Objective. This course is designed primarily as a graduate seminar in comparative politics. Its object is to introduce the participants to the comparative study of democratic political processes. The course meets preparation requirements for this substantive subfield of the Ph.D. comprehensive examination in comparative politics. No background in comparative politics is assumed. It is appropriate as an introduction for students new to the field or as an "outside" course.

Approach. The comparative democratic political processes subfield focuses on choosing political leaders and making political decisions in the context of competitive elections and relative freedom of political action. We begin by discussing the meaning and measure of contemporary democracy and the nature of democratic transitions. We then turn to political parties, as key institutions linking citizens and policymakers, and policymaking institutions. The second half of the course focuses on the comparative study of individual citizens' attitudes and behavior (political culture, participation, interest groups.)

Many seminar sessions will be divided into two main parts. In one of these, we shall discuss the starred collective readings shown in Column 3 of the syllabus. Our discussion is designed to accomplish both substantive and methodological objectives. On one hand, we want to understand how to explain the particular substantive theme, addressing the concepts, theories and evidence presented. The readings are designed to introduce a variety of substantive topics, not to be definitive on any of them. (The unstarred readings are recommended for those interested in following up some additional aspects of these topics.) On the other hand, we want to understand strengths and limitations of various approaches to comparative analysis--cross-sectional or longitudinal comparisons, sample of countries or units, quantitative versus qualitative measurement of variables, specification issues, and so forth.

In the other part of the session, we shall have presentations by seminar members. These presentations are of two types, exemplifying two of the major approaches to the study of democratic processes in comparative politics. Each seminar participant is responsible for one presentation of each type. One presentation will be on a particular comparative quantitative data set, as suggested in Column 4. The student is responsible for examining the appropriate website and related material, downloading the data (or a subset of it), doing some simple analysis to show that the data are accessible, describing to the class the unit basis of the data, the types of variables and their measurement, and identifying some publications or papers using these data. Any special problems of limitations of the data should be noted. The other presentation will focus on a specific country and application of the general theme of the week to the politics of that country and vice versa. We would hope for a presentation that would focus on a theoretical issue and demonstrate the importance of context, or trace some particular institution or process in a case-study approach. Each type of presentations should be about 20 minutes long, followed by another 10 minutes of discussion. A written outline, summary, or annotated bibliography is to be handed out.
Grades and Responsibilities of Seminar Participants. Seminar participants are responsible for two presentations and associated written summaries/annotated bibliographies. There will also be a midterm examination. Grades will be based on the seminar presentations and the associated written summaries (15% each), the midterm (15%), class discussion (10%) and a research paper on some aspect or problem of democratic processes (45%). Individual meetings with both instructors about the paper topics early in the semester are mandatory, no later than the midterm. The paper topic must be approved in advance. Papers are due on the last day of classes, Monday December 13. In exceptional cases, a take-home final exam may be substituted for the research paper, in which case the midterm is worth 30% and the final is worth 30%.

Additional or Alternative Topics. In a small seminar it is easy to alter the topics for later weeks in response to class interest or to avoid overlap with work previously taken. If you find that your favorite theme or work is missing from the following syllabus, don't hesitate to raise the possibility of making a change to incorporate it. (Note that at the end we have one suggestion for another topic that is might be of interest to some.). If you find we're reading something you've done to death in another seminar, we can switch. Moreover, while the starred items are the ones that seemed to me more interesting, it’s easy to switch to some of the recommended items if the class would rather discuss these.

Availability of Materials. The following books are available for purchase in the bookstore. (However, they may be available more cheaply as used copies on line):


Other book references in syllabus follow. Required assigned chapters will be available in a box in the political science lounge (Harkness 314.)

- Carey, John and Matthew Shugart. *Executive Decree Authority*. 
Cheibub, Jose Antonio. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. 2006.
Della Porta, Donatella. Social Movements, Political Violence & the State. 1995.
Duch, Raymond and Randy Stevenson. The Economic Vote. 2008.
Kech, Margaret. & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. 1998.
Samuels, David and Matt Shugart, Presidents, Prime Ministers & Political Parties. 2010.

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Discussion Theme</th>
<th>Collective Reading</th>
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<td>Sept. 7</td>
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<td>Collective Reading</td>
<td>* Dahl, <em>Democracy &amp; Critics</em> 1989</td>
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<td>* Collier &amp; Levitsky, “Dem” *WP (49.3) 1997</td>
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<td>Poe, Tate, Keith “Human Rights” <em>ISQ</em> 1999</td>
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<td>*Rueschemeyer, et al, 1992 Capitalist Development, Pp. 75-121, (Ch 4)</td>
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<td>Boix and Stokes “Endog Dem” <em>WP</em> 2003</td>
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<td>McFaul, “4th Wave” <em>WP</em> 2002</td>
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<td>Przeworski, “Conquered or Granted” nd.</td>
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<td>*Laitin, <em>Hegemony &amp; Culture</em>, 1986 esp. Ch. 1, 4, 6, 8 &amp; appendix</td>
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<td>*Rogowski, <em>Commerce &amp; Coalitions</em>, Ch.1</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Number/majorities, Polarization/Extremism</td>
<td>Ch 1-4,7-8,10-12,15</td>
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<td>Volatility, Nationalization, Personalism</td>
<td>*Forum of Kreuzer,Cusak, Boix “PR” <em>APSR</em> May 2010</td>
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<td>*Crissp, et al.,”Vote-Seeking Incentives,” <em>JOP</em> 2004</td>
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<td>*Hicken, <em>Building Party Systems</em>, forthcoming, ch. 2,3</td>
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<td>Boix “Setting the Rules” <em>APSR</em>, 1999</td>
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<td>Lijphart et al *Electoral Systems…*1994</td>
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<td>Chhibber &amp; Ken Kollman, “Party Agg.” <em>APSR</em> 1998</td>
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<td>Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, ch. 1</td>
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<td>Powell, <em>Cont Dem</em>. Ch. 5</td>
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<td>Golder, “Explaining…Rad Right” * CPS* 2003</td>
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<td>*Meguid, “Competition….” <em>APSR</em> Aug 2005</td>
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<td>Schofield et al “Multipty Compet” <em>Public Choice</em> 1998</td>
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<td>Cox, “Centripetal” <em>JAPS</em> 1990</td>
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<td>Powell &amp; Vanberg <em>BJPS</em> 2000</td>
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<td>Oct. 19</td>
<td>Executive-Legislative Relations (Presidential) and other decision rules</td>
<td>*Tsebelis, “Veto Points” <em>BJPS</em> 1995 (<em>Frye, Presidential powers</em>)</td>
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<td>*Shugart &amp; Carey, <em>Pres &amp; Ass</em> 1991 Ch. 1-3, 7, 8, 13</td>
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<td>Samuels &amp; Shugart, <em>Presidents,PMs Parties</em> 2010.</td>
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<td>Dahl, ch. 10-11.</td>
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<td>Tsebelis, Veto Players 2002.</td>
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<td>Linz “Perils of Pres” <em>JoD</em> 1990</td>
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Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 1999.
Carey & Shugart, Exec Decree Authority, Ch 1,10

Oct. 26  Government Formation and Stability
(Parliamentary)  *Laver and Schofield,
               Multiparty Government
               esp. Ch. 2,4,5
*Martin & Stevenson, “Gov Form,”  (*Martin data set)
 AJPS, 2001
* Diermeir & Stevenson, “Cab terminations” APSR 3

2000

Tsebelis, Veto Players, Ch. 9.
Diermeir et al “Structural model gov form” Econometrica 2003
Laver “Government Termination,” Ann Rev 2003
Huber, “Vote of Confidence,” APSR 1996.
Volder & Carrubba, “Oversize Coalitions” AJPS 2004

Nov. 2  Legislative and Executive Processes

*Huber, Rationalizing Parl., (*Transparency Int.)
Intro, Ch. 5-7  (*World Bank Govern.)
*Strom, Minority Government, Ch. 6, 7
*Bowler, Pty Discipline, Ch. 1,2
*Diermeir & Feddersen, “Cohesion” APSR sept 1998
Laver & Shepsle, Cab. Ministers, Ch. 1, 10, 17
Tsebelis, Veto Players, Ch. 4, 7
Carey Legislative Voting & Accountability 2009
Martin “Gov Agenda” AJPS July 2004
Huber & Shipan, Deliberate Discretion 2002

TAKE-HOME MIDTERM EXAMINATION ABOUT HERE. EXACT DATE BY NEGOTIATION

Nov 9  Political Culture:  *Norris & Inglehart; Esmer, CS 2002 (*World Values
                           Studies)  
                           Citizen Values  (*World Values
                           (Procedural,   
                             Substantive)   
                           (Procedural,
                             substantive)"
                           *Inglehart, Culture Shift, 1990, Intro, Ch. 1-2
                           *Kitschelt, Transformation of
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| Nov. 16 | Comparing Citizen Behavior (Partisanship, Economic voting, Cleavages/issues, Participation) | *Converse & Pierce, Repres in France, 1986, Ch. 3,4,7 (*CSES Studies)  
Inglehart “Changing”, Dalton 1984, Ch. 2.  
*Verba, Nie, Kim Participation & Equality, 1978, Ch. 3-4  
*Quinn, “Voter choice,” AJPS 1999 43:4  
Franklin, Voter Turnout & Dynamics 2004.  
*Verba, Nie, Kim 1978 Ch. 5-7  
*Keck & Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders 1998, Ch. 1,3  
Putnam, “Concl.” In Dem in Flux 2002  
Howard, Weakness of Civil Society in EE 2003, Ch. 4  
Della Porta, Social Movements …. 1995.  
Gurr, Minorities at Risk 1993 |
| Nov. 30 | Interest Group & Policymaking Systems      | *Lehmbruch, “Concertation” in Goldthorpe 1984  
Siaroff “Corporatism” EJPR 1999 |
| Dec. 7  | Responsiveness and Representation          | *Powell, Elections as Instruments…, 2000, Esp.  
Ch. 1, 2, 6, 9, 10.  
*Cox, Making Votes Count, Ch. 12  
* Stokes, Mandates & Democracy, 2001, Ch. 1.  
Samuels & Shugart, Presidents…. 2010, Ch. 8  
Powell, “Democratic Representation” Ann Rev 2004  
Vowles, “Introducing PR in New Zealand,” PA 2000 |
Papers are due on December 13 (last day of classes in the college.)

Substitution topic – for one of above:

Coercive Processes

Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War. 2006.
Poe, Tate, Keith “Human Rights” ISQ 1999
Birner, Ethnicity & Electoral Politics 2007, esp. ch.7.
Huntington, Third Wave, 1991, Ch. 5.
“Quality of Democracy,” JoD, Oct 2004
Cheibub, Presidentialism…. 2006 , Ch. TBA.
Londregan & Poole, “Poverty, Coup Trap…” WP, Jan 1990.
“Coups” in Acemoglu & Robinson, Economic Origins 2006, Ch.
Enders & Sandler, Political Economy of Terrorism, 2005.