# Distribution Grids


### Agenda


#### Distribution Grids for primary fuels and electricity

- Domestic coal transport
- Primary FF carrier flows
- U.S. crude oil trunklines
  - U.S. Natural gas pipeline grid
  - U.S. Power Plants (all), geographical distribution
- Electricity generation, outlook
- U.S. electrical grid, schematics
  Network of transmission lines
  Electrical specifications, cables, transformation
- Balancing task: supply = demand
- E-Grid failures/vulnerabilities
- Grid organization/management

 $\sim$ 

### Coal Transport by Rail/Barge





Coal: largest volume moved by rail, 4.9 million carloads @ \$(12-17)/t. 2023: 425.9M st


Oil and petroleum products: 672,118 tank cars (Jan-Oct 2014)

Coal transport by river barges (1,500 t/barge @ \$5/t). Typical: 15-barge tows (1/4 mi). Less used for oil/petroleum.


2022: Low water level in major US rivers

 $^{\circ}$ 

#### Primary Fossil Fuel Carrier Flow



## U.S. Major Crude Oil Pipeline (Trunkline) Network



55,000 mi of crude oil trunk pipelines connecting regional markets, 30,000-40,000 mi of gathering lines (Texas, Louisiana, Wyoming, ....) Gathering and larger trunk pipelines: transfer crude oil from production wells to refineries. Several new major, large volume oil pipelines under design/construction (Canada, Europe, Asia)

D

## **U.S.** Natural Gas Pipeline Grid



U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Network

U.S. Regions (PADDs)

**Compressor Stations** 

- More than 210 natural gas pipeline systems.
- 305,000 miles gas transmission pipelines.
- > 1,400 compressor stations  $\rightarrow$  continuous flow.
- > 11,000 delivery points, 5,000 receipt points, 1,400 interconnection points .
- 24 hubs or market/distribution centers.
- 100 LNG peaking facilities (see map).
- 400 underground natural gas storage facilities.
- 49 import/export via pipeline terminals.
- 8 ( $\rightarrow$ 20?) LNG import/export facilities.



Size (in.) Right of Wa		Material	Labor	Misc.	Total	
8	\$ -	\$ -	\$-	\$-	\$ -	
12	\$ 68,779.00	\$ 188,942.00	\$ 737,056.00	\$ 438,626.00	\$ 1,433,403.00	
16	\$ 267,288.00	\$ 415,979.00	\$ 1,937,269.00	\$ 1,473,663.00	\$ 4,094,199.00	
20	\$ 199,333.00	\$ 329,680.00	\$ 2,728,127.00	\$ 1,740,590.00	\$ 4,997,730.00	
24	\$ 134,000.00	\$ 337,650.00	\$ 2,021,810.00	\$ 836,247.00	\$ 3,329,707.00	
30	\$ 736,129.00	\$ 920,316.00	\$ 4,919,086.00	\$ 3,406,645.00	\$ 9,982,176.00	
36	\$ 504,104.00	\$ 895,253.00	\$ 3,301,095.00	\$ 2,763,844.00	\$ 7,464,296.00	

W. Udo Schröder, 2024


### Agenda

#### Distribution Grids for primary fuels and electricity


- Domestic coal transport
- Primary FF carrier flows
- U.S. crude oil trunklines
  - U.S. Natural gas pipeline grid
  - U.S. Power Plants (all), geographical distribution
  - Electricity generation, outlook
  - U.S. electrical grid, schematics
    Network of transmission lines
    Electrical specifications, cables, transformation
  - Balancing task: supply = demand
  - E-Grid failures/vulnerabilities
  - Grid organization/management

## U.S. Electrical Power Plants (2009, All Types)

Interactive Map (NPR): http://www.npr.org/2009/04/24/110997398/visualizing-the-u-s-electric-grid



## U.S. Electricity Generation: Planning The Future



Projections for U.S. future energy sector: Even with increased efficiencies, significant > 20% increase in electricity demand.

#### ←(2018 >10% Hydro)


Generation: BAU + new policies Tax credits, C tax ?

State-level policies, federal renew. en. requirements + cost reductions for wind (- 13%), solar PV (-22%) favor renewable (+ hydro) technologies  $18\% \rightarrow 31\%$ .


Predict increased electricity demand, planning supported by investments into existing electrical grid.

σ

#### The Current U.S. Electrical Grid




### U.S. Electrical Transmission Lines



11

W. Udo Schröder, 202

### **Basic U.S. Power Transmission**





Main conductors: 4 twisted strands of aluminum.


Metal wires conduct electron currents only on the surface  $\rightarrow$  optimize/maximize surface.

Better conductors are Cu, Ag, Au but not economical.

Steel strands form core bundle, for stability. HV overhead conductors are not insulated.

(carbon fibers in future?) Different wire standard gauges (American Wire Gauges)

#### AC Transformer Substations



Shunt Reactor, compensates capacitance



 $V_{primary} = -N_{primary} d\Phi/dt$   $V_{secondary} = -N_{secondary} d\Phi/dt$   $V_{secondary} / V_{primary} = N_{secondary} / N_{primary}$   $Changes \ load \ impedance \ Z_{primary}$ Laminated or toroidal transformer cores.

Iron/steel laminations prevent eddy currents. Insulated with a nonconducting material, such as varnish or epoxy.

Toroidal: coils wrapped around cylindrical core.




Transformers, changes V amplitude

### Agenda

#### Distribution Grids for primary fuels and electricity

- Domestic coal transport
- Primary FF carrier flows
- U.S. crude oil trunklines
  - U.S. Natural gas pipeline grid
  - U.S. Power Plants (all), geographical distribution
  - Electricity generation, outlook
- U.S. electrical grid, schematics Network of transmission lines Electrical specifications, cables, transformation
- Balancing task: supply = demand
- E-Grid failures/vulnerabilities
- Grid organization/management

## Main Tasks: Balance Electrical Power Distribution



Flexibility in response to diurnal, annual variations

Develop and keep reserves: active/standby (idling) "Peak shaving" (add generation/reduce demand)

Minimize transfer losses (distance, method)

#### Optimize economy (price)

Protection	Generator Primary Control and AGC	Economic Dispatch	Unit Commit	ment	Mid-Term Planning	Expansion Planning
Milliseconds	Seconds	Minutes	Hours	Days	Weeks	Years



video


The Brain (Computer Assisted)



video

W. Udo Schröder, 2024

#### Balancing Agencies: Diurnal Tasks



Conventional base load: Thermal stations (nuclear, oil, coal, gas).


Peak power demands needs quick-responding generators (natural gas, LNG) for "peak shaving."

Take into account spot prices for power. Uncertainty discourages investment !


Accepting large fractions of variable renewable sources (wind/solar) with few traditional base load generators  $\rightarrow$  great potential "residual loads."

Base load → Storage or idling fossil fuel, hydro or nuclear generators.

Good planning requires good RenEnergy/weather forecasts. W. Udo Schröder, 2024



#### Actual BA Records




 $\frac{100}{100}$ 

#### **Transmission Performance**

Line Type	Voltage (kV)	Miles
Alternating Current (ac)	200-299	84,000
	300-399	54,000
AC	400-599	26,000
	≥ 600	2,400
	Total ac	161,000
Direct Current (dc)	200-299	700
	300-399	0
DC	400-599	1,800
20	≥ 600	0
	Total dc	2,500
	Total	169,000

Source: North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Electricity Supply & Demand Database, http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=4|38.



Source: World Bank Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.

W. Udo Schröder, 2024

2010: > 5,000 generating units with > 50 MW of expected on-peak summer capacity (North American Electric Reliability Corporation).

#### 169,000 mi HV (> 200kV) lines 6,000,000 mi HV (< 200kV) lines

Grid serves about 125 million (37%) residential, 17.6 million (36%) commercial, 775,000 industrial (27% use) customers.

Retail price  $\approx$  \$100/MWh.


Grid performance: low losses (heat), Reliability (few outages): US customers have 1.5 - 2 power interruptions per year, 2 - 8 hours without power.

U.S. e-Grid Performance


#### Electricity Transmission Grid (On a good day)



#### Electricity Transmission Grid (On a bad day)



#### Vulnerable National e-Grid



## Cyber Vulnerabilities Of e-Grid



1<sup>st</sup> known cyber attack: Ukraine, Dec. 23, 2015 e-Grid partial blackout. 225,000 customers 1-6 hrs w/o power.

Reconstruction:

 $\rightarrow$  deep reconnaissance over a 6-mos period

- $\rightarrow$  well-coordinated attack @ several points.
- → 2009: US NSA's "Stuxnet" malware destroyed few hundred Iranian nuclear centrifuges.

#### Nation states develop cyber strategies

- $\rightarrow$  spear-phishing emails compromise corporate networks
- $\rightarrow$  seizing Supervised Control And Data Acquisition, switch off substations;
- → disable/destroy IT infrastructure (uninterruptible power supplies, modems, RTUs, commutators);
- $\rightarrow$  destruction of server files;
- $\rightarrow$  denial-of-service attack on info call-centers

Daily criminal "Denial of Service" attacks on internet sites

## **Fin Distribution Grids**