### Abstract

We examine the political consequences of conditioning ex-felon voting rights on the payment of legal financial obligations (LFOs). We study two states – Alabama and Tennessee – in which ex-felons cannot restore their voting rights until they have paid all court fees, fines, and restitution, plus child support in Tennessee. By randomly sampling court records of convicted felons in Alabama from 2005 - 2011, we estimate that the median amount of LFOs accrued is about \$5,000 and that 85% have a non-zero balance. We expect that existing economic racial disparities will disproportionately reduce black ex-felons' ability to restore their right to vote. Consistent with this, we find that blacks are about 10 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to have a non-zero LFO balance in Alabama. Blacks are also about 16 and 12 p.p. more likely to have their voting rights applications denied due to LFOs in Alabama and Tennessee, respectively.

### **Court Records as Granular Public Records**

- Electronic state-level court cases offer rich, publicly available, and individually-identifiable information that can be systematically matched to other local administrative data.
- ► We collected Alabama court records through an online interface known as Alacourt.

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ase										
Case In	formation									
County:	05-BALDWII	N	Case Number:		Judge: F	REW-ROBERT	WILTERS			
Defendant Stat	tus: <b>JAIL</b>		Trial Type:		Charge: F	POSS MARIJU	ANA 1ST			
Related Cases	: DC-				Court Action:	GUILTY PLEA				
Probation Offic	ce #:		Probation Office Name: I	03802						
Jury Demand:	False		Traffic Citation #:		DL Destroy Date:					
Grand Jury Co	urt Action:		Inpatient Treatment Orde	red: NO	Previous DUI Convictions: 000					
Case In	itiation									
	Date: 02/23/201	0 Case Init	iation Type: ARREST			Offense Da	ate:			
Filing Date:	01/20/201					Arresting A	gency Type: COUNTY			
Arrest Date:	02/23/201	<b>0</b> Arresting	Officer: WINBERG			City Code/I	Name: <b>00</b>			
Indictment Date	e: <b>09/25/200</b>	9 Grand Ju	ıry: <b>9-163</b>			Domestic	Violence: NO			
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# **Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The Case of Legal Financial Obligations**

Michael Morse & Marc Meredith PhD student, Harvard Assoc. Prof, UPenn

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# Searching Court Records

► We collected two different random samples – at the case-level and individual-level – using two different search queries.

	SJIS Party S	earch Form				
Party Name:		Last Name First				
SSN:		Social Security Number (Optional)			Case Lookup	
Party Type:	Plaintiffs O Defendants I ALL	Applies to civil cases only (Optional)	County:	03 - MONTGOMERY	\$	Select a count
			Division:	CC - CIRCUIT-CRIMINAL	\$	Select a divisio
County:	Statewide Search	Select a county if not statewide.	Case Year:	2015	\$	Four digit case y
Division:	All Divisions	Select a division if not all divisions.	Case Number:		Fxt 0( \$	Six digit Case Nun
Date of Birth:		A Date of Birth				
Case Year:	Select a year	♦ Four digit case year to limit results.	Number of Cases:	Please Select a Number	\$	Select a number to (optional)
elect a range	of filing dates:			Search	t	
From	:					
То	:					
No of Records:	100	No. of records to be returned.	Case Number:	03 ¢ - CC ¢ - 2015 ¢ -	≠ . 00 ¢	View Case
	Search	Reset				

# Sampling Court Records

- ► We used systematic sampling to first collect a sample of 8,372 circuit court cases, 3,452 of which contained at least one felony conviction.
- ▶ We then randomly sampled 1,000 people convicted of a felony between 2005 2011. For each of these records, we extracted the convicted felon's full name and date of birth and used the party search query to find and download all related cases in Alacourt.
- ► Because our individual-level sample is drawn from our case-level sample, this means that people convicted of felonies in multiple cases will be also be overrepresented in our individual-level sample. However, if we know  $\pi_i$  – the probability that convicted felon *i* was selected into the individual-level sample – for all i that were ultimately selected into our individual-level sample, we can account for this overrepresentation by weighting observations by  $\frac{1}{\pi}$  when conducting individual-level analyses.
- $\mathbf{r}_i$  is the product of  $\pi_{i,1}$  convicted felon *i*'s probability of being selected into the case-level sample (1) – and  $\pi_{i,2|1}$  – convicted felon *i*'s probability of being selected into the individual-level sample (2) conditional on being selected into the case-level sample (1). To calculate  $\pi_{i,1}$ , we first calculate  $n_{i,j,v}$  – the number of integers between 1 and 51 that would have caused convicted felon *i* to be selected into the case-level sample in district j and year y – using our knowledge of the case numbers in which individual i was convicted of at least one felony.  $\pi_{i,1}$  is equal to  $1 - \prod_i \prod_v (1 - \frac{n_{i,j,y}}{51})$ . To calculate  $\pi_{i,2|1}$  we define  $c_i$  as the number of cases in which individual *i* was convicted of a felony that were included in the case-level sample.  $\pi_{i,2|1}$  is equal to  $1 - \prod_{j=1}^{c_i} (1 - \frac{1,000}{2.849 + 1 - j})$

# Alabama Application Records Linked to Alabama Court Records


Court records help us understand restoration of voting rights decisions **Application Records** 

		Name							LFOs	LFOs	Sentence	Sentence
Fi	rst	Middle	Last	DOB	Decision	Comment	Race	Sex	Assessed	Balance	Imposed	Suspended
					Denied	Owes money	Black	Male	\$5030	\$2510	5Y	0Y
					Approved	—	White	Male	\$2070	\$0	2Y	2Y
					Denied	Owes money			—			
					Denied	Other	Black	Male	\$4230	\$4230	1Y	1Y
							1					

Court	Records

### **Quantities of Interest**

- $\blacktriangleright LFO_i = 1$  if convicted felon *i* owes LFOs to the state
- restore their voting rights (e.g., completed their entire sentence)
- $V_i = 1$  if convicted felon *i* would vote if eligible
- $B_i = 1$  if convicted felon *i* is African-American
- $> X_i$  be a vector of individual-level characteristics that we wish to condition on
- Ideally, we would estimate non-African-American is prevented from voting because of LFOs.
- Case-level:  $p(LFO_c = 1 | B_c = 1, X_c) p(LFO_c = 1 | B_c = 0, X_c)$ The downside with a case-level analysis though is that it limits us to individual-level characteristics that are constant across cases.
- ▶ Individual-level:  $p(LFO_i = 1 | B_i = 1, X_i) p(LFO_i = 1 | B_i = 0, X_i)$ Using these individual-level data allow us to better measure whether a convicted felon has an outstanding LFO balance – on a representative sample after weighting.



## **Alacourt Individual-level Results**

		%	% Max	Perc	centile of	Percent	%	
	Estimated	Imposed	ed Sentence Total LFOs Accrued		LFO Balance		LFO	
	Pop. Size	Sentence	Expired	$25^{th}$ 5	50 <sup>th</sup> 75 <sup>th</sup>	<b>25</b> <sup>th</sup> <b>50</b> <sup>t</sup>	<sup>h</sup> <b>75</b> <sup>th</sup>	Balance
AII (N = 993)	92,032	0.759	0.402	2,260 4	,981 10,453	681 3,24	2 8,114	0.847
	(1,546)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(125) (2	256) (507)	(131) (225	) (438)	(0.014)
Blacks (N = 445)	41,692	0.776	0.348	2,549 5	,236 10,605	1,173 3,64	3 9,127	0.899
	(1,008)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(254) (3	354) (879)	(220) (399	) (563)	(0.017)
Non-Blacks (N = 548)	50,340	0.745	0.447	2,148 4	,669 10,036	371 2,55	5 6,955	0.804
	(1,173)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(145) (3	366) (643)	(122) (310	) (681)	(0.020)
Difference		0.030	-0.099	401 !	567 569	802 1,08	8 2,172	0.095
p-value on $H_0$ : Difference = 0		0.345	0.005	0.173 0	.272 0.555	0.003 0.01	4 0.012	0.000

► We conceptualize that an LFO is disenfranchising when it is the sole criteria that prevents someone who would otherwise vote from voting. To formalize this logic, let

 $D_i = 1$  if convicted felon *i* has satisfied all other requirements to be eligible to

 $p(LFO_i = 1 | D_i = 1, V_i = 1, B_i = 1, X_i) - p(LFO_i = 1 | D_i = 1, V_i = 1, B_i = 0, X_i)$ which captures the differential probability that an African-American and

▶ Because none of our datasets contain all of the information we need to estimate this exact quantity of interest, we instead estimate a series of related quantities.