PSC/IR 262, 260W: Elections in Developing Countries

University of Rochester Spring 2014 Mondays, 2:00-4:40pm LCHAS, 104

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Overview

How do elections work in developing countries? Do contexts that are specific to countries in the developing world have implications for the nature and operation of electoral politics therein? In this course we will explore a number of issues that have particular relevance for elections in developing countries, including clientelism and vote-buying, electoral manipulation and fraud, ethnic voting, and electoral violence. In addition, we will consider how limited levels of information and political credibility affect both the operation of electoral accountability and the nature of electoral competition. In doing so, we will draw on examples from Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Requirements

- Class participation 10%
- Midterm 25%
- Presentation 25%
- Final exam 40%

This is a seminar course, and therefore participation in class is essential. You are expected to complete at least the required readings so that you are able to engage effectively in the class discussion, which will be based in large part on theories and concepts introduced in the readings. The reading load is reasonable, but some of the material is technical, so you should give yourself ample time to work through it. Statistical expertise is not a prerequisite, but you will still be expected to understand the arguments and conclusions of the more technical articles.

To complement and inform the class discussion, each week we will have presentations by two students that will provide detailed information on a specific election. As such,

these case studies will present concrete examples that will enable us to flesh out and evaluate the theories and concepts introduced in the readings. Each presentation will last for 15-20 minutes, and will provide relevant background information about the country in question, along with a detailed narrative of the specific election under investigation. In addition, presenters should apply the conceptual material introduced in the readings to the case at hand, considering how applicable the theories and concepts are to the case, how they help us to understand it, and how the case itself may help us refine and develop the theoretical arguments. You will be expected to undertake a significant amount of independent research into the case, and should discuss it with me during office hours well in advance of the presentation. The presentation will contribute 25% of your overall grade.

There will be an in-class midterm exam in Session 7 (3/03) and a final exam at 4:00pm on Tuesday, May 6, which will contribute 25% and 40% of your overall grade, respectively. In the midterm you will be required to answer two essay questions, covering material from sessions 3-6. In the final you will be required to answer three short answer questions covering material from the entire course, and two essay questions covering material from sessions 8-14.

Students in the W sections: You are required to write a 3,500 word paper in which you compare and contrast two elections, one of which may be the same as that addressed in your presentation. Your comparative analysis should consider both how and why the two cases differ in relation to one of the key issues addressed during the course. Word counts should not include references. The essay is due in Session 10 (3/31). I shall correct and return it with comments in Session 12 (4/14), and a revised version will be due in Session 14 (4/28). The overall grades for students in the W sections will be based on: participation 10%, presentation 20%, midterm exam 20%, essay 25%, final exam 25%.

Exam Policy

The exams are closed book and closed note (meaning also no internet access and no cell phones). The exam dates are firm, and missed exams may only be re-taken under the following circumstances: (1) a death in the family, (2) participation in a University-sponsored academic or sporting event (extra-curricular events do not count), (3) an unforeseen medical emergency. In the case of (1) and (2), you must inform me within 24 hours of the exam that you will miss it. In some cases I may require supporting documentation (e.g. a doctor's note) out of fairness to the other students.

Paper Extension Policy

Hard copies of papers must be turned in at the start of class on the due date (emailed versions will not be accepted). Extensions will only be granted in the case of: (1) a death in the family, (2) an unforeseen medical emergency. In case of such an emergency,

please let me know as soon as possible. In some cases I may require supporting documentation (e.g. a doctor's note) out of fairness to the other students. *Turning a paper in late without an agreed extension will result in the loss of one third of one letter grade for every 24 hours that the paper is late.*

Academic Honesty

While I encourage you to discuss the course readings and assignments with your fellow students, all written work must be done independently. Papers require full citations listed in a consistent format. Lastly, all class activities must be performed in accordance with the University of Rochester's Academic Honesty Policy (http://www.rochester.edu/college/honesty). Under UR rules I *must* report possible violations to the Board on Academic Honesty. Plagiarism is a very serious problem, and you should pay particularly close attention to the University's rules on what constitutes plagiarism, and how to avoid it.

Resources

Reading materials will be available on blackboard, although many can be found easily online or in the library. In addition, the following represent useful resources for presentations and essays:

- http://aceproject.org
- http://www.ndi.org
- http://www.cartercenter.org
- Lexis Nexis and Factiva search engines

COURSE SCHEDULE

Session 1 (1/20): Introduction

Why study elections? What is significant about the context of developing countries? *Readings:*

- Collier, Paul. 2009. *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins. Chapter 1.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1999. "Minimalist conception of democracy: a defense," in Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon (eds.) *Democracy's Value*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 43-50.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn Karl. 1996. "What Democracy Is ... and Is Not," in Diamond and Plattner (eds.) *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Session 2 (1/27): An African Election (film)

What is distinctive about this election? How is it different from elections in the US?

Session 3 (2/03): Cheating

How and why do you rig an election? Is electoral fraud more likely in developing countries? Why? What are the implications for democracy? How can we measure fraud? *Cases*: Azerbaijan 2013, Nigeria 2007.

Readings:

- Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2003. "Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences." Annual Review of Political Science 6: 233-256.
- Schedler, Andreas. 2002. "The Menu of Manipulation." *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 36-50.
- Simpser, Alberto. 2013. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.
- "How to rig an election" The Economist March 3rd 2012.
- "How to save votes" *The Economist* February 28th 2012.
- "Democracy 1, vote-rigging 0" The Economist April 14th 2011.

Session 4 (2/10): Ways to Prevent Cheating

What are the possible ways to prevent cheating? How effective are they? How can we measure the effect of efforts to prevent cheating?

Cases: Zimbabwe 2008, Brazil 2002.

Readings:

• Birch, Sarah. 2007. "Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct." Comparative

Political Studies 40(12): 1533-1556.

- Hyde, Susan. 2007. "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." World Politics 60(1): 37-63.
- Geisler, Gisela. 1993. "Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do with It? Vagaries of Electoral Observation and Democratic Standards." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31(4): 613-637.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan, Jennifer McCoy and Thomas M. Mustillo. 2008. "Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the Quality of Elections in Contemporary Latin America." Comparative Political Studies 41(1): 73-98.

Session 5 (2/17): Pre-Electoral Violence

What are the different types of electoral violence? What is the purpose of pre-electoral violence? When does violence occur in the electoral cycle? How does violence affect elections? How can it be prevented? Is violence more likely in developing countries? Why?

Cases: Philippines 2010, Nigeria 2009.

Readings:

- Rapoport, David C. and Leonard Weinberg. 2001. "Elections and Violence" in Rapoport and Weinberg (eds.) The Democratic Experience and Political Violence, London: Frank Cass.
- Sisk, Timothy D. 2008. "Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence." *Unpublished Manuscript*.
- Bratton, Michael. 2008. "Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Election Campaigns." *Electoral Studies* 27(4): 621-632.

Session 6 (2/24): Post-Electoral Violence

Why do elections lead to violence? When are elections more likely to lead to violence? How can it be prevented? Should the international community intervene? *Cases:* Kenya 2007, plus one of Armenia 2008, Mongolia 2008, or Nicaragua 2008. *Readings:*

- Daxecker, Ursula E. 2012. "The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-Election Violence in Africa." *Journal of Peace Research*, 49(4): 503-516.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Simon Hug. 2012. "Elections and Ethnic Civil War." *Comparative Political* Studies 46(3): 387-417.
- Mueller, Susanne D. 2011. "Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence and Institutional Decay in Kenya," in Gillies (ed.) Elections in Dangerous Places, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Laasko, Liisa. 2007. "Insights into Electoral Violence in Africa," in Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler (eds.) *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Session 7 (3/03): Midterm

Spring Break

Session 8 (3/17): Vote Buying

What is vote buying? How does it work? Whose votes get bought? How does it affect democracy? Is it more likely in developing countries? Why? How can we measure it? How can it be reduced?

Cases: Taiwan 1993, Thailand 2001.

Readings:

- Schaffer, Frederic Charles (ed.). 2007. *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chapters 1-4.
- Vicente, Pedro C. 2013. "Is Vote-buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa." *The Economic Journal* forthcoming.
- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot," *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 19-31.

Session 9 (3/24): Clientelism

What is (and what isn't) clientelism? How is it distinct from vote buying? Who gets targeted and how does it work? Why is it likely in developing countries? What does it mean for democracy? Should it be prevented? How? How can we measure it? *Cases:* Two of Argentina, Singapore 1997, Peru 1995.

Readings:

- Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.
- Hicken, Allen. 2011. "Clientelism." Annual Review of Political Science 14: 289-310.
- Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2007. "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The
 Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa," in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (eds.)
 Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Session 10 (3/31): Ethnic voting

What is ethnicity? How can we measure it? Why might people vote on ethnic lines? Is ethnic voting more likely in developing countries? Why? Does it matter? *Cases:* India 2004 or 2009, Malawi 1994.

Readinas:

• Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. "What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?" Annual

- Review of Political Science 9: 397-424.
- Collier, Paul. 2009. *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins. Chapter 2.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. "Counting Heads: A Theory of Voter and Elite Behavior in Patronage Democracies," in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (eds.) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Posner, Daniel. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.

Session 11 (4/07): Political parties

What role do parties play in elections in developing countries? Is it comparable to that in more developed countries/democracies? What do parties look like? Are they ideological, ethnic, mass-based or elite-led? What do party systems look like? Why do developing countries have such high levels of party system fragmentation and volatility? What does this mean for elections?

Cases: Kenya 1997, Mexico 2000 Readings:

- Salih, Mohamed M. A. 2003. "Introduction: The Evolution of African Political Parties," in Salih (ed.) African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance, London: Pluto Press.
- Doorenspleet, Renske. 2007. "Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Salih (ed.) *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*, London: Pluto Press.
- Bleck, Jaimie and Nicolas van de Walle. 2010. "Parties and Issues in Francophone West Africa: Towards a Theory of Non-Mobilization." *Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies Working Paper 1-10.*
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2005. "The Demise of Mexico's One-Party Dominant Regime:
 Elite Choices and the Masses in the Establishment of Democracy," in Scott
 Mainwaring and Frances Hagopian (eds) The Third Wave of Democratization in
 Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferree, Karen. 2010. "The Social Origins of Electoral Volatility in Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* 40(4): 759-779.

Session 12 (4/14): Accountability 1

What do we mean by accountability? Why should we care about it? Why is it important in democracies? Why might formal electoral institutions not be sufficient for it to be realized? What are the obstacles to it in developing countries?

Cases: Ghana 2004, Honduras 2013

Readings:

• Harding, Robin and Leonard Wantchekon. 2010. "The Political Economy of Human Development." UNDP Human Development Research Paper 2010/29.

- Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2006. "Health and Democracy." *American Economic Review* 96(2): 313-318.
- Keefer, Philip. 2004. "What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development And Vice Versa?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 247-272.

Session 13 (4/21): Accountability 2

How can the obstacles to accountability in developing countries be overcome? To what extent does accountability operate in developing countries? What is the effect of democracy on the provision of public goods and services? How do we know this is related to accountability?

Cases: Uganda 1997, Mongolia 2013 Readings:

- Harding, Robin and David Stasavage. 2013. "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections." *Journal* of Politics forthcoming.
- Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): 1415-1451.
- Fujiwara, Thomas and Leonard Wantchekon. 2013 "Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics forthcoming.
- Ferrez, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(2): 703-745.

Session 14 (4/28): Elections in Nondemocracies

Why are elections held in non-democracies? Can electoral accountability operate in these contexts?

Cases: China.

Readings:

- Tsai, Lily. 2007. "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *American Political Science Review* 101(2): 355-372.
- Zhang, X., S. Fan L. Zhang and J. Huang. 2004. "Local Governance and Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *Journal of Public Economics* 88(12): 2857-2871.
- Luo, R., L. Zhang, J. Huang and S. Rozelle. 2007. "Elections, Fiscal Reform and Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 35(3): 583–611.
- Simpser, Alberto. 2013. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 (again).

APPENDIX: Further Reading

Session 1 (1/20): Introduction

• Lindberg, Staffan. 2006. "The Surprising Significance of African Elections." *Journal of Democracy* 17(1): 139-151.

Session 3 (2/03): Cheating

• Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions." *Perspectives on Politics* 5(3): .

Session 4 (2/10): Ways to prevent cheating

- Beaulieu, Emily and Susan Hyde. 2009. "In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts." Comparative Political Studies 42(3): 392-415.
- Ichino, Nahomi and Matthias Schundeln. 2012. "Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana." *Journal of Politics* 74(1): 292-307.
- Beber, Bernd and Alexandra Scacco. 2012. "What the Numbers Say: A Digit-Based Test for Election Fraud." *Political Analysis* online.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 8.

Session 5 (2/17): Pre-Electoral Violence

- Collier, Paul and Pedro C. Vicente. 2011. "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria." *Unpublished Manuscript*.
- Chaturvedi, Ashish. 2005. "Rigging Elections With Violence." *Public Choice* 125(1): 189-202.
- Chaturvedi, Ashish and Arnab Mukherji. 2005. "Do Elections Incite Violent Crime?" *Unpublished Manuscript*.
- Wilkinson, Steven I. 2006. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.
- Makumba, John. 2002. "Zimbabwe's Hijacked Election". *Journal of Democracy* 13(4): 87-101.
- Barry Bearak and Celia W. Dugger, "As Zimbabwe's Election Nears, Assassins Aim at the Grass Roots." The New York Times, June 22, 2008.

Session 6 (2/24): Post-Electoral Violence

- Mehler, Andreas. 2007. "Political Parties and Violence in Africa: Systematic Reflections against Empirical Background," in Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler (eds.) Votes, Money & Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Von Borzyskowski, Inken. 2013. "Sore Losers? International Condemnation and

Domestic Incentives for Post-Election Violence." Unpublished manuscript.

Session 8 (3/17): Vote Buying

- Wang, Chin-Shou and Charles Kurzman. 2007. "The Logistics: How to Buy Votes," in Schaffer (ed.) Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Hicken, Allen D. 2007. "How Effective Are Institutional Reforms?" in Schaffer (ed.) Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2007. "How Effective Is Voter Education?" in Schaffer (ed.) Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Blaydes, Lisa. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.
- Kramon, Eric. 2009. "Vote-Buying and Political Behavior: Estimating and Explaining Vote-Buying's Effect on Turnout in Kenya on effect on turnout in Kenya." Afrobarometer Working Paper 114.

Session 9 (3/24): Clientelism

- Shami, Mahvish. 2012. "Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity." *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 588-606.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin." World Politics 55(3): 399-422.
- Stokes, Susan. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." American Political Science Review 99(3): 315-325.
- Tam, Waikeung. 2005. "Political Insecurity and Clientelist Politics: The Case of Singapore." *Unpublished manuscript*.

Session 10 (3/31): Ethnic voting

- Chandra, Kanchan and Steven Wilkinson. 2008. "Measuring the Effect of "Ethnicity."" *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4/5): 515-563.
- Posner, Daniel. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 529-545.

Session 11 (4/07): Political parties

- Brader, Ted and Joshua A. Tucker. 2001. "The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 69-83.
- Fridy, Kevin S. 2006. "The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarrelling Cocks: Disaggregating Partisanship in Ghana's Fourth Republic." *African Affairs* 106(423): 281-305.

Session 12 (4/14): Accountability 1

- Keefer, Philip. 2007. "Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies." American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 804-821.
- Harding, Robin. 2013. "Attribution and Accountability: Voting for Roads in Ghana." *Unpublished Manuscript*.
- Lindberg, Staffan I. and Minion K. C. Morrison. 2007. "Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana." *Political Science Quarterly* 123(1): 95-122.

Session 13 (4/21): Accountability 2

- Stasavage, David. 2005. "The Role of Democracy in Uganda's Move to Universal Primary Education." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(1): 53-73.
- Avritzer, Leonardo. 2009. *Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil*, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani. 2011. "Mass Media and Public Services: The Effects of Radio Access in Public Education in Benin." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5559.