PURPOSE: Why do nations sometimes cooperate and at other times engage in (often violent) conflict? This course surveys current theories of international relations, at times employing game theory to model international interaction. Among other things, we will examine the roles of individual choice, strategic interaction, uncertainty, power, domestic politics, and anarchy. By the end of the semester, students will be expected to

1. Understand the relevant international relations literature;
2. Employ game-theoretic techniques;
3. Critically analyze theories of international politics; and
4. Understand the general scientific method of theory building and empirical testing.

PREREQUISITES: Although there are no prerequisites, this is an advanced undergraduate course. Some previous course work in international relations (e.g., PSC 270, 271, or 275) or in international history is assumed. Additionally, depending on one’s background, students may find this to be a fairly technical course. Knowledge of calculus is not required. However, students should be comfortable with algebra and deductive logic. Students will be introduced to elementary concepts in game theory and will be expected to become proficient with these in order (1) to solve game-theoretic problems in homeworks and on exams and (2) to understand course readings.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS: The course requirements for all students consist of a midterm exam, a final exam, homeworks, and participation. 472 students also have a paper requirement (please see me for details). Students are required to attend lectures and recitations. In recitation, the TA will cover the homework (if one was due that week), hold discussions, address questions concerning lectures and readings, and conduct review sessions prior to exams.

I cannot stress this enough: DO THE HOMEWORK. You will be asked to solve game-theoretic problems on the exams. You cannot become proficient in the technical skills unless you actually apply them.

The final course grade will be composed as follows:

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<th>PSC 272</th>
<th>PSC 472</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Midterm</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Exam</td>
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<td>Research Paper (20-30 pages)</td>
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<td>HW &amp; Participation</td>
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Warnings:

- Because homework answers will be given out in recitation, late homeworks will receive zero credit.
- A student cannot receive a passing grade for the course if s/he has not taken all exams. 472 students must also turn in the paper components (less than 4 days late) to receive a passing grade.
- I am a reasonable person and will work with you if you have a learning disability, family emergency, become ill, must observe a religious holiday, etc. In general, I expect at least two weeks advance notification that you will miss an assignment or exam. You must arrange with me to make up the work in a timely manner. If you are physically unable to contact me in advance (e.g., if you wake up extremely ill), you must contact me (via email or phone) as soon as possible and then bring some form of verification from a physician. Failure to complete an assignment or take an exam without appropriately notifying me will result in zero credit for that assignment or exam.

READINGS:  The course readings will be drawn from a number of books and articles. The following books are currently available at the bookstore.

Required texts:


Recommended texts:


Key:  The readings in the course schedule below use the following abbreviations:

- BdM  Bueno de Mesquita text
- D&S  Dixit & Skeath text
- (V)  Vasquez reader
- (O)  Accessible online (see “Online Course Readings” on course web page)
- (R)  Only on reserve at Rush Rhees

COURSE WEB PAGE:

The PSC 272 course web page is located at [www.rochester.edu/College/PSC/signorino](http://www.rochester.edu/College/PSC/signorino)

Select the “courses” option on the left menu, then “PSC 272/472” in the main frame. The easiest way to access the PSC 272 web page is to type in the above URL and bookmark it on your computer. Alternatively, you can get to it by going to the Political Science web page, clicking on “People,” then clicking on my name (which should take you to my web page), then clicking on “courses,” and then clicking on “PSC 272/472.”

The web page provides:
1. The syllabus (in a number of formats) in case you lose this, or need it but don’t have it on hand.
2. Direct links to the online course readings. This is basically an HTML version of the syllabus that has direct links to readings available online (e.g., *World Politics, American Political Science Review*, Thucydides, Hobbes, etc).
COURSE SCHEDULE:

1. Course Introduction

2. International Relations Theory and Methods
   - BdM. Ch 5.

HW 1. Theories: internal logic and empirical testing

3. Three “Images” of International Politics
   - Kenneth N. Waltz. 1954. Man, the State, and War. Ch 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.
   - BdM. Ch 1.

HW 2. Critical analysis of Waltz.

4. Preferences, Rationality, and Expected Utility
   - BdM. Ch 2, 8 pp. 236-257.

5. Strategy and Equilibrium
   - D&S. Ch 2, 4, 5.

HW 3. Game theory: Preferences, expected utility, strategic form games.

6. Sequential Moves and Credible Threats
   - D&S. Ch 3, 6.

7. Liberal IR Theory
   - (V) Hugo Grotius. 1625. Prolegomena to The Law of War and Peace.

8. Realism

- Niccolo Machiavelli. 1513. From *The Prince*.

9. What is Power?

- BdM. Ch 6, 7.

*Midterm: Covers Topics 1-9. Thursday, Mar 1*

10. Neorealism, Structural Realism

- BdM. Ch 3 pp. 56-73, Ch 15

11. Neoliberal Theory: Hegemons, Institutions, and Regimes

- BdM. Ch 3 pp. 73-94.

*HW 5. Critical analysis of (neo)realism or (neo)liberalism.*

12. Sustaining Cooperation through Repeated Interaction

- D&S. Ch 8.

13. Neorealism vs Neoliberalism: When Is Cooperation More or Less Likely?


*HW 6. Game theory: Repeated games.*
14. Uncertain Incentives: What’s Your “Type”?
• BdM. Ch 10.
• D&S. Ch 12.

15. Deterrence, Crises, and Brinkmanship
• BdM. Ch 11.
• D&S. Ch 13.

HW 7. Game theory: Incomplete information.

16. Rational Deterrence Theory

17. Spatial Models
• BdM. Ch 9.

18. States as Unitary Actors? What is the “National Interest”??
• (V)Arnold Wolfers. 1952. “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol.” *Political Science Quarterly*.
• BdM. Ch 8 pp. 257-266.

19. Domestic Politics
• BdM. Ch 4, 12, 13.

HW 8. Game theory: social choice.

20. The Democratic Peace
• (O)(O)Immanuel Kant. 1795. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.”
• (V)(O) Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace.” *APSR.*
• BdM. Chapter 13 pp. 396-400.

21. After the Cold War: Peace in Our Time?
(All readings in Lynn-Jones & Miller edited volume. All on Reserve.)
• (R) John J. Mearsheimer. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.”

22. Course Wrap-Up

*Final exam: Covers entire semester*  
TBA (5/7--5/14)