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*XI. Rulemaking and Administrative Procedures III: OIRA and Regulatory Review (11/14)*

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Note: Overview paper on OIRA to be supplied.

*XII. Separation of Powers/Congress (11/21)*

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*XIII. Interest Groups and Courts (12/5)*

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Note: will likely add one more courts paper.

Background:

Ernesto Dal Bó. "Regulatory Capture: A Review," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 22 (2): 203-225.

*XIV. Student Presentations/Conclusions (12/12).*

Some Data Sources:

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/part.html> PART scores

<http://www.performance.gov/> Government Assessments of Agency Performance

<http://www.fedview.opm.gov/> Federal Employee View Survey

<http://www.princeton.edu/~psrc/SFGS/> Survey of the Future of Government Service

<http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/PIMP/index.htm> Political Ideology Measurement Project

<http://web.stanford.edu/~bonica/data.html> Adam Bonica's Ideal Points

Review Papers that Might Be Helpful:

Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. "Formal Models of Bureaucracy," *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Krause, George. 2011. "Legislative Delegation of Authority to Bureaucratic Agencies," *Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy*.  
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238958.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199238958-e-22>

Krause, George A., and Neal D. Woods. "Policy Delegation, Comparative Institutional Capacity, and Administrative Politics in the American States,"  
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