

IR 201: Comparative Legislatures and Executives

Monday and Wednesday, 12:30-1:45PM

Instructor: Olesya Tkacheva

Office Hours: Monday and Wednesday, 2:00-3:00PM and by appointment

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Course description: Why do some countries enact policies that lead to economic growth and prosperity while others suffer from rampant corruption? What factors affect the durability of democratic governments? How do electoral rules impact policy outcomes? This course lays out the foundation for answering these and many other important policy questions by introducing students to the key tools of institutional analysis of public policy. The key objective of the course is to provide a thorough treatment of differences among governing institutions and to equip students with an analytical framework for understanding how these institutions induce certain types of behavior among office holders.

Evaluation:

- Class participation: 10%
Students are expected to complete assigned readings before the class and to participate in discussion.
- Midterm (October 19, 2009): 30%
- Final (December 16, 2009 at 7:15PM): 30%
- Policy paper (10-12 pages, double spaced, 12-point font): 30%
Students will write a policy paper that develops a reform agenda for countries currently facing economic or political crisis. The list of countries will be suggested by the instructor. This assignment will be completed in three steps. A two-page description of the project is due on September 30, 2009. A detailed outline is due on November 4, 2009. The final draft of the paper is due on December 7, 2009. No late papers will be accepted without a valid and documented reason.

Books Recommended for Purchase (available at the bookstore):

Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Mathew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)

Other readings are available at the University of Rochester library e-reserve.

Week 1: Introduction:

No reading assigned

September 7: No Class

Week 2 (September 9): Scope and Methods

Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, no. 2: 131-147.

Peter A. Hall, Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44, no. 5: 936-57.

Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15, no. 2: 201-232.

Suggested:

Thomas H. Hammond and Christopher K. Butler. 2003. "Some Complex Answers to the Simple Question 'Do Institutions Matter?': Policy Choice and Policy Change in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15, no. 2: 145-200.

Gretchen Helmke. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda." *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 4: 725-739 (at JSTOR).

William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder. 2009. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, Chapter 2.

Week 3 (September 14-16): Policy Process as a Collective Action Problem

Mancur Olson. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapters 2 and 3.

Barbara Geddes. 1994. *Politician's Dilemma*. Berkley: University of California Press, Chapter 2.

Joanne Gowa. 1988. "Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Process in the United States." *International Organization* 42, no. 1: 15-32.

Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins 1993. *Legislative Leviathan*. Berkley: University of California Press, Chapter 4.

Week 4 (September 21-23): Classifying Electoral Systems

Clark, Golder, and Nadenichek Golder. *Principles of Comparative Politics*, Chapter 12

John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14, no. 14: 417-439.

G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), Chapters 1 and 2.

Mathew Soberg Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, *Mixed Member Electoral System: The Best of Both Worlds?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) Chapters 1 and 2.

Week 5 (September 28-30): Electoral Systems and Legislators' Incentives

Steven R. Reed. 1994. "Democracy and the Personal Vote: A Cautionary Tale from Japan." *Electoral Studies* 13, no. 1:17-28.

Stephen M. Swindle. 2002. "The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote." *Party Politics* 8, no. 3: 279-300.

David J. Samuels. 1999. "Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-Centric Electoral Systems: Evidence from Brazil." *Comparative Political Studies* 32, no. 4: 487-518.

Herbert Kitchshelt. 2000. "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Politics." *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 6: 845-79.

Suggested:

Allen Hicken. 2007. "How Do Rules and Institutions Encourage Vote Buying?" In Frederic C. Schaffer, ed. *Democracy for Sale: The Causes, Consequences, and Reform of Vote Buying* Lynne Rienner.

Scott Desposato. 2006. "How Informal Electoral Institutions Shape Brazilian Legislative Arena." In *Informal Institutions and Democracy* by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

October 5: No Class (Fall Break)

Week 6 (October 7): Electoral Systems and the Provision of Public Goods

Barry Ames, "Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress." *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 2: 324-343.

Mark P. Jones, Sebastian Saiegh, and Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tomassi. 2002. "Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 3: 656-669.

Miriam A Golden. 2003. "Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy." *British Journal of Political*

Science 33, no. 1: 189-212.

Suggested:

Allen Hicken and Joel W. Simmons. 2008. "The Personal Vote and the Efficacy of Education Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 1: 109-124.

Bonnie N. Field and Peter M. Siavelis. 2008. "Candidate Selection Procedures in Transitional Polities." *Party Politics* 14, no. 5: 620-39.

Week 7 (October 12-14): Electoral Systems and Corruption

Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman. 2005. "Electoral Rules as Constraints on Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4: 573-606.

Gabriella Montinola and Robert Jackman. 2002. "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-country Study." *British Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 1: 147-70.

Philip Keefer. 2002. "Clientelism, Credibility and Democracy." World Bank. Working paper.

Eric C.C. Chang and Miriam Golden. 2007. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 1: 115-137.

Alt and Lassen. 2003. "The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15: 341-65.

Suggested:

David Samuels. 2006. Informal Institutions When Formal Contracting is Prohibited: Campaign Finance in Brazil." In *Informal Institutions and Democracy* by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Midterm Exam: October 19

Weeks 8 and 9 (October 21-28): Defining Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes

Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies*. Chapters 1, 2, 8. Skim Chapters 6 and 7.

Clark, Golder, and Golder. 2009. *Principles of Comparative Politics*, Chapter 11 and pp. 742-763.

Week 10 (November 2-4): Regime Type and Democratization

Clark, Golder, and Golder. 2009. *Principles of Comparative Politics*, pp. 743-762

Matthew Soberg Shugart and Scott Mainwaring. 1997. "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin

America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate.” In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* by Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., pp. 12-54.

Jose Antonio Cheibub. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*, Ch. 1 & 6.

Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1997. “Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System.” In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* by Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., pp. 418-436.

Suggested:

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.

Peter Siavelis. 2006. “Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy.” In *Informal Institutions and Democracy* by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Week 11 (November 9-11): Regime Type and Executive-Legislative Relations

Barry Ames. 2002. “Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies.” In *Legislative Politics in Latin America* by Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.

Gary Cox and Scott Morgenstern. 2002. “Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents.” *Legislative Politics in Latin America* by Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.

L. Martin and R. Stevenson. 2001. “Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1: 33-50.

John Huber. 1996. “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies.” *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 2: 269-282.

Jose Antonio Cheibub. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*, Chapter 4.

Week 12 (November 16-18): Structural Constraints on Policy Making: Veto Players

Clark, Golder, and Golder. 2009. *Principles of Comparative Politics*, Chapter 14.

George Tsebelis. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 2: 289–325.

Haggard and McCubbins, eds., 2001. *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2.

Vicki Birchfield and Markus M.L. Crepaz. 1998. "The Impacts of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrial Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 34: 767-92.

Josephine T. Andrews and Gabriella Montinola. 2004. "Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 1: 55-87.

Week 13 (November 23-30): Regime Type and the Budget Process

Haggard and McCubbins, eds., 2001. *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, Chapters 3-5

Mark Hallerberg and Juergen von Hagen. 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union." In Poterba, James, and Juergen von Hagen, eds. *Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 209-232.

David Samuels. 2002. "Progressive Ambition, Federalism and Pork-Barreling in Brazil." In Morgenstern and Nacif, eds. *Legislative Politics in Latin America*

November 25: No Class

Week 14 (December 1-3): Regime Type and Delegation

Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell. 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economic* 150, no. 1: 171-95.

John Huber. 2000. "Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37, no. 3: 397-413.

Terry Moe. 1984. "The New Economics of Organization," *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 739-777.

Mathew S. R. Palmer. 1995. "Toward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining Ministerial Responsibility." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 11, no. 1: 167-191.

John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2003. *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1, 2, and 4.

Week 15 (December 7-9): Regime Type and Regulatory Policy

Haggard and McCubbins, eds., 2001. *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, Chapters 7-10.

Final Exam: December 16 at 7:15 PM