

ELECTIONS UNDER DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP

IR235
University of Rochester
Spring 2013
TR 11:05am-12:20pm
Room: LCHAS 121

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Course Description:

Elections have become a near universal phenomenon in the modern world. In democracies, elections are the primary means of linking citizens to the government. In many new democracies, elections aspire to this function, but often fall short. Meanwhile, elections in modern authoritarian regimes serve functions that have little to do with representation and accountability. This course considers the promise and practice of elections in the modern world. It begins by considering the functions that elections should fulfill in democracies: providing representation and accountability. Why is representation a good thing? Why is accountability? What types of institutions facilitate successful electoral representation and accountability? The course then proceeds to consider how elections in new democracies succeed and fail in fulfilling these functions. We then examine the role of elections in authoritarian regimes. Why do autocrats hold elections? What special functions do elections under autocracy serve? Do elections under autocracy lead to democracy? The final sections of the course consider the breakdown of authoritarian regimes that hold elections. Why do these regimes collapse? And what role do elections play in their downfall? The course proceeds thematically, but readings will examine elections in new democracies such as India, Poland, Chile, Brazil, and Ukraine, while the conduct of authoritarian elections will be examined in countries such as China, Tanzania, Egypt, Jordan, and Russia.

Course Objectives:

In this course you will:

1. Become familiar with the intellectual history of elections
2. Gain an understanding of the role that elections play in modern democracy
3. Learn about two important concepts: accountability and representation
4. Become an expert on the ways that democratic elections can be undermined
5. Become familiar with the form and function of elections in authoritarian regimes
6. Learn about how electoral authoritarian regimes break down
7. gain 'real-world' knowledge about elections in both democracies and non-democracies
8. use the analytic toolkit of social science to examine the conduct of elections

Requirements:

- 1) Attend class sessions and participate

The format of this seminar will be discussion. Your participation includes both attendance and engagement in class discussion.

I will lecture briefly at times, but most of our class time will be spent discussing the themes and arguments presented in our readings. Everyone should have something to say in every class. Your comments need not dazzle every time. Often times, the most productive contributions to class

discussions are questions. If you don't understand something in the readings, say so. The authors we read are not perfect; their prose may not always be clear and their arguments will never be bulletproof. Speak up and air your grievances if you are confused. We will all be better for it and you will be rewarded come evaluation time.

Attendance is mandatory. Unexcused absences will negatively affect your participation grade. Our class is very small, and therefore, you cannot free ride on your fellow classmates. Your absences will be noticed by all and have a palpable impact on our sessions. Please let me know in advance if you will need to be absent.

- 2) Complete assigned readings before the date indicated on the syllabus.
In order to participate effectively in discussion, you will need to have done the required readings for that day. Much is expected in terms of reading, but you are up to the task. The suggested readings are not required, but are listed to help you if you want to go deeper into a topic for your paper or for your own edification.

- 3) Response Papers/Discussion Leadership
You will be responsible for writing three 2-4 page response papers over the course of the semester.

These papers should have three components:

- 1) The paper should briefly (one paragraph) sum up the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.
- 2) It should contain an evaluation and critique of the author's argument and evidence. Does the author's argument make sense? Why or why not? Does his evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that undermines (or supports) the author's argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion's share of the paper.
- 3) The paper should conclude with some questions for the class that flow from your evaluation/critique.

You will give a short 5-minute presentation on your paper to kick off our discussion of that reading. Students are encouraged to be creative in the presentational style. You may use video clips, news items, or simulations for example. Students will be evaluated on how well they are able to generate discussion of their reading.

Each week we will determine who will write reaction papers for the following week. I will ask for volunteers.

- 4) One Final Paper
Your most important assignment in this class will be a 15-30 page research paper. In this paper, you will undertake original research on a topic related to elections in either established democracies, new democracies, or authoritarian regimes. I will distribute a list of sample topics for the paper in the coming weeks, and we will discuss in class.

The research paper should contain an argument and evidence for that argument. Either the argument or the evidence should be original. In other words, you can develop your own theoretical argument and bring original evidence to bear on it. Or you can take a theoretical argument that we examine in the course and test its validity against new empirical evidence. Or you can use existing data or case material to examine a novel theoretical argument. Any of these strategies are acceptable.

We will discuss this paper strategy more at a later date.

In late January we will discuss the methods of writing a research paper in more detail. On January 31, I will distribute an extensive list of example topics, and I will solicit individual appointments with each of you to discuss your strategy. Then, on February 28, you will submit a topic along with a brief outline.

On April 2, I will ask each of you to submit a written mid-term progress report on your research. Details on this progress report will be provided in February.

A complete draft of the paper will be due on April 25th. This draft will be evaluated separately from subsequent revisions and will constitute the primary grade on the paper. I will read all of your papers and provide comments for revision.

The final revision of your paper will be due by email to me on May 13th. NOTE: This is not a revision to change the final grade on your complete draft. Only your revisions will be graded for this component.

- 5) One Midterm quiz
In-class on March 7
- 6) One take-home final quiz
Distributed on April 30th and due on May 3rd by email.

Academic Honesty:

All assignments and activities associated with this course must be performed in accordance with the University of Rochester's Academic Honesty Policy. Plagiarism will not be tolerated in this course and any plagiarism on any assignment will result in a failing grade for the course. *When in doubt, cite.* If you have questions about attribution, please see me. I am here to help! More information is available at: www.rochester.edu/college/honesty/

Evaluation:

Class Attendance and Participation: 20%

Response Papers and Discussion Leadership: 15%

Mid-term quiz: 10%

Final take-home quiz 15%

Final Draft of Paper: 30%

Revisions to Final Paper: 10%

Required Texts for Purchase:

Manin, Bernard. 1997. *Principles of Representative Government*

PART I: THE PROMISE OF ELECTION

January 17-Introduction and Overview

January 22-The History of Elections—What are elections? Why are modern democracies electoral democracies? Alternation. Lot vs election.

Required:

Manin, Bernard. 1997 *Principles of Representative Government*, pg 1-94

January 24-Modern Elections—The principle of distinction. The foundations of representation. Why is representation a good thing? Why representation? Are elections aristocratic?

Required:

Manin, Bernard. 1997. *Principles of Representative Government*, pg 94-192

January 29 Modern Elections: Data and Trends –Modern elections. Suffrage. Elections around the world. What countries hold elections? The history of Elections

Required:

Przeworski, Adam. 2010 *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, 44-59. [Blackboard]

Roessler, Philip and Marc Howard. 2009 “Post-Cold War Political Regimes” in Lindberg, Staffan ed., *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. Chapter 4, pp 101-127. [Blackboard]

LeDuc, Lawrence, Richard Niemi, and Pippa Norris. 2010. Comparing Democracies 3: Elections and Voting in the 21st Century. Introduction. Pp 1-16 [Blackboard]

January 31: Electoral Systems—Proportional representation. First past the post systems. Visions of democracy? The mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems. Presidentialism vs parliamentarism.

Required:

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. Chapter 2-3 (pp10-47) and Chapter 8 (pp143-170) [Blackboard]

February 5 Representation and Accountability—Two visions of electoral linkages. Pros and cons of representation and accountability as linkage mechanisms.

Required:

Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes. 1999. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Chapter 1, pp 29-54. [Blackboard]

Fearon, James. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance” 1999 in Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan

Stokes. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Chapter 2, pp 55-70 and 82-83. [Blackboard]

February 7 Representation and Accountability in Practice—Congruence between citizens and policymakers. Economic Voting. Do voters know whom to hold accountable? Clarity of responsibility.

Required:

Huber, John and Bingham Powell. 1994. "Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy" *World Politics* 46(3).

Samuels, David. 2004. "Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective" *American Political Science Review*. 98 (3).

February 12: Elections, Political Parties, and Accountability—How do stable political parties facilitate representation and accountability? Individual vs collective accountability What is an institutionalized party system?

Required:

Mainwaring, Scott. 1998. "Party Systems in the Third Wave" *Journal of Democracy* 9(3).

Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization. Stanford: Stanford UP. Selection TBD

Zielinski, Jakub, Kazmierz M. Slomczynski and Goldie Shabad. 2005. "Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse Incentives of Fluid Party Systems" *World Politics*. 57(3).

February 14 Clientelism—Programmatic vs clientelist linkages. Is clientelism undemocratic? The causes of clientelism

Required:

Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson 2007. "Citizen-politician Linkages: an introduction" in Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson (eds) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. New York: Cambridge. 1-46 [Blackboard]

Second reading TBD.

PART II: HOW ELECTIONS ARE UNDERMINED

February 19 Elections and the Definition of Democracy The definition of democracy. Why are elections an integral component of most definitions of democracy? Are elections sufficient for democracy to be established? What makes an election free and fair?

Required:

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is...and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy*. 2(3): 75-88

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge pg 10-40.
[Blackboard]

Fish, M Steven. 2005. *Democracy Derailed in Russia*, pp 15-20 [Blackboard]

Suggested:

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1943. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Chapter 21, pp250-256 and Chapter 22, pp 269-273[Blackboard]

February 21—Elections and Development—Do elections increase public goods provision? How? Are there other accountability mechanisms?

Required:

Tsai, Lily. 2007. "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in China" *American Political Science Review*. 101(2).

Second reading TBD.

February 26 Hybrid Regimes—The gray area between democracy and authoritarianism. How leaders undermine elections. Competitive authoritarian regimes.

Required:

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2): 51-65.

Schedler, Andreas. 2010 "Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense" *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 69-80

Hale, Henry. 2010. "Eurasian Politics as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin's Russia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 1(1).

February 28 Electoral Fraud What is fraud? How is it employed? Why is it employed in some settings, but not others? Detecting electoral fraud.

Required:

Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2003. "Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences" *Annual Review of Political Science* 6

Simpser, Alberto. 2013. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections. Chapter 1.
[Blackboard]

Topics and outlines due in class!

March 5 Vote Buying—What is vote buying? Commitment problems. Ballot secrecy. Is it undemocratic? Vote buying vs turnout buying.

Required:

Schaffer, Frederic Charles, ed. 2007. *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Chapters 2-3, and Chapter 6. Pp 17-45 and pp81-99. [Blackboard]

March 7-In-Class Mid-Term Quiz

March 19 Electoral Subversion in the Workplace Political pressure in the workplace. Why and when do employers apply pressure on their employees? Landholding inequality and electoral integrity. Industrial concentration.

Required:

Mares, Isabela and Boliang Zhu. 2011. “The Structural Determinants of Electoral Fraud in Semi-Competitive Electoral Systems: Revisiting the Case of Imperial Germany” Working paper. [Blackboard]

Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. 2013. “Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace” Working Paper. [Blackboard]

PART III: AUTHORITARIAN ELECTIONS

March 21: Why hold elections? --The logic of authoritarian elections. Why do authoritarian leaders hold elections? Cooptation.

Required:

Lust-Okar E. 2009. “Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes in *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*.. [Blackboard]

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2007. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(11)

March 26 Authoritarian Elections and Elites—Elite management. Elite cooptation. Rent distribution. Coordination. Information

Required:

Blaydes, Lisa. 2008. “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt” Working Paper. Available Online:
<http://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/Dictatorships042508/Blaydes.pdf>

Reuter, Ora John and Graeme Robertson. 2012. "Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments" *Journal of Politics*. 74(4)

March 28 Authoritarian Elections and the Opposition—The role of the opposition. How authoritarian leaders keep the opposition divided? Systemic and non-systemic oppositions.

Required:

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2004. "Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition" *Comparative Politics*. 36(2): 159-179

Reuter, Ora John and Graeme Robertson. 2013. "Cooptation and Legislatures in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes" Working paper [Blackboard]

April 2 The Consequences of Authoritarian Elections—Can authoritarian elections lead to democratization? Accountability without alternation?

Required:

Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Graeme Robertson. 2013. "Elections, Information, and Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era." [Blackboard]

Szakonyi, David. 2013. "You're Fired! Measuring the Effect of the 2010 Russian Wildfires on Support for United Russia" Working Paper [Blackboard]

Progress report on paper due!

PART IV: THE BREAKDOWN OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM

April 4 Electoral Revolutions and Electoral Breakdown—When can authoritarian elections lead to mass mobilization against the regime? The "colored" revolutions. Protest.

Required:

Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44(1): 7-48

Joshua A. Tucker, 2007. "Enough! Electoral Fraud Collective Action Problems and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5(3): 535-551.

April 9 The Breakdown of Electoral Authoritarianism: The Opposition—What is the role of the opposition in the breakdown of electoral authoritarianism? Opposition unity. Liberalizing elections.

Required:

Howard, Marc Morje, and Philip Roessler. 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2): 365-81.

Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik. 2010. "Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes" *World Politics*. 62(1).

April 11 The Breakdown of Electoral Authoritarianism: The Regime—Ruling party strength. Coercive capacity. State capacity.

Required:

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge Selections. [Blackboard]

April 16 The Breakdown of Electoral Authoritarianism: International Influences—Diffusion. The role of the West.

Required:

Beissinger, Mark. 2007. Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics* 5 (2): 259-76.

Mcfaul, Michael. 2007. "Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution," *International Security*. 32(2).

April 18 The Breakdown of Electoral Authoritarianism: New Media—What is the role of the internet? Social media. Does new media break down barriers to collective action? Freedom of information.

Required:

Reuter, Ora John and David Szakonyi. 2013. "Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Authoritarian Regimes" Working paper [Blackboard]

Bailard, C. (2012). A Field Experiment on the Internet's Effect in an African Election: Savvier Citizens, Disaffected Voters, or Both? *Journal of Communication*, 62 (2), 330-344.

April 23 Case Study #1: Ukraine—Ukraine's orange revolution.

Required:

Katarnycky, Adrian. 2005. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution" *Foreign Affairs* 84(2).

Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries*. New York: Cambridge. Chapter 5 [Blackboard]

We may watch CBC's "Anatomy of a Revolution" in class.

April 25 Case Study #2: Russia—Post electoral protest in Russia after the 2011-12 elections. Why did protests fail in Russia and succeed in Ukraine?

Required:

Bunce, Valerie and Karrie Koesel. 2012. Putin, Popular Protests and Political Trajectories in Russia: A Comparative Perspective. *Post-Soviet Affairs*. [Blackboard]

Second reading TBD.

Final Draft of Paper Due!

April 30: Elections and Violence—Can multiparty elections be held too early? Post-election violence. Ethnic violence.

Required:

Snyder, Jack. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: Norton, 2000. pp. 15-43 [Blackboard]

Wilkinson, Steven. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 [Blackboard]

Take Home Final Distributed in Class.