

# **Syllabus, PSC 535 "Bureaucratic Politics" (Graduate)**

**Spring, 2010**

## **Instructors:**

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## **Time and Place:**

Mondays 10:00 to 1:00 in Harkness 329

## **Description:**

This course covers a selection of work in Political Science, Economics and Sociology on bureaucracy -- mostly in government but to some extent in the private sector as well. The goal of the course is to build familiarity with recent and important theoretical approaches, empirical strategies, and results regarding major questions about bureaucratic politics.

## **Requirements:**

This course is a seminar. Although the instructors will spend some time during each meeting introducing the material and (when needed) clarifying the technical aspects of the readings, the primary purpose of our meetings is student-lead critique and discussion of the readings. As such, the readings assigned for each week will be parceled out to students who will be expected to summarize their main approach and result in a 15 minute presentation. We will then hold a student-led discussion of the readings for that week. We require all students to show up to class having read the readings for that week carefully, and ready to contribute critiques and questions for discussion.

There are two major assignments. First, there will be a midterm in which students must write a review of a published article on bureaucratic politics. Second, each student must develop a research proposal which must be submitted in writing, and be explained to the class in a 20 minute presentation at the end of the semester. The research proposal must be grounded in a review and critique of the readings covered in one of the topics on the syllabus below.

## **Books:**

Unfortunately, there are 4 books that we're using too much of to legally or ethically provide copies to you. These books are listed below. They aren't available from the bookstore, so you'll need to order them online. In each case, we've provided the date on which you'll need to have them read so that you know when you need to get them ordered.

- Gary Miller (1992) *Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. **Read by Feb 15**
- Daniel P. Carpenter (2001) *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. **Read by: Feb 22**
- John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan (2002) *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. **Read by: March 1**
- David E. Lewis (2008) *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. **Read by: April 12**

Most other readings are in journals accessible from a university computer. The few excerpts from books that we will scan in and put on e-reserves.

## Schedule:

### Week 1 (Jan 25). Introduction to the Course (no readings)

### Week 2 (Feb 1). Organization Theory in Sociology

- Stinchcombe (1965) "Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production" *Administrative Science Quarterly* 4(2): 168
- Hannan and Freeman (1977) "The Population Ecology of Organizations" *American Journal of Sociology*. 82(5): 147.
- DiMaggio and Powell (1983) "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields" *American Sociological Review*. 48(2): 147.
- Edelman (1990) "Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due-Process in the American Workplace" *American Journal of Sociology* 95(6): 1401.
- **Optional Background** Chandler (1984) "Beginnings of the Modern Industrial Corporation." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 130(4): 382.

### Week 3 (Feb 8). Organization Theory in Economics Part 1

- Ronald Coase (1937) "The Nature of the Firm" *Economica*. 4(16): 386.
- Alchian and Demsetz (1972) "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization" *American Economic Review*. 62(5): 777.
- Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) "The Firm as an Incentive Structure." *American Economic Review*. 62(5): 777.

### Week 4 (Feb 15). Organization Theory in Economics Part 2

- Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) "Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory" *Journal of Finance*. 43(3): 593.
- Gary Miller (1992) *Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy*

## Introduction and Chapters 9 through 11

### **Week 5 (Feb 22). Organization Theory Applied by Political Scientists.**

- Moe (1990) "The Politics of Structural Choice: Towards a Theory of Public Bureaucracy." In Williamson, Ed. *Organization Theory*.
- Daniel P. Carpenter (2001) *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy* Intro and Chapters 1, 7, 8, and 10.

### **Week 6 (March 1). Determinants of Bureaucratic Discretion Part 1.**

- Huber and Shipan (2002) *Deliberate Discretion* Chapters 1, 4, 6, and 7

### **Week 7 (March 8). Spring Break**

### **Week 8 (March 15). Determinants of Bureaucratic Discretion Part 2**

- Steve Callander (2008) "A Theory of Policy Expertise." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 3(2): 123.
- Jordan and Meirowitz (2008) "Lobbying and Discretion" *Working Paper*.
- Philip Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997) "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations" *Journal of Political Economy*. 105(1): 1.

### **Week 9 (March 22). Allocation of Authority Within the Executive Part 1**

- Terry Moe (1989) "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure" in Chubb and Peterson, Eds. *Can the Government Govern?*
- Zegart (1999) *Flawed by Design* Chapters 1, 4, and 5

### **Week 10 (March 29). Allocation of Authority Within the Executive Part 2**

- Lewis (1997) *Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design*. Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5.
- Jeong, Miller, and Sobel (2009) "Political Compromise and Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System." *Journal of Law Economics and Organization* 25: 472.

### **Week 11 (April 5). Judicial vs. Administrative Implementation**

- Berkowitz and McQuaid (1988) *Creating the Welfare State*. Chapter 2.
- Burke (2004) *Lawsuits, Lawyers, and Legal Rights* Chapters 1 and 3
- Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) "Advocates." *Journal of Political Economy*. 107(1): 1.

### **Week 12 (April 12). Option 1: Patronage vs. Merit**

- Lewis (2008) *The Politics of Presidential Appointments*. Chapters 3 through 5.
- Sean Gailmard and John W. Patty (2007) "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy

Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise" *American Journal of Political Science*. 51(4): 873.

**Week 12 (April 12). Option 2: Organizational Choice**

- Lindblom (1959) "The Science of Muddling Through" *Public Administration Review*. 19(2): 79.
- Cohen, March, and Olsen (1959) "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice" *Administrative Science Quarterly*. 17(1): 1.
- Bendor (1995) "A Model of Muddling Through" *American Political Science Review*. 89(4): 819.
- Bendor, Moe, and Schoolts (2001) "Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of a Research Program" *American Political Science Review*. 95(1): 169.
- Olsen (2007) "Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of Politics" *American Political Science Review*. 95(1): 191.

**Week 12 (April 12). Option 3: Inference about Bureaucratic Preferences**

- David C. Nixon (2004) "Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology" *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*. 20(2): 438.
- Anthony Bertelli and Christian Grose (2007) "Agreeable Administrators? Analyzing the Public Positions of Cabinet Secretaries and Presidents" *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 37(2): 228.
- Joshua Clinton and David E. Lewis (2008) "Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences" *Political Analysis*. forthcoming.

**Weeks 14 and 15 (April 19 and 26) Student Presentations**