
PSC 272

Theories of International Relations

Spring 2004
9:40-10:55 T/Th
Meliora 204

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PURPOSE

Why do nations sometimes cooperate and at other times engage in (often violent) conflict? This course surveys current theories of international relations, at times employing game theory to model international interaction. Among other topics, we will examine the roles of individual choice, strategic interaction, uncertainty, power, domestic politics, and anarchy. By the end of the semester, students will be expected to:

- understand the relevant international relations literature;
- employ game-theoretic techniques;
- critically analyze theories of international politics; and
- understand the general scientific method of theory building and empirical testing.

PREREQUISITES

Although there are no prerequisites, this is an advanced undergraduate course. Some previous course work in international relations (e.g., PSC 106) or in international history is assumed. Additionally, depending on one's background, students may find this to be a fairly technical course. Knowledge of calculus is not required. However, students should be comfortable with algebra and deductive logic. Students will be introduced to elementary concepts in game theory and will be expected to become proficient with these in order (1) to solve game-theoretic problems in homeworks and on exams and (2) to understand course readings.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Evaluation is based on problem sets (10% of your grade), a midterm exam (40% of your grade), and a final exam (50% of your grade). Students may work together on problem sets, but each must turn in his or her own write-up. Students are required to attend recitations. In recitation, the TA will cover the homework (if one was due that week), hold discussions, address questions concerning lectures and readings, and conduct review sessions prior to exams.

Students taking the course to fulfill their writing requirement must meet with me during the first two weeks of class.

I cannot stress this enough: DO THE HOMEWORK. You will be asked to solve game-theoretic problems on the exams. You cannot become proficient in the technical skills unless you actually apply them.

The midterm is given in class, and the final exam is given during the period scheduled by the University. Neither exam is given early — make any travel plans accordingly.

Warnings

- As homework answers will be given out in recitation, late homeworks will receive zero credit.
- A student cannot receive a passing grade for the course if s/he has not taken all exams.
- I am a reasonable person and will work with you if you have a learning disability, family emergency, become ill, must observe a religious holiday, etc. In general, I expect at least two weeks advance notification that you will miss an assignment or exam. You must arrange with me to make up the work in a timely manner. If you are physically unable to contact me in advance (e.g., if you wake up extremely ill), you must contact me (via email) as soon as possible and then bring some form of verification from a physician. Failure to complete an assignment or take an exam without appropriately notifying me will result in zero credit for that assignment or exam.

A web page for this course is to be found here:

<http://www.rochester.edu/College/PSC/clarke/272.html>

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

Be familiar with the University's policies on academic integrity and disciplinary action (<http://www.rochester.edu/College/CCAS/AdviserHandbook/AcadHonesty.html>). Violators of University regulations on academic integrity will be dealt with severely, which means that your grade will suffer, and I will forward your case to the Chair of the College Board on Academic Honesty.

TEXTS

The course readings will be drawn from a number of books and articles. The following books are currently available at the bookstore.

Required texts:

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 2003. *Principles of International Politics*, 2nd ed. CQ Press. (BdM)
- John A. Vasquez. 1996. *Classics of International Relations*. 3rd edition. Prentice-Hall.
- Kenneth N. Waltz. 1954. *Man, the State, and War*. Columbia University Press.

Recommended texts:

- Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath. 1999. *Games of Strategy*. Norton. (D&S)

COURSE SCHEDULE

Readings can be found either in one of the required texts or online at the course web site. Readings that are available online are marked with a (†), and readings that can be found in the Vasquez reader are marked with a (v).

1. Course Introduction

2. International Relations Theory and Methods

- (v) Harold Guetzkow. 1950. “Long Range Research in International Relations.” *The American Perspective*.
- (v) Hedley Bull. 1966. “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach.” *World Politics*.
- (v) J. David Singer. 1969. “The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence.”
- BdM. Ch 2.

⇒ Homework #1. Theories: internal logic and empirical testing.

3. Three “Images” of International Politics

- Kenneth N. Waltz. 1954. *Man, the State, and War*. Ch 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.
- BdM. Introduction.

⇒ Homework #2. Critical analysis of Waltz.

4. Preferences, Rationality, and Expected Utility

- BdM. Ch 3, 9 pp. 287-306.

5. Strategy and Equilibrium

- ^(v)Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing. 1977. From *Conflict Among Nations*.
- D&S. Ch 2, 4, 5.

⇒ Homework #3. Game theory: preferences, expected utility, strategic form games.

6. Sequential Moves and Credible Threats

- D&S. Ch 3, 6.

7. Liberal IR Theory

- ^(v)Hugo Grotius. 1625. Prolegomena to *The Law of War and Peace*.
- ^(v)Woodrow Wilson. 1917. “The World Must be Made Safe for Democracy.”
- ^(v)Woodrow Wilson. 1918. “The Fourteen Points.”
- ^(†)L. P. Jacks. 1923. “A League of Nations as a League of Governments?” *The Atlantic Monthly*.
- ^(v)Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn. 1958. From *World Peace through World Law*.

⇒ Homework #4. Game theory: extensive form games.

8. Realism

- ^(v)Thomas Hobbes. 1651. “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind. . . .” *Leviathan*.
- ^(v)Niccolo Machiavelli. 1513. From *The Prince*.
- ^(v)Thucydides. 5th century b.c. “The Melian Dialogue.” *History of the Peloponnesian War*.
- ^(v)Hans J. Morgenthau. 1948. From “Political Power: A Realist Theory of International Politics.” *Politics Among Nations*.

9. What is Power?

- BdM. Ch 7, 8.

⇒ Midterm: covers topics 1-9.

10. Neorealism, Structural Realism

- ^(v)Morton Kaplan. 1966. From “Some Problems of International Systems Research.” *International Political Communities: An Anthology*.
- ^(v)Kenneth N. Waltz. 1979. From *Theory of International Politics*.
- ^(v)A.F.K. Organski. 1958. From “The Power Transition.” *World Politics*.
- BdM. Ch 4 pp. 114-131, Ch 16.

11. Neoliberal Theory: Hegemons, Institutions, and Regimes

- ^(v)Robert O. Keohane. 1984. From *After Hegemony*.
- ^(†)Arthur Stein. 1982. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World.” *International Organization*.
- BdM. Ch 4 pp. 131-151.

⇒ Homework #5. Critical analysis of (neo)realism or (neo)liberalism.

12. Sustaining Cooperation through Repeated Interaction

- ^(†)Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane. 1985. “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions.” *World Politics*.
- ^(†)Robert Axelrod. 1981. “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists.” *APSR*.
- D&S. Ch 8.

13. Neorealism vs Neoliberalism: When Is Cooperation More or Less Likely?

- ^(†)Robert Jervis. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” *World Politics*.
- ^(†)Charles Lipson. 1984. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.” *World Politics*.
- ^(†)Joseph M. Grieco. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” *International Organization*.
- ^(†)Duncan Snidal. 1991. “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation.” *APSR*.

⇒ Homework #6. Game theory: repeated games.

14. **Uncertain Incentives: What's Your "Type"?**

- BdM. Ch 10.
- D&S. Ch 12.

15. **Deterrence, Crises, and Brinkmanship**

- BdM. Ch 11.
- D&S. Ch 13.

⇒ Homework #7. Game theory: incomplete information.

16. **Rational Deterrence Theory**

- ^(v)Herman Kahn. 1960. "The Three Types of Deterrence."
- ^(v)Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke. 1974. "The Gap Between Deterrence Theory and Deterrence Policy." *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*.
- ^(†)Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal. 1989. "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies." *World Politics*.
- ^(†)Paul Huth. 1988. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War." *APSR*.

17. **Spatial Models**

- BdM. Ch 9 pp. 306-323.

18. **States as Unitary Actors? What is the "National Interest"?**

- ^(v)Hans J. Morgenthau. 1952. "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States." *APSR*.
- ^(v)Arnold Wolfers. 1952. "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol." *Political Science Quarterly*.
- BdM. Ch 9 pp. 306-323.

19. **Domestic Politics**

- ^(†)Graham Allison. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *APSR*.
- ^(†)Peter Gourevitch. 1978. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization*.
- ^(†)Robert D. Putnam. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics." *International Organization*.
- BdM. Ch 5, 6, 12.

⇒ Homework #8. Game theory: social choice.

20. **The Democratic Peace**

- ^(v)Immanuel Kant. 1795. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.”
- ^(v)Dean V. Babst. 1964. “Elective Governments — A Force for Peace.” *The Wisconsin Sociologist*.
- ^(v)Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace.” *APSR*.
- BdM. Chapter 12 pp. 401-406.

21. **After the Cold War: Peace in Our Time?**

(All readings in Lynn-Jones & Miller edited volume which is on reserve at Rush Rhees.)

- John Mueller. “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World.”
- John Lewis Gaddis. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System.”
- John J. Mearsheimer. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.”

22. **Course Wrap-Up**

⇒ **Final exam** — as scheduled by the University. No exceptions.