

## Comparative Authoritarianism

IR234  
University of Rochester  
Spring 2013  
Wednesdays 2:00-4:40pm  
Room: LCHAS 161

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Office Hours: Thursday 1pm-3pm or by  
appointment.

### Course Description:

It has been said that politics is the study of who gets what, when, where, and how. This course is an advanced introduction to the *politics* of authoritarian regimes. Historically, most of the world's political regimes have been authoritarian. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic countries have come to outnumber those with authoritarian forms of government; but 40% of the world's governments remain authoritarian, and over half of the planet's population lives under non-democratic rule. Any effort to understand the foundations comparative politics would be incomplete without a consideration of non-democratic regimes.

We will begin the course by investigating conceptual and operational differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes. We will then ask if those differences matter. The course then proceeds to examine the question of 'who governs' in authoritarian regimes. We will look at conceptual distinctions between and empirical examples of personalist, monarchical, military, and single party regimes. The course then moves to consider the means by which authoritarian governments maintain and exercise their power. We will examine issues related to ideology, coercion, cooptation, electoral manipulation, patronage distribution, and political socialization. We will also look at how authoritarian governments manage relations with opposition forces and elites. Most of our focus will be on the political dynamics of contemporary authoritarian regimes, although we will also review the workings of authoritarian regimes from decades past in order to contextualize our discussions.

Although the primary focus of our course is not on democratic transitions, we will be vigilant in identifying the ways that the study of authoritarian rule can inform the study of democratization processes. In addition, your paper assignment will address this issue. Our approach to the material will be thematic. So we will not spend a great deal of time exploring the histories and details of particular cases, but our readings include empirical material from countries in all regions of the world.

### Course Objectives:

In this course you will:

1. gain a firm understanding of the difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes
2. become familiar with the different types of authoritarian rule
3. learn about how authoritarian governments exercise and perpetuate their power
4. gain exposure to several modern and historical cases of authoritarian government
5. gain useful 'real-world' knowledge about contemporary authoritarian regimes

6. use the analytic toolkit of social science to examine why we observe certain political outcomes in authoritarian regimes

### Requirements:

- 1) Attend class sessions and participate

The format of this seminar will be discussion. Your participation includes both attendance and engagement in class discussion.

I will lecture briefly at times, but most of our class time will be spent discussing the themes and arguments presented in our readings. Everyone should have something to say in every class. Your comments need not dazzle every time. Often times, the most productive contributions to class discussions are questions. If you don't understand something in the readings, say so. The authors we read are not perfect; their prose may not always be clear and their arguments will never be bulletproof. Speak up and air your grievances if you are confused. We will all be better for it and you will be rewarded come evaluation time.

Attendance is mandatory. Our class is very small, and therefore, you cannot free ride on your fellow classmates. Your absences will be noticed by all and have a palpable impact on our sessions. Please try to let me know in advance if you will need to be absent.

- 2) Complete assigned readings before the date indicated on the syllabus

In order to participate effectively in discussion, you will need to have done the required readings for that day. Much is expected in terms of reading, but you are up to the task. The suggested readings are not required, but are listed to help you if you want to go deeper into a topic for your paper or for your own edification.

- 3) One quiz: The Geography and History of Authoritarianism

No, this is not high school. But in order for you to engage knowledgably with our material, it is important that you have a firm 'real-world' grasp of our subject matter. This early semester quiz will push you to acquire that grasp.

- 4) Four 2-4 page reaction papers/presentation

Over the course of the semester, you will write four reaction papers on a reading (or readings) of your choice from a class session.

These papers should have three components:

- 1) The paper should briefly (one paragraph) sum up the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.

- 2) It should contain an evaluation and critique of the author's argument and evidence. Does the author's argument make sense? Why or why not? Does his evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that undermines (or supports) the author's argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion's share of the paper.

- 3) The paper should conclude with some questions for the class that flow from your evaluation/critique.

You will give a short 5-minute presentation on your paper to kick off our discussion of that reading. Your questions should help us in our discussion.

Each week we will determine who will write reaction papers for the following week. I will ask for volunteers.

*Note:* Some of our readings are not social science texts that follow the argument-hypothesis-evidence format. Therefore, for the following readings you have the option of writing an expert book review: Dahl (January 23) Kapuschinski (February 13), and McAuley (March 6). In these expert book reviews, you will review the book (or book selections) with an eye toward its usefulness for political science majors like yourself. The book review should mix summary of the book with commentary on its style, argument, prose, clarity, and/or case material. It should conclude with some recommendations about why you would (or would not) recommend this book for a political science major to read (in his/her free time). This is NOT the same as the midterm book review.

5) Mid-term book review: You will write a 5 page review and discussion of one of the books listed below. This will be by email on March 8. Please choose from one of the following selections. If there is a book on authoritarian regimes that you would like to review that is not on this list, please see me. I will be happy to accommodate such requests. All of these have been placed on reserve at Rhees library, but I suggest that you acquire your own copy.

Non-Fiction:

Hertog, Steffen. *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats.*

Khlevniuk, Oleg V. *Master of the House: Stalin and his inner circle.*

McGregor, Richard. *The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers.*

Treisman, Daniel. *The Return: Russia's Journal from Gorbachev to Medvedev*

Fiction:

Vargas Llosa, Mario. *The Feast of the Goat.*

Zamyatin, Evgenii. *We*

Memoirs:

Ginzburg, Eugenia. *1967 Journey into the Whirlwind.*

Castaneda, Jorge. 2000. *Perpetuating Power: How Mexico's Presidents Were Chosen*

## 6) One Final Paper

Your most important assignment in this class will be a 15-30 page research paper. In this paper, you will undertake original research on a topic within one of the following three themes:

1) How some aspect of authoritarian rule affects democratization or regime change. Aspects of authoritarian rule that we will examine in this class include the existence of ruling parties, the maintenance of legislatures, the role of the military, the use of elections, control of the media, repression, coercion, electoral fraud, political socialization, and patronage. Authoritarian regimes vary along all of these dimensions. Under this theme, your paper would examine how one of these aspects affects regime change or democratization.

2) How some aspect of authoritarian rule affects policy or political outcomes (aside from democratization). Under this theme you might examine how one of these aspects affects the prevalence of protest or violence in authoritarian regimes. Or you might examine how it affects economic growth, development, social spending, or human rights.

3) The causes of some aspect of authoritarian rule. So, for example, you might ask: why do some authoritarian regimes have legislatures? Why do some regimes engage in electoral fraud? Why are elections held in some regimes, but not in others? The comparison set should be other authoritarian regimes.

The research paper should contain an argument and evidence for that argument. Either the argument or the evidence should be original. In other words, you can develop your own theoretical argument and bring original evidence to bear on it. Or you can take a theoretical argument that we examine in the course and test its validity against new empirical evidence. Or you can use existing data or case material to examine a novel theoretical argument. Any of these strategies are acceptable.

I am open to many strategies of empirical testing in your paper. The evidence you choose to support your argument can be statistical, or you can compare several cases that vary on a key variable. Alternatively, you can use temporal variation in a single case. Here you might compare Nigeria before and after a military coup or China's human rights record over time. You can also examine a single case (possibly with no variation). BUT if you choose this option, then the case must be 'surprising' in light of some existing theoretical argument AND you must provide a provisional argument for why it does not conform to the predictions of existing theory. For example, it is said that military regimes are the least durable type of authoritarian regime. If you know about a long-lived military regime, you could examine this regime and elaborate on the reasons why you think it defies conventional wisdom. This is how many social scientists develop new theories.

In late January we will discuss the methods of writing a research paper in more detail. On January 30, I will distribute an extensive list of example topics, and I will solicit individual appointments with each of you to discuss your strategy. We should have these meetings in early February. Then, on February 27, I will ask each of you to submit a topic along with an outline. On April 3, I will ask each of you to submit a written mid-term progress report on your research. Details on this progress report will be provided in February.

The full *draft* of the paper will be due on April 24<sup>th</sup>. On May 1, you will each give a 10 minute in-class, power point presentation of your findings.

A final revision of your paper will be due on May 13<sup>th</sup>. This revision should take into account my feedback on the full draft and the feedback you receive during your presentation. NOTE: This is not a revision to change the final grade on your paper. Only your revisions will be graded for this component.

### **Evaluation:**

Class Attendance and Participation: 20%  
Geography Quiz: 5%  
Reaction Papers: 20%  
One Mid-term Book Review: 10%  
Final Draft of Final Paper: 30%  
Final Presentation: 5%  
Revision of Final Paper: 10%

### **Required Texts for Purchase:**

McAuley, Mary. 1992. *Soviet Politics: 1917-1991*. New York: Oxford.

Kapuscinski, Ryszard. 1983. *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*. London: Harcourt.

### **Recommended Texts for Purchase:**

Your mid-term book review book.

Other required readings can be accessed either through the Rochester library or through our blackboard site.

### **Academic Honesty:**

All assignments and activities associated with this course must be performed in accordance with the University of Rochester's Academic Honesty Policy. Plagiarism will not be tolerated in this course and any plagiarism on any assignment will result in a failing grade for the course. *When in doubt, cite.* If you have questions about attribution, please see me. I am here to help! More information is available at: [www.rochester.edu/college/honesty/](http://www.rochester.edu/college/honesty/)

## COURSE SCHEDULE

### PART I—WHAT IS AUTHORITARIANISM?

#### January 16—Introduction and Overview

**January 23—What is an authoritarian regime?** Concepts. What is the purpose of the state? Liberty, equality, and order. Democracy: authoritarianism's modern rival. Are citizens capable of governing themselves? What is liberty? Guardianship. Do citizens know their own preferences?

Required:

Held, David. 1987. *Models of Democracy*. pp71-89 [Blackboard]

Dahl, Robert. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. Chapter 4-7, pp53-106. [Blackboard]

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1943. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Chapter 21, pp250-256 and Chapter 22, pp 269-273[Blackboard]

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is...and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy*. 2(3): 75-88

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 76(6): 22-43.

Suggested:

Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy*. Chapter 1-2, pp. 1-33

Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. "The Imperatives of State-Building." *Journal of Democracy* 15, 2: 17-31.

Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, Introduction and Chapters 1-7, 10-22, 24, 28-31.

Locke, John, *Second Treatise of Government*. Chapters 1-19.

Berlin, Isaiah. 1958 [1969]. Two concepts of liberty. *Four Essays on Liberty*

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Chapter 1, pp1-92 and 460-61.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. "Democracy as a Universal Value" *Journal of Democracy*. 10, 3. pp3-17.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge pg 10-40.

**January 30—Geography, Facts, Trends, Data!** How do we know an authoritarian regime when we see one? Does it matter how we define democracy? Waves of democratization? Introduction to classifying authoritarian regime types. Geographic distribution of authoritarian regimes.

Required:

“Freedom in the World 2012” Release Booklet  
[http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline\\_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf)  
(Familiarize yourself with methodology, maps, and charts in this booklet)

Fish, M Steven. *Democracy Derailed in Russia*, pp 15-20 [Blackboard]

“Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited” 2009. Cheibub, Jose, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland. *Public Choice*. Pp67-90

Geddes, Barbara, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright. 2013. “New Data on Authoritarian Regimes”  
<http://www.personal.psu.edu/jgw12/blogs/josephwright/pp9.pdf>

Roessler, Philip and Marc Howard. “Post-Cold War Political Regimes” in Lindberg, Staffan ed., *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. Chapter 4, pp 101-127.

**February 6 Authoritarianism’s Consequences**—Effects of authoritarian rule on policy outcomes. Are authoritarian regimes better at maintaining order? Economic Growth. Human Rights. Development. War. Property Rights. Credible Commitment.

Quiz! The Geography and History of Authoritarianism

Required:

Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 567-576.

North, Douglas and Barry Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” *The Journal of Economic History*.

Bruce Russett 1994. *Grasping the Democratic Peace* Chapters 1 and 2. pp 3-42 [Blackboard]

Baum, Matthew, and David A. Lake. 2003. —The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital. *American Journal of Political Science* 4(2): 333-47.

Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. —Political Regimes and Economic Growth. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (3): 51-69.

Translated Excerpts from Interview with Advisor to Russian Presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Vladislav Surkov. *Vedomosti*. 15 February, 2010. [Blackboard]

Suggested:

Brown, David S., and Wendy Hunter. 1999. —Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America, 1980-92 *American Political Science Review* 93 (4): 779-90.

Brown, David S., and Wendy Hunter. 2004. —Democracy and Human Capital Formation: Education Spending in Latin America 1980 to 1997. *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (7): 842-64.

Kaufman, Robert R. and Alex Segura-Ubierno. 2001. —Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis 1973-1997, *World Politics* 53 : 553-587.

Ross, Michael L. 2006. —Is Democracy Good for the Poor. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4)

Stasavage, David. 2005. —Democracy and Education Spending in Africa. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2): 343-58.

## **PART II: WHO GOVERNS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES?**

**February 13 – Personalist Regimes**—What is traditional authority? Charismatic authority? Dynasties. The foundations of personal rule. Are personalist dictators more prone to violence? Are they more prone to suffer coups?

### Required:

H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. 1998. "A Theory of Sultanism: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule." In *Sultanistic Regimes*, eds. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. pp 2-25 [Blackboard]

Kapuschinski, Ryszard. 1983 *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*. Entire.

Weber, Max. 1958. "The three types of legitimate rule". *Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions*, 4 (1): 1-11. [Blackboard]

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," *World Politics* 59(4): 595-638.

### Suggested:

Crystal, Jill. 1989. "Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar." *Comparative Politics* 21(4): 427-443

Gorlizki, Yoram and Khlevniuk, Oleg. 2006. "Stalin and his circle." In Ronald G. Suny, editor, *The Cambridge history of Russia*, Volume 3, pages 243–267. New York: Cambridge

**February 20 – Military Regimes**—How does a military regime differ from other types of authoritarian regimes? Do military leaders have Are military regimes different from personalist regimes? Why are there so few military regimes in the world today?

Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Chapter 1 pp3-30 [Blackboard]

Samuel Decalo. 1973. "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11(1): 105-127.

Stepan, Alfred. 1989. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. pp3-29. [Blackboard]



Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization after 20 Years" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2.

Wright, Thomas C. "The Antirevolutionary Military Regimes" in Wright, Thomas C. 2001. *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*. Westport: Praeger.

Suggested:

Brooker, Paul. 2000. *Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory Government and Politics*. pp59-80.

Barros, Robert J. 2002. *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (Chapter 2).

Cook, Steven. 2007. *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*

**February 27—Institutionalized Dictatorships:** Is "institutionalized dictatorship" an oxymoron? Ruling parties. Legislatures. Cooptation How does a ruling party in an authoritarian regime differ from a political party in a democracy? Why do parties exist in some regimes and not others? Variation in ruling party institutions. Parties as constraints on dictators. Elite cohesion. Are party regimes more long-lived than others? Rule by concession? Cooptation

Paper Outlines Due!

Required:

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "The Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single party Rule" *World Politics* 57(3)

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Introduction and Chapter 1 pp1-44. [Blackboard]

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4): 715-741.

Li, Cheng. 2010. China's communist party-state: The structure and dynamics of power. In William A. Joseph, editor, *Politics In China: An Introduction*, pages 165–191. New York: Oxford UP.

Suggested:

"The Party Goes On in China" *The Economist*. 28 May 2009

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge.

Castaneda, Jorge. 2001. *Perpetuating Power: How Mexico's Presidents Were Chosen*. Introduction and pp 1-61.

Langston, Joy. 2002. "Breaking Out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime." *Latin American Politics and Society*. 44(3).

Reuter, Ora John and Thomas Remington. 2009. "Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem." *Comparative Political Studies*. 42(4).

Voslensky, Mikhail. 1984. *Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class*. 1-4, 14-111

Brownlee, Remainder

Huntington, Samuel. 1970. "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems." in Huntington, Samuel and Clement Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*.

Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*, 104(3): pp482-502.

Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2):322-43.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies* 40(11): 1279-1301.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

### **PART III: HOW AUTHORITARIAN LEADERS RULE**

**March 6—Ideology**—Communism. Totalitarianism. State planning of the economy. Does ideology matter? Revolutionary regimes. Life under communism

#### Required:

McAuley, Mary. 1992. *Soviet Politics: 1917-1991*. Selections

Linz, Juan. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Selections. [Blackboard]

Wedeen, Lisa. 1998. "Acting 'As If': Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(3): 503-523

#### Suggested:

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America, and Post-Communist Europe*. pp 38-51

Chiot, Daniel. 1996. *Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age*.

Friedrich, Carl and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1965. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Introduction.

Ericson, Richard. 1991. "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications for Reform." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(4): 11-27.

**March 8—Mid-term book review due by email.**

**March 13—Spring Break—Use this time to work on your papers.**

**March 20—Repression--**Why do authoritarian regimes coerce? Do some coerce more than others? Why? Stalin's Great Terror.

Required:

Readings on Great Terror TBD

Eva Bellin. 2005. "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (eds.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, pp. 21-41 [Blackboard]

Suggested:

**March 27- Patronage and Natural Resources** How do authoritarian leaders use state resources to appease citizens and social groups? Are they different from democracies in this sense? What factors inhibit their ability to gain privileged access to state resources? Clientelism and political machines. Is some form of representation and accountability possible under authoritarianism?

Required:

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2007. "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss"? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa" In Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson Eds., *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*. pp50-67 [Blackboard]

Fish, M Steven. *Democracy Derailed in Russia*, Chapter 5 [Blackboard]

Friedman, Thomas L. 2006. The first law of petropolitics. *Foreign Policy*, (154):28-36.

Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Beatriz Magaloni, and Barry Weingast. 2003. "Tragic Brilliance: Equilibrium Hegemony and Democratization in Mexico. [Blackboard]

Suggested:

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. Chapters 3 and 4. pp 98-151

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*. 53(3): pp325-361.

Hale, Henry. 2003. "Explaining Machine Politics in Russia's Regions: Economy, Ethnicity, and Legacy." *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 19(3).

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy : Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*.

Greene, Kenneth. 2010. "The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance" *Comparative Political Studies*.

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam and Women" *American Political Science Review*. 102(1): 107-123.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo. 2010. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse" *American Political Science Review*. 105(1).

**April 3—Hybrid Regimes**—What is a hybrid regime? The gray area between democracy and authoritarianism. Are these the only 'modern' form of non-democratic regime?

Required:

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. Introduction and Chapter 1, pp 1-82[Blackboard]

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2): 51-65.

Schedler, Andreas. 2010 "Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense" *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 69-80

Hale, Henry. 2010. "Eurasian Politics as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin's Russia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 1(1).

Suggested:

Diamond, Larry. 2002. "Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13(2).

**April 10—Authoritarian Elections**— Why do authoritarian leaders hold elections? Elections as precursors to democratization? Elections as mechanisms of authoritarian rule?

Required:

Reuter, Ora John and Graeme Robertson. 2012. "Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments" *Journal of Politics*. 74(4)

Lust-Okar E. 2009. "Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes in *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*.. [Blackboard]

Teorell, Jan and Axel Hadenius. 2009. "Elections as Levers of Democratization" in *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*.. [Blackboard]

Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Graeme Robertson. 2013. "Elections, Information, and Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era." [Blackboard]

Blaydes, Lisa. 2008. "Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt" Working Paper. Available Online:  
<http://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/Dictatorships042508/Blaydes.pdf>

Suggested:

Hale, Henry. 2005. "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics*. 58(1): 133-165.

Brownlee, Jason. 2010. "Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions" *American Journal of Political Science*. 53(3).

**April 17-"Winning" Authoritarian Elections: Fraud, Persuasion, and Vote Buying--** Why use electoral fraud? Why not? Does the popularity of some authoritarian rulers legitimate their rule? How do authoritarian leaders generate and maintain popular support? How do authoritarians use the media to maintain social control? Vote buying. Is vote-buying undemocratic? Why does vote-buying and voter coercion happen in some settings, but not others?

Required:

Gehlbach, Scott. 2010. "Reflections on Putin and the Media" *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 26(1): 77-87

Simpser, Alberto. 2013. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections. Chapter 1.  
[Blackboard]

Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. 2012. "Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace" Manuscript. [Blackboard]

Stokes, Suan. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99 August 315-325.

Suggested:

Hyde, Susan D. 2007. "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." *World Politics* 60 (1):37-63.

Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes" *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 319-347

Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2011. "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia" Forthcoming. *American Economic Review*. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v101y2011i7p3253-85.html>

Schatz, Edward. 2009. "The Soft Authoritarian Tool Kit: Agenda Setting Power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan." *Comparative Politics*. 41(2).

Schedler, Andreas. 2006. "What Is Vote Buying?" *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, ed. F.C. Schaffer (Lynne Rienner)

Stokes, Susan. 2006. "Is Vote Buying Undemocratic?" *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, ed. F.C. Schaffer (Lynne Rienner)

**April 24—Opposing Modern Authoritarian Regimes** What is the role of opposition in authoritarian regimes? How is it different from the role of the opposition in democracies? Can the opposition win? How? When do regimes permit the oppositions to organize? Opposition coalitions. Coordination problems. Protest.

**Final Draft of Paper Due !!!!!**

Required:

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2004. "Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition" *Comparative Politics*. 36(2): 159-179

Howard, Marc Morje, and Philip Roessler. 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2): 365-81.

Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44(1): 7-48

Joshua A. Tucker, 2007. "Enough! Electoral Fraud Collective Action Problems and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5(3): 535-551.

Suggested:

Goldstone, Jack A., "Understanding the Revolutions of 2011," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2011

Goldberg, Jeffrey, "Danger Falling Tyrants," *Atlantic Monthly*, June 2011, Vol. 307, Issue 5,

Beissinger, Mark. 2007. Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics* 5 (2): 259-76.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. Chapters 7 (and skim Chapter 5 for main idea)

Gregory Kasza, *The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations*, New Haven: Yale University Press (1995), pp. 7-25

Katarnycky, Adrian. 2005. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution" *Foreign Affairs* 84(2).

Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries*. New York: Cambridge.

**May 1—Student Presentations**

**May 4—Constructive Critiques Due**

**May 13—Final Versions of Final Paper Due by Email**