warsaw Rising, August 1, 1944.

BRADFORD WINEMAN

See also

Himmler, Heinrich; Poland; Resistance; Warsaw Rising

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ROYAL MARINE, Operation (May 1940)

British plan to mine the Rhine River. On November 17, 1939, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill proposed mining Germany's inland waterways. He suggested introducing mines into the Rhine from French tributaries and between Strasbourg and Lauter, where the left bank was French territory, while Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers dropped additional mines into Germany's other rivers and canals at the same time. Churchill

hoped that thousands of small 20-pound mines might overwhelm German countermeasures and completely halt traffic on Germany's waterways. Such mines would be more than sufficient to damage or sink river barges. To avoid causing problems with the neutral Kingdom of the Netherlands, the mines would deactivate after several days, hopefully before they drifted across the Dutch frontier.

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the War Cabinet approved the plan, and Churchill began assembling the mines. The French government and military, however, remained cool to the idea, especially Premier Édouard Daladier. By March 1940 Britain had assembled more than 6,000 mines, and Churchill wanted to begin deploying them in the Rhine.

The Allied Supreme War Council then endorsed plans to lay mines along the Norwegian coast and bomb the Ruhr in combination with Operation ROYAL MARINE in an effort to shut down German industry. However, newly appointed French premier Paul Reynaud, fearing German retaliation with a possible strike on Paris, rejected ROYAL MARINE and any bombing or mining of German industry, so only the mining of the Norwegian coast went forward in April. Reynaud insisted on a three-month delay before launching ROYAL MARINE in order to give the French Air Force time to prepare for German retaliation. He later agreed that Britain could launch the operation should German forces invade France or Belgium.

Royal Marines hastily implemented the plan after German troops opened their offensive into France on May 10, 1940. In the first week of fighting, they placed more than 1,700 mines into the Rhine. These effectively halted river traffic between Karlsruhe and Mainz and damaged several pontoon bridges. By May 24, British marines had placed more than 2,300 mines, and these drifted into the Rhine, Moselle, and Meuse Rivers. In the closing days of the campaign, the RAF dropped some additional mines in night sorties. As Churchill later wrote, Operation ROYAL MARINE's limited success was "swept away in the general collapse of French resistance." The operation did, however, lay the groundwork for later mine-laying efforts by both the RAF Bomber Command and the RAF Coastal Command. During the next two years, the British placed almost 16,000 mines, which sank some 369 German vessels totaling an estimated 361,821 tons.

STEPHEN K. STEIN

See also

Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Daladier, Édouard; Mines, Sea; Reynaud, Paul

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Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve

Traditionally, the permanent strength of the Royal Navy was quite small. On January 1, 1939, it numbered fewer than 10,000 officers and only about 109,000 seamen. The Royal Marines added another 12,400 officers and men. The marines manned up to a quarter of the guns aboard ship and were available for landing parties. These permanent personnel were, however, barely sufficient to man the ships of the active fleet. To operate the ships of the reserve fleet that had not undergone modernization in the period between the wars required the calling up of some 71,000 reservists. These included members of Royal Navy Reserve (RNR), consisting of members of the Royal Fleet Reserve who had completed 12 years of service and officers in the merchant service who had joined the RNR and had received some naval training, and some 6,000 men of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR). The addition of the reserves enabled the Royal Navy to expand to some 200,000 personnel by full mobilization in August 1939.

Wartime losses and the addition of new ships during the course of the conflict led to further personnel expansion, with by far the greatest officer additions occurring in the RNVR. It reached a total of 48,000 officers (comprising three-quarters of the officers in the wartime navy) and 5,000 ratings, the volunteers coming from both Britain and throughout the empire. The RNVR particularly made its mark in the Battle of the Atlantic, where many of its officers commanded destroyers, corvettes, frigates, and submarines. Its impact was also strong in the Fleet Air Arm, where a number of its members commanded squadrons.

At peak strength in mid-1944, the Royal Navy numbered 863,500 officers and men, including 73,400 members of the Women's Royal Navy Service. The vast majority of the additional personnel, however, came as a consequence of the National Service Acts and were to serve for "hostilities only."

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Great Britain, Navy; Great Britain, Women's Royal Naval Service

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Royal Oak, HMS, Sinking of (October 14, 1939)

Loss of a British battleship to a German submarine attack within the Home Fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands. Built as one of five superdreadnoughts of the Revenge class, the *Royal Oak* was launched in November 1914. On May 31, 1916, two weeks after commissioning, it fought at Jutland. It remained with the Grand Fleet for the rest of the war and served in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean until 1937, when it joined the Home Fleet. The *Royal Oak* and the other ships in its class were 624 feet long, displaced 28,000 tons, and carried a main battery of 8 15-inch guns, with a secondary armament of 14 6-inch guns.

When World War II began in September 1939, the *Royal Oak* was based at Scapa Flow, which, as in World War I, was Britain's main fleet anchorage in war with Germany. Nonetheless, substantial weaknesses in Scapa Flow's defenses led the commander of German submarines, Rear Admiral Karl Dönitz, to conceive an attack within the harbor that might destroy British faith in its security and usefulness. To carry out the mission, he chose

Lieutenant Commander Günther Prien of the *U-47*, who set out in his Type VII-B boat from Kiel on October 8.

German aerial surveys on October 11 and 12 showed 5 battleships and battle cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier, and 10 cruisers at anchor in Scapa Flow, but this low-level reconnaissance, along with an uncoordinated sortie by the battleship *Gneisenau* and other German surface units, persuaded the Admiralty that an attack was imminent. The British dispatched their large ships into the North Sea and then moved almost all of them to Loch Ewe in northwest Scotland. Only the *Royal Oak*, which until then had been used as a convoy escort, returned to Scapa Flow.



The British battleship *Royal Oak*. The ship was riding at anchor at the British base of Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands when it was sunk by a German U-boat on October 14, 1939. (Roger Viollet/Getty Images)

On the moonless night of October 13, the *U-47* began a surface approach to Scapa Flow through a gap in the sunken blockship barriers revealed by aerial photography. During the four-hour passage, Prien submerged once to avoid detection by a passing merchant ship and learned that even with illumination from the northern lights, targets were not visible through his periscope. Back on the surface, he narrowly escaped entanglement in a blockship's mooring cable but emerged into the main anchorage shortly after midnight.

Prien identified the only suitable targets as the *Royal Oak* and the battle cruiser *Repulse* (he had misidentified the latter vessel, actually the seaplane carrier *Pegasus*). The *U-47* fired four torpedoes, scoring only one hit. The torpedo struck the *Royal Oak* on the starboard bow, causing its crew to believe that a small internal explosion had occurred. After a shot from his stern tube also missed, Prien fired three more reload torpedoes from his bow tubes. All struck the *Royal Oak* amidships, and 13 minutes later the battleship capsized. Of its crew, 833 men were lost and only 424 survived.

Believing that the U-boat had been spotted by destroyers, Prien retired quickly, reaching open water unmolested more than two hours later, following another difficult passage by a slightly different route. The British Admiralty grimly announced the sinking of the *Royal Oak* on October 15, ironically on the same day that an additional blockship ordered weeks earlier arrived at Scapa Flow to close the gap by which Prien had entered.

Prien returned in the *U-47* to Wilhelmshaven on October 17 to a national celebration. The *Royal Oak* remains at the bottom of Scapa Flow and is designated a war grave.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Battleships; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Prien, Günther

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Rudel, Hans-Ulrich (1916–1982)

German Air Force colonel. Born at Seiferdauj, Silesia, Germany, on July 2, 1916, Hans-Ulrich Rudel joined the Luftwaffe in 1936 and was originally commissioned as a reconnaissance pilot. After the start of World War II, he was accepted into dive-bomber pilot training in May 1940 and was posted to Staffel 1, Sturmkampf Geschwader 2 (1.StG-2, or Squadron 1, Dive-Bomber Wing 2) a year later.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Rudel participated in the strike against the Soviet fleet at Kronstadt and was credited with having sunk the battleship *Marat* on September 23, 1941. Between May 1941 and January 1942, he flew over 500 sorties and was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. By February 1943, he had flown 1,000 missions and was a national hero. Rudel fitted a 37mm gun to his Junkers Ju-87G Stuka and used it for "tank busting." His success in this regard led to his assignment in developing tactics for such weapons on Stuka aircraft.

Rudel's unit was attached to the 3rd SS Panzer Division for Operation CITADEL, and at the end of the first day of fighting, Rudel had destroyed 12 Soviet tanks. In October 1943, he was promoted to major and awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Swords. Throughout 1944, he continued to add to his score, and he was awarded the Diamonds to his Knight's Cross in March for his efforts to save a downed crew behind enemy lines. Shot down himself that same month, he made it to friendly lines.

On February 9, 1945, after destroying a Soviet tank, Rudel's Ju-87 was hit by antiaircraft fire. Badly wounded, Rudel was nonetheless able to land the aircraft with instructions shouted to him over the intercom by his radio operator. A man of great determination, he returned to action six weeks later, despite the amputation of his right leg and orders that he not fly.

Rudel ended the war commanding Schlachtgeschwader 2 (Ground-Attack Wing 2). His final tally was 2,530 sorties. He was credited with the destruction of the *Marat,* 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 70 landing craft, 150 gun emplacements, 519 tanks and 800 other combat vehicles, and 7 aircraft. For his exceptional service, Adolf Hitler instituted the Knight's Cross of the Iron

Cross with Swords, Gold Oak Leaves, and Diamonds. Rudel was the only recipient of this award.

On May 8, 1945, Rudel led the remaining aircraft from his unit to land at a U.S. airfield and surrender. U.S. authorities rejected demands from the Soviets that he be turned over to them. Held as a prisoner of war, he was released in March 1946. Rudel then immigrated to Argentina to work for its air force. An unrepentant Nazi, he wrote several books supporting the regime and condemning the German General Staff for failing Hitler. In the early 1960s, Rudel returned to Germany, but his extreme right-wing views made him unwelcome in the Federal Republic's armed forces and aviation industry. On several occasions, he ran unsuccessfully for political office as an ultraconservative and ultimately became a ski instructor, despite his artificial leg. Rudel died in Rosenheim, Germany, on December 18, 1982.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Germany, Air Force; Kursk, Battle of; Richthofen, Wolfram von

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Ruge, Otto (1882–1961)

Norwegian Army general. Born on September 1, 1882, in Kristiania (present-day Oslo), Norway, Otto Ruge joined the Norwegian Army and was an instructor at the Military Academy from 1923. In 1930 he headed the Communications Section of the General Staff, and between 1933 and 1938 he was chief of staff of the General Staff. From 1938 to 1940, he was inspector general of infantry.

A colonel at the time of the German invasion of his country on April 9, 1940, Ruge rallied Norwegian forces and halted a German advance at

Midtskogen. Whereas Norwegian Army commander General Kristian Laake lacked confidence in continued resistance, Ruge expressed a determination to fight on. Appointed commander in chief of the Norwegian Army on April 10 and promoted to brigadier general, he hoped to contain the German invasion along the southern Norwegian coast and then slowly withdraw northwest to allow time for mobilization of the rest of the country and British and French military intervention.

Ruge skillfully directed the Norwegian defense in a series of delaying positions. Not having been informed in advance of the British evacuation and with a German victory in sight, he steadfastly refused to abandon his men and capitulated only when King Haakon VII and the government had departed for London. Ruge disbanded the 6th Division on June 9, and the next day a member of his staff signed an armistice with the Germans. Ruge then became a German prisoner of war and was only released at the end of the war.

From 1945 to 1946, Ruge was once again commander in chief of the Norwegian Army, and he served as commander in chief of the armed forces from 1946 to 1948. He died in Mysen, Norway, on August 15, 1961.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Norway, Army; Norway, German Conquest of

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Ruhr Air Campaign (March–July 1943)

Air campaign mounted by the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command. The Ruhr not only produced huge amounts of key war matériel but is situated in a part of Germany that was relatively easy for Allied bombers based in eastern England to reach. The Ruhr had come under attack beginning early in the war and had been the object of Allied bombing thereafter, but beginning

in early March 1943 it became a major target of the British and American Combined Bomber Offensive to destroy German industry.

The Germans were well aware of the vulnerability of the Ruhr to Allied air assault and the importance of the area to their war effort. They thus assembled in its defense large numbers of searchlights, antiaircraft guns, and interceptor aircraft. The Ruhr was also shielded by an almost constant haze of industrial smoke from its many factory chimneys that served to conceal potential targets from air observation.

The Ruhr air campaign began in early March and ended in late July. It certainly inflicted significant damage to a number of Ruhr factories. Essen absorbed almost 12,000 tons of bombs in a four-month period, and Duisburg was bombed 299 times during the war. In May and June 1943, the Battle of the Ruhr saw 16 major raids on the area. In all, Bomber Command flew some 23,000 sorties, the majority of these against the Ruhr, and lost some 1,000 aircraft, or about 4 percent of those committed.

Despite this considerable effort, the air campaign against the Ruhr had only mixed results. In order for factories to be kept out of production, bombing had to be more or less constant. It was not, for the Allies were obliged to strike other targets to prevent the Germans from concentrating all of their antiaircraft effort in the Ruhr area alone, and the Allies had insufficient numbers of bombers to strike all targets at once. Thus, on moonless nights the bombers were redirected against other targets deeper into Germany.

Although bombing accuracy was poor, the raids did inflict significant damage and caused many casualties. At the same time, however, the Germans were able to relocate from the Ruhr much of their vital war industries. They also quickly repaired bomb damage and resumed industrial production in the areas struck. The bombers also paid a heavy price, for the Germans dramatically increased the number of antiaircraft batteries and employed night fighter aircraft and improved radar to excellent effect. Indeed, night fighters soon accounted for more Allied bombers shot down than antiaircraft fire.

Heavy Allied aircraft losses brought an end to the bomber offensive at the end of July. Allied air attacks on the Ruhr continued on an intermittent basis, however, until the area was secured by Allied ground forces in April 1945.

Ruins of a bomb-damaged Krupp factory destroyed in the heavy Allied bombing of the industrial area of the Ruhr Valley beginning in the spring of 1945, photo from July 1945. (Margaret Bourke-White/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Germany; Germany, Collapse of; Ruhr Land Campaign

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Ruhr Land Campaign (25 March–April 18, 1945)

By March 1945, the Western Allies had defeated all German opposition west of the Rhine River and had crossed Germany's last defensive stronghold at several points. British field marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, commander of the 21st Army Group, advocated that the next Allied advance should come in his own northern zone, where the Allies could push through the north German plain and begin the final assault on Berlin. This route, however, was heavily defended, and supreme commander Allied Expeditionary Force General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower favored a broad front approach in which his main thrust would be concentrated in the center against the Ruhr River Valley.

The Ruhr industrial complex was Germany's industrial heartland and the most important Allied military objective after Berlin. Between 1942 and 1945, the Allied air campaign had diminished the Ruhr's productive capacity and forced a 25–30 percent drop in steel production. Allied air forces also enforced some measure of isolation on the Ruhr by crippling 11 of 17 critical rail centers that connected it with the rest of Germany. Still, the Allies recognized that the only way to totally eliminate the Ruhr's contribution to the German war effort was to occupy it.

Sixty-five German divisions defended the Ruhr. These were largely concentrated in the west to defend against a direct assault from the Rhine. Although understrength, these divisions presented a formidable obstacle to any direct American offensive. General Omar N. Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, chose to envelop the Ruhr in a classic pincer movement. Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges's First Army would advance along the Ruhr's southern boundary while Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's Ninth Army enveloped the Ruhr from the north. The two armies planned to link up at Paderborn.

The Ruhr campaign began on March 25 when the First Army broke out of the Remagen bridgehead over the Rhine and advanced eastward. The forward armored elements advanced rapidly through the Germans' thinly dispersed flank defenses. The 3rd Armored Division reached Marburg and turned north on March 28, the same day that the Ninth Army, led by its 2nd Armored Division, moved out from its bridgehead. The 3rd Armored Division encountered stiff German resistance on the approach to the Paderborn rendezvous. Students and instructors from a local Waffen-SS panzer training camp blocked the U.S. advance with their Tiger and Panther tanks. The 2nd

and 3rd Armored Divisions then bypassed this resistance. At noon on Easter Sunday, April 1, forward armored elements of the First and Ninth Armies linked up in the Lippstadt area west of Paderborn, completing the Ruhr envelopment.

The Ruhr Pocket (Ruhr Kessel) contained Field Marshal Walther Model's Army Group B headquarters, Colonel General Josef Harpe's Fifth Panzer Army, most of General of Infantry Gustav-Adolf von Zangen's Fifteenth Army, and two corps of the First Parachute Army. In all, German forces caught in the pocket included remnants of 18 divisions and seven corps commands. The encircled German forces were unable to muster sufficient strength to break through the U.S. perimeter and could not count on a rescue from outside the pocket. Characteristically, Adolf Hitler ordered Model to defend "Fortress Ruhr" to the last man.

Initially the Americans deployed 13 divisions for the Ruhr battle. Later, with progress slower than expected, 4 additional divisions were committed. Major General John B. Anderson's XVI Corps of the Ninth Army cleared the densely populated industrial area north of the Ruhr River. To the south, Major General James A. Van Fleet's III Corps, Major General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps, and Major General Clarence R. Huebner's V Corps of the First Army cleared the rugged and forested Sauerland. Meanwhile, three divisions of Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow's Fifteenth Army were to keep the Germans occupied along the Rhine River.

German resistance proved to be spotty and unpredictable. The Americans adopted an effective technique for clearing the pocket. Once a town was captured, they would call ahead by telephone to inform the next town that they were coming soon and demand its surrender.

American forces reduced the Ruhr Pocket quickly. Essen, home of the Krupp industrial combine, was taken on April 11, and by the 14th they had effectively cut the area in two when troops from the First and Ninth Armies linked up along the Ruhr River. Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, XVIII Airborne Corps commander, wrote to Model and demanded his surrender, but the German general refused to disobey Hitler's order. Instead, he disbanded his army and on April 21 committed suicide. All organized resistance in the Ruhr Pocket ceased on April 18. During the two-week campaign the Americans captured 317,000 German soldiers, including 30 generals and an admiral, more than the Allies had captured at Tunisia or the Soviets at

Stalingrad. The Western Allies also liberated 200,000 forced laborers and 5,639 prisoners of war.

THOMAS G. NESTER

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Germany, Collapse of; Hitler, Adolf; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Model, Walther; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Simpson, William Hood; Document 221

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Ruhr Valley

Highly industrialized and populated area located in northwestern Germany. The Ruhr Valley encompasses 1,760 square miles and is bounded by the Lippe River to the north, the Rhine to the west, the Ruhr River to the south, and the Bergisches Land to the southwest. The Ruhr's natural resources include considerable coal deposits, and by the close of the 19th century the Ruhr Valley had become a thriving industrial region. From that time forward, the Ruhr region contained almost a dozen industrial cities and was one of the most densely populated regions in Europe.

Essen was the most important of its great industrial cities and the center of production for the great Krupp armaments firm. Cannon and other weaponry produced by Krupp in the Ruhr were vital to the German military effort in both World War I and World War II. Indeed, it was in part to protect the Ruhr that German leader Adolf Hitler ordered the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936.

During World War II, the Ruhr became a prime target for intense Allied bombing campaigns, and when Allied land forces advanced on Germany from the west in 1944, the Ruhr was a key ground objective.

The Ruhr not only produced huge amounts of key war matériel, but it was situated in a part of Germany that was relatively easy for Allied bombers based in eastern England to reach. Beginning in March 1943, the Ruhr was a major target of the British and American Combined Bomber Offensive to destroy German industry. In May and June 1943, the Battle of the Ruhr saw 16 major raids on the area.

The Allied air campaign had only mixed results, and heavy Allied aircraft losses brought an end to the bomber offensive at the end of July. Attacks on the Ruhr continued, however.

German ground forces defended the Ruhr until mid-April 1945, when the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, having sealed off the Ruhr, took some 317,000 German prisoners in the so-called Ruhr Pocket.

NEIL M. HEYMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Germany; Germany, Collapse of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Ruhr Air Campaign; Ruhr Land Campaign

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Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von (1875–1953)

German field marshal. Born at Aschersleben, Germany, on December 12, 1875, Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt joined the army in 1893 and served throughout World War I. Following the war, he rose steadily in the new Reichswehr. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in October 1920 and colonel in February 1923. Rundstedt was then chief of staff of the 2nd Infantry Division. In March 1925, he assumed command of the 18th Infantry Regiment. In November 1927, he was promoted to major general, and a year later, he commanded the 2nd Cavalry Division.

Promoted to lieutenant general in March 1929, Rundstedt took command of the 3rd Infantry Division and then Group Command I. He was promoted to general of infantry in October 1932 and to colonel general in March 1938. Unhappy with Adolf Hitler's growing power, Rundstedt retired on October 31, 1938. He was recalled to duty at the age of 64, and in September 1939, he led Army Group South into Poland.

In the German invasion of France in May 1940, Rund-stedt commanded Army Group A, composed of 45 divisions. By May 14, his tanks had opened up a broad gap in the Allied front. Rundstedt argued that his tanks should halt until infantry divisions could catch up. Hitler agreed but made the order a fast one, stopping General of Panzer Troops Heinz Guderian's panzer thrust that could have cut off the British escape from Dunkerque. Hitler promoted Rundstedt to field marshal on July 19, 1940. Later, Rundstedt took command of occupation forces and was given responsibility for coastal defenses in Holland, Belgium, and France.

Rundstedt participated in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union, as commander of Army Group South. His forces made slow progress during the first weeks, but in September 1941, he directed the capture of Kiev and 665,000 Soviet troops. Rundstedt strongly opposed continuing the advance into the Soviet Union during the winter and advised Hitler to call a halt, but his advice was rejected.

Rundstedt continued the advance and reached Rostov on November 21, but a Soviet counterattack forced his troops back. When Rundstedt called for withdrawal, Hitler replaced him with General Walther von Reichenau. After the führer recalled him to duty in March 1942, sending him to France as Oberbefehlshaber West (commander in chief, west), Rundstedt organized the construction of the fortifications known as the Atlantic Wall along 1,700 miles of coastline. After the June 6, 1944, Normandy landings, he urged Hitler to make peace. Hitler responded by replacing him with Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, but in September, Rundstedt returned to his former post. Having been in command during the last major German offensive (Ardennes, Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945), he was sacked as commander in chief, west, in March 1945.

Rundstedt was the prototype, if not the caricature, of the old-style Prussian officer, deeply attached to Germany's imperial traditions. He never failed to contradict Hitler with respect to military matters when he felt it

necessary to do so, but he also never questioned his regime. Captured by the Western Allies on May 1, 1945, Rundstedt was released in May 1949 and lived in Hannover, Germany, until his death on February 24, 1953.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Atlantic Wall; BARBAROSSA, Operation; France, Battle for; France Campaign; Germany, Collapse of; Hitler, Adolf; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Manstein, Erich von; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Poland Campaign; Reichenau, Walther von; Rhine Crossings; Rostov, Battle for; Stülpnagel, Karl Heinrich von

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Ruweisat Ridge, Battles of (July 1–27, 1942)

Crucial battles that helped determine the outcome of fighting in North Africa and the Middle East. German field marshal Erwin Rommel and his Axis forces had already won spectacular victories at Gazala (May 26–June 13, 1942) and in the capture of Tobruk (June 20–21), costing the British some 80,000 men and 1,000 tanks. Driving his troops hard, Rommel hoped to rout the retreating imperial forces and capture Cairo and seize the Suez Canal. The British defeat at Mersa Matrûh on June 28 appeared to confirm this course of action.

After months of heavy fighting, however, Axis forces were exhausted and much understrength. At the end of June, the three German divisions of 2,000 infantrymen possessed only 55 tanks, 77 field pieces, and 63 antitank guns. Italian forces included 8,000 infantrymen, 70 tanks, and 200 field pieces. Axis forces were at the end of a rapidly lengthening supply and reinforcement line. Rommel had also outrun his air support, with the Axis air forces struggling to establish new forward bases.

On June 25, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, British commander in the Middle East, took personal control of the Eighth Army. Its defensive positions were almost 100 miles west of Alexandria, Egypt, and ran south for 38 miles from the coastal town of El Alamein to the impassable salt marshes of the Qattara Depression. These positions formed a natural choke point, as they could be penetrated but not outflanked. The terrain was largely flat except for two low east-west ridges—Miteiriya in the north and Ruweisat in the center.

The South African 1st Division occupied the northern positions, the Indian 18th Brigade held the center, and the New Zealand 2nd Division deployed in the south. Rommel's attack plan had his 90th Light Division attacking in the north. It would drive east and then swing left to the sea, encircling the South Africans. The 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions were to move east in the center and then strike right, striking the New Zealanders in the rear.

Confident of victory, Rommel unleashed the Afrika Korps on July 1. The panzers found their path blocked by the Indian 18th Brigade. The Indian defenses were incomplete, and the troops were short of ammunition and even water. Luckily, the day before the German attack, artillery units had arrived with some 40 guns, and the defenders fought tenaciously until overrun that evening. They had, however, destroyed 18 German tanks and stopped the German advance. To the north, the 90th Light Division encountered heavy fire from the South Africans and an artillery reinforcement. Panic erupted among the long-suffering German soldiers, and the officers were fully occupied restoring control.

On July 2, Rommel attempted to use his Panzers to renew the attack in the north. Auchinleck now inserted the 1st Armoured Division, consisting of the 2nd, 4th, and 22nd Armoured Brigades. The 4th and 22nd Brigades, with 38 Grant medium tanks, thrust into the open southern German flank and fought the panzers until nightfall. Rommel resumed the offensive on July 3, sending his tanks forward along both sides of Ruweisat Ridge. The Italian Ariete and Trieste Divisions, which had excellent fighting records, were instructed to attack south. But the 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades barred the Panzers' path. In the south the Trieste Division failed to move, and the Ariete was split, its tanks entangled in the armor battle. The remaining units

were struck by the New Zealanders, and the Ariete Division fled, with the loss of 531 men and 44 guns.

Auchinleck now unleashed a series of counterstrokes, relying heavily on information garnered through Ultra intercepts. Reinforcements from the Australian 9th Division came into play. The 2nd Armoured Brigade replaced the 4th Armoured Brigade, decimated in the fighting. In the north, on July 10 the South African 2nd and Australian 26th Brigades attacked positions west of El Alamein held by Italian infantry. This assault overran the Italian lines and netted 1,500 prisoners and 30 guns. Only the newly arrived 382nd German Infantry Regiment, a battalion of elite Bersaglieri (marksmen) Italian troops, and additional Italian guns halted the attack.

Auchinleck then mounted an assault in the center of the line, sending his New Zealand 4th and 5th Brigades and Indian 5th Brigade against some 4,000 Italian troops on Ruweisat Ridge. Between July 14 and 15 they seized the ridge, but it was impossible to dig into the rock terrain, and no tanks came forward to help the New Zealanders. In addition, corps commander Lieutenant General William H. Gott failed to coordinate his infantry and armor. In a devastating counterattack, German armor recovered the ridge, and 1,405 New Zealanders were lost.

On July 17, two Australian battalions attacked south against Italian positions on Miteiriya Ridge. The Australians captured 700 prisoners, but they came under fire by Italian guns and were halted by a German task force. Rommel now reluctantly concluded that he must go over to the defensive. German engineers utilized power drills to lay extensive minefields. They also erected strongpoints, where troops were armed with automatic weapons and antitank guns.

In his report of July 21, Rommel exaggerated his losses in order to accelerate reinforcement. This report, decoded by Ultra, strengthened Auchinleck’s resolve to crush Rommel and the Afrika Korps. Strong pressure also came from British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, whose government was under parliamentary attack occasioned by a series of military defeats.

Auchinleck planned a three-pronged assault for the night of July 21–22. The Indian 161st Brigade was to seize the western end of Ruweisat Ridge, while the newly arrived 23rd Armoured Brigade (less one regiment in support of the Australians) was entrusted with the major objective of attacking the

center and overrunning Rommel's headquarters. The New Zealand 6th Brigade was to attack from the south in a northwest direction. The 2nd and 22nd Armoured Brigades were to join the New Zealanders by daybreak.

The Indians met stiff resistance from German and Italian infantry, incurring substantial losses in their failure. In the south, the New Zealanders secured their objective, but the 2nd and 22nd Armoured Brigades failed to link up with the New Zealanders. On the morning of July 22, the 15th and 21st Panzers destroyed the 6th Brigade, inflicting 904 casualties. That same morning, the 23rd Armoured Brigade unleashed two regiments of Valentine infantry tanks in a determined assault. Running into vicious antitank gunfire and blundering into uncleared minefields, the British had 40 tanks destroyed and another 40 damaged. Only 7 were still intact. This attack did cause serious concern for the defenders, as it had penetrated German defenses and overrun a key strongpoint.

Auchinleck's last effort came in the northern sector, in an attack against Miteiriya Ridge on July 26–27. One battalion from the Australian 24th Brigade and two battalions from the British 69th Brigade were to seize the ridge. The 2nd Armoured Brigade would then move through gaps cleared in the minefields to support the infantry. The infantry troops gained their objectives and overran two Axis battalions. But the mine clearing went awry, and the Australians and British fell victim to swift German armored counterattacks, losing 1,000 men.

Commonwealth infantrymen, particularly the New Zealanders, emerged from these battles bitter about the lack of British armor support and what they regarded as incompetent British commanders. Although 7,000 Axis prisoners were captured in the Ruweisat battles, British/Commonwealth casualties totaled 13,250. A tactical stalemate, the Battles of Ruweisat Ridge were an operational success for the British. Rommel's drive to the east had reached culmination. The stage was now set for the coming battle at Alam Halfa and El Alamein. Nonetheless, on August 8, Churchill relieved Auchinleck from command.

SHERWOOD S. CORDIER

See also

Afrika Korps; Armored Warfare; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Gazala, Battle of; Gott, William Henry Ewart "Strafer"; Mersa Matrûh, First Battle

of; North Africa Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Rydz-Śmigły, Edward (1886–1941)

Marshal of Poland. Born on March 11, 1886, at Brzeóany in Austrian Galicia, Edward Rydz-Śmigły joined a Polish paramilitary organization in 1907 and graduated from its officer school in 1912. In August 1914, he joined the First Legion organized by Józef Piłsudski and fought in it alongside the Austrians against the Russians until July 1917. Rydz-Śmigły advanced quickly thanks to his leadership abilities, and by 1917, he had reached the rank of colonel and commanded a regiment.

When Piłsudski discovered that the Central Powers did not intend to grant Poland its independence, he and his First Legion refused to swear allegiance to Austria and Germany and went underground. Rydz-Śmigły followed Piłsudski and was appointed commander of the clandestine Polish Military Organization (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa). Following the declaration of Poland's independence in November 1918, Rydz-Śmigły became one of Piłsudski's closest associates and was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. In 1920, during the Russo-Polish War, he commanded the Third Army that spearheaded the Polish-Ukrainian offensive that occupied Kiev. After the peace treaty of Riga in March 1921, he became one of the inspectors of the Polish Army, with the rank of lieutenant general.

Rydz-Śmigły supported Piłsudski in his 1926 coup d'état. In May 1935, when Marshal Piłsudski died, Rydz-Śmigły took power, assuming both Piłsudski's rank and his place as head of the Polish armed forces. Thereafter, he made a considerable but belated effort to modernize Poland's defenses.

Such efforts were halted by the September 1939 invasion of Poland, first by Germany and then by the Soviet Union.

Rydz-Śmigły next turned to Poland's ally Romania. Promised the right of free passage to France for himself and the remnants of his military forces, he sought shelter on Romanian territory. Under pressure from Berlin, the Bucharest government decided to intern him as well as other members of the Polish government. Rydz-Śmigły escaped internment, however, and returned secretly to Poland via Hungary. He died in Warsaw from heart failure on November 28, 1941, while trying to organize Polish underground resistance against German occupation.

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI

See also

Poland; Poland, Army; Poland Campaign; Resistance

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Saalwächter, Alfred (1883–1945)

German admiral. Born in Neusalz an der Oder, in the German part of Silesia, on January 20, 1883, Alfred Saalwächter entered the German Navy as a cadet in April 1901. He was promoted to ensign in September 1904 and to lieutenant, junior grade, in March 1906. Following initial training, he held various seagoing assignments. Promoted to lieutenant in April 1911, he served in the operations department of the Admiralty Staff in Berlin until 1915.

In March 1915, Saalwächter became flag lieutenant of the battleship *Friedrich der Grosse*, flagship of the High Seas Fleet. In February 1916, he entered U-boat service. Following training, he commanded in succession the *U-25*, *U-46*, and *U-94* until March 1918.

Remaining in the navy after the war, Saalwächter was promoted to lieutenant commander in 1920. Following assignments in naval administration, Saalwächter took command of the light cruiser *Amazone* in 1926. Promoted to commander, he commanded the battleship *Schlesien*. He was promoted to captain in October 1928 and to rear admiral in October 1932. During 1933–1938, he was inspector for naval instruction. Promoted to vice admiral in April 1933 and to admiral in June 1937, he assumed command of the North Sea naval station of Wilhelmshaven in October 1938.

With the beginning of World War II in September 1939, Saalwächter commanded German naval operations in the North Sea. Promoted to general admiral in January 1940, he played a leading role in the planning and execution of Operation WESERÜBUNG, the German invasion of Norway in April 1940. For his contribution he was awarded the Knight's Cross. In the summer of 1940, he took command of Navy Group West, in which post he was responsible for directing operations of German surface units in the North Atlantic and the English Channel, including Operation CERBERUS (the

"Channel Dash") in February 1942. He was replaced in September by Admiral Wilhelm Marschall.

Saalwächter resigned from the navy on November 30, 1942, shortly before the remaining heavy German surface units ceased their activity in the Atlantic. Imprisoned by the Soviets in June 1945, he was convicted that October by a Soviet military tribunal of war crimes and was executed by firing squad in Moscow on December 6. A Russian court exonerated him in 1994.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; CERBERUS, Operation; Marschall, Wilhelm; WESERÜBUNG, Operation

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Saar, French Invasion of the (September 1939)

Ineffectual French offensive at the beginning of World War II. On May 19, 1939, French and Polish military officials agreed that their armies would attack Germany if Germany moved against either state. Supreme commander of French land forces General Maurice Gamelin pledged that he would invade Germany with the majority of his troops not more than 15 days after mobilization began. Britain and France also promised that in the event of a German attack, they would move against Germany immediately from the air.

Despite the Allied pledge, the French military strategy for war with Germany was to remain on the defensive, wearing down the enemy until France's army was strong enough to take the initiative. During World War I, 1.5 million Frenchmen had perished, and it was unacceptable that such a slaughter be repeated.

Gamelin declared that he would not open this war with a new Battle of Verdun, a costly all-out assault on fortified positions. His deputy, General Alphonse Georges, vowed to resign if ordered to lead an invasion. The French military philosophy was summed up in the phrase “Stingy with blood; extravagant with steel.” Given this mind-set, any French military operations on behalf of the Poles were destined to be extremely cautious.

On September 1, Germany invaded Poland. Six days later, the Polish General Staff radioed an appeal for Gamelin to act quickly, in hopes that Germany would divert units from the invasion to the west. The French mobilization had just begun, and most heavy artillery was still in storage. The army’s 85 divisions were dispersed to guard against possible attacks from fascist Spain and Italy while also defending the long border with Germany. Regardless, honor demanded some action on behalf of the Poles.

If France’s troops could pass through Belgium, they might outflank Germany’s West Wall (known as the Siegfried Line by the French) defenses. Belgium, however, insisted on remaining neutral. With the northern route thus closed, Gamelin had little choice but to attack within a 90-mile-wide sector between the Rhine and Moselle Rivers in the Saar, directly into the teeth of what he believed to be strong fortifications. The invasion force was designated 2nd Army Group. General André Prételat was its commander. Chief of staff of the Fourth Army in 1918, Prételat had since 1934 been a member of the Supreme War Council, which was wedded to defensive strategy.

On the night of September 7–8, a few light French units entered German territory along a 15-mile front southeast of Saarbrücken. On September 9, stronger forces from the Fourth and Fifth Armies followed, while the Third Army advanced into the Wendt Forest slightly to the west. Despite Gamelin’s earlier pledge to use the majority of his troops, no more than 15 divisions crossed the frontier; most French authorities believe that only 9 of the 85 divisions on the northeast front took part.

The French advanced against a pitifully inadequate German force in the west. Adolf Hitler had gambled on a Schlieffen Plan in reverse, throwing the bulk of his resources against Poland while leaving only weak covering forces in the west, on the (correct) assumption that the French would be slow to move. The German Army had a maximum of 25 divisions in the west, the bulk of which were inadequately trained and poorly equipped reserves. The

mechanized and motorized troops had all been committed to the fighting in Poland, and artillery had been stripped from the West Wall. German forces in the west had no tanks, little artillery, and virtually no aircraft.

Only light skirmishing occurred. So cautious was the French advance that a single automatic weapon halted an entire platoon. Artillery of both sides lobbed shells in the general direction of the enemy. Modern Char B heavy tanks supported French infantry, but the French government, fearful of retaliation against Paris, refused to authorize bombing, and the Royal Air Force readily complied with French requests to follow the same policy.

While Polish cities shuddered under German bombs, the 2nd Army Group inched forward. It advanced a mere five miles by September 12, capturing 20 deserted German villages. Gamelin then ordered Prételat to halt short of the Siegfried Line and prepare for retreat should the Germans counterattack through Belgium. Five days later, as it was clear that the Poles were collapsing under the German hammer blows, Soviet troops invaded eastern Poland. By the end of the month, the Poles were finished.

Not a single Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bomber or panzer had been diverted from the invasion of Poland by Gamelin's timid "invasion." On September 30, Prételat was ordered to withdraw his troops secretly at night. By mid-October, Germany had 70 divisions in the west. On October 16, a handful of infantry attacked the remaining French troops, and in two days Germany reoccupied all the territory the 2nd Army Group had required two weeks to capture. Casualties on both sides in the ineffectual campaign were light. Most French losses resulted from a thick belt of German mines and booby traps.

The French high command lamented that Poland had not been able to hold out until spring, when a proper offensive might have been undertaken. Gamelin later justified the feeble effort by saying that the governments of France and Poland had not ratified a parallel political treaty to complete their mutual support agreement, although France had signed the political agreement on September 4.

Given France's reliance on large numbers of reservists, its troop dispersions, and its defensive mentality, a stronger offensive may not have been a realistic option, but German observers believed that a more determined French effort would have carried to the Rhine and changed the course of the war. It is worth noting that Britain, which also had a solemn

obligation to defend Poland, did nothing to assist Poland beyond dropping propaganda leaflets. By the time of the French offensive, the British Expeditionary Force had not even completed its assembly. Both states would pay a heavy price for their lack of military preparedness.

GERALD D. SWICK

See also

France; France, Army; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Maginot Line; Poland; Poland Campaign; Sitzkrieg

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Saeki Shizuo (1894–1980)

Japanese Army colonel. Born on February 20, 1894, in Hiroshima, Saeki Shizuo joined the army in 1913 and was initially trained as a cavalry officer. When the Japanese Army reorganized its cavalry scout units into mechanized units, in 1941 Lieutenant Colonel Saeki took command of the 5th Scout Regiment attached to the 5th Division, the mainstay of General Yamashita Tomoyuki's Twenty-Fifth Army.

On December 8, 1941, the 5th Division landed in Singora, Thailand, and moved south to break the British defense line at Jitra in northern Malaya. A detachment was organized around Saeki's 5th Scout Regiment. With 580 infantrymen, 18 tanks and armored vehicles, and 2 artillery pieces, Saeki conducted a miniblitzkrieg on British defenses at Jitra, which was held by 6,000 defenders. This successful attack led to the total collapse of the British defenses in northern Malaya.

Promoted to colonel, in July 1944 Saeki took command of the 29th Tank Regiment. In April 1945, he received command of the 2nd Independent Tank Brigade organized for the defense of the Japanese home islands. Saeki died in Tokyo on May 15, 1980.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also
Malaya Campaign; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Saint-Lô, Battle of (July 11–19, 1944)

Key battle following the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion. Saint-Lô was the hub of an extensive road network that allowed the Germans to rapidly shift men and weapons east and west to meet American attacks. Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, commanding the U.S. First Army, needed the road from Saint-Lô west to Périers as a line of departure for an offensive (code-named COBRA) to break out of the Normandy bocage of hedgerow country. The bocage consisted of small fields and orchards surrounded by underbrush-covered earthen dikes three to five feet thick and six to nine feet high, with numerous narrow, sunken lanes. These brush-crowned embankments walled in the fields and provided excellent positions for the German defenders.

On July 11, Major General Charles H. Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division began the attack to take Saint-Lô and the Martinsville Ridge to its east. The 35th Infantry Division attacked on its right, and the 2nd Infantry Division (V Corps) attacked on its left. Defending was the 3rd Parachute Division of General of Parachute Panzer Troops Eugen Meindl's II Parachute Corps plus badly battered Kampfgruppen (battle groups) of varying sizes from the 266th, 352nd, and 353rd Infantry Divisions under command of the 353rd.

The 116th Infantry Regiment attacked on the left and the 115th Infantry Regiment on the right in the 29th Infantry Division's zone, using assault

groups composed of infantry, tanks, and engineers to methodically attack and seize each field. Many tanks were equipped with steel prongs hastily welded to the fronts of their hulls to help them through hedgerows and to punch holes in which to place explosives. By the end of the day, the 116th Infantry decisively penetrated German defenses, but heavier resistance stopped the 115th. However, the 2nd Infantry Division seized Hill 192, which overlooked the Saint-Lô area.

Ruins of St.-Lô, France, the site of fierce fighting in July 1944 between U.S. and German forces during the Normandy Campaign. (Frank Scherschel/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Attacking U.S. forces made little headway between July 12 and 14. On July 15, the Germans stopped both regiments. At 7:30 p.m., however, the 116th Infantry again began making headway, but it was halted for the night by higher headquarters. The 2nd Battalion failed to receive the order, and although it was cut off, it was not attacked. Meanwhile, that same day the

35th Infantry Division seized the north slope of Hill 122 about a mile north of Saint-Lô.

On July 16 the 115th Infantry was again thwarted, and the 116th Infantry defeated two German counterattacks. On July 17 the 115th continued attacking the high ground on the Martinville Ridge, commanding the German rear area. Major Thomas D. Howie's 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry, attacked southwest, and by 6:00 a.m. it had taken the village of La Madeleine without opposition, relieving the regiment's 2nd Battalion. La Madeleine was about 500 yards from Saint-Lô itself.

The 2nd Battalion was supposed to attack into Saint-Lô, but it had suffered too many casualties to do this. Howie then took the mission. Shortly after Howie issued his orders he was killed, and his executive officer, Captain William H. Puntenney, assumed command. Heavy German artillery and mortar fire followed by a counterattack thwarted the attack plan. U.S. artillery and mortar fire and air strikes then defeated the German counterattack. Both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 116th Infantry were now isolated from the remainder of the division. By the end of the day of July 17, however, the 29th Division was on the inner slopes of hills that led directly into Saint-Lô.

On the morning of July 18, the 35th Infantry Division reported that the Germans had pulled out everywhere in its sector. Task Force C—commanded by Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, assistant division commander of the 29th Infantry Division, and composed of reconnaissance, tank, tank destroyer, and engineer units—was tapped to seize the town. Cota was to obtain infantry support from the nearest available infantry unit just before entering the town. That was 1st Battalion, 115th Infantry (less one platoon designated to contain a small number of German holdouts). By 7:00 p.m., Saint-Lô had been secured. Major Howie's men carried his body into the town and placed it on the rubble surrounding what had been the Cathedral of Notre Dame.

Pockets of resistance still remained, and the Germans poured in mortar and artillery fire. Cota was wounded, and some 200 of the 600-man task force became casualties, but the capture of Saint-Lô and the adjacent high ground solidly protected the U.S. First Army's left flank as it penetrated the German lines and prepared the way for Operation COBRA.

UZAL W. ENT

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; COBRA, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign

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Saint-Nazaire, Raid on (March 28, 1942)

British commando raid on the French port of Saint-Nazaire on the Bay of Biscay. The port of Saint-Nazaire had one of the few dock facilities capable of accommodating the German battleship *Tirpitz* and the only one on the French coast. The plan to raid the port was developed by Captain John Hughes-Hallett of British Combined Operations. Known as Operation CHARIOT, it called for commandos to ram a ship loaded with explosives into the dock to demolish it while other forces landed to destroy additional port facilities. Wrecking the dry dock might prevent the Germans from sending the *Tirpitz* from Norway on a sortie against the Atlantic convoys because it would lack repair facilities in France.

On the afternoon of March 26, 1942, the British strike force sailed from Falmouth. Commander Robert Ryder had charge of the naval forces, and Lieutenant Colonel Augustus Charles Newman commanded the landing party. The naval force centered on the destroyer *Campbeltown* (the obsolete former U.S. Navy *Buchanan* acquired under the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement) and naval launches. The *Campbeltown* was packed with four tons of timed explosives. The destroyers *Tynedale* and *Atherstone* provided escort. The flotilla, flying the German naval ensign and flashing German recognition signals, entered Saint-Nazaire Harbor early on March 28. At 1:30

a.m. the Germans, although initially fooled, opened fire with shore artillery, but the darkness hampered their accuracy.

At 1:34 a.m., the *Campbeltown* slammed into the dry dock's outer caisson at 18 knots. The impact crushed the bow for 36 feet and drove the ship onto the caisson a full 12 inches into the steel gate, while some 260 commandos poured off the *Campbeltown* and launches to destroy machinery, several buildings, bridges, and smaller vessels. German reinforcements arrived, and the firing soon became intense. Although three motor launches and the two escorting destroyers escaped to Britain under air cover, most of the commandos were left behind.

At 10:30 a.m., high-ranking German officers and engineers were at the dry dock to inspect the damage when the explosives in the destroyer's bow detonated. Another charge aboard a motor torpedo boat destroyed the lock gates of the Saint-Nazaire basin. Some 400 Germans were killed in the raid, most of them in the explosion aboard the *Campbeltown*. Among the dead were two of the commando officers, who had refused to reveal the presence of the explosives. The British lost 2 motor torpedo boats and 14 motor launches. Of 621 raiders who participated, 169 were killed and 200 captured; 5 escaped to Spain. The British had achieved their primary objective, as the Germans were unable to use the dry dock for the remainder of the war. The *Tirpitz* never entered the Atlantic. Operation CHARIOT has been dubbed the "greatest raid of all."

STEPHEN PATRICK WARD

See also

Tirpitz, Attacks on

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Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Free French Seizure of (December 24, 1941)

Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, island territories of France off the coast of Newfoundland with a population of fewer than 4,500 people in 1941, became a cause célèbre in the winter of 1941–1942. Following the German defeat of France in June 1940, the government of the Saint-Pierre and Miquelon territory recognized the collaborationist French government of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain in Vichy. Although there was some Free French agitation, threats to bring in Vichy forces kept most such sentiments under control. At the same time, control over the islands was a minor issue for the governments of Canada, Britain, and the United States. Britain advocated Free French control over the territory, whereas the United States vehemently opposed any change, and Canada attempted to hold a middle ground.

In 1941, increased German U-boat activity in the North Atlantic added greater weight to the matter, as it was feared that the territory's radio station was broadcasting information detrimental to Allied interests. Proposals were circulated among Ottawa, London, and Washington to pressure the territorial government to transfer authority over the station—which received further impetus after the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.

Learning that authority might be transferred, head of Free French forces in London General Charles de Gaulle decided to forestall any Anglo-British action. On December 22, 1941, Vice Admiral Émile Henri Muselier, commander of the Free French Navy, departed Halifax with the three corvettes *Mimosa, Alysse,* and *Acorit* and the submarine *Surcouf,* then the world's largest. Ostensibly on a training exercise, Muselier instead sailed for Saint-Pierre, some 365 miles to the northeast.

Muselier's vessels arrived in the early morning hours of December 24. Security was lax, and Muselier sent ashore a landing party of several dozen men and easily seized control of its strategic locations without a shot being fired. Muselier arrested the leaders of the Vichy government and quickly held a plebiscite on December 25 to demonstrate the wishes of the majority of the people to support the Free French. The vote was 783 in favor of Free France, 14 against, and 215 blank, or null and void ballots.

In Washington, Secretary of State Cordell Hull was enraged, as he believed that de Gaulle had acted with British approval and support. Although Hull was under attack from American media, which was increasingly critical of what it regarded as his appeasement policies toward Vichy, Hull released an inflammatory statement calling for a return to the

status quo in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon and insisting Canada enforce the return of the territory to Vichy control.

The governments of Canada, Britain, and the Free French all refused to follow the American dictates. Although various plans and projects were suggested, the islands remained in Free French hands. The result for de Gaulle, however, was less than he had hoped. He had managed to secure a French territory for his cause, but, contrary to his ambitions, it did not lead to any other territories opting to follow his flag. In addition, this event exacerbated de Gaulle's poor relations with Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was already suspicious of his motives, and hampered de Gaulle's later activities.

DANIEL M. GERMAN

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; de Gaulle, Charles; Free French; Hull, Cordell; Vichy France

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Saipan, Battle of (June 15–July 9, 1944)

Important Pacific theater battle. Saipan, part of the Mariana Islands chain that includes Guam and Tinian, had belonged to Germany and passed to Japanese control as League of Nations mandates after World War I. Following the successful U.S. invasions in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King pushed for an assault on the Marianas. Despite opposition from General Douglas MacArthur, King's view prevailed.

The invasion force for Saipan included the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions; the 27th Infantry Division was in reserve. Admiral Raymond Spruance commanded the Fifth Fleet, while Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner was in charge of planning and executing the landing. Marine Major General

Holland (“Howlin’ Mad”) Smith commanded the V Amphibious Corps and would be in charge of the troops once they disembarked.

The attack plan, code-named Operation FORAGER, called for the marines to land along a strip of beach on the western side of the island. American estimates placed up to 15,000 Japanese soldiers on Saipan, but there were actually some 30,000 army and naval personnel there as well as many civilians.

Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi commanded the Fourth Fleet, a small area fleet charged with defending the Marianas. He established his headquarters on Saipan, which was also headquarters for the Japanese Twenty-First Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Hideyoshi Obata. Lieutenant General Saitō Yoshitsugu had actual ground command on Saipan. His men were well entrenched in caves and other natural fortifications on the island, and they were well supplied with defensive firepower.

More than 800 ships transported the U.S. invasion force from Eniwetok to the Marianas. Bombardment vessels pounded Saipan for three days before the landing, but this bombardment was insufficient, as many Japanese defensive positions had not been identified. Early on the morning of June 15, the marines went ashore. Contrary tides and Japanese fire prevented the 2nd Marine Division, aiming for the north end of the target beaches, from landing in the preferred location. The 4th Marine Division landed with greater accuracy, but the Japanese mounted an excellent defense and subjected them to withering artillery and mortar fire. Both sides suffered heavy casualties in the first days of the battle.

Despite stubborn Japanese opposition, the marines slowly advanced. The 2nd Marine Division swung north along the western coast of Saipan, while the 4th Marine Division pushed across to the eastern coast of the island before turning northward as well. On June 16 and 17, Holland Smith committed his reserve, the 27th Infantry Division, to the battle, deploying it between the two marine divisions and ordering it to drive northward up the center of the island.

Army reinforcements disembarking from LSTs proceed across a coral reef toward the beach during the Battle of Saipan (June 15–July 9, 1944). (National Archives)

While the marines and infantry were struggling to gain control of Saipan, Spruance learned that the Japanese fleet had sailed from the Philippines for the Marianas. Spruance then departed with most of his ships to engage the Japanese fleet. Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, who commanded Task Group 58 of the American carriers, successfully defeated the Japanese threat in the July 19–21 Battle of the Philippine Sea. Known to the Americans as the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot," this battle destroyed Japanese naval airpower, but it also deprived the Americans on Saipan of much-needed naval gunfire and air support.

In the meantime, marines and army troops on Saipan continued to drive north. In a controversial decision, Major General Holland Smith, dissatisfied with army progress, relieved Major General Ralph C. Smith from command of the 27th Infantry Division. This matter, largely the result of different tactical doctrines, led to an interservice dispute that raged well after the end of the war.

On July 7, the Japanese mounted the largest banzai attack of the war, but that desperation charge by 3,000 Japanese soldiers was the last major effort in a lost battle. Most Japanese fought to the death rather than surrender, and their commanders, including Nagumo and Saitō, committed suicide.

Hundreds of Japanese civilians also leaped to their deaths from cliffs at the northern end of Saipan rather than surrender. Organized resistance on the island ended on July 9, and Saipan was declared secure on July 13. U.S. forces suffered 3,126 killed, 13,160 wounded, and 326 missing. Japanese losses were approximately 27,000 killed. Only 2,000 were taken prisoner.

The fall of Saipan brought the resignation of Japanese premier General Tōjō Hideki. Guam and Tinian in the Marianas were also secured by early August. Even as fighting for the three islands went forward, Seabees were clearing runways for B-29 bombers to strike Japan.

HAROLD J. GOLDBERG

See also

Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guam, Battle for; King, Ernest Joseph; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nagumo Chūichi; Obata Hideyoshi; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Saitō Yoshitsugu; Smith, Holland McTyeire; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tōjō Hideki; Turner, Richmond Kelly

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Saitō Yoshitsugu (1890–1944)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Miyagi Prefecture on November 28, 1890, Saitō Yoshitsugu graduated from the Japanese military academy in 1912 and from the war college in 1924. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1932. A cavalry officer, Saitō was a member of the Inspectorate General for Cavalry during 1932–1933. He then held cavalry commands. Promoted to colonel in 1936, he was then chief of staff of a division.

In 1939, Saitō was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the Military Remount Depot of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army. In 1941, he became chief of the Military Remount Department of the War Ministry. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1942, Saitō received command of the 43rd Division and was given charge of the Northern Marianas District of Saipan and Tinian islands in April 1944.

The convoy carrying 7,000 men of the 43rd Division to the Marianas came under U.S. Navy submarine attack, and five of seven transports were sunk. Although most of the men were saved, they arrived at Saipan without their equipment.

Saitō also had little time to prepare for a U.S. invasion of the island. The main Japanese body arrived on May 5 and the remainder on June 7, and U.S. forces invaded on June 15. Saitō had only his 43rd Infantry Division and the 27th Independent Brigade, in addition to naval personnel. Saitō was junior to Admirals Nagumo Chūichi and Takagi Takeo, who had their headquarters on the island but few resources.

Saitō's tactic of trying to defend at the water's edge was not successful, nor were banzai night attacks against the U.S. beachhead. Overwhelming U.S. ground strength and naval and air support steadily reduced the defenders, who were driven into the northern part of the island. On July 6–7, some 3,000 Japanese survivors mounted the war's largest banzai attack, which failed. Saitō committed suicide on July 10; his remains were cremated and given a funeral with military honors presided over by Major General Holland Smith. On July 9, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner declared the island secure.

KITA YOSHITO

See also

Mariana Islands Campaign; Nagumo Chūichi; Saipan, Battle of; Smith, Holland McTyeire; Takagi Takeo

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Sakai Saburo (1916–2000)

Japanese Navy pilot. Born on August 26, 1916, at Saga on the island of Kyushu, Sakai Saburo joined the navy in May 1933. As a naval aviation pilot, second class, and later an ensign, Sakai became one of Japan's well-trained fighter pilots. After service in China from 1938 to 1941, Sakai fought in the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941. He then fought in the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. He was credited with 64 aerial victories, placing him fifth among Japanese aces of the war.

Sakai's most intense aerial combats were over Port Moresby, Lae, and Buna from April to July 1942. He was badly wounded over Guadalcanal on August 7. Blinded in his right eye, he was assigned to training duties. Sakai's fellow pilots continued to fly the Mitsubishi A6M Reisen (known as the Zero by the Allies), even as this unarmored aircraft was outgunned by newer and more powerful U.S. aircraft. Japan's training system could not make up for pilot losses, and poorly trained pilots with insufficient hours flew obsolescent planes. Japan's pilot situation was so desperate that Sakai reentered aerial combat at Iwo Jima in the summer of 1944. He then flew as a test pilot in Japan. His last aerial combat was an attack that downed a Boeing B-29 Superfortress on August 13, 1945.

After the war, Sakai wrote his memoirs, *Samurai!,* describing his experiences and gave motivational lectures. He also met with his wartime opponents. Sakai died of a heart attack on September 22, 2000, at Naval Air Station Atsugi, Kanagawa Prefecture, following a banquet in his honor hosted by the U.S. Navy.

Sakai Saburo, who with 64 Allied planes to his credit was a leading Japanese ace during the war, is shown here during a visit to the USS *Boxer* at Yokosuka, Japan, October 3, 1952. (Bettmann/Corbis)

JOHN W. WHITMAN

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Japan, Navy; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Sakonji Naomasa (1890–1948)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Kagoshima City on June 6, 1890, Sakonji Naomasa graduated from the Japanese naval academy in 1912 and held several assignments as a communications and torpedo officer. Promoted to commander in 1930 and to captain in 1935, he was assigned as commanding officer of the gunnery training ship *Setsu* in 1936. Sakonji was then director of the Hangzhou Special Service Agency in China.

At the beginning of the Pacific war, Sakonji was Japanese naval attaché in Thailand. He left that post in May 1942 as a rear admiral and was assigned command of the 16th Cruiser Squadron. Later he was chief of staff of the China Fleet.

In February and March 1944, while Sakonji was commanding the 16th Cruiser Squadron, the Southwest Area Fleet carried out surface raiding operations into the Indian Ocean. Sakonji issued orders that all crews and passengers in Allied ships encountered be killed. This came about from a request of German leader Adolf Hitler, who, on January 3, 1942, had suggested to Ambassador Oshima Hiroshi that the Axis powers kill the crews of Allied ships to help counter superior Allied shipbuilding capacity.

Hitler told Oshima that he had ordered his U-boat commanders to carry out this policy. Oshima relayed Hitler's request to Tokyo, and one year later the Japanese Combined Fleet received oral instructions from chief of the Imperial Naval Staff Admiral Nagano Osami to execute crew members of captured ships, except those who might be able to provide useful intelligence.

During the February 1944 operation, Captain Mayuzumi Haruo of the cruiser *Tone* sank the British merchant ship SS *Behar* and rescued 108 survivors, of whom 4 subsequently died. Thirty-two of the captives were disembarked at Batavia in mid-March. En route to Singapore on March 18 on board the *Tone,* Sakonji reprimanded Mayuzumi for not carrying out the orders of the Southeast Area Fleet to kill survivors, whereupon 65 survivors still on board the *Tone* were executed.

Promoted to vice admiral in October 1944, Sakonji became chief of staff of the China Area Fleet. After the war, a British military court in Hong Kong tried both Sakonji and Mayuzumi for the *Behar* incident. The two held that they were carrying out a direct order, but Sakonji was convicted of war crimes and sentenced to death by hanging. He was executed on January 21,

1948. Also convicted, Mayuzumi was sentenced to seven years' hard labor at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo.

HIRAMA YOICHI

See also

Japan, Navy; Leyte Landings; ōshima Hiroshi; Prisoners of War

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Sakurai Seizo (1889–1985)

Japanese Army general. Born in Yamaguchi Prefecture on June 27, 1889, Sakurai Seizo graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1911 and was commissioned in the infantry. He graduated from the War College in 1919. Sakurai was posted to the army General Staff during 1915–1916, 1921–1924, 1927–1928, and 1929–1934. A specialist in transportation, he was assigned to the Maritime Transportation Unit of the General Staff, which he headed from 1930 to 1934. From 1924 to 1926, Sakurai was a resident officer in France.

Promoted to colonel in 1934, Sakurai commanded the 77th Infantry Regiment in 1934 and 1935. He served as an investigator in the Cabinet Investigation Bureau and in the Planning Agency in 1936 and 1937. He was assigned to the 1st Shipping Transportation Headquarters in 1937 and to the Army Transportation Department in 1938. Promoted to major general in 1938, Sakurai commanded an infantry brigade in the 22nd Division from 1938 until 1940 during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), then was chief of staff of the Thirteenth Army in central China (1940–1941).

Promoted to lieutenant general in 1941, Sakurai took command of the 33rd Division and led it in the invasion of Burma in January 1942. In 1943, he was appointed chief of the Armor Headquarters under the minister of war. He returned to Burma to command the newly established Twenty-Eighth Army and led it in HA-GO (Operation Z) in January 1944, skillfully executing

the Japanese retreat across the Sittang River in March and April. He continued to conduct delaying actions in Burma until the end of the war in August 1945. Sakurai died in Tokyo on July 7, 1985.

NAKAYAMA TAKASHI

See also
Burma Theater; Japan, Army

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Salazar, António de Oliveira (1889–1970)

Portuguese dictator. Born on April 28, 1889, in the village of Vimieiro near the town of Santa Comba Dão, Portugal, António de Oliveira Salazar was educated at the University of Coimbra, where he became a respected professor of political economy. Salazar was elected to the Portuguese Chamber of Deputies, but he soon withdrew because he considered it to be a futile exercise.

In 1926 to end chronic political instability in Portugal (there had been 40 cabinets since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1910), the Portuguese military seized power. Salazar was then briefly minister of finance. Recalled to the same post in 1928, he received the full financial authority he demanded, and in short order he placed Portuguese finances on a firm foundation. During the next few years, Salazar gradually increased his power until, in 1932, he became premier of an authoritarian government. From that point until 1968, Salazar dominated Portuguese affairs.

Under a new constitution ratified in a 1933 referendum, Salazar reorganized Portugal as a corporative unitary republic rather than pluralist state. A national assembly elected by heads of families served as the legislative body. A corporative chamber advised the assembly about social and economic matters and represented syndicates of various corporations. The Catholic Church also had widespread influence. Salazar's National Union Party was the political voice of the so-called Estado Novo (New

State), which combined 18th-century enlightened despotism with Christian morality but also had fascist and democratic trappings. This system came to be known as clerical fascism; it was subsequently a model in Spain and Austria.

Profoundly religious, Salazar was also an ascetic and a bachelor. Unlike most dictators, he lived frugally on a modest salary and was utterly uninterested in the accumulation of personal wealth. Salazar also remained virtually unknown to his people. Although he admired fascism and supported the Nationalist side in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, he also intensely disliked Adolf Hitler and the Nazis and maintained diplomatic relations with Portugal's long-standing ally, Great Britain.

Unlike Francisco Franco in Spain, Salazar kept his country strictly neutral during World War II until, under British and U.S. pressure, he agreed in October 1943 to lease bases in the Azores. These proved vital to the Allied cause in the Battle of the Atlantic. Nonetheless, Salazar maintained that the nation was neutral, and Portugal profited from selling goods to both sides. Portugal emerged from the war in a much better position than Spain and was readily admitted to the United Nations and invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Although Portugal was a police state, Salazar always tried to preserve some of the elements of a democratic facade. Increasingly, in his last years in power he was forced to devote substantial financial and military resources to maintaining Portuguese control over the overseas empire. A disabling stroke in 1968 finally forced him to give up power. His successor, Marcelo Caetano, introduced some reforms. Salazar died in Lisbon on July 27, 1970.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Portugal; Spanish Civil War

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Salerno Invasion (September 9, 1943)

Allied invasion of southern Italy in September 1943. The Allied plan for the invasion of the Italian mainland called for a three-pronged effort. In Operation BAYTOWN, General Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighth Army would cross the Strait of Messina and land at Calabria on September 3; then it would work its way north. The following day, in Operation SLAPSTICK, 3,600 soldiers of the British 1st Airborne Division would drop on the Italian port of Taranto. The third part of the invasion, Operation AVALANCHE, was the largest. It involved the landing of two corps, the British X Corps and the U.S. VI Corps, at Salerno on September 9. The goal was to then secure the port of Naples 30 miles to the northwest.

U.S. Navy vice admiral H. Kent Hewitt had overall command of AVALANCHE. U.S. rear admiral John L. Hall commanded the mainly American Southern Attack Force, and Royal Navy commodore Geoffrey Nigel Oliver commanded the largely British Northern Attack Force. Royal Navy rear admiral Philip Vian commanded 1 fleet carrier and 4 escort carriers supporting with air cover. In all, 627 vessels participated in the operation.

Lieutenant General Mark Clark commanded the Fifth Army, the ground force for AVALANCHE. The Fifth Army consisted of the British X Corps with the 46th and 56th Divisions and the U.S. VI Corps with the 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions. Two battalions of U.S. Rangers and two of British Commandos were included to secure key passes northwest of Salerno.

The Allies expected no opposition. On September 8, 1943, hours before the assault forces landed, General Dwight D. Eisenhower broadcast that Italy had signed an armistice with the Allies. Clark fully expected to secure Naples quickly and then throw a line across Italy, trapping German units between his army and the British Eighth Army to the south. Clark decided to forgo a preliminary bombardment, which meant that German forces that had occupied the Italian positions were virtually undegraded. As it evolved for the Allies, the battle was confusing and hard to control, developing its own momentum.

At 3:10 a.m. on September 9, the rangers began going ashore to secure the Allied northern flank. They were followed 20 minutes later by men of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division, who secured the southern flank. The British X Corps then landed between the rangers and the 36th Infantry Division. The

56th Infantry Division secured the southern sector of the British corps area, and the 46th Infantry Division secured the north sector. With the support of the rangers and X Corps, British commandos were able to land at the town of Salerno itself.

On the first day, the Germans mounted only sporadic, small-scale counterattacks. German theater commander Field Marshal Albert Kesselring immediately ordered his forces south of Salerno to withdraw from southern Italy to prevent being cut off. The German 16th Panzer Division was to oppose the Salerno landings and prevent any Allied deep penetration there until German troops from the south became available. The Germans concentrated the limited forces initially available against the British X Corps.

On the morning of September 10, General Clark visited both corps' zones. Because VI Corps was making better progress, Clark assigned it four miles of the X Corps' area. This, however, stretched the Americans thin. Meanwhile, more men and equipment came ashore, although a shortage of landing craft hampered operations. Naval gunfire, however, strongly supported the troops ashore. During the Salerno operation, Allied warships fired more than 11,000 tons of shells to assist shore operations. On September 11, German aircraft launched glide bombs at the Allied ships, damaging two cruisers, and other attacks followed. On September 16, two glide bombs badly damaged the British battleship *Warspite*.

On September 13, the Germans launched their first major counterattack, overrunning a battalion of the 36th Infantry Division, but they then encountered stiff resistance along the banks of the Calore River. Tank, tank-destroyer, and artillery units poured fire into the ranks of the attacking Germans, and accurate naval gunfire played an important role. With the beachhead seemingly in jeopardy, on the night of September 13 two battalions (1,300 men) of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division were air-dropped into the 36th Infantry Division sector and quickly thrown into the line.

Throughout September 14, German units attacked all along the line, probing for weak spots. Meanwhile, Allied aircraft pounded German lines of communication and frontline positions. Elements of the British 7th Armoured Division now landed to reinforce X Corps, and the 180th Infantry Regiment came ashore in VI Corps' sector. That night, another 2,100 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived, further reinforcing the line.

Another airborne operation occurred on the night of September 14 to

insert the 2nd Battalion of the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment 20 miles north of the X Corps zone. Its assignment was to harass German lines of communications for five days, then either infiltrate back into the beachhead or link up with advancing units. Only 15 of the 40 transport aircraft involved dropped their men near the target area, and most of the paratroopers landed far from their intended drop zones. Although the men of the battalion caused some disruption in the German rear areas, they paid a heavy price. Of the 600 men who participated in the jump, only 400 gained friendly lines.

On September 15, Kesselring ordered another counterattack, which failed in the teeth of the Allied reinforcement. Clark now had more than 150,000 men ashore. Meanwhile, Montgomery's Eighth Army was still 50 miles to the south, making only slow progress against only light German resistance. Kesselring knew he could no longer hope to defeat the Allies at Salerno, and on September 16 the Germans began a deliberate, well-executed withdrawal northward. The Eighth and Fifth Armies finally linked up on September 19. The Allies first entered Naples on October 1.

The Salerno fighting had been costly for both sides. The British had suffered 5,259 casualties and the Americans 1,649. Germans killed, wounded, or missing were 3,472. The next target was to secure Naples. Salerno was a clear indication that much hard fighting lay ahead.

TROY D. MORGAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

U.S. Coast Guardsmen and men of the Navy Beach Battalion hug the beach at Paesnum, just south of Salerno, during a German bombing raid in October 1943. (Library of Congress)

See also

Clark, Mark Wayne; Glide Bombs; Italy Campaign; Kesselring, Albert; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law

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Salmide, Henri (1919–2010)

German Navy noncommissioned officer. Heinz Stahlschmidt was born in Dortmund, Germany, on November 13, 1919. As a German Navy petty officer and bomb disposal expert during World War II, Stahlschmidt was stationed at Bordeaux, France, in August 1944 when his superiors ordered him to destroy the extensive docks of that major port. Stahlschmidt initially followed orders and assembled a large quantity of explosives in a bunker for the demolition work. Realizing that laying the explosives through the extensive dock network and detonating them would result in the deaths of thousands of Frenchmen, Stahlschmidt instead detonated the bunker itself, killing as many as 50 German soldiers.

Sought by both the Gestapo and French authorities, Stahlschmidt was hidden by a French family in Bordeaux in the Resistance. After the war he married a French woman and became a naturalized French citizen as Henri Salmide. Although Salmide acted entirely on his own, after the war members of the French Resistance sought to appropriate the episode, claiming that they had been behind Salmide's actions. In 1994, Salmide was awarded the French Légion d'Honneur. In 1997 he explained to an interviewer, "I acted according to my Christian conscience. I could not accept that the port of Bordeaux be wantonly destroyed when the war was clearly lost."

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
France; Vichy France

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Sano Tadayoshi (1889–1945)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Shizuoka Prefecture on March 7, 1889, Sano Tadayoshi graduated from the Japanese military academy in 1911 and was commissioned in the artillery. He graduated from the army war college in 1922. Sano was an instructor at the military academy twice (1924–1927 and 1928–1931). He served in the 4th Field Artillery Regiment from 1931 to 1933 and was on the staff of the 5th Division from 1933 to 1935. Promoted to colonel in 1935, he twice commanded regiments: the 24th Field Artillery in 1935 and the 20th Field Artillery in 1936 and 1937.

During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), Sano served as the chief of staff of the 14th Division in northern China from 1937 to 1938. Promoted to major general in 1938, he took command of the 4th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade. In 1940, he was director of the Field Artillery School.

At the beginning of the Pacific war in December 1941, Sano was a lieutenant general and commanded the 38th Division. His division captured Hong Kong in December 1941 and assisted in the capture of Sumatra in the Netherlands East Indies in February 1942. Ordered to Guadalcanal in October 1942, Sano and what remained of his division were evacuated in February 1943. Appointed chief of staff of the Homeland Defense General Headquarters, Sano commanded the Thirty-Fourth Army in central China in 1944 and 1945, where he engaged in the defense of Wuchang and Hankou (Hankow), both in Hubei (Hupeh) Province. Assigned to the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters in 1945, he died on July 3, 1945.

NAKAYAMA TAKASHI

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Hong Kong, Battle of

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Sansonetti, Luigi (1888–1959)

Italian Navy admiral. Luigi Sansonetti was born in 1888 in Rome. He was appointed a midshipman in 1906 and earned a medal for bravery in the 1911 landings at Tripoli during the Turkish-Italian War. In the 1920s, he acquired a reputation as an organizer and was promoted to captain in 1934.

In the autumn of 1936, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, the navy's chief of staff, chose Sansonetti as his deputy after Sansonetti demonstrated exceptional ability while commanding the cruiser *Fiume* during the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War. Sansonetti was promoted to rear admiral in 1938.

In June 1939, Sansonetti accompanied Cavagnari to Germany for the first meeting between the top commands of the Regia Marina and the German Kriegsmarine. In August 1939, however, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini appointed Admiral Odoardo Somigli deputy chief of staff over Cavagnari's objections. As compensation, Sansonetti received command of the 7th (light cruiser) Division, and he led this force at the July 9, 1940, Battle of Calabria, firing the opening salvos of the action.

In December 1940, Sansonetti took command of the 3rd (heavy cruiser) Division. On March 28, 1941, he fought in the Gavdos action, aggressively ignoring fleet commander Admiral Angelo Iachino's instructions to break off his pursuit of a British cruiser squadron. According to his critics, this action compromised the timetable of the entire operation by 50 minutes. Iachino, however, never openly criticized Sansonetti's decision.

The position of deputy chief of staff opened up again in the aftermath of Italy's Cape Matapan defeat on March 28, 1941, and Sansonetti was named to this position on July 15, 1941. A better organizer than his predecessor, Inigo Campioni, and a fine diplomat, Sansonetti was able to manage both the

Germans and Iachino, who was his senior and had aspired to that same position.

Because he exercised operational control at Italian naval headquarters, Sansonetti determined the course of his nation's effort at sea between July 1941 and September 1943. By the spring of 1943, he had come under criticism from the younger admirals and officers for a lack of aggression, a trait Sansonetti's supporters believed was cool strategic vision.

When Admiral Raffaele de Courten became the new chief of staff in July 1943, he stated that he had different ideas, but he retained Sansonetti as his deputy because it was not time for shake-ups in the command, given the change in government and the national crisis sparked by the pending Allied invasion. Moreover, there was no other man available with such a complete understanding of the central command's structure and operations.

Following the armistice and the disintegration of Italy's army and air force, Sansonetti remained in Rome and kept the Supermarina in operation despite the chaos, while de Courten accompanied King Victor Emmanuel III in his flight across the peninsula. On September 9, against de Courten's prior instructions, Sansonetti ordered the battle fleet to sail to an Allied port instead of La Maddalena, after the German attack against that base. He also ordered the squadron at Taranto to Malta when it appeared that German forces were threatening that Italian naval base.

After Rome fell to the Germans, the Supermarina had to shut down. Sansonetti evaded capture and, after a 23-day cross-country trek, made it to Allied lines. He recovered his position, but it was clear that de Courten would have preferred the fleet to scuttle rather than regroup in Allied controlled ports. On April 19, 1944, Sansonetti was relieved and became the president of the admiral's council, a prestigious but powerless position usually reserved for retired admirals. Sansonetti left the navy in 1951 and died on November 7, 1959.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Calabria, Battle of; Campioni, Inigo; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Cavagnari, Domenico; de Courten, Raffaele; Iachino, Angelo; Italy, Navy

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Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the (October 26, 1942)

Important carrier battle between the United States and Japan off the Santa Cruz Islands. The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands was the fourth in a series of sea engagements for control of the Solomon Islands. Japanese land forces on Guadalcanal were fighting to regain Henderson Field, and Japanese naval forces sought to establish air supremacy there.

The battle occurred off the Santa Cruz Islands some 250 miles east of the Solomons. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey commanded U.S. South Pacific Forces, while Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid had operational command of the *Hornet* and *Enterprise*, the only two U.S. aircraft carriers left in the Pacific theater. Vice Admiral Kondō Nobutake’s task force, centered on the carriers *Shōkaku, Zuihō, Junyō,* and *Zuikaku*, sought to gain air superiority over Guadalcanal, assisting Japanese land forces in retaking Henderson Field.

On October 26, Halsey moved to block the Japanese advance. Halsey initiated the battle when he ordered U.S. naval units to search for the Japanese. U.S. reconnaissance aircraft spotted the Japanese first, and at 7:40 a.m., dive-bombers from the *Enterprise* damaged the light Japanese carrier *Zuihō*. The Japanese countered with 62 Kate torpedo planes from the *Shōkaku* and 21 Zero fighters from the *Zuikaku* and *Zuihō*. At 7:45 a.m., Kinkaid sent another force of 19 Wildcat fighters, 29 Dauntless SBD dive-bombers, and 25 Avenger TBF torpedo bombers.

Puffs of flak fill the sky above the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier *Enterprise* during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, October 26, 1942. (National Archives)

The two strike forces spotted one another heading toward their respective targets. Zeros attacked the *Enterprise* strike force and destroyed eight U.S. planes without loss. After this brief fight, the Japanese aircraft continued toward the U.S. carriers. Unfortunately for the Americans, the *Hornet*'s combat air patrol had been vectored to the wrong location, and Japanese torpedo planes and dive-bombers attacked the *Hornet* simultaneously.

The carrier absorbed four bombs, two torpedoes, and a Japanese plane that crashed through the flight deck, whereon two of its bombs detonated. The *Hornet* was left dead in the water. Thirty-eight of 53 Japanese aircraft were shot down. On the other hand, U.S. aircraft hit the *Shōkaku,* forcing it out of the fight, and nearly hit the *Zuikaku*. The U.S. planes also damaged the Japanese heavy cruiser *Tone*.

The *Hornet*'s second wave of aircraft attacked the heavy cruiser *Chikuma* and killed many of its crew at their antiaircraft stations. The second Japanese strike from the *Zuikaku,* divided because the Kate torpedo planes had to rearm, attacked the destroyer *Porter* at 10:00 a.m., leaving it dead in the water. The Japanese planes then struck the carrier *Enterprise,* which had escaped the first attack. At 10:17 a.m., four Japanese bombs hit the *Enterprise*'s port bow and forward elevator. Thirty minutes later, the second part of the strike force struck the *Enterprise* again, with minimal success

because of deadly antiaircraft fire, much of it from the battleship *South Dakota*. Japanese planes also struck the cruiser *San Juan*, but it sustained little damage. Twenty-four of 44 aircraft in the two Japanese strike units were shot down.

By the end of the day, the *Hornet* lay dead in the water, and the *Enterprise* was out of action. Halsey ordered a withdrawal to preserve the *Enterprise*, and Kondō pursued. The *Hornet* was under tow at 2:55 p.m. when the *Junyo*'s second strike wave of Kates attacked and severely damaged it. Kinkaid then ordered the ship scuttled. Despite eight U.S. torpedo hits, the carrier was still afloat when two Japanese destroyers finally sank it with Long Lance torpedoes at 1:35 a.m. on October 27. Kondō then called off the pursuit.

During the withdrawal, U.S. planes hit both the Japanese destroyer *Teruzuki* and the carrier *Junyō*. The destroyer *Mahan* was another casualty of the battle. It collided with the battleship *South Dakota* and had to go to a dockyard.

During the Battle of Santa Cruz, the Japanese lost 99 aircraft. Sixty-eight pilots and 77 crewmen were killed. Aircrew losses continued to affect Japan, which, unlike the United States, had no effective pilot replacement system. The *Zuikaku*, *Zuihō*, and *Chikuma* were all out of action for many weeks. On the other hand, the United States lost the *Hornet* and the destroyer *Porter* (torpedoed by a Japanese submarine, probably the *I-21*), and the *Enterprise* was damaged, although it continued limited service off Guadalcanal while undergoing repairs. Eighty U.S. aircraft, 18 pilots, and 8 crewmen were lost.

Although on paper the Battle of Santa Cruz was a defeat for the United States, it prevented the Japanese from disrupting U.S. land operations on Guadalcanal. Kondō might have achieved a more decisive victory had he continued the pursuit; Halsey probably would have been forced to stand and fight to protect the damaged *Enterprise*.

ALEXANDER D. SAMMS

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Nagumo Chūichi; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater

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Sasaki Minoru (1893–1961)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Hiroshima Prefecture on January 1, 1893, Sasaki Minoru graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1914 and from the Military Staff College in 1923. Stationed in Poland and Soviet Russia as a resident officer from 1928 to 1930, he was then assigned as an instructor at the Army War College and served on the General Staff in 1932. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1933 and to colonel in 1937.

Promoted to major general in 1939, Sasaki took command of the 4th Cavalry Brigade before becoming chief of staff of the Sixth Army. In August 1942, he became head of the Army Mechanized Department. In May 1943, he was assigned as commander of the Southeast Detachment at Munda on New Georgia Island, responsible for the defense of the central part of the Solomon Islands, including New Georgia and Kolombangara.

At the end of June 1943, Allied forces assaulted New Georgia before the Japanese could complete construction of their defensive positions. Sasaki nonetheless was able to block the initial U.S. attempt to take Munda Airfield on July 7. Despite reinforcements and a strong effort, Sasaki was forced to give up Munda on August 4 and had no choice but to withdraw to Kolombangara. Under continued attack, the outlying islands were occupied one by one, and Kolombangara was isolated. Short of ammunition and provisions, Sasaki supervised the successful evacuation of some 9,400 Japanese defenders to Bougainville.

Reassigned to Eighth Army Area headquarters in November 1943, Sasaki was promoted to lieutenant general in October 1944. He died at Tokyo on April 27, 1961.

KITA YOSHITO

See also
Kolombongara, Battle of; New Georgia, Battle of

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Sasaki Toichi (1886–1955)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Ehime Prefecture on January 27, 1886, Sasaki Toichi graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1905 and the War College in 1917. From 1919 to 1921, he served on the staff of the Siberian Expeditionary Army. From 1922 to 1924, he was assigned as resident officer in Guandong (Kwantung), where he developed a close relationship with Sun Yat-sen and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek).

In 1926 Sasaki was appointed assistant military attaché in China, and in 1927 he was assigned as resident officer in Nanjing (Nanking). That same year, he took part in an operation that overthrew the military government in Beijing (Peking) carried out by the revolutionary government at Guandong. Sasaki had hoped the Nationalist Party would be able to achieve national reunification and sovereignty of China, establishing a cooperative relationship with Japan, but he became disillusioned when Nationalist forces massacred Japanese citizens and ransacked their residences in Nanjing in 1927 and in Jinan (Tsinan) in 1928.

In 1930, Sasaki was promoted to colonel and assigned to command the 18th Infantry Regiment. Following the Second Shanghai Incident, he was assigned to the staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. In 1932, he was appointed military adviser to the Japanese puppet government of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo). He became chief adviser in 1934 and contributed to improvements in the puppet government's armed forces. Promoted to major general in 1935, Sasaki took command of the 30th Infantry Brigade in 1937. In 1938, he was promoted to lieutenant general and commanded the Military Police Corps in China. The next year, he took command of the

Japanese 10th Division. In April 1941, he went on the reserve list. Recalled in July 1945, he was appointed commander of the 149th Division in China. After the war, he was arrested on charges of war crimes. Sasaki was tried and convicted and died in prison in Fushun, China, on May 30, 1955.

KITA YOSHITO

See also
China; Jiang Jieshi

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Sauckel, Fritz (1894–1946)

German plenipotentiary for labor. Born on October 27, 1894, in Hassfurt, Bavaria, Fritz Sauckel had only a secondary education before working in the merchant marine. Taken prisoner by the French in 1914 during World War I, he was not released until November 1919. Sauckel joined the Nazi Party in 1923 and became Gauleiter (district leader) of Thuringia in 1927, Reich governor in 1933, and Reich defense commissioner for the Kassel Military District in 1940. He also was a Schutzstaffel (SS)-Obergruppenführer without function.

Hitler recognized Sauckel's blind obedience and fanaticism and rewarded him with the position of plenipotentiary general for labor mobilization in March 1942. Sauckel overhauled the erratic administration and applied an efficient system based on the forced deportation of workers from the occupied territories to Germany to work in the war machine. Sauckel boasted openly that of 5 million foreign workers he had secured for the Reich, only 200,000 had come voluntarily. He fully supported the brutal methods by which they were relocated and the terrible conditions in which they lived and worked.

Arrested at the end of the war, Sauckel was brought to trial at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on charges of war crimes and

crimes against humanity. Found guilty on October 1, 1946, he was hanged at Nuremberg on October 16.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also
Germany; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials

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Saucken, Dietrich von (1892–1980)

German Army general of panzer troops. Born on May 16, 1892, in the East Prussian village of Fischhausen, Dietrich von Saucken was commissioned a lieutenant in the infantry in 1912. He soon transferred to the cavalry and served honorably in World War I. Wounded seven times, he received the Iron Cross First and Second Class and the Hohenzollern House Order with Swords.

Following the war, Saucken continued in the Reichswehr. As a colonel, he commanded the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (1937–1940) of the 4th Panzer Division in the campaigns for Poland (September 1–October 6, 1939) and France (May 10–June 25, 1940). The 4th Panzer Division attacked in Holland via Maastricht and then fought in France. In December 1941, Saucken commanded the 4th Rifle Brigade of the 4th Panzer Division. For the remainder of the war, Saucken served on the Eastern Front.

Saucken was one of those cavalry officers who made a successful transition to armored units. The 4th Panzer Division was attached to Army Group Center and in the early months of Operation BARBAROSSA, which commenced on June 22, 1941, fought at Minsk, then Gomel, Bryansk, and Vyazma. In December 1941, the division suffered heavy losses in its effort to capture Tula. Saucken remained with the 4th Panzer Division, much of the time as its commander, until the summer of 1944. During the war, the 4th Panzer was the most heavily decorated of all German tank divisions. It was engaged at Kirov, Orel, Kursk, the Dnieper campaigns, Bobruisk, and Kovel.

Seriously wounded in January 1942, Saucken did not return to active duty until that August. He was promoted to major general in January 1942, to lieutenant general in April 1943, and to general of panzer troops in August 1944.

After he left the 4th Panzer Division, Saucken became deputy commander of III Panzer Corps in May 1944. He took over the XXXIX Panzer Corps in July 1944, the Panzer Korps Grossdeutschland in December 1944, and the Second Army in March 1945. His final command was the Special Army Command in the Danzig area. In the last year of the war, Saucken conducted several skillful delaying actions with steadily dwindling resources.

After the war, Saucken spent more than 10 years as a prisoner in the Soviet Union. On his release in 1955, he retired to Bavaria. Well-respected and one of his nation's greatest war heroes, he was the last of only 27 recipients of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds. Saucken died in Pullach, Bavaria, on September 27, 1980.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; France, Battle for; Poland Campaign; Poland–East Prussia Campaign

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Saunders, Laverne George "Blondie" (1903–1988)

U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) brigadier general. Born in Stratford, South Dakota, on March 12, 1903, Laverne George Saunders graduated from the University of South Dakota in 1924 and then in 1928 from the U.S. Military

Academy at West Point, where he was a star football player. He immediately enrolled for flight training at Kelly Field, Texas, and was in the same class as Curtis LeMay. From 1931 to 1939, Saunders was an instructor and innovative football coach at West Point.

In 1940, Saunders took command of the 23rd Bomb Squadron, and from 1940 to 1943, he commanded the 11th Bomb Group of Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses. This became the first USAAF bomber formation to serve in the Guadalcanal Campaign in 1942, where its success resulted in Saunders's promotion to brigadier general in December 1942. Saunders transferred to Britain as commanding general of the VII Bomber Command (January to March 1943) and chief of staff of the Seventh Air Force (March to June 1943), surviving a crash landing off the Shetland Islands in which he was badly injured.

In June 1943, Saunders organized the 58th Bomb Wing (Very Heavy), which was activated at Salina, Kansas. He took it to the China-Burma-India theater in 1944. From India, he carried out the first raid by Boeing B-29 Superfortresses on Japan, which was conducted against the iron and steel works at Yawata on June 15, 1944. Saunders temporarily commanded the fledgling XX Bomber Command in July 1944 until LeMay arrived in India to take command in August 1944. Saunders was scheduled to return to the United States to take command of a new Boeing B-29 Superfortress wing, but he agreed to stay on in India on LeMay's urging, a decision that almost cost him his life.

On September 19, 1944, Saunders was returning to Kharagpur from an inspection trip to Piardoba when his North American B-25 Mitchell bomber crashed. Saunders and the crew chief were the only survivors. Saunders spent much of the next three years in military hospitals and underwent numerous operations, being medically retired from the service as a brigadier general in 1947. Saunders died in Aberdeen, South Dakota, on November 16, 1988.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; LeMay, Curtis Emerson

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Savoia, Amedeo Umberto di (1898–1942)

Italian Air Force major general and colonial viceroy. Born at Turin on October 21, 1898, Amedeo di Savoia was the son of Emanuele Filiberto di Savoia, the 2nd Duke of Aosta, a prominent World War I Italian Army leader and supporter of protofascist Gabriele d'Annunzio's putative military dictatorship. Despite his youth, Amedeo di Savoia was a decorated soldier in World War I, and after completing his interrupted studies, he joined his uncle, Luigi di Savoia, Duke of the Abruzzi, in establishing a colonial agricultural concern in Somalia.

From 1922 to 1926, Savoia worked in the Congo, obtained a law degree in Palermo, fought in the Italian pacification of Libya, and earned his military pilot's license. On the death of his father in 1931, Savoia became the 3rd Duke of Aosta. He also rose rapidly through the ranks of the Italian Air Force. Promoted to major general in 1936, by late 1937 he was also appointed viceroy of Ethiopia, where besides pursuing more humane "pacification" policies of that territory, he introduced modern agricultural methods and sought to improve public works.

Despite his misgivings regarding Italy's June 1940 entry into the war, the Duke of Aosta's numerically superior forces overran British holdings in Sudan and British Somaliland during the first several months of the conflict. Hampered by sparse supplies and internal dissent, however, they could not hold out against British counterattacks in early 1941. By April 1941 the British had taken Keren, and the Italians were obliged to abandon Addis Ababa.

Making a valiant last stand at Amba Alagi, Amedeo di Savoia and the remains of his force finally surrendered on May 19, 1941. Already ill and fatigued, he was transferred to a British prisoner-of-war camp at Nairobi, where he died on March 3, 1942.

GORDON E. HOGG

See also
Italy, Air Force; Somalia

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Savo Island, Battle of (August 9, 1942)

Naval battle in the long struggle between Japan and the United States for control of the Solomon Islands. On August 7, 1942, to protect the lines of communication between the United States and Australia, U.S. marines landed on Guadalcanal and captured a nearly complete Japanese airfield. U.S. vice admiral Frank Jack Fletcher commanded the landing support force that included the aircraft carriers *Saratoga, Wasp,* and *Enterprise;* the battleship *North Carolina;* 5 heavy cruisers; 1 light cruiser; 16 destroyers; and 3 oilers. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner had command of the amphibious force of some 75 transports and support vessels.

On the evening of August 8, claiming inadequate fuel, Fletcher withdrew his carriers. Two days of air operations had also reduced his air strength by 21 percent, but the principal reason for the decision was that Fletcher feared the loss of his carriers in the restricted waters surrounding Guadalcanal.

British rear admiral Victor Crutchley commanded the screening force of cruisers and destroyers. On the night of August 8–9, Crutchley deployed his ships in four main groups to protect the transports. The U.S. cruiser *Chicago* and the destroyers *Bagley* and *Patterson,* along with the Australian cruisers *Australia* and *Canberra,* patrolled the area south of Savo Island. The U.S. cruisers *Vincennes, Astoria,* and *Quincy* and the destroyers *Helm* and *Wilson* patrolled east of Savo Island. The U.S. cruiser *San Juan,* the destroyers *Monssen* and *Buchanan,* and the Australian cruiser *Hobart* patrolled between Guadalcanal and Florida Island. A final group, mostly destroyers, remained near the transports. Finally, the U.S. destroyers *Blue* and *Ralph Talbot* individually acted as pickets seaward of Savo Island.

Within hours of the U.S. landings on August 7, Japanese vice admiral Mikawa Gunichi sailed from Rabaul with the heavy cruisers *Chokai, Aoba, Furutaka, Kako,* and *Kinugasa* along with the light cruisers *Yubari* and *Tenryu* and the destroyer *Yunagi*. He planned to destroy the transports at the landing site.

At 10:45 p.m. on August 8, Turner called a meeting to discuss the withdrawal of Fletcher's carriers. Crutchley sailed to the meeting in the *Australia,* signaling Captain Howard D. Bode of the *Chicago* that he had tactical command. Bode never received the message.

Shortly after midnight, the Japanese superior ability in night operations was confirmed when Mikawa's force slipped past the U.S. destroyer pickets undetected. The Japanese then attacked at high speed and in column. At 1:40 a.m., the *Patterson* was struck by a shell, opening the battle. Over three minutes, the *Canberra* absorbed 24 large-caliber shells and 2 torpedo hits and was put out of the action without firing a shot. The ship sank the next day. The *Chicago* was next. A torpedo struck its bow, and a shell hit the foremast. Confused as to his position, Bode ordered the *Chicago* away from the Japanese.

Unintentionally, the Japanese then divided into two nearly equally strong formations. Both attacked the *Vincennes* group. In 22 minutes, all three U.S. cruisers were out of action, and by the next day all had sunk. Over the course of the battle, the Japanese also damaged the destroyer *Ralph Talbot*. The destroyer *Jarvis,* which had been damaged the preceding day in an air attack, sustained further punishment. Japanese planes sank it on August 9 as it limped to Australia for repairs.

At 2:40 a.m., Mikawa withdrew without attacking the transports at the landing site, which would have had a much more decisive impact on the battle for Guadalcanal. Mikawa feared reprisals from Allied aircraft, not knowing that Fletcher had already departed. In only half an hour, the Allies lost four heavy cruisers and one destroyer. Three other ships were heavily damaged; 1,023 men were dead and another 709 wounded. The Japanese ships suffered some 10 shell hits, 58 dead, and 33 wounded. The only major Japanese loss came on the return, when the U.S. submarine *S-38* torpedoed and sank the *Kako* as it was about to enter Kavieng Harbor.

The Allied disaster in the Battle of Savo Island was due to several causes. First, the Allies ignored reports from an Australian patrol plane that had

spotted Mikawa's group on August 8 and other intelligence indicating a Japanese response to the landings. Furthermore, Crutchley issued patrol plans leaving great gaps that radar could not cover in the restricted waters around Savo Island. Additionally, there was a lack of communication among the Allied ships. Each group was unaware of the location of the others. Allied sailors were also exhausted after two days at general quarters. In contrast, Mikawa concentrated his forces. Japanese sailors were fresh and superbly trained in night-fighting techniques.

There were multiple inquiries into the disaster, but none laid the blame on any individual. Scrutiny fell on Bode, but he was not punished. Nevertheless, he committed suicide in 1943. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz summed up the defeat succinctly when he attributed it to "lack of battle-mindedness." Naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison called it "probably the worst defeat ever inflicted on the United States Navy in a fair fight."

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Crutchley, Sir Victor Alexander Charles; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Mikawa Gunichi; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Turner, Richmond Kelly

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Scapa Flow

The main base of the British Home Fleet in World War II. Located in the Orkney Islands off northern Scotland, Scapa Flow is one of the great natural

harbors/anchorages in the world. Sheltered by Mainland, Graemsay, Burray, South Ronaldsay, and Hoy Islands, it encompasses almost seven square miles of water with depths suitable for the anchoring of large ships. The British Royal Navy first used and fortified the site as an anchorage in 1812 during the Napoleonic Wars for basing warships to protect merchant ships subject to attack by French privateers. In 1905, the Admiralty became interested in Scapa Flow as a base for the Home Fleet, and during World War I, it was home to both the British Grand Fleet and the Northern Patrol enforcing the naval blockade of Germany.

Scapa Flow was the base for the Home Fleet during World War II because it was geographically well suited for warships protecting the Arctic convoys bound for the Soviet Union as well as for closing the entrance to the North Sea. Additionally, a naval base built during World War I to service warships existed at Lyness on the island of Hoy. The British expanded this facility during the war to store up to 100,000 tons of oil for the fleet. Depot ships anchored in Scapa Flow also supplemented supplies provided from ashore.

The anchorage lacked adequate defense against aerial or submarine attack at the outbreak of the war, and the October 14, 1939, sinking of the British battleship *Royal Oak* by a German submarine led to efforts to increase the defenses. Among these was the construction of what became known as the Churchill Barriers—four causeways that closed Kirk Sound, Skerry Sound, Water Sound, and East Weddell Sound and formed the eastern approaches to Scapa Flow—to render penetration by German submarines of the main anchorage more difficult. While not complete until almost the end of the war, these barriers broke the surface of the water in 1942, thus sealing approaches to Scapa Flow. The British employed some 1,200 Italian prisoners of war in the construction of the causeways, technically a breach of the Geneva Convention that banned the use of prisoners of war in labor associated with a country's war effort.

Buttressing the defense of the anchorage were booms, trawlers for minesweeping duty, and antisubmarine vessels. To protect against air attack, the British added 25 antiaircraft guns, radar facilities, and barrage balloons. Finally, the British extended defensive works on the island that housed gun emplacements to guard the anchorage and port facility. Scapa Flow remained in use as a base for the British Royal Navy until its closure in 1956.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also
Great Britain, Navy; *Royal Oak*, HMS, Sinking of

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Scheldt, Battles of the (October–November 1944)

A series of battles waged by British forces against German troops to gain control of the Scheldt estuary and open the port of Antwerp. On September 4, after the German Fifteenth Army escaped from the Breskens Pocket (formed on the mainland north of the Leopold Canal and west of Antwerp), it was disposed to hold the Scheldt estuary and prevent the Allies from opening Antwerp. German commander General Gustav-Adolf von Zangen left only a rear guard on the mainland and concentrated his strength on the South Beveland and Walcheren Islands, both of which formed the northern boundary of the estuary. In late September, British field marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery assigned clearing the Scheldt to the Canadian First Army, which was already engaged in taking the English Channel ports, including Boulogne and Calais.

The British attacks to clear the Scheldt began in October. Canadian lieutenant general Guy Simonds, commanding the Canadian First Army, designed the plan. Simonds had been temporarily elevated from command of the Canadian II Corps because of the illness of Lieutenant General (promoted to general on November 14) Henry Crerar. A key element in Simonds's plan was the destruction of dikes that protected Walcheren from the North Sea. This action flooded most of the island and restricted German movement and communications. Also important was the use of special equipment, including

flamethrower “wasps” (converted universal carriers) and “buffaloes” (amphibious vehicles).

Belgian villagers salvage what they can following the destruction of their homes in the fighting and the flooding of the Scheldt Estuary in late 1944. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Simonds’s plan had three phases. The first called for the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division to seal off South Beveland while the British I Corps drove northeast to cover the flanks of the Canadian II Corps and the British Second Army. The Canadian 3rd Infantry Division cleared the Breskens Pocket in nearly a month of tough fighting. In the second phase, the Canadian 2nd Division and the Scottish 52nd Lowland Division took South Beveland, reaching the causeway to Walcheren at the end of October. Three attempts by the Canadians to cross the causeway ended in failure, although one did gain the other side. The Scottish Division then relieved the exhausted Canadians. In the final phase that began on November 1, commandos amphibiously assaulted the south and west ends of Walcheren, supported by the 52nd Division in the south and east.

It took a week to clear all pockets of German resistance, but the parts of the island that commanded the Scheldt were taken on November 3. Throughout the campaign, the Germans were both ably led and entrenched, providing a tough fight for the Canadians and British.

The battles to clear the Scheldt estuary cost the Allies 13,000 casualties. The first oceangoing ships arrived on November 29. Denying the Allies use of the port for nearly three months delayed the defeat of Germany considerably. The Germans also harassed Antwerp with V-1 buzz bombs and V-2 rockets, which, however, had little effect on port operations beyond the decision to transfer ammunition resupply to other ports. The terror weapons killed many civilians and caused much damage to the city, however. Montgomery admitted after the war that delaying redirecting the full weight of his forces to clear the Scheldt until October 16 had been a mistake.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

Antwerp, Battle of; Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Simonds, Guy Granville; V-1 Buzz Bomb; V-2 Rocket

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Schepke, Joachim (1912–1941)

German Navy lieutenant and submariner. Born on March 8, 1912, in Flensburg, Germany, Joachim Schepke entered the German Navy in 1930. As a junior lieutenant, he commanded the Type II coastal submarines *U-3* and *U-19* before he assumed command of the *U-100*, a Type VIIC oceangoing submarine, on May 30, 1940.

On the evening of September 21, 1940, Schepke attacked the 41-ship Allied convoy HX.72 and succeeded in sinking seven ships with a total of 50,340 gross register tonnage within only 4 hours, earning him the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Schepke further distinguished himself in convoy battles against SC.7 and SC.11. From the latter convoy, he sank seven ships

within 13 hours. For these successes, he was awarded the Iron Cross Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves.

During a wolf pack night attack on March 17, 1941, comprising the *U-37*, *U-74*, *U-99* (Lieutenant Otto Kretschmer), *U-100*, and *U-110* against convoy HX.112, Schepke's boat suffered depth-charging by Royal Navy destroyers *Walker* and *Vanoc*. The *U-100* escaped, but the *Vanoc* used its newly installed Type 286 M radar to detect the boat on the surface at a range of some 1,000 yards. The destroyer rammed and sank the *U-100*, killing Schepke and most of his crew. It was the first recorded sinking of a U-boat attributed to radar detection. Schepke has been credited with sinking 37 ships totaling 145,842 gross register tonnage.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Depth Charges; Kretschmer, Otto August Wilhelm; Radar; Submarines; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Schindler, Oskar (1908–1974)

German businessman who saved some 1,200 Jews from certain imprisonment or death during World War II. Oskar Schindler was of German heritage but was born in Zwittau, Moravia, Austria-Hungary (now in the Czech Republic), on April 28, 1908. Raised a Catholic, he received only the equivalent of a high school education before becoming a salesman. He held a number of different positions in business thereafter and several times attempted to start his own commercial enterprise, with no success. In 1935, he joined the Sudeten German Party, a separatist group. Within a short period of time, Schindler also began to work clandestinely for the Abwehr—the German military intelligence organization. In the summer of 1938, Czechoslovakian authorities jailed him for his activities, but he was soon released. The

following year, he joined the Nazi Party, chiefly because he believed that he could profit from it rather than having any allegiance to its ideology.

After the German invasion of Poland began on September 1, 1939, Schindler purchased an enamelware factory near Kraków. In the meantime, he continued to work sporadically for German intelligence, which lent the impression that he was at least sympathetic to German war aims. His accountant, a German-speaking Jew by the name of Itzhak Stern, helped Schindler secure the services of some 1,100 Polish Jews to work in his factory. All the while, Schindler ingratiated himself with local German authorities, attending parties and mingling with Schutzstaffel (SS) officers.

Schindler witnessed more and more brutality toward Jews in Kraków, which troubled him greatly. After German soldiers rounded up scores of Jews in 1943 for deportation to concentration camps, Schindler stepped up his efforts to shield his Jewish workers from Nazi atrocities. On several occasions he was arrested or accused of violating the Nuremberg Laws, but each time his charm and cunning prevailed. Increasingly, Schindler defended his workforce and claimed exemptions for them because his business was considered essential to the war effort. Schindler treated his workers fairly and civilly, even permitting them to pray.

Late in the war, as Soviet troops advanced to the west, Schindler learned that German officials planned to close all factories in Poland, including his own. He then convinced SS officials to allow him to operate a factory in Brünnlitz (now in the Czech Republic), where he would manufacture military items. He also received approval to relocate his mostly Jewish labor force of some 1,200 to the new facility, under the premise that the workers were already trained and hence indispensable. Before the move, which took place in October 1944, a list of 1,200 workers—mostly Jews—was drawn up and presented to the authorities.

After setting up shop in the new plant, which was now ordered to produce parts for the V-2 rocket as well as hand grenades, Schindler and his small management team purposely misled authorities by giving them the impression that they were immersed in war work. In reality, few military items were made in the factory, and those that were had been purposely sabotaged. By mid-1945, Schindler and his family had closed the facility and fled to Austria. Almost all of his workers survived.

Upon arrival in Austria, the businessman was nearly broke, but the tales

of his heroic deeds were already known to occupation officials. Schindler later engaged in a number of new business ventures, all of which failed. He ultimately took up residence in West Germany in 1958, where another commercial venture failed. He remained there for the rest of his life, subsisting on a small government pension. Schindler died on October 9, 1974, in Hildesheim, West Germany. His deeds were later brought to light in a book published by Thomas Keneally titled *Schindler's List*. In 1993, Steven Spielberg produced a riveting and popular film rendition of the book, also titled *Schindler's List*. Schindler's remains rest on Mount Zion in Israel, where he had requested burial to be with his "children." He is the only former Nazi Party member interred in Israel. His grave continues to be a popular visitation site and is piled high with Kaddish stones, a sign of love and gratitude of the Jewish people.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Czechoslovakia; Germany; Nuremberg Laws; Poland

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Schmid, Anton (1900–1942)

German Army sergeant executed for assisting Jews during the Holocaust. Born in Vienna on January 9, 1900, Anton Schmid enlisted in the German Army in 1938. Following the June 22, 1941, German invasion of the Soviet Union, he was assigned to the Vilnius ghetto in Lithuania that autumn. In Vilnius, Schmid met many Jewish workers who were assigned to perform various tasks in and around his office. Shocked when he witnessed the execution of Jews a few miles from Vilnius, Schmid resolved to assist the Jews in any way possible.

Schmid hid Jews in three houses of which he had charge. He also did everything in his power to free people from the Lakishki jail. In addition,

Schmid was involved with the Jewish underground, transporting members of the Resistance in his truck and supplying them with identity papers.

In January 1942, Schmid was arrested for these activities, and on February 25 he was brought before a military tribunal. Found guilty, he was shot by a firing squad on April 13, 1942. Schmid is credited with saving the lives of more than 250 people. On May 16, 1967, the Israeli government posthumously awarded Schmid the Righteous Among the Nations medal.

CRAIG S. HAMILTON

See also

Holocaust; Resistance

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Schnaufer, Heinz Wolfgang (1922–1950)

German Air Force major. Born in Stuttgart on February 16, 1922, Heinz Wolfgang Schnaufer entered the Luftwaffe in 1939 and completed flight training in 1941. Trained to fly the Bf-110 twin-engine interceptor, Schnaufer and his radio operator, Fritz Rumplehardt, elected to join the Luftwaffe's night-fighter force. The two remained together throughout the war. In November, they were assigned to Nachtjagd-geschwader 1 (Night-Fighter Wing 1) of II Gruppe (Group, thus II/NJC1) near Hamburg.

Schnaufer did not score his first kill until June 1942, and by the end of the year his score was only 7. In July 1943, he was promoted to first lieutenant and given command of 12th Staffel (Squadron) NJG1. By December 1943, he had shot down 42 Allied aircraft and been awarded the Knight's Cross. In June 1944, when he had increased his score to 84, he was awarded the Oak Leaves. The next month, he was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords for his tally of 89 victories. Following his 100th victory in October 1944, Schnaufer was given Germany's highest award, the Diamonds to the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Sword. He was the last

Luftwaffe pilot to be awarded the Diamonds. Schnaufer ended the war as the commander of IV/NJG1 with a final score of 121 Allied aircraft shot down.

Known to Royal Air Force Bomber Command as the "Night Ghost of Saint Trond" for his exploits from his operational base, Schnaufer surrendered to the British in May 1945 but was released by the end of the year. Following the war, Schnaufer took over the family wine business. He died on July 15, 1950, in Munich, from injuries sustained in an automobile accident two days earlier.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also
Germany, Air Force

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Scholl, Hans (1918–1943) and Sophie (1921–1943)

Members of the German opposition movement. Hans Scholl was born on September 28, 1918, in Ingersheim. His sister, Sophie Scholl, was born on May 9, 1921, in Forchtenberg am Kocher. In late 1933, Hans Scholl joined the Hitler Youth, but he soon became disillusioned with National Socialism. In 1937, he and some of his friends were briefly jailed for "subversive activities" in the Jugendbewegung (Youth Movement).

Although Sophie joined the Bund Deutscher Mädel (Association of German Girls) at the age of 12, her initial enthusiasm gradually gave way to criticism. She was aware of the dissenting political views of her father, of friends, and also of some teachers. The arrest of her brother and his friends in 1937 left a strong impression on her.

In March 1937, Hans was drafted into the Reichsarbeitsdienst (National Labor Service, RAD). Two years of military service with a cavalry unit in

Bad Cannstatt followed. As a member of the armed forces, Hans began studying medicine at the University of Munich in 1939.

In the spring of 1940, Sophie Scholl became a kindergarten teacher. She chose this profession hoping that it would be recognized as alternate service to the RAD, membership in which was a prerequisite for university admission. From the spring of 1941, however, she served six months of auxiliary war service as a nursery school teacher, and the militaristic regimen of the RAD convinced her to practice passive resistance.

In the summer of 1940, Hans was sent as a member of the student medical corps with the German Army when it invaded France. Later that year, he returned to Munich, where he joined with Christoph Probst and others to form the White Rose, a resistance group. From the end of July to October 1940, Hans Scholl served as a medic on the Eastern Front.

In May 1942, Sophie joined Hans at the University of Munich, and she insisted on being included in the White Rose. The group's activities included publishing leaflets calling for the restoration of democracy and social justice. During the summer of 1942, the Scholls' father was imprisoned for making a critical remark about Adolf Hitler to an employee.

Hans Scholl and Alexander Schmorell wrote the *Leaflets of the White Rose*, which were scathing in their criticism of Germans who did nothing to oppose the Third Reich. Three more leaflets titled *Leaflets of the Resistance* were issued, each more hard-hitting than the last. The initial two called for passive resistance in a largely philosophical way. The third leaflet advocated specific measures such as sabotage of armament plants, obstruction of scientific, war-related research, and boycotts of cultural institutions that enhanced the Nazi image.

After publication of the fourth leaflet, the White Rose suspended activities because Hans Scholl and other core members were sent as part of a student medical unit to the Eastern Front. Their experiences in this campaign only hardened their resolve, and on their return to Munich, they expanded White Rose activities to other German universities. The leaflets were at first sent anonymously to people all over Germany. Two final leaflets appeared, one in January and the last in mid-February 1943.

The Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) was soon involved and found it relatively easy to track down the perpetrators. Hans and Sophie Scholl were arrested on February 18, 1943, while distributing the sixth leaflet at the

University of Munich. Probst was taken two days later. On February 22, Sophie, Hans, and Christoph were condemned to death. They were executed by guillotine a few hours later. Both Scholls were later hailed as martyrs by the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

PETER OVERLACK

See also
Germany; Resistance

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Schörner, Ferdinand (1892–1973)

German field marshal. Born in Munich on May 12, 1892, Ferdinand Schörner served in the Bavarian Army before attending the universities at Munich, Lausanne, and Grenoble. Commissioned an officer in October 1914, Schörner specialized in mountain warfare. He served on both the Italian front and the Western Front in World War I and was wounded. Following the war, he fought with the Freikorps before joining the Reichswehr. Although Schörner served on the General Staff, he much preferred line service.

Lieutenant Colonel Schörner took command of the 98th Mountain Regiment in 1937. Promoted to colonel in 1939, he led his unit in the invasion of Poland in September 1939. He commanded the 6th Mountain Division in the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940. Promoted to major general in August, he led the same unit in the April 1941 German invasion of Greece. Schörner's division was then transferred to the Arctic in 1941 and 1942. There he took command of Mountain Corps Norway in January 1942 as a lieutenant general. He was promoted to general of mountain troops, and his force was reorganized as the XIX Mountain Corps in June 1942.

Transferred to south Russia in October 1943, Schörner took command of Army Detachment Nikopol. Following a brief period in staff work with the high command in March 1944, Schörner was promoted to colonel general. He commanded Army Group South Ukraine from March to July 1944 and Army Group North Ukraine from July 1944 to January 1945.

Schörner commanded Army Group Center from January to May 1945, which he managed to keep largely intact until the German surrender. Promoted to field marshal in April 1945 and named in Adolf Hitler's testament to succeed Hitler as head of the German Army (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres), Schörner had several of his own men executed for cowardice. He was one of the most brutal of German army generals.

Held prisoner by the Soviets after the war, Schörner was sentenced to 25 years in prison as a war criminal, but he was released in January 1955. He returned to the Federal Republic of Germany, where he found himself accused by the Association of Returned Prisoners of War and his former chief of staff, Lieutenant General Oldwig von Natzmer, with ordering the execution of thousands of German soldiers in drumhead courts-martial. In 1957, a Munich court found him guilty and sentenced him to 4.5 years in prison and loss of his military pension for executing without trial a soldier found drunk at the wheel of an army truck.

Veterans of the 6th Mountain Division themselves raised the sum lost in the pension and more to give to their former commander. Following his release, Schörner lived in Munich, where he died on July 2, 1973.

SPENCER C. TUCKER AND JOHN P. VANZO

See also

Eastern Front; France, Battle for; Greece Campaign, German; Hitler, Adolf; Poland Campaign

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Schuschnigg, Kurt von (1897–1977)

Austrian chancellor. Born in Riva (today Lake Garda, Italy) on December 14, 1897, Kurt von Schuschnigg fought in the Austro-Hungarian Army during World War I. After the war, he studied law at the University of Innsbruck and became a lawyer. Schuschnigg joined the Christian Social Party and was elected to the national legislature in 1927.

In 1932, Schuschnigg was appointed minister of justice. The following year, he also became minister of education in Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss's cabinet.

Upon the assassination of Dollfuss in July 1934, Schuschnigg became chancellor. He attempted to eliminate the threat from the Heimwehr, a paramilitary rightist defense force, by disbanding it. But it was the illegal Austrian Nazi Party that represented the real danger for his government and Austria's independence. Continuing the authoritarian course of his predecessor, Schuschnigg rejected any reconciliation with the Social Democrats to establish a common defense against German aspirations for Anschluss (union with Austria). Furthermore, Schuschnigg's sympathies with the Hapsburg dynasty isolated his country among the European democracies. The situation turned hopeless when Benito Mussolini, Austria's former protector, aligned himself with Germany in the Axis alliance.

Austrian chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg addresses a delegation of Boy Scouts in front of the Chancellory in Vienna. An opponent of the German takeover of his country, he was imprisoned for the duration of the war. (Three Lions/Getty Images)

Schuschnigg capitulated to German chancellor Adolf Hitler during a meeting at Berchtesgaden in February 1938, promising to allow the Austrian Nazi Party legal existence. In addition, he was forced to incorporate Nazis into his government, among them Arthur Seyss-Inquart as minister of the interior. A few days later, the Nazis began a seizure of power in the provinces.

On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg attempted to regain control by arranging for a plebiscite on Austrian independence to be held on March 13. The German Wehrmacht invaded two days before the scheduled plebiscite, and under heavy German pressure, Schuschnigg was forced to resign and to call publicly for no resistance to the invasion.

Schuschnigg was subsequently arrested and sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he and his family received unusually comfortable treatment until they were liberated in May 1945. Following his release, Schuschnigg immigrated to the United States, where he was a professor of international law at Saint Louis University from 1948 to 1967. Returning to Austria, he wrote *Im Kampf gegen Hitler* (1969), published in English as *The*

Brutal Takeover (1971). Schuschnigg died in Mutters, Austria, on November 18, 1977.

MARTIN MOLL

See also
Austria; Seyss-Inquart, Arthur

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Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids (1943)

The attack by the U.S. Eighth Air Force on Schweinfurt and Regensburg on August 17, 1943, and the follow-up mission against Schweinfurt on October 14, 1943, were designed to disrupt the German war economy and vindicate U.S. commitment to unescorted daylight precision bombing. Lieutenant General Ira Eaker's Eighth Air Force celebrated the first anniversary of American heavy bomber operations from England in August by striking the two most critical targets on their objective list, the anti–friction-bearing plants at Schweinfurt and the large Messerschmitt aircraft factory complex at Regensburg. This was the deepest penetration into Germany flown to date by U.S. bombers. The attack plan was designed to force the German fighters to meet nearly simultaneous attacks.

The 3rd Bombardment Division, commanded by Brigadier General Curtis LeMay, was supposed to take off first, hit Regensburg, and then proceed to landing fields in North Africa. The 1st Bombardment Division, commanded by Brigadier General Bob Williams, was to follow about 30 minutes later; the hope was that it would find its route to Schweinfurt unobstructed by enemy fighters lured away by LeMay's force.

Heavy fog ruined these well-laid plans. Because of special training and innovative assembly techniques, the 3rd Division took off in the thick cloud cover, but the 1st Division did not. LeMay's bombers could not wait around and were sent off to Regensburg. The other force did not get airborne for

more than three hours, giving defending German fighters a chance to refuel and rearm. Escorting Republic P-47 Thunderbolts did not have the range to protect the bombers past Aachen on the German border, and the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses suffered terribly. Of the 376 that began the raid, 60 were shot down; 24 of those belonged to LeMay. Of the 146 aircraft LeMay took to Regensburg, only about half were able to fly back from North Africa. But the feisty air leader did attack Bordeaux on the way home. Bombing at Regensburg had inflicted some damage on most key buildings, but results at Schweinfurt were not as satisfactory, although some essential machinery was destroyed.

Plans for the return to Schweinfurt on October 14 were just as complicated and also foiled by weather. A total of 149 B-17s from the 1st Division and 142 from the 3rd Division would cross enemy defenses about 30 miles apart, while a third force of Consolidated B-24 Liberators attacked from the south. The B-24s could not assemble properly because of bad weather and flew an uneventful feint instead. The B-17s met an unusually well-coordinated fighter defense using rockets, cannons, and bombs. The attacking force lost 59 bombers over Germany. Another bomber ditched in the English Channel, and 5 others were abandoned over England or crashed on landing. Of the 257 B-17s that made it into Germany, only 50 were not damaged by flak or fighters.

The October 14 attack caused the most damage to the ball-bearing plants of any of the 16 such U.S. Army Air Forces missions during the war. Although Allied leaders exaggerated their success, the 10 percent damage inflicted on the factories inspired the Germans to diversify and disperse their ball-bearing facilities. More important was the effect of the raid on the American bomber force.

Leaders realized that they could not sustain such heavy losses, and deep-penetration raids were suspended while force strength was rebuilt and long-range fighter escorts were developed. By the time the Eighth Air Force returned to Schweinfurt four months later, though, its efforts to destroy the dispersed and reorganized industry were doomed to failure.

CONRAD C. CRANE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; “Big Week” Air Battle; Eaker, Ira Clarence; LeMay, Curtis Emerson

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Seabees

U.S. Navy construction battalions. Organized during the opening days of U.S. involvement in World War II, the Seabees built the infrastructure that enabled the navy to extend its operations globally during the war. Seabees turned the jungles of the Pacific islands into the docks and air bases that allowed the United States to carry out its island-hopping and leapfrogging strategies and to conduct the strategic bombing of Japan.

As U.S. involvement in the war approached in 1941, Rear Admiral Ben Moreell saw that the continued construction of overseas bases, which would be essential to the United States in the event of war with Japan, would be in jeopardy because the civilian crews, which were prohibited from carrying weapons by international law, were at risk from enemy attack. As a solution, he advocated the creation of an organization composed of skilled construction laborers who were naval personnel. After the labor unions protested that these battalions would take work away from civilian construction workers, Moreell agreed that his units would only serve overseas, leaving stateside construction for civilian contractors.

A U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee for CB) road crew lays a four-lane highway on the island of Guam in late 1944. (PhotoQuest/Getty Images)

On January 2, 1942, Congress authorized the organization of Naval Construction Battalions, the nickname “Seabee” being derived from the initials “C” and “B.” The Seabee symbol was a flying fighting bee wearing a sailor cap and carrying a machine gun, a wrench, and a hammer. The slogan of the Seabees was “Construimus, Batuimus” (We Build, We Fight).

In a change from other navy units, Seabees were commanded by officers of the Civil Engineering Corps (CEC) who were trained for construction work. The 250,000 men and 8,000 officers who became Seabees were men who had built American roads and skyscrapers. Seabees were recruited based on their civilian skills and experience in more than 60 skilled trades.

Because experience was the key factor, normal physical standards applied to fighting men were relaxed. Seabees ranged in age from 18 to 50, with the average being 37. There were reports that some Seabees were as old as 60. Seabees also received higher pay than the average enlisted man; their pay was equivalent at least to that of petty officers. Because their primary mission was to build, not fight, the Seabees spent only three weeks at boot camp and received only basic small-arms training.

Seabees served in all the war theaters and took part in most of the major operations, but the majority of them served in the South Pacific theater. They

built new naval bases and additions to existing ones, docks, staging facilities, warehouses, hospitals, roads, and airstrips. Aided by such innovations as Marston mats, Quonset huts, and prefabricated buildings, Seabee units were able to construct large air bases in a matter of days.

Special battalions were also organized, known as Seabee Special Battalions. The 1st Seabee Special Battalion was composed of enlisted men trained as stevedores and longshoremen to unload the ships in combat zones. Among other units were those that maintained the bases, repaired tires, built pontoon bridges, drove trucks, and handled the transportation and storage of fuel. Although they were not organized as a fighting unit, individual Seabees received 33 Silver Stars and 5 Navy Crosses during the war.

PAMELA FELTUS

See also

Logistics, Allied; Moreell, Ben; Southwest Pacific Theater; Two-Ocean Navy Program; United States Navy

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SEA LION, Operation, Planning for (1940)

German preparations for an invasion of Britain. As early as November 1939, commander of the German Navy Grand Admiral Erich Raeder had ordered a study of the feasibility of a landing in Britain. The study was to detail the problems the small German Navy would confront in conducting an invasion in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the Royal Navy. Following the successful German occupation of Norway and the progress of the German Army against France, Raeder ordered a second study and presented the results to a surprised Adolf Hitler on June 4, 1940. The führer had not yet considered the invasion of England a possibility.

Raeder's purpose in this case, unlike his energetic promotion of the occupation of Norway, Operation WESERÜBUNG (WESER EXERCISE), was to

forestall any attempt by others to influence Hitler for a rash descent on Britain. The Naval Command still had reservations about an invasion, especially after heavy losses in the Norwegian Campaign, and Raeder argued that the focus should remain on the surface, air, and U-boat campaign against Britain's maritime supply lines. Even with Germany's improved geographic position as a consequence of its acquisition of the French Atlantic and English Channel ports, available sealift transport and landing craft were both lacking.

Hitler still held to his idea that the British would see reason and be forced to the peace table. He also feared that a total defeat of England would benefit the United States and Japan. The failure of London to respond to Hitler's peace feelers, however, led him to initiate immediate preparations for an invasion. On July 16 Hitler issued Directive 16, "On Preparation for a Landing Operation against England," which placed the navy primarily in a transport role. The key precondition for Operation SEA LION (SEELÖWE), as the invasion of Britain was to be known, projected for September 15, 1940, was German air superiority.

The German Army's demand for a broad-front landing caused an intense debate with naval leaders, who preferred a narrow-front approach. Both services vigorously sought to persuade Hitler to support their proposal. Initially the army won support for its plans, but a compromise was reached on August 26. The army also had no real enthusiasm for an enterprise that, as Raeder lectured them, was not another river crossing. In its planning, the navy estimated that convoying 13 divisions in the initial assault wave against Britain would require 155 transports and 3,350 smaller craft: 1,720 barges, 470 tugs, and 1,160 motorboats. Conflicting interests and rivalries prevented any real collaboration among the army, navy, and air force.

The massive preparations undertaken by the navy to assemble the necessary landing craft have been well documented and indicate that the navy did its best to comply with the führer's decision. The debate lingers as to whether Operation SEA LION was simply a propaganda ploy and a diversion for other military operations, however, especially as Hitler was already contemplating an invasion of the Soviet Union. Certainly, Raeder was skeptical, and he persistently pointed out the impact of the invasion preparations on the navy and maritime transportation as well as the risks of mounting an operation and supplying an invasion force of at least 40

divisions in waters controlled by the enemy. For Raeder, Operation SEA LION remained a last resort, but he loyally continued preparations. Even as he sensed Hitler's equivocation over Operation SEA LION, Raeder spoke positively of the chances for a successful landing.

On August 1, 1940, a Hitler directive ordered the Luftwaffe to switch its preinvasion tactics to a strategic air offensive and to be prepared to switch targets at any time if a new invasion date was set. The failure of the Luftwaffe to control the skies over Britain and the approach of bad weather resulted in the decision to indefinitely postpone the invasion. On October 12, Operation SEA LION was definitively deferred until the spring of 1941. Until 1942, it continued to serve as a deception.

For Hitler, Operation SEA LION became a means of psychological warfare. Raeder continued to report on the navy's planning efforts (e.g., the development of new landing craft), but, as he later reflected, these had been to no effect and had needlessly tied up resources. Yet Operation SEA LION had allowed Raeder to keep the navy and its needs in front of the führer. If the navy's grand building plans in the aftermath of a defeat of the Soviet Union had been successful, no direct attack on Britain would have been necessary.

Had the German invasion occurred and proven successful, commander in chief of the Reichswehr Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch had decreed that "The able-bodied male population between the ages of 17 and 45 will, unless the local situation calls for an exceptional ruling, be interned and dispatched to the Continent." Great Britain was then to be plundered for anything of worth, civilian hostages were to be taken, and the death penalty was to be imposed for any act of resistance. Most likely the deported males would have been employed as industrial slave labor in the Reich.

KEITH W. BIRD

See also

Britain, Battle of; Germany, Navy; Hitler, Adolf; Raeder, Erich

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Sedan, Battle of (May 14, 1940)

Engagement in which the German Army broke through French lines on May 14, 1940, during the Battle for France (May 10–June 25). Located north of the Maginot Line and astride the Meuse River, the city of Sedan was in a poorly defended sector, serving as the pivot point for the German envelopment of Allied forces in the Low Countries under the German operations plan SICHELSCHNITT (SICKLE CUT).

While the German attack into the Low Countries drew the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and principal French armies into Belgium, Panzer Group Kleist under Colonel General Paul von Kleist quietly moved through the Ardennes with the first units of General of Panzer Troops Heinz Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps, arriving opposite at Sedan on the evening of May 12. General Charles Huntziger's French Second Army defended the Sedan vicinity, but it was not unduly alarmed by the German arrival.

Preceded by an accurate and demoralizing five-hour bombing attack of French defensive positions conducted principally by Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers, on May 13 German infantry and motorcyclists succeeded in crossing the Meuse east and west of Sedan. The French defenders, consisting mostly of new reservists, were surprised by the rapid German crossing. Despite the lack of reserves in addition to insufficient artillery and air support, the French resisted fiercely but were gradually driven back. By the end of May 13, the Germans had secured a bridgehead three miles wide and six miles deep. German military engineers worked feverishly to construct pontoon bridges and tank ferries.

The commander of the French 55th Infantry Division at Sedan, General of Division Henri Jean Lafontaine, remained calm and prepared to continue the fight. Unfortunately, others were not so determined. To the north, General André Georges Corap's French Ninth Army had already retreated, leaving the Second Army's flank exposed. Within the French Second Army some commanders, believing that the Germans had already penetrated the French positions, ordered their units to retreat. The retreat of these units started a panic within the French forces.

Despite this, the French sent two tank battalions and two infantry regiments to counterattack the bridgehead. The French attempted a two-pronged counterattack on May 14 with their 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armored Divisions, but only the 3rd was able to reach a part of Guderian's forces. The French armored unit lacked the tactical flexibility to mount an effective attack and suffered heavy casualties, not to German armor but to the antitank guns of the German assault engineers. After losing half their tanks, the French withdrew. Repeated air attacks by French and British bombers throughout the day achieved little and brought heavy air losses for the attackers.

By the end of May 14, the French defenders were in complete disarray. The French 55th and 71st Infantry Divisions sustained heavy casualties and fled the battlefield, causing panic in the neighboring French X Corps. The German bridgehead was now 30 miles wide and 15 miles deep. The Germans also held the key terrain, which denied the French the ability to mount an effective counterattack.

During the course of the battle, the realistic training and combat experience of the German forces proved decisive. German commanders were aggressive and rapidly pursued any advantage they discovered. Their use of combined arms gave them an unmatched tactical flexibility and agility and allowed them to constantly outmaneuver and destroy the French forces piecemeal. By May 15, Guderian's forces were across the Meuse River in strength and ready to exploit the opening they had punched in the French defenses.

C. J. HORN

See also

Corap, André Georges; France, Battle for; Guderian, Heinz; Huntziger, Charles Léon Clément; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Maginot Line; Manstein, Erich von; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; SICHELSCHNITT, Operation

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Seelow Heights, Battle of (April 16–19, 1945)

Important battle during the Red Army's Berlin Campaign (April 16–May 7, 1945). On April 15, 1945, Soviet marshal Georgi Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front reached the forward positions of German general of infantry Theodor Busse's Ninth Army. Busse's 100,000 men were positioned on the high ground of the Seelow Heights that dominated the Oder River's floodplain and key approach route to Berlin. They had spent four weeks preparing defensive positions, building bunkers, laying obstacles, and establishing "kill zones." But with the Soviet Air Force commanding the skies and having more than 1 million men, 3,000 tanks, and 16,000 artillery pieces and mortars, Zhukov enjoyed overwhelming numerical and firepower superiority.

Busse's superior, Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici, commander of Army Group Vistula, had decided not to resist the Soviet crossing at the Oder but instead to fortify the Seelow Heights and surrounding terrain, building three lines of resistance. The spring thaw had softened the ground, making it difficult for armored vehicles to maneuver, and Heinrici had his engineers release water from the upstream reservoir, turning the already soggy Oder floodplain to a morass.

Zhukov opened his attack with a massive artillery barrage during the early predawn hours of April 16 but inflicted little initial damage. Heinrici had anticipated the Soviets' timing and withdrawn the bulk of his screen just hours earlier. German artillery, having preregistered major areas of the battlefield, inflicted heavy casualties on the advancing Soviet forces. Zhukov, who was competing with 1st Ukrainian Front commander Marshal Ivan Konev for the honor of taking Berlin, quickly committed his reserves. The initial advance was very slow, with the Soviets gaining only 2.5 to 3.5 miles and penetrating the Germans' first line of defense. The German second line remained intact, with the Germans effectively employing their antiaircraft artillery against the Soviet armor.

Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front had greater success, and Stalin therefore informed Zhukov that he had approved Konev turning north and driving on Berlin. Zhukov now redoubled his efforts, burning up artillery. The Soviets made another 2.5- to 5-mile advance on April 17, with Zhukov's Forty-Seventh Army and Third Shock Army penetrating the German second defensive line. To the south, Konev's forces pushed back the Fourth Panzer Army and Army Group Center. Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner kept his two remaining panzer divisions in reserve rather than commit them to support Fourth Panzer Army, but with Konev's advance threatening to encircle Army Group Center, Schoerner finally committed his reserves on April 18. By that date, however, the Seelow Heights had been bypassed from the north. By nightfall, the Soviets had advanced another 2 to 5 miles in the German center and 2 to 3 miles on the German right flank, reaching Busse's third line of defense.

Zhukov finally broke through Busse's final line and drove past Seelow Heights at midday on April 19. The gateway to Berlin was now open, with only broken German formations and rear echelons between Zhukov and the German capital. Zhukov's forces enveloped the Fourth Panzer Army and the Ninth Army. The bulk of Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front rushed north to Berlin, while other elements drove west toward the approaching Americans. Germany's Eastern Front had dissolved. Encircled by April 23, Berlin fell nine days later. The Germans lost about 12,300 killed in the Battle of Seelow Heights. Some estimates put Soviet battle deaths as high as 33,000.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Berlin, Land Battle for; Heinrici, Gotthard; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Schörner, Ferdinand; Stalin, Joseph; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Selective Service Act (September 1940)

U.S. conscription legislation passed more than a year before American intervention in World War II. In mid-July 1940, German troops had overrun France and the Low Countries. During a speech accepting the Democratic nomination for a third term, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed support for a draft bill that would make all young American men liable for military service. This action took some political courage, as Roosevelt was running for reelection in a campaign that would be dominated by the issue of peace. Although most Americans supported the Allies, they also feared intervention in the war and hoped that aid to Britain would suffice to check Germany. At this time, Roosevelt publicly argued that substantial increases in U.S. military forces were necessary primarily to defend U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere and deter aggressors.

The eventual legislation's drafting and passage relied heavily on lobbying and publicity by a small group of dedicated pro-Allied eastern patricians who consciously looked back to the comparable efforts they had undertaken for World War I mobilization. They worked closely with sympathetic politicians, notably Senator Edward R. Burke (Democrat, Nebraska) and Congressman James W. Wadsworth (Republican, New York), who sponsored the bill that eventually emerged, and consulted frequently with military leaders, including army chief of staff General George C. Marshall. After considerable debate, Congress passed the Selective Service Act in September 1940, the first peacetime draft in U.S. history, to raise an army of no more than 900,000 men. Initially, the draft was restricted to men between the ages of 21 and 35. Terms of service were to be 12 months rather than the 18 months the army originally sought, and deployment was to be limited to the Western Hemisphere.

In August 1941 as the international situation deteriorated, Congress, by a one-vote margin, removed these restrictions. Between the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack and 1945, almost 10 million Americans were inducted into the military under this legislation. The original Selective Service Act expired in 1947, although Cold War tensions prompted the passage of replacement legislation in 1948.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Marshall, George Catlett; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States; Document 73

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Senger und Etterlin, Fridolin Rudolf von (1891–1963)

German Army general of panzer troops. Born in Waldshut on September 4, 1891, into a noble family, Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin attended Eton College and was a Rhodes Scholar from 1912 to 1914. He was commissioned in the German Army at the outbreak of World War I, and following the war he remained in the Reichswehr as a cavalry instructor.

Senger rose through the ranks, serving at the cavalry school in Hanover (1919–1921) and then as chief of staff of the Cavalry Inspectorate. An opponent of the all-tank theorists, Senger supported development of mechanized infantry (Panzergrenadiers). In March 1939, he was promoted to colonel and given command of a regiment, which he later led in the September 1 invasion of Poland. He commanded a mechanized brigade in the invasion of France on May 10, 1940. Senger's cosmopolitan background led to his appointment as chief of the German delegation to the Franco-Italian armistice commission following the surrender of France in June.

In September 1941, Senger was promoted to major general and commanded the 17th Panzer Division. He led the division in Operation BARBAROSSA, which began on June 22, 1941, and in Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's subsequent offensive in the Ukraine. In 1943, doubts about the capability of Italian troops led to Senger's promotion to lieutenant general and reassignment to coordinate Axis strategy in Sicily. He remained in Italy for the rest of the war and led German troops in several significant battles, including the withdrawal from Sardinia and Corsica and the Battle of Monte Cassino.

Promoted to general of panzer troops in January 1944, Senger oversaw the negotiations that led to the surrender of German forces in Italy in May 1945. Held as a prisoner of war from 1946 to 1948, on his release he became the headmaster of Salem, a public school near Lake Constance. During the 1950s, he advised Federal Republic of Germany president Konrad Adenauer on rearmament and the formation of the new German military, the Bundeswehr. Senger died in Freiburg im Breisgau on January 4, 1963.

THOMAS LANSFORD

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; France, Battle for; Italy Campaign; Manstein, Erich von; Poland Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of

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Sevastopol, Siege of (October 30, 1941–July 4, 1942)

One of the great battles on the Eastern Front. Sevastopol is located on the southwestern tip of the Crimean Peninsula. In 1941, it was one of the world's most powerful fortresses and home to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Its location made any approach to the city difficult, and it was strongly defended by large concrete bunkers, minefields, and a dozen naval gun batteries containing 42 heavy guns ranging from 152mm to 304mm in caliber.

Securing Sevastopol was a major German military objective. By taking the entire Crimean Peninsula with Sevastopol, Adolf Hitler sought to deny the Red Air Force the ability to strike the Ploieşti oil fields, which were vital to the German war effort. He also hoped that destruction of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet might bring neutral Turkey into the war against the Soviet Union. Hitler was determined to have Sevastopol, but Soviet leader Joseph Stalin

was just as determined to hold it. In Soviet hands, it could threaten any further German advance into the southern Soviet Union.

Sevastopol came under air attack in the first hours of the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. From late September to mid-November, General of Infantry Erich von Manstein's Eleventh Army overran the entire Crimean Peninsula except for Sevastopol. Meanwhile, during the last two weeks of October the Soviets reinforced the base, sending to Sevastopol by sea from Odessa the remains of Major General Ivan Yefimovich Petrov's Independent Maritime Army, some 32,000 men. Petrov, who took command of all ground forces at Sevastopol, immediately set his men to work building three defensive lines, the most northerly of which was 10 miles from the fortress. Vice Admiral Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrsky had overall command of Sevastopol and used his cruisers and destroyers to bring in supplies from Novorossiysk, which they could reach overnight. In all, Oktyabrsky commanded about 102,000 men. Manstein had the smallest German army on the Eastern Front—seven divisions comprising about 100,000 troops—but with more guns and many more aircraft. There were few tanks on either side.

The siege itself began on October 30, when Manstein mounted the first effort to break through the well-fortified Soviet lines. After three weeks, the attack had barely penetrated the Soviet defenses and was halted. On December 17, the Germans launched a second and more intense attack that breached the three defensive lines and pushed to within five miles of the city. The Soviets, however, fought for every inch of ground. The rainy and cold weather became a serious problem for the Germans, who were ill-prepared in summer uniforms.

The fighting was bitter, and tunnels deep belowground helped the Soviets survive. On December 26, Soviet forces landed on the Kerch Peninsula to the east, diverting German troops. By mid-January, the Germans were again forced to discontinue the attack. For a few months that winter, the population of Sevastopol believed that they had won the battle, and life in the city regained some semblance of normalcy.

Soviet soldiers resting on a pile of rubble in the ruined streets of Sevastopol during the hard-fought battles there in 1942. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

It was not to be. Stavka, the Soviet high command, activated the Crimea Front under Major General Dmitry Timofeyevich Kozlov and ordered him to deploy three armies on the Kerch Peninsula, which was possible in winter when the Kerch Strait was frozen solid. When good weather returned in the spring, Manstein committed 5 German and 2 Romanian infantry divisions and 1 German panzer division against Kozlov's 21 infantry divisions and 4 tank brigades. A German amphibious landing unhinged Kozlov's defenders and led to the surrender of more than 170,000 Red Army troops. Manstein now returned to the conquest of Sevastopol, which Hitler insisted be taken.

On June 2, the Germans used 700 guns to begin the systematic reduction of the massive Soviet forts. The German artillery included some three dozen heavy siege guns that had been specially developed to reduce the French Maginot Line, ranging in size from 280mm to 800mm (10.9 inches to 31 inches). The largest of these, the "Dora" Gustav gun, was in fact the largest artillery piece of all time.

Manstein opened a third assault by four divisions from the north on June 7, but it failed to break through the defenders, who from tunnels and caves continued an effective resistance with small arms. On June 11, three German divisions attacked on the southeast but also made little headway. After two weeks of fighting, the Germans were on the shore of Severnaya Bay, north of

Sevastopol, and at the Sapun Heights to the southeast. The last Soviet reinforcements arrived between June 22 and 26. Thereafter, the only links between Sevastopol and the outside world were by submarine and air. Waves of German bombers leveled the city and the naval base, dropping some 50,000 bombs in one week.

A surprise German assault by boat across the bay on June 28 shattered the defenders, and beginning on the night of June 30, Oktyabrsky, Petrov, and a few hundred top Soviet military, party, and government personnel were evacuated by air. Fighting ended on July 4, 1942.

The Germans claimed 92,000 Soviet prisoners taken, along with 460 guns, but they suffered 24,000 casualties of their own in the June and July fighting alone. An overjoyed Hitler promoted Manstein to field marshal. Manstein had indeed achieved much, given the difficult terrain and weather and the defenders' determination. Hitler then transferred the Eleventh Army north to Leningrad, a decision that adversely affected the German Army in its drive on Stalingrad later that year.

The Soviets retook Sevastopol in May 1944. Then the situation was reversed, with the German Seventeenth Army defending the city and the Soviets attacking. Although the Germans evacuated 38,000 troops by sea, the Soviets claimed 100,000 others killed or captured. After the long siege and this battle, little was left of Sevastopol.

MICHAEL SHARE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Artillery Doctrine; Caucasus Campaign; Gustav Gun; Manstein, Erich von

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Seversky, Alexander Procofieff de (1894–1974)

U.S. aircraft designer. Born in Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia, on June 7, 1894, Alexander Procofieff de Seversky was the son of a wealthy Russian sportsman and pilot. In 1914, as a young pilot flying his first combat mission for the Imperial Russian Navy, de Seversky was shot down, losing his right leg. He later flew 57 additional missions, downing 13 German aircraft and becoming chief of Russian naval fighter aviation in the Baltic. In 1917, the Russian provisional government named de Seversky assistant naval attaché for air at its embassy in Washington, D.C.

After the Bolsheviks seized power in late 1917, de Seversky offered his expertise to the U.S. military, serving as a test pilot and consulting engineer. Following the war, de Seversky remained in the United States. He became a U.S. citizen in 1927, whereupon he was commissioned a major in the Air Corps Specialist Reserve. He became a prominent aircraft designer, developing numerous significant technical improvements and innovations. In 1922, de Seversky formed the Seversky Aero Corporation, reorganized and expanded in 1931 as the Seversky Aircraft Corporation.

From the 1920s until his death, de Seversky was a dedicated advocate of the strategic importance of airpower, working relentlessly to enhance U.S. aviation and eventually its missile and satellite capabilities. Between the wars, he collaborated with Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell on tests designed to prove the superiority of airpower over battleships.

World War II and its aftermath won de Seversky's message a favorable hearing. Besides lobbying politicians and the military, he published numerous newspaper articles and three books on the indispensability of airpower to modern warfare—all urging that the U.S. Air Force become the world's strongest. *Victory through Air Power* (1942) became a Walt Disney film that both President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill admired. *Air Power: Key to Survival* (1950) and *America: Too Young to Die!* (1961) reiterated the themes. De Seversky died in New York City on August 24, 1974.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing

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Seyss-Inquart, Arthur (1892–1946)

Leading Austrian Nazi and Reich commissioner in the Netherlands. Born in Stannern, Moravia, on July 22, 1892, Arthur Seyss-Inquart studied law at the University of Vienna before joining the Austro-Hungarian Army. During World War I, he saw action and was badly wounded. After the war he became a lawyer in Vienna, where he developed right-wing views. A strong advocate of Anschluss (union with Germany) in the 1930s, Seyss-Inquart was regarded as the leader of the small Austrian Nazi organization. Publicly he sought to achieve reconciliation with the government headed by Kurt von Schuschnigg, but behind the scenes he eagerly undermined the Austrian state.

Seyss-Inquart became state councilor in May 1937, and in February 1938, following pressure by Adolf Hitler, Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart the minister of the interior. When Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite on the issue of Anschluss, the German government pressured him to resign on March 13, 1938, in favor of Seyss-Inquart as chancellor. Shortly thereafter, Hitler's German followers took control.

Seyss-Inquart then became the Reich representative in the former Austria and minister without portfolio in Hitler's cabinet. When Germany conquered Poland on September 1, 1939, Seyss-Inquart served as deputy governor there under Hans Frank. Displeased with the atrocities committed by Schutzstaffel (SS) forces and unable to exert any influence over policies, Seyss-Inquart asked for a new appointment.

In May 1940, Seyss-Inquart became Reich commissioner of the newly occupied Netherlands. He tried to come to terms with the Dutch and have them carry out a Nazification program. But instead of achieving

collaboration, Seyss-Inquart found himself dealing with the Dutch Nazi movement. In Seyss-Inquart's view, Dutch Nazi leader Anton Mussert's followers were unsuited for German occupation policy. They were only a small minority with no real support from the Dutch population and no administrative experience.

Therefore, Seyss-Inquart preferred to work with the traditional elites. He sought to resign his post, but Hitler refused his request, believing that Seyss-Inquart's moderate approach would achieve the desired results. Seyss-Inquart was nominally responsible for recruitment of Dutch workers to be relocated in the Reich, the deportation of Jews to the extermination camps, and German exploitation of the Dutch economy, but he never managed to restrain the SS from interfering in the Netherlands.

After the war Seyss-Inquart was charged with war crimes and tried at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. He was found guilty and hanged on October 16, 1946.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Netherlands; Schuschnigg, Kurt von

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Sfax, Action off (April 16, 1941)

Naval action, also known as the Battle of the Tarigo Convoy, fought in the Mediterranean Sea north of the Tunisian port city of Sfax between units of the Italian and British navies. The action resulted from the first nocturnal interception and destruction of an Italian-escorted convoy to Africa by British surface forces.

Faced by an Axis advance toward Egypt and under pressure from London to stop the flow of supplies to Africa, the commander of the Mediterranean

Fleet, Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, ordered the 14th Destroyer Flotilla of the *Jervis*, *Janus*, *Nubian*, and *Mohawk* under Captain Philip John Mack to reinforce the submarines and aircraft operating from Malta against Axis traffic. The flotilla arrived on April 11, the same day Axis troops laid siege to the port of Tobruk in Libya.

The flotilla's first two sorties were unproductive, but on April 13 a convoy of one Italian and four German transports departed Naples for Tripoli escorted by the Italian 8th Destroyer Squadron under Captain Pietro De Cristofaro of the *Luca Tarigo, Baleno,* and *Lampo*. A Malta-based aircraft sighted the convoy on the morning of April 15, and the British destroyers weighed anchor that evening.

Heavy winds scattered the Axis convoy, and it had fallen four hours behind schedule by the time it regrouped off Cape Bon, Tunisia, at 10:00 p.m. on April 15. The British were searching along the convoy's estimated track and nearly missed it due to the delay, but at 1:58 a.m. on April 16 lookouts aboard the *Jervis* reported shadows six miles ahead. The wind was gusting at 40 mph, and the air was heavy with dust blowing off the continent. While the British maneuvered to position the quarter moon behind the Axis ships, Italian and German lookouts saw nothing of the menace approaching from astern. When it opened fire at 2:20 a.m., the *Jervis* was a mere 2,400 yards off the starboard quarter of the *Baleno,* the rear escort.

Salvos from the *Jervis* and *Janis* quickly disabled the *Baleno,* whose crew thought that their ship was under air attack. Then the rear British destroyers, the *Nubian* and *Mohawk,* pushed up the convoy's starboard side while the other two swung up the port side. The *Luca Tarigo,* which had been in the lead, reversed course as ships blazed up behind it. At 2:35 a.m. the *Nubian* spotted the *Luca Tarigo* as it emerged from the smoke, and the two ships traded salvos from 1,000 yards as they passed.

The *Luca Tarigo* attracted the fire of the other British destroyers, and at 2:40 a.m. the *Jervis* hit the Italian warship with a torpedo. As the Italian flagship went dead in the water, the British destroyers returned to their execution of the transports. Suddenly a torpedo struck the *Mohawk,* blowing away the ship's aft section; an enterprising ensign aboard the *Luca Tarigo* had manually aimed and fired the torpedo just a minute before. At 2:53 a.m. another torpedo struck the *Mohawk,* and the large British destroyer began to settle.

The *Lampo,* located on the convoy's far side, was last to enter the action, ineffectively attacking the *Nubian* with guns and torpedoes. The *Nubian*'s reply inflicted serious damage on the *Lampo,* which eventually grounded on Kerkenah Bank to keep from foundering. After dispatching the *Lampo,* the *Nubian* chased down the last transport, which was fleeing southeast, and set it ablaze. Two transports eventually joined the *Lampo* grounded on the banks, while the *Tarigo* and the other three transports sank outright. The *Baleno* capsized on the morning of April 17. In this debacle, the Axis lost 1,700 men, 300 vehicles, and 3,500 tons of supplies. The British lost the *Mohawk;* the other three destroyers suffered only slight splinter damage. The Axis convoys continued, however. Two arrived in Tripoli without loss four days later, and Italian naval headquarters regarded the destruction of the *Tarigo* convoy as an anomaly based on lucky air reconnaissance.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Convoys, Axis; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Shanghai, Battle of (August 13–November 9, 1937)

First major battle of the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945. Formal war between Japan and China developed rather unexpectedly from a clash on July 7, 1937, between Japanese and Chinese troops near the historic Lugouqiao (Lukouch'iao) Marco Polo Bridge, a major railroad artery 10 miles from Beijing (Peking) in Hebei (Hopeh) Province. Chinese and Japanese officials deadlocked when they tried to reach an appropriate

settlement that would cover not just this particular incident but would also govern overall Sino-Japanese relations.

As the situation deteriorated, Japanese troops seized control of the Beijing-Tianjin (Tientsin) area. On August 7, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the Guomindang (Kuomintang, Nationalist, GMD) president of China, decided to retaliate by attacking Japanese forces stationed at the Japanese settlement in Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu), China's leading port and major international commercial center. Japan and several prominent Western powers each administered part of an area of the city called the International Settlement, where their nationals enjoyed extraterritorial privileges. To protect these rights, the Japanese government had installed its own garrison, a force expanded after the Lugouqiao/Marco Polo Bridge clash.

Meanwhile, top Japanese naval officials urged forceful action in the Shanghai area, a hotbed of Chinese Nationalist sentiment. At this sensitive time, several Japanese warships—together with naval vessels of other foreign nations—were moored in Shanghai Harbor. The situation in Shanghai grew increasingly explosive, and on August 9 Chinese soldiers killed two Japanese marines.

Jiang believed that the constricted conditions of street fighting in Shanghai would minimize Japanese superiority in logistics, tanks, and artillery and that the urban location would prove more advantageous to his own forces than the northern Chinese plains, the focus to date of Sino-Japanese military confrontation. By diverting Japanese attention to central China, he also hoped to allow beleaguered northern Chinese military units to regroup.

On August 11, Jiang ordered his troops to positions within the greater Shanghai area, carefully avoiding the foreign sections of the city. Japanese commanders rushed reinforcements to Shanghai, but when battle began on August 13, a mere 12,000 Japanese soldiers faced 80,000 Chinese. For a week the battle hung in the balance as Chinese units came close to driving their enemy into the Huangpu (Whampoa) River.

From August 20, Japanese reinforcements arrived en masse by sea, landing on the banks of the Chang Jiang (Yangtze) River and mounting what quickly became a siege of Shanghai. The Chinese government likewise poured men into Shanghai, where heavy fighting continued for almost three months as both sides struggled for control of the city. Combat was brutal. On

August 14, Chinese warplanes tried to bomb Japanese naval vessels in Shanghai Harbor but only succeeded in hitting civilian areas of the city. Japanese warships in the Changjiang and Huangpu Rivers responded with heavy point-blank fire against Nationalist positions, which continued throughout the battle. During the siege, a stray shell hit the U.S. cruiser *Augusta*, killing a crewman and wounding 18 others.

Japanese troops fighting in the 1937 Battle of Shanghai. (Corbis)

Hoping that the influential foreign residents of the city's International Settlement might serve as mediators and perhaps win overseas support for China, Jiang ordered Shanghai's defenders to hold out to the end, and for several weeks of bitter house-to-house fighting they did so. Between August and November 1937, 270,000 Chinese troops—constituting 60 percent of the city's Nationalist garrison and the core of Jiang's newly modernized Chinese Army—were killed or wounded in the fighting, along with many thousands of civilians. Japanese casualties totaled some 40,000. Much of Shanghai was devastated, although both sides left the foreign settlements undisturbed.

At the beginning of November, a Japanese amphibious force landed at Hangzhou (Hangchow) Bay 50 miles from Shanghai, threatening the city's rear. In what swiftly became a disorganized rout, Chinese forces evacuated

Shanghai. Instead of retreating to newly built fortifications along the Shanghai-Nanjing (Nanking) railway line, they fell back farther on Nanjing, the Nationalist capital, which became the next Japanese target.

Jiang's decision to launch the Battle of Shanghai marked a deliberate extension to central China of Sino-Japanese conflict. It was a major strategic shift reflecting Jiang's new determination, after the Xi'an (Sian) Incident in Shaanxi (Shensi) and his rapprochement with the Communists, to move to outright opposition toward further Japanese incursions. It also constituted the real beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, which would last a further eight years.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Sino-Japanese War

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Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich (1882–1945)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in Zlatoust in the southern Urals on October 2, 1882, Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov began his military career in the Russian Imperial Army in 1901. He became an officer two years later upon graduation from the Moscow Military College. In 1910 after graduation from the General Staff Academy, he served in the Tashkent Military District and in Russian Poland. During World War I he served in Galicia, and in 1917 he was promoted to colonel and commanded a grenadier regiment.

Shaposhnikov joined the Red Army in 1918 and served on its field staff during the Russian Civil War. In 1923 he published his first book, and he was an assistant to chief of staff M. V. Frunze by April 1924. In 1926, Shaposhnikov assumed command of the Leningrad Military District. He became known internationally for his three-volume study *The Brain of the*

Army (1927–1929), in which he argued that the General Staff should be the sole agency directing the Red Army.

Shaposhnikov was admitted to Communist Party membership in 1930; the usual probationary period was waived. From 1928 to 1931, he was head of the Red Army staff. He was demoted in 1931, allegedly because he published an account of the civil war that gave Leon Trotsky more credit than Joseph Stalin could abide. From 1931 to 1937, Shaposhnikov was successively commander of the Volga Military District, chief of the Frunze Military Academy, and commander of the Leningrad Military District. Shaposhnikov then served on the board that helped purge the Red Army in 1937.

Appointed chief of staff of the army and deputy commissar of defense in May 1937, Shaposhnikov did what he could to modernize and improve the Red Army, although much of his work in this regard was blocked by Stalin and others. He also was unable to prevent the disbanding of seven mechanized corps in November 1939, despite Colonel General Georgii Zhukov's success with armor in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol in Manchuria.

Shaposhnikov drew up the plans for the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland at the beginning of World War II and the belated successful offensive in the November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940, First Finnish-Soviet War. (Stalin at first ignored his counsel.) Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in May 1940, Shaposhnikov relinquished the post of chief of staff because of poor health, although he retained the position as deputy defense commissar.

On the eve of the June 22, 1941, German attack, Shaposhnikov urged Stalin to abandon forward positions in Poland in favor of the Stalin Line along the Soviet Union's former border. Stalin dismissed Shaposhnikov from his posts for this advice. With the German invasion, Stalin reinstated Shaposhnikov as chief of the General Staff on July 29, 1941, in a reorganized Stavka that apparently followed the form suggested by Shaposhnikov in his study *The Brain of the Army*. Although ill, Shaposhnikov played an important role in planning the Soviet defense of Moscow and the subsequent Soviet counterattack. In June 1942, he advised against an attack on Kharkov as being premature.

Shaposhnikov left his post as chief of the General Staff for reasons of health on June 26, 1942. Although still ill, he remained on the Stavka and as deputy commissar of defense. In June 1943, he became commandant of the

Voroshilov Military Academy. Shaposhnikov continued to hold this post and serve on the Stavka until his death in Moscow on March 26, 1945.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich; Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Shepherd, Lemuel Cornick, Jr. (1896–1990)

U.S. Marine Corps general. Born on February 10, 1896, in Norfolk, Virginia, Lemuel Cornick Shepherd Jr. graduated from the Virginia Military Institute and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in April 1917. As a member of the 5th Marine Regiment during World War I, he participated in all the major U.S. actions and was wounded three times.

After the war, Shepherd served in Brazil, China, and Haiti. In 1937, he graduated from the Naval War College and then commanded the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, which developed amphibious tactics and techniques. In June 1939, Shepherd served on the staff of the Marine Corps Schools. In March 1942, he assumed command of the 9th Marine Regiment. After organizing and training the regiment, he deployed with it to the Pacific as part of the 3rd Marine Division. In July 1943, while serving on Guadalcanal, Shepherd was promoted to brigadier general and was assigned as assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division. From December 1943 through March 1944, he participated in the Cape Gloucester operation on New Britain. Shepherd assumed command of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in May 1944 and led it in the recapture of Guam from July 21 to August 10, 1944.

Following this operation, Shepherd was promoted to major general and charged with expanding the brigade into the 6th Marine Division, which he led in the assault and occupation of Okinawa from April to June 1945. He next took his division to Tsingtao, China, where he received the surrender of Japanese forces in that area on October 25, 1945.

In 1946, Shepherd was appointed assistant commandant of the Marine Corps. He also headed the 1946 board that recommended the helicopter as the future Marine Corps amphibious assault vehicle. From 1948 to 1950, Shepherd was commandant of the Marine Corps Schools. In 1950, he took command of Fleet Marine Forces in the Pacific and participated in the September 15, 1950, Inchon landing during the Korean War (1950–1953). In January 1952, Shepherd became the commandant of the Marine Corps, a position he held until his retirement in January 1956. Two months after his retirement, he was recalled to active duty and appointed chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, a position he held until September 1959. Shepherd died in La Jolla, California, on August 6, 1990.

C. J. HORN

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guam, Battle for; Okinawa, Invasion of

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Sherman, Forrest Percival (1896–1951)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Merrimack, New Hampshire, on October 30, 1896, Forrest Percival Sherman graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1917. From then onward he won a reputation as a brilliant, cerebral tactician and skilled mediator. In 1922, he became a naval aviator, and his subsequent career assignments focused heavily on aviation. In 1932, Sherman commanded Fighting Squad-ron 1 aboard the *Saratoga*. From 1933

to 1936, he was director of the Board of Ordnance's Aviation Ordnance Section, and from 1937 to 1940 he was aviation officer of the U.S. Fleet.

In 1940, Sherman joined the War Plans Division, drafting plans for hemispheric defense, serving on the U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board of Defense, and attending the August 1941 Atlantic Charter conference. Promoted to captain, in May 1942 Sherman assumed command of the aircraft carrier *Wasp* but lost his ship to the Japanese submarine *I-19* on September 15, 1942, during the Battle of Guadalcanal, earning the Navy Cross for "extraordinary heroism."

Sherman then spent a year at Pearl Harbor as chief of staff to Vice Admiral John H. Towers, commander of the Pacific Fleet's air elements. Sherman's talent for staff work, including operational planning, force deployment, and logistical support, encouraged Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of U.S. Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, to appoint him his planning officer as a rear admiral. As deputy chief of staff (plans), Sherman devised and implemented much of Nimitz's strategy in the Pacific theater, including which specific islands would be attacked or bypassed. He also sometimes represented Nimitz before the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

Returning to Washington, Sherman was promoted to vice admiral in December 1945. As deputy chief of naval operations, he became heavily involved in formulating both unification of the armed forces and Cold War strategy. After emphasizing to President Harry S. Truman the potential Soviet threat in the Mediterranean, an important influence in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine of February 1947, Sherman became the first commander of the new U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.

In November 1949, Sherman became chief of naval operations as a full admiral. He supported U.S. intervention in the Korean War and proposed the successful naval blockade of North Korea. He also gave cautious approval to the September 1950 Inchon landing and backed Truman in his relief of General Douglas MacArthur and the primacy of Europe in U.S. defense planning. While on a diplomatic assignment to Naples, Italy, Sherman suffered a fatal heart attack on July 22, 1951.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Nimitz, Chester William; Towers, John Henry

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Sherman, Frederick Carl (1888–1957)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born in Port Huron, Michigan, on May 27, 1888, Frederick Carl Sherman graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1910 and was commissioned an ensign in 1912. Before World War I, he served on battleships and submarines, and during the war, he commanded a submarine on Atlantic seaboard patrols.

After the war, Sherman rotated between shore and sea assignments, including two stints as a student at the Naval War College. In 1936, he qualified as a naval aviator, and by the time he took command of the aircraft carrier *Lexington* in 1940, he had become an ardent proponent of naval airpower. Shortly after the United States entered World War II, Sherman's pilots carried out raids against Japanese bases on New Britain Island and New Guinea. Sherman was promoted to rear admiral in April 1942. In the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 7–8, 1942, his forces sank the Japanese light aircraft carrier *Shōhō,* although damage from Japanese bombs forced the scuttling of the *Lexington*.

Later that year, Sherman was appointed commander of Task Force 16, and in 1943 he headed Carrier Division 2. In these posts, Sherman participated in operations in the South and Central Pacific theaters, helping to neutralize Japanese airpower in these areas, sinking or damaging many enemy ships, and earning a reputation as an aggressive leader and a skilled tactician. As with other air admirals, he believed that naval air forces, organized into multicarrier task forces, were the key to victory in the Pacific war, and at one point he urged that aviators should be in command of all task forces that included carriers.

Following assignment in the United States from March to August 1944 for a rest, Sherman became commander of Task Group 38.3/58.3. He took part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944), supported the landings on Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945) and Okinawa (March–June 1945), and engaged in raids against Japan.

Shortly before the end of the war, Sherman was promoted to vice admiral and given command of the 1st Fast Carrier Task Force and Task Force 58. In January 1946, he was named commander of the Fifth Fleet, his final post before retiring from the navy in March 1947. Sherman died in San Diego, California, on July 27, 1957.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Okinawa, Invasion of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; United States Navy Carrier Raids

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Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887–1957)

Japanese diplomat. Born in ōita on July 29, 1887, Shigemitsu Mamoru graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and became a diplomat in 1911. He was appointed a member of the Japanese delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Frustrated by the results of the conference, Shigemitsu joined with other young Japanese diplomats in urging a more forceful Japanese foreign policy.

Shigemitsu was counselor for the Foreign Ministry (1920–1924), chief secretary in the Chinese embassy (1925–1927), and counsel general in Shanghai (1927–1930). He became Japanese minister to China in 1931. In spite of his efforts to improve relations with China, the Japanese Army

escalated the crisis following the Mukden Incident. In April 1932, a Korean nationalist tried to assassinate Shigemitsu with a hand grenade. Shigemitsu was badly wounded, losing a foot.

Shigemitsu served as deputy minister of foreign affairs from 1933 to 1936. He resigned because of the failure of his hard-line approach in negotiations with China. He was then successively ambassador to the Soviet Union (1936–1938), to Great Britain (1938–1941), and to the Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei) government in China during 1942.

Shigemitsu became minister of foreign affairs under Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki in April 1943. In attempting to justify the war, Shigemitsu stressed that Japan sought to liberate Asian peoples from Western oppression. Shigemitsu continued as minister for foreign affairs and minister for Greater East Asia under Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki.

Shigemitsu resigned in April 1945; in August 1945, he returned as minister of foreign affairs under Prime Minister Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko and signed the official surrender on board the U.S. battleship *Missouri* on September 2, 1945. Arrested as a war criminal, Shigemitsu was sentenced to seven years in Sugamo Prison, but he was released in 1950.

Shigemitsu again became minister of foreign affairs in December 1954, remaining in office until December 1956. Among his accomplishments were the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Japan's entry into the United Nations in 1956. Shigemitsu died in Yugawara, Kanagawa, on January 26, 1957.

SAKAI KAZUOMI

See also

Higashikuni Naruhiko, Prince of Japan; Japan; Koiso Kuniaki; Tōjō Hideki

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Shimada Shigetaro (1883–1976)

Japanese Navy admiral and minister of the navy. Born in Tokyo on September 24, 1883, Shimada Shigetaro graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1904 and participated in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Following the war, he entered the gunnery school and became a gunnery officer. From 1916 to 1919, Shimada was in Italy, first as a resident officer, then as assistant attaché, and later as attaché.

In 1904, Shimada joined the navy General Staff and became an instructor at the Naval War College. Promoted to captain in 1928, he commanded first the cruiser *Tama* and then the battleship *Hiei* (1928).

Following promotion to rear admiral in 1929, Shimada became chief of staff of the Second Fleet and then chief of staff of the Combined Fleet in 1930. In 1931, he became the director of the Submarine School, and in 1932, he was chief of staff of the Third Fleet. He next held various posts on the navy General Staff. Promoted to vice admiral in 1934, Shimada became the deputy chief of the Naval Staff until he was assigned as commander of the Second Fleet in 1937. Promoted to admiral in 1940, Shimada became the commander in chief of the China Fleet, and later he served as the commander in chief of the Kure and Yokosuka naval districts.

In October 1941, Shimada became minister of the navy in the cabinet of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki. Shimada owed his appointment to his ability to get along with those around him. Although he shared the navy's reluctance to go to war against the United States, he found that it was impossible to swim against the tide and followed Tōjō's policies.

In February 1944, Shimada assumed the office of chief of the navy General Staff, tasked with Tōjō's demand to conduct the war at sea more effectively. From that date, Shimada concurrently held the offices of minister of the navy and chief of the navy General Staff. Navy and intellectual circles denigrated him, whispering that "Shimada is Tōjō's puppet." Following the loss of Saipan, in July 1944 Tōjō reluctantly ordered Shimada to resign before resigning himself.

In January 1945, Shimada went on the reserve list. After the war, he was arrested by Allied authorities as a war criminal. Tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, he was sentenced to life in prison but released in 1956. Shimada died in Tokyo on June 7, 1976.

ASAKAWA MICHIO

See also
Japan, Navy; Saipan, Battle of

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Shinano, IJN, Sinking of (November 29, 1944)

Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier. Third in the projected four-ship Yamato class of Japanese superbattleships, the *Shinano* was laid down at the Yokosuka Navy Arsenal on May 4, 1940. It had been completed up to the main deck by the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway, in which the Japanese lost four carriers. The Japanese then decided to convert the *Shinano* into an aircraft carrier. Based on experiences in the Battle of Midway, it received an armored flight deck.

The *Shinano* was seen as a floating base for refueling, rearming, and maintaining aircraft from other carriers. As a result, despite its massive size and a 550-foot-long aircraft hangar, it would have carried only 47 aircraft for self-defense (total hangar capacity was about 70 aircraft). Reflecting its new mission, it had large holds for fuel, munitions, and spare parts in the spaces where gun turrets were to have been located.

Launched on October 8, 1944, the *Shinano* displaced 73,040 tons fully loaded and was 872 feet 8 inches in overall length and 119 feet 11 inches in beam. Its design speed was 27 knots. Antiaircraft armament consisted of 16 5-inch and 145 25mm guns, along with 336 5-inch rocket launchers. It had a crew of 2,400 men. The *Shinano* was the largest carrier ever built until the U.S. Navy's Forrestal class of the 1950s.

On November 29, 1944, the *Shinano* was being moved to Kure for its final fitting out when the U.S. submarine *Archerfish* intercepted it in the Inland Sea and hit it with four torpedoes aft. Having retained its battleship triple-hull protection, the carrier continued to travel at 16 knots. However, an

untrained crew and the fact that many of the ship's watertight compartments were not yet complete resulted in the carrier sinking later that day.

C. J. HORN

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Midway, Battle of; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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SHINGLE, Operation

See Anzio, Battle of

Ship's Combat Information Center

The concept of a command space where all the relevant combat information is integrated and applied to directing a ship's and naval task group's weapons arose from the early battles of World War II's Pacific Campaign, where Allied naval units faced mass waves of Japanese aircraft. The early radars provided adequate warning of the approach of these aircraft, but the early radar plotting rooms were neither well arranged nor large enough to depict the overall tactical picture in a fashion that enabled commanders to deploy their forces effectively.

Naval warfare was now three-dimensional, with threats coming from below and above as well as on the sea surface. Moreover, the advent of radar and naval airpower as a decisive combat arm had transformed naval warfare into engagements involving larger numbers of enemy and friendly force contacts over far greater expanses of ocean. Airpower had also accelerated the pace of battle far beyond that which could be directed from the traditional open bridge.

Early radar plotting rooms enabled commanders to track and command forces against a handful of targets, but the need to detect incoming raids and rapidly direct fighter aircraft to intercept enemy aircraft required something better. The U.S. Navy applied the lessons learned from the battles in the Coral Sea and at Midway to design a new command space where information from all the ship's sensors (e.g., radar, sonar, and visual lookouts) as well as reports from fleet headquarters and other ships were received, plotted, analyzed, and presented to the ship's or task group's commander and from which he issued his orders.

The first Combat Information Center (CIC), as it is known today, was employed during the Gilbert Islands Campaign in November 1943. The captain of the U.S. Navy destroyer *Fletcher* (DD-445), Commander William M. Cole, and his executive officer (XO) LCDR, Joseph C. Wyle, generally are credited with establishing the first operational combat application for using the space. The CO remained on the bridge, while the XO remained in radar plot advising the captain on the tactical situation. The *Fletcher* preformed so effectively in the early battles that it was placed in the van for the Battle of Tassafaronga, leading three other destroyers.

Although that battle was a disaster, the destroyer action was successful. Cole's report and other after-action reports were studied and the lessons applied. Radar plotting rooms were expanded to accommodate the faster and larger volume of information available.

By early 1945 the CIC concept and doctrine had emerged, but it was the Battle for Okinawa that drove it to the form that exists today. The Japanese defenders threw hundreds of kamikaze (suicide) aircraft at the fleet daily, almost simultaneously with the fleet directing several thousand aircraft in strikes ashore and conducting naval gunfire support. It was a complex fleet air defense and battle management problem that nearly overwhelmed the unit commanders' ability to command.

Four months later, the navy issued Radar Bulletin Number 6, the first navy-wide CIC manual. Although technology has changed the method, means, and equipment in the CIC, the principles derived from World War II remain largely unchanged to this day. Aircraft carrier CICs came to be called Combat Direction Centers after 1979, but the most significant change affecting CICs was the development of the Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC) in the 1980s, when the advent of Soviet supersonic long-range

bombers and antiship cruise missiles expanded the naval task group's area of interest out to several thousand miles and required the task group commander to coordinate his task group's operations with commands ashore.

With his area of interest and span of control far exceeding that of the ship's commander, it became necessary to separate the ship's CIC and the task group commander's command center. All flag-configured U.S. Navy ships now have a TFCC where strategic intelligence information is integrated with reports on the situation overland to enable the admiral to command a joint task group that may include U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps units.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; Kamikaze; Midway, Battle of; Okinawa, Invasion of; Tassafaronga, Battle of

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SHŌ Plans

Japanese naval plans developed to meet threats posed by the U.S. Navy. As early as July 21, 1944, the Japanese Naval General Staff in Tokyo issued a directive for subsequent "urgent operations." The Combined Fleet was to maintain the strategic status quo and take advantage of tactical situations to seize the initiative "to crush the enemy fleet and attacking forces." On July 26, the Naval General Staff informed Combined Fleet commander Admiral Toyoda Soemu that the "urgent operations" would be known by the code name SHŌ (VICTORY).

The Japanese developed four SHŌ Plans to combat the next U.S. offensive move; SHŌ ICHI-GO (Operation VICTORY 1) covered defense of the Philippine archipelago. SHŌ-2 was for the defense of the Kuriles and Ryukus, SHŌ-3 was

for southern and central Japan, and SHŌ-4 covered threats against northern Japan and the Kurile Islands.

For SHŌ-1, which Tokyo expected to be the plan implemented, the Japanese planned to commit the entire Combined Fleet. It called for holding the fleet back and letting the Americans make their landings, then launching an all-out naval attack. Toyoda knew this would be a gamble. He said after the war that if things went well, the Japanese might have achieved "unexpectedly good results," but at worst there was a chance of losing the entire fleet. Toyoda believed that chance had to be taken.

He knew all too well that should the Americans retake the Philippines, even with the fleet left intact, Japanese shipping anes to the south—especially to the vital resources of the Dutch East Indies—would be completely cut off. Thus, even if the fleet was able to return to Japanese waters, it would not be able to secure fuel. And if the fleet was to remain in southern waters where it could obtain fuel, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and weapons. Thus, Toyoda concluded, "There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the Philippines."

Japanese naval air strength, however, had been severely reduced in the June 19–21, 1944, Battle of the Philippine Sea (the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot"), and during October 12–14, U.S. carrier planes and army B-29s struck Japanese airfields on Formosa, Okinawa, and the Philippines. These attacks had the effect of denying the Japanese Navy badly needed land-based air support; this probably doomed the Japanese plan. The Japanese did add extra antiaircraft guns to their ships in an attempt to offset the lack of airpower, but offensively they would have to rely on naval gunnery and some land-based planes in the Philippines. As it turned out, these assets were completely insufficient in the ensuing Battle of Leyte Gulf on October 23–26, 1943.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Toyoda Soemu

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Short, Walter Campbell (1880–1949)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Fillmore, Illinois, on March 30, 1880, Walter Campbell Short graduated from the University of Illinois in 1901 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army in 1902. He served in the Philippines and participated in the 1916–1917 Punitive Expedition into Mexico. He fought in France during World War I and held staff positions, rising to the rank of temporary colonel.

After the war, Short reverted to his permanent rank of captain. He then served with the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division. Short was an instructor at the Command and General Staff College (1919–1922 and 1929–1930) and graduated from the Army War College in 1925. He was promoted to colonel in 1934 and commanded the 6th Infantry Regiment. In 1936, he became the assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Promoted to brigadier general in 1937, he commanded a brigade of the 1st Infantry Division and then commanded that division (1938–1940). Promoted to major general in 1940, he commanded I Corps.

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, military governor of Hawaii, January 5, 1941. As with his naval counterpart, Short was removed from his command following the Japanese attack of December 7. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Widely respected in the army as an expert trainer, in January 1941 Short was appointed commander of the Hawaiian Department, and the next month he was promoted to temporary lieutenant general. As relations between the United States and Japan deteriorated in 1941, Short worked feverishly to strengthen Hawaii's defenses, focusing on accelerated training of his units and antisabotage measures. Despite warnings from Washington of possible war with Japan, he was caught off guard by the attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, apparently because he believed that if war came it would begin in Southeast Asia.

Both Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, were blamed for the poor state of U.S. preparedness to meet the Japanese attack, and both men were relieved of their commands shortly

afterward. Short was reduced to major general, and in February 1942, under pressure, he retired from the army. A special investigating committee that year blamed both Short and Kimmel for failing to adequately defend the Hawaiian Islands from attack despite repeated warnings from the War and Navy Departments. Although there were some calls for courts-martial, the secretaries of war and the navy both decided that there was no evidence to justify these.

Congressional hearings into the Pearl Harbor attack continued after the war. In 1947, Short accused the War Department of scapegoating him. He admitted to underestimating the possibility of a Japanese strike, but he blamed officials in Washington for withholding critical intelligence about Japanese intentions.

Following his retirement, Short worked for Ford Motor Company. He died in Dallas, Texas, on September 3, 1949. In 1999, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution exonerating both Short and Kimmel for the Pearl Harbor fiasco.

MOLLY M. WOOD AND JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Kimmel, Husband Edward; Pearl Harbor, Attack on

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Shtemenko, Sergei Matveevich (1907–1976)

Soviet Army general. Born into a peasant family in Volgograd Oblast on February 20, 1907, Sergei Matveevich Shtemenko joined the Red Army in 1926 and the Communist Party in 1930. Graduating from the Academy of Motorization and Mechanization, he commanded an independent heavy-tank training battalion near Zhitomir. He went to the General Staff Academy in September 1938. Before graduation in 1940, Shtemenko's class was assigned

in August 1939 to the Operations Department of the General Staff to prepare for the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland and, later, to work on preparations for the Soviet invasion of Finland.

On graduation, Shtemenko was reassigned to the General Staff, despite his request to command a mechanized unit. Shtemenko then worked in the Office of Operations as a senior assistant to the section chief in 1940, moving up to deputy chief by August 1941. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, he was appointed a section chief. General Alexi Antonov made Shtemenko his deputy in April 1941, and he succeeded Antonov as chief of the Operations Directorate in May 1943, a post he held until April 1946.

Shtemenko successfully organized the operations of the Transcaucasus Front (army group) in 1942 and subsequently for the Black Sea and Northern Fronts. He was involved in planning for all fronts, and he played a key role in the planning for Operation BAGRATION against German Army Group Center and in the campaign against Berlin (March 31–May 2, 1945). By war's end, he was a colonel general.

In his subsequent two-volume work *The Soviet General Staff at War*, Shtemenko stressed the need for creativity in the direction of war and frequently praised Joseph Stalin's role in the war. In November 1948, Shtemenko was promoted to army general. He then served as Soviet deputy prime minister, and in September 1952, he became a candidate member of the Central Committee. Two months later, however, he was assigned to Germany as chief of staff of the occupation forces. Shtemenko was demoted in 1953 after Stalin's death but promoted again in 1956 after three years of obscurity. Shtemenko was demoted again in 1957 and then was again promoted to army general in February 1968. Within six months of that promotion, he was appointed chief of staff of Warsaw Pact forces. Shtemenko retired in 1975 and died in Moscow on April 23, 1976.

CLAUDE R. SASSO

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Berlin, Land Battle for; Stalin, Joseph; Soviet Union, Army

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Shumilov, Mikhail Stepanovich (1895–1975)

Soviet Army general. Born in Verkhtechenskoye on November 17, 1895, Mikhail Stepanovich Shumilov attended military school and was an ensign during World War I. He joined the Red Army in 1918, and during the Russian Civil War he commanded a rifle regiment. Shumilov attended the Higher Infantry School in 1929 and commanded a rifle corps in the 1939–1940 First Finnish-Soviet War.

At the start of World War II, Shumilov commanded another rifle corps but was soon promoted to deputy commander of the Fifty-Fifth Army on the Leningrad Front. In 1942, he commanded the Sixty-Fourth Army (later the Seventh Guards Army) in the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943). Shumilov also fought in the Battle of Kursk during July 5–13, 1943. He participated in the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, attaining the rank of colonel general.

After the war, Shumilov commanded the White Sea (1948–1949) and Voronezh (1949–1955) military districts, and in 1958 he became consultant to the group of inspectors general of the Ministry of Defense. Shumilov died in Moscow on June 28, 1975.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Finnish-Soviet War, First; Kursk, Battle of; Soviet Union, Army; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Shuttle Bombing, Soviet Union (June–August 1944)

U.S.-Soviet collaboration designed to allow American bombers to hit German targets too deep to be attacked from normal operating bases. The concept of shuttle bombing was tested in 1943 in flights between bases in Britain and North Africa, including the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission on August 17, 1943. Code-named Operation FRANTIC, the shuttle-bombing operation allowed U.S. bombers to fly missions from bases in Britain and Italy and land at bases in the Soviet Union. The planes could then fly missions from Soviet bases and also carry out missions during their return flights to U.S. air bases in Britain and Italy.

Senior U.S. commanders hoped that these missions would force the Germans to disperse their air defense forces, lead to a better Soviet understanding of the value of strategic bombing, and establish a more collaborative relationship between the U.S. and Soviet militaries. The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) also hoped that an improved relationship with the Soviets might lead to U.S. use of airfields in the Soviet Far East for shuttle attacks against Japan.

Following extended negotiations, including approval from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin at the Tehran Conference in December 1943, the Soviets committed themselves to support the plan by making available airfields at Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatin. USAAF personnel worked hard to make the concept of shuttle operations succeed despite considerable restrictions placed by Soviet authorities on support personnel, logistical operations, and communications support.

On June 2, 1944, the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy flew Operation FRANTIC's first mission. It involved 130 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers and 70 North American P-51 Mustang escort fighters, with a successful strike on rail yards at Debrecen, Hungary, en route to the Soviet bases. A strike from these bases inflicted damage on an airfield at Galatz, Romania, on June 6. During the return flight to Italy on June 11, the bombers successfully attacked an airfield at Focşani, Romania.

The first Eighth Air Force mission from Britain occurred on June 21, 1944. It hit its designated target, a synthetic oil plant near Berlin, but German aircraft shadowed the bombers to Poltava and conducted an air raid on the

base that night, destroying 43 B-17s and damaging another 26. The surviving and repaired bombers attacked a synthetic oil plant near Drohobycz, Poland, on their flight to Fifteenth Air Force bases in Italy on June 26. These aircraft flew a combined mission with Fifteenth Air Force units and then returned to their bases in Britain.

The Eighth Air Force performed shuttle-bombing missions on August 6–8 and September 11–13. The August mission attacked an aircraft plant at Gdynia, Poland, en route to the Soviet bases; successfully hit oil refineries at Trzebinia, Poland, the following day; and then bombed airfields in Romania en route to bases in Italy, followed by return flights to Britain. The September mission involved an attack on an armaments factory at Chemnitz during the flight to Russia and a strike on steel works at Diósgyőr, Hungary, on the leg out to Italy.

The only other Fifteenth Air Force shuttle operations were fighter-bomber sweeps in late July (Lockheed P-38 Lightning and P-51 raids on Romanian airfields) and early August (P-38 raids on Romanian airfields and railroads in support of Soviet operations). Also, 117 F-5 (camera-equipped P-38) photoreconnaissance missions were flown to or from Soviet bases between June 2 and September 19, 1944. The last shuttle operation of FRANTIC was a resupply effort on September 18 to support the Polish Home Army uprising in Warsaw by 107 B-17s with P-51 fighter escorts.

Because of Soviet resistance to continuing the shuttle missions, by late October 1944 U.S. personnel supporting FRANTIC in the Soviet Union were reduced to a small caretaker contingent. Overall, the shuttle operations had little operational effect, and the targets that were struck could have been hit from the home bases in Britain and Italy. Operation FRANTIC did generate increased contacts between the U.S. and Soviet militaries, but it had limited substantive effect on relations between the two states. The operation did not lead to any significant collaboration in the Far East.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids; Soviet Union, Air Force; Tehran Conference; United States Army Air Forces; Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

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Sian Incident

See Xi'an Incident

Siberian Internment of Japanese

Following the Soviet-Japanese conflict during the final stages of World War II, the Soviets interned large numbers of Japanese in Siberian gulags. On August 9, 1945, in a breach of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (which was supposed to be valid until 1946), overwhelmingly superior Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria, southern Sakhalin Island, and the Kurile Islands. By the time of the Japanese surrender on August 15, more than 2.7 million Japanese soldiers and civilians were trapped in the Soviet-occupied territories.

Among the captured Japanese, approximately 700,000 prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians were deported to Soviet gulags, most of them in Siberia and some as far as European Russia. Following formal protests from other Allied nations and the Japanese government, some 280,000 POWs were repatriated in 1948. An additional 95,000 were returned by the end of 1949. Some POWs, including General Yamada Otozō and Major Sejima Ryūzō, were detained as late as 1956. Throughout this period, more than 60,000 Japanese internees perished in the harsh conditions of the Siberian gulags.

The Soviet action was motivated by a grave shortage of manpower in the Soviet Union and a quest to secure bargaining chips with the Japanese and Allied nations. It was also rumored that at the time of the capitulation, Guandong (Kwantung) Army headquarters in Manchuria secretly agreed to

hand over Japanese POWs as part of war reparations. Together with the continuing occupation by Russia of the Japanese Northern Territories, resentment over the Siberian internment remains an obstacle to improving diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Guandong Army; Manchuria Campaign; Yamada Otozō

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SICHELSCHNITT, Operation (1940)

German military plan for the invasion of Western Europe in 1940. Following the German invasions of Denmark and Norway, Adolf Hitler's next strike was against France and the Low Countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg). Hitler believed that defeating France offered the best chance of forcing Britain to the peace table. The balance of forces appeared to be somewhat equal. By the time of the invasion on May 10, 1940, Germany had assembled in the west 2.5 million men in 136 divisions. The Germans were matched on the ground by a combined Allied force of more than 2 million men in three army groups of 138 divisions. The Allies actually outnumbered the Germans in tanks, and the French tanks were generally heavier and better armed than those of the Germans. The most glaring Allied weaknesses were in aircraft and antiaircraft artillery.

The German invasion, originally set for November 12, 1939, was repeatedly postponed because of bitterly cold weather and pleas from Hitler's generals for additional time to prepare. Then on January 10, 1940, an event occurred that may have changed history; the pilot of a German military aircraft flying from Münster to Köln became lost in dense fog and was forced to land near Mechelen-sur-Meuse, Belgium. The passenger, Major Helmuth Reinberger, was a staff officer of the 7th Parachute Division and was carrying

top-secret operational plans for the German attack in the west. Reinberger was to have traveled by train, but delays led him to fly. Although the two Germans tried to burn the papers, the Belgian police secured the bulk of them. That discovery was only one of several indications of a German plan to strike west that caused neutral Belgium to open military talks with France and Britain. When Hitler learned that the invasion plan had been compromised, though, he abandoned it.

The need to recast the plan delayed the German invasion until May. Lieutenant General Erich von Manstein, assisted by General of Panzer Troops Heinz Guderian and Major General Walther Model, drew up the new plan. Known as SICHELSCHNITT (SICKLE CUT), the plan was agreed on in a meeting between Hitler and Manstein on February 17, 1940, and became the basis for German planning of the assault in the west, FALL GELB (CASE YELLOW).

The plan shifted the major effort from central Belgium to just north of the French defensive system known as the Maginot Line. The northern effort would occur first, drawing the Allies into Belgium. Then the major blow would fall to the south, in the hilly and wooded Ardennes—country reputedly impassable for tanks. The plan called for the invading Germans to cross the Meuse River and crack the French lines at Sedan, then swing northwest to the English Channel, cutting off the best British and French divisions, which would in the meantime have moved into Belgium.

German field marshal Erich von Manstein, the key figure in drawing up plans for Operation SICHELSCHNITT. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Colonel General Fedor von Bock's Army Group B, charged with invading Belgium and Holland, was downgraded from 37 divisions in the original plan to only 28 in the Manstein plan, with three rather than eight panzer divisions. Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group A, which was to move through the Ardennes, was upgraded from 17 to 44 divisions, including 7 armor divisions rather than 1. At the point of the breakthrough, the Germans thus would outnumber the defending French 44 divisions to 9.

The original German plan was similar to the Schlieffen Plan of 1914 and would have followed Allied staff predictions. Its axis of advance would have encountered the best Franco-British forces and might thus have ended in failure. Manstein's plan appeared risky, and although he had Hitler's firm backing, many senior military leaders opposed the plan. Apart from the plan,

factors working in Germany's favor were the experiences it had gained in Poland regarding the movement of massed armor and supply columns, clear German superiority in numbers of combat aircraft and antiaircraft guns, and the fact that a single national command system faced four disparate national armies.

THOMAS J. WEILER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Armored Warfare; Belgium Campaign; Blitzkrieg; Bock, Fedor von; France, Battle for; Guderian, Heinz; Luxembourg; Maginot Line; Manstein, Erich von; Model, Walther; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von

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Sicilian Channel

See Sicily, Strait of

Sicily, Invasion of (July 9–August 22, 1943)

Allied invasion of Sicily also known as Operation HUSKY, to that point the largest amphibious landing in history. At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and their staffs discussed the next military objective to follow the final defeat of Axis forces in North Africa. The British favored a strike against the Axis southern flank that would avoid the strong German defenses in northern France, whereas U.S. Army chief of staff General

George C. Marshall and the Americans advocated a cross-Channel invasion of France as the shorter road to victory. Ultimately, Roosevelt agreed with the British view that a southern advance would secure Allied Mediterranean shipping lanes, provide bombers with bases from which to strike the Axis in Southern Europe, and perhaps drive Italy from the war. The next big offensive of the Western Allies was therefore the invasion of Sicily, code-named HUSKY.

U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower had overall command of Allied forces in the Mediterranean. The ground commander for HUSKY was British general Sir Harold Alexander, commander of the Fifteenth Army Group. British admiral Andrew B. Cunningham commanded the naval forces, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder commanded the supporting Allied air forces. British and American forces would participate in HUSKY in almost equal numbers.

The Eastern Task Force would put ashore General Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth Army in southeastern Sicily from just south of Syracuse to the end of the southeastern peninsula. The Eighth Army was then to advance along the coast, its final objective being the port of Messina on the northeastern tip of the island. The Western Task Force would land Lieutenant General George S. Patton's U.S. Seventh Army in southwestern Sicily between Licata and Scoglitti. On securing the beachhead, Patton was to move inland to conduct supporting attacks and protect Montgomery's left flank. The newly formed Seventh Army had the supporting role, because Alexander believed that Montgomery's veteran troops were better suited for the chief offensive role. The Allies enjoyed clear air superiority; they had some 3,700 aircraft as opposed to 1,600 for the Axis forces.

A U.S. munitions ship blows up after being hit by a German bomb off Gela on July 11, 1943, during the Allied invasion of Sicily. (Universal History Archive/UIG via Getty images)

Sicily was defended by Italian general Alfredo Guzzoni's Sixth Army (consisting of seven static coastal divisions and four maneuver divisions) and German lieutenant general Hans-Valentin Hube's XIV Panzer Corps, consisting of the 15th Panzergrenadier Division and the Hermann Göring Panzer Division. On July 10, the Germans reinforced with the 1st Parachute Division and the 29th Panzergrenadier Division. Axis strength totaled between 300,000 and 365,000 men.

The Allied invasion was preceded by an elaborate British deception, Operation MINCEMEAT. This was designed to convince the Germans that the Allies planned to invade Sardinia and islands in the eastern Mediterranean. The deception worked, causing Adolf Hitler to shift some resources to those locations.

The invasion of Sicily, preceded by naval and air bombardment, began with airborne landings on July 9, 1943, the first large use by the Allies of such troops in the war. Few of the 144 gliders landed on their objectives, and many crashed into the sea. The paratroopers were also widely dispersed.

Worse, the invasion fleet fired on the second wave of transport aircraft in the mistaken belief that they were German aircraft and shot down 23 C-47s.

Nonetheless, the widely dispersed airborne soldiers created confusion among the Axis defenders, disrupted communications, and, despite their light weapons, prevented some German armor units from reaching the invasion beaches. The seaborne invasion began early on July 10 in bad weather. The second-largest landing undertaken by the Allies in the European theater after OVERLORD, it involved two large task forces and 2,590 vessels. Operation HUSKY was the first Allied invasion of the war in which specially designed landing craft, including the DUKW truck, were employed.

Resistance from the Italian coastal defenses was weak, and by nightfall the Allies had secured the beachheads. At Gela, the Hermann Göring Division attacked the U.S. 1st Infantry Division but was driven off by naval gunfire. Inland, the rugged terrain and Axis resistance slowed the Allied advance, although Patton's forces reached the capital of Palermo on July 22 and, several days later, cut the island in two. The British occupied Syracuse with little resistance.

British and American forces were soon in competition to be first to Messina, and a major controversy erupted when Montgomery expropriated an inland road that had been assigned to the Americans. This shift delayed the advance for two days and prolonged the campaign. Meanwhile, on July 25, Benito Mussolini fell from power in Italy as that government moved toward leaving the war. In Sicily, Axis forces continued a tenacious defense. Allied forces pressed forward, with the Americans aided by a series of small skillfully executed amphibious operations on the north coast east of San Stefano.

On August 11, German field marshal Albert Kesselring ordered the evacuation of Axis forces, the Italians having already begun their exodus across the narrow Straits of Messina to Italy. The Italians brought out 62,000 personnel and 227 vehicles; the Germans evacuated 39,569 troops and 9,605 vehicles. It was thus something of a hollow victory when, on August 17, Patton's forces reached Messina hours after the last Germans had evacuated. Later that day, elements of the British Eighth Army also entered the city.

The conquest of Sicily claimed 11,843 British and 8,781 Americans killed, wounded, missing, or captured. The Germans suffered some 29,000 casualties, including 4,325 killed, 6,663 captured, and an estimated 18,000

wounded. Some 2,000 Italians were killed and 137,000 were captured, most of the latter taken by the Seventh Army. The Axis side also lost up to 1,850 aircraft against only 375 for the Allies.

The invasion of Sicily was one of the most important Anglo-American campaigns of the war. It was the first assault by the Western Allies on Fortress Europe and another important experience in coalition planning. The invasion set important precedents and achieved its goal of driving Italy from the war. On September 3, a new Italian government signed a secret armistice with the Allied powers.

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

See also

Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Casablanca Conference; Italy; Kesselring, Albert; Marshall, George Catlett; MINCEMEAT, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Mussolini, Benito; Patton, George Smith, Jr.

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Sicily, Strait of

A relatively narrow channel of water that separates the western Mediterranean Sea and the Tyrrhenian Sea from the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Strait of Sicily, also known as the Sicilian Channel and the Sicilian Strait, lies between the Italian-controlled island of Sicily to the north and east

and Tunis (North Africa) to the south and west. Italians refer to the strait as the Canale di Sicilia and the Stretto di Sicilia.

The Strait of Sicily is approximately 100 miles across at its widest point and has a maximum depth of some 1,037 feet. The strait is known for its powerful and sometime erratic currents, which make navigating it by ship a challenging task. Oceanographers have discovered that its deeper currents run generally east to west, while shallow and surface currents travel in the opposite direction. There are several islands within the Strait of Sicily, the largest of which by far is Pantelleria, situated about 60 miles southwest of Sicily and 40 miles northeast of Tunis. The Strait has significant geographic and strategic value because it controls the only direct sea access route from Western Europe to North Africa and the Middle East. The island of Malta, another strategically significant landmark, lies just to the east of the strait.

The Sicilian Strait was the locale of numerous naval encounters between Italian vessels and British and U.S. ships during the prelude to the invasion of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943). The Italians also mined parts of the waterway to stymie Allied shipping. In May 1943, the Allies used the strait during Operation RETRIBUTION, a naval effort to block an Axis withdrawal from North Africa. The Allies occupied Pantelleria on June 11 as a prelude to their invasion of Sicily.

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See also

Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Pantelleria, Allied Occupation of; Sicily, Invasion of

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SICKEL CUT, Operation

See SICHELSCHNITT, Operation

Sidon, Engagement off (June 9, 1941)

Naval engagement between Vichy French and Allied ships off Syria. Concerned that German aircraft had staged through the French mandate of Syria en route to assist an anti-British coup in Iraq and fearing a sudden German strike against the territory with the speed and power of Berlin's attack on Crete, Great Britain, British Empire, and Free French units invaded Syria on June 8, 1941.

Vichy French naval assets in the area consisted of the large destroyers *Guépard* and *Valmy* of the 3rd Scout Division commanded by Captain Raymond Gervais de Lafond, the sloop *Élan*, and three submarines. The British Mediterranean Fleet, gravely weakened by the losses suffered off Crete, initially committed a squadron commanded by Vice Admiral E. L. S. King, consisting of three light cruisers and eight destroyers.

Learning that British forces were off southern Lebanon, the *Guépard* and *Valmy* sortied from Beirut at 7:00 a.m. on June 8 to investigate. They shelled an Australian column on the coast road and then returned north. When King learned that warships had fired on the Australians, he returned to find the French gone. King dispatched the destroyers *Janus*, *Jackal*, *Isis*, and *Hotspur*, under Commander John Anthony William Tothill, to sweep north along the coast while he returned to Haifa.

The Vichy French naval command in Beirut meanwhile ordered Gervais de Lafond's division to return south. It had reached Sidon when, at 3:25 p.m., it sighted destroyer masts to the southwest. The British ships were strung out, with the *Janus* leading the *Jackal* by a mile, the *Hotspur* a mile behind the *Jackal*, and the *Isis* inshore, two miles south of the *Hotspur*. When Tothill sighted the large French destroyers, he rang up full speed without waiting to concentrate. Gervais de Lafond surprised the British commander, however, when his ships loosed their first salvo from 16,000 yards. Although the second broadsides straddled, the *Janus* continued to close range as the *Jackal* steamed hard to catch up.

The French turned west while the straggling British line assumed a parallel heading. At 3:43 p.m. at a range at 10,000 yards, the *Guépard* struck the *Janus* hard with three shells. With steam escaping and a boiler out of

action, the *Janus* drifted to a stop and was hit two more times. At this juncture, the *Jackal* overhauled the *Janus* and wrapped smoke around the stricken ship. At 3:54 p.m., the French ships ceased fire and turned east. A few minutes later, Gervais de Lafond sighted the *Isis* speeding north to join the fight. With half his ammunition already expended, the French captain turned north as the rest of the British flotilla gave chase.

As they steamed up the Lebanese coast, the French hit *Jackal,* igniting a small fire, while a British shell lightly damaged the *Guépard* at 4:21 p.m. The British finally broke off the chase at 4:46 p.m.

The *Janus* was towed to Haifa, where it burned out of control until 5:00 a.m. the next day. The British Admiralty concluded that Tothill should have concentrated and expressed surprise at the accuracy of French gunnery. The French squadron fought minor engagements against Allied warships on June 16 and June 22 before withdrawing to France on July 9, five days before an armistice ended the fighting in Syria.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

France, Navy; Gervais de LaFond, Raymond-Émile; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in

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Siegfried Line, Breaking the (October–December 1944)

Allied penetration of the western defenses of Germany. The Siegfried Line—an Allied label based on German World War I defenses and known to the Germans as the West Wall—was a system of defensive positions in western Germany. The Siegfried Line ran south to north from the Swiss border along the Rhine River to the area of Karlsruhe and then northwest to Saarbrucken;

it followed the Saar River to Trier and then paralleled the German border with Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The West Wall did not rely on large fortifications but used terrain features and several belts of mutually supporting bunkers, pillboxes, and firing positions. These defenses, combined with minefields and antitank barriers such as “dragons’ teeth” and deep ditches, protected the German border region. The forward defenses were backed by hardened bunkers for troops, supplies, and command-and-control facilities. The operational concept was to slow attacking forces and create opportunities for counterattacks by mobile reserve forces.

The defensive system was initially developed following the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, and extensive work on it was carried out in 1938 under the direction of Fritz Todt. All construction work stopped in June 1940 after the conquest of France, and the line was stripped of its armaments. Many guns were shifted to the new defenses on the French coast. In August 1944, German leader Adolf Hitler directed that an accelerated program begin to strengthen the West Wall in response to Allied advances in France, but the defenses were limited by shortages of troops, artillery, and ammunition. Nonetheless, the West Wall provided an important shield for reconstituting forces that had retreated from France, and it became the focal point for the defense of the German homeland in the west under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.

The Siegfried Line was a major concern of Allied planning and operations after the breakout from Normandy (June 6, 1944). German defenses and Allied logistical constraints were the chief considerations in the debate within the senior Allied leadership over a broad-front or narrow-front strategy. By September 11, 1944, the Allied forces were advancing on the German frontier in a relatively continuous front from Switzerland to Antwerp, with Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in the north, General Omar N. Bradley’s 12th Army Group in the center, and Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers’s 6th Army Group in the south.

After extensive high-level debate, Allied theater commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower shifted logistical priority to the 21st Army Group and authorized Montgomery to conduct Operation MARKET-GARDEN, an effort during September 17–26, 1944, to flank the German northern defenses, cross the Rhine River at Arnhem, and rapidly penetrate and capture the industrial

heart of Germany. When the MARKET-GARDEN operation failed to cross the Rhine, though, Eisenhower returned to the broad-advance concept to maintain pressure on the German forces and penetrate the Siegfried Line.

British field marshals Bernard L. Montgomery and Alan Brooke (second from left) accompany Prime Minister Winston Churchill (second from right), and U.S. general William H. Simpson (right) inspecting German field fortifications of the Westwall, called by the Allies the Siegfried Line, in March 1945. These obstacles were called “dragons’ teeth” and were intended to halt tanks. (Library of Congress)

Initial contact with the West Wall was made by elements of Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges’s U.S. First Army as it advanced to the German frontier in early September in the area north of Luxembourg. Hodges began a reconnaissance in force into the Eifel region of Germany on September 14 in an effort to sustain momentum and rapidly breach the fixed defenses. Although the defensive positions were not fully manned, initial U.S. penetrations of the Siegfried Line were blunted by German counterattacks, and the American forces paused to replenish logistical stocks. On September 29, the First Army began a major offensive against West Wall positions around Aachen, a key defensive stronghold in the Siegfried Line, with the objective of opening a route to the Rhine River. After a vicious urban battle, the Aachen garrison surrendered on October 21.

In October and again in early November, the First Army also attempted to clear the Hürtgen Forest in an effort to open a route to the Rhine and secure the Roer River dams, which potentially allowed the German military to flood crossing areas downstream in the Roer River Valley. After initial successes, aggressive German counterattacks pushed back the attackers, and the Hürtgen Forest Campaign (September 12–December 16) became a bloody contest that held up the First Army. At the same time, the Ninth Army cleared the German defenses to the north and secured the west bank of the Roer River by December 9, but it did not attempt to cross due to the flooding threat posed by the dams.

During September, Lieutenant General George S. Patton's U.S. Third Army fought through the Lorraine border region south of Luxembourg toward the West Wall, battling German forces that used old French defensive positions of the Maginot Line and pre–World War I fortifications (especially those around Metz) to strengthen resistance to the American advance. Patton's offensive then bogged down from a combination of the German defensive effort and logistical shortages.

After resupplying and refitting in late October, the Third Army reinitiated the assault on Metz on November 8, and the city's garrison finally surrendered on November 22. After cleaning out the remaining German positions in Lorraine, the Third Army reached the Siegfried Line on December 15 and quickly seized several river crossings. Patton then paused the advance to resupply his forces before pushing through the West Wall and breaking out toward the Rhine in an attack planned for December 19.

In the south, Devers's 6th Army Group fought to the upper Rhine, capturing Strasbourg on November 23. However, the Germans continued to hold the West Wall defenses and a pocket in rough terrain around the city of Colmar. Although Devers was prepared to force the Rhine, Eisenhower ordered him to consolidate along that river and reduce the Colmar pocket.

The multiple Allied advances on the West Wall were halted on December 16 when the Germans launched an offensive in the Ardennes that became known as the Battle of the Bulge (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). As the Allies responded to the German drive in the Ardennes, the Germans launched a second attack out of the Colmar pocket, threatening to retake Strasbourg. Both offensives fit into the operational concept for the West Wall and provided strength for defensive operations and a base for

counteroffensives against the attacking force. Although surprised, the Allies were able to counter the German attacks, and the planned Allied assaults on the Siegfried Line were only delayed.

The final series of advances through the Siegfried Line and into Germany began on February 8, 1945, with an attack from the northern flank of Montgomery's 21st Army Group by the Canadian First Army, with the mission of clearing the west bank of the lower Rhine. This attack was complemented by U.S. attacks into the Roer River Valley and the Hürtgen Forest. The Roer River dams were seized on February 10, and the west bank of the lower Rhine was cleared by March 5. In February after repositioning following its counterattack in the Battle of the Bulge, the Third Army began a series of attacks that penetrated the Siegfried Line and allowed an advance toward the Rhine through the Eifel region. In the 6th Army Group area, the Colmar pocket was eliminated by February 9, and the U.S. Seventh Army captured Saarbrüken on March 19 and broke through the final West Wall defenses on March 20.

The Siegfried Line held up the Allied offensive and allowed the German army to attempt counterattacks, but once the Allied logistical system provided adequate support to the combat forces, the strength of the Allies overwhelmed the German defensive structure.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also

Alsace Campaign; Ardennes Offensive; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Devers, Jacob Loucks; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Hürtgen Forest Campaign; Lorraine Campaign; Maginot Line; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rhineland Offensive; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Todt, Fritz; West European Theater of Operations; West Wall, Advance to the

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Signals Intelligence

The collection and analysis of electromagnetic emissions that provide insight into an enemy's technological capabilities. The broader category of signals intelligence (known today as SIGINT) includes both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). COMINT includes the monitoring of radio and telephone traffic, the decryption of coded messages, and analysis of message content. ELINT is the collection and analysis of electromagnetic emissions such as telemetry and radar signals. This entry deals with COMINT.

SIGINT played a key role in World War II. In the 1920s, the knowledge that cryptanalysis had achieved important results in several countries during World War I led to the development of new and improved cipher methods and especially new cipher machines. These were produced not only for diplomatic and military communications but also for use in business. The American Edward Hugh Hebern had been working since 1917 to develop a rotor-driven machine, but he secured a U.S. patent only in 1924.

Also in 1917, the German Arthur Scherbius experimented with a similar machine; he secured a German patent on February 23, 1918. He was followed in October 1919 by Dutch inventor Hugo Alexander Koch and the Swede Arvid Gerhard Damm. In 1923, Scherbius purchased the Koch patents and produced a new rotor-driven cipher machine known as Enigma. Scherbius demonstrated the Enigma machine in 1923 at Bern and in 1924 at the World Postal Congress at Stockholm. He developed several versions of the Enigma; the commercial version, Enigma-D, was purchased by several countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.

The Enigma influenced production of cipher machines in other countries for military uses. In Sweden, engineer Boris Hagelin began his improved

machine series; in Great Britain, Type X was an improved Enigma. The Japanese constructed a special version, and experiments led to the 97-shiki-O-bun In-ji-ki for high-level diplomatic communications (later identified by the Americans with the code name “Purple”). During the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, the nationalist side and their Italian allies employed Enigma-D machines, and the Italians also used their Enigma version known as Alfa. The Poles developed their own cipher machine, Lacida, and the Czechs experimented with a version driven by compressed air rather than electricity. Boris Hagelin successfully marketed his machines in Sweden and France, later to the Italian Navy, and finally in the United States, where 140,000 copies of his M-209 machine were built.

The Germans relied heavily on the Enigma machine for military communications during the war. Only in 1975, with the publication of Frederick Winterbotham’s book *The Ultra Secret*, did it become generally known that Allied cryptanalysts had unlocked the secrets of the Enigma machine and that Allied intelligence had been able to read the most secret German military and diplomatic communications, although not in real time. Winterbotham’s book was only the first in a flood of publications about Allied code breaking. These included work published by the Poles, who in 1932 and 1933 had been the first to crack the secrets of the Enigma; the French, who had delivered to the Poles cipher materials secured from a German agent; the British, who established at Bletchley Park a decryption center; and the Americans, who also came into this operation and worked to break the Japanese codes.

The concentration on Enigma obscured the fact that there was not one Enigma machine but rather several versions. Moreover, Bletchley Park could break only some of the cipher key nets of Enigma, depending on the number of signals sent in the daily settings of the various key nets. Concentration on Enigma also led to neglect of the many other machine- or hand-cipher systems of other nations, which were tackled by the cryptanalysts of many countries with mixed success.

The German defeat of Poland in September 1939 came so rapidly that Polish cryptanalysts had virtually no impact on that campaign. Evacuated by way of Romania to France, however, they joined French intelligence, which was operating in close conjunction with the British. But Allied efforts against the German Enigma key nets only had limited success at first and did not

greatly influence Allied operations until mid-1940. With the defeat of France in June 1940, that nation's cryptanalysts went to the unoccupied southern zone. From there, some Poles were able to join the British at Bletchley Park.

On the Axis side, the German naval decryption service, xB-Dienst, enjoyed considerable success in breaking the hand-cipher systems of the Royal Navy, which at this time did not use machines but rather superenciphered codebooks. This enabled German warships, in most cases, to evade superior British forces. It also provided the Germans with Allied convoy information.

In May 1940 Bletchley Park at last was able, with only short delays, to decrypt the main operational Enigma key net of the German Luftwaffe. This was aided by the introduction of the first "bombes"—devices developed by mathematicians Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman to determine the daily settings of the German machines. These intercepts, now known by the intelligence code name of Ultra, influenced the Battle of Britain (July 10–September 30, 1940), as daily reports by the German air groups revealed their strengths and intended operations. Using this information, Britain's home chain radar, and a system of coast watchers, the British could use fewer fighter aircraft with maximum efficiency, sending fighters aloft at the right time to intercept incoming German bombers.

But Bletchley Park could not then break the Enigma key nets of the German Army. Of special importance at the time was breaking the German Navy key nets, especially those used by the U-boats. The German Enigma machine was known to the British from a replica the Poles had constructed and delivered to France and Britain in August 1939, but the problem was the wiring of the cipher rotors. Only five of these were known, but the German Navy used eight, and these had to be identified together with information about the cipher settings, which changed daily. This was only accomplished in May and June 1941.

Despite decoding delays, the Allies were able to read German radio signals and thus had the means to destroy their surface supply organization in the Atlantic. This in turn forced the Germans to cancel commerce raiding operations by their large surface combatants. Also, from early August 1941, it became possible to decrypt U-boat radio traffic, which made it possible for the Allies to reroute their Atlantic convoys around the German U-boat

dispositions. This prevented the sinking of perhaps 300 merchant ships in the second half of 1941.

Not all German officials had confidence in the security of the ciphers. Commander of submarines Rear Admiral Karl Dönitz tried several times after mid-1941 to improve the system. He introduced a code for the grid map positions and a separate cipher key net for the Atlantic U-boats. Then on February 1, 1942, he ordered the introduction of an improved cipher machine known as M-4 that had a divided Umkehrwalze B (reverse rotation) reflective rotor and an additional fourth, rotor, the so-called Greek Beta. This change produced an 11-month blackout at Bletchley Park in reading German U-boat traffic.

At the same time, xB-Dienst was able—partially in 1942 and more so in 1943—to decrypt the Anglo-American superenciphered codebook Naval Cipher No. 3 used for communication with the convoys. Although there were decoding delays, the decryption led to excellent results for the U-boats in the North Atlantic until the early spring of 1943.

On October 30, 1942, in the Mediterranean, a German U-boat was forced to surface, and a specially trained British boarding party was able to salvage important cipher materials, especially the weather short-signal book. This was used to find "cribs," the cipher/clear text compromises that aided in determining daily settings of the M-4 machine. Thus, from mid-December 1942, Bletchley Park could once again send to the submarine tracking room of the Admiralty the dispositions of the German U-boat wolf packs in order to reroute convoys.

But there were now so many wolf packs that new tactics had to be found to avoid repetition of the heavy losses incurred in mid-March, when the Germans introduced a new weather short-signal book, producing a new blackout. By concentrating the available bombes on U-boat traffic, Bletchley Park was again able after only 10 days to break the U-boat cipher.

Coupled with this, the Allies committed additional anti-submarine forces, very long-range aircraft, hunter-killer groups of destroyers and the first escort carriers, radar in escort ships and lightweight radar in aircraft, high-frequency direction finders, and Leigh lights. The turning point came in late May 1943, when Dönitz redeployed his submarines from the North Atlantic convoy routes to the Central Atlantic and to distant operational areas. At the same time, Bletchley Park decrypted the orders, enabling the British to relocate

their air groups from the convoy routes to Britain over to a strong offensive against U-boat routes in and out of the Bay of Biscay.

In June 1943, the British realized that the Germans had decrypted their signals, and the Admiralty changed to a new superenciphered code, Naval Cipher No. 5, which led to a blackout for xB-Dienst. On July 1, the Germans introduced a new Greek rotor C/Gamma, but this produced only a short interruption in decryption at Bletchley Park because of the introduction of a new high-speed bombe. Development in the United States of high-speed bombes led to the transfer in November 1943 of decryption work on the U-boat cipher to the U.S. decryption organization Op-20G, while Bletchley Park concentrated on the German Enigma ciphers of Germany's air force and army, both of which had substantially increased the number of their key nets.

Bletchley Park's first break into the German Army ciphers had come as the Germans prepared to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. This provided information about German deployment of forces to Poland and preparation of trains specifically to transport prisoners of war, clear proof that the deployments were not simply an effort to blackmail the Soviet Union.

During the invasion, Bletchley Park was able to intercept and read a great many German signals. Because the British did not trust the security of the Soviet code and cipher systems, decryptions from the German forces on the Eastern Front were transmitted to Moscow in a special secure cipher and only under cover stories. It is as yet unknown if the Soviets were aware from their spies in Britain, including Kim Philby and especially John Cairncross at Bletchley Park, of the source of the information and if so whether Soviet leader Joseph Stalin trusted it. Also, while the decryption services of Germany's army, navy, and air force were able to read Soviet codes and some ciphers and use the information thus obtained in operations, it is not known how extensively and when the Soviets could decrypt German signals.

Signals intelligence was of great importance in the Mediterranean theater. When Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940, the Allies could read many of the Italian codes and ciphers. In addition, some ciphers were captured from Italian submarines forced to surface. But the Italians soon changed many of their systems, and decryption fell off sharply as a result. Then in February 1941, Bletchley Park cracked the German Air Force cipher Light Blue and the Italian version of the Enigma known as Alfa, used for radio communication between Rome and the Dodecanese Islands. These successes

had important consequences, most notably in defeating the Italian Navy at the Battle of Cape Matapan on March 28, 1941.

In May 1941, decryption of the German signals provided excellent intelligence concerning German plans to invade Crete, but the British defense of the island failed because the German Air Force controlled the skies and because the intercepts included misleading information about a German seaborne invasion. As it transpired, this was not a significant German effort and led the British to shift defensive assets to the north away from the airfields, where the main German assault occurred. The Battle of Crete revealed both the advantages and disadvantages of SIGINT regarding enemy intentions.

From June 1941, Bletchley Park's decryption of the Italian Hagelin naval cipher machine C-38m used in communications between Supermarina in Rome and Tripoli had important consequences for Axis resupply of forces in the Western Desert. Axis shipping losses increased dramatically in the second half of 1941 and in 1942, when it became possible to vector Allied submarines and surface warship strike groups from Malta to intercept Italian convoys between Sicily and the Tunisian coast and Tripoli. The British always tried first to send reconnaissance aircraft to report the target so that the signals they sent prevented the Italians from recognizing the true source of the information.

Decrypted signals had to be used judiciously. Thus, Afrika Korps commander General Erwin Rommel exaggerated the evils of his supply situation to gain additional support, causing British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill twice to order his commanders in the field to begin offensives that then failed in Rommel's counterattacks. Rommel also learned much about British force strengths in Egypt because the U.S. military attaché in Cairo used a code broken by the Italians for his reports. Allied commanders also made different use of SIGINT results in operations extending from El Alamein to Tunisia and during the landing operations at Sicily (July 9, 1943), Salerno (September 9), and Anzio (January 22, 1944). Revelations of the Ultra secret in 1975 did force a reconsideration of the military reputations of several Allied commanders, including Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery.

In connection with the preparation of the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, the Allies in Operation FORTITUDE successfully used radio deception to convince the Germans of the presence in southeast England of a U.S.

Army group commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton, a force that did not exist. This false information led Adolf Hitler to believe that the Normandy Invasion was a feint and that the Allies planned to make their major cross-Channel attack in the Pas de Calais area. Hitler thus held back his panzer divisions of the Fifteenth Army from Normandy until too late and then sent them piecemeal into action.

The Western Allies also succeeded in the decryption of the German Army teleprinter cipher machine used for communications between the highest levels from the army high command and field armies. This was made possible by development of the first electronic precursor of the later computers, the Colossus machine, which became operational in the spring of 1944. It proved important in halting the German counterattack against the breakthrough at Argentan and led to the encirclement of strong German forces at Falaise (August 1944). But Allied reliance on Ultra intelligence, as the German decryptions were known, meant that the German December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) took the Allies unawares, as the Germans had observed strict radio silence and used only secure landlines for communication.

Other belligerents and also neutral powers employed SIGINT during the war. The Finns cracked many Soviet codes, and the Swedish mathematician Arne Beurling broke into the German naval teleprinter Siemens T-52 cipher machine. German teleprinter lines running through Swedish territory were tapped there. Swedish intelligence officers, who favored the Allied side, delivered information to the British naval attaché at Stockholm. Thus, the Admiralty learned of the German plan to attack convoy PQ 17 in July 1942 with large surface ships, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft, whereupon British first sea lord Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound ordered the convoy to scatter without waiting for the report of the departure of the German task forces. This led to catastrophe for the convoy, as German aircraft and U-boats sank two-thirds of its merchant ships.

The rising number of cipher key nets employed by the Germans also overstretched Bletchley Park capacities. Thus, even by mid-1942, of about 50 key nets then in use, Bletchley Park could only decrypt about 30, and these with varying time delays and gaps.

SIGINT had great influence in the Far East theater. In September 1940, American cryptanalysts under the leadership of William Friedman broke the

Japanese diplomatic Purple cipher. (It has now been revealed that both the Germans and the Soviets were also able to break Purple.) Thus, during negotiations with Japanese in 1941, the U.S. State Department knew not only the documents the Japanese diplomats would present but also their specific negotiating instructions. Purple intercepts provided clear evidence in late 1941 that the Japanese had decided to break off negotiations. But the diplomatic communications gave no hints of Japanese military plans, and the Japanese Army codes were still difficult to decrypt.

The Japanese Navy's superenciphered codes, especially JN.25—an earlier version of which had been broken—could not be read after changes in the codebooks and superenciphering tables. Thus, U.S. military and naval leaders had to depend on traffic analysis and direction finding, which did provide clear evidence, supported by optical observations, of the deployment of Japanese forces for attacks against the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. There was, however, no direct indication of an attack against Pearl Harbor, which thus came as a great surprise.

Breaking the new version of JN.25 and other Japanese codes took time, because reconstructing the tables and the codebook was always difficult after changes. In 1942, by clever evaluation of vague indications, Commander Joseph J. Rochefort concluded that the Japanese planned first to invade New Guinea (March 1942) and then to strike at Midway (June 3–6). This conclusion enabled Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz to counter the Japanese moves, leading to the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8) and the Battle of Midway.

During the struggle for the Solomon Islands in late 1942 and 1943, U.S. cryptanalysts learned to decrypt the Japanese codes more quickly, and by 1944 they could in most cases provide timely decryptions of Japanese signals in support of strategic operations. Of special importance was the success in breaking the so-called Maru cipher for Japanese logistical support to the islands they held in the Pacific. This allowed U.S. submarines to be directed with considerable accuracy to intercept positions, which in turn produced rising losses in the already thinly stretched Japanese merchant ship capacity and in Japanese warships. SIGINT closely supported General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Forces from New Guinea to the Philippines and the Central Pacific Forces under Admiral Nimitz against the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands and finally against Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

In the Indian Ocean area, British cryptanalysts were able to break Japanese Army and Air Force codes. On the other side, the Japanese had only limited success in decryption operations. In consequence, they employed mainly traffic analysis and direction finding for their military and naval operations.

There is no doubt that SIGINT was of great importance to all belligerents in the war. It is also true that the Allies were much more effective in its use. SIGINT alone did not win the war for the Allies, but undoubtedly it significantly shortened the length of the conflict.

JÜRGEN ROHWER

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Ardennes Offensive; Atlantic, Battle of the; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Cape Matapan, Battle of; Convoy PQ 17; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Crete, Battle of; Dönitz, Karl; Electronic Intelligence; Enigma Machine; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Hunter-Killer Groups; Midway, Battle of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Nimitz, Chester William; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Pound, Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Stalin, Joseph; Turing, Alan Mathison; Document 149

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Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz (1881–1943)

Polish general and prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile. Born in Tuszów Narodowy near Mielec (then Austria) on May 20, 1881, Władysław Eugeniusz Sikorski studied engineering in Lemberg (L'viv) and served in the Austrian Army in 1904 and 1905. Sikorski became chief of the Polish Supreme National Committee's Military Department during World War I and commanded the Polish Fifth Army during the 1919–1920 Polish-Soviet War. Chief of the Polish General Staff in 1921 and 1922, he became prime minister in 1922 and minister for military affairs in 1924 and 1925. A rival of Józef Piłsudski, Sikorski was relieved of his command after 1926. He then gained considerable reputation as a military writer, stressing the importance to Poland of the alliance with France.

When the Germans attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, Sikorski was still without assignment. With the military defeat of his country and internment of the Polish government in Romania, Sikorski arrived in Paris on September 24. There he became prime minister and minister for military affairs of the newly formed Polish government-in-exile. As supreme commander of the Polish armed forces, Sikorski reorganized those Polish soldiers who reached France. When France was defeated in June 1940, Sikorski convinced British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill to evacuate the Polish troops and the government-in-exile to Great Britain.

Sikorski pushed for the reestablishment after the war of the Polish state in its pre–September 1939 frontiers, and he outlined plans for a Polish-Czech federation. This position was compromised by the fact that Sikorski represented a defeated country, depending on the goodwill of its Western allies. Under these circumstances, Sikorski's attempts to normalize Polish-Soviet relations met with difficulties that were only partly resolved following Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Relations between the government-in-exile and Moscow then became impossible with the revelation of the Soviet massacre of Polish Army officers in the Katyn Forest in 1940.

In the midst of this crisis, Sikorski was killed in a plane crash at Gibraltar on July 4, 1943; he had been returning to Britain from an inspection of Polish

troops in the Middle East. He was succeeded in authority by much less able men, but in any case the situation for Poland would have been impossible, given the decision by Britain and the United States to maintain harmonious relations with the Soviet Union.

PASCAL TREES

See also
Katyn Forest Massacre; Poland; Poland, Army

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Simonds, Guy Granville (1903–1974)

Canadian Army general. Born on April 23, 1903, at Bury Saint Edmunds, England, the son of a British Army officer who brought his family to Canada, Guy Granville Simonds graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, in 1925 and then served with the artillery in the small interwar Canadian Army, where he emerged as a rising star. A brilliant performance at the British Army Camberley Staff College in 1936–1937 confirmed this promise. During World War II, Simonds rose from major to brigadier in September 1942 and to major general in April 1943.

Simonds was naturally aggressive with an intuitive grasp of mobile, armored warfare. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery considered him a protégé and far superior to the plodding General Henry Crerar. Simonds cut his teeth commanding the Canadian 1st Division in Sicily with great success and then briefly the 5th Armoured Division in Italy. In January 1944 he was promoted to lieutenant general and given charge of the Canadian II Corps, which he commanded in the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944.

Simonds's battle plans in the assaults around Caen and particularly in the bloody attritional fighting to close the Falaise gap from the north in August 1944 (Operations TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE) were operational masterpieces but were so complex that they often overmatched the abilities of his

inexperienced corps. Simonds's performance at Falaise remains controversial. Although he sacked subordinates with abandon and relentlessly pressed his exhausted soldiers forward, many historians have criticized him for showing insufficient "resolution." In fact, the task given to Simonds's army was beyond its capacity—at least in the time allotted—not least because most units were well understrength.

The greatest achievement of Simonds and the Canadian First Army (he assumed command from an ailing Crerar in September 1944) was undoubtedly the clearance of the Scheldt estuary in the fall of 1944, which opened Antwerp to shipping and resolved the supply problem that had threatened to strangle Allied mobility. Fighting under the most appalling conditions and despite Montgomery's inexplicable refusal to allocate sufficient troops, at least until General Dwight D. Eisenhower finally intervened, the Canadians prevailed. Simonds displayed more innovation and flexibility, and both commander and men proved that they had absorbed the summer's hard lessons.

Simonds's career went into eclipse after the war. He lost out to the more politically astute Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes in running the postwar army and left little mark except as a critic of Canada's drift into the American military orbit. Simonds died on May 15, 1974, in Toronto.

PATRICK H. BRENNAN

See also

Canada, Army; Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Rhineland Offensive; Scheldt, Battles of the

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Simović, Dušan (1882–1962)

Yugoslavian Army general. Born on November 9, 1882, in Kragujevac, Serbia, Dušan Simović joined the Serbian Army and fought in both the Balkan Wars and World War I. After the war, he was commandant of the Officers' Military School. He became chief of the Yugoslavian Army General Staff in 1939 and chief of the Air Force Staff the following year.

In February 1941, Adolf Hitler demanded that Yugoslavia join the Axis, and despite Simović's opposition, Regent Prince Paul agreed to join the Tripartite Pact on March 25. Two days later, Simović led a military coup in Belgrade that deposed Paul and named as king young Peter II. Simović hoped to maintain Yugoslavia's neutrality and carry out internal reform, but German forces invaded the country on April 6 and also attacked Belgrade from the air.

The Germans occupied Yugoslavia within two weeks. Simović and King Peter II evaded capture and fled to Greece. Simović then headed the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London but chose to resign in 1942.

In February 1945, King Peter II appointed Simović to lead the Yugoslav government, but Partisan leader Marshal Josip Broz (Tito) vetoed this because of Simović's anticommunism, and Simović retired in May. Simović died in Belgrade on August 26, 1962.

MICHAEL J. SCOTT

See also

Tito; Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of

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Simpson, William Hood (1888–1980)

U.S. Army general. Born in Weatherford, Texas, on May 19, 1888, William Hood Simpson graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1909. He then served in the Philippines and in the 1916–1917 Punitive Expedition into Mexico. During World War I, he deployed to France with the

American Expeditionary Forces, ending the war as a temporary lieutenant colonel.

Reverting to captain after the war, Simpson attended the Infantry School (1924), the Command and General Staff School (1925), and the Army War College (1927–1928). Promoted to colonel in 1938, he took command of an infantry regiment. He was promoted to brigadier general in October 1940 and became assistant division commander of the 2nd Infantry Division. In September 1941, he was promoted to major general and assumed command of the 35th Infantry Division.

Simpson commanded XII Corps in September 1942 and was promoted to lieutenant general the next month. He then commanded the Fourth Army in California. Assigned to Europe in May 1944, Simpson organized the new Ninth Army headquarters staff in England. The Ninth Army became operational in France as a single-corps army under 12th Army Group in September 1944.

Simpson's army cleared Brittany and captured the port of Brest. It then occupied a quiet frontline sector in the vicinity of Luxembourg between the First and Third Armies. In the reorganization of army commands in October 1944, the Ninth Army headquarters moved to Maastricht. Simpson had his first major combat test in the November offensive designed to reach the Rhine. The undersized Ninth Army spent nearly four weeks against stiff German resistance before reaching the Roer River. The offensive ended when the Germans launched their December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive, and the Ninth Army was placed under British field marshal Bernard Montgomery.

Finally up to strength, the Ninth Army cleared the Rhineland (January–March 1945), then crossed the Rhine (March 24) and linked up with the First Army to encircle the Ruhr (April 1). In April, back under General Bradley's control, the Ninth Army reached the Elbe. Elements of the Ninth Army were the first to cross the river (April 12), linking up with Soviet forces. Simpson later claimed that his forces could have reached Berlin within 24 hours had supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower given the order.

After brief occupation duty in Germany (June 1945), Simpson undertook a mission to China (July). In October he took command of the Second Army in Tennessee and was transferred with it to Baltimore (June 1946). Retiring in

November 1946, Simpson was promoted to general on the retired list in July 1954. He died in San Antonio, Texas, on August 15, 1980.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Germany, Collapse of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Rhine Crossings; Ruhr Land Campaign

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Singapore, Battle for (February 8–15, 1942)

Capture of the great British base of Singapore was essential to Japanese success in the Far East. Throughout the 1930s, British governments had neglected Pacific defenses, as budgetary constraints forced retrenchment. From 1939 onward, moreover, fighting in Europe and North Africa was Britain's priority, diverting additional men and resources from the Far East, where Singapore was complacently considered impregnable.

The Japanese plan called for an approach to Singapore from the north by land. The British had designed Singapore's defenses primarily to meet a seaborne attack. Although some of its big guns were capable of firing against land targets, they lacked high-explosive shells for use against attacking troops.

The drive on Singapore began with the Japanese invasion of northern Malaya on December 8, 1941. By January 15, 1942, the British Indian III Corps of the 8th and 11th Infantry Divisions had been forced back to the defensive line in Johor, which was held by the Australian 8th Division. By the end of January, the Japanese had driven British forces back across the Straits of Johor into a defensive position on Singapore Island.

The Straits of Johor protected the northern and western shores of Singapore Island. The straits varied in width from 600 to 2,000 yards and were crossed only by a 70-foot-wide causeway that the British cut but could

not destroy. Singapore Island was largely covered by jungle growth and plantations that sharply limited observation and fields of fire. Except for several towns, the population was concentrated on the southeast coast in Singapore Town, a city of 1 million. The key location around Bukit Timah village in the center of the island contained a large depot of military stores and the three reservoirs for the island's water supply.

Lieutenant General Arthur E. Percival commanded 85,000 defending troops. Japanese commander Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki had only 30,000 men of the Twenty-Fifth Army. The attackers were short of ammunition and other supplies, but their aircraft dominated the skies. Percival deployed the bulk of his troops too far forward, defending 30 miles of front to make his stand on the island's beaches. Most of his men were poorly trained and were exhausted and dispirited after weeks of battle and defeat. Moreover, they had been outfought by a battle-hardened enemy skilled in infiltration and tactics suitable for the jungle terrain. The defending force of Indians (now consolidated into the 11th Division) and the Australian 8th Division had been reinforced on January 29 by the British 18th Division and, a few days earlier, by the partially trained Indian 44th Brigade. The only other troops were fortress troops, with two Malayan brigades and volunteers.

All but one of the island airfields were within reach of Japanese artillery fire, and the few remaining fighter aircraft were thus redeployed to Sumatra, from which they could provide only limited air support. Yamashita planned to throw the British off balance by feinting east of the causeway and making his major attack to the west of it.

On the morning of February 8, the Japanese attacked. Two divisions crossed in landing craft against the Australian 22nd Brigade west of the Kranji River. Although the Australians sank many landing craft, they were too thin on the ground to hold the line. By the next morning, the Japanese had taken Ama Keng and were attacking Tengah Airfield. The defenders then withdrew to establish a line on the narrow neck of land between the Kranji and Jurong Rivers.

Meanwhile, on the evening of February 9, the Japanese successfully attacked the Australian 27th Brigade, creating a gap between the brigade and the Kranji-Jurong line. The Japanese soon bypassed that line, which was never properly prepared or occupied by the defenders. A British counterattack attempting to restore the position failed.

By February 11, the Japanese had seized and repaired the causeway, allowing them to send additional resources, including tanks, onto the island and advance toward Nee Soon village. On February 12, Percival ordered a withdrawal to a perimeter marked by the Bukit Timah Road, the Mac-Ritchie and Pierce Reservoirs, and Paya Lebar-Kallang. Heavy fighting began south of the Bukit Timah Road on February 13, where for 48 hours the Australians held, and along Pasir Panjang Ridge, where Malayan forces stubbornly repulsed the Japanese. On February 14, however, the defenders were forced back to what proved to be their final line.

London had ordered Percival to continue the fight and not surrender. Conditions in the city were shocking, with dead and dying in the streets and loss of the water supply imminent. Reserves of food and ammunition for the troops had been seriously depleted by loss of the depots. Meanwhile, the British evacuated by sea certain key personnel essential to the later war effort, and demolitions destroyed heavy guns, aviation fuel, bombs, and other equipment. Many of Percival's troops simply deserted, including the engineers who were to destroy the naval dockyard.

When it was clear that nothing was to be gained by further resistance, on February 14 Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill instructed Field Marshal Archibald P. Wavell, Allied theater commander, to authorize Percival to surrender. Percival also had the welfare of civilians to consider when, on February 15, he surrendered his 70,000 troops unconditionally to Yamashita. The Japanese had taken Malaya and Singapore in only 70 days. The loss of Singapore was the greatest defeat of British forces since the 1781 Battle of Yorktown and had immense repercussions for British prestige in Asia.

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See also

China-Burma-India Theater; Malaya Campaign; Percival, Arthur Ernest; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945)

Struggle between Japan and China for control of China. The Sino-Japanese War, sometimes known as the Second Sino-Japanese War to distinguish it from the war between these two states during 1894–1895, began against the backdrop of repeated efforts of Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) Party leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to crush Chinese Communist forces led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). Japanese efforts to control China flared into all-out war in 1937. Previously, an uneasy truce had held, despite Japanese encroachments into Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and the Chinese provinces outside the Great Wall. As Japanese forces moved onto the northern China plain, the situation became more volatile, however, and a confusing three-sided conflict emerged until the Japanese surrender of August 1945.

Scholars of the conflict delineate up to four broad phases of the war. The first began with the September 1931 Mukden (Shenyang) Incident, in which intelligence officers of the elite Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army in southern Manchuria blew up a portion of track on the rail line at Mukden. They blamed it on the Chinese and used it as an excuse to occupy all of Manchuria, an area roughly the size of Texas and a major resource base. In succeeding years, the Japanese occupied more territory in northern China outside the Great Wall as Jiang concentrated on “extermination campaigns” against Mao’s Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin (Juichin) of Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province in southeastern China.

From October 1934 to October 1935, Jiang pursued Communist forces through China’s hinterlands to Yan’an (Yenan) in what became known as the Long March. When Mao’s forces reached the relative safety of Yan’an in northeastern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, Jiang ordered local warlords, nominally loyal to him, to continue the campaign against the Communists instead of concentrating on resisting Japanese expansion. The Xi’an (Sian) Incident in December 1936, a coup staged by two Nationalist generals, forced Jiang to accept a United Front against Japan and helped focus Chinese Nationalist fervor against the Japanese.

The Lugouqiao (Lukou-ch’iao) or Marco Polo Bridge Incident began the second phase and the start of the larger conflict. On July 7, 1937, Japanese

Army troops demanded entry into the town of Wanping (Wan-p'ing), about 10 miles west of Beijing (Peking) in Hebei (Hupeh) Province. The town was held by forces loyal to Jiang's Nationalist government. When the GMD troops denied entry to the Japanese, who were supposedly looking for a lost soldier, the Japanese threatened the use of force at the Marco Polo Bridge, where the opposing sides met.

In the aftermath of the Japanese demand for entry into the town and the Chinese refusal, Japanese forces began shelling Wanping and attacking the bridge. Larger Chinese units held their positions and even drove the Japanese back. Negotiations then began, used by both sides to concentrate additional forces in the northern China plain. On July 28, the Japanese attacked and seized control of the bridge; shortly thereafter the Japanese captured both Beijing and Tianjin (Tientsin), local Chinese commanders having decided to abandon these cities rather than risk their destruction. On July 31, Jiang informed the Chinese people that "the hope for peace has been shattered" and that the Chinese people had to fight the Japanese "to the bitter end" and expel the invader.

From July to December, Japanese forces seized most of the territory north of the Huanghe (Hwang Ho, known to Westerners as Yellow) River. Fighting was not confined to northern China, for in August 1937 the Japanese attacked the great commercial city of Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu). Not until November, after three months of hard fighting involving the best Nationalist troops, did Shanghai fall. Japanese forces then advanced up the Changjiang (Yangtze) River, and in December they took Nanjing (Nanking), also in Jiangsu Province, where they committed wide-scale atrocities. Nationalist forces withdrew deep into the Chinese interior to Chongqing (Chungking), in Sichuan (Szechwan), where Jiang established his new capital.

During the next several years, Japanese forces conquered much of northern and east-central China. The Japanese moved somewhat predictably along railroad lines and major waterways to facilitate troop transport and resupply. In theory, this should have aided the Chinese defenders, because it reduced the element of surprise. China, however, did not present a truly unified front.

Although Jiang possessed the most modern Chinese military force, his armies were less powerful than the Japanese. Other Chinese commanders were really regional military leaders, warlords unwilling to risk their troops

and thereby weaken their position relative to other Chinese warlords. All too frequently, poorly led Chinese troops fought well for a brief time but then fled with escaping civilians.

Chinese soldiers surrendering to the Japanese in September 1938. Japanese forces came to control much of China between 1937 and 1939, despite stubborn Chinese resistance. (Topical Press Agency/Getty Images)

By 1940, the Japanese controlled northern and eastern China, and the Chinese Communists dominated northwestern China. Late that year, the Communists launched the “Hundred Regiments” offensive against Japan, but they were defeated by the better-equipped Japanese. The Communists then switched to guerrilla warfare against Japanese positions in northern and central China. This policy led to Japanese reprisals against both the Communists and the civilian population. Guerrilla warfare did not drive out the Japanese, but it did help disrupt their control and served to establish the Communists as dedicated opponents of Japanese rule, enhancing their postwar political position.

By 1940 the situation had stabilized, and a third, somewhat quieter, phase began. Although few major battles occurred, there were regular skirmishes in the three-sided conflict that had emerged after 1937. The Japanese occupied most of the eastern third of China, its major ports, and the bulk of its industrial areas. The Japanese-controlled territory included the majority of

Han ethnic Chinese people. The Japanese established a puppet regime under Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei), a left-wing member of the Guomindang who had been forced from power in December 1935. With Nationalist forces, Communist guerrillas, and an uncooperative Chinese population, the Japanese military sought to wear down Chinese resistance and cut off China from outside assistance, chiefly from the United States.

None of the three main contending armies could afford a major and costly campaign. Mao's Communist forces carried out a social revolution in the areas under their control, introducing land reform and seeking to improve the lot of the peasantry in health care and education. They also sought to identify landowners and other members of the Chinese upper classes with the hated Japanese occupiers. Mao remained vigilant against Jiang's armies, as the Chinese president continued to keep many of his best military units in a blockade of the Communist base area around Yan'an. Typically, Communist forces attacked troops and sought to convert the peasants to their cause in areas only weakly held by the Japanese.

Jiang also proceeded cautiously, for he intended to conserve Nationalist military strength to continue the civil war and crush the Communists once Japan had been defeated. For a time the Soviet Union and the Western powers provided aid to Jiang, despite logistical challenges. The Soviets sought to keep Japan occupied in China to forestall any invasion of Siberia, but the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact signed in April 1941 eased Moscow's fears of Japanese expansion and enabled Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to concentrate on the greater threat posed by Germany, which invaded in June. Britain, France, and the United States also provided assistance, but the German conquest of France in the spring of 1940 reduced that aid to a trickle, as Great Britain fought Germany alone while the United States gave highest priority to assisting Britain in its time of greatest peril.

The civil war, however, was never far from the surface, as evidenced in the so-called New Fourth Army Anhui (Anhwei) Incident of January 1941. As part of the United Front against Japan, Jiang permitted Mao to reorganize his armed units into the Eighth Route Army and later authorized formation of the New Fourth Army. There was disagreement about its area of operations; Jiang expected the force to operate north of the Huanghe, but the New Fourth Army instead moved south into Shandong (Shantung). Consequently, GMD armies surrounded and attacked the New Fourth Army on January 6, 1941,

badly mauling that smaller force and compelling the surrender of 2,000 of its troops.

In September 1940, meanwhile, Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina, and in July 1941 they moved into southern Indochina. This effort to cut the Chinese off from U.S. aid flowing from India brought U.S. retaliation against Japan in the form of an economic embargo on certain critical war materials, especially oil. In turn, this triggered Japan's decision to go to war against the United States. Japan's December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor and its war with Britain and the Netherlands broadened the conflict into a general Pacific war and severely strained its capability to conduct offensive operations in China.

Japanese military leaders were forced to reassign divisions from China to carry out the invasions of Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma. In consequence, Japanese operations in China subsided. Jiang, confident of ultimate Allied victory, continued his policy of largely avoiding pitched battle with major Japanese military units, although he reluctantly agreed to commit some divisions to assist in operations against Japanese forces in Burma.

Meanwhile, Chinese Communist forces continued their pattern of securing the loyalty of the peasants in areas they controlled while engaging in small-unit attacks against the Japanese. The general Nationalist military inactivity against the Japanese aided the Chinese Communists in that it helped them to secure the mantle of Chinese nationalism. The Japanese "three-alls" reprisal policy also assisted the Communists. Following a guerrilla attack, Japanese forces would move into a nearby populated area and "kill all, loot all, burn all." Their policy turned many of the survivors into new recruits for the Communists.

U.S. aid to the Nationalists increased after December 1941, but China was a distant part of the China-Burma-India theater. In April 1942, Japanese forces in Burma (present-day Myanmar) took Lashio and cut the Burma Road, Nationalist China's only land route to the outside world. Thereafter, American aid had to be flown over "the Hump" of the Himalayas to reach Chongqing. Jiang's U.S. military adviser, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, tried to train and organize new Chinese divisions equipped by the United States, but he became increasingly frustrated with Jiang's refusal to commit them to fight the Japanese in Burma or in southeastern China. There was also

disagreement among U.S. generals about aid to China. Major General Claire Chennault wanted to build on the success of the Flying Tigers and their high kill ratio against Japanese pilots to commit most aid to the new U.S. Fourteenth Air Force in China.

In October 1944, Stilwell was recalled at Jiang's request, and the China-Burma-India theater was separated into the China theater and the Burma-India theater. This final phase of the Sino-Japanese War (late 1944 to August 1945) highlighted the corruption and inefficiency of Nationalist forces. The United States had provided sufficient aid to build a modern army of 30 divisions and also created the Fourteenth Air Force. Further, the United States began strategic bombing of Japanese air bases on Formosa some 100 miles from the Chinese mainland.

Throughout 1943, American planners had contemplated using either eastern China or Formosa as a staging point for the men and supplies necessary to launch an invasion of the Japanese home islands. Early planning assumed that the new Chinese Nationalist divisions would reopen the Burma Road and contain Japanese forces in China proper. It also assumed that the Fourteenth Air Force would be able to subject Japanese coastal defenses to attack.

The successes of the U.S. amphibious forces in the Southwest and Central Pacific and of U.S. submarines in cutting the flow of food and raw materials, especially oil, from the Japanese-conquered territories to the home islands somewhat reduced the importance of China as a staging area against Japan. At the same time, Japanese forces in China launched a two-pronged offensive that demonstrated continued Chinese military weakness.

Operation ICHI-GO (VICTORY NUMBER ONE), which Japan conducted from April to December 1944, aimed to cross the Burma-India border through southern China to seize Allied airfields at the western side of the Hump air-transport route, capture key north-south railroads in China, and seize Fourteenth Air Force airfields used to stage attacks on Japanese forces. The attack on Assam failed, as Allied forces in Burma under Lieutenant General Sir William Slim broke the March–July 1944 siege of Imphal and then went on the offensive.

But the Japanese attack in China succeeded. The Japanese first won control of the key north-south railroad between the Huang and Chenjiang Rivers; they then seized the airfields used by the Fourteenth Air Force, and

later in 1944 they secured Guilin (Kweilin), Nanning, and Liuzhou (Liuchow) in Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province. Chinese Nationalist forces not only fought poorly, but peasants attacked them as they retreated, demonstrating the huge divide between the Chinese masses and the government. Interestingly, the Japanese did not strike Communist base areas in northern and north-central China, causing some observers to speculate about a de facto Japanese-Chinese Communist truce that benefited both sides.

The ICHI-GO operation was the high point of Japanese military operations in China. Thereafter, Tokyo began transferring its best divisions from China and Manchuria to meet the U.S. drive across the Pacific into the Philippines and later the Bonin Islands and the Ryukyus. Remaining Japanese forces in China were badly overextended, and Japanese commanders sought to consolidate, especially by the summer of 1945, to face a possible Soviet attack.

Meanwhile, the weight of corruption and inefficiency was beginning to sink Jiang's Nationalist regime. The Chinese government had limited financial resources because Japanese troops occupied the populous and most productive part of China. Corruption and inefficiency also hurt the government.

Jiang's regime responded by printing more and more money, driving down the value of paper and leading to dramatic inflation that wiped out much of the middle class. By contrast, Mao's Communist forces emerged from the war in a much stronger position because of their apparent honesty and commitment to the welfare of the peasants and their resistance to the Japanese.

By the summer of 1945, the war was drawing to a close. In early August 1945, Red Army troops—honoring Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's pledge at the February 1945 Yalta Conference that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan "two or three months" after the defeat of Germany—invaded Manchuria in overwhelming force and quickly occupied that Chinese province. On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered.

The fighting in China had tied down some 1.2 million Japanese troops, with some 396,000 killed. China had sustained military casualties alone of more than 3.2 million, with more than 1.3 million dead. The number of civilian dead is unknown.

Unfortunately for the Chinese, the end of the long Sino-Japanese War did

not bring peace to China. Ignoring American advice, Jiang moved troops to Manchuria to secure that key province before the Communists in northern China could do so. Fighting broke out between the Nationalists and the Communists that ultimately led to a Communist victory in October 1949, bringing the long years of civil war and international war to an end.

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See also

Burma Road; Chennault, Claire Lee; China; Hump, The; ICHI-GO, Operation; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Nanjing Massacre; Shanghai, Battle of; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Stalin, Joseph; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Document 21; Document 75; Document 108

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Sirte, First Battle of (December 17, 1941)

Important Mediterranean air and naval battle between Great Britain and Italy that occurred because both nations were conducting convoy operations at sea. The British were trying to get a tanker, the *Breconshire*, to fuel-starved Malta. Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian departed Alexandria on December 16, 1941, with the *Breconshire*, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers. Meanwhile, British Force K of three light cruisers and six destroyers sortied from Malta to meet it.

Simultaneously, Italy dispatched supply ships to North Africa. This effort was particularly important, given heavy Italian shipping losses over the

previous months. Seven destroyers and a torpedo boat provided close escort for two small convoys totaling 4 merchant ships and carrying 400 vehicles, 17 tanks, 10 artillery pieces, and other supplies. The escort, commanded by Vice Admiral Carlo Bergamini, consisted of the battleship *Caio Duilio,* 2 light cruisers, and 3 destroyers. Italian vice admiral Angelo Iachino's covering force was also at sea. It consisted of the battleships *Littorio, Giulio Cesare,* and *Andrea Doria* as well as 2 heavy cruisers and 10 destroyers. Bergamini had developed the battleship convoy, with which he had enjoyed success following earlier Italian convoy disasters. The battleship escort operated near the slow-moving convoys and maneuvered in such a way as to remain close to them. At the same time, Iachino's heavier force was steaming between Vian's force and the main Italian convoy east of Malta.

The Italians learned through radio intercepts that British cruisers had departed Alexandria, and on December 16 their reconnaissance aircraft and German Junkers Ju-52s flying troops from Greece to North Africa sighted the *Breconshire* and reported it as a battleship. Later that day, the British ships came under ineffective Italian air attack. Iachino assumed that British battleships were at sea hunting for his convoys, although in reality the lack of escorts and the threat of German submarines prevented the commander of British forces in the Mediterranean, Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, from dispatching battleships from Alexandria.

Iachino increased speed to 24 knots, the fastest the *Doria* could manage, and steamed to engage. Vian had been joined by Force K and was aware of Iachino's approach from aerial reconnaissance early in the afternoon. He turned to the south, away from Iachino, to protect the *Breconshire*. Vian was also aware that additional Italian forces were at sea.

On December 17, Vian's ships had again been subjected to Italian air attack, and the British antiaircraft fire had been observed by Iachino's fleet, which then closed. Sunset was approaching when contact was made. The Italians opened fire at extreme range of 35,000 yards, dropping to 24,000 yards. Vian detached the two destroyers, and later all of Force K, to protect the *Breconshire*, which steamed south to escape.

Italian fire for this range was quite accurate, and their shells straddled several British ships. The British destroyers made smoke and advanced on the Italians, who countered by ordering their destroyers forward. The British

destroyers boldly moved forward, but Vian almost immediately ordered them to retire on the main force.

With night coming on, Iachino ordered a withdrawal. Vian, under orders from Admiral Cunningham, did not try to force a night engagement. One British destroyer had suffered one dead and sustained very minor damage. In the morning, Vian ordered Force K to escort the *Breconshire* into Valetta, Malta, while he retired to Alexandria.

Meanwhile, the two Italian convoys arrived safely at Tripoli and Benghazi. In an ancillary development on December 19, Force K, trying to intercept the Axis convoys, ran into an Italian minefield near Tripoli. One cruiser and a destroyer were lost and two cruisers were damaged at a cost of more than 600 dead.

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See also

Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Iachino, Angelo; Malta; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Vian, Sir Philip Louis

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Sirte, Second Battle of (March 22, 1942)

Mediterranean air and naval battle fought between the British and Italians as a consequence of British efforts to resupply Malta. Conditions on the British island were dire in 1942, with the Royal Navy able to pass only a few ships through the gauntlet of Axis air and naval forces dominating the Mediterranean. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, Britain's naval commander in the Mediterranean, was determined that the next effort to resupply Malta would be successful.

On March 20, 1942, British convoy MW.10 of four merchant ships, including the tanker *Breconshire,* departed Alexandria for Malta with fuel and provisions. Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian commanded an escort force of four light cruisers, nine large destroyers, and seven small Hunt-class destroyers. A light cruiser and a destroyer were ordered from Malta to join it. Five British submarines were also on patrol.

German reconnaissance aircraft located the British convoy on the evening of March 21, and the next morning a British submarine off the port of Taranto reported an Italian naval force headed south. Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino commanded the battleship *Littorio,* two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers. Two other Italian destroyers ordered to sea failed to arrive in time to participate in the battle. The Axis powers also had six submarines on patrol in the eastern Mediterranean. The Italian ships lacked radar (the first effective set would not be installed until May), but they did have command of the air, and Iachino knew that the British lacked battleships.

By March 22, Vian was nearing Malta and had lost one Hunt-class destroyer, torpedoed by a U-boat. At 2:10 p.m. on March 22, the British sighted the three Italian cruisers and four destroyers. Vian now carried out the procedures decided on earlier. Five destroyers continued on with the convoy, while Vian's remaining cruisers and destroyers made smoke and launched torpedo attacks against the Italian ships. The Italian ships then drew off.

Vian's detached forces had barely regained the convoy when, at 4:37 p.m., the Italian fleet again came into sight. Iachino's intention was to steam to the southwest and cut off Vian from Malta, at the same time positioning himself downwind of the immense smoke screens being laid down by the British ships. Vian's force consistently charged and fell back, feinting and threatening the remainder of the afternoon, as the range slowly closed.

With the approach of darkness, Iachino closed to within 5,000 yards. Fire from the *Littorio* damaged two British destroyers; two other British warships suffered minor shell damage. But with nightfall and lacking radar, Iachino decided to withdraw, despite having suffered only one British shell hit on the *Littorio*. During Iachino's return to Taranto, however, two Italian destroyers foundered in a storm with heavy loss of life.

The Luftwaffe sank two of the British transports short of Malta. The other two reached Malta, but they had been only partly offloaded before they too

were sunk by air attack. One of the British destroyers damaged in the battle on March 22 was later sunk at Malta, again from the air, while undergoing repairs. The success of the Axis blockade of Malta led to another failed British attempt to resupply the island in June.

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See also

Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Iachino, Angelo; Malta; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Vian, Sir Philip Louis

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Sittang, Battle of the (February 18–23, 1942)

Early Japanese victory in Burma. In January 1942, Japanese forces launched an attack by the 55th and 33rd Divisions on Burma (present-day Myanmar) from Thailand. The objective was to take southern and central Burma from the defending British forces and cut off this vital supply line from India to China. The Japanese attack through the Kawkareik Pass began a series of successful minor actions against weakly defended outposts in eastern Burma.

Lieutenant General Thomas Hutton's British forces—the equivalent of two small divisions of poorly equipped British, Indian, and Burmese troops—were unable to halt the Japanese advance. Major General John George Smyth's Indian 17th Infantry Division failed to impede the Japanese at Moulmein and again at Bilin. The division then began a fighting withdrawal in an attempt to fall back across the Sittang and establish a new defensive position.

A small garrison force defended the railway bridge; 17th Division headquarters had already moved across the Sittang while the rest of the division continued to advance by road from the Bilin area. Advancing Japanese forces outflanked and cut off the two brigades east of the river. In

the confusion of the battle, word reached Smyth that the Japanese were about to break through to the river. Recognizing the importance of the bridge to the overall Japanese campaign, he ordered the span destroyed. The two stranded Indian brigades then fought a desperate battle against superior Japanese forces.

The Japanese, no longer able to capture the bridge intact, concentrated on destroying the eight battalions of the Indian 17th Infantry Division, which had no place to retreat to and no hope of reinforcement. Unit order soon collapsed, and small elements crossed the river to safety as best they could. In the process, the brigades abandoned significant amounts of arms, equipment, and motor transport east of the river. Many men were shot or drowned trying to cross the 600-yard-wide swiftly flowing river. Most of those who did escape did so with not much more than their individual weapons. Only about 2,000 officers and men made it to safety.

With the 17th Infantry Division temporarily rendered combat-ineffective, the British were unable to establish a viable defensive position on the west side of the river, and the Japanese soon resumed their offensive. The Battle of the Sittang was critical for the defense of Rangoon. Two weeks later on March 9, Japanese forces captured that important port and Burmese capital.

Denied their primary and most direct military supply route, British forces in the country now had to move farther west and north to reestablish any semblance of a defensive line and new land supply routes from India. The Japanese had also severed the land supply route to China. Japanese forces were now poised to move north and fight for control of all of Burma and to threaten British India.

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See also

Burma Theater; Singapore, Battle for

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Sitzkrieg (October 4, 1939–May 10, 1940)

Period of apparent inactivity in ground or aerial combat between Germany and the Allies following the fall of Poland. The Sitzkrieg (Stationary War) was also known as the Phony War, *drôle de guerre*, and the Bore War. Although Adolf Hitler hoped to launch an offensive against France in 1939 before winter began, the Wehrmacht required more time to redeploy its forces before such an undertaking. German generals begged for additional time, and terrible winter weather led Hitler to reluctantly agree to delays that ultimately postponed the invasion until the spring of 1940.

France remained committed to the strategy of passive defense it had adopted from the war's outset. The French Army had completed its mobilization along the German frontier while Hitler's forces seized Poland. Although France had an overwhelming advantage in numbers and equipment, French Army commander General Maurice Gamelin failed to seize the opportunity and invade Germany in strength from the west. On September 30, Gamelin ordered an end to the small foray he had authorized into the Rhineland and a withdrawal to the French frontier. The French also manned the Maginot Line and settled into garrison duty by October 4.

Belgium and the Netherlands maintained their neutrality, and the British —who were slow to commit resources to France and to understand the gravity of the situation—believed that the economic pressure of the Royal Navy's blockade could force a negotiated settlement. As a result, an illusion of peace led to the term "Sitzkrieg"—an ironic reference to the German blitzkrieg (lightning war) campaign in Poland—and settled over the opposing forces. Both sides were reluctant to unleash premature air action that might bring about the bombing of cities, and the British limited their early bombing activity largely to dropping of leaflets (critics called it the "Confetti War").

Civilian trains continued to run along tracks between the German and French lines. Children and soldiers alike played in the open fields separating the combatants. The surreal atmosphere at the front began to take a toll on the morale of the French Army, as defeatism and apathy spread through the French government.

Meanwhile, preparations for further hostilities continued. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) gradually grew in strength along the Belgian border, but the Allies failed to take advantage of lessons learned in Poland

regarding the use of tanks in divisions. The army largely ignored Colonel Charles de Gaulle's pleas to reform French armor doctrine to reflect Germany's successful demonstration of blitzkrieg warfare in Poland.

As the bitterly cold winter of 1940 gave way to spring, illusions regarding the war continued. Even an American intelligence assessment, correctly noting that Germany would complete its buildup along the French border in May 1940, concluded that no attack would follow. The Norway Campaign of April 1940 did little to weaken that common perception, which lingered in many minds until May 10, when the Germans launched their invasion of France and the Low Countries.

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See also

Blitzkrieg; France, Battle for; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Maginot Line; Norway, German Conquest of; Poland Campaign

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Skerki Bank, Battle near (December 2, 1942)

The naval action resulting from the nighttime interception of an Italian convoy to Tunisia by British warships operating from Algeria. Followin Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of French North Africa on November 8, 1942, German and Italian troops withdrew into Tunisia and began building up their forces there. During the first critical weeks following the Allied invasion, the Allied naval command headed by the Royal Navy's Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, commander in chief in the Mediterranean, did not interfere with the stream of Italian shipping crossing the Sicilian Channel. Malta's Force K was not reestablished until November 27 due to concerns about air support. On November 30 Cunningham constituted Force Q, commanded by Rear Admiral C. H. J. Harcourt, with three light cruisers and two destroyers at Bône in Algeria.

Signals intelligence from Luftwaffe Enigma intercepts informed the Allied naval command of an important Italian/German convoy of four transports designated Convoy H en route from Palermo to Bizerte, Tunisia, and at 5:30 p.m. on December 1, Force Q sallied on its first mission. Although Italian intelligence intercepted and decrypted the aerial sighting report that the British deemed necessary to protect the secret of their penetration of Enigma, naval headquarters decided that there was not time to withdraw Convoy H and that it must proceed.

Convoy H had an unusually strong escort under Captain Aldo Cocchia. It consisted of the destroyers *Da Recco, Camicia Nera* and *Folgore* and the torpedo boats *Clio* and *Procione*. When Cocchia learned that enemy warships threatened his force, he decided on a change of course to the south, hoping that this might confuse enemy forces searching for him. Unfortunately, the order confused his force more, as not all ships received the order or executed it correctly. Thus, Convoy H was scattered when Harcourt's ships appeared on the original convoy track. The light cruisers *Aurora, Sirius*, and *Argonaut* led, followed by the destroyers *Quiberon* and *Quentin*. At 12:38 a.m. the cruisers engaged one transport, setting off its cargo of munitions. In response, Cocchia ordered his warships to counterattack.

The *Camicia Nera* advanced and at 12:43 a.m. launched six torpedoes from an estimated range of 2,200 yards and then retired north as British salvos splashed closely around. The *Folgore* also fired six torpedoes at close range before withdrawing. At 12:52 a.m., however, nine 5.25-inch shells pounded the Italian destroyer, resulting in a large fire and extensive flooding. The *Folgore* took on a 20-degree list and at 1:16 a.m. capsized, with the loss of 126 men.

The *Procione* turned to counterattack after sighting the *Sirius* 2,000 yards off its starboard bow, but at 12:53 a.m. a broadside ravaged the torpedo boat, slaughtering the forward gun crew. The *Procione* withdrew southwest and never opened fire. The *Clio* made smoke and fired at British searchlights and muzzle flashes, while the *Da Recco* maneuvered to launch torpedoes.

Meanwhile, British warships were sailing alongside the convoy, firing and launching torpedoes at targets of opportunity. By 1:25 they had reached the head of the formation and began to circle back to the west. All four transports were either sunk or on fire by this time. At 1:30 a.m. the *Da Recco* closed to within 4,500 yards of the British ships, but the destroyer's torpedo

attack failed; concentrated fire from the *Sirius, Quiberon,* and *Quentin* killed 118 crewmen and left the ship dead in the water. Following this, the British column set course for Bône.

Harcourt's force had sunk every merchant ship. It had also sent to the bottom the *Folgore,* heavily damaged the *Da Recco,* and moderately damaged the *Procione*. Nearly 2,200 Axis sailors and troops lost their lives. Harcourt's ships had suffered only splinter damage in return. Force Q did not make it back to base unscathed, however. German aircraft surprised it at 6:30 a.m. and sank the *Quentin*. Nonetheless, the battle was a major setback for the Italian Navy. Although its counterattack was piecemeal and poorly coordinated, it was remarkable that the convoy escort had failed to inflict any damage whatsoever on the British.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Convoys, Axis; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Malta; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; TORCH, Operation

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Skorzeny, Otto (1908–1975)

German Schutzstaffel (SS) Obersturmbannführer and Waffen-SS lieutenant colonel. Born in Vienna, Austria, on June 12, 1908, Otto Skorzeny studied engineering at Vienna Technische Hochschule (Technical College). His involvement there in a dueling society led to his nickname, "Scar-face." Upon graduation, Skorzeny worked as an engineer. After the 1938 Anschluss (union) of Austria with Germany, Skorzeny volunteered as a pilot for the German Luftwaffe. Rejected because of his age, he joined the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division (later the 1st SS Panzer Division).

Transferring to the SS Das Reich Division, he fought in the invasion of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940 and as a lieutenant in the invasions of the Balkans (April to May 1941) and the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941). Badly wounded in fighting on the Eastern Front, he was evacuated. On his recovery, he was assigned to a desk job in a supply depot.

In April 1943, Skorzeny was promoted to captain in the SS and placed in charge of German Special Troops. He studied British commando operations and set up a facility at a hunting lodge at Friedenthal near Berlin, where volunteers were trained in special operations techniques. On September 9, 1943, Skorzeny and his commandos gained international attention when they rescued deposed Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in a daring assault on Gran Sasso, a mountain resort where he was being held, freeing him within five minutes without firing a shot. On October 15, 1944, with Hungarian leaders trying to leave the war, Hitler sent Major Skorzeny and his commandos into that country. There they seized Milos Horthy, son of Hungarian regent Miklós Horthy, and the next day they seized the regent himself. A pro-Nazi government then took power in Hungary.

In late October, Hitler personally promoted Skorzeny to lieutenant colonel in the Waffen-SS and charged him with responsibility for covert operations for the upcoming Ardennes Offensive (December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945). Skorzeny took command of the 10th Panzer Brigade, a collection of 2,500 men from different units, some speaking English and dressed in American uniforms to commit sabotage and create havoc behind Allied lines. In Operation GRIEF (GRAB), the brigade experienced limited success creating confusion among U.S. troops.

With the defeat of the Ardennes Offensive, the brigade was disbanded, and Skorzeny fought briefly on the Eastern Front before he was transferred back to the west, where he led an unsuccessful effort to destroy the bridge captured by U.S. forces over the Rhine at Remagen (March 7).

Arrested after the German surrender and charged with war crimes, Skorzeny was acquitted for lack of evidence, but he was not released. He escaped from prison in July 1948 and made his way to Spain, where he married Countess Ilse Lüthje and established a prosperous engineering business. In 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany government declared Skorzeny *entnazifiziert* (denazified). However, he remained stateless until 1958, when he received an Austrian passport. Skorzeny also raised funds to

enable ex-SS men to find refuge in Latin America. He died of lung cancer in Madrid on July 7, 1975.

CULLEN MONK

See also

Ardennes Offensive; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Belgium Campaign; Commandos/Rangers; Denmark Campaign; France, Battle for; Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós; Hungary; Mussolini, Benito; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the

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SLEDGEHAMMER, Operation

Code name for an Allied contingency invasion of France. Following U.S. entry into World War II in December 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided that the United States would endeavor to contain Japanese expansion in the Pacific while first concentrating on the defeat of Germany. At the Arcadia Conference (December 22, 1941–January 15, 1942), Roosevelt committed the United States to Operation BOLERO, the rapid buildup of U.S. forces in Britain.

American planners, especially U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, advocated a cross-Channel invasion as the best means to end the war as quickly as possible. An invasion of France by the Western Allies would also relieve German pressure on the Soviet Union. British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, who feared a repetition of the bloody stalemate in Flanders during World War I, sought to commit major Allied military assets in the Mediterranean theater and involve the United States in efforts to contain Soviet power. Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir Alan Brooke supported that position.

Marshall directed Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower of the War Plans Division to draw up a plan, which Marshall then presented to Roosevelt in March 1942, for a British-U.S. invasion of the French coast somewhere between Le Havre and Calais. Known as the Marshall Memorandum, it outlined two military options. The first of these was SLEDGEHAMMER. Originally conceived by the British as an emergency invasion of France to prevent a Soviet collapse (or to take advantage of the situation if German forces were defeated in the east and France became vulnerable to invasion), SLEDGEHAMMER was a high-risk operation. It is a matter of debate whether the War Department actually considered SLEDGEHAMMER viable. The second option, ROUNDUP, called for a 48-division invasion in early 1943.

Although the Marshall Memorandum emphasized that ROUNDUP was the preferred solution, it noted that even a failed small cross-Channel invasion of France would be preferable to dispersing Allied military assets elsewhere. The U.S. planners believed that the spring of 1943 was not only the earliest possible date for an all-out invasion of France but also could be the only date, as by 1944 the Soviet Union might have been driven from the war.

Churchill fought against SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, believing that a cross-Channel invasion, even in 1943, was too risky. He favored the Mediterranean strategy, known as GYMNAST, in which British and French forces would invade and conquer French North Africa, supposedly without prejudicing ROUNDUP.

The Dieppe Raid of August 19, 1942, destroyed any illusions about the possibility of an Allied invasion of France in 1942 or even 1943. The cross-Channel invasion of France, ultimately known as Operation OVERLORD, did not occur until June 6, 1944.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Arcadia Conference; Brooke, Sir Alan Francis; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dieppe Raid; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Marshall, George Catlett; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; ROUNDUP, Operation

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Slessor, Sir John Cotesworth (1897–1979)

British marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Born in Ranikhet, India, on June 3, 1897, John Cotesworth Slessor joined the Royal Flying Corps in World War I. During the interwar period, he held a variety of RAF positions, including as instructor and as a participant in the Waziristan Operations in 1936–1937. Slessor earned promotion to squadron leader in July 1932, to group captain in July 1937, and to air commodore in September 1937. Concerned with the effective use of airpower, he published a book, *Air Power and Armies,* in 1936.

Slessor played a key role in planning the force structure and strategic concept for the RAF in World War II while serving as director of plans for the Air Staff from 1937 to 1941. An advocate of a heavy bomber force and strategic bombing operations, Slessor was often involved in coordination and planning with senior American leaders throughout the war, including the January 1943 Casablanca Conference and the "ABC" staff discussions among the Americans, British, and Canadians to coordinate Allied plans should the United States enter the war.

In May 1941, Slessor assumed command of the 5 Bomber Group. In February 1942, he returned to the Air Staff and a newly established position, assistant chief of the Air Staff (Policy). In February 1943, he was appointed air officer commanding Coastal Command. In this post, he directed the successful offensive of land-based aircraft against German submarines transiting the Bay of Biscay. In May 1944, Slessor assumed command of RAF Mediterranean and Middle East forces. He was also deputy commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces under U.S. Army Air Forces major general Ira Eaker. Slessor also helped plan and direct the air components of the final phase of the Italy Campaign (1943–1945) and the August 15, 1944, Allied landing in southern France, Operation DRAGOON.

In April 1945, Air Marshal Slessor returned to the Air Ministry as the air member for personnel, with responsibility for planning the demobilization of the wartime force and the development of the peacetime force structure of the RAF. Promoted to marshal of the Royal Air Force in 1950, Slessor ended his military career chief of the Air Staff from 1950 to 1952. He died in Wroughton, England, on July 12, 1979.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also

Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Antisubmarine Warfare; Bay of Biscay Offensive; DRAGOON, Operation; Eaker, Ira Clarence; Great Britain, Air Force

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Slim, Sir William Joseph (1891–1970)

British Army field marshal. Born on August 6, 1891, in Bristol, William Joseph Slim came from humble stock. He joined the Officer Training Corps, and in August 1914 he was commissioned a second lieutenant. At Gallipoli in 1915, he received a serious wound, but he made a full recovery. He deployed to Mesopotamia in 1916, winning the Military Cross for valor before being wounded again and sent to India to convalesce.

Between the wars, Slim served with the Indian Army, honed his writing in part-time journalism, and distinguished himself as an instructor at the Staff College at Camberley and as a student at the Imperial Defence College.

By 1940, Slim was a brigadier commanding the Indian 10th Infantry Brigade. At Gallabat in the Sudan, his brigade retreated in the face of inferior Italian forces. After this error in judgment, he adopted a marked preference for the offensive. The next year, he was promoted to major general and assumed command of the Indian 10th Division in Iraq and Syria.

With the Japanese invasion of Burma (present-day Myanmar), Slim returned to the China-Burma-India theater in March 1942 to command the Burma Corps. Overwhelmed by the superior skill and mobility of attacking Japanese forces, Slim oversaw a 1,000-mile retreat, the longest in British Army history. Throughout, he kept his demoralized and seriously outclassed corps together, preserving 12,000 men to fight another day.

Promoted to lieutenant general and given command of XV Corps in April 1942, Slim worked to instill in his soldiers resilience and an aggressive attitude. Emphasizing fitness, night and jungle training, small-unit tactics, and self-reliance, he restored the confidence of a badly shaken army. As with the more famous Bernard Montgomery, Slim had the advantage of being not quite a gentleman. He spoke to his troops using their language (he knew Urdu and Gurkhali), and he shared their sacrifices, transmitting his own forceful personality to the units under his command. Slim continued his personal brand of leadership when he assumed command of the Fourteenth Army in May 1943.

General William Slim, one of the ablest British generals of World War II. He is shown here when he was chief of the British Imperial General Staff, August 10, 1948. In 1949 he was promoted to field marshal. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Slim's Fourteenth Army faced its sternest challenge with the Japanese HA-GO and U-GO offensives in March 1944, the latter aiming for Imphal and Kohima. Initially caught off balnce, Slim's army fought doggedly, forcing the Japanese to expend their momentum and limited supplies in costly attacks. Counterattacking, the Fourteenth Army pursued the Japanese across the malarial mountains of Burma during the monsoon season. In headlong retreat, the Japanese Fifteenth Army lost nearly half of its initial force of 150,000 men. Fighting a unified Japanese army with an aura of invincibility about it, Slim's multiethnic and religiously diverse army inflicted the largest land defeat on Japan to that time. Slim then led the reconquest of Burma until war's end.

After the war, Slim served as chief of the Imperial General Staff, and in 1949 he was promoted to field marshal. From 1953 to 1960, he was governor-general of Australia, becoming in 1960 First Viscount Slim. He published his memoirs, *Defeat into Victory*, in 1956. Slim died in London on December 14, 1970.

WILLIAM J. ASTORE

See also

Burma Theater; China-Burma-India Theater; Chindits; Great Britain, Army; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; India

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Sloops

See Corvettes and Sloops

Slovik, Edward Donald (1920–1945)

U.S. Army private and the only U.S. serviceman to be executed for desertion during World War II. Born on February 18, 1920, near Detroit, Michigan, Edward Donald Slovik was classified 4F because of his criminal record but reclassified as draft-eligible in 1943 because of a manpower shortage. In August 1944, Slovik was sent to France to join the 28th Infantry Division as a replacement.

On August 25, Slovik and another soldier became separated from their unit and fell in with a Canadian patrol. They spent six weeks with the Canadians before U.S. military police returned Slovik to his original company on October 5. Slovik told an officer that he was frightened of

combat and would run away again. Believing that his punishment would be the stockade, Slovik deserted the next day.

Returning to his unit, Slovik signed a confession of desertion. He was given a chance to clear himself of the charges, but he refused. He was court-martialed on November 11 and sentenced to be executed by firing squad. Supreme Allied commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower, believing it necessary for morale, approved the sentence, and the execution proceeded on January 31, 1945, near Saint-Marie aux Mines, France. Years later, U.S. president Jimmy Carter officially pardoned Slovik.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also
Eisenhower, Dwight David

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Smith, Holland McTyeire (1882–1967)

U.S. Marine Corps general. Born in Seale, Alabama, on April 20, 1882, Holland McTyeire Smith graduated from the Alabama Polytechnic Institute (today Auburn University) in 1901 and then earned a law degree at the University of Alabama in 1903. He then practiced law for two years in Montgomery. More interested in military service than law, Smith received a commission as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps (1905).

During the next decade Smith served in a variety of land and sea assignments, including in the Dominican Republic (1916–1917), where he experimented with amphibious landing techniques. During this time he also earned the nickname “Howlin’ Mad” for his frequent explosions of temper. Following U.S. entry into World War I, Smith fought in France with the 5th Marine Regiment and then served as adjutant to the 4th Marine Brigade. After postwar occupation duty in Germany, he returned to the United States in 1919.

Smith graduated from the Naval War College in 1921. An enthusiastic advocate and pioneer of amphibious warfare, Colonel Smith became director

of operations and training at Marine Corps headquarters in Washington, D.C. (1927). Here he worked to develop new tactics, landing craft, and amphibious tractors. Smith believed that amphibious warfare would be an essential element of any U.S. Pacific military operations. He was especially concerned about developing efficient amphibious landing craft and worked closely with Andrew J. Higgins on new designs.

Smith served as assistant to the Marine Corps commandant (April–September 1939). Promoted to brigadier general, Smith took command of the 1st Marine Brigade (September). Promoted to major general in February 1941, Smith deployed his brigade to Cuba to practice amphibious techniques. Doubled in size, it became the 1st Marine Division. In June, Smith assumed command of what became the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.

Smith headed marine amphibious training on the west coast of the United States and then commanded the joint Army-Marine V Amphibious Corps in the Central Pacific (June 1943). Smith's troops executed his amphibious tactics while seizing Japanese-held islands, and his forces took the Gilbert Island atolls of Makin (November 20–23) and Tarawa (November 20–24). Based on lessons learned at Tarawa, Smith urged the deployment of additional amphibious tractors and the development of more effective landing support techniques.



U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant General Holland M. “Howling Mad” Smith at his base on Saipan in 1944. (Corbis)

Smith’s forces then seized the Marshalls and Marianas, capturing Kwajalein (January 19–February 6, 1944) and Eniwetok (February 17–22) in the Marshalls as well as Saipan (June 15–July 9), Tinian (July 24–August 1), and Guam (July 21–August 10). On Saipan, however, Smith relieved army 27th Infantry Division commander Major General Ralph K. Smith for not being sufficiently aggressive. This action led to sharp marine-army recriminations but did not prevent Smith’s promotion to lieutenant general (February 1944), when he took command of the new Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (July 1944–July 1945). Smith directed the assault on Iwo Jima, the penultimate amphibious assault of the war, during February 19–March 26, 1945.

Smith assumed command of the Marine Training and Replacement Command at Camp Pendleton, California, in July 1945. He retired from the

Marine Corps in August 1946 as a full general, the third marine in history to reach that rank. Smith died in San Diego, California, on January 12, 1967.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Eniwetok, Capture of; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Higgins, Andrew Jackson; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kwajalein, Battle for; Landing Craft; Makin Island, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Nimitz, Chester William; Saipan, Battle of; Smith, Ralph Corbett; Tarawa, Battle of; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of

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Smith, Julian Constable (1885–1975)

U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant general. Born in Elkton, Maryland, on September 11, 1885, Julian Smith graduated from the University of Delaware in 1907 and was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1909. He later participated in several U.S. operations in Latin America and the Caribbean. A 1928 graduate of the Army Command and General Staff School, Smith was an instructor at the Marine Corps Schools, then served in Nicaragua (1930–1933) and was operations officer with the 7th Marine Regiment (1933–1934).

Smith then became director of operations and training at Marine Corps Headquarters (1935–1938). From 1938 to 1940, Colonel Smith was chief of staff of the 1st Marine Brigade. Promoted to brigadier general in March 1941, Smith served as naval observer in London.

On his return to the United States, Smith was promoted to major general in October 1942 and assumed command of Marine Training Schools, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. In May 1943, Smith commanded the 2nd Marine Division, leading it in the invasion of Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands during

November 20–24, 1943. In some of the war's heaviest fighting, Smith's marines defeated the tenacious Japanese defenders on Betio Atoll.

In April 1944, Smith became commanding general, Expeditionary Troops, Third Fleet. Smith's forces then captured the southern Palau Islands, and in September 1944, they occupied Ulithi, which became the hub of U.S. naval operations in the Western Pacific. In December 1944, Smith assumed command of the Department of the Pacific, a post he held until the end of the war.

In February 1946, Smith assumed command of the Parris Island Marine Base in South Carolina. He retired from the marines as a lieutenant general that December. Smith died at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on November 5, 1975.

EDWARD F. FINCH

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Tarawa, Battle of

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Smith, Ralph Corbett (1893–1998)

U.S. Army general. Born in Omaha, Nebraska, on November 27, 1893, Ralph Corbett Smith was commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry in 1916. He received his bachelor's degree from Colorado State Teachers College in 1919. Smith participated in the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916 and 1917, and served with the 1st Division in France during World War I.

Between the world wars, Smith was an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, a student and an instructor at the Command and General Staff School, a student at the Army War College and the École Supérieure de la Guerre in France, and a member of the General Staff's Military Intelligence Division. In March 1942, Smith was appointed assistant commander of the 76th Infantry Division, and later that year as a major general, he assumed command of the 27th Infantry Division.

During the invasion of Saipan (June 15–July 9, 1944) in the Mariana Islands, Smith's 27th Infantry Division fought alongside two Marine Corps divisions as part of the Army-Marine Corps V Amphibious Corps. In the opinion of Major General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith, a marine who commanded V Corps, the 27th Infantry Division performed poorly. Before the battle's end, and with the concurrence of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the operation, Holland Smith relieved Ralph Smith for a lack of aggressiveness.

The relief of an army general by a Marine Corps general was unprecedented and led to bitter recriminations. An army board of inquiry later exonerated Ralph Smith, and many army officers said that he had been victimized by his reluctance to sacrifice lives in ill-conceived frontal assaults planned by the corps staff. Holland Smith's defenders claimed that the relief was justified and that the army exonerated Ralph Smith to excuse the failings of the 27th Division. Whatever the merits of the arguments, U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall did not again permit Holland Smith to command army troops.

After his relief, Ralph Smith commanded the 98th Infantry Division and then served as military attaché in France before retiring in October 1946. Smith died in Palo Alto, California, on January 21, 1998.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Marshall, George Catlett; Saipan, Battle of; Smith, Holland McTyeire

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Smith, Walter Bedell (1895–1961)

U.S. Army general. Born in Indianapolis, Indiana, on October 5, 1895, Walter Bedell Smith was nicknamed "Beetle." He joined the Indiana National Guard in 1910 and briefly attended Butler University. He then earned a

commission in the National Guard and served with the 39th Infantry in France during World War I, where he was wounded in August 1918.

Smith remained in the army after the war and proved himself a capable administrator. Assignments included the Bureau of Military Intelligence, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Federal Liquidation Board. He was also a student and then instructor at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia; the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Army War College. His abilities were noted by General George C. Marshall, who became army chief of staff in September 1939. The following month Marshall named Smith assistant secretary of the General Staff and, in August 1941, secretary of the General Staff.

After the United States entered the war, Smith became the U.S. secretary to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in February 1942. Following heavy lobbying from European theater commander Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Marshall reluctantly ordered Smith to Europe in September 1942 to assume his most recognizable role as Eisenhower's chief of staff. Smith earned Eisenhower's trust to handle staff planning and administration, thus allowing his commander to spend more time on operational matters. In a post far less glamorous than battle command, Smith made decisions beyond staff direction, often issuing orders to field commanders in Eisenhower's name.

Eisenhower rejected any notion that Smith should be assigned anywhere but as his chief of staff. Entrusted by Eisenhower with the job of negotiating with Italian emissaries, Smith, through a combination of bluster and intimidation, secured the Italian surrender on September 3, 1943.

As planning for Operation OVERLORD began in earnest, Smith became chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. The main body of the Operation OVERLORD plan, however, had been developed by British general Sir Frederick Morgan, who had been appointed chief of staff to the supreme Allied commander months before Eisenhower was assigned as that commander. When Eisenhower insisted on Bedell Smith being his chief of staff, Morgan loyally agreed to step down; Morgan served to the end of the war as Smith's deputy.

On June 5, 1944, when Eisenhower turned to Smith for advice on whether he should launch the Normandy landings, Smith urged that the attack proceed, calling it "the best possible gamble." The invasion began the

following day. When the Third Reich collapsed, Eisenhower authorized Smith to accept the German surrender at Rheims on May 7, 1945.

In January 1946, Smith returned to Washington to be chief of the Operations and Planning Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In March, President Harry S. Truman appointed him ambassador to the Soviet Union, where he remained until 1949. Smith was convinced that the United States should take a strong stand against Soviet expansion and that the Soviet Union would back down if confronted by American power. From 1950 to 1953, Smith served as the second director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He was promoted to full general on August 1, 1951. Smith retired from the army on February 9, 1953. He also served as undersecretary of state in the Eisenhower administration.

Smith retired from government service in October 1, 1954. He then entered private business. Smith died in Washington, D.C., on August 9, 1961.

THOMAS D. VEVE

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Marshall, George Catlett; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for

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Smolensk, Battle of (July 10–August 5, 1941)

Crucial battle at the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARBAROSSA, June 22). Smolensk was an important rail and communications center 200 miles from Moscow. The historic gateway to Moscow, Smolensk is located at the western exit from the 50-mile gap between the Dnieper and Dvina Rivers. Soviet marshal Semen Timoshenko

took command of the West Front comprising seven armies with weak infantry divisions and virtually no mobile reserves to stem further German advances. He organized his forces on the Dnieper River line anchored by Vitebsk and Mogilev as the first-echelon defense of the heart of the Soviet Union.

The large concentration of Soviet troops served as a magnet for German commanders, who sought to encircle their enemy in a decisive battle. The armored spearheads of Colonel General Heinz Guderian's Second Panzer Group and General Hermann Hoth's Third Panzer Group were to cross the Dvina and Dnieper Rivers, advance on a parallel axis along the Minsk-Moscow highway, and link behind Smolensk to trap the Soviets. Colonel General Alexander Löhr's Fourth Air Fleet provided aerial support. The plan was risky, as the speed it required of the mechanized elements would preclude use of the slower infantry armies needed to secure the vulnerable flanks of the panzer groups.

On July 10, the Second Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper and bypassed Soviet troop concentrations without concern for flank security, heavy rains, or determined Soviet resistance. Guderian drove his forces deep toward Smolensk. At the same time, the Third Panzer Group captured Vitebsk and forced the Soviet defense toward Velikiye Luki. By July 13, three Soviet armies were withdrawing toward Smolensk to establish a defense of the city. To buy time, Timoshenko ordered counterattacks with his remaining armies into the exposed flanks of the Second Panzer Group, which led to bitter fighting and slowed the German mechanized elements.

Two German soldiers watch burning buildings in Smolensk, August 12, 1941. The Germans used this photo to support their persistent claims that they had taken the city. (Keystone/Getty Images)

On July 16, Guderian's Second Panzer Group captured Smolensk, and the Third Panzer Group captured Yartsevo to form an elongated pocket around three Russian armies trapped north of the Dnieper. Instead of trying to close the pocket, however, Guderian sent his panzers toward Yelnya, forfeiting a *Kesselschlacht* (cauldron, or encircling battle) and offering a salient for the Soviets to attack. On July 20, Timoshenko formed new armies to counterattack and pin down German forces, especially those in the Yelnya salient. As 60-mile-long columns of Soviet infantry moved forward and hundreds of trains appeared loaded with vehicles and tanks, the Germans realized that the Red Army had not yet been beaten.

Furious fighting raged around Smolensk as the Soviets counterattacked to hold open a corridor for more than 100,000 men to escape. The Soviets lost the Battle of Smolensk, although fighting continued there until August 5. In the Smolensk pocket, the Germans took more than 300,000 prisoners, 3,000 guns, and 3,200 tanks. The victory strained the German forces at all levels, however, forcing a pause of several weeks. As Adolf Hitler and the German Army high command debated whether the next objective should be Moscow or Ukraine, the Soviets reorganized and prepared their defenses that would halt the Germans at the gates of Moscow.

STEVEN J. RAUCH

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Blitzkrieg; Eastern Front; Guderian, Heinz; Hoth, Hermann; Löhr, Alexander; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich

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Smuts, Jan Christian (1870–1950)

South African politician and honorary British field marshal. Born to Afrikaaner parents at the family farm, Bovenplaats, at Riebeeck West, Cape Colony, on May 24, 1870, Jan Smuts won highest honors at Christ's College, Cambridge. He then practiced law in Capetown. During the 1899–1902 South African War (Second Boer War), he fought against the British as a Boer general. Following the war, Smuts, who was a close ally of Louis Botha, helped draft the constitution of the Union of South Africa and sought accommodation with the British.

When World War I began, Smuts was defense minister under Prime Minister Botha and headed the southern offensive that took control of German South-West Africa (the future Namibia) from the Germans. Made a British Army general, Smuts then commanded British operations in East Africa. By the time World War I ended, he had joined the British Imperial War Cabinet as minister of air and helped organize the Royal Air Force, the world's first independent air arm. Smuts represented South Africa during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where he supported the League of Nations and helped develop the mandate system.

On the death of Botha, Smuts became prime minister of South Africa in August 1919. He remained in that post until the Nationalists attained power in 1924. In 1933, he formed a coalition with Nationalist Party leader (James) Barry Hertzog and was deputy prime minister. On the outbreak of war with Germany, Hertzog favored South African neutrality. Smuts, who advocated

war with Germany, narrowly defeated Hertzog in Parliament and became prime minister again on September 6, 1939. He was also minister of defense, and from June 1940, he commanded South African armed forces in the war. During the conflict, despite his unprecedented power, Smuts overcame significant opposition to his policies from Nazi sympathizers, although he refused to suppress his opponents completely.

South African prime minister Jan Christian Smuts was a close personal friend of British prime minister Winston Churchill and aligned his nation firmly behind the Allied war effort. Smuts was made a British field marshal for his efforts. (Library of Congress)

Smuts's longtime friend British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill frequently consulted with him on strategic matters. Smuts was a strong advocate of holding onto Egypt, no matter the cost; thus, South African forces, following their participation in the East Africa campaign, deployed to

Egypt in late 1941. The next year, they helped to take the island of Madagascar. In 1941, Smuts was made an honorary British field marshal.

Smuts was also a staunch advocate of the formation of the United Nations (UN), and he wrote its preamble and helped draft its charter. In April 1945, Smuts attended the San Francisco Conference and was thus one of the UN's official founders. His internationalist outlook undoubtedly cost him political support at home, however, and in 1946 Smuts retired following his defeat in the general elections. Smuts died at his home near Pretoria on September 11, 1950.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Africa; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; East Africa Campaign; Egypt; Madagascar; South Africa, Union of

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Snipers

Highly trained infantry riflemen firing at long range from concealment against selected enemy targets. Sniping was a phenomenon of World War I that did not seem likely to occur in World War II because of the initial rapid advances of invading German and Japanese troops. When military operations began to take on a more static aspect, however, it was realized that sniping could be of great value, especially in affecting morale. The ability of a seemingly invisible sniper to kill individuals at a range of 600 or even 1,000 yards could have a significant effect on the attacked unit. Snipers generally worked in pairs, one acting as a spotter while the other handled shooting.

Heinrich Himmler can be considered the instigator of German sniper training. He began a Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) sniper training program. The Germans had sold off many of their sniper rifles and had not reordered any telescopic sights, but Himmler rectified this situation. At first

the Germans used any rifle to which a telescopic sight could be fitted, but later they concentrated on the standard infantry rifle, the Kar 98k, fitted with telescopic sights.

When the German Army invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, it encountered many Soviet snipers and needed to neutralize them. The Soviet snipers were at first more numerous than skilled, but they improved with training and experience. Stories abound of Russian snipers' effectiveness. One sniper killed 75 German soldiers and wounded another 25 from the German 465th Infantry Regiment in September 1941. Russian snipers were armed chiefly with the Mosin-Nagant 1891/30 rifle, which was fitted with a variety of telescopic sights.

As the war progressed, snipers appeared in increasing numbers on both sides on the Eastern Front. The Soviets had snipers who recorded tallies of 400 or even 500 dead. The leading German sniper managed about 300 kills. The movie *Enemy at the Gates* (2001) celebrated the success of Soviet sniper Vasily Zaitsev in the Battle of Stalingrad.

In the Pacific theater, U.S. Army snipers were equipped with the Springfield. 30-caliber M1903 A-3 and A-4 rifles, with a commercial 2.5-magnification telescopic sight. The sight was fragile, having been designed for deer hunting. Because the rifle had no iron sights fitted, if the telescope was damaged the rifle was rendered useless for sniping. In all, the U.S. Army issued some 28,000 Springfield sniper rifles. The M-1 Garand service rifle was also fitted with a telescopic sight and designated as the M-1C or M-1D, but this came too late in the war to have great effect on sniping techniques and practice.

The U.S. Marine Corps has always had a great interest in sniping, and it parted from the commercial telescopic sight to fit a Unertl scope, which had military durability. One marine sniper, Private David Cass, shot down a Japanese machine-gun crew at a range of 1,200 yards. Japanese snipers often, to their own danger, were roped into trees from which they could fire on advancing Allied troops. Many were killed by machine-gun fire, and on one celebrated occasion a Japanese sniper was comprehensively dispatched by a round from a Boys .50-caliber antitank rifle, which went straight through the tree and the sniper.

Sergeant P. Dorzhiev, a Red Army sniper credited with killing 181 German soldiers on the Leningrad front, looking through binoculars and holding his rifle, 1942. (Library of Congress)

The British Army had long been intensely interested in long-range rifle marksmanship, and in February 1940 it established a sniper training school at Bisley Camp in England. Initially, British snipers used the vintage Pattern 1914 Enfield rifle. The British seldom used snipers in the first half of the war; the war of movement in France and the Low Countries in 1940 did not offer opportunities for sniping, and in the Western Desert Campaign, heat distortion and the lack of cover made sniping virtually impossible.

In the campaign in Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943), however, sniping regained its importance for the British. By this time, snipers were using the new British service rifle, redesignated Rifle No. 4 Mk 1 (T). Originally standard-issue weapons, the rifles were then sent to the London gun makers Holland and Holland for rebuilding. Although there was some criticism of the telescopic sight used, at least one British sniper engaged Germans at a range of 700 yards and scored several hits.

Begun as a minor activity in all armies in World War II, sniping soon accumulated its own lore, and the sight of an oddly dressed rifleman clutching a telescopic rifle and accompanied by another rifleman with a spotting telescope became more and more common. Their impact was

remarkable, and defending troops went about their business in considerable peril of their lives. Sniping continues in today's militaries.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Himmler, Heinrich; Infantry Tactics; Rifles; Sicily, Invasion of; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Snorkel

A hollow mast through which a submarine draws air from the surface so that it may operate internal combustion engines while submerged. Although suggestions for such a device emerged in the U.S. Navy as early as 1914 and primitive arrangements were even tested contemporaneously by Imperial Russian Navy submarines, there were no operational installations of snorkels until the late 1930s.

In 1933 Lieutenant Commander Jan J. Wichers of the Royal Netherlands Navy took out a patent for an extensible air mast and subsequently developed his concepts further to incorporate an automatic head valve, intermediate cushioning via a float to compensate for pressure variations, and internal connections and air containers within the submarine. The Dutch knew it as the *snuiver* (sniffer). The first installations were in the Dutch submarines *O-19* and *O-20*, completed in 1939. They incorporated a motor drive to extend or lower the mast, although the exhaust tube was fixed. Both boats sailed to the Netherlands East Indies, where they operated against Japan after December 1941.

The succeeding Netherlands O-21 class carried a fully extensible system. When Germany invaded and conquered the Netherlands in May 1940, the *O-21* through *O-24* escaped to Britain, where Royal Navy designers studied them but took little interest in their breathing devices, which were removed

before the submarines reentered service. German technicians, too, found this equipment of little use when they examined the captured *O-25, O-26,* and *O-27* and also had it removed before deployment.

In 1943, however, German interest in the concept revived, largely at the instigation of designer Hellmuth Walter. He urged its adoption to permit extended submerged U-boat operation while using diesels as a counter to the ever more successful Allied antisubmarine campaign. Wichers's design was modified to use the entire boat interior as an air cushion from which the engines could freely aspirate. After urgent testing, installation began in September 1943, with priority going to equipping boats already operational, followed by new construction vessels. The first submarine fitted with the snorkel was the *U-58,* operating in the Baltic.

In service, snorkel-equipped U-boats proved capable of operations in areas the Allies considered safe from submarines. Nevertheless, they suffered from two operational problems that have continued to concern submariners: restricted speed while snorkeling and a greater detection signature. Wartime installations limited U-boats to five to six knots, while the head float was both a relatively large radar target and a cause of visible spray.

Postwar examination of captured U-boats rapidly inspired the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, and the Soviet Navy to install snorkel equipment in submarines, moves quickly followed by other navies. Testing soon revealed a third problem: the diesels transmitted their entire noise signature into the surrounding water and made snorkeling submarines easy to detect. Furthermore, improved designs that allowed greater underwater speed only exacerbated the wake problem. Consequently, most snorkel design efforts since the late 1940s have focused on reducing the size and radar reflectance of the head, careful streamlining to diminish wake formation, and rigorous machinery sound reduction.

Despite disadvantages, the snorkel has equipped almost every operational submarine since the early 1950s. Nuclear boats rely on snorkels to run important auxiliary machinery when submerged, while the very operational efficiency of conventional and closed-cycle vessels requires them.

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See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Submarines

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Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich (1897–1968)

Soviet marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in the village of Koz′liki, Grodno Province (then Poland), on July 21, 1897, Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky joined the Red Army in 1918. During the Russian Civil War, he rose to command the 32nd Rifle Division. He attended the Red Army Military Academy of the General Staff in 1921 and served in Central Asia as deputy chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Sokolovsky was then chief of staff of a division and corps, commanded a division from 1930 to 1935, was deputy chief of staff of the Volga Military District, and was chief of staff of the Urals Military District and then the Volga Military District.

Promoted to major general in May 1938 and to lieutenant general in June 1940, Sokolovsky was deputy chief of the General Staff in February 1941. In the midsummer of 1941 he became chief of staff of the Western Front, which was responsible for the defense of Moscow. Promoted to colonel general in June 1942, he commanded the Western Front in February 1943. He fought in the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943) and was promoted to army general in August. As chief of staff of Marshal Georgii Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front beginning in April 1944, Sokolovsky alternated between duties in the field and in Moscow. He was deputy commander of the 1st Belorussian Front during the capture of Berlin (March 31–May 2, 1945).

After the war, Sokolovsky was deputy to Zhukov as commander of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany and governor of the Soviet zone of Berlin. Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union in 1946, he commanded Soviet occupation forces in Germany from 1946 to 1949. He then became first deputy minister of war and then chief of the General Staff from 1952 to 1960. His final assignment was as general inspector and head of a group working to formulate Soviet nuclear war strategy. Sokolovsky died in Moscow on May 10, 1968.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Berlin, Land Battle for; Kursk, Battle of; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign (August 1942–February 1943)

Extended six-month South Pacific naval campaign between Allied and Japanese forces that halted the Japanese Pacific advance. Between May and July 1942, Japan sought to expand its defensive ring into the eastern and central Solomon Islands. As a part of this drive, it sent elements of the Eighth Army to occupy the island of Guadalcanal. On July 6, the Japanese began construction of an airfield there, from which they would be able to bomb the advanced Allied base at Espiritu Santo.

News of the construction project forced U.S. commanders to expedite their plan for the Solomons, known as Operation WATCHTOWER. Conceived and advocated by U.S. chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King, WATCHTOWER called for securing the island of Tulagi as an additional base to protect the U.S.-Australia lifeline and as a starting point for a drive up the Solomons to Rabaul. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, U.S. commander in the South Pacific under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, then dispatched an amphibious force under Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner to lift Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift's 1st Marine Division from Nouméa to the Solomons. Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher's three-carrier task force provided protection.

On August 7, 1942, the marines went ashore on Tulagi and Guadalcanal and captured the airfield, which they renamed Henderson Field. The airfield soon became the focal point of fighting on the island. In all, the protracted struggle for Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943) included 10 major

land actions, 50 engagements involving warships or aircraft, and 7 major naval battles.

The Japanese did not send their main fleet but rather ships in driblets. The Americans soon had Henderson Field operating; U.S. land-based airpower controlled “the Slot” (the narrow channel through the Solomon Islands) during the day, but the Japanese initially controlled it at night. The Imperial Japanese Navy excelled at night fighting, for which its crews had been intensively trained, as was shown in the Battle of Savo Island (August 9, 1942).

When he learned of the landings at Guadalcanal, Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi at Rabaul immediately made plans to reinforce the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal and attack the vulnerable ships at the landing site. Meanwhile, Vandegrift needed four days to unload all the transports, but Fletcher replied that he could not leave his carriers in position more than 48 hours, and he began removing them on the evening of August 8. On the night of August 8–9, Mikawa arrived off the landing site and proceeded to administer the worst defeat suffered by the U.S. Navy in a fair fight.

In the Battle of Savo Island, Mikawa sank four Allied cruisers (three U.S. and one Australian) and a destroyer. Three other ships sustained heavy damage. Mikawa did not suffer any losses in the battle, although one of his cruisers was sunk by a U.S. submarine in the return to Rabaul. Mikawa, however, had hauled off without attacking the vulnerable transports. The battle clearly demonstrated Japanese superior night-fighting techniques, excellent gunnery, and the effectiveness of Japan’s Long Lance torpedo.

Both sides now reinforced Guadalcanal, but U.S. possession of Henderson Field tipped the balance. Rushed to completion, it ultimately boasted about 100 U.S. aircraft. At night the so-called Tokyo Express of Japanese destroyers and light cruisers steamed down the channel between the islands and into the sound to shell marine positions and deliver supplies. The latter effort was never sufficient and only haphazard. It often consisted of drums filled with supplies pushed off the ships to drift to shore.

U.S. Navy dive bombers attacking Japanese-held Tulagi Island during the Solomon Islands Campaign of August 1942-February 1943. (Iconic Archive/Getty Images)

The next major naval action was the August 22–25 Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo dispatched to Guadalcanal a convoy of destroyers and transports carrying troop reinforcements. Admiral Kondō Nobutake steamed from Truk toward the Solomons with a task force to provide protection. Fletcher's carrier aircraft intercepted the Japanese and sank the light carrier *Ryujo* and several other vessels, but the carrier *Enterprise* suffered damage. On August 31, the Japanese torpedoed and badly damaged the carrier *Saratoga*, reducing U.S. carrier strength to only the *Wasp*. It in turn fell victim to a Japanese submarine on September 15. The carrier was so badly damaged by three torpedoes that it had to be scuttled.

Another major naval encounter, the Battle of Cape Esperance, occurred during October 11–13. The Americans detected a Japanese convoy off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. In a night engagement on October 12–13, the Japanese lost a cruiser and a destroyer and had a cruiser heavily damaged; one U.S. destroyer was lost, and two cruisers were damaged. The next day, U.S. aircraft sank two other Japanese destroyers that were searching for survivors. Although the battle was not decisive, it was the first U.S. Navy night victory against the Japanese and substantially lifted U.S. morale. In

October, there were important command changes: Vice Admiral William F. Halsey replaced Ghormley, and Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid replaced Fletcher.

Meanwhile, Kondō's repositioning of ships and Halsey's instructions to Kinkaid to seek out the Japanese fleet brought on a fourth naval battle for control of the Solomons: the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. In the ensuing engagement of October 26–27, each side launched simultaneous strikes against the other. In the exchange, U.S. aircraft badly damaged the Japanese light carrier *Zuihō* and fleet carrier *Shōkaku*. The U.S. carrier *Hornet* was also severely damaged and placed under tow, but with Kondō's ships closing in, it was abandoned to be sunk by Japanese destroyers. Japan won the battle, leaving the United States with only one carrier in the South Pacific, but the Japanese sustained such losses that they were unable to exploit the situation.

From November 12 to 15, a series of intense sea fights took place off Guadalcanal. In the first, on November 12–13, U.S. ships and land aircraft blocked reinforcement of the island by Japanese troops in 11 transports protected by destroyers. At the same time, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, commanding five cruisers and eight destroyers, moved to intercept a powerful Japanese force under Vice Admiral Abe Hiroaki that included two battleships that sought to shell Henderson Field.

In a night action east of Savo Island, both sides suffered heavy losses. Abe lost the battleship *Hiei* (badly damaged in the fight, it fell prey to U.S. aircraft the next morning) and two destroyers. The United States lost two cruisers and four destroyers. Virtually all other ships on both sides were damaged. Rear Admirals Callaghan and Norman Scott were among the dead, but Tanaka was forced to turn back, and the planned Japanese bombardment of Henderson Field was canceled.

On November 13 and 14, Tanaka returned with his reinforcement convoy, and a force of cruisers under Rear Admiral Nishimura Shoji shelled Henderson Field. It failed to knock out the airfield, however, and U.S. aircraft sank one cruiser and damaged another as Nishimura's force withdrew north. The aircraft then attacked Tanaka's convoy and sank six transports.

During the third phase of the naval Battle of Guadalcanal (November 14–15), Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee with two battleships and four destroyers met and defeated yet another Japanese force under Kondō near Savo Island. The United States lost two destroyers, but Kondō lost the battleship *Kirishima* and

a destroyer. The net effect of this three-day battle was that Tanaka landed only some 4,000 troops. The Japanese lost six transports sunk, but they had to beach another four, representing some 70,000 tons of scarce shipping. Most important from the U.S. standpoint was that U.S. forces now had round-the-clock control of the waters around Guadalcanal.

On November 30, U.S. and Japanese naval forces again clashed in the Battle of Tassafaronga. Rear Admiral Carlton H. Wright moved with five cruisers and seven destroyers to intercept Tanaka's force of eight destroyers carrying supplies to Guadalcanal. In the ensuing fight Japan lost one destroyer, while the United States had one cruiser sunk and three others badly damaged.

As the numbers of U.S. troops ashore steadily grew and Japanese strength dwindled, at the end of December Tokyo decided to abandon Guadalcanal entirely, and the naval battles of the Solomons came to an end. The final battle of the campaign was a skirmish off Rennell Island on January 30, 1943, a victory for Japan. By this time the Japanese had almost completely withdrawn from Guadalcanal, though. The sustained battle for Guadalcanal gave U.S. naval forces the initiative and led to improved U.S. Navy night-fighting and fire-control techniques that served it well in the long years of fighting ahead.

WILLIAM P. MCEVOY AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Abe Hiroaki; Callaghan, Daniel Judson; Cape Esperance, Battle of; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Ghormley, Robert Lee; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Kondō Nobutake; Lee, Willis Augustus "Ching"; Mikawa Gunichi; Nimitz, Chester William; Rabaul; Rennell Island, Battle of; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Savo Island, Battle of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Tanaka Raizo; Tassafaronga, Battle of; Turner, Richmond Kelly; Document 182

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Somalia

Somalia is located on the Horn of Africa (Africa's east-central coast) and currently encompasses 246,200 square miles. Somalia's 1939 population was approximately 1.45 million. Northern Somalia lies on the choke point of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden; Italian ports in southern Somalia offered bases for raiding into the Indian Ocean. In 1940, Somalia was divided into three colonies.

Italian Somaliland, the largest territory, had 1,200 miles of coastline. Its capital was Mogadishu. In 1936, Italian Somaliland had been incorporated as an enlarged province (having received much of Ethiopia's southern desert region) into Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI). The AOI consisted of all Italian East Africa.

British Somaliland, with its capital of Berbera, bordered the Gulf of Aden. It lacked a good harbor and resources. French Somaliland was a tiny enclave sandwiched between British Somaliland and Italian Eritrea. Its harbor at Djibouti, however, was the finest of any of the three Somali colonies. All three territories were arid or desert, although British Somaliland did have a high plateau in the interior. Djibouti boasted the only railroad, which wound its way through the Ethiopian highland to Addis Ababa.

In 1939 and 1940, the French reinforced their colony to a total of about 7,000 men under General of Brigade Paul L. Legentilhomme. When Germany defeated France in June 1940, Legentilhomme attempted to have the territory declare for the Free French. French governor Hubert J. Deschamps and local commanders of France's navy and air force opposed him, however, forcing Legentilhomme to flee on August 5, 1940, to British Somaliland with some French troops and several hundred anti-Italian Ethiopian refugees who had been undergoing training by the French. French

Somaliland remained under a weak Allied naval blockade until December 1942, when Free French and Allied forces recaptured the colony.

Following their own entry into the war in June 1940, the Italians successfully invaded British Somaliland that August. An overwhelming force with command of the air led by Lieutenant General Guglielmo Nasi advanced in three columns and fought a sharp action at Tug Argan on August 12, 1940, resulting in the British retreat to Berbera. The Royal Navy evacuated 5,300–5,700 troops and 1,000 civilians, most of them going to nearby Aden. Commonwealth losses in this campaign were 140 killed or wounded and 120 missing. Italian losses were 465 killed, 1,530 wounded, and 34 missing, the vast majority being Somali troops. This Italian military success shortened the AOI defensive perimeter substantially.

At the time, there were few Commonwealth forces on the Kenyan border with Somalia and Ethiopia. Lieutenant General Gustavo Pesenti commanded Italian forces on the Kenyan border. The Italian military effort had focused largely on British Somaliland; now, cut off from home and with limited resources, the Italians went on the defensive. Meanwhile, British Commonwealth strength in Kenya increased under Lieutenant General Alan G. Cunningham, commanding the East Africa Force. This eventually numbered one South African division and two African divisions.

In mid-December 1940, Cunningham began raids on the AOI from Kenya, using effective light South African armor as a key component. A raid on December 16–17, 1940, against El Wak in Somalia not only showed up Pesenti as an incompetent commander but also cost the Italians valuable cipher material that helped Commonwealth forces read Italian radio traffic. Major General Carlo de Simone, who had distinguished himself at the Battle of Tug Argan, now replaced Pesenti.

Relying heavily on South African motorized units, Cunningham launched a major offensive against southern Somalia on the night of February 8–9, 1941. Commonwealth forces advanced with flanking movements up the Somalia coast, quickly collapsing the Italian positions. Mogadishu fell to the British on February 25 without a fight. Using captured ports and supplies and innovative sea and land transport, by March 1, 1941, Cunningham had sent a column to pursue the Italians into the highlands toward Harar.

To complete the Italian debacle in Somalia, naval, air, and land forces, making up the Aden Force, landed at and easily took Berbera on March 16,

1941. This port soon became a key supply point for Cunningham's advancing forces, which captured Addis Ababa on April 16. The fighting in Somalia was over, although warfare continued in Ethiopia in Gondar north of Lake Tana until late November 1941. The campaign in Somalia and the southern AOI was a classic military operation, involving the defeat of an enemy in detail through the use of motorized columns to flank each successive defensive position.

JACK GREENE

See also

Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon; East Africa Campaign; Legentilhomme, Paul Louis; Savoia, Amedeo Umberto di

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Somervell, Brehon Burke (1892–1955)

U.S. Army general. Born in Little Rock, Arkansas, on May 9, 1892, Brehon Burke Somervell graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1914 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the engineers. He served in the Punitive Expedition into Mexico (1916–1917) and in engineer and staff posts with the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I.

Somervell graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1923 and from the Army War College in 1926. He directed a comprehensive study of the Turkish economy in 1933–1934 and headed the sprawling Works Progress Administration (WPA) in New York City from 1936 to 1940. In 1940, Somervell's army superiors, impressed by the managerial skills he had demonstrated in his engineering assignments with the WPA, named him head of the army's floundering Construction Division, which had fallen behind in the building of training camps and munitions plants as the nation rearmed.

A hard-driving leader who had little tolerance for bureaucratic red tape, Somervell had the building program on schedule within a year, expediting its

operation and initiating new projects, including the construction of the Pentagon. In March 1942, after briefly serving as G-4 (assistant chief of staff for logistics) on the War Department General Staff, Somervell was appointed chief of the newly established Services of Supply, later renamed the Army Service Forces, with the rank of lieutenant general.

In this post, Somervell emerged as a major figure in the U.S. Army's conduct of the war, directing the procurement and shipping of supplies and equipment and serving as the army's top logistics adviser. Recognizing the importance of logistics to victory, Somervell spared no effort in seeing that American soldiers were well equipped.

Following his retirement in April 1946, Somervell became president of Koppers Company, and within five years he turned the struggling company into a highly profitable enterprise. Somervell died in Ocala, Florida, on February 13, 1955.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Logistics, Allied; United States Army

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Somerville, Sir James Fownes (1882–1949)

British Royal Navy admiral of the fleet. Born at Weybridge, Surrey, on July 17, 1882, James Fownes Somerville entered the Royal Navy as a cadet aboard HMS *Britannia* in 1897. During World War I, he distinguished himself in the Dardanelles/Gallipoli Campaign in 1915. Assigned to the navy Signal School, he was director of the Signal Department in the Admiralty from 1924 to 1927.

In 1931, Somerville commanded a cruiser. Following service at Portsmouth, he was promoted to rear admiral and commanded destroyer flotillas in the Mediterranean Fleet. He then commanded the East Indies

station but was invalided home in 1938 with tuberculosis and placed on the retired list as a vice admiral in July 1939.

When World War II began, Somerville volunteered his services. He distinguished himself working on the development of radar and then as Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay's subordinate during the May 26–June 4, 1940, Dunkerque evacuation. After the fall of France, the Royal Navy established a covering force at Gibraltar with Somerville in command.

In Operation CATAPULT (July 1940) Somerville negotiated with French admiral Marcel Gensoul to neutralize French naval units at Mers-el-Kébir. Somerville's Force H launched successive attacks on Oran and Dakar with aircraft and gunfire. The *Ark Royal*'s aircraft then struck Italian bases at Genoa, Livorno, and on Sardinia and Sicily, and Force H covered multiple convoys to Malta from August 1940 to March 1942. Force H fought in the Battle of Cape Teulada on November 26, 1940, and played a decisive role in hunting down the German battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941.

In March 1942, Somerville took command of the Eastern Fleet, conducting holding operations against the Japanese First Air Fleet's Indian Ocean offensive. His carriers covered the Diégo-Suarez (May 5–7, 1942) and Madagascar (September 1942) operations before withdrawing to serve elsewhere. Somerville's Eastern Fleet carriers recommenced offensive operations in 1944 until he relinquished command in August. He was reinstated as an admiral on the active list after five years' war service at sea.

Somerville went to Washington, D.C., in October 1944 to head the British naval delegation. He was promoted to admiral of the fleet in May 1945 and retired permanently the next year. Somerville died at Wells, Somerset, on May 19, 1949.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; CATAPULT, Operation; Dakar, Attack on; Diégo-Suarez, Battle of; Diégo-Suarez, Japanese Raid on; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Indian Ocean Campaign; Madagascar; Malta; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home

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Sonar

Sonar—known as asdic (for Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee) in British and Commonwealth navies until the 1950s—was the most important underwater detection device during World War II. Sonar took two forms: in its active form, it emitted sonic impulses and measured distance and direction through receiving their reflections; in its passive form, it determined bearing and range through comparative analysis of received sound.

The Anti-Submarine Detection Investigating Committee (a British entity) produced an experimental sonar set in 1918, but the first operational units did not go to sea until 1928 (aboard British A-class destroyers). By 1940, most major navies deployed some form of active sonar aboard antisubmarine vessels. All were searchlight units that used high-frequency emissions (20 to 40 kilocycles). They had short ranges (to 3,500 yards) and were ineffective at speeds much above 15 knots. Such sets also had a 200-yard dead zone and slow operating rates, and they determined direction but not depth. Most navies, in consequence, relied heavily on hydrophones for submarine search and used sonar primarily for attack guidance.

Major wartime sonar developments attempted to address these deficiencies. Power rotation and improved displays enhanced operating rates, and streamlined steel domes raised useful search speeds. Dual-frequency sets (operating at either 14 or 30 kilocycles) enhanced ranges, and tilting transducers helped to eliminate, or at least reduce, the dead zone.

Realization of the performance capabilities of German submarines, in particular, drove sonar development. The introduction of heavy depth charges and the monster Mark X* weapon to counter deep-diving U-boats required methods for accurately determining the target’s depth because of the still relatively slow sink rate of these weapons. For accurate depth determination,

Britain developed a specialized sonar (Type 147B) that was fitted from 1943 to some Atlantic escorts in addition to its standard type.

A simultaneous line of development—scanning sonar that used an omnidirectional transmitter coupled to an array of fixed receiving transducers—offered a possible solution to several of the search problems: range, depth determination, and the dead zone. Such equipment required greater power to maintain range. Because rotation was eliminated, however, it could be larger and so could operate at lower frequencies, enhancing performance. The successful operational deployment of such equipment in Allied navies had to wait until after the war though.

Wartime submarines also carried sonar. Most navies relied on active sets for target detection, but Germany pursued a different course with its Gruppenhorchgerät (GHG), a standard installation from 1935. An array of sound-receiving diaphragms on each side of the bow connected to a pulse-timing compensator and provided bearings of received noise. This apparatus could detect single ships out to 16 miles and large groups to 80 miles, but the bearings it provided were insufficiently precise for accurate attacks. At short ranges, however, a supplemental swiveling hydrophone (Kristall-Basisgerät) generated bearings accurate to within one degree. Finally, to obtain ranges, U-boats carried an active sonar (SU-Apparatus) developed from surface-warship sets, although this was rarely used because its emissions revealed a submarine's presence. Trials late in the war, however, using GHG with SU-Apparatus demonstrated that as few as three active pulses sufficed to determine target distance, course, and approximate speed.

At the outbreak of war, sonar was widely—although mistakenly—regarded as rendering the ocean transparent in the search for submarines. Its limitations were rapidly appreciated, however, and major corrections were implemented. By 1942, sonar was an integrated part of a suite of search sensors that included, most important, radar and shipborne high-frequency direction finding.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Depth Charges; Hunter-Killer Groups

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Song Zheyuan (1885–1940)

Chinese Nationalist general. Born in Leling (Loling), Shandong (Shantung), on October 30, 1885, Song Zheyuan (Sung Che-yuan) enrolled at the Battalion School of the Left Route Reserve Army in Beijing (Peking), Hebei (Hupeh), in 1908. Graduating in 1912, Song joined what later became the National Army of warlord Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yü-hsiang). Song became a Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party member in September 1926 when Feng declared allegiance to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). When Feng and Jiang split in October 1929, Song became commander in chief of the National Army to fight against Jiang. In November 1930, the National Army was defeated and reorganized as the National Government troops, with Song commanding the Twenty-Ninth Army.

After the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, Song assumed new responsibilities in northern China. In January 1933, during his term as governor of Chaha'er (Chahar) Province, Song commanded the Twenty-Ninth Army in resisting the Japanese advance into Rehe (Jehol), which fell in May. In December 1935, Song became chairman and pacification commissioner of the newly created Hebei (Hupeh)- Chaha'er Political Affairs Council and governor of Hebei. This temporary measure maintained Chinese territorial sovereignty by reaffirming the Twenty-Ninth Army's control over Hebei and Chaha'er while China prepared for the impending Sino-Japanese armed conflict.

On July 7, 1937, the 37th Division of the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with the Japanese at Lugouqiao (Lukouch'iao)—the Marco Polo Bridge—near Beijing. Hoping to avert full-scale war, Song went to Tianjin (Tientsin), also in Hebei, to negotiate with the Japanese military commanders. During the July 12–26 negotiations, Song presented four demands: no infringement of Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty, no alteration of Song's Hebei-

Chaha'er Political Council, no removal of local officials appointed by the GMD government, and no restriction on the position of the Twenty-Ninth Army. The Japanese, however, demanded a northern China autonomous region comprising Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi (Shansi), Chaha'er, and Suiyuan. They also insisted on withdrawal of the Twenty-Ninth Army's 37th Division from Lugouqiao. Unwilling to compromise, Song led his army from Beijing on July 28, formally beginning the Sino-Japanese War.

On August 8, Song was appointed commander of the 1st Army Group, a conglomerate of the Twenty-Ninth Army and other forces. It served in the First War Zone, which covered Hebei and northern Shandong. In February 1938, Song also became deputy commander of the First War Zone. He held himself responsible for the fall of Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, of Beijing in November and December 1937, and of the strategic point of Xinxiang (Hsin-hsiang) on the Hebei-Shandong-Henan (Honan) border in February 1938.

Song resigned all his official posts in late 1938 on the grounds of illness. He died on April 4, 1940, in Mianyang (Meingyang), Sichuan (Szechwan). To honor his memory, the National Government granted Song the rank of full general posthumously on April 17, 1940.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

China, Army; Jiang Jieshi; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Nanjing Massacre; Sino-Japanese War

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Sopwith, Sir Thomas Octave Murdoch (1888–1989)

British aviation pioneer. Born in London on January 17, 1888, Thomas Octave Murdoch Sopwith received training as an engineer. A private income allowed him to pursue wide-ranging interests. A self-taught aviator, he was one of the first in Britain to secure a pilot's license. Flying a Howard-Wright biplane, in 1910 Sopwith won the £4,000 Baron de Forest Prize for the longest flight by a British pilot to a continental destination (169 miles). In 1912, he founded Sopwith Aviation Co., Ltd., and the Flying School at Kingston-on-Thames. Sopwith began producing his own aircraft and by August 1914 had delivered 45 aircraft to the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS).

During World War I, Sopwith built for the British government, and often test-flew, such aircraft as the Pup, Dolphin, Snipe, Tabloid, and Triplane. His Camel, introduced in 1917, was the finest British fighter aircraft of that war. Sopwith ultimately supplied some 16,000 aircraft to the RNAS and to the Royal Flying Corps and its successor, the Royal Air Force (RAF). He also built the multirole 1–1/2 Strutter, the first British two-seat fighter. In addition to Britain, Sopwith supplied aircraft to France, Russia, Belgium, and the United States. He also manufactured the Baby seaplane and the Cuckoo, the first carrier torpedo plane.

The military drawdown after the war forced Sopwith to liquidate his company in 1920. That November, he founded a new aviation firm, the H. G. Hawker Engineering Company, named for Sopwith test pilot Harry Hawker. In 1928, the highly successful Sydney Camm–designed Hart light bomber brought substantial contracts for the firm and made it the principal supplier to the RAF. Between 1935 and 1938, Sopwith combined several aviation firms, forming the Hawker-Siddeley Group.

Sopwith's arguably most important aircraft, the Camm-designed Hawker Hurricane, first flew in 1935. At the beginning of World War II, it constituted 60 percent of RAF Fighter Command strength and played a vital role in the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain. Usually pitted against bombers because they were marginally outclassed by the German Bf-109E fighter, Hurricanes claimed more German aircraft in the Battle of Britain than all other British defenses combined. Hurricanes underwent modification to fill ground-support and tank-attack roles. A naval version, the Sea Hurricane, saw wide service. Hawker also produced the Sea Fury, Tempest, and Typhoon fighters/light bombers.

In 1959, Sopwith took over the De Havilland firm, and in 1963, he took over Blackburn. He retired in 1963, although he remained a member of the board until 1978, shortly after the British government nationalized the firm as British Aerospace. Sopwith died at Compton Manor in Hampshire, England, on January 27, 1989.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Naval

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Sorge, Richard (1895–1944)

Soviet spy. Born in Baku, Russia (now Azerbaijan), on October 4, 1895, to a German father and a Russian mother, Richard Sorge moved with his family to Germany when he was a child. Sorge enlisted in the German Army at the start of World War I. Badly wounded and disillusioned by his wartime experiences, he joined the Bolshevik Party after the war.

After working as an agitator, Sorge traveled to the Soviet Union in 1925, when he was recruited to become an espionage agent for the Comintern (Communist International), the Soviet-sponsored international organization dedicated to world revolution. In 1930, Sorge arrived in Shanghai and began forming an espionage ring while developing his cover as a freelance journalist. In September 1933, Sorge arrived in Japan on a new assignment and began recruiting agents. The most important recruit was Ozaki Hotsumi, a close associate of future prime minister Konoe Fumimaro.

Still using a journalistic cover, Sorge began to cultivate contacts in the German embassy in Tokyo. Using a mixture of false credentials (at the order of Comintern, he had joined the Nazi Party) and a genuine reputation as an expert on Asian affairs, Sorge eventually became a close confidante of

German military attaché Major General Eugen Ott, who later became German ambassador to Japan.

During the critical year of 1941, Sorge's spy ring provided Moscow with valuable information about Japanese intentions. In August, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, informed by Sorge that Japan would not invade Siberia but would strike south, was able to transfer divisions from Asia to Europe. These Siberian reinforcements played a vital role in blunting the German drive on Moscow in the winter of 1941. Sorge also kept Moscow informed about the breakdown of negotiations between the United States and Japan until he was unmasked and arrested by the Japanese police in October 1941. Contrary to myth, Sorge did not know of Japan's plans to attack Pearl Harbor; he only predicted war between Japan and the United States.

A Japanese court sentenced Sorge to death for espionage, and he was hanged in Tokyo on November 7, 1944. Belatedly, in 1964 Moscow proclaimed him a Hero of the Soviet Union. Sorge was indisputably one of history's master spies.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Japan; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan

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Sosabowski, Stanisław (1892–1967)

Polish Army major general. Born on May 8, 1892, in Stanisławów, Galicia, Stanisław Sosabowski served in the Austrian Army from 1913 to 1918. He joined the army of the newly reborn Poland in 1918 and was sent to Paris as an armaments expert on a committee charged with purchasing surplus Allied military equipment.

In 1922 and 1923, Sosabowski studied at the Warsaw Staff College. He then commanded various infantry units. From 1930 to 1937, he was instructor

of military organization and on General Staff service. In 1937, Sosabowski took command of the 9th Infantry Regiment. In 1939, on the eve of the German invasion, he assumed command of the 21st Infantry Regiment stationed in Warsaw and finally of all infantry units of the 21st Division.

After the September 1939 defeat of Poland and its occupation by German and Russian forces, Sosabowski escaped abroad, first to France and then to Great Britain. There he organized and trained the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade. He demanded that the brigade be sent to assist in the Warsaw Rising (August 1–October 2, 1944) staged by Polish Resistance forces to destroy German Army units stationed there. The British government vetoed the idea.

In September 1944, Sosabowski was ordered to participate with his brigade in the airborne phase of Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26), the effort to secure a crossing over the Rhine River at Arnhem. He protested, arguing that the order was based on faulty intelligence and was bound to end in catastrophe. Consequently, he insisted on a formal, written order. His gloomy prediction proved correct. Dropped into Arnhem on the second day of the operation, his brigade fought well but was decimated by German armor. Following the return to Scotland of Sosabowski and what remained of his brigade, he was dismissed from his post at the insistence of angry British superiors.

Sosabowski published two books of memoirs. He died in Middlesex, England, on September 25, 1967. In 2006, Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands awarded the Military Order of William to the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade and awarded Sosabowski posthumously the Bronze Lion, the Netherland's second highest decoration for combat heroism.

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI

See also

MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Poland, Army; Warsaw Rising

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Sosnkowski, Kazimierz (1885–1969)

Polish Army lieutenant general. Born on November 19, 1885, in Warsaw, Kazimierz Sosnkowski graduated from the Lemberg (L'viv) Polytechnical School. From 1914 to 1917 he served as chief of staff to Joseph Piłsudski, commander of the 1st Brigade of the Polish Legion. In July 1917 Sosnkowski was arrested by the Germans for conspiratorial activity and kept at the fortress of Magdeburg until the eve of the capitulation. He returned to Warsaw on November 10, 1918, and, together with Piłsudski, worked to build the reborn country's army. As minister of war during the Russo-Polish War of 1919–1920, Sosnkowski was responsible for establishing the armed forces that defeated the Red Army in the decisive Battle of Warsaw of August 13–15, 1920.

Sosnkowski continued as minister of war from 1920 to 1924 and as inspector of the Polish armed forces from 1927 to 1939. He was a strong supporter not only of an alliance with France but also of close cooperation with Czechoslovakia. During the September 1939 German invasion of Poland, he commanded the southern sector of the front and scored several local successes around L'vov (L'viv). Following the unexpected Soviet invasion of Poland from the east on September 17, Sosnkowski took refuge in Romania. After the internment of the Polish government there, he managed to escape to France and joined the cabinet of General Władysław Sikorski.

Sikorski appointed Sosnkowski minister without portfolio, in charge of relations with the Polish Resistance movement, a post he held during 1940–1943. Sosnkowski succeeded Sikorski as commander in chief of the Polish armed forces following Sikorski's death in July 1943 and continued in this capacity until 1944.

Rather than return to communist Poland, Sosnkowski remained in exile after the war, first in Great Britain and then in Canada. A talented writer, he published two books. Sosnkowski died on October 11, 1969, on his farm in Quebec, Canada.

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI

See also

Poland; Poland, Army; Poland Campaign; Sikorski, Władysław Eugeniusz

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South Africa, Union of

The Union of South Africa played an important—and often overlooked—role in the Allied victory in World War II. Strategically located at the southern tip of the African continent, in 1939 South Africa was a British dominion with a population of 10.14 million. South Africa controlled vital shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean around the Cape of Good Hope into the South Atlantic. It also possessed important natural resources, including rich deposits of coal, diamonds, iron, gold, and uranium, important to both warring sides.

Sentiment in South Africa toward the war was sharply divided. In 1939, South Africa was home to 7 million native Africans (called blacks), 815,000 racially mixed people (called coloreds), 231,000 Asians (mostly Indians), and 2.1 million people of European ancestry (largely British or Dutch [Boers] called whites). The whites wielded all the power.

To the great majority of black South Africans, the war was of scant interest. Disenfranchised, they saw little to gain in a "white man's war." Many also harbored bitter memories of having fought in the 1899–1902 South African War (Second Boer War) and having being betrayed by both sides. Many white South Africans, especially Boers, sympathized with Adolf Hitler's racist policies and harbored their own resentment against the British.

Indeed, a South African Nazi party was formed in 1932 and was followed by other right-wing groups. The largest of these was the Ossewabrandwag (Ox-Wagon Sentinels, OB), which became committed to the violent overthrow of the government. The majority of white South Africans, disgusted by OB excesses, repudiated the protofascist groups by giving the moderate United South African National Party 73 percent of the vote in 1938—the largest electoral majority in the country's history. Hitler's demands for the return of Germany's former colony, South-West Africa (Namibia), mandated to the Union of South Africa after World War I, contributed to the election result.

Following the British declaration of war against Germany on September 3, 1939, there was sharp debate in the South African parliament whether to follow suit. On September 6, Minister of Justice Jan Christian Smuts, who favored intervention on the British side, won an 80-to-67 vote over Prime Minister (James) Barry Hertzog, who supported neutrality. Hertzog then resigned and was replaced by Smuts. Smuts also was minister of defense and, from June 1940, he commanded South African military forces. In 1945, Smuts was made an honorary field marshal in the British Army. A longtime friend of Winston L. S. Churchill, who frequently consulted him on strategy, Smuts pushed successfully for a British attack on Vichy French–held Madagascar to deny it as a possible Japanese base, and South African forces took part in the later stages of the Madagascar Campaign.

An energetic leader who held an unprecedented concentration of power, Smuts nonetheless proceeded cautiously on the domestic front. He edged extreme nationalists out of his coalition government, but a significant minority of pro-German citizens still resisted supporting Britain. In some schools of the Transvaal, students began the day with the Nazi salute and were told that shortwave radio broadcasts from Germany were their only reliable source of information. A few right-wing terrorist acts occurred, but police rounded up the most dangerous elements by late 1940. Despite calls from his supporters, Smuts adroitly refused to suppress his political opponents completely.

During the war, South Africa built a considerable armaments industry, which also employed thousands of women. It manufactured for South African and Allied use armored cars, howitzers, mortars, and ammunition. South Africa also exported food. Industry of all kinds boomed, and by 1945 South African industrial output had nearly doubled. New employment opportunities drew people into urban areas. By war’s end, blacks outnumbered whites in towns and demanded changes in society. After the war, the reenergized African National Congress became a serious political factor, leading whites to elect a right-wing parliament in 1948 that passed rigid segregation laws and introduced apartheid (separateness).

The Smuts government made no effort to institute conscription. In September 1939, Major General Pierre van Ryneveld commanded the Union Defence Force (UDF), comprising South Africa’s land, sea, and air forces. Its Permanent Force of its regulars numbered only 5,385 men. Coastal defenses

were antiquated, and much of the military equipment was obsolete. The UDF had no tanks or modern artillery. The South African Naval Service (SANS) had no ships, and the South African Air Force (SAAF) possessed exactly six modern aircraft. The same situation prevailed among the reserves.

During the war, South Africa raised three infantry divisions. South African troops won laurels in the campaign in Italian East Africa (Abyssinia) in early 1941, advancing more than 1,000 miles in less than two months. By September 1941, there were nearly 60,000 South African troops in Egypt. South Africans fought at Sidi Rezegh (where the 1st South African Division lost nearly one-third of its strength), at Tobruk (where nearly 11,000 men of the 2nd Division became prisoners on its fall in June 1942), and at El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1942). Following these engagements, what remained of the 1st South African Division was reconstituted as the new 6th Armored Division. It fought in Sicily and then in Italy until the end of the war.

South African troops on parade at a training camp before leaving to take part in military operations. South African forces distinguished themselves during the war. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

The SAAF was in combat throughout the war. By the end of the conflict, it numbered four wings and 28 squadrons. South African pilots fought in the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain and in East Africa and Madagascar under British command. The SAAF ultimately made up about one-third of the strength of the Western Desert Air Force. The SAAF also

served in the central Mediterranean and played a significant role in training Allied aircrews.

The SAAF used British, German, and U.S. aircraft plus indigenous models such as the Wapiti multipurpose biplane. John Everitt Frost's total of 15 air victories was the highest among SAAF pilots, but three South Africans—Marmaduke T. Saint John Pattle, Adolph Gysbert "Sailor" Malan, and Johannes Jacobus le Roux—were among the five top-scoring aces of Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF). Saint John Pattle's records are incomplete, but he is believed to have achieved 41 victories, more than any other RAF pilot.

The SANS patrolled South Africa's coastline and carried out minesweeping, antisubmarine, and rescue activities (more than 150 Allied merchant vessels and warships were sunk off South Africa by Axis submarines). SANS minesweepers removed mines laid by several German auxiliary cruisers, and South African ships provided support off Sicily and Italy. By 1945, the navy had 78 vessels, including three new frigates, one of which (the *Natal*) sank a German submarine, the *U-714*.

With few exceptions, during the war South African blacks served only in noncombatant roles in the Non-European Army Service, but many came under enemy fire. By far the largest number of black recruits came from rural areas that had been hard-hit by drought. Pay was half that for whites. The Native Military Corps provided mess and hygiene and specially trained support troops for the South African white fighting units.

Thousands of British women and children found wartime haven in South Africa, as did Greece's royal family and former shah of Iran Reza Khan Pahlavi. After hostilities ceased, a stream of German children arrived for adoption; many were *Lebensborn* (Fount of Life) babies, conceived to increase the "Aryan" population and shunned in postwar Germany.

Altogether, 334,224 South Africans volunteered for full-time military service during the war. Of these, 132,194 whites and most of the 123,131 blacks who volunteered served in the South African land forces; 44,569 whites served in the SAAF and another 9,455 in the SANS. A total of 21,265 women served in the various branches of the women's Auxiliary Defence Corps, and 3,710 served in the Military Nursing Service. The war claimed nearly 9,000 South African dead, more than 8,000 wounded, and 14,000 taken prisoner.

GERALD D. SWICK AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Africa; Armaments Production; El Alamein, Battle of; Madagascar; North Africa Campaign; Smuts, Jan Christian; Tobruk, First Battle of; Tobruk, Second Battle of; Tobruk, Third Battle of

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Southeast Pacific Theater

The U.S. Navy's strategy for the defeat of Japan by a thrust through the Central Pacific depended on control of the Southeast Pacific, particularly the Panama Canal region through which all shipping destined for the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific theaters transited. In this regard, the Imperial Japanese Navy squandered a huge potential strategic advantage in not challenging the United States in these waters using its large and capable submarine force. Japanese doctrine, however, called for submarines to operate in direct fleet support or as scouting forces, and the carrier strikes envisioned in war plans prior to December 1941 (Rainbow 5) never materialized. Japan never adopted the more aggressive commerce raiding and interdiction roles for its submarines that were employed with great success by both Germany and the United States in the Atlantic and the Western Pacific. Nor did the large 5,200-ton Japanese submarines of the I-400 class carrying three bomber-seaplanes (fielded in late 1944 and clearly designed for operations against the U.S. West Coast and the Panama Canal) ever deploy to the region as anticipated. Once the threat to the Panama Canal failed to materialize, the United States dedicated little in the way of naval protection to shipping in the region.

The March 1941 ABC Conference of Britain, Canada, and the United States established Pacific operational areas that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconfirmed in March 1942. The agreement gave the navy operational control over the areas of operation in the Central, South, North, and Southeast Pacific; the army was responsible for the Southwest Pacific.

Further, the Pacific Military Council determined in March 1943 that all of the Pacific should be under the strategic command of Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific, although General Douglas MacArthur held overall command of the Southwest Pacific. The actual boundaries had been established earlier in Joint Chiefs of Staff directives to MacArthur and Nimitz of April 4, 1942, that outlined the Southeast Pacific as everything east of a line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala border to the mid-Pacific near Clipperton Island and then southward to the South Pole. To patrol this vast ocean area, Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth Jr. commanded a tiny force of three older light cruisers and several destroyers. As events played out, however, Shafroth's force proved to be more than sufficient, given the lack of Japanese activity.

To protect the canal and transit shipping, the U.S. Army had capable forces but only in the 10-mile-wide Panama Canal Zone. The various Latin American countries offered little in terms of genuine security, even after Mexico and Colombia declared war on the Axis powers in 1942–1943. The U.S. Navy provided minimal resources for Rear Admiral Clifford E. Van Hook's Panama Canal Force, consisting of the elderly destroyers *Borie*, *Barry, Tattnall,* and *Goff* along with the gunboat *Erie*, 2 patrol craft, 2 small converted motor yachts, and 24 Catalina maritime patrol aircraft. Although a few Japanese submarines entered the area as part of the June 1942 Japanese naval offensive against Midway and the Aleutian Islands, they did no damage. German U-boats did tremendous destruction to shipping on the Caribbean side of the canal, however, including two sinkings just outside the eastern entrance.

Despite the lack of a credible Japanese threat to U.S. shipping in the Southeast Pacific, naval commanders in 1942 assigned whatever escort assets were available to open-ocean vessels, particularly troop convoys transiting to the Central and Southwest Pacific theaters and Pearl Harbor. In late January 1942, Shafroth's light cruisers *Trenton* and *Concord* and some destroyers escorted two large convoys from the canal through to Bora Bora with 4,500

men assigned to the construction of a new naval fueling station. At about the same time, the carrier *Lexington* and its assigned force escorted an eight-ship convoy carrying 20,000 troops through the Southeast Pacific (two for Christmas Island, two for Canton Island, and four for New Caledonia).

In retrospect, the failure of the Imperial Japanese Navy to harass Allied shipping or attempt even limited interdiction operations in the Southeast Pacific represented a tremendous missed strategic opportunity. Although such a Southeast Pacific campaign would likely not have changed the eventual outcome of the war, it certainly would have mitigated Allied pressure in other Pacific areas of operation and complicated thrusts against the Japanese defensive perimeter.

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See also

Central Pacific Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Nimitz, Chester William; Panama Canal; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Southwest Pacific Theater

Geographical area known to Japan as the Southern Resource Area and also the Southeast Area and to the Allies as the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). Major land areas in this theater were the Philippine Islands, the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, Australia, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands. In August 1942, the boundary was redrawn to exclude Guadalcanal and certain others of the Solomon Islands.

Japan entered the SWPA in a quest for natural resources, especially oil. Oil powered Japan's economy and its armed forces, and the U.S. embargo of it helped trigger the Japanese decision to go to war against the United States. Dependent on foreign oil imports and rapidly using up its stocks, Japan needed to secure oil, the absence of which would paralyze Japanese industry within a year and immobilize the fleet within two years. Oil resources in the Netherlands East Indies, Japanese leaders believed, would make Japan self-sufficient in that vital commodity.

Japanese Southern Army headquarters in Saigon, French Indochina, supervised army operations from the Philippines south. Navy leaders meanwhile decided that U.S. airfields and fleet bases could not be tolerated on the flank of this advance. Japanese lieutenant general Homma Masaharu's Fourteenth Army with two divisions invaded the Philippines beginning on December 8, 1941. U.S. resistance officially ended on May 7, 1942. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi's Sixteenth Army with three divisions invaded the Netherlands East Indies beginning on December 20. Dutch resistance there ceased on March 8.

By May 1942, the Japanese were securing oil from the conquests, but the fleet was only using about 42 percent of its merchant tanker capacity. Iron, manganese, chrome, and copper awaited exploitation in the Philippines. Japan desperately needed bauxite from the Netherlands East Indies for aircraft aluminum. Nickel was available from Celebes. Local Japanese commanders were inefficient at developing these resources, and what materials the Japanese did extract from Borneo, Java, and Sumatra encountered shipping bottlenecks.

As Japan pushed south, its navy engaged in several actions. The Battle of the Java Sea largely destroyed the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) fleet. The United States won a small victory against Japanese transports in the Battle of Makassar Strait (February 4, 1942). There was fighting at Badung Strait, and the Allied cruisers *Houston* and *Perth* were destroyed in the Battle of Sunda Strait (February 28–March 1). The short-lived ABDA Command collapsed in early March 1942, and the Japanese breached the Malay Barrier.

The startling successes of their initial campaigns encouraged the Japanese Navy leadership to propose that five divisions invade Australia. Shipping and logistics, however, posed insurmountable problems, because Japan, already

short of shipping capacity, lost 700,000 tons of shipping—nearly 12 percent of total capacity—sunk or severely damaged in the first four months of war. The Japanese Army had never considered operating in the SWPA area and had not planned how to campaign over such a large area and with such extended lines of communications. Japanese Army planners estimated that to capture Australia would require 12 divisions and 1.5 million tons of shipping. Japan did not have the military assets and resources for such an operation. Australia was simply one continent too far.

Rather than invade Australia, Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo ordered six of the divisions that had participated in the southern operations back to the Japanese home islands, China, and Manchuria. Planners redirected their logistical effort to the northwest and west when they should have been building bases—especially air bases—and establishing and supplying garrisons in the south.

On March 30, 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Southwest Pacific Area. General Douglas MacArthur received command. It succeeded the ABDA area formed on January 15 as well as the Australia–New Zealand Area established at the end of January. The first priority was to strengthen lines of communications to Australia and to build up logistics and airpower. The air war here would be primarily land-based.

Japan landed troops on New Guinea in February and March 1942. Japan sought Port Moresby on the south coast as an air base, part of its campaign to cut the lines of communications to Australia and to deny the port as a base for Allied counterattacks. In the May 7–8, 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea, the U.S. Navy deflected the Japanese seaborne invasion attempt. The Japanese then attempted to seize Port Moresby by land, crossing over the Owen Stanley Mountains. Australian forces fought a delaying action south toward Port Moresby that weakened the Japanese and ultimately halted this thrust. The Australians then drove the Japanese back to New Guinea's north coast. A Japanese landing at Milne Bay (August 25–September 6, 1942) failed, boosting Allied morale.

On July 2, 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered MacArthur to begin an offensive to clear the Japanese from New Guinea. This effort was limited by the availability of forces and because the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy were both constrained by the priority given to Europe. The long fight for Buna concluded on January 22, 1943. The Australians and Americans

executed shore-to-shore and ship-to-shore operations up New Guinea's coast. Rabaul on New Britain was initially a target, but the United States chose to bypass that major Japanese bastion, cutting it off from outside resupply.

Although progress was slow, the Allies kept the initiative, imposed a tremendous drain on Japanese resources, and prevented the Japanese from consolidating their conquests. Weather, disease, and inhospitable terrain inflicted heavy losses on all combatants in this theater but especially on the Japanese. Particularly devastating to Japan was the loss of so many of its air assets, and the destruction of Japanese transports in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 2–5, 1943) gave Japan a stark warning of the precariousness of its position.

The Americans launched almost every operation so as to extend their air umbrella and logistics closer to the Philippines. The strategy of island-hopping, which made use of growing U.S. Navy strength in the theater, allowed U.S. forces to advance while bypassing strong Japanese ground forces. Allied shipping constraints and a shortage of service troops were greater impediments to the advance than shortfalls in combat troops.

The SWPA area was the location of one of two major U.S. offensives (comprising mainly land-based air and ground forces) aimed at Japan. The second location was the Central Pacific, in which the U.S. offensives comprised mainly carrier air and sea power. The Japanese had insufficient assets to meet both offensives and were often off balance as they tried to maneuver against the two. Japan was simultaneously heavily committed in Burma and China and had to maintain major forces in Manchuria as a check on potential action by the Soviet Union.

The U.S. SWPA and Central Pacific offensives indirectly supported each other early in the campaigns and then directly supported one another as they converged at the Luzon-Formosa-China coast area. The speed, flexibility, and mass of the two Allied thrusts neutralized the defender's traditional advantage of interior lines of communications. Coordination between the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy of current and future operations was critically important.

The Japanese regarded campaigns in New Guinea (March 8, 1942–September 13, 1945) as a means to delay their enemies, reduce the enemies' resources, and gain time to reorganize for a counteroffensive. Rather than weakening the Allies, however, the campaigns here became a drain on

Japanese manpower, ships, and aircraft. Allied airpower cleared Japanese from the air and sea. Nowhere did the Japanese stop the advance, nor could they sustain the attrition that went with it.

The vast majority of Japanese troop and logistics shipping occurred in SWPA waters. Oil moved north through these waters, and U.S. submarines attacked the vital Malaya/Netherlands East Indies–Japan line of communications. Japan lost half its cargo-carrying capacity in 1944 to air and submarine attacks. Critical oil and raw materials required for war production in the home islands were sent to the ocean bottom.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea during June 19–21, 1944, largely destroyed what remained of Japanese naval aviation. Japanese Navy leaders then developed plans for a decisive battle, depending on the avenue of the U.S. advance. When the United States invaded the Philippines in October, Japan immediately initiated its plan, which resulted in the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf—the greatest naval battle, in terms of ships and numbers of men engaged, in history. In the ensuing battle, the U.S. Navy all but destroyed the Japanese Navy as an organized fighting force.

The inability of Japan to transport men and supplies to Leyte and its similar difficulties in supplying and reinforcing Luzon hastened Japan's defeat in the Philippines. The U.S. conquest of the Philippines (October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945) enabled U.S. airpower there to sever the seaborne supply lines between the Japanese home islands and its Southern Resource Area. U.S. Navy forces swept into the South China Sea in January 1945 and severed Japanese lines of communications with Indochina. The U.S. conquest of the Philippines, the ability of carrier task forces to go wherever they pleased, and the strangulation wrought by the submarine fleet completely isolated the Southern Resource Area.

Large Japanese ground forces remained in Indochina and in the Netherlands East Indies, but they could play no role in defense of the home islands, nor could raw materials reach the home islands. This made MacArthur's use of Australian forces in Borneo in mid-1945 all the more questionable. It was a campaign with little strategic value.

The last operations in the SWPA area were U.S. preparations for the invasion of Japan. The Philippines provided staging areas for 18 U.S. Army divisions, large numbers of aircraft, logistics organizations, and hundreds of ships. With Japan's surrender in August, operations in the SWPA area came

to an end. The conclusion of hostilities did not bring peace, however, because wars in which indigenous peoples sought independence from their colonial occupiers soon began.

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See also

ABDA Command; Balikpapan, Battle of; Bismarck Sea, Battle of; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Hart, Thomas Charles; Java Sea, Battle of; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Rabaul; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Sunda Strait, Battle of; Document 167

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Soviet Union

In 1939, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) numbered some 193 million people inhabiting an area of more than 8.6 million square miles extending over 11 time zones. The Soviet Union was, in fact, as large geographically as the two next-largest countries—China and Canada—combined and stretched from the Pacific Ocean in the east to Poland and Hungary in the west. Although Great Russians living around Moscow comprised a majority of the population, the country was composed of many different nationalities who spoke nearly 170 different languages. The largest republic by far in the Soviet Union was the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic, which had more than 100 million people.

The alliance between the Soviet Union and Germany of August 23, 1939, had brought advantages to each side. It allowed Adolf Hitler to attack Poland, secure in the fact that he would not have to wage war with the Soviet Union, and it bought time for Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin to rebuild the Red Army, which he had so weakened in the Great Purges. The pact between Germany and the Soviet Union also yielded great economic advantages to the German war machine in the form of Soviet raw materials and the activities of the Soviet Union as a purchasing agent for Germany abroad.

The pact brought far less advantage to the Soviet Union, although the Red Army benefited from establishment of a joint tank training center at Kazan and an air base at Lipetsk. Germany also provided some finished machinery and a few weapons of war. But the German and Soviet division of Poland that flowed from the pact also meant the end of a buffer between the two states.

Stalin was shocked at the speed with which Germany defeated France in 1940. Given the punishment that little Finland had inflicted on the Soviet Union in the Winter War of 1939–1940, it is no wonder that Stalin doubted the ability of the Red Army to stand up to the German military. The Soviet leadership counted on a stalemated struggle similar to that of the Western Front in World War I or at least a war of several years. Critical to a prolonged struggle that would give the Soviet Union a chance to win was denying the Germans the eastern Ukraine, which was the reason why so much Soviet armor was positioned forward in June 1941. Stalin quickly acted on the fall of France to cash in any remaining chips under the pact of August 1939, annexing the Baltic states and taking Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Romania.

Stalin nevertheless refused to believe warnings, many of which were supplied by the Western powers, that Germany intended to invade. He chose to regard these as attempts to entangle the Soviet Union and Germany in an armed conflict, and he continued to believe that any war between Germany and the Soviet Union lay years in the future. He therefore forbade preparations for a preventative counterattack into the German deployments, which his General Staff proposed.

Stalin was determined not to be tricked into a war with Germany. Not only did the Soviet Union provide no provocation for the Germans, but it continued to make deliveries of goods under the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact even as the invasion was in progress. Stalin rejected calls by

his generals in the weeks and days before the attack to put Soviet forces in the border areas on alert. Even when he was informed that German troops were invading and firing on Soviet positions, Stalin refused for hours to allow return fire; he claimed that Hitler must not be aware of what was going on. For more than a week Stalin remained incommunicado, stunned by his failure and hiding from his people. Not until July 3 did he address the nation.

Stalin's refusal to adequately prepare for a German attack was made worse by his subsequent orders that Red Army units stand fast rather than retreat, leading to the cutting off and surrender of vast numbers of Russian soldiers. Decisions such as these almost drove the Soviet Union from the war. But while Hitler unlearned the art of war, Stalin proved that he was capable of learning it, absorbing specialist knowledge and technical information and paying attention to knowledgeable subordinates. He continued to make the major decisions, shifting units and commanders about. Front commanders reported to him at the end of each day and received their instructions directly from him.

During the war, Stalin deliberately downplayed communism, choosing to emphasize Russian patriotism. Toward this end, he even enlisted the services of the Russian Orthodox Church. World War II is known in Russian history as the "Great Patriotic War." The Soviet populace was more used to deprivation and suffering than most peoples, but the war took a huge toll on the population as German and Soviet forces fought back and forth across the Russian heartland and practiced scorched-earth policies.

During the first months of the German invasion, the government exercised total control over the media and withheld any information as to the real losses suffered by the Red Army. There was no hint in the press of hunger or starvation, which were widespread. Even news of the suffering in besieged Leningrad was suppressed. Those spreading rumors were subject to severe punishment under Article 58 of the Soviet criminal code. Strict censorship often delayed evacuation of populations westward ahead of German Army advances.

On June 22, 1941, the Supreme Soviet had declared martial law in all front regions, and two days later it extended martial law to the entire European part of the Soviet Union. Millions of civilians were conscripted to build bunkers, barricades, and tank traps. During July and August 1941 at Leningrad alone, nearly 1 million citizens helped build defensive works. A

decree of December 26, 1941, announced that unauthorized leave would be punished by five to eight years' imprisonment. Even more draconian was a decree of July 28, 1942, stating that all workers who left their jobs without permission would be treated as deserters and handed over to military tribunals.

All facets of ordinary Soviet life were militarized, with civilian activities directed by the Commissariat of Defense and the secret police. War put a severe strain on the state budget, and the Soviet government therefore imposed a "war tax" on all adult citizens that further tightened the already draconian conditions for most of the population.

The Soviet government pursued a scorched-earth policy. As the Red Army withdrew, it destroyed absolutely everything in its path with no regard to the civilian population left behind. Hundreds of thousands of tons of grain and agricultural products were simply burned to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Germans. This suffering was repeated several times over with the ebb and flow of the war.

At the time of the German invasion on June 22, 1941, some 11 million Soviet citizens had undergone some military training during the previous 15 years, and a like number had received some military instruction. Even at the end of the war, after its horrendous casualties, the Red Army had 6 million men under arms, twice the German total.

Increasing industrial production would be vital if the Soviet Union was to have any chance of victory, and it registered great success in this area. In the Third Five-Year Plan (1938–1942), increasing attention had been given to the production of armament, the development of new industry in the east, and the relocation of existing production east of the Ural Mountains, where it would be safe from the Luftwaffe. After the German invasion, whole factories were disassembled, loaded on flatcars, and then shipped east, where they were reassembled and resumed production of tanks, planes, and guns. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, much of the industrial effort was inefficient, the product of confusion and an inept bureaucracy. On the plus side, much of the conversion from peacetime to wartime production was carried out by local initiative, without central intervention.

German soldiers salvaging belongings left behind by withdrawing Russian civilians, in a village on the outskirts of Leningrad, November 28, 1941. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Not even a majority of production could be relocated so quickly, and in the second half of 1941, the Soviet Union lost 68 percent of its iron production, 63 percent of its coal, 58 percent of its steel, and 40 percent of its farmland. The loss of Ukraine to the Germans was a particularly heavy blow, for it boasted the Soviet Union's most fertile farmland.

Despite this, the Soviet Union registered solid gains in arms production during the war. It emphasized simple yet durable weapons. The Russian Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik ground-attack aircraft and the T-34 tank were also easy to manufacture and maintain. Between 1940 and 1945, the Soviet Union far outproduced Germany; in that period, it manufactured 146,929 aircraft, 102,301 tanks, and more than 14.6 million rifles and carbines.

During the war, the Soviet civilian population endured hunger, cold, malnutrition, and disease. The German invasion had far-reaching consequences for the food supply, as a large part of Soviet agricultural production was soon in German hands. Also, in the first months of the war, Soviet authorities were far more intent on relocating industry than on saving agricultural production. The relocation of factories east of the Urals had priority over the shipment of food supplies. The Red Army also requisitioned tractors and horses from agricultural work. Soldiers and workers in

armaments industries received priority in food and medical supplies at the expense of peasants, the old, and children. The cities were hard-hit, and many people there sought refuge in the countryside, where they worked as day laborers to secure bread. Given the lack of machinery, it is not surprising that harvests were poor. Agricultural production fell sharply, resulting in sharp increases in the price of food.

The vast casualties sustained by the Red Army in fighting the Germans, the manpower requirements of the armed forces, and the demands of war industries all led to a severe labor shortage. This shortage was taken up in part by women (who had long been in the industrial workforce in the Soviet Union), by men who were too old for the army, and by teenage boys. Women were the major labor source in the agricultural sector, and by the end of the war they comprised a majority of the workers in the industrial sector as well. The percentage of female labor in agriculture rose from 40 percent in 1940 to 70 percent in 1943, to 82 percent in 1944, and to 92 percent in 1945. The loss of their husbands to the army placed an additional burden on married women, who now had to support both children and aged relatives. Workdays were extended to 16 hours and longer.

The war exacted a frightful human toll on the Soviet Union. Immediate postwar calculations set the toll at 20 million people dead, an estimate raised 60 years later to as many as 27 million or more. This death toll swelled in part because of Stalin's own policies. During the war, the Soviet authorities executed 157,000 of their own soldiers. Stalin wrote off Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) held by the Germans, for surrender was regarded as treason. When Hitler offered to exchange Stalin's only son, Yakov, for Hitler's nephew Leo Raubal, Stalin refused, and Yakov died in captivity. Even Soviet prisoners who managed to escape from the Germans were severely punished, sometimes with death. To add insult to injury, Red Army POWs captured by the Germans who managed to survive the cruel circumstances of imprisonment were treated as traitors at the end of the war. Many were executed out of hand; others were shipped off to the gulags.

The physical and economic damage sustained during the war was equally as devastating. The Soviets claimed that 1,700 towns and some 70,000 villages had been destroyed, while major cities such as Stalingrad, Odessa, Kiev, and Leningrad also suffered catastrophic damage. An estimated 25 million Soviets were left homeless at war's end, and estimates have indicated

that at least 25 percent of the total national wealth of the country had been wiped out between 1941 and 1945.

The war was the seminal experience for generations of Soviet citizens. Its legacy of burned villages and hatred came to be reflected in the brutal Soviet treatment of its zone of Germany at the end of the war.

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See also

Soviet Union, Air Force; Soviet Union, Army; Soviet Union, Navy; Stalin, Joseph; Women in World War II; Document 7; Document 36; Document 79; Document 89; Document 99; Document 111; Document 144; Document 160; Document 241

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Soviet Union, Air Force

As part of the reorganization of the Soviet armed forces in 1923, air squadrons were retained under the control of the ground units to which they were attached. Administratively, however, the squadrons came under the control of the Chief Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army. In 1925, the Soviets established the General Staff of the Air Force. Systematic numbering of squadrons began in 1926, and their formation was standardized as five squadrons—each divided into three sections—for an air brigade. As armed force doctrine evolved, and in 1928 operational control of all air units was placed under the Chief Directorate of the Air Force.

Nikolai Polikarpov produced fighters such as the I-5 by 1924, and Andrei Tupolev created the first Soviet bomber designs, such as the ANT-4, in 1927. Development stalled during the Great Purges in the late 1930s, when the

government ordered the imprisonment of some 450 aircraft designers and engineers, although most were allowed to continue their work from confinement.

During the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union supplied both I-15 and I-16 aircraft and pilot/instructors to the republican side; however, these aircraft were outclassed by the German Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighter. From October 1936 to December 1938, the Soviet Union sent 1,409 aircraft to Spain, of which 1,176 were destroyed. Nevertheless, by January 1937, 17 Soviet pilots had been decorated as Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The Spanish experience spurred the Soviets to develop aircraft specifically for ground-attack and close-support duties. Representative of this effort were the Yakovlev Yak-1, the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-1, and the Lavochkin-Gorbunov-Gudkov LaGG-3, which entered service in 1939 and 1940. These three designs were later improved.

Alexander Yakovlev's Yak-1 was powered by a 1,100-horsepower (hp) engine and had a top speed of 360 mph. It was armed with a 20mm cannon and two 7.62mm machine guns. The virtue of this fighter was its simple construction and reliability. The Yak-1 could complete a 360-degree turn in 17 seconds. It enjoyed one of the highest productions of any aircraft of the war; a total of 30,000 were manufactured.

Artem Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich combined to produce the 1,350-hp MiG-1, which had a maximum speed of 380 mph. The MiG-1 was best suited to an interceptor role at high altitude. The LaGG-3 was the result of the collaboration of Semyon Lavochkin, Vladimir Gorbunov, and Mikhail Gudkov. The LaGG-3, built entirely of wood, had armament, engine, and speed comparable to that of the Yak-1. It also had a tendency to spin during sharp turns.

Another reorganization of the Soviet Air Force took place in July 1940, with a view toward concentrating air assets. The 20- to 30-plane squadrons were amalgamated into 60-plane regiments. Between three and five regiments made up an air division, each of which supported a ground army. By February 1941, although 106 new air regiments had been authorized, only 19 had actually been formed. Moreover, by the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941), only 20 percent of Soviet Air Force units had been fitted with the new Yak, MiG, and LaGG models.

In April 1942, Lieutenant General Alexander Novikov took command of

the Red Army Air Force. In May, he ordered that all Soviet airpower—heretofore apportioned sporadically among the ground armies and employed without concentration—should be unified. The remnants of surviving postinvasion Soviet airpower thus were gathered to become the First Air Army.

The initial success of Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union owed much to the German Luftwaffe, which destroyed many Soviet aircraft on the ground. In only the first two days 2,500 Soviet planes had been destroyed, and the Germans had achieved air superiority. Another factor contributing to the demise of the Soviet Air Force was poor tactics, as Soviet bombers attempted to attack without fighter protection. When threatened, Soviet bombers formed a tight wedge pattern, while threatened Soviet fighters maneuvered into a defensive circle. At the beginning of the campaign against Germany, frustrated by their lack of tactical training and having to fly outclassed aircraft, many Soviet pilots resorted to ramming German aircraft during engagements.

A ground crew loading bombs on a Red Army aircraft covered with camouflaged netting, 1941. (Library of Congress)

As the German offensive into the Soviet Union continued, the Soviets organized an evacuation eastward of much of their industry, including more than half the aircraft factories. As a result, production fell off dramatically in the second half of 1941. By June 1942, however, 1,000 aircraft per month were once again being produced.

Moreover, the refabricated aviation plants began to produce upgraded aircraft models such as the MiG-3, which had an increased combat radius, and an up-gunned version of the Yak-1 with 12.7mm cannon and a 1,260-hp engine. LaGG production was decreased in favor of a new product that was the creation of Sergei Ilyushin. His Il-2 Shturmovik began to reach the front lines in mid-July 1942. The impetus behind the design was the creation of a “flying tank”: an aircraft with the ability to operate at altitudes of 50 to 500

feet and survive enemy ground fire while supporting Soviet forces by destroying German tanks.

A design revision, Il-2m3, began delivery in November 1942. It added protection from German fighters. The new Shturmovik was a two-seater—the gunner faced rearward and manned a 12.7mm machine gun. The pilot now controlled two 23mm cannon and either a 1,300-pound bomb load or 880 pounds of bombs and 8 rockets. The Il-2 proved so successful that at 35,000 units, it was the highest-production aircraft ever. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin personally prioritized its production. The Germans dubbed the Il-2 “Der schwarze Tod” (The Black Death).

Soviet pilots revised and developed new principles of engagement, following the practices of their top aces such as Alexander Pokryshkin. His formula was “altitude-speed-maneuver-fire.” From a higher altitude, a pilot had the opportunity to select his target and maneuver with speed into an advantageous position for attack. Squadron formations gave way to the “loose pair” of two aircraft operating together, either covering the other (attacking) aircraft. This tactic was first used during the late 1941 Battle of Moscow and resulted in Luftwaffe losses of 1,400 aircraft between October and December 1941. The six Soviet air regiments taking part in the defense of the capital were given the honorific “Guards” designation. From November 15 to December 5, 1941, Soviet pilots flew 15,840 sorties, compared with only 3,500 for the Luftwaffe.

The new air doctrine also stipulated that bombers have fighter escorts: 4 bombers with 10 fighters and 16–24 bombers protected by a group of 20 fighters. The fighters were organized into groups. Each group consisted of 3–4 pairs totaling 6–8 fighters. Normally, four groups would constantly patrol a sector of the combat area. When fighters escorted ground-attack aircraft, the fighters divided into an escort group and an assault group. The escort group remained with the ground-attack aircraft but flew 300 to 1,000 feet higher to engage enemy fighters. The assault group flew 1,500 to 3,000 feet above the escort group and usually a half mile ahead to scout for enemy patrols and act as an advance guard to prevent enemy fighters from closing on the escort group.

In October 1942, Lavochkin produced the La-5 aircraft. Its 1,600-hp engine propelled the aircraft 30 mph faster than the Messerschmitt Bf-109F. Simultaneously, Yakovlev produced the Yak-9, which increased the Yak-1’s

combat radius and was armed with either a 20mm or a 37mm cannon and a 12.7mm synchronized machine gun.

The Soviets had also organized a long-range aviation force in March 1942. The core of this was the Petlyakov Pe-8 four-engine bomber. Soviet emphasis, however, as with the Luftwaffe, was on ground-support aviation.

All major Soviet campaigns after the September 30, 1941–April 1942, Battle of Moscow had substantial air involvement. One-quarter of Soviet airpower was concentrated in the area of Stalingrad by mid-November 1942 for the planned counteroffensive. In the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943) the Soviets deployed 1,300 aircraft. During the Battle of Berlin (March 31–May 2, 1945), 7,500 Soviet aircraft flew a daily average of 15,000 sorties.

The Soviets also organized foreign-piloted air formations, several of which distinguished themselves in combat. These included Regiment Normandie of French pilots, the 1st Polish Warsaw Fighter Regiment, the 2nd Kraków Night Bomber Regiment, the 3rd Polish Ground Attack Regiment, and the Czechoslovak Fighter Regiment. Noteworthy also is the organization of a 400-woman 588th Night Bomber Regiment, the pilots of which were known by the Germans as the “night witches.” During the course of the war, these women flew some 24,000 sorties. Lidiia Litviak was the first woman pilot in history to shoot down an enemy aircraft in daytime combat.

Soviet aircraft production continued to climb during the war. From June 1941 to December 1944, the Soviets produced some 97,000 aircraft. During the war, the Soviet Air Force also benefited greatly from Lend-Lease deliveries of British and U.S. aircraft. The Soviets received 2,097 P-40 Tomahawks, 1,329 Supermarine Spitfires, 4,746 Bell P-39 Aircobras, 2,400 Bell P-63 Kingcobras, and several transports and bombers. Lend-Lease provided a total of 18,865 aircraft.

By 1945, the Red Army Air Force numbered 17 air armies, each composed of two fighter divisions, two fighter-bomber divisions, a night-bomber regiment, a reconnaissance squadron, and a liaison squadron. These air armies were held in reserve and tasked to support ground operations on a case-by-case basis. They were under the command of air officers who coordinated efforts with ground commanders. Novikov also established an air reserve that could be moved around to achieve local air superiority. By 1945, 40 percent of Soviet air strength was held in a reserve capacity. The Red

Army Air Force grew dramatically in size during the war and certainly played an important role in the Soviet victory in World War II on the Eastern Front, especially—as its name indicates—in ground-support aviation.

NEVILLE PANTHAKI

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Air Warfare, Fighter Tactics; Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Ilyushin, Sergei Vladimirovich; Kursk, Battle of; Lend-Lease; Litviak, Lidiia Vladimirovna; Moscow, Battle of; Novikov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich; Petlyakov, Vladimir Mikhailovich; Raskova, Marina Mikhailovna; Soviet Women's Combat Wings; Women in World War II

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Soviet Union, Army

Russia's defeat in World War I gave strong impetus to Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin's industrialization campaign of the 1930s. His emphasis on technological progress, articulated in a speech on February 4, 1931, also implied the need for improvements in military technology to enable the Soviet Union to catch up with the Western powers. Soviet commissar of war Kliment Voroshilov claimed that a future war would be "a war of factories." The Japanese takeover of all Manchuria in the same year provided a compelling reason for Soviet rearmament. Although it enjoyed modern weapons at the beginning of the war, the Red Army remained committed to the concept that wars were won not by training and technology but by the masses and by ideology.

Stalinist purges had sharply affected the military leadership. Perhaps 40 million people were “repressed” during the Stalin era; half that number died. The so-called Great Terror that did away with the old-guard Bolshevik leadership also struck down senior military officers. Among the executed were 3 of 5 marshals, 13 of 15 army commanders, 8 of 9 fleet admirals and admirals grade I, 50 of 57 corps commanders, and 154 of 186 divisional commanders. Undoubtedly, the purges claimed the most aggressive and outspoken officers, and their loss was keenly felt, especially during the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which began on June 22, 1941. Among those purged was Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who had foreseen in his 1936 “Problems Concerning the Defense of the USSR” the German operational concept for an invasion of the Soviet Union and developed a plan to counter it.

Despite the ruinous purges, the Soviet military under Stalin had a strong influence on military-economic policy as it pushed for an armament-in-depth that implied not only state investment in stocks of weapons but also support for civilian heavy industry. On the eve of World War II, aircraft, tank, and armament plants were concentrated in the western parts of the Soviet Union. Although some efforts were made during the period before the German invasion of June 1941 to relocate military and general industrial production to the less vulnerable area east of the Ural Mountains, advocates of such a policy were often branded as defeatists. The German invasion of the western Soviet territories was in fact an economic disaster, depriving the Red Army of much of its military industrial base.

The success of the German tank divisions in France in 1940 led Stalin to reverse his decision taken in the fall of 1939 to eliminate the five Soviet tank corps. A decree of July 6, 1940, ordered the creation of 9 new Red Army mechanized corps, and in February and March 1941, other decrees called for an additional 20 formations.

In June 1941, on paper at least, the Red Army seemed in an excellent position to resist a German attack. It had some 5.37 million men under arms, and in the two weeks after the invasion, another 5 million were called to the colors. The Red Army enjoyed superiority over its attacker in major areas of military equipment. Germany had some 6,000 tanks, the Soviets 23,140 (10,394 of them in the west). Much of this equipment was also of high quality. By 1941, the Soviets possessed some of the best tanks of the war.

Their BT-series and T-26 were superior in armor, firepower, and maneuverability to the German light PzKpfw I and II and could destroy any German tank. Similarly, the Soviet T-34 medium tank and KV-1 heavy tank were superior to the PzKpfw III and IV and indeed to any German tank in June 1941.

Soviet units also enjoyed superiority in numbers of certain weapons. Thus, a fully equipped Soviet tank division was to have 375 tanks; a German panzer division had only between 135 and 208. A fully equipped Soviet rifle division had 1,304 machine guns, whereas a German infantry division had only 486.

Although Soviet formations in the west were not fully equipped when Operation BARBAROSSA began, they should have been able to repel the German attack. Nonetheless, the Red Army sustained staggering losses early in the invasion. The bulk of Soviet forces in the western areas were in forward positions, where they were easily cut off and surrounded.

On the first day alone, 1,200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, most of them on the ground. Within two days, 2,000 Soviet aircraft had been lost. Within five days, the Germans had captured or destroyed 2,500 Soviet tanks. Within three weeks, the Soviets had lost 3,500 tanks, 6,000 aircraft, and 2 million men, including a significant percentage of the officer corps.

Others were made the scapegoats for Stalin's own failures. General Dimitri G. Pavlov, commander of the sector that had borne the brunt of the German attack, had pleaded with Stalin a week before the German onslaught to be allowed to establish rearward defensive positions. He and eight other generals and political officials were tried and shot.

In the first months of the invasion, Stalin consistently ignored sound military advice from his generals, with disastrous results. His orders that the army stand and fight merely meant that larger portions of it were surrounded and destroyed. German armored pincers took Minsk in mid-July, along with 290,000 prisoners, 2,500 tanks, and 1,400 guns. Smolensk followed a week later, with 100,000 prisoners, 2,000 tanks, and 1,900 guns taken. During August and September, instead of letting his armies escape a German panzer pincer on Kiev, Stalin ordered the city held. German infantry then sealed off Kiev. It fell on September 19 and with it most of five Soviet armies: 665,000 prisoners and vast quantities of weapons.

Fortunately for the Soviet Union, the campaign was sufficiently

prolonged for Stalin to grow as a war leader. He absorbed specialized knowledge and, if lacking in imagination, by the end of the war had grown into an effective military strategist. He was also famed, and feared, for his frequent and often abrupt interference in the conduct of operations. Front commanders reported to him daily and received orders directly from him. On August 8, Stalin took over the position of supreme commander in chief.

There were frequent changes in the top professional leadership of the General Staff (Glavnokomand). At first, Georgii K. Zhukov was commanding general; from the end of July 1941, it was Boris M. Shaposhnikov; from May 1942, it was Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky; and from February 1945 to March 1946, it was Alexi I. Antonov. Officers who had been imprisoned under the purges were now released to take command. Prominent among some 4,000 so freed was Colonel Konstantin K. Rokossovsky (later marshal of the Soviet Union), who had undergone extensive torture.

Supply remained a serious problem for the army. Early in August 1941, the Main Directorate of the Red Army was established under the General Staff and was responsible for supplying the army. Arms shortages were especially acute in the winter of 1941–1942. By December 1941, only 39 percent of aircraft production goals had been met, and artillery shell production was no more than 20 to 30 percent of targets.

The rapid conversion of Soviet industry to military purposes and the relocation of entire factories east of the Urals both registered considerable results in 1942, when 59 percent of industrial production was devoted to arms manufacture, compared with only 30 percent before 1940. The military share of the state budget on the army also increased dramatically. The General Staff and the government concentrated the Soviet Union’s entire productive capacity on the war effort, and achievements were dramatic. During 1942 Germany produced 9,200 tanks, but the Soviet Union manufactured 24,089; only the United States, with 24,997, built more. Superior military production to that of Germany was a major factor in the Soviet military victory in the war. In 1944, thanks in large part to the organizing genius of Albert Speer, Germany managed to produce 22,100 tanks, but the Soviet Union kept ahead, with 28,963. Artillery production also grew, from 42,300 guns in 1941 to 127,000 in 1942. Other weapons systems underwent similar production increases.

The vast distances in the Soviet Union and the primitive transportation helped to break down the German blitzkrieg, which had prospered on the short distances of Poland and France. Weather also helped to save the Red Army. Hitler believed that the Red Army could be defeated in a short campaign of only six weeks, and the German Army was ill-prepared to deal with the Russian winter and temperatures of –5 degrees Fahrenheit. Eventually, temperatures in the winter of 1941–1942 plunged to –60 degrees Fahrenheit. Soviet forces were able to fight in those conditions, but the German Army was not.

Hitler also miscalculated Soviet manpower resources. In 1941, some 22 million Soviet citizens had experienced some degree of military training. Before the invasion, the Germans had estimated Soviet strength in the west at about 155 divisions: 100 infantry, 25 cavalry, and the equivalent of 30 mechanized. This was not far off the mark; actual Soviet strength was 177 divisional equivalents, but this included air force and border troops, and Soviet divisions were smaller than their German counterparts. By mid-August, the Germans had met and defeated the Soviet force they had expected, but by then another 160 Soviet divisions had appeared. By the summer of 1942, despite catastrophic losses, the Soviet field army numbered 5,534,000 officers and men.

The bulk of Soviet soldiers were poorly trained. The low educational level of the population hampered creation of technically effective combat units. The numerous nationalities and languages of the Soviet Union also worked against an efficient, cohesive military establishment. Women proved to be invaluable in the war effort; some 10 percent of Soviet military personnel and 15 percent of partisan forces were female, many of them serving in combat roles. Women went to the front as pilots, navigators, mechanics, and political officers. In sharp contrast to other armies in the war, there were also all-women ground units, including the 1st Independent Volunteer Women’s Rifle Brigade and the 1st Independent Women’s Reserve Rifle Regiment. Women also were heavily involved in partisan activities in the western portions of the Soviet Union occupied by the Germans.

Improving circumstances enabled the Red Army to take the offensive in November 1942. The winter campaign of 1942–1943 broke the German stranglehold on Leningrad and drove Axis forces west. Stalingrad, Rostov, and Kursk were all liberated. When the Germans began Operation CITADEL in

the summer of 1943, the Red Army halted the German drive in the great Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943). That summer and fall, the Red Army resumed the advance, and from this point the Soviets maintained the initiative for the remainder of the war.

On a 1,200-mile front, Soviet forces destroyed more than 200 Axis divisions and more than 14,000 aircraft. During this period, partisan activity complemented the combat actions of the regular Soviet forces, tying down large numbers of German troops in maintaining lines of communication. In the newly liberated regions, industrial enterprises were set up that increased steadily military production.

Red Army soldiers advancing on the Germans amid the ruins of a workers' settlement on the outskirts of Stalingrad, January 26, 1943. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Soviet forces also received improved arms: the machine pistol (PPS), a new heavy machine gun, the 76mm artillery piece, a 57mm antitank gun, a new 152mm howitzer, and 120mm and 160mm mortars. Furthermore, production was increased of the magnificent T-34 tank with its 76mm gun, and new KV-85 and IS heavy tanks were introduced.

U.S. Lend-Lease aid was certainly important to the Red Army's war effort. The Soviet Union received 375,000 American trucks, 50,000 Jeeps, and 12,000 railroad cars. These greatly enhanced the mobility of the Red Army and allowed it to carry out sustained offensive operations. The United States also supplied 1.75 million tons of food.

If lacking in flair, most Soviet soldiers fought with a dogged persistence, even in hopeless situations. Nonetheless, a staggering 5.25 million Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner during the war. Desertion rates remained high, in part because of the brutal conditions. One source estimates that the Soviet

Union executed 157,000 people during the war on charges of cowardice or desertion.

Soviet military casualties continued to be high, in part because of the costly Soviet practice of attacking without tanks, holding the armor back until a breakthrough was achieved. The Soviets lost more men in the battle for Berlin alone at the end of the war than the United States lost during the war in all theaters combined.

By the end of 1944, the Red Army had almost completely liberated Soviet territory. In January 1945, the Red Army began its offensive against Berlin. The East Prussian Campaign and the Vistula-Oder Operation were the most important strategic operations for the Red Army in the war. In the spring of 1945, the Red Army mounted simultaneous operations on a vast front extending from the Baltic to the Carpathians. On April 25, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front met the First American Army in Torgau on the Elbe River, symbolizing the end of Nazi Germany. By the end of the fighting in Europe, despite its horrific losses during the conflict, the Red Army had 6 million men under arms, double the number for the German Army.

Three months after the conclusion of fighting in Europe, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. On August 9, 1945, Soviet forces mounted a large, rapid, and highly successful invasion of Manchuria. Lasting only a week, this bold operation was conducted in difficult terrain against what were considered some of Japan's best troops and ended with Soviet control of Manchuria.

EVA-MARIA STOLBERG AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Antonov, Alexei Innokentievich; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Hitler, Adolf; Kursk, Battle of; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Pavlov, Dimitri Grigorevich; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich; Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph; Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich; Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich; Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich; Women in World War II; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Soviet Union, Navy

When World War II began in September 1939, the Soviet Navy was in the process of implementing significant changes in its naval policies. In late 1935, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had switched from the strategic concept of a small war at sea and planned to build a large oceangoing fleet. In August 1939, the Naval Staff had finalized a building plan for the next 10 years for 15 battleships, 16 battle cruisers, 2 light aircraft carriers, 28 cruisers, 36 destroyer leaders, 163 destroyers, 442 submarines, and many smaller vessels. Of the new construction, only 1 cruiser, 4 destroyer leaders, 13 destroyers, and 158 submarines had been completed by the time the war began. In addition to these, the Soviet Navy had available only 3 old battleships, 5 cruisers, 17 destroyers, and 7 submarines.

During the November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940, Winter War against Finland, the Baltic Fleet carried out shore bombardment and submarine operations against supply traffic to Finland. The fleet sank only a few Finnish ships, at the cost of one submarine lost. The end of that war, however, pushed the Soviet borders forward in the Arctic by the inclusion of the entire Fisher Peninsula (Poluostrov Rybachiy) and in the Baltic in the Karelian sector. These territorial acquisitions and Hanko at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland as a new naval base greatly improved the defenses of Leningrad, the Soviet Union’s second-largest city.

The nonaggression pact with Germany of August 23, 1939, brought further territorial gains for the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1940, acting under its secret provisions, the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic states, further improving the base situation for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. In the Black Sea, Soviet territorial gains in Bessarabia created an additional buffer for Odessa and allowed the establishment of a Danube Flotilla.

The rising danger of war with Germany forced the Soviet Navy in October 1940 to scale down its naval building program. Although Soviet intelligence agencies received many reports about German preparations for an attack and British and U.S. leaders also sent warnings based on their intelligence reports, Stalin refused to believe that Adolf Hitler would attack the Soviet Union before subduing Britain. The German attack of June 22, 1941, therefore caused great disorder and led to heavy Soviet losses, especially in the army and air force but also in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets.

The program to build an oceangoing fleet had to be scrapped as well. By that time, 4 cruisers, 7 destroyer-leaders, 30 destroyers, and 204 submarines had been commissioned, and the Soviets had added 4 submarines from the Estonian and Latvian fleets to their own forces. Ships in the Far East yards would be completed, whereas the bigger ships in the western yards were laid up for completion after the war. Of the ships partly completed, only 3 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 10 cruisers, 2 destroyer-leaders, 42 destroyers, and 91 submarines would be launched.

The Baltic Fleet—now comprising 2 old battleships, 3 cruisers, 2 destroyer-leaders, 19 destroyers, and 70 submarines—had to defend the entrances to the Bay of Riga and the Gulf of Finland by laying mine barrages. At the same time, the Germans and the Finns (in the so-called Continuation War, the Finns had reentered the war as a cobelligerent of Germany to secure the territory lost to the Soviet Union earlier) tried to blockade the Baltic Fleet by laying mines. The German attack forced the Soviets to abandon their Baltic bases and the Finnish harbor at Hanko, incurring great losses in the process.

The German Juminda barrage of mines was particularly effective, augmented as it was by air attacks against Soviet ships in the enclosed harbor fortress at Kronstadt and at Leningrad. In 1941, the Leningrad shipyards managed to complete 7 destroyers and 5 submarines, but the Soviet Union lost 1 battleship, 15 destroyers, and 28 submarines to mine and air attacks, with many more vessels damaged.

From 1942 until October 1944, the Baltic Fleet was confined to the innermost part of the Gulf of Finland by German and Finnish mine barrages. Only the submarines could even try to break out into the open. This tactic met with some success in 1942, when the Soviets launched 31 submarine

operations; 22 of these breached the mine barriers and reached the Baltic, where they sank 25 ships. Twelve submarines, however, were lost. In 1943, all attempts to break through the barriers failed, and 4 more submarines were lost. Only after the Finnish truce of October 1944 did Soviet submarines again try to reach the Baltic Sea.

By the end of the war, the remaining 22 submarines managed to sink 35 ships, including the liners *Wilhelm Gustloff*, *General Steuben,* and *Goya*. The *Wilhelm Gustloff* was the largest German ship ever sunk by a Soviet submarine; some 9,300 people lost their lives. In the case of the *General Steuben*, of 4,000 people aboard (including 2,000 German military wounded), only 300 survived; and in the case of *Goya,* only 183 survived of some 7,000 passengers and crew. Baltic Fleet vessels, operating in conjunction with aircraft, also supported the operations of the Red Army in late 1944 and early 1945. They carried out landing operations in the Gulf of Finland and on the Baltic Islands, and they also attacked German naval forces in the area.

In June 1941, the Black Sea Fleet consisted of 1 old battleship, 5 cruisers, 3 destroyer-leaders, 14 destroyers, and 44 submarines. The German invasion of the Ukraine that month forced the fleet to first support and then evacuate the cities captured by German and Romanian forces in operations beginning in the Danubian estuaries and lasting through mid-1942. Nikolayev, which contained the chief Soviet building yards, had to be evacuated that August. The cruisers, leaders, and destroyers already launched there were towed to Caucasian ports, and the remaining ships were destroyed before the German forces occupied the city.

Between August and October, German and Romanian forces surrounded Odessa by land, and Soviet forces there had to be supported by the fleet, which then evacuated the city. For six months, the Soviet main base at Sevastopol also had to be supplied and supported by naval operations that involved nearly all available naval forces.

In December 1941, the fleet undertook a great amphibious operation against German forces occupying the Kerch Peninsula in an attempt to relieve the defenders at Sevastopol. By May 1942, however, the Germans had annihilated the Soviet ground forces, and only remnants could be evacuated. To the very end of the final German attack on Sevastopol, Soviet surface ships and submarines attempted to supply the fortress and evacuate the wounded. In these operations, which lasted through mid-July 1942, the Black

Sea Fleet lost 1 cruiser, 2 destroyer-leaders, 9 destroyers, and 12 submarines. Five of the submarines were lost during operations to interdict Axis sea traffic on the west coast of the Black Sea, an area heavily mined by both the Germans and Romanians.

From August 1942 until September 1943, the Black Sea Fleet concerned itself primarily with the supply of harbors on the Caucasian coast that were endangered by the continuing German offensive. This allowed the Red Army to hold Taupse, and naval landing operations coordinated with submarine and motor torpedo boat attacks assisted in the Soviet offensive on the Kuban Peninsula as well. Here Soviet forces successfully interrupted sea traffic between Romania and Crimea. The attacks against German sea traffic along the west coast, however, were largely a failure.

The battle for the Crimea began in October 1943 and lasted until May 1944. The Black Sea Fleet again tried to disrupt sea traffic from Constanta to Sevastopol with submarines, light surface forces, and air attacks. On Stalin's order, the larger ships were kept out of these operations.

After a short pause, in August 1944 the Red Army began its offensive into Romania. Once Romania capitulated, Bulgaria was occupied, and the Germans were forced to scuttle the remainder of their naval forces in the Black Sea—effectively ending naval combat in that theater. Between July 1942 and the end of Black Sea naval operations, the Black Sea Fleet lost 1 destroyer-leader, 2 destroyers, and 14 submarines. A few small submarines were transferred via inland waterways from the Arctic and by rail from the Pacific to augment the fleet there, but they arrived too late to participate in operations against German-Romanian shipping.

The Soviet Northern Fleet began the war with 8 destroyers and 15 submarines. Its first task was to support the Red Army in halting the German offensive toward Murmansk. The submarines were then sent to attack German supply traffic along the Norwegian coast from the Lofoten Islands to Kirkenes, although they met only limited initial success. A few British submarines sent to Murmansk for some months achieved slightly better results. The Northern Fleet was soon augmented by the transfer of 8 submarines along interior waterways from the Baltic in 1941. Another 5 submarines came from the Pacific in 1942 and 1943, and 12 new submarines arrived from the Caspian during that time as well.

The fleet carried out operations throughout the war, inflicting some losses

on German shipping and losing 25 submarines, mainly to mine barrages and antisubmarine forces. The fleet also supported Allied convoys over the final portion of the route to Murmansk with destroyers—including 3 sent from the Pacific Fleet via the northern sea route—and naval aircraft. The main defense burden for these convoys, however, fell to the British Home Fleet. In the later years of the war, British and U.S. surface ships and submarines assisted in defending the northern sea route as well. Overall, the Northern Fleet suffered minimal losses beyond the submarines; only 3 destroyers and some escort vessels and auxiliaries were damaged or sunk.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet served as a reservoir of personnel and for the training of naval crews for most of the war. It transferred a few destroyers to the Northern Fleet, however, along with some submarines. In the last month of the war, strengthened by Lend-Lease deliveries of U.S. ships, the Pacific Fleet took part in the war against Japan, conducting landing operations on the east coast of Korea, on Sakhalin Island, and in the Kurile Islands. Lend-Lease played a vital role in securing the route along the Aleutian Islands to Kamchatka and Soviet bases in the Far East, especially Vladivostok. This proved to be a much safer route than either Murmansk or Arkhangelsk for Allied supplies to reach the Soviet Union, not least because of the Soviet-Japanese nonaggression pact of March 1941.

The Pacific Fleet lost only five submarines through accidents during these operations, though two were eventually recovered. One additional submarine, which was en route to the Northern Fleet, was lost to a Japanese submarine attack just off the U.S. West Coast. A submarine also went down in the final days of the war, sunk in all likelihood by a Japanese mine.

Outside of these major theater operations, the Soviet Navy also employed river flotillas. The first flotilla operations came on the Pripyat River in September 1939 against the Poles. Other operations followed: on the Danube and the Dnieper in 1941, on the Volga in 1942, and on the Danube again in 1944 and 1945. Flotillas carried out operations on Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega from 1941 to 1944, and they assisted the Red Army in its operations on smaller seas, rivers, and lakes.

JÜRGEN ROHWER

See also

Baltic Sea, Naval Operations in; Black Sea, Area of Operations; Convoys, Allied; Lend-Lease

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Soviet Women's Combat Wings (1942–1945)

Soviet women's combat aviation regiments evolved from the 122nd Aviation Group, established in Moscow in October 1941 by Marina Raskova. The first of these was the 46th Taman Guards (initially designated 588th) Bomber Regiment. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Evdokia Bershanskaia, it remained all female throughout the war and produced 24 Heroes of the Soviet Union. It consisted of one training squadron and three operational squadrons, with two-woman aircrews. The regiment flew converted U-2 biplane trainers (renamed Po-2 in 1944) and became operational in the Ukraine and reached Berlin at the end of the war.

The 125th M. M. Raskova Borisov Guards (initially designated as the 587th) Bomber Regiment was commanded first by Major Marina Raskova and then Major Valentin Markov. It produced five Heroes of the Soviet Union. The unit consisted of two Pe-2 dive-bomber squadrons. These aircraft were armed with five machine guns that were fired by the pilot, the navigator, and the gunner. Initially, the gunners were mostly male. The regiment flew 1,134 medium-range sorties. It became operational near Stalingrad, and by the end of the war it was stationed in the Baltic.

The 586th Fighter Regiment was commanded first by Major Tamara Kazarinova and then Major Aleksandr Gridnev. It included some male technicians and one men's squadron, formed as a replacement for a women's unit sent to Stalingrad. The regiment flew Yak-1 and Yak-9 aircraft and was

charged with protecting Soviet industrial centers, rail junctions, and bridges, including those in Voronezh, Kastornaia, Kursk, Kiev, and Budapest. It became operational in Saratov and by the end of the war had reached to Vienna.

Also noteworthy were Il-2 pilots and senior lieutenants Tamara Fedorovna Konstantinova and Anna Aleksandrovna Timofeeva-Egorova, both Heroes of the Soviet Union. Konstantinova was deputy squadron commander of the 999th Ground Attack Regiment, 277th Ground Attack Division, First Air Army, 3rd Baltic Front. Timofeeva-Egorova was chief navigator of the 805th Ground Attack Regiment, 197th Ground Attack Division, Sixteenth Air Army, 1st Belorussian Front.

By the end of the war, women constituted 12.5 percent of all Soviet fighter aviation personnel, including ground support.

KAZIMIERA J. COTTAM

See also

Litviak, Lidiia Vladimirovna; Raskova, Marina Mikhailovna; Women in World War II; Document 153

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Soviet Writers, Union of

Organization founded by the Communist Party on April 23, 1932, designed to promote literary conformity among Soviet writers. Essentially an official censorship bureau designed to consolidate communist rule and Joseph Stalin’s dictatorship, the Union of Soviet Writers survived until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Union of Soviet Writers replaced all existing literary organizations and established firm guidelines for Soviet

literature. The initial membership numbered approximately 1,500 people, and the union eventually sponsored literature in 76 languages.

The approved form of writing was socialist realism, featuring a bland literary style and the promotion of government policies. Writers were compelled to avoid the innovative techniques of modern literature and to emphasize positive role models that were creating the new Soviet society. The Union of Writers also controlled the nation's leading literary periodicals.

Writers acquired membership in the union by application. Because such membership was virtually required to be published, it became obligatory. Membership often brought coveted privileges in a poverty-stricken society, such as special housing and food allowances.

During World War II, some members of the union were evacuated from vulnerable locations such as Moscow and Leningrad to safer regions farther east. Nevertheless, many served at the front either in combat roles or as journalists. More than 900 members received war decorations, and some 400 were killed during the conflict. The work of the organization in restricting and guiding the production of literature receded during the war years, however. As the government built support for the war by permitting the revival of religion and traditional Russian patriotism, it also gave writers a degree of freedom that lasted until 1946. This loosening of restrictions was also a Soviet ruse to demonstrate to its democratic allies that it was an "open" society.

A wave of expulsions from the Union of Soviet Writers signaled the revival of the Stalinist dictatorship that had been established in the late 1920 and 1930s. In 1946 several prominent writers were removed from the organization, and the period from 1946 to 1953, the year in which Stalin died, saw writers placed under the heaviest restrictions.

Following Stalin's death and during the era of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, who was in power until 1964, a number of Union of Soviet Writers branches, notably the one in Moscow, allowed a new level of literary freedom. Some of the union's journals retained their character as bastions of "socialist realist" orthodoxy, but others became outlets for more liberal views.

With the end of the Khrushchev era, the Union of Soviet Writers again closely restricted literature and its subjects. The expulsion of disloyal writers from the organization was once more a signal for the restoration of literary

orthodoxy. The most significant of these expulsions came in 1969, when Alexander Solzhenitsyn was ousted by the Moscow branch. Many members of the union during this time avoided controversy by focusing their work on themes such as nature writing, which did not bring them into the controversial areas of politics and economics.

The Union of Soviet Writers reached a peak membership of 10,000 people by the start of the 1990s. With the reforms undertaken by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, its influence rapidly declined. The Union of Soviet Writers dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1991.

NEIL M. HEYMAN

See also

Literature and the War; Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph

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Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey" (1891–1974)

General in the U.S. Army Air Forces and later the U.S. Air Force. Born on June 28, 1891, in Boyertown, Pennsylvania, Carl Andrew Spaatz graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in June 1914 and began his military career as an infantry second lieutenant in Hawaii. In October 1915, he was detailed to the Aviation School in San Diego, California, where he received his wings in May 1916. In June, he joined the 3rd Aero Squadron in the Punitive Expedition into Mexico.

Following U.S. entry into World War I, Captain Spaatz served in France, first as commander of the 31st Aero Squadron and then as an instructor at the American Aviation School. In September 1918, he joined the 13th Squadron, 2nd Pursuit Group, and was credited with downing three German planes.

Following the war, Major Spaatz commanded the 1st Pursuit Group (1921–1924), graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School (1925), and spent three years in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC). During

January 1–7, 1929, Spaatz commanded an army aircraft, the famous *Question Mark*, in a record endurance flight of nearly 151 hours aloft. From 1929 to 1935, he commanded the 7th Bombardment Group and 1st Bombardment Wing in California, subsequently returning to the OCAC. In June 1936, he graduated from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and was promoted to lieutenant colonel. He then served at Langley Field, Virginia, and had a third tour with the OCAC. In early 1940, Spaatz spent several weeks in Britain as a military observer. By July 1941, he had risen to the rank of temporary brigadier general, serving as chief of the Air Staff for the newly established Army Air Forces (AAF).

Following U.S. entry into World War II, Major General Spaatz traveled to Britain in July 1942 to command the U.S. Eighth Air Force. That December, Spaatz transferred to command the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa. Promoted to lieutenant general in March 1943, he assumed command of Allied Northwest Africa Air Forces. During the last six months of 1943, Spaatz served as deputy commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Spaatz returned to Britain in January 1944 to command U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, consisting of the Eighth Air Force in Britain and the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. These forces proved to be vital in preparation for and then support of the Allies' Normandy Invasion (June 6, 1944).

Major General Carl Spaatz (left) and Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker, 1942. Both men played important roles in the U.S. Army Air Forces' strategic bombing campaigns during the war. (Library of Congress)

Promoted to temporary general in March 1945, Spaatz returned to AAF headquarters in June, only to be assigned to command U.S. Strategic Air Forces, Pacific, in July. He then supervised the final air campaign against Japan. Spaatz remained certain of the efficacy of strategic bombing of industry in the war, and he believed that still heavier bombing might have obviated the need for the Normandy Invasion. In October 1945, he recommended that atomic weapons should form the backbone of U.S. defense strategy.

In February 1946, President Harry S. Truman nominated Spaatz for assignment as commander of the AAF. Spaatz played a leading role in the creation of the separate U.S. Air Force. He was the last commander of the AAF and became the first chief of staff of the Air Force in September 1947. Spaatz retired in June 1948 and died in Washington, D.C., on July 14, 1974.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; United States Army Air Forces

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Spain

Located in the Iberian Peninsula in Southwestern Europe, Spain is bordered by France to the north, Portugal and the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the Mediterranean Sea to the east, and the Strait of Gibraltar to the south. Spain, which encompasses approximately 195,400 square miles, had a 1939 population of 25.64 million.

Following the nationalist victory in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), Francisco Franco-Bahamonde ruled Spain as dictator. El Caudillo (the leader) continued his repressive policies with the aim of preserving the values of traditional Catholic Spain. Spain sided early with the fascist states of Germany and Italy. On March 27, 1939, Spain joined the Anti-Comintern Pact (Communist International). Germany, desperate for Spanish exports of wolfram—the source of tungsten and armor-piercing projectiles—actively courted Franco. Spain, economically devastated by its Civil War, needed nitrates for fertilizers and oil, of which it had no domestic supply. Pushed by foreign minister and Falangist leader Ramón Serrano Súñer (his brother-in-law), Franco edged Spain closer to active participation in the war.

Following the German defeat of France, Hitler met with Franco at Hendaye on the French-Spanish border on October 23, 1940, and demanded that Franco enter the war. Hitler was angry at Franco’s noncommittal response, which was accompanied by an impressive shopping list of required military hardware. Franco was displeased at Hitler’s vague reply to the demand for territorial compensation, especially French Morocco.

Although he promised Hitler a quick response, Franco dallied and never brought Spain into the war. He did not wish to entangle his still-prostrate country in a new war, and he believed that his cause was better served if he posed as a neutral. This attitude of nonbelligerency (not neutrality) infuriated Hitler, who even considered invading Spain (Operation FELIX) as part of a Mediterranean strategy following his defeat in the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain.

Franco did congratulate Hitler after each of his early victories and sent troops, under the guise of volunteers, to fight Russia after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. This was the Blue Division, so named because the troops wore blue Falange Party shirts with their red Carlist berets and brown Foreign Legion trousers. Commanded by General Agustín Muñoz Grandes, this 18,000-man division was sent to demonstrate Franco's hatred of communism; get rid of Falange hotheads, as a sop to Hitler; and demonstrate to Hitler that Spaniards would fight a German invasion of Spain.

The Blue Division, which joined the German order of battle as the 250th Infantry Division in Army Group North, distinguished itself in fighting around Leningrad. From August 1941 to March 1944, some 47,000 Spanish soldiers served in the division. It sustained 22,000 casualties, a casualty rate of 47 percent, of whom 4,500 died. Fewer than 300 prisoners of war were repatriated in 1945.

The Allies pressed Franco to withdraw the Blue Division, but Hitler released it without being asked to strengthen Franco's hand against the Allies. The last troops returned to Spain in April 1944, although Spanish volunteers continued to fight for Germany afterward. Several were organized into Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) units, and a Spanish SS battalion helped defend Berlin to the last.

Throughout the war, Franco provided the Germans and Italians with assistance in the form of observation posts in Spanish Morocco to monitor Allied ship movements, and he allowed German submarines to be serviced in Spanish ports. During the Allied buildup at Gibraltar preceding Operation TORCH (November 8, 1942), Franco ordered partial mobilization of the Spanish military but did nothing more. The success of TORCH and especially the toppling of Benito Mussolini from power led Franco to shift to a more neutral position. He reduced the strength of the Blue Division and at the end of 1943 dissolved the Falangist militia.

In February 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt also ordered an embargo on fuel and food exports to Spain. On May 2, 1944, with stocks of oil nearly exhausted, Franco signed an agreement with the Allies whereby he promised a strictly neutral stance. He agreed to hand over all interned Italian ships, close the German consulate in Tangier, and expel German intelligence agents from Spain. He also agreed to curtail wolfram shipments to Germany to a token 20 tons a month. Despite this agreement, until the end of the war Spain continued to furnish the Germans with intelligence information. Only in April 1945 did Spain sever diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany and Japan.

When World War II ended, Spain became a primary refuge for leading Nazis and collaborators. The Allies sought to punish Franco's wartime conduct with quarantine treatment. Spain was excluded from the United Nations and condemned for its political nature and close association with the Axis nations. The Cold War changed that, however, and the United States came to view Spain as a bulwark against communism. The boycott of Franco was lifted, U.S. air and naval bases were established in Spain, and U.S. aid helped prop up the regime, a fact remembered with bitterness by many Spanish democrats.

ROGER L. RICE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Hitler-Franco Meeting at Hendaye; Mussolini, Benito; Roo-se-velt, Franklin D.; TORCH, Operation; Document 7; Document 17; Document 18

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Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)

The Spanish Civil War was fought between the Republican side, which was determined to eliminate an entrenched feudalism and introduce Spain to the reforms enjoyed by the rest of Western Europe, and the Nationalists, who sought to destroy the newly elected government that had expelled the monarchy and threatened Spain's traditional values. Soon Spain's civil war was hopelessly complicated and prolonged by the intrusion of outside forces. The bloodletting went on for nearly three years, from July 1936 to April 1939. Millions died or were maimed. The Republicans and the Nationalists were equally ruthless.

In 1923, King Alfonso XIII copied Italy and called on his confidante, General Miguel Primo de Rivera, to establish an authoritarian corporative state. When this failed to solve problems by 1930, Alfonso XIII dismissed Primo de Rivera, recalled the Spanish Cortes (parliament), and allowed elections. Municipal elections of the spring of 1931 were such a repudiation of the king that he went into exile that year, and Spain became a republic.

The period that followed was marked by continuous unrest. When the leftist Republicans were in power, they pushed through reforms to benefit the workers and the peasants. The Republicans also moved to curtail the special privileges enjoyed by the church and the wealthy. Then in 1933, when the Center and the Right won a majority in the Cortes, they curtailed the reforms and restored special privileges enjoyed by the establishment. They also purged leftists and liberals, and they carried out a purge in the army of those not sympathetic with their cause. Both sides grew increasingly intolerant, and it was clear that the power struggle would not be resolved at the polls.

The Republicans won the hotly contested February 1936 elections. The leftist parties (republicans, socialists, syndicalists, and communists) had combined in a Popular Front and beaten the Nationalist coalition of Conservative Republicans, Clericals, and Monarchists. Demonstrations and political violence on both sides increased. The Nationalists began a rebellion on July 18, 1936, launched prematurely because the government headed by President Manuel Azaña learned that something was afoot. The rebellion began in a revolt of army regiments in Spanish Morocco and was led by the

top echelons in the army, notably Generals José Sanjurjo y Sacanell, Emilio Mola y Vidal, Juan Yagüe, and Francisco Franco.

Spanish Republican soldiers, fighting against General Francisco Franco's Nationalists, line up in a trench in preparation for an attack in 1936 during the Spanish Civil War. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

At the outset of the civil war, the Nationalists had support from perhaps two-thirds of the army and 90 percent of its officers, the church, the die-hard monarchists, and the conservative old-line families who controlled the majority of the wealth of Spain. They also had support from the Foreign Legion and the many powerful armies of the paramilitary groups, the Carlists and the Falange (the closest Spanish equivalent to the Fascist Party). The government side, known as the Republicans or Loyalists, could count on the navy, which was solidly Republican, and the bulk of the air force; the peasants and workers; and the most industrialized part of Spain, the Madrid-Valencia-Barcelona triangle. The loyalties of the middle class were fairly evenly divided.

Opinions differ as to which side would have won had it been left to the Spaniards to decide, but the Republicans would have to be given the edge. Certainly, the war would have been much shorter; foreign intervention merely heightened and prolonged the suffering.

German and Italian aid came early. Only a week into the fighting, Adolf Hitler agreed to supply the Nationalists with German transports and fighter escorts to ferry Franco's troops from Morocco to Spain. This was crucial to Nationalist hopes because the Republicans controlled the navy. The Nationalist side pressed half a dozen planes into this service, but beginning on July 29, the Germans aided in the transport of 13,000 crack Spanish and Moroccan troops to Nationalist-controlled Seville in southern Spain.

By intervening in Spain, Hitler hoped to tie the Western democracies down and distract attention from his arms buildup. A Nationalist victory would also guarantee a supply of Spanish iron ore and other strategic materials. Spain could also prove to be a testing ground for new weapons. By the end of September, Germany had supplied 73 aircraft to assist the Nationalists; Italy had sent 56.

In November 1936 the Germans formed the Kondor Legion of some 5,000 men and more than 100 aircraft. Ultimately, some 19,000 men and 300–400 planes served in Spain during the course of the war. Spain provided a training school for the coordination of ground troops and tactical air forces that would be so devastatingly effective in Poland and France during World War II. It was the German military intervention, providing air cover for Franco's forces, that proved decisive to the outcome.

The Italian intervention was both larger and less effective than that of the Germans. Perhaps 48,000 Italian soldiers went to Spain in the Italian Corpo Truppe Volontarie, along with several hundred aircraft. During August and September 1937, Mussolini dispatched Italian submarines to the Mediterranean to attack Spanish Republic warships as well as merchant shipping from other nations that were supplying the Republican side.

The Soviet attitude toward the Spanish Civil War was curious. Stalin wished to simulate commitment while believing that victory by either side was undesirable. A Republican triumph would most likely produce a left-wing government unresponsive to Kremlin control. Yet success by Franco would weaken France and free Hitler to concentrate on the east. Simple continuation of the war might even lead to a wider conflict in which France, Britain, Germany, and Italy would destroy one another and the Soviet Union would emerge as the arbiter of Europe.

Soviet aid therefore was always limited in scope and subject to many restrictions, and no Soviet fighting units were ever dispatched to Spain,

although Stalin did send equipment and instructors. The Soviets insisted on payment in cash for goods rendered, and the Republican government shipped several hundred million dollars in gold to Odessa.

The sympathies of the French government and the majority of its people were with the Republicans. Initially Premier Léon Blum promised to supply the Republican government with aircraft and other military equipment. Some aid was sent, but the British government, led by Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (and then in 1937 by Neville Chamberlain), pursued appeasement and insisted on embargoing military supplies to either side. London made it clear to Blum that if French aid led to an enlarged struggle involving Germany, Britain might not honor its pledge to defend France. France desperately needed British support against Germany, and Blum reversed policy and halted aid to the Spanish Republic.

Ultimately, 27 nations, including all the great powers, signed a nonintervention agreement pushed by London. Yet men and supplies continued to flow to the Nationalist side from Germany and Italy. It was only relatively late that significant military aid reached the Republican side from the Soviet Union. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration in the United States had no wish to offend the large Catholic vote and adhered to a noninterventionist position, with strong congressional and popular support that opposed any overseas involvement. Mexico was the only Western country to help the Loyalist side, sending 18,000 rifles.

There were those in the West who were appalled by the attitude of their governments, and many volunteered to fight in Spain. The vast majority of these fought on the Republican side, and most were communists. Some 40,000 men came from 54 nations, and 8,000 of them died in Spain. It was rather miraculous that the Republican side managed to hold as long as it did.

Wherever the Nationalists were in control, they slaughtered members of the Popular Front as a matter of official policy. A Red terror also broke out in Republican Madrid, as self-appointed “chekas” set about trying rebels and suspected rebels. Thousands, including many of the rich, were summarily executed after drumhead trials. President Azaña and other leaders were aghast but powerless to stop it; Franco did not lament the deaths of tens of thousands of innocents executed by his troops, which the authorities organized and directed. The militia killings on the Republican side were the work of men running wild without authority.

The rebels had hoped to take Madrid at the offset of the war. Mola's plans had hinged on speed—on storming into Madrid and ending the war quickly. In this he failed. Mola's supply of weapons and ammunition dwindled rapidly as the militia on the Republican side gained in experience. Franco perhaps missed an opportunity to win the war early when he turned away from Madrid, which was still unfortified, to try to relieve Nationalists besieged in the Alcazar in Toledo. The siege there, which lasted for 72 days, was one of the most dramatic episodes of the Spanish Civil War. As it transpired, the Alcazar, which had no strategic significance, fell to the Republicans before the Nationalist relief force arrived.

Madrid's resistance became legendary. When Mola was informed that the resistance was more stubborn than anticipated, he indicated that the four Nationalist columns converging on Madrid from different directions would be joined by a "fifth column"—that is, secret sympathizers or supporters of an enemy who would engage in sabotage or spying within defense lines or national borders. The expression entered the vocabulary. The inhabitants of Madrid vowed "no pasarán" (they shall not pass). Madrid blunted a series of Nationalist attacks between November 1936 and March 1937.

Franco and Mola moved their troops toward Andalusia and Extremadura, depriving the Republican forces of the most important wheat-growing and cattle-raising regions in Spain. On February 8, 1937, the Nationalists took Málaga, although the Loyalists repulsed two Italian divisions at Guadalajara in mid-March.

In the spring of 1937, Franco began the Great Northern Campaign, a two-staged attack that caused the surrender of Asturias and then the Basque area. On April 1, the Nationalists invested Bilbao, crushing the remaining Basque Loyalist resistance. On June 18 Bilbao fell to the Nationalists, who then moved against Santander. By the end of the year, the Nationalists controlled all of northwestern Spain.

In despair, the Republicans turned increasingly to the Soviets, who therefore steadily won greater influence. Gradually, the more moderate leaders were bypassed and ousted until eventually the communists took control under politician and trade unionist Francisco Largo Caballero. Aided by Soviet agents, the Spanish communists then purged the Republican side of Syndicalists, Trotskyites, and others who did not adhere to the Moscow party line.

In April 1937, the world was horrified when German and Italian aircraft bombed Guernica into rubble. The Germans used a new technique known as carpet bombing, which claimed 7,000 civilian casualties. The attack gave an exaggerated impression of the destructiveness of airpower but inspired Spanish artist Pablo Picasso to dramatize the event in a painting. Italian planes also attacked long columns of refugees headed north to France from the stricken cities of Spain. In their offensive in the Basque region, the Nationalists captured Santander on August 25, 1937.

On concluding the campaign in the north, Franco turned his attention east toward Aragon and Catalonia. The battles were hard-fought, but Nationalist forces reached the coast and split Republican-held territory. Before the Nationalist forces could exploit their victories, Republican troops under new Republican leader Juan Negrín staged a great offensive along the Ebro River beginning on July 24–25, 1938. The Republicans committed 100,000 of 400,000 men in their army.

Caught by surprise, Franco halted operations in Catalonia. Nationalist airpower and artillery, which gave the margin of difference throughout the civil war, halted the Republicans and cost them 70,000 casualties. The failure of this summer offensive spelled the beginning of the end for the republic.

On October 10, Franco launched an all-out counteroffensive along the Ebro. The Nationalists quickly regained all territory lost there and followed up by crushing remaining Republican forces in Catalonia. By December, Nationalist forces surrounded Barcelona, causing its capitulation on January 26. The final blows came with the capture of Madrid on March 27 and of Valencia on March 30. The Spanish Civil War was over.

The toll of the fighting has never been accurately determined. The most careful estimates are that about 600,000 Spaniards were killed on both sides, and after the war, another 100,000 were executed by the victorious Nationalists. Half a million more lived on as refugees in camps on the French side of the Pyrenees.

Spain was left with deep wounds that many decades later still had not healed. The West did not come off well in Spain, and its failure to stand up for democracy encouraged other demands by the dictators elsewhere. Perhaps the most important effect internationally of the civil war in Spain was to bring Germany and Italy together in what came to be known as the Rome-Berlin Axis.

See also

Franco-Bahamonde, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo; Guernica, Kondor Legion Attack on; Kondor Legion; Spain; Document 17; Document 18; Document 19

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Spears, Sir Edward Louis (1886–1974)

British Army general and diplomat. Born on August 7, 1886, in Paris, France, to British parents, Edward Louis Spiers, tired of innumerable mispronunciations, changed the spelling of his last name to Spears in 1918.

In 1903, Spears joined the Irish Militia and rose to second lieutenant. Three years later, he was admitted to the Royal Irish Hussars of the British Army. Spears used his bilingual abilities to translate French texts into English. These skills also made him valuable as a liaison between French and British forces in World War I. The two nations had few guidelines on how to elicit cooperation among their troops, and Spears took the initiative to formulate a blueprint for the position of liaison. He was wounded several times during the war. A friendship with Winston L. S. Churchill, whom he met before the war through a mutual friend, blossomed during the war and afterward.

In 1920 Spears resigned his commission and entered politics. He served in the House of Commons from 1920 to 1922 and from 1931 to 1945. In late

1940, Prime Minister Churchill commissioned Spears a major general and sent him as a personal representative to France. When French premier Paul Reynaud's government fell and General Henri Philippe Pétain established the Vichy regime, Spears was attached to General of Brigade Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French. As part of this mission, Spears traveled to the Levant.

Spears's relationship with de Gaulle soured, and in 1942 Churchill appointed Spears minister to Lebanon and Syria. Spears, now knighted, supported local independence over French colonial claims, causing diplomatic tension and local uprisings before the French assented to Lebanese and Syrian independence. De Gaulle's dislike of Spears led Churchill to remove Spears in late 1944.

Spears lost his seat in Parliament in the Labour Party's sweeping victory in the 1945 British elections. He remained active in business interests. Spears died in Windsor on January 27, 1974.

MATTHEW ALAN MCNIECE

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; de Gaulle, Charles; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul

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Special Operations Executive

British intelligence agency specializing in overseas sabotage and covert operations. British officials established the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in July 1940, impelled by a much-exaggerated belief that fifth-column activities in Western Europe had contributed greatly to the successful German conquest of those countries.

Intended in British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill's words to "set Europe ablaze" by promoting resistance activities in occupied countries, the

organization initially combined sabotage, research, and propaganda functions. In August 1941, propaganda operations were transferred to the Political Warfare Executive, a separate agency under the Foreign Office; the SOE remained under the Ministry of Economic Warfare, which was headed by Hugh Dalton.

SOE operations focused primarily on delivering agents to European countries to work with—and, where appropriate, inspire—indigenous resistance movements. Because these activities frequently attracted unwelcome attention from the German Gestapo and local police, they aroused the enmity of the British intelligence agencies, especially MI6, which focused primarily on gathering information and preferred obscurity to ensure the safety of its operations.

At its height, the SOE employed 10,000 men and 3,000 women, many recruited through the British old-boy network. At least half of the men and some women spent periods as agents in hostile or neutral countries. The SOE was normally organized in country sections, although in France it had six sections, each of which worked with a different faction of the French Resistance. Activities of the SOE sections eventually provided arms for half a million French opponents of Germany and so facilitated the success of the June 6, 1944, Allied landings at Normandy.

Although its earlier efforts in Italy had proved fruitless, in 1943 the SOE took part in the unconditional surrender negotiations between General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Marshal Patrice Badoglio; thereafter it assisted Italian partisans who fought the remaining German occupation forces. The SOE's Scandinavian efforts were also largely successful, assisting Danish and Norwegian anti-German resistance efforts, foiling German plans to use Norwegian heavy water to develop atomic weapons, gathering military intelligence in Denmark, and securing valuable seaborne supplies of special steels and ball bearings from Sweden. In Poland, SOE operatives assisted in extensive sabotage efforts by severely damaging 6,000 locomotives, which disrupted German railroad traffic to the Eastern Front. SOE agents in Czechoslovakia helped in the May 1942 assassination of German Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, a propaganda coup that nonetheless provoked savage reprisals against Czech Jews and the town of Lidice.

SOE efforts in the Netherlands, by contrast, proved disastrous; in 1942 and 1943, German intelligence penetrated SOE communications networks,

capturing—and in many cases executing—more than 50 SOE agents.

The SOE sent a mission to the Soviet Union, where officials welcomed it politely and pointedly excluded it from any operational role. Until late 1941, the British agent Kim Philby, later revealed to be a Soviet double agent, served as a rather effective SOE trainer.

Communist operatives penetrated the large SOE mission in Cairo, which supervised Balkan missions and helped to steer SOE assistance toward communist resistance factions. In Greece, the SOE armed several thousand agents but found that communist partisans often used this weaponry to eliminate rival Greek forces rather than the Germans. In Yugoslavia, the SOE initially supported General Draza Mihajlović's Četnik resistance fighters, but it later switched its support to Josip Broz's (Tito) communist forces, a decision that aided the latter appreciably in winning control of Yugoslavia. In Albania, SOE operatives likewise tended to favor communist over right-wing guerrilla groups.

SOE operations extended far beyond Europe. In 1940 and 1941, SOE agents escorted Emperor Haile Selassie back to Ethiopia. With quiet acquiescence from the United States, in Latin America the SOE secretly established sleeper groups that were ready to take action should pro-Nazi forces seem likely to become predominant.

The most significant non-European SOE operations were in Asia. Australian-based SOE agents of Force 136 clashed, sometimes bitterly, with their counterparts from the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (by contrast, they cooperated well in Europe). In Burma, the SOE contravened its own charter by undertaking intelligence-collecting work. It also helped to organize highly effective bodies of Karen guerrillas, who killed more than 17,000 Japanese troops in the war's final months. In April 1945, the SOE persuaded the Japanese-sponsored Burmese National Army to switch its loyalties to the Allies. SOE operations in Thailand and French Indochina were limited and somewhat ineffective.

Although it was forbidden to operate in China, the SOE secretly sent two missions there. One undertook highly profitable foreign exchange and smuggling ventures that left SOE finances with a surplus when the agency disbanded in January 1946. The other instructed the Chinese Communists of the Eighth Route Army of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) in SOE sabotage methods.

Although its personnel were relatively few and its resistance and guerrilla efforts in occupied countries could only supplement, not substitute for, full-scale military invasions of those territories, SOE operations proved valuable in boosting Allied morale and dislocating Axis control of subjugated areas.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

China; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Lidice Massacre; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Office of Strategic Services; Resistance

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Speer, Albert (1905–1981)

German minister for armaments. Born on March 19, 1905, in Mannheim, Albert Speer was educated at the Munich Institute of Technology and the Institute of Technology in Berlin-Charlottenburg. He received his architect's license in 1927. He was the protégé and academic assistant of Heinrich Tessenow when he first met Adolf Hitler at a Nazi rally in December 1930.

Speer joined the Nazi Party in March 1931. He also joined the Nazi organization for professional architects and soon began receiving party commissions. In 1933, Speer designed the party's celebrations at Templehof Airport, introducing the "cathedral of light" concept that became a hallmark of party rallies. This brought him to the attention of Minister of Propaganda Josef Goebbels, who put Speer in contact with Hitler. The führer soon commissioned Speer to design his official apartments.

By 1934, Albert Speer was "Hitler's architect," and he held several official posts. In January 1937, Speer added the title of inspector general of construction for Berlin. He reported directly to Hitler and impressed the Nazi

leader by completing the Reich Chancellery in only nine months. In January 1938, Hitler made Speer the first commissioner for the Chancellery. He now controlled all building and industrial materials as well as the transport and labor—some 65 million workers—associated with them.

In 1941, Speer offered his services to the army reserve and became chief of defense construction. When Fritz Todt died in a plane crash in February 1942, Hitler again turned to Speer. On February 15 Speer was sworn in as the new minister for armament and munitions. His position also covered most aspects of construction and transportation.

Between 1942 and 1944, Speer tripled overall German armament output. Ammunition production increased 300 percent, and tank output rose 600 percent. By 1943, he was in charge of naval armaments as well as German rocket and atomic programs. Many saw him as Hitler's successor, as the two shared a close acquaintance based on their mutual interest in architecture.

Albert Speer with Adolf Hitler in 1942. (Library of Congress)

The workload, however, took its toll. It also brought Speer into contact with the concentration camps and the conditions of slave labor, which he later claimed to have found abhorrent. After touring facilities in the northeast, Speer fell gravely ill in the winter of 1943–1944. He remained hospitalized until early May 1944.

When he returned to work, Speer found his influence diminished. His name appeared on the list of putative ministers during the attempted coup of July 20, 1944; his friendship with Hitler and the fact that he was listed as someone to be approached after the attempted coup saved him. Speer remained at his posts and was made responsible for the construction of Germany's western defenses. Yet Speer was now less than committed to the Nazi cause. He spoke publicly of final victory and promised miracle weapons, but he privately doubted both. When Hitler adopted a scorched-earth policy, Speer sought to undermine it, and he involved himself in several wild schemes to eliminate the top Nazi leadership.

On April 23, 1945, Speer visited Hitler in his bunker. He then flew to join Admiral Karl Dönitz's successor government at Flensburg as minister of economics and production. While there, following the German surrender, Speer was debriefed for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey before being arrested by the British on May 23, 1945.

Speer became one of the main defendants at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg and adopted the strategy of accepting collective responsibility while simultaneously denying personal culpability. Found guilty, he received 20 years' imprisonment and served the full sentence.

While he was in prison, Speer wrote the accounts of his work and experiences in Nazi Germany that would make him both famous and infamous. He remained a significant literary and historical figure until his death in Paddington, England, on September 1, 1981.

TIMOTHY C. DOWLING

See also

Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Hitler, Adolf; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Organization Todt; Todt, Fritz

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Speidel, Hans (1897–1984)

German Wehrmacht lieutenant general and Bundeswehr general. Born in Metzingen, Germany, on October 28, 1897, Hans Speidel joined the German Army in 1914 and was soon commissioned a second lieutenant. He commanded a company during the 1916 Battle of the Somme and served throughout World War I. Following the armistice, Speidel remained in the Reichswehr and graduated from the University of Tübingen with a doctorate in political science and history in 1925. After service as an assistant military attaché in Paris, he joined the General Staff as chief of its Foreign Armies Division.

Speidel was a lieutenant colonel and chief of staff of the Eighteenth Army during the May 10–June 25, 1940, invasion of France, and he was the officer who accepted the surrender of Paris on June 14, 1940. He was subsequently appointed chief of staff to General of Infantry Otto von Stülpnagel, German military governor of France. In March 1942 Speidel was assigned to the Eastern Front, where he served for two years as chief of staff of V Army Corps during the Battle of Vyasma-Bryansk (October 2–20, 1941), the Third Battle of Kharkov (March 1–14, 1943), and the assault on Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943). Although he distinguished himself and was promoted to lieutenant general during his service in Russia, Speidel became convinced that the war could not be won and that Adolf Hitler's regime had to be overthrown.

In April 1944, Speidel was appointed chief of staff to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Army Group B in France, which was responsible for the defense of the French Atlantic coast against an anticipated Allied assault. Speidel's opposition to Hitler led him to endeavor to convince Rommel to back the coup against Hitler. Speidel was not part of the inner circle of officers who carried out the July 20, 1944, assassination attempt against

Hitler, however, which undoubtedly saved Speidel's life. Speidel helped ensure that Paris was not demolished in spite of Hitler's orders to the contrary, and he was arrested by the Gestapo on September 7.

Imprisoned in Berlin, Speidel was acquitted by a court-martial. His expulsion from the army would have brought him to trial before the People's Court. Interrogated about his possible role in the plot against Hitler, he outwitted his questioners and insisted that he and Rommel were not involved. Speidel was held prisoner for seven months and then managed to escape and go into hiding. French troops captured him on April 29, 1945.

After the war, Speidel became a professor of modern history at the University of Tübingen, but he remained a consultant on defense matters. In 1954, he was appointed chief negotiator for the Federal Republic of Germany with France regarding German entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Speidel was also appointed a lieutenant general in the new German military force, the Bundeswehr.

In April 1957, Speidel became commander in chief of NATO Land Forces in Central Europe and was promoted to full general. He held that post until September 1963. In March 1964, he retired from the army and resumed academic work and writing. Speidel died at Bad Honnef, Germany, on November 28, 1984.

THOMAS LANSFORD

See also

France, Battle for; July Bomb Plot; Kharkov, Battles of; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Stalingrad, Battle of; Vyazma-Bryansk, Battle for

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Sperrle, Hugo Walter (1885–1953)

German Air Force field marshal. Born at Ludwigsburg on February 2, 1885, Hugo Sperrle enlisted in the Württemberg 8th Infantry Regiment as an officer candidate in 1903. When World War I began, he was a captain and was training as an aerial observer. Following the war, Sperrle joined a Freikorps organization before being selected to join the Reichswehr as an infantry officer. During the interwar years, he held a variety of command and staff positions and underwent flight training at the secret German base in Lipetsk, Russia. With the formation of the Luftwaffe in 1935, Sperrle was promoted to lieutenant general. In 1936, he was ordered to organize and command the Kondor Legion to support the Nationalists in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War.

Sperrle returned from Spain in 1937 to command Luftflotte (air fleet) 3, a post he would retain until 1944. Luftflotte 3 remained in the west for the Polish Campaign but spearheaded the German Army's attack on France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940. Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 and Major General Albert Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 bore the brunt of the German air campaign against Britain. Following the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, Sperrle and his command stayed in France when the rest of the Luftwaffe transferred to the east for Operation BARBAROSSA (June 22, 1941).

Promoted to general of aviation in October 1935 and to field marshal in July 1940, Sperrle was known for his voracious appetite for the good life. He established his headquarters in Paris and maintained a lavish lifestyle. As the fortunes of war turned against Germany, Sperrle became increasingly indolent and detached from his responsibilities.

Following the Allied invasion at Normandy (June 6, 1944), Sperrle was blamed for the Luftwaffe's failures and relieved of his command in August 1944. He was captured by the British in May 1945 and tried for war crimes at Nuremberg but acquitted in 1948. Sperrle died in Munich on April 2, 1953.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Britain, Battle of; France, Battle for; Germany, Air Force; Kondor Legion; Spanish Civil War

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Spitsbergen

Of tactical and strategic importance, the Norwegian islands of Spitsbergen are located in the Arctic Sea north of the mainland. Extending over some 23,658 square miles, the islands comprise the major share of the larger Svalbard group. During the war, Allied convoys regularly passed through this territory carrying Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union. In 1943, U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall noted in a public speech that while World War I for him had exemplified the importance of roads, railroads, and rivers, World War II demonstrated the importance of oceans.

Ocean currents and climate gave Spitsbergen strategic importance. The North Atlantic drift, an extension of the Gulf Stream, brings abnormally warm water north of the Arctic Circle directly past the islands, continuing to the ice-free Russian port of Murmansk and dissipating in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya. Germany conquered Norway in 1940. During the war, both sides established weather stations and port and loading facilities in the islands, and they also mined coal there.

In August 1941, a Canadian raiding party centered on the 49th Battalion of the Edmonton Regiment attacked and destroyed a German meteorological station in the islands, wrecked asbestos and gypsum mines, and destroyed about 450,000 tons of mined coal and 275,000 gallons of oil. The raiders then evacuated the Norwegian population to England; about 2,000 Russian miners were transported to a northern Soviet port. The Allies also established a base there.

Germany carried out a major raid on Spitsbergen on September 8, 1943. Operation SIZILIEN included two battleships, the *Tirpitz* and *Scharnhorst;* five destroyers; and four other vessels. The raiders departed Altafjord on September 6. On September 9, however, they destroyed by naval gunfire Allied coal and port facilities and weather stations.

ARTHUR I. CYR

See also

Germany, Navy; Norway; *Tirpitz*, Attacks on

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Sports and Athletics

The value of sports and athletic programs in maintaining combat effectiveness was thoroughly demonstrated in World War I. Spectator sports and fitness programs during that conflict helped to maintain both the morale and productivity of the civilian populace. As a result, many nations promoted official athletic programs and policies during World War II. The preferred sports and the nature of officially sanctioned athletic programs differed from nation to nation, as did their announced purposes. Those variations demonstrate the cultural differences among the combatant nations and the separate paths each had taken in developing sports and athletics.

However different in their particulars, officially promoted sports and athletics programs can be loosely grouped into four functional categories. Physical training programs featured mandatory athletic activities, often specialized, that were intended to develop physical and psychological fitness for military service as part of routine duty. Recreational athletic programs supported morale, discipline, and physical fitness through voluntary but often heavily encouraged leisure activities. Mass-participation sports programs employed competition as a means to foster physical and psychological fitness while improving morale and esprit de corps. Both recreational athletics and mass-participation sports programs were often deliberately promoted as alternatives to less beneficial pursuits. Finally, elite spectator sports programs provided morale-boosting entertainment while encouraging more active participation in sports and athletic pursuits.

Britain established the Army Sport Control Board in 1918 to govern an expanding number of military sports associations, thus regulating and promoting recreational athletics, mass participation, and spectator sports

programs. The board supplemented efforts by the Army Physical Training Corps and its staff of instructors from the Army School of Gymnastics at Aldershot to promote uniform physical training throughout the British Army. When Britain entered World War II, it boasted a well-established and centralized program of military sports and athletics.

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa followed the British model to varying degrees. France had its own apparatus for regulating physical training and promoting recreational athletics. The armies of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden each promoted physical training, recreational athletics, and participant and spectator sports. Germany was infamous for its regimented sports military training. The Soviet Union was also known for spreading revolutionary ideals through sports. But Japan may have reaped the earliest substantive benefit from such programs, as it began fighting in China in 1937.

The Japanese armed forces featured systematic physical training and some forms of competitive sport. Physical training played a particularly important role in the development of Japanese fighter pilots. A program of gymnastics, diving, and trampoline exercises incorporated into the lengthy flight training process theoretically improved a pilot's ability to remain oriented and under control during violent aerial maneuvers. While the material contributions of such physical and mental conditioning to the early success of Japanese aviation are anecdotal, the rigorous and unparalleled training did contribute to the mystique and esprit de corps of Japanese fighter pilots early in the war. As the United States began mobilization, American flight training programs adopted some of the same techniques.

U.S. military personnel were the beneficiaries of programs formally established following World War I. Both the army and the navy trained all officers to lead physical training, sports, and athletic activities as part of their routine duties. Specially trained instructors supplemented the officers' efforts, benefiting from the expansion of military athletic facilities undertaken as relief projects during the Great Depression. As the nation mobilized, the growing network of military posts offered such facilities in accordance with both official regulations and public expectations. American men and women entering wartime service generally viewed themselves as civilians temporarily in uniform rather than as military personnel, and their government went to great lengths to support that view by providing them

with familiar civilian comforts. These included provisions for sports and athletics.

As a result, Americans, perhaps more than the people of any other nation, created an extensive sporting infrastructure that extended to frontline areas. Facilities and equipment for baseball, basketball, and other favored sports became commonplace, and American military newspapers devoted substantial space to sports coverage. That coverage linked soldiers and the home front by including major civilian sporting events. Some concessions had to be made, however. American football, with its substantial equipment requirements and high risk of injury, was deliberately de-emphasized in the U.S. military during the war.

American servicemen playing softball on an idle stretch of runway on an atoll in the Gilbert Islands (today the Republic of Kiribati), March 1944. (J.R. Eyerman/Life Magazine/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

JEFFERY A. CHARLSTON

See also

Combat Fatigue; Germany; Medicine and the War; Propaganda; United States

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Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick (1896–1955)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born in Dorchester, Massachusetts, on January 8, 1896, Clifton Albert Frederick Sprague graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1917, then was assigned to the gunboat *Wheeling* in the Mediterranean (1917–1918). Following shore duty, Sprague qualified as a naval aviator at Pensacola Navy Air Station in 1920. He then served aboard the airship tender *Wright* on the west coast (1920–1923).

From 1926 to 1928, Sprague was stationed at Hampton Roads Naval Air Station, where he helped develop arresting gear for aircraft-carrier landings. He was then assistant air officer aboard the aircraft carrier *Lexington* (1928–1929) before commanding a patrol squadron aboard the *Wright* at San Diego, in the Panama Canal Zone, and at Pearl Harbor. He served once again at the Hampton Roads Naval Air Station before helping to outfit the *Yorktown,* where he was air officer from 1937 to 1939. From 1939 to 1941, he commanded auxiliaries. Sprague was commanding the seaplane tender *Tangier* at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked on December 7, 1941.

In June 1942, Sprague became chief of staff of the Gulf Sea Frontier, helping develop convoy techniques. In 1943, he commanded the Seattle Naval Air Station. Promoted to captain, Sprague outfitted the carrier *Wasp* and brought it into commission that November. He continued as skipper of the *Wasp* through the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944). Promoted to rear admiral in August 1944, Sprague commanded escort carrier Task Unit 77.4.3 (“Taffy 3”) in the invasion of Leyte Island in the Philippines (October 20–December 25, 1944).

On the morning of October 25, 1944, Japanese vice admiral Kurita Takeo’s superior force surprised the Americans in Leyte Gulf. Sprague’s command of 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, and 4 destroyer escorts was nearest to the advancing Japanese force that numbered 4 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. While ordering his destroyers to attack the Japanese, Sprague summoned air support from other escort-carrier groups. His defensive efforts eventually led the Japanese to withdraw.

Sprague's handling of the battle and the bravery of the men on the destroyers are credited with preventing the Japanese force from destroying the U.S. transports anchored off the invasion beaches.

In February 1945, Sprague took command of Carrier Division 26, participating in support of the U.S. landings at Iwo Jima (February 19) and Okinawa the following month. He then headed Carrier Division 2.

In the summer of 1946, Sprague commanded Joint Task Group 1.1.2 and Navy Air Group Joint Task Force 1 in the Bikini atomic bomb tests. From 1946 to 1948, he was chief of naval air basic training at Corpus Christi, Texas. He commanded Carrier Division 6 in the Mediterranean in 1948 and 1949, and the 17th Naval District and Alaskan Sea Frontier from 1941 to 1951. Sprague retired in November 1951 as a vice admiral and died of a heart attack in San Diego, California, on April 11, 1955.

EDWARD F. FINCH

See also

Iwo Jima, Battle for; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Okinawa, Invasion of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the

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Sprague, Thomas Lamison (1894–1972)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born in Lima, Ohio, on October 2, 1894, Thomas Lamison Sprague graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1917. Following U.S. entry into World War I, he served in Atlantic convoy duty and then on antisubmarine patrol aboard the destroyer *Montgomery,* commanding it as a lieutenant in 1920.

Sprague next underwent flight training at Pensacola Naval Air Station and was designated a naval aviator. Staff and flight assignments followed. During 1931 and 1932, he commanded Scouting Squadron 6. Sprague then supervised a laboratory at the Philadelphia naval aircraft factory, was air

officer aboard the carrier *Saratoga* in 1935 and 1936, and served as superintendent of naval air training at Pensacola from 1937 to 1940. He was executive officer of the carrier *Ranger* in the Atlantic in 1940 and 1941. Sprague next helped to commission the new escort carrier *Charger* and took command of it during Chesapeake Bay training operations for antisubmarine patrols.

Following a tour of duty as chief of staff to the commander of air units in the Atlantic Fleet in the first half of 1943, Sprague fitted out and commanded the carrier *Intrepid* through operations in the Marshall Islands (January 29–February 22, 1944) and off Truk in February 1944. He was promoted to rear admiral in June 1944 and assumed command of Carrier Division 22, which comprised 18 escort carriers and numerous destroyers and destroyer-escorts, for operations off Guam and the Philippine Islands.

On the morning of October 25, 1944, Sprague's division, designated Task Group (TG) 77.4 ("Taffy 1"), was divided into three groups spread across Leyte Gulf supporting the amphibious operation when a powerful Japanese surface force under Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo surprised the Americans. Sprague ordered all of his aircraft to attack the enemy while two of his groups made smoke and moved away from the foe. The other group (TG 77.4.3, "Taffy 3"), commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague (no relation), bore the brunt of the Japanese attack. The ferocity of the U.S. counterattack convinced Kurita that his forces had encountered the bulk of the U.S. fleet, not merely an escort carrier group. Kurita then withdrew, sparing both Thomas Sprague's ships and the vulnerable transports supporting the invasion of Leyte (October 20–December 25).

Sprague next commanded Carrier Division 3 off Okinawa (April–June 1945) and Task Force 38.1 off Japan (July–August 1945). Following the war, Sprague was first deputy chief and then chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel (1946–1949). He was promoted to vice admiral in August 1949, and he then commanded all air units in the Pacific Fleet until his retirement in April 1952. He returned briefly to duty in 1956 and 1957 to negotiate with the Philippine government about bases in the Philippines. Sprague died in Oakland, California, on September 17, 1972.

EDWARD F. FINCH

See also

Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of; Truk, Raid on

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Spruance, Raymond Ames (1886–1969)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born on July 3, 1886, in Baltimore, Maryland, Raymond Ames Spruance grew up in Indianapolis, Indiana. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1906. Spruance's early assignments included service on the battleship *Minnesota* during the around-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet. His first command was the destroyer *Bainbridge* in 1913. During World War I, Spruance rose to the rank of commander and commanded a troopship. He then commanded destroyers, attended the Naval War College, served in the Office of Naval Intelligence, taught at the Naval War College, and commanded the battleship *Mississippi*.

Promoted to captain in 1932 and to rear admiral in 1939, in July 1941 Spruance took command of Cruiser Division 5 of four heavy cruisers and support ships at Pearl Harbor. As surface screen commander for Vice Admiral William F. Halsey's carriers, he participated in raids on the Gilbert, Marshall, Wake (December 8–23, 1941), and Marcus Islands and in the raid on Tokyo on April 18, 1942.

When Halsey was confined to a hospital, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz, on Halsey's recommendation, assigned Spruance to replace him as Task Force 16 commander. Spruance brilliantly handled the air and naval assets available to him, and his forces won the June 3–6, 1942, Battle of Midway. Nimitz then named Spruance his chief of staff.

In May 1943, Spruance was promoted to vice admiral. In August, he took command of the Pacific Ocean Area and the Pacific Fleet, which became known as the Fifth Fleet in April 1944. Promoted to admiral in February 1944 and operating from the heavy cruiser *Indianapolis* as his flagship,

Spruance led campaigns against Japanese naval forces and island strongholds from the Marshalls (January 29–February 22) through the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21) and the invasions of Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945) and Okinawa (March–June 1945).

Spruance also directed Operation HAILSTONE, the highly successful raid on Truk in February 1944 that destroyed 12 Japanese warships and auxiliaries, 26 merchant ships, and some 249 aircraft. Although the Battle of the Philippine Sea was a major defeat for Japan, in which it suffered the loss of 3 carriers, 2 oilers, and more than 600 aircraft, Spruance came under criticism in some quarters for not being sufficiently aggressive.

Spruance took command of the Pacific Fleet from Nimitz in November 1945. Congressman Carl Vinson (D-GA), a strong supporter of Admiral Halsey, blocked efforts to secure Spruance's promotion to fleet admiral (five-star rank). In an unprecedented step, Congress eventually passed a bill providing that Spruance would receive full admiral's pay on retirement for the rest of his life, which was the benefit normally reserved only for five-star officers.

In February 1946, Spruance became the president of the Naval War College. He retired from the navy in July 1948 and served as ambassador to the Philippines during 1952–1955. Spruance died on December 13, 1969, in Pebble Beach, California. The Spruance class of destroyers, the last of which was decommissioned in 2005, was named for him.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Okinawa, Invasion of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the

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Stahlschmidt, Heinz

See Salmide, Henri

Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953)

Secretary-general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, supreme commander of the Soviet armed forces, marshal of the Soviet Union, and Soviet dictator. Stalin was indisputably one of the most powerful rulers in history as well as one of the greatest murderers.

Born Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili in the Georgian town of Gori on December 21, 1879, Joseph Stalin was the only child of his parents to survive infancy. His parents were semiliterate peasants; his father, an alcoholic, worked as a cobbler, and his mother was a washerwoman and a domestic. Soso, the common Georgian nickname for Iosif, attended the elementary ecclesiastical school in Gori. His mother wanted him to become a priest, and in September 1894 he entered a seminary on a free scholarship.

Stalin's "official" biographies obscure more than they reveal, and they differ for the most part on the cause of Soso's exit from the seminary in 1899. Some say that he was expelled for revolutionary activity, and others claim that he quit, but it was at seminary that Dzhugashvili was introduced to Russian socialism and Marxism. His career as a low-level party functionary began in 1901 under the pseudonym Koba and included "expropriations" (robbery) and counterfeiting in support of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). Arrested, he was tried, convicted, and exiled to Siberia in 1903.

Koba escaped from exile in 1904, and the next year he joined the Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP led by Vladimir Lenin. By 1907, he was recognized as an outstanding Bolshevik propagandist in the Caucasus. By 1912, he was sponsored by Lenin to membership in the Bolshevik-controlled RSDLP Central Committee at the Prague conference where the final split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks took place.

Stalin (meaning “steel”), as Koba was then known, was freed from Siberian exile by the Russian Revolution of March 1917. He returned to Petrograd and became editor of the party newspaper *Pravda*. His seniority on the Central Committee allowed him a leadership role of the Bolsheviks until Lenin’s return to Petrograd from Switzerland in April 1917. Stalin seems to have played little role in the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917.

Stalin’s supposed expertise on the nationalities question led to his appointment as commissar of nationalities in the new Bolshevik government. Through the civil war period, the real government of Russia was the Bolshevik Politburo of Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin, Grigory Zinoviev, and Stalin. To Stalin fell the day-to-day management of the party; in 1922, his power base was expanded when he was appointed secretary-general of the Central Committee, whereby de facto control over party appointments accrued to him.



Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1942. Stalin dominated Soviet affairs from the late 1920s until his death in 1953. (Library of Congress)

Following Lenin's incapacitation by stroke in 1923 and his death on January 21, 1924, Stalin was gradually able to parlay his base of power into control of the organs of Soviet governance. By 1929, Stalin had clearly emerged as first among equals and the leader of Soviet Russia. In the 1930s, he began to purge "old Bolsheviks"—his former colleagues—in his quest to maintain and strengthen his hold on power.

Periodic purges were not unprecedented after the Bolshevik seizure of power. Most were directed at subordinate officials and low-ranking party members, who bore the brunt of policy failures. They generally resulted in loss of privileges, demotion in rank, or expulsion from the party. The Great Purges, conducted on Stalin's orders, were characterized by their focus on party and state elites, the use of mass terror, and dramatic public show trials

and “confessions” by the accused. These usually resulted in the execution of the accused or a long prison sentence, which itself often meant death.

Beginning in 1936, in a series of show trials held in Moscow, numerous leading communists and old Bolsheviks were tried; they confessed and were executed or sentenced to hard labor. At the same time, millions of ordinary Soviet citizens simply disappeared in what became known as the “deep comb-out.” Eventually some 8 million people were arrested, 1 million of whom were executed; most of the remainder were sent to the gulags. In 1937, after the destruction of his former adversaries, Stalin began to eliminate potential threats to his power with a purge of military leaders. Eventually, 40 to 50 percent of the senior officer corps disappeared. Not all were executed or died in the gulags; many survived and were rehabilitated during World War II.

Stalin also reversed Lenin’s New Economic Policy (1921–1928), which had introduced a degree of capitalism in order to revive the economy, purged the middle-class peasants who had emerged under that policy (the Kulaks), and carried out the collectivization of agriculture. Reliable casualty figures for the collectivization drive are unavailable, but if one includes the famine fatalities, the number of those who died may exceed 10 million people—a figure that, for whatever it is worth, Stalin gave to Winston L. S. Churchill in Moscow in August 1942. Russian writer Nikolai Tolstoy has put the number who died in the gulags under Stalin at 12 million people. These numbers compare with a total of 15,000 executions in the last 50 years of the czars. In terms of the sheer number of victims, the Soviet Union under Stalin unquestionably outdistanced Adolf Hitler’s Germany.

In addition to the collectivization of agriculture, Stalin implemented a series of five-year plans that set quotas for growth in all areas of the economy. Much of this effort was devoted to the exploitation of Soviet natural resources and development of heavy industry. The last of these plans prior to World War II also emphasized armaments production. Considerable progress was achieved, much of which came at the expense of the living standards of the Soviet people.

In the 1930s, German ambitions alarmed Stalin, who grew interested in collective security. He instructed People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maksim Litvinov to pursue an internationalist course. In 1934, the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations. Stalin also secured defensive pacts with

other nations, including France. In the late 1930s, many western leaders still distrusted the Soviet Union; thus, even though the Kremlin was willing to enter into arrangements with the West against Germany and Japan, no effective coalition was forged, and events during the decade took a course that largely ignored the Soviet Union.

Unsentimental in such matters, in August 1939 Stalin arranged a nonaggression pact with Germany that allowed Hitler to invade Poland without fear of war with the Soviets. Stalin hoped thereby to gain time to strengthen his own military. He also gained territory in eastern Poland and the Baltic states. When Finnish leaders rejected his demands for territory in Karelia, in November 1939 Stalin ordered Soviet forces to invade Finland in order to secure territory and bases against a potential German attack.

Stalin rejected numerous Western warnings in the winter and spring of 1941 that Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union. In consequence, Soviet forces were largely unprepared for Operation BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of June 22, 1941. Soviet military units were not even immediately authorized to return fire.

For nearly two weeks after the German attack, Stalin remained incommunicado, but he finally reappeared to proclaim the “Great Patriotic War” and rally his people and the Red Army to the defense of the Rodina (Motherland). During the course of the fighting on the Eastern Front, Stalin grew dramatically as a military commander. All important strategic and operational decisions—and some not so important—required his personal approval as supreme commander. He also absorbed specialist military knowledge, although he held no strategic dogmas or pet operational blueprints. For the most part, Stalin allowed his generals to formulate their own views and develop their own plans following his general ideas, based on well-founded knowledge of the situation. If Stalin bears great responsibility for the early defeats suffered by the Soviet Union in the first two years of the war, he must also be credited for Soviet successes in its last two years.

Besides rallying the Soviet people and armed forces with speeches and rhetoric, Stalin demonstrated his own readiness to stand firm against the German onslaught. On October 15, 1941, with the Germans having driven to within 50 miles of Moscow, the Soviet government and diplomatic community were evacuated to Kuibyshev on the Volga. This caused a panic among the Muscovites, who believed they had been abandoned. The

announcement on October 17 that Stalin was in the Kremlin restored relative calm to the city. Stalin remained in the Kremlin, directing strategic operations throughout the siege of Moscow and, with rare exceptions, for the remainder of the war.

During the war, Stalin had a clear picture of his postwar objectives. As the Western powers had used the new East European states after World War I to isolate communist Russia and contain Bolshevism, so Stalin planned to use the same states—under Soviet control as satellites—to exclude Western influences from his own empire. At no time in the war after June 1941 was less than three-quarters of the German Army committed on the Eastern Front. Stalin used this fact, delays by the Western Allies in opening a true second front, and the great suffering of the Soviet Union (up to 27 million dead in the war, officially) to secure massive amounts of Lend-Lease aid. He also used the actual occupation of Eastern Europe and much of Central Europe by the Red Army to secure major concessions from the West at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

Stalin continued to rule the Soviet Union with an iron fist almost until the day of his death. He had instigated yet another purge when he died on March 5, 1953, at his dacha in Kuntsevo, near Moscow.

ARTHUR T. FRAME AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; BAGRATION, Operation; Eastern Front; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Great Purges; Lend-Lease; Moscow, Battle of; Potsdam Conference; Soviet Union; Tehran Conference; Yalta Conference; Document 57; Document 111; Document 144; Document 160

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Stalingrad, Battle of (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943)

Key battle on the Eastern Front. The Battle of Stalingrad, the first large encirclement of a German army in the war, gave the Soviets a psychological lift and the military initiative.

In the spring of 1942, German chancellor Adolf Hitler placed major emphasis in the summer campaign on the southern portion of the German-Soviet Front, code-named FALL BLAU (CASE BLUE). Hitler ordered Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group South east from around Kursk to secure Voronezh, which fell to the Germans on July 6. Hitler then reorganized his southern forces into Army Groups A and B. Field Marshal Siegmund W. List commanded the southern formation, Army Group A; Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs commanded the northern formation, Army Group B.

Hitler's original plan called for Army Groups A and B to coordinate in a great effort to secure the Don and Donets Valleys and capture the cities of Rostov and Stalingrad. The two army groups could then move southeast to capture the oil fields that were so important to both armies. On July 13, however, Hitler ordered a change of plans, demanding the simultaneous capture of Stalingrad—a major industrial center and key crossing point on the Volga River—and the Caucasus. Dividing the effort placed further strains on already inadequate German resources, especially on logistical support. This also meant that inevitably a gap would appear between the two German army groups, enabling most Soviet troops caught in the Don River bend to escape eastward. Meanwhile, on July 23, Army Group A captured Rostov. It then crossed the Don River and advanced deep into the Caucasus, reaching to within 70 miles of the Caspian Sea.

Hitler now intervened again, slowing the advance of General of Panzer Troops Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army of Army Group B toward Stalingrad when he detached Colonel General Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army to join Army Group A to help secure the Caucasus oil fields. Nonetheless, the Sixth Army reached the Volga north of Stalingrad on August 23.

The great city of Stalingrad curved for some 20 miles along the high western bank of the Volga River. Hitler's original intent was merely to control the river by gunfire and destroy the city's arms factories, notably the

Tractor, Red October, and Barricades works, but now he demanded a full occupation of the Soviet dictator's namesake city.

To meet the German thrust toward Stalingrad, on July 12, 1942, the Soviet General Staff had formed the Stalingrad Front. It consisted of the Sixty-Second, Sixty-Third, and Sixty-Fourth Armies, all under the command of Marshal Semen K. Timoshenko, who was replaced by Lieutenant General Vasily N. Gordov on July 27. The Twenty-First Army and the Eighth Air Army were also integrated into the Stalingrad Front. General Vasily Chuikov, a protégé of Marshal Georgii Zhukov, commanded the Sixty-Second Army, which was holding on the west bank of the Volga. Stalin, meanwhile, rushed reinforcements and supplies to Stalingrad.

Angry over the slow progress of the Sixth Army into Stalingrad, Hitler on August 11 ordered Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army from the Caucasus north to that place, leaving a badly depleted Army Group A holding a 500-mile front and stalling the southernmost drive. Hitler also ordered his sole strategic reserve in the area, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Eleventh Army, north to Leningrad.

Such wide-ranging shifts of German resources took a terrible toll on men but especially on equipment. They also consumed precious fuel and stretched the German lines far beyond what was reasonable or safe. German Army high command chief of staff Colonel General Franz Halder and other German generals grew more and more alarmed. They pointed out to Hitler that the German army in Russia now had to maintain a front of more than 2,000 miles. Between the two armies of Army Group B, a lone division held a 240-mile gap. North of Stalingrad, Romanian troops protected the single railroad bringing supplies to the Sixth Army. The possibilities open to the Soviets were enormous, providing they had the resources available. Hitler claimed they did not.

Halder continued warning Hitler and tried to get him to break off the battle for Stalingrad. This time, Hitler sacked Halder. Hitler also relieved List and, from a distance of 1,200 miles, took personal command of Army Group A, which was nominally under Colonel General Paul L. E. von Kleist. The irony is that the Germans might have taken Stalingrad in July had Hitler not diverted Hoth south to support Kleist.

Beginning on August 24, a costly battle of attrition raged for Stalingrad. Luftwaffe carpet bombing at the end of August killed some 40,000 people,

but it also turned the city into defensive bastions of ruined buildings and rubble. Stalin refused to allow the evacuation of the civilian population, believing that this would force the defenders, especially local militia forces, to fight more tenaciously.

The ruined city posed a formidable obstacle. Germany's strength lay in maneuver warfare, but Hitler compelled the Sixth Army to engage the Soviet strength of static defense. Stalin ordered the city held at all costs, and Soviet forces resisted doggedly. To make things as difficult as possible for German artillery and aviation, Chuikov ordered his troops to keep within 50 yards of the Germans. Zhukov, who had just been appointed deputy supreme commander, second in authority only to Stalin, arrived at Stalingrad on August 29 to take overall charge of operations.

Hitler became obsessed with Stalingrad, and he wore down his army in repeated attempts to capture that symbol of defiance. Taking Stalingrad was unnecessary from a military point of view; the 16th Panzer Division at Rynok controlled the Volga with its guns, closing it to north-south shipping. But Hitler insisted that the city be physically taken.

For a month the Sixth Army pressed slowly forward, but casualties in the battle of attrition were enormous on both sides, with advances measured in yards. The battle disintegrated into a block-by-block, house-by-house, and even room-by-room struggle for survival.

Paulus has been blamed for refusing to disobey Hitler's order to stand firm and extract his army before it was too late, but his and Hitler's greatest failing lay in not anticipating the Soviet encirclement. Nor did Paulus have a mobile tank reserve to counter such a Soviet effort and keep open a supply corridor.

Battle of Stalingrad, 1942–1943



Red Army soldiers fire at the Germans from snow-covered rubble while defending the Krasnye Oktyabr (Red October) factory during the bitterly contested Battle of Stalingrad in the winter of 1942–1943. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

While he fed the cauldron of Stalingrad with only sufficient troops absolutely necessary to hold the city, Zhukov patiently assembled 1 million men in four fronts (army groups) for a great double envelopment. This deep movement, Operation URANUS, began on November 19 and was timed to coincide with the frosts that would make Soviet cross-country tank maneuvers possible against Axis infantry.

For the northern pincer, the Soviets assembled 3,500 guns and heavy mortars to blast a hole for three tank and two cavalry corps and a dozen infantry divisions. They encountered Romanian infantry divisions. The Romanians fought bravely, but their 37mm guns and light Skoda tanks were no match for the Soviet T-34s. The southern Soviet prong of two corps, one mechanized and the other cavalry, broke through on November 20 against two Romanian infantry divisions.

By November 23, Operation URANUS had encircled the Sixth Army and had driven some units of the Fourth Panzer Army into the pocket. Hitler now ordered Manstein from the Leningrad Front and gave him a new formation—Army Group Don, drawn from Army Group A—with instructions to rectify the situation.

Hitler forbade any withdrawal, convinced that the Sixth Army could be resupplied from the air. Reich marshal Hermann Göring is usually blamed for assuring Hitler that this could be done, but responsibility is more properly shared among Göring, chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe Colonel General Hans Jeschonnek, and Hitler. Hitler was no doubt misled by Luftwaffe success the previous winter in supplying by parachute drops 5,000 German troops surrounded at Kholm near Moscow and 100,000 men at Demyansk.

The decision that Stalingrad could be supplied by air was also taken at a time when the Soviets had air superiority. By November 20, the second day of Operation URANUS, the Soviets committed between 1,350 and 1,414 combat aircraft to Stalingrad. Meanwhile, Colonel General Wolfram F. von Richthofen’s Luftflotte (Air Fleet) 4, flying in support of the Sixth Army, had 732 combat aircraft, of which only 402 were operational. The Soviets used their air superiority to attack German army positions and for bombing raids

on the main Ju-52 base at Zverevo, where they destroyed a substantial number of German transport aircraft. Worsening weather impeded the relief effort, and much of the Luftwaffe's airlift capability was redeployed to resupply Axis troops in North Africa following Allied landings there in early November.

A fair appraisal of air transport available, even in the best weather conditions, was that the Luftwaffe could only bring in one-tenth of the Sixth Army's requirements. By the last week in December, the Luftwaffe delivered only an average 129 tons of supplies a day, condemning the German forces in the pocket to slow starvation and death. The final tally over a 72-day period was 8,350 tons with 488 aircraft and more than 1,000 aircrew lost.

Then on January 16, 1943, the Soviets took Pitomnik, the principal airfield within the Stalingrad pocket. Its loss was the death blow to the airlift operation. During the last days of the battle, supplies were dropped only by parachute, and many of the supplies fell into Soviet hands.

Hitler still refused to authorize any attempt by the Sixth Army to escape. He would allow only a linking up of a relief force. None of the hard-won territory was to be surrendered, but it was simply impossible for the Sixth Army to link up with a relief force and not surrender territory in the process. Paulus favored a breakout, but he was not prepared to gamble either his army or his career. Manstein's force of three understrength panzer divisions managed to reach within 35 miles of Sixth Army positions, and he urged a fait accompli, forcing Hitler to accept it. Paulus replied with a pessimistic assessment of his army's ability to close the short distance to reach Manstein's relief force. There was insufficient fuel, the horses had mostly been eaten, and it would take weeks to prepare. The relieving forces would have to come closer. A linkup could succeed only if the Sixth Army pushed from the other side against the Soviets, but this could not be done without shrinking the Stalingrad pocket, which Hitler expressly forbade.

In mid-December the Volga froze, allowing the Soviets to use vehicles to cross the ice. During the next seven weeks, Zhukov sent 35,000 vehicles across the river along with 122mm howitzers to blast the German defensive works. By then seven Soviet armies surrounded the Sixth Army, and breakout was impossible. Even in this hopeless situation, Paulus refused to disobey Hitler by ordering a surrender. Hitler sought to stiffen his will by promoting Paulus to field marshal (Hitler noted that no Prussian or German field

marshal had ever surrendered). Paulus then surrendered on January 31 (he maintained he had been "taken by surprise"), but he refused to order his men to do the same. The last German units capitulated on February 2.

There may have been 294,000 men trapped at Stalingrad, including Hiwis (Hilfswilligers, volunteer Soviet auxiliaries working with the Germans) and Romanians. Of only 91,000 men (including 22 generals) taken prisoner by the Soviets, fewer than 5,000 survived the war and Soviet captivity. The last Germans taken prisoner at Stalingrad were not released until 1955. Including casualties in allied units and the rescue attempts, Axis forces lost upwards of half a million men. The Stalingrad Campaign may have cost the Soviets 1.1 million casualties, including more than 485,000 dead.

The effect of the Battle of Stalingrad on the German war effort has been hotly debated. It is frequently seen as the turning point in the European theater of war, the decisive defeat from which the Wehrmacht could never recover, but militarily Stalingrad was not irredeemable. The German front lines had been largely reestablished by the time the remnants of the Sixth Army surrendered. Stalingrad was more important for its psychological than its military value. If any single battle denied Germany victory, it was Kursk, still six months and several German successes away.

EVA-MARIA STOLBERG AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bock, Fedor von; Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Halder, Franz; Hoth, Hermann; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Kursk, Battle of; Leningrad, Siege of; List, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter; Manstein, Erich von; Paulus, Friedrich; Richthofen, Wolfram von; Romania; Stalin, Joseph; Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich; Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Standley, William Harrison (1872–1963)

U.S. admiral and later ambassador to the Soviet Union. Born in Ukiah, California, on December 18, 1872, William Harrison Standley graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1895. He saw active service in the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and World War I. Standley was promoted to rear admiral in 1927 and to vice admiral in 1932. He received his fourth star in May 1933, and in July President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him the sixth chief of naval operations. Roosevelt, who had great confidence in Standley, would have left him indefinitely in that post had not Standley insisted on retiring in January 1937 at the regulation age of 64.

Well before the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Standley was strongly interventionist. He joined the pro-Allied Century Group in June 1940, publicly stating that the United States should recognize that it was already effectively at war with Germany. In 1941, Roosevelt recalled Standley to active duty. His wartime responsibilities included defense planning for the Office of Production Management, service on the Roberts Commission investigating the Pearl Harbor attack, Navy Department public relations assignments, and membership in the Beaverbrook-Harriman mission, which provided Lend-Lease supplies to Soviet Russia.

In April 1942, Roosevelt appointed Standley ambassador to the Soviet Union. Soviet officials and American diplomats alike distrusted Standley's candid and forceful style, especially his insistence that the State Department not restrict the topics he might discuss with Soviet representatives. Apparently, Standley also resented the manner in which W. Averell Harriman, the president's special envoy, often conducted U.S.-Soviet diplomatic negotiations independently of him. In May 1943, these assorted frustrations led Standley to submit his resignation, suggesting that Harriman replace him. Indeed, this occurred when Standley returned to the United States in October.

In March 1944, Roosevelt appointed Standley to the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group, where he remained until he retired from active duty in August 1945. Standley died in San Diego, California, on October 25, 1963.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Harriman, William Averell; Lend-Lease; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Soviet Union

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Standley, William H., and Arthur A. Ageton. *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955.

Stark, Harold Raynsford "Betty" (1880–1972)

U.S. Navy admiral and chief of naval operations. Born in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, on November 12, 1880, Harold Raynsford Stark graduated in 1903 from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. There, as a plebe, he acquired the nickname "Betty," after Elizabeth Page Stark, the wife of Revolutionary War hero John Stark, who was being commemorated at that time. Stark was commissioned an ensign in the U.S. Navy in 1905 and participated in the Great White Fleet's 1907–1909 around-the-world cruise, and as a World War I staff officer he helped coordinate Anglo-American naval operations. He then commanded a flotilla in the Mediterranean, and he subsequently captained torpedo boats, destroyers, and an armed cruiser.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. Navy chief of naval operations during 1939–1942. (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

Stark graduated from the Naval War College in 1924 and then served as an aide to Secretary of the Navy Charles Adams from 1930 to 1933. Promoted to rear admiral in November 1934, Stark was chief of the Bureau of Ordnance from 1934 to 1937. Following promotion to vice admiral, he commanded all cruisers in the Battle Force during 1938–1939. In these years, Stark was a staunch proponent of naval preparedness.

In August 1939 one month before World War II began in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt named Stark chief of naval operations as a full admiral. Stark, who shared Roosevelt's profoundly interventionist outlook, immediately presented a naval building program designed to make the U.S. Navy the world's largest naval force. His memorandum Plan D (Dog), prepared for Roosevelt in November 1940, delineated what became

the fundamental U.S. wartime strategy—that Germany, the greatest threat to the United States, must be defeated first.

Convinced that Britain's survival was essential to U.S. national security, in early 1941 Stark proposed and held staff talks with a high-level British delegation. The resulting ABC-1 (America-Britain-Canada) Rainbow 5 strategic agreement, much of which Stark drafted, became the basis of wartime Anglo-American cooperation. Stark constantly urged Roosevelt to do more to assist Britain, and by the autumn of 1941, U.S. naval forces were effectively at war with Germany in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Although Stark attempted to improve Pacific fortifications and naval strength, he opposed measures (such as an oil embargo) that might provoke a forceful Japanese response. Like other U.S. military and civilian officials, he failed to interpret correctly or transmit to Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, U.S. commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, deciphered cable traffic indicating that Japan might attack the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. One subsequent investigation faulted him for this misjudgment.

In March 1942 Roosevelt replaced Stark as chief of naval operations with Admiral Ernest J. King. Roosevelt then dispatched Stark to Britain as commander of U.S. naval forces in the European theater. Stark performed valuable wartime liaison functions between London and Washington, established and later dismantled certain U.S. naval bases in Europe, directed logistical support for U.S. naval forces, and served as Washington's unofficial envoy to Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle. Stark retired in 1946 and died in Washington, D.C., on August 20, 1972.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; King, Ernest Joseph; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States Navy; Document 77

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STARVATION, Operation (March 27–August 15, 1945)

Operation STARVATION was the U.S. aircraft mining of Japan's home waters. By 1945, Japan had withdrawn most of its remaining merchant shipping to the home islands, where it operated principally in coastal waters, which were relatively safe from submarine attack. After some delays and interservice squabbles in which U.S. Army Air Forces major general Curtis LeMay protested the diversion of his aircraft to this mission, on March 27, 1945, Boeing B-29 Superfortresses of the Mariana Islands–based XXI Bomber Command launched Operation STARVATION, a systematic mining campaign designed to disrupt Japan's overseas and interisland trade, complete the submarine blockade, and thus prevent food and raw materials from reaching Japan. B-29s planted mines outside Japan's major ports, in the Inland Sea, and in critical straits, particularly the heavily trafficked Shimonoseki Strait.

Japan proved to be as unprepared for mines as it had been for submarines. It relocated searchlights and antiaircraft batteries in an effort to shoot down the mine-laying B-29s, and it increased research into mine countermeasures, but the efforts were inadequate. Japan never developed effective techniques to sweep acoustic and pressure mines. Instead, the Japanese continued to sail ships into mined waters, hoping to run ships through the minefields faster than the United States could lay additional mines.

In May 1945, U.S. mines sank or disabled more Japanese ships than did submarines. Mines blocked 19 of Japan's 22 principal shipyards, preventing the repair of damaged ships. Arrivals at Japan's industrial ports dropped from 800,000 tons in March to 250,000 tons in July, when food displaced coal and iron as Japan's predominant import. Yet Japan failed to import sufficient food to meet its people's needs, and average daily per capita food intake dropped from 1,900 calories in 1944 to 1,680 calories by the midsummer of 1945. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese (millions, according to some estimates) faced imminent starvation, and growing numbers of Japan's remaining factories were rendered idle for lack of raw materials.

Mining sorties accounted for only 5.7 percent of XXI Bomber Command's sorties that summer. Short of mines and more interested in bombing Japanese cities, XXI Bomber Command never devoted the effort to laying mines hoped for by the navy. Yet at a cost of only 15 planes lost,

1,528 B-29 sorties dropped 12,135 mines into Japanese home waters by the war's end. These damaged or sank at least 750,000 tons of Japanese shipping (possibly as much as 1.25 million tons) and closed most of Japan's ports. Damaged ships piled up in Japanese ports, and mercantile traffic dropped to a trickle. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz described Operation STARVATION's results as "phenomenal." It indeed proved to be a vital element of the strategy of blockade and bombing that forced Japan's surrender on August 15, 1945.

STEPHEN K. STEIN

See also

Mines, Sea; Minesweeping and Mine Laying, Sea

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Stauffenberg, Claus Philipp Schenk von (1907–1944)

German Army colonel who attempted to assassinate Adolf Hitler in 1944. Born on November 15, 1907, at Greifenstein Castle, Jettingen, into a staunchly Roman Catholic Prussian noble family, Claus Philipp Schenk von Stauffenberg was strikingly handsome and highly intelligent.

In 1926, Stauffenberg joined the 17th Cavalry Regiment as an officer candidate, and he was commissioned in 1930. He attended the War Academy in Berlin in 1936 and, as a captain, became a logistics officer in 1938. He served in the campaigns in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 and then was posted to the General Staff.

Stauffenberg seriously questioned National Socialism after the virulent anti-Jewish Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass) of November 9, 1938.

Service with German forces in the Soviet Union exacerbated his disillusionment.

German Army major Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg who led the July 1944 assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Stauffenberg was badly wounded by the explosion of a mine in April 1943 while serving in North Africa. He injured his knee and left ear and lost his left eye, right hand, and two fingers of his left hand. While convalescing, he came to believe that removing Hitler was the only answer to Germany's dilemma, and he then became a leading figure in the conspiracy to assassinate the German leader.

Promoted to colonel in June 1944, the next month Stauffenberg was appointed chief of staff to Colonel General Friedrich Fromm, commander of the Replacement Army. This position allowed him access to Hitler. As a severely disabled war hero, he was spared the searches of persons who were

admitted to see Hitler. Two assassination attempts, on July 11 and July 15, were aborted, but on July 20, 1944, Stauffenberg placed a bomb hidden in a briefcase beside Hitler at his headquarters, the Wolf's Lair, in Rastenberg, East Prussia, and quickly left the scene to fly to Berlin. The briefcase was moved, and the ensuing blast only slightly injured Hitler, bur Stauffenberg was convinced that the führer was dead.

The subsequent coup in Berlin failed because of delays, poor coordination, and simple bad luck. Stauffenberg and several others were arrested on the night of July 20, court-martialed, and shot in the courtyard of the War Ministry in Berlin. Several thousand others who were also opposed to the regime also subsequently perished. Stauffenberg today is considered one of the heroes and ethical role models of the Bundeswehr.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also

Germany; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot

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Steiner, Felix (1896–1966)

German Schutzstaffel (SS) general. Born on May 23, 1896, at Stallupönen in East Prussia, Felix Steiner joined the German army in 1914 and became a lieutenant during World War I. In 1921, he took up active service in the Reichswehr. In 1935, he joined the predecessor to the Waffen-SS.

Steiner fought both in the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the campaign for France in May and June 1940. In 1940, he formed a motorized SS division based on a recruiting program for volunteers from countries in Western and Northern Europe. Steiner commanded this "Viking Division"

(5th SS Panzer Division) in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union. During the 1942 German summer offensive, the division pushed through the south of Russia and reached Kuban. In 1943, Steiner commanded the III ("Germanic") SS Panzer Corps, and on July 1, 1943, he was promoted to Obergruppenführer and general of the Waffen-SS.

During the final battle for Berlin (March 31–May 2, 1945), Adolf Hitler ordered Steiner to seal a gap through which Soviet forces were pouring, hoping in vain that he might be able to turn the tide. With few men and little equipment, Steiner was unable to accomplish anything. He surrendered to British forces on May 3, 1945. Steiner was not released until April 1948. He died on May 17, 1966, in Munich.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Berlin, Land Battle for; Caucasus Campaign; Hitler, Adolf; Waffen-SS

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Steinhoff, Johannes (1913–1994)

German Air Force general. Born in Bottendorf on September 15, 1913, Johannes Steinhoff joined the German Navy in 1934. His interest in aviation led him to transfer to the Luftwaffe in 1936, and by the beginning of World War II, he was the Staffelkapitan (squadron leader) of Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wing) 26. Steinhoff served briefly with the Luftwaffe's fledgling night-fighter force but eventually returned to single-engine day fighters.

Steinhoff served in every theater of war to which the Luftwaffe was deployed, and he ran up the impressive tally of 176 victories. His final assignment was a posting to Jagdverband (Fighter Group) 44, Adolf Galland's "Squadron of Experts." On April 18, 1945, Steinhoff crashed his

Me-262 on takeoff, and the resulting fire left him scarred for the rest of his life.

Steinhoff joined the air force of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952, rising to the rank of full general. He served as inspector of the Bundesluftwaffe from 1966 to 1970 and chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from 1971 until his retirement in 1974. Steinhoff died at Bottendorf, Germany, on February 21, 1994.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Galland, Adolf Joseph Ferdinand; Germany, Air Force

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Stephen Hopkins versus *Stier* (September 27, 1942)

During the war, the German Navy used converted merchant ships as surface raiders or auxiliary cruisers to prey on Allied shipping. Disguised as neutral-flag cargo ships, they were heavily armed. The raiders' profiles were changed frequently by the use of false masts and stacks, with their armament concealed behind panels that could be quickly removed when they encountered prey.

The U.S. Liberty ship SS *Stephen Hopkins*, commanded by merchant marine captain Paul Buck, was on its maiden voyage returning from Cape Town in ballast and bound for Dutch Guiana with 58 people on board (crew of 42, 1 passenger, and a 15-man U.S. Navy guard) when it came on the German commerce raider *Stier* (Ship 23). Under Commander Horst Gerlach, it had departed Germany on May 10, 1942, and had earlier sunk three Allied

merchant ships. Now on September 27, it was taking on supplies from the German blockade-runner *Tannenfels*. Because of heavy fog, the *Stephen Hopkins* closed to only about two miles from the *Stier* when the two German ships opened fire. The *Stier* was armed with four 5.9-inch guns, two 37mm and four 20mm guns, and two 21-inch torpedo tubes. The *Tannenfels* mounted one 5.9-inch gun and several smaller-caliber weapons.

The *Stephen Hopkins* was armed with one 4-inch gun, two 37mm cannon, and four .50-caliber and two .30-caliber machine guns. Its battery was the responsibility of the ship's 15-man U.S. Navy Armed Guard commanded by Navy Reserve lieutenant (junior grade) Kenneth M. Willett. Firing with great accuracy, the crew of the 4-inch gun managed to mortally wound the German raider, hitting it with some 15 shells during the course of a half hour, disabling its rudder and setting its fuel oil bunkers ablaze.

When members of the 4-inch gun crew fell to German fire, others took their places. Both ships were soon sinking. The *Stephen Hopkins* went down at 10:00 a.m. Buck and Willett were among the dead. Nineteen survivors took to one lifeboat, which had little food and water, to begin what would be a 2,200-mile, 31-day journey to Brazil; 15 men survived the voyage.

In the engagement the *Stier* suffered 3 dead and 33 wounded. Gerlach ordered his crew to set detonating charges to scuttle his ship, then transferred to the *Tannenfels*. In his battle report, Gerlach reported that he had fought a "heavily armed cruiser."

Captain Buck was posthumously awarded the Merchant Marine Distinguished Service Medal, as was U.S. Merchant Marine Academy cadet Edwin Joseph O'Hara, who single-handedly fired the last shots from the ship's 4-inch gun. Willett received the Navy Cross. The *Stephen Hopkins* was the only U.S. ship to sink a German surface warship during the war.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Commerce Raiders, Surface, German; Liberty Ships

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Stephenson, Sir William Samuel (1896–1989)

Chief of British security in North America during 1940–1945. Born on January 11, 1896, at Point Douglas, Winnipeg, Canada, William Samuel Stephenson was a pilot in the Royal Flying Corps during World War I. He became an ace but was also seriously wounded. Between the wars, Stephenson's successful business ventures in radio required extensive travel throughout the world. After trips to Germany in the 1930s, he provided British intelligence with information about German rearmament.

In June 1940, Stephenson arrived in New York to direct British intelligence in the Western Hemisphere for the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). Officially, Stephenson was the passport control officer, with headquarters in Rockefeller Center. His counterespionage operation, British Security Co-ordination, worked with MI5, the Special Operations Executive, and the Political Warfare Executive.

Before the United States entered the war, Stephenson aided J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, supplying it with information about German, Italian, and Vichy agents in the United States. Stephenson also assisted William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services in its organization and training. After U.S. entry into the war, Stephenson's extensive South American operations worked to secure enemy ciphers and expose enemy agents. Stephenson also ran double agents and engaged in propaganda work and special operations.

Stephenson was knighted in 1945, and President Harry S. Truman awarded him the Presidential Medal of Merit. Stephenson died in Bermuda on January 31, 1989.

ANDREW JACKSON WASKEY

See also

Counterintelligence; Donovan, William Joseph; Electronic Intelligence; Office of Strategic Services; Signals Intelligence

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Stettinius, Edward Reilly, Jr. (1900–1949)

U.S. Lend-Lease administrator (1942–1943), undersecretary of state (1943–1944), and secretary of state (1944–1945). Born in Chicago, Illinois, on October 22, 1900, Edward Reilly Stettinius Jr. was the son of a prominent industrialist who moved to New York in 1914. After attending the University of Virginia, Stettinius joined General Motors, implementing innovative employee benefit programs. He moved to U.S. Steel in 1934, and four years later he became chairman of its board.

In 1940, because of his earlier liaison work on New Deal industrial recovery programs, Stettinius received the government position of chairman of the War Resources Board, which had been established to survey potential American war needs. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt placed Stettinius on the National Defense Advisory Commission. At that point, Stettinius resigned from U.S. Steel to devote full time to government service. As director of priorities in the Office of Production Management, he encouraged the development of synthetic rubber. Then, in 1942, Roosevelt appointed Stettinius to head the administration of the Lend-Lease program, which he made more effective while successfully winning congressional support for its operations.

In September 1943, Stettinius became undersecretary of state, working under Secretary of State Cordell Hull with a commission to improve and coordinate the State Department’s notoriously inefficient organizational structure and improve its lackluster public image. Stettinius’s other major responsibility was the creation of an international security organization, the United Nations (UN). After laying the groundwork for this organization in

the spring of 1944, Stettinius attended the August 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where he played a major role in drafting the UN Charter.

When poor health caused Hull's resignation in November 1944, Stettinius succeeded him. The new secretary of state instituted public relations policies that greatly enhanced his department's popularity. He attended the controversial February 1945 Yalta Conference of Allied leaders, helping draft American proposals for a Declaration on Liberated Europe and clarify the UN Charter. Stettinius's greatest diplomatic contributions occurred between April and June 1945 at the San Francisco Conference, which drafted the final UN Charter. His diplomatic skills were instrumental in persuading the numerous delegates to reach consensus.

Many officials considered Stettinius a lightweight, and during the San Francisco Conference, Harry S. Truman, who had succeeded Roosevelt as president in April 1945, decided to replace him with South Carolina Democrat James F. Byrnes. On June 27, 1945, one day after the conference ended, Stettinius resigned to become first U.S. representative to the new UN. Disillusioned with the Truman administration's failure to use UN mechanisms to resolve the developing Cold War, in June 1946 Stettinius resigned to become rector of the University of Virginia. Stettinius died of coronary thrombosis in Greenwich, Connecticut, on October 31, 1949.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Dumbarton Oaks Conference; Hull, Cordell; Lend-Lease; United Nations, Formation of; Yalta Conference

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Stier versus *Stephen Hopkins*

See *Stephen Hopkins* versus *Stier*

Stilwell, Joseph Warren (1883–1946)

U.S. Army general. Born on March 19, 1883, near Palatka, Florida, Joseph Warren Stilwell was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry on graduation from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1904. Promoted to temporary major in August 1917, Stilwell served with British and French forces before his assignment to the U.S. Army IV Corps in France during World War I. After the war, he studied Chinese and spent several years in China and Siam (Thailand), serving with American units stationed there. He was promoted to colonel in August 1935. Stilwell earned his nickname, "Vinegar Joe," as a result of his brusque manner while an instructor at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Promoted to temporary major general in October 1940, by July 1941 Stilwell was commanding III Corps at Monterey, California.

In February 1942, Stilwell was promoted to temporary lieutenant general and assumed command of all U.S. Army forces in the China-Burma-India theater while also serving as chief of staff to Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) Chinese leader Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Charged with coordinating the efforts of Britain, China, and the United States against Japan, Stilwell was also responsible for preparing China for the planned Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands. When the Japanese captured Burma in the spring of 1942, Stilwell personally led an Allied column on a 140-mile march through the Burmese jungle to avoid capture.

U.S. Army lieutenant general Joseph W. Stilwell, 1942. Stilwell commanded U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India Theater as well as serving as chief of staff to Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi until he was removed following policy differences with Jiang. (Library of Congress)

Stilwell's belief that China's best hope for recapturing its territory from the Japanese was through the employment of Western-trained and -equipped Chinese Army forces brought him into direct conflict both with Jiang and Major General Claire Chennault, former commander of the American Volunteer Group (the "Flying Tigers"). As commander of the Fourteenth Army Air Force and a firm airpower proponent, Chennault believed his air force capable of defeating the Japanese without the commitment of significant ground forces; he continually argued that he should receive the bulk of supplies coming over the Himalayas. Jiang, worried that any forces used against the Japanese would not be available for his anticipated postwar conflict with the Chinese Communists, was more than willing to support

Chennault's position. Throughout 1943 and 1944, tensions among Stilwell, Chennault, and Jiang mounted.

Despite the demonstration of the potential of Chinese forces against the Japanese and the gains in Burma, Stilwell was unable to convince Jiang to reform his army. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged Jiang to place Stilwell (who had been promoted to temporary general in August 1944) in command of all Chinese forces, Jiang refused and then demanded Stilwell's relief. Unwilling to alienate Jiang, Roosevelt ordered Stilwell's return. On October 18, 1944, Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan replaced him.

After his relief, Stilwell assumed command of the Tenth Army, a command slated for the planned invasion of Japan. Following Japan's surrender, Stilwell returned to the United States and took command of the Sixth Army. Stilwell died of liver cancer at the Presidio in San Francisco, California, on October 12, 1946.

DAVID M. TOCZEK

See also

Burma Theater; Chennault, Claire Lee; China; Commandos/Rangers; Flying Tigers; Hump, The; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Jiang Jieshi; Document 179

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Stimson, Henry Lewis (1867–1950)

U.S. secretary of war. Henry Lewis Stimson was born in New York City on September 21, 1867, into an old and distinguished family. He was educated at Yale University and Harvard Law School. In 1891, he entered the law firm of Root and Clarke. Its leading partner, Elihu Root, a future secretary of war and secretary of state, became one of Stimson's two lifelong role models, the other being future president Theodore Roosevelt.

Like Roosevelt, Stimson found public service more satisfying than practicing law, and he soon became active in New York Republican politics. Appointed secretary of war in 1911, Stimson attempted to modernize the army and improve troop training and the efficiency of the General Staff. He left office when Woodrow Wilson became president, in 1913.

When World War I began in Europe in 1914, the staunchly interventionist and pro-Allied Stimson campaigned ardently for military preparedness. After Congress declared war on Germany in April 1917, Stimson volunteered, serving in France as a lieutenant colonel of artillery. He returned from the war convinced that the United States must assume a far greater international role.

As governor-general of the Philippines in 1928, Stimson ruled in the spirit of benevolent paternalism. Appointed secretary of state in 1929 under President Herbert Hoover, Stimson played a prominent role in negotiating the London Naval Treaty of 1930. He also attempted to strengthen the League of Nations by protesting Japan's establishment in 1931 of the puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo). He remained at the State Department until 1933.

In the later 1930s, Stimson was among the strongest advocates of firm American opposition to the fascist states. When World War II began in 1939, Stimson, a convinced believer in an Anglo-American alliance, demanded extensive American assistance to the Allies and massive U.S. rearmament. Seeking bipartisan support for his foreign policies, in June 1940 the Democratic president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, recruited Stimson as secretary of war, a position Stimson held throughout the war. With army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, Stimson and his able team oversaw the massive recruitment and industrial mobilization programs the war effort demanded.

Stimson oversaw the Manhattan Project, and in April 1945 he informed new president Harry S. Truman of this initiative's existence. In the summer of 1945, Stimson suggested that the Allies publicly warn the Japanese government that unless Japan surrendered, it faced attack by devastating new weaponry. This advice led the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union to issue the July 1945 Potsdam Declaration to this effect. Shortly afterward, Stimson urged Truman to share with the Soviets—with appropriate safeguards—the secrets of nuclear power. After retiring in 1945, Stimson endorsed a greatly enhanced American international role. He died in Huntington, New York, on October 20, 1950.

See also

Manhattan Project; Marshall, George Catlett; Potsdam Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.

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Stirling, Sir Archibald David (1915–1990)

British Army colonel. Born the son of a British general in Kier, Scotland, on November 15, 1915, David Archibald Stirling studied architecture at Trinity College, Cambridge, but he did not complete his academic work, preferring other activities, such as mountaineering. Stirling was in the Canadian Rockies preparing for a Mount Everest climb when war commenced in 1939.

Stirling joined the British Army as a junior officer and served a short stint in the Scots Guards before joining "Layforce," founded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Laycock, whose commandos were soon dispersed as reinforcements. Stirling deployed to the Middle East with Number 3 Commando. Hospitalized for several months following an injury, Stirling formalized plans for a special raiding group. In July 1941 he secured approval from his commander in chief, General Claude Auchinleck, for the plan. Auchinleck designated 66 men of Layforce as L-Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade, under Stirling's command. The unit designation implied the presence of a large formation. The men were to mount parachute operations against Axis airfields in Libya.

This was the beginning of the elite Special Air Service (SAS), which grew to regimental size. The first attack encountered high winds and sandstorms, and only 22 men of the force survived. Stirling then switched to specially equipped ground vehicles of the Long Range Desert Group. His tactics were to make the final approach on foot, strike the target, and then move by vehicle deeper into enemy territory. In 18 months, his SAS

destroyed 350 Axis aircraft and also blew up ammunition dumps, supply depots, and trains. These raids forced the Axis powers to divert frontline troops to provide rear-area security. Captured in Tunisia on January 10, 1943, Stirling escaped four times but was recaptured. He ended the war imprisoned at Colditz Castle, a maximum-security prison near Leipzig.

Stirling's force soon expanded into three regiments. Today, the SAS is recognized as one of the world's premier special operations forces. Following his release at the end of the war, Stirling settled in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). He returned to the United Kingdom in 1961, where he became involved in security-related ventures. Stirling died in London on November 4, 1990, having been knighted that year.

ROBERT B. MARTYN

See also
Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Commandos/Rangers

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STRANGLE, Operation (March 15–May 11, 1944)

Interdiction campaign by Allied air forces during the spring of 1944 directed against German supply lines in central Italy that supported the Gustav Line. Operation STRANGLE was intended to force a German withdrawal through the application of airpower alone.

The Germans established the Gustav Line centered on Monte Cassino to block an Allied northward advance on Rome. By the spring of 1944, three major ground assaults had failed to breach this line, and even the amphibious landing at Anzio on January 22, 1944, had failed. Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, commander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, decided to launch a supply interdiction operation to break the stalemate and force a German withdrawal.

Operation STRANGLE was directed mainly against the Italian rail system, Germany's primary means of supply transportation, but it also encompassed

ports and bridges. The campaign involved an interdiction belt running across Italy from east to west as far north of the Gustav Line as possible to force the Germans to use alternate transport means to the front. Medium bombers of the U.S. Army Air Force's Twelfth Air Force and British First Air Force began operations on March 19, and the strongly escorted daylight raids continued until May 11, 1944. The bombers succeeded in inflicting substantial damage on the rail system and coming close to closing down all rail traffic 100 miles north of Rome. Nonetheless, the operation failed to force the Germans to withdraw from the Gustav Line.

The campaign failed for four principal reasons. First, there were no significant ground operations during this period, and the aerial campaign was thus unsupported by other arms. Second, the Allies significantly overestimated (by a factor of close to 10) German supply requirements while they were in the static defenses of the Gustav Line, especially in the absence of any serious ground actions. Third, the German Army minimized the effects of the campaign against the rail system through rapid repair of damage and construction of bypasses around destroyed rail sections, imposition of stricter rationing, movement at night, and diversion of scarce motor vehicles to transport supplies. Finally, the Allies could not deploy an adequate night bombing force, which prevented their air forces from neutralizing the German countermeasures.

By the end of April, the Allies determined that airpower alone would not force a German withdrawal from the Gustav Line, and they launched Operation DIADEM on May 11. The operation combined an aerial interdiction campaign against supply lines with a ground offensive. This air offensive was focused closer to the immediate German rear areas and also targeted their operational reserves and major command-and-control facilities. Within several weeks, Allied ground forces had penetrated the Gustav Line, linked up with the Anzio beachhead, and captured Rome on June 4.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Air Warfare, Ground-Attack Aviation; Anzio, Battle of; Eaker, Ira Clarence; Italy Campaign; Rome, Advance on and Capture of

References

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Stratemeyer, George Edward (1890–1969)

Lieutenant general in the U.S. Army Air Forces and, later, the U.S. Air Force. Born in Cincinnati, Ohio, on November 24, 1890, George Edward Stratemeyer graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1915. Commissioned in the infantry, he served along the Mexican border. In 1916, however, Stratemeyer transferred to the Signal Corps and became an aviator.

During World War I, Stratemeyer commanded the School of Military Aeronautics at Ohio State University. He was then chief test pilot at Kelly Field, Texas, and Chanute Field, Illinois. In 1921, he took command of Chanute Field. Stratemeyer was next assigned to Hawaii and then taught tactics at West Point from 1924 to 1929. He graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field, Virginia, in 1930 and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1932, where he then taught for several years.

Promoted to lieutenant colonel, Stratemeyer commanded the 7th Bombardment Group at Hamilton Field, California, from 1936 to 1938. He graduated from the Army War College in 1939 and then commanded the Southeast Air Corps Training Center, Maxwell Field, Alabama. He next served as chief of the Air Staff at Washington, D.C., and was promoted to major general in 1942.

In August 1943, Stratemeyer arrived in India to take command of U.S. Army Air Forces in the China-Burma-India theater, where his forces performed important work in the resupply of Chinese troops fighting the Japanese. President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved Stratemeyer's plan to bomb Japanese forces from a base in India and others in China. Stratemeyer

next headed the Eastern Air Command (a joint U.S.-British air organization) and Army Air Forces in China with headquarters in Chongqing (Chungking). His units helped relocate some 200,000 Chinese troops and 5,000 horses from eastern to western China. Stratemeyer was promoted to lieutenant general in May 1945.

From February 1946 to April 1949, Stratemeyer led the new Air Defense Command. A forceful advocate of an expanded air force, he promoted the establishment of an air force academy. He then commanded the Far East Air Force. When the United States entered the Korean War in 1950, Stratemeyer's meager air assets helped prevent the invading North Korean forces from achieving victory. Throughout, his units maintained air supremacy over Korea.

A massive heart attack in May 1951 cut short Stratemeyer's career, and he retired in January 1952. He died in Orlando, Florida, on August 9, 1969.

UZAL W. ENT AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Burma Air Campaign; China-Burma-India Theater; Flying Tigers; Hump, The

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Stroop, Jürgen (1895–1952)

German Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) general. Born on September 26, 1895, in Detmold, Josef Stroop joined the 55th Bavarian Infantry Regiment in August 1914. He later blamed the Jews and others for Germany's defeat in World War I. Stroop even changed his first name from the "Jewish-sounding" Josef to Jürgen.

Stroop joined the SS in July 1932, rapidly rising in rank. By 1939, he was a Brigadeführer. Stroop received the assignment of suppressing the uprising

by Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto (April 19–May 16, 1943). Commanding 2,000 men, Stroop ordered the Jewish quarter of Warsaw set on fire to burn out resisting Jews and other dissidents and turned antiaircraft guns on the buildings. Stroop was responsible for the killing and capturing of 56,065 persons. Including those who likely perished at Treblinka and other concentration camps, he was responsible for the deaths of more than 71,000 people. For this slaughter, Stroop was awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class, and promoted to Gruppenführer.

Stroop later directed SS and police activities in Greece. He surrendered to the Americans at the end of the war and was tried and convicted for the execution of U.S. fliers in Greece. He was then extradited to Poland, where he was tried for crimes there. Sentenced to death on charges related to the Warsaw Rising, Stroop was convicted and hanged in Warsaw on March 6, 1952.

MATTHEW ALAN MCNIECE

See also

Holocaust; Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

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Student, Kurt (1890–1978)

German Luftwaffe general. Born in Birkholz, Brandenburg, on May 12, 1890, Kurt Student was educated at the cadet school at Lichterfelde (1905–1908). He joined the German Army as an officer candidate in 1910 and was commissioned a lieutenant in 1911. Student volunteered for flying school and qualified as a pilot in 1913. On the outbreak of World War I, he was testing aircraft armament. From 1916, he commanded a fighter squadron on the Western Front, where he was wounded in aerial combat.

Student continued in the army after the war and was posted to the Central Flying Office, where he worked with the clandestine German air units

training in Soviet Russia. He then reverted to the infantry (1928–1933), where he was promoted to major and served as a battalion commander. Following Adolf Hitler's accession to power, Student directed air training schools for the Aviation Ministry. Promoted to colonel in August 1933, he headed the test center for aviation equipment and organized Germany's first airborne forces.

Promoted to major general in April 1938, Student was inspector of Parachute Forces. As commander of the 7th Air Division of paratroops and glider-borne infantry, he was chiefly responsible for this major innovation of airborne warfare. Thanks in part to his high standards and his talent in picking capable subordinates, Student soon commanded some of the finest infantry in the world. He was promoted to lieutenant general in January 1940.

Student played a key role in Hitler's May 10, 1940, invasion of France and the Low Countries, directing his elite forces in reducing key strongpoints, most notably Fortress Eben Emael in Belgium. Student suffered a serious head wound while directing an assault at Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and departed on leave. He urged an immediate assault on Britain and establishment of an airhead in the Folkstone area before Britain could recover its balance. Hitler believed that the British would recognize the inevitability of a German victory and negotiate, and he let the opportunity pass. Student returned to duty in September, when he was promoted to major general.

Student participated in operations against Greece and then directed the successful airborne assault on Crete in May 1941. The heavy casualties in this operation, the consequence of Ultra intercepts, convinced Hitler that the days of parachute troops were over. From that point, the German airborne forces were employed as elite infantry. Student's forces carried out the rescue of deposed Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in September 1943 in a raid commanded by Standartenführer Otto Skorzeny.

General Kurt Student, commander of German airborne forces, reviewing his men in May 1940. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

As a lieutenant general, Student commanded the First Parachute Army during the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion. As a colonel general from July 1944, he assisted in the defense of Holland during Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944). In November 1944, he assumed command of Army Group H in defense of the Rhine. In late April 1945, he commanded Army Group Vistula.

Taken prisoner by the British in Schleswig-Holstein, Student was charged with the mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war by his forces in Crete. Tried by a British court and found guilty on three out of eight charges, he was sentenced to five years in prison. A request by the Greek government that he be extradited for trial on charges of numerous crimes committed against civilians on Crete was denied. Student was released on medical grounds in 1948. He died in Lemgo in the Federal Republic of Germany on July 1, 1978.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Airborne Forces, Axis; Crete, Battle of; Greece Campaign, German; Hitler, Adolf; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; Signals Intelligence

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Stülpnagel, Karl Heinrich von (1886–1944)

German Army general and opposition leader. Born in Darmstadt on January 2, 1886, Karl Heinrich von Stülpnagel received a classical education and pursued studies in Geneva. In 1904, Stülpnagel entered the German Army as an officer candidate. He served on the General Staff during World War I, rising to major.

Stülpnagel continued in the army after the war and held infantry commands. Promoted to colonel in 1932, he headed the Foreign Studies Branch of the General Staff from 1933 to 1937. Promoted to major general in 1936 and to lieutenant general in 1937, he was appointed head of the Operations Section of the General Staff in 1938.

Stülpnagel impressed his colleagues with his wit and intelligence, and many believed him to be one of the best officers in the German Army. Stülpnagel’s personal opposition to war against Britain, however, would lead him to join his close associates, Generals Ludwig Beck and Franz Halder, in the conspiracy against Adolf Hitler.

Stülpnagel was promoted to general of infantry in April 1939, and he served as deputy chief of the General Staff (August 1938–May 1940). He commanded II Corps in the May 10, 1940, invasion of France, and following the defeat of France, he served as chairman of the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden from June 1940 to February 1941. He then commanded the Seventeenth Army in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union. Poor health forced him to relinquish this command in November 1941.

In March 1942, Stülpnagel took over from his cousin Otto von Stülpnagel the post of military governor of Paris. In this position, Karl Heinrich von Stülpnagel enforced German occupation policies, including the execution of 29,000 hostages in an effort to end resistance to German rule. Here, he became active in the opposition’s plot to assassinate Hitler. He was the only German general outside of Berlin who actively participated in the coup plans

of July 1944. Believing that the bomb plot of July 20 had been successful, Stülpnagel ordered the arrest of some 1,000 German security personnel in Paris.

Stülpnagel's inability to convince Field Marshal Günther von Kluge (German commander in chief, west) to support the coup doomed his efforts. Kluge ordered Stülpnagel to release the German prisoners and then fired the beleaguered general.

Ordered to report to Berlin on July 21, Stülpnagel stopped en route at Verdun and there attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head. Only blinded, he was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to Berlin. Tried there by the People's Court, he was convicted and sentenced to death. Stülpnagel was hanged at Plötzensee Prison in Berlin on August 30, 1944.

GENE MUELLER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Beck, Ludwig; France, Battle for; Halder, Franz; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von

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Stülpnagel, Otto von (1878–1948)

German Army general. Born in Berlin on June 16, 1878, into a distinguished military family, Otto von Stülpnagel was commissioned in the German Army in 1898 and served on the Western Front in World War I. After the war, he was extradited to France to stand trial on charges of having murdered civilians, but he was acquitted.

Stülpnagel remained in the Reichswehr after the war. Opposed to democracy, he worked to overthrow the Weimar Republic and became an avid Nazi. In the 1920s, Stülpnagel served as inspector of transport troops and was promoted to major general in 1929. In his post, he feuded with Colonel Heinz Guderian over the utility of tanks and armor. Stülpnagel

issued orders that specifically prohibited the development of tactical plans using concentrations of armor, advocating instead tanks in infantry support. Stülpnagel then joined what would become the Luftwaffe, rising to the rank of general of aviation. He returned to the army in 1939.

Retired from the army that same year in Adolf Hitler's purge of generals, Stülpnagel was recalled to active duty in the rank of general of infantry in 1940. Too old to be assigned a field command, he served on the French armistice committee and was instrumental in convincing Hitler to allow the new Vichy French government some autonomy in its control of France's colonial possessions.

Hitler then appointed Stülpnagel military governor of the German-occupied portion of France. In this post, Stülpnagel served as a moderating force between the French and hard-line German elements led by Heinrich Himmler and the Schutzstaffel (SS). Stülpnagel's goal was to retain military control over police functions. He endorsed harsh measures against the French Resistance, and by March 1941 deportations of French Jews had begun.

After police powers were transferred to the SS, Stülpnagel resigned his post and was succeeded in March 1942 by his cousin, General of Infantry Karl Stülpnagel. Charged after the war with crimes in France, Otto von Stülpnagel hanged himself in Paris on February 6, 1948.

THOMAS LANSFORD

See also

Guderian, Heinz; Holocaust; Vichy France

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Stump, Felix Budwell (1894–1972)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born on December 15, 1894, in Parkersburg, West Virginia, Felix Budwell Stump graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, in 1917. He served in the cruiser *Cincinnati* during World War I. Following the war, Stump underwent flight training at Pensacola during 1919–1920, and he earned an MS in aeronautical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1923. Stump then was assigned to Torpedo Squadron 2 on the experimental aircraft carrier *Langley*. Later, he was navigator of the carrier *Lexington* and then, with the rank of commander, executive officer of the carrier *Enterprise* in 1940 and 1941.

Stump's World War II service began with his transfer in January 1942 from commanding officer of the *Langley* to the staff of the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet. After the dissolution of that command the following month, he spent eight months as air officer to the commander, Western Sea Frontier. In December 1942, Captain Stump commissioned the new carrier *Lexington*. He commanded it in operations against Tarawa (November 20–24, 1943), the Gilbert Islands (November 1943), and Kwajalein (January 19–-February 6, 1944).

Stump commanded escort Carrier Division 24 for most of 1944. He was promoted to rear admiral in May 1944. As part of Task Force 52, he supported landings in the Mariana Islands during June–August 1944. Stump commanded Task Unit 77.4.2 (known as "Taffy II") during the invasion of Leyte (October 20–December 25, 1944). In this operation, his escort carriers engaged Admiral Kurita Takeo's powerful Center Force at the battle off Samar and sank the Japanese heavy cruiser *Chikuma*.

Stump commanded Task Unit 77.12.1 in support of the landings at Mindoro in December 1944. He then commanded the San Fabian Carrier Group during the landings on Luzon in January 1945. During March–June 1945, Stump's escort carriers supported the invasion of Okinawa.

Stump became chief of Naval Air Technical Training in June 1945, a post he held until his promotion to vice admiral in December 1948. From 1948 to 1951 he was commander of the Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet and from 1951 to 1953 commander of the U.S. Second Fleet. In July 1953, Stump was promoted to admiral and became commander in chief, Pacific Command. Later, in March 1955, he was appointed U.S. military adviser to the South East Asia Treaty Organization. Stump retired in August 1958 and died in Bethesda, Maryland, on June 13, 1972.

ROBERT KRUMEL

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Kwajalein, Battle for; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Tarawa, Battle of

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Submachine Guns

The submachine gun (SMG) is a pistol-caliber automatic firearm that can be carried by one man in vehicles for local defense. It is also extremely useful in trench fighting and in operations to clear buildings. In the latter form of warfare, the SMG came into its own, able to fire bursts of pistol ammunition in enclosed spaces at short ranges within which the cartridge was still fully effective. On the battlefield, it also had its uses in fighting in bunkers and in wooded areas where ranges were short. All special operating forces used it during World War II.

Bethel Abiel Revelli, an Italian more famous for his machine-gun designs, invented the first SMG. His Villar Perosa weapon of 1915, although a tactical failure, used a pistol cartridge but fired it automatically by the "blowback" principle. This relies simply on the weight of the breechblock to delay rearward movement caused by the explosion of the gases in the cartridge case. These gases push the cartridge case to the rear, with safety ensured by delaying the movement of the breechblock until the pressure in the barrel has dropped after the bullet has left the barrel. Also in World War I, the Germans used their Mauser pistol as an SMG and issued an attachable stock for it, but this weapon was too light to be really effective.

In the interwar period, the Americans developed the highly effective Thompson SMG, which used the .45-caliber automatic Colt pistol cartridge. The Thompson was an important development, for it used a pistol cartridge but was of sufficient weight to fire accurately in short bursts. At the same

time, the Germans further developed their World War I Bergmann SMG. It eventually became well known as the MP38 and MP40 SMGs.

The United States continued to make and issue the Thompson in .45 caliber throughout the war, although a much cheaper variant, the M3 (known as the “grease gun” from its appearance), was also issued. Both weapons were effective at the short ranges for which they were designed, and British troops were often armed with the Thompson, which they preferred to their own Sten gun.

The Sten gun was a weapon born from economic need. British forces needed an SMG, but only rimmed cartridges were in use for the British Army pistol. The 9mm Parabellum round was available, however, and so the design was based on that cartridge. The weapon was initially quite crude, although it developed as the war progressed. It had the unfortunate capability of firing when it was not required to, and British troops often relieved German troops of their MP38 or MP40 SMGs as soon as they could.

The MP38 and MP40 utilized the same ammunition, which simplified supply. The Germans used both as well as some older Bergmann SMGs throughout the war. These solid and reliable weapons were effective to 50 yards. They were steel and plastic throughout, with no wood in their construction, a hallmark of all later examples of SMGs.

German troops in the field often preferred the Soviet PPSh M1941. A much cruder weapon, it had a wooden stock and fired from a 71-round drum magazine (as opposed to the MP38 32-round magazine). Further, the weapon was little affected by the weather and could be fired in dusty, muddy, or icy conditions, a characteristic of immense value to the operator.

The receivers of later PPS 1943 models were stamped out so that tolerances were maximized, allowing the weapon to accumulate dust, dirt, carbon deposits, and other encrustations that defeated the more accurately made German weapons. This fact allowed the Soviet weapons to keep on firing when the Germans were struggling with their weapons.

The Japanese came upon the SMG late in the war, and the Type 100 SMG was used by Japanese paratroops in the attack at Leyte (October 20–December 25, 1944). It was not well made and was considered inferior to European and American standards, but it could also be seen as a simple, cheap weapon, two of the characteristics of the SMG.

A member of the U.S. 1st Marine Division firing on a Japanese sniper with his Thompson submachine gun as a companion runs for cover. The marines were part of the effort to secure Japanese-held Wand Ridge during the April–June 1945 Battle for Okinawa. (Corbis)

The Italians, having invented the weapon, did not fail to develop the idea themselves. Pietro Beretta and his company designed and manufactured the Model 38 SMG, which was followed by the Models 38A and 18/42, all using 9mm Parabellum. These were wooden-stocked weapons and were highly regarded at the time.

A combination of the SMG and the standard rifle evolved into the assault rifle, which was first developed by the Germans in World War II.

DAVID WESTWOOD

See also

Pistols and Revolvers; Rifles

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Submarines

During the period between the two world wars, the world's major navies constructed small classes of submarines that served the dual purpose of meeting immediate operational needs and providing data for the development of improved vessels. By the mid-1930s, most of these navies had evolved one or two basic types that were well matched to their operational requirements, had attained substantial design maturity, and were suited to large-scale series production. The vast majority of World War II submarines, rather than having radical new designs, were of standardized types that had been modified in light of operational experience.

These standardized submarine types shared many common features. Functionally, they were submersibles rather than true submarines; their designs were optimized for operation on the surface, and they had only limited capabilities while submerged. Underwater, they relied on electric motors powered by large storage batteries for propulsion; on the surface, they used diesel engines for propulsion and to recharge the batteries. The submarines incorporated substantial numbers of torpedo tubes and reload torpedoes, and they also mounted guns for use against surface or aerial targets.

Their operational range was a function of the capacity of their bunkers for diesel fuel; their radius of action while submerged was limited by battery cell capacity. Maximum speed while submerged usually was not much more than half their surface speed, and maintaining high submerged speeds was impossible for any length of time without totally draining the batteries and forcing the submarine to the surface. Consequently, most navies during the conflict primarily operated their submarines as stealthy surface vessels that could submerge for evasion or escape before or after an attack.

Britain

British submarine development was influenced by the cruiser and fleet submarine concepts. The main thrust of early evolution between the wars centered on the overseas patrol type, which displaced 1,475 tons on the surface and had a range of 10,900 miles at eight knots, a submerged endurance of 36 hours at two knots, and a diving depth of 500 feet. Armament included a battery of 8 torpedo tubes with 14 torpedoes and a 4-

inch deck gun. A group of similar-sized mine-laying submarines also was built, as was a small series of fast large submarines for work with the fleet, but both of these developments proved expensive and of limited operational usefulness.

In the early 1930s, a fresh start was made with the Swordfish (S) class, which was designed for offensive patrols in narrow waters. These boats displaced 640 tons standard. They had a cruising range of 3,800 miles at 9 knots on the surface and 36 hours at 3 knots submerged, and they could dive to 300 feet. Armament was 6 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and a 3-inch gun. A larger overseas patrol type, the Triton (T) class, appeared in 1937. These displaced 1,090 tons standard; they had a cruising range of 4,500 miles at 11 knots on the surface and 55 hours at 3 knots submerged, and they could dive to 300 feet. Armament was 10 torpedo tubes with 16 torpedoes and a 4-inch gun. Britain concentrated its production of submarines during the war on these two types, producing a total of 62 of the S type and 53 of the T type.

Just before the war, the Royal Navy developed a small submarine for training not only crews and new commanding officers but also antisubmarine vessels. When war came, the design was quickly adapted for operational use, and it proved to be particularly useful in confined waters such as the North Sea and the Mediterranean. The U class displaced between 540 and 646 tons on the surface, with a range of 3,600 miles at 10 knots on the surface, a submerged endurance of 60 hours at 2 knots, and a diving depth of 200 feet. Armament included a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 10 torpedoes and a 3-inch deck gun.

A total of 71 boats were constructed of this class and its slightly improved successors of the V class. Although they were useful boats in the early part of the war, the later examples diverted resources from construction of more effective vessels. Britain also built some 36 midget submarines; with four-man crews, these vessels attacked ships at anchor in harbor.

France

France constructed three series of submarines in the period between the wars: large, oceangoing, long-range vessels for worldwide service and for operation with the fleet, smaller boats for offensive patrols in European waters, and a successful group of minelayers. The first postwar French submarines were of

the 1922 and 1923 programs and were based on the study of German U-boats taken as reparations. These nine submarines of the Requin class had a standard surface displacement of 947 tons and were armed with 10 21.7-inch torpedo tubes, 1 3.9-inch deck gun, and 2 25.2mm machine guns. The 31 large submarines of the Redoutable class (launched between 1928 and 1937) generally were regarded as effective boats. They displaced 1,384 tons standard on the surface; their maximum range was 10,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface, and their submerged endurance was 60 hours at 2 knots. They had a battery of 11 torpedo tubes (7 of them in two remotely controlled trainable external mounts) with a total of 13 torpedoes and a single 3.9-inch deck gun.

The French also constructed several smaller seagoing patrol-type submarines. A 1922 building program called for four 600-ton boats. These were the Sirène class, nine of which were eventually built. Several other patrol-type submarine classes were authorized in the years before the war, but not all were complete when France fell in June 1940. These submarines displaced between 600 and 900 tons. The Aurore class, the last series of French submarines being constructed when World War II began, displaced 893 tons and were armed with nine 21.7-inch torpedo tubes (three in an external remotely controlled trainable mount) plus a single 3.9-inch deck gun and two 13mm machine guns.

The French mine-laying submarines of the Saphir class displaced 761 tons on the surface and could cruise for 7,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface. They had a submerged endurance of 48 hours at 2 knots and could safely operate to a depth of 250 feet. They carried 5 torpedo tubes (3 in a trainable external mount) with 7 torpedoes, 32 mines, and a single 3-inch deck gun.

The French Navy also operated the largest submarine in the world at the outbreak of the war. The *Surcouf,* designed for long-range commerce warfare, displaced 2,880 tons standard on the surface and had a range of 10,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface. It had a range of 60 hours at 2 knots submerged and could operate safely at a depth of 250 feet. The *Surcouf*'s battery included no fewer than 12 tubes (8 in external mounts) with 22 torpedoes, two 8-inch guns in a special turret mounting, and a seaplane stowed in a hangar and launched with a catapult. The *Surcouf* also was equipped with a special compartment to accommodate prisoners taken from

intercepted vessels and a small motor launch to transport boarding parties. The submarine proved to be successful in peacetime, but it never operated in combat as designed and was subsequently lost in a collision.

Soviet Union

At the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Soviet Union deployed the world's largest submarine force, with 168 boats in service. Soviet mass production of submarines began early and produced a wide variety of types. There were two basic series of M-type coastal submarines, two basic medium submarine series (the S type, derived from the same basic design as the German Type VII, and the Shchuka [Pike] type of indigenous origin), minelayers of the L type, and long-range boats of the K type.

The final M type displaced 283 tons when surfaced, had a range of 4,500 miles at 8 knots on the surface or 36 hours at 3 knots submerged, could dive to 295 feet, and had a battery of 2 torpedo tubes with 4 torpedoes and a 45mm antiaircraft gun. The S type displaced 856 tons surfaced, had a range of 9,500 miles at 9 knots on the surface or 45 hours at 3 knots submerged, could dive to 330 feet, and had a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and a 4-inch deck gun. Their indigenous rivals displaced 587 tons, had a range of 3,650 miles at 7 knots on the surface or 50 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 295 feet, and carried 6 torpedo tubes with 10 torpedoes. The minelayers displaced 1,108 tons, had a range of 10,000 miles at 8.6 knots on the surface or 60 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 330 feet, and carried 8 torpedo tubes with 14 torpedoes and 20 mines.

The K-type boats were popular with their crews and regarded as the best Soviet submarines of the war. These displaced 1,480 tons, had a range of 15,000 miles at 9 knots on the surface or 50 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 330 feet, and carried 10 torpedo tubes with 24 torpedoes. Despite this variety, the Soviet Union's yards produced a great many submarines, completing some 200 boats during the course of the war.

United States

The U.S. Navy took the process of type standardization the furthest, entering World War II with a single basic design that was improved but never

replaced during the course of the conflict. These fleet boats emerged through the crystallization and synthesis of a series of designs produced to meet requirements for fleet submarines to accompany the battle fleet, cruiser submarines for long-distance raiding, and patrol submarines for offensive operations in the Pacific. Nine vessels (essentially experimental prototypes) in five classes were produced between 1921 and 1934, ranging in size from 1,100 tons to 2,700 tons standard on the surface. Overall, these submarines were not very successful, suffering problems with their diesel machinery, diving ability, and general reliability, but they provided valuable experience and data for an improved design.

The new series that began with the Porpoise class of 1934 were of 1,310 to 1,475 tons standard on the surface. They introduced diesel-electric reduction drive, which proved to be vastly more reliable than previous arrangements. Surface cruising range was 11,000 miles at 10 knots, and they had a patrol endurance of 75 days. They could operate for up to 48 hours submerged at 2 knots and had a safe-operating depth limit of 250 feet. A battery of 6 to 8 torpedo tubes with 16 to 24 torpedoes was fitted, along with a light deck gun. Between 1934 and 1940, 38 submarines of this group were constructed, and they formed the backbone of the U.S. submarine force when the United States entered the war.

The Gato class that followed became the first wartime standard class. Displacement rose to 1,526 tons, the torpedo tube battery increased to 10 tubes, and safe depth increased to 300 feet. They were followed by the similar Balao class; its deeper safe-operating depth of 400 feet was accomplished by substituting high-tensile steel for the mild steel used in earlier boats. The Tench class introduced diesel-electric direct drive that brought about a significant reduction in noise and internal machinery space, leading to the addition of four reload torpedoes to the outfit. A total of 221 submarines from these three classes were completed during or immediately after the war. Significant wartime modifications included reducing superstructure, adding radar, and enlarging the gun armament by fitting 4-inch or 5-inch deck guns and adding multiple light antiaircraft weapons.

Looking forward along the deck from the stern of a U.S. Navy submarine off the submarine base of New London, Connecticut, August 1943. (National Archives)

Germany

The Germans developed their submarines clandestinely, since the Versailles Treaty prohibited them such weapons. Design work continued for foreign navies, with production undertaken in the customers' yards under German supervision. The first new German submarine, *U-1*, was completed only five weeks after German chancellor Adolf Hitler's repudiation of the Versailles Treaty on June 29, 1935.

The overwhelming majority of the 1,150 U-boats commissioned between 1935 and 1945 belonged to two groups: the 500-ton Type VII medium boats and the 740-ton Type IX long-range submarines. The Type VIIC displaced between 760 and 1,000 tons on the surface; it had a cruising range of 6,500 to 10,000 miles at 12 knots on the surface and 80 miles at 4 knots submerged. It

had a battery of 5 torpedo tubes with 14 torpedoes, an 88mm deck gun, and ever-increasing numbers of light antiaircraft weapons. Almost 700 of these boats in all their variants entered service during World War II.

The Type IXC displaced 1,120 tons; it had a cruising range of 11,000 miles at 12 knots on the surface and 64 hours at 2 knots submerged. It had a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 22 torpedoes, a 105mm deck gun, and ever-increasing numbers of light antiaircraft weapons. Almost 200 of this type and its variants were commissioned.

Germany also commissioned several other important types of submarines during the war. Among the most important were the Type X minelayers and the Type XIV supply boats. Both variants operated as replenishment vessels for operational boats during the Battle of the Atlantic, providing fuel, provisions, medical supplies, reload torpedoes, and even medical care and replacement crew members. Consequently, they became prime targets for Allied antisubmarine forces, and few survived.

The other major vessels were the radical Type XXI and Type XXIII boats designed for high submerged speed and extended underwater operation. Revolutionary streamlined hull shapes, greatly increased battery space, and the installation of snorkels allowed these boats to operate at submerged speeds that made them difficult targets for Allied antisubmarine forces. Confused production priorities and the general shortage of materials late in the war prevented more than a few from putting to sea operationally.

Italy

Italian submarines were of four basic types: large ocean-going cruiser submarines, large minelayers, large long-range patrol boats, and medium-size vessels. The cruisers were few and proved to be rather unsuccessful, especially because they were slow to dive; they saw little operational service. The minelayers were much more successful. They displaced between 1,054 and 1,305 tons standard on the surface, with a range of 8,500 miles at nine knots on the surface, a submerged endurance of 60 hours at two knots, and a diving depth of 330 feet. Armament included a battery of 6 to 8 torpedo tubes with 8 to 14 torpedoes, 36 mines, and one or two 3-inch deck guns.

Two series of patrol submarines emerged as essentially standard designs immediately before the war began. The larger group displaced between 920

and 1,000 tons standard on the surface, with a range of 9,000 miles at eight knots on the surface, a submerged endurance of 60 hours at two knots, and a diving depth of 330 feet. Armament included a battery of 8 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and one 4-inch deck gun.

The smaller group displaced between 650 and 680 tons standard on the surface, with a range of 5,000 miles at eight knots on the surface, a submerged endurance of 60 hours at two knots, and a diving depth of 330 feet. Armament included a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and one 4-inch deck gun. These smaller patrol submarines performed well in the shallow, clear waters of the Mediterranean. The larger boats performed quite effectively in the Atlantic.

Japan

Japan constructed large submarines intended to operate primarily as integral components of the battle fleet. The Kaidai (admiralty) type design was based on a large German cruiser submarine from World War I, and the type evolved into a series of 24 boats in five classes, constructed between 1921 and 1935. These vessels displaced between 1,390 and 1,635 tons standard, had operating ranges between 10,000 and 14,000 miles at 10 knots, carried a battery of 6 to 8 tubes with 14 to 16 torpedoes, could operate submerged for 36 hours at two knots, and had a safe operating depth of between 200 and 250 feet.

Japan also developed large cruiser submarines of the Junsen (cruiser) type between 1924 and 1938. These eight huge vessels had standard displacements of between 1,970 and 2,231 tons and an operational range of 24,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface. They could dive safely to 300 feet.

In 1939, Japan essentially standardized its large submarine type with a vessel design displacing about 2,100 tons and capable of cruising on the surface for 14,000 miles at 16 knots or 24,000 miles at 10 knots. They could dive to 330 feet. Three models were produced: a headquarters type emphasizing communications and command facilities, an attack type emphasizing torpedo armament, and a scouting type that added hangar space and a catapult for a small reconnaissance floatplane. Some 46 of these large submarines were constructed, plus 3 others that brought together the facilities of all three types into the Sen-toku (special submarine) type, a single monster

hull displacing 3,530 tons standard. Japan also constructed 10 final examples of the Kaidai type early in World War II.

Japan also developed and constructed a series of medium submarines intended for coastal work. In addition, Japan expended considerable effort on the development of midget submarines: small boats with two-man crews intended for stealthy attacks on ports and roadsteads after they were transported close to the scene of operation by larger submarines. Finally, late in the war, Japan was developing submarines with high underwater performance, but these never entered service.

Technology played a major part in determining the effectiveness of submarines. Most navies encountered problems with their torpedoes early, especially those submarine arms that relied on magnetic rather than contact pistols. Radar development conferred a special advantage on Allied submarines in particular, offsetting the edge in optical quality possessed by German and Japanese boats.

U.S. submarines were almost unique in their level of habitability, and they were almost the only boats that featured full air-conditioning and adequate space for their crews to sleep. Sonar developed rapidly, as did countermeasures; some navies put considerable effort into stealth and self-defense measures by emphasizing use of wakeless electric torpedoes and special antiescort homing torpedoes. The course of the submarine war demonstrated that those arms that fell behind in the technological battle suffered disproportionately heavily in combat.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Depth Charges; Hunter-Killer Groups; I-400–Class Japanese Submarines; Leigh Light; Sonar; Submarines, Midget; Torpedoes; Wolf Pack Tactic

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Submarines, Midget

Midget submarines include small submarines, human torpedoes, and submersibles. Although envisioned as a low-cost, mass-producible weapon against both shipping and warships, midget submarines as a group achieved little. First developed by Italy and adopted by Germany, Japan, and Great Britain, midget submarines have had a history of futility with only occasional success. Other than the unprecedented success of the British X-Craft, midget submarines proved costly in terms of human losses and ineffectual in the overall war effort. However, their low production costs made the designs attractive to increasingly desperate nations.

On November 1, 1918, Italian divers riding a modified torpedo sank the ex-*Austrian*, now the Yugoslav dreadnought *Viribus Unitas*. This provided the foundation for the first human-torpedo designs. The Italians continued to experiment with these craft and used them in World War II against the British in the Mediterranean and against the Soviet Union in the Black Sea.

When a prototype of the Siluro a Lenta Corsa (slow-running torpedo) class of submersibles proved hard to handle during testing, its operators cursed the boat with the enduring name of Maiale (pig). A two-man crew straddled the 23-foot-long and 2.5-foot-wide Maiale. Mounted on the nose was a 485-pound warhead that was 5 feet 11 inches long and would be attached underneath the keel of a target. Later, the Maiale employed heavier warheads weighing 550 and 660 pounds. Shrouded propellers afforded propulsion through netted waters.

Operating from one end of a converted tanker, several Maiale boats engaged in assaults against British ships at Gibraltar. Although many of their operators were captured or killed, these efforts nonetheless produced results. Three crews sank more than 20,000 tons of British ships at Gibraltar on September 19, 1941. On December 19, three crews were captured after

heavily damaging the battleships *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant* at Alexandria. Similar attacks damaged other ships but at the loss of most of the operators.

However limited their success, the Maiale-class design gave rise to the Forzatori di Basi CB-class craft, the only ones of this type to see action. In these, a four-man crew operated a boat 49 feet 3 inches by 9 feet 10 inches armed with two 17.7-inch (450mm) torpedoes. Most of the operational CB craft were used in a blockade of Sevastopol in the summer of 1942. The Italians planned to conduct a raid on New York Harbor by a refitted version, the CA.2-class boat. On May 25, 1943, however, British warships sank the Marconi-class submarine *Leonardo da Vinci,* which was to shuttle the *CA.2* across the Atlantic.

A German program, hoping to build on the success of the Maiale, was perhaps the most extensive yet least productive effort by the warring powers to build a midget submarine. The Biber (beaver) was a small single-man vessel armed with two torpedoes attached underneath. The Molch (salamander) was its larger cousin. During September 25–26, 1944, Molch boats attacked Allied vessels supporting Operation DRAGOON. Seven of the nine Molch boats involved were sunk, with no Allied vessels lost. During the first months of 1945, 70 Molch and Biber craft were lost, having sunk only seven Allied ships and damaged two.

The Neger (Negro) was a slight improvement with increased range. On July 5, 1944, a flotilla of Neger boats attacked the Allied Normandy Invasion fleet, losing 15 of 24 of their own and sinking only the British minesweepers *Magic* and *Cato*. The flotilla attacked again on July 7–8, losing all 21 Neger boats to antisubmarine forces and sinking only 1 additional minesweeper, HMS *Pylades*. The German Navy ordered more than 1,000 Seehund (seal) design craft, but only 138 were commissioned. Operated by a two-man crew and armed with two torpedoes, 35 Seehund craft were lost in early 1945 over the course of 140 missions, having sunk only 8 Allied ships.

The Japanese counterpart to these, the Ko-Hyoteki, was well designed but had a poor service record. The Type A–class boats had a crew of two aboard a vessel 78.74 feet long by 6 feet wide that was armed with two torpedoes. Piggybacked on C1-class submarines, five Ko-Hyoteki boats took part in Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Ensign Sakamaki Kazuo of the Ko-Hyoteki that ran aground near Bellows Field became the first U.S.-held Japanese prisoner of war.

The Japanese also deployed Type B–class boats off their Pacific islands. Slightly larger and slower than the Type A, these boats could carry a three-man crew for two or three days. Seven Type-B Ko-Hyoteki craft were sunk in attacks on Diégo-Suarez and Sydney on May 31, 1942, in which they damaged two British warships and sank a ferry. On January 5, 1945, *No. 82* launched its two torpedoes at the U.S. cruiser *Boise,* which was carrying General Douglas MacArthur and his staff. The cruiser evaded the torpedoes, and one of its escorts rammed and sank the Japanese midget sub.

The naval version of Japanese kamikaze (divine wind) suicide aircraft came in the form of the Kaiten (meaning “heaven-shaker”). Essentially a human-guided torpedo, it had a 3,416-pound warhead. Limited range and dependence on a “mother” submarine severely restricted the effectiveness of these, and 900 men and several mother submarines were lost in largely unsuccessful limited operations from November 1944 through July 1945.

The British, after fortifying their Mediterranean harbors against the Italian and German raiders, designed their own improved midget submarines. On November 21, 1943, the British used four Welmans, a single-man boat with a speed of three knots, against a floating U-boat dock near Bergen, Norway. One man was captured when his Welman became entangled in antisubmarine netting; the other three craft encountered various other problems. They escaped to the north, and all three were scuttled.

A Japanese midget submarine, beached at Bellows Field, Hawaii, following the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. (National Archives)

The Chariot was a much-improved design. It was essentially a hollowed-out 21-inch torpedo with a 600-pound detachable warhead. Only six operations involving Chariots were launched, including an aborted attack on November 1, 1942, against the German battleship *Tirpitz*. The British also sank an Italian cruiser under construction in 1943 and attacked and sank the German (ex-Italian) heavy cruisers *Bolzano* and *Gorizia* at La Spezia on June 21 and June 26, 1944, respectively.

The British X-Craft exemplified the best designs and the most successful midget submarines of the war. Three types saw the most service: the X510, X20, and XE series. Each had a four-man crew aboard a boat 49 feet 3 inches by 5 feet 9 inches, could achieve nearly six knots in speed, and could dive to about 300 feet. Craft *X5* through *X10* were all tasked with sinking the *Tirpitz*. The crews of the *X6* and *X7* successfully placed charges that severely damaged the German battleship in its harbor at Bergen, but both crews were captured.

The *X20* and *X23* served an important role in the Allied invasion of Normandy, placing a navigational beacon just before the invasion of June 6, 1944. In 1945, several of the XE class saw action in the Far East. On July 31, multiple operations achieved success, including the sinking of the Japanese cruiser *Takao* by the *XE1* and *XE3* and the destruction by the *XE4* and *XE5* of the underwater telephone cables connecting Saigon to Hong Kong and Singapore.

Daring in design and operations, midget submarines represented the marriage of technology and desperation. The difficulty of transport and the risks of loss of support craft and personnel outweighed the benefits of these small craft. Although midget submarines and human torpedoes did have some spectacular successes, their limited range, speed, and offensive capabilities rendered them largely ineffectual.

MATTHEW ALAN MCNIECE

See also

DRAGOON, Operation; Human Torpedoes; Kaitens; Submarines; *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant,* Sinking of; *Tirpitz,* Attacks on

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Suez Canal

Canal linking the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. First opened in 1869 and designed to facilitate worldwide commercial and military shipping interests, the Suez Canal is located in northern Egypt and runs on a north-south axis. When the canal began operations, it revolutionized shipping because it offered a short link between Europe and Asia and did away with the need for navigating around the entire African continent.

The canal's northern terminus is at Port Said; its southern terminus is situated at Port Tawfik in the Egyptian city of Suez. The Suez Canal does not have locks; instead, water flows into the waterway from both the Red and Mediterranean Seas. Within the canal is the Great Bitter Lake, where excess seawater can be stored. The lake also helps to offset tidal action, keeping the water level in the canal relatively uniform. The canal can accommodate ships with drafts as deep as 62 feet and maximum beams of 245 feet 3 inches.

At the start of World War II the British controlled the waterway, which was a significant strategic advantage for the Allies. A major Axis war aim was to seize control of Egypt and the Suez Canal. The Axis powers were forced to withdraw from Egypt, however, as a consequence of the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4).

The Egyptian government nationalized the canal in 1956, touching off the Suez Crisis that year. The Suez Canal remains vitally important to the world economy, and considerable quantities of oil from the Middle East pass through it each year. Today, all but the largest supertankers can navigate the canal.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

El Alamein, Battle of; Great Britain, Navy; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; TORCH, Operation

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Sugihara Chiune (1900–1986)

Japanese diplomat. Born on January 1, 1900, at Yaotsu, Gifu Prefecture, Sugihara Chiune entered Waseda University in 1918. The next year, he passed an examination given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for overseas studies, and he became a student at a language institute in Harbin, Manchuria. After graduation, in 1924 Sugihara entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and worked in the Japanese consulate in Harbin.

In 1932, Sugihara was transferred to the Division of Foreign Affairs of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) and was involved in negotiations with the Soviet Union for the transfer of the Eastern Chinese Railway. He then returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. After working in the ministry's Personnel Section and the Information Bureau, he was assigned in 1937 as a secretary and interpreter of legation in Helsinki, Finland.

Two years later, Sugihara was assigned as a vice consul to the Japanese consulate in Kaunas, Lithuania, where he was acting consul. In July 1940, as the annexation of the Baltic countries to the Soviet Union loomed, many refugees (most of them Jews who had escaped from Poland) asked Sugihara for Japanese transit visas to escape from Lithuania. Sugihara took personal responsibility for issuing visas until the end of August. As a result, 6,000–10,000 Jewish refugees were saved.

Sugihara then worked in the Japanese consulates in Prague and in Königsberg and in the Japanese legation in Romania. After internment following the end of the war, Sugihara returned to Japan. He resigned from the diplomatic service in 1947. In 1978, the Israeli government honored him

with a medal for his services in saving the lives of Jews during World War II. The government also bestowed on him Israel's highest honor as "Righteous among Nations." Sugihara died on July 31, 1986, at his home near Tokyo.

MASAAKI SHIRAISHI

See also
Holocaust

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Sugiyama Hajime (1880–1945)

Japanese Army field marshal. Born in Fukuoka Prefecture on January 2, 1880, Hajime Sugiyama graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1900. Following routine assignments, he graduated from the Army War College in 1910. During World War I, Sugiyama commanded the 14th Infantry Battalion. In February 1915, he became military attaché in India. He then held several overseas assignments, including with the Japanese mission to the League of Nations.

In 1922, Sugiyama began his rise in the Ministry of War, first as chief of the Aviation Section of the Military Affairs Bureau and then as director of the Military Affairs Bureau. In 1930, he became deputy minister of the army. Appointed army deputy chief of staff in 1934, in February 1937 he joined the cabinet of Senjuro Hayashi as army minister. He was retained in that position in the succeeding cabinet of Fumimaro Konoe. After the July 7, 1937, Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Sugiyama was among the faction that pushed for escalation of the conflict, leading to the 1937–1945 Sino-Japanese War.

In December 1938, Sugiyama assumed command of the northern China theater. Between October 1940 and February 1944, he was army chief of staff. Although Sugiyama's career was capped by conferment of the honorary

rank of field marshal in 1943, he did not distinguish himself for enlightened leadership but excelled only in political maneuvering and following the prevailing political winds within the army. Emperor Hirohito often reprimanded Sugiyama for his evasive statements and his claims that victory over China and then the United States would be easily achieved.

In July 1944, Sugiyama joined the cabinet formed by his former classmate Kuniaki Koiso, who replaced Hideki Tōjō as prime minister. Sugiyama presided over the final mobilization efforts as Japan began preparations for an anticipated Allied invasion of the main islands in early 1945. He responded to the Japanese surrender by committing suicide with a pistol on September 12, 1945.

General Sugiyama Hajime, Japanese minister of war, shown here in Tokyo during a celebration to mark the Japanese capture of Nanjing (Nanking), China, January 5, 1938. (Bettmann/Corbis)

KUROSAWA FUMITAKA

See also

Japan; Japan, Army; Marco Polo Bridge, Battle of; Tōjō Hideki

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Sultan, Daniel Isom (1885–1947)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born in Oxford, Mississippi, on December 9, 1885, Daniel Sultan graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1907 and was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. During the next decades, he rose to the rank of colonel while holding a variety of engineer assignments, including assisting in the construction of fortifications on

Corregidor in the Philippine Islands and conducting surveys for a proposed canal in Nicaragua. He also served as a member of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors; had tours as district engineer for Savannah, Georgia, and Chicago, Illinois; and was engineer commissioner for Washington, D.C. Sultan graduated from the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College.

In December 1938, Sultan, recently promoted to brigadier general, was named commander of the 22nd Infantry Brigade in Hawaii. In April 1941, as a major general, he assumed command of the 38th Infantry Division. A year later, he took command of VIII Corps. In November 1943, Sultan, now a lieutenant general, was appointed deputy commander of the China-Burma-India theater, headed by Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell.

Operating from Delhi, India, Sultan assumed much of Stilwell's administrative and logistical burden, concentrating on getting vitally needed supplies to China by air over the Himalayan Mountains (the Hump) and through the construction of a road (known as the Ledo Road, later renamed the Stilwell Road) and a pipeline across northern Burma ending at Wanting, China. Following the recall of Stilwell in October 1944, Sultan became commander of the India-Burma theater. He commanded all U.S. forces in the theater and personally commanded a combined force of American, British, and Chinese troops that helped drive the Japanese from northern Burma in 1945.

At the end of the war, Sultan was named U.S. Army inspector general. Sultan died in Washington, D.C. on January 14, 1947.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Burma Road; Burma Theater; China; Hump, The; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Sunda Strait, Battle of (February 28–March 1, 1942)

Southwest Pacific naval battle between Allied and Japanese forces. By February 1942, the collective Allied defense of the Southwest Pacific, the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command, had largely collapsed.

Following the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, two major Japanese invasion forces steamed toward the island of Java. The larger of the two, the Western Attack Force, detached 13 transports to conduct landings at Eretan Wetan and Merek. The remaining 43 transports, screened by 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 7 destroyers approached Bantam Bay just east of the entrance to Sunda Strait. An additional force, which included the aircraft carrier *Ryujo,* 2 heavy cruisers, and 2 destroyers, under the command of Rear Admiral Kurita Takeo, stood off in the Java Sea to support the various operations.

Allied intelligence knew of the Japanese intention to land in the region but did not know the exact timetable. Believing that a landing would not occur until the following day, overall ABDA naval commander Dutch vice admiral Conrad Helfrich ordered the surviving Allied naval forces to reassemble at Tjilatjap in an effort to halt the Japanese.

The U.S. heavy cruiser *Houston* and the Australian light cruiser HMAS *Perth* exited Batavia Harbor at 7:00 p.m. on February 28 as ordered. Their escort, the Dutch destroyer *Evertsen*, was delayed, however, and did not take part in the coming battle. The crews of both Allied ships were exhausted after weeks of incessant action. Morale was also low; Japanese forces had handed the Allies one defeat after another. Neither ship carried a full load of fuel, both were low on ammunition and in need of maintenance, and the *Houston*'s after turret was inoperable following a Japanese air attack on February 4.

At 10:39 p.m. on February 28, the Japanese destroyer *Fubuki* spotted the *Perth* and *Houston* approaching Bantam Bay shortly after the transports had begun discharging their troops. The *Fubuki* reported the sighting and, unseen by the Allied vessels, maintained contact. At this point, only three destroyers, including the *Fubuki*, were in the vicinity. The closest heavy cruisers were 20

miles north of the bay. At 11:14 p.m., the *Perth* spotted the *Harukaze,* recognized it as a Japanese destroyer, and opened fire. This prompted the *Fubuki* to launch nine torpedoes, but all missed. The Allied ships circled to port as the light cruiser *Natori,* followed by three additional destroyers, came into view. It is not certain whether the Allied captains realized they had come upon the main invasion fleet.

The cruisers fired upon the light cruiser and destroyers. Two more Japanese destroyers arrived, bringing the number engaged to eight. Light damage was inflicted on the *Perth, Shirayuki,* and *Harukaze* as the destroyers launched several torpedo attacks and the Allied cruisers circled and successfully avoided 28 torpedoes fired against them.

By 11:46 p.m., the heavy cruisers *Mikuma* and *Mogami,* supported by one destroyer, opened fire from the north. The *Houston* hit the *Mikuma* at 11:55 p.m., inflicting light damage. Captain Waller, his ship down to practice shells, decided to lead the force into Sunda Strait. At midnight, the *Mogami* fired 6 torpedoes while two destroyers launched 18.

At 12:05 a.m. on March 1, *Mogami*'s torpedoes, which had run past their intended targets, entered Bantam Bay at 48 knots and struck three Japanese army transports, the minesweeper *W2,* and the *Ryujo Maru*—headquarters ship of General Imamura Hitoshi, commander in chief of the Sixteenth Army. The explosion threw the general into the water. He reached shore three hours later after swimming through oil-coated water. Four of the destroyer torpedoes, however, struck the *Perth* in quick succession, and the light cruiser sank at 12:12 a.m.

Captain Albert H. Rooks, skipper of the *Houston,* seeing that the way west was blocked, turned his ship east and continued to fight, resorting to firing star and practice shells once the ship's live ammunition had been expended. The heavy cruisers, with ranges less than 7,000 yards, began to punish the U.S. ship. Shrapnel killed Rooks five minutes after he had issued an abandon-ship order at 12:25 a.m. By that time, the *Houston* had absorbed overwhelming punishment. Several torpedoes as well as numerous 8-inch and smaller-caliber shells had struck the U.S. cruiser. A salvo penetrated the after engine room, bursting steam lines and killing the entire engine room crew.

The *Houston* finally rolled over and sank at 12:45 a.m. on March 1. The *Houston* lost 693 men, and the *Perth* lost 351 in the battle; 703 survivors of both Allied ships became prisoners of war. During the battle, the Japanese

ships fired 87 torpedoes. Excluding the transports, damage to the Japanese ships was light. Worst hit was the destroyer *Harukaze*, which had 3 men killed and 5 wounded. The Battle of Sunda Strait finalized the Japanese Navy's victory at sea in the East Indies.

RODNEY MADISON AND VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

ABDA Command; Imamura Hitoshi; Java Sea, Battle of; Kurita Takeo; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Sung Che-yuan

See Song Zheyuan

Sun Li-jen

See Sun Liren

Sun Liren (1900–1990)

Nationalist Chinese general. Born in Lujiang (Lukiang), Anhui (Anhwei) Province, on October 17, 1900, Sun Liren (Sun Li-jen) graduated from Qinghua (Tsinghua) University in 1923. He added an engineering degree

from Purdue University in 1924 and a bachelor's degree from the Virginia Military Institute in 1927. Returning to China, he enlisted as a corporal in the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) Army, and by 1930 he commanded a regiment. In the 1937 Battle of Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, he was badly wounded by grenade fragments.

Sun recovered, and in 1942 he and his 38th Division gained fame during the Allied retreat in Burma by rescuing a nearly surrounded British division at Yenangyaung (April 10–19, 1942). For this action, London awarded Sun the Commander Order of the British Empire. While other units collapsed before the Japanese onslaught, Sun kept his division together, withdrawing in good order through mountainous northwest Burma and joining Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell's training operation at Ramgarh as deputy commander of the Chinese army in India—the so-called X-Force.

In late 1943, Sun led his New First Army into northern Burma to help clear the Ledo Road route. In December, he took Yupbang Ga, initiating a six-month drive through the Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys toward Myitkyina. Sun had impressed Stilwell earlier as aggressive and professional. But in January 1944, Stilwell fulminated at apparent Chinese malingering, convinced that Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) had ordered Sun not to risk well-trained Chinese forces in Burma's jungles. Sun countered that American intelligence grossly underestimated Japanese strength, necessitating slowing for more reconnaissance. Scholars substantiate both allegations.



Chinese Nationalist general Sun Liren (Sun Li-Jen), shown here in 1949. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Still, in March the 38th fought successfully alongside Brigadier General Frank Merrill's Marauders in the first joint Sino-American combat operation. Sun took Kamaing, just west of Myitkyina, in June, and Bhamo, near the Chinese border, on December 15, 1944. Sun's 38th Division led the X-Force across the frontier, linking up with the Yunnan Province–based Y-Force on January 27, 1945. This action ended the three-year blockade of China and opened the way for the newly christened Stilwell Road to Kunming. In August, Sun took the Japanese surrender in Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province.

After combat in the Chinese Civil War, Sun became commander in chief of all Nationalist forces in Taiwan in 1950. In 1955, however, he was forced to resign following a subordinate's alleged anti-Jiang plot. Although a secret investigation cleared Sun of any wrongdoing, he was not only forced from his

position but also placed under house arrest from 1955 until 1988, after the end of the Jiang era. A popular figure, Sun died at his home in Taichung, Taiwan, on November 19, 1990.

MARK WILKINSON

See also

Bhamo, Siege of; China; China, Army; China-Burma-India Theater; Merrill, Frank Dow; Myitkyina, Siege of; Stilwell, Joseph Warren; Yenangyaung, Battle of

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Suomussalmi, Battle of (December 7, 1939–January 8, 1940)

Battle of the 1939–1940 Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War). After the failure of protracted negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin ordered the Red Army to invade Finland. Stalin confidently expected victory within two weeks. Soviet forces, however, were poorly led, and they were equipped and trained for mechanized warfare on open terrain rather than the dense forests of Finland. The Soviets were also not prepared for winter warfare in temperatures that plunged to −43 degrees.

The Finns were badly outnumbered, but they were highly motivated and understood that their national survival was at stake. Finnish soldiers were well trained and adept at small-unit tactics, marksmanship, wilderness navigation, and camouflage. Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, commander of Finnish forces, had served with distinction in the Russian Army, and many of his officers had fought against the Russians after World War I to secure Finnish independence. During the subsequent fighting, Finnish skills on skis offset Soviet numbers through tactical mobility and elusiveness.

Prior to the war, a Finnish threat analysis anticipated two Soviet thrusts: a major assault on the Karelian Isthmus aimed at Viipuri (Vyborg) and Helsinki and an attack north of Lake Ladoga to outflank Finnish defenses on the isthmus. Thick forests and the scarcity of roads seemed to forbid large-scale operations in central and northern Finland. Consequently, eight Finnish divisions were deployed on the isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. Only six independent battalions and an understrength division in reserve covered central and northern Finland.

The Russians, however, had secretly built roads and extended rail lines to the border. They committed eight divisions to a major offensive in central and northern Finland, which surprised the Finns. This offensive was designed to cut Finland in half and ravage the agricultural regions bordering the Gulf of Bothnia. As a part of this offensive, the Soviet 163rd Rifle Division was to advance on two forest roads to the town and road junction of Suomussalmi in central Finland as part of the Soviet effort to seize the Bothnian port of Oulu to the west of Suomussalmi. Evacuated by the Finns, Suomussalmi was occupied by the Russians on December 7.

Finnish border guards harassed the Russians until an independent battalion took up positions north of the town. On December 7, Mannerheim committed two battalions of the 9th Division to this front. Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo commanded.

Siilasvuo isolated the 163rd, which now was extended some 25 miles on narrow roads, establishing a roadblock on the southern road from Suomussalmi to the border. Some 350 Finnish troops with heavy machine guns occupied an isthmus between two frozen lakes, affording a clear field of fire against attempts to outflank the position.

Bodies of soldiers from the Red Army's 44th Division lie along the roadside following the Battle of Suomussalmi in Finland. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

To extricate the 163rd, on December 20 the Soviets sent their 44th Motorized Rifle Division along the southern road toward Suomussalmi. This well-trained and well-equipped unit had both artillery and tanks. Finnish interception of Soviet radio signals revealed the Soviet plan, however. On December 22, Mannerheim appointed Siilasvuo commander of the 9th Division and began to send substantial reinforcements to him. Eventually, these units included six infantry battalions, four 76.2mm guns, four 105mm guns, and two 37mm antitank guns. To delay the 44th, Siilasvuo unleashed a series of savage raids on its lead elements. When Soviet attempts to dislodge the Finnish roadblock failed, the 44th halted six miles east of Suomussalmi.

Efforts by Soviet pilots to assist the ground troops were in vain. The Finns concentrated for swift attacks and then dispersed, vanishing into the forests. Bombs dropped on the road were as likely to hit Soviet soldiers as Finns, and the fixed Finnish positions were well camouflaged. While the 44th remained paralyzed, Siilasvuo concentrated on the 163rd. The trapped Soviet soldiers were cut down in droves as they sought to escape, and the unit was annihilated by the night of December 30.

The Soviet 44th Division, strung out in a 20-mile column, proved to be a more difficult foe. Fighting was ferocious, and Finnish losses were substantial. A tank breakout was halted when Bofors antitank gunners

destroyed seven Russian tanks in 15 minutes and following vehicles slid into deep snow in the ditches. The last resistance ended by dawn of January 8 as Russian survivors abandoned their equipment and fled in disorder.

Soviet losses in the Battle of Suomussalmi were 27,500 killed or frozen to death and 1,300 prisoners. The Soviets also lost 43 tanks, 270 other vehicles, and 48 guns. Finnish losses came to 900 killed and 1,770 wounded.

SHERWOOD S. CORDIER

See also

Finland, Air Force; Finland, Army and Navy; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil von

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Sutherland, Richard Kerens (1893–1966)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born on November 27, 1893, in Hancock, Maryland, Richard Kerens Sutherland graduated from Yale University in 1916. He served in France during World War I and rose to the rank of captain. He remained in the army after the war and graduated from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1928 and from the Army War College in 1933. Sutherland was assigned to General Douglas MacArthur's staff in the Philippines in 1938 and became MacArthur's chief of staff in 1939. He was a lieutenant colonel in 1939 and a brigadier general in July 1941.

As MacArthur's chief of staff, Sutherland anticipated, understood, and executed exactly what his commander wanted. MacArthur decided policy, and Sutherland supplied the details. Sutherland counterbalanced MacArthur's verbal eloquence with sharp, unemotional logic. Promoted to major general in December 1941, Sutherland supervised the 1941–1942 Philippines Campaign, planned President Manuel Quezon's evacuation, and convinced MacArthur to comply with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's orders sending

him to Australia. Once they were in Australia, MacArthur sent Sutherland to New Guinea with the authority, if necessary, to relieve Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger. Had Sutherland done so, he would have assumed command of I Corps, a step toward command of an army. Sutherland placed the good of the service above his own ambitions, and Eichelberger remained in command.

Beginning in January 1943, MacArthur employed Sutherland in a strategic planning and liaison role with Washington. That March, Sutherland represented MacArthur at a conference in Washington regarding 1943–1944 Pacific theater operations. By October 1943, Sutherland was the de facto deputy commander to MacArthur and was promoted to lieutenant general in February 1944. Intelligent and yet imperious, Sutherland worked poorly with the navy staff and, indeed, with the army staff in Washington.

Sutherland incurred MacArthur's displeasure when he ignored his commander's orders not to bring his Australian officer-mistress to the Philippines in 1944. Sutherland had hoped for army command, but MacArthur now snubbed him. By February 1945, a depressed Sutherland was performing his duties by rote. He took leave in the United States in the summer but returned to the Pacific on the Japanese surrender to restore order to MacArthur's headquarters.

Sutherland remained in Japan for three months and then returned to the United States and retired in November 1946. He died in Washington, D.C., on June 25, 1966.

JOHN W. WHITMAN

See also

Eichelberger, Robert Lawrence; MacArthur, Douglas; New Guinea Campaign; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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Suzuki Kantarō (1867/1868–1948)

Japanese Navy admiral and prime minister of Japan (1945). Born in Osaka in 1867 or 1868, Suzuki Kantarō graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1887 and the Naval War College in 1898. He saw combat in the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War and in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Following service in a variety of positions at sea and ashore, including command of the Naval Academy, Suzuki was promoted to admiral in 1923.

In 1925, Suzuki became chief of the Naval General Staff. He retired in 1929. Transferring to the reserves, he was appointed grand chamberlain to the emperor and a member of the Privy Council. Suzuki served in that post until he was badly wounded by assassins during a failed coup attempt on February 26, 1936.

On April 5, 1945, Suzuki was recalled from retirement to replace Koiso Kuniaki as prime minister. Faced with Japan's military collapse, Suzuki's cabinet remained deadlocked over whether to surrender or fight a last-ditch battle in defense of the home islands. Although Suzuki continued to maintain a bellicose pose in public, he supported foreign minister Tōgō Shigenori's desperate and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to enlist the help of the Soviet Union as a mediator with the United States.

By August 1945, the situation for Japan had become dire. On August 6, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima; it was followed with an atomic attack on Nagasaki three days later. Meanwhile, on August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. Nevertheless, the members of Suzuki's cabinet were unable to reach a decision until Emperor Hirohito broke the deadlock. Suzuki and his cabinet resigned on August 17, 1945. Suzuki died in Noda City in Chiba Prefecture on April 7, 1948.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Japan; Japan, Surrender of

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Suzuki Sosaku (1891–1945)

Japanese Army general. Born in Aichi Prefecture on September 27, 1891, Suzuki Sosaku graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1912 and was commissioned in the infantry. He graduated from the Army War College in 1919.

Suzuki served on the General Staff twice (1920–1923 and 1925–1928) and was a resident officer in Germany from 1923 to 1925. He then served on the staff of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry from 1928 to 1933 and concurrently as an instructor at the Army War College from 1929 to 1933. He also served on the headquarters staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army from 1933 to 1935.

Promoted to colonel in 1935, Suzuki commanded the 4th Infantry Regiment. In 1937, he simultaneously became chief of the 2nd Section in the Department of Military Education and a staff member in the Supreme Headquarters. Promoted to major general in 1938, he served as the Central China Area Army vice chief of staff in 1938 and 1939 and as the China Expeditionary Army vice chief of staff in 1939 and 1940. In 1940, he took over as chief of the 3rd Division (transportation and communication) of the General Staff.

Promoted to lieutenant general in 1941, at the beginning of the Pacific war Suzuki was chief of staff of the Twenty-Fifth Army, assisting army commander Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki in executing the seizure of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore from December 1941 to February 1942. Now assigned to the Department of Weaponry, he took office as the chief of the Department of Transportation and then commander of the Shipping Headquarters in 1943.

In July 1944, Suzuki became commander of the new Thirty-Fifth Army with the mission of defending the vast area of the central and southern Philippines. He had only one division on Leyte Island in the central Philippines when U.S. forces landed there on October 20, 1944. Suzuki moved with his headquarters from Cebu City to Leyte, concentrated his military assets as much as he could, and endeavored to drive back the U.S.

forces. Given overwhelming U.S. command of the air and the sea, this proved to be impossible, and most Japanese forces on Leyte were destroyed.

Committing most of his men to the defense of Mindanao, Suzuki returned to Cebu in late March 1945, but he left there for Mindanao by small boat in early April and was killed in the Mindanao Sea during a U.S. air attack on April 19. Suzuki was posthumously promoted to full general.

NAKAYAMA TAKASHI

See also

Leyte Landings; Malaya Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Suzuki Teiichi (1888–1989)

Japanese Army general and politician. Born on December 16, 1888, in Chiba, Japan, Suzuki Teiichi graduated from the Army Cadet School and the War College. A typical Japanese army technocrat, Suzuki held various field and staff duties in China and became a leading expert on China in the army.

From the mid-1930s, Suzuki cultivated close relations with General Tōjō Hideki that eventually brought him important government posts. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1940, Suzuki retired from active service in April 1941. However, in the same month he was appointed cabinet minister-cum-director of the National Planning Bureau and was involved in the war mobilization program of the Konoe and Tōjō cabinets. Between November 1943 and October 1944, Suzuki served as an adviser to the Tōjō and Koiso cabinets.

In September 1945, Suzuki was arrested by the Allied occupation authority. Brought to trial before the International War Crimes Tribunal, he was sentenced to imprisonment; he was released in 1955. Suzuki died in Chiba on July 15, 1989.

See also

Koiso Kuniaki; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Tōjō Hideki

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Sweden

Sweden, a democratic nation, has a land area of 173,745 square miles and had a 1939 population of just under 6.5 million people. Located in Northern Europe, Sweden shares a common border with Norway to the west and Finland to the east. Denmark is across the Baltic Sea to the south. Swedish interests before the war had been served by the balance of great powers in Europe, and Swedes greatly feared that this would be upset during the conflict. Sweden had a tradition of neutrality; it had last been at war during the Napoleonic Wars in 1814.

Despite Nordic solidarity and strong Swedish sympathy for the plight of its neighbors, this sentiment was not allowed to upset Swedish national interests during the war.

Sweden was underprepared militarily in 1939. Although the nation had begun a rearmament program in 1936, it still lacked modern equipment in any significant quantities. Military weakness continued until near the end of the war. In 1937, the Swedish Army had only 403,000 men, with only 79 antiaircraft guns and no tanks. In 1945, the army had grown to 600,000 men, 2,750 antiaircraft guns, and 766 tanks. The air force went from 596 aircraft in 1940 to 1,018 in 1945; the navy increased from 47 vessels of all types in 1939 to 126 by May 1945. The expansion of Sweden's military and the generally deteriorating German military position after 1942 precluded any German invasion of the country.

Sweden had large deposits of high-grade iron ore, and in 1939 it provided half of all German iron-ore imports. This trade was vital for the German war effort. Depending on the season, the ore came either down the Baltic or

through the northern Norwegian port of Narvik. Sweden was less fortunate in other areas, having to import such vital commodities as coal and oil. During the war, Sweden lost 241 ships involved in its foreign trade.

Sweden proclaimed its neutrality at the beginning of the war. When the First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War) began in November 1939 with the Soviet invasion of Finland, Swedish prime minister Per Albin Hansson, leader of the Socialist Party, established a coalition government that included all political parties except the communists. Its principal goal was to keep Sweden out of a wider war. Swedish sentiment heavily favored Finland, and by the end of the war, some 10,000 Swedes had volunteered to fight with the Finns. Plans to occupy the Åland archipelago between the two countries were never carried out, however.

The Swedish Army employed reindeer to transport reinforcements and food supplies. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

At the same time, the Swedish government denied Britain and France the right to send troops across its territory to assist Finland. Stockholm correctly assumed that the Western Allies had plans to seize the northern Swedish ore fields in the course of such an operation. Sweden did act as an intermediary between the Soviet and Finnish governments to end the Winter War in March 1940.

In April 1940, when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, Sweden's military was placed on full alert, but this time the government insisted on absolute neutrality. The national government lengthened military conscription from four months to 450 days and ordered army strength increased to 600,000 men. The failure of Allied arms in Norway and in the campaign for France and the Low Countries effectively cut Sweden off from the west and placed it within the German zone of control. This development caused the Swedish government to yield to German demands that a portion of the Swedish railroad network be made available for the passage of supplies to Norway and the rotation of German troops between Norway and Germany. The Swedish government was also forced to accede to German demands for the transit to Finland of a German division stationed in Norway so it could participate in the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

As the tide of war turned against Germany—and with the Swedish military considerably stronger than it had been at the beginning of the war—under Allied pressure, Sweden canceled its transit agreement with Germany in August 1943. Although Sweden remained neutral until the end of the war, it was generally accommodating to the Allied side. In addition, many Norwegian and Danish volunteers wishing to combat the Germans received military training in Sweden. These forces played little role in the fighting at the end of the war, however. As the war progressed, Sweden also became a haven for Jews fleeing other Nordic nations.

Sweden emerged from the war as the leading Nordic power, although the end of the European balance of power and Soviet domination of Eastern Europe presented a difficult challenge for Sweden's political leadership in the decades that followed.

THOMAS J. WEILER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Finland; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Finnish-Soviet War, Second; Northeast Europe Theater; Norway

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Swift, Innis Palmer (1882–1953)

U.S. Army major general. Born in Fort Laramie, Wyoming, on February 7, 1882, Innis Swift graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1904 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the cavalry. He served with the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916 and 1917 and in France during World War I.

Between the wars, Swift graduated from the Command and General Staff School, the Army War College, and the Army Industrial College. In 1936, he took command of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, and in 1939 he was named commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. Two years later, as a major general, he became commander of the 1st Cavalry Division.

A hard-nosed soldier, Swift trained the 1st Cavalry Division to a high standard. From February 29 to May 18, 1944, he led his division (now redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division, Special) in heavy fighting to seize the Admiralty Islands off the coast of New Guinea. Over the next months, Swift turned the islands into a major base for air raids against Japanese forces on New Guinea and at Rabaul on New Britain Island.

Later in 1944, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commander of the U.S. Sixth Army and a good friend for many years, named Swift commander of I Corps. In January 1945, Swift's corps landed at Lingayen Gulf on Luzon Island in the Philippines, and during the next weeks it contended with difficult terrain and stubborn Japanese defenders in the mountains northeast of Manila while protecting the flank of XIV Corps as it drove down the central plain to seize Manila. From February through June, Swift fought a grinding battle against the Japanese Shobu Group in the rugged mountains of northern Luzon before turning over the mopping-up operation to XIV Corps to prepare for the invasion of Japan.

Swift retired from the army in February 1946 and died in San Antonio, Texas on November 3, 1953.

See also

Admiralty Islands Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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Swing, Joseph May (1894–1984)

U.S. Army lieutenant general. Born on February 28, 1894, in Jersey City, New Jersey, Joseph May Swing graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1915 and was commissioned in the field artillery. He served with the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916 and 1917 and with the 1st Division during World War I. During the interwar period, Swing graduated from the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College, was an instructor at the Field Artillery School, and served as chief of staff of the 2nd Infantry Division and artillery commander for the 1st Cavalry Division.

In February 1942, Swing, with the rank of brigadier general, was appointed divisional artillery commander of the 82nd Infantry Division, which was converted into the army's first airborne division that summer. Quickly becoming a disciple of the airborne concept, Swing, promoted to major general, was named commander of the newly established 11th Airborne Division in December 1942. While training the division, Swing headed a special board that recommended numerous changes in the use of airborne troops. During maneuvers at the end of 1943, he demonstrated with his 11th Airborne Division how airborne forces could overwhelm an enemy, ending any doubts about the use of airborne troops in division-size units.

Swing took his division to the Southwest Pacific theater in May 1944. During October 20–December 26, it was committed as light infantry to the struggle for Leyte Island in the Philippines. In 1945, Swing's men, fighting

both as light infantry and airborne troops, participated in the bitter battle for Manila (February 3–March 3), helped clear southern Luzon Island of Japanese, and assisted in mopping-up operations in northern Luzon. In August 1945, Swing's division deployed to Japan as the vanguard of the Allied occupation force there.

Swing remained with the division until the end of 1947. He then served successively as commander of I Corps, commandant of the Army War College, and commander of the Sixth Army. Retiring from the army in February 1954 as a lieutenant general, he headed the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization from 1954 to 1962. Swing died in San Francisco, California, on December 9, 1984.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Manila, Battle for; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of

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Switzerland

Nation located in Central Europe with a 1939 population of approximately 4.2 million. Encompassing 15,940 square miles, Switzerland borders Germany to the north, Italy to the south, Austria and Liechtenstein to the east, and France to the west. At the time of World War II, Switzerland was a federal constitutional republic of 26 cantons.

Switzerland occupied a key position between warring nations during World War II. Switzerland had a strong tradition of neutrality, but the situation was nonetheless delicate because it had substantial German- and Italian-speaking populations. Because Germans comprised a majority of the population, Switzerland could have been the target of German expansionist

policies; likewise, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini had cast his sights on securing the Italian-speaking Swiss canton of Ticino.

The Swiss observed Axis politics in the 1930s with growing alarm, and from 1934 they acted to shore up their national defenses. Germany's absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 confirmed Swiss fears. By 1939, Swiss citizens were used to air-raid drills; they had gas masks and stockpiles of food at home, while the government moved foodstuffs for army use to fortified emplacements in the Alps and relocated the country's gold reserves.

Eligibility for military service was continuously extended. Aside from these precautionary measures, Switzerland adopted a strategy of dissuasion that later would be adapted to the circumstances. For the time being, this meant increased military spending, modernization of equipment, and construction of a defensive line at the national frontiers. Bridges and roads running to the frontiers were mined. Artillery, small arms, and munitions stocks were concentrated along the borders, and antiaircraft batteries protected the industrial centers.

On August 30, 1939, the Swiss parliament elected Colonel Henri Guisan commander in chief of the army, and Colonel Jakob Labhart became chief of the General Staff. On September 2, following the German invasion of Poland and realizing that a German invasion of Switzerland was possible, the Federal Council declared general mobilization and issued a formal declaration of neutrality. The small Swiss Air Force was also mobilized. It consisted of 150 Swiss-built fighters of indifferent quality and 50 modern Messerschmitt Me-109s. Switzerland had the one advantage of being (and remaining) only a secondary objective of the Axis powers. German war plans to outflank the French through Swiss territory were dismissed because of the rugged terrain and potentially stubborn Swiss resistance.

When World War II began, 435,000 Swiss citizens were mobilized for the armed forces, a number that approached 700,000 during the war. The army was organized into three corps, including nine divisions (three of which were specially trained mountain divisions) and three mountain brigades. A fourth corps was created in 1939 and 1940.

When Poland, Denmark, and Norway fell to the German blitzkrieg, Guisan and Labhart planned to mass infantry (and what little artillery existed) behind the Swiss fortified northern borders along a line of rivers, lakes, and

mountains parallel to Germany. The joint orders for resistance issued by Guisan and the Federal Council in April 1940 made it plain that surrender was not an option; an invader would have to fight for every inch of ground.

Switzerland's situation became perilous on the defeat of France in June 1940, when the Axis effectively surrounded Swiss territory (the remaining exit was closed off after the occupation of Vichy France near the end of 1942). Assuming that an invasion from all sides would occur in just a matter of time, Guisan developed the idea of the "Alpine redoubt," relying on a mountain fortress centered on the Saint Gotthard massif. Even though they would be defeated at the borders, Swiss forces could resist from the massif indefinitely, controlling (and, if necessary, destroying) the transportation routes through the Alps and thus defeating the main purpose of any Axis invasion.

A Swiss border post during World War II. (Bettmann/Corbis)

After June 1940, Axis attention to Switzerland became more intense. Plans for occupation were made, but these were never carried out. After Germany turned east and invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Switzerland again became an issue only when the Allies began rolling back Axis forces in Italy, and the Alpine republic blocked the German retreat. Eventually, Switzerland was able to avoid invasion until the end of the war.

A meeting point for diplomats and a center for espionage (the Swiss arrested 387 spies and executed 17 of them) as well as for Red Cross relief efforts throughout the war, Switzerland by 1945 was also a venue for diplomatic negotiations to bring the war to an end.

Although Switzerland's effort to establish credible defenses against the Axis powers was remarkable, some aspects of its role in the war became a matter of considerable controversy during the 1990s. The Alpine republic's economic transactions with all belligerents—although permitted by its neutral status—sufficed to tarnish its image as the tiny defender of liberty in fascist-ruled Europe. Switzerland's restrictive refugee policy cast another shadow when the world learned how Germany annihilated Europe's Jews, and some isolated yet notorious remarks made by Swiss politicians advocating acceptance of the "New Order" did not help. The manner in which Swiss banks handled the Nazi gold issue is perhaps the biggest stain on Switzerland's reputation.

In the final analysis, this criticism boils down to the question of whether Switzerland was too accommodating in its relations with the Axis powers. It is probably true that the Swiss avoided invasion partly by cooperating to the extent allowed under the concept of armed neutrality. Then again, German military planners took Swiss defenses seriously and advised against getting entangled in protracted mountain warfare. It is difficult to see what other options Switzerland might have followed.

PASCAL TREES

See also

Blitzkrieg; Guisan, Henri

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Sydney, HMAS, Sinking of (November 19, 1941)

The sinking of the Australian light cruiser *Sydney* in November 1941 was the worst naval disaster in that nation's history. Constructed in England for the Australian government, the Perth-class *Sydney* was commissioned in September 1935. At 562 feet 3 inches in overall length and displacing 6,830 to 7,105 tons standard load, it was capable of 32.5 knots. It was armed with eight twin-mounted 6-inch and four 4-inch guns as well as eight 21-inch torpedo tubes.

The *Sydney*'s World War II service was initially limited to patrol and escort duties in the Indian Ocean. After Italy entered the war, the *Sydney* was dispatched to the Mediterranean. There it took part in several engagements, ferried troops and supplies to Crete, and shelled Italian shore positions in North Africa. Returning to Australia in February 1941, the *Sydney* resumed its duties in the Indian Ocean, where German commerce raiders were known to be active.

On November 19, 1941, commanded by Captain Joseph Burnett, the *Sydney* was returning to its base at Fremantle when, more than 100 miles off the west coast of Australia, its crew spotted an apparent merchant ship some 11 miles distant. The ship in question identified itself as a Dutch merchantman but was in fact the disguised German commerce raider *Kormoran*. At 19,000 tons and commissioned in September 1940, the *Kormoran* was armed with six 150mm (5.9-inch), one 75mm, four 37mm, and five 20mm guns. It also had six 533mm torpedo tubes and was carrying several hundred mines.

Apparently assuming the ship in question to be friendly, Burnett closed to about 1,000 yards, thereby nullifying his own ship's advantages in speed and longer-range guns. The *Sydney* was parallel to the *Kormoran* when the German raider suddenly opened fire with its heretofore disguised main guns and torpedoes. One of the latter ripped into the *Sydney*'s bow, inflicting tremendous damage that flooded the forward portion of the ship and rendered A and B turrets useless. In all, the *Kormoran* fired 87 150mm rounds at the Australian ship.

Following an exchange of fire lasting approximately half an hour, the *Sydney* limped away down in the bow with heavy damage to its bridge and

most of its boats destroyed. Two hours later, burning fiercely, it sank with the loss of all its 645 men. Not only was this the greatest loss of life ever suffered by the Australian Navy, but the *Sydney* was also the largest Allied warship sunk in the war with all hands lost.

The *Kormoran* was also damaged fatally. One of the *Sydney*'s shells put its engines out of action and set the ship on fire. With hundreds of mines aboard his ship that might at any time explode, the *Kormoran*'s captain ordered the crew to abandon ship and the ship scuttled. It went down about 14 miles distant from the *Sydney*. Eighty members of the 400-man crew were lost. The rest were recovered and became prisoners of war.

A search for the *Sydney* was undertaken only after a lapse of five days, when the cruiser failed to return to Fremantle. Many Australians doubted the veracity of the accounts of the battle by the *Kormoran*'s crew, leading to wide-ranging conspiracy theories. The remains of both ships were finally located in March 2008. In August 2009, an Australian special commission investigating the sinking largely confirmed the German account but left unanswered the question of why Burnett had brought his ship into such a vulnerable position.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Australia, Navy; Commerce Raiders, Surface, German

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Sydney, Japanese Raid on (May 31, 1942)

Sydney, a major Australian port for Allied merchant shipping, was within striking distance of Japanese oceangoing submarines based in Rabaul and New Guinea. In an attempt to disrupt this vital Allied commerce, Japanese

naval officials ordered submarines to attack the harbor. On the night of May 31, 1942, the *I-22*, *I-24*, and *I-27* arrived at Sydney, and each deployed a Type A two-man midget submarine to penetrate the port's defenses and torpedo shipping that lay at anchor.

The element of surprise was lost when the midget submarines approached antitorpedo netting in the harbor. Allied forces were alerted when one of the Japanese craft became entangled in the nets. The U.S. heavy cruiser *Chicago* then opened fire on the submarine but failed to hit it and only inflicted damage on the shore. The failure to hit the midget submarine notwithstanding, the Japanese crew elected to scuttle their boat.



The aftermath of a Japanese submarine attack against Allied shipping in Sydney Harbor. This ferry was hit by a Japanese torpedo. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

A second midget submarine avoided the nets and launched its torpedoes. One failed to detonate, but the other hit an accommodation ship, with the explosion killing 19 servicemen and wounding 11 more. The fate of this midget submarine is unknown, although presumably it sank during the attack. The crew of the third midget submarine, after being hunted for hours by a collection of Australian light warships, chose to commit suicide. Contributing to the attack of their diminutive counterparts, the fleet submarines, joined by the *I-21* and *I-29*, shelled Newcastle and Sydney with their deck guns and

sank three merchantmen with gunfire and torpedoes as they left port, retiring to base.

After the raid, the Allies recovered one of the midget submarines. Following its study by naval architects, it went on a tour of Australia in an effort to raise morale. Today it is on display at the Australian War Museum in Canberra. The Japanese submarine attack against Sydney was the last executed by Japanese naval forces against Australian ports in World War II.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Submarines, Midget

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Syria

Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, after World War I Syria became a League of Nations mandate administered by France. Located in the Middle East, Syria encompasses 71,479 square miles and had a 1939 population of some 2.5 million. Syria is bordered by Turkey to the north, Transjordan (Jordan) to the south, Palestine to the southwest, Iraq to the east, and Lebanon (another French mandate) and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. Following the defeat of France by Germany in June 1940, Syria was controlled by the Vichy government headed by Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, which appointed General Henri Dentz as high commissioner with a cabinet headed by Khalid al-Azm. Pétain ordered Dentz to allow landing rights in Syria for German and Italian aircraft on their way to support Rashid Ali al-Gaylani’s regime in Iraq.

Australian troops just before their advance into Syria in collaboration with Free French forces, July 10, 1941. (Bettmann/Corbis)

On June 8, 1941, Allied forces commanded by British lieutenant general Maitland Wilson that included the British Ninth Army, Australian troops, and Major General Paul Legentilhomme's Free French forces, along with the Transjordan Arab Legion, crossed from Palestine into Lebanon and Syria. By June 15, they had reached the Syrian capital of Damascus, which fell on June 21. On July 13, Dentz and the Vichy French surrendered and the next day signed the Acre Convention. The fighting had claimed 4,500 Allied and 6,000 Vichy French casualties.

Syria was then turned over to the Free French authorities. On September 27, 1941, the French recognized Syria's independence but within the framework of the League of Nations mandate, and it continued to occupy the country, which was used as an Allied base for the rest of the war. Free French commander General Georges Catroux became Syria's delegate-general and plenipotentiary. French authorities declared martial law, imposed strict press censorship, and arrested political subversives.

In July 1943, following pressure from Great Britain, France announced new elections. A nationalist government came to power that August, electing as president Syrian nationalist Shukri al-Quwatli, one of the leaders of the 1925–1927 uprising against the French. France formally granted Syria independence on January 1, 1944, but the country remained under Anglo-

French occupation for the rest of the war. In January 1945, the Syrian government announced the formation of a national army, and in February it declared war on the Axis powers.

Syria became a charter member of United Nations in March 1945. In early May 1945, anti-French demonstrations erupted throughout Syria, whereon French forces bombarded Damascus, killing 400 Syrians. British forces then intervened. A United Nations resolution in February 1946 called on France to evacuate the country, and by April 15 all French and British forces were off Syrian soil.

GARY KERLEY

See also

Catroux, Georges Albert Julien; Iraq; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Vichy France

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Syria and Lebanon, Campaign in (June 8–July 14, 1941)

The growing German commitment in the Balkans and the Mediterranean encouraged those in Iraq who favored the Axis side to stage a coup on April 2, 1941. The coup brought to power Rashid Ali el-Gaylani, who was closely linked with the violently anti-British grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el Husseini. The Arab nationalists hoped that a German victory would liberate their country and the Arabs from the yoke of British control and restrict the growing Jewish presence in Palestine. Encouraged by the Germans, who promised air support and also promised to persuade the Vichy French in Syria to provide matériel help, Rashid Ali refused the British the right to transit troops through Iraq and surrounded the British air base at Habbaniya, 25 miles west of Baghdad. With the British fully committed in the Western Desert, Greece, and East Africa, it seemed an opportune time to move.

In desperation, British commander in the Middle East General Sir Archibald Wavell, apprehensive about losing British communications with India and the supplies of Iraqi oil, ordered a minor offensive. The besieged garrison at Habbaniya attacked on May 2. A 5,800-member column, Habforce, was hastily organized from the 1st Cavalry Division in Palestine. Habforce made a 500-mile transdesert dash to reach Habbaniya on May 19, by which time the 10th Indian Division had landed in Basra.

Although Axis planes flew to Syria in support and were involved in the fighting, the Iraqis moved a month too early, before the Germans were able to offer effective assistance. The Germans were too slow in reacting, and the British captured Baghdad on May 31.

British leaders became alarmed by Ultra evidence that Vichy high commissioner in Syria General Henri Fernand Dentz, who buttressed his pro-Vichy patriotism with a strong personal Anglophobia, had supplied weapons to the Iraqis and freely cooperated with the Germans. The British worried that Germany—supported by the vehemently anti-British French admiral Jean Darlan, who was now in control of Vichy France—would extend its victories beyond Crete and through Syria into the Middle East.

This fear, combined with the threat posed to the British base in Egypt by the French Army of the Levant, a force of 45,000 hard-core professional soldiers that included four battalions of Foreign Legionnaires, convinced the British to launch Operation EXPORTER, the invasion of Syria and Lebanon. On June 8, a hastily concocted force consisting of the Australian 21st and 25th Brigades, the Indian 5th Brigade, and the weak 1st and 2nd Free French Brigades, all commanded by General Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson, invaded in three drives—through Deraa to Damascus, through Merjayun to Rayak, and along the coast from Haifa to Beirut.

The British had hoped for a peaceful occupation by guaranteeing the independence of Syria and Lebanon, but Dentz was aware of negotiations between Vichy France and Germany that would culminate in the Paris Protocols, and he was determined to demonstrate solidarity with Germany. By the end of the first phase on June 13, it was evident that the Vichy French showed no sympathy with Free French ambitions, and all advances were stalled by fierce fighting at Kissoué, Mezze, the Litani River, and especially Merjayun. Damascus finally fell on July 22, and with the conclusion of Operation BATTLEAXE in the Western Desert, the British were able to bring up

two fighter and three bomber squadrons. Meanwhile, Habforce and Major General William Slim's Indian 10th Division invaded Syria from Iraq against Palmyra and Aleppo on June 21 to isolate Dentz's force.

The campaign for Syria and Lebanon also involved naval operations. Vice Admiral Edward Leigh Stuart King commanded a British force of three cruisers, eight destroyers, and a landing ship with a small commando unit. Opposing them was a Vichy French force of two large destroyers, a sloop, and three submarines. The naval portion of the campaign consisted of small skirmishes as the British carried out both coastal landings and shore bombardment. The French damaged several of the British warships through both air and naval attacks, necessitating the dispatch of other ships. The French lost to air attack on June 21, just 50 miles from Syria, one of two large destroyers dispatched from Toulon. The other French destroyer made it safely to Beirut on June 21, but it was damaged there in bombing the next day. The Vichy French government considered dispatching the battle cruiser *Strasbourg* from Toulon but, with the campaign too far gone, decided against it.

French cavalry on the march along the frontier between Syria and Palestine, July 1941. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

After five weeks of bitter fighting, Dentz capitulated on July 11, and an armistice known as the Acre Convention was signed on July 14. Although its terms were generous, the immediate results of the armistice did little to encourage belief in any French desire to see the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Only 5,668 troops (1,006 of whom were native Frenchmen) opted to join Free French forces rather than be repatriated to France.

This tragic, regrettable episode, which cost the lives of 3,500 men, was a short but sour campaign imbued with resentment, particularly between the Vichy and Free French forces who wreaked sacrilegious vengeance on each other. For the British, however, the campaign consolidated their flank and guarded against any German attack through Turkey.

A few weeks later Britain, in unison with the Soviet Union, occupied Iran to guarantee the transfer of Lend-Lease supplies through Iran to Soviet Russia. In the process, Britain secured its position in the Middle East. Thus, in the midsummer of 1941, Germany consolidated its position in the Balkans while Britain dominated the Middle East. The British commander was liberated from all other preoccupations but that of defeating Axis forces in Libya, and for the first time he could concentrate all his force on a single task.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; Dentz, Henri Fernand; Iran; Iraq; Lend-Lease; North Africa and the War; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Syria; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Wilson, Henry Maitland

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Szabo, Violette Bushnell (1921–1945)

British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agent. Born in Paris on June 26, 1921, to an English father and a French mother, Violette Bushnell grew up in both countries. An avid bicyclist and crack marksman, the tomboyish Bushnell left school at age 14 and held a series of jobs. In 1940, she joined the British Land Army and developed a reputation for fearlessness during air

raids and blackouts. On Bastille Day (July 14) 1940, she met Étienne Szabo, a former French Foreign Legionnaire and Free French soldier, whom she married on August 21 shortly before he shipped out for Africa. She saw Szabo only once more, during a week in Liverpool in March 1941.

British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agent Violette Szabo. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Violette Szabo worked as a telephone operator and then for the Auxiliary Territorial Service as part of an antiaircraft battery. In June 1942 she gave birth to a daughter, Tania. Shortly afterward, Szabo learned that her husband had been killed in action. Szabo's courage and loyalties had been noted by Captain Selwyn Jepson of the SOE, and so he recruited her for intelligence and Resistance work. Assigned to the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry, a cover for SOE female recruits, Szabo underwent screening at Wanborough Manor and attended the commando course, the parachute school, and psychological training at Beaulieu.

Szabo's first mission, a parachute drop outside Paris, took place in April 1944. She then worked with the French Resistance in Rouen. Although police questioned her twice, Szabo's cover as a commercial secretary held. Her second mission, to aid French sabotage during the June 6, 1944, Normandy landings, began the day before. Sent to Limoges to escort Jacques Dufour, a valuable Maquis agent with information about an advancing panzer division, Szabo encountered an unexpected concentration of Germans at Salon La Tour. Covering Dufour's escape, Szabo was captured after engaging the soldiers in a running gun battle through the town. The Gestapo transferred her to Paris, where she was tortured before being shipped to the Ravensbrück concentration camp in Germany. From there, she was sent to Torgau as a factory slave and then to a labor camp at Königsberg in East Prussia.

Szabo returned to Ravensbrück in early February 1945. There she and two Resistance colleagues, Denise Bloch and Lilian Rolfe, were executed by firing squad on the orders of the Gestapo, and their remains were cremated. In January 1947, Violette Szabo was posthumously awarded the French Croix de Guerre and the British George Cross, the first occasion that the latter was awarded to a woman.

MARGARET SANKEY

See also

Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Resistance

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WORLD WAR II

The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection

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Taiwan

Taiwan (Formosa), an island about 14,000 square miles in area, is located 115 miles off China's eastern coast; it was named Formosa (Beautiful) by the Portuguese who visited it in 1590. Taiwan's 1939 population was approximately 5.76 million. As a consequence of the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War, China ceded control of the island to Japan. The Japanese subsequently expanded existing military bases on Taiwan while constructing additional facilities.

With the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Japan used Taiwan as a base for air attacks against the Chinese mainland. By late 1941, the island was serving as the base for Japan's Eleventh Naval Air Fleet and its Fifth Army Air Force. On December 8, 1941, the Japanese used Taiwan to launch the first air attacks against U.S. bases in the Philippines.

As Taiwan lay deep within Japan's defensive perimeter, it was not subjected to concerted attacks until 1944, when U.S. forces pushed across the Central Pacific toward the Japanese home islands. By that time, many U.S. military officials, including Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King and the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, favored an invasion and occupation of the island to sever the Japanese lines of communication south to the Netherlands East Indies. Air attacks by the China-based XX Bomber Command against Japanese installations on Taiwan were largely ineffectual.

Ultimately, these bombing raids proved unnecessary in the context of a prelude to a U.S. amphibious assault, for in July 1944 President Franklin D.

Roosevelt decided to pursue the conquest of the Philippines, followed by Iwo Jima and Okinawa rather than Taiwan. The Japanese air bases on Taiwan, however, maintained aircraft capable of reaching the Philippine Islands. Consequently, between October 12 and 14, 1944, the U.S. Third Fleet launched punishing air strikes against Taiwan to reduce Japanese air strength there prior to the invasion of the Philippines. These assaults destroyed more than 500 Japanese aircraft, with important effects on the subsequent Battle of Leyte Gulf, which began on October 20.

Taiwan was attacked by Allied naval aircraft twice more during the war. The first of these strikes occurred in January 1945, prior to the U.S. invasion of the Philippine island of Luzon. The second was executed in April 1945 by air assets of the British Pacific Fleet to reduce the number of Japanese planes capable of flying kamikaze missions against Allied naval forces off Okinawa.

On October 25, 1945, formal surrender ceremonies took place on Taiwan, and the island reverted to Chinese control in accordance with an agreement reached at the Cairo Conference in November 1943. In 1949, the island became a refuge for Chinese Nationalist forces. Today, Taiwan is officially known as the Republic of China. The People's Republic of China, however, continues to claim Taiwan.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

King, Ernest Joseph; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; Nimitz, Chester William; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Takagi Sōkichi (1893–1979)

Japanese Navy rear admiral. Born on August 9, 1893, in Kumamoto Prefecture on Kyushu Island, Takagi Sōkichi graduated from the Japanese

Naval Academy In 1915. He served in a number of different ships before graduating from the Navigation School in 1921. Promoted to lieutenant, he then served as navigation officer on the submarine tender *Komahashi* and the patrol vessel *Manshu*.

In 1927, Takagi graduated from the Naval War College and was promoted to lieutenant commander and posted as naval attaché to France until 1930. On his return to Japan, he was assigned as private secretary to the naval minister for two years until his promotion to commander. A weak constitution confined Takagi to land assignments for the remainder of his naval career. From 1933 to 1936, he taught in the Naval War College.

In 1937, Takagi was promoted to captain and assigned to the Navy Department as chief of the research section. Here he developed ties for the navy with the political leadership and Japanese intellectuals. From 1939 onward, Takagi organized study groups of leading experts to discuss policy as well as diplomatic and economic topics in the hopes of preventing an arbitrary decision by the military authorities to go to war. With the Second Sino-Japanese War continuing without resolution, Takagi opposed war with the United States.

In 1942, Takagi was removed from his post in the research section and assigned as chief of staff of the Maizuru Naval District. In May 1943, he was promoted to rear admiral and began maneuvering with his confidants about how to extract Japan from the war. Minister of the Navy Shimada Shigetaro charged Takagi with investigating the reasons for the Japanese defeats of 1942. Going well beyond the scope of his charge, Takagi analyzed all aspects of Japan's strategic situation and reached the conclusion that a Japanese defeat in the war was inevitable. Believing that the only way he could end Japan's involvement was through a change in government, Takagi concluded that the only solution was to assassinate Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, but he was forced from office in July 1944 before the attempt could be carried out.

In the fall of 1944, Takagi became a member of the research department of the Navy Staff College, and Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa ordered him to undertake a study of how Japan might withdraw from the war. Takagi continued to work on this until Japan's surrender in August 1945.

After the war, Takagi served in the Higashikuni Naruhiko cabinet as a secretary and helped revise the Japanese Constitution. Takagi wrote a number of books of military history, but the most important of his publications was

his diary covering the period 1937 to 1945, which provided an insider's view of activities at the highest levels of the Japanese government and navy. Takagi Sōkichi died in Chigasaki, Kanagawa, Japan, on July 27, 1979.

HASEGAWA REI

See also
Japan, Navy; Tōjō Hideki; Yonai Mitsumasa

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Takagi Takeo (1892–1944)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, on January 25, 1892, Takagi Takeo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1911 and from the Navy Staff College in 1925. He then commanded the submarines *Ro 28* and *Ro 68* and later joined the staff of the submarine flotilla. As a captain, he commanded the cruisers *Nagara* and *Takao* and the battleship *Mutsu* between 1933 and 1938. Following his promotion to rear admiral in 1938, Takagi became chief of staff of the Second Fleet and then director of the Second Department of the Naval General Staff. In September 1941, he took command of the 5th Cruiser Squadron.

At the beginning of the Pacific war, Takagi's forces supported the Japanese invasion of the Philippines (December 8, 1941–June 9, 1942) and then headed to the Netherlands East Indies as the covering force for the landing on Java. In the Battle of the Java Sea (February 27, 1942), Takagi's 5th Squadron attacked with torpedoes and sank two Dutch light cruisers and one Dutch and two British destroyers. His force also damaged a British heavy cruiser.

Promoted to vice admiral in March 1942, Takagi commanded a carrier task force, with the fleet carriers *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku* acting as a cover force for the seaborne invasion of Port Moresby in New Guinea. In the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 7–8, 1942, the Japanese Navy won a tactical victory, exchanging the loss of the light carrier *Shoho* for the U.S. fleet carrier

Lexington and damaging the U.S. fleet carrier *Yorktown*. In a strategic sense, however, Japan lost the battle. Takagi's superior, Vice Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi, called off the Port Moresby invasion, and Takagi's two fleet aircraft carriers, *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku*, either were so badly damaged or had lost so many aircraft that both were unavailable for the pivotal Battle of Midway (June 3–6), whereas the *Yorktown* was able to participate. In 1943, Takagi was assigned to command the Sixth (Submarine) Fleet, based in Saipan. He died there by suicide on July 8, 1944, and was promoted to brevet admiral that same day.

ASAKAWA MICHIO

See also

Coral Sea, Battle of the; Inouye Shigeyoshi; Japan, Navy; Java Sea, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of

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Takahashi Ibō (1888–1947)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, on April 20, 1888, Takahashi Ibō graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1908. Commissioned an ensign in 1910 and a lieutenant in 1914, he graduated from the Imperial Naval War College in 1919 and was promoted to lieutenant commander and assigned as chief gunnery officer of the battleship *Iwami*.

From August 1923 to August 1925, Takahashi was naval attaché to the United Kingdom, during which time he was promoted to commander. Returning to Japan, he became the executive officer of the cruiser *Tama,* after which he took command of the light cruiser *Tenryū*. He was also a member of the Japanese delegation to the London Naval Conference in late 1929.

Promoted to captain on November 30, 1929, Takahashi took command of the heavy cruiser *Atago* in 1932, and the next year he commanded the battleship *Kirishima*. Promoted to rear admiral on November 15, 1935, Takahashi served on the Navy General Staff, where he urged that Japan include the Netherlands East Indies within its economic control sphere. Promoted to vice admiral on November 15, 1939, Takahashi commanded the Mako Guard District.

In early December 1941, Takahashi took command of the Third Fleet. In this post he had responsibility for Japanese naval operations in the invasion of the Philippine Islands (December 8, 1941). Takahashi then commanded Japanese naval forces in the February 1942 invasion of Java in the Netherlands East Indies.

On March 10, 1942, Takahashi was transferred to command the newly established 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and in April he took command of the newly created Southwest Area Fleet. In November 1942, he became commander of the important Kure Naval District in Japan, holding this position until he retired in 1944. Takahashi died on March 18, 1947.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of

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Takamatsu Nobuhito, Imperial Prince of Japan (1905–1987)

Japanese imperial prince and navy officer. Born on January 3, 1905, the third son of Emperor Taishō and younger brother of Emperor Hirohito, Takamatsu

Nobuhito graduated from the Naval Academy and the Naval War College. He then pursued a career as a gunnery officer in the Imperial Navy.

In November 1941, following several line and staff appointments, Commander Prince Takamatsu became a member of the Operation Planning Section of the Navy General Staff. In November 1942, he was promoted to captain, and in August 1944, he was appointed deputy head of the Yokosuka Gunnery School.

Prince Takamatsu Nobuhito, shown here in naval uniform, was the brother of Japanese emperor Hirohito. (Topical Press Agency/Getty Images)

A liberal thinker, Prince Takamatsu was highly critical of the government's decision to go to war with the United States, and during the war, he advocated an early peace with the Allies. Elements in Japan opposed to Premier General Tōjō Hideki, including Prince Konoe Fumimaro, saw in Prince Takamatsu a possible candidate for prime minister, although this did not transpire.

Takamatsu died in Tokyo on February 3, 1987. His posthumously published diaries are an important source for the study of Japanese political history of the 1930s and 1940s.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Tōjō Hideki

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Tanaka Raizo (1892–1969)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan, on April 27, 1892, Tanaka Raizo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1913 and trained as a torpedo specialist. Developing a reputation for excellence in seamanship, he was promoted to captain in 1935 and commanded destroyers, the cruiser *Jintsu*, and then the battleship *Kongo*. In 1937, he took charge of a destroyer squadron.

Promoted to rear admiral in October 1941, Tanaka commanded the 2nd Destroyer Squadron, one of the most highly trained units of the Japanese Navy and especially expert in night action. In his flagship, the cruiser *Jintsu*, Tanaka was involved in most major battles of the first 18 months of the war. He was particularly well known for the so-called Tokyo Express—the nightly supply runs to Japanese Army units on Guadalcanal. Known to the Americans as "Tenacious Tanaka," he regularly carried out his assignments, often in the face of superior Allied naval forces equipped with radar, and

gained a reputation in the West as one of the most brilliant and indefatigable Japanese Navy commanders of the war.

Japanese admiral Tanaka Raizo, known to the Americans as Tenacious Tanaka, commanded the nightly supply runs by the Japanese navy during the campaign for the Solomon Islands and gained the reputation as one of the most brilliant and indefatigable Japanese navy commanders of the war. (Japan Defense Agency)

In the Battle of Tassafaronga on November 30, 1942, a superior U.S. force under Rear Admiral Carlton H. Wright intercepted Tanaka's ships trying to float barrels of supplies ashore to Guadalcanal. His ships were not deployed for combat, and Tanaka lost a destroyer, but his crews used their Long Lance torpedoes to good effect and sank one U.S. cruiser and damaged three others before making their escape. Two weeks later, however, after two successful supply missions, a U.S. patrol-torpedo boat sank Tanaka's flagship, the destroyer *Teruzuki*.

Tanaka was wounded in this incident and on December 27 was reassigned to command of an obscure naval base in Burma, allegedly for criticizing his superiors' decision to squander scant Japanese destroyer assets in trying to supply Japanese island outposts. Although promoted to vice admiral in 1944, Tanaka did not again see combat. Tanaka retired on June 26, 1946, and died in Yamaguchi, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan, on July 9, 1969.

HIRAMA YOICHI

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Japan, Navy; Tassafaronga, Battle of

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Tanaka Shinichi (1893–1976)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Hokkaido, Japan, on March 18, 1893, Tanaka Shinichi graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1913 and from the Army War College in 1923. A resident officer in Riga and Moscow between 1928 and 1931, he served as a staff officer with the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria in 1931 and 1932. From 1933 to 1935, he was a resident officer in Berlin. On his return to Japan, Tanaka was promoted to colonel and appointed chief of the Military Service Section of the War Ministry in August 1936. The following March, he became chief of the Military Affairs Section.

At the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, Tanaka insisted on dispatching three divisions to China over the objections of General Ishiwara Kanji, chief of the Operations Division in the General Staff. After becoming a major general in 1939, Tanaka was appointed chief of staff of the Inner Mongolia Garrison Army and participated in the May–September 1939 Battle of Khalkhin Gol, in which the Japanese were defeated by the Soviets.

In October 1940, Tanaka became chief of the Operations Division of the General Staff. Promoted to lieutenant general in October 1941, he played a leading role in planning military operations leading to the Pacific war. Contrary to officials in the War Ministry, he favored an attack on the Soviet Union, and in late 1942, he also disagreed with them regarding military operations on Guadalcanal. He insisted on continuing the operations, but the War Ministry favored evacuation. During this controversy, Tanaka slapped General Satō Kenryō, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and verbally insulted Prime Minister General Tōjō Hideki. In consequence, he was discharged from his post.

Assigned command of the 18th Division in northern Burma, from 1943 to 1944 Tanaka demonstrated superior leadership in adversity, fighting British forces under Brigadier Orde Wingate and Chinese forces reorganized by U.S. Army lieutenant general Joseph Stilwell. Tanaka's outnumbered forces were gradually driven back.

In September 1944, Tanaka was appointed chief of staff of the Burma Area Army. While traveling to Japan from Burma in May 1945, he was seriously injured in the crash of his airplane near Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and was still hospitalized in Saigon at the end of the Pacific war. Tanaka died in Kawasaki City on September 24, 1976.

TOBE RYOICHI

See also

Burma Theater; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Ishiwara Kanji; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Tōjō Hideki

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Tanaka Shizuichi (1887–1945)

Japanese Army general. Born in Hyogo Prefecture, Japan, on October 1, 1887, Tanaka Shizuichi graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in

1907 and was commissioned in the infantry. Upon graduation from the Army War College in 1916, he was assigned to the Military Administration Division of the War Ministry during 1917–1919. During the next three years, he was a resident officer in Britain, studying at Oxford University. He served on the General Staff beginning in 1922 and was appointed military attaché in Mexico in 1926, returning to the General Staff two years later.

Promoted to colonel in 1930, Tanaka took command of the 2nd Infantry Regiment. He was military attaché in the United States in 1932 and chief of staff of the 4th Division in 1934. After becoming a major general, he took command of the 5th Infantry Brigade in 1935. The next year, he was appointed chief of the General Affairs Division in the Military Police Headquarters.

In 1937, Tanaka commanded the Guandong Military Police Command; he was promoted to lieutenant general and headed the Military Police Command the following year. In charge of the 13th Division in China in 1939 during the Second Sino-Japanese War, he was engaged in defensive operations in central China. One year later, he again headed the Military Police Command. He led the East Army in 1941 and the Fourteenth Army in 1942, endeavoring to maintain public order in the Philippines.

As a full general in 1943, Tanaka was assigned to the General Staff but without a specific post, in deference to his health problems. He became director of the Army War College in 1944 and was, in addition, military counselor to the emperor. As Twelfth Area Army commander from March 1945, he was responsible for the defense of central Honshu Island, including Tokyo and the Imperial Palace.

In August 1945, Emperor Hirohito was determined to surrender to the Allied powers, but prominent Japanese military leaders opposed such a step. Tanaka worked hard to persuade these leaders to accept peace and helped foil a coup d’état. He committed suicide in Tokyo on August 24, taking personal responsibility for the surrender.

NAKAYAMA TAKASHI

See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Japan, Surrender of

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Tang, U.S. Navy Submarine

The Balao-class submarine *Tang* (SS-306) was built at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California. It was laid down on January 15, 1943; launched on April 17, 1943; and commissioned on October 15, 1943. The *Tang* had two propellers and was powered by both diesel engines and electric motors. It displaced 1,490 tons surfaced and 2,070 tons submerged. It was 311 feet 10 inches in length, with a beam of 27 feet 4 inches and a draft of 16 feet 10 inches. It had a speed of 20.25 knots on the surface and 8.75 knots submerged. Patrol endurance was 75 days.

As with other U.S. submarines, the *Tang* had a deep-dive capability of 600 feet, a closely guarded secret during the war. It had a crew complement of 20 officers and 68 sailors. The *Tang* was armed with 10 21-inch torpedo tubes (6 forward and 4 aft), a 5-inch deck gun, and Bofors 40mm and Oerlikon 20mm cannon.

Ordered to the Pacific, the *Tang* embarked on its first war patrols on January 22, 1944. It sank a number of Japanese ships and rescued two dozen downed American aviators. During the course of its fifth patrol, on October 24, 1944, in one of the more bizarre incidents of the war, the *Tang* under Commander Richard H. O'Kane was off the coast of Taiwan (then known as Formosa) when O'Kane fired two torpedoes at a Japanese transport. The first struck home, but the second torpedo porpoised, circled back, and exploded against the stern of the *Tang*, sinking it. The *Tang*'s patrol had been the most successful ever by a U.S. submarine, with 13 ships sunk.

O'Kane was among those who escaped from the *Tang* utilizing Momsen lungs—the first successful use of these from a sunken submarine—after the sub came to rest on the bottom at 180 feet. The survivors were taken prisoner by the Japanese and subsequently tortured by some of the survivors of the ship they had just sunk. The top-scoring submariner in terms of ships sunk

(31 credited during the war, reduced to 24 afterward), O'Kane survived the war and was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

O'Kane, Richard Hetherington; U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan

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Tank, Kurt (1898–1983)

German aircraft designer and test pilot. Born in Bromberg-Schwedenhohe, Germany, on February 24, 1898, Kurt Tank wanted to join the air service when World War I began, but his father insisted he follow family tradition and enlist in the cavalry. He ended the war as a captain, with numerous decorations for bravery.

After the war, Tank, a gifted student, graduated in 1923 from the Technische Hochschule in Berlin. A mentor from the university landed him a position in the design department of Rohrbach Metallflugzeugbau, where he worked on flying boats. He gained his fame while employed by the Focke-Wulf aircraft manufacturing firm. His many successful designs included the FW-200 Kondor. Begun as a transport for the German airline Lufthansa, it was employed as a long-range maritime bomber and reconnaissance aircraft.

Tank also designed the FW-189 tactical reconnaissance airplane, but his crowning achievement was undoubtedly the FW-190 fighter. In 1938, he was asked to design a replacement for the Messerschmitt Bf-109, the Luftwaffe's frontline fighter. Tank's design was an air-cooled, radial-engine, wide-track aircraft armed with four 20mm cannon and two machine guns. The FW-190 proved to be a nasty surprise to the British when they first encountered it in 1941, and it outclassed the Spitfire Mk V. Its heavy armament earned it the nickname "Wurger" (Butcher-Bird). The FW-190 became a mainstay of the Luftwaffe and served on all fronts for the remainder of the war.

Tank's last two designs, the FW-190D9 and FW's Ta-152, were improved versions of the basic FW-190 design in an attempt to counter the better Allied fighters appearing in the skies over Germany. At the end of the war, Tank and his engineers surrendered to the Americans and were released after a short internment.

Tank's postwar career included designing jet aircraft for Argentina and India. He returned to Germany in the 1970s as an aviation consultant and died in Munich on June 5, 1983.

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See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Germany, Air Force

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Tanks, All Powers

Armored, tracked, armed vehicles, originally developed in World War I. Improved in the years after the war, the tank came into its own as a weapon system in World War II.

After World War I, a number of individuals greatly influenced the structure of armored forces and the design of tanks. They included Ernest Swinton, J. F. C. Fuller, and Basil Liddell Hart in Britain; Jean E. Estienne and Charles de Gaulle in France; Heinz Guderian in Germany; and Adna Chaffee in the United States. These individuals shaped thinking regarding the armored forces of World War II.

Yet even as imaginative military thinkers contemplated what could be done with a properly organized and equipped armored force, some of the senior leaders in each army continued to see tanks only as support to traditional infantry and cavalry elements. Limited military budgets also greatly hindered the development of armored forces, at least until Germany

rose again as a threat to peace. The impact of prewar thinking and actions on tank designs varied among nations.

France

In the 1930s, the French General Staff considered tanks primarily as infantry support. New ideas emerged, however, including the development of mechanized infantry and cavalry. The cavalry concept involved three types of reconnaissance vehicles: one that was wheeled for long-range reconnaissance, a machine-gun-armed light tank for cross-country reconnaissance, and a more heavily armed and armored tank capable of fighting. A four-year rearmament plan in 1936 included the formation of three divisions légères mécaniques (DLM), equipped with S-35 and H-35 tanks, and two divisions cuirasses de réserve (DCR), with B tanks and R-35 and FCM-36 light tanks to accompany infantry forces.

The S-35 (SOMUA) medium tank was designed for cavalry combat. One of the best tanks of the time, it was the first to use an all-cast hull and turret construction. Weighing 20 tons with a crew of three, it boasted an electric-drive turret with a 47mm main gun. Its 190-horsepower (hp) gasoline engine provided a speed of 25 mph. About 500 were manufactured. After the defeat of France in June 1940, both the Germans and Italians employed the S-35 in their armies.

The H-35 (Hotchkiss) light tank, developed for cavalry use, was later also adopted by the infantry. Product improvements—a long-barreled 37mm main gun and a new engine—led to production of the H-39 by 1939. This 10.6-ton tank had a crew of two and was powered by a liquid-cooled gasoline engine. Captured vehicles were used by Germany in the Soviet and Mediterranean theaters of war. Free French forces also used the H-39.

The 1935 production version of the Char B heavy tank was the Char B1, further improved as the Char B-1 *bis*. The main battle tank of the French Army in 1940, it weighed 32 tons, had a crew of four, and mounted a 75mm main gun in the hull and a 47mm gun in the turret. Final production models were powered by 300-hp aircraft engines.

Germany

From an analysis of the writings of British theorists Fuller and Liddell Hart, Guderian led the development of panzer (armored) divisions, three of which were formed in 1935. Based on tanks, they also included infantry, artillery, and other elements. Initially, the divisions were equipped with the specially developed light tanks PzKpfw I and II (PzKpfw is the abbreviation for *Panzerkampfwagen*, or armored fighting vehicle), while two larger designs, the PzKpfw III and IV, were being built. Germany planned to phase out the earlier tanks but kept PzKpfw I and II in service with second-line units into 1945.

Many product improvements of the PzKpfw I, II, III, and IV were incorporated in production. The PzKpfw I, originally intended as a cheaply produced training vehicle, weighed less than 6 tons, had a crew of two, and mounted only two machine guns. Its 60-hp gasoline engine allowed a speed of 25 mph. The main production version of the PzKpfw II weighed 9.5 tons, had a crew of three and a 20mm main gun, and was driven by a 140-hp gasoline engine.

From 1937 through 1942, several versions of the PzKpfw III were produced. The main armament was increased from 37mm to 50mm, with some of these tanks mounting a close-support, short-barreled 75mm cannon. Added armor increased the weight from 15 to 22.3 tons. Gasoline engine power increased from 230-hp to 300-hp.

Late versions of the PzKpfw IV became the backbone of German armor at the end of the war. The most important tank of the series, up-gunned and up-armored from earlier versions, it weighed 23.6 tons, carried a crew of five, and mounted a long-barreled 75mm main gun. Its 300-hp gasoline engine allowed a speed of 25 mph. The main armament of the PzKpfw IV gave it parity in hitting power with later Soviet and American tanks.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, German armor encountered the Soviet T-34, whose superior firepower, speed, shape, suspension, armor, and maneuverability made all German tanks virtually obsolete. By March 1942, however, Germany had prototypes of the PzKpfw VI Tiger heavy tank. With armor up to 100mm thick and an 88mm main gun, based on the successful antiaircraft gun, the Tiger was superior to any other tank, in spite of poor reliability. It had a five-man crew. The 700-hp gasoline engine could drive the 55-ton tank at 23.5 mph.

A German tank near Grodno, Poland, on its way to the Soviet border in the initial phase of Hitler's Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. (Corbis)

In November 1942, the first production PzKpfw V Panther was delivered. A new tank designed to counter the T-34, it was Germany's best tank of the war. The 1944 version carried a crew of four and mounted a long-barreled 75mm gun. The 44.8-ton vehicle was equipped with a 700-hp gasoline engine.

The final German tank of the war was the PzKpfw Tiger II, with production models appearing in November 1944. Also known as the King Tiger, at 69.7 tons, it was the heaviest operational tank of the war. With a massive turret mounting a long-barreled 88mm gun, the tank's maximum armor thickness reached 150mm. It had a five-man crew. Its 700-hp gasoline engine could drive the tank at 23.5 mph. A total of 484 were produced.

Great Britain

By World War II, the British Army had opted for two categories of tanks: high-speed cruiser tanks and heavily armored but slow infantry tanks. An emphasis on mobility and armor protection, obscuring the importance of gun power, plagued British tanks throughout the war.

In 1940, the army was equipped with the Cruiser Mark I and II and the Infantry Tank Mark I and II (Matildas). The 12-ton Cruiser Mark I had a crew of six men and a 2-pounder main gun. The major production version,

the Cruiser Mark IIA, an improved Mark I, weighed 13.5 tons, held a crew of four to five men, and had a 2-pounder main gun. The Infantry Tank Mark I (Matilda I) quickly proved inadequate. Although well armored, it carried only a crew of two and an armament of one machine gun.

The Mark II (Matilda II), of which 2,987 were manufactured between 1940 and 1943, was the most important British tank in the Western Desert. This 26.5-ton tank carried a crew of four men and a 2-pounder main armament. Two diesel engines drove it at 15 mph.

German tanks armed with more powerful guns led to British attempts to design replacements. However, when the British designs, the Centaur and Cromwell, were ready in 1942, German tanks had even heavier armament. The redesigns, the Challenger and Black Prince, respectively, were either unsuccessful (in the case of the Challenger) or produced too late (the Black Prince).

Meanwhile, British requirements were met by American tanks, originally the M-3 and M-4 medium tanks and the M-3 light tanks. The most effective British tank of the war became the M-4 with a 17-pounder gun, known as the Sherman Firefly.

Britain fielded an effective tank of its own design, the Churchill, before the end of the war. Originally produced in 1941, it was not truly successful until 1944, with the Churchill VII production. This 40-ton version had a crew of five and a 75mm main gun. Its 350-hp engine could drive it at 12.5 mph. Variations were used for many purposes, such as engineer vehicles and for close support.

United States

U.S. tank development and doctrine were hampered before World War II by a decision to assign tanks to the infantry only and the reluctance of the cavalry to give up the horse. By the 1930s, however, the army had formed a mechanized cavalry brigade, leading to the creation of the Armored Force by 1940. A number of tank designs had also been explored.

Based on the earlier M-2 series, the M-3 Stuart light tank was standardized in July 1940. The Stuart weighed 12.3 tons, had a crew of four, and mounted a 37mm gyro-stabilized main gun. Improvements finally

resulted in the M-5A1. With twin gasoline engines, this tank could reach a speed of 40 mph.

Serious tank production began with the 1940 design of the M-3 medium Lee and Grant tanks, in service by mid-1941. Six basic models were eventually produced, with their weight growing from 30 to 32 tons. The crew of six men operated a sponson-mounted 75mm gun and a turret-mounted 37mm gun. Various engines were utilized, both gasoline and diesel, in the 340- to 375-hp range. The limited-traverse 75mm gun was less than ideal, but the M-3 provided a quickly available tank with a large gun.

Production of the M-4 medium Sherman tank, with a 75mm cannon in a fully traversable turret, began in October 1941. The standard U.S. Army medium tank, the Sherman was improved as the war progressed to the M-4A3 version. Almost 50,000 of them were produced. This tank's weight, initially 33.25 tons, grew to 35.5 tons. The most significant improvement was the high-velocity 76mm gun. It had a five-man crew. Engines varied widely, and the maximum speed was 24 to 26 mph. Variants to the standard tank included flamethrowers and recovery vehicles.

The United States was slow to develop a heavy tank, the consequence of Lieutenant General George S. Patton's belief that tank destroyers rather than other tanks should deal with German armor. The heavy M-26 tank was standardized in January 1945, but only a few reached Europe before the end of the war there. With a crew of five men, the Pershing weighed 46 tons and mounted a 90mm main gun. The 470-hp engine could drive the tank at 20 mph.

A U.S. Army M4 Sherman tank transporting infantrymen toward the front lines in southern Okinawa, May 5, 1945. (Corbis)

Soviet Union

In the late 1930s, it was the Soviet Union, rather than Germany, that was most interested in massive armor formations. The Soviet Union also possessed more armored fighting vehicles than any other nation. In June 1941, the Soviets had 23,140 tanks (10,394 of them in the west), whereas the invading Germans had only some 6,000. Moreover, the Soviets had some of the best tanks in the world. During the war, the Soviet Union built more tanks than any other power, including a wide range of armored fighting vehicles, from light to heavy tanks.

At the beginning of World War II, the Soviets possessed a large number of their medium BT-series tanks, chiefly the BT-5s and BT-7s. These and the Soviet T-26 tanks were superior in armor, firepower, and maneuverability to the German light PzKpfw III and IV and could destroy any German tank. The Soviet T-34 medium tank, introduced in 1941, and the KV-1 heavy tank, introduced in 1940, both mounted the 76.2mm (3-inch) gun and were superior to the PzKpfw III and IV and indeed any other German tank in 1941.

The T-34 was probably the best all-around tank of World War II, better armed and armored than the German tanks it faced. The short-barreled 76.2mm gun initially mounted on this tank was replaced by a longer version

that was mounted in most vehicles, followed later by an 85mm version. Weighing 26.3 tons and with a crew of five men, it could reach 31 mph with its 500-hp diesel engine.

The Soviet Union also produced a series of heavy tanks. The Soviets began the war with the KV-1, which entered service in December 1940. Wholly a Soviet design, the KV was named for Defense Commissar Klimenti Voroshilov. Initially the KV-1 had a 550-hp diesel engine, but this was upgraded to 600-hp in the KV-1B. The KV-1B weighed nearly 47.5 tons, carried a five-man crew, and had a maximum speed of 22 mph. The KV-1 mounted the powerful 76.2mm gun and three machine guns. It had a maximum of 100mm armor protection and was proven against the 88mm gun and anything else the Germans might throw against it, except for heavy artillery. The KV-1 disproved the myth that the Soviets were technologically backward.

The KV-1 evolved into the IS-1 through IS-3, the final Soviet heavy tanks of the war and the most powerful tanks in the world for a decade thereafter. (IS or JS stood for the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin.) The IS-1 was produced beginning in 1944 to counter the new, more powerful German tanks. The IS-1 had an improved transmission and suspension system as well as a redesigned hull and a new larger turret mounted well forward.

The IS-1 weighed nearly 49.5 tons and had a crew of four. Powered by a 600-hp diesel engine, it was capable of 23 mph. The first IS-1 tank mounted the 85mm gun, but shortly thereafter a 100mm gun was used; some IS-1s even mounted the 122mm gun. In addition, this tank had four machine guns. The IS-1 was followed by the IS-2, with an improved hull shape and streamlining throughout. The IS-3 was a complete redesign, based on the experience of the IS-1 and IS-2 in combat. The IS-3 had a lower silhouette, a ballistically shaped hull, and a new “inverted frying pan,” a lower-profile turret shape to provide maximum deflection against incoming shells. It weighed nearly 51 tons and mounted an improved 122mm gun and had two machine guns. The IS-3 entered service in January 1945 and participated in the March 31–May 2, 1945, Battle of Berlin. Although never available in large numbers, it was for a decade the most powerful tank in the world and a major influence on subsequent tank design across the globe.

Czechoslovakia

The Czechs produced LT-34 and LT-35 light tanks for their army. Germany later provided LT-34 tanks to its ally Romania and used LT-35 tanks on the Eastern Front. The LT-38 was chosen as the light tank after the LT-35 and was produced up to 1942 for Germany. All of these vehicles were armed with the 37mm gun. Only prototypes of the medium tank ST-39, armed with a 47mm gun, had been made when Germany took over Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

Italy

The basic Italian light tank of the war was the Fiat Carro Armato L6/40, somewhat equivalent to the German PzKpfw II. It weighed approximately 7.5 tons, had a 70-hp engine, and was capable of 26 mph. It mounted a 20mm main gun and one machine gun. Unsuitable for frontline service because of its light armament, the L-6/40 was utilized in North Africa in cavalry and reconnaissance roles. It also was sent to the Eastern Front in fighting against the Soviet Union, and it served in Italy.

In 1940, the Italians decided on a new tank, the Fiat M-13/40, which became their principal medium tank and the mainstay of Italy's armor force in North Africa. The 15.5 ton M-13/40 had a crew of four men. It carried a new high-velocity 47mm gun in the turret, with a secondary armament of four machine guns in the hull.

Japan

Although no match for Allied tanks, the most successful Japanese tank was the medium tank Type 97, initially produced in 1937. This 15-ton tank had a crew of four and mounted a 57mm main gun. Its 170-hp diesel engine could drive it at 23.5 mph. The tank was based on the light tank Type 95, designed in 1933 and produced until 1942. With a crew of three and armed with a 37mm gun, the light tank weighed 7.4 tons and could reach 25 mph with its 110-hp diesel engine. Japan did some additional work on medium tanks, with larger main guns.

Throughout the war, the trend was to field tanks with larger main guns to counter the other trend of adding heavier armor. These trends continued in

the postwar years.

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See also

Armored Warfare; Chaffee, Adna Romanza, Jr.; de Gaulle, Charles; Guderian, Heinz; Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry; Patton, George Smith, Jr.

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Tanner, Väinö Alfred (1881–1966)

Finnish politician, Social Democratic Party (SDP) leader, and prime minister (1926–1927). Born in Helsinki on March 12, 1881, Väinö Alfred Tanner completed a year of business school in 1901, then worked for corporations in Hamburg, Turku, and Vyborg before entering law school at the University of Helsinki. Graduating in 1911, he practiced law until 1915 while playing a leading role in the cooperative movement. In 1918, Tanner became chairman of the Finnish Social-Democratic Party. He struggled to defend Finnish freedom and democracy first against the threats posed by the right wing in Finland and then from the Soviet Union during and after World War II.

Tanner was instrumental in concluding the 1920 Tartu Treaty and the 1940 Moscow Treaty, both of which eased Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union. Tanner transformed the SDP into a party that offered a Scandinavian brand of socialism. His pragmatic leadership helped heal the wounds of the civil war following World War I, and he led his party to power

in 1926 and again in 1937. Tanner served as premier of Finland from December 1926 to December 1927.

When the Winter War with the Soviet Union began on November 30, 1939, as foreign minister, Tanner championed his government's resistance to Soviet demands. A cabinet minister throughout World War II, he helped rally the Finnish working class behind the war effort.

Following World War II, Moscow considered Tanner its greatest nemesis. On Soviet insistence, in 1946 a Finnish court sentenced him to five and a half years of imprisonment under the vague charge of "war responsibility." Pardoned in 1949, Tanner made an energetic political comeback and was reelected chairman of his party in 1957. Suspicious of Tanner's attempts to oust Urho Kekkonen from the presidency, in October 1961 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev staged the so-called Note Crisis in which he demanded that Finland reaffirm its neutrality. This secured the reelection of the incumbent president after his quick moves to placate the Soviets.

In 1963 Tanner retired; he died in Helsinki on April 19, 1966.

SILVIU MILOIU

See also

Finland; Finnish-Soviet War, First

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Taranto, Attack on (November 11, 1940)

British Royal Navy raid on the principal Italian naval base, the fortified harbor of Taranto. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, British Mediterranean Fleet commander, and Rear Admiral Sir Arthur Lumley St. George Lyster of the carrier *Illustrious* planned the operation, code-named JUDGMENT. The date for the raid was to be October 21, 1940, the anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar and a night with a full moon. Thirty Fairey Swordfish were slated to make the attack from the aircraft carriers *Illustrious*

and *Eagle*. The Swordfish, although it was a 10-year-old biplane, was nonetheless a reliable, sturdy torpedo platform, especially effective in night operations.

A fire on the *Illustrious*, which destroyed several aircraft, forced postponement of the operation. Then the *Eagle*, which had sustained near misses from Italian bombs, was found to have been more seriously damaged than originally estimated.

As a consequence, the attack was delayed, and the raid was conducted by the *Illustrious* alone. Twenty-one Swordfish aircraft fitted with extra fuel tanks participated, with 11 of them armed with torpedoes and the remainder carrying bombs and flares. The torpedoes were modified to negate the effects of porpoising in the harbor's shallow water.

At 8:30 p.m. on November 11, the *Illustrious* launched its aircraft some 170 miles from Taranto. All six of Italy's battleships were in the harbor, where they were protected by barrage balloons, more than 200 antiaircraft guns, and torpedo nets, although the latter were far short of the number the Italian Navy considered necessary. The British planes set out in two waves an hour apart. The first wave achieved complete surprise when it arrived at Taranto at 11:00 p.m. The pilots cut off their engines and glided in to only a few hundred yards from their targets before releasing the torpedoes against the battleships, which were illuminated by the flares and Italian antiaircraft tracers. The *Conte di Cavour* was the first battleship struck, followed by the *Littorio*. In the second attack at 11:50 p.m., the *Littorio* was struck again, and the *Caio Duilio* was also hit. In the two attacks, the *Conte di Cavour* and *Caio Duilio* each took one torpedo, and the *Littorio* absorbed three.

The Conte di Cavour was the only battleship to sink, and it went down in shallow water. Italian tugs towed the other two damaged ships to shore. The cruiser *Trento* and the destroyer *Libeccio* were both hit by bombs, but they did not explode and caused only minor damage. Fifty-two Italian sailors died in the attack. The British lost two planes; the crewmen of one were rescued by the Italians.

The *Conte di Cavour* was later raised and towed to Trieste to be repaired, but the work was not completed, and it was never recommissioned. The *Littorio* was overhauled by March 1941, and the *Duilio*, which was transferred to Genoa, was repaired and returned to Taranto in May 1941.

The Taranto raid thus deprived Italy of its naval advantage and at least

temporarily altered the Mediterranean balance of power. It also underscored the effectiveness of naval aircraft and was useful to the Japanese. Japan was already working on techniques to employ air-dropped torpedoes in shallow water. Taranto provided confirmation for its plan to strike Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

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See also

Aircraft Carriers; Air Warfare, Naval; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Great Britain, Navy; Italy, Navy; Mediterranean Theater, Naval Operations in; Pearl Harbor, Attack on

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Tarawa, Battle of (November 20–24, 1943)

One of the bloodiest amphibious assaults in military history. In December 1941, a Japanese task force seized Tarawa—part of the Gilbert Islands, which stretch some 500 miles along the equator. Tarawa is a hook-shaped atoll with a lagoon formed by a coral reef just beneath the ocean surface. The barb in the hook is formed by the 2-mile-long triangular-shaped Betio Island, less than 300 acres of nondescript coral, sand, and coconut palms rising no more than 15 feet above sea level.

The Japanese constructed an airfield there, and by November 1943, they had turned Betio into a fortress. Rear Admiral Shibasaki Keiji commanded 5,000 naval infantry troops who manned reinforced concrete blockhouses, coconut-log bunkers, and gun pits, all connected by a network of tunnels and trenches. Heavy guns in hardened revetments commanded virtually every approach to the island, prompting Shibasaki to remark that Betio could not be taken by 1 million men in 100 years.

The Central Pacific commander, U.S. admiral Chester W. Nimitz, decided to seize the Gilberts in a joint assault by the army and the marines as the first test of offensive amphibious operations. The V Amphibious Corps, commanded by Marine Major General Holland M. Smith, was responsible for the landing, code-named Operation GALVANIC. The 2nd Marine Division, led by Major General Julian C. Smith, would seize Tarawa, while the army's 27th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Ralph C. Smith, landed at Makin.

V Corps staffers decided that the portion of Betio that faced the lagoon was the least heavily defended terrain, and they designated landing areas there as Red Beaches 1, 2, and 3. A disadvantage to those sites was the precise navigation required for the landing craft to pass into the lagoon and then maintain formation as they approached the beaches. Amphibious doctrine called for landings at high tide so the landing craft could clear defensive obstacles.

Unfortunately, the planners did not have reliable tide charts, and when Holland Smith designated November 20, 1943, as D-day, the tides would not be favorable to the marines. By then, U.S. aircraft had flown hundreds of sorties against Betio, saturating the island with bombs as ships of the Fifth Fleet pounded the island's defenses one last time. Faulty U.S. reconnaissance reports indicated that nothing was left alive on Betio.

At 9:00 a.m. on November 20, almost two hours after the last

bombardment began, Colonel David M. Shoup led three reinforced battalions of his 2nd Marine Regiment toward Red Beaches 1, 2, and 3. Japanese heavy guns then opened up, unleashing a deadly hail of fire into the tightly packed amphibious tractors (amphtracs) as they neared the reef, paused briefly to climb over it, and then landed on the beaches. The shallow-draft Higgins boats that followed could not get over the reef, however, and the marines were forced to debark into the water about 600 yards from the shore. Withering Japanese machine-gun fire met the marines, who were unable to return fire as they slowly waded toward shore laden with equipment. A small seawall afforded little cover from Japanese small-arms fire as navy corpsmen set up aid stations.

By afternoon, the marines had penetrated no more than a few hundred feet in many places. Shoup, who was wounded, still directed the fight and requested that reserves be committed in a message that emphasized the precariousness of the situation, stating, “Issue in doubt.” Of the 5,000 marines who landed that day, almost 1,500 became casualties. During the night, the Japanese threatened with counterattacks, snipers, and infiltrators. Many marines had drained their canteens and emptied their cartridge belts. The wounded could only wait for evacuation in the morning.

The morning of November 21 saw little improvement. Stiff resistance compelled the attackers to destroy each Japanese strongpoint at a heavy price as U.S. Navy destroyers provided fire support at dangerously close ranges. The day ended with more of Betio in marine hands, but the island was not yet secure. At midmorning on November 22, the marines began their final assault on the Japanese command post, where they poured gasoline down air vents and then ignited it, killing those inside, including Shibasaki. Many Japanese committed suicide as the marines cleared the western portion of the island and pushed the remaining defenders into a narrow tail of land in the east.

The final Japanese act entailed a series of night banzai attacks, in which mobs of enemy soldiers charged marine positions with drawn swords and bayonets. They were cut down by artillery and machine-gun fire from the exhausted marines. Commanders declared the battle over on the morning of November 23, after 76 hours of horrendous fighting. The Japanese had 4,690 men killed; only 17 prisoners were taken, along with 129 Korean laborers. The desperate Japanese defense of the island cost the marines and the navy 1,027 dead, 88 missing, and 2,292 wounded.

The casualties shocked an American public that viewed the fight on Tarawa as evidence that there would be no cheap victories as the battles were carried to the Japanese homeland. The Battle of Tarawa brought many changes, including improved naval fire support and significant increases in firepower ashore, to include more automatic weapons, tanks, explosive charges, and flamethrowers. Shoup, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions on Tarawa, later become Marine Corps commandant.

A U.S. marine fires at a Japanese pillbox from behind the remains of a palm tree, during the November 1943 battle for Tarawa. (National Archives)

STEVEN J. RAUCH

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Makin Island, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Smith, Holland McTyeire; Smith, Julian Constable; Smith, Ralph Corbett

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Tarigo Convoy, Battle of the

See Sfax, Action off

Tassafaronga, Battle of (November 30, 1942)

Naval battle between Japanese and U.S. forces during the August 1942–February 1943 Guadalcanal Naval Campaign. Responding to intelligence that the Japanese Navy intended to resupply Guadalcanal on the night of November 30, 1942, the South Pacific commander, Admiral William F. Halsey, dispatched Rear Admiral Carlton H. Wright's Task Force 67 (TF 67)—consisting of the heavy cruisers *Minneapolis*, *New Orleans*, *Pensacola*, and *Northampton;* the light cruiser *Honolulu;* and six destroyers—to intercept Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo's 2nd Destroyer Squadron, which was steaming in a southeasterly direction. Tanaka had eight destroyers, six of which carried supply drums; the other two destroyers were unencumbered.

To avoid enemy identification and detection problems, the Americans formed into one destroyer and two cruiser groups, each having one ship equipped with the new SG surface-search radar. Cruiser scout planes were to provide reconnaissance and night illumination. Destroyers took station on the engaged bow of the cruisers to deliver a torpedo attack prior to the commencement of gunnery.

Tanaka sought to avoid a general engagement. He intended to have his destroyers drop their floating supply drums, to be retrieved by small Japanese craft from the beaches. As TF 67 approached the Lengo Channel on a northwesterly heading, the lack of a U.S. forward destroyer picket proved to be a critical mistake. Tanaka was cruising only two miles off the Guadalcanal beach but remained undetected until radar picked up his column dead ahead

at 23,000 yards. However, no flare planes had been able to launch to illuminate the Japanese ships. Wright delayed in ordering the destroyers to commence their torpedo attack, believing that the range was greater than the 7,000 yards reported by the destroyer *Fletcher* at 11:20 p.m. Thus, the initial tactical advantage provided by radar had been squandered, with the loss of four precious minutes until Wright unleashed the destroyers. The Japanese column had already passed abaft the destroyers' port beam, making hits difficult as the range opened.

At about 9,000 yards, the U.S. cruisers opened fire, hitting the nearest Japanese destroyer, the *Takanami*. Several ships fired illumination star shells, but the U.S. gunfire accuracy was poor. Well drilled in night detection, maneuver, and torpedo tactics, Tanaka's crews executed a column turn and launched 20 torpedoes at the U.S. ships even while sustaining some shell hits themselves. At 11:27 p.m., the *Minneapolis* suffered two torpedo hits, destroying its bow. Putting its rudder over hard right to avoid a collision, the *New Orleans* took a torpedo near a magazine, which blew off its bow back to No. 2 turret. The third ship in line, the *Pensacola,* veered left to avoid the *New Orleans* but took a torpedo hit at 11:39 p.m. that flooded the after engine room and knocked out three turrets and all power.

Steaming behind the three damaged U.S. cruisers, the *Honolulu* avoided any hits, but the *Northampton* was not so fortunate. That ship first turned right with the *Honolulu,* then back to a westerly heading. Two torpedoes struck it at 11:48 p.m., destroying the after engine room and setting the ship afire from the mast to the stern.

Tanaka reformed his squadron for a second but unsuccessful attack and then cleared the area by 1:30 a.m., with the undamaged *Honolulu* in fruitless pursuit. The *Minneapolis* limped safely into Tulagi Harbor, as did the *New Orleans* and *Pensacola*, all heavily damaged. The *Northampton* sank at 3:04 a.m., with the loss of 58 hands. Jury-rigged to make the voyage home, all three damaged cruisers returned to action by October 1943.

The Tassafaronga debacle resulted from superb Japanese night-fighting training and techniques combined with poor U.S. gunnery and the failure to detach destroyers ahead for forward operations.

STANLEY D. M. CARPENTER

See also

Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; Radar; Southwest Pacific Theater; Tanaka Raizo; Torpedoes

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Taylor, Maxwell Davenport (1901–1987)

U.S. Army general. Born in Keytesville, Missouri, on August 26, 1901, Maxwell Davenport Taylor graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1922 and was commissioned in the engineers. He attended the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, before being assigned to the 3rd Engineers in Hawaii. In 1926, Taylor transferred to the field artillery. A talented linguist, he taught French and Spanish for five years at West Point; graduated from the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1935; and was then an assistant military attaché in Japan.

In 1937, Taylor was assigned to Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell's staff. Following graduation from the Army War College in 1940, Taylor was appointed to the staff of U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall and promoted to lieutenant colonel. In July 1942, Taylor became chief of staff of the 82nd Airborne Division as a colonel, and in December, he was promoted to brigadier general as the divisional artillery commander.

Taylor joined the 82nd in Sicily after the July 9, 1943, Allied invasion, and on September 7, he volunteered for a secret mission behind enemy lines, going to Rome to determine if an airborne drop there was feasible. Meeting with Italian officials, he determined that the Germans had quickly secured both Rome and the facilities necessary for such an operation to succeed. On his recommendation, the mission was scrapped just as the first troop-laden aircraft became airborne. Taylor was then senior representative on the

commission that convinced the new Italian government to declare war on Germany.

Taylor returned to the 82nd, and in March 1944 in the United Kingdom, he took command of the 101st Airborne Division (the Screaming Eagles). Promoted to major general in the same month, he jumped with the division during the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, behind Utah Beach. After being rotated back to Britain after more than a month of combat, Taylor and his division next participated in Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26). On September 17, the division seized Vechel, captured and held the Zon Bridge, and then took Sint Oedenrode and Eindhoven. Taylor was subsequently wounded and was out of action for two weeks. Taylor rejoined his division on December 25 and fought with it for the remainder of December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, German Ardennes Offensive. The division then helped mop up pockets of resistance in the Ruhr before resuming the advance east. At the end of the war in Europe, the 101st helped seize Berchtesgaden.

In September 1945, Taylor became superintendent of West Point, where he initiated curriculum reforms. Between 1949 and 1951, he headed the Berlin Command. In 1951, he was promoted to lieutenant general and became the U.S. Army's deputy chief of staff for operations and training. In February 1953, Taylor took command of the Eighth Army in Korea as a full general, at a time when an armistice was imminent. He was then commanding general, Army Forces Far East, in 1954 and commander in chief, Far East Command, in 1955.

Taylor served as the army chief of staff between 1955 and 1959, differing sharply with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's strategy of "massive retaliation." Taylor urged greater emphasis on conventional forces and the ability to fight limited wars, which later became known as "flexible response." Retiring in 1959, Taylor expressed his views publicly in his book *The Uncertain Trumpet,* which caught the attention of Senator John F. Kennedy. In 1961, President Kennedy brought Taylor out of retirement to serve as his military adviser during 1961 and 1962; thereafter, he was appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving in that post from 1962 to 1964. Taylor opposed the commitment of U.S. ground troops to Vietnam but urged an escalation of the war through the bombing of North Vietnam. During 1964 and 1965, he was ambassador to South Vietnam. For

the remainder of his life, he defended U.S. policies in Vietnam and blamed his country's defeat on the media. Taylor was president of the Institute for Defense Analysis between 1966 and 1969 and president of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1965 to 1970. He died in Washington, D.C., on April 19, 1987.

UZAL W. ENT AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Ardennes Offensive; Italy Campaign; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Rome, Advance on and Capture of; Sicily, Invasion of

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Tedder, Sir Arthur William (1890–1967)

British Marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Born on July 11, 1890, at Glenguin, Scotland, Arthur William Tedder graduated from Magdalene College, Cambridge, in 1913. Commissioned in the British Army later that year, he served in France at the beginning of World War I but was posted to the Royal Flying Corps in 1916. He rose to command 70 Squadron and accepted a commission in the RAF in 1919.

From 1929 to 1931, Tedder was assistant commandant of the RAF Staff College. He then held administrative positions at the Air Armament School and the Air Ministry. He headed up training from 1934 to 1936, then was commander in the Far East. In 1937 he was promoted to air vice marshal. He returned to Britain to become director of research in the Air Ministry in 1938.

In the summer of 1940, Tedder was transferred to North Africa as deputy air commander. He became air commander in chief of the Middle East Air Force in June 1941, directing air operations against the Axis powers in North Africa. Tedder constantly struggled with a shortage of air assets. A forceful airpower advocate along with his subordinate, Air Vice Marshal Arthur

Coningham, Tedder worked to combine and coordinate RAF activities with ground forces in innovative ways. In February 1943 as commander in chief of Allied air assets in the Mediterranean, he was overall air commander for the 1943 Tunisia and Sicily campaigns.

In late 1943, Tedder used the experience gained in these operations to help plan air support for the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion as deputy supreme commander, earning high praise from General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Tedder developed a detailed plan to use airpower to disrupt German communications and supply lines prior to the actual landings. In November 1944, he replaced Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory as commander of tactical air forces. At the end of the war in Europe, Tedder signed the surrender agreement with Germany on behalf of Eisenhower.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower (left), supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, announcing the unconditional German surrender signed at Reims, France, on May 7, 1945. RAF Air chief marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, deputy supreme commander, is on the right. (Library of Congress

On his return to Britain, Tedder was promoted to marshal of the RAF (five-star rank). In January 1946, he was made a baron and appointed chief of the air staff, a post he held until his retirement in 1950. From 1954 to 1960, he was chairman of the Standard Motor Company. Tedder died in Surrey, England, on June 3, 1967.

HAROLD LEE WISE

See also

Coningham, Sir Arthur "Mary"; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; North Africa Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of; Tunisia Campaign

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Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943)

One of the most important Allied conferences during the war. Usually overshadowed by the 1945 Yalta Conference, the meeting at Tehran was in fact equally as or more important than Yalta because of the decisions made there. Attending were the "Big Three"—U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. The conference was also the first face-to-face meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin.

The Soviet leader claimed that his wartime responsibilities would not allow him to travel far, so the conference, code-named Eureka, took place at Tehran, Iran; the journey to Tehran was Stalin's first trip abroad since 1912. Held from November 28 to December 1, 1943, the conference was immediately preceded by a meeting at Cairo (code-named Sextant) that involved Chinese Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and featured a discussion of the Allied effort against Japan. Because the Soviet

Union was not then at war with Japan, Stalin refused to attend that meeting, necessitating the Eureka conference.

At the Tehran meeting, Roosevelt was convinced that he could win over Stalin and, toward that end, turned on his formidable charm to try to secure the Soviet leader's confidence. At Tehran and later at Yalta, Roosevelt deliberately distanced himself from Churchill, a serious mistake. The British prime minister could not believe that the democracies would take separate paths.

The Western leaders labored under a number of disadvantages at Tehran. The first involved the strategic military situation. British and U.S. troops were then fighting the Germans only in Italy with 14 divisions, whereas the Soviet Union had 178 divisions locked in combat. In addition, the Western leaders feared that Stalin might yet seek a diplomatic accommodation with Adolf Hitler, and Roosevelt was also anxious to secure Soviet assistance in the war against Japan.

At Tehran, Stalin pressured the West on an early date for an Allied invasion of France. The Soviet ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky, had counseled Stalin to press for an immediate second front, which he knew was impossible, in order to secure additional Lend-Lease aid. Stalin insisted on learning the name of the commander of Operation OVERLORD as proof that the Western Allies were indeed serious about a cross-Channel invasion, and in a follow-up meeting in Cairo after Eureka, Roosevelt named General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the post. The three leaders also spent a great deal of time discussing Germany and its possible future division at Tehran. Roosevelt suggested splitting Germany into five states and internationalizing the Ruhr and other areas. Churchill, fearful of potential Soviet expansion into Europe, thought that Prussia might be detached from the rest of Germany.

Discussions over Poland were more controversial. All three leaders agreed on the Oder River as the future Polish-German boundary, but the Western leaders rejected the Soviet demand that a tributary of the Oder, the Western Neisse River, be the southern demarcation line. Nor did they sanction Poland securing the important port of Stettin on the west bank of the Oder. The three did concur that Poland would receive most of East Prussia, although the Soviet Union claimed the Baltic port of Königsberg (the future Kaliningrad) and land to the northeast. The Western leaders could hardly oppose the Curzon Line, established by the victorious Allies at the 1919 Paris

Peace Conference following World War I, as the eastern boundary of Poland. The British did object, however, to the Soviet seizure of the predominantly Polish city of L'vov (L'viv).

Churchill pointed out to Stalin that Britain had gone to war over Poland, but Stalin insisted that the Red Army needed security in its rear areas and that a primary goal of the war was to protect the Soviet Union against future German attack. Obviously, a Poland that had been compensated for the loss of its eastern territory to the Soviet Union by receiving German territory in the west would necessarily have to look to the Soviet Union for security.

Churchill later had the difficult task of promoting all these arrangements to the Polish government-in-exile in London; the large Polish community in the United States was also upset by them. Stalin refused normal diplomatic relations with the London Poles, charging that they were stirring up trouble for the Red Army. No independent Polish government would ever concede changes that put the country at the Soviet Union's mercy. Thus, a Polish government subservient to Moscow was probably inevitable.

Stalin also demanded that the Soviet Union be allowed to keep its 1939–1940 acquisitions of Bessarabia, the Karelian Isthmus, and the Baltic states. Although these acquisitions were clear violations of the Atlantic Charter, the Siege of Leningrad gave Stalin a strong argument for a security zone there. He also insisted that Finland cede its Arctic port of Petsamo, pay heavy reparations, and provide space for a base to protect sea approaches to Leningrad. In return, he promised to respect Finland's independence, assuming that country behaved properly.

Stalin reassured Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. He also stressed the importance of an Allied invasion of France to relieve pressure on the Red Army from German troops on the Eastern Front. Further, Stalin expressed the view that a landing in southern France (the future Operation ANVIL) would be most helpful. He was pleased when the Western leaders told him that the invasion of northern France (Operation OVERLORD) was scheduled for May 1944. He promised to launch a Soviet ground offensive to coincide with it. The three leaders also agreed that after the war, Iran, which was serving as a supply corridor to the Soviet Union and was occupied by Allied troops, would be restored to full territorial integrity and sovereignty and that all troops would be withdrawn.

Marshal Josef Stalin (left), President Franklin D. Roosevelt (center), and Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill (right) at the Tehran Conference, November 28–December 1, 1943. (Library of Congress)

Although the Tehran Conference served to dissipate tensions between the two Western leaders and Stalin, sharp differences on the conduct of the war and the composition of postwar Europe remained. These differences were very much in evidence at the February 1945 Yalta Conference.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Cairo Conference; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; DRAGOON, Operation; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Lend-Lease; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Poland; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Yalta Conference; Document 174

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Templer, Sir Gerald Walter Robert (1898–1979)

British Army field marshal. Born at Colchester, Essex, England, on September 11, 1898, Gerald Walter Robert Templer attended Wellington College and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. During World War I, he saw action with the Royal Irish Fusiliers in France. Between the wars, he served in Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Palestine. In 1938, Templer joined the War Office General Staff, assigned to military intelligence and clandestine operations—areas where his work was both imaginative and thorough.

When World War II began in September 1939, Templer served as an intelligence officer in the British headquarters in France under Major General Sir Frank Nöel Mason-MacFarlane. On May 16, 1940, Templer became chief of staff to an ad hoc British force under Mason-Macfarlane intended to assist the French on the British Expeditionary Force's western flank. Templer was evacuated from Dunkerque with other British forces during May 27–June 4. In Britain, he held various staff and command appointments, becoming the army's youngest lieutenant general in October 1942 and commanding II Corps in Newmarket.

In 1943, seeking a combat assignment, Templer requested and was granted a demotion to major general. He successively commanded the 1st Division in North Africa and the 56th Division in Italy under the U.S. Fifth Army. His division saw heavy fighting at Monte Camino in late 1943 and at the Anzio bridgehead in January and February 1944, suffering substantial casualties. In July 1944, Templer transferred to command the 6th Armoured Division. In August, as the division advanced on Florence, he was severely wounded by a mine and evacuated to Britain.

On his recovery, Templer worked briefly for the Special Operations Executive, and in March 1945, he began a year as the energetic director of civil affairs and military government in British-occupied Germany. After War Office assignments as director of military intelligence and vice chief of the

Imperial Staff as well as heading the Eastern Command, he became the British high commissioner and commander in chief in Malaya in October 1951, playing a key role in the suppression of its communist insurgency. From 1955 to 1958, Templer, now a field marshal, was chief of the Imperial General Staff, handling difficult Middle Eastern problems, including the 1956 Suez crisis, and reluctantly but vigorously implementing military cuts. Retiring in 1958, Templer died in Chelsea, London, on October 25, 1979.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Anzio, Battle of; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Italy Campaign; Special Operations Executive

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Terauchi Hisaichi (1879–1946)

Japanese Army field marshal. Born in Yamaguchi Prefecture on the Japanese island of Honshu on August 8, 1879, Terauchi Hisaichi graduated from the Military Academy in 1899 and the War College in 1903. He was appointed assistant military attaché in Austria in 1911, regimental commander of the 3rd Imperial Guards in 1919, chief of staff of the Imperial Guards Division in 1922, commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade in 1924, and chief of staff of the Korea Army in 1927. Promoted to lieutenant general in August 1929, he commanded the Imperial Garrison Unit in 1929 and then the 5th Division in August 1930. In January 1932, he took command of the 4th Division, and in August 1934, he became Formosa Army commander. In October 1935, he was promoted to full general.

A prominent member of the Control Faction, Terauchi served as minister of war in the Hirota Kōki cabinet (March 1936–January 1937) and was one of the leading figures in the ouster of Hirota. He next served as inspector

general of military training (1937), North China Area Army commander (1937–1938), and military counselor (1938–1941).

In November 1941, he took command of the Southern Expeditionary Army, which, at the start of the Pacific war, conquered the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies (December 1941–May 1942). He subsequently became responsible for the defense of an area extending from Burma to western New Guinea. Promoted to the honorary rank of field marshal in June 1943 and briefly considered to succeed Tōjō Hideki as prime minister in July 1944, Terauchi commanded the Southern Expeditionary Army until September 1945. As a commander, Terauchi was essentially a coordinator who typically allowed subordinate officers great latitude in the conduct of operations.

Thanks to the intervention of Lord Louis Mountbatten, Allied supreme commander in Southeast Asia, Terauchi, who had suffered a debilitating stroke in April 1945, avoided prosecution as a war criminal. Allowed to settle near Johore Bahru, Malaya, he died there on June 12, 1946.

BRUCE J. DEHART

See also

Burma Theater; Hirota Kōki; Malaya Campaign; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Tōjō Hideki

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ter Poorten, Hein (1887–1968)

Dutch Army lieutenant general. Hein ter Poorten was born on November 21, 1887, in Buitenzorg (now Bogor) on the island of Java in the Netherlands East Indies (present-day Indonesia) and was commissioned an artillery officer in 1911. He subsequently learned to fly at his own expense and helped establish the Netherlands' army air force.

In 1919 ter Poorten studied at the Army Staff College in the Netherlands. Returning to the Netherlands East Indies, he advanced steadily in rank and served on the General Staff during 1926–1931 and 1933–1936 and became inspector of artillery. He became chief of the General Staff in the Netherlands East Indies in July 1939. In October 1941 following the death in a plane crash of Lieutenant General Gerardus Johannes Berenschot, ter Poorten succeeded him as commander of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army as a lieutenant general.

Ter Poorten was regarded by most observers as a competent and skilled officer who got along well with his military associates, although his relations with civilian leaders are said to have been less successful. In January 1942 as the Japanese invaded the Netherlands East Indies, ter Poorten assumed command of all Allied land forces of the ABDA (American, British, Dutch, and Australian) Command in Java. With few resources available to him and no hope of air or naval support, there was little he could do but carry out a fighting withdrawal to protect the Dutch political centers of Batavia and Bandung. Following the rapid Japanese advance and with his men out of ammunition and low on food and water, ter Poorten surrendered all Allied forces to the Japanese on March 8, 1942.

Held prisoner of the Japanese for the remainder of the war, ter Poorten returned to the Netherlands after the Japanese surrender. He retired in 1946 and died in The Hague on January 15, 1968.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Netherlands East Indies; Netherlands East Indies, Japanese Conquest of

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Theobald, Robert Alfred (1884–1957)

U.S. Navy rear admiral. Born in San Francisco, California, on January 25, 1884, Robert Alfred Theobald graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1907 and was commissioned an ensign. During the next years, he served in a variety of assignments at sea and in shore posts, impressing his superiors with his skills in gunnery, his seamanship, and his intellectual acumen. During the 1930s, Theobald was both a student and an instructor at the Naval War College. He commanded the battleship *Nevada*, served as a member of the navy's General Board, and commanded a cruiser division and later a destroyer flotilla.

Shortly after the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Captain Theobald took command of the destroyers in the Pacific Fleet. In May 1942, he was appointed commander of the North Pacific Force and was promoted to rear admiral that June. Because the force initially had a main body of only five cruisers and four destroyers, Theobald was inclined to be cautious in moving against the Japanese in the Aleutian Islands, an approach that placed him at odds with the more aggressive-minded army commanders in the theater.

The conflict between Theobald and the army, along with the admiral's irritation at being assigned to a backwater in the war, angered Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet. On January 4, 1943, Nimitz relieved Theobald, who then took charge of the First Naval District and the Boston Navy Yard. Theobald retired from the navy in February 1945.

After the war, Theobald involved himself in the Pearl Harbor controversy, arguing that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet in 1941 and an old friend, and Lieutenant General Walter Short, commander of the Hawaiian Department, were unfairly made the scapegoats for the Japanese success. In his book *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack* (1954), Theobald charged that President Franklin D. Roosevelt and members of his administration did not adequately warn Hawaiian commanders of a possible attack and had shifted the blame to Kimmel and Short to cover up their own errors in judgment. Theobald died in Boston on May 13, 1957.

JOHN KENNEDY OHL

See also

Kimmel, Husband Edward; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; United States Navy

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Theobald, Robert Alfred. *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack*. New York: Devin-Adair, 1954.

Thierry d'Argenlieu, Georges Louis Marie (1889–1964)

French admiral. Born in Brest, France, on August 7, 1889, Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu graduated from the École Navale in Brest in 1906 and was commissioned in the navy. During World War I, he served in the French marines and commanded a patrol boat in the Mediterranean.

In September 1919, Thierry d'Argenlieu left the navy and entered the Carmelite Order as Père Louis de la Trinité (Father Louis of the Trinity). In February 1932, he became provincial superior in Paris. In 1939, he was called back into the navy at Cherbourg, and in February 1940, he was appointed captain. Captured by the Germans on June 19, Thierry d'Argenlieu escaped three days later and joined General Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement in Britain. Thierry d'Argenlieu participated in the ill-fated September 23–25, 1940, Free French attack on Vichy forces at Dakar and was wounded three times. He then took command of Free French naval forces in Equatorial Africa. Operating in conjunction with Colonel Philippe Leclerc on land, he led the naval operations at Gabon.

Between February and May 1941, Thierry d'Argenlieu headed a mission to Canada to rally support for de Gaulle, and by July, he was named high commissioner for the Pacific, which involved, in conjunction with the other Allies, defending French territories in the Pacific and easing diplomatic tensions between Free French administrators in Tahiti and New Caledonia. The following year, in May, Thierry d'Argenlieu helped rally the Wallis and Futuna islands.

In June 1943, Thierry d'Argenlieu was promoted to rear admiral and became commander in chief of all Free French naval forces. Following the

liberation of France, he was promoted to vice admiral in December 1944 and made *chef d'état major general adjoint de la marine*. He had been named a *compagnon de la libération* on January 29, 1941, when he also became the first grand chancellor of that order, serving until 1958.

After the war, the French government sent Thierry d'Argenlieu to San Francisco in April 1945 as a delegate to the meetings that formed the United Nations and then to Indochina as high commissioner to reestablish French control there. His efforts to roll back the colonial clock and his decision to employ force and order the shelling of Haiphong by the cruiser *Suffren* on November 23, 1946, led directly to the outbreak of the First Indochina War.

In June 1946, Thierry d'Argenlieu was promoted to admiral. The following year, he was recalled to Paris, and in 1948, he returned to his monastery in Brest. He died in Le Relecq-Kerhuon (Finistère), France, on September 7, 1964.

JOHN MACFARLANE

See also

Dakar, Attack on; de Gaulle, Charles; Free French; Vichy France

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Thoma, Wilhelm Ritter von (1891–1948)

German Army general. Born on September 11, 1891, at Dachau, Germany, Wilhelm von Thoma joined the German Army in 1914 as an officer candidate and was commissioned in the infantry. He fought in the Battle of Verdun in 1916 and later that year against the Russian Brusilov Offensive on the Eastern Front. He continued in the Reichswehr after World War I and became a leading theorist of armored warfare, second in the German Army only to Heinz Guderian. In 1934, Major Thoma took command of Germany's only tank battalion. He then had charge of all German ground troops in the Spanish Civil War (1936 to 1939).

Thoma led the 3rd Panzer Regiment in the 2nd Panzer Division during the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, where he performed brilliantly. Following the conquest of Poland, he became director of Mobile Forces. Sent to North Africa to report on whether German forces should be dispatched there, he submitted a negative report but urged that if a commitment was to be made, four armored divisions should be sent. Promoted to major general in August 1940, he assumed command of the 3rd Panzer Division.

In July 1941, Thoma replaced Lieutenant General Hans Jürgen von Arnim as commander of the 17th Panzer Division in the Soviet Union and participated in the Battle of Smolensk (July 10–August 5, 1941) and the Battle of Kiev (August 21–September 16). That September, he assumed command of the 20th Panzer Division in the Moscow region, a post he held until January 1942.

In September, Thoma was ordered to North Africa in command of the Afrika Korps. He arrived there in time to participate in the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4, 1943), when British general Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army took the offensive against Axis forces. On the death of General of Panzer Troops Georg Stumme, Thoma briefly commanded Panzerarmee Afrika and was promoted to general of panzer troops. Adolf Hitler then ordered Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to return to Africa from sick leave and resume command. On his arrival on October 25, Rommel criticized Thoma for his tactics.

Thoma had been slightly wounded in the fighting, and he reported to Rommel that he had only 35 tanks remaining. Rommel ordered a withdrawal, which Hitler countermanded. On November 4, 1942, complaining of Hitler's "unparalleled madness," Thoma donned a clean uniform, put on his medals, and climbed into a tank, racing from one point to another on the front lines in the thick of the battle. His tank was hit several times and caught fire, and Thoma was taken prisoner. That same night, he dined with British general Sir Bernard Law Montgomery but refused to discuss German strategy in the battle. Released from prison in early 1948, Thoma died in Söcking (Starnberg), Germany, on April 30, 1948.

GENE MUELLER AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; El Alamein, Battle of; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the; Kondor Legion; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Poland Campaign; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Smolensk, Battle of; Spanish Civil War

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Thomas, Norman Mattoon (1884–1968)

Noted socialist, minister, and pacifist who helped shape much of U.S. isolationist and pacifistic sentiments in the 20th century. Norman Mattoon Thomas was born on November 20, 1884, in Marion, Ohio, and graduated from Princeton University in 1905. He then studied at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City and was ordained a Presbyterian minister in 1911.

Thomas served as an assistant pastor and then pastor of several Presbyterian churches in New York City. While in New York, Thomas was greatly influenced by the Social Gospel movement. Demoralized by what he saw as an intolerably high rate of poverty and discouraged by American militarism, he joined the Socialist Party of America.

Thomas spoke out against the American involvement in World War I and in 1918 founded and edited the *World Tomorrow*, a publication dedicated to pacifism and socialist ideals. In 1920, he cofounded the American Civil Liberties Union with such luminaries as Upton Sinclair and Jane Addams. Thomas now turned toward politics and ran unsuccessfully as the Socialist Party candidate for the governorship of New York in 1924. He sought the office again—unsuccessfully—in 1938 and also ran for mayor of New York City in 1925 and again in 1929. In 1926, when longtime Socialist Party leader Eugene Debbs died, Thomas took up the leadership role of the Socialist Party in the United States. Thomas also ran in six presidential elections (1928, 1932, 1936, 1940, 1944, and 1948) as the Socialist Party candidate but was unsuccessful in each.

Although Thomas was a sharp and consistent critic of American-style capitalism and lambasted both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party

with equal vigor, he also denounced fascism in all its forms and railed against Soviet-style communism. Thus, despite his socialist beliefs, he was firmly anti-Soviet, even though he did not agree with the militaristic implementation of containment that followed World War II. Thomas also believed that America's involvement in World War II was a mistake, at least prior to the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor.

In 1940, he cofounded the America First Committee, which was dedicated to maintaining American isolationism and keeping the United States out of World War II. The committee became the largest and most vocal pacifist organization in the nation but was dissolved within days of the Pearl Harbor attack. Thomas backed the war effort after that, although he derided some of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, including the decision to permit big business to control much of the war's military production.

After World War II, Thomas kept up his high profile in the peace movement and spoke out against postwar rearmament and the American involvement in the Korean War. He also spoke out loudly—and often—against the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, and spearheaded some of the earliest organized antiwar protests of the conflict. He worked tirelessly for world disarmament throughout the 1950s and 1960s and was particularly vocal in his denunciation of the nuclear arms race. Although Thomas resigned as head of the Socialist Party in 1955, he nevertheless remained its chief spokesman until his health began to fail in the late 1960s. Thomas died in New York City on December 19, 1968.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

America First Committee; United States

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Three Alls Campaign

Japanese scorched-earth policy in China. First initiated in 1940 by Japanese Army major general Tanaka Ryūkichi, it was recommended as official policy by General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the North China Area Army since July 1941, in retaliation for the communist-led "Hundred Regiments" offensive of December 1940. On December 3, 1941, the policy received the approval of Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo and reportedly that of Emperor Hirohito himself. The new policy, Sankō Sakusen, became known as the "Three Alls" (for "kill all, burn all, destroy all"). It included the destruction of villages, the confiscation of food stocks, and the mobilization of the Chinese peasantry to build new protected villages with containment walls, moats, and watchtowers. The policy permitted the execution of "enemies pretending to be local people" and all males between the ages of 15 and 60 suspected of being enemies of the Japanese.

This Japanese policy of deliberate destruction sharply reduced both the area under control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and CCP military strength. Communist leader Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) now reasserted his personal authority over both the CCP and military strategy, ending any major CCP challenge to Japanese military control in northern China for the remainder of the war. CCP military forces would engage the Japanese in guerrilla warfare only when there were favorable circumstances and on the initiative of local commanders.

A 1996 study by Japanese historian Himeta Mitsuyoshi claims that the policy led to the deaths of more than 2.7 million Chinese civilians. Ultrarightist groups in Japan have countered by blaming the Chinese and their "Clean Field Strategy," in which Chinese soldiers would destroy civilian homes and crops to prevent shelter and supplies from being used by the Japanese.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Mao Zedong; Okamura Yasuji; Sino-Japanese War

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Timoshenko, Semen Konstantinovich (1895–1970)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in the village of Furmanka, Ukraine, on February 18, 1895, Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko was drafted into the Russian Army during World War I in 1915. He served as a machine gunner and was decorated. Timoshenko joined the Red Army in April 1918 and earned his military reputation in the Russian Civil War. A man of great personal courage, he also developed a friendship with Joseph Stalin, to whom he remained intensely loyal.

Virtually illiterate until he began his military schooling, Timoshenko graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1922, from cavalry schools, and from the Lenin Political Academy in 1930. He then held a succession of military commands. In August 1933, he was appointed deputy commander of the Belorussia Military District. He went on to command the Northern Caucasus, Kharkov, and Kiev military districts. He escaped persecution in the Great Purges and certainly benefited from the execution of thousands of fellow officers.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Timoshenko. (Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

A member of the Supreme Soviet on its establishment in 1937, Timoshenko retained this position for life. In September 1939, he commanded the Ukrainian Front in the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland. When Soviet forces performed poorly in the Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War), Stalin appointed Timoshenko to command in Finland on January 7, 1940.

The day after being promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union on May 7, 1940, Timoshenko succeeded Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Voroshilov as defense commissar. Rough and blunt, he was, in many ways, unsuited for high command. He worked to rebuild the Red Army, although slavishly following Stalin's guidelines. As such, he must bear, along with Stalin, responsibility for the military debacle that followed the German invasion of June 22, 1941. Initially, Timoshenko refused authorization for

Soviet commanders to return fire. On July 21, he yielded the post of defense commissar to Stalin and became commander in chief of the Western Front, where he had some success in delaying the German advance.

Transferred to command the Southwestern Front in September 1941, Timoshenko failed to prevent a German breakthrough to the Crimea and the disaster of the Kiev encirclement (August 21–September 26), which, however, could be blamed on Stalin's refusal to allow a withdrawal. Transferred to the Finnish Front in January 1942, Timoshenko remained there through May, then returned to the Ukraine, where his offensive at Kharkov that month failed. During the remainder of the war, he served in lesser assignments and, at one point or another, commanded operations on the Northern Caucasus, 2nd and 3rd Baltic, and 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts.

After the war, Timoshenko commanded the South Ural Military District between 1946 and 1949 and the Belorussian Military District in 1946 and again from 1949 to 1960. Timoshenko died in Moscow on March 31, 1970.

MICHAEL SHARE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Finnish-Soviet War, First; Kharkov, Battles of; Kiev Pocket, Battle of the

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Tinian, U.S. Invasion of (July 24–August 1, 1944)

U.S. battle in the Marianas chain in the West-Central Pacific. Located some 3 miles south of the island of Saipan, Tinian Island is roughly 13 miles long from north to south and 5 miles wide. It was the site of an amphibious landing by the U.S. marines on July 25, 1944, as part of Operation FORAGER, itself part of the U.S. Navy's campaign across the Central Pacific as directed by the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz. The invasion of

Tinian followed U.S. assaults, also part of FORAGER, on Saipan and Guam in the Marianas. Saipan was secured between June 15 and July 9, and Guam—a U.S. territory taken by Japan at the beginning of the war—was recaptured between July 21 and August 12, 1944.

In the summer of 1944, the Marianas were an important part of the Japanese defensive ring, sitting astride the Pacific supply routes to Japan's home islands. U.S. Navy planners decided to seize the islands to provide forward naval bases for the Allied push toward the home islands, interdict Japanese supply lines, and draw out the Japanese fleet so that it might be engaged in decisive battle. This engagement, the July 19–21 Battle of the Philippine Sea, resulted in significant aircraft and ship losses for Japan. U.S. Army Air Forces planners strongly advocated the Marianas operation to provide air bases from which Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers might strike Japan. Tinian was especially valuable for airfields because it is relatively flat.



U.S. soldiers wade through shallow surf from grounded landing craft to the beach of Tinian Island, June 1944. (National Archives)

General Obata Hideyoshi, the commander of the Japanese Thirty-First Army, directed the defense of the Marianas, and Colonel Ogata Takashi commanded the reinforced 50th Infantry Regiment and other supporting army

and navy forces on Tinian. Ogata had some 8,000–9,000 men. The Japanese expected the assault, and the defenders did what they could with their limited resources to prepare, determined to inflict as many casualties on the Americans as possible.

Vice Admiral Richmond Turner commanded the Joint Amphibious Forces, and U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant general Holland Smith commanded the landing forces. Rear Admiral Henry W. Hill served as the commander of the assault forces for Tinian, and U.S. Marine Corps major general Harry Schmidt led the landing force. U.S. ships and both army and navy aircraft subjected Tinian to a heavy preparatory bombardment, during which napalm was first used. Additionally, because Tinian was only three miles from Saipan, marine and army artillery units there contributed gunfire support to the invasion force.

The landing forces embarked from Saipan several days before the July 24 landing. Turner wanted the landing to take place on the more suitable but more heavily defended southwestern beaches, but the marines insisted that it occur on two small northern beaches (allowing only one division to come ashore at a time), and Turner reluctantly agreed. A feint at the southern beach served to attract much of the defenders' attention, while the V Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 4th Marine Division and then the 2nd Marine Division, went ashore to the north. U.S. aircraft flying from Saipan as well as artillery there provided support throughout the battle.

The marines overcame fierce Japanese counterattacks and were able to declare Tinian secure on August 1. Almost all Japanese defenders died in the fighting. U.S. casualties included 389 killed in action and more than 1,800 wounded.

Navy Seabees quickly converted Tinian into a massive air-support facility. Soon, B-29s of the Twentieth Air Force were striking Japanese cities. Additionally, Seventh Air Force fighters and bombers supported other operations in the Central Pacific. Tinian was also the home base for the two atomic bomb missions at the end of the war.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also

B-29 Raids against Japan; Central Pacific Campaign; Mariana Islands Campaign; Nimitz, Chester William; Obata Hideyoshi; Philippine Sea,

Battle of the; Saipan, Battle of; Smith, Holland McTyeire; Turner, Richmond Kelly

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Tirpitz, Attacks on (1941–1944)

The German battleship *Tirpitz*, sister ship to the *Bismarck*, was commissioned at Wilhelmshaven, Germany, in February 1941. The *Tirpitz* displaced 52,600 tons fully loaded, mounted 8 15-inch guns, and had a crew of 2,340 men. Recognizing the threat posed by this powerful warship, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command flew 269 sorties in five separate attacks against Wilhelmshaven during January 1941 in an effort to destroy it. On February 28, Bomber Command flew another 116 sorties with the same goal.

As with the *Bismarck*, the *Tirpitz*, which was based in Norway beginning in January 1942, posed a threat to Allied shipping and tied up many Allied ships in the Home Fleet that could better be deployed elsewhere. As a consequence, between 1942 and 1944, large numbers of Allied ships and aircraft (most of them British), assisted by the Norwegian Resistance, attacked the battleship in Norwegian waters.

On the nights of March 30–31 and April 27, 1942, the RAF struck the *Tirpitz* at Föttenfjord, near Trondheim. The latter strike involved RAF Lancaster bombers and achieved complete surprise, but no bombs hit the battleship. In July 1943, Allied ships, including the U.S. Navy battleship *Alabama*, seeking a diversion for the July 9, 1943, Sicily invasion, tried unsuccessfully to lure the *Tirpitz* from its hiding place in Norway's waters and into the North Atlantic.

On September 6, 1943, the *Tirpitz* saw its only real offensive action of the war when it sortied to shell Spitsbergen. On September 22, the British midget submarines *X-6* and *X-7* slipped through German defenses at Kaa Fjord,

Norway, and their crews managed to plant mines on the battleship's hull. The explosions severely damaged the *Tirpitz,* but the Germans were able to effect repairs. Then on April 3, 1944, 40 Fairey Barracuda torpedo bombers flying from the Royal Navy carriers *Victorious* and *Furious* attacked. The *Tirpitz* took 14 hits. Though disabled, it remained afloat, and again the Germans made repairs.

More powerful bombs were necessary, and the RAF turned to British inventor Sir Barnes Wallis, who had created the skip-bombs used in the Dam Buster raids. Wallis developed a 12,000-pound armor-piercing bomb known as "tallboy." On September 11, 1944, 38 Lancaster bombers left Scotland for airfields in the northern Soviet Union, from which they planned to attack the *Tirpitz*. On September 15, 27 bombers of RAF Squadrons 9 and 617, carrying 20 tallboys, took off from Yagodnik, near Arkhangelsk, for Kaa Fjord. With the mountains screening their approach, they caught the German defenders by surprise. One tallboy went through the *Tirpitz*'s forecastle, exploding in its hull. Several other near misses severely damaged the ship's engines.

The Germans then decided not to repair the *Tirpitz,* and on October 15, they moved it to Tromsø to serve as a semistatic heavy artillery battery. On October 29, the British, unaware of the extent of the damage inflicted on the ship, sent 37 Lancasters equipped with extra fuel tanks from Lossiemouth, Scotland, on a 2,250-mile mission against the *Tirpitz,* but none of their 32 tallboys hit home.

On November 12, 1944, with German fighters now stationed nearby, Wing Commander James Brian "Willie" Tait led his 32 Lancasters on a wide-sweeping route over Sweden, which confused the German defenders. Arriving over the *Tirpitz,* the British scored three direct hits. One tore a 100-foot hole in the *Tirpitz*'s hull, detonating the magazines and capsizing the battleship. A total of 917 men in its crew died.

After the war, a Norwegian salvage company bought the rights to the German battleship and between 1948 and 1957 salvaged most of the hulk for scrap.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Bismarck, Sortie and Sinking of; Germany, Navy

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Tiso, Jozef (1887–1947)

Slovak nationalist and president of the Slovak Republic (1939–1945). Born on October 13, 1887, at Vel'ká Bytča, Slovakia (then Hungary), Jozef Tiso was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1910. In 1918, he helped to found the Slovak People's Party (SPP). Tiso represented the SPP in the Czechoslovakian parliament in 1925 and served as minister of health during 1927–1928. With the death of SPP leader Andrej Hlinka in August 1938, Monsignor Tiso took over as head of the party.

Roman Catholic priest and Slovak nationalist Jozef Tiso was president of Slovakia following the German take over in March 1939. Tiso retained that position throughout World War II, when he cooperated closely with the Germans. Tried and convicted of treason and war crimes, he was executed in 1947. (Corbis)

On October 6, 1938, Tiso became prime minister of an autonomous Slovakia created under the terms of the Munich Pact. In early March 1939, the Czechoslovakian government deposed him for promoting Slovak independence, but Tiso received Adolf Hitler's support during a visit to Berlin on March 13 and the following day proclaimed Slovak independence. The Germans occupied Czechoslovakia on March 15, and on March 16, Tiso placed the new Slovak state under the protection of Germany, primarily to avoid its annexation by Hungary.

On October 26, 1939, Tiso became president of the newly created Slovak Republic. Although he personally opposed Nazism, he was forced to share power with the fascist paramilitary Hlinka Guards, and his government

willingly collaborated with the Germans, allowing some 68,000 Slovakian Jews to be deported to German concentration camps.

Tiso's government survived an internal uprising in August 1944 but fell to the Red Army and Czech partisans in April 1945. Tiso fled to Austria but was extradited to Czechoslovakia, where he was tried and convicted of treason and war crimes. He was executed by hanging at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, on April 18, 1947. Largely in consequence of Tiso's authoritarian, collaborationist regime, the postwar communist government of Czechoslovakia treated Slovaks as second-class citizens and repressed the Catholic Church.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also
Czechoslovakia; Hitler, Adolf

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Tito (1892–1980)

Yugoslav Resistance leader and later premier and president of Yugoslavia. Born into a peasant family in Kumroveć (Croatia), then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Josip Broz was apprenticed to a mechanic and followed this trade, traveling throughout the Dual Monarchy. In 1913, he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army.

An excellent soldier, Broz was a sergeant major commanding a platoon in a Croatian regiment at the outbreak of World War I, and he fought against the Russians until his capture in 1915. While a prisoner of war, Broz became fluent in Russian. Released following the March 1917 Russian Revolution, he joined the Bolsheviks at Petrograd but was then a political prisoner until the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917.

Broz fought in the Red Guard during the Russian Civil War but returned to Croatia in 1920 to take an active role in the Communist Party of

Yugoslavia (Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije, KPJ). His underground work, often conducted from jail, brought his rapid rise in the party apparatus as a member of the KPJ Politburo and Central Committee. He took the pseudonym “Tito” for security reasons.

Imprisoned during 1929–1934, Tito became secretary-general of the KPJ in 1937. Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, he assumed command of the communist Partisan movement, with the twin goals of expelling the Germans and ultimately securing control of the government. Tito and the Partisans employed guerrilla tactics to compensate for their lack of advanced weaponry.

Tito’s Partisans were in competition with the Serbian-dominated Četniks (Chetniks) led by General Dragoljub “Draza” Mihajlović, minister of war in the exiled government. For the most part, the Ćetniks were unwilling to embark on the types of actions that would bring widespread reprisals by the Germans against the Yugoslav population, whereas the Partisans had no such inhibitions. In a controversial decision that had far-reaching repercussions for the political future of Yugoslavia, the British government, which provided the Allied military support for the Yugoslav Resistance, shifted all support to the Partisans in 1943.

Tito’s Partisans grew to a force of 800,000 by the end of the war, tying down a large number of Axis divisions. By then, Tito was in full control of Yugoslavia, and he insisted that the Red Army ask permission to enter Yugoslavia in pursuit of the Germans. Tito’s forces attempted to annex the southern provinces of Austria, moving into Carinthia. Only the timely arrival of the British V Corps prevented the seizure of this territory. The Yugoslavs were finally convinced by threat of force to leave Austria in mid-May 1945.

Tito took his revenge on the Croats, many of whom had been loyal to the Axis powers, as had the Slovenes. Perhaps 100,000 people who had sided with the Germans were executed by the Partisans without trial within weeks of the war’s end. The majority of German prisoners taken in the war also perished in a long “march of hate” across Yugoslavia.

With the support of the Red Army, Tito formed the National Front and consolidated his power. He nationalized the economy and built it on the Soviet model. He often went his own way in matters of foreign policy, however, leading to a break with the Soviet Union in 1948. After that, he became more pragmatic in economic matters and allowed a degree of

decentralization. He claimed that there might be “different paths to socialism,” giving birth to what became known as polycentrism.

Tito traveled widely and became one of the principal leaders of the nonaligned nations. By 1954, however, he had ended reform, and in the mid-1970s, the Yugoslavian economy began to falter, and nationalist pressure from various ethnic groups threatened to break up the state. Tito died on May 4, 1980, in Ljubljana, Yugoslavia. The complicated federated state system that he had put in place did not long survive his death, as the various ethnic groups asserted their independence.

JEREMY C. ONGLEY

See also

Mihailović, Dragoljub “Draža”; Yugoslavia

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Tizard, Sir Henry Thomas (1885–1959)

British scientist. Born in Gillingham, Kent, England, on August 23, 1885, Henry Thomas Tizard studied math and chemistry at Magdalen College, Oxford, and established his academic reputation with the publication of a paper on the color changes of indicators in 1911. Tizard joined the Royal Garrison Artillery at the start of World War I. In June 1915, he transferred to the Royal Flying Corps as an experimental equipment officer, testing bombsights and then aircraft. In 1917, he published his scientific system for investigating the performance of aircraft. As a lieutenant colonel, he was assigned to the headquarters of the Ministry of Munitions in 1917.

In the spring of 1919, Tizard left the army and returned to Oxford as a lecturer. There he conducted pioneering work on aviation fuel, which led to a new understanding of the internal combustion engine. Tizard accepted an invitation to join the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in 1920, and by 1927, he was its permanent secretary and largely responsible for

establishing the Chemical Research Lab. Tizard became rector of the Imperial College of Science and Technology in 1929, a post he held until 1942. He was also increasingly involved with defense matters as a member of the Aeronautical Research Committee, which he chaired from 1933 to 1943, as he did the engine subcommittee.

That period saw revolutionary advances in aircraft and engines as well as research into ways to defend against hostile aircraft. The Air Ministry appointed Tizard to head a committee that would apply technical and scientific knowledge to strengthening British air defenses. Known as the Tizard Committee, it first met in January 1935. Its efforts led to the development and deployment of ground and airborne radar by 1939. Britain led the world in such work, and Tizard was knighted in 1937.

Tizard was instrumental in establishing a government group to conduct scientific intelligence, and he also investigated the feasibility of an atomic bomb. His greatest service to the war effort, however, may have been the mission he headed to Canada and the United States in August 1940. Tizard proposed that Britain share its most sensitive technical secrets with the United States. Ultimately, Britain provided full information on radar and the cavity magnetron.

On his return to Britain, Tizard became a semiofficial adviser to the minister of aircraft production and served on the Air Council. He did not get along with Frederick A. Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell), Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill's scientific adviser, and he accepted the presidency of Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1942, although two years later, he agreed to chair a new committee to study the potential effects of new weapons on defense policy. Tizard left Magdalen College in 1946 and returned to Whitehall as chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee and the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy. He retired in 1952. Tizard died in Fareham, Hampshire, England, on October 9, 1959.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Lindemann, Frederick Alexander; Radar

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Tobruk, First Battle of (January 6–22, 1941)

North African battle between Italian and British forces. The Mediterranean port of Tobruk, located in northeast Libya some 70 miles from the Egyptian border, was an important focal point in the fighting in North Africa during 1941–1942. On December 7, 1940, Major General Richard O'Connor's Western Desert Force launched Operation COMPASS to drive invading Italian forces from Egypt. On December 11 at Sidi Barrani in Egypt, O'Connor's unit soundly defeated the Italians but was unable to capitalize on this victory immediately, as one of its two divisions, the Indian 4th Division, was withdrawn for service in the Sudan several weeks before the arrival of the replacement Australian 6th Division.

Following this necessary pause, O'Connor's forces crossed into Libya, and on January 5, 1941, they took Bardia on the coast, just across the border and east of Tobruk. On January 6, the British 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats) and the Australian 6th Division assaulted Tobruk, completely besieging the fortress there three days later.

Italian lieutenant general Pitassi Mannella defended Tobruk with 32,000 men, 220 guns, and 70 tanks along a defensive perimeter of some 30 miles. Following preparations, the Australian 6th Division launched an attack on the morning of January 21. It began with the largest artillery barrage in the Western Desert to that point, on a front about 2,500 yards wide along the southeast portion of the Italian perimeter, and it was supported both by British naval gun fire against the town and by Royal Air Force bombers. Bangalore torpedoes blasted holes in the Italian wire, and the infantry moved forward, supported by Matilda tanks. That portion of the Italian defensive line was secured, and Mannella was taken prisoner. The remainder of the Italian garrison surrendered the next day but not before destroying some of the port facilities.

At a cost of some 500 casualties, the British took 25,000 prisoners. They also captured 208 guns, 23 medium tanks, and 200 trucks. In the campaign thus far, O'Connor's forces had taken 100,000 Italian prisoners.

The British were soon able to get the port of Tobruk back into working order. Most of the city, including two water-distillation plants, was undamaged. O'Connor then continued his drive west.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
O'Connor, Richard Nugent

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Tobruk, Second Battle of (April 1941–January 1942)

Important North African land battle between the Afrika Korps (Africa Corps) and British Commonwealth forces in northeast Libya. Spearheaded by German lieutenant general Erwin Rommel's 5th Light Division (later reconstituted as the 21st Panzer Division), Axis forces had driven Commonwealth units back through Cyrenaica to the Egyptian border in March and April 1941. Allied losses had been heavy, but the commander in chief for the Middle East, Lieutenant General Archibald Wavell, had decided to defend the port of Tobruk.

Initially garrisoned by the Australian 9th Division, Tobruk repulsed several Axis attacks during mid-April. Throughout the following siege, Allied naval units and aircraft provided critical supplies and reinforcements to the garrison. During the summer and fall, Germany sent in the nonmotorized Afrika Infantry Division, the remainder of the 15th Panzer Division, and some miscellaneous German units. Italy supplied both regular infantry and Bersaglieri, artillery, and better armor elements, upgrading its previously poor-performing units. All of this was in preparation for an Axis seizure of Tobruk, followed by an advance on Egypt.

The Axis forces also established a line of interlocking fortified posts at Bardia and along the Egyptian border, built around the Italian Savona Infantry Division. Between Tobruk and the border, Rommel, nominally under the command of the Italian governor of Libya, General Ettore Bastico, established armor units centered on the Afrika Korps. The Italian Maneuver Corps was in support; it consisted of the Ariete Armored Division and elements of the Trieste Motorized Division.

In May and June, Wavell conducted Operations BREVITY and BATTLEAXE, respectively, in an attempt to break through the frontier line and to relieve Tobruk. Both failed, and Wavell was relieved and replaced by Lieutenant General Claude Auchinleck. Under him, Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham commanded the Eighth Army. Auchinleck began gathering his growing strength for Operation CRUSADER, scheduled for November, while Rommel brought in siege artillery for a final assault of the now largely British-garrisoned Tobruk.

The Allies struck the first blow, their well-camouflaged preparations being complete by November 17. The two-pronged Allied operation consisted of a slow but steady advance along the coast road by infantry and heavy tanks, while Cunningham’s armor units moved inland. A portion of the Ariete Division repulsed the British 22nd Armour Brigade at Bir el Gobi on November 18, but it was not until two days later that Rommel began to react to the Allied attack.

British tanks on patrol at Tobruk, Libya. (Library of Congress)

As Rommel shifted armored forces to attack and hammer some of the Allied mobile units, the British 70th Division in Tobruk assaulted the largely Italian infantry units holding the siege lines. Rommel wanted to force the Allies back so he might make his “dash to the wire” (the barbed wire along the Egyptian border erected by the Italians in the 1930s), but his advance failed to disrupt the Allies or capture Allied supply dumps.

Believing that Cunningham was moving too slowly, Auchinleck replaced him with Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie. Meanwhile, the New Zealand 2nd Division continued its advance to link up with the 70th Division at Tobruk.

Throughout this period, the Allied naval stranglehold in the Mediterranean kept supplies from arriving in North Africa. The dramatic destruction of the *Duisburg* convoy on the night of November 8–9 resulted in the temporary halt of all Axis convoys to Libya at the same time that Rommel’s battles exhausted his ammunition and tanks. He had no choice but to retreat.

As Axis forces began to pull back near Gazala, just west of Tobruk, and the Allies linked up with Tobruk, the Second Battle of Bir el Gobi occurred on December 4. The Giovani Fascisti (Young Fascists), a two-battalion volunteer unit, held off the advance of a brigade of the 4th Indian Division. After this battle and one other small action, however, Bastico and Rommel

were in agreement by the middle of the month that Axis forces had to fall back through Cyrenaica. The retreat went well, although all of Cyrenaica was lost. Isolated Axis units along the border were forced to surrender. The first German general of the war to be captured, Major General Arthur Schmitt, and 13,800 men marched off to prisoner-of-war camps.

This action was the first major victory by the British against an army with a substantial German element. The Germans and Italians had sustained 38,300 casualties, with almost 30,000 of them prisoners. Allied losses were 17,700 (7,500 prisoners).

The Axis supply situation from Italy soon improved, enabling the shipment of important reinforcements to North Africa. In January 1942, an Axis counterattack penetrated as far as Gazala, where both armies would face each other during the next several months.

JACK GREENE

See also

Afrika Korps; Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Bastico, Ettore; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Tobruk, Third Battle of (June 20–21, 1942)

The port of Tobruk in eastern Libya held great military significance but had also become a symbol of Allied defiance after it had withstood an eight-month Axis siege. During the winter of 1941–1942, British commander in the Middle East General Claude Auchinleck decided not to defend Tobruk in the event of another Axis advance. At the last moment, however, British prime

minister Winston L. S. Churchill reversed this decision, and in March 1942 the South African 2nd Division took over the defense of Tobruk. The Tobruk garrison consisted of two brigades of the South African 2nd Division, the Indian 11th Brigade, the 201st Guards Brigade, and the British Army's 32nd Tank Brigade with 61 operational Valentine tanks and a few Matildas.

South African major general Hendrik B. Klopper exercised command, but his force had little time to prepare for an approaching Axis assault. The defenses had deteriorated over time, and many of the mines had been removed and placed on the Gazala Line. As Major General Ettore Baldassarre's Italian XX Motorized Corps and Major General Walther Nehring's Afrika Korps approached, overall Axis commander Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel feinted toward the Egyptian border as if in pursuit of Major General Neil N. Ritchie's retreating British Eighth Army; then he wheeled north to the eastern end of the Tobruk defenses, which he reached on June 18. In 1941, Rommel had attacked the western end and failed in a series of bloody assaults. This time, however, he had both momentum and surprise on his side, and he was determined not to leave an enemy's fortified position to his rear as he advanced eastward.

German Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers over Tobruk, June 21, 1942. (Keystone/Getty Images)

The Axis attack began at dawn on June 20, 1941, led by assault engineers and supported by air attacks. The Afrika Korps had the most success, and the Italian XX Corps followed through a break in the defenses created by the Afrika Korps. A series of rapid movements within the fortress paralyzed the Allied response, and by the evening of June 21, the last of the garrison had surrendered, destroying as many supplies and as much of the port facilities as possible beforehand.

The Allies had 32,220 troops captured, including virtually all of the South African 2nd Division. Axis forces also secured invaluable supplies, including nearly 2,000 tons of fuel, 5,000 tons of food, 2,000 vehicles, and large amounts of ammunition (including both German and Italian stores). This booty was of immense help to Rommel in resuming his eastward drive, although there was considerable squabbling over its distribution.

The fall of Tobruk provided a supply port for the Axis forces close to the front. Moreover, it was a tremendous psychological blow to the Allies. With this and the Axis victory at Gazala (May 26–June 13), Rommel and the Italian commander in chief in Libya, General Ettore Bastico, were promoted to field marshal. Conversely, the Allied defeat led Britain's Middle Eastern commander, Auchinleck, to remove Ritchie from command of the Eighth Army on June 25 and assume that position himself. The fall of Tobruk also led Adolf Hitler to delay an assault against Malta in favor of allowing Rommel to continue his advance eastward toward the Nile.

JACK GREENE

See also

Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; Bastico, Ettore; Gazala, Battle of; Nehring, Walther Kurt; Ritchie, Sir Neil Methuen; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen

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Todt, Fritz (1891–1942)

German minister for arms and munitions. Born on September 4, 1891, in Pforzheim, Germany, Fritz Todt fought in the German Army during World War I and was awarded the Iron Cross. He subsequently studied engineering before joining Sager and Woerner, a company that specialized in building roads and tunnels.

Todt joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nazi Party) in January 1922 and the Storm Troopers (Sturmabteilungen, or SA) in October 1931. In 1930, he published a paper titled "Proposals and Financial Plans for the Employment of One Million Men." This report impressed Adolf Hitler, and when he came to power in 1933 he appointed Todt to head technology and roadway construction as chief of what became known as the Organization Todt (OT). Fritz Todt was involved in every aspect of autobahn construction, from design to aesthetics, and he was a role model in National Socialist labor relations.

With the outbreak of war, the OT provided German troops with a highly skilled corps of engineers, filling Germany's expanding empire with new roads, bridges, aircraft fields, and fortifications. In 1941, Todt took responsibility for restoring the road and rail system in the Soviet Union. His growing influence in the Nazi Party hierarchy, however, brought him into conflict with Hermann Göring and Martin Bormann.

When Todt was appointed as the Reich's minister for arms and munitions in March 1940 (in addition to his other positions), he controlled all the major technical tasks of the German war effort. Over the next several years, the OT had large numbers of conscript laborers at its disposal. Todt also supervised construction of the Atlantic Wall, intended to repel an anticipated Anglo-American seaborne invasion launched from Britain.

Todt predicted that victory would eventually go to the Soviets. In a meeting with Hitler at Rastenburg in February 1942, alarmed at the attrition of equipment on the Eastern Front, he advised Hitler to end the war with the Soviet Union—counsel that displeased the führer. Todt died when his plane crashed shortly after takeoff from Rastenburg on the morning of February 8,

1942. Sabotage was suspected but could not be proven. Todt was succeeded by his assistant, Albert Speer.

PETER OVERLACK

See also

Atlantic Wall; Bormann, Martin Ludwig; Conscript Labor; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Speer, Albert; Organization Todt

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Tōgō Shigenori (1882–1950)

Japanese foreign minister (1941–1942, 1945). Born in Kagoshima Prefecture, on Kyushu, on December 10, 1882, Tōgō Shigenori graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1908 and taught at Meiji University. Politically moderate, he joined the Foreign Ministry in 1912. Developing expertise in European and American affairs, he served in a number of increasingly senior posts at home and abroad during the 1920s and 1930s. From the mid-1930s, Tōgō emerged as a vocal, if ineffective, critic of the diplomatic orientation toward Nazi Germany that accompanied the military's growing domination of the Japanese government. He opposed the decision of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki to conclude the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in November 1936.

Ironically, Tōgō became ambassador to Germany in 1937, but his tenure was short, and in 1938, pro-Nazi Ōshima Hiroshi replaced him. That same year, Tōgō became ambassador to the Soviet Union, where he played a major role in settling a long-standing dispute over fishing rights in the North Pacific. He also helped to prevent the Soviet-Japanese border clash at

Nomonhan from becoming a full-scale war in the summer of 1939. Tōgō then launched an initiative to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Soviets. Although unsuccessful at the time, those negotiations helped to lay the groundwork for the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact of April 1941.

In November 1940, two months after the government concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Tōgō was recalled to Japan. Despite his opposition to the pact, Tōgō became foreign minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki in October 1941. As Japan prepared for war with the United States and other Western powers in Asia and the Pacific, Tōgō continued to conduct last-minute negotiations with Washington.

Japanese foreign minister Tōgō Shigenori. (Corbis)

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), Tōgō and the Foreign Ministry were increasingly marginalized within the Japanese government. In the summer of 1942, the Tōjō cabinet established the Greater

East Asia Ministry, an umbrella organization charged with coordinating Japanese policy in occupied areas of China and Southeast Asia. Tōgō opposed the creation of the new ministry, not only because it usurped part of the conduct of Japan's foreign relations, but also because it drew personnel away from the Foreign Ministry. He resigned from his post in protest on September 1, 1942, and then took over the foreign ministry portfolio.

After resigning, Tōgō was appointed to the House of Peers, where he remained throughout most of the war. In April 1945, he became foreign minister under Suzuki Kantaro. An advocate of pursuing an early peace, Tōgō hoped at least to be able to preserve the imperial throne. He continued an ultimately abortive effort to secure Soviet mediation with the United States during the summer of 1945.

With Japan facing imminent destruction by August 1945, the Suzuki cabinet remained deadlocked over the issue of accepting unconditional surrender. By that time, Tōgō had emerged as the cabinet's most forceful opponent of the military's plans for a last-ditch defense of the home islands. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9, respectively) and the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria on August 9, Emperor Hirohito broke the deadlock in favor of peace. On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered.

After the war, Tōgō was tried for war crimes by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo. He was accused of conspiring with the militarists to wage aggressive war by conducting bad-faith negotiations with the United States. Tōgō acknowledged that he was aware of the plans for the Pearl Harbor attack, but he claimed that he was forced by the military into continuing negotiations with the United States even after the decision for war had been made. Nevertheless, Tōgō was convicted and received a 20-year sentence. He died in Sugamo Prison, in Tokyo, on July 23, 1950.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Anti-Comintern Pact; Hirohito, Emperor of Japan; Japan, Surrender of; Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Act; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Tōjō Hideki; Tripartite Pact

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Tōjō Hideki (1884–1948)

Japanese Army general and prime minister (1941–1944). Born in Tokyo on December 30, 1884, Tōjō Hideki graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1905. A career staff officer, he served as an attaché in Europe in the early 1920s. During the early 1930s, he associated himself with the Control Faction, an influential clique within the Japanese military that favored military cooperation with the civil bureaucracy and large corporations to expand Japanese influence in China. The failure of a coup attempt by the rival Imperial Way Faction in February 1936 paved the way for the Control Faction's domination of the army and eventually of Japan itself.

Because of his position as one of the Control Faction leaders, Tōjō's career prospered in the late 1930s. In 1938, he was recalled to Tokyo from Manzhouguo (Manchukuo), where he had been serving on the staff of the Guandong Army, to take up an appointment as an army vice minister. In 1940, he became army minister in the cabinet of Konoe Fumimaro. An ardent militarist determined to advance Japanese power, Tōjō was a keen supporter of the Axis alliance with Nazi Germany and expansion of the war in China.

Following the collapse of the Konoe cabinet in October 1941, Tōjō, still an active army officer, was appointed prime minister in an atmosphere of escalating tension with the United States. As prime minister, he did nothing to alleviate those tensions but rather sought to prepare Japan for a war he considered inevitable. On December 7, 1941, Japan initiated hostilities in the Pacific with its attack on Pearl Harbor.

Following an early succession of victories in Southeast Asia and the Pacific during 1941 and 1942, it became increasingly apparent that Tōjō and other Japanese leaders had grossly underestimated the political will and resources of the United States and its allies. In view of Japan's growing matériel inferiority, Tōjō attempted to centralize and coordinate the war effort by taking personal control of key posts in the cabinet and the army in 1943

and 1944. These actions, however, aroused opposition among members of powerful civil and military circles. Tōjō made a vain attempt to cultivate closer relations with Japan's Asian neighbors by convening the Greater East Asia Conference in November 1943. But the conference, which was attended by Japanese-sponsored puppet rulers from China and Southeast Asia, merely produced a vague declaration of Asian solidarity.

Under increasing pressure from his military and political rivals, who held him responsible for Japan's mounting defeats, Tōjō resigned in July 1944 after the fall of Saipan. Koiso Kuniaki became the new prime minister. Following Japan's surrender on August 15, 1945, Tōjō was tried and convicted of war crimes. He was hanged in Tokyo on December 23, 1948.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Japan; Japan, Army; Koiso Kuniaki; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Pearl Harbor, Attack on

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Tokyo, Bombing of (March 9–10, 1945)

The B-29 incendiary raid on Tokyo on the night of March 9–10, 1945, was the deadliest air attack of World War II. Conducted as a test of new tactics after disappointing results with precision methods, the raid set the pattern for a new firebombing campaign that devastated Japanese cities over the next five months.

By February 1945, the U.S. Twentieth Air Force's strategic bombing campaign against Japan was in trouble. New commander of its combat operations from the Marianas Major General Curtis LeMay had reorganized the staff, instituted new training, and designed new maintenance programs, but the achievements of his high-altitude precision-bombing attacks remained disappointing. Besides technological problems with the hastily fielded B-29

Superfortress, the biggest difficulty was the weather. Overcast skies and jet stream winds at normal bombing altitudes obscured targets and altered flight patterns. Other theater commanders were trying to gain control of the expensive B-29s, and LeMay knew that he could be relieved just as his predecessor had been if he did not produce significant success.

LeMay had some experience with fire raids in China and had conducted some experiments over Japan. Although unsure how higher headquarters would react to a departure from precision bombing, he and his staff decided to destroy key targets by burning down the cities around them. This would be achieved with low-level mass night raids. Such tactics would avoid high winds, reduce the strain on the B-29s' problematic engines, allow aircraft to carry more bombs, and exploit weaknesses in the Japanese air defenses.

The first raid employing these new tactics, Operation MEETINGHOUSE, was conducted against Tokyo on the night of March 9. The selected zone of attack covered six important industrial targets and numerous smaller factories, railroad yards, and home industries, but it also included one of the most densely populated areas of the world, Asakusa Ku, with a population of more than 135,000 people per square mile. For the first time, the XXI Bomber Command had more than 300 bombers on a mission—325 to be exact—and put more than 1,600 tons of incendiary bombs on the target.

Incendiary bombs dropped by U.S. Army Air Forces Boeing B-29 Superfortresses leveled entire city blocks of downtown Tokyo during air raids in 1945. The raid of March 9, 1945, was the most destructive air attack in history. (Corbis)

Before the firestorm ignited by Operation MEETINGHOUSE had burned itself out, between 90,000 and 100,000 people had been killed. Another 1 million were rendered homeless. Sixteen square miles were incinerated, and the glow of the flames was visible 150 miles away. Victims died horribly in intense fires that consumed the oxygen, boiled water in canals, and sent liquid glass rolling down streets. The B-29 crews fought superheated updrafts that destroyed at least 10 aircraft. They also wore oxygen masks to avoid vomiting from the stench of burning flesh. A total of 14 Superfortresses were lost on the mission.

The attack on Tokyo was judged a great success. It resuscitated the flagging strategic bombing campaign against Japan and restored the hopes of U.S. Army Air Forces leaders that the B-29s could prove the worth of independent airpower by defeating an enemy without the need for an invasion. MEETINGHOUSE set the standard for the incendiary raids that dominated Twentieth Air Force operations for the remainder of the war.

CONARD C. CRANE

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; B-29 Raids against Japan; Incendiary Bombs and Bombing; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Document 216

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Tokyo Raid (April 18, 1942)

One of a half dozen U.S. carrier raids in the months after the December 7, 1941, attack at Pearl Harbor, the Tokyo Raid (Doolittle Raid) of April 18, 1942, was the first U.S. air strike on the Japanese home islands. Since the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States had suffered a series of costly defeats, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt rarely failed to stress to his military chiefs the need to strike Japan. Captain Francis S. Low, operations officer on the staff of chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest J. King, suggested that army bombers utilize carriers for a raid. King and commanding general of army air forces Lieutenant General Henry W. "Hap" Arnold approved, and Arnold picked Lieutenant Colonel James "Jimmy" H. Doolittle of his staff as army coordinator. Ultimately Doolittle led the mission.

The planners knew that Japanese picket ships were stationed 500 miles off the home islands. For that reason, attacking planes would have to be launched at 550 miles out. Although bombers could take off from carriers, they would not be able to return to them and would thus have to fly on to Zhuzhou (Chuchow), China, a flight of 2,000 miles. There they were to refuel, then fly on to Chungking 800 miles away. The B-25 Mitchell was the only army bomber that could both take off from a carrier and had that range. The plan called for the B-25s to bomb Japan at night and then land at the Chinese fields the next morning. The carrier *Hornet,* commanded by Captain Marc A. Mitscher, would transport them.

On April 2 the *Hornet* sailed from San Francisco, California, with 16 specially modified B-25s aboard. A few days later it rendezvoused with the carrier *Enterprise,* which was to provide air cover. The *Enterprise,* commanded by Captain George D. Murray, also had Task Force (TF) 16 commander Vice Admiral William Halsey aboard. TF 16 included the 2 carriers, 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and 2 oilers. Two U.S. Navy submarines also operated near the Japanese coast to report on enemy ship movements and weather conditions.

The Japanese were aware from radio traffic that something was in the offing, perhaps an attack on Japan itself. Combined Fleet Headquarters ordered naval aircraft concentrated in the Tokyo area and alerted picket boats off shore beyond the range of carrier aircraft. At 7:38 a.m. on April 18, about 650 miles off the Japanese coast, picket boat No. 23, *Nitto Maru,* detected the carriers. Although the U.S. cruisers promptly sank it, it was able to get off a radio message reporting the presence of American carriers.

Halsey now jettisoned the plan to fly the B-25s off on the afternoon of April 19 and bomb Tokyo at night. At 8:00 a.m. Halsey flashed this message to the *Hornet:* "Launch planes. To Colonel Doolittle and his gallant command Good Luck and God bless you."

Doolittle's B-25 was the first plane airborne, at 8:20 a.m.; all the planes were away within an hour. This was the only time in the war that U.S. Army Air Forces bombers were launched from a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier on a combat mission. TF 16 then turned about and departed the area at flank speed. Bad weather hid the U.S. warships from Japanese search planes and TF 16 escaped unscathed.

The B-25s achieved total surprise because the Japanese assumed an attack range of 200 miles and thus a later launch. At 12:30 p.m. Tokyo time, Doolittle's aircraft dropped the first bombs. Each bomb load consisted of two 500-pound high-explosive and two 500-pound incendiary bombs. Most of the planes struck Tokyo, although Kobe, Yokohama, and Nagoya were also bombed. No B-25s were downed over Japan, and only one was hit by antiaircraft fire. All, however, were subsequently lost, as the fields in China were unready to receive them. Of the 80 crewmen, 3 died of injuries, 4 were seriously injured, 5 were interned in the Soviet Union until they managed to escape to Iran in 1943, and 8 were captured by the Japanese; 3 of these were executed. Another died in captivity.

The raid inflicted little material damage, but it and the other U.S. carrier attacks had far-reaching effects. The raids led the Japanese to shift four fighter groups to the defense of Tokyo and other cities. It also led to a punitive army expedition in China in which perhaps 250,000 Chinese died. Most important for the course of the war, it increased support in Tokyo for pushing the outer defensive ring farther and adopting Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku's plan to draw out the U.S. fleet and destroy it. This latter led to the decisive Japanese defeat in the Battle of Midway on June 3–6, 1942. The raid also lifted American morale (Roosevelt told the American people it had been launched from "Shangri-La"). For his part in the attack, Doolittle was promoted two grades to brigadier general and awarded the Medal of Honor.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Doolittle, James Harold "Jimmy"; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; King, Ernest Joseph; Midway, Battle of; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Yamamoto Isoroku

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"Tokyo Rose" (1916–2006)

Japanese propagandist during World War II. Toguri D'Aquino achieved notoriety as one of several women who broadcast from Tokyo between 1943 and 1945. "Tokyo Rose" was a moniker created by her listeners, as there is no trace of the name in broadcast records. Born in Los Angeles on July 4, 1916, Iva Ikuko Toguri graduated from the University of California at Los Angeles in January 1940 and pursued graduate work there until June, when she began working with her father's business. In July 1941 she sailed for Japan without a U.S. passport, planning to visit a sick aunt and to begin the

study of medicine. By September 1941, she had decided to return permanently to the United States and applied for a passport, but that application was still in State Department hands when the war began.

By mid-1942, Toguri had worked as a typist for a news agency in Tokyo and then for Radio Tokyo. In November 1943, she began to host *Zero Hour* on Radio Tokyo, part of the Japanese psychological warfare designed to lower U.S. military morale. The 75-minute program was broadcast early each evening and aimed at American troops in the South Pacific. Toguri was variously introduced as Orphan Ann, Orphan Annie, "Your favorite enemy Ann," or "Your favorite playmate and enemy, Ann." The program was popular because it featured recorded big-band music.

Only in early 1944 did Toguri become aware that U.S. troops had given her—and other Japanese women broadcasting over Radio Tokyo—the "Tokyo Rose" title. She was the only American citizen given that nickname; the others were all Japanese. In April 1945, she married Felipe D'Aquino, a Portuguese citizen of Japanese Portuguese ancestry.

Following her postwar admissions to the press about her wartime role as well as inflammatory stories by columnist Walter Winchell, among others, Toguri D'Aquino was arrested by the U.S. Army in September 1948 and taken to the United States to stand trial for treason. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) inquiries into her activities took several years. Her treason trial began in San Francisco on July 5, 1949, and ended on September 29 when the jury delivered a guilty verdict. On October 6, 1949, she was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, fined $10,000, and stripped of her American citizenship. She became only the seventh person to be convicted of treason in U.S. history.

Iva Toguri D'Aquino (known as Tokyo Rose) on her release from a federal women's reformatory in 1956. (Library of Congress)

On January 28, 1956, Toguri D'Aquino was released. She fought several efforts at deportation and went to work in the Chicago area.

In November 1976, Toguri D'Aquino filed a third petition seeking a presidential pardon (she had applied unsuccessfully in 1954 and 1968). That same year, an investigation first by the *Chicago Tribune* and then the television program *60 Minutes* determined that two of the star witnesses in Toguri D'Aquino's trial had lied during their testimony, apparently coerced to do so by the FBI. Given these revelations, she received a full pardon on January 19, 1977, from President Gerald Ford. Toguri D'Aquino died in Chicago on September 26, 2006.

CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

See also

Propaganda

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Tolbukhin, Fedor Ivanovich (1894–1949)

Soviet Army marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in the village of Androniki, Yaroslavl Oblast, Russia, on June 16, 1894, Fedor Ivanovich Tolbukhin entered the Russian Army in 1915 during World War I and rose to the rank of captain by war's end. He joined the Red Army in 1918 and was a divisional chief of staff in the Russian Civil War. After attending service schools, he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1934. Tolbukhin became chief of staff, first of a division and then of a corps. He next held the same post with the Transcaucasian Military District in 1938, when he also joined the Communist Party.

Promoted to major general in June 1941, Tolbukhin continued as chief of staff in what became the Transcaucasian Front following the German invasion of the Soviet Union. From late 1941, he was chief of staff of the Caucasian Front and then the Crimea Front. He commanded the Fifty-Seventh Army at Stalingrad beginning in July 1942. Promoted to lieutenant general, Tolbukhin led the main effort in the Soviet counteroffensive. He took command of the Sixty-Eighth Army on the Northwestern Front in February 1942 and the Southern Front in March. He was promoted to colonel general in April and to army general in September. Tolbukhin's army was redesignated the 4th Ukrainian Front in October.

Along with General Andrei Yeremenko, Tolbukhin led the Soviet offensive that retook the Crimea in May 1944. Thereafter, he commanded the 3rd Ukrainian Front, which liberated Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria, and pushed into Yugoslavia. He was named a marshal of the Soviet Union in September 1944. At the end of the war, Tolbukhin commanded the Southern Group of armies in Bulgaria and Romania. His final army assignment was to command the Transcaucasian Military District, which he did until his death in Moscow on October 17, 1949.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Crimea Campaign; Stalingrad, Battle of; Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich

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TOLSTOY Meeting

See Churchill-Stalin Meeting

TORCH, Operation (November 8, 1942)

The Allied invasion of North Africa. Following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed with the British position that the Allies should first concentrate on Germany, the most powerful of the Axis opponents. U.S. planners, especially U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, sought the earliest possible invasion of France. They supported GYMNAST, a British contingency plan based on a cross-Channel invasion, and ROUNDUP, a 48-division invasion of France projected to occur by April 1943. However, the failure of the attack on Dieppe, France, on August 19, 1942 (Operation JUBILEE), led the Americans to concede that a cross-Channel invasion lay many months, if not years, in the future. Winston L. S. Churchill and British planners meanwhile attempted to interest the United States in a more opportunistic approach that would include operations in the Mediterranean theater.

Some of the many vessels in the Allied convoy crossing the Atlantic to take part in Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. (Time Life Pictures/National Archives/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Roosevelt had promised Soviet leader Joseph Stalin that the Western Allies would undertake an invasion by the end of 1942 and was determined to honor that pledge. But if a cross-Channel invasion was impossible, where might such an assault be mounted? Churchill argued for attacks against what he termed the "soft underbelly of Europe," in the Mediterranean. Even before the Dieppe Raid, Roosevelt and Churchill had settled on an invasion of North Africa, supposedly not to the exclusion of ROUNDUP.

Gaining control of Vichy-administered Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia would provide bases from which the Allies could conduct both air operations to help protect their Mediterranean shipping and strategic bombing raids against targets in Southern Europe. The area would also offer a location from which to mount invasions of such Mediterranean islands as Sicily, Sardinia, and Crete or even mainland Europe in Italy or Greece. Further, an invasion of Northwest Africa would provide badly needed combat experience for U.S. troops.

Roosevelt became the chief proponent of the operation and insisted on it over the objections raised by many of his own service chiefs, including Marshall. The invasion, code-named TORCH, was timed to coincide with the

planned breakout of British Empire forces at El Alamein in Egypt; the Allies hoped to crush Axis troops in a pincer movement between the two forces. On October 23, British Eighth Army commander General Bernard Montgomery initiated the final contest for control of North Africa in Operation LIGHTFOOT, the Battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 4). Superior British resources carried the day against tenacious Axis resistance, and by November 2 the Eighth Army had broken through. The army then began a pursuit of German field marshal Erwin Rommel's Axis forces, which made good their escape.

On November 8, British and U.S. forces carried out their surprise landings in Morocco and Algeria, the largest amphibious operation in history to that time. The British had favored landings in central North Africa, at Tunis and Bizerte in Tunisia, or at least at nearby Bône in eastern Algeria, but the Americans were more cautious and won the point. The landings occurred at Casablanca in Morocco and at Oran and Algiers in Algeria. U.S. Army lieutenant general Dwight D. Eisenhower, commanding U.S. troops in Britain, was appointed commander in chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. His deputy was another American, Major General Mark W. Clark. Eisenhower saw to it that U.S. and British officers were thoroughly integrated within his staff, and British admiral of the fleet Andrew B. Cunningham directed all naval forces.

The most westerly landing, at Casablanca on the Atlantic, ensured for the Allies a lodgment in North Africa even if the other two landings inside the Mediterranean went awry. Major General George S. Patton commanded the Western Task Force of 38,000 men, escorted by warships led by U.S. rear admiral Henry K. Hewitt. The force had steamed all the way from Norfolk, Virginia, one of the longest expeditionary efforts in history.

The other two invasions were mounted from England and went ashore in Algeria. The Central Task Force, under U.S. Army major general Lloyd Fredendall, numbered nearly 41,000 men (37,100 Americans and 3,600 British), supported by British commodore Thomas H. Troubridge's covering warships. The 55,000-man Eastern Task Force headed for Algiers was largely British in composition (45,000 British troops and only 10,000 Americans), but to give the illusion that it was mostly American, U.S. major general Charles Ryder had command. Once Algiers was secured, British lieutenant

general Kenneth A. N. Anderson took command. British vice admiral Sir Harold M. Burrough commanded its covering warships.

During the landings, the Allies made every effort to emphasize the U.S. role and downplay British participation. Given the British attack against French ships at Mers-el-Kébir, Algeria, on July 3, 1940, and British operations in Syria (June 8–July 4, 1941), Allied leaders rightly assumed that Americans would receive a far friendlier reception from French forces than would the British. Thus, efforts were made to show the American flag, quite literally, wherever possible.

No one knew the extent to which French troops would resist the invasion. U.S. diplomat Robert Murphy made preliminary contacts with Vichy French officials in North Africa, and on October 22 General Clark had a secret meeting near Algiers with French major general Charles Mast, chief of staff of XIX Corps. This meeting did not bring the desired agreement, and for the most part, French troops resisted the landings.

Operation TORCH began early on the morning of November 8. The Casablanca operation was widely dispersed, at Safi, Fedala, Mehdia, and Port Lyautey. Although taken by surprise, the French troops fought well. The unfinished French battleship *Jean Bart* lay at Casablanca. Although it was incapable of movement, its 15-inch guns nonetheless soon began a duel with the U.S. battleship *Massachusetts*. French naval units, including the cruiser *Primauguet*, attempted a sortie, but superior U.S. naval strength beat them back. In the battle, four destroyers and eight submarines of the French Navy were either sunk or missing, and 490 French fighters were killed and another 969 wounded. The French at Casablanca surrendered on November 11.

The two Allied landings east and west of Oran encountered heavy French resistance. An attempt by two former U.S. Coast Guard cutters to run into the port failed, and a U.S. airborne battalion, flying all the way from Britain, was only partially successful in securing nearby airfields. At Algiers the frontal naval assault failed, but the city was soon ringed by Allied troops on the land side. The Allies secured their objectives before long. Overall casualties were light, and the landings provided the Allies with excellent training for their subsequent invasions of Europe.

Adolf Hitler now decided to reinforce North Africa. Had these resources been sent to Rommel earlier, the Axis powers might have secured the Suez

Canal. Hitler's belated decision only delayed the inevitable and ensured that the ultimate Axis defeat in Tunisia would be more costly.

Despite misgivings, Eisenhower negotiated with the commander of Vichy France's armed forces and former premier Admiral Jean Darlan, who was visiting in Algiers at the time of the landings. On November 11, Darlan agreed to assist the Allies by ordering a cease-fire in return for heading the administration of French North Africa. Darlan was, however, assassinated on December 24, allegedly by a monarchist acting alone, a deed that removed a potential embarrassment to the Western governments. The British and French then installed General Henri Giraud, who had escaped from France, as commander of French forces in North Africa, ignoring General Charles de Gaulle. The latter, understandably furious, had not even been informed of the landings beforehand.

On November 9, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain's Vichy French government responded to the Allied North African invasions by severing diplomatic relations with the United States. Nonetheless, Hitler ordered German troops into "unoccupied" France. Operation ATTILA had been drawn up by the Germans in 1940. Its main objective was to capture the principal French naval units at Toulon. But on November 27, French crews frustrated the German attempt and scuttled 77 ships, including 3 battleships.

Once the Allied forces that had landed in North Africa had secured their initial objectives ashore, they moved to accomplish two key objectives: to secure ports in Tunisia and block the resupply of Axis units and to build up a force in Morocco to occupy Spanish Morocco if Spain—or the Germans acting through Spain—should attempt to take Gibraltar. As it transpired, the latter was unnecessary, because the landings alone forced the Spanish into a more neutral stance.

Allied forces were unprepared for immediate overland operations but nonetheless were forced into conducting a land campaign by Hitler's prompt reinforcement of North Africa. As early as November 9, he had dispatched troops to Tunisia to occupy the important airfield at El Aouina. German and Italian units began arriving in North Africa at a rate of about 1,000 men a day.

Patton's force at Casablanca linked up with units moving west from Oran to threaten Spanish Morocco, and the British moved east to secure airfields in eastern Algeria, necessary for providing air support for ground operations

beyond the range of Gibraltar. On November 12, two British parachute companies dropped on Bône, supported by commandos from the sea. The Souk-el-Arba airfield fell on November 16. The next day, Anderson's I Corps drove from Oran and Algiers into Tunisia, with the objective of securing the port of Bizerte.

Although I Corps had moved from Bône into the mountains only 20 miles southwest of Bizerte, the drive stalled after several weeks. It fell victim to insufficiently aggressive Allied leadership, rainy weather that delayed reinforcements from Algiers some 500 miles to the west, the rapid Axis reinforcement, and aggressive defensive actions by General of Panzer Troops Walther Nehring, whose counterattacks ended the Allied "race for Tunis."

Nehring, who was pessimistic about Axis chances, soon found himself replaced by Colonel General Jürgen von Arnim. Thus, 1942 ended in a temporary stalemate once Rommel's forces successfully linked up with Arnim's Tunisian defenders. Operation TORCH, which many claim delayed the Allied goal of a cross-Channel invasion, had nonetheless proven successful. Subsequent Allied amphibious operations in Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943), Italy (September 9), and Normandy (June 6, 1944) benefited immensely from the operation.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Anderson, Sir Kenneth Arthur Noel; Clark, Mark Wayne; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; Dieppe Raid; Eisenhower, Dwight David; El Alamein, Battle of; Fredendall, Lloyd Ralston; Giraud, Henri Honoré; Hewitt, Henry Kent; Marshall, George Catlett; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Nehring, Walther Kurt; North Africa Campaign; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; ROUNDUP, Operation; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at; Tunisia Campaign

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Torpedoes

Self-propelled weapons armed with explosive charges designed to be launched by ships, submarines, or aircraft against enemy ships. Torpedoes were the deadliest of naval weapons, especially when launched from submarines. The torpedo was invented by Englishman John Whitehead for the Austro-Hungarian Navy in 1866, but those in use by 1939 were far more capable than his seven-knot, flywheel-driven weapon.

Except for Japan, however, no nation entered World War II with torpedoes that differed significantly from those of World War I. All were straight-running and had the same top speeds (39 knots to 47 knots), ranges (2,500 yards to 7,000 yards), and depth-setting mechanisms as those of the earlier war. A few countries had influence warheads that were expected to detonate as they passed under the ship's hull, thereby breaking its back, but those proved unreliable in early operations and had to be withdrawn until their technical faults were corrected. By war's end, though, the most advanced torpedoes had homing guidance and a complex variety of influence warheads, and more important, they had become the critical weapon of war between naval forces on and above the surface and those below.

One of the aerial torpedoes carried by the U.S. Navy's Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bomber, aboard an aircraft carrier in the South Pacific, January 1943. (National Archives)

Employed principally by submarines, torpedoes were responsible for more than 30 percent of the warship losses and 70 percent of merchant shipping losses during the war. Those statistics are rather ironic, given that before the war submarines were not expected to play a significant role in naval operations and that the three naval powers that employed torpedoes most effectively suffered torpedo reliability problems during the war's early years. U.S. and German difficulties with their weapons' warheads, depth-setting mechanisms, and guidance systems are the best known, but Great Britain suffered similar problems with its own torpedoes. The Royal Navy accepted the fleet's reports, however, and corrected the technical faults within nine weeks of receiving the first report.

The United States and Germany waited nearly a year to examine their problems, and another year passed before they corrected their weapons'

deficiencies. Nonetheless, those two countries best demonstrated the deadly effectiveness of the submarine-torpedo combination in naval warfare. In fact, Germany and the United States possessed the most technologically advanced torpedoes at war's end, with the former having the best antiship torpedo and the latter the world's only antisubmarine torpedo, designated the Mark 24 mine to hide its true nature.

Japan entered the war with the only torpedoes that were significantly better than those of World War I. Some Japanese submarine and ship torpedoes employed an oxygen-alcohol power train that gave their Long Lance torpedoes a speed of almost 50 knots and a range exceeding 42,000 yards with little wake. They also had the war's most powerful warheads (weighing more than 1,000 pounds), which were also extremely reliable, providing Japan's highly trained crews with a critical advantage in ship-to-ship and submarine-to-ship engagements.

Japan wasted that technological advantage by not employing the torpedoes' most deadly platform, the submarine, effectively. Moreover, Japan never developed a homing system to guide its torpedoes toward a ship's engine noises or wake. More important, by 1943, naval airpower and air defenses including radar had increased engagement ranges to the point that in many cases, submarines became the torpedo's only tactically viable delivery platform, rendering Japan's advantage in torpedo range all but irrelevant.

After World War I, France designed a larger, more powerful torpedo, which resulted in the impressive 21.7-inch Model 1923DT. A submarine version, which emphasized speed over range, was also developed. Italian torpedoes were generally reliable. In fact, Italy's aircraft-carried torpedoes were so much better than Germany's that Luftwaffe antishipping squadrons preferred to use Italian models, and Germany imported nearly 1,000 Italian aerial torpedoes during the war. Soviet torpedo development was generally unsuccessful until the 1932 purchase of an Italian 21-inch weapon that formed the basis for the major types used by the Soviets during the war. Whereas Japan had gone to 61cm (24-inch) torpedoes (but only in surface ships, for Japanese submarines used the 21-inch oxygen-driven torpedo), many of the minor navies still employed the smaller and older torpedoes on their ships and submarines, but 45cm torpedoes were carried primarily by Japanese aircraft until 1943, when they also began to carry the larger 533mm models.

Much has been written about the revolutionary changes that torpedoes underwent in the course of the war. Most of this transformation was driven by the Battle of the Atlantic between the Western Allies and the German Navy, where torpedo and antisubmarine detection systems shaped the course of the battles.

By 1942, Germany had homing torpedoes that guided onto the target ship's engine noises and pattern-running torpedoes that made evasion difficult. Research programs included wake-homing, active sonar-based terminal guidance, and even a rocket-propelled high-speed torpedo, which, however, never got past the drawing board. Fortunately for the Allied powers, Germany's research and development effort lacked direction before Admiral Karl Dönitz took command of the Kriegsmarine in January 1943.

As torpedoes proved critical to the German U-boat arm, so too did they figure in the Western Allies' struggle against the U-boat. The Allies developed search and guidance systems for torpedoes to attack maneuvering underwater submarines. The Mark 24 mine employed from Allied antisubmarine aircraft used a descending circular search and passive acoustic homing guidance to seek, find, and attack submerged German vessels by detecting and following the noises made by the U-boats' machinery. The Mark 24 was the precursor to modern antisubmarine torpedoes, as was the German homing torpedo, father to the antiship torpedoes carried by today's submarines.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Dönitz, Karl; Mines, Sea; Raeder, Erich; Submarines; Versailles, Treaty of

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Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at (November 27, 1942)

When British and U.S. forces invaded French North Africa on November 8, 1942, 81 ships of the French Navy were anchored at Toulon, France, under the command of Admiral Jean de Laborde. Only a third of the fleet's ships were ready to sail. Another third required significant work, and the remainder had been decommissioned in accordance with the armistice with Germany.

Even before the July 1940 armistice with Germany, the French government had promised Britain that it would destroy the fleet if necessary to prevent it from falling into German hands. This pledge notwithstanding, London made an effort to secure units of the French fleet, and at Mers-el-Kébir during Operation CATAPULT on July 3, 1940, British ships opened fire on French ships, sinking a number of them and killing nearly 1,300 French seamen.

Despite these actions, France honored its pledge. Two years later, after arranging a cease-fire with the Allies in North Africa on November 11, 1942, French Navy commander Admiral Jean Darlan ordered the fleet to sail from Toulon to North Africa. That same day, German soldiers began occupying the area around the port city and positioned artillery to fire on the fleet should it attempt to depart. While the Germans tightened their noose, the fleet's officers debated their options. They feared both a German effort to capture the French ships from the land and a repetition of the incident at Mers-el-Kébir. Most remained loyal to the Vichy government and opposed the idea of attempting to sail the fleet to Africa, although officers subsequently had to quell anti-German demonstrations on several ships.

Darlan tried to convince Vichy minister of the navy Admiral Paul Auphan to order the fleet to sail, but Vichy officials replaced Auphan with the more pliable Admiral Jean-Marie Abrial. They negotiated an agreement with the Germans that promised the neutrality of the Toulon naval base and handed over the remaining 158 ships of France's merchant fleet (totaling 646,000 tons). The Germans, however, continued preparations to seize Toulon.

On November 14, Laborde ordered all ship crews to make the necessary preparations to scuttle and prevent the capture of their vessels. German troops entered the Toulon base in force at 4:45 a.m. on November 27 but failed to surprise the French. Laborde then ordered the ships scuttled, and most had

sunk by the time German soldiers reached the piers at 6:20 a.m. French crews sabotaged critical systems and heavy guns with explosives to prevent their salvage, and they detonated explosives on those ships in dry dock. Five submarines managed to reach the open sea. Of these, 1 was lost at sea, 3 joined the Allies in North Africa, and 1 was interned in Spain. In all, the French scuttled 77 ships, roughly half the tonnage of the entire French Navy. The total included 3 battleships (the *Strasbourg, Dunkerque,* and *Provence*), 7 cruisers, a seaplane tender, 32 destroyers, 16 submarines, and 18 smaller craft. German and Italian engineers subsequently managed to salvage and repair 4 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, and 2 submarines.

STEPHEN K. STEIN

See also

Abrial, Jean Marie Charles; Auphan, Paul Gabriel; Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; France, Navy; Laborde, Jean Joseph de; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Vichy France

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Tovey, Sir John Cronyn (1885–1971)

British Royal Navy admiral. Born in Borley Hill, Rochester, Kent, England, on March 7, 1885, John Cronyn Tovey entered the Royal Navy's cadet training establishment, HMS *Britannia,* in 1900. As commander of the destroyer *Onslow,* he distinguished himself in the 1916 Battle of Jutland by conducting a torpedo attack under heavy German fire.

After the war, Tovey attended the Royal Naval Staff College and the Defence College, worked in the Admiralty Plans Division, and commanded a destroyer flotilla in 1925. In 1932, he took command of the battleship *Rodney*. Promoted to commodore early in 1935 and then to rear admiral that same year, his first seagoing flag appointment was as rear admiral for destroyers in the Mediterranean Fleet in March 1938.

At the beginning of World War II, Vice Admiral Tovey was commander, Light Forces, Mediterranean Fleet. He led four light cruisers against the Italian main fleet in the Battle of Calabria on July 9, 1940. In October 1940, Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill named Tovey to replace Sir Charles Forbes as commander in chief, Home Fleet. In this post, Tovey led the hunt for the German battleship *Bismarck*. He commanded in person aboard the battleship *King George V* when it and the *Rodney* pummeled the *Bismarck* into a burning wreck on May 26, 1941. Despite one mistake when he thought the *Bismarck* was far north of its actual position, he had conducted the operation well.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and the extension of British and U.S. aid to the Soviet Union, Tovey's Home Fleet had to deal with attacks on Allied convoys to Murmansk and Archangelsk by German U-boats, bombers, and surface ships based in Norway. The difficult assignment of defending the convoys was largely accomplished, except for convoy PQ 17 in July 1942. At that time, Tovey was under orders to keep the main fleet clear of German air bases and so could do little as the convoy was savaged.

Tovey was part of another controversial episode, the struggle to secure B-24 bombers for convoy escort. He insisted that the key to an Allied victory was the Battle of the Atlantic, and he harried the Admiralty with calls for long-range aircraft to counter the U-boats. This made him unpopular with Churchill, who was enthusiastic about strategic bombing. In May 1943, just as the Atlantic battle was being won in no small part due to the aircraft Tovey had been demanding, Churchill replaced him as commander in chief of the Home Fleet. Tovey then assumed the post of commander in chief of the Nore, the point where the Thames River meets the North Sea. He was on the short list to be first sea lord in 1945 but was passed over as being "too obstinate," and he retired.

Tovey was made a baron in 1946. He later served four years as a lay official in the Church of England. Tovey died in Funchal, Madeira, on January 12, 1971.

JAMES LEVY

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; *Bismarck*, Sortie and Sinking of; Calabria, Battle of; Convoys, Allied; Forbes, Sir Charles Morton; Great Britain, Navy

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Towers, John Henry (1885–1955)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born in Rome, Georgia, on January 20, 1885, John Henry Towers graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1906. He qualified as a pilot in 1911, only the second U.S. Navy officer to win his wings, and he then helped develop and test early naval aircraft. In 1914, he commanded the naval aircraft in operations at Veracruz, Mexico.

During World War I, Towers served as assistant director of the new Division of Naval Aviation in the office of the chief of naval operations, helping to organize the navy's air effort, including antisubmarine activity. After the war, as an early advocate of naval airpower, he commanded the navy's first aircraft carrier, the *Langley*, between 1927 and 1928. Towers also studied at the Naval War College and commanded the San Diego Naval Air Station and the aircraft carrier *Saratoga*.

In June 1939, Towers was promoted to rear admiral and began a three-year assignment as chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, where he oversaw the growth of U.S. naval air forces and pilot training. Under his leadership, the air arm of the navy grew from 2,000 aircraft in 1939 to 39,000 in 1942. In October 1942, he became commander of U.S. naval aviation in the Pacific and was promoted to vice admiral. In early 1944, Towers became deputy commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area. His fervent advocacy of naval aviation created enemies and kept him from a combat assignment until July 1944, when he assumed command of Task Force 38, too late in the war to see any significant action.

Promoted to full admiral, Towers assumed command of the Fifth Fleet in November 1945 and of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in February 1946. In the immediate postwar years, he consistently opposed the establishment of an

independent air force. He headed the General Board until his retirement in December 1947 and then worked as assistant to the president of Pan American Airways. Towers died in Saint Albans, New York, on April 30, 1955.

MOLLY M. WOOD

See also

Aircraft, Naval; Aircraft Carriers; Air Warfare, Naval; United States Navy

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Toyoda Soemu (1885–1957)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born in Ōita Prefecture, Japan, on May 22, 1885, into a samurai family, Toyoda Soemu graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1905 and became a gunnery officer. He graduated from Gunnery School, then taught there, before also graduating from the Naval War College.

Between 1919 and 1922 as a lieutenant commander, Toyoda was a resident officer in Britain. Promoted to captain in 1925, Toyoda commanded the cruiser *Yura* and then the battleship *Hyuga*. In 1927, he took command of Submarine Division 7. Promoted to rear admiral in 1931, he was assigned as chief of the Intelligence Department. He next served as chief of the Operations Department of the Naval General Staff, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet (1933), and chief of the Education Bureau of the Navy Ministry (1934).

Promoted to vice admiral in 1935, Toyoda assumed command of the Second Fleet and then command of the Fourth Fleet in 1937. Thereafter, he was assigned as chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry and chief of the Shipbuilding Office. Promoted to admiral in September 1941, Toyoda commanded the Kure Naval District. In 1941, he was recommended for the post of minister of the navy, but General Tōjō Hideki blocked the

appointment because of Toyoda's strong antiarmy sentiments. Toyoda joined the Supreme War Council in November 1942 and assumed command of the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal in May 1943.

In May 1944, Toyoda succeeded Admiral Koga Mineichi as commander in chief of the Combined Fleet. Toyoda was firmly committed to the policy of making a strong offensive strike. His first attempt took place in Operation A-GO and resulted in the June 19–21, 1944, Battle of the Philippine Sea, which turned out to be a catastrophic defeat for Japan. Nonetheless, Toyoda continued his policy of initiating a major offensive fleet action, and he developed a series of contingency plans (the SHŌ operations).

Operation SHŌ-1 culminated in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, waged from October 23 to 26, 1944. The largest naval battle in history, it was a major Japanese defeat. In April 1945, Toyoda instituted steps to save Okinawa, resulting in kamikaze attacks, including that of the battleship *Yamato*.

Toyoda replaced Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo as navy chief of staff in May 1945 and held that position to the end of the war. He was one of the triumvirate of die-hard military leaders, along with Generals Umezu Yoshijiro and Anami Korechika, who rejected unconditional surrender. Following the war, Toyoda was arrested as a war criminal and tried but was acquitted. Released in September 1949, he died in Tokyo on September 22, 1957.

HIRAMA YOICHI

See also

Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; SHŌ Plans; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Treasury Islands, Battle of the (October 27–November 6, 1943)

The Allied attack on the Treasury Islands group of the Solomons was part of the strategy of isolating Rabaul and Bougainville. Blanche Harbor would provide an excellent staging area for operations against Bougainville, and a preliminary reconnaissance indicated the presence there of only some 250 Japanese troops.

On October 27, 1943, in Operation GOODTIME, some 4,600 New Zealand troops and 1,966 Americans supported by aircraft and six destroyers came ashore on Mono and Stirling, the two islands comprising the Treasury Islands group. U.S. rear admiral George A. Fort commanded the support group.

A new assault element was the employment of light-draft improvised gunboats, in which two Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) were each armed with three 40mm, two 20mm, and five .50-caliber machine guns. Designated LCI(G)s, these provided close fire support for the landing craft. They proved to be quite successful and were then employed in all the other Pacific theater amphibious operations.

The Japanese were slow to react to the invasion. Only after the Allied troops were ashore did they dispatch 25 Aichi D3A (“Val”) dive-bombers from Shortland Island, 25 miles distant. Twelve of the planes were shot down, but bombs from the remainder badly damaged the U.S. destroyer *Cony*, which suffered 8 dead and 10 wounded and had to be towed to Tulagi.

On November 1, the Allied troops captured Falamae, capital of the Treasury Islands, and 11 days later the islands were declared secure. Although some Japanese resistance occurred thereafter, casualties through this date were 40 New Zealanders killed and 145 wounded. U.S. ground casualties totaled 12 killed and 29 wounded. Japanese losses by this date were 205 killed. A motor torpedo boat base was soon established on Stirling Island.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bougainville Campaign; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign

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Tresckow, Henning Hermann Robert Karl von (1901–1944)

German Army major general and key member of the opposition to German chancellor Adolf Hitler. Henning Hermann Robert Karl von Tresckow was born on January 10, 1901, in Magdeburg, Saxon-Anhalt, into a family with a history of military service. At age 16 Henning entered the military as a cadet and saw action in the World War I Second Battle of the Marne in 1918, earning the Iron Cross 1st Class.

Tresckow left the army after the war and became a stockbroker before pursuing a law degree. In 1924 he joined the Reichswehr. He had no great love for the Weimar Republic and welcomed the 1933 Nazi takeover. By 1938, however, Tresckow had moved into opposition as a result of Kristallnacht, the November pogrom against the Jews.

Tresckow completed General Staff Officer training and thereafter served almost exclusively in staff positions. He was chief of staff of the 228th Infantry Division during the September 1939 German invasion of Poland, earning his second Iron Cross 1st Class but was shocked by the atrocities committed by the Schutzstaffel (SS). In December 1940, he was a staff officer in Army Group B, serving under his uncle Field Marshal Fedor von Bock. Tresckow's opposition to the Nazi regime increased with the brutalities that accompanied the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, especially the execution of captured Red Army soldiers.

Promoted to colonel in 1942, Tresckow used his influence and access to the senior military leadership to recruit officers sympathetic to overthrowing the Nazi regime and Adolf Hitler in particular. Although many of the senior officers were sympathetic, they refused to participate in any plot to overthrow the regime. None, however, reported his activities to the Gestapo.

On March 14, 1943, Tresckow and his adjutant Lieutenant Fabian von Schlabrendorff planted a bomb on Hitler's plane at Smolensk in the Soviet Union, but it failed to explode because of a defective detonator. Tresckow's resolve was unshaken, however.

In September 1943, Tresckow became chief of staff of the Second Army. In January 1944 he was promoted to major general. By that date he had recruited Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg and engaged former Leipzig mayor Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, a key political opposition leader, to plan what became the July Plot or Operation VALKYRIE. On July 20, 1944, Stauffenberg planted a briefcase with a bomb in the vicinity of Hitler at the *Wolfschanse* bunker. The ensuing blast killed four men, but Hitler was only wounded and quickly recovered. The next day, upon hearing of the failed coup d'état, Tresckow committed suicide. His body was cremated at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

Tresckow's wife was arrested and his children taken away as part of the Nazi *Sippenhaft*, or collective family punishment, but she was released in October.

WILLIAM H. VAN HUSEN

See also

Bock, Fedor von; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot; Stauffenberg, Claus Philipp Schenk von

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Trident Conference (May 15–25, 1943)

Diplomatic conference between British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and their political and military advisers. The Trident Conference, held in Washington, D.C., is also known as the Third Washington Conference. The agenda at the conference

involved military activities for the rest of the year and the date of a cross-Channel invasion. The British objective was to convince the Americans to agree to an invasion of Italy after the conquest of Sicily (Operation HUSKY, July 9–August 22, 1943) was completed. The British argued that such a course would deprive Germany of an ally and make the western and central Mediterranean an Anglo-American lake. Churchill hoped that new options for Anglo-American strategy would be opened and perhaps break the U.S. obsession with a cross-Channel attack.

The Americans, particularly U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, were prepared for such arguments by the British. They pointed out that Soviet and American public opinion would demand an invasion of France. The Americans insisted that BOLERO, the buildup of men and matériel in England, should take precedence and that it would not prevent an invasion of Italy, although they did not commit to that invasion. Roosevelt and Marshall agreed to follow up HUSKY with the best means to drive Italy from the war and tie down the maximum number of German forces.

Certainly, this position pointed toward an invasion of Italy but left options open. For the first time, Roosevelt had not come down in favor of Churchill's position, and the British leader would never again feel confident that Roosevelt would support him once they had discussed all aspects of a question. The two leaders agreed on a date of May 1, 1944, as the deadline for the cross-Channel attack, splitting the difference between the preferred American date of April 1 and the British date of June 1.

Other topics of discussion included the China-Burma-India theater, which generated much talk but little action, and the atomic bomb. Over British skepticism, the conferees approved (but never implemented) plans for operations in Burma. Churchill and Roosevelt could not agree on whether aiding Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) or forcing the Japanese from Southeast Asia should be the goal. Churchill was further frustrated because no one, not even members of his own delegation, favored his proposal for a landing in Sumatra.

Churchill and Roosevelt also continued their discussion from the Casablanca Conference on developing an atomic bomb, with the British leader protesting the U.S. refusal to share information, a course of action recommended by most of Roosevelt's advisers. The president reluctantly

agreed to reveal secrets to the British but had not done so by the time of the Quebec Conference that August.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD

See also

Casablanca Conference; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Marshall, George Catlett; Quebec Conference, Second; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Tripartite Pact (September 27, 1940)

Diplomatic agreement among Germany, Italy, and Japan. Negotiated in Tokyo, the pact was signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940, by German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Italian foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano, and Japanese ambassador Kurusu Saburo. Primarily designed to forestall the entry of the United States into the war, the agreement stated as its main principle the establishment and maintenance of a new order, calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the nations concerned. The pact formalized the Axis partnership.

German, Italian, and Japanese leaders sign the Tripartite Alliance Pact in Berlin, September 27, 1940. (Keystone/Getty Images)

The agreement, which was to last 10 years, contained six articles. In Article 1, Japan recognized the establishment of a new order in Europe under the leadership of Germany and Italy. In Article 2, Germany and Italy recognized Japanese leadership in the establishment of a new order in greater East Asia. Article 3 pledged each partner to cooperate in the processes that would lead to the final goal stated in Articles 1 and 2. Article 3 served as a direct warning to the United States, although there was no mention of that power by name. In it, the three Axis powers vowed to "to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the contracting powers is attacked by a power not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." Thus, Germany and Italy would be bound to fight on the side of Japan were the United States to attack that country. Article 4 called for joint technical commissions from the three powers to implement quickly the agreement. Article 5 stated that the three powers respected agreements that had been concluded by any of the three powers with the Soviet Union. Article 6 set the 10-year limit of the agreement and provisions for its renewal.

Soviet leaders were alarmed by the pact, although Article 5 supported the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. In November 1940 to allay Soviet concerns, the German government formally asked the Soviet Union to

join the pact, and meetings were held to discuss that possibility. Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov was invited to Berlin, and talks concerning German-Soviet relations began on November 12, 1940. These negotiations did not result in agreement, as Adolf Hitler, already planning to invade the Soviet Union, rejected the Soviet insistence on concrete agreements concerning territory and spheres of influence.

Other nations were also pressured by Germany to adhere to the Tripartite Pact. Romania signed on November 23, 1940, as did Slovakia the next day. Bulgaria joined on March 1, 1941. Yugoslavia adhered to the pact on March 25, 1941, but renounced its action two days later, after the government of Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković was overthrown on the issue and replaced by that of General Dušan Simović. Unlike the Allies, the Axis coalition never developed a grand strategy for fighting the war.

JOSEPH C. GREANEY

See also

Ciano, Galeazzo, Conte di Cortellazo; Hitler, Adolf; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Ribbentrop, Ulrich Friedrich Willy Joachim von; Stalin, Joseph; Document 74; Document 110; Document 114

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Troina, Battle of (July 31–August 6, 1943)

The Battle of Troina occurred during the Allied conquest of Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and lasted from July 31 to August 6, 1943. It was both the largest and most prolonged battle between American and German forces to that point in the war. The 15th Panzergrenadier Division, united for the first time during the Sicilian campaign, defended against the advance of three infantry regiments of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, two attached infantry

regiments from the U.S. 9th Infantry Division, two troops of the U.S. 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 4th Tabor (battalion) of Moroccan Goums.

Located in western Sicily at an elevation of some 3,600 feet (the highest city in Sicily), Troina had a population of some 12,000 in 1943. With half a dozen mostly north-south ridge systems and surrounded by high hills that commanded all avenues of approach, Troina became a linchpin of the Axis Etna Line. The 15th Panzergrenadier Division defending here had two regimental-sized combat units. Group Fullriede occupied Troina proper and the high ground to the north of town. Group Ens covered the terrain to the south.

In late July 1943, Allied intelligence believed that the Axis defenders would withdraw to defensive positions behind Troina. Only slight resistance was expected in the U.S. forces' advance on Troina. Thus, the U.S. 39th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division, then attached to the 1st Infantry Division, was surprised when its advance on Troina was abruptly halted, despite heavy American artillery fire, on July 31 by Group Fullriede. During the next five days, the Americans committed more units as attack after attack was repulsed by the 15th Panzergrenadiers. German artillery and mortars, along with machine-gun and small-arms fire, halted every American and Moroccan assault. Any infantry advances faced stiff counterattacks by the German forces. During the battle, American forces suffered more than two dozen German counterattacks.

The Americans now concluded that a large-scale coordinated attack would be required. Three infantry regiments and a troop of reconnaissance cavalry would frontally assault the German positions, while a fourth infantry regiment and the Goums carried out a wide enveloping assault from the north and a fifth infantry regiment and a second troop of reconnaissance cavalry made a similar encircling move from the south.

Faced with this effort on August 3, the German forces grudgingly gave ground while launching numerous counterattacks. On August 4, North American A-36 Apache fighter bombers carried out two large air attacks on the town and surrounding hills. Yet the 15th Panzergrenadier continued to hold. By the end of August 5, American forces had suffered substantial casualties but still had not captured the town or many of the high, dominating German defensive positions.

Now faced with a risk of encirclement and the loss of its avenues of retreat, late on August 5 the German defenders were ordered to withdraw to a new defensive line about 5,000 yards west of Troina. This was accomplished that night. American troops entered the ruins of Troina shortly afterward on August 6. Although it had suffered more than 1,600 killed, some 40 percent of its prebattle strength, the 15th Panzergrenadier Division had stalled the American advance for six critical days.

ALAN M. ANDERSON

See also

Sicily, Invasion of

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Truk, Raid on (February 17–18, 1944)

In the fall of 1943, the U.S. Navy unleashed its Central Pacific Campaign, capturing Tarawa (November 20–24) and Makin (November 20–23) in the Gilbert Islands. Early the next year, U.S. amphibious forces seized Kwajalein (January 19–February 6) in the Marshall Islands. These successes allowed an immediate leap forward to Eniwetok Atoll, just 660 miles northeast of Truk, the principal Japanese fleet anchorage in the Central Pacific during the war.

In 1940 the Japanese began fortifying Truk, which was strategically located at the center of Micronesia. While the base never became the "Gibraltar of the Pacific" or a facility comparable to Pearl Harbor, by July 1942 it was headquarters for the Japanese Combined Fleet. Defensive construction continued into early 1944, eventually including four airstrips and two seaplane bases supporting 335 aircraft, three torpedo boat bases, and heavy coastal artillery. There were only 40 antiaircraft guns, however, and

the total garrison of soldiers, sailors, and airmen amounted to fewer than 12,000 men.

In response to the U.S. advances in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, the Japanese decided to abandon Truk as the principal base for the Combined Fleet, leaving there just the Fourth Fleet with 2 training cruisers and 8 destroyers, along with approximately 50 merchant ships and auxiliaries. Only a week after the Japanese withdrawal, Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, arrived off Truk with three fast carrier groups of 5 fleet carriers, 4 light carriers, 6 battleships, 10 cruisers, and 22 destroyers.

At 6:45 a.m. on February 17, Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher, commander of Task Force 58, began launching 70 Grumman F6F Hellcats from 90 to 100 miles east-northeast of Truk in the first of what would be 30 separate air attacks that day and the next. The Japanese had little warning of the raid, and 30 of their 45 fighters that met the initial onslaught were shot down. As the U.S. aircraft attacked shipping, airfields, and shore facilities on the many islands within the massive lagoon, a number of ships got under way in an effort to flee. The cruiser *Katori*, the destroyers *Maikaze* and *Nowaki*, and the auxiliary *Akagi Maru* cleared the lagoon's north exit at 9:00 a.m.

Spruance learned of this Japanese exodus at 9:42 a.m. Although Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers jumped the fleeing squadron and sank the *Akagi Maru* and crippled the *Katori* and *Maikaze*, Spruance decided to form a surface task group to hunt down the Japanese. This consisted of Battleship Division 7 with the *New Jersey* and *Iowa;* Cruiser Division 6 with the heavy cruisers *Minneapolis* and *New Orleans;* and Destroyer Squadron 46 with the *Izard, Burns, Charrette,* and *Bradford*. Coached by carrier planes (and undergoing a few nuisance attacks from Japanese aircraft), the task group first sighted and sank an armed trawler, the *Shonan Maru,* at 2:46 p.m. It then found the *Katori,* and at 3:16 p.m. Spruance ordered the two heavy cruisers, screened by the *Bradford* and *Burns,* to sink it. Meanwhile, the *Nowaki* and the damaged *Maikaze* appeared. When the topmasts of the battleships rose into view, the *Nowaki* fled to the west.

U.S. naval aircraft attacking the Japanese base of Truk in the Carolines during February 16-17, 1944. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The *Maikaze* and *Katori,* however, launched torpedoes at the battleships rushing down upon them. At 3:34 p.m., one streaked between the *New Jersey* and *Iowa*. Another passed the *Iowa* on its port side, and a third crossed 100 yards astern. Two minutes later, the *Minneapolis* made a hard turn to avoid a fourth torpedo.

Meanwhile, U.S. gunnery was overwhelming. At 3:37 p.m. the *Katori*'s bow rose out of the water, and the ship sank stern first, some guns being served to the end. The *Maikaze* succumbed to a combined bombardment from the *New Jersey, Izard*, and *Charrette* as they raced past as close as 7,000 yards. Meanwhile, the *Nowaki* had sent a salvo of long-running 24-inch torpedoes back toward the U.S. formation.

At 3:45 p.m., the *New Jersey* lofted a three-gun salvo toward the fleeing warship at a range of 32,200 yards. The *Iowa* did the same, its initial range 35,700 yards. Both ships believed that their first broadsides straddled. Then a torpedo streaked across the *Iowa*'s bow. As the *Nowaki* steamed into the glare of the sun, the battleships resorted to radar for aiming and spotting. More straddles followed. Finally, with a range of 39,000 yards they ceased fire, and the Japanese destroyer escaped unharmed.

In the attack on Truk, U.S. aircraft and ships shot down 70 of the 365 Japanese aircraft present and destroyed as many as 200 more on the ground. They also sank 2 light cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 4 destroyers, 2 small submarine chasers and 2 submarine tenders, an aircraft ferry, 5 tankers, and 21 other transports/freighters/auxiliaries, all totaling some 191,000 tons of shipping. The United States lost 25 planes, although many more were damaged. On the night of February 17, however, a Japanese torpedo bomber attacked and damaged the carrier *Intrepid*. It was out of action until June.

The U.S. flyers were disappointed that they did not get a chance to hit the Japanese battle fleet, but their efforts still represented the greatest one-day total of shipping sunk during the entire war. The raid also ended Truk's usefulness for the Combined Fleet. The raid was also the only surface action involving the Iowa-class battleships, and their final salvos were the longest-range broadsides ever fired against an enemy by a ship under way at sea.

Another carrier raid on Truk, on April 29, 1944, left only 12 Japanese aircraft serviceable and destroyed nearly all air support facilities. Thereafter heavy bombers from Eniwetok and the Admiralties routinely pounded Truk.

VINCENT P. O'HARA

See also

Central Pacific Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Spruance, Raymond Ames

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Truman, Harry S. (1884–1972)

U.S. Democratic politician and president of the United States (April 1945–January 1953). Born in Lamar, Missouri, on May 8, 1884, Harry S. Truman grew up on the family farm in Grandview. Poor eyesight kept him from the U.S. Naval Academy and the U.S. Military Academy. Truman never formally attended college, but he read for the bar at night at the Kansas City School of

Law. He enlisted in the National Guard as a young man and served in combat in France during World War I as a field artillery battery commander.

Following the war, Truman entered politics and, with the backing of "Boss" Tom Pendergast, was elected a judge in the court of Jackson County, Missouri. Truman served in that post from 1926 to 1934, when he was elected to the U.S. Senate from Missouri. He remained active as a reserve officer, rising to the rank of colonel and only retiring from the U.S. Army Reserve after he left the presidency.

He was reelected to the Senate in 1940, but he remained relatively obscure until his service as chairman of the Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, when he helped eliminate millions of dollars of waste in defense contracting. His efforts contributed significantly to the efficiency of the U.S. defense industry on the eve of the U.S. entry into World War II and thereafter.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt selected Truman as his running mate in 1944, and Truman was sworn in as vice president in January 1945. Roosevelt did not share with Truman his thinking on many significant war-related issues, and Truman was thus poorly prepared to become president when Roosevelt died suddenly on April 12, 1945. Despite his almost blind start, Truman made some bold moves virtually immediately. He supported the San Francisco Conference of Nations that established the United Nations, and he mustered popular and bipartisan support for that fledgling organization, with the intention of altering the nation's traditionally isolationist outlook in favor of a postwar internationalist foreign policy.

U.S. president Harry S. Truman, shown here in 1945. (Library of Congress)

When the Germans surrendered only 26 days after he assumed office, Truman appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower to head the American occupation zone in Germany and supported a vigorous program of denazification and war crimes prosecution. Attending the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, Truman worked with Soviet premier Joseph Stalin and new British prime minister Clement Attlee to build on the agreements that had been reached by Stalin, Roosevelt, and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill at Yalta. Truman also decided to employ the atomic bomb against Japan in August 1945, a decision he later said he never regretted or agonized about because he knew that it saved many thousands of American lives.

As it became increasing clear that the Soviet Union was systematically acting contrary to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, Truman concluded that a strong Anglo-American stand was the only means of preventing a total Soviet domination of Europe. But rapid American demobilization had

reduced U.S. military strength in Europe to 391,000 men by 1946, whereas the Soviets still had 2.8 million troops under arms. Truman used U.S. economic power and the country's momentary nuclear monopoly to blunt the Soviet aspirations in postwar Europe. He also effectively blocked the Soviets from assuming any role in the occupation of Japan.

Truman was wary of Soviet conventional military power in Europe, but he also tried to maintain the wartime alliance that he considered essential to the viability of the United Nations. When Soviet intentions finally became clear—first with the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia and then with the Berlin Blockade—the defining Cold War American policy of containment solidified with three landmark decisions: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Truman laid down the principles of the Truman Doctrine in a speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, when he stated his belief that the United States had to adopt a policy to support free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside influences. In response, Congress approved his request for $400 million in economic and military aid for both Greece and Turkey. Greece was then being torn apart in a civil war, and Turkey was under heavy pressure from Moscow over control of the Dardanelles. The support package for Greece also included U.S. military advisers.

The $13 billion Marshall Plan proved to be the engine of economic recovery in Europe, and it effectively prevented Moscow from stoking and exploiting economic chaos. The Soviet Union rejected aid under Washington's conditions and forced what were now its East European satellites to do likewise. In March 1948, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, with American backing, formed the Brussels Pact, which developed into the Western European Union in 1955.

Truman decided on an airlift as the answer to the Soviet blockade of Berlin, demonstrating U.S. resolve. In April 1949, the United States entered into its first (and still its most durable) standing military alliance since 1800 with the establishment of NATO. Truman also put Moscow on notice that the United States was willing to use its fledgling nuclear arsenal to defend Western Europe. In May 1949, when it became clear that the Soviets had no intention of allowing all of Germany's four occupation zones to reunite under a democratically elected government, Truman supported the establishment of

the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), formed from the three western occupation zones. The Soviets retaliated in October by establishing the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

In what he described as his most difficult decision while in office, Truman authorized the commitment of U.S. forces in Korea in June 1950, within a week of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. He also supervised the reorganization of the U.S. defense and intelligence establishments along the lines that remain familiar today. His administration established the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency and formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staffs and the global network of joint military commands.

Truman's decision to remove General Douglas MacArthur as U.S. and United Nations commander in Korea and the negative American public reaction to this, together with the stalemate in the war there, led Truman not to run for reelection in 1952. He left office in January 1953.

Truman played an important role during World War II, and his postwar policies rebuilt Western Europe, integrated the greater part of Germany into the West, and prevented the spread of communism in Europe outside the Soviet occupation zone. Truman died in Kansas City, Missouri, on December 26, 1972.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Germany, Postwar Occupation of; Japan, Occupation of; Potsdam Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stimson, Henry Lewis; United Nations, Formation of; United States; Yalta Conference; Document 229

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Truscott, Lucian King, Jr. (1895–1965)

U.S. Army general. Born in Chatfield, Texas, on January 9, 1895, Lucian King Truscott Jr. had a limited formal education but taught school in Oklahoma. He joined the army when the United States entered World War I and was selected for officer training. Commissioned into the cavalry in August 1917, he did not see overseas service during the war.

Between 1919 and 1925, Truscott was stationed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He was promoted to captain in 1925, to major in 1926, and to lieutenant colonel in 1935. He was first a student and then an instructor at the Cavalry School (1925–1931) and the Command and General Staff School (1934–1940).

In February 1941, Truscott joined IX Corps as assistant G-3 and profoundly impressed his chief, Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower. As both men rose in the army, Eisenhower repeatedly selected Truscott for important assignments. Promoted to brigadier general in May 1942, he was assigned to Britain's Combined Operations headquarters, where he developed ranger units that participated in the Dieppe Raid that summer. After becoming a major general in November 1942, he commanded the force that seized Port Lyautey in French Morocco. During the fighting for Tunisia in 1943, Truscott served as Eisenhower's deputy in charge of training, and in March 1943, he took command of the 3rd Infantry Division.

In fighting in Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and again in peninsular Italy, Truscott's division established an exemplary reputation. Truscott became known for his rigorous training, steely leadership, and ability to inspire confidence. A month after the Anzio landing on January 22, 1944, he replaced Major General John P. Lucas as commander of the U.S. VI Corps after Lucas was relieved because of the operation's initial failure. On May 23, Truscott's greatly augmented VI Corps broke out of its beachhead. Had Fifth Army commander Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark not redirected Truscott's advance to Rome, VI Corps might have trapped large numbers of retreating Germans.

On August 15, 1944, Truscott's corps landed on the French Riviera as the vanguard of Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch's Seventh Army in Operation DRAGOON (launched on August 15), VI Corps drove rapidly up the Rhône Valley and again only narrowly missed making a major entrapment of

German troops. Promoted to lieutenant general in September 1944, Truscott handed over command in the Vosges Mountains in late October. In mid-December, back in Italy, he succeeded Clark as commander of the Fifth Army, and in April 1945, he directed its 19-day final offensive through the Po Valley to the Alps.

Truscott was the only U.S. general of the war to command in battle at four successively higher echelons. Had his superiors in the Mediterranean not blocked his transfer to England—which Eisenhower had requested early in 1944—he, instead of Major General J. Lawton Collins, would have led VII Corps over Utah Beach into Normandy on June 6.

Truscott retired from the army on medical grounds in 1947. He wrote his memoirs and served in various advisory capacities. He was promoted to full general on the retired list in 1954. Truscott died in Washington, D.C., on September 12, 1965.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Anzio, Battle of; DRAGOON, Operation; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Italy Campaign; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation; Tunisia Campaign

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Tsuchihashi Yuitsu (1891–1975)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in 1891 and commissioned as a second lieutenant in the army in 1912, Tsuchihashi Yuitsu graduated from the Japanese Military Staff College in 1920. Promoted to colonel in 1935 and fluent in French, during 1937–1939 he served concurrently as military attaché to France and Belgium. In early 1939, Tsuchihashi went to Hanoi to meet with French governor-general Jules Brevié to demand the interdiction of American supplies for the Guomindang (Nationalist) government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) in China that were being routed through Indochina.

The French refused the request, and the next year the Japanese sent occupation troops into Indochina.

Tsuchihashi was chief of staff of the Japanese Twenty-First Army in 1939 and then headed the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff. In October 1940 he was appointed vice chief of staff of the China Expeditionary Army, and in 1941 he was promoted to lieutenant general and assumed command of the 48th Division, which he led in the Philippines and Dutch East Indies campaigns. In November 1944 he assumed command of the Japanese Indochina Garrison Army, which in December 1944 became the Japanese Thirty-Eighth Army with him still in command.

Tokyo worried that the United States would soon mount an amphibious assault on Vietnam from the Philippines and thought it best to neutralize the French first before having to deal with an American invasion. Well aware that French authorities, whom the Japanese had left in place, were planning to wrest control, in March 1945 Tsuchihashi carried out a preemptive coup against the French administration and military forces in Indochina. With the unconditional surrender of Japan, Tsuchihashi surrendered his own forces north of the 16th parallel to the Chinese at Hanoi on September 28, 1945. This created a political vacuum in Vietnam, into which the Viet Minh, the communist-dominated nationalist organization that had been fighting both the French and the Japanese and was led by Ho Chi Minh, quickly moved. Tsuchihashi retired in June 1950 and died on May 31, 1975.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

French Indochina; Ho Chi Minh

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Tsuji Masanobu (1902–ca. 1968)

Japanese Army colonel and politician. A native of Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan, born on October 11, 1902, Tsuji Masanobu graduated from the Military Academy in 1924 and from the General Staff Academy in 1931. He took part in the Japanese Army's attack on Shanghai in 1932 and then served in a succession of staff positions. Attached to the staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in 1936, Tsuji became a close supporter of the influential general Ishiwara Kanji. Tsuji participated in planning the Guandong Army's disastrous border clash with the Soviet Union at Nomonhan (May–September 1939), and in 1940, he was transferred to the China Expeditionary Army.

Late in 1940, Tsuji, by that time a lieutenant colonel, joined the staff of the Japanese Army on Taiwan. Convinced of the inevitability of war with the Western powers, he began to collect intelligence about Southeast Asia, in particular Malaya. In September 1941, Tsuji was dispatched to the staff of Japanese forces occupying French Indochina, where he stepped up his intelligence-gathering activities in anticipation of a Japanese thrust into Southeast Asia. Subsequently, Tsuji played a major role in planning the successful Japanese 1941–1942 campaign in Malaya, culminating with the surrender of Singapore in February 1942.

After the fall of Singapore, Tsuji took part in the Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942–February 1943), and during March–July 1944, he helped plan the abortive Japanese offensive at Imphal on the Burma-India border. In Thailand when the war ended, Tsuji went into hiding, possibly to escape indictment for war crimes, until 1948. Still a right-wing nationalist, he was elected to the Japanese Diet (parliament) four times between 1952 and 1959. Two years later, for reasons that have never been explained, Tsuji took a trip to Laos and vanished. He was pronounced legally dead (presumably a casualty of the Laotian Civil War) on July 7, 1968.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guandong Army; Imphal and Kohima, Sieges of; Ishiwara Kanji; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Malaya Campaign; Singapore, Battle for

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Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich (1893–1937)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born on the Aleksandrovkoye estate 150 miles southwest of Moscow on February 16, 1893, Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky was the son of a nobleman and a servant girl. Debts forced the family to sell the estate and move to Moscow in 1909. There, Tukhachevsky entered the Alexandrovsky Military College. During World War I, as an officer in the elite Semenovsky Guards, he fought in Poland and won six decorations before being taken prisoner in 1915. After three attempts, he managed to escape in 1917.

In 1918 Tukhachevsky joined the Red Army, and as a protégé of Leon Trotsky he became a prominent military commander during the Russian Civil War, leading the First Army and then the Eighth and Fifth Armies. Appointed commander in the west in April 1920, Tukhachevsky led the Russian invasion of Poland. Fighting here, however, laid the seeds for future conflicts and hatreds between him and Joseph Stalin and Kliment Voroshilov.

In March 1921, Tukhachevsky brutally suppressed the anti-Bolshevik uprisings at Kronstadt. Between 1922 and 1924, he headed the Military Academy. In May 1924, he became deputy to Marshal Mikhail Frunze, chief of the General Staff. Following Frunze's death, Tukhachevsky became chief of staff of the Red Army, occupying that post from 1926 to 1928. Following disagreements with Defense Commissar Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky was commander of the Leningrad Military District between 1928 and 1931.

There, Tukhachevsky developed his theories of deep operations, the application of mechanization and armor along with air support to warfare, and the use of airborne troops, carrying out actual maneuvers with these forces. Tukhachevsky saw clearly the nature of the German threat, and he called for forward areas to be lightly held, with large formations remaining back for subsequent reaction and deep-penetration operations. Voroshilov, an old-fashioned proponent of cavalry, opposed his theories.

Tukhachevsky returned to Moscow in 1931 as deputy commissar for military and naval affairs, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Union, and director of armaments. In 1936, he was named first deputy commissar for military-naval affairs and director of the Department of Combat Training. Foreign observers recognized Tukhachevsky's contribution in establishing the most advanced armor and airborne divisions in the world. In November 1935, he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union.

Tukhachevsky believed strongly in the need to understand thoroughly the defensive aspects of war as a prerequisite for comprehending the operational level of war as a whole; Stalin demanded unilateral adherence to the offensive. Tukhachevsky also predicted that Adolf Hitler would cooperate with Japan and that Germany would invade both the West and the Soviet Union, and he argued for an end to cooperation with the Germans and a defense in depth. His meddling in such areas and the 1935 publication of these views in an article angered Stalin.

That April, Tukhachevsky was removed from his posts and assigned to command the Volga Military District. He was arrested on May 26, 1937. Secretly tried and condemned on charges of spying for the Germans, he was executed by firing squad on the night of June 11–12 in Moscow. A 1956 Soviet investigation concluded that the charges against him had been fabricated, and he was formally rehabilitated in 1963. Almost all of Tukhachevsky's theories were proven correct during World War II.

MICHAEL SHARE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Joseph; Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich

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Tulagi Island, Battle of (August 7–8, 1942)

Engagement between U.S. and Japanese forces, part of the larger Guadalcanal Campaign (August 1942–September 1943). Tulagi is a 2-mile-long and half-mile-wide island in the Solomon chain, located just off Florida Island and 20 miles north of Guadalcanal. It was part of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate until occupied by Japan in May 1942. At the beginning of the war, Tulagi was the site of an Australian-built seaplane base. The Japanese began bombarding the island in January 1942, and with the approach of the Japanese task force in the Coral Sea operation, the Australian government ordered the evacuation of the island on May 1. The Japanese then garrisoned Tulagi with a 350-man detachment of the 3rd Kure Special Landing Force, under Commander Suzuki Masaaki.

Targeted for invasion as part of the U.S. Guadalcanal Offensive, Tulagi had to be cleared of Japanese forces in order to secure the chief U.S. target—the airfield being constructed by the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Transport Group Yoke, consisting of three transports and four destroyer transports, delivered Brigadier General William Rupertus's landing force of the 1st Raider Battalion; the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines; the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines; and the 1st Parachute Battalion.

The landing on Tulagi on August 7, 1942, was unopposed, but the marines soon ran into stiff Japanese resistance. Tulagi was the first battle in which U.S. troops had encountered Japanese defensive tactics, including strongly entrenched dugouts and tunnels constructed to withstand heavy naval or air bombardment. These fortifications had to be taken by assault with grenades and high-explosive charges.

It was not possible to secure the small island on the first day, so the marines dug in. During the night of August 7–8, they encountered a Japanese banzai charge. Turning back this attack, the marines secured the island the next day. Some 200 of the Japanese defenders were killed, and only 3 were captured; 40 others escaped to nearby islands. U.S. forces suffered 36 men killed and 54 wounded in the operation.

HERSCHEL M. SARNOFF

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater

U.S. marines wade ashore during the assault on Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, 1942. (U.S. Navy/Getty Images)

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Tunis, Battle of (May 3–13, 1943)

By the end of April 1943, the converging Allied offensive conducted by General Harold Alexander's 18th Army Group with Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth Army and Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson's British Fifth Army had pushed the Axis forces into a pocket around Tunis and Bizerte. Although the two Axis armies in Colonel General Jürgen von Arnim's Army Group Afrika—General Giovanni Messe's Italian First Army and General of Panzer Troops Gustav von Vaerst's Fifth Panzer Army—had linked up for the final defense, their loss of equipment had been so great that defending even the 100-mile arc was impossible in the face of massive Allied superiority. Alexander had 20 divisions with 300,000 men and 1,400 tanks against Arnim's fighting strength of only 60,000 men and up to 100 tanks.

The British had taken the high ground around Medjez-el-Bab, allowing a direct attack against Tunis and Bizerte. Arnim held off the Allied offensive, delivered simultaneously on every sector between April 19 and 25, but in doing so, the Axis forces consumed the last of their scant resources. The tourniquet applied by the Allied air and naval blockade across the Mediterranean from Italy was now so tight that few reinforcements or supplies reached Tunisia. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and Arnim had reported in February that 140,000 tons per month would be required to maintain the fighting power of the Axis forces, but they received just 23,000 tons in April and a paltry 2,000 tons in the first week of May.

As a result, Axis forces suffered severe shortages of food, ammunition, and fuel. Fuel resources were sufficient to move just 16 miles, which drastically restricted all tactical movement. Despite heroic efforts to transfer even the smallest amounts by air and submarine, Arnim later admitted that he would have been forced to capitulate by the beginning of June regardless of Allied operations simply because of a shortage of food. The complete breakdown of the logistics system explains the collapse of Axis resistance far more clearly than any Allied offensive.

Montgomery's failure to break through the Enfidaville bottleneck led Alexander to devise a new final plan. He switched the Indian 4th and 7th Armoured Divisions and the 201st Guards Brigade from the Eighth Army to the First Army and charged Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks's IX Corps with making the final attack. Operation STRIKE was to be an overwhelming onslaught on a 3,500-yard front by the 4th Indian and 4th British Divisions, supported by a massive phalanx of 470 tanks in the valley south of the Medjerda River. Its goal was the capture of Tunis. American forces, meanwhile, had captured Mateur on May 3 and pushed the German line back to Chouïgui, just 15 miles from Bizerte, preventing the Germans from reinforcing their positions in the Medjerda Valley.

The assault opened at 3:00 a.m. on May 6 with a concentrated barrage by up to 652 guns, which pulverized Axis strongpoints; this was followed by an intense air assault at dawn. Under this massive onslaught, German resistance collapsed, and the Allied infantry broke through almost without opposition so that by 10:00 a.m., tanks of the 6th and 7th Armoured Divisions were pouring through the gap. They failed, however, to grasp the elementary principles of

exploitation that Rommel had earlier demonstrated and advanced with unnecessary caution.

On May 7, the 11th Hussars entered Tunis, the first unit to cross the Egyptian border in 1940, aptly crowning the end of the campaign, and U.S. forces from II Corps entered Bizerte later the same day. The Fifth Army was thus trapped between the British and American spearheads, and Vaerst surrendered on May 8, furnishing 40,000 prisoners. Also on that day, British admiral Andrew Cunningham carried out Operation RETRIBUTION, a rejoinder to the agonies suffered by the British during the evacuation of Greece and Crete in 1941, to prevent any escape of the Axis forces by sea.

Alexander's principal concern thereafter was to prevent the vast bulk of the Axis troops south of Tunis from retreating with Messe's First Army into the Cape Bon Peninsula and establishing a redoubt. Immediately, the 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions drove to Hammam Lif at the neck of the peninsula, but the hills there reach almost to the beach, and a small detachment of Germans held up the Allies for another two days. Without fuel or ammunition or any hope of escape, further resistance was futile, and the remaining Germans were mopped up, the last units surrendering on May 13. In all, the Allies took some 250,000 prisoners in the Battle of Tunis, the largest capitulation yet suffered by the Axis powers.

PAUL H. COLLIER

Spahis (Algerian cavalry) of the French forces passing a French tank during the Allied victory parade on Avenue Gambetta in Tunis, 1943. (Library of Congress)

See also

Afrika Korps; Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Anderson, Sir Kenneth Arthur Noel; Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Cunningham, Sir Andrew Browne; Horrocks, Sir Brian Gwynne; Kesselring, Albert; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Tunisia Campaign

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Tunisia Campaign (November 17, 1942–May 13, 1943)

Allied military campaign leading to the clearing of Axis forces from North Africa. Following the Anglo-U.S. invasion of Northwest Africa on November

8, 1942, German leader Adolf Hitler belatedly recognized that a collapse of Axis power in Africa threatened not just Benito Mussolini's regime in Italy but also Germany by exposing the whole of Southern Europe to Allied attack. Hitler therefore allocated reinforcements to Tunisia on a scale far greater than ever before seen in Africa.

By the end of 1942, commander of the Fifth Panzer Army colonel general Jürgen von Arnim had achieved his short-term objectives. He had prevented the Allies from reaching the central Tunisian coastline and thereby isolating the Fifth Army from General Erwin Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika, which was withdrawing into southern Tunisia. Arnim had also deepened the Axis bridgehead by pushing back the British around Tébourba in the north, and he had blocked the way to Tunis by tenaciously recapturing Longstop Hill, which the Germans finally took on Christmas Day 1942 and renamed Der Weihnachten Hügel (Christmas Hill). Thereafter, Allied operations ground to a halt as winter rain turned the terrain into a muddy morass.

Allied judgments that German tanks could not operate in the drier mountainous terrain were dramatically proven wrong on January 18, 1943, when Arnim launched an offensive against French forces around Pont du Fahs. By the end of January, the veteran 21st Panzer Division had captured the Faid Pass and the Allies had been pushed back from the Eastern Dorsals, whereas Rommel had withdrawn to the Mareth Line, a prewar French defensive system in southern Tunisia. Rommel now had close to 80,000 troops, and the Fifth Army had risen to 100,000 men, mostly German troops, giving the Axis forces a much better ratio to Allied strength, despite being significantly weaker in tanks.

Moreover, the strategic position had now reversed, as the Axis units were able to concentrate their forces in a strong central position with the advantage of interior lines, and fleetingly, the two panzer armies had the opportunity to strike back. Rommel was not dismayed by the threat of Lieutenant General Lloyd Fredendall's U.S. II Corps poised on the line of his retreat, and indeed, he conceived an ingenious plan to defeat the Americans while Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery's British Eighth Army was still stretched out along a supply line across Libya before turning Axis strength against it.

On February 14, Arnim attacked Sidi Bouzid and Sbeitla with the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions, while Rommel occupied Gafsa virtually unopposed and then captured the American airfields at Thelepte, 60 miles

beyond. Rommel wanted to exploit the Allied confusion with a combined drive to Tebessa and secure Allied supply dumps, then sweep up behind the British army in the north. Unfortunately for him, he no longer had the freedom that he had enjoyed in the desert to disregard the Comando Supremo's instructions, which were to push on toward Thala and Le Kef.

By February 20, Rommel had broken through the Kasserine Pass instead of farther north, as the Allies had been led to expect through Ultra intelligence. Fredendall's force cracked after losing two tank, two infantry, and two artillery battalions. Nevertheless, increasing Allied resistance, poor terrain for mobile operations, Arnim's lack of cooperation, and growing Axis losses obliged Rommel to call off the operation on February 22.

Rommel's offensive was a brilliant success as a limited objective and came perilously close to driving the Allies from Tunisia, but it had no long-term effect on Allied strategy. The Americans had suffered a humiliating defeat and significant losses of men, matériel, and confidence. Commander in chief, Mediterranean, General Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Fredendall with the more aggressive Major General George S. Patton Jr.

U.S. forces had, however, gained invaluable battle experience. The Allies quickly retook most of the passes, and on February 20, they formed First and Eighth Armies into the 18th Army Group under General Harold Alexander, with the aim of ending the campaign before May.

Rommel was promoted to commander in chief of Army Group Afrika, and his Panzerarmee was renamed the Italian First Army, under General Giovanni Messe. On February 26, Arnim launched an abortive offensive, which merely delayed Rommel's second strike against the Eighth Army at Medenine until March 6. The interval enabled Montgomery to rush extra divisions forward, which decisively shattered Rommel's attack. The defeat did not end the war in Africa, but it dispelled any hope that the Axis forces could overcome one of the two Allied armies before they developed a combined pressure and therefore decided the final conclusion. Rommel was ill, and on March 9, he flew to Germany in an effort to convince Hitler to evacuate the Tunisian bridgehead. As it turned out, Rommel never returned.

At the end of March, after his initial frontal attack had failed, Montgomery's forces outflanked the Mareth positions and then joined with the First Army in the early days of April. Montgomery, however, failed to prevent Messe from withdrawing to the defensive bottleneck at Wadi Akarit,

north of Gabès. Although the two Axis armies formed a strong force, Allied air and naval actions prevented reinforcements and supplies of food, ammunition, and fuel from reaching Tunisia, and the Axis forces suffered severe shortages, particularly of fuel, which drastically restricted all tactical movement.

Patton's U.S. II Corps now threatened Messe's rear and flank, but Messe withdrew to Enfidaville as the two Axis armies were pressed into a pocket around Tunis and Bizerte. Although both armies had linked up for the final defense, improving their position, their loss of equipment had been so great that defense of even the 100-mile arc was impossible in the face of the massive Allied superiority.

Political and psychological considerations strongly influenced the final assault, as Eisenhower ordered that the Americans, now under Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, should make the main effort in the north. Alexander launched the final offensive on April 22, with the British First Army attacking toward Tunis and Bradley striking against Bizerte and Montgomery on the defensive at Enfidaville. When the advance stalled, two of Montgomery's best divisions were switched to the First Army, and a fresh assault was launched.

Axis prisoners of war being herded out of Tunis as Allied armies enter the city. (National Archives)

Axis defenses quickly collapsed, and Tunis and Bizerte both fell on May 7; the last German and Italian units surrendered six days later. Some 250,000 prisoners were captured, the largest capitulation yet suffered by the Axis powers, depriving them of experienced troops. Coming soon after the German defeat at Stalingrad (February 2), the situation was a further humiliation for Hitler. For Mussolini, however, the Tunisia Campaign was a disaster. The best part of the Italian Army had been lost, and the Italian empire on which he had based the credibility of his regime simply ceased to exist.

PAUL H. COLLIER

See also

Afrika Korps; Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Arnim, Hans Jürgen Dieter von; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Fredendall, Lloyd Ralston; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Mareth, Battle of; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; TORCH, Operation; Tunis, Battle of

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Tunner, William Henry (1906–1983)

U.S. Army Air Forces and, later, U.S. Air Force lieutenant general. Born on July 14, 1906, at Elizabeth, New Jersey, William Henry Tunner graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1928. He earned his pilot's wings in 1929 and served in a variety of capacities in the Army Air Corps throughout the 1930s. In 1939 he was assigned to the Ferrying Command, tasked with organizing the delivery of military aircraft from industry to user. Ferrying Command later became Air Transport Command, where Tunner ultimately managed the flow of 10,000 aircraft monthly.

Through his ferrying duties, Tunner, who was promoted to brigadier general in June 1943, won recognition as an innovative organizer and command of the India-China Division of the Air Transport Command in the summer of 1944. He reorganized and made more efficient the operation commonly known as the Hump Airlift, named for the 16,000-foot gap in the Himalayas through which aircraft had to pass. This operation ultimately supplied Nationalist Chinese forces with more than 71,000 tons of cargo. Tunner's crews often operated with dated aircraft in poor conditions, working at the end of a logistical trail in a low-priority theater; nevertheless, the operation's success furthered Tunner's reputation as an efficient and effective commander.

After the war Tunner headed the Atlantic Division of the Military Air Transport Service during 1945–1948. In the summer of 1948 he organized the Berlin Airlift, quickly imposing a highly structured system of air routes

and nearly doubling the number of aircraft flowing into Berlin. The Soviets lifted their blockade in May 1949 after the airlift had delivered over 2 million tons of coal and food to the city.

In the 1950s Tunner headed Combat Cargo Command, responsible for the Korean War's intratheater airlift. He was promoted to lieutenant general in July 1953, and from 1958 he commanded the Military Air Transport Service until his retirement in 1960. Tunner died in Ware Neck, Virginia, on April 6, 1983.

JOHN D. PLATING

See also

Aircraft, Transport; Airlift; Hump, The

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Tunner, William. *Over the Hump*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1964.

Tupolev, Andrei Nikolayevich (1888–1972)

Leading Soviet aircraft designer. Born on November 10, 1888, in Pustomazovo, Tver Oblast, Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev demonstrated a special interest in mathematics and physics at an early age. He studied natural sciences at the Imperial Technical Institute in Moscow and, under the supervision of Russian aerodynamics engineer Nikolai Y. Zhukovskii, built a wind tunnel for the institute and exhibited a model airplane, the *Antoinette,* at the aeronautics exhibition in Moscow in 1910. Arrested for anticzarist activities in 1911, Tupolev was released and worked at the Dux aircraft factory in Moscow.

During World War I, Tupolev was a lecturer at the Imperial Technical Institute. He held that military aviation was a prerequisite for prosecuting a successful war. The new Soviet government was then beginning to reconstruct an air arm. As many engineers had left the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks entrusted Tupolev and others with establishing the Central Aerodynamics and Hydrodynamics Research Institute in Moscow. Tupolev

served as its director from 1918 to 1935, and the institute produced all the leading Soviet aircraft designers.

In 1927 Tupolev designed the first Soviet all-metal aircraft, the ANT-3, and in 1930 he produced the TB-3 four-engine bomber. The most advanced heavy bomber of its day, it was armed with six machine guns, had a maximum speed of 180 mph and a range of 1,800 miles, and could carry 2.5 tons of bombs. TB-3s saw combat in the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (May–September 1939), and in the First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War). Tupolev also designed the twin-engine SB-2 ground-support bomber, which fulfilled a variety of wartime roles.

Although Tupolev was the most prominent Soviet aircraft designer, he was arrested in October 1937 in the Great Purges and accused of passing technical secrets to the Germans. The NKVD (Soviet secret police) and the government ran their own aircraft design bureau in a Moscow prison, and there Tupolev continued his work. In the summer of 1941 with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the aircraft design bureau was evacuated to the Siberian city of Omsk, and Tupolev was released from prison.

After the war, Tupolev designed many passenger planes and bombers. The Soviet Union's foremost aircraft designer of World War II, Tupolev died in Moscow on December 23, 1972.

EVA-MARIA STOLBERG

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Soviet Union, Air Force; Spanish Civil War

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Turing, Alan Mathison (1912–1954)

British mathematician and cryptologist. Born in Paddington, England, on June 23, 1912, Alan Mathison Turing was educated at Cambridge University, where he studied mechanical and mathematical logic. While still an undergraduate, he published a seminal article suggesting a machine that could, by following a prescribed set of rules, move from one "state" to another. Afterward known as the "Turing Machine," this concept was the foundation for the logical structure of modern-day computers.

From 1939, British intelligence collected top mathematicians and code breakers at Bletchley Park outside of London to assist in breaking the German codes of the Enigma machine. There, Turing led the attempt to build on work carried out by the Poles. Bletchley Park was eventually able to read most German encrypted radio traffic, although not in real time. Nonetheless, this work was immensely important; the information it provided, code-named Top Secret Ultra, proved vital to the Allied victory in World War II. Turing left Bletchley Park in 1943 to develop a speech encipherment system.

Following the war, Turing worked on the development of the first electronic computers and wrote papers that are considered the foundation of today's field of artificial intelligence. Arrested, tried, and convicted in 1952 for homosexual activities, Turing acceded to a regimen of estrogen injections in lieu of imprisonment and continued with his research while under observation by members of a security detail, who were vexed when he took a Greek vacation in 1953. Turing, whose mother claimed that he often experimented with poisonous chemicals, died on June 4, 1954, at Winslow, Cheshire, England, after eating part of an apple laced with potassium cyanide; an inquest deemed his death a suicide.

ROBERT BATEMAN

See also

Bletchley Park; Enigma Machine; Signals Intelligence

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Turkey

Eurasian nation covering 300,948 square miles. Strategically located both in Europe and Asia Minor, European Turkey borders Greece and Bulgaria to the east and north, and in Asia Minor today it shares common borders with Georgia to the northwest, Armenia and Iran to the east, and Syria and Iraq to the south. Turkey's 1939 population was approximately 17.4 million people. The Ottoman Empire had been on the losing side in World War I and had been forced to give up substantial territory at its end; what remained became present-day Turkey. Turkish leaders were understandably reluctant to embark on a new war, especially as their military machine was obsolete. For these reasons, and despite their hatred of their traditional enemy on their border, the Soviet Union (Georgia and Armenia being then both Soviet republics), the Turkish leaders were determined to keep the nation neutral in World War II.

Domestically, Turkey had been a secular state since 1924, but it was hardly a democracy. The father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), died in 1938. Premier Ismet Inönu, his closest associate, then took over the leadership of the nation and its one political party, the People's Party. Inönu was reelected president in 1943.

Turkish leaders were particularly apprehensive over the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, as well as the possibility that Germany and the Soviet Union might combine against their country. In September 1939, they attempted without success to negotiate a mutual security pact with the Soviets. Turkey also kept its large army mobilized throughout the conflict, worried not only by the ambitions of Germany and the Soviet Union but also by those of Italy in the Balkans. The period of greatest threat was from the beginning of the war to the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

Although it remained neutral, Turkey was pro-West in its orientation. Once the Germans controlled the Balkans, however, Ankara signed the Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Friendship with Berlin on June 18, 1941, which extended economic concessions to Germany. Nonetheless, Inönu strongly resisted pressure by German ambassador Franz von Papen to enter the war on the German side.

Infantrymen of the Turkish Army, May 1940. (Bettmann/Corbis)

When the tide of war turned against the Axis powers, Turkey resumed its pro-West position, although it also resisted pressure from the United States and Britain to enter the war. Indeed, by 1944, relations between the Allies and Turkey had reached a low point. Although Turkey declared war on Germany on February 23, 1945, this step was taken to ensure membership in the United Nations.

Following the war, the Soviet Union applied tremendous pressure on Turkey in an effort to annex Kars and Ardahan. These two northeast Turkish provinces had long been a source of contention between the two nations. Moscow also demanded a share of control over the defense of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. This Soviet pressure on Turkey and the communist threat to Greece led to the 1947 Truman Doctrine and to Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact; Papen, Franz von

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Turner, Richmond Kelly (1885–1961)

U.S. Navy admiral. Born on May 27, 1885, in Portland, Oregon, Richmond Kelly Turner graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1908. Following service in World War I, he held a variety of posts and qualified as a pilot at the age of 42.

Turner attended the Naval War College in 1935 and remained there until 1938 as head of the Strategy Section. He then became director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department in Washington, D.C. In March 1941, Turner was promoted to rear admiral.

Following the U.S. entry into World War II, Turner assumed additional duties as assistant chief of staff to Admiral Ernest J. King. In this dual capacity, he played a significant role in strategic planning for the Pacific theater. In July 1942, he became commander of the Amphibious Force, South Pacific, and he directed most U.S. amphibious landings in the Pacific during the war.

Turner, known as "Terrible Turner," had a reputation for being both brilliant and hot-tempered. His first operation involved the amphibious landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi (August 7–8, 1942). Turner also had charge of amphibious assaults in the central Solomons: the Russell Islands (February 21, 1943) and Rendova Island (June 30, 1943). As U.S. forces readied for their drive through the Central Pacific, he assumed command of the Fifth Amphibious Force, U.S. Fifth Fleet.

Turner planned and commanded the landings against the Gilbert Islands of Makin and Tarawa (November 20, 1943). In early 1944, he also had charge of the landings against the Marshall Islands of Kwajalein (January 29) and Eniwetok (February 22). He was promoted to vice admiral in February 1944.

In March, Turner became commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific, while simultaneously retaining command of the Fifth Amphibious Force. He

directed the invasions of the Mariana Islands of Saipan (June 15–July 9, 1944), Tinian (July 21–August 1), and Guam (July 21–August 10). He also commanded the amphibious forces in the onslaughts against Iwo Jima (February 19–March 26, 1945) and Okinawa (March–June 1945). In May 1945, in the midst of the Okinawa Campaign, Turner was promoted to admiral. He next worked on plans for the invasion of Japan (Operation OLYMPIC), scheduled for the fall of 1945. He attended the Japanese surrender ceremonies on September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay.

Following the war, Turner served as U.S. naval representative on the United Nations Military Committee until his retirement in July 1947. Turner died in Monterey, California, on February 12, 1961.

R. KYLE SCHLAFER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; Eniwetok, Capture of; Gilbert Islands Campaign; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guam, Battle for; Iwo Jima, Battle for; King, Ernest Joseph; Kwajalein, Battle for; Landing Craft; Makin Island, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Naval Gunfire, Shore Support; Okinawa, Invasion of; Saipan, Battle of; Savo Island, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southwest Pacific Theater; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tarawa, Battle of; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of; Tulagi Island, Battle of; United States Navy

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Tuskegee Airmen

Personnel of the all-black combat units of the U.S. Army Air Forces during World War II. No African Americans had ever entered the U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC), but in 1938 in a farsighted move, the Civil Aeronautics Authority authorized flight training for 20,000 college students yearly, and

soon after its inception, the program was opened to African Americans. The following year, Public Law #18 provided for contracting with civilian aviation schools for the elementary and primary phases of USAAC combat aviation training. This program also was reluctantly opened to blacks.

Tuskegee Institute, Alabama, would emerge as the primary site for training African American military aviation cadets. Air Corps commanders favored Tuskegee, comforted by the belief that the institution still adhered to the accomodationist philosophy of its founder, Booker T. Washington. But contrary to popular opinion, the training at Tuskegee was fully the equal of any white USAAC facility. However, the Tuskegee program was of minor importance in the total air-training effort, and its success or failure would have little effect on the total World War II effort.

On July 19, 1941, the USAAC activated the pioneer all-black 99th Pursuit Squadron. After lengthy training at Tuskegee, the 99th, under the rigorous command of Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin O. Davis Jr., was sent into combat in North Africa and Italy. It was later joined by the 100th, 301st, and 302nd Pursuit Squadrons to form the 332nd Fighter Group, again commanded by Davis. Davis insisted that his men stick close to the bombers that they were to escort, and consequently, the 332nd's "Good Shepherds" compiled an extraordinary combat record, losing only 25 bombers in 179 bomber escort missions, destroying 112 German aircraft in the air and another 150 on the ground. The 332nd's pilots flew a greater variety of fighter aircraft than any other U.S. fighter group: P-39s, P-40s, P-47s, and P-51s.

In the postwar decades, many Tuskegee Airmen pursued distinguished careers in the U.S. Air Force and in the civil aviation industry. Many historians have argued that the effort of American blacks to participate unsegregated in World War II was the catalyst of the U.S. civil rights movement beginning in the 1950s. It is certainly true that the American armed forces ended racial segregation a full decade ahead of civil society in the United States. On March 29, 2007, the Tuskegee Airmen were awarded the Congressional Gold Medal.

Tuskegee Airmen, including Benjamin O. Davis Jr. (the first African American general in the U.S. Air Force, third from left), in Alabama, 1942. The Tuskegee Airmen were the first African American pilots in the U.S. Army Air Forces and distinguished themselves in combat operations during the war. (Library of Congress)

STANLEY SANDLER

See also

Aircraft, Fighters; Davis, Benjamin Oliver, Jr.; United States Army Air Forces

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Twining, Nathan Farragut (1897–1982)

U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) general. Born in Monroe, Wisconsin, on October 11, 1897, Nathan Farragut Twining joined the Oregon National Guard in June 1916. He received an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in May 1917 and graduated after an abbreviated wartime course in November 1918 but remained an officer cadet until June 1919.

Twining's early career was in the infantry, but he entered the Primary Flying School at Brooks Field, Texas, in August 1923. He graduated from Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas, and received his wings in September 1926. Twining transferred to the Air Corps that November. His first operational assignment was to the 18th Pursuit Squadron in Hawaii.

Between March 1932 and August 1935, Twining served with several units and was promoted to captain. He graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama, in 1936 and from the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1937. From 1937 to 1940, Twining was stationed at Duncan Field, Texas. Promoted to major in August 1940, he became assistant chief of the Technical Inspection Division, Headquarters Air Corps, Washington, D.C., and was later promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In March 1942, Twining was promoted to brigadier general and became chief of staff to Major General M. F. Harmon, commander of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific. In January 1943, Twining took command of the newly formed Thirteenth Air Force, operating in the Solomon Islands and Bismarck Archipelago. Nicknamed the "Jungle Air Force," the unit provided invaluable support to General George C. Kenney's Fifth Air Force. On January 26, Twining's Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress was forced down in the Coral Sea. He and the other 15 survivors spent five days in a life raft before being rescued. In July, Twining, now a major general, assumed command of all Allied air assets in the South Pacific.

In November 1943, Twining took command of the newly formed U.S. Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. Among his command's critical targets were the Romanian oil refineries at Ploeşti. In June 1945, he was promoted to temporary lieutenant general and then given command of the Twentieth Air Force in the Pacific in August. His new command dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9).

In December 1945, Twining assumed command of the Air Material

Command, Wright Field, Ohio. In 1947 he headed the Alaska Command, and in May 1950 he became deputy chief of staff of the air force. Promoted to general in October and made vice chief of staff, Twining oversaw much of the U.S. Air Force's conversion from propeller to jet aircraft.

In June 1953 Twining became chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, overseeing the reorganization of the service, the introduction of new aircraft, and improvements in training. He also fought against decreases in conventional forces in favor of nuclear forces.

In August 1957, Twining became the first U.S. Air Force general to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His 1957 assertions that there was a "bomber gap" with the Soviet Union led to a substantial increase in air force appropriations from Congress. He retired in 1960 and became vice chairman of the Holt, Rinehart and Winston Publishing company. Twining died at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, on March 29, 1982.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Hiroshima, Bombing of; Kenney, George Churchill; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Ploieşti, Raids on

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Two-Ocean Navy Program

Massive U.S. Navy expansion approved by Congress in 1940. Because agreements signed at the Washington Conference in early 1922 had limited most U.S. naval construction, the United States could counter the rising naval power of Japan only by shifting naval assets from the Atlantic to the Pacific. After 1933, however, Germany's rearmament raised new potential dangers in the Atlantic; meanwhile, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, himself a naval enthusiast, viewed naval expansion as one of many economic stimuli

designed to end the Great Depression, and he promoted building programs in 1933 and 1934 to bring U.S. numbers of noncapital ships up to treaty-authorized limits. In 1935, Germany and Britain reached an agreement stipulating that the German fleet could have up to 35 percent of the tonnage of the Royal Navy, and in 1936, Japan abandoned its 1922 limits. A two-ocean war now became a real possibility for U.S. planners.

Early in 1938, Roosevelt proposed a 20 percent increase in U.S. warship tonnage, an increase that Congress approved on May 17. Through the remainder of 1938 and into 1939, as Germany's aggressive moves led to the absorption of Czechoslovakia and prompted Anglo-French guarantees to Poland regarding its security, Roosevelt concluded that the greater danger to U.S. national interests lay in the Atlantic rather than the Pacific, with a special concern for defending the Panama Canal. After World War II began in September 1939, Roosevelt organized a "neutrality patrol" in the Western Atlantic, defined in October 1939 as lying west of a line from the Saint Lawrence River to Trinidad.

Germany's conquest of the Low Countries and France in May and June 1940 affected the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. French possessions in Indochina and Dutch holdings in the East Indies were tempting targets for the Japanese, as were the Philippines. On June 14, 1940, as he was still planning a defensive posture in the Pacific while making the Atlantic the main theater of U.S. naval operations, Roosevelt requested a 25 percent increase in the carrier, cruiser, and submarine tonnage authorized in May 1938, amounting to an 11 percent rise in total U.S. fleet tonnage. Three days later, after German troops had occupied Paris, chief of naval operations Admiral Harold Stark asked Congress to appropriate $4 billion for a two-ocean navy. This represented a 70 percent increase in the combat fleet and would add 1,325,000 tons of new construction, amounting to 257 ships above the 488 that already existed or were being built at that time.

Roosevelt signed the Two-Ocean Navy Act on July 19, 1940. The largest naval appropriation in U.S. history, it authorized construction of 2 new Iowa-class and 5 Montana-class battleships, 6 Alaska-class battle cruisers, 18 aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers, 43 submarines, and 15,000 aircraft. It also provided for the purchase or conversion of 100,000 tons of auxiliary ships and the expenditure of $50 million for patrol, escort, and miscellaneous vessels.

Although modified to meet the changing demands of the war, the act created the combat core of the U.S. Navy as it developed from the middle of 1942 through the remainder of the war and for much of the decade that followed. Under its aegis were built the Essex-class carriers, the Baltimore-class heavy cruisers, the Cleveland- and Atlanta-class light cruisers, the Bristol- and Fletcher-class destroyers, and numerous smaller surface vessels and submarines.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Panama Canal; Rainbow Plans; Stark, Harold Raynsford "Betty"; United States Navy

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U

Udet, Ernst (1896–1941)

German Air Force general. Born on April 26, 1896 at Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Ernst Udet joined the German Army during World War I and became a pilot. In March 1918, he joined Baron Manfred von Richthofen's Flying Circus. After Richthofen's death, Udet temporarily led this military unit until Hermann Göring assumed command. Udet ended the war with 62 victories, the highest-scoring surviving German ace.

Thereafter, Udet remained in aviation as a stunt pilot and explorer. Göring recruited his old comrade into the new German Air Force (Luftwaffe) in 1935. Udet became a general and was the first inspector of fighters, a post for which he was well suited. Later, Göring made him director of armaments, overseeing technical development. Udet was a brilliant flyer and was technically proficient but ill-suited for administration. He constantly clashed with inspector general of the Luftwaffe General Erhard Milch. Udet did oversee the procurement of the Messerschmitt Bf-109 and the Junkers Ju-87 Stuka, and he also pushed for the development of jet aircraft, but overall, he lacked the temperament needed for his position. As a result of his actions, as well as those of Göring, Milch, and chief of staff of the Luftwaffe General Hans Jeschonnek, German industry continually failed to meet production goals. The situation was so serious by the spring of 1941 that Göring replaced Udet with Milch. Having become the scapegoat for the air force's failures over Britain and elsewhere, a despondent Colonel General Udet committed suicide in Berlin on November 17, 1941.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Jeschonnek, Hans; Milch, Erhard

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U-505, Capture of (June 4, 1944)

U.S. Navy captain Daniel V. Gallery Jr. commanded antisubmarine Task Group (TG) 22.3, operating out of Norfolk, Virginia. It consisted of the escort carrier *Guadalcanal* (CVE-60) and five destroyer escorts. A hunter-killer group, TG 22.3 sank several German U-boats while providing protection for Allied Atlantic convoys.

Gallery had developed a plan for capturing a German submarine intact, and it was executed to perfection on June 4, 1944. *U-505*, a German type IXC submarine commissioned in August 1941, had previously sunk eight Allied merchant ships totaling some 46,447 tons and was on its 11th patrol under the command of Senior Lieutenant Harald Lange about 150 miles off the coast of Rio de Oro, Northwest Africa, on June 4, 1944, when it was detected by sonar aboard the destroyer escort *Chatelain*. The contact was only about 800 yards distant, and the escorts immediately converged on the contact while the *Guadalcanal* moved away at top speed and launched a Grumman 4F Wildcat to join another Wildcat and a Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bomber already airborne.

The range was so short that the *Chatelain* first fired hedgehogs at the submarine, then circled back to drop depth charges. One of the aircraft spotted the submarine and fired on it to mark the spot for the *Chatelain*. An oil slick soon surfaced, and the submarine followed. The *Chatelain* opened fire on the submarine with all available weapons, as did other ships in the task force and two of the aircraft.

Believing his boat to be fatally damaged, Lange ordered the crew to abandon ship. This was accomplished so promptly that scuttling procedures had not yet been completed. While the destroyer escorts *Chatelain* and *Jenks* collected survivors, an eight-man party from the *Pillsbury* came alongside the

submarine in a boat and went aboard. One German, the only fatality in the action, lay on the deck, but *U-505* was otherwise deserted. The boarding party secured charts and codebooks, closed scuttling valves, and disarmed the demolition charges.

The *U-505* had taken in a fair amount of water and was down by the stern, but a tow was rigged to the *Guadalcanal*, and an engineer succeeded in using this to move the propellers, recharge the sub's diesel batteries, and then pump out the water. Three days later a fleet tug took over the tow, and the *U-505* eventually reached Bermuda.

That the *U-505* was captured and not sunk posed the risk that the Germans would learn of its capture and that this would endanger the Allied code-breaking operation of the Ultra secret. Chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest King was so angered that he almost ordered Gallery court-martialed. The 58 Germans taken prisoner were then held in isolation, denied access to the International Red Cross, for the remainder of the war. The secret of the capture was not divulged.

The codebooks and other material recovered did yield temporary benefit to the Bletchley Park code breakers, but more important were two technologically advanced G7 acoustic honing torpedoes. The leader of the boarding party, Lieutenant Junior Grade Albert David, subsequently received the Medal of Honor, the only such award in the Atlantic Fleet during the war.

The *U-505* was the first warship captured at sea by the U.S. Navy since the War of 1812 and the only submarine taken by it. In 1954, the *U-505* was donated to the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry, where it remains on display as a museum ship.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Bletchley Park; Depth Charges; Gallery, Daniel Vincent, Jr.; Hedgehog; Hunter-Killer Groups; Sonar

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U-405 vs. USS *Borie*

See Borie, USS, vs. *U-405*

Ugaki Matome (1890–1945)

Japanese Navy vice admiral. Born in Okayama Prefecture, Japan, on February 15, 1890, Ugaki Matome graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1912. He served at sea, graduated from the Naval Staff College in 1923, and joined the Naval General Staff. He then studied in Germany, commanded battleships, and was promoted to rear admiral in 1938.

In August 1941, Ugaki became chief of staff of the Combined Fleet under Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Ugaki was involved in planning the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack and all other Combined Fleet operations until he and Yamamoto were shot down in their aircraft over Bougainville on April 18, 1943. Ugaki survived, although he was seriously wounded. He returned to Tokyo to recuperate.

On February 25, 1944, Ugaki took command of the 1st Battleship Division consisting of the superbattleships *Yamato* and *Musashi*. He fought at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944) and throughout the Marianas (June–August) and Leyte campaigns (October 20–December 25). He returned to the Naval General Staff in November, and then, on February 10, 1945, he assumed command of the Fifth Air Fleet, controlling the remaining Japanese naval air forces on Kyushu, the frontline defense of the home islands.

Emulating the example from the Philippines of Rear Admiral Ōnishi Takijirō, Ugaki formed the Special Attack Corps (Tokkotai) to conduct kamikaze attacks against the U.S. fleet. The Tokkotai was heavily engaged at Okinawa (March–June 1945), using both standard-production naval aircraft and specialized rocket-propelled suicide attackers (Ohka) launched from medium bombers, and inflicted significant U.S. losses.

After the U.S. victory at Okinawa, Ugaki was engaged in refitting the Fifth Air Fleet preparatory to repelling an invasion of Kyushu. With the

atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito called on the Japanese to lay down their arms. Determined to die in the Tokkotai spirit, that same day Ugaki joined two others in a Yokosuka D4Y Judy aircraft in an abortive kamikaze attack on the U.S. fleet off Okinawa, which they did not survive.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Leyte Landings; Mariana Islands Campaign; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Ukraine Campaign (November 1943–July 1944)

Soviet campaign to retake Ukraine. During the period between August and November 1943, the Soviet 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts pushed back German field marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South from the Donets River to the Dnieper River. On November 6, General Nikolai Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front took the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, and by the beginning of December, Soviet forces had crossed the Dnieper in a number of places, forcing the Germans from their hastily prepared positions. The Soviets then committed massive resources to liberate the remainder of Ukraine, including 70 percent of their armor and more than half of their air strength. The Soviet advantage in the air was especially glaring: a four-to-one superiority in numbers of aircraft over Luftwaffe units supporting Army Group South.

On November 11, 1943, German units launched a counterattack toward Kiev, and on November 20 they retook Zhitomir. Although fighting seesawed back and forth, the 1st Ukrainian Front launched a major assault on the First

and Fourth Panzer Armies on December 24. By December 31, the Red Army again held Zhitomir.

A Soviet soldier runs past a burning German tank during the battle for Kiev. (Corbis)

As Soviet pressure mounted, Manstein feared that Army Group South would be cut off, and he requested permission from Adolf Hitler to withdraw from the Dnieper bend. Hitler refused, and on January 5, 1944, Soviet Army general Ivan Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front drove southwest from the vicinity of Cherkassy. During the next three weeks, the Soviets trapped 70,000 to 80,000 German troops of XI and XLII Corps in a pocket near Korsun. In a five-day period, the Germans lost 44 Ju-52 transport aircraft in a vain attempt to supply the pocket by air. Manstein's efforts to break through with two panzer corps failed, and the Soviets continued to reduce the pocket. On February 15 Hitler finally authorized a breakout, and on the night of February 16–17 some 30,000 Germans managed to escape in the direction of Lysyanka, although they abandoned their wounded and heavy equipment. The Germans sustained 20,000 deaths in the Korsun pocket, and the Soviets captured another 17,000 German troops, including 1,500 wounded. The victory led to Konev's promotion to marshal of the Soviet Union.

Simultaneous with Konev's attack, part of the 1st Ukrainian Front began the Rovno-Lutsk operation on January 27, 1944, to separate Army Group South from Army Group Center. On February 2 Rovno fell, and nine days

later the Soviets took the major railroad junction at Shepetovka. To the south on February 7, Colonel General Fedor Tolbukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front occupied Nikopol on the east bank of the Dnieper. It then turned south into the Crimean Peninsula, and on February 22 General Rodion Malinovsky's 3rd Ukrainian Front took Krivoy Rog, with its important metallurgical deposits.

On February 29, Vatutin was fatally wounded by Ukrainian partisans while on an inspection tour north of Kiev. Marshal Georgii Zhukov then took command of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and on March 4 he began an offensive from Shepetovka toward the juncture between the First and Fourth Panzer Armies. On March 5 the 2nd Ukrainian Front drove southwest toward Uman, joined the next day by the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Vast quantities of U.S. Lend-Lease trucks provided a degree of mobility that was previously lacking in Soviet offensive operations.

The 1st Ukrainian Front entered Tarnopol on March 9, outflanking the Germans on the Bug River, which Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front forces reached three days later. Striking south from Tarnopol into the rear of the First Panzer Army, Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Dniester River at the end of March. Meanwhile, the 2nd Ukrainian Front gained the Prut River by March 26, and when tank units of both fronts linked up, they completely isolated the First Panzer Army. Farther south, the 3rd Ukrainian Front drove back the German Sixth Army to the Bug, sealing off the Crimean Peninsula.

On March 25, Manstein flew to Berchtesgaden and managed to convince a reluctant Hitler to allow the First Panzer Army to break free to the west of its encirclement, but on March 30 the führer relieved Manstein and replaced him with Field Marshal Walther Model. Hitler also renamed the two army groups in the south. Army Group South became Army Group North Ukraine, and Army Group A became Army Group South Ukraine. The First Panzer Army managed to break free of its encirclement, and Model then launched a counteroffensive along the Dniester River.

For the next several months, the front remained relatively static. However, Zhukov's armor reached the Carpathian Mountains, effectively cutting the German front in two. Having gained the Romanian border, the 2nd Ukrainian Front now turned south and joined with Malinovsky's 3rd Ukrainian Front in a night attack led by General Vasily Chuikov's Eighth

Guards Army to retake the Black Sea port of Odessa, which the Sixth Army abandoned on April 10. Hitler then relieved Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist of command of Army Group South Ukraine, replacing him with General Ferdinand Schröder.

On April 8, 1944, Soviet forces launched an offensive into the Crimea. Too late, Hitler authorized an evacuation. By the evening of May 9, the Soviets had retaken Sevastopol, capturing another 30,000 Axis troops. The Soviets now controlled most of the Ukraine, including its key industrial and agricultural areas. Stavka (the Soviet high command) had employed all six of its tank armies in the Ukrainian operation but now began to transfer units, including four tank armies, to Operation BAGRATION—the destruction of Army Group Center in Belorussia, which began on June 22, 1944, the third anniversary of Operation BARBAROSSA. The Soviets retook the remainder of the Ukraine following the Battle of Brody-Lwów in July.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich; Manstein, Erich von; Model, Walther; Tolbukhin, Fedor Ivanovich; Vatutin, Nikolai Fedorovich; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Ulithi

Western Pacific atoll. Located in the Caroline Islands some 103 nautical miles east of Yap, Ulithi consists of 40 islets (4 of which are inhabited)

totaling only about 1.7 square miles in area around one of the largest lagoons in the world, approximately 22 miles long and up to 15 miles wide and capable of holding up to 700 ships. Some 1,200 miles from Okinawa and 3,660 miles from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Ulithi is about halfway (360 miles from each) on a direct line between Guam and Peleliu.

The first European to arrive at Ulithi was Portuguese navigator Diego da Rocha in 1526. The Japanese established a radio and weather station there early in World War II but evacuated it in the early summer of 1944. Supported by U.S. Navy ships under Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy, the U.S. Army 323rd Regimental Combat Team of the 81st Infantry Division landed unopposed on September 23, 1944. A few days later a battalion of Seabees arrived. The Americans soon removed the natives to Fedarai and converted the remaining islands into bases to support navy ships and personnel. This included an air base on Falalop islet.

Within a few months there were more than 600 ships at Ulithi staging for Operation ICEBERG, the March–June 1945 invasion of Okinawa. In January 1945, Seabees completed a recreation center on Mogmog Island capable of accommodating up to 9,000 officers and men. The Japanese carried out occasional raids but inflicted only limited damage. On March 11, 1945, the U.S. aircraft carrier *Randolph* was hit and damaged by a kamikaze aircraft that had flown all the way from Japan.

Today Ulithi is administered by the State of Yap in the Federated States of Micronesia. Ulithi's population in 2000 was 773. Falalop is the most accessible islet.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Blandy, William Henry Purnell; Fleet Train; Okinawa, Invasion of; Seabees

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Ulmanis, Karlis (1877–1942)

Latvian nationalist and authoritarian head of state during 1934–1940. Karlis Ulmanis was born on September 4, 1877, in Berze, Latvia (then the Russian Empire). He studied agriculture in Switzerland and Germany and then worked in Latvia as a writer, lecturer, and agricultural manager. Because of his nationalist activities, Russian authorities forced Ulmanis to seek exile in the United States in 1905. Ulmanis studied and taught there and briefly operated a dairy farm.

Ulmanis returned to Latvia in 1913 and founded the Farmers' Union Party. After the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, he worked feverishly for Latvian independence. A member of the National Council that proclaimed Latvian independence on November 18, 1918, Ulmanis became the first prime minister. As such, he signed a peace treaty with the Soviets in August 1920, which formally recognized the independent state of Latvia. He served four times as prime minister (1918–1919, 1919–1921, 1925–1926, 1931) before instituting his own authoritarian regime on May 15, 1934. During his paternalist rightist regime, Ulmanis emphasized national unity and rural virtues, arguing that a real Latvian is and must remain a nationalist farmer. He titled himself "Vadonis" (The Leader).

Ulmanis's regime collapsed in 1940 because of the August 1939 German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, which provided for Latvia's incorporation into the Soviet Union. Ulmanis was deported to the Soviet Union in July 1940. He died in Krasnovodsk, Soviet Union, of dysentery on September 20, 1942.

SILVIU MILOIU

See also

Latvia; Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

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Umberto II, King of Italy (1904–1983)

Italian crown prince who became king soon after World War II but reigned for only 35 days. Born in the Castle of Racconigi, Italy, near Turin, on September 15, 1904, Umberto Nicola Tommaso Giovanni Maria, Prince Royal of Savoy, was the sole male child of Italian king Vittorio Emanuele III (Victor Emmanuel III). From his birth, Umberto was designated Prince of Piedmont and heir apparent to the Italian throne.

Umberto had a military education, and at age 19, he became an officer in the Italian Army. A profligate socialite during the 1920s and 1930s, he nonetheless received rapid military promotion because of his royal status. He was promoted to brigade general in 1931, to division general in 1934, to corps general in 1936, and to army general in 1938.

In June 1940, Umberto commanded the Army of the Alps in the Italian invasion of southeastern France. This opportunistic attack, begun in the wake of the German blitzkrieg, did not go well. Although Umberto was a mere figurehead commander, with real control over the army exercised by Benito Mussolini and the Supreme Command, his reputation was sharply diminished by the campaign.

Umberto switched allegiance to the Allied side when his father signed an armistice with the Western Allies in September 1943. The king's authority had been tainted by his tacit approval of the fascists, so on June 5, 1944, the apolitical Umberto became lieutenant general of the realm and acting regent for the duration of the war. He attempted to shore up Italy's deteriorating foreign relations and proved to be a much less intransigent and, certainly, more affable head of state than Victor Emmanuel, but the House of Savoy's collusion with Mussolini and fascism for two decades poisoned his prospects for success in establishing a postwar Italian royal dynasty.

In 1946, a national referendum was scheduled to determine whether Italy should remain a monarchy or become a constitutional republic. In an effort to maintain the House of Savoy's royal status, Victor Emmanuel abdicated on May 9, 1946, in favor of his more popular son. Umberto, now the king of Italy, campaigned vigorously with various promonarchist parties to preserve the throne. On June 2, 1946, however, the citizens voted 12.7 million to 10.7 million to abolish the monarchy and make Italy a republic. Dubbed by Italians "the King of May" for his 35 days of official reign, Umberto was forced to leave the country and went to live a luxurious life of exile in

Portugal. Umberto II, the last king of Italy, died in Geneva on March 18, 1983.

JOHN P. VANZO AND GORDON E. HOGG

See also
Italy; Mussolini, Benito; Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy

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Umezu Yoshijirō (1882–1949)

Japanese Army general. Born in Ooita Prefecture, Japan, on January 4, 1882, Umezu Yoshijirō graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1903 and the Army War College in 1911. Between 1913 and 1921, he served in Germany and Denmark and was posted as a military attaché in Switzerland. He thereafter quickly advanced through the ranks of the army bureaucracy and was appointed as chief of the General Staff in August 1931.

In 1934, Umezu was transferred to China and assumed command of the China Expeditionary Army. He achieved international notoriety when, with He Yingqin (Ho Ying-ch'in) in June 1935, he negotiated Japan's first formal encroachment into northern China. During the attempted coup by army junior officers on February 26, 1936, Umezu was the only member of the army's leadership to call for its immediate suppression. This decisive action helped bring his appointment as vice minister of the army in March 1937.

While Umezu labored to reequip the army, he also worked to increase its political influence. After the outbreak of full-scale military conflict with China in 1937, he assumed command of the No. 1 Expeditionary Forces. In 1939, he was reassigned to command the Guandong (Kwantung) Army and helped shore up the Japanese Army in the wake of the clash with Soviet forces at Nomonhan (May–September).

With the collapse of the cabinet of Tōjō Hideki in July 1944, Umezu became chairman of the army General Staff and took charge of prosecuting the war. He accepted Emperor Hirohito's decision to terminate the war and

represented the Japanese military during the September 2, 1945, signing of the surrender document on board the battleship *Missouri*. Tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Umezu died in prison in Tokyo on January 8, 1949.

KUROSAWA FUMITAKA

See also

Guandong Army; International Military Tribunal, Far East; Japan; Khalkhin Gol, Battle of; Tōjō Hideki

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Unarmored Vehicles

General-purpose and specialized vehicles vital to mobile warfare, sometimes known as "soft" vehicles as opposed to "hard" (armored) vehicles. During World War II, the Allied side produced an overwhelming number of unarmored vehicles, an important factor in its ultimate victory. Most such vehicles were in fact hurriedly evolved from existing commercial designs.

During the war, the United States manufactured 3.2 million military vehicles, a production level previously believed unattainable. Canada made no military vehicles in 1938 but turned out nearly 816,000 between 1939 and 1945, more than were produced by all Axis nations combined. Germany led the Axis powers in production of unarmored military vehicles, but the majority of the German infantry units nonetheless moved on foot or by rail and horse: nearly 3 million horses pulled German supply wagons.

Trucks were especially important in resupply, as a combat division could require up to 750 tons of supplies daily. In the seven-month-long Tunisia Campaign of 1943, for example, 6,000 Allied supply vehicles traveled a total of more than 35 million miles. During the Allied drive through France from August 25 to November 16, 1944, the Red Ball Express hauled more than 412,000 tons of supplies. Even this effort was not sufficient to meet all needs,

however. Britain's equivalent, the Red Lion Express, delivered 500 tons daily to its Second Army. Axis operations, by contrast, often suffered for want of adequate supply transport and fuel.

The war's most notable truck design was the General Motors (GM) CCKW series (C for model year 1941, C for conventional cab, K for all-wheel drive, and W for tandem rear axle); this 22-ton truck was popularly known as the "deuce-and-a-half" or "Jimmy" (for GMC, or General Motors Corporation). One in four was to have a ring for mounting a .50-caliber antiaircraft gun.

The U.S. Army's Quartermaster Corps determined that 22 tons was the maximum weight possible for a truck that could be produced quickly in unlimited quantities. Few such trucks existed in 1939, but more than half a million were made by various manufacturers during the war. The CCKW series featured six-wheel drive and cab-mounted levers to engage the front wheels. About half the trucks were made with Timken split-housing axles, the rest with GM's "banjo"-style axles. On the latter version, front and rear drive shafts turned in reverse rotation of each other. Engine blocks were cast iron. Bodies might be wood or steel or a combination of both. Variants included cargo trucks, flatbed trucks, troop carriers, fuel and water tankers, dump trucks, tractors, and wreckers. Their distinctive Saginaw Steering recirculating ball gear made for exceptionally easy steering.

International Harvester developed the M-5H-6—a 22-ton 6 × 6 for use by the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. Its Hendrickson rear walking-beam suspension was more durable off-road and allowed greater flexibility on uneven terrain than the standard 6 torque rod version. Thornton locking differentials let both rear axles lock together and turn all four rear wheels at the same time for exceptional traction, even on Pacific beaches.

Most Canadian trucks were Canadian Military Pattern (CMP), developed jointly by GM and Ford of Canada from British military specifications and used by all Commonwealth forces. Their cab-over-engine design was a radical departure.

Britain utilized Canadian and U.S. vehicles extensively but also made its own. Vauxhall Motors, Ltd., manufactured more than 250,000 trucks during the war, notably the Bedford 15 cwt (15 hundredweight, or 1,680 pounds) and the 3 ton Model OY. The Soviet Union depended on the U.S. Lend-Lease

program for the bulk of its motor transport, supplemented by its own GAZ and ZIS trucks.

Germany's most successful truck was the Blitz (Lightning), a 1938 design by Opel, Germany's General Motors subsidiary. More than 82,000 were produced between 1937 and 1944. The standard model was a 4 × 2 with 6-cylinder motor and 5-speed gearbox. Some 100 variants served as mobile workshops, laundries, labs, command vehicles, radio vans, and ambulances. A 4 × 4 version, Type A, was a reasonably good cross-country vehicle.

Italy's heavy trucks, such as the 6-ton Autocarro Unificato Pesante (heavy unified truck), won the respect of the British, who captured and used them in North Africa. Among medium trucks, the most modern was the Fiat 665 NL. Tough and powerful, it had very large wheels and front-wheel drive.

Japan's land transport consisted principally of trucks purchased earlier from the United States and captured vehicles. As these broke down, no spare parts were available, but for the most part, the terrain of the Pacific islands and Japanese jungle-infiltration tactics did not lend themselves to extensive motorized transport. The primary Japanese truck was the 4-wheeled, 12-ton Type 97. Other models included the 52-ton Type 2 heavy truck and the 6-wheeled Type 94. All were built by Isuzu, Japan's largest wheeled-transport manufacturer during the war.

China had an estimated 7,000 trucks in 1937, mostly small European models suited to the primitive Chinese road system. Some light American trucks were received through Lend-Lease. Chinese Communist forces also procured unarmored vehicles by capturing them from the Japanese.

U.S. military planners saw the need for a specially designed small truck, something extremely lightweight, high-speed, exceptionally rugged, and dependable in all terrains—essentially, a mule with wheels and an engine. The result became an American icon. Officially designated Truck, 3-ton, 4 x 4, or General Purpose (GP) 4 x 4, it was dubbed "jeep," an existing nickname for any handy utility vehicle, by the troops. Soon, "jeep" was identified exclusively with the GP 4 x 4. The versatile little vehicle hauled supplies and wounded, performed reconnaissance duties, served command and communications roles, and shot up soft targets with its .50-caliber machine gun. Willys-Overland, Ford, and American Bantam produced more than 654,000 jeeps between 1940 and 1945. The jeep inspired a Soviet lookalike,

the GAZ-67B Field Car, a 4 x 4 with a 4-cylinder Ford Model A engine and steel ladder-frame chassis.

Britain also developed a lightweight utility vehicle, the Austin 10. It featured a “pickup” truck body (that term was coined later). Replaced by jeeps in fighting units, it saw extensive service with signal, military police, and headquarters units.

U.S. Army soldiers on Harley-Davidson motorcycles. During World War II, the Harley-Davidson Motor Company built more than 90,000 motorcycles for the U.S. armed forces. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Germany’s KdF Kübelwagen (bucket car), Volkswagen (VW) TYP 82, was based on existing plans for a civilian car. The Kübelwagen had an open, boxy body of flat panels for rapid production and a rear-mounted engine. It had excellent cross-country performance and was easy to handle, although it lacked four-wheel drive. More than 520,000 were built. Japan’s Type 95 by Kurogane was a light, 4 x 4 scout and field car with a 2-cylinder, air-cooled, front-mounted engine. Some 4,700 were made.

Tractors towed antitank and artillery guns cross-country and performed vehicle recovery. Breakdown recovery vehicles often had a trailer that pivoted on a turntable mounted on the tractor.

Britain’s Scammell tractors were famous for their articulating rear bogie. The Soviet Union’s fully tracked agricultural tractors were slow and primitive compared with Western military models, but they were well suited to Soviet

terrain and climate and were readily available due to a prewar Five-Year Plan production drive. The S-65 and S-80 6-cylinder diesel Stalinets saw extensive service.

The U.S. M26 truck-tractor from Pacific Car Foundry Company became the U.S. Army's standard tank-recovery vehicle, used in conjunction with 8-wheeled M15 and M15A1 transporter semitrailers, which had capacities of 40 to 45 tons. Its three winches could pull 35,000 to 60,000 pounds each.

Italy favored compact tractors with big wheels and powerful engines, such as the snub-nose Fiat TM40 Trattore Medio (tractor medium) 4 x 4. Germany developed specialized designs to cope with mud and snow in the Soviet Union. The Ostradschlepper (east wheel tractor) 4 x 4 Skoda 175, designed by the father of the VW Beetle, Ferdinand Porsche, had extremely large wheels with cleats but offered no great advantage and proved hard to handle. The more successful Raupenschlepper-Ost (Caterpillar-east) Steyr RSO/1 could replace its conventional 340mm wide steel tracks with a 600mm version for better traction.

Motorcycles carried messengers, reconnaissance patrols, sharpshooters, and even mortars. Britain's premier wartime cycle was the M20 from Birmingham Small Arms. More than 125,000 served in Allied armies around the world. In the United States, Harley-Davidson received so many government contracts that it eclipsed rival firm Indian for dominance in the U.S. motorcycle market. Harley's WLA, a cheaper, hardier military version of its popular V-twin WL, proved to be the best motorcycle of the war, used in every theater. More than 90,000 were made.

Japanese troops also rode a version of the Harley. In 1935, the Rikuo Nainen Company obtained a Harley-Davidson license, from which it developed the Type 37 motorcycle for military use, with an air-cooled gas engine, a higher body, and magnetic plugs. German motorcycle troops were as much a symbol of blitzkrieg as tanks or dive-bombers. Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW, Bavarian Motor Works) produced its R-71 model throughout the war. Germany developed a unique crossbreed for paratroopers. First used on Crete in 1941, the Kleine Kettenkraftrad Sd Kfz (small, linked vehicle) placed a tracked rear end behind the front of a motorcycle to create a compact half-track cycle for supply transport.

Amphibious vehicles ran on land and swam through water. The most famous was America's DUKW (D for model year 1942, U for amphibian, K

for all-wheel drive, and W for tandem rear axles), built on the dependable CCKW truck chassis. About 21,000 were built. The Soviet Union's ZIL-485 and Britain's Terrapin were essentially enlarged DUKWs. Japan's Su-Ki was based on Toyota's 4 x 4 truck of the same name, and Germany's Kfz1/20 Schwimmwagen, VW 166, was a Kübelwagen with a propeller and a bathtub-shaped body.

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See also

Armored Cars; Armored Personnel Carriers; Jeep; Lend-Lease; Logistics, Allied; Red Ball Express

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Unconditional Surrender

Total surrender without conditions or terms. At the Casablanca Conference on January 24, 1943, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that "The elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan." Caught off guard by the announcement, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill nonetheless supported the president. In his Guildhall Speech of June 30, 1943, Churchill declared that unconditional surrender meant "that [the Axis] willpower to resist must be completely broken, and that they must yield themselves absolutely to our justice and mercy."

German colonel general Alfred Jodl, chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, signs the unconditional surrender, Rheims, France, May 7, 1945. (National Archives)

The term “unconditional surrender” was identified with Union brigadier general Ulysses S. Grant in 1862 during the American Civil War when he demanded the surrender without terms of Fort Donelson, Tennessee. The demand for unconditional surrender had not been U.S. policy in conflicts with other nations prior to World War II. In this conflict it sprang from the widespread belief in Germany after World War I that the German armed forces had not been defeated on the battlefield but instead had been “stabbed in the back” by the civilian government. This myth greatly assisted the rise to power of Adolf Hitler. To obviate another such legend, Roosevelt demanded unconditional surrender, which would make it clear to all that the Axis powers had been defeated militarily. Unconditional surrender would also allow the victors to dictate peace terms that might destroy the racist, aggressive philosophies extant in the Axis states. In addition, the policy reassured Soviet leader Joseph Stalin that the United States and Great Britain were committed to the war effort and to the complete defeat of the Axis nations.

Under unconditional surrender, there would be no negotiations with members of the Axis. There would also be no “recognition” or “vacuum” rule, meaning that enemy leaders would not be able to act or exercise political

authority. The victorious alliance would install a military government to exercise governmental functions.

In one sense, this declaration played into the hands of the Axis leadership. German minister of propaganda Joseph Goeb-bels told the German people, “Enjoy the war; the peace will be awful.” Some have also charged that it prolonged the war because it precluded negotiations with the German Resistance.

DOUGLAS B. WARNER

See also

Casablanca Conference; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Goebbels, Paul Joseph; Hitler, Adolf; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph

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Union of Soviet Writers

See Soviet Writers, Union of

United Nations Declaration (January 1, 1942)

Declaration of cooperation that pledged a concerted effort to defeat the Axis powers and led to the establishment of postwar international institutions. The Atlantic Charter of basic war goals had resulted from the Placentia Bay Conference involving U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill in August 1941. The Washington Conference, held from December 22, 1941, to January 14, 1942 (code-named Arcadia), brought together Roosevelt and Churchill and their staffs to develop an overall strategic war plan. The resulting United Nations

Declaration was issued by China, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union on January 1, 1942. Later, 22 other nations signed and were designated “joint declarers.”

Signatory nations agreed to use their full resources to secure the defeat of the Axis powers, continue the war until victory was achieved, and avoid making any separate peace. There was also a concluding declaration that the agreement could be joined by any other nation that provided or in the future would provide “mutual assistance and contributions” for the defeat of the Axis powers. Eventually, 19 other governments signed that accord.

This understanding thus became not only a statement of general principles but also a device for binding diverse governments together. Further, the Washington Conference addressed such topics as an invasion of North Africa, countering the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, and Lend-Lease aid for the Soviet Union. In addition, Roosevelt agreed to send U.S. troops to Iceland and Northern Ireland.

The conference led to the first official use of the term “United Nations,” coined by President Roosevelt and immediately accepted to describe the Allies. This label both implied the impressive diversity of the Allied regimes and encapsulated Roosevelt’s own very comprehensive—critics would argue utopian—vision of the postwar system of international relations. Throughout the war, Churchill and other leaders readily employed the term as a shorthand reference to the great, inclusive military alliance. Immediately after the war, the term would become the title for new global institutions established to encourage international agreements, facilitate international cooperation, and endeavor to prevent a future global war as well as more limited armed conflicts.

Representatives of twenty-six Allied nations gather around U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt to sign the Declaration by the United Nations, January 1, 1942. (Bettmann/Corbis)

ARTHUR I. CYR

See also

Atlantic Charter; United Nations, Formation of

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United Nations, Formation of

The creation of the United Nations represented an attempt by the World War II Allies to establish a postwar international organization that would be more effective than the interwar League of Nations at mediating international disputes and preventing full-scale conflicts. In the war's early months, even before the United States intervened, U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull established a departmental planning group for this purpose. Meeting off the Newfoundland coast in August 1941, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt

and British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill included a broad proposal for an international security system in the Atlantic Charter, their declaration of overall war objectives.

On January 1, 1942, the governments of 26 nations fighting Germany, Italy, and Japan issued the United Nations Declaration affirming their alliance against the Axis powers and also stating their commitment to liberal war objectives, as set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and the restoration of the principles of international law. In 1943, both houses of the U.S. Congress also passed resolutions demanding the creation of a postwar international security organization, in which they implied that their own country should take the leading role it had abdicated in the League of Nations.

Meeting in Moscow in October 1943, foreign ministers of the four leading Allied powers—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—signed the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, committing themselves in general terms to the creation of a postwar international organization.

More specific proposals emerged from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 39 nations held in Washington, D.C., from August to October 1944. These proposals represented a compromise between the ideas of Roosevelt and other devotees of realpolitik—that agreement between the "Big Four" Allied powers that "the four policemen" must be the foundation of postwar international security—and more idealistic popular visions of a world in which all powers, great and small, enjoyed equal status and protection. Participants at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference agreed to create the bipartite United Nations organization, modeled on the earlier League of Nations but reserving ultimate authority to the dominant Allied states. All member states would be represented in the General Assembly, which would debate, discuss, and vote on issues that came before it. Executive authority was to rest with the 11-member Security Council, which would have 5 permanent members—Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The remaining Security Council representatives were to be drawn from other United Nations states, all of whom would serve two-year terms in rotation. Besides providing an international security mechanism, the United Nations was also expected to promote international cooperation on economic, social, and humanitarian issues.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allies agreed, on Soviet

insistence, that each permanent Security Council member should enjoy veto power over all General Assembly decisions. The Soviet Union also obtained separate representation for Belorussia (Belarus) and the Ukraine. Participants at the Yalta Conference further agreed on a United Nations trustee system to administer both former League of Nations mandatory territories—originally colonies taken from Germany and Turkey after World War I—and areas seized from the Axis powers when the ongoing war ended.

The Yalta Conference formally invited all Allied and most neutral powers to attend a meeting that would open in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to establish the new United Nations organization. Representatives of 50 nations attended this gathering, which ended on July 25, 1945, and hammered out the details of the charter of the new organization. The charter accorded smaller states slightly more authority than had the original Dumbarton Oaks proposals and also incorporated the International Labor Organization established under the original 1919 League of Nations Covenant. To pursue its stated nonsecurity objectives, the charter created the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). By the end of 1945, all states represented at San Francisco had ratified the United Nations Charter. In 1946 the body held its first session in London, and a year later it moved permanently to the United States, where its headquarters in New York City were completed soon afterward.

Edward Stettinius, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Charter meeting in San Francisco, signing the Charter as U.S. president Harry Truman (second from left) and others look on, July 25, 1945. (Underwood Archives/Getty Images)

Although sometimes derided as ineffective and handicapped in international crises by its reliance on military forces contributed by member states, the United Nations often provided a valuable forum for the quiet exchange of views and the promotion of humanitarian and social goals. On occasion, it also conveniently furnished a useful alternative channel of communications among powers whose diplomatic relations were otherwise limited or even nonexistent.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atlantic Charter; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dumbarton Oaks Conference; Hull, Cordell; Moscow Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Yalta Conference; Document 226

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Unit 731, Japanese Army

Japanese Army secret biological warfare unit. Established under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ishii Shiro in Harbin, Manchuria, in August 1936, Unit 731 was officially known as the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department. Some 3,000 personnel worked to produce bacteria for anthrax, bubonic plague, cholera, dysentery, tetanus, typhoid, typhus, and other infectious diseases.

To develop methods to disperse biological agents and enhance their effectiveness, Unit 731 infected prisoners of war, at least 3,000 of whom died in the experiments. Unit personnel referred to the prisoners—mostly Chinese, Koreans, and Soviets—as *maruta* (logs) because the Japanese informed the local Chinese that the Unit 731 facility was a lumber mill. U.S., British, and Australian prisoners were also used as human guinea pigs.

Unit 731's activities were outrageous crimes against humanity. After infecting a prisoner with the virus, researchers might then cut open his body, sometimes while he was still alive, to determine the effects of the disease. No anesthetics were employed, as these might affect the results. Medical researchers also confined infected prisoners with healthy ones to determine how rapidly diseases spread. In addition, Unit 731's doctors conducted experiments on compression and decompression and the effects of extreme cold on the body, subjecting limbs to ice water and then amputating them to determine the effects. The Japanese Army also repeatedly conducted field tests using biological warfare against Chinese villages.

In a more widespread use, Japanese aircraft spread plague-infected fleas over Ningbo (Ningpo) in Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province in eastern China in October 1940, causing 99 deaths. The Chinese government correctly concluded that an epidemic of plague in these areas was caused by Japanese biological weapons, and it publicized its findings. Japanese troops also dropped cholera and typhoid cultures into wells and ponds. In 1942, germ-warfare units deployed dysentery, cholera, and typhoid in Zhejiang Province.

At the end of the Pacific war, Ishii and other researchers escaped to Japan. They left behind their laboratory equipment as well as plague-infected mice that produced outbreaks of the disease in the Harbin area between 1946 and 1948. The U.S. government feared that the Japanese might employ biological warfare against North America via balloon bombs from Japan, but such a plan was never carried out.

After the Japanese surrender, the United States did not bring Ishii and his colleagues before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo War Crimes Trials) for their crimes. Instead, they were granted immunity in exchange for providing information on the experiments to U.S. authorities, which Washington considered invaluable in its own biological warfare program. The Soviet government did prosecute 12 members of the unit at Khabarovsk in December 1949, all of whom admitted their crimes.

They were convicted and received sentences of from 2 to 25 years in a labor camp.

KOTANI KEN

See also
Balloon Bombs; Chemical Weapons and Warfare

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United States

Following its entry into World War II in December 1941, the United States devoted its considerable resources to the production of industrial goods at previously unimagined levels. This effort allowed the country to become the "arsenal of democracy" envisioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although the nation's security from direct attack played a considerable role in its remarkable capacity for production, the U.S. achievement was a peculiarly American phenomenon and a function of distinctly American traits.

Still reeling from the effects of the Great Depression, many Americans saw the war as a means to escape hard economic times. In 1940 and 1941, war orders and Lend-Lease contracts had already begun to bring the nation's economy out of a decade-long economic depression. The introduction of peacetime conscription removed thousands of young men from the job market, thereby improving job opportunities for those who remained. The military's preparedness campaign also sparked the economy through construction of new military facilities and orders for goods required by the armed services, from tents to aircraft. Grateful for meaningful, well-paying jobs, Americans threw themselves into war work with enthusiasm and energy.

The war eventually pulled 12 million young men and women out of the civilian labor force and into the armed services, but the United States, owing to its large population, was still able to increase production tremendously.

The U.S. Army, cognizant of the supremely important role that war production would play, opted to have only 90 divisions—the "90-division gamble." This decision placed a ceiling on the number of men called to military service, thereby ensuring that workers with critical industrial skills would be exempt from conscription. The military gamble also permitted the exemption of most miners and agricultural workers, ensuring the continued growth and expansion of those sectors as well.

The United States also had three significant underutilized sources for labor from which it could draw. More than 6 million women entered the workforce. Marginalized by New Deal programs that had emphasized male breadwinners, many women welcomed the chance to work outside the home. They also embraced the opportunity to make direct contributions to the American war effort, although most worked for unequal wages and were discouraged from joining unions or applying for supervisory positions. Most women worked in traditionally female sectors or in newly created industrial jobs, and their share of nonmilitary government jobs nearly doubled during the war. The image of "Rosie the Riveter," sleeves rolled up and bandanna tied in her hair, sent the powerful propaganda message that women in the workforce were crucial to American industrial might.

The United States also called on African Americans, most of whom had not worked in industrial jobs prior to the war. The combination of Jim Crow segregation in the South and the availability of good-paying industrial jobs in the West and North created a "second great migration" (the first occurred during World War I) of nearly 700,000 blacks from the South. Others moved to industrial and commercial jobs in southern cities such as Atlanta, Montgomery, and New Orleans. African American workers found that they could escape Jim Crow in the North and West, but they continued to face endemic discrimination, lower pay, and outbreaks of white violence. Few of these individuals returned to the South after 1945, however. Some white workers protested the modest advances made by black workers, especially in skilled sectors, and race riots in Detroit and Mobile, among other cities, underscored abiding problems in American race relations.

A presidential executive order guaranteeing blacks equal wages and freedom from discrimination did little to create real equality in the workplace. Nor was it lost on black Americans that the United States was fighting a war against fascism while retaining segregation in the military. Many blacks

embraced the Double V Campaign, aimed at achieving victory over fascism abroad while also destroying racism at home, although the United States proved to be more ready to fight the first battle than the second. Despite segregation, the service of African Americans in the armed forces, especially the prestigious Tuskegee Airmen, was a source of great pride to the black community.

Mexicans also helped to solve the nation's need for agricultural labor. Indeed, the labor crisis caused by the war forced the United States to rethink its immigration policies. In 1942, the government admitted 200,000 Mexican workers under the bracero program. Untold thousands of other Mexicans entered illegally as immigration restrictions were informally relaxed to meet labor needs. The braceros worked primarily as fruit pickers in western states, although they also had jobs in construction and maintenance. The bracero program proved to be so beneficial to the American economy that it was continued into the 1960s.

The growth of labor unions, which gained millions of members in the 1930s, also helped U.S. production. Unions provided spokespeople and leaders with whom the government could negotiate. Many unions, such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL), were willing to work with both government and business. They agreed to suppress strikes and work stoppages in return for higher wages and guarantees of overtime pay. As a result, both organized strikes and wildcat strikes (work stoppages called without the support of national organizations) were kept to a minimum. Unions that did strike during the war, such as the United Mine Workers, faced a backlash of public opinion and charges that ranged from antipatriotism to treason. The increase of industrial work, of course, meant more workers and more union members. More than 4 million American workers joined unions during the war years.

As a result of these developments, the United States easily met its labor needs without resorting to coercion. The nation added more than 6 million industrial jobs in three and a half years; General Motors alone added 750,000 workers to its payroll. Careful use of selective service, the 90-division gamble, support from organized labor, and the introduction of new groups to the industrial labor pool gave the United States the workforce required for vastly increased production.

Control of the economy proved to be a contentious issue. Most leaders of

American big business disliked and distrusted Roosevelt and the New Deal. The president first tried to manage the economy through a series of bureaucratic agencies that were based on the New Deal model and appealed to American patriotism and volunteerism. That approach proved ineffective, however, and led to creation of the War Production Board in January 1942. When that in turn failed to resolve all the mobilization issues, the Roosevelt administration created another board under the stewardship of former U.S. Supreme Court justice James Byrnes in 1943, designed to better integrate military production with the larger civilian economy. Roosevelt introduced two dozen separate agencies to enforce centralized control of the economy, but none of these met the government's need for production and business's desire for autonomy. The government eventually secured the cooperation of big business through a "cost-plus" system, by which the federal government paid for the costs of wartime conversion and guaranteed contractors a profit.

The results were amazing. In 1940, Roosevelt stunned leaders in the aviation industry by asking them to produce what seemed an impossible goal of 50,000 airplanes; by the end of the war, the United States had produced nearly 300,000. In 1944 alone, the country built 96,318 airplanes, while Germany and Japan together built 67,987. In the same year, the United States built 2,247 major naval vessels; Japan built just 248. Also by 1944, the United States was producing half of the world's steel. The Ford Motor Company alone produced a greater value of durable goods than did the entire nation of Italy. America's wartime industrial capacity provided the nation tremendous strategic flexibility and allowed the United States to conduct warfare in the European and Pacific theaters simultaneously while also supplying allies such as the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and China through the Lend-Lease program.

The massive war production ended the period of chronic unemployment and underconsumption in the United States. Job security and high wages meant near-universal improvements in American standards of living, and millions of Americans made their way into the middle class. Nutrition levels and housing quality increased dramatically, although the concentration of industry in war production meant that many desirable consumer goods, such as automobiles, were hard to find. Many other consumer goods—including foodstuffs—were rationed by the government, but Americans nevertheless enjoyed more access to goods than any other belligerent nation.

After its entry into the war, the United States completely halted production of civilian vehicles. As a consequence, more money was available for the purchase of war bonds, which were employed to fund the war effort. Individual savings also rose. Thus, despite being involved in a two-front global war, many people remember World War II as “the good war” in part because of its beneficial effects on the economy.

Relative affluence and a common sense of purpose contributed to a national mood of unity. The war also led to a reduction of the divisiveness that had characterized the depression years, and community activism rose amid a sense of shared struggle. Whereas many people experienced the Great Depression as an individual or familial crisis, the war was communal and national. The “Okies” and “Arkies,” reviled as unwelcome migrants to California during the Dust Bowl of 1930s had, by 1942 or 1943, become soldiers or well-paid industrial workers. The War Department’s decision to conscript men into national units, a policy used to great effect in World War I, underscored the idea of the war as an American endeavor, although select National Guard units also went to war as representatives of specific states or regions.

American movie star Rita Hayworth set an example by sacrificing her car's bumpers during the war, turning in the nonessential metal. Hayworth was also active in promoting war bonds. (National Archives)

Some scholars have argued that the American home front was devoid of both ideology and romanticism. The internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans and alliances struck with the Soviet Union and with China under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) disturbed those Americans who tried to find ideological justifications for the war. But most Americans understood the war more practically as a job that needed to be done. Appeals to Roosevelt's Four Freedoms—freedom from fear and want and freedom of speech and worship—therefore did not carry the same patriotic meaning as similar appeals in World War I.

The persistency of racism notwithstanding, most Americans experienced better economic times and a great deal more optimism in the 1940s than in the 1930s. The sharp contrasts between the war years and the depression

years undoubtedly helped to make the home front a more hopeful place than would have been expected. Government policies that assigned relatively few fathers to combat units helped as well: by sending proportionally fewer fathers into combat, the U.S. military ensured that the nation would have as few widows and orphans as possible. World War II was surely not "the good war" for all Americans, but the U.S. home front did witness dramatic social and economic changes that improved the lives of millions.

When the war ended in 1945, the United States suffered some economic dislocations as the nation converted to peacetime production, mainly in the way of inflation. However, pent-up demand for products that had been unavailable or strictly rationed during the war drove consumer spending during the late 1940s. The nation avoided a postwar recession, which many economists had feared and that had been the case after World War I. Also, because the United States had been the only major belligerent that had not suffered major or catastrophic damage to its productive capacity, it maintained impressive resources to export billions of dollars of goods to other countries struggling to recover from the war. Indeed, by 1945, the United States was by far the world's largest economy (owning more than half of the entire world's economy) and would remain so for decades thereafter.

As millions of American men were demobilized from the military, many women who had held industrial (and traditionally male) positions were urged and even compelled to leave the workforce to open up job opportunities for men. Thus, for women World War II was a transitional era toward more autonomy and equality; not until the 1960s would women again begin to enter the workforce in large numbers, a trend that continues to the present day.

MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

See also

African Americans in World War II; Armaments Production; Byrnes, James Francis; Japanese Americans; Knudsen, William S.; Krug, Julius Albert; Lend-Lease; Liberty Ships; National War Labor Board, U.S.; Nelson, Donald Marr; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; Tuskegee Airmen; United States War Production Board; Women in World War II; Document 46; Document 65; Document 70; Document 80; Document 81; Document 142; Document 180

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United States Army

When World War II began in Europe, the U.S. Army ranked 19th in the world in size; with only 190,000 men, it was just after that of Portugal in terms of personnel. On September 1, 1939, as the war began in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt named General George C. Marshall to be army chief of staff. Junior to some 60 other general officers when appointed, Marshall proved to be a brilliant choice; he was a superb organizer and staff officer.

In September 1940, Congress passed the Selective Training and Service Act (the Burke-Wadsworth Act), the nation's first peacetime draft. The measure provided for the registration of all males between the ages of 21 and 35 and the induction into the armed forces of 800,000 draftees. Securing men was relatively easy, but training them and mobilizing U.S. military production would take time, and much of the new U.S. weaponry was going to Great Britain to keep that nation in the war. Marshall's draftees trained with broomsticks for rifles and logs representing artillery pieces. Trucks bore signs with the word "tank."

In World War II, the United States deployed a citizen army, mainly volunteers and draftees. Only two regular army divisions in 1940 were sufficiently equipped to be considered real divisions. In any case, most of the

army's regulars were soon scattered to assist in training. At the height of the war, regulars made up only 3.5 percent of the Army Ground Forces, 2.6 percent of the Army Service Forces, and 1.3 percent of the Army Air Forces. The vast majority of the officers—54 for every 1,000 enlisted men—were national guardsmen, reservists, or newly commissioned. Ultimately, 59 percent of army officers were drawn from the ranks.

Men of the 165th Infantry assaulting Butaritari are hampered by the coral and heavy Japanese defending fire, Makin Atoll, Gilbert Islands, November 20, 1943. (National Archives)

By December 7, 1941, the army was training 16 regular army divisions in the continental United States, along with 18 National Guard divisions and 2 Army of the United States divisions (composed of regulars, federalized guardsmen, and reservists). There were also the regular army's Philippine Division and 12 Philippine Army divisions, all of which were destroyed in fighting there early in 1942.

U.S. forces were initially poorly equipped and ineffectively trained, and they lacked supporting weaponry such as tanks and antitank and antiaircraft guns. Ammunition was also scarce. All this changed when the United States fully mobilized for war. By 1944, U.S. steel production was about half the world total. This statistic translated into large numbers of aircraft and ships but also 86,333 tanks, 650,000 Willys jeeps, and 12,573,000 rifles and

carbines. The army had so many vehicles that it could have placed every man and woman in the service in them at the same time and had room left over.

Marshall stressed firepower and maneuver. To him, this meant not only that tanks would play a prominent role but also that the entire army would be mechanized and motorized to a degree beyond that of any other military in the world. This emphasis would also enable the army to make effective use of the triangular concept, worked out while he was deputy commander of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, between 1927 and 1932. The army went from large foot-bound, two-brigade (four-regiment) infantry divisions of 22,000 men to highly mobile three-regiment, 15,245-man (14,037 in January 1945) divisions. This triangular concept extended to the lowest level. One maneuver unit would fix an enemy formation in place while another turned its flank and the third maneuver unit remained in reserve.

In July 1941, President Roosevelt called for an estimate of the forces required to defeat “potential enemies.” Tasked with this assignment, Major Albert C. Wedemeyer estimated that by the end of 1943, Germany and its allies might field 400 divisions. Conventional wisdom held that attacking forces needed a ratio of two to one to overcome defenders, and Wedemeyer thus set the requirement at 800 divisions. Leaving out the Soviet Union, which he believed might not be able to withstand the German onslaught, he calculated that other allies could provide 100 divisions, which meant that the United States would have to raise 700.

Counting support troops, this would mean a total U.S. military of 28 million men. But the U.S. population was only 135 million people, and industrial production requirements, which experts believed would limit any military to a maximum of 10 percent of the overall population, meant that the armed forces could comprise no more than 13.5 million men. Of this total, the army would get 8.8 million—2.05 million in the air forces and 6.75 in the ground forces. The latter were to be formed into five armies: three purely offensive task forces and two defensive ones.

Wedemeyer postulated 215 maneuver divisions—61 armored, 61 mechanized, 54 infantry, 4 cavalry, 10 mountain, and 7 airborne. He thought that with overwhelming air superiority, firepower, and heavy armored components as well as a high degree of mechanization and motorization, such a force would be sufficient. Transporting a force of this size to Europe would

require 1,000 ships, and building these alone would take two years, as would raising, equipping, and training the troops.

As it worked out, the U.S. Army fell far short of Wedemeyer's figure. Instead, the so-called 90-division gamble was adopted. Actually, the U.S. Army of World War II numbered only 89 divisions—66 infantry, 1 (dismounted) cavalry, 16 armored, 5 airborne, and 1 mountain. Only 2 divisions did not enter sustained combat, and only 1 failed in combat.

In early 1943, Marshall reorganized the army into three major components: the Army Ground Forces, the Army Service Forces, and the Army Air Forces. In personnel, the army grew to 8,157,386 men and women by April 1945, of whom 1,831,091 served in the 16 Army Air Forces. Many of the army's best soldiers were not in the infantry, however. The Army Air Forces and specialist branches, such as rangers and paratroops, and the service staffs were permitted to skim off too high a proportion of the fittest and best-educated recruits. The infantry rifle companies were, however, called on to fight the Wehrmacht, the most skilled army of modern times.

The army worked on developing new high-firepower weapons. These included remodeled Browning automatic rifles; the Browning air-cooled, lightweight .30-caliber machine gun; the M-2 .50-caliber machine gun (which remains in use); and the superb M1 Garand infantry rifle with an 8-round clip. The M1, designed by John C. Garand and adopted by the army in 1936, fired 40 rounds a minute in the hands of the average rifleman, but an expert could get off twice that in the same time frame. It had 40 percent less recoil than the M-1903 Springfield it replaced and had only 72 parts, compared to 92 for the Springfield. The Garand could be entirely broken down using only one tool, a .30-caliber round. There was also the lightweight (5-pound) M1 Carbine, which was issued to officers instead of a handgun. Later, the army introduced the M3 submachine gun, most of the parts of which were stamped out. This weapon was capable of a rate of fire of 450 rounds per minute.

The artillery developed new techniques to minimize the time necessary for all guns in a battery to fire on a target and to coordinate the fire of several batteries so that their shells rained down on one target simultaneously (the time on target, or TOT, technique). The 105mm howitzer and the 155mm "Long Tom" artillery pieces provided the U.S. Army with remarkably effective firepower. Self-propelled guns also enabled the artillery to keep up with the fast-moving armored and mechanized formations.

The army was not so efficient in other areas. Congress had abolished the Tank Corps in 1920 and relegated tanks to the infantry. Not until 1931 did the cavalry, which still employed horses, receive light "tankettes," known as "combat cars." The U.S. Armored Force came into being only in July 1940 after the defeat of France, but its M-3 Grant, designed hurriedly in 1940, was obsolescent before it was built. Even the M-4 Sherman medium tank, the main U.S. and British tank of the war, had trouble matching up with some of the more powerful German tanks.

The army had no heavy tank in the field until the M-26 Pershing arrived in Europe in January 1945 because its armor commanders, notably Lieutenant General George S. Patton, believed that tanks should not fight other tanks. Between 1944 and 1945, the 3rd Armored Division alone had 648 Shermans completely destroyed in combat and another 700 knocked out of action, repaired, and put back into operation—a loss rate of 580 percent. The U.S. Army lost 6,000 tanks in Europe in World War II, whereas the German Army never had more than 1,500 tanks operable at any one time.

Despite shortcomings, the U.S. Army had greater firepower than any other army in the world. It was not only the quality and quantity of military equipment and supplies produced but also the speed with which new weapons came online. The bazooka antitank weapon, for example, went from development to production of 5,000 units in only 30 days.

The U.S. way of waging war is to use machines if possible to do the killing and to minimize American loss of life. The army carried a strong indirect fire punch, including massive air forces and substantial quantities of field artillery. For Operation COBRA, the Normandy breakout of July 25–31 1944, VII Corps disposed of 43 battalions of field artillery. In December 1944 in Europe alone, the army fired more than 3 million rounds of 105mm ammunition. Artillerymen were able to shift and mass fire on a target on a scale never before seen. The time-on-target technique was a devastating weapon. Air-ground coordination vastly exceeded that of other combatants. Joint and combined operations typified the army's campaigns.

Europe was the U.S. Army's principal theater. It was accorded a priority over the Pacific, which affected all fighting and supply efforts. Seventy-seven percent of army divisions, a total of 68, went to Europe, and there were over 3 million army personnel in Europe and the Mediterranean by April 1945. The Pacific absorbed only 23 percent of all army divisions (21). But despite

the priority of Europe, the Pacific theater claimed half or more of the army forces for the first two years of the war. Only in October 1943 were there more divisions in Europe than in the Pacific; 1.8 million army personnel served in the Pacific by the end of the war.

Although green U.S. Army divisions experienced some problems at first, notably in the Battle of Kasserine Pass (February 14–22, 1943), they also showed a great ability to learn from their mistakes and adapt. As the army gained experience in the late summer of 1944, its units were arguably better, man for man, than the highly touted Germans. Average U.S. infantry divisions could defeat average German divisions and could even match elite German divisions. They were significantly better than Japanese divisions, the tactics of which had deteriorated to digging in and dying in place.

Army doctrine and tactics were also basically sound and flexible. The Germans and Japanese were impressed with how quickly the Americans adapted and how rapidly they replaced unsuccessful tactics with effective ones. Communications, engineering, and medical services were the best in the world. Only at the senior command level in Europe did the army show some debatable weaknesses, with a desire to execute the safe rather than the risky course of action—for instance, the broad-front strategy. Yet even that "cautious" approach presented the Germans with crisis piled on crisis, unsustainable attrition, and too much pressure everywhere to allow recovery.

European combat, especially long multiple-month campaigns, cut heavily into available army manpower. In Europe, 81 percent of all casualties occurred in the divisions, and they were heavily concentrated in the infantry. Units might lose 30 percent of their men in a week, yet they stayed in the line and continued to fight. The 9th Division, for instance, sustained 17,974 casualties in a four-month period, yet it fought on.

The army did not replace combat losses efficiently or in the necessary quantities, despite training 1.1 million men as replacements and despite a peak strength of 99,288 Women's Army Corps personnel to replace men for battle. There were too few divisions to allow frequent rotation off the line for rest and training. Units were usually short of personnel, and replacements from the States could hardly replace battle casualties, let alone nonbattle losses. A flow of replacements from the States was mandatory. But that system did not always work well. Regardless, the personnel system did keep

the divisions fighting for extended periods of time. Units learned how to receive, train, and integrate replacements.

The manpower situation was different in the Pacific. Campaigns were usually relatively short in duration and limited in space, with obvious exceptions such as those on New Guinea (March 8, 1942–September 13, 1945) and Luzon (October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945). Battalions and regiments were the key maneuver units, not divisions and corps as in Europe. And in the Pacific, infantry losses were far higher than expected. During the entirety of the war, the U.S. Army sustained in action 937,259 total casualties —killed, wounded, taken prisoner, and missing (234,874 dead).

The U.S. Army had come a long way since 1939. By 1945, it was the best-armed, most mobile, best-equipped, best-supplied, most educated, and highest-paid army in history.

JOHN W. WHITMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Artillery Doctrine; Artillery Types; COBRA, Operation; Engineer Operations; Kasserine Pass, Battle of; Louisiana Maneuvers; Marshall, George Catlett; McNair, Lesley James; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Selective Service Act; Tanks, All Powers; United States Army Air Forces; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy; United States Women's Army Corps; Wedemeyer, Albert Coady; Women in World War II; Document 235

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United States Army Air Forces

World War II witnessed a dramatic change in the scope and use of airpower by the U.S. military. Prior to and during World War II, there was no independent American air force. Instead, the army controlled the employment of aircraft over land, and the navy had charge of them over water. Since World War I, airpower advocates such as Brigadier General William Mitchell had argued for an independent air force (and for his outspoken criticism of the military leadership, a court-martial convicted Mitchell in 1926). Whatever its status, the pre–World War II Army Air Corps remained a relatively small coterie of professionals in which all pilots had to be officers.

By the mid-1930s, Air Corps theory centered around strategic bombing—the use of large bombers to destroy specific industrial targets and thereby cripple an opposing army for lack of essential supplies and win a war without a costly ground assault. Not only was such a campaign relatively inexpensive, but it also created an argument for air force independence, since this was a mission unique to airpower. The strategic bombing theory entailed a number of corollary assumptions. First was the belief that the bomber would always reach the target. The aircraft envisioned by army leaders were large, fast, and heavily armed. As a result, there was little development of long-range fighter aircraft prior to the war, since escorts were held to be unnecessary. Another assumption involved the denigration of tactical aviation—aircraft used to support the immediate needs of the battlefield. Leaders believed that by tying aircraft to ground forces, airpower lost its unique advantage along with the justification for independence. These ideals were epitomized by Major General Henry “Hap” Arnold, who became chief of the Army Air Corps in October 1938 and held that post throughout the war.

Whatever theory existed, tight budgets and isolationist views in Congress limited the growth of American aviation between the world wars. In 1939, even with war clearly on the horizon, the American aviation industry delivered only 921 aircraft to the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. Changes quickly ensued following the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, however. European governments placed large orders with American aircraft firms. And earlier, in November 1938, President Franklin D.

Roosevelt, long concerned about the threat posed by Nazi Germany, had privately expressed a desire for an Air Corps of 20,000 aircraft, but publicly, he sought half that number. At the time, the Air Corps only possessed some 1,600 aircraft. Following the fall of France in May 1940, Roosevelt increased his goal to 50,000 aircraft for the army and navy together.

Despite massive orders, the aviation industry mobilized slowly. By 1941, the Air Corps possessed only 5,500 aircraft, and few matched the performance of their European counterparts. Only in heavy bombers, with the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, did American equipment approach that of Europe. In March 1941, Robert Lovett became assistant secretary of war for air, and he immediately set about increasing U.S. production. Output rose from 12,000 aircraft annually to 96,000 by the end of 1944. Manpower also increased dramatically. From 43,000 personnel in 1939, the number of people serving in the Air Corps rose to 300,000 by December 1941. To meet increased manpower requirements, the Air Corps lowered its standards, but entering the Air Corps remained much more difficult than entering other services.

The organization of the corps also changed with expansion. In 1941, the Air Corps gave way to the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), with Arnold as chief; it was coequal with the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces. In return for greater autonomy, Arnold verbally promised U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, himself a strong supporter of airpower, that he would not seek independent status for the air force for the duration of the war.

Individual theaters each had their own numbered air forces, sometimes further divided by primary mission. For example, the First Air Force remained in New York, provided training, and oversaw the defense of the northeast region of the United States; the Eighth Air Force served in Great Britain and undertook the strategic bombardment of continental Europe; and the Ninth Air Force, which began in the Mediterranean theater, moved to Britain in 1943 as a tactical air force for the invasion of France. By the end of the war, there were 16 numbered air forces.

In 1941, to utilize airpower properly, the Air War Plans Division wrote AWPD/1 as an annex to the army’s comprehensive plan to defeat the Axis powers. AWPD/1 embodied the tenets of strategic bombardment. It called for 1,060 medium bombers, 3,740 heavy bombers, 3,740 very heavy bombers,

and 2,000 fighters to destroy 154 specific industrial targets in Germany—primarily aircraft-manufacturing sites, followed by power plants, the transportation network, and synthetic petroleum plants. In six months, the authors argued, Germany would be unable to resist the Allied armies, and civilian morale would be shattered, making an invasion unnecessary. These attacks were to be carried out in precision daylight strikes.

With the American entrance into the war in December 1941, the USAAF could not immediately launch the kind of offensive action envisioned in AWPD/1. In the Pacific theater, the Japanese advanced so rapidly that American forces found themselves fighting defensive battles for their very survival. It would take time to deploy the kind of force called for in AWPD/1 to defeat either Japan or Germany, however.

Major General Carl Spaatz commanded the Eighth Air Force, charged with carrying the air war to Germany. Activated in January 1942, the Eighth Air Force did not fly its first mission until July 4, 1942, when American medium bombers joined British aircraft attacking German airfields in the Netherlands. On August 17, 1942, American strategic bombardment began when 12 B-17s attacked the railroad marshaling yard in Rouen, France. That November, the Eighth Air Force lost much of its force to the Mediterranean theater, where Allied troops had invaded North Africa. The North African Campaign provided valuable experience to American airmen. Most important, the Americans learned from the British the value of close cooperation between air and ground forces.

In January 1943, President Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, and their respective military staffs met in Casablanca to discuss strategy. Despite British pressure for the USAAF to join the Royal Air Force in its area attacks against German cities at night, the Americans argued for daylight precision strikes, which meant that Germany would be bombed around the clock. From the meeting came a directive for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) that eventually destroyed Germany’s industrial base as well as its civilian morale.

To accomplish the goals of the CBO, Brigadier General Ira Eaker, the new commander of the Eighth Air Force, oversaw the development of the Pointblank Directive, which called for establishing air supremacy first by using the bomber to attack aircraft-manufacturing plants. To protect themselves from enemy fighters, bombers flew in large box formations that

massed defensive firepower. The first large Pointblank raid was against the Schweinfurt ball-bearing works, with a second mission against the Messerschmitt plant at Regensburg on August 17, 1943. Republic P-47 Thunderbolt fighters had only enough range to escort the bombers to the German border. As a result, the Eighth Air Force lost 60 bombers, one-sixth of the attacking force. A second raid in October cost an equal number of bombers during a day referred to as “Black Thursday.” The USAAF could not sustain such losses, and American bombers suspended raids deep into Germany until long-range escorts became available. Meanwhile, Arnold questioned the leadership of the Eighth Air Force and replaced Eaker, whom he sent to the Mediterranean, with Major General James H. Doolittle. Spaatz returned to England to oversee all American air operations as commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

Technical changes improved USAAF performance. By January 1944, external fuel tanks and increased capacity permitted P-47 and Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters to escort the bombers far into Germany. Finally, North American P-51 Mustangs began reaching units in Britain; with external tanks, they could escort bombers as far as Berlin. In February 1944, the Americans launched Operation ARGUMENT, a coordinated attack on the German aircraft industry by both the Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force flying from Italy. “Big Week,” February 20–25, 1944, witnessed thousands of sorties. The loss rate was only one-sixth that of the previous year, and U.S. fighter escorts began to take a grievous toll on inexperienced German pilots. In the air battles of 1944, the USAAF gained mastery of Europe’s skies not directly through bomb damage but rather through the attrition of German pilots. In March 1944, Spaatz began the systematic bombing of Germany’s petroleum industry. German fighters had to defend their source of fuel. Attrition among German aircrews could not be replaced, and the lack of fuel meant that replacement pilots had greatly reduced training time.

By the date of the Allied invasion of France on June 6, 1944, the German Air Force could not challenge Allied airpower. The appearance of Germany’s jet and rocket fighters, the Messerschmitt Me-262 and Me-163, caused brief consternation within the USAAF, but these aircraft were too few in number and their pilots were too inexperienced to pose a serious threat.

On the other side of the world, the USAAF provided support for General Douglas MacArthur’s ground forces in the Southwest Pacific. Initially, the

Pacific theater lacked large industrial targets within range; however, heavy bombers did contribute to the ultimate victory. More important were the medium bombers of the Fifth Air Force commanded by Major General George C. Kenney. Operations tended to be directed against Japanese island garrisons and shipping. To meet the low-level operations found in the theater, Kenney modified many North American B-25 Mitchell bombers to carry additional machine guns or cannon in the nose. His pilots also practiced bombing from treetop level using fragmentation bombs slowed by parachutes. Finally, to better strike ships, Kenney's bombers attacked from mast height.

The USAAF also flew missions in the China-Burma-India theater, although operations there were decidedly of secondary importance. Part of the problem involved logistics. The Japanese controlled all of coastal China as well as Burma. To supply China and the American forces there, the USAAF developed an aerial route over the Himalayas, referred to as "the Hump." By July 1944, despite a slow start, the operation was finally delivering sufficient matériel to meet operational needs, although at a very high cost. In China, Major General Claire Chennault led the Fourteenth Air Force in its efforts to push back the Japanese. Always operating at the limits of supply, his forces achieved only moderate success.

By 1944, the U.S. Navy's advance through the Central Pacific included the Mariana Islands. These islands provided bases for the Boeing B-29 Superfortresses then entering service. To ensure the proper use of the new bombers, Arnold maintained operational authority over their employment by controlling the Twentieth Air Force directly from Washington. Though the bombers were initially deployed in India and China, the Marianas proved to be far superior as bases, and all of the bombers eventually flew from there. But initial efforts to strategically bomb Japan did not fare well.

The B-29 was unique in that it was the first aircraft to contend with the jet stream, making bombing accuracy more difficult than normal. Not until early 1945, when Major General Curtis LeMay arrived in the Marianas and introduced new tactics to improve effectiveness, did the B-29s have a vital impact on Japanese industry. Instead of high-altitude precision strikes against industrial targets, the B-29s switched to low-altitude night incendiary attacks against cities. The largely wooden structures in Japan ignited with little help. The most destructive of these raids—and probably the single most destructive

raid in the history of air warfare—occurred on the night of March 9–10, 1945, when B-29s set 16 square miles of Tokyo aflame, killing at least 90,000 people. The destruction of cities peaked on August 6, 1945, when the B-29 *Enola Gay* dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. A second atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki three days later.

The USAAF fought in every theater of World War II, contributing substantially to the Allied victory. As Germany and Japan surrendered, teams from the United States conducted a survey of the exact impact of the bombing. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded that airpower had a notable impact on Germany and Japan, yet bombing itself could not have won the war.

Aircraft played an integral part in the Allied war-fighting capabilities, making victory possible. The most effective uses of bombing were the systematic assault on the German petroleum industry late in 1944 and the assault against transportation. In the Pacific, to avoid conflict with the navy, the USSBS assessed the USAAF campaign as part of the overall force applied against Japan. The report concluded that the atomic bombs simply compelled Japan's leaders to accept reality.

By the end of the war, the USAAF had taken delivery of some 158,800 aircraft, including 51,221 bombers and 47,050 fighters. A total of 22,948 aircraft were lost in action. During the conflict, the USAAF flew 2,363,800 combat sorties and dropped 2,057,000 tons of bombs, 75 percent of them on Germany. By March 1945, the USAAF had more than 1,831,000 personnel, representing 22.4 percent of the army's total strength. USAAF personnel casualties over the course of the war came to 115,382, including 40,061 dead. Even without the unqualified endorsement of the USSBS, the USAAF had proved its worth, leading to its independence from the army in 1947.

RODNEY MADISON

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Aircraft, Fighters; Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Aircraft, Production of; Aircraft, Reconnaissance and Auxiliary; Aircraft, Transport; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Atomic Bomb, Decision to Employ; Casablanca Conference; Chennault, Claire Lee; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Doolittle, James Harold "Jimmy"; Eaker, Ira Clarence; Hiroshima, Bombing of; Hitler, Adolf; Hump, The;

Kenney, George Churchill; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Lovett, Robert Abercrombie; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; Nagasaki, Bombing of; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Schweinfurt and Regensburg Raids; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"; Tokyo, Bombing of; United States Women's Air Force Service Pilots; Women in World War II

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United States Coast Guard

U.S. sea service that played a notable role in antisubmarine and escort efforts in the North Atlantic, in domestic port safety and security missions, and in amphibious operations in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters while maintaining its peacetime search-and-rescue and law-enforcement responsibilities. During World War II, Coast Guard personnel saw worldwide action manning destroyers, transports, and auxiliary vessels as well as cutters, patrol boats, and landing craft.

The late 1930s and early 1940s brought the expansion of the Coast Guard in terms of missions, ships, and personnel. The Lighthouse Service joined the Coast Guard in July 1939, and the Bureau of Marine Inspection transferred to the service in 1942, strengthening its maritime safety and security mission. As war approached for the United States, the service began preparing its 19,000 men and cutter fleet for war.

Even before the United States formally entered the war, the service went on a wartime footing when, in September 1941, Coast Guard commandant Rear Admiral Russell R. Waesche ordered cutters to don wartime paint schemes and, pursuant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's order, engage German and Italian submarines and aircraft operating west of 26 degrees west longitude. The Coast Guard cutter *Northland* promptly seized a German

weather station and a supporting trawler on the Greenland coast in September 1941. Then on November 1, 1941, Roosevelt ordered the Coast Guard transferred to the Navy Department.

On North Atlantic escort duty, the Coast Guard sank 12 German submarines and rescued over 1,000 Allied sailors while losing the cutters *Escanaba* and *Alexander Hamilton* to hostile action. Notable in this service was the cutter *Bibb*'s rescue of nearly 250 survivors from 3 ships sunk by U-boats in convoy SC.118 during February 1943 and the destruction of *U-175* by the cutters *Spencer* and *Duane* in April 1943. Coast Guard cutters also provided important escort and antisubmarine service in the Greenland Patrol Area, including the October 1944 capture of the German Naval Auxiliary *Externsteine,* the only German surface combatant taken at sea by U.S. forces during World War II.

A Coast Guard-manned LST at Iwo Jima. The Coast Guard performed invaluable service in many theaters during the war. (U.S. Coast Guard)

At home, Coast Guard captains of the port oversaw marine safety and security and assumed responsibility for the inspection of commercial vessels and the administration of professional seamen. Search-and-rescue stations and a wartime beach patrol provided coastal surveillance for Axis submarines and espionage activity. The volunteer Temporary Reserve was also formed and provided numerous civilian vessels for coastal patrol duties. Seaman John Cullen of Station Amagansett on Long Island, New York, helped foil German saboteurs when, conducting a beach patrol in June 1942, he discovered them landing. Cutters, small boats, and aircraft all played an important role in antisubmarine and rescue efforts in the Western Atlantic. During the war, the Coast Guard rescued some 1,500 sailors from vessels torpedoed along the U.S. Atlantic coast.

The Coast Guard manned attack transports and LSTs (landing ships, tank) and applied its small-boat handling skills to operating landing craft in all the major amphibious assaults of the war. Just as significant, Coast Guard surfmen trained others for this dangerous and difficult duty. The Coast Guard crews of the attack transport *Leonard Wood* and the attack cargo ship *Aquarius* each participated in eight amphibious assaults.

Signalman First Class Douglas A. Munro, operating from the Coast Guard–manned attack transport *Hunter Liggett,* led a group of landing craft

evacuating U.S. marines near Matanikau on Guadalcanal in September 1942. Munro beached his Higgins boat between a large Japanese force and the marines on the beach, shielding the other boats from hostile fire and engaging the Japanese with light weapons while the evacuation was completed. In the course of the fighting, he was fatally wounded by Japanese fire. For his actions, Munro was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, the only coastguardsman ever to receive America's highest decoration.

Active in numerous assaults in the European theater as well, the Coast Guard had a large presence during the Normandy Landing (June 6, 1944). The 60 83-foot Coast Guard patrol boats assigned to search-and-rescue duties during Operation OVERLORD assault rescued more than 1,500 Allied soldiers whose landing craft had been destroyed on D-day.

As commandant, Waesche piloted the service through the war and oversaw the enlistment of women and African Americans into the Coast Guard. Led by Captain Dorothy C. Stratton, the Women's Reserve—better known as the SPARs (an acronym from the Latin and English versions of the Coast Guard motto)—played an important support role during the war. More than 230,000 men and 10,000 women served in the Coast Guard over the course of World War II. Ultimately, their skill and bravery were the service's major contributions to victory.

THOMAS J. STUHLREYER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Antisubmarine Warfare; United States Navy; Waesche, Russell Randolph, Sr.

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United States Marine Corps

Established in 1775 as a shipboard security force for the Continental Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps struggled to maintain its institutional viability while

performing numerous and varied missions around the globe during the first century of its existence. Sustained by its reputation as a rapidly deployable, tenacious combat force, the corps and its civilian proponents argued that U.S. expansionist policies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries demanded a naval infantry force capable of seizing and defending advanced naval bases.

Progressive Marine Corps leaders had begun preparing this new doctrine when World War I interrupted their planning, although the valiant exploits of the corps during this conflict further endeared the service to the American public. Following World War I, the prevalent antimilitarism of the 1920s ushered in a period of military retrenchment, and the resulting scramble for available funds heightened interservice rivalries. The Marine Corps's lack of a clearly defined mission brought tremendous scrutiny on its funding and reductions in its strength that threatened its very existence. A massive public relations campaign featuring Marine Corps service in policing domestic mail routes and protecting American interests in Latin America and China bolstered the corps' public image and political clout with Congress, allowing the marines to withstand meager appropriations and perpetuate the claim of being America's premier fighting force.

In the early 1920s, U.S. military strategists began planning for numerous wartime contingencies, focusing primarily on Japan, the nation's chief Pacific rival. Recognizing the navy's need to secure advance operating bases on islands west of Hawaii in any war against Japan, the Marine Corps adopted amphibious assault as its raison d'être.

Integrating the newly constituted Fleet Marine Force into the U.S. Navy, the marines streamlined their bureaucracy and concentrated on preparations for seizing and defending advance bases in the Pacific. The corps assigned personnel to naval intelligence and planning staffs and began educating its officers in the tactics of amphibious operations. Lieutenant Colonel Earl "Pete" Ellis's exhaustive studies of Japanese-held Pacific islands in the early 1920s formed the nucleus of the marines' amphibious assault doctrine. In 1934, the corps published a more exhaustive guide to amphibious operations, *The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, and it held a series of fleet landing exercises designed to test its concepts. These exercises were crucial in highlighting the need for detailed logistical planning, speed in ship-to-shore movement, overwhelming fire superiority from air and naval

bombardment, and specialized equipment to successfully carry out opposed landings.

Although Marine Corps aviation utilized previous experience in Latin America to develop rudimentary close air support tactics based on dive-bombing (which the German Luftwaffe then adopted), the U.S. Navy's ambivalence toward developing close-in naval gunfire support techniques and constraints on the procurement of new equipment severely limited the development of U.S. amphibious warfare prior to 1939.

Between 1939 and 1941 as the U.S. military buildup went forward, the Marine Corps tripled in size from some 25,000 to 75,000 men and improved its amphibious capabilities. However, the corps was spread thinly to cover a wide range of duties in garrisons and aboard ships, from Iceland to the Caribbean to Hawaii and numerous smaller islands throughout the Pacific.

In July 1941 the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General John Marston, became the first American troops deployed to the European theater of war when U.S. Navy Task Force 19 landed the unit in Iceland to relieve British forces of the task of securing the vital island astride the Atlantic convoy routes. U.S. Army forces began arriving that August, and by March 1942 all the marines on Iceland had been transferred to the Pacific.

On December 7, 1941, marines aboard battleships at Pearl Harbor and at nearby airfields assisted in defending Hawaii against the Japanese attacks. Elsewhere in the Pacific, isolated marine garrisons on Guam and in China had little choice but to surrender. Marines on Wake Island and in the Philippines valiantly attempted to resist Japanese invasions, but Wake Island fell after two weeks of resistance, and the Philippines surrendered in May 1942.

Marines were at the forefront of early U.S. operations against Japan. In the Southwest Pacific, the 1st Marine Division carried out assaults in the Solomon Islands in August 1942. The long campaign for Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943) revealed the complexities of conducting amphibious operations under battle conditions, including the need for increased logistical support and a simplified command-and-control structure. Advancing up the Solomons from 1942 to 1944 toward the Japanese fortress at Rabaul, the marines found themselves engaged in jungle warfare against a fiercely determined Japanese foe.

In 1943, encouraged by success in the Solomons, the Marine Corps played a leading role in the thrust through the Central Pacific toward the main Japanese islands. The atolls of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands proved to be a different kind of challenge than the jungle warfare of the Southwest Pacific. Ineffective fire support, confused communications, and a shortage of proper equipment made the initial assault at Tarawa (November 20, 1943) a bloody and sobering affair.

Applying the lessons learned from Tarawa to refine their amphibious doctrine, the marines advanced through the key Marshall Islands atolls of Kwajalein, Roi-Namur, and Eniwetok. During the summer of 1944, marines landed on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Marianas. They also learned how to conduct sustained combat operations on these larger extensively fortified islands. In the fall of 1944, marine infantry and aviation forces supported General Douglas MacArthur's advance on the Philippines. Marines landed on Peleliu on September 15, 1944, and suffered heavy casualties in a savage weeklong battle. From September 1944 to April 1945, Marine Corps tactical air support became a vital component of army operations on Leyte and Luzon.

On February 19, 1945, the marines invaded the island of Iwo Jima in their most spectacular and costly operation of the war. Nearly the entire 21,000-man Japanese garrison died defending the island while inflicting almost 30,000 casualties on American forces in a 36-day slugfest. During the battle, journalist Joe Rosenthal snapped a photo of 5 marines and 1 navy corpsman raising a flag on Iwo Jima's Mount Suribachi. This image instantly became an icon of Marine Corps valor and esprit de corps as well as a symbol of American fortitude in World War II. In June 1945, marines and army troops secured Okinawa, just 360 miles from Japan, after three months of ferocious combat in the hills and caves across the island.

Men of the U.S. 4th Marine Division shelling Japanese positions inland from the beaches of Iwo Jima in February 1945. (National Archives)

After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, U.S. marines served throughout the Pacific in occupation duties. World War II was a defining moment for the marines. Their seemingly prophetic development of amphibious assault doctrine in the interwar period proved invaluable to winning the Pacific campaigns, and their prior planning and experience also aided the army-led invasions of Europe. The Marine Corps had grown to 20 times its prewar strength, with approximately 500,000 men in six marine infantry divisions and four air wings. It had honed its amphibious doctrine while expanding its aviation and combat support capabilities. Although the Marine Corps comprised less than 5 percent of the U.S. military in the war, marines constituted nearly 10 percent of all American wartime casualties, with 19,733 killed and 67,207 wounded.

Despite continued and often heated interservice clashes among the army, the navy, and the new U.S. Air Force, marine combat performance during World War II further attached the Marine Corps to the public, thus ensuring that the service would survive demobilization as a separate institution within the navy and an elite component of the U.S. military establishment.

DEREK W. FRISBY

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Central Pacific Campaign; Eniwetok, Capture of; Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Guam, Battle for; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kwajalein, Battle for; Landing Craft; Okinawa, Invasion of; Peleliu Island, Battle of; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Saipan, Battle of; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Tarawa, Battle of; Tinian, U.S. Invasion of; United States Navy; Wake Island, Battle for

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United States Navy

U.S. naval preparations for war were under way long before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The United States had moved away from its post–World War I emphasis on naval arms limitation as a consequence of the outbreak of war between China and Japan in July 1937. On May 7, 1938, Congress passed a naval expansion bill authorizing a 20 percent increase in the overall tonnage of the navy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisers hoped that this step would deter Japan from further expansion in the Pacific that might threaten U.S. interests there. The Japanese, however, continued their expansionary moves. The concern of the Roosevelt administration over this failure was heightened by the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 and the string of Allied defeats there that followed. On June 20, 1940, believing that the United States might soon stand alone in the face of Axis aggression, Congress passed a second naval expansion bill, which called for a two-ocean navy through a 70 percent increase in overall naval tonnage.

Despite the fact that the bulk of the navy was based in the Pacific, the initial deployment of U.S. naval forces in World War II was in the Atlantic theater and took place while the United States was still technically neutral. President Roosevelt aligned the United States with the European Allied powers, and following the fall of France, he sent material aid to Great Britain. This included the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement of September 2, 1940, that saw 50 World War I–vintage U.S. destroyers transferred to the Royal Navy and ultimately the passage of Lend-Lease legislation that transferred significant military equipment to powers fighting the Axis. The transport of these supplies across the Atlantic via merchant convoys led to the need to protect them against German submarines.

By mid-1941, U.S. naval forces were engaged in escorting convoys to Iceland, where they then became Britain's responsibility. This situation led to an escalation of hostilities with the September 1941 German torpedo attack on the escorting destroyer *Greer*. Roosevelt responded with a shoot-on-sight order regarding Axis warships threatening convoys. On October 31, 1941, a German submarine torpedoed and sank the U.S. destroyer *Reuben James*, the first U.S. warship lost in World War II.

Yet war for the United States came not in the Atlantic but in the Pacific. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the nation formally joined the Allied side. The U.S. Navy, which by late December was under the direction of the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, faced a multiple-theater conflict. In the Atlantic, the war at sea centered on the protection of Allied supply lines to Great Britain. Although the Battle of the Atlantic was fought primarily by British and Canadian forces, the United States contributed through the deployment of convoy escorts largely under the direction of the Atlantic Fleet commander, Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll. In early 1943, the United States assumed responsibility for the protection of convoys in the Central Atlantic.

In addition to the destroyer forces deployed for this duty, special hunter-killer groups based around escort carriers executed search-and-destroy operations against Axis submarines. Through the use of radar and sonar, these forces played an important role in the Allied victory in the critical Battle of the Atlantic. By the close of the war, U.S. naval units had accounted for 25 percent of the 781 German U-boats sunk during the conflict.

In addition to commerce protection, the U.S. Navy also contributed

warships to aid the Royal Navy in fleet surface operations in the Atlantic. In March 1942, the United States sent its first naval task force, centered on the aircraft carrier *Wasp,* into the Atlantic. The navy provided critical gunfire support and sealift in all the Allied amphibious operations of the war, beginning with Operation TORCH (November 8, 1942), the Allied invasion of North Africa, and extending through Operation OVERLORD, the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion. As with the U-boat war, the British provided the lion's share of the vessels required for this task.

Initial U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean theater was the result of Allied disagreement over the strategy to attack the European Axis powers. Although the United States favored an attack on German-held France via the English Channel, to take place in mid-1943, the prevailing British view called for a peripheral attack via the Mediterranean. This attack took the form of Operation TORCH. The Royal Navy conducted assaults on the Mediterranean beachheads of northern Africa, and the United States had responsibility for the Atlantic coast. The majority of the naval units covering the landing forces and providing fire support were British, and overall command of the naval force rested with the Royal Navy, but the U.S. Navy employed a task force under Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt that included one fleet carrier, three battleships, and four converted escort carriers. Following this operation, U.S. involvement increased through the July 9–August 22, 1943, Allied invasion of Sicily. Hewitt once again commanded a U.S. squadron under the direction of the Royal Navy. This arrangement was repeated in the Allied invasion of mainland Italy.

In Operation NEPTUNE, the naval portion of the Normandy Invasion, of all the Allied gunfire support ships—7 battleships, 23 cruisers, and 80 destroyers—the United States supplied 3 battleships, 3 cruisers, and 31 destroyers. These ships provided invaluable supporting fire for amphibious forces landing on the beaches. The final major Allied landing in the Atlantic theater, Operation DRAGOON—the August 15, 1944, invasion of southern France—was predominantly composed of U.S. units and under the command of Admiral Hewitt. U.S. gunfire support ships included 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, and 59 destroyers.

Although the involvement of the U.S. Navy in both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean was eclipsed by that of the Royal Navy, the chief reason for this was that the United States bore the brunt of the naval war in the Pacific.

This effort faced great challenges from the outset, as the U.S. Pacific Fleet, under the command of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, was gravely wounded by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which put all of the fleet's battleships out of commission. In any case, the initial U.S. effort in the vast Pacific centered on U.S. Navy carriers, which had not been in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The denuded U.S. Pacific Fleet was further weakened following the loss of the British capital ships *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* on December 10, 1941, and the February 1942 destruction of the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, a collection of Allied warships. As a result of these blows, for most of the war the U.S. Navy was the sole Allied naval force pitted against the Japanese, who seized the U.S. possessions of Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines.

Gun crews of a U.S. Navy cruiser covering the American landing on the island of Mindoro scan the skies in an effort to identify a plane overhead. Two 5-inch guns and inboard 20mm antiaircraft crews are ready to take action, December 15, 1944. (National Archives)

Amid these disasters, U.S. and British military officials met in early 1942 and resolved that the United States would assume responsibility for the Pacific theater. U.S. strategists realized that to defeat Japan, it was necessary

to recapture lost U.S. possessions and take Japanese Pacific holdings, thus isolating the Japanese home islands and starving their war machine of supplies. Command of the Pacific was divided into two theaters to achieve this end. The Southwest Pacific was under General Douglas MacArthur, who pursued an advance from Australia through the Netherlands East Indies to the Philippines. The North, Central, and South Pacific areas were assigned to Admiral Chester Nimitz, who succeeded Admiral Kimmel as commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Consequently, Nimitz commanded the majority of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. He pursued War Plan Orange, a prewar strategy that called for an advance toward Japan through the Central Pacific.

These operations, however, could not take place until the country's industrial strength produced more warships to augment the force that remained after Pearl Harbor. War Plan Orange saw the role of submarines as scouts for the U.S. battle line, but after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy deployed its submarines with the destruction of Japanese overseas commerce as a key mission. Surface units were charged with preventing further Japanese expansion.

While the submarine war unfolded, a critical concern was the threat posed to Australia, which was both a vital naval base and an area to station troops. The need to protect Australia led to the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 7–8, 1942. This engagement aborted a Japanese landing at Port Moresby in New Guinea. Japan's attempt to take Midway Island and draw out and destroy the U.S. carriers led to the pivotal Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942). The loss of four of Japan's finest carriers in this battle was a great blow to further Japanese expansion in the Pacific and, in a very real sense, the turning point in the Pacific war.

The U.S. Navy subsequently implemented its plan to defeat Japan. The amphibious operations that ensued were made possible by the tremendous wartime naval production of the United States. By 1944, the U.S. Navy was larger than all other navies of the world combined, and the Pacific Fleet comprised 14 battleships, 15 fleet carriers, 10 light carriers, 24 cruisers, and hundreds of destroyers and submarines. The Japanese, whose industrial base was much smaller than that of the United States, could not match this production.

One of the keys to Allied victory in the war was the ability of U.S. Navy task forces to operate at great distances across the vast Pacific. To support

this effort, the navy created an extensive logistics network. This Service Force Pacific Fleet, known as a fleet train, included tankers and supply and repair ships moving in the wake of the combat ships. A massive system of reprovisioning and repair, the fleet train markedly reduced the need for combat ships to spend precious time moving to and from their home bases and thus greatly increased the number of combat ships deployed.

In the Central Pacific, the navy lifted army and marine elements to take Japanese-held islands in the Marshall, Caroline, Mariana, and Philippine Islands. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944), the U.S. Navy eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as a cohesive fighting force and cut the Japanese off from their southern resources area. The Allied conquest of Okinawa from March to June 1945 signaled to U.S. amphibious forces the completion of Plan Orange. With the destruction of the IJN and the seizure of bases within striking distance of Japan, the home islands were both isolated and subjected to the strategic bombing of cities and the devastation of coastal trade.

Equally important in the isolation of Japan was the submarine campaign, the most successful *guerre de course* (war against trade) in modern history. Of Japan's total of 8 million tons of merchant shipping (at best marginal for meeting Japanese requirements in peacetime), U.S. submarines sank almost 5 million tons, thus crippling Tokyo's ability to supply the home islands, especially with oil.

By the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy had participated in every major theater of the naval war. The cost was high, as the navy lost 36,674 officers and enlisted personnel. In the Battle of Okinawa alone, Japanese kamikaze attacks caused the navy more casualties than it had suffered in all its previous wars combined. Materially, the navy lost 2 battleships, 4 fleet aircraft carriers, 1 light carrier, 6 escort carriers, 12 cruisers, 68 destroyers, and 47 submarines in the course of the war. Nevertheless, the manpower and industrial strength of the United States had not only made good the losses but also augmented the navy to the point that its size in both personnel and ships eclipsed that of all the other naval powers of the world combined. This force was critical to the Allied victory in World War II.

ERIC W. OSBORNE

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Atlantic, Battle of the; Battle Cruisers; Battleships; Caroline Islands Campaign; Central Pacific Campaign; Convoy PQ 17; Convoys, Allied; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Cruisers; Destroyers; Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement; DRAGOON, Operation; Eastern Solomons, Battle of the; Gilbert Islands Campaign; *Greer*, Attack on; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Hewitt, Henry Kent; Hunter-Killer Groups; Ingersoll, Royal Eason; *Kearny*, USS, Torpedoing of; Kimmel, Husband Edward; King, Ernest Joseph; Lend-Lease; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Mariana Islands Campaign; Marshall Islands, Naval Campaign; Midway, Battle of; Naval Strengths, Atlantic Theater; Naval Strengths, Pacific Theater; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Sinking of; *Reuben James*, Sinking of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Southeast Pacific Theater; Southwest Pacific Theater; Sprague, Clifton Albert Frederick; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Submarines; Two-Ocean Navy Program; United States Marine Corps

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United States Navy Carrier Raids (February 1–April 18, 1942)

Beginning with the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Allies had suffered a series of defeats in the Pacific in December 1941 and January 1942. U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W.

Nimitz was determined to hit back with his carriers, the only real effective weapons, apart from submarines, he had available. In early January 1942, the carrier *Yorktown* helped escort a convoy carrying marine reinforcements to American Samoa. That mission accomplished, Nimitz ordered Vice Admiral William F. Halsey to take the offensive against the Japanese.

On January 25, the *Yorktown* and its sister ship the *Enterprise* departed Samoan waters. Six days later, they separated into two task forces (TF). TF 8, centered on the *Enterprise* and including the heavy cruisers *Northampton, Salt Lake City*, and *Chester* and three destroyers, would raid the Marshall Islands; TF 17, centered on the *Yorktown,* with the heavy cruiser *Louisville*, the light cruiser *St. Louis,* and four destroyers, would attack both the Marshall Islands and the Gilbert Islands. Halsey sent the *Enterprise* and three screening destroyers against Wotje, Taroa Island in Maloelap Atoll, and Roi and Kwajalein islands in Kwajalein Atoll, all in the Marshalls. He ordered Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance with the *Northampton* and the *Salt Lake City* to bombard Wotje, while the *Chester* shelled Maloelap. Meanwhile, the *Yorktown* task force under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher would attack Jaluit and Mili Atolls in the southern Marshalls and Makin Atoll in the Gilberts.

Aircraft from the *Enterprise* enjoyed the most success. They attacked a number of Japanese ships at Kwajalein and aircraft on the ground. They also struck new Japanese ground installations.

A predawn launch and severe thunderstorms hampered efforts by the *Yorktown*'s aircraft against Japanese installations and shipping at Jaluit Atoll, and seven of its planes were lost. Other planes from the *Yorktown* struck Japanese installations and ships at Makin and Mili. The Japanese were caught by surprise. A patrolling four-engine Kawanishi H6K "Mavis" flying boat attempted to attack the destroyers and then the *Yorktown* but was shot down by Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters. Poor weather, lack of suitable targets, and the approach of darkness led to cancellation of a second attack on Jaluit.

By late afternoon on February 1, both task forces were steaming at flank speed for Pearl Harbor when radar on the *Enterprise* detected six Mitsubishi G3M Nell bombers heading for it. This was their second mission of the day; earlier these same aircraft had bombed and damaged the cruiser *Chester*. Antiaircraft fire from the *Enterprise* shot down one of the Nells. Several others were damaged, but they were able to drop three bombs each. The

Enterprise took evasive action, but one close miss showered the ship with fragments and set off a small fire, mortally wounding one sailor. The Japanese flight leader then attempted to crash his plane into the *Enterprise* but struck only a glancing blow before his aircraft fell into the sea. Later, two other Nells attacked. Their bombs missed thanks to evasive maneuvers, and one of the Nells was shot down.

Halsey returned to Pearl Harbor on February 6. Because of the close proximity of Japanese airfields, he was fortunate to have only the *Chester* receive a bomb hit and to lose only 12 planes. Despite optimistic pilot reports, only one Japanese ship had actually been sunk, although many others had been heavily damaged. Nine Japanese planes had been destroyed on the ground, and three fighters had been shot down. Ninety Japanese had perished, including the area commander, a rear admiral.

The raid also revealed U.S. deficiencies. Aircraft required self-sealing gasoline tanks and armor protection, and there was also a clear need for IFF (identification, friend or foe) to identify returning aircraft. Carrier fighter complements also had to be increased and those of torpedo and dive-bombers reduced. There was no question, however, that the raid was worth its cost. Although Tokyo dismissed it as “aerial guerrilla warfare,” it revealed the vulnerability of the Japanese island outposts to U.S. carrier attack.

Nimitz did not wait long before sending out the carriers again. Thus, while the Japanese were hitting Darwin on February 19, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown led TF 11, centered on the aircraft carrier *Lexington* against the principal Japanese base of Rabaul in the Solomon Sea. Nimitz hoped this attack would divert the Japanese from attacking Port Moresby on the south coast of New Guinea, which had been revealed by radio intercepts as a Japanese objective.

On February 20, the *Lexington* was about 350 miles from Rabaul when radar picked up an unknown aircraft. Wildcats from the *Lexington* shot down this Mavis flying boat. Another was splashed, but a third got away. Soon thereafter, the *Lexington* came under attack from two flights of nine Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” bombers. All their bombs missed. In this largest air encounter of the Pacific theater to date, counting the two Mavises downed earlier, the Wildcats shot down 19 of 20 Japanese aircraft encountered for only 2 of their own lost. Fearing other attacks that would include dive-bombers, however, Brown aborted his mission.

Although the Japanese pilots had saved Rabaul from attack, the abortive U.S. raid paid an important dividend by convincing the Japanese command on Truk that landings scheduled for Port Moresby and Tulagi that March were too risky and should await the arrival of additional carriers sent by Combined Fleet commander Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. This delayed the Japanese invasion attempt until the end of April, which culminated in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8, 1942).

Another U.S. carrier strike occurred on February 24, when aircraft from the *Enterprise* attacked Wake Island. Then on March 4, its planes hit Marcus Island, halfway between Wake and Iwo Jima near the Japanese Bonin Islands and only 1,000 miles from Tokyo. Damage inflicted was slight.

On March 6, the *Yorktown* rendezvoused with TF 11 centered on the *Lexington* and, under the command of Vice Admiral Brown, steamed for Rabaul and Gasmata to attack Japanese shipping there in an effort to check the Japanese advance and cover the landing of Allied troops at Nouméa, New Caledonia. The task force was the most powerful assembled by the United States to date. Centered on the two carriers, it contained 8 heavy cruisers (7 U.S. and 1 Australian) and 14 destroyers. As TF 11 was steaming toward Rabaul, it received word that on March 7, Japanese forces had landed in the Huon Gulf on the northeast coast of Papua New Guinea at Salamaua and at Lae.

This led Brown to change his objective from Rabaul to the Salamaua-Lae area. On the morning of March 10, the two carriers launched 104 aircraft from the Gulf of Papua. The planes would thus have to fly north some 125 miles, over the Owen Stanley Mountains, to reach their objective. This difficult route, however, provided both security for the task force and surprise for the attacking aircraft.

Complete surprise was achieved, and there was no Japanese air opposition. After strafing and bombing Japanese ships and troops ashore, the planes returned to the carriers with only one Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless dive-bomber lost to Japanese antiaircraft fire. The Japanese suffered four transports sunk and a number of other vessels damaged.

A month later, the Americans carried out their most ambitious attack to date, the first U.S. bombing raid on the Japanese home islands. The Tokyo Raid of April 18, 1942, usually known as the Doolittle Raid for its commander, U.S. Army Air Forces lieutenant colonel James H. Doolittle,

saw 16 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers fly off the carrier *Hornet*, with the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* along to provide air cover. Although the least successful of the U.S. carrier raids in military terms, it was spectacular in its propaganda value. The Tokyo Raid led the Japanese to shift aircraft for the defense of their home islands, formalized decisions already taken in Tokyo to expand the Japanese outer defensive ring, and silenced critics of Admiral Yamamoto's plan to draw out the U.S. fleet and destroy it. On May 5, Imperial Headquarters directed Yamamoto to carry out his plan to occupy Midway Island and key points in the western Aleutians. This set up the decisive June 3–6 Battle of Midway.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Brown, Wilson, Jr.; Coral Sea, Battle of the; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Midway, Battle of; Nimitz, Chester William; Rabaul; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tokyo Raid; Yamamoto Isoroku; Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers

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United States Navy Carrier Raid against Japan (February 10–18, 1945)

The first U.S. carrier strike against the Japanese home islands since the Tokyo (Doolittle) Raid of April 18, 1942, the operation of February 10–18, 1945, was intended as a diversion prior to the U.S. assault of Iwo Jima but also to destroy as many Japanese aircraft as possible.

Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, had wanted to hit the Japanese home islands since October, but circumstances would not permit this. On January 16, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and his staff relieved Halsey and his staff, and the Third Fleet again became the Fifth

Fleet. At the same time, Vice Admiral Mark A. Mitscher relieved Vice Admiral John S. McCain as commander of the Fast Carrier Force, and Task Force (TF) 38 now became TF 58. It thus fell to Spruance to carry out the raid.

TF 58 was organized into five task groups (TG.1 through TG.5), comprising in all 11 fleet carriers, 5 light carriers, 8 battleships, 1 battle cruiser, 5 heavy cruisers, 9 light cruisers, and 77 destroyers. Spruance flew his flag in the heavy cruiser *Indianapolis*. There was some apprehension over the raid, as half of the carrier air groups would be undertaking their first mission. To enhance protection against anticipated kamikaze attacks, the number of fighters aboard the fleet carriers were increased to 73 F4U Corsairs and F6F Hellcats. They also each carried 30 dive-bombers and torpedo bombers.

TF 58 departed Ulithi Atoll on February 10. Everything possible was done to conceal its objective, including radio deceptions and the employment of long-range reconnaissance aircraft. Deception was accomplished thanks to thick weather, which also affected subsequent air operations.

The carriers arrived at their launch position some 60 miles south of Honshu and 125 miles southeast of Tokyo by dawn on February 16. Although flying conditions were poor, air strikes commenced immediately, with the first target being the airfields around Tokyo Bay. Following strikes on these and aircraft factories, the attackers shifted their attention to shipping. Air strikes continued until late on February 17, when deteriorating weather forced Spruance to depart. Japanese reaction was sporadic and light.

Results were substantial although hardly spectacular. TF 58 aircraft claimed a number of ships and small craft sunk in Tokyo Bay. More impressive results were registered against airfields and factories. Although the figures are undoubtedly high, TF 58 claimed 341 Japanese aircraft shot down in the air and 190 destroyed on the ground. U.S. losses were 60 planes in combat and 28 to operational causes from 738 sorties, although a total of 2,761 sorties were flown, including combat air patrols.

TG 58.2 and TG 58.3 arrived off Iwo Jima on February 18, ready to support the marine assault there the next day.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Iwo Jima, Battle for; Kamikaze; McCain, John Sidney, Sr.; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Spruance, Raymond Ames; Tokyo Raid

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United States Neutrality Acts

During the 1930s, the U.S. Congress passed five neutrality acts, each prompted by isolationists in Congress who hoped to keep the United States out of the expanding conflicts in Europe and Asia. The isolationists were influenced in part by the considerable public disillusionment regarding American involvement in World War I.

The Senate Munitions Committee, more commonly referred to as the Nye Committee (named after Republican senator Gerald Nye) and in existence from 1934 to 1936, spent some 18 months examining the U.S. munitions industries during World War I. The committee's chief task was to prove the "merchants of death" theory: that munitions makers had unduly influenced the U.S. decision to enter World War I in 1917. While the Nye Committee could offer no solid evidence of such influence, its report did little to alter the public perception to the contrary. If anything, the committee's high-profile inquiry only added to the then-prevailing isolationist sentiment.

The Neutrality Acts contained an inherent flaw—they prevented any assistance to "belligerents" without regard to aggression. The Neutrality Act of 1935 prohibited the sale of arms to belligerents but allowed the sale of raw materials and the extension of loans. The 1936 act, however, blocked the sale of raw materials and outlawed extending credit to belligerents.

In 1937, Congress passed two acts. The first redefined belligerents to include civil war combatants, and the second prohibited Americans from booking passage on ships registered to belligerent nations. This act was designed to prevent events such as the German sinking of the British

passenger liner *Lusitania* in May 1915, which had claimed 128 American lives.

Following Germany's September 1, 1939, invasion of Poland, President Franklin Roosevelt called Congress into special session to repeal the arms embargo in order to assist Britain and France in resisting Germany and to include a ban on American citizens and ships sailing into specified danger zones. In the debate, isolationists claimed that the new legislation would change the rules to assist one side against the other and would also mean that the United States would have a vested interest in seeing that side win. Those arguing for repeal pointed out that the prevailing legislation was unneutral in that it discriminated against those powers that were victims of aggression, while the aggressor states were already well armed.

The Fourth Neutrality Act was passed in November 1939. It allowed the sale of arms and raw materials to all belligerents on a "cash-and-carry" basis. It also established the proscribed danger zones in the Atlantic. The act offered a tremendous advantage to Britain, with the largest surface fleet in the world. Extensions of credit remained prohibited, however, and the British treasury was virtually empty by 1941. In November 1941, most of the restrictions of the Neutrality Acts were lifted with passage of the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941.

The Neutrality Acts did not serve to isolate the United States from the growing maelstrom of World War II. If anything, they may have placed the United States in an unnecessarily vulnerable position, as the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor clearly demonstrated. The acts hampered President Franklin Roosevelt's ability to prepare the nation for war and also hamstrung his ability to come to the aid of key U.S. allies. Roosevelt found it increasingly necessary to circumvent Congress and the Neutrality Acts as war crept ever closer in 1940 and 1941. Some critics charge that Roosevelt wrongly usurped congressional prerogatives in doing so, but in the end he was acting as commander in chief, charged with protecting the nation against aggression. If any blame is to be laid, it was Congress—more than the president—that created the situation in which the White House felt the need to clandestinely circumvent congressional authority.

PAUL J. SPRINGER AND PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Lend-Lease; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States; Document 8; Document 9; Document 13; Document 116

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United States Pacific Fleet

Established in 1920, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was commanded in December 1941 by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and based at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The fleet had been moved there by order of President Franklin Roosevelt the previous February. Kimmel was relieved of his command following the December 7 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and was followed by Admiral (later Fleet Admiral) Chester W. Nimitz, who assumed command there on December 25, 1941.

Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Pacific Fleet had been organized into a Battle Force and a Scouting Force (there were also a Base Force and an Amphibious Force). Nimitz reorganized it into four task forces, each centered on a fleet aircraft carrier with accompanying cruisers and destroyers. Scouting duties were left to aircraft and submarines. Although there were half a dozen battleships available (three were transferred from the Atlantic), these were a good deal slower than the carriers and thus could not operate with them. They were relegated to convoy, patrol, and shore bombardment duties. The navy's offensive firepower was now centered in the aircraft carriers, the new dreadnoughts. When the fast battleships came into service, they served the additional useful function of providing antiaircraft protection for the carriers.

In March 1942, Nimitz was also given command of all U.S. naval forces in the Pacific Ocean Area. This was divided into the North Pacific, Central Pacific, and South Pacific Areas. Then on March 15, 1943, the Seventh Fleet was formed at Brisbane, Australia. It was first commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpenter, but in November Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid replaced him. Known as "MacArthur's Navy," it operated under General

Douglas MacArthur, commander of the South Pacific theater. The South Pacific command became the Third Fleet, also on March 15, 1943. It was commanded by Admiral William F. Halsey, who answered to Nimitz. In June 1944, its onshore headquarters was moved to Pearl Harbor. The fleet operated in and around the Solomon Islands, the Philippine Islands, Formosa (now Taiwan), Okinawa, and the Ryukyus. It also was stationed in Japanese waters at the end of the war.

To improve efficiency, Nimitz worked out a system whereby staffs rotated in command for major operations. The ships were the same. When Halsey and his staff were in command, it was designated as the Third Fleet. But when Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and his staff were in command, it became the Fifth Fleet. The system extended to some subordinate commanders. Thus, Fast Carrier Task Force (TF) 38 of the Third Fleet was commanded by Vice Admiral John S. McCain, but when the carriers were part of the Fifth Fleet, they became TF 58 under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher. First Australian and then British naval units operated with the fleet under U.S. command.

This system worked perfectly, giving staffs some downtime and the opportunity to plan the next strike, which they would then execute. An ancillary benefit was that this deceived the Japanese into believing that they were two separate fleets operating against them.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Carpenter, Arthur Schuyler; Kimmel, Husband Edward; Kinkaid, Thomas Cassin; MacArthur, Douglas; McCain, John Sidney, Sr.; Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Nimitz, Chester William; Spruance, Raymond Ames

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United States War Production Board

U.S. government agency responsible for industrial and economic mobilization as well as raw materials allocation and military procurement. The War Production Board (WPB) was established by executive order on January 16, 1942, only weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The WPB replaced the already-existing Office of Production Management (OPM) as well as the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB). The WPB's principal responsibilities were to convert civilian industry to armaments production, establish and assign production priorities, allocate or ration strategic or scarce materials, control prices and wages, and procure military end items for the armed services.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Donald M. Nelson, who had been the executive vice president of Sears and Roebuck and who had also headed the SPAB earlier, to administer the WPB. In theory, Nelson's powers were sweeping, with the authority to control the entirety of the American economy. In practice, however, Nelson found himself in a continual tug-of-war with military leaders and oftentimes immersed in bureaucratic turf wars that resulted in considerable duplication and waste.

The WPB followed prevailing business models of the day that combined centralized policy making and decision making with decentralized implementation and operations. Thus, the WPB operated 12 regional offices throughout the United States and 120 field offices, which worked directly with local industries. The board also established advisory boards made up chiefly of businessmen and industrialists and created similar groupings to help set and enforce policies and report on war production.

The membership of the WPB included the chairman; the vice chairman; the secretaries of war, navy, and agriculture; the federal loan administrator (who helped businessmen with loans to expand factories and facilities); the chairman of the Economic Warfare Office; the administrator of the Office of Price Administration; an army lieutenant general in charge of military production; and a special presidential assistant who helped supervise the expansion of America's industrial base. Nelson soon realized that a system would have to be developed to prioritize industrial needs and allocate scarce or strategic raw materials in order to meet the needs of the military and provide for some modicum of civilian production.

In the autumn of 1942, Nelson appointed Ferdinand Eberstadt vice chairman of the WPB and chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

Within months, Eberstadt had devised an efficient system known as the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), which simultaneously prioritized the needs of the military and industrial manufacturers so that the proper end items were produced at the right time and in the right quantity. This was accomplished principally through the strict allocation of three critical raw materials: steel, aluminum, and copper. The CMP proved to be highly effective and significantly enhanced wartime production.

The WPB also organized scrap metal drives, helped educate consumers on the importance of war production and thriftiness, prohibited nonessential production, and helped businessmen expand or reconvert their factories through government subsidies and low-cost government-backed loans. There are myriad examples of how the war reordered the economy. Auto factories stopped making cars and instead made tanks and airplanes, typewriter makers began to make machine guns, and companies that made silk scarves and ribbons made parachutes; there was even a roller-coaster company that began manufacturing repair platforms for bombers. From 1942 to 1945, the WPB oversaw the production of $185 billion in armaments and military supplies of all sorts. In 1940, about 6,000 aircraft were built in U.S. factories; by 1943, that number had skyrocketed to 85,000.

Despite the quantitative success of the WPB, wartime production was fraught with difficulties. Nelson later reported that the War and Navy Departments as well as the powerful Army and Navy Munitions Board had nearly wrested away from him control of the economy. The system contained much waste, which was heavily criticized by Senator Harry S. Truman’s Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, and some criticized Nelson for having ceded too many prerogatives to the military. Indeed, by vesting much of the power to procure with the military, Nelson had perhaps unwittingly permitted the military to control the entirety of the process.

Nelson left the WPB in 1944 and was replaced by Julius S. Krug, who had worked for the OPM. The WPB’s work was terminated by executive order on October 4, 1945. It was replaced by the Civilian Production Board (CPB), an agency within the Executive Office of the President. The CPB was charged with supervising demobilization and industrial reconversion.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Armaments Production; Eberstadt, Ferdinand; Krug, Julius Albert; Nelson, Donald Marr; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; United States

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United States Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service

U.S. Navy Women's Reserve (1942–1948). The acronym WAVES stood for Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service. The WAVES was established on July 30, 1942, under Public Law 689, H.R. 6807, an amendment to the Naval Reserve Act of 1938. The first director of the WAVES, Lieutenant Commander Mildred McAfee, was also president of Wellesley College in Massachusetts.

Public Law 689 specifically stated that the WAVES would remain restricted to the continental United States and not serve on board naval vessels or aircraft. This restriction is, however, misleading, as women did serve on vessels and in combat areas as nurses in the Navy Nurses Corps, established in 1908. The restriction keeping WAVES in the continental United States did not last, and by September 1944, they were allowed to volunteer for duty in Alaska, Hawaii, the Caribbean, and Panama. By the end of the war, women constituted nearly 2 percent of the U.S. Navy. In some areas, such as the Navy Department in Washington, over half the uniformed personnel were WAVES.

A recruiting poster for the U.S. Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), 1943. (Library of Congress)

WAVES served in many noncombat roles during the war. Eighty were naval air navigators. Some trained future naval aviators in instrument flying and served as gunner's mates to teach men antiaircraft gunnery. Others were involved with decoding messages or with the hospital corps. Well over 85,000 women served in the WAVES during World War II. A study conducted in 1944 showed that the WAVES then in service released from noncombat duties enough male personnel to man 10 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, 28 cruisers, and 50 destroyers. There were also a Coast Guard women's auxiliary, the SPARS (combining the Latin and English versions of the Coast Guard motto, Semper Paratus, meaning "always ready") and the Marine Corps Women's Reserve.

The WAVES became a permanent part of the navy in 1948 when Congress passed the Women's Armed Service Integration Act (Public Law

625). This step eventually led to the full integration into the armed forces of all women's units in the 1970s.

SUZANNE SCOTT FINNEY

See also

United States Navy; Women in World War II

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United States Women's Air Force Service Pilots

U.S. organization that trained and utilized women as pilots during World War II. The Women's Air Force Service Pilots (WASP) attracted more than 25,000 female pilots, of whom 1,879 were accepted; 1,074 graduated from the training program. Thirty-eight women lost their lives while performing their duties as military pilots.

On September 10, 1942, Nancy Harkness Love, with the support of the U.S. Air Transport Command, organized 25 women pilots into the Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS). The WAFS was charged with delivering aircraft from factories to military bases. By 1943, the Army Air Forces (AAF) recognized the importance of the work being done by this small detachment of WAFS pilots and decided to expand it to include the many qualified women pilots volunteering their services.

On November 16, 1942, Jacqueline Cochran, America's foremost aviatrix, established the Women's Flying Training Detachment (WFTD) in Houston, Texas. When the organization was moved to Avenger Field in Sweetwater, Texas, Cochran began accepting women into an intensive training program. She convinced the chief of the Army Air Forces, General Henry "Hap" Arnold, that she could successfully bring together a corps of

women pilots. She promised that if they were given the same training that male AAF cadets received, the women would be equally capable of flying military aircraft and could relieve male pilots needed for combat duty. The first class began training on November 16, 1942. After graduation, the pilots were stationed at army air bases across the United States.

On August 5, 1943, the WAFS and the WFTD merged to form the Women's Air Force Service Pilots, with Cochran as director of the WASP and its Training Division and Love as director of the Ferrying Division. WASP pilots flew more than 60 million miles in every type of aircraft, from the fastest fighters to heavy four-engine bombers, and on every type of stateside mission flown by the Army Air Forces except combat.

WASP pilots ferried planes, tested them, delivered them for repair, performed check flights, put flying time on new engines, towed targets for antiaircraft gunnery practice, flew searchlight tracking missions, and instructed male pilot cadets. WASP pilots delivered and flew 77 different types of aircraft, with a total of 12,650 planes transported across the United States.

Cochran pressed for full militarization of the WASP. In 1944, she and Arnold went before Congress to promote a bill that would make the WASP a women's service within the Army Air Forces. On June 21, 1944, despite vigorous lobbying efforts, the bill was defeated by 19 votes. On December 20, 1944, the WASP was disbanded.

In September 1977, a select House subcommittee on veteran affairs heard testimony on H.R. 3277, which recognized WASP service as active duty in the armed forces and entitled the women to veterans' benefits. On October 19, 1977, Senator Barry Goldwater attached the bill as an amendment of the GI Bill Improvement Act, H.R. 8701. The bill passed the House, and on November 23, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed it into law.

AMY GOODPASTER STREBE

See also

Arnold, Henry Harley "Hap"; Cochran, Jacqueline; Love, Nancy Harkness; United States Army Air Forces; Women in World War II

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United States Women's Army Corps

As the United States moved closer to war, many women expressed an interest in assisting the U.S. military. By the spring of 1941, Edith Nourse Rogers, a U.S. congresswoman from Massachusetts, had prepared legislation that outlined the formation of a women's military corps. She sought legal benefits and protection that had been denied to contract and volunteer nurses in previous wars. However, reluctant to give women military recognition equivalent to that granted to men, the War Department ensured that the bill under consideration did not entitle women to full military benefits.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, underscored the need for women who could perform routine noncombat work and thereby free men for combat duties. U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall encouraged a resistant Congress to pass a bill creating the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC) in May 1942.

Oveta Culp Hobby, head of the Women's Interest Section in the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations, became the WAAC commanding officer. Assigned the rank of major, she oversaw the enlistment of qualified applicants. Recruitment posters for the WAAC featured a uniformed woman standing in front of an American flag and above it the statement "This Is My War Too!" The WAAC was open to women who were 21 to 45 years of age without dependents and who met minimum physical requirements. Marital status was not a factor. Applicants went to army recruitment stations, where interviewers evaluated their abilities and skills. The women also took aptitude tests and had to pass physical examinations.

Every applicant wrote an essay to explain her motivation to join the corps. Many sought service for patriotic reasons and to help bring the war to an earlier end. Economic incentives motivated many, as women enjoyed having employment and professional opportunities unavailable to them in

peacetime. Some considered wartime service as a valuable work experience that would be helpful in acquiring jobs in the future. The potential for adventure lured many.

Initial WAAC officer candidates trained at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, and were commissioned in September 1942. The officers then trained the first 12,200 enlistees for the 150,000 WAAC positions authorized by Congress. Instructors taught the enlistees basic military skills as well as military customs and protocol. Women also practiced first-aid techniques and drilled to acquire discipline and physical fitness. WAACs perfected administrative procedures for assignments to supply and company positions.

At first, WAACs were deployed to assignments such as translation and folding parachutes. Although many WAACs served in nursing or clerical roles, some utilized mechanical skills for radio operation and motor pool duties. Later, WAACs were trained at specialist schools and sent to assignments where their skills were needed. Some attended officer candidate school. Officials often assigned WAACs to U.S. military bases where they could perform routine tasks so that male soldiers could be sent overseas more quickly. WAACs were assigned to such specialty units as the Transportation Corps, the Chemical Warfare Service, the Signal Corps, the Army Medical Department, Army Ground Forces, and the Corps of Engineers (where some worked on the Manhattan Project).

Some WAACs served overseas. The 149th Post Headquarters Company, assigned to Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower at Algiers, was the first to deploy, in January 1943. Women also served with Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark’s Fifth Army in Africa and Italy, often near the front lines.

WAACs encountered varying attitudes toward their service. Many male officers and soldiers accepted their presence, but some men disliked them and attempted to make their service difficult. WAACs occasionally faced unfair disciplinary actions or endured verbal abuse and hostility. Such treatment, health concerns, fear, disillusionment with military service, or family pressure led some WAACs to ask to be discharged. Others deserted. Military officials could not court-martial these women, because the WAACs did not have full military status.

In July 1943, legislation reorganized the WAAC into the Women’s Army Corps (WAC), granting women the same military status as male troops. WAACs who wanted to transfer to the WAC as soldiers were expected to

meet more demanding standards, including more thorough medical examinations. Each also had to secure the recommendation of her commander. Approximately 75 percent of the WAACs transferred. Oveta Culp Hobby held the highest WAC rank, that of colonel.

Women of the 149th Post Headquarters Company, the first U.S. Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) unit in overseas service about to depart for their assignment in North Africa in 1943. (R. Gates/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Soon after the establishment of the WAC, the U.S. Eighth Air Force asked for the services of a WAC battalion. The first WACs assigned there went to London in July 1943. Notable WAC service included providing assistance to the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion. WACs plotted bomber positions, collected intelligence, censored soldiers' mail, and served as cryptographers. Only women considered sufficiently mature and stable were selected to serve in Europe.

Most commanders recognized the competence and efficiency of the WACs. Ultimately, the army requested as many as 600,000 women in the corps. That demand was never met because many women preferred higher-paying jobs on the home front or joined rival military auxiliaries. Overall, approximately 150,000 served in the corps. Many were awarded Purple Hearts for wounds they received. Others received Air Medals, Bronze Stars, and other citations.

Although it consisted primarily of whites (94 percent), the corps also represented the diverse population of the United States. Some 4,000 African Americans as well as Hispanic, Asian, and Native American women served in the corps. As with other military units at that time, African American units were segregated, but Hobby sought improvements such as the integration of black officers and equitable salaries for WACs.

An estimated 2,000 WACs chose to enlist after World War II. Most of the women, however, were honorably discharged at the end of the conflict. The public reception given to returning WACs was generally apathetic and unappreciative; men, not women, were regarded as war heroes. Because of their military status, WAC veterans were, like their male colleagues, eligible for such benefits as the GI Bill, but they often had to fight legally to receive health care from the Veterans Administration.

The WAC enabled women to seek careers in the postwar military, although many initially encountered difficulties in achieving ranks and pay equivalent to their service achievements. In 1948, the Women's Armed Services Integration Act incorporated the WAC as a corps within the U.S. Army. Thirty years later the separate corps came to an end, and female soldiers joined the army directly instead of the WAC.

ELIZABETH D. SCHAFER

See also

Hobby, Oveta Culp; Marshall, George Catlett; United States; Women in World War II

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United States Women's Land Army

U.S. government program to provide agricultural labor to the nation's farmers, loosely based on the British program of the same name. By mid-1943, an extreme shortage of farm labor forced the government to develop a comprehensive plan to assist farmers. The Emergency Farm Labor Program, Public Law 45, under the control of the Department of Agriculture and Extension Service, created several farm labor programs, including the Women's Land Army (WLA). As part of the Emergency Farm Labor Program, the WLA brought women to the forefront of agricultural labor. Beginning in April 1943 and continuing to the end of 1945, the WLA recruited, hired, and placed more than 3 million farm and nonfarm women over the age of 18, putting them to work in full- or part-time positions on American farms.

Mirroring the New Deal program structure, the WLA established a national office under the direction of home economist Florence L. Hall. It disseminated information and money to state-level organizations run by extension agents. The national WLA mandated federal policy for its members, whereas state programs implemented plans for housing, insurance, local transportation, uniforms, and equitable wages. In 1943, 13 states had full-time WLA supervisors, and 30 states had part-time supervisors. In some states where the WLA organization was quite large, state supervisors were assisted by county supervisors who worked at the local level. Successful state supervisors planned recruitment campaigns, organized camps for women workers, provided training courses, opened child care centers, and monitored farmer/worker opinion of the WLA.

States without the WLA or the Emergency Farm Labor Program in place hired women through local labor initiatives.

Farmers in the western and eastern coastal regions of the United States readily accepted and hired female labor in 1943 and throughout the war.

Continuing a prewar trend, eastern and western states supported the use of women in agricultural labor to harvest perishable crops. But even though much of the nation favored wartime domestic policy, some areas of the country resisted the placement of nonfarm women on farms. States in the South and Midwest, historically opposed to nonfarm and middle-class women in the fields, did not accept the WLA in 1943. In the Midwest, the opposition to nonfarm women in agriculture left farms understaffed and crops unharvested.

In the South, racial issues plagued several states and state labor programs. In 1943, some southern states made a conscious effort to recruit only white women, effectively preventing African American women from joining the organization. In 1944 and 1945 as the labor situation became dire, it proved impossible to hire African American women, as many had left the region or taken jobs in industry.

Most midwestern and southern farmers who protested the WLA in 1943 would ultimately use women as farm laborers by the end of the war; in all, several hundred thousand women would work on farms in these regions. Farmers in the Great Plains and eastern Rocky Mountains, however, remained opposed—sacrificing agricultural production and money—to having women as farmworkers.

By the end of 1945, farmers for the most part had accepted the WLA, and agricultural production goals were met. The Emergency Farm Labor Program continued until 1947, but the WLA ended with World War II.

STEPHANIE CARPENTER

See also

Great Britain, Women's Land Army; Women in World War II

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Upham, Charles (1908–1994)

New Zealander captain who was awarded the Victoria Cross (VC) twice for his service in World War II. Born on September 21, 1908, at Christchurch, New Zealand, Charles Upham was the only British Commonwealth soldier in the war to win the VC and Bar and only the third soldier in history to do so. He was actually recommended for the VC three times, but the last two recommendations were consolidated into a single award.

Upham won his first VC as a second lieutenant in the 20th Battalion, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, on Crete for actions between May 22 and 30, 1941. At Minqar Qaim in North Africa while in command of a company, he was recommended for his second VC when, on the night of June 27, 1942, he single-handedly attacked a stalled column of German trucks armed with a sandbag full of hand grenades. At Ruweisat Ridge, he was severely wounded twice on the night of July 14–15 but refused evacuation. When the Germans attacked his company for the last time, he led the counterattack, personally destroying a German tank and several guns. He kept going until he passed out from loss of blood.

Captured, Upham spent the rest of the war as a prisoner of war (POW), but he received a third VC recommendation for his conduct at Ruweisat Ridge. After his many attempts to escape, the Germans finally sent Upham to Colditz, where he remained until he was freed by American forces in 1945. Even then, he demanded that his rescuers give him an American uniform and a weapon and allow him to accompany them as they pursued the retreating Germans.

Following his repatriation, Upham's two pending VC recommendations were resurrected from the files where they had sat while he was a POW. For whatever reason, the British military could not accept the idea of a soldier with three VCs, so he essentially received the Bar for the Ruweisat Ridge action. After being decorated in London by King George VI, Upham returned to his native New Zealand and became a sheep farmer. For the remainder of his life, he resisted all urging to enter politics or to exploit in any way his status as one of the greatest Allied heroes of World War II. Upham died in Christchurch, New Zealand, on November 22, 1994.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Crete, Battle of; New Zealand; North Africa Campaign; Ruweisat Ridge, Battles of

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Urquhart, Robert Elliot (1901–1988)

British Army major general. Born on November 28, 1901, in Shepperton, Surrey, England, Robert "Roy" Elliot Urquhart was educated at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He was commissioned into the Highland Light Infantry in 1920 and served in various locations. Urquhart attended the Staff College at Camberley from 1935 to 1937. Assigned to duty with the 1st (Abbottabad) Gurkha Infantry Brigade in India, he was in that post at the beginning of World War II.

In December 1940, as an acting lieutenant colonel, Urquhart was appointed chief of staff of the 3rd Infantry Division. In March 1941, he took command of a battalion in the 4th Infantry Division, and in April 1942, he was assigned to the 51st Highland Division and saw action in North Africa. Promoted to brigadier, Urquhart commanded the 231st Malta Brigade. Redesignated the 231st Infantry Brigade, the unit fought in Sicily and on the Italian Peninsula. Urquhart was wounded in the amphibious operation near Pizzo on September 8, 1943.

Urquhart then served in a staff assignment with XII Corps in the United Kingdom. In January 1944, Lieutenant General Frederick "Boy" Browning selected Urquhart to command the British 1st Airborne Division in Britain as a major general. Not an airborne soldier, he was selected because of his battle experience.

Urquhart's 1st Airborne Division participated in Operation MARKET-GARDEN (September 17–26, 1944), Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's abortive effort to secure the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem and end the war in 1944. The 1st Airborne Division, which had jumped in North Africa and in

Italy but not in the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, had the most difficult assignment in the operation: to seize the bridge at Arnhem. Not parachute-qualified, Urquhart flew by glider to the Arnhem landing zone on September 14. The 8,000 British forces there were widely scattered and soon encountered German armor; Urquhart himself barely escaped capture. His force held out much longer than intended, but with the land force not making contact, the 2,200 survivors were evacuated on September 25–26.

Urquhart reverted to his permanent rank of colonel after the war and served in the War Office. Promoted again to major general, he commanded the 16th Airborne Division during 1947 and 1948; thereafter, he was given appointments as commander in Malaya from 1950 to 1952 and commander of British troops in Austria from 1952 to 1955. He then retired and became director of a civilian engineering firm in Glasgow, Scotland. Urquhart died at Menteith, Scotland, on December 13, 1988.

JAMES M. BATES

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Browning, Frederick; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation

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Ushijima Mitsuru (1887–1945)

Japanese Army general. Born on July 31, 1887, in Kagoshima Prefecture, Japan, Ushijima Mitsuru graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1901 and the Army War College in 1916. He held major military posts as a staff officer and a commander of troops both within and outside Japan. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1939, he assumed the post of head of the Military Academy three years later.

Arriving in Okinawa in August 1944, Ushijima took command of the Thirty-Second Army. That unit had been established under direct control of the imperial headquarters in March 1944 specifically for the purpose of

defending the Ryukyu Islands. By that time, the Thirty-Second Army numbered four divisions and five mixed brigades. However, its military potential was hugely diminished when the 9th Division, one of the elite units in the army, was relocated to Taiwan (Formosa) in December and not replaced on Okinawa.

Ushijima did what he could to strengthen the island's defenses, but the loss of his best division forced him to change his strategy from pursuing a "fight to the finish" to instigating delaying tactics. The goal of this strategy was to prolong the battle against U.S. forces in order to forestall a landing in the main Japanese home islands as long as possible.

The invasion of Okinawa began on March 26, 1945, when the U.S. forces landed on the Kerama Islands. On April 1, those forces went ashore on Okinawa proper. The landing was deceptively easy, as Ushijima had withdrawn the bulk of his forces to contest the populous interior. Fighting continued into late June. With the battle lost, Ushijima committed ritual suicide on a cliff on June 23 (June 22, according to another account), leaving as his last orders: "Guard your own position, follow the orders of your superiors, and fight bravely to the last breath for your homeland." Ushijima had been promoted to full general on June 20, just prior to his death.

TOMOYUKI TAKEMOTO

See also

Okinawa, Invasion of

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U.S. Submarine Operations against Japan (1941–1945)

One day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, chief of naval operations Admiral Harold R. Stark declared unrestricted

submarine warfare against Japan. On the outbreak of the war, the U.S. Navy's Asiatic and Pacific fleets' submarine forces included 55 large boats and 18 medium-sized ones (out of a total of 111). Some 73 submarines were under construction.

Yet, until April 1, 1942, U.S. submarines sank only a modest 93,300 tons of Japanese shipping, less than one-tenth of what an average of 100 operational German submarines sank in the same period. At this stage of the war, U.S. submarine operations suffered from the early loss of the Philippines, for which the poorly developed Australian submarine bases could not compensate. In addition, the campaign was hobbled by a doctrine that required submarines to concentrate on enemy heavy warships and by the chronic problems of the Mark XIV torpedoes.

Following the erratic performance in 1942 that yielded a total of 620,616 tons of Japanese merchant shipping, the U.S. submarine campaign gathered pace in 1943. The smaller S-class coastal submarine and the T-class fleet submarines were gradually replaced by the larger and more capable submarines of the Gato, Balao, and Tench classes.

Beginning in mid-1942, the U.S. Navy began installing the first SJ (10cm) surface search radars in the submarines, which further enhanced their combat value (German submarines, by comparison, only received radars in mid-1944), and in October 1943, the torpedo problems were finally resolved.

The Japanese mercantile fleet amounted to 6.4 million tons at the time of Pearl Harbor. Following the cessation of neutral shipping to Japan, this volume was barely sufficient to cover the needs for industrial and civilian imports (3 million tons) and the movement of troops and supplies across the sea. The situation was briefly alleviated by the capture of 1 million tons of merchant ships during the Japanese advance in early 1942. By mid-1943, however, the U.S. submarine campaign had already eaten up these small gains made by captures and new construction.

In 1943, the U.S. submarine service was fully committed to the war against the Japanese sea lines of communications, even though an operational order issued by Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in June 1943 still listed aircraft carriers and battleships as prime targets. Key traffic patterns of Japanese shipping had been identified, and U.S. submarines operating from Pearl Harbor and Australian bases conducted systematic patrols of such choke points as the Luzon bottleneck.

Because the Japanese Navy failed to respond to the increasing threat and organize valuable transports and cargo vessels into convoys, Japan lost 1.668 million tons of merchant shipping in 1943, with submarines accounting for 1.34 million tons of the total. Imports into Japan fell from 35 million tons in 1942 (already down from a peacetime level of 67 million tons) to 27 million in 1943.

In late 1943, the Japanese Navy reluctantly committed itself to convoying some of the more valuable transports and cargo ships, but the assets assigned remained woefully short of what was necessary to stem or even reduce the bloodletting. In addition, Japanese escort ships possessed neither active sonars nor radars, and their depth charges were ineffective. Nonetheless, U.S. submarine losses were substantial.

In response to the Japanese convoys, the U.S. Navy introduced the Coordinated Submarine Attack Groups—small ad hoc wolf packs. Throughout 1944, U.S. submarines continued to inflict crippling losses on the Japanese merchant marine, amounting to 2.43 million tons. In 1944, Japanese imports dropped to a mere 16 million tons. Figures for the key materials were even more alarming. Oil imports fell from 1.75 million barrels per month in August 1943 to 360,000 barrels in July 1944. After September 1943, at best only 28 percent of the petroleum shipped from the southern regions actually made it to the home islands, and during the last 15 months of the war, only an average of 9 percent did.

By the time the massive strategic air attacks began to lay waste to Japan's cities, a substantial part of the industry located therein was already idle due to the lack of materials. The destruction of more than 3 million tons of Japanese merchant shipping in 1944 left barely enough tonnage to cover the basic military requirements of Japan's army and navy, much less those of the civilian sector.

During this phase of intensive war on the enemy's sea lines of communications, the U.S. submarines also achieved some remarkable successes against Japanese warships. During the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19, 1944, U.S. submarines claimed 2 Japanese carriers (*Taihō* and *Shōkaku*), and during the prelude to the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf (for which no less than 29 submarines had been deployed), they sank 2 heavy cruisers and fatally damaged a third on October 23.

Toward the end of 1944, the diminutive Japanese escort force was raised

to the status of an escort fleet and provided with somewhat better means, including aircraft, simple radar sets, and useful depth charges. Thus, in the last quarter of 1944, the Japanese antisubmarine forces reached their peak efficiency (as did the U.S. submarines), sinking four U.S. submarines in October and another four in November. Thereafter, crushing Allied naval and air superiority and the lack of fuel oil put an end to most organized Japanese naval activities, although not before U.S. submarines had scored further spectacular successes against the Japanese fleet. In November, the U.S. submarine *Archerfish* sank the giant carrier *Shinano* on its shakedown cruise, and the *Sealion* dispatched the battleship *Kongō;* in December, the *Redfish*'s torpedoes claimed the new carrier *Unryū* in the East China Sea.

The number of U.S. submarine successes—of any kind—declined steeply in 1945 for want of suitable targets and because of a highly successful mining campaign in the Japanese home waters that year, which claimed the lion's share of the 1.6 million tons of Japanese shipping lost in 1945. U.S. submarines entered the last sanctuaries of Japanese shipping in the Sea of Japan in June 1945 to ravage the remnants of the Japanese merchant fleet but found targets exceedingly scarce thereafter. During the last months of the war, the submarines were confined to seeking what little coastal traffic had managed to escape the mine barrages and the attention of U.S. aircraft. When the war was over, Japan's merchant fleet had been reduced to 12 percent of its prewar size, and only half of the surviving ships—a paltry 312,000 tons of mostly minor vessels—were in operation due to fuel shortages.

In addition to their economic impact, the U.S. submarines played a decisive role in paralyzing Japan's maritime empire in the Western and Southwestern Pacific by denying the Japanese use of their interior lines of communications for the movement of troops and equipment by sea. Thus, they facilitated the advance of the U.S. amphibious forces, which could safely bypass the immobilized and isolated Japanese island garrisons.

The U.S. submarine service began the war with 111 boats, added 203, and lost 52 (50 of them in the Pacific). Of the 16,000 submariners who sailed on war patrols, 3,506 did not return—a casualty rate of 22 percent, the highest of all arms in the U.S. services during the war. Nevertheless, the U.S. submarine campaign in World War II was the only campaign of its type in the history of naval warfare that can be rated a complete success.

The submarines played a decisive role in the war by incapacitating

Japan's economy. Of the 7.8 million tons of Japanese merchant shipping lost between 1941 and 1945, nearly two-thirds (4.8 million tons) was sunk by U.S. submarines, which were also responsible for one-third of the Japanese warship losses.

DIRK STEFFEN

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Convoys, Axis; Japan, Navy; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Lockwood, Charles Andrew, Jr.; Nimitz, Chester William; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; Radar; *Shinano,* IJN, Sinking of; Sonar; Stark, Harold Raynsford "Betty"; Submarines; Torpedoes; United States Navy

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Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich (1908–1984)

Soviet colonel general and minister of armaments. Born in the city of Samara, Russia, on the Volga River on October 30, 1908, Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov volunteered for service in the Red Army in 1926, but his one period of active duty was cut short when his unit was demobilized the next year. Ustinov joined the Communist Party in 1927 and worked as a metals craftsman between 1927 and 1929. In 1934, he graduated from the Institute of Military Mechanical Engineering in Leningrad, where he studied artillery design. He was then a design engineer at the Bolshevik Arms Factory in Leningrad, becoming its director in 1938.

The Bolshevik factory produced considerable quantities of weapons for the 1939–1940 First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War). Ustinov's efficient management of the factory attracted the attention of Joseph Stalin, who made him commissar (minister) of armaments just after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. As armaments minister, Ustinov oversaw the

relocation of factories east from the western Soviet cities endangered by the German advance. He also dramatically increased the production of tanks and other military matériel. Commissioned colonel general of military engineers in 1944, Ustinov continued as minister of armaments well after the war, until 1957.

Appointed minister of defense in 1976, Ustinov was named a marshal of the Soviet Union that same year. He was responsible for the deployment of troops to Afghanistan in 1979 and remained minister of defense until his death in Moscow on December 20, 1984.

MICHAEL SHARE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph

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V

V-1 Buzz Bomb

The first operational cruise missile, produced by the Germans during World War II. On June 13, 1944, a British Observer Corps watch post on the Kentish coast spotted a stubby-winged aircraft with a strange engine inbound from the North Sea. Its engine made a buzzing sound as it flew overhead. This “buzz bomb” was on its way to London and was the first of more than 7,900 to be launched by Germany against Great Britain. Another 4,883 attacked Antwerp late in the war. Although only 4 of the first dozen missiles launched against Britain actually reached the island and only 1 hit its target of London, the campaign drew extensive Allied defensive and offensive reactions and gave birth to today’s cruise missile programs.

Germany’s Vergeltungswaffe 1 (Vengeance Weapon 1, or V-1) had its origins in a 1938 Luftwaffe research program to develop new aircraft propulsion systems. Given the code name Flakzielgerät (antiaircraft training device) 76 to hide its true purpose, the project was centered on the Schmidt pulse-jet engine designed in 1928. Gerhard Fieseler Werke GmbH, the manufacturer, designated it the Fi-103 Reichenberg and intended it as a test platform; however, on June 19, 1942, the Luftwaffe directed that it be developed as a flying bomb.

The first airframe flew successfully on December 24, 1942. Subsequent testing revealed and led to the correction of problems with the autopilot and airframe design. Both surface- and air-launched variants were built. The result was a 25-foot-long midwing monoplane missile with a 17.6-foot wingspan; it was fueled by inexpensive 75-octane gasoline and could deliver a 1,870-pound warhead to a target up to 200 miles away.

Guidance was simple: a gyro-based autopilot ensured that the V-1 stayed on course and at the correct altitude. A nose propeller connected to a counter determined the missile’s flight range. The propeller spun as the missile flew, and the V-1 dived when the counter reached a preset number of rotations.

This system resulted in half of the missiles landing within eight miles of the aim point. Dual fuzing made the warhead one of the most reliable of the war: fewer than 4 out of every 1,200 missiles were duds. A steam-powered catapult system was developed for the surface-launched version.

The V-1 campaign was to have begun on December 13, 1943, but delays were caused by strategy disagreements; the debate concerned whether to launch the new weapons as missiles became available or wait until stockpiles and protective bunker sites could be built to support a sustained campaign. The Allied landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944, forced a decision, and six days later, Adolf Hitler ordered the offensive to commence.

The Western Allies reacted swiftly, as they had anticipated the flying-bomb campaign. They directed hundreds of bombing sorties at the launch sites, V-1 production facilities, and the transport systems that delivered the missiles. The Allies also reinforced their antiaircraft defenses, assigning some 944 heavy guns, 700 rocket launchers, and 1,200 light antiaircraft guns as well as four Mosquito fighter-bomber squadrons and eight single-engine fighter squadrons to defend London and other strategic targets from the V-1. One daring approach was to intercept the V-1 (which was possible because of its 360-mph speed) and then carefully tip up one of its wings, causing the missile to crash.

The Germans launched slightly more than 10,000 V-1s against England. Of these, some 7,488 crossed the English Channel, and 3,957 were shot down. Of the 3,531 that made it past the defenses, 2,419 reached London. About 30 fell on Southampton and Portsmouth, and 1 made it to Manchester. The V-1 offensive killed 6,184 people and injured an additional 17,981. Although the V-1s were relatively ineffective, their use marked the beginning of a new era in weaponry.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Normandy Invasion and Campaign; V-2 Rocket

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V-2 Rocket

German strategic guided missile, first launched against London on September 8, 1944. Germany's Vergeltungswaffe 2 (Vengeance Weapon 2, or V-2) had its origins in the Versailles Treaty imposed on Germany by the Allied powers after World War I. That agreement prohibited Germany from possessing long-range artillery or military aircraft, limitations that ultimately led to a secret German Army program to develop long-range rocket artillery. The program initially focused on relatively simple solid-fuel artillery rockets, but in early 1930, the military's interest shifted to liquid-fueled rockets when Captain Walter Dornberger joined the Heereswaffenamt (Army Weapons Bureau, or HWA). A year later, Dornberger established a small research center at Kummersdorf, south of Berlin, to conduct army-controlled research into liquid-fueled rockets. Progress was slow until he recruited scientist Wernher von Braun and two of his colleagues to the program. The V-2 design team was formed.

Originally designated the Aggregat 4 (or A-4), the V-2 was based on the stated requirement for a 200-mile bombardment rocket to enter service by mid-1943. The team's first liquid-fueled rocket, the A-1, was a static proof-of-concept design that led to the A-2, first launched in 1934 from Borkum Island in the North Sea. The more powerful A-3 followed, and three years later, the project moved to a new test center at Peenemünde on the Baltic coast. Most of the A-3's early flights failed, however, with test rockets rarely getting off the launch pad. The rocket's fins and guidance systems suffered design faults because little was understood about high-speed flight and powerful-thrust rocket engines.

A German V-2 rocket at Cuxhaven on the North Sea in Germany, 1944. (Fox Photos/Getty Images)

The A-5 was built to resolve these problems. Slightly longer than the A-3 at 16 feet, the A-5 incorporated parachute-recovery, telemetry, and radio-control systems to ensure a thorough monitoring of the rocket's flight and problems. These additions and the construction of a supersonic wind tunnel greatly enhanced the designers' ability to discover and correct problems. Progress slowed significantly in 1940, however, when Adolf Hitler suspended any weapons research projects that could not be placed in production immediately.

Work accelerated again in December 1942, when the army General Staff restored the project's pre-1940 funding. In late 1943, it provided increased support, including a program involving a submerged launch from a U-boat. But on August 17–18, 1944, the Royal Air Force (RAF), which had been made aware of the program in large part by the work of the Polish underground, launched a raid on Peenemünde that killed at least 120

personnel and damaged sufficient facilities there to set the program back by some six months. Development decelerated further as equipment and personnel were dispersed to reduce the program's vulnerability. As a consequence, production of the V-2 did not begin until June 1944.

The V-2 weighed 13.6 tons and was 46 feet in overall length. Its gyroscopic autopilot controlled graphite fins located in the rocket-engine exhaust to direct the missile's flight. The early missiles used a radio-controlled fuel cutoff to control range, but most production models incorporated a gyro-integrating accelerometer for that purpose. The last models used a combination of the two systems. The rocket engine employed alcohol and liquid oxygen to generate some 55,000 pounds of thrust. The warhead consisted of 1,605 pounds of cast amatol, a relatively weak explosive that was chosen because it did not detonate when atmospheric friction drove up the missile's skin temperature. As with the V-1, warhead fuzing was extremely reliable. Of 1,150 V-2s hitting Great Britain, only two were duds.

Unlike the V-1, however, the V-2's supersonic speed and ballistic flight profile precluded in-flight intercept, forcing the Allies into an expensive bombing campaign to destroy the missiles before they could be launched. That effort was further complicated by the V-2's reliance on a mobile, quickly set up launch system. The Western Allies directed hundreds of bomber sorties at V-2 production facilities and Germany's transportation network to prevent the missiles from reaching operational units. Hundreds of other fighter-bombers conducted low-level sweeps over suspected launch areas to attack V-2 units before they fired.

The first V-2 fell on Chiswick, near London, on September 8, 1944, killing 3 people and wounding 17. Between that date and March 27, 1945, 1,054 V-2s fell on England, and 517 of these struck London. Slightly more than 2,700 Londoners perished during the V-2 raids. The port of Antwerp also came under heavy V-2 attack, with 900 missiles fired on it in the last three months of 1944.

The V-2 was expensive (one estimate suggests it cost about one-third as much as the Manhattan Project in the United States), and many have argued that resources expended on it would have been better used to develop surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to protect Germany from Allied bombing. This argument overlooks two critical elements of the V-2 program.

First, it diverted a significant portion of the Allied bombing effort. Second, SAMs require electronic guidance systems that are susceptible to countermeasures, and by 1943, the Allies enjoyed a massive superiority in this area. Viewed in that context, the V-2 was an early asymmetrical warfare system that allowed the Germans to use technologies that circumvented Allied capabilities, forcing them into expensive countermeasures with forces that might otherwise have been employed against German industry or forces on the ground.

CARL OTIS SCHUSTER

See also

Braun, Wernher von; Dornberger, Walter Robert; Peenemünde; Peenemünde Raid; Versailles, Treaty of

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Vågsøy Island Raid (December 27, 1941)

A British combined-arms operation, known as Operation ARCHERY, against German-held Vågsøy Island, Norway. It involved the cruiser *Kenya;* the destroyers *Chiddingfold, Offa*, *Onslow*, and *Oribi;* the troop transports *Prince Charles* and *Prince Leopold;* and the submarine *Tuna*. The invasion force of 570 men included No. 3 Commando, two platoons of No. 2 Commando, a medical detachment from No. 4 Commando, and a demolition unit from No. 6 Commando, along with a dozen Norwegians. The Royal Air Force provided air support. As with the earlier Operation CLAYMORE, the chief objective of the raid was Norwegian fish oil factories, the destruction of which would adversely affect German glycerine production for munitions.

Following a preliminary naval bombardment, the commandos went ashore on the morning of December 27. Opposition was light except in the town of Måløy, where a unit of German mountain troops was on leave from

the Eastern Front and bitter house-to-house fighting ensued. The raid concluded in midafternoon.

The commandos destroyed four fish factories, a considerable quantity of fish oil, ammunition and fuel stores, and some military installations. British naval forces also destroyed 10 ships in the harbor. The commandos killed some 120 Germans and captured 98. They also brought off some Norwegian collaborators and Norwegians seeking to join their country's armed forces in exile. The commandos further secured a copy of the German naval code. The attackers suffered 22 men killed and 57 wounded. The Royal Air Force lost eight aircraft.

This raid and the earlier Operation CLAYMORE helped convince German chancellor Adolf Hitler to send an additional 30,000 German troops to Norway and to take steps to upgrade its coastal defenses.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

CLAYMORE, Operation; Signals Intelligence

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Vandegrift, Alexander Archer (1887–1973)

U.S. Marine Corps general. Born on March 13, 1887, in Charlottesville, Virginia, Alexander Archer Vandegrift attended the University of Virginia from 1906 to 1908 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in 1909. Much of his early years in the Marine Corps were spent in Latin America and the Caribbean. He served in the intervention in Haiti in 1915 and again in 1916–1918 and 1919–1923. He subsequently served with the Marine Expeditionary Force in China in 1927–1929 and again in 1935–1937. During 1937–1941 he was secretary and then assistant to Major General Thomas Holcomb, Marine Corps commandant. Vandegrift was

promoted to brigadier general in April 1940 and to major general in March 1942.

Vandegrift assumed command of the 1st Marine Division in April 1942 and led it on Guadalcanal from August to December 1942. The division's success was due largely to the training program that he instituted. In three months of hard fighting and despite the haphazard nature of air and naval support, Vandegrift and his men gradually pushed back the Japanese forces. For his actions in the Battle of Tenaru River (August 21) and the Battle of Bloody Ridge (September 12), Vandegrift received the Navy Cross and the Medal of Honor.

Promoted to lieutenant general in July 1943, Vandegrift commanded the I Marine Amphibious Corps during its assault on Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, on November 2, 1943. Using deception and a careful choice of landing sites, his forces surprised the Japanese ashore and quickly established a beachhead. On the successful completion of this operation, Vandegrift returned to the United States to serve as commandant of the Marine Corps from January 1, 1944. He was promoted to full (four-star) general in April 1945 with date of rank from March 21, 1945, becoming the first marine to achieve that rank. Vandegrift was commandant until December 31, 1947, when he left active service. He was placed on the retired list on April 1, 1949. Vandegrift died in Bethesda, Maryland, on May 8, 1973.

C. J. HORN

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Bougainville Campaign; Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of; Guadalcanal Land Campaign

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Vandenberg, Arthur Hendrick (1884–1951)

Influential U.S. Republican senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during 1947–1949. Born in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on March 22, 1884, Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg spent one year at the University of Michigan before leaving for financial reasons. He went on to become a politically influential newspaper reporter and editor, loyal to the Republican Party. Appointed senator for Michigan in 1928, he won reelection that year and again in 1934, 1940, and 1946.

Mildly progressive domestically and predominantly isolationist on foreign policy, during the 1930s Vandenberg served on the Nye Committee that investigated the munitions industry's role in precipitating American entry into World War I. He supported, with reservations, American membership in the World Court and some portions of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. The senator also supported the Neutrality Acts passed in the last half of the 1930s.

Following the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Vandenberg gradually moved to supporting internationalist policies, publicly renouncing isolationism in January 1945. By then a prominent senator, he was crucial in converting the mainstream of his party to internationalism. President Roosevelt made Vandenberg, the ranking Republican on the SFRC, a delegate to the 1945 San Francisco Conference that drew up the final United Nations (UN) Charter. Vandenberg, already suspicious of Soviet motivations, obtained the inclusion of an article permitting the creation of regional security organizations. Vandenberg represented a large Polish constituency, and he therefore took particular interest in the agreements on Poland and Eastern Europe reached at the February 1945 Yalta Conference.

President Harry S. Truman included Vandenberg in the U.S. delegations to postwar meetings of Big Four (U.S., Soviet, British, and Chinese) foreign ministers in New York, Paris, and London intended to resolve remaining questions from World War II, assignments that convinced Vandenberg of the impossibility of dealing with the Soviet Union in the postwar era. He was also a U.S. delegate to the first two sessions of the new UN General Assembly.

The Truman administration's diligent cultivation of Vandenberg proved to be fruitful. As chairman of the SFRC in 1947 and 1948, he worked assiduously to implement the Truman Doctrine aid program for Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan. The Vandenberg Resolution, introduced in

1948, paved the way for Senate approval of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although ailing, Vandenberg discouraged the excesses of McCarthyism and accepted, albeit reluctantly, Truman's June 1950 decision to send U.S. troops to war in Korea. Vandenberg died in Grand Rapids on April 18, 1951.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Paris Peace Treaties; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.; United Nations, Formation of; United States Neutrality Acts; Yalta Conference

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Vandenberg, Hoyt Sanford (1899–1954)

U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) general. Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on January 24, 1899, Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1923 and was assigned to the Air Service. He earned his wings in 1925 and then held various routine assignments. Vandenberg attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1936 and was an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School in 1936–1938. In 1939 he graduated from the Army War College.

Vandenberg then joined the Planning Division under Chief of the Army Air Corps Brigadier General Henry H. Arnold. Vandenberg was promoted to major in July 1941 and to lieutenant colonel that November. His work in helping to direct the Air Corps buildup following the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack led to his promotion to colonel in January 1942. In June of that year, he was assigned to Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower's staff

in Britain to assist in the development of air plans for Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa (November 8, 1942).

Promoted to brigadier general in December, Vandenberg accompanied Brigadier General James Doolittle to North Africa as chief of staff of the Twelfth Air Force in February 1943. In the summer of 1943, Vandenberg was assigned to Air Force Headquarters as the deputy chief of the Air Staff. In March 1944, he was promoted to major general and assigned to Britain as deputy commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces under British air chief marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. In August 1944, Vandenberg assumed command of the Ninth Air Force, which covered the advance of Allied forces across France and into Germany. In the process, he won high praise from army generals for the Ninth Air Force's close support of their forces. In March 1945, he was promoted to lieutenant general.

After the war, Vandenberg held a number of staff assignments, including service as director of the Central Intelligence Group, forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency. Promoted to full general in 1947, Vandenberg played an important role in making the air force a separate service in September of that year. Spaatz became its first chief of staff, and Vandenberg was vice chief of staff. After Spaatz retired in April 1948, Vandenberg succeeded him. When the Soviet Union imposed a blockade on Berlin that summer, Vandenberg helped convince President Harry S. Truman that the air force could supply West Berlin.

Vandenberg was a forceful and effective advocate for the Strategic Air Command in battles with the navy over strategic deterrence in 1949. The Korean War (1950–1953) saw a doubling of air force strength, to 106 wings. He vigorously defended the need for a flexible and technologically advanced conventional and nuclear air force capable of strategic and tactical missions, which ran counter to the Eisenhower administration's emphasis on nuclear weapons. Vandenberg retired in June 1953. He died of prostate cancer at Walter Reed Army Medical Center on April 2, 1954.

WILLIAM P. HEAD

See also

Doolittle, James Harold "Jimmy"; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Leigh-Mallory, Sir Trafford; Spaatz, Carl Andrew "Tooey"; TORCH, Operation; United States Army Air Forces

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Vasilevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailovich (1895–1977)

Marshal of the Soviet Union and chief of staff of the Red Army. Born in Novaya Golchikha in the Volga region on September 30, 1895, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilevsky attended a seminary before entering the czar’s army and rising to captain. He joined the Red Army in 1919, and during the Russian Civil War he was commander of a rifle regiment. Vasilevsky then commanded the 143rd Regiment of the Moscow Military District and was chief of the Red Army’s Combat Training Directorate from 1931 to 1934.

In 1935, Vasilevsky was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Volga Military District. Between 1936 and 1937, he attended the Frunze General Staff Academy and taught tactics there for several months. Vasilevsky was then attached to the General Staff as chief of the Operations Training Section. Admitted to the Communist Party as a full member in 1938, he was deputy chief of operations of the General Staff in 1939 and 1940 and then chief of the Operational Department in 1941.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Vasilevsky became invaluable to Stavka (the Soviet high command) in his visits to and coordination of the various military fronts. Only General Georgii Zhukov, with whom he worked out the successful 1942–1943 Soviet winter offensives, was more active in this regard. Appointed chief of the General Staff in June 1942, Vasilevsky was promoted to army general in January 1943 and to marshal of the Soviet Union one month later.

Vasilevsky coordinated the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts from Kursk through the advance from the Dnieper River to the Dniester and Prut Rivers. He subsequently coordinated operations for the 1st Baltic and 2nd Belorussian Fronts in East Prussia. In February 1945, he stepped down as

chief of the General Staff to take command of the 3rd Belorussian Front following the death of its commander, General Ivan Chernyakhovsky.

Less volatile than Zhukov, Vasilevsky is said to have been a rational influence on Joseph Stalin, who selected him in July 1945 for the singular honor of being the first Soviet theater commander against the Japanese. Vasilevsky's Manchurian campaign was a lightning operation that required the coordination of three fronts from three directions, with the object of penetrating central Manchuria to destroy the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army. The campaign was a complete success.

In November 1948, Vasilevsky was reappointed chief of the General Staff, and in March 1949 he became minister of defense. He retired from public life following Stalin's death in March 1953. Vasilevsky was among 11 Soviets to receive the five-star ruby Order of Victory and was twice named a Hero of the Soviet Union. He published his war memoirs, *Delo Vsei Zhizni* (A Lifelong Cause), in 1973. The work revealed Stalin's failure to follow the recommendations of his military advisers in the opening and disastrous stages of the German invasion. Vasilevsky died in Moscow on December 5, 1977.

CLAUDE R. SASSO

See also

Chernyakhovsky, Ivan Danilovich; Guandong Army; Kursk, Battle of; Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad, Battle of; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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Vatutin, Nikolai Fedorovich (1901–1944)

Soviet Army general. Born at Chepukhino, Russia, near Belgorod, on December 16, 1901, Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin enlisted in the Red Army in April 1920 and joined the Communist Party in 1921. He graduated in turn

from the Poltava Infantry School (1922), the Frunze Military Academy (1929), and the General Staff Academy (1937). Vatutin served as chief of staff of the Kiev Military District and went to Poland in 1939 as chief of staff of the Ukrainian Front. He next served on the General Staff Operations Directorate, and by June 1940, he was the first deputy chief of the General Staff.

Shortly after the German Army invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Vatutin became chief of staff of the Northwest Front. In September 1941, he represented Stavka (the Soviet high command) at Leningrad. In the critical defense of Moscow, he served as chief of staff to General Ivan Konev, commanding an operational group.

Winning recognition in the Soviet winter counteroffensive, Vatutin returned to the Northwest Front and remained with it until May 1942, when he went back to his post with the General Staff in Moscow. He then commanded the collapsing Voronezh Front, which lost Voronezh in early July 1942, although he was promoted to colonel general less than a week later.

Vatutin received command of the new Southwest Front at Stalingrad in October 1942. The next month, his men drove 75 miles in three days on the north side of the double envelopment of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Vatutin then commanded the outer encirclement forces and advanced into the Donets Basin to fight Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Fourth Panzer Army.

Promoted to army general in February 1943, Vatutin boldly advanced his forces at great cost to the outskirts of Zaporozhye before being struck by Manstein's counterattack. He commanded the Voronezh Front and stopped Manstein's attack in the July 5–13, 1943, Battle of Kursk with the help of the reserve Steppe Front. He brought his front across the Dnieper, where it became the 1st Ukrainian Front on October 20. The front recaptured Kiev on the night of November 4–5, 1943, and participated in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation that encircled 57,000 Germans in the Cherkassy bulge. Shortly thereafter, on February 28, 1944, Vatutin was shot and seriously wounded by Bandera guerrillas (Ukrainian partisans) in the Korosten area, 75 miles north of Kiev, while on a trip to visit his Sixtieth Army. He died of his wounds on April 15, 1944, in Kiev.

CLAUDE R. SASSO

See also

Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Korsun Pocket, Battle of the; Kursk, Battle of; Moscow, Battle of; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Vella Gulf, Battle of (August 6–7, 1943)

Battle fought on the night of August 6–7, 1943, when a U.S. destroyer force under Commander Frederick Moosbrugger intercepted a Japanese transport group off northwest Kolombangara. Following the Battle of Kula Gulf (July 6, 1943) and the Battle of Kolombangara (July 13), the Japanese had switched to the Vella Gulf–Blackett Strait supply route. On the night of August 1–2, the Japanese made a successful run by this route, the only opposition coming from an unsuccessful attack by U.S. patrol-torpedo boats.

Against the advice of his ship captains, who worried that the Americans would be waiting, Japanese commander Captain Sugiura Kaju decided to try it again. This time, however, the South Pacific Command had intelligence concerning the operation, and on August 5 Moosbrugger received orders to sweep Vella Gulf on the night of August 6–7 with a force of six destroyers.

Moosbrugger, with Destroyer Division 13—the *Dunlap*, *Craven,* and *Maury*—and Commander Roger R. Simpson's Destroyer Division 15—the *Lang, Sterett,* and *Stack*—led his force in two columns into the gulf. The sky was overcast, and rainsqualls reduced visibility to less than 4,000 yards. Moosbrugger hugged the shore of the high volcanic cone of Kolombangara.

At 11:33 p.m. on August 6, U.S. radar picked up the Japanese destroyers: Sugiura in the *Hagikaze,* followed by the *Arashi, Kawakaze,* and *Shigure*. The Japanese ships, crammed with 50 tons of supplies and 900 troops, sailed into an ambush. Moosbrugger had been privy to Captain Arleigh Burke's planning for a night destroyer action and executed the attack to near perfection. At 11:41 p.m., with Simpson's division covering, Moosbrugger

commenced a torpedo attack on the unsuspecting Japanese column, which bore 6,300 yards off his port bow. The 12th Destroyer Division then turned away to avoid any Japanese torpedoes. Simpson turned to port to cross the Japanese T, and a few minutes later as the three leading Japanese destroyers exploded in flames that lit up the dark night, he opened fire. Only the *Shigure,* lagging behind because of engine problems, escaped—and then only because the torpedo that struck its rudder failed to detonate.

For Japan, the Battle of Vella Gulf marked the first time it had been bested in a night destroyer action. The second time—in the November 25, 1943, Battle of Cape St. George—Burke, in an action remarkably similar to Vella Gulf, would administer the defeat.

RONNIE DAY

See also

Burke, Arleigh Albert; Cape St. George, Battle of; Kolombongara, Battle of; Kula Gulf, Battle of; Vella Lavella, Battle of

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Vella Lavella, Battle of (October 6–7, 1943)

The last surface action of the July–October Battle of New Georgia. The Naval Battle of Vella Lavella resulted from Japan's decision to evacuate 600 of its troops on Vella Lavella Island. For this purpose, the Japanese put together at Rabaul a transport group of three old destroyers, five subchasers, and eight smaller craft supported by the destroyers *Akigumo, Isokaze, Kazagumo, Yūgumo, Shigure,* and *Samidare,* under the command of Rear Admiral Ijuin Matsuji.

Allied aircraft promptly reported the Japanese operation, but the only U.S. Navy force available consisted of the destroyers *Selfridge, Chevalier,*

and *O'Bannon,* under the command of Captain Frank R. Walker. Three additional destroyers under Captain Harold O. Larson were detached from convoy duty and sent speeding to reinforce Walker, but they arrived too late to participate in the action.

The sea was calm, and a brilliant half-moon made for excellent visibility when a Japanese search plane reported at 8:58 p.m. that Walker's force consisted of one cruiser and four destroyers, the first of a number of mistakes the Japanese were to make. Ijuin allowed the subchaser group to proceed on to Vella Lavella (this group had departed earlier and was ahead of the main body), but he ordered the destroyer-transports (which were also ahead of the main body) back to the Shortlands. Their two escorts, the destroyers *Samidare* and *Shigure,* were to join the main group.

Walker made contact at 10:31 p.m., and his radar picked up the two Japanese groups just before they joined. Walker made for the larger group. Ijuin mishandled his force. He missed a chance to cross the T and ended up with his ships staggered and the *Yūgumo* masking the torpedo tubes of the other three ships. In the exchange that followed, U.S. gunfire and a torpedo sank the *Yūgumo* but not before a torpedo from the latter struck the *Chevalier* a mortal blow. The *O'Bannon,* following through thick gun smoke, collided with the *Chevalier,* and although it was able to back clear, it was also out of the fight.

The *Selfridge* continued on alone as all five Japanese ships headed west. (Japanese aircraft had reported Larson's force coming up from the south as cruisers.) At 11:06 p.m., a torpedo caught the *Selfridge* on its port side. Ijuin fled the scene, leaving the U.S. destroyer *Chevalier* damaged so badly that it had to be scuttled; the other two ships were barely able to limp home to Tulagi. The subchaser group meanwhile rescued the stranded Japanese troops and escaped unnoticed.

The final chapter was written the next morning, when four U.S. patrol-torpedo (PT) boats were sent in five miles west of Vella Lavella to look for survivors. The *PT 163* picked up 33 of the *Yūgumo*'s crew and put in at Biloa to transfer them to the army; at that point, one of the Japanese men killed a sailor with his own gun and was in turn slain, along with 3 other prisoners who joined in the fray.

RONNIE DAY

See also

New Georgia, Battle of; Vella Gulf, Battle of

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Vella Lavella, Land Battle of (August 15–October 7, 1943)

Vella Lavella is the northwestern island of the New Georgia group in the Solomons chain. The costly fighting at New Georgia (July–October 1943) had made South Pacific theater commander Admiral William F. Halsey reluctant to assault the nearby and strongly defended Kolombangara. But Vella Lavella, which lay beyond Kolombangara, was only lightly held by the Japanese and offered superior prospects as an Allied air base. Because it was only about 35 nautical miles from the recently captured Munda Airfield on New Georgia, planes from the latter could easily provide cover for a landing on Vella Lavella.

A small U.S. landing party reconnoitered Vella Lavella in late July and found, at Barakoma on the southeast coast, suitable sites for both a landing beach and an airstrip. Several days before the scheduled invasion on August 15, an advance landing party of about 100 men slipped ashore with orders to mark the landing beaches. Most of the few Japanese troops on the island proved to be emaciated refugees from the New Georgia fighting.

The main landing on August 15 was executed by Task Force 31, commanded by Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson. Once the landing was completed, overall command of the Vella Lavella force passed to Major General Oscar W. Griswold, commander of XIV Corps and the New Georgia

Occupation Force. A marine defense battalion was included, but the principal ground component was the army's 35th Regimental Combat Team, led by Brigadier General Robert B. McClure, assistant commander of the 25th Division. The landing force totaled about 4,600 soldiers, marines, and Seabees.

Confronted with such a strong invasion force, General Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the Eighth Area Army at Rabaul, decided not to mount a counterlanding at Vella Lavella. Instead, he would fight a delaying action to evacuate as many men as possible north to Bougainville. Thus, most of the fighting in and around Vella Lavella—and most of the 198 Allied casualties in the operation—resulted from Japanese aerial attacks against the landing force and its supporting ships. Ground combat was essentially limited to patrolling and skirmishing.

On September 18, McClure and his American troops turned over their operation to elements of Major General Harold Eric Barrowclough's New Zealand 3rd Division. While U.S. Navy Seabees completed the Barakoma Airfield, the New Zealanders worked their way up both the east and west coasts of the island. Although they failed to trap the escaping Japanese, the island was fully in Allied hands by October 7.

The Allies also failed to prevent the withdrawal of nearly 10,000 Japanese from bypassed Kolombangara. Nevertheless, the air bases at Barakoma and at Munda and Ondonga on New Georgia brought all of Bougainville within the combat radius of Allied fighters and greatly facilitated the landings that began there on November 1. The capture of Vella Lavella marked the first time that the Allies successfully bypassed a major Japanese position in the South Pacific.

RICHARD G. STONE

See also

Bougainville Campaign; Griswold, Oscar Woolverton; Halsey, William Frederick, Jr.; Imamura Hitoshi; Kolombongara, Battle of; New Georgia, Battle of; Wilkinson, Theodore Stark "Ping"; Vella Lavella, Battle of

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Vereker, John Standish Surtees Prendergast (1886–1946)

British Army field marshal. Born in London on July 10, 1886, John Standish Surtees Prendergast Vereker, Sixth Viscount Gort, was educated at Harrow and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He served in World War I first as an operations officer and then with the Grenadier Guards, winning the Victoria Cross. Between the wars, Vereker rose steadily in rank and responsibility. He commanded the Staff College, Camberley, and then a brigade. Promoted ahead of other officers in his class, he was appointed chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in December 1937 and promoted from major general to full general.

Vereker's appointment as CIGS was a mistake, for he did not work well with the secretary of state for war, Leslie Hore-Belisha, who was both unorthodox and flamboyant. Vereker, the traditional soldier, was neither. He did develop plans for cooperation with the French in the event of war, but he failed in key areas of modernization, including the development of armored forces and air-ground coordination.

When World War II began, Vereker assumed the job of commander in chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France, even though he lacked experience in high command. He was glad to escape the bureaucracy and openly anticipated the excitement of war. Vereker built up the BEF in France from 4 to 13 divisions, and as a commander, his dependability and determination stood him in good stead. But he was frequently criticized for his penchant for details; even as the German blitzkrieg drove into France on May 10, 1940, he was discussing uniforms. Vereker's relationship with Hore-Belisha worsened when the war minister, during an inspection trip to France, was critical despite the real progress that had been made on defensive positions. Vereker may not have been directly involved in the subsequent

campaign that led Hore-Belisha to resign from office, but his friends certainly were.

Following the German invasion of May 10, 1940, Vereker took personal command of BEF troops in the field. This was a mistake, because his place was at headquarters, not in the field directing specific operations, and he only worsened the situation by taking many experienced staff officers with him. He did manage to mount a counterattack on May 21.

Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill ordered Vereker to provide two British divisions to support a last-ditch French counterattack, but on May 27 Vereker disregarded the order, believing that the attack would fail. Anticipating the impending surrender of Belgian forces, he took the decision to use the two divisions to protect his flank. Disregarding Churchill's orders and those of French Army commander Maxime Weygand, Vereker ordered the BEF to fall back on the port of Dunkerque (Dunkirk), through which it was evacuated to England. He intended to stay to the end, but on June 1 he was ordered home.

Vereker's next two assignments were as inspector general of training forces (1940–1941) and governor of Gibraltar (May 1941–May 1942). In May 1942, he was appointed governor of Malta, a vital British outpost then under heavy attack. There, his proclivity for details and his leadership paid off. He organized both military and civil defenses, and in January 1943 he was promoted to field marshal.

Vereker remained in Malta until July 1944. Later that year, he was sent to Palestine as high commissioner and commander in chief. In 1945, King George VI made him a viscount, but he was already mortally ill. Vereker returned home in November 1945 and died of cancer in London on March 31, 1946.

FRED R. VAN HARTESVELDT

See also

Dunkerque, Evacuation of; France, Battle for; Hore-Belisha, Isaac Leslie; Malta; Weygand, Maxime

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Versailles, Treaty of (June 28, 1919)

Peace treaty at the end of World War I concluded between the victorious Allied powers and Germany. Rarely did the treaty not intrude in discussions of international affairs in the 1920s and 1930s. Arranged by the Paris Peace Conference and signed in the Hall of Mirrors at the Château of Versailles (where Prussian minister-president Otto von Bismarck had proclaimed the German Empire in September 1870), the treaty contained 438 articles, one-fourth of them dealing with Germany's future borders.

One of the major issues to be resolved at the peace conference was French and Belgian security, a central issue for any German peace treaty. France had twice been invaded by Germany from the east since 1870, and Premier Georges Clemenceau of France demanded a military frontier along the Rhine River. Clemenceau and his aides wanted all German territory west of the Rhine (the Rhineland) taken from Germany and made into one or more independent states. They also demanded that these states maintain forever a joint Allied military force to guarantee the peace settlement. British prime minister David Lloyd George and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson opposed detaching German territory, however, and wanted an immediate withdrawal of military forces once a peace treaty had been signed.

Certain aspects of the Rhineland settlement were easily resolved. The treaty provided for the return to France of Alsace and Lorraine, which Germany had taken in 1871 at the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War. France was also awarded the coal production of the Saar basin for a 15-year period to compensate it for the deliberate German damage and destruction of many of France's coal mines. The Saar would be under administration of the League of Nations, and in 1935 the inhabitants would vote to determine their future. If, as expected, the Saarlanders voted to rejoin their fatherland, Germany was to repurchase the mines at a price to be determined by outside experts. To enhance its security, Belgium received the two small border enclaves of Eupen and Malmédy. Luxembourg was placed outside the German customs union and secured control of its railroads.

There was sharp confrontation, however, over the Rhineland itself. Warning of an “Alsace-Lorraine in reverse,” Wilson and Lloyd George opposed taking it from Germany. Clemenceau denied that France wanted to annex the Rhineland, saying that the territory could be one or more states and could adopt any form of government it wished.

The impasse was finally broken in March 1919, when Lloyd George and Wilson agreed to secure France’s eastern border with a treaty of guarantee if France would drop its demand for an independent Rhineland. Furthermore, Britain and the United States agreed to come to the assistance of France if Germany ever invaded. Some French leaders accused Clemenceau of selling out French security, but the French premier hoped that by compromising he would at least maintain Anglo-U.S.-French cooperation. The treaty provided that the Rhineland would remain German, but it was to be permanently demilitarized. In addition, the right (east) bank of the Rhine would be demilitarized by an area of 50 kilometers (about 30 miles).

The Allies agreed on a staggered withdrawal from the Rhineland. British forces would occupy for five years a northern zone around the Rhine bridgehead at Köln (Cologne), U.S. forces would occupy a center zone at Koblenz (Coblenz) for 10 years, and French forces would occupy a southern zone, with its Rhine crossing at Mainz, for 15 years.

In the east, a new Polish state came into being, the result of Wilson’s call in his Fourteen Points for “a free and independent Poland with access to the sea.” Germany ceded Poznań, parts of East Prussia, and Upper Silesia, while the Baltic port of Danzig (Gdansk) became a “free city” inside the so-called Polish Corridor. To provide Poland access to the Baltic, the Allies separated East Prussia, with its 1.5 million Germans, from the rest of Germany. Although the Germans were given free transit across it, in 1939 Adolf Hitler used the Polish Corridor as a pretext to begin World War II.

Poland also received Upper Silesia. After German protests, a plebiscite was held in March 1920, and the districts of Marienwerder and Allenstein were awarded to Germany. Poland retained the rich coal districts, however. Germany also had to give up the port of Memel to newly independent Lithuania and the Hultschin district to newly independent Czechoslovakia. Two other plebiscites that same year awarded the northern part of the former duchy of Schleswig to Denmark. In all, Germany lost some 27,000 square miles of territory and 6.5 million inhabitants.

Germany also had to give up its Pacific islands north of the equator and its Shandong (Shantung) Peninsula concession to Japan. Australia received as mandates the former German islands south of the equator. Germany further had to relinquish its African empire as mandates: German East Africa to Great Britain, German South-West Africa to South Africa, and the Kamerun (Cameroon) to France.

The Treaty of Versailles also required Germany to pay war reparations. The Allies had told the Germans that they would be liable for war damages, the precedent for assessing reparations having been set by the Germans in the Treaty of Frankfurt of 1871, when they had imposed an indemnity of 5 billion francs on France (twice the cost of the war and a sum that the French paid) and in the more recent punitive Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918, which they had imposed on Russia. Article 231 of the treaty justified the collection of reparations by placing blame for the war on Germany and its allies, which both dismayed and outraged most Germans.

British electoral politics, meanwhile, drove up the amount of reparations by adding pensions and widows' benefits to the total. The exact amount was to be determined later. Following a series of conferences in 1920, reparations were finally set at $33 billion, a sum that resulted in great economic instability for Germany and, in the long run, hamstrung much of Europe's postwar economic recovery.

Another controversial provision dictated the precise size and nature of the German military. Britain and the United States wanted Germany to have a small professional army modeled after their own military establishments. The French disagreed, however, fearing that this would simply be a cadre army, rapidly expandable later. But the new German Army, or Reichswehr, following Anglo-Saxon suggestions, was restricted to a 100,000 all-volunteer force, with its men serving 12-year enlistments. The officer corps was strictly limited to just 4,000 active-duty officers. Germany was denied any military aircraft, tanks, and heavy artillery. The German Navy, meanwhile, was limited to 6 predreadnought battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and no submarines.

The treaty also demanded the indictment of former kaiser Wilhelm II for having perpetrated "supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." His trial was to be conducted by a five-judge panel composed of jurists selected by the Allied powers. The Americans did not

support this, however, as Wilson believed that it would make the kaiser a martyr among most Germans. The stipulation was rendered moot, however, because the Netherlands—where Wilhelm had sought asylum—refused to extradite him. The Versailles Treaty also demanded that Germany turn over some 900 people—mostly German officers—for trial as war criminals. Only 12, however, were actually tried. Six of them were acquitted, while the remaining 6 were given short prison terms.

No other modern treaty has evoked as much controversy as the Versailles Treaty. Rarely in the 1920s or 1930s did it fail to enter into discussions of European security. The treaty, while harsh, certainly did not seriously affect German power, as Adolf Hitler's regime demonstrated. Debate over whether it was too hard on Germany abounds. Certainly it handicapped the leaders of the new democratic Weimar Republic. It was they, rather than the kaiser or the leaders of the German Army, who were forced to sign the treaty and bear its shame in the eyes of the German people.

The important point to remember about the Versailles Treaty is that it was never fully enforced. The U.S. Senate never approved it (or the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee for which France had bartered away the Rhineland), and Britain soon retreated into isolation, leaving France alone to enforce its provisions.

The German government announced in 1923 that it was ending war reparations, and the French government, then headed by Premier Raymond Poincaré, sent troops into the Ruhr. Although this action brought a sharp change in policy on the part of Berlin, it also incurred the wrath of London and Washington. Never again did a French government attempt to go it alone against Germany.

Ultimately the Germans paid only about $9 billion in reparations, and in the 1930s, as Adolf Hitler steadily whittled away at the other treaty provisions, Britain, France, and the United States made no move. Nevertheless, while it is difficult to argue with any certainty that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh or too lenient, many Germans perceived it as unduly punitive. This helps explain—in part—the rise of ultranationalism, militarism, and rightist radicalism in Germany during the 1930s, which led to the ascendance of Nazism under Hitler. The incontrovertible result of that was World War II.

See also

Germany; Hitler, Adolf; Rhineland, Remilitarization of; Document 6

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Vian, Sir Philip Louis (1894–1968)

British Royal Navy admiral of the fleet. Born in London on June 13, 1894, Philip Louis Vian entered the Royal Navy in 1910. Educated at the Hillside School and the Royal Naval colleges of Osborne and Dartmouth, he served in destroyers and cruisers during World War I and the interwar years.

At the beginning of World War II, Vian was commanding a reserve destroyer flotilla on Atlantic convoy duty. He soon distinguished himself as an aggressive and effective leader of light forces. As commodore commanding the 4th Destroyer Flotilla of four modern Tribal-class destroyers and a cruiser, he seized the German Navy supply ship *Altmark* in Norwegian territorial waters on February 16, 1940, and freed 299 British prisoners held in it.

Vian also distinguished himself in the 1941 Norwegian Campaign, and in the chase of the German battleship *Bismarck*, which led to his early promotion to rear admiral that July. Vian then led Force K, a squadron of light cruisers, in offensive operations along the Norwegian coast until he was transferred to command Cruiser Squadron 15 in the Mediterranean in October 1941.

There, Vian further demonstrated his skill as his ships covered resupply convoys to Malta, most notably during the Second Battle of Sirte on March 22, 1942. In 1943, he commanded a squadron of five escort carriers charged with providing fighter cover and close air support for Operation AVALANCHE, the September 9, 1943, Salerno landings. Force V, operating in light winds and confined waters, provided more than half of all air support during the operation's first four days. This success was tempered, however, by Vian's inexperience in carrier operations, which showed in extraordinarily high operational losses.

British admiral Sir Philip Louis Vian (left) shown here during a meeting with U.S. admiral William F. Halsey. (Corbis)

Vian then led the Eastern Task Force covering the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion (Operation NEPTUNE) before taking command of the British carrier squadron destined for the Pacific. He was promoted to vice admiral in November 1944. After preliminary strikes against oil refineries in Sumatra, the carriers joined the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Okinawa in March 1945. After two months providing important air support to U.S. land operations on that island, the British Pacific Fleet withdrew to refit, then rejoined the U.S.

Third Fleet for the final attack on the Japanese home islands. Vian's adaptability to carrier warfare requirements supported the integration of U.S. practice into the Royal Navy, and his drive was manifest in the fleet's accomplishments.

Following World War II, Vian served ashore and afloat until his retirement in 1952, when he was promoted to admiral of the fleet. Vian died at Ashford Hill, Berkshire, England, on May 27, 1968.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Altmark Incident; *Bismarck,* Sortie and Sinking of; Central Pacific Campaign; Malta; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Salerno Invasion; Sirte, Second Battle of

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Vichy France

The government organized in the area of France not under German occupation. The armistice of June 25, 1940, divided France into occupied and unoccupied zones. Germany occupied three-fifths of the country, including northern and western France, and the entire Atlantic coast. A new government under 84-year-old Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, the last premier of the Third Republic, administered the remaining two-fifths of metropolitan France, including most of the Mediterranean coastline. French citizens needed a pass to cross from one zone to the other. Vichy France was left with its colonies (although Japan established de facto control over French Indochina during 1940–1941).

Beginning on July 9, the French National Assembly convened in the resort town of Vichy, about 250 miles south of Paris, to consider Pétain's plans for the future of France. Meanwhile, several dozen politicians who had left metropolitan France to try to set up a new government in North Africa

and continue the fight were arrested and returned to France, where they were charged with plotting against the security of the state.

In July 1940, Pétain enjoyed overwhelming popular support. The vast majority of the French assumed that the war was lost and that Britain would soon also be defeated. They were disillusioned with the leaders of the Third Republic, and the defeat produced strong support for new leadership and authoritarian government. Vice Premier Pierre Laval assumed the key role in the cabinet to draft and carry through Pétain's program. In a completely legal procedure, on July 10, 1940, the French National Assembly voted 567 to 80 (most of the latter were socialists) to terminate the Third Republic and hand full authority to Pétain to recast the state and promulgate a new constitution to be ratified by the nation.

The task of creating a new constitution was never completed, but a series of decrees issued by Pétain dissolved the parliament and eliminated the office of president. Pétain assumed the functions of "chief of the French State." Further decrees set up a court at Riom to try those "responsible for the war" and prescribed loyalty oaths for government officials and the military. The National Revolution, as Pétain described his regime to the French people in a broadcast on July 12, never in fact established its political institutions, although in 1941 the government convened a National Council of nominated notables to serve as an advisory body.

The conservative Vichy regime claimed that it swept away the old corruption and factionalism that had marked the Third Republic, replacing it with a new morality under the slogan "Work, Family, and Fatherland"—rather than the "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" of the old republic. Vichy was, in fact, marked by factions, cliques, and considerable infighting and was notable for its constantly changing parade of officeholders.

Vice Premier Pierre Laval, the marshal's designated successor, favored active collaboration with the Germans. The key figure in the government during the early months of the new regime, Laval arranged a meeting between Pétain and Adolf Hitler on October 24, 1940, at Montoire, France. Hitler sought French participation in the war against Britain; Pétain wanted a final peace treaty and an end to the German occupation. Neither side made the necessary concessions, and the meeting ended unsatisfactorily, but many French were appalled by the marshal's meeting with Hitler and his announcement that he accepted, in principle, collaboration with Germany.

In December 1940 Pétain abruptly dismissed Laval, who had for some time been the object of intrigues by the advisers around the marshal. Following the brief tenure of Pierre Flandin, in February 1941 Pétain appointed as his chief minister Admiral Jean Louis Xavier François Darlan, commander of the French Navy but a man with a passion for politics and intrigue. Darlan lasted 14 months but was unsuccessful in his effort to turn France into Germany's favorite ally. Summing up the difference between Laval and Darlan, one German officer later said, "When we asked Laval for a chicken, he gave us an egg; and when we asked Darlan for an egg, he gave us a chicken."

Darlan, who hated the British—especially following the Royal Navy's July 3, 1940, attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir—followed a policy of everything short of war against Britain. He even sought to negotiate an arrangement with the Germans that would have given them a base at Dakar and French-convoyed supplies to assist the Axis effort in North Africa. Darlan accorded the Germans and Italians basing rights in Syria that brought British military intervention and fighting by Frenchmen against Frenchmen.

In April 1942, Darlan departed and Laval returned to power. This time the situation was different. The outcome of the war was now in doubt, and Laval pursued a double game in which he tried to dissemble and delay on German demands and preserve some French autonomy. Initially, the majority of the French population passively accommodated the German occupation. As the war wore on, however, Britain survived, and Germany suffered reversals in the Soviet Union; support for Vichy began to ebb away. This was abetted by the system of forced labor in Germany (the Service du Travail Obligatoire), in which some 700,000 French men and women were relocated to work in the Reich. Laval also cooperated with the Germans to a degree in rounding up Jews, who were then transported to the death camps. Of some 76,000 French Jews deported, only about 2,500 survived the war.

French marshal and leader of Vichy France Philippe Pétain (left) and German chancellor Adolf Hitler (right) shake hands at Montoire, France, as Hitler's interpreter Colonel Paul Schmidt looks on. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

A small but vicious war developed within France, pitting growing numbers of members of the French Resistance against the Germans and their Vichy allies. Laval established a special police force, the Milice, to arrest and punish "terrorists," thus freeing up the Gestapo for work elsewhere. About 8,000 Frenchmen also joined the German armed forces—most notably a legion of anti-Bolshevik volunteers that fought on the Eastern Front and became the 33rd Waffen-SS (Schutzstaffel) Charlemagne Grenadier Division.

The British government had no formal diplomatic relations with Vichy, as it officially supported the Free French movement headed by General Charles de Gaulle; however, it kept contact with Vichy through the Canadian embassy. The U.S. government maintained diplomatic ties with Vichy and entertained the vain hope that France could be persuaded to reenter the war against Germany.

Vichy's weak resistance to Operation TORCH, the Allied landings in North Africa beginning on November 8, 1942, resulted in the German occupation of the unoccupied zone and the disbanding of the French Army and the French Air Force. On November 27, 1942, the French Navy scuttled its ships in

Toulon Harbor to prevent the Germans from capturing them, rebuffing an order by Darlan (then in Algiers) on November 11 that the ships should sail to North Africa if they were in danger of capture by the Germans. Admiral Jean Abrial, who commanded at Toulon, decided that the fleet's loyalty was to the Pétain government, and 77 ships—roughly half the tonnage of the French Navy—went to the bottom.

Pétain remained in office after the Germans occupied the rest of France following TORCH, but any pretense of independence was gone. The marshal failed to place himself at the head of the remaining armistice French forces or even attempt to escape to Algiers. Removed to Sigmaringen, Germany, in the summer of 1944, the Vichy government no longer had any relevance. Postwar, some 10,000 French were executed for collaboration with the Germans, including Laval. Pétain, stripped of his rank, was condemned to death, but de Gaulle commuted the sentence to life in prison. Despite de Gaulle's efforts to cast France during the war as a nation of resisters, the four-year-long Vichy regime left a legacy of shame and controversy that still haunts France today.

DANA LOMBARDY, T. P. SCHWEIDER, AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Darlan, Jean Louis Xavier François; de Gaulle, Charles; France; France, Air Force; France, Army; France, Navy; Free French; Laval, Pierre; Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul; TORCH, Operation; Toulon, Scuttling of French Fleet at; Document 67

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Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy (1869–1947)

Italian monarch (1900–1946). Born in Naples on November 11, 1869, the only child of Umberto I and Margherita of Savoy, Victor Emmanuel, Prince of Naples, was tutored in a rigorous Prussian-style military regimen despite his diminutive size. He inherited the Italian throne after his father's assassination on July 29, 1900. Presiding over a liberal constitutional monarchy and playing Italy's Triple Alliance position against overtures to the Triple Entente, Victor Emanuel III secured Libya following the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War and entered World War I in 1915 on the side of the Entente. Fascist Party leader Benito Mussolini made a bid for primacy in ruling Italy in 1922, and the king failed to remove him by invoking his cabinet's martial law decree; in 1924, he sealed the fascist triumph by allowing the embattled Duce to stay on despite widespread furor over the murder of socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti by fascist operatives.

The attentive yet reticent figurehead acquiesced in the 1935–1936 Italian war with Ethiopia, the intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), Mussolini's inchoate anti-Semitic laws, the 1939 invasion of Albania, the Pact of Steel approved later that year, and Italy's ill-advised declaration of war on the Allies on June 10, 1940.

Witnessing his country's abysmal military efforts, the king did not relish being swept away in the inevitable fascist defeat. Retaining his authority over Italy's armed forces, Victor Emmanuel arrested Mussolini after his ouster by the fascist Grand Council on July 25, 1943, replacing him with Marshal Pietro Badoglio.

Following the September 8, 1943, armistice with the Western Allies, the king, with his family and aides, fled Rome for Brindisi as German troops surrounded the capital, provoking the ire of his subjects in liberated and occupied Italy alike. Urged by the Allies to abdicate, he nonetheless clung to his title but relinquished power as his son, Crown Prince Umberto, was installed as the ruling "lieutenant of the realm" following the June 4, 1944, liberation of Rome. On May 9, 1946, the stubborn Victor Emmanuel III formally passed the throne to Umberto II, but it was too late to save the monarchy. Victor Emmanuel then went into exile in Egypt and died in Alexandria on December 28, 1947.

King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy. (Mario Nunes Vais/Alinari via Getty Images)

GORDON E. HOGG

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; Italy; Mussolini, Benito; Umberto II, King of Italy

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Victory Ship

An improved Liberty cargo ship design produced in U.S. and Canadian yards. A total of 531 Victory ships were built during World War II; three others were constructed in 1946. Commissioned by the United States War Shipping Administration shortly after its formation in February 1942, the Victory was an improved Liberty design with higher speed (15 to 17 knots as opposed to 11 knots for the Liberty). The first ship was SS *United Victory*. Completed on February 28, 1944, it entered service a month later.

Most Victory ships were oil-fired, although some produced in Canadian yards were capable of utilizing either oil or coal. Their hulls were also strengthened, and to reduce stress (several Liberty ships had experienced hull fractures), their frames were 36 inches apart as opposed to 30 inches in the Liberty design. They were also slightly larger than the Liberty ships. Displacing 15,200 tons, they were 455 feet in overall length and 62 feet in beam (versus 441 feet 6 inches and 57 feet in the Liberty). They also presented a very different appearance, with a raked bow and a cruiser stern for higher speed.

Most Victory ships were armed with an antisubmarine 5-inch gun mounted at the stern and antiaircraft armament consisting of a single bow-mounted 3-inch gun and 8 20mm cannon. These weapons were manned by U.S. Naval Armed Guard personnel, who were members of the navy. Some of the Victory ships were armed with the 5-inch stern-mounted gun and antiaircraft protection of a quad 40mm Bofors cannon, 4 dual 40mm Bofors cannon, and 10 single 20mm cannon. These ships were manned exclusively by U.S. Navy personnel.

Of Victory ships built during the war, 414 were standard cargo ships and 117 were attack transports. Because they entered service late in the conflict, only 5 Victory ships were sunk during the war. Following the war, most were placed in reserve, although a number served thereafter in a wide variety of roles. For example, SS *Simmons Victory* became the electronic intelligence collection ship USS *Liberty* (AGTR-5), which was attacked and severely damaged by Israeli forces during the Six-Day War of June 1967. Some Victory ships remain in the National Defense Reserve Fleet, and 3 are museum ships: SS *American Victory* at Tampa, Florida; SS *Lane Victory* at Los Angeles, California; and SS *Red Oak Victory* at Richmond, California.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
Liberty Ships

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Vietinghoff genannt Scheel, Heinrich Gottfried von (1887–1952)

German Army general. Born on December 6, 1887, at Mainz, Germany, Heinrich Vietinghoff genannt Scheel joined the Garde-Grenadier Kaiser Franz Regiment in 1906 and was commissioned a year later. In 1914 he was promoted to senior lieutenant and the next year to captain. During World War I, he served on both the Western and Eastern Fronts and was awarded the Iron Cross, both First and Second Class. In December 1916, he was assigned to the Oberste Heeresleitung (Army Supreme Command, OHL); in April 1917, he was posted to the General Staff, where he remained until the end of the war.

Vietinghoff remained in the Reichswehr after the war and served on the staff of army commander Colonel General Hans von Seeckt and later at the War Ministry. He also held various troop assignments. In November 1938, as a lieutenant general, Vietinghoff assumed command of the 5th Panzer Division, and from October 1939 he commanded the XIII Army Corps. He served ably in these positions, and in June 1940, he was promoted to general of panzer troops and given command of the XLVI Panzer Corps under Colonel General Heinz Guderian on the Russian Front until June 1942. After briefly leading the Ninth Army in the Soviet Union on an interim basis, Vietinghoff took command of the Fifteenth Army on the Channel coast.

In August 1943, Vietinghoff assumed command of the Tenth Army in Italy and the next month was promoted to colonel general. He temporarily

replaced the wounded Field Marshal Albert Kesselring as commander of Army Group C and the Southwest Front. In January 1945 Vietinghoff assumed command of Army Group Kurland in East Prussia. In early March 1945, he returned to Italy as commander of German forces in that country. That same month, he and Schutzstaffel (SS) general Karl Wolff met in Switzerland for secret talks with the Allies regarding a separate surrender of German forces in Italy. Following discussions at his headquarters at Recoaro and pressed by his chief of staff, General of Panzer Troops Hans Röttiger, Vietinghoff dispatched the special envoys who signed the surrender on the Italian Front that went into effect on May 2, 1945.

Taken prisoner by the Allies, Vietinghoff was held until 1948. Following the war he served as an adviser to the Konrad Adenauer government on the issues of German rearmament. In October 1950 he wrote the Himmeroder Memorandum, one of the key documents that led to the establishment of the Bundeswehr and to German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He died at Pfronten-Ried, Bavaria, on February 25, 1952.

ALESSANDRO MASSIGNANI

See also

Guderian, Heinz; Italy Campaign; Kesselring, Albert; Wolff, Karl Friedrich Otto

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Visconti-Prasca, Sebastiano (1883–1961)

Italian Army general. Born in Rome on February 27, 1883, Sebastiano Visconti-Prasca was commissioned in the army from the Military School in 1904. He served in the Italo-Turkish War and in World War I, being promoted to lieutenant colonel in November 1917. Following graduation from the War College, he joined the General Staff.

In January 1920, Visconti-Prasca was assigned to Germany as a member of the Inter-Allied Commission for Upper Silesia. In 1921 he joined the War Ministry and in 1922 the Army Council. Appointed military attaché to Yugoslavia in March 1924, he was recalled in 1930 following Yugoslav allegations of spying.

Visconti-Prasca then rejoined the General Staff. After a period commanding the 36th Infantry Regiment, he was appointed to the Bologna army headquarters. In October 1933, he was assigned to the office of the army chief of staff but was dismissed from that post by chief of the General Staff Pietro Badoglio because he was suspected of having disclosed a secret agreement between Badoglio and French general Maurice Gamelin.

From December 1934, Visconti-Prasca commanded Italian troops in the Saar as part of the supervising League of Nations administration there. In January 1935, he was promoted to brigade general and became an honorary aide-de-camp to King Victor Emmanuel III. That September, Visconti-Prasca assumed command of the 2nd Cosseria Infantry Brigade.

In July 1937, Visconti-Prasca became military attaché in Paris, and in September of the same year, he was promoted to division general. In December, he was recalled to Italy; he was then assigned to the General Staff in March 1939. In June, Visconti-Prasca was appointed to command XXVI Corps in Albania, and the following month, he was promoted to corps general. That December, he commanded the Eleventh Army in Albania and worked on the plan for the Italian invasion of Greece that called for four divisions attacking along a 60-mile front. Visconti-Prasca was absolutely convinced that Italy would be victorious, a view he expressed to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 quickly turned into a disaster, and Visconti-Prasca was relieved of his command on November 8. In December, he was forced to retire altogether from the military. Following the 1943 armistice with the Allies, he was deported to Germany. Freed at the end of the war, Visconti-Prasca defended his actions in a book and several articles. He died in Monte Porzio Catone on February 25, 1961.

ALESSANDRO MASSIGNANI

See also

Badoglio, Pietro; Greece Campaign, Italian; Italy, Army

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Vlasov, Andrei Andreyevich (1901–1946)

Soviet Army general. Born on December 16, 1901, in Lomakino, Nizhny-Novgorod Province, Russia (now Kursk Oblast), Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov fought in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. In 1930, he became an instructor at the Leningrad Officers' School. Between 1937 and 1938, Vlasov was a military adviser to Chinese Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Vlasov returned to the Soviet Union and, as a major general, led the 90th Infantry Division into Bessarabia.

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Vlasov assumed command of the IV Mechanized Corps positioned around Przemyśl and L'viv (Lvov). In August, he commanded the Thirty-Seventh Army in the defense of Kiev. In December 1941, Vlasov, now a lieutenant general, commanded the reinforced Twentieth Army before Moscow and was regarded as one of the principal heroes of the battle that drove the Germans from the Soviet capital city.

Vlasov was one of Joseph Stalin's favorite generals, and in March 1942, the Soviet dictator sent him to beleaguered Leningrad as second-in-command of the new Volkhov Front. The next month, Vlasov took over the Second Guards Army. Under heavy German attack, their supply lines severed, and permission to withdraw denied until it was too late, he and his men were surrounded. Vlasov ordered his troops to split into small units and fend for themselves. He was taken prisoner in July 1942.

Vlasov's hatred of Stalin for his disastrous mismanagement of the military situation led German intelligence officers to seek his cooperation in heading an army formed of Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) to fight against the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet POWs were already serving as auxiliaries to the German Army in noncombat roles, many of them doing so simply to stay alive. Vlasov worked out a political program for a

noncommunist Russian state, but this flew in the face of Adolf Hitler's policy of subjugating the Soviet Union. Although German intelligence officers established the Russian Liberation Army (Russkaya Osvoboditel'naya Amiya, ROA), Hitler refused it any combat role, and it became only a device to encourage Red Army desertions.

German Schutzstaffel (SS) chief Heinrich Himmler met with Vlasov in September 1944 and promised him a combat role. Himmler also arranged for the establishment of the multiethnic Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Komitet Osvobozhdeniye Narodov Rossii), which was announced in Prague that November. Two divisions of the ROA came into being, one of which was sent along the Oder River in mid-April 1945 but retreated before the Red Army.

The "Vlasov Army" then changed sides. Cooperating with the Czech Resistance, it helped liberate Prague and disarmed 10,000 German soldiers, hoping to be recognized by the Western Allies.

At the end of the war, Soviet authorities demanded Vlasov's return in accordance with repatriation agreements reached at the Yalta Conference, and on May 12, 1945, U.S. units handed him over, together with other ROA prisoners of war. On August 13, 1946, the Soviet Supreme Court condemned Vlasov as a "German collaborator" and an "enemy of the Russian people" and imposed the death penalty on him the same day.

EVA-MARIA STOLBERG AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Collaboration; Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Leningrad, Siege of; Moscow, Battle of; Stalin, Joseph

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Voronezh, Battle of (June 28–July 13, 1942)

Important Eastern Front battle. In June 1942, German chancellor Adolf Hitler ordered a resumption of offensive operations against the Red Army. The objective was to secure the lower Don River, capture the oil fields of the Caucasus and Caspian regions, and interdict Lend-Lease shipments on the Volga. Führer Directive 41 called for the destruction of Soviet forces west of the Don. The German summer offensive, code-named Operation BLAU (BLUE), was along a front from the seaport city of Taganrog on the eastern coast of the Black Sea to Kursk in the north. Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group South was to carry out the German offensive.

The key to securing the eastern bank of the Don was capturing Voronezh, a major rail conduit connecting the Urals and Siberia with Ukraine and the Caucasus. In the early hours of June 28, Army Group von Weichs, commanded by Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs zu Glon, supported by the VIII Air Corps, attacked Colonel General Filipp Golikov's Bryansk Front. Weichs had his Second Army, the Hungarian Second Army under Colonel General Gustzav Jany, and Colonel General Herman Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army quickly drive a wedge between Red Army lieutenant general Nikolai Pukhov's Thirteenth Army and Lieutenant General Mikhail Parsegov's Fortieth Army. This gap increased owing to Parsegov's piecemeal deployment of his armor assets.

Two days later, General of Panzer Troops Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army attacked General Vasily Gordov's Twenty-First and General Dmitry Ryabyshev's Twenty-Eight Armies of the Southwest Front. The Sixth Army's rapid advance spearheaded by the XL Panzer Corps forced a hasty Soviet retreat toward the Don. By July 1 the Southwest Front along the Oskal River had been largely destroyed, and the road to Voronezh was open for the Germans. On July 2, German forces under Weichs and Paulus met at Staryy Oskol, neutralizing the Soviet Twenty-First and Fortieth Armies.

On June 30, Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army engaged the Red Army's I, IV, XVII, XVIII, and XXIV Tank Corps at Voronezh. Although the Soviets had more tanks, they failed to hold off Hoth's attack owing to poor coordination and logistical support and piecemeal deployment of their armor. The experienced German commanders and their tank crews and well-coordinated German air support resulted in heavy Soviet losses.

The Luftwaffe maintained air superiority against the Red Air Force by attacking airfields and harassing Soviet defense lines. It also acted as a

spearhead, attacking Soviet defensive positions in advance of the German tank and infantry formations. The Germans lost 175 aircraft, the Soviets 783.

On July 4, the 24th Panzer and Gross Deutschland Divisions secured two bridges over the Don west of Voronezh. Two days later they entered that city, meeting moderate resistance. Although Hitler wanted to avoid a costly urban battle, Bock assured the führer that the city could be taken easily.

Convinced that Voronezh would be the launching point for a German drive on Moscow, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin ordered a concentration of forces to hold the city. On July 7 he established a new Voronezh Front under General Nikolai Vatutin. Fighting intensified the next week. With a continuation of the fighting, Hitler ordered a withdrawal from Voronezh, but Bock ignored the order, whereupon Hitler dismissed Bock. Stavka (the Soviet high command) ordered reinforcements into the city to hold it at all costs. General Pavel Rotmistrov, commanding the Fifth Tank Army, led the defense. Although he initially experienced some success, Rotmistrov was forced to withdraw from the city on July 15, losing half of his tanks in the process.

The fighting for Voronezh delayed the commencement of Operation BRAUNSCHWEIG, the German advance on the Caucasus. On July 9, Army Group South was split into Army Group A under Field Marshal Wilhelm von List and Army Group B under von Weichs. Resupply soon became an issue for the Germans, as vital supplies had to be flown in by Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft. Fighting died down after July 13, and the Germans withdrew to the south of the city, with the main road and railway remaining under Soviet control.

Although Red Army losses particularly in aircraft and tanks were heavy compared to those of the Germans, the struggle for Voronezh denied the Germans vital road and rail links and delayed the Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies in their advances on the Caucasus and Stalingrad. In January 1943, the Soviets liberated all Voronezh.

WILLIAM H. VAN HUSEN

See also

Bock, Fedor von; Caucasus Campaign; Eastern Front; Germany, Air Force; Hitler, Adolf; Hoth, Hermann; List, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter; Paulus,

Friedrich; Stalin, Joseph; Stalingrad, Battle of; Vatutin, Nikolai Fedorovich; Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von

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Voronov, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1899–1968)

Soviet Army marshal. Born in Saint Petersburg on May 5, 1899, Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov joined the Red Army in 1918 and the Communist Party in 1919. A specialist in artillery, he rose to command a battery during the Russian Civil War (1918–1924). He was taken prisoner during the 1919–1921 war with Poland. Voronov then held a variety of assignments, including battalion and regimental commands.

Voronov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1930 and served as director of the Leningrad Artillery Officers' School from 1934 to 1936. He served as a military adviser to the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and commanded the artillery of a front during the 1939–1940 First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War). A favorite of Soviet premier Joseph Stalin, Voronov served as chief of artillery of the Soviet army, deputy commander of the artillery directorate, and commander of national air defense forces as well as assistant commissar of defense.

As commander of artillery from 1943, Voronov played a key role in planning all major Soviet campaigns. To maximize artillery effectiveness, he insisted on concentrating artillery rather than scattering it among smaller units. Voronov introduced both artillery divisions and artillery brigades for assault divisions, and he pushed mechanization. He was the first of three officers promoted during the war to the rank of marshal of artillery in 1943.

Following the war, Voronov became a strong advocate of missiles and, as president of the Academy of Artillery Sciences between 1950 and 1953, he oversaw the development of strategic nuclear weapons. He then commanded

the Artillery Academy until his retirement in 1958. Voronov died in Moscow on February 28, 1968.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Artillery Types; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Soviet Union, Army

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Vörös, János (1891–1968)

Hungarian Army general and minister of defense (1944–1945). Born in Csabrendek, Hungary, on March 25, 1891, János Vörös graduated from a military prep school in 1911 and joined the joint army of the Dual Monarchy. He distinguished himself during World War I as a first lieutenant and was decorated. On graduation from the Hungarian Military Academy in 1921, Vörös joined the General Staff. Between 1931 and 1936, he taught strategy at the Military Academy. In May 1941, he was promoted to brigadier general, and in November 1943, he took command of II Corps.

Appointed chief of staff of the Hungarian Army under pressure from the Germans after their occupation of Hungary, he served between April 19 and October 16, 1944. That May, he was promoted to full general.

It was partly Vörös's fault that Governor Miklós Horthy's attempt to surrender failed on October 15, 1944. Although Horthy made a proclamation requesting an armistice, Vörös ordered the continuation of military operations. A day later, Hungarian fascists took power in Budapest, appointed a prime minister friendly to Germany, and relieved Vörös, who had concluded that Hungary must leave the war. Vörös fled, disguised as a Franciscan monk, and surrendered to the Soviets on November 1. He was taken to Moscow, and he served as a member of the Hungarian delegation that negotiated an armistice with the Soviet Union. On his return from Moscow, Vörös was appointed minister of defense in the new interim

government (December 1944–November 1945) and was a member of the Hungarian government delegation that signed the peace treaty with the Soviet Union on January 20, 1945. Vörös resigned as chief of staff on March 2, 1946.

On March 25, 1949, Vörös was arrested by the Hungarian government on charges of spying for the United States. Tried and convicted, he was sentenced to life in prison, but he was freed during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. He died in Balatonfüred, Hungary, on July 23, 1968. In 1992, the Hungarian Supreme Court annulled the charges against Vörös and rehabilitated him.

ANNA BOROS-MCGEE

See also

Horthy de Nagybánya, Miklós; Hungary; Hungary, Army

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Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich (1881–1969)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in Verkhneye, Bakhmut Region, Yekaterinoslav Province, Russia, on February 4, 1881, Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov joined the Bolshevik Party in 1903 and participated in the November 1917 Russian Revolution. He served as a military commander in the civil war that followed. Voroshilov was a member of the Ukrainian provisional government and organized the defense of Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad), where he became acquainted with Joseph Stalin. Voroshilov's close relationship with Stalin rather than his military competence led to his rapid advance to prominence.

In 1925, Voroshilov was appointed people's commissar for army and navy affairs and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Union. In 1934, he was appointed people's commissar for defense (minister of defense), a post he held until 1940, when he was removed for

serious Soviet military deficiencies in the war with Finland. When the Red Army reinstituted officer ranks in 1935 and established the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union, Voroshilov was one of the first five appointed. He was also one of only two marshals who survived the Great Purges of the military in 1937, supporting the tribunal that condemned his colleagues and announcing their fate. The Soviet KV-1 heavy tank, which entered service in December 1940, was named for him.

When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Voroshilov was appointed commander of the strategic Northern Axis defending Leningrad. In August of that year when Leningrad was seriously threatened because of Voroshilov's incompetence, Stalin relieved him of command and replaced him with General Georgii Zhukov. Voroshilov was shortly thereafter appointed to the State Defense Committee, where he served for the remainder of the war.

In 1945 as Stalin's representative, Voroshilov supervised the establishment of the communist regime in Hungary as the chairman of the Allied Control Commission. On Stalin's death in 1953, Voroshilov became the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Voroshilov died in Moscow on December 2, 1969.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; Finnish-Soviet War, First; Great Purges; Leningrad, Siege of; Moscow, Battle of; Stalin, Joseph

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Vosges, Advance to (August 29–September 15, 1944)

Allied campaign following the August 15, 1944, ANVIL-DRAGOON landings in southern France. The Allied landings here opened a new phase in the war in the European theater of operations. One day after the surrender of Toulon and Marseille (August 28, 1944), American and French troops commenced a campaign northward up the Rhône River Valley.

Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch, commanding the U.S. Seventh Army, led the American troops. Directly under Patch was Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott Jr., who commanded VI Corps. Truscott's corps consisted of three American infantry divisions—the 3rd, 36th, and 45th. General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny commanded the French First Army, which was organized into I and II Corps. Facing this array of Allied forces was the German Nineteenth Army under General of Infantry Friedrich Wiese, with eight divisions, the most reliable of which was the 11th Panzer Division (the "Ghost Division").

The Allied plan was to strike quickly up the Rhône River Valley, trapping as many Germans as possible in southern France and closing off the Rhône as an escape route. By forcing Wiese's troops northward, the Allies hoped to either push them into Lieutenant General George S. Patton's advancing Third Army or place themselves between the Germans and the Reich. By August 25, Patch had finalized his plans for the campaign. The American VI Corps was to drive up the east bank of the Rhône to Lyon, proceed on to Dijon, and then head northeastward toward Strasbourg on the Rhine. The French II Corps was to advance up the west bank of the Rhône, and the I Corps would guard the right flank of VI Corps.

VI Corps jumped off on August 29, and by September 1 the 36th Infantry Division reached the high ground overlooking Lyon. By September 2 the Germans had all but abandoned Lyon, and on the next day the French 1st Infantry Division had the honor of liberating France's third-largest city. By September 3 it was obvious that the German Nineteenth Army was in full retreat, so Truscott requested permission to press on without pause and close off the Belfort gap in the Vosges Mountains. The 3rd Division accepted the surrender of Besançon on September 7, and on September 10 the French II Corps captured Dijon.

Later that evening, elements of the American Seventh and Third Armies linked up, forming a united Allied front. Truscott then ordered his troops to wheel eastward to take Vesoul, which the Germans evacuated on September

12. On September 13–14 VI Corps pivoted again, this time in the direction of the Belfort gap, then halted at the Vosges Mountain passes on September 15.

A French woman exclaims to her neighbor and to an American soldier, “Tout Belfort est libre” (All Belfort is Free). (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

The advance against the Belfort gap was not carried out, as the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army came under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The troops were realigned so that Truscott’s three divisions were on the left, connected to Patton’s forces, and the French troops were on the extreme right of the Allied line. The campaign to the Vosges Mountains was over.

CHRISTOPHER C. MEYERS

See also

De Lattre de Tassigny, Jean Joseph Marie Gabriel; DRAGOON, Operation; France Campaign; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; Truscott, Lucian King, Jr.

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Vyazma-Bryansk, Battle for (October 2–20, 1941)

Important Eastern Front land battle. After German forces encircled Leningrad in the north, Adolf Hitler turned his attention to the center part of the Soviet front. His Führer Directive 36 on September 6, 1941, focused German preparations on a drive against Moscow in Operation TAIFUN (TYPHOON), entrusted to Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center. Bock commanded five field armies consisting of 14 panzer divisions, 9 Panzergrenadier divisions, and 44 infantry divisions. He planned to use his armor to seize two key towns, Vyazma (some 150 miles west of Moscow) and Bryansk (220 miles southwest of Moscow) to open the road to the Soviet capital for his infantry. The leading German units involved were Colonel General Heinz Guderian's Second Panzer Group, Colonel General Hermann Hoth's Third Panzer Group, Colonel General Erich Hoepner's Fourth Panzer Group, and Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs's Second Army.

To defend Moscow, the Soviets had assembled six armies under Colonel General Ivan Konev's Western Front. They were backed by four second-echelon armies. To Konev's immediate south were two additional armies of Marshal Semen Budenny's Reserve Front. Three more reserve armies were eventually brought forward. All the armies were badly understrength; though totaling 80 divisions, they had, in fact, the equivalent of only 25 full-strength divisions. The Germans had more than twice the number of tanks as the Soviets (an estimated 1,000 to 479), and the Soviets had only about 360

aircraft to at least twice as many German planes. The Soviets also suffered from a shortage of trained officers, as many had been pulled out of their units in August and September to organize new formations in the rear. In addition, the Soviets were short of modern antitank and antiaircraft weapons.

Lieutenant General Andrei Yeremenko commanded Soviet forces in the Bryansk area where the Germans planned to attack. On September 2, Stavka (the Soviet high command) ordered Yeremenko's Bryansk Front to move in two different directions, toward Roslav and southwest on Starodub in an effort to halt the German advance. The Soviet effort ended in failure, necessitating a return to defensive operations by September 13. German forces also moved into a gap of some 36 miles between the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts.

On September 30, Guderian's Second Panzer Group began an advance that carried it 50 miles the first day and 100 miles during the next three days. Guderian took the key rail junction of Orel, 150 miles in the Soviet rear, on October 8. Two days earlier, the Second Panzer Group had surrounded Bryansk. At the same time, Weichs's forces moved from the west, trapping the Soviet Third, Thirteenth, and Fiftieth Armies, although some of Yeremenko's forces escaped to the east on October 25.

To the north, meanwhile, Hoth's Third Panzer Group drove into the gap between the Soviet Nineteenth and Thirtieth Armies northwest of Vyazma, while the Fourth Panzer Group penetrated a vulnerable area between the Reserve and Bryansk Fronts. Konev countered by sending his deputy, Lieutenant General Ivan Vasilevich Boldin, with three divisions and two tank brigades to strike the flank of the Third Panzer Group on October 3–4, but these efforts came too late. Boldin's force was caught in the German encirclement, along with the greater part of Konev's Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-Fourth, and Third-Second Armies west of Vyazma.

General Konstantin Rokossovsky had been sent to Vyazma with his staff to gather five reinforced divisions there for a counterattack on October 6, only to find no Soviet divisions and German tanks already on the scene. He fled the town but soon discovered that he was between the inner and outer rings of the encirclement; he decided to break out to the northeast, picking up units along the way, including the 18th Infantry (the Home Guard Division) and an NKVD unit. These units broke out and joined Konev in Mozhaisk, 40

miles west of Moscow, where surviving elements of the Western and Reserve Fronts were forming a new 135-mile line to Kaluga.

Lieutenant General Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin, Nineteenth Army commander, also broke out of the encirclement to the east with two-plus divisions on the night of October 12–13. The Germans were hampered by the onset of the rainy season, which turned the roads into quagmires. But Stalin's penchant for linear defense with fronts deployed in single operational echelon had been pierced by German armor supported by artillery and Junker Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers, resulting in the encirclement and capture of as many as 660,000 Soviet troops, 1,242 tanks, and 5,412 artillery pieces. Vyazma surrendered on October 14 and Bryansk on October 20. This engagement was, however, the last of the great German encirclements.

When word reached Moscow of the defeat, a great many citizens took flight, necessitating the proclamation of martial law in the capital on October 19. Konev received the blame for the defeat; he was replaced by General of the Army Georgii Zhukov, who was charged with the final defense of Moscow.

CLAUDE R. SASSO AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bock, Fedor von; Budenny, Semen Mikhailovich; Guderian, Heinz; Hoepner, Erich; Hoth, Hermann; Konev, Ivan Stepanovich; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Smolensk, Battle of; Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von; Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich

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W

Wachi Takaji (1893–1978)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Hiroshima on February 1, 1893, Wachi Takaji graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1914 and from the Army War College in 1922. He worked in the China Section of the General Staff and then was a resident officer in southern China from 1925 to 1927. He was resident officer in Tsinan from 1928 to 1929, on the staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army during 1931 and 1932, resident officer in Canton from 1932 to 1934, head of the Taiyuan Special Service Agency from 1935 to 1936, and on the staff in the China Garrison Army from 1936 to 1937. Wachi was promoted to colonel in 1937.

Before the Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, Wachi encouraged warlords in southern China to revolt against the National Government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) in Nanjing (Nanking). After the start of the war, Wachi headed the Ran (Orchid) Organization. He engaged in efforts to negotiate with the Chinese to end the war and tried to communicate with Chinese chief of staff General Ho Yingqin (Ho Ying-chin) via a Chinese agent in 1938, but these efforts failed.

Promoted to major general in 1940, Wachi became chief of staff of the Taiwan Army in March 1941 and simultaneously headed its Research Division, supervising the study of land warfare. In February 1942, he became chief of staff of the Fourteenth Army, which assaulted Corregidor Island in the Philippines during April and May. Afterward, he had charge of the military government in the Philippines. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1943.

In March 1944, Wachi was appointed vice chief of staff of the Southern Expeditionary Army and was made chief of staff of the Thirty-Fifth Army fighting on Leyte that November. After the war, he was arrested on war crimes charges and held in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo. Tried and convicted by the Yokohama Military Tribunal for crimes committed by Japanese troops in

the Philippines, he was sentenced to six years at hard labor but released in 1950. Wachi died in Tokyo on October 30, 1978.

TOBE RYOICHI

See also

Corregidor, Battle of; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of; Sino-Japanese War

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Waesche, Russell Randolph, Sr. (1886–1946)

U.S. Coast Guard admiral and commandant. Born on January 6, 1886, at Thurmont, Maryland, Russell Randolph Waesche was educated at Purdue University and the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service School of Instruction (later the U.S. Coast Guard Academy). After commissioning in October 1906, he served aboard and commanded several cutters. In 1915, Waesche was assigned to Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C., as the chief of the Communications Division, where he served throughout World War I. During the 1920s, he commanded several patrol cutters and destroyers and returned to headquarters in 1928 as the chief ordnance officer. In 1932, he was appointed as the aide to the new commandant, Rear Admiral Harry G. Hamlet. In June 1936, he succeeded Hamlet as commandant and was promoted to rear admiral.

From 1936, Waesche oversaw the growth, reorganization, and modernization of the Coast Guard, its vessels, and its facilities, and in the latter half of 1941, he prepared the service for war. In September, he transmitted President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s order for all cutters to engage German and Italian aircraft and submarines west of 26 degrees west longitude. Then on November 1, Roosevelt ordered the transfer of the operational control of the Coast Guard to the Navy Department.

During the course of the war, Waesche worked closely with both chief of naval operations Admiral Ernest King and Treasury Secretary Henry

Morgenthau to ensure that the Coast Guard successfully prosecuted both its wartime and peacetime missions. While diligently preserving his service's identity, he pursued a policy of unprecedented cooperation with the navy and army in which coastguardsmen served with distinction in every theater of operations. He ensured that the Coast Guard's unique capabilities in such areas as small-boat handling and Arctic operations were recognized and utilized in the war effort.

U.S. Coast Guard admiral and commandant Russell R. Waesche. (U.S. Coast Guard)

Waesche shaped the postwar Coast Guard as he worked diligently to have the service returned to the Treasury Department and to retain several missions acquired during the war, including marine inspection and licensing. The Coast Guard's first four-star admiral and arguably its most important commandant, Waesche retired from active service in December 1945. Waesche died in Bethesda, Maryland, on October 17, 1946.

THOMAS J. STUHLREYER

See also

King, Ernest Joseph; Morgenthau, Henry, Jr.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United States Coast Guard; United States Navy

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Waffen-SS

Military component of the German Schutzstaffel (SS) that fought alongside the Wehrmacht (German armed forces) as an elite and politically reliable National Socialist force. The Waffen-SS (Armed Schutzstaffel) was one of the major branches of the Schutzstaffel. The SS itself was established in 1925 as a special unit of the Sturmabteilung (SA). The SS initially functioned as a bodyguard unit for the Nazi hierarchy and contained the most ideologically fervent party members. Party leader Adolf Hitler appointed Heinrich Himmler as the leader of the SS (Reichsführer-SS) in 1929, and Himmler increased membership from 280 to 50,000 and endowed members with a distinctive black uniform as well as the skull and double runic "SS" symbols. Himmler's aim was to transform the SS from its security function within the Nazi Party into a separate and powerful bureaucratic organ of the German state.

Between 1933 and 1936, Himmler combined all state police functions, merging the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei, or secret state police) with the Nazi Party's security organization (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) to create the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). He ensured his organization a more pervasive role in 1939 after his appointment as Reichskommissar for the Strengthening of German Ethnicity. Through this post, the SS was assured economic and political control of occupied Europe, especially in the east, where Nazi ideology envisaged a German territorial expansion (*Lebensraum*) and the subordination or elimination of the Slavic and Jewish populations. To

achieve this goal, Himmler created a separate economic office for the SS, the Wirtschafts und Verwaltungshauptamt (WVHA), and oversaw the Race and Population Resettlement Office (Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt, RuSHA).

Himmler had much higher ambitions for the SS than mere police functions. He wanted it to be a professional military body that might one day subsume the German Army. As its political and bureaucratic functions expanded, the SS formed illegal military units, originally known as Verfügungs-truppe, or special assignment troops. On March 17, 1933, Josef "Sepp" Dietrich established, on Hitler's direct order, a personal armed guard, the Leibstandarte. Early on, members of the unit served, among other things, as honor guards and color guards at parades and other events, such as the 1934 Nuremberg rally. The rally involved Dietrich's SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, of 2,600 men. But Himmler also employed such units in liquidating the leadership of the Sturmabteilung (SA, or storm troops) during the Blood Purge of June 1934 (Night of the Long Knives).

To qualify for the Verfügungstruppe, males had to be between 17 and 22 years old and at least 5 feet 11 inches tall. These units were supposed to be superior to army formations in training and morale and were to receive the best weapons. Early armed SS personnel also included concentration camp guards, the SS Totenkopfverbände (Death's Head formations), organized by Theodor Eicke. By March 1936, the SS was subdivided into five Sturmbanne (battalions) totaling 3,500 men: No. 1 Oberbayern, No. 2 Elbe, No. 3 Sachsen, No. 4 Ostfriesland, and No. 5 Brandenburg. After Germany introduced conscription in 1935, the SS organized two 5,000-man regiments, the Deutschland and the Germania.

On October 1, 1936, the SS Inspectorate was created to supervise the two SS officer training schools in operation at Bad Tolz and Braunschweig, under the supervision of Oberstgruppenführers Paul Hausser and Felix Steiner. Early applicants had to have served at least two years in the army. Training emphasized physical fitness and endurance rather than parade-ground drill so that fully equipped troops could march/run 1.86 miles within 20 minutes. There was also a rigorous combat training course. Steiner's demanding standards meant that in 1937, only 15 of every 100 SS applicants were accepted.

Steiner also sought to instill a sense of family in each SS unit, encouraging officers to consort with noncommissioned officers and not to

address one another by rank but rather as “comrade.” In addition, the SS oath contained a sense of elitism and personal bond to the führer: “I swear to Adolf Hitler, as Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich, loyalty and bravery. I vow obedience to you and to the superiors whom you shall appoint, obedience unto death, so help me God.”

The SS motto was “Loyalty Is My Honor” (*Meine Ehre Heisst Treue*). Mystique and symbolism were used to entice and muster group solidarity. Only those who had graduated from the two officer training schools and possessed the rank of Untersturmführer or above were permitted to carry a special dagger. SS recruits were also tattooed in their armpits, and the first 10,000 received an SS ring (later, only officers who had served three years might wear the ring). Himmler also created a pseudo-Arthurian court at Wewelsburg Castle, near Paderborn in Westphalia, where he organized a roundtable of favorite officers (the Circle of Friends of the SS-Reichsführer), with a runic coat of arms for each member.

On August 17, 1938, a decree by Hitler set up a separate headquarters for the military training of these SS units and established their military character as armed (Waffen) SS. For obvious reasons, the leaders of the Army Supreme Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH) rejected the idea of another military establishment independent of its authority and had some success in limiting its size. By the eve of the war, there were only about 23,000 men in the SS formations, including the Death’s Head groups.

But with the coming of the war, the size and scope of SS activities increased dramatically. During the Polish Campaign of September 1939, Waffen-SS regiments were merged within regular Wehrmacht divisions. In October, the first three SS divisions were formed, one each from the Verfügungs-truppe (later known as SS Das Reich Division), the Death’s Head units (SS Totenkopf Division), and the police (Polizedivision). Hitler’s Leibstandarte, initially a motorized regiment, became a fourth SS division (SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). In November, the various SS branches were united under the name Waffen-SS.

SS divisions were fully integrated into the regular army command structure, but this did not mean that there was no tension between regular army and SS commanders. The SS divisions were highly politicized and supported the National Socialist credo and its racial policies, especially in Eastern Europe. There was also anger in the army over the fact that the SS

units had claim on the best weaponry. Sharp tensions and inefficiencies also existed within SS headquarters, where Himmler mirrored his master in practicing a divide-and-rule style of leadership.

The Waffen-SS role was greatly expanded after the German invasion of the Soviet Union began on June 22, 1941. It was a foregone conclusion that the SS would play a paramount role during this ideological war of annihilation. In addition to the 1st SS Panzer Division (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler), there were five other Waffen-SS divisions at this time: the 2nd SS Panzer Division (Das Reich), the 3rd SS Panzer Division (Totenkopf), the 4th SS Pol*i*zei Panzergrenadier Division, the 5th SS Panzer Division (Viking), and the 6th SS Gebirge Division "Nord" (composed largely of Norwegians). The SS Einsatzgruppen (special action groups), death squads to murder Jews and communists, were also formed, a third of their membership being recruited from Waffen-SS units.

Four of these groups of about 3,000 men each were formed by July 1941 to follow Army Groups North, Center, and South into the Soviet Union. Their role of exterminating Jews and Soviet officials had been decided prior to the Soviet invasion and was sanctioned by Hitler through his Commissar Order (Komissarbefehl) of May 1941 as well as the operational orders to the Wehrmacht stipulating that no German soldiers were to be disciplined for any action against the civilian Soviet population.

SS formations fought on all battlefronts in which Germany was engaged, with the exception of the Western Desert campaigns. As casualties mounted and following the general army reform of May 1943 that reduced divisional size, Waffen-SS units were amalgamated and renamed. By the end of the war, when the total number in the SS mounted to more than 800,000 men in 38 divisions, some 200,000 were foreign volunteers (Freiwilligen). This practice of recruitment was accepted despite the SS pretense of representing only the most racially pure Germanic elements. Among the militarily effective new formations were the 9th SS Panzer Division (Hohenstaufen), the 10th SS Panzer Division (Frundsburg), and the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitlerjugend, composed largely of Hitler Youth).

A German Waffen-SS mortar squad manning a Leichte Infanterie geschütz 18, a small 75mm infantry support weapon. (Corbis)

Paradoxically, the early Waffen-SS units suffered higher casualties than their regular Wehrmacht counterparts, specifically as a result of their ideological zeal to fight the enemy. As the war progressed, anti-Semitic and anticommunist elements of the occupied populations formed their own Waffen-SS units, for example Nordland, which was the first non-German-organized (Norwegian and Danish); Lettisches (Baltic); Skanderbeg (Albanian); Maria Theresa (Austrian); Kama (Croatian); Nederland (Netherlands); Hunyadi (Hungarian); Charlemagne (French); Bohmen-Mahren (Czech and Slovak); Kalevala (Finnish); Galicia (Ukrainian); and Kaminski (Ukrainian and Russian).

Some Waffen-SS units were among the most effective German military formations, and there were a number of capable commanders. Undoubtedly, the most effective of the latter was Hausser, who became the first SS general to command a German field army and directed the Normandy defenses beginning in late June 1944. But Waffen-SS formations were also the most brutal German military units in their treatment of enemy prisoners and conquered peoples, and they committed numerous atrocities. The growing strength of the SS also posed a real threat to the ascendancy of the

Wehrmacht, especially in the last year of the war. Hitler despised many of the army generals, and it is clear that had Germany won the war, the Waffen-SS would have replaced the Wehrmacht as the army of the Reich. In all, as many as 250,000 Waffen-SS members may have been killed during the course of the war.

NEVILLE PANTHAKI

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Commissar Order; Concentration Camps, German; Dietrich, Josef "Sepp"; Hausser, Paul "Papa"; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; Steiner, Felix; Document 52

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Wainwright, Jonathan Mayhew (1883–1953)

U.S. Army general. Born on August 23, 1883, at Fort Walla Walla, Washington Territory, Jonathan "Skinny" Mayhew Wainwright graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1906 and was commissioned in the cavalry. During his early career, he fought against Moro rebels in the Philippines (1906–1908) and was assigned to various military posts in the western United States. Following the U.S. entry into World War I, he served with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France, ending the war as a brevet lieutenant colonel.

Wainwright then reverted to his permanent rank of captain and held a variety of command and staff assignments. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1929, he graduated from the Command and General Staff School (1931), and the Army War College (1936). Promoted to colonel, he commanded the 3rd Cavalry Regiment at Fort Myer, Virginia (1936–1938). After being promoted

to temporary brigadier general (1938), he assumed command of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. In September 1940, Wainwright was promoted to temporary major general and assigned to the Philippines to command the Philippine Division.

U.S. Army lieutenant general Jonathan M. Wainwright in Yokohama, Japan, following his release from Japanese captivity, 1945. (Corbis)

Following the Japanese landings there on December 8, Wainwright commanded the North Luzon Force. General Douglas MacArthur, confident that his forces could throw back any Japanese invasion, had scrapped the original plan to meet a Japanese invasion by withdrawing into the Bataan Peninsula. Wainwright's Filipino and American U.S. forces fought well but were ultimately forced from the Lingayen Gulf onto Bataan. Much of their equipment and supplies was lost in the withdrawal.

With a Japanese victory in sight, Washington ordered MacArthur to leave the Philippines for Australia, and he was awarded the Medal of Honor. On MacArthur's departure on March 11, 1942, Wainwright took over as commander of U.S. forces in the Far East, with the rank of lieutenant general. Forced off Bataan to Corregidor and with supplies running out and no hope of relief, he had no choice but to surrender on May 6, 1942. MacArthur protested U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall's recommendation that Wainwright receive the Medal of Honor.

Treated harshly as a prisoner of war in camps in northern Luzon, Formosa, and Manchuria for the next three years, Wainwright was liberated by the Soviets in August 1945. He witnessed the formal Japanese surrender on September 2 and traveled to the Philippines to receive the surrender of Japanese forces there.

Wainwright returned to the United States and, despite MacArthur's opposition, was awarded the Medal of Honor. In September 1945, Wainwright was promoted to full general. He took command of the Fourth Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in 1946 but retired in August 1947. Wainwright died in San Antonio, Texas, on September 3, 1953.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM

See also

Bataan Death March; MacArthur, Douglas; Philippines, Japanese Conquest of

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Wakabayashi Tōichi (1912–1943)

Japanese Army officer. Born in Yamanashi, Japan, on March 27, 1912, Wakabayashi Tōichi was promoted to lieutenant from the enlisted ranks. He was a brilliant tactical commander in the field. On December 9, 1941, his company of the 228th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Division carried out a

surprise attack on the British Gin Drinker's Line at Hong Kong, helping to force the British capitulation.

Transferred to Guadalcanal in November 1942, Wakabayashi's company was assigned the duty of delaying the advancing Americans to facilitate a Japanese evacuation from the island. Wakabayashi carried out this duty skillfully before he was killed in action on Mount Austin on January 14, 1943. Posthumously promoted to captain, he became a wartime icon of the Japanese Army.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also

Guadalcanal Land Campaign; Hong Kong, Battle of

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Wake Island, Battle for (December 8–23, 1941)

Military engagement between U.S. and Japanese forces over control of Wake Island. Strategically located in the Central Pacific and a U.S. possession since 1899, Wake Island is actually a small atoll of three islets—Wake, Peale, and Wilkes—comprising only 2,600 acres of sand and coral. Wake Island is located some 2,000 miles west of Hawaii and 600 miles from the Marshall Islands, in 1941 a Japanese stronghold. Wake served primarily as a refueling stop for the transpacific Pan American Airways Clipper Service, but as war loomed between the United States and Japan, both sides recognized its value as a reconnaissance base.

The United States began fortifying Wake in early 1941. That December, the island had some 1,221 civilian workers and 530 military personnel, including 449 members of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion under Major James P. S. Devereux. Navy commander Winfield S. Cunningham exercised overall command. The defenders had 6 5-inch naval guns, 12 3-inch antiaircraft guns, 18 .50-caliber machine guns, and 30 .30-caliber machine

guns. On December 4, 12 Grumman F-4F Wildcats flew off the carrier *Enterprise* and landed at Wake's partially completed airstrip.

Within a few hours of its December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan also moved against Guam and Wake. Guam fell quickly, but at Wake Island the Japanese received their first military rebuff of the war. At noon on December 8, 18 Japanese land-based bombers from the Marshall Islands struck Wake, destroying eight of the Wildcats on the ground and inflicting other damage. They also killed 23 marine aviation personnel and wounded another 11. Ten civilian employees of Pan American Airways were also killed. Although riddled by Japanese machine-gun fire, the Pan-Am Clipper was able to take off with a capacity load of civilians that afternoon. Japanese air attacks continued for two more days.

Convinced the defenses on Wake Island had been sufficiently reduced, a Japanese invasion force arrived off the island on the morning of December 11. It consisted of the light cruisers *Yubari, Tenryu,* and *Tatsuta;* six destroyers; two patrol boats; and two transports with 450 men of the Special Naval Landing Force (Japanese marines). The defenders held their fire until the Japanese were at point-blank range. After a short, sharp fight, the Japanese withdrew—but not before they had lost the destroyers *Hayate* (literally blown from the water, it was the first Japanese warship sunk in the Pacific war) and *Kisaragi*. The cruiser *Yubari* was badly damaged, and other Japanese ships were also hit and damaged.

In Hawaii, meanwhile, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was preparing a relief expedition that would commit all three of his aircraft carriers. The *Saratoga* was to make the relief attempt, while the *Enterprise* and *Lexington,* with other ships, carried out diversionary raids against the Marshall Islands and stood ready to support. The expedition was delayed and did not sail until December 16, however.

Commanded by Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher, it consisted of the *Saratoga;* the cruisers *Astoria, Minneapolis,* and the *San Francisco;* 10 destroyers; the seaplane tender *Tangier* (carrying a marine battalion); and the fleet oiler *Neches*. The task force was forced to travel at only 13 knots, however—the top speed of the *Neches.*

In Pearl Harbor, meanwhile, Vice Admiral William S. Pye temporarily replaced Kimmel (who had been relieved) as new Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz made his way to Hawaii. Pye ordered the

Lexington task force under Vice Admiral Wilson E. Brown to reinforce Fletcher and insisted that Fletcher refuel before entering a possible battle zone. This imposed further delay so that the relief forces were still some 600 miles from Wake when a second Japanese expeditionary force arrived at the island on December 23. With reports of Japanese carriers and battleships near Wake Island, aware that Washington considered Wake Island "a liability, not an asset," and informed by radio message from Cunningham that the Japanese had come ashore and that "the issue is in doubt," Pye ordered the relief expedition to return to Pearl Harbor.

This second Japanese expeditionary force was much stronger than the first. It included four heavy cruisers and about 1,500 marines. The aircraft carriers *Hiryū* and *Sōryū,* which had participated in the Pearl Harbor raid, were detached to provide distant support in the form of air strikes. Following a preliminary bombardment, the Japanese landings began before dawn. Most of the defenders were tied down manning the heavy guns, and few were available to act as infantry. Superior Japanese numbers told, and informed that no help would be forthcoming, Cunningham decided that morning that he had no choice but to surrender.

In the two battles for Wake Island, the Japanese lost 820 killed, one light cruiser heavily damaged, two destroyers and two patrol boats sunk, and at least seven or eight aircraft shot down and another 20 damaged. U.S. losses totaled 130 killed, 49 wounded, two missing in action, and 12 aircraft destroyed. A total of 433 military personnel and 1,104 civilians were taken prisoner.

All the defenders, except for about 100 civilians, were sent to prison camps. The Japanese put the remainder to work finishing the air station. They were executed in October 1943. The Japanese commander, Rear Admiral Shigematsu Sakaibara, was later convicted of war crimes and executed.

Although the heroic marine defense of Wake Island provided a boost to U.S. morale, Japan now controlled the line of communications across the Central Pacific and was free to move against the Philippines.

MARLYN R. PIERCE AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Amphibious Warfare; Brown, Wilson, Jr.; Cunningham, Winfield Scott; Fletcher, Frank Jack; Kimmel, Husband Edward; Pearl Harbor, Attack on;

Nimitz, Chester William; Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers

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Walker, Frederick John (1896–1944)

British Royal Navy captain and one of the most important Allied exponents of antisubmarine warfare. Born at Plymouth, England, on June 3, 1896, Frederick John Walker entered the Royal Navy in 1909. He served with the Grand Fleet during most of World War I.

In 1921, Walker began seriously studying antisubmarine warfare. He attended the first specialist course at the navy's Anti-Submarine School and then became fleet antisubmarine officer aboard battleships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets. In 1933, he was promoted to commander and took command of the asdic-equipped (known as sonar by the U.S. Navy) destroyer HMS *Shikari* but then had charge of the yacht of the commander in chief, China Station, for three years. In 1937, Walker became experimental officer at the Anti-Submarine School, the appointment he held at the outbreak of World War II. Walker's career was apparently at a dead end, because the Royal Navy held that antisubmarine warfare was a solved problem.

Walker joined Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay's staff in Dover as operations officer and was heavily engaged in Operation DYNAMO, the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkerque (Dunkirk, May 26–June 4, 1940). He pleaded to return to sea and finally received command of the sloop *Stork,* flagship of Escort Group 36, in September 1941. The group's first assignment was to escort Convoy HG.76, composed of 31 merchantmen and a naval auxiliary, from Gibraltar. During an epic battle on December 14–23, Walker's group fought off air and submarine attacks, losing two merchantmen, an escort, and the escort carrier *Audacity* but sinking five U-boats in the process. Walker demonstrated the skillful

combination of effective deployment of surface and aerial assets with relentless determination and aggressive hunting that became his trademark.

Promoted to captain in June 1942, Walker received a shore assignment at Liverpool shortly afterward, but he returned to sea in February 1943 in command of the sloop *Starling*, flagship of Support Group 2. While ashore, he had convinced Admiral Sir Max Horton of the potential value of hunter-killer groups of fast, modern antisubmarine vessels, and this command was his opportunity to prove it. For the next year, Walker's group hunted U-boats relentlessly, destroying 16 and conclusively demonstrating the validity of his concept.

Walker drove himself hard. The most successful antisubmarine warfare commander in history, he died of a stroke in Liverpool on July 9, 1944.

PAUL E. FONTENOY

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Horton, Sir Max Kennedy; Hunter-Killer Groups; Ramsay, Sir Bertram Home

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Walker, Walton Harris (1889–1950)

U.S. Army general. Born in Belton, Texas, on December 3, 1889, Walton Harris Walker attended the Virginia Military Institute (1907–1908) before graduating from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1912. Commissioned in the infantry, he commanded a machine-gun battalion in the 5th Infantry Division in France during World War I. He finished the war as a brevet major but reverted to captain on his return to the United States.

Between 1919 and 1923, Walker was both a student and an instructor at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the Infantry School, Camp (now Fort) Benning, Georgia. He was then posted to West Point as an instructor and a tactical officer until 1925. Walker graduated from the

Command and General Staff School in 1926 and was then infantry representative at the Coast Artillery School until 1930. Between 1933 and 1935, he served as a battalion commander in the 15th Infantry Regiment in Tianjin (Tientsin), China. Walker then served at Headquarters, III Corps Area, Baltimore, Maryland. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1936, he graduated from the Army War College that year and was assigned as executive officer to Brigadier General George C. Marshall at Vancouver Barracks, Washington.

Having impressed Marshall, Walker moved to the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff in 1937. Shortly before U.S. entry into World War II, he was promoted to colonel and took command of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment. In January 1942, he assumed command of the 3rd Armored Division and was promoted to major general. That September, he assumed command of the IV Armored Corps at Camp Young, California. There, he established the Desert Training Center, responsible for training armored units for desert warfare in North Africa.

In February 1944, Walker's IV Armored Corps was redesignated XX Corps and ordered to Britain. In July, the corps was committed in Normandy as part of the Third Army, commanded by Walker's mentor, Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. XX Corps became known as the "Ghost Corps" for the speed of its advance. In August 1944, Walker was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for battlefield heroism. Pushing into France from the Loire River to the Moselle, XX Corps reduced German fortifications at Metz in November 1944. Walker was criticized during this time for an apparent lack of concern about taking heavy casualties.

Major General Walton H. Walker, who distinguished himself during World War II as commander of XX Corps (known as the “Ghost Corps” for the speed of its advance), in the campaign to liberate France. (Keystone/Getty Images)

During the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), Patton swung the bulk of his Third Army north to counterattack into the southern flank of the German thrust. Walker’s XX Corps remained to cover the front that had been previously held by an entire army. In April 1945, his units liberated the Buchenwald concentration camp. By May 1945, the units reached Linz, Austria, the farthest advance east of any of Patton’s units.

Promoted to lieutenant general in April 1945, Walker ended the war as commander of the 8th Service Command in Dallas, Texas. In June 1948, he assumed command of the Fifth Army, headquartered in Chicago. That September, he assumed command of the Eighth Army in Japan, the ground force element of General Douglas MacArthur’s Far Eastern Command (FEC).

The four divisions there were at two-thirds of their authorized wartime strength. Although Walker instituted a training program, it had reached only the battalion level when the Korean War began in June 1950.

The Eighth Army was committed to the defense of South Korea, and Walker had the daunting task of stopping the rapidly advancing North Korean army. To add to his problems of insufficient strength and lack of equipment, only three of his four U.S. division commanders and none of the Republic of Korea (ROK) division commanders had ever previously commanded a division. ROK and American troops carried out delaying actions back to the Naktong River, where the Pusan Perimeter was formed. There, Walker led the longest, largest, most complex, and most successful mobile defense in U.S. military history. He combined a magnificent sense of timing with a judicious employment of his meager reserves and threatened, coerced, and exhorted his American and ROK commanders, refusing to yield ground without a fierce struggle, justifying his "Bulldog" nickname. Failure in the campaign would have ended the war.

The Eighth Army then took the offensive but was forced to withdraw from North Korea following the Chinese military intervention. Walker had Patton's weakness for driving at high speeds, and on December 23, 1950, while racing to inspect units north of Seoul, his jeep was struck by a truck, and he was killed. Walker was posthumously promoted to full general.

UZAL W. ENT

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Armor Warfare; Eisenhower, Dwight David; MacArthur, Douglas; Metz, Battle of; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Tanks, All Powers

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Wallace, Henry Agard (1888–1965)

U.S. politician, New Deal administrator, and vice president of the United States (1941–1945). Henry Agard Wallace was born on October 7, 1888, on his family's farm in Adair County, Iowa. Wallace's father served as agriculture secretary for the Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge administrations. The younger Wallace broke with his family's Republican leanings and, as editor of *The Farmer*, endorsed Franklin D. Roosevelt for president in 1932. Wallace was subsequently rewarded with his father's old job in the Department of Agriculture. For the next eight years, Wallace was a fiercely loyal member of the New Deal elite, using the powers of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Farm Security Administrations to shore up crop market prices and modernize small farms.

Wallace's visibility in office persuaded Roosevelt to choose him as his vice presidential running mate in 1940, despite the misgivings of conservative Democratic Party members who claimed that he was too intellectual. Such suspicions deepened during World War II as Wallace espoused an increasingly radical left-wing agenda, particularly in international matters, in which he was accused of being naively sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. During the war, Wallace kept a relatively low profile, but he did tour Asia and Latin America several times to build support for the Allies. He also headed the Board of Economic Warfare for a short time.

A combination of southern Democrats and urban northeasterners prevented Wallace's renomination at the 1944 party convention. Also, Roosevelt's inner circle, who feared that the ill president would not complete a fourth term, pushed for the more conservative Harry S. Truman as the vice presidential candidate. Shortly before his death in April 1945, Roosevelt appointed Wallace to be secretary of commerce.

Wallace refused to stay quiet, however, and he soon became a leading critic of President Truman's hard line toward the Soviet Union, forcing the president to dismiss him in September 1946. Recognizing that his future as a prominent Democrat had ended, Wallace decided to run in the 1948 election as a third-party candidate on a platform that advocated socialist-style reform, racial integration at home, and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. This platform did not attract many American voters. Wallace's national support slipped away under a barrage of criticism, and his 2.7 percent of the

November 1948 vote left him in fourth place behind Strom Thurmond, a humiliating defeat that shattered the anti-Truman Left.

Wallace then withdrew from public life and spent his remaining years as a gentleman farmer. He died in Danbury, Connecticut, on November 18, 1965.

ALAN ALLPORT

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.

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Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887–1979)

British engineer. Born at Ripley, Derbyshire, England, on September 26, 1887, Barnes Neville Wallis decided to become an engineer but could not afford to go to university. Apprenticeships to engineering works followed. Wallis designed dirigibles such as the R-100 and adapted a revolutionary concept to aircraft design. He discovered that an airframe could be made lighter yet stronger through geodetics, a cross-bracing system of stress balancing whereby one side in tension is stabilized by its opposite being in compression. He employed this technique in the Wellesley (later Wellington) bomber; the 1935 prototype caused the British government to rescind an order for biplanes in favor of the new design. The Wellington became the Royal Air Force's most durable bomber.

Wallis's theoretical work, including early tests involving catapulting marbles across his family's bathtub, led him to believe that a single bomb might destroy a dam. He designed a 5-ton cylindrical bomb that, when released at low altitude with a certain forward rate of airspeed and a certain rate of backspin, would literally bounce across the surface of the water, hit the dam, and drive itself down to the base of the structure before exploding,

thus maximizing its effectiveness/damage. His hypotheses proved to be correct when, on the night of May 16–17, 1943, newly formed No. 617 Squadron's Lancaster bombers destroyed the Möhne and Eder dams, causing widespread flooding of Germany's industrialized Ruhr area.

Wallis's "tallboy" (12,000-pound) and "grand slam" (22,000-pound) bombs were employed against targets such as the *Tirpitz,* the Bay of Biscay U-boat pens, and the German V-rocket sites. His talent for seeing a complex problem, formulating a solution, and bringing it to fruition proved to be invaluable to the Allied war effort. Despite receiving little recognition in his own time, Wallis continually advanced design engineering.

Knighted in 1968, Wallis did important and innovative design work after the war, including work on variable-geometry (swing-wing) aircraft and supersonic aircraft. He died in Effingham, England, on October 30, 1979.

MATTHEW ALAN MCNIECE

See also
Great Britain, Air Force; *Tirpitz,* Attacks on

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Wang Ching-wei

See Wang Jingwei

Wang Jingwei (1883–1944)

Chinese politician. Born in Guangzhou (Canton) in Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, China, on May 4, 1883, Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei) studied law in Tokyo in his youth, but his avocation was politics. An early ally of Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen), he quickly rose to a prominent position in Sun's revolutionary movement devoted to overthrowing the ruling Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty. Imprisoned for participating in a plot to assassinate the regent Prince

Qun (Ch'ün) in 1910, Wang was released after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. He then spent the period from 1912 to 1917 in exile after Sun's movement collapsed.

Wang's revolutionary credentials and his role in rebuilding the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—made him the logical candidate to succeed Sun after the latter's death in 1925. Nevertheless, Wang was pushed aside by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), who controlled the army. Wang attempted to form his own government, but he failed and eventually mended fences with Jiang in a show of unity following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

Appointed titular head of the Nationalist government in 1932, Wang was forced to bear the onus of appeasing the Japanese while Jiang led the army in a campaign to exterminate the Communists. Disillusioned, Wang resigned and left China in 1935 to recover from an assassination attempt. He returned following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, but he quickly grew pessimistic about China's military prospects. After failing to persuade Jiang to make peace with Japan (which led Nationalist agents to make another attempt on his life), Wang fled to Japanese-occupied China.

In March 1940, the Japanese Army installed Wang as head of the puppet Reorganized Nationalist Government in Nanjing (Nanking), Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. Wang's hopes of presenting himself as a credible alternative to Jiang were ultimately doomed by the harsh reality of Japanese military domination. Wang died in Nagoya, Japan, on November 10, 1944, while undergoing medical treatment.

Wang Jingwei, who led the puppet government of the territory of China that was occupied by the Japanese. (Corbis)

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also

China; Collaboration; Jiang Jieshi

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Wanklyn, Malcolm David (1911–1942)

British Royal Navy lieutenant commander and the first submariner to win the Victoria Cross in World War II. Born in Kolkata, India, on June 28, 1911, Malcolm David Wanklyn joined the Royal Navy in 1925. Trained at Dartmouth Naval College, he was assigned in 1930 as a midshipman first to the battleship *Marlborough* and then to the battle cruiser *Renown*. From 1932 he served in submarines in the Mediterranean Fleet and then at Portsmouth. In 1936 he was promoted to first lieutenant. At the beginning of World War II, Wanklyn commanded the submarine *H-32*. In August 1940, he took command of the *Upholder,* then still under construction, a small 630-ton U-class submarine armed with four 21-inch torpedo tubes (eight torpedoes) and a 76mm (3-inch) deck gun with a crew of 31–33 men.

Promoted to lieutenant commander and having already torpedoed and sunk an Italian tanker and a merchant ship, Wanklyn won the Victoria Cross for an action on the evening of May 24, 1941. He was south of Sicily on his seventh patrol in the *Upholder* when he sighted an Italian troop convoy with a strong destroyer escort. Although the submarine's listening gear was inoperative and fading light made periscope observation difficult, Wanklyn was able to work to a favorable position to torpedo and sink the 18,000-ton troopship *Conte Rosso* and then escape after evading 37 depth charges dropped by the destroyers.

Wanklyn was lost, along with his entire crew, when the *Upholder* was sunk on its 25th patrol, becoming overdue on April 14, 1942. Most likely, it was sunk by depth charges dropped by the Italian torpedo boat *Pegaso* northeast of Tripoli that day, but it may have been damaged or sunk by German aircraft that attacked a supposed submarine in the same area on April 14, just before the *Pegaso* attack. It may also have been lost three days earlier, when a submarine reportedly encountered a minefield near Tripoli.

Wanklyn is considered the most successful British submarine commander of the war in terms of total tonnage sunk, having been credited with sinking 21 Axis ships totaling some 140,000 tons and including a destroyer, troopships, tankers, and storeships.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also
Submarines

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Wannsee Conference (January 20, 1942)

Daylong conference of German leaders to discuss the bureaucratic demands of arranging for the emigration, deportation, concentration, and elimination of the Jewish population within Germany and the occupied territories. The conferees also confirmed policies for the treatment of Jews who were of mixed blood or in mixed marriages.

The conference was convened and organized by Chief of the Security Police Reinhard Heydrich, who invited 15 top Nazi bureaucrats and Schutzstaffel (SS) officers to plan for the concentration of Jews and their execution. It took place in a villa in Wannsee, a suburb of Berlin on January 20, 1942.

The German invasion and occupation of much of Eastern Europe, especially Poland and the Soviet Union, presented a demographic challenge to the German government because of the large Jewish populations in those areas, especially in Poland and the western Soviet Union. By the end of 1941, the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, recognized that deportation and emigration were no longer adequate for the task of eliminating the Jewish population. He authorized Heydrich to create the bureaucracy and arrangements for a "final solution to the Jewish question." The Wannsee Conference dealt with these matters. Jews were to be "evacuated" to the east, with the "Jewish question" to be resolved first in the General Government.

The organizational challenges of identifying, transporting, housing, and eventually eliminating what the conferees (over)estimated as a population of 11 million European Jews (this number included those in neutral nations, such as Ireland and Switzerland) demanded that the Nazi government establish an infrastructure and clear procedures for implementing the goals of the regime.

Although much of the discussion focused on forced emigration and deportation to Eastern Europe, the underlying objective of the conference was to legitimize the "Final Solution," the systematic murder of the Jewish population in Europe. Specific topics discussed at the conference included estimating the size of Europe's Jewish population, organizing a systematic sweep of Europe to eliminate all Jewish remnants, and confronting local resistance in occupied countries.

Using the Nazi racial laws (the Nuremberg Laws), those attending the Wannsee Conference confirmed criteria for dealing with mixed-blood Jews and mixed marriages. Mixed-blood individuals were divided into a complex classification system based on "Mixed Blood of First Degree" and "Mixed Blood of Second Degree." This juridical understanding of race was designed to bring about the complete extermination of Jews in Europe.

Stenographers carefully documented the day's events in an outline of the conversations. In 1984 a German documentary concerning the Wannsee Conference appeared, based on this source and letters written by Hermann Göring and Adolf Eichmann.

JAMES T. CARROLL

See also

Eichmann, Karl Adolf; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; Document 131

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Warlimont, Walter (1894–1976)

German Army general of artillery. Born in Osnabrück, Germany, on October 3, 1894, Walter Warlimont was commissioned a second lieutenant in the army in June 1914. During World War I, he served as an artillery battery officer, adjutant, and battery commander. Following the collapse of the monarchy at the end of the war, Warlimont joined one of the new Freikorps

formations. He transferred to the new German Army, the Reichswehr, in 1922 and was the second adjutant to General Werner von Blomberg, chief of the Truppenamt (the covert General Staff).

His gift for foreign languages gave him a broader exposure to other countries than many of his army contemporaries. Warlimont studied the English language for three months in England in 1926, and in May 1929, he began a year with the U.S. Army while studying American methods of industrial mobilization. He also married an American. War Minister Blomberg sent Warlimont to Spain between 1936 and 1937 as military attaché to General Francisco Franco. In 1938, Warlimont assumed command of the 26th Artillery Regiment in Düsseldorf as a colonel.

In September 1938, he was appointed to head the National Defense Section (L Section) while also serving as deputy chief of the Operations Staff of the recently established Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces Supreme Command, OKW). Colonel General Wilhelm Keitel was chief of staff, and Major General Alfred Jodl was the chief of the OKW Operations Staff. Warlimont became chief of the Operations Staff when Jodl was transferred to a command position in October 1938. Keitel ordered Jodl's return to the OKW in August 1939, thereby restoring Warlimont to his former post.

Warlimont was promoted to major general in August 1940, to lieutenant general in April 1942, and to general of artillery in April 1944.

Warlimont attended most of the major command conferences and drafted the bulk of the principal operational plans and directives. The latter included the infamous Commissar Order (Komissarbefehl); despite the fact that he was able to reduce its severity, his role in regard to this document was held against him after the war. Warlimont also drafted papers on Spain, Gibraltar, and Malta, and in November 1940, he went to France to discuss methods to strengthen Vichy France against the influence of Charles de Gaulle's Free French forces.

Warlimont was injured in the July 20, 1944, bomb plot against Hitler. Warlimont remained on duty, but by September 1944, he was diagnosed with a serious concussion. Transferred to the Führer Reserve of general officers, he was never recalled to duty.

Warlimont was cautious and reserved. Known as "the Fox" by some, he was not trusted by Hitler. Warlimont was arrested by the Americans in 1945,

tried at Nuremberg for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, and sentenced to life imprisonment. His sentence was reduced in 1951, and he was released six years later.

During his incarceration and after his release, Warlimont worked on a number of historical projects, including his major work, *Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939–1945* (1962). He died on October 9, 1976, in Kreuth, Bavaria.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

Blomberg, Werner von; Commissar Order; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Jodl, Alfred; Keitel, Wilhelm

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Warlimont, Walter. *Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939–1945*. Translated by R. H. Barry. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990.

Warsaw, Battle of (September 8–27, 1939)

On September 1, 1939, German forces invaded Poland from three directions, with the bulk of German forces deployed on the flanks in Army Groups North and South. Only weak German forces to the west connected the two army groups. The meeting point for the German northern and southern pincers was to be the capital of Warsaw, which with 1.3 million people was Poland's largest city.

On September 5, the government began evacuating its offices in the city, and the next day, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły and his commanders departed for Brest in the east. On September 8, as German troops closed on Warsaw, Lord Mayor Stefan Starzyński formed a defense committee composed of both civilian and military leaders; its Order No. 1 proclaimed that the city would be defended. All public transport was commandeered, rationing was begun, and the populace was organized into guard and labor battalions. Polish general Juliusz Rommel was in command, and General

Walerian Czuma was responsible for the actual defense of the city with some 120,000 Polish Army troops.

The Poles did what they could, utilizing old Russian city defenses, turning city blocks into strongpoints, covering intersections with artillery, and taking advantage of rubble for ambush positions. They also made use of makeshift weapons, including gasoline bombs used against German tanks. The Polish defensive positions were difficult to detect, and the German formations, organized for rapid movement, would have little advantage in city fighting at close quarters.

Defending against the Luftwaffe was another matter altogether. The city had 54 fighter aircraft, which had some success against the Germans in the first days. But their numbers were steadily reduced both through aerial combat and lack of spare parts. Those that remained were withdrawn entirely on September 8, leaving only 40mm and 75mm antiaircraft guns and machine guns, and these were spread thin. German air strength was so dominant that the Poles were forced to restrict ground counterattacks to night actions.

In addition to shortages of military equipment, particularly for use against air attack, Warsaw had little in the way of food. By September 14, even with rationing, stocks were sufficient only for two weeks. Despite this, people in the city were defiant, and morale remained high. But on September 8, German ground units entered the fray. On that day, Polish troops repulsed an attack by the 4th Panzer Division in the Ochota suburb, destroying some 60 German armored vehicles. This rebuff convinced the Germans that a direct ground assault on the city would be costly and that the best course would be a protracted siege. That day also, the Germans began what would be a growing artillery bombardment, probably the key factor in the city's eventual surrender.

Warsaw had been under intermittent terror bombing from the first day of the invasion, but on September 13, the Germans announced their intention to bomb cities, and Adolf Hitler ordered that civilians be prevented from leaving Warsaw. These decisions were based on the belief that terror bombing would hasten the Polish surrender. The next day, September 14, the bombing of Warsaw was especially severe. That day was the Jewish New Year for Warsaw's 400,000 Jews, who were specially targeted by German bombers while in the streets and in the synagogues of Nalewki, the Jewish quarter.

German troops parade through Warsaw, Poland, following its capture in September 1939. (National Archives)

Hitler rejected any talk of a siege, and German Army units were sent into the city on September 15. Five days later, 12 German divisions supported by more than 1,000 artillery pieces began an assault that reached its peak on September 25, when the Germans launched Operation COAST, an air attack expressly ordered by Hitler that involved some 400 bombers and dive-bombers. They dropped 72 tons of incendiary bombs, causing fires throughout the city. On September 26 the Germans captured two of the three Polish defensive lines, and the Poles opened negotiations with the German Eighth Army commander, General of Infantry Johannes von Blaskowitz.

On September 27, Warsaw surrendered unconditionally. The Germans took 140,000 Poles prisoner, 36,000 of them wounded. In addition, some 2,000 Polish troops died in the battle, along with 60,000 civilians. Damage to the city itself was immense, with an estimated 12 percent of the structures destroyed. Warsaw was the first capital to suffer such devastation in the war.

See also

Blaskowitz, Johannes Albrecht von; Blitzkrieg; Poland Campaign; Rydz-Śmigły, Edward

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Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (April 19–May 16, 1943)

Armed attempt by Jews living in the Warsaw ghetto to defy the Germans. Through the summer of 1942, the Germans deported or executed more than 300,000 Jews from the Warsaw ghetto, leaving between 55,000 to 60,000 there. Aware through authenticated reports of the mass killings that were taking place and resolved to fight back against the Germans, inhabitants of the ghetto formed the Jewish Fighting Organization (Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa, ŻOB) and prepared to obstruct future German deportations.

Lightly armed and poorly trained for combat, the ŻOB saw its first action against a small German *Aktion* (the German euphemism for an operation to round up and deport those destined for death camps) in January 1943. Surprised by the opposition and suffering several casualties, the Germans withdrew from the ghetto to regroup their forces and evaluate the situation.

Shocked that the Jews would arm themselves and fight another round of deportations, the Germans returned in force in April to liquidate the ghetto completely. On April 19, 1943, Waffen-SS, police, and Wehrmacht units moved into the ghetto to complete the January operation. To ensure success, they sent in columns of troops, a tank, and two armored cars. Shortly after the Germans reentered the ghetto and started to fan out to round up the deportees, the ŻOB struck with pistol fire, homemade hand grenades, and Molotov cocktails.

Despite facing an overwhelming superiority of equipment and firepower, the ŻOB forced the Germans from the ghetto within two hours in a noteworthy, though short-lived, achievement. Chagrined and angered by the resistance, SS-Brigadeführer Jürgen Stroop, the police chief of Warsaw, ordered his troops back into the ghetto. Using their superior firepower, the Germans forced the ŻOB fighters from the rooftops and into the buildings and below the streets into the sewers. Desiring a rapid conclusion to the *Aktion*, Stroop petitioned and received permission from SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler to use whatever means necessary to eliminate resistance. Unable to quell the ŻOB, the Germans set about systematically destroying each building in the ghetto with explosives and fire.

Jewish civilians taken by the Germans during the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, Poland, 1943. (National Archives)

Despite the destruction of its headquarters building at 18 Mila Street on May 8, which also took the life of ŻOB leader Mordechai Anielewicz, the ŻOB continued to engage the German troops. Increasingly frustrated by his units' inability to subdue the resistance completely, Stroop ordered the main synagogue destroyed. On May 16, with sporadic fighting continuing as small bands of ŻOB fighters persistently engaged the German troops, Stroop declared the operation complete when Warsaw's most prominent synagogue collapsed into a pile of rubble. In his report to his superiors, he acknowledged

that 16 of his men had been killed and 85 wounded. Deaths among the ghetto's inhabitants ran into the thousands, with roughly 50,000 taken into custody and either shot outright or deported.

Although some members of the underground Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) assisted the ŻOB during the ghetto uprising, the majority did not participate in the fighting, waiting instead for their own planned revolt, which would come in August 1944.

DAVID M. TOCZEK

See also

Bór-Komorowski, Tadeusz; Concentration Camps, German; Himmler, Heinrich; Holocaust; Jewish Resistance; Stroop, Jürgen; Waffen-SS; Warsaw Rising; Document 129; Document 197

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Warsaw Rising (August 1–October 2, 1944)

Attempt by Polish insurgents to wrest Warsaw from German control. The Poles mustered fierce resistance from August 1 to October 2, 1944. By the summer of 1944, the Red Army had pushed the German Army almost completely out of the Soviet Union and continued moving west across German-occupied Poland. The Soviets, however, had pushed aside the London-based Polish government-in-exile and established their own communist provisional government. As they advanced, Soviet forces disarmed the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK), responsible to the London-based government. On July 26, the London Poles ordered AK commander General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski to capture Warsaw from the Germans before the Soviets arrived.

The AK had some 40,000 fighters in Warsaw, but they were desperately short of arms and ammunition. Although there were some clandestine arms

factories in the city, the AK's total armament amounted to little more than 2,000 pistols, 1,000 rifles, 25,000 homemade grenades, and a handful of antitank rifles. The German garrison in Warsaw numbered more than 21,000 well-equipped, combat-experienced troops, including three Waffen-SS divisions and two Wehrmacht panzer divisions. Lieutenant General Reiner Stahel commanded the German combat units around Warsaw. The overall German commander was Schutzstaffel (SS) Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski.

Operation BURZA (TEMPEST) began on August 1, 1944. The lead units of the Red Army were only about 12 miles away, closing in on the east bank of the Vistula River. On the first day of the rising, the AK gained control of most of the west bank of the Vistula, but the Poles never managed to take the bridges. Fighting back almost immediately, the Germans took Warsaw's Old Town on August 2. By the next day, German reinforcements were pouring into the battle, and the Luftwaffe had begun round-the-clock bombing of the Polish-controlled areas.

The savage street fighting ground on for weeks, with the Polish insurgents using the city's sewers for lines of communication and as routes of escape. SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler ordered that the entire city be "razed to the ground" and all its inhabitants killed as an object lesson to all other cities under German occupation.

On September 10, Red Army units under General Konstantin Rokossovsky finally moved into Warsaw's Praga district on the east bank of the Vistula. After five days of heavy fighting, the Soviets consolidated their positions on the east bank and ceased to advance. Not only did the Soviets provide no further support to AK forces fighting desperately on the other side of the river, but they also refused permission for Western Allied aircraft to land on Soviet airfields after making supply drops to the beleaguered insurgents. Under pressure from U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Soviets finally allowed a single wing of 110 U.S. B-17 bombers to refuel at Poltava for a supply drop on September 18.

On September 30 as the Germans systematically reduced the pocket of Polish resistance, Bór-Komorowski appointed General Leopold Okulicki as his successor in command of the AK. Bór-Komorowski and his surviving fighters finally surrendered on October 2, after 63 days of fierce resistance. Some 15,000 insurgents and 150,000 Polish civilians died during the rising.

Another 700,000 of Warsaw's inhabitants were sent to concentration or slave labor camps, where 245,000 later died. Approximately 93 percent of the city was an unrecognizable pile of rubble. The Germans lost about 10,000 killed during the fighting.

Soldiers of the Polish Home Army fighting the Germans during the Warsaw Uprising of August–October 1944. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Shortly after suppressing the rising, the German Army withdrew from Warsaw at its own pace, and the Red Army followed it into the city. Soviet commanders later claimed that stiff German resistance and the lack of supplies had prevented them from giving the AK any more support. Many historians, however, have suggested that the Soviet commanders were following specific orders from their leader, Joseph Stalin, who wanted the German Army to eliminate any Polish opposition to the establishment of a postwar communist government under Moscow's control.

DAVID T. ZABECKI

See also

Bór-Komorowski, Tadeusz; Himmler, Heinrich; Poland; Poland–East Prussia Campaign; Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich; Stalin, Joseph

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Watson-Watt, Sir Robert Alexander (1892–1973)

British scientist who developed radar. Robert Watson Watt (who hyphenated his name after being knighted in 1942) was born in Angus, Scotland, on April 13, 1892. He graduated in engineering in 1912 from University College, Dundee (University of St. Andrews), where he won medals in mathematics and electrical engineering. His interest in radio waves began thereafter, when he was an assistant to professor of natural philosophy William Peddie.

During World War I, Watson Watt worked as a meteorologist at the Royal Aircraft Factory, Farnborough, applying his knowledge of radio to locate thunderstorms that posed hazards to airmen. In 1916, he proposed the use of cathode ray oscilloscopes to record and display such information, a project that led to his development of cathode ray direction finders in the mid-1920s, by which date Watson Watt was superintendent of the Radio Research Station at Slough, part of the National Physical Laboratory.

Sir Robert A. Watson-Watt, the British scientist credited with the development of radar. (The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

In 1933, Watson Watt took over a new radio department in Teddington, where he elucidated the theoretical basis for radar, conducting early experiments in using radio waves to locate aircraft. By 1938, he was director of communications development in the Air Ministry, and in 1940, he was appointed scientific adviser on telecommunications to the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

Watson Watt's assorted inventions proved their worth in the July 10–September 30, 1940, Battle of Britain, which might have been lost without them. Certainly they made major contributions to the ultimate Allied victory. In 1938, Chain Home, a pioneering early-warning system of fixed radar stations, was installed along Britain's east coast, where incoming German aircraft might be expected, and the system was later refined to detect low-flying airplanes. Watson Watt also developed airborne interception radar for installation in aircraft to allow them to locate other airplanes and also seaborne vessels; these proved invaluable in the Battle of the Atlantic. And he developed identification, friend or foe (IFF), devices that could distinguish between friendly and hostile aircraft and could be installed on antiaircraft artillery as well as radio navigation for bomber airplanes. These greatly facilitated the massive Allied bombing raids on Germany and Japan.

The British shared these technological innovations with the Americans, and they represented the most significant instance of reverse Lend-Lease except perhaps for Ultra intercepts.

Watson-Watt received a substantial financial award from the British government after the war for his work on radar and was recognized with numerous other professional honors and prestigious appointments. He established a consulting firm and lived in Canada for some years before returning to Britain. He died in Inverness, Scotland, on December 5, 1973.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atlantic, Battle of the; Britain, Battle of; Identification, Friend or Foe; Lend-Lease; Radar

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Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival (1883–1950)

British Army field marshal. Born in Colchester, England, on May 5, 1883, Archibald Percival Wavell graduated at the top of his class from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1901 and was commissioned in the Black Watch. He established his military reputation during the South African War (Second Boer War, 1899–1902) and in service on the Northwest Frontier in India. Wavell graduated, again at the top of his class, from the Staff College of Camberley and then studied the Russian language for two years in Russia.

During World War I, Wavell served in France, losing an eye in combat. After his recovery and eight months with the Russian army in the Caucasus, he served in Palestine under Lieutenant General Edmund Allenby as a brigadier general. He held a variety of posts in the 1920s and 1930s and returned to Palestine in 1937 to command British forces there during the Arab-Jewish riots.

Promoted to lieutenant general in 1938, Wavell was appointed commander in chief, Middle East, in August 1939. He had to establish the command virtually from scratch in Cairo, with few resources. His heavily outnumbered forces halted the Italian invasion of Egypt from Libya, and he then launched Operation COMPASS (December 7, 1940–February 7, 1941). It was a spectacular success, destroying more than a dozen Italian divisions and clearing all Cyrenaica. Empire forces operating under his command also had considerable success in Ethiopia and against anti-Allied elements in Syria and Iraq.

Reversals followed, however, largely due to the arrival in North Africa of German reinforcements under Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel and to Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill's decision to strip resources from Wavell's command for an ill-fated intervention in Greece. Following the British defeat in Greece and Crete (over which Wavell had no control) and

the failure of Operation BATTLEAXE to drive the Germans from Egypt and relieve Tobruk, Churchill replaced Wavell with General Claude Auchinleck in July 1941 and transferred Wavell as commander in chief in India.

With the U.S. entry into the war, Wavell was briefly Allied commander in the Far East. Following the loss of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, he prepared India for invasion, then mounted a counterattack against Japanese forces in Burma, which the Japanese repulsed. Promoted to field marshal in January 1943 and raised to the peerage in July, he was named viceroy of India in June 1943, a post he handled well until replaced by Admiral Louis Mountbatten in 1947. Made an earl with the title Viscount Keren of Eritrea and Winchester, Wavell returned to Britain and settled in London. A prolific and talented writer, he wrote *The Palestine Campaigns* (1928), *Allenby* (two volumes, 1940 and 1943), *Generals and Generalship* (1941), *Allenby in Egypt* (1943), *Speaking Generally* (1946), and *The Good Soldier* (1948). He also edited a poetry anthology. Wavell died in London on May 24, 1950.

DAVID M. GREEN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre; COMPASS, Operation; Crete, Battle of; Greece Campaign, Italian; India; Mountbatten, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas; North Africa Campaign; Syria and Lebanon, Campaign in; Tobruk, First Battle of

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Wedemeyer, Albert Coady (1897–1989)

U.S. Army general. Born in Omaha, Nebraska, on July 9, 1897, Albert Coady Wedemeyer graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1918 in an accelerated program and was commissioned in the infantry. Between the wars, he served in the United States, the Philippines, and China

and attended the Command and General Staff School, being promoted to captain in 1936.

From 1936 to 1938, Wedemeyer attended the German War College (Kriegsakademie), producing a lengthy final report on the German military. This document strongly impressed Major General George C. Marshall, then assistant chief of staff in the War Department General Staff War Plans Division; in 1941 after he became chief of staff, Marshall placed Wedemeyer, a major at the time, in the same division. Wedemeyer contributed heavily to the War Department's "Victory Plan," which governed overall planning for wartime mobilization. In 1942 and 1943, promoted to brigadier general, he served in the War Department Operations Division, where he advocated an early cross-Channel invasion of Western Europe and opposed British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill's alternative proposals for Mediterranean operations.

U.S. Army Major general albert C. Wedemeyer. (Corbis)

In the fall of 1943 Wedemeyer, now a major general, became deputy chief of staff to the new South-East Asia Command. In that capacity, he helped to develop plans for future operations and unsuccessfully attempted to resolve differences between China's Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), president of the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—and Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of American military forces in the China-Burma-India theater and Jiang's chief of staff.

In October 1944, Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell and soon developed a far less antagonistic working relationship with Jiang. Although critical of corruption and ineptitude within the GMD, Wedemeyer, who was promoted to lieutenant general in early 1945, energetically helped reorganize the Chinese Army and enhance its fighting abilities, drafting plans—never implemented—to retake southern China's coast from Japanese forces. He urged greater levels of U.S. aid for Jiang's government and the denial of such assistance to Chinese Communist leaders.

Following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Wedemeyer supervised the demobilization of Japanese troops in China and their replacement by Jiang's forces. Despite continuing to criticize corruption and inefficiencies within the Nationalist government, Wedemeyer believed that the United States should give it staunch backing and much-expanded economic and military aid, and he expressed misgivings over Marshall's yearlong 1946 effort to establish a coalition Chinese government that would include Communist leaders.

In April 1946, Wedemeyer left China. After Marshall sent him on a two-month fact-finding mission to China and Korea the following year, Wedemeyer repeated these recommendations while also forcefully urging the Chinese government to institute major reforms. The Harry S. Truman administration ignored Wedemeyer's advice and deemed his report too politically sensitive, suppressing it for two years.

After serving on the War Department General Staff and commanding the Sixth Army, Wedemeyer retired in 1951 to become a business executive. In 1954, he was promoted to full general on the retired list. He was active in conservative Republican politics, and he openly condemned the Truman administration's failure to provide greater assistance to China. Wedemeyer died at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on December 17, 1989.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

China; China, Army; Jiang Jieshi; Marshall, George Catlett; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Wei Lihuang (1897–1960)

Chinese Nationalist military commander. Born in Hefei (Hofei) in Anhui (Anhwei), China, on February 16, 1897, Wei Lihuang began his military career as a volunteer in the revolutionary army of his native province in 1912. In 1916, Wei went to Guangzhou (Canton) in Guangdong (Kwangtung), where he joined the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—and participated in the 1925–1928 Eastern and Northern Expeditions and the antiwarlord and anti–Chinese Communist "bandit extermination campaigns" of the early 1930s. In late 1935, Wei became commander in chief of GMD forces on the border between Hunan, Hubei (Hupeh), Anhui, and Jiangxi (Kiangsi), a position second only to Chen Cheng (Ch'en Ch'eng).

After the Sino-Japanese War began in July 1937, Wei led the Fourteenth Group Army to defend Beijing (Peking) in Hebei (Hupeh), and in October, he became deputy commander of the Second War Area of Shanxi (Shansi) and the two defunct provinces of Chaha'er (Chahar) and Suiyuan. There, he engaged the Japanese in the Battle of Xinkou (Hsinkow) near Taiyuan in Shanxi, which fell in November. In January 1939, Wei also became commander of the First War Area of Hebei, northern Shandong (Shantung), Henan (Honan), and Anhui and, in October, also governor of Henan.

Between September and December 1940, Wei joined the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army to launch the "Hundred Regiments"

offensive against the Japanese in northern China. At year's end, he received the concurrent command post of the Hebei-Chaha'er War Area. Because of his growing connections with the Eighth Route Army, Wei was relieved of all of his posts at the end of 1941 and assigned to the GMD Military Affairs Commission's Xi'an (Sian) office in Shaanxi (Shensi). In October 1943, he succeeded Chen Cheng as commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, with headquarters at Kunming in Yunnan, where he participated in the joint Anglo-American–Chinese campaign for the recovery of Burma.

In the Second Burma Campaign of May 1944 to January 1945, Wei, as deputy commander of the Chinese ground forces, led five Chinese armies across the Nu River, captured Wanting, and reopened the Burma Road through Tengchung and Lungling in coordination with Allied forces stationed in India. The Chinese mission then ended, and Wei was militarily inactive throughout the remainder of the war.

In January 1948, Wei succeeded Chen as acting director of the Northeastern Headquarters and commander of "bandit suppression" in the northeast region, which fell to the Chinese Communists in October. Subsequently relieved of all his titles and posts, Wei was then imprisoned at Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu (Kiangsu), awaiting trial on charges of corruption. Released after Li Zongren (Li Tsung-jen) became acting president in January 1949, Wei retired in Hong Kong until March 1955, when he returned to Beijing and there served on various committees of the People's Republic of China. Wei died in Beijing on January 17, 1960.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

Burma Road; Chen Cheng; China-Burma-India Theater; Li Zongren

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Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von (1881–1954)

German Army field marshal. Born in Dessau, Germany, on November 12, 1881, Maximilian Maria Joseph Weichs zur Glon joined the 2nd Bavarian Heavy Cavalry Regiment in July 1900 and would maintain an association with the cavalry for most of his military career. He attended the Kriegsakademie (War College) in 1910 and served in several positions as a General Staff officer during World War I.

Weichs remained in the Reichswehr, the new German Army, after the war, holding several cavalry-related positions. Promoted to major general in April 1933, he took command of the 3rd Cavalry Division at Weimar, which became the 1st Panzer Division in 1935. Weichs was promoted to lieutenant general in April 1935 and to general of cavalry in October 1936. His career suffered a temporary setback when he and 15 other generals were "retired" by Adolf Hitler following the Fritsch Affair.

Weichs was recalled to duty for the 1939 Polish Campaign that began World War II. He commanded XIII Corps and enjoyed success at Warsaw (September 8–27). Given command of the new Second Army, he participated in the May 10–June 25, 1940, Battle for France and was promoted to colonel general in July 1940. He commanded the forces invading northern Yugoslavia in April 1941, and after occupying Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade, he received the Yugoslav surrender on April 18.

The Second Army then moved east and participated in Operation BARBAROSSA, the June 22, 1941, invasion of the Soviet Union, as part of the southern flank of Army Group Center. Weichs fell ill in November and did not return to duty until January 1942, at which time his Second Army was on the northern wing of Army Group South. His forces captured Voronezh in July 1942.

Weichs assumed command of Army Group B in July 1942. It eventually consisted of the German Second and Sixth Armies, the Fourth Panzer Army, the Hungarian Second Army, the Italian Eighth Army, and the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies. Not only was Weichs short of German troops, but Hitler stripped half his motorized transport to support Army Group A. As the Sixth Army invested Stalingrad, Weichs worried about the ability of his Axis allies to protect his flanks.

In November, when the Soviets launched their encirclement of Stalingrad, Weichs had no reserves, and Hitler refused his request to withdraw the Sixth Army westward. Although restoring the situation was beyond the means Weichs had available, Hitler showed his lack of confidence in him by assigning most of Army Group B in late November to the newly created Army Group Don. Weichs was promoted to field marshal in February 1943, but his remaining forces were distributed between Army Group Center and Army Group Don. He was transferred to the Führer Reserve on July 10.

Weichs's retirement was short-lived. He was recalled on July 26 and named both commander in chief, southeast, and commander in chief, Army Group F. With responsibility for all Axis forces in the Balkans, he was forced to contend with both growing guerrilla activity and the Italian surrender in September 1943. Weichs performed well, conducting several successful antipartisan operations. He also kept open supply lines for vital raw materials to the Reich.

With the collapse of Romania and the defection of Bulgaria in August and September 1944, Weichs successfully extricated German forces in the Balkans with minimal losses. By January 1945, the remnants of Army Group F were fighting in Hungary. Hitler retired him again in March.

Weichs was held as a prisoner after the war and was one of the defendants at the American Military Tribunals in Nuremberg, but he was released because of ill health before the trial. Weichs died in Burg Rösberg near Bonn on September 27, 1954.

JON D. BERLIN

See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Poland Campaign; Stalingrad, Battle of; Warsaw, Battle of; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of; Yugoslavia Campaign

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Welles, Benjamin Sumner (1892–1961)

U.S. undersecretary of state (1937–1940). Born in New York City on October 14, 1892, into a socially prominent family, Benjamin Sumner Welles attended Harvard University, acquiring a strong interest in history and literature. In 1915, on the advice of family friend Franklin D. Roosevelt, Welles applied to join the Foreign Service. Assigned to Buenos Aires in 1917, he decided to specialize in Latin America. Welles resigned from the department in 1922, but within three months, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes appointed him commissioner to the Dominican Republic. Welles's mandate was to implement the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the restoration of the indigenous government there.

Appointed assistant secretary of state by President Roosevelt in 1933, Welles implemented the administration's "Good Neighbor" policy toward Latin America. In 1937, Roosevelt promoted him to undersecretary, annoying Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who resented Welles's close relationship with the president. When World War II began in Europe, Welles won Latin American nations' acquiescence in the declaration of a neutral zone around the entire continent.

In February and March 1940, Roosevelt dispatched Welles on a well-publicized peace mission to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London, purportedly to explore the possibility of negotiating peace before Germany launched its anticipated spring offensive and, if this proved to be impossible, to detach Italian dictator Benito Mussolini from German leader Adolf Hitler. Another objective of this unsuccessful venture was almost certainly to demonstrate to American voters that the president had made every possible effort to bring about peace.

Welles attended Roosevelt's August 1941 meeting with Winston L. S. Churchill off the Canadian coast, where he helped to draft the Atlantic Charter. In January 1942, shortly after the Axis powers declared war on the United States, he met with all Latin American foreign ministers at Rio de Janeiro, winning their consent to a proclamation recommending a break with the Axis nations. For the sake of maintaining unanimity, Welles accepted this measure rather than the outright declaration of a diplomatic break preferred by Hull.

Welles was heavily involved in postwar planning undertaken jointly by the State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations. After the United States entered the war, he began an extensive speaking campaign to win popular support for the creation of a postwar international organization, which would eventually become the United Nations. In 1943, Hull, prompted by his antagonism toward Welles, used reports of his subordinate's involvement in a homosexual incident as a reason to insist on his resignation. Welles retired that September. He then wrote and spoke extensively on foreign affairs. Welles died in Bernardsville, New Jersey, on September 24, 1961.

U.S. undersecretary of state Sumner Welles. (Thomas D. McAvoy/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Atlantic Charter; Hull, Cordell; Latin America and the War; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United Nations, Formation of

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WESERÜBUNG, Operation (April 1940)

Code name for the German invasion of Norway and Denmark, Operation WESERÜBUNG (WESER EXERCISE, the Weser being a river in Germany) was the first and only joint operation of German armed forces in the war. On the order of German chancellor Adolf Hitler, commander of the German Navy Grand Admiral Erich Raeder initiated plans to occupy Norway in order to protect Swedish iron ore imports and to forestall an expected Allied invasion. Norway would also provide the German Navy with bases for surface raiders and U-boats to break out into the Atlantic for its commerce war.

The *Altmark* Incident of February 1940 provided strong evidence, in German eyes at least, of a pro-British stance in the Norwegian government on the grounds that the Norwegians had not defended their territorial waters against the British. Hitler was convinced that the British intended to invade Norway, a move he sought to forestall. Psychological considerations also played a role, but Raeder warned Hitler that such a venture would violate all the rules of naval warfare and force the commitment of virtually the entire German Navy.

Until this point in the war, the navy had made no significant contribution, and it was not slated to have a major role in the upcoming campaign against France. Hitler placed operational planning for the first time under his Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces Supreme Command). His stipulation that forces for WESERÜBUNG, the code name for the invasion, be placed under a "special command" threatened the autonomy of both the army and the Luftwaffe.

For the invasion of Denmark and Norway, Hitler committed a total of some 120,000 troops, with the vast majority assigned to Norway. The initial invasion force sent to Norway was to be transported in six separate groups: (1) 10 destroyers would move some 2,000 mountain troops to occupy the northern port of Narvik, with the battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* providing distant cover; (2) the heavy cruiser *Admiral Hipper* and 4

destroyers would lift 1,700 troops to Trondheim; (3) the light cruisers *Köln* and *Königsberg*, the artillery training ship *Bremse*, the transport *Karl Peters*, 2 torpedo boats, and 5 motor torpedo boats would transport 1,900 men to Bergen; (4) the light cruiser *Karlsruhe*, 3 torpedo boats, 7 torpedo boats, and the mother ship *Tsingtau* would carry 1,100 men to Kristiansand; (5) the heavy cruiser *Blücher*, the heavy cruiser *Lützow*, the light cruiser *Emden*, 3 torpedo boats, and 8 minesweepers would move to Oslo with 2,000 troops; and (6) 4 minesweepers would transport 150 troops to Egersund.

On April 4, 1940, Hitler decided that the operation would begin five days later. On April 8, the British began their own mining operation in Norwegian waters, which was to be followed by the landing of troops. German naval units were, however, already at sea and successfully stole a march on the British. Strong Norwegian resistance, assisted by Allied forces, led to sharp fighting, particularly at Narvik on April 10 and 13, where 10 German destroyers were trapped by British naval units, including the battleship *Warspite*, and destroyed. At one point, Hitler lost his nerve and ordered the Narvik forces to seek internment in Sweden. Raeder instead convinced Hitler to send reinforcements to Oslo instead of using the more dangerous sea routes to Trondheim and Bergen.

The successful German campaign against France and the Low Countries, begun on May 10, caused the British and French to withdraw their forces from Norway on June 5–8. On June 10, the Norwegian armed forces surrendered.

Raeder ordered his battleships to attack enemy shipping and protect supply shipments for German relief forces linking up with German forces at Narvik (Operation JUNO, June 4–9). On June 8, the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* encountered the British aircraft carrier *Glorious* at sea, steaming for Scapa Flow, and sank it with gunfire. The *Glorious* had, in addition to Hurricane fighters, a half dozen Swordfish torpedo bombers on board, but for some reason, none of its aircraft were aloft. The German battleships also sank both of the escorting British destroyers, but one, the *Acosta*, succeeded in torpedoing and damaging the *Scharnhorst*. As a result, Admiral Wilhelm Marschall chose to return to base, perhaps saving several nearby British convoys steaming without battleship escort.

Royal Navy losses in the campaign had been serious: a fleet carrier and 2 cruisers as well as a number of smaller ships. In addition, 8 large

merchantmen, including 2 troopships and 2 tankers, were lost, but the destroyers suffered the most. Nine were sunk, and another 12 were damaged.

During Operation WESERÜBUNG, the German Navy lost its new heavy cruiser *Blücher*, 2 light cruisers, and 10 destroyers. Other ships were damaged. These losses created serious operational problems for the German surface navy. Moreover, Operation WESERÜBUNG had revealed serious command problems, leading to the replacement of Marschall, the second fleet commander of the war. In addition, a large number of torpedo failures had cost the U-boats opportunities to inflict more serious damage on the Royal Navy.

Yet WESERÜBUNG was the German Navy's major feat of arms of the war. Hitler considered Norway as Germany's "zone of destiny," to be defended at all costs, especially after the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 2, 1941, but this created a considerable drain on German resources, as the navy and army were forced to commit major resources to defend Norway.

KEITH W. BIRD

See also

Altmark Incident; Germany, Navy; Great Britain, Navy; Marschall, Wilhelm; Narvik, Naval Battles of; Raeder, Erich

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West European Theater of Operations

In accordance with its military pact with the Poles, France was to invade Germany two weeks after any German attack on Poland, thereby forcing the Germans into a two-front war. Following the German invasion of September 1, 1939, however, the best the French could manage was a token drive into the Saar region by nine divisions. French forces advanced a maximum of five miles on a narrow front. Casualties were negligible, but the French then

halted, and when Poland collapsed, they withdrew to the Maginot Line. A more vigorous French thrust would have driven forward to the Rhine, with untold consequences for the course of the war. German forces manning the West Wall had little ammunition, no tanks, and virtually no air support.

But if the French effort in response to the German invasion of Poland was pathetic, Britain's was worse. The Royal Navy did impose a naval blockade on Germany, but the effects of this were far different from those caused by a similar blockade in World War I. This blockade was nullified by Germany's nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, the secret terms of which promised Germany strategic natural resources. Germany could also secure necessary supplies from Italy, and both countries acted as purchasing agents for Berlin abroad. Two weeks into the war, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had not even completed assembling, and London rejected pleas for the Royal Air Force (RAF) bombing raids against Germany that had been agreed to before the war.

Following the German victory over Poland and the rejection by Britain and France of his terms for peace on a "forgive-and-forget" basis, Adolf Hitler prepared to move west. In late November 1939, he informed his military chiefs that Germany could deal with the Soviet Union only when it was free in the west. Hitler was determined to attack France and Britain "at the earliest moment."

All was then quiet in the west. This period of the war came to be known as the "Sitzkrieg," the "Phony War," and the "Bore War." France carried out a full mobilization, and its forces manned the Maginot Line, but Britain imposed only a partial conscription, and by mid-October it had only four divisions in France. Hardly any air action took place, with both sides reluctant to bomb cities. Bad weather and the pleas of his generals for additional time caused Hitler to postpone the German invasion of France.

The Allies had no wish to take the offensive themselves. The commander of the French Army, General Maurice Gamelin, said, "The first one who comes out his shell will be in peril." Meanwhile, British first lord of the admiralty Winston L. S. Churchill developed a scheme to mine the coastal waters of neutral Norway to deny Germany access to high-grade Swedish iron ore shipped from the port of Narvik. Allied Scandinavian plans, including discussions of sending troops to aid Finland in its war against the Soviet Union, were soon an open secret.

Initially, Hitler had no intention of opening a new front in Northern Europe, for in mid-December he set January 14, 1940, as the start date for the western offensive, which was then postponed again. In February, however, Hitler concluded that the British intended to move against Norway and that Germany would have to move first. The German invasion of Norway began on April 9, 1940, catching the Allies by complete surprise.

The Germans took Denmark in only one day, but Norway proved more difficult to subdue. The Allies landed troops in the north and occupied Narvik, but mounting aircraft losses, the unsatisfactory situation elsewhere in Norway, and the German invasion of France brought evacuation in early June. The Norwegian Campaign badly hurt the German surface navy; it lost 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers, half of its total, but Hitler secured additional food production for the Reich and protection for his northern flank on the Baltic. Most important, the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) secured locations for naval bases nearer to the Allied Atlantic convoy routes. Thus, it could now launch attacks into the North Atlantic and later strike Allied convoys bound for the Soviet Union. But Hitler also suffered the consequences of strategic overreach; by 1944, he had 365,000 of his best troops in Norway, a serious drain on his badly stretched resources.

Hitler's next stroke was the oft-delayed invasion of France and the Low Countries. On January 10, 1940, a German military aircraft was forced to land in Belgium. Its passenger was carrying the operational plans for the German attack in the west. Compromise of this plan led Hitler to abandon it and caused the German invasion to be delayed until May. The old plan would have seen the Germans encountering the best British and French divisions, but the new plan, SICHELSCHNITT (meaning "the cut of the sickle"), shifted the major effort from central Belgium to just north of the Maginot Line.

The northern effort would occur first, drawing the Allies into Belgium. Then the major blow would fall to the south, in the hilly and wooded Ardennes. The Germans planned to cross the Meuse River and crack the French lines at Sedan, then swing northwest to the English Channel and cut off the best British and French divisions in Belgium.

The campaign for France and the Low Countries began on May 10, 1940. The Allies matched the German invading forces on the ground and outnumbered the Germans in tanks. Their problem lay in tactical deployment. The first three French tank divisions did not assemble for training until

January 1940, and the majority of French tanks along the eastern frontier were split into isolated packets as infantry support. The Germans dominated the air, a vital factor in their success, and the Allies were sadly deficient in antiaircraft weapons. Other important factors in the outcome of the campaign included appallingly inadequate senior French military leadership, catastrophic failures in French military intelligence, and the lack of adequate reserves to deal with the German breakthrough.

German airborne forces in the north secured vital bridges and the Belgian bastion of Eben Emael. The Allies followed the German script by pouring their forces into Belgium. On May 13, German forces to the south crossed the Meuse. For all intents and purposes, the struggle for France was over on May 15, when the Germans penetrated the Meuse defenses.

Once the panzer divisions were free, the way was clear to drive to the English Channel and cut off the main Allied armies in Belgium. By May 24, the Germans had captured Boulogne and isolated Calais, forcing the BEF to rely on Dunkerque (Dunkirk) for resupply. Allied forces in Belgium were now cut off from the bulk of the French forces to the south. As British forces withdrew northward to the coast, King Leopold III surrendered his armed forces on May 28, despite promises that his nation would not undertake any such unilateral action. This opened a gap between the BEF left flank and the sea into which the Germans now poured, threatening to cut off the BEF entirely. At this point, Hitler intervened. For five days, he kept the German armored thrust from the south in place, saving the BEF and probably enabling Britain to continue in the war.

Between May 26 and June 4, the British carried out an epic evacuation at Dunkerque. In Operation DYNAMO, they evacuated some 365,000 troops, of whom about 225,000 were British. The BEF was forced to abandon virtually all its equipment in France, but it did extract almost all its remaining personnel. In Britain, the evacuation swept away the “phoniness” of the war, but many Britons were oblivious to the facts that in May 1918 there had been 10 times the number of British divisions in France as in May 1940, that they had left the French in the lurch, or that the French First Army had held the Germans from the beaches and allowed the BEF to escape.

On June 5 after consolidating, the Germans struck south, cutting through French forces and reaching the Seine River west of Paris four days later. Stunned by these developments and unprepared for improvised action, much

of the French army simply disintegrated. On June 13 the government declared Paris an open city to spare it air attack, and the next day German troops took peaceful possession of the French capital.

On June 12, new French Army commander General Maxime Weygand had concluded that the situation was hopeless and so informed the cabinet. Two days earlier, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, convinced that the war was all but won, had brought his country into the conflict on the German side by invading southeastern France. Thirty-two Italian divisions attacked five French divisions along the Italian border but made little headway.

On June 16, French premier Paul Reynaud was forced to resign, and a majority of the cabinet voted to ask Hitler for terms. The new premier was 84-year-old Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, a World War I hero who had been brought into the government as deputy premier to bolster French resolve but now favored an immediate armistice. On June 17, the Pétain government opened negotiations with the Germans. Fighting ceased on the battlefields of France on June 25.

France was divided into occupied and unoccupied zones, and its army was reduced to 100,000 officers and men. The navy, almost entirely intact, remained under French control but was to be disarmed in French ports. France also had to pay for the German occupation of three-fifths of its territory.

Paris was included in the German occupation zone, so the new French government established itself at Vichy, in south-central France. Vichy France was frankly totalitarian and, to a considerable degree, collaborationist. Pétain and his advisers believed that Germany had won the war and that, at least for the foreseeable future, France would be under German control.

It took something akin to clairvoyance in the dark days of June 1940 to see a possible Allied victory, but a small number of Frenchmen and Frenchwomen vowed to continue the fight and took the lead in forming resistance groups. In London, on June 18 young General of Brigade Charles de Gaulle, who had been undersecretary of war only a few days before, announced over the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) the establishment of the Free French. He soon secured British military assistance and, ultimately, recognition of his government.

Winston Churchill, who had become British prime minister on May 10, feared that the Germans would acquire the French fleet, although the French

government had promised London that it would scuttle its ships rather than see them fall into German hands. This pledge was not sufficient for Churchill, who ordered Operation CATAPULT (June 1940). The British would offer French naval commanders a cruel choice between continuing the fight, disarming in neutral ports, or scuttling their ships.

The British rather easily acquired some 130 French vessels of all types, but at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria on July 3, there was fighting in which the British sank a number of French ships and killed nearly 1,300 French seamen. Despite this, the French government honored its pledge more than two years later. In November 1942, the Germans tried to seize the bulk of the French Navy—80 ships assembled at Toulon—but the French scuttled 77 of them.

The Germans now dominated the continent. They were emphatically the senior partner in the German-Italian combination, they were on good terms with Francisco Franco in Spain, and the Soviet Union was benevolently neutral. History seemed to repeat itself, for the Germans now controlled almost exactly the same geographic area as had Napoleon, and in 1940, as in 1807, only Great Britain remained at war with the would-be conqueror.

Britain now awaited a German attack. In early June, there was only one properly equipped and trained division to defend the British Isles. BEF equipment abandoned in France included 600 tanks, 1,000 field guns, 500 antiaircraft guns, a vast number of small arms, and half a million tons of stores and ammunition. The fleet was far to the north, away from the Luftwaffe. If German forces could have landed in Britain in the weeks following Dunkerque, there would have been little means of stopping them.

Hitler and his military chiefs, however, were caught off guard by the speed of the French defeat and had no plans for a follow-up invasion of Britain. Not until late July did they begin planning for a descent on England, code-named SEA LION (SEELÖWE).

Following the defeat of France, Hitler had postponed any decision regarding Britain. He hoped and expected that the British people would recognize that Germany had won and agree to a negotiated peace. Some of his generals urged him to strike Britain before it could reorganize and consolidate its strength, but he refused. In early June, the RAF Fighter Command had only about a sixth the number of aircraft that the Germans could send against Britain. Yet when formal orders were issued for Operation

SEA LION, German preparations were halfhearted. In any case, command of the air was the prerequisite for any invasion.

The Battle of Britain raged from July 10 to September 30, 1940. The Germans, however, never achieved their goal of driving the RAF from the skies. Ineffective German leadership, intelligence failures resulting in poor targeting decisions, radar and Ultra in the hands of the British, the lack of a strategic bomber on the German side, superior British pilot and aircraft replacement, and the German concentration on London all contributed to the German defeat.

Finally, on November 1, with the Luftwaffe sustaining prohibitive losses, the Germans shifted to night bombing—what Londoners called "the Blitz." Heavy bombing continued into May 1941. Although savage and relentless, night area bombing had no strategic result. The German air offensive had failed, in what was the first serious German military setback of the war. In mid-October 1940, Operation SEA LION was officially shelved until the spring, when it was postponed indefinitely.

Hitler failed to recognize the need to maintain the pressure on Britain. He could have intensified aircraft and submarine attacks against shipping to the British Isles, which might have brought an eventual British collapse, but his attention was increasingly drawn eastward, to the Soviet Union. The commander of the German Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, and the commander of the German Air Force, Hermann Göring, both believed that the defeat of Britain would leave Germany in a much stronger position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Hitler contended that the Soviet Union was preparing to attack Germany and that Britain was holding out only because its leaders hoped that Germany and the Soviet Union would go to war. If he could eliminate the Soviet Union, then Britain would capitulate. Hitler lacked patience and failed to understand the limitations of the blitzkrieg in terms of distance and resupply. He also did not appreciate interdiction or an indirect approach. Finally, Hitler was driven by ideological and political factors. In June 1941 after shoring up his Balkan flank, he sent his armies against the Soviet Union.

In December 1941, the United States joined the conflict as an active participant. Hitler and Mussolini then declared war on the United States, resolving a possible strategic dilemma for President Franklin D. Roosevelt concerning the Allied policy of concentrating first on Germany. Soviet leader

Joseph Stalin called for an immediate invasion of Western Europe by British and U.S. ground forces, but it would take many months for the vast U.S. industrial base to shift to war production, for armed forces to be raised and trained, and for the Battle of the Atlantic to be won. In 1942, the U.S. contribution to the war in Europe came in the form of strategic bombing, and there was little of that.

The Americans sought the earliest possible cross-Channel invasion of northern France. U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall was a strong supporter of an invasion of Northwestern Europe in the fall of 1942. The British were leery, fearful that such a move would lead to a repeat of the situation in northeastern France in World War I. Proof that the Western Allies were not ready to undertake a cross-Channel invasion was provided in Operation JUBILEE, the raid on Dieppe on the coast of Normandy on August 19, 1942. The raid buried the myth that a cross-Channel invasion was feasible in 1942 and cast grave doubts on the Allied plan for a cross-Channel invasion in 1943.

Roosevelt had promised Stalin that the Western Allies would undertake an invasion by the end of 1942 and was determined to honor that pledge. Roosevelt met that commitment with Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of French North Africa on November 8, 1942. With success there, U.S. military leaders, most notably General George Marshall, attempted to secure British approval for a cross-Channel invasion in 1943. Churchill demurred and convinced Roosevelt to pursue operations in the Mediterranean against Italy. The British leader wanted an Allied concentration in the Mediterranean, which he termed the “soft underbelly of Europe.” The Americans reluctantly agreed to invasions first of Sicily and then of Italy, but they insisted on the cross-Channel invasion of France for the spring of 1944.

The Allies developed precise and elaborate plans for the invasion of Normandy (Operation OVERLORD), which eventually began on June 6, 1944. Prior to the landing, Allied air forces would conduct a massive bombing campaign to isolate the region. The landing itself would be preceded by a night drop of three divisions of paratroops. The next morning, five infantry divisions would go ashore along the 50-mile stretch of coast. Some 10,000 aircraft would secure the skies, while hundreds of ships provided naval support.

Success was probable if the Allies could establish a bridgehead large

enough to build up their strength. Once they broke through the German lines, the Allies would have the whole of France for maneuver because their armies were fully mechanized, and the bulk of the defending German forces were not. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who commanded the coastal defenses, believed that the German defense was doomed unless it could destroy the invaders on the beaches.

Hitler did not agree and indeed welcomed the invasion as an opportunity to destroy the British and U.S. forces. In Britain, the Allied armies were immune to attack; in France, they could be destroyed. “Let them come,” he said. “They will get the thrashing of their lives.”

The only possibility of German success was to introduce panzer reserves rapidly, but this was fatally delayed by Allied air superiority and Hitler’s failure to immediately commit resources available elsewhere. Operation FORTITUDE, the Allied deception plan, had convinced Hitler that the Normandy Invasion was a feint and that the main thrust would come in the Pas de Calais sector.

The Allies put ashore 1 million men within a month following D-day, but a great storm severely damaged one of two artificial harbors that had been towed across the Channel. The Germans then turned the French ports into forts, destroying them when they had to surrender. Supply became a major problem and remained so until near the end of the war. The Normandy countryside also proved to be ideal defensive terrain, and not until the end of July were the Allies able to break out in Operation COBRA (July 25–31), when Lieutenant General Omar Bradley’s U.S. First Army forced the German line west of Saint-Lô, with Major General J. Lawton Collins’s VII Corps making the main effort. Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. arrived in France on July 6, and two days after the start of COBRA, Bradley ordered him to take command of VIII Corps.

On August 1, the U.S. command was reorganized. Bradley moved up to command the 12th Army Group, Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges assumed command of the First Army, and Patton’s Third Army was activated. In the British zone of operations, General Bernard Montgomery’s mostly British Commonwealth 21st Army Group consisted of Lieutenant General Henry Crerar’s Canadian First Army and Lieutenant General Miles C. Dempsey’s British Second Army. Patton’s Third Army scored the greatest success, although the general was fortunate to arrive in command when the

static warfare of the previous two months had finally passed into the mobile warfare at which he excelled. The weather was also dry, and the flat terrain of northern France was ideal tank country.

Patton took full advantage of the circumstances and was certainly the outstanding general of the campaign for France. The Third Army displayed instant efficiency and soon had parlayed the local breakthrough of COBRA into a theater-wide breakout. The Third Army first turned west to clear out the Brittany peninsula and then, after taking Brest, turned to the east. In a single month, it had liberated most of France north of the Loire River.

Meanwhile, the Allies launched Operation DRAGOON on the Côte d'Azur, near Cannes in southern France, on August 15. The operation had been planned largely to secure the French Mediterranean ports for a rapid Allied buildup in France. Originally code-named ANVIL and planned to coincide with D-day, this effort had to be postponed because of a shortage of landing craft as a consequence of OVERLORD and the British reluctance to divert assets from Italy.

Crossed rifles in the sand serve as a comrade's tribute to this American soldier who died in the Normandy Invasion of June 6, 1944. (National Archives)

On August 15, some 86,000 men went ashore on a 30-mile front 20 miles east of the French naval base of Toulon. German ground forces were thinly spread and inadequate in numbers and resources. Lieutenant General Alexander Patch's Seventh Army ultimately consisted of 10 divisions: 7 U.S. and 3 French. The Allies pushed up the Rhône River Valley. By the time of the linkup with Bradley's 12th Army Group near the Swiss border in the fall of 1944, the southern Allied force had grown into the 6th Army Group of 23 divisions under Lieutenant General Jacob Devers. In Toulon and Marseille, DRAGOON provided him with two large intact French ports that could be used to help supply the expanding Allied buildup in France.

The Allies squandered a golden opportunity. Montgomery was making little progress, while Patton and the Third Army swung wide in an enormous enveloping movement that prevented German forces from consolidating along the Seine. Patton's rapid drive made it possible to trap large numbers of two German field armies, including seven panzer divisions, in the so-called Falaise Pocket. The destruction of these German forces was within Allied reach, but Eisenhower and Bradley did not grasp the significance of the

situation and refused to authorize Patton to span a 15-mile-wide gap between Argentan and Falaise, the former having been assigned as a British objective.

The pocket was finally closed during August, and 60,000 Germans were killed or captured, with substantial amounts of arms and equipment seized, yet some 100,000 Germans escaped during August 13–18. German forces in France now fought their way homeward under Allied pursuit. Paris was liberated on August 25, a task wisely left to the French. By August 31, Patton's Third Army reached the Meuse at Verdun, and the following day it gained the Moselle River. In the north, Montgomery drove into Belgium, all the while complaining of shortages of supplies and fuel and pressing for a single thrust into Germany under his command.

Between the two Allied spearheads, there was little resistance. Facing Patton's six strong divisions were five weak German divisions with few tanks or antitank guns. Opposing the British was the hastily assembled German First Parachute Army, a scratch force of some 18,000 men, boys, and walking wounded. In the sector between Aachen and Metz, the Germans had only eight infantry battalions. On the whole front, the Germans fielded some 100 tanks and 570 aircraft. In tanks and in aircraft, the Allies had a 20-to-1 advantage.

Yet the Allied advance stalled. The supply lines of the Allies were lengthening even as those of the Germans were contracting. The original Allied plan had been to consolidate on the Seine while opening the Brittany ports and establishing a sound logistical base, but that plan had been nullified by their unanticipated rapid advance after the Saint-Lô breakout. Much of the French railroad system had been destroyed by Allied air strikes, and the bulk of the supplies had to move from the Normandy beaches to the front by road.

Despite the best efforts of the Allies, supplies were simply insufficient for the broad-front strategy on which Eisenhower insisted. The supply situation was made worse by the need for essential services in liberated French cities and towns, and there were natural obstacles in the Vosges Mountains, the Ardennes, and the Hürtgen Forest.

By the end of August, the German Army had suffered more casualties than at Stalingrad—losing roughly 500,000 soldiers and 1,600 tanks in what was one of the greatest defeats in the history of warfare. One daring thrust through the north, south, or center might have proved decisive. There were two competing schools of Allied operational strategy: the narrow front and

the broad front. Montgomery and Patton were the two leading proponents of the narrow front, provided that it was for their own forces; Eisenhower wanted the broad front.

Arguing that there were only sufficient resources for one major thrust, Montgomery pressed Eisenhower to halt Patton's Third Army and concentrate resources behind his troops. Montgomery believed that he could make a quick end to the war, and he wanted the British to lead the charge and take Berlin. Patton wanted, above all else, to beat Montgomery to that prize. Eisenhower controlled the flow of supplies and made the ultimate decision for a broad front.

While this discussion was in progress, though, Montgomery missed a chance to shorten the war. British tanks took Brussels on September 3 and Antwerp the next day, so rapidly that the Germans were unable to destroy its port facilities. Only the opening of the 45-mile-long Scheldt estuary stood between the Allies and relief of their growing supply difficulties. But Montgomery preferred to concentrate his troops for a thrust across the Rhine into northern Germany and overlooked the enormous logistical implications of Antwerp. The British were well positioned to take the German Fifteenth Army fleeing northeastward up the coast. An advance of less than 10 miles beyond Antwerp would have sealed off the Walcheren and South Beveland peninsula, but Montgomery halted at Antwerp. Consequently, the Fifteenth Army escaped across the Scheldt at night and then went back into Holland.

Eisenhower now had to decide between concentrating on a narrow front or launching a broad-based attack in which the Allies would attack, regroup, and then attack again. Although Allied headquarters had always known that no major thrust could be made into Germany until Antwerp had been secured as a supply base, Eisenhower allowed Montgomery to ignore opening Antwerp in favor of securing a bridgehead across the Rhine and perhaps ending the war in one bold stroke. Also affecting the plan was pressure to use the airborne divisions that had participated in the Normandy Invasion and were now recuperating in Britain. Unfortunately, Montgomery failed to carry out the detailed staff planning to make the plan work.

The operation was code-named MARKET-GARDEN. MARKET, the airborne segment, involved three paratroop divisions; GARDEN, the ground portion, was centered on the British Second Army. The operation occurred during September 17–26, 1944. The airborne forces were to secure key bridges over

the Maas (Meuse), Waal, and Lek (lower Rhine) Rivers, then the Second Army would race up from Belgium along a 60-mile-long narrow causeway, cross the rivers, and secure Arnhem on the lower Rhine. The plan involved a high degree of risk, but outflanking the Siegfried Line (called the West Wall by the Germans) and gaining entry into northern Germany seemed worth it.

Factors involved in the failure of the operation included the refusal to modify the hastily developed plan, a lack of coordination with the Dutch underground, and the ignoring of Dutch warnings as well as Ultra intercepts and late photographic evidence of the presence of two battle-hardened panzer divisions transferred from the Eastern Front and reconstituting around Arnhem. The operation also suffered from insufficient numbers of men and logistical support. The greatest tactical mistake, however, was to drop the British 1st Airborne Division seven to eight miles from Arnhem, allowing German panzers to isolate it. The operation, which Montgomery later termed "90 percent successful," was in fact a total failure.

By mid-September the Allied opportunity had been lost, and the Germans had recovered sufficiently to slow the advance almost to a standstill. The task of forcing the Germans from the Scheldt fell chiefly to Lieutenant General Guy Simonds's Canadian First Army. This consumed two months of hard fighting. Patton was also held up in bloody fighting before the fortress of Metz (September 19–November 22). With the onset of bad weather, any chance for the Allies to win the war in 1944 was gone.

The Germans not only managed to rebuild their shattered divisions but also transferred new units into the battle so that they actually enjoyed a manpower advantage over the Allied Expeditionary Force, although they were numerically inferior in tanks, artillery, and above all airpower. Between September 12 and December 16, 1944, the U.S. Army suffered one of its worst defeats in the Hürtgen Forest, ideal defensive terrain. The Germans, who were now defending their homeland, resisted with great tenacity.

Hitler now proposed a final offensive in the west. In September 1944, with the Eastern Front static for several months and the Allied offensive in the west gaining ground, he conceived of a sudden offensive to take the Allies by surprise, break their front, and recapture Antwerp. He hoped at least to buy three to four months to deal with the advancing Soviets. Western Front commander Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt thought that the plan was unrealistic, as did other high-ranking officers. Hitler refused to change his

mind, though, and substantial German forces were transferred from the Eastern Front for what would be the biggest battle fought on the Western Front in World War II and the largest engagement ever fought by the U.S. Army.

On December 16, the Germans launched their Ardennes Offensive, also known as the Battle of the Bulge. It caught the Western Allies completely by surprise, and bad weather restricted the use of Allied airpower. The German force of divisions pushing against three divisions of Hodges's First Army drove a "bulge" 50 miles deep and 70 miles wide into the American defenses, which gave the engagement its name.

Allied resources diverted to the battle and clearing skies that permitted the intervention of Allied aircraft turned the tide. The battle dragged on until January 16, 1945, and before the Germans could switch resources to the east, the Soviets launched their last great offensive. In effect, the Ardennes Offensive hastened the end of the war. Both sides suffered heavily, but the Western Allies quickly made up their losses, whereas the Germans could not.

Deaf to reason, Hitler categorically forbade retreat. Everything that could be of use to the enemy had to be destroyed. The fate of his people was irrelevant, for he concluded that if the Germans were unable to win, they did not deserve to survive.

On March 7, 1945, U.S. forces captured intact a German bridge across the Rhine at Remagen and immediately put forces across. In the west, the Germans now had fewer than 60 understrength and poorly equipped divisions to oppose 85 well-equipped Allied divisions. With both Patton and Hodges making solid progress, Eisenhower ordered Bradley's 12th Army Group to make the main thrust, pushing through central Germany and ignoring Berlin, on which the Soviets were advancing.

The Ninth Army would encircle the Ruhr while the remainder of Montgomery's 21st Army Group covered Bradley's drive by moving northeast, cutting off German forces in Denmark and Norway. Lieutenant General Jacob Devers's 6th Army Group, meanwhile, provided right-flank security for Bradley, advancing down the Danube to secure the so-called Alpenfestung (literally, Alpine fortress), or National Redoubt. The Ruhr was encircled on April 1. The Seventh Army, in the meantime, took Nuremberg, crossed the Danube, and moved into Austria, joining up in the Brenner Pass with elements of the Fifth Army from Italy. On April 11, the Ninth Army

reached the Elbe near Magdeburg. German resistance now rapidly collapsed. Soviet forces took Berlin, and on May 8 Admiral Karl Dönitz, Hitler's successor, surrendered German forces unconditionally. The war in Europe was over.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Britain, Battle of; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; COBRA, Operation; Collins, Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe"; Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; de Gaulle, Charles; Dempsey, Miles Christopher; Denmark Campaign; Devers, Jacob Loucks; Dönitz, Karl; DRAGOON, Operation; Dunkerque, Evacuation of; Eben Emael, German Capture of; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Falaise-Argentan Pocket; FORTITUDE, NORTH and SOUTH, Operations; France, Battle for; France Campaign; Free French; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Hitler, Adolf; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Hürtgen Forest Campaign; Léopold III, King of the Belgians; Maginot Line; MARKET-GARDEN, Operation; Marshall, George Catlett; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Netherlands Campaign; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Norway, German Conquest of; OVERLORD, Operation, Planning for; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Poland Campaign; Raeder, Erich; Remagen Bridge, Capture of the; Reynaud, Paul; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Ruhr Land Campaign; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Saar, French Invasion of the; Scheldt, Battles of the; SEA LION, Operation, Planning for; SICHELSCHNITT, Operation; Simonds, Guy Granville; Stalin, Joseph; TORCH, Operation; Vichy France; Weygand, Maxime

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Westphal, Siegfried (1902–1982)

German Army general of cavalry. Born in Leipzig, Germany, on March 28, 1902, Siegfried Westphal entered the military as an officer candidate in the 12th Grenadier Regiment in November 1918. He remained in the army after World War I, and in December 1922, he was commissioned as a lieutenant in a cavalry regiment. He attended the Kriegsakademie (War College) and qualified as a General Staff officer.

At the start of World War II, Westphal was operations officer of the 58th Infantry Division. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1941, he became operations officer of General Erwin Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika that November and was promoted to colonel in August 1942 and then, as one of the youngest generals in the German Army, to major general in March 1943. In June, Westphal became chief of staff to Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, commander in chief, south, and as such he played an important role in the Sicily and Italy campaigns. Westphal was promoted to lieutenant general in April 1944.

In September 1944, Westphal became chief of staff to Oberbefehlshaber West (commander in chief, west) Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt. He helped plan the German Ardennes Offensive that led to the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Battle of the Bulge. Promoted to general of cavalry in February 1945, Westphal returned to his prior position as chief of staff to Kesselring a month later, a post he retained until the end of the war.

Westphal was hardworking and decisive, and his chiefs had only high praise for his abilities. Westphal rejected all involvement with National Socialism and firmly believed in the separation of politics from the military.

Westphal was captured by Americans in May 1945. He testified for the prosecution at the International Military Tribunals in 1946 and was released in December 1947. Westphal died at Celle, Germany, on July 2, 1982.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Ardennes Offensive; International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trials; Italy Campaign; Kesselring, Albert; Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Sicily, Invasion of

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West Wall, Advance to the (August 17–September 10, 1944)

Allied pursuit of German forces from the Seine to the German border. The breakout of the Allied armies from the Normandy beachheads in Operation COBRA on July 25, 1944, was followed by a rapid pursuit of the retreating German forces to the Seine River. On August 19, supreme Allied commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to continue the advance east of the Seine, despite growing logistical difficulties.

Allied plans called for the main effort to be made northeast of the Ardennes Forest by Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery's 21st Army Group (Canadian First Army and British Second Army), supported by Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges's U.S. First Army of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group. Montgomery's forces were to move northeast from the lower Seine through Liège to cross the Rhine and seize the Ruhr industrial area. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.'s U.S. Third Army (also part of 12th Army Group) was to make a secondary effort south of the Ardennes and east from the upper Seine across the Moselle between Metz and Nancy and into the Saarland. Intermediate Allied objectives were to clear the English Channel ports; seize the German

V-weapons sites in the Pas de Calais area; liberate northwestern France, Belgium, and Holland; and destroy German forces between the Seine and Germany. The ultimate Allied objectives were a quick crossing of the Rhine and seizure of the Ruhr.

Speed was essential if the Allied forces were to reach the Rhine before the Germans could organize an effective defense of the West Wall, a fortified line on Germany's western border running some 300 miles from Cleves on the Dutch-German border to Basel, Switzerland. Known by the Allies as the Siegfried Line, this barrier consisted of mutually supporting pillboxes, concrete antitank obstacles, and extensive barbed-wire entanglements. Constructed between 1936 and 1938, the West Wall had been neglected after the German victories in 1940, and parts of it had been dismantled to construct the Atlantic Wall.

The general German retreat in the west began on August 17. Leaving behind the garrisons in the channel ports, Field Marshal Walther Model's Army Group B (elements of 46 divisions of the First, Seventh, Fifth Panzer, and Fifteenth Armies) withdrew to the northeast. Closely pursued by the Allies, the retreating German forces conducted an orderly withdrawal but were unable to reestablish a continuous line of defense until they reached the West Wall. By September 10, Army Group B and Army Group G (7 divisions of the Nineteenth Army withdrawing from southern France) had met at the West Wall and formed a continuous front with some 63 understrength divisions spread from the North Sea to Switzerland.

Paris was liberated on August 25, and the Allied pursuit east of the Seine achieved quick success. General Sir Henry Crerar's Canadian First Army advanced up the channel coast, overrunning the German V-weapon sites in the Pas de Calais on September 6 and taking Ostend on September 9. Farther east, General Sir Miles Dempsey's British Second Army rapidly advanced to the Albert Canal between Antwerp and Hasselt, taking Brussels on September 3, Antwerp on September 4, and Ghent on September 5. The Germans retained the Scheldt estuary, however, thus preventing Allied use of the Belgian ports.

On the British right, Hodges's First Army attacked from Melun on August 26 and captured Laon on August 30, Tournai on September 2, and Mons on September 3, taking some 25,000 German prisoners in the so-called Mons Pocket. The First Army then crossed the Meuse on September 4–5,

liberating Liège on September 7 and Luxembourg two days later. By September 10, the First Army was deployed from Hasselt on the Albert Canal through Liège, Verviers, and Malmédy to Luxembourg.

Despite logistical restrictions, Patton's Third Army also made good progress, and by September 1 it had crossed the Meuse between Verdun and Commercy and was in position to attack toward the Moselle and the West Wall between Metz and Nancy when its advance ground to a halt for lack of gasoline and other supplies. On September 2, Alexander Patch's U.S. Seventh Army, advancing northward from southern France, linked up with Allied forces near Lyon, thereby completing the Allied line from the channel to the Swiss border and ending the great pursuit.

The Normandy Invasion and breakout and the subsequent pursuit to the West Wall were costly for both sides. From June 6 to September 11, 1944, the Germans lost about 500,000 men. In the same period, the Allies suffered some 224,000 casualties. The continuation of the Allied drive into Germany would be much slower and even more costly.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Antwerp, Battle of; Bradley, Omar Nelson; COBRA, Operation; Crerar, Henry Duncan Graham; Dempsey, Miles Christopher; Devers, Jacob Loucks; DRAGOON, Operation; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hodges, Courtney Hicks; Model, Walther; Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law; Patch, Alexander McCarrell, Jr.; Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Vosges, Advance to; West European Theater of Operations

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Wever, Walter (1887–1936)

German Air Force lieutenant general. Born in Posen, Prussia (today's Poznan, Poland), on November 11, 1887, Walter Wever joined the army as an officer candidate in 1905. He served as platoon leader early in World War I. Promoted to captain in 1915, he was assigned as a staff officer in the Oberste Heeresleitung (German Supreme Command) two years later. Following the war, Wever continued to serve in the Truppenamt, the clandestine German General Staff. In 1933, his name and that of Erich von Manstein were submitted to Hermann Göring to fill the position of chief of the Air Command Office, essentially chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff. Göring selected Wever, who was known for his keen intellect, hard work, and ability to quickly grasp the key concepts of complex problems.

An ardent Nazi, Wever threw himself into his work and became one the architects of the Luftwaffe. He deduced that the Soviet Union was the real enemy and believed that the Luftwaffe would need a long-range bomber to strike Soviet bases and factories. Wever remained the chief advocate of a four-engine, strategic "Ural" bomber. He believed that the other central tasks for the Luftwaffe were achieving air superiority and providing ground support. Toward this end, he set about developing and organizing a balanced air force.

As chief of the newly created Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force Supreme Command), Wever was constantly visiting units to learn firsthand of their problems. He insisted on flying himself as an example to his subordinates. On June 3, 1936, during a visit to Dresden, Wever's plane crashed on landing and he was killed. With his death, the Luftwaffe lost one of its leading strategic visionaries. His death also brought a shift in Luftwaffe priorities to tactical airpower.

MARLYN R. PIERCE

See also

Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Germany, Air Force; Göring, Hermann Wilhelm; Manstein, Erich von

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Weygand, Maxime (1867–1965)

French Army general. Born on January 21, 1867, in Brussels, Belgium, Maxime Weygand was probably of distinguished parentage; rumor had it that he was the illegitimate son of Belgian king Leopold II. Weygand arrived in France under mysterious circumstances at age six. He graduated from the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr in 1887 and from the Cavalry School at Saumur the following year.

During the next two decades, Weygand worked hard and enjoyed rapid promotion. In 1902, he returned to Saumur as an instructor. In 1912, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and selected to attend the Centre des Hautes Études Militaires (Center for Advanced Military Studies), where he performed brilliantly and caught the attention of the French Army commander, General of Division Joseph Joffre.

In mid-August 1914, Weygand became chief of staff to General Ferdinand Foch's new Ninth Army. He continued as Foch's chief of staff for the next nine years and was the only officer on the general's staff to have his full confidence—the two men were virtually inseparable. At the end of the war, Weygand was a general of division.

In 1920, Foch sent Weygand to head the French military mission to Poland during its war with Russia. Weygand returned to France after the Polish victory and was promoted to lieutenant general. Between 1923 and 1924, he was high commissioner to the Levant. Removed as a "rightist general" after the victory by the Left in the 1924 elections, he next headed the Centre des Hautes Études Militaires.

In January 1930 Weygand succeeded Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain as chief of staff of the French Army. In his new post, Weygand advocated mechanization instead of the construction of the Maginot Line. He managed

to push through the motorization of 7 of the 20 peacetime French divisions and in 1933 secured the creation of light mechanized divisions.

Weygand retired from the army in 1935. Recalled to service four years later on the eve of World War II, he assumed command of French forces in the Middle East. On May 19, 1940, in the midst of the May 10–June 25 Battle for France, Premier Paul Reynaud ordered the 73-year-old Weygand to return to France and replace General Maurice Gamelin as supreme Allied commander in Flanders.

Weygand arrived too late to save France. He failed in his effort to get the British to attack from the north in a joint effort to pinch off the German armored thrust to the sea, the last hope of an Allied victory at that point. Realizing the hopelessness of the French position, he urged the government to capitulate. Following the French surrender on June 22, Weygand was briefly defense minister of Vichy France, in which position he worked to transfer military assets from the occupied zone to the unoccupied zone and to North Africa. Removed from his office on suspicion of being anti-Vichy, he was sent to Algeria. His connections with anti-German forces there brought his forced retirement to Cannes, where he was under constant police surveillance.

French general Maxime Weygand, shown here in 1939. His appointment to command French forces during the 1940 Battle for France came too late to alter the outcome. (Pictorial Parade/Getty Images)

After the November 8, 1942, Anglo-American landings in North Africa, Weygand urged the Vichy regime to break with Germany and join forces with the Allies. That same month, he attempted to fly to North Africa to meet with the Americans, but the Gestapo arrested him and imprisoned him in Germany. Released at the end of the war, Weygand was flown to Paris, where General Charles de Gaulle ordered his arrest as a member of the Vichy government. He was, however, released from prison in 1946 and rehabilitated in 1948. Weygand lived a quiet retirement and wrote many books, including his memoirs. He died in Paris on January 28, 1965.

MICHAEL S. NEIBERG

See also

France; France, Army; France, Battle for; Gamelin, Maurice Gustave; Maginot Line; Pétain, Henri Philippe; Reynaud, Paul; Vichy France

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Weyland, Otto Paul (1902–1979)

U.S. Army Air Forces (later U.S. Air Force) general. Born in Riverside, California, on January 27, 1902, Otto Paul Weyland graduated from Texas A&M University in 1923 with a degree in mechanical engineering and a commission in the U.S. Army Air Corps Reserve. After flight training at Kelly Field, Texas, he served with the 12th Observation Squadron as flight instructor at Kelly Field from 1927 to 1931. Weyland was promoted to first lieutenant in June 1930 and subsequently commanded the 4th Observation Squadron.

Weyland returned to Kelly Field as an instructor in November 1934, becoming chief of the Observation Section in 1935. He was promoted to captain that March. Weyland graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School in 1938 and the Army Command and General Staff School in 1939. That June, he was appointed assistant to the chief of the Aviation Division, National Guard Bureau.

Weyland was promoted to major in March 1940, and while commanding the 16th Pursuit Group in the Panama Canal Zone, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and made chief of staff of the Sixth Air Force. Promoted to colonel in March 1942, he was appointed deputy director of air support in June at army headquarters in Washington, D.C. In September 1943 he was promoted to brigadier general, and in November he went to Europe to command the 84th Fighter Wing in Britain. In February 1944, Weyland commanded the XIX Tactical Air Command (Ninth Air Force), supporting Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third Army. Weyland established his

command post next to that of Patton and had his intelligence and operations officers maintain contact with Patton's counterparts, setting new standards for joint service teamwork. Advancing to major general in January 1945, Weyland commanded the Ninth Air Force.

In September 1945, Weyland became deputy commandant of the Army Command and General Staff School. When the U.S. Air Force became a separate service, he was charged with devising plans and operations for this new branch. He was then deputy commandant of the National War College, Washington, D.C. In July 1950, he became commanding general, Tactical Air Command.

At the outset of the Korean War, Weyland was on temporary duty as Far East Air Force (FEAF) vice commander for operations. When FEAF commander General George E. Stratemeyer suffered a heart attack, Weyland —promoted to lieutenant general in April 1951—replaced him in June. He retained that post to the end of the war. Promoted to full general in July 1952, he returned to the United States in 1953 and once again commanded the Tactical Air Command at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, from 1954 until his retirement in July 1959. He was then a consultant for Douglas Aircraft Corporation and director of a life insurance company. Weyland died in San Antonio, Texas, on September 2, 1979.

UZAL W. ENT

See also

Patton, George Smith, Jr.; Stratemeyer, George Edward; United States Army Air Forces

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White, Isaac Davis (1901–1990)

U.S. Army general. Born in Peterborough, New Hampshire, on March 6, 1901, Isaac Davis White (usually referred to as I. D. White) graduated from

Norwich University in 1922 and was commissioned in the cavalry. As World War II approached, he became an early and influential proponent of the fledgling armored force.

Joining the 2nd Armored Division in January 1942, White first commanded the division's reconnaissance squadron as a major, then served at successively higher levels. He commanded the 67th Armored Regiment in fighting in North Africa, then commanded the 2nd Armored Division's Combat Command B in Sicily (July 9–August 22, 1943) and, as a brigadier general, in the fighting across Europe. During the Battle of Celles the 2nd Armored Division surrounded and destroyed much of the 2nd Panzer Division during December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive, cutting off the German penetration at its farthest advance. By early 1945, White was a major general in command of the division.

After the war, White commanded the Cavalry School at Fort Riley (1945–1946), the U.S. Constabulary in the Army of Occupation in Germany (1948), and then the Armored Center and School at Fort Knox (1949–1950). An ardent horseman, he also managed the army equestrian team that competed in the 1948 Olympic Games.

During the latter stages of the Korean War in 1952, White took command of X Corps, then returned to command the Fourth Army as a lieutenant general at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. His next assignments were the command of Army Forces, Far East, and the Eighth Army (1955–1957), during which he was promoted to full general. Then, following reorganization in the region, he became commander of U.S. Army, Pacific.

Retiring in 1961, White served as a trustee of Norwich University, as president of the U.S. Armor Association, and as a defense consultant. He died in Hanover, New Hampshire, on June 11, 1990.

LEWIS SORLEY

See also

Ardennes Offensive; Armored Warfare; Sicily, Invasion of; TORCH, Operation

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White, Thomas Dresser (1901–1965)

U.S. Army Air Forces (later U.S. Air Force) general. Born in Walker, Minnesota, on August 6, 1901, Thomas Dresser White graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1920 and served in the infantry until 1924, when he transferred to aviation. During the 1920s and 1930s, his natural intellect and language skills led to assignments, primarily in attaché positions, including duty in China, the Soviet Union, and Italy. White graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School in 1938, followed by the Army Command and General Staff School. He was then assigned to the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. In April 1940, White became military attaché in Brazil and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941.

In March 1942, White returned to the United States to serve on the Third Air Force staff, including duty as its chief of staff as a colonel. He was promoted to brigadier general in November 1942. He was reassigned to the Army Air Forces Headquarters as the assistant chief of staff for intelligence in January 1944 and participated in the planning for the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion. In September 1944, White moved to the Southwest Pacific as deputy commander of the Thirteenth Air Force. In this capacity, he participated in the campaigns in New Guinea (March 8, 1942–September 13, 1945) and the Philippines (October 20, 1944–August 15, 1945). In June 1944, White assumed command of the Seventh Air Force, leading operations in Okinawa (March–June) and the Mariana Islands (June–August) and preparing for the planned invasion of Japan.

After the war, White served as chief of staff of the Pacific Air Command and commanded the Fifth Air Force in Japan. He was promoted to major general in November 1946. He returned to Washington, D.C., in October 1948, serving in a series of air staff and joint staff positions, with promotion to lieutenant general in July 1951. He was promoted to full general in June 1953 when he was appointed vice chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force. He served as chief of staff of the air force from July 1957 until his retirement in June 1961. White died in Washington, D.C., on December 22, 1965.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also

Mariana Islands Campaign; New Guinea Campaign; Normandy Invasion and Campaign; Okinawa, Invasion of; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; United States Army Air Forces

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White Rose

German resistance group. At the center of the White Rose group were a brother and sister, Hans and Sophie Scholl (ages 24 and 21 at the time of their deaths). They were both bright and attractive and had been leaders in Nazi youth groups, but they and their friends became disillusioned with the course of events in Germany.

Formed in Munich, the White Rose actually began in the Wehrmacht. Hans was a sergeant in the army, as were others in the conspiratorial group. These young men had served briefly on the Eastern Front and were aware of the full bestiality of the Nazi regime. When they returned to Munich to pursue medical studies at the University of Munich, they decided to act. Most members were in their early 20s. A professor, Kurt Huber, was also associated with the group. The Scholls and their friends refused to remain indifferent to what was happening in the world around them. Hans had not planned to involve his sister, also a student at the university, but she found out about the group's activities and insisted on being included.

The White Rose organization printed a number of carefully worded leaflets attacking the Third Reich and calling for resistance against it. These were circulated around the universities and mailed to prominent individuals in a half dozen cities. In addition, slogans against the regime were painted on walls in Munich. These activities were all the more courageous because they began as a moral protest: in the fall of 1942, Germany was not yet losing the war.

By early 1943, the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) was closing in on the organization, but Hans Scholl did not seem to notice or care. Most members of the group believed that the end of the war was near. In February, the Gestapo arrested three members of the White Rose. Four days later, they were taken before Roland Freisler, the notorious chief justice of the People's Court for the Reich. There was no trial in any acceptable meaning of the term, and that same day they were condemned and beheaded by guillotine. Soon other members of the group were located, and three of them—including a university professor—were also executed.

The defiant acts of the White Rose hardly disturbed the authority of the Reich. There would eventually be memorials to the Scholls in Germany, but it is doubtful that they would have wanted such recognition or thought it proper. That their actions were not influential was unimportant; what mattered was that they stood up for what they believed. As Sophie Scholl wrote in a letter to a friend, "I think that right and justice are superior to other loyalties."

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Resistance; Scholl, Hans and Sophie

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Whittle, Sir Frank (1907–1996)

British air commodore and aviation engineer. Born on June 1, 1907, at Coventry, England, Frank Whittle entered the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1923 as a cadet at the RAF College at Cranwell. He graduated from its Air Apprentices Wing in 1926 and from the RAF College, Cranwell, in 1928. He

dreamed of an aircraft able to fly at enormous speed and altitude, and his 1928 senior thesis was on jet propulsion. Whittle qualified as a pilot, and in 1928, he joined a fighter squadron. Three years later, he became a test pilot. Whittle attended both RAF Engineering School and, from 1934 to 1937, Cambridge University.

Although the Air Ministry challenged the idea of jet propulsion as impractical, Whittle persevered and secured a patent for his turbojet engine in 1930. Obtaining a leave of absence from the RAF, he tested his first jet engine on the ground in April 1937, the year after he and his backers formed Power Jets, Ltd. With the beginning of World War II, the British government supported his project.

Whittle's first flight-worthy engine, the W.1, took to the sky in May 1941 powering an experimental Gloster E.28/39 aircraft. This effort led to the twin-engine Gloster Meteor, which first flew in March 1943. The Gloster Meteor ultimately flew at nearly 600 mph and went into service in July 1944, only weeks after the debut of the German Messerschmitt Me-262. The first RAF jet aircraft, the Meteor played a major role in intercepting and downing German V-1s, and several improved Mk III Meteors performed ground-attack missions in Europe in the last weeks of the war. Subsequently, the U.S. Air Force copied Whittle's centrifugal jet engine in the twin-engine Bell P-59A.

In 1948, Whittle was knighted after having retired from the RAF as an air commodore. In 1977, he became a research professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. Whittle died in Baltimore, Maryland, on August 8, 1996.

KATHLEEN GASTON HITT

See also

Airborne Forces, Allied; Aircraft, Jet and Rocket; Great Britain, Air Force

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Wilhelm Gustloff, General von Steuben, and *Goya,* Sinking of

The sinking of three ships evacuating German personnel from the Baltic during January to April 1945 included history's worst maritime disaster. The 25,000-ton *Wilhelm Gustloff* was launched in 1937 as the flagship of Adolf Hitler's "Strength through Joy" movement, which provided low-cost vacations for German workers. The *Wilhelm Gustloff* was employed as a cruise ship until World War II, when it became a floating barracks for German submariners training in the Baltic.

With the advance of the Soviet Army on the Eastern Front, the *Wilhelm Gustloff* was pressed into service to evacuate German personnel from the Baltic. On the night of January 30, 1945, it was sunk in the Baltic Sea by the Soviet submarine *S-13* (commanded by Captain Third Rank Alexander Marinseko). When it went down, the ship was carrying nearly 1,000 submariners and other military personnel, but just before it sailed, it had taken on a large number of refugees, so there were probably more than 8,000 people on board. The ship sank quickly, and only 964 survivors were picked from the sea. Some of these later died of their wounds or exposure, so the total number of people who perished in the tragedy probably exceeds 7,000.

The *Wilhelm Gustloff* was the largest German vessel ever sunk by a Soviet submarine. More people were lost in that ship than in the sinking of either the *Titanic* in 1912 or the *Lusitania* in 1915. On February 10, 1945, the *S-13* sank another German liner—the *General von Steuben*—with 3,000 people on board, including 2,000 wounded German troops. Only 300 of them survived. A third German liner, the *Goya,* with more than 6,000 people on board, most of them wounded German soldiers, was sunk by another Soviet submarine on April 15, and only 183 survived.

Many Germans erroneously believed that the *Wilhelm Gustloff* was marked with red crosses and was a noncombatant. In reality, the ship mounted antiaircraft guns and was transporting naval personnel as well as refugees. It should not have been permitted to sail virtually unescorted. A footnote to its sinking is the speculation that the ship may have been carrying a priceless art treasure—the carved amber panels commissioned by King Frederick I of Prussia in the early 18th century.

The German passenger ship *Wilhelm Gustloff*, shown here in April 1938. As many as 7,000 people aboard, most of them German refugees from the Baltic region, died when the ship was sunk by a Soviet submarine on the night of January 30, 1945. (Topical Press Agency/Getty Images)

The *Wilhelm Gustloff*, *General Steuben*, and *Goya* had been taking part in what was the largest seaborne evacuation in history. The sinking of the three liners, with the loss of more than 15,000 people, obscured the fact that only 1 percent of the refugees the Germans evacuated from the Baltic by sea perished. This operation, carried out from January to May 1945, was the greatest German Navy success of the war and also a personal triumph for Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, who directed the operation. Despite shortages of fuel and shipping and threats from mines, air attacks, and submarines, the German Navy transported more than 2 million Germans by sea to the west ahead of the advancing Red Army.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy

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Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands (1880–1962)

Monarch of the Netherlands (1890–1948). Born at The Hague on August 31, 1880, Wilhelmina Helena Paulina Maria was the only child of King William III of the Netherlands (1817–1890) and his second wife, Queen Emma of Waldeck-Pyrmont. After William's death on November 21, 1890, Wilhelmina became queen, but Queen Emma acted as regent for her until 1898. Wilhelmina was educated by private tutors. She often toured the Netherlands with her mother so that her subjects would know her before she reached her majority. Wilhelmina married Heinrich Vladimir, the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. They had one daughter, Juliana.

Wilhelmina played an important role in keeping her country neutral during World War I, but maintaining neutrality during World War II proved to be unsuccessful. Germany invaded the Netherlands on May 10, 1940, and it was immediately clear that the country would be defeated. Wilhelmina arranged the evacuation of Crown Princess Juliana and her husband, Prince Bernhard, together with their two infants, Beatrix and Irene, on May 13. The next day, Wilhelmina escaped along with senior members of her government. She established a government-in-exile in London, a step that infuriated Adolf Hitler.

In radio addresses to her people, Wilhelmina justified her flight abroad on the grounds that she needed the freedom to act in the best interests of her country. Her stirring, patriotic radio speeches strengthened the people's resolve over the long period of German occupation. Wilhelmina steadfastly encouraged the Dutch resistance movement and appointed her son-in-law, Prince Bernhard, as its chief. She personally received Netherlanders who reached Britain during the war. In 1942, she visited both Canada and the United States.

Wilhelmina returned to liberated southern Holland on March 13, 1945, where she was welcomed enthusiastically. In September 1948, she abdicated in favor of her daughter, Juliana. Wilhelmina died at Het Loo Palace, Apeldoorn, Holland, on November 28, 1962.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON

See also
Netherlands

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Wilhelmshaven, Raid on (June 11, 1943)

Wilhelmshaven was the first German city attacked in the coordinated American and British bombing known as the Combined Bomber Offensive. Submarine pens, bases, and construction yards were all located at the port of Wilhelmshaven. Destruction of German submarine construction yards was a top priority of the American Eighth Air Force, given the destruction being wrought by the Germans in the Battle of the Atlantic.

The end of the North African Campaign in early 1943 freed resources needed to resume the bomber offensive against Germany, and on June 10, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued the Pointblank Directive, which, among other things, called for a united effort to destroy Germany's industrial base. Springing from decisions reached at the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, Pointblank marked the beginning of a coordinated air offensive against major German cities by the U.S. Eighth Air Force, flying precision-bombing missions by day, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command, conducting area bombing missions by night.

The first of these missions was a raid by 252 B-17s of the Eighth Air Force against the German naval yards at Bremen and Wilhelmshaven on June 11, 1943, while the RAF attacked Münster and Düsseldorf. As clouds obscured Bremen, 168 B-17s attacked Wilhelmshaven, and 30 struck the port area of Cuxhaven.

The bombers lacked fighter support because the targets were too distant for the available escorts. Over Wilhelmshaven they encountered flak, which scattered some of the groups. The German fighters waited until the bombers executed their bombing runs, a period when pilots and bombardiers focused on the ground target and not on evasive maneuvers and defensive nose fire.

Employing head-on attacks, notably against the 379th Bomb Group in the "high group" position, the German fighters disrupted the lead bombardiers' efforts. None of the 417 tons of bombs that were dropped hit the primary target. Eight bombers were lost and another 62 damaged.

The Wilhelmshaven raid demonstrated the difficulty of conducting strategic bombing beyond the range of fighter escorts. Nevertheless, the increased coordination by the Allied air forces meant that from that time forward, German cities would be subjected to round-the-clock bombing.

C. J. HORN

See also

Aircraft, Bombers; Air Warfare, Strategic Bombing; Atlantic, Battle of the

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Wilkinson, Theodore Stark "Ping" (1888–1946)

U.S. Navy vice admiral. Born in Annapolis, Maryland, on December 22, 1888, Theodore Stark "Ping" Wilkinson graduated at the top of his class in 1909 from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. In 1912, he earned an MS degree from George Washington University. He was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor for U.S. operations at the port of Veracruz, Mexico.

During World War I, Wilkinson served in the Bureau of Ordnance, designing mines and antisubmarine depth charges. Between the wars, Wilkinson, a gunnery specialist, captained a destroyer, was fleet gunnery officer for the Scouting Force, and served in shore assignments as an ordnance officer and secretary to the navy's General Board from 1934 to 1937.

A battleship captain for most of 1941, Wilkinson became director of Naval Intelligence in October of that year. He escaped blame for the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack because the evaluation and

dissemination of intelligence was another bureau's responsibility, even though his office gathered intelligence information. Promoted to rear admiral in April 1942, Wilkinson took command of Battleship Division 2 that August, and in January 1943, he became deputy commander of the South Pacific Force, under Admiral William F. Halsey. During the Solomon Islands Naval Campaign (August 1942–February 1943), Wilkinson not only solved numerous operational problems but also exercised his considerable diplomatic skills on often-contentious Allied colleagues.

From July 1943 to late 1945, Wilkinson commanded the III Amphibious Force, with headquarters at Guadalcanal. He firmly advocated a leapfrogging strategy of avoiding heavily fortified Japanese-held islands and concentrating on easier targets. Wilkinson successfully organized numerous landings in the Pacific theater, including those at New Georgia (June 1943), Vella Lavella (October 6), and Bougainville (November 1). He was promoted to vice admiral in September 1944 and commanded the Third Amphibious Force during 1944–1945 in landings at Leyte (October 1944) and the Lingayen Gulf (January 1945).

Returning to Washington at the end of the war, Wilkinson became a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff joint strategic survey committee. He drowned when his automobile accidentally plunged off the car ferry at Norfolk, Virginia, on February 21, 1946.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

Bougainville Campaign; Leyte Landings; New Georgia, Battle of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Vella Lavella, Battle of

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Willkie, Wendell Lewis (1892–1944)

U.S. industrialist and Republican politician. Born on February 18, 1892, in Elwood, Indiana, Wendell Lewis Willkie earned a law degree from Indiana University in 1916. After serving in the U.S. Army during World War I, he practiced law in Ohio and New York before he became president of the Commonwealth and Southern Utility Company. Willkie left the Democratic Party as a result of New Deal policies and joined the Republicans. As his party's nominee in the 1940 presidential race, he polled more than 22 million votes but lost to incumbent President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who garnered 27 million.

A supporter of Roosevelt's foreign policy, Willkie was offered but refused positions in the cabinet and the War Department. He played an active role, however, in pushing for passage of the Lend-Lease Act, even though most of the Republican Party leadership opposed it. In January 1941, Roosevelt sent Willkie to England on a fact-finding mission. The trip received significant press coverage and helped secure the bill's passage. Willkie also backed Roosevelt's efforts to extend the peacetime draft and repeal the Neutrality Act of 1935. In August 1942, Roosevelt sent Willkie as a special envoy on a 50-day trip to more than a dozen countries on three continents to confirm the U.S. commitment to defeat the Axis powers; the junket was a great success.

Willkie was in great demand as a speaker throughout 1943 and 1944, and his books, *One World* (1943) and *An American Program* (1944), were highly influential. Although popular, he was not among the leaders of the Republican Party and withdrew from the 1944 presidential primary. Willkie died of a massive heart attack in New York City on October 7, 1944.

T. JASON SODERSTRUM

See also

Lend-Lease; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Republican Party politician Wendell L. Willkie speaking to the press during his campaign for the presidency of the United States in 1940. (Ed Clark/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

Willoughby, Charles Adolphe (1892–1972)

U.S. Army general. Born in Heidelberg, Germany, on March 8, 1892, Charles Adolphe Willoughby was of disputed ancestry. He claimed he had a German aristocratic father and an American mother. Educated at the University of Heidelberg in Germany and the Sorbonne in Paris, he immigrated to the United States in 1910. That same year, he enlisted in the U.S. Army as Private Adolphe Weidenbach, rising to sergeant in 1913, and thereafter he enrolled as a senior at Gettysburg College, graduating the next year.

Originally commissioned in the reserves as a major, Willoughby relinquished that rank for a regular army commission as a second lieutenant in 1916, changing his name to Charles Willoughby. He served on the Mexican border and then in France. At the end of World War I, he was a pilot in the Army Air Service, but after the war, he returned to his original branch of infantry.

Willoughby then served successively on the Mexican border, in Puerto Rico, and as military attaché in Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. He graduated from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1929 and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1931. He also managed to find time to write a history of the Infantry School, a study of U.S. participation in World War I, and a biography of Simon Bolivar.

Willoughby met General Douglas MacArthur in the mid-1930s at Fort Leavenworth, and in 1940 the general arranged for his assignment to the Philippines. MacArthur appointed Willoughby as his chief of military intelligence in August 1941. When the Philippines fell to Japan in the spring of 1942, the two men escaped together to Australia. Willoughby remained with MacArthur throughout the war and was promoted to brigadier general and then to major general.

Historians have not been kind to Willoughby. One noted that a contemporary stated that he had "the best hindsight of any intelligence officer in the army." Many of his intelligence coups were based on the U.S. success in breaking the Japanese codes, and he had a habit of ignoring information that did not accord with his preconceived view of situations.

After the war, Willoughby remained with MacArthur in the occupation of Japan. He was much criticized for failing to provide warning of the June 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea, although he did apparently send reports to Washington regarding a possible North Korean invasion of South Korea in the spring of 1950. Certainly he grossly overestimated the ability of the South Korean forces and underestimated that of the North Koreans. He also misread the intentions of the Chinese regarding intervention in the Korean War and their initial military strength in North Korea.

Following MacArthur's recall in April 1951, Willoughby also retired from the military. He then became editor of the *Foreign Intelligence Digest* and wrote a laudatory study of MacArthur. Willoughby died in Naples, Florida, on October 26, 1972.

ROBERT BATEMAN AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

MacArthur, Douglas; Signals Intelligence; Southwest Pacific Theater

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Wilson, Henry Maitland (1881–1964)

British Army field marshal. Born in Stowlangtoft Hall, Suffolk, England, on September 5, 1881, Henry Maitland Wilson was educated both at Eton, where he acquired the nickname "Jumbo" for his impressive frame, and at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, where he was commissioned in 1901. He then saw military action in the South African War (Second Boer War, 1899–1902). Promoted to captain in April 1908, he was appointed adjutant of the Oxford University Officer Training Corps in October 1911. In October 1914, he was appointed brigade major of the 48th Infantry Brigade. Wilson served with his unit on the Western Front in World War I, winning the Distinguished Service Order.

In January 1919, Wilson was promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel and attended the Staff College, Camberley. Between 1920 and 1923, he was a company commander at Sandhurst. He next commanded a battalion of the Rifle Brigade in India. In 1930, Wilson was promoted to colonel and appointed a senior instructor at the Staff College. He then commanded the 6th Rifle Brigade. After being promoted to major general in 1935, Wilson went on half pay until August 1937, when he took command of the 2nd Division at Aldershot.

In June 1939, Wilson was promoted to lieutenant general and assigned to command the British Army of the Nile in Egypt. As such, he oversaw the 1940 campaign of Lieutenant General Richard O'Connor against Marshal Rodolfo Graziani's Italian forces in Egypt and Libya. Following the British victories against the Italians in Libya, Wilson became military governor of Cyrenaica in February 1941. The next month, however, he assumed command of the four-division Allied force sent to Greece. His skill in the delaying action and retreat that ensued did much to reduce losses and allowed the Royal Navy to extricate most of the expeditionary force.

In May 1941, General Archibald Wavell, commander in chief of British forces in the Middle East, appointed Wilson to command British troops in Palestine and Transjordan. With a two-division force, Wilson quelled a pro-German coup in Iraq that same month, and in June he launched a campaign against Vichy French forces in Syria. In July, he concluded the armistice that gave the Allies control of Syria and Lebanon.

Wilson then commanded the Persia-Iraq theater and the Ninth Army before succeeding General Harold Alexander as commander in chief, Middle East, in January 1943, conducting an operation against the Dodecanese Islands. In January 1944, Wilson replaced General Dwight D. Eisenhower as commander in chief of the Mediterranean theater and thus had overall responsibility for Allied operations in Italy. Wilson also helped plan the landing at Anzio (January 22, 1944) and Operation DRAGOON, the Allied landing in southern France (August 15, 1944).

After the death of General Sir John Dill in November, Wilson was promoted to field marshal in January and dispatched to Washington as head of the British Joint Staff Mission. In this capacity, he attended the final wartime conferences at Yalta (February 4–11, 1945) and Potsdam (July 17–August 2). Elevated to the peerage in 1946 as First Baron Wilson of Libya and Stowlangtoft, Wilson retired from the army in April 1947 and wrote his memoirs. He died in the Chilterns (Aylesbury), England, on December 31, 1964.

BRITTON W. MACDONALD AND SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Alexander, Sir Harold Rupert Leofric George; Anzio, Battle of; Cunningham, Sir Alan Gordon; Dill, Sir John Greer; Dodecanese Islands Campaign; DRAGOON, Operation; Greece Campaign, German; Greece Campaign, Italian; O'Connor, Richard Nugent; Potsdam Conference; Syria; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival; Yalta Conference

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Winant, John Gilbert (1889–1947)

U.S. Republican Party politician, federal government official, and ambassador to Great Britain (1941–1946). John Gilbert Winant was born on February 23, 1889, in New York City and graduated from Princeton University in 1912. After teaching school, in 1916 he was elected to the New Hampshire House of Representatives; the following year he enlisted in the military and saw action as a captain and pilot in France. In 1919, Winant returned to his former teaching position, and in 1920 he was elected to the New Hampshire Senate.

A progressive Republican who supported many of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal programs, Winant was the first person to serve more than one term as New Hampshire's governor—a testament to his popularity. In 1935, Roosevelt selected Winant to be the first administrator of the new Social Security Administration, a post he held until 1937. From 1939 until 1941, Winant headed the International Labor Office in Geneva.

In January 1941, Winant became U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, arguably the most important American diplomatic post overseas. Winant was immediately faced with distrust by many in Britain because of his predecessor's stormy and unpopular tenure. Indeed, Joseph P. Kennedy, who had resigned under great pressure in November 1940, had made numerous alarming and impolitic statements concerning Great Britain and World War II. Winant made it clear—from the start—that he disagreed vociferously with Kennedy's defeatism. Winant was soon embraced by Britons, including the royal family. Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill and Winant became close personal and political allies, and Winant helped facilitate the extraordinary wartime relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt. At the same time, Winant was engaged in a long affair with Sarah Churchill, the prime minister's second daughter.

Winant remained in London until 1946, at which time President Harry S. Truman appointed him to be America's representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Winant, however, had hoped to become secretary-general of the United Nations and remained on the job for only a few months before writing a book about his experiences titled *Letter from Grosvenor Square*. Exhausted and distraught over the abrupt end of his relationship with Sarah Churchill, Winant

committed suicide at his home in Concord, New Hampshire, on November 3, 1947.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Great Britain; Kennedy, Joseph Patrick, Sr.; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Wingate, Orde Charles (1903–1944)

British Army general. Born in Nainital, India, on February 26, 1903, Orde Charles Wingate was educated at Charterhouse School and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, from which he was commissioned in the Royal Artillery in 1923. In 1927 he was posted to Khartoum, where he served with the Sudan Defence Force until 1933.

In 1936, Wingate was sent to Palestine, then in the throes of the Arab Revolt. Despite his Arabist training and the pro-Arab sentiment of Palestine's British rulers, Captain Win-gate became a fanatical Zionist and by 1938 had secured official permission to organize the Special Night Squads, joint Anglo-Jewish units that conducted small-unit operations against Arab terrorists. In 1939, however, his extreme views led to his transfer back to England.

The following year, Wingate went to the Sudan to help organize the effort to drive the Italians from Ethiopia and restore Haile Selassie to his throne. The troops Wingate raised, the Gideon Force, ultimately played a key role in achieving success in ousting the Italians and restoring Haile Selassie, and he and the emperor entered Addis Ababa on May 4, 1941. But Wingate's outspokenness angered his superiors. Exhausted, ill with malaria, and probably suffering from depression, Wingate attempted suicide in June 1941.

In early 1942, Sir Archibald Wavell, who had high regard for Wingate's abilities, requested his transfer to the Far East. In India, Wingate raised the Chindits, an irregular force designed for operations in the enemy rear in Burma. The first Chindit operation, from February to April 1943, was conducted by a brigade-sized force. It achieved limited success but raised morale in a theater that had seen only Japanese victories to that point.

British Army general Orde Wingate, one of the most unorthodox British officers of modern times and a staunch proponent of guerrilla warfare. (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

Wingate, now a major general, secured the personal support of Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill for further operations. The second Chindit operation, conducted by three brigades and supported by an American air contingent ran from March to July 1944, but its results were also mixed, in part because of Wingate's untimely death in a plane crash on March 24, 1944, near Imphal in India.

GEORGE M. BROOKE III

See also

Burma Theater; Chindits; Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival

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Winkelman, Henri Gerard (1876–1952)

Netherlands Army general and commander of Dutch forces at the onset of World War II. Born at Maastricht, the Netherlands, on August 17, 1876, Henri Gerard Winkelman was appointed a cadet at the Royal Military Academy in 1892. In 1894, he joined the infantry in the Netherlands. Two years later, he was promoted to second lieutenant and assigned to the 4th Infantry Regiment. Between 1902 and 1905, he studied at the Advanced Military Academy.

In 1913 Winkelman was promoted to captain and in 1923 to major. From 1909 to 1913 and from 1917 to 1924, he served with the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. By 1931, he was chief of staff of the field army. That same year, Winkelman was promoted to major general and took command of the 4th Military Division.

In 1934 Winkelman retired, but with a German invasion impending and on the mobilization of Dutch forces, he was recalled into active service in 1939 and appointed commander of Dutch air defenses. On February 6, 1940, Winkelman was also made commander of the army and navy. On May 10, German forces invaded the Netherlands. It was clear that Dutch forces could not long resist, and with the departure of Queen Wilhelmina and her ministers to Britain, Winkelman became the highest authority on Dutch territory. The government empowered him to capitulate at what he judged to be the proper time. On May 15, Winkelman signed the instruments of surrender at Rijsoord. He then oversaw the demobilization of the Dutch Army.

In July 1940, Winkelman was deported to Germany as a prisoner of war, where he remained until the end of the war. On May 12, 1945, he returned to the Netherlands, and he formally retired from the army in October. In 1946, he served as a military councilor in the Special Court of Annulment. Winkelman died in Soesterberg, the Netherlands, on December 27, 1952.

KATHLEEN GASTON HITT

See also

Netherlands; Netherlands Campaign

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Winter War

See Finnish-Soviet War, First

Wisborg, Count of

See Bernadotte, Folke

Witzleben, Erwin von (1881–1944)

German field marshal. Born in Breslau, Silesia (now Wrocław, Poland), on December 4, 1881, Erwin von Witzleben joined the German Army in 1901 as a lieutenant. He spent much of World War I on the Western Front, where he was decorated for valor. After the war, he rose steadily in rank and responsibility.

When Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, Witzleben was named to command the Berlin Military Area. He was promoted to major general in

February 1934 and to lieutenant general that December. In 1935, he took command of III Corps. He was promoted to general of infantry in October 1936.

Witzleben became an opponent of Hitler as early as 1934 and an active conspirator in 1938 as a result of Hitler's purge of senior generals and threat of war against Czechoslovakia. Witzleben commanded Army Group C in the September 1939 Polish Campaign. Promoted to colonel general that November, he commanded the First Army in the 1940 Campaign for France. On July 19, 1940, Hitler promoted him to field marshal, and until March 1941, Witzleben commanded Army Group D. He then became oberbefehlshaber West (commander in chief, west) in France, but his attitude toward Hitler became known. In March 1942 Witzleben went on medical leave for an operation, and Hitler used this as an excuse to assign him to the Führer Reserve on March 21. Witzleben was never reassigned to an active position.

The bomb plot to assassinate Hitler was to be carried out on July 20, 1944, with Witzleben assuming the position of commander in chief of the armed forces thereafter. Witzleben dallied, however; when the plot failed, he was arrested and tried for treason by the Nazi People's Court. As the principal army officer among the accused, Witzleben was treated with special ridicule. Condemned to death on August 8, 1944, he was strangled with piano wire that same day.

ROBERT T. KACZOWKA

See also

Germany; Hitler, Adolf; July Bomb Plot

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Wöhler, Otto (1894–1987)

German Army general of infantry. Born on July 12, 1894, in Grossburgwedel, Germany, Otto Wöhler entered the army in January 1913. He served in World War I, ending the war as a staff officer. In 1938, he was sent to Vienna as a staff officer of the newly established 5th Army Group, commanded by Colonel General Wilhelm List.

In December 1939 Wöhler, then a colonel, was appointed chief of staff of XVII Corps. In early 1942, he was transferred to the Eleventh Army as chief of staff to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. In April 1942, Wöhler became chief of staff of Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Günther von Kluge.

Wöhler assumed command of a corps under General of Panzer Troops Werner Kempf in April 1943. That August, Manstein relieved Kempf and placed Wöhler in command of Armeeabteilung Kempf (Army Department Kempf), a group of divisions in the Ukraine that were later redesignated the Eighth Army of Army Group South. Charged with the defense of Kharkov, Wöhler cited shortages of artillery ammunition and overextended lines and pulled the Eighth Army out of Kharkov. On August 25, 1943, two divisions of the Eighth Army launched a successful counterattack against the Red Army, stabilizing the German lines.

On December 23, 1944, Wöhler replaced Colonel General Johannes Friessner as commander of Army Group South, giving him command over much of the Hungarian front. Wöhler's immediate concern was preventing the Soviet encirclement and capture of Budapest. He proposed defending the city from the west bank of the Danube River. Adolf Hitler overruled this plan and ordered Budapest held in its entirety. Wöhler was able to withdraw some of the Eighth Army before the city was encircled and eventually taken.

Wöhler commanded the last major German counteroffensive of the war, code-named FRÜHLINGSERWACHEN (AWAKENING SPRING) (March 6–16, 1945). This operation called for the Sixth Panzer Army to attack and push the Soviets away from the Nagykanizsa oil fields in Hungary. The assault was doomed because of inadequate supplies and overwhelming Soviet numbers. Soon after this failure, Wöhler was forced to retreat from Hungary into Austria, prompting Hitler to relieve him from command on April 7, 1945.

In 1948, Wöhler was tried by the American Military Tribunal for war crimes committed by his subordinates while he was chief of staff of the Eleventh Army. Found guilty, he was sentenced to eight years in prison but

was released in the autumn of 1951. Wöhler died in 1987 in Grossburgwedel, West Germany.

FRANK TOOMEY

See also

Budapest, Battle of; Kluge, Günther Adolf Ferdinand von; Manstein, Erich von

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Wolff, Karl Friedrich Otto (1900–1984)

German Schutzstaffel (SS) Obergruppenführer and Waffen-SS general. Born in Darmstadt, Germany, on May 13, 1900, Karl Friedrich Otto Wolff joined the army in 1917 during World War I. After the war, he formed his own advertising company but went bankrupt in 1931. That same year, he joined the Nazi Party and the SS. In June 1933, SS chief Heinrich Himmler appointed Wolff as his adjutant. Three years later, Wolff became chief of Himmler's personal staff, a position of immense influence, as he determined who had access to Himmler.

In the summer of 1939, Wolff began working at Adolf Hitler's headquarters as Himmler's representative. Wolff served as an intermediary between the SS and the state administration. Easing administrative friction caused by the Endlösung, or "Final Solution" (the Holocaust), was one of his primary tasks. Wolff secured transport to deport millions of Jews to the death camps.

On January 30, 1942, Wolff was promoted to SS-Obergruppenführer and general of the Waffen-SS but, isolated in Hitler's headquarters, he lost control of Himmler's entourage. In September 1943, he became the highest

SS and police official in Italy. In charge of fighting the Italian Resistance, he was therefore responsible for the massacres of civilians.

By early 1945, Wolff became convinced that the war was lost, and he made contact with the Allies. He signed a treaty of unconditional surrender at the Italian front on May 2, 1945, one week before the general capitulation. Arrested after the war and charged with minor crimes, he was sentenced to four years but spent only a week in prison. Recent scholarship has suggested that Allied intelligence personnel—particularly those from the United States—may have prevented Wolff from being indicted on major charges, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Wolff was working as a businessman in Köln (Cologne) when new evidence against him emerged. In 1962, he was arrested and charged with committing genocide. Found guilty in 1964, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison but released in 1971. Wolff died in Rosenheim, Bavaria, Germany, on July 15, 1984.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Himmler, Heinrich; Hitler, Adolf; Holocaust; Italy

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Wolf Pack Tactic

German submarine tactic involving coordinated attacks against Allied convoys. The Battle for the Atlantic hinged on the Allied ability to produce sufficient ship tonnage to move supplies and matériel to strategic points, whereas the Germans sought to sink as much of that tonnage in as short a time as possible. Early in the war, German U-boats operated mostly as lone raiders, partly because of the small numbers available for operations. To counter the U-boats, the Allies turned to convoys with armed escorts for

protection, causing the U-boats to focus on evasive tactics to survive rather than sinking merchant tonnage.

Rear Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander of the German submarine force, recognized that unless the U-boats could overcome the defenses of Allied merchant convoys, the tonnage war would inevitably be lost. His solution was a concept that came to be called *Rudeltaktik*, or wolf pack attack—a method for U-boats to penetrate a convoy's antisubmarine defenses and destroy the merchant ships. Once a U-boat located an Allied convoy, other submarines would be vectored to that location. Groups of U-boats would then attack on the surface at night at relatively high speeds, maximizing the effect. U-boats operated in a hit-and-run manner, launching their attack and then fleeing on the surface before the convoy's surface escorts could react.

Dönitz's intelligence staff also broke the British convoy codes and was able to supply specific information concerning departure and arrival schedules, escort strength, and weather reports from all ocean areas. Success in the intelligence war was critical in locating targets for U-boat concentrations.

By late 1942, Dönitz had more than 200 operational U-boats with which to implement wolf pack operations. Some Italian submarines also participated. A wolf pack generally consisted of 6 to 9 U-boats, but some utilized as many as 20 to 30. Wolf packs were identified with code names, such as Löwenherz (Lion Heart) or Streitaxt (Battle Axe), giving the submariners a sense of cohesion and collective focus for the operation. Each pack deployed into a concave patrol line with about 10 miles between each pack member.

Using darkness, the U-boats would operate on the surface to lessen the effectiveness of the Anti-Submarine Detection Investigating Committee of the British Naval Staff with asdic (early sonar), and the compact silhouette of the U-boat helped provide camouflage. The patrol line combed the Atlantic in an eastern or western direction while under control by radio from Dönitz's command post at Lorient, France.

When an individual submarine sighted a convoy, its crew would immediately radio the convoy's position and course to Dönitz's headquarters, which would then relay orders for the pack to concentrate the line on the projected course of the convoy. The U-boat that originally established contact would shadow the convoy at a safe distance and keep headquarters advised of

any change in the convoy's course. When at least three U-boats came in contact with the convoy, the attack began, and Dönitz turned immediate control of the battle over to the individual U-boat commanders.

The wolf pack had little opportunity to cooperate tactically, as Allied radio detection prohibited communications between individual boats. The multiboat attack would confuse and disrupt the escorts, however, thereby improving each boat's chance of gaining an effective position from which to launch an attack. The U-boats would fire a salvo of three or four torpedoes along several paths to increase the chances of a hit. Because the convoy formed a compact target, a single salvo might result in several hits on different ships within the formation. After their attacks, the U-boats submerged to escape counterattack.

Unless the convoy managed to elude the wolf pack by a radical change of course, the merchant ships might be hounded by the pack over several successive nights. The action would be broken off only when the U-boats had exhausted their torpedoes or the convoy reached a point where continuous air cover could be provided. These tactics resulted in the sinking of almost 400,000 tons of Allied shipping per month during late 1942, with a peak occurring in November, when 118 ships were sunk for a total of 743,321 tons.

Radio communications between the U-boats and Dönitz's headquarters, however, were the Achilles' heel of the wolf packs. The Allies introduced high-frequency direction-finding equipment in faster Allied escort vessels to drive away the shadowing U-boat, forcing it to submerge or destroying it with depth charges or air attack. Allied technical superiority, the use of long-range aircraft, and code breaking culminated in May 1943, when the Allies destroyed over 40 German submarines. "Black May" signaled the defeat of the wolf packs as the ratio of Allied tonnage produced to tonnage sunk by the U-boats tipped against the Germans.

During World War II, more than 130 wolf packs operated against Allied shipping, sinking more than 2,759 Allied merchant ships and 138 warships and killing almost 60,000 seamen. Of the 1,170 U-boats Dönitz employed throughout the war, 753 were lost, along with some 29,000 crewmen.

STEVEN J. RAUCH

See also

Antisubmarine Warfare; Atlantic, Battle of the; Convoys, Allied; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Signals Intelligence; Sonar; Submarines

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Women in World War II

In spite of a wealth of new scholarship on women and World War II, the contributions and experiences of women remain understudied and undervalued. Perhaps this reflects the fact that the number of women who enlisted during the war was relatively small in comparison to men, military historians (predominantly male) tend to focus on combat units, little attention has been given to the role of women on the home front or in resistance movements, and the inclination of many writers is to suggest that women who engaged directly in combat were so rare that their wartime experiences can be dismissed as peripheral.

Specialists in the field have argued against each of these trends, and as their work continues, we may yet reach a point when the contributions of women are consistently woven into accounts of every aspect of World War II. Until then, however, we are left primarily with overviews and with the knowledge that historians have a great deal more to do before women are accorded a balanced and proper place in accounts of World War II.

The best place to begin a summary of women's experiences during the war is on the home front, where women served as traditional guardians of the family and culture in every country and in a wide variety of nontraditional roles created in the crucible of war. In Allied countries, millions of women worked as volunteers for government agencies and distributed ration books, assisted with salvage projects, joined blood and scrap drives, planted victory gardens, served in the Civil Air Patrol, sold war bonds, or worked as air raid wardens and ambulance drivers. In the United States, many of the more than 36 million Americans who joined the Red Cross and the over 5 million who served as volunteers were women. The Red Cross employed 6,500 women in

the United States by 1945 and thousands more in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Women also played a key role in the United Service Organizations (USO), which operated over 3,000 clubs worldwide that catered to the social and entertainment needs of Allied soldiers. The USO included 1.5 million volunteers, most of whom were women, and more than 7,000 performers, who conducted 428,521 performances by 1947.

Alice McLean's American Women's Voluntary Services (AWVS) also served a vital support role, training 18,000 women to drive ambulances, give first aid, and set up field kitchens. Between 1940 and 1945, the AWVS carried out relief work at military bases and shoveled snow during winter months to free soldiers for training. Similar services were performed in Britain by the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institute (NAAFI) and the Entertainment National Service Association (ENSA), both of which included a high percentage of women workers and volunteers, and other organizations such as the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) and a wide array of religious groups.

In government, women conducted much of the official business and administrative details in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. They worked in such agencies as the U.S. Office of War Information, which produced propaganda and translated enemy broadcasts and publications.

The Allies also recruited women for industrial work. In Britain, where more than half the population served in the armed forces or in key war industries (5 million in uniform and 21 million in agriculture or manufacturing), women represented 38 percent of the workforce by 1945. More than 6 million women took jobs in war-related industries in the United States, and they proved especially adept at aircraft construction and welding. They were generally superior to men in repetitive skilled jobs such as riveting and parachute construction, and they were encouraged to work by government advertising campaigns that urged them to support their loved ones at the front by working at home for victory. In the Soviet Union, 1 million women worked in industrial jobs by December 1941, and before the war ended, they constituted 55 percent of the overall civilian workforce. By 1945, women constituted 92 percent of the agricultural workforce.

In most countries, women struggled with housing shortages, sexism, and

lower wages than men. Women in the United States suffered from a lack of any national service legislation that might have organized their wartime contributions at home and provided child care. Two-thirds of American men stayed at home during World War II—a great many of them working in war-related industries—and millions of women remained homemakers, but few men saw the need to help provide child care for the women the government was encouraging to take war-related jobs. Instead, many people criticized women who left their children at home while they worked and lambasted the decay of the traditional family under the exigencies of war.

In contrast, Great Britain passed a law in December 1941 that required unmarried young women to enlist in war work of some kind. The British proved much more adept at organizing women for war. At least 125,000 women were drafted and given a choice of service (which was denied to drafted men) in auxiliary units, civil defense, or the Women's Land Army (WLA), and eventually more than 470,000 women served in the armed forces or uniformed auxiliary units; another 80,000 joined the WLA and worked in agriculture to release men for war services between 1939 and 1945.

Efforts to recruit women were much weaker in Germany, Italy, and Japan, where more conservative cultures and racial ideology emphasized the importance of women as homemakers and the primary transmitters of culture. Still, large numbers of German, Italian, and Japanese women worked in war-related industries. Young single German girls had to work as nurses, on farms, or as domestics for terms ranging between 6 and 12 months. By the end of the war, 1.5 million German women had entered the workforce, along with another 1.5 million foreign women brought into Germany to toil in forced-labor camps. Efforts to mobilize women in Japan were delayed until the war was clearly being lost, but more than 1.5 million Japanese women took jobs outside the home by 1945.

Volunteers of the Women's Voluntary Service unload bags of salvaged goods at a sorting depot in the United Kingdom, November 25, 1941. (Evening Standard/Getty Images)

In occupied countries, women were less likely to be involved in industrial labor, but they were vulnerable to detention in labor, concentration, or death camps and exposed to sexual exploitation, in addition to food and housing shortages. Millions died during the Holocaust, and many women were raped by soldiers in China, the Soviet Union, Germany, and other countries as the fortunes of war changed. Thousands more were compelled by some occupying armies or by economic need to become prostitutes, and although accurate statistics are difficult to determine, it is known that the Japanese forced 200,000 *ianfu* (comfort women) from Korea, China, the Philippines, and Malaya to serve as prostitutes for their soldiers. Following the Allied invasion of Italy, for example, an estimated 42,000 prostitutes were working the streets of Naples in 1944, and almost all of them catered to soldiers.

It will never be known how many millions more were compelled by circumstance to sell themselves or become virtual concubines for their captors or liberators, but it is certain that those who lived in countries that changed hands were vulnerable to charges of treason. French women suspected of overfamiliarity with German forces had their heads shaved after

their liberation, and the Soviets called women suspected of collaboration "German bed straw" and sent them to the gulags.

Women in occupied countries and Great Britain were also subjected to blackouts and bombardment. Of the estimated 1.3 million civilian casualties of strategic bombing in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom during the war, more than half were women, a ratio that almost certainly holds true for the 15 million to 25 million Soviet and 20 million Chinese civilians who died as well. These figures reflect both the higher ratio of women in cities where the male population had been reduced by conscription and the danger faced by civilians generally. Significantly, more civilians died in Britain between 1939 and 1941 (approximately 45,000) than members of the British armed forces, and in countries that saw strategic bombing longer than Britain (Germany and Japan, in particular), civilians were killed in staggering numbers as the war progressed.

Beyond the home front, all the major combatants in World War II utilized female nurses, and all except Japan made use of uniformed women's auxiliaries to help support their war machines and to free men for combat. These units were typically distinguished by military branch and performed virtually all noncombatant roles, and most were patterned after those formed by the British in the early years of the war. Women eventually composed more than 10 percent of the British armed forces, a ratio over five times higher than that in the United States.

By 1943, the British were utilizing 7.75 million women in private industry or in the military. The Women's Voluntary Service for Civil Defense (WVS) enlisted more than 1 million women to help clear rubble, organize relief shelters, and fight fires, and more than 470,000 other women served as nurses, while 2 million worked in munitions; some 400,000 served full- or part-time in the Home Guard or the Royal Observer Corps. More than 207,000 women in the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) supported the British Army, including 57,000 who served in the Anti-Aircraft Command as spotters, searchlight operators, and radar technicians. In the Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA), women pilots from all over the Commonwealth and the world ferried aircraft between bases and from factories to the front; 15 of them died in the line of duty.

In Canada, 45,000 women served in the Women's Division of the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Canadian Women's Army, or the Women's Royal

Canadian Naval Service. Similarly in Australia, 64,833 women served in various military auxiliaries.

Even occupied countries with governments-in-exile followed the British example, as in the case of Poland. The Poles formed the Pomocnicza Lotnicza Służba Kobiet (Auxiliary Air Force, PLSK) in 1942, and as many as 1,653 officers and enlisted women joined up to support Polish Air Force units in the field by performing noncombatant office, supply, and repair duties.

Women in the United States responded in similar fashion, forming the Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES), the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs), the Women's Army Corps (WAC), the women's Coast Guard arm known as the SPARS (from the Coast Guard motto "Semper Paratus," or "always ready"), and the Women Marines. The WAVES organization was formed in 1942 as part of the U.S. Naval Reserve and trained women for a wide array of technical and support specialties. At its height, the WAVES numbered 8,000 officers and 76,000 enlisted women, most of whom were stationed in the continental United States—equivalent to the manpower of an entire carrier task force. The WASPs were formed in 1943 by combining the Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS) and the Women's Flying Training Detachment (WFTS). They served with, but not as a part of, the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF).

WASP pilots ferried military aircraft from factories to bases and filled aviation support roles stateside. The number of WASPs eventually peaked at 1,074, but despite an outstanding record that included 12,650 ferrying missions in 27 different types of aircraft, they were disbanded late in 1944 because of protests from Congress and from male pilots who feared competition with women during and after the war.

In contrast to the WASPs, the WAC (which began as the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps) existed from 1942 to 1978 and served during World War II as a separate corps of women that performed all levels of support work for the army, including military intelligence and air-traffic control. WACs were eventually stationed at more than 225 bases worldwide, and 150,000 of them (including 6,500 African Americans) served in every theater of the war by 1945. These were the first American military women to formally serve apart from nurses, and they amassed 3 Air Medals, 16 Purple Hearts, 10 Soldiers' Medals, and 565 Bronze Stars.

More than 32,000 WACs served with the AAF in 200 enlisted and 60

officer specialties; 7,530 WACs were deployed to Europe, and 5,500 went to the Southwest Pacific. Their record of success led U.S. Army leaders to ask Congress to make the WAC permanent in 1946. Women's units were rounded out by the SPARs, which enlisted almost 11,000 women to help free men for sea duty with the Coast Guard, and the Women Marines, the last women's reserve unit formed by the U.S. armed forces.

U.S. Marine Corps commandant Thomas Holcomb opposed enlisting women for a long time, but when he relented, he insisted on giving them the title "Women Marines" and making them a regular part of the corps. By 1945, 800 officers and 14,000 enlisted Women Marines were in uniform, and their service freed enough men from support duty to form the 5th Marine Division. All told, more than 350,000 U.S. women served in uniform, including over 74,000 army and navy nurses, a handful of whom were captured by the Japanese and became prisoners of war.

Four American women pilots, graduates of the four-engine school at Lockbourne Field, Ohio, walking past a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress in 1944. The Women's Air Force Service Pilots (WASP) division was a noncombat organization but performed a vital wartime function in the transport of aircraft. (U.S. Air Force)

Neither Germany nor Japan utilized auxiliaries or military women to the same extent as the Allies, but a number of women and organizations still played an important part in the war. In Germany, Hanna Reitsch flew helicopters, gliders, an experimental version of the V-1 rocket, the Me-163 Komet rocket plane, and bombers as a test pilot for the Luftwaffe; in addition, she landed a light plane in the streets of Berlin during a mission to Adolf Hitler's underground bunker during the final days of the war. Melitta Schenk von Stauffenberg also flew as a test pilot and won the Iron Cross Second Class and the Gold Pilot badge before being shot down by a U.S. fighter in April 1945. The largest number of German women (100,000) served in Luftwaffe flak (antiaircraft) units from 1944 onward, and a handful joined SS units and guarded women at concentration and death camps. A small number of those guards were executed after the war. In Japan, the most important mobilization of women was conducted by the Greater Japan's Women's Association, which trained volunteers for civil defense and military training.

Although most countries took steps to limit the participation of women in combat, the Soviet Union (as in World War I) broke with broad cultural convention by placing them in or near the front lines. More than 800,000 women served in the Soviet Army, including approximately 400,000 in the Air Defense Forces and another 400,000 in ground units. Air Defense women began in traditional support roles, and eventually a small number served in combat with both single-sex and integrated units by 1945.

Women manned thousands of antiaircraft batteries, completely replaced men in barrage balloon units, and manned searchlights throughout the war. On the ground, women served in tank and artillery crews, as mechanics and cooks, and in medical or headquarters units on all fronts. The most famous women were those who fought as snipers or as fighter and light bomber pilots, including Lidiya V. Litviak, who racked up 11 individual kills, 3 group kills, and 1 balloon kill prior to being shot down in August 1943. The first female ace in history, she fought with integrated units.

Among Soviet women snipers, the most famous was Lyudmila Mikhailovna Pavlichenko, who is credited with 309 kills; wounded four times, she became the first Soviet citizen to visit the White House. She eventually visited 43 U.S. cities as well as Britain and Canada, then returned home and became a master sniper instructor and trained 80 snipers who were

collectively credited with killing more than 2,000 Germans. Her expertise encouraged the Soviets to form the Central Women's School for Sniper Training in 1943, and by the end of the war, 1,885 snipers had graduated and claimed 11,280 German kills. Pavlichenko was ultimately named a Hero of the Soviet Union, an honor shared by 94 other Soviet women who fought during World War II.

Alongside the Soviets, liberated or exiled Poles formed the Emilia Plater Independent Women's Battalion in 1943, and between 8,000 and 14,000 women fought with Polish armies under Soviet command.

Although the Western powers were unwilling to follow the Soviet example, they did enlist women for espionage operations. The most important of these missions were conducted by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). At least 50 women were dropped into occupied France to work with Resistance forces, and others worked with intelligence agencies such as the British MI-6. One of the most legendary was the American Amy Thorpe, who worked for both MI-6 and the OSS. Among other activities, she secured both Italian naval and Vichy French ciphers, leading the MI-6 chief of station in Washington to say she had saved at least 100,000 lives.

Thorpe survived the war, but a number of OSS and SOE women did not, including Noor Inayat Khan, an SOE operative killed in 1944 at Dachau, who was posthumously awarded the British George Cross and the Croix de Guerre with Gold Star. Other famous female operatives include Virginia Hall and Jeanette Guyot, who received Distinguished Service Crosses for their work with the OSS, and Violette Szabo, an SOE operative who was arrested in France and executed by the Germans on February 5, 1945. She was posthumously awarded the Croix de Guerre and the George Cross.

Women also fought behind the lines as members of the resistance in occupied countries. Women composed 12 to 20 percent of the French Resistance; many performed support work by decoding messages, serving as couriers, and operating Resistance newspapers. Others fought directly against the Germans, utilizing assassination, bombing, and sabotage to support the Allied war effort. As in most cultures, their ability to fight was limited by men, though communist cells often gave women more latitude to engage in direct combat. Famed female Resistance fighters include Lucie Samuel, who was awarded the Croix de Guerre; Marie-Madeleine Fourcade, who led a

Resistance network of more than 3,000 people; and Georgette “Claude” Gerard, who led more than 5,000 men and women in the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior, FFI), better known as the Maquis. The number of women who served in the Resistance is difficult to determine with any precision, but the French government did recognize more than 200,000 women after the war for their service.

In Poland, Resistance leaders formed the Armia Krajowa (Home Army), and one-seventh of its members were women. They served as couriers and medics and in some specialized units, including one designed for fighting in the Warsaw sewers during the uprising of 1944. Women also served in the resistance forces of all other occupied countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. More than 20 percent of the 150,000 people in Allied intelligence networks in Western Europe were women, and they helped rescue 5,000 Allied airmen and 1,600 other soldiers. Women were especially valuable in this role because couples were far less suspicious when traveling than men walking alone. These women also assisted with the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion, and they paid a high price when they were captured. Between 200 and 300 French women are known to have been executed by the Germans, and 8,500 were sent to the infamous female concentration camp at Ravensbrück. Only 400 survived.

In the Soviet Union, an estimated 200,000 women fought with the partisans, and in Italy, 35,000 women (one-third of the Resistance) fought against the Germans in support roles or in small squads. Some were members of the all-female Novella Albertazzi, and by the end of the war, 5,000 women had been imprisoned by the Germans; 3,000 were deported to Germany, and at least 650 died in combat or were executed.

Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, RSI) also recruited women support units. In the Balkans, women fought with the Greek Resistance in large numbers, and about 100,000 served with the Yugoslav National Liberation Army under Josip Broz (Tito). They trained and fought in integrated units, and the death rate for women was 25 percent, twice that of the men.

This litany of sacrifice and service is hardly complete, for it omits the thousands of women who were taken prisoner by the Japanese when Singapore fell and the thousands more who experienced some aspect of the war in Africa, the Middle East, Burma, and Indonesia. It also neglects the

handful of women captured when Japanese forces seized or sank civilian ships in the opening days of the war and the women on Soviet and Scandinavian merchant ships who helped fight the Battle of the Atlantic. These and other women remain largely unknown to history, and until their stories are told, our knowledge of World War II will remain incomplete.

What we can determine at this juncture is that virtually all women who served in the war were demobilized in 1945 and encouraged to go home. They had confounded social and military expectations of the prewar years, which made no allowances for the importance of women to national war efforts, and in many ways, their societies were ungrateful for their service. France (in 1944) and Italy (in 1946) extended suffrage to women as a reward for their sacrifices, but other gains were few and far between. Most men and many women wanted to return to traditional roles, and in the rush toward peace, many valiant women were slighted. They were not eligible for the Victoria Cross, were banned from some Italian Resistance group parades, and were denied admittance into the American Veterans of Foreign Wars. Some women found their wartime experiences such a social liability that they hid them for the rest of their lives, much to the dismay of historians.

We are left today with the discomfiting knowledge that male-dominated political systems created World War II and that the vital contributions of women during the war were forgotten by most men afterward. Although much has improved over recent decades in terms of our knowledge and our appreciation, much work remains to be done. After all, the victors of the war were those countries that most successfully mobilized their women.

LANCE JANDA

See also

Cochran, Jacqueline; Emilia Plater Independent Women's Battalion; Fourcade, Marie-Madeleine Bridou; France; Germany; Great Britain, Women's Auxiliary Air Force; Great Britain, Women's Land Army; Great Britain, Women's Royal Naval Service; Greece; Grizodubova, Valentina Stepanovna; Hobby, Oveta Culp; Holcomb, Thomas; Italy; Japan; Litviak, Lidiia Vladimirovna; Office of Strategic Services; Partisans/Guerrillas; Raskova, Marina Mikhailovna; Reitsch, Hanna; Resistance; Signals Intelligence; Soviet Union; Soviet Women's Combat Wings; Special Operations Executive; Szabo, Violette Bushnell; Tito; United States;

United States Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service; United States Women's Air Force Service Pilots; United States Women's Army Corps; United States Women's Land Army; Document 151; Document 152; Document 178

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Women's Land Army

See United States Women's Land Army

Wood, Edward Frederick Lindley (1881–1959)

British statesman. Born at Powderham Castle, Devonshire, England, on April 16, 1881, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood graduated from Oxford University in 1903 and entered Parliament in 1910. His career was undistinguished until 1925, when he was appointed viceroy of India and given the title Baron Irwin. Convinced that India must eventually have Dominion status, Irwin was also determined to maintain civil order. His conversations with Indian nationalists offended much of British opinion, and his forceful administration alienated most Indians. In 1931, he returned to England.

Irwin became Viscount Halifax in 1934, and for five months in 1935 he served as British secretary for war. On Anthony Eden's resignation in February 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appointed Halifax foreign secretary. By then, Halifax had ample opportunity to observe Britain's military weakness, and a semiofficial visit to Germany in late 1937 exposed him to that country's military and territorial aspirations. He believed,

however, that Adolf Hitler's regime would negotiate sincerely, if aggressively, and that, in any event, British and French obstruction of German aims in Central Europe was impracticable.

Halifax's willingness to appease German demands weakened after Germany occupied the Czechoslovak rump state in March 1939. His readiness to guarantee Polish sovereignty and support British rearmament exempted him from much of the condemnation that later fell on Chamberlain. Some, including King George VI, preferred Halifax above Winston L. S. Churchill to succeed Chamberlain as prime minister in May 1940, a prospect that horrified Halifax himself. He remained foreign secretary until December 1940, when Churchill persuaded him to become the British ambassador to the United States.

In Washington, strong isolationism confronted Halifax until the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite Halifax's friendships with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and members of Roosevelt's circle, his ambassadorial role was eclipsed by the far more powerful relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill. Serving until May 1946, Halifax participated in the conferences that established the United Nations, and he worked alongside John Maynard Keynes to negotiate a U.S. loan to Britain after the Lend-Lease program ceased in 1945.

In retirement, Halifax, a devout Anglo-Catholic, dedicated himself to his lifelong avocations of church work, scholarship, hunting, and estate management. He died at Garrowby, Yorkshire, England, on December 23, 1959.

JOHN A. HUTCHESON JR.

See also

Chamberlain, Arthur Neville; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Eden, Sir Robert Anthony; Document 43

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X

Xi’an Incident (December 12, 1936)

Coup d’état staged by two Chinese Nationalist (Guomindang, GMD) generals against their leader, resulting in united war resistance against Japan. The undeclared Sino-Japanese War began after the Mukden (Shenyang) Incident of September 1931 in Liaoning, one of the three northeastern provinces that comprised Manchuria; the other two were Jilin (Kirin) and Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang). Preoccupied with exterminating the Chinese Communists in order to consolidate his rule over the whole country, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek), the president of China, devised the policy of “internal pacification before resistance against external aggression,” which frustrated many Nationalist Chinese, including some of his military generals.

By the end of 1935, Jiang’s lack of resistance enabled the Japanese to occupy Manchuria and Rehe (Jehol), an old province made up of parts of today’s northeast Hebei (Hopeh), southwest Liaoning, and southeast Inner Mongolia. The Japanese were about to advance into Chaha’er (Chahar, an old province west of Rehe comprising the northern part of today’s Hebei) and Suiyuan (a defunct province west of Chaha’er comprising the central part of current Inner Mongolia). Under steadily mounting pressure, Jiang stubbornly refused to declare war on Japan. This stance led some leaders to conclude that coercion was the only way to force him to reverse his stance, precipitating the Xi’an (Sian) Incident of December 1936 in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province.

On December 4, 1936, Jiang flew to Xi’an to discuss with Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang) and Yang Hucheng (Yang Hu-ch’eng), commanders of the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies, respectively, the last “extermination campaign” against the Chinese Communists, who had settled in Yan’an (Yenan), north of Xi’an, a year earlier after the 1934–1935 Long March. Zhang seized this opportunity to try to persuade Jiang to cooperate with the Chinese Communists in a united front against the Japanese. Unable to convince Jiang, Zhang and Yang decided to stage a coup.

In the early morning of December 12, Zhang marched his army to Lintong (Lin-t'ung), west of Xi'an, where Jiang's villa was located, and kidnapped Jiang, while Yang seized all Jiang's establishments and personnel in Xi'an.

Zhang took Jiang back to Xi'an, where he was held in detention, then invited the Chinese Communists to visit to negotiate for a united front against the Japanese. The Chinese Communist delegation included Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), Li Kenong (Li K'o-nung), and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying). Madam Jiang Soong Meiling traveled from Nanjing (Nanking), Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, to represent her husband in negotiations with Zhou. Their discussion was based on Zhang's proposal for ending the civil war and forming a united front to resist the Japanese invasion, to which Jiang finally gave his verbal agreement on Christmas Eve. On December 25 Jiang was released, and he flew back to Nanjing, immediately beginning work on a united front for the forthcoming Sino-Japanese War.

Zhang, who accompanied Jiang back to Nanjing, was arrested by Jiang's agents, tried on charges of insubordination, and sentenced by a military court to a 10-year prison term. On January 4, 1937, Jiang granted him amnesty and placed him under the National Military Council's close surveillance, a face-saving measure. The next day, Jiang relieved Yang all of his military posts and still held him in detention at year's end. The sacrifice of the individuals involved in the coup was widely appreciated as a pivotal point in the bitter anti-Japanese resistance effort of the Chinese.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

Jiang Jieshi; Li Kenong; Sino-Japanese War; Yang Hucheng; Ye Jianying; Zhang Xueliang; Zhou Enlai

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Xu Xiangqian (1901–1990)

Chinese Communist general. Born in Wutai (Wut'ai), Shanxi (Shansi) Province, China, on November 8, 1901, Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsung-ch'ien) became a teacher. He went to Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, in 1924, where he joined the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—and enrolled at the newly opened Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy, commanded by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). After graduation in 1925, Xu took part in the First Eastern Expedition against Guangdong warlord Chen Jiongming (Ch'en Chiung-ming) and was sent to Henan (Honan) as a political worker in the GMD's National Revolutionary Army as a result of an agreement between the GMD and warlord Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yü-hsiang). Xu campaigned in several northern China provinces against warlords Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin) and Yan Xishan (Yen Hsi-shan). Because of illness, Xu joined the Northern Expedition belatedly in the fall of 1926; he soon became an instructor at the Central Political and Military Academy. There, he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

After the split between the GMD and the CCP (1927), the party assigned Xu to work in the labor movement in Quangzhou. When the Quangzhou Commune was destroyed and driven from the city, Xu was among those who created the ill-fated 4th Division of the Red Army, which was annihilated in the GMD assault on the Hailufeng (Hai-lu-feng) soviet in early 1928. Xu fled to Shanghai and then to a Communist guerrilla base in Hubei. He was one of the earliest Communist military men to arrive at the base, which was soon to grow into the Eyuwan (O-yü-wan) soviet along the borders of Hubei, Henan, and Anhui (Anhwei) Provinces and came to be second only to the base formed by Zhu De (Chu Te) and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) in Jiangxi (Kiangsi).

In the face of Jiang's "extermination campaigns," Xu's Fourth Front Red Army reeled across western China until it arrived in north Shaanxi (Shensi) in mid-1937, just before the Sino-Japanese War began. The Communists immediately reorganized its units into the Eighth Route Army. In the spring of 1938, Xu advanced into south Hebei (Hopeh), where he established contact with Communist guerrillas and opened communications with anti-Japanese forces in Shandong (Shantung). The following year, Xu was sent

into Shandong to coordinate the activities of several guerrilla units, which became known as the First Column.

Because of poor health, Xu left the front lines in 1941 and for the next year was without an assignment. From 1942 to 1946, he was in Yan'an (Yenan) in Shaanxi as a deputy commander. He is also reported to have been president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy in 1945.

During the Chinese Civil War, Xu led Communist forces in combat against GMD troops in Shanxi. As commander of the First Army Group of the North China Military Region, he scored a notable victory at Taiyuan over the forces of General Yan Xishan and several thousand Japanese "volunteers." Chronic ill health sidelined him again for the next several years, but during the 1950s and 1960s he reemerged as a prominent political figure and was named among the 10 marshals of the People's Republic in 1955. Xu retired in 1985 and died in Beijing on September 21, 1990.

ERROL MACGREGOR CLAUSS

See also

China, Army; Feng Yuxiang; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Sino-Japanese War

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Y

Yahara Hiromichi (1902–1981)

Japanese Army colonel. Born in Tottori Prefecture, Japan, on October 2, 1902, Yahara Hiromichi graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1923 and was commissioned in the infantry. Six years later, he graduated from the Army War College. Yahara served in the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry twice: from 1930 to 1933 and from 1935 to 1937. He was a resident officer in the United States between 1933 and 1935 and was three times an instructor at the Japanese War College: in 1937, from 1938 to 1940, and again from 1942 to 1944.

Unlike many Japanese Army officers, Yahara had the reputation of being realistic in his appraisals. During the 1937–1945 Second Sino-Japanese War, he served on the staff of the newly established Second Army Headquarters and then in the Fifth Army Headquarters. Yahara was engaged in offensive operations in northern and central China between 1937 and 1938. Assigned to Supreme Headquarters in Tokyo, he secretly traveled in Thailand and Malaya to gather military intelligence. He then served successively in the Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters in Tokyo, was assistant attaché in Thailand, and served on the staff in Fifteenth Army Headquarters in 1941.

At the beginning of the Pacific war, Yahara was engaged in operations to seize Burma during 1941 and 1942. From 1942 to 1944, he taught at the War College. Promoted to colonel in 1943, he was appointed to the staff of the Thirty-Second Army on Okinawa in 1944. Yahara carefully planned a protracted defensive strategy for the island to secure time for the Japanese to prepare the home islands for invasion. His plan of operations was duly approved by the headquarters of the Tenth Area Army on Taiwan, which had overall control of Okinawa. It was also approved by the commander of the Thirty-Second Army on Okinawa, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, and by his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Cho Isamu.

Soon after U.S. forces landed on Okinawa on April 1, 1945, however, certain elements of the Supreme Army Headquarters, the Tenth Area Army, the Eighth Air Division (kamikazes), and the Grand Fleet all urged that the Thirty-Second Army mount a general offensive and retake airfields lost to the Americans. In spite of Yahara's objections, Ushijima then ordered costly counterattacks, which were unsuccessful and had the effect of accelerating the Japanese defeat. Although pockets of resistance remained, the Americans declared Okinawa secure on June 21. It seems certain that the defense of Okinawa would have lasted longer had Yahara's plan of defending and making the Americans pay for every bit of ground been followed.

Yahara was taken prisoner during the Okinawa engagement, and after the war, he published an account of the battle. He also entered private business. Yahara died in Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, on May 7, 1981.

NAKAYAMA TAKASHI

See also

Okinawa, Invasion of; Ushijima Mitsuru

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Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945)

In January 1944, the Allied powers' European Advisory Commission on Germany began meeting in London. It was decided that Germany's postwar government would be an Allied control council in Berlin, composed of commanders of the occupying forces of the various powers. But the commission members needed clarification from the Allied leaders on other matters. Between August and October 1944, delegates at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington worked to draft proposals for a postwar United Nations international organization. They too needed to decide several issues. To resolve these and other matters, a second and last meeting of the Big Three—British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill, U.S. president

Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin—and their staffs (some 700 people in all) occurred from February 4 to 11, 1945, in the Soviet Union at Yalta in the Crimea.

The meeting at Yalta (code-named Argonaut) was less significant than either its detractors or supporters have alleged. Many of the decisions confirmed there had already been taken during the earlier 1943 Tehran Conference and other meetings. At the time, its outcome generated considerable satisfaction. Only with the developing Cold War during the late 1940s and the realization that Soviet help had not been necessary in the Pacific war did Yalta became such a fractious issue in U.S. politics, with Republican Party leaders charging that there had been a Democratic Party "giveaway" to the communists.

The bargaining position of the Western leaders had not appreciably improved since the Tehran Conference. Indeed, they had just suffered the humiliation of the initial German successes in the December 16, 1944–January 25, 1945, Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge). The Red Army, by contrast, had smashed German Army Group Center and was then only 50 miles from Berlin.

Another factor at Yalta was Roosevelt's determination to draw Stalin "out of his shell" and bring the Soviet Union into postwar cooperation with the Western powers. Convinced that Stalin was "getatable," Roosevelt continued the conciliatory tactical approach he had employed at the Tehran Conference by making every effort to accommodate the Soviet leader. It did not enhance the Western bargaining position when Roosevelt announced that U.S. troops were unlikely to remain long in Europe. He also continued his practice of distancing himself from Churchill, most notably on colonial issues. Another factor at work was that Roosevelt and the United States had chosen to seek the speediest possible conclusion to the war with the least expenditure of American lives rather than wage the war for certain geopolitical objectives, as Churchill had preferred.

Stalin, however, knew exactly what he wanted. After World War I, the Western Allies had sought to construct a cordon sanitaire (protective barrier) to contain Bolshevism. Stalin's goal was now the reverse—he wanted a belt of East European satellite states to exclude the West. This arrangement was to provide security against another German invasion; insulate the Soviet orbit from Western political, economic, and cultural influences; and protect a

severely wounded Soviet Union, which had suffered the deaths of as many as 27 million citizens and terrible material losses.

Roosevelt secured Soviet agreement to the Declaration on Liberated Europe. The leaders pledged that the provisional governments of liberated areas would be "representative of all democratic elements" and that there would be "free elections … responsive to the will of the people." But events would prove that such lofty phrases were subject to completely different interpretations.

In discussions on Germany, the Big Three agreed to government by an Allied control council. German occupation zones were also set, and at the suggestion of the Western leaders, France was allowed a zone, although Stalin insisted that it be carved from territory already assigned to Britain and the United States. The three leaders also agreed on steps to demilitarize Germany, dissolve the National Socialist Party, and punish war criminals. Further, in what would later be regarded as a controversial decision, they agreed that all nationals accused of being "deserters or traitors" were to be returned to their countries of origin.

The Soviets insisted on exacting heavy reparations from Germany for damages inflicted by that nation on the Soviet Union. The Western Allies, remembering the trouble caused by reparations after World War I and fearful that they would be subsidizing Soviet exactions, refused to set a specific amount but tentatively agreed to discuss the sum of $20 billion. The Soviet Union was to receive half of any reparations.

Particularly important to Roosevelt was the establishment of a postwar United Nations organization. Well aware of this and not greatly interested in the organization himself, Stalin used it to secure concessions on other matters. The Big Three adopted recommendations from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference that the United Nations be organized on the lines of the old League of Nations, complete with the General Assembly, Security Council, and Secretariat. The Big Three also set the composition of the Security Council. Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet Union might have three votes in the General Assembly. The most difficult matter to resolve was that of the veto in the Security Council. This became an issue in U.S. politics later, when the Soviet Union exercised that privilege so liberally. The U.S. Senate would not have approved American participation without the veto provision, however.

British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill (left), U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (center), and Soviet premier Josef Stalin (right) at the Yalta Conference during February 4–11, 1945. (National Archives)

The disposition of Poland was an especially vexing matter for the Western leaders, but the Red Army already occupied the country. Regarding boundaries, Stalin demanded and succeeded in establishing the Curzon Line, with slight modifications, as Poland's eastern border. The Allies were more strenuous in objecting to the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's western boundary, and there was no agreement on this matter at Yalta. Regarding the Polish government, Moscow only a month before Yalta had recognized the Lublin Poles as the official government of Poland. Stalin agreed to broaden this puppet government on a "democratic basis," and he pledged to hold "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." The Western Allies secured the same concessions for Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Perhaps the most controversial decisions taken at Yalta concerned the Far East. These decisions were kept secret from China. Stalin had already made it clear that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan sometime after the defeat of Germany. This matter was, in fact, never in doubt. The problem lay in the timing. Here, Stalin was in the same position enjoyed by the Allies before the invasion of northern France. Tardy Soviet entry into the Pacific

war might mean heavy U.S. casualties in an invasion of the Japanese home islands. No one knew whether the atomic bomb would work and, even if it did, whether it would be decisive in bringing about Japan's defeat.

Stalin pledged to enter the war against Japan "two or three months" after the defeat of Germany. In return, the Soviet Union would receive South Sakhalin Island, concessions in the port of Dairen, the return of Port Arthur as a naval base, control over railroads leading to these ports, and the Kurile Islands (which had never been Russian territory). Outer Mongolia would continue to be independent of China, but China would regain sovereignty over Manchuria. In effect, these concessions would replace Japanese imperialism with that of the Soviet Union, but the Western leaders believed they were necessary to secure the timing of the Soviet entry into the Pacific war. In future years, what Americans disliked most about Yalta was that these concessions turned out to be unnecessary.

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See also

Ardennes Offensive; Churchill, Sir Winston L. S.; Dumbarton Oaks Conference; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Stalin, Joseph; Tehran Conference; Document 210

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Yamada Otozō (1881–1965)

Japanese Army general. Born in Nagano Prefecture, Japan, on November 6, 1881, Yamada Otozō graduated from the Japanese Military Academy as a cavalry officer in 1902. In 1904, he participated in the Russo-Japanese War. He graduated from the Military Staff College in 1912 and then served on the army General Staff. From 1914 to 1922, he was an instructor at the Cavalry Command. Between 1922 and 1926 Yamada commanded a cavalry regiment, and he was promoted to colonel in 1925. From 1926 to 1927, he was chief of staff of Japanese forces in Korea.

Yamada commanded the 4th Cavalry Brigade between 1931 and 1935. He was promoted to major general in 1934. He was then chief of the Third Department and chief of the General Affairs of the army General Staff. In 1935, Yamada also became a director of the Military Staff College. In 1937, he took command of the 12th Division in Manchuria. A year later he was appointed to command the Third Army and then the Central China Area Army during the 1937–1945 Second Sino-Japanese War. In 1939, he became director of the Education Department of the War Ministry; he was promoted to full general the following year.

In July 1944, Yamada assumed command of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manchuria. As the American offensive in the Pacific placed Japan under increasing pressure, the Guandong Army lost 20 ground divisions and 2 air divisions, all transferred to the Pacific theater and the Japanese home islands between February 1944 and March 1945. Yamada recruited 75,000 Japanese civilians living in Manchuria to supplement his military forces, but their training and equipment were both deficient.

Following the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9, 1945, Yamada surrendered his forces on the order of the Japanese government. The Soviets did not accept a cease-fire until September 5, however. Before the cease-fire, about 60,000 Japanese had been killed in combat, and 185,000 Japanese were killed or died in Manchuria after the cease-fire. Arrested by the Soviets after his surrender, Yamada was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment at hard labor. He was released in 1956. Yamada died in Tokyo on July 18, 1965.

ASAKAWA MICHIO

See also
Guandong Army; Manchuria Campaign

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Yamaguchi Tamon (1892–1942)

Japanese vice admiral. Born in Shimane Prefecture, Japan, on August 17, 1892, Yamaguchi Tamon graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1912. Trained as a torpedo officer, he was promoted to senior lieutenant in 1918. He was then assigned to assist in the effort to return to Japan the submarines that formed part of the German reparations in 1919.

Yamaguchi attended Princeton University in the United States between 1921 and 1923 and then graduated from the Naval Staff College in 1924. He next served on the Naval General Staff. Promoted to commander in 1928, he was a member of the Japanese delegation to the 1929–1930 London Naval Disarmament Conference.

Yamaguchi was promoted to captain in 1932 and served as naval attaché in the United States between 1934 and 1937. Thereafter, he commanded the battleship *Ise* and the First Combined Air Fleet in China, engaged in air operations over China. Promoted to rear admiral in 1940, Yamaguchi assumed command of Carrier Division 2, composed of the aircraft carriers *Hiryū* and *Sōryū*. A close confidant of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Yamaguchi was an outspoken supporter of Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) and, later, his plan to confront American naval forces at Midway (June 3–6, 1942).

Yamaguchi and the cautious Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi were often at odds. During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Yamaguchi urged Nagumo to make follow-up strikes on Pearl Harbor facilities and to destroy the U.S. carriers absent on December 7, 1941, but Nagumo refused. In early 1942, Yamaguchi took part in actions against the British in the Indian Ocean.

Yamaguchi and his carriers next participated in the Battle of Midway. Again, he and Nagumo disagreed on tactics. Yamaguchi stressed the necessity for the Japanese to strike first, and on the sighting of the U.S. carriers, he urged that the Japanese launch an immediate dive-bomber attack without the torpedo bombers, but Nagumo refused. Nagumo's decisions left his carriers vulnerable, and three of the four were sunk by U.S. Navy dive-bombers. With his own carrier *Akagi* sinking, Nagumo transferred command of air operations to Yamaguchi.

Yamaguchi launched attacks against what he thought were two different U.S. carriers; actually, there was only one, the *Yorktown*. Although Yamaguchi lost 24 aircraft, his attacking planes badly damaged the *Yorktown*, and it was later sunk by a Japanese submarine. As Yamaguchi prepared a third strike that evening, U.S. dive-bombers from the carriers *Enterprise* and *Yorktown* mortally damaged the *Hiryū*. Yamaguchi assumed blame for the loss of his ship and refused to leave it. His staff tried to dissuade him, but Yamaguchi rejected their appeals. The 800 survivors then abandoned ship, and *Hiryū* was scuttled, sinking on June 5. Yamaguchi was last seen reciting poetry and sipping tea.

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See also

Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Nagumo Chūichi; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Yamamoto Isoroku (1884–1943)

Japanese Navy marshal admiral. Born in Nagaoka, Honshu, Japan, on April 4, 1884, Yamamoto Isoroku was the biological son of the former samurai Takano Sadayoshi and the adoptive son of Yamamoto Tatewaki. Educated at

the Japanese Naval Academy (1901–1904), Yamamoto Isoroku saw service in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. He attended the Naval Staff College in 1915 and 1916.

Initially trained in gunnery, Yamamoto became a leading advocate of naval airpower during the 1920s and 1930s, in part because of his experiences as chief executive officer at Kasumigaura Naval Flight School between 1924 and 1926, when he became a pilot as well. Also significant in forming Yamamoto's perceptions were his two periods as a resident officer in the United States. Between 1919 and 1921, he studied English at Harvard University. Promoted to captain in 1923, he served as naval attaché in Washington, D.C., from 1926 to 1928. Yamamoto's time in the United States persuaded him of that country's unlimited economic potential and the relatively low quality of the U.S. Navy.

On returning to Japan from the United States, Yamamoto took command of the aircraft carrier *Akagi* and used it as a platform to test new concepts in naval aviation. He was a delegate to the 1929–1930 London Naval Conference and became chief of the navy's technical service in 1930. Yamamoto was promoted to rear admiral the next year. In this position, he pushed the development of modern aircraft for the navy. In 1933, Yamamoto took command of the 1st Naval Air Division. He headed the Japanese delegation to the 1935–1936 London Naval Conference, where he announced that Japan would no longer abide by the 5-5-3 naval ratio with the United States and Britain. He returned home a national hero.

Appointed vice minister of the navy in 1936, Yamamoto opposed his government's decision to proceed with construction of the giant Yamato-class battleships, believing that they were a waste of precious resources. Unable to overcome the reliance on traditional battleships, he nonetheless pushed the construction of aircraft carriers, long-range bombers and flying boats, and the new Zero fighter. His opposition to the increasingly belligerent official position led to his removal from his government post.

Appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet in August 1939 and promoted to full admiral in November 1940, Yamamoto opposed Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and the movement toward war with the United States. Nonetheless, he also rejected the navy's original plan to lie in wait for the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the Far East after the U.S. ships had been savaged by submarine and torpedo attacks. Instead, Yamamoto devised a

preemptive strike against the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He hoped that by crippling U.S. naval power at the war's outset, Japan might use the breathing spell that would ensue to conquer the Southern Resource Area and erect an impregnable defensive barrier.

Yamamoto did what he could to prepare his fleet for war, purging ineffective officers and insisting on realistic, rigorous—even dangerous—training, both day and night, so that when war came, the fleet was the best trained in the world, certainly at night fighting. He ignored technological advances such as radar, which Japanese ships did not receive until 1943.

The success of the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, enhanced Yamamoto's prestige, which he used to persuade the Naval General Staff to accept his overly complex Midway plan in April 1942. Designed to draw out the remnants of the U.S. Fleet—specifically the carriers absent from Pearl Harbor on December 7—Yamamoto's Midway campaign ended in disaster on June 3–6 with the Combined Fleet's loss of four fleet carriers, a blow from which the Japanese Navy never recovered.

Although the tide of the Pacific war clearly shifted in favor of the Allies after Midway, U.S. leaders remained wary of Yamamoto's leadership. Accordingly, when U.S. intelligence learned that Yamamoto intended a one-day inspection trip to the northern Solomons in April 1943, the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz, with the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dispatched aircraft to intercept his plane. On April 18, U.S. Army Air Forces P-38 Lightning fighters shot down Yamamoto's aircraft near Buin in the southern Bougainville Island, killing the admiral. He was posthumously promoted to marshal admiral.

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See also

Japan, Navy; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Document 82; Document 126

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Yamamoto Isoroku, U.S. Ambush of (April 18, 1943)

Aerial ambush and killing of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku over Bougainville in the South Pacific. On April 14, 1943, U.S. intelligence intercepted and decoded the inspection trip travel schedule for Yamamoto, revealing an opportunity to intercept his flight over Bougainville four days later. Yamamoto had been the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor and was commander in chief of the Combined Fleet.

There was some hesitation about such an effort, stemming from concerns that the move might compromise U.S. code-breaking operations. Also, Yamamoto, although a superb officer, had proved to be a disaster as a strategist. Nonetheless, the order for the attack came from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox through Admiral Chester Nimitz to Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, air commander in the Solomons area.

Mitscher assigned the mission to the U.S. Army Air Forces 339th Fighter Squadron of the Thirteenth Air Force on Guadalcanal because of the long-range capability of its Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters. The operation, code-named Y-MISSION, was carefully planned and carried out at low altitude under radio silence to ensure surprise. Major John W. Mitchell, the squadron commander, led the 400-mile mission. The 16 aircraft that performed the mission conducted a successful flight and interception, arriving over Bougainville just as 2 Japanese G4M Betty medium bombers and 6 Mitsubishi A6M Reisen Zero fighter escorts approached to land at Kahili Field at Buin in southern Bougainville. Both Japanese bombers were shot down, along with three of the Zeros, and Yamamoto was killed. Captain Thomas G. Lanphier and Lieutenant Rex Barber shared the credit for downing Yamamoto’s aircraft, although a debate over the actual pilot responsible for shooting down the plane continued after the war.

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See also

Mitscher, Marc Andrew; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Signals Intelligence; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Yamashita Tomoyuki (1885–1946)

Japanese Army general. Born in Osugi Nara, Kochi, Shikoku, on November 8, 1885, Yamashita Tomoyuki may have been Japan's greatest general of World War II. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1908 and the War College in 1916. Trained as an infantry officer, he distinguished himself early on in a variety of assignments.

Yamashita served on the General Staff in 1918 and then was resident officer in Germany from 1919 to 1921. Promoted to major in 1922 and to lieutenant colonel in 1923, he served concurrently as military attaché to Austria and Hungary (1927–1929). Promoted to colonel in 1929, he then commanded a regiment before serving in the Army Ministry (1932–1936). He next commanded a brigade in the Korea Army (1936–1937) and was promoted to lieutenant general in 1937. He was chief of staff of the North China Area Army between 1937 and 1939 in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) before commanding the 4th Division (1939–1940).

Recalled to Tokyo in July 1940, Yamashita became inspector general of army aviation. In November of that year, minister of war General Tōjō Hideki, who saw Yamashita as a rival, sent him on a six-month military mission to Germany and Italy. On his return to Japan in June 1941, Yamashita warned against going to war with Great Britain and the United States until Japanese forces could be modernized—unwelcome advice that produced his exile to command the Guandong (Kwantung) Army in Manzhoudiguo (Manchoutikuo).

Japanese lieutenant general Yamashita Tomoyuki (left) with a U.S. Army MP following his surrender of the Philippines. (National Archives)

In November 1941, just weeks before Tokyo launched the Pacific war, Yamashita received command of the Twenty-Fifth Army, which he proceeded to lead to the greatest land victory in Japanese history. In a campaign lasting 70 days (December 7, 1941, to February 15, 1942) and outnumbered by the British, Yamashita conquered Malaya and Singapore and earned the nickname “Tiger of Malaya.”

Largely because Prime Minister Tōjō saw him as a rival, in July 1942 Yamashita was sent to command the First Army in northern Manchuria. Following Tōjō’s fall from power in July 1944, Yamashita was assigned to command the Fourteenth Army in the Philippines, arriving there only a week before the U.S. invasion of Leyte on October 20. Plagued by divided command with little authority over Japanese naval and air assets, Yamashita was unable to prevent the fall of Leyte that December.

Following the U.S. landings on the big island of Luzon in January 1945, Yamashita gave Rear Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji charge of the defense of Manila. Iwabuchi ignored Yamashita’s orders to withdraw and staged a suicidal defense of the Philippine capital.

Yamashita then withdrew his remaining forces into the northern mountains and, despite lack of supplies, held out there until August 15. Charged with war crimes the next month for atrocities committed by

Iwabuchi's Naval Defense Force, Yamashita claimed both ignorance of them and inability to control his subordinate. In a controversial decision, the U.S. military court rejected this position, which became known as the "Yamashita defense," holding that the crimes were sufficiently widespread that Yamashita must have known of them and that he was responsible for the actions of his subordinate commander. Found guilty, Yamashita was hanged in Tokyo on February 23, 1946.

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See also

Guandong Army; Iwabuchi Sanji; Malaya Campaign; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Singapore, Battle for; Tōjō Hideki

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Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

The Japanese Yamato-class battleships were the largest battleships ever built. Of five of its class originally planned, only the *Yamato* and its sister *Musashi* were finished as battleships. A third ship, the *Shinano,* was completed as an aircraft carrier.

The *Yamato* was built in great secrecy. Its keel was laid at the Kure Naval Yard on November 4, 1937; the ship was launched on August 8, 1940, and commissioned on December 16, 1941. The Yamato-class ships displaced 62,315 tons standard load and 69,990 tons full load (in contrast, the U.S. Iowa class displaced 57,540 tons at full load). The vessels measured 862 feet 9 inches in length and 121 feet 1 inch in beam. The armor belt was 16.1 inches thick, and the deck armor was 9.1 inches thick. Armament consisted of 9 18.1-inch main guns in three triple turrets, 12 6.1-inch guns, 12 5-inch antiaircraft guns, 24 25mm antiaircraft guns, and 4 13mm machine guns.

Each ship also carried seven float-planes, launched from two catapults. The ships had turret armor of 25.6 inches. They were capable of speeds up to 27.7 knots. Crew size was some 2,500 men.

The *Yamato* had a rather uneventful career. Assigned as fleet commander Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku's flagship in February 1942, it was part of the Japanese Midway operation (June 3–6, 1942) but saw no action in that battle. The *Yamato* might have played an important role in the fighting for control of the Solomons, but Japanese leaders were reluctant to risk such a national symbol. With subsequent activities curtailed by the shortage of oil, the ship's actions were severely limited, and it saw little combat.

On December 24, 1943, the U.S. submarine *Skate* attacked the *Yamato* near Truk, damaging it on the starboard side near turret 3, which resulted in the flooding of a magazine. The *Yamato* returned to Japan for repairs, which were completed at Kure by April 1944. During the October 23–26, 1944, Battle of Leyte Gulf, the *Yamato* and *Musashi* formed the core of Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo's Force A. Kurita sailed from Brunei with a powerful force that included 5 battleships and 10 heavy cruisers.

The *Yamato* sustained two bomb hits in the Sibuyan Sea while under way to San Bernardino Strait, where the ship and what remained of Kurita's force encountered a force of six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts of escort carrier group Taffy 3, at the Battle of Samar (October 25). Although the *Yamato* escaped intact from this encounter, it also did not inflict any damage.

The *Yamato*'s next and final mission was an attempt to disrupt the U.S. landing on Okinawa, which began on March 16, 1945. In response to the invasion, on April 5, 1945, Admiral Toyoda Soemu ordered Operation TEN-GO, committing the Second Fleet to the battle. With no carriers and aircraft to protect his ships, Second Fleet commander Vice Admiral Itō Seiichi initially refused the order, which he considered a suicide mission. Vice Admiral Kusaka Ryūnosuke ultimately prevailed on Itō to agree, however.

The plan called for the *Yamato,* supported by the light cruiser *Yahagi* and eight destroyers, to steam to Okinawa and attack Allied shipping there. The *Yamato* would then be run aground and, as a stationary battery, provide gunfire support to the Japanese defenders on Okinawa. The *Yamato* was only provided sufficient fuel for a one-way mission. Itō Seiichi, aware that it was a

suicide mission, had overall charge of the operation and was aboard the *Yamato,* which was commanded by Rear Admiral Aruga Kosaku.

U.S. Navy forces off Okinawa were alerted to the approaching sortie by signals intelligence, and the Japanese task force was quickly detected by U.S. submarines as it emerged from the southernmost exit of Japan's Inland Sea on April 6. Because all available Japanese aircraft were targeted at naval forces around Okinawa, the *Yamato* was left exposed and vulnerable to air attack. U.S. carrier-based aircraft commenced their attacks on the Japanese task force on April 7 at 12:32 p.m.

The Japanese warships were subjected to repeated air attacks, but they only shot down 10 of 386 attacking aircraft. Amid massive explosions, the *Yamato* sank at 2:23 p.m., less than two hours after the air attacks began. The U.S. report on the ship's sinking claimed hits by at least 11 torpedoes and 8 bombs; Japanese survivors put the total at nearer to 16 torpedoes and 18 bombs. Only 269 of the *Yamato*'s 2,767 crew members survived. The light cruiser *Yahagi* and four of the destroyers were also sunk, but four damaged destroyers escaped back to Japan.

The *Musashi,* built by Mitsubishi at Nagasaki, was laid down on March 29, 1938; launched on November 1, 1940; and commissioned on August 5, 1942. It joined the *Yamato, Nagato,* and *Mutsu* in the 1st Battleship Division, and, following trials and gunnery drills, was declared fully operational in December.

The *Musashi* saw even less combat than the *Yamato*. In February 1943, it replaced the *Yamato* as Yamamoto's flagship. In mid-May 1943, the *Musashi* deployed as part of a task force to the North Pacific but failed to encounter U.S. forces. It subsequently was part of a task force dispatched to the Aleutians but returned to Japan when the Americans recaptured Attu Island before its arrival. At the end of July, after receiving upgrades in fire control and radar in Japan, the *Musashi* steamed for Truk. It remained there until February 1944 and took part in several attempts to intercept U.S. carrier forces that were, however, unsuccessful.

Departing Palau on March 29, the *Musashi* came under attack by the U.S. submarine *Tunny*. The *Musashi* managed to evade five of the six torpedoes fired at it, but the sixth damaged the forward area of the ship and caused 18 casualties. After repairs at Kure, when it also received upgrades that included

enhanced antiaircraft protection, it sailed for Okinawa to join the Second Fleet under Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo.

During the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–21, 1944), the *Musashi* escorted the Japanese fast carriers. In October, the battleship was at Brunei preparing as part of Admiral Kurita's force for the counterattack of the U.S. landings at Leyte that led to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. On October 24, in the Sibuyan Sea, Kurita's task force came under heavy U.S. air attacks. The *Musashi* was damaged forward in the first attacks, forcing it to reduce speed to only 10 knots. It sank that same evening, overwhelmed by 17 bombs and 10 to 19 torpedo hits. A total of 1,023 of its 2,399-man crew died; the others were rescued by Japanese destroyers. Eighteen U.S. aircraft were lost in the attack.

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See also

Itō Seiichi; Japan, Navy; Kurita Takeo; Kusaka Ryūnosuke; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Okinawa, Invasion of; Ozawa Jisaburo; Philippine Sea, Battle of the; *Shinano*, IJN, Sinking of; Solomon Islands, Naval Campaign; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Yanagawa Heisuke (1879–1945)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Yanagawa Heisuke was born in Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan, on October 2, 1879. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1900 and was commissioned in the cavalry. Yanagawa participated in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. In 1912, he graduated

from the Military Staff College and was an instructor there between 1915 and 1918. He was then an instructor at the Chinese Military Staff College (1918–1920). From 1920 to 1923, he was in Geneva as a member of the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations.

On his return to Japan, Yanagawa was promoted to colonel and assigned to command the 20th Cavalry Regiment. Between 1925 and 1927, he was chief of the Maneuver Section of the army General Staff. Promoted to major general in 1927, he commanded a cavalry brigade (1927–1929) and then became the director of the Cavalry School (1929–1930). During 1930 and 1931, he was inspector general of cavalry. Following his promotion to lieutenant general in 1931, Yanagawa served as vice minister of war (1932–1934). He commanded the 1st Division (1934–1935) and the Taiwan Army (1935–1936) and then served on the General Staff.

In the early 1930s, two competing groups emerged within the Japanese Army: the Kodo-ha (Imperial Way) group, which advocated the importance of character building, and the Tosei-ha (Control) faction, which emphasized the importance of military modernization. Yanagawa was a member of the Kodo-ha group. Both factions were in agreement, however, that Japanese political and social systems had to be reformed by a strong military government. On February 26, 1936, a number of young army officers attempted a coup d'état, which failed. Yanagawa sympathized with the plotters and was slated to be vice minister of war if the coup had succeeded. With its failure, Yanagawa was placed on the reserve list.

Only a year later, in October 1937, Yanagawa was reactivated and assigned as commander of the Tenth Army, sent to China to fight in the Second Sino-Japanese War. When the Tenth Army landed at Hangchow Bay to support the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, Chinese forces were already in retreat toward Nanjing (Nanking). Yanagawa insisted on a pursuit of the Chinese, and troops under his command committed many atrocities in the Japanese occupation of Nanjing.

In 1940, Yanagawa became minister of justice; the next year, he was made minister of state in the second and third cabinets of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro. Yanagawa retired from public service in October 1941 and died in Tokyo on January 22, 1945.

ASAKAWA MICHIO

See also
Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan; Nanjing Massacre

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Yan'an, Dixie Mission to

See Dixie Mission to Yan'an

Yang Hucheng (1893–1949)

Chinese Nationalist general. Born in Pucheng, Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, China, on November 20, 1893, Yang Hucheng (Yang Hu-ch'eng) began his military career by joining his native provincial forces after the 1911 Revolution, fighting first the remnants of the Qing (Ch'ing) forces and then warlords for control of Shaanxi. In January 1924, Yang joined the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD).

In 1925, when Shaanxi came under the control of warlord Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yü-hsiang), the provincial forces were reorganized as the National Army's Third Army, with Yang as commander of its 3rd Division. After Feng declared allegiance to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) in September 1926, the National Army became the Second Army Group of the GMD National Revolutionary Army, with Yang commanding its Tenth Army and the Eastern Route Army in the 1926–1928 Northern Expedition. When Feng-Jiang cooperation broke down in early 1929, Yang became commander of the new 14th Division, stationed at Nanyang in Henan (Honan). In mid-1930, Yang, as commander of the Seventh Army and the Punish-the-Rebel Army's Seventeenth Route Army, marched into Shaanxi to crush Feng's elements, and at year's end, he occupied Xi'an (Sian).

During his Xi'an years, Yang served as governor (1931) and pacification commissioner (1932–1936) of Shaanxi while continuing in the command post

of the Seventeenth Route Army. Meanwhile, he grew increasingly dissatisfied with Jiang's nonresistance toward Japanese aggression in northern China, which he had been following since September 1931. Beginning in late 1935, Yang opened communications with Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang), commander of the Nationalist Northeastern Army, and the Chinese Communists, who had just arrived at Yan'an (Yenan) in northern Shaanxi after the 1934–1935 Long March.

These talks led to the Xi'an Incident of December 1936. On December 12, Yang and Zhang arrested Jiang, who had gone to Xi'an a week earlier to discuss the anti–Chinese Communist "extermination campaign," and compelled him to negotiate with the Chinese Communists for a common anti-Japanese policy. The discussion between Jiang and the Chinese Communist delegation, led by Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), resulted in a Nationalist–Chinese Communist united front. On December 25, Jiang was released and flew back to Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu (Kiangsu), accompanied by Zhang, who never returned.

On January 5, 1937, Jiang removed Yang from his official posts and sent him on a tour of Europe and the United States in June. When Yang returned to China and arrived at Nanchang in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) on November 30, he was arrested and detained by GMD authorities; he was held throughout the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War.

On September 17, 1949, Yang was shot by GMD special agents who were about to evacuate to Taiwan, in their headquarters in Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan). In February 1950, in honor of his patriotism, the Chinese Communists located his remains and shipped his body back to Xi'an for burial.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

Jiang Jieshi; Sino-Japanese War; Xi'an Incident; Zhang Xueliang; Zhou Enlai

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Yan Xishan (1883–1960)

Chinese warlord and general. Born into a wealthy family in Wutai (Wut'ai), Shanxi (Shansi) Province, China, on October 8, 1883, Yan Xishan (Yen Hsi-shan) attended the military college of his native province between 1901 and 1904 and then went to Japan on a government scholarship. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1909. Returning to Shanxi thereafter, Yan was a colonel and regimental commander by 1910.

On the outbreak of the October 1911 Revolution, Yan joined the revolutionaries and was appointed military governor of Shanxi. By 1917, he was the sole ruler of the province. During the turbulent decade that followed, Yan proved adroit at navigating among the various warlord coalitions that were constantly battling for control of China. At the same time, his social and economic reforms turned Shanxi into a model province that contrasted sharply with the depredations of other warlords. In 1927, Yan joined the Guomindang (Nationalists), led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). After the Nationalist reunification of China the following year, Jiang rewarded Yan by confirming him as governor of Shanxi.

In the 1930s, Yan's position was threatened by pressure from the Japanese, who seized Manchuria in 1931, and from the Chinese Communists, who had relocated to the city of Yan'an (Yenan) in Shanxi Province. Yan responded by implementing a massive economic reform program in 1934 and by strengthening his ties to the Nationalists, but he had little success because of his inadequate financial resources and his history of isolation. Within a few months of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, Yan's army was barely maintaining a foothold in Shanxi. His relations with the Communists were also poor. Following an open clash with them in 1939, Yan attempted to establish connections with the Japanese, prompting accusations of treason.

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, Yan continued to resist the advance of the Communists in northern China, but his efforts, including the use of Japanese troops, ultimately failed. Forced from Shanxi in April 1949, he fled to Taiwan. Yan died in Taipei on May 24, 1960.

JOHN M. JENNINGS

See also
China; Jiang Jieshi

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Yeh Chien-ying

See Ye Jianying

Ye Jianying (1897–1986)

Chinese Communist general. Born in Meixian (Mei-hsien), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, China, on April 28, 1897, Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) enrolled at the Yunnan Military Academy in 1917. Graduating in 1919, he joined his native provincial army, where he became a member of the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—in 1920. In 1924, Ye became deputy director of the Instruction Department of the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy, where he met Zhou Enlai (Chou En-Lai).

In mid-1927, Ye secretly joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while remaining chief of staff of the GMD's National Revolutionary Army's Fourth Army. Ye helped plan the two abortive Communist uprisings at Nanchang in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) and Guangzhou (Canton) in Guangdong, in August and December, respectively. At year's end, Ye fled abroad. He returned to China in 1931, serving in the Soviet base in Ruijin (Juichin), Jiangxi, as chief of staff of the Red Army and president of the Red Army Academy.

In October 1934, Ye participated in the Long March as chief of staff of the Third Red Army Group and reached Yan'an (Yenan) in Shaanxi (Shensi) a year later. In Shaanxi, Ye worked closely with Nationalist generals Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang) and Yang Hucheng (Yang Hu-ch'eng), an

alliance that resulted in the GMD-CCP united front against Japan, a key product of the Xi'an (Sian) Incident of December 1936.

From the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 until early 1941, Ye worked closely with the GMD in Xi'an, at Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu (Kiangsu), at Wuhan in Hubei (Hupeh), at Changsha in Hunan, and at Chongqing (Chungking) in Sichuan (Szechwan) coordinating the war efforts of the Chinese Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. In August 1937, he became chief of staff of Zhu De's (Chu Teh) Eighth Route Army, renamed the Eighteenth Army Group under the GMD forces in September. In January 1939, Ye became head of the Nationalists' Guerrilla Warfare Training Center in southern Hengshan in Hunan.

After the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941, Ye returned to Yan'an, where he stayed until the war's end; during this period, he resumed his post as chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army and helped train Chinese Communist forces. Ye also continued his liaison work with both Chinese and foreign correspondents and foreign military delegations, including the July–August 1944 U.S. Dixie Mission.

After the war, Ye headed the CCP side of GMD-CCP negotiations to avert civil war. During the Chinese Civil War, he was chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army until January 1949, when Beijing (Peking) in Hebei was liberated. Ye then moved south to organize CCP control over his native province, holding important posts in Guangzhou. In 1955 he returned to Beijing, where he was rewarded by being named among 10 marshals of the People's Liberation Army. He then undertook diplomatic assignments in several foreign countries. Ye died in Beijing on October 22, 1986.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

China; Dixie Mission to Yan'an; New Fourth Army Incident; Xi'an Incident; Zhang Xueliang

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Yenan, Dixie Mission to

See Dixie Mission to Yan'an

Yenangyaung, Battle of (April 10–19, 1942)

Important battle in Burma between Allied and Japanese forces. With the capture of Rangoon (Yangon) in March 1942, the Japanese were able to establish effective supply lines and bring reinforcements into Burma. Although the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the American Volunteer Group (AVG, Flying Tigers) were inflicting losses, the Japanese held air superiority.

Japanese Fifteenth Army commander General Iida Shōjirō now turned his 33rd and 55th Divisions north. His objective was to seize the oil fields and refinery at Yenangyaung on the Irrawaddy, north of Prome. Supported by Burmese dissidents in a growing unconventional warfare capability, the Japanese employed frontal assaults, small-unit infiltrations, guerrilla operations, and sabotage to keep Allied forces on the defensive.

Lieutenant General William Slim's I Burma Corps held a defensive line with the Indian 17th Infantry Division forward of Prome on the Irrawaddy River and the 1st Burma Division near Toungoo and the Sittang River. Three Chinese armies—the Fifth, Sixth, and Sixty-Sixth—were moving south to reinforce. U.S. lieutenant general Joseph Stilwell, who arrived in China in March to lead the U.S. effort to train the Nationalist Chinese Army, planned to reopen the land supply routes to China.

The Japanese captured Prome and Toungoo in early April. The British then concentrated their resources near Allanmyo, on the Irrawaddy, redeploying the 17th and 1st Divisions from Toungoo. Slim's mission was to prevent the Japanese from taking the oil fields and to defend northern Burma. Critical to this effort was the ability of the Chinese to hold in the east in the Sittang Valley and the speed with which they could bring in reinforcements to allow the British to redeploy and form a reserve force large enough to conduct large-scale offensive operations to stop the Japanese advance up the Irrawaddy. On April 8, Slim moved I Burma Corps headquarters from Taungdwingyi to Magwe, just south of Yenangyaung. The oil fields were still

producing fuel for the Allied forces, but as a precaution, they were to be destroyed.

This forest of derricks that marked the great oil fields of Yenangyaung, Burma, the immediate objective of the Japanese invasion up the Irrawaddy Valley, April 16, 1942. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The main Japanese effort against Yenangyaung began in earnest on April 10 with direct assaults against forward British brigades and attempts to infiltrate small elements and units disguised as Burmese forces and Chinese. By April 14, the Japanese had split the defending British forces. The next day, Slim ordered the destruction of the oil fields and the refinery as heavy fighting continued in the Yenangyaung area.

British forces, now supported by the Chinese 38th Division, continued to engage the Japanese 33rd Division. Slim prepared an offensive thrust in which the 38th Division would reduce pressure on the 1st Burma Division, allowing elements of the Indian 17th Infantry Division to counterattack the Japanese. As the Battle of Yenangyaung continued, however, the collapse of Chinese forces in the Sittang area put the entire British effort in the west at risk.

At the same time, the Japanese cut off the 1st Burma Division, but British counterattacks, coupled with attacks by the Chinese 38th Division, allowed Slim to extract it. By April 25, however, Allied forces had begun a general withdrawal. The complete loss of Burma and the retreat of all British forces to India were now only a matter of time.

JOSEPH G. D. BABB

See also

Burma Theater; Flying Tigers; Iida Shōjirō; Sittang, Battle of the; Slim, Sir William Joseph; Stilwell, Joseph Warren

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Yen Hsi-shan

See Yan Xishan

Yeremenko, Andrei Ivanovich (1892–1970)

Soviet Army marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in Markovka, Russia, on October 14, 1892, Andrei Ivanovich Yeremenko was drafted into the Russian Army in 1913 and fought in World War I as a junior officer. He joined the Red Guards in October 1917 and the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party in 1918. Yeremenko fought as a cavalry officer in the Russian Civil War, ending that conflict as deputy commander of a regiment. He then commanded a regiment and attended the Military Political Academy and the Frunze Military Academy in 1935. Yeremenko commanded a cavalry division between 1935 and 1938 and then the VI Cossack Cavalry Corps, which he led in the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland in September 1939.

In June 1940, Yeremenko took command of a mechanized corps and was promoted to lieutenant general. When the German Army invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, he was commanding the First Red Banner Far Eastern Army. Recalled to the west, he replaced General Dimitri Pavlov as Western Front commander, helping to restore a degree of stability. An outstanding tactician, Yeremenko understood the importance of airpower and the need to mass armor.

In August 1941 Yeremenko assumed command of the new Bryansk Front, where he was seriously wounded in October. After his recovery, he was promoted to colonel general and put in command of the Fourth Shock Army in the defense of Moscow. Again seriously wounded in February 1942, Yeremenko took command of the Southeast Front, defending Stalingrad, in August. In January 1943 he assumed command of the Southern Front, pushing the Germans out of the Caucasus. Transferred to command the Kalinin Front in April 1943, he was promoted to army general in August.

Yeremenko commanded the 1st Baltic Front in October and November 1943 for the advance on Smolensk. He then led the Independent (Black Sea) Maritime Front in the eastern Crimea before heading the 4th Ukrainian Front from March to July 1945.

Following the end of the war, Yeremenko commanded, in turn, the Carpathian, West Siberian, and North Caucasus military districts until 1958. In 1955 he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union. He next served as inspector general of the Ministry of Defense until his death in Moscow on November 19, 1970.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Pavlov, Dimitri Grigorevich; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Ye Ting (1896–1946)

Chinese Communist general. Born in Huiyang (Hui-yang), Guangdong (Kwangtung), China, on September 10, 1896, Ye Ting (Yeh T'ing) enrolled at the Baoding (Paoting) Military Academy in 1916, withdrawing in 1918; he then joined his provincial army, where he became a member of the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD)—in 1920. In 1924, Ye went to Moscow for advanced training, where he met Nie Rongzhen

(Nieh Jung-chen) and joined the Moscow branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Returning to Guangdong in 1925, Ye was assigned to command and train what later became the Independent Regiment, an attachment of the GMD National Revolutionary Army's Fourth Army. After the GMD-CCP split in 1927, Ye participated in the two abortive Communist uprisings in Nanchang, Jiangxi (Kiangsi), and Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong, in August and December, respectively. At the end of 1927, Ye went abroad.

When the Second Sino-Japanese War began, Ye returned to China in October 1937 to command the newly created New Fourth Army, which was formally established in January 1938, with headquarters in Nanchang. After the Japanese took Xuzhou (Hsüchow), Jiangsu, Ye's forces operated behind Japanese lines north of the Chang Jiang River in May.

Ye's rapid extension of operations in the Jiangsu-Anhui area and his victories over the Japanese mopping-up campaigns in southern Anhui in 1939 and 1940 aroused Nationalist suspicions. The GMD leaders feared growing CCP power that might undermine its rule after the war. The situation culminated in the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941. Ye was charged with insubordination and imprisoned for the remainder of the war until March 4, 1946, when he was set free. He then requested reinstatement of his CCP membership, which was immediately granted. Ye died on April 8, 1946, when a plane in which he was traveling crashed in northwest Shaanxi (Shensi).

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

New Fourth Army Incident; Sino-Japanese War

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Yokoyama Shizuo (1890–1961)

Japanese Army lieutenant general. Born in Fukuoka Prefecture, Japan, on December 1, 1890, Yokoyama Shizuo graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1912 and was commissioned into the infantry. He graduated from the Army War College in 1925. After assignment to the General Staff, he was transferred to the Korea Army Headquarters in 1929. In 1932, he was doubly assigned as chief of the Railway Division of the Railway and Shipping Section of the General Staff and to the Naval General Staff. Yokoyama became commander of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army Railway District in 1935. Promoted to colonel in 1936, he served in the Guandong Army Headquarters in 1937.

During the 1937–1945 Second Sino-Japanese War, Yokoyama commanded the 2nd Infantry Regiment in offensive operations in northern China. Promoted to major general in 1939, he next took charge of the 2nd Field Railway Headquarters and then the 1st Field Railway Headquarters in 1940. Having been promoted to lieutenant general in 1941, Yokoyama assumed command of the 8th Division in eastern Manchuria and, from 1942 to 1944, he prepared for possible fighting with the Soviet Far East Command.

Yokoyama and his division were sent to Luzon in the Philippines in October 1944, where he commanded the Shimbu Group, later known as the Forty-First Army. Its mission was to defend central and southern Luzon under the overall authority of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, commander of Fourteenth Area Army. Yokoyama prepared to hold the mountainous region east of Manila City.

The issue of the defense of Manila was never resolved, as orders from the Fourteenth Area Army were unclear and the chain of command was complicated. Rear Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji's Manila Naval Defense Force, nominally under Yokoyama, had authority in the Manila area. General Yamashita did not want to fight for Manila, but Iwabuchi defied his orders and staged a bitter contest for the city that claimed an estimated 100,000 civilian lives.

Yokoyama surrendered his surviving forces to U.S. authorities in September 1945. Arrested as a war criminal for atrocities committed by Japanese troops in Manila, he was sentenced to death by a Philippine military tribunal in 1948. His sentence was later reduced to life imprisonment. Removed to Tokyo's Sugamo Prison, he was released on amnesty in December 1953. Yokoyama died in Tokyo on January 6, 1961.

See also

Iwabuchi Sanji; Philippines, U.S. Recapture of; Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Yonai Mitsumasa (1880–1948)

Japanese Navy admiral and statesman. Born in Iwate Prefecture, Japan, on March 2, 1880, Yonai Mitsumasa graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1901 and served in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Following his graduation from the Naval War College in 1914, he held various posts, including military attaché, staff officer, and commander of a battleship. In 1925, he was promoted to flag officer. Appointed commander of the Second Fleet, Yonai became commander in chief of both the Combined Fleet and the First Fleet in 1936. In February 1937, he assumed the post of minister of the navy in the cabinet of Premier Hayashi Senjūrō and was promoted to admiral of the navy in April 1937. Yonai remained in this post in both Konoe Fumimaro's first cabinet and Hiranuma Kiichiro's cabinet.

In the first negotiations for the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan in the summer of 1938, Yonai foiled efforts to conclude the alliance, working in cooperation with Japanese Navy vice minister Yamamoto Isoroku and strongly opposing its main supporters, who included army leaders. In August 1939, Yonai was discharged because the Hiranuma cabinet was compelled to resign en bloc, but his previous post brought him appointment to the position of military councilor. In January 1940 Yonai assembled a new cabinet based on the support of Emperor Hirohito, but Yonai opposed Japan's plans to go to war with the United States. Army leaders therefore forced the cabinet to resign en bloc.

In July 1944 with Japan's military situation fast deteriorating, Yonai and Koiso Kuniaki formed a new cabinet on the resignation of Premier General Tōjō Hideki. By special order of the emperor, Yonai was reappointed minister of the navy in the Koiso cabinet. Yonai remained in this post in Suzuki Kantarō's cabinet in April 1945 to help lay the groundwork for the postwar period and in the cabinets of both Higashikuni Naruhiko and Shidehara Kijuro. Yonai died in Tokyo on April 20, 1948.

TOMOYUKI TAKEMOTO

See also

Japan; Japan, Navy; Koiso Kuniaki; Takagi Sōkichi; Tōjō Hideki; Yamamoto Isoroku

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Yorktown Class, U.S. Aircraft Carriers

The three ships of the U.S. Navy's Yorktown class of large aircraft carriers were, in effect, the first modern aircraft carriers. The *Yorktown*, *Enterprise*, and *Hornet* had been designed from experience with other carriers and were the forerunners of the formidable Essex-class carriers that joined the fleet at the end of 1942.

All three Yorktown-class ships were built at Newport News, Virginia, and commissioned during 1937–1941. They displaced 19,875 tons standard load and 25,484 tons full load. They were 809 feet 4 inches in length (824 feet 9 inches on the flight deck) and 83 feet in beam (109 feet 6 inches at maximum width of the flight deck). Capable of 32.5 knots, they were protected by an armor belt ranging in thickness from 2.5 to 4 inches, with only 1.5 inches of deck armor. Initial armament consisted of 8 5-inch guns in single mounts, 16 1.1-inch guns in four mounts, and 24. 50-caliber machine

guns (from February 1942, the machine guns were replaced with 30 20mm Oerlikon cannon; antiaircraft capability underwent continued expansion during the war so that by its end the *Enterprise* mounted 11 quadruple-mounted 40mm, eight twin-mounted 20mm, and 16 single 20mm guns). The Yorktown-class carriers operated 96 aircraft. (The 1938 air group consisted of 18 fighters, 36 torpedo bombers, 37 dive-bombers, and 5 utility aircraft.) They had a crew complement of 2,175 men.

The *Yorktown* (CV-5) was laid down on May 21, 1934; launched on April 4, 1936; and commissioned on September 30, 1937. It was operating in the Atlantic at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Ordered to the Pacific, in January 1942 it escorted a convoy carrying marine reinforcements to American Samoa, then took part in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands carrier raids and, in mid-March, joined the carrier *Lexington* in attacking Japanese forces that had landed at Lae and Salamaua in eastern New Guinea.

The *Yorktown* participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7–8), when its aircraft and those of the *Lexington* sank the light Japanese carrier *Shōhō* and damaged the fleet carrier *Shōkaku*. Japanese aircraft from the *Shōkaku* and *Zuikaku* found both U.S. carriers and so severely damaged the *Lexington* that it had to be scuttled. The *Yorktown* was hit by a single bomb that penetrated the flight deck and exploded below, killing or badly wounding 60 men.

The *Yorktown* was put back in service at Pearl Harbor in only three days, enabling it to participate with the *Enterprise* and *Hornet* in the Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), when its aircraft fatally damaged the Japanese carrier *Sōryū*. The *Yorktown* was badly damaged by Japanese aircraft, however. Protected by a screen of destroyers, the carrier was in tow when it was sunk by the Japanese submarine *I-168* on June 7.

The *Enterprise* (CV-6), known affectionately as “The Big E,” was laid down on July 16, 1934; launched on October 3, 1936; and commissioned on May 12, 1938. Its aircraft provided the air cover for the Tokyo (Doolittle) Raid of April 18, 1942. During the Battle of Midway, its SBD Dauntless dive-bombers helped account for the loss of the Japanese carriers *Akagi*, *Kaga*, and *Hiryū*. The *Enterprise* was damaged in the battles off Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943) but repaired in time to take part in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 16, 1942. Again damaged, it was

repaired at Pearl Harbor and returned to action, and its air group helped to sink the Japanese battleship *Hiei*.

After undergoing a major refit in the second half of 1943, the *Enterprise* then took part in the U.S. strikes against the Japanese Pacific islands, and its aircraft helped sink the Japanese battleship *Musashi* in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944). Hit by a Japanese kamikaze in May 1945, the *Enterprise* was out of action the remainder of the war. Repaired, it was nonetheless decommissioned on February 17, 1947, and assigned to reserve as an antisubmarine warfare carrier (CVS-6) in July 1953. Although there was an effort to have the ship preserved as a memorial, it was sold to be broken up for scrap on July 1, 1958.

The U.S. Navy Yorktown-class aircraft carrier *Enterprise* (CV-6) was launched in 1936. The ship earned 20 battle stars for its wartime service, the most of any U.S. warship of World War II. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

The *Hornet* (CV-8) was laid down on September 26, 1939; launched on December 14, 1940; and commissioned on October 20, 1941. The *Hornet* carried the 16 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers that struck Tokyo and other Japanese cities on April 18, 1942. Later, its aircraft initiated the Battle of Midway. It then took part in the naval battles off Guadalcanal. In the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (October 26–27, 1942), the *Hornet* was struck by two Japanese bombs. After several more hits, the ship’s engines and communications went dead. Although efforts were made to take it in tow, the damage was too extensive; this and closing Japanese forces led to its

abandonment. The *Hornet* was sunk by torpedoes from Japanese destroyers on the morning of October 27. It had been in service little more than a year.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Guadalcanal Naval Campaign; Kamikaze; Leyte Gulf, Battle of; Midway, Battle of; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Santa Cruz Islands, Battle of the; Tokyo Raid; United States Navy Carrier Raids; Yamato Class, Japanese Battleships

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Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967)

Japanese diplomat and postwar prime minister. Born in Tokyo on September 22, 1878, the son of Takeuchi Tsuna, leader of the Jiyūtō (Liberal Party), Yoshida graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and became a diplomat in 1906. He served as the Japanese consul general in Mukden (Shenyang) (1925–1928), deputy minister of foreign affairs (1928–1930), and ambassador to Great Britain (1936–1939).

Yoshida Shigeru in 1945. Yoshida served as Japanese prime minister after the war. (Library of Congress)

While in Mukden, Yoshida believed that Japan should colonize China, and he supported the army's aggressive policies there. In the 1930s, however, he criticized the army for its anti-Western attitude. A candidate for minister of foreign affairs in 1936, Yoshia was not appointed because army leaders objected. He retired in 1939.

Yoshida worked with his father-in-law, Count Makino Nobuaki, and Prince Konoe Fumimaro to try to end the Pacific war, activities that brought his arrest in April 1945 and his imprisonment for 40 days. After the war, Yoshida became minister of foreign affairs in the cabinets of both Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko and Shidehara Kijūrō. He himself served as prime minister (May 1946–May 1947 and October 1948–December 1954).

Yoshida played a key role in the reconstruction of the Japanese economy after the war in cooperation with the United States, but in 1950 when

negotiating the peace treaty he signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, together with the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, he rejected the demand of U.S. special emissary John Foster Dulles for Japanese rearmament. Yoshida's administration, however, fixed the basic pro-Western Japanese orientation in the Cold War era. Yoshida retained considerable political influence after his retirement. He died in Ōiso, Kanagawa, on October 20, 1967.

SAKAI KAZUOMI

See also

Higashikuni Naruhiko, Prince of Japan; Japan; Konoe Fumimaro, Prince of Japan

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Yoshida Zengo (1885–1966)

Japanese Navy admiral. Born in Saga, Japan, on February 4, 1885, Yoshida Zengo graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1904. Commissioned an ensign the following year, he was a student at the Torpedo School in 1907. He was promoted to lieutenant commander in 1915 and was appointed a staff officer of the Third Fleet.

Promoted to captain in 1923, Yoshida commanded, in turn, the battleships *Kongo* and *Mutsu*. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1929, and he was chief of staff of the Combined Fleet in 1931 and made head of the Naval Affairs Bureau in the Naval Ministry in 1933. Promoted to vice admiral in 1934, Yoshida was appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet in 1938.

From August 1938 to September 1940, Yoshida served as minister of the navy. During this period, he strongly opposed the Tripartite Pact, which he believed would lead to war against the United States and Great Britain.

Leaders of the Japanese Army and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke, however, pressured Japanese naval leaders, and the pact was signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940. Yoshida was so shocked by this decision that he resigned his post.

Yoshida suffered a brief period of mental illness, but he returned to the navy. Promoted to admiral in November 1940, he commanded the China Area Fleet in 1942 and 1943 and then served as head of the Naval War College from December 1943 until his retirement from the navy in June 1945. Yoshida died in Tokyo on November 14, 1966.

KOTANI KEN

See also

Japan, Navy; Matsuoka Yōsuke; Tripartite Pact

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Yugoslavia

Nation located in the western Balkans encompassing about 99,000 square miles. In 1939, Yugoslavia had a population of some 16 million and bordered the Adriatic Sea and Italy to the west; Austria to the north; Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to the east; and Greece and Albania to the south. During War II, Yugoslavia was the setting not only for Europe’s greatest resistance struggle but also a bloody civil war.

Yugoslavia was one of the new states formed at the end of World War I. Serbia, which had been on the winning (Allied) side in the war, was its nucleus, with the addition of territories from the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. Unfortunately, the new state consisted of nationalities that had been on opposing sides in the war and had strong religious, linguistic, and cultural differences. The nation began as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but in 1929 it was renamed Yugoslavia, the “land of the South Slavs.” The

country was held together not so much by common ties as by outside pressures and by the fact that its peoples believed that they had a better chance of surviving together rather than separately.

The Serbs were the largest single nationality in Yugoslavia, and their king, Alexander, became head of the new state. Many non-Serbs complained of being second-class citizens, and in 1934 King Alexander was assassinated by Croatian terrorists (Ustaše) while on a state visit to France. In September 1939 World War II began, and Yugoslavian leaders declared the country neutral. They hoped to keep their state out of the war, although Serb sentiment, at least, was heavily pro-Allied. Serbs also dominated the army officer corps.

In late 1940 to counter Russian moves and to solidify his flanks before attacking the Soviet Union in Operation BARBAROSSA (June 22, 1941), German leader Adolf Hitler forced the Balkan states to join the Axis alliance. Prince Paul, regent for the young King Peter II, tried to stall for time, but in March 1941 following a meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, the prince concluded that resistance was futile and might lead to the extermination of the Yugoslav state.

On March 25, Yugoslav leaders traveled to Berlin to sign the Tripartite Pact. In taking this step, they hoped that they were preserving their country's independence; however, Yugoslav public opinion was sharply opposed to the Axis alliance, and this opposition found expression in nationwide demonstrations that prompted a coup on March 27 by Yugoslav Air Force officers, headed by General Dušan Simović. He formed a new government under Peter II.

Although the new government assured the Germans that there would be no immediate change of course in Yugoslav foreign policy, Hitler interpreted the coup as a personal affront and planned a military reprisal. Code-named Operation RETRIBUTION, the reprisal began on April 6 and included heavy air strikes against the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade. The operation also involved troops from Italy, Hungary (Hungarian premier Pál Teleki committed suicide rather than dishonor himself by participating in such an act), and Bulgaria, for a total of 52 Axis divisions.

Axis forces easily defeated Yugoslavian regular forces, overrunning the country in only 11 days. The Yugoslav government leaders and King Peter fled to London, arriving there in mid-June. Despite the poor performance of

their armed forces, Yugoslav leaders found themselves acclaimed as heroes for having resisted Hitler. Soon they had established a government-in-exile.

Defeated Yugoslavia was now partitioned among the Axis states. Slovenia was divided between Germany and Italy, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were combined into the independent state of Croatia under the direction of the Ustaše government of Ante Pavelić, Italian forces occupied the Dalmatian coast and Montenegro, Albania annexed the Kosovo region and Macedonia, Bulgaria received Macedonia east of the Vardar River, Hungary took the Bachka and Baranya regions, and Serbia and the Banat fell under German military control.

All ethnic Croatians among the 300,000 Yugoslav prisoners of war taken in the invasion were freed, and by August 1941 the Germans had established a Serb collaborationist government under General Milan Nedić. In Croatia, meanwhile, the Ustaše began the mass murder of minorities and forced Serbs to convert to Catholicism from Orthodox Christianity. In 1941, the Croatians killed at least 200,000 Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, most of them at the Jasenovac concentration camp.

Yugoslav resistance to the Germans began immediately. Centered among the Serbs, it was divided in two factions. Colonel Dragoljub “Draza” Mihailović retreated with a small force to the mountains and set up the Četniks (named for Serb guerrillas who had fought the Turks). The Četniks began receiving assistance from the British Special Operations Executive in June 1941. Mihailović hoped to build up his strength, avoiding reprisals by the Germans against the civilian population, and at the opportune time lead an uprising against the Germans. He strongly supported restoration of the monarchy.

German reichsmarshall Hermann Göring and Crown Prince Paul of Yugoslavia inspecting antiaircraft guns at Döberitz airfield in Yugoslavia in 1939. (Library of Congress)

Josip Broz (Tito), leader of the Yugoslav Communist Party since 1937, headed the second major resistance group. Known as the Partisans, the group favored immediate attacks on the Germans regardless of the cost to the civilian population in German reprisals. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht redeployed all but four of its divisions from Yugoslavia. Tito capitalized on this situation, and the Partisans were particularly active in Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia. By the autumn of 1941, Tito's Partisans numbered 50,000 people and contested the Germans for control of much of the countryside. In contrast to Mihailović, Tito favored a Pan-Yugoslav platform after the war, stressing participation of all ethnic groups and establishment of a federated Yugoslav state.

Tito and Mihailović met on two separate occasions in September and October but failed to develop a cooperative approach against the Germans. Hostilities between these two groups began in November 1941 when Četniks attacked the Partisan base at Uzice. Moreover, the Četniks often collaborated with Italian troops and the Nedić government in attempts to rid Serb and Montenegrin areas of Partisan influence. An agreement with German forces

concluded on November 11 allowed the Četniks freedom of movement in return for taking action against the Partisans.

Partisan strength continued to grow, however. During 1942 their numbers reached 100,000 people, and by 1943 they had swelled to 250,000. By the end of the war, Tito claimed nearly 800,000 followers. So effective were their activities that the Germans recalled their 113th Division from the Eastern Front and the 342nd Division from France to help contain the Partisans. The Yugoslav resistance is thus credited with tying down a large number of Axis troops who would otherwise have been available for deployment elsewhere.

German forces mounted six major anti-Partisan operations between 1941 and 1944; the chief consequence of these sweeps was to force Tito to abandon any fixed base of operations. German reprisals against civilians, sometimes at the rate of 20 civilians killed for every dead German, usually generated still greater Partisan support. By 1943, both the Nedić government in Serbia and the Ustaše government in Croatia were unstable, and Tito's strength had grown to the point where he transformed the Partisans into the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. Also in 1943, Tito created a shadow Yugoslav provisional government known as the Anti-Fascist Council for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ). Located in Bosnia, the AVNOJ established a network of district committees in Partisan-controlled areas of Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

The British continued to support Mihailović and his Četniks until December 1943, when, falsely convinced by a communist agent that the Serb-dominated Četnik resistance group was not fighting the Germans, Winston L. S. Churchill's government decided to channel all its aid to the Partisans. On November 29, 1943, the AVNOJ created the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (Nacionalni Komitet OsloboĐenja Jugoslavije) as a shadow government. It banned King Peter from returning to Yugoslavia and announced its intent to create a postwar federated state.

When Italian troops withdrew from Yugoslavia at the end of 1943, Tito's force seized the Italian arms depots. Faced with surprisingly successful resistance movements in the hills of Serbia and Bosnia, the Germans launched a number of operations, two of the largest coming in 1943, in an increasingly futile attempt to crush the Partisan movement. Accounts of

Partisan survival and heroism in the midst of these assaults assumed mythic dimensions in postwar Yugoslavia.

When the Germans pulled out many of their troops, the Partisans, largely recruited from the peasantry, already held most of the countryside and the main lines of communication. In a coordinated effort on October 20, 1944, the Soviet army and Partisan forces moved into Belgrade. On March 7, 1945, Tito's provisional government formally declared itself the legitimate leadership of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

For Yugoslavia, the toll of World War II had been heavy. By its end, an estimated 1.7 million Yugoslavs had been killed, both in combat and in atrocities committed by and against civilians.

At the end of the war, Yugoslavia attempted to annex Italian Istria and Trieste and the southern provinces of Austria. Tito's forces moved into Carinthia and tried to take it by coup de main. The speedy advance of the British V Corps prevented this, but there was a tense standoff. In mid-May 1945, the threat of force finally convinced the Yugoslavs to leave Austria. Clearly, Tito had hoped to seize any area where there was a blood tie to any ethnic group in Yugoslavia, including Carinthia, Istria, and Slovenia.

Tito did exact vengeance on the Croats, many of whom had been loyal to the Germans, as had many Slovenes. Within weeks of the war's end, the Partisans executed without trial up to a quarter of a million people who had sided with the Germans, most of them Croats. In addition, the majority of German prisoners taken in the war perished in a long "march of hate" across Yugoslavia. German soldiers captured in Yugoslavia worked as slave laborers; 60 percent of them were dead within a year. Also, despite protests by Western governments, the new Yugoslav government tried and executed General Mihailović.

The fact that the Yugoslav resistance had fought so well against the Germans and that it had liberated most of the country placed Tito in a strong position to demand and secure a Red Army withdrawal from those parts of Yugoslavia it occupied. In 1948, however, Yugoslavia was expelled from the international communist movement.

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See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Collaboration; Croatia; Hitler, Adolf; Mihailović, Dragoljub “Draža”; Partisans/Guerrillas; Paul, Prince Regent of Yugoslavia; Pavelić, Ante; Resistance; Simović, Dušan; Special Operations Executive; Tito; Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of; Yugoslavia Campaign; Document 175

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Yugoslavia, Axis Conquest of (April 6–17, 1941)

German-led Axis conquest of Yugoslavia in April 1941. On December 13, 1940, German chancellor Adolf Hitler issued orders for the conquest of Greece (Operation MARITA) to support the Italians in Albania and protect Germany’s southern flank during the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. Use of the Belgrade-Nis-Salonika railroad line was essential for German operations in Greece, and thus the cooperation of Yugoslavia was needed. Accordingly, Hitler pressured Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941.

This precipitated a bloodless military coup in Belgrade on March 26–27. Prince Regent Paul fled to Greece, 17-year-old King Peter II took the throne, and the Yugoslav Air Force’s General Dušan Simović formed a new government. Although Simović assured Hitler that Yugoslavia would remain friendly, the führer was enraged by the coup, and on March 27 he issued Directive No. 25 ordering the German conquest of Yugoslavia, which assigned supporting roles in the operation to both Italy and Hungary.

The German high command quickly prepared plans for the operation and began to assemble the necessary forces. The latter included Colonel General

Maximilian von Weichs zu Glon's Second Army, then in Austria and southwest Hungary (11 divisions in four corps); Lieutenant General Georg-Hans Reinhardt's XLI Panzer Corps, near Timisoara, Romania (1 Schutzstaffel [SS] motorized infantry division plus 1 infantry and 1 panzer regiment); and Colonel General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist's First Panzer Group (5 divisions in two corps), assembling in Bulgaria for the planned invasion of Greece. Luftwaffe assets assigned to the operation included some 1,148 aircraft of the Fourth Air Fleet in Austria, the VIII Air Corps in Bulgaria, and the X Air Corps on Sicily.

The weak Yugoslav Army was no match for the Germans. Mobilized on March 29, it totaled fewer than 1 million men in 35 divisions, other troops under three army groups, one independent field army headquarters, and the Coastal Defense Command. The Yugoslavs had few modern tanks and little artillery and relied on animal transport. Most Yugoslav war matériel had been obtained from Germany, and there were few reserves of ammunition or other supplies. The Yugoslav Air Force had some 459 military aircraft, its airfields were vulnerable, and it lacked spares and other equipment. The Yugoslav Navy consisted of 1 old training cruiser, 4 modern destroyers, 4 submarines, 2 river monitors, and 16 old motor torpedo boats. Its ships were manned largely by Croats. Politically unreliable, the navy would play no role in the coming campaign.

German infantrymen engaged in mopping up operations in a small town on the Drau River in Yugoslavia, May 9, 1941. (Bettmann/Corbis)

After only 10 days for planning and preparations, the Germans began their assault on April 6, 1941, with a massive air attack on Belgrade that killed some 17,000 civilians, destroyed much of the Yugoslav Air Force, and cut communications between the Yugoslav Supreme Command and its units in the field. The same day, Field Marshal Siegmund Wilhelm List's Twelfth Army launched Operation MARITA. The German XL Panzer Corps took Skopje on April 7, thereby cutting off the Yugoslav line of retreat toward Salonika, and the Twelfth Army continued into Greece.

Directive No. 25 called for a three-pronged attack aimed at Belgrade. The First Panzer Group attacked from Bulgaria on April 8 on the Nis-Kragujevac-Belgrade axis, overcame stiff resistance by the Yugoslav Fifth Army, and took Nis on April 9. At the same time, the XLI Panzer Corps attacked from Romania and plowed through the Yugoslav Sixth Army. Using bridges over

the Danube, Drava, and Sava Rivers seized by the Second Army between April 1 and 7, the XLVI Panzer Crops attacked toward Belgrade on April 10, routing the Yugoslav Fourth and Second Armies and reaching Novi Sad on April 11. That same day, Zagreb fell to the LI Infantry Corps, aided by the 14th Panzer Division detached from the XLVI Panzer Corps. Meanwhile, the XLIX Mountain Corps forced the surrender of Yugoslav forces in Slovenia, and the Italian Second Army attacked from Trieste down the Yugoslav coast, meeting little resistance.

German forces advancing during the April 1941 Axis invasion of Yugoslavia. (Ullstein Bild via Getty Images)

On the evening of April 12 the three converging German corps surrounded Belgrade, and the next morning German forces entered unopposed. The Second Army then assumed responsibility for all operations in Yugoslavia and acted to prevent the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces into the Serbian mountains. Weichs's two pursuit groups moved toward Sarajevo from Zagreb and from Belgrade via Uzice. On April 14, the Yugoslav government was evacuated to Greece, and negotiations for an armistice began.

Sarajevo fell the next day, and on April 17 Yugoslavia surrendered unconditionally at Belgrade. The armistice went into effect on April 18, ending a 12-day campaign in which the Germans had only 558 casualties,

including 151 killed. Yugoslavia was then annexed or occupied by the victorious Axis powers except for Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which formed the pro-Axis Independent State of Croatia.

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See also

Balkans Theater; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; List, Siegmund Wilhelm Walter; Richthofen, Wolfram von; Tripartite Pact; Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von; Yugoslavia

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Yugoslavia Campaign (1944–1945)

Campaign to drive German forces from Yugoslavia by communist-led Partisans. By mid-1944, the Partisans led by Josip Broz (Tito) were poised to achieve both of their principal objectives: the annihilation of the royalist Četniks led by Dragoljub "Draza" Mihailović and the expulsion of Axis occupation forces from Yugoslavia. The Italian capitulation in September 1943 provided the Partisans with enormous quantities of arms and other equipment, and in December 1943 the Allies cut off aid to the Četniks and increased their support for the Partisans. Having survived several German assaults on his headquarters in early 1944, Tito saw his prestige enhanced when he was named minister of war in the new government-in-exile formed by King Peter II on May 17, 1944. In June 1944, Tito launched the Partisans against the Četnik stronghold in Serbia, aiming to destroy his rival and deliver a significant blow against the Axis occupation forces.

The Germans managed to hold the Partisans in eastern Serbia, and in July 1944 Tito asked Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to divert the Soviet Red Army toward Belgrade to hasten the defeat of the 60,000 to 70,000 remaining Četniks and the Axis occupation forces. On August 2 the Partisans advanced into Macedonia, and on August 20 the Red Army launched a drive deep into Romania, which surrendered on August 24. The Soviets declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, and three days later the Bulgarians asked for an armistice, declared war on Germany, and moved forces from Sofia toward the Yugoslav border.

German commander in chief, southeast, Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs zur Glon commanded German forces in both Greece and Yugoslavia. Principal forces available to him in Yugoslavia were the Second Panzer Army (9 divisions in 4 corps but no panzer units), with headquarters at Kragujevac, and Military Command Southeast (3 divisions under 2 corps headquarters), with headquarters in Belgrade. The situation at the end of August 1944 made it necessary for German Army Group E (11 divisions under 6 corps-level headquarters) to begin the withdrawal of all troops from Greece (except for garrisons on Crete and Rhodes) to Macedonia.

Yugoslavian leader Marshal Tito (right) and his staff at his secret mountain retreat during the campaign against German forces in Yugoslavia, 1944. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

With the Bulgarian declaration of war on September 8, the German 1st Mountain Division moved north, occupied Skopje, and secured the critical Belgrade-Nis-Salonika railroad line. On October 14, Army Group E headquarters assumed responsibility for a 375-mile defense line in southeastern Yugoslavia facing 13.5 Soviet and Bulgarian divisions of the Soviet 3rd Ukrainian Front (Thirty-Seventh and Fifty-Seventh Armies) and the Bulgarian First, Second, and Fourth Armies. On September 8–9 a general uprising in Greece hastened the German withdrawal, and by November 2 the last organized German units had left Greece.

By late September Soviet forces advancing from Romania were fighting north of Belgrade, and on September 29 the Red Army entered Serbia. On October 20, Belgrade was "liberated" by the Red Army and Tito's I Partisan Corps. The Red Army subsequently moved on toward Hungary, leaving the Partisans to mop up the remaining Četnik forces and hasten the withdrawal of German occupation forces.

At this point, the guerrilla war fought by the Partisans against the Axis occupation forces became a conventional campaign. The combined onslaught of the Partisans and the Red Army brought about the collapse of the Četniks. In September, Mihailović had called for a general mobilization to rid Serbia of Partisans and Axis occupation forces, but attacked on three sides, the Četniks were forced to retreat and regroup in Bosnia. They subsequently ceased to be a major factor in the Yugoslav equation. Mihailović returned to Serbia in April 1945 hoping to organize resistance to the communists, but he was captured by the Partisans and executed in July 1946.

After the fall of Belgrade, German forces withdrew from Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro, moving in good order to the northwest. Unable to mount a major counterattack, they also abandoned Serbia to form a defensive line in Bosnia and western Croatia. In March 1945 a new communist-dominated coalition government was formed with Tito as premier, and on March 20 the Partisan forces were redesignated as the Yugoslav National Army and began a general offensive against the Germans. The Germans held in central Bosnia and eastern Croatia until April 10, when they began a

headlong retreat toward Austria, where the bulk of the German units surrendered to the British.

On May 9 the Partisans took Zagreb, having smashed the Ustaše and the Independent State of Croatia. By May 15 all of Yugoslavia had been retaken, and the Partisans exacted a terrible revenge on the remaining Axis troops and their Yugoslav collaborators. Those Germans taken prisoner by the Partisans were severely mistreated, and some 50,000 of them died in captivity.

CHARLES R. SHRADER

See also

Balkans Theater; Mihailović, Dragoljub "Draža"; Stalin, Joseph; Tito; Weichs zur Glon, Maximilian Maria Joseph Freiherr von; Yugoslavia

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Z

Zaibatsu (Japan)

Japanese term that referred to a relatively small number of large and powerful business and financial cartels that controlled entire industries and exerted much influence on Japan's economy and politics prior to World War II. The term *zaibatsu* can be translated as "financial (or commercial) clique." The Zaibatsu played an important role in Japanese industrialization and militarization beginning in the late 19th century and became an integral part of Japanese expansion into Korea and China in the 20th century.

The origins of the Zaibatsu can be traced to the Meiji Restoration in Japan (ca. 1868–1910), but their growth and influence did not accelerate until the early 1920s, when the term was first used to describe these companies. The largest and most important of these early enterprises were Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, and Mitsui. After the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, several newer companies were added, including Nakajima and Okura.

Almost all of the Zaibatsu entities, which were owned and controlled by a small number of wealthy families, were vertically integrated businesses that consisted of a holding company, an affiliated financial subsidiary, and a number of secondary and tertiary industrial subsidiaries that gave that one enterprise virtual control over an entire industry or sector of the economy. These included banking, steel making, chemical manufacturing, mining, etc. The families retained sole or majority control over the holding companies, which set policies for the firms underneath them. By the late 1930s, the four top Zaibatsu entities alone controlled 30 percent of Japan's chemical, mining, and metal fabrication industries and nearly 50 percent of the heavy equipment and machinery industries.

The Zaibatsu had important connections with the Japanese government and the military, which gave it considerable clout in political and military decision making. These connections were at once semifeudal in origin and structure but were also indicative of quasi-corporatist business-government

relations, not dissimilar to what existed in fascist Italy after 1922 and in Nazi Germany beginning in the early 1930s. Most Zaibatsu entities prospered during the global depression of the 1930s by exploiting business opportunities in Korea and China, garnering lucrative military contracts, engaging in financial and currency manipulation, and exploiting cheap or slave labor in Japan's newly acquired colonies.

The Zaibatsu played a major role in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and profited handsomely from it. Nissan became an important Zaibatsu operating in Manchukuo (Manchuria) after 1939. Although the Japanese government nationalized a number of Zaibatsu entities during World War II, this did not dampen the controlling families' willingness to work with the government; indeed, many Zaibatsu heads were often part of government decision making between 1940 and 1945.

After the defeat of Japan in 1945, Allied occupation officials initially sought to dismantle the Zaibatsu in the belief that it had contributed to Japan's prewar militarism and was fundamentally monopolistic and inefficient. By late 1947, however, severe economic hardship in Japan and the accelerating Cold War prompted a major reassessment of occupation and reconstruction policies known as the "reverse course." Now occupation officials sought to promote Japanese industrialization and speed up economic reconstruction. This policy change essentially stopped plans to disassemble the Zaibatsu. In the end, of the more than 1,000 Zaibatsu firms existing in 1945, fewer than 30 were dissolved.

To encourage economic modernization and diversification, however, occupation authorities compelled the Zaibatsu to do away with interlocking directorates and divest itself of privately held holding companies. Today vestiges of the Zaibatsu remain in Japan, although they are less likely to be vertically integrated and more likely to engage in horizontal business cooperation. It is also far less likely that one family controls an entire corporation.

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See also

Japan; Japan, Occupation of; Korea; Manzhouguo; Sino-Japanese War

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Zeitzler, Kurt von (1895–1963)

German Army general. Born in Cossmar-Luckau, Germany, on June 9, 1895, Kurt von Zeitzler joined the German Army and rose to command the 72nd Infantry Regiment in World War I. He continued in the army after the war and qualified as a General Staff officer.

Zeitzler was an early supporter of Adolf Hitler and in 1934 was one of the first to join the panzer forces. As a lieutenant colonel on the army General Staff (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH), he helped plan the German military takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Promoted to colonel, Zeitzler briefly commanded a regiment before becoming chief of staff of Lieutenant General Ewald von Kleist's XII Corps in the September 1, 1939, invasion of Poland and of Army Group Kleist (later the First Panzer Group) in the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940.

Zeitzler continued as chief of staff of the First Panzer Group during the invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia and for Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union, on June 22, 1941. He also played important roles in organizing the German drive through the Ardennes in 1940 and in Kleist's panzer operations in Greece and the Ukraine in 1941. Zeitzler proved especially adept at logistical matters, ensuring that supplies kept up with the fast-moving tanks.

In April 1942, Zeitzler was assigned as chief of staff to commander in chief, West, Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt and promoted to general of infantry. Zeitzler played a major role in defeating the Allied raid at Dieppe on August 19. In September, Hitler named Zeitzler to replace Colonel General Franz Halder as chief of the OKH and promoted him to colonel general. An aggressive officer with the nickname "Kugelblitz" (Lightning Ball), Zeitzler seemed to be the type of officer Hitler desired.

As the senior General Staff officer of the German Army, Zeitzler made a number of changes to improve procedures. Effecting change in Hitler's strategic thinking proved more difficult, although he did stand up to the

führer on a number of occasions. The August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943, Battle of Stalingrad drove a wedge between the two men, however. Once the Sixth Army was cut off, Zeitzler urged that it be allowed to break out, whereas Hitler demanded that it remain in place. Zeitzler went so far as to predict that an airlift of supplies to the beleaguered army would not be successful, angering Hitler further. Zeitzler also proposed a major restructure of the high command, suggesting that the OKW (Armed Forces Supreme Command) and the OKH be merged and that Generals Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl be replaced. Zeitzler also argued that the Waffen-Schutzstaffel (Waffen-SS) should be placed under direct OKH command. Hitler rejected these suggestions.

Following the failure at the Battle of Kursk (July 5–13, 1943), which he had largely planned, Zeitzler fell out completely with Hitler. Having gained the enmity of Keitel and Jodl, dumbfounded by Hitler's prosecution of the war, and frustrated at his own inability to affect decisions, Zeitzler simply walked off the job on June 30, 1944, for "reasons of health."

In January 1945, an angry Hitler took the extraordinary step of dismissing Zeitzler from the army. Imprisoned after the war, Zeitzler was released in 1947. He died at Hohenaschau in Upper Bavaria on September 25, 1963.

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See also

BARBAROSSA, Operation; Dieppe Raid; Halder, Franz; Hitler, Adolf; Jodl, Alfred; Keitel, Wilhelm; Kursk, Battle of; Kleist, Paul Ludwig Ewald von; Rundstedt, Karl Rudolf Gerd von; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Zettai kokubo ken

See Absolute National Defense Zone

Zhang Fakui (1896–1980)

Chinese Nationalist leader. Born in Shixing (Shihhsing), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, China, on July 25, 1896, Zhang Fakui (Chang Fa-k'uei) joined his native provincial forces after the 1911 Revolution. In 1912, he became a member of what became the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD), the Nationalist Party. In 1925, the GMD organized the National Government at Guangzhou (Canton) in Guangdong and reorganized the various armies into the National Revolutionary Army. Zhang took command of the Fourth Army's Independent Regiment, participating in the Eastern and Northern Expeditions of 1925–1928.

During his service, Zhang became involved in the political struggle between Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei) and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) as to who should be the leader of a reunified China. Zhang cooperated with Wang and staged a coup in November 1927 to recapture Guangdong, at that time in the hands of the pro-Jiang Guangxi (Kwangsi) clique. At this juncture, the Chinese Communists staged the abortive Guangzhou uprising in early December. Defeated by the Guangxi clique and alleged to have a role in the Communist coup, Zhang left the army and retired to Japan. In early 1929, Zhang returned to China, commanding several divisions against warlord forces. Nevertheless, Zhang was again involved in anti-Jiang coalitions centered around Wang in Guangzhou.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 brought the reconciliation of Jiang and Wang. Zhang traveled abroad beginning in 1932 until being recalled in 1935. He was then assigned the tasks of pacifying Chinese Communist areas and preparing for a full-scale Japanese invasion. When the Second Sino-Japanese War erupted in 1937, Zhang took command of the Eighth Army Group in the unsuccessful defenses of Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, Wuhan in Hubei (Hupeh), and Guangzhou.

In late 1938, Zhang was made commander of the Fourth War Zone of Guangdong and Guangxi. The situation in southern China remained relatively stable until 1944, when the Japanese launched the devastating ICHI-GO Offensive (April–December), which forced Zhang's forces into major retreats. At year's end, Zhang relocated the Fourth War Zone to western

Guangxi, reorganizing the military forces and resisting any further Japanese advance. In May 1945 Zhang retook Guangxi, and he returned to Guangzhou in September to receive the Japanese surrender.

Following the war, Zhang became the director of Jiang's headquarters at Guangzhou until late 1947, when he served as commander of the Chinese land forces in the Chinese Civil War. In June 1949 Zhang went to Hong Kong, where he was associated with the so-called Third Force Movement. He avoided politics thereafter. Zhang died in Hong Kong on March 10, 1980.

ERROL MACGREGOR CLAUSS AND LAW YUK-FUN

See also

China; China, Army; ICHI-GO, Operation; Jiang Jieshi; Sino-Japanese War

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Zhanggufeng/Khasan, Battle of (July 29–August 11, 1938)

Armed clash along the border between the Soviet Maritime Province and Japanese colonial Korea. The border dispute between the two sides led to fighting, beginning on July 29, 1938, on a small hill known as Zhanggufeng (Chang-ku-feng) and the adjacent Lake Khasan.

On August 6, Soviet lieutenant general Vsevolod Nikolaevich Sergeev's XXXIX Rifle Corps of 23,000 infantry troops, with tanks and armored vehicles and supported by heavy artillery and air cover, attacked units of Japanese lieutenant general Suetaka Kamezō's 14th Division of 7,000 infantry troops defending Zhanggufeng. By August 9, lacking heavy artillery and armor, the Japanese were driven from the hill. The Soviet forces then broke off contact except for reconnaissance. The Japanese refrained from a counterattack on the eve of their Wuhan operation in China. A truce was arranged between the two sides on August 11, 1938. The Japanese sustained

1,440 casualties (526 killed). The victorious Soviets paid a higher price, with 792 killed or missing and 3,279 wounded.

As a consequence of the battle, the Soviets gained confidence in their combat effectiveness. The battle also revealed glaring Japanese weaknesses in firepower and tanks, but the army did nothing to rectify these shortcomings.

TOHMATSU HARUO

See also
Japan, Army; Soviet Union, Army

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Zhang Xueliang (1901–2001)

Chinese Nationalist general. Born in Taian (T'aian), Liaoning Province, China, on June 3, 1901, Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang) was the eldest son of the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin). Graduating from the Fengtian (Fengtien, old name of Liaoning) Military Academy in 1920, Zhang Xueliang joined his father's army, resisting the growth of Japanese and Russian influences in Manchuria and defending Manchuria against other warlords.

In June 1929 the elder Zhang was assassinated, allegedly by the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) Army. The younger Zhang became commander in chief of the Northeast Peace Preservation Forces. That December, he declared allegiance to the government of Jiang Jieshi and his Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD), believing that national unity was essential to halt the Japanese advance in Manchuria.

The Zhang-Jiang relationship developed strains after the Mukden (Shenyang) Incident of September 1931 in Liaoning. Following Jiang's nonresistance policy toward the Japanese advance, Zhang led his Northeastern Army out of Manchuria. At year's end, Zhang became pacification commissioner of Beijing (Peking), Hebei (Hopeh). In January

1933, he engaged the Japanese along the Great Wall, defending the Rehe (Jehol) Province. Held responsible for the loss of Rehe in March, Zhang resigned his military posts and went abroad on an inspection tour.

Zhang returned in early 1934 and became deputy commander in chief of the Henan-Hubei-Anhui (Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei) "Bandit Suppression" Office, responsible for crushing the Chinese Communists. In October 1935, Zhang became head of the Northwest "Bandit Suppression" Office and was stationed in Xi'an (Sian), Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, where he began communicating with the Chinese Communists who had just completed the 1934–1935 Long March and settled in the northeastern part of Shaanxi. In mid-1936, Zhang and Chinese Communist leader Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) finally agreed on an anti-Japanese united front.

Jiang remained the chief obstacle, which precipitated the Xi'an Incident of December 1936. In early December, he went to Xi'an to discuss the last anti–Chinese Communist campaign. Unable to convince Jiang to drop this plan, Zhang, in cooperation with Shaanxi's pacification commissioner, Yang Hucheng (Yang Hu-ch'eng), kidnapped Jiang on December 12. Zang then invited Zhou to discuss the Nationalist-Communist cooperation.

On Christmas Day after securing Jiang's agreement on a united front, Zhang accompanied Jiang back to Nanjing (Nanking), Jiangsu (Kiangsu). On arrival, Zhang was arrested for insubordination and put under the National Military Council's strict surveillance, thereby ending his public life. In November 1946, he was taken to Taiwan and held in detention until 1991, when he went to the United States. Zhang died in Honolulu, Hawaii, on October 14, 2001.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Xi'an Incident; Yang Hucheng; Zhou Enlai

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Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader. Born into a wealthy family in Shaoxing (Shaohsing), Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province, on March 5, 1898, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) studied at Waseda University and, from 1917 to 1919, at Japan University in Tokyo. He returned to China to continue his studies at Nankai University and joined the May Fourth Movement demonstrations in Beijing (Peking) in 1919 that called for modernization and democracy in China. Imprisoned briefly for this activity, Zhou left China in late 1920 for France on a work-study plan. There, he helped organize a branch of the CCP.

Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), shown here in 1938, was one of the important leaders of the Communist Party in China. A veteran of the Long March and close associate of Mao Zedong (Mao Tsetung), Zhou was premier of the People's Republic of China from 1949 until his death in 1976. (Earl Leaf/Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images)

Returning to China in 1924, Zhou embarked on his revolutionary career, directing the Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province CCP Military Affairs Department. He then served as director of the Political Department of the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek), leader of the Nationalist Party, the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD). Zhou secretly helped plan the Shanghai uprisings of 1925, 1926, and 1927 in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, narrowly escaping arrest by the GMD.

From April 1927, Zhou directed the CCP Central Committee's Military Affairs Department. He assisted in the planning for the Nanchang Uprising of August 1927 and was an important figure in the formation of the Red Army. He participated in the Long March but was removed from the Central Military Commission at the 1935 Zunyi (Tsunyi) Conference.

Zhou supported the idea of a conventional army to oppose Jiang's GMD and disagreed with Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) concept of guerrilla warfare. Zhou initially outranked Mao in the party leadership but later assumed a subordinate role. During the next four decades, the two men worked closely together, despite their great differences in approach and outlook. Zhou proved to be an indefatigable and gifted administrator, a masterful diplomat, and an adroit politician. He was also the ultimate survivor.

Zhou was the chief CCP negotiator with Jiang following the Xi'an Incident in 1936 and helped form the united front with the GMD against the Japanese. Following World War II, Zhou tried without success to negotiate a coalition government with the GMD.

Named China's prime minister on October 1, 1949, Zhou remained in that post for more than 26 years until his death. For the first 8 years, he served concurrently as foreign minister. Zhou played a key role during the Korean War (1950–1953), paving the way for China's entry into the conflict. Zhou headed China's delegation to the 1954 Geneva Conference to end the Indochina War and deal with other Asian problems. He worked to stabilize the mercurial Mao and to keep China's government functioning through the constant upheavals of Mao's Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The urbane and sophisticated Zhou served as China's chief emissary to the outside world. He died in Beijing on January 9, 1976.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

China; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Xi’an Incident

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Zhu De (1886–1976)

Chinese Communist marshal. Born into poverty in Yilong (Yi-lung), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, on December 18, 1886, Zhu De (Chu Teh) passed the civil service entrance examination. By 1906 he had transferred to the Yunnan Military Academy, graduating in 1911, whereupon he participated in the Chinese Revolution. Until the end of World War I, Zhu served in warlord armies in Yunnan and Sichuan (Szechwan) Provinces, apparently acquiring both wealth and an addiction to opium that he ultimately defeated before traveling to Germany to study in Berlin and Göttingen. An encounter with the young Chinese revolutionary Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) converted Zhu to communism, which brought Zhu’s expulsion from Germany.

Returning to China in 1926, Zhu concealed his new sympathies and joined the army of the Guomindang (Kuomintang, GMD), the Nationalist Party. In August 1927, he joined the unsuccessful Communist uprising in Nanchang, later considered the birth of the communist Red Army. Subsequently, he took his troops to join the Communist guerrilla forces of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) in Hunan Province. Zhu became commander and Mao political commissar of their combined force, the Fourth Red Army, which moved to Jiangxi in 1929, expanding to 200,000 men by 1933. The two men developed strategies for modern large-scale Chinese guerrilla warfare, focusing on control of the country.

In 1934 after repeated Nationalist attacks, Zhu’s forces escaped encirclement in what became the epic 6,000-mile Long March to a new base at Yan’an (Yenan) in northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, during which Mao, with Zhu’s support, won control of the Chinese Communist movement.

When Communist forces allied with Nationalist troops after the 1937 Japanese invasion of China, Zhu commanded all Chinese Communist troops in what had become the Eighth Route Army. After directing the disastrous "Hundred Regiments" Campaign against Japanese troops in late 1940, Zhu returned to guerrilla operations in Japanese-controlled areas. By 1945, he had built the Red Army into a force of 800,000, controlling much of northern China's countryside.

During the 1945–1949 Chinese Civil War, Zhu directed Communist military strategy. From 1949 to 1954 he served as China's defense minister, and in 1955 he was among 10 marshals of the People's Republic of China. Persecuted for several years during the Cultural Revolution, he was subsequently rehabilitated. When he died in Beijing (Peking) on July 6, 1976, Zhu was head of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

PRISCILLA MARY ROBERTS

See also

China; Mao Zedong; Zhou Enlai

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Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich (1896–1974)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born in Strelkovka, Kaluga Province, Russia, on November 19, 1896, Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov was the son of peasants. He was apprenticed as a furrier at age 12. Conscripted into the Russian Army in 1915, Zhukov served in the cavalry during World War I. After recovering from wounds received in combat, he joined the Red Army in 1918.

Zhukov commanded from platoon through squadron levels in the Russian Civil War, joining the Bolshevik Party in 1919. He took charge of a cavalry regiment in 1922 and a brigade in 1930. In 1932, he assumed command of a

cavalry division; four years later, he commanded a corps. Zhukov was one of the few senior officers to survive the military purges of 1937.

Serving as deputy commander of the Belorussian Military District, Zhukov was sent to the Far East in June 1939 to deal with Japan's attempted invasion of Mongolia. By the end of August, he had decisively repulsed the Japanese in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. In 1940, he was promoted to army general and appointed chief of the General Staff. After the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Zhukov asked to be relieved from that post when Joseph Stalin rejected his suggestion that Kiev be abandoned before it was lost to the Germans. Stalin's decision cost the Soviets some 665,000 soldiers captured by the Germans.

During the course of World War II, Zhukov was involved in the planning and execution of nearly every major campaign of the Eastern Front. In October 1941, he replaced Marshal Kliment Voroshilov at Leningrad and galvanized the defense there. Then, as commander of the West Front that same month, he organized the defense of Moscow; in November and December, he launched the counteroffensive that forced the Germans back from Moscow. In the fall of 1942, Zhukov and General Aleksandr Vasilevsky planned the counteroffensive at Stalingrad that trapped General Friedrich Paulus's German Sixth Army.

Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union and appointed deputy supreme commander of the Red Army, Zhukov returned to Leningrad in 1943 and lifted the siege there. Then in July as special representative for Stavka (the Soviet high command), again along with Vasilevsky, Zhukov supervised the defense of the Kursk salient and the subsequent offensive that swept across the Ukraine.



Soviet marshal Georgii Zhukov, ca. 1942. Known as “Stalin’s Fireman,” Zhukov took part in almost every major Soviet battle of the war. (Library of Congress)

During June 22–August 29, 1944, Zhukov commanded the Belorussia Offensive, which destroyed German Army Group Center and ended the German occupation of Poland and Czechoslovakia. In April 1945, he personally commanded the final assault on Berlin; he took the official German surrender for the Soviet Union on May 8, 1945, and remained to command Soviet occupation forces in Germany.

In 1946, Zhukov assumed command of all Soviet ground forces, but one year later, he fell victim to Stalin’s paranoia and was relegated to command of the Odessa Military District. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Zhukov became deputy minister of defense and then in 1955 defense minister. During the Nikita Khrushchev years, Zhukov’s fortunes rose and fell but rose again when Khrushchev was deposed in 1964. Zhukov died in Moscow on June 18, 1974.

ARTHUR T. FRAME

See also

BAGRATION, Operation; BARBAROSSA, Operation; Eastern Front; Germany, Surrender of; Great Purges; Kharkov, Battles of; Kursk, Battle of; Leningrad, Siege of; Moscow, Battle of; Paulus, Friedrich; Poland–East Prussia Campaign; Stalingrad, Battle of

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Zoot Suit Riots (May–June 1943)

Series of violent clashes that occurred chiefly in Los Angeles, California, during May–June 1943, pitting U.S. servicemen—chiefly sailors and marines—against Mexican Americans. The rioting later spread to other cities, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, San Diego, Oakland, and San Jose; these latter occurrences were not, however, on the same scale as the riots in Los Angeles.

The riots took their name from the zoot suit, a particular style of clothing that featured long suit coats, baggy pegged pants, a porkpie hat, shoes with high soles, and often a long key chain dangling from the coat pocket. These suits were often worn by the city's Mexican American youths, who called themselves pachucos. Because of wartime restrictions, however, the manufacture of such suits had been banned in 1942 to save fabric for the war effort. Nevertheless, there was a brisk business in the continued illicit manufacture and sale of the suits.

Since the United States entered the war in late 1941, the Los Angeles area had become the temporary home to thousands of soldiers, sailors, and marines. The city also became a favorite spot for servicemen to indulge themselves with women and drink while on leave or with shore passes when

their ships were at Los Angeles for resupply. The local press meanwhile added to racial and ethnic tensions by consistently portraying the city's Mexican American youths as troublemakers and would-be gangsters.

Tensions increased when a group of Latino youths were falsely accused of having murdered a Mexican man during the summer of 1942; the local newspapers only accelerated the rush to judgment. This incident outraged many in the Mexican American community but seemed to give credence to the white community's distrust of the Latino community.

The first major occurrence of violence was on the night of May 30, 1943, when a group of 12 sailors and soldiers began harassing a small group of Mexican American women on the street. A group of young pachucos then confronted the servicemen, and a melee ensued. Several individuals were seriously hurt. Thereafter servicemen targeted zoot suiters, further escalating tensions.

On the evening of June 3 another fight between servicemen and Mexican Americans erupted, this time involving several dozen people. The Los Angeles police did virtually nothing to stop the violence. On June 4, as many as 200 sailors, soldiers, and marines went into the Barrio in East Los Angeles and began assaulting Mexican American youths, some as young as 12 years old, in zoot suits. After beating them, the servicemen stripped off their suits and burned them. The local press portrayed the growing violence as originating solely from the Mexican American community.

After senior military officials revoked passes to military personnel and confined them to barracks, the violence died down by June 8. By midmonth, however, rioting had erupted in other California cities as well as those farther to the east.

In the aftermath, much criticism was aimed at military officials and civilian authorities for having failed to end the rioting sooner. Local officials and the press, however, continued to portray the unrest as being a problem emanating from the Mexican American community. On June 16, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt commented on the riots in her weekly syndicated column. Among other things, she wrote that "The question goes deeper than just suits. It is a racial protest." The *Los Angeles Times* lashed out at Roosevelt, accusing her of stirring up a race war and exhibiting communist leanings.

Some believed that the unrest had been part of a Nazi disinformation campaign, but there is no evidence to suggest that. The riots clearly

demonstrated the high level of racial animosity in the United States during the war; indeed, they were among a number of riots and other violence that erupted between 1941 and 1945 involving racism.

PAUL G. PIERPAOLI JR.

See also
United States; Document 161

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Z Plan

German naval construction program initiated prior to World War II. The Z Plan had its origins in the early 1930s and was based on Adolf Hitler's assertion that no major military undertakings would be initiated until 1944 or 1945. Under restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty following World War I, the German Navy was limited to 6 predreadnought battleships, 6 cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, and no submarines. The Z Plan, which clearly violated the Versailles Treaty, called for a powerful balanced fleet and was eagerly supported by the commander of the German Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, and his fellow admirals, who were then in competition with the army and air force for scarce strategic resources.

Hitler approved the Z Plan on January 27, 1939, three months before he revoked the British-German Naval Agreement of 1935 that had limited his navy to a maximum of 35 percent of its British counterpart; that move itself was a violation of the Versailles Treaty. The Z Plan received supreme priority and called for a powerful fleet of surface ships and submarines centered on 6 superbattleships of 56,000 tons (H class), 12 small battleships of 20,000 tons, 4 aircraft carriers, 44 light cruisers, 68 destroyers, 90 torpedo boats, and 240 U-boats. Four battleships of the Bismarck and Scharnhorst classes (2 each) and 5 heavy cruisers as well as the 3 Deutschland-class pocket battleships already completed or under construction would join this planned fleet. The

total program would include 800 vessels of all types and was scheduled to be completed in 1948. Later, the completion date was advanced to 1944.

At the beginning of World War II the program was canceled, but it was revived in July 1940 after the defeat of France. The plan was even expanded, with schemes for a postwar German Navy of some 1,200 ships, including 25 battleships, 8 aircraft carriers, 100 cruisers, and 400 U-boats. At that time, the program also foresaw a massive buildup of harbors in many of the newly occupied territories, among them the French Atlantic coast and Norway. Trondheim was to become the largest German naval base in Europe. Colonies overseas would provide additional bases, with control of the Atlantic to follow in a second phase.

Little construction was actually undertaken because of the lack of human and industrial resources. After the German defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23, 1942–February 2, 1943), the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) suspended all construction of heavy surface warships in favor of submarines. Since September 1939, industrial facilities had been geared to the rapid completion of the battleships *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz,* the cruisers *Prinz Eugen* and *Seydlitz,* and the aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin* as well as the buildup of submarines. The *Seydlitz* and *Graf Zeppelin* were never completed.

German Navy warships at Hamburg, February 1939. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Hitler saw the Z Plan as a means for Germany to challenge Great Britain and the United States for world naval mastery. The plan remains one of the most striking examples of the lack of realism in German military planning.

From its inception, the program wasted enormous resources and, up to 1943, worked against a buildup of submarines, the major threat to British and U.S. mastery of the Atlantic.

MARTIN MOLL

See also

Bismarck and *Tirpitz*, German Battleships; Dönitz, Karl; Germany, Navy; Raeder, Erich

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Medals and Decorations of World War II

All of the major militaries of World War II conferred symbolic badges of distinction upon their soldiers, sailors, and airmen to recognize gallantry, combat valor, distinguished service, meritorious achievement, or war service. Those military awards took the form of orders, decorations, and medals.

Membership in an order conferred a distinction of chivalry or nobility upon the recipient. Such orders had their origins in medieval Europe hundreds of years ago, and most countries in the mid-20th century had a wide range of such orders. Some were exclusively military, some were exclusively civilian, and some were combined. (This essay will consider only those national orders most commonly awarded to the military.) Orders were awarded for distinguished service, sometimes for gallantry and valor in combat, and quite frequently for simply holding high rank. Most orders had multiple classes or degrees, which generally was a function of the rank of the recipient. For the most part only officers were eligible to receive chivalric and nobility orders. The first modern military decorations evolved from those chivalric and nobility orders.

Like orders, military decorations are awarded to recognize gallantry, valor, distinguished service, or meritorious achievement but without conferring any special social status upon the recipient. As recognition for enlisted soldiers became increasingly common during the 19th century, some countries established decorations that could be conferred regardless of rank.

Some countries through the end of World War II, however, had a dual system of decorations—one for officers and one for enlisted men.

Ranking below orders and decorations in precedence, medals were first introduced during the 19th century to recognize service in a war, a campaign, a battle, or periods of long service. In most but not all countries that fought in World War II, the badge of campaign and service medals had a round shape, whereas the badges of decorations tended to take on a variety of shapes, with stars and crosses predominating.

Although not military medals or decorations in the strictest sense, badges for weapons and equipment qualifications and special skills were also awarded; they comprised a widely developed system in most countries. Some of these badges, such as the U.S. Army's Combat Infantryman Badge and Combat Medic Badge and the German Infantry Assault Badge and Close Combat Badge, often carried greater prestige than most campaign medals and many decorations.

Some countries, including Great Britain and the United States, had specific decorations that were awarded only for combat valor and others that were awarded only for distinguished or meritorious service. In Germany and France, by contrast, most decorations could be awarded for either valor or service, and it was impossible to tell the difference once the award was on a soldier's uniform. The Soviet Union, which had the widest array of medals and decorations, had a composite system. Some countries, such as France, Belgium, and the United States, also had a system of awards for entire units, both for valor and meritorious service.

In the United States and Germany, all ranks were eligible for all decorations. In Britain and to a lesser degree France and the Soviet Union, certain decorations were only for officers, and others were only for enlisted personnel. In most countries with a dual system, however, the highest combat decoration could be awarded to both officers and enlisted soldiers. Some countries, including France, had a system of decorations that could be awarded to civilians as well as to military personnel. Others, such as Britain and Germany, generally had separate awards for civilians. The United States had a mixed system in which certain military decorations could be awarded to civilians and some could not.

The full medal of an award, consisting of a badge and a suspension ribbon, was normally worn only on dress uniforms and for special occasions.

For daily wear on service uniforms, the medals and decorations were represented by ribbon bars in the same pattern as the award's suspension ribbon. Soldiers of most countries during World War II did not wear full medals or ribbon bars on their combat or field uniforms. German and Soviet soldiers, and especially officers, did wear ribbon bars on their field uniforms, and German soldiers holding the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross invariably wore that decoration suspended from a neck ribbon on their uniforms, regardless of the situation.

The numbers of the highest military decorations awarded by the various belligerents during World War II are summarized in Table 1. Tables 2 through 10 list for the specified country their orders and decorations in order of precedence, followed by a listing of campaign and service medals. The dates in parentheses after the orders and decorations indicate when the award was established. The dates in parentheses after the campaign medals indicate the periods of service for which the medal was awarded.

Table 1. Statistics of Highest Decorations Awarded during World War II

United States	Medal of Honor	464
	Distinguished Service Cross	5,057
	Navy Cross	3,958
Great Britain	Victoria Cross and Bar	1
	Victoria Cross	181
	George Cross	158
	Distinguished Service Order	5,444
Soviet Union	Hero of the Soviet Union 3rd Award	4
	Hero of the Soviet Union 2nd Award	104
	Hero of the Soviet Union	11,066
	Order of Victory	22
Germany	Grand Cross of the Iron Cross	1
	Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross	7,365
	Gold Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds	1
	Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds	27
	Oak Leaves and Swords	159

	Oak Leaves	890
France	Legion of Honor (All Classes)	21,000
	Medaille Militaire	222,000
Poland	*Virtuti Militari*	
	Grand Cross	13
	Commander	24
	Cavalier	74
	Gold Cross	442
	Silver Cross	10,658

Table 2. U.S. Military Decorations and Campaign and Service Medals of World War II

Precedence of Decorations
1. Navy Medal of Honor (1861) Army Medal of Honor (1862)
2. Distinguished Service Cross (1918) Navy Cross (1919)
3. Army Distinguished Service Medal (1918) Navy Distinguished Service Medal (1918)
4. Silver Star (1918)
5. Legion of Merit (1942)
6. Distinguished Flying Cross (1926)
7. Soldier's Medal (1926) Navy and Marine Corps Medal (1942)
8. Bronze Star Medal (1942)
9. Air Medal (1942)
10. Navy Commendation Medal (1944) Army Commendation Medal (1945)
11. Purple Heart (1932)
Campaign and Service Medals
American Defense Service Medal (1939–1941)
American Campaign Medal (1941–1946)
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal (1942–1946)
European–African–Middle East Campaign Medal (1941–1946)
World War II Victory Medal (1941–1946)

Army of Occupation Medal (1945–1990)
Naval Occupation Service Medal (1945–1990)

Table 3. British Orders, Decorations, and Campaign and Service Medals of World War II

Precedence of Orders and Decorations
1. Victoria Cross (1856)
2. George Cross (1940)
3. Order of the Garter (1348)
4. Order of the Thistle (1687)
5. Order of the Bath (1st through 3rd Classes) (1399)
6. Order of Merit (1902)
7. Order of St. Michael and St. George (1818)
8. Royal Victorian Order (1st through 3rd Classes) (1896)
9. Order of the British Empire (1st through 3rd Classes) (1917)
10. Order of the Companions of Honour (1917)
11. Distinguished Service Order (1886)
12. Royal Victorian Order (4th Class) (1896)
13. Order of the British Empire (4th Class) (1917)
14. Imperial Service Order (1902)
15. Royal Victorian Order (5th Class) (1896)
16. Order of the British Empire (5th Class) (1917)
17. Distinguished Service Cross (Royal Navy) (1914)
18. Military Cross (Army) (1914)
19. Distinguished Flying Cross (Royal Air Force) (1918)
20. Air Force Cross (Royal Air Force) (1918)
21. Distinguished Conduct Medal (Army) (1854)
22. Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (Royal Navy) (1855)
23. George Medal (1940)
24. Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (Flying) (Royal Air Force) (1943)
25. Distinguished Service Medal (Royal Navy) (1914)
26. Military Medal (Army) (1916)
27. Distinguished Flying Medal (Royal Air Force) (1918)

28. Air Force Medal (Royal Air Force) (1918)
29. British Empire Medal (1917)
Campaign and Service Medals
Defence Medal (1939–1945)
War Medal (1939–1945)
1939–1945 Star (1939–1945)
Atlantic Star (1939–1945)
Air Crew Europe Star (1939–1944)
Africa Star (1940–1943)
Pacific Star (1941–1945)
Burma Star (1941–1945)
Italy Star (1943–1945)
France and Germany Star (1944–1945)
British Commonwealth Campaign and Service Medals
Indian Service Medal (1939–1945)
Canadian Volunteer Service Medal (1939–1947)
South African Service Medal (1939–1945)
Australia Service Medal (1939–1945)
New Zealand War Service Medal (1939–1945)
Southern Rhodesia War Service Medal (1939–1945)
Newfoundland Volunteer War Service Medal (1939–1945)

Table 4. French Military Decorations and Campaign Medals of World War II

Precedence of Decorations
1. Legion of Honor Grand Cross (1805)
2. Legion of Honor Grand Officer (1802)
3. Legion of Honor Commander (1802)
4. Legion of Honor Officer (1802)
5. Legion of Honor Chevalier (1802)
6. Order of the Liberation (1940)
7. Medaille Militaire (1852)
8. Croix de Guerre 1939–1945 (1939)

9. Combatant’s Cross (1926)
10. Resistance Medal (1943)
11. Escapee’s Medal (1926)
12. Medal of Liberated France (1947)
Campaign and Service Medals
Cross for Combat Volunteers (1939–1945)
War Commemorative Medal (1939–1945)
Cross for Combatant Volunteers in the Resistance (1940–1945)
Free French Forces Voluntary Service Medal (1940–1943)
Italian Campaign Medal (1943–1944)
Medal for Those Deported or Interred for Acts of Resistance (1940–1945)
Medal for Those Deported or Interred for Political Acts (1940–1945)

Table 5. Soviet Orders and Decorations and Campaign and Service Medals of World War II

Precedence of Orders and Decorations
1. Hero of the Soviet Union (1934)
2. Hero of Socialist Labor (1938)
3. Order of Lenin (1930)
4. Order of Victory (1943)
5. Order of the Red Banner (1924)
6. Order of Suvorov (army, 3 classes) (1942)
7. Order of Ushakov (navy, 2 classes) (1944)
8. Order of Kutuzov (army, 3 classes) (1942–1943)
9. Order of Nakhimov (navy, 2 classes) (1944)
10. Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky (3 classes) (1943)
11. Order of Alexander Nevsky (army and air force) (1942)
12. Order of the Patriotic War (2 classes) (1942)
13. Order of the Red Star (1930)
14. Order of the Badge of Honor (civilians) (1935)
15. Order of Glory (army and air force, 3 classes) (1943)
16. Order of Mother Heroine (civilians) (1944)
17. Order of the Glory of Motherhood (civilians) (1944)

18. For Valor (1938)
19. For Meritorious Service in Battle (1938)
20. Ushakov Medal (navy, 2 classes) (1944)
21. Nakhimov Medal (navy, 2 classes) (1944)
Campaign and Service Medals
Defense of Leningrad Medal (1941–1944)
Defense of Moscow Medal (1941–1942)
Defense of Odessa Medal (1941)
Defense of Sevastopol Medal (1941–1942)
Defense of Stalingrad Medal (1942)
Defense of Kiev Medal (1941)
Defense of the Caucasus Medal (1942–1943)
Defense of the Soviet Arctic Medal (1944)
Liberation of Belgrade Medal (1944)
Liberation of Warsaw Medal (1945)
Liberation of Prague Medal (1945)
Capture of Budapest Medal (1944–1945)
Capture of Königsberg Medal (1945)
Capture of Vienna Medal (1945)
Capture of Berlin Medal (1945)
Victory over Germany Medal (1941–1945)
Victory over Japan Medal (1945)

Table 6. German Military Decorations and Campaign Medals and Shields of World War II

Precedence of Decorations
1. Grand Cross of the Iron Cross (1813)
2. Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Gold Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds (1944)
3. Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds (1941)
4. Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords (1941)
5. Pour le Mérite with Oak Leaves (1810)*
6. Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves (1940)
7. Pour le Mérite (1740)*

8. Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross (1939)
9. War Order of the German Cross in Gold (1941)
10. Knight’s Cross of the War Cross of Merit in Gold (1944)†
11. Knight’s Cross of the War Cross of Merit in Silver (1940)†
12. War Order of the German Cross in Silver (1941)
13. Roll of Honor Clasp (1941)
14. Iron Cross 1st Class (1813)
15. War Cross of Merit 1st Class (1939)†
16. Iron Cross 2nd Class (1813)
17. War Cross of Merit 2nd Class (1939)†
18. War Medal for Merit (civilians) (1940)
Campaign Medals, Shields, and Cuff Bands
Spanish Cross (6 classes) (1936–1939)
Sudetenland Commemorative Medal (1938)
Anschluss Commemorative Medal (1938)
Return of Memel Commemorative Medal (1939)
West Wall Medal (1939–1941, 1944)
Medal for the Winter Campaign in the East (1941–1942)
Narvik Shield (1940)
Crimea Shield (1941–1942)
Demyansk Shield (1941–1942)
Kuban Shield (1943)
Cholm Shield (1942)
Warsaw Shield (1944)
Lappland Shield (1945)
1936 Spain 1939 Cuff Band (1936–1939)
Condor Legion Cuff Band (1936–1939)
Crete Cuff Band (1941)
Afrika Cuff Band (1941–1943)
Kurland Cuff Band (1943)
* Not awarded after 1918 but still worn on German uniforms during World War II. † Awarded with or without Swords to indicate direct involvement in military operations.

Table 7. Italian Military Decorations and Campaign Medals of World War II

Precedence of Orders and Military Decorations
1. Military Order of Italy (5 classes) (1815)
2. Order of the Roman Eagle (6 classes) (1942)
3. Gold Medal of Military Valor (1793)
4. Silver Medal of Military Valor (1833)
5. Bronze Medal of Military Valor (1887)
6. War Cross for Military Valor (1922)
7. Medal for Military Valor (3 classes) (1833)
8. Medal for Naval Valor (3 classes) (1836)
9. Medal for Aeronautical Valor (3 classes) (1927)
10. War Merit Cross (1918)
Campaign and Service Medals
Medal for the March on Rome (1922)
Medal for the Ethiopian Campaign (1935–1936)
Medal for the Spanish Campaign (1936–1939)
Medal for the Albanian Campaign (1940)
Medal for the Campaign Against France (1940)
Medal for the Italo-German Campaign in North Africa (1940–1943)
Medal of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (1941–1942)
War Commemorative Medal (1940–1943)
Medal for the War of Liberation (1943–1945)
Medal for Volunteers of the War (1940–1945)

Table 8. Polish Orders, Military Decorations, and Campaign Medals of World War II

Precedence of Orders and Decorations
1. Order of the White Eagle (1705)
2. Virtuti Militari (5 classes) (1792)
3. Cross of Valor (1920)
4. Cross of Merit for Bravery (1928)
5. Gold Cross of Merit with Swords (1942)
6. Silver Cross of Merit with Swords (1942)

7. Bronze Cross of Merit with Swords (1942)
8. Order of the Grunwald Cross (3 classes) (1943)
Campaign and Service Medals
Army Medal for War (1939–1945)
Navy Medal for War (1939–1945)
Air Force Medal for War (1939–1945)
Merchant Marine Medal for War (1939–1945)
Partisan Cross (1939–1945)
Home Army Cross (1939–1945)
Monte Casino Commemorative Cross (1944)

Table 9. Chinese Orders, Military Decorations, and Campaign Medals of World War II

Precedence of Orders and Decorations
1. Honor Saber of the Awakened Lion (1935)
2. Order of National Glory (1937)
3. Order of the Blue Sky and White Sun (1929)
4. Order of the Precious Tripod (9 classes) (1929)
5. Order of Loyalty and Valor (1944)
6. Order of the Cloud and Banner (9 classes) (1935)
7. Order of Loyalty and Diligence (1944)
8. Order of Grand Community (Air Force) (1945)
9. Order of Cosmic Diagram (Air Force) (1945)
10. Order of Book of Nature (Air Force) (1945)
11. Order of Sublime Commencement (Air Force) (1945)
12. Order of Renaissance and Honor (Air Force, 3 classes) (1937)
13. Order of Victory of Resistance against Aggression (1945)
14. Medal of the Armed Forces (1929)
15. Medal of the Brilliant Light (1937)
16. Medal of Victorious Garrison (1937)
17. Medal of Loyalty and Integrity (1945)
18. Star Medals (Air Force) (1938)
Campaign and Service Medals

Medal of Victory of Resistance against Aggression (1937–1945)
China World War II Commemorative Medal (1937–1945)

Table 10. Japanese Orders, Military Decorations, and Campaign Medals of World War II

Precedence of Orders and Decorations
1. Order of the Rising Sun (8 classes) (1875)
2. Order of the Sacred Treasure (8 classes) (1888)
3. Order of the Golden Kite (7 classes) (1890)
Campaign and Service Medals (Military Medals of Honor)
China Incident War Medal (1931–34)
China Incident War Medal (1937–1945)
Great East Asia War Medal (1941–1945)

United States

The United States has never had orders of chivalry or nobility. The Medal of Honor is America's oldest continuous military decoration. It was established for the U.S. Navy on December 12, 1861, and for the U.S. Army on July 12, 1862. Because the Medal of Honor is awarded "in the name of Congress," it frequently but erroneously is called the "Congressional Medal of Honor." Since its introduction it has been America's highest military decoration for battlefield heroism. It is awarded by the president to members of the U.S. Armed Forces who distinguish themselves by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of their lives above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in combat against an armed enemy of the United States. Originally it was authorized only for enlisted personnel. Officers became eligible for the army version of the Medal of Honor in 1863 and for the navy version in 1915.

The Army and Navy Medals of Honor differed initially in that the Army Medal of Honor from the start could be awarded only for acts of combat valor. Until 1942 the Navy Medal of Honor was awarded for both wartime and peacetime acts of heroism. Between 1917 and 1942 the navy actually had two different designs for the Medal of Honor, one for combat and one for noncombat. The suspension ribbon was the same for both navy versions, while the badge of the medal was different.

During World War II the Army Medal of Honor was awarded 324 times, including 38 awards to members of the U.S. Army Air Forces. The Navy Medal of Honor was awarded 140 times, including to 82 U.S. marines and one U.S. coastguardsman. The most Medals of Honor awarded for a single World War II battle was 27, for Iwo Jima. The most Medals of Honor within a single unit was 21, awarded to soldiers of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (including the 100th Infantry Battalion), a unit consisting of Japanese Americans.

In 1918 and 1919 the modern system of American military decorations came into being when the U.S. Congress established the Distinguished Service Cross, the Navy Cross, and the Distinguished Service Medal. The concept of the Pyramid of Honor for the first time in American history recognized respective levels of military service to the nation. The Distinguished Service Cross and the Navy Cross are America's second-highest decorations and are awarded only for combat heroism. Although they have different names and completely different ribbons and badges, they are on the same level. Civilians are not eligible for the Medal of Honor but are eligible for the Distinguished Service Cross and the Navy Cross. Virginia Hall, a World War II Office of Strategic Services operative (and technically a civilian), was the only woman ever awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Foreigners were also eligible for the Distinguished Service Cross. French colonel Raoul Salan was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his role in Operation DRAGOON, the Allied southern France landings.

Also established at the end of World War I was the Distinguished Service Medal, America's third-highest decoration overall and the highest for service other than direct combat. Although the name of the award is the same, the army and navy versions of the Distinguished Service Medal have completely different ribbons and badges.

American soldiers wounded in action in World War I were authorized to wear for each wound a Wound Chevron, a small inverted chevron on the lower right uniform sleeve. In 1932 the Wound Chevron was superseded when the Revolutionary War–era Badge of Military Merit was reestablished as the Purple Heart. Awarded for wounds received in combat, the Purple Heart was retroactive to April 5, 1917, but initially the recipient still had to be alive to receive it. During the early days of World War II, eligibility for the Purple Heart was extended to those who received mortal wounds.

Second and subsequent awards of U.S. Army decorations are indicated by a Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster device on the suspension ribbon or the ribbon bar. Fifth subsequent awards are indicated by a Silver Oak Leaf Cluster device. For navy and marine decorations, the second and subsequent awards are indicated by a $^{5}/_{16}$-inch Gold Star Device on the ribbon and the fifth subsequent award by a $^{5}/_{16}$-inch Silver Star Device.

America awarded four campaign medals during World War II and a Victory Medal at the end of the war. A $^{3}/_{16}$-inch Bronze Star Device affixed to the medal ribbon indicated each individual campaign in which a soldier participated. One $^{3}/_{16}$-inch Silver Star Device represented five campaigns. Separate Occupation Medals for the army and the navy were awarded for occupation duty in Germany and Japan starting in 1945. But since Berlin remained technically an occupied city until the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, both medals were awarded to American soldiers and sailors stationed in Berlin through 1990.

Determining the most decorated American serviceman of World War II is an inexact process at best. Three U.S. Navy officers are certainly among the leading contenders. Submarine commander Samuel D. Dealey received the Medal of Honor, four Navy Crosses, an Army Distinguished Service Cross, a Silver Star, and a Purple Heart (posthumously). PT boat commander John D. Bulkeley received the Medal of Honor, two Army Distinguished Service Crosses, the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, and two Purple Hearts. Submarine commander Eugene B. Fluckey received the Medal of Honor and Four Navy Crosses. The most decorated ground combat soldier was Audie L. Murphy, who received the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, two Silver Stars, and three Purple Hearts.

United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth

All of the countries of the British Commonwealth that committed forces to World War II used the British military awards system. British subjects who receive orders and decorations are entitled to use postnominal initials for those specific awards. Of the eight British orders in use during World War II,

two were most frequently conferred upon military officers. The Most Honorable Order of the Bath was established in 1399 as a purely military order of knighthood. In disuse for many years, it was revived in 1725, and a Civil Division was added in 1847. It had three classes: Knight Grand Cross (GCB), Knight Commander (KCB), and Companion (CB). The Order of the Bath was only conferred on general and flag officers. At a lower level, the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire was established in 1917. It had five classes. Knight Grand Cross (GBE), Knight Commander (KBE), and Commander (CBE) were usually awarded to general officers. The Officer (OBE) and Member (MBE) classes could be awarded to field grade officers.

Britain's highest decoration for combat gallantry is the Victoria Cross (VC). Established in 1856, it can be awarded to both officers and enlisted. New Zealand captain Charles Upham was the only soldier of World War II, and one of only three ever, to win a Victoria Cross and Bar. He was actually recommended for the VC on three separate occasions, but his second and third nominations were consolidated. A bar attached to the suspension ribbon of a decoration is the British method of indicating subsequent awards.

In 1940 Britain introduced the George Cross (GC) as its second-highest award for heroism. Actually considered the equivalent of the VC, the GC is awarded to both civilians and military personnel for acts of extreme heroism not involving direct enemy fire. While the American Medal of Honor can be awarded for acts of heroism as a prisoner of war, similar acts by British soldiers are recognized with the George Cross. The GC is also awarded for nonwar acts of heroism, such as those performed by policemen and firemen. During World War II the island of Malta was awarded the George Cross for its staunch resistance against a prolonged Axis sea blockade and relentless air attacks. Malta today displays the badge of the George Cross in the upper left corner of the country's flag.

Below the level of the Victoria Cross and George Cross, British decorations split into two parallel systems, one for officers and the other for enlisted. The British only consolidated the two systems in 1993. For British officers of all services the Distinguished Service Order (DSO), established in 1886, was second in precedence to the Victoria Cross. It could be awarded for either exceptional service or gallantry, but during both world wars it was frequently awarded for heroism. Awarded also to foreign officers, Major General Robert T. Frederick was among the American recipients. The

equivalent decoration for army other ranks was the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM), established in 1854, and for navy other ranks the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (CGM), established in 1855. In 1943 the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (Flying) was added for the Royal Air Force.

Established in 1914, the second level below the Victoria Cross included the Military Cross (MC) for army officers and the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for navy officers. When the Royal Air Force became a separate service in 1918, the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) was established to recognize heroism in aerial combat, and the Air Force Cross (AFC) was established for noncombat aerial heroism. The other ranks' equivalent decorations were the army's Military Medal (MM), established in 1916; the Royal Navy's Distinguished Service Medal (DSM), established in 1914; and the Royal Air Force's Distinguished Flying Medal (DFM) and Air Force Medal (AFM), established in 1918.

Britain awarded 10 campaign medals during World War II. Eight of those medals deviated from standard practice in that their badges were in the shape of a six-pointed star rather than round. Soldiers from the Commonwealth nations also received the British campaign stars, but in many cases those countries also augmented the British awards with their own service medals. Such countries included India, Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Southern Rhodesia.

France

Although France fell on June 17, 1940, the Free French under General Charles de Gaulle used the same system of decorations as the Third Republic, and after the war the newly formed Fourth Republic instituted several awards for World War II service. France's highest decoration, which was also an order, was and still is the Legion of Honor. Established by Napoleon in 1802, it was awarded to both military and civilians. Although it could be awarded for battlefield heroism, it most frequently was awarded for distinguished service. It had five classes: Grand Cross, Grand Officer, Commander, Officer, and Knight. The class of the award was a function of the recipient's rank. Enlisted soldiers during World War II generally were not eligible.

France’s highest purely military decoration was the Medaille Militaire (Military Medal). Established in 1852, it was an award primarily for soldiers and NCOs and also for general officers. The rationale behind such apparently odd criteria was that by the time a French officer reached the general officer ranks, he would already have the Legion of Honor. Even in the French military today it is very rare for a colonel or above not to have the Legion of Honor. The same criteria for the Medaille Militaire therefore still applies in the modern French military. The Medaille Militaire was also awarded to foreigners; General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery were among the World War II recipients.

The combat decoration below the Medaille Militaire was the 1939–1945 Croix de Guerre (War Cross), awarded to both officers and enlisted. With the same badge and a similar ribbon to the 1914–1918 Croix de Guerre, a device attached to the suspension ribbon indicated the level of the headquarters authorizing the award: Bronze Palm for field army, Gilt Star for corps, Silver Star for division, and Bronze Star for brigade or regiment.

The limited nature of France’s participation in the war also limited the scope of its campaign and service medals, which focused on resistance activities and combat service as part of larger Allied formations. Most of the French campaign medals were established in the 1950s. Some, such as the Medal for Those Deported or Interred for Acts of Resistance and the Medal for Those Deported or Interred for Political Acts, recognized French civilians during the German occupation.

Soviet Union

All Imperial Russian orders and decorations were abolished by the Soviet Union following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Through the 1930s the Soviets introduced a little more than a half dozen orders and decorations, most of which could be awarded to both civilians and military personnel. The Hero of the Soviet Union, the Hero of Socialist Labor, and the Order of Lenin were the three highest at the start of World War II and remained so until the Soviet Union ended in 1991. During World War II only four soldiers received the Hero of the Soviet Union three times: Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Semen Budenny and fighter pilots Ivan Kozhedub and

Alexander Pokryshkin. After the war Zhukov received a fourth Hero of the Soviet Union in 1956, making him the most decorated Soviet soldier of all time.

Throughout the war the Soviets established a wide array of orders, many of which were awarded only by individual services. The Order of Victory was established in 1943, right behind the Order of Lenin in precedence. Awarded only 22 times and only to marshals and senior generals, Zhukov, Joseph Stalin, and Marshal of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevsky each received the Order of Victory twice. Five foreign generals, including Eisenhower and Montgomery, also received the award. Ironically, many of the Soviet orders established during the war were named for military heroes of Imperial Russia, including the Order of Suvorov, the Order of Ushakov, and the Order of Kutuzov.

The Soviet Union did not have a system for indicating second and subsequent awards of decorations and medals. On their service uniforms recipients simply added an additional ribbon bar for each subsequent award, and on their dress uniforms they wore an additional copy of the full medal.

The Soviet Union awarded a wide array of campaign medals, which fell into four broad categories: (1) Defense Medals, awarded to both soldiers and civilians who actively participated in the defense of certain cities and areas; (2) Capture Medals, awarded to soldiers who participated directly in the attacks on certain enemy cities; (3) Liberation Medals, awarded to soldiers for the capture of East European cities occupied by the Germans; and (4) Victory Medals, awarded for both Germany and Japan, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was at war with Japan for only 21 days. In 1965, 1975, and 1985 the Soviet Union issued medals to commemorate the 20th, 30th, and 40th anniversaries, respectively, of the victory in World War II. The Russian Federation has continued the practice, issuing 50th, 60th, and 65th Anniversary Medals.

Germany

Prior to 1918, almost all German military awards were conferred by the individual German kingdoms, grand duchies, and other states—Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, etc. During World War I, however, the

awards of Prussia were the ones most widely conferred. Many of the Third Reich's decorations were continuations or expansions of Prussian awards.

The Iron Cross, the most famous of German military decorations, was established in 1813 by King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia. It was awarded in three classes. The Iron Cross 2nd Class and Iron Cross 1st Class could be awarded to all ranks. The rarely awarded Iron Cross Grand Cross was reserved for senior commanders. Under Adolf Hitler, the Iron Cross was reinstated on September 1, 1939. Hitler also established a Knight's Cross between the 1st Class and the Grand Cross. As the war progressed, four more levels of the Knight's Cross were added. Reich Marshal Hermann Göring was the only World War II recipient of the Grand Cross, and Stuka pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel was the only recipient of the Iron Cross Knight's Cross with Golden Oak Leaves, Diamonds, and Swords, an award created specifically for him. Established in 1941, the War Order of the German Cross in Gold was the intermediate award between the Iron Cross 1st Class and the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

The Iron Cross was conferred progressively. A soldier's first act of combat valor, regardless of the nature of the action, was recognized with the Iron Cross 2nd Class; the second act of valor was recognized with the Iron Cross 1st Class and so on. One of the few exceptions to that rule was Göring, who was awarded the Grand Cross directly. Forty-three non-German officers were awarded the Iron Cross Knight's Cross, including Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who received the Oak Leaves and Swords.

Until 1918, Prussia's premier combat decoration was the Orden Pour le Merite (Order of Merit), established in 1740 by Frederick the Great. It was widely known as "The Blue Max," in reference to World War I ace Max Immelmann. Only officers were eligible for the award. In 1813 a higher-level Pour le Merite mit Eichenlaub (with Oak Leaves) was established to recognize extraordinary achievement in battle. Although it was not awarded by the Third Reich, the Pour le Merite remained a recognized and prestigious decoration, and officers such as Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who had received the award during World War I, continued to wear it.

In 1939, Germany established a War Cross of Merit in 2nd and 1st Classes to recognize meritorious service not necessarily involving bravery in direct combat. In 1940 Germany added a Knight's Cross in Silver class to the War Cross of Merit and then in 1944 added a Knight's Cross of the War

Cross of Merit in Gold. All classes could be awarded with Swords, to indicate direct contribution to military operations, or without Swords for meritorious service behind the lines. Established in 1941, the War Order of the German Cross in Silver was the intermediate award between the War Cross of Merit 1st Class and the Knight's Cross of the War Cross of Merit in Silver.

Germany issued very few actual campaign medals in World War II. The Spanish Cross, for service with the Condor Legion or the Blue Division during the Spanish Civil War, was something of a combination of a campaign medal and an order, because it was awarded in six classes, largely dependent upon the rank of the recipient. Germany's only proper campaign medal was the Medal for the Winter Campaign in the East, awarded only for service during the winter campaign of 1941–1942 and widely known among the soldiers as "the Order of the Frozen Flesh." The West Wall Medal, issued in 1940–1941 and again in 1944, was awarded only to construction workers who built the German defenses along the Atlantic coast.

Instead of campaign medals, the Germans recognized participation in some (but by no means all) battles with either cuff titles or small metal shields that were worn on the lower sleeve of the uniform. There were five recognized cuff titles and seven shields, although several unauthorized versions of each type of award did appear on German uniforms.

Italy

Italy's medals and decorations were a complex mixture, reflecting the country's changing status during World War II. Italian awards were issued first by the Kingdom of Italy and then from 1943 by the Republic of Italy and the Social Republic of Italy simultaneously. The Military Order of Savoy, established in 1815, was Italy's principal military distinction. It was awarded to officers in five classes. In 1946 it was renamed the Military Order of Italy. The highest Italian military decoration for combat heroism was the Gold Medal of Military Valor, established in 1833 and awarded to all ranks. The Silver Medal of Military Valor also was established in 1833, and the Bronze Medal of Military Valor was established in 1887. All three awards are current Italian decorations.

The Order of the Roman Eagle for military and civilian foreigners was established in 1942. Awarded in six classes and two medals, it was abolished in 1944, although Mussolini's Social Republic of Italy continued to award it until 1945.

Italy awarded campaign medals for the Ethiopian Campaign, the Spanish Campaign, the French Campaign, and the Albanian Campaign as well as the semiofficial Medal for the Italo-German Campaign in North Africa and the Medal of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia. After the war Italy issued a War Commemorative Medal for service to the Kingdom of Italy between 1940 and 1943 and a Liberation Campaign Medal for service to the Republic of Italy during the 1943–1945 period. An unofficial campaign ribbon also appeared after the war to commemorate service in the military forces of the Social Republic of Italy.

Poland

As with Italy, three different authorities conferred Polish military awards during World War II. After the defeat and dismemberment of the Republic of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union in October 1939, the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile, first based in France and then in London, raised military forces to fight with the Western Allies and also continued the resistance struggle within Poland through the Polish Home Army. Established in 1944, the communist-supported National Polish Liberation Committee became the nominal government of the Polish units fighting under Soviet operational control.

Established in 1705, the Order of the White Eagle was Poland's premier decoration for military officers and civilians. After the fall of Poland, the Polish government-in-exile continued to confer it, but it was never awarded by the post–World War II People's Republic of Poland. The order, however, was never formally abolished, and the postcommunist government reinstituted it in 1992.

Poland's highest purely military decoration was the Virtuti Militari, established in 1792 and awarded in five classes. Since 1918, NCOs and ordinary soldiers have been eligible for the lower three classes. After the fall of Poland the London-based government-in-exile continued to award the

Virtuti Militari, as did the National Polish Liberation Committee from 1944 on. After the war the Virtuti Militari continued as the highest military decoration of the People's Republic of Poland. In October 1992 the postcommunist Polish Sejm passed an act recognizing all of the World War II Virtuti Militari awards conferred by both the government-in-exile and the National Polish Liberation Committee.

In 1942 the government-in-exile established the Gold, Silver, and Bronze Cross of Merit with Swords to recognize acts of valor not involving direct combat. In 1943 the communist resistance movement in Poland established the Order of the Grunwald Cross, which was adopted in 1944 by the National Polish Liberation Committee. It was awarded in three classes to both Poles and Allied military personnel for valor in combat against the Germans. The three Crosses of Merit with Swords are current decorations of the Republic of Poland. The Grunwald Cross was disestablished by the Sejm in 1992, although the Polish government continues to recognize the previous awards.

In 1945 the government-in-exile established separate wartime service medals for Polish Army, Navy, Air Force, and Merchant Marine personnel. In 1945 the National Polish Liberation Committee established the Partisan Cross to recognize members of partisan units who fought the Germans in Poland as well as in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and France. In 1966 the government-in-exile established the Home Army Cross, which was recognized in 1992 by the postcommunist government. Poland's only actual campaign medal of World War II was the Monte Casino Commemorative Cross, introduced by the government-in-exile in 1944 and recognized by the Polish government in 1992.

China

The Republic of China had a vast and bewildering array of decorations and orders, and it is very difficult to establish their relative order of precedence with any real precision. The most important military decorations included the Order of National Glory, The Order of the Blue Sky and White Sun, the Order of the Precious Tripod, the Order of Loyalty and Valor, the Order of the Cloud and Banner, and the Order of Loyalty and Diligence. China's highest military award was the Honor Saber of the Awakened Lion,

specifically established in 1935 for senior-most ranking military officers who already had every other conceivable order and decoration. The Order of Loyalty and Valor was awarded only for acts of great valor while wounded. No other country had such an award.

The fascination of Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) with his fledgling air force was reflected in the group of Chinese air decorations established in the late 1930s and extended in 1945. The 3rd Class of the Order of Renaissance and Honor, established in 1937, was awarded to pilots with three aerial victories, 200 combat missions, or 600 flying hours. The 1st Class of the order required nine aerial victories, 300 combat missions, or 900 hours of flight time. Three new single-class orders introduced in 1945 brought the totals up to 600 combat missions or 1,800 flight hours for the Order of Cosmic Diagram. None of the three new orders had any air-to-air kill criteria. The Order of Grand Community was awarded to distinguished air commanders.

China's only actual campaign medal was the Medal of Victory of Resistance Against Aggression, established in 1946. During the war, the Chinese government had offered to present a special campaign medal to American military personnel serving in China. The U.S. government demurred, but the postwar government of Taiwan resurrected the idea in the late 1970s and awarded the medal to all American veterans who could prove they had served in China. Most of those who received the China World War II Commemorative Medal were veterans of the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force and its predecessor organizations, the China Air Task Force and the American Volunteer Group (the Flying Tigers).

Japan

Most Japanese decorations and orders were instituted in the late 19th century. Japan's premier decoration was the Order of the Chrysanthemum, which was only awarded to members of the royal family and foreign heads of state. The Order of the Rising Sun came in eight classes and was awarded for exceptional civil or military service. The Order of the Sacred Treasure, also in eight classes, was conferred for distinguished civil or military service. The

primary Japanese award for combat heroism was the Order of the Golden Kite, which came in seven classes.

During the war, Japan established several awards for the various occupation and puppet regimes it set up in China. In 1936, Emperor Aixinjueluo Puyi of Manchukuo initiated the Order of the Pillars of State and the Order of the Auspicious Cloud, both for Japanese officers and Chinese officials who cooperated with the Japanese occupation. When the Japanese invaded China proper, they established another puppet regime called the Reorganized National Government of China. In 1943, that government instituted the Order of United Glory, also for Japanese officers and Chinese collaborators.

Japanese war service medals were called Military Medals of Honor. First established in 1874 for the Formosa Expedition, such medals were awarded to all military personnel who participated in battles in a given war. Only three such medals were awarded for World War II, one each for what the Japanese called the 1931–1934 and the 1937–1945 "China War Incidents" and a general medal for the 1941–1945 "Great East Asia War." The Military Medals of Honor were abolished from the Japanese awards system by the postwar Allied occupation government.

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Military Organization

Militaries are hierarchical organizations. Long ago, army commanders learned through trial and error that a given number of soldiers operating on the battlefield as part of a coordinated and synchronized team functioned far more effectively than an equal number or even a larger number of individual combatants. In the classical period, the ancient Greeks developed the phalanx, and the ancient Romans developed the century, the cohort, and the legion. By World War II, there was an amazing similarity in the names and the structures of the various echelons of most of the world's armies. There was somewhat less similarity among the navies and air forces of the various nations.

Armies

The primary unit in almost all armies was the section, or squad, consisting of 8 to 12 soldiers and led by a junior-ranking noncommissioned officer (NCO), usually a corporal or a sergeant. Most armies further divided the infantry squad into two or three teams, each with a specific function, such as carrying and manning a light machine gun. In artillery units, the section made up the crew of a single gun. In armor units, the crew of a single tank was the primary unit.

The platoon consisted of three or four squads and up to 30 soldiers, commanded by a junior lieutenant and assisted by a midlevel sergeant. In the British Army, the lieutenant was called a platoon commander. In the U.S.

Army, he was known as a platoon leader. In the U.S. Army, the company was the lowest level at which an officer exercised full command authority. As World War II progressed, attrition of combat units forced many armies to place NCOs in charge of platoons; some NCOs eventually earned a battlefield commission in this manner. The term “platoon” is derived from the French word *peloton*, which simply means “a group of men,” and was first used to describe any group of soldiers who fired their weapons in unison.

The company, consisting of three or four platoons, is one of the oldest of all military organizations. It traces its lineage directly to the Roman century, commanded by a centurion. By World War II, companies in most armies numbered between 100 and 250 soldiers, depending on the type. In artillery units, the company-size unit was known as a battery (with between two and six gun sections, depending on the size of the gun), and in a cavalry unit, the company-size unit was called a troop. The company commander was assisted by a senior first lieutenant as the executive officer and a senior NCO as the first sergeant. In almost all armies except those of the British Commonwealth, the company, battery, or troop commander was a captain. The British assigned majors as company commanders and still do so to this day.

In the early 17th century Maurice of Nassau introduced the battalion, patterned on the ancient Roman cohort. Commanded by a lieutenant colonel, the World War II battalion consisted of three to five companies, totaling between 400 and 800 soldiers depending on the type of unit. In cavalry organizations, the battalion-size unit was called a squadron—which was in no way equivalent to a naval squadron or an air force squadron. In most armies, the equivalent artillery unit was also called a battalion, but in the German Army it was called an *Abteilung*. The battalion is the lowest echelon at which a commander has a dedicated staff to assist him in planning and conducting operations.

The regiment, commanded by a colonel, is another of the oldest of military formations. Evolving from the ancient Roman legion, the World War II regiment consisted of three or four battalions and had between 1,000 and 3,000 soldiers. Nominally, the next echelon above the regiment was the brigade, but there was a great deal of variation at this particular level from army to army.

In the U.S. Army of World War II, a brigade was generally an

organization separate from a division, consisting of three or more battalions and commanded by either a colonel or a brigadier general, depending on its size and mission. In the German Army, a brigade consisted of two regiments as part of a divisional structure. After World War II, the U.S. Army abandoned the regiment and made the brigade the echelon between the division and the battalion.

The division first appeared at the end of the 18th century. Composed of two or more brigades or regiments plus a full range of supporting arms and services, the World War II division was the lowest echelon capable of semi-independent combined-arms operations. Depending on its type (infantry, armored, airborne, cavalry), the division had from 12,000 to 18,000 soldiers. Rather than brigades or regiments, a U.S. armored division of World War II was organized into three combat commands (A, B, and Reserve), which could be task-tailored from the division's battalions from operation to operation. That system was the forerunner of the U.S. Army's modern division-brigade system.

In most armies the division was commanded by a major general, but in the German and Soviet Armies, a lieutenant general led the division. Despite the difference in rank titles, a divisional commander in all cases was the equivalent of a two-star general. Because of high attrition rates among senior officers in the German Army, however, it was not uncommon for a German division to be commanded by a colonel.

Two or more divisions composed a World War II corps. A product of the mass armies of the French Revolution, a corps of Napoleon's day was commanded by a marshal. During World War II, the standard rank of a corps commander was lieutenant general (or three-star equivalent). In the U.S. Army, however, most of the corps commanders were senior major generals who had successfully commanded at the divisional level. In addition to its subordinate divisions, a corps also had a number of separate battalions and brigades of supporting arms and services, which it routinely allocated to the divisions to reinforce them for specific operations.

Depending on the number of subordinate divisions, a corps could have from 50,000 to 80,000 soldiers. The Japanese equivalent of a corps was called an army, and it directly controlled its subordinate divisions. Corps were always designated in Roman numerals—for example, V Corps—while

all echelons below that corps were designated in Arabic numerals: thus, 3rd Infantry Division.

The echelon above the corps was the army, sometimes called the field army but also known as the numbered army to distinguish it from the army as a whole. In most militaries, the army was commanded by a full general (four-star equivalent), but the majority of U.S. armies in World War II were actually commanded by lieutenant generals. At the end of the war, the most successful of the army commanders, among them George S. Patton Jr., received their fourth star. The Japanese equivalent of a field army was called an area army. Armies are designated by spelling out their numerical designation: for example, Third Army.

The army group, which first appeared in World War I, is the largest battlefield command in military history. An army group is commanded by either a full general (four-star equivalent) or a field marshal (equivalent to a five-star general). In the Soviet Army, the army group was known as a front. Army group designations used Arabic numerals: for example, 12th Army Group.

Above the level of the army group, most World War II militaries had at least one or two additional echelons of command. A theater was responsible for directing all the military activity in a given geographic area of operations. The commander of a theater usually held the title commander in chief (abbreviated as CinC). On the German side, the theater commander held the title Oberbefehlshaber (OB). The OB only commanded the forces of a single service. In the integrated Anglo-American command structure, a CinC was a joint commander, meaning he had direct command authority over all land, naval, and air forces in his theater. Allied navies and the Royal Air Force (RAF) also use the title CinC for those who commanded both the support units (the shore establishment for navies or the air base and logistics structure for the RAF) and operational units.

At the highest levels of military command in World War II, each nation had a body of military officers that formed the supreme command, presiding over all military activities and reporting directly to the country’s political leadership. Britain had the Imperial General Staff, and the United States had the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the conduct of World War II, however, the two bodies formed a combined committee known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The highest Soviet military body was called Stavka. The Germans had

a supreme command for each of its three services: Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) for the army, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM) for the navy, and Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) for the air force. Making matters more complicated still, there was a supreme command of the armed forces sitting over them, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). Unfortunately for Germany, the four supreme commands spent almost as much time fighting each other as they did fighting the Allies.

Marines

Almost all marine organizations of World War II were relatively small and specialized. Although they were components of their respective navies, they were all organized along army lines. The U.S. Marine Corps was by far the largest of World War II—larger, in fact, than the entire armies of some nations. The corps was the highest level of command echelon in the U.S. Marine Corps of World War II.

Air Forces

The organization of most air forces was similar to that of armies. The flight was the lowest echelon (composed of four to eight planes in 1939 and four planes by 1940) and was commanded by a lieutenant in the German service, a flight lieutenant in the RAF, and a first or second lieutenant in the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF). The equivalent Italian unit was the *sezione* (section), which consisted of three planes until 1941 and two planes after that. Nonflying units had no standard personnel strength, although a flight generally consisted of no more than 20 personnel and a nonflying squadron rarely numbered more than 400. Squadrons (*Staffeln* in the Luftwaffe and *squadriglia* in the Italian Air Force) consisted of two to four flights and a headquarters flight (which was made up of two planes in a flying unit); they were commanded by captains (in fighter squadrons) or majors (in bomber units) in the U.S. service or the equivalent rank of squadron leader in the RAF. German *Staffeln* and Italian *squadriglia* were usually commanded by captains but might be commanded by majors in some cases.

Above the squadron level, the echelons of command differed among the various air forces. For the RAF, the higher echelons were structured along territorial and aircraft-type lines, and the next level of command was the wing, which consisted of the aircraft assigned to a single airfield (and each airfield might have one to four squadrons). The USAAF called the next echelon a group, and it was made up of two to four squadrons. The units were commanded by lieutenant colonels in the USAAF or wing commanders in the RAF, although some American bomber groups were commanded by colonels. By 1944, most American bomber groups were commanded by colonels. The Soviet Air Force grouped squadrons into 60-plane regiments commanded by majors (for fighters) or lieutenant colonels (for bombers). The equivalent German and Italian formations were the *Gruppe* and the *gruppo*, respectively, and normally were commanded by majors, although some bomber units were commanded by lieutenant colonels.

A U.S. wing consisted of two to four air groups; that echelon was known as a *Geschwader* in the German Air Force and as a *stormo* in the Italian Air Force. In all but the RAF, this was the highest echelon equipped with a single type of aircraft (fighters, bombers, etc.), and it was commanded by a colonel in the USAAF or the equivalent in other nations' air forces. In 1944, many American bomber wings were commanded by brigadier generals.

An RAF group captain (equivalent to a colonel) commanded a base, which consisted of two to four airfields located fairly close together. From 1942 on, an air commodore (U.S. equivalent brigadier general) commanded several bases within a designated area. The air commodores reported to the commander in chief of a numbered RAF group, who was normally an air vice marshal (U.S. equivalent major general). The RAF was unique among the air forces of World War II in that its commanders below the theater level commanded only aircraft of a specific type or mission. All but the Soviet Air Force used this structure primarily for their nonflying air force units. For example, a German *Luftgau* (air district) commanded primarily the nonflying support units within its area of responsibility and was headed by an oberst (colonel), and several districts constituted a *divizion* under a generalmajor. The Italian Air Force utilized a similar command structure for its units above the *stormo* level within Italy, calling them *squadra aeree*, but its *aeree* commands for external regions (such as its African colonies, Sardinia, and the Dodecanese Islands) commanded all air force units within their *aeree*,

regardless of type or mission. These *squadra aeree* were commanded by major generals.

For the other air forces, operational commands were based on the number of flying units and the support units assigned them. The German Air Force organized several *Geschwader* of the same type of aircraft into an air division (*Luftdivizion*) under a generalmajor. A *Luftkorps* (air corps) might be established to support a specific campaign or theater (e.g., Luftkorps Afrika), but that was done only three times in the war. The Soviet Air Force structured its aerial units along the same lines as its army, with air brigades and air divisions built around air regiments of varying aircraft types and missions. An air division or corps might support a Soviet army, whereas a numbered air army of one or more air corps would support a front.

For the U.S. Army Air Forces, the command echelon above the wing was the numbered air force, which was commanded in 1942 and 1943 by a major general whose forces included fighter and bomber groups as well as all support units assigned to them. Initially, a numbered air force was considered the equivalent of a division command, but most were commanded by lieutenant generals in 1944 as the size of some numbered air forces grew. Also, by 1944 the Western Allies had four tactical air commands (TACs)—two-star commands assigned to support the ground campaign. A TAC's various fighter, fighter-bomber, attack, and bomber squadrons were drawn from numbered air forces and assigned to provide close air support, usually to an army group but on rare occasions to an army.

The German equivalent of the numbered air force was the *Luftflotte,* or air fleet, which was commanded by a generalleutnant. The Italian Air Force had *aeree divisioni,* each commanded by a generale di divizione (major general), but they commanded only aircraft of a single type (bomber, fighter). The next echelon for the U.S. Army Air Forces was the theater command, which controlled one or more numbered air forces. In 1944, the U.S. Army Air Forces Mediterranean, for example, was commanded by a lieutenant general, whereas the commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces Europe in 1944 was a full (four-star) general.

Navies

Nations organized their navies along their own unique lines, but in general, seagoing organizations and designations were based on size and ship type, and shore-unit organizations and designations were based on shore-unit size. Destroyers, submarines, and smaller seagoing units were organized in squadrons (in the U.S. and French Navies), flotillas (in the British, Italian, and Soviet Navies), and *Geschwader* (in the German Navy) of 4 to 18 units. Theoretically, two to three squadrons constituted a flotilla, but that structure was done away with by all but the Italian Navy before World War II. Except for the Soviet Navy, a destroyer squadron/flotilla consisted of 4 to 6 destroyers of the same class, commanded by a captain (equivalent to an army or air force colonel) with the title of commodore. The Soviet Navy assigned two or more destroyer squadrons to a flotilla, commanded by a captain first rank (senior to a Royal Navy/U.S. Navy captain but not a flag officer). In European navies, the commodore commanded the flotilla or *Geschwader* flagship (which was often modified to carry additional communications equipment) as well as the flotilla itself. The U.S. Navy was unique in that it provided its squadron commanders with a small staff.

The fast-attack squadron, flotilla, or *Geschwader* consisted of 10 to 18 fast-attack boats commanded by a commander (equivalent to a lieutenant colonel). In the British service, the flotilla commander also commanded the tender that provided the boats with their maintenance, logistics, and communications support. Navies sought to have squadrons and flotillas deploy and fight together as teams, but as the war wore on and maintenance requirements increasingly dictated unit availability, squadrons occasionally deployed with units from another squadron or flotilla. Cruisers and larger ships were organized into divisions of two or more units of the same class, commanded by a rear admiral (equivalent to an army major general). Before 1939, most naval officers expected to fight their warships in divisions and squadrons and trained accordingly.

Airpower's proven effectiveness in the 1940 Norwegian and 1941 Pearl Harbor campaigns changed all that. Fleets deployed and fought in naval formations equivalent to army combined-arms teams. The Royal Navy called those organizations forces and designated them alphabetically (Forces C and D, for example, fought off Crete); the U.S. Navy designated them task groups. A Royal Navy force could consist of as little as a cruiser supported by a pair of destroyers, or it could be centered on a battleship, supported by

one to four cruisers of varying types, possibly an aircraft carrier, and one or two destroyer flotillas. Smaller Royal Navy forces were commanded by either a very senior captain or a rear admiral. The largest, normally those established by the Admiralty, were commanded by a vice admiral.

Before December 1941, U.S. Navy task groups were centered on a battleship under the command of a rear admiral, normally the battleship's division commander. After Pearl Harbor, however, they were formed around aircraft carriers. Destroyers, cruisers, and battleships were stationed around the carrier to augment its antiaircraft firepower and screen it against submarines.

Convoys constituted a special case in the Western navies. They were commanded by one-star commodores. The one-star commodore was a wartime rank that was senior to a captain but junior to a rear admiral; typically a retired navy or merchant ship captain, a convoy commander was in charge of a convoy's merchant ships and, nominally at least, its escorts. In practice, however, the escort commander deployed his ships as he believed the situation dictated and kept the convoy commander informed, coordinating his actions as required to best protect the convoy. The Soviet, German, and Italian Navies assigned convoy command to the senior naval officer present; usually but not always, he was the escort force commander.

The U.S. Navy established an echelon above the task group level in 1942, called the task force. Navy task forces consisted of two or more task groups and were commanded by senior rear admirals in 1942. Before late 1943, two or more U.S. Navy task forces constituted a numbered fleet, commanded by a vice admiral. Odd-numbered fleets operated in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and even-numbered fleets served in the Atlantic and European waters. However, as the navy expanded and numbered fleets came to consist of up to a dozen task forces, some numbered fleets (the Third and Seventh Fleets, whose designations were spelled out just as numbered armies were) came to be commanded by full (four-star) admirals by late 1944. The much smaller Royal and Italian Navies placed their largest forces directly under their respective admiralties until they were allocated to a regional or functional commander (e.g., the commander in chief Mediterranean or commander in chief Home Fleet for Britain or, for Italy, a specific mission); these officers were either rear admirals, vice admirals, or admirals, depending on the size and importance of the command.

By 1942, the U.S. Navy had two theater-level fleet commanders, called commanders in chief, with the rank of admiral; they were in charge of all shore establishments, numbered fleets, aircraft, ships, submarines, and units within their assigned area of responsibilities. One commanded the Atlantic Fleet, and the other commanded the Pacific Fleet (which was also responsible for the Indian Ocean). Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief Pacific, became an admiral of the fleet (five-star equivalent) in 1945.

The Kriegsmarine (German Navy) organized its smaller combatants into *Geschwader*, and its cruisers served under the Kreuzer division (the title was changed to Kampfgruppe in 1944). However, only its destroyers, submarines, and smaller units deployed in units. Doctrinally, major German naval units were to deploy in Kampfgruppen. In theory, the German naval Kampfgruppen consisted of the units supporting a battleship that deployed under a konteradmiral or a vizadmiral for a specific mission. Once deployed, the Gruppe operated under one of the navy's three geographic area commanders (Kommando der Marine Ost, Kommando der Marine West, or Kommando der Marine Nord).

In practice, however, the Germans never had enough major surface units to implement the system. For example, the sortie of the battleship *Bismarck* was led by the fleet commander himself, Admiral Günther Lütjens. Most German surface units deployed alone and had their operations coordinated either by the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM), the Kommando der Marine West, or the Kommando der Marine Nord, depending on whether they were operating outside the North Atlantic, in the North Atlantic, or in the North and Norwegian Seas, respectively.

The U.S. Navy called its shore-based units either activities, commands, or bases. An activity was a small shore unit with a single mission (maintenance, fuel or ordnance support, ship repairs, etc.) under an officer in charge (ranging from a lieutenant to a lieutenant commander, or the equivalent of an army captain to a major, respectively). The Royal Navy did not refer to activities but designated all its units as commands, with the commander's rank determined by unit size. In the U.S. Navy, a command consisted of several activities or was a larger unit that conducted a specialized mission but was too large to be treated as an activity. A command could deploy detachments to support a specific mission for short periods of time; an activity rarely had the resources to do so. Lieutenant commanders,

commanders, and captains were in charge of commands. A base typically hosted several activities and commands, both shore-based and seagoing. In all navies, captains commanded bases.

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Rank Structures, Selected World War II Belligerents

All modern armies have two primary classes of soldiers: officers and enlisted men. This distinction originated in the armies of ancient times. In the medieval period, the distinction was between knights and men at arms, that is, between nobility and commoners. Through the beginning of the 20th century, the distinction between military officers and enlisted soldiers reflected the social class distinctions of society as a whole. An officer was, by definition, a gentleman. The breakdown in the old social orders that started during World War I was likewise reflected in the world's armies. By the end of World War II, the distinction between officers and enlisted men had become far more a professional one than a social one.

Officers, who comprise 15 to 20 percent of modern armies, are further divided into three basic groups. Company-grade officers (lieutenants and captains) are responsible for the leadership of platoons and companies. Field-grade officers (majors and colonels) lead battalions and regiments. General officers command the higher military echelons and also coordinate the overall direction of an army and its military activities.

Generals answer directly to the political leadership of modern democracies. In some armies, the highest-level general officers hold the title of marshal or field marshal. Through the end of World War I the lowest-ranking general officer rank in the British Army and the U.S. Army was brigadier general. In 1926 the British rank of brigadier general was changed

to brigadier, which was no longer considered a general officer but was still a senior officer ranking above colonel. The rank insignia for a brigadier was changed accordingly. The rank remains brigadier today, although within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a British brigadier is still the equivalent of an American brigadier general for all protocol matters.

Through the end of World War II, the rank title of the third highest of the German general officer ranks was a function of that officer's branch, hence general of infantry, general of artillery, general of cavalry, general of Panzer troops, etc. With the establishment of the German Air Force, the Luftwaffe adopted a similar system, with general of fliers, general of air defense artillery, and general of parachute troops. The German Bundeswehr today no longer uses such distinctions.

Navies also recognize three broad groups of officers, without necessarily using the army terms. In most militaries, generals and admirals are collectively called flag officers because each one has a personal flag bearing the insignia of his rank. (Although women flag officers are relatively common in some armies today, colonel was the highest rank held by female officers in World War II.)

Enlisted soldiers, sailors, and airmen are divided into two basic categories: enlisted men and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The term used for the NCO varies from army to army—for example, *Unteroffizier* in German and *sous officier* in French—but the meaning is universal. In any army, NCOs are the backbone of the organization. They are the first-line leaders responsible for training individual soldiers and for training and leading fire teams and squads. NCOs hold key leadership positions in platoons and companies. At the higher levels, NCOs assist staff officers in the planning and execution of operations. In all armies, the larger majority of the enlisted ranks denote the distinctions within the NCO corps. The British and the Americans had the best NCO corps of World War II; the Soviets had the weakest.

NCOs include corporals, sergeants, and, in some armies, warrant officers. In the U.S. Army the lowest NCO rank was corporal, while in the British Army it was lance corporal. In most navies the NCOs are called petty officers, and in some services they are called warrant officers. The category of warrant officer is the most difficult to classify because the individual's exact status varies from country to country and service to service. Most

armies of World War II followed the British model, in which warrant officers were the highest category of NCOs. In the U.S. military, by contrast, warrant officers were a distinct personnel class between officers and enlisted men. They were and still are considered to be specialist officers highly skilled in a certain functional area (such as pilots), receiving pay equivalent to company-grade officers but without the full range of command authority and responsibilities.

In the U.S. military, warrant officers were and are much closer to commissioned officers. In the British military, they are clearly the most senior of the NCOs. Contrary to widely held popular belief, the rank of sergeant major does not exist in the British military. Rather, it is a position title—or an appointment, as the British call it—such as squad leader or company commander. The rank of the NCO holding the sergeant major position is always a warrant officer, but he is addressed by his position title of sergeant major. There is, then, no direct comparison between British and American warrant officers, which partially explains the difficulty in correlating World War II military ranks.

The confusion between American and British warrant officers causes problems to this day in many North American Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters. Most armies of World War II had warrant officers on the British model. Italy, China, Japan, and Finland had warrant officers on the American model. In the latter part of World War II, the Royal Navy (but not the British Army) established a rank called commissioned warrant officer, which it considered to be the lowest of its officer ranks. At the same time, warrant officer (without the commission) remained the Royal Navy's highest enlisted rank.

As in the British Army, the U.S. Army of World War II did not have a distinct rank for sergeant major. The top NCO in an American company was the first sergeant, who had the unique insignia of a diamond between the three upper and three lower stripes of the rank chevron. The top NCO at the battalion and regimental levels was the sergeant major, who wore the rank chevron of a master sergeant—the same insignia as a first sergeant but without the diamond. Ironically, the actual rank of sergeant major had existed in the U.S. Army since at least the Civil War, but it disappeared immediately after World War I—only to be reestablished in the U.S. Army in 1958. The

British did not have company first sergeants. The senior NCO in British companies was called the company sergeant major.

Rank and pay grade are often considered to be the same thing. But although they are roughly equivalent, they are not exactly the same, nor have they ever been. Each specific rank has a distinctive insignia and a defined legal authority. Not so for pay grade. There were and still are many examples of two or even more ranks within the same pay grade, but although the pay is the same, the relative rank is not. In most of the world's armies, command authority is tied rigidly to rank. The senior officer is always in command. The German Army, however, was always different in this respect and even remains so today. The principle in the German Army was always that function overrode rank. An officer in a command position, even if his actual rank was below that authorized for the position, always exercised command authority over lower-level commanders, even if they happened to outrank him. Such a situation would have been unthinkable in the British or U.S. Armies, but it was not uncommon in the German Army.

Establishing rank equivalency among armies is an inexact science at best, as the confusion over warrant officers and sergeants major illustrates. Common sense would seem to dictate that two soldiers in different armies with the exact same rank titles would be essentially equivalent. Unfortunately, that is not the case. The rank of major general provides one of the best examples. A British and an American major general are essentially equivalent, but they are not the same as a German generalmajor. In the U.S. Army, major general was and still is the second of the general officer ranks, whereas in the German Army it was the first, the same level as an American brigadier general. Nor can similarity of rank insignia be used as a reliable guide. The insignia of a French général de brigade, for example, was two stars, while an American brigadier general wore only one star. A French général de division wore three stars, while an American major general wore two.

Consequently, rather than simply accepting rank titles at face value, a reasonably approximate rank equivalency can only be established by considering the duty that the holder of that rank actually performed. In the U.S. and British Armies, divisions were commanded by major generals. In the German Army, however, a generalleutnant was the prescribed rank for a divisional commander. Generalleutnant was also the second of the German

general officer ranks. Thus, a German lieutenant general and a British or American major general were clearly at the same level.

The problem of rank equivalency is further compounded by the fact that all armies did not have the same number of ranks, whether for officers or enlisted personnel. Most armies had three ranks of company-grade officer, but the Soviet Army had four, and the Italian Army had five. The Royal Navy had two grades of commodore. The rank of commodore did not exist in the U.S. Navy at the start of the war but was established in 1943. Both France and Britain had only one grade of marshal, but Germany and Italy had two, and the Soviet Union had three. The U.S. Army had none, but the rank of general of the army (five-star general) is the equivalent of a British field marshal or a German generalfeldmarschall. In some cases, the various military organizations of the same country did not even have the same rank structures. The British Army had three grades of warrant officer. The Royal Air Force (RAF) had only one, but the Royal Canadian Air Force had two. As noted, the Royal Navy had two, but one was an NCO and the other actually an officer.

All air forces grew from their respective armies. By World War II, some of those air forces were independent organizations, such as the RAF and the Luftwaffe, but most were still part of their respective armies, albeit operationally autonomous. The RAF had an officer rank structure parallel to the British Army's but with completely different rank titles and insignia. Most air forces retained the rank structures and titles of their respective armies. In many cases, however, the senior-most air force general officer rank was one or two ranks below the top army rank. The Luftwaffe was a notable exception. The highest German military rank, reichsmarschall, existed only in the German Air Force.

Officer candidates had their own separate rank structures in most armies. But the ranks of cadet, midshipman, aspirant, fahnrich (in the German Army), and so on were essentially temporary training ranks. With the exception of those in Germany and a few other countries, officer candidates in most armies did not take part in combat operations until they had received their commissions—or had failed the course of instruction and were returned to the ranks.

Many German organizations outside the Wehrmacht wore uniforms and had military-like rank structures. For all intents and purposes, the Waffen-SS

was another of Germany's armed forces but had its own unique rank titles and insignia. The German police used the same ranks as the army, up to generaloberst, the highest police rank. The sturmabteilungen (SA), the brown-shirted paramilitary of the Nazi Party, wore uniforms and had military-like ranks, as did the Nazi Party itself. SA and SS ranks titles were almost identical.

Tables 1–6 represent an effort to equate the various enlisted and officer ranks of World War II. In determining the level at which to place a given rank, the duties and responsibilities of the person holding that rank take precedence over the face value of the rank title. The tables do not include officer candidates or true warrant officers (except in Table 1, which lists only American ranks). Warrant officers as NCOs are included. Many armies also had special rank structures and designations for musicians, buglers, and pipers, which likewise are not included in the tables.

The British Army, which describes itself as "a very tribal organization," had and still has a sometimes confusing number of variations on the enlisted ranks from regiment to regiment. In some cases just the title of the rank varies, with the insignia remaining the same. Corporals and lance corporals in the Royal Artillery, for example, are called bombardiers and lance bombardiers. Other ranks, such as squadron quartermaster corporal, had a unique rank insignia and existed only in the Household Cavalry. For the most part, the British enlisted ranks shown in the tables are the most common. The militaries of the British Commonwealth countries of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada all followed the British systems, with some minor variations. The Commonwealth countries did not have field marshals or admirals of the fleet. The Indian Army, including the Gurkha regiments, was led mostly by British officers and senior NCOs. The tables do include a listing of the very narrow range of officer and NCO ranks available to indigenous Indian troops.

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Table 1. Comparison In U.S. Ranks in Varions Branches of Service

	U.S. Army	*U.S. Army Air Forces*	*U.S. Marine Corps*	*U.S. Navy*	*U.S. Coast Guard*
Officers					
	General of the Army	General of the Army		Fleet Admiral	
	General	General	General	Admiral	
	Lieutenant General	Lieutenant General	Lieutenant General	Vice Admiral	Vice Admiral
	Major General	Major General	Major General	Rear Admiral	Rear Admiral
	Brigadier General	Brigadier General	Brigadier General	Commodore	Commodore
	Colonel	Colonel	Colonel	Captain	Captain
	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Commander	Commander
	Major	Major	Major	Lieutenant Commander	Lieutenant Commander
	Captain	Captain	Captain	Lieutenant	Lieutanant
	First Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Lieutenant (j.g.)	Lieutenant (j.g.)
	Second Lieutenant	Second Lieutenant	Second Lieutenant	Ensign	Ensign

Warrant Officers					
	Chief Warrant Officer	Chief Warrant Officer	Chief Warrant Officer	Chief Warrant Officer	Chief Warrant Officer
	Warrant Officer	Warrant Officer Flight Officer	Warrant Officer	Warrant Officer	Warrant Officer
Enlisted					
Grade 1	Master Sergeant First Sergeant	Master Sergeant First Sergeant	Master Sergeant Master Technical Sergeant	Chief Petty Officer	Chief Petty Officer
Grade 2	First Sergeant Technical Sergeant	First Sergeant Technical Sergeant	Gunnery Sergeant Technical Sergeant	Petty Officer First Class	Petty Officer First Class
Grade 3	Staff Sergeant Technician 3rd Grade	Staff Sergeant Technician 3rd Grade	Platoon Sergeant Staff Sergeant	Petty Officer Second Class	Petter Officer Second Class
Grade 4	Sergeant Technician 4th Grade	Sergeant Technician 4th Grade	Sergeant	Petty Officer Third Class	Petty Officer Third Class
Grade 5	Corporal Technician 5th Grade	Corporal Technician 5th Grade	Corporal	Seaman First Class	Seaman First Class
Grade 6	Ptivate First Class	Ptivate First Class	Private First Class	Seaman Second Class	Seaman Second Class
Grade 7	Private	Private	Private	Seaman Third Class	Seaman Third Class

Table 2: Comparison of U.S. and German Ranks in the Various Branches of Service

	U.S. Army	*Wehrmacht Heer*	*Waffen-SS*	*Sturmabteilungen (SA)*	*National Socialist Worker's Party (NSDAP)*
Officers		Reichs marschall			
	General of the Army	Generalfeld marschall	Reichsführer-SS	Stabchef der SA	Reichleiter
	General	Generaloberst	Oberstgruppen führer		Gaulieter
	Lieutenant General	General der Infantrie General der Artillerie General der Kavallerie	Obergruppen führer	Obergruppen führer	Hauptbefehl sleiter

		General der Panzer Truppen			
	Major General	Generalleutnant	Gruppenführer	Gruppenführer	Hauptdien stleiter
	Brigadier General	Generalmajor	Brigadeführer	Brigadeführer	Hauptbereich sleiter
			Oberführer	Oberführer	
	Colonel	Oberst	Standartenführer	Standartenführer	Hauptabschnitt sleiter
	Lieutenant Colonel	Oberstleutnant	Obersturmbann führer	Obersturmbann führer	Hauptgemeins chaftsleiter
	Major	Major	Sturmbannführer	Sturmbannführer	Gemeinschaft sleiter
	Captain	Hauptmann Rittmeister	Hauptsturm führer	Hauptsturm führer	Haupteinsatz sleiter
	First Lieutenant	Oberleutnant	Obersturmführer	Obersturmführer	Obereinsatzsleiter
	Second Lieutenant	Leutnant	Untersturmführer	Sturmführer	Einsatzsleiter
Enlisted					
	Master Sergeant First Sergeant	Stabsfeldwebel	Sturmscharführer	Haupttrupp führer	Hauptbereits chaftsleiter
	Technical Sergeant	Oberfeldwebel	Hauptschar führer	Obertruppführer	Oberbereitschaftsleiter
	Staff Sergeant Technician 3rd Grade	Feldwebel Wachtmeister	Oberscharführer	Truppführer	Bereitschaftsleiter
		Unterfeldwebel	Scharführer	Oberscharführer	
	Sergeant Technician 4th Grade	Unteroffizier	Unterführer	Scharführer	Hauptarbeit sleiter
		Stabsgefreiter			
	Corporal Technician 5th Grade	Obergefreiter			Oberarbeitsleiter
		Gefreiter	Rottenführer	Rottenführer	Arbeitsleiter
	Ptivate First Class	Oberchütze	Sturmmann	Obersturmmann	Oberhelfer
	Private	Schütze	SS-Mann	Sturmmann	Helfer

Note: The NSDAP had a wide range of titles within most of the lower rank levels. This list uses the most representative titles.

U.S. Army Air Forces	*Luftwaffe*	*U.S. Navy*	*Kriegsmarine*
	Reichsmarschall		
General of the Army	Generalfeldmarschall	Fleet Admiral	Grossadmiral

General	Generaloberst	Admiral	Generaladmiral
Lieutenant General	General der Flieger General der Flak Truppen General der Fallschrimjäger	Vice Admiral	Admiral
Major General	Generalleutnant	Rear Admiral	Vizeadmiral
Brigadier General	Generalmajor	Commodore	Konteradmiral
			Kommodore
Colonel	Oberst	Captain	Kapitän zur See
Lieutenant Colonel	Oberstleutnant	Commander	Frigattenkapitän
Major	Major	Lieutenant Commander	Korvettenkapitän
Captain	Hauptmann	Lieutenant	Kapitänleutnant
First Lieutenant	Oberleutnant	Lieutenant (j.g.)	Oberleutnant zur See
Second Lieutenant	Leutnant	Ensign	Leutnant zur See
Master Sergeant First Sergeant	Stabsfeldwebel	Chief Petty Officer	Stabsoberbootsmann
Technical Sergeant	Oberfeldwebel	Petty Officer First Class	Oberbootsmann
			Stabsbootsmann
Staff Sergeant Technician 3rd Grade	Feldwebel Wachtmeister	Petty Officer Second Class	Bootsmann
	Unterfeldwebel		Oberbootsmannmaat
Sergeant Technician 4th Grade	Unteroffizier	Petty Officer Third Class	Bootsmannmaat
	Stabsgefreiter		Matrosenoberstabsgefreiter
Corporal Technician 5th Grade	Obergefreiter	Seaman First Class	Matrosenstabsgefreiter
	Gefreiter		Matrosenhauptgefreiter
Ptivate First Class	Oberchütze	Seaman Second Class	Matrosenobergefreiter
			Matrosengefreiter
Private	Flieger	Seaman Third Class	Matrose

Table 3: Comparison of Ranks in the Armies of World War II

	United States	*Germany*	*Germany Waffen-SS*	*Great Britain*
Officers		Reichsmarschall		
	General of the Army	Generalfeldmarschall	Reichsführer-SS	Field Marshal
	General	Generaloberst	Oberstgruppenführer	General
	Lieutenant General	General der Infantrie General der Artillerie General der Kavallerie General der Panzer Truppen	Obergruppenführer	Lieutenant-General
	Major General	Generalleutnant	Gruppenführer	Major-General
	Brigadier General	Generalmajor	Brigadeführer	Brigadier
			Oberführer	
	Colonel	Oberst	Standartenführer	Colonel
	Lieutenant Colonel	Oberstleutnant	Obersturmbannführer	Lieutenant-Colonel
	Major	Major	Sturmbannführer	Major
	Captain	Hauptmann Rittmeister (Cavalry)	Hauptsturmführer	Captain
	First Lieutenant	Oberleutnant	Obersturmführer	Lieutenant
	Second Lieutenant	Leutnant	Untersturmführer	Second Lieutenant
Enlisted				
	Master Sergeant First Sergeant	Stabsfeldwebel	Sturmscharführer	Warrant Officer Class 1
	Technical Sergeant	Oberfeldwebel	Hauptscharführer	Warrant Officer Class 2
				Warrant Officer Class 3
	Staff Sergeant Technician 3rd	Feldwebel Wachtmeister	Oberscharführer	Staff Sergeant

	Grade	(Cavalry and Artillery)		
		Unterfeldwebel	Scharführer	
	Sergeant Technician 4th Grade	Unteroffizier	Unterführer	Sergeant
		Stabsgefreiter		
	Corporal Technician 5th Grade	Obergefreiter		Corporal Bombardier (Artillery)
		Gefreiter	Rottenführer	Lance Corporal Lance Bombardier (Artillery)
	Ptivate First Class	Oberchütze	Sturmmann	
	Private	Schütze	SS-Mann	Private Gunner Trooper Sapper

India (Indigenous Troops)	*France*	*Soviet Union*	*Italy*	*Poland*
		Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza	Maresciallo dell'Impero	
	Maréchal de France	Glavny Marshal	Maresciallo d'Italia	Marszalek Polski
		Marshal	Generale d'Armata	
	Général d'Armée	General Armiyi	Generale di Copro d'Armata Comandante Designato d'Armata	
	Général de Corps d'Armée	General Polkovnik	Generale di Corpo d'Armata	General Broni
		General Leytenant		General Dywizji

	Général de Division		Generale di Divisione	
	Général de Brigade	General Major	Generale de Brigata	General Brygady
	Colonel	Polkovnik	Colonnello	Pulkownik
	Lieutanant Colonel	Podpolkovnik	Tenente Colonnello	Podpulkownik
	Commandant Chef de Bataillon (Infantry) Chef d'Escadron (Cavalry and Artillery)	Major	Maggiore	Major
Subedar-Major (Infantry) Rissaldar-Major (Cavalry)	Capitaine	Kapitan	Primo Capitano	Kapitan
		Starshiyi Leytenant	Capitano	
Subedar (Infantry) Rissaldar (Cavalry)	Lieutenant	Leytenant	Primo Tenente	Porucznik
Jemedar (Infantry) Jebedar (Cavalry)	Sous-Lieutenant	Mladshiy Leytenant	Tenente	Podporucznik
			Sottotenente	
	Adjudant-Chef	Starshina	Sergente Maggiore	Chorazy
	Adjudant	Starshiy Serzhant		Starszy Sierzant
Havildar-Major (Infantry) Kot-Daffadar (Cavalry)				
	Sergent-Chef	Serzhant	Sergente	Sierzant
	Sergent-Comptable			
Havildar (Infantry) Daffadar (Cavalry)	Sergent	Mladshiy Serzhant	Corporale Maggiore	Plutonowy
	Caporal-Chef			

Naik (Infantry) Lance-Daffadar (Cavalry)	Caporal	Yefreyto	Corporale	Kapral
Lance-Naik (Infantry) Acting Lance-Daffadar (Cavalry)				
	Soldat de 1ére Classe		Appuntato	Starszy Szeregowiec
Sepoy (Infantry) Sowar (Cavalry)	Soldat de 2ème Classe	Krasnoarmeyets	Soldato	Szeregowiec

	Bulgaria	*Croatia*	*Finland*	*Hungary*
Officers				
		Vojskovodja	Sotamarsalkka	Tábornagy
		General Pjesastva (Infantry) General Topnistva (Artillery) General Konjanistva (Cavalry)		
	General		Kenraali	Vezérezredes
	General-Leytenant	Podmarsal	Kenraaliluutnantti	Altábornagy
	General-Major	General	Kenraalimajuri	Vezérornagy
	Polkovik	Pukovnik	Eversti	Ezredes
	Podpolkovik	Podpukovnik	Everstiluutnantti	Alezredes
	Major	Bojnik	Majuri	Örnagy
	Nadsatnik	Satnik	Kapteeni	Százados
	Kapitan			
	Porucik	Natporuènik	Luutnantti	Fohadnagy
	Podporucik	Poruènik	Vänrikki	Hadnagy
Enlisted				

		Zastavnik	Vääpeli	Fotözsörmester
		Èasnièki Namjesnik	Ylikersantti	Tözsörmester
	Feldfebel	Stoñerni Narednik	Kersantti	Örmester
	Podofitiser	Narednik		Szadaszvezetö
	Kandidat Podofitiser		Alikeersantti	
		Vodnik	Korpraali	Tizedes
		Razvodnik		
	Efreitor	Desetnik		Örvezetö
	Rednik	Domobran	Sotamies	Honvéd

Romania	*Slovakia*	*Greece*	*Japan*	*China*
Maresal al România		Stratigos	Gen-sui	Te-chih-shang-chaing
General de Armatâ		Archistratigos	Tai-sho	I-chi-shang-chaing
General de Corp de Armatâ				Erh-chi-shang-chaing
General de Divizie	General I Triedy	Antistratigos	Chu-jo	Chung-chaing
General de Brigadâ	General II Triedy	Ypostratigos	Sho-sho	Shao-chaing
Colonel	Plukovnik	Syntanmatarchis	Tia-sa	Shang-hsiao
Locotenent-Colonel	Podplukovnik	Antisyntanmatarchis	Chu-sa	Chung-hsiao
Maior	Major	Tagmatarchis	Sho-sa	Shao-hsiao
Câpitan	Stotnik	Lochagos	Tia-i	Shang-wei
Locotenent	Nadporocik	Ypolochagos	Chu-i	Chung-wei

Sublocotenent	Porocik	Anthypolochagos	Sho-i	Shao-wei
Plutonier Adjutant	Dostojnicky Zastupca	Monimos Anthypaspistis	So-cho	Shang-shih
Plutonier Maior				
Plutonier			Gun-so	
Sergent Maior	Zastavnik	Monimos Epilochias		Chung-shih
Sergent	Rotnik	Monimos Lochias	Go-cho	Hsia-shih
Caporal	Catnik	Monimos Dekaneus	Go-cho Kimmi Joto-hei	
		Efredos Dekaneus	Joto-hei	Shang-teng-ping
Fruntas	Desiatnik		Itto-hei	I-teng-ping
			Nito-hei	Erh-teng-ping
Soldat	Desiatnik	Stratiotis	Hei-sotsu	Bin-shih

Table 4: Comparison of Ranks in the Air Forces of World War II

	United States	*Germany*	*Great Britain*
Officers		Reichsmarschall	
	General of the Army	Generalfeldmarschall	Marshal of the Royal Air Force
	General	Generaloberst	Air Chief Marshal
	Lieutenant General	General der Flieger General der Flak Truppen General der Fallschrimjäger	Air Marshal
	Major General	Generalleutnant	Air Vice Marshal
	Brigadier General	Generalmajor	Air Commodore
	Colonel	Oberst	Group Captain

	Lieutenant Colonel	Oberstleutnant	Wing Commander
	Major	Major	Squadron Leader
	Captain	Hauptmann	Flight Lieutenant
	First Lieutenant	Oberleutnant	Flying Officer
	Second Lieutenant	Leutnant	Pilot Officer
Enlisted			
	Master Sergeant First Sergeant	Stabsfeldwebel	Warrant Officer Class 1
	Technical Sergeant	Oberfeldwebel	Warrant Officer Class 2
	Staff Sergeant Technician 3rd Grade	Feldwebel Wachtmeister (Air Defense Artillery)	Flight Sergeant
		Unterfeldwebel	
	Sergeant Technician 4th Grade	Unteroffizier	Sergeant
		Stabsgefreiter	
	Corporal Technician 5th Grade	Obergefreiter	Corporal
		Gefreiter	Leading Aircraftman
	Ptivate First Class	Oberchütze	
	Private	Flieger	Aircraftman

France	*Soviet Union*	*Italy*	*Poland*
	Glavny Marshal Aviatsijyi	Maresciallo dell’ Avia	
	Marshal Aviatsiyi	Generale d’Armata Aerea	
Général d’Armée Aérienne	General Armiyi	Generale di Copro d’Armata Aerea	
	General Polkovnik		General Broni

Général de Corps Aérienne		Generale di Squadra Aerea	
Général de Division Aérienne	General Leytenant	Generale di Divisione Aerea	General Dywizji
Général de Brigade Aérienne	General Major	Generale de Brigata Aerea	General Brygady
Colonel	Polkovnik	Colonnello	Pulkownik
Lieutanant Colonel	Podpolkovnik	Tenente Colonnello	Podpulkownik
Commandant	Major	Maggiore	Major
Capitaine	Kapitan	Primo Capitano	Kapitan
	Starshiyi Leytenant	Capitano	
Lieutenant	Leytenant	Primo Tenente	Porucznik
Sous-Lieutenant	Mladshiy Leytenant	Tenente	Podporucznik
		Sottotenente	
Adjudant-Chef	Starshina	Sergente Maggiore	Chorazy
Adjudant	Starshiy Serzhant		Starszy Sierzant
Sergent-Chef	Serzhant	Sergente	Sierzant
Sergent-Comptable			
Sergent	Mladshiy Serzhant		Plutonowy
Caporal-Chef			
Caporal	Yefreyto	Primo Aviere	Kapral
Soldat de 1ère Classe		Aviero Scelto	Starszy Szeregowiec
Soldat de 2ème Classe	Krasnoarmeyets	Aviere	Szeregowiec

	Bulgaria	*Finland*	*Hungary*
Officers			

	General	Kenraali	
	General-Leytenant	Kenraaliluutnantti	Altábornagy
	General-Major	Kenraalimajuri	Vezérornagy
	Polkovik	Eversti	Ezredes
	Podpolkovik	Everstiluutnantti	Alezredes
	Major	Majuri	Örnagy
	Nadsatnik	Kapteeni	Százados
	Kapitan		
	Porucik	Luutnantti	Fohadnagy
	Podporucik	Vänrikki	Hadnagy
Enlisted			
		Vääpeli	Fotözsörmester
		Ylikersantti	Tözsörmester
	Feldfebel	Kersantti	Örmester
	Podofitiser		Szadaszvezetö
	Kandidat Podofitiser	Alikeersantti	
		Korpraali	Tizedes
	Efreitor		Örvezetö
	Rednik	Sotamies	Honvéd

Romania	*Greece*	*Japan*	*China*

	Pterarchos	Tai-sho	
			Shang-chaing
General Comandant	Antipterarchos	Chu-jo	Chung-chaing
General de Escadra	Ypopterarchos	Sho-sho	Shao-chaing
	Taxiarchos Aeroporias		
Comandor	Sminarchos	Tia-sa	Shang-hsiao
Capitan-Comandor	Antisminarchos	Chu-sa	Chung-hsiao
Locotenent-Comandor	Episminagos	Sho-sa	Shao-hsiao
Câpitan	Sminagos	Tia-i	Shang-wei
Locotenent	Yposminagos	Chu-i	Chung-wei
Sublocotenent	Anthyposminarchos	Sho-i	Shao-wei
Adjutant Sef Aviator	Archisminias	So-cho	Shang-shih
Adjutant Maior Aviator			
Adjutant Aviator		Gun-so	
Adjutant Stagiar Aviator	Episminias		Chung-shih
Sergent	Sminias	Go-cho	Hsia-shih
Caporal	Yposminias A	Go-cho Kimmi Joto-hei	
	Yposminias B	Joto-hei	Shang-teng-ping
Fruntas		Itto-hei	I-teng-ping
		Nito-hei	Erh-teng-ping
Soldat	Sminitis	Hei-sotsu	Bin-shih

Table 5: Comparison of Ranks in the Navies of World War II

	United States	*Germany*	*Great Britain*
Officers			
	Fleet Admiral	Grossadmiral	Admiral of the Fleet

	Admiral	Generaladmiral	Admiral
	Vice Admiral	Admiral	Vice-Admiral
	Rear Admiral	Vizeadmiral	Rear Admiral
	Commodore	Konteradmiral	Commodore First Class
		Kommodore	Commodore Second Class
	Captain	Kapitän zur See	Captain
	Commander	Frigattenkapitän	Commander
	Lieutenant Commander	Korvettenkapitän	Lieutenant Commander
	Lieutenant	Kapitänleutnant	Lieutenant
	Lieutenant (Junior Grade)	Oberleutnant zur See	Sub-Lieutenant
	Ensign	Leutnant zur See	Commissioned Warrant Officer
Enlisted			
	Chief Petty Officer	Stabsoberbootsmann	Warrant Officer
	Petty Officer First Class	Oberbootsmann	Chief Petty Officer
		Stabsbootsmann	
	Petty Officer Second Class	Bootsmann	Petty Officer
		Oberbootsmannmaat	
	Petty Officer Third Class	Bootsmannmaat	Leading Seaman I
		Matrosenoberstabsgefreiter	
	Seaman First Class	Matrosenstabsgefreiter	Leading Seaman II
		Matrosenhauptgefreiter	
	Seaman Second Class	Matrosenobergefreiter	Able Seaman
		Matrosengefreiter	
	Seaman Third Class	Matrose	Ordinary Seaman

France	*Soviet Union*	*Italy*

		Grande Ammiraglio
Amiral de la Flotte	Admiral Flota	Ammiraglio d’Armata Ammiraglio designato d’Armata
Amiral Vice-Amiral Commandant en Chef	Admiral	Ammiraglio di Squadra
Vice-Amiral	Vitse Admiral	Ammiraglio di Divisione
Contre Amiral	Kontr Admiral	Contrammiraglio
Capitaine de Vaisseau	Kapitan Prevogo Ramga	Capitano di Vascello
Capitaine de Frégate	Kapitan Vtorogo Ramga	Capitano di Fregata
Capitaine de Corvette	Kapitan Tret’yego Ramga	Capitano di Corvetta
Lieutenant de Vaisseau	Kapitan Leytenant	Primo Tenente
Enseigne de Vaisseau de 1ère Classe	Leytenant	Tenente di Vascello
Enseigne de Vaisseau de 2ème Classe	Mladshiy Leytenant	Sottotenente di Vascello
Maître Principal	Starshina	Secondo Capo
Premier Maître	Glavnyy Starshina	
Maître		
Deuxième Maître I	Starshina Pervoy Stat’i	Sottocapo
Deuxième Maître II		
Quartier Maître de 1ère Classe	Starshina Vtoroy Stat’i	
		Marinaio Comune di la classe
Quartier Maître de 2ème Classe	Starshiy Krasnoflotets	Marinaio Comune di 2a classe
		Marinaio Comune di 3a classe
Matelot Breveté		
Matelot	Krasnoflotets	Marinaio Comune

	Poland	*Bulgaria*	*Finland*
Officers			
	Admiral	Admiral	Amiraal
	Wiceadmiral	Vitze-Admiral	Vara-Amiraali
	Kontradmiral	Kontr-Admiral	Kontra-Amiraali
	Komador	Kapitan I Rang	Kommodori
	Komador Podporucznik	Kapitan II Rang	Komentaja
	Kapitan Marynarki		Komentajakapteeni
	Porucznik Marynarki	Kapitanliutenant	Kapteeniluutnaatti
		Mitschman I Rang	Luutnantti
	Podporucznik Marynarki	Mitschman II Rang	Aliluutnantti
Enlisted			
	Chorazy	Konduktor	Pursimies
	Starszy Bosman	Korabnik	Alikersantti
	Bosman	Podofitser	Ylikersanti
	Bosmanmat	Kandidat Podofitser	Kersantti
	Mat	Efreitor	Ylimatruusi
	Starszy Marynarz		
	Marynarz	Morjak	Matruusi

Romania	*Greece*	*Japan*	*China*

	Archinávorchos		
	Návarchos	Kai-gun Tai-sho	Hai-tzuin Shan-tzian
Amiral			Hai-tzuin Chzhun-tzian
Vice-Amiral	Antinávarchos	Kai-gun Chu-jo	Hai-tzuin Shao-tzian
Contra-Amiral	Ypoávarchos	Kai-gun Sho-sho	Hai-tzuin Tai-chaing
Comandor	Pluiarchos	Kai-gun Tai-sa	Hai-tzuin Shan-tzo
Capitan-Comandor	Antipluiarchos	Kai-gun Chu-sa	Hai-tzuin Chzhun-tzo
Locotenent-Comandor	Plutatarchos	Kai-gun Sho-sa	Hai-tzuin Shao-tzo
Capitan de Marina	Ypopliarchos	Kai-gun Tai-i	Hai-tzuin Shang-wei
Locotenent de Marina	Antiplupliarchos	Kai-gun Chu-i	Hai-tzuin Chung-wei
	Semaiphóros	Kai-gun Sho-i	Hai-tzuin Shao-wei
Plutonier Maior	Archikeleustes A	Joto-heiso	Hai-tzuin Shih
Plutonier	Archikeleustes B		
	Keleustes	Itto-heiso	
Sergent Maior	Ypokeleustes A		Hai-tzuin Chong-shih
	Ypokeleustes B		
Sergent	Dókimos Ypokeleustes	Nito-heiso	Hai-tzuin Hsiao-shih
Caporal	Diopos		Ye-ding-ping
		Hei-cho	Erh-deng-ping
Marinar Frinklas	Náftis A	Joto-hei	San-deng-peng
		Itto-hei	Yi-deng-lien-ping
Marinar	Náftis B	Siu-hei	Erh-deng-lien-ping

Table 6: Comparison of Ranks in the Marines of the United States and Great Britain

	United States	*Great Britain*
Officers		

	General	General
	Lieutenant General	Lieutenant-General
	Major General	Major-General
	Brigadier General	Brigadier
	Colonel	Colonel
	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant-Colonel
	Major	Major
	Captain	Captain
	First Lieutenant	Lieutenant
	Second Lieutenant	Second Lieutenant
Enlisted		
	Master Gunnery Sergeant First Sergeant Master Technical Sergeant	Warrant Officer Class 1
	Gunnery Sergeant Technical Sergeant	Warrant Officer Class 2
	Platoon Sergeant Staff Sergeant	Colour Sergeant
	Sergeant	Sergeant
	Corporal	Corporal
		Lance Corporal
	Ptivate First Class	
	Private	Marine

Chronology

September 1939

1 Germany invades Poland.
3 Great Britain and France declare war on Germany.
5 The United States declares neutrality.
7 French forces cross the German border near Saarbrucken.
17 The Soviet Union invades eastern Poland.
29 Germany and the Soviet Union formally divide Poland.

October 1939

5 The Polish organized resistance ends at Kock.
14 The German submarine *U-57* sinks the British battleship *Royal Oak* at Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands.
26 Hans Frank assumes the post of governor-general of German-occupied Poland.

November 1939

1 Germany annexes western Poland.
3 The Soviet Union incorporates eastern Poland.
30 The Soviet Union invades Finland.

December 1939

6 The Battle of the Mannerheim Line begins.
13 Battle of the River Plate.
14 The Soviet Union is expelled from membership in the League of Nations.

17 The German pocket battleship *Graf Spee* is scuttled off Montevideo, Uruguay.

February 1940

13 The Soviets are able to breach the Mannerheim Line.

March 1940

12 The Soviets and Finns sign a peace treaty, ending the First Finnish-Soviet War (Winter War).

April 1940

The Katyn Forest Massacre takes place throughout April and into early May.
9 Germany invades Norway and Denmark.
27 Heinrich Himmler orders the construction of concentration camp at Auschwitz.

May 1940

3 Vidkun Quisling becomes the leader of Norway; King Haakon departs.
10 Germany invades the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France.
Winston L. S. Churchill becomes British prime minister.
11 German forces capture Fort Eben Emael.
13 Queen Wilhelmina leaves the Netherlands for exile in London.
14 The German Air Force bombs Rotterdam.
15 The Netherlands Army surrenders to Germany.
19 The German ports of Hamburg and Bremen are bombed by the British.
20 German forces reach the English Channel.
26 Operation DYNAMO, the evacuation of British and French forces at Dunkerque (Dunkirk), commences.
28 Belgium capitulates to Germany.

June 1940

4 Operation DYNAMO ends.
8 Allied forces complete the evacuation from Norway.
9 Norway signs an armistice with Germany.
10 Italy declares war on France and Great Britain.
Norway surrenders to the Germans.
11 Italian forces invade southeastern France.
14 Paris falls to the Germans.
15 Soviet forces invade Lithuania.
16 Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain becomes French premier.
17 Soviet forces invade Latvia and Estonia.
18 Neutral Sweden accedes to a transit agreement with Germany.

22 France signs an armistice with Germany.
27 Soviet forces invade Romania.
28 The British government recognizes Charles de Gaulle as leader of the Free French.
German forces bomb two British channel islands, Guernsey and Jersey.

July 1940

1 German submarines attack merchant ships in the Atlantic Ocean.
3 In Operation CATAPULT, Royal Navy units secure portions of the French fleet but engage and sink a number of French warships at Mers-el-Kébir, Algeria.
9 Vichy becomes the temporary capital of France.
The British government rejects Adolf Hitler's peace offer.
10 The Battle of Britain commences.
16 Hitler plans Operation SEA LION (SEELÖWE), the invasion of Great Britain.
25 The United States announces an embargo of strategic materials to Japan.

August 1940

5 Italian forces invade British Somaliland.
Latvia is formally admitted into the Soviet Union.
Lithuania is formally admitted into the Soviet Union
6 Estonia is formally admitted into the Soviet Union.
17 Hitler declares a blockade of Great Britain.
20 Winston Churchill delivers his famous "Battle of Britain" speech.
25–26 The Royal Air Force conducts the first air raid on Berlin.

September 1940

3 A destroyer-for-bases deal between the United States and Britain is announced by U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt as an executive order.
Britain receives 50 World War I–vintage U.S. destroyers in return for leases on base territory in North America.
7 Start of the London Blitz.
9 U.S. Navy destroyers commence joint operations with the Royal Navy in the North Atlantic.
13 Italian forces invade Egypt.
15 A major German air attack is made on London.
16 Conscription is introduced in the United States.
22 Vichy France allows Japanese air bases and troops in French Indochina.
23 British and Free French forces attack Dakar.
Hitler meets with Spanish dictator Francisco Franco at Hendaye, France, on the border with Spain.
27 The Axis Tripartite Pact is signed between Germany, Italy, and Japan.
29 Germany annexes Luxembourg.

October 1940

7 German forces enter Romania.
10 Operation SEA LION is shelved.
28 Italian forces invade Greece from Italian-occupied Albania.
31 The Battle of Britain ends; the Germans switch to night bombing (the Blitz).
British forces land on Crete.

November 1940

5 Roosevelt wins election to a third four-year term as U.S. president.
11 British forces stage an air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, Italy.
14–15 Germany stages an air attack on Coventry, England, destroying much of the city.
19–20 Germany stages an air attack on Birmingham, England.
20 Hungary joins the Axis alliance.
22 The Greeks defeat the Italians, capturing Koritsá, Albania.
23 Romania joins the Axis alliance.
24 Slovakia joins the Axis.
26 German occupation forces establish the Warsaw Ghetto.
30 Germany again annexes Alsace and Lorraine.

December 1940

9 British forces begin to drive the Italians from Egypt in Wavell's offensive.
29 U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt delivers his famous "Arsenal of Democracy" speech.
29–30 Large areas of London are destroyed in German firebomb raids.

January 1941

3–5 Battle of Bardia in Libya.
6 President Franklin Roosevelt delivers his "Four Freedoms" speech.
19 British forces invade Italian Eritrea.
22 Tobruk falls to Australian and British forces.

February 1941

5–7 The Battle of Beda Fomm takes place. The British defeat Italian forces in Libya.
8 British forces take Benghazi, Libya.
Bulgaria and Germany sign a military pact.
12 German general Erwin Rommel arrives in North Africa.

March 1941

1 Bulgaria joins the Tripartite Pact.
2 German forces enter Bulgaria.

11 Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease Bill.
16 The British mount a counteroffensive in Somaliland and Ethiopia.
24 Rommel commences an offensive in Libya.
25 The Yugoslavian government agrees to join the Axis alliance.
26 The pro-Axis Yugoslav government is overthrown.
28 Britain inflicts losses on the Italian fleet in the Battle of Cape Matapan.

April 1941

3 A pro-Axis regime is established in Iraq.
6 Germany invades Greece and Yugoslavia.
The British occupy Addis Abba, the capital of Ethiopia.
9 Rommel's forces capture Bardia.
10 The U.S. destroyer *Niblack* fires the first American shot of the war with a depth charge attack on a German U-boat.
11 The Axis siege of Tobruk commences.
13 A five-year nonaggression pact is signed between Japan and the Soviet Union.
17 The Yugoslavian Army surrenders to the Germans.
23 Greece signs an armistice with Germany.
25 Rommel's forces take the Halfaya Pass.
28 Rommel's forces capture Sollum.
28–29 British forces evacuate Greece for Crete.

May 1941

1 The British repulse a German attack on Tobruk.
2 The British invade Iraq.
4 Hitler delivers the "Thousand Year Reich" speech.
5 Emperor Haile Selassie returns to Addis Ababa.
10 German deputy Führer Rudolf Hess flies to Scotland.
13 Martin Bormann succeeds Rudolf Hess as Nazi Party chancellor.
20 The Germans mount an airborne assault against Crete.
24 The German battleship *Bismarck* sinks Britain's battle cruiser *Hood*.
27 The British sink the German battleship *Bismarck*.
31 Crete falls to the Germans.

June 1941

4 A pro-Allied government is installed in Iraq.
8 British and Free French troops attack Syria and Lebanon.
14 Vichy French forces in Syria are defeated by the British.
15 The British counteroffensive in Libya is defeated.
15–17 Battle of Sollum-Halfaya Pass.
22 Germany, Italy, and Romania declare war on the Soviet Union.
Germany commences Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union.
26 Finland declares war on the Soviet Union (the Continuation War).

27 Hungary declares war on the Soviet Union.
30 German forces take Lviv in Soviet-occupied Poland.

July 1941

1 Claude Auchinleck succeeds Archibald Wavell as British commander in chief, Middle East.
5 Josip Broz Tito announces communist resistance movement in Yugoslavia.
7 U.S. marines relieve British forces in Iceland.
9 The Germans capture 300,000 Soviet troops near Minsk in the Soviet Union.
12 The Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance is signed.
14 British forces occupy Syria and Lebanon.
19 The U.S. Navy begins escorting ships to and from Iceland.
24 Southern French Indochina is occupied by Japanese forces.
26 The United States suspends trade with Japan.
27 German forces encircle Smolensk.
31 German preparations commence for the "final solution."

August 1941

1–8 Battle of Roslavl.
12 The Atlantic Charter drawn up by Churchill and Roosevelt.
25 Soviet and British troops occupy Iran.

September 1941

3 Gas chambers are used experimentally at Auschwitz concentration camp.
4 The German submarine *U-652* attacks the U.S. Navy destroyer *Greer*.
8 German forces lay siege to Leningrad.
11 President Roosevelt issues a "shoot on sight" order.
19 German forces capture Kiev.
24 German forces isolate Soviet forces in the Crimea.
27 The first U.S. Liberty ship, SS *Patrick Henry,* is launched.
29 Germans murder nearly 34,000 Jews in Kiev.

October 1941

2 Germany commences Operation TAIFUN (TYPHOON), the planned capture of Moscow.
11 PQ-1, the first arctic convoy, reaches Arkhangelsk.
15 German forces reach the Don River.
16 German and Romanian forces capture Odessa in the Soviet Union.
16–17 The U.S. Navy destroyer *Kearney* is hit by a torpedo from the German submarine *U-568*.
17 General Tōjō Hideki becomes Japanese premier.
31 The U.S. Navy destroyer *Reuben James* is sunk by the German submarine *U-552*.

November 1941

8 Germans move into the Crimean Peninsula.
13 The British aircraft carrier *Ark Royal* is sunk by a German submarine.
18 British forces launch a counteroffensive in Libya.
20 Germany takes Rostov in the Soviet Union.
22 The German commerce raider *Atlantis* is sunk.
27 Soviet forces retake Rostov.

December 1941

5 German forces suspend the attack on Moscow.
7 Japanese forces bomb Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands.
8 The United States, Great Britain, and other Allied powers declare war on Japan.
Japanese forces attack Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippine Islands.
Japan invades Hong Kong, Malaya, and Thailand.
9 Japan invades the Gilbert Islands.
China declares war on Germany and Japan.
Hitler issues the "Night and Fog" decree.
10 British forces relieve the Tobruk garrison.
Japanese aircraft sink the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse* off Malaya.
Japanese forces take Guam.
11 Italy declares war on the United States.
Germany declares war on the United States.
Japanese forces invade Burma.
16 Japanese forces invade Borneo.
Axis forces in North Africa retreat to El Agheila in Libya.
19 Hitler assumes command of the German Army.
22 The Arcadia Conference opens in Washington, D.C.
23 The Japanese offensive in the Philippines commences.
24 British forces recapture Benghazi.
25 Japanese forces take Hong Kong.
26 Soviet forces land on the Kerch Peninsula.
31 Japanese forces occupy Manila in the Philippines.

January 1942

1 A United Nations declaration is signed by 26 nations.
The Soviets begin an offensive in Finland.
2 Japan captures Manila.
11 Japan invades the Netherlands East Indies.
Japanese forces capture Kuala Lumpur.
13 Germany begins a U-boat offensive along the U.S. East Coast.
Soviet forces recapture Kiev.
17 British forces recapture Sollum and the Halfaya Pass.
20 Japan commences the Burma offensive.

	The Wannsee Conference is held in Berlin to discuss procedures of the “final solution.”
21	The Axis offensive against British forces in Libya commences.
25	Japanese forces land at Lae, New Guinea.
26	The first U.S. troops committed to the war effort arrive in North Ireland.
28	German forces recapture Benghazi.

February 1942

1	U.S. planes bomb the Marshall and Gilbert Islands.
6	Britain and the United States establish the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
8	Japanese forces take Rangoon, Burma.
15	Singapore surrenders to Japanese forces.
19	Japanese forces capture Bali.
25	Some 110,000 Japanese Americans are ordered into internment camps.
27–29	The naval Battle of the Java Sea is waged.
29	Japanese forces capture Timor.

March 1942

2	Japanese forces land in Mindanao in the Philippines; Batavia in the Netherlands East Indies is evacuated, and the Dutch government is moved to Bandung on Java.
7	Japanese troops enter Rangoon, Burma.
9	The island of Java surrenders to the Japanese.
13	Japanese forces land in the Solomon Islands.
17	U.S. general Douglas MacArthur reaches Australia from the Philippines.
19	The gas chamber is first used on human victims at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
28	The British Saint Nazaire Raid occurs.

April 1942

5	Japanese naval forces raid Ceylon.
9	U.S. forces surrender to the Japanese on Bataan Peninsula, on Luzon in the Philippines.
14	Pierre Laval becomes premier of Vichy France.
18	U.S. B-25 bombers raid Tokyo (the Doolittle Raid).
26	Hitler assumes total power in Germany.

May 1942

1	Mandalay surrenders to Japanese forces.
6	Corregidor falls to the Japanese.
	U.S. forces surrender in the Philippines.
7–8	The naval and air Battle of the Coral Sea is waged.
20	Japanese forces complete the conquest of Burma.
22	Mexico declares war on the Axis powers.
26	Axis forces begin an offensive in Libya.
27	Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia Reinhard Heydrich is attacked and mortally

wounded in Prague.
30 The Royal Air Force bombs Köln (Cologne), Germany.

June 1942

4 Japanese forces attack the Aleutian Islands.
4–6 The naval and air Battle of Midway Island is waged.
5 German forces besiege Sevastopol in the Crimea.
6 Heydrich dies in Prague.
7 The village of Lidice in Bohemia is liquidated in retaliation for Heydrich's death.
13 British forces abandon Gazala.
21 Axis forces in North Africa capture Tobruk.
23 Rommel's forces invade Egypt.
24 General Dwight D. Eisenhower is named to command U.S. forces in Europe.
26–29 Rommel's forces capture Mersa Matrûh.
28 German forces launch a summer offensive in Russia.

July 1942

1–3 The Germans secure Sevastopol.
1–4 First Battle of El Alamein, in Egypt, is waged.
3 Japanese forces land on Guadalcanal, in the Solomon Islands.
4 U.S. bombers fly their first mission in the European theater.
7 German forces take Voronezh.
22 The first Warsaw ghetto deportations to death camps occur.
23 German forces capture Rostov-on-Don, in the Soviet Union.
25 German forces take Rostov.
29 German forces enter the Caucasus.

August 1942

7 U.S. marines land on Guadalcanal.
8 Eisenhower is selected to command Operation TORCH.
9 German forces capture Caucasus oil fields.
A civil disobedience campaign begins in India.
12 Churchill and U.S. diplomat Averell Harriman accept Joseph Stalin's invitation and meet with him in Moscow.
13 General Bernard L. Montgomery becomes commander of the Eighth Army in Egypt.
19 British and Canadian forces raid Dieppe, France.
Brazil declares war on Germany and Italy.
23 The Battle for Stalingrad begins.
31 The Battle of Alam Halfa halts the Axis advance in North Africa.

September 1942

2 Axis forces retreat following the Battle of Alam Halfa.

12 The British transport *Laconia* is sunk by the German U-boat *U-156*.
13–17 First Moscow Conference.
17 German admiral Karl Dönitz issues the *Laconia* Order to U-boat commanders.
Beginning of the Manhattan Project.
22 German forces reach Stalingrad.
26 Australian ground forces stop Japanese land forces working overland toward Port Moresby, New Guinea.

October 1942

18 Hitler issues the Commando Order.
23 The British Eighth Army attacks Axis forces at El Alamein, Egypt.

November 1942

1 British forces break through at El Alamein.
4 Axis forces retreat from El Alamein.
8 In Operation TORCH, Allied forces land in Algeria and Morocco.
9 German forces invade Tunisia.
11 Axis forces occupy Vichy-administered France.
13 British forces retake Tobruk.
16 Australian and U.S. forces attack Buna-Gona, New Guinea.
19 A Soviet counteroffensive begins at Stalingrad.
23 The German Sixth Army is encircled in Stalingrad.
27 The French scuttle 77 warships at Toulon, France.
28 The Allies are repulsed by Germans 20 miles outside Tunisia.

December 1942

13 Axis forces withdraw from El Agheila.
16 German forces try but fail to relieve Stalingrad.
24 French admiral Jean Darlan is assassinated in Algiers.
31 The naval Battle of the Barents Sea is waged.

January 1943

2 Australian and U.S. forces take Buna, New Guinea.
14–24 The Casablanca Conference, involving Churchill and Roosevelt, takes place.
18 Armed resistance begins in the Warsaw Ghetto.
23 Tripoli, Libya, is taken by the British Eighth Army.
25 Soviet forces retake Voronezh.
27 Wilhelmshaven, Germany, is bombed by the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF).
30 Admiral Karl Dönitz succeeds Admiral Erich Raeder as commander of the German Navy.
31 German field marshal Friedrich Paulus surrenders at Stalingrad.

February 1943

1 German forces withdraw from the Caucasus.
6 Soviet forces cross the Donets River.
8 The Red Army recaptures Kursk.
9 U.S. forces secure Guadalcanal.
12 British forces enter Tunisia.
14 Soviet forces retake Rostov.
22 German field marshal Rommel exits by the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia.
25 Rommel is replaced by General Jürgen von Arnim as commander of German forces in North Africa.

March 1943

2–4 The naval Battle of the Bismarck Sea is fought.
5 Allied aircraft bomb industrial targets in Germany's Ruhr Valley.
17–25 Battle of El Guettar.
20–28 The Eighth Army breaks the Axis Mareth Line, in Tunisia.

April 1943

1–22 Axis forces withdraw from Tunisia.
12 German forces discover a mass grave in the Katyn Forest in Soviet-occupied Poland.
18 Japanese admiral Yamamoto Isoroku's plane is shot down in a U.S. aerial ambush.
19 The German Army begins effort to liquidate the Warsaw ghetto.
22 The United States and Great Britain start the Allied offensive in North Africa.

May 1943

6–7 Allied forces capture Bizerte and Tunis.
11 Japanese-held Attu Island in the Aleutians is attacked by U.S. troops.
12–25 The Trident Conference takes place in Washington.
13 The Allies capture Tunis and secure the surrender of 275,000 German and Italian troops in North Africa.
16 The Warsaw ghetto uprising ends.
16–17 The RAF makes Ruhr Valley dams a priority target.
21 French Resistance leader Jean Moulin is arrested by the Germans.
22 Dönitz suspends U-boat operations in the North Atlantic.
27 British special operations forces arrive in Yugoslavia to assist Tito's Partisans.

June 1943

11 The Italian island of Pantelleria surrenders.
13 The Tunisia Campaign ends in defeat for the Axis powers.
30 U.S. forces retake Attu Island.

July 1943

5–17 The Battle of Kursk is waged.
9 In Operation HUSKY, U.S. and British forces invade Sicily.
19 U.S. aircraft bomb Rome.
22 U.S. forces capture Palermo, Sicily.
24 Allied aircraft bomb Norway.
RAF bombings reduce Hamburg, Germany, to rubble.
25 King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy dismisses Benito Mussolini; Pietro Badoglio succeeds Mussolini as Italian leader.

August 1943

1 Japan establishes a puppet regime in Burma.
The U.S. air operation against Ploieşti takes place.
5 Soviet forces recapture Belgorod and Orel.
6 The naval Battle of Vella Gulf, in the Solomon Islands, is fought.
14–24 The Allied Quadrant Conference is held in Quebec, Canada.
17 British and U.S. forces conclude the conquest of Sicily.
The USAAF conducts daylight raids on Regensburg and Schweinfurt, Germany.
17–18 The Peenemünde air raid takes place.
24–28 German forces suppress an uprising in Denmark.

September 1943

3 British forces land at Calabria, Italy.
8 The Italian government signs an armistice with the Allies.
9 Allied forces land at Taranto and Salerno, Italy, during Operation AVALANCHE.
10–11 German forces occupy Rome.
12 Mussolini is rescued by German commandos led by Otto Skorzeny.
14 German forces withdraw to the Dnieper River line.
15 Mussolini establishes the puppet Italian Social Republic.
18 Allied forces capture Sardinia.
19 Finland signs an armistice with the Allies.
22 Soviet forces secure a bridgehead on the Dnieper River.
The Alten Fjord raid takes place.
23 Mussolini establishes a new fascist government in northern Italy.
24 German forces retreat from Smolensk, Soviet Union.
25 Soviet forces retake Smolensk and Novorossiysk, Soviet Union.
27 U.S. P-47 fighters begin escorting bombers over Europe.

October 1943

1 The Allies capture Naples.
Soviet forces cross the Dnieper River.
1–15 Battle of the Volturno River.

4 German forces capture the Greek island of Kos.
5 Allied forces capture Corsica.
9 Soviet forces retake the Taman Peninsula.
13 Italy declares war on Germany.
The USAAF conducts a second raid on Schweinfurt.
14 Canadian forces take Campobasso, Italy.
Soviet forces capture Zaporozhye, Ukraine.
18 British, Soviet, and U.S. foreign ministers meet in Moscow.
25 The Soviets take Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine.
31 German forces are cut off in the Crimea.

November 1943

1 U.S. forces invade Bougainville, in the Solomon Islands.
5 The Greater East Asia Conference is held in Tokyo.
7 Soviet forces liberate Kiev.
9 De Gaulle becomes president of the French Committee of National Liberation.
20 Allies attack the Sangro River in Italy.
Eduard Beneš and Stalin sign a Soviet-Czech peace treaty.
22–26 The Allies hold the Cairo Conference.
23–30 Battle of the Sangro River.
28 The Tehran Conference between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin begins (runs until December 1).

December 1943

2 The Bari air raid occurs.
3–7 The Cairo meetings resume.
12–18 Battle of San Pietro.
24 Eisenhower receives command of the Allied European invasion.
26 U.S. forces reach Cape Gloucester, in the Solomon Islands.

January 1944

16 Eisenhower is appointed supreme commander of Allied forces in Western Europe.
20–22 Battle of the Rapido River.
22 The Allied beachhead is established at Anzio, Italy.
25 The Allies begin a counteroffensive in Burma.
27 Soviet forces break the 900-day siege of Leningrad.

February 1944

3 Allied offensive stalls at Cassino, Italy.
7 U.S. forces take Kwajalein, in the Marshall Islands.
15 Allied aircraft bomb Monte Cassino, Italy.
Soviet forces secure Estonia.

18 U.S. naval forces attack the Japanese on Truk, in the Caroline Islands.
20–26 Allied forces coordinate “Big Week” air strikes against German factories.
26 The Soviets bomb Helsinki, Finland.

March 1944

8 Japanese forces begin an offensive in Burma.
15 Japanese forces invade India.
18 The RAF conducts a great raid on Hamburg.
30 The RAF raids Nuremberg, Germany.

April 1944

2 Soviet troops enter Romania.
4 De Gaulle assumes command of all Free French forces.
10 The Soviet forces retake Odesssa.
15 Soviets troops take Tarnopol, Ukraine.
19 Japanese forces capture Zhengzhou, China.

May 1944

1 Japanese forces take Xuchang, China.
9 The Soviets recapture Sevastopol.
11 Allied forces attack the Gustav Line near Rome.
12 German forces surrender in Crimea.
17–18 German troops withdraw from Monte Cassino.
23 The Allies break out from the Anzio beachhead.
25 German forces withdraw from Anzio.
Japanese forces take Luoyang, China.

June 1944

1 German forces in Italy withdraw from the Gustav Line to the Gothic Line.
4–5 Allied troops enter Rome.
6 Allied troops land in Normandy, France (D-day).
9 Soviet forces attack Finland.
10 Germans liquidate the town of Oradou-sur-Glane, France.
10–13 Soviet forces attack Finland.
12 All Normandy beachheads are linked up.
12–13 German V-1 buzz bombs hit London.
15 The USAAF bombs Tokyo.
U.S. forces invade Saipan.
19–21 The Battle of the Philippine Sea is fought.
22 Soviet forces commence an offensive in Belorussia.
Japanese forces withdraw from Kohima, India.
27 Cherbourg, France, is liberated by the Allies.

July 1944

1 The Bretton Woods International Monetary Conference opens.
3 The Soviets recover Belorussia.
4 The Allies defeat Japanese forces at Imphal, India.
9 British and Canadian forces capture Caen, France.
U.S. forces declare Saipan secured.
13–17 Battles of Brody and Lwow.
18 U.S. forces liberate Saint-Lô, France.
Tōjō Hideki resigns as Japanese premier; he is succeeded by Koiso Kuniaki.
20 An assassination attempt on Hitler is unsuccessful, and the effort by the German Resistance to seize power fails.
Soviet forces cross the Bug River into Poland.
21 U.S. forces invade Guam in the Mariana Islands.
General Hans Guderian is appointed chief of staff of the German Army.
23 Soviet forces take Lublin, Poland.
25 Soviet forces liberate the Majdanek concentration camp.
In Operation COBRA, Allied forces break out from Normandy.
28 The Soviets retake Brest-Litovsk, Belorussia.
U.S. forces take Coutances, France.
29 The German Me-262 is the first jet aircraft to enter operation.

August 1944

1 The Warsaw Uprising against Germans begins.
U.S. troops reach Avranches, France.
4 The last Jews leave the Netherlands, Anne Frank included.
Allied forces capture Florence, Italy.
6 British forces reach the Arno River.
8 Japanese forces capture Hengyang, China.
10 U.S. forces declare Guam secure.
11 German forces withdraw from Florence.
15 In Operation DRAGOON, Allied forces land in southern France.
16 Falaise, France, is liberated by the Allies.
The French Resistance stages an uprising in Paris.
21 Allied forces trap 60,000 Germans in the Argentan-Falaise pocket.
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference opens in Washington.
22 The final Japanese withdrawal from Indian territory occurs.
23 Romania surrenders.
24 Romania declares war on Germany.
The Allies liberate Bordeaux, France.
25 Free French forces liberate Paris.
The Allies begin an attack on the Gothic Line in Italy.
28 The Allies secure Toulon and Marseille, France.
30 German forces withdraw from Bulgaria.
31 Soviet forces take Bucharest.

September 1944

1	Dieppe is liberated by British forces.
2	Allied forces take Pisa, Italy.
3	German forces withdraw from Finland.
	Brussels is liberated.
4	The Soviets and Finns agree to a cease-fire.
	Antwerp is liberated.
5	The Soviets declare war on Bulgaria.
6	The Allies liberate southern Netherlands.
	Soviet forces enter Yugoslavia.
8	Soviet and Bulgarian forces conclude an armistice.
	Bulgaria declares war on Germany.
	German V-2 rockets hit London.
11	U.S. forces cross into Germany from Luxembourg.
	Soviet forces enter Hungary.
12	U.S. forces enter the Hürtgen Forest.
12–16	Operation OCTAGON, the Second Quebec Conference, takes place.
16	Soviet forces enter Sofia.
17–26	Operation MARKET-GARDEN, the effort of the Western Allies to secure a crossing over the Rhine River at Arnhem, fails.
18	U.S. forces enter Brest.
19	An armistice is concluded between the Allies and Finland.
21	Canadian forces enter Rimini.
22	Allied forces capture Boulogne, France.
25	Allied forces break through the Gothic Line in Italy.
	Hitler calls up remaining 16- to 60-year-old males for military service.
26	Soviet forces occupy Estonia.
	Remaining Allied forces surrender at Arnhem.
28	Canadian forces liberate Calais, France.

October 1944

2	Germans end the Warsaw Uprising.
	The Polish Home Army surrenders to the Germans.
	The Allies enter western Germany.
9–17	The Second Moscow Conference takes place.
10–29	The Soviets capture Riga in Latvia.
13	The first V-1s and V-2s land on Antwerp.
14	British forces liberate Athens, Greece.
	Rommel is forced to commit suicide.
18	Soviet forces enter Czechoslovakia.
20	Yugoslav Partisans and Soviet forces enter Belgrade.
	U.S. troops land at Leyte, in the Philippines.
21	German forces surrender at Aachen, Germany.
23	Charles de Gaulle is recognized by the United States as head of the French provisional

government.
23 Soviet forces enter East Prussia.
23–26 The Battle of Leyte Gulf is fought.
24 The Japanese employ kamikaze suicide aircraft, for the first time, in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
25 Soviet forces capture Kirkenes, Norway.
30 Gas is used for the last time in executions at Auschwitz.

November 1944

4 Axis troops surrender in Greece.
10 Japanese forces take Guilin, China.
Japanese forces capture Liuzhou, China.
12 RAF aircraft sink the German battleship *Tirpitz*.
20 French forces reach the Rhine through the Belfort Gap.
22 U.S. forces capture Metz.
24 French forces liberate Strasbourg, France.
The USAAF begins systematic bombing of Japan.
27 The Freiburg air raid occurs.
28 Antwerp is opened to Allied supply ships.
Soviet forces cross the Danube.
29 The Allies occupy Albania.

December 1944

3–4 Civil war in Greece commences, and martial law is proclaimed in Athens.
Japanese forces retreat in Burma.
7 French forces attack German forces trapped in the Colmar pocket.
16 The Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes) commences.
16–22 The Battle of Saint Vith takes place.
17 Waffen-SS troops murder U.S. prisoners of war at Malmédy, Belgium.
24–27 The Battle of Celles takes place.
26 U.S. forces relieve Bastogne, France.
27 Soviet forces besiege Budapest.
31 German forces in Alsace launch Operation NORDWIND (NORTH WIND).

January 1945

1–17 The Germans begin to leave the Ardennes.
7 German forces break out of the Colmar pocket.
9 U.S. forces invade Luzon.
12 Soviet forces begin the Vistula-Oder offensive.
16 The Battle of the Bulge ends.
17 Soviet troops occupy Warsaw.
German forces begin withdrawing from the Ardennes.
19 German forces retreat in large numbers across the Baltic Sea.

20 The Hungarian government concludes an armistice with Soviet forces.
26 Soviet troops liberate Auschwitz.
27 Soviet forces occupy Lithuania.
30 Soviet submarine sinks the passenger ship *Wilhelm Gustloff,* killing 5,100 people.

February 1945

2 Churchill and Roosevelt meet at Malta prior to the Yalta Conference.
4–11 The conference involving Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta takes place in the Crimea.
8 The Allied offensive to the Rhine River begins.
13 Remaining German forces in Budapest surrender to Soviet forces.
13–14 The RAF and the USAAF conduct firebombing of Dresden, Germany.
19 U.S. forces land on Iwo Jima, in the Bonin Islands.
20 Soviet forces take Danzig in East Prussia (today's Gdansk, Poland).
22–23 Allied air forces launch Operation CLARION.

March 1945

3 Finland declares war on Germany.
4 U.S. forces secure Manila.
7 Allied forces take Köln.
U.S. forces seize the Remagen Bridge over the Rhine River.
9 The USAAF firebombs Tokyo.
16 U.S. forces secure Iwo Jima.
19 Hitler orders a scorched-earth policy for Germany.
20 U.S. forces take Saarbrücken and Zweibrücken.
20–21 Allied forces capture Mandalay, Burma.
27 U.S. forces capture Frankfurt.
28 Eisenhower orders Western Allied forces to halt at the Elbe River.

April 1945

1 U.S. forces land on Okinawa.
5 Admiral Suzuki Kantaro becomes Japanese premier.
7 Soviet forces enter Vienna.
10 Allied forces take Hanover, Germany.
12 Roosevelt dies in Warm Springs, Georgia.
Vice President Harry S. Truman becomes U.S. president.
13 Soviet forces secure Vienna.
Allies take Arnhem.
15 British forces liberate the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp.
Austria nullifies the Anschluss of 1938 and establishes a republic.
16 Soviet ground forces attack Berlin.
U.S. forces enter Nuremberg.
18 Germans in the Ruhr Valley surrender.

20	The remaining German forces in France surrender.
23	Soviet forces reach Berlin.
	Allied forces reach the Po River in Italy.
23–24	Heinrich Himmler offers surrender to the United States and Britain.
25	U.S. and Soviet forces meet at the Elbe River in Germany.
	The UN San Francisco Conference begins.
26	British forces capture Bremen.
	Pétain is arrested by the Free French.
28	Italian partisans execute Mussolini at Lake Como, Italy.
	Allied forces take Venice.
29	German forces in Italy surrender.
	American forces liberate the Dachau concentration camp.
	Soviet forces liberate the Ravensbrück concentration camp.
30	Hitler commits suicide in Berlin.

May 1945

1	The Allies take Moulmein, Burma.
	Queen Wilhelmina returns to the Netherlands.
	Dönitz establishes the “Flensburg Government.”
2	German forces in Italy surrender.
	The Soviets capture Berlin.
3	Rangoon, Burma, is liberated.
	British forces occupy Hamburg.
5	An uprising against German occupation occurs in Prague, Czechoslovakia.
	The Allies liberate Denmark.
	A truce is established on the Western Front.
7	The Battle of the Atlantic ends.
	The Germans surrender unconditionally at Rheims, France.
8	V-E day is celebrated.
	The Netherlands is liberated.
	Soviet forces enter Prague.
9	Allied forces return to the Channel Islands.
14	Australian troops capture Wewak, New Guinea.
	Members of the German high command/provisional government are imprisoned.
23	Allied forces arrest Dönitz and members of the Flensburg Government.

June 1945

5	Allied powers divide Germany into four occupation zones.
10	Australian forces invade Borneo.
28	The U.S. Senate approves the United Nations Charter in a vote of 89 to 2.
30	U.S. forces liberate Luzon, the Philippines.

July 1945

1 Allied troops move into Berlin.
5 Churchill fails to retain his position as British prime minister.
The United States and Britain recognize the Polish communist government.
16 The atomic bomb is successfully tested at Alamogordo, New Mexico.
17 The Potsdam Conference between Churchill, Truman, and Stalin opens (ends August 2).
21–22 U.S. forces secure Okinawa.
26 Clement Attlee becomes British prime minister.
27 Chinese forces retake Guilin.

August 1945

6 A USAAF B-29 drops an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.
8 The Soviet Union declares war on Japan.
9 Soviet forces invade Manchuria.
The United States drops an atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan.
14 Japan capitulates unconditionally.
30 The Allied Control Council begins in Germany.

September 1945

2 The formal Japanese surrender takes place aboard the U.S. battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Harbor.
V-J day.
5 British forces reach Singapore.
7 Japanese forces in Shanghai surrender.
9 Japanese forces in China surrender.
13 Japanese forces in Burma surrender.
Japanese forces in New Guinea surrender.
16 Japanese forces in Hong Kong surrender.

October 1945

24 The United Nations Charter comes into force (initially with 29 members).

November 1945

20 The International Military Tribunal (the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials) commences.

ANNETTE RICHARDSON AND LAWTON B. WAY

Selected Glossary

AA	antiaircraft
AAA	antiaircraft artillery
abn	airborne
Abt	Abteilung (branch) (German)
Abwehr	military intelligence (German). Germany's military intelligence branch was the Abwehrabteilung, commonly known as the Abwehr.
ACC	Allied Control Council
ace	airman who has shot down at least five enemy aircraft; the Germans used the term "expert."
ACV	U.S. Navy designation for an auxiliary aircraft carrier
AD	armored division
AEAF	Allied Expeditionary Air Forces
AEF	Allied Expeditionary Force
AF	air force
AFHQ	Allied Forces Headquarters
AFV	armored fighting vehicle
AGF	Allied Ground Forces
AGRA	Army Group Royal Artillery
AIF	Australian Imperial Force
AK	Armeekorps (army corps) (German)
AK	Armia Krajowa (Home Army) (Polish)
AMC	armed merchant cruiser (a merchant vessel fitted out as a warship for cruising operations)
AMF	Australian Military Forces
AMG	Allied Military Government
AMGOT	Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories
amt	office (German)
ANC	Army Nurse Corps (U.S.)
ANZAC	Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
AOA	American Ordnance Association

AOC	air officer commanding (British)
AOK	Armee-Oberkommando (staff of a numbered army) (German)
APC	armored personnel carrier
APDS	armor-piercing discarding sabot
armd	armored
Armeegruppe	army group (German)
arty	artillery
ARV	armored recovery vehicle
asdic	Anti-Submarine Detection Investigating Committee (British acronym for sonar)
ASF	Army Service Forces (U.S.)
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
AT	antitank
ATA	Air Transport Auxiliary (British)
ATC	Air Transport Command (U.S.)
ATS	Auxiliary Territorial Service (British)
Ausf	Ausführung (model) (German)
AVG	American Volunteer Group (the Flying Tigers)
AVG	U.S. Navy designation for an auxiliary aircraft vessel
AVRE	armored vehicle Royal Engineers
B	U.S. Army Air Forces designation for bomber model aircraft
BAR	Browning automatic rifle (U.S.)
BARV	beach armored recovery vehicle
bazooka	handheld rocket launcher, an antitank weapon (U.S.)
BB	U.S. Navy designation for a battleship
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCATP	British Commonwealth Air Training Plan
BCRA	Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Central Intelligence and Operations Bureau) (French)
bde	brigade
B-Dienst	Beobachtungs-Dienst, the cryptanalysis section of German naval intelligence (properly xB-Dienst)
BDJ	Bund Deutsches Jungvolk (German Youth Association)
BDM	Bund Deutscher Mädel (Association of German Girls)
BEF	British Expeditionary Force
BEW	Board of Economic Warfare (U.S.)
Bf	German designation for Messerschmitt fighter plane designs up to 1938, produced by Bayerische Flugzeugwerke, a German aircraft-manufacturing firm
bhp	brake horsepower
Big Four	Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and China
Big Three	Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain
Blitz	Germany's aerial campaign against Britain, from the German word for lightning
blitzkrieg	lightning war, the German method of mobile attack using both aerial and land forces
bn	battalion
BOAC	British Overseas Airways Corporation
BP	Bletchley Park, site of the British code-breaking operation (located outside London in Buckinghamshire)

Br	British
brig	brigadier (British)
BSC	British Security Coordination
C	U.S. symbol to designate a cargo aircraft model
CA	U.S. Navy designation for a heavy cruiser
CAM	Catapult merchant ship
CAP	Civil Air Patrol (U.S.)
CAPF	Canadian Army Pacific Force
CAS	chief of air staff (British)
CATF	China Air Task Force
cav	cavalry
CB	Companion of the Order of the Bath (British award)
CB	counterbattery fire of artillery
CB	U.S. Navy designation for a large cruiser
CB (“Seabee”)	U.S. Navy Construction Battalion or its personnel
CBE	Commander Order of the British Empire (British award)
CBI	China-Burma-India (theater of war)
CBO	combined bomber offensive
CCA	Combat Command A (armored division) (U.S.)
CCB	Combat Command B (armored division) (U.S.)
CCR	Combat Command Reserve (armored division) (U.S.)
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff (British and U.S.)
CDL	canal defense light
CG	commanding general
CGS	chief of the General Staff (British)
CI	counterintelligence
CIC	Counterintelligence Corps (U.S.)
CIGS	chief of the Imperial General Staff (British)
CinC	commander in chief
CINCAF	commander in chief of the Allied Forces
CINCMED	commander in chief of the Mediterranean
cl	class of ship
CL	U.S. Navy designation for a light cruiser
CLAA	U.S. Navy designation for an antiaircraft cruiser
CLN	Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (National Liberation Committee) (Italian)
cm	centimeter
CMHQ	Canadian military headquarters
CNF	Comité National Français (French National Committee)
CNL	National Liberation Committee (Polish)
CNO	chief of naval operations (U.S.)
CNR	Conseil National de la Résistance (National Resistance Council) (French)
CO	commanding officer
CO	conscientious objector
CofS	chief of staff
COHQ	Combined Operations Headquarters (British)

COI	coordinator of information
Comando	Italian Armed Forces Supreme Command
COMINCH	U.S. Navy commander in chief
Supremo	
COMINT	communications intelligence
commo	communications
COMMZ	areas behind the fighting forces (acronym for communications zone)
COMNAVEU	Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe
COSSAC	chief of staff to the supreme Allied commander
counterbattery	artillery fire directed against enemy heavy weapons and artillery
CP	command post
CV	U.S. Navy designation for an aircraft carrier
CVE	U.S. Navy designation for an escort aircraft carrier, also known as a "jeep carrier" (crews said the acronym stood for "combustible, vulnerable, and expendable")
CVO	Commander of the Royal Victorian Order (British award)
CW	chemical warfare
CW	continuous wave
D-day	day on which an operation commences
D+#	notation indicating the specific number of days that have passed since a given D-day
DAF	Desert Air Force (British)
DAK	Deutsches Afrika Korps (German Africa Corps)
DD	duplex-drive amphibious tank
DD	U.S. Navy designation for a destroyer
DE	U.S. Navy designation for a destroyer escort
DEMS	defensively equipped merchant ship
DF	direction finder or direction-finding
DFC	Distinguished Flying Cross (British, U.S. military decoration)
div	division
DLM	*division légère mécanique* (light mechanized division) (French)
DMS	U.S. Navy designation for a destroyer minesweeper
DNI	director of naval intelligence, U.S. Navy
dogface	slang term for an American infantryman
DP	displaced person
DP	dual-purpose
drôle de guerre	French term for the so-called Phony War (*see* Sitzkrieg)
DSC	Distinguished Service Cross (British, U.S. military decoration)
DSO	Distinguished Service Order (British military decoration)
DUKW	"duck" amphibious truck (U.S.)
EAC	European Advisory Commission
EAM	Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon (National Liberation Front), Greek unit that fought the Germans
E-boat	Eilboot (fast boat) (German), describing a small torpedo-carrying boat
ECM	electronic countermeasures

EDES	Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (National Republican Greek League)
E&E	escape and evasion
Einsatzgruppen	German Schutzstaffel (SS) operational troops within the occupied territories, involved in exterminating Jews
EK	Eisernes Kreuz (Iron Cross) (German military decoration)
ELAS	Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (Greek National Popular Liberation Army)
ELINT	electronic intelligence
engr	engineer
EOD	explosive-ordnance disposal
Ersatzheer	German Replacement Army
ETO	European theater of operations
EW	electronic warfare
FA	field artillery (U.S.)
Fallschirmjäger	paratrooper (German)
FANY	Field Auxiliary Nursing Yeomanry (British)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.)
FCA HQ	First Canadian Army, Headquarters
FDR	Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. president
Feldheer	field army (German)
FFI	Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (French Forces of the interior)
FHO	Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East), German organization specializing in gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union
FHQu	Führerhauptquartier (leader's [Adolf Hitler's] principal headquarters) (German)
flak	Flugzeugabwehrkanone (antiaircraft guns) (German); Allied aircrews appropriated the term for German antiaircraft fire
FM	field manual (U.S.)
FM	frequency-modulation radio
FNFL	Forces Navales Françaises Libres (Free French Naval Forces)
fps	feet per second
FR	fortified region
Freikorps	Free Corps (German), the private militia groups of the early Weimar Republic period that continued to fight the Soviets in the east and contested with leftists in the German cities
Front	a Soviet army group
FUSAG	1st U.S. Army Group, used as a ghost unit in the Allied deception operation (code-named FORTITUDE) prior to the Normandy Invasion
FW	German designation for the Focke-Wulf aircraft-manufacturing firm
FWD	forward headquarters
G	U.S. designation for divisional (or higher-level) staff sections, as follows:
G-1	administration
G-2	intelligence
G-3	operations and training
G-4	logistics

G-5	civil affairs
GAU	Glavnoye Artilleriyskoye Upravleniye (Main Soviet Artillery Directorate)
Gauleiter	regional leader of the Nazi Party
GC	George Cross (British military decoration)
GCI	ground-controlled intercept
Gd	Guards
geh	geheim (secret) (German)
GenStdH	Generalstab des Heeres (army General Staff) (German)
Geschwader	air force wing (German)
Gestapo	Geheimstaatspolizei (Secret State Police) (German)
GHQ	general headquarters
GI	slang term for an American soldier (acronym for government issue)
GKdo	Generalkommando (corps headquarters) (German)
GKO	Soviet State Defense Committee
GMC	gun motor carriage
GNP	gross national product
GO	general order
GOC	general officer commanding (British)
grt	gross register tons
GRU	Glavnoe Razvedyvate'noe Upravlenie (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff)
GS	General Staff
H hour	commencement time on D-day
H-Dienst	Haffen-Dienst, the German Harbor Service
He	German designation for the Heinkel aircraft-manufacturing firm
HE	high-explosive
HEAT	high-explosive antitank (shell)
Hedgehog	Allied naval antisubmarine weapon; also, three crossed angle irons used as an antitank obstacle
Heeresgruppe	army group (German)
HF	high-frequency
HF/DF	high-frequency direction finding
Hiwi Hilfswillige	German term for Polish and Soviet volunteer military auxiliaries
HJ	Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth) (German)
HMAS	His Majesty's Australian Ship
HMCS	His Majesty's Canadian Ship
HMNS	Her Majesty's Netherlands Ship
HMNZS	His Majesty's New Zealand Ship
HMS	His Majesty's Ship
hp	horsepower
HQ	headquarters
HSSPF	Höhere SS und Polzeiführer (senior commanders of the Schutzstaffel [SS] and the police) (German)
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVAR	high-velocity aircraft rocket
Hvy	heavy

HWE	Home War Establishment (Canadian)
ICC	Inter-Allied Control Council
ID	infantry division
i.G.	im Generalstab (designation for General Staff officers) (German)
IG	inspector general
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
Il	Soviet designation for aircraft designed by Sergei Ilyushin
ILR	Infanterie Lehrregiment (Infantry School training regiment) (German)
IMT	international military tribunal
Ind	Indian
inf	infantry
intel	intelligence
intsum	intelligence summary
It	Italian
IWM	Imperial War Museum (in London)
Jabo	Jagdbomber (fighter-bomber) (German)
Jäger	light infantry (German)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.)
jeep	quarter-ton truck (slang term for a general-purpose truck, or GP)
JG	Jagdgeschwader (Luftwaffe fighter wing) (German)
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee (British and American)
JS	Jagdstaffel (fighter squadron) (German)
JSM	Joint Staff Mission (British)
Ju	German designation for the Junkers aircraft-manufacturing firm
JV	Jagdverband (fighter formation) (German)
Krations	U.S. Army field rations
Kampfgruppe	task force or battle group (German)
KBE	Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (British award)
KCB	Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath (British award)
KG	Kampfgeschwader (aircraft squadron) (German)
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Committee for State Security) (Soviet), the secret police
kHz	kilohertz, or 1,000 cycles per second
KIA	killed in action
KKV	Kleinkampfverbände (small fighting units or special forces) (German)
km	kilometer
KM	Kriegsmarine (German Navy)
KONR	Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Soviet)
Kreisleiter	district leader of the Nazi Party (German)
Kripo	Kriminalpolizei (criminal police) (German)
kt	knot, or 1 nautical mile per hour
KTB	Kriegstagebuch (war diary) (German)
KZ	Konzentrationslager (concentration camp) (German)

LAF	Lithuanian Activist Force
LAH	Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler's bodyguard unit); later, the 1st Waffen-SS Panzer Division
Landser	German slang term for the common soldier
LC	Designation for various types of landing craft, as follows:
LCA	landing craft, assault
LCI	landing craft, infantry
LCI(L)	landing craft, infantry (large)
LCM	landing craft, mechanized
LCS	London Controlling Station
LCS	landing craft, support
LCS(L)	landing craft, support (large)
LCT	landing craft, tank
LCVP	landing craft, vehicle and personnel
Leatherneck	Slang term for the U.S. Marine Corps
LF	low-frequency
LOCs	lines of communication
LOCUS	landing craft obstacle clearance units (British)
LRDG	Long-Range Desert Group (British)
LS	Designation for various types of landing ships, as follows:
LSD	landing ship, dock
LSH	landing ship, headquarters
LSI	landing ship, infantry
LSM	landing ship, medium
LST	landing ship, tank
LSV	landing ship, vehicle
lt	light
Luftflotte	German air fleet
Luftflotte-Reich	German Home Air Command
Luftwaffe	German air force
LVF	Légion des Volontaires Français (Waffen-SS, or armed SS, French volunteer force)
LVT	landing vehicle, tracked
Lw	Luftwaffe (German Air Force)
M	U.S. designation for a particular model number
MAAF	Mediterranean Allied Air Force
MAC	merchant aircraft carrier
MAD	magnetic anomaly detection
MAP	Ministry of Air Production (British)
Maquisards	French term for troops of the French Resistance, the Maquis
MBE	Member of the Order of the British Empire (British award)
MC	Military Cross (British military decoration)
MCWR	Marine Corps Women's Reserve (U.S.)
Me	German designation for the Messer-schmidtt aircraft-manufacturing firm
MEK	Marine-Einsatz-Kommando (Naval Replacement Command) (German)
MG	Maschinengewehr (machine gun) (German)

MGB	motor gunboat
MHz	megahertz, or 1 million cycles per second
MI	designation for British intelligence branches, as follows:
MI-1	intelligence administration
MI-2	intelligence for Eastern Europe and Asia
MI-3	intelligence for Western Europe and the Americas
MI-4	intelligence map support
MI-5	Security Service
MI-6	Secret Intelligence Service (operating under the British Foreign Office, this unit had responsibility for gathering foreign intelligence relating to Britain's national security; its chief had responsibility for the Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park)
MI-7	press intelligence
MI-8	signals intelligence
MI-9	escape service, providing support for Allied escape and evasion
MI-10	intelligence technical support
MI-11	field security police
MI-12	postal security
MI-14	intelligence for Germany
MI-15	photoreconnaissance
MI-16	intelligence for science
MI-17	intelligence coordination
MI-19	intelligence for enemy prisoners of war and refugees from Europe
MI	military intelligence
MIA	missing in action
MiG	Soviet designation for the Mikoyan and Gurevich aircraft-manufacturing firm
MILORG	Military Organization (Norwegian armed resistance group)
Mk	British designation for a "Mark" model number
mm	millimeter
Molotov cocktail	inflammatory device, usually a bottle that is filled with gasoline and has a rag fuse. After the fuse is lit, the device is thrown, exploding on impact and setting fire to the area around it. Named for Soviet commissar for foreign affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, the device was chiefly used on the Eastern Front during the war by Soviet troops and partisans attacking tanks and vehicles.
MP	Mashinenpistole (submachine gun) (German)
MP	member of Parliament
MP	military police
mph	miles per hour
MT	motor transport
MTB	motor torpedo boat
MTO	Mediterranean theater of operations
MUR	Mouvements Unis de la Résistance (United Resistance Movements) (French)
NAAF	North African Air Force
NBS	Norden bombsight
NCO	noncommissioned officer
Nebelwerfer	mobile electronically fired multiple-barrel rocket launcher (German)

NKVD	Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) (Soviet)
nm	nautical mile
NRMA	National Resources Mobilization Act (Canadian)
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers' [Nazi] Party)
Null-Tag	Zero Day (German), equivalent to the Allied D-day; also known as O-tag
NZ	New Zealand
oa	overall, a descriptor of the length of a vessel; thus, a ship that is 300 feet in length (oa) measures 300 feet from the front of the bow to the end of the stern.
OB	Oberfehlshaber (commander in chief) (German)
OB	order of battle (U.S., British)
OBE	Officer of the Order of the British Empire (British award)
OC	Office of Censorship (U.S.)
OCS	officer candidate school (U.S.)
ODESSA	Organisation der Ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen (Organization of Former SS Members) (German)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OFEC	Office for Economic Coordination
Oflag	Offizierslager (prisoner-of-war camp for officers) (German)
OG	operational group
OGBM	Otdelny Gvardeskiy Batal'on Miverov (Separate Guard Battalion) (Soviet)
OK	German designation for the high command of various departments of the armed forces, as follows:
OKH	Oberkommando des Heeres (Army Supreme Command)
OKL	Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force Supreme Command)
OKM	Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (Navy Supreme Command)
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces Supreme Command)
OP	observation post
op	operation
opord	operations order
Orpo	Ordnungspolizei (Order Police) (German)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services (U.S.)
OT	Organisation Todt, German construction group
OWI	Office of War Information (U.S.)
OWM	Office of War Mobilization (U.S.)
P	U.S. Army Air Forces designation for a fighter (pursuit) aircraft model
PAF	Polish Air Force
Pak	Panzerabwehrkanone (antitank gun) (German)
Panzerfaust	panzer fist (German), designation for a shaped-charge antitank weapon
Panzergrenadier	German mechanized infantry
Panzerschreck	Panzer Terror, name for a German antitank rocket that was the counterpart to the U.S. bazooka
pdr	

	Pounder, a gun-size designation related to projectile weight measurement; thus, a 6-pdr gun fires a 6-pound projectile.
Pfc	private first class (U.S. Army enlisted rank)
PFF	Pathfinder Force (U.S. and British term for advance unit guiding main body to destination)
PHOTINT	photographic intelligence
PIAT	British antitank weapon (acronym for projector, infantry, antitank)
PLUTO	Pipeline under the Ocean, referring to the Allied pipeline to France under the English Channel that was put in place after the June 1944 Normandy Invasion.
PM	prime minister
PNF	Partito Nazionale Fascista (Fascist National Party) (Italian)
POL	petroleum, oil, lubricants
Pol	Polish
POW	prisoner of war
PPA	Polish People's Army
PUC	Presidential Unit Citation (U.S.)
PWE	Political Warfare Executive (British)
Pz	Panzer (armor) (German)
PzDv	panzer division
PzGr	Panzergrenadier (mechanized infantry) (German)
PzKpfw	Panzerkampfwagen (armored fighting vehicle) (German)
QM	quartermaster
RA	Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force)
RA	Royal Artillery
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAC	Royal Armoured Corps
RAD	Reichsarbeitsdienst (German Labor Service)
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCM	radar countermeasure
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RCT	regimental combat team
RDF	radio direction finding
RE	Royal Engineers
recce	reconnaissance
regt	regiment
REI	Régiment Étranger d'Infanterie (Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment) (French)
Reichsheer	army of Germany's Third Reich
Reichsleiter	national-level leader of the Nazi Party (German)
Reichswehr	armed forces of Germany's Weimar Republic
RFSS	Reichsführer-SS (SS leader for the Reich) (German)
RKFDV	Reichskommissar für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums (Reich commissioner for the strengthening of Germanism) (German)
RM	Regia Marina (Italian Navy)

RM	Royal Marines
RN	Royal Navy
RNVR	Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
ROA	Russkaia Osvoboditel'naia Armiia (Russian Liberation Army)
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office)
RSI	Republica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social Republic)
RTR	Royal Tank Regiment
RTTY	radio teletype
RuSHA	Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt (Race and Resettlement Office) (German)
S	U.S. designation for various regimental or lower-level staff sections, as follows:
S-1	personnel
S-2	intelligence
S-3	operations
S-4	supply
SA	Sturmabteilungen (storm battalions or troops), Nazi armed groups that helped bring Adolf Hitler to power
SACEUR	supreme Allied commander in Europe
SACMED	supreme Allied commander in the Mediterranean
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAS	Special Air Service (British)
SBG	small box girder bridge
SBS	Special Boats Section (British)
SCAEF	supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
SCAP	supreme commander, Allied powers (title given to General Douglas MacArthur as head of the occupation forces in Japan)
SD	Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) (German)
SdKfz	Sonderkraftfahrzeug (special motor vehicle, such as a half-track or armored car) (German)
SFHQ	Special Forces Headquarters
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SIGINT	signals intelligence
Sipo	Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) (German)
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (British), classified as MI-6
sitrep	situation report
Sitzkrieg	British parody of the term blitzkrieg (*sitz* is the German word for "sit"); referred to the period from October 1939 to May 1940 when little military action took place on the Western Front, a period also known as the Phony War and the Bore War
Smersh	Smert Shpionam (Death to Spies), a Soviet counterintelligence organization
SMLE	short-magazine Lee-Enfield, the standard British-issue rifle of World War II
SOE	Special Operations Executive (British)
Sonder-kommando	special unit (German)
SOP	standing operating procedure (order to be followed automatically in specified circumstances)
SOS	Service of Supply (U.S.)

SP	self-propelled
SPARS	U.S. Coast Guard women's auxiliary (derived from the Coast Guard motto, Semper Paratus)
Spetsnaz	Spetsialnoge Naznacheniya (Special Forces) (Soviet)
SPF	special-purpose force
SPOC	special operations center
sq	squadron
SS	Schutzstaffel (Protective Bodies, or bodyguard) (German); originally the bodyguard for Adolf Hitler, the SS grew into a large and elite party force.
SS	U.S. Navy designation for a submarine
SSS	Selective Service System (U.S.)
SSTV	SS-Totenkopfverbände (SS Death's Head formations) (German), the guard units for concentration camps
SSVT	SS-Verfügungstruppe (SS Reserves) (German)
Stabschef	chief of staff (German)
Stalag	Mannschafts-Stammlager (prisoner-of-war camp for enlisted men) (German)
Stavka	Soviet high command
STO	Service du Travail Obligatoire (Mandatory Labor Service) (French)
STOL	short takeoff and landing
StuG	Sturmgeschütz (assault gun) (German)
Stuka	Sturzkampfflugzeugu (designation for a dive-bomber, specifically the Ju-87) (German)
TA	Territorial Army (British)
TA	traffic analysis
tac	tactical
TAF	tactical air force
TBS	talk between ships
TD	tank destroyer
Teller mine	German antitank mine
TF	task force
TG	task group
TM	technical manual (U.S.)
T/O&E	table of organization and equipment (U.S.)
Tommy	slang term for a British soldier
TOT	time on target (artillery term)
U-boat	Unterwasserboot (submarine) (German)
UDT	underwater demolition team (U.S.)
UHF	ultrahigh frequency
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UPA	Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)
USA	U.S. Army
USAAF	U.S. Army Air Forces
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard

USCGC	U.S. Coast Guard Cutter
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USMCR	U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
USN	U.S. Navy
USNR	U.S. Naval Reserve
USNS	U.S. Naval Ship
USO	United Service Organizations (U.S.)
USS	U.S. Ship
USSTAF	U.S. Strategic Air Forces
UXB	unexploded bomb
V	Vergeltungswaffen, a designation for missile reprisal weapons (German)
VC	Victoria Cross (British military decoration)
V-E	Victory in Europe (conclusion of the war in Europe)
VHF	very high frequency
V-J	Victory over Japan (conclusion of the war in the Pacific)
Volksdeutsche	German word referring to the residents of border areas in adjacent countries who were ethnically German
Volkssturm	people's militia (German)
VT	variable time artillery proximity fuze
VVS	Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sili (military air force, Soviet Union)
WAAC	Women's Auxiliary Army Corps (U.S.)
WAAF	Women's Auxiliary Air Force (British)
WAC	Women's Army Corps (U.S.)
Waffen-SS	armed Schutzstaffel (SS), the German SS fighting units during the war
WAFS	Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (U.S.)
WASP	Women Airforce Service Pilots (U.S.)
WAVES	Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (U.S.)
Wehrmacht	German armed forces from 1935 to 1945, succeeding the Weimar Republic's Reichswehr
WFst	Wehrmachtführungsstab (Operations Staff of the Armed Forces) (German)
WIA	wounded in action
WLA	Women's Land Army (British)
WMC	War Manpower Commission (U.S.)
WP	white phosphorous
WPB	War Production Board (U.S.)
WPD	War Plans Division (U.S.)
WRNS	Women's Royal Navy Service (British)
WSA	War Shipping Administration (U.S.)
WVS	Women's Volunteer Service (British)
XO	executive officer
Yak	Soviet designation for the Yakovlev aircraft-manufacturing firm
ŻOB	

Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa, the Russian name for the Jewish Fighting Organization of the Warsaw ghetto

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Documents

Documents are the raw materials of history. The historian must recognize their unique properties and exercise great caution in handling them. The story the documents tell may or may not be true, and each type of document has its own advantages and disadvantages. One distinguished World War II historian, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, edited collections of German documents on interwar foreign policy and termed documents "the bare bones of history." He recalled that as "a young and budding historian I had a thing about documents. I believed that in documents lay the real truth of history." He nonetheless confessed that though never losing his basic interest in documents, he later

> discovered … that historical truth—in that it exists at all—lies not in documents alone, nor in memoirs, diaries, biographies or oral history. All these are essential and invaluable factors in the historian's armoury but, when the chips are down, the final result depends on the historian himself alone, on his ability to weigh, assay and analyse the accumulated material at his disposal and to come up with his own honest opinions and conclusions. There are no answers at the back of the book. (Wheeler-Bennett 1976, 58)

The further back we go in the historical record, the fewer documents we normally have at our disposal. This is due in part to the loss or destruction of many documents over time and to the fact that mass literacy has been largely

a phenomenon of the 19th and 20th centuries. When fewer people were able to read or write, the written record was less extensive. Those who lacked the ability to leave any written record of their own were underrepresented in historical accounts, which relied heavily on written sources.

The documents in this volume are only a tiny fraction of the millions of documents that World War II generated. In a few cases, tracking down these documents presented a challenge demanding persistence and ingenuity. In assembling this collection, the editor was fortunate in having at her disposal the outstanding resources of the libraries of the University of Hong Kong, George Washington University and its associated consortium, and the Library of Congress. Perhaps the hardest task, however, was not simply locating these documents but making the final selection.

Quite a number of documents chose themselves. One important priority was to provide reasonably full coverage of both the diplomatic and military courses of the war. Another was to give some sense of its geographical extent and implications. Whether actual fighting took place on its soil, for every country involved in World War II the political, social, and economic impact was profound. The documents included here were chosen to convey some sense of the wider domestic consequences of the experience of total war.

World War II did not have tidy temporal limits. Powers entered the war at different times: Great Britain, Germany, and France in 1939, Italy in 1940, the Soviet Union in mid-1941, and the United States at the end of 1941. In a broader perspective, the causes of World War II can be traced back at least to World War I, which fragmented and weakened the existing international system, creating a set of problems that it would take another war to resolve. Nor did the consequences of World War II end when the fighting ended in 1945. The power vacuum that the war created in large parts of the world was effectively filled by the Cold War, which evolved out of the balance of forces that existed when World War II ended and from ideological and geopolitical conflicts, the ancestry of which was far more venerable. The documents in this volume therefore cover the rise of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, the development of the Sino-Japanese conflict, the Italo-Ethiopian War, the Spanish Civil War, and the reaction of the large Western democracies, including the United States, to these events.

Although the formal time frame for this volume ends in 1945, one can already discern in the documents the burgeoning Cold War as tensions

mounted between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies over control of Eastern Europe and the treatment of Germany. From early in the war, liberal Europeans demonstrated a real wish to integrate their continent so as to prevent future wars resembling the two of the previous 30 years. The rise of nationalist and communist political forces in Asia was also clearly apparent even before World War II began, but the war enormously enhanced the position of both and ultimately ended formal Western colonialism there. Significantly, by 1945 top American political and military leaders were urging that their country indefinitely maintain a strong and modern military capable of responding immediately to international challenges and also an overseas intelligence capability.

Politicians, diplomats, and generals made—or tried to make—the war's biggest decisions, but their ultimate success in implementing these decisions depended on their ability to win support or at least acquiescence from their populations. Tens of millions of ordinary people fought in the war as soldiers or irregular partisans. At least as many worked in the war industries, and hundreds of millions lived in territories that were fought over, bombed, or occupied. Tens of millions of soldiers and civilians died in combat, as prisoners of war, or as the victims of bombing, atrocities, concentration camps, exposure, starvation, and disease. From small children to the elderly, even among those fortunate enough to escape the war's worst ravages, its effects were still felt long after the actual fighting ceased. For many, the war was a period of brutal hardship and of battles and experiences they would rather forget. For others more fortunate, the war was a period of camaraderie and excitement, of using their skills and living their lives with an intensity they would never again attain, and of shared effort in a common and uplifting cause. And for many, maybe even the majority, the war and its effects were simply to be endured. Some, of course, left no records behind.

For many years newspapers reported the war in detail, from the level of high policy down to human interest stories of its impact on individuals who might or might not be typical. Official government broadcasting operations and private broadcasting stations also kept extensive collections of transcripts and recordings of radio broadcasts. Official government records in the political, military, diplomatic, economic, and domestic spheres preserve the information that the government wanted to share with its citizens.

Less official materials were also abundant, their survival in many cases

dependent upon the vagaries of chance. Private organizations, business or philanthropic, often maintained what were effectively their own archives, and some individuals saved large collections of personal papers. Many of those involved in the war kept diaries—those in prominent or interesting positions perhaps in the hope of enshrining their claims to historical recognition and many ordinary people in the expectation that their wartime experiences would be among the high points of their lives. After the war ended, new technology, especially light and easily operable recording machines, contributed to the development of the new field of oral history, whose practitioners made dedicated efforts to collect, transcribe, and make available the recollections of all levels of wartime participants, from those who were children at the time to high-ranking officials. The growing interest in family history likewise impelled individuals to set down their recollections for future generations.

One must always, however, approach every source with what will often prove to be well-warranted skepticism. Documents are never simply neutral records of events. Every document is written for a purpose, even if it is simply to record one's own private experiences and feelings. In no circumstances can one treat a document in a vacuum; the more one knows about its context, the better one can appreciate it.

What, then, is the value of documents to historians? Should we conclude that since every document is inherently problematic, it is impossible to make any credible use of documents? To that, the dedicated historian would undoubtedly answer "certainly not." Historians regard documents as treasures and devote much effort and ingenuity to tracking down new and previously overlooked sources. The interpretation of written sources, while overwhelming at times, is not a task requiring superhuman talents. It merely demands the fundamental qualifications of any good historian: knowledge, skill, discernment, and critical abilities.

No single collection of documents could ever hope to encapsulate the vast range of individual experiences in and responses to World War II. Even though several were chosen at least in part because each seemed broadly representative of a particular type of wartime experience, the small selection of personal letters and memoirs included here perhaps suggests how very differently the same war could be felt for each man, woman, or child involved.

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DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO 1938

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Introduction

In 1924 Adolf Hitler, then a rising young politician, published his memoirs and political program, a volume named *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle). He claimed that Germany needed and was entitled to *Lebensraum* (living space) to fulfill its national ambitions and potential and that such territory could only be found in the lands east of Germany, especially communist Russia, a state that he claimed was dominated by Jews. Hitler flatly declined to be satisfied with the restoration of the pre–World War I German boundaries of 1914.

Primary Source

If under foreign policy we must understand the regulation of a nation's relations with the rest of the world, the manner of this regulation will be determined by certain definite facts. As National Socialists we can, furthermore, establish the following principle concerning the nature of the foreign policy of a folkish state:

The foreign policy of the folkish state must safeguard the existence on this planet of the race embodied in the state, by creating a healthy, viable natural relation between the nation's population and growth on the one hand and the quantity and quality of its soil on the other hand.

As a healthy relation we may regard only that condition which assures the sustenance of a people on its own soil. Every other condition, even if it endures for hundreds, nay, thousands of years, is nevertheless unhealthy and

will sooner or later lead to the injury if not annihilation of the people in question.

Only an adequately large space on this earth assures a nation freedom of existence.

Moreover, the necessary size of the territory to be settled cannot be judged exclusively on the basis of present requirements, not even in fact on the basis of the yield of the soil compared to the population. … If a nation's sustenance as such is assured by the amount of its soil, the safeguarding of the existing soil itself must also be borne in mind. This lies in the general power-political strength of the state, which in turn to no small extent is determined by geomilitary considerations.

Hence, the German nation can defend its future only as a world power. …

Germany today is no world power. Even if our momentary military impotence were overcome, we should no longer have any claim to this title. What can a formation, as miserable in its relation of population to area as the German Reich today, mean on this planet? In an era when the earth is gradually being divided up among states, some of which embrace almost entire continents, we cannot speak of a world power in connection with a formation whose political mother country is limited to the absurd area of five hundred thousand square kilometers.

From the purely territorial point of view, the area of the German Reich vanishes completely as compared with that of the so-called world powers. …

Thus, in the world today we see a number of power states, some of which not only far surpass the strength of our German nation in population, but whose area above all is the chief support of their political power. Never has the relation of the German Reich to other existing world states been as unfavorable as at the beginning of our history two thousand years ago and again today. Then we were a young people, rushing headlong into a world of great crumbling state formations, whose last giant, Rome, we ourselves helped to fell. Today we find ourselves in a world of great power states in process of formation, with our own Reich sinking more and more into insignificance.

We must bear this bitter truth coolly and soberly in mind. We must follow and compare the German Reich through the centuries in its relation to other states with regard to population and area. I know that everyone will then come to the dismayed conclusion which I have stated at the beginning of this

discussion: *Germany is no longer a world power, regardless whether she is strong or weak from the military point of view*.

We have lost all proportion to the other great states of the earth, and this thanks only to the positively catastrophic leadership of our nation in the field of foreign affairs, thanks to our total failure to be guided by what I should almost call a testamentary aim in foreign policy, and thanks to the loss of any healthy instinct and impulse of self-preservation.

If the National Socialist movement really wants to be consecrated by history with a great mission for our nation, it must be permeated by knowledge and filled with pain at our true situation in this world; boldly and conscious of its goal, it must take up the struggle against the aimlessness and incompetence which have hitherto guided our German nation in the line of foreign affairs. Then, without consideration of "traditions" and prejudices, it must find the courage to gather our people and their strength for an advance along the road that will lead this people from its present restricted living space to new land and soil, and hence also free it from the danger of vanishing from the earth or of serving others as a slave nation.

The National Socialist movement must strive to eliminate the disproportion between our population and our area—viewing this latter as a source of food as well as a basis for power politics—between our historical past and the hopelessness of our present impotence. And in this it must remain aware that we, as guardians of the highest humanity on this earth, are bound by the highest obligation, and the more it strives to bring the German people to racial awareness so that, in addition to breeding dogs, horses, and cats, they will have mercy on their own blood, the more it will be able to meet this obligation. …

I still wish briefly to take a position on the question as to what extent the demand for soil and territory seems ethically and morally justified. This is necessary, since unfortunately, even in so-called folkish circles, all sorts of unctuous bigmouths step forward, endeavoring to set the rectification of the injustice of 1918 as the aim of the German nation's endeavors in the field of foreign affairs, but at the same time find it necessary to assure the whole world of folkish brotherhood and sympathy.

I should like to make the following preliminary remarks: The demand for restoration of the frontiers of 1914 is a political absurdity of such proportions and consequences as to make it seem a crime. Quite aside from

the fact that the Reich's frontiers in 1914 were anything but logical. For in reality they were neither complete in the sense of embracing the people of German nationality, nor sensible with regard to geomilitary expediency. They were not the result of a considered political action, but momentary frontiers in a political struggle that was by no means concluded; partly, in fact, they were the results of chance. With equal right and in many cases with more right, some other sample year of German history could be picked out, and the restoration of the conditions at that time declared to be the aim of an activity in foreign affairs. …

The boundaries of the year 1914 mean nothing at all for the German future. Neither did they provide a defense of the past, nor would they contain any strength for the future.

Through them the German nation will neither achieve its inner integrity, nor will its sustenance be safeguarded by them, nor do these boundaries, viewed from the military standpoint, seem expedient or even satisfactory, nor finally can they improve the relation in which we at present find ourselves toward the other world powers, or, better expressed, the real world powers. The lag behind England will not be caught up, the magnitude of the Union will not be achieved; not even France would experience a material diminution of her world-political importance. …

And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-War period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the east. At long last we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-War period and shift to the soil policy of the future.

If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.

Here Fate itself seems desirous of giving us a sign. By handing Russia to Bolshevism, it robbed the Russian nation of that intelligentsia which previously brought about and guaranteed its existence as a state. For the organization of a Russian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavs in Russia, but only a wonderful example of the state-forming efficacy of the German element in an inferior race. Numerous mighty empires on earth have been created in this way. Lower nations led by Germanic organizers and overlords have more than once grown to be mighty

state formations and have endured as long as the racial nucleus of the creative state race maintained itself. For centuries Russia drew nourishment from this Germanic nucleus of its upper leading strata. Today it can be regarded as almost totally exterminated and extinguished. It has been replaced by the Jew. Impossible as it is for the Russian by himself to shake off the yoke of the Jew by his own resources, it is equally impossible for the Jew to maintain the mighty empire forever. He himself is no element of organization, but a ferment of decomposition. The Persian empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state. We have been chosen by Fate as witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the mightiest confirmation of the soundness of the folkish theory.

Our task, the mission of the National Socialist movement, is to bring our own people to such political insight that they will not see their goal for the future in the breathtaking sensation of a new Alexander's conquest, but in the industrious work of the German plow, to which the sword need only give soil. …

If the National Socialist movement frees itself from all illusions with regard to this great and all-important task, and accepts reason as its sole guide, the catastrophe of 1918 can some day become an infinite blessing for the future of our nation. Out of this collapse our nation will arrive at a complete reorientation of its activity in foreign relations, and, furthermore, reinforced within by its new philosophy of life, will also achieve outwardly a final stabilization of its foreign policy. Then at last it will acquire what England possesses and even Russia possessed, and what again and again induced France to make the same decisions, essentially correct from the viewpoint of her own interests, to wit: A political testament.

The political testament of the German nation to govern its outward activity for all time should and must be:

Never suffer the rise of two continental powers in Europe. Regard any attempt to organize a second military power on the German frontiers, even if only in the form of creating a state capable of military strength, as an attack on Germany, and in it see not only the right, but also the duty, to employ all means up to armed force to prevent the rise of such a state, or, if one has already arisen, to smash it again. See to it that the strength of our nation is founded, not on colonies, but on the soil of our European homeland. Never regard the Reich as secure unless for centuries to come it can give every scion

of our people his own parcel of soil. Never forget that the most sacred right on this earth is a man's right to have earth to till with his own hands, and the most sacred sacrifice the blood that a man sheds for this earth.

Source: Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 642–664 (italics in original). Translated by Ralph Manheim. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company and also The Random House Group, Ltd. All rights reserved.

2. Benito Mussolini (and Giovanni Gentile), "What Is Fascism?": Article for the Italian Encyclopedia, 1932

Introduction

Italy was the first European state to embrace fascism after World War I. The former socialist journalist Benito Mussolini, who fought as a corporal in the war, attacked the peace settlement as giving far too little to Italy and organized right-wing opposition to the existing government. In 1922 King Victor Emanuel appointed him prime minister. Fascist doctrine, as expounded by Mussolini, glorified military action and heroism in the interests of the state, to which individual rights were to be subordinated, and looked back to an idealized mythological past—in Italy's case the Roman Empire. Mussolini called for military expansion and the acquisition of overseas colonies.

Primary Source

…[A]s regards the future development of mankind—and quite apart from all present political considerations—Fascism does not, generally speaking, believe in the possibility of utility of perpetual peace. It therefore discards pacifism as a cloak for cowardly supine renunciation in contra-distinction to self-sacrifice. War alone keys up all human energies to their maximum tension and sets the seal of nobility on those people who have the courage to face it. All other tests are substitutes which never place a man face to face with himself before the alternative of life or death. … The Fascist accepts and loves life; he rejects and despises suicide as cowardly. Life as he understands

it means duty, elevation, conquest; life must be lofty and full, it must be lived for oneself but above all for others, both near by and far off, present and future. …

Such a conception of life makes Fascism the resolute negation of the doctrine underlying so-called scientific and Marxian socialism, the doctrine of historic materialism which would explain the history of mankind in terms of the class struggle and by changes in the processes and instruments of production, to the exclusion of all else.

…Fascism believes now and always in sanctity and heroism, that is to say in acts in which no economic motive—remote or immediate—is at work. Having denied historic materialism, which sees in men mere puppets on the surface of history, appearing and disappearing on the crest of the waves while in the depths the real directing forces move and work, Fascism also denies the immutable and irreparable character of the class struggle which is the natural outcome of this economic conception of history; above all it denies that the class struggle is the preponderating agent in social transformations. …

After socialism, Fascism trains its guns on the whole block of democratic ideologies, and rejects both their premises and their practical applications and implements. Fascism denies that numbers, as such, can be the determining factor in human society; it denies the right of numbers to govern by means of periodical consultations; it asserts the irremediable and fertile and beneficent inequality of men who cannot be leveled by any such mechanical and extrinsic device as universal suffrage. …

…In rejecting democracy Fascism rejects the absurd conventional life of political equalitarianism, the habit of collective irresponsibility, the myth of felicity and indefinite progress. …

…Granted that the XIXth century was the century of socialism, liberalism, democracy, this does not mean that the XXth century must also be the century of socialism, liberalism, democracy. Political doctrines pass; nations remain. We are free to believe that this is the century of authority, a century tending to the “right,” a Fascist century. If the XIXth century was the century of the individual (liberalism implies individualism) we are free to believe that this is the “collective” century, and therefore the century of the State. …

The key-stone of the Fascist doctrine is its conception of the State, of its

essence, its functions, and its aims. For Fascism the State is absolute, individuals and groups relative. Individuals and groups are admissable insofar as they come within the State. Instead of directing the game and guiding the material and moral progress of the community, the liberal State restricts its activities to recording results. The Fascist State is wide awake and has a will of its own. For this reason it can be described as "ethical."…

The Fascist State organises the nation, but it leaves the individual adequate elbow room. It has curtailed useless or harmful liberties while preserving those which are essential. In such matters the individual cannot be the judge, but the State only.

…Fascism sees in the imperialistic spirit—i.e., in the tendency of nations to expand—a manifestation of their vitality. In the opposite tendency, which would limit their interests to the home country, it sees a sign of decadence. Peoples who rise or rearise are imperialistic; renunciation is characteristic of dying peoples. The Fascist doctrine is that best suited to the tendencies and feelings of a people which, like the Italian, after lying fallow during centuries of foreign servitude, is now reasserting itself in the world.

But imperialism implies discipline, the coordination of efforts, a deep sense of duty and a spirit of self-sacrifice. This explains many aspects of the practical activity of the State, as also the severity which has to be exercised towards those who would oppose this spontaneous and inevitable movement of XXth century Italy by agitating outgrown ideologies of the XIXth century, ideologies rejected wherever great experiments in political and social transformations are being dared.

Never before have the peoples thirsted for authority, direction, order, as they do now. If each age has its doctrine, then innumerable symptoms indicate that the doctrine of our age is the Fascist. That it is vital is shown by the fact that it has aroused a faith; that this faith has conquered souls is shown by the fact that Fascism can point to its fallen heroes and its martyrs.

Fascism has now acquired throughout the world that universality which belongs to all doctrines which by achieving self-expression represent a moment in the history of human thought.

Source: Benito Mussolini (and Giovanni Gentile), "What Is Fascism?," in *Enciclopedia Italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti,* Vol. 14 (Rome, Italy: Istituto Giovanni Treccani, 1932), 847–851. Reprinted in Benito Mussolini, *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions* (Rome: Ardita Publishers, 1935), 7–42; excerpt, 18–31.

3. Oxford Union Debate: Report in *The Times,* February 11, 1933

Introduction

World War I left a legacy of pervasive disillusionment with war. In 1933 students at Oxford University, nursery of the British political elite, voted that they would not fight for their country. The brief report carried in the *London Times* on this debate was in no way indicative of the national furor that this episode provoked. Somewhat ironically, a few years later many of those voting for the motion nonetheless took up arms on their country's behalf. The motion's passage was nonetheless symptomatic of the prevailing British antiwar mood of 1933, an outlook that the growing breakdown in Europe perhaps made yet more pronounced.

Primary Source

After a debate in the Oxford Union Society on Thursday night, a motion "that this House will in no circumstances fight for its King and country" was carried by 275 votes to 153.

In addition to the five principal speakers, one of whom was Mr. C. F. M. Joad, notice had been received from 57 members, the largest number on record, that they intended to take part in the debate.

Source: "Oxford Union Debate," *The Times,* February 11, 1933.

4. Japan Withdraws from the League of Nations: Count Yasuya Ichida, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, March 27, 1933

Introduction

In September 1931 Japanese troops provoked an armed clash over the railroad in Mukden, Manchuria (present-day Shenyang, China). The League of Nations protested against Japan's actions and passed resolutions ordering the withdrawal of Japanese troops, which Japan ignored. The following year this incident became the pretext for Japan to establish a puppet regime in Manchuria, the nominally independent state of Manzhouguo, headed by the former Chinese emperor Aixinjuelup Puyi. The League of Nations and many of its member nations, together with the United States, refused to recognize Manzhouguo as an independent country, which soon caused Japan to withdraw entirely from the League of Nations. In March 1933, shortly before President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in the United States, the Japanese emperor issued a rescript proclaiming Japan's decision to leave. Japan's foreign minister informed the League of Nations immediately of Japan's withdrawal. A sense that Japan enjoyed special rights in East Asia informed both documents.

Primary Source

The Japanese Government believe that the national policy of Japan, which has for its aim to ensure the peace of the Orient and thereby contribute to the cause of peace throughout the world, is identical in spirit with the mission of the League of Nations, which is to achieve international peace and security. It has always been with pleasure, therefore, that this country has for thirteen years past, as an original Member of the League and a permanent member of its Council, extended a full measure of co-operation with her fellow members towards the attainment of its high purpose. It is indeed a matter of historical fact that Japan has continuously participated in the various activities of the League with a zeal not inferior to that exhibited by any other nation. At the same time, it is, and has always been, the conviction of the Japanese Government that in order to render possible the maintenance of peace in various regions of the world, it is necessary in existing circumstances to allow the operation of the Covenant of the League to vary in accordance with the actual conditions prevailing in each of those regions. Only by acting on this just and equitable principle can the League fulfill its mission and increase its influence.

Acting on this conviction, the Japanese Government have, ever since the Sino-Japanese dispute was, in September 1937–38, submitted to the League, at meetings of the League, and on other occasions, continually set forward a consistent view. This was, that if the League was to settle the issue fairly and equitably, and to make a real contribution to the promotion of peace in the Orient, and thus enhance its prestige, it should acquire a complete grasp of the actual conditions in this quarter of the globe, and apply the Covenant of the League in accordance with these conditions. They have repeatedly emphasized and insisted upon the absolute necessity of taking into consideration the fact that China is not an organized State—that its internal conditions and external relations are characterized by extreme confusion and complexity, and by many abnormal and exceptional features—and that, accordingly, the general principles and usages of international law which govern the ordinary relations between nations are found to be considerably modified in their operation so far as China is concerned, resulting in the quite abnormal and unique international practices which actually prevail in that country.

However, the majority of the Members of the League evinced in the course of its deliberations during the past seventeen months a failure either to grasp these realities or else to face them and take them into proper account. Moreover, it has frequently been made manifest in these deliberations that there exist serious differences of opinion between Japan and these Powers concerning the application and even the interpretation of various international engagements and obligations, including the Covenant of the League and the principles of international law. As a result, the Report adopted by the Assembly at the Special Session of February 24 last, entirely misapprehending the spirit of Japan, pervaded as it is by no other desire than the maintenance of peace in the Orient, contains gross errors both in the ascertainment of facts and in the conclusions deduced. In asserting that the action of the Japanese army at the time of the incident of September 18, and subsequently, did not fall within the just limits of self-defence, the Report assigned no reasons and came to an arbitrary conclusion, and in ignoring alike the state of tension which preceded, and the various aggravations which succeeded, the incident—for all of which the full responsibility is incumbent upon China—the Report creates a source of fresh conflict in the political arena of the Orient. By refusing to acknowledge the actual circumstances that

led to the foundation of Manchukuo, and by attempting to challenge the position taken up by Japan in recognizing the new State, it cuts away the ground for the stabilisation of the Far Eastern situation.

Nor can the terms laid down in its recommendations—as was fully explained in the Statement issued by this Government on February 25 last—ever be of any possible service in securing enduring peace in these regions.

The conclusion must be that, in seeking a solution of the question, the majority of the League have attached greater importance to upholding inapplicable formulae than to the real task of assuring peace, and higher value to the vindication of academic theses than to the eradication of the sources of future conflict. For these reasons, and because of the profound differences of opinion existing between Japan and the majority of the League in their interpretation of the Covenant and of other treaties, the Japanese Government have been led to realize the existence of an irreconcilable divergence of views, dividing Japan and the League on policies of peace, and especially as regards the fundamental principles to be followed in the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East. The Japanese Government, believing that in these circumstances there remains no room for further co-operation, hereby give notice, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1, Paragraph 3, of the Covenant, of the intention of Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations.

Source: Count Yasuya Ichida, Telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, March 27, 1933, League of Nations, Official Journal, 14th Year, No. 5, May 1933, 657–658.

5. Adolf Hitler, Proclamation and Address to the German People, October 14, 1933

Introduction

Shortly after coming to power in Germany, Hitler announced his intention to withdraw from the League of Nations and also from the European disarmament conference then in progress. The league, he argued, was merely an instrument to enforce the unjust peace settlement of the Treaty of

Versailles. He appealed to the German people to endorse these actions in a referendum, and by a large majority they were approved.

Primary Source

Adolf Hitler, Proclamation, October 14, 1933

Filled with the sincere desire to accomplish the work of the peaceful internal reconstruction of our nation and of its political and economic life, former German Governments, trusting in the grant of a dignified equality of rights, declared their willingness to enter the League of Nations and to take part in the Disarmament Conference.

In this connection Germany suffered a bitter disappointment.

In spite of our readiness to carry through German disarmament … other Governments could not decide to redeem the pledges signed by them in the Peace Treaty.

By the deliberate refusal of real moral and material equality of rights to Germany, the German nation and its Governments have been profoundly humiliated.

After the German Government had declared, as a result of the equality of rights expressly laid down on December 11, 1932, that it was again prepared to take part in the Disarmament Conference, the German Foreign Minister and our delegates were informed … that this equality of rights could no longer be granted to present-day Germany.

As the German Government regards this action as an unjust and humiliating discrimination against the German nation, it is not in a position to continue, as an outlawed and second-class nation, to take part in negotiations which could only lead to further arbitrary results.

While the German Government again proclaims its unshaken desire for peace, it declares to its great regret that, in view of these imputations, it must leave the Disarmament Conference. It will also announce its departure from the League of Nations.

It submits this decision … to the judgment of the German people.

Source: John W. Wheeler-Bennett, ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1933* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 287–289. Reprinted with permission of Chatham House.

Adolf Hitler, Address to the German People, October 14, 1933

My German Nation!

In November 1918, when the German nation laid down its arms trusting implicitly in the assurances contained in President Wilson’s 14 Points, this marked the end of a disastrous struggle for which some individual statesmen could be blamed but certainly not the people of the warring nations. The German People fought so heroically only because they were completely convinced that they had been wrongfully attacked and were therefore justified in fighting. The other nations had hardly any idea of the immense sacrifice which Germany, almost entirely without allies, was forced to make at that time. If in those months the rest of the world had held out its hand to its defeated enemy in a spirit of fairness, mankind would have been spared a great deal of suffering and countless disappointments.

The German People suffered the most profound disappointment. Never had a defeated nation tried more sincerely to assist in healing the wounds of its former enemy than the German People did in the long years when it complied with the dictates imposed upon it. The fact that all these sacrifices could not genuinely pacify the other nations was due to a treaty which, by attempting to perpetuate the status of victor and vanquished, could only perpetuate hatred and enmity. The nations of the world had a right to expect that people would have learned from the greatest war in history that the sacrifices—particularly those of the European nations—far exceed any potential gain. So when this treaty forced the German People to destroy all its armaments in order to achieve worldwide general disarmament, many people believed that this was merely a sign that an awareness capable of saving the world was spreading.

The German nation destroyed its weapons. Counting on its former enemies to honor the terms of the treaty, it complied with their demands with almost fanatical conscientiousness. On land, air and sea an enormous quantity of war material was deactivated, destroyed and scrapped. In accordance with the wishes of the powers which were dictating the terms, the former army of millions was replaced by a small professional army equipped with weapons of no military significance. At that time the political leaders of the nation were men whose intellectual roots were entirely within the world of the victorious powers. For this very reason the German People were entitled to expect that the rest of the world would keep its word, for the German People

were trying to fulfill their treaty obligations by the sweat of their brow under immense hardship and indescribable deprivation.

No war can remain a permanent human condition. No peace can be the perpetuation of war. At some point the victor and the vanquished must find a way to join in mutual understanding and trust. For fifteen years the German People have waited and hoped that the end of the war would also bring an end to the hatred and enmity. But it seemed that the aim of the Treaty of Versailles was not to bring mankind lasting peace but instead to keep it in a state of permanent hatred.

The consequences were unavoidable. When right finally yields to might a state of permanent uncertainty disturbs and inhibits the course of normal international relations. In concluding this treaty it was completely forgotten that the world could not be rebuilt by the slave labor of a violated nation; that this could be ensured only by the cooperation of all nations in mutual trust; that the basic prerequisite for such cooperation is the removal of the war psychosis; that historical clarification of the problematical question of war guilt cannot be achieved by the victor forcing the defeated nation to sign a peace treaty which begins with a confession of the defeated nation's war guilt. On the contrary, for then the ultimate responsibility for the war emerges most clearly from the contents of a dictate like this!

The German People are utterly convinced that they are not responsible for the war. The other participants in this tragic disaster may well be equally convinced of their innocence. This makes it all the more urgent to ensure that this situation, in which all sides are convinced that they are not to blame, does not become a state of permanent enmity. We must also ensure that the memories of this worldwide catastrophe are not artificially kept alive, and that, by unnaturally perpetuating the idea of a "victor" and a "vanquished," a permanent state of inequality is not created, causing on the one side understandable arrogance and on the other bitter resentment.

It is no coincidence that after such a protracted and artificially prolonged sickness of the human race certain consequences must manifest themselves. A shattering collapse of the economy was followed by a no less dangerous general political decline. But what possible meaning did the World War have, if the consequences were an endless series of economic disasters not only for the vanquished but also for the victors? The well-being of the nations is not greater, nor has there been a genuine improvement in their political fortunes

or a profound increase in human happiness! Armies of unemployed have formed a new social class and the disintegration of the economic structure of the nations is accompanied by the gradual collapse of their social structure.

It is Germany which suffered the most from the consequences of this peace treaty and the general uncertainty which it has created. The number of unemployed rose to one third of the normal national work force. That, however, meant that, including all family members, approximately twenty million out of sixty-five million people in Germany were without any livelihood and faced a hopeless future. It was only a question of time before this host of economically disenfranchised people would become an army of politically and socially alienated fanatics.

One of the oldest civilized countries in the contemporary human community with over six million Communists was on the brink of a disaster which only the indifferent and ignorant could ignore. If the red menace had spread like a raging fire throughout Germany, the Western civilized nations would have been forced to recognize that it does matter whether the banks of the Rhine and the North Sea coast are guarded by the advance troops of a revolutionary expansionist Asiatic empire, or by peaceful German farmers and working men who, genuinely conscious of a common bond with the other civilized European nations, are struggling to earn their daily bread by honest labor. The National Socialist movement, in rescuing Germany from this imminent catastrophe, saved not only the German nation but rendered the rest of Europe a historic service.

This National Socialist revolution has but one goal, namely to restore order within its own nation, to give our hungry masses work and bread, to champion the concepts of honor, loyalty and decency as the basis of a moral code which cannot harm other nations but only contribute to their general welfare. If the National Socialist movement did not represent a body of ideas and ideals, it could never have succeeded in saving our People from ultimate disaster. It remained true to these ideals not only in the course of its struggle to obtain power but also after it came to power! We have waged war on all the depravity, dishonesty, fraud and corruption which had festered and spread within our nation since the disastrous Treaty of Versailles. This movement is dedicated to the task of restoring loyalty, faith and decency without regard to person.

For the last eight months we have been engaged in a heroic struggle

against the Communist threat to our nation, against the subversion of our culture, the destruction of our art and the corruption of our public morality. We have put an end to atheism and blasphemy. We humbly thank Providence for granting us success in our struggle to alleviate the distress of the unemployed and to save the German farmer. In just under eight months, in the course of a program which we calculated would require four years, more than two and a quarter million of the six million unemployed have been returned to useful production.

The most persuasive evidence of this enormous achievement is provided by the German People themselves. They will show the world how firmly they support a regime which has no other goal than—through peaceful labor and acts of civilized morality—to assist in the reconstruction of a world which is anything but happy today. … In claiming without reservation the rights granted us in the treaties themselves, I wish to state without reservation that as far as Germany is concerned no further territorial conflicts exist between the two countries [Germany and France]. After the return of the Saar only a madman could conceive of a war between the two states, for which from our point of view there would then no longer be any moral or rational justification. For no one could demand the extermination of millions of young lives in order to achieve a correction of the present frontiers which would be questionable both in its extent and value.

When the French Premier asks why German youth are marching in rank and file, our reply is that this is not to demonstrate against France. It is to display and document the political will required to defeat Communism and which will be necessary to keep Communism in check. In Germany only the army bears arms. And the National Socialist organizations have only one enemy and that is Communism. But the world must accept the fact that when the German People organize themselves so as to protect our Nation from this danger, they select the only forms which can guarantee success. While the rest of the world is digging in behind indestructible fortifications, building vast fleets of aircraft, enormous tanks, huge pieces of artillery, it cannot speak of a threat when German National Socialists bearing absolutely no arms march in columns of four, thus providing visible evidence and effective protection of the German national community!

When, however, the French Premier asks why Germany is demanding weapons which would have to be destroyed later, this is an error. The

German People and the German Government never demanded weapons but only equal rights. If the world decides that all weapons down to the last machine gun are to be destroyed, we are prepared to sign a convention to this effect immediately. If the world decides that specific weapons are to be destroyed, we are prepared to forgo them. If, however, the world approves of certain weapons for every nation, we are not prepared to be excluded as a nation deprived of the same rights.

If we fight for the things in which we sincerely believe, we shall be more honorable partners within the family of nations than if we were prepared to accept humiliating and dishonorable conditions. …

The former German Governments confidently joined the League of Nations hoping to find there a forum where they could achieve a just resolution of conflicting national interests, and above all genuine reconciliation with their former enemies. This presupposed, however, the ultimate recognition of equal rights for the German nation. Their participation in the disarmament conference was based on the same assumption. Demotion to the status of membership without equal rights in an institution or conference of this nature is an intolerable humiliation for a nation of 65 million people which values its honor and for a government which attaches no less importance to its honor!

The German People more than fulfilled its obligation to disarm. It should now be the turn of the nations who are armed to show no less willingness to fulfill the same obligations. In taking part in this conference the German Government's goal is not to negotiate for a few cannons or machine guns for the German People, but to work towards universal world peace as an equal partner. Germany has no less a right to security than any other nation. … The deliberate demotion of our nation, by granting every nation of the world an automatic right which we alone are denied, is in our view a perpetuation of intolerable discrimination. In my speech about peace in May I already stated that under these circumstances, to our great regret, we would not be able to remain within the League of Nations or to participate in international conferences.

Germany's current leaders have nothing in common with the paid traitors of November 1918. All of us—like every decent Englishman and Frenchman—have risked our lives to do our duty to our fatherland. We are not responsible for the war, we are not responsible for what happened in it. We

feel responsible only for what every man of honor had to do, and we did, at a time of national crisis. The boundless love we feel for our nation is matched by our ardent desire to reach an understanding with the other nations and we will attempt to achieve this wherever possible. It is impossible for us, as the representatives of an honest nation and as honest people, to participate in institutions under conditions which would be acceptable only to a dishonest person. In the past men may well have existed who even under such intolerable conditions may have believed that they could be party to international agreements. There is no point in examining whether they were the best elements in our nation, but beyond any doubt the best elements in our nation did not support them. The world can only be interested in negotiating with the honest men rather than the questionable elements within a nation, and in signing treaties with the former rather than the latter. The world must, however, in turn make allowance for the sense of honor of a regime of this nature, just as we in turn are grateful that we are able to deal with honest men. This is all the more vital, because only in this kind of atmosphere can the solution be found which will lead to genuine peace between the nations. Unless a conference of this nature is conducted in a spirit of sincere understanding it is doomed to failure. Having gathered from the statements of the official representatives of a number of major powers that they have no intention of granting Germany equal rights at the present time, Germany at this time and in such a humiliating position finds it impossible to impose its presence upon other nations. The implementation of the threats to use force can only constitute violations of international law.

The German Government is absolutely convinced that its appeal to the entire German nation will prove to the world that the Government’s desire for peace and its concept of honor are shared by the entire nation. In order to document this claim I have decided to request the President of the Reich (Reichspräsident) to dissolve the German Parliament (Reichstag) and in new elections and a plebiscite provide the German People with the chance to make a historical statement, not merely by approving of their government’s principles but by showing total solidarity with them.

May this statement convince the world that the German People have expressed their total solidarity with their government in this struggle for equal rights and honor; that both sincerely desire only to play their part in ending an epoch of tragic human error, regrettable discord and strife between

the nations which dwell in the most civilized continent in the world and have a common mission to accomplish for all mankind. May this powerful demonstration of our People's desire for peace and honor succeed in providing the relationships between the European states with the necessary basis not only for an end to a century of discord and strife but for the foundation for a new and better community: namely, the recognition of a common higher duty based on equal rights for all!

Source: Adolf Hitler, "October 14, 1933 Radio Broadcast," Der-Fuehrer.org, http://der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/33-10-14.htm.

6. German Law on Military Service, March 16, 1935

Introduction

To support Hitler's denunciation of the military restraints of the Treaty of Versailles, the Reichstag immediately passed legislation to subject all young German men to compulsory military training and expand the size of the army.

Primary Source

1. Service in the Armed Forces is predicated upon university military service.

2. The German peace army, including police units which have been incorporated in the army, shall comprise twelve corps command and thirty-six divisions.

3. The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on compulsory military duty.

Source: Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression,* Vol. 1, *Preparation for Aggression, 1933–1936* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 438.

7. The Soviet Union Embraces the Popular Front: Resolution of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, August 1935

Introduction

Until the mid-1930s, Soviet communists generally fiercely condemned any other leftists or socialists who did not share precisely their own political views. The rise of fascism in Germany and the increasingly bellicose behavior of Benito Mussolini's Italy alarmed Soviet leader Joseph Stalin into switching to a popular front policy. In the interests of opposing fascism, Soviet leaders were now prepared to ally themselves with noncommunist leftists of every political complexion, and the Communist International promptly endorsed such "popular front" policies. Popular Front governments briefly held power in both France and Spain. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union attempted to form alliances within the international state system it had once rejected, joining the League of Nations in 1934 and signing a mutual security treaty with France the following year.

Primary Source

In face of the towering menace of fascism to the working class and all the gains it has made, to all toilers and their elementary rights, to the peace and liberty of the peoples, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International declares that *at the present historical stage it is the main and immediate task of the international labor movement to establish the united fighting front of the working class*. For a successful struggle against fascism, the bitterest enemy of all the toilers, who, without distinction of political views, have been deprived of all rights and liberties, it is imperative that unity of action be established between all sections of the working class, irrespective of what organization they belong to, even before the majority of the working class unites on a common fighting platform for the overthrow of capitalism and the victory of the proletarian revolution. But it is precisely for this very reason that this task makes it the duty of the Communist Parties to take into

consideration the changed circumstances and to apply the united front tactics *in a new manner*, by seeking to reach agreements with the organizations of the toilers of various political trends for joint action on a factory, local, district, national and international scale.

With this as its point of departure, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International enjoins the Communist Parties to be guided by the following instructions when carrying out the united front tactics.

1. *The defense of the immediate economic and political interests of the working class, the defense of the latter against fascism,* must be the starting point and form the main content of the workers' united front in all capitalist countries. In order to set the broad masses in motion, such slogans and forms of struggle must be put forward as arise from the vital needs of the masses and from the level of their fighting capacity at the given stage of development. Communists must not limit themselves to merely issuing appeals to struggle for proletarian dictatorship, but must show the masses *what they are to do today* to defend themselves against capitalist plunder and fascist barbarity. They must strive, through the joint action of the labor organizations, to mobilize the masses around *a program of demands that are calculated to really shift the burden of the consequences of the crisis on to the shoulders of the ruling class; demands, the fight to realize which, disorganizes fascism, hampers the preparations for imperialist war, weakens the bourgeoisie and strengthens the positions of the proletariat.*…

2. Without for a moment giving up their independent work in the sphere of Communist education, organization and mobilization of masses, the Communists, in order to render the road to unity of action easier for the workers, *must strive to secure joint action with the Social-Democratic Parties,* reforming trade unions and other organizations of the toilers against the class enemies of the proletariat, on the basis of short or long-term agreements. …

5. Joint action with the Social-Democratic Parties and organizations not only does not preclude, but on the contrary, *renders still more necessary the serious and well-founded criticism of* reformism, of Social-Democracy as the ideology and practice of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and the patient exposition of the principles and program of Communists to the Social-Democratic workers. …

6. *Election campaigns* must be utilized for the further development and

strengthening of the united fighting front of the proletariat. While coming forward independently in the elections and unfolding the program of the Communist Party before the masses, the Communists must seek to establish a united front with the Social-Democratic Parties and the trade unions (also with the organizations of the toiling peasants, handicraftsmen, etc.), and exert every effort to prevent the election of reactionary and fascist candidates. In face of fascist danger, the Communists may, *while reserving for themselves freedom of political agitation and criticism,* participate in election campaigns on *a common platform and with a common ticket of the anti-fascist front,* depending on the growth and success of the united front movement, also depending on the electoral system in operation. …

Emphasizing the special importance of forming a united front in the sphere of the economic struggle of the workers and the establishment of the unity of the trade union movement as a most important step in consolidating the united front of the proletariat, the Congress makes it a duty of the Communists to adopt all practical measures for the realization of the unity of the trade unions by industries and on a national scale.

Source: "The Offensive of Fascism and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Fight for the Unity of the Working Class against Fascism," English translation, in *Seventh World Congress of the Communist International* (New York: Workers' Library Publishers, 1935), 223.

8. The United States Neutrality Act, August 31, 1935

Introduction

As the international situation in both Europe and Asia deteriorated, many members of the U.S. Congress feared that disputes arising over American arms trade with belligerents or the deaths of Americans traveling on belligerent ships might draw the United States into another war. Seeking to avoid this, in 1935 both houses of Congress passed legislation whereby once the president proclaimed that a state of war existed between two or more countries, Americans were forbidden to trade in munitions with any

belligerent government, and only at their own risk could American citizens travel on belligerent ships.

Primary Source

Joint Resolution Providing for the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to belligerent countries; the prohibition of the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war by vessels of the United States for the use of belligerent states; for the registration and licensing of persons engaged in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and restricting travel by American citizens on belligerent ships during war.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between, or among, two or more foreign states, the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States, or possessions of the United States, to any port of such belligerent states, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country.

The President, by proclamation, shall definitely enumerate the arms, ammunition, or implements of war, the export of which is prohibited by this Act.

The President may, from time to time, by proclamation, extend such embargo upon the export of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to other states as and when they may become involved in such war.

Whoever, in violation of any of the provisions of this section, shall export, or attempt to export, or cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States, or any of its possessions, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and the property, vessel, or vehicle containing the same shall be subject to the provisions of sections 1 to 8, inclusive, title 6, chapter 30, of the Act approved June 15, 1917. … In the case of the forfeiture of any arms, ammunition, or implements of war by reason of a violation of this Act, no public or private sale shall be required; but such arms, ammunition, or implements of war shall be delivered to the Secretary of War for such use or disposal thereof as shall be approved by the President.

When in the judgment of the President the conditions which have caused him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist he shall revoke the same and the provisions hereof shall thereupon cease to apply.

Except with respect to prosecutions committed or forfeitures incurred prior to March 1, 1936, this section and all proclamations issued thereunder shall not be effective after February 29, 1936. …

SEC. 3. Whenever the President shall issue the proclamation provided for in section 1 of this Act, thereafter it shall be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any arms, ammunition, or implements of war to any port of the belligerent countries named in such proclamation as being at war, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country.

Whoever, in violation of the provisions of this section, shall take, attempt to take, or shall authorize, hire, or solicit another to take any such vessel carrying such cargo out of port or from the jurisdiction of the United States shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; and, in addition, such vessel, her tackle, apparel, furniture, equipment, and the arms, ammunition, and implements of war on board shall be forfeited to the United States.

When the President finds the conditions which have caused him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist, he shall revoke his proclamation, and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply. …

SEC. 5. Whenever, during any war in which the United States is neutral, the President shall find that special restrictions placed on the use of the ports and territorial waters of the United States, or of its possessions, by the submarines of a foreign nation will serve to maintain peace between the United States and foreign nations, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or to promote the security of the United States, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall thereafter be unlawful for any such submarine to enter a port or the territorial waters of the United States or any of its possessions, or to depart therefrom, except under such conditions and subject to such limitations as the President may prescribe. When, in his judgment, the conditions which have caused him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist, he shall revoke his proclamation and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply.

SEC. 6. Whenever, during any war in which the United States is neutral, the President shall find that the maintenance of peace between the United

States and foreign nations, or the protection of the lives of citizens of the United States, or the protection of the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or the security of the United States requires that the American citizens should refrain from traveling as passengers on the vessels of any belligerent nation, he shall so proclaim, and thereafter no citizen of the United States shall travel on any vessel of any belligerent nation except at his own risk, unless in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe: Provided, however, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to a citizen traveling on the vessel of a belligerent whose voyage was begun in advance of the date of the President's proclamation, and who had no opportunity to discontinue his voyage after that date: And provided further, That they shall not apply under ninety days after the date of the President's proclamation to a citizen returning from a foreign country to the United States or to any of its possessions. When, in the President's judgment, the conditions which have caused him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist, he shall revoke his proclamation and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply.

SEC. 7. In every case of the violation of any of the provisions of this Act where a specific penalty is not herein provided, such violator or violators, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. …

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 265–271.

9. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message on the Neutrality Act, September 1935

Introduction

A few days after the passage of the first U.S. Neutrality Act, President Franklin D. Roosevelt rather reluctantly signed the legislation. When doing so, he suggested that as it stood certain aspects were too inflexible and might require revision in the future and that should the legislation be renewed when it expired, consideration might be given to modification of its terms.

Primary Source

I have given my approval to S. J. Resolution 173—the neutrality legislation which passed the Congress last week.

I have approved this Joint Resolution because it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war. The purpose is wholly excellent, and this Joint Resolution will to a considerable degree serve that end.

It provides for a licensing system for the control of carrying arms, etc., by American vessels; for the control of the use of American waters by foreign submarines; for the restriction of travel by American citizens on vessels of belligerent Nations; and for the embargo of the export of arms, etc., to both belligerent Nations.

The latter Section terminates at the end of February, 1936. This Section requires further and more complete consideration between now and that date. Here again the objective is wholly good. It is the policy of this Government to avoid being drawn into wars between other Nations, but it is a fact that no Congress and no Executive can foresee all possible future situations. History is filled with unforeseeable situations that call for some flexibility of action. It is conceivable that situations may arise in which the wholly inflexible provisions of Section I of this Act might have exactly the opposite effect from that which was intended. In other words, the inflexible provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out. The policy of the Government is definitely committed to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of any entanglements which would lead us into conflict. At the same time it is the policy of the Government by every peaceful means and without entanglement to cooperate with other similarly minded Governments to promote peace.

In several aspects further careful consideration of neutrality needs is most desirable and there can well be an expansion to include provisions dealing with other important aspects of our neutrality policy which have not been dealt with in this temporary measure.

Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. 4, *The Court Disapproves, 1935: With a Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 345–346.

10. Benito Mussolini, “A Call to Arms”: Speech to His Followers, October 2, 1935

Introduction

In October 1935 Italy, seeking colonies of its own, ignored the strictures of the League of Nations and invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in East Africa. Benito Mussolini, Italy’s fascist leader (Duce), argued that Italy deserved her “place in the sun,” especially because it had not received its just rewards for joining the Allies against Germany in 1915. He urged France and Britain to ignore any League of Nations call for sanctions upon Italy.

Primary Source

Black Shirts of the Revolution! Men and women of all Italy! Italians all over the world—beyond the mountains, beyond the sea! Listen!

A solemn hour is about to strike in the history of the country. Twenty million Italians are at this moment gathered in the squares of all Italy. It is the greatest demonstration that human history records. Twenty million! One heart alone! One will alone! One decision!

This manifestation signifies that the tie between Italy and Fascism is perfect, absolute, and unalterable. Only brains softened by puerile illusions, by sheer ignorance, can think differently, because they do not know what exactly is the Fascist Italy of 1935.

For many months the wheel of destiny and of the impulse of our calm determination moves toward the goal. In these last hours the rhythm has increased and nothing can stop it now. It is not only an army marching towards its goals, but as if 44,000,000 Italians were marching in unity behind this army because the blackest of injustices is being attempted against them, that of taking from them their place in the sun.

When, in 1915, Italy threw in her fate with that of the Allies, how many cries of admiration, how many promises! But after the common victory, which cost Italy 600,000 dead, 400,000 lost, 1,000,000 wounded, when peace was being discussed around the table only the crumbs of a rich colonial booty were left for us to pick up.

For thirteen years we have been patient while the circle tightened around us at the hands of those who wish to suffocate us. We have been patient with Ethiopia for forty years—it is enough now.

Instead of recognizing the rights of Italy, the League of Nations dares talk of sanctions. But until there is proof to the contrary I refuse to believe that the authentic people of France will join in supporting sanctions against Italy.

The 6,000 dead at the action of Boligny—whose devotion was so heroic that the enemy commander was forced to admire them—those fallen would now turn in their graves.

And until there is proof to the contrary, I refuse to believe that the authentic people of Britain will want to spill blood and send Europe into a catastrophe for the sake of a barbarian country unworthy of ranking among civilized nations.

Just the same, we cannot afford to overlook the possible developments of tomorrow. To economic sanctions, we shall answer with our discipline, our spirit of sacrifice, our obedience. To military sanctions, we shall answer with military measures. To acts of war, we shall answer with acts of war.

A people worthy of their past and their name cannot and never will take a different stand. Let me repeat, in the most categorical manner, the sacred pledge which I make at this moment before all the Italians gathered together today, that I shall do everything in my power to prevent a colonial conflict from taking on the aspect and weight of a European war.

This conflict may be attractive to certain minds, which hope to avenge their disintegrated temples through this new catastrophe. Never, as at this historical hour, have the people of Italy revealed such force of character, and it is against this people to which mankind owes its greatest conquest, this people of heroes, of poets and saints, of navigators, of colonizers, that the world dares threaten sanctions.

Italy! Italy! Entirely and universally Fascist! The Italy of the Black Shirt revolution, rise to your feet, let the cry of your determination rise to the skies and reach our soldiers in East Africa. Let it be a comfort to those who are about to fight. Let it be an encouragement to our friends and a warning to our enemies.

It is the cry of Italy, which goes beyond the mountains and the seas out into the great big world. It is the cry of justice and of victory.

Source: "Text of Premier Mussolini's Address to the Italian People on the War," in Benito Mussolini, *Scritti e Discorsi di Benito Mussolini*, Vol. IX (Milano: Ulrico Hoepli Editore, 1935), 218–220. United Press dispatch, October 2, 1935, official Italian government translation, published in the *New York Times*, October 3, 1935.

11. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement Imposing an Arms Embargo on Ethiopia and Italy, October 30, 1935

Introduction

Faced with the outbreak of war between Italy and Ethiopia, the U.S. president had no alternative but to impose an arms embargo on both countries.

Primary Source

In view of the situation which has unhappily developed between Ethiopia and Italy, it has become my duty under the provisions of the Joint Resolution of Congress approved August 31, 1935, to issue, and I am to-day issuing, my proclamation making effective an embargo on the exportation from this country to Ethiopia and Italy of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. Notwithstanding the hope we entertained that war would be avoided, and the exertion of our influence in that direction, we are now compelled to recognize the simple and indisputable fact that Ethiopian and Italian armed forces are engaged in combat, thus creating a state of war within the intent and meaning of the Joint Resolution. In these specific circumstances I desire it to be understood that any of our people who voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either of the belligerents do so at their own risk.

Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. 4, *The Court Disapproves, 1935: with a Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 417–418.

12. The Nuremberg Laws on Citizenship and Race: The Reich Citizenship Law of September

15, 1935, and Supplementary Decree, November 14, 1935

Introduction

The Nazi government soon passed legislation putting into effect its theories that Jews were inferior and were not entitled to German citizenship. Under the Nuremberg decrees of September–November 1935, German Jews were denied citizenship and could not hold public office. They were also forbidden to marry German nationals. The citizenship law came into force on September 30, 1935.

Primary Source

German Citizenship Law, September 15, 1935

(1) A national is a person who belongs to the protective association of the German Reich and as a result is under special obligations to it (2) Nationality is acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Reich and State nationality laws.

(1) Only a national of German or similar blood, who proves by his behaviour that he is willing and able loyally to serve the German people and Reich, is a citizen of the Reich (2) The right to citizenship is obtained by the grant of Reich citizenship papers (3) Only a citizen of the Reich may enjoy full political rights in consonance with the provisions of the laws.

The Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy to the *Fuehrer,* will issue the required legal and administrative decrees for the implementation and amplification of this law.

Source: Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression,* Vol. 4, Part I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 7.

Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour, September 15, 1935

Inspired by the realization that the purity of German blood is the pre-requisite for the continued existence of the German people, and animated by the inflexible determination to assure the German nation for all time, the Reichstag has unanimously passed the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Marriages between Jews and nationals of German or similar blood are forbidden. Marriages concluded in spite of this are invalid, even if they have been contracted with a view to circumventing this law. …

Extra-marital intercourse between Jews and nationals of German or similar blood is forbidden.

Jews may not employ in their households female nationals of German or similar blood under 45 years of age.

Jews are forbidden to hoist the Reich and national flags and to show the Reich colours. They are, on the other hand, allowed to show the Jewish colours. …

Source: Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression,* Vol. 4, Part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 7–8.

First Supplementary Decree of November 14, 1935

On the basis of Article III of the Reich Citizenship Law of September 15, 1935, the following is hereby decreed:

(1) Until further provisions concerning citizenship papers, all subjects of German or kindred blood who possessed the right to vote in the *Reichstag* elections when the Citizenship Law came into effect, shall, for the present, possess the rights of Reich citizens. The same shall be true of those upon whom the Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy to the *Fuehrer* shall confer citizenship (2) The Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy to the *Fuehrer,* may revoke citizenship.

(1) The provisions of Article I shall apply also to subjects who are of mixed Jewish blood (2) An individual of mixed Jewish blood is one who is descended from one or two grandparents who, racially, were full Jews, insofar that he is not a Jew according to Section 2 of Article 5. Full-blooded Jewish grandparents are those who belonged to the Jewish religious community.

Only citizens of the Reich, as bearers of full political rights, can exercise the right of voting in political matters, and have the right to hold public office. The Reich Minister of the Interior, or any agency he empowers, can make exceptions during the transition period on the matter of holding public office. The measures do not apply to matters concerning religious organizations.

(1) A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He cannot exercise the right to vote; he cannot hold public office (2) Jewish officials will be retired as of December 31, 1935. In the event that such officials served at the front in the World War either for Germany or her allies, they shall receive as pension, until they reach the age limit, the full salary last received, on the basis of which their pension would have been computed. They shall not, however, be promoted according to their seniority in rank. When they reach the age limit, their pension will be computed again, according to the salary last received on which their pension was to be calculated (3) These provisions do not concern the affairs of religious organizations (4) The conditions regarding service of teachers in public Jewish schools remains unchanged until the promulgation of new laws on the Jewish school system.

(1) A Jew is an individual who is descended from at least three grandparents who were, racially, full Jews (2) A Jew is also an individual who is descended from two full-Jewish grandparents if:

a. he was a member of the Jewish religious community when this law was issued, or joined the community later;
b. when the law was issued, he was married to a person who was a Jew, or was subsequently married to a Jew;
c. he is the issue from a marriage with a Jew, in the sense of Section I, which was contracted after the coming into effect of the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor of September 15, 1935;
d. he is the issue of an extramarital relationship with a Jew, in the sense of Section I, and was born out of wedlock after July 31, 1936.

(1) Insofar as there are, in the laws of the Reich or in the decrees of the National Socialist German Workers' Party and its affiliates, certain requirements for the purity of German blood which extend beyond Article 5, the same remain untouched. …

The *Fuehrer* and Chancellor of the Reich is empowered to release anyone from the provisions of these administrative decrees.

Source: Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression,* Vol. 4, Part I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 8–10.

First Ordinance for the Execution of the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour, November 14, 1935

2. Marriages between Jews and nationals of mixed Jewish blood who have only one fully Jewish grandparent shall also belong to the category of marriages forbidden. …

3. (1) Nationals of mixed Jewish blood with two grandparents who are full Jews require the permission of the Reich Minister for the Interior and the deputy of the Leaders … in order to contract a marriage with nationals of German or similar blood or with nationals of mixed Jewish blood who have only one full Jewish grandparent. …

4. A marriage shall not be contracted between nationals of mixed Jewish blood who have only one full Jewish grandparent. …

Source: Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression,* Vol. 4, Part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 10–11.

13. The United States Neutrality Act, February 29, 1936

Introduction

The U.S. Neutrality Acts were only valid for a year and to remain in force had to be extended on their expiration. On each occasion, Congress attempted to remedy flaws in the legislation that had become apparent in the preceding year. In 1936, Congress gave the president discretion as to whether or not to proclaim that a state of war existed between two or more countries. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had only invoked the act in connection with the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia, since he wished American arms to be

available to Ethiopia, with the cause of which he sympathized. The new legislation also forbade Americans providing financing through loans or credits for trade in munitions with belligerents.

Primary Source

JOINT RESOLUTION Extending and amending the joint resolution (Public Resolution Numbered 67, Seventy-fourth Congress), approved August 31, 1935.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 1 of the joint solution (Public Resolution Numbered 67, Seventy-fourth Congress) approved August 31, 1935, be, and the same hereby is, amended by striking out in the first section, on the second line, after the word "assembled" the following words: "That upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between," and inserting therefor the words: "Whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war between"; and by striking out the word "may" after the word "President" and before the word "from" in the twelfth line, and inserting in lieu thereof the word "shall"; and by substituting for the last paragraph of said section the following paragraph: "except with respect to offenses committed, or forfeitures incurred prior to May 1, 1937, this section and all proclamations issued thereunder shall not be effective after May 1, 1937."

SEC. 2. There are hereby added to said joint resolution two new sections, to be known as sections la and lb, reading as follows:

"SEC. la. Whenever the President shall have issued his proclamation as provided for in section 1 of this Act, it shall thereafter during the period of the war be unlawful for any person within the United States to purchase, sell, or exchange bonds, securities, or other obligations of the government of any belligerent country, or of any political subdivision thereof, or of any person acting for or on behalf of such government, issued after the date of such proclamation, or to make any loan or extend any credit to any such government or person: Provided, That if the President shall find that such action will serve to protect the commercial or other interests of the United States or its nationals, he may, in his discretion, and to such extent and under such regulation as he may prescribe, except from the operation of this section

ordinary commercial credits and short-time obligations in aid of legal transactions and of a character customarily used in normal peace-time commercial transactions.

"The provisions of this section shall not apply to a renewal or adjustment of such indebtedness as may exist on the date of the President's proclamation.

"Whoever shall violate the provisions of this section or of any regulations issued hereunder shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Should the violation be by a corporation, organization, or association, each officer or agent thereof participating in the violation may be liable to the penalty herein prescribed.

"When the President shall have revoked his proclamation as provided for in section 1 of this Act, the provisions of this section and of any regulations issued by the President hereunder shall thereupon cease to apply.

"SEC. lb. This Act shall not apply to an American republic or republics engaged in war against a non-American state or states, provided the American republic is not cooperating with a non-American state or states in such war."

SEC. 3. Section 9 of said joint resolution is amended to read as follows:

"There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act."

Approved, February 29, 1936.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 312–314.

14. German Memorandum Respecting the Termination of the Treaty of Locarno and the Reoccupation of the Rhineland, March 7, 1936

Introduction

In May 1935 the French government, alarmed by German rearmament, concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. In March 1936, this document was submitted to the French parliament for ratification. The German government, declaring that the treaty constituted a breach of the 1923 Treaty of Locarno, promptly announced that it considered the latter treaty as ipso facto terminated. German troops would therefore reoccupy the Rhineland, which the Treaty of Versailles had stipulated should remain demilitarized. International protests ensued, but no country instituted concrete measures to reverse the German action. Although Germany stated its readiness to reenter the League of Nations, that event never took place.

Primary Source

…The latest debates and decisions of the French Parliament have shown that France, in spite of the German representations, is determined to put the pact with the Soviet Union definitively into force. A diplomatic conversation has even revealed that France already regards herself as bound by her signature of this pact on the 2nd May 1935. In the face of such a development of European politics, the German Government, if they do not wish to neglect or to abandon the interests of the German people which they have duty of safeguarding, cannot remain inactive.

The German Government have continually emphasized during the negotiations of the last years their readiness to observe and fulfill all the obligations arising from the Rhine Pact (Locarno Agreements) as long as the other contracting parties were ready on their side to maintain the peace. This obvious and essential condition can no longer be regarded as fulfilled by France. France has replied to the repeated friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently Germany regards herself for her part as no longer bound by this dissolved treaty. …In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defence, the German Government have today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

…The German Government declare themselves ready to conclude new agreements for the creation of a system of peaceful security for Europe on the basis of the following proposals:

(1) The German Government declare themselves ready to enter into negotiations with France and Belgium with regard to the creation of a zone demilitarized on both sides. …
(2) The German Government propose … the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany, France and Belgium. …
(3) The German Government desire to invite Great Britain and Italy to sign this treaty as guarantor Powers. …
(5) The German Government are prepared … to conclude an air pact calculated to prevent in an automatic and effective manner the danger of sudden air attacks.
(6) The German Government repeat their offer to conclude with the States bordering Germany in the east non-aggression pacts. …
(7) Now that Germany's equality of rights and the restoration of her full sovereignty over the entire territory of the German Reich have finally been attained, the German Government consider the chief reason for their withdrawal from the League of Nations removed. They are therefore willing to re-enter the League of Nations. In this connection they express the expectation that in the course of a reasonable period the question of colonial equality of rights and that of the separation of the League Covenant from its Versailles setting may be clarified through friendly negotiations.

Source: Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression,* Vol. 8 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 395–397.

15. Georgi Dimitrov, Secretary-General of the Third Communist International, Telegram to the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, August 15, 1936

Introduction

As the fascist states of Germany, Italy, and Japan grew in strength and ambition, threatening the Soviet Union in both Europe and Asia, Soviet president Joseph Stalin used the Third Communist International, or Comintern, to urge united front policies upon communists elsewhere. Soviet Comintern operatives encouraged foreign communists to join with noncommunists in their own countries in opposing internal and external fascist threats. This cable to the Chinese Communist Party, drafted by the Comintern's secretary-general in late July 1936, was only dispatched when Stalin had read and approved it. While pressing Chinese Communists to join with the forces of China's nationalist Guomindang president Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) in opposition to Japan, it also warned that they must be careful not to lose control of the party or become too close to the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang.

Primary Source

Having read your decision of 25 December 1935 and your information sent by telegraph, we approve in general your plans for creating a united anti-Japanese national front. However, we think that the leadership of the party and the Red Army has to have a clear understanding of the essence and character of the united anti-Japanese national front, since making a mistake on this question would have fatal consequences for the toilers of China.

1. Creating a united anti-Japanese national front does not imply weakening the soviets, subsuming the Red Army into a broad anti-Japanese army, and [immersing] the Communist Party in some broad political league of China.

Politically, the united anti-Japanese national front must represent an agreement among the CCP, Guomindang, and other organizations on a common anti-Japanese platform, while each retains its complete political and organizational independence. Militarily, the anti-Japanese front must show an agreement between the Red Army and other armed forces about the organization of a united anti-Japanese army, while each of these forces retains its independence, is responsible for its sector of the front, but is subordinated to the central command in fulfillment of a common military plan. The government of national defense must be representative of all the parties and organizations that participate in the united anti-Japanese national front.

We especially emphasize that the correct line for creating a united anti-Japanese national front presumes a further strengthening of the party and the Red Army. Therefore, we are worried by your decision to admit to the party anyone who wants to join, regardless of social origin, and by the fact that the party is not afraid of certain careerists infiltrating its ranks, as well as by your intention to admit even [Manchurian warlord] Zhang Xueliang to the party. Today more than ever, it is necessary to safeguard the purity of the ranks and the monolithic integrity of the party. While you are systematically conducting recruitment into the party and especially strengthening it in Guomindang territory, it is important to avoid mass admissions and admit only the best, tested people from among the workers, peasants and students.

We would also consider it a mistake to admit to the Red Army, without distinction, students and former officers of other armies, since this might undermine its concord and unity.

We agree with you that, in the interests of creating a united anti-Japanese national front, the party must introduce substantial correctives into its previous economic policy: to discontinue unnecessary confiscations—in particular, to discontinue confiscations of the land of small property owners which they rent out, as well as the land of soldiers and officers who actively participate in the struggle against the Japanese occupiers—and to permit free trade.

At the same time, we consider it improper to allow the representatives of the propertied classes to participate in the political administration of the soviet regions, since they can undermine the administrative apparatus from within.

2. The current domestic and external situation in China challenges the party with the immediate and most important task of uniting all the anti-Japanese forces to protect the territorial integrity of China and to protect the Chinese people from complete colonial enslavement.

In this connection, it is expedient for the Communist Party of China to declare that it supports a united all-China democratic republic, the convocation of an all-China parliament on the basis of the universal suffrage, and the creation of an all-China government of national defense, which, under present conditions, would be the best means to unite all the democratic forces of the Chinese people in defense of their motherland from the Japanese occupiers.

The Communist Party of China may also declare that, given the creation of an all-China democratic republic, the soviet regions will be included in an all-China democratic republic, will participate in an all-China parliament, and will implement in their territories the democratic regime instituted for all of China.

3. We think that it is incorrect to place Chiang Kai-shek in the same category as the Japanese occupiers. This conception is politically mistaken since the major enemy of the Chinese people is Japanese imperialism, and every resource must be dedicated to fight it. Besides, it is impossible to conduct a successful struggle simultaneously against the Japanese occupiers and Chiang Kai-shek. It is also wrong to consider the entire Guomindang and all of the Chiang Kai-shek armies as allies of Japan. A serious armed resistance to Japan also requires participation of the Chiang Kai-shek army, or of its majority.

For all these reasons it is essential to work for the cessation of hostilities between the Red Army and the Chiang Kai-shek army, and for an agreement with [Chiang’s army] to struggle jointly against the Japanese occupiers. This

is essential despite the fact that Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang are still afraid to conclude an anti-Japanese agreement with anybody.
For this purpose, we deem it necessary that the Communist Party of China and the leadership of the Red Army immediately extend an official offer to the Guomindang and Chiang Kai-shek to enter into negotiations to cease hostilities and sign a concrete agreement about the common struggle against the Japanese occupiers. The Communist Party and the Red Army command must immediately express their readiness to send a delegation for these negotiations or to receive a delegation of the Guomindang and Chiang Kai-shek in the soviet regions.

Our demands, to be discussed during these negotiations, must be roughly the following:

1) Ending the civil war and uniting the armed forces of the Chinese people in a genuine struggle against the Japanese occupiers.
2) Creating a unified command and working out a common military plan against Japan, while preserving the complete political and organizational independence of the Red Army, which would be responsible for a particular sector of the front in the struggle against Japan.
3) Securing an appropriate territorial base for the Red Army, along with the necessary arms and supplies.
4) Freeing the imprisoned Communists and the cessation of the persecution of Communists in the Guomindang region.

If, despite proposals for negotiations and despite all attempts to achieve an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, he continues hostilities against the Red Army, the army must conduct the struggle against the Chiang Kai-shek units as a necessary defense, while continuing the campaign and concrete measures aimed at achieving an agreement with the Guomindang and its army and at creating the united anti-Japanese front.

Your declaration calling for support of the actions of the southwestern army group against Chiang Kai-shek seems incorrect to us. Politically, it would have been better to condemn any further stirring up of internal strife, which

has been provoked by the Japanese imperialists, and to concentrate the main fire against them.

4. We also recommend that you alter your slogan of the "immediate declaration of war against Japan." Your slogan must reflect the aggressive character of the war waged by Japanese imperialism, and the defensive character of the struggle of the Chinese people. Therefore, it is better to adopt the slogan, "Japanese occupiers out of China," a slogan of the defense of territorial integrity, national independence, and freedom of the Chinese people.

5. It is important to maintain contact with Zhang Xueliang, using it to perform our work in the army of Zhang Xueliang, to strengthen our positions in all of his units, to broadly disseminate among the soldiers and the officer corps the ideas of a united anti-Japanese national front. However, Zhang Xueliang must not be viewed as a reliable ally. Especially after the defeat of the Southwest, vacillations from Zhang Xueliang are possible, and even his direct betrayal of us.

We are waiting for your delegate to discuss in detail the whole range of questions raised by us and to receive an exhaustive response to them.

Source: Alexander Dallin and F. I. Firsov, *Dimitrov and Stalin 1934–1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 103–105. Copyright (c) Yale University Press. Reprinted with permission.

16. The Anti-Comintern Pact: German-Japanese Agreement and Supplementary Protocol, Signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936

Introduction

By the mid-1930s, nations increasingly aligned themselves with each other on ideological lines, with fascists presenting themselves as the sworn enemies of bolshevism or communism and vice versa. In late 1936 two fascist states,

Germany and Japan, signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, whereby each agreed to oppose the spread of communism at home and abroad.

Primary Source

Agreement Guarding against the Communistic International

The Imperial Government of Japan and the Government of Germany,

In cognizance of the fact that the object of the Communistic International (the so-called Comintern) is the disintegration of, and the commission of violence against, existing States by the exercise of all means at its command,

Believing that the toleration of interference by the Communistic International in the internal affairs of nations not only endangers their internal peace and social welfare, but threatens the general peace of the world,

Desiring to co-operate for defense against communistic disintegration, have agreed as follows.

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting States agree that they will mutually keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Communistic International, will confer upon the necessary measures of defense, and will carry out such measures in close co-operation.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting States will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is menaced by the disintegrating work of the Communistic International, to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of the present Agreement or to participate in the present Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The Japanese and German texts are each valid as the original text of this Agreement. The Agreement shall come into force on the day of its signature and shall remain in force for the term of five years. The High Contracting

States will, in a reasonable time before the expiration of the said term, come to an understanding upon the further manner of their co-operation. …

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941*, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 153.

17. Joint Congressional Resolution Prohibiting Exports of Arms to Spain, January 8, 1937

Introduction

When the Spanish Civil War began, existing U.S. neutrality legislation did not cover internecine conflicts. The U.S. Congress nonetheless wished to keep its own country at a distance from this new crisis. In response to the intensifying civil war, in January 1937 Congress therefore prohibited all exports of arms to Spain, effectively preventing either side from obtaining munitions of war from the United States.

Primary Source

JOINT RESOLUTION

To prohibit the exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war from the United States to Spain.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That during the existence of the state of civil strife now obtaining in Spain it shall, from and after the approval of this Resolution be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States, or possessions of the United States, to Spain or to any other foreign country for transshipment to Spain or for use of either of the opposing forces in Spain. Arms, ammunition, or implements of war, the exportation of which is prohibited by this Resolution, are those enumerated in the President's Proclamation No. 2163 of April 10, 1936.

Licenses heretofore issued under existing law for the exportation of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to Spain shall, as to all future exportations thereunder, ipso facto be deemed to be cancelled.

Whoever in violation of any of the provisions of this Resolution shall export, or attempt to export, or cause to be exported either directly or indirectly, arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States or any of its possessions, shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

When in the judgment of the President the conditions described in this Resolution have ceased to exist, he shall proclaim such fact, and the provisions hereof shall thereupon cease to apply.

Approved, January 8, 1937, at 12.30 p.m.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 353–354.

18. Communism in the Spanish Civil War: José Diaz, "For Unity, until Victory," Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain, March 5, 1937

Introduction

After General Francisco Franco launched an army rebellion against Spain's socialist government in July 1936, Spanish communists supported the republican government, despite its noncommunist character. Communists were represented in the government but did not dominate it, and they supported its suppression of the May 1937 Anarchist Uprising in Barcelona. Such policies of setting aside leftist ideological differences, characteristic of the Popular Front era, continued until Franco's forces finally prevailed in March 1939. Popular Front collaboration was not popular with all communists, and the Trotskyist Workers' Party of Marxist Unit (POUM) opposed, leading to bitter feuding among Spanish communists and those who came from elsewhere to join in the fighting. In March 1937 José Diaz, secretary-general of the Communist Party of Spain, made the following report to that organization.

Primary Source

Realizing the new character which our struggle acquired when the war began, our party announced the slogan of broadening the Popular Front, of turning toward the union of all Spaniards. For this it took account of the fact that the civil war was now transformed into a war of independence, a war of national liberation. …

Our struggle, which in its basic content is a national one, also has a marked international character. This international character of our struggle has been defined, in a few words but in the manner of a genius, by our great comrade Stalin. … Stalin, in his historic telegram to the Central Committee of our party, says the following:

"In helping the revolutionary masses of Spain as much as possible, the workers of the Soviet Union are only doing their duty. They realize that to liberate Spain from the oppression of the fascist reactionaries is not the private affair of the Spaniards, but the common cause of all advanced and progressive humanity."…

We are fighting for the Democratic Republic, for a Democratic and Parliamentary Republic of a new type, with deep social content. The struggle which is going on in Spain does not have as its object the establishment of a democratic republic such as can be seen in France or in any other capitalist country. No; the Democratic Republic for which we are fighting is different. We are fighting to destroy the material bases on which reaction and fascism rest, for without the destruction of these bases a true political democracy cannot exist.

In our struggle we are pursuing *the annihilation of the material bases of semifeudal Spain,* tearing out the roots of fascism. …

We must annihilate the big landowners. …

We must also *destroy the economic and political power of the Church,* which was a center of conspiracy against the popular masses and one of the firmest supports of semifeudal Spain, and for this we must proceed with the

confiscation and nationalization of its property. Let it be well understood that *fighting the Church* in its semifeudal economic and political structure is not the same thing as *fighting religion,* but the contrary, for only a republican and democratic Spain, liberal and progressive, will be able to guarantee freedom of religion in our country.

We must also proceed with the *liquidation of militarism*. …

We must likewise *break up the great financial oligarchies*. …

In addition to these fundamental points, whose solution will mean the disappearance of the semifeudal castes which have been dominant in Spain, and the transformation of the material and social base of our new Democratic and Parliamentary Republic, it is necessary to proceed, to the direct participation of all the people in elections and in the posts of political and economic leadership of the country. Thus we will move directly to the inauguration of a true democracy, which will permit wide channels to be opened for the economic, political, and cultural progress of our people. …

The fact of not having clearly understood the character of our struggle leads organizations and parties associated with ours to adopt extremist attitudes which in no way benefit the cause of the people, but far from carrying us rapidly to victory, seriously obstruct the attainment of it. To these equivocal positions correspond those premature attempts at "socialization" and "collectivization." … Today, when there is a Popular Front government in which all the forces who are fighting against fascism are represented, this is not advisable, but is self-defeating. Now is it necessary to move rapidly to coordinate production and intensify it under a single administration to provide everything necessary for the front and the rear. To persist now in these attempts is to go against the interests which are supposedly being defended. To announce those premature attempts at "socialization" and "collectivization" while the war has still not been decided, at moments when the enemy within, aided by fascism without, is violently attacking our positions and endangering the fate of our country, is absurd and equivalent to becoming accomplices of the enemy. Such attempts reveal the failure to understand the character of our struggle, which is the struggle for the defense

of the Democratic Republic, in which all the popular forces needed to win the war can and must combine.

It is said that the Communists have renounced their revolutionary program. No; what has happened is that we conform to the realities of the struggle and the necessities of the war. …

We have not abandoned our revolutionary program just because we did not carry forward these unfortunate attempts. What is happening is that today it is impossible to have a more revolutionary program than the one which the Communist Party has placed before the people. We plan our tactics and our strategy in accordance with the given situation. That is, we Marxist-Leninists apply to each concrete situation the tactics and strategy which correspond to that situation; and he who pretends to jump stages, with resounding names, wishing to do the impossible, will smash against the difficulties of the situation. But the harm is not that they smash themselves; the harm is that with their lack of understanding they compromise everyone's cause and endanger the freedom of Spain. …

In spite of everything, at all cost, we must maintain the Popular Front. Whatever the difficulties which are found in one path, the Communist Party will continue to be the most vigorous defender of the Popular Front and of its expression in power: the legitimate government. Our party will permit no one to attack the union of the anti-fascist forces with impunity. Our slogan is, "United now to win the war, and united afterward to reap the fruits of victory"; he who tries to break the union of the Popular Front, he who tries to break the union of the Spanish people struggling for the independence of Spain and staking everything on this struggle, is working consciously or unconsciously in favor of our enemies. …

Who are the enemies of the people? The enemies of the people are fascists, the Trotskyists, and the "uncontrollables." … Our principal enemy is fascism. Against it we are concentrating all of the people's vigor and hatred. Against it we are setting all the forces ready to annihilate it; but our hatred is also directed, with the same concentrated force, against the agents of fascism who hide themselves behind pretended revolutionary slogans as POUM'ists,

disguised Trotskyists, the better to accomplish their mission as agents of our enemies waiting in ambush in our own territory. We cannot annihilate the Fifth Column without also annihilating those who also defend politically the enemy's slogans directed at disrupting and disuniting the anti-fascist forces. The slogans of the enemy are: Against the Democratic Republic, against the anti-Fascist Popular Front, against the Popular Front government, against the regular army, etc., and above all against the Soviet Union on account of its magnificent solidarity with the Spanish people in this struggle. Although the Trotskyists try to conceal themselves with other apparently more revolutionary slogans, such as the social republic, workers' government, red militia, they cannot avoid revealing their fascist ears. …

It is a serious error to consider the Trotskyists as a fraction of the workers' movement. This is an unprincipled group of counterrevolutionaries classified as agents of international fascism. The recent Moscow trial has shown in the light of day that the chief of the band, Trotsky, is a direct agent of the Gestapo. In his hatred of the Soviet Union, of the great Bolshevik Party and of the Communist International, he joined hands with the fascists.

Source: Jose Diaz, "For Unity, until Victory," Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain, March 5, 1937, translated by Robert V. Daniels in *A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse*, 3rd ed. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 75–78. (c) 1994 Trustees of the University of Vermont. Reprinted with permission of the University Press of New England, Hanover, New Hampshire.

19. The United States Neutrality Act, May 1, 1937

Introduction

The U.S. neutrality legislation of 1937 extended the American arms embargo to countries in a state of civil war and also to nations that were assisting one or another belligerent or party in a civil war. The new legislation clearly reflected the experience of the Spanish Civil War, in which each side received assistance from other European communist or fascist powers.

American ships were also forbidden to carry munitions of war to any belligerent state.

Primary Source

JOINT RESOLUTION To amend the joint resolution, approved August 31, 1935, as amended.

Resolved…

EXPORT OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR

Section 1. (a) Whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war between, or among, two or more foreign states, the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export, or attempt to export, or cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States to any belligerent state named in such proclamation, or to any neutral state for transshipment to, or for the use of, any such belligerent state.

(b) The President shall, from time to time, by proclamation, extend such embargo upon the export of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to other states as and when they may become involved in such war.

(c) Whenever the President shall find that such a state of civil strife exists in a foreign state and that such civil strife is of a magnitude or is being conducted under such conditions that the export of arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States to such foreign state would threaten or endanger the peace of the United States, the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export, or attempt to export, or cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States to such foreign state, or to any neutral state for transshipment to, or for the use of, such foreign state.

(d) The President shall, from time to time by proclamation, definitely enumerate the arms, ammunition, and implements of war, the export of which is prohibited by this section. The arms, ammunition, and implements of war so enumerated shall include those enumerated in the President’s proclamation Numbered 2163, of April 10, 1936, but shall not include raw materials or any other articles or materials not of the same general character as those enumerated in the said proclamation, and in the Convention for the

Supervision for the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, signed at Geneva June 17, 1925.

(e) Whoever, in violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall export, or attempt to export, or cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. …

(f) In the case of the forfeiture of any arms, ammunition, or implements of war by reason of a violation of this Act, … such arms, ammunition, or implements of war shall be delivered to the Secretary of War for such use or disposal thereof as shall be approved by the President of the United States.

(g) Whenever, in the judgment of the President, the conditions which have caused him to issue any proclamation under the authority of this section have ceased to exist, he shall revoke the same, and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply with respect to the state or states named in such proclamation, except with respect to offenses committed, or forfeiture incurred, prior to such revocation.

EXPORT OF OTHER ARTICLES AND MATERIALS

Section 2. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 of this Act and he shall thereafter find that the placing of restrictions on the shipment of certain articles or materials in addition to arms, ammunition, and implements of war from the United States to belligerent states, or to a state wherein civil strife exists, is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States, he shall so proclaim, and it shall thereafter be unlawful, for any American vessel to carry such articles or materials to any belligerent state, or to any state wherein civil strife exists, named in such proclamation issued under the authority of section 1 of this Act, or to any neutral state for transshipment to, or for the use of, any such belligerent states or any such state wherein civil strife exists. The President shall by proclamation from time to time definitely enumerate the articles and materials which it shall be unlawful for American vessels to so transport. …

(c) The President shall from time to time by proclamation extend such restrictions as are imposed under the authority of this section to other states

as and when they may be declared to become belligerent states under the authority of section 1 of this Act.

(d) The President may from time to time change, modify, or revoke in whole or in part any proclamations issued by him under the authority of this section.

(e) Except with respect to offenses committed, or forfeitures incurred, prior to May 1, 1939, this section and all proclamations issued thereunder shall not be effective after May 1, 1939.

FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

Section 3. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 of this Act, it shall thereafter be unlawful for any person within the United States to purchase, sell, or exchange bonds, securities, or other obligations of the government of any belligerent state or of any state wherein civil strife exists, named in such proclamation, or of any political subdivision of any such state, or of any person acting for or on behalf of the government of any such state, or of any faction or asserted government within any such state wherein civil strife exists, or of any person acting for or on behalf of any faction or asserted government within any such state wherein civil strife exists, issued after the date of such proclamation, or to make any loan or extend any credit to any such government, political subdivision, faction, asserted government, or person, or to solicit or receive any contribution for any such government, political subdivision, faction, asserted government, or person:

PROVIDED, That if the President shall find that such action will serve to protect the commercial or other interest of the United States or its citizens, he may, in his discretion, and to such extent and under such regulations as he may prescribe, except from the operation of this section ordinary commercial credits and short-time obligations in aid of legal transactions and of a character customarily used in normal peacetime commercial transactions. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit the solicitation or collection of funds to be used for medical aid and assistance, or for food and clothing to relieve human suffering, when such solicitation or collection of funds is made on behalf of and for use by any person or organization which is not acting for or on behalf of any such government, political subdivision,

faction, or asserted government, but all such solicitations and collections of funds shall be subject to the approval of the President and shall be made under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe. …

(c) Whoever shall violate the provisions of this section or of any regulations issued hereunder shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Should the violation be by a corporation, organization, or association, each officer or agent thereof participating in the violation may be liable to the penalty herein prescribed. …

EXCEPTIONS—AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Section 4. This Act shall not apply to an American republic or republics engaged in war against a non-American state or states, provided the American republic is not cooperating with a non-American state or states in such a war. …

AMERICAN VESSELS PROHIBITED FROM CARRYING ARMS TO BELLIGERENT STATES

Section 6. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 of this Act, it shall thereafter be unlawful, until such proclamation is revoked, for any American vessel to carry any arms, ammunition, or implements of war to any belligerent state, or to any state wherein civil strife exists, named in such proclamation, or to any neutral state for transshipment to, or for the use of, any such belligerent state or any such state wherein civil strife exists.

(b) Whoever, in violation of the provisions of this section, shall take, or attempt to take, or shall authorize, hire, or solicit another to take, any American vessel carrying such cargo out of port or from the jurisdiction of the United States shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; and in addition, such vessel, and her tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, and the arms, ammunition, and implements of war on board, shall be forfeited to the United States.

USE OF AMERICAN PORTS AS BASE OF SUPPLY

Section 7. (a) Whenever, during any war in which the United States is neutral, the President, or any person thereunto authorized by him, shall have cause to believe that any vessel, domestic or foreign, whether requiring clearance or not, is about to carry out of a port of the United States, fuel, men, arms, ammunition, implements of war, or other supplies to any warship, tender, or supply ship of a belligerent state, but the evidence is not deemed sufficient to justify forbidding the departure of the vessel as provided for by section 1, title V, chapter 30, of the Act approved June 15, 1917, and if, in the President's judgment, such action will serve to maintain peace between the United States and foreign states, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or to promote the security or neutrality of the United States, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to require the owner, master, or person in command thereof, before departing from a port of the United States, to give a bond to the United States, with sufficient sureties, in such amount as he shall deem proper, conditioned that the vessel will not deliver the men, or any part of the cargo, to any warship, tender, or supply ship of the belligerent state.

(b) If the President, or any person thereunto authorized by him, shall find that a vessel, domestic or foreign, in a port of the United States, has previously cleared from a port of the United States during such war and delivered its cargo or any part thereof to a warship, tender, or supply ship of a belligerent state, he may prohibit the departure of such vessel during the duration of the war.

SUBMARINES AND ARMED MERCHANT VESSELS

Section 8. Whenever, during any war in which the United States is neutral, the President shall find that special restrictions placed on the use of the ports and territorial waters of the United States by the submarines or armed merchant vessels of a foreign state, will serve to maintain peace between the United States and foreign states, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or to promote the security of the United States, and shall make proclamation therefore, it shall thereafter be unlawful for any such submarine or armed merchant vessel to enter a port or the territorial waters of the United States or to depart therefrom, except under such conditions and subject to such limitations as the President may prescribe.

Whenever, in his judgment, the conditions which have caused him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist, he shall revoke his proclamation and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply.

TRAVEL ON VESSELS OF BELLIGERENT STATES

Section 9. Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 of this Act it shall thereafter be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to travel on any vessel of the state or states named in such proclamation, except in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe. …

ARMING OF AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSELS PROHIBITED

Section 10. Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1, it shall thereafter be unlawful, until such proclamation is revoked, for any American vessel engaged in commerce with any belligerent state, or any state wherein civil strife exists, named in such proclamation, to be armed or to carry any armament, arms, ammunition, or implements of war, except small arms and ammunition therefore which the President may deem necessary and shall publicly designate for the preservation of discipline aboard such vessels.

REGULATIONS

Section 11. The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such officer or officers, or agency or agencies, as he shall direct. …

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 355–365.

20. The Sino-Japanese War Begins: The Japanese Embassy in Washington to the U.S. Department of State, July 12, 1937

Introduction

Throughout World War II, Japan never formally declared war on China, and China left its formal declaration of war on Japan until December 1941, immediately after Pearl Harbor. The following note from the Japanese embassy in Washington to the U.S. Department of State recounts the Japanese version of the incident of July 1937 at the Marco Polo Bridge, near Beijing in China, which precipitated full-scale hostilities between the two countries.

Primary Source

1. In the evening of July 7, 1937, a detachment of the Japanese troops stationed at Fengtai, near Peiping, was engaged in a night maneuver in the vicinity of Lukow Kiao. At 11:40 p.m. Chinese troops under the command of Feng Chih-an (29th Army) made an attack upon the Japanese soldiers for no cause at all.

Thereupon the detachment stopped the maneuver and asked the command at Fengtai to send out reinforcements.

2. At such maneuvers, the Japanese troops immediately carry a very small quantity of loaded shells for use in case of emergency. In point of fact the commanding officer of the said detachment had with him one box of loaded shells for the machine guns. In view of these facts, it is absolutely impossible for the Japanese soldiers to have challenged the Chinese.

3. The right of maneuver of the Japanese troops stationed in North China is clearly stipulated in the China-Japanese Protocol of 1902 concerning the restoration of Tientsin to China. Moreover, the Japanese authorities had informed the Chinese in advance of the holding of the maneuver in question. It is entirely groundless to say that the recent maneuver of the Japanese troops is an unlawful act committed outside the region stipulated in the said Protocol as reported in the newspapers.

4. Since the night of July 7, the Japanese authorities have made an earnest endeavor to localize the incident and once succeeded in bringing the Chinese authorities to agree to a peaceful settlement. On the night of July 10, however, the 29th Army, in violation of the agreement, suddenly fired on the Japanese troops, causing considerable casualties. In addition, it is reported, China has been increasing the forces of the first line by ordering Suiyan troops to march south and by sending central forces and air corps to the front.

Since the night of July 10, China not only has failed to manifest any sincerity toward a peaceful settlement but has flatly rejected the local negotiation at Peiping.

5. The presence of disorderly Chinese troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area not only disturbs peace and order in North China which is of vital importance to Japan, but also endangers the lives and property of the Japanese nationals there.

In the circumstances, the Japanese Government has decided to take precautionary steps to meet all situations, including the dispatch of additional military forces to North China.

6. The Japanese Government, desirous as ever to preserve peace in East Asia, has not abandoned hope that through peaceful negotiations the aggravation of the situation may yet be prevented.

An amicable solution can yet be attained if China agrees to offer apologies for the recent lawless action and to give adequate guarantees against such outrages in future.

In any case the Japanese Government is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the Powers in China.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan: 1931–1941,* Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 318–319.

21. Mao Zedong, “Urgent Tasks of the Chinese Revolution since the Formation of the Kuomintang Chinese Communist Party United Front,” September 1937

Introduction

After Japan began full-scale war with China in 1937, Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, followed the United Front strategy adopted by the Soviet communists. In China, the creation of such a coalition was facilitated by the action of the "Young Marshal," the warlord of Manchuria, in kidnapping nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) in December 1936 and forcing him to enter into an anti-Japanese alliance with his bitter communist rivals. Given the significance of Soviet financial support to the Chinese Communists, Soviet influence was also important in prevailing on the communists to accept this strategy. In this statement, Mao ignored the role that any such pressures played in persuading him to accept the United Front strategy.

Primary Source

To resist Japan we need a strengthened united front which means the mobilization of the people of the whole country to participate in the united front. To resist Japan we need a solid united front, which means the necessity of common policies. Common policies should be the guiding principle of the united front. They will also serve as a binding force of the united front, binding tightly, as with a cord, all the organizations and individuals from all the parties, groups, classes and armies that participate in it. Only thus can solidarity be achieved. We are opposed to the old form of control because it is unsuitable to the national revolutionary war. We welcome the establishment of a new system of control to replace the old, that is, by promulgating common policies to set up a revolutionary order. For only thus can the needs of the war of resistance be met.

What should our common policies be? They are the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Ten Great Policies for Anti-Japanese Resistance and National Salvation announced by the Chinese Communist Party. …

Communism is to be implemented in a future stage of the revolutionary development. Communists do not wishfully envisage the realization of the historically determined revolution. This is the basic reason why the Chinese Communist Party has raised the slogans of an anti-Japanese national united front and a united democratic republic. As to the implementation of the Three

People's Principles, the Chinese Communist Party agreed to it during the first united front formed ten years ago at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, and they were indeed carried out on a national scale between 1925 and 1927 by every faithful Communist and every faithful Kuomintang member. Unfortunately in 1927 the united front was shattered, resulting in the suspension of the Three People's Principles during the past decade. However, as far as the Chinese Communist Party is concerned, all the policies carried out by it during the last ten years have been in harmony with the great revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles and the three great policies. The Chinese Communist Party has never ceased its firm resistance to imperialism; this is the principle of nationalism. The soviet system of people's representative councils is nothing else than the principle of democracy, and the agrarian revolution is without a doubt the principle of people's livelihood. Why, then, has the Chinese Communist Party announced the abolition of soviets and the cessation of land confiscation? It is not that these measures are undesirable, but that armed invasion by Japanese imperialists has brought about changes in class relations in China, thus making imperative and making possible the alliance of all classes in the fight against Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, a democratic united front is being formed internationally, to fight against the danger of fascism. Therefore, the formation of a national, democratic united front in China is today a necessity in China. …

Our race and nation now stand at a critical hour of survival. May the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party work in close harmony! May all our fellow countrymen who do not want to be slaves rally together on the foundation of Kuomintang–Chinese Communist Party solidarity! The realization of all necessary reforms in order to overcome numerous difficulties—such is the urgent task now facing us in the Chinese revolution. The accomplishment of this task will certainly bring about the defeat of Japanese imperialism. If we devote our efforts [to this task] our future is indeed bright.

Source: Robert V. Daniels, *A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse,* 3rd ed. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 78–79.

22. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Quarantine Speech, October 5, 1937

Introduction

As the international situation deteriorated in both Asia and Europe, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt toyed with the idea that his country might join with others in taking action against aggressor nations. In a speech delivered in the city of Chicago, in the American isolationist heartland of the Midwest, he floated the idea that the United States might join with other "peace-loving" nations in subjecting aggressor nations to a "quarantine," presumably through the imposition of economic and other sanctions. The following day the U.S. government issued a public statement protesting against Japanese behavior in China and calling for the cessation of fighting. Although Roosevelt's speech, delivered the same day that the League of Nations adopted a report condemning Japanese behavior in China, was well received, at that time he took no further concrete action to implement the measures he had suggested.

Primary Source

…The political situation in the world, which of late has been growing progressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the peoples and nations who wish to live in peace and amity with their neighbors.

Some 15 years ago the hopes of mankind for a continuing era of international peace were raised to great heights when more than 60 nations solemnly pledged themselves not to resort to arms in furtherance of their national aims and policies. The high aspirations expressed in the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the hopes for peace thus raised have of late given way to a haunting fear of calamity. The present reign of terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago.

It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties. It has now reached the stage where the very foundations of civilization are seriously threatened. The landmarks, the traditions which have marked the progress of

civilization toward a condition of law and order and justice are being wiped away.

Without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including vast numbers of women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air. In times of so-called peace, ships are being attacked and sunk by submarines without cause or notice. Nations are fomenting and taking sides in civil warfare in nations that have never done them any harm. Nations claiming freedom for themselves deny it to others.

Innocent peoples, innocent nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane considerations.

To paraphrase a recent author, “perhaps we foresee a time when men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book, every picture, every harmony, every treasure garnered through two millenniums, the small, the delicate, the defenseless—all will be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed.”

If those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that America may expect mercy, that this Western hemisphere will not be attacked and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization.

No, if those days come, “there will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage until every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in a vast chaos.”

If those days are not to come to pass—if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear—then the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure.

The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of human instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.

Those who cherish their freedom and recognize and respect the equal right of their neighbors to be free and live in peace, must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice, and confidence may prevail throughout the world. There must be a return to a

belief in the pledged word, in the value of a signed treaty. There must be recognition of the fact that national morality is as vital as private morality.

A bishop wrote me the other day: “It seems to me that something greatly needs to be said in behalf of ordinary humanity against the present practice of carrying the horrors of war to helpless civilians, especially women and children. It may be that such a protest might be regarded by many, who claim to be realists, as futile, but may it not be that the heart of mankind is so filled with horror at the present needless suffering that that force could be mobilized in sufficient volume to lessen such cruelty in the days ahead. Even though it may take 20 years, which God forbid, for civilization to make effective its corporate protest against this barbarism, surely strong voices may hasten the day.”

There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining. There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored.

The overwhelming majority of the peoples and nations of the world today want to live in peace. They seek the removal of barriers against trade. They want to exert themselves in industry, in agriculture and in business, that they may increase their wealth through the production of wealth-producing goods rather than striving to produce military planes and bombs and machine guns and cannon for the destruction of human lives and useful property.

In those nations of the world which seem to be piling armament on armament for purposes of aggression, and those other nations which fear acts of aggression against them and their security, a very high proportion of their national income is being spent directly for armaments. It runs from 30 to as high as 50 per cent. The proportion that we in the United States spend is far less—11 or 12 per cent.

How happy we are that the circumstances of the moment permit us to put

our money into bridges and boulevards, dams and reforestation, the conservation of our soil, and many other kinds of useful works rather than into huge standing armies and vast supplies of implements of war.

Nevertheless, my friends, I am compelled, as you are compelled, to look ahead. The peace, the freedom, and the security of 90 per cent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining 10 per cent who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the 90 per cent who want to live in peace under law and in accordance with moral standards that have received almost universal acceptance through the centuries, can and must find some way to make their will prevail.

The situation is definitely of universal concern. The questions involved relate not merely to violations of specific provisions of particular treaties; they are questions of war and of peace, of international law and especially of principles of humanity. It is true that they involve definite violations of agreements, and especially of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. But they also involve problems of world economy, world security and world humanity.

It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognize the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances; but at the same time it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honoring sanctity of treaties, of respecting the rights and liberties of others and of putting an end to acts of international aggression.

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

AND MARK THIS WELL: When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

It is my determination to pursue a policy of peace and to adopt every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war. It ought to be inconceivable that in this modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating, in contravention of solemn treaties, the territory of other nations that have done them no real harm and are too weak to protect themselves adequately. Yet the peace of the world and the welfare and security of every nation are today being threatened by that very thing.

No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the

freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or its good standing by conciliating its differences, and by exercising great patience with, and consideration for, the rights of other nations.

War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.

If civilization is to survive, the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored. Shattered trust between nations must be revived.

Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace.

Source: Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 406–411.

23. Italy Joins the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact: Protocol Signed in Rome, November 6, 1937

Introduction

At the end of 1937, Italy formally joined the Anti-Comintern Pact that Germany and Japan had signed one year earlier. This action formally aligned all three major fascist states together against communism, another indication of the degree to which international politics were increasingly organized on ideological lines.

Primary Source

The Government of the German Reich,

The Italian Government and

The Imperial Japanese Government

Considering that the Communist International continues consistently to endanger the civilized world in the West and East, and disturbs and destroys its peace and order,

Convinced that close co-operation between all States interested in maintaining peace and order can alone diminish and remove this danger,

Considering that Italy, which since the beginning of this Fascist Government has combated this danger with inflexible determination and has eradicated the Communist International in its territory, has decided to take its place against the common enemy side by side with Germany and Japan who, for their part, are animated by the same desire to guard against the Communist International,

Have agreed as follows, in accordance with Article II of the Agreement against the Communist International concluded on November 25, 1936, in Berlin between Germany and Japan:

Article 1.—Italy accedes to the Agreement against the Communist International together with the Additional Protocol, concluded between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, a copy of which is annexed.

Article 2.—The three Powers signing the present Protocol agree that Italy shall be considered as an original signatory of the Agreement and Additional Protocol mentioned in the preceding article, the signature of the present Protocol being equivalent to the signature of the above-mentioned Agreement and Additional Protocol.

Article 3.—The present Protocol is considered as an integral part of the above-mentioned Agreement and Additional Protocol. …

Source: Stephen Heald, ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1937* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 306–307. Reprinted with permission of Chatham House.

24. The Hossbach Memorandum, Berlin, November 10, 1937: Minutes of a Conference

in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, November 5, 1937, from 4:15 to 8:30 p.m.

Introduction

In late 1937, German chancellor Adolf Hitler met with his top military and diplomatic advisers to discuss their country's future strategy in international affairs. Notes of the meeting were taken by Colonel Hossbach, an aide who acted as secretary. Hitler discussed his plans to annex both Czechoslovakia and Austria in the near future, enterprises that he believed could be accomplished without war with either Great Britain or France. He also argued that the latest possible dates for a major war must be 1943–1945, since after that date the German military position in relation to that of potential enemies would begin to deteriorate.

Primary Source

Present:

The Fuehrer and Chancellor, Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister,

Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army,
Admiral Dr. H. C. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy,
Colonel General Göring, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe,
Baron von Neurath, Foreign Minister,
Colonel Hossbach.

The Fuehrer began by stating that the subject of the present conference was of such importance that its discussion would, in other countries, certainly be a matter for a full Cabinet meeting, but he—the Fuehrer—had rejected the idea of making it a subject of discussion before the wider circle of the Reich Cabinet just because of the importance of the matter. His exposition to follow was the fruit of thorough deliberation and the experiences of his 4 1/2 years of power. He wished to explain to the gentlemen present his basic ideas concerning the opportunities for the development of our position in the field of foreign affairs and its requirements, and he asked, in the interests of a

long-term German policy, that his exposition be regarded, in the event of his death, as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then continued:

The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community [*Volksmasse*] and to enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space.

The German racial community comprised over 85 million people and, because of their number and the narrow limits of habitable space in Europe, constituted a tightly packed racial core such as was not to be met in any other country and such as implied the right to a greater living space than in the case of other peoples. If, territorially speaking, there existed no political result corresponding to this German racial core, that was a consequence of centuries of historical development, and in the continuance of these political conditions lay the greatest danger to the preservation of the German race at its present peak. To arrest the decline of Germanism [*Deutschtum*] in Austria and Czechoslovakia was as little possible as to maintain the present level in Germany itself. Instead of increase, sterility was setting in, and in its train disorders of a social character must arise in course of time, since political and ideological ideas remain effective only so long as they furnish the basis for the realization of the essential vital demands of a people. Germany's future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving of the need for space, and such a solution could be sought, of course, only for a foreseeable period of about one to three generations. …

The question for Germany ran: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost.

German policy had to reckon with two hate-inspired antagonists, Britain and France, to whom a German colossus in the center of Europe was a thorn in the flesh, and both countries were opposed to any further strengthening of Germany's position either in Europe or overseas; in support of this opposition they were able to count on the agreement of all their political parties. Both countries saw in the establishment of German military bases overseas a threat to their own communications, a safeguarding of German commerce, and, as a consequence, a strengthening of Germany's position in Europe. …

Beside the British Empire there existed today a number of states stronger than she. The British motherland was able to protect her colonial possessions not by her own power, but only in alliance with other states. How, for

instance, could Britain alone defend Canada against attack by America, or her Far Eastern interests against attack by Japan!…

France's position was more favorable than that of Britain. The French Empire was better placed territorially; the inhabitants of her colonial possessions represented a supplement to her military strength. But France was going to be confronted with internal political difficulties. In a nation's life about 10 percent of its span is taken up by parliamentary forms of government and about 90 percent by authoritarian forms. Today, nonetheless, Britain, France, Russia, and the smaller states adjoining them, must be included as factors [*Machtfaktoren*] in our political calculations.

Germany's problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. The campaigns of Frederick the Great for Silesia and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had involved unheard-of risk, and the swiftness of the Prussian action in 1870 had kept Austria from entering the war. If one accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remain still to be answered the questions "when" and "how." In this matter there were three cases [*Falle*] to be dealt with:

Case 1: Period 1943–1945.

After this date only a change for the worse, from our point of view, could be expected.

The equipment of the army, navy, and Luftwaffe [air force], as well as the formation of the officer corps, was nearly completed. Equipment and armament were modern; in further delay there lay the danger of their obsolescence. In particular, the secrecy of "special weapons" could not be preserved forever. The recruiting of reserves was limited to current age groups; further drafts from older untrained age groups were no longer available.

Our relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament which would by then have been carried out by the rest of the world. If we did not act by 1943–45 any year could, in consequence of a lack of reserves, produce the food crisis, to cope with which the necessary foreign exchange was not available, and this must be regarded as a "waning point of the regime." Besides, the world was expecting our attack and was increasing its counter-

measures from year to year. It was while the rest of the world was still preparing its defenses [*sich abriegele*] that we were obliged to take the offensive.

Nobody knew today what the situation would be in the years 1943–45. One thing only was certain, that we could not wait longer.

On the one hand there was the great Wehrmacht [army], and the necessity of maintaining it at its present level, the aging of the movement and of its leaders; and on the other, the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and of a limitation of the birth rate, which left no choice but to act. If the Fuehrer was still living, it was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by 1943–45. The necessity for action before 1943–45 would arise in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2:

If internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French Army completely and render it incapable of use for war against Germany, then the time for action against the Czechs had come.

Case 3:

If France is so embroiled by a war with another state that she cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our politico-military position our first objective, in the event of our being embroiled in war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in any possible operation against the West. In a conflict with France it was hardly to be regarded as likely that the Czechs would declare war on us on the very same day as France. The desire to join in the war would, however, increase among the Czechs in proportion to any weakening on our part and then her participation could clearly take the form of an attack toward Silesia, toward the north or toward the west.

If the Czechs were overthrown and a common German-Hungarian frontier achieved, a neutral attitude on the part of Poland could be the more certainly counted on in the event of a Franco-German conflict. Our agreements with Poland only retained their force as long as Germany's

strength remained unshaken. In the event of German setbacks a Polish action against East Prussia, and possibly against Pomerania and Silesia as well, had to be reckoned with.

On the assumption of a development of the situation leading to action on our part as planned, in the years 1943–45, the attitude of France, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Russia could probably be estimated as follows:

Actually, the Fuehrer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question could be cleared up in due course by Germany. Difficulties connected with the Empire, and the prospect of being once more entangled in a protracted European war, were decisive considerations for Britain against participation in a war against Germany. Britain's attitude would certainly not be without influence on that of France. An attack by France without British support, and with the prospect of the offensive being brought to a standstill on our western fortifications, was hardly probable. Nor was a French march through Belgium and Holland without British support to be expected; this also was a course not to be contemplated by us in the event of a conflict with France, because it would certainly entail the hostility of Britain. It would of course be necessary to maintain a strong defense [*eine Abriegelung*] on our western frontier during the prosecution of our attack on the Czechs and Austria. And in this connection it had to be remembered that the defense measures of the Czechs were growing in strength from year to year, and that the actual worth of the Austrian Army also was increasing in the course of time. Even though the populations concerned, especially of Czechoslovakia, were not sparse, the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria would mean an acquisition of foodstuffs for 5 to 6 million people, on the assumption that the compulsory emigration of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia and 1 million people from Austria was practicable. The incorporation of these two States with Germany meant, from the politico-military point of view, a substantial advantage because it would mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces for other purposes, and the possibility of creating new units up to a level of about 12 divisions, that is, 1 new division per million inhabitants.

Italy was not expected to object to the elimination of the Czechs, but it was impossible at the moment to estimate what her attitude on the Austrian

question would be; that depended essentially upon whether the Duce were still alive.

The degree of surprise and the swiftness of our action were decisive factors for Poland's attitude. Poland, with Russia at her rear, will have little inclination to engage in war against a victorious Germany.

Military intervention by Russia must be countered by the swiftness of our operations; however, whether such an intervention was a practical contingency at all was, in view of Japan's attitude, more than doubtful.

Should case 2 arise—the crippling of France by civil war—the situation thus created by the elimination of the most dangerous opponent must be seized upon whenever it occurs for the blow against the Czechs.

The Fuehrer saw case 3 coming definitely nearer; it might emerge from the present tensions in the Mediterranean, and he was resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938.

In the light of past experience, the Fuehrer did not see any early end to the hostilities in Spain. If one considered the length of time which Franco's offensives had taken up till now, it was fully possible that the war would continue another 3 years. On the other hand, a 100 percent victory for Franco was not desirable either, from the German point of view; rather were we interested in a continuance of the war and in the keeping up of the tension in the Mediterranean. Franco in undisputed possession of the Spanish Peninsula precluded the possibility of any further intervention on the part of the Italians or of their continued occupation of the Balearic Islands. As our interest lay more in the prolongation of the war in Spain, it must be the immediate aim of our policy to strengthen Italy's rear with a view to her remaining in the Balearics. But the permanent establishment of the Italians on the Balearics would be intolerable both to France and Britain, and might lead to a war of France and England against Italy—a war in which Spain, should she be entirely in the hands of the Whites, might make her appearance on the side of Italy's enemies. The probability of Italy's defeat in such a war was slight, for the road from Germany was open for the supplementing of her raw materials. The Fuehrer pictured the military strategy for Italy thus: on her western frontier with France she would remain on the defensive, and carry on the war against France from Libya against the French North African colonial possessions.

As a landing by Franco-British troops on the coast of Italy could be

discounted, and a French offensive over the Alps against northern Italy would be very difficult and would probably come to a halt before the strong Italian fortifications, the crucial point [*Schwerpunkt*] of the operations lay in North Africa. The threat to French lines of communication by the Italian Fleet would to a great extent cripple the transportation of forces from North Africa to France, so that France would have only home forces at her disposal on the frontiers with Italy and Germany.

If Germany made use of this war to settle the Czech and Austrian questions, it was to be assumed that Britain—herself at war with Italy—would decide not to act against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany was not to be expected.

The time for our attack on the Czechs and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Anglo-French-Italian war and would not necessarily coincide with the commencement of military operations by these three States. Nor had the Fuehrer in mind military agreements with Italy, but wanted, while retaining his own independence of action, to exploit this favorable situation, which would not occur again, to begin and carry through the campaign against the Czechs. This descent upon the Czechs would have to be carried out with "lightning speed."

In appraising the situation Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Fritsch repeatedly emphasized the necessity that Britain and France must not appear in the role of our enemies, and stated that the French Army would not be so committed by the war with Italy that France could not at the same time enter the field with forces superior to ours on our western frontier. General von Fritsch estimated the probable French forces available for use on the Alpine frontier at approximately twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on the western frontier, with the role, according to the German view, of invading the Rhineland. In this matter, moreover, the advanced state of French defense preparations [*Mobiolmachung*] must be taken into particular account, and it must be remembered apart from the insignificant value of our present fortifications—on which Field Marshal von Blomberg laid special emphasis—that the four motorized divisions intended for the West were still more or less incapable of movement. In regard to our offensive toward the southeast, Field Marshal von Blomberg drew particular attention to the strength of the Czech

fortifications, which had acquired by now a structure like a Maginot Line and which would gravely hamper our attack.

General von Fritsch mentioned that this was the very purpose of a study which he had ordered made this winter, namely, to examine the possibility of conducting operations against the Czechs with special reference to overcoming the Czech fortification system; the General further expressed his opinion, that under existing circumstances he must give up his plan to go abroad on his leave, which was due to begin on November 10. The Fuehrer dismissed this idea on the ground that the possibility of a conflict need not yet be regarded as imminent. To the Foreign Minister's objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable distance as the Fuehrer seemed to assume, the Fuehrer put the summer of 1938 as the date which seemed to him possible for this. In reply to considerations offered by Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch regarding the attitude of Britain and France, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements that he was convinced of Britain's nonparticipation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict under discussion lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we must immediately begin action against the Czechs. On the other hand, should the powers not engaged in the war declare themselves disinterested, then Germany would have to adopt a similar attitude to this for the time being.

Colonel General Göring thought that, in view of the Fuehrer's statement, we should consider liquidating our military undertakings in Spain. The Fuehrer agrees to this with the limitation that he thinks he should reserve a decision for a proper moment.

The second part of the conference was concerned with concrete questions of armament.

HOSSBACH

Certified Correct:
Colonel (General Staff)

Source: *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945,* Series D, Vol. 1, *From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937–September 1938)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 29–39.

1938 DOCUMENTS

25. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Recommending Increased Armament for National Defense, January 28, 1938

Introduction

By the beginning of 1938, the international situation alarmed President Franklin D. Roosevelt sufficiently to impel him to recommend substantial increases in U.S. defense spending to Congress. He stated bluntly that "our national defense is, in the light of the increasing armaments of other Nations, inadequate for purposes of national security."

Primary Source

To the Congress:

The Congress knows that for many years this Government has sought in many Capitals with the leaders of many Governments to find a way to limit and reduce armaments and to establish at least the probability of world peace.

The Congress is aware also that while these efforts, supported by the hopes of the American people, continue and will continue they have nevertheless failed up to the present time.

We, as a peaceful Nation, cannot and will not abandon active search for an agreement among the nations to limit armaments and end aggression. But it is clear that until such agreement is reached—and I have not given up hope of it—we are compelled to think of our own national safety.

It is with the deepest regret that I report to you that armaments increase today at an unprecedented and alarming rate. It is an ominous fact that at least one-fourth of the world's population is involved in merciless devastating conflict in spite of the fact that most people in most countries, including those

where conflict rages, wish to live at peace. Armies are fighting in the Far East and in Europe; thousands of civilians are being driven from their homes and bombed from the air. Tension throughout the world is high.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States it is my constitutional duty to report to the Congress that our national defense is, in the light of the increasing armaments of other Nations, inadequate for purposes of national security and requires increase for that reason.

In spite of the well-known fact that the American standard of living makes our ships, our guns and our planes cost more for construction than in any other Nation and that the maintenance of them and of our Army and Navy personnel is more expensive than in any other Nation, it is also true that the proportion of the cost of our military and naval forces to the total income of our citizens or to the total cost of our Government is far lower than in the case of any other great Nation.

Specifically and solely because of the piling up of additional land and sea armaments in other countries, in such manner as to involve a threat to world peace and security, I make the following recommendations to the Congress:

(1) That there be authorized for the Army of the United States additions to anti-aircraft materiel in the sum of $8,800,000 and that of this sum $6,800,000 be appropriated for the fiscal year 1939.
(2) That there be authorized and appropriated for the better establishment of an Enlisted Reserve for the Army the sum of $450,000.
(3) That there be authorized the expenditure of $6,080,000 for the manufacture of gauges, dies and other aids to manufacture of Army materiel, the sum of $5,000,000 thereof to be expended during the fiscal year 1939.
(4) That the sum of $2,000,000 be authorized and appropriated toward the making up of deficiencies in ammunition for the Army.
(5) That the existing authorized building program for increases and replacements in the Navy be increased by 20 per cent.
(6) That this Congress authorize and appropriate for the laying down of two additional battleships and two additional cruisers during the calendar year 1938. This will call for the expenditure of a very small amount of Government funds during the fiscal year 1939.

(7) That the Congress authorize and appropriate a sum not to exceed $15,000,000 for the construction of a number of new types of small vessels, such construction to be regarded as experimental in the light of new developments among Navies; and to include the preparation of plans for other types of ships in the event that it may be necessary to construct such ships in the future.

I believe also that the time has come for the Congress to enact legislation aimed at the prevention of profiteering in time of war and the equalization of the burdens of possible war. Such legislation has been the subject for many years of full study in this and previous Congresses.

It is necessary for all of us to realize that the unfortunate world conditions of today have resulted too often in the discarding of those principles and treaties which underlie international law and order; and in the entrance of many new factors into the actual conduct of war.

Adequate defense means that for the protection not only of our coasts but also of our communities far removed from the coast, we must keep any potential enemy many hundred miles away from our continental limits.

We cannot assume that our defense would be limited to one ocean and one coast and that the other ocean and the other coast would with certainty be safe. We cannot be certain that the connecting link, the Panama Canal, would be safe. Adequate defense affects therefore the simultaneous defense of every part of the United States of America.

It is our clear duty to further every effort toward peace but at the same time to protect our Nation. That is the purpose of these recommendations. Such protection is and will be based not on aggression but on defense.

Source: Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 68–71.

26. Broadcast by the Former Austrian Chancellor Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, March 11, 1938

Introduction

Under the Treaty of Versailles, union between Austria and Germany was forbidden. After regaining the Rhineland, Adolf Hitler's next objective was Austria, where the Austrian Nazi Party agitated for union (Anschluss) with Germany. As chancellor, the authoritarian Kurt von Schuschnigg headed a semifascist government, but he nonetheless opposed annexation. In early March 1938, German troops massed on the Austrian border as the Austrian government organized a nationwide plebiscite on whether Austria should join Germany. Despite that pressure, Chancellor von Schuschnigg urged the defense of Austrian independence. On March 11 under pressure from Germany, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, head of the German Nazi Party, replaced von Schuschnigg as chancellor of Austria, and the plebiscite scheduled for March 13 was canceled. German troops marched into Austria, and the two countries were forcibly united. Schuschnigg made a public broadcast to the Austrian people protesting against these developments. Shortly afterward he was imprisoned and did not regain his freedom until Germany's defeat in 1945.

Primary Source

Men and women of Austria!

Today we have been confronted with a difficult and decisive situation. I am authorized to report to the Austrian people on the events of the day.

The Government of the German Reich presented the Federal President with an ultimatum with a time-limit, according to which he had to appoint as Federal Chancellor a prescribed candidate, and constitute a Government in accordance with the proposals of the Government of the German Reich. Otherwise it was intended that German troops should march into Austria at the hour named.

I declare before the world that the reports which have been spread in Austria that there have been labour troubles, that streams of blood have flowed, and that the Government was not in control of the situation and could not maintain order by its own means, are fabrications from A to Z.

The Federal President authorizes me to inform the Austrian people that we yield to force. Because we are not minded, at any cost and even in this grave hour, to shed German blood, we have ordered our armed forces, in case

the invasion is carried out, to withdraw without resistance and to await the events of the next hours. …

So I take my leave of the Austrian people with a German word and a heartfelt wish—God protect Austria!

Source: Stephen Heald, ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1938,* Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 64–66. Reprinted with permission of Chatham House.

27. Press Release Issued by the Department of State on September 26, 1938: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message Sent Directly to the President of Czechoslovakia and the Chancellor of Germany and through the Secretary of State to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France, Morning of September 26, 1938

Introduction

In late September 1938, Adolf Hitler's demands that the Czech territory of the Sudetenland be incorporated into Germany came to a head. Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union had all guaranteed Czechoslovakia's security, but the first two powers were reluctant to go to war. The Soviets stated their readiness to fight, but in reality they were in no position to do so. Hitler therefore refused to compromise on his demands for the Sudetenland. As negotiations continued and appeared deadlocked, U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt sent a message to the leaders of all those nations concerned, urging them to make every effort to reach a settlement that would preserve European peace.

Primary Source

The fabric of peace on the continent of Europe, if not throughout the rest of the world, is in immediate danger. The consequences of its rupture are incalculable. Should hostilities break out the lives of millions of men, women and children in every country involved will most certainly be lost under circumstances of unspeakable horror.

The economic system of every country involved is certain to be shattered. The social structure of every country involved may well be completely wrecked.

The United States has no political entanglements. It is caught in no mesh of hatred. Elements of all Europe have formed its civilization.

The supreme desire of the American people is to live in peace. But in the event of a general war they face the fact that no nation can escape some measure of the consequences of such a world catastrophe.

The traditional policy of the United States has been the furtherance of the settlement of international disputes by pacific means. It is my conviction that all people under the threat of war today pray that peace may be made before, rather than after, war.

It is imperative that peoples everywhere recall that every civilized nation of the world voluntarily assumed the solemn obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 to solve controversies only by pacific methods. In addition, most nations are parties to other binding treaties obligating them to preserve peace. Furthermore, all countries have today available for such peaceful solution of difficulties which may arise, treaties of arbitration and conciliation to which they are parties.

Whatever may be the differences in the controversies at issue and however difficult of pacific settlement they may be, I am persuaded that there is no problem so difficult or so pressing for solution that it cannot be justly solved by the resort to reason rather than by the resort to force.

During the present crisis the people of the United States and their Government have earnestly hoped that the negotiations for the adjustment of the controversy which has now arisen in Europe might reach a successful conclusion.

So long as these negotiations continue, so long will there remain the hope that reason and the spirit of equity may prevail and that the world may thereby escape the madness of a new resort to war.

On behalf of the 130 millions of people of the United States of America

and for the sake of humanity everywhere I most earnestly appeal to you not to break off negotiations looking to a peaceful, fair, and constructive settlement of the questions at issue.

I earnestly repeat that so long as negotiations continue, differences may be reconciled. Once they are broken off reason is banished and force asserts itself.

And force produces no solution for the future good of humanity.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 425–426.

28. Agreement Concluded at Munich between Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy, September 29, 1938

Introduction

In August 1938, German chancellor Adolf Hitler demanded that Czechoslovakia cede to Germany the Sudetenland, a portion of that state's territory the population of which was largely of ethnically German origin. The Czechs proclaimed their willingness to fight Germany and sought assistance in doing so from Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. While the latter state proclaimed its own willingness to aid the Czechs, Britain and France were far more reluctant to contemplate war. Eventually Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, flew to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden in Germany and, with French assistance, brokered an agreement whereby Czechoslovakia handed over the Sudetenland to Germany. Welcomed by many at the time and subsequently defended on the grounds that in September 1938 Britain was militarily too ill-equipped to face war against Germany, the controversial Munich Agreement nonetheless quickly came to symbolize the interwar irresolution of the Western democracies in dealing with any serious threat to international peace and order.

Primary Source

GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment:

The evacuation will begin on 1st October.

The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.

The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order:

The territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October; the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October; the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October; the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. The commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and

Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences. …

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in Paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French Proposals of 19 September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part shall give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

Source: "Agreement Signed at Munich between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy" (September 29, 1938), in U.S. Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, Series D (1937–1945), Germany and Czechoslovakia* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957–1964), 2:1014–1016.

29. Neville Chamberlain, "Peace for Our Time," September 30, 1938

Introduction

Only too soon, Neville Chamberlain's public declaration after returning from Munich that the agreement represented "peace for our time" was discredited, making it synonymous in the future with a myopic determination to ignore at any price the threats that authoritarian dictatorships posed to democratic nations during the 1930s.

Primary Source

[Neville Chamberlain read this statement to the officials and members of the public who came to meet him at Heston Airport when his aircraft landed after his return from Munich. After meeting the British king and queen at Buckingham Palace and appearing with them on the balcony to a tumultuous welcome, Chamberlain returned that evening to find a cheering crowd assembled outside 10 Downing Street, the British prime minister's official residence. Happily, Chamberlain waved the statement again before this largely euphoric audience.]

We, the German Führer and Chancellor, and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference, and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.

[*He then added:*]

My good friends this is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time. And now I recommend you to go home and sleep quietly in your beds.

Source: Facsimile written text of declaration by Neville Chamberlain, September 30, 1938, as reproduced in "Ovation in London," *The Times* (London), October 1, 1938, 14.

30. Japanese Prime Minister Prince Konoe, Statement on China, December 22, 1938

Introduction

In December 1938 after almost 18 months of war with China, Japan's prime minister, Prince Konoe, announced that Japan would carry on the war until the Guomindang government had been eliminated. He also announced Japan's intention of establishing a new order in East Asia.

Primary Source

The Japanese Government are resolved to carry on military operations for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang régime, and at the same time to proceed with the work of establishing a new order in East Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share our ideals and aspirations. A spirit of renaissance is now spreading over all parts of China and enthusiasm for reconstruction is mounting ever higher. The Japanese Government desire to make public their basic policy for adjusting relations between China and Japan in order that their intentions may be thoroughly understood at home and abroad.

Japan, China, and Manchukuo will be united by the common aim of establishing a new order in East Asia and realizing a relationship of neighborly amity, common defense against Communism, and economic cooperation. For that purpose, it is necessary first that China should cast aside all narrow and prejudiced views of the past and do away with the folly of anti-Japanism and resentment regarding Manchukuo. In other words Japan frankly desires China to enter of her own free will into complete diplomatic relations with Manchukuo.

The existence of Comintern influence in East Asia cannot be tolerated. Japan therefore considers it an essential condition of the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations that there should be concluded an anti-Comintern agreement between the two countries in consonance with the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy. In order to ensure the full accomplishment of this purpose Japan demands, in view of the

actual circumstances prevailing in China, that Japanese troops shall be stationed, as an anti-Communist measure, at specified points during the time the Agreement is in force, and that the Inner Mongolian region be designated a special anti-Communist area.

As regards economic relations between the two areas, Japan does not intend to exercise an economic monopoly in China, nor does she intend to demand that China shall limit the interests of those third Powers which grasp the meaning of the new East Asia and are willing to act accordingly. Japan seeks only to render effective cooperation and collaboration between the two countries. That is to say, Japan demands that China, in accordance with the principle of equality between the two countries, shall recognize freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China with a view to promoting the economic interests of both peoples, and that in the light of historical and economic relations between the two nations China should extend to Japan facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially in the regions of North China and Inner Mongolia.

The above gives the general lines of what Japan demands. If Japan's true object in conducting the present vast military campaign be fully understood it will be plain that what she seeks is neither territory nor indemnity for the cost of military operations. Japan demands only minimum guarantees for the execution of her functions as a participant in the establishing of a new order. Japan not only respects China's sovereignty, but is prepared to give positive consideration to the questions of the abolition of extraterritoriality and the rendition of foreign concessions and settlements—matters which are necessary for the full independence of China.

Source: James W. Gantenbein, *Documentary Background of World War II, 1931 to 1941* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 903–904. Copyright (c) 1948 Columbia University Press. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

1939 DOCUMENTS

31. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the U.S. Congress, January 12, 1939

Introduction

Addressing Congress on January 4, 1939, in his annual State of the Union message, President Franklin D. Roosevelt warned that despite the narrow escape from European war the previous September, the international situation was ominous. Besides calling for major increases in American defense spending, he urged national unity in the crisis as an essential component of U.S. security. Warning that time was pressing, just over a week later he followed up with a message asking Congress to authorize specific, detailed, and substantial increases in the country's military budget, including a major program to enhance American aircraft production.

Primary Source

In my annual message to this Congress I have spoken at some length of the changing world conditions outside of the American Hemisphere which make it imperative that we take immediate steps for the protection of our liberties.

It would be unwise for any of us to yield to any form of hysteria. Nevertheless, regardless of political affiliations, we can properly join in an appraisal of the world situation and agree on the immediate defense needs of the Nation.

It is equally sensational and untrue to take the position that we must at once spend billions of additional money for building up our land, sea, and air forces on the one hand, or to insist that no further additions are necessary on the other.

What needs to be emphasized is the great change which has come over conflicts between nations since the World War ended, and especially during the past 5 or 6 years.

Those of us who took part in the conduct of the World War will remember that in the preparation of the American armies for actual participation in battle, the United States, entering the war on April 6 1917, took no part whatsoever in any major engagement until the end of May 1918. In other words, while other armies were conducting the actual fighting, the

United States had more than a year of absolute peace at home, without any threat of attack on this continent to train men, to produce raw materials, to process them into munitions and supplies and to forge the whole into fighting forces. It is even a matter of record that as late as the autumn of 1918, American armies at the front used almost exclusively French or British artillery and aircraft.

Calling attention to these facts does not remotely intimate that the Congress or the President have any thought of taking part in another war on European soil, but it does show that in 1917 we were not ready to conduct large scale land or air operations. Relatively we are not much more ready to do so today than we were then—and we cannot guarantee a long period, free from attack, in which we could prepare.

I have called attention to the fact that "We must have armed forces and defenses strong enough to ward off sudden attack against strategic positions and key facilities essential to insure sustained resistance and ultimate victory." And I have said, "We must have the organization and location of those key facilities so that they may be immediately utilized and rapidly expanded to meet all needs without danger of serious interruption by enemy attack."

I repeat that "there is new range and speed to offense."

Therefore, it has become necessary for every American to restudy present defense against the possibilities of present offense against us.

Careful examination of the most imperative present needs leads me to recommend the appropriation at this session of the Congress, with as great speed as possible, of approximately $525,000,000, of which sum approximately $210,000,000 would be actually spent from the Treasury before the end of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940.

The survey indicates that of this sum approximately $450,000,000 should be allocated for new needs of the Army, $65,000,000 for new needs of the Navy, and $10,000,000 for training of civilian air pilots. …

In the case of the Army, information from other nations leads us to believe that there must be a complete revision of our estimates for aircraft. The Baker board report of a few years ago is completely out of date. No responsible officer advocates building our air forces up to the total either of planes on hand or of productive capacity equal to the forces of certain other nations. We are thinking in the terms of necessary defenses and the

conclusion is inevitable that our existing forces are so utterly inadequate that they must be immediately strengthened.

It is proposed that $300,000,000 be appropriated for the purchase of several types of airplanes for the Army. This should provide a minimum increase of 3,000 planes, but it is hoped that orders placed on such a large scale will materially reduce the unit cost and actually provide many more planes.

Military aviation is increasing today at an unprecedented and alarming rate. Increased range, increased speed, increased capacity of airplanes abroad have changed our requirements for defensive aviation. The additional planes recommended will considerably strengthen the air defenses of the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone. If an appropriation bill can be quickly enacted, I suggest that $50,000,000 of the $300,000,000 for airplanes be made immediately available in order to correct the present lag in aircraft production due to idle plants.

Of the balance of approximately $150,000,000 requested for the Army, I suggest an appropriation of $110,000,000 to provide “critical items” of equipment which would be needed immediately in time of emergency, and which cannot be obtained from any source within the time and quantity desired—materiel such as antiaircraft artillery, semiautomatic rifles, antitank guns, tanks, light and heavy artillery, ammunition, and gas masks. Such purchases would go far to equip existing units of the Regular Army and the National Guard.

I suggest approximately $32,000,000 for “educational orders” for the Army—in other words, to enable industry to prepare for quantity production in an emergency, of those military items which are noncommercial in character and are so difficult of manufacture as to constitute what are known as “bottlenecks” in the problem of procurement.

The balance should be used, I believe, for improving and strengthening the seacoast defenses of Panama, Hawaii, and the continental United States, including the construction of a highway outside the limits of the Panama Canal Zone, important to the defense of the zone.

The estimated appropriation of $65,000,000 for the Navy should be divided into (a) $44,000,000 for the creation or strengthening of Navy bases in both oceans in general agreement with the report of the special board

which has already been submitted to the Congress, (b) about $21,000,000 for additional Navy airplanes and air material tests.

Finally, national defense calls for the annual training of additional air pilots. This training should be primarily directed to the essential qualifications for civilian flying. In cooperation with educational institutions, it is believed that the expenditure of $10,000,000 a year will give primary training to approximately 20,000 citizens.

In the above recommendations for appropriations totaling $525,000,000, I have omitted reference to a definite need, which, however, relates to the implementing of existing defenses for the Panama Canal. The security of the Canal is of the utmost importance. The peace garrison now there is inadequate to defend this vital link. This deficiency cannot be corrected with existing forces without seriously jeopardizing the general defense by stripping the continental United States of harbor defense and antiaircraft personnel. The permanent garrison in the Canal Zone should be increased to provide the minimum personnel required to man the antiaircraft and seacoast armament provided for the defense of the Canal. Such personnel cannot be increased until additional housing facilities are provided—and, in the meantime, additional personnel must be trained. I recommend, therefore, an appropriation of $27,000,000 to provide an adequate peace garrison for the Canal Zone and to house it adequately. Five million dollars of this sum should be made available immediately in order that work on necessary construction can be initiated.

All of the above constitutes a well-rounded program, considered by me as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and by my advisors to be a minimum program for the necessities of defense. …

Devoid of all hysteria, this program is but the minimum of requirements.

I trust, therefore, that the Congress will quickly act on this emergency program for the strengthening of the defense of the United States.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 450–453.

32. The Western Guarantee of Polish Independence: British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Statement in the House of Commons, March 31, 1939

Introduction

The German assumption in March 1939 of a protectorate over the remainder of Czechoslovakia, a move that effectively amounted to annexation of that country and also contravened the agreement reached at Munich six months earlier, finally impelled the Western powers to take a decisive stand against Germany. Speaking in the House of Commons, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain announced that both Britain and France had undertaken to guarantee Poland's security against outside aggression. Since Poland was known to be Germany's next contemplated target, if neither side backed down, this pledge was likely to precipitate war.

Primary Source

The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): The right hon. gentleman the leader of the Opposition asked me this morning whether I could make a statement as to the European situation. As I said this morning, His Majesty's Government have no official confirmation of the rumours of any projected attack on Poland and they must not, therefore, be taken as accepting them as true.

I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the general policy of His Majesty's Government. They have constantly advocated the adjustment, by way of free negotiation between the parties concerned, of any differences that may arise between them. They consider that this is the natural and proper course where differences exist. In their opinion there should be no question incapable of solution by peaceful means, and they would see no justification for the substitution of force or threats of force for the method of negotiation.

As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the

event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.

I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government.

Source: *Great Britain: Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939; Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, Misc. No. 9 (1939), Cmd. 6106* (London: HMSO, 1939), 36.

33. Adolf Hitler, Directive for "Operation White," the Attack on Poland, April 11, 1939

Introduction

In response to Adolf Hitler's pressure on Poland to cede the Danzig corridor to Germany, in March 1939 Great Britain and France gave Poland a guarantee that should Poland be attacked, both nations would respond by declaring war on its aggressor. Believing that this action meant that Poland would not yield without war, in April an infuriated Hitler issued a military directive that his armed forces should prepare themselves to attack Poland anytime after September 1, 1939.

Primary Source

The present attitude of Poland requires, over and above the plan "Frontier Security East," the initiation of military preparations, to remove if necessary any threat from this direction for ever.

1.) *Political Requirements and Aims*

German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principles of avoiding any disturbances. Should Poland, however, change her policy

towards Germany, which so far has been based on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary in spite of the Treaty in force with Poland.

The aim will then be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which will satisfy the requirements of national defence. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich territory at the outbreak of hostilities, at the latest.

The political leaders consider it their task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

The development of increasing internal crises in France and resulting British restraint might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

Intervention by Russia, if she were in a position to intervene, cannot be expected to be of any use to Poland, because this would mean Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.

The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military superiority. (In the course of further developments it may become necessary to occupy the Baltic states up to the border of the former Courland and to incorporate them in the Reich.)

Germany cannot count on Hungary as a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Rome-Berlin Axis.

2.) *Military Conclusions*

The great objections in the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the Western Democracies. "Operation white" constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military conflict with the Western opponents.

The isolation of Poland will be all the more easily maintained, even after the outbreak of hostilities, if we succeed in starting the war with sudden, heavy blows and in gaining rapid successes.

The overall situation will require, however, that in all cases precautions be taken to safeguard the western frontier and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air above them.

Against the Baltic States—Lithuania in particular—security measures are to be carried out in case of a Polish march through this country.

3.) *Tasks of the Wehrmacht*

The task of the Wehrmacht is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. To this end a surprise attack is to be aimed at and prepared. Camouflaged or open general mobilization will not be ordered earlier than the day before the attack and at the latest possible moment. The forces provided for "Frontier Security West" (section I, "Frontier Security") must not be employed for the time being for any other purpose.

All other frontiers are to be kept under observation only; the Lithuanian frontier is to be covered.

Source: J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., *Nazism 1919–1945: A Documentary Reader*, Vol. 3, *Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1988), 127–128. Reprinted with permission.

34. Albert Einstein to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 2, 1939

Introduction

Even before Germany was formally at war with the Allies, anti-Nazi scientists were well aware of the possibility that Germany might develop an atomic bomb. Albert Einstein, the renowned German physicist who had developed the theory of relativity, a man whose Jewish origins had forced him to flee to the United States, wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt on the subject. Einstein urged that the United States should attempt to buy up international uranium stocks and encourage its scientists to develop atomic weapons before the Nazi regime succeeded in doing so. Roosevelt responded positively and quickly to Einstein's exhortations.

Primary Source

Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future. Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem to call for watchfulness

and if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and recommendations.

In the course of the last four months it has been made probable through the work of Joliot in France as well as Fermi and Szilard in America that it may be possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain that this could be achieved in the immediate future.

This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable—though much less certain—that extremely powerful bombs of this type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs might very well prove too heavy for transportation by air.

The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in moderate quantities. There is some good ore in Canada and former Czechoslovakia, while the most important source of uranium is in the Belgian Congo.

In view of this situation you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain reactions in America. One possible way of achieving this might be for you to entrust the task with a person who has your confidence and who could perhaps serve in an unofficial capacity. His task might comprise the following:

a) to approach Government Departments, keep them informed of the further development, and put forward recommendations for Government action, giving particular attention to the problem of securing a supply of uranium ore for the United States.
b) to speed up the experimental work, which is at present being carried on within the limits of the budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds, if such funds be required, through his contacts with private persons who are willing to make contributions for this cause, and perhaps also by obtaining co-operation of industrial laboratories which have necessary equipment.

I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over. That she should have taken such early action might perhaps be understood on the ground that the son of the German Under-Secretary of State, von Weizsacker, is attached to the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, where some of the American work on uranium is now being repeated.

Source: "Einstein's Letter," Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.ne.anl.gov/About/legacy/e-letter.shtml.

35. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to Adolf Hitler, August 22, 1939

Introduction

As German troops moved to threaten Poland and in light of Adolf Hitler's alleged Polish mistreatment of German minorities, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain wrote to Hitler. He warned that whatever Hitler might believe, Great Britain would regard as a casus belli Germany's invasion of or declaration of war on Poland.

Primary Source

Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty's Government, and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening.

These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfil.

It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured.

Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. I am certain that it is desired neither by our people, nor by yours, and I cannot see that there is anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not and should not be resolved without the use of force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails to-day.

We have been, and at all times will be, ready to assist in creating conditions in which such negotiations could take place, and in which it might be possible concurrently to discuss the wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest to us and to you.

The difficulties in the way of any peaceful discussion in the present state of tension are, however, obvious, and the longer that tension is maintained, the harder will it be for reason to prevail.

These difficulties, however, might be mitigated, if not removed, provided that there could for an initial period be a truce on both sides—and indeed on all sides—to press polemics and to all incitement.

If such a truce could be arranged, then, at the end of that period, during which steps could be taken to examine and deal with complaints made by either side as to the treatment of minorities, it is reasonable to hope that suitable conditions might have been established for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues between them (with the aid of a neutral intermediary, if both sides should think that that would be helpful).

But I am bound to say that there would be slender hope of bringing such

negotiations to successful issue unless it were understood beforehand that any settlement reached would, when concluded, be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would be ready, if desired, to make such contribution as they could to the effective operation of such guarantees.
At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war.

In view of the grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you.

Source: "The British War Bluebook: Letter of August 22, 1939, from the Prime Minister to the German Chancellor," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk56.asp.

36. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Protocols, and Clarifications, August 23, 1939–January 10, 1941

Introduction

On August 23, 1939, Count Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, and V. M. Molotov, his Soviet counterpart, signed a nonaggression pact between their two countries, together with several secret protocols delineating the Soviet and German spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics, including an understanding on the partitioning of Poland between the two signatory powers. Under the agreement, the Soviet Union also provided appreciable quantities of valuable war supplies to Germany. These agreements were subjected to further clarifications on August 28, 1939; September 28, 1939; and, in one case, also on January 10, 1941. They paved the way for Hitler to invade Poland one week later, the event that in turn impelled Great Britain and France to declare war on Germany, the beginning of general war in Europe.

Primary Source

Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 23, 1939

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and taking as a basis the fundamental regulations of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have reached the following agreement:

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties bind themselves to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive action and any attack on one another, both singly and also jointly with other Powers.

Article 2. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties becoming the object of warlike action on the part of a third Power, the other Contracting Party shall in no manner support this third Power.

Article 3. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall in future remain continuously in touch with one another, by way of consultation, in order to inform one another on questions touching their joint interests.

Article 4. Neither of the two Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of Powers which is directed directly or indirectly against the other Party.

Article 5. In the event of disputes or disagreements arising between the Contracting Parties on questions of this or that kind, both Parties would clarify these disputes or disagreements exclusively by means of friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, by arbitration committees.

Article 6. The present Agreement shall be concluded for a period of ten years on the understanding that, insofar as one of the Contracting Parties does not give notice of termination one year before the end of this period, the period of validity of this Agreement shall automatically be regarded as prolonged for a further period of five years.

Article 7. The present Agreement shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement takes effect immediately after it has been signed.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 76–77.

Secret Supplementary Protocol on the Border of the Spheres of Interest of Germany and the USSR, Signed by V. M. Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, August 23, 1939

In signing the nonaggression pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two sides discussed in strict confidentiality the issue of delimiting the spheres of mutual interest in Eastern Europe. This discussion led to the following result:

In the event of territorial-political reorganization of the districts making up the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interest of

Germany and the USSR. The interests of Lithuania with respect to the Vilnius district are recognized by both sides.

In the event of territorial-political reorganization of the districts making up the Polish Republic, the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR will run approximately along the Pisa, Narew, Vistula, and San rivers.

The question of whether it is in the signatories' mutual interest to preserve the independent Polish State and what the borders of that state will be can be ascertained conclusively only in the course of future political development.

In any event, both governments will resolve this matter through friendly mutual agreement.

Concerning southeastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the interest of the USSR in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.

This protocol will be held in strict secrecy by both sides.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 78.

Clarification of the Secret Supplementary Protocol of August 23, 1939, Signed in Moscow by V. M. Molotov and Count F. W. Schulenburg, August 28, 1939

In order to clarify the first paragraph of point 2 of the "Secret Supplementary Protocol" of 23 August 1939, this is to explain that said paragraph is to be read in the following final version, namely:

"2. In the event of the territorial-political reorganization of the districts making up the Polish State, the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR will run approximately along the Pisa, Narew, Vistula, and San rivers."

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 105–106.

Confidential Protocol Concerning the Possibility of Resettling the Population Residing within the Spheres of Interest of the Governments of the USSR and Germany, Signed by V. M. Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, September 28, 1939

The Government of the USSR will not impede German citizens or other persons of German ancestry residing within its spheres of interest should they desire to move to Germany or to German spheres of interest. It agrees that this resettlement will be conducted by persons authorized by the German Government in accordance with responsible local authorities and that in the process the property rights of the resettled persons will not be infringed.

The German Government assumes the same obligation with respect to persons of Ukrainian or Belorussian ancestry residing within its spheres of interest.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 106.

Secret Supplementary Protocol on Changing the Soviet-German Agreement of August 23, Concerning the Spheres of Interest of Germany and the USSR, Signed by V. M. Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, September 28, 1939

The undersigned plenipotentiaries state the concurrence of the German Government and the Government of the USSR in the following:

Point 1 of the secret supplementary protocol signed on 23 August 1939 is changed so that the territory of the Lithuanian state is included in the sphere of interest of the USSR because, on the other side, Lublin voivodeship and parts of Warsaw voivodeship are included in the sphere of interest of Germany (see map accompanying the Treaty on Friendship and the Border between the USSR and Germany, signed today). As soon as the Government of the USSR takes special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian border, with the objective of making it a natural and simple border, will be adjusted so that the Lithuanian territory that lies southwest of the line shown on the map goes to Germany.

It is further stated that economic agreements between Germany and Lithuania now in force must not be broken by the aforementioned measures by the Soviet Union.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 107.

Secret Supplementary Protocol on Preventing Polish Agitation on the Territory of the Other Treaty Signatory, Signed by V. M. Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, September 28, 1939

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, in concluding the Soviet-German treaty on the border and friendship, have stated their concurrence in the following:

Neither side will permit on their territories any sort of Polish agitation affecting the territory of the other country. They will abort such agitation on their own territories and will inform each other as to effective measures to accomplish this.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 107.

Secret Protocol of January 10, 1941, Clarifying the Agreements of August 1939

The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR V. M. Molotov, with the authorization of the Government of the USSR on one side, and German Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg, with the authorization of the Government of Germany on the other side, have concurred on the following:

The government of Germany renounces its claims to the part of the territory of Lithuania indicated in the Secret Supplementary Protocol of September 28, 1939, and shown on the map that is attached to this Protocol.

The Government of the USSR agrees to compensate the Government of Germany for the territory indicated in point 1 of the present Protocol with a payment to Germany in the amount of 7,500,000 gold dollars, the equivalent of 31,500,000 German marks.

Payment of the sum of 31.5 million German marks will be made as follows: one-eighth, i.e., 3,937,500 German marks, in deliveries of nonferrous metals over a three-month period beginning from the day of signing of the present Protocol, and the remaining seven-eighths, i.e., 27,562,500 German marks, in gold through deductions from German payments of gold that the German side has to make before February 11, 1941, based on an exchange of letters between the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade of the USSR A. I. Mikoyan and the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation Mr. Schnurre that took place in conjunction with the signing of the "Agreement of January l0, 1941, on Mutual Deliveries of Commodities for the Second Treaty Period according to the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, between the USSR and Germany."

The present Protocol … comes into force immediately upon signing.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,* edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 267–268.

37. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Telegram to German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, August 24, 1939

Introduction

Despite Adolf Hitler's rejection of his earlier pleas for peace, as it seemed ever more likely that Great Britain and France would declare war on Germany over Poland, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appealed once more to the German chancellor to reach a negotiated settlement acceptable to the Western democracies. Roosevelt also sent a message to the president of Poland urging that he conclude a negotiated settlement with Germany and one to King Victor Emmanuel of Italy asking him to act as a mediator in the dispute. When President Ignacy Mościcki of Poland replied noncommitally the next day, Roosevelt was sufficiently encouraged to press negotiations once more upon Hitler, who remained unresponsive to all his suggestions.

Primary Source

In the message which I sent to you on last April 14 I stated that it appeared to me that the leaders of great nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impended, but that unless the effort were immediately made with good will on all sides to find a peaceful and constructive solution of existing controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe appears to be very near at hand indeed.

To the message which I sent to you last April I have received no reply, but because of my confident belief that the cause of world peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples everywhere may yet be averted.

I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Governments of Germany and of Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable and stipulated period, and that they agree likewise by common accord to solve the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods: first, by direct negotiation; second, by submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or, third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation, selecting as conciliator or moderator a national of one of the traditionally neutral states of Europe, or a national of one of the American republics which are all of them free from any connection with or participation in European political affairs.

Both Poland and Germany being sovereign governments, it is understood, of course, that upon resort to any one of the alternatives I suggest, each nation will agree to accord complete respect to the independence and territorial integrity of the other.

The people of the United States are as one in their opposition to policies of military conquest and domination. They are as one in rejecting the thesis that any ruler, or any people, possess the right to achieve their ends or objectives through the taking of action which will plunge countless millions of people into war and which will bring distress and suffering to every nation of the world, belligerent and neutral, when such ends and objectives, so far as

they are just and reasonable, can be satisfied through processes of peaceful negotiation or by resort to judicial arbitration.

I appeal to you in the name of the people of the United States, and I believe in the name of peace-loving men and women everywhere, to agree to the solution of the controversies existing between your Government and that of Poland through the adoption of one of the alternative methods I have proposed. I need hardly reiterate that should the Governments of Germany and of Poland be willing to solve their differences in the peaceful manner suggested, the Government of the United States still stands prepared to contribute its share to the solution of the problems which are endangering world peace in the form set forth in my message of April 14.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 476–477.

38. Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland, London, August 25, 1939

Introduction

On August 25, Great Britain and Poland signed a formal agreement of mutual assistance. In practice, the military support that Britain could provide Poland against German attack was extremely limited. The agreement nonetheless bound Britain to go to war with any power that should attack Poland, a commitment that could easily precipitate a broad European war.

Primary Source

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Polish Government:

Desiring to place on a permanent basis the collaboration between their respective countries resulting from the assurances of mutual assistance of a

defensive character which they have already exchanged:

Have resolved to conclude an Agreement for that purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Halifax, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Polish Government:

His Excellency Count Edward Raczynski, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Polish Republic in London;

Who, having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed [to the] following provisions:

ARTICLE 1.

Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.

ARTICLE 2.

(1) The provisions of Article I will also apply in the event of any action by a European Power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces.

(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of action by that Power which threatened the independence or neutrality of another European State in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Party, the provisions of Article I will apply, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other European State concerned.

ARTICLE 3.

Should a European Power attempt to undermine the independence of one of

the Contracting Parties by processes of economic penetration or in any other way, the Contracting Parties will support each other in resistance to such attempts. Should the European Power concerned thereupon embark on hostilities against one of the Contracting Parties, the provisions of Article I will apply.

ARTICLE 4.

The methods of applying the undertakings of mutual assistance provided for by the present Agreement are established between the competent naval, military and air authorities of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 5.

Without prejudice to the foregoing undertakings of the Contracting Parties to give each other mutual support and assistance immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, they will exchange complete and speedy information concerning any development which might threaten their independence and, in particular, concerning any development which threatened to call the said undertakings into operation.

ARTICLE 6.

(1) The Contracting Parties will communicate to each other the terms of any undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or may in future give to other States.
(2) Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to give such an undertaking after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the other Contracting Party shall, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be informed thereof.
(3) Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties may enter into in future shall neither limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating in these undertakings and the third State concerned.

ARTICLE 7.

Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement, they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 8.

(1) The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years.
(2) Unless denounced six months before the expiry of this period it shall continue in force, each Contracting Party having thereafter the right to denounce it at any time by giving six months' notice to that effect.
(3) The present Agreement shall come into force on signature.

Source: "The British War Bluebook: Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland, London, August 25, 1939," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk19.asp.

39. Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler, August 25, 1939

Introduction

In late August, Adolf Hitler wrote to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini explaining that he intended to invade Poland even if it meant war with Britain and France. Mussolini replied immediately, assuring Hitler of his sympathy but warning that if other powers declared war on Germany over Poland, Italy was unlikely to come to Germany's assistance.

Primary Source

FÜHRER: I am replying to your letter which has just been delivered to me by Ambassador von Mackersen.

(1) Concerning the agreement with Russia, I approve of that completely. His Excellency Marshal Göring will tell you that in the discussion which I had with him last April I stated that a rapprochement between Germany and Russia was necessary to prevent encirclement by the democracies.

(2) I consider it desirable to try to avoid a break or any deterioration in relations with Japan, since that would result in Japan's return to a position close to the democratic powers. With this in mind, I have telegraphed to Tokyo and it appears that after the first surprise of public opinion passed, a better psychological attitude prevails.

(3) The Moscow treaty blockades Rumania and can alter the position of Turkey, which accepted the English loan, but which has not yet signed the treaty of alliance. A new attitude on the part of Turkey would upset all the strategic plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(4) As regards Poland I have complete understanding for the German position and for the fact that such strained relations cannot continue permanently.

(5) As for the practical position of Italy, in case of a military collision, my point of view is as follows:

If Germany attacks Poland and the conflict remains localized, Italy will afford Germany every form of political and economic assistance which is requested.

If Germany attacks, and Poland's allies open a counterattack against Germany, I want to let you know in advance that it would be better if I did not take the initiative in military activities in view of the present situation of Italian war preparations, which we have repeatedly previously explained to you, Führer, and to Herr von Ribbentrop.

Our intervention can, therefore, take place at once if Germany delivers to us immediately the military supplies and the raw materials to resist the attack which the French and English especially would direct against us.

At our meetings the war was envisaged for after 1942 and at such time I would have been ready on land, on sea, and in the air according to the plans which had been arranged.

I am also of the opinion that the purely military preparations which have already been undertaken and the others which will be entered upon in Europe and Africa will serve to immobilize important French and British forces.

I consider it my implicit duty as a true friend to tell you the whole truth and inform you about the actual situation in advance. Not to do so might have unpleasant consequences for us all. This is my point of view and since within a short time I must summon the highest governmental bodies of the realm, I ask you to let me know yours as well.

MUSSOLINI

Source: "Letter from Mussolini to Hitler, August 25, 1939," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns058.asp.

40. Message Communicated to British Ambassador in Berlin Sir Nevile Henderson by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop, August 31, 1939, at 9:15 p.m.

Introduction

Throughout late August, negotiations between Great Britain and Germany continued, serving, if nothing else, as a convenient smoke screen for Germany's military preparations to invade Poland. On the evening of August 31, the German government informed the British government that Polish officials had refused to enter into the negotiations with Germany proposed by the British government. Germany once more stated its demands for Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Later that evening, the Polish government indicated its willingness to consider entering into direct talks with Germany, but by this time German troops had already been ordered to invade Poland.

Primary Source

His Majesty's Government informed the German Government, in a note dated the 28th August, 1939, of their readiness to offer their mediation towards direct negotiations between Germany and Poland over the problems in dispute. In so doing they made it abundantly clear that they, too, were aware of the urgent need for progress in view of the continuous incidents and the general European tension. In a reply dated the 28th August, the German Government, in spite of being sceptical as to the desire of the Polish Government to come to an understanding, declared themselves ready in the interests of peace to accept the British mediation or suggestion. After considering all the circumstances prevailing at the time, they considered it

necessary in their note to point out that, if the danger of a catastrophe was to be avoided, then action must be taken readily and without delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to the evening of the 30th August, with the proviso that the latter was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations.

Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.

Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an authorised Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilisation, and only towards 12 o'clock on the night of the 30th August, 1939, did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations.

Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government of the views of the German Government as regards possible bases of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation of the last British note precise information as to the text of the German proposals which would be regarded as a basis of negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.

The Government of the German Reich considered themselves entitled to claim that in these circumstances a Polish personage would immediately be nominated, at any rate retroactively.

For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their part continually not only to emphasise their willingness to start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while being from the Polish side merely put off with empty subterfuges and meaningless declarations.

It has once more been made clear as a result of a démarche which has meanwhile been made by the Polish Ambassador that the latter himself has no plenary powers either to enter into any discussion, or even to negotiate.

The Führer and the German Government have thus waited two days in

vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers.

In these circumstances the German Government regard their proposals as having this time too been to all intents and purposes rejected, although they consider that these proposals, in the form in which they were made known to the British Government also, were more than loyal, fair and practicable.

The Reich Government consider it timely to inform the public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated to the British Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop.

The situation existing between the German Reich and Poland is at the moment of such a kind that any further incident can lead to an explosion on the part of the military forces which have taken up their position on both sides. Any peaceful solution must be framed in such a way as to ensure that the events which lie at the root of this situation cannot be repeated on the next occasion offered, and that thus not only the East of Europe, but also other territories shall not be brought into such a state of tension. The causes of this development lie in: (1) the impossible delineation of frontiers, as fixed by the Versailles dictate; (2) the impossible treatment of the minority in the ceded territories.

In making these proposals, the Reich Government are, therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting solution which will remove the impossible situation created by frontier delineation, which may assure to both parties their vitally important line of communication, which may—as far as it is at all possible—remove the minority problem and, in so far as this is not possible, may give the minorities the assurance of a tolerable future by means of a reliable guarantee of their rights.

The Reich Government are content that in so doing it is essential that economic and physical damage done since 1918 should be exposed and repaired in its entirety. They, of course, regard this obligation as being binding for both parties.

These considerations lead to the following practical proposals:

(1) The Free City of Danzig shall return to the German Reich in view of its purely German character, as well as of the unanimous will of its population;
(2) The territory of the so-called Corridor which extends from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerder-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (inclusive) and

thence may run in a westerly direction to Schönlanke, shall itself decide as to whether it shall belong to Germany or Poland;

(3) For this purpose a plebiscite shall take place in this territory. The following shall be entitled to vote: all Germans who were either domiciled in this territory on the 1st January, 1918, or who by that date have been born there, and similarly of Poles, Kashubes, &c., domiciled in this territory on the above day (the 1st January, 1918) or born there up to that date. The Germans who have been driven from this territory shall return to it in order to exercise their vote with a view to ensuring an objective plebiscite, and also with a view to ensuring the extensive preparation necessary therefor. The above territory shall, as in the case of the Saar territory, be placed under the supervision of an international commission to be formed immediately, on which shall be represented the four Great Powers—Italy, the Soviet Union, France and England. This commission shall exercise all the rights of sovereignty in this territory. With this end in view, the territory shall be evacuated within a period of the utmost brevity, still to be agreed upon, by the Polish armed forces, the Polish police, and the Polish authorities;

(4) The Polish port of Gdynia, which fundamentally constitutes Polish sovereign territory so far as it is confined territorially to the Polish settlement, shall be excluded from the above territory. The exact frontiers of this Polish port should be determined between Germany and Poland, and, if necessary, delimited by an international committee of arbitration;

(5) With a view to assuring the necessary time for the execution of the extensive work involved in the carrying out of a just plebiscite, this plebiscite shall not take place before the expiry of twelve months;

(6) In order to guarantee unrestricted communication between Germany and East Prussia and between Poland and the sea during this period, roads and railways shall be established to render free transit traffic possible. In this connexion only such taxes as are necessary for the maintenance of the means of communication and for the provision of transport may be levied;

(7) The question as to the party to which the area belongs is to be decided by simple majority of the votes recorded;

(8) In order to guarantee to Germany free communication with her province

of Danzig-East Prussia, and to Poland her connexion with the sea after the execution of the plebiscite—regardless of the results thereof—Germany shall, in the event of the plebiscite area going to Poland, receive an extra-territorial traffic zone, approximately in a line from Butow to Danzig or Dirschau, in which to lay down an autobahn and a 4-track railway line. The road and the railway shall be so constructed that the Polish lines of communication are not affected, i.e., they shall pass either over or under the latter. The breadth of this zone shall be fixed at 1 kilometre, and it is to be German sovereign territory. Should the plebiscite be favourable to Germany, Poland is to obtain rights, analogous to those accorded to Germany, to a similar extra-territorial communication by road and railway for the purpose of free and unrestricted communication with her port of Gdynia;

(9) In the event of the Corridor returning to the German Reich, the latter declares its right to proceed to an exchange of population with Poland to the extent to which the nature of the Corridor lends itself thereto;

(10) Any special rights desired by Poland in the port of Danzig would be negotiated on a basis of territory against similar rights to be granted to Germany in the port of Gdynia;

(11) In order to remove any feeling in this area that either side was being threatened, Danzig and Gdynia would have the character of exclusively mercantile towns, that is to say, without military installations and military fortifications;

(12) The peninsula of Hela, which as a result of the plebiscite might go either to Poland or to Germany, would in either case have similarly to be demilitarised;

(13) Since the Government of the German Reich has the most vehement complaints to make against the Polish treatment of minorities, and since the Polish Government for their part feel obliged to make complaints against Germany, both parties declare their agreement to have these complaints laid before an international committee of enquiry, whose task would be to examine all complaints as regards economic or physical damage, and any other acts of terrorism. Germany and Poland undertake to make good economic or other damage done to minorities on either side since the year 1918, or to cancel expropriation as the case may be,

or to provide complete compensation to the persons affected for this and any other encroachments on their economic life;

(14) In order to free the Germans who may be left in Poland and the Poles who may be left in Germany from the feeling of being outlawed by all nations, and in order to render them secure against being called upon to perform actions or to render services incompatible with their national sentiments, Germany and Poland agree to guarantee the rights of both minorities by means of the most comprehensive and binding agreement, in order to guarantee to these minorities the preservation, the free development and practical application of their nationality (Volkstum), and in particular to permit for this purpose such organisation as they may consider necessary. Both parties undertake not to call upon members of the minority for military service;

(15) In the event of agreement on the basis of these proposals, Germany and Poland declare themselves ready to decree and to carry out the immediate demobilisation of their armed forces;

(16) The further measures necessary for the more rapid execution of the above arrangement shall be agreed upon by both Germany and Poland conjointly.

Source: "The British War Bluebook: Message Which Was Communicated to H.M. Ambassador in Berlin by the State Secretary on August 31, 1939, at 9:15 p.m.," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk98.asp.

41. Clare Hollingworth, The German Invasion of Poland, August 30–September 1, 1939

Introduction

On August 30, 1939, Clare Hollingworth, who began working for the British newspaper the *Daily Telegraph*, beginning what would become a renowned career as a war correspondent, was staying with friends in Katowice, Poland, on the border with Germany. War was generally considered imminent. She decided to cross the frontier into Germany, borrowing the British consul's official car for the purpose. During this brief day trip Hollingworth saw

German tanks massed on the border in readiness to attack Poland, and one night later after she had returned to Katowice, the invasion began. Hollingworth became the first reporter to file a dispatch on the outbreak of the European war. In a book published in 1940, she described at greater length these events and her experiences.

Primary Source

Clare Hollingworth on the German Invasion of Poland: Excerpts from *The Three Weeks' War in Poland* (1940)

Since all British correspondents had been expelled from Berlin some days before, I decided to have a look round in German Silesia. Katowice was too quiet for news. I crossed the frontier at Beuthen without trouble. (Though news of my crossing so upset the Polish Foreign Office that the British Embassy were required to vouch for me.) The German frontier town was nearly deserted. It was open to enfilading fire from Polish batteries, and the Germans evidently thought it prudent to evacuate civilians. Those who remained looked depressed and unhappy. I spoke to old acquaintances and found increased trust in Hitler, even among those who had been critical—but, linked with this, a refusal to believe in war.

"It won't come to that, liebes Fraülein, don't you worry. The Führer will get Germany her rights without war this time, just as he did before."

They told me stories of the "atrocities" committed by Poland against her German minority, and asked me if I had seen such things. I had not.

"Ah, you don't see them, but they happen every day. Why do you suppose our people come across the frontier to escape the Poles?" Then I learned an interesting thing. German "refugees" from Poland were not being allowed into the Reich. They were being kept for use on the frontier. We were to hear much of them before the end of the war.

I found a noticeable shortage of supplies in Beuthen. There was no soap for foreigners, while even for Germans it was strictly rationed. Aspirin itself, the German product par excellence, was unobtainable. A friendly butcher showed the meat ration, the weekly allowance for a family with two children; it was enough for three meals, I reckoned, and your German is no vegetarian. The family's tea ration would have made a good "mash" (as they say in the

Midlands) for six English tea-drinkers; and the coffee, which tasted like burnt toast, and *was* burnt maize, could perhaps serve twelve. Oils and fats could be bought with a special permit only. Butter, cream and milk had been unobtainable for five weeks. I found it impossible to get meals in restaurants, and should have gone hungry, had not a waiter, well tipped in the past, produced a partridge from nowhere. What kind of victualling is this, I wondered, on which to begin a major war?

I drove along the fortified frontier road via Hindenburg (which in the nineteen-twenties the townsfolk voted to call "Leninburg") to Gleiwitz, which had become a military town. On the road were parties of motor-cycle despatch-riders, bunched together and riding hard. As we came over the little ridge into the town, sixty-five of them burst past us, each about ten yards behind the other. From the road I could see bodies of troops, and at the roadside hundreds of tanks, armoured cars and field guns stood or moved off toward the frontier. Here and there were screens of canvas or planking, concealing the big guns; they seemed not to be camouflaged against air-attack. I guessed that the German Command was preparing to strike to the north of Katowice and its fortified lines: the advance which was to reach Czestochowa in two days of war.

In the middle of all this I bought odd things—wine, electric torches—and drove back peacefully. Now and then a trooper would spot the Union Jack on my car and give a sudden, astonished gape. As we reached a length of road which lies parallel with the frontier, I looked across a hollow, some wire and tank-barricades, and watched the peasant-women moving about the Polish fields, a few hundred yards away. In the evening I returned to Poland, without trouble, the feverish preparations of the German military uppermost in my mind.

[*The next day, Hollingworth learned that in her absence the Polish authorities had uncovered and, so they believed, squelched various plots by German-Polish nationals, activities in which the German Consul was openly implicated, a fact that "showed me again that we stood on the edge of war." She nonetheless retired to bed, but was awoken in the early hours of September 1, 1939.*]

Slam! Slam! … a noise like doors banging. I woke up. It could not be later than five in the morning. Next, the roar of airplanes and more doors banging. Running to the window I could pick out the planes, riding high, with

the guns blowing smoke-rings below them. There was a long flash into the town park, another, another. Incendiary bombs? I wondered. As I opened my door I ran against the friends with whom I was staying, in their dressing-gowns.

"What is all this about?"

"We aren't sure. A big air-raid practice was announced for to-day. Or it may be something more. We are trying to reach Zoltaszek" (my old friend the Chief of Police). Just then the Polish maid appeared.

"Only Mrs. Zoltaszek is at home."

"Then ask her what's going on. Is this an air-raid practice? What does she know?" they pressed the girl. She spoke into the telephone for a moment and then turned, her eyes wide open.

"She … she says it's the beginning of war!…"

I grabbed the telephone, reached the *Telegraph* correspondent in Warsaw and told him my news. I heard later that he rang straight through to the Polish Foreign Office, who had had no word of the attack. The *Telegraph* was not only the first paper to hear that Poland was at war—it had, too, the odd privilege of informing the Polish Government itself.

I had arranged for a car to come on the first hint of alarm, but it did not arrive. We stood, drank coffee, walked about the rooms and waited; I was alternately cursing my driver and wondering whether the *Telegraph* would produce a Special Edition for my news. The war, as a tragic disaster, was not yet a reality. When my driver came at last, he met my fury with a pitying smile.

"It's only an air-raid practice," he said.

We ran down to the British Consulate, which I knew well. On our way I noticed smiles on the faces turned up to the sky. "Well," they seemed to be saying, "so this is the air-raid practice."

"But of course it's an air-raid practice, Herr Konsul," the Secretary of the Consulate was saying as I arrived. My own reaction, for the moment, was actual fear: fear that I had made the *gaffe* of my life by reporting a non-existent war.

However, official confirmation of the war came soon enough. At once the Secretary—one of the German minority, who had worked at the Consulate since its opening in 1920—burst into tears.

"This is the end of poor Germany," she wept.

Just then my sympathy with “poor Germany” was not all that it might have been.

Everyone at the Consulate was working furiously. Papers were being stuffed into the big, old-fashioned stoves until ashes fluffed under one’s feet. The Consul was whipping round by telephone to ensure the departure of those British subjects who remained.

Source: Clare Hollingworth, *The Three Weeks’ War in Poland* (London: Duckworth, 1940), 11–17. Courtesy Clare Hollingworth.

42. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Speech in the British House of Commons, September 1, 1939

Introduction

British diplomats soon learned of the German invasion of Poland on the night of August 31–September 1, 1939. On the morning of September 1, the British and French governments delivered an ultimatum to Germany stating that if German troops were not withdrawn within 48 hours, they would both declare war on Germany. Neville Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons, giving an account of the negotiations of the previous days, which made it clear that Hitler had throughout intended war with Poland.

Primary Source

…Only last night the Polish Ambassador did see the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Ribbentrop. Once again he expressed to him what, indeed, the Polish Government had already said publicly, that they were willing to negotiate with Germany about their disputes on an equal basis. What was the reply of the German Government? The reply was that without another word the German troops crossed the Polish frontier this morning at dawn and are since reported to be bombing open towns. [An Hon. Member: “Gas?”] In these circumstances there is only one course open to us. His

Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin and the French Ambassador have been instructed to hand to the German Government the following document:

"Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German Army which indicated clearly that he was about to attack Poland. Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding. In these circumstances it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the German Government have created conditions, namely, an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland, which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance. I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland."

[An Hon. Member: "Time limit?"] If a reply to this last warning is unfavourable, and I do not suggest that it is likely to be otherwise, His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to ask for his passports. In that case we are ready. Yesterday, we took further steps towards the completion of our defensive preparations. This morning we ordered complete mobilisation of the whole of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force. We have also taken a number of other measures, both at home and abroad, which the House will not perhaps expect me to specify in detail. Briefly, they represent the final steps in accordance with prearranged plans. These last can be put into force rapidly, and are of such a nature that they can be deferred until war seems inevitable. Steps have also been taken under the powers conferred by the House last week to safeguard the position in regard to stocks of commodities of various kinds.

…As regards the immediate man-power requirements, the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force are in the fortunate position of having almost as many men as they can conveniently handle at this moment. There are, however, certain categories of service in which men are immediately

required, both for Military and Civil Defence. These will be announced in detail through the Press and the B.B.C. …

So much for the immediate present. Now we must look to the future. It is essential in the face of the tremendous task which confronts us, more especially in view of our past experiences in this matter, to organise our man-power this time upon as methodical, equitable and economical a basis as possible. We, therefore, propose immediately to introduce legislation directed to that end. A Bill will be laid before you which for all practical purposes will amount to an expansion of the Military Training Act. Under its operation all fit men between the ages of 18 and 41 will be rendered liable to military service if and when called upon. It is not intended at the outset that any considerable number of men other than those already liable shall be called up, and steps will be taken to ensure that the man-power essentially required by industry shall not be taken away. …

It now only remains for us to set our teeth and to enter upon this struggle, which we ourselves earnestly endeavoured to avoid, with determination to see it through to the end. We shall enter it with a clear conscience, with the support of the Dominions and the British Empire, and the moral approval of the greater part of the world. We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi Government. As long as that Government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years, there will be no peace in Europe. We shall merely pass from one crisis to another, and see one country after another attacked by methods which have now become familiar to us in their sickening technique. We are resolved that these methods must come to an end. If out of the struggle we again re-establish in the world the rules of good faith and the renunciation of force, why, then even the sacrifices that will be entailed upon us will find their fullest justification.

Source: "The British War Bluebook: Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on September 1, 1939," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk105.asp.

43. Telegram from the British Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador at Berlin,

September 3, 1939, 5:00 a.m.

Introduction

Early on the morning of September 3, 1939, the British foreign secretary dispatched what was effectively an ultimatum to Germany. It stated that unless Germany ceased its military operations against Poland by 11:00 a.m. that day, Great Britain would consider itself at war with Germany.

Primary Source

Please seek interview with [German] Minister for Foreign Affairs at 9 a.m. today, Sunday, or, if he cannot see you then, arrange to convey at that time to representative of German Government the following communication:

"In the communication which I had the honour to make to you on 1st September I informed you, on the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, unless the German Government were prepared to give His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against Poland and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish Territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would, without hesitation, fulfill their obligations to Poland.

"Although this communication was made more than twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honour to inform you that, unless not later than 11 a.m., British Summer Time, today 3rd September, satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government and have reached His Majesty's Government in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from that hour."

If the assurance referred to in the above communication is received, you should inform me by any means at your disposal before 11 a.m. today 3rd September. If no such assurance is received here by 11 a.m., we shall inform the German representative that a state of war exists as from that hour.

Source: "The British War Bluebook: Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin). Foreign Office, September 3, 1939, 5 a.m.," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk118.asp.

44. German Reply to the British Ultimatum, September 3, 1939, 11:20 a.m.

Introduction

Twenty minutes after the deadline of the British ultimatum expired, the German government issued its reply. As was anticipated, Germany refused to alter its policy toward Poland, which effectively meant that the two countries would shortly be at war.

Primary Source

The German Government have received the British Government's ultimatum of the 3rd September, 1939. They have the honour to reply as follows:

The German Government and the German people refuse to receive, accept, let alone to fulfill, demands in the nature of ultimata made by the British Government.

On our eastern frontier there has for many months already reigned a condition of war. Since the time when the Versailles Treaty first tore Germany to pieces, all and every peaceful settlement was refused to all German Governments. The National Socialist Government also has since the year 1933 tried again and again to remove by peaceful negotiations the worst rapes and breaches of justice of this treaty. The British Government have been among those who, by their intransigent attitude, took the chief part in frustrating every practical revision. Without the intervention of the British Government—of this the German Government and the German people are fully conscious—a reasonable solution doing justice to both sides would certainly have been found between Germany and Poland. For Germany did not have the intention nor had she raised the demands of annihilating Poland. The Reich demanded only the revision of those articles of the Versailles Treaty which already at the time of the formulation of that dictate had been described by understanding statesmen of all nations as being in the long run unbearable, and therefore impossible for a great nation and also for the entire political and economic interests of Eastern Europe. British statesmen, too, declared the solution in the East which was then forced upon Germany as containing the germ of future wars. To remove this danger was the desire of

all German Governments and especially the intention of the new National Socialist People's Government. The blame for having prevented this peaceful revision lies with the British Cabinet policy.

The British Government have—an occurrence unique in history—given the Polish State full powers for all actions against Germany which that State might conceivably intend to undertake. The British Government assured the Polish Government of their military support in all circumstances, should Germany defend herself against any provocation or attack. Thereupon the Polish terror against the Germans living in the territories which had been torn from Germany immediately assumed unbearable proportions. The Free City of Danzig was, in violation of all legal provisions, first threatened with destruction economically and by measures of customs policy, and was finally subjected to a military blockade and its communications strangled. All these violations of the Danzig Statute, which were well known to the British Government, were approved and covered by the blank cheque given to Poland. The German Government, though moved by the sufferings of the German population which was being tortured and treated in an inhuman manner, nevertheless remained a patient onlooker for five months, without undertaking even on one single occasion any similar aggressive action against Poland. They only warned Poland that these happenings would in the long run be unbearable, and that they were determined, in the event of no other kind of assistance being given to this population, to help them themselves. All these happenings were known in every detail to the British Government. It would have been easy for them to use their great influence in Warsaw in order to exhort those in power there to exercise justice and humaneness and to keep to the existing obligations. The British Government did not do this. … The British Government, therefore, bear the responsibility for all the unhappiness and misery which have now overtaken and are about to overtake many peoples.

After all efforts at finding and concluding a peaceful solution had been rendered impossible by the intransigence of the Polish Government covered as they were by England, after the conditions resembling civil war, which had existed already for months at the eastern frontier of the Reich, had gradually developed into open attacks on German territory, without the British Government raising any objections, the German Government determined to put an end to this continual threat, unbearable for a great Power, to the

external and finally also to the internal peace of the German people, and to end it by those means which, since the Democratic Governments had in effect sabotaged all other possibilities of revision, alone remained at their disposal for the defence of the peace, security and honour of the Germans. The last attacks of the Poles threatening Reich territory they answered with similar measures. The German Government does not intend, on account of any sort of British intentions or obligations in the East, to tolerate conditions which are identical with those conditions which we observe in Palestine which is under British protection. The German people, however, above all do not intend to allow themselves to be ill-treated by the Poles.

The German Government, therefore, reject the attempt to force Germany, by means of a demand, having the character of an ultimatum, to recall its forces which are lined up for the defence of the Reich, and thereby to accept the old unrest and the old injustice. The threat that, failing this, they will fight Germany in the war, corresponds to the intention proclaimed for years past by numerous British politicians. The German Government and the German people have assured the English people countless times how much they desire an understanding, indeed close friendship, with them. If the British Government hitherto always refused these offers and now answer them with an open threat of war, it is not the fault of the German people and of their Government, but exclusively the fault of the British Cabinet or of those men who for years have been preaching the destruction and extermination of the German people. The German people and their Government do not, like Great Britain, intend to dominate the world, but they are determined to defend their own liberty, their independence, and above all their life. The intention … of carrying the destruction of the German people even further than was done through the Versailles Treaty is taken note of by us, and we shall therefore answer any aggressive action on the part of England with the same weapons and in the same form.

Source: "The British War Bluebook: Memorandum Handed to Sir N. Henderson at 11:20 a.m. on September 3, 1939, by Herr von Ribbentrop," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk119.asp.

45. French Premier Édouard Daladier, Statement to the Nation, September 3, 1939

Introduction

On September 3, 1939, French prime minister Édouard Daladier announced to his countrymen that Germany had ignored a last-minute appeal from France and Britain to withdraw from Poland. France and Britain were therefore at war with Germany.

Primary Source

Men and Women of France.

Since daybreak on September 1, Poland has been the victim of the most brutal and most cynical of aggression. Her frontiers have been violated. Her cities are being bombed. Her army is heroically resisting the invader.

The responsibility for the blood that is being shed falls entirely upon the Hitler Government. The fate of peace is in Hitler's hands. He chose war.

France and England have made countless efforts to safeguard peace. This very morning they made a further urgent intervention in Berlin in order to address to the German Government a last appeal to reason and request it to stop hostilities and to open peaceful negotiations.

Germany met us with a refusal. She had already refused to reply to all the men of goodwill who recently raised their voices in favor of the peace of the world.

She therefore desires the destruction of Poland, so as to be able to dominate Europe quickly and to enslave France.

In rising against the most frightful of tyrannies, in honoring our word, we fight to defend our soil, our homes, our liberties.

I am conscious of having worked unremittingly against the war until the last minute.

I greet with emotion and affection our young soldiers, who now go forth to perform the sacred task which we ourselves did perform before them. They can have full confidence in their chiefs, who are worthy of those who have previously led France to victory.

The cause of France is identical with that of Righteousness. It is the cause of all peaceful and free nations. It will be victorious.

Men and Women of France!

We are waging war because it has been thrust on us. Every one of us is at his post, on the soil of France, on that land of liberty where respect of human dignity finds one of its last refuges. You will all co-operate, with a profound feeling of union and brotherhood, for the salvation of the country.

Vive la France!

Source: "Statement by Edouard Daladier, Premier, to the Nation, September 3, 1939," The Avalon Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/fr3.htm.

46. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address, September 3, 1939

Introduction

As war began in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed the American people. He stated that he hoped to preserve peace in the United States and that within a few days the government would issue an official proclamation of neutrality. He pointedly stated that he would not, however, ask Americans to remain neutral in their thoughts, an indication of where his own sympathies and those of most of his countrymen lay.

Primary Source

Tonight my single duty is to speak to the whole of America.

Until 4:30 this morning I had hoped against hope that some miracle would prevent a devastating war in Europe and bring to an end the invasion of Poland by Germany.

For 4 long years a succession of actual wars and constant crises have shaken the entire world and have threatened in each case to bring on the gigantic conflict which is today unhappily a fact.

It is right that I should recall to your minds the consistent and at times successful efforts of your Government in these crises to throw the full weight of the United States into the cause of peace. In spite of spreading wars I think that we have every right and every reason to maintain as a national policy the fundamental moralities, the teachings of religion, and the continuation of efforts to restore peace—for some day, though the time may be distant, we can be of even greater help to a crippled humanity.

It is right, too, to point out that the unfortunate events of these recent years have been based on the use of force or the threat of force. And it seems to me clear, even at the outbreak of this great war, that the influence of America should be consistent in seeking for humanity a final peace which will eliminate, as far as it is possible to do so, the continued use of force between nations. …

You must master at the outset a simple but unalterable fact in modern foreign relations. When peace has been broken anywhere, peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.

It is easy for you and me to shrug our shoulders and say that conflicts taking place thousands of miles from the continental United States, and, indeed, the whole American hemisphere, do not seriously affect the Americas—and that all the United States has to do is to ignore them and go about our own business. Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought does affect the American future.

Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields. At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of American neutrality. This would have been done even if there had been no neutrality statute on the books, for this proclamation is in accordance with international law and with American policy.

This will be followed by a proclamation required by the existing Neutrality Act. I trust that in the days to come our neutrality can be made a true neutrality. It is of the utmost importance that the people of this country, with the best information in the world, think things through. The most dangerous enemies of American peace are those who, without well-rounded information on the whole broad subject of the past, the present, and the future, undertake to speak with authority, to talk in terms of glittering generalities, to give to the Nation assurances or prophecies which are of little present or future value. …

I cannot prophesy the immediate economic effect of this new war on our Nation, but I do say that no American has the moral right to profiteer at the expense either of his fellow citizens or of the men, women, and children who are living and dying in the midst of war in Europe.

Some things we do know. Most of us in the United States believe in spiritual values. Most of us, regardless of what church we belong to, believe in the spirit of the New Testament—a great teaching which opposes itself to the use of force, of armed force, of marching armies, and falling bombs. The overwhelming masses of our people seek peace—peace at home, and the kind of peace in other lands which will not jeopardize peace at home.

We have certain ideas and ideals of national safety, and we must act to preserve that safety today and to preserve the safety of our children in future

years.

That safety is and will be bound up with the safety of the Western Hemisphere and of the seas adjacent thereto. We seek to keep war from our firesides by keeping war from coming to the Americas. For that we have historic precedent that goes back to the days of the administration of President George Washington. It is serious enough and tragic enough to every American family in every State in the Union to live in a world that is torn by wars on other continents. Today they affect every American home. It is our national duty to use every effort to keep them out of the Americas.

And at this time let me make the simple plea that partisanship and selfishness be adjourned, and that national unity be the thought that underlies all others.

This Nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take account of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience.

I have said not once but many times that I have seen war and that I hate war. I say that again and again.

I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurances that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end.

As long as it remains within my power to prevent, there will be no blackout of peace in the United States.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 483–485.

47. Statement Issued by the Indian Congress Working Committee, September 15, 1939

Introduction

The outbreak of World War II gave new impetus to anticolonial movements. Speaking for India, its greatest imperial possession, in September 1939, the British government declared that India was at war with the Axis powers.

Within India, the nationalist Indian Congress movement publicly announced that it was strongly opposed to fascism and Nazism but deplored Britain's presumption in dictating India's policy on the war. Under the leadership of the Oxford-educated barrister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress Working Committee deftly positioned itself so that it could demand an end to British imperialism as the price for its support for the Allied cause.

Primary Source

The working committee has given its earnest consideration to the grave crisis that has developed owing to the declaration of war in Europe. The principles which should guide the nation in the event of war have been repeatedly laid down by the Congress, and only a month ago this Committee reiterated them and expressed its displeasure at the flouting of Indian opinion by the British Government in India.

As a first step to dissociate itself from this policy of the British Government, the Committee called upon the Congress members of the Central Legislative Assembly to refrain from attending the next session. Since then the British Government has declared India a belligerent country and promulgated ordinances, passed the Government of India Act amending Bill, and taken other far-reaching measures which affect the Indian people vitally, and circumscribe and limit the powers and activities of the Provincial Governments. This has been done without the consent of the Indian people, whose declared wishes, in such matters, have been deliberately ignored by the British Government. The Working Committee must take the gravest view of these developments.

The Congress has repeatedly declared its entire disapproval of the ideology and practice of fascism and nazi-ism and their glorification of war and violence and the suppression of the human spirit. It has condemned aggression, in which they repeatedly indulged, and their sweeping away of well-established principles and recognized standards of civilized behavior. It has seen in fascism and Nazi-ism the intensification of the principle of imperialism, against which the Indian people have struggled for many years. The Working Committee must therefore unhesitatingly condemn the

aggression of the Nazi Government in Germany against Poland and sympathize with those who resist.

The Congress has further laid down that the issue of war and peace for India must be decided by the Indian people, and no outside authority can impose this decision upon them, nor can the Indian people permit their resources to be exploited for imperialist ends. Any imposed decision, or an attempt to use Indian resources, for purposes not approved by them, will necessarily have to be opposed by them. If co-operation is desired in a worthy cause, this cannot be obtained by compulsion and imposition, and the Committee cannot agree to the carrying out by the Indian people of orders issued by an external authority. Co-operation must be between equals by mutual consent for a cause which both consider to be worthy.

The people of India have in the recent past faced great risks and willingly made great sacrifices to secure their own freedom and establish a free and democratic state in India, and their sympathy is entirely on the side of democracy and freedom; but India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom, when that very freedom is denied her, and such limited freedom as she possesses is taken away from her.

The Committee is aware that the Governments of Great Britain and France have declared that they are fighting for democracy and freedom and to put an end to aggression; but the history of the recent past is full of examples showing constant divergence between the spoken word, the ideals proclaimed, and the real motives and objectives. During the war of 1914–18, the declared war aims were the preservation of democracy, self-determination and freedom of small nations; and yet the very Governments which solemnly proclaimed these aims entered into secret treaties embodying imperialist designs for the carving out of an Ottoman empire.

While stating that they did not want any acquisition of territory, the victorious Powers added largely to their colonial domains. The present European war itself signifies an abject failure of the Treaty of Versailles and of its makers, who broke their pledged word and imposed an imperialist peace on the defeated nations. The one hopeful outcome of that Treaty, the

League of Nations, was muzzled and strangled at the outset and later on killed by its parent States.

Subsequent history demonstrated afresh how even a seemingly fervent declaration of faith may be followed by an ignoble desertion. In Manchuria the British Government connived at aggression; in Abyssinia they acquiesced in it; in Czechoslovakia and Spain, where democracy was in peril, it was deliberately betrayed, and the whole system of collective security was sabotaged by the very Powers who had previously declared their firm faith in it.

Again it is asserted that democracy is in danger and must be defended, and with this statement the Committee is in entire agreement. The Committee believes that the peoples in the West are moved by this ideal and objective, and for these they are prepared to make sacrifices; but again and again the ideals and sentiments of the people and of those who have sacrificed themselves in the struggle have been ignored and faith has not been kept with them.

If the war is to defend the *status quo*, imperialist possessions, colonies, vested interests, and privilege, then India can have nothing to do with it. If, however, the issue is democracy and a world order based on democracy, then India is intensely interested in it. The Committee is convinced that the interests of Indian democracy do not conflict with the interests of British democracy or world democracy. But there is an inherent and ineradicable conflict between democracy for India, or elsewhere, and imperialism and fascism. If Great Britain fights for the maintenance and extension of democracy, then she must necessarily end imperialism in her own possessions and establish full democracy in India, and the Indian people must have the right of self-determination to frame their own constitution through a Constituent Assembly without external interference, and must guide their own policy. A free and democratic India will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defense against aggression and for economic co-operation. She will work for the establishment of a real world order based on freedom and democracy, utilizing the world’s knowledge and resources for the progress and advancement of humanity.

The crisis that has overtaken Europe is not of Europe only, but of humanity, and will not pass, like other crises or wars, leaving the essential structure of the present-day world intact. It is likely to refashion the world for good; for politically, socially, and economically this crisis is an inevitable consequence of the social and political conflicts and contradictions which have grown alarmingly since the last Great War, and it will not be finally resolved till these conflicts and contradictions are removed and a new equilibrium established. That equilibrium can be based only on the ending of the domination and exploitation of one country by another, and on the reorganization of economic relations on a juster basis for the common good of all. India is the crux of the problem, for India has been an outstanding example of modern imperialism, and no refashioning of the world can succeed which ignores this vital problem. With her vast resources she must play an important part in any scheme of world reorganization. But she can only do so as a free nation whose energies have been released to work for this great end. Freedom today is indivisible, and every attempt to retain imperialist domination in any part of the world will lead inevitably to a fresh disaster.

The Working Committee has noted that many rulers of Indian states have offered their services and resources, and expressed their desire to support the cause of democracy in Europe. If they must make their professions in favor of democracy abroad, the Committee suggests that their first concern should be the introduction of democracy within their own states, in which today undiluted autocracy reigns. The British Government in India is more responsible for this autocracy than even rulers themselves, as has been made painfully evident during the past year. This policy is the very negation of democracy and of the new world order for which Great Britain claims to be fighting in Europe.

As the Committee views past events in Europe, Africa, and Asia, and more particularly the past and present occurrences in India, it fails to find any attempt to advance the cause of democracy, self-determination, or any evidence that the present war declarations of the British Government are being, or are going to be, acted upon. The true measure of democracy is the ending of imperialism and fascism alike and the aggression that has

accompanied them in the past and the present. Only on that basis can the new order be built up.

In the struggle for that new world order, the Committee is eager and desirous to help in every way; but the Committee cannot associate itself, or offer any co-operation in a war which is conducted on imperialist lines, and which is a means to consolidate imperialism in India and elsewhere.

In view, however, of the gravity of the occasion, and the fact that the pace of events during the last few days has often been swifter than the working of men's minds, the Committee desires to take no final decision at this stage, so as to allow for a full elucidation of the issues at stake, the real objectives aimed at, and the position of India in the present and in the future. But a decision cannot long be delayed, as India is being committed from day to day to a policy to which she is not a party, and of which she disapproves. The Working Committee, therefore, invites the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged, in particular how these aims are going to apply to India and to be given effect to at present. Do they include the elimination of imperialism and the treatment of India as a free nation whose policy will be guided in accordance with the wishes of her people? A clear declaration about the future pledging the Government to the ending of imperialism and fascism alike, will be welcomed by the people of all countries; but it is far more important to give immediate effect to it to the largest possible extent, for only this will convince the people that the declaration is meant to be honored. The real test of any declaration is its application in the present, for it is the present that will govern action today and will give shape to the future.

War has broken out in Europe, and the prospect is terrible to contemplate. But war has been taking its heavy toll of human life during the past years in Abyssinia, Spain, and China. Innumerable innocent men, women, and children have been bombed to death from the air in open cities. Cold-blooded massacres and torture to the utmost humiliation have followed each other in quick succession during these years of horror. That horror grows; violence and the threat of violence shadow the world, and, unless checked and ended,

will destroy the previous inheritance of past ages. That horror has to be checked in Europe and China, but it will not end till its root causes, fascism and imperialism, are removed. To that end, the Working Committee is prepared to give its co-operation; but it will be infinite tragedy if even this terrible war is carried on in the spirit of imperialism and for the purpose of retaining this structure which is itself the cause of war and human degradation.

The Working Committee wishes to declare that the Indian people have no quarrel with the German people, or the Japanese people, or any other people; but they have a deep-rooted quarrel with the systems which deny freedom and are based on violence and aggression. They do not look forward to the victory of one people over another, or to a dictated peace, but a victory of real democracy for all people in all countries, and a world freed from the nightmare of violence and imperialistic oppression.

The Committee earnestly appeals to the Indian people to end all internal conflict and controversy at this grave hour of peril, and keep in readiness and hold together as a united nation, calm of purpose, and determined to achieve freedom for India within the larger freedom of the world.

Source: Jawaharlal Nehru, *Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru* (New York: John Day, 1941), 431–436.

48. Declaration of the Governments of the German Reich and the Soviet Union, September 28, 1939

Introduction

After defeating Poland and dividing its territory between them, the German and Soviet governments appealed to Britain and France to end the war, a course that would have left Germany and the Soviet Union in undisturbed enjoyment of their new acquisitions.

Primary Source

After the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. have, by means of the treaty signed today, definitively settled the problems arising from the collapse of the Polish state and have thereby created a sure foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe, they mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interest of all peoples to put an end to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments will therefore direct their common efforts, jointly with other friendly powers if occasion arises, toward attaining this goal as soon as possible.

Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war, the Governments of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. shall engage in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures.

Source: "Declaration of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. of September 28, 1939," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/dec939.asp.

49. The Declaration of Panama, Adopted at the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Panama, October 3, 1939

Introduction

One month after war began in Europe, representatives of all the various American states met in Panama. The United States was instrumental in the passage of a resolution that imposed a "hemisphere defense zone" around both American continents stretching several hundred miles into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Only Canadian waters were excluded. Although all belligerents were supposedly banned from undertaking hostilities within this zone, in practice its intention was to prevent German naval operations in the

area. The enforcement of this zone would depend largely upon the U.S. Navy.

Primary Source

The governments of the American republics meeting at Panamá, have solemnly ratified their neutral status in the conflict which is disrupting the peace of Europe, but the present war may lead to unexpected results which may affect the fundamental interests of America and there can be no justification for the interests of the belligerents to prevail over the rights of neutrals causing disturbances and suffering to nations which by their neutrality in the conflict and their distance from the scene of events, should not be burdened with its fatal and painful consequences.

During the World War of 1914–1918 the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru advanced, or supported, individual proposals providing in principle a declaration by the American republics that the belligerent nations must refrain from committing hostile acts within a reasonable distance from their shores.

The nature of the present conflagration, in spite of its already lamentable proportions, would not justify any obstruction to inter-American communications which, engendered by important interests, call for adequate protection. This fact requires the demarcation of a zone of security including all the normal maritime routes of communication and trade between the countries of America.

To this end it is essential as a measure of necessity to adopt immediately provisions based on the above-mentioned precedents for the safeguarding of such interests, in order to avoid a repetition of the damages and sufferings sustained by the American nations and by their citizens in the war of 1914–1918.

There is no doubt that the governments of the American republics must foresee those dangers and as a measure of self-protection insist that the waters to a reasonable distance from their coasts shall remain free from the commission of hostile acts or from the undertaking of belligerent activities by nations engaged in a war in which the said governments are not involved.

For these reasons the governments of the American republics

RESOLVE AND HEREBY DECLARE

As a measure of continental self-protection, the American republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American Continent, which they regard as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea, or air.

Such waters shall be defined as follows. All waters comprised within the limits set forth hereafter except the territorial waters of Canada and of the undisputed colonies and possessions of European countries within these limits. … [details omitted]

The governments of the American republics agree that they will endeavor, through joint representation to such belligerents as may now or in the future be engaged in hostilities, to secure the compliance by them with the provisions of this declaration, without prejudice to the exercise of the individual rights of each state inherent in their sovereignty.

The governments of the American republics further declare that whenever they consider it necessary they will consult together to determine upon the measures which they may individually or collectively undertake in order to secure the observance of the provisions of this declaration.

The American republics, during the existence of a state of war in which they themselves are not involved, may undertake, whenever they may determine that the need therefore exists, to patrol, either individually or collectively, as may be agreed upon by common consent, and in so far as the means and resources of each may permit, the waters adjacent to their coasts within the area above defined.

Source: United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: The American Republics*, Vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 36–37.

50. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Albert Einstein, October 19, 1939

Introduction

Six weeks after war began in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt replied affirmatively to Albert Einstein's earlier suggestion that the United States should mount a major initiative to develop atomic weapons. From this seed would grow the Manhattan Project and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Primary Source

I want to thank you for your recent letter and the most interesting and important enclosure.

I found this data of such import that I have convened a Board consisting of the head of the Bureau of Standards and a chosen representative of the Army and Navy to thoroughly investigate the possibilities of your suggestion regarding the element of uranium.

I am glad to say that Dr. Sachs will cooperate and work with this Committee and I feel this is the most practical and effective method of dealing with the subject.

Please accept my sincere thanks.

Source: "FDR—Albert Einstein—10/19/39," Box 5, Sachs, Alexander folder, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Marist College, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box5/a64e01.html.

51. Heinrich Himmler, Order to the Members of the German SS and Police, October 28, 1939

Introduction

National Socialist racial theory urged all "Aryan" men to father as many children as possible to carry on the race. At the beginning of the war Heinrich Himmler, head of the German SS and Police, directed all members of those two organizations to father as many children as possible, whether legitimate or not. He was concerned that otherwise they might die in battle with no offspring to perpetuate their genetic heritage.

Primary Source

To all men of the SS and Police

The old proverb that only he can die in peace who has sons and children must again hold good in this war, particularly for the SS. He can die in peace who knows that his clan and everything that his ancestors and he himself have wanted and striven for will be continued in his children. The greatest gift for the widow of a man killed in battle is always the child of the man she has loved.

Beyond the limits of bourgeois laws and conventions, which are perhaps necessary in other circumstances, it can be a noble task for German women and girls of good blood to become even outside marriage, not light-heartedly but out of a deep moral seriousness, mothers of the children of soldiers going to war of whom fate alone knows whether they will return or die for Germany. …

During the last war, many a soldier decided from a sense of responsibility to have no more children during the war so that his wife would not be left in need and distress after his death. You SS men need not have these anxieties; they are removed by the following regulations:

Special delegates, chosen by me personally, will take over in the name of the *Reichsführer SS* [head of the SS], the guardianship of all legitimate and illegitimate children of good blood whose fathers were killed in the war. We will support these mothers and take over the education and material care of these children until they come of age, so that no mother and widow need suffer want.

During the war, the SS will take care of all legitimate and illegitimate children born during the war and of expectant mothers in cases of need. After the war, when the fathers return, the SS will in addition grant generous material help to well-founded applications by individuals.

SS-Men and you mothers of these children which Germany has hoped to show that you are ready, through your faith in the Führer and for the sake of the life of our blood and people, to regenerate life for Germany just as bravely as you know how to fight and die for Germany.

Source: Jeremy Noakes, ed., *Nazism 1919–1945,* Vol. 4, *The Home Front in World War II* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1998), 368–369. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

52. General Hans Frank, Decree for the Combating of Violent Acts in the General Government of Poland, October 31, 1939

Introduction

In all the conquered territories, the feared security force, the SS (Schutzstaffel), exerted heavy influence on the German occupation authorities, pressuring them to emphasize security and racial considerations. Two months after German forces invaded Poland, General Hans Frank, who remained governor-general of Poland from 1939 to the spring of 1945, issued a decree imposing the death penalty for numerous acts of resistance to the German occupation forces. By this decree, Frank also permitted the SS to operate its own courts-martial to deal with offenses committed under its provisions.

Primary Source

Anyone who commits a violent act against the German Reich or the German sovereign authority in the General Government will receive the death penalty.

Anyone who willfully damages equipment belonging to the German authorities, objects which serve the work of the authorities, or installations which are for the benefit of the public will receive the death penalty.

Anyone who encourages or incites disobedience to the decrees or regulations issued by the German authorities will receive the death penalty.

Anyone who commits a violent act against a German because of his membership of the German nation will receive the death penalty.

Anyone who willfully commits arson and thereby damages the property of a German will receive the death penalty.

Those who incite or aid such acts will be punished in the same way as the persons who commit them. Attempted acts will be punished in the same way as those which have been committed. …

Anyone who conspires to commit such a crime as those contained in Sections 1–5, enters into serious discussion of such crimes, offers to commit such a crime, or anyone who accepts such an offer will receive the death penalty.

Anyone who receives information about the intention to commit a crime such as those contained in Sections 1–5 and fails to report it to the authorities, or to the person who is threatened at once, or in time for the crime to be prevented, will receive the death penalty. …

(2) Anyone who receives information about the unauthorized possession of a weapon by another person and fails to inform the authorities immediately will receive the death penalty.

Source: J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., *Nazism 1919–1945,* Vol. 3, *Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1988), 367. Reprinted with permission of the University of Exeter Press.

53. The "Cash-and-Carry" United States Neutrality Act: 76th Congress, 2nd Session, Public Resolution No. 54, November 4, 1939

Introduction

In the fall of 1939, the U.S. neutrality legislation came up for renewal. On September 21, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress for major revisions in the existing neutrality legislation. He would undoubtedly have preferred to repeal it entirely, but at this juncture that option was almost certainly still politically impossible. A compromise was reached whereby belligerent nations, in effect the Allies, could now purchase munitions of war in the United States but only if they paid in cash and transported the goods in their own vessels. Americans were still forbidden either to finance such war trade or provide shipping for munitions of war. The new legislation reflected prevailing American sympathy for the Allies, even as many Americans still hoped that their country would avoid intervention in the war.

Primary Source

JOINT RESOLUTION To preserve the neutrality and the peace of the United States and to secure the safety of its citizens and their interests.

Whereas the United States, desiring to preserve its neutrality in wars between foreign states and desiring also to avoid involvement therein,

voluntarily imposes upon its nationals by domestic regulation the restrictions set out in this joint resolution; and

Whereas by so doing the United States waives none of its own rights or privileges, or those of any of its nationals, under international law, and expressly reserves all the rights and privileges to which it and its nationals are entitled under the law of nations; and

Whereas the United States hereby expressly reserves the right to appeal, change or modify this joint resolution in the interests of the peace, security or welfare of the United States and its people: Therefore be it Resolved,

PROCLAMATION OF A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN FOREIGN STATES

Section 1. (a) That whenever the President, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, shall find that there exists a state of war between foreign states, and that it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States, the President shall issue a proclamation naming the states involved; and he shall, from time to time, by proclamation, name other states as and when they may become involved in the war.

(b) Whenever the state of war which shall have caused the President to issue any proclamation under the authority of this section shall have ceased to exist with respect to any state named in such proclamation, he shall revoke such proclamation with respect to such state.

COMMERCE WITH STATES ENGAGED IN ARMED CONFLICT

Sec. 2. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a) it shall thereafter be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any passengers or any articles or materials to any state named in such proclamation.

(b) Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section or of any regulations issued thereunder shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Should the violation be by a corporation, organization, or association,

each officer or director thereof participating in the violation shall be liable to the penalty herein prescribed.

(c) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a) it shall thereafter be unlawful to export or transport, or attempt to export or transport, or cause to be exported or transported, from the United States to any state named in such proclamation, any articles or materials (except copyrighted articles or materials) until all right, title, and interest therein shall have been transferred to some foreign government, agency, institution, association, partnership, corporation, or national. …

(g) The provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of this section shall not apply to transportation by American vessels (other than aircraft) of mail, passengers, or any articles or materials (except articles or materials listed in a proclamation referred to in or issued under the authority of section 12 [i])

to any port in the Western Hemisphere south of thirty-five degrees north latitude,

to any port in the Western Hemisphere north of thirty-five degrees north latitude and west of sixty-six degrees west longitude,

to any port on the Pacific or Indian Oceans, including the China Sea, the Tasman Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Arabian Sea, and any other dependent waters of either of such oceans, seas, or bays or,

to any port on the Atlantic Ocean or its dependent waters south of thirty degrees north latitude.

The exceptions contained in this subsection shall not apply to any such port which is included within a combat area as defined in section 3 which applies to such vessels. …

(i) Every American vessel to which the provisions of subsections (g) and (h) apply, and every neutral vessel to which the provisions of subsection (l) apply, shall, before departing from a port or from the jurisdiction of the United States, file with the collector of customs of the port of departure, or if there is no such collector at such port then with the nearest collector of customs, a sworn statement (1) containing a complete list of all the articles and materials carried as cargo by such vessel, and the names and addresses of the consignees of all such articles and materials, and (2) stating the ports at which such articles and materials are to be unloaded and the ports of call of such vessel. All transportation referred to in subsections (f), (g), (h), and (l) of this section shall be subject to such restrictions, rules, and regulations as

the President shall prescribe; but no loss incurred in connection with any transportation excepted under the provisions of subsections (g), (h), and (l) of this section shall be made the basis of any claim put forward by the Government of the United States. …

(l) The provisions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to the transportation by a neutral vessel to any port referred to in subsection (g) of this section of any articles or materials (except articles or materials listed in a proclamation referred to in or issued under the authority of section 12 [i]) so long as such port is not included within a combat area as defined in section 3 which applies to American vessels.

COMBAT AREAS

Sec. 3. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a), and he shall thereafter find that the protection of citizens of the United States so requires, he shall, by proclamation, define combat areas, and thereafter it shall be unlawful, except under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed, for any citizen of the United States or any American vessel to proceed into or through any such combat area. The combat areas so defined may be made to apply to surface vessels or aircraft, or both.

(b) In case of the violation of any of the provisions of this section by any American vessel, or any owner or officer thereof, such vessel, owner, or officer shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Should the owner of such vessel be a corporation, organization, or association, each officer or director participating in the violation shall be liable to the penalty hereinabove prescribed. In case of the violation of this section by any citizen traveling as a passenger, such passenger may be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.

(c) The President may from time to time modify or extend any proclamation issued under the authority of this section, and when the conditions which shall have caused him to issue any such proclamation shall have ceased to exist he shall revoke such proclamation and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply, except as to offenses committed prior to such revocation. …

TRAVEL ON VESSELS OF BELLIGERENT STATES

Sec. 5. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a) it shall thereafter be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to travel on any vessel of any state named in such proclamation, except in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed.

(b) Whenever any proclamation issued under the authority of section 1 (a) shall have been revoked with respect to any state the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply with respect to such state, except as to offenses committed prior to such revocation.

ARMING OF AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSELS PROHIBITED

Sec. 6. Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a), it shall thereafter be unlawful until such proclamation is revoked, for any American vessel engaged in commerce with any foreign state to be armed, except with small arms and ammunition therefor, which the President may deem necessary and shall publicly designate for the preservation of discipline aboard any such vessel.

FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

Sec. 7. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a), it shall thereafter be unlawful for any person within the United States to purchase, sell, or exchange bonds, securities, or other obligations of the government of any state named in such proclamation, or of any political subdivision of any such state, or of any person acting for or on behalf of the government of any such state, or political subdivision thereof, issued after the date of such proclamation, or to make any loan or extend any credit (other than necessary credits accruing in connection with the transmission of telegraph, cable, wireless and telephone services) to any such government, political subdivision, or person. The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to the sale by any person within the United States to any person in a state named in any such proclamation of any articles or

materials listed in a proclamation referred to in or issued under the authority of section 12 (i). …

SOLICITATION AND COLLECTION OF FUNDS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Sec. 8. (a) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a), it shall thereafter be unlawful for any person within the United States to solicit or receive any contribution for or on behalf of the government of any state named in such proclamation or for or on behalf of any agent or instrumentality of any such state. …

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Sec. 9. This joint resolution (except section 12) shall not apply to any American republic engaged in war against a non-American state or states, provided the American republic is not cooperating with a non-American state or states in such war. …

NATIONAL MUNITIONS CONTROL BOARD

Sec. 12. … (d) It shall be unlawful for any person to export, or attempt to export, from the United States to any other state, any arms, ammunition, or implements of war listed in a proclamation referred to in or issued under the authority of subsection (i) of this section, or to import, or attempt to import, to the United States from any other state, any of the arms, ammunition, or implements of war listed in any such proclamation, without first having submitted to the Secretary of State the name of the purchaser and the terms of sale and having obtained a license therefore. …

(i) The President is hereby authorized to proclaim upon recommendation of the Board from time to time a list of articles which shall be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war for the purposes of this section; but the proclamation Numbered 2237, of May 1, 1937 (50 Stat. 1834) defining the term “arms, ammunition, and implements of war” shall, until it is revoked, have full force and effect as if issued under the authority of this subsection. …

GENERAL PENALTY PROVISION

Sec. 15. In every case of the violation of any of the provisions of this joint resolution or of any rule or regulation issued pursuant thereto where a specific penalty is not herein provided, such violator or violators, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisonment not more than two years, or both. …

REPEALS

Sec. 19. The joint resolution of August 31, 1935, as amended and the joint resolution of January 8, 1937, are hereby repealed; but offenses committed and penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities incurred under either of such joint resolutions prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution may be prosecuted and punished, and suits and proceedings for violations of either of such joint resolution or any rule or regulation issued pursuant thereto may be commenced and prosecuted, in the same manner and with the same effect as if such joint resolution had not been repealed.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 494–505.

54. Address of Finland's Prime Minister, A. K. Cajander, at Helsinki Fair Hall, at a National Defense Celebration Arranged by Finnish Private Enterprise Owners, November 23, 1939

Introduction

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland, a small country on its borders in the far northwest of Europe that until 1918 had been under Russian rule. Joseph Stalin, the Soviet president, alleged that Finland might otherwise pose a potential threat to Russia and proposed an exchange of territory that the Finns found unacceptable. The Finns publicly defied all the Soviet Union's demands and, once war broke out, appealed for Western aid,

declaring their determination to fight on to the bitter end. Finland's plight attracted much sympathy from the Western powers. Ironically, after Germany's June 1941 invasion of Russia, the Finns allied themselves with Germany against the Soviet Union.

Primary Source

The people of Finland stand in front of an unexpected incident. The events followed in quick succession and the total sequence of events emerged as a total surprise for the majority of the Finnish people. …

A little bit over two months ago the Soviet Union approached the Finnish Cabinet making certain propositions which were explained as aiming at improvement of the security of St. Petersburg or Leningrad and at strengthening of the friendly relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union.

These proposals were not completely unexpected. The forthcoming talks concerning required improvements of Leningrad's security were anticipated in private conversations with some members of the Finnish Cabinet a considerable time ago. …

A new decisive turn of events in Europe and even in the whole world took place when Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact which in some respects even exceeded the regular scope of such agreements.

The pact came like a bolt from the blue. In Finland it, however, was not a complete surprise. As early as 1937 a remark was made by a prominent foreign authority about a possibility of the Soviet Union and Germany to conclude a pact perhaps in the near future. But the very timing of this non-aggression pact was, I guess, a complete surprise to all of us. …

The non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union was immediately followed by a war between Germany and Poland from which again a new war between the Western Powers and Germany ensued. A universal conflagration was ignited.

The Oslo countries, Finland included, declared themselves to be absolutely neutral in this campaign between the great powers. Despite their neutrality Finland and other Oslo countries suffer continuously and heavily from the economic consequences of the great war. Furthermore, especially

Holland, Belgium and Finland but Switzerland, too, have been able to keep to their neutrality only by maintaining an extremely efficient guard for their defense.

In the opposite case their declaration of neutrality would scarcely have been respected.

When Poland was near to collapse the Soviet Union marched its troops into eastern Poland and occupied it. Simultaneously the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs made it known to the governments of Finland and the Baltic countries, as well as to other countries, that it will conduct a policy of neutrality towards them. …

The only great power which could have earlier been a potential threat to Leningrad—well, in that case presumably along the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland—namely Germany, has concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, which means that there exists no threat against the Soviet Union and Leningrad from there—without considering the overall present importance of Leningrad to the Soviet Union. And the new Soviet naval and air bases in Liepaja (Libau), Ventpils (Windau), Hiiumaa, Saaremaa and Paldiski permit, as disclosed by the Soviets, the Soviet Union to rule the Baltic Sea and thus the Gulf of Finland and up to the Gulf's farthest recess in front of Leningrad.

Judging from the present facts, all arguments about threats to Leningrad from the Finnish territory are very difficult to understand.

A request for negotiations with the Soviet government was received on the 5th of October. For over a month friendly discussions were carried out between the Finnish and Soviet Cabinets concerning concrete political issues of certain territorial exchanges to improve the security of Leningrad.

The Cabinet of Finland, after discussing with representatives of parliamentary groups and after consulting the highest military command, yielded to Soviet demands in order to maintain good neighborly relations so far as it could, as a representative of an independent nation, to increase the security of a foreign metropolis but without sacrificing Finland's own national security.

However, the Soviets have made propositions which are very far away from those which can be considered as prerequisites in securing Leningrad. If they were accepted it would have offended Finland's neutrality and damaged her opportunities to self-defence: it would have meant severing the southern

defence line of Finland at two of its most important points and handing over its first-class fortifications to a foreign power. Thus it had resulted in severe decrease in the security of Finland. Such proposals were unacceptable to the Finnish government. …

Finland will not submit herself to a role of a vassal country. We will not yield to this by someone waging a nerve war or trying to exhaust us or doing the contrary, by offering temptations. Finland will peacefully, with open eyes and determined mind, observe the events in the west and in the east, and as a peace loving country, which always appreciates good neighborly relations, is at any time ready to continue the negotiations on a basis which does not risk the vital interests of Finland or her national values. No further concessions can be attained especially now when Finland herself gains nothing from these territorial exchanges.

Finland is convinced that it is advantageous to the real interests of the Soviet Union that it has as a neighbor a nation, whose loyalty it can trust in all circumstances.

The global situation continues tense, and this makes Finland among many other neutral countries to keep a considerable amount of men in arms as protectors of neutrality and also be otherwise prepared. …

We have to keep together—as a unified nation—like we did at the time of our first challenge, as unanimous as a democratic nation relying on its free will can ever be. The spirits born from our ordeals should and will stand the hardships, too. But even at that moment when an immediate danger is over we have to stay together. All in all we are a small nation and the stability of our international status depends decisively on our unanimity.

The world attention has focused on us without our own active influence. We have been met with a large scale sympathy of nations. This state of affairs obliges us. Let us make it known that we are worthy of the sympathy the world both in speeches and deeds has shown to us. …

Source: "The Address by Prime Minister A.K. Cajander on the 23rd of November 1939, at Helsinki Fair Hall, at a National Defence Celebration Arranged by Finnish Private Enterprise Owners," History of Finland: A Selection of Events and Documents, http://www.histdoc.net/history/cajander.html. Copyright by Paul Kruhse. Reprinted with permission.

55. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Finland, December 1, 1939

Introduction

On hearing the news of the Soviet invasion of Finland, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took the occasion of one of his regular press conferences to express shock and condemnation. That same month the League of Nations also expelled the Soviet Union, citing its attacks on Poland and Finland as the reasons for taking this action.

Primary Source

The news of the Soviet naval and military bombings within Finnish territory has come as a profound shock to the Government and people of the United States. Despite efforts made to solve the dispute by peaceful methods to which no reasonable objection could be offered, one power has chosen to resort to force of arms. It is tragic to see the policy of force spreading, and to realize that wanton disregard for law is still on the march. All peace-loving peoples in those nations that are still hoping for the continuance of relations throughout the world on the basis of law and order will unanimously condemn this new resort to military force as the arbiter of international differences.

To the great misfortune of the world, the present trend to force makes insecure the independent existence of small nations in every continent and jeopardizes the rights of mankind to self-government. The people and government of Finland have a long, honorable and wholly peaceful record which has won for them the respect and warm regard of the people and Government of the United States.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers; The Soviet Union, 1933–1939* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 799–800.

1940 DOCUMENTS

56. Mao Zedong, “On the New Democracy,” January 1940

Introduction

Mao Zedong was prepared to follow a united front strategy in China in opposition to Japanese invasion, but he and his fellow communists had by no means abandoned their intention of ultimate political domination of China. In January 1940 Mao mapped out the course that he believed revolution would follow in China, progressing through democracy to communism. He also indicated his belief that revolution in China would rely primarily on the Chinese peasantry, a break with orthodox Marxist theory that emphasized the industrial proletariat.

Primary Source

The historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution is that it is divided into two steps, that of democracy and that of socialism. The first step is not democracy in the general sense, but a new and specific kind, of a Chinese type—i.e., new democracy. …

Evidently, if the nature of the present Chinese society is colonial, semcolonial, and semi-feudal, then the progress of the Chinese revolution must be in two steps. The first step is to turn the colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal society into an independent democratic society; the second step is to push the revolution forward to build up a socialist society. The present phase of the Chinese revolution carried out by us is the first step.

The beginning of the first step of the Chinese revolution can be traced back to the Opium War when Chinese society began to change from a feudal society to a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society. …

But a change took place in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution after the outbreak of the first imperialist World War and the establishment of a socialist state on one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, i.e., after the Russian revolution of 1917. Before that time, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution was within the orbit of the old bourgeois-democratic

revolution. From the standpoint of the revolutionary front, it is a part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution. …

As to the first stage or the first step in this colonial and semi-colonial revolution—according to its social nature, it is fundamentally still a bourgeois-democratic revolution in which the objective requirement is still basically to clear away the obstacles in the way of capitalist development; nevertheless, this revolution is no longer the old type led solely by the bourgeoisie for the building of capitalist society and a state of the bourgeois dictatorship, but a new type of revolution wholly or partly led by the proletariat, the first stage of which aims at the setting up of a new democratic society, a new state of the joint dictatorship, of all revolutionary classes. The fundamental character of this revolution will not change until the [arrival of the stage of] socialist revolution, even though, during its progress, it may pass through a number of stages in accordance with the possible changes in the conditions of enemies and allies.

This kind of revolution, because it is a great blow to the imperialists, is bound to be opposed and not tolerated by the imperialists; on the other hand, it is permitted by the socialist country and socialistic international proletariat.

Therefore, it is inevitable that this revolution will become a part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution. …

Today those who are capable of leading the people to defeat Japanese imperialism and put democracy into practice are the saviours of the people. If the Chinese bourgeoisie is capable of fulfilling this duty, it certainly deserves every praise. Otherwise, the responsibility on the whole cannot but fall on the shoulders of the proletariat.

Therefore, no matter what the circumstances, the Chinese proletariat, peasantry, intelligentsia, and other petty-bourgeois elements are the main force upon which the fate of China depends. These classes either have awakened or are awakening, and are bound to be the basic parts of the state and government framework in the democratic Republic of China. The democratic Republic of China which we are aiming to construct now can

only take the form of dictatorship of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people, i.e., a new democratic republic. In other words, a republic of the Three People's Principles in the true revolutionary sense as put forward by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen including the Three Great Policies. …

In such a republic as that mentioned above, our economy must be the economy of the new democracy, just as the politics is the politics of the new democracy.

Big banks, big industries, and big business shall be owned by this republic. "In order that private capital may not manipulate the livelihood of the people, all native-owned or foreign-owned enterprises, either monopolist or of a dimension too large for private efforts to manage such as banks, railroads, airlines, etc., will be managed and controlled by the state. This is the essence of restriction of capital." This was a slogan statement made by the Kuomintang in the declaration of its First National Congress. This is the correct course for the economic constitution of the new democratic republic; at the same time, however, the state will not confiscate other capitalist private property and will not forbid the development of capitalist production that "cannot manipulate the people's livelihood." This is because the Chinese economy is still in a very backward state.

It will adopt certain necessary measures to confiscate the land of big landlords and distribute it among peasants without any, or with very little, land, in order to realize Dr. Sun's slogan, "The tiller should own his land," and to liquidate the feudal relations in rural areas. This is not to build up socialist agriculture, but to turn the land into the private property of the peasants. The rich peasant economy will also be allowed to exist in the rural areas. This is the policy of "the equalization of landownership," the correct slogan of which is, "The tiller should own his land."…

The Chinese revolution is in essence a revolution of the peasantry; the present war of resistance is in essence a war of resistance of the peasantry. The politics of new democracy is in essence [the politics of] the transfer of power to the peasantry. The new, genuine Three People's Principles are in their essence the principles of a peasant revolution. The content of popular

culture is in essence [the question of] the elevation of the cultural [level] among the peasantry. The anti-Japanese war is in essence a peasant war. … Therefore, the peasant question becomes the fundamental question of the Chinese revolution, and the force of the peasantry is the main force of the Chinese revolution. Besides the peasantry, the second [largest] section of the Chinese population consists of workers. China has several millions of industrial workers. Without them, China would not be able to live on, for it is they who are the producers in the industrial economy. Without the workers, the [Chinese] revolution would not be able to succeed, for it is they who are the leaders of the revolution and have the highest revolutionary spirit. Under these conditions the revolutionary, new or genuine Three People's Principles must adopt the policy of [aiding] the workers and peasants. If there is such a Three People's Principles which does not adopt this policy, does not truly protect and assist them, does not endeavour to "awaken the people," then it is bound to decay. …

The culture of the new democracy is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the masses, or, in terms of present-day China, the culture of the anti-Japanese united front. It can only be led by the cultural thought of the proletariat, i.e., Communist thought; it cannot be led by the thought of any other class. The culture of the new democracy, in short, is "the proletarian-led anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the masses."…

China should absorb on a great scale the progressive culture of foreign countries as a raw material for her own cultural food. Such absorption was not sufficient in the past. This refers not only to the socialist and new democratic culture, but also to the ancient cultures of foreign countries, which are useful to us; for instance, the cultural heritage of the capitalist countries in their earlier period of growth. These foreign materials we must not treat as we treat our food. We submit our food to the mouth for chewing and to the stomach and intestines for digestion, add to it saliva, pepsin, and other secretions of the intestines to separate it into the essence and the residue, and then absorb the essence of our nourishment and pass off the residue. It should never be indiscriminately and uncritically absorbed. The thesis of "wholesale Westernization" is a mistaken viewpoint. To absorb blindly foreign materials has done China much harm. The same attitude is

necessary for the Chinese Communists in the application of Marxism to China. We must unify appropriately the general truth of Marxism and the concrete actuality of the Chinese revolution, i.e., we must adopt the national form before we can make Marxism useful and not apply it subjectively and dogmatically. Subjective and formal Marxists are only playing with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no place for them in the revolutionary ranks of China. Chinese culture must have its own form, i.e., a national form. A national form and a new democratic content—this is our new culture of today. …

The combination of new democratic politics, new democratic economics, and new democratic culture is the Republic of New Democracy. It is truly a republic in name and in reality. And that is the New China we aim to build.

The New China stands before every one of us. We should be ready to receive it.

The mast of the ship New China is appearing on the horizon. We should clap our hands to welcome it.

Raise both your hands! The new China is ours!

Source: Robert V. Daniels, *A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse,* 3rd ed. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 80–83.

57. Chinese Communists Request Financial Assistance from the Soviet Union: Georgi Dimitrov to Joseph Stalin, February 23, 1940

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party was heavily dependent upon financial subsidies from the Soviet Union. In February 1940 the party's representative in Moscow, Zhou Enlai, asked Georgi Dimitrov, secretary-general of the Communist International (Comintern), to provide a subsidy of US$350,000

for 1940. Dimitrov supported this request, which Soviet president Joseph Stalin granted but cut down to US$300,000. At this time Japan remained undecided as to whether it should launch a war against the Soviet Union or the Western powers. Stalin therefore had every incentive to encourage Chinese resistance to Japan.

Primary Source

The CC [Central Committee] of the CP [Communist Party] of China charged C. [Comrade] Zhou Enlai with presenting a budget of party and military expenditures to us, explaining the extremely difficult financial situation in the party, and requesting financial support.

It is clear from this budget (see enclosure [omitted]) that the *monthly deficit* of the party is, for party spending, 58,280 U.S. dollars and for the military, 300,000 U.S. dollars.

We, of course, have explained to C. [Comrade] Zhou Enlai that the party must mobilize all existing resources in the country to cover these enormous deficits and that he should not count on outside help.

However, considering the situation of the party and the urgent necessity of supporting the party press and propaganda and the existing network of party schools for educating party and military cadres, we would consider it appropriate to provide assistance to the Chinese Communist Party for these purposes in the amount of 350,000 U.S. dollars in 1940.

We are asking, if you find it possible in the current situation, to give a directive to the appropriate organs to offer financial help to the Communist Party of China in this or some other amount.

Source: Alexander Dallin and F. I. Firsov, *Dimitrov and Stalin 1934–1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 122–123. Reprinted with permission.

58. “Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat”: Winston Churchill, Speech in the British House of

Commons, May 13, 1940

Introduction

In May 1940 as German forces launched a blitzkrieg attack on Western Europe, Winston Churchill, a veteran politician who had been a longtime critic of the Neville Chamberlain administration's appeasement policies, became British prime minister. Taking power when Great Britain faced a grim war situation, in his first speech as prime minister Churchill stated that all he could offer the British people was "blood, toil, tears, and sweat."

Primary Source

On Friday evening last I received from His Majesty the mission to form a new administration. It was the evident will of Parliament and the nation that this should be conceived on the broadest possible basis and that it should include all parties. …

To form an administration of this scale and complexity is a serious undertaking in itself. But we are in the preliminary phase of one of the greatest battles in history. We are in action at many other points—in Norway and in Holland—and we have to be prepared in the Mediterranean. The air battle is continuing, and many preparations have to be made here at home.

I say to the House as I said to ministers who have joined this government, I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat. We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many months of struggle and suffering.

You ask, what is our policy? I say it is to wage war by land, sea, and air. War with all our might and with all the strength God has given us, and to wage war against a monstrous tyranny never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy.

You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word. It is victory. Victory at all costs—Victory in spite of all terrors—Victory, however long and hard the road may be, for without victory there is no survival.

Let that be realized. No survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge, the impulse of the ages, that mankind shall move forward toward his goal.

I take up my task in buoyancy and hope. I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men.

Source: Winston Churchill, "Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat," May 13, 1940. Quotations from the works of Winston S. Churchill reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown, London, on behalf of the Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Copyright © The Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Speech available through The Churchill Centre, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/blood-toil-tears-and-sweat.

59. "We Shall Never Surrender": Winston Churchill, Speech in the British House of Commons, June 4, 1940

Introduction

By early June 1940, it was clear that the British Expeditionary Force in France had suffered a serious defeat. Britain launched a desperate evacuation effort from the Dunkirk beaches, sending every type of vessel across the English Channel to bring its troops home. Most of Britain's military equipment was lost in France. Speaking not just for his British audience but also to the government and people of the United States, the only possible source of outside aid for his country, Winston Churchill promised that his country would fight on and would never surrender.

Primary Source

In a long series of very fierce battles, now on this front, now on that, fighting on three fronts at once, battles fought by two or three divisions against an equal or sometimes larger number of the enemy, and fought very fiercely on old ground so many of us knew so well, our losses in men exceed 30,000 in killed, wounded and missing. …

In the confusion of departure it is inevitable that many should be cut off. Against this loss of over 30,000 men we may set the far heavier loss certainly inflicted on the enemy, but our losses in material are enormous. We have perhaps lost one-third of the men we lost in the opening days of the battle on March 21, 1918, but we have lost nearly as many guns—nearly 1,000—and

all our transport and all the armored vehicles that were with the army of the north.

These losses will impose further delay on the expansion of our military strength. That expansion has not been proceeding as fast as we had hoped. The best of all we had to give has been given to the B. E. F., and although they had not the number of tanks and some articles of equipment which were desirable they were a very well and finely equipped army. They had the first fruits of all our industry had to give. That has gone and now here is further delay.

How long it will be, how long it will last depends upon the exertions which we make on this island. An effort, the like of which has never been seen in our records, is now being made. Work is proceeding night and day, Sundays, and week days. Capital and labor have cast aside their interests, rights and customs and put everything into the common stock. Already the flow of munitions has leaped forward. There is no reason why we should not in a few months overtake the sudden and serious loss that has come upon us without retarding the development of our general program.

Nevertheless, our thankfulness at the escape of our army with so many men, and the thankfulness of their loved ones, who passed through an agonizing week, must not blind us to the fact that what happened in France and Belgium is a colossal military disaster.

The French Army has been weakened, the Belgian Army has been lost and a large part of those fortified lines upon which so much faith was reposed has gone, and many valuable mining districts and factories have passed into the enemy's possession.

The whole of the Channel ports are in his hands, with all the strategic consequences that follow from that, and we must expect another blow to be struck almost immediately at us or at France. …

We must never forget the solid assurances of sea power and those which belong to air power if they can be locally exercised. I have myself full confidence that if all do their duty and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our island home, ride out the storms of war, outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary, alone.

We shall not flag nor fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France and on the seas and oceans; we shall fight with growing confidence

and growing strength in the air. We shall defend our island whatever the cost may be; we shall fight on beaches, landing grounds, in fields, in streets and on the hills. We shall never surrender and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, will carry on the struggle until, in God's good time, the New World with all its power and might, sets forth to the liberation and rescue of the Old.

Source: Winston Churchill, "We Shall Fight on the Beaches," June 4, 1940. Quotations from the works of Winston S. Churchill reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown, London, on behalf of the Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Copyright © The Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Speech available through The Churchill Centre, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/we-shall-fight-on-the-beaches.

60. Benito Mussolini, "Speech on War Entry," June 10, 1940

Introduction

Although Italy was an ally of Germany both ideologically and by treaty, Italy's fascist dictator Benito Mussolini initially hesitated to join the European war. In August 1939, he told Hitler that "If Germany attacks Poland and the conflict is localized, Italy will give Germany every form of political and economic aid which may be required." Mussolini warned, however, that Italy would not participate in a wider war, stating that "If Germany attacks Poland and the allies of the latter counter-attack Germany, I must emphasize to you that I cannot assume the initiative of warlike operations, given the actual conditions of Italian military preparations which have been repeatedly and in timely fashion pointed out to you." Germany's stunning military successes of May and June 1940 and the impending defeat of France impelled the opportunistic Mussolini to reverse his stance, declare war on both France and Britain, and invade France.

Primary Source

Fighters of land, sea and air, Blackshirts of the revolution and of the legions, men and women of Italy, of the empire and of the Kingdom of Albania, listen!

The hour destined by fate is sounding for us. The hour of irrevocable decision has come. A declaration of war has already been handed to the Ambassadors of Great Britain and France.

We take the field against the plutocratic and reactionary democracies who always have blocked the march and frequently plotted against the existence of the Italian people.

Several decades of recent history may be summarized in these words: Phrases, promises, threats of blackmail, and finally, crowning that ignoble edifice, the League of Nations of fifty-two nations.

Our conscience is absolutely clear.

With you, the entire world is witness that the Italy of fascism has done everything humanly possible to avoid the tempest that envelops Europe, but all in vain.

It would have sufficed to revise treaties to adapt them to changing requirements vital to nations and not consider them untouchable for eternity.

It would have sufficed not to begin the stupid policy of guarantees, which proved particularly deadly for those who accepted them.

It would have sufficed not to reject the proposal the Fuehrer made last Oct. 6 after the campaign in Poland ended.

Now all that belongs to the past.

If today we have decided to take the risks and sacrifices of war, it is because the honor, interests and future firmly impose it since a great people is truly such if it considers its obligations sacred and does not avoid the supreme trials that determine the course of history.

We are taking up arms, after having solved the problem of our continental frontiers, to solve our maritime frontiers. We want to break the territorial and military chains that confine us in our sea because a country of 45,000,000 souls is not truly free if it has not free access to the ocean.

This gigantic conflict is only a phase of the logical development of our revolution. It is the conflict of poor, numerous peoples who labor against starvers who ferociously cling to a monopoly of all riches and all gold on earth.

It is a conflict of fruitful, useful peoples against peoples who are in a

decline. It is a conflict between two ages, two ideas.

Now the die is cast and our will has burned our ships behind us.

I solemnly declare that Italy does not intend to drag other peoples bordering on her by sea or land into the conflict. Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Egypt, take note of these words of mine. It depends on them and only on them if these words are rigorously confirmed or not.

Italians, in a memorable mass meeting in Berlin, I said that according to the rules of Fascist morals, when one has a friend one marches with him to the end. This we have done and will continue to do with Germany, her people and her victorious armed forces.

On this eve of an event of import for centuries, we turn our thoughts to His Majesty, the King and Emperor, who always has understood the thought of this country. Lastly, we salute the new Fuehrer, the chief of great allied Germany.

Proletarian, Fascist Italy has arisen for the third time, strong, proud, compact as never before.

There is only one order. It is categorical and obligatory to every one. It already wings over and enflames hearts from the Alps to the Indian Ocean: Conquer!

And we will conquer in order, finally, to give a new world of peace with justice to Italy, to Europe and to the universe.

Italian people, rush to arms and show your tenacity, your courage, your valor.

Source: Official Italian government translation published in the *New York Times*, June 11, 1940.

61. “Their Finest Hour”: Winston Churchill, Speech in the British House of Commons, June 18, 1940

Introduction

As the last of the British forces escaped from France and the French government neared surrender, Winston Churchill again reiterated Great Britain’s determination to fight on alone for as long as might be necessary. He also offered France common citizenship with Great Britain, a proposal that in some ways anticipated the later European Union. Churchill’s government believed that a German invasion of the British Isles was the next item on Hitler’s military agenda. The prime minister therefore sought to persuade the British people that even though the military situation was desperate, any such undertaking would fail, provided that the British could find the resolution to endure the air bombing that would precede it. Churchill’s stirring rhetoric not only heartened his own countrymen but also caught the imagination of the rest of the world. As with earlier speeches, his speech was intended to win the support not only of his own population but also of the American president and people.

Primary Source

…The disastrous military events which have happened during the past fortnight have not come to me with any sense of surprise. Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could to the House that the worst possibilities were open; and I made it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would make no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight on, “if necessary for years, if necessary alone.”…

If Hitler can bring under his despotic control the industries of the countries he has conquered, this will add greatly to his already vast armament output. On the other hand, this will not happen immediately, and we are now assured of immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and

munitions of all kinds from the United States; and especially of airplanes and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans, coming from regions which are beyond the reach of enemy bombers. …

We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French resistance will be prolonged, both in France and in the French Empire overseas. The French Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting adrift their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them. The House will have read the historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen—and of our own hearts—we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle. However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we in this island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people. If we are now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes to our own. All these shall be restored.

What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, “This was their finest hour.”

Source: Winston Churchill, “Their Finest Hour,” June 18, 1940. Quotations from the works of Winston S. Churchill reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown, London, on behalf of the Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Copyright © The Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Speech available through

The Churchill Centre, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/their-finest-hour.

62. General Charles de Gaulle, Speech on British Radio, London, June 18, 1940

Introduction

After French leaders surrendered to Germany, permitting Germany to occupy much of France and establish a client government based at Vichy for the rest, some French soldiers and officials decided to fight on in exile. The most prominent Free French leader was the youthful General Charles de Gaulle. In June 1940 British prime minister Winston Churchill permitted de Gaulle to use the official British radio service to appeal to his countrymen to continue their fight and resist the Germans until victory was attained.

Primary Source

The leaders who, for many years past, have been at the head of the French armed forces, have set up a government. Alleging the defeat of our armies, this government has entered into negotiations with the enemy with a view to bringing about a cessation of hostilities. It is quite true that we were, and still are, overwhelmed by enemy mechanized forces, both on the ground and in the air. It was the tanks, the planes, and the tactics of the Germans, far more than the fact that we were outnumbered, that forced our armies to retreat. It was the German tanks, planes, and tactics that provided the element of surprise which brought our leaders to their present plight.

But has the last word been said? Must we abandon all hope? Is our defeat final and irremediable? To those questions I answer No!

Speaking in full knowledge of the facts, I ask you to believe me when I say that the cause of France is not lost. The very factors that brought about our defeat may one day lead us to victory. For, remember this, France does not stand alone. She is not isolated. Behind her is a vast Empire, and she can make common cause with the British Empire, which commands the seas and

is continuing the struggle. Like England, she can draw unreservedly on the immense industrial resources of the United States.

This war is not limited to our unfortunate country. The outcome of the struggle has not been decided by the Battle of France. This is a world war. Mistakes have been made, there have been delays and untold suffering, but the fact remains that there still exists in the world everything we need to crush our enemies some day.

Today we are crushed by the sheer weight of mechanized force hurled against us, but we can still look to a future in which even greater mechanized force will bring us victory. The destiny of the world is at stake.

I, general de Gaulle, now in London, call on all French officers and men who are at present on British soil, or may be in the future, with or without their arms; I call on all engineers and skilled workmen from the armaments factories who are at present on British soil, or may be in the future, to get in touch with me.

Whatever happens, the flame of French resistance must not and shall not die.

Tomorrow I shall broadcast again from London.

Source: BBC Radio Broadcast, June 18, 1940, Lehrman Institute, http://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/index.html.

63. Armistice Agreement between the German High Command of the Armed Forces and French Plenipotentiaries, Compiègne, June 22, 1940

Introduction

Facing overwhelming military defeat, on June 23, 1940, French military leaders signed an armistice with Germany. Under its terms, a large portion of

France, including Paris, the capital city, was to be under German military occupation. All French military armaments were to be surrendered to Germany. The armistice left Great Britain as the only power still fighting against Germany.

Primary Source

Between the chief of the High Command of the armed forces, Col. Gen. [Wilhelm] Keitel, commissioned by the Fuehrer of the German Reich and Supreme Commander in Chief of the German Armed Forces, and the fully authorized plenipotentiaries of the French Government, General [Charles L. C.] Huntziger, chairman of the delegation; Ambassador [Léon] Noel, Rear Admiral [Maurice R.] LeLuc, Army Corps General [Georges] Parisot and Air Force General [Jean Marie Joseph] Bergeret, the following armistice treaty was agreed upon:

ARTICLE I.

The French Government directs a cessation of fighting against the German Reich in France as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories, mandates as well as on the seas.

It [the French Government] directs the immediate laying down of arms of French units already encircled by German troops.

ARTICLE II.

To safeguard the interests of the German Reich, French State territory north and west of the line drawn on the attached map will be occupied by German troops.

As far as the parts to be occupied still are not in control of German troops, this occupation will be carried out immediately after the conclusion of this treaty.

ARTICLE III.

In the occupied parts of France the German Reich exercises all rights of an occupying power. The French Government obligates itself to support with

every means the regulations resulting from the exercise of these rights and to carry them out with the aid of French administration.

All French authorities and officials of the occupied territory, therefore, are to be promptly informed by the French Government to comply with the regulations of the German military commanders and to cooperate with them in a correct manner.

It is the intention of the German Government to limit the occupation of the west coast after ending hostilities with England to the extent absolutely necessary.

The French Government is permitted to select the seat of its government in unoccupied territory, or, if it wishes, to move to Paris. In this case, the German Government guarantees the French Government and its central authorities every necessary alleviation so that they will be in a position to conduct the administration of unoccupied territory from Paris.

ARTICLE IV.

French armed forces on land, on the sea, and in the air are to be demobilized and disarmed in a period still to be set. Excepted are only those units which are necessary for maintenance of domestic order. Germany and Italy will fix their strength. The French armed forces in the territory to be occupied by Germany are to be hastily withdrawn into territory not to be occupied and be discharged. These troops, before marching out, shall lay down their weapons and equipment at the places where they are stationed at the time this treaty becomes effective. They are responsible for orderly delivery to German troops.

ARTICLE V.

As a guarantee for the observance of the armistice, the surrender, undamaged, of all those guns, tanks, tank defense weapons, war planes, anti-aircraft artillery, infantry weapons, means of conveyance, and munitions can be demanded from the units of the French armed forces which are standing in battle against Germany and which at the time this agreement goes into force are in territory not to be occupied by Germany.

The German armistice commission will decide the extent of delivery.

ARTICLE VI.

Weapons, munitions, and war apparatus of every kind remaining in the unoccupied portion of France are to be stored and/or secured under German and/or Italian control—so far as not released for the arming allowed to French units.

The German High Command reserves the right to direct all those measures which are necessary to exclude unauthorized use of this material. Building of new war apparatus in unoccupied territory is to be stopped immediately.

ARTICLE VII.

In occupied territory, all the land and coastal fortifications, with weapons, munitions, and apparatus and plants of every kind are to be surrendered undamaged. Plans of these fortifications, as well as plans of those already conquered by German troops, are to be handed over.

Exact plans regarding prepared blastings, land mines, obstructions, time fuses, barriers for fighting, etc., shall be given to the German High Command. These hindrances are to be removed by French forces upon German demand.

ARTICLE VIII.

The French War Fleet is to collect in ports to be designated more particularly, and under German and/or Italian control to demobilize and lay up—with the exception of those units released to the French Government for protection of French interests in its colonial empire.

The peacetime stations of ships should control the designation of ports.

The German Government solemnly declares to the French Government that it does not intend to use the French War Fleet which is in harbors under German control for its purposes in war, with the exception of units necessary for the purposes of guarding the coast and sweeping mines.

It further solemnly and expressly declares that it does not intend to bring up any demands respecting the French War Fleet at the conclusion of a peace.

All warships outside France are to be recalled to France with the exception of that portion of the French War Fleet which shall be designated to represent French interests in the colonial empire.

ARTICLE IX.

The French High Command must give the German High Command the exact location of all mines which France has set out, as well as information on the other harbor and coastal obstructions and defense facilities. Insofar as the German High Command may require, French forces must clear away the mines.

ARTICLE X.

The French Government is obligated to forbid any portion of its remaining armed forces to undertake hostilities against Germany in any manner.

The French Government also will prevent members of its armed forces from leaving the country and prevent armaments of any sort, including ships, planes, etc., being taken to England or any other place abroad.

The French Government will forbid French citizens to fight against Germany in the service of States with which the German Reich is still at war. French citizens who violate this provision are to be treated by German troops as insurgents.

ARTICLE XI.

French commercial vessels of all sorts, including coastal and harbor vessels which are now in French hands, may not leave port until further notice. Resumption of commercial voyages will require approval of the German and Italian Governments.

French commercial vessels will be recalled by the French Government or, if return is impossible, the French Government will instruct them to enter neutral harbors.

All confiscated German commercial vessels are, on demand, to be returned [to Germany] undamaged.

ARTICLE XII.

Flight by any airplane over French territory shall be prohibited. Every plane making a flight without German approval will be regarded as an enemy by the German Air Force and treated accordingly.

In unoccupied territory, air fields and ground facilities of the air force shall be under German and Italian control.

Demand may be made that such air fields be rendered unusable. The French Government is required to take charge of all foreign airplanes in the unoccupied region to prevent flights. They are to be turned over to the German armed forces.

ARTICLE XIII.

The French Government obligates itself to turn over to German troops in the occupied region all facilities and properties of the French armed forces in undamaged condition.

It [the French Government] also will see to it that harbors, industrial facilities, and docks are preserved in their present condition and damaged in no way.

The same stipulations apply to transportation routes and equipment, especially railways, roads, and canals, and to the whole communications network and equipment, waterways and coastal transportation services.

Additionally, the French Government is required on demand of the German High Command to perform all necessary restoration labor on these facilities.

The French Government will see to it that in the occupied region necessary technical personnel and rolling stock of the railways and other transportation equipment, to a degree normal in peacetime, be retained in service.

ARTICLE XIV.

There is an immediate prohibition of transmission for all wireless stations on French soil. Resumption of wireless connections from the unoccupied portion of France requires a special regulation.

ARTICLE XV.

The French Government obligates itself to convey transit freight between the German Reich and Italy through unoccupied territory to the extent demanded by the German Government.

ARTICLE XVI.

The French Government, in agreement with the responsible German officials, will carry out the return of population into occupied territory.

ARTICLE XVII.

The French Government obligates itself to prevent every transference of economic valuables and provisions from the territory to be occupied by German troops into unoccupied territory or abroad.

These valuables and provisions in occupied territory are to be disposed of only in agreement with the German Government. In that connection, the German Government will consider the necessities of life of the population in unoccupied territory.

ARTICLE XVIII.

The French Government will bear the costs of maintenance of German occupation troops on French soil.

ARTICLE XIX.

All German war and civil prisoners in French custody, including those under arrest and convicted who were seized and sentenced because of acts in favor of the German Reich, shall be surrendered immediately to German troops.

The French Government is obliged to surrender upon demand all Germans named by the German Government in France as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories, and mandates.

The French Government binds itself to prevent removal of German war and civil prisoners from France into French possessions or into foreign countries. Regarding prisoners already taken outside of France, as well as sick and wounded German prisoners who cannot be transported, exact lists

with the places of residence are to be produced. The German High Command assumes care of sick and wounded German war prisoners.

ARTICLE XX.

French troops in German prison camps will remain prisoners of war until conclusion of a peace.

ARTICLE XXI.

The French Government assumes responsibility for the security of all objects and valuables whose undamaged surrender or holding in readiness for German disposal is demanded in this agreement or whose removal outside the country is forbidden. The French Government is bound to compensate for all destruction, damage or removal contrary to agreement.

ARTICLE XXII.

The Armistice Commission, acting in accordance with the direction of the German High Command, will regulate and supervise the carrying out of the armistice agreement. It is the task of the Armistice Commission further to insure the necessary conformity of this agreement with the Italian-French armistice.

The French Government will send a delegation to the seat of the German Armistice Commission to represent the French wishes and to receive regulations from the German Armistice Commission for executing [the agreement].

ARTICLE XXIII.

This armistice agreement becomes effective as soon as the French Government also has reached an agreement with the Italian Government regarding cessation of hostilities.

Hostilities will be stopped six hours after the moment at which the Italian Government has notified the German Government of conclusion of its agreement. The German Government will notify the French Government of this time by wireless.

ARTICLE XXIV.

This agreement is valid until conclusion of a peace treaty. The German Government may terminate this agreement at any time with immediate effect if the French Government fails to fulfill the obligations it assumes under the agreement.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication No. 6312: Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, Series D, IX* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 671–676.

64. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long to U.S. State Department Officials Adolf A. Berle and James Dunn, June 26, 1940, Describing Methods of Obstructing the Granting of U.S. Visas to Applicants

Introduction

Some influential diplomats sought to impede the entry of Jewish would-be immigrants into the United States. In the summer of 1940 just after the fall of France, Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long explained to two of his colleagues methods whereby it could be made almost impossible for Jews to obtain visas to enter the United States. Long displayed no concern for the fact that this decision might well mean death or, at best, internment in a concentration camp for those Jews refused entry.

Primary Source

Attached is a memorandum from [Long's assistant] Mr. [Avra] Warren. I discussed the matter with him on the basis of this memorandum. There are two possibilities and I will discuss each category briefly.

NON-IMMIGRANTS

Their entry into the United States can be made to depend upon prior authorization by the Department [of State]. This would mean that the consuls would be divested of discretion and that all requests for non-immigrant visas (temporary visitor and transit visas) be passed upon here. It is quite feasible and can be done instantly. It will permit the Department to effectively control the immigration of persons in this category and private instructions can be given to the Visa Division as to nationalities which should not be admitted as well as to individuals who are to be excluded.

This must be done for universal application and could not be done as regards Germany, for instance, or Russia, for instance, or any other one government because it would first, invite retaliation and second, would probably be a violation of some of our treaty arrangements. The retaliation clause is in connection with Germany because it could mean the closing of our offices in almost all of Europe.

IMMIGRANTS

We can delay and effectively stop for a temporary period of indefinite length the number of immigrants into the United States. We could do this by simply advising our consuls to put every obstacle in the way and to require additional evidence and to resort to various administrative devices which would postpone and postpone and postpone the granting of the visas. However, this could only be temporary. In order to make it more definite it would have to be done by suspension of the rules under the law by the issuance of a proclamation of emergency—which I take it we are not yet ready to proclaim.

SUMMING UP

We can effectively control non-immigrants by prohibiting the issuance of visas unless the consent of the Department to this be obtained in advance for universal application.

We can temporarily prevent the number of immigrants from certain localities such as Cuba, Mexico and other places of origin of German intending immigrants by simply raising administrative obstacles.

The Department will be prepared to take these two steps immediately upon the decision but emphasis must be placed on the fact that discrimination must not be practiced and with the additional thought that in case a suspension of the regulations should be proclaimed under the need of an emergency, it would be universally applicable and would affect refugees from England.

The Canadian situation and travel across that border we can handle through an exception to the general rule and so advise our consuls in Canada.

Source: "Memo from Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, to State Department Officials dated June 26, 1940, Outlining Effective Ways to Obstruct the Granting of U.S. Visas," Public Broadcasting Service, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/barmemo.html.

65. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Recommending Additional Appropriations for National Defense, July 10, 1940

Introduction

In the summer of 1940, the stunning recent German successes in Europe impelled President Franklin D. Roosevelt to ask Congress for greatly increased funding for defense. As he himself pointed out, it was the third such request he had submitted in slightly under two months, an index of just how grave he considered the international situation to be.

Primary Source

…On May 16, in a message to the Congress, I pointed out that the swift and shocking developments of that time forced every neutral nation to look to its defenses in the light of new factors loosed by the brutal force of modern offensive war. I called attention to the treacherous use of the "fifth column," by which persons supposed to be peaceful visitors were actually a part of an enemy unit of occupation, and called especial attention to the necessity for

the protection of the whole American Hemisphere from control, invasion or domination. I asked at that time for a sum totaling $1,182,000,000 for the national defense.

On May 31, 1940, I again sent a message to the Congress, to say that the almost incredible events of the then past two weeks in the European conflict had necessitated another enlargement of our military program, and at that time I asked for $1,277,741,170 for the acceleration and development of our military and naval needs as measured in both machines and men.

Again today, in less than two months' time, the changes in the world situation are so great and so profound that I must come once again to the Congress to advise concerning new threats, new needs, and the imperative necessity of meeting them. Free men and free women in the United States look to us to defend their freedom against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Those enemies of freedom who hate free institutions now deride democratic Governments as weak and inefficient.

We, the free men and women of the United States, with memories of our fathers to inspire us and the hopes of our children to sustain us, are determined to be strong as well as free. The apologists for despotism and those who aid them by whispering defeatism or appeasement, assert that because we have not devoted our full energies to arms and to preparation for war that we are now incapable of defense.

I refute that imputation.

We fully understand the threat of the new enslavement in which men may not speak, may not listen, may not think. As these threats become more numerous and their dire meaning more clear, it deepens the determination of the American people to meet them with wholly adequate defense.

We have seen nation after nation, some of them weakened by treachery from within, succumb to the force of the aggressor. We see great nations still gallantly fighting against aggression, encouraged by high hope of ultimate victory.

That we are opposed to war is known not only to every American, but to every government in the world. We will not use our arms in a war of aggression; we will not send our men to take part in European wars.

But, we will repel aggression against the United States or the Western Hemisphere. The people and their representatives in the Congress know that the threats to our liberties, the threats to our security, the threats against our

way of life, the threats to our institutions of religion, of democracy, and of international good faith, have increased in number and gravity from month to month, from week to week, and almost from day to day.

It is because of these rapid changes; it is because of the grave danger to democratic institutions; and above all, it is because of the united will of the entire American people that I come to ask you for a further authorization of $4,848,171,957 for the national defense.

Let no man in this country or anywhere else believe that because we in America still cherish freedom of religion, of speech, of assembly, of the press; that because we maintain our free democratic political institutions by which the nation after full discussion and debate chooses its representatives and leaders for itself—let no man here or elsewhere believe that we are weak.

The United States is the greatest industrial nation in the world. Its people, as workers and as business men, have proved that they can unite in the national interest and that they can bring together the greatest assembly of human skills, of mechanical production, and of national resources, ever known in any nation.

The principal lesson of the war up to the present time is that partial defense is inadequate defense.

If the United States is to have any defense, it must have total defense.

We cannot defend ourselves a little here and a little there. We must be able to defend ourselves wholly and at any time.

Our plans for national security, therefore, should cover total defense. I believe that the people of this country are willing to make any sacrifice to attain that end.

After consultation with the War and Navy Departments and the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, I recommend a further program for the national defense. This contemplates the provision of funds and authorizations for the materiel requirements without which the manpower of the nation, if called into service, cannot effectively operate, either in the production of arms and goods, or their utilization in repelling attack.

In broad outline our immediate objectives are as follows:

To carry forward the Naval expansion program designed to build up the Navy to meet any possible combination of hostile naval forces.

To complete the total equipment for a land force of approximately 1,200,000 men, though of course this total of men would not be in the Army in time of peace.
To procure reserve stocks of tanks, guns, artillery, ammunition, etc., for another 800,000 men or a total of 2,000,000 men if a mobilization of such a force should become necessary.
To provide for manufacturing facilities, public and private, necessary to produce critical items of equipment for a land force of 2,000,000 men, and to produce the ordnance items required for the aircraft program of the Army and Navy—guns, bombs, armor, bombsights and ammunition.
Procurement of 15,000 additional planes for the Army and 4,000 for the Navy, complete with necessary spare engines, armaments, and the most modern equipment.

The foregoing program deals exclusively with materiel requirements. The Congress is now considering the enactment of a system of selective training for developing the necessary manpower to operate this materiel and manpower to fill army non-combat needs. In this way we can make certain that when this modern materiel becomes available, it will be placed in the hands of troops trained, seasoned, and ready, and that replacement materiel can be guaranteed. …

The total amount which I ask of the Congress in order that this program may be carried out with all reasonable speed is $2,161,441,957, which it is estimated would be spent out of the Treasury between now and July 1, 1941, and an additional $2,686,730,000 for contract authorizations.

So great a sum means sacrifice. So large a program means hard work—the participation of the whole country in the total defense of the country. This nation through sacrifice and work and unity proposes to remain free.

Source: *Development of United States Foreign Policy: Addresses and Messages of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 66–69.

66. Declaration on “Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of

the Americas," Adopted at the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Havana, July 30, 1940

Introduction

Meeting in Havana, Cuba, the foreign ministers of the United States and the various Latin American nations joined in a statement that an attack by a non-American nation on any one of them would be regarded as an attack on all.

Primary Source

The Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics

DECLARES

That any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which sign this declaration.

In case acts of aggression are committed or should there be reason to believe that an act of aggression is being prepared by a non-American nation against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American nation, the nations signatory to the present declaration will consult among themselves in order to agree upon the measure it may be advisable to take.

All the signatory nations, or two or more of them, according to circumstances, shall proceed to negotiate the necessary complementary agreements so as to organize cooperation for defense and the assistance that they shall lend each other in the event of aggressions such as those referred to in this declaration.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 562.

67. German Foreign Minister Count Joachim von Ribbentrop, Authority of Nazi Ambassador to Vichy France Otto Abetz, August 3, 1940

Introduction

After the armistice with Germany part of France was occupied, while until 1943 the remaining portion was ruled by a government based at Vichy and largely subservient to Germany. Otto Abetz, the Nazi ambassador to France, effectively functioned as a proconsul, supervising the nominally independent Vichy regime.

Primary Source

In answer to a question of the Quartermaster General, addressed to the High Command of the Armed Forces and transmitted by the latter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Führer has appointed Abetz, until now Minister, as Ambassador, and on my report has decreed the following:

I. Ambassador Abetz has the following functions in France:

1. To advise the military agencies on political matters.
2. To maintain permanent contact with the Vichy Government and its representatives in the occupied zone.
3. To influence the important political personalities in the occupied zone and in the unoccupied zone in a way favorable to our intentions.
4. To guide from the political point of view the press, the radio, and the propaganda in the occupied zone and to influence the responsible elements engaged in the molding of public opinion in the unoccupied zone.
5. To take care of the German, French, and Belgian citizens returning from internment camps.
6. To advise the secret military police and the Gestapo on the seizure of politically important documents.
7. To seize and secure all public art treasures and private art treasures, and particularly art treasures belonging to Jews, on the basis of special instructions relating thereto.

II. The Führer has expressly ordered that only Ambassador Abetz shall be responsible for all political questions in Occupied and Unoccupied France. Insofar as military interests are touched by his duties, Ambassador Abetz shall act only in agreement with the Military Command in France.

III. Ambassador Abetz will be attached to the Military Commander in France as his deputy. His domicile shall continue to be in Paris as hitherto. He will receive from me instructions for the accomplishment of his tasks and will be responsible solely to me. I shall greatly appreciate it if the High Command of the Armed Forces will give the necessary orders to the military agencies concerned as quickly as possible.

Source: *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945–1 October 1946,* Vol. 6 (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1948), 560–561 (Doc. RF-1061). The German text is in ibid., 32:432–433 (Doc. 3614-PS).

68. Reich Economics Minister Walter Funk, Memorandum for Hermann Göring, Proposals for a "New Order" in Europe, August 6, 1940

Introduction

In late June 1940, Hermann Göring, Adolf Hitler's deputy, instructed Walter Funk, the Reich's economics minister, to prepare and submit to him proposals for a "New Order" in Europe. These were to focus on the economic integration of the occupied territories with Germany proper, economic measures that might be taken against enemy states, and the eventual economic reconstruction of continental Europe. The proposals that Funk submitted focused primarily on the first of these mandates, envisaging effective German control of all the major sectors of the European economy.

Primary Source

The question of what form the European economy will finally take cannot of course be answered definitively at the present time.

I am working on the assumption that the integration of the occupied territories in the economy of Greater Germany and the reconstruction of a

continental European economy under German leadership will not occur through a single political act such as the conclusion of a customs or currency union, but that this goal will be achieved through a series of individual measures which will begin at once and to some extent have already begun. The decisive factor must be to link the European economies as completely and as closely as possible with the economy of Greater Germany. In the process, all measures which are designed to improve the satisfaction of German needs and to strengthen German economic influence in the various countries concerned must be given priority, while vice versa all measures which, from the standpoint of our greater German interests, are unimportant must be prevented or be postponed until later. From this point of view, at the moment the following measures are important and have priority:

1. The securing of as large a proportion as possible of European production for German requirements.
2. The extension of European production with a view to a further improvement in the possibilities of satisfying German needs from within Europe, i.e., the application of the principles of the Four Year Plan and the German Battle of Production to the European economy.
3. The creation of a European payments system (Central Clearing) on the basis of the *Reichsmark*, which in the first instance will provide the technical means for paying for the influx of German goods onto the German market and, secondly, will deal with the gold and credit aspects of the exchange of goods within Europe.
4. The control of international trade within Europe as well as European trade with overseas countries through inter-state agreements involving the exercise of German power and influence. The control of the economic and financial policy of the European states with the aim of aligning the economic-political methods and form of economic activity practiced by them as far as possible with the German norms.

   These questions are being dealt with at this moment in the territories occupied by the German Wehrmacht [army]; it must be our next task gradually to create a similar state of affairs in the other countries which are dependent on us.
5. The linking of the European economies with the greater German economy under German leadership in the following spheres:

a. The organization of the economy: the creation of organizational forms such as those represented in Germany by the Organization of Business [Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft] and the Reich Food Estate and the fusion of these organizations into a combined European organization under German leadership.
b. The inclusion of the relevant branches of European business in the German market-regulating associations (Cartells) at the same time ensuring that German leadership is firmly secured (iron, coal, metals, chemicals, electricity etc.).
c. Securing control of the capital of the most important European industrial undertakings (armaments industry, iron and metal industries, etc.).
d. The infiltration of the decisive posts in European business with suitable German experts.

6. Simplification of the practice of granting permits for international trade within Europe, the removal of restrictive regulations, the adaptation of the customs arrangements to the need for an intensification of trade and cooperation in the industrial, raw material, and agrarian spheres.

As far as point 2 of your commission, "Economic conflict with the enemy states," is concerned, I consider it premature to make you any suggestions at present. Preparations are, however, underway in house. In this connection, I would like to reiterate my view that in order to construct a unified European *Grossraumwirtschaft* [new economic order] under German leadership it is vital to take over the leading business posts in Europe which at the moment are all in possession of Englishmen and Frenchmen. Similarly, we need a reserve of foreign exchange and raw materials for the transitional period in order to be able to remove the restrictions on German consumption as soon as possible. I am thinking in terms of a sum of circa ten billion gold marks which represents the equivalent of the value of the German private property stolen by the Allies.

I would be grateful if you would inform me of your approval of the proposed work programme and of any further wishes you may have in connection with it. The relevant Ministries, in particular the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the Foreign Ministry, have expressed their approval of the programme.

Source: J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., *Nazism 1919–1945,* Vol. 3, *Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1988), 281–282. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

69. "The Few": Winston Churchill, Speech in the British House of Commons, August 20, 1940

Introduction

At the height of the Battle of Britain when German air raids sought to pulverize British industrial towns and eliminate the Royal Air Force, Winston Churchill once more addressed the House of Commons. As always, he reiterated British determination to continue fighting against Germany and updated the progress made in British rearmament since the disaster of Dunkirk. Churchill defended Britain's policy of refusing to allow supplies into Europe even to feed civilians in the occupied countries of the continent. The British premier described the "destroyers for bases" deal with the United States then under negotiation whereby the United States would obtain base rights in various British Caribbean islands in return for providing 50 overage destroyers and other war supplies. He expressed his confidence that the United States and Britain would work ever more closely together against Hitler. Churchill also paid moving and memorable tribute to the British airmen, "the few," who were holding off Hitler's forces.

Primary Source

Rather more than a quarter of a year has passed since the new Government came into power in this country. What a cataract of disaster has poured out upon us since then! The trustful Dutch overwhelmed; their beloved and respected Sovereign driven into exile; the peaceful city of Rotterdam the scene of a massacre as hideous and brutal as anything in the Thirty Years' War; Belgium invaded and beaten down; our own fine Expeditionary Force, which King Leopold called to his rescue, cut off and almost captured, escaping as it seemed only by a miracle and with the loss of all its equipment;

our Ally, France, out; Italy in against us; all France in the power of the enemy, all its arsenals and vast masses of military material converted or convertible to the enemy's use; a puppet Government set up at Vichy which may at any moment be forced to become our foe; the whole western seaboard of Europe from the North Cape to the Spanish frontier in German hands; all the ports, all the airfields on this immense front employed against us as potential springboards of invasion. Moreover, the German air power, numerically so far outstripping ours, has been brought so close to our Island that what we used to dread greatly has come to pass and the hostile bombers not only reach our shores in a few minutes and from many directions, but can be escorted by their fighting aircraft. Why, Sir, if we had been confronted at the beginning of May with such a prospect, it would have seemed incredible that at the end of a period of horror and disaster, or at this point in a period of horror and disaster, we should stand erect, sure of ourselves, masters of our fate and with the conviction of final victory burning unquenchable in our hearts. Few would have believed we could survive; none would have believed that we should today not only feel stronger but should actually be stronger than we have ever been before.

Let us see what has happened on the other side of the scales. The British nation and the British Empire, finding themselves alone, stood undismayed against disaster. No one flinched or wavered; nay, some who formerly thought of peace, now think only of war. Our people are united and resolved, as they have never been before. Death and ruin have become small things compared with the shame of defeat or failure in duty. We cannot tell what lies ahead. It may be that even greater ordeals lie before us. We shall face whatever is coming to us. We are sure of ourselves and of our cause, and that is the supreme fact which has emerged in these months of trial.

Meanwhile, we have not only fortified our hearts but our Island. We have rearmed and rebuilt our armies in a degree which would have been deemed impossible a few months ago. We have ferried across the Atlantic, in the month of July, thanks to our friends over there, an immense mass of munitions of all kinds: cannon, rifles, machine guns, cartridges and shell, all safely landed without the loss of a gun or a round. The output of our own factories, working as they have never worked before, has poured forth to the troops. The whole British Army is at home. More than 2,000,000 determined men have rifles and bayonets in their hands tonight, and three-quarters of

them are in regular military formations. We have never had armies like this in our Island in time of war. The whole Island bristles against invaders, from the sea or from the air. …

Our Navy is far stronger than it was at the beginning of the war. The great flow of new construction set on foot at the outbreak is now beginning to come in. We hope our friends across the ocean will send us a timely reinforcement to bridge the gap between the peace flotillas of 1939 and the war flotillas of 1941. There is no difficulty in sending such aid. The seas and oceans are open. The U-boats are contained. The magnetic mine is, up to the present time, effectively mastered. The merchant tonnage under the British flag, after a year of unlimited U-boat war, after eight months of intensive mining attack, is larger than when we began. We have, in addition, under our control at least 4,000,000 tons of shipping from the captive countries which has taken refuge here or in the harbors of the Empire. Our stocks of food of all kinds are far more abundant than in the days of peace, and a large and growing program of food production is on foot.

Why do I say all this? Not, assuredly, to boast; not, assuredly, to give the slightest countenance to complacency. The dangers we face are still enormous, but so are our advantages and resources. I recount them because the people have a right to know that there are solid grounds for the confidence which we feel, and that we have good reason to believe ourselves capable, as I said in a very dark hour two months ago, of continuing the war "if necessary alone, if necessary for years."…

The great air battle which has been in progress over this Island for the last few weeks has recently attained a high intensity. It is too soon to attempt to assign limits either to its scale or to its duration. We must certainly expect that greater efforts will be made by the enemy than any he has so far put forth. …

On the other hand, the conditions and course of the fighting have so far been favorable to us. I told the House two months ago that, whereas in France our fighter aircraft were wont to inflict a loss of two or three to one upon the Germans, and in the fighting at Dunkirk, which was a kind of no-man's-land, a loss of about three or four to one, we expected that in an attack on this Island we should achieve a larger ratio. This has certainly come true. …

We believe that we shall be able to continue the air struggle indefinitely and as long as the enemy pleases, and the longer it continues the more rapid

will be our approach, first towards that parity, and then into that superiority, in the air upon which in a large measure the decision of the war depends.

The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the World War by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few. All hearts go out to the fighter pilots, whose brilliant actions we see with our own eyes day after day; but we must never forget that all the time, night after night, month after month, our bomber squadrons travel far into Germany, find their targets in the darkness by the highest navigational skill, aim their attacks, often under the heaviest fire, often with serious loss, with deliberate careful discrimination, and inflict shattering blows upon the whole of the technical and war-making structure of the Nazi power.

The defection of France has, of course, been deeply damaging to our position. …

Most of the other countries that have been overrun by Germany for the time being have persevered valiantly and faithfully. The Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Dutch, the Belgians are still in the field, sword in hand, recognized by Great Britain and the United States as the sole representative authorities and lawful Governments of their respective States.

That France alone should lie prostrate at this moment is the crime, not of a great and noble nation, but of what are called “the men of Vichy.” We have profound sympathy with the French people. Our old comradeship with France is not dead. In General de Gaulle and his gallant band, that comradeship takes an effective form. These free Frenchmen have been condemned to death by Vichy, but the day will come, as surely as the sun will rise tomorrow, when their names will be held in honor, and their names will be graven in stone in the streets and villages of a France restored in a liberated Europe to its full freedom and its ancient fame. …

I do not think it would be wise at this moment, while the battle rages and the war is still perhaps only in its earlier stage, to embark upon elaborate speculations about the future shape which should be given to Europe or the new securities which must be arranged to spare mankind the miseries of a third World War. The ground is not new, it has been frequently traversed and

explored, and many ideas are held about it in common by all good men, and all free men. But before we can undertake the task of rebuilding we have not only to be convinced ourselves, but we have to convince all other countries that the Nazi tyranny is going to be finally broken. The right to guide the course of world history is the noblest prize of victory. We are still toiling up the hill; we have not yet reached the crest-line of it; we cannot survey the landscape or even imagine what its condition will be when that longed-for morning comes. The task which lies before us immediately is at once more practical, more simple and more stern. I hope—indeed, I pray—that we shall not be found unworthy of our victory if after toil and tribulation it is granted to us. For the rest, we have to gain the victory. That is our task.

There is, however, one direction in which we can see a little more clearly ahead. We have to think not only for ourselves but for the lasting security of the cause and principles for which we are fighting and of the long future of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Some months ago we came to the conclusion that the interests of the United States and of the British Empire both required that the United States should have facilities for the naval and air defense of the Western Hemisphere against the attack of a Nazi power which might have acquired temporary but lengthy control of a large part of Western Europe and its formidable resources. We had therefore decided spontaneously, and without being asked or offered any inducement, to inform the Government of the United States that we would be glad to place such defense facilities at their disposal by leasing suitable sites in our Transatlantic possessions for their greater security against the unmeasured dangers of the future. The principle of association of interests for common purposes between Great Britain and the United States had developed even before the war. Various agreements had been reached about certain small islands in the Pacific Ocean which had become important as air fueling points. In all this line of thought we found ourselves in very close harmony with the Government of Canada.

Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt in the United States about the air and naval defense of their Atlantic seaboard, and President Roosevelt has recently made it clear that he would like to discuss with us, and with the Dominion of Canada and with Newfoundland, the development of American naval and air facilities in Newfoundland and in the West Indies. There is, of course, no question of any transference of sovereignty—that has never been

suggested—or of any action being taken without the consent or against the wishes of the various Colonies concerned; but for our part, His Majesty's Government are entirely willing to accord defense facilities to the United States on a 99 years' leasehold basis, and we feel sure that our interests no less than theirs, and the interests of the Colonies themselves and of Canada and Newfoundland, will be served thereby. These are important steps. Undoubtedly this process means that these two great organizations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage. No one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on full flood. Let us not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished; no one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on full flood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days.

Source: "The Few: August 20, 1940," The Churchill Centre, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/113-the-few. Quotations from the works of Winston S. Churchill reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown, London, on behalf of the Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Copyright © The Estate of Winston S. Churchill.

70. United States National Defense Advisory Commission Directive, August 31, 1940 (as Sent by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the U.S. Congress, September 13, 1940)

Introduction

This government directive on wartime labor was largely written by Sidney Hillman, one of the top leaders of the Committee on Industrial Organization, which in the later 1930s had spearheaded the drive to unionize such major industries as steel and automobile production. In May 1940 as German forces appeared likely to defeat France, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced a huge new program to increase American military and naval production and appointed the seven-man National Defense Advisory Commission to oversee this effort. Hillman, a longtime Roosevelt ally, was entrusted with

coordinating defense labor. As the *New York Times* reported, on September 13, 1940, Roosevelt sent this directive to the U.S. Congress.

Primary Source

Primary among the objectives of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense is the increase in production of materials required by our armed forces and the assurance of adequate future supply of such materials with the least possible disturbance to production of supplies for the civilian population. The scope of our present program entails bringing into production many of our unused resources of agriculture, manufacturing and man power.

This program can be used in the public interest as a vehicle to reduce unemployment and otherwise strengthen the human fiber of our nation. In the selection of plant locations for new production, in the interest of national defense, great weight must be given to this factor.

In order that surplus and unemployed labor may be absorbed … all reasonable efforts should be made to avoid hours in excess of 40 per week. However, in emergencies or where the needs of the national defense cannot be otherwise met, exceptions to this standard should be permitted. When the requirements of the defense program make it necessary to work in excess of these hours, or where work is required on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, overtime should be paid in accordance with the recognized local practices.

All work carried on as part of the defense program should comply with Federal statutory provisions affecting labor wherever such provisions are applicable. This applies to the Walsh-Healey Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, etc. There should be compliance with State and local statutes affecting labor relations, hours of work, wages, Workmen's Compensation, safety, sanitation, etc.

Adequate provision should be made for the health and safety of employes.

As far as possible, the local employment or other agencies designated by the United States Employment Service should be utilized.

Workers should not be discriminated against because of age, sex, race, or color.

Adequate housing facilities should be made available for employees.

The commission reaffirms the principles enunciated by the Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army in his order of Nov. 15, 1917, relative to the relation of labor standards to efficient production:

"Industrial history proves that reasonable hours, fair working conditions, and a proper wage scale are essential to high production. Every attempt should be made to conserve in every way possible all our achievements in the way of social betterment. But the pressing argument for maintaining industrial safeguards in the present emergency is that they actually contribute to efficiency."

Source: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Message to Congress on Defense Contracts and Labor Policy," September 13, 1940, in *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 1940,* edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 417–420.

71. The Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement: Secretary of State Cordell Hull to British Ambassador Lord Lothian, September 2, 1940

Introduction

After negotiations lasting all summer, in September 1940 Great Britain and the United States reached an agreement whereby Great Britain accorded the United States basing rights in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Caribbean, and British Guiana. In return, the United States supplied 50 surplus destroyers to Britain to augment its naval forces in the battle against Hitler.

Primary Source

I have received your note of September 2, 1940, of which the text is as follows:

I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the national security of the United States and their desire to strengthen the ability of the United States to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defence of the Western Hemisphere, His Majesty's Government will secure the grant to the Government of the United States, freely and without consideration, of the lease for immediate establishment and use of naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay of Bermuda.

Furthermore, in view of the above and in view of the desire of the United States to acquire additional air and naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana, and without endeavouring to place a monetary or commercial value upon the many tangible and intangible rights and properties involved, His Majesty's Government will make available to the United States for

immediate establishment and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the eastern side of the Bahamas, the southern coast of Jamaica, the western coast of St. Lucia, the west coast of Trinidad in the Gulf of Paria, in the island of Antigua and in British Guiana within fifty miles of Georgetown, in exchange for naval and military equipment and material which the United States Government will transfer to His Majesty's Government.

All the bases and facilities referred to in the preceding paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a period of ninety-nine years, free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in question.

His Majesty's Government, in the leases to be agreed upon, will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases, and appropriate provisions for their control.

Without prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the United States authorities and their jurisdiction within the leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States within these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in which these areas are situated, shall be determined by common agreement.

The exact location and bounds of the aforesaid bases, the necessary seaward, coast and anti-aircraft defences, the location of sufficient military garrisons, stores and other necessary auxiliary facilities shall be determined by common agreement. His Majesty's Government are prepared to designate immediately experts to meet with experts of the United States for these purposes. Should these experts be unable to agree in any particular situation, except in the case of Newfoundland and Bermuda, the matter shall be settled by the Secretary of State of the United States and His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am directed by the President to reply to your note as follows: The Government of the United States appreciates the declarations and the generous action of His Majesty's Government as contained in your

communication which are destined to enhance the national security of the United States and greatly to strengthen its ability to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. It therefore gladly accepts the proposals.

The Government of the United States will immediately designate experts to meet with experts designated by His Majesty's Government to determine upon the exact location of the naval and air bases mentioned in your communication under acknowledgment.

In consideration of the declarations above quoted, the Government of the United States will immediately transfer to His Majesty's Government fifty United States Navy destroyers generally referred to as the twelve hundred–ton type.

Source: *Private Laws, Concurrent Resolutions, Treaties, International Agreements Other Than Treaties, and Proclamations:* Part 2, *United States Statutes at Large Containing the Laws and Concurrent Resolutions Enacted during the Second and Third Sessions of the Seventy-Sixth Congress of the United States of America, 1939–1941, and Treaties, International Agreements Other Than Treaties, Proclamations, and Reorganization Plans,* Vol. 54 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 2406–2408.

72. Speech of Dr. Robert Ley, Director of the German Labor Front, as Reported in the Swedish Press, September 15, 1940

Introduction

In February 1940, Adolf Hitler instructed Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front, a government agency whose aim was to further the welfare of the German people, to prepare a scheme for comprehensive old-age pensions. Ley apparently persuaded Hitler to endorse this proposal on the grounds that it would encourage all Germans to remain loyal to the state while enduring wartime difficulties and deprivation. Pensions would also be conditional on individuals' support for the National Socialist regime. Ley clearly intended that his pension scheme would constitute only one part of a wide-ranging social welfare program. The Finance and Labor Ministries opposed Ley's plans as impracticable. They were, however, symptomatic of the degree to

which, to win popular support for the war effort, most governments at war felt obliged to promise their citizenry the reward of future social benefits.

Primary Source

The German people are going to be rewarded for their wartime sacrifices with an old age free from cares.

In eighteen years Germany will not be recognizable. A proletarian nation will have become a master nation.

In ten years' time the German worker will live better than an English lord.

The meeting started late because the Reich Chancellor, Hitler, was spending the evening with Dr. Ley as his guest. Hitler regularly rings up his closest colleagues and invites himself for a few hours. This evening he told Dr. Ley among other things that house construction methods were completely out of date. We are still building in exactly the same way as a thousand years ago by putting brick upon brick. Building technology has never been modernized or rationalized. Germany will have the task of reforming the construction industry. Prefabricated materials will have to be used. If in the future everything has been standardized and prefabricated then later on it will only be necessary to put the materials together at the building site so that a house can be built in a few days. According to Dr. Ley, this type of building will be 50 per cent cheaper than hitherto.

The starting point of the interview was the creation of a new old age pensions scheme which has been in preparation for a year. And which is apparently now ready. It is intended to be the reward for the wartime sacrifices made by the German people. I asked Dr. Ley if it would be based on some kind of insurance scheme. His reply was:

It will be based on completely new principles, since the whole nation will guarantee that the old age pensions are paid for by the national community. A social contribution will be paid as part of income tax and it is now my task through rationalization to achieve a more effective use of the same amount of money. I rejected an insurance-based scheme; it creates too large an administrative apparatus and, in any case, is a compulsory savings system to which the poor do not have access. The financial apparatus of the state will take over responsibility for collecting the money for the old age pensions and also for payment. In this way there will be no administrative costs. The

pensions will be three times higher than hitherto because the administrative costs will have been saved. Thus, invalidity pensions will be increased from RM [reichsmarks] 33 to RM 90 per month. The old age pension will increase from the current minimum of RM 60 to a maximum of RM 250. In addition to the normal pensions, there will be an honorarium for the victims of the war and for those injured at work, for example for miners who have become invalids through their work. Mothers who have at least four children will receive an equivalent subsidy. They will not only be decorated with the Mothers' Cross but will get their honorarium in old age.

All in all, we will need 8 billion for the new old age pension scheme. Up to now this sum has been spent on insurance schemes. Thus, no new burden will be placed on the nation. The administrative costs will now be completely eliminated since the tax system will take over the scheme. This will save 2 billion. Furthermore, I have devised a scheme to utilize the unemployment insurance for the old age pensions, which will bring in another 2 billion. As is well known, the former will no longer be needed, since there will not be any unemployment in Germany.

In future, the workers will not receive their long wage slips as they do now with the numerous deductions for insurance and unemployment benefit. All these figures made the workers suspicious; now this will all be done via taxation.

If we take over the insurance capital, Dr. Ley continued, then we hope that we can reduce interest rates to 2 or 1.5 per cent and, when this is achieved, it will benefit the individual consumer. We will no longer need the insurance companies' money, since the housing construction industry, for which it was needed hitherto, is going to be financed by the state.

The health insurance offices will also disappear and be replaced by a health service. The party will build Community Houses in all towns. Doctors and dentists will work there. The health of every German will be examined once a year just like a car engine is serviced once a year. There will be three groups of doctors:

General practitioners, who know the genetic history of every single family and who have the families' trust.
Company doctors who are employed in the factories.

Specialists who will be treated as artists and, as a result, will have a special position in the national community.
The practice of medicine will be licensed. Its economic basis will be secured and, in addition, there will be the opportunity for private practice.

The post-war national socialist reforms will revolutionize social conditions, continued Dr. Ley, in that in future there would be no difference in the payment of workers of the hand and workers of the brain. Hitler wants payment in future to be made in accordance with three principles: the danger involved in the work (for this reason miners will be paid the most), the difficulty of the occupation, and, finally, according to performance. In future, the piecework rates will be set not by the plant managers but by independent agencies. The wages principle will be radically reformed. The wage will be divided into a tied and a free sum. In future, people will not be able to buy just what they want. Just as at the moment the rationing system prevents many people from buying more than a certain amount of many goods, the same will be true in the future. The goods which Germany has to import will be controlled by the state. The use of wages will be directed in accordance with the interests of the state. Since Germany has too little wool, it is not on for certain people to buy ten suits and hang them in their wardrobes. Similarly, it is not on for people to drink twenty-five cups of coffee when one is enough. The demand for imported goods will be restricted, whereas people will gladly purchase what we ourselves produce in quantity, such as, for example, the Volkswagen from German steel. It is Hitler's plan to pay wages in coupons so that people can have wage rises but only on condition that they use the higher wages to buy a Volkswagen or a house on an estate. So the state will say: OK you can have more money but you must invest the extra income in a house.

In future there will be an eight-hour working day in Germany. The laws which currently prevent workers from freely choosing their place of work will be repealed. The weekend will go from Saturday midday until Monday morning. Everybody will have holidays and over the next ten years Dr. Ley intends to build ten spa hotels, as well as the new large complex in Rügen with 20,000 beds, and finally KdF [the Nazi leisure program, Strength Through Joy] hotels with 2,400 beds in each city.

The training period for young people will be shortened. The apprentice period will be reduced through rationalization from four years to two.

Finally, a major building programme will be carried out. Very shortly Hitler will sign a decree to this effect. Three rooms with a large kitchen and bathroom will become the norm. They will cost RM 30 per month since the rents are going to be halved and it will be 50 per cent cheaper to build prefabricated houses.

During the course of the press conference, Dr. Ley repeatedly emphasized that power means money. After the war the role of London will have been played out and Germany will have the power. Then Germany will be rich enough to realize its programme so that in ten years' time the German worker will be better off than an English lord.

Source: Jeremy Noakes, ed., *Nazism 1919–1945,* Vol. 4, *The Home Front in World War II* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1998), 289–291. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

73. The Selective Service Act, September 16, 1940

Introduction

Selective service legislation was eventually passed in September 1940, at the height of a presidential election campaign. All American men between the ages of 21 and 36 were required to register for the draft and, if called up, to serve for 1 year. Should Congress declare that the national interest was endangered, their term of service might be extended. No more than 900,000 men could be trained under the act at any one time, and inductees could not serve outside the Western Hemisphere. More than 16 million men signed up on October 16, 1940, the day selected for implementation of the legislation, which—although later greatly expanded—provided the basis for the system of conscription in operation throughout World War II. The act also empowered the president to compel private businesses to give priority to the production of goods for the war effort.

Primary Source

Public Law 783, 76 Cong., 2d Sess., An Act to Provide for the Common Defense by Increasing the Personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and Providing for Its Training.

…*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* that (a) the Congress hereby declares that it is imperative to increase and train the personnel of the armed forces of the United States.

(b) The Congress further declares that in a free society the obligation and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system of selective compulsory military training and service.

(c) The Congress further declares, in accordance with our traditional military policy as expressed in the National Defense Act of 1916, as amended, that it is essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard, as an integral part of the first-line defenses of this Nation, be at all times maintained and assured. To this end, it is the intent of the Congress that whenever the Congress shall determine that troops are needed for the national security in excess of those of the Regular Army and those in active training and service under section 3(b), the National Guard of the United States, or such part thereof as may be necessary, shall be ordered to active Federal service and continued therein so long as such necessity exists.

Sec. 2. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, it shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and of every male alien residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner and in such age group or groups, as shall be determined by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.

Sec. 3. (a) Except as otherwise provided in the Act, every male citizen of the United States, and every male alien residing in the United States who has declared his intention to become such a citizen, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six at the time fixed for his registration, shall be liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States. The President is authorized from time to time, whether or not a state of war exists,

to select and induct into the land and naval forces of the United States for training and service, in the manner provided in this Act, such number of men as in his judgment is required for such forces in the national interest: *Provided,* That within the limits of the quota determined under section 4 (b) for the subdivision in which he resides, any person, regardless of race or color, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-six, shall be afforded an opportunity to volunteer for induction into the land or naval forces of the United States for the training and service prescribed in subsection (b), but no person who so volunteers shall be inducted for such training so long as he is deferred after classification: *Provided further,* That no men shall be inducted for such training and service until adequate provision shall have been made for such shelter, sanitary facilities, water supplies, heating and lighting arrangements, medical care, and hospital accommodations, for such men, as may be determined by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be, to be essential to public and personal health: *Provided further,* That except in time of war there shall not be in active training or service in the land forces of the United States at any one time under subsection (b) more than nine hundred thousand men inducted under the provisions of this Act. The men inducted into the land or naval forces for training and service under this Act shall be assigned to camps or units of such forces.

(b) Each man inducted under the provisions of subsection (a) shall serve for a training and service period of twelve consecutive months, unless sooner discharged, except that whenever the Congress has declared that the national interest is imperiled, such twelve-month period may be extended by the President to such time as may be necessary in the interests of national defense.

(c) Each such man, after the completion of his period of training and service under subsection (b), shall be transferred to a reserve component of the land or naval forces of the United States; and until he attains the age of forty-five, or until the expiration of a period of ten years after such transfer, or until he is discharged from such reserve component, whichever occurs first, he shall be deemed to be a member of such reserve component and shall be subject to such additional training and service as may now or hereafter be prescribed by law: *Provided,* That any man who completes at least twelve months' training and service in the land forces under subsection (b), and who

thereafter serves satisfactorily in the Regular Army or in the active National Guard for a period of at least two years, shall, in time of peace, be relieved from any liability to serve in any reserve component of the land or naval forces of the United States and from further liability for the training and service under subsection (b), but nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any such man, while in a reserve component of such forces, from being ordered or called to active duty, in such forces.

(d) With respect to the men inducted for training and service under this Act there shall be paid, allowed, and extended the same pay, allowances, pensions, disability and death compensation, and other benefits as are provided by law in the case of other enlisted men of like grades and length of service of that component of the land or naval forces to which they are assigned, and after transfer to a reserve component of the land or naval forces as provided in subsection (c) there shall be paid, allowed and extended with respect to them the same benefits as are provided by law in like cases with respect to other members of such reserve component. Men in such training and service and men who have been so transferred to reserve components shall have an opportunity to qualify for promotion.

(e) Persons inducted into the land forces of the United States under this Act shall not be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the Territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands. …

Sec. 4. (a) The selection of men for training and service under section 3 (other than those who are voluntarily inducted pursuant to this Act) shall be made in an impartial manner, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, from the men who are liable for such training and service and who at the time of selection are registered and classified but not deferred or exempted: *Provided,* That in the selection and training of men under this Act, and in the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this Act, there shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color. …

[*Following sections exempted ministers of religion and theology students, occupations the president determined to be of national importance, college students, and conscientious objectors on grounds of religion.*]

Sec. 9. The President is empowered, through the head of the War Department or the Navy Department of the Government, in addition to the

present authorized methods of purchase or procurement, to place an order with any individual, firm, association, company, corporation, or organized manufacturing industry for such product or material as may be required, and which is of the nature and kind usually produced or capable of being produced by such individual, firm, company, association, corporation, or organized manufacturing industry.

Compliance with all such orders for products or material shall be obligatory on any individual firm, association, company, corporation, or organized manufacturing industry or the responsible head or heads thereof and shall take precedence over all other orders and contracts theretofore placed with such individual, firm, company, association, corporation, or organized manufacturing industry, and any individual, firm, association, company, corporation, or organized manufacturing industry or the responsible head or heads thereof owning or operating any plant equipped for the manufacture of arms or ammunition or parts of ammunition, or any necessary supplies or equipment for the Army or Navy, and any individual firm, association, company, corporation, or organized manufacturing industry or the responsible head or heads thereof owning or operating any manufacturing plant, which, in the opinion of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy shall be capable of being readily transformed into a plant for the manufacture of arms or ammunition, or parts thereof, or other necessary supplies or equipment, who shall refuse to give to the United States such preference in the matter of the execution of orders, or who shall refuse to manufacture the kind, quantity, or quality of arms or ammunition, or the parts thereof, or any necessary supplies or equipment, as ordered by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, or who shall refuse to furnish such arms, ammunition, or parts of ammunition, or other supplies or equipment, at a reasonable price as determined by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be, then and in either such case, the President, through the head of the War or Navy Departments of the Government, in addition to the present authorized methods of purchase or procurement, is hereby authorized to take immediate possession of any such plant or plants, and through the appropriate branch, bureau, or department of the Army or Navy to manufacture therein such product or material as may be required, and any individual firm, company, association, or corporation, or organized manufacturing industry or the responsible head or heads thereof,

failing to comply with the provision of this section shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine not exceeding $50,000. …

[*Following sections provided for the establishment of local selective service boards to implement the legislation, and provided penalties for evading the law*.]

Source: The Selective Service (Burke-Wadsworth) Act, Pub.L. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885, enacted September 16, 1940. Reprinted in John O'Sullivan and Alan M. Meckler, eds., *The Draft and Its Enemies: A Documentary History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 176–186.

74. Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, Signed in Berlin, September 27, 1940

Introduction

In September 1940 the governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan formally allied themselves with each other to establish a "new order" in both Europe and Asia. This alignment effectively linked all the various opponents of the Western democracies, intensifying the ideological aspects of the international conflict.

Primary Source

The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.

Furthermore, it is the desire of the three governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized.

Accordingly, the governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE ONE

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishment of a new order in Europe.

ARTICLE TWO

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in greater East Asia.

ARTICLE THREE

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

ARTICLE FOUR

With the view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, members which are to be appointed by the respective governments of Germany, Italy and Japan will meet without delay.

ARTICLE FIVE

Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting powers and Soviet Russia.

ARTICLE SIX

The present pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force 10 years from the date of its coming into force. At the proper

time before expiration of said term, the high contracting parties shall at the request of any of them enter into negotiations for its renewal.

Source: "Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/triparti.asp.

75. Undated Statement Handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador, October 8, 1940

Introduction

From the beginning of outright war between Japan and China in 1937, the U.S. government gradually imposed trade embargoes of increasing severity on goods and materials that might assist the Japanese war effort. At the end of September 1940, the regulations on iron and steel scrap were tightened dramatically. One week later, the Japanese ambassador delivered a formal protest on the matter to the secretary of state.

Primary Source

Since iron and steel scrap classified as No. 1 heavy melting scrap was placed under export-licensing system on July 26, 1940, permission of the United States Government was obtained up to August 19 of the same year for 99 percent of applications for shipments to Japan.

In the light of this fact, the sudden enlargement of the iron and steel scrap licensing system to include all grades of these materials is hardly explicable from the standpoint of national defense, on which the regulation of September 30, 1940, is purported to be based.

The discriminatory feature of the announcement, that licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only, has created a widespread impression in Japan that it was motivated by a desire to bring pressure upon her.

The fact that the majority of essential articles and materials that Japan desires to import from America is placed under licensing system is causing a

feeling of tension among the people of Japan, who naturally presume that the system is intended to be a precursor of severance of economic relations between Japan and the United States.

In view of the high feeling in Japan it is apprehended that, in the event of continuation by the United States Government of the present attitude toward Japan in matters of trade restriction, especially if it leads to the imposition of further measures of curtailment, future relations between Japan and the United States will be unpredictable.

It is a matter of course that the Governments of both Japan and the United States should endeavor as best they can to preclude such an eventuality. To this endeavor the Japanese Government will devote itself and trusts that it may have the full cooperation of the United States Government.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 579.

76. Mao Zedong, Telegram to Georgi Dimitrov and Dmitry Zakharovich Manuilsky, November 7, 1940

Introduction

By late 1940 the Chinese Communists, especially their dominant leader, Mao Zedong, disliked the united front alliance with China's governing Guomindang (Nationalist Party). From then onward throughout the war, Mao repeatedly charged that Guomindang leaders were ready to surrender or at least reach some accommodation with the occupying Japanese. On numerous occasions he unsuccessfully sought the sanction of Soviet officials in the Comintern to break with the Guomindang, an attitude that ultimately contributed to the beginning of the Chinese Civil War shortly after the 1945 Japanese surrender. Comintern officials passed on this and similar telegrams to Soviet president Joseph Stalin. The underlining was done by the recipients.

Primary Source

Preparing for capitulation, Chiang Kai-shek has lately been inspiring a broad anti-Communist campaign to clear the way to direct capitulation to Japan. The propaganda about China's alleged adherence to the Anglo-American bloc is merely a smokescreen to camouflage capitulation. However, Chiang Kai-shek still takes into account the position of the Soviet Union and fears protests by the Chinese people. After Com.[rade] Stalin's telegram to Chiang Kai-shek arrived, there were signs that the Guomindang was relenting toward the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union can further increase its pressure on Chiang Kai-shek and we, on our part, increase our activity, it may be possible to delay his capitulation and the broad anti-Communist military expedition; and if it is possible to delay them for two to three more months, our situation will very much improve. Currently, Chiang Kai-shek is trying to push us out of central China and Shandong Province (where we have 300 thousand people, including 200 thousand troops and 70–80 thousand activists of different kinds) and make us retreat into northern China. We cannot accept these demands of Chiang Kai-shek, since the Japanese are relentlessly organizing punitive expeditions in northern China: our bases are diminishing and shrinking daily. There are serious problems with food and supplies, and we already have 500 thousand people in northern China, including 300 thousand troops and various kinds of activists, and their lives and struggle are extremely difficult.

Chiang Kai-shek's plan is to drive our forces to northern China, i.e., to the valley of the old tributary of the Yellow River. Our forces are being surrounded by fortified zones (the construction of these zones is already going at a fast pace) in order to expose us to Japanese fire and to Chiang Kai-shek and so liquidate us.

Chiang Kai-shek demands that we evacuate our troops from central China and Shandong Province to the provinces of Hebei, Qahar, and Shanxi in one month. If this demand is not met on time, he will start a war against us. The military units of Tang Enbo or Pin Xiang, totaling about 200 thousand people, have already started moving towards the eastern and northeastern regions of Anhui. The anti-Communist war may break out at any moment.

At this time, we are stepping up the struggle throughout the country against capitulation to Japan and against the splitting of the united anti-Japanese national front. On the one hand, we will soften our stance toward Chiang Kai-shek and agree to evacuate part of our 4th Army, which is located in the southern valley of the Yangtse River and in its northern valley in order to delay Chiang Kai-shek's attack against us. However, there is no way that we can agree to his demand that all our units leave central China and move to the three provinces of northern China, since we cannot put ourselves in a situation where we will be surrounded by a new wall of China, where we will have both Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese confronting us, where we will be eliminated by them and thus give Chiang Kai-shek an opportunity to quietly capitulate to the Japanese. If we take a conciliatory position, before Chiang Kai-shek attacks us, we will begin a counteroffensive for defensive purposes, in order to smash his troops and fortified zones. In this case, our military plan will be to leave the bulk of our forces (about 350 thousand soldiers) to struggle against the Japanese in different anti-Japanese bases, assemble some of our auxiliary and shock troops (about 150 thousand soldiers) to deliver a blow at the rear of the enemy's expeditionary force, i.e., in Henan, Gansu, and other provinces, in order to completely smash Chiang Kai-shek's expedition and turn the political situation around (this is possible).

If a combined offensive of Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese [takes place], and if we do not undertake the aforementioned military action, it will be impossible to forestall their attack and deter it, and as a result, our situation will be very precarious. However, there is also a danger that if we do proceed with this useful (for us) undertaking, Chiang Kai-shek will make sure to accuse us, in order to deceive the people, of disrupting the anti-Japanese struggle. This may result in a final split between us and Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, politically it [the attack] is not advantageous to us, even though the mere fact of our troops moving into the rear of the expeditionary force does not imply any desire on our part to break with Chiang Kai-shek.

Although at this time our slogans will be: "To ask Chiang Kai-shek to remove and punish He Ying Qin: withdrawal of the anti-Communist expeditionary forces; ending the capitulation campaign; implementing the three principles of Sun Yatsen; reforming the government organs; freedom

[to hold] popular anti-Japanese demonstrations; freedom for the anti-Japanese political prisoners; convocation of the national council, etc."—which will find a positive response with the majority of the people—Chiang Kai-shek may break with us permanently. Therefore, although we are now ready to undertake the necessary military measures, we have not yet made a final decision. The plan of Chiang Kai-shek is very dangerous and harmful for us. If we fail to resolve this question correctly, it could cause countless disasters in the future. Consequently, we now need to seriously approach this problem, for which purpose I am informing you about it and asking that you give directives as soon as possible.

Source: Alexander Dallin and F. I. Firsov, eds., *Dimitrov and Stalin 1934–1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 128–130. Reprinted with permission.

77. "Plan Dog": Harold R. Stark, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, November 12, 1940

Introduction

In November 1940 the chief of U.S. naval operations, Harold R. Stark, sent the secretary of the navy a memorandum arguing that British and U.S. strategic interests were highly interdependent. Stark therefore argued that the existing naval strategic Plan Orange directed primarily against Japan should be modified in favor of Plan Dog (Plan D), which would involve a major Atlantic naval commitment together with primarily defensive measures in the Pacific. This "Atlantic first" strategy would ultimately govern the entire American prosecution of the war.

Primary Source

Referring to my very brief touch in a recent conference as to the desirability of obtaining at once some light upon the major decisions which the President may make for guiding our future naval effort in the event of war, and in further immediate preparation for war, you may recall my remarks the

evening we discussed War Plans for the Navy. I stated then that if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere; but that if she loses the problems confronting us would be very great; and, while we might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere.

As I stated last winter on the Hill, in these circumstances we would be set back upon our haunches. Our war effort, instead of being widespread, would then have to be confined to the Western Hemisphere.

I now wish to expand my remarks, and to present to you my views concerning steps we might take to meet the situation that will exist should the United States enter war either alone or with allies. In this presentation, I have endeavored to keep in view the political realities in our own country.

The first thing to consider is how and where we might become involved.

The immediate war alternatives seem to be:

(a) War with Japan in which we have no allies. This might be precipitated by Japanese armed opposition should we strongly reinforce our Asiatic Fleet or the Philippines Garrison, should we start fortifying Guam, or should we impose additional important economic sanctions; or it might be precipitated by ourselves in case of overt Japanese action against us, or by further extension of Japanese hegemony.

(b) War with Japan in which we have the British Empire, or the British Empire and Netherlands East Indies, as allies. This might be precipitated by one of the causes mentioned in (a), by our movement of a naval reinforcement to Singapore, or by Japanese attack on British or Netherlands territory.

(c) War with Japan in which she is aided by Germany and Italy, and in which we are or are not aided by allies. To the causes of such a war, previously listed, might be added augmented American material assistance to Great Britain, our active military intervention in Britain’s favor, or our active resistance to German extension of military activities to the Western Hemisphere.

(d) War with Germany and Italy in which Japan would not be initially involved, and in which we would be allied with the British. Such a war would be initiated by American decision to intervene for the purpose of preventing the disruption of the British Empire, or German capture of the British Isles.

(e) We should also consider the alternative of now remaining out of war, and devoting ourselves exclusively to building up our defense of the Western Hemisphere, plus the preservation by peaceful means of our Far Eastern interests, and plus also continued material assistance to Great Britain.

As I see it, our major national objectives in the immediate future might be stated as preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United States, plus that of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; the prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation implies; and the diminution of the offensive military power of Japan, with a view to the retention of our economic and political interests in the Far East. It is doubtful, however, that it would be in our interest to reduce Japan to the status of an inferior military and economic power. A balance of power in the Far East is to our interest as much as is a balance of power in Europe.

The questions that confront me are concerned with the preparation and distribution of the naval forces of the United States, in cooperation with its military forces, for use in war in the accomplishment of all or part of these national objectives.

I can only surmise as to the military, political, and economic situation that would exist in the Atlantic should the British Empire collapse. Since Latin-America has rich natural resources, and is the only important area of the world not now under the practical control of strong military powers, we can not dismiss the possibility that, sooner or later, victorious Axis nations might move firmly in that direction. For some years they might remain too weak to attack directly across the sea; their effort more likely would first be devoted to developing Latin American economic dependence, combined with strongly reinforced internal political upheavals for the purpose of establishing friendly regimes in effective military control.

The immediacy of danger to us may depend upon the security of the Axis military position in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, the degree of our own military preoccupation in the Pacific, and the disturbing influence of unsatisfied economic needs of Latin-America.

The present situation of the British Empire is not encouraging. I believe it easily possible, lacking active American military assistance, for that empire to lose this war and eventually be disrupted.

It is my opinion that the British are over-optimistic as to their chances for ultimate success. It is not at all sure that the British Isles can hold out, and it may be that they do not realize the danger that will exist should they lose in other regions.

Should Britain lose the war, the military consequences to the United States would be serious.

If we are to prevent the disruption of the British Empire, we must support its vital needs.

Obviously, the British Isles, the "Heart of the Empire," must remain intact. But even if the British Isles are held, this does not mean that Britain can win the war. To win, she must finally be able to effect the complete, or, at least, the partial collapse of the German Reich.

This result might, conceivably, be accomplished by bombing and by economic starvation through the agency of the blockade. It surely can be accomplished only by military successes on shore, facilitated possibly by over-extension and by internal antagonisms developed by the Axis conquests.

Alone, the British Empire lacks the manpower and the material means to master Germany. Assistance by powerful allies is necessary both with respect to men and with respect to munitions and supplies. If such assistance is to function effectively, Britain must not only continue to maintain the blockade, but she must also retain intact geographical positions from which successful land action can later be launched.

Provided England continues to sustain its present successful resistance at home, the area of next concern to the British Empire ought to be the Egyptian Theater. Should Egypt be lost, the Eastern Mediterranean would be opened to Germany and Italy; the effectiveness of the sea blockade would be largely nullified; Turkey's military position would be fully compromised; and all hope of favorable Russian action would vanish. Any anti-German offensive in the Near East would then become impossible.

The spot next in importance to Egypt, in my opinion, is Gibraltar, combined with West and Northwest Africa. From this area an ultimate offensive through Portugal, Spain, and France, with the help of populations inimical to Germany, might give results equal to those which many years ago were produced by Wellington. The western gate to the Mediterranean would still be kept closed, provided Britain holds this region.

This brief discussion naturally brings into question the value to Britain of

the Mediterranean relative to that of Hong Kong, Singapore, and India. Were the Mediterranean lost, Britain's strength in the Far East could be augmented without weakening home territory.

Japan probably wants the British out of Hong Kong and Singapore; and wants economic control, and ultimately military control, of Malaysia.

It is very questionable if Japan has territorial ambitions in Australia and New Zealand.

But does she now wish the British out of India, thus exposing that region and Western China to early Russian penetration or influence? I doubt it.

It would seem more probable that Japan, devoted to the Axis alliance only so far as her own immediate interests are involved, would prefer not to move military forces against Britain, and possibly not against the Netherlands East Indies, because, if she can obtain a high degree of economic control over Malaysia, she will then be in a position to improve her financial structure by increased trade with Britain and America.

Her economic offensive power will be increased. Her military dominance will follow rapidly or slowly, as seems best at the time.

The Netherlands East Indies has 60,000,000 people, under the rule of 80,000 Dutchmen, including women and children. This political situation cannot be viewed as in permanent equilibrium. The rulers are unsupported by a home country or by an alliance. Native rebellions have occurred in the past, and may recur in the future. These Dutchmen will act in what they believe is their own selfish best interests.

Will they alone resist aggression, or will they accept an accommodation with the Japanese?

Will they resist, if supported only by the British Empire?

Will they firmly resist, if supported by the British Empire and the United States?

Will the British resist Japanese aggression directed only against the Netherlands East Indies?

Should both firmly resist, what local military assistance will they require from the United States to ensure success?

No light on these questions has been thrown by the report of the proceedings of the recent Singapore Conference.

The basic character of a war against Japan by the British and Dutch would be the fixed defense of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java. The

allied army, naval, and air forces now in position are considerable, and some future reenforcement may be expected from Australia and New Zealand. Borneo and the islands to the East are vulnerable. There is little chance for an allied offensive. Without Dutch assistance, the external effectiveness of the British bases at Hong Kong and Singapore would soon disappear.

The Japanese deployment in Manchukuo and China requires much of their Army, large supplies and merchant tonnage, and some naval force. It is doubtful if Japan will feel secure in withdrawing much strength from in front of Russia, regardless of non-aggression agreements. The winter lull in China will probably permit the withdrawal of the forces they need for a campaign against Malaysia. The availability of ample supplies for such a campaign is problematical.

Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous and efficient defense of Malaysia, Japan will need to make a major effort with all categories of military force to capture the entire area. The campaign might even last several months. Whether Japan would concurrently be able successfully to attack Hong Kong and the Philippines, and also strongly to support the fixed positions in the Mid-Pacific, seems doubtful. During such a campaign, due to her wide dispersion of effort, Japan would, unquestionably, be more vulnerable to attack by the United States (or by Russia) than she would be once Malaysia is in her possession.

This brings us to a consideration of the strategy of an American war against Japan, that is, either the so-called “Orange Plan,” or a modification. It must be understood that the Orange Plan was drawn up to govern our operations when the United States and Japan are at war, and no other nations are involved.

You have heard enough of the Orange Plan to know that, in a nutshell, it envisages our Fleet’s proceeding westward through the Marshalls and the Carolines, consolidating as it goes, and then on to the recapture of the Philippines. Once there, the Orange Plan contemplates the eventual economic starvation of Japan, and, finally, the complete destruction of her external military power. Its accomplishment would require several years, and the absorption of the full military, naval, and economic energy of the American people.

In proceeding through these Mid-Pacific islands, we have several subsidiary objectives in mind. First, we hope that our attack will induce the

Japanese to expose their Fleet in action against our Fleet, and lead to their naval defeat. Second, we wish to destroy the ability of the Japanese to use these positions as air and submarine bases from which to project attacks on our lines of communication to the mainland and Hawaii. Third, we would use the captured positions for supporting our further advance westward.

Most of the island positions are atolls. These atolls, devoid of natural sources of water other than rainfall, and devoid of all supplies, are merely narrow coral and sand fringes around large shallow areas where vessels may anchor. Alone, they are undefendable against serious attack, either by one side or the other. They do, however, afford weak positions for basing submarines and seaplanes. Our Fleet should have no difficulty in capturing atolls, provided we have enough troops, but we could not hold them indefinitely unless the Fleet were nearby.

We know little about the Japanese defenses in the Mid-Pacific. We believe the real islands of Truk and Ponape in the Carolines are defended with guns and troops, and we believe that some of the atolls of the Marshalls may be equipped as submarine and air bases, and be garrisoned with relatively small detachments of troops.

The Marshalls contain no sites suitable for bases in the absence of the Fleet, though there are numerous good anchorages. With the Fleet at hand, they can be developed for use as seaplane and submarine bases for the support of an attack on real islands such as Ponape and Truk. With the Fleet permanently absent, they will succumb to any serious thrust.

Our first real Marshall-Caroline objective is Truk, a magnificent harbor, relatively easily defended against raids, and capable of conversion into an admirable advanced base. When we get this far in the accomplishment of the “Orange Plan,” we have the site for a base where we can begin to assemble our ships, stores, and troops, for further advance toward the Philippines. It would also become the center of the defense system for the lines of communications against flank attack from Japan.

Getting to Truk involves a strong effort. We would incur losses from aircraft, mines, and submarines, particularly as the latter could be spared from the operations in Malaysia.

We would lose many troops in assaulting the islands. Going beyond Truk initiates the most difficult part of the Orange Plan, would take a long time, and would require the maximum effort which the United States could sustain.

Truk is not looked upon as a satisfactory final geographical objective. It is too far away to support useful operations in the China Sea. It can not be held in the absence of fairly continuous Fleet support. No matter what gains are made in the Mid-Pacific, they would undoubtedly be lost were the Fleet to be withdrawn to the Atlantic. We would have then to choose between a lengthy evacuation process, and a major loss of men, material, and prestige.

In advancing to the capture of Ponape and Truk, the Orange Plan contemplates proceeding promptly, delaying in the Marshalls only long enough to destroy Japanese shore bases, to capture the atolls neccessary to support the advance, and to deny future bases to Japan.

We have little knowledge as to the present defensive strength of the Marshall and Caroline groups, considered as a whole. If they are well defended, to capture them we estimate initial needs at 25,000 thoroughly trained troops, with another 50,000 in immediate reserve. If they are not well defended, an early advance with fewer troops might be very profitable. Several months must elapse from the present date before 75,000 troops could be made ready, considering the defense requirements of Alaska, Hawaii, and Samoa, and our commitments with respect to the internal political stability of the Latin-American countries.

We should consider carefully the chances of failure as well as of success. An immediate success would be most important morally, while a failure would be costly from the moral viewpoint. Before invading Norway, Germany trained for three months the veterans of the Polish campaign. Remembering Norway, we have the example of two methods of overseas adventure. One is the British method; the other is the German method.

The question of jumping directly from Hawaii to the Philippines has often been debated, but, so far as I know, this plan has always been ruled out by responsible authorities as unsound from a military viewpoint. Truk is 1,900 miles from Yokohama, 5,300 miles from San Francisco, 3,200 miles from Honolulu, and 2,000 miles from Manila. I mention this to compare the logistic problem with that of the Norway incident. An enormous amount of shipping would be required. Its availability under present world conditions would be doubtful.

Of course the foregoing, (the Orange Plan), is a major commitment in the Pacific, and does not envisage the cooperation of allies. Once started the abandonment of the offensive required by the plan, to meet a threat in the

Atlantic, would involve abandoning the objectives of the war, and also great loss of prestige.

A totally different situation would exist were the Philippines and Guam rendered secure against attack by adequate troops, aircraft, and fortifications. The movement of the Fleet across the Pacific for the purpose of applying direct pressure upon Japan, and its support when in position, would be less difficult than in the existing situation.

Should we adopt the present Orange Plan today, or any modification of that plan which involves the movement of very strong naval and army contingents to the Far East, we would have to accept considerable danger in the Atlantic, and would probably be unable to augment our material assistance to Great Britain.

We should, therefore, examine other plans which involve a war having a more limited objective than the complete defeat of Japan, and in which we would undertake hostilities only in cooperation with the British and Dutch, and in which these undertake to provide an effective and continued resistance in Malaysia.

Our involvement in war in the Pacific might well make us also an ally of Britain in the Atlantic. The naval forces remaining in the Atlantic, for helping our ally and for defending ourselves, would, by just so much, reduce the power which the United States Fleet could put forth in the Pacific.

The objective in a limited war against Japan would be the reduction of Japanese offensive power chiefly through economic blockade. Under one concept, allied strategy would comprise holding the Malay Barrier, denying access to other sources of supply in Malaysia, severing her lines of communication with the Western Hemisphere, and raiding communications to the Mid-Pacific, the Philippines, China, and Indo-China. United States defensive strategy would also require army reinforcement of Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, the establishment of naval bases in the Fiji-Samoan and Gilbert Islands areas, and denial to Japan of the use of the Marshalls as light force bases. We might be able to re-enforce the Philippine garrison, particularly with aircraft. I do not believe that the British and Dutch alone could hold the Malay Barrier without direct military assistance by the United States. In addition to help from our Asiatic Fleet, I am convinced that they would need further reenforcement by ships and aircraft drawn from our Fleet in Hawaii, and possibly even by troops.

Besides military aid for the allied defense forces, our intervention would bring them a tremendous moral stimulus.

An alternative concept of the suggested limited war would be to provide additional support from the main body of the Fleet either by capturing the Marshalls, or by capturing both the Marshalls and Carolines. This, or a similar Fleet activity, would be for the purpose of diverting away from Malaysia important Japanese forces to oppose it, and thus reducing the strength of their assault against the Dutch and British.

But we should consider the prospect that the losses which we would incur in such operations might not be fruitful of compensating results. Furthermore, withdrawal of the Fleet from captured positions for transfer to the Atlantic would be more difficult.

It is out of the question to consider sending our entire Fleet at once to Singapore. Base facilities are far too limited, the supply problem would be very great, and Hawaii, Alaska, and our coasts would be greatly exposed to raids.

One point to remember, in connection with a decision to adopt a limited offensive role, as in both of the alternative plans just mentioned, is that, in case of reverses, public opinion may require a stronger effort. For example, should Japanese success in the Far East seem imminent, there would be great pressure brought to bear to support our force there, instead of leaving it hanging in the air. Thus, what we might originally plan as a limited war with Japan might well become an unlimited war; our entire strength would then be required in the Far East, and little force would remain for eventualities in the Atlantic and for the support of the British Isles.

Let us now look eastward, and examine our possible action in the Atlantic.

In the first place, if we avoid serious commitment in the Pacific, the purely American Atlantic problem, envisaging defense of our coasts, the Caribbean, Canada, and South America, plus giving strong naval assistance to Britain, is not difficult so long as the British are able to maintain their present naval activity. Should the British Isles then fall we would find ourselves acting alone, and at war with the world. To repeat, we would be thrown back on our haunches.

Should we enter the war as an ally of Great Britain, and not then be at war with Japan, we envisage the British asking us for widespread naval

assistance. Roughly, they would want us, in the Western Atlantic Ocean from Cape Sable to Cape Horn, to protect shipping against raiders and submarine activities. They would also need strong reenforcements for their escort and minesweeping forces in their home waters; and strong flying boat reconnaissance from Scotland, the Atlantic Islands, and Capetown. They might ask us to capture the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. To their home waters they would have us send submarines and small craft, and to the Mediterranean assistance of any character which we may be able to provide. They would expect us to take charge of allied interests in the Pacific, and to send a naval detachment to Singapore.

This purely naval assistance, would not, in my opinion, assure final victory for Great Britain. Victory would probably depend upon her ability ultimately to make a land offensive against the Axis powers. For making a successful land offensive, British manpower is insufficient. Offensive troops from other nations will be required. I believe that the United States, in addition to sending naval assistance, would also need to send large air and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to participate strongly in this land offensive. The naval task of transporting an army abroad would be large.

To carry out such tasks we would have to exert a major naval and military effort in the Atlantic. We would then be able to do little more in the Pacific than remain on a strict defensive.

Were we to enter the war against Germany and Italy as an ally of Great Britain, I do not necessarily anticipate immediate hostile action by Japan, whatever may be her Axis obligation. She may fear eventual consequences and do nothing. We might be faced with demands for concessions as the price of her neutrality. She might agree to defer her aggressions in the Netherlands East Indies for the time being by a guarantee of ample economic access to the Western Hemisphere and to British and Dutch possessions. But she might even demand complete cessation of British and American assistance to China.

The strong wish of the American government and people at present seems to be to remain at peace. In spite of this, we must face the possibility that we may at any moment become involved in war. With war in prospect, I believe our every effort should be directed toward the prosecution of a national policy with mutually supporting diplomatic and military aspects, and having as its guiding feature a determination that any intervention we may undertake

shall be such as will ultimately best promote our own national interests. We should see the best answer to the question: “Where should we fight the war, and for what objective?” With the answer to this question to guide me, I can make a more logical plan, can more appropriately distribute the naval forces, can better coordinate the future material preparation of the Navy, and can more usefully advise as to whether or not proposed diplomatic measures can adequately be supported by available naval strength.

That is to say, until the question concerning our final military objective is authoritatively answered, I can not determine the scale and the nature of the effort which the Navy may be called upon to exert in the Far East, the Pacific, and the Atlantic.

It is a fundamental requirement of our military position that our homeland remain secure against successful attack. Directly concerned in this security is the safety of other parts of the Western Hemisphere. A very strong pillar of the defense structure of the Americas has, for many years, been the balance of power existing in Europe. The collapse of Great Britain or the destruction or surrender of the British Fleet will destroy this balance and will free European military power for possible encroachment in this hemisphere.

I believe that we should recognize as the foundation of adequate armed strength the possession of a profitable foreign trade, both in raw materials and in finished goods. Without such a trade, our economy can scarcely support heavy armaments. The restoration of foreign trade, particularly with Europe, may depend upon the continued integrity of the British Empire.

It may be possible for us to prevent a British collapse by military intervention.

Our interests in the Far East are very important. The economic effect of a complete Japanese hegemony in that region is conjectural. But regardless of economic considerations, we have heretofore strongly opposed the further expansion of Japan.

We might temporarily check Japanese expansion by defeating her in a war in the Far East, but to check her permanently would require that we retain possession of, and militarily develop, an extensive and strategically located Asiatic base area having reasonably secure lines of communication with the United States. Retaining, and adequately developing, an Asiatic base area would mean the reversal of long-standing American policy.

Whether we could ensure the continued existence of a strong British

Empire by soundly defeating Japan in the Far East is questionable, though continuing to hold on there for the present is a definite contribution to British strength.

Lacking possession of an Asiatic base area of our own, continued British strength in the Far East would doubtless prove advantageous to us in checking Japan permanently.

The military matters discussed in this memorandum may properly receive consideration in arriving at a decision on the course that we should adopt in the diplomatic field.

An early decision in this field will facilitate a naval preparation which will best promote the adopted course. As I see affairs today, answers to the following broad questions will be most useful to the Navy:

A) Shall our principal military effort be directed toward hemisphere defense, and include chiefly those activities within the Western Hemisphere which contribute directly to security against attack in either or both oceans? An affirmative answer would indicate that the United States, as seems now to be the hope of this country, would remain out of war unless pushed into it. If and when forced into war, the greater portion of our Fleet could remain for the time being in its threatening position in the Pacific, but no major effort would be exerted overseas either to the east or the west; the most that would be done for allies, besides providing material help, would be to send detachments to assist in their defense. It should be noted here that, were minor help to be given in one direction, public opinion might soon push us into giving it major support, as was the case in the World War.

Under this plan, our influence upon the outcome of the European War would be small.

(B) Shall we prepare for a full offensive against Japan, premised on assistance from the British and Dutch forces in the Far East, and remain on the strict defensive in the Atlantic? If this course is selected, we would be placing full trust in the British to hold their own indefinitely in the Atlantic, or, at least, until after we should have defeated Japan decisively, and thus had fully curbed her offensive power for the time being. Plans for augmenting the scale of our present material assistance to Great Britain would be adversely affected until Japan had been decisively

defeated. The length of time required to defeat Japan would be very considerable.

If we enter the war against Japan and then if Great Britain loses, we probably would in any case have to reorient towards the Atlantic. There is no dissenting view on this point.

(C) Shall we plan for sending the strongest possible military assistance both to the British in Europe, and to the British, Dutch, and Chinese in the Far East? The naval and air detachments we would send to the British Isles would possibly ensure their continued resistance, but would not increase British power to conduct a land offensive. The strength we could send to the Far East might be enough to check the southward spread of Japanese rule for the duration of the war. The strength of naval forces remaining in Hawaii for the defense of the Eastern Pacific, and the strength of the forces in the Western Atlantic for the defense of that area, would be reduced to that barely sufficient for executing their tasks. Should Great Britain finally lose, or should Malaysia fall to Japan, our naval strength might then be found to have been seriously reduced, relative to that of the Axis powers. It should be understood that, under this plan, we would be operating under the handicap of fighting major wars on two fronts.

Should we adopt Plan (C), we must face the consequences that would ensue were we to start a war with one plan, and then, after becoming heavily engaged, be forced greatly to modify it or discard it altogether, as, for example, in case of a British fold up. On neither of these distant fronts would it be possible to execute a really major offensive. Strategically, the situation might become disastrous should our effort on either front fail.

(D) Shall we direct our efforts toward an eventual strong offensive in the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific? Any strength that we might send to the Far East would, by just so much, reduce the force of our blows against Germany and Italy. About the least that we would do for our ally would be to send strong naval light forces and aircraft to Great Britain and the Mediterranean. Probably we could not stop with a purely naval effort. The plan might ultimately require capture of the Portuguese and Spanish Islands and military and naval bases in Africa and possibly Europe; and thereafter even involve undertaking a full scale land offensive. In consideration of a course that would require landing large numbers of troops abroad, account must be

taken of the possible unwillingness of the people of the United States to support land operations of this character, and to incur the risk of heavy loss should Great Britain collapse. Under Plan (D) we would be unable to exert strong pressure against Japan, and would necessarily gradually reorient our policy in the Far East. The full national offensive strength would be exerted in a single direction, rather than be expended in areas far distant from each other. At the conclusion of the war, even if Britain should finally collapse, we might still find ourselves possessed of bases in Africa suitable for assisting in the defense of South America.

Under any of these plans, we must recognize the possibility of the involvement of France as an ally of Germany.

I believe that the continued existence of the British Empire, combined with building up a strong protection in our home areas, will do most to ensure the status quo in the Western Hemisphere, and to promote our principal national interests. As I have previously stated, I also believe that Great Britain requires from us very great help in the Atlantic, and possibly even on the continents of Europe or Africa, if she is to be enabled to survive. In my opinion Alternatives (A), (B), and (C) will most probably not provide the necessary degree of assistance, and, therefore, if we undertake war, that Alternative (D) is likely to be the most fruitful for the United States, particularly if we enter the war at an early date.

Initially, the offensive measures adopted would, necessarily, be purely naval. Even should we intervene, final victory in Europe is not certain. I believe that the chances for success are in our favor, particularly if we insist upon full equality in the political and military direction of the war.

The odds seem against our being able under Plan (D) to check Japanese expansion unless we win the war in Europe. We might not long retain possession of the Philippines. Our political and military influence in the Far East might largely disappear, so long as we were fully engaged in the Atlantic. A preliminary to a war in this category would be a positive effort to avoid war with Japan, and to endeavor to prevent war between Japan and the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies. The possible cost of avoiding a war with Japan has been referred to previously.

I would add that Plan (D) does not mean the immediate movement of the Fleet into the Atlantic. I would make no further moves until war should

become imminent, and then I would recommend redistribution of our naval forces as the situation then demanded. I fully recognize the value of retaining strong forces in the Pacific as long as they can profitably be kept there.

Until such time as the United States should decide to engage its full forces in war, I recommend that we pursue a course that will most rapidly increase the military strength of both the Army and the Navy, that is to say, adopt Alternative (A) without hostilities.

Under any decision that the President may tentatively make, we should at once prepare a complete Joint Plan for guiding Army and Navy activities. We should also prepare at least the skeletons of alternative plans to fit possible alternative situations which may eventuate. I make the specific recommendation that, should we be forced into a war with Japan, we should, because of the prospect of war in the Atlantic also, definitely plan to avoid operations in the Far East or the Mid-Pacific that will prevent the Navy from promptly moving to the Atlantic forces fully adequate to safeguard our interests and policies in the event of a British collapse. We ought not now willingly engage in any war against Japan unless we are certain of aid from Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies.

No important allied military decision should be reached without clear understanding between the nations involved as to the strength and extent of the participation which may be expected in any particular theater, and as to a proposed skeleton plan of operations.

Accordingly, I make the recommendation that, as a preliminary to possible entry of the United States into the conflict, the United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret staff talks on technical matters with the British military and naval authorities in London, with Canadian military authorities in Washington, and with British and Dutch authorities in Singapore and Batavia. The purpose would be to reach agreements and lay down plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it necessary to enter the war under any of the alternative eventualities considered in this memorandum.

Source: Folder Navy Department “Plan Dog,” Box 4, Presidential Safe Files, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.

78. Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 7, 1940

Introduction

Winston Churchill thought this the most important letter he ever wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As 1940 drew to an end, British dollar reserves were exhausted, and the prospect loomed that before long Britain would be unable to pay for any further American war supplies. This letter, drafted by Churchill with advice from other government officials, including Lord Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, frankly set out the desperate British position of high shipping losses and inadequate naval defenses and merchant tonnage and asked the United States, in its own interests, to make up these deficiencies. Although still arguing that such assistance represented the best means of keeping the United States itself out of war, Churchill was clearly suggesting that the United States take measures that would place it even more clearly on the side of Great Britain and that, should the Axis object to them, had the potential to make the country an active rather than passive belligerent. Churchill's appeal was the genesis of the Lend-Lease program, which Roosevelt proposed to Congress and the American people early in 1941, and of the expansion of hemispheric defense zone, which he extended ever farther into the Atlantic during that year.

Primary Source

As we reach the end of this year I feel that you will expect me to lay before you the prospects for 1941. I do so strongly and confidently because it seems to me that the vast majority of American citizens have recorded their conviction that the safety of the United States as well as the future of our two democracies and the kind of civilization for which they stand are bound up with the survival and independence of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Only thus can those bastions of sea power, upon which the control of the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans depends, be preserved in faithful and friendly hands. The control of the Pacific by the United States Navy and of the Atlantic by the British Navy is indispensable to the security of the trade

routes of both our countries and the surest means to preventing the war from reaching the shores of the United States. …

2. There is another aspect. It takes between three and four years to convert the industries of a modern state to war purposes. Saturation point is reached when the maximum industrial effort that can be spared from civilian needs has been applied to war production. Germany certainly reached this point by the end of 1939. We in the British Empire are now only about halfway through the second year. The United States, I should suppose, was by no means so far advanced as we. Moreover, I understand that immense programs of naval, military and air defence are now on foot in the United States, to complete which certainly two years are needed. It is our British duty in the common interest as also for our own survival to hold the front and grapple with Nazi power until the preparations of the United States are complete. Victory may come before the two years are out; but we have no right to count upon it to the extent of relaxing any effort that is humanly possible. Therefore I submit with very great respect for your good and friendly consideration that there is a solid identity of interest between the British Empire and the United States while these conditions last. It is upon this footing that I venture to address you.

3. The form which this war has taken and seems likely to hold does not enable us to match the immense armies of Germany in any theatre where their main force can be brought to bear. We can however by the use of sea power and air power meet the German armies in the regions where only comparatively small forces can be brought into action. We must do our best to prevent German domination of Europe spreading into Africa and into Southern Asia. We have also to maintain in constant readiness in this Island armies strong enough to make the problem of an overseas invasion insoluble. For these purposes we are forming as fast as possible, as you are already aware, between fifty and sixty divisions. Even if the United States was our ally instead of our indispensable partner we should not ask for a large American expeditionary army. Shipping, not men, is the limiting factor and the power to transport munitions and supplies claims priority over the movement by sea of large numbers of soldiers.

4. The first half of 1940 was a period of disaster for the Allies and for the Empire. The last five months have witnessed a strong and perhaps unexpected recovery by Great Britain; fighting alone but with invaluable aid

in munitions and in destroyers placed at our disposal by the great Republic of which you are for the third time chosen Chief.

5. The danger of Great Britain being destroyed by a swift overwhelming blow has for the time being very greatly receded. In its place there is a long, gradually maturing danger, less sudden and less spectacular but equally deadly. This mortal danger is the steady and increasing diminution of our sea tonnage. We can endure the shattering of our dwellings and the slaughter of our civilian population by indiscriminate air attacks and we hope to parry these increasingly as our science develops and to repay them upon military objectives in Germany as our Air Force more nearly approaches the strength of the enemy. The decision for 1941 lies upon the seas; unless we can establish our ability to feed this Island, to import munitions of all kinds which we need, unless we can move our armies to the various theatres where Hitler and his confederate Mussolini must be met, and maintain them there and do all this with the assurance of being able to carry it on till the spirit of the continental dictators is broken, we may fall by the way and the time needed by the United States to complete her defensive preparations may not be forthcoming. It is therefore in shipping and in the power to transport across the oceans, particularly the Atlantic Ocean, that in 1941 the crunch of the whole war will be found. If on the other hand we are able to move the necessary tonnage to and fro across the salt water indefinitely, it may well be that the application of superior air power to the German homeland and the rising anger of other Nazi-gripped populations will bring the agony of civilization to a merciful and glorious end. But do not let us underrate the task.

6. Our shipping losses, the figure[s] for which in recent months are appended, have been on a scale quite comparable to that of the worst years of the first war. In the 5 weeks ending November 3rd the figures reached a total of 420,500 tons. Our estimation of the annual tonnage which ought to be imported in order to maintain our war effort at full strength is 43,000,000 tons; the tonnage entering in September was only at the rate of 37,000,000 tons and in October at 38,000,000 tons. Were the diminution to continue at this rate it would be fatal, unless indeed immensely greater replenishment than anything at present in sight could be achieved in time. Although we are doing all we can to meet this situation by new methods, the difficulty of limiting the losses is obviously much greater than in the last war. We lack the

assistance of the French Navy, the Italian Navy and the Japanese Navy, and above all the United States Navy, which was of such vital help to us during the culminating years. The enemy commands the ports all around the northern and western coast of France. He is increasingly basing his submarines, flying boats and combat planes on these ports and on the islands off the French coast. We lack the use of ports or territory in Eire in which to organize our coastal patrols by air and sea. In fact, we have now only one effective passage of entry to the British Isles, namely the northern approach, against which the enemy is increasingly concentrating, reaching ever farther out by U-boat action and long distance bombing. In addition, there have for some months been merchant ship raiders both in the Atlantic and in the Indian Oceans. And now we have powerful warship raiders to contend with as well. We need ships both to hunt down and to escort. Large as are our resources and preparations, we do not possess enough.

7. The next six or seven months bring the relative battleship strength in home waters to a smaller margin than is satisfactory. …

9. There is a second field of danger: the Vichy Government may either by joining Hitler's new order in Europe or through some maneuver such as forcing us to attack an expedition dispatched by sea against free French Colonies, find an excuse for ranging with the Axis Powers the very considerable undamaged naval forces still under its control. If the French Navy were to join the Axis, the control of West Africa would pass immediately into their hands with the gravest consequences to our communication between the northern and southern Atlantic, and also affect Dakar and of course thereafter South America.

10. A third sphere of danger is in the Far East. Here it seems clear that the Japanese are thrusting Southward through Indo China to Saigon and other naval and air bases, thus bringing them within a comparatively short distance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. It is reported that the Japanese are preparing five good divisions for possible use as an overseas expeditionary force. We have today no forces in the Far East capable of dealing with this situation should it develop.

11. In the face of these dangers, we must try to use the year 1941 to build up such a supply of weapons, particularly aircraft, both by increased output at home in spite of bombardment, and through ocean-borne supplies, as will lay the foundation of victory. In view of the difficulty and magnitude of this task,

as outlined by all the facts I have set forth to which many others could be added, I feel entitled, nay bound, to lay before you the various ways in which the United States could give supreme and decisive help to what is, in certain aspects, the common cause.

12. The prime need is to check or limit the loss of tonnage on the Atlantic approaches to our Islands. This may be achieved both by increasing the naval forces, which cope with attacks, and by adding to the number of merchant ships on which we depend. For the first purpose there would seem to be the following alternatives:

The reassertion by the United States of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas from illegal and barbarous warfare in accordance with the decisions reached after the late Great War, and as freely accepted and defined by Germany in 1935. From this, the United States ships should be free to trade with countries against which there is not an effective legal blockade.

It would, I suggest, follow that protection should be given to this lawful trading by United States forces, i.e., escorting battleships, cruisers, destroyers and air flotillas. Protection would be immediately more effective if you were able to obtain bases in Eire for the duration of the war. I think it is improbable that such protection would provoke a declaration of war by Germany upon the United States though probably sea incidents of a dangerous character would from time to time occur. Hitler has shown himself inclined to avoid the Kaiser's mistake. He does not wish to be drawn into war with the United States until he has gravely undermined the power of Great Britain. His maxim is "one at a time." The policy I have ventured to outline, or something like it, would constitute a decisive act of constructive non-belligerency by the United States, and more than any other measure would make it certain that British resistance could be effectively prolonged for the desired period and victory gained.

Failing the above, the gift, loan or supply of a large number of American vessels of war, above all destroyers already in the Atlantic, is indispensable to the maintenance of the Atlantic route. Further, could not United States naval forces extend their sea control over the American side of the Atlantic, so as to prevent molestation by enemy vessels of the approaches to the new line of naval and air bases which the United States is establishing in British islands in the Western Hemisphere. The strength of the United States naval

forces is such that the assistance in the Atlantic that they could afford us, as described above, would not jeopardize control over the Pacific. …

13. The object of the foregoing measures is to reduce to manageable proportions the present destructive losses at sea. In addition it is indispensable that the merchant tonnage available for supplying Great Britain and for the waging of the war by Great Britain with all vigour, should be substantially increased beyond the one and a quarter million tons per annum which is the utmost we can now build. The convoy system, the detours, the zig zags, the great distances from which we now have to bring our imports, and the congestion of our western harbours, have reduced by about one third the value of our existing tonnage. To ensure final victory, not less than three million tons of additional merchant shipbuilding capacity will be required. Only the United States can supply this need. … Moreover we look to the industrial energy of the Republic for a reinforcement of our domestic capacity to manufacture combat aircraft. Without that reinforcement reaching us in a substantial measure, we shall not achieve the massive preponderance in the air on which we must rely to loosen and disintegrate the German grip on Europe. … I invite you then, Mr. President, to give earnest consideration to an immediate order on joint account for a further 2,000 combat aircraft a month. Of these aircraft I would submit that the highest possible proportion should be heavy bombers, the weapon on which above all others we depend to shatter the foundations of German military power. I am aware of the formidable task that this would impose upon the industrial organization of the United States. Yet, in our heavy need, we call with confidence to the most resourceful and ingenious technicians in the world. We ask for an unexampled effort believing that it can be made. …

15. You have also received information about our armies. In the munitions sphere, in spite of enemy bombing, we are making steady progress. Without your continued assistance in supply of machine tools and in the further release from stock of certain articles we could not hope to equip as many as 50 divisions in 1941. I am grateful for the arrangements already practically completed for your aid in the equipment of the army which we have already planned and for the provision of American-type weapons for an additional 10 divisions in time for the campaign of 1942. But when the tide of dictatorship begins to recede, many countries, trying to regain their freedom, may be asking for arms, and there is no source to which they can look except

to the factories of the United States. I must therefore also urge the importance of expanding to the utmost American productive capacity for small arms, artillery and tanks.

16. I am arranging to present you with a complete program of munitions of all kinds which we seek to obtain from you, the greater part of which is of course already agreed. An important economy of time and effort will be produced if the types selected for the United States Services should, whenever possible, conform to those which have proved their merit under actual conditions of war. In this way reserves of guns and ammunition and of airplanes become inter-changeable and are by that very fact augmented. This is however a sphere so highly technical that I do not enlarge upon it.

17. Last of all I come to the question of finance. The more rapid and abundant the flow of munitions and ships, which you are able to send us, the sooner will our dollar credits be exhausted. They are already as you know very heavily drawn upon by payments we have made to date. Indeed as you know orders already placed or under negotiation, including expenditure settled or pending for creating munitions factories in the United States, many times exceed the total exchange resources remaining at the disposal of Great Britain. The moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies. While we will do our utmost and shrink from no proper sacrifice to make payments across the exchange, I believe that you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and mutually disadvantageous in effect if, at the height of this struggle, Great Britain were to be divested of all saleable assets so that after victory was won with our blood, civilization saved and time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone. Such a course would not be in the moral or economic interests of either of our countries. We here would be unable after the war to purchase the large balance of imports from the United States over and above the volume of our exports, which is agreeable to your tariffs and domestic economy. Not only should we in Great Britain suffer cruel privations but widespread unemployment in the United States would follow the curtailment of American exporting power.

18. Moreover I do not believe the Government and people of the United States would find it in accordance with the principles which guide them, to confine the help which they have so generously promised only to such munitions of war and commodities as could be immediately paid for. You

may be assured that we shall prove ourselves ready to suffer and sacrifice to the utmost for the Cause, and that we glory in being its champion. The rest we leave with confidence to you and to your people, being sure that ways and means will be found which future generations on both sides of the Atlantic will approve and admire.

19. If, as I believe, you are convinced, Mr. President, that the defeat of the Nazi and Fascist tyranny is a matter of high consequence to the people of the United States and to the Western Hemisphere, you will regard this letter not as an appeal for aid, but as a statement of the action necessary to the achievement of our common purpose.

Source: Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 7 December 1940, enclosed in Lord Lothian to Roosevelt, 8 December 1940, Folder Diplomatic Correspondence Great Britain: Military Situation: December 1940, Box 34, Presidential Safe Files, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box34/a311s08.html.

79. Adolf Hitler, Military Directive No. 21 for Operation BARBAROSSA, the Invasion of Russia, December 18, 1940

Introduction

By the end of 1940, disputes with the Soviet Union over Finland and Bulgaria had led Adolf Hitler to conclude that Russia would not acquiesce indefinitely in German domination of Europe. These developments only reinforced Hitler's long-cherished ambition of mounting an invasion of Russia. In December 1940, he instructed the German military to prepare to launch such an operation the following spring, a campaign that Hitler anticipated would be swift and decisive.

Primary Source

TOP SECRET

BY OFFICER ONLY

The German Wehrmacht must be prepared *to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign* (Operation Barbarossa) even before the conclusion of the war against England.

For this purpose the *Army* will have to employ all available units, with the reservation that the occupied territories must be secured against surprises.

For the *Luftwaffe* it will be a matter of releasing such strong forces for the Eastern campaign in support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations can be counted on and that damage to eastern German territory by enemy air attacks will be as slight as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the east is limited by the requirement that the entire combat and armament area dominated by us must remain adequately protected against enemy air attacks and that the offensive operations against England, particularly against her supply lines, must not be permitted to break down.

The main effort of the *Navy* will remain unequivocally directed against England, even during an Eastern campaign.

I shall order the *concentration* against Soviet Russia possibly eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.

Preparations requiring more time to get under way are to be started now, if this has not yet been done, and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.

It is of decisive importance, however, that the intention to attack does not become apparent.

The preparations of the High Commands are to be made on the following basis:

I.

General Purpose

The mass of the Russian *Army* in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armoured wedges; and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.

In quick pursuit a line is then to be reached from which the Russian *Air Force* will no longer be able to attack the territory of the German Reich. The ultimate objective of the operation is to establish a cover against Asiatic

Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. Then, in case of necessity, the last industrial area left to Russia in the Urals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian *Baltic Sea Fleet* will quickly lose its bases and thus will no longer be able to fight.

Effective intervention by the Russian *Air Force* is to be prevented by powerful blows at the very beginning of operations. …

IV.

All orders to be issued by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this directive must clearly indicate that they are *precautionary measures* for the possibility that Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be assigned to the preparatory work at an early date is to be kept as small as possible; additional personnel should be briefed as late as possible and only to the extent required for the activity of each individual. Otherwise, through the discovery of our preparations—the date of their execution has not even been fixed—there is danger that most serious political and military disadvantages may arise. …

Source: "Führer's Directive" (December 18, 1940), United States Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry; Series D (1939–1945), The War Years,* Vol. 11, *February 1–June 22, 1941, Document 532* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957–1964), 899–902.

80. "The Arsenal of Democracy": Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on National Security and the Common Cause, December 29, 1940

Introduction

As 1940 came to an end, Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to Winston Churchill's appeal for assistance with a public "fireside chat" to the American people. He urged that the United States must become the world's "arsenal of democracy," mounting a major rearmament effort of its own while supplying the Allies. His speech laid the groundwork for the Lend-

Lease legislation passed early the next year, under which the U.S. government, though still formally neutral, provided massive military assistance to the Allies.

Primary Source

This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on national security; because the nub of the whole purpose of your President is to keep you now, and your children later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last-ditch war for the preservation of American independence and all the things that American independence means to you and to me and to ours. …

Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now.

For, on September 27, 1940, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in Asia, joined themselves together in the threat that if the United States of America interfered with or blocked the expansion program of these three nations—a program aimed at world control—they would unite in ultimate action against the United States.

The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.

It was only three weeks ago their leader stated this: “There are two worlds that stand opposed to each other.” And then in defiant reply to his opponents, he said this: “Others are correct when they say: With this world we cannot ever reconcile ourselves. … I can beat any other power in the world.” So said the leader of the Nazis.

In other words, the Axis not merely admits but proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.

In view of the nature of this undeniable threat, it can be asserted, properly and categorically, that the United States has no right or reason to encourage talk of peace, until the day shall come when there is a clear intention on the part of the aggressor nations to abandon all thought of dominating or conquering the world.

At this moment, the forces of the states that are leagued against all peoples who live in freedom, are being held away from our shores. The Germans and the Italians are being blocked on the other side of the Atlantic by the British, and by the Greeks, and by thousands of soldiers and sailors who were able to escape from subjugated countries. In Asia, the Japanese are being engaged by the Chinese nation in another great defense.

In the Pacific Ocean is our fleet.

Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and in Asia are of no concern to us. But it is a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war-makers should not gain control of the oceans which lead to this hemisphere. …

If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas—and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.

We should enter upon a new and terrible era in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run by threats of brute force. To survive in such a world, we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy.

Some of us like to believe that even if Great Britain falls, we are still safe, because of the broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific. But the width of those oceans is not what it was in the days of clipper ships. At one point between Africa and Brazil the distance is less than from Washington to Denver, Colorado—five hours for the latest type of bomber. And at the North end of the Pacific Ocean America and Asia almost touch each other.

Even today we have planes that could fly from the British Isles to New England and back again without refueling. And remember that the range of the modern bomber is ever being increased. …

There are those who say that the Axis powers would never have any desire to attack the Western Hemisphere. That is the same dangerous form of wishful thinking which has destroyed the powers of resistance of so many conquered peoples. The plain facts are that the Nazis have proclaimed, time and again, that all other races are their inferiors and therefore subject to their orders. And most important of all, the vast resources and wealth of this

American Hemisphere constitute the most tempting loot in all the round world.

Let us no longer blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that the evil forces which have crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others are already within our own gates. Your Government knows much about them and every day is ferreting them out.

Their secret emissaries are active in our own and in neighboring countries. They seek to stir up suspicion and dissension to cause internal strife. They try to turn capital against labor, and vice versa. They try to reawaken long slumbering racial and religious enmities which should have no place in this country. They are active in every group that promotes intolerance. They exploit for their own ends our natural abhorrence of war. These trouble-breeders have but one purpose. It is to divide our people into hostile groups and to destroy our unity and shatter our will to defend ourselves.

There are also American citizens, many of them in high places, who, unwittingly in most cases, are aiding and abetting the work of these agents. I do not charge these American citizens with being foreign agents. But I do charge them with doing exactly the kind of work that the dictators want done in the United States.

These people not only believe that we can save our own skins by shutting our eyes to the fate of other nations. Some of them go much further than that. They say that we can and should become the friends and even the partners of the Axis powers. Some of them even suggest that we should imitate the methods of the dictatorships. Americans never can and never will do that.

The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. … We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender. …

The history of recent years proves that shootings and chains and concentration camps are not simply the transient tools but the very altars of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a “new order” in the world, but what they have in mind is only a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope.

The proposed “new order” is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a Government based upon the consent of the governed. It is not a union of ordinary, self-respecting men and

women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate and enslave the human race.

The British people and their allies today are conducting an active war against this unholy alliance. Our own future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our ability to "keep out of war" is going to be affected by that outcome.

Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less chance of the United States getting into war, if we do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.

If we are to be completely honest with ourselves, we must admit that there is risk in any course we may take. But I deeply believe that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I advocate involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.

The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security. Emphatically we must get these weapons to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough, so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure.

Let not the defeatists tell us that it is too late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today.

Certain facts are self-evident.

In a military sense Great Britain and the British Empire are today the spearhead of resistance to world conquest. They are putting up a fight which will live forever in the story of human gallantry.

There is no demand for sending an American Expeditionary Force outside our own borders. There is no intention by any member of your Government to send such a force. You can, therefore, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as deliberate untruth.

Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and our people.

Democracy's fight against world conquest is being greatly aided, and

must be more greatly aided, by the rearmament of the United States and by sending every ounce and every ton of munitions and supplies that we can possibly spare to help the defenders who are in the front lines. It is no more unneutral for us to do that than it is for Sweden, Russia and other nations near Germany, to send steel and ore and oil and other war materials into Germany every day in the week.

We are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency; and in its vast scale we must integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations which are resisting aggression.

This is not a matter of sentiment or of controversial personal opinion. It is a matter of realistic, practical military policy, based on the advice of our military experts who are in close touch with existing warfare. These military and naval experts and the members of the Congress and the Administration have a single-minded purpose—the defense of the United States. …

We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war. …

I believe that the Axis powers are not going to win this war. I base that belief on the latest and best information.

We have no excuse for defeatism. We have every good reason for hope—hope for peace, hope for the defense of our civilization and for the building of a better civilization in the future.

I have the profound conviction that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort than they have ever yet made to increase our production of all the implements of defense, to meet the threat to our democratic faith.

As President of the United States I call for that national effort. I call for it in the name of this nation which we love and honor and which we are privileged and proud to serve. I call upon our people with absolute confidence that our common cause will greatly succeed.

Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech, “The Arsenal of Democracy,” December 29, 1940, Fireside Chat Files: State Department, 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Digital Archives.

1941 DOCUMENTS

81. “The Four Freedoms”: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address Delivered to Congress, January 6, 1941

Introduction

In his annual State of the Union address to Congress in January 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt highlighted the international situation. He pledged that the United States would assist those countries that were “resisting aggression” and that it would defend the Western Hemisphere against all incursions. To do so, he argued, the United States must immediately mount a huge rearmament program. He also committed the country to the defense at home and abroad of the “four freedoms”: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.

Primary Source

I address you, the Members of the Seventy-seventh Congress, at a moment unprecedented in the history of the Union. I use the word “unprecedented,” because at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today.

Our national policy is this:

First, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to all-inclusive national defense.

Second, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to full support of all those resolute peoples, everywhere, who are resisting aggression and are thereby keeping war away from our hemisphere. By this support, we express our determination that the democratic cause shall prevail; and we strengthen the defense and security of our own Nation.

Third, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We

know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.

In the recent national election there was no substantial difference between the two great parties in respect to that national policy. No issue was fought out on this line before the American electorate. Today, it is abundantly evident that American citizens everywhere are demanding and supporting speedy and complete action in recognition of obvious danger.

Therefore, the immediate need is a swift and driving increase in our armament production. …

I also ask this Congress for authority and for funds sufficient to manufacture additional munitions and war supplies of many kinds, to be turned over to those nations which are now in actual war with aggressor nations.

Our most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal for them as well as for ourselves. They do not need manpower. They do need billions of dollars worth of the weapons of defense.

The time is near when they will not be able to pay for them in ready cash. We cannot, and will not, tell them they must surrender, merely because of present inability to pay for the weapons which we know they must have. …

For what we send abroad, we shall be repaid, within a reasonable time following the close of hostilities, in similar materials, or, at our option, in other goods of many kinds which they can produce and which we need.

Let us say to the democracies: "We Americans are vitally concerned in your defense of freedom. We are putting forth our energies, our resources, and our organizing powers to give you the strength to regain and maintain a free world. We shall send you, in ever-increasing numbers, ships, planes, tanks, guns. This is our purpose and our pledge."

In fulfillment of this purpose we will not be intimidated by the threats of dictators that they will regard as a breach of international law and as an act of war our aid to the democracies which dare to resist their aggression. Such aid is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally proclaim it so to be. …

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—

everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb.

To that new order we oppose the greater conception—the moral order. A good society is able to face schemes of world domination and foreign revolutions alike without fear.

Since the beginning of our American history we have been engaged in change—in a perpetual peaceful revolution—a revolution which goes on steadily, quietly adjusting itself to changing conditions without the concentration camp or the quick-lime in the ditch. The world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized society.

This Nation has placed its destiny in the hands and heads and hearts of its millions of free men and women; and its faith in freedom under the guidance of God. Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep them. Our strength is in our unity of purpose.

To that high concept there can be no end save victory.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 608–610.

82. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku to Japanese Navy Minister Oikawa Koshiro, January 7, 1941

Introduction

From the beginning of 1941 Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander of the Japanese Combined Pacific Fleet, formulated and began to advocate plans for an unannounced attack on American naval forces at Pearl Harbor. He drew on Japan's past historical experience in successfully launching such an attack against the Russian Pacific Fleet in 1904, the opening of the Russo-Japanese War. The eventual attack on Pearl Harbor closely followed Yamamoto's plans and was directed by him.

Primary Source

(CORDIALLY REQUEST THAT YOUR MINISTER ALONE READ THIS.)

(IT IS ALSO REQUESTED THAT THIS LETTER BE BURNED AFTER READING.)

OPINIONS ON WAR PREPARATIONS

Although a precise outlook on the international situation is hard for anyone to make, it is needless to say that now the time has come for the Navy, especially the Combined Fleet, to devote itself seriously to war preparations, training and operational plans with a firm determination that a conflict with the U.S. and Great Britain is inevitable.

Therefore, I dare say here generally what I have in mind, to which your kind consideration is cordially invited. (This generally corresponds to what I verbally said to you roughly late in last November.)

1. *War Preparations:* Views on war preparations of the Combined Fleet have already been conveyed to the central authorities in Tokyo, and I believe

the central authorities have been exerting the utmost efforts for their completion.

As the aforementioned request covers general major points alone, however, I think more detailed requests will be made when a real war is sure to come. Preparations are required to be made by all means [and] will be marked as such, to which your special consideration is cordially invited. Especially, in view of the fact that satisfaction can never be attained in air strength, whether aircraft or personnel, your special encouragement is kindly requested to promote their production whenever opportunities arise.

2. *Training:* Most of the training that has so far been planned and carried out deals with normal and fundamental circumstances, under which each unit is assigned a mission with the "*yogei sakusen*" [decisive engagement] as its main aim. Needless to say, the utmost efforts should be made to master it, as by so doing sufficient capabilities will be made so as to meet requirements needed in varied scenes of an engagement and a battle.

Considering a case in which this country goes to war with the U.S. and Great Britain as a practical problem, however, I think there may be no such case happening throughout the whole period of an expected war as all of the Combined Fleet closing in an enemy force, deploy, engage in a gunnery and torpedo duel, and finally charge into the enemy force in as gallant a way as possible. On the other hand, there may be cases in which various problems that have been somehow neglected in peace-time training in spite of their importance actually happen. In view of the current situation, therefore, I think earnest studies should be made of those problems.

Even when aforementioned normal and fundamental training is carried out, instead of being engrossed in overall tactical movements lacking precise consideration, unremitting studies should be made as to whether his fleet, squadron, division and ship display its fighting power to the utmost degree in every phase of maneuvers. (It will be an effective way for that end to let deviate shell firing and actual torpedo firing be included in every maneuver, and designate units at random during the maneuver to practice this training.)

If either of the British and Italian Fleets, which encountered in the Mediterranean sea last year, had been fully trained from peace time to rouse up in the fighting spirit of "attacking enemy whenever it is sighted" and accustomed to a sudden firing, there ought not to have been a case in which none was sunk on either side in spite of the fact that the duel took place for

25 minutes. It should be regarded as a blunder that could not be allowed in our Navy.

3. *Operational Policy:* Studies on operational policy, too, have so far been based on one big "*yogei sakusen*" to be fought in a formal way. Review of numerous maneuvers held in the past, however, shows that the Japanese Navy has never won an overwhelming victory even once; they used to be suspended under such a situation that, if by letting things take their own course, there was much fear that our Navy might be dragged into gradual defeat.

It might be of some use only when collecting reference materials for determining whether we should go to war or not, but it should not be repeated by all means if and when a decision is made to go to war.

The most important thing we have to do first of all in a war with the U.S., I firmly believe, is to fiercely attack and destroy the U.S. main fleet at the outset of the war, so that the morale of the U.S. Navy and her people goes down to such an extent that it cannot be recovered.

Only then shall we be able to secure an invincible stand in key positions in East Asia, thus being able to establish and keep the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Well, then, what policy should we take to accomplish this?

4. *Operational Plan That Should Be Adopted at the Outset of War:*

We learned many lessons in the Russo-Japanese War. Among them, those concerning the outset of war are as follows:

a. Japan had a chance to launch a surprise attack upon the enemy main force at the outset of war.
b. The morale of our destroyer force at the outset of war was not necessarily high (there being exceptions) and their skill was insufficient. This was most regrettable, about which serious reflection should be made.
c. Both the planning and execution of the blockade operation were insufficient.

In view of these successes and failures in the Russo-Japanese War, we should do our very best at the outset of a war with the U.S., and we should have a firm determination of deciding the fate of the war on its first day.

The outline of the operational plan is as follows:

a. In case of the majority of the enemy main force being in Pearl Harbor, to attack it thoroughly with our air force and to blockade the harbor.
b. In case they are staying outside of the harbor, too, to apply the same attack method as the above.

The strength to be used in the aforementioned operation and their assignments:

a. 1st and 2nd Carrier Divisions (2nd Carrier Division alone in an unavoidable case) to launch a forced or surprise attack with all of their air strength, risking themselves on a moonlit night or at dawn.
b. One destroyer squadron to rescue survivors of carriers sunken by an enemy counterattack.
c. One submarine squadron to attack the enemy fleeing in confusion after closing in on Pearl Harbor (or other anchorages), and, if possible, to attack them at the entrance of Pearl Harbor so that the entrance may be blocked by sunken ships.
d. Supply force to assign several tankers with the force for refueling at sea.

In case the enemy comes out from Hawaii before our attack and keeps on coming at us, to encounter it with all of our decisive force and destroy it in one stroke.

It is not easy to succeed in either case, but I believe we could be favored by God's blessing when all officers and men who take part in this operation have a firm determination of devoting themselves to their task, even sacrificing themselves.

The above is an operation with the U.S. main force as a main target, and an operation of launching a forestalling and surprise attack on the enemy air forces in the Philippines and Singapore should definitely be made almost at the same time of launching attacks on Hawaii. However, if and when the U.S. main force is destroyed, I think, those untrained forces deploying in those southern districts will lose morale to such an extent that they could hardly be of much use in actual bitter fighting.

On the other hand, when we take a defensive stand toward the east and await the enemy coming on out of fear that such an operation against Hawaii

is too risky, we cannot rule out the possibility that the enemy would dare to launch an attack upon our homeland to burn our capital city and other cities.

If such happens, our Navy will be subject to fierce attacks by the public, even when we succeed in the southern operation. It is evidently clear that such a development will result in lowering the morale of the nation to such an extent that it cannot be recovered. (It is not a laughing matter at all to recall how much confusion our nation was thrown into when the Russian fleet appeared in the Pacific in the Russo-Japanese War.)

I sincerely desire to be appointed C-in-C of an air fleet to attack Pearl Harbor so that I may personally command that attack force.

I firmly believe that there is a more suitable man to command the normal operations of the Grand Combined Fleet after that operation, as I previously stated my view verbally to your Minister.

Sincerely hoping that you will pass a clear judgment on my request to shift me to that post, so that I may be able to devote myself exclusively to my last duty to our country. …

Source: Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993), 115–118. Reprinted with permission of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 1993 by Prange Enterprises, Inc.

83. Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke, Cable Number 44 to the Washington Embassy (Koshi), January 30, 1941

Introduction

In 1940, U.S. naval intelligence deciphered the Japanese secret Foreign Office codes. Although German intelligence informed the Japanese foreign minister in May 1941 that they believed such code-breaking was taking place, American officials retained the ability to decipher much of Japan's official cable traffic. Among the messages decoded was one from the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo to the embassy in Washington instructing Japanese diplomats in the United States to determine American military capabilities

and to launch a campaign of propaganda and subversion in collaboration with Italy and Germany.

Primary Source

(Foreign Office secret)

(1) Establish an intelligence organ in the Embassy which will maintain liaison with private and semi-official intelligence organs. (See my messages to Washington #591 and #732 from New York to Tokyo, both of last year's series.) With regard to this, we are holding discussions with the various circles involved at the present time.

(2) The focal point of our investigations shall be the determination of the total strength of the U.S. Our investigations shall be divided into three general classifications: political, economic, and military, and definite course of action shall be mapped out.

(3) Make a survey of all persons or organizations which either openly or secretly oppose participation in the war.

(4) Make investigations of all anti-Semitism, communism, movements of Negroes, and labor movements.

(5) Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union members, and anti-Semites, in carrying out the investigations described in the preceding paragraph would undoubtedly bear the best results.

These men, moreover, should have access to governmental establishments, (laboratories?), governmental organizations of various characters, factories, and transportation facilities.

(6) Utilization of our "Second Generations" and our resident nationals. (In view of the fact that if there is any slip in this phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, the utmost caution must be exercised.)

(7) In the event of U.S. participation in the war, our intelligence set-up will be moved to Mexico, making that country the nerve center of our intelligence net. Therefore, will you bear this in mind and in anticipation of such an eventuality, set up facilities for a U.S.-Mexico international

intelligence net. This net which will cover Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru will also be centered in Mexico.

(8) We shall cooperate with the German and Italian intelligence organs in the U.S. This phase has been discussed with the Germans and the Italians in Tokyo, and it has been approved. …

Source: United States Department of Defense, *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor,* Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 30.

84. Reverend Arle Brooks, Statement upon His Conviction for Draft Evasion, January 1941

Introduction

The United States Selective Service Act of 1940 contained provisions for exemption for conscientious objection on religious grounds. Members of some American denominations, however, considered even registering for the draft unacceptable. One of these was the Reverend Arle Brooks of the Disciples of Christ Church, who was convicted of draft evasion in January 1941. Although Brooks could have used his status as a minister to avoid military service, he preferred to make a public issue of his pacifist beliefs. Before his sentencing, he made the following public statement justifying his stance.

Primary Source

My conscience forbade me to register under the Selective Service Training Act of 1940.

The present wars are the natural product of our economic system and our way of living. Preparation for war is easier than going through the painful process of reconstructing our social and economic system and improving our own lives.

Wars destroy human lives. Individuals have the right to give their lives for a cause. They have no right to take the life of another. Wars are destructive, futile and immoral. Wars have failed to solve the basic problems

of the world. Participation in war to settle international or national differences does not do justice to man's intelligence.

The people of America are filled with fear of an invasion. Are we so morally weak that the power of one man could control 130,000,000 free people? Free people cannot be enslaved unless they allow it. Are we too lethargic to find a better method of settling international affairs? The people of India have almost won their freedom from Great Britain without firing a shot. They are willing to give their lives but refuse to take the lives of the British soldiers.

Democracy does not mean a blind following of the will of the majority. In a democracy the minority has a right and a duty to follow its ideals. Sometimes the ideals of the minority have eventually been adopted by the majority. Gandhi said, "We are sunk so low that we fancy that it is our duty and our religion to do what the law lays down. If man will only realize that it is unmanly to obey laws that are unjust no man's tyranny will enslave him. … It is a superstition and an ungodly thing to believe that an act of a majority binds a minority." I believe in and have worked for the brotherhood of man, which is the highest form of democracy and which recognizes no national boundaries. I have worked with children of the slums of Chicago, with transients, relief people, prisoners in Texas, and with sharecroppers in Mississippi.

Conscription is a denial of the democracy for which I have worked. Under conscription the individual is required blindly to obey his superior officer even when the superior officer is wrong. Hitler could not wage his war if the people of Germany had not granted him the power to conscript them. The United States is adopting a system of conscription which may produce tyranny instead of freedom.

I cannot agree with those who believe that registration is a mere census. Registration is the first and necessary step in conscription. My conscience will not permit me to take this first step.

As a minister I could have received complete exemption. I felt it my moral duty to do all within my power to protest against conscription which will eventually weaken and destroy democracy. I am not evading the draft. I am opposing it. I am defending democracy.

Source: *Christian Century* 58 (February 5, 1941): 181. Reprinted in John O'Sullivan and Alan M. Meckler, eds., *The Draft and Its Enemies: A Documentary History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 174–176.

85. German Führer Adolf Hitler, Order on Collaboration with Japan, Issued by General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, March 5, 1941

Introduction

Germany sought to persuade Japan to move aggressively against British and American interests in East and Southeast Asia. From the German perspective, such policies would divert Anglo-American attention from the war with Germany. In anticipation of a forthcoming visit by Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka Yōsuke, Hitler ordered his military to collaborate closely with their Japanese counterparts in developing a joint strategy.

Primary Source

The Führer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:

1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three-Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this.

2. To prepare the way for collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available.

For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for assistance in military economics and in technical matters.

Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese proposals which would have the most immediate application in waging war.

In special cases the Führer reserves the decision to himself.

3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.
b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.
c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.
d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).

A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.

4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three-Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.

The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.

5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.

Source: Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression*, Vol. 1, Chapter 9, *Preparation for Aggression, 1933–1936* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 847–849.

86. The Lend-Lease Act, March 11, 1941

Introduction

In March 1941, the U.S. Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act. This act became the basis under which, throughout the war, the United States supplied its numerous allies with massive quantities of military supplies designed to assist them in their efforts to wage war against Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Primary Source

AN ACT Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States."… SEC. 3. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

(2) To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article, but no defense article not

manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph, except after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed $1,300,000,000. The value of such defense articles shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned or such other department, agency, or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise.

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract.

(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

(c) After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement

with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States.

(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939. …

SEC. 8. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States. …

Source: *Public Laws, Part 1: United States Statutes at Large Containing the Laws and Concurrent Resolutions Enacted during the First Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United States of America, 1941–1942, and Treaties, International Agreements Other than Treaties, and Proclamations,* Vol. 55 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 31–33.

87. "Draft Understanding," Paper Presented to the Department of State through the Medium of Private American and Japanese Individuals, April 9, 1941

Introduction

By 1941, the United States and Japan were seriously at odds over Japanese policy in Asia, especially toward China. Private Americans, notably two Catholic missionary fathers, working in collaboration with the Japanese ambassador to the United States and various Japanese military figures, developed a draft of what they hoped might become an understanding between Japan and the United States. Although many of its proposals were unacceptable to the United States, to start the ball rolling on talks, Secretary of State Cordell Hull agreed to discuss it. This proposal marked the beginning of eight months of intensive but ultimately fruitless negotiations over the

possibility of reconciling the differences dividing Japan and the United States.

Primary Source

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an *entente cordiale,* arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
4. Naval, aerial, and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
6. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

7. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding, subject, of course, to modifications by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.

I.

The Concepts of the United States and of Japan Respecting International Relations and the Character of Nations

The Governments of the United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II.

The Attitudes of Both Governments Toward the European War

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among nations not directly affected by the European War.

The Government of Japan, with no intention of evading its existing treaty obligation, desires to declare that its military obligations under the Axis Alliance come into force only when one of the parties of the Alliance is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European War.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

III.

China Affairs

The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang Kai-shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan:

a. Independence of China.
b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China.
c. No acquisition of Chinese territory.
d. No imposition of indemnities.
e. Resumption of the “Open Door”; the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan.
f. Coalescence of the Governments of Chiang Kai-shek and of Wang Ching-wei.
g. No large-scale or concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory.
h. Recognition of Manchukuo.

With the acceptance of the Chiang Kai-shek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.

The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities, and economic cooperation.

Should the Chiang Kai-shek regime reject the request of President Roosevelt, the United States Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese.

IV.

Naval, Aerial, and Mercantile Marine Relations in the Pacific

a. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for determination at the proposed joint Conference.
b. At the conclusion of the projected Conference, each nation might dispatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.
c. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use its good offices to release for contract by Americans a certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.

V.

Commerce Between Both Nations, and Their Financial Cooperation

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to

mutually supply such commodities as are respectively available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed Conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to foster trade and industrial development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

VI.

Economic Activity of Both Nations in the Southwestern Pacific Area

On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific shall be carried on by peaceful means, without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

VII.

The Policies of Both Nations Affecting Political Stabilization in the Pacific

a. The Government of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing States within the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific to any European Power.
b. The Government of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third power.
c. The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hong Kong

and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.

d. Japanese immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific shall receive amicable consideration—on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

CONFERENCE

a. It is suggested that a Conference between delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this Conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.
b. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.
c. This Conference could be held as soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.
d. The present agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearranged agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between the two Governments.

AGENDA

The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character, and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941,* Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 398–402.

88. Text of the U.S.-Danish Agreement on Greenland, April 9, 1941

Introduction

In April 1941, the United States announced that it would construct air and naval bases on Greenland, a huge island far out in the Atlantic that was under Danish sovereignty. Germany had occupied Denmark in the spring of 1940, so the United States reached this agreement with the government-in-exile. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration feared that unless it took this measure and effectively assumed responsibility for Greenland's defense, the territory might easily fall under German control.

Primary Source

Whereas:

ONE. After the invasion and occupation of Denmark on April 9, 1940 by foreign military forces, the United Greenland Councils at their meeting at Godhavn on May 3, 1940 adopted in the name of the people of Greenland a resolution reiterating their oath of allegiance to King Christian X of Denmark and expressing the hope that, for as long as Greenland remains cut off from the mother country, the Government of the United States of America will continue to hold in mind the exposed position of the Danish flag in Greenland, of the native Greenland and Danish population, and of established public order; and

TWO. The Governments of all of the American Republics have agreed that the status of regions in the Western Hemisphere belonging to European powers is a subject of deep concern to the American Nations, and that the course of military events in Europe and the changes resulting from them may create the grave danger that European territorial possessions in America may be converted into strategic centers of aggression against nations of the American Continent; and

THREE. Defense of Greenland against attack by a non-American power is essential to the preservation of the peace and security of the American Continent and is a subject of vital concern to the United States of America and also to the Kingdom of Denmark; and

FOUR. Although the sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland is fully recognized, the present circumstances for the time being prevent the Government in Denmark from exercising its powers in respect of Greenland.

Therefore,

The undersigned, to wit: CORDELL HULL, Secretary of State of the United States of America, acting on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and HENRIK DE KAUFFMANN, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Denmark at Washington, acting on behalf of His Majesty the King of Denmark in His capacity as sovereign of Greenland, whose authorities in Greenland have concurred herein, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Government of the United States of America reiterates its recognition of and respect for the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark over Greenland. Recognizing that as a result of the present European war there is danger that Greenland may be converted into a point of aggression against nations of the American Continent, the Government of the United States of America, having in mind its obligations under the Act of Habana signed on July 30, 1940, accepts the responsibility of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its present status.

ARTICLE II

It is agreed that the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to construct, maintain and operate such landing fields, seaplane facilities and radio and meteorological installations as may be necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article I.

ARTICLE III

The grants of the rights specified in Article II shall also include the right to improve and deepen harbors and anchorages and the approaches thereto, to install aids to navigation by air and by water, and to construct roads, communication services, fortifications, repair and storage facilities, and housing for personnel, and generally, the right to do any and all things necessary to insure the efficient operation, maintenance and protection of such defense facilities as may be established.

ARTICLE IV

The landing fields, seaplane, harbor and other defense facilities that may be constructed and operated by the Government of the United States of America under Articles II and III will be made available to the airplanes and vessels of all the American Nations for purposes connected with the common defense of the Western Hemisphere.

ARTICLE V

It is agreed that the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to lease for such period of time as this Agreement may be in force such areas of land and water as may be necessary for the construction, operation and protection of the defense facilities specified in Articles II and III. In locating the aforesaid defense areas, the fullest consideration consistent with military necessity shall be given to the welfare, health and economic needs of the native population of Greenland. It is agreed, however, that since the paramount objective sought is the early attainment of an adequate defense establishment in Greenland, the utilization of any area deemed by the Government of the United States of America to be needed for this purpose shall not be delayed pending the reaching of an agreement upon the precise terms of a formal lease. A description of such areas, by metes and bounds, and a statement of the purpose for which they are needed shall in each case be communicated to the Danish authorities in Greenland as soon as practicable, and the negotiation of a formal lease shall be undertaken within a reasonable period of time thereafter.

ARTICLE VI

The Kingdom of Denmark retains sovereignty over the defense areas mentioned in the preceding articles. So long as this Agreement shall remain in force, the Government of the United States of America shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any such defense area in Greenland and over military and civilian personnel of the United States and their families, as well as over all other persons within such areas except Danish citizens and native Greenlanders, it being understood, however, that the Government of the United States may turn over to the Danish authorities in Greenland for trial and punishment any person committing an offense within a defense area, if

the Government of the United States shall decide not to exercise jurisdiction in such case. The Danish authorities in Greenland will take adequate measures to insure the prosecution and punishment in case of conviction of all Danish citizens, native Greenlanders, and other persons who may be turned over to them by the authorities of the United States, for offenses committed within the said defense areas.

ARTICLE VII

It is agreed that the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to establish and maintain postal facilities and commissary stores to be used solely by military and civilian personnel of the United States, and their families, maintained in Greenland in connection with the Greenland defense establishment. If requested by the Danish authorities in Greenland, arrangements will be made to enable persons other than those mentioned to purchase necessary supplies at such commissary stores as may be established.

ARTICLE VIII

All materials, supplies and equipment for the construction, use and operation of the defense establishment and for the personal needs of military and civilian personnel of the United States, and their families, shall be permitted entry into Greenland free of customs duties, excise taxes, or other charges, and the said personnel and their families, shall also be exempt from all forms of taxation, assessments or other levies by the Danish authorities in Greenland.

ARTICLE IX

The Government of the United States of America will respect all legitimate interests in Greenland as well as all the laws, regulations and customs pertaining to the native population and the internal administration of Greenland. In exercising the rights derived from this Agreement the Government of the United States will give sympathetic consideration to all representations made by the Danish authorities in Greenland with respect to the welfare of the inhabitants of Greenland.

ARTICLE X

This Agreement shall remain in force until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security of the American Continent have passed. At that time the modification or termination of the Agreement will be the subject of consultation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Denmark. After due consultation has taken place, each party shall have the right to give the other party notice of its intention to terminate the Agreement, and it is hereby agreed, that at the expiration of twelve months after such notice shall have been received by either party from the other this Agreement shall cease to be in force.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 641–647.

89. Pact of Neutrality between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan and Declaration Regarding Mongolia, April 13, 1941

Introduction

In April 1941 the Soviet Union and Japan, the past relations of which had often been difficult, signed a formal agreement that they would remain neutral toward each other. Russia also agreed to respect Japan's interests in Manchuria in exchange for reciprocal pledges from Japan on Mongolia. Later that year Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and Japan declared war on both the United States and Britain. Even so, these agreements remained in effect until the summer of 1945, shortly before Japan's surrender.

Primary Source

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, have

decided to conclude a pact on neutrality, for which purpose they have appointed as their Representatives: [names omitted]

Who, after an exchange of their credentials, which were found in due and proper form, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE ONE

Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE TWO

Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

ARTICLE THREE

The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

ARTICLE FOUR

The present Pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokyo, also as soon as possible. …

Declaration Regarding Mongolia, April 13, 1941

In conformity with the spirit of the Pact on neutrality concluded on April 13, 1941, between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Japan, in the interest of insuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solemnly declare that the U.S.S.R. pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo and

Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Source: "Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, April 13, 1941," The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s1.asp.

90. Opposition to American Intervention in World War II: Charles A. Lindbergh, Radio Address, April 23, 1941

Introduction

While President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his chief advisers were strongly interventionist in World War II, taking measures that effectively made American entry into the conflict more likely, opposition to the war also existed. The private group America First was established in 1940 to organize those forces who believed that the best way the United States could meet the ever more serious international crisis was by building up American defenses while holding itself aloof from Europe. Its most celebrated member was the aviator Charles Lindbergh, the first person to make a solo flight across the Atlantic, whose personal inspections of German military forces during the later 1930s had convinced him that Germany had gained irreversible airpower superiority over Britain and France.

Primary Source

There are many viewpoints from which the issues of this war can be argued. Some are primarily idealistic. Some are primarily practical. One should, I believe, strive for a balance of both. But, since the subjects that can be covered in a single address are limited, tonight I shall discuss the war from a viewpoint which is primarily practical. It is not that I believe ideals are unimportant, even among the realities of war; but if a nation is to survive in a hostile world, its ideals must be backed by the hard logic of military practicability. If the outcome of war depended upon ideals alone, this would be a different world than it is today.

I know I will be severely criticized by the interventionists in America when I say we should not enter a war unless we have a reasonable chance of winning. That, they will claim, is far too materialistic a viewpoint. They will advance again the same arguments that were used to persuade France to declare war against Germany in 1939. But I do not believe that our American ideals, and our way of life, will gain through an unsuccessful war. And I know that the United States is not prepared to wage war in Europe successfully at this time. We are no better prepared today than France was when the interventionists in Europe persuaded her to attack the Siegfried line.

I have said it before, and I will say it again, that I believe it will be a tragedy to the entire world if the British Empire collapses. That is one of the main reasons why I opposed this war before it was declared and why I have constantly advocated a negotiated peace. I did not feel that England and France had a reasonable chance of winning. France has now been defeated; and, despite the propaganda and confusion of recent months, it is now obvious that England is losing the war. I believe this is realized even by the British Government. But they have one last desperate plan remaining. They hope that they may be able to persuade us to send another American Expeditionary Force to Europe, and to share with England militarily, as well as financially, the fiasco of this war.

I do not blame England for this hope, or for asking for our assistance. But we now know that she declared a war under circumstances which led to the defeat of every nation that sided with her from Poland to Greece. We know that in the desperation of war England promised to all those nations armed assistance that she could not send. We know that she misinformed them, as she has misinformed us, concerning her state of preparation, her military strength, and the progress of the war.

In time of war, truth is always replaced by propaganda. I do not believe that we should be too quick to criticize the actions of a belligerent nation. There is always the question whether we, ourselves, would do better under similar circumstances. But we in this country have a right to think of the welfare of America first, just as the people in England thought first of their own country when they encouraged the smaller nations of Europe to fight against hopeless odds. When England asks us to enter this war, she is considering her own future and that of her Empire. In making our reply, I

believe we should consider the future of the United States and that of the Western Hemisphere.

It is not only our right, but it is our obligation as American citizens, to look at this war objectively and to weigh our chances for success if we should enter it. I have attempted to do this, especially from the standpoint of aviation; and I have been forced to the conclusion that we cannot win this war for England, regardless of how much assistance we extend.

I ask you to look at the map of Europe today and see if you can suggest any way in which we could win this war if we entered it. Suppose we had a large army in America, trained and equipped. Where would we send it to fight? The campaigns of the war show only too clearly how difficult it is to force a landing, or to maintain an army, on a hostile coast.

Suppose we took our Navy from the Pacific and used it to convoy British shipping. That would not win the war for England. It would, at best, permit her to exist under the constant bombing of the German air fleet. Suppose we had an air force that we could send to Europe. Where could it operate? Some of our squadrons might be based in the British Isles, but it is physically impossible to base enough aircraft in the British Isles alone to equal in strength the aircraft that can be based on the continent of Europe.

I have asked these questions on the supposition that we had in existence an Army and an air force large enough and well enough equipped to send to Europe; and that we would dare to remove our Navy from the Pacific. Even on this basis, I do not see how we could invade the continent of Europe successfully as long as all of that continent and most of Asia is under Axis domination. But the fact is that none of these suppositions are correct. We have only a one-ocean Navy. Our Army is still untrained and inadequately equipped for foreign war. Our air force is deplorably lacking in modern fighting planes.

When these facts are cited, the interventionists shout that we are defeatists, that we are undermining the principles of democracy, and that we are giving comfort to Germany by talking about our military weakness. But everything I mention here has been published in our newspapers and in the reports of congressional hearings in Washington. Our military position is well known to the governments of Europe and Asia. Why, then, should it not be brought to the attention of our own people?

I say it is the interventionists in America as it was in England and in

France, who give aid and comfort to the enemy. I say it is they who are undermining the principles of democracy when they demand that we take a course to which more than 80 percent of our citizens are opposed. I charge them with being the real defeatists, for their policy has led to the defeat of every country that followed their advice since this war began. There is no better way to give comfort to an enemy than to divide the people of a nation over the issue of foreign war. There is no shorter road to defeat than by entering a war with inadequate preparation. Every nation that has adopted the interventionist policy of depending upon someone else for its own defense has met with nothing but defeat and failure. …

There is a policy open to this Nation that will lead to success—a policy that leaves us free to follow our own way of life and to develop our own civilization. It is not a new and untried idea. It was advocated by Washington. It was incorporated in the Monroe Doctrine. Under its guidance the United States became the greatest Nation in the world.

It is based upon the belief that the security of a nation lies in the strength and character of its own people. It recommends the maintenance of armed forces sufficient to defend this hemisphere from attack by any combination of foreign powers. It demands faith in an independent American destiny. This is the policy of the America First Committee today. It is a policy not of isolation, but of independence; not of defeat, but of courage. It is a policy that led this Nation to success during the most trying years of our history, and it is a policy that will lead us to success again. …

The United States is better situated from a military standpoint than any other nation in the world. Even in our present condition of unpreparedness no foreign power is in a position to invade us today. If we concentrate on our own defenses and build the strength that this Nation should maintain, no foreign army will ever attempt to land on American shores.

War is not inevitable for this country. Such a claim is defeatism in the true sense. No one can make us fight abroad unless we ourselves are willing to do so. No one will attempt to fight us here if we arm ourselves as a great nation should be armed. Over a hundred million people in this Nation are opposed to entering the war. If the principles of democracy mean anything at all, that is reason enough for us to stay out. If we are forced into a war against the wishes of an overwhelming majority of our people, we will have proved

democracy such a failure at home that there will be little use fighting for it abroad.

The time has come when those of us who believe in an independent American destiny must band together and organize for strength. We have been led toward war by a minority of our people. This minority has power. It has influence. It has a loud voice. But it does not represent the American people. During the last several years I have traveled over this country from one end to the other. I have talked to many hundreds of men and women, and have letters from tens of thousands more, who feel the same way as you and I.

Most of these people have no influence or power. Most of them have no means of expressing their convictions, except by their vote which has always been against this war. They are the citizens who have had to work too hard at their daily jobs to organize political meetings. Hitherto, they have relied upon their vote to express their feelings; but now they find that it is hardly remembered except in the oratory of a political campaign. These people, the majority of hard-working American citizens, are with us. They are the true strength of our country. And they are beginning to realize, as you and I, that there are times when we must sacrifice our normal interests in life in order to insure the safety and the welfare of our Nation.

Such a time has come. Such a crisis is here. That is why the America First Committee has been formed—to give voice to the people who have no newspaper, or newsreel, or radio station at their command; to the people who must do the paying, and the fighting, and the dying if this country enters the war.

Source: Charles A. Lindbergh, Radio Address, April 23, 1941, Reprinted in T. H. Breen, ed., *The Power of Words: Documents in American History,* Vol. 2, *From 1865* (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 172–174. Reprinted with permission of Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

91. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation of Unlimited National Emergency, May 27, 1941

Introduction

In May 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared that due to the war in Europe and Asia, a state of national emergency was necessary in the United States. This measure, which authorized him to take such action as he felt desirable to safeguard American security, represented another important step in bringing the United States closer to outright war.

Primary Source

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A Proclamation

(Proclaiming That an Unlimited National Emergency Confronts This Country, Which Requires That Its Military, Naval, Air and Civilian Defenses Be Put on the Basis of Readiness to Repel Any and All Acts or Threats of Aggression Directed Toward any Part of the Western Hemisphere.)

WHEREAS on September 8, 1939 because of the outbreak of war in Europe a proclamation was issued declaring a limited national emergency and directing measures "for the purpose of strengthening our national defense within the limits of peacetime authorizations,"

WHEREAS a succession of events makes plain that the objectives of the Axis belligerents in such war are not confined to those avowed at its commencement, but include overthrow throughout the world of existing democratic order, and a worldwide domination of peoples and economies through the destruction of all resistance on land and sea and in the air, AND

WHEREAS indifference on the part of the United States to the increasing menace would be perilous, and common prudence requires that for the security of this nation and of this hemisphere we should pass from peacetime authorizations of military strength to such a basis as will enable us to cope instantly and decisively with any attempt at hostile encirclement of this hemisphere, or the establishment of any base for aggression against it, as well as to repel the threat of predatory incursion by foreign agents into our territory and society,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, do proclaim that an unlimited national emergency confronts this country, which requires that its military, naval, air and civilian

defences be put on the basis of readiness to repel any and all acts or threats of aggression directed toward any part of the Western Hemisphere.

I call upon all the loyal citizens engaged in production for defense to give precedence to the needs of the nation to the end that a system of government that makes private enterprise possible may survive.

I call upon all our loyal workmen as well as employers to merge their lesser differences in the larger effort to insure the survival of the only kind of government which recognizes the rights of labor or of capital.

I call upon loyal state and local leaders and officials to cooperate with the civilian defense agencies of the United States to assure our internal security against foreign directed subversion and to put every community in order for maximum productive effort and minimum of waste and unnecessary frictions.

I call upon all loyal citizens to place the nation's needs first in mind and in action to the end that we may mobilize and have ready for instant defensive use all of the physical powers, all of the moral strength and all of the material resources of this nation. …

Source: *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 4, *May 31, 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 654.

92. Ho Chi Minh, Letter from Abroad, May or June 1941

Introduction

The European war encouraged nationalist forces within Asian colonies. In mid-May 1941, the Eighth Plenum of the Communist Party of Indochina decided to launch an armed uprising against the Vichy-oriented French colonial administration of Indochina and the Japanese with whom the French were collaborating. The rebellion proved abortive, but before it took place, the party's leader, Ho Chi Minh, still in exile, sent this letter of encouragement.

Primary Source

Elders!

Prominent personalities!

Intellectuals, peasants, workers, traders, and soldiers!

Dear compatriots!

Since the French were defeated by the Germans, their forces have been completely disintegrated. However, with regard to our people, they continue to plunder us pitilessly, suck all our blood, and carry out a barbarous policy of all-out terrorism and massacre. Concerning their foreign policy, they bow their heads and kneel down, shamelessly cutting our land for Siam; without a single word of protest, they heartlessly offer our interests to Japan. As a result, our people suffer under a double yoke: they serve not only as buffaloes and horses to the French invaders but also as slaves to the Japanese plunderers. Alas! What sin have our people committed to be doomed to such a wretched plight!

Living in such painful and lamentable conditions, can our people bind their own hands to doom themselves to death? No! Certainly not! More than 20 million sons and daughters of Lac Hong are resolute to do away with slavery. For nearly eighty years under the French invaders' iron heels we have unceasingly sacrificed ourselves and struggled for national independence and freedom. …

Now, the opportunity has come for liberation. France itself is unable to dominate our country. As to the Japanese, on the one hand they are bogged in China, on the other they are hamstrung by the British and American forces and certainly cannot use all their forces to contend with us. If our entire people are united and single-minded, we are certainly able to smash the picked French and Japanese armies.

Compatriots throughout the country! Rise up quickly! Let us follow the heroic example of the Chinese people! Rise up quickly to organize the Association for National Salvation to fight the French and the Japanese.

Elders!

Prominent personalities!

Some hundreds of years ago, when our country was endangered by the Mongolian dynasty, our elders under the Tran dynasty rose up indignantly and called on their sons and daughters throughout the country to rise as one in order to kill the enemy. Finally they saved their people from danger, and their good name will be carried into posterity for all time. The elders and

prominent personalities of our country should follow the example set by our forefathers in the glorious task of national salvation.

Rich people, soldiers, workers, peasants, intellectuals, employees, traders, youth, and women who warmly love your country! At the present time national liberation is the most important problem. Let us unite together! As one in mind and strength we shall overthrow the Japanese and French and their jackals in order to save people from the situation between boiling water and burning heat.

Dear compatriots!

National salvation is the common cause to the whole of our people. Every Vietnamese must take part in it. He who has money will contribute his money, he who has strength will contribute his strength, he who has talent will contribute his talent. I pledge to use all my modest abilities to follow you and am ready for the last sacrifice.

Revolutionary fighters!

The hour has struck! Raise aloft the insurrectionary banner and guide the people throughout the country to overthrow the Japanese and French! The sacred call of the Fatherland is resounding in your ears; the blood of our heroic predecessors who sacrificed ther lives is stirring in your hearts! The fighting spirit of the people is displayed everywhere before you! Let us rise up quickly! Unite with each other, unify your action to overthrow the Japanese and the French.

Victory to Viet-Nam's Revolution!

Victory to the World's Revolution!

Source: Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works,* Vol. 2 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 151–154.

93. William J. Donovan to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information," June 10, 1941

Introduction

In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan, a Buffalo lawyer and vehemently pro-Allied former U.S. attorney general who won the Medal of Honor in World War I, proposed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt the creation of a U.S. foreign intelligence service. Donovan prepared this memorandum after discussions with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, several British intelligence operatives, and various others close to Roosevelt.

Primary Source

Strategy without information upon which it can rely is helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose. Modern warfare depends upon the economic base—upon the supply of raw materials, on the capacity and performance of the industrial plant, on the scope of agricultural production, and upon the character and efficiency of communications. Strategic reserves will determine the strength of the attack and the resistance of the defense. Steel and gasoline constitute these reserves as much as do men and powder. The width and depth of terrain occupied by the present-day Army exacts an equally wide and deep network of operational lines. The “depth of strategy” depends upon the “depth of armament.”

The commitment of all the resources of a nation, moral as well as material, constitutes what is called total war. To anticipate every intention as to the mobilization and employment of these forces is a difficult task. General von Bernhardi says, “We must try by correctly foreseeing what is coming, to anticipate developments and thereby to gain an advantage which our opponents cannot overcome on the field of battle. That is what the future expects us to do.”

Although we are facing imminent peril, we are lacking in effective services for analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such information as we might obtain (or in some cases have obtained) relative to the intention of potential enemies and the limit of the economic and military resources of these enemies. Our mechanism of collecting information is inadequate. It is true we have intelligence units in the Army and Navy. We can assume that

through these units our fighting services can obtain technical information in time of peace, have available immediate operation information in time of war, and, on certain occasions, obtain “spot” news as to enemy movements. But these services cannot, out of the very nature of things, obtain that accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without which no strategic board can plan for the future. And we have arrived at the moment when there must be plans laid down for the spring of 1942.

We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our Government, documents and memoranda concerning military and naval and air and economic potentials of the Axis which, if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a knowledge both of the related languages and techniques, would yield valuable and often decisive results.

Critical analysis of this information is as presently important for our supply program as if we were actually engaged in armed conflict. It is unimaginable that Germany would engage in a $7 billion supply program without first studying in detail the productive capacity of her actual and potential enemies. It is because she does exactly this that she displays such mastery in the secrecy, timing and effectiveness of her attacks.

Even if we participate to no greater extent than we do now, it is essential that we set up a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect, either directly or through existing departments of Government, at home and abroad, pertinent information concerning potential enemies, the character and strength of their armed forces, their internal economic organization, their principal channels of supply, the morale of their troops and their people and their relations with their neighbors or allies.

For example, in the economic field there are many weapons that can be used against the enemy. But in our Government, these weapons are distributed through several different departments. How and when to use them is of vital interest not only to the Commander-in-Chief but to each of the departments concerned. All departments should have the same information upon which economic warfare could be determined.

To analyze and interpret such information by applying to it not only the experience of Army and Naval officers, but also of specialized, trained research officials in the relative scientific fields (including technological,

economic, financial and psychological scholars), is of determining influence in modern warfare.

Such analysis and interpretation must be done with immediacy and speedily transmitted to the intelligence services of those departments which, in some cases, would have been supplying the essential raw materials of information.

But there is another element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack against the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation. In this attack, the most powerful weapon is radio. The use of radio as a weapon, though effectively employed by Germany, is still to be perfected. But this perfection can be realized only by planning, and planning is dependent upon accurate information. From this information, action could be carried out by appropriate agencies.

The mechanism of this service to the various departments should be under the direction of a Coordinator of Strategic Information, who would be responsible directly to the President. This Coordinator could be assisted by an advisory panel consisting of the Director of the FBI, the Directors of the Army and Navy Intelligence Service, with corresponding officials from other Governmental departments principally concerned.

The attached chart shows the allocation of and the interrelation between the general duties to be discharged under the appropriate directors. Much of the personnel would be drawn from the Army and Navy and other departments of the Government, and it will be seen from the chart that the proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other department of the Government.

The basic purpose of this Service of Strategic Information is to constitute a means by which the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and his Strategic Board would have available accurate and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military operational decisions could be based.

Source: File Coordinator of Information 1941, Box 141, Subject Files, President's Secretary's File, Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.

94. Hitler’s Decision to Invade the Soviet Union: Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini, June 21, 1941

Introduction

One of Hitler’s greatest mistakes was his decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941, a war that would bleed Germany white of men and resources. Writing to his fellow dictator, Benito Mussolini, on June 21, 1941, Hitler explained his decision to invade the Soviet Union in terms that made it clear that he ultimately expected victory there. It seems that he had in all probability always intended to break the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact whenever this might seem most convenient to him.

Primary Source

Duce!

I am writing this letter to you at a moment when months of anxious deliberation and continuous nerve-racking waiting are ending in the hardest decision of my life. I believe—after seeing the latest Russian situation map and after appraisal of numerous other reports—that I cannot take the responsibility for waiting longer, and above all, I believe that there is no other way of obviating this danger—unless it be further waiting, which, however, would necessarily lead to disaster in this or the next year at the latest.

The situation: England has lost this war. With the right of the drowning person, she grasps at every straw which, in her imagination, might serve as a sheet anchor. Nevertheless, some of her hopes are naturally not without a certain logic. England has thus far always conducted her wars with help from the Continent. The destruction of France—in fact, the elimination of all west-European positions—is directing the glances of the British warmongers continually to the place from which they tried to start the war: to Soviet Russia.

Both countries, Soviet Russia and England, are equally interested in a Europe fallen into ruin, rendered prostrate by a long war. Behind these two countries stands the North American Union goading them on and watchfully waiting. Since the liquidation of Poland, there is evident in Soviet Russia a

consistent trend, which, even if cleverly and cautiously, is nevertheless reverting firmly to the old Bolshevist tendency to expansion of the Soviet State. The prolongation of the war necessary for this purpose is to be achieved by tying up German forces in the East, so that—particularly in the air—the German Command can no longer vouch for a large-scale attack in the West. I declared to you only recently, Duce, that it was precisely the success of the experiment in Crete that demonstrated how necessary it is to make use of every single airplane in the much greater project against England. It may well happen that in this decisive battle we would win with a superiority of only a few squadrons. I shall not hesitate a moment to undertake such a responsibility if, aside from all other conditions, I at least possess the one certainty that I will not then suddenly be attacked or even threatened from the East. The concentration of Russian forces—I had General Jodl submit the most recent map to your Attaché here, General Maras—is tremendous. Really, all available Russian forces are at our border. Moreover, since the approach of warm weather, work has been proceeding on numerous defenses. If circumstances should give me cause to employ the German air force against England, there is danger that Russia will then begin its strategy of extortion in the South and North, to which I would have to yield in silence, simply from a feeling of air inferiority. It would, above all, not then be possible for me without adequate support from an air force, to attack the Russian fortifications with the divisions stationed in the East. If I do not wish to expose myself to this danger, then perhaps the whole year of 1941 will go by without any change in the general situation. On the contrary, England will be all the less ready for peace, for it will be able to pin its hopes on the Russian partner. Indeed, this hope must naturally even grow with the progress in preparedness of the Russian armed forces. And behind this is the mass delivery of war material from America which they hope to get in 1942.

Aside from this, Duce, it is not even certain whether I shall have this time, for with so gigantic a concentration of forces on both sides—for I also was compelled to place more and more armored units on the eastern border, also to call Finland’s and Rumania’s attention to the danger—there is the possibility that the shooting will start spontaneously at any moment. A withdrawal on my part would, however, entail a serious loss of prestige for us. This would be particularly unpleasant in its possible effect on Japan. I have, therefore, after constantly racking my brains, finally reached the

decision to cut the noose before it can be drawn tight. I believe, Duce, that I am hereby rendering probably the best possible service to our joint conduct of the war this year. For my overall view is now as follows:

1. France is, as ever, not to be trusted. Absolute surety that North Africa will not suddenly desert does not exist.
2. North Africa itself, insofar as your colonies, Duce, are concerned, is probably out of danger until fall. I assume that the British, in their last attack, wanted to relieve Tobruk. I do not believe they will soon be in a position to repeat this.
3. Spain is irresolute and—I am afraid—will take sides only when the outcome of the war is decided.
4. In Syria, French resistance can hardly be maintained permanently either with or without our help.
5. An attack on Egypt before autumn is out of the question altogether. I consider it necessary, however, taking into account the whole situation, to give thought to the development of an operational unit in Tripoli itself which can, if necessary, also be launched against the West. Of course, Duce, the strictest silence must be maintained with regard to these ideas, for otherwise we cannot expect France to continue to grant permission to use its ports for the transportation of arms and munitions.
6. Whether or not America enters the war is a matter of indifference, inasmuch as she supports our opponent with all the power she is able to mobilize.
7. The situation in England itself is bad; the provision of food and raw materials is growing steadily more difficult. The martial spirit to make war, after all, lives only on hopes. These hopes are based solely on two assumptions: Russia and America. We have no chance of eliminating America. But it does lie in our power to exclude Russia. The elimination of Russia means, at the same time, a tremendous relief for Japan in East Asia, and thereby the possibility of a much stronger threat to American activities through Japanese intervention.

I have decided under these circumstances as I already mentioned, to put an end to the hypocritical performance in the Kremlin. I assume, that is to say, I am convinced, that Finland, and likewise Rumania, will forthwith take part in

this conflict, which will ultimately free Europe, for the future also, of a great danger. General Maras informed us that you, Duce, wish also to make available at least one corps. If you have that intention, Duce—which I naturally accept with a heart filled with gratitude—the time for carrying it out will still be sufficiently long, for in this immense theater of war the troops cannot be assembled at all points at the same time anyway. You, Duce, can give the decisive aid, however, by strengthening your forces in North Africa, also, if possible, looking from Tripoli toward the West, by proceeding further to build up a group which, though it be small at first, can march into France in case of a French violation of the treaty; and finally, by carrying the air war and, so far as it is possible, the submarine war, in intensified degree, into the Mediterranean.

So far as the security of the territories in the West is concerned, from Norway to and including France, we are strong enough there—so far as army troops are concerned—to meet any eventuality with lightning speed. So far as air war on England is concerned, we shall for a time remain on the defensive—but this does not mean that we might be incapable of countering British attacks on Germany; on the contrary, we shall, if necessary, be in a position to start ruthless bombing attacks on British home territory. Our fighter defense, too, will be adequate. It consists of the best squadrons that we have.

As far as the war in the East is concerned, Duce, it will surely be difficult, but I do not entertain a second's doubt as to its great success. I hope, above all, that it will then be possible for us to secure a common food-supply base in the Ukraine for some time to come, which will furnish us such additional supplies as we may need in the future. I may state at this point, however, that, as far as we can tell now, this year's German harvest promises to be a very good one. It is conceivable that Russia will try to destroy the Rumanian oil region. We have built up a defense that will—or so I think—prevent the worst. Moreover, it is the duty of our armies to eliminate this threat as rapidly as possible.

I waited until this moment, Duce, to send you this information, because the final decision itself will not be made until 7 o'clock tonight. I earnestly beg you, therefore, to refrain, above all, from making any explanation to your Ambassador at Moscow, for there is no absolute guarantee that our coded reports cannot be decoded. I, too, shall wait until the last moment to have my own Ambassador informed of the decisions reached.

The material that I now contemplate publishing gradually, is so exhaustive that the world will have more occasion to wonder at our forbearance than at our decision, except for that part of the world which opposes us on principle and for which, therefore, arguments are of no use.

Whatever may now come, Duce, our situation can become no worse as a result of this step; it can only improve. Even if I should be obliged at the end of this year to leave 60 or 70 divisions in Russia, that is only a fraction of the forces that I am now continually using on the eastern front. Should England nevertheless not draw any conclusions from the hard facts that present themselves, then we can, with our rear secured, apply ourselves with increased strength to the dispatching of our opponent. I can promise you, Duce, that what lies in our German power, will be done.

Any desires, suggestions, and assistance of which you, Duce, wish to inform me in the contingency before us, I would request that you either communicate to me personally or have them agreed upon directly by our military authorities.

In conclusion, let me say one more thing, Duce. Since struggling through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free. The partnership with the Soviet Union, in spite of the complete sincerity of the efforts to bring about a final conciliation, was nevertheless often very irksome to me, for in some way or other it seemed to me to be a break with my whole origin, my concepts, and my former obligations. I am happy now to be relieved of these mental agonies.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 349–353.

95. A. Philip Randolph and the March on Washington, January–June 1941

Introduction

The stated values of the United States, as proclaimed in its war aims, made the Roosevelt administration vulnerable to demands by African Americans for legal equality and the end of segregation and discrimination. In the first half of 1941, A. Philip Randolph, leader of the trade union the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, a traditionally black occupation, took advantage of the crisis to put pressure on Washington to end racial discrimination by planning a march on Washington by 100,000 African Americans to protest racial segregation. Given professed American support for democracy and equality and opposition to Nazi racialism, such an event would have been a damaging propaganda blow. It also provided the seed for the 1963 March on Washington headed by the black activist Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., a gathering largely organized by Randolph and at which he himself also spoke. In the shorter term, the threatened 1941 march was called off when the Roosevelt administration issued Executive Order 8802, outlawing discrimination in any industrial plant awarded government defense contracts and establishing an enforcement agency, the Fair Employment Practices Commission. Although these measures often proved ineffective in practice, they marked the beginning of government efforts toward racial equality in the United States.

Primary Source

A. Philip Randolph, Statement Made on the Proposed March on Washington, January 15, 1941

Negro America must bring its power and pressure to bear upon the agencies and representatives of the Federal Government to exact their rights in National Defense employment and the armed forces of the country. I suggest that ten thousand Negroes march on Washington, D. C. with the slogan: “We

loyal Negro American citizens demand the right to work and fight for our country." No propaganda could be whipped up and spread to the effect that Negroes seek to hamper defense. No charge could be made that Negroes are attempting to mar national unity. They want to do none of these things. On the contrary, we seek the right to play our part in advancing the cause of national defense and national unity. But certainly there can be no national unity where one tenth of the population are denied their basic rights as American citizens.

Source: A. Philip Randolph, "Let's March on Capital 10,000 Strong, Urges Leader of Porters," *Pittsburgh Courier*, January 25, 1941, 13.

Extract from Transcript of June 18, 1941, White House Meeting between Franklin D. Roosevelt, Philip Randolph, Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia

Philip Randolph: Mr. President, time is running on. You are quite busy, I know. But what we want to talk with you about is the problem of jobs for Negroes in defense industries. Our people are being turned away at factory gates because they are colored. They can't live with this thing. Now, what are you going to do about it?

Franklin D. Roosevelt: Well, Phil, what do you want me to do?

Philip Randolph: Mr. President, we want you to do something that will enable Negro workers to get work in these plants.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: Why, I surely want them to work, too. I'll call up the heads of the various defense plants and have them see to it that Negroes are given the same opportunity to work in defense plants as any other citizen in the country.

Philip Randolph: We want you to do more than that. We want something concrete, something tangible, definite, positive, and affirmative.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: What do you mean?

Philip Randolph: Mr. President, we want you to issue an executive order making it mandatory that Negroes be permitted to work in these plants.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: Well Phil, you know I can't do that. If I issue an executive order for you, then there'll be no end to other groups coming in here and asking me to issue executive orders for them, too. In any event, I

couldn’t do anything unless you called off this march of yours. Questions like this can’t be settled with a sledge hammer.

Philip Randolph: I’m sorry, Mr. President, the march cannot be called off.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: How many people do you plan to bring?

Philip Randolph: One hundred thousand, Mr. President.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: Walter, how many people will really march?

Walter White: One hundred thousand, Mr. President.

Fiorello La Guardia: Gentlemen, it is clear that Mr. Randolph is not going to call off the march, and I suggest we all begin to seek a formula.

Source: “March on Washington in 1941,” Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAmarchW.htm. Reprinted with permission of Spartacus Educational Publishers Ltd.

Philip Randolph, Statement on the Cancellation of the March on Washington, June 25, 1941

The march has been called off because its main objective, namely the issuance of an Executive Order banishing discrimination in national defense, was secured. The Executive Order was issued upon the condition that the march be called off.

Source: “March on Washington in 1941,” Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAmarchW.htm. Reprinted with permission of Spartacus Educational Publishers Ltd.

96. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 8802, Reaffirming the Policy of Full Participation in the Defense Program by All Persons, Regardless of Race, Creed, Color, or National Origin, and Directing Certain Action in Furtherance of Said Policy, June 25, 1941

Introduction

In June 1941 under pressure from African Americans, Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order that supposedly banned discrimination in connection with all defense program contracts. In practice, the U.S. Congress refused to provide the funding to enforce decisions made under this executive order, and those who sought to evade its provisions often argued that winning the war must take priority over ending discrimination.

Primary Source

WHEREAS it is the policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders; and

WHEREAS there is evidence that available and needed workers have been barred from employment in industries engaged in defense production solely because of considerations of race, creed, color, or national origin, to the detriment of workers' morale and of national unity:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, and as a prerequisite to the successful conduct of our national defense production effort, I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of employers and of labor organizations, in furtherance of said policy and of this order, to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

And it is hereby ordered as follows:

All departments and agencies of the Government of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production shall take special measures appropriate to assure that such programs are administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

All contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

There is established in the Office of Production Management a Committee on Fair Employment Practice, which shall consist of a chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President. The Chairman and members of the Committee shall serve as such without compensation but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence and other expenses incidental to performance of their duties. The Committee shall receive and investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the provisions of this order and shall take appropriate steps to redress grievances which it finds to be valid. The Committee shall also recommend to the several departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and to the President all measures which may be deemed by it necessary or proper to effectuate the provisions of this order.

Source: Executive Order 8802 dated June 25, 1941, General Records of the United States Government, Record Group 11, National Archives.

97. “Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation”: Policy Document Approved by the Imperial Conference, Japanese Government, July 2, 1941

Introduction

After lengthy and heated discussions among top Japanese military and political leaders, a full-scale Japanese Imperial Conference met on July 2, 1941, to approve a document guiding Japanese policy. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke had argued forcefully but unsuccessfully for a “Northern policy” of war against Soviet Russia rather than a “Southern policy” of moving into French Indochina. The army and navy received permission to annex bases in southern French Indochina, even at the risk of war with the

United States and Britain. No final decision was made on war against the Soviet Union, though military units in Manchuria were instructed to prepare themselves for potential involvement in such a conflict. And though admitting the possibility of war with the United States and Britain, the participants hoped to avert such an outcome by means of diplomatic negotiations.

Primary Source

Policy

1. Our Empire is determined to follow a policy that will result in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and will thereby contribute to world peace, no matter what change may occur in the world situation.

2. Our Empire will continue its efforts to effect a settlement of the China Incident, and will seek to establish a solid basis for the security and preservation of the nation. This will involve taking steps to advance south, and, depending on changes in the situation, will involve a settlement of the Northern Question as well.

3. Our Empire is determined to remove all obstacles in order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.

Summary

1. Pressure applied from the southern regions will be increased in order to force the capitulation of the Chiang regime. At the appropriate time, depending on future developments, the rights of a belligerent will be exercised against the Chungking regime, and hostile Foreign Settlements will be taken over.

2. In order to guarantee the security and preservation of the nation, our Empire will continue all necessary diplomatic negotiations with reference to the southern regions, and will also take such other measures as may be necessary.

In order to achieve the following objectives, preparations for war with Great Britain and the United States will be made. First of all, on the basis of “Outline of Policies Toward French Indochina and Thailand” and

"Acceleration of Policies Concerning the South," various measures relating to French Indochina and Thailand will be taken, with the purpose of strengthening our advance into the southern regions. In carrying out the plans outlined above, our Empire will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States.

3. Our attitude with reference to the German-Soviet war will be based on the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. However, we will not enter the conflict for the time being. We will secretly strengthen our military preparedness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and we will deal with this matter independently. In the meantime, we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great care. If the German-Soviet war should develop to the advantage of our Empire, we will, by resorting to armed force, settle the Northern Question and assure the security of the northern borders.

4. In carrying out the various policies mentioned above [in Section 3], and especially in deciding on the use of armed force, we will make certain that there will be no great obstacles to the maintenance of our basic posture with respect to war with Great Britain and the United States.

5. In accordance with established policy, we will strive to the utmost, by diplomatic and other means, to prevent the entry of the United States into the European war. But if the United States should enter the war, our Empire will act in accordance with the Tripartite Pact. However, we will decide independently as to the time and method of resorting to force.

6. We will immediately turn our attention to putting the nation on a war footing. In particular, the defense of the homeland will be strengthened.

7. Concrete plans covering this program will be drawn up separately.

Source: Nobutaka Ike, ed., *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 78–79. Reprinted with permission of Stanford University.

98. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress Relating to the Dispatch of Naval Forces to Iceland, July 7, 1941

Introduction

The U.S. hemisphere defense zone stretched increasingly farther into the Atlantic. In July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that the United States had dispatched naval forces to Iceland to prevent that country's potential use as a German naval base and, if necessary, to defend Iceland against outside attack. By doing so, the United States also enhanced its own military capabilities.

Primary Source

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith for the information of the Congress a message I received from the Prime Minister of Iceland on July 1, and the reply I addressed on the same day to the Prime Minister of Iceland in response to this message.

In accordance with the understanding so reached, forces of the United States Navy have today arrived in Iceland in order to supplement, and eventually to replace, the British forces which have until now been stationed in Iceland in order to insure the adequate defense of that country.

As I stated in my message to the Congress of September 3 last regarding the acquisition of certain naval and air bases from Great Britain in exchange for certain overage destroyers, considerations of safety from overseas attack are fundamental.

The United States cannot permit the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere. We have no desire to see any change in the present sovereignty of those regions. Assurance that such outposts in our defense frontier remain in friendly hands is the very foundation of our national security and of the national security of every one of the independent nations of the New World.

For the same reason substantial forces of the United States have now been sent to the bases acquired last year from Great Britain in Trinidad and in British Guiana in the south in order to forestall any pincers movement undertaken by Germany against the Western Hemisphere. It is essential that Germany should not be able successfully to employ such tactics through

sudden seizure of strategic points in the South Atlantic and in the North Atlantic.

The occupation of Iceland by Germany would constitute a serious threat in three dimensions:

The threat against Greenland and the northern portion of the North American Continent, including the islands which lie off it.
The threat against all shipping in the North Atlantic.
The threat against the steady flow of munitions to Britain—which is a matter of broad policy clearly approved by the Congress.

It is, therefore, imperative that the approaches between the Americas and those strategic outposts, the safety of which this country regards as essential to its national security and which it must therefore defend, shall remain open and free from all hostile activity or threat thereof.

As Commander in Chief I have consequently issued orders to the Navy that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts.

This Government will insure the adequate defense of Iceland with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a sovereign state.

In my message to the Prime Minister of Iceland I have given the people of Iceland the assurance that the American forces sent there would in no way interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of that country, and that immediately upon the termination of the present international emergency all American forces will be at once withdrawn, leaving the people of Iceland and their Government in full and sovereign control of their own territory.

Source: *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 5, *July 12, 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 590.

99. Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, July 12, 1941

Introduction

Three weeks after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the British and Soviet governments signed an agreement whereby they promised to act as allies in their common war against Germany and that neither would conclude a separate peace.

Primary Source

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have concluded the present Agreement and declare as follows:

(1) The two Governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.
(2) They further undertake that during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. …

Source: *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 5, *September 27, 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 233.

100. Memorandum by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles on a Meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador on the Japanese Occupation of Indochina, July 24, 1941

Introduction

After Japanese forces, with the sanction of the German-dominated Vichy government, occupied bases in southern French Indochina, the United States issued a formal protest against this action on the grounds that it could not be justified in terms of Japanese national security. That same day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with the Japanese ambassador to protest against Japanese policies toward French Indochina. Roosevelt warned that if these

policies were not modified, the United States might cut off all gasoline exports to Japan. Roosevelt asked Japan to consider a solution whereby Indochina might be neutralized during the war.

Primary Source

At the request of the Japanese Ambassador, the President received the Ambassador for an off-the-record conference in the Oval Room at the White House at five o'clock this afternoon. At the President's request, Admiral Stark and I were present.

At the outset of the conference the President made approximately the following statement to the Ambassador. The President said, referring to a talk which he had made this morning to a home defense group under the leadership of Mayor La Guardia, that for more than two years the United States had been permitting oil to be exported from the United States to Japan. He said that this had been done because of the realization on the part of the United States that if these oil supplies had been shut off or restricted the Japanese Government and people would have been furnished with an incentive or a pretext for moving down upon the Netherlands East Indies in order to assure themselves of a greater oil supply than that which, under present conditions, they were able to obtain. The United States had been pursuing this policy primarily for the purpose of doing its utmost to play its full part in making the effort to preserve peace in the Pacific region. At the present time, the President said, the Ambassador undoubtedly knew that there was a very considerable shortage in the oil supply in the eastern part of the United States and the average American man and woman were unable to understand why, at a time when they themselves were asked to curtail their use of gasoline oil, the United States Government should be permitting oil supplies to continue to be exported to Japan when Japan during these past two years had given every indication of pursuing a policy of force and conquest in conjunction with the policy of world conquest and domination which Hitler was carrying on. The average American citizen could not understand why his Government was permitting Japan to be furnished with oil in order that such oil might be utilized by Japan in carrying on her purposes of aggression. The President said that if Japan attempted to seize oil supplies by force in the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch would, without

the shadow of a doubt, resist, the British would immediately come to their assistance, war would then result between Japan, the British and the Dutch, and, in view of our own policy of assisting Great Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result. It was with all of these facts in mind, the President said, that notwithstanding the bitter criticism that had been leveled against the Administration and against the Department of State, the President up to now had permitted oil to be shipped by Japan from the United States.

The President then went on to say that this new move by Japan in Indochina created an exceedingly serious problem for the United States. He said that, as I had stated to the Ambassador yesterday, insofar as assuring itself that it could obtain foodstuffs and raw materials from Indochina, Japan, of course, had it reached an agreement with the United States along the terms of the discussions between Secretary Hull and the Ambassador, would have been afforded far greater assurances of obtaining such supplies on equal terms with any other nation. More than that, the President said, the cost of any military occupation is tremendous and the occupation itself is not conducive to the production by civilians in occupied countries of food supplies and raw materials of the character required by Japan. Had Japan undertaken to obtain the supplies she required from Indochina in a peaceful way, she not only would have obtained larger quantities of such supplies, but would have obtained them with complete security and without the draining expense of a military occupation. Furthermore, from the military standpoint, the President said, surely the Japanese Government could not have in reality the slightest belief that China, Great Britain, the Netherlands or the United States had any territorial designs on Indochina nor were in the slightest degree providing any real threats of aggression against Japan. This Government, consequently, could only assume that the occupation of Indochina was being undertaken by Japan for the purpose of further offense and this created a situation which necessarily must give the United States the most serious disquiet.

The President said that he had been following in complete detail the conversations which had been progressing between Secretary Hull and the Ambassador and that he was confident that the Ambassador would agree that the policies now undertaken in Indochina by the Japanese Government were

completely opposed to the principles and the letter of the proposed agreement which had been under discussion.

At this point the Ambassador took out of his pocket two sheets of notes which he had prepared and asked the President's permission to refer to them in order to make a statement of his Government's position.

In this exposition the Ambassador covered exactly the same ground which he had covered in his conversation with me last night.

The only points of difference were that at the outset of the conversation, the Ambassador very clearly and emphatically stated that the move by Japan into Indochina was something which he personally deplored and with which he personally was not in agreement. …

The President then said that he had a proposal to make to the Ambassador which had occurred to him just before the Ambassador had come in and which he had not had time to talk over with me before making his proposal to the Ambassador.

The President said that it might be too late for him to make this proposal but he felt that no matter how late the hour might be, he still wished to seize every possible opportunity of preventing the creation of a situation between Japan and the United States which could only give rise to serious misunderstandings between the two peoples. The President stated that if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indochina with its military and naval forces, or, had such steps actually been commenced, if the Japanese Government would withdraw such forces, the President could assure the Japanese Government that he would do everything within his power to obtain from the Governments of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and of course the United States itself a binding and solemn declaration, provided Japan would undertake the same commitment, to regard Indochina as a neutralized country in the same way in which Switzerland had up to now been regarded by the powers as a neutralized country. He stated that this would imply that none of the powers concerned would undertake any military act of aggression against Indochina and would refrain from the exercise of any military control within or over Indochina. He would further endeavor to procure from Great Britain and the other pertinent powers a guarantee that so long as the present emergency continued, the local French authorities in Indochina would remain in control of the territory and would

not be confronted with attempts to dislodge them on the part of de Gaullist or Free French agents or forces.

If these steps were taken, the President said, Japan would be given solemn and binding proof that no other power had any hostile designs upon Indochina and that Japan would be afforded the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring herself of the source of food supplies and other raw materials in Indochina which she was seeking to secure.

The Ambassador then reiterated concisely and quite clearly what the President had suggested. He then made some statement which was not quite clear to the effect that such a step would be very difficult at this time on account of the face-saving element involved on the part of Japan and that only a very great statesman would reverse a policy at this time.

The President then mentioned the fact that in the United States the belief was apparent that such policies as those which Japan was now pursuing were due to German pressure upon Japan. To this the Ambassador reacted by saying that Japan was, of course, an independent country and that while such pressure might be exercised, decisions on the policy she was pursuing were solely her own and no one else had any responsibility for them.

The President then said that one thing the Japanese Government did not understand as clearly as this Government was the fact that Hitler was bent upon world domination and not merely the domination of Europe or of Africa. The President said that if Germany succeeded in defeating Russia and dominating Europe and then dominating Africa, there wasn't the slightest question in his mind that Germany thereafter would turn her attention to the Far East and likewise to the Western Hemisphere, and, that while such a development might not take place for many years, perhaps even ten years, the laws of chance made it easily possible that in such contingency, the navies of Japan and of the United States would be cooperating together against Hitler as the common enemy. The President reemphasized his belief that what Hitler had in mind was complete domination of the entire world.

To this the Ambassador replied that he would like to quote an old Chinese proverb in which he had great faith, namely, "He who continuously brandishes the sword eventually kills himself."

The Ambassador said that he would immediately report his conversation to his Government in Tokyo. He seemed to be very much impressed with

what the President had said but I did not gather from his reactions that he was in any sense optimistic as to the result.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 699–702.

101. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order Freezing Japanese and Chinese Assets in the United States: White House Statement, July 26, 1941

Introduction

Two days after meeting with the Japanese ambassador, President Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. This decree effectively blocked trade between the United States and Japan. The State Department simultaneously imposed a complete embargo on all U.S. exports to Japan including gasoline, which was essential to Japan's continuation of its war against China. The imposition of these measures marked a substantial hardening in American policy toward Japan in response to Japan's occupation of Indochinese bases.

Primary Source

In view of the unlimited national emergency declared by the President, he has today issued an Executive Order freezing Japanese assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets of various European countries were frozen on June 14, 1941. This measure, in effect, brings all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests are involved under the control of the government, and imposes criminal penalties for violation of the order.

This Executive Order, just as the order of June 14, 1941, is designed among other things to prevent the use of the financial facilities of the United States and trade between Japan and the United States in ways harmful to national defense and American interests, to prevent the liquidation in the

United States of assets obtained by duress or conquest and to curb subversive activities in the United States.

At the specific request of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for the purpose of helping the Chinese Government, the President has, at the same time, extended the freezing control to Chinese assets in the United States. The administration of the licensing system with respect to Chinese assets will be conducted with a view to strengthening the foreign trade and exchange position of the Chinese Government. The inclusion of China in the Executive Order, in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese Government, is a continuation of this government's policy of assisting China.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 704–705.

102. Agreement between Japan and France Pledging Military Cooperation in Defense of Indochina, July 29, 1941

Introduction

Undeterred by warnings from the United States and Great Britain, at the end of July 1941 Japan and the Vichy government signed an agreement whereby they pledged to cooperate together to defend Indochina. Under German pressure, the Vichy government effectively acquiesced in Japan's takeover of bases in its Asian colony.

Primary Source

The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of France,

Taking into consideration the present international situation,

And recognizing as the result, that there exist reasons for Japan to consider that, in case the security of French Indo-China should be threatened, general tranquillity in East Asia and her own security would be exposed to danger,

And renewing at this opportunity the promise made by Japan, on the one hand, to respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia, especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and the French sovereignty over the whole of the Union of French Indo-China; and the promise made by France, on the other hand, not to conclude with any third Power or Powers any agreement or understanding regarding Indo-China envisaging political, economic or military co-operation which is directly or indirectly aimed against Japan.

Have agreed upon the following provisions:

(1) The two Governments mutually promise military co-operation for joint defence of French Indo-China.
(2) Measures to be taken for such co-operation shall be the object of special arrangements.
(3) The above stipulations shall be valid only so long as the situation which has motivated their adoption exists.

Source: Unofficial translation, *Contemporary Japan,* October 1941.

103. Japanese Foreign Minister, Tokyo, Cable to Japanese Embassy, Berlin, July 31, 1941

Introduction

By the end of July 1941 after a cabinet meeting earlier that month decided on policies likely to result in war, the Japanese government in Tokyo was effectively convinced that war with the United States was probably inevitable. The Japanese foreign minister cabled the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, asking him to bear this decision in mind and to make Japan’s sympathies clear to the German government. American code breakers intercepted and deciphered this cable, a copy of which was also sent to the Japanese ambassador in Washington.

Primary Source

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1390[a]. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are

proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Source: United States, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, *Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings,* 39 Pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946) J, Pt. 12: 8–10. Exhibits of Joint Committee, Exhibit No. 1, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941.

104. The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941

Introduction

The Atlantic Charter was issued after President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill met secretly at sea, at Argentia Harbor, off Placentia Bay on the Newfoundland coast, on August 8–11, 1941. The charter represented the first formal statement of the principles and objectives for which the United States and Great Britain were fighting. Roosevelt and Churchill both agreed to this statement. One week later on August 21, 1941, in a message to the U.S. Congress enclosing the text of this statement, Roosevelt stated that there could be no compromise or negotiated peace with Nazism and added the interpretive comment that the charter's "declaration of principles includes of necessity the world need for freedom of religion and freedom of information. No society of the world organized under the announced principles could survive without these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which we strive."

Primary Source

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights

and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 2.

105. White House Press Release, Statement on Sending a Military Mission to China, August 26, 1941

Introduction

In August 1941, the U.S. government announced that it would send a military mission to China and that China would receive Lend-Lease assistance in its war against Japan.

Primary Source

This Government is preparing to send a military mission to China. The mission will be sent for the purpose of assisting in carrying out the purposes of the Lend-Lease Act. It is being organized and it will operate under the direction of the Secretary of War. Its chief will be Brigadier General John Magruder.

The function of the mission will be to study, in collaboration with Chinese and other authorities, the military situation in China, the need of the Chinese Government for materiel and materials; to formulate recommendations regarding types and quantities of items needed; to assist in procurement in this country and in delivery in China of such materiel and materials; to instruct in the use and maintenance of articles thus provided; and to give advice and suggestions of appropriate character toward making Lend-Lease assistance to China as effective as possible in the interest of the United States, of China, and of the world effort in resistance to movements of conquest by force.

The sending of this mission is in keeping with and is on parallel lines to the sending of a similar mission to the Soviet Union. The purposes of the two missions are identical.

General Magruder has had long experience in China where he twice served as Military Attaché. He, therefore, will be working on familiar ground, among people he knows well and to whom he is well known. An adequate staff of thoroughly qualified officers will accompany General Magruder.

Source: *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 5, *August 26, 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 166.

106. “The Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire’s Policies”: Document Adopted by the

Japanese Imperial Conference, September 6, 1941

Introduction

By September 1941, continuing negotiations between Japan and the United States to reach a modus vivendi in the Pacific had proved fruitless. In early September, the Japanese government approved a policy document that effectively set a time limit for negotiations with the United States and Great Britain, after which Japan would embark on war. Before this document was adopted, the visibly unhappy Japanese emperor interrogated his top military men as to the prospects that they were about to involve Japan in a lengthy and unwinnable war. He also insisted on presenting the participants with a lengthy list of questions on the current military and diplomatic situation. Though the advocates of war admitted that this would be risky and that victory was by no means certain, they apparently never considered making significant concessions to the United States but instead preferred to argue that the circumstances would never be more favorable for war.

Primary Source

In view of the current critical situation, in particular, the offensive attitudes that such countries as the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands are taking towards Japan, and in view of the situation in the Soviet Union and the condition of the Empire's national power, we will carry out our policy toward the South, which is contained in the "Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation," as follows:

I. Our Empire, for the purposes of self-defense and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war, with the last ten days of October as a tentative deadline, resolved to go to war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands if necessary.
II. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to attain our objectives. The minimum objectives of our Empire to be attained through negotiations with the United States and Great Britain and the

maximum concessions therein to be made by our Empire are noted in the attached documents.

III. In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.

Policies other than those toward the South will be based on established national policy; and we will especially try to prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from forming a united front against Japan.

[*Attached Document*]

The Minimum Demands of Our Empire to Be Attained Through Diplomatic Negotiations with the United States (and Great Britain), and the Maximum Concessions to Be Made by Our Empire

ITEM ONE:

The minimum demands of our Empire to be attained through diplomatic negotiations with the United States and Great Britain.

1. The United States and Great Britain shall neither interfere with nor obstruct the settlement of the China Incident by our Empire.

(a) They shall not obstruct our efforts to settle the Incident on the basis of the Fundamental Treaty between Japan and China, and the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchukuo, and China.

(b) They shall close the Burma Road and cease to assist the Chiang Kai-shek regime militarily, politically, and economically.

Note: This does not prejudice the position that our Empire has been taking in relation to the settlement of the China Incident in the [Japanese ambassador to the United States] Nomura operation. We should particularly insist on stationing our troops under a new agreement between Japan and China. However, we have no objection to affirming that we are in principle prepared to withdraw our troops following the settlement of the Incident, except for those that are dispatched to carry out the purposes of the Incident. We have

no objection to affirming that the economic activities of the United States and Great Britain in China will not be restricted, insofar as they are carried out on an equitable basis.

2. The United States and Great Britain shall refrain from actions that may threaten the defense of our Empire in the Far East.

(a) They shall not secure any military rights in the territories of Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies, China, and the Far Eastern section of the Soviet Union.
(b) They shall not increase their military forces in the Far East beyond the present strength [of those forces].

Note: Any demand to dissolve the special relations between Japan and French Indochina based on the agreement between Japan and France shall not be accepted.

3. The United States and Great Britain shall cooperate in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire.

(a) They shall restore commercial relations with our Empire and supply those goods from their territories in the Southwest Pacific that our Empire urgently needs to sustain herself.

(b) They shall amicably contribute to the economic cooperation between Japan, Thailand, and the Netherlands East Indies.

ITEM TWO:

The maximum concessions to be made by our Empire:

If the demands indicated in Item One are met,

1. Our Empire will not advance militarily from the bases in French Indochina to the neighboring areas other than China.

Note: If we are asked about our attitude toward the Soviet Union, we will reply that we will not resort to military force unilaterally unless the Soviet Union violates the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact and acts against the spirit of the pact in such a way as to menace Japan and Manchukuo.

2. Our Empire is prepared to withdraw its forces from French Indochina after a just peace has been established in the Far East.

3. Our Empire is prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands.

APPENDIX:

Japan's attitude toward the European war will be governed by the ideas of protection and self-defense. Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and her actions therein in the event that the United States should enter the European war will be made by herself acting independently.
Note: The above does not alter our obligations under the Tripartite Pact.

Source: Nobutaka Ike, ed., *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 135–136. Reprinted with permission of Stanford University.

107. The "Shoot-on-Sight" Policy: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address Concerning the German Attack on the Destroyer *Greer,* September 11, 1941

Introduction

By the autumn of 1941, American naval vessels were escorting convoys of merchant ships bound for Great Britain and Russia well over halfway across the Atlantic. This practice meant that they were increasingly likely to clash with German submarines and other naval vessels. In September 1941, the U.S. destroyer *Greer* was the subject of a German torpedo attack. In indignant terms, President Roosevelt described this incident to Congress, carefully omitting to mention that the *Greer* had in fact been following the submarine and radioing its whereabouts to a British military airplane equipped with antisubmarine torpedoes. Roosevelt also rightly noted that American merchant vessels increasingly were targets for German submarine attacks. Roosevelt used this episode to authorize American naval vessels to shoot on sight should they encounter any German ship. In effect, an undeclared naval war between Germany and the United States was now under

way in Atlantic waters. Four weeks later, Roosevelt would also request that Congress permit the arming of merchant vessels carrying goods bound for nations at war.

Primary Source

My fellow Americans:

The Navy Department of the United States has reported to me that on the morning of September 4 the U. S. Destroyer GREER, proceeding in full daylight toward Iceland, had reached a point southeast of Greenland. She was carrying American mail to Iceland. She was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable.

She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine. The submarine deliberately fired a torpedo at the GREER, followed later by another torpedo attack. In spite of what Hitler's propaganda bureau has invented, and in spite of what any American obstructionist organization may prefer to believe, I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her.

Our destroyer, at the time, was in waters which the Government of the United States had declared to be waters of self-defense surrounding outposts of American protection in the Atlantic.

In the north, outposts have been established by us in Iceland, Greenland, Labrador, and Newfoundland. Through these waters there pass many ships of many flags. They bear food and other supplies to civilians and they bear materiel of war, for which the people of the United States are spending billions of dollars, and which, by congressional action, they have declared to be essential for the defense of their own land.

The United States destroyer, when attacked, was proceeding on a legitimate mission.

If the destroyer was visible to the submarine when the torpedo was fired, then the attack was a deliberate attempt by the Nazis to sink a clearly identified American warship. On the other hand, if the submarine was beneath the surface and, with the aid of its listening devices, fired in the direction of the sound of the American destroyer without even taking the trouble to learn its identity—as the official German communiqué would

indicate—then the attack was even more outrageous. For it indicates a policy of indiscriminate violence against any vessel sailing the seas, belligerent or non-belligerent.

This was piracy—legally and morally. It was not the first nor the last act of piracy which the Nazi government has committed against the American flag in this war. Attack has followed attack. …

It would be unworthy of a great nation to exaggerate an isolated incident, or to become inflamed by some one act of violence. But it would be inexcusable folly to minimize such incidents in the face of evidence which makes it clear that the incident is not isolated, but part of a general plan.

The important truth is that these acts of international lawlessness are a manifestation of a design which has been made clear to the American people for a long time. It is the Nazi design to abolish the freedom of the seas, and to acquire absolute control and domination of the seas for themselves.

For with control of the seas in their own hands, the way can become clear for their next step—domination of the United States and the Western Hemisphere by force. Under Nazi control of the seas, no merchant ship of the United States or of any other American republic would be free to carry on any peaceful commerce, except by the condescending grace of this foreign and tyrannical power. The Atlantic Ocean, which has been and which should always be, a free and friendly highway for us would then become a deadly menace to the commerce of the United States, to the coasts of the United States, and to the inland cities of the United States.

The Hitler government, in defiance of the laws of the sea and of the recognized rights of all other nations, has presumed to declare, on paper, that great areas of the seas—even including a vast expanse lying in the Western Hemisphere—are to be closed, and that no ships may enter them for any purpose, except at peril of being sunk. Actually they are sinking ships at will and without warning in widely separated areas both within and far outside of these far-flung pretended zones.

This Nazi attempt to seize control of the oceans is but a counterpart of the Nazi plots now being carried on throughout the Western Hemisphere, all designed toward the same end. For Hitler’s advance guards—not only his avowed agents but also his dupes among us—have sought to make ready for him footholds and bridgeheads in the New World, to be used as soon as he has gained control of the oceans.

His intrigues, his plots, his machinations, his sabotage in this New World are all known to the Government of the United States. Conspiracy has followed conspiracy. …

To be ultimately successful in world mastery Hitler knows that he must get control of the seas. He must first destroy the bridge of ships which we are building across the Atlantic, over which we shall continue to roll the implements of war to help destroy him and all his works in the end. He must wipe out our patrol on sea and in the air. He must silence the British Navy.

It must be explained again and again to people who like to think of the United States Navy as an invincible protection that this can be true only if the British Navy survives. That is simple arithmetic.

For if the world outside the Americas falls under Axis domination, the shipbuilding facilities which the Axis Powers would then possess in all of Europe, in the British Isles, and in the Far East would be much greater than all the shipbuilding facilities and potentialities of all the Americas—not only greater but two or three times greater. Even if the United States threw all its resources into such a situation, seeking to double and even redouble the size of our Navy, the Axis Powers, in control of the rest of the world, would have the manpower and the physical resources to out-build us several times over.

It is time for all Americans of all the Americas to stop being deluded by the romantic notion that the Americas can go on living happily and peacefully in a Nazi-dominated world. Generation after generation America has battled for the general policy of the freedom of the seas. That policy is a very simple one, but a basic, fundamental one. It means that no nation has the right to make the broad oceans of the world at great distances from the actual theater of land war unsafe for the commerce of others.

That has been our policy, proved time and time again, in all our history.

Our policy has applied from time immemorial—and still applies—not merely to the Atlantic but to the Pacific and to all other oceans as well.

Unrestricted submarine warfare in 1941 constitutes a defiance—an act of aggression—against that historic American policy. …

This attack on the GREER was no localized military operation in the North Atlantic. This was no mere episode in a struggle between two nations. This was one determined step toward creating a permanent world system based on force, terror, and murder.

And I am sure that even now the Nazis are waiting to see whether the

United States will by silence give them the green light to go ahead on this path of destruction.

The Nazi danger to our western world has long ceased to be a mere possibility. The danger is here now—not only from a military enemy but from an enemy of all law, all liberty, all morality, all religion. …

One peaceful nation after another has met disaster because each refused to look the Nazi danger squarely in the eye until it actually had them by the throat.

The United States will not make that fatal mistake.

No act of violence or intimidation will keep us from maintaining intact two bulwarks of defense—first, our line of supply of materiel to the enemies of Hitler; and, second, the freedom of our shipping on the high seas.

No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs, we will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters.

We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek it now. But, neither do we want peace so much that we are willing to pay for it by permitting him to attack our naval and merchant ships while they are on legitimate business.

I assume that the German leaders are not deeply concerned by what we Americans say or publish about them. We cannot bring about the downfall of nazi-ism by the use of long-range invectives.

But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.

These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. They are a menace to the free pathways of the high seas. They are a challenge to our sovereignty. They hammer at our most precious rights when they attack ships of the American flag—symbols of our independence, our freedom, our very life.

It is clear to all Americans that the time has come when the Americas themselves must now be defended. A continuation of attacks in our own waters, or in waters which could be used for further and greater attacks on us, will inevitably weaken American ability to repel Hitlerism. …

If submarines or raiders attack in distant waters, they can attack equally well within sight of our own shores. Their very presence in any waters which America deems vital to its defense constitutes an attack.

In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense American naval

vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow first.

Upon our naval and air patrol—now operating in large numbers over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean—falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas—now. That means very simply and clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships—not only American ships but ships of any flag—engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. They will protect them from submarines; they will protect them from surface raiders. …

My obligation as President is historic; it is clear. Yes, it is inescapable.

It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas which are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense.

But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.

The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief to the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy—at once.

The sole responsibility rests upon Germany. There will be no shooting unless Germany continues to seek it.

That is my obvious duty in this crisis. That is the clear right of this sovereign Nation. That is the only step possible, if we would keep tight the wall of defense which we are pledged to maintain around this Western Hemisphere. …

Source: "Fireside Chat 18: On the Greer Incident (September 11, 1941)," The Miller Center, University of Virginia, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3323.

108. Text of Basic Japanese Terms of Peace with China: Document Handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Toyoda

Teijirō to U.S. Ambassador in Japan Joseph Clark Grew, September 22, 1941

Introduction

As lengthy negotiations between the United States and Japan continued, in late September the Japanese government handed the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo the latest version of the peace terms that Japan would be prepared to accept. Japan expected to keep Manzhouguo, to continue stationing some troops in China, and to have the members of its collaborationist puppet administration included in the Chinese government. Predictably, U.S. officials found these unacceptable.

Primary Source

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

3. Cooperative defense between Japan and China.

Cooperation between Japan and China for the purposes of preventing communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public order in China.

Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.

4. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.

The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for carrying out the China Affairs will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said Affairs, excepting those troops which come under point 3.

5. Economic cooperation.

(a) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China, having the development and utilization of essential materials for national defense in China as its principal objective.

(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic activities by third Powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Chingwei Government.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Recognition of Manchukuo.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 744–745.

109. Inter-Allied Council Statement on the Principles of the Atlantic Charter, September 24, 1941

Introduction

In late September 1941, representatives of those European governments—many of them from countries that were currently under German occupation—fighting Hitler and his allies met in London and endorsed the Atlantic Charter. British prime minister Winston Churchill had already promised Parliament that this agreement's fourth principle would not be allowed to compromise the special economic relationships existing within the British Empire. The Soviet Union made reservations, the significance of which would become apparent in the future.

Primary Source

Adherence to the principles set forth in the Roosevelt-Churchill Declarations by the governments allied with Great Britain was formally declared at the second meeting of the Inter-Allied Council, held in London on September 24, 1941.

The position of the Soviet Government was given by its Ambassador, Mr. Maisky, in the following terms: "The Soviet Union defends the right of every nation to the independence and territorial integrity of its country and its right to establish such a social order and to choose such a form of government as it deems opportune and necessary for the better promotion of its economic and

cultural prosperity." He added that the Soviet Union advocates the necessity of collective action against aggressors and that "the Soviet Government proclaims its agreement with the fundamental principles of the declaration of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill."

The following resolution was then adopted unanimously:

"The Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia, and representatives of General de Gaulle, leader of Free Frenchmen, having taken note of the declaration recently drawn up by the President of the United States and by the Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill) on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, now make known their adherence to the common principles of policy set forth in that declaration and their intention to cooperate to the best of their ability in giving effect to them."

[*Maisky also added the following reservation:*]

"Considering that the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs, and historic peculiarities of particular countries, the Soviet Government can state that a consistent application of these principles will secure the most energetic support on the part of the government and peoples of the Soviet Union."

Source: *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 5, *September 27, 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 233–234.

110. Cable from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Tokyo, Secret, October 1, 1941

Introduction

One year after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, German officials expressed their dissatisfaction with what they considered to be the very lackluster assistance their country had received from Japan. In a cable intercepted and deciphered by American code breakers, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin reported this to his Foreign Ministry in Tokyo.

Primary Source

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop, who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However, we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretense that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is

getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.

Source: United States, 79 Congress, 2nd Session, *Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings*, 39 Pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), Pt. 12: 48–49. Exhibits of Joint Committee, Exhibit No. 1, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941.

111. Paraphrase of Letter, Franklin D. Roosevelt to Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, October 30, 1941

Introduction

In October 1941, U.S. and Soviet officials met in Moscow. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt quickly promised Joseph Stalin up to $1 billion worth of supplies for the Russian war effort.

Primary Source

I have examined the record of the Moscow Conference and the members of the mission have discussed the details with me. All of the military equipment and munitions items have been approved and I have ordered that as far as possible the delivery of raw materials be expedited. Deliveries have been directed to commence immediately and to be fulfilled in the largest possible amounts. In an effort to obviate any financial difficulties immediate arrangements are to be made so that supplies up to one billion dollars in value may be effected under the Lend-Lease Act. If approved by the Government of the U.S.S.R. I propose that the indebtedness thus incurred be subject to no interest and that the payments by the Government of the U.S.S.R. do not commence until five years after the war's conclusion and be completed over a ten-year period thereafter.

I hope that special efforts will be arranged by your Government to sell us the available raw materials and commodities which the United States may need urgently under the arrangement that the proceeds thereof be credited to the Soviet Government's account.

At this opportunity I want to tell you of the appreciation of the United States Government for the expeditious handling by you and your associates of the Moscow supply conference, and to send you assurances that we will carry out to the limit all the implications thereof. I hope that you will communicate with me directly without hesitation if you should so wish.

Source: *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 5, *November 8, 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 365–366.

112. Notes of Imperial Conference, Government of Japan, November 5, 1941

Introduction

After lengthy discussions among Japanese military and political leaders, on November 5 a full-dress Imperial Conference met. Its primary function was to ratify the decisions reached at a preceding November 1 meeting of the Liaison Committee of top military and political leaders and to endorse the final version of the document drafted on that occasion. This document, which the conference adopted after lengthy consideration of the probable impact of war upon Japan, set a December 1 deadline for reaching a settlement with the United States that would be acceptable to Japan.

Primary Source

[The conference was convened at 10:30 a.m. and adjourned at 3:15 p.m. with a one-hour recess between 12:30 and 1:30 p.m. The participants were as follows: Tojo Hideki, Prime Minister and War Minister; Hara Yoshimichi, President of the Privy Council; Shimada Shigetaro, Navy Minister; Togo Shigenori, Foreign Minister; Kaya Okinori, Finance Minister; Suzuki Tiichi, Director of the Planning Board; Nagano Osami, Navy Chief of Staff; Sugiyama Gen, Army Chief of Staff; Ito Seiichi, Navy Vice Chief of Staff; Tsukada Ko, Army Vice Chief of Staff. The Secretaries were: Hoshino Naoki, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; Muto Akira, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry; and Oka Takasumi, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry.]

Agenda: “Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire’s Policies.”

I. Our Empire, in order to resolve the present critical situation, assure its self-preservation and self-defense, and establish a New Order in Greater East

Asia, decides on this occasion to go to war against the United States and Great Britain and takes the following measures:

The time for resorting to force is set at the beginning of December, and the Army and Navy will complete preparations for operations.

Negotiations with the United States will be carried out in accordance with the attached document.

Cooperation with Germany and Italy will be strengthened.

Close military relations with Thailand will be established just prior to the use of force.

II. If negotiations with the United States are successful by midnight of December 1, the use of force will be suspended.

[*Attached Document*]

Summary of Negotiations with the United States of America:

We will negotiate with the United States and seek to reach an agreement on the basis of attached Proposal A or Proposal B, both of which express, in a more moderate and amended form, important matters that have been pending between both countries.

PROPOSAL A:

We will moderate our position on the most important matters pending in the negotiations between Japan and the United States: (1) stationing and withdrawal of troops in China and French Indochina; (2) nondiscriminatory trade in China; (3) interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact; (4) the Four Principles. This will be done as follows:

1. *Stationing and withdrawal of troops in China:*

We will moderate our position on this point as follows (in view of the fact that the United States—disregarding for the time being the reason for the stationing of troops—attached importance to the stationing of troops for an indefinite period, disagrees with the inclusion of this item in the terms for peace, and urges us to make a clearer statement of our intentions regarding withdrawal):

Of the Japanese troops sent to China during the China Incident, those in designated sections of North China and Inner Mongolia, and those on Hainan Island, will remain for a necessary period of time after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. The remainder of the troops will begin withdrawal simultaneously with the establishment of peace in accordance with arrangements to be made between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will be completed within two years.

Note: In case the United States asks what the "necessary period of time" will be, we will respond that we have in mind 25 years.

Stationing and withdrawal of troops in French Indochina:

We will moderate our position on this point as follows, since we recognize that the United States is apprehensive that Japan has territorial ambitions in French Indochina and is building a base for military advance into neighboring territories:

Japan respects the sovereignty of French Indochina over her territory. Japanese troops currently stationed in French Indochina will be immediately withdrawn after the settlement of the China Incident or the establishment of a just peace in the Far East.

2. *Nondiscriminatory trade in China:*

In case there is no prospect of an agreement on the basis of the proposal that was presented on September 25, we will proceed on the basis of the following:

The Japanese Government will recognize the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in the entire Pacific region, including China, if this principle is applied throughout the world.

3. *The interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact:*

On this point we will respond as follows: We do not intend to broaden unreasonably the interpretation of the right of self-defense. Regarding the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese Government, as it has stated on previous occasions, will act independently. Our position will be that we assume that the United States is fully aware of this.

4. *Regarding the so-called Four Principles put forward by the United States,* we will make every effort to avoid their inclusion in official agreements between Japan and the United States (this includes understandings and other communiqués).

PROPOSAL B:

1. Both Japan and the United States will pledge not to make an armed advance into Southeast Asia and the South Pacific area, except French Indochina.

2. The Japanese and American Governments will cooperate with each other so that the procurement of necessary materials from the Netherlands East Indies will be assured.

3. The Japanese and American Governments will restore trade relations to what they were prior to the freezing of assets. The United States will promise to supply Japan with the petroleum Japan needs.

4. The Government of the United States will not take such actions as may hinder efforts for peace by both Japan and China.

Notes:

1. As occasion demands, it is permissible to promise that with the conclusion of the present agreement Japanese troops stationed in southern Indochina are prepared to move to northern Indochina with the consent of the French Government; and that the Japanese troops will withdraw from Indochina with the settlement of the China Incident or upon the establishment of a just peace in the Pacific area.

2. As occasion demands, we may make insertions in the provision on nondiscriminatory trade and on the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact in the abovementioned proposal (Proposal A).

Statement by Prime Minister Tojo:

The Conference is now opened. With His Majesty’s permission I will take charge of the proceedings.

At the Imperial Conference of September 6 “Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire’s Policies” was discussed and the following was decided by His

Majesty: our Empire, determined not to avoid war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in the course of assuring her self-preservation and self-defense, was to complete preparations for war by late October. At the same time it was decided that we would endeavor to attain our demands by using all possible diplomatic measures vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain; and that in case there was no prospect of our demands being attained through diplomacy by early October, we would decide immediately on war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

Since then, while maintaining close coordination between political and military considerations, we have made a special effort to achieve success in our diplomatic negotiations with the United States. In this interval we have endured what must be endured in our efforts to reach an agreement, but we have not been able to get the United States to reconsider. During the negotiations, there has been a change in the Cabinet.

The Government and the Army and Navy sections of Imperial Headquarters have held eight Liaison Conferences in order to study matters more extensively and deeply on the basis of the "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Polices" adopted on September 6. As a result of this, we have come to the conclusion that we must now decide to go to war, set the time for military action at the beginning of December, concentrate all of our efforts on completing preparations for war, and at the same time try to break the impasse by means of diplomacy. Accordingly, I ask you all to deliberate on the document "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies."…

Statement by Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama:

I respectfully make my statement.

First I will discuss [enemy] army strength in the several countries in the South.

Army strength in the several countries in the South is gradually being increased. Roughly speaking, Malaya has an army of about 60,000 to 70,000 and about 320 airplanes, the Philippines have about 42,000 men and about 170 airplanes, the Netherlands East Indies have about 85,000 men and about 300 airplanes, and Burma has about 35,000 men and about 60 airplanes. Compared to strength before the outbreak of the war in Europe, enemy

strength has been increased about eight times in Malaya, four times in the Philippines, two and one-half times in the Netherlands East Indies, and five times in Burma; it totals well over 200,000 in these countries. It is anticipated that the rate of increase will rise as the situation changes.

The ground forces in these regions, although varying from one region to another, are composed for the most part of native soldiers, with a nucleus of about 30 per cent white, "homeland" soldiers. They do not have sufficient education and training, and their fighting ability is generally inferior. It should be remembered, however, that they are thoroughly acclimatized, and used to tropical conditions. As to the fighting ability of the enemy air force, I assume that it cannot be taken lightly when compared to the ground force, since the ability of the aircraft is excellent and their pilots are comparatively skilled.

I will comment on the following matters: (1) timing of the commencement of war; (2) prospects of the operations in the South; (3) situation in the North resulting from operations in the South; (4) relationship between operations and diplomacy.

1. *On the timing of the commencement of war:*

From the standpoint of operations, if the time for commencing war is delayed, the ratio of armament between Japan and the United States will become more and more unfavorable to us as time passes; and particularly, the gap in air armament will enlarge rapidly. Moreover, defensive preparations in the Philippines, and other American war preparations, will make rapid progress. Also, the common defense arrangements between the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China will become all the more close, and their joint defensive capability will be rapidly increased. Finally, if we delay until after next spring, the weather will permit operational activities in the North, and also there will be a high probability that our Empire will have to face simultaneous war in the South and in the North. Thus it would be very disadvantageous for us to delay; and it is to be feared that it might become impossible for us to undertake offensive operations.

In addition, weather conditions in the area where important operations are going to take place are such that no delay is possible. Accordingly, in order to

resort to force as soon as preparations for the operations we contemplate are completed, we would like to set the target date in the early part of December.

2. *On the prospects of the operation:*

Since the principal Army operations in the initial stages in the South will be landing operations against fortified enemy bases, conducted after a long ocean voyage in the intense heat of the sun while repelling attacks from enemy submarines and aircraft, we expect to face considerable difficulties. However, if we take a broad view of the situation, the enemy forces are scattered over a wide area and moreover separated by stretches of water, making coordinated action difficult. We, on the other hand, can concentrate our forces, undertake sudden raids, and destroy the enemy piecemeal. Therefore, we are fully confident of success, given close cooperation between the Army and the Navy. As for operations after we land, we have complete confidence in our victory when we consider the organization, equipment, quality, and strength of the enemy forces.

After the initial stage in our operations has been completed, we will endeavor to shorten greatly the duration of the war, using both political and military strategies, particularly the favorable results from our naval operations. Nevertheless, we must be prepared for the probability that the war will be a protracted one. But since we will seize and hold enemy military and air bases and be able to establish a strategically impregnable position, we think we can frustrate the enemy's plans by one means or another.

We will firmly maintain in general our present posture with respect to defense against the Soviet Union and operations in China while we engage in operations in the South. In this way we will be able to strengthen our invincible position vis-à-vis the North, and there will be no problem carrying on in China as we have been doing. With regard to China, the favorable results of the operations in the South should particularly contribute to the settlement of the China Incident.

3. *On the situation in the North resulting from operations in the South:*

The Red Army has suffered massive losses at the hands of the German Army; and there has been a marked decline in the productivity of the Soviet

armament industry. In addition, the Red Army in the Far East has sent westward to European Russia forces equal to 13 infantry divisions, about 1,300 tanks, and at least 1,300 airplanes since last spring. Its war potential, both militarily and spiritually, is declining. Consequently, the probability of the Soviet Union taking the offensive, so long as the Kwantung Army is firmly entrenched [in Manchuria], is very low.

However, it is possible that the United States may put pressure on the Soviet Union to permit America to utilize a part of the Soviet territory in the Far East for air and submarine bases for use in attacking us; and the Soviet Union would not be in a position to reject these American demands. Hence we must anticipate the possibility that we might see some submarines and aircraft in action against us from the North. Consequently, it cannot be assumed that there is no danger of a war breaking out between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of such causes and changes in the situation. Thus our Empire must conclude its operations in the South as quickly as possible, and be prepared to cope with this situation.

4. *On the relationship between operations and diplomacy:*

Up to now, in accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6, we have limited our preparations for operations so that they would not impede diplomatic negotiations. But from now on, given the decision for war, we will take all possible measures to be ready to use force at the beginning of December. This will have the effect of goading the United States and Great Britain; but we believe that diplomacy, taking advantage of progress in war preparations, should be stepped up. Needless to say, if diplomatic negotiations succeed by midnight of November 30, we will call off the use of force. If they do not succeed by that time, however, we would like to receive the Imperial Assent to start a war in order not to miss our opportunity, and thereby to fully achieve the objectives of our operations. …

Hara [speaking on behalf of the Emperor]. …

It would not be desirable to fail to get an agreement on Japanese-American negotiations. We have endured hardships for four years because we are a unified nation, under an Imperial family with a history of 2,600 years. It seems that Britain already has war weariness. I wonder about Germany. It also seems that there is an antiwar movement in Italy. I believe that the

favorable situation in our country results from our national polity with the Imperial family as its head. Nonetheless, our people want to settle the China Incident quickly. Statesmen must give serious consideration to the wisdom of waging war against a great power like the United States without the prospect of the China Incident being settled quickly. At the last Imperial Conference it was decided that we would go to war if the negotiations failed to lead to an agreement. According to the briefings given today, the present American attitude is not just the same as the previous one, but is even more unreasonable. Therefore, I regret very much that the negotiations have little prospect of success.

It is impossible, from the standpoint of our domestic political situation and our self-preservation, to accept all of the American demands. We must hold fast to our position. As I understand it, the Japanese-Chinese problem is the important point in the negotiations, and there is no suspicion that the United States is acting as spokesman for the Chungking regime. If Chiang, relying on American power, should negotiate with us, I doubt that the negotiations could be completed in two or three months. It would be nice if he would capitulate in the face of Japan’s firm determination; but I think there is absolutely no hope for this.

On the other hand, we cannot let the present situation continue. If we miss the present opportunity to go to war, we will have to submit to American dictation. Therefore, I recognize that it is inevitable that we must decide to start a war against the United States. I will put my trust in what I have been told: namely, that things will go well in the early part of the war; and that although we will experience increasing difficulties as the war progresses, there is some prospect of success.

On this occasion I would like to make one comment to the leaders of the Government. Although the China Incident is one cause for war between Japan and the United States and Great Britain, another is the German-British war. I do not believe that the present situation would have developed out of just the China Incident. We have come to where we are because of the war between Germany and Great Britain. What we should always keep in mind here is what would happen to relations between Germany and Great Britain and Germany and the United States, all of them being countries whose population belongs to the white race, if Japan should enter the war. Hitler has said that the Japanese are a second-class race, and Germany has not declared

war against the United States. Japan will take positive action against the United States. In that event, will the American people adopt the same attitude toward us psychologically that they do toward the Germans? Their indignation against the Japanese will be stronger than their hatred of Hitler. The Germans in the United States are considering ways of bringing about peace between the United States and Germany. I fear, therefore, that if Japan begins a war against the United States, Germany and Great Britain and Germany and the United States will come to terms, leaving Japan by herself. That is, we must be prepared for the possibility that hatred of the yellow race might shift the hatred now being directed against Germany to Japan, thus resulting in the German-British war's being turned against Japan.

Negotiations with the United States have failed to lead to an agreement. A war against the United States and Great Britain is inevitable if Japan is to survive. However, we must give serious consideration to race relations, exercise constant care to avoid being surrounded by the entire Aryan race—which would leave Japan isolated—and take steps now to strengthen relations with Germany and Italy. Paper agreements will not do. I would like to call the attention of the officials in the Government to the following point: don't let hatred of Japan become stronger than hatred of Hitler, so that everybody will in name and in fact gang up on Japan. I hope that our officials will deal adequately with international affairs in the future.

Tojo: The points of the President of the Privy Council are well taken. Ever since the previous Imperial Conference, the Government has not given up its earnest desire to somehow break the impasse in our negotiations with the United States. It is natural for the Supreme Command to devote itself exclusively to military operations, since it sees little hope for the negotiations' success. However, in the hope that there might be some way to break the impasse, the Government sought a settlement, even though it meant some sacrifice of freedom in military operations. That is, we pursued diplomacy and military planning at the same time. There is still some hope for success. The reason the United States agreed to negotiate with us is that they have some weaknesses: (1) they are not prepared for operations in two oceans; (2) they have not completed strengthening their domestic structure; (3) they are short of materials for national defense (they have only enough for one year); and so on.

They will learn how determined Japan is from the deployment of our

troops, which we will carry out on the basis of the present proposal. The United States has from the beginning believed that Japan would give up because of economic pressure; but if they recognize that Japan is determined, then that is the time we should resort to diplomatic measures. I believe this is the only way that is left for us. This is the present proposal. This is the last measure we can take that is in line with what President Hara has called "going by diplomacy." I cannot think of any other way in the present situation.

If we enter into a protracted war, there will be difficulties, as mentioned before. The first stage of the war will not be difficult. We have some uneasiness about a protracted war. But how can we let the United States continue to do as she pleases, even though there is some uneasiness? Two years from now we will have no petroleum for military use. Ships will stop moving. When I think about the strengthening of American defenses in the Southwest Pacific, the expansion of the American fleet, the unfinished China Incident, and so on, I see no end to difficulties. We can talk about austerity and suffering, but can our people endure such a life for a long time? The situation is not the same as it was during the Sino-Japanese War [1894–1895]. I fear that we would become a third-class nation after two or three years if we just sat tight. We agreed upon the present proposal as a result of a careful study in the light of the possibility just mentioned. The President should share our views on this point.

I intend to take measures to prevent a racial war once war is started. I should like to prevent Germany and Italy from making peace with Great Britain or with the United States by taking advantage of the results of campaigns in the South. I think the sentiments of the American people are as the President of the Privy Council has indicated, and so I intend to take precautions.

As to what our moral basis for going to war should be, there is some merit in making it clear that Great Britain and the United States represent a strong threat to Japan's self-preservation. Also, if we are fair in governing the occupied areas, attitudes toward us would probably relax. America may be enraged for a while, but later she will come to understand [why we did what we did]. In any case I will be careful to avoid the war's becoming a racial war.

Do you have any other comments? If not, I will rule that the proposals

have been approved in their original form.

Source: Nobutaka Ike, ed., *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 208–239. Reprinted with permission of Stanford University Press.

113. "The Foreign and Domestic Implementation of the 'Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies' Adopted by the Imperial Conference on November 5," Document Approved by the 67th Liaison Conference, Japanese Government, November 12, 1941

Introduction

After the November 5, 1941, Imperial Conference, Japanese officials drew up detailed plans for the conduct of the war that now seemed inevitable. Meeting on November 12, they approved a "Basic Plan for a Wartime Economy," which is not included here, and also a blueprint for the conduct of Japanese diplomacy toward friends, enemies, and neutral powers.

Primary Source

1. Toward Germany and Italy:

In the event that Japanese-American negotiations fail, and it is recognized that war is inevitable (it is assumed that this will be after November 25th), Germany and Italy will be notified without delay that the Empire intends to declare war on Great Britain and the United States as soon as preparations have been completed. As part of the above-mentioned preparations, the following necessary agreements will be negotiated: (a) The participation of Germany and Italy in the war against the United States; (b) neither of the two parties will make peace separately.

Note: In case Germany demands that we participate in the war against the Soviet Union, we will respond that we do not intend to join the war for the time being. Even if this should lead to a situation whereby Germany will delay her entry into the war against the United States, it cannot be helped.

2. Toward Great Britain:

As to those items that might be agreed on as a result of negotiations with the United States that affect Great Britain, we will get Great Britain to accept them; moreover, we will take steps to get her to cooperate immediately in a positive manner by negotiating either directly or through the United States.

In order to keep our plans secret, no other special diplomatic measures will be taken.

3. Toward the Dutch East Indies:

In order that our plans may be kept secret and deceptive, we will gradually begin diplomatic negotiations, ostensibly in the form of continuing our earlier negotiations, for the purpose of acquiring vital materials for our Empire.

4. Toward the Soviet Union:

In general we will continue our negotiations on the basis of Paragraph One of "The Essentials of Diplomatic Negotiations with the Soviet Union," adopted by the Liaison Conference between Supreme Headquarters and the Government on August 4, 1941.

5. Toward Thailand:

(a) Just before we occupy the country we will demand the following and secure Thailand's immediate agreement (even if Thailand does not accept our demands, our troops will enter the country as planned; however, efforts will be made to limit armed clashes between Japan and Thailand); (1) that the transit of Japanese troops and the use of facilities be allowed, and that other aid also be provided; (2) that immediate steps be taken to prevent clashes between Japanese and Thai troops in connection with the transit of Japanese troops; (3) that a mutual defense pact be signed if Thailand wishes it.

Note: There should be no particular change in our approach to Thailand before we enter into these negotiations; great care must be taken to keep secret our plans to begin war.

(b) Immediately after our occupation, agreements will be made on the spot regarding the following points: (1) the transit and stationing of Japanese troops; (2) providing military facilities and building new ones; (3) providing the necessary transportation and communications facilities and factories, etc.; (4) providing billets and provisions for troops in transit and for troops on occupation duty; (5) loaning the necessary military funds.

Note: Negotiations regarding Points (1) and (2) will be on the basis of the "Essentials of Policy toward French Indochina and Thailand" adopted by the Liaison Conference between the Government and the Supreme Headquarters on February 1, 1941. We will promise to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand; in order to facilitate our negotiations and depending on Thailand's attitude, she may be secretly told that in the future she might be given a part of Burma, or perhaps Malaya.

6. Toward China:

The following steps should be taken in order to limit consumption as much as possible so as to prepare for a protracted world war, to assure the preservation of Japan's overall war-making capacity, and to prepare for the possibility that her war-making ability might be reduced in the future:

(a) Eliminate British and American forces in China.
(b) Place enemy Foreign Settlements (including the Foreign Legation Quarter in Peking) under effective Japanese control. However, care should be taken to keep to a minimum the burden placed on Japan's human and material resources. Note: Enemy forces will be removed from the International Settlement and the Peking Legation Quarter, and these areas will be placed under our control; but since the interests of friendly foreign powers are also involved, these areas will not be taken over.
(c) In order to conceal our plans, the foregoing paragraphs will not become effective until war begins with the United States.
(d) The exercise of the rights of a belligerent against Chungking will not take the form of a special declaration, but for practical purposes will go into effect with the opening of hostilities against the United States.
(e) As for enemy rights in China, even those relating to the National Government will, depending on the need, be placed for the time being under the control of Japan. Special steps will be taken to adjust them.

(f) In the occupied areas, the Chinese leaders will be encouraged as much as possible to carry on activities, and efforts will be made to secure the support of the people through Sino-Japanese joint efforts. In this way peace will gradually be restored in local areas wherever possible.
(g) With respect to economic relations with China, emphasis will be placed on the acquisition of vital materials; and for this reason rational adjustments will be made in the restrictions presently in force.

Source: Nobutaka Ike, ed., *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 241–243. Reprinted with permission of Stanford University Press.

114. "Draft Proposal for Hastening the End of the War against the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Chiang [Kai-shek]," Approved by the 69th Liaison Conference, Japanese Government, November 15, 1941

Introduction

Three days after approving a broad plan for the conduct of Japanese diplomacy in the approach to war, the country's top military and civilian officials accepted a policy statement on the strategy to be followed in the impending conflict. Interestingly, Japanese leaders not only envisaged working in close concert with Germany and Italy but also hoped to negotiate a peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Primary Source

POLICY

1. We will endeavor to quickly destroy American, British, and Dutch bases in the Far East, and assure our self-preservation and self-defense. We will

endeavor at the same time to hasten the fall of the Chiang regime by taking positive measures, to work for the surrender of Great Britain in co-operation with Germany and Italy, and to destroy the will of the United States to continue the war.

2. We will do our utmost to prevent an increase in the number of countries at war against us; and we will endeavor to influence the countries not presently involved.

SUMMARY

1. Our Empire will engage in a quick war, and will destroy American and British bases in Eastern Asia and in the Southwest Pacific region. At the same time that it secures a strategically powerful position, it will control those areas producing vital materials, as well as important transportation routes, and thereby prepare for a protracted period of self-sufficiency.

At the appropriate time, we will endeavor by various means to lure the main fleet of the United States [near Japan] and destroy it.

2. First of all, Japan, Germany, and Italy will cooperate and work for the surrender of Great Britain.

(a) The Empire will adopt the following policies: (1) the connection between Australia and India and the British mother country will be broken by means of political pressure and the destruction of commerce, and their separation will be achieved; (2) the independence of Burma will be promoted, and this will be used to stimulate the independence of India.
(b) We will endeavor to get Germany and Italy to adopt the following policies: (1) to carry out operations against the Near East, North Africa, and Suez, and at the same time carry out operations against India; (2) strengthen the blockade of Great Britain; (3) if conditions permit, carry out the invasion of the British Isles.
(c) The three countries will cooperate and adopt the following policies: (1) endeavor to establish contact among the three countries through the Indian Ocean; (2) strengthen naval operations; (3) stop the shipment of vital materials from the occupied countries to Great Britain.

3. Japan, Germany, and Italy will cooperate and endeavor to deal with Great Britain, and at the same time endeavor to destroy the will of the United States to fight.

(a) The Empire will adopt the following policies: (1) In dealing with the Philippines, for the time being the present policy will be continued, and thought will be given to how it can hasten the end of the war. (2) An all-out attempt will be made to disrupt commerce to the United States. (3) The flow of materials from China and the South Seas to the United States will be cut off. (4) Strategic propaganda against the United States will be stepped up; emphasis will be placed on enticing the American main fleet to come to the Far East, persuading Americans to reconsider their Far Eastern policy, and pointing out the uselessness of a Japanese-American war; American public opinion will be directed toward opposition to war. (5) Attempts will be made to break the ties between the United States and Australia.
(b) We will endeavor to get Australia and Italy to adopt the following policies: (1) to set up naval attacks against the United States in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans; (2) to step up military, economic, and political offensives against Central and South America.

4. In China we will stop support going to Chiang by utilizing the results of our military operations (especially against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands), and will destroy Chiang's power to resist. We will also work for the collapse of the Chiang regime by vigorously undertaking various strategies—the seizure of the Foreign Settlements, utilization of the overseas Chinese in the South Pacific, stepping up military operations, etc.

5. The Empire will endeavor to the utmost to prevent the outbreak of a war with the Soviet Union while we are engaged in military operations in the South.

We will keep in mind the possibilities of arranging a peace between Germany and the Soviet Union, depending on the wishes of those two countries, and bringing the Soviet Union within the Axis camp; of improving Japanese-Soviet relations; and, depending on circumstances, of encouraging the Soviets to push into Iran and India.

6. We will continue our present policy toward French Indochina. We will persuade Thailand to cooperate with us by restoring to her territory she has lost to the British.

7. While paying full attention to changes in the war situation, the international situation, and popular feelings in enemy countries, we will endeavor to seize the following opportunities in order to bring the war to a close: (a) conclusion of the principal military operations in the South; (b) conclusion of the principal military operations in China, especially the capitulation of the Chiang regime; (c) favorable developments in the war situation in Europe, especially the conquest of the British Isles, the end of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the success of the policy vis-à-vis India.

For this purpose we will step up our diplomatic and propaganda activities directed against Latin America, Switzerland, Portugal, and the Vatican.

The three countries—Japan, Germany, and Italy—agree not to sign a separate peace agreement; at the same time, they will not immediately make peace with Great Britain when she surrenders, but will endeavor to use Great Britain to persuade the United States. In the planning to promote peace with the United States, attention will be paid to supplies of tin and rubber in the South Pacific region, and to the treatment of the Philippines.

Source: Nobutaka Ike, ed., *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 247–249. Reprinted with permission of Stanford University Press.

115. "The Jews Are to Blame": Article in *Das Reich,* November 16, 1941

Introduction

By late 1941, German authorities were no longer content simply to impose ever tighter restrictions on Jews in Germany and occupied Europe. They now contemplated more drastic treatment of the Jews: their physical removal from Germany by their deportation eastward out of German territory and into ghettos in cities farther west and soon their elimination by means of mass

murder. An article in *Das Reich*, the official organ of Josef Goebbels's Ministry of Propaganda, signaled the move toward even harsher German treatment of European Jewry.

Primary Source

The historical guilt of world Jewry for the outbreak and extension of the war is so clearly proven that there is no point in wasting any words on it. The Jews wanted their war and now they have got it. But now they are feeling the effects of the prophecy which the Führer made on 30 January 1939 in the German Reichstag that, if international finance Jewry should succeed in plunging the nations once again into a world war, the result would not be the Bolshevization of the earth and consequently the victory of Jewry but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.

We are now experiencing the implementation of this prophecy and in the process the Jews are suffering a fate which, while harsh, is more than earned. Sympathy, let alone regret, is entirely inappropriate in this case. In provoking this war, World Jewry has completely miscalculated the forces at its disposal and it is now experiencing a gradual process of annihilation which it intended us to suffer and would inflict on us without any qualms if it had the power to do so. It is now heading for destruction on the basis of its own law: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.

In this historic confrontation every Jew is our enemy irrespective of whether he is vegetating in a Polish ghetto or is continuing his parasitic existence in Berlin or Hamburg or is blowing a war trumpet in New York or Washington. All Jews are part of an international conspiracy against national socialist Germany on the basis of their birth and race. They desire its defeat and destruction and are doing whatever is in their power to bring this about. The fact that in the Reich itself they have few opportunities to do so is not a result of the fact that they are loyal but is entirely due to the fact that we have taken what seemed to us the appropriate measures to prevent it.

One of these measures is the introduction of the yellow Jewish star which every Jew has to wear so that it is visible. Through this we wanted to mark them out above all so that, in the event of the slightest attempt to offend against the German national community, they could be instantly recognized as Jews. It is an extraordinarily humane regulation, so to speak a hygiene

prophylactic measure which is intended to prevent the Jews from slipping into our ranks unrecognized in order to provoke discord.

When a few weeks ago the Jews appeared on the Berlin street scene adorned with their Jewish star the first impression of the citizens of the Reich capital was one of general surprise. Only very few people knew there were so many Jews in Berlin. Everybody discovered among their acquaintance or in their neighbourhood someone who appeared to be harmless, who may have stood out by their periodic grumbling and complaining, but nobody would have imagined he was Jewish. He had evidently disguised himself, made the right gestures, adapted himself to the milieu in which he lived and awaited his moment. Which of us had the slightest idea that the enemy was standing right next to him, that he was quietly listening in to conversations on the street, in the underground, or in the queues in front of tobacconists or cleverly inciting people? There are Jews who one can hardly recognize as Jews from their outward appearance. Here too they have adapted themselves as far as they can. These are the most dangerous ones. It's typical that every measure that we take against the Jews is reported the following day in the English and American press. So the Jews still have secret contacts with the enemy and make use of them not only in their own interests but in all matters of military importance to the Reich. So the enemy is amongst us. Is it not then obvious that we should make sure that every citizen can recognize him?

The Jews are now gradually finding themselves isolated and are now trying to employ a new trick. They are familiar with the good-natured German *Michel* [a stereotype of a German simpleton] who resides in us, who is always ready to shed a sentimental tear and to forget all the injustice done to us; suddenly one has the impression that the Berlin Jews consist entirely of sweet little helpless babies or infirm old women designed to win our sympathy. The Jews are sending out their sympathy-evoking phalanx. They may disturb a few harmless souls, but not us. We know only too well what they're up to.

If for no other reason we must win the war on their account. For were we to lose it then those harmless looking Jews would turn into ferocious wolves. They would fall upon our people, on our women and children, in order to take their revenge in a way for which history can show no parallel. This is what they did in Bessarabia and in the Baltic states when Bolshevism took over and in those places they had not even suffered either at the hands of the

people or the government; we cannot retreat from our struggle against Jewry —quite apart from the fact that we don't wish to do so. The Jews must be separated off from the German national community since they threaten our national stability.

This is an elementary principle of ethnic, national and social hygiene. They will never cease their activities. If they could they would bring one nation after another into the war against us. What do they care about the suffering that people endure as a result so long as they can force the world to submit to their financial and racial domination? The Jews are a parasitic race which settles on the cultures of nations which are healthy but lack a racial instinct like a putrefying mould. There is only one effective means of combating this: to cut it out and dispose of it. …

If we Germans have any fatal flaw in our national character it is our tendency to be too forgetful. Although this flaw demonstrates our human decency and magnanimity, it does not always speak for our political insight or skill. We consider everybody to be as good-natured as ourselves. … But [German poet Friedrich Gottlieb] Klopstock gave us the good advice not to be too fair; our enemies were not noble enough to see the good side of our flaw.

If there is any situation where this advice is appropriate then it is vis-à-vis the Jews. Here a concession represents not only weakness but neglect of duty and a crime against the security of the state. For the Jews are only longing for the opportunity to reward our stupidity with blood and terror. It must never come to that. And one of the most effective measures to prevent it is a ruthless, cold toughness towards the destroyers of our nation, towards the people who caused the war, towards those who will profit from it if we lose, and therefore, necessarily towards those who will be its victims if we win. And so let me repeat again for the nth time:

The Jews are aiming to destroy us. They have provoked and brought about this war. They want to use it to destroy the German Reich and our people. This plan must be thwarted.

There is no difference between Jews. Every Jew is a sworn enemy of the German people. If he does not show his enmity towards us that is only through cowardice or cunning and not because he is not an enemy at heart.

The Jews bear the guilt for every German soldier killed in this war. They have him on their conscience and they must therefore pay for it.

If someone wears the Jewish star then he is marked out as an enemy of the people. Anyone who maintains social contact with him belongs to him and must be considered and treated as a Jew. He deserves the contempt of the whole nation which he is abandoning in its darkest hour in order to be on the same side as those who hate it.

The Jews enjoy the protection of our enemies abroad. There is no further proof needed of their destructive role in our nation.

The Jews are the envoys of our enemies among us. Anyone who supports them has gone over to the enemy.

The Jews have no right to prance around among us on an equal footing. Wherever they seek to make their views known on the streets, in queues in front of shops, on public transport, they should be told to keep quiet not only because their views are fundamentally wrong but because they are Jews and have no right to a voice in the affairs of the community.

If the Jews try to appeal to your sympathy you should be aware that they are relying on your forgetfulness; show them at once that you have seen through them and punish them with your contempt.

A decent enemy deserves our magnanimity on defeat. But the Jew is not a decent enemy; he only pretends to be one.

The Jews are guilty of the war. They do not suffer an injustice through our treatment of them. They have more than earned it.

It is a matter for the government to deal with them. No one has the right to act off his own bat, but everyone has the duty to respect the state's measures against the Jews, to give them their support and not to allow themselves to be led astray about the threat posed by the Jews by any tricks or subterfuges they may use.

The security of the state requires this of us all.

Source: J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., *Nazism 1919–1945,* Vol. 3, *Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader,* revised ed. (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 2001), 515–518. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

116. The U.S. Congress Repeals the 1939 Neutrality Act: House Joint Resolution No.

237, November 17, 1941

Introduction

By late 1941, U.S. neutrality legislation had increasingly become a dead letter as the U.S. government provided military assistance to Great Britain and other belligerents under the new Lend-Lease legislation. In October 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt requested the repeal of those provisions still in effect, which forbade the arming of American merchant vessels. In November 1941 less than a month before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Congress granted his request.

Primary Source

House Joint Resolution No. 237 to repeal Sections 2, 3, and 6 of The Neutrality Act of 1939, and for other purposes.

SECTION I

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the U.S. of America in Congress assembled, that Section 2 of The Neutrality Act of 1939 (relating to commerce with states engaged in armed conflict), and Section 3 of such act (relating to combat area) are hereby repealed.

SECTION II

Section 6 of The Neutrality Act of 1939 (relating to the arming of American vessels) is hereby repealed; and during the unlimited national emergency, proclaimed by the President on May 27, 1941, the President is authorized, through such agency as he may designate, to arm, or to permit or cause to be armed, any American vessel as defined in such Act. The provision of Section 16 of the Criminal Code (relating to hands from armed vessels on clearing) shall not apply to any such vessel.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 786.

117. “The Deportation of Jews to the Reichskommissariat Ostland”: German Gestapo Branch Office, Stuttgart, Directive to the Landräte and Police Chiefs of Württemberg, November 18, 1941

Introduction

In late 1941, the German government began large-scale deportations eastward of Jews living in Germany and territories annexed from the former Austrian and Czechoslovak states. The authorities of the German province of Württemberg each received a “very urgent” directive from the regional Gestapo office in Stuttgart instructing them which Jews had been selected for deportation and how to organize their removal. The state was to confiscate all property and assets of the deportees.

Primary Source

I. Within the framework of the de-jewifying [*Entjudung*] of the whole of Europe, railway transports containing 1,000 Jews each are at present regularly leaving from Germany, the *Ostmark* [formerly Austria] and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia for the *Reichskommissariat Ostland*. Württemberg and Hohenzollern are participating initially with a transport of 1,000 Jews which will leave Stuttgart on 1 December 1941.

II. Those Jews involved have already been selected and registered here. They were selected in accordance with Section 5 of the first supplementary decree of the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 November 1935. … The following were exempted:

Jews living in German-Jewish mixed marriages.
Jews of foreign nationality.
Jews over 65 years of age.
[*However, these criteria were breached in individual cases.*]

Those Jews scheduled for evacuation from your area are listed in appendix 1 [not included here]. You will be kept informed of alterations which are unavoidable as a result of the resettlement of the remaining Jews in Württemberg, which is continuing simultaneously, and on account of special circumstances, illness etc. I must emphasize that on no account may the number scheduled for your area be deviated from either upwards or downwards. Surplus Jews must be sent back to their previous locations. Absentees (through suicide etc.) must be reported immediately.

III. The train scheduled for transporting the Jews is timetabled to leave Stuttgart on 1 December 1941 between 8 and 9 o'clock.

The Jews who are to be evacuated from Stuttgart itself as well as from the country areas will be concentrated in a transit camp in the grounds of the former Reich Garden Show (Killesberg) in Stuttgart from 27 November onwards.

IV. Each person may take with them:

(a) Money up to 50 RM [reichsmarks] in Reich credit notes. This money will be supplied from here so in practice the Jews should not bring any money with them on their journey here.
(b) 1 or 2 cases (no bulky goods). This luggage must not weigh more than 50 kg.
(c) Bedding, consisting of 1–2 blankets, 2 sheets and 1 mattress for two people (but without a bolster).
(d) A complete set of clothing (particularly warm underwear and decent shoes).
(e) Food for 1–2 days. We have already seen to the further adequate provisioning of all participants in the transport.
(f) Crockery (a plate or pot with a spoon).

The following must not be taken: bonds, foreign exchange, savings books, etc. and valuables of all kinds (gold, silver, platinum with the exception of wedding rings), livestock.

Those ration books valid for the period after 1 December 1941 must be handed in to the local Food Office in return for a receipt. This receipt must be presented in the transit camp.

Work books must be withdrawn and handed over to the local Labour Office.

V. Before the groups which have been assembled for transportation in the various districts are handed over, the local police authority must carry out a thorough search for weapons, ammunition, explosives, poison, foreign exchange, jewellery, etc. Any property seized must be listed and handed over to the local finance office (see further Section VI).

VI. To prevent fraudulent transfers, the entire property of the Jews being deported will be confiscated by the police. I request that this measure is implemented. The Jews have already been sent, via the Jewish Cultural Association, the enclosed property declaration form in which they are obliged to provide a complete declaration of their assets and present the list to their town hall by 25.11.1941 at the latest. The mayors must carry out sample inspections of the declarations and send them to the local Finance Office.

The entire assets of these Jews will be confiscated. The confiscation orders will be handed over to individuals in the transit camp. The liquidation will be carried out by the President of the Finance Office in Württemberg through the local Finance Offices. You are requested to liaise with them in connection with the sealing of the [Jews'] dwellings and other measures.

VII. Those Jews being evacuated have been informed of my orders today in the enclosed circular. This was done through the Jewish Cultural Association for the sake of administrative convenience and uniformity. In this communication every one of those Jews has been given a transport number which corresponds with the enclosed list. For the sake of convenience, therefore, I suggest that in the event of any queries, and when collecting the group together for transportation, these numbers should be used.

In view of the restricted number of available goods wagons, I request that you pay particular attention to ensuring that the amount of individuals' luggage is kept strictly within the allowance.

I have engaged the firm of Barr, Moering & Co. of Stuttgart to collect the rest of the luggage, some of which is heavy, for the whole area of Württemberg and Hohenzollern. In cooperation with the local authorities, it is responsible for collecting the luggage from the individual districts and transporting it to the station of departure. A representative of this firm will visit you shortly to discuss the procedure in detail.

In addition, I request that you ensure, possibly by employing a Jewish

middle man, that a sufficient quantity of building equipment, tools, kitchen equipment for communal feeding, e.g., cauldrons, stoves, buckets, and first aid boxes are provided. For this purpose, the following rough proportions should be adhered to: one bucket for ten persons, one shovel or spade for ten persons, one pickaxe for ten persons, a sharp hatchet or axe for twenty persons, a saw for twenty persons, a stove with chimney and a tray for fifty persons, and a first aid box, a cauldron, and a sewing machine for a hundred persons, a large tool box for twenty persons. However, these materials should not be bought new.

VIII. Your task, therefore, is to collect the Jews together at the proper time, to secure their property in cooperation with the financial authorities, to seal their dwellings and if necessary appoint caretakers, search the Jews' persons and their luggage and, deploying an appropriate number of officials, to deliver the Jews on 27 or 28 November 1941 to the camp in Stuttgart (special instructions will be given concerning the exact time for their delivery to the camp). If the numbers of those involved in the transport to Stuttgart require special railway carriages you must ensure their provision. The transport leader (official) must present a detailed list in quadruplicate containing the transport numbers, the personal details, and the identity numbers.

Any costs arising will be met by the Jewish Cultural Association in Stuttgart and paid from a special fund. …

Source: J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., *Nazism 1919–1945,* Vol. 3, *Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader,* revised ed. (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 2001), 521–523. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

118. Memorandum of the Japanese Government to the U.S. Government, Transmitted by Cable from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941

Introduction

On December 6, 1941, the Japanese government transmitted to its Washington embassy a memorandum breaking off diplomatic relations with the United States. American naval code breakers intercepted and deciphered this document, which was supposed to be delivered in the near future to the U.S. government. The American government anticipated that once war began, Japan would attack Western possessions in Asia but did not know precisely when or where this would occur.

Primary Source

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views, concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan’s true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China; they have attempted to frustrate Japan’s aspiration to realize the ideal

of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another’s position.

An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one’s selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world’s actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact

between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: “Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.” It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. [*sic*] Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia have for the past two hundred years or more been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

5. [*sic*] In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the

negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the question of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

"VERY IMPORTANT"

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Source: United States, 79 Congress, 2nd Session, *Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings,* 39 Pts. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), Pt. 12: 239–245. Exhibits of Joint Committee, Exhibit No. 1, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941.

119. President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan, December 6, 1941

Introduction

As relations between the United States and Japan appeared to have reached an impasse, the State Department dispatched by cable an urgent message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan, making one last appeal for peace.

Primary Source

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers, have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. These developments contain tragic possibilities.

The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seems essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty’s Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand

Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indochina for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indochina for the common defense of French Indochina. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indochina, nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indochina in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indochina is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indochina have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable. None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indochina if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to

ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Publication 1983: Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 828–830.

120. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary of State Cordell Hull with Nomura Kichisaburo and Kurusu Saburo, December 7, 1941

Introduction

On December 7, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had his final interview with Ambassadors Kurusu and Nomura, during which they delivered a lengthy memorandum from the Japanese government breaking off diplomatic relations. U.S. code breakers had already intercepted this document. Since the U.S. government had already received the news of Pearl Harbor, the meeting was notably chilly.

Primary Source

The Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment to see the Secretary at 1:00 p.m., but later telephoned and asked that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 as the Ambassador was not quite ready. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu arrived at the Department at 2:05 p.m. and were received by the Secretary at 2:20.

The Japanese Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to deliver at 1:00 p.m. the document which he handed the Secretary, but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to the need of more time to decode the

message. The Secretary asked why he had specified one o'clock. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but that that was his instruction.

The Secretary said that anyway he was receiving the message at two o'clock.

After the Secretary had read two or three pages he asked the Ambassador whether this document was presented under instructions of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied that it was. The Secretary as soon as he had finished reading the document turned to the Japanese Ambassador and said,

"I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without making any comment.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941,* 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 830–837.

121. Draft Japanese Declaration of War on the United States (Not Delivered), December 1941

Introduction

The Japanese decision to attack the American fleet without formally declaring war helped to convince U.S. leaders and the general public that their opponent's behavior was beyond the pale. The Japanese Foreign Office did in fact draft a declaration of war, composed in English, for the Japanese ambassador to hand to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, but Admiral Yamamoto's insistence upon delivering the war's first blow unannounced ensured that it was never delivered.

Primary Source

Your Excellency:

I have the honour, under instructions from my Government, to inform Your Excellency that as the hostile measures taken by the United States have seriously jeopardized the security, and therefore existence, of Japan, they have been constrained to resort to measures of self-defense and consequently there now exists a state of war between the two countries.

I am also directed to leave with Your Excellency a copy of the Statement of our Government which sets forth their views concerning the rupture of our relations.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Statement of the Japanese Government

Being earnestly desirous of the peace of the Pacific, the Japanese Government have consistently pursued a policy of promoting friendly relations with Great Britain and the United States. These relations, however, have suffered a progressive deterioration in recent years largely through the unresponsive attitude of these Powers who have failed to understand the realities of the situation prevailing in our part of the world.

Our cardinal policy aims at inaugurating a new order in Greater East Asia throughout which we are striving to ensure and enhance a common prosperity. It is essentially a policy of peace designed to cultivate the friendship among, and increase the welfare of, the peoples of this vast region. It is a policy calculated to serve the interests of these peoples, redounding ultimately to the benefit of the whole mankind.

Great Britain and the United States, however, have willfully misunderstood our aims and aspirations and, in collusion with other hostile countries, have endeavoured, openly and covertly, to oppose and obstruct the peaceful execution of our constructive policy. The Anglo-Saxon Powers have not scrupled to render active assistances to the Chungking régime, a mere pawn in their game of Imperialist politics, prolonging the latter’s futile struggle to the untold misery of China’s teeming millions who are becoming increasingly anxious for peace with Japan. By aiding the Chungking régime these Powers have greatly impeded the restoration of tranquility in China and by thus opposing our efforts for a speedy settlement of the China Affair, they

have more than forfeited the good will of our people. Anxious, however, to maintain amicable relations with them, Japan has, displaying utmost patience, persevered in the face of provocations hoping that they will reconsider and repair their attitude. It is highly regrettable that these Powers should have failed to respond to our policy and should have, on the contrary, resorted to unfriendly measures, some of them very severe and stringent, vis-à-vis this country.

In these circumstances, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy; two leading Powers of Europe who, fully sharing our views, have pledged their willing cooperation in establishing a new order in Greater East Asia. But our association with the Axis Powers has added yet another cause of alienation in our relations with the so-called Democratic Powers who have begun to entertain unwarranted misapprehensions regarding our policy and purposes, despite our repeated assurances that we seek no quarrel with them. Far from harbouring any aggressive design, Japan was, as stated above, bent upon the peaceful initiation of an era of common prosperity throughout the Greater East Asia.

It will be recalled that in August last year Japanese forces were dispatched to Northern French Indo-China in connection with the prosecution of the China Affair. Later on, in summer this year, our forces made a peaceful entry into the Southern region in order to cope with the grave situation developing in the Southwestern Pacific, due to the rapid augmentation of military measures by the United States, Great Britain and her allies and associates. These Powers chose to regard our peaceful advance into Southern French Indo-China as a menace to their territories and froze our assets in their respective countries, a measure tantamount to a wholesale rupture of economic relations. They have since even gone the length of establishing encircling positions against Japan which, creating an unprecedented tension in the Pacific, has greatly exacerbated their relations with us. The increasing pressure they have brought to bear upon Japan has as its aim no other than our economic strangulation. Sometimes, economic warfare is admittedly more cruel and disastrous than an open resort to arms. Thus the ruthless measures of economic attrition now directed against us constitute a really serious threat, affecting as they deeply do, the very existence of our Empire. In other words, we, as a nation, are faced with the question of life and death.

We could not acquiesce in these hostile measures, as it would spell the decline and downfall of our nation.

Finding ourselves in such a predicament, we still patiently endeavoured to find a way out of it. The negotiations at Washington are a case in point.

Our Government have, since April last, conducted protracted negotiations with the American Government with a view to bringing about a friendly and fundamental adjustment of the Japanese-American relations. We were afraid that the steady deterioration of our relations would, if left without a timely check, drift toward an inevitable catastrophe, an awful eventuality entailing immense suffering not only on the countries in the Pacific basin but on the entire mankind as well. We were convinced that, good will animating both sides, there should be no question that is not amenable to amicable settlement. We, therefore, exercised utmost patience and, in the spirit of compromise, proposed many a formula, often involving great sacrifices on our part, to meet the desires of the American Government which were, we much regret to say, not always reasonable nor practicable. In fact, we went to the last possible limit of concessions, short of compromising the honour and prestige as a great Power, in order to satisfy the United States. But the latter has persistently maintained a very rigid attitude, making not the slightest gesture to respond to our sincere efforts to reach a friendly settlement. In short, the American Government were singularly lacking in the spirit of mutual accommodation which is indispensable to a successful conclusion of any international negotiations. They maintained, throughout the course of negotiations lasting more than seven months, their original position from which they stubbornly refused to withdraw even an inch. Thus, it has finally come to the present pass where it can no longer serve any useful purpose by continuing further negotiations. Our untiring and unsparing efforts have been frustrated through the uncompromising attitude of the American Government and we have now been forced, although with great reluctance, to abandon the negotiations and, with that, renounce our cherished desire to come to a friendly understanding with the United States.

With the breakdown of the negotiations, we have thus been led to give up, at last and finally, the hope to find an escape, through peaceful means, from our predicament. At the same time, the hostile ring encircling our Empire is being steadily strengthened day after day, gravely threatening our safety and security. The economic warfare, in its most relentless form, is also being

prosecuted with renewed energy against this country. In short, the concerted pressure of the hostile Powers is such that our national existence is now in serious jeopardy. Standing at the cross-roads of her destiny, Japan decided to defend her prime right of existence, a course that offered the only possible way of survival. Our patience finally exhausted and our destiny at stake, the nation has risen, as one man, to meet the challenge. Steeped in the conviction that right always will triumph, our hundred million peoples have girt on the sword of justice, anxious to defend the fatherland and eager to vindicate our glorious cause.

Source: Akira Iriye, *Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999), 105–108. Originally published in *This Is Yomiuri* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1998), 220–221.

122. Adolf Hitler, Secret "Night-and-Fog Decree" on the Punishment of Offenders in Occupied Territory, December 7, 1941

Introduction

Resistance efforts were launched in all territories occupied by the German military. Guerrilla and partisan activities were particularly widespread in the Soviet Union. Even when they were not so effective, at the very least such undertakings had considerable nuisance value, and they were also a propaganda liability. In December 1941, Adolf Hitler ordered that in principle the German military should employ the death penalty to punish all such offenses.

Primary Source

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Directives for the prosecution of offences committed within the occupied territories against the German State or the occupying power, of December 7th, 1941.

Within the occupied territories, communistic elements and other circles hostile to Germany have increased their efforts against the German State and the occupying powers since the Russian campaign started. The amount and the danger of these machinations oblige us to take severe measures as a deterrent. First of all the following directives are to be applied:

I. Within the occupied territories, the adequate punishment for offences committed against the German State or the occupying power which endanger their security or a state of readiness is on principle the death penalty.
II. The offences listed in paragraph I as a rule are to be dealt with in the occupied countries only if it is probable that sentence of death will be passed upon the offender, at least the principal offender, and if the trial and the execution can be completed in a very short time. Otherwise the offenders, at least the principal offenders, are to be taken to Germany.
III. Prisoners taken to Germany are subjected to military procedure only if particular military interests require this. In case German or foreign authorities inquire about such prisoners, they are to be told that they were arrested, but that the proceedings do not allow any further information.
IV. The Commanders in the occupied territories and the Court authorities within the framework of their jurisdiction, are personally responsible for the observance of this decree.
V. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces determines in which occupied territories this decree is to be applied. He is authorized to explain and to issue executive orders and supplements. The Reich Minister of Justice will issue executive orders within his own jurisdiction.

Source: United States, Office of United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, 8 vols. and 2 suppl. vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946–1948), VII:873–874 (Doc. No. L-90).

123. “A Date Which Will Live in Infamy”: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to the U.S. Congress, December 8, 1941

Introduction

On December 8, 1941, in an address that, though short, was one of the most famous speeches he ever gave, President Franklin D. Roosevelt officially informed Congress of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Although Japan’s behavior put the United States in a de facto state of war, he sought an official declaration of hostilities from Congress. With the exception of one dissenting vote from Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin of Montana, both the Senate and the House voted unanimously in favor of his request.

Primary Source

Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.

This morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.

As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounded determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 838–839.

124. China Declares War on Japan, Germany, and Italy: Statement of the Chinese Government, December 9, 1941

Introduction

An undeclared state of war existed between China and Japan from July 7, 1937, onward. China did not, however, formally declare war on Japan until two days after Pearl Harbor, when, following the example of the United States, the Guomindang government declared that it was at war not just with Japan but also with Germany and Italy. By taking this action, China undoubtedly hoped to enhance its chances of receiving assistance from the United States and the other Allied powers.

Primary Source

Japan's national policy has always aimed at the domination of Asia and mastery of the Pacific. For more than four years China has resolutely resisted Japan's aggression, regardless of suffering and sacrifice, in order not only to maintain her national independence and freedom but also to uphold international law and justice and to promote world peace and human happiness.

China is a peace-loving nation. In taking up arms in self-defense, China entertained the hope that Japan might yet realise the futility of her plans of conquest. Throughout the struggle all the other powers have shown the utmost forbearance likewise in the hope that Japan might one day repent and mend her ways in the interest of peace in the entire Pacific region.

Unfortunately Japan's aggressive capacities prove to be incorrigible. After her long and fruitless attempt to conquer China, Japan, far from showing any signs of penitence, has treacherously launched an attack on China's friends, the United States and Great Britain, thus extending the theater of her aggressive activities and making herself the arch-enemy of justice and world peace.

This latest act of aggression on the part of Japan lays bare her insatiable ambitions and has created a situation that no nation which believes in international good faith and human decency can tolerate.

The Chinese Government hereby formally declares war on Japan. The Chinese Government further declares that all treaties, conventions, agreements and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan are and remain null and void.

The Chinese Government's Declaration of War on Germany and Italy

Since the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan have unmistakably banded themselves into a block of aggressor states working closely together to carry out their common program of world conquest and domination. To demonstrate their solidarity Germany and Italy successively accorded recognition to Japan's puppet regimes in northeastern China and at Nanking. As a consequence, China severed her diplomatic relations with Germany and Italy last July. Now the Axis powers have extended the theater of their aggressive activities and thrown the whole Pacific region into turmoil, making themselves the enemies of international justice and world civilization.

This state of affairs can no longer be tolerated by the Chinese Government and people. The Chinese Government hereby declares that as from midnight, December 9, 1941, a state of war exists between China and Germany and between China and Italy. The Chinese Government further declares that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Germany and between China and Italy are and remain null and void.

Source: "China's Declaration of War against Japan, Also Against Germany and Italy," *Contemporary China* 1(15) (December 15, 1941), http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/411209b.html.

125. German Declaration of War with the United States: Press Release of the U.S.

Department of State, December 11, 1941

Introduction

Immediately after Pearl Harbor in cables intercepted by Allied cryptographers, Japan urgently requested both the German and Italian governments to declare war on the United States. Four days after Pearl Harbor, both Axis powers did so. The ranking German diplomat in Washington delivered a formal declaration of war to the United States, a copy of which the German Foreign Office had already presented to the ranking U.S. diplomat left in Berlin.

Primary Source

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES:

The Government of the United States having violated in the most flagrant manner and in ever increasing measure all rules of neutrality in favor of the adversaries of Germany and having continually been guilty of the most severe provocations toward Germany ever since the outbreak of the European war, provoked by the British declaration of war against Germany on September 3, 1939, has finally resorted to open military acts of aggression.

On September 11, 1941, the President of the United States publicly declared that he had ordered the American Navy and Air Force to shoot on sight at any German war vessel. In his speech of October 27, 1941, he once more expressly affirmed that this order was in force. Acting under this order, vessels of the American Navy, since early September 1941, have systematically attacked German naval forces. Thus, American destroyers, as for instance the Greer, the Kearney and the Reuben James, have opened fire on German submarines according to plan. The Secretary of the American Navy, Mr. Knox, himself confirmed that American destroyers attacked German submarines.

Furthermore, the naval forces of the United States, under order of their Government and contrary to international law have treated and seized German merchant vessels on the high seas as enemy ships.

The German Government therefore establishes the following facts:

Although Germany on her part has strictly adhered to the rules of international law in her relations with the United States during every period of the present war, the Government of the United States from initial violations of neutrality has finally proceeded to open acts of war against Germany. The Government of the United States has thereby virtually created a state of war.

The German Government, consequently, discontinues diplomatic relations with the United States of America and declares that under these circumstances brought about by President Roosevelt Germany too, as from today, considers herself as being in a state of war with the United States of America.

Accept, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the expression of my high consideration.

December 11, 1941.

RIBBENTROP.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1941,* Vol. 1, *General: The Soviet Union* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 588–589.

126. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku to Admiral Takahashi Sankichi, December 19, 1941

Introduction

A few days after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto described the operation to an eminent colleague, retired admiral Takahashi Sankichi, a previous naval commander in chief who had written him a letter of congratulations. Yamamoto was wrong on one point—that a midget submarine had sunk a battleship unaided—but nonetheless had good reason to feel satisfaction. He obviously took great pride in the successful implementation of the strategic plan for which he had argued long and hard in the face of strong opposition.

Primary Source

It was my great honor to have been given your excellency's congratulatory letter upon our early victory in the war. But I think much could not have been done unless the traditional spirit of the Imperial Navy, which my preceding Commanders-in-Chief, including your excellency, had long built up, was fully displayed to save our country's crisis. I think I owe you very much in this respect.

The plan of launching a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor at the outset of a war to give a fatal blow on the enemy fleet was decided in December of last year, when the fleet strategy was revised. Since then, everything possible had been studied or tried to make it possible. Especially in the Nagumo force, which actually undertook the attack, those concerned from Nagumo down to the men exerted themselves to make the plan possible; it was not before the fall that aerial torpedoing in shallow waters of only 10-odd meters was made possible with the great help of the technicians concerned, and it was only in last August and September that the technique of horizontal bombing had been improved so that one hit might be expected from nine attacking bombers. Until then, it had made little progress from the days when your excellency took command of a carrier division.

What made me worry more than anything, however, was the fact that the time of our going to war was called off by one month, a fact which pressed me with intensified fear that refueling in the northern route, the only possible route to take, would no longer be possible to determine the fate of the operation.

As it turned out, however, I should say we were blessed by the War God, since a wide high pressure zone, the last one appearing in that district in this year, prevailed in the district extending as long as 2,000 miles. It was the first such phenomenon since 1928, which enabled refueling at sea. (Though a detailed report on this point is not yet available, I conclude as above.)

Such good luck, together with negligence on the part of the arrogant enemy, enabled us to launch a successful surprise attack. Especially of note is the fact that the actual hit rate of aerial torpedoing and bombing was upped 50 percent compared with that of training. I can't help but conclude that such an achievement was beyond the reach of human beings, and the loyal fliers must have been inspired by the soul of the Emperor, who graciously worried about the outcome of this attempt. I am deeply impressed by this development.

Some of the above apparently should be classed as “confidential,” but I dared to write them, believing that you must be glad to hear them, as your excellency, once as C-in-C of the Combined Fleet and also as CO of a carrier division, exerted yourself to improve the skill of the Navy to the present level.

I cannot understand, from the viewpoint of common sense, not to speak of the strategic point of view, why the American Fleet made such a movement. Such a tragic fate ought to have been theirs, since they either made light of our strength and ability or lacked ability to make a correct strategic judgment.

Be that as it may, least expected was the fact that 51 medium land-bombers launched a successful attack on a fully protected enemy fleet without any help from a surface force of fighters, and sustained a minor loss of only three bombers, and even those were shot down after releasing a torpedo. I believe this fact should be taken into serious consideration in planning future war preparations.

On the other hand, I don’t think it is time to tell the full account of the midget submarines which penetrated the harbor, but at least it is certain that a radio dispatch saying “successful surprise attack” was received from one of them and also that a battleship was sunk during a time when there was no aerial attack. When thinking of the fact that those daring young men, including young officers who had graduated from the Naval Academy only less than one year before, penetrated an enemy base in spite of darkness and accomplished such a success, I think I should not say such a big word that the youngsters in these days are not a match to. … This is another point in which I was deeply impressed by this operation.

I well realize that it will be long before we reach a successful conclusion of the war and there are numerous difficulties lying ahead of us. But, as mentioned, the burning spirit and the skill of those young officers and others are worthy of appreciation and respect. Therefore, I am now thinking that we may be able to meet His Majesty’s wish when we exert ourselves to fulfill our mission. …

Source: Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993), 120–121. Reprinted with permission of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 1993 by Prange Enterprises, Inc.

127. Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, The Ventotene Manifesto: “Towards a Free and United Europe: A Draft Manifesto,” 1941

Introduction

Throughout Europe, the outbreak of war led liberals to turn to the postwar integration of Europe, a measure they now supported as the only means of avoiding future destructive conflicts. The Italian democratic socialists Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi wrote this manifesto in 1941 while interned on the island of Ventotene. It was initially circulated in mimeographed form and then published clandestinely in Rome in January 1944. This publication also included two lengthy essays by Spinelli, “The United States of Europe and the Various Political Tendencies” and “Marxist Politics and Federalist Politics.” This manifesto was regarded as one of the seminal texts that helped to bring about the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and eventually the European Union. The manifesto also anticipated the postwar European welfare states—noncommunist and democratic but nonetheless characterized by a substantial element of government direction and control for the general good.

Primary Source

I.

The Crisis of Modern Civilization

Modern civilization has taken the principle of freedom as its basis, a principle which holds that man must not be a mere instrument to be used by others but an autonomous centre of life. With this code at hand, all those aspects of society that have not respected this principle have been placed on trial, a great historical trial.

The equal right of all nations to organize themselves into independent States has been established. Every people, defined by its ethnic, geographical, linguistic and historical characteristics, was expected to find the instrument

best suited to its needs within a State organization created according to its own specific concept of political life, and with no outside intervention. The ideology of national independence was a powerful stimulus to progress. It helped overcome narrow-minded parochialism and created a much wider feeling of solidarity against foreign oppression. It eliminated many obstacles hindering the free movement of people and goods. Within the territory of each new State, it brought the institutions and systems of the more advanced societies to more backward ones. But with this ideology came the seeds of capitalist imperialism which our own generation has seen mushroom to the point where totalitarian States have grown up and world wars have been unleashed.

Thus the nation is no longer viewed as the historical product of co-existence between men who, as the result of a lengthy historical process, have acquired greater unity in their customs and aspirations and who see their State as being the most effective means of organizing collective life within the context of all human society. Rather the nation has become a divine entity, an organism which must only consider its own existence, its own development, without the least regard for the damage that others may suffer from this. The absolute sovereignty of national States has led to the desire of each of them to dominate, since each feels threatened by the strength of the others, and considers that its “living space” should include increasingly vast territories that give it the right to free movement and provide self-sustenance without needing to rely on others. This desire to dominate cannot be placated except by the hegemony of the strongest State over all the others.

As a consequence of this, from being the guardian of citizens’ freedom, the State has been turned into a master of vassals bound into servitude, and has all the powers it needs to achieve the maximum war-efficiency. Even during peacetime, considered to be pauses during which to prepare for subsequent, inevitable wars, the will of the military class now holds sway over the will of the civilian class in many countries, making it increasingly difficult to operate free political systems. Schools, science, production, administrative bodies are mainly directed towards increasing military strength. Women are considered merely as producers of soldiers and are rewarded with the same criteria as prolific cattle. From the very earliest age, children are taught to handle weapons and hate foreigners. Individual freedom is reduced to nothing since everyone is part of the military

establishment and constantly called on to serve in the armed forces. Repeated wars force men to abandon families, jobs, property, and even lay down their lives for goals, the value of which no one really understands. It takes just a few days to destroy the results of decades of common effort to increase the general well-being.

Totalitarian States are precisely those which have unified all their forces in the most coherent way, by implementing the greatest possible degree of centralization and autarky. They have thus shown themselves to be the bodies most suited to the current international environment. It only needs one nation to take one step towards more accentuated totalitarianism for the others to follow suit, dragged down the same groove by their will to survive.

The equal right of all citizens to participate in the process of determining the State's will is well-established. This process should have been the synthesis of the freely expressed and changing economic and ideological needs of all social classes. A political organization of this kind made it possible to correct or at least to minimize many of the most strident injustices inherited from previous regimes. But freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and the steady extension of suffrage, made it increasingly difficult to defend old privileges, while maintaining a representative system of government. Bit by bit the penniless learned to use these instruments to fight for the rights acquired by the privileged classes. Taxes on unearned income and inheritances, higher taxes levied on larger incomes, tax exemptions for low incomes and essential goods, free public schooling, greater social security spending, land reforms, inspection of factories and manufacturing plants were all achievements that threatened the privileged classes in their well-fortified citadels.

Even the privileged classes who agreed with equality in political rights, could not accept the fact that the underprivileged could use it to achieve a de facto equality that would have created a very real freedom with a very concrete content. When the threat became all too serious at the end of the First World War, it was only natural that these privileged classes should have warmly welcomed and supported the rise of dictatorships that removed their adversaries' legislative weapons.

Moreover, the creation of huge industrial, banking conglomerates and trades unions representing whole armies of workers gave rise to forces (unions, employers and financiers) lobbying the government to give them the

policies which most clearly favoured their particular interests. This threatened to dissolve the State into countless economic fiefdoms, each bitterly opposed to the others. Liberal and democratic systems increasingly lost their prestige by becoming the tools that these groups will always resort to in order to exploit all of society even more. In this way, the conviction grew up that only a totalitarian State, in which individual liberties were abolished, could somehow resolve the conflicts of interest that existing political institutions were unable to control. Subsequently, in fact, totalitarian regimes consolidated the position of the various social categories at the levels they had gradually achieved. By using the police to control every aspect of each citizen's life, and by violently silencing all dissenting voices, these regimes barred all legal possibility of further correction in the state of affairs. This consolidated the existence of a thoroughly parasitic class of absentee landowners and rentiers who contribute to social productivity only by cutting the coupons off their bonds. It consolidated the position of monopoly holders and the chain stores who exploit the consumers and cause small savers' money to vanish. It consolidated the plutocrats hidden behind the scenes who pull the politicians' strings and run the State machine for their own, exclusive advantage, under the guise of higher national interests. The colossal fortunes of a very few people have been preserved, as has the poverty of the masses, excluded from the enjoyment of the fruits of modern culture. In other words an economic regime has substantially been preserved in which material resources and labour, which ought to be directed to the satisfaction of fundamental needs for the development of essential human energies, are instead channelled towards the satisfaction of the most futile wishes of those capable of paying the highest prices. It is an economic regime in which, through the right of inheritance, the power of money is perpetuated in the same class, and is transformed into a privilege that in no way corresponds to the social value of the services actually rendered. The field of proletarian possibilities is so restricted that workers are often forced to accept exploitation by anyone who offers a job in order to make a living.

In order to keep the working classes immobilized and subjugated, the trade unions, once free organizations of struggle, run by individuals who enjoyed the trust of their members, have been turned into institutions for police surveillance run by employees chosen by the ruling class and responsible only to them. Where improvements are made in this economic

regime, they are always solely dictated by military needs which have merged with the reactionary aspirations of the privileged classes in giving rise to and consolidating totalitarian States.

The permanent value of the spirit of criticism has been asserted against authoritarian dogmatism. Everything that is affirmed must prove its worth or disappear. The greatest achievements of human society in every field are due to the scientific method that lies behind this unfettered approach. But this spiritual freedom has not survived the crisis created by totalitarian States. New dogmas to be accepted as articles of faith or simply hypocritically are advancing in all fields of knowledge.

Although nobody knows what a race is, and the most elementary understanding of history brings home the absurdity of the statement, physiologists are asked to believe, demonstrate and even persuade us that people belong to a chosen race, merely because imperialism needs this myth to stir the masses to hate and pride. The most self-evident concepts of economic science have to be treated as anathema so as to enable autarchic policy, trade balance and other old chestnuts of mercantilism to be presented as extraordinary discoveries of our times. Because of the economic interdependence of the entire world, the living space required by any people which wants to maintain a living standard consistent with modern civilization can only be the entire world. But the pseudo-science of geopolitics has been created in an attempt to prove the soundness of theories about living space and to provide a theoretical cloak to the imperialist desire to dominate.

Essential historical facts are falsified, in the interests of the ruling classes. Libraries and bookshops are purged of all works not considered to be orthodox. The shadows of obscurantism once more threaten to suffocate the human spirit. The social ethic of freedom and equality has itself been undermined. Men are no longer considered free citizens who can use the State to achieve collective goals. They are, instead, servants of the State, which decides what their goals must be, and the will of those who hold power becomes the will of the State. Men are no longer subjects with civil rights, but are instead arranged hierarchically and are expected to obey their superiors without argument, the hierarchy culminating in a suitably deified leader. The regime based on castes is reborn from its own ashes, as bullying as it was before.

After triumphing in a series of countries, this reactionary, totalitarian

civilization, has finally found in Nazi Germany the power considered strong enough to take the last step. After meticulous preparation, boldly and unscrupulously exploiting the rivalries, egoism and stupidity of others, dragging in its path other European vassal States, primarily Italy, and allying itself with Japan, which follows the very same goals in Asia, Nazi Germany has launched itself on the task of crushing other countries. Its victory would mean the definitive consolidation of totalitarianism in the world. All its characteristics would be exasperated to the utmost degree, and progressive forces would be condemned for many years to the role of simple negative opposition.

The traditional arrogance and intransigence of the German military classes can give us an idea of the nature of their dominance after victory in war. The victorious Germans might even concede a façade of generosity towards other European peoples, formally respecting their territories and their political institutions, and thus be able to command while at the same time satisfying the false patriotric sentiments of those who count the colour of the flag flying at the country's borders and the nationality of prominent politicians as being the major considerations and who fail to appreciate the significance of power relationships and the real content of the State's institutions. However camouflaged, the reality is always the same: a new division of humanity into Spartans and Helots. Even a compromise solution between the two warring sides would be one more step forward for totalitarianism. All those countries which managed to escape Germany's grasp would be forced to adopt the very same forms of political organization to be adequately prepared for the continuation of hostilities.

But while Hitler's Germany has managed to chop down the smaller States one by one, this has forced increasingly powerful forces to join battle. The courageous fighting spirit of Great Britain, even at that most critical moment when it was left to face the enemy alone, had the effect that the Germans came up against the brave resistence of the Russian Army, and gave America the time it needed to mobilize its endless productive resources. This struggle against German imperialism is closely linked to the Chinese people's struggles against Japanese imperialism.

Huge masses of men and wealth are already drawn up against totalitarian powers whose strength has already reached its peak and can now only

gradually consume itself. The forces that oppose them have, on the other hand, already survived the worst and their strength is increasing.

With every day that passes, the war the Allies are fighting rekindles the yearning for freedom, even in those countries which were subjected to violence and who lost their way as a result of the blow they received. It has even rekindled this yearning among the peoples in the Axis countries who realize they have been dragged down into a desperate situation, simply to satisfy their rulers' lust for power.

The slow process which led huge masses of men to be meekly shaped by the new regime, who adjusted to it and even contributed to its consolidation, has been halted and the reverse process has started. All the progressive forces can be found in this huge wave, which is slowly gathering momentum: the most enlightened groups of the working classes who have not let themselves be swayed, either by terror or by flattery, from their ambition to achieve a better standard of living, the sharpest members of the intellectual classes, offended by the degradation to which intelligence is subjected, entrepreneurs who, wanting to undertake new initiatives, want to free themselves of the trappings of bureaucracy and national autarky, that bog down all their efforts, and, finally, all those who, with an innate sense of dignity, will not bend one inch when faced with the humiliation of servitude.

Today, the salvation of our civilization is entrusted to these forces.

II.

Post-War Tasks: European Unity

Germany's defeat would not automatically lead to the reorganization of Europe in accordance with our ideal of civilization. In the brief, intense period of general crisis (when the States will lie broken, when the masses will be anxiously waiting for a new message, like molten matter, burning, and easily shaped into new moulds capable of accommodating the guidance of serious internationalist minded men), the most privileged classes in the old national systems will attempt, by underhand or violent methods, to dampen the wave of internationalist feelings and passions and will ostentatiously begin to reconstruct the old State institutions. Most probably, the British leaders, perhaps in agreement with the Americans, will try to push things in

this direction, in order to restore balance-of-power politics, in the apparent immediate interests of their empires.

All the reactionary forces can feel the house is creaking around them and are now trying to save their skins: the conservative forces, the administrators of the major institutions of the nation States, the top-ranking officers in the armed forces including, where they still exist, the monarchies, the monopoly capitalist groups whose profits are linked to the fortunes of States, the big landowners and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, whose parasitical income is only guaranteed in a stable, conservative society and, in their wake, the countless band of people who depend on them or who are simply blinded by their traditional power. If the house were to collapse, they would suddenly be deprived of all the privileges they have enjoyed up to now, and would be exposed to the assault of the progressive forces.

The Revolutionary Situation: Old and New Trends

The fall of the totalitarian regimes will, in the feelings of entire populations, mean the coming of “freedom”; all restrictions will disappear and, automatically, very wide freedom of speech and assembly will reign supreme. It will be the triumph of democratic beliefs. These tendencies have countless shades and nuances, stretching from very conservative liberalism to socialism and anarchy. These beliefs place their trust in the “spontaneous generation” of events and institutions and the absolute goodness of drives originating among the grass roots. They do not want to force the hand of “history,” or “the people,” or “the proletariat,” or whatever other name they give their God. They hope for the end of dictatorships, conceiving this as restoring the people’s unsuppressible right to self-determination. Their crowning dream is a constituent assembly, elected by the broadest suffrage, which scrupulously respects the rights of the electors, who must decide upon the constitution they want. If the population is immature, the constitution will not be a good one, but to amend it will be possible only through constant efforts of persuasion. Democrats do not refrain from violence on principle but wish to use it only when the majority is convinced it is indispensable, little more, that is, than an almost superfluous “dot” over an “i.” They are suitable leaders only in times of ordinary administration, when the overall population is convinced of the validity of the basic institutions and believe that any

amendment should be restricted to relatively secondary matters. During revolutionary times, when institutions are not simply to be administered but created, democratic procedures fail miserably. The pitiful impotence of democrats in the Russian, German, Spanish revolutions are the three most recent examples. In these situations, once the old State apparatus had fallen away, along with its laws and its administration, popular assemblies and delegations immediately spring up in which all the progressive socialist forces converge and agitate, either hiding behind the ancient regime, or scorning it. The population does have some fundamental needs to satisfy, but it does not know precisely what it wants and what must be done. A thousand bells ring in its ears. With its millions of minds, it cannot orientate itself, and breaks up into a number of tendencies, currents and factions, all struggling with one another.

At the very moment when the greatest decisiveness and boldness is needed, democrats lose their way, not having the backing of spontaneous popular approval, but rather a gloomy tumult of passions. They think it their duty to form a consensus and they represent themselves as exhortatory preachers, where instead there is a need for leaders who know just what they want. They miss chances favorable to the consolidation of a new regime by attempting to make bodies, which need longer preparation and which are more suited to periods of relative tranquillity, work immediately. They give their adversaries the weapons they need to overthrow them. In their thousand tendencies, they do not represent a will for renewal, but vain and very confused ambitions found in minds that, by becoming paralyzed, actually prepare the terrain for the growth of the reaction. Democratic political methods are a dead weight during revolutionary crises.

As the democrats wear down their initial popularity as assertors of freedom by their endless polemics, and in the absence of any serious political and social revolution, the pre-totalitarian political institutions would inevitably be reconstituted, and the struggle would again develop along the lines of the old class opposition.

The principle whereby the class struggle is the condition to which all political problems are reduced, has become the fundamental guideline of factory workers in particular, and gave consistency to their politics for as long as the fundamental institutions were not questioned. But this approach becomes an instrument which isolates the proletariat, when the need to

transform the entire social organization becomes paramount. The workers, educated in the class system, cannot see beyond the demands of their particular class or even their professional category and fail to concern themselves with how their interests link up with those of other social classes. Or they aspire to a unilateral dictatorship of the proletariat in order to achieve the utopian collectivization of all the material means of production, indicated by centuries of propaganda as the panacea for all evils. This policy attracts no class other than the workers, who thus deprive the other progressive forces of their support, or alternatively leaves them at the mercy of the reaction which skillfully organizes them so as to break up the proletarian movement. Among the various proletarian tendencies, followers of class politics and collectivist ideals, the Communists have recognized the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient following to assure victory so that, unlike the other popular parties, they have turned themselves into a rigidly disciplined movement, exploiting the Russian myth in order to organize the workers, but which does not accept orders from them and uses them in all kinds of political manoeuverings.

This attitude makes the Communists, during revolutionary crises, more efficient than the democrats. But their ability to maintain the workers as far removed from the other revolutionary forces as they can, by preaching that their “real” revolution is yet to come, turns them into a sectarian element that weakens the sum of the progressive forces at the decisive moment. Beside this, their absolute dependence upon the Russian State, which has repeatedly used them in pursuing its national policies, prevents this Party from undertaking political activity with any continuity. They always need to hide behind a Karoly, a Blum, a Negrin, only to fall headlong into ruin with the democratic puppets they used, since power is achieved and maintained, not simply through cunning but with the ability to respond fully and viably to the needs of modern society.

If tomorrow the struggle were to remain restricted within the traditional national boundaries, it would be very difficult to avoid the old contradictions. The nation States, in fact, have so deeply planned their respective economies, that the main question would soon be which group of economic interests, i.e., which class, should be in control of the plan. The progressive front would be quickly shattered in the brawl between economic classes and categories. The most probable result would be that the reactionaries would benefit more than anyone else.

A real revolutionary movement must arise from among those who have been bold enough to criticize the old political approaches and it must be able to collaborate with democratic and with Communist forces; and generally with all those who work for the break-up of totalitarianism, without, however, becoming ensnared by the political practices of any of these. The reactionary forces have capable men and officers who have been trained to command and who will fight tenaciously to preserve their supremacy. In moments of dire need, they know just how to disguise their true nature, saying they stand by freedom, peace, general well-being and the poorer classes.

Already in the past we have seen how they wormed their way into popular movements, paralyzing, deflecting and altering them into precisely the opposite of what they are. They will certainly be the most dangerous force to be faced.

The point they will seek to exploit is the restoration of the nation State. Thus they will be able to latch on to what is, by far the most widespread of popular feelings, so deeply offended by recent events and so easily manipulated to reactionary ends: to patriotic feeling. In this way they can also hope to confound their adversaries' ideas more easily, since for the popular masses, the only political experience acquired to date has been within the national context. It is, therefore, fairly easy to channel them and their more shortsighted leaders towards the reconstruction of the States destroyed in the storm.

If this end is achieved, the forces of reaction will have won. In appearance, these States might well be democratic and socialist on a large scale. It would only be a question of time before power fell into the hands of the reactionaries. National jealousies would be revived, and the State would again seek to fulfil its requirements in its armed strength. In a more or less brief space of time the most important duty would be to convert populations into armies. Generals would again command, the monopoly holders would again draw profits from autarchies, the bureaucracy would continue to swell, the priests would keep the masses docile. All the initial achievements would shrivel into nothing, faced with the need to prepare for war once more.

The question which must be resolved first, failing which progress is no more than mere appearance, is the definitive abolition of the division of Europe into national, sovereign States. The collapse of the majority of the

States on the continent under the German steam-roller has already given the people of Europe a common destiny: either they will all submit to Hitler's dominion, or, after his fall, they will all enter a revolutionary crisis and will not find themselves separated by, and entrenched in, solid State structures. Feelings today are already far more disposed than they were in the past to accept a federal reorganization of Europe. The harsh experience of recent decades has opened the eyes even of those who refused to see, and has matured many circumstances favourable to our ideal.

All reasonable men recognize that it is impossible to maintain a balance of power among European States with militarist Germany enjoying equal conditions with other countries, nor can Germany be broken up into pieces or held on a chain once it is conquered. We have seen a demonstration that no country within Europe can stay on the sidelines while the others battle: declarations of neutrality and non-aggression pacts come to nought. The uselessness, even harmfulness, of organizations like the League of Nations has been demonstrated: they claimed to guarantee international law without a military force capable of imposing its decisions and respecting the absolute sovereignty of the member States. The principle of nonintervention turned out to be absurd: every population was supposed to be left free to choose the despotic government it thought best, in other words virtually assuming that the constitution of each individual State was not a question of vital interest for all the other European nations. The multiple problems which poison international life on the continent have proved to be insoluble: tracing boundaries through areas inhabited by mixed populations, defence of alien minorities, seaports for landlocked countries, the Balkan Question, the Irish problem, and so on. All matters which would find easy solutions in the European Federation, just as corresponding problems, suffered by the small States which became part of a vaster national unity, lost their harshness as they were turned into problems of relationships between various provinces.

Moreover, the end of the sense of security inspired and created by an unassailable Great Britain, which led Britain to ["splendid isolation,"] the dissolution of the French army and the disintegration of the French Republic itself at the first serious collision with the German forces (which, it is to be hoped, will have lessened the chauvinistic attitude of absolute Gallic superiority), and in particular the awareness of the risk of total enslavement are all circumstances that will favour the constitution of a federal regime,

which will bring an end to the current anarchy. Furthermore, it is easier to find a basis of agreement for a European arrangement of colonial possessions since England has accepted the principle of India's independence and since France has potentially lost its entire empire in recognizing its defeat.

To all of this must be added the disappearance of some of the most important dynasties, and the fragility of the basis which sustains the ones that survive. It must be taken into account that these dynasties, by considering the various countries as their own traditional appanages, together with the powerful interests backing them, represented a serious obstacle to the rational organization of the United States of Europe, which can only be based on the republican constitution of federated countries. And, once the horizon of the old continent is superseded, and all the peoples who make up humanity are included in a single design, it will have to be recognized that the European Federation is the only conceivable guarantee ensuring that relationships with American and Asiatic peoples will work on the basis of peaceful co-operation, waiting for a more distant future when the political unity of the entire world will become possible.

Therefore, the dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties no longer coincides with the formal lines of more or less democracy, or the pursuit of more or less socialism, but the division falls along a very new and substantial line: those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of struggle as being the ancient one, the conquest of national political power, and who, although involuntarily, play into the hands of reactionary forces, letting the incandescent lava of popular passions set in the old moulds, and thus allowing old absurdities to arise once again, and those who see the main purpose as the creation of a solid international State, who will direct popular forces towards this goal, and who, even if they were to win national power, would use it first and foremost as an instrument for achieving international unity.

With propaganda and action, seeking to establish in every possible way the agreements and links among the individual movements which are certainly in the process of being formed in the various countries, the foundation must be built now for a movement that knows how to mobilize all forces for the birth of the new organism which will be the grandest creation, and the newest, that has occurred in Europe for centuries; in order to constitute a steady federal State, that will have at its disposal a European

armed service instead of national armies; that will break decisively economic autarkies, the backbone of totalitarian regimes; that will have sufficient means to see that its deliberations for the maintenance of common order are executed in the individual federal States, while each State will retain the autonomy it needs for a plastic articulation and development of political life according to the particular characteristics of the various peoples.

If a sufficient number of men in the main European countries understand this, then victory will soon fall into their hands, since both circumstances and opinion will be favourable to their efforts. They will have before them parties and factions that have already been disqualified by the disastrous experience of the last twenty years. Since it will be the moment for new action, it will also be the moment for new men: the MOVEMENT FOR A FREE AND UNITED EUROPE.

III.

Postwar Duties: Reform of Society

A free and united Europe is the necessary premise to the strengthening of modern civilization as regards which the totalitarian era is only a temporary setback. As soon as this era ends the historical process of struggle against social inequalities and privileges will be restored in full. All the old conservative institutions that have hindered this process will either have collapsed or will be teetering on the verge of collapse. The crisis in these institutions must be boldly and decisively exploited.

In order to respond to our needs, the European revolution must be socialist, i.e., its goal must be the emancipation of the working classes and the creation of more humane conditions for them. The guiding light in determining what steps need to be taken, however, cannot simply be the utterly doctrinaire principle whereby private ownership of the material means of production must in principle be abolished and only temporarily tolerated when dispensing with it entirely. Wholesale nationalization of the economy under State control was the first, utopian form taken by the working classes' concept of their freedom from the yoke of capitalism. But when this State control is achieved, it does not produce the desired results but leads to a

regime where the entire population is subservient to a restricted class of bureaucrats who run the economy.

The truly fundamental principle of socialism, vis-à-vis which general collectivization was no more than a hurried and erroneous inference, is the principle which states that, far from dominating man, economic forces, like the forces of nature, should be subject to man, guided and controlled by him in the most rational way, so that the broadest strata of the population will not become their victims. The huge forces of progress that spring from individual interests, must not be extinguished by the grey dullness of routine. Otherwise, the same insoluble problem will arise: how to stimulate the spirit of initiative using salary differentials and other provisions of the same kind. The forces of progress must be extolled and extended, by giving them increasing opportunities for development and employment. At the same time, the tracks guiding these forces towards objectives of greatest benefit for all society must be strengthened and perfected.

Private property must be abolished, limited, corrected, or extended according to the circumstances and not according to any dogmatic principle. This guiding principle is a natural feature in the process of forming a European economic life freed from the nightmares of militarism or national bureaucratism. Rational solutions must replace irrational ones, even in the working class consciousness. With a view to indicating the content of this principle in greater detail, we emphasize the following points while stressing the need to assess the appropriateness of every point in the programme and means of achieving them in relationship to the indispensable premise of European unity:

a) Enterprises with a necessarily monopolistic activity, and in a position to exploit consumers, cannot be left in the hands of private ownership: for example, electricity companies or industries of vital interest to the community which require protective duties, subsidies, preferential orders, etc., if they are to survive (the most visible example of this kind of industry so far in Italy is the steel industry); and enterprises which, owing to the amount of capital invested, the number of workers employed, and the significance of the sector involved can blackmail various State bodies, forcing them to adopt the policies most beneficial to themselves (for example, the mining industries, large banks, large weapons

manufacturers). In this field, nationalization must certainly be introduced on a vast scale, without regard for acquired rights.

b) Private property and inheritance legislation in the past was so drawn up as to permit the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, privileged members of society. In a revolutionary crisis this wealth must be distributed in an egalitarian way thereby eliminating the parasitic classes and giving the workers the means of production they need to improve their economic standing and achieve greater independence. We are thus proposing an agrarian reform which will increase the number of owners enormously by giving land to those who actually farm it and an industrial reform which will extend workers' ownership in non-nationalized sectors, through co-operative adventures, employee profit-sharing, and so on.

c) The young need to be assisted with all the measures needed to reduce the gap between the starting positions in the struggle to survive to a minimum. In particular, State schools ought to provide a real chance for those who deserve it to continue their studies to the highest level, instead of restricting these opportunities to wealthy students. In each branch of study leading to training in different crafts and the various liberal and scientific professions, State schools should train the number of students which corresponds to the market requirements, so that average salaries will be roughly equal for all the professional categories, regardless of the differing rates of remuneration within each category according to individual skills.

d) The almost unlimited potential of modern technology to mass produce essential goods guarantees, with relatively low social costs, that everyone can have food, lodging, clothing and the minimum of comfort needed to preserve a sense of human dignity. Human solidarity towards those who fall in the economic struggle ought not, therefore, to be manifested with humiliating forms of charity that produce the very same evils they seek to remedy but ought to consist in a series of measures which unconditionally, and regardless of whether a person is able to work or not, guarantee a decent standard of living for all without lessening the stimulus to work and save. In this way, no-one will be forced any longer to accept enslaving work contracts because of their poverty.

e) Working class freedom can only be achieved when the conditions described have been fulfilled. The working classes must not be left to the

mercy of the economic policies of monopolistic trade unions who simply apply the overpowering methods characteristic, above all, of great capital to the shop floor. The workers must once again be free to choose their own trusted representatives when collectively establishing the conditions under which they will agree to work, and the State must give them the legal means to guarantee the proper implementation of the terms agreed to. But all monopolistic tendencies can be fought effectively once these social changes have been fulfilled.

These are the changes needed both to create very broad-based support around the new institutional system from a large number of citizens willing to defend its survival and to stamp freedom and a strong sense of social solidarity onto political life in a very marked way. Political freedom with these foundations will not just have a formal meaning but a real meaning for all since citizens will be independent, and will be sufficiently informed as to be able to exert continuous and effective control over the ruling class.

It would be superfluous to dwell at length on constitutional institutions, not knowing at this stage, or being able to foresee, the circumstances under which they will be drawn up and will have to operate. We can do no more than repeat what everyone knows regarding the need for representative bodies, the process of developing legislation, the independence of the courts (which will replace the present system) safeguarding impartial application of legislation and the freedom of the press and right of assembly guaranteeing informed public opinion and the possibility for all citizens to participate effectively in the State's life. Only two issues require further and deeper definition because of their particular significance for our country at this moment: the relationship between Church and State and the nature of political representation.

a) The Treaty which concluded the Vatican's alliance with Fascism in Italy must be abolished so that the purely lay character of the State can be asserted and so that the supremacy of the State in civil matters can be unequivocally established. All religious faiths are to be equally respected, but the State must no longer have earmark funds for religion.
b) The house of cards that Fascism built with its corporativism will collapse together with the other aspects of the totalitarian State. There are those

who believe that material for the new constitutional order can be salvaged from this wreck. We disagree. In totalitarian States, the corporative chambers are the crowning hoax of police control over the workers. Even if the corporative chambers were a sincere expression of the will of the various categories of producers, the representative bodies of the various professional categories could never be qualified to handle questions of general policy. In more specifically economic matters, they would become bodies for the accumulation of power and privilege among the categories with the strongest trade union representation. The unions will have broad collaborative functions with State bodies which are appointed to resolve problems directly involving these unions, but they should have absolutely no legislative power, since this would create a kind of feudal anarchy in the economic life of the country, leading to renewed political despotism. Many of those who were ingenuously attracted by the myth of corporativism, can and should be attracted by the job of renewing structures. But they must realize the absurdity of the solution they vaguely desire. Corporativism can only be concretely expressed in the form it was given by totalitarian States regimenting the workers beneath officials who monitored everything they did in the interests of the ruling class. The revolutionary party cannot be amateurishly improvised at the decisive moment, but must begin to be formed at least as regards its central political attitude, its upper echelons, the basic directives for action. It must not be a heterogeneous mass of tendencies, united merely negatively and temporarily, i.e., united by their anti-Fascist past and the mere expectation of the fall of the totalitarian regime, in which all and sundry are ready to go their own separate ways once this goal has been reached. The revolutionary party, on the contrary, knows that only at this stage will its real work begin. It must therefore be made up of men who agree on the main issues for the future.

Its methodical propaganda must penetrate everywhere there are people oppressed by the present regime. Taking as its starting point the problem which is the source of greatest suffering to individuals and classes, it must show how this problem is linked to other problems, and what the real solution will be. But from this gradually increasing circle of sympathizers, it must pick out and recruit into the organization only those who have identified and

accepted the European revolution as the main goal in their lives, who carry out the necessary work with strict discipline day in day out, carefully checking up on its continuous and effective safety, even in the most dangerously illegal situations. These recruits will be the solid network that will give consistency to the more ephemeral sphere of the sympathizers.

While overlooking no occasion or sector in which to spread its cause, it must be active first and foremost in those environments which are most significant as centres for the circulation of ideas and recruiting of combative men. It must be particularly active vis-à-vis the working class and intellectuals, the two social groups most sensitive, in the present situation, and most decisive for tomorrow's world. The first group is the one which least gave in to the totalitarian rod and which will be the quickest to reorganize its ranks. The intellectuals, particularly the younger intellectuals, are the group which feels most spiritually suffocated and disgusted with the current despotism. Bit by bit other social groups will gradually be drawn into the general movement.

Any movement which fails in its duty to ally these forces, is condemned to sterility. Because if the movement is made up of intellectuals alone, it will lack the strength to crush reactionary resistance, and it will distrust and be distrusted by the working class and even though inspired by democratic sentiment, when faced with difficulties it will be liable to shift its position, as regards the mobilisation of other classes, against the workers, and thus restore Fascism. If, instead, the movement is backed only by the proletariat, it will be deprived of the clarity of thought which only intellectuals can give and which is so vital in identifying new paths and new duties: the movement would be a prisoner of the old class structure, looking on everyone as a potential enemy, and will slither towards the doctrinaire Communist solution.

During the revolutionary crisis, this movement will have the task of organizing and guiding progressive forces, using all the popular bodies which form spontaneously, incandescent melting pots in which the revolutionary masses are mixed, not for the creation of plebiscites, but rather waiting to be guided. It derives its vision and certainty of what must be done from the knowledge that it represents the deepest needs of modern society and not from any previous recognition by popular will, as yet inexistent. In this way it issues the basic guidelines of the new order, the first social discipline directed to the unformed masses. By this dictatorship of the revolutionary party a new

State will be formed, and around this State new, genuine democracy will grow.

There are no grounds for fearing that such a revolutionary regime will develop into renewed despotism. This arises only when the tendency has been to shape a servile society. But if the revolutionary party continues resolutely from the very outset to create the conditions required for individual freedom whereby every citizen can really participate in the State's life, which will evolve, despite secondary political crises, towards increasing understanding and acceptance of the new order by all—hence towards an increasing possibility of working effectively and creating free political institutions. The time has now come to get rid of these old cumbersome burdens and to be ready for whatever turns up, usually so different from what was expected, to get rid of the inept among the old and create new energies among the young. Today, in an effort to begin shaping the outlines of the future, those who have understood the reasons for the current crisis in European civilization, and who have therefore inherited the ideals of movements dedicated to raising the dignity of humanity, which were shipwrecked either on their inability to understand the goal to be pursued or on the means by which to achieve it, have begun to meet and seek each other.

The road to pursue is neither easy nor certain. But it must be followed and it will be!

Source: Excerpted from *Ventotene, Federalism and Politics: The Ventotene Papers of the Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies* (Ventotene, Italy: 1995), Web site: JEF (Young European Federalists), http://www.communicate-europe.co.uk/index.php?id=1623. Reprinted with permission.

1942 DOCUMENTS

128. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, on the Mobilization of U.S. Manpower in World War II: Extract from his Final Biennial

Report (September 1, 1945) to the Secretary of War

Introduction

At the end of the war, George C. Marshall, who served as chief of staff of the U.S. Army throughout the war, summarized the Herculean efforts that the United States had undertaken between late 1941 and 1945, to mobilize the greatest army in its history to fight the war.

Primary Source

The process of mobilization for this war reached its peak and immediately started to decline with the surrender of Germany. In the summer of 1943 the firm decision was reached to build up the Army to an effective strength of 7,700,000 enlisted men believed necessary to meet our strategic commitments.

At the close of the European war the operating strength of the Army plus ineffectives was approximately 8,300,000. The ineffectives consisted of 500,000 men undergoing hospitalization, including 100,000 in the process of being discharged because they were no longer fit for either active or limited service, and 100,000 en route overseas as replacements, in all totaling approximately 600,000 men. …

The technique for the mobilization of American manpower in this war was unique. The special nature of the war introduced many new factors. Perhaps greater than any other single advantage of the United Nations was the productive capacity of American industry. It was therefore necessary not to cut too deeply into the manpower of the Nation in the process of acquiring the men urgently needed by the Army and the Navy. We had the problems of arming both ourselves and the Allied Nations while, at the same time, we created huge armed forces necessary to the successful prosecution of the war. Furthermore, our lines of communication were to be extended entirely around the world, requiring large forces of men to work them and absorbing even larger forces in transit over the thousands of miles to and fro without profit to the military enterprise.

Fighting across the oceans, we needed a very powerful Navy and a large merchant fleet to transport and maintain our armies and to carry munitions to our Allies. At the same time, it was our purpose to exploit every possible scientific device and technique to secure victory at the smallest cost in lives of our men. These various efforts demanded large numbers of men and women, and necessitated their allocation among the various programs with exceeding care, so that the right numbers of men would be doing the most important things at the most important time. The mere statement of this requirement fails to indicate the exceeding difficulty involved in its application to the special claims of each industry and the demands of each theater commander. To resolve the conflicting requirements posed a most difficult problem for a democracy at war.

It was estimated that the absolute ceiling on the number of American men physically fit for active war service lay between 15 and 16 million. The requirements of the naval and merchant shipping program had to be given a high order of priority. The Army decided to establish its strength ceiling at 7,700,000. Before we could bring the enemy to battle we had to secure our lines of communication and build our training and service installations. Within this total strength of the Army the minimum requirements of the Service Forces were set at 1,751,000. It was decided at the outset that the first offensive blows we could deliver upon the enemy would be through the air, and anticipated that the heavier and more effective our air assault, the sooner the enemy’s capacity to resist would be destroyed. So the Air Forces were authorized to bring their strength to 2,340,000 men and were given the highest priority for the best qualified both physically and by educational and technical ability of the military manpower pool.

Each theater of operations had requirements for men over and above those allocated for its armies, air forces, and service installations. The troop basis allowed 423,000 men for these troops which would be directly attached to theater headquarters and major command installations throughout the world.

This left the Ground Forces with a maximum of 3,186,000 men within the limitations of the 7,700,000 effective troops strength. Yet when we entered the war it was almost impossible to compute accurately how many ground combat troops we would need to win. The precise results to be attained by modern aerial warfare could only be an educated guess.

…[I]n early 1942 we established a troop basis of 3,600,000 men which would permit the organization of 71 divisions: 59 infantry (including 18 National Guard), 10 armored, and two cavalry. This force was the largest we then had the ability to train, equip, and provide a nucleus of trained officers and noncommissioned officers. In mid-1942, when the original build-up in the United Kingdom for the invasion of France and the North African operation began to take shape, we found we needed more and still more service troops. The demand was insatiable. The over-all strength of the Army by the end of the year had increased to 5,397,675 men. Throughout 1942, however, the planners were at work estimating the requirements for 1943 which we believed would carry the Army to its peak of mobilization and would give us the necessary strength to force a victorious decision. At first it was estimated this would provide the Army with 105 divisions. Later it became evident that the men for only 100 divisions could be found with this strength. By the middle of 1943 we determined that this projected mobilization might impose too great a strain on the Nation's manpower, if all of the ambitious efforts planned for the global war were to remain in balance. Fortunately for our dilemma, Stalingrad was now past history and the great Soviet armies were showing a steadily increasing offensive power. The ceiling was therefore reduced to 7,700,000 shortly after the TRIDENT Conference in Washington, the meeting at which the over-all strategy became sufficiently firm to permit more precise planning. This amounted to a reduction of 548,000 men. The projected number of divisions was reduced to 90, including three special or "light" divisions that were being trained for jungle and mountain warfare. Later the 2d Cavalry Division, then in North Africa, was activated to provide urgently required service troops to support the amphibious landing in southern France. At the same time the Air Force mobilization was fixed at 273 combat groups containing five very heavy bombardment (B-29s and 32s), 96 heavy bombardment (Flying Fortresses and Liberators), 26 medium bombardment, 8 light bombardment, 87 fighter, 27 troop carrier, and 24 reconnaissance groups.

On the face of it this appeared to be a critically small ground force for a nation as large as ours. Germany with a prewar population of 80,000,000 was mobilizing 313 divisions. Japan was putting 120 in the field; Italy 70; Hungary 23; Rumania 17; Bulgaria 18. Among the major Allies, the Soviets had a program for more than 550 divisions; the British for more than 50; the

Chinese more than 300, though their divisional strength was often little more than regimental according to our method of computation. We were, however, second of the Allies in the mobilization of men and women for military service, third among all the belligerent nations. The Soviet war effort was putting 22,000,000 men and women into the fight. By the time of their defeat, the Germans had mobilized 17,000,000. Our peak mobilization for the military services was 14,000,000. The British Empire mobilized 12,000,000; China 6,000,000.

This war brought an estimated total of 93,000,000 men and women of the Axis and United Nations into the conflict. And fortunately for us the great weight of numbers was on the side of the United Nations. Total Allied mobilization exceeded 62,000,000; total enemy mobilization, 30,000,000. The figures show how heavily the United States was concentrating on aerial warfare, on the production and movement of arms for its own troops and those of its Allies, and the meaning in terms of manpower of waging war from 3,000 to 9,000 miles from our shores.

Our ground strength was, for the size of our population, proportionately much smaller than that of the other belligerents. On the other hand it was, in effect, greater than a simple comparison of figures would indicate, for we had set up a system of training individual replacements that would maintain 89 divisions of ground troops and 273 combat air groups at full effective strength, enabling these units to continue in combat for protracted periods. In past wars it had been the accepted practice to organize as many divisions as manpower resources would permit, fight those divisions until casualties had reduced them to bare skeletons, then withdraw them from the line and rebuild them in a rear area. In 1918 the AEF was forced to reduce the strength of divisions and finally to disband newly arrived divisions in France in order to maintain the already limited strength of those engaged in battle. The system we adopted for this war involved a flow of individual replacements from training centers to the divisions so they would be constantly at full strength. The Air Forces established a similar flow to replace combat casualties and possible relief crews.

This system enabled us to pursue tremendous naval and shipping programs, the air bombardment programs and unprecedented, almost unbelievable, production and supply programs, and at the same time to gather the strength necessary to deliver the knock-out blows on the ground. There

were other advantages. The more divisions an Army commander has under his control, the more supporting troops he must maintain and the greater are his traffic and supply problems. If his divisions are fewer in number but maintained at full strength, the power for attack continues while the logistical problems are greatly simplified. …

The final manpower crisis occurred during the prolonged and very heavy fighting in the fall of 1944 and the winter of 1944–45, both in Europe and in the Philippines. However, our own tribulations of this nature were much less serious, it is believed, than those of our Allies and certainly of the German enemy, whose divisions at times were reduced below 5,000.

In the Siegfried Line fighting prior to the final advance to the Rhine, the weather was atrocious and most of the troops had been continuously engaged since the landing in Normandy in June. The lack of port facilities prior to the opening of Antwerp to Allied shipping made it impossible to maintain divisions in normal corps reserve and thus permit the rotation of units between the fighting line and comfortable billets in rear areas. Divisions for this purpose were available in England and in northwestern France, but the state of the railroads and the flow of supplies made it impossible to maintain them at the front. All this resulted in a great strain on the fighting troops, and when a shortage in replacements was added, the situation grew very serious. It was just at this moment that the Germans launched their final offensive effort in the Ardennes. …

To implement the replacement system we had established the Ground and Service Force Replacement Training Centers. It required more than a year to train the many elements of a new division because of the difficulties of teaching men and units the teamwork so essential under the trying conditions of battle. But it was possible and practicable in a much shorter time to train an individual soldier so that he was competent to join a veteran team as a replacement where the battle experienced soldier can quickly fit him into the divisional structure. At the replacement training centers men were made ready to join the divisions and replace casualties in a concentrated training period of 17 weeks. At these training centers they were given six weeks of basic military training and intense physical conditioning. In the remaining period they acquired competence in handling the weapons with which they would fight or the equipment with which they would work and in learning the

tactics of squads, platoons, companies, and battalions, the tactical units which actually engaged in combat.

An infantryman, for example, became proficient in his primary weapons and familiarized with the M1 rifle, the carbine, the hand grenade, the rifle grenade, the automatic rifle, the .30 caliber medium machine gun, the 60-mm mortar, and the two-man rocket launcher. These were the weapons that every infantry rifleman might be called upon to use. Not only were men taught to handle their weapons with proficiency in the replacement training centers, but they were taught to take care of themselves personally. There was intensive instruction in personal sanitation, malaria control, processing of contaminated water, cooking, and keeping dry in the open and all the other lore that a good soldier must understand. But most important, our replacements were taught the tricks of survival in battle. As the Army acquired battle veterans, both officers and enlisted men were returned to the United States for duty as instructors in the replacement training centers. These veterans, who learned how to survive in combat, passed on knowledge to new men and thereby increased both their effectiveness and their chances of survival in their first experience of combat. The training of replacements was made as realistic as possible to manage in training. Problems of street fighting, jungle fighting, and close combat were staged in realistic fashion with live ammunition, and men learned to crawl under supporting live artillery barrages just as they must in battle. Although this training cost us a few casualties in this country, it is certain that for every casualty we took in this manner, we saved the lives of many men in battle.

After the completion of their replacement training, men received a furlough at home before reporting to oversea replacement depots where their long journey to the fighting fronts began. In the theaters of operations they again staged through the replacement depots which were established in the rear of each army group, army, and corps. When division commanders needed new men to replace casualties, they called on corps replacement depots and the men moved forward to the line.

Where it was possible, the replacements were absorbed in the division in its inactive periods, or in regiments in reserve positions, and each new man was teamed up with a veteran so that he could learn to know his squadmates before he saw action. But when the battle was moving at a fast pace, replacements at times had to join units engaged with the enemy.

By the spring of 1944, as most of the shortcomings of the replacement system had become evident, the War Department took vigorous corrective action. A directive was sent to every theater requiring the establishment of retraining centers so that every man in the Army would be put to his most efficient use.

Since the early critical days of the mobilization, the Service Forces, the Ground Force training commands, and particularly the Air Forces had acquired great numbers of the best qualified of our men. The shortage of physically qualified men for infantry and artillery became apparent about midway in the activation of the new divisions. Later we started approaching the bottom of the manpower barrel, and it grew increasingly difficult to get men physically fit for combat out of the remaining civilian manpower pools. The only way in which the battle line could be kept firm was with suitable men already in the Army. To do this we speeded up the training program and stripped the divisions training in this country of nearly 90,000 infantrymen. At this same time the overseas divisions were returning increasing numbers of sick, wounded, and injured men to the hospitals as the intensity of the fighting developed and sickness took its toll. It was our purpose to fill up the service units with these hospitalized men who still could serve their country but no longer could endure the extreme hardships of the fox holes, and to send forward fresh men to take their place, after a necessary period of retraining.

In the United States we resolved to move out all physically fit men from the service and training commands and replace them with men who had been wounded or weakened by disease and the hardships of the front, with men who had been overseas so long that they were entitled to return home under the rotation policy, and where possible with civilians. …

To keep the overall effective strength of the Army within the troop basis of 7,700,000, the call on Selective Service had been reduced from 160,000 a month in early 1944 to 60,000 in the fall. But when the replacement crisis reached its peak in the winter, there was no remaining alternative but again to call on Selective Service for more men. The call was increased to 80,000 in February of this year and 100,000 a month thereafter to the end of June. …

It is remarkable how exactly the mobilization plan fitted the requirements for victory. When Admiral Doenitz surrendered the German Government, every American division was in the operational theaters. All but two had seen

action; one had the mission of securing the vital installations in the Hawaiian Islands; the other was an airborne division in SHAEF Reserve. To give General Eisenhower the impetus for final destruction of the German armies of the west, two divisions, already earmarked for future operations in the Pacific, the 86th and 97th, were halted on the West Coast in February, rushed across the United States and onto fast ships for Europe. When these troops left the New York Port of Embarkation there were no combat divisions remaining in the United States. The formed military forces of the nation were completely committed overseas to bring about our victory in Europe and keep sufficient pressure on Japan so that she could not dig in and stave off final defeat.

The significance of these facts should be carefully considered. Even with two-thirds of the German Army engaged by Russia, it took every man the Nation saw fit to mobilize to do our part of the job in Europe and at the same time keep the Japanese enemy under control in the Pacific. What would have been the result had the Red Army been defeated and the British Islands invaded, we can only guess. The possibility is rather terrifying.

Source: George C. Marshall, U.S. Army, *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 195–200.

129. Conditions in the Warsaw Ghetto: The Diary of Stanislav Rozycki, 1941 or 1942

Introduction

As a prelude to embarking on the outright extermination of Jews in Germany and occupied Europe, in 1940 German authorities established ghettos, segregated areas for Jews alone, in most East European cities and towns. Jews from areas farther west were deported to these. The official food allocation for ghetto Jews was 300 calories a day; housing was overcrowded and often unheated in winter, and sanitation was basic. One Polish observer, Stanislav Rozycki, described in his diary conditions in the Warsaw ghetto,

ultimately destroyed by German troops in 1943 after fierce fighting from the inhabitants despite their debilitated condition.

Primary Source

…The majority are nightmare figures, ghosts of former human beings, miserable destitutes, pathetic remains of former humanity. One is most affected by the characteristic changes which one sees in their faces: as a result of misery, poor nourishment, the lack of vitamins, fresh air and exercise, the numerous cares, worries, anticipated misfortunes, suffering and sickness, their faces have taken on a skeletal appearance. The prominent bones around their eye sockets, the yellow facial colour, the slack pendulous skin, the alarming emaciation and sickliness. And, in addition, this miserable, frightened, restless, apathetic and resigned expression like that of a hunted animal. I pass my closest friends without recognizing them and guessing their fate. Many of them recognize me, come up to me and ask curiously how things are "over there" behind the walls—there where there is enough bread, fresh air, freedom to move around, and above all freedom. …

On the streets children are crying in vain, children who are dying of hunger. They howl, beg, sing, moan, shiver with cold, without underwear, without clothing, without shoes, in rags, sacks, flannel which are bound in strips round the emaciated skeletons, children swollen with hunger, disfigured, half conscious, already completely grown-up at the age of five, gloomy and weary of life. They are like old people and are only conscious of one thing: "I'm cold," "I'm hungry." They have become aware of the most important things in life that quickly. Through their innocent sacrifice and their frightening helplessness the thousands upon thousands of these little beggars level the main accusation against the proud civilization of today. Ten per cent of the new generation have already perished: every day and every night hundreds of these children die and there is no hope that anybody will put a stop to it.

There are not only children. Young and old people, men and women, bourgeois and proletarians, intelligentsia and business people are all being declassed and degraded. … They are being gobbled up by the streets on to which they are brutally and ruthlessly thrown. They beg for one month, for two months, for three months—but they all go downhill and die on the street

or in hospitals from cold, or hunger, or sickness, or depression. Former human beings whom no one needs fall by the wayside: former citizens, former “useful members of human society.”

I no longer look at people; when I hear groaning and sobbing I go over to the other side of the road; when I see something wrapped in rags shivering with cold, stretched out on the ground, I turn away and do not want to look. … I can’t. It’s become too much for me. And yet only an hour has passed. …

For various reasons standards of hygiene are terribly poor. Above all, the fearful population density in the streets with which nowhere in Europe can be remotely compared. The fatal over-population is particularly apparent in the streets: people literally rub against each other, it is impossible to pass unhindered through the streets. And then the lack of light, gas, and heating materials. Water consumption is also much reduced; people wash themselves much less and do not have baths or hot water. There are no green spaces, gardens, parks; no clumps of trees and no lawns to be seen. For a year no one has seen a village, a wood, a field, a river or a mountain: no one has breathed slightly better air for even a few days this year. Bedding and clothing are changed very rarely because of the lack of soap. To speak of food hygiene would be a provocation and would be regarded as mockery. People eat what is available and when it is available. Other principles of nutrition are unknown here. Having said all this, one can easily draw one’s own conclusions as to the consequences: stomach typhus and typhus, dysentery, tuberculosis, pneumonia, influenza, metabolic disturbances, the most common digestive illnesses, lack of vitamins and all other illnesses associated with the lack of bread, fresh air, clothing, and heating materials. Typhus is systematically and continually destroying the population. There are victims in every family. On average up to a thousand people are dying each month. In the early morning the corpses of beggars, children, old people, young people and women are lying in every street—the victims of the hunger and the cold. The hospitals are so terribly overcrowded that there are 2–3 patients lying in every bed. Those who do not find a place in a bed lie on the floor in rooms and corridors. The shortage of the necessary medicines in sufficient quantities makes it impossible to treat the sick. Moreover, there is a shortage of food for the sick. There is only soup and tea. …

While this cruel struggle for a little bit of bread, for a few metres of living space, for the maintenance of health, energy and life is going on, people are

incapable of devoting much energy and strength to intellectual matters. In any case, there are German restrictions and bans. Nothing can be printed, taught or learnt. People are not allowed to organize themselves or exchange cultural possessions. We are cut off from the world and from books. We are not allowed to print anything, neither books nor newspapers; schools, academic institutions etc. are not permitted to open. There are no cinemas, radio, no contacts with world culture. Nothing reaches us, no products of the human spirit reach us. We have to smuggle in not only foodstuffs and manufactured goods, but also cultural products. For that reason everything which we achieve in this respect is worthy of recognition irrespective of how much there is or what it consists of. …

Source: J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., *Nazism 1919–1945,* Vol. 3, *Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1988), 460–462. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

130. Japanese Biological Warfare, 1941: Testimony of Anonymous Japanese Hygiene Specialist

Introduction

Japanese medical men habitually conducted medical and biological experiments on prisoners (*maruta*, meaning “logs”) of every nationality. Unit 731 Liaison Office, an army medical unit, was entrusted with such enterprises. Here, an elderly former hygiene specialist who in 1994 still preferred to remain anonymous recounted his experiences.

Primary Source

Five people were selected from each prefecture to become hygiene specialists, and I was one of Iwate’s five. In January 1941, we arrived in Dalian. We spent three months training in a unit there, and in March I was transferred to Pingfang and entered Unit 7231. I was eighteen years old.

At the former unit we were always hit around by the senior soldiers, and it was rough. But at Unit 731, there was harmony. There were only medical officers and civilian doctors. There was no seniority among soldiers, no noncommissioned officers. The facilities and the food were good, and we didn't get hit.

From April to July we had general education. There were about two hundred of us in the same residence hall. Later, we worked at dissecting dogs. After I opened up a dog, the instructor explained the organs.

Part of our work was growing bacteria in glass dishes. They warned us not to touch the bacteria with our hands. We were told, "Don't remove the cover until you get the order to do so." We were ordered to apply the bacteria culture medium to the glass dish as a preparation stage and leave it overnight. In twenty-four hours, the bacteria would generate. The medium was sweet, like jelly, and we would eat it. The officer would scream at us, "If you eat that, you'll die." …

Sometimes I drove truckloads of Chinese for tests. Around May 1941—we were still wearing winter uniforms—we were told to load some Chinese prisoners into a truck. There was just a rush mat on the floor of the truck. We had guns, but I don't think they were loaded. The newest members of our group had less than half a year of service.

The officers told us where to take the Chinese. We pulled the canopy over the back of the truck and started out. There were between twenty and thirty of them. We drove for about three or four hours and we were told to stop and unload the Chinese. We were in an open plain; there was nothing around. The interpreter told the Chinese "Go!" and they were happy to be running around. They were all men, all built better than we were, some in good clothing with shoes, others in sandals. Some were coal carriers, still black with coal dust the way they had been when they were picked up. Others were dirty with the soil of whatever work they had been doing.

The truck went back empty. A couple of civilian employees and four or five soldiers stayed. A few days later, I carried another load of about the same

number of people out there to the same place. The ones we had brought before were still there, lying huddled together on the ground in groups of five or six, blue with cold, begging, “Help … help.” So we carried them by hand back to the truck. When we got back to the unit, we were ordered back to the barracks. That was the only time I ever carried anyone in such bad shape, but I made three or four trips out to the plain carrying prisoners. They were strong and healthy when we hauled them out there, but later they were shaking, screaming: “My stomach hurts!”; “I’m finished!”; “I’m dying!”

The third time I brought a load of Chinese out to the plain, there were two or three trucks that were returning empty stopped by the side of the road. I pulled my truck over, and there was an old man sitting there on a mat rush holding a skylark. I started up the truck again and heard some gunshots. I stopped and looked back, and the old man was lying dead. Later, I asked a researcher about it. He told me, “Don’t ever say a word about that. He was a spy.”

There was an airfield near the unit headquarters. There were lots of planes, and when they took off in the morning it was noisy. Planes from other units used to land there often. I was once told that a plane that had just left had gone for a plague germ attack on the Chinese army. But a civilian researcher told us, “The bacteria that you fellows cultivated were spread in Nanjing, or somewhere in China.” Once, someone said that the bacteria that we made had been cultivated well, and four or five Chinese had died. We cheered ourselves. “We’re medal earners,” we said. We were really proud.

There was a big smokestack in the unit. On some days it poured smoke, sometimes there was none. It was far from our barracks. Once, we asked what was burning. The answer was “prisoners.”

Source: Hal Gold, *Unit 731: Testimony* (Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1996), 178–181.

131. The Final Solution: The Wannsee Protocol, January 20, 1942

Introduction

In January 1942 top German officials met at Wannsee to discuss the best means for exterminating Jews throughout Europe. They listed those Jews then resident not only in Germany and territories occupied by Germany but also in countries allied with Germany, neutral, or still unconquered. In their discussion, officials contemplated the initial forcible deportation of Jews to territories in the east; their subsequent employment in labor camps, where many of them were expected to die of "natural causes"; and then a "final solution" to remove the remainder permanently from European life. In all, these discussions envisaged disposing of over 11 million Jews throughout Europe. Where persons of mixed blood were concerned some latitude might be allowed, especially if combined with forcible sterilization. Effectively, the meeting sanctioned genocide on a massive scale, to be implemented where possible by methods adapted from industrial processes designed to handle and process large quantities of raw materials or animals.

Primary Source

TOP SECRET

Minutes of Meeting

This meeting of top German officials with responsibility for Jews under their control was held on 20 January 1942 in Berlin, at Grossen Wannsee No. 56/58. Those present included Gauleiter Dr. Meyer and Reichsamtleiter Dr. Leibbrandt of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories; Dr. Stuckart, Secretary of State of the Ministry for the Interior; Secretary of State Neumann, Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan; Dr. Freisler, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Justice; Dr. Bühler, Secretary of State of the Office of the General Government; Dr. Luther, Under Secretary of State of the Foreign Office; SS-Oberführer Klopfer of the Party Chancellery; Ministerialdirektor Kritzinger of the Reich Chancellery; SS-Gruppenführer Hofmann of the Race and Settlement Main Office; SS-Gruppenführer Müller and SS-Obersturmbannführer Eichmann of the Reich Main Security Office; SS-Oberführer Dr. Schöngarth of the Security Police, Security Department, Commander of the Security Police, Security Department (SD) of the General

Government; SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Lange of the Security Police, Security Department, Commander of the Security Police and the Security Department for the General-District of Latvia, in his capacity as deputy to the Commander of the Security Police and the Security Department for the Reich Commissariat “Eastland.”…

II.

At the beginning of the discussion Chief of the Security Police and of the SD, SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich, reported that the Reich Marshal [Hermann Göring] had appointed him delegate for the preparations for the final solution of the Jewish question in Europe and pointed out that this discussion had been called for the purpose of clarifying fundamental questions. The wish of the Reich Marshal to have a draft sent to him concerning organizational, factual and material interests in relation to the final solution of the Jewish question in Europe makes necessary an initial common action of all central offices immediately concerned with these questions in order to bring their general activities into line. The Reichsführer-SS [Heinrich Himmler] and the Chief of the German Police (Chief of the Security Police and the SD) [Reinhard Heydrich] was entrusted with the official central handling of the final solution of the Jewish question without regard to geographic borders. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD then gave a short report of the struggle which has been carried on thus far against this enemy, the essential points being the following:

a) the expulsion of the Jews from every sphere of life of the German people
b) the expulsion of the Jews from the living space of the German people

In carrying out these efforts, an increased and planned acceleration of the emigration of the Jews from Reich territory was started, as the only possible present solution.

By order of the Reich Marshal, a Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration was set up in January 1939 and the Chief of the Security Police and SD was entrusted with the management. Its most important tasks were

a) to make all necessary arrangements for the preparation for an increased emigration of the Jews
b) to direct the flow of emigration
c) to speed the procedure of emigration in each individual case

The aim of all this was to cleanse German living space of Jews in a legal manner.

All the offices realized the drawbacks of such enforced accelerated emigration. For the time being they had, however, tolerated it on account of the lack of other possible solutions of the problem.

The work concerned with emigration was, later on, not only a German problem, but also a problem with which the authorities of the countries to which the flow of emigrants was being directed would have to deal. Financial difficulties, such as the demand by various foreign governments for increasing sums of money to be presented at the time of the landing, the lack of shipping space, increasing restriction of entry permits, or the cancelling of such, increased extraordinarily the difficulties of emigration. In spite of these difficulties, 537,000 Jews were sent out of the country between the takeover of power and the deadline of 31 October 1941. Of these:

- approximately 360,000 were in Germany proper on 30 January 1933
- approximately 147,000 were in Austria (Ostmark) on 15 March 1939
- approximately 30,000 were in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1939

The Jews themselves, or their Jewish political organizations, financed the emigration. In order to avoid impoverished Jews remaining behind, the principle was followed that wealthy Jews have to finance the emigration of poor Jews; this was arranged by imposing a suitable tax, i.e., an emigration tax, which was used for financial arrangements in connection with the emigration of poor Jews and was imposed according to income.

Apart from the necessary Reichsmark exchange, foreign currency had to be presented at the time of landing. In order to save foreign exchange held by Germany, the foreign Jewish financial organizations were—with the help of Jewish organizations in Germany—made responsible for arranging an

adequate amount of foreign currency. Up to 30 October 1941, these foreign Jews donated a total of around 9,500,000 dollars.

In the meantime the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police had prohibited emigration of Jews due to the dangers of an emigration in wartime and due to the possibilities of the East.

III.

Another possible solution of the problem has now taken the place of emigration, i.e., the evacuation of the Jews to the East, provided that the Führer gives the appropriate approval in advance.

These actions are, however, only to be considered provisional, but practical experience is already being collected which is of the greatest importance in relation to the future final solution of the Jewish question.

Approximately 11 million Jews will be involved in the final solution of the European Jewish question, distributed as follows among the individual countries:

[*The document proceeds to list the number of Jews living not only in states such as France, Hungary, and Rumania already currently under German occupation or control, but also in countries at war with Germany including Britain and Russia; allied with it, such as Italy; sympathetic but neutral, such as Spain and Portugal; and simply neutral, including Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland*.]

Under proper guidance, in the course of the final solution the Jews are to be allocated for appropriate labor in the East. Able-bodied Jews, separated according to sex, will be taken in large work columns to these areas for work on roads, in the course of which action doubtless a large portion will be eliminated by natural causes.

The possible final remnant will, since it will undoubtedly consist of the most resistant portion, have to be treated accordingly, because it is the product of natural selection and would, if released, act as the seed of a new Jewish revival (see the experience of history).

In the course of the practical execution of the final solution, Europe will be combed through from west to east. Germany proper, including the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, will have to be handled first due to the housing problem and additional social and political necessities.

The evacuated Jews will first be sent, group by group, to so-called transit ghettos, from which they will be transported to the East.

SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich went on to say that an important prerequisite for the evacuation as such is the exact definition of the persons involved.

It is not intended to evacuate Jews over 65 years old, but to send them to an old-age ghetto—Theresienstadt is being considered for this purpose.

In addition to these age groups—of the approximately 280,000 Jews in Germany proper and Austria on 31 October 1941, approximately 30% are over 65 years old—severely wounded veterans and Jews with war decorations (Iron Cross I) will be accepted in the old-age ghettos. With this expedient solution, in one fell swoop many interventions will be prevented.

The beginning of the individual larger evacuation actions will largely depend on military developments. Regarding the handling of the final solution in those European countries occupied and influenced by us, it was proposed that the appropriate expert of the Foreign Office discuss the matter with the responsible official of the Security Police and SD.

In Slovakia and Croatia the matter is no longer so difficult, since the most substantial problems in this respect have already been brought near a solution. In Rumania the government has in the meantime also appointed a commissioner for Jewish affairs. In order to settle the question in Hungary, it will soon be necessary to force an adviser for Jewish questions onto the Hungarian government.

With regard to taking up preparations for dealing with the problem in Italy, SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich considers it opportune to contact the chief of police with a view to these problems.

In occupied and unoccupied France, the registration of Jews for evacuation will in all probability proceed without great difficulty.

Under Secretary of State Luther calls attention in this matter to the fact that in some countries, such as the Scandinavian states, difficulties will arise if this problem is dealt with thoroughly and that it will therefore be advisable to defer actions in these countries. Besides, in view of the small numbers of Jews affected, this deferral will not cause any substantial limitation.

The Foreign Office sees no great difficulties for southeast and western Europe.

SS-Gruppenführer Hofmann plans to send an expert to Hungary from the

Race and Settlement Main Office for general orientation at the time when the Chief of the Security Police and SD takes up the matter there. It was decided to assign this expert from the Race and Settlement Main Office, who will not work actively, as an assistant to the police attaché.

IV.

[*Intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews could give rise to problems in defining precisely who qualified as a Jew, and here it was proposed to follow the guidelines given in the earlier Nuremberg Laws of the 1930s, though in many cases exceptions and exemptions for meritorious conduct or the reverse were at least theoretically possible, as were forcible sterilization and the forced dissolution of mixed marriages.*]

With regard to the issue of the effect of the evacuation of Jews on the economy, State Secretary Neumann stated that Jews who are working in industries vital to the war effort, provided that no replacements are available, cannot be evacuated.

SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich indicated that these Jews would not be evacuated according to the rules he had approved for carrying out the evacuations then underway.

State Secretary Dr. Bühler stated that the General Government would welcome it if the final solution of this problem could be begun in the General Government, since on the one hand transportation does not play such a large role here nor would problems of labor supply hamper this action. Jews must be removed from the territory of the General Government as quickly as possible, since it is especially here that the Jew as an epidemic carrier represents an extreme danger and on the other hand he is causing permanent chaos in the economic structure of the country through continued black market dealings. Moreover, of the approximately 2.5 million Jews concerned, the majority is unfit for work.

State Secretary Dr. Bühler stated further that the solution to the Jewish question in the General Government is the responsibility of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD and that his efforts would be supported by the officials of the General Government. He had only one request, to solve the Jewish question in this area as quickly as possible.

In conclusion the different types of possible solutions were discussed, during which discussion both Gauleiter Dr. Meyer and State Secretary Dr. Bühler took the position that certain preparatory activities for the final solution should be carried out immediately in the territories in question, in which process alarming the populace must be avoided.

The meeting was closed with the request of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD to the participants that they afford him appropriate support during the carrying out of the tasks involved in the solution.

Source: "Wannsee Protocol, January 20, 1942," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/wannsee.asp.

132. President Manuel Quezon to General Douglas MacArthur: Filipino Collaborators, January 28, 1942

Introduction

On January 28, 1942, the Japanese government announced that prominent Filipino government officials had formed a new government under Japanese authority in Manila and gave the names of those Filipinos who had accepted office in it. President Manuel Quezon, sheltering with Douglas MacArthur's forces in Corregidor, heard the news on Japanese radio broadcasts but refused to condemn the behavior of his former colleagues. Indeed, he told MacArthur by letter that such men should not be regarded as traitors to their country.

Primary Source

I have been mortified by the radio broadcast from Tokyo asserting that a new government has been established in the Philippines, which government has pledged its conformity with Japan's New East Asia policy.

I know what the real sentiments of my people are and I am certain that their stand is not changed despite the military reverses of our forces. I am likewise convinced of the loyalty of the men who have accepted positions in the so-called new government.

I want you, therefore, to give publicity to the following statement: “The determination of the Filipino people to continue fighting side by side with the United States until victory is won has in no way been weakened by the temporary reverses suffered by our arms. We are convinced that our sacrifices will be crowned with victory in the end and in that conviction we shall continue to resist the enemy with all our might.”

Japanese military forces are occupying sections of the Philippines comprising only one-third of our territory. In the remaining areas constitutional government is still in operation under my authority.

I have no direct information concerning the veracity of the news broadcast from Tokyo that a Commission composed of some well-known Filipinos has been recently organized in Manila to take charge of certain functions of civil government. The organization of such a Commission, if true, can have no political significance not only because it is charged merely with purely administrative functions but also because the acquiescence by its members to serve on the Commission was evidently for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of the civilian population, and can in no way reflect the sentiments of the Filipinos towards the enemy. Such sentiments are still those I have repeatedly expressed in the past: loyalty to America and resolute resistance against the invasion of our territory and liberties.

At the same time I am going to open my mind and heart to you without attempting to hide anything.

We are before the bar of history and God only knows if this is the last time that my voice will be heard before going to my grave.

My loyalty and the loyalty of the Filipino people has been proven beyond question. Now we are fighting by your side under your command despite overwhelming odds. But, it seems to me questionable whether any government has the right to demand loyalty from its citizens beyond its willingness or ability to render actual protection.

This war is not our making. …

Despite all this, we never hesitated for a moment in our stand.

We decided to fight by your side and we have done the best we could and we are still doing as much as could be expected from us under the circumstances. But how long are we going to be left alone? Has it already been decided in Washington that the Philippine front is of no importance as far as the final result of the war is concerned and that, therefore, no help can

be expected here in the future, or at least before the power of resistance is exhausted? If so, I want to know, because I have my own responsibility to my countrymen whom, as President of the Commonwealth, I have led into a complete war effort. I am greatly concerned as well regarding the soldiers I have called to the colors and who are now manning the firing line. I want to decide in my own mind whether there is justification for allowing these men to be killed when for the final outcome of the war the shedding of their blood may be wholly unnecessary. It seems that Washington does not fully recognize our situation nor the feelings which the apparent neglect of our safety and welfare have engendered in the hearts of the people here. …

In reference to the men who have accepted positions in the Commission established by the Japanese, every one of them wanted to come to Corregidor, but you told me that there was no room for them here. They are not "quislings." The "quislings" are the men who betrayed their country to the enemy. Those men did what they have been asked to do, while they were free, under the protection of their government. Today they are virtually prisoners of the enemy. I am sure they are only doing what they think is their duty. They are not traitors. They are the victims of the adverse fortunes of war and I am sure they have no choice. Besides, it is probable that they accepted their positions in order to safeguard the welfare of the civilian population in the occupied areas. I think, under the circumstances, America should look upon their situation sympathetically and understandingly.

I am confident that you will understand my anxiety about the long-awaited reinforcements and trust you will again urge Washington to insure their early arrival.

Source: "Letter of President Quezon to Field Marshal MacArthur, January 28, 1942," Official Gazette, Republic of the Philippines, http://www.gov.ph/1942/01/28/letter-of-president-quezon-to-field-marshal-macarthur-january-28–1942/.

133. President Sukarno of Indonesia Justifies His Wartime Cooperation with Japan

Introduction

Many, though by no means all, Asian nationalists in countries under European colonial rule decided to cooperate with Japanese occupying forces. One such was the young Sukarno in the Dutch East Indies, an anti-Dutch activist who would later become the first president of independent Indonesia. Fearing that he might decide to work with the Japanese, shortly before the latter arrived Dutch officials sought to intern Sukarno. He fled and took shelter with a friend, Waworunto, who lived in the town of Padang. In his autobiography Sukarno later justified his decision to accept, at least temporarily, the Japanese administration. Here he recounts his early reaction to the Japanese takeover.

Primary Source

It was a matter of days at the most before the Imperial Nipponese Army would take Padang. As I walked the streets I realized my poor, weak, subservient, undefended brothers needed to be rallied. There was nobody in charge. Nobody but Sukarno. Right actions are simply efforts to fulfill the service of God. I knew the time had come once more to go forth and answer the Call. I assumed leadership immediately.

There was a local organization of traders in the area. I saw its chief and he set to work rounding up his people. Then I sent Waworunto in one direction and Riwu in another to marshal the rest. A mass rally was held in the market place. There I organized a People's Command to function as an interim government and to maintain order. "Friends," I boomed, in my first speech in nine years, "I call upon you to obey the invaders. The Japanese are very strong. We are very weak. Your job is not to fight them. Remember, we do not have weapons. We do not have training. We will all be annihilated if we attempt open opposition.

"An unarmed man cannot oppose a large number of warriors, but all the armies of all the states on earth combined have no power to enslave a single soul that has determined to stay free. *Saudara-saudara*, I ask you: Who can chain a people if their spirit will not be chained?

"We have to win the utmost from this enemy. Therefore we must be careful. Our countrymen must be warned not to resist. At all costs avoid clashes in the

beginning. Do not panic. I repeat: Do not panic. The first rule your leader gives you is to obey the Japanese. And trust. Trust in Allah to deliver us."

The rally ended with public prayers led by myself as Imam. …

The prayers ended, the people dispersed. I retired to the home of Waworunto and waited. It didn't take long. One week later they came. It was four in the morning. Maybe five. I was lying in bed but I wasn't sleeping. I was tense. Wide awake. It was a very still night. No unusual noises. In fact, not even the usual noises. My family was sleeping peacefully. They were suddenly awakened by a growing noise. At first it sounded like thunder. Big rolls of noise getting louder and louder and louder. The fearsome, curdling sound was the thunder of armored cars and tanks and foot soldiers marching into Padang.

The Japanese had arrived.

The night was hot, but I lay there shivering. I realized this thunderous noise was the drumroll to action. It signified the end of an era.

Next morning I rose early and took a quiet stroll throughout the town [Padang]. The Japanese had forced the stores open without placing anyone in charge. This invited the Indonesians to plunder. It being their first opportunity to treat themselves to luxuries, they did. The Japanese cleverly sent the Dutch police through the streets to restore order, thereby furthering the concentration of hatred on Western authority.

On every street the Japanese were welcomed with friendly shouts and cheers of enthusiasm. "Why is this?" asked Waworunto.

"Because our people hate the Dutch. They hate them even more now that they have fled like rats and left us totally alone. Not one attempted to protect us or this land. They swore to fight to their last drop of blood and then ran scared.

"Look here," I said as we walked slowly. "The first factor in the emotions of an invaded people is the attitude they held toward their previous bosses

whom the new invaders vanquished. If you hate somebody then you love those who kick them out. Besides, humiliating defeat was inflicted on our superior and almighty white masters by an Asian race. It's no wonder our people hail them as liberators."

Waworunto, my good and true friend who is now dead, looked quietly at me. "And do you hail them as liberators, too?"

"No! I know what they are. I have watched their past performances. I know they are Fascists. But I also know this is the end of Dutch Imperialism. Exactly as I predicted, we will suffer through a period of Japanese occupation to be followed by freedom from all foreign domination forever."

Across the street we witnessed a Japanese soldier slam an Indonesian across the head with the butt of his rifle.

"Then is it your intention to use the Japanese?" Waworunto quickly asked me.

We walked on. There was nothing we could do. "Of course," I answered in an undertone. "I know all about their brutality. I know of Nipponese behavior in occupied territory—but okay. I am fully prepared for a few years of this. I must rationally consider what they can do for my people. We must be grateful to the Japanese. We can use them. If human beings stay in the groove of colonialism without anything radical to stir them or their colonizers, it is difficult ever to make a revolution."

Waworunto stared at me, his eyes open wide. The truth of what I was saying was dawning on him.

"Look here, Bung," I said, "this chaos, confusion, inflamed feelings—or even just the change itself—will of necessity bring the result for which I have sacrificed my whole life."

We walked along in silence, each busy with his own thoughts. Then my friend commented, "Perhaps our citizens will always consider them liberators

and remain strongly pro-Japanese, thereby making it difficult someday to rid our land of them."

"This is not possible," I explained. "It is folly for an invader to imagine he will long be loved or that a colonized society will remain content while undergoing his domination. No matter how weak, degenerate, or barbaric the old colonizers and no matter how civilized the new in their manners or intelligence, a once-colonized people will always regard the disappearance of foreign domination as a liberation. Such will happen here, too."

"And when will that be?"

"When we are ready," I said simply. "When we are ready."

I made no moves. I just waited. One day later Captain Sakaguchi, Division Commander of the Padang Area, came to the house of Waworunto and introduced himself [to me]. …

When the Japanese arrived, Padang unfurled its red-and-white Indonesian flag. The citizens thought they were "freed." After centuries of being forbidden our own banner, what a thrill to see that sacred *Merah-Putih* flown. Instantly bulletins were posted on trees and store fronts to the effect that only the Rising Sun would be hoisted. Coincident with this blow, the conquerors seized our newspapers. The "liberation of Padang" was short-lived.

I went to Sakaguchi's office and requested a postponement of the flag order.

"This is very heavy for us and it's going to be a difficult situation," I said. "If not met as diplomatically as possible it might cause serious repercussions—for both sides."

Sakaguchi indicated he understood the problem but cautioned, "Perhaps, Mr. Sukarno, you should not take TOO LONG about it."

This was a black day for my people and for me. I went first to the mosque and prayed. Then, at a mass meeting I instructed my brothers to lower their

flags until “such time as we may fly our colors free of all foreign domination.”

Every flag came down. I abhorred Hitler, but this outcome unconsciously reminded me of one phrase of his: *Gross sein heissat Massen bewegen können*—Greatness is the ability to move the masses into action. Had it not been Sukarno speaking they’d have rebelled, realizing all too abruptly the sons of Nippon were not the heroes they imagined. And I was fearful of any uprising. We were too untrained a people to rout a force as militaristic as the Japanese—yet.

Three days later Sakaguchi called again. Again we conversed in French. It wasn’t until months later that I learned Sakaguchi spoke Indonesian. “Monsieur Sukarno,” he said, “I bring a message. Your presence is requested by Le Commandant de Bukittinggi.”

“Requested?” I repeated.

“Oui, Monsieur. Requested.”

“Not ordered?” I asked.

“No, Monsieur. Requested.”

From Captain Sakaguchi’s obsequious manner, it was obvious Holland’s fears were to be realized. The Japanese were going to suggest I work with them. The commander of that mighty division which had marched in during the night was the Military Commandant of Bukittingi, Colonel Fujiyama. It was he who sent word personally “requesting” Mr. Sukarno to please come.

Mr. Sukarno came. …

It was there [at Bukittingi] I had my little known but enormously important meeting. My famous meeting. The meeting which determined my strategy for the rest of the war. The meeting which up until now has pinned on me the label “Japanese collaborator.”

Commandant Fujiyama spoke in his native tongue. In the room was an American interpreter captured in Singapore. “Mr. Sukarno,” said Fujiyama, motioning me to sit, “this war is to free Asia from the yoke of Western colonialism.”

I knew I was being sounded out and I chose my words carefully. Each syllable of mine would be sifted, weighed, and examined. I knew it. “You Japanese have a slogan which says, ‘Free Asia.’ Is that right?” I asked after a few moments.

“Yes, Mr. Sukarno,” he said, offering me a cigarette. “That is so.”

I puffed the cigarette lazily, then said casually, “And do you intend to abide by that slogan?”

“Yes, Mr. Sukarno, we do,” he said, watching me carefully.

“Well, then, would you say Indonesia is a part of Asia?”

“Of course, Mr. Sukarno.”

I took a deep breath. “So then I am to assume your aim is also to free Indonesia, is that correct?”

The pause was no longer than a heartbeat. “Yes, Mr. Sukarno. Perfectly correct.”

During this high-level conversation, a little shuffling Japanese soldier served tea. My nerves were strung tight and I picked at my fingernails, a habit of mine when I’m nervous. We waited for the rattling of the tea cups to subside. Even after he pattered away the noise was still there. My teeth and my bones were all rattling. The life or death of my country depended on the successful outcome of this talk.

After the soldier exited, Fujiyama resumed. “In the light of this understanding, we wish to know if you are interested in helping the Japanese army?”

“In what way?”

“In keeping peace.”

“May I ask how I alone can keep the peace for the Japanese army?”

The Supreme Commander of the Japanese Imperial 25th Army smiled. On his level they did a lot of that. “We understand Sukarno alone commands the masses. Therefore, the simplest way to get to the people is to get to Sukarno. Our job is not to reach millions of Indonesians. Our job is to win one Indonesian. Namely, you. It is then hoped you will reach the millions for us.”

His manner made it apparent he had to win me. Out in the streets my people weren’t hailing his people quite so loudly any more. The first flush had already faded. He knew if he turned against me and harmed me in any way, if he tried to force me to do anything against my will, the whole population would rise against him. The Japanese needed me and I knew it. But I also needed them to make my country ready for revolution.

This was like a game of volleyball. Except that the stakes were freedom. Colonel Fujiyama had first serve. Now it was my turn. Allah, I prayed silently, show me the way.

“Well,” I said, “now that I know what you want, I presume you know what I want.”

“No, Mr. Sukarno, I do not. What would the Indonesians really like?”

“To be free.”

“As a patriot who loves his people and longs for their liberty, you must realize independent Indonesia can be established only in cooperation with Japan,” he retaliated.

“Yes,” I nodded. “It has become clear and bright to me that our lifeline lies in Japan. … Will your government help me to liberate Indonesia?”

“If you promise total cooperation during our occupation, we will grant our unconditional promise to establish the freedom of your homeland.”

“Can I be guaranteed that during the whole period I work for you, it will also be permissible for me to work for my people in the full knowledge that my ultimate aim is someday … somehow … to release them from the yoke of both Dutch—and Japanese—domination?”

“It is guaranteed. The Japanese government will put no obstacles in your way.”

I looked at him. We both looked at each other. Measured one another.

“You see, Mr. Sukarno,” he continued, making his point carefully, “I am an administrator. You are a nation with layers of Javanese, Balinese, Hindu, Moslem, Buddhist, Dutch, Malaysian, Polynesian, Chinese, Filipino, Arabic, and other cultures, breeds, religions, and heterogeneous customs. You are spread out. Communications are difficult. My assignment is to marshal this area into good running order quickly. The most efficient method is to keep the populace quiet and functioning harmoniously. To accomplish this I am told I must do business with Sukarno. In return I promise official and active cooperation politically.”

I had to trust this little man because I saw in him the key. “Very well,” I said. “If this is your promise, okay. I pledge my full cooperation. I will make propaganda for you. But only as it continues along the line of emancipating Indonesia and only so it is understood that while I conspire with you I will also try at the same time to gain sovereignty for my people.”

“Agreed,” he said.

“It is also understood that the proviso whereby I remain unhampered in my ceaseless labors for nationalism is not to be known just to you, but to the entire High Command.”

“My government will be so apprised. It is on this basis we pledge our mutual support to one another.”…

My friends—and those of you who are not my friends but who I hope will understand Sukarno better after you finish his book—this is the first time I have told my story of how, when, where, and why I decided to throw my lot in with the Japanese. Puppet … quisling … I know all the words. However, without the condition that the Japanese work with me toward making my country free, I would never have done it. Until this very moment it's never been properly explained. The outside world does not understand. They think Sukarno was a collaborator. For me to squeeze more and more political concessions out of the victors, I was forced into many things that ripped me apart. But I had to do them. If I didn't keep my bargain they wouldn't keep theirs.

Source: Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 154–163.

134. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order No. 9066 Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, February 19, 1942

Introduction

Less than three months after Pearl Harbor, on the urging of the War Department, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order permitting the forcible removal of Japanese Americans from areas considered to be important to national defense and their internment for the duration of the war. Although the numbers of German Americans residing in the United States were far greater than those of Japanese origin, they did not face similar restrictions. The order was an example of the manner in which during the war the U.S. government frequently disregarded or set aside civil liberties.

Primary Source

WHEREAS the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense

material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities as defined in section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U. S. C., Title 50, Sec. 104):

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such actions necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commanders may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgement of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas. I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities and services.

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.

Source: Executive Order 9066, February 19, 1942; General Records of the United States Government; Record Group 11; National Archives.

135. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), Message to the Indian People, February 21, 1942, Published in the *Inter-Allied Review,* March 15, 1942

Introduction

The Chinese Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) sympathized in principle with those Asian nations that sought freedom from European domination, a stance derived in great part from his resentment of Western nations' past quasi-colonial treatment of China. While at war with Japan, however, he placed a higher priority on persuading the British colonies to support the war effort. Japan sought to appeal to Indian nationalists by promising them independence, pledges that at least some Indians found alluring. In February 1942 Jiang therefore published a message exhorting the people of India to bend all their energies to defeating Japan and to defer until after the war the question of independence.

Primary Source

During my two weeks' stay in India I have had the opportunity of discussing very frankly with the highest civil and military authorities as well as with my

Indian friends, questions concerning joint plans against aggression and the objective of our common efforts. I was happy to find that there was full sympathy and general understanding between us. …

China and India comprise one-half of the world's population. Their common frontier extends for nearly 2,000 miles. In the 2,000 years' history of their intercourse, which has been of a purely cultural and commercial character, there has never been an armed conflict. Indeed, nowhere else can one find so long a period of uninterrupted peace between two neighboring countries. This is an irrefutable proof that our two peoples are peace-loving by nature. To-day they have not only identical interests but also the same destiny. For this they are in duty bound to side with the anti-aggression countries, and fight shoulder to shoulder to secure real peace for the whole world.

Moreover, our two peoples have an outstanding virtue in common—namely, the noble spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of justice and righteousness; it is this traditional spirit which should move them to self-negation for the salvation of mankind. It is also this spirit which prompted China to be the first to take up arms against the aggressor countries, not merely for the purpose of securing her own freedom, but also for the purpose of securing justice and freedom for all mankind. I venture to suggest to my brethren, the Indian people, that in this most critical moment in the history of civilization, our two peoples should exert themselves to the utmost in the cause of freedom for all mankind, for only in a free world could the Chinese and Indian peoples obtain their freedom. Furthermore, should freedom be denied either to China or to India there could be no real peace in the world.

The present international situation divides the world into two camps, of aggression and anti-aggression. All those who opposed aggression and are striving for the freedom of their country and mankind should join the anti-aggression camp. There is no middle course, and there is no time to wait for developments. Now is the crucial moment for the whole future of mankind. The issue before us does not concern a dispute with any one man or country, nor does it concern any specific questions now pending between one people and another. Any people, therefore, which joins the anti-aggression front may be said to cooperate, not with any particular country, but with the entire front.

This leads us to believe that the Pacific war is a turning-point in the history of nationalism. The method, however, whereby the peoples of the world could attain their freedom might be different from what it used to be. The anti-aggression nations now expect that in this new era the people of India will voluntarily bear their full share of responsibility in the present struggle for the survival of that free world in which India must play her part.

The vast majority of the world's opinion is in full sympathy with India's aspirations for freedom. This sympathy, which is so valuable and so difficult to obtain, cannot be appraised in terms of money or material, and should therefore by all means be retained. The present struggle is one between freedom and slavery, between light and darkness, between good and evil, between resistance and aggression. Should the anti-aggression front lose the war, the civilization of the world would suffer a setback for at least 100 years, and there would be no end to human sufferings.

…(After referring to the cruelties committed by the Japanese soldiers and characterizing them as beyond description, General Chiang Kai-shek said:)

In these horrible times of savagery and brute force, the people of China and their brethren the people of India should, for the sake of civilization and human freedom, give their united support to the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter and in the joint declaration of the 26 nations, and ally themselves with the anti-aggression front. I hope the Indian people will wholeheartedly join the allies—namely, China, Great Britain, America and the Soviet Union—and participate shoulder to shoulder in the struggle for survival of a free world until complete victory has been achieved and the duties incumbent upon them in these troubled times have been fully discharged.

I sincerely hope, and I confidently believe, that our ally, Great Britain, without waiting for any demands on the part of the people of India, will as speedily as possible give them real political power, so that they may be in a position further to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realize that their participation in the war is not merely an aid to the anti-aggression nations for the securing of victory, but also the turning-point in

their struggle for India's freedom. From an objective point of view, I am of the opinion that this would be the wisest policy, which will redound to the credit of the British Empire.

Source: "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Message to the Indian People (Excerpt)," ibiblio, March 15, 1942, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420221a.html.

136. Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement, February 23, 1942

Introduction

Although all three were Allies, relations between the United States and Great Britain were closer than those of either with the Soviet Union. Their warm relationship was symbolized by the relatively early conclusion of the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement in February 1942, which governed the terms on which the United States provided Lend-Lease aid to Great Britain. Under this agreement, Britain and the United States also secretly pooled their knowledge and expertise on nuclear energy, and leading British scientists crossed the Atlantic to work on the Manhattan Project, which developed the first atomic bomb.

Primary Source

Signed in Washington on February 23, 1942, by Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, and Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador

Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations:

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;

And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefore should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is

known and until the progress of events makes clearer and final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the provision of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfill or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Government of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.

ARTICLE II

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply.

ARTICLE III

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President of the United States of America transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the act or

permit the use thereof by any one not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE IV

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost, or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VII

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two

countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

At an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun between the two governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded governments.

ARTICLE VIII

This agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two governments.

Source: *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. 6, *February 28, 1942* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 190–192.

137. The Bataan Death March, April 1942: Recollections of Bill Nolan

Introduction

In 1942, 70,000 starving American and Filipino troops on the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines surrendered to Japan, ending a 100-day siege. The horrific 65-mile journey of the weakened survivors, mostly on foot, to Camp O'Donnell, a prisoner-of-war camp, became one of the enduring

memories of the Pacific war. A typical account was that of American prisoner Bill Nolan.

Primary Source

On April 10th, 1942, the Jap guards started us walking from our position at Cabcaben, going north as fast as the guards could walk. Myself with a very sore head, ears hurt, could not hear … very thirsty … no food or water. The temperature reached 95 degrees and prisoners would faint or pass out on the march. These prisoners that could not get up were shot or bayoneted to death and left along the road. Some were run over by Japanese trucks bringing Jap soldiers for the invasion of Corregidor. As these trucks passed American soldiers, they would hit and club Americans on their head and shoulders. Many fell and died under the wheels of Jap trucks. We walked from 6:00 a.m. until 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. Again no water or food. Calvin Graef, my First Sergeant, and myself both dipped water from the ditch on the side of the road.

This ditch contained water covered with green slime, dead horses, and American soldiers killed by Japs. Everyone suffered from malaria and dysentery. We had no quinine since February, ’42. That night we slept on the ground on the side of the road. During these stops, Jap soldiers would strip us for our rings, watches, and pen-and-pencil sets. On dead American soldiers Japs would cut off fingers to get the rings. They took our canteens, gun belts —and left us with shirts and pants. Our helmets were knocked off and left on the road. So no hats for the rest of the march.

These conditions continued for four days until we reached San Fernando. Here we received our first cup of rice and some tea. While waiting in line for food, I passed out. When I came to, I was lying on the ground and had another large bump on the back of my head and was very dizzy.

We stayed here overnight, and the next morning at daybreak, all prisoners were marched to the railway station. At the siding were small, metal box cars. We were pushed by bayonets into those cars. About 100 prisoners in each car … could only stand up … and no room to sit down. The door was locked by the guards. Again the temperature reached 95 degrees. The metal sides of these box cars became so hot, we could not touch them. The ride lasted until dark when we unloaded. During the ride many prisoners became

uncontrollable from the heat with no water or toilet facilities. Everyone had dysentery, and everyone went on the floor and over prisoners lying on the floor. These prisoners had passed out or were dead. I believe 10 or 15 men died in each box car during the eight hour trip.

Source: Adrian R. Martin, *Brothers from Bataan: POWs, 1942–1945* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1992), 78–79. Reprinted with permission of Adrian R. Martin.

138. The Internment of Japanese Americans: Recollections of Mary Tsukamoto

Introduction

Mary Tsukamoto, an American-born Japanese woman, recalls her family's evacuation from Florin, California, after Pearl Harbor, and her efforts, as a member of the Japanese American Citizens League, to help fellow Japanese Americans follow the government's orders. After the war Tsukamoto became a prominent activist within the Japanese American community, spearheading efforts to preserve and publicize its history. She was also one of the leaders of the ultimately successful campaign by Japanese Americans to obtain financial compensation for their wartime treatment by the U.S. government.

Primary Source

I do remember Pearl Harbor Day. I was about twenty-seven, and we were in church. It was a December Sunday, so we were getting ready for our Christmas program. We were rehearsing and having Sunday School class, and I always played the piano for the adult Issei [Japanese Americans born in Japan] service. Of course, because there were so many Japanese, all of it was in Japanese; the minister was a Japanese, and he preached in Japanese. But after the service started, my husband ran in. He had been home that day and heard on the radio. We just couldn't believe it, but he told us that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. I remember how stunned we were. And suddenly the whole world turned dark. We started to speak in whispers, and because of our experience [with earlier anti-Japanese sentiment] in Florin, we immediately sensed something terrible was going to happen. We just prayed that it

wouldn't, but we sensed that things would be very difficult. The minister and all of the leaders discussed matters, and we knew that we needed to be prepared for the worst.

Then, of course, within a day or two, we heard that the FBI had taken Mr. Tanigawa and Mr. Tsuji. I suppose the FBI had them on their list, and it wasn't long before many of them were taken. We had no idea what they were going through. We should have been more aware. One Issei, Mr. Iwasa, committed suicide. So all of these reports and the anguish and the sorrow made the whole world very dark. Then rumors had it that we were supposed to turn in our cameras and our guns, and they were called in. Every day there was something else about other people being taken by the FBI. Then gradually we just couldn't believe the newspapers and what people were saying. And then there was talk about sending us away, and we just couldn't believe that they would do such a thing. It would be a situation where the whole community would be uprooted. But soon enough we were reading reports of other communities being evacuated from San Pedro and from Puget Sound. After a while we became aware that maybe things weren't going to just stop but would continue to get worse and worse.

We read about President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066. I remember the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) people had a convention in San Francisco in March. We realized that we needed to be able to rise to the occasion to help in whatever way we could in our community. We came home trying to figure out just how we could do that. We had many meetings at night and the FBI was always lurking around. We were told we couldn't stay out after eight o'clock in the evening.

Meanwhile, Hakujin [white] neighbors were watching us and reporting to the FBI that we were having secret meetings. We were not supposed to meet after eight o'clock, but often we couldn't cut off our JACL meeting at eight o'clock, and so we would have tea or coffee and keep talking. We would be reported and the police would come. There were so many people making life miserable for us. Then we heard that we had been restricted to traveling five miles from our homes; it was nine miles to Sacramento, and at that time everything was in Sacramento, like doctors, banks, and grocery stores. So it just was a terrible, fearful experience. Every time we went anywhere more than five miles away, we were supposed to go to the Wartime Civilian

Control Administration (WCCA) office in Sacramento, nine miles away, to get a permit. It was ridiculous.

A lot of little things just nagged at us and harassed us, and we were frightened, but even in that atmosphere I remember we frantically wanted to do what was American. We were Americans and loyal citizens, and we wanted to do what Americans should be doing. So we were wrapping Red Cross bandages and trying to do what we could to help our country. By May 1942, more than a hundred of our boys were already drafted. We worried about them, and they were worried about what was going to happen to their families. We knew what we wanted to do. We started to buy war bonds, and we took first aid classes with the rest of the Hakujin people in the community. We went out at night to go to these classes, but we worried about being out after eight o'clock. It was a frightening time. Every little rule and regulation was imposed only on the Japanese people. There were Italian and German people in the community, but it was just us that had travel restrictions and a curfew. …

I had anxieties for Grandpa and Grandma. They were old and had farmed all their lives, and after more than fifty years here, the thought of uprooting these people and taking them away from their farm and the things they loved was terrible. Grandpa growing tea and vegetables, and Grandma growing her flowers. It was a cruel thing to do to them in their twilight years. But we had to get them ready to leave, anxious for their health and their safety. And my daughter, who was five, had to be ready to go to school. Al [her husband] had had a hemorrhage that winter, so we all had our personal grief as well.

The Farm Security Administration told us that we should work until the very last moment. Yet we had to worry about selling our car and our refrigerator and about what we should do with our chickens and our pets. … I wrote to the President of the United States and the principal of the high school and the newspaper editors thanking them for whatever they did for us. I don't know if I was crazy to do this, but I felt that history was happening, and I felt that it was important to say good-bye in a proper way, speaking for the people who were leaving and trying to tell our friends that we were loyal Americans and that we were sorry that this was happening. We needed to say something, and that's what I did.

We left early in the morning on May 29, 1942. Two days earlier we sold our car for eight hundred dollars, which was just about giving it away. We

also had to sell our refrigerator. But some wonderful friends came to ask if they could take care of some things we couldn't store. …

It happened so suddenly to our community. You know, we grew up together, we went through the hardships of the Depression, and then finally things were picking up. People who had mortgages on their land were beginning to be able to make payments back to the bank. They were going to own the land that they had worked so hard to have. Then we had to evacuate. So there were still some people who owed some money on their property, and they lost the property because, of course, they couldn't make mortgage payments.

These were our people, and we loved them. We wept with them at their funerals and laughed with them and rejoiced at their weddings. And suddenly we found out that the community was going to be split up. The railroad track was one dividing line, and Florin Road the other dividing line. We were going to Fresno; the ones on the other side went to Manzanar; and the ones on the west side went to Tule. The ones on the west and north went to Pinedale and Poston. We never dreamed we would be separated—relatives and close friends, a community. The village people, we were just like brothers and sisters. We endured so much together and never dreamed we would be separated. Suddenly we found out we wouldn't be going to the same place. That was a traumatic disappointment and a great sadness for us. We were just tied up in knots, trying to cope with all of this happening. I can't understand why they had to do this. I don't know why they had to split us up. …

I don't know, we had been a very happy family. When we left, we swept our house and left it clean, because that's the way Japanese feel like leaving a place. I can just imagine everyone's emotions of grief and anger when they had to leave, when the military police came and told them, "Get ready right now. You've got two hours to get ready to catch this train."

Early in the morning, Margaret and George File came after us in their car because we no longer had one to move our things. We had taken our luggage the day before on the pick-up. We were very fortunate. Al had a very dear friend, Bob Fletcher, who was going to stay at our place and run our farm, our neighbor's farm, and Al's cousin's farm. So these three adjoining farms would be taken care of, at least the grape vineyards would be. Bob would stay at our place, and we left our dog with him. Nobody could take pets, and

this was a sad thing for our daughter. There were tears everywhere; Grandma couldn't leave her flowers, and Grandpa looked at his grape vineyard. We urged him to get into the car and leave. I remember that sad morning when we realized suddenly that we wouldn't be free. It was such a clear, beautiful day, and I remember as we were driving, our tears. We saw the snow-clad Sierra Nevada mountains that we had loved to see so often, and I thought about God and about the prayer that we often prayed.

I remember one scene very clearly: on the train, we were told not to look out the window, but people were peeking out. After a long time on the train somebody said, "Oh, there's some Japanese standing over there." So we all took a peek, and we saw this dust, and rows and rows of barracks, and all these tan, brown Japanese people with their hair all bleached. They were all standing in a huddle looking at us, looking at this train going by. Then somebody on the train said, "Gee, that must be Japanese people in a camp." We didn't realize who they were before, but I saw how terrible it looked: the dust, no trees—just barracks and a bunch of people standing against the fence, looking out. Some children were hanging onto the fence like animals, and that was my first sight of the assembly center. I was so sad and discouraged looking at that, knowing that, before long, we would be inside too.

Source: Mary Tsukamoto, "Jerome," in *And Justice for All: An Oral History of the Japanese American Detention Camps,* edited by John Tateishi, 3–13. © 2015. Reprinted with permission of the University of Washington Press.

139. General Douglas MacArthur, Australia, and the British Empire: Prime Minister's War Conference, Minute 23, June 1, 1942

Introduction

The experience of war and the priority that the British—like the American—government gave to winning the war in Europe before that in Asia severely strained existing ties between Australia and Great Britain, its imperial "mother country." From Pearl Harbor onward, Australian prime minister

John Curtin increasingly turned for aid to the United States, a tendency encouraged by the arrival in Australia in the spring of 1942 of the dominating American general Douglas MacArthur. Although defeated in the Philippines, MacArthur immediately became Allied supreme commander in the Southwest Pacific Area. It was symptomatic of MacArthur's significance to Australia that on April 8, 1942, Curtin created the Prime Minister's War Conference, regular meetings between himself as prime minister and minister for defense and MacArthur, to which other senior ministers were invited on an ad hoc basis. The two men united in sending a barrage of appeals to both London and Washington, urging more assistance to the Pacific theater.

Primary Source

STRATEGICAL POLICY IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AUSTRALIA AS A BASE

[*At the beginning of this meeting MacArthur and his chief of staff, Major Richard K. Sutherland, were handed several highly confidential telegrams on Allied strategy exchanged between Curtin and Australia's minister for external affairs, Herbert V. Evatt, who was then in London*.]

2. The Commander-in-Chief [MacArthur] said that, though he had now been in Australia for some time, we were still where we had started insofar as assistance from the United Kingdom was concerned, as we had not obtained an additional ship, soldier or squadron to the forces that were here. He considered these results were distressing.

3. The Commander-in-Chief desired to point out the distinction between the United States and the United Kingdom in their relations and responsibilities to Australia. Australia was part of the British Empire and it was related to Britain and the other Dominions by ties of blood, sentiment and allegiance to the Crown. The United States was an ally whose aim was to win the war, and it had no sovereign interest in the integrity of Australia. Its interest in Australia was from the strategical aspect of the utility of Australia as a base from which to attack and defeat the Japanese. As the British Empire was a Commonwealth of Nations, he presumed that one of its principal purposes was jointly to protect any part that might be threatened. The failure

of the United Kingdom and U.S.A. Governments to support Australia therefore had to be viewed from different angles.

4. The Commander-in-Chief added that, though the American people were animated by a warm friendship for Australia, their purpose in building up forces in the Commonwealth was not so much from an interest in Australia but rather from its utility as a base from which to hit Japan. In view of the strategical importance of Australia in a war with Japan, this course of military action would probably be followed irrespective of the Australian relationship to the people who might be occupying Australia.

5. The Commander-in-Chief said that he had detected a cooling off of the earlier eagerness for offensive action which had been manifested when the Southwest Pacific Area had been created. This was apparently due to the Churchill-Roosevelt agreement to treat Germany as the primary enemy. The directive had provided for preparations for offensive action. Reinforcements had commenced to flow to Australia from the U.S.A. Then they had stopped. The Commander-in-Chief considered that any appeal to the United Kingdom should be not for forces for offensive action, but for those necessary to ensure the security of Australia by adequate defence. The United Kingdom did not admit earlier that the forces were not sufficient for defence. This view had been modified by the promise of reinforcements should Australia be heavily attacked. They now said that they did not believe in the probability of Australia being attacked. The promise of help if Australia were heavily attacked was an extremely weak reed on which to rely, as it would be impossible to come to the assistance of Australia in sufficient strength and early enough if Japan had air and sea superiority to carry out such an attack. Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief did not consider that any quid pro quo was being offered for the assistance Australia had rendered overseas with naval, military and air forces. The fact that Britain had carried out a raid on Cologne with 1,000 heavy bombers showed that she must have reserves behind this force of anything up to 4,000 bombers, yet the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, had a total of 40 heavy bombers, of which a large number were unserviceable.

6. The Commander-in-Chief considered it the fundamental duty of the United Kingdom Government to give aid to Australia, and it was to the strategic advantage of the United States that the security of Australia should be maintained. Therefore, both countries should help.

7. In regard to the future prospects of assistance from the U.S.A., the Commander-in-Chief said that the flow of planes to Australia had been resumed, and he had been promised 107 in June, plus 75% of the requisite personnel. He had been promised that this flow would continue in the quantity based on losses in the South Pacific Area and the estimate of the United States Chiefs of Staff of the situation. The United States authorities are re-considering the amount of assistance by U.S.A. air forces which could be given in the Southwest Pacific Area, and General Arnold's [Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps] visit to London was no doubt connected with this. The Commander-in-Chief was hopeful that increases in the United States air forces would be approved in accordance with his request for an increase in the first-line strength from 500 aircraft to 1,000 aircraft. In regard to land forces, the Commander-in-Chief said that the 37th Division was on its way, two-thirds being intended for New Zealand and one-third for Fiji. It would be followed by a United States Marine Division, which would go to New Zealand and be under American and not New Zealand control. It was expected to arrive in July. The Commander-in-Chief stated that he was hopeful of getting the Corps of three divisions for which he had asked. General Richardson, who was the Commanding General of a United States Army Corps, was coming to Australia shortly. The purpose of this mission was not known, but the Commander-in-Chief was hopeful, in view of General Richardson's command, that it meant that his forces would follow later. …

8. In regard to naval forces, the Commander-in-Chief referred to his request for two aircraft carriers for the Southwest Pacific Area. Since the Battle of the Coral Sea the American naval forces in this area had been increased by one 8-inch cruiser and one destroyer. There were therefore now five 8-inch cruisers allotted to the Southwest Pacific Area. The United States authorities had advised the Commander-in-Chief that no carriers were available. At his suggestion, the United States authorities had asked the United Kingdom Government whether they could make any carriers available, but a negative reply was received. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that Admiral Somerville [U.K. Commander-in-Chief, Far Eastern Fleet] had three aircraft carriers, and he considered that one could be spared in view of the fact that naval action was now centred in the Pacific Ocean, since the Japanese naval forces had withdrawn from the Indian Ocean. The

Eastern Fleet was working between the African coast and Ceylon. The Commander-in-Chief suggested that arrangements should be sought whereby part of Admiral Somerville's forces could operate in the Southwest Pacific Area, by special arrangement, in order to exercise joint pressure against Japanese bases to the north of Australia. …

11. In regard to the results of Dr. Evatt's mission as shown in the cablegrams, the Commander-in-Chief said that, if he might speak with frankness (which the Prime Minister asked that he should do), he considered that Dr. Evatt was undoubtedly a brilliant advocate who, by the skilful manner in which he had put his case, had aroused a live interest in the English people as to the security of Australia and had achieved a good press for his case. He had no doubt evoked a sympathetic hearing from Mr. Churchill and other Ministers, but from the practical military point of view little had been achieved. He added, however, that probably no one could have done better. As the cables showed, the efforts he had exerted had been those of a great pleader, but the agreement between Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt on grand strategy was a high hurdle to get over. It was evident that Mr. Churchill was determined that the seat of war should not be in the Pacific Ocean. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that this was good, if Tokyo also agreed. The conception of grand strategy of concentrating against one flank whilst holding the other was quite sound in principle, but he would emphasize that the holding was as important as the attacking. The United Nations had utterly failed to provide the forces necessary to hold the flank in the Pacific. This was evident from the tragedies that had occurred in Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies and Burma. They proved that the United Nations did not have sufficient forces for holding the situation in the Pacific. He emphasized that he was asking for a defensive and not an offensive situation. …

12. In regard to what Australia was doing to help itself, the Commander-in-Chief said that the Defence programme was clear and well-defined, and was being executed with reasonable efficiency and speed. It should ultimately provide a first-class Army and also a first-class Air Force by 1943, if the aircraft requested were despatched. Two carriers, however, were required for the naval forces, and a concentration of effort should be made in London to obtain these carriers for [Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area] Admiral Leary's forces, or an arrangement for Admiral

Somerville to work in closest contact with the naval forces in the Southwest Pacific Area. The support of Great Britain should also be obtained for the supply to Australia of the aircraft required for the expansion of the R.A.A.F. [Royal Australian Air Force] to 71 squadrons. In regard to the 9th Division of the A.I.F. [Australian Infantry Forces] in the Middle East, the Commander-in-Chief said that he would insist on its return to Australia, but not in too abrupt a manner. … The Commander-in-Chief considered that in Australia's hour of peril she was entitled at least to the use of all the forces she could raise herself. If Australian forces were serving overseas and could not be returned, then it was essential that a quid pro quo should be given in the shape of corresponding British forces. In regard to the two R.A.A.F. Spitfire squadrons which were being returned to Australia, the Commander-in-Chief noted that Australia had two permanent R.A.A.F. squadrons abroad and ten squadrons which had been formed under the R.A.A.F. infiltration scheme. Mr. Churchill was only giving back to Australia part of her forces and one R.A.F. [British Royal Air Force] squadron as a gesture.

13. The Commander-in-Chief suggested that a statement be prepared in two columns, the first of which would show what forces Australia has in other theatres and the other what is required for the defence of Australia. He considered that Australia was entitled to have in the Southwest Pacific theatre every unit it could raise, and in his opinion the military situation warranted such a view. …

15. Following a general discussion, the Prime Minister stated that he would submit the Commander-in-Chief's suggestions to the next meeting of the Advisory War Council.

Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–49,* Vol. 5, *July 1941–June 1942* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982), 818–823.

140. Martin Bormann's Confidential Instruction 40/540 on the "Yellow Peril," June 5, 1942

Introduction

The German military alliance with Japan undercut the racial principles of Aryan supremacy so fiercely espoused by Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party. In June 1942, Hitler's secretary found it necessary to issue an order warning that under no circumstances should the German media and public use the term "yellow peril" to refer to the Japanese.

Primary Source

The following item from propaganda themes is issued at the request of the Directorate of Reich Propaganda and the Minister of Propaganda:

It has already been pointed out that particularly stupid people are trying either to belittle the successes of our Japanese allies or to question their significance for Germany by speaking of a "yellow peril" which menaces even Germany.

It must be stated again that any person who does not take exception to such phrases but repeats them thoughtlessly, parrot-fashion, is a traitor to his country and does Germany the gravest harm in the midst of a decisive life and death struggle.

Since discussion of this theme has been taken up in certain intellectual circles, it is necessary to challenge the phrase resolutely wherever it is used and, if necessary, to report the stubborn persons who persist in using it.

Source: Margaret Carlyle, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1939–1946,* Vol. 2, *Hitler's Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 84. Reprinted with permission of Chatham House.

141. The Bracero Program: Agreement between the Governments of Mexico and the United States, July 23, 1942

Introduction

In an effort to alleviate the serious labor shortage in the United States and free more young American men for military service, in 1942 the governments of Mexico and the United States signed an agreement admitting Mexicans as temporary guest workers. Most of those Mexicans who entered the United

States under this program, which was extended until 1964, worked on farms and railroads. Signed in Mexico City on July 23, 1942, the agreement took effect on August 4, 1942.

Primary Source

Agreement of August 4, 1942, for the Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers to the United States as Revised on April 26, 1943, by an Exchange of Notes between the American Embassy at Mexico City and the Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1) It is understood that Mexicans contracting to work in the United States shall not be engaged in any military service.

2) Mexicans entering the United States as a result of this understanding shall not suffer discriminatory acts of any kind in accordance with the Executive Order No. 8802 issued at the White House June 25, 1941.

3) Mexicans entering the United States under this understanding shall enjoy the guarantees of transportation, living expenses and repatriation established in Article 29 of the Mexican Federal Labor Law as follows:

Article 29. All contracts entered into by Mexican workers for lending their services outside their country shall be made in writing, legalized by the municipal authorities of the locality where entered into and visaed by the Consul of the country where their services are being used. Furthermore, such contract shall contain, as a requisite of validity of same, the following stipulations, without which the contract is invalid.

I. Transportation and subsistence expenses for the worker, and his family, if such is the case, and all other expenses which originate from point of origin to border points and compliance of immigration requirements, or for any other similar concept, shall be paid exclusively by the employer or the contractual parties.

II. The worker shall be paid in full the salary agreed upon, from which no deduction shall be made in any amount for any of the concepts mentioned in the above sub-paragraph.

III. The employer or contractor shall issue a bond or constitute a deposit in cash in the Bank of Workers, or in the absence of same, in the Bank of

Mexico, to the entire satisfaction of the respective labor authorities, for a sum equal to repatriation costs of the worker and his family, and those originated by transportation to point of origin.

IV. Once the employer established proof of having covered such expenses or the refusal of the worker to return to his country, and that he does not owe the worker any sum covering salary or indemnization to which he might have a right, the labor authorities shall authorize the return of the deposit or the cancellation of the bond issued.

It is specifically understood that the provisions of Section III of Article 29 above-mentioned shall not apply to the Government of the United States notwithstanding the inclusion of this section in the agreement, in view of the obligations assumed by the United States government under Transportation (a) and (c) of this agreement.

4) Mexicans entering the United States under this understanding shall not be employed to displace other workers, or for the purpose of reducing rates of pay previously established.

In order to implement the application of the general Principles mentioned above the following specific clauses are established:

(When the word "employer" is used hereinafter it shall be understood to mean the Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture of the United States of America; the word "sub-employer" shall mean the owner or operator of the farm or farms in the United States on which the Mexican will be employed; the word "worker" hereinafter used shall refer to the Mexican Farm laborer entering the United States under this understanding.)

CONTRACTS

a. Contracts will be made between the employer and the worker under the supervision of the Mexican Government. (Contracts must be written in Spanish.)

b. The employer shall enter into a contract with the sub-employer, with a view to proper observance of the principles embodied in this understanding.

ADMISSION

a. The Mexican health authorities will, at the place whence the worker comes, see that he meets the necessary physical conditions.

TRANSPORTATION

a. All transportation and living expenses from the place of origin to destination, and return, as well as expenses incurred in the fulfillment of any requirements of a migratory nature shall be met by the Employer.

b. Personal belongings of the workers up to a maximum of 35 kilos per person shall be transported at the expense of the Employer.

c. In accord with the intent of Article 29 of Mexican Federal Labor Law, quoted under General Provisions (3) above, it is expected that the employer will collect all or part of the cost accruing under (a) and (b) of Transportation from the sub-employer.

WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT

a. (1) Wages to be paid the worker shall be the same as those paid for similar work to other agricultural laborers under the same conditions within the same area, in the respective regions of destination. Piece rates shall be so set as to enable the worker of average ability to earn the prevailing wage. In any case wages for piece work or hourly work will not be less than 30 cents per hour.

b. (2) On the basis of prior authorization from the Mexican Government salaries lower than those established in the previous clause may be paid those emigrants admitted into the United States as members of the family of the worker under contract and who, when they are in the field, are able also to become agricultural laborers but who, by their condition of age or sex, cannot carry out the average amount of ordinary work.

c. The worker shall be exclusively employed as an agricultural laborer for which he has been engaged; any change from such type of employment or any change of locality shall be made with the express approval of the worker and with the authority of the Mexican Government.

d. There shall be considered illegal any collection by reason of commission or for any other concept demanded of the worker.

e. Work of minors under 14 years shall be strictly prohibited, and they shall have the same schooling opportunities as those enjoyed by children of

other agricultural laborers.

f. Workers domiciled in the migratory labor camps or at any other place of employment under this understanding shall be free to obtain articles for their personal consumption, or that of their families, wherever it is most convenient for them.

g. The Mexican workers will be furnished without cost to them with hygienic lodgings, adequate to the physical conditions of the region of a type used by a common laborer of the region and the medical and sanitary services enjoyed also without cost to them will be identical with those furnished to the other agricultural workers in the regions where they may lend their services.

h. Workers admitted under this understanding shall enjoy as regards occupational diseases and accidents the same guarantees enjoyed by other agricultural workers under United States legislation.

i. Groups of workers admitted under this understanding shall elect their own representatives to deal with the Employer, but it is understood that all such representatives shall be working members of the group.

The Mexican Consuls, assisted by the Mexican Labor Inspectors, recognized as such by the Employer will take all possible measures of protection in the interest of the Mexican workers in all questions affecting them, within their corresponding jurisdiction, and will have free access to the places of work of the Mexican workers. The Employer will observe that the sub-employer grants all facilities to the Mexican Government for the compliance of all the clauses in this contract.

j. For such time as they are unemployed under a period equal to 75% of the period (exclusive of Sundays) for which the workers have been contracted they shall receive a subsistence allowance at the rate of $3.00 per day.

Should the cost of living rise this will be a matter for reconsideration.

The master contracts for workers submitted to the Mexican government shall contain definite provisions for computation of subsistence and payments under the understanding.

k. The term of the contract shall be made in accordance with the authorities of the respective countries.

l. At the expiration of the contract under this understanding, and if the same is not renewed, the authorities of the United States shall consider illegal, from an immigration point of view, the continued stay of the worker

in the territory of the United States, exception made of cases of physical impossibility.

SAVINGS FUND

a. The respective agencies of the Government of the United States shall be responsible for the safekeeping of the sums contributed by the Mexican workers toward the formation of their Rural Savings Fund, until such sums are transferred to *the Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Company of San Francisco for the account of the Bank of Mexico, S.A., which will transfer such amounts to the Mexican Agricultural Credit Bank. This last shall assume responsibility for the deposit, for the safekeeping and for the application, or in the absence of these, for the return of such amounts*.

b. The Mexican Government through the Banco de Crédito Agrícola will take care of the security of the savings of the workers to be used for payment of the agricultural implements, which may be made available to the Banco de Crédito Agrícola in accordance with exportation permits for shipment to Mexico with the understanding that the Farm Security Administration will recommend priority treatment for such implements.

NUMBERS

As it is impossible to determine at this time the number of workers who may be needed in the United States for agricultural labor employment, the employer shall advise the Mexican Government from time to time as to the number needed. The Government of Mexico shall determine in each case the number of workers who may leave the country without detriment to its national economy.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is understood that, with reference to the departure from Mexico of Mexican workers, who are not farm laborers, there shall govern in understandings reached by agencies to the respective Governments the same fundamental principles which have been applied here to the departure of farm labor.

It is understood that the employers will cooperate with such other agencies of the Government of the United States in carrying this

understanding into effect whose authority under the laws of the United States are such as to contribute to the effectuation of the understandings.

Either Government shall have the right to renounce this understanding, given appropriate notification to the other Government 90 days in advance. This understanding may be formalized by an exchange of notes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Mexico and the Embassy of the United States of America in Mexico.

[*Italicized portions were added in April 1943*.]

Source: "The Official Bracero Agreement," The Farmworkers Website, http://www.farmworkers.org/bpaccord.html.

142. Evan Griffith, "Appeal to Buy War Bonds," August 3, 1942

Introduction

Although taxes rose in wartime, much of the war's costs were financed by government borrowing. In the Allied countries purchases were voluntary, but much moral pressure was exerted to persuade the general public that it was their patriotic duty to invest in as many war bonds as they could afford. For the first time in over a decade most people were earning good money in war-related jobs, and due to wartime restrictions there was relatively little on which they could spend their wages. Farmers, too, were enjoying unwonted prosperity after the hardships of the 1930s. The following appeal to Kansas farmers was signed by Evan Griffith, the administrator of that state's War Savings Staff, and sent out on August 3, 1942.

Primary Source

TO THE FARMERS OF KANSAS:

Your own sons and neighbors are fighting on foreign battle fields to hold back the Japs and Hitler. Millions of other American boys are being trained for overseas service. These men cannot fight bare-handed. They must have

guns and tanks and ships and planes—which cost a lot of money. We must supply these war implements in a hurry. We must win, and the sooner we win, the fewer American boys will be killed.

Farmers, like all Americans, have obligations to meet and families to support. Crop failures have occurred frequently in recent years. Some sections are just now recovering from the effects of drought and depression years. This year, again, adverse weather conditions have hurt some localities. Farming in Kansas certainly has not been profitable for everyone every year. Still, the Kansas farmer has kept his faith in the "good earth" of Kansas—and that faith now is paying dividends. It appears that farm income for Kansas this year will be more than in any year since 1929—and I am writing to ask you to buy all of the War Bonds you possibly can. You can buy these Bonds through your banker, postmaster, building and loan association and many of our merchants.

You help win the war … you're backing the boys in the service … when you Buy War Bonds.

War Bonds are the soundest investment on earth … you are always guaranteed at least what you pay for them, plus interest … War bonds can be cashed in at any time after sixty days … they are a liquid asset, like wheat in the bin.

We all realize that we can't buy cars and tires and farm machinery … but we can convert Bonds into cash for farm machinery and other necessary articles when the war is over and these articles are available again.

Source: Evan Griffith, "Appeal to Buy War Bonds," August 3, 1942, "Government Material" File, Linda Kuntz Papers, World War II Participants and Contemporaries Collection, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Reprinted in Mark P. Parillo, ed., *We Were in the Big One: Experiences of World War II Generation* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002), 14–17.

143. The French Resistance Plans for European Unity and Reform: Extract from Manifesto, "Combat and Revolution," Written by the French Resistance Leaders Henri Frenay, Claude Bourdet, and André Hauriou

and Published in the Southern Resistance Journal *Combat,* September 1942

Introduction

This manifesto, composed in July 1942 in an effort to clarify the long-term aims of the French resistance, called not simply for the overthrow of German rule in France but also for the establishment of a new republic in France, based on socialist principles, and for the creation of a European federation. Its conclusions summarized this outlook, which was symptomatic of the boost that World War II gave to pressures for extensive social reform.

Primary Source

The revolution that we bear within ourselves will be socialist because the moment has come to stop talking and take action to wrest from a powerful oligarchy the control and benefit of the economy, and to restore important sectors of the economy to the nation or, if appropriate, to communities of producers and consumers.

Contrary to Vichy's policy, which has consolidated large-scale capitalism by the Comité d'Organisation, we want to see workers sharing in the life and profits of enterprises. We shall improve their conditions of life by pooling the benefits of technical progress.

The revolution that we bear within ourselves is more than a material revolution—it is a revolution of the mind, of youth and of the people.

The bourgeois Republic was built on narrow selfishness and on fears that were ill-concealed by the rhetoric of goodwill.

The men of the Resistance, hardened by daily trials, will introduce into France a spirit of generosity, greatness and daring.

The path of learning will be genuinely open to all, as part of their education, and will train character as well as the mind. Thus it will bring forth from the heart of the nation a genuine elite which can be constantly renewed. If an elite cannot renew itself, it dies.

We wish to bring about a harmonious synthesis between victorious individualism and a generous awareness of the community.

The revolution that we bear within is the dawn of a new civilization. That is what the worldwide civil war is about.

History teaches us that frontiers are constantly widening.

The United States of Europe—a stage on the road to world union—will soon be a living reality for which we are fighting.

Instead of a Europe which is not united but enslaved under the yoke of a power-intoxicated Germany, we and the other peoples will create a united Europe on the basis of liberty, equality, fraternity and the rule of law.

Frenchmen of town and country, we call on you to fight for the liberation of our territory from dictatorship and for economic and spiritual freedom. Join the ranks of Combat, which is fighting for France from Dunkirk to Bayonne, from Brest to Nice and in the overseas empire.

With General de Gaulle and the Fighting French forces alongside the United Nations we shall win the war and overthrow Fascism. After that we shall remake France.

Source: Henri Frenay, Claude Bourdet, and André Hauriou, "Combat and Revolution," *Combat: Organe due Mouvement de Libération française* 34 (September 1942). Reprinted in Georges Cottier, ed., *De la Résistance à la Revolution: Anthologie de la presse clandestine* (Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1945), 238. Excerpted and translated in Walter Lipgens, ed., *Documents on the History of European Integration*, Series B, Vol. 1, *Continental Plans for European Union 1939–1945* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), 291–293.

144. Soviet Press Release: Joseph Stalin to Henry C. Cassidy, Associated Press Representative, Moscow, October 3, 1942

Introduction

One perennial thorn in Soviet relations with Britain and the United States was the decision of the Western Allies to defer opening a second front in Europe until June 1944. Stalin believed that this postponement left his country and its people to absorb the brunt of the German military assault. In response to a question from an American journalist, Stalin wrote a letter complaining of this delay, which the Soviet information services immediately published as a press release.

Primary Source

Henry C. Cassidy, representative of the Associated Press, addressed the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Josef Stalin with a request to reply orally or in writing to three questions which interest the American public. Mr. Stalin replied with the following letter:

Dear Mr. Cassidy,

Owing to pressure of work and the consequent inability to grant you an interview, I shall confine myself to a brief written answer to your questions.

"1. What place does the possibility of a second front occupy in Soviet estimates of the current situation?"

Answer: A very important place, one might say, a place of first-rate importance.

"2. To what extent is Allied aid to the Soviet Union proving effective and what could be done to amplify and improve this aid?"

Answer: As compared with the aid which the Soviet Union is giving to the Allies by drawing upon itself the main forces of the German fascist armies, the aid of the Allies to the Soviet Union has so far been little effective. In order to amplify and improve this aid, only one thing is required: that the Allies fulfill their obligations fully and on time.

"3. What remains of the Soviet capacity for resistance?"

Answer: I think that the Soviet capacity of resisting the German brigands is in strength not less, if not greater, than the capacity of fascist Germany or of any other aggressive power to secure for itself world domination.

With respect,

J. STALIN.

Source: Information Bulletin, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., October 6, 1942.

145. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order Providing for the Stabilizing

of the National Economy, White House News Release, October 4, 1942

Introduction

Wartime conditions often generated inflation, as wages and prices both spiraled out of control. In most countries, governments responded with interventionist measures and controls. In October 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established an agency to stabilize the U.S. economy insofar as possible through wage and price controls. This was only one of a wide array of government controls imposed during the war, ranging from conscription and higher taxes to rationing and the supervision of labor practices.

Primary Source

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, and particularly by the Act of October 2, 1942, entitled "An Act to Amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, to Aid in Preventing Inflation, and for Other Purposes," as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to control so far as possible the inflationary tendencies and the vast dislocations attendant thereon which threaten our military effort and our domestic economic structure, and for the more effective prosecution of the war, it is hereby ordered as follows:

TITLE I

Establishment of an Office of Economic Stabilization

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of Economic Stabilization at the head of which shall be an Economic Stabilization Director (hereinafter referred to as the Director).

2. There is established in the Office of Economic Stabilization an Economic Stabilization Board with which the Director shall advise and consult. The Board shall consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the

Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Price Administrator, the Chairman of the National War Labor Board, and two representatives each of labor, management, and farmers to be appointed by the President. The Director may invite for consultation the head of any other department or agency. The Director shall serve as Chairman of the Board.

3. The Director, with the approval of the President, shall formulate and develop a comprehensive national economic policy relating to the control of civilian purchasing power, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing, subsidies, and all related matters—all for the purpose of preventing avoidable increases in the cost of living, cooperating in minimizing the unnecessary migration of labor from one business, industry, or region to another, and facilitating the prosecution of the war. To give effect to this comprehensive national economic policy the Director shall have power to issue directives on policy to the Federal departments and agencies concerned.

4. The guiding policy of the Director and of all departments and agencies of the Government shall be to stabilize the cost of living in accordance with the Act of October 2, 1942; and it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Director and of all departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate in the execution of such administrative programs and in the development of such legislative programs as may be necessary to that end. The administration of activities related to the national economic policy shall remain with the departments and agencies now responsible for such activities, but such administration shall conform to the directives on policy issued by the Director.

TITLE II

Wage and Salary Stabilization Policy

1. No increases in wage rates, granted as a result of voluntary agreement, collective bargaining, conciliation, arbitration, or otherwise, and no decreases in wage rates, shall be authorized unless notice of such increases or decreases

shall have been filed with the National War Labor Board, and unless the National War Labor Board has approved such increases or decreases.

2. The National War Labor Board shall not approve any increase in the wage rates prevailing on September 15, 1942, unless such increase is necessary to correct maladjustments or inequalities, to eliminate substandards of living, to correct gross inequities, or to aid in the effective prosecution of the war.

Provided, however, that where the National War Labor Board or the Price Administrator shall have reason to believe that a proposed wage increase will require a change in the price ceiling of the commodity or service involved, such proposed increase, if approved by the National War Labor Board, shall become effective only if also approved by the Director.

3. The National War Labor Board shall not approve a decrease in the wages for any particular work below the highest wages paid therefor between January 1, 1942 and September 15, 1942, unless to correct gross inequities and to aid in the effective prosecution of the war.

4. The National War Labor Board shall, by general regulation, make such exemptions from the provisions of this title in the case of small total wage increases or decreases as it deems necessary for the effective administration of this Order.

5. No increases in salaries now in excess of $5,000 per year (except in instances in which an individual has been assigned to more difficult or responsible work) shall be granted until otherwise determined by the Director.

6. No decrease shall be made in the salary for any particular work below the highest salary paid therefor between January 1, 1942 and September 15, 1942, unless to correct gross inequities and to aid in the effective prosecution of the war.

7. In order to correct gross inequities and to provide for greater equality in contributing to the war effort, the Director is authorized to take the necessary action, and to issue the appropriate regulations, so that, insofar as practicable, no salary shall be authorized until Title III, Section 4 to the extent that it

exceeds $25,000 after the payment of taxes allocable to the sum in excess of $25,000. Provided, however, that such regulations shall make due allowance for the payment of life insurance premiums on policies heretofore issued, and required payments on fixed obligations heretofore incurred, and shall make provision to prevent undue hardship.

8. The policy of the Federal Government, as established in Executive Order No. 9017 of January 12, 1942, to encourage free collective bargaining between employers and employees is reaffirmed and continued.

9. Insofar as the provisions of Clause (1) of section 302(c) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 are inconsistent with this Order, they are hereby suspended.

TITLE III

Administration of Wage and Salary Policy

1. Except as modified by this Order, the National War Labor Board shall continue to perform the powers, functions, and duties conferred upon it by Executive Order No. 9017, and the functions of said Board are hereby extended to cover all industries and all employees. The National War Labor Board shall continue to follow the procedures specified in said Executive Order.

2. The National War Labor Board shall constitute the agency of the Federal Government authorized to carry out the wage policies stated in this Order, or the directives on policy issued by the Director under this Order. The National War Labor Board is further authorized to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the speedy determination of the propriety of any wage increases or decreases in accordance with this Order, and to avail itself of the services and facilities of such State and Federal departments and agencies as, in the discretion of the National War Labor Board, may be of assistance to the Board.

3. No provision with respect to wages contained in any labor agreement between employers and employees … which is inconsistent with the policy herein enunciated or hereafter formulated by the Director shall be enforced

except with the approval of the National War Labor Board within the provisions of this Order. …

TITLE IV

Prices of Agricultural Commodities

1. The prices of agricultural commodities and of commodities manufactured or processed in whole or substantial part from any agricultural commodity shall be stabilized, so far as practicable, on the basis of levels which existed on September 15, 1942 and in compliance with the Act of October 2, 1942. …

TITLE V

Profits and Subsidies

1. The Price Administrator in fixing, reducing, or increasing prices, shall determine price ceilings in such a manner that profits are prevented which in his judgment are unreasonable or exorbitant.

2. The Director may direct any Federal department or agency including, but not limited to, the Department of Agriculture (including the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Surplus Marketing Administration), the Department of Commerce, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and other corporations organized pursuant to Section 5d of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, as amended, to use its authority to subsidize and to purchase for resale, if such measures are necessary to insure the maximum necessary production and distribution of any commodity, or to maintain ceiling prices, or to prevent a price rise inconsistent with the purposes of this Order. …

Source: "President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order Providing for the Stabilizing of the National Economy," ibiblio, October 3, 1942, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421003a.html.

146. The New Order in East Asia: Speech of Lieutenant Colonel Nagatomo, October 28, 1942

Introduction

In 1942, Japanese lieutenant colonel Nagatomo, chief of the No. 3 Branch of the Thailand Prisoner of War Administration, delivered the following speech to Allied prisoners of war at Thanbyuzayat, Burma. His audience, most of whom went on to work on the notorious Burma Railroad, were expected to remain smiling while listening to the speech, an attitude perhaps facilitated by the fact that very few of them understood Japanese.

Primary Source

It is a great pleasure to me to see you at this place as I am appointed Chief of the war prisoner camp obedient to the Imperial Command issued by His Majesty the Emperor. The great East Asiatic war has broken out due to the rising of the East Asian Nations whose hearts were burnt with the desire to live and preserve their nations on account of the intrusion of the British and Americans for many years past.

There is, therefore, no other reason for Japan to drive out the Anti-Asiatic powers of the arrogant and insolent British and Americans from East Asia in cooperation with our neighbors of China and other East Asiatic Nations and establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere for the benefit of all human beings and establish lasting great peace in the world. During the past few centuries, Nippon [Japan] has made great sacrifices and extreme endeavors to become the leader of the East Asiatic Nations, who were mercilessly and pitilessly treated by the outside forces of the British and Americans, and the Nippon Army, without disgracing anybody, has been doing her best until now for fostering Nippon’s real power.

You are only a few remaining skeletons after the invasion of East Asia for the past few centuries, and are pitiful victims. It is not your fault, but until

your governments do not [*sic*] wake up from their dreams and discontinue their resistance, all of you will not be released. However, I shall not treat you badly for the sake of humanity as you have no fighting power left at all.

His Majesty the Emperor has been deeply anxious about all prisoners of war, and has ordered us to enable the operating of war prisoner camps at almost all the places in the SW countries.

The Imperial Thoughts are unestimable and the Imperial Favors are infinite and, as such, you should weep with gratitude at the greatness of them. I shall correct or mend the misleading and improper Anti-Japanese ideas. I shall meet with you hereafter and at the beginning I shall require of you the four following points:

(1) I heard that you complain about the insufficiency of various items. Although there may be lack of materials it is difficult to meet your requirements. Just turn your eyes to the present conditions of the world. It is entirely different from the prewar times. In all lands and countries materials are considerably short and it is not easy to obtain even a small piece of cigarette, and the present position is such that it is not possible even for needy women and children to get sufficient food. Needless to say, therefore, at such inconvenient places even our respectable Imperial Army is also not able to get mosquito nets, foodstuffs, medicines, and cigarettes. As conditions are such, how can you expect me to treat you better than the Imperial Army? I do not prosecute according to my own wishes and it is not due to the expense but due to the shortage of materials at such difficult places. In spite of our wishes to meet their requirements, I cannot do so with money. I shall supply you, however, if I can do so with my best efforts and I hope you will rely upon me and render your wishes before me. We will build the railroad if we have to build it over the white man’s body. It gives me great pleasure to have a fast-moving defeated nation in my power. You are merely rubble, but I will not feel bad because it is your rulers. If you want anything you will have to come through me for same and there will be many of you who will not see your homes again. Work cheerfully at my command.
(2) I shall strictly manage all of your going out, coming back, meeting with friends, communications. Possessions of money shall be limited, living manners, deportment, salutation, and attitude shall be strictly according to

the rules of the Nippon Army, because it is only possible to manage you all, who are merely rabble, by the order of military regulations. By this time I shall issue separate pamphlets of house rules of war prisoners and you are required to act strictly in accordance with these rules and you shall not infringe on them by any means.

(3) My biggest requirement from you is escape. The rules of escape shall naturally be severe. This rule may be quite useless and only binding to some of the war prisoners, but it is most important for all of you in the management of the camp. You should, therefore, be contented accordingly. If there is a man here who has at least 1 percent of a chance of escape, we shall make him face the extreme penalty. If there is one foolish man who is trying to escape, he shall see big jungles toward the East which are impossible for communication. Towards the West he shall see boundless ocean and, above all, in the main points of the North, South, our Nippon Armies are guarding. You will easily understand the difficulty of complete escape. A few such cases of ill-omened matters which happened in Singapore (execution of over a thousand Chinese civilians) shall prove the above and you should not repeat such foolish things although it is a lost chance after great embarrassment.

(4) Hereafter, I shall require all of you to work as nobody is permitted to do nothing and eat at the present. In addition, the Imperial Japanese have great work to promote at the places newly occupied by them, and this is an essential and important matter. At the time of such shortness of materials your lives are preserved by the military, and all of you must award them with your labor. By the hand of the Nippon Army Railway Construction Corps to connect Thailand and Burma, the work has started to the great interest of the world. There are deep jungles where no man ever came to clear them by cutting the trees. There are also countless difficulties and suffering, but you shall have the honor to join in this great work which was never done before, and you shall also do your best effort. I shall investigate and check carefully about your coming back, attendance so that all of you except those who are unable to work shall be taken out for labor. At the same time I shall expect all of you to work earnestly and confidently henceforth you shall be guided by this motto.

Source: Robert S. La Forte and Ronald E. Marcello, eds., *Building the Death Railway: The Ordeal of American POWs in Burma, 1942–1945* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1993), 287–289. Reprinted with permission.

147. Mohandas Gandhi, "Message to America," October 31, 1942

Introduction

Although the Congress Party in India supported the Allied war effort, it also continued to call for the withdrawal of British rule from India as soon as possible. In the autumn of 1942 Mohandas Gandhi, who spearheaded the movement for Indian independence, appealed to Americans to support the demands of Indian nationalists as an important war measure.

Primary Source

As I am supposed to be the spirit behind the much discussed and equally well abused resolution of the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress on independence, it has become necessary for me to explain my position, for I am not unknown to you.

I have in America perhaps the largest number of friends in the West—not even excepting Great Britain. …

Moreover, you have given me a teacher in Thoreau, who furnished me through his essay on the "Duty of Civil Disobedience" scientific confirmation of what I was doing in South Africa. …

I invite you to read my formula of withdrawal or as it has been popularly called "Quit India" with this background. …

…I assert that I would not have asked my country to invite Great Britain to withdraw her rule over India irrespective of any demand to the contrary, if I had not seen at once that for the sake of Great Britain and the Allied cause it was necessary for Britain boldly to perform the duty of freeing India from bondage.

By that supreme act of justice Britain would have taken away all cause for the seething discontent of India. She will turn the growing ill will into

active good will. I submit that it is worth all the battleships and airships that your wonder working engineers and financial resources can produce.

I know that interested propaganda has filled your ears and eyes with distorted visions of the Congress position. I have been painted as a hypocrite and enemy of Britain under disguise. My demonstrable spirit of accommodation has been described as my inconsistency, proving me to be an utterly unreliable man. I am not going to burden this letter with proof in support of my assertions. If the credit which I have enjoyed in America will not stand me in good stead, nothing I may argue in self defense will carry conviction.

You have made common cause with Great Britain. You cannot therefore disown responsibility for anything that her representatives do in India. You will do a grievous wrong to the Allied cause, if you do not sift the Truth from the chaff whilst there is yet time. Just think of it. Is there anything wrong in the Congress demanding unconditional recognition of India's independence? It is being said: "But this is not the time." We say: This is the psychological moment for that recognition. For then and then only can there be irresistible opposition to Japanese aggression. It is of immense value to the Allied cause if it is also of equal value to India.

I want you to look upon the immediate recognition of India's independence as a war measure of first class magnitude.

Source: "Gandhi's Latest Message to America," ibiblio, October 31, 1942. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421031a.html.

148. White House News Release, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement Announcing the Opening of a Second Front in French North and West Africa, November 7, 1942

Introduction

In November 1942, Anglo-American forces under the overall command of U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower opened a second front against French

colonies in North Africa, including Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Although these areas were under the control of officials supposedly loyal to the collaborationist Vichy government in France, Allied leaders hoped that they would quickly come over to the Allied side. Roosevelt made a radio broadcast to the French people, appealing to them to support the invasion. He followed up these appeals with personal messages seeking support from the head of the French government, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, and the governors-general and commanders of the French colonies. He also sought the continued neutrality of the dictator of Spain, General Francisco Franco.

Primary Source

In order to forestall an invasion of Africa by Germany and Italy, which if successful, would constitute a direct threat to America across the comparatively narrow sea from Western Africa, a powerful American force equipped with adequate weapons of modern warfare and under American Command is today landing on the Mediterranean and Atlantic Coasts of the French Colonies in Africa.

The landing of this American Army is being assisted by the British Navy and air forces and it will, in the immediate future, be reinforced by a considerable number of divisions of the British Army.

This combined allied force, under American Command, in conjunction with the British campaign in Egypt is designed to prevent an occupation by the Axis armies of any part of Northern or Western Africa, and to deny to the aggressor nations a starting point from which to launch an attack against the Atlantic Coast of the Americas.

In addition, it provides an effective second front assistance to our heroic allies in Russia.

The French Government and the French people have been informed of the purpose of this expedition, and have been assured that the allies seek no territory and have no intention of interfering with friendly French Authorities in Africa.

The Government of France and the people of France and the French Possessions have been requested to cooperate with and assist the American expedition in its effort to repel the German and Italian international criminals,

and by so doing to liberate France and the French Empire from the Axis yoke.

This expedition will develop into a major effort by the Allied Nations and there is every expectation that it will be successful in repelling the planned German and Italian invasion of Africa and prove the first historic step to the liberation and restoration of France.

Source: "President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Statement Announcing the Opening of a Second Front in French North and West Africa," ibiblio, November 7, 1942, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421107b.html.

149. Enigma Code-Breaking in World War II: Recollections of Edward Thomas

Introduction

The Allies' ability to intercept and decrypt German, Italian, and Japanese military codes was a major advantage to them in World War II. Beginning in the spring of 1940, the British gradually broke those of Germany (Enigma) and Italy (Fish), while the Americans received a steady stream of intelligence from Japanese (Magic) intercepts. The overall code-breaking operations were known as Ultra. The headquarters of British operations of the Government Code and Cypher School was Bletchley Park, where teams of British and eventually American cryptographers lived in great seclusion and secrecy, working in huts in the mansion's spacious grounds. One of them was Edward Thomas, a young naval officer who joined Hut 3 at Bletchley Park in early 1942 after 18 months in Iceland as a naval intelligence officer.

Primary Source

In early 1942 some half-dozen naval officers knowing German were summoned to Bletchley's Naval Section. Current gossip at the Park had it that there were two explanations for this. One was that the Section's head, observing that Hut 3 boasted several individuals in RAF and Army uniform, wished to have some navy-clad folk about the place to impress visiting VIPs. The other was that officers with first-hand experience of the naval war might

be able to add a touch of verismo to the interpretation and analysis of the German naval Enigma decrypts then being done in Hut 4, mainly by men and women in civilian garb. We naval folk were soon to learn the supererogatory character of this second explanation. There was precious little that Hut 4's civilians did not know about how navies worked. Most of what I ever knew about the German navy came from those who had been working on the naval Enigma since it was first broken a year earlier.

I vividly remember the sense of shock produced on my first arrival at the Park by the grimness of its barbed-wire defences, by the cold and dinginess of its hutted accommodation, and by the clerk-work we were first set to do. But this was soon swept aside by the much greater shock of discovering the miracles that were being wrought at the Park. In Iceland I had been interrogating the survivors of the many merchant ships sunk in the, at first, highly successful offensive against the Atlantic convoys launched by the U-boats in March 1941. I had spent many hours trying to analyse their strength and tactics. I could have spared my pains. For I now discovered that all this, and everything else about the U-boats, was known with precision by those privy to the Enigma decrypts. Leafing through the files of past messages—for the dreaded Shark key for U-boats, that had been introduced a week before my arrival, was to defeat Hut 8's cryptographers for another ten months—I shivered at seeing the actual words of the signals passing between Admiral Dönitz and the boats under his command whose terrible work I had seen at first hand. …

I can place the date of my arrival in Hut 4 pretty exactly. It was shortly before 11 February 1942, the day of the famous "Channel Dash" of the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Prinz Eugen*. There was great commotion in the hut and cries of "Where's Harry? Harry will be furious!" Indeed he was. Harry Hinsley, whom we naval newcomers had already pin-pointed as perhaps the most knowledgeable of all those in Hut 4, flew in late in the afternoon scattering smiles, scarves, and stimulus in every direction, exclaiming, "It's happened again: whenever I take a day off something big blows up." There had, indeed, been good indications that the ships were about to move; but the Enigma settings of 10, 11, and 12 February, by a stroke of the ill luck which precipitated tragedy from time to time, were not solved until three days later.

Hinsley was a key figure in Hut 4. His uncanny ability to sense, from tiny

clues in the decrypts or the externals of the radio traffic, that something unusual was afoot was already legendary in the Park. He was well versed in the ways of navies, having more than once visited the Home Fleet in Scapa Flow to explain the workings of the Enigma to the Commander-in-Chief. He was a popular figure there and was known, as I later discovered when I joined the Home Fleet, as "the Cardinal." He was the chief channel for the exchange of ideas between the Naval Section and the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC). This capable—but not infallible—organization had already in 1940 rejected a suggestion by Hinsley which, if adopted, might have saved the aircraft carrier *Glorious*. On the other hand, during the "Channel Dash" it was smart work done in the OIC which contrived to use the decrypts to have the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau* mined off the Dutch coast with resounding strategic consequences. …

This episode coincided with the onset of Hut 8's ten-month-long inability to break into the newly introduced Shark. Severe losses of merchant ships were to follow, largely in consequence of this. But already by the end of 1941 a turning-point had been reached in the battle of the Atlantic. The evasive routing of convoys made possible by Hut 8's breaking of the naval Enigma in the spring of 1941 had, according to some historians' calculations, spared some three hundred merchant ships and so provided a cushion against the heavy losses yet to come. It also defeated Dönitz's offensive, which was intended to knock out Britain while the German armies disposed of Russia, so avoiding a two-front war. The six-months' long decline in sinkings also provided a crucial breathing-space during which the Allies could develop anti-submarine weapons and tactics, and get on with building more merchant ships. This victory, which saved Britain, was based entirely on the work of Bletchley Park. It was also responsible, though I did not know it at the time, for the great reduction in the number of survivors who passed through my hands in Iceland, reducing my work-load and making it possible for me to be released to Bletchley. …

We naval newcomers were at once impressed by the easy relations and lack of friction between those in, and out of, uniform. Despite the high tension of much of the work, a spirit of relaxation prevailed. Anyone of whatever rank or degree could approach anyone else, however venerable, with any idea or suggestion, however crazy. This was partly because those in uniform had mostly been selected from the same walks of life as the civilians

—scholarship, journalism, publishing, linguistics, and so forth—and partly because these were the people who saw most clearly what stood to be lost by a Hitler victory. All at the Park were determined to give their all to see this did not happen. Service officers gladly served under civilians, and vice versa. Dons from Oxford and Cambridge worked smoothly together. …

…Hut 3 [was] responsible for translating and elucidating the German Air Force and Army decrypts from Hut 6, for supporting its cryptanalysts, and for signalling the gist of the decrypts to operational Commands in the Mediterranean and, later, in other theatres. …New, fascinating, and exciting work was found for us. [German general Erwin] Rommel, fighting in Africa, depended on shipments of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies sent across the Mediterranean in convoys controlled by the Italians. His fortunes waxed or waned with the adequacy, or inadequacy, of his supplies. His most notable victories came when his logistic position was good; and his defeats when he was weakened through want of supplies. They were adequate when the fortunes of war permitted his convoys to arrive safely and in sufficient number: but he faltered when the RAF and Navy contrived to prevent this. His final defeat owed much to the sustained sinking of his supply ships. Bletchley played a big part in bringing this about.

Hut 6's decrypts told us a great deal about these convoy movements. One source was the Air Force Enigma which throughout 1941 had been revealing, albeit somewhat spasmodically, the instructions for their air escort. This intelligence had, for example, resulted in considerable disruption of the transport to Africa of the first of Rommel's armoured formations. The second and more important source was the Italian administration machine cipher, C38m, broken by Hut 8 in the summer of 1941. This yielded, amongst other things, advance warning of the sailing dates, routes, and composition of virtually all trans-Mediterranean supply convoys. It also threw occasional light on Italian main-fleet movements. During 1941 the gist of the relevant Enigma decrypts had been signalled by Hut 3 to the Mediterranean authorities by the SCU/SLU channel, while that of the C38m decrypts had been sent by a part-naval, part-civilian processing watch in Hut 4 separately to Malta and elsewhere. An outstanding result of these messages had been a spate of sinkings in late 1941 which played a big part in Rommel's retreat to El Agheila at that time.

It was probably a coincidence that, at the time of the Hut 3 reorganization

of early 1942, a twenty-four-hour watch of naval officers—one of them a regular—was set up and became an integral part of that hut. Called 3N, one of its jobs was to provide advice, hitherto lacking, to the watch on naval problems arising from the Army–Air Force decrypts. Its other and more important task was to co-ordinate the shipping intelligence from these decrypts with what came out of the C38m. To bring this about 3N and Hut 4's Italian watch became virtually a single team, the former being responsible for the final shape of the outgoing signals—and for taking on the chin any riposte from bewildered recipients at the other end (which was seldom). This development came at a bad time for the British in the Mediterranean. The Axis had greatly strengthened its convoy defences and Malta was all but immobilized by the attacks of the newly arrived Luftflotte 2. Axis convoys were getting through wholesale, and opportunities for attacking them were much reduced. Rommel's recovery in January 1942 was made possible by these developments. Every scrap of intelligence became doubly valuable. The co-ordination of the two sources came at the right moment. …

The Air Force Enigma, unlike the C38m, would sometimes indicate the importance—to the German Air Force, of course—of a given convoy, occasionally specifying that it carried urgent supplies of fuel or ammunition. Though these indications were made only in general terms, they were invaluable to the attack planners. From about August 1942 Hut 6 regularly broke the Chaffinch key of the German Army in Africa and this provided, as well as much else of the highest importance, precise details of cargoes. Ships carrying operationally urgent supplies could now be distinguished from those with routine shipments. This made selective attack possible and greatly increased the effectiveness of the anti-ship campaign. An example of its effectiveness may be found in the Allies' ability, which came as a surprise to some historians, to feed the 250,000 prisoners trapped in Cape Bon during the final phase of the war in Africa. Ships known from the decrypts to be carrying rations had been spared; while those with cargoes of tanks, fuel, and ammunition had been selected for attack.

The arrival of Chaffinch, supplementing the former sources, coincided with that of Rommel on the Egyptian frontier. It now became doubly urgent to deprive him of supplies. It also coincided, to our great good fortune, with the recovery of Malta as a base for anti-shipping operations, and with the breaking by Hut 8 of the naval Enigma key used by the Germans in the

Mediterranean. Its yield made for much more efficient attacks on coastal supply shipping, on which Rommel, far from his supply bases and convoy terminals, now largely depended. All this sharply increased the pace of our work. Rommel clamoured for fuel, and attacks on tanker convoys were now given highest priority. Many were successful. Those during August 1942 were largely responsible for his failure at Alam Haifa. After the war I found my initials at the bottom of the signals giving details of the three supremely important tanker movements at the time of the October battle of El Alamein. Their sinking was largely responsible for Rommel's long and halting retreat westwards. I well remember the frustration that exploded from our Hut 3 colleagues at Montgomery's failure to overtake and destroy him. I had not seen such a demonstration since the Knightsbridge fighting six months earlier, when the Eighth Army advanced against an anti-tank trap at the so-called "Cauldron" position and lost heavily. Hut 3 believed that it had provided full details of Rommel's intentions on this occasion.

The Hut 4/3N routine continued until the final victory at Cape Bon. It seemed scarcely credible that the Axis could have sufficient ships left unsunk to succour the fighting in Tunisia. But they did. And the pressure continued right up to the end.

Source: Edward Thomas, "A Naval Officer in Hut 3," in *Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park*, edited by F. H. Hinsley and A. Stripp, 42–49 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

150. A. Philip Randolph, "Why Should We March?" November 1942

Introduction

Even after Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, supposedly banning racial discrimination by any business in receipt of government wartime contracts, discriminatory practices and segregation remained entrenched in employment and the armed services. Black protests and the March on Washington Movement continued until March 1946. In late 1942

A. Philip Randolph, head of the Congress on Racial Equality and the group's chief spokesperson, justified his activist tactics.

Primary Source

Though I have found no Negroes who want to see the United Nations lose this war, I have found many who, before the war ends, want to see the stuffing knocked out of white supremacy and of empire over subject peoples. American Negroes, involved as we are in the general issues of the conflict, are confronted not with a choice but with the challenge both to win democracy for ourselves at home and to help win the war for democracy the world over.

There is no escape from the horns of this dilemma. There ought not to be escape. For if the war for democracy is not won abroad, the fight for democracy cannot be won at home. If this war cannot be won for the white peoples, it will not be won for the darker races.

Conversely, if freedom and equality are not vouchsafed the peoples of color, the war for democracy will not be won. Unless this double-barreled thesis is accepted and applied, the darker races will never wholeheartedly fight for the victory of the United Nations. That is why those familiar with the thinking of the American Negro have sensed his lack of enthusiasm, whether among the educated or uneducated, rich or poor, professional or nonprofessional, religious or secular, rural or urban, north, south, east or west.

That is why questions are being raised by Negroes in church, labor union, and fraternal society; in poolroom, barbershop, schoolroom, hospital, hair-dressing parlor; on college campus, railroad, and bus. One can hear such questions asked as these: What have Negroes to fight for? What's the difference between Hitler and that "cracker" [Governor Eugene] Talmadge of Georgia? Why has a man got to be Jim Crowed to die for democracy? If you haven't got democracy yourself, how can you carry it to somebody else?

What are the reasons for this state of mind? The answer is: discrimination, segregation, Jim Crow. Witness the navy, the army, the air corps; and also government services at Washington. In many parts of the South, Negroes in Uncle Sam's uniform are being put upon, mobbed, sometimes even shot down by civilian and military police, and on occasion

lynched. Vested political interests in race prejudice are so deeply entrenched that to them winning the war against Hitler is secondary to preventing Negroes from winning democracy for themselves. This is worth many divisions to Hitler and Hirohito. While labor, business, and farm are subjected to ceilings and floors and not allowed to carry on as usual, these interests trade in the dangerous business of race hate as usual.

When the defense program began and billions of the taxpayers' money were appropriated for guns, ships, tanks and bombs, Negroes presented themselves for work only to be given the cold shoulder. North as well as South, and despite their qualifications, Negroes were denied skilled employment. Not until their wrath and indignation took the form of a proposed protest march on Washington, scheduled for July 1, 1941, did things begin to move in the form of defense jobs for Negroes. The march was postponed by the timely issuance (June 25, 1941) of the famous Executive Order No. 8802 by President Roosevelt. But this order and the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, established thereunder, have as yet only scratched the surface by way of eliminating discriminations on account of race or color in war industry. Both management and labor unions in too many places and in too many ways are still drawing the color line.

It is to meet this situation squarely with direct action that the March on Washington Movement launched its present program of protest mass meetings. Twenty thousand were in attendance at Madison Square Garden, June 16; sixteen thousand in the Coliseum in Chicago, June 26; nine thousand in the City Auditorium of St. Louis, August 14. Meetings of such magnitude were unprecedented among Negroes. The vast throngs were drawn from all walks and levels of Negro life—businessmen, teachers, laundry workers, Pullman porters, waiters, and red caps; preachers, crapshooters, and social workers; jitterbugs and Ph.D's. They came and sat in silence, thinking, applauding only when they considered the truth was told, when they felt strongly that something was going to be done about it.

The March on Washington is essentially a movement of the people. It is all Negro and pro-Negro, but not for that reason anti-white or anti-Semitic, or anti-Catholic, or anti-foreign, or anti-labor. Its major weapon is the non-violent demonstration of Negro mass power. Negro leadership has united back of its drive for jobs and justice. "Whether Negroes should march on Washington, and if so, when?" will be the focus of a forthcoming national

conference. For the plan of a protest march has not been abandoned. Its purpose would be to demonstrate that American Negroes are in deadly earnest, and all out for their full rights. No power on earth can cause them today to abandon their fight to wipe out every vestige of second class citizenship and the dual standards that plague them.

A community is democratic only when the humblest and weakest person can enjoy the highest civil, economic, and social rights that the biggest and most powerful possess. To trample on these rights of both Negroes and poor whites is such a commonplace in the South that it takes readily to anti-social, anti-labor, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic propaganda. It was because of laxness in enforcing the Weimar constitution in republican Germany that Nazism made headway. Oppression of the Negroes in the United States, like suppression of the Jews in Germany, may open the way for a fascist dictatorship.

By fighting for their rights now, American Negroes are helping to make America a moral and spiritual arsenal of democracy. Their fight against the poll tax, against lynch law, segregation, and Jim Crow, their fight for economic, political, and social equality, thus becomes part of the global war for freedom.

PROGRAM OF THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON MOVEMENT

1. We demand, in the interest of national unity, the abrogation of every law which makes a distinction in treatment between citizens based on religion, creed, color, or national origin. This means an end to Jim Crow in education, in housing, in transportation, and in every other social, economic, and political privilege; and especially, we demand, in the capital of the nation, an end to segregation in public places and in public institutions.

2. We demand legislation to enforce the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, so that the full weight of the national government may be used for the protection of life and thereby may end the disgrace of lynching.

3. We demand the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the enactment of the Pepper Poll Tax bill so that all barriers in the exercise of the suffrage are eliminated.

4. We demand the abolition of segregation and discrimination in the army, navy, marine corps, air corps, and all other branches of national defense.

5. We demand an end to the discrimination in jobs and job training. Further, we demand that the FEPC be made a permanent administrative agency of the U.S. Government and that it be given power to enforce its decisions based on its findings.

6. We demand that federal funds be withheld from any agency which practices discrimination in the use of such funds.

7. We demand colored and minority group representation on all administrative agencies so that these groups may have recognition of their democratic right to participate in formulating policies.

8. We demand representation for the colored and minority racial groups on all missions, political and technical, which will be sent to the peace conference so that the interests of all people everywhere may be fully recognized and justly provided for in the post-war settlement.

Source: A. Philip Randolph, "Why Should We March?," *Survey Graphic* 31 (November 1942): 488–489.

151. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Women in the War, 1942

Introduction

The left-wing American activist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was an energetic member of the American Communist Party, which published her 1942 pamphlet urging women to contribute to the American war effort. Flynn's exhortations exemplified not only the new demands the war made on women

but also the united front against fascism, which, after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the international communist movement urged upon its members. Flynn also urged that both women and American blacks should permanently increase their participation in the labor force and that the American labor movement make a concerted effort to unionize women and blacks and drop its discrimination against them. After the war, neither of these hopes would be entirely fulfilled.

Primary Source

We American women, like the Chinese, British, and Soviet women, will work till we drop and fight till we die to defend our beautiful country and our democratic liberties from the brutish ideology of the Nazis. We are not called upon to engage in actual combat. …

Today it is more useful and just as heroic to *make arms* for our fighting forces and our brave allies. Our main tasks are on the home front. Eighteen people are required at work to keep one fighter on the field at sea, or in the air. Women's work is manifold today. It includes industry, civilian defense, politics, the labor unions, and as trained auxiliaries to the armed forces. General H. H. Kitchener said in the last war: "If the women of either side should stop their war work, that side would lose." This is even more evident today. The women of the nation are essential to winning the war. They are the reservoir of labor. In ever-increasing numbers women will be called out of the kitchen onto the assembly line. It is a matter of patriotism, necessity, and arithmetic. Women are cheerfully answering the call.

Our armed forces are expected to reach ten million in 1943. They are drawn mainly out of production. Their needs take precedence. They must be fed, clothed, shod, trained, transported, given tanks, guns, airplanes, bullets, bombs, Jeeps, ships, parachutes, and myriad other essentials. Civilian needs must also be adequately met to keep our home-front forces healthy and efficient. It is estimated that fifty-eight million workers will be required in 1943. War Chief [Paul V. McNutt, head of the War Production Board] announces that eighteen million must be women or five million more than are employed today. *One out of six able-bodied women, over eighteen years old, will be in war jobs within the next year*. …

Prejudices break down in a national crisis. Women and the Negro people must be given the right to show their mettle as workers. Work is not man's versus women's, any more than it is white's versus Negro's, or native-born's versus foreign-born's, or Christian's versus Jew's. Such a characterization as "male, white, Christian, native born" is typically Nazi, repugnant to American concepts of democracy. Women's role in industry, like that of the Negro people, is not of a temporary nature. War emergency accelerates the entry of women into industry. But there were ten million employed in 1930, two and a half million more than in 1920. Many more will remain in industry after this war than were there before, especially in new industries. …

The Negro people and women must have permanent access to all jobs and professions. This is democracy. To deny it is to disrupt national unity and cripple production in a critical war period. Victory is at stake. …

When women delegates at auto, steel, and other conventions insist that women's problems are today the concern of the whole labor movement, they are absolutely right. *There are over twelve million unorganized women workers in America today. This figure nearly equals the total membership of all existing trade unions put together.* In other words, organized labor could double its strength and influence by organizing all the women workers now outside its ranks. …

If women workers remain unorganized, the labor unions will have themselves to blame. The dire results of neglect will most directly affect the women. It will lower their standards, deprive them of strength to defend themselves, and weaken their morale as workers in a war period—and after. It will make them ready prey for anti-union schemes such as company unionism. In addition to the disastrous effects upon the women workers, labor unions must face the reality that the security of already established standards, the guarantee of hard-fought gains, the very existence of some unions depend upon enlisting these new workers. As the labor composition changes, it must either be absorbed in the union or the union is thereby weakened. Several million male trade unionists are away in our armed forces. More will follow. Not only the jobs they vacate but the unions they build will depend upon the women they leave behind them. …

It is likewise a disgrace that some A. F. of L. [American Federation of Labor] and independent unions adhere stubbornly to their bars against Negroes as members. This automatically excludes them from occupations

where a closed shop or union contract exists. Or they are denied equal status, discouraged from joining, or "Jim Crowed" into separate locals, deprived of the right to hold office or to be delegates to conventions. Jurisdictional rights are invoked by the offending unions to resist efforts of the A. F. of L. Council to remedy the situation—just as Southern states invoke "state's rights" to resist abolition of poll-tax restrictions on voting and national antilynching legislation. The C.I.O. [Committee on Industrial Organization] has taken a strong position opposing all forms of discrimination against Negro workers. It encourages Negro membership on an equal basis and has many Negro organizers and officials. C.I.O. contracts in iron and steel, maritime and mining industries, among others, have eliminated wage differentials between Negroes and whites on similar jobs. The result is that the C.I.O. has a large Negro membership, and Negroes have proven themselves efficient workers, loyal and intelligent members, and capable leaders.

Eternal vigilance is the price of democracy. The best resolutions and declarations of principle must be put in practice or they are empty words, "full of sound and fury—signifying nothing." The doubly shameful and un-American discrimination against Negro women, as Negroes and as women, is widespread. It demands the most emphatic protest and actions by women's organizations, by trade unions, and by government agencies. Despicable and widespread discrimination still prevails in spite of President Roosevelt's Order No. 8802, which specifically bars discrimination against Negroes in plants working on war orders. …

To summarize—the vital needs of American women workers to help win the war are as follows:

Equal opportunity to work for all women (Negro and white) at all occupations.
Adequate training for jobs, under government and union supervision.
Equal pay for equal work.
Safe and sanitary shop conditions.
Equal membership, protection by and participation in labor unions.
Child-care centers, with federal funds and supervision.
Adequate modern housing. …

The voice of women must be heard in the highest councils of the trade union movement and the government. Let us overcome our past shortcomings now in the white heat of a war for human liberation. There should be more than 6 women out of 531 in Congress. England has 13 women members in a Parliament of 615. The Supreme Soviet has 50 percent women, from all

regions and occupations. Labor, as the vanguard of progressive forces in our country, can blaze a trail, set an example.

Source: Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, eds., *American Women in a World at War: Contemporary Accounts from World War II* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), 16–24; originally Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, *Women in the War* (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1942). Reprinted with permission of the Communist Party of the United States, International Publishers Company.

152. Oral History of Fanny Christina Hill

Introduction

World War II opened new opportunities for all women, black and white alike. Fanny Christina Hill was a Texas-born black woman, age 24 in 1940, who worked as a domestic servant in California until she took a job at the North American Aircraft plant. Although she stopped work late in the war to have a child, she returned to North American Aircraft in 1946, where she remained until she retired in 1980.

Primary Source

Most of the men was gone, and they wasn't hiring too many men unless they had a good excuse. Most of the women was in my bracket, five or six years younger or older. I was twenty-four. There was a black girl that hired in with me. I went to work the next day, sixty cents an hour.

I think I stayed at the school for about four weeks. They only taught you shooting and bucking rivets and how to drill the holes and to file. You had to use a hammer for certain things. After a couple of whiles, you worked on the real thing. But you were supervised so you didn't make a mess. …

I was a good student, if I do say so myself. But I have found out through life, sometimes even if you're good, you just don't get the breaks if the color's not right. I could see where they made a difference in placing you in certain jobs. They had fifteen or twenty departments [in the factory], but all the Negroes went to Department 17 because there was nothing but shooting and bucking rivets. You stood on one side of the panel and your partner stood on this side, and he would shoot the rivets with a gun and you'd buck them

with the bar. That was about the size of it. I just didn't like it. I didn't think I could stay there with all this shooting and a'bucking and a'jumping and a'bumping. I stayed in it about two or three weeks and then I decided I did *not* like that. I went and told my foreman and he didn't do anything about it, so I decided I'd leave.

While I was standing out on the railroad track, I ran into somebody else out there fussing also. I went over to the union and they told me what to do. I went back inside and they sent me to another department where you did bench work and I liked that much better. You had a little small jig that you would work on and you just drilled out holes. Sometimes you would rout them or you would scribe them and then you'd cut them with a cutters.

I must have stayed there nearly a year, and then they put me over in another department, "Plastics." It was the tail section of the B-Bomber, the Billy Mitchell Bomber. I put a little part in the gun sight. You had a little ratchet set and you would screw it in there. Then I cleaned the top of the glass off and put a piece of paper over it to seal it off to go to the next section. I worked over there until the end of the war. Well, not quite the end, because I got pregnant, and while I was off having the baby the war was over. …

I started working in April and before Thanksgiving, my sister and I decided we'd buy a house instead of renting this room. The people was getting a little hanky-panky with you; they was going up on the rent. So she bought the house in her name and I loaned her some money. The house only cost four thousand dollars with four hundred dollars down. It was two houses on the lot, and we stayed in the little small one-bedroom house in the back. I stayed in the living room part before my husband came home and she stayed in the bedroom. I bought the furniture to go in the house, which was the stove and the refrigerator, and we had our old bedroom sets shipped from Texas [where they had grown up]. I worked the day shift and my sister worked the night shift. I worked ten hours a day for five days a week. Or did I work on a Saturday? I don't remember, but know it was ten hours a day. I'd get up in the morning, take a bath, come to the kitchen, fix my lunch—I always liked a fresh fixed lunch—get my breakfast, and then stand outside for the ride to come by. I always managed to get someone that liked to go to work slightly early. I carried my crocheting and knitting with me.

You had a spot where you always stayed around, close to where you worked, because when the whistle blew, you wanted to be ready to get up and

go to where you worked. The leadman always come by and give you a job to do or you already had one that was a hangover from the day before. So you had a general idea what you was going to do each day. …

Some weeks I brought home twenty-six dollars, some weeks sixteen dollars. Then it gradually went up to thirty dollars, then it went up a little bit more and a little bit more. And I learned somewhere along the line that in order to make a good move you gotta make some money. You don't make the same amount everyday. You have some days good, sometimes bad. Whatever you make you're supposed to save some. I was also getting that fifty dollars a month from my husband and that I saved straight away. I was planning on buying a home and a car. And I was going to go back to school. My husband came back, but I never was laid off, so I just never found it necessary to look for another job or to go to school for another job.

I was still living over on Compton Avenue with my sister in this small little back house when my husband got home. Then, when Beverly [her daughter] was born, my sister moved in the front house and we stayed in the back house. …

I worked up until the end of March [1945] and then I took off. Beverly was born the twenty-first of June. I'd planned to come back somewhere in the last of August. I went to verify the fact that I did come back, so that did not go on my record that I didn't just quit. But they laid off a lot of people, most of them, because the war was over.

It didn't bother me much—not thinking about it jobwise. I was just glad that the war was over. I didn't feel bad because my husband had a job and he also was eligible to go to school with his GI bill. So I really didn't have too many plans—which I wish I had had. I would have tore out page one and fixed it differently; put my version of page one in there.

I went and got me a job doing day work. That means you go to a person's house and clean up for one day out of the week and then you go to the next one and clean up. I did that a couple of times and I discovered I didn't like that so hot. Then I got me a job downtown working in a little factory where you do weaving—burned clothes and stuff like that. I learned to do that real good. It didn't pay too much but it paid enough to get me going, seventy-five cents or about like that.

When North American called me back, was I a happy soul! I dropped that job and went back. That was a dollar an hour. So, from sixty cents an hour,

when I first hired in there, up to one dollar. That wasn't traveling fast, but it was better than anything else because you had hours to work by and you had benefits and you come home at night with your family. So it was a good deal.

It made me live better. I really did. We always say that Lincoln took the [cotton] bale off the Negroes. I think there is a statue up there in Washington, D.C., where he's lifting something off the Negro. Well, my sister always said —that's why you can't interview her because she's so radical—"Hitler was the one that got us out of the white folks' kitchen."

Source: Sherna Berger Gluck, ed., *Rosie the Riveter Revisited* (Boston: Twayne, 1987), 37–42. Reprinted by permission of Sherna Berger Gluck.

153. Russia's "Night Witches": Reminiscences of Lieutenant Olga Lisikova, Pilot, Commander of the Aircraft

Introduction

Even though British and American women served in their countries' armed forces, they were normally restricted to noncombatant jobs. Those who flew, for example, did so as ferry pilots, delivering airplanes or supplies. After the German invasion of June 1941, however, the Soviet Union raised three combat regiments of women fliers, most of them pilots who had trained in civil aviation before the war. The "night witches" flew throughout the war on both bomber and fighter missions, over 30,000 combat sorties in all. Many of the ground crew of these units were also women. The most prominent of these pilots was Major Marina Raskova, who died in an air crash.

By no means did all such fliers serve in all-women units. The redoubtable Lieutenant Olga Lisikova, born into a family of intellectuals in the Russian Far East in 1917, flew with the 1st Regiment, whose members were mostly men. She had entered flying school in 1937. During the war, she soon became commander of an otherwise all-male crew. Eventually she joined the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army General Staff.

Primary Source

Sixteen of us girls went to flying school, where we were issued flying uniforms. I put mine on, and it was terrible—I looked like a monster! It was so awfully oversized that I couldn't move in it. I cut it drastically, as well as the high boots. Out of the remainder I appeared in the formation, and I was given ten days in the guardhouse for destroying state property! The other girls decided to support me and express their solidarity, and the next day they all appeared for roll call in their altered uniforms. The commander of the battalion could do nothing but release me from the guardhouse. …

[After retraining in 1940] I was transferred to the Flying Division of Special Role, which was assigned to the State Committee of Soviet Defense. This organization completed missions on all fronts, from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea. The main base was at the Vnukovo airdrome, not far from Moscow. When we were fulfilling our combat missions, we flew out of auxiliary airfields closer to the front lines or to the location of our mission. The pilots were experienced airline pilots with many hours. Our missions were to bail out paratroopers, drop supplies for encircled troops, transport fuel and spare parts to advancing troops, fly to the partisans in the rear, drop intelligence officers to the enemy rear, and bring supplies to besieged Leningrad. …

In a month I was appointed commander of the aircraft. But a few days later I was ordered to fly to Siberia to be assigned as a copilot ferrying aircraft from America. It turned out that the commander of my division learned that I, a woman, was flying in his division, and he was determined to get rid of me. But then he was ordered to another command, and my chief rescinded the order. …

I actively took part in all the combat missions my division carried out. The new commander of the division summoned me and told me that I, being the only female pilot in the division, had a great responsibility, because all eyes were on me. Each flight, every landing was closely watched by the staff. And where the failure of a male pilot could pass unnoticed, mine would be always under surveillance. Any blunder, or worse—an accident—would not serve me well. He cautioned me to be demanding of myself. After that talk I

changed drastically; I didn't look or act like myself. Everything congested inside; I became very strict with myself and my subordinates. Before, I would go to rest and relax after a mission; now, I went to the navigators' room and scrupulously studied the route of the next mission. When the crew went to see a movie, I went to the meteorological station and studied the weather reports. I would do everything better than the men. …

We were transferred to a division of the long-distance flights, closer to the front. After this redeployment, the commanding staff of the division invited me to a dinner with their major-general at the head of table. As the dinner came to an end, I noticed the general's staff were quietly sneaking out of the room. I tried to follow their example, but I was stopped by the commander of the division. I understood that the general wanted to bed me down. Yes, I was only a lieutenant, but apart from that I was Olga Lisikova, and it was impossible to bed me down. His pressure was persistent. I had to think very fast, because nobody would dare to come to my rescue. In desperation I said, "I fly with my husband in my crew!" and he was taken aback. He didn't expect to hear that. He released me; I immediately rushed out and found the radio operator and mechanic of my crew. I didn't make explanations. I, as commander of the crew, ordered that one of them was to be my fictitious husband and gave them my word of honor that nobody would ever learn the truth! Then I released them.

I couldn't sleep all night; I couldn't believe any commander would behave like that. I thought, Were generals allowed to do anything that came to mind? I couldn't justify his behavior. The only explanation that seemed appropriate was that I was really very attractive in my youth. Thank God we flew away early the next morning.

I already had 120 combat missions when our division began receiving the C-47 aircraft. It was a most sophisticated plane, beyond any expectations. We pilots didn't even have to master it—it was perfect and flew itself! Before I was assigned a mission in it, I made one check flight. My next flight was a combat mission, to drop paratroopers to liberate Kiev. Later, when Kiev had been liberated, I flew there again. There were few planes on the landing strip, and in the distance I saw an aircraft of unusual shape, like a cigar. I realized

at once that it was an American B-29. I taxied and parked next to it. My radio operator, tail gunner, and I were invited aboard by the American crew. We spoke different languages, but my mechanic knew German and an American spoke it also; thus, the communication took place. The outside of the aircraft was no surprise, but when you got into it, touched it, and saw the most sophisticated equipment, you realized that it was the most perfect aircraft design. The Americans received us very warmly. The news that we flew the American C-47 made them respect us more. The most astonishing news for them was that I, a woman, was commander of the plane. They couldn't believe it. It was an instant reaction—I suggested that I would fly them in my plane to prove it! I put the crew in the navigator compartment and placed the copilot in the right seat beside me. The flight was short, six or seven minutes, but it was hilarious. After that I was strictly reprimanded by my commander.

By the time I had made 200 combat missions, I was entrusted at last to fly in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. I will tell you about one of those flights. … I was assigned a mission to fly to the enemy rear and drop supplies to the partisans. I crossed the front line at 4,000 meters, and at the appointed place began a dive. The altimeter showed me to be lower and lower, but I could see nothing through the clouds. Finally the altitude read zero and then less than that. Judging by the meter I was to be deep in the soil, but still I held the dive. I couldn't return to base without completing my mission: I didn't want to be reproached after the flight that I hadn't fulfilled the risky mission only because I was a coward, because I was a woman. Then I glimpsed the ground, and below me was the target where we were to drop the cargo. The area was covered with dense, patchy fog. We dropped the supplies to the partisans and returned to base.

When we returned we learned that all the crews had turned back, not having managed to fulfill the mission. Everyone was astonished. How could I, a woman, do what other male pilots hadn't managed to accomplish? The division commander said he would promote me to be awarded the Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union, but I never received that award, because my crew consisted of males. If the crew had been female, it would have been awarded.

I flew with the division almost the whole war and completed 280 combat missions, but I was never awarded a single order. Although I was promoted for awards, it was always denied. The deputy commander of our division staff told me that it was totally his fault and responsibility that I had never been given an order. He had decided that I might get a swelled head in the purely male division if I had been given a high award. Instead, he thought it quite healthy for stories about me to be published in the press. Twenty years later, when I met him at the reunion of our division, I saw that his breast was pinned with high awards. I told him that during the whole war I had made more than 280 combat flights as commander of the aircraft, while he had all the traces of distinction on his body although he hadn't made a single combat flight.

Source: Anne Noggle, *A Dance with Death: Soviet Airwomen in World War II* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1994), 238–245.

154. Extract from the Beveridge Report, December 1942

Introduction

In all European countries, the experience of fighting the war and the sacrifices that ordinary people were obliged to make for that objective encouraged the perspective that after the war, states must provide for the welfare of all citizens. The presence of labor representatives in the coalition governments fighting the war reinforced this view. In 1942 the British government published the Beveridge Report, written by Sir William Beveridge, head of the London School of Economics, that laid the foundations of the postwar British welfare state.

Primary Source

THREE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF RECOMMENDATIONS

6. In proceeding from this first comprehensive survey of social insurance to the next task—of making recommendations—three guiding principles may be

laid down at the outset.

7. The first principle is that any proposals for the future, while they should use to the full the experience gathered in the past, should not be restricted by consideration of sectional interests established in the obtaining of that experience. Now, when the war is abolishing landmarks of every kind, is the opportunity for using experience in a clear field. A revolutionary moment in the world's history is a time for revolutions, not for patching.

8. The second principle is that organisation of social insurance should be treated as one part only of a comprehensive policy of social progress. Social insurance fully developed may provide income security; it is an attack upon Want. But Want is one only of five giants on the road of reconstruction and in some ways the easiest to attack. The others are Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness.

9. The third principle is that social security must be achieved by co-operation between the State and the individual. The State should offer security for service and contribution. The State in organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, responsibility; in establishing a national minimum, it should leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family.

10. The Plan for Social Security set out in this Report is built upon these principles. It uses experience but is not tied by experience. It is put forward as a limited contribution to a wider social policy, though as something that could be achieved now without waiting for the whole of that policy. It is, first and foremost, a plan of insurance—of giving in return for contributions benefits up to subsistence level, as of right and without means test, so that individuals may build freely upon it.

THE WAY TO FREEDOM FROM WANT

11. The work of the Inter-departmental Committee began with a review of existing schemes of social insurance and allied services. The Plan for Social Security, with which that work ends, starts from a diagnosis of want—of the circumstances in which, in the years just preceding the present war families

and individuals in Britain might lack the means of healthy subsistence. During those years impartial scientific authorities made social surveys of the conditions of life in a number of principal towns in Britain, including London, Liverpool, Sheffield, Plymouth, Southampton, York and Bristol. They determined the proportions of the people in each town whose means were below the standard assumed to be necessary for subsistence, and they analysed the extent and causes of that deficiency. From each of these social surveys the same broad result emerges. Of all the want shown by the surveys, from three-quarters to five-sixths, according to the precise standard chosen for want, was due to interruption or loss of earning power. Practically the whole of the remaining one-quarter to one-sixth was due to failure to relate income during earning to the size of the family. These surveys were made before the introduction of supplementary pensions had reduced the amount of poverty amongst old persons. But this does not affect the main conclusion to be drawn from these surveys: abolition of want requires a double re-distribution of income, through social insurance and by family needs.

12. Abolition of want requires, first, improvement of State insurance, that is to say provision against interruption and loss of earning power. All the principal causes of interruption or loss of earnings are now the subject of schemes of social insurance. If, in spite of these schemes, so many persons unemployed or sick or old or widowed are found to be without adequate income for subsistence according to the standards adopted in the social surveys, this means that the benefits amount to less than subsistence by those standards or do not last as long as the need, and that the assistance which supplements insurance is either insufficient in amount or available only on terms which make men unwilling to have recourse to it. None of the insurance benefits provided before the war were in fact designed with reference to the standards of the social surveys. Though unemployment benefit was not altogether out of relation to those standards, sickness and disablement benefit, old age pensions and widows' pensions were far below them, while workmen's compensation was below subsistence level for anyone who had family responsibilities or whose earnings in work were less than twice the amount needed for subsistence. To prevent interruption or destruction of earning power from leading to want, it is necessary to improve the present schemes of social insurance in three directions: by extension of

scope to cover persons now excluded, by extension of purposes to cover risks now excluded, and by raising the rates of benefit.

13. Abolition of want requires, second, adjustment of incomes, in periods of earning as well as in interruption of earning, to family needs, that is to say, in one form or another it requires allowances for children. Without such allowances as part of benefit or added to it, to make provision for large families, no social insurance against interruption of earnings can be adequate. But, if children's allowances are given only when earnings are interrupted and are not given during earning also, two evils are unavoidable. First, a substantial measure of acute want will remain among the lower paid workers as the accompaniment of large families. Second, in all such cases, income will be greater during unemployment or other interruptions of work than during work.

14. By a double re-distribution of income through social insurance and children's allowances, want, as defined in the social surveys, could have been abolished in Britain before the present war. As is shown in para. 445, the income available to the British people was ample for such a purpose. The Plan for Social Security set out in Part V of this Report takes abolition of want after this war as its aim. It includes as its main method compulsory social insurance, with national assistance and voluntary insurance as subsidiary methods. It assumes allowances for dependent children, as part of its background. The plan assumes also establishment of comprehensive health and rehabilitation services and maintenance of employment, that is to say avoidance of mass unemployment, as necessary conditions of success in social insurance. These three measures—of children's allowances, health and rehabilitation and maintenance of employment—are described as assumptions A, B and C of the plan; they fall partly within and partly without the plan extending into other fields of social policy. …

15. The plan is based on a diagnosis of want. It starts from facts, from the condition of the people as revealed by social surveys between the two wars. It takes account of two other facts about the British community, arising out of past movements of the birth rate and the death rate, which should dominate planning for its future. … The first of the two facts is the age constitution of

the population, making it certain that persons past the age that is now regarded as the end of working life will be a much larger proportion of the whole community than at any time in the past. The second fact is the low reproduction rate of the British community today: unless this rate is raised very materially in the near future, a rapid and continuous decline of the population cannot be prevented. The first fact makes it necessary to seek ways of postponing the age of retirement from work rather than of hastening it. The second fact makes it imperative to give first place in social expenditure to the care of childhood and to the safeguarding of maternity.

16. The provision to be made for old age represents the largest and most growing element in any social insurance scheme. … Briefly, the proposal is to introduce for all citizens adequate pensions without means test by stages over a transition period of twenty years, while providing immediate assistance pensions for persons requiring them. …

SUMMARY OF PLAN FOR SOCIAL SECURITY

17. The main feature of the Plan for Social Security is a scheme of social insurance against interruption and destruction of earning power and for special expenditure arising at birth, marriage or death. The scheme embodies six fundamental principles: flat rate of subsistence benefit; flat rate of contribution; unification of administrative responsibility; adequacy of benefit; comprehensiveness; and classification. … Based on [these principles] and in combination with national assistance and voluntary insurance as subsidiary methods, the aim of the Plan for Social Security is to make want under any circumstances unnecessary.

Source: Sir William Beveridge, *Social Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William Beveridge Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, November 1942* (London: HMSO, 1942), 6–9.

1943 DOCUMENTS

155. General Douglas MacArthur, Communiqué Announcing the End of the Papuan Campaign, January 24, 1943

Introduction

After six months of heavy fighting, in January 1943 Allied forces commanded by U.S. general Douglas MacArthur recaptured Papua from the Japanese. This event represented the first significant Allied land victory in the Pacific war. At the end of the campaign, MacArthur issued a communiqué summing up the operations of the previous six months.

Primary Source

The destruction of the remnants of the enemy forces in the Sanananda area concludes the Papuan campaign. The Horii Army has been annihilated. The outstanding military lesson of this campaign was the continuous calculated application of air power, inherent in the potentialities of every component of the Air Forces, employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops. The effect of the modern instrumentality was sharply accentuated by the geographical limitations of the theater. For months on end, air transport with constant fighter coverage moved complete infantry regiments and artillery battalions across the almost impenetrable mountains and jungles of Papua, and the reaches of the sea; transported field hospitals and other base installations to the front; supplied the troops and evacuated casualties. For hundreds of miles bombers provided all-around reconnaissance, protected the coast from hostile naval intervention, and blasted the way for the infantry as it drove forward. A new form of campaign was tested which points the way to the ultimate defeat of the enemy in the Pacific. The offensive and defensive power of the air and the adaptability, range and capacity of its transport in an effective combination with ground forces, represent tactical and strategical elements of a broadened conception of warfare that will permit the application of offensive power in swift, massive strokes, rather than the dilatory and costly island advance that some have assumed to be necessary in a theater where the enemy’s far-flung strongholds are dispersed throughout a vast expense of archipelagos. Air

forces and ground forces were welded together in Papua and when in sufficient strength with proper naval support, their indissoluble union points the way to victory through new and broadened strategic and tactical conceptions.

Source: Charles E. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific,* 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:98.

156. An American Bombing Raid on Düsseldorf: Robert S. Raymond to His Future Fiancée, January 27, 1943

Introduction

In the spring of 1940 Robert S. Raymond, a young American from Kansas City, volunteered to serve in the French Army. During the fall of France he was evacuated to Great Britain, where he joined the Royal Air Force and trained as a bomber pilot, flying 30 missions on Lancaster bombers. He then transferred to the U.S. Army Air Force, where he remained until the war ended. This letter to Betty, a friend who later became his wife, describes a major bombing raid over the German city of Düsseldorf from which he had just returned. It was written at midnight, when Raymond, though tired, was still too keyed up to sleep.

Primary Source

Have just returned from Düsseldorf, and sitting here in my quiet room, with Griffiths sleeping peacefully, it seems incredible that I was there only 4 hours ago. Griffiths's curly blonde head is little troubled by the experience of another bombing raid, but I am not yet sleepy and shall tell you about it, for memory, particularly mine, is a transient thing, and inevitably softens the clear-cut lines of any experience, however impressive.

Düsseldorf is a great industrial city situated in the Ruhr on the Rhine River, producing great quantities of vital war materials so badly needed by the Wehrmacht on all fronts. It is vulnerable in that the great river is an

outstanding landmark, enabling easy identification, and because it is less than 400 miles from England, making it possible for us to carry a much greater weight of bombs than, for instance, to Italy.

We took off under low cloud with the promise of better weather over the target and on our return. Climbed up through several cloud layers just as the sun was tinting them with the last red colours of the day, and so up over the North Sea with George flying. Some flak over the Dutch coast was sent up to our height through a solid layer of cloud, and from then on we were never entirely free from it until we had arrived within a few minutes of the target, when I remarked to Watt that, although we were quite sure of our position, it looked too quiet to be entirely healthy. But we were evidently the first to arrive, and the defenses were lying doggo in the hope that we would either pass over and not bother them or, being uncertain of our position, fail to locate the city. Neither happened; being quite sure of where we were even above the scattered cloud, we ran straight in and planted our cookie and incendiaries (more than 1000 of them) and, since, the scattered cloud below made a good photo of the result improbable, I turned away immediately.

Watt said, “Bomb’s gone.”

Immediately after the cookie blossomed into a great red mushroom glow and the string of incendiaries began to sprinkle on the ground, more than 50 searchlights concentrated on the place where we should have been after dropping that load, and the flak was bursting right at the apex of the searchlight cone. The ground defenses had been quietly plotting our track all the while, and now that they knew they were to be the “Target for tonight,” they threw up everything they had. I’m afraid we left our companions a hard row to hoe, but we have faced the same situation elsewhere.

Flak all the way to the coast, and finally the blessed emptiness of the lonely North Sea, where we found ice forming on our wings when we attempted to descend through the cloud, and so stayed upstairs at lower temperatures until we were over England and Price could get us the latest weather report from our Base.

An hour before we arrived the cloud ceiling was 4,000 feet and closing down rapidly. By the time we got there, it was down to 800 feet with rain falling and the air gusty and full of pockets (air currents) that tossed us around like peas in an empty sack between 300 and 1,200 feet. Having just [censored] just before setting course from Base earlier in the evening, we

were even more cautious than usual. Discipline in the air is absolutely essential, for only the W.A.A.F. in the control tower knows where everyone is. Reviewing the situation now, I know that six months ago under such conditions I would most certainly have been listed as missing with my crew from this night's operations. But somewhere during my training I learned to fly confidently by instruments alone, and only that accuracy enabled me to maintain contact and land on the flarepath as smoothly and easily in darkness as it is possible to do during the day. All members of air-crew are trained, not born, for their jobs, and only hard work and practice enable any crew to live through an Operational tour. I've known so many who trusted to instinct, luck and fortune to carry them through. Each serves in more or less marginal situations, but eventually there can be no substitute. For that reason an Operational Crew of proven ability is a premium product and a valuable unit. They can be developed from average material, but somehow the sum of their abilities must be so integrated that the whole is something greater than the sum of its parts. And that is one of the reasons why I still enjoy flying a bomber.

Primarily, I suppose, it's based on vanity. We live a life of comparative life and leisure, are fed, clothed, housed and paid more than others, but when the chips are down, it's up to small units of 7 men each, to do in a few hours what would otherwise cost the lives of many thousands to accomplish. Our capacity for destruction is tremendous. God grant that in the days of peace to come we shall work as hard and be as zealous to rebuild and re-create the brave new world.

Several bursts of flak were so near tonight that the gunners still think we were hit, since we could not examine the plane adequately in the dark when we had parked it at the dispersal point, but we shall see tomorrow. …

My letters inevitably taper off to unconnected inconsequentials. Just remembered some sounds I would like to hear—the long, hollow whistle of a train—you, singing—birds on a spring morning—frogs at midnight—traffic on Main Street—the smooth patter of a salesman (with the goods)—wind in a pine forest—the K.C. [Kansas City] Philharmonic—a church choir—the clatter of a mowing machine—the rustle of tall corn—the drowsy hum of bees around a hive—the crackle of a wood fire—carpenters sawing and hammering—and many others, but most of all your voice.

Source: "Diary (4)" File, World War II Participants and Contemporaries Collection, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.

157. Final Declaration of the Casablanca Conference, February 12, 1943

Introduction

On January 14–24, 1943, British prime minister Winston Churchill and American President Franklin D. Roosevelt met at Casablanca, Morocco, a gathering also attended by the Free French leader Charles de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud, who represented the Vichy government. Joseph Stalin, the Soviet president, was invited but, in view of his country's critical wartime situation, declined to leave Russia. The Casablanca Conference first set the Allied war objective of demanding the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan—a policy intended in part to allay the fears of both Stalin and Chinese president Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) that their allies might desert them and make a separate peace. The conference's final declaration was not released until the following month, by which time all nations whose representatives had absented themselves from the conference were already familiar with its terms.

Primary Source

The decisions reached and the actual plans made at Casablanca were not confined to any one theater of war or to any one continent or ocean or sea. Before this year is out, it will be made known to the world—in actions rather than words—that the Casablanca Conference produced plenty of news; and it will be bad news for the Germans and Italians—and the Japanese.

We have lately concluded a long, hard battle in the Southwest Pacific and we have made notable gains. That battle started in the Solomons and New Guinea last summer. It has demonstrated our superior power in planes and, most importantly, in the fighting qualities of our individual soldiers and sailors.

American armed forces in the Southwest Pacific are receiving powerful aid from Australia and New Zealand and also directly from the British themselves.

We do not expect to spend the time it would take to bring Japan to final defeat merely by inching our way forward from island to island across the vast expanse of the Pacific.

Great and decisive actions against the Japanese will be taken to drive the invader from the soil of China. Important actions will be taken in the skies over China—and over Japan itself.

The discussions at Casablanca have been continued in Chungking with the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek or Jiang Jieshi] by General Arnold and have resulted in definite plans for offensive operations.

There are many roads which lead right to Tokyo. We shall neglect none of them.

In an attempt to ward off the inevitable disaster, the Axis propagandists are trying all of their old tricks in order to divide the United Nations. They seek to create the idea that if we win this war, Russia, England, China, and the United States are going to get into a cat-and-dog fight.

This is their final effort to turn one nation against another, in the vain hope that they may settle with one or two at a time—that any of us may be so gullible and so forgetful as to be duped into making "deals" at the expense of our Allies.

To these panicky attempts to escape the consequences of their crimes we say—all the United Nations say—that the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government or any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "Unconditional Surrender." In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders.

…

In the years of the American and French revolutions the fundamental principle guiding our democracies was established. The cornerstone of our whole democratic edifice was the principle that from the people and the people alone flows the authority of government.

It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, that the conquered populations of today be again the masters of their destiny. There

must be no doubt anywhere that it is the unalterable purpose of the United Nations to restore to conquered peoples their sacred rights.

Source: "Casablanca Conference 1943," The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/casablan.asp.

158. "The Four Policemen": Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, Memorandum of Conversation during a Meeting with Anthony Eden, March 27, 1943

Introduction

In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt described his concept of the future world order to visiting British foreign secretary Anthony Eden. The president envisaged that the greatest powers, the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and China, would act as the "four policemen" and between them would organize and dominate the rest of the world. Roosevelt was reluctant to permit the automatic return of the European powers to their former Asian colonies.

Primary Source

Subject: Eden Visit—Conference with the President, Anthony Eden, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, Viscount Halifax, Mr. Wm. Strang

…There was a general discussion about the organization of the United Nations after the war. The President and Welles were very emphatic that the United States could not be a member of any independent regional body such as a European Council; they felt that all the United Nations should be members of one body for the purposes of recommending policy; that this body should be world-wide in scope.

That there would be under this body regional councils with similar advisory powers made up of the nations geographically located in the regions; but, finally, that the real decisions should be made by the United

States, Great Britain, Russia and China, who would be the powers for many years to come that would have to police the world.

The President was very insistent with Eden that China should be a member, altho it was clear to me that Eden still was not convinced of the wisdom of the procedure. The President feels that China, in any serious conflict of policy with Russia, would undoubtedly line up on our side.

I said that Churchill's speech in which he advocated a purely European Council of Nations, had a very unfortunate effect over here. Eden said he was sure Churchill had not meant to exclude the United States and that he rather felt that Churchill spoke on the spur of the moment and that he, Eden, agreed that the United Nations should be organized on a global basis.

The whole idea of the trusteeship of mandated islands, etc. was discussed and the President and Eden seemed to be much closer together than they were at the beginning of their conferences on this policy.

The President made it clear that he did not want a commitment made in advance that all those colonies in the Far East should go back to the countries which owned or controlled them prior to the war. He specifically mentioned Timor, Portugal, Indo-China and France. He suggested that all the specific problems which Mr. Eden had raised in his visit here be referred to the State Department and they be asked to start exploratory discussions with the British or with any other country in regard to all of them.

I said I thought it would have a very bad effect, both in England and the United States, if the world got the impression that the United States and England were, together, planning the future of the world without consulting anyone else. Eden agreed to this and said the British were conducting direct conferences on matters that concerned them and Russia and he assumed we would do the same thing.

Source: "Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt regarding a meeting with Anthony Eden, March 27, 1943," PBS American Experience, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/presmemorandum.html.

159. German Security Department, Report on Adolf Hitler's Disappearance from Public View,

April 19, 1943

Introduction

As the German war news became less favorable, Adolf Hitler, Germany's supreme leader, made dramatically fewer public appearances. A report from the German Security Department commented on the detrimental impact of his reclusive habits on German public opinion and the opportunity that his absence from popular view gave for damaging rumors to spread.

Primary Source

It has been emphasized in some reports that the whole population has appreciated the fact that recently they have heard more of the Führer. Judicious and positive-minded citizens have remarked that it is not a good idea for the Führer to remain "out of sight" for too long. The nation wants to have its close personal relationship with the Führer confirmed by frequently receiving news of him. But in the course of the war it has become rare for a picture of the Führer to appear in the newspapers or in the newsreels; the same is true of speeches by the Führer. A picture of the Führer in which one could see that his hair had not gone completely white, as rumour once had it, would have a more positive effect on the population than many fighting slogans. In order to keep alive the contact between leader and nation, it was frequently suggested that the Führer should be shown not only at highly official occasions and at military conferences, but more often in his personal life, as was done before, at the field kitchen or while having a walk, and that there should be reports on his daily routine, and his remarks and comments should be published.

Source: Jeremy Noakes, ed., *Nazism 1919–1945,* Vol. 4, *The Home Front in World War II* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1998), 547. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

160. Soviet President Joseph Stalin, Reuters Interview on the Dissolution of the Comintern,

May 1943

Introduction

In May 1943, Soviet president Joseph Stalin decided to dissolve the Comintern, the Moscow-based central Communist International that for more than 20 years had sought to direct the efforts of non-Soviet foreign communist parties. As early as 1940, Stalin contemplated this move on the grounds that the Comintern's existence made it easier to depict communist parties in other countries as Soviet-controlled subversive organizations. At the time he took this action, he may also have hoped to ingratiate himself with his Allies, the United States and Great Britain. On his instructions, Secretary-General Georgi Dimitrov of the Comintern and his assistant, Dmitry Zakharovich Manuilsky, drew up a draft resolution that—with minor modifications, some of them inserted at Stalin's behest after the fact—the presidium of the organization accepted. After the dissolution of the Comintern, Soviet president Joseph Stalin granted the chief Reuters news agency correspondent in Moscow an interview. Stalin justified the dissolution of the Comintern on the grounds that this demonstrated the independence of the various national communist parties, something that given their heavy involvement in many resistance movements throughout Europe and elsewhere, he may have been particularly eager to emphasize at this time.

Primary Source

The dissolution of the Communist International is proper and timely because it facilitates the organization of the common onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy—Hitlerism. The dissolution of the Communist International is proper because:

(a) It exposes the lie of Hitlerites to the effect that "Moscow" allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to "Bolshevise" them. An end is now being put to this lie.
(b) It exposes the calumny of the adversaries of Communism within the Labour movement to the effect that Communist Parties in various countries are allegedly acting not in the interests of their people but on orders from outside. An end is now being put to this calumny too.

(c) It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for uniting the progressive forces of their respective countries, regardless of party or religious faith, into a single camp of national liberation—for unfolding the struggle against Fascism.
(d) It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for uniting all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against the menace of world domination by Hitlerism, thus clearing the way to the future organization of a companionship of nations based on their equality.

I think that all these circumstances taken together will result in a further strengthening of the United Front of the Allies and other united nations in their fight for victory over Hitlerite tyranny. I feel that the dissolution of the Communist International is perfectly timely—because it is exactly now, when the Fascist beast is exerting its last strength, that it is necessary to organize the common onslaught of freedom-loving countries to finish off this beast and to deliver the people from Fascist oppression.

Source: Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International 1919–1943: Documents,* 3 vols. (London: Frank Cass, 1971), 3:476–477. Reprinted with permission of Chatham House.

161. The Zoot Suit Riots, Los Angeles: Report of the Warren Committee, June 1943

Introduction

In a weeklong rampage in early June 1943, hundreds of servicemen clashed with zoot-suited young Mexican Americans in East Los Angeles, stripping them of their distinctive clothing and beating them up. Mexican Americans were generally impoverished; lived in substandard housing; were subjected to disease, malnutrition, and discrimination; were forced to attend segregated schools; and had few economic opportunities open to them. Young Mexican American men tended to join pachuco gangs that were often at violent odds with each other as well as the white community. Governor Earl Warren of California established a committee to investigate the Zoot Suit Riots, which eventually issued a report strongly condemning the involvement of the police

and armed forces in these events. Little further action, however, was taken on it.

Primary Source

There are approximately 250,000 persons of Mexican descent in Los Angeles County. Living conditions among the majority of these people are far below the general level of the community. Housing is inadequate; sanitation is bad and is made worse by congestion. Recreational facilities for children are very poor; and there is insufficient supervision of the playgrounds, swimming pools and other youth centers. Such conditions are breeding places for juvenile delinquency. …

Mass arrests, dragnet raids, and other wholesale classifications of groups of people are based on false premises and tend merely to aggravate the situation. Any American citizen suspected of crime is entitled to be treated as an individual, to be indicted as such, and to be tried, both at law and in the forum of public opinion, on his merits or errors, regardless of race, color, creed, or the kind of clothes he wears.

Group accusations foster race prejudice, the entire group accused want revenge and vindication. The public is led to believe that every person in the accused group is guilty of crime.

It is significant that most of the persons mistreated during the recent incidents in Los Angeles were either persons of Mexican descent or Negroes. In undertaking to deal with the cause of these outbreaks, the existence of race prejudice cannot be ignored. …

On Monday evening, June seventh, thousands of Angelenos, in response to twelve hours' advance notice in the press, turned out for a mass lynching. Marching through the streets of downtown Los Angeles, a mob of several thousand soldiers, sailors, and civilians, proceeded to beat up every zoot-suiter they could find. Pushing its way into the important motion picture theaters, the mob ordered the management to turn on the house lights and then ranged up and down the aisles dragging Mexicans out of their seats. Street cars were halted while Mexicans, and some Filipinos and Negroes, were jerked out of their seats, pushed into the streets, and beaten with sadistic frenzy. If the victims wore zoot-suits, they were stripped of their clothing and left naked or half-naked on the streets, bleeding and bruised. Proceeding

down Main Street from First to Twelfth, the mob stopped on the edge of the Negro district. Learning that the Negroes planned a warm reception for them, the mobsters turned back and marched through the Mexican east side spreading panic and terror.

Throughout the night the Mexican communities were in the wildest possible turmoil. Scores of Mexican mothers were trying to locate their youngsters and several hundred Mexicans milled around each of the police substations and the Central Jail trying to get word of missing members of their families. Boys came into the police stations saying: "Charge me with vagrancy or anything, but don't send me out there!" pointing to the streets where other boys, as young as twelve and thirteen years of age, were being beaten and stripped of their clothes … not more than half of the victims were actually wearing zoot-suits. A Negro defense worker, wearing a defense-plant identification badge on his workclothes, was taken from a street car and one of his eyes was gouged out with a knife. Huge half-page photographs, showing Mexican boys stripped of their clothes, cowering on the pavement, often bleeding profusely, surrounded by jeering mobs of men and women, appeared in all the Los Angeles newspapers. …

At midnight on June seventh, the military authorities decided that the local police were completely unable or unwilling to handle the situation, despite the fact that a thousand reserve officers had been called up. The entire downtown area of Los Angeles was then declared "out of bounds" for military personnel. This order immediately slowed down the pace of the rioting. The moment the Military Police and Shore Patrol went into action, the rioting quieted down.

Source: Governor's Citizens' Committee, "The Zoot Suit Riots," Digital History, 1943, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=606.

162. Earl Brown, The Detroit Race Riots of June 1943

Introduction

In June 1943 serious race riots took place in the American industrial city of Detroit, Michigan. Over the previous three years, Detroit's population had swollen from 1.6 million to 1.8 million, as around 50,000 African Americans and 150,000 largely southern whites migrated to the city in response to the demands of the industrial war effort. Tensions between blacks and whites and between newcomers and older residents were fierce. In the hot summer of 1943, Detroit erupted in race riots. In the course of two days 34 people—25 of them black—were killed, 461 were injured, and extensive looting took place. Less extensive riots also occurred in Los Angeles, New York, Beaumont (Texas), and Newark (New Jersey). Earl Brown, then the only African American individual on the editorial staff of *Life* magazine, wrote an account of the Detroit riots.

Primary Source

On Sunday, June 20, 1943, one of the most serious race riots in American history broke out in the city of Detroit. Before it was brought under control some thirty hours later, twenty-five Negroes and nine white persons were killed and property worth several hundreds of thousands of dollars had been destroyed.

The forces which led to the outbreak in that city exist, to a greater or lesser degree, in most of our cities. Similar outbreaks have occurred elsewhere. A study of the factors leading to the outbreak in Detroit is important because it can show us how to avoid similar outbreaks, not only in Detroit, but in other cities. …

My first visit to wartime Detroit occurred in July, 1942. I found that although Detroit is the munitions capital of the United Nations and its war production is essential to victory, there was a disturbing lack of unity of effort. The atmosphere was tense, and the tension was increasing. There were sudden gusts of strikes for unimportant reasons—a strike occurred at the Chrysler Tank Arsenal because the men were not allowed to smoke during work.

But racial feeling was the most alarming of all. Groups of Negro zoot-suiters were brawling with gangs of young white toughs; the determination of Negroes to hold the war jobs they had won was matched by the determination of numerous white groups to oust them. There were many signs of trouble. …

One of the features of Detroit that in many ways sets it off from many other cities is the presence of great numbers of religious and political fanatics. Even before the last war Detroit was known as the city of "jazzed-up religion." Today all shades of opinion are to be found in the city, all races, all creeds, all political attitudes and beliefs. The first figure to attract national attention was Father Charles Coughlin. Railing against Hoover and Wall Street from his radio pulpit, he soon attracted a great following in Detroit and through the Middle West. Next came the Black Legion, an organization of native white Americans and an offshoot of the Ku Klux Klan—with hoods, grips, and passwords. It was organized originally for the purpose of getting and holding jobs for Southern whites, but it quickly developed into an elaborate "hate" organization—its enmity directed against Catholics, Jews, Negroes, and "radicals."…

By the middle 30s, Detroit had a representation of every kind of panacea, political nostrum, and agitation. There were the Anglo-Saxon Federation and an anti-Negro organization called the National Workers League. But the most steady, day-in and day-out exhortation came from the sensational preachers. Of these the best known are the Reverend Frank J. Norris and the Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith. …

These three men—Coughlin, Norris, and Smith—are the best known of the Detroit religious-political demagogues, but there are thousands of others. Some have been in Detroit for years; others came during the recent migrations. It is estimated that there are more than 2,500 Southern-born evangelists of one kind or another in Detroit alone, not counting those in near-by communities. This war has caused an upheaval among the little shouting sects in the South; they have split and split again, and new sects have been formed. …

There is a connection between the apocalyptic doctrine of these sects and religious and racial intolerance. The appeal is not only highly emotional but is grounded on old traditions—which in the South mean White Protestant Supremacy. … Many of these exhorters are members of the Klan off-shoot organizations, defiantly "American," suspecting "radicals," and completely at home with White Supremacy. For more than a decade—and increasingly during the past three years—these rustic preachers have been spreading their brand of the Word. As feeling in Detroit became more aroused over the race

issue, the effect of this kind of preaching was like pouring gasoline on a bonfire. …

It is interesting to note that despite the racial collisions and the frequent enforcement of Jim Crow practices in Detroit, Negroes have succeeded in getting some political preferment. There are two Negro assistant prosecuting attorneys, the State Labor Commissioner is a Negro, and one of the State Senators is a Negro. The Detroit Street Railway Company, which is owned by the city, employs about a thousand Negroes—both men and women—as motormen, bus drivers, conductors, and workers of other kinds. With the police it is another matter, and this has been a burning issue. Out of 3,600 policemen, only forty are Negroes. In addition, Southern whites have been taken into the force freely, and they have frequently shown a hostile attitude toward Negroes.

The local political machine was perfectly happy to cooperate with Negro gamblers, but they had no interest whatever in the fact that most of Detroit's Negroes lived in two wretched slum areas. The two principal Negro districts in Detroit cover about thirty square blocks on the West Side and a larger district on the East Side called Paradise Valley. … Here—on the East Side—live most of Detroit's Negroes. Almost everybody now has plenty of war wages to pay for lodging, but decent houses simply do not exist. The only recourse the Negroes have is to cram themselves into the filthy valley tenements. …

The war naturally aggravated Detroit's underlying instability. Anti-Negro sentiment was particularly strong in the Polish districts of Hamtramck, a suburb. As early as July, 1941, gangs of Polish youths provoked a series of minor riots. An editor of a Polish paper reports that anti-Negro handbills were distributed on the steps of St. Florian's Church in Hamtramck during the Sojourner Truth riots.

For many months the Negro press in Detroit and elsewhere busily promoted a "Double-V" campaign for victory at home as well as abroad. This campaign was based on the assumption that victory in the war against the fascists abroad did not mean much if there was Jim Crow at home. Colored soldiers had told a thousand bitter stories of discrimination and lack of respect for the uniform. The killings of colored soldiers at Alexandria, Louisiana, and in other Southern communities were taken to heart. The hopes roused by President Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802, issued June 25, 1941,

forbidding job discrimination in plants with war contracts slowly faded. The Committee on Fair Employment Practice, set up by the President shortly after the issuance of the Executive Order, was left to pine away without money or authority and was finally placed under the War Manpower Commission. If the government would do nothing, there was nothing left but the union and the determination of the Negroes themselves. Colored workers who had been promoted to more skilled jobs were ready to hold on for dear life to their new jobs, and the brimstone evangelists, viewing with alarm this resolution of the Negroes, whipped up resentment.

Shortly after the beginning of 1943 a series of anti-Negro strikes broke out in the plants. Aside from fights between individuals, there was no violence in the plants, but much bitterness was aroused. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics lists anti-Negro strikes in the following plants from mid-March until the end of May: United States Rubber Company; Vickers, Incorporated; Hudson Motor Car Company; Hudson Naval Arsenal; and the Packard Motor Car Company. In the Packard strike, which brought the climax, 26,883 men left work when three Negroes were upgraded. The circumstances of this strike were so peculiar that union leaders were convinced that it had been engineered by one of the anti-Negro groups in the city, but nothing was ever proved.

Shortly after the Packard strike Mayor Jeffries called together the editors of the three local dailies, the *Free Press*, the *News*, and the *Times*, to take counsel. The conference over, nothing was done. A procession of Negro leaders and a few prominent white citizens besought the Mayor to take heed and act before the explosion. The Mayor listened, but appeared to be more confused after these visits than before. Then everyone relaxed to await the inevitable. It came on the evening of June 24, 1943.

Belle Isle lies in the Detroit River, connected with the city and Grand Boulevard by a bridge. There were probably a hundred thousand persons in the park that hot, humid Sunday, and the greater number seem to have been Negroes. The atmosphere was anything but peaceful. Tension had increased to the breaking point. An argument between a Negro and a white man became a fist fight and the fighting spread.

A hurry call was made for the police, but by the time they arrived the brawl, involving some two hundred white sailors by this time, was eddying across the bridge into the riverside park on the mainland near the Naval

Armory. The news that fighting had broken out traveled like the wind. A young man in a colored night club on Hastings Street is supposed to have grabbed the microphone about 11:30 and urged the five hundred customers present to “come on and take care of a bunch of whites who have killed a colored woman and her baby at Belle Isle Park.” This rumor was, of course, false. It was matched by another story, which spread through the white districts, that Negroes had raped and killed a white woman on the park bridge. By midnight fighting and looting had spread into a dozen different districts and Paradise Valley was going crazy. By two o’clock that morning a crowd of Negroes stopped an East Side street car and stoned white factory workers who were passengers. White men coming from work at the Chevrolet Gear and Axle plant, three miles away from the center of Paradise Valley, were attacked by a Negro mob.

Alfred McClung Lee, chairman of the Sociology Department of Wayne University, and Norman Humphrey, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the same institution, have pieced together a remarkable timetable of the violence in *Race Riot* (New York: Dryden Press, 1943), a report on the riot. Both the authors were present and moved about the city while the fighting was in progress. Their report shows that:

At four o’clock in the morning (Monday, June 21) there was a meeting in the office of Police Commissioner Witherspoon to determine action. Mayor Jeffries, Colonel Krech (the U.S. Army commander of the Detroit area), Captain Leonard of the Michigan State Police, John Bugas (in charge of the local office of the F.B.I.), and Sheriff Baird were present. Colonel Krech told the Mayor that the military police could be on duty in Detroit in forty-nine minutes after a request from the Mayor had been cleared through the Governor and the proper U.S. Army officials. Nothing was done about this at the time, and by 6:30 a.m. Commissioner Witherspoon decided that there was a let-up in “serious rioting.”

But there was no let-up. At 8:30 in the morning a Negro delegation asked the Mayor to send for troops. At nine o’clock Commissioner Witherspoon asked the Mayor for troops. Mayor Jeffries telephoned to the Governor, who transmitted the request by telephone to the Sixth Service Command Headquarters in Chicago. By eleven o’clock it was known that troops could not come unless martial law was declared. Governor Kelly hesitated to do so.

By this time gangs of white hoodlums were roaming the streets burning Negro cars.

The police had already shown themselves to be helpless or negligent. On the previous night, police had been stationed outside the all-night Roxy movie theater. A witness reported that a threatening white crowd assembled at the entrance and every time a Negro came out of the theater the mob went for him. When the witness asked the police to get Negroes a safe-conduct through the mob, the officers replied, “See the chief about it!”

At four o’clock on Monday afternoon Major General Aurand arrived from Chicago. By that time, according to Lee and Humphrey, “the crowds of whites were increasing in size on Woodward Avenue. Milling packs of human animals hunted and killed any of the easily visible black prey which chanced into the territory.”

At 6:30 Monday night, just as Mayor Jeffries was going on the air with a plea for a return to sanity, four white boys, aged 16 to 20, shot down Moses Kiska, a middle-aged Negro, “because we didn’t have anything to do.” Still no troops, and all through the evening, after even the Mayor had admitted that the city administration and police were unable to deal with the situation, there went on an endless amount of official confusion until, at last, it was discovered precisely what had to be done to get federal intervention. Just before midnight President Roosevelt proclaimed a state of emergency, and by Tuesday morning 6,000 troops in trucks and jeeps were patrolling the city. The hold of the city authorities had so completely collapsed that it took the United States Army to get twenty-nine Negro members of the graduating class of Northeastern High School away from the closing exercises in safety.

Two days later Governor Kelly decided to ease restrictions a little, and by degrees the city began to breathe again. …

Source: Earl Brown, *Why Race Riots? Lessons from Detroit, Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 87* (New York: n.p., 1944), 1–3, 14–15, 18–24.

163. Minister of Justice Dino Grandi, Order of the Day, Submitted to the Fascist Grand Council, Demanding the Restoration of the Functions of Various Organs of the Constitution, July 24, 1943

Introduction

As Allied forces invaded Italy, where major cities had already been subjected to heavy Allied bombing, and closed in on Rome, its capital, the Italian dictator called what would become the last meeting of the fascist Grand Council, Italy's highest governing body. Mussolini hoped to use this occasion to eliminate any remaining vestiges of opposition to him within his government. Instead, Count Dino Grandi, minister of justice and former ambassador to Great Britain, proposed a motion to restore the king of Italy to power. The motion passed by 18 votes to 9, with 1 abstention. Mussolini was overthrown, arrested, and imprisoned, and the king of Italy and his new prime minister, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, opened negotiations with the Allies for an armistice, which was signed on September 8, 1943. German forces in Italy nonetheless continued to fight fiercely against the Allies until the spring of 1945.

Primary Source

The Grand Council,

Assembled in these days of supreme trial, turns its thought first of all to the heroic fighters of every branch of the forces, who side by side with the proud people of Sicily, among whom the single-minded faith of the Italian people shines most brightly, are renewing the noble traditions of arduous courage and the indomitable spirit of self sacrifice of our glorious armed forces; proclaims it to be the sacred duty of all Italians to defend at all costs the unity, independence, and liberty of the country, the fruits of the sacrifices

and efforts of four generations from the Risorgimento till today, and the life and future of the Italian people;

Affirms the need for the moral and physical union of all Italians at this serious moment which is decisive for the destiny of the nation;

Declares that to achieve this unity it is necessary to restore immediately all functions belonging to the state, ascribing to the Crown, the Grand Council, the Government, Parliament, and the Corporations the tasks and responsibilities laid down for them by our state and constitutional laws;

Invites the Head of the Government to pray His Majesty the King, to whom the faithful and trusting heart of the whole Nation turns, that for the honour and safety of the country he now assumes effective command of the armed forces on land, on sea, and in the air, in accordance with Article 5 of the Statute of the Kingdom, and therewith the supreme initiative of decision which our institutions attribute to him, and which have always been throughout our national history the glorious appendage of our august dynasty of the House of Savoy.

Source: Margaret Carlyle, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1939–1946,* Vol. 2, *Hitler's Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 118. Reprinted with permission of Chatham House.

164. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Press Release: Statement of General Douglas MacArthur on the Capture of Munda, New Georgia, August 9, 1943

Introduction

In the Pacific theater, Allied forces under General Douglas MacArthur waged a succession of hard-fought but ultimately successful campaigns. On August 5, 1943, during the New Georgia campaign, Allied troops took the stronghold of Munda, a prelude to victory in the entire campaign, which was achieved on October 10, 1943. MacArthur issued a communiqué marking Munda's capture, shrewdly taking the opportunity to highlight what he considered to be the continuing shortfall of men and equipment in his command.

Primary Source

We are doing what we can with what we have. Our resources are still very limited, but the results of our modest but continuous successes in campaigns have been cumulative to the point of being vital. A measure of their potentiality can be obtained by imagining the picture to have been reversed, with the enemy capturing Guadalcanal and besieging Port Moresby rather than we in possession of Munda and at the gates of Salamaua. Such a contrast might well have meant defeat for us in the war for the Pacific.

The margin was close but it was conclusive. Although for many reasons our victories may have lacked in glamorous focus, they have been decisive of the final result in the Pacific. I make no predictions as to time or detail, but Japan on the Pacific fronts has exhausted the fullest resources of concentrated attack of which she was capable, has failed, and is now on a defensive which will yield just in proportion as we gather force and definition. When that will be I do not know, but it is certain.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:118–120.

165. The Quebec Conference, August 17–24, 1943: Joint Statement by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 24, 1943

Introduction

In August 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill and their staffs met at Quebec to coordinate Anglo-American military and diplomatic strategy. The two leaders announced that they intended to do more to assist China and had also considered the question of relations with the Free French government-in-exile.

Primary Source

The Anglo-American war conference, which opened at Quebec on August 17, under the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work.

The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken to provide for the forward action of the fleets, armies, and air forces of the two nations.

Considering that these forces are intermingled in continuous action against the enemy in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method should be maintained at the summit of the war direction.

Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the war effort of the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy spreads and deepens.

It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcement of the decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action.

It may, however, be stated that the military discussions of the chiefs of staff turned very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Dr. T. V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Kai-shek, was a party to the discussions. In this field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and approve the unanimous recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreements were also reached upon the political issues underlying or arising out of the military operations.

It was resolved to hold another conference before the end of the year between the British and American authorities, in addition to any tri-partite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions so far as they affect the war against Germany and Italy will be furnished to the Soviet Government.

Consideration has been given during the Conference to the question of relations with the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a number of governments will be made in the latter part of the week.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 7–8.

166. Military Armistice between the Allied Powers and the Italian Government, Signed at Fairfield Camp, Sicily, September 3, 1943

Introduction

After lengthy negotiations, in September 1943 the king of Italy and his new prime minister, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, signed an armistice with the invading Anglo-American forces under General Dwight D. Eisenhower. This agreement did not mark the end of fighting in Italy. German troops in Italy doggedly refused to surrender and continued to fiercely oppose the Allies until the spring of 1945.

Primary Source

The following conditions of an Armistice are presented by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, acting by authority of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain and in the interest of the United Nations, and are accepted by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government

Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.

Italy will use its best endeavors to deny, to the Germans, facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany.

Immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military-naval program.

Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.

Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this Armistice.

The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.

Other conditions of a political, economic, and financial nature with which Italy will be bound to comply will be transmitted at a later date.

The conditions of the present Armistice will not be made public without prior approval of the Allied Commander in Chief. The English will be considered the official text.

Source: *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949,* Vol. 3, *Multilateral 1931–1945, Department of State Publication 8484* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 769–770.

167. General Douglas MacArthur’s Strategy of Highly Selective Island-Hopping: General

Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Press Release, September 21, 1943

Introduction

General Douglas MacArthur, commander of Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific, is generally regarded as one of the greatest and most successful exponents of the Pacific war island-hopping strategy. He himself, however, wished to make it clear that the policy he favored was more of a leapfrogging strategy and that he had no wish to take every island dividing American forces and the Japanese homeland.

Primary Source

My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed “island-hopping” which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. “Island-hopping” with extravagant losses and slow progress … is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:100.

168. The Fulbright and Connally Resolutions, September–November 1943

Introduction

After World War I, Senate opposition had blocked U.S. entry into the League of Nations, the international organization established to mediate and settle future disputes between states. After Pearl Harbor, many Americans held their country's failure to join the league at least partly responsible for the occurrence of World War II. By large majorities, in 1943 the Senate and the House both passed resolutions demanding that the United States help to create and participate in a new international organization that, it was hoped, would be more successful than its predecessor. The Senate resolution was sponsored by Senator Tom Connally of Texas, and its House counterpart was sponsored by Congressman J. William Fulbright of Arkansas.

Primary Source

The Fulbright Resolution: House Concurrent Resolution 25, Seventy-Eighth Congress, September 21, 1943

…*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),* That the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein through its constitutional processes.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 11.

The Connally Resolution: Senate Resolution 192, Seventy-Eighth Congress, November 5, 1943

Resolved, that the war against all our enemies be waged until complete victory is achieved.

That the United States cooperate with its comrades-in-arms in securing a just and honorable peace.

That the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world.

That the Senate recognizes the necessity of there being established at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

That, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, any treaty made to effect the purposes of this resolution, on behalf of the Government of the United States with any other nation or any association of nations, shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 15.

169. Joint Declarations of the Moscow Conference, October 18–November 1, 1943

Introduction

In October 1943, the foreign ministers of the Big Four Allied powers—Great Britain, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union—met in Moscow to discuss future policy on the war. At the conference's end, they declared their intention of continuing their collaboration after the war in order to establish a postwar international organization to maintain order and security. Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union also jointly issued more specific declarations on policy toward Italy, Austria, and the prosecution of war crimes. For Italy, they declared their intention of overthrowing the fascist system of government. Their declaration on Austria was couched in terms designed to encourage that country to separate itself from Germany, in the hope of receiving better postwar treatment from the victorious Allies. They announced their intention of prosecuting those responsible for wartime atrocities. These meetings and the announcements that followed were the preliminaries to summit meetings late the next month of U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese president Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) at Cairo, followed

immediately by a similar meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Soviet president Joseph Stalin in Tehran.

Primary Source

JOINT FOUR-NATION DECLARATION

The governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China;

United in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of January, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

Recognizing the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

Jointly declare:

That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security they will consult with one another and as occasion

requires with other members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy toward Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based on democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting, shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.

All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character.

All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty.

Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

Fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles stated above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the combined chiefs of staff.

The three governments, parties to this declaration, will, at the request of any one of them, consult on this matter. It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA

The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any charges effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring States which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace. Austria is reminded, however that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

STATEMENT ON ATROCITIES, Signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin.

The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Nazi domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of the territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers, and that in their desperation the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy.

Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Polish officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged.

Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusors in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the government of the Allies.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 11–15.

170. Proclamation of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, October 21, 1943

Introduction

Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), a leading Indian nationalist and socialist, disagreed with the decision of many Indian Congress Party leaders who sought independence to continue to pressure the British government to grant this but nonetheless to support the Allied cause in World War II. From 1941 to 1943 the radical Bose, president of Congress in 1937 and 1939, went to Germany to proselytize among Indian soldiers captured by the Germans. Although the leftist Bose deplored Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, he still welcomed German support for his cause. In the spring of 1943 he traveled by submarine to Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia, where he established a Free Indian (Azad Hind) movement, which soon attracted numerous Indian adherents. In October 1943 Bose proclaimed his Azad Hind the Provisional Government of India and won recognition from Japan, Germany, and their clients. Bose's declaration of an independent Indian government set forth of his view of the international situation and his perceptions of the opportunities that the war offered his country's quest for independence. Bose also raised a military force, the Azad Hind Fauj (Indian National Army of Liberation), and in May 1944 he led his forces into northern India, but after encountering opposition they withdrew in the autumn of 1944. In the spring of 1945 they attempted to march on the Indian capital of Delhi but were beaten back, retreating from Burma through Thailand and into Malaya. Although court-martialed by the British, popular pressure meant that Bose's forces were amnestied. Shortly after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Japan's defeat became

inevitable, Bose himself died in an airplane crash as he flew from Singapore to Tokyo to consider his next move. To many Indians, he remained a national hero.

Primary Source

After the first defeat at the hands of the British in 1757 in Bengal, the Indian people fought an uninterrupted series of hard and bitter battles over a stretch of one hundred years. The history of this period teems with examples of unparalleled heroism and self-sacrifice. And, in the pages of that history, the names of Sirajuddoula and Mohanlal of Bengal, Haider Ali, Tippu Sultan and Velu Tampi of South India, Appa Sahib Bhonsle and Peshwa Baji Rao of Maharashtra, the Begums of Oudh, Sardar Shyam Singh Atariwala of Punjab and last, but not least, Rani Laxmibai of Jhansi, Tantia Topi, Maharaja Kunwar Singh of Dumraon and Nana Sahib—among others—the names of all these warriors are for ever engraved in letters of gold. Unfortunately for us, our forefathers did not at first realise that the British constituted a grave threat to the whole of India, and they therefore did not put up a united front against the enemy. Ultimately, when the Indian people were roused to the reality of the situation, they made a concerted move—and under the flag of Bahadur Shah in 1857, they fought their last war as free men. In spite of a series of brilliant victories in the early stages of this war, ill-luck and faulty leadership gradually brought about their final collapse and subjugation. Nevertheless, such heroes as the Rani of Jhansi, Tantia Topi, Kunwar Singh and Nana Sahib live like eternal stars in the nation’s memory to inspire us to greater deeds of self-sacrifice and valour.

Forcibly disarmed by the British after 1857 and subjected to terror and brutality, the Indian people lay prostrate for a while—but with the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885, there came a new awakening. From 1885 until the end of the last World War, the Indian people, in their endeavour to recover their lost liberty, tried all possible methods—namely agitation and propaganda, boycott of British goods, terrorism and sabotage—and finally armed revolution. But all these efforts failed for a time. Ultimately in 1920, when the Indian people, haunted by a sense of failure, were groping for a new

method, Mahatma Gandhi came forward with the new weapon of non-cooperation and civil disobedience.

For two decades thereafter, the Indian people went through a phase of intense patriotic activity. The message of freedom was carried to every Indian home. Through personal example, people were taught to suffer, to sacrifice and to die in the cause of freedom. From the centre to the remotest villages, the people were knit together into one political organisation. Thus, the Indian people not only recovered their political consciousness but became a political entity once again. They could now speak with one voice and strive with one will for one common goal. From 1937 to 1939, through the work of the Congress Ministries in eight provinces, they gave proof of their readiness and their capacity to administer their own affairs.

Thus, on the eve of the present World War, the stage was set for the final struggle for India's liberation. During the course of this war, Germany, with the help of her allies, has dealt shattering blows to our enemy in Europe—while Nippon, with the help of her allies, has inflicted a knockout blow to our enemy in East Asia. Favoured by a most happy combination of circumstances, the Indian people today have a wonderful opportunity for achieving their national emancipation.

For the first time in recent history, Indians abroad have also been politically roused and united in one organisation. They are not only thinking and feeling in tune with their countrymen at home, but are also marching in step with them, along the path to freedom. In East Asia, in particular, over two million Indians are now organised as one solid phalanx, inspired by the slogan of 'Total Mobilisation.' And in front of them stand the serried ranks of India's Army of Liberation, with the slogan 'Onward to Delhi' on their lips.

Having goaded Indians to desperation by its hypocrisy and having driven them to starvation and death by plunder and loot, British rule in India has forfeited the goodwill of the Indian people altogether and is now living a precarious existence. It needs but a flame to destroy the last vestige of that unhappy rule. To light that flame is the task of India's Army of Liberation. Assured of the enthusiastic support of the civil population at home and also

of a large section of Britain's Indian Army, and backed by gallant and invincible allies abroad—but relying in the first instance on its own strength, India's Army of Liberation is confident of fulfilling its historic role.

Now that the dawn of freedom is at hand, it is the duty of the Indian people to set up a provisional Government of their own, and launch the last struggle under the banner of that Government. But with all the Indian leaders in prison and the people at home totally disarmed—it is not possible to set up a Provisional Government within India or to launch an armed struggle under the aegis of that government. It is, therefore, the duty of the Indian Independence League in East Asia, supported by all patriotic Indians at home and abroad, to undertake this task—the task of setting up a provisional Government of Azad Hind (Free India) and of conducting the last fight for freedom, with the help of the Army of Liberation (that is, the Azad Hind Fauj or the Indian National Army) organised by the League.

Having been constituted as the provisional Government of Azad Hind by the Indian Independence League in East Asia, we enter upon our duties with a full sense of the responsibility that has devolved upon us. We pray that providence may bless our work and our struggle for the emancipation of our motherland. And we hereby pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in arms to the cause of her freedom, of her welfare, and her exaltation among the nations of the world.

It will be the task of the provisional Government to launch and to conduct the struggle that will bring about the expulsion of the British and their allies from the soil of India. It will then be the task of the Provisional Government to bring about the establishment of a permanent National Government of Azad Hind constituted in accordance with the will of the Indian people and enjoying their confidence. After the British and their allies are overthrown and until a permanent National Government of Azad Hind is set up on Indian soil, the provisional Government will administer the affairs of the country in trust for the Indian people.

The provisional Government is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Indian. It guarantees religious liberty, as well as equal rights and

equal opportunities to all its citizens. It declares its firm resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally and transcending all the differences cunningly fostered by an alien government in the past.

In the name of God, in the name of bygone generations who have welded the Indian people into one nation, and in the name of the dead heroes who have bequeathed to us a tradition of heroism and self-sacrifice—we call upon the Indian people to rally round our banner and strike for India's freedom. We call upon them to launch the final struggle against the British and all their allies in India and to prosecute that struggle with valour and perseverance and full faith in final victory—until the enemy is expelled from Indian soil and the Indian people are once again a Free Nation.

Source: Sisir K. Bose and Sugata Bose, eds., *The Essential Writings of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 296–299.

171. Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia Congress, Tokyo, November 6, 1943

Introduction

In early November 1943, representatives of seven Asian nations—Japan, China, Thailand, Manzhouguo, the Philippines, Burma, and Free India, a government established by the breakaway Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose—met at Tokyo on the invitation of the Japanese government to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. On November 6 the meeting issued a declaration expressing the participants' intention of working together against Great Britain and the United States to drive Western powers completely out of Asia.

Primary Source

It is a basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world each have its proper place and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance. The United States of America and the British

Empire have, in seeking their own prosperity, oppressed other nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation, sought to satisfy their incredible ambition of enslaving the entire region and finally came to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies the cause of the present war.

The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view of contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination, ensuring their self-existence and self-defense and constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:

The countries of Greater East Asia, through mutual cooperation, will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.

The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of the nations in their region by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practising mutual assistance and amity.

The countries of Greater East Asia, by respecting one another's traditions and developing the faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.

The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.

The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world and work for the abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse throughout the world and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.

Source: Japanese Ministry of Greater East Asia, *Addresses before the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations* (Tokyo: Japanese Ministry of Greater East Asia, 1943), 63–65.

172. Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, November 9, 1943

Introduction

The war created millions of refugees, caring for whom could not be left until the war had ended. In late 1943, the Allied governments therefore established an agency for this purpose. Inevitably, the United States provided the bulk of the new organization's funding, one reason why its first director was former governor Herbert Lehman of New York. Lehman's Jewish origins and prewar involvement in efforts to help European Jews escape the Nazis also made him an appropriate choice, as did his executive ability.

Primary Source

The Governments or Authorities whose duly authorized representatives have subscribed hereto,

[*Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, the United States of Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, French Committee of National Liberation, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, United Mexican States, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia*]

Being United Nations or being associated with the United Nations in this war,

Being determined that immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

There is hereby established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

1. The Administration shall have power to acquire, hold and convey property, to enter into contracts and undertake obligations, to designate or create agencies and to review the activities of agencies as created, to manage undertakings and in general to perform any legal act appropriate to its objects and purposes.

2. Subject to the provisions of Article VII, the purposes and functions of the Administration shall be as follows:

(a) To plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services; and to facilitate in such areas, so far as necessary to the adequate provision of relief, the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services. The form of activities of the Administration within the territory of a member government wherein that government exercises administrative authority and the responsibility to be assumed by the member government for carrying out measures planned by the Administration therein shall be determined after consultation with and with the consent of the member government.

(b) To formulate and recommend measures for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments for the coordination of purchasing, the use of ships and other procurement activities in the period following the cessation of hostilities, with a view to integrating the plans and activities of the Administration with the total movement of supplies, and for the purpose of achieving an equitable distribution of available supplies. The Administration may administer such coordination measures as may be authorized by the member governments concerned.

(c) To study, formulate and recommend for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments measures with respect to such related matters, arising out of its experience in planning and performing the work of relief and rehabilitation, as may be proposed by any of the member governments. Such proposals shall be studied and recommendations formulated if the proposals are supported by a vote of the Council, and

the recommendations shall be referred to any or all of the member governments for individual or joint action if approved by unanimous vote of the Central Committee and by the vote of the Council.

ARTICLE II. MEMBERSHIP

The members of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shall be the governments or authorities signatory hereto and such other governments or authorities as may upon application for membership be admitted thereto by action of the Council. The Council may, if it desires, authorize the Central Committee to accept new members between sessions of the Council. …

ARTICLE III. THE COUNCIL

1. Each member government shall name one representative, and such alternates as may be necessary, upon the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which shall be the policy-making body of the Administration. The Council shall, for each of its sessions, select one of its members to preside at the session. The Council shall determine its own rules of procedure. Unless otherwise provided by the Agreement or by action of the Council, the Council shall vote by simple majority.

2. The Council shall be convened in regular session not less than twice a year by the Central Committee. It may be convened in special session whenever the Central Committee shall deem necessary, and shall be convened within thirty days after request therefor by one-third of the members of the Council.

3. The Central Committee of the Council shall consist of the representatives of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, with the Director General presiding, without vote. Between sessions of the Council it shall when necessary make policy decisions of an emergency nature. All such decisions shall be recorded in the minutes of the Central Committee which shall be communicated promptly to each member government. Such decisions shall be open to reconsideration by the Council at any regular session or at any special session called in accordance with Article III, paragraph 2. The Central

Committee shall invite the participation of the representative of any member government at those of its meetings at which action of special interest to such government is discussed. It shall invite the participation of the representative serving as Chairman of the Committee on Supplies of the Council at those of its meetings at which policies affecting the provision of supplies are discussed.

4. The Committee on Supplies of the Council shall consist of the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing those member governments likely to be principal suppliers of materials for relief and rehabilitation. The members shall be appointed by the Council, and the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make emergency appointments between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The Committee on Supplies shall consider, formulate and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies designed to assure the provision of required supplies. The Central Committee shall from time to time meet with the Committee on Supplies to review policy matters affecting supplies.

5. The Committee of the Council for Europe shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments or territories within the European area and such other members of the Council representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the European area as shall be appointed by the Council; the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make these appointments in cases of emergency between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The Committee of the Council for the Far East shall consist of all members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments of territories within the Far Eastern area and such other members of the Council representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the Far Eastern area as shall be appointed by the Council; the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make these appointments in cases of emergency between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The regional committees shall normally meet within their respective areas. They shall consider and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies with respect to relief and rehabilitation within their respective areas. The

Committee of the Council for Europe shall replace the Inter-Allied Committee on European post-war relief established in London on September 24, 1941 and the records of the latter shall be made available to the Committee for Europe.

6. The Council shall establish such other standing regional committees as it shall consider desirable, the functions of such committees and the method of appointing their members being identical to that provided in Article III, paragraph 5 with respect to the Committees of the Council for Europe and for the Far East. The Council shall also establish such other standing committees as it considers desirable to advise it, and, in intervals between sessions of the Council, to advise the Central Committee. For such standing technical committees as may be established, in respect of particular problems such as nutrition, health, agriculture, transport, repatriation, and finance, the members may be members of the Council or alternates nominated by them because of special competence in their respective fields of work. The members shall be appointed by the Council, and the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make emergency appointments between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. Should a regional committee so desire, subcommittees of the standing technical committees shall be established by the technical committees in consultation with the regional committees, to advise the regional committees.

7. The travel and other expenses of members of the Council and of members of its committees shall be borne by the governments which they represent.

8. All reports and recommendations of committees of the Council shall be transmitted to the Director General for distribution to the Council and the Central Committee by the secretariat of the Council established under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 4.

ARTICLE IV. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

1. The executive authority of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shall be in the Director General, who shall be appointed by the Council on the nomination by unanimous vote of the Central Committee. The Director General may be removed by the Council on recommendation by unanimous vote of the Central Committee.

2. The Director General shall have full power and authority for carrying out relief operations contemplated by Article I, paragraph 2 (a), within the limits of available resources and the broad policies determined by the Council or its Central Committee. Immediately upon taking office he shall in conjunction with the military and other appropriate authorities of the United Nations prepare plans for the emergency relief of the civilian population in any area occupied by the armed forces of any of the United Nations, arrange for the procurement and assembly of the necessary supplies and create or select the emergency organization required for this purpose. In arranging for the procurement, transportation, and distribution of supplies and services, he and his representatives shall consult with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations and shall, wherever practicable, use the facilities made available by such authorities. Foreign voluntary relief agencies may not engage in activity in any area receiving relief from the Administration without the consent and unless subject to the regulation of the Director General. The powers and duties of the Director General are subject to the limitations of Article VII.

3. The Director General shall also be responsible for the organization and direction of the functions contemplated by Article I, paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c). …

ARTICLE V. SUPPLIES AND RESOURCES

1. In so far as its appropriate constitutional bodies shall authorize, each member government will contribute to the support of the Administration in order to accomplish the purposes of Article I, paragraph 2 (a). The amount and character of the contributions of each member government under this provision will be determined from time to time by its appropriate constitutional bodies. All such contributions received by the Administration shall be accounted for.

2. The supplies and resources made available by the member governments shall be kept in review in relation to prospective requirements by the Director General, who shall initiate action with the member governments with a view to assuring such additional supplies and resources as may be required. …

ARTICLE VI. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

The Director General shall submit to the Council an annual budget, and from time to time such supplementary budgets as may be required, covering the necessary administrative expenses of the Administration. Upon approval of a budget by the Council the total amount approved shall be allocated to the member governments in proportions to be determined by the Council.

Each member government undertakes, subject to the requirements of its constitutional procedure, to contribute to the Administration promptly its share of the administrative expenses so determined.

ARTICLE VII

Notwithstanding any other provision herein contained, while hostilities or other military necessities exist in any area, the Administration and its Director General shall not undertake activities therein without the consent of the military command of that area, and unless subject to such control as the command may find necessary. The determination that such hostilities or military necessities exist in any area shall be made by its military commander. …

Source: Pamphlet No. 4, in *Pillars of Peace: Documents Pertaining to American Interest in Establishing a Lasting World Peace: January 1941–February 1946* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Book Department, Army Information School, May 1946), 18–26.

173. The Cairo Conference Declaration, November 23–25, 1943

Introduction

In late November 1943, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt met at Cairo with China’s leader, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek), before proceeding to Tehran, where the two joined Stalin. At the conclusion of the Tehran meeting, they issued a public declaration that they sought the unconditional surrender of Japan, independence for Korea, and the expulsion of Japan from all the territories it had seized.

Primary Source

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already mounting.

The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Source: "Declaration of the Cairo Conference, November 23–25, 1943, Released December 1, 1943," in U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 20.

174. Declarations of the Tehran Conference, November 28–December 1, 1943

Introduction

From November 28 to December 1, 1943, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt met at Tehran to discuss the future prosecution of the war. When the conference ended, the three leaders issued various public declarations on the prosecution and objectives of the war and their future treatment of Iran.

Privately, they agreed to provide support for the communist partisans in Yugoslavia and to launch Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Western Europe, in May 1944, a date later deferred to June 1944.

Primary Source

(i) DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS, 1 DECEMBER 1943

We the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—we are sure that our concord will win an enduring Peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our Diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of Democratic Nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny,

and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

(ii) DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN, 1 DECEMBER 1943

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations, and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security, and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

(iii) MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE, 1 DECEMBER 1943

The Conference:

(1) Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:
(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:
(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet Union would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:
(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:
(5) Agreed that the military staffs of the Three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 21–22.

175. Declaration and Statements of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, November 29, 1943

Introduction

In Yugoslavia, which was occupied by German troops during the war, communist partisans led by Josip Broz Tito came to dominate the anti-German guerrilla movement and rejected the monarchical government-in-exile of King Peter II. The Yugoslav case was an example of the manner in which fierce anti-German resistance won European communists new credibility in various occupied countries. On occasion, the communists treated royalist and noncommunist rivals at least as savagely as they did their German enemies, and fierce internecine feuding divided the guerrilla movement. In November 1943, communist partisans met at Jajce, Bosnia, where they asserted their claims to represent the Yugoslav people and their vision of the communist government that would take power after the war. The monarchist government was declared illegitimate.

Primary Source

Declaration of the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, Jajce, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, November 29, 1943

In the course of two and a half years of continuous people's liberation struggle against the occupier and his collaborators, the peoples of Yugoslavia have achieved big and decisive successes, both in internal and in foreign policy affairs. After each attempt of the enemy to atomize our People's Liberation Army, the military strength of our Army has increased, consolidated its ranks and raised them to a higher military and technical level. The more pressure the enemy put in an effort to suppress the liberation movement of our peoples, the closer became the ranks of the people in this movement around the Supreme Headquarters and Comrade Tito, the celebrated leader of the people, around the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia and around the national political representatives of the individual nations of Yugoslavia. Our liberated territory

has steadily increased, our material reserves and sources of supply of our People's Liberation Army and the population have increased also.

Simultaneously, organs of people's authority and various economic and management organs in service of this authority have developed.

The recognition of the big successes of our People's Liberation War abroad on the one side and the complete unmasking of the role and high treason of the Yugoslavia "government"-in-exile on the other side have set entirely new tasks before the leading organs of our peoples' liberation movement. It was necessary systematically to consolidate all these successes and to exploit them for a further successful continuation of our People's Liberation War.

In view of these facts, the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia at its Second Session, held on November 29, 1943,

Establishes:

I

1. The two and a half years of our People's Liberation War have offered proof to the whole world that the peoples of Yugoslavia have set off, firmly and with determination, on a path of armed resistance to the occupier, on a path indicated to our people by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which all truly patriotic forces and political groups of our peoples have been pursuing with it. The enormous majority of the peoples of Yugoslavia have joined the ranks of the liberation movement, and extended active support to its People's Liberation Army. Also all patriotic and honest functionaries from all political parties, groups and patriotic organizations, have, together with the people, actively participated in the peoples' liberation movement. All this is equally true of all the Yugoslav nations. By their activity in the peoples' liberation movement, the peoples of Yugoslavia have spoken up publicly in protest against traitors, reactionaries and speculators in the country and abroad who stayed in power in old Yugoslavia by means of violence and deceit and are now once again trying—by depending on the most reactionary circles—to regain power with the help of treason, deceit and speculation. But all these endeavours cannot conceal the fact that an entirely new relation of political forces has been created in our country during the People's Liberation

War and that this new relation must be adequately expressed also in its management and state leadership. …

III

Bearing in mind all these facts, the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, which is the supreme and only true representation of the will and feelings of all peoples of Yugoslavia,

Decides

To constitute the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia as the supreme legislative and executive representative organ of Yugoslavia, as the supreme representative of the sovereignty of the peoples and state of Yugoslavia as a whole, and to set up a National Committee of the Liberation of Yugoslavia as an organ with all the characteristics of a peoples' government, through which the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia will exercise its executive function.

To deprive the Yugoslav "traitor" government-in-exile of all the rights of a legal government of Yugoslavia and especially of the right to represent the peoples of Yugoslavia—anywhere and before anyone.

Source: Snezana Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 202–210. Reprinted with permission of Martinus Nijhoff.

Decision to Create Yugoslavia on Federal Principles, Jajce, November 29, 1943

On the basis of the right of every people to self-determination, including the right to secession or to unification with other peoples, and in accordance with the true will of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, made certain during the three-year joint people's liberation struggle which praised the inseparable fraternity of the peoples of Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia passes the following

Decision

1. The peoples of Yugoslavia do not recognize and have never recognized the partition of Yugoslavia by the fascist imperialists and they have proved,

during the joint armed struggle, their firm will to remain further united in Yugoslavia;

2. In order to carry out the principles of the sovereignty of the peoples of Yugoslavia, and in order for Yugoslavia to present a true homeland for all its peoples and never again to become a domain of any other hegemonistic clique, Yugoslavia is building and will be built along the lines of the federal principle which will provide for full equality of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins, respectively the peoples of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. …

4. All rights will be guaranteed to the national minorities in Yugoslavia. …

Source: "The Declaration from the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, November 29, 1943," The Archives of Yugoslavia, http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akt

Decision on the Supreme Legislative and Executive People's Representative Body of Yugoslavia and the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, as Temporary Organs of the Supreme People's Authority in Yugoslavia during the People's Liberation War, Jajce, November 29, 1943

1. In accordance with the firm will of the peoples of Yugoslavia, their harmony and unity in the struggle against the occupying forces, to build a new national fraternity and equality based upon Yugoslavia as the joint homeland of all its peoples, and thanks to the successes of the unified People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, which, under the leadership of the Supreme Headquarters, have united in the very struggle all people's-liberation movements in Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia has developed—during the liberation war—into the supreme representative of the sovereignty of the peoples and state of Yugoslavia as the whole.

2. Relating to that fact and to the degree of the people's liberation struggle in Yugoslavia, in accordance with the principles of the federal system of the fraternally-built Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia constitutes itself as the supreme legislative

and executive people's representative body of Yugoslavia during the people's liberation war. …

Source: "The Declaration from the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, November 29, 1943," The Archives of Yugoslavia, http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akt

176. The "Death Railway" from Burma to Thailand: Experiences of Roy M. "Max" Offerle

Introduction

The Japanese generally sent their prisoners of war to labor camps, where they worked on a variety of industrial, construction, mining, and agricultural enterprises. Although working conditions varied, they were generally poor, with food increasingly short as the war progressed, clothing inadequate, and medical facilities poor and sometimes virtually nonexistent. Camps were primitive and overcrowded, with dangerously poor sanitation and mechanical equipment conspicuous by its absence. One of the most notorious of these work projects was the construction of the railway linking the Burmese capital, Rangoon, to Thailand's capital, Bangkok, on which 50,000 Australian, British, Dutch, and American prisoners of war and around 250,000 local Asian slave laborers worked. Perhaps a third of the Western prisoners and almost half of the Asian laborers died while working on the "death railway," many from horrific tropical ulcers, cholera, dysentery, malaria, or other diseases. Working conditions were worst from February to October 1943, when Japanese officials launched a campaign to expedite completion of the railway, with those supervising its construction demanding still more work from men whose health and strength were rapidly declining. Roy M. "Max" Offerle, born in Texas in 1921, was one of 668 American soldiers of the Second Battalion captured on the Indonesian island of Java in March 1942. Recovering from amoebic dysentery, he was set to work on constructing the Burma-Thailand Railway, and sent to 18 Kilo(meter) Camp, where his elder brother Oscar, who later died of a tropical ulcer, was also working. Offerle's experiences were fairly typical of such prisoners.

Primary Source

Basically, 18 Kilo was like one of the many camps we were to be in in the future. You're talking about, like, maybe three, four, five thousand men in these camps, a lot of men. They had long huts made out of bamboo frames tied together with atap, which are leaves wrapped over thin pieces of bamboo about three feet long. They'd leave the walls open, and they had atap leaf roofs that were then overhanging. My brother was working in the cookhouse and then on the wood detail, cutting wood for the kitchen. Anybody related to the kitchen got a little better food. When I got there, he started bringing me some extra food, and it helped me get well fast. The quality wasn't too good, but the quantity was fair.

The first job we had was a fill about three blocks long. It was forty meters across the top of the depression; there was a natural slope to it, which went about twenty feet deep. It took four or five thousand men working a month or two to build this fill. … The men worked hard because they knew they were off as soon as they moved a meter of dirt. After we got accustomed to pick-and-shovel work and carrying dirt, we would finish at three or four o'clock in the afternoon.

Well, then the Japs just gave us a larger quota. So we went to a meter-and-a-tenth, a meter-and-a-quarter, a meter-and-a-half per man per day. Later on up country, they went to two meters of dirt. When they went to one-and-a-half meters of dirt, you'd get in about dark. Two meters of dirt would get you in at about ten or eleven o'clock at night. They eventually went to this, and by then, too, we got food that didn't have all of your vitamins. You weren't keeping your strength up. The men's physical strength gradually wore down and our quotas gradually went up, which set us up for disease and sickness and a lot of the things that were to follow.

At this time, our group, which was one of the largest groups of Americans working on the railroad, hadn't yet experienced real hardship. We were getting a little sickness, some malaria, maybe a few people hurt. From 18 Kilo we went to 80 Kilo Camp. Now, we had larger quotas to meet. We were up in a lot more jungle. Conditions were not so good. We were farther away, so supplies were harder to get up there. We got away from canteens and extra food that you could buy.

From 80 Kilo, which was a smaller camp, we went to 100 Kilo, which was a larger camp. Incidentally, we were at 85 Kilo Camp for a while—80, 85, 100. But 100 Kilo Camp seemed to be a larger camp. I believe it was in 100 Kilo Camp where we got the full brunt of the rainy season. When you talk about rainy season in Burma, you're talking about three or four months where it comes out like you're pouring it from a bucket, day in and day out. It's possibly three or four hundred inches of rain in a season. Actually, creeks and rivers form, and you can almost watch vegetation grow. The rainy or monsoon season turned everything to soup or mud. They couldn't get supplies up there easily. Then the speedup on work came. We went from one meter, to a meter-and-a-half, to two meters of dirt per day. Well, the men's health broke down. We started getting lots of malaria, beriberi, dysentery, and tropical ulcers, because it seemed that the germ that causes tropical ulcers was more prevalent in the rainy season. We started getting a multitude of diseases.

The more people that got sick, the less the Japs had for working parties, so more sick people had to work. They'd set a quota of men every day that had to go out, and they'd fill it. I worked all this time. I hadn't been sick, although I lost weight. I didn't have malaria, beriberi, or any diseases. So I worked. This *kumi* of fifty men that I was in was originally all sergeants, and it was down after the rainy season started to thirteen or fourteen men. That didn't mean they were all dead; some of them were, but most of them were just sick. They were sick enough that if they had been in the United States, they'd have been in an isolation ward with a nurse twenty-four hours a day. Yet here they were in a bamboo hut in the rainy season eating a little rice and water stew; no medication and no one to take care of them, except our own medics and doctor who had no medicine.

This developed into a situation where we started losing men fast. The Japs would force the sick out. If they wanted a *kumi* of twenty-five to go out, and had fourteen healthy there, that meant eleven sick had to go out. So they would come down through the sick barracks. The first time I stayed in, I had malaria and was sick as a dog. I was shaking and felt terrible and had a high fever and chills. I asked the doctor if I could stay in, and he said, "Yes, you haven't been in, so stay in." So here come the Japs down for extra men to go to work. Well, I got off the heavy-duty job, but they said they had to send me out on light duty. The doctor said, "There are some men sicker than you. Can

you go out on light duty?" I said, "Well, if I have to, I will." He said, "Yes, you'd better go out." These Japs raised Cain, and they started beating everybody and giving the doctors and medics a hard time. So, light duty was busting rocks with a sledgehammer—putting rocks on the roads—because they were just a sea of mud, and they were trying to fix the roads enough to get trucks up them with supplies.

Source: Robert S. La Forte and Ronald E. Marcello, eds., *Building the Death Railway: The Ordeal of American POWs in Burma, 1942–1945* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1993), 171–173.

177. The British Home Front: Recollections of Pamela Lazarus

Introduction

When World War II began, Pamela Lazarus, a young Jewish girl, lived in the East End of London, which suffered worst in the Blitz. Her memories of the war focus on themes common to many recollections: the shortage of food, the blackout, the horrors of bombing, the dramatic impact of American soldiers upon the British population, and the absence of her father in the armed forces.

Primary Source

It wasn't much fun being a small kid at that time. It was too scary. London was a smoggy city, filled with gray skies, gray fog, rainy days and one seldom saw a blue sky or sunshine. Or so it seemed. And indoors, it always seemed to be night. Everyone had black curtains on the windows so that no light would escape into the street, and more importantly, be seen from the German airplanes flying overhead. Lights could show them a good place to drop a bomb. Besides, electricity was expensive, and not to be used if not necessary.

My Dad was away in the army, somewhere in Europe and my mother was very nervous. She was a young woman in her mid 20s, with a little girl (me) and a new baby, and she wanted someone to look after her, and there wasn't anyone to do it. So she cried a lot, and when the siren would go off to warn of an air-raid, she would scream in fear. I always felt responsible for her, like I

should be her mother and take care of her. But I was only three and four and five and six and didn't know how, except by not being a burden.

In the beginning, the bombing was at night. She would tell me to quickly! quickly! put on a sweater or coat and shoes and run downstairs. I would hide under the kitchen table until she had dressed herself and wrapped up the baby. Then we would run through the long, narrow garden to the air-raid shelter. It seemed always to be night, and dark, with sirens screaming and wailing.

The shelter was simply some corrugated steel sheets made into a shed against the brick, garden wall, with a sloping roof. It had a dirt floor and two wooden benches inside on which to sit. No heat, no light. Mother brought candles if she remembered, or else we sat in the dark. If a stranger was on the street when the sirens began, they could knock at any house door and be taken in to the shelter, and spend the night in the shelter.

Mother was always complaining about the rations. She wasn't a good cook and didn't know how to make exotic things like puddings or any treats, so our food was very simple. Mostly something boiled or fried. There was often nothing—nothing at all—to eat and we got used to being hungry. …

The City Authorities would regularly send people (women with small children) out of the City, into the country for safety. Mother would go with much grumbling and complaining. She was a City person.

The train would be packed to the limit with American soldiers coming and going somewhere. Every seat was taken, every foot of ground had someone crammed into it. As a small child, I could not step over the rucksacks or around the people, so the soldiers would pass me down the corridor, from hand to hand, with my mother trying to keep up. And they gave me chewing gum! I learned to say "Any gum, chum?" for a stick of Wrigley's Spearmint gum.

Those yanks! I thought they were the grandest, most glamorous people in the world.

Easy smiling, handsome, glamorous looking, movie-star sounding, generous and friendly.

Yanks! With oranges and chocolate bars in their backpacks, silk stockings in their hip pocket, chewing gum (Wrigley's Juicy Fruit) in their hands. All to be given away, to us, if only we can get to talk to them. If only your young and pretty aunt will go dancing with one, and then invite him home for tea.

They aren’t like us English. To be proper we must be standoffish, serious, and quiet. (Children should be seen and not heard.) And we shouldn’t want or take more than one of anything.

But the Yanks! Their uniforms are smooth and beautiful; their movements are relaxed, spacious. They take up lots of space, just standing there. They have wonderful accents. Sometimes hard to understand, but wonderful to hear when they draaawl their words. It sounds soft, unthreatening, friendly. They talk easily, loudly to each other—they laugh easily, out loud, even in public places!

They like children! How astonishing—they actually like children! Talk to us, tousle our hair, sit us on their laps, tell us we’re cute (what’s cute??), give us sticks of gum. And we don’t have to save it—we can eat it. Before dinner! And they don’t get angry if we ask for more. Or if we hang around them, stay close, touch them. This must be what having a father is like.

Age 5—in love. Head-over-heels madly in love—with Yanks. …

During one of these exits from the city, we were staying with a woman and her four daughters in a big farm house. These pretty girls were being dated by American soldiers and one day one of the soldiers brought an extraordinary treat to the house. It was something I had never seen before and that the girls had not seen in 4 or 5 years—a fresh orange! The orange was peeled, with everyone standing around the table watching. Then, it was carefully divided into segments, and each person got one segment. First we licked it, so no drop of juice could escape. Then, we took tiny nibbles, letting the juice come slowly into our mouths, and held it there. Don’t swallow too fast! Then take another tiny nibble, until finally, the whole slice was gone. How terrible that there was no more. Seeing what a great success the gift had been, the soldier decided he had to be a hero to the nth degree.

A few days later he came back with his friend, and a carton, a whole carton of cans of sliced peaches. 12 cans. 12 CANS! Wow! What to do with such booty? Urgent conversations took place. Suggestions made and discarded. Finally, with everyone watching, the carton, less one can, was taken down into the cellar, and buried under the heap of coal.

Then, everyone was sworn to secrecy. No one must tell what was hidden there.

Some time passed, and one day there was a knock at the door. Military police. They wanted to search the house for stolen contraband from the PX.

My heart was racing … would we go to jail? Would the soldiers be arrested? What would happen? They searched everywhere, but did not want to get dirty moving the heap of black, sooty coal, and so the peaches were undiscovered. But we all felt horribly guilty whenever a can was opened, and it spoiled the pleasure in eating those sweet slices. …

Back in London, one day my Zaida (Grandfather) and Mum were pushing the baby carriage along the High Street of our neighborhood, in the middle of the day, when the siren began its up and down wailing. Mother wanted to run to the tube station shelter because it was closer. But Zaida said "No, we cannot leave Booba (Grandmother) alone. She would be too frightened." Mother insisted on going to the station. … But Zaida grabbed hold of the baby carriage and began pushing it, running, toward home. Mother and I had no choice but to follow him.

We spent the rest of the day and all the night in the dark, in the shelter. In the morning, when it was quiet, we came out, only to hear on the news that the subway station we had almost gone to had been bombed. All the people down there on the subway platform had died.

When the war was over, there was a party on the street. And some time later the soldiers began coming home.

I begged my mother to allow me to run down the stairs and answer the door when my daddy came home. And she said yes.

It seemed a long time later that the doorbell rang, and I remember very well the excitement of that moment. I ran to the door, opened it, and a giant stood there. A tall, tall man in uniform, with a backpack. A total stranger. I don't remember him at all after that moment for many years. My mother told me that I kept asking her when he was going away again, because I didn't like this stranger telling me what to do.

Source: "Pamela's Story: Stolen Fruit, a London Childhood," Timewitnesses: Memories of the Last Century, http://timewitnesses.org/english/~pamela.html. Reprinted with permission of Pamela Lazarus.

178. Susan B. Anthony II on Women's Rights in the Postwar World, 1943

Introduction

Feminist activists demanded that women not simply revert to prewar roles after the war but that, as part of the war's objectives, they should gain full equality with men. In 1943 Susan B. Anthony II, niece of the prominent 19th-century American woman activist who had likewise taken the lead in fighting for women's rights, articulated these concerns. She warned that if women did not obtain adequate guarantees of their future rights and status, they would be discouraged from devoting themselves wholeheartedly to the war effort.

Primary Source

What assurance have the women of America that maximum exertion of their energies now will give them not only a place in the war today but a place in the world tomorrow?…

If we are to win the war it is clear that nursery schools, public cafeterias, housing projects, medical services, recreation facilities, and special services for maternity cases are vital necessities. But they are more than that—they are the key to the postwar position of women and a promise to men and women of a standard of living that will enable *three-thirds of a nation* to be wellhoused, well fed, and well cared for.

If we do not obtain nursery schools, if we do not obtain adequate health programs, school lunch, and milk for our children *now, when they are desperately needed as wartime measures*, you can be sure of a reversion in the postwar world to substandards of living. …

Victory can no longer be regarded as separate from the assurance to our people of a future that will hold a place for them. To arouse the spirit of victory the people must be given a demonstration of what democracy means, what full employment means, what public services mean.

We are in a death struggle against fascism—a system whose ideology and practice reduces men and women to slaves, living on starvation levels. What better proof could we offer the American people of our absolute irreconcilability with Hitler's methods than to start *now* to provide employment and security for all. …

America has limped along for too many centuries utilizing half the productive forces of the nation. Only in wartime does our vast industrial and agricultural machine become nearly fully used. Only in wartime does the vast

energy and talent of the American woman begin to be unleashed. It has been said that women are the margin for victory in this war. I would add that women are the margin for victory for the economic life of the peace. The kind of war we wage determines the kind of peace. The kind of peace we have will be determined largely by the kind of use we make of our labor potential.

If we plan a nation producing enough food, housing, clothing, for all of our people, then we will need the labor of all of the adult men and women to staff the factories, farms, and offices. Energies going into the weapons of war today should be used for the essentials and for the luxuries of life tomorrow. Unless we envisage a return to the economy of scarcity of prewar America, we are going to need our women as well as our men in production. Unless we envisage losing the war, we need community services *now* to release women for the big wartime tasks of production.

With them America will be on the road to victory, both in war and peace. Without them America cannot mobilize its labor forces either for war or peace. If we provide these services now, they will be a means to victory. They can then be utilized as a means of raising the peacetime standards of living of *all our people*.

Yet women need more than the mere extension of community services to give them a real stake in the war. They need the assurance that *never again will they be deprived of the right to work, and the right to hold top positions*. Temporary orders permitting equal pay for equal work, transitory demands of employers for their services, are not enough. …

When women formed only one-quarter of the productive forces of the nation, it was easy to push aside their claims to equal participation in governing the nation. The right to vote has been relied upon as the complete answer to our demands for a voice in the highest councils of the Government. In almost doubling the number of women workers this war doubles the justice of our demands for an equal place in the legislatures, on the court benches, and in law enforcement.

No longer can women be satisfied with a backseat in Congress, with one seat in the President's circle of advisers and administrators, *with no seat on the Supreme Court Bench*. Wherever people are governed, representatives of these people should be amongst the governors. That is part of the fundamental democratic principle for which we are now fighting. Women,

being governed, must logically be among the governors. We would be but a poor pretender to democracy if, after having worked our women to the utmost to win the war, we barred them from a meaningful role in the peace. How can we claim to be purified of fascist tendencies in our own nation if we permit a fascist concept of women to prevail?

As we know, the fascist concept of woman is that her life's work is to breed and feed. She breeds a dozen years and feeds for a lifetime. After breeding—after having fulfilled her biological function—she is then, according to the fascists, only useful to brood over the kitchen stove. The boundary for women, under fascism, is the home; and beyond that boundary she must not go. Democracy's task is to elevate woman so that the world is her home—not the home her world.

Fascism is determined to make women servants of the house. Democracy must encourage women to be servants of the world. The conditions of war are definitely pulling women out of the house into the world. The peace must not push them back into the house, unless they wish to go there.

We must recognize that woman's place is in the world as much as man's is. Woman's place is in the factory, in the office, in the professions, in the fields, and at the council table—wherever human labor, human effort, is needed to produce and create. In the postwar world there must be an abolition of the fatal distinctions between men and women—between "men's jobs" and "women's jobs." Personal ability, not choice, must determine the job-holder. Present discriminations must be done away with, for they work against men as well as women.

The greatest distinction between men's and women's work is that jobs at the top are tacitly regarded as being "For Men Only." The menial and the semiskilled jobs are thought to be ideal for women. Wartime necessity will to some degree wipe out this distinction; but extreme vigilance will be needed in the postwar period if we are to maintain any of the higher positions we reach now as an expedient because the men are fighting.

The hopeful thing is that each major American war has resulted in the extension of democracy to a group that was formerly underprivileged. The American Revolution extended to white men the right to vote, the right to elect the world's first republican form of Government. The Civil War extended to black men the right to vote. The First World War extended to white and black women the right to vote.

This extension of democracy in past wars has not come easily. It has not been handed down generously from above. It has been wrenched from the hands and against the prejudices of those in power; it has been reluctantly granted, after great pressures and bloody battles.

In these wars of American history, the Government has had to extend democracy to new sections of the population for a specific reason of winning the war. Each war in our history has demanded the lives and the sweat of larger and larger sections of the population.

Today, we are engaged in the greatest war of our history. More men, more machines, more material are being used against the enemy. Today, for the first time, whole populations, men and women, are involved as active belligerents.

And out of the necessities of our struggle against fascism, this nation is being forced to mobilize that great reservoir of anti-fascist fighters—the American women. As in the Civil War when the Union freed the Negroes to fight to win the war, so today our Government is being forced to free women to win this war. America must unlock the doors that have imprisoned millions of women. Women must be let out—liberated from the homes, so that they can take their place in the war of the world today—and in the work of the world tomorrow.

Source: Susan B. Anthony II, *Out of the Kitchen—Into the War: Woman's Winning Role in the Nation's Drama* (New York: Stephen Daye, 1943). Reprinted in Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, eds., *American Women in a World at War: Contemporary Accounts from World War II* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), 214–218.

1944 DOCUMENTS

179. General Joseph W. Stilwell on China, 1942–1944

Introduction

Relations between General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of U.S. forces in China and Burma from 1942 to 1944, and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang K'ai-shek), the leader of China's Guomindang (Nationalist) government, were poor. In his diary Stilwell jotted caustic comments on Jiang and his government, assailing its inefficiency and corruption, which he contrasted with the austerity of the regime's Communist rivals. Jiang's reluctance to take the offensive and his eagerness to conserve his resources for the postwar battle against the Communists he already anticipated also irked Stilwell, whom the Roosevelt administration withdrew at Jiang's request in 1944 after his relations with the Guomindang leader had deteriorated to the point where they had become unworkable.

Primary Source

General Joseph W. Stilwell on China, Excerpts from *The Stilwell Papers*

[Undated Diary Note]

CHIANG K'AI-SHEK. I never heard Chiang K'ai-shek say a single thing that indicated gratitude to the President or to our country for the help we were extending to him. Invariably, when anything was promised, he would want more. Invariably, he would complain about the small amount of material that was being furnished. He would make comparisons between the huge amounts of Lend-Lease supplies going to Great Britain and Russia with the meagre trickle going to China. He would complain that the Chinese had been fighting for six or seven years and yet we gave them practically nothing. It would of

course have been undiplomatic to go into the nature of the military effort Chiang K'ai-shek had made since 1938. It was practically zero.

Whether or not he was grateful was a small matter. The regrettable part of it was that there was no quid pro quo. We did what we could, furnished what was available, without being allowed to first ask what he would do, etc. The result was that we were continuously on the defensive and he could obstruct and delay any of our plans without being penalized. …

[Undated Diary Note]

[I have] faith in Chinese soldiers and Chinese people; fundamentally great, democratic, misgoverned. No bars of caste or religion. … Honest, frugal, industrious, cheerful, independent, tolerant, friendly, courteous.

I judge Kuomintang and Kungchangtang [Communist Party] by what I saw:

[GMD] Corruption, neglect, chaos, economy, taxes, words and deeds. Hoarding, black market, trading with enemy.

Communist programme … reduce taxes, rents, interest. Raise production, and standard of living. Participate in government. Practice what they preach. …

[Excerpts from an Undated Paper on the Dominant Military Doctrine of the Chinese Army]

In time of war you have to take your allies as you find them. We are fighting Germany to tear down the Nazi system—one-party government, supported by the Gestapo and headed by an unbalanced man with little education. We had plenty to say against such a system. China, our ally, was being run by a one-party government (the Kuomintang), supported by a Gestapo (Tai Li's organization) and headed by an unbalanced man with little education. This government, however, had the prestige of the possession of power—it was opposing Japan, and its titular head had been built up by propaganda in America out of all proportion to his deserts and accomplishments. We had to back the existing regime in order to have any chance of getting China to pull her weight. To change the structure during the emergency would have been next to impossible. All through the Chinese machinery of government there

are interlocking ties of interest … family, financial, political, etc. No man, no matter how efficient, can hope for a position of authority on account of being the man best qualified for the job: he simply must have other backing. To reform such a system, it must be torn to pieces. You build a framework to grow grapevines on: in the course of time, the vines grow all over it, twisting in and out and around and pretty soon the frame is so tightly held by the vines that if you start pulling them out, you will tear the frame to pieces. We could not risk it, we had to take the instrument as we found it and do the best we could. But because it was expedient to back this government to get action against Japan, it was not necessarily advisable to endorse its methods and policies. We could have required some return for our help.

Chiang K'ai-shek made a great point of how badly the U.S.A. had neglected China, who had been fighting desperately for so long, while Lend-Lease materials had been poured into Great Britain and Russia by the billion. His case was that we owed him a great debt and that it was a crying shame we didn't do more to discharge it. This attitude met with sympathy in the U.S. It was true that large quantities of Lend-Lease materials were going to Russia and Great Britain. It was also true that Russia and Great Britain, particularly Russia, were making good use of this material against Germany. It was also true that there was no possible way of delivering the goods to Chiang K'ai-shek unless he made an effort on his part to break the blockade. It seemed reasonable to expect Great Britain to use the huge Indian Army for the purpose. The U.S. was fighting Germany in Europe, and Japan in the Pacific. She was supplying enormous quantities of munitions and food to all the Allies. Under the circumstances it seemed reasonable for somebody else to display a little energy in Burma.

To keep the show going, I had to overlook some of these incongruities and pretend, like the other players. If not, the critics would say it was a bum show, and we are very much afraid of the critics in our show.

[This paper was never finished.]

[Notes, Probably July 1944]

SOLUTION IN CHINA

The cure for China's trouble is the elimination of Chiang K'ai-shek. The only thing that keeps the country split is his fear of losing control. He hates the Reds and will not take any chances on giving them a toehold in the government. The result is that each side watches the other and neither gives a damn about the war [against Japan]. If this condition persists, China will have civil war immediately after Japan is out. If Russia enters the war before a united front is formed in China, the Reds, being immediately accessible, will naturally gravitate to Russia's influence and control. The condition will directly affect the relations between Russia and China, and therefore indirectly those between Russia and [the] U.S.

If we do not take action, our prestige in China will suffer seriously. China will contribute nothing to our effort against Japan, and the seed will be planted for chaos in China after the war. …

[Undated Notes]

Chiang K'ai-shek is the head of a one-party government supported by a Gestapo and a party secret service. He is now organizing an S.S. of 100,000 members.

[He] hates the so-called Communists. He intends to crush them by keeping any munitions furnished him and by occupying their territory as the Japs retire.

[He] will not make an effort to fight seriously. He wants to finish the war coasting, with a big supply of material, so as to perpetuate his regime. He has blocked us for three years and will continue to do so. He has failed to keep his agreements.

[He] has spoken contemptuously of American efforts and has never said one word to express gratitude for our help, except in one message to the President, in which he attacked me.

[He] is responsible for major disasters of the war. Nanking. Lan Fang. Changsha and Hengyang. Kweilin and Liuchow. Red blockade.

But [he] is the titular head of China and has marked me as *persona non grata.*

Therefore I cannot operate in the China theatre while he is in power. …

Source: Joseph Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers,* edited by Theodore H. White (New York: Sloan Associates, 1948), 291–296, 311–312. Courtesy heirs of Winifred Stilwell.

180. The Economic Bill of Rights: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress, January 11, 1944

Introduction

Franklin D. Roosevelt had won fame as a reformist president who was responsible for the New Deal of the 1930s, a major program of social and economic measures intended to help poorer Americans weather the Great Depression. In his State of the Union address to Congress in January 1944, the president made it clear that he hoped to revitalize reform at home. He proposed the passage of an economic bill of rights, a major domestic-reform program, to accompany American victories overseas. Roosevelt's thinking reflected that of many other liberals in numerous countries, who shared the hope that the war would force the implementation of measures that would bring substantially greater social justice to the working classes and the poor.

Primary Source

This Nation in the past two years has become an active partner in the world's greatest war against human slavery.

We have joined with like-minded people in order to defend ourselves in a world that has been gravely threatened with gangster rule.

But I do not think that any of us Americans can be content with mere survival. Sacrifices that we and our Allies are making impose upon us all a sacred obligation to see to it that out of this war we and our children will gain something better than mere survival.

We are united in determination that this war shall not be followed by another interim which leads to new disaster—that we shall not repeat the tragic errors of ostrich isolationism.

When Mr. Hull went to Moscow in October, and when I went to Cairo and Tehran in November, we knew that we were in agreement with our Allies in our common determination to fight and win this war. But there were many vital questions concerning the future peace, and they were discussed in an atmosphere of complete candor and harmony. …

The one supreme objective for the future, which we discussed for each nation individually, and for all the United Nations, can be summed up in one word: Security.

And that means not only physical security which provides safety from attacks by aggressors. It means also economic security, social security, moral security—in a family of nations.

In the plain down-to-earth talks that I had with the Generalissimo [Jiang Jieshi or Chiang Kai-shek] and Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, it was abundantly clear that they are all most deeply interested in the resumption of peaceful progress by their own peoples—progress toward a better life.

All our Allies have learned by experience—bitter experience—that real development will not be possible if they are to be diverted from their purpose by repeated wars—or even threats of war.

The best interests of each nation, large and small, demand that all freedom-loving nations shall join together in a just and durable system of peace. In the present world situation, evidenced by the actions of Germany, Italy, and Japan, unquestioned military control over the disturbers of the peace is as necessary among nations as it is among citizens in any community. And an equally basic essential to peace—permanent peace—is a decent standard of living for all individual men and women and children in all nations. Freedom from fear is eternally linked with freedom from want.

There are people who burrow through our nation like unseeing moles, and attempt to spread the suspicion that if other nations are encouraged to raise their standards of living, our own American standard of living must of necessity be depressed.

The fact is the very contrary. It has been shown time and again that if the standard of living of any country goes up, so does its purchasing power—and that such a rise encourages a better standard of living in neighboring countries with whom it trades. That is just plain common sense—and it is the kind of plain common sense that provided the basis for our discussions at Moscow, and Cairo and Teheran. …

The overwhelming majority of our people have met the demands of this war with magnificent courage and a great deal of understanding. They have accepted inconveniences; they have accepted hardships; they have accepted tragic sacrifices.

However, while the majority goes on about its great work without complaint, we all know that a noisy minority maintains an uproar, an uproar of demands for special favors for special groups. …

Such selfish agitation can be and is highly dangerous in wartime. It creates confusion. It damages morale. It hampers our national effort. It prolongs the war. …

If ever there was a time to subordinate individual or group selfishness to the national good, that time is now. Disunity at home, and bickering, self-seeking partisanship, stoppages of work, inflation, business as usual, politics as usual, luxury as usual—and sometimes a failure to tell the whole truth—these are the influences which can undermine the morale of the brave men ready to die at the front for us here. …

Therefore, in order to concentrate all of our energies, all of our resources on winning this war, and to maintain a fair and stable economy at home, I recommend that the Congress adopt:

First, (1) A realistic and simplified tax law which will tax all unreasonable profits, both individual and corporate, and reduce the ultimate cost of the war to our sons and our daughters. The tax bill now under consideration by the Congress does not begin to meet this test.

Second, (2) A continuation of the law for the renegotiations of war contracts which will prevent exorbitant profits and assure fair prices to the Government. For two long years I have pleaded with the Congress to take undue profits out of war.

Third, (3) A cost of food law which will enable the Government (a) to place a reasonable floor under the prices the farmer may expect for his production; and (b) to place a ceiling on the prices the consumer will have to pay for the necessary food he buys. This should apply, as I have intimated, to necessities only; and this will require public funds to carry it out. It will cost in appropriations about one percent of the present annual cost of the war.

Fourth, (4) An early re-enactment of the stabilization statute of October, 1942. This expires this year, June 30th, 1944, and if it is not extended well in advance, the country might just as well expect price chaos by summertime. We cannot have stabilization by wishful thinking. We must take positive action to maintain the integrity of the American dollar.

And Fifth, (5) A national service law which, for the duration of the war, will prevent strikes, and, with certain appropriate exceptions, will make

available for war production or for any other essential services every able-bodied adult in this whole Nation.

These five measures together form a just and equitable whole. I would not recommend a national service law unless the other laws were passed to keep down the cost of living, to share equitably the burdens of taxation, to hold the stabilization line, and to prevent undue profits.

The Federal Government already has the basic power to draft capital and property of all kinds for war purposes on a basis of just compensation.

And, as you know, I have for three years hesitated to recommend a national service act. Today, however, with all the experience we have behind us and with us, I am convinced of its necessity. Although I believe that we and our Allies can win the war without such a measure, I am certain that nothing less than total mobilization of all our resources of manpower and capital will guarantee an earlier victory, and reduce the toll of suffering and sorrow and blood. …

National service is the most democratic way to wage a war. Like selective service for the armed forces, it rests on the obligation of each citizen to serve his nation to his utmost where he is best qualified. …

It is our duty now to begin to lay the plans and determine the strategy. More than the winning of the war, it is time to begin plans and determine the strategy for winning a lasting peace and the establishment of an American standard of living higher than ever known before.

This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength, under the protection of certain inalienable political rights—among them the right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our rights to life and liberty.

We have come to a clear realization of the fact, however, that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. “Necessitous men are not free men.” People who are hungry, people who are out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.

In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of station, or race or creed.

Among these are:

- The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation;
- The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;
- The right of farmers to raise and sell their products at a return which will give them and their families a decent living;
- The right of every business man, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;
- The right of every family to a decent home;
- The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health;
- The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, and sickness, and accident and unemployment;
- And finally, the right to a good education.

All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won we must be prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being.

America's own rightful place in the world depends in large part upon how fully these and similar rights have been carried into practice for all our citizens. For unless there is security here at home there cannot be lasting peace in the world. …

I ask the Congress to explore the means for implementing this economic bill of rights—for it is definitely the responsibility of the Congress so to do, and the country knows it. Many of these problems are already before committees of the Congress in the form of proposed legislation. I shall from time to time communicate with the Congress with respect to these and further proposals. In the event that no adequate program of progress is evolved, I am certain that the Nation will be conscious of the fact.

Our fighting men abroad—and their families at home—expect such a program and have the right to insist on it. It is to their demands that this Government should pay heed, rather than to the whining demands of selfish pressure groups who seek to feather their nests while young Americans are dying. …

Each and every one of us has a solemn obligation under God to serve this Nation in its most critical hour—to keep this Nation great—to make this Nation greater in a better world.

Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt, "State of the Union Message to Congress, January 11, 1944," Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/address_text.html.

181. Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, Directive to Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, February 12, 1944

Introduction

In early 1944, the Anglo-American chiefs of staff issued a directive formally appointing General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had previously led the North African and Italian campaigns, commander of the Allied forces that would undertake Operation OVERLORD, the long-awaited Western invasion of Germany. The original invasion date was set for May, though it was later deferred until June 6, 1944.

Primary Source

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

2. *Task.* You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such

forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.

4. *Command*. You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support.

5. *Logistics*. In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the Continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command.

6. *Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies*. In preparation for your assault on enemy-occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces, agencies of sabotage, subversion, and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities, are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.

7. *Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas*. Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the U.S.S.R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the same time as overlord with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as overlord. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.

8. *Relationship with Allied Governments—the re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories*. Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.

Source: Gordon A. Harrison, *United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations, Cross Channel Attack, Office of the Chief of Military History* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1951), 457–458.

182. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Communiqué No. 677, Statement of General Douglas MacArthur on the Seizure of the Northern Solomon Islands, New Georgia, February 16, 1944

Introduction

In February 1944, General Douglas MacArthur issued a press statement marking the Allied capture of the Northern Solomon Islands, which brought the Solomon Campaign to a close. This event also represented a further setback for Japan in the Pacific.

Primary Source

We have seized the northern end of the Solomons Archipelago. New Zealand and American ground troops, covered by naval and air forces, landed and occupied the Green Islands. Enemy ground resistance was negligible and his air reaction weak. This culminates the successful series of flank movements commencing in the New Georgia group which has gradually enveloped all enemy forces in the Solomons. These forces, estimated at 22,000 strong, dispersed through Choiseul, Shortland, Bougainville and Buka Islands, are now isolated from their source of supply at Rabaul. Starvation and disease, certain to ensue from military blockade, render their position hopeless. With their airfields destroyed and their barge traffic paralyzed, the relief of these scattered garrisons is no longer practicable and their ultimate fate is sealed.

For all strategic military purposes this completes the campaign for the Solomon Islands.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:136.

183. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Communiqué No. 691, Statement of General Douglas MacArthur on the Bismarck Campaign, March 1, 1944

Introduction

At the end of February 1944, Allied forces under General Douglas MacArthur's command in the Southwest Pacific theater undertook a risky series of landings on the Admiralty Islands in the Bismarck Sea. MacArthur, who personally supervised this operation, issued a communiqué highlighting its military significance.

Primary Source

We have landed in the Admiralty Islands which stand at the northern entrance to the Bismarck Sea almost due south of Guam and 1,300 miles from the Philippines. … This marks a final stage in the great swinging move pivoting on New Guinea which has been the basic purpose of the operations initiated on June 29, 1943, when the Southwest Pacific Area and South Pacific Area were united under General MacArthur's command. The axis of advance has thereby been changed from the north to the west. This relieves our supply line of the constant threat of flank attack which has been present since the beginning of the Papuan Campaign. This line, previously so precariously exposed, is now firmly secured not only by air cover, but by our own front to which it is perpendicular. Tactically it tightens the blockade of the enemy's remaining bases. Their supply lines are definitely and conclusively severed and only a minimum of blockade running, by submarine or individual surface

craft, is now possible. In addition to the troops trapped in the Solomons, some fifty thousand of the enemy, largely in New Britain and at Rabaul, are now inclosed. Their situation has become precarious and their ultimate fate is certain under blockade, bombardment and the increasing pressure of besieging ground forces. The end of the Bismarck Campaign is now clearly in sight with a minimum of loss to ourselves.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:140.

184. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Communiqué No. 745, Statement of General Douglas MacArthur on the Hollandia Landings, April 25, 1944

Introduction

Continuing their policy of chipping away at Japanese conquests in the Pacific, in April 1944 Allied forces commanded by General Douglas MacArthur landed at Hollandia and Aitape in Dutch New Guinea. MacArthur marked the occasion, as usual, with a communiqué setting forth the significance of this new development.

Primary Source

We have seized the Humboldt Bay area on the northern coast of Dutch New Guinea, approximately 500 miles west of Saidor. Our ground troops have landed at Aitape, Hollandia, and Tanahmerah Bay, covering a front of about 150 miles. The landings were made under cover of naval and air bombardment and followed neutralizing attacks by our air forces, and planes from carriers of the Pacific Fleet. Complete surprise and effective support, both surface and air, secured our initial landings with slight losses. We are pushing forward to secure the local airfields. Our feints over the past week towards Madang and Wewak apparently deceived the enemy into

concentrating the mass of his forces forward into those areas, thus leaving the vital sector of Hollandia vulnerable and making possible our surprise movement to his rear. The operation throws a loop of envelopment around the enemy's Eighteenth Army, dispersed along the coast of New Guinea in the Madang, Alexishafen, Hansa Bay, Wewak sectors, similar to the Solomons and Bismarck loops of envelopment. To the east are the Australians and the Americans; to the west the Americans; to the north the sea controlled by our Allied naval forces; to the south untraversed jungle mountain ranges; and over all our Allied air mastery. This enemy army is now completely isolated. With its communication and supply lines severed, its condition becomes similar to that of the beleaguered Seventeenth and Eighteenth Armies in the Bismarck and Solomon Archipelagos. Its present strength is 60,000. The total remaining forces of these two armies, which are now themselves surrounded, are estimated at 140,000: 50,000 in New Britain, 10,000 in New Ireland, 20,000 in Bougainville, and 60,000 in New Guinea. Since the start of the campaign they have lost 110,000 men, 44 percent of their original strength of a quarter of a million, and the remainder is now neutralized and strategically impotent. The enemy's maritime and air losses have been proportionately heavy. His invested garrisons can be expected to strike desperately to free themselves and time and combat will be required to accomplish the annihilation, but their ultimate fate is now certain. Their situation reverses Bataan. The present operation when completed frees British New Guinea from enemy control, and is the first recapture of Dutch territory in the war.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:147–148.

185. Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou of Greece, The Lebanon Charter, May 20, 1944

Introduction

In several Balkan countries, most notably Greece and Yugoslavia, the anti-German guerrilla resistance movement was bitterly split between left-wing and communist forces and their right-wing and centrist, often monarchist, counterparts. The rival groupings frequently fought each other as fiercely as they did the Germans, and in both countries civil war ensued toward the end of the war. On February 29, 1944, forces of the left-wing ELAS (the Greek People's Liberation Army) and the center-right EDES (the National Republican Greek League) signed the Plaka agreement, an armistice that supposedly brought to an end the civil war that had erupted between them the previous October. Ten days later a new democratic umbrella organization to govern Greece was established, around which all anti-German forces could supposedly unite. Two months after the putative establishment of this Government of National Unity, the Greek prime minister, Georgios Papandreou, a moderate democrat, summoned a meeting of representatives of all Greek political groupings in Lebanon. In his final speech, Papandreou listed eight points on which all Greeks could agree, and the rest of the delegates promised to unite around these in future. At the end of the year with the defeat of Germany in sight, civil war began once again.

Primary Source

1. The reorganization and re-establishment of discipline in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East under the Greek national flag must be carried out exclusively on a national and military basis, not on a political basis. The army will carry out the orders of the Government, and cannot possess political opinions.

2. All guerilla bands in free Greece must be unified and disciplined under the orders of a single Government. The guerilla principle of military organization cannot be a permanent one; but no change should be made at the moment which will lead to a reduction of resistance. Consequently the present situation must be regarded as a transitional one, and the initiative in settling it can only be taken by the Government in consultation with GHQ, MEF [General Headquarters, Middle East Force].

3. The reign of terror in the Greek countryside must cease and the personal security and political liberty of the people must be firmly established when and where the invader has been driven out. Outbreaks of terrorism must

also cease in the towns. Ministers of the Government will be in office in Greece to administer the armed forces and the liberated Greek population. As soon as the presence of the Government in Greece is possible, it must not lose a minute in proceeding there.

4. Adequate supplies of food and medicines must be sent to enslaved and mountain Greece.

5. Greece, when liberated, must be secured to the state of order and liberty necessary to enable the people to decide, freely and without pressure, both on their constitution and their régime and Government:

(a) The special task of the Government of National Unity will be to secure order and liberty.
(b) The people must be enabled to make its decision as soon as possible.
(c) On the question of the sovereign power, the political leaders who have joined the Government of National Unity are understood to retain such views as they have already expressed.

6. Severe punishment will be imposed on traitors and those who have exploited the misfortunes of the people. Since this problem concerns the post-liberation period, it is necessary to make it clear that the Government of National Unity will continue beyond the date of liberation for such period as the conscience of the nation and its own political judgment may decide.

7. Arrangements will be made in advance in concert with the Allies, for the satisfaction of Greece's material needs in the way of reconstruction, including such necessities as the provision of outlets for Greek products and freedom of emigration.

8. Full satisfaction of Greece's national claims is called for by the past services and sacrifices of the Greek people. This must include the security of our new frontiers.

Source: Margaret Carlyle, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1939–1946,* Vol. 2, *Hitler's Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 348–349. Reprinted with permission of Chatham House.

186. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Communiqué No. 780, Statement of General Douglas MacArthur on the Biak Island Landing, May 28, 1944

Introduction

Just one month after landing on Hollandia, American and Australian forces landed on Biak Island, Dutch New Guinea. This operation developed into a particularly bloody campaign, as Japanese defenders took refuge in the caves that honeycombed the island and fought bitterly and tenaciously, often to the death. Allied troops faced particularly difficult conditions in terms of food shortages, illness, and foul wet weather.

Primary Source

We have landed on Biak Island. … The capture of this stronghold will give us command domination of Dutch New Guinea except for isolated enemy positions. For strategic purposes this marks the practical end of the New Guinea campaign. The final stage has also been reached in the offensive initiated in this theater on 29 June 1943, by the combined forces of the Southwest Pacific and the South Pacific Areas. It has resulted in the reconquest or neutralization of the Solomons, the Bismarcks, the Admiralties, and New Guinea. From the forward point reached by the Japanese we have advanced our front approximately 1,800 statute miles westward and approximately 700 miles to the north. … Compared with the enemy our offensive employed only modest forces and through the maximum use of maneuver and surprise has incurred only light losses. The operations have effected a strategic penetration of the conquered empire Japan was attempting to consolidate in the Southwestern Pacific and have secured bases of departure for the advance to its vital areas in the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:152.

187. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Order of the Day and Letter to Troops, June 6, 1944

Introduction

After long months of planning, on June 6, 1944, the Allies launched their Western offensive against German forces in France and Western Europe. Before the invasion began, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, issued an order of the day to his troops. Each soldier also received a letter detailing how the Allied troops should conduct themselves in the areas they liberated. In marked contrast to German looting of the conquered areas of Europe, Eisenhower warned soldiers that they must treat the inhabitants generously and respect their rights and property.

Primary Source

TO TROOPS OF A.E.F.

Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Forces!: You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over oppressed peoples in Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of 1940–41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats, in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned! The free men of the world are marching together to Victory!

I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full victory!

Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.

TO TROOPS OF THE A.E.F.

You are soon to be engaged in a great undertaking—the invasion of Europe. Our purpose is to bring about, in company with our Allies, and our comrades on other fronts, the total defeat of Germany. Only by such a complete victory can we free ourselves and our homelands from the fear and threat of the Nazi tyranny.

A further element of our mission is the liberation of those people of Western Europe now suffering under German oppression.

Before embarking on this operation, I have a personal message for you as to your own individual responsibility, in relation to the inhabitants of our Allied countries.

As a representative of this country, you will be welcomed with deep gratitude by the liberated peoples, who for years have longed for this deliverance. It is of the utmost importance that this feeling of friendliness and goodwill be in no way impaired by careless or indifferent behavior on your part. By a courteous and considerate demeanor, you can on the other hand do much to strengthen that feeling.

The inhabitants of Nazi-occupied Europe have suffered great privations, and you will find that many of them lack even the barest necessities. You, on the other hand, have been, and will continue to be, provided adequate food, clothing, and other necessities. You must not deplete the already meager local stocks of food and other supplies by indiscriminate buying, thereby fostering the “Black Market,” which can only increase the hardship of the inhabitants.

The rights of individuals, as to their persons and property, must be scrupulously respected, as though in your own country. You must remember, always, that these people are our friends and Allies.

I urge each of you to bear constantly in mind that by your actions not only you as an individual, but your country as well, will be judged. By establishing a relationship with the liberated peoples, based on mutual understanding and respect, we shall enlist their wholehearted assistance in the defeat of our common enemy. Thus shall we lay the foundations for a lasting peace, without which our great effort will have been in vain.

Source: Alfred D. Chandler, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years*, 5 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 3:1913–1914.

188. Forrest C. Pogue on D-Day, June 6–7, 1944

Introduction

Forrest C. Pogue, then a young official army combat historian with the U.S. military, was present at the D-day landings. His group of five combat historians was attached to part of the 175th Infantry, which was supposed to land on the afternoon of June 6, 1944, D-day itself. Congestion on the invasion beaches meant that the 175th did not land until June 7, 1944, while the historical personnel remained aboard ship until the following day. From this vantage point Pogue could see very little, because "everything was obscured by smoke from the firing, fires that had been started by shells, and by the demolition of mines." He later wrote rather skeptically that he had never "been able to understand how correspondents, who watched the D-day attack from ten miles out, ever got such vivid pictures of the shore." Beginning on June 7 when various wounded men came aboard his ship, over the next six weeks Pogue conducted numerous interviews with officers and men who had taken part in the D-day fighting, enabling him to form a composite picture of these events.

Primary Source

Naval craft off the beaches fired sporadically. Everyone seemed pleased that the French ships were joining in the attack on shore positions. Destroyers lay near the shore and fired on shore positions several miles in. The Germans replied occasionally to the fire, but without effect, and as for German air, we saw only one enemy plane, a reconnaissance aircraft, during the day. British and American planes were over in force all day. In one fifteen-minute period we counted five flights of eighteen Marauders each.

After three o'clock the skies cleared except for a few clouds over the fighting area and it turned hot, to our great discomfort. We wanted to go

ashore, but orders came out that only people with rifles, who were prepared to use them, were to go in. So we parasites, armed for the most part with pistols, stayed aboard as spectators of the second act. Standing on jeeps and trucks, we watched developments off Omaha Beach as if we were at a fair. Actually, we could make out very little on the shore. Signs of movement were obscured by smoke from the firing, fires that had been started by shells, and by the demolition of mines. I did not see how it was possible for troops to have recognized any landmarks, nor have I been able to understand how correspondents, who watched the D-Day attack from ten miles out, ever got such vivid pictures of the shore. …

My own picture of D-Day was gleaned from dozens of interviews with officers and men who went in during the morning of 6 June. Some I talked to shortly after they were wounded, others I interviewed as they rested near the front lines, and some gave their stories weeks later. A short outline of that morning is given below.

The ships that took the assault elements to Normandy had been loaded, much like ours, in many coves and inlets in Wales, southern England, and the eastern counties. On the evening of 5 June they had proceeded from the rendezvous area near the Isle of Wight southward toward France. Shortly after midnight, minesweepers of the Allied fleet began to clear channels through the minefields for the ships. British and American airborne units took off from English fields and flew overhead to drop over their objectives—the British east of the Orne and the Americans in the Cotentin Peninsula. The British reached their bridgehead early and secured it, while the American forces, scattered to a considerable degree, had a tough job of assembling for concerted action.

Toward daylight the planes and ships took up their task of softening up the enemy, the chief change in plan being that … the air force struck a few miles inland instead of at the beaches. On the western limit of Omaha Beach, the Rangers scrambled ashore to find that the six guns they were to knock out were pulled back out of their way.

By daylight, ship channels had been cleared to the beaches and the small landing craft had been filled with men from the LSTs and larger transports and were on their way in from rendezvous points some ten miles out. The floating tanks were started in, as were guns in small craft. Only five out of thirty-two DDs survived of those that tried to float in under their own power,

while most of those in the other tank battalion, sent in at the last minute by boat, got in safely. In one field artillery battalion all but one gun was lost when the craft carrying them capsized.

The accounts of the early landings tend to follow the same pattern. Heavy seas threatened to swamp the smaller craft and made many of the soldiers seasick. Enemy fire struck numerous craft or forced navy crews to unload in deep water. Poor visibility, obstacles, and inexperience led other navy crews to land on the wrong beaches. Many of the soldiers in the first waves had to wade ashore carrying heavy equipment, which they often disposed of in deep water. At the extreme ends of the beaches, the cliffs interfered to some extent with the enemy fire and gave our troops some protection. In front of Vierville, the men hid behind the seawall that ran along the beach, and near Saint-Laurent-sur-Mer they found mounds of shingles to use as cover. Accounts of the first hours on the beaches speak of efforts of officers and non-coms [noncommissioned officers] to organize their units and get them off the beaches, but often those who tried to direct the attack fell as soon as they exposed themselves to the enemy. In some cases, platoons stuck together, but in others sections landed some distance apart—and there were instances where dispersed elements attached themselves to entirely different regiments and divisions and did not return to their parent organization for two or three days.

The first real effort to give direction to the attack came after the regimental commanders landed. The command group of the 116th Regimental Combat Team, which included Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, the assistant division commander, and Colonel C. D. W. Canham, the regimental commander, came in at about 7.30 a.m. The S-4 of the regiment was killed near the water's edge and other members of the command group were hit. Colonel Canham was wounded as he tried to organize the attack, but after receiving first aid he returned to his task. One of the most active commanders was General Cota, who, according to the accounts of the soldiers, was apparently everywhere that morning. Some spoke of his handling the bangalore torpedo that breached the wire at one of the exits, and others had him handling a Browning automatic rifle. His activities in the first weeks ashore made him almost a legendary figure. Non-coms were also called on to give leadership, as heavy casualties were inflicted on the junior officers. In one case, a private who had worked until a short time before in

the regimental Post Exchange rallied the men of his unit by calling them by name and persuading them to follow him over the seawall.

On the 16th Infantry's beaches, Colonel George Taylor, the RCT commander, gained lasting fame by saying to his officers and men: "The only people on the beach are the dead and those who are going to die—now let's get the hell out of here." In a short time he had the men in his sector moving. He and Colonel Canham were promoted to the rank of brigadier general for their work on D-Day.

The manner of the advance up the bluffs differed somewhat among the various units. Some stayed behind the seawall until units in the second and third waves came in through them and went up the cliffs. Others, after being reorganized, pressed forward and by noon were on top of the bluffs.

By midnight on 6 June all of the regiments in the 1st Division (the 16th, the 18th, and 26th) and two from the 29th (the 116th and 115th) had been landed on Omaha Beach. The 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions were in position to their right. Heavy seas, landings on the wrong beaches, intense fire from well-entrenched positions, the foundering of DD tanks and artillery pieces, abnormally high casualties among officers, failure to open all the beach exits, beach congestion, the slowness of some of the assault waves to move forward from the seawall, the difficulty of using the full force of naval gunfire because of the fear of inflicting losses on the infantrymen, the lack of sufficient gaps in underwater obstacles and beach obstacles, and the failure, for various reasons, of air bombardment to take out beach fortifications all placed V Corps a considerable distance from its D-Day objectives, and, as a result of the presence of the German 352d Division in the area, in danger of a counterattack before the time estimated. In the face of this situation, the regiments were reorganized, defenses were set up for the night, and preparations made for a vigorous offensive to attain the D-Day objectives as quickly as possible.

Source: Forrest C. Pogue, *Pogue's War: Diaries of a WWII Combat Historian* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 51–54. Reprinted with permission of University Press of Kentucky.

189. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the GI Bill of Rights (The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, S. 1767, Public Law 346, Chapter 268), June 22, 1944

Introduction

Although Congress remained unresponsive to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's call for an "economic bill of rights" for all Americans, politicians were, by contrast, eager to provide an extensive package of benefits for each returning U.S. serviceman. In the summer of 1944, Congress therefore passed an act providing World War II veteran soldiers with a cash bonus, access to subsidized medical care, higher education, and substantial housing benefits, including subsidized mortgages. Many returning soldiers were able to use these assorted facilities to become the first members of their families to enter the American middle class. The program also set the precedent that the U.S. government would provide a similar range of benefits to all future veterans of its wars.

Primary Source

This bill, which I have signed today, substantially carries out most of the recommendations made by me in a speech on July 28, 1943, and more specifically in messages to the Congress dated October 27, 1943, and November 23, 1943:

It gives servicemen and women the opportunity of resuming their education or technical training after discharge, or of taking a refresher or retrainer course, not only without tuition charge up to $500 per school year, but with the right to receive a monthly living allowance while pursuing their studies.

It makes provision for the guarantee by the Federal Government of not to exceed 50 percent of certain loans made to veterans for the purchase or construction of homes, farms, and business properties.

It provides for reasonable unemployment allowances payable each week up to a maximum period of one year, to those veterans who are unable to find a job.

It establishes improved machinery for effective job counseling for veterans and for finding jobs for returning soldiers and sailors.

It authorizes the construction of all necessary additional hospital facilities.

It strengthens the authority of the Veterans Administration to enable it to discharge its existing and added responsibilities with promptness and efficiency.

With the signing of this bill a well-rounded program of special veterans' benefits is nearly completed. It gives emphatic notice to the men and women in our armed forces that the American people do not intend to let them down.

By prior legislation, the Federal Government has already provided for the armed forces of this war: adequate dependency allowances; mustering-out pay; generous hospitalization, medical care, and vocational rehabilitation and training; liberal pensions in case of death or disability in military service; substantial war risk life insurance, and guaranty of premiums on commercial policies during service; protection of civil rights and suspension of enforcement of certain civil liabilities during service; emergency maternal care for wives of enlisted men; and reemployment rights for returning veterans.

This bill therefore and the former legislation provide the special benefits which are due to the members of our armed forces—for they "have been compelled to make greater economic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than the rest of us, and are entitled to definite action to help take care of their special problems." While further study and experience may suggest some changes and improvements, the Congress is to be congratulated on the prompt action it has taken.

There still remains one recommendation which I made on November 23, 1943, which I trust that the Congress will soon adopt—the extension of social security credits under the Federal Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance Law to all servicemen and women for the period of their service.

I trust that the Congress will also soon provide similar opportunities for postwar education and unemployment insurance to the members of the merchant marine, who have risked their lives time and again during this war for the welfare of their country.

But apart from these special benefits which fulfill the special needs of veterans, there is still much to be done. …

As a related problem the Congress has had under consideration the serious problem of economic reconversion and readjustment after the war, so that private industry will be able to provide jobs for the largest possible number. …

A sound postwar economy is a major present responsibility.

Source: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the GI Bill of Rights (The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, S. 1767, Public Law 346, Chapter 268), June 22, 1944.

190. Report on Conditions in the Concentration Camps of Oswieczim (Auschwitz) and Birkenau: Summary of the Auschwitz Escapees Report by Gerhart Riegner, World Jewish Congress, Geneva, Sent under Cover of R. E. Shoenfeld, U.S. Chargé to Czech Government in London, to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, July 5, 1944

Introduction

Throughout the war, German concentration and extermination camps continued to murder millions of Jews. They were also used to provide slave labor for German industry and agriculture. In the summer of 1944, the U.S. government received a graphic account of the horrifying conditions in the Auschwitz and Birkenau concentration camps.

Primary Source

The Czechoslovak Government has received through its representative in a neutral country an extract from the document drawn up regarding the fate of the Jews in the German camp at Birkenau. This document was drawn up at

Bratislava by two Slovak Jews who had managed to escape from the camps at Oswieczim and Birkenau in April. It contains an urgent request for the Allies to be informed of the frightful conditions in these camps. The Czechoslovak Government considers it its duty to comply with this request and the following is a literal translation of the extract as received from the neutral country.

The information contained in the document has been further considerably supplemented by reports which a Polish major who escaped from Oswieczim furnished to the underground organization in Slovakia.

OSWIECZIM AND BIRKENAU

The concentration camp at Oswieczim was originally intended for political prisoners, and about 15,000 Germans, Czechoslovaks, Poles and Russians were there in "protective detention." Besides this, professional criminals were sent there and asocial elements, homosexuals, Bible students, and later Jews from the occupied countries. Over the entrance is the inscription in German "Arbeit macht frei."

The Birkenau labour camp, which lies 4 km. from Oswieczim, and the agricultural work of the Harmense camps are both under the control of the governor of the Oswieczim camp. Inside Oswieczim camp are work-shops of the German armaments concerns Siemens and Krupp. The huts in the camp are in three rows covering an area of 500 × 300 metres. They are surrounded by a double fence 3 metres high charged with high tension electricity. At every 500 metres is a watch-tower 5 metres high with machine-guns and search-lights. This is the "kleine Postenkette" [little post chain]. Another line of watch-towers runs in a circle of 2 kilometres and the work-shops are between the two rows of watch-towers.

Birkenau camp is formed of three blocks covering an area 1,600 × 850 metres and is also surrounded by two rings of watch-towers. The outer ring is connected with the outer ring of watch-towers of Oswieczim camp and they are only separated by the railway-lines. Birkenau camp is called after the small forest of Birkenwald (in Polish Brzezinky) nearby. The local population used to call this place "Rajsko."

Working conditions at Birkenau and Oswieczim are unimaginable. Work is carried on either in the camp or in the neighbourhood. Roads are built.

Reinforced concrete buildings are put up. Gravel is quarried. Houses in the neighbourhood are knocked down. New buildings are put up in the camps and in the work-shops. Work is also done in the neighbouring coal mines or in the factory for synthetic rubber. Some persons also work in the administration of the camps. Any person who does not carry out his work to the satisfaction of the overseer is flogged or beaten to death. The food is 300 grammes of bread per head every evening, or 1 litre per head of turnip soup and a little coffee. That is for the Jews. Non-Jews receive rather more. Anyone who cannot work and has a temperature of at least 38.6 degrees is sent to the "Krankenbau," the hut for the sick. The German doctor divides sick persons into two groups: curable and seriously ill. The seriously ill are disposed of by a phenol injection in the region of the heart. Among non-Jews this is done only to those who are really seriously ill, while among the Jews 80 to 90 percent of all those ill receive it. 15,000 to 20,000 persons have already been got rid of in this way by injections. Particularly inhuman scenes took place when the sick were killed wholesale during the process of delousing when a typhus epidemic broke out. Near the "Krankenbau" is the "hygiene institute" where sterilisation and artificial insemination of the women are carried out and blood tests are made for blood transfusion. For these experiments chiefly Jews are used. Since March, 1942 enormous transports of Jews have come to Oswieczim and Birkenau. A very small number of them have been sent to the labour camp, while an average of 90 percent of those who have come have been taken straight from the train and killed. These executions took place at the beginning in the forest of Birkenwald by gas suffocation in a special building constructed for the purpose. After the suffocation by gas the dead bodies were burnt. At the end of February, 1943, four new crematoria were built, two large and two small, in the camp of Birkenau itself. The crematorium contains a large hall, a gas chamber and a furnace. People are assembled in the hall which holds 2,000 and gives the impression of a swimming-bath. They have to undress and are given a piece of soap and a towel as if they were going to the baths. Then they are crowded into the gas chamber which is hermetically sealed. Several S.S. men in gas-masks then pour into the gas chamber through three openings in the ceiling a preparation of the poison gas megacyklon, which is made in Hamburg. At the end of three minutes all the persons are dead. The dead bodies are then taken away in carts to the furnace to be burnt. The furnace has

nine chambers, each of them with four openings. Each opening will take three bodies at once. They are completely burnt after 1.5 hours. Thus each crematorium can burn 1,500 bodies daily. The crematoria can be recognized from outside by their lofty chimneys.

On principle only Jews are put to death by gas, this is only done to Aryans in exceptional cases. Aryans are shot with pistols on a special execution ground which lies between blocks 10 and 11 of Oswieczim camp. The first executions took place there in the summer of 1941 and reached their peak a year later when they were carried out by hundreds. Later when this aroused attention a large number of non-Jews who were condemned to death, were taken straight from the train to the execution ground and not entered on the lists of the camp. According to careful calculations during the period from April, 1942, to April, 1944, from 1.5 to 1.75 million Jews were put to death by gas or in some other way, half of these being Polish Jews, others [being] Jews from Holland, Greece, France, Belgium, Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Norway, Lithuania, Austria and Jews of various other nationalities who were brought to Oswieczim from other camps in Poland. About 90 percent of the members of the transports arriving in Birkenau and Oswieczim were taken straight from the train to be put to death and about 10 percent became inmates of the camp. Each of the new inmates was registered and received a number. In April, 1944, 180,000 persons in all had been registered as inmates of the camp, counting Jews and non-Jews together. Of the whole number who had arrived before there were only 34,000 in the camp at the beginning of April this year, 18,000 of them being non-Jews. (In both the sources that we have quoted this number includes the membership of both camps together.)

The remainder had been killed by hard work, illness, especially epidemics of typhus and malaria, ill treatment, and finally “selection.” Twice a week the camp doctor indicated persons destined for selection. Those selected were all gassed. In a single block of Birkenau camp the average number of deaths a week was as much as 2,000, 1,200 of these being natural deaths and 800 “selection.” A special book entitled “S.B. Sonderbehandelte” is kept dealing with the “selected.” Notice of the deaths of the others is sent to the supreme commander of the camp at Oranienburg. At the beginning of 1943 the “political section” (camp Gestapo) at Oswieczim received 500,000 forms for

release. The governor had them all made out in the names of persons who had already been gassed and lodged them in the archives of the camp. …

The above is the contents of the two documents. The persons who have managed to secure the transmission of the documents to a neutral country added

(a) the following information:

"12,000 Jews are being deported daily from the territories of Carpathian Ruthenia, Transylvania and the district of Kosice where there used to be 320,000 Jews. Those deported are sent to Oswieczim, 5,000 going by train via Slovakia daily and 7,000 via Carpathian Ruthenia."

and (b) the following suggestions:

The Allied Governments, especially those whose citizens are suffering in both these camps, should jointly address to the Germans and Hungarians a threat of reprisals directed at the Germans in the hands of these governments.

The crematoria in both camps, which are recognisable by their high chimneys and watch-towers, should be bombed and so should the main railway-lines connecting Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia with Poland which are also of military importance, (especially the bridge at Cop).

Public warnings to the Germans and Hungarians should be repeated.

The Vatican should be requested to pronounce a severe public condemnation.

Source: "Summary of the Auschwitz Escapees Report by Gerhart Riegner, World Jewish Congress, Geneva, Sent under Cover of R.E. Shoenfeld, U.S. Chargé to Czech Government in London, to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, July 5, 1944," PBS: The American Experience, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/bombsummary.html.

191. General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, July 5, 1944

Introduction

Supreme commander of the Allied forces in Europe General Dwight D. Eisenhower supplemented his official reports with regular personal letters to General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army. One month after

the Normandy landings, American forces faced fierce and difficult fighting in France in conditions that Eisenhower graphically described.

Primary Source

…I spent four days in the beachhead. We began attacking southward with the VIII Corps on the 3rd and the VII Corps joined in with one Division on July 4th. I was particularly anxious to visit these Corps and their Divisions during actual operations. The going is extremely tough, with three main causes responsible. The first of these, as always, is the fighting quality of the German soldier. The second is the nature of the country. Our whole attack has to fight its way out of very narrow bottlenecks flanked by marshes and against an enemy who has a double hedgerow and an intervening ditch almost every fifty yards as ready-made strong points. The third cause is the weather. Our air has been unable to operate at maximum efficiency and on top of this the rain and mud were so bad during my visit that I was reminded of Tunisian wintertime. It was almost impossible to locate artillery targets although we have plenty of guns available. Even with clear weather it is extraordinarily difficult to point out a target that is an appropriate one for either air or artillery.

Source: Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed., *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 194–195. Courtesy of the Eisenhower Library.

192. General Erwin Rommel, Teletype Message to Hitler, July 15, 1944

Introduction

Six weeks after the Normandy Invasion began, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of German forces in France, sent Hitler a teletype message warning that Germany faced defeat by the Allies and should withdraw from France. Ignoring this advice, Hitler ordered what became a disastrous German counterattack against advancing Allied units around Caen. On July 17, Rommel was severely injured when British fighter planes strafed his car. In company with other like-minded German generals, he had intended

that if Hitler ignored his advice, he would open negotiations with Allied commanders in France for an armistice and a separate peace in the West, a move that Rommel hoped would spare Germany from invasion by Russian forces from the east. Rommel had also met with a representative of another group of German military officers who intended to assassinate Hitler, though he himself apparently knew little or nothing of these plans. Rommel had, however, stated his belief that Hitler should be removed from power, albeit without bloodshed. On July 20 the planned coup failed, and the conspirators, who were arrested and tortured, eventually implicated Rommel. In order not to embarrass the German government, he was given the opportunity to commit suicide, which he accepted. After his death, he received a hero's funeral with full military honors.

Primary Source

The situation on the Normandy front is growing worse every day and is now approaching a grave crisis.

Due to the severity of the fighting, the enemy's enormous use of material—above all, artillery and tanks—and the effect of his unrestricted command of the air over the battle area, our casualties are so high that the fighting power of our divisions is rapidly diminishing. Replacements from home are few in number and, with the difficult transport situation, take weeks to get to the front. As against 97,000 casualties (including 2,360 officers)—i.e., an average of 2,500 to 3,000 a day—replacements to date number 10,000, of whom about 6,000 have actually arrived at the front.

Material losses are also huge and have so far been replaced on a very small scale; in tanks, for example, only 17 replacements have arrived to date as compared with 225 losses.

The newly arrived infantry divisions are raw and, with their small establishment of artillery, anti-tank guns and close-combat anti-tank weapons, are in no state to make a lengthy stand against major enemy attacks coming after hours of drumfire and heavy bombing. The fighting has shown that with this use of material by the enemy, even the bravest army will be smashed piece by piece, losing men, arms and territory in the process.

Due to the destruction of the railway system and the threat of the enemy air force to roads and tracks up to 90 miles behind the front, supply

conditions are so bad that only the barest essentials can be brought to the front. It is consequently now necessary to exercise the greatest economy in all fields, and especially in artillery and mortar ammunition. These conditions are unlikely to improve, as enemy action is steadily reducing the transport capacity available. Moreover, this activity in the air is likely to become even more effective as the numerous air-strips in the bridgehead are taken into use.

No new forces of any consequence can be brought up to the Normandy front except by weakening Fifteenth Army's front on the Channel, or the Mediterranean front in southern France. Yet Seventh Army's front, taken over all, urgently requires two fresh divisions, as the troops in Normandy are exhausted.

On the enemy's side, fresh forces and great quantities of war material are flowing into his front every day. His supplies are undisturbed by our air force. Enemy pressure is growing steadily stronger.

In these circumstances we must expect that in the foreseeable future the enemy will succeed in breaking through our thin front, above all, Seventh Army's, and thrusting deep into France. Apart from the Panzer Group's sector reserves, which are at present tied down by the fighting on their own front and—due to the enemy's command of the air—can only move by night, we dispose of no mobile reserve for defence against such a break-through. Action by our air force will, as in the past, have little effect.

The troops are everywhere fighting heroically, but the unequal struggle is approaching its end. It is urgently necessary for the proper conclusion to be drawn from this situation. As C.-in-C. of the Army Group I feel myself in duty bound to speak plainly on this point.

Source: B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., *The Rommel Papers* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), 486–487. Reprinted with permission.

193. Gestapo Interrogation Record of Captain Kaiser on Count von Stauffenberg's Assassination Plot of July 20, 1944

Introduction

From 1943 onward, a substantial number of German military officers, many of them former supporters who felt that both Hitler's conduct of the war on the Eastern Front and his refusal to seek a negotiated peace settlement were misguided, made plans to assassinate Hitler. On July 20, 1944, these plans culminated in an unsuccessful attempt, spearheaded by Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, to kill the führer at a meeting by means of a bomb hidden in a briefcase. The plotters were quickly arrested, interrogated under torture, and brutally executed. Gestapo interrogations soon revealed the extent of their plans, including the terms on which they hoped to make peace with the Allies. By the time of the assassination attempt, the Normandy Invasion had already made some of these terms a dead letter, and even before then, the plotters undoubtedly overestimated the concessions that the Allies were likely to grant.

Primary Source

The recent interrogation of Captain Kaiser has produced several indications that Stauffenberg had two channels to the English via middlemen. The details are currently being investigated. Already on 25 May, Kaiser produced a note for Stauffenberg to serve as the basis for negotiations with the enemy:

To cease the air war immediately.
To give up plans for invasion.
To avoid further sacrifice of blood.
To maintain a permanent defence capability in the east, withdraw from all occupied territories in the north, west and south.
To avoid any occupation.
A freely elected government as part of an independently formulated constitution.
Total participation in the implementation of armistice conditions and in the preparation of peace.
The Reich frontiers of 1914 in the east. Austria and the Sudetenland to remain with the Reich. Autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine.
The acquisition of South Tyrol down to Bolzano, Merano.
Energetic reconstruction with participation in the reconstruction of Europe.
The right to deal with the enemies of the people ourselves.

The reacquisition of honour, self-respect and the respect of others.

At the end of June 1944 Kaiser learned from [former mayor of Leipzig Carl] Goerdeler that inquiries were being made at the highest level in England about the clique of conspirators. Stauffenberg sent over a list of the men who would be the future negotiation partners, expressing the wish that Austria should remain with the Reich and that the settlement of accounts with the war criminals should be left to the future German government.

Source: Jeremy Noakes, ed., *Nazism 1919–1945*, Vol. 4, *The Home Front in World War II* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1998), 617. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

194. The Bretton Woods Agreements: United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods: Summary of Agreements, July 22, 1944

Introduction

The Allies recognized that the postwar world would require new international organizations to perform not just political but also economic functions. In the summer of 1944, Allied representatives met in the United States at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to devise plans for the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. These two bodies were expected to play major roles in reestablishing stable currencies and financing postwar economic reconstruction. Although professional bankers would be recruited to run them, they were organized and funded by governments and represented a great departure from the more ad hoc arrangements among private bankers for reconstruction and recovery that had characterized the post–World War I period.

Primary Source

This Conference at Bretton Woods, representing nearly all the peoples of the world, has considered matters of international money and finance which are important for peace and prosperity. The Conference has agreed on the problems needing attention, the measures which should be taken, and the forms of international cooperation or organization which are required. The agreements reached on these large and complex matters are without precedent in the history of international economic relations.

I. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Since foreign trade affects the standard of life of every people, all countries have a vital interest in the system of exchange of national currencies and the regulations and conditions which govern its working. Because these monetary transactions are international exchanges, the nations must agree on the basic rules which govern the exchanges if the system is to work smoothly. When they do not agree, and when single nations and small groups of nations attempt by special and different regulations of the foreign exchanges to gain trade advantages, the result is instability, a reduced volume of foreign trade, and damage to national economies. This course of action is likely to lead to economic warfare and to endanger the world's peace.

The Conference has therefore agreed that broad international action is necessary to maintain an international monetary system which will promote foreign trade. The nations should consult and agree on international monetary changes which affect each other. They should outlaw practices which are agreed to be harmful to world prosperity, and they should assist each other to overcome short-term exchange difficulties.

The Conference has agreed that the nations here represented should establish for these purposes a permanent international body, The International Monetary Fund, with powers and resources adequate to perform the tasks assigned to it. Agreement has been reached concerning these powers and resources and the additional obligations which the member countries should undertake. Draft Articles of Agreement on these points have been prepared.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

It is in the interest of all nations that post-war reconstruction should be rapid. Likewise, the development of the resources of particular regions is in the general economic interest. Programs of reconstruction and development will speed economic progress everywhere, will aid political stability and foster peace.

The Conference has agreed that expanded international investment is essential to provide a portion of the capital necessary for reconstruction and development.

The Conference has further agreed that the nations should cooperate to increase the volume of foreign investment for these purposes, made through normal business channels. It is especially important that the nations should cooperate to share the risks of such foreign investment, since the benefits are general.

The Conference has agreed that the nations should establish a permanent international body to perform these functions, to be called The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It has been agreed that the Bank should assist in providing capital through normal channels at reasonable rates of interest and for long periods for projects which will raise the productivity of the borrowing country. There is agreement that the Bank should guarantee loans made by others and that through their subscriptions of capital in all countries should share with the borrowing country in guaranteeing such loans. The Conference has agreed on the powers and resources which the Bank must have and on the obligations which the member countries must assume, and has prepared draft Articles of Agreement accordingly.

The Conference has recommended that in carrying out the policies of the institutions here proposed special consideration should be given to the needs of countries which have suffered from enemy occupation and hostilities.

The proposals formulated at the Conference for the establishment of the Fund and the Bank are now submitted, in accordance with the terms of the invitation, for consideration of the governments and people of the countries represented.

Source: "Pamphlet No. 4: Pillars of Peace," in *Documents Pertaining to American Interest in Establishing a Lasting World Peace: January 1941–February 1946* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Book Department, Army Information School, May 1946), 30–31, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1944/440722a.html.

195. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Communiqué No. 845, Statement of General Douglas MacArthur on the Capture of Sansapor, New Guinea, August 1, 1944

Introduction

The Allied landing on and capture of Sansapor effectively marked the end of the New Guinea Campaign. As always, Allied commander General Douglas MacArthur issued a communiqué to mark the occasion.

Primary Source

We have seized the coastal area of Sansapor and the nearby islands of Amsterdam and Middelburg, at the western tip of Dutch New Guinea, nearly 200 miles beyond Noemfoor and slightly more than 600 miles southeast of the Philippines. … The operation was an amphibious one, the ground troops acting in coordination with naval and air forces. The enemy base at Manokwari, the pivot of the defense of the Vogelkop Peninsula, is now bypassed and useless. Its garrison, 15,000 strong[,] … is now isolated with its only possible escape route to the south over hazardous terrain of swamp and jungle. Our air bases are now established from Milne Bay along the entire coast of New Guinea. The enemy is no longer able to operate in this area, either by air or sea, beyond the Halmahera-Philippine line which is the main defense cover for his conquered empire in the Southwest Pacific. Should this line go, all of his conquests south of China will be imperiled and in grave danger of flank envelopment.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:160.

196. The Morgenthau Plan, August 1944

Introduction

Within the U.S. government, opinions differed over the future treatment of Germany. Some, especially members of the War Department, believed that it would be necessary to reintegrate Germany into the broader European economy and that Germany should therefore be treated relatively leniently. Others, notably Henry Morgenthau Jr., the U.S. secretary of the treasury, took a more punitive approach, envisaging the breakup of Germany and its "pastoralization," namely the permanent destruction of the country's industrial capabilities. In August 1944, Morgenthau put forward a plan encapsulating his views on the desirability of harsh postwar treatment of Germany.

Primary Source

TOP SECRET: PROGRAM TO PREVENT GERMANY FROM STARTING A WORLD WAR III

1. Demilitarization of Germany. It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.

2. New Boundaries of Germany.

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia.
(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.
(c) As indicated in 4 below an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

3. Partitioning of New Germany. The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (a) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (b) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

4. The Ruhr Area. (The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, including the Rhineland, the Kiel Canal, and all German territory north of the Kiel Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries; but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment [shall] be removed from the mines and the mines closed.
(b) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objective.

5. Restitution and Reparation. Reparations, in the form of future payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;
(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;
(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;
(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and
(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

6. Education and Propaganda.

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.
(b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated.

7. Political Decentralization. The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.
(b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Lander) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.
(c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a large degree of local autonomy.

8. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy. The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which

are essential to military operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

9. Controls over Development of German Economy. During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries.

10. Agrarian Program. All large estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

11. Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups. A program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups is contained in section 11 [not included here].

12. Uniforms and Parades.

(a) No German shall be permitted to wear, after an appropriate period of time following the cessation of hostilities, any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.
(b) No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in Germany and all military bands shall be disbanded.

13. Aircraft. All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate any aircraft, including those owned by foreign interests.

14. United States Responsibilities. Although the United States would have full military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program, the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany’s continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time.

Source: "Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany," FDR Library and Archives, Germany: Jan.–Sept. 1944, Folder i297, Box 31, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/a297a01.html.

197. The Warsaw Uprising: Telegrams among the Allied Leaders, August 20–22, 1944

Introduction

In August 1944, Soviet troops advanced across Polish territory toward the capital city of Warsaw, still occupied by German forces. Anticipating the speedy arrival of Russian forces and encouraged by broadcasts from refugee communist compatriots based in Moscow, Poles in Warsaw launched a desperate uprising against the occupying Nazis. For several weeks, however, the Soviet army halted its advance not far from Warsaw, enabling the Nazis to savagely repress the revolt before Soviet troops took the city. Soviet officials also refused to permit Britain or the United States to airlift supplies to the beleaguered Poles of Warsaw, an attitude against which British and American leaders protested. Many believed that the underlying reason for Soviet nonassistance to the Polish uprising was the political calculation that by the time Soviet troops entered Warsaw, Nazi forces would have eliminated many noncommunist Poles who might otherwise have spearheaded resistance to future Soviet domination. Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt begged Joseph Stalin to permit his troops to assist the rebels, but he refused. The episode marked the beginning a definite downturn in Soviet relations with the Western Allies.

Primary Source

Telegram from President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin, August 20, 1944

We are thinking of world opinion if the anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do the utmost to save as

many of the patriots there as possible. We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles in Warsaw, or you will agree to help our planes in doing it very quickly. We hope you will approve. The time element is of extreme importance.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1944*, Vol. 3, *The British Commonwealth and Europe* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 1383.

Telegram from Joseph Stalin to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, August 22, 1944

I have received the message from you and Mr. Roosevelt about Warsaw. I wish to express my opinions.

Sooner or later the truth about the group of criminals, who have embarked on the Warsaw adventure in order to seize power, will become known to everybody. These people have exploited the good faith of the citizens of Warsaw, throwing many almost unarmed people against the German guns, tanks and aircraft. A situation has arisen in which each new day serves not only the Poles for the liberation of Warsaw but the Hitlerites who are inhumanly shooting down the inhabitants of Warsaw.

From the military point of view, the situation which has arisen, by increasingly directing the attention of the Germans to Warsaw, is just as unprofitable for the Red Army as for the Poles. Meanwhile the Soviet troops who have recently encountered new and notable efforts by the Germans to go over to the counter attack, are doing everything possible to smash these counter attacks of the Hitlerites and to go over to a new wide-scale attack in the region of Warsaw. There can be no doubt that the Red Army is not sparing its efforts to break the Germans round Warsaw and to free Warsaw for the Poles. That will be the best and most effective help for the Poles who are anti-Nazis.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1944*, Vol. 3, *The British Commonwealth and Europe* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 1391.

198. David K. E. Bruce Describes the Liberation of Paris, August 24–25, 1944

Introduction

Like its fall to German forces in June 1940, the liberation of Paris, the French capital city, by Allied forces represented one of the great symbolic moments of the war. From the first landings on D-day, Colonel David K. E. Bruce, the European head of the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime U.S. overseas intelligence agency, accompanied the invading Allied forces. He and his compatriot, the novelist and foreign correspondent Ernest Hemingway, were the first two Americans to enter Paris in the vanguard of the liberating forces. By the afternoon of August 24, 1944, their unit was on the outskirts of the city, the center of which Allied troops entered the next day.

Primary Source

David K. E. Bruce, Diary Entry, August 24, 1944

We got up at six o'clock, and waited around for a couple of hours before joining one of [Free French general Jacques] Le Clerc's [Second Armored Division] columns…

As we went down the hill toward the Seine about five o'clock in the afternoon, the streets were lined with people. All houses were gay with flags, and the population was almost hysterical with joy. Our progress was extremely slow, and there were many long halts as road blocks were cleared, or small pockets of enemy resistance eliminated. During these stops we were mobbed by the bystanders. They gave us fruit and flowers, they kissed us on both cheeks, men, women, and children throwing their arms around us and saying, "Merci, Messieurs" (often adding: "We have waited for you four years.") When they knew we were Americans that often seemed to increase their enthusiasm. Although we were passing through a tenement district, the people, on the whole, appeared to be moderately well dressed and fed. The French flag was everywhere—often it had the Cross of Lorraine [emblem of the Free French] imprinted on it. There were a good many American and British flags, and a few Russian, in evidence. We yelled ourselves hoarse,

shouting “Vive la France” as we passed through the crowds. Everyone thrust drinks at us that they had been hoarding for this occasion. It was impossible to refuse them, but the combination was enough to wreck one’s constitution. In the course of the afternoon, we had beer, cider, white and red Bordeaux, white and red Burgundy, champagne, rum, whiskey, cognac, armagnac, and Calvados.

As night fell, we were still a mile short of the Pont de Sèvres, and there was determined resistance in a factory below the bridge at which our tanks were cutting loose. The vehicles were drawn up along the sidewalks. Mouthard found a house in which we distributed ourselves, and we had our rations there. We could cook nothing, since there is no gas or coal, but the electricity, they told us, is turned on for several hours each day and night.

The people all complain of the high cost of food. For six weeks most of the railroads operating into Paris have been inactive as a result of bombing, sabotage, or for other causes, and the transport of produce to the city from other parts of France has been almost completely suspended.

David K. E. Bruce, Diary Entry, August 25, 1944

There had been some fighting during the night and this morning. We did not get under way until 12:30 p.m. when we crossed the bridge. Tanks had preceded us some time before. The Artillery halted two kilometers from the bridge and shelled Mont Valérien thoroughly.

As we drove into a large square near the Bois de Boulogne, we were suddenly halted in front of a café, and it was said that snipers were firing with machine guns from some of the upstairs windows of a larger apartment house. In any event, everyone turned loose at the building. I did see flashes several times near the roof as if someone were shooting from there, although I could not actually distinguish a weapon. Ernest [Hemingway], Gravey and I, sheltered in a doorway, Lester and Mac [his driver] more bravely lay under the jeep. Finally, a tank sent a few shells into the unfortunate house, and we were told to move on. From that point forward, we were surrounded continually by surging masses of cheering people. Kissing and shouting were general and indiscriminate. It was a wonderful sunny day and a wonderful scene. The women were dressed in their best clothes, and all wore somewhere the tricolor—on their blouses, in their hair, and even as earrings.

We stopped once when three German tanks were signalled ahead. We then turned off and, under the guidance of a Spahis lieutenant raced through the side streets until we emerged, just behind the Arc de Triomphe, on Avenue Foch where we parked the cars. The Majestic Hotel, which had been German headquarters, was on fire. At the end of the Champs Elysées a vehicle was burning in the Place de la Concorde, and behind, in the Tuileries Gardens, it looked as if a tank was on fire. Smoke was issuing from the Crillon Hotel, and across the river, from the Chamber of Deputies. Snipers were firing steadily into the area around the Arc de Triomphe, and the French were firing back at them.

We walked across to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. It was being guarded by six veterans, standing at attention, and a mutilated ex-soldier, seated in a wheel chair. They had been there all during the fracas at the Majestic. The French Captain in charge asked us if we wanted to ascend to the roof of the Arc. We did so and were greeted by a squadron of Pompiers [firemen] standing at attention. For some reason, their Commander presented me with a pompier's medal. The view was breathtaking. One saw the golden dome of the Invalides, the green roof of the Madeleine, Sacré-Coeur, and other familiar landmarks. Tanks were firing in various streets. Part of the Arc was under fire from snipers. A shell from a German 88 nicked one of its sides.

When we descended, Mouthard led us back toward our car. Seven or eight German soldiers lay dead in a heap on the street. As we made our way forward there was a burst of fire. We found the head of the street, where our car stood, barricaded, while shots were interchanged with a Gestapo headquarters there. As we sheltered beneath a tank, a man drove in alongside of us and asked if we would like to drink a bottle of champagne at his house. The Spahis lieutenant, Lester, Gravey and I accepted. As we started down Avenue Foch, firing became general again. Every side street seemed enfiladed. There was enthusiastic confusion. Almost every civilian had a weapon and wanted to shoot it. People on roofs were being shot at, and in many of the top stories of buildings. Some of them were, no doubt, German snipers dressed in civilian clothes, and some of them the hated French Milice [collaborationist militia]. We finally made our way to our host's, not without fear.

Arrived there, we found a most beautiful apartment, with very fine

furniture and Chinese porcelains, his lovely wife, and a magnum of iced champagne. His name was Robert Lalou, 40, Avenue Foch. He said he had been an aviator in the French Army in 1940. After another couple of bottles of champagne, our Spahis friend announced he must return to his squadron. We crossed the Avenue and parted with him. On the corner, we found a retired French Lieutenant-Colonel entertaining some of our men with champagne, which was continually renewed by a servant bringing hampers of it from a nearby apartment. We dallied there for a while and decided to push on. Hemingway, Red (Hemingway's driver) and myself, finding the Champs Elysées absolutely bare of traffic, passed down it at racing speed to the Travellers Club. When we entered, we found the rooms all closed with the exception of the bar. There a number of the Old Guard had collected, including the President of the Club. We were the first outsiders to come there since the taking of Paris. They celebrated by opening champagne. In the midst of this festivity a sniper began to fire from an adjoining roof. Red shouldered his musket and made for the roof, but was balked.

We next collected our gang and not knowing what was ahead except for the usual indiscriminate popping of small arms, dashed to the Café de la Paix. The Place de l'Opéra was a solid mass of cheering people, and, after kissing several thousand men, women, and babies, and losing a carbine by theft, we escaped to the Ritz. Except for the manager, the imperturbable Ausiello, the Ritz was completely deserted, so we arranged to quarter there as well as to take lodging for the Private Army. This was done. Ausiello asked what he could immediately do for us, and we answered we would like fifty martini cocktails. They were not very good, as the bartender had disappeared, but they were followed by a superb dinner. During the night, there was almost incessant shooting. The French Forces of the Interior are well out of hand, and draw on anybody whom they consider suspicious.

Source: Nelson Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich: The World War II Diaries of Colonel David K. E. Bruce* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 170–174. Reprinted with the permission of the family of David K. E. Bruce.

199. General Douglas MacArthur, Radiogram to Commander, Allied Air Forces, and

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, September 2, 1944

Introduction

Like Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower in Europe, Douglas MacArthur sought to win the hearts and minds of those people whom he was liberating. Just before launching the Allied campaign to retake the Philippines, he therefore insisted to the air and naval commanders that the invading forces must make every effort to respect the lives and property of the Philippine inhabitants.

Primary Source

One of the purposes of the Philippine campaign is to liberate the Filipinos; they will not understand liberation if accomplished by indiscriminate destruction of their homes, their possessions, their civilization and their own lives; humanity and our moral standing throughout the Far East dictate that the destruction of lives and property in the Philippines be held to a minimum, compatible with the assurance of a successful military campaign; indications are that in some localities the Japanese are evacuating cities, leaving Filipinos in residence, either failing to warn them or compelling them to stay; aerial bombing causes the greatest destruction; our objective in areas we are to occupy is to destroy totally hostile effort in order to insure our own success; in other areas we neutralize, to weaken any hostile effort which may tend to increase resistance to our occupation objectives; in the latter areas, our attack objectives are primarily airfields and shipping, not metropolitan areas or villages or barrios; to the extent possible, we must preserve port facilities that we plan to use. The Commander Allied Air Forces will, and CINCPOA [the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas] is requested, to issue general instructions in consonance with the above objective of minimizing destruction of life and property of Filipinos. …

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:191–193.

200. General Douglas MacArthur to Major General John Hilldring, September 2, 1944

Introduction

Besides taking steps to safeguard Philippine lives and property, General Douglas MacArthur also wrote to the director of the Civil Affairs Department of the War Department in Washington, urging that once liberated, the Philippines be granted at least the same degree of independence from U.S. control the islands had enjoyed before the war began.

Primary Source

It is essential … in any plans for the control of civil affairs that the measure of freedom and liberty given to the Filipino people be at least comparable to that enjoyed under the Commonwealth Government before Japanese occupation. … It would be a matter of gravest concern if restrictions were imposed, whether by direct or by individual means, in excess of those existing before the war. If any impressions were created that the United States is curtailing rather than expanding liberties, the most unfortunate repercussions might be expected. The only restrictions which should be imposed are the minimum required by military necessity and these should be removed as quickly as possible. …

I repeat, utmost care should be taken that an imperialistic attitude not be introduced into the situation under the guise of military operations and necessity. This would be entirely alien to the spirit of recent legislation passed by Congress and the announced purposes of the President of the United States.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:193.

201. General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, September 14, 1944

Introduction

As the Normandy Invasion progressed, supreme commander of the Allied forces General Dwight D. Eisenhower reported regularly to General George C. Marshall, the army's chief of staff in Washington. After three months of fighting, Eisenhower already found it necessary to discourage British efforts to rush to take Berlin ahead of Soviet forces. He rightly anticipated that his troops faced at least "one more major battle" before they could overcome the desperate German resistance.

Primary Source

I think that by forwarding to the Combined Chiefs of Staff periodic appreciations as well as copies of principal directives you are kept fairly well acquainted with our situation. The fact is that we are stretched to the absolute limit in maintenance both as to intake and as to distribution after supplies are landed.

From the start we have always known that we would have to choose, after breaking out of the original bridgehead, some line which would mark a relative slackening in offensive operations while we improved maintenance facilities and prepared for an offensive operation that could be sustained for another indefinite period. At first it seemed to me that the German would try to use some one of the number of lines available to him in France on which to make a rather determined stand, but due to the decisiveness of our victory below the Seine I determined to go all out in effort and in risk to continue the drive beyond the German border, up to and including the Rhine before we began the process of regrouping and re-fitting.

While this was going on [British Commander Field Marshal Bernard] Montgomery suddenly became obsessed with the idea that his Army Group could rush right on into Berlin provided we gave him all the maintenance that was in the theater—that is, immobilize all other divisions and give their transport and supplies to his Army Group, with some to Hodges. Examination of this scheme exposes it as a fantastic idea. First of all, it would have to be done with the ports we now have, supplemented possibly by Calais and Ostend. The attack would be on such a narrow front that flanking threats would be particularly effective and no other troops in the whole region would be capable of going to its support. Actually I doubt that the idea was

proposed in any conviction that it could be carried through to completion; it was based merely on wishful thinking, and in an effort to induce me to give to 21st Army Group and to [U.S. general Omar] Bradley's left every ounce of maintenance there is in the theater.

As opposed to this the only profitable plan is to hustle all our forces up against the Rhine, including Devers's forces, build up our maintenance facilities and our reserves as rapidly as possible and then put on one sustained and unremitting advance against the heart of the enemy country. Supporting this great attack will probably be subsidiary operations against the German ports on the left and against his southern industrial areas on the right.

I have sacrificed a lot to give Montgomery the strength he needs to reach the Rhine in the north and to threaten the Ruhr. That is, after all, our main effort for the moment. The great Airborne attack which will go in support of this operation will be Sunday the 17th, unless weather prevents. It should be successful in carrying Montgomery up and across the Rhine; thereafter it is absolutely imperative that he quickly capture the approaches to Antwerp so that we may use that port. The port facilities themselves are practically undamaged and we have there ample storage for bulk oil, something that we critically need.

Le Havre will be developed for utilization by U.S. forces.

During the early and middle summer, I was always ready to defer capture of ports in favor of bolder and more rapid movement to the front. But now approaches the season of the year when we can no longer afford this, especially in view of the resistance the German is ready to offer in Fortress defense, as demonstrated both at St. Malo and at Brest. Every day I thank my stars that I held out for ANVIL in the face of almost overwhelming pressure. Marseilles may yet be a Godsend to us.

My own belief is that, assuming continuation of the Russian pressure at its present scale, we will have to fight one more major battle in the West. This will be to break through the German defenses on the border and to get started on the invasion. Thereafter the advance into Germany will not be as rapid as it was in France, because we won't have the F.F.I. [French Forces of the Interior] in the German rear, but I doubt that there will be another full-dress battle involved. The big crash to start that move may prove to be a rather tough affair.

Recently Spaatz received a message from Arnold suggesting the

desirability of moving a lot of our heavy bombers to France immediately. This is simply beyond the realm of feasibility at the moment. Big bombers can still operate effectively from England and we need every ton of space and every bit of port capacity to get in the things that the ground troops and their shorter range air support units require. This will continue to be true for an indefinite period.

Source: Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed., *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 202–203. Courtesy of the Eisenhower Library.

202. Winston Churchill, The Percentages Agreement, October 9, 1944

Introduction

In his wartime memoirs, British prime minister Winston Churchill gave the following account of how he reached agreement with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin over the division of much of Eastern Europe and the Balkans into British and Soviet spheres of influence.

Primary Source

We [the British party] alighted at Moscow on the afternoon of October 9, and were received very heartily and with full ceremonial by [Russian foreign minister V. I.] Molotov and many high Russian personages. At ten o'clock that night we held our first important meeting in the Kremlin. There were only Stalin, Molotov, Eden, [U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell] Harriman, and I, with Major Birse and Pavlov as interpreters. …

The moment was apt for business, so I said, "Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?" While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper:

Rumania	
Russia	90%
The others	10%
Greece	
Great Britain	90%
(in accord with U.S.A.)	
Russia	10%
Yugoslavia	50–50%
Hungary	50–50%
Bulgaria	
Russia	75%
The others	25%

I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down.

Of course we had long and anxiously considered our point, and were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won.

After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand matter? Let us burn the paper.” “No, you keep it,” said Stalin. …

Source: Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 226–228, 231–235. Quotations from the works of Winston S. Churchill reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown, London, on behalf of the Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Copyright © The Estate of Winston S. Churchill.

203. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Special Communiqué, Statement of General Douglas MacArthur on the Leyte Island Landings in the Philippines, October 20, 1944

Introduction

In October 1944, General Douglas MacArthur's forces launched the Philippine Campaign, the beginning of a nine-month effort to retake the former U.S. dependency. On this occasion, MacArthur's headquarters issued a special press release, noting that the campaign marked yet another step in the gradual dismantling of the Japanese Empire.

Primary Source

In a major amphibious operation we have seized the eastern coast of Leyte Island in the Philippines, 600 miles north of Morotai and 2,500 miles from Milne Bay from whence our offensive started nearly 16 months ago. This point of entry in the Visayas is midway between Luzon and Mindanao and at one stroke splits in two the Japanese forces in the Philippines. The enemy's anticipation of attack in Mindanao caused him to be caught unawares in Leyte and beachheads in the Tacloban area were secured with small casualties. The landing was preceded by heavy naval and air bombardments which were devastating in effect. Our ground troops are rapidly extending their positions and supplies and heavy equipment are already flowing out in great volume. The troops comprise elements of the 6th U.S. Army, to which are attached units from the Central Pacific, with supporting elements.

The naval forces consist of the 7th U.S. Fleet, the Australian Squadron, and supporting elements of the 3rd U.S. Fleet. Air support was given by naval carrier forces, the Far East Air Force, and the RAAF [Royal Australian Air Force].

The enemy's forces of an estimated 225,000 include the 14th Army Group under command of Field Marshal Count Terauchi, of which seven divisons have already been identified: 16th, 26th, 30th, 100th, 102nd, 103rd, and 105th.

The strategic result of capturing the Philippines will be decisive. The enemy's so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be cut in two. His conquered empire to the south comprising the Dutch East Indies, and the British possessions of Borneo, Malaya, and Burma will be severed from Japan proper. The great flow of transportation and supply upon which Japan's vital war industry depends will be cut as will the counter supply of his forces to the south. A half million men will be cut off without hope of support and with ultimate destruction at the leisure of the Allies a certainty. In broad strategical conception the defensive line of the Japanese which extends along the coast of Asia from the Japan Islands through Formosa, the Philippines, the East Indies, to Singapore and Burma will be pierced in the center permitting an envelopment to the south and to the north. Either flank will be vulnerable and can be rolled up at will.

Source: Charles A. Willoughby et al., eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:202.

204. General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, November 11, 1944

Introduction

In November 1944, supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe General Eisenhower described to the U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall in Washington the delays to which bad weather was subjecting the Allies' Western offensive against Germany.

Primary Source

I am getting exceedingly tired of the weather. Every day we have some report of weather that has broken records existing anywhere from twenty-five to

fifty years. The latest case is that of the floods in [U.S. general George C.] Patton's area. His attack got off exactly as planned and with an extraordinarily fine example of cooperation between the Eighth Air Force and the ground troops. Then the floods came down the river and not only washed out two fixed bridges, but destroyed his principal floating bridge and made others almost unusable. It was so bad that in one case where we had installed a fixed bridge, the approaches to it were under three feet of water. At one point the Moselle is more than one mile wide, with a current of from seven to ten feet a second. Nevertheless, the peak of the flood should be passed in a day or so—provided rain in that basin is not too great—and Patton will get ahead all along his front.

The attack of the First and Ninth Armies was scheduled anywhere between the 11th and the 16th, depending upon the weather necessary to get the desired air support. The jump-off had to be postponed this morning even after a rather favorable prediction yesterday. The predictions now give us a sorry outlook, and it appears that we will have to go, eventually, without the planned air support. The weather is apt to prevent even our fighter-bombers from rendering the help that they otherwise could.

Within the last three days [U.S. general Omar] Bradley and I have visited every division of the First and Ninth Armies. Morale is surprisingly high and the men have succeeded in making themselves rather comfortable. There are no signs of exhaustion and the sick rate is not nearly as high as we would have a reasonable right to expect.

All of us keep hoping that some little spell will come along in which we can have a bit of relief from mud, rain, and fog so that tanks and infantry can operate more easily on the offensive and so that we can use our great air asset. In spite of difficulties, no one is discouraged and we will yet make the German wish that he had gone completely back of the Rhine at the end of his great retreat across France. …

Source: Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed., *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 209–210. Courtesy of the Eisenhower Library.

205. The U.S. Government Refuses to Bomb Auschwitz: John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, to John W. Pehle, Director, War Refugee Board, November 18, 1944

Introduction

In August 1944 Jewish representatives requested the United States War Department to authorize the bombing of Auschwitz. To the distress of the Jewish community, John J. McCloy, then assistant secretary of war, refused on the ground that to do so would require the diversion of scarce military resources from other missions and that it might provoke further German reprisals against the Jews. In November 1944 McCloy, facing renewed requests to this effect, again refused to permit American airplanes to undertake the bombing of the concentration camps at Auschwitz and Birkenau. German officials continued to operate these facilities for several additional months, until invading Allied ground forces finally liberated the camps and their inmates.

Primary Source

I refer to your letter of November 8th, in which you forwarded the report of two eye-witnesses on the notorious German concentration and extermination camps of Auschwitz and Birkenau in Upper Silesia.

The Operation Staff of the War Department has given careful consideration to your suggestion that the bombing of these camps be undertaken. In consideration of this proposal the following points were brought out:

a. Positive destruction of these camps would necessitate precision bombing, employing heavy or medium bombardment, or attack by low flying or dive bombing aircraft, preferably the latter.
b. The target is beyond the maximum range of medium bombardment, dive bombers and fighter bombers located in United Kingdom, France or Italy.
c. Use of heavy bombardment from United Kingdom bases would necessitate a hazardous round trip flight unescorted of approximately

2,000 miles over enemy territory.

d. At the present critical stage of the war in Europe, our strategic air forces are engaged in the destruction of industrial target systems vital to the dwindling war potential of the enemy, from which they should not be diverted. The positive solution to this problem is the earliest possible victory over Germany, to which end we should exert our entire means.
e. This case does not at all parallel the Amiens mission because of the location of the concentration and extermination camps and the resulting difficulties encountered in attempting to carry out the proposed bombing.

Based on the above, as well as the most uncertain, if not dangerous effect such a bombing would have on the object to be attained, the War Department has felt that it should not, at least for the present, undertake these operations.

I know that you have been reluctant to press this activity on the War Department. We have been pressed strongly from other quarters, however, and have taken the best military opinion on its feasibility, and we believe the above conclusion is a sound one.

Source: "John J. Mccloy, Assistant Secretary of War, Explains to John W. Pehle, Director, War Refugee Board, That the War Department Cannot Authorize the Bombing of Auschwitz, November 18, 1944," PBS: The American Experience, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/bombjohn.html.

206. General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, December 5, 1944

Introduction

From France, General Dwight D. Eisenhower continued his informal reports to Marshall on the conditions facing the Allied forces. At the end of the year, German resistance still remained strong.

Primary Source

Much now depends on the date and scale of the anticipated winter offensive of the Russians. I say "anticipated" although we have nothing except

conjecture on which to base our ideas as to Russia's intentions. At present we have newly formed Divisions arriving on our front, and have attracted several Divisions directly from Hungary and East Prussia. In spite of all this, the enemy is badly stretched on this front and is constantly shifting units up and down the line to reinforce his most threatened points. G-2 studies show that he is more frightened of our operations in the First and Ninth Armies than anywhere else. He is assisted in that area, however, by the flooded condition of the Roer River and the capability he has of producing a sudden rush of water by blowing the dams near Schmidt. [U.S. general Omar] Bradley has about come to the conclusion that we must take that area by a very difficult attack from the west and southwest.

There can be no question of the value of our present operations. The German is throwing in the line some Divisions with only six weeks' training, a fact that contributes materially to his high casualty rate. As explained in my most recent appreciation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, our problem is to continue our attacks as long as the results achieved are so much in our favor, while at the same time preparing for a full-out, heavy offensive when weather conditions become favorable, assuming the enemy holds out. Unless some trouble develops from within Germany, a possibility of which there is now no real evidence, he should be able to maintain a strong defensive front for some time, assisted by weather, floods and muddy ground. …

Source: Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed., *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 210–211. Courtesy of the Eisenhower Library.

207. The Comfort Women of World War II: Reminiscences of "Ms. K"

Introduction

During World War II thousands of attractive young Korean, Chinese, Indonesian, and Dutch women were virtually enslaved and forced to become prostitutes, or "comfort women," serving the Japanese forces. Many were so ashamed that only decades later were they prepared even to tell of their

experiences. The following is the story of Ms. K, a Korean woman who wished to remain anonymous.

Primary Source

I was born in Ulsan, a small town in the southern part of Korea, in 1928. I was the oldest among several children in my family.

My Japanese name was Kikuko Kanazima. Under the Japanese colonial rule at the time, we were forbidden to use our own Korean names or language. I finished elementary school under the direction of a Japanese principal. Twice a day, at the beginning and the end of school, we were instructed to bow to the picture of Emperor Hirohito placed at the top of the classroom blackboard. We were also ordered to bow to soldiers whenever they passed.

I was about 15 years old when a tragic fate took hold of me. A town clerk and policeman visited my home and told me that I had to appear at the county office by a certain date. I was told that young girls had to join "*Jungshindae*," the women's labor corps, to fight for the Emperor so that the war would soon be won. They also told me that I would work at a military factory and that I would be paid wages.

My mother resisted this order. However, at the end of September, a policeman came again and took me to the county office by force. When I arrived, there were about 30 girls of my age there. The police put us on a truck that took us to a military cargo train. On the train I could see 30 or 40 Korean men who were drafted as laborers. We were put into a boxcar which had no windows, with lighting only from a dim candle. Two soldiers guarded us.

After about one week's ride, we arrived at Uonkil Station in Manchuria. They separated us into different groups and put us into military trucks. After riding quite a while through the night, I and a few other girls were discharged at a military camp. Some young girls, including those of Chinese origin, were already at the camp. Each girl received two blankets, one towel, and a military-type uniform. Then guards took us to a wooden warehouse surrounded by barbed wire. They put one girl into each of the small cubicles. Our supervisors were Japanese soldiers or men wearing militia uniform. They told us to obey them.

For the first three days, only officers visited me. After that I was forced to have sex with 20 to 40 soldiers a day. I worked from eight in the morning till ten at night, but there were many nights I had to sleep overnight with an officer. A military doctor inspected us on a regular basis, but we all ended up having venereal diseases. Some girls died from these and other illnesses. Some girls became hysterical and crazy. In exchange for sex, soldiers apparently paid some kind of military money, but our supervisors took the money, saying that they would save it for us. In any case, I never received a penny from them.

During this horrifying enslavement, I was moved to three different military camps. The last unit was called “Koyabashi 8000” stationed near Jijiharu. Whenever we were moved, we were guarded by military policemen and kept under constant watch. I tried to escape several times, but I was caught each time by the soldiers and severely beaten by the supervisors. On one occasion, I jumped off a truck and tried to run away in the dark. But they caught me and my supervisor beat me savagely all over my body and then cut off my three left fingers with a knife.

Life in the camp became devastating toward the end of the war. We were starving. Those who were sick had no medical treatment. Then, one day, the camp became completely silent. I went outside. There were no soldiers in the camp. Finally, a Chinese told me that the war was over.

It took me about two months to walk back to Korea. I had to beg food from the Chinese on the way. I was glad to have survived, but very ashamed and angry about my past life. I decided not to go back to my home because of the shame and potential harm to my family.

I settled down in Pusan and worked as a waitress in restaurants and as a house maid. Eventually, I contacted an aunt who arranged a meeting with my mother. My mother asked me to come back to her, but I decided to live by myself. As time passed, I became sick and had to undergo a hysterectomy.

In 1979, my younger sister who was living in New York City invited me to live with her. So I came to America. At present, I live alone with financial assistance from my sister, the U.S. government, and the South Korean government. I wait for death.

If I were to speak to the Japanese government, there is one question I would ask: Is it right to ignore me like this as if they did nothing to me? Are they justified after trampling an innocent and fragile teenage girl and making

her suffer for the rest of her life? How would you feel if your own daughter met the same fate as mine?

This should never happen again in the world. I hope the Japanese people will also join mankind's march for justice and peace.

Source: Sangmie Choi Schellstede, ed., *Comfort Women Speak: Testimony of Sex Slaves of the Japanese Military* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 2000), 102–105. Reprinted with permission of Holmes and Meier.

208. Reminiscences of Arnold Brown, 1944–1945

Introduction

The burden of the hardest fighting and highest casualties fell upon the infantry. Arnold Brown, a company commander in the 90th Infantry Division, enlisted as a private in 1936 and gradually won promotion. His unit fought through the Normandy campaign and into Germany, and he was awarded a British Military Cross. His recollections highlight the brutal and wasteful aspects of war.

Primary Source

The first thing, here comes old General Patton walking across the stage. He walks from one end of the stage to the other, then he walks back and stops. And he says, "Men, this is it!"

I'm not going to quote all his curse words. He said, "We're going to cross that damn Moselle River at 2 o'clock in the morning."

He said, "I want to tell you a little bit about the enemy over there. Now, in these fortress battalions, the Germans don't have their best troops. Their armored forces, their crack troops, are back in reserve. Some of the fillers in these fortress battalions are old men."

He said, "Kill the sonofabitches."

He said, "Some of them have been slightly wounded in combat, or maybe they've got a crippled leg or one arm missing, but they can man those machine guns in these forts. Kill the sonofabitches."

Then he said, “There’s this business about taking prisoners. When you accept an enemy as a prisoner, and you’ve searched him and disarmed him and he’s in your possession, you treat him according to the Geneva Convention.

“But there’s nothing that says you can’t shoot the sonofabitch before you’ve accepted him as a prisoner. Some of those snipers will take camouflage in a tree, and some of them are going to let you pass and are camouflaged behind you, and they’ll kill a few of your men. Then, when you locate his position, he wants to come out and surrender. Don’t accept that sonofabitch. Kill him.”…

One other incident took place that I think is of interest. I had my company command post in Oberwampach set up in the home of the Schilling family. When the Germans were shelling us, a five-year-old boy got excited and dashed out the front door, right into the impact area of the artillery. A 20-year-old soldier dashed out to rescue the little boy.

They were both mortally wounded.

The soldier asked someone to rub his left arm; he claimed it hurt him. I rubbed his arm, and he turned blue and died.

The little boy died slowly in his mother’s arms, and to see this—you read about these things—but to see the grief this mother was going through of her son being killed by something she had no control over, it really brings some strong lessons to you.

This soldier’s name was Sergeant Whitfield. I recommended him for a Distinguished Service Cross and he got it. Now he was a true hero. He gave his life trying not to defend his own life, but to rescue an innocent little boy, and truly he earned his decoration.

After the battle, we picked up a German soldier who had been wounded. He had been shot in the leg with a .50-caliber bullet, and he laid out overnight in this freezing, subzero weather. Both of his arms and both of his legs were frozen stiff as a board. He begged us to shoot him.

I couldn’t do it. I asked for a volunteer. Even if he survived, he’d have to have both arms and both legs amputated, and this could have been a mercy killing. But these battle hardened soldiers that had been fighting Germans a few minutes before would not volunteer. One soldier, out of sympathy for the suffering and bravery of this soldier, lit a cigarette and held it to his lips.

Another soldier brought him a hot cup of coffee and held it so he could get coffee until we got the litter jeep up there and sent him to the rear.

I've always been curious to know what happened to him, but I believe he would have died before they got him back to the aid station.

Source: "Arnold Brown, 90th Infantry Division, Page 2," 9 Lives: An Oral History, http://www.tankbooks.com/interviews/arnold2.htm. Reprinted with permission of Aaron Elson.

1945 DOCUMENTS

209. General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, January 12, 1945

Introduction

In January 1945, supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe General Dwight D. Eisenhower confidentially informed the U.S. Army's chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, of the weaknesses of the Free French forces fighting with the Allies.

Primary Source

At the moment our most worrisome area is the south. While there is nothing vital in the region that we should not be able to cover easily if we could solve all of our problems from the purely tactical viewpoint, the great danger is that [U.S. general Jacob] Devers will be caught out of position and some of his troops manhandled. The French were so completely upset over my plan to pull out of the Alsace Plain, that obviously the problem became, in its larger sense, a military one. I could not have the weakened French forces trying to fight a battle by themselves and, more serious than this, I could not have the French government getting in extremely bad position with its population, a consequence which it was apparent de Gaulle thought would follow upon a voluntary evacuation of Alsace.

When Devers turned his complete Seventh Army northward, he was badly mistaken in the ability of the French Army to finish off the Colmar

pocket. At that time he had been directed to turn part of the 15th Corps northward, west of the Vosges, in order to support Patton's right but it was expected that his first concern east of the mountains would be to clean up his own rear. I must say that he can hardly be blamed for making a miscalculation with respect to the French, because the forces opposing them in the pocket were at that time estimated at not over 12,000 to 14,000 fighting men. Nevertheless, it is a very bad thorn in our side today.

Tomorrow morning the attacks on the northerly side of the Ardennes salient are being extended. [General Matthew B.] Ridgway's 18th [Airborne] Corps will come in, attacking in the direction of St. Vith. As our lines shorten in the salient I will be able to get a reserve out of refitting divisions, and these will be so stationed as to support our right. …

The weather is abominable. It seems to me that I have fought weather for two years and a half. Right now, at my base headquarters, a foot of snow is on the ground. Flying conditions in the battle zone have been almost impossible for several days now. A week of good weather would be nothing less than a godsend. …

Source: Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed., *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 212–213. Courtesy of the Eisenhower Library.

210. The Yalta Accords, February 11, 1945

Introduction

The most controversial of the wartime summit meetings of Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt was that held in the Crimea at Yalta in February 1945, which discussed questions relating to the future government of many states in both Europe and Asia. Hard and sometimes inconclusive bargaining took place on several issues, including the future status of Germany, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Poland; German reparations; and the nature of the United Nations organization. Although portions on "Liberated Europe," "Poland," and "Meetings of the Three Foreign Secretaries" were published on February 13, 1945, the remaining text of the Yalta agreements signed by the Russian, British, and American foreign ministers was not released until March 24,

1945. Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt themselves personally signed accords on the prosecution of the war in Asia and the postwar status and rights of various Asian nations, including the Soviet Union.

Primary Source

Washington, 24 March [1945].—The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows:

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and
(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional

Government in regard to decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference should be as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the Government of_____to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of_____desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."

Territorial trusteeship:

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear

that territorial trusteeship will only apply to

(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;
(b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war;
(c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and
(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

[Beginning of first section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European

liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;
(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and
(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

[End of first section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps,

including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

Protocol On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.
(c) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The conference agree that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

[Beginning of second section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

VII. POLAND

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish

Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"[Soviet foreign minister] M. Molotov, [U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union] Mr. Harriman and [British ambassador to the Soviet Union] Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

[*Provisions on Yugoslavia, Italy, Bulgaria, Southeastern Europe, Iran, Turkey, the Dardanelles Straits, and Regular Meetings of Foreign Ministers omitted*.]

[End of third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]

[*The following agreement on the war in Asia was signed by the three principals at the meeting, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin.*]

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN, 11 FEBRUARY 1945

The leaders of the three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored; and
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria.

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the

U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 23–28.

211. Lothar Metzger, Eyewitness Account of the Firebombing of Dresden, February 13–14, 1945

Introduction

In 1944 and 1945, most major German cities were subjected to fire raids. In a raid that lasted two days, February 13–14, 1945, more than 1,200 British and American bombers poured incendiary bombs over the German city of Dresden, the population of which, swollen by numerous refugees, amounted to close to 1 million. It was later estimated that 35,000 Germans died in the attack, though some sources put the number closer to 100,000.

Primary Source

It was February 13th, 1945. I lived with my mother and sisters (13, 5 and 5 months old twins) in Dresden and was looking forward to celebrating my 10th birthday February 16th. My father, a carpenter, had been a soldier since 1939 and we got his last letter in August 1944. My mother was very sad to receive her letters back with the note: “Not to be found.” We lived in a 3 room flat on the 4th floor in a working class region of our town. I remember celebrating Shrove Tuesday (February 13th) together with other children. The activities of the war in the east came nearer and nearer. Lots of soldiers went east and lots of refugees went west through our town or stayed there, also in the air raid night February 13th/14th.

About 9:30 pm the alarm was given. We children knew that sound and got up and dressed quickly, to hurry downstairs into our cellar which we used as an air raid shelter. My older sister and I carried my baby twin sisters, my mother carried a little suitcase and the bottles with milk for our babies. On

the radio we heard with great horror the news: “Attention, a great air raid will come over our town!” This news I will never forget.

Some minutes later we heard a horrible noise—the bombers. There were nonstop explosions. Our cellar was filled with fire and smoke and was damaged, the lights went out and wounded people shouted dreadfully. In great fear we struggled to leave this cellar. My mother and my older sister carried the big basket in which the twins were lain. With one hand I grasped my younger sister and with the other I grasped the coat of my mother.

We did not recognize our street any more. Fire, only fire wherever we looked. Our 4th floor did not exist anymore. The broken remains of our house were burning. On the streets there were burning vehicles and carts with refugees, people, horses, all of them screaming and shouting in fear of death. I saw hurt women, children, old people searching a way through ruins and flames.

We fled into another cellar overcrowded with injured and distraught men, women and children shouting, crying and praying. No light except some electric torches. And then suddenly the second raid began. This shelter was hit too, and so we fled through cellar after cellar. Many, so many, desperate people came in from the streets. It is not possible to describe! Explosion after explosion. It was beyond belief, worse than the blackest nightmare. So many people were horribly burnt and injured. It became more and more difficult to breathe. It was dark and all of us tried to leave this cellar with inconceivable panic. Dead and dying people were trampled upon, luggage was left or snatched up out of our hands by rescuers. The basket with our twins covered with wet cloths was snatched up out of my mother’s hands and we were pushed upstairs by the people behind us. We saw the burning street, the falling ruins and the terrible firestorm. My mother covered us with wet blankets and coats she found in a water tub.

We saw terrible things: cremated adults shrunk to the size of small children, pieces of arms and legs, dead people, whole families burnt to death, burning people ran to and fro, burnt coaches filled with civilian refugees, dead rescuers and soldiers, many were calling and looking for their children and families, and fire everywhere, everywhere fire, and all the time the hot wind of the firestorm threw people back into the burning houses they were trying to escape from.

I cannot forget these terrible details. I can never forget them.

Now my mother possessed only a little bag with our identity papers. The basket with the twins had disappeared and then suddenly my older sister vanished too. Although my mother looked for her immediately it was in vain. The last hours of this night we found shelter in the cellar of a hospital nearby surrounded by crying and dying people. In the next morning we looked for our sister and the twins but without success. The house where we lived was only a burning ruin. The house where our twins were left we could not go in. Soldiers said everyone was burnt to death and we never saw my two baby sisters again.

Totally exhausted, with burnt hair and badly burnt and wounded by the fire we walked to the Loschwitz bridge where we found good people who allowed us to wash, to eat and to sleep. But only a short time because suddenly the second air raid began (February 14th) and this house too was bombed and my mother's last identity papers burnt. Completely exhausted we hurried over the bridge (river Elbe) with many other homeless survivors and found another family ready to help us, because somehow their home survived this horror.

In all this tragedy I had completely forgotten my 10th birthday. But the next day my mother surprised me with a piece of sausage she begged from the "Red Cross." This was my birthday present.

In the next days and weeks we looked for my older sister but in vain. We wrote our present address on the last walls of our damaged house. In the middle of March we were evacuated to a little village near Oschatz and on March 31st, we got a letter from my sister. She was alive! In that disastrous night she lost us and with other lost children she was taken to a nearby village. Later she found our address on the wall of our house and at the beginning of April my mother brought her to our new home.

You can be sure that the horrible experiences of this night in Dresden led to confused dreams, sleepless nights and disturbed our souls, me and the rest of my family. Years later I intensively thought the matter over, the causes, the political contexts of this night. This became very important for my whole life and my further decisions.

Source: "The Fire-Bombing of Dresden: An Eye-Witness Account," Timewitnesses: Memories of the Last Century, http://timewitnesses.org/english/~lothar.html. Reprinted with permission of Tim Holloway, webmaster.

212. General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, February 20, 1945

Introduction

By late February 1945, Eisenhower could report to Marshall in Washington that though hampered by floods and difficulties with the French, Allied forces on the Western Front were making steady progress.

Primary Source

The Germans handled the Roer dams in the one way that was most detrimental to us. Rather than blow out the dams completely, they jammed the flood gates in such a way as to create flood conditions throughout the length of the Roer river and to prolong the flood period to the greatest possible extent. We have already reported that we believe we can attack on the 23rd. I sincerely hope that we will not be longer delayed. [U.S. general John Edwin] Hull will have told you that all our preparations are made, the troops are in fine fettle and there is no question in my mind that if we get off to a good start over the river, the operations will be a complete success.

Throughout the front the German has thinned out very much indeed. If we had only a few extra divisions we could put on a very worthwhile attack anywhere between Karlsruhe and the Ardennes.

The French continue to be difficult. I must say that next to the weather I think they have caused me more trouble in this war than any other single factor. They even rank above landing craft. Right now they want three divisions released from the line to assist in the development of new divisions and to exhibit armed might throughout the countryside. Of course there is some merit in their contentions but I suspect also that they are showing a bit of pique at what they consider the slight that [Free French leader] General de Gaulle suffered in not being invited to [the Yalta Conference of Big Three Allied leaders in the] Crimea. As usual we will work out something that will cause us as little damage as possible, but the most popular note in the French press these days is expression of dissatisfaction with the Allies, including this Command, for failing to bring in more foodstuffs and rolling stock for the French, and lack of political deference to their government.

Hull has probably given you the sequence of our projected operations. If the weather improves with the advancing spring I feel that matters will work out almost exactly as projected. I get terribly impatient during periods such as we are now forced to undergo, but I never forget the situation of the German and consequently never lose my basic optimism.

Source: Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed., *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 215–216. Courtesy of the Eisenhower Library.

213. Refugees on the Eastern Front: A Teenage Girl Describes the Flight from East Prussia, January–February 1945

Introduction

As the Eastern Front moved into German territory when Russian troops entered East Prussia in January 1945, millions of Germans fled west before the advancing army. Some were physically expropriated from their homes, as Russia had already determined that postwar Poland would receive much of this area, and Germans were unlikely to remain welcome residents. During this forcible evacuation and flight in the depths of winter, at least 1 million Germans died, most of them civilians, experiencing the kind of treatment that earlier in the war their own forces had inflicted on occupied countries. A teenage German girl later described her family's flight eastward, which lasted more than a month.

Primary Source

On 21 January 1945 Lyck had to be evacuated. With a heavy heart my mother, my sister and I parted from my father, who had been conscripted into the Volkssturm, and from my grandparents. My grandfather intended to take as much of our movable property as possible and join a trek going in the direction of Arys.

With the last trains that were running we reached Rastenburg, where we stayed the night with relatives. Radio reports which we heard indicated that

East Prussia was in a hopeless position. In the meantime, the bad news had reached us that trains to the Reich had stopped running. Now we had only one thought: to leave Rastenburg as quickly as possible. My grandmother stayed behind with her maid because she was determined to wait for her husband. We were never to see her or my grandfather again.

At the goods depot in Rastenburg we three found refuge in a goods wagon which was carrying soldiers in the direction of Königsberg. We had to leave the train at Korschen but had the good fortune to get another goods train which was full of refugees. Babies died of hunger on the way.

On 26 January 1945 we reached Bartenstein. In their fear of falling into the hands of the Russians many refugees had managed, despite the extreme cold, to attach themselves to the transport in open coal wagons. On arrival in Bartenstein many had already frozen to death.

We stayed the night in our wagon. At first light, we left the goods train and looked for lodgings in Bartenstein. A female acquaintance from Lyck joined us with her son, who had been caught out by the flight in the middle of his convalescence. It was minus 25 degrees centigrade. While we were going along we heard the dull grumble of artillery fire in the distance.

We found lodgings and rested for two days. But then the approaching artillery fire drove us out of the town of Bartenstein. With the sound of endless explosions as our own troops blew up the Wehrmacht installations in Bartenstein, we found our way out of the town amidst a headless mass of fleeing people. We soon realized that we could not make any progress along the roads. We went back to the goods depot and again had the incredible luck of finding a wagon which was only partly full. Our acquaintance got hold of a railwayman who, after much persuasion, agreed to couple this wagon onto a hospital train which was going to Braunsberg. The railwaymen looked after the refugees in a very touching way and provided them with food and drink.

On 1 February the transport arrived at Braunsberg. Here we received the latest bad news. Allenstein had fallen. Elbing was occupied by the Russians. We were in a huge trap!

The Russian planes endlessly attacked Braunsberg with bombs and gunfire. A friend of my mother’s took us in. Many refugees had to camp in cellars. We stayed in Braunsberg until 10 February 1945. Every day we had to queue for food and coal. The drone of the Stalin organs [Katyusha rockets] was getting nearer and nearer. Electricity and gas had packed up. There were

ten of us living in a single room. We decided to leave the town. We left our domicile in the dark with a few other fellow-sufferers and groped our way forward in a pitch black night along a road covered with human and animal corpses. Behind us was Braunsberg in flames; to the left of us—around Frauenberg—bitter fighting was going on.

Around midnight—completely filthy and muddy—we reached the little town of Passarge on the Frische Haff. We awaited the new day in a barn. Hein P., our convalescent soldier, could go no further. We had to leave them behind as we continued on foot to the Frische Haff. In the meantime, the icy cold had been replaced by constant rain. We reached the banks of the Frische Haff, paused for a few minutes and then began the walk to the opposite spit of land.

The ice was brittle and in many places we had to wade through water 25 cm. deep. We kept testing the surface in front of us with sticks. Numerous bomb craters forced us to make detours. Often one slipped and thought one had had it. Our clothes, which were soaked through, only allowed us to move clumsily. But fear of death made us forget the shivering which shook our bodies.

I saw women performing superhuman feats. As leaders of the treks they instinctively found the safest paths for their wagons. Household goods were strewn all over the ice; wounded people crept up to us with pleading gestures, hobbling on sticks; others were carried on small sledges by their comrades.

Our journey through this valley of death took us six hours. We reached the Frische Haff. We sank into a fitful sleep in a tiny chicken coop. Our stomachs grumbled with hunger.

On the next day we walked in the direction of Danzig. On the way we saw gruesome scenes. Mothers in a fit of madness threw their children into the sea. People hanged themselves; others fell upon dead horses, cutting out bits of flesh and roasting them on open fires. Women gave birth in the wagons. Everyone thought only of himself—no one could help the sick and the weak.

In Kahlberg we placed ourselves at the disposal of the Red Cross and cared for the wounded in the Beach Hall. On 13 February 1945 we went on board a ship as nursing personnel. On the next day we reached Danzig-Neufahrwasser and disembarked.

On 15 February 1945 we were assigned accommodations in Zoppot. My

mother, sister and I could barely keep upright. Nevertheless, we dragged ourselves to the goods depot in Gotenhafen where, for the third time, by a stroke of luck we managed to get a military postal wagon to take us to Stolp (Pomerania). On 19 February as nursing personnel on a hospital train, we arrived via Hanover in Gera in Thuringia, where we were put up by relatives. It was 28 February 1945. On that day our flight from East Prussia was over.

Source: Jeremy Noakes, ed., *Nazism 1919–1945*, Vol. 4, *The Home Front in World War II* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1998), 664–666. Reprinted with permission of University of Exeter Press.

214. The Restoration of the Philippine Commonwealth: Douglas MacArthur, Address at Malacañang Palace, Manila, February 27, 1945

Introduction

After brutally heavy fighting, on February 23, 1945, American and Filipino forces took Manila, the Philippine capital, from the Japanese defenders. On behalf of the United States, General Douglas MacArthur, the Allied commander in chief, made a rather grandiloquent official declaration that the government of the Philippines was now restored to civilian administration under the Commonwealth government headed by Philippine president Sergio Osmeña.

Primary Source

More than three years have elapsed—years of bitterness, struggle and sacrifice—since I withdrew our forces and installations from this beautiful city that, open and undefended, its churches, monuments and cultural centers might, in accordance with the rules of warfare, be spared the violence of military ravage. The enemy would not have it so and much that I sought to preserve has been unnecessarily destroyed by his desperate action at bay but by these ashes he has wantonly fixed the future pattern of his doom.

Then we were but a small force struggling to stem the advance of overwhelming hordes treacherously hurled against us, behind the mask of professed friendship and international goodwill. That struggle was not in vain! God has indeed blessed our arms! The girded and unleashed power of America supported by our Allies turned the tide of battle in the Pacific and resulted in an unbroken series of crushing defeats upon the enemy culminating in the redemption of your soil and the liberation of your people. My country has kept the faith.

These soldiers have come here as an army of free men, dedicated, with your people, to the cause of human liberty and committed to the task of destroying those evil forces that have sought to suppress it by brutality of the sword. An army of free men that has brought your people once again under democracy's banner, to rededicate their churches, long desecrated, to the glory of God and public worship; to reopen their schools to liberal education; to till the soil and reap its harvest without fear of confiscation; to reestablish their industries that they may again enjoy the profit from the sweat of their own toil; and to restore the sanctity and happiness of their homes unafraid of violent intrusion.

Thus to millions of your now liberated people comes the opportunity to pledge themselves—their hearts, their minds, and their hands—to the task of building a new and stronger nation—a nation consecrated in the blood boldly shed that this day might be—a nation dedicated to making imperishable those sacred liberties for which we have fought and many have died.

On behalf of my Government I now solemnly declare, Mr. President, the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here reestablished as provided by law.

Your country thus is again at liberty to pursue its destiny to an honored position in the family of free nations. Your capital city, cruelly punished though it be, has regained its rightful place—Citadel of Democracy in the Far East.

Source: Gregorio F. Zaide, ed., *Documentary Sources of Philippine History,* Vol. 12 (Metro Manila, Philippines: National Book Store Publishers, 1990), 107–108. Reprinted with permission of the Zaide Foundation.

215. President Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), Speech before the Preparatory Commission for Constitutional Government, Chongqing, China, March 1, 1945

Introduction

In China, the prospect of victory against Japan in the relatively near future did little to bring peace. The Chinese Nationalist leader, President Jiang Jieshi, announced his intention of summoning a national assembly to reestablish constitutional government in China. He also took the opportunity to assert the Guomindang's status as the sole legitimate government, appeal for national unity, and demand that Chinese Communist forces lay down their arms as a precondition for their inclusion in the forthcoming assembly. The Chinese Communists, who already controlled substantial parts of the country, were highly unlikely to do so, as they feared—with some justification—that any such move would put them at the mercy of the Guomindang's own forces. Their refusal to do so after the Japanese surrender would become one major cause of the lengthy and bitter civil war that by late 1945 had broken out in China.

Primary Source

You will recall that in 1936 the Government decided to summon a National Assembly on November 12, 1937, for the inauguration of constitutional government and the termination of the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang. On July 7, 1937, Japan suddenly made war on us, and the plan had to be shelved. However, the determination of the Kuomintang to realize constitutional government remained as strong as ever. Had it not been for the recommendation of further postponement by the People's Political Council, the National Assembly would have been convened during 1940 in accordance with another Government decision. This year, on the first of January, on behalf of the Government, I announced that the National Assembly will be summoned before the close of the year, unless untoward and unexpected military developments should in the meanwhile intervene.

The Kuomintang is the historical party of national revolution; it overthrew the Manchu dynasty; it destroyed Yuan Shih-kai who would be emperor; it utterly defeated the militarists that succeeded Yuan Shih-kai; it brought about national unification; it achieved the removal of the unequal treaties; and it led the country into the eight-year-old struggle against Japan. It is we who are the party of liberation and progress. In summoning the National Assembly and returning the rule to the people in conformity with the sacred will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang is performing its historical role.

We must emerge from this war a united nation. Only a united nation can effectively perform the tasks of political and economic reconstruction to raise the lot of our toiling masses and handle the problems of external relations in a new, uncharted world. Before the Japanese invasion, we were a united nation. Today, but for the Communists and their armed forces, we are a united nation. There are no independent warlords or local governments challenging the central authority.

I have long held the conviction that the solution of the Communist question must be through political means. The Government has labored to make the settlement a political one. As the public is not well informed on our recent efforts to reach a settlement with the Communists, the time has come for me to clarify the atmosphere.

As you know, negotiations with the Communists have been a perennial problem for many years. It has been our unvarying experience that no sooner is a demand met than fresh ones are raised. The latest demand of the Communists is that the Government should forthwith liquidate the Kuomintang rule, and surrender all power to a coalition of various parties. The position of the Government is that it is ready to admit other parties, including the Communists as well as non-partisan leaders, to participate in the Government without, however, relinquishment by the Kuomintang of its power of ultimate decision and final responsibility until the convocation of the National Assembly. We have even offered to include the Communists and other parties in an organ to be established along the line of what is known abroad as a “war cabinet.” To go beyond this and to yield to the Communist demand would not only place the Government in open contravention of the political program of Dr. Yat-sen, but also create insurmountable practical difficulties for the country.

During the past eight years, the country has withstood all the vicissitudes of military reverses and of unbelievable privation and has ridden through the storm for the simple reason that it has been led by a stable and strong Government. The war remains to be won, the future is still fraught with peril. If the Government shirks its responsibility and surrenders its power of ultimate decision to a combination of political parties, the result would be unending friction and fears, leading to a collapse of the central authorities. Bear in mind that in such a contingency, unlike in other countries, there exists in our country at present no responsible body representing the people for the government to appeal to.

I repeat, whether by accident or design, the Kuomintang has had the responsibility of leading the country during the turbulent last decade and more. It will return the supreme power to the people through the instrumentality of the National Assembly, and in the meanwhile, it will be ready to admit other parties to a share in the government, but it definitely cannot abdicate to a loose combination of parties. Such a surrender would not mean returning power to the people.

We must emerge from the war with a united army. The Communists should not keep a separate army. Here allow me to digress a little. The Chinese Communist propaganda abroad has tried to justify this private army on the ground that if it becomes incorporated in the National Army, it will be in danger of being destroyed or discriminated against. Their propaganda also magnify, out of all proportion, the actual military strength of the Communists. To you, I need hardly say that Government forces have always without exception borne the brunt of Japanese attack and will continue to do so. Today, with the wholehearted co-operation of our Allies, powerful armies are being equipped and conditioned to assume the offensive. We are synchronizing our efforts with those of our Allies in expelling Japan from the Asiatic mainland. …

To meet any fear the Communists may have the Government has expressed its willingness for the duration of the war to place an American general in command of the Communist forces under my over-all command as supreme commander—again if the United States Government could agree to the appointment of an American officer. The Communists have, however, rejected all those offers. If the Communists are sincere in their desire to fight

the Japanese alongside us and our Allies, they have indeed been given every opportunity to do so.

No one mindful of the future of our 450,000,000 people and conscious of standing at the bar of history, would wish to plunge the country into a civil war. The Government has shown its readiness and is always ready to confer with the Communists to bring about a real and lasting settlement with them. …

I have explained the Government's position on the Communist problem at length, because today that is the main problem to unity and constitutional government. …

Upon the inauguration of constitutional government, all political parties will have legal status and enjoy equality. The Government has offered to give legal recognition to the Communist party as soon as the latter agrees to incorporate their army and local administration in the National Army and Government. The offer still stands. …

I am optimistic of national unification and the future of democratic government in our country. The torrent of public opinion demanding national unity and reconstruction is mounting ever stronger and will soon become an irresistible force. No individual or political party can afford to disregard this force any longer. Let all of us, regardless of party affiliations, work together for the twin objectives of our people—national unity and reconstruction.

Source: "Speech by President Chiang Kai-shek before the Preparatory Commission for Constitutional Government in Chungking," ibiblio, March 1, 1945, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/1945-03-01b.html.

216. The Firebombing of Tokyo, March 10, 1945: Reminiscences of Shinoda Tomoko

Introduction

As the end of the war came closer, most major Japanese cities, like those in Germany, were subjected to intense firebombing raids. In 1945, Shinoda Tomoko was a 16-year-old schoolgirl. She recalled her experiences in the major raid on Tokyo.

Primary Source

We were among those surrounded by flames on 10 March 1945. My mother, older sister, and I tried to make our escape. Wherever I went, a wave of fire rushed toward me. Finally I made it to Oshiage station. There were thousands of people there. It was so hot and suffocating that I pressed my cheek to the ground. The air was cool and clean down there. I saw the legs of all sorts of people in front of me. Occasionally on my way a man I didn't know would splash ditch water from a bucket on us and urge us on, saying it was just a little further. Behind me a man sat covered with a large quilt. My back pressed against his, I waited for day to break, fearful and worried about the heat.

With the coming of the pale dawn, people started heading for home. Several military trucks came by around that time. Thinking they had come to help us, I stood up, and the man behind me toppled over. I shook him, but he was dead. They said he died from smoke and the heat of the flames.

On the way home, I thought I saw some black work gloves. When I took a closer look, they were hands that had been torn off. Many red fire trucks were burned out on the major road next to the streetcar tracks, with firemen dead on their vehicles. The dead were blackened and had shrunk to the size of children. It was impossible to tell if they were men or women.

I finally made it back to the charred remains of our house. My mother and sister were there. We hugged each other, weeping. We dug up the crockery, furniture, and food that we had buried in our yard. The rice that had been washed and in our pot was now charred, but we ate it. The tin cans of food that had been stored in the basement of the school building, which had been spared, had burst open due to the tremendous heat of the surrounding fires. I had two younger brothers in first and second grade, but they had been evacuated and were not in Tokyo, so they were safe.

Source: Frank Gibney, ed., *Sensō: The Japanese Remember the Pacific War; Letters to the Editor of Asahi Shimbun* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 204–205. Reprinted with permission of M. E. Sharpe.

217. Will of Kamikaze Pilot Ryōji Uehara, Late 1944 or Early 1945

Introduction

As defeat came ever closer, the Japanese fought with a ferocity that dismayed and astonished their Western opponents. Specially trained Japanese pilots undertook kamikaze (literally “divine wind”) suicide missions in which they deliberately sacrificed themselves and crashed an airplane into an enemy ship or other major target. Although the majority of kamikazes were shot down before reaching their objective, they were especially dreaded by American troops and sailors, perhaps because they seemed to epitomize the fanatical Japanese determination to fight to the death.

The bloodiest Pacific battle of World War II took place on the island of Okinawa, where from April to June 1945 Japanese defenders fought ferociously and suicidally against invading American forces. American casualties numbered 12,000 dead, 38,000 wounded, and 26,000 losses due to battle stress, while 107,539 Japanese soldiers were killed, 23,764 sealed in caves or buried by the Japanese themselves, and a mere 10,755 were captured or surrendered. One hundred thousand or more Okinawan civilians also died during the fighting. During the campaign hundreds of Japanese kamikazi airplanes flying in mass formation repeatedly attacked the 1,600 American naval vessels assembled for the Okinawa assault, sinking 30 and damaging a further 164. Among the kamimaze pilots who took part in the Battle of Okinawa was Japanese Army captain Uehara Ryōji, a student from Keio University in Tokyo who was called up for military service in December 1943 and chosen for what was termed the “Special Attack Unit.” He died in action at the age of 22 on May 11, 1945, when he attacked an American mechanized unit in Kadena Bay, Okinawa. Before doing so, Uehara wrote a last will and testament to his parents.

Primary Source

To my dear Father and Mother:

I was so lucky ever since I was given my life some twenty years ago that I was brought up never deprived of anything. Under the love and affection of my loving parents, and with constant encouragement from my wonderful elder brothers and younger sister, I was so fortunate to spend such happy days. I say this in face of the fact that at times I had a tendency to act in a spoiled and selfish manner. Throughout, of all of us siblings, I was the one who caused you, Father and Mother, the most worry. It pains my heart that my time will come before I can return, or try to return, any of these favors I received. But in Japan, where loyalty to the Emperor and filial piety are considered one and the same thing, and total loyalty to the nation is a fulfillment of filial piety, I am confident of your forgiveness.

As a member of the flying staff, I spent each and every day with death as the premise. Every letter and each word I wrote constituted my last will and testament. In the sky so high above, death is never a focus of fear. Will I in fact die when I hit the target? No, I cannot believe that I am going to die, and there was even a time when I felt a sudden urge somehow to dive into a target. The fact of the matter is that I am never afraid of death, and, to the contrary, I even welcome it. The reason for this is my deep belief that, through death, I'll be able to get together again with my beloved older brother, Tatsu. To be reunited with him in heaven is what I desire the most. I did not have any specific attitude toward life and death. My reasoning was that the cultivation of a specific attitude toward life and death would amount to an attempt to give a meaning and value to death, something that would have to stem from a person's utter fear of an uncertain death. My belief is that death is a passage leading to reunion with my loved ones in heaven. I am not afraid to die. Death is nothing to be afraid of when you look at it as just a stage in the process of ascending to heaven.

Succinctly speaking, I have always admired liberalism, mainly because I felt that this political philosophy was the only one to follow were Japan really to survive eternally. Perhaps this sort of thinking seems foolish, but it is only because Japan is currently drowned in totalitarianism. Nevertheless, and this state of affairs notwithstanding, it will be clear to any human being who sees clearly and is willing to reflect on the very nature of his or her humanity that liberalism is the most logical ideology.

It seems to me that a nation's probable success in the prosecution of a war would, on the very basis of that nation's ideology, be clearly evident even before the war was fought. It would in fact be so obvious that eventual victory would clearly be seen to belong to the nation that holds a natural ideology, i.e., an ideology which in its way is constitutive of human nature itself.

My hope of making Japan like the British Empire of the past has been utterly defeated. At this point, therefore, I gladly give up my life for Japan's liberty and independence.

While the rise and fall of one nation is indeed a matter of immense importance for any human being, the same shift dwindles to relative insignificance if and when that same human being places it within the context of the universe as a whole. Exactly as the saying has it, "Pride goeth before a fall (or, those who savor victory will soon find themselves in the camp of the defeated)," and even if America and Great Britain turn out to be victorious against us, they will eventually learn that the day of their own defeat is imminent. It pleases me to think that, even if they are not to be defeated in the near future, they may be turned to dust anyway through an explosion of the globe itself. Not only that, but the people who are getting the most fun out of life now are most certainly doomed to die in the end. The only difference is whether it comes sooner or later.

In the drawer, right side of my bookcase, in the annex of the house, you will find the book I am leaving behind. If the drawer does not open, please open the left drawer and pull out a nail—then try the right drawer again.
Well, then, I pray that you will take good care of yourselves.

My very best to my big brother, sister Kiyoko, and to everyone.

Well, then. Good-bye. Farewell. Good-bye forever.

From Ryōji

Source: Kike Wadatsumi no Koe, *Listen to the Voices from the Sea,* translated by Midori Yamanouchi and Joseph L. Quinn, S.J. (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2000), 236–238. Reprinted with permission.

218. General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, March 26, 1945

Introduction

In March 1945, American forces crossed the Rhine River into German territory. Supreme commander General Eisenhower reported informally to Chief of Staff George C. Marshall on the move, which marked the beginning of the final stage of the war in Europe. Eisenhower ascribed much of the final campaign's success to his own earlier insistence that the Allies engage German forces west of the Rhine in battle, which had helped to exhaust them.

Primary Source

I have just finished a rapid tour of the battle front. Yesterday and the day before I was with the 9th Army to witness its jumpoff and the early stages of the Rhine crossing. [General William Hood] Simpson performed in his usual outstanding style. Our losses in killed, during the crossing, were 15 in one assault division and 16 in the other. I stayed up most of one night to witness the preliminary bombardment by 1250 guns. It was an especially interesting sight because of the fact that all the guns were spread out on a plain so that the flashes from one end of the line to the other were all plainly visible. It was a real drum-fire. …

Naturally I am immensely pleased that the campaign west of the Rhine that [U.S. general Omar] Bradley and I planned last summer and insisted upon as a necessary preliminary to a deep penetration east of the Rhine, has been carried out so closely in accordance with conception. You possibly know that at one time the C.I.G.S. [Chief of the (British) Imperial General Staff Sir Alan Brooke] thought I was wrong in what I was trying to do and argued heatedly upon the matter. Yesterday I saw him on the banks of the Rhine and he was gracious enough to say that I was right, and that my current plans and operations are well calculated to meet the current situation. The point is that the great defeats, in some cases almost complete destruction, inflicted on the German forces west of the Rhine, have left him with very badly depleted strength to man that formidable obstacle. It was those victories that made possible the bold and relatively easy advances that both

First and Third Armies are now making toward Kassel. I hope this does not sound boastful, but I must admit to a great satisfaction that the things that Bradley and I have believed in from the beginning and have carried out in the face of some opposition both from within and without, have matured so splendidly.

Source: Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed., *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 219–220. Courtesy of the Eisenhower Library.

219. Winston Churchill and Berlin, April 1–3, 1945

Introduction

Increasingly concerned that Soviet influence would dominate much of Central and Eastern Europe when the war ended, in March and April 1945 British prime minister Winston Churchill dispatched a barrage of telegrams in which he sought to persuade supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe General Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. Army chief of staff George C. Marshall, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt to follow a strategy of striking directly for the German capital of Berlin. Churchill's final appeal was addressed to Roosevelt. Roosevelt's reply, possibly drafted by Marshall, ignored the implications for dealings with the Soviets raised by Churchill and focused entirely on the tactical military questions involved.

Primary Source

Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Telegram No. C-931, April 1, 1945

… I venture to put to you a few considerations upon the merits of the changes in our original plans now desired by General Eisenhower. It seems to me the differences are small and as usual not of principle but of emphasis. Obviously, laying aside every impediment and shunning every diversion, the allied armies of the north and centre should now march at the highest speed towards the Elbe. Hitherto the axis has been upon Berlin. General

Eisenhower on his estimate of the enemy's resistance, to which I attach the greatest importance, now wishes to shift the axis somewhat to the southward and strike through Leipzig, even perhaps as far south as Dresden. He withdraws the Ninth U.S. Army from the northern group of armies and in consequence stretches its front southwards. I should be sorry if the resistance of the enemy was such as to destroy the weight and momentum of the advance of the British Twenty First Army Group and to leave them in an almost static condition along the Elbe when and if they reach it. I say quite frankly that Berlin remains of high strategic importance. Nothing will exert a psychological effect of despair upon all German forces of resistance equal to that of the fall of Berlin. It will be the supreme signal of defeat to the German people. On the other hand, if left to itself to maintain a siege by the Russians among its ruins and as long as the German flag flies there, it will animate the resistance of all Germans under arms.

There is moreover another aspect which it is proper for you and me to consider. The Russian armies will no doubt overrun all Austria and enter Vienna. If they also take Berlin, will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it. This also appears sound on military grounds.

Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, Telegram No. R-733, April 4, 1945

I have given your personal message No. 931 a very careful reading and have gone over the various papers involved, some of which I had not previously read. Further, I have just received a copy of Eisenhower's directive to his Army Group Commanders, dated April 2. …

As to the "far-reaching changes desired by General Eisenhower in the plans that had been concerted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Malta and had received your and my joint approval," I do not get the point. For example, the strength and all the resources agreed upon for the northern Group of Armies were made available to Montgomery. Following the

unexpected Remagen Bridgehead and the destruction of the German Armies in the Saar Basin there developed so great a weakness on those fronts that the secondary efforts realized an outstanding success. This fact must have a very important relation to the further conduct of the battle. However, General Eisenhower's directive of April 2, it seems to me, does all and possibly a little more to the north than was anticipated at Malta. Leipzig is not far removed from Berlin which is well within the center of the combined effort. At the same time the British Army is given what seems to me very logical objectives on the northern flank. …

I appreciate your generous expression of confidence in Eisenhower and I have always been deeply appreciative of the backing you have given him and the fact that you yourself proposed him for this command. I regret that the phrasing of a formal discussion should have so disturbed you but I regret even more that at the moment of a great victory by our combined forces we should become involved in such unfortunate reactions.

It appears reasonable to expect that under Eisenhower's present plans the great German Army will in the very near future be completely broken up into separate resistance groups, while our forces will remain tactically intact and in a position to destroy in detail the separated parts of the Nazi Army.

You have my assurance of every cooperation.

Source: Warren F. Kimball, ed., *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Complete Correspondence*, 3 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 3:603–605, 607–609.

220. Statement of Truman K. Gibson Jr., Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, at Press Conference, Monday, April 9, 1945

Introduction

Faced with rising African American pressure, the U.S. Army sought—somewhat inaccurately—to depict the wartime American military as a haven of racial tolerance and integration. In the spring of 1945 as the war in Europe was ending, Truman K. Gibson Jr., an African American aide in the Press Branch of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations, issued a

somewhat anodyne statement on the subject. Although undoubtedly something of a whitewash effort designed to placate American and international public opinion, Gibson's statement did illustrate the U.S. Army's perceived need and wish to portray itself as strongly opposed to racial discrimination.

Primary Source

The press has already reported that Negro and White Infantrymen are now fighting side by side in Germany. In France I visited some of the Negro platoons before they left for the front and talked with the men being trained at the Reinforcement Training Center. What I saw and heard was evidence that the Supreme Command in SHAEF was following in racial matters what must be the basic policy of any Army, in any way, namely, that of utilizing most efficiently all available resources of men and materiel to defeat the enemy.

Such a policy is working. At the Training Center a white noncommissioned veteran, who was assisting in the training program, said graphically, if ungrammatically, about the Negro trainees: "Sure they'll get along all right. It don't matter whose [*sic*] firing next to you when you're both killing Krauts." The Texas-born, battle-scarred Commanding Officer of the Center was confident that the trainees, all of whom volunteered for the training course with all noncommissioned officers, taking a reduction to the grade of private, would do well in combat. He said, "These men will fight because they have been trained and treated just like the other soldiers here and they know they are going to be used in the same manner. In the same Divisions. They want to fight. When the first group went out we had only two cases of AWOL [Absent Without Leave] among all the Negro soldiers in the Center. We found out where the two men were when we received a wire from a front line Division Commander informing us that they had reported to him to fight."

The estimate of this officer has been confirmed by the report of an official observer who spent time with some of the platoons in the fighting around Remagen where the first of the units was committed to combat. He reported that the Negro soldiers fought as well as any others and that the mistakes they made were the same as those made by other troops lacking battle experience.

This policy of making the best use of all soldiers is further evidenced in the excellent performance of the Service of Supply troops throughout the theater. These troops, a large percentage of whom are Negroes, regard themselves as soldiers performing vital jobs. They had a very real identification with the fighting front. In one Quartermaster Depot, manned by Negro personnel, the first sergeant when questioned as to why the men were working voluntarily around the clock, replied: “We have got to keep the supplies moving and we all want to do our part.” The officers in this unit were white and were enthusiastic about their men and their work. Discussing their men, Negro officers in a Quartermaster Truck Company said that on many occasions their drivers had insisted on delivering white Infantrymen into dangerous territory late at night far in advance of the debarkation points because “they hated to see the ‘Doughs’ walk.”

In the European Theater of Operations are the first units of Negro nurses and Wacs to go overseas. The nurses, stationed at a hospital in the north of England, are busy treating American soldiers who have been wounded in action. They are described by their Commanding Officer as being the equals professionally of any nurses in the area. The Wacs officer and man the Central Postal Directory for the entire European Theater of Operations. Their efficiency has drawn repeated praise from the Commanding Officer of the United Kingdom Base Section. They have adjusted exceptionally well in the short time they have been overseas to their work and the community in which they are situated.

Generally, on both the Continent and in England, it was apparent that the attitude of the Supreme Command that there should be no discrimination against any soldier on account of his race had reached all elements of the Command. Discriminatory acts and incidents that have occurred were regarded by the soldiers as being individual in nature. As a result of my trip to the Mediterranean and European Theaters I am impressed that such differences as exist between soldiers are not due to racial characteristics but to such factors as training, motivation, and environment. The fact that the Commands in these theaters believe this is encouraging. Certainly the record being made by Negro soldiers gives the lie to any charge that Negroes cannot and will not fight.

Source: "Statement by Truman Gibson, Jr., April 9, 1945: White House File, Nash Papers," Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/large/documents/index.pl documentdate=1945-04-09&documentid=17-12&pagenumber=1.

221. General Dwight D. Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, April 15, 1945

Introduction

By mid-April 1945, Allied forces were moving into the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland. Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to Chief of Staff George C. Marshall in Washington, laying out his strategy for the rest of the war. Eisenhower defended his decision, in which Marshall concurred, to ignore British suggestions that British and American forces should take Berlin before Soviet troops arrived there. Eisenhower also described the horrific experience of visiting a German internment camp, which had clearly shaken him.

Primary Source

Today I forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the essentials of my future plans. In a word, what I am going to do now that the western enemy is split into two parts, is to take up a defensive line in the center (along a geographical feature that will tend to separate our forces physically from the advancing Russians) and clean up the important jobs on our flanks. A mere glance at the map shows that one of these is to get Lubeck and then clear up all the areas west and north of there. The other job is the so-called "redoubt." I deem both of these to be vastly more important than the capture of Berlin—anyway, to plan for making an immediate effort against Berlin would be foolish in view of the relative situation of the Russians and ourselves at this moment. We'd get all coiled up for something that in all probability would never come off. While true that we have seized a small bridgehead over the Elbe, it must be remembered that only our spearheads are up to that river; our center of gravity is well back of there.

[British commander Field Marshal Sir Bernard] Montgomery anticipates that he will need no help from the Americans other than that involved in an extension of [General William Hood] Simpson's left. However, I rather think that he will want possibly an American Airborne Division and maybe an Armored Division. I have enough in reserve to give him this much if he needs it. But assuming that he needs no American help, that job will be performed by the 17 divisions of the 21st Army Group.

In the center, extending all the way from Newhouse on the Elbe down to the vicinity of Selb on the border of Czechoslovakia, will be the Ninth and First Armies, probably with about 23 to 24 divisions, including their own reserves. This will be enough to push on to Berlin if resistance is light, and the Russians do not advance in that sector. [U.S. general Omar] Bradley's main offensive effort will be the thrust along the line Würzburg-Nuremberg-Linz, carried out by the Third Army with about 12 divisions. [U.S. general Jacob] Devers, with another 12 U.S. divisions and 6 French divisions, will capture Munich and all of the German territory lying within his zone of advance.

About 8 divisions at that time will be on strictly occupational duties, largely under Fifteenth Army. This will leave about 5 divisions, including Airborne, in my Reserve.

The intervention of the British Chiefs of Staff in my military dealings with the Soviet has thrown quite a monkey-wrench into our speed of communication. If you will note from [acting soviet chief of staff of the Russian Army General Alexei] Antonov's reply to the telegram that we finally sent (as revised on recommendations of the BCOS [British Chiefs of Staff]) the point he immediately raised is whether our message implies an attempt, under the guise of military operations, to change the occupational boundaries already agreed upon by our three governments. Frankly, if I should have forces *in the Russian occupational zone* and be faced with an order or "request" to retire so that they may advance to the points they choose, I see no recourse except to comply. To do otherwise would probably provoke an incident, with the logic of the situation all on the side of the Soviets. I cannot see exactly what the British have in mind for me to do, under such circumstances. It is a bridge that I will have to cross when I come to it but I must say that I feel a bit lost in trying to give sensible instructions to my various commanders in the field.

On a recent tour of the forward areas in First and Third Armies, I stopped momentarily at the salt mines to take a look at the German treasure. There is a lot of it. But the most interesting—although horrible—sight that I encountered during the trip was a visit to a German internment camp near Gotha. The things I saw beggar description. While I was touring the camp I encountered three men who had been inmates and by one ruse or another had made their escape. I interviewed them through an interpreter. The visual evidence and the verbal testimony of starvation, cruelty and bestiality were so overpowering as to leave me a bit sick. In one room, where they [there] were piled up twenty or thirty naked men, killed by starvation, [U.S. general] George Patton would not even enter. He said he would get sick if he did so. I made the visit deliberately, in order to be in position to give *first-hand* evidence of these things if ever, in the future, there develops a tendency to charge these allegations merely to "propaganda."

If you could see your way clear to do it, I think you should make a visit here at the earliest possible moment, while we are still conducting a general offensive. You would be proud of the Army you have produced. …

Source: Joseph Patrick Hobbs, ed., *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 221–223. Courtesy of the Eisenhower Library.

222. President Harry S. Truman, First Message to Congress, April 16, 1945

Introduction

On April 12, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had led the United States since 1933, died suddenly of a cerebral hemorrhage. His successor, Harry S. Truman of Missouri, quickly reaffirmed his intention of carrying on the policies of Roosevelt, including the prosecution of the war to victory and the formulation of a lasting peace settlement. When Truman became president many considered him a mediocrity, but he became one of the major architects of American involvement in the Cold War that would very soon pit the Soviet Union against the Western powers.

Primary Source

It is with heavy heart that I stand before you, my friends and colleagues, in the Congress of the United States.

Only yesterday, we laid to rest the mortal remains of our beloved President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. At a time like this, words are inadequate. The most eloquent tribute would be a reverent silence.

Yet, in this decisive hour, when world events are moving so rapidly, our silence might be misunderstood and might give comfort to our enemies.

In His infinite wisdom, Almighty God has seen fit to take from us a great man who loved, and was beloved by, all humanity.

No man could possibly fill the tremendous void left by the passing of that noble soul. No words can ease the aching hearts of untold millions of every race, creed, and color. The world knows it has lost a heroic champion of justice and freedom.

Tragic fate has thrust upon us grave responsibilities. We must carry on. Our departed leader never looked backward. He looked forward and moved forward. That is what he would want us to do. That is what America will do.

So much blood has already been shed for the ideals which we cherish, and for which Franklin Delano Roosevelt lived and died, that we dare not permit even a momentary pause in the hard fight for victory.

Today, the entire world is looking to America for enlightened leadership to peace and progress. Such a leadership requires vision, courage, and tolerance. It can be provided only by a united nation deeply devoted to the highest ideals.

I call upon all Americans to help me keep our Nation united in defense of those ideals which have been so eloquently proclaimed by Franklin Roosevelt.

I want in turn to assure my fellow Americans and all of those who love peace and liberty throughout the world that I will support and defend those ideals with all my strength and with all my heart. That is my duty and I shall not shirk it.

So that there can be no possible misunderstanding, both Germany and Japan can be certain, beyond any shadow of doubt, America will confine to fight for freedom until no vestige of resistance remains!

We are deeply conscious of the fact that much hard fighting is still ahead of us.

Having to pay such a heavy price to make complete victory certain, America will never become a party to any plan for partial victory!

To settle for merely another temporary respite would surely jeopardize the future security of all the world.

Our demand has been, and it remains, unconditional surrender!

We will not traffic with the breakers of the peace on the terms of the peace.

The responsibility for the making of the peace—and it is a very grave responsibility—must rest with the defenders of the peace, the United Nations. We are not unconscious of the dictates of humanity. We do not wish to see unnecessary or unjustified suffering. But the laws of God and of man have been violated and the guilty must not go unpunished. Nothing shall shake our determination to punish the war criminals even though we must pursue them to the end of the earth.

Lasting peace can never be secured if we permit our dangerous opponents to plot future wars with impunity at any mountain retreat—however distant. In this shrinking world, it is futile to seek safety behind geographical barriers. Real security will be found only in law and in justice.

Here in America, we have labored long and hard to achieve a social order worthy of our great heritage. In our time, tremendous progress has been made toward a really democratic way of life. Let me assure the forward-looking people of America that there will be no relaxation in our efforts to improve the lot of the common people.

In the difficult days ahead, unquestionably we shall face problems of staggering proportions. However, with the faith of our fathers in our hearts, we fear no future.

On the battlefields, we have frequently faced overwhelming odds—and won! At home, Americans will not be less resolute!

We shall never cease our struggle to preserve and maintain our American way of life.

At this very moment, America, along with her brave Allies, is paying again a heavy price for the defense of our freedom. With characteristic energy, we are assisting in the liberation of entire nations. Gradually, the shackles of slavery are being broken by the forces of freedom.

All of us are praying for a speedy victory. Every day peace is delayed costs a terrible toll.

The armies of liberation today are bringing to an end Hitler's ghastly threat to dominate the world. Tokyo rocks under the weight of our bombs.

The grand strategy of a United Nations' war has been determined—due in no small measure to the vision of our departed Commander in Chief. We are now carrying out our part of that strategy under the able direction of Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, and General MacArthur.

I want the entire world to know that this direction must and will remain—unchanged and unhampered!

Our debt to the heroic men and valiant women in the service of our country can never be repaid. They have earned our undying gratitude. America will never forget their sacrifices. Because of these sacrifices, the dawn of justice and freedom throughout the world slowly casts its gleam across the horizon.

Our forefathers came to our rugged shores in search of religious tolerance, political freedom, and economic opportunity. For those fundamental rights, they risked their lives. We know today that such rights can be preserved only by constant vigilance, the eternal price of liberty! Within an hour after I took the oath of office, I announced that the San Francisco Conference would proceed. We will face the problems of peace with the same courage that we have faced and mastered the problems of war. In the memory of those who have made the supreme sacrifice—in the memory of our fallen President—we shall not fail!

It is not enough to yearn for peace. We must work and, if necessary, fight for it. The task of creating a sound international organization is complicated and difficult. Yet, without such organization, the rights of man on earth cannot be protected. Machinery for the just settlement of international differences must be found. Without such machinery, the entire world will have to remain an armed camp. The world will be doomed to deadly conflict, devoid of hope for real peace.

Fortunately, people have retained hope for a durable peace. Thoughtful people have always had faith that ultimately justice must triumph. Past experience surely indicates that, without justice, an enduring peace becomes impossible.

In bitter despair, some people have come to believe that wars are inevitable.

With tragic fatalism, they insist that, as wars have always been, of necessity wars will always be. To such defeatism, men and women of good-will must not and cannot yield. The outlook for humanity is not so hopeless.

During the darkest hours of this horrible war, entire nations were kept going by something intangible—hope! When warned that abject submission offered the only salvation against overwhelming power, hope showed the way to victory.

Hope has become the secret weapon of the forces of liberation!

Aggressors could not dominate the human mind. As long as hope remains, the spirit of man will never be crushed.

But hope alone was not and is not sufficient to avert war. We must not only have hope but we must have faith enough to work with other peace-loving nations to maintain the peace. Hope was not enough to beat back the aggressors as long as the peace-loving nations were unwilling to come to each other's defense. The aggressors were beaten back only when the peace-loving nations united to defend themselves.

If wars in the future are to be prevented, the peace-loving nations must be united in their determination to keep the peace under law. The breaking of the peace anywhere is the concern of peace-loving nations everywhere.

Nothing is more essential to the future peace of the world than continued cooperation of the nations which had to muster the force necessary to defeat the conspiracy of the Fascist powers to dominate the world.

While these great states have a special responsibility to enforce the peace, their responsibility is based upon the obligations resting upon all states, large and small, not to use force in international relations except in the defense of law. The responsibility of the great states is to serve and not dominate the peoples of the world.

To build the foundation of enduring peace we must not only work in harmony with our friends abroad but we must have the united support of our own people.

Even the most experienced pilot cannot bring a ship safely into harbor unless he has the full cooperation of the crew. For the benefit of all, every individual must do his duty.

I appeal to every American, regardless of party, race, creed, or color, to

support our efforts to build a strong and lasting United Nations Organization.

You, the members of Congress, surely know how I feel. Only with your help can I hope to complete one of the greatest tasks ever assigned to a public servant. With Divine guidance, and your help, we will find the new passage to a far better world, a kindly and friendly world, with just and lasting peace.

With confidence, I am depending upon all of you.

To destroy greedy tyrants with plans of world domination, we cannot continue in successive generations to sacrifice our finest youth.

In the name of human decency and civilization, a more rational method of deciding national differences must and will be found!

America must assist suffering humanity back along the path of peaceful progress. This will require time and tolerance. We shall need also an abiding faith in the people, the kind of faith and courage which Franklin Delano Roosevelt always had!

Today, America has become one of the most powerful forces for good on earth. We must keep it so. We have achieved a world leadership which does not depend solely upon our military and naval might.

We have learned to fight with other nations in common defense of our freedom. We must now learn to live with other nations for our mutual good. We must learn to trade more with other nations so that there may be—for our mutual advantage—increased production, increased employment, and better standards of living throughout the world.

May we Americans live up to our glorious heritage.

In that way, America may well lead the world to peace and prosperity.

At this moment, I have in my heart a prayer. As I assume my heavy duties, I humbly pray to Almighty God, in the words of Solomon:

“Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and bad: for who is able to judge this thy so great a people?”

I ask only to be a good and faithful servant of my Lord and my people.

Source: “President Truman’s Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, April 16, 1945,” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ww2/stofunio.htm.

223. Henry L. Stimson, Memorandum Discussed with President Harry S. Truman, April 25, 1945

Introduction

By the spring of 1945, it seemed likely that the United States would succeed in its massive Manhattan Project to develop atomic weapons. At the end of April, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson suggested to the new president, Harry S. Truman, then only a fortnight into his tenure of the presidency, that it might be desirable to place both the military and peaceful uses of atomic energy under some form of international control.

Primary Source

1. Within four months we shall in all probability have completed one of the most terrible weapons ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.

2. Although we have shared its development with the U.K., physically the U.S. is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years.

3. Nevertheless it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely.

a. Various segments of its discovery and production are widely known among many scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the whole process which we have developed.
b. Although its construction under present methods requires great scientific and industrial effort and raw materials, which are temporarily mainly within the possession and knowledge of U.S. and U.K., it is extremely probable that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered by scientists in the future, together with the use of materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the

future will make it possible for atomic bombs to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a larger nation in a much shorter time.

4. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one. …

5. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technical development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed.

6. To approach any world peace organization of any pattern now likely to be considered, without an appreciation by the leaders of our country of the power of the new weapon, would seem to be unrealistic. No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thoroughgoing rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated.

7. Furthermore, in the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations. Also our leadership in the war and in the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further.

8. On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.

9. As stated in General Groves’s report, steps are under way looking towards the establishment of a select committee of particular qualifications for

recommending action to the executive and legislative branches of our government when secrecy is no longer in full effect. The committee would also recommend the actions to be taken by the War Department prior to that time in anticipation of the postwar problems. All recommendations would of course be first submitted to the President.

Source: Henry L. Stimson with McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1948), 635–636. Henry Lewis Stimson Papers (MS 465), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

224. The Private and Political Testaments of Adolf Hitler, April 29, 1945

Introduction

Shortly before committing suicide in Berlin, together with his longtime companion Eva Braun, whom he had married by this time, Adolf Hitler wrote a will and testament. By killing himself, he avoided trial by the Allies. Hitler's will made it clear that despite Germany's crushing defeat, he retained all his faith in the political principles he had proclaimed for a quarter century. He blamed the outbreak of war and Germany's defeat on an international Jewish conspiracy and expelled from the party Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler, who had tried to open peace negotiations with the Allies.

Primary Source

MY PRIVATE WILL AND TESTAMENT

As I did not consider that I could take responsibility, during the years of struggle, of contracting a marriage, I have now decided, before the closing of my earthly career, to take as my wife that girl who, after many years of faithful friendship, entered, of her own free will, the practically besieged town in order to share her destiny with me. At her own desire she goes as my wife with me into death. It will compensate us for what we both lost through my work in the service of my people.

What I possess belongs—insofar as it has any value—to the Party. Should this no longer exist, to the State; should the State also be destroyed, no further decision of mine is necessary.

My pictures, in the collections which I have bought over the course of years, have never been collected for private purposes, but only for the extension of a gallery in my home town of Linz a.d. Donau.

It is my most sincere wish that this bequest may be duly executed.

I nominate as my Executor my most faithful Party comrade, Martin Bormann.

He is given full legal authority to make all decisions. He is permitted to take out everything that has a sentimental value or is necessary for the maintenance of a modest simple life, for my brothers and sisters, also above all for the mother of my wife and my faithful co-workers who are well known to him, principally my old Secretaries Frau Winter, etc. who have for many years aided me by their work.

I myself and my wife—in order to escape the disgrace of deposition or capitulation—choose death. It is our wish to be burnt immediately on the spot where I have carried out the greatest part of my daily work in the course of twelve years' service to my people.

Given in Berlin, 29th April 1945, 4:00 o'clock

(Signed) A. HITLER

MY POLITICAL TESTAMENT

More than thirty years have now passed since I in 1914 made my modest contribution as a volunteer in the first world war that was forced upon the Reich.

In these three decades I have been actuated solely by love and loyalty to my people in all my thoughts, acts, and life. They gave me the strength to make the most difficult decisions which have ever confronted mortal man. I have spent my time, my working strength, and my health in these three decades.

It is untrue that I or anyone else in Germany wanted the war in 1939. It was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who were either of Jewish descent or worked for Jewish interests. I have made too

many offers for the control and limitation of armaments, which posterity will not for all time be able to disregard, for the responsibility for the outbreak of this war to be laid on me. I have further never wished that after the first fatal world war a second against England, or even against America, should break out. Centuries will pass away, but out of the ruins of our towns and monuments the hatred against those finally responsible whom we have to thank for everything, international Jewry and its helpers, will grow.

Three days before the outbreak of the German-Polish war I again proposed to the British ambassador in Berlin a solution to the German-Polish problem—similar to that in the case of the Saar district, under international control. This offer also cannot be denied. It was only rejected because the leading circles in English politics wanted the war, partly on account of the business hoped for and partly under influence of propaganda organized by international Jewry.

I have also made it quite plain that, if the nations of Europe are again to be regarded as mere shares to be bought and sold by these international conspirators in money and finance, then that race, Jewry, which is the real criminal of this murderous struggle, will be saddled with the responsibility. I further left no one in doubt that this time not only would millions of children of Europe's Aryan peoples die of hunger, not only would millions of grown men suffer death, and not only would hundreds of thousands of women and children be burnt and bombed to death in the towns, without the real criminal having to atone for this guilt, even if by more humane means.

After six years of war, which in spite of all setbacks will go down one day in history as the most glorious and valiant demonstration of a nation's life purpose, I cannot forsake the city which is the capital of this Reich. As the forces are too small to make any further stand against the enemy attack at this place, and our resistance is gradually being weakened by men who are as deluded as they are lacking in initiative, I should like, by remaining in this town, to share my fate with those, the millions of others, who have also taken upon themselves to do so. Moreover I do not wish to fall into the hands of an enemy who requires a new spectacle organized by the Jews for the amusement of their hysterical masses.

I have decided therefore to remain in Berlin and there of my own free will to choose death at the moment when I believe the position of the Fuehrer and Chancellor itself can no longer be held.

I die with a happy heart, aware of the immeasurable deeds and achievements of our soldiers at the front, our women at home, the achievements of our farmers and workers and the work, unique in history, of our youth who bear my name.

That from the bottom of my heart I express my thanks to you all, is just as self-evident as my wish that you should, because of that, on no account give up the struggle but rather continue it against the enemies of the Fatherland, no matter where, true to the creed of great Clausewitz. From the sacrifice of our soldiers and from my own unity with them unto death, will in any case spring up in the history of Germany, the seed of a radiant renaissance of the National-Socialist movement and thus of the realization of a true community of nations.

Many of the most courageous men and women have decided to unite their lives with mine until the very last. I have begged and finally ordered them not to do this, but to take part in the further battle of the Nation. I beg the heads of the Armies, the Navy, and the Air Force to strengthen by all possible means the spirit of resistance of our soldiers in the National-Socialist sense, with special reference to the fact that also I myself, as founder and creator of this movement, have preferred death to cowardly abdication or even capitulation.

May it, at some future time, become part of the code of honour of the German officer—as is already the case in our Navy—that the surrender of a district or of a town is impossible, and that above all the leaders here must march ahead as shining examples, faithfully fulfilling their duty unto death.

SECOND PART OF THE POLITICAL TESTAMENT

Before my death I expel the former Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering from the party and deprive him of all rights which he may enjoy by virtue of the decree of June 29th, 1941; and also by virtue of my statement in the Reichstag on September 1st, 1939, I appoint in his place Grossadmiral Doenitz, President of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Before my death I expel the former Reichsfuehrer-SS and Minister of the Interior, Heinrich Himmler, from the party and from all offices of State. In his stead I appoint Gauleiter Karl Hanke as Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of

the German Police, and Gauleiter Paul Giesler as Reich Minister of the Interior.

Goering and Himmler, quite apart from their disloyalty to my person, have done immeasurable harm to the country and the whole nation by secret negotiations with the enemy, which they conducted without my knowledge and against my wishes, and by illegally attempting to seize power in the State for themselves.

In order to give the German people a government composed of honourable men,—a government which will fulfill its pledge to continue the war by every means—I appoint the following members of the new Cabinet as leaders of the nation:

President of the Reich: DOENITZ

Chancellor of the Reich: DR. GOEBBELS
Party Minister: BORMANN
Foreign Minister: SEYSS-INQUART

[*Here follow fifteen other names*.]

Although a number of these men, such as Martin Bormann, Dr. Goebbels, etc., together with their wives, have joined me of their own free will and did not wish to leave the capital of the Reich under any circumstances, but were willing to perish with me here, I must nevertheless ask them to obey my request, and in this case set the interests of the nation above their own feelings. By their work and loyalty as comrades they will be just as close to me after death, as I hope that my spirit will linger among them and always go with them. Let them be hard, but never unjust, above all let them never allow fear to influence their actions, and set the honour of the nation above everything in the world. Finally, let them be conscious of the fact that our task, that of continuing the building of a National Socialist State, represents the work of the coming centuries, which places every single person under an obligation always to serve the common interest and to subordinate his own advantage to this end. I demand of all Germans, all National Socialists, men, women, and all the men of the Armed Forces, that they be faithful and obedient unto death to the new government and its President.

Above all I charge the leaders of the nation and those under them to scrupulous observance of the laws of race and to merciless opposition to the universal poisoner of all peoples, international Jewry.

Given in Berlin, this 29th day of April 1945. 4:00 a.m.
ADOLF HITLER

Source: U.S. Office of United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, 8 vols. and 2 suppl. vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946–1948), 6:259–263, Doc. No. 3569-PS.

225. Marquis Koichi Kido, "Analysis of and Plan for the War Situation," June 8, 1945

Introduction

Although Japanese military leaders were determined to fight to the bitter end, other officials were less committed to their country's destruction. Immediately after a meeting of the Imperial Conference, attended by Emperor Hirohito, approved the military plans for the anticipated American invasion of the Japanese homeland, the eminent Marquis Koichi Kido, a relative of the emperor, drafted a memorandum that he handed to Hirohito. Kido recommended opening peace negotiations with the Allies, using the then still neutral Soviets as intermediaries, a suggestion to which the emperor agreed. These discussions proved inconclusive, especially after the Soviet Union itself declared war on Japan the following month. Given the intransigence of the Japanese military and their reluctance to consider any negotiated settlement, it is by no means certain that even if Japan and the Allies had reached some agreement on surrender terms, Kido and like-minded colleagues would have been able to obtain its acceptance by the Japanese government.

Primary Source

(1) The progress of the war in Okinawa, to my regret, makes me believe that it is destined inevitably to result in a miserable fiasco. Moreover, it is

almost certain that this result will come about in the very near future.

(2) After a careful scrutiny of reports on our national strength, attached for reference to the agenda of the conference in the imperial presence, I can see that, by the latter part of this year, we will be all but incapable of conducting the war on all fronts.

(3) Although it is very likely that I, a nonexpert in this field, would be unable to estimate accurately the enemy's strategy for the future, I can say that, judging from his air force at present and the tremendous effect of his mass incendiary bombing, it would not be a difficult task to sweep away, one after another, all the cities and towns, down to villages in the country. He would not require much time for it either. If the enemy were to adopt the tactics of destroying residential quarters, this would at the same time bring about the loss of stored clothing and foodstuffs. Especially in farming villages, since they are not accustomed to air raids or to confronting this type of attack, it would be almost impossible to enforce the dispersal of supplies beforehand. So it has to be observed that most of these supplies will have to be lost, especially in small towns and villages all over the country, since their antiaircraft defense has hardly amounted to anything.

(4) If this is correct, the extreme shortage of provisions and foodstuffs that will sweep the country in the latter part of this year and thereafter—in light of the approaching chilly season—will cause serious unrest among the people at large. And, in consequence, the situation will be beyond salvation.

(5) Therefore, I believe it is most urgent that resolute steps be taken. By what means and measures should we attain this objective? That is what must be most carefully worked out.

(6) Judging from various announcements and articles indicating the enemy's so-called peace offensive, it is well nigh certain that he looks upon the overthrowing of the so-called militarist clique as his chief objective.

(7) Although I believe it is a proper course to start negotiations after the military proposed peace, this is almost impossible at present, considering the current condition of our country. Also, we are most likely to lose a good chance should we wait until the opportunity matures. As a result, we cannot be sure we will not share the fate of Germany and be reduced to adverse circumstances under which we will not attain even our supreme object of safeguarding the Imperial Household and preserving the national polity.

(8) Although to do so may be very much out of usage according to past

precedents, and although it is regrettable to have to ask for His Majesty's approval concerning this monumental proposal, I believe we have no alternative but to solicit an imperial resolution for the sake of all the people and exert our wholehearted efforts to saving the war situation as follows: (a) Negotiate with a mediating country by means of His Majesty the Emperor's personal message. Though it would perhaps be a good idea to initiate direct negotiations with the Anglo-Americans, who are our opponents, it would be more appropriate to have Soviet Russia, which is observing neutrality at present, act as our intermediary. (b) The chief point in the prospective message by His Majesty would be to make it known that the Throne, who had always been interested in peace—citing the imperial rescript on the declaration of war—has decided, in view of the impossibly heavy war damages we have sustained, to bring the war to a close on "very generous terms." (c) The terms would have limits: If a guarantee for making the Pacific Ocean literally "a pacific ocean" in the true sense were obtained, Japan would give up her position of occupation and direction in the Pacific, inasmuch as we would be allowed to help various nations and races achieve independence in their respective countries and sectors. The army and navy forces stationed in the occupied areas would be evacuated on our own initiative. Though it is possible that they might be forced by pressing circumstances to give up their arms on the spot, this would have to depend on the outcome of negotiations. In regard to the reduction of armaments, we must be prepared for pretty strong demands being forced on us. There will be no choice for us but to be content with a minimum defense.

Source: *The Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931–45: Selected Translations into English* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1984), 434–436.

226. Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 26, 1945

Introduction

In June 1945, the great powers finally completed their negotiations over the creation of the United Nations, the new international organization designed to prevent future wars. Its charter represented a compromise between the idea that all nations should be equal, with all entitled to vote in the General Assembly, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "four policemen" vision of a concert of the great powers running the world between them. Five member states—Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and France, the coalition that had won the war—each had a permanent seat and veto power on the Security Council, which had to approve all executive action taken by the United Nations. In conjunction with the new United Nations, the Allies also created an international court of justice. A lineal descendant of the prewar Permanent Court of International Justice, its function was to rule on and settle disputes between states.

Primary Source

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the

promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I

PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to each of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II

MEMBERSHIP

Article 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III

ORGANS

Article 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Composition

Article 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately if the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;
b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

Article 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

Article 17

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

3. The Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

Voting

Article 18

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made

by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

Procedure

Article 20

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Article 21

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

Article 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER V

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Composition

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by

some other specially designated representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its request and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on questions relating to the Security Council's military

requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57

1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

Article 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

Article 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Composition

Article 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place of the nine members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, twenty-seven additional members shall be elected. Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of office of nine members so elected shall expire at the end of one year, and of nine other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.

Article 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies, may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations

and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Article 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Voting

Article 67

1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 68

The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

Article 69

The Economic and Social Council shall invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that Member.

Article 70

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies.

Article 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

Article 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

CHAPTER XI

DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
c. to further international peace and security;
d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XII

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice

to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held under mandate;
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this

Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the

United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Composition

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

a. those Members administering trust territories;
b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and

c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Functions and Powers

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Voting

Article 89

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 90

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

CHAPTER XIV

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Article 92

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93

1. All Members of the United Nations are de facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

2. A state which is not of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in

each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 95

Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96

1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV

THE SECRETARIAT

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

Article 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.

CHAPTER XVII

TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article 106

Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

CHAPTER XVIII

AMENDMENTS

Article 108

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 109

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER XIX

RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE

Article 110

1. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. The ramifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization when he has been appointed.

3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ramifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the deposited ramifications shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signatory states.

4. The states signatory to the present Charter which ratify it after it has come into force will become original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications.

Article 111

The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatory states.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Governments of the United Nations have signed the present Charter.

DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 95–110.

227. The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17–August 2, 1945

Introduction

After the German surrender but before that of Japan, the “Big Three” Allied leaders met at Potsdam in Berlin, Germany. They decided to establish a council of the foreign ministers of the major Allied powers to meet at regular intervals and discuss questions arising out of the war. They agreed on temporary arrangements for the administration of Germany, in principle on the transfer of German territory in the east to Poland, and on the consequent need for the transfer of populations from country to country.

Primary Source

PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS, AUGUST 1, 1945

The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and U.K., which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions:

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS.

A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States.

(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. …

C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in

Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD.

A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or

destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all

citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES.

11. In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

(a) mining and industrial production and its allocation;
(b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;
(c) wages, prices and rationing;
(d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole;
(e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
(f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
(g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.
(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.)
(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.
(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing

Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any break-down in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

(a) to effect essential repair of transport;
(b) to enlarge coal production;
(c) to maximize agricultural output; and
(d) to erect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.

III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY.

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R., and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made

by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U.K. and U.S.A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

IV. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE.

A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:

(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.A.

(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a

ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.A. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:

(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S.A. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1).

(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

V. CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VI. WAR CRIMINALS.

The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September.

VII. AUSTRIA.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The three governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria.

VIII. POLAND.

A. DECLARATION.

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interests of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND.

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

IX. CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION.

The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The Three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the

establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The Three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

X. TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XI. REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA, AND HUNGARY.

The Three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The Three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto. (Annex I)

XII. ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GERMAN POPULATIONS.

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions

pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIII. OIL EQUIPMENT IN RUMANIA.

The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members and one to be composed of United States and Soviet Members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot.

XIV. IRAN.

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

XV. THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER.

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached:

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

XVI. THE BLACK SEA STRAITS.

The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. …

XXI. MILITARY TALKS.

During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the Three Governments on military matters of common interest. …

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 28–29.

228. Allied Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, Potsdam, July 26, 1945

Introduction

At the Potsdam Conference, the leaders of China, the United States, and Great Britain agreed upon the wording of a proclamation calling upon Japan to surrender or otherwise face devastation. Although the atomic bomb had just been tested, they did not specifically describe the impact that the new weapon would be likely to have on Japan. This step was taken in large part on the suggestion of Henry L. Stimson, the influential American secretary of war, who hoped thereby to avoid the use of atomic weapons against Japan.

Primary Source

(1) We—The President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those [industries] which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 49–50.

229. President Harry S. Truman Recalls the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb, August 6, 1945

Introduction

In his memoirs, President Truman later described his reasons for using atomic weapons, a decision he claimed he never subsequently regretted. He focused on his desire to save American lives that would otherwise have been lost in the impending invasion of Japan. Truman's account has since been challenged by claims that Japan would in any case have surrendered, a hypothesis that is itself questionable. Although by this time the emperor and moderate politicians in Japan apparently wished to negotiate peace, even after the bomb had been used militarists within the Japanese cabinet and the Japanese Army were determined to continue fighting. It remains dubious whether, absent the impact of the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the emperor would have been able to prevail in seeking peace.

Primary Source

A month before the test explosion of the atomic bomb the service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had laid their detailed plans for the defeat of Japan before me for approval. …

The Army plan envisaged an amphibious landing in the fall of 1945 on the island of Kyushu, the southernmost of the Japanese home islands. This would be accomplished by our Sixth Army, under the command of General Walter Krueger. The first landing would then be followed approximately four months later by a second great invasion, which would be carried out by our Eighth and Tenth Armies, followed by the First Army transferred from Europe, all of which would go ashore in the Kanto plains area near Tokyo. In all, it had been estimated that it would require until the late fall of 1946 to bring Japan to her knees.

This was a formidable conception, and all of us realized fully that the fighting would be fierce and the losses heavy. But it was hoped that some of Japan's forces would continue to be preoccupied in China and others would be prevented from reinforcing the home islands if Russia were to enter the war.

There was, of course, always the possibility that the Japanese might choose to surrender sooner. Our air and fleet units had begun to inflict heavy damage on industrial and urban sites in Japan proper. Except in China, the armies of the Mikado had been pushed back everywhere in relentless successions of defeats.

Acting Secretary of State Grew had spoken to me in late May about issuing a proclamation that would urge the Japanese to surrender but would assure them that we would permit the emperor to remain as head of the state. Grew backed this with arguments taken from his ten years' experience as our Ambassador in Japan, and I told him that I had already given thought to this matter myself and that it seemed to me a sound idea. Grew had a draft of a proclamation with him, and I instructed him to send it by the customary channels to the Joint Chiefs and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in order that we might get the opinions of all concerned before I made my decision.

On June 18 Grew reported that the proposal had met with the approval of his Cabinet colleagues and of the Joint Chiefs. The military leaders also

discussed the subject with me when they reported the same day. Grew, however, favored issuing the proclamation at once, to coincide with the closing of the campaign on Okinawa, while the service chiefs were of the opinion that we should wait until we were ready to follow a Japanese refusal with the actual assault of our invasion forces.

It was my decision then that the proclamation to Japan should be issued from the forthcoming conference at Potsdam. This, I believed, would clearly demonstrate to Japan and to the world that the Allies were united in their purpose. By that time, also, we might know more about two matters of significance for our future effort: the participation of the Soviet Union and the atomic bomb. We knew that the bomb would receive its first test in mid-July. If the test of the bomb was successful, I wanted to afford Japan a clear chance to end the fighting before we made use of this newly gained power. If the test should fail, then it would be even more important to us to bring about a surrender before we had to make a physical conquest of Japan. General Marshall told me that it might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy's surrender on his home grounds.

But the test was now successful. …

[At Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's suggestion, shortly after becoming president in April 1945 Truman had] set up a committee of top men and had asked them to study with great care the implications the new weapon might have for us.

Secretary Stimson headed this group as chairman, and the other members were George L. Harrison, president of the New York Life Insurance Company, who was then serving as a special assistant to the Secretary of War; James F. Byrnes, as my personal representative; Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy; Assistant Secretary William L. Clayton for the State Department; and three of our most renowned scientists—Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington and Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; Dr. Karl T. Compton, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Chief of Field Service in the Office of Scientific Research and Development; and Dr. James B. Conant, president of Harvard University and chairman of the National Defense Research Committee.

This committee was assisted by a group of scientists, of whom those most prominently connected with the development of the atomic bomb were Dr.

Oppenheimer, Dr. Arthur H. Compton, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, and the Italian-born Dr. Enrico Fermi. The conclusions reached by these men, both in the advisory committee of scientists and in the larger committee, were brought to me by Secretary Stimson on June 1.

It was their recommendation that the bomb be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done. They recommended further that it should be used without specific warning and against a target that would clearly show its devastating strength. I had realized, of course, that an atomic bomb explosion would inflict damage and casualties beyond imagination. On the other hand, the scientific advisers of the committee reported, "We can see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." It was their conclusion that no technical demonstration such as they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to an end. It had to be used against an enemy target.

The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used. The top military advisers to the President recommended its use, and when I talked to Churchill he unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war.

In deciding to use this bomb I wanted to make sure that it would be used as a weapon of war in the manner prescribed by the laws of war. That meant that I wanted it dropped on a military target. I had told Stimson that the bomb should be dropped as nearly as possibly upon a war production center of prime military importance.

Stimson's staff had prepared a list of cities in Japan that might serve as targets. Kyoto, though favored by [Head of the Army Air Force] General Arnold as a center of military activity, was eliminated when Secretary Stimson pointed out that it was a cultural and religious shrine of the Japanese.

Four cities were finally recommended as targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki. They were listed in that order as targets for the first attack. The order of selection was in accordance with the military importance of these cities, but allowance would be given for weather conditions at the time of the bombing. …

On July 28 Radio Tokyo announced that the Japanese government would continue to fight. There was no formal reply to the joint ultimatum of the

United States, the United Kingdom, and China. There was no alternative now. The bomb was scheduled to be dropped after August 3 unless Japan surrendered before that day.

On August 6, the fourth day of the journey home from Potsdam, came the historic news that shook the world. … Shortly afterward I called a press conference. … My statements on the atomic bomb … read in part. …

"We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

"It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth."…

Still no surrender offer came. An order was issued to General Spaatz [commander of U.S. air forces in Asia] to continue operations as planned unless otherwise instructed. …

On August 9 the second atom bomb was dropped, this time on Nagasaki. We gave the Japanese three days in which to make up their minds to surrender, and the bombing would have been held off another two days had weather permitted. During those days we indicated that we meant business. On August 7 the 20th Air Force sent out a bomber force of some one hundred and thirty B-29s, and on the eighth it reported four hundred and twenty B-29s in day and night attacks. The choice of targets for the second atom bomb was first Kokura, with Nagasaki second. The third city on the list, Niigata, had been ruled out as too distant. By the time Kokura was reached the weather had closed in, and after three runs over the spot without a glimpse of the target, with gas running short, a try was made for the second choice, Nagasaki. There, too, the weather had closed in, but an opening in the clouds gave the bombardier his chance, and Nagasaki was successfully bombed.

This second demonstration of the power of the atomic bomb apparently threw Tokyo into a panic, for the next morning brought the first indication that the Japanese Empire was ready to surrender.

Source: Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Year of Decisions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), 416–426. Reprinted courtesy Ms. Margaret Truman Daniel.

230. Paul Fussell, “Thank God for the Atom Bomb”

Introduction

On only two occasions have atomic weapons ever been detonated in a combat situation—in August 1945, over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many have since questioned the need for their use, especially against cities that contained many civilians. The literary critic Paul Fussell, who had already seen heavy fighting in the European theater, later took issue with those who suggested that American soldiers deprecated these bombings. He recalled the very different reaction of himself and his fellow soldiers, who felt that the employment of atomic weapons was amply justified if it meant that no further American soldiers died in combat.

Primary Source

On Okinawa, only weeks before Hiroshima, 123,000 Japanese and Americans *killed* each other. (About 140,000 Japanese died at Hiroshima.) “Just awful” was the comment on the Okinawa slaughter not of some pacifist but of General MacArthur. On July 14, 1945, General Marshall sadly informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff—he was not trying to scare the Japanese—that it’s “now clear … that in order to finish with the Japanese quickly, it will be necessary to invade the industrial heart of Japan.” The invasion was definitely on, as I know because I was to be in it.

When the atom bomb ended the war, I was in the Forty-fifth Infantry Division, which had been through the European war so thoroughly that it had needed to be reconstituted two or three times. We were in a staging area near Rheims, ready to be shipped back across the United States for refresher training at Fort Lewis, Washington, and then sent on for final preparation in the Philippines. My division, like most of the ones transferred from Europe, was to take part in the invasion of Honshu. (The earlier landing on Kyushu was to be carried out by the 700,000 infantry already in the Pacific, those with whom James Jones has sympathized.) I was a twenty-one-year-old second lieutenant of infantry leading a rifle platoon. Although still officially fit for combat, in the German war I had already been wounded in the back

and the leg badly enough to be adjudged, after the war, 40 percent disabled. But even if my leg buckled and I fell to the ground whenever I jumped out of the back of a truck, and even if the very idea of more combat made me breathe in gasps and shake all over, my condition was held to be adequate for the next act. When the atom bombs were dropped and news began to circulate that "Operation Olympic" would not, after all, be necessary, when we learned to our astonishment that we would not be obliged in a few months to rush up the beaches near Tokyo assault-firing while being machine-gunned, mortared, and shelled, for all the practiced phlegm of our tough façades we broke down and cried with relief and joy. We were going to live. We were going to grow to adulthood after all. The killing was all going to be over, and peace was actually going to be the state of things. When the *Enola Gay* dropped its package, "There were cheers," says John Toland, "over the intercom; it meant the end of the war."…

Experience whispers that the pity is not that we used the bomb to end the Japanese war but that it wasn't ready in time to end the German one. If only it could have been rushed into production faster and dropped at the right moment on the Reich Chancellery or Berchtesgaden or Hitler's military headquarters in East Prussia (where Colonel Stauffenberg's July 20 [1944] bomb didn't do the job because it wasn't big enough), much of the Nazi hierarchy could have been pulverized immediately, saving not just the embarrassment of the Nuremberg trials but the lives of around four million Jews, Poles, Slavs, and gypsies, not to mention the lives and limbs of millions of Allied soldiers. If the bomb had only been ready in time, the young men of my infantry platoon would not have been so cruelly killed and wounded.

Source: Paul Fussell, *Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 13–18. Reprinted with permission of Paul Fussell.

231. Mao Zedong, "Chiang Kai-shek Is Provoking Civil War," Commentary Written for the Xinhua News Agency, August 13, 1945

Introduction

In August 1945, the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong condemned the order of Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), head of the Guomindang (Nationalist) government, that only Guomindang representatives could accept the surrender of Japanese forces in China. Mao feared that if Communist officials accepted this ruling, Guomindang officials would augment their existing weaponry with surrendered Japanese arms, putting the Chinese Communists in a disadvantageous position should, as seemed increasingly likely, fighting break out between them and the Guomindang. Within a few months civil war had indeed begun between the Guomindang and its Communist opponents, a conflict that lasted until October 1949, when Jiang's forces fled to the island of Taiwan and the victorious Communists established the People's Republic of China.

Primary Source

A spokesman for the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee has made a statement describing as "a presumptuous and illegal act" the order setting a time-limit for the surrender of the enemy and the puppets, which was issued by Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Group Army, on August 10 from the General Headquarters in Yenan. This comment is absolutely preposterous. Its logical implication is that it was wrong of Chu Teh to act in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and with the enemy's declared intention of surrendering and to order his troops to effect the surrender of the enemy and the puppets, and that on the contrary it would have been right and legitimate to advise the enemy and puppets to refuse to surrender. No wonder that even before the enemy's actual surrender, Chiang Kai-shek, China's fascist ringleader, autocrat and traitor to the people, had the audacity to "order" the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas to "stay where they are, pending further orders," that is, to tie their own hands and let the enemy attack them. No wonder this selfsame fascist ringleader dared to "order" the so-called underground forces (who are, in fact, puppet troops "saving the nation by a devious path" and Tai Li's secret police collaborating with the Japanese and puppets) as well as other puppet troops to "be responsible for maintaining local order," while forbidding the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas to "take presumptuous action on their own" against enemy and puppet forces. This

transposition of the enemy and the Chinese is in truth a confession by Chiang Kai-shek; it gives a vivid picture of his whole psychology, which is one of consistent collusion with the enemy and puppets and of liquidation of all those not of his ilk. However, the people's anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas will never be taken in by this venomous scheme. …

Both the comment by the spokesman for the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Chiang Kai-shek's "orders" are from beginning to end provocations to civil war; at this moment, when attention at home and abroad is focused on Japan's unconditional surrender, their aim is to find a pretext for switching to civil war as soon as the War of Resistance ends. … So now they are saying that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should not demand that the enemy and puppet troops surrender their guns. In the eight years of the War of Resistance, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have suffered enough from the attacks and encirclements of both Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese. And now, with the War of Resistance coming to an end, Chiang Kai-shek is hinting to the Japanese (and to his beloved puppet troops) that they should not surrender their guns to the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army but "only to me, Chiang Kai-shek." One thing, however, Chiang Kai-shek has left unsaid, "… so that I can use these guns to kill the Communists and wreck the peace of China and the world." Isn't this the truth? What will be the result of telling the Japanese to hand over their guns to Chiang Kai-shek and telling the puppet troops to "be responsible for maintaining local order"? The result can only be that a merger of the Nanking and Chungking regimes and co-operation between Chiang Kai-shek and the puppets will take the place of "Sino-Japanese collaboration" and of co-operation between the Japanese and the puppets, and that Chiang Kai-shek's "anti-communism and national reconstruction" will take the place of the "anti-communism and national reconstruction" of the Japanese and [the collaborationist Japanese-backed wartime President of China] Wang Ching-wei. Isn't this a violation of the Potsdam Declaration? Can there be any doubt that the grave danger of civil war will confront the people of the whole country the moment the War of Resistance is over? We now appeal to all our fellow-countrymen and to the Allied countries to take action, together with the people of the Liberated Areas, resolutely to prevent a civil war in China, which would endanger world peace.

After all, who has the right to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppets? Relying solely on their own efforts and the support of the people, the anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas, to whom the Kuomintang government refused all supplies and recognition, have succeeded by themselves in liberating vast territories and more than 100 million people and have resisted and pinned down 56 per cent of the invading enemy troops in China and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. If not for these armed forces, the situation in China would never have been what it is today! To speak plainly, in China only the anti-Japanese armed forces of the Liberated Areas have the right to accept the surrender of the enemy and puppet troops. As for Chiang Kai-shek, his policy has been to look on with folded arms and sit around and wait for victory; indeed he has no right at all to accept the surrender of the enemy and the puppets.

We declare to all our fellow-countrymen and to the people of the whole world: The Supreme Command in Chungking cannot represent the Chinese people and those Chinese armed forces which have really fought Japan; the Chinese people demand the right of the anti-Japanese armed forces of China's Liberated Areas under Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh to send their representatives directly in order to participate in the acceptance of Japan's surrender and in the military control over Japan by the four Allied Powers and also to participate in the future peace conference. If this is not done, the Chinese people will deem it most improper.

Source: Mao Zedong, "Chiang Kai-Shek Is Provoking Civil War, 13 August 1945," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 4 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press), 27–29, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_02.htm.

232. Emperor Hirohito, Radio Broadcast Accepting the Potsdam Declaration, August 14, 1945

Introduction

On August 14, 1945, Japanese emperor Hirohito (the Shōwa emperor) transmitted a message to his people informing them that the Japanese

government had decided to accept the terms of the previous month's Potsdam declaration and surrender to the Allies. He called upon his subjects to resolve to bear the unbearable, an appeal widely credited with preventing last-ditch military opposition to the Allied occupation.

Primary Source

To our good and loyal subjects: After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that our empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by our imperial ancestors and which we lay close to the heart.

Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to insure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.

But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of our military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of our servants of the State and the devoted service of our 100,000,000 people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects, nor to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors? This

is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia.

The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met death [otherwise] and all their bereaved families, pains our heart night and day.

The welfare of the wounded and the war sufferers and of those who lost their homes and livelihood is the object of our profound solicitude. The hardships and sufferings to which our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great.

We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable. Having been able to save and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, we are always with you, our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.

Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion that may engender needless complications, of any fraternal contention and strife that may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.

Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, nobility of spirit, and work with resolution so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.

Source: "Emperor Hirohito, Accepting the Potsdam Declaration, Radio Broadcast: Transmitted by Domei and Recorded by the Federal Communications Commission, 14 August 1945," Mount Holyoke, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hirohito.htm.

233. William J. Donovan to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget, August 25, 1945

Introduction

In August 1945 President Harry S. Truman disbanded the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the U.S. wartime foreign intelligence agency. OSS director general William J. Donovan remained convinced that the United States needed a permanent overseas intelligence agency in order to conduct overseas espionage operations. In a coordinated lobbying campaign conducted as he gradually liquidated his operations, Donovan expressed these views to the influential director of the Bureau of the Budget and numerous other Washington officials. Within two years his efforts succeeded, as the burgeoning Cold War resulted in the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Primary Source

It is our estimate … the effectiveness of OSS as a War Agency will end as of January 1, or at latest February 1946, at which time liquidation should be completed. At that point I wish to return to private life. Therefore, in considering the disposition to be made of the assets created by OSS, I speak as a private citizen concerned with the future of his country.

In our government today there is no permanent agency to take over the functions which OSS will have then ceased to perform. These functions while carried on as incident to the war are in reality essential in the effective discharge by this nation of its responsibilities in the organization and maintenance of the peace.

Since last November I have pointed out the immediate necessity of setting up such an agency to take over valuable assets created by OSS. Among these assets was the establishment for the first time in our nation's history of a foreign secret intelligence service which reported information as seen through

American eyes. As an integral and inseparable part of this service there is a group of specialists to analyze and evaluate the material for presentation to those who determine national policy.

It is not easy to set up a modern intelligence system. It is more difficult to do so in time of peace than in time of war.

It is important therefore that it be done before the War Agency has disappeared so that profit may be made of its experience and "know how" in deciding how the new agency may best be conducted.

I have already submitted a plan for the establishment of a centralized system. However, the discussion of that proposal indicated the need of an agreement upon certain fundamental principles before a detailed plan is formulated. If those concerned could agree upon the principles with which such a system should be established, acceptance of a common plan would be more easily achieved.

Accordingly, I attach a statement of principles, the soundness of which I believe has been established by study and by practical experience.

PRINCIPLES—THE SOUNDNESS OF WHICH IT IS BELIEVED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY OUR OWN EXPERIENCE AND FIRST-HAND STUDY OF THE SYSTEMS OF OTHER NATIONS—WHICH SHOULD GOVERN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRALIZED UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

The formulation of a national policy both in its political and military aspects is influenced and determined by knowledge (or ignorance) of the aims, capabilities, intentions, and policies of other nations.

All major powers except the United States have had for a long time past permanent world-wide intelligence services, reporting directly to the highest echelons of their governments. Prior to the present war, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service. It never has had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system.

The defects and dangers of this situation have been generally recognized. Adherence to the following would remedy this defect in peace as well as war so that American policy could be based upon information obtained through its own sources on foreign intentions, capabilities, and developments as seen and interpreted by Americans.

1. That each department of Government should have its own intelligence bureau for the collection and processing of such informational material as it finds necessary in the actual performance of its functions and duties. Such a bureau should be under the sole control of the department head and should not be encroached upon or impaired by the functions granted any other governmental intelligence agency.

Because secret intelligence covers all fields and because of possible embarrassment, no executive department should be permitted to engage in secret intelligence but in a proper case should call upon the central agency for service.

2. That in addition to the intelligence unit for each department there should be established a national centralized foreign intelligence agency which should have the authority:

A. To serve all departments of the Government.
B. To procure and obtain political, economic, psychological, sociological, military, and other information which may bear upon the national interest and which has been collected by the different Governmental departments or agencies.
C. To collect when necessary supplemental information either at its own instance or at the request of any Governmental departments or agencies.
D. To integrate, analyze, process, and disseminate, to authorized Governmental agencies and officials, intelligence in the form of strategic interpretive studies.

3. That such an agency should be prohibited from carrying on clandestine activities within the United States and should be forbidden the exercise of any police functions at home or abroad.

4. That since the nature of its work requires it to have status, it should be independent of any department of the government (since it is obliged to serve all and must be free of the natural bias of an operating department). It should be under a director, appointed by the President, and be administered under Presidential direction, or in the event of a General Manager being appointed, should be established in the Executive Office of the President, under his direction.

5. That subject to the approval of the President or the General Manager the policy of such a service should be determined by the Director with the advice and assistance of a Board on which the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Treasury should be represented.

6. That this agency, as the sole agency for secret intelligence, should be authorized, in the foreign field only, to carry on services such as espionage, counterespionage, and those special operations (including morale and psychological) designed to anticipate and counter any attempted penetration and subversion of our national security by enemy action.

7. That such a service should have an independent budget granted directly by the Congress.

8. That such a service should have its own system of codes and should be furnished facilities by departments of Government proper and necessary for the performance of its duties.

9. That such a service should include in its staff specialists (within Governmental departments, civil and military, and in private life) professionally trained in analysis of information and possessing a high degree of linguistic, regional, or functional competence, to analyze, coordinate, and evaluate incoming information, to make special intelligence reports, and to provide guidance for the collecting branches of the agency.

10. That in time of war or unlimited national emergency, all programs of such agency in areas of actual and projected military operations shall be coordinated with military plans, and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or if there be consolidation of the armed services, under the supreme commander. Parts of such programs which are to be executed in the theater of military operations shall be subject to control of the military commander.

Source: "Gen. Donovan's Letter to the Director of the Bureau of Budget, Harold D. Smith," Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch3_c.htm.

234. George C. Marshall, "Price of Victory": American Casualties in World War II, Extract

from Final Biennial Report to the Secretary of War, September 1, 1945

Introduction

American leaders were well aware of the human cost that the war exacted. In his final report to the secretary of war, U.S. Army chief of staff George C. Marshall gave detailed figures on American military casualties. These did not include the numbers of those killed or invalided out as the result of disease, exposure, or accident rather than in combat.

Primary Source

Even with our overwhelming concentration of air power and fire power, this war has been the most costly of any in which the Nation has been engaged. The victory in Europe alone cost us 772,626 battle casualties of which 160,045 are dead. The price of victory in the Pacific was 170,596 including 41,322 dead. Army battle deaths since 7 December 1941 were greater than the combined losses, Union and Confederate, of the Civil War. …

Army casualties in all theaters from 7 December 1941 until the end of the period of this report [30 June 1945] total 943,222, including 201,367 killed, 570,732 wounded, 114,205 prisoners, 56,867 missing; of the total wounded, prisoners, or missing more than 633,200 have returned to duty, or have been evacuated to the United States.

The great strategic bombardment strikes on Germany and the inauguration of the Mediterranean campaign pushed our total casualty rate above 5,000 a month in 1943. In the first five months of 1944 the increasing tempo of the air attack and the fighting in Italy drove our losses, killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, to 13,700 men a month. Once ashore in Western Europe, the casualty rate leaped to 48,000 a month and increased to 81,000 by December. The average for the last seven months of the year was 59,000.

Out in the Pacific the advance on Japan cost 3,200 men a month throughout 1944. In the first seven months of this year the rate increased to 12,750 as we closed on the Japanese Islands.

The heaviest losses have been on the ground where the fighting never ceases night or day. Disregarding their heavy losses to disease and exposure, the combat divisions have taken more than 81 percent of all our casualties. However, though the percentage of the total is small, the casualties among the combat air crews have been very severe. By the end of July the Army Air Forces had taken nearly 120,000 casualties. Of this total 36,698 had died. The air raids over enemy territory gave Air Force casualties the heaviest weighting of permanency. The wounded of the Ground Forces drove their total casualties high, but with the exceptional medical care the Army has had in this war, the wounded had good chances to recover. …

In the Army at large, the infantry comprises only 20.5 percent of total strength overseas, yet it has taken 70 percent of the total casualties. Enemy fire is no respecter of rank in this war; 10.2 percent of the casualties have been officers, a rate slightly higher than that for enlisted men.

The improvement of battle surgery and medical care, on the other hand, reduced the rate of death from wounds to less than one-half the rate in World War I, and permitted more than 58.8 percent of men wounded in this war to return to duty in the theaters of operations.

As staggering as our casualties have been, the enemy forces opposing us suffered many times more heavily; 1,592,600 Germans, Italians, and Japanese troops were killed for the 201,367 American soldiers who died. It is estimated that permanently disabled enemy total 303,700. We captured and disarmed 8,150,447 enemy troops.

Source: George C. Marshall, U.S. Army, *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 61–62.

235. George C. Marshall, “For the Common Defense,” Extract from Final Biennial Report to the Secretary of War, September 1, 1945

Introduction

As the war ended, George C. Marshall, army chief of staff, put forward proposals for a “peacetime security policy” for the United States. He envisaged a relatively small permanent standing army, buttressed by a citizen soldiery who could be called to arms in case of need. The latter he hoped to create through a program of universal military training, required of all young American men. Marshall expected the regular army to be “a strategic force, heavy in airpower, partially deployed in the Pacific and the Caribbean ready to protect the Nation against a sudden hostile thrust and immediately available for emergency action wherever required.” In addition, he called for the creation of substantial national stockpiles of arms, ammunition, and other military equipment and a heavy emphasis on the promotion of scientific research and development in the defense field. Largely due to popular opposition, the United States did not introduce universal military training, but most of Marshall’s other recommendations were put into effect.

Primary Source

Our present national policies require us to: Maintain occupation forces in Europe and the Pacific; prepare for a possible contribution of forces to a world security organization; maintain national security while the world remains unstable and later on a more permanent or stable basis.

These policies require manpower. Yet at the same time it is the policy of the nation to completely demobilize the wartime army as rapidly as possible. Unless hundreds of thousands of men of the wartime forces are to remain in service at home and overseas, more permanent decisions must be made.

The War Department recommends that the occupation forces and the U.S. complement in the International security force be composed as much as possible of volunteers. This can be accomplished by establishing now a new permanent basis for the regular military establishment. If this recommendation and those which I will now discuss in detail for establishing a peacetime security policy are now adopted by the Congress, demobilization can proceed uninterrupted until all men now in temporary service have returned to their homes.

FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE

To fulfill its responsibility for protecting this Nation against foreign enemies, the Army must project its planning beyond the immediate future. In this connection I feel that I have a duty, a responsibility, to present publicly at this time my conception, from a military point of view, of what is required to prevent another international catastrophe.

For years men have been concerned with individual security. Modern nations have given considerable study and effort to the establishment of social security systems for those unable or unwise enough to provide for themselves. But effective insurance against the disasters which have slaughtered millions of people and leveled their homes is long overdue.

We finish each bloody war with a feeling of acute revulsion against this savage form of human behavior, and yet on each occasion we confuse military preparedness with the causes of war and then drift almost deliberately into another catastrophe. …

We must start, I think, with a correction of the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy. War has been defined by a people who have thought a lot about it—the Germans. They have started most of the recent ones. The German soldier-philosopher Clausewitz described war as a special violent form of political action. Frederic of Prussia, who left Germany the belligerent legacy which has now destroyed her, viewed war as a device to enforce his will whether he was right or wrong. He held that with an invincible offensive military force he could win any political argument. This is the doctrine Hitler carried to the verge of complete success. It is the doctrine of Japan. It is a criminal doctrine, and like other forms of crime, it has cropped up again and again since man began to live with his neighbors in communities and nations. There has long been an effort to outlaw war for exactly the same reason that man has outlawed murder. But the law prohibiting murder does not of itself prevent murder. It must be enforced. The enforcing power, however, must be maintained on a strictly democratic basis. There must not be a large standing army subject to the behest of a group of schemers. The citizen-soldier is the guarantee against such a misuse of power.

In order to establish an international system for preventing wars, peace-loving peoples of the world are demonstrating an eagerness to send their representatives to such conferences as those at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco with the fervent hope that they may find a practical solution. Yet,

until it is proved that such a solution has been found to prevent wars, a rich nation which lays down its arms as we have done after every war in our history, will court disaster. The existence of the complex and fearful instruments of destruction now available make this a simple truth which is, in my opinion, undebatable.

So far as their ability to defend themselves and their institutions was concerned, the great democracies were sick nations when Hitler openly massed his forces to impose his will on the world. As sick as any was the United States of America. We had no field army. There were the bare skeletons of three and one-half divisions scattered in small pieces over the entire United States. It was impossible to train even these few combat troops as divisions because motor transportation and other facilities were lacking and funds for adequate maneuvers were not appropriated. The Air Forces consisted of a few partially equipped squadrons serving continental United States, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines; their planes were largely obsolescent and could hardly have survived a single day of modern aerial combat. We lacked modern arms and equipment. When President Roosevelt proclaimed, on 8 September 1939, that a limited emergency existed for the United States we were, in terms of available strength, not even a third-rate military power. Some collegians had been informing the world and evidently convincing the Japanese that the young men of America would refuse to fight in defense of their country.

The German armies swept over Europe at the very moment we sought to avoid war by assuring ourselves that there could be no war. The security of the United States of America was saved by sea distance, by Allies, and by the errors of a prepared enemy. For probably the last time in the history of warfare those ocean distances were a vital factor in our defense. We may elect again to depend on others and the whim and error of potential enemies, but if we do we will be carrying the treasure and freedom of this great Nation in a paper bag.

Returning from France after the last war, with General Pershing [commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I], I participated in his endeavors to persuade the Nation to establish and maintain a sound defense policy. Had his recommendations been accepted, they might have saved this country the hundreds of billions of dollars and the more than

a million casualties it has cost us again to restore the peace. We might even have been spared this present world tragedy. …

Twice in recent history the factories and farms and people of the United States have foiled aggressor nations; conspirators against the peace would not give us a third opportunity.

Between Germany and America in 1914 and again in 1939 stood Great Britain and the USSR, France, Poland, and the other countries of Europe. Because the technique of destruction had not progressed to its present peak, these nations had to be eliminated and the Atlantic Ocean crossed by ships before our factories could be brought within the range of the enemy guns. At the close of the German war in Europe they were just on the outer fringes of the range of fire from an enemy in Europe. [German field marshall Hermann] Goering stated after his capture that it was a certainty that the eastern Americas would have been under rocket bombardment had Germany remained undefeated for two more years. The first attacks would have started much sooner. The technique of war has brought the United States, its homes and factories into the front line of world conflict. They escaped destructive bombardment in the second World War. They would not in a third.

It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And the peace can only be maintained by the strong.

What then must we do to remain strong and still not bankrupt ourselves on military expenditures to maintain a prohibitively expensive professional army even if one could be recruited? President Washington answered that question in recommendations to the first Congress to convene under the United States Constitution. He proposed a program for the peacetime training of a citizen army. At that time the conception of a large professional Regular Army was considered dangerous to the liberties of the Nation. It is still so today. But the determining factor in solving this problem will inevitably be the relation between the maintenance of military power and the cost in annual appropriations. No system, even if actually adopted in the near future, can survive the political pressure to reduce the military budget if the costs are high—and professional armies are very costly.

There is now another disadvantage to a large professional standing army. Wars in the twentieth century are fought with the total resources, economic,

scientific, and human of entire nations. Every specialized field of human knowledge is employed. Modern war requires the skill and knowledge of the individuals of a nation.

Obviously we cannot all put on uniforms and stand ready to repel invasion. The greatest energy in peacetime of any successful nation must be devoted to productive and gainful labor. But all Americans can, in the next generations, prepare themselves to serve their country in maintaining the peace or against the tragic hour when peace is broken, if such a misfortune again overtakes us. This is what is meant by Universal Military *Training*. It is not universal military *service*—the actual induction of men into the combatant forces. Such forces would be composed during peacetime of volunteers. The trainees would be in separate organizations maintained for training purposes only. Once trained, young men would be freed from further connection with the Army unless they chose, as they now may, to enroll in the National Guard or an organized reserve unit, or to volunteer for service in the small professional army. When the Nation is in jeopardy they could be called, just as men are now called, by a committee of local neighbors, in an order of priority and under such conditions as directed at that time by the Congress.

The concept of universal military training is not founded, as some may believe, on the principle of a mass Army. The Army has been accused of rigidly holding to this doctrine in the face of modern developments. Nothing, I think, could be farther from the fact, as the record of the mobilization for this war demonstrates. Earlier in this report I explained how we had allocated manpower to exploit American technology. Out of our entire military mobilization of 14,000,000 men, the number of infantry troops was less than 1,500,000 Army and Marine.

The remainder of our armed forces, sea, air, and ground, was largely fighting a war of machinery. Counting those engaged in war production there were probably 75 to 80,000,000 Americans directly involved in prosecution of the war. To technological warfare we devoted 98 percent of our entire effort.

Nor is it proposed now to abandon this formula which has been so amazingly successful. The harnessing of the basic power of the universe will further spur our efforts to use brain for brawn in safeguarding the United States of America.

However, technology does not eliminate the need for men in war. The Air Forces, which were the highest developed technologically of any of our armed forces in this war, required millions of men to do their job. Every B-29 that winged over Japan was dependent on the efforts of 12 officers and 73 men in the immediate combat area alone. …

This war has made it clear that the security of the Nation, when challenged by an armed enemy, requires the services of virtually all able-bodied male citizens within the effective military group.

In war the Nation cannot depend on the numbers of men willing to volunteer for active service; nor can our security in peace.

In another national emergency, the existence of a substantial portion of the Nation's young manpower already trained or in process of training, would make it possible to fill out immediately the peacetime ranks of the Navy, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. As a result our Armed Forces would be ready for almost immediate deployment to counter initial hostile moves, ready to prevent an enemy from gaining footholds from which he could launch destructive attack against our industries and our homes. By this method we would establish, for the generations to come, a national military policy: (1) which is entirely within the financial capabilities of our peacetime economy and is absolutely democratic in its nature, and (2) which places the military world and therefore the political world on notice that this vast power, linked to our tremendous resources, wealth, and production, is immediately available. There can be no question that all the nations of the world will respect our views accordingly, creating at least a probability of peace on earth and of good will among men rather than disaster upon disaster in a tormented world where the very processes of civilization itself are constantly threatened. …

The terms of the final peace settlement will provide a basis for determining the strength of the regular or permanent postwar military forces of the United States, air, ground, and naval, but they cannot, in my opinion, alter the necessity for a system of Universal Military Training.

The yardstick by which the size of the permanent force must be measured is maximum security with minimum cost in men, matériel, and maintenance. So far as they can foresee world conditions a decade from now, War Department planners, who have taken every conceivable factor into consideration, believe that our position will be sound if we set up machinery

which will permit the mobilization of an Army of 4,000,000 men within a period of 1 year following any international crisis resulting in a national emergency for the United States.

The Regular Army must be comprised largely of a strategic force, heavy in air power, partially deployed in the Pacific and the Caribbean ready to protect the Nation against a sudden hostile thrust and immediately available for emergency action wherever required. It is obvious that another war would start with a lightning attack to take us unaware. The pace of the attack would be at supersonic speeds of rocket weapons closely followed by a striking force which would seek to exploit the initial and critical advantage. We must be sufficiently prepared against such a threat to hold the enemy at a distance until we can rapidly mobilize our strength. The Regular Army, and the National Guard, must be prepared to meet such a crisis.

Another mission of the Regular Army is to provide the security garrisons for the outlying bases. We quickly lost the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Islands at the beginning of this war and are still expending lives and wealth in recovering them.

The third mission of the permanent Army is to furnish the overhead, the higher headquarters which must keep the machine and the plans up to date for whatever national emergency we may face in the future. This overhead includes the War Department, the War College, the service schools, and the headquarters of the military area into which continental United States is subdivided to facilitate decentralized command and coordination of the peacetime military machine. This was about all we had on the eve of this war, planners and a small number of men who had little to handle in practice but sound ideas on how to employ the wartime hosts that would be gathered in the storm. Had it not been for the time the British Empire and the Soviets bought us, those plans and ideas would have been of little use.

The fourth and probably the most important mission of the Regular Army is to provide the knowledge, the expert personnel, and the installations for training the citizen-soldier upon whom, in my view, the future peace of the world largely depends. …

Only by Universal Military Training can full vigor and life be instilled into the Reserve system. It creates a pool of well-trained men and officers from which the National Guard and the Organized Reserve can draw volunteers; it provides opportunities for the Guard and Reserve units to

participate in corps and Army maneuvers, which are vital preparations to success in military campaigns. Without these trained men and officers, without such opportunities to develop skill through actual practice in realistic maneuvers, neither the Regular Army, the National Guard, nor the Reserve can hope to bring efficiency to their vital missions. …

An unbroken period of 1 year's training appears essential to the success of a sound security plan based on the concept of a citizen army.

It is possible to train individual soldiers as replacements for veteran divisions and air groups as we now do in a comparatively short period of time. The training of the unit itself cannot be accomplished at best in less than a year; air units require even more time. The principle is identical to that of coaching a football team. A halfback can quickly learn how to run with the ball, but it takes time and much practice and long hours of team scrimmage before he is proficient at carrying the ball through an opposing team. So it is with an army division or combat air group. Men learn to fire a rifle or machine gun quickly, but it takes long hours of scrimmage, which the army calls maneuver, before the firing of the rifle is coordinated with the activities of more than 14,000 other men on the team.

All men who might someday have to fight for their Nation must have this team training. The seasoned soldiers of our present superb divisions will have lived beyond the age of military usefulness. The situation will be similar in the peacetime army to that which was obtained when we began to mobilize for this war and all men had to have at least a year of unit training before we had divisions even fit for shipment overseas.

The training program would be according to the standards which have made the American soldier in this war the equal of the finest fighting men. It would be kept abreast of technical developments and the resulting modification of tactics. …

The peacetime army must not only be prepared for immediate mobilization of an effective war army, but it must have in reserve the weapons needed for the first months of the fighting and clear-cut plans for immediately producing the tremendous additional quantities of matériel necessary in total war. We must never again face a great national crisis with ammunition lacking to serve our guns, few guns to fire, and no decisive procedures for procuring vital arms in sufficient quantities.

The necessity for continuous research into the military ramifications of

man’s scientific advance is now clear to all and it should not be too difficult to obtain the necessary appropriations for this purpose in peacetime. There is, however, always much reluctance to expenditure of funds for improvement of war-making instruments, particularly where there is no peacetime usefulness in the product.

The development of combat airplanes is closely allied with development of civil aeronautics; the prototypes of many of our present transport planes and those soon to come were originally bombers. Many of the aeronautical principles that helped give this Nation the greatest Air Force in the world grew out of commercial development and our production know-how at the start of this war was partially the fruit of peacetime commercial enterprise. Since many vital types of weapons have no commercial counterpart, the peacetime development of these weapons has been grossly neglected. Antiaircraft weapons are a good example. The highly efficient antiaircraft of today did not materialize until long after the fighting began. The consequent cost in time, life, and money of this failure to spend the necessary sums on such activity in peacetime has been appalling.

There is another phase of scientific research which I think has been somewhat ignored—the development of expeditious methods for the mass production of war matériel. This is of great importance since it determines how quickly we can mobilize our resources if war comes and how large and costly our reserve stocks of war matériel must be. Serious thought and planning along this line can save millions of tax dollars.

We can be certain that the next war, if there is one, will be even more total than this one. The nature of war is such that once it now begins it can end only as this one is ending, in the destruction of the vanquished, and it should be assumed that another reconversion from peace to war production will take place initially under distant enemy bombardment. Industrial mobilization plans must be founded on these assumptions and so organized that they will meet them and any other situation that may develop. Yet they must in no way retard or inhibit the course of peacetime production.

If this Nation is to remain great it must bear in mind now and in the future that war is not the choice of those who wish passionately for peace. It is the choice of those who are willing to resort to violence for political advantage. We can fortify ourselves against disaster, I am convinced, by the measures I have here outlined. In these protections we can face the future with a

reasonable hope for the best and with quiet assurance that even though the worst may come, we are prepared for it.

Source: George C. Marshall, U.S. Army, *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 208–214.

236. Kase Toshikazu, Account of the Japanese Surrender Ceremony, September 2, 1945

Introduction

Eleven Japanese delegates attended the ceremony of surrender to the Allied powers aboard USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay. Kase Toshikazu, one of three Foreign Ministry representatives, gave a vivid account of what was for Japan its moment of utmost humiliation.

Primary Source

It was a surprisingly cool day for early September. The sky was dull gray with clouds hanging low. We left Tokyo at about five o'clock in the morning. There were nine of us, three each from the Foreign Office, and the War and Navy Departments, besides the two delegates, Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister representing the government, and General Umedzu, the Chief of Staff of the Army representing the Supreme Command. With the two delegates leading the procession, our cars sped at full speed on the battered and bumpy road to Yokohama. Along the highway, we could see nothing but miles and miles of debris and destruction where there had once flourished towns containing a great number of munitions factories. The ghastly sight of death and desolation was enough to freeze my heart. These hollow ruins, however, were perhaps a fit prelude to the poignant drama in which we were about to take part for were we not sorrowing men come to seek a tomb for a fallen Empire? They were also a grim reminder that a nation was snatched from an impending annihilation. For were not the scenes of havoc the atomic bomb wrought a sufficient warning? The waste of war and the ignominy of surrender were put on my mental loom and produced a strange fabric of grief

and sorrow. There were few men on the road and none probably recognized us. Our journey was kept in utmost secrecy in order to avoid publicity lest extremists might attempt to impede us by violence.

To begin with, there was much ado in selecting the delegates. Nobody wanted to volunteer for the odious duty. The Prime Minister, Prince Higashikuni, was the Emperor's uncle and was considered unsuitable on that account. Next choice fell on Prince Konoye, who was Vice Premier and the real power in the government, but he shunned the ordeal. Finally the mission was assigned to Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister. On accepting the imperial command to sign the surrender document as principal delegate, he confided to me what an honor he felt it, since it was the mark of the sovereign's confidence in him. Shigemitsu, who had served twice before as Foreign Minister—namely, in the latter period of the Tojo Cabinet and through the duration of the succeeding Koiso Cabinet—is a man of confirmed peaceful views and during his twelve months' term of office did his utmost to prepare for an early termination of the war. His efforts, in which I assisted him to the best of my ability, were in fact, powerfully instrumental in expediting the restoration of peace. Such being the case, there was reason to believe that unlike others who evaded the mission, hating it as unbearably onerous, Shigemitsu regarded it as a painful but profitable task. In his mind he was determined to make this day of national mortification the starting day for a renewed pilgrimage onward toward the goal, though dim and distant, of a peaceful state. If this day marked a journey's end it must also signify a journey's beginning. Only the traveler to grief must be replaced by the traveler to glory.

Not so with General Umedzu, who reluctantly accepted the appointment as the second delegate. He had opposed the termination of hostilities to the last moment and was, moreover, a soldier born to command and not to sue. When he was recommended for the mission he grew, so it is reported, pale with anger and laconically remarked that if it was forced upon him, he would instantly commit hara-kiri in protest. It required the Emperor's personal persuasion to make him execute the duties with good grace.

It may sound somewhat silly, but as precautions were then deemed necessary, the appointment of two delegates was not intimated to the press until the last moment. The names of nine persons who accompanied them were not published at all as the service officers were against this, though

these names had been communicated to and approved by the Allied authorities. Such, indeed, was the temper of the times.

This party arrived in Yokohama in less than an hour's time. It was on this day that the spearhead of the Eighth Army landed at the same port. Sentries with gleaming bayonets were heavily guarding the streets through which we rode slowly to the port area. All the cars had removed the flags on the bonnet and officers had left their swords behind. We had thus furled the banner and ungirt the sword. Diplomats without flag and soldiers without sword—sullen and silent we continued the journey till we reached the quay.

There were four destroyers with white placards hung on the mast marked A to D. We boarded the one marked B, which was the *Lansdown*, a ship which saw much meritorious service in the battle of the Pacific. As the destroyer pushed out of the harbor, we saw in the offing lines on lines of gray warships, both heavy and light, anchored in majestic array. This was the mighty pageant of the Allied navies that so lately belched forth their crashing battle, now holding in their swift thunder and floating like calm sea birds on the subjugated waters. A spirit of gay festivity pervaded the atmosphere.

After about an hour's cruise the destroyer stopped in full view of the battleship *Missouri*, which lay anchored some eighteen miles off the shore. The huge 45,000 tonner towered high above the rest of the proud squadron. High on the mast there fluttered in the wind the Stars and Stripes. It was this flag that had lighted the marching step of America's destiny on to shining victory. Today this flag of glory was raised in triumph to mark the Big Day. As we approached the battleship in a motor launch, our eyes were caught by rows of sailors massed on her broadside lining the rails, a starry multitude, in their glittering uniforms of immaculate white.

Soon the launch came alongside the battleship, and we climbed its gangway, Shigemitsu leading the way, heavily limping on his cane. For he walks on a wooden leg, having had his leg blown off by a bomb outrage in Shanghai some fifteen years ago. It was as if he negotiated each step with a groan and we, the rest of us, echoed it with a sigh. As we, eleven in all, climbed onto the veranda deck on the starboard side, we gathered into three short rows facing the representatives of the Allied powers across a table covered with green cloth, on which were placed the white documents of surrender. The veranda deck was animated by a motley of sparkling colors, red, gold, brown, and olive, as decorations and ribbons decked the uniforms

of different cut and color worn by the Allied representatives. There were also row upon row of American admirals and generals in somber khaki; but what added to the festive gayety of the occasion was the sight of the war correspondents who, monkey-like, hung on to every cliff-like point of vantage in most precarious postures. Evidently scaffolding had been specially constructed for the convenience of the cameramen, who were working frantically on their exciting job. Then there was a gallery of spectators who seemed numberless, overcrowding every bit of available space on the great ship, on the mast, on the chimneys, on the gun turrets—on everything, and everywhere.

They were all thronged, packed to suffocation, representatives, journalists, spectators, an assembly of brass, braid, and brand. As we appeared on the scene we were, I felt, being subjected to the torture of the pillory. There were a million eyes beating us in the million shafts of a rattling storm of arrows barbed with fire. I felt their keenness sink into my body with a sharp physical pain. Never have I realized that the glance of glaring eyes could hurt so much.

We waited for a few minutes standing in the public gaze like penitent boys awaiting the dreaded schoolmaster. I tried to preserve with the utmost sangfroid the dignity of defeat, but it was difficult and every minute seemed to contain ages. I looked up and saw painted on the wall nearby several miniature Rising Suns, our flag, evidently in numbers corresponding to the planes and submarines shot down or sunk by the crew of the battleship. As I tried to count these markings, tears rose in my throat and quickly gathered to my eyes, flooding them. I could hardly bear the sight now. Heroes of unwritten stories, they were young boys who defied death gaily and gallantly, manning the daily thinning ranks of the suicide corps. They were just like cherry blossoms, emblems of our national character, all of a sudden blooming into riotous beauty and just as quickly going away. What do they see today, their spirit, the glorious thing, looking down on the scene of surrender.

MacArthur walks quietly from the interior of the ship and steps to the microphones:

“We are gathered here, representatives of the major warring powers,” he said, “to conclude a solemn agreement whereby peace may be restored. The issues, involving divergent ideals and ideologies, have been determined on the battlefields of the world and hence are not for our discussion or debate.

Nor is it for us here to meet, representing as we do a majority of the people of the earth, in a spirit of distrust, malice or hatred. But rather it is for us, both victors and vanquished, to rise to that higher dignity which alone befits the sacred purposes we are about to serve, committing all our people unreservedly to faithful compliance with the obligation that they are here formally to assume.

"It is my earnest hope and indeed the hope of all mankind that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past—a world founded upon faith and understanding—a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish—for freedom, tolerance and justice.

"The terms and conditions upon which the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Forces is here to be given and accepted are contained in the instrument of surrender now before you.

"As Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, I announce it my firm purpose, in the tradition of the countries I represent, to proceed in the discharge of my responsibilities with justice and tolerance, while taking all necessary dispositions to insure that the terms of surrender are fully, promptly and faithfully complied with."

In a few minutes' time the speech was over and the Supreme Commander invited the Japanese delegates to sign the instrument of surrender. Shigemitsu signed first followed by Umedzu. It was eight minutes past nine when MacArthur put his signature to the documents. Other representatives of the Allied Powers followed suit in the order of the United States, China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand.

When all the representatives had finished signing, MacArthur announced slowly: "Let us pray that peace be now restored to the world and that God will preserve it always. These proceedings are closed."

At that moment, the skies parted and the sun shone brightly through the layers of clouds. There was a steady drone above and now it became a deafening roar and an armada of airplanes paraded into sight, sweeping over the warships. Four hundred B-29's and 1,500 carrier planes joined in the aerial pageant in a final salute. It was over.

Source: Kase Toshikazu, *Eclipse of the Rising Sun,* edited by David Nelson Rowe (London: Jonathan Cape, 1951), 4–10. Reprinted with permission of Yale University Press.

237. First Instrument of Japanese Surrender, September 2, 1945

Introduction

On September 2, 1945, representatives of the Allied powers met with Japanese delegates on USS *Missouri*, moored in Tokyo Bay, to accept the Japanese surrender. The brief surrender document called upon all Japanese military forces to lay down their arms and cease fighting and represented Japan's acceptance of the unconditional surrender terms demanded by the Allies. It also ceded ultimate authority over the government of Japan to supreme commander of the Allied powers in the Pacific General Douglas MacArthur, who was the foremost American representative at the ceremony.

Primary Source

We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under the Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, and orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority, and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.
Signed at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0904 on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945

MAMORU SHIGEMITSU

By Command and on Behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government

YOSHIJIRO UMEDZU

By Command and on Behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters

Accepted at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0903 on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945, for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

C.W. NIMITZ
United States Representative

HSU YUNG-CH'ANG
Republic of China Representative

BRUCE FRASER
United Kingdom Representative

KUZMA DEREVYANKO
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative

THOMAS BLAMEY
Commonwealth of Australia Representative

L. MOORE COSGRAVE
Dominion of Canada Representative

JACQUES LE CLERC
Provisional Government of the French Republic Representative

C.E.L. HELFRICH
Kingdom of the Netherlands Representative

LEONARD M. ISITT
Dominion of New Zealand Representative

Source: *Surrender by Japan: Terms between the United States of America and the Other Allied Powers and Japan,* Department of State Publication 2504, Executive Agreement Series 493 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 1–5.

238. Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, September 2, 1945

Introduction

On September 2, 1945, as Vietnam waited for the defeated Japanese forces to leave, Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese communist and nationalist leader, declared in Hanoi that an independent state now existed in Vietnam, which until taken over by Japan during the war had been under French colonial rule. Hoping to secure U.S. support, Ho deliberately modeled his statement on the American Declaration of Independence. Although French forces returned to Indochina in the fall of 1945 and temporarily ousted Ho, he continued to lead the Vietnamese battle for independence, driving out the French in 1954. Subsequent American attempts to maintain the southern portion of Vietnam as an independent noncommunist state and prevent its unification with the communist north ruled by Ho ultimately embroiled the United States in the lengthy and divisive Vietnam War.

Primary Source

“All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”

This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free.

The Declaration of the French Revolution made in 1791 on the Rights of Man and the Citizen also states: “All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights.”

Those are undeniable truths.

Nevertheless, for more than eighty years, the French imperialists, abusing the standard of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland and oppressed our fellow-citizens. They have acted contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice.

In the field of politics, they have deprived our people of every democratic liberty. They have enforced inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political regimes in the North, the Center and the South of Viet-Nam in order to wreck our national unity and prevent our people from being united.

They have built more prisons than schools. They have mercilessly slain our patriots—they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood.

They have fettered public opinion; they have practised obscurantism against our people.

To weaken our race they have forced us to use opium and alcohol.

In the fields of economics, they have fleeced us to the backbone, impoverished our people, and devastated our land.

They have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw materials. They have monopolised the issuing of bank-notes and the export trade.

They have invented numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people, especially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty.

They have hampered the prospering of our national bourgeoisie; they have mercilessly exploited our workers.

In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese Fascists violated Indochina's territory to establish new bases in their fight against the Allies, the French imperialists went down on their bended knees and handed over our country to them.

Thus, from that date, our people were subjected to the double yoke of the French and the Japanese. Their sufferings and miseries increased. The result was that from the end of last year to the beginning of this year, from Quang Tri province to the North of Viet-Nam, more than two million of our fellow-citizens died from starvation. On March 9 [1945], the French troops were disarmed by the Japanese. The French colonialists either fled or surrendered, showing that not only were they incapable of "protecting" us, but that, in the span of five years, they had twice sold our country to the Japanese.

On several occasions before March 9, the Viet Minh League urged the French to ally themselves with it against the Japanese. Instead of agreeing to

this proposal, the French colonialists so intensified their terrorist activities against the Viet Minh members that before fleeing they massacred a great number of our political prisoners detained at Yen Bay and Cao Bang.

Notwithstanding all this, our fellow-citizens have always manifested toward the French a tolerant and humane attitude. Even after the Japanese putsch of March 1945, the Viet Minh League helped many Frenchmen to cross the frontier, rescued some of them from Japanese jails, and protected French lives and property.

From the autumn of 1940, our country had in fact ceased to be a French colony and had become a Japanese possession.

After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French.

The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the Fatherland. Our people at the same time have overthrown the monarchic regime that has reigned supreme for dozens of centuries. In its place has been established the present Democratic Republic.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government, representing the whole Vietnamese people, declare that from now on we break off all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all the international obligation that France has so far subscribed to on behalf of Viet-Nam and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our Fatherland.

The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common purpose, are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists to reconquer their country.

We are convinced that the Allied nations which at Tehran and San Francisco have acknowledged the principles of self-determination and equality of nations, will not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Viet-Nam.

A people who have courageously opposed French domination for more than eighty years, a people who have fought side by side with the Allies

against the Fascists during these last years, such a people must be free and independent.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, solemnly declare to the world that Viet-Nam has the right to be a free and independent country and in fact it is so already. The entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilise all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty.

Source: Bernard B. Fall, ed., *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920–66* (London: Pall Mall, 1967), 143–145. Courtesy of Dorothy Fall.

239. General H. H. Arnold, "Air Power and the Future," November 12, 1945

Introduction

As the war came to an end, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, head of the U.S. Army Air Forces and a longtime advocate of the establishment of a large American air force, set forth his vision of the future of American airpower. Not only did he call for a major enhancement of American air capabilities, but he also believed that this should be backed up by overseas bases, active governmental encouragement of scientific research and development, the development of civil aviation capacities, the creation of a permanent U.S. foreign intelligence agency, and the integration of American defense services. Arnold also argued that for the indefinite future, the existence of atomic weapons made it advisable for the United States to seek overwhelming air superiority over all other nations. In what was undoubtedly part of a coordinated campaign, the following July the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey reinforced Arnold's message when it submitted a report repeating the same conclusions.

Primary Source

MANY DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR II. WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS WE

SHOULD TAKE TO MAINTAIN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE YEARS THAT LIE AHEAD OF US.

This is a final report on the war activities of the Army Air Forces. I would also like to make it a document of some help to those entrusted with the future security of our country, as well as to the leaders of our Air Forces in the future. It is not possible to cover all the causes and effects from which timely lessons from the war may be drawn. A number of indicated steps, however, may be taken in the near future. Many of them are not so clear, and will require years of study and evaluation before they become apparent. Meanwhile, I offer herewith in both categories some of the personal conclusions which I have reached after my many years of service, and as a result of my experience in command of the Army Air Forces during World War II. It must be borne in mind that these conclusions are my own and may or may not reflect the views of the War Department. …

Air superiority … is the first essential for effective offense as well as defense. A modern, autonomous, and thoroughly trained Air Force in being at all times will not alone be sufficient, but without it there can be no national security.

AIR POWER AND AIR FORCE

Air Power includes a nation’s ability to deliver cargo, people, destructive missiles and war-making potential through the air to a desired destination to accomplish a desired purpose.

Air Power is not composed alone of the war-making components of aviation. It is the total aviation activity—civilian and military, commercial and private, potential as well as existing.

Military Air Power—or Air Force—is dependent upon the air potential provided by industry which, in turn, thrives best in an atmosphere of individual initiative and private enterprise. Government can do much to increase this air potential by judicious use of its coordinating and planning powers.

An Air Force is always verging on obsolescence and, in time of peace, its size and replacement rate will always be inadequate to meet the full demands of war. Military Air Power should, therefore, be measured to a large extent

by the ability of the existing Air Force to absorb in time of emergency the increase required by war together with new ideas and techniques.

National safety would be endangered by an Air Force whose doctrines and techniques are tied solely to the equipment and processes of the moment. Present equipment is but a step in progress, and any Air Force which does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security.

Further, our concept of the implements of Air Power should not be confined to manned vehicles. Controlled or directed robots will be of increasing importance, and although they probably will never preclude some form of human guidance, reliance upon direct manual skills in pilotage will gradually decrease.

In practical terms for the immediate future, the doctrine of Air Force growing out of the larger concept of Air Power can be expressed as a determination:

To maintain a striking air arm in being.

To keep the AAF and the aviation industry able to expand harmoniously as well as rapidly.

To maintain well-equipped overseas bases.

To support an alert and aggressive system of commercial air transportation—one of the foundations of American Air Power.

To remember that it is the team of the Army, Navy and Air Force working in close cooperation that gives strength to our armed services in peace or war.

To make available to the United Nations Organization, in accordance with the provisions of its Charter, adequate and effective Air Force contingents for possible use by the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.

To promote scientific research and development, and to maintain a close contact with industry. …

Our Air Force must be flexible in its basic structure and capable of successfully adapting itself to the vast changes which are bound to come in the foreseeable future. Whatever its numerical size may be, it must be second to none in range and striking power. …

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

…[T]he spectacular innovations in technological warfare which appeared with ever-increasing momentum in World War II and culminated with the atomic bomb demand continuous scientific research to insure the maintenance of our national security and world peace. In the past, the United States has shown a dangerous willingness to be caught in a position of having to start a war with equipment and doctrines used at the end of a preceding war. We have paid heavily for this error. A repetition of this error in the future could mean annihilation. No war will be started unless the aggressor considers that he has sufficient supremacy in weapons to leave his adversaries in a state of ineffective war-making capacity. …

In the accomplishment of its fundamental responsibility for insuring that the nation is prepared to wage effective warfare, the Air Force must be able to call on all talents and facilities existing in the nation and sponsor further development of the facilities and creative work of science and industry. The Air Force must also be authorized to expand existing research facilities and to make such facilities available to scientists and industrial concerns working on problems for the Air Force. Further, the Air Force must have the means of recruiting and training personnel who have full understanding of the scientific facts necessary to procure and use the most advanced equipment. Although basic scientific research should not be undertaken by the Air Force in its own organization, it must encourage and sponsor such basic research as may be deemed necessary for the defense of the nation.

During this war the Army, the Army Air Forces and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. When the countless aspects of Air Force operations requiring scientific and technological talent are considered, the conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry and the universities. The Legislative and Executive branches of the Government should determine the best form of organization and the most efficient scheme for uniting all efforts to create the best scientific facilities and utilize all available scientific talents.

It is in the national interest to establish a national research foundation composed of the most highly qualified scientists in the United States and charged with the responsibility of furthering basic research and development in all fields of science and the scientific training of adequate numbers of highly qualified men. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the

actual research and development work. The Air Force must be advised continuously on the progress of scientific research and development in view of the new discoveries and improvements in aerial warfare.

INTEGRATION OF AIR POWER INTO NATIONAL DEFENSE

The greatest lesson of this war has been the extent to which air, land and sea operations can and must be coordinated by joint planning and united command. The attainment of better coordination and balance than now exists between services is an essential of national security. …

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization presided over by the Chief of Staff to the President, as developed during World War II, proved itself sound, and made coordination of effort possible not only among our own armed services but with the Allies. This organization should be continued in time of peace when the absence of the compulsions of war make cooperation and coordination of effort much more difficult to achieve.

The following requirements, in my opinion, must accordingly be met:

A. Organization

(1) One integrated, balanced United States military organization that will establish, develop, maintain and direct at the minimum expense the forces, including the mobile striking forces, required for peace enforcement and for national security with the capability for the most rapid expansion in case of all-out war.

(2) Retention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization with a Chief of Staff to the President.

(3) The size and composition of our striking forces to be based on:

(a) Capabilities and limitations of possible enemies.
(b) Effectiveness and employment of modern weapons of war.
(c) The geographical position of the United States, its outlying bases and such other bases as it might control or use.

(4) Maximum economy and efficiency to be secured by:

(a) Ruthless elimination of all arms, branches, services, weapons, equipment or ideas whose retention might be indicated only by tradition, sentiment or sheer inertia.
(b) Ruthless elimination of duplication throughout the entire organization.

B. Principles

(1) The above organization, to attain its objectives, must adhere rigidly to the following principles:

(a) Development of the Intelligence necessary for the effective application of our military force to whatever job it may be called upon to do.
(b) Continuous planning for both offensive and defensive operations against all potential enemies, taking into account their capabilities and possible intentions.
(c) Planning for, and direction of technical research to ensure that the most modern weapons are being developed, tested and service tested in order to retain for the United States military equipment its present preeminent position.
(d) Development and application of the most effective tactics and techniques.
(e) Realistic recommendations for Congressional appropriations for military purposes and for the distribution of these appropriations where they will produce the maximum benefit to the national security.

The Air Forces must also assume their full responsibility, under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to hold immediately available national Air Force contingents for combined enforcement action. These forces must be of sufficient strength, and their degree of readiness must be such as to make effective use of their inherent striking power and mobility.

World War II brought unprecedented death and destruction to war-making and peace-loving nations alike, and as any future war will be vastly more devastating, the mission of the armed forces of the United States should be not to prepare for war, but to prevent war—to insure that peace be perpetuated.

Source: H. H. Arnold, *Third Report of the Commanding General of the Air Forces to the Secretary of War* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 452–470.

1946 DOCUMENT

240. The Effects of the Atomic Bombs: Excerpt from United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War), Washington, D.C., July 1, 1946

Introduction

Less than a year after the Pacific war ended, the U.S. government sought to assess the effects upon Japan of the major bombing campaign mounted in the later years of the war. The survey covered both the physical impact and casualties and the effect on morale and provided a graphic account of the explosions of nuclear devices over both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was too soon, however, to assess the long-term impact of the nuclear explosions on the health of the survivors.

Primary Source

EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBS

On 6 August and 9 August 1945, the first two atomic bombs to be used for military purposes were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively. One hundred thousand people were killed, 6 square miles or over 50 percent of the built-up areas of the two cities were destroyed. The first and crucial question about the atomic bomb thus was answered practically and conclusively; atomic energy had been mastered for military purposes and the overwhelming scale of its possibilities had been demonstrated. A detailed examination of the physical, economic, and morale effects of the atomic bombs occupied the attention of a major portion of the Survey’s staff in Japan

in order to arrive at a more precise definition of the present capabilities and limitations of this radically new weapon of destruction.

Eyewitness accounts of the explosion all describe similar pictures. The bombs exploded with a tremendous flash of blue-white light, like a giant magnesium flare. The flash was of short duration and accompanied by intense glare and heat. It was followed by a tremendous pressure wave and the rumbling sound of the explosion. This sound is not clearly recollected by those who survived near the center of the explosion, although it was clearly heard by others as much as fifteen miles away. A huge snow-white cloud shot rapidly into the sky and the scene on the ground was obscured first by a bluish haze and then by a purple-brown cloud of dust and smoke.

Such eyewitness accounts reveal the sequence of events. At the time of the explosion, energy was given off in the forms of light, heat, radiation, and pressure. The complete band of radiations, from X- and gamma-rays, through ultraviolet and light rays to the radiant heat of infra-red rays, travelled with the speed of light. The shock wave created by the enormous pressures built up almost instantaneously at the point of explosion but moved out more slowly, that is at about the speed of sound. The superheated gases constituting the original fire ball expanded outward and upward at a slower rate.

The light and radiant heat rays accompanying the flash travelled in a straight line and any opaque object, even a single leaf of a vine, shielded objects lying behind it. The duration of the flash was only a fraction of a second, but it was sufficiently intense to cause third degree burns to exposed human skin up to a distance of a mile. Clothing ignited, though it could be quickly beaten out, telephone poles charred, thatchroofed houses caught fire. Black or other dark-colored surfaces of combustible material absorbed the heat and immediately charred or burst into flames; white or light-colored surfaces reflected a substantial portion of the rays and were not consumed. Heavy black clay tiles which are an almost universal feature of the roofs of Japanese houses bubbled at distances up to a mile. Test of samples of this tile by the National Bureau of Standards in Washington indicates that temperatures in excess of 1,800° C. must have been generated in the surface of the tile to produce such an effect. The surfaces of granite blocks exposed to the flash scarred and spoiled at distances up to almost a mile. In the

immediate area of ground zero (the point on the ground immediately below the explosion), the heat charred corpses beyond recognition.

Penetrating rays such as gamma-rays exposed X-ray films stored in the basement of a concrete hospital almost a mile from ground zero. Symptoms of their effect on human beings close to the center of the explosion, who survived other effects thereof, were generally delayed for two or three days. The bone marrow and as a result the process of blood formation were affected. The white corpuscle count went down and the human processes of resisting infection were destroyed. Death generally followed shortly thereafter.

The majority of radiation cases who were at greater distances did not show severe symptoms until 1 to 4 weeks after the explosion. The first symptoms were loss of appetite, lassitude and general discomfort. Within 12 to 48 hours, fever became evident in many cases, going as high as 104° to 105° F., which in fatal cases continued until death. If the fever subsided, the patient usually showed a rapid disappearance of other symptoms and soon regained his feeling of good health. Other symptoms were loss of white blood corpuscles, loss of hair, and decrease in sperm count.

Even though rays of this nature have great powers of penetration, intervening substances filter out portions of them. As the weight of the intervening material increases the percentage of the rays penetrating goes down. It appears that a few feet of concrete, or a somewhat greater thickness of earth, furnished sufficient protection to humans, even those close to ground zero, to prevent serious after effects from radiation.

The blast wave which followed the flash was of sufficient force to press in the roofs of reinforced concrete structures and to flatten completely all less sturdy structures. Due to the height of the explosion, the peak pressure of the wave at ground zero was no higher than that produced by a near miss of a high-explosive bomb, and decreased at greater distances from ground zero. Reflection and shielding by intervening hills and structures produced some unevenness in the pattern. The blast wave, however, was of far greater extent and duration than that of a high-explosive bomb and most reinforced-concrete structures suffered structural damage or collapse up to 700 feet at Hiroshima and 2,000 feet at Nagasaki. Brick buildings were flattened up to 7,300 feet at Hiroshima and 8,500 feet at Nagasaki. Typical Japanese houses of wood construction suffered total collapse up to approximately 7,300 feet at

Hiroshima and 8,200 feet at Nagasaki. Beyond these distances structures received less serious damage to roofs, wall partitions, and the like. Glass windows were blown out at distances up to 5 miles. The blast wave, being of longer duration than that caused by high-explosive detonations, was accompanied by more flying debris. Window frames, doors, and partitions which would have been shaken down by a near-miss of a high-explosive bomb were hurled at high velocity through those buildings which did not collapse. Machine tools and most other production equipment in industrial plants were not directly damaged by the blast wave, but were damaged by collapsing buildings or ensuing general fires.

The above description mentions all the categories of the destructive action by the atomic-bomb explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There were no other types of action. Nothing was vaporized or disintegrated; vegetation is growing again immediately under the center of the explosions; there are no indications that radio-activity continued after the explosion to a sufficient degree to harm human beings.

Let us consider, however, the effect of these various types of destructive action on the cities of Hiroshima, and Nagasaki and their inhabitants.

Hiroshima is built on a broad river delta; it is flat and little above sea level. The total city area is 26 square miles but only 7 square miles at the center were densely built up. The principal industries, which had been greatly expanded during the war, were located on the periphery of the city. The population of the city had been reduced from approximately 340,000 to 245,000 as a result of a civilian defense evacuation program. The explosion caught the city by surprise. An alert had been sounded but in view of the small number of planes the all-clear had been given. Consequently, the population had not taken shelter. The bomb exploded a little northwest of the center of the built-up area. Everyone who was out in the open and was exposed to the initial flash suffered serious burns where not protected by clothing. Over 4 square miles in the center of the city were flattened to the ground with the exception of some 50 reinforced concrete buildings, most of which were internally gutted and many of which suffered structural damage. Most of the people in the flattened area were crushed or pinned down by the collapsing buildings or flying debris. Shortly thereafter, numerous fires started, a few from the direct heat of the flash, but most from overturned charcoal cooking stoves or other secondary causes. These fires grew in size,

merging into a general conflagration fanned by a wind sucked into the center of the city by the rising heat. The civilian-defense organization was overwhelmed by the completeness of the destruction, and the spread of fire was halted more by the air rushing toward the center of the conflagration than by efforts of the fire-fighting organization.

Approximately 60,000 to 70,000 people were killed, and 50,000 were injured. Of approximately 90,000 buildings in the city, 65,000 were rendered unusable and almost all the remainder received at least light superficial damage. The underground utilities of the city were undamaged except where they crossed bridges over the rivers cutting through the city. All of the small factories in the center of the city were destroyed. However, the big plants on the periphery of the city were almost completely undamaged and 94 percent of their workers unhurt.

These factories accounted for 74 percent of the industrial production of the city. It is estimated that they could have resumed substantially normal production within 30 days of the bombing, had the war continued. The railroads running through the city were repaired for the resumption of through traffic on 8 August, 2 days after the attack.

Nagasaki was a highly congested city built around the harbor and up into the ravines and river valleys of the surrounding hills. Spurs of these hills coming down close to the head of the bay divide the city roughly into two basins. The built-up area was 3.4 square miles of which 0.6 square miles was given over to industry. The peak wartime population of 285,000 had been reduced to around 230,000 by August 1945, largely by pre-raid evacuations. Nagasaki had been attacked sporadically prior to 9 August by an aggregate of 136 planes which dropped 270 tons of high explosives and 53 tons of incendiary bombs. Some 2 percent of the residential buildings had been destroyed or badly damaged; three of the large industrial plants had received scattered damage. The city was thus comparatively intact at the time of the atomic bombing.

The alarm was improperly given and therefore few persons were in shelters. The bomb exploded over the northwest portion of the city; the intervening hills protected a major portion of the city lying in the adjoining valley. The heat radiation and blast actions of the Nagasaki bomb were more intense than those of the bomb dropped over Hiroshima. Reinforced-concrete structures were structurally damaged at greater distances; the heavy steel-

frame industrial buildings of the Mitsubishi steel works and the arms plant were pushed at crazy angles away from the center of the explosion. Contrary to the situation at Hiroshima, the majority of the fires that started immediately after the explosion resulted from direct ignition by the flash.

Approximately 40,000 persons were killed or missing and a like number injured. Of the 52,000 residential buildings in Nagasaki 14,000 were totally destroyed and a further 5,400 badly damaged. Ninety-six percent of the industrial output of Nagasaki was concentrated in the large plants of the Mitsubishi Co. which completely dominated the town. The arms plant and the steel works were located within the area of primary damage. It is estimated that 58 percent of the yen value of the arms plant and 78 percent of the value of the steel works were destroyed. The main plant of the Mitsubishi electric works was on the periphery of the area of greatest destruction. Approximately 25 percent of its value was destroyed. The dockyard, the largest industrial establishment in Nagasaki and one of the three plants previously damaged by high-explosive bombs, was located down the bay from the explosion. It suffered virtually no new damage. The Mitsubishi plants were all operating, prior to the attack, at a fraction of their capacity because of a shortage of raw materials. Had the war continued, and had the raw material situation been such as to warrant their restoration, it is estimated that the dockyard could have been in a position to produce at 80 percent of its full capacity within 3 to 4 months; that the steel works would have required a year to get into substantial production; that the electric works could have resumed some production within 2 months and been back at capacity within 6 months; and that restoration of the arms plant to 60 to 70 percent of former capacity would have required 15 months.

Some 400 persons were in the tunnel shelters in Nagasaki at the time of the explosion. The shelters consisted of rough tunnels dug horizontally into the sides of hills with crude, earth-filled blast walls protecting the entrances. The blast walls were blown in but all the occupants back from the entrances survived, even in those tunnels almost directly under the explosion. Those not in a direct line with the entrance were uninjured. The tunnels had a capacity of roughly 100,000 persons. Had the proper alarm been sounded, and these tunnel shelters been filled to capacity, the loss of life in Nagasaki would have been substantially lower.

The Survey has estimated that the damage and casualties caused at

Hiroshima by the one atomic bomb dropped from a single plane would have required 220 B-29s carrying 1,200 tons of incendiary bombs, 400 tons of high-explosive bombs, and 500 tons of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs, if conventional weapons, rather than an atomic bomb, had been used. One hundred and twenty-five B-29s carrying 1,200 tons of bombs would have been required to approximate the damage and casualties at Nagasaki. This estimate pre-supposed bombing under conditions similar to those existing when the atomic bombs were dropped and bombing accuracy equal to the average attained by the Twentieth Air Force during the last 3 months of the war.

As might be expected, the primary reaction of the populace to the bomb was fear, uncontrolled terror, strengthened by the sheer horror of the destruction and suffering witnessed and experienced by the survivors. Prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs, the people of the two cities had fewer misgivings about the war than people in other cities and their morale held up after it better than might have been expected. Twenty-nine percent of the survivors interrogated indicated that after the atomic bomb was dropped they were convinced that victory for Japan was impossible. Twenty-four percent stated that because of the bomb they felt personally unable to carry on with the war. Some 40 percent testified to various degrees of defeatism. A greater number (24 percent) expressed themselves as being impressed with the power and scientific skill which underlay the discovery and production of the atomic bomb than expressed anger at its use (20 percent). In many instances, the reaction was one of resignation.

The effect of the atomic bomb on the confidence of the Japanese civilian population outside the two cities was more restricted. This was in part due to the effect of distance, lack of understanding of the nature of atomic energy, and the impact of other demoralizing experiences. …

Source: *United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report, Pacific War, July 1, 1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 96–103.

1949 DOCUMENT

241. Soviet Espionage during World War II: Robert J. Lamphere to Meredith Gardner, “Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, aka Karl Fuchs,” September 26, 1949

Introduction

Espionage activities continued unabated during World War II, as each side spied on its enemies and also on its allies. In 1949 U.S. authorities discovered that during the war Klaus Fuchs, a German-born British scientist with communist sympathies who had worked since the early 1940s in the joint Anglo-American program to develop an atomic bomb, had passed on vital information to the Soviet Union, thereby speeding up the postwar development of Soviet atomic weapons. In the late 1940s Robert J. Lamphere, the Federal Bureau of Investigations operative entrusted with liaison duties with other agencies on Soviet espionage, consulted with Meredith Gardner, a highly trained cryptographer in the Army Security Agency, in an effort to identify one of the Soviet sources in the atomic energy project, whom decoded Soviet communications had code-named “Rest.” The two men eventually succeeded in pinpointing Fuchs, who stood trial for espionage and was convicted and sentenced to 14 years in prison.

Primary Source

REST

On June 15, 1944, Rest furnished to a representative of Soviet intelligence (M.G.B.), Part III of a document now identified as MSN-12. This document dated June 6, 1944, is on file with the Atomic Energy Commission and is entitled “Fluctuations and the Efficiency of a Diffusion Plant,” and Part III specifically refers to “The Effect of Fluctuations in the Flow of N2.” The designation MSN stands for documents prepared by British scientists who were in New York City working on Atomic Energy research. The author of this document is K. Fuchs, who is actually Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, who is usually known as Karl Fuchs. He is a top ranking British Atomic scientist.

Information available concerning Rest indicated that he was a British scientist, inasmuch as he had also furnished to the Soviet Intelligence information concerning British participation in the Atomic Energy development. It was also indicated that he had a sister in the United States. There are indications that Rest was actually the author of the document.

Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs also known as Karl Fuchs, was born December 19, 1911, at Russelsheim, Germany. His father, Emil Fuchs was born May 13, 1874, and was a professor in Germany. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs entered the United Kingdom in 1933, and from 1941 to 1943, was a medical physicist at the University of Birmingham, England. In November 1943, he was designated by the British Government to come to the United States as a part of the British Atomic Energy Commission. He arrived at New York City on December 3, 1943, and went to Los Alamos in August 1944. While in the United States, Fuchs worked with a group of British scientists in the period of March to June 1944, on the development of diffusional operational processes working particularly with the Kellex Corporation, which was working under the Manhattan Engineering District. Fuchs left for England from Montreal, Canada, on June 28, 1946.

In November 1947, Fuchs was back in the United States and visiting the Chicago Operations Office of the Atomic Energy Commission. At that time, he attended discussions regarding unclassified and declassified aspects of neutron spectroscopy. He also participated in declassification conferences which were being held between the United States, Great Britain and Canada. Fuchs is presently the senior research worker at the Atomic Energy Commission project at Harwell, England.

Fuchs has a sister, Kristal Fuchs Heineman, who prior to January 1941, resided at 55 Carver Road, Watertown, Massachusetts. From approximately 1941, until about 1945, she resided with her husband, Robert Block Heineman at 144 Lakeview Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. They presently reside at 94 Lakeview Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Robert Block Heineman has been reliably reported as a member of the Communist Party, United States of America in 1947.

The address book of Israel Halperin implicated in the Canadian Espionage network contained the following: “Klaus Fuchs, Asst. to M. Born, 84 Grange Lane, University of Edinburgh, Scotland Camp (possibly comp)

N.—Camp L., Internment Operations—Kristal Heineman, 55 Carvel Road, Watertown." The phrase Camp L is encircled.

In addition to the foregoing a captured German document prepared presumably by German Counter Intelligence and which relates to Communist Party members in Germany contains the following:

"Klaus Fuchs, student of philosophy, December 29, 1911, Russelsheim, RSHA-IVA2, Gestapo Field Office Kiel.

"Gerhard Fuchs, October 30, 1909, Russelsheim, student RSHA-IVA2, Gestapo Field Office Kiel."

It is to be noted that Gerhard Fuchs is the brother of Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs.

Source: Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, eds., *Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939–1957* (Washington, DC: National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), 141–143.

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