Beyond Negative Power: Rethinking the Administrative Presidency

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**Motivation**
- How do we ensure the bureaucracy is doing what it’s supposed to be doing?
- Existing theories are about presidential and congressional control (Moe 1985; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
  - Imply principals oversee “enemy”/unaligned agencies most.
- I present counterevidence focused on the president and a new theory that accounts for oversight of “ally” agencies.

**Data on OIRA: the “800 lb. gorilla”**
- Congress created OIRA in 1980 and President Reagan formalized its role reviewing regulations in 1981.
- Everyone complains about it.
- Existing studies treat it as a veto player (Wiseman 2009; Acs and Cameron 2013).
- Actually plays a more complicated role.

**OIRA doesn’t review all the big stuff**

**President Clinton reviewed liberal agencies more than we would expect**

**Rethinking theories of presidential control**
- I contribute a new theory that adds the possibility of presidents exerting effort to increase the odds of policies succeeding.
- OIRA is just one example of a tool presidents can use.
- The theory has broad implications for how we think about the role of presidents (and other principals) in policymaking.

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