

**Political Science 568: International Organization**  
**Friday, 9:30-11:55, Fenno Room (Harkness 329)**

**Spring 2014**

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Harkness Hall 336  
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**Purpose of the course:** This is an advanced course intended for Ph.D. students. The course conducts a broad survey of the field, focusing on recent developments in the theory of international organization, and making use of historical examples from a range of substantive issue areas.

**Course Requirements:** Each student writes a data-based research paper (20-25 pages, described below). A draft of the paper is due Monday, December 6, at 5:00 pm, and the final version is due December 17 at 12:00 noon. There will be opportunities to present versions of the paper during the semester. There will be a take-home final exam, due December 20 at 4:00 pm. Grading: 1/3 class participation, 1/3 final paper, 1/3 final.

**Research Papers:** Although the papers are short (no more than 25 pages, please), the standards are high. The papers are expected to formulate a hypothesis, ground it in appropriate literature, illustrate an argument or puzzle using qualitative evidence, and test the hypothesis using quantitative evidence.

**Books:**

- Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006.
- Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2002. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, eds. *Rational Design: Explaining the Form of International Institutions*, Cambridge University Press, January 2004. Originally published as The Rational Design of International Institutions, as Special Issue of *International Organization* 55 (4) (Autumn 2001).
- Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998.
- Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- Stone, Randall W. *Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002).
- Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

- Thompson, Robert, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher H. Achen, and Thomas König. 2006. *The European Union Decides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Selected chapters.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner. *Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

***Course Outline:***

***Jan. 17: No class (International Organization Board Retreat)***

***Jan. 24: Public Goods and Transaction Costs***

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Stone, Randall W. 2008. Institutions, Power and Interdependence. In Helen Milner and Andrew Moravcsik, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stone, Randall W., Branislav Slantchev and Tamar London. 2008. Choosing How to Cooperate. *International Studies Quarterly*. (Forthcoming, June).

Gilligan, Michael J. 2008. A Defense of the Transactions Costs Approach to Understanding International Institutions. In Milner and Moravcsik, eds., Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. (On his web page.)

Simmons, Beth A. 1993. Why Innovate? Founding the Bank for International Settlements. *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 3. (Apr.): 361-405.

***Jan. 31: Institutional Design***

Koremenos, Barbara. Contracting around International Uncertainty,” *American Political Science Review* 99: 549-65, November 2005.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, eds. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4) (Autumn). Reprinted as *Rational Design: Explaining the Form of International Institutions*, Cambridge University Press, January 2004.

***Feb. 7: Delegation and Agency***

Vaubel, Roland. A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. *Public Choice* 51 (1986): 39-57.

Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2) (Spring): 241-76.

***Feb. 14: Credibility and Institutional Effectiveness***

Stone, Randall W. *Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002).

Stone, Randall W. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4) (November 2004): 577-92.

Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization* 66 (Fall): 537-69.

***Feb. 21: Informal Governance***

Stone, Randall W. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

***Feb. 28: Voting in the UN***

Fang, Songying. 2008. The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics. *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 304-21.

Voeten, Erik. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. *The American Political Science Review* 95 (4) (December): 845-858.

Voeten, Eric. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. *International Organization* 59 (3) (Fall): 527-57.

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker. 2006. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (4): 905-30.

Voeten, Erik. 2000. Clashes in the Assembly. *International Organization* 54 (2) (Spring): 185-215.

Carter, David B. , and Randall W. Stone. (forthcoming). Multilateralism and Democracy: The Case of Vote Buying in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization*.

***Mar. 7: Institutional Change in the European Union***

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. *International Organization* 52 (2) (Spring): 397-419.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press.

Thompson, Robert, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher H. Achen, and Thomas König. 2006. *The European Union Decides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Selected chapters.

Henning, C. Randall. 1998. Systemic Conflict and Monetary Integration in Europe. *International Organization* 52 (3) (Summer): 537-74.

Schneider, Christina J. 2007. Enlargement Processes and Distributional Conflicts: The Politics of Discriminatory Membership in the European Union. *Public Choice*, Vol. 132, No. 1/2 (July): 85-102.

***March 14: No class (Spring Break)***

***Mar. 21: The WTO***

Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2002. The Economics of the World Trading System. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Chapters.

Kucik, J. and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization* 62 (3): 477-505

Steinberg, Richard. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-74.

Davis, Christina. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1) (February): 153-69.

***Mar. 28: No class (ISA)***

***Apr. 4: Preferential Trade Agreements***

Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner. *Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

***Apr. 11: International Law and Domestic Politics***

Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Dai, Xinyuan. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. *International Organization* 59 (2) (Spring 2005): 363-98.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Laurence Helfer and Chris Farris. 2011. Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties. *International Organization*, 65(4): 673-707.

***Apr. 18: International Law and Courts***

Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds. 2000. *Legalization and World Politics: A Special Issue of International Organization*. *International Organization* 54 (3) (Summer).

Reinhardt, Eric R. 2001. Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (April): 174–95.

Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett, and Christina Davis. 2009. Who Files? Developing Country Participation in WTO Adjudication. *Journal of Politics* 71 (3) (July): 1033-1049.

Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel and Charles R. Hankla. 2008. Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. *American Political Science Review* 102 (4): 435-452.

Voeten, Eric. 2008. The impartiality of international judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights. *American Political Science Review* 102 (4), 417-432.

***Apr. 25: Informal Governance***

Randall W. Stone, ed. 2013. Special Issue on *Informal Governance of International Organizations*. *Review of International Organizations* 8(2) (June).