Who Speaks for the Poor?

Electoral Geography and the Political Representation of Low-Income Citizens

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Who speaks for the poor? In the United States, this important question is difficult to answer: Usually, in contemporary democracies, a social democratic or workers' party, and the candidates who contest elections on its label, ensure that the interests of the poor and working class citizens are at least articulated in the policymaking process. However, as noted by Sombart (1976 [1906]) and others over the course of the twentieth century (recently, e.g., Archer 2007), the absence of a social democratic or workers' party clearly sets the US apart from all other developed democracies. Further, even members of the left-leaning Democrats regularly ignore the preferences of low-income citizens (Gilens 2012, Bartels 2008). Current explanations of cross-national differences in the the political and partisan representation of low-income citizens emphasize the historical organization of society (Iversen & Soskice 2009), the role of unions and class-based organizations in Europe (Huber & Stephens 2001, Golden & Pontusson 1992), and the disenfranchising effects of increasing income inequality in the United States (Anderson & Beramendi 2012, Lupu & Pontusson 2011).

This paper, and a larger book project, will offer a very different account of the origins of cross-national differences in social policy, and political inequality in the US: Current American electoral geography – specifically, the geographic distribution of low-income citizens across congressional districts – undermines legislators' incentives to be responsive to the poor, and significantly limits the electoral viability of low-income peoples' parties. In other countries, a more equitable mapping of low-income citizens' votes-to-seats ensures that legislators have incentives to be responsive to all citizens, and social policy tends to be more generous as a consequence.

This paper will also demonstrate how the electoral geographies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries structured the strategic entry incentives of low-income peoples' parties. Specifically, when new electoral geographies favor a low-income constituency, we see parties entering to represent low-income voters' interests. Then, whether the new party takes on a left or right ideological flavor, usually a social democratic or agrarian ideology, depends on whether poverty is predominantly concentrated in urban industrial, or rural agricultural regions: The appropriate ideological form of poverty responsiveness varies with the location of the poverty. Once established, the ideological position these low-income peoples' parties take has lasting and cumulative effects on social policy in each country, with those systems with social democratic parties implementing more broadly accessible and effective social insurance programs.

Although this is a broadly comparative project that aims to understand important differences in the politics of contemporary democracies, this research will provide an explanation for the muted political voice of American workers and their families, the limited efforts of American political parties to mobilize a low-income constituency, and the comparatively limited social spending and antipoverty policy in the US. When the effects of electoral geography are understood, especially from the comparative perspective this manuscript will offer, the limited responsiveness of American legislators to low-income voters, and indeed, the absence of partisan representation for low-income and working class voters, are no longer puzzling features of contemporary American politics. Instead, these are the clear consequences of the political economic incentive structures created by the current and historical geographic distribution of income within our country.

To provide theoretical justification for my emphasis on electoral geography, and to connect to the existing literature on cross-national differences in social policy, this manuscript outlines a "folk theorem" of democratic policy-making in which vote-to-seat mappings crucially structure parties' and candidates' incentives to mobilize and represent the poor. The core idea here is about changing electoral power: when demographic changes increase the frequency with which low-income voters are decisive in election outcomes (i.e., who forms the majority in single-member districts), there new opportunities for office-seeking political entrepreneurs who can effectively mobilize a low-income voting bloc. This idea motivates a theory of strategic party entry, and provides insight into the conditions under which we might expect a party to enter and mobilize a low-income constituency. The theoretical development in this introductory section sets the stage for the broadly comparative analysis presented later, where the timing of party entry is explained by important changes in electoral geography.

1 Electoral Geography, the Political Representation of Low-Income Citizens, and Social Policy

This analysis is premised on a five-stage model of the democratic policy-making process, which can be characterized in the following way:[1]

Stage 1. Preference Formation. Individuals develop preferences over one or more policy dimensions, usually including social or tax and transfer policy.

Stage 2. Mobilization. This stage includes both the mobilization of parties and candidates – their "strategic entry" – and the electorate, both to turnout, generally, but also to rally in support of a particular candidate.

Stage 3. Elections. This is the crucial step in which the effects electoral geography enter, but note that it is a purely mechanical step: Votes are tallied and seats are allocated according to the current electoral rules.

Stage 4. Government Formation. Usually, governments will be formed by the party that wins the plurality of seats in the legislature, sometimes in coalition with other parties.

Stage 5. Legislation. Once formed, governments will implement policy more or less in accordance with the preferences of the constituencies they (and their coalition partners) represent.

While simplified, this model provides a useful framework for the comparative analysis of differences in social policy. Most importantly for this analysis, it draws attention to the fact that parties choosing whether to mobilize in Stage 2 will take into account the mapping from votes-to-seats in Stage 3. In fact, it is the thesis of this project that the strategic impact of electoral geography on the vote-to-seat mapping in Stage 3 is precisely why pro-worker parties have failed to emerge in the United States.

To illustrate how electoral geography shapes how votes map into seats, consider a country with a set of single-member districts (SMD), where the candidate who wins a plurality of each district becomes the districtâĂŹs sole representative in the legislature. (Variation in electoral geography has the biggest effects on vote-to-seat mapping in SMD systems; (**?**)). Then, imagine a society in which the population is equally divided according to position in the national income distribution – into low-income, middle-income, and high-income groups – and that these groups are sufficiently meaningful, distinct, and homogenous such that their members hold common preferences on all important policy dimensions (Stage 1). In the second stage of the policy-making process, each group form a party to compete in elections for seats in a legislature, and may devote some resources towards mobilizing its members. Note that the income groups vary in their abilities to bare the costs of mobilization (in accordance with the resources model of turnout; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). As a con-

[1] Gary Cox suggested this helpful framework, but it is similar to Achen & Bartels's (2015.) "folk theorem" of democracy.

sequence, low-income citizens are typically under-represented in the electorate, compared with middle-income citizens and, especially, high-income citizens ("turnout bias"). As above, elections are held in a third stage (more on this shortly) and seats in the legislature are distributed to parties according to the current electoral rules. Then, in Stage 4, the party that wins the most seats will form the government, and implement its group's most preferred policies (Stage 5). If a party wins a plurality, but not the majority of seats, it will form a coalition with one of the other parties, and implement compromise legislation.

Now, imagine two hypothetical distributions of citizens, similar to those we considered in the tax-rate-setting example above: In one case ("represenatative districts"), the national income distribution is replicated in each district. In a second case ("segregation"), districts partition the national income distribution such that the income groups are perfectly segregated. If, in the fully segregated case, all citizens vote by type, the party that represents low-income citizens can be assured approximately one third of the seats in the legislature: Even if turnout bias is dramatic, the pivotal voter in one third of the districts will be a low-income voter. Each party will hold an approximately equal of the seats in the legislature, and the low-income peoples' party will share in policy-making at least some of the time.[2]

Compare the fully segregated outcome to case in which districts are representative: Because of the turnout bias, high-income voters comprise the largest share of each district, and their party can form the government with an overwhelming majority in the legislature. If, however, low-income voters prefer the policies most preferred by middle-income voters, to those that would be implemented by the high-income people's party on at least one dimension, they will have incentives to vote strategically (i.e., not by type) for the party that represents middle-income citizens. Then, as long as turnout bias is not dramatic, the party that represents middle-income citizens will win the seat in each district and implement the policies most preferred by middle-income voters. Notice that the party that represents middle-income citizens has no incentive to change its policy proposal to appeal to low-income voters. Further, the middle-income people's party need only exert as much mobilization effort as is needed to overcome the middle-income turnout bias. If there are costs associated with contesting the election, the low-income people's party is unlikely to stand: When districts are heterogenous and there is turnout bias such that low-income voters are under-represented in the electorate, the low-income people's party will not win a single seat. This case – SMD electoral rules with representative districts, and substantial turnout bias – will be characterized by two-party competition between the party that represents high-income citizens and the party that represents middle-income citizens. If redistribution is a major dimension of electoral competition, it will likely be limited in this case.

Of course, this is not the first analysis to suggest that the election stage of policy-making – that is, the mapping of votes to seats – has implications for social and redistributive policy. But the explicit consideration of electoral geography differentiates this study from the

[2]More assumptions are needed to identify the sets of cases in which the low-income peoples' party is likely to be a coalition partner. Iversen & Soskice (2006) find, for example, that when the policy is restricted to redistributive policy, and transfers must be regressive, middle-income voters have more to gain in coalition with low-income voters, than with high-income voters. If the *formateur* is chosen randomly, in the Iversen-Soskice set-up, a low-income–middle-income coalition will be the most frequent result.

two existing strands of literature in this area. First, it is clearly distinct from analyses that study the effects of electoral rules on policy outcomes while treating the number of parties as exogenous. For example, Iversen & Soskice (2006) and Austen-Smith (2000), for example, assume that while three parties compete under (single national district) PR rules, electoral competition is limited to two parties SMD rules. (Lizzeri & Persisco 2003, Persson & Tabellini 2000, for example, assume that only two party competition, regardless of the electoral rules.) Here, I take a different approach, and suggest that behavior at Stage 2 – voter, candidate, and party mobilization – is structured by incentives created in the mechanical Stage 3, when votes are mapped into seats. Vote-to-seat mappings vary across groups in a society; variation in the geographic distribution of groups across electoral districts will ensure that some groups are over-represented in the legislature while others are under-represented. Importantly, parties will form and contest elections when the vote-to-seat mapping is favorable for their constituency. Similarly, parties and candidates mobilize different groups in society when their support is pivotal in the allocation of seats.

Second, this paper also differentiates itself from existing studies that examine the effects of voting rules on the number of parties likely to emerge âĂŞ like Persson & Tabellini (2003, 17) âĂŞ that either (a) focus only on the effects of voting rules on the number of parties that emerge within each electoral district, or (b) effectively do the same by assuming that all electoral districts have the same composition of voters. This emphasis on the implications of electoral geography for the mobilization of voters, candidates, and parties also marks an important departure from the comparative politics literature: Instead, voter turnout is usually attributed to motivational and facilitative factors (e.g., Blais 2000, Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995). When low-income voters abstain from voting, it is because they lack resources (e.g., Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980), or because of the alienating effects of high income inequality (recently, Anderson & Beramendi 2012, Pontusson & Rueda 2010, Solt 2008, but also Schattschneider 1960). And, the presence of low-income peoples' parties is more often attributed to the organization of production in society (Iversen & Soskice 2009), the strength of unions and other class-based organizations (e.g., Huber & Stephens 2001), and not the strategic actions of party elites and other office seekers (Bartolini 2000).

The incentives created by electoral geography may also have implications for the way attitudes about social policy develop (Stage 1). While political economists often assume fixed (Stage 1) preferences, the political psychology literature suggests that there are opportunities for attitudes to be framed, primed, or otherwise manipulated by election-motivated elites (Gilens 1999). Bartels (2005, 23), for example, provides evidence that support for more limited social policy "derived in considerable part from 'unenlightened' considerations of self-interest on the part of people who did not recognize the implications of Bush's tax cuts for their own economic well-being or their broader political values." Although the implications of electoral geography for public opinion formation are beyond the scope of this research, it seems reasonable to expect that if low-income Americans were often pivotal in the allocation of congressional seats, we might observe higher levels of public support for more generous social policy. That is, the incentives created at Stage 3 in the policy-making process to build and cultivate a low-income constituency also likely has effects on the structure of public discussions about social policy – whether more responsive social policy serves

as a rallying point – and, ultimately, on the structure of public opinion.

In looking for other explanations for cross-national differences in the political representation of low-income voters, it may also be the case that low-income peoples' parties are less likely to enter governing coalitions (Stage 4) once elected, or that low-income peoples' parties are less effective in passing their most preferred policies (Stage 5). Both of these explanations, I suspect, can be quickly dismissed, but in any case, are their systematic treatment is beyond the scope of this project.[3]

A Theory of Political Representation and Party Entry

The theory of political representation and party entry presented here echoes Aldrich (2011): Office- and policy-seeking politicians create parties when they facilitate the electoral victories that are necessary to achieve these goals. That is, parties are *endogenous* institutions in the sense that they are created to serve a strategic purpose, and can be adapted to their strategic context over time. Aldrich (2011) identifies three conditions under which ambitious politicians will coordinate across districts to form parties: First, they must share sufficient common interests. Second, these common interests must culminate in a problem that will require a solution over the long-term. Third, the current institutional arrangements, at best, inadequately address the common problem and, potentially, undermine an appropriate response. To these conditions, however, I add a fourth, ultimately most important, tenant: For ambitious politicians to coordinate across districts in their appeals to a specific (here, low-income) constituency, this must be a viable strategy. That is, this constituency's vote-to-seat mapping must render the new party an important force in government formation and/or legislation; office-seeking politicians could otherwise secure seats by strategically crafting appeals to local constituents *as members of existing parties*. Important changes in electoral geography, therefore, that alter the vote-to-seat mapping of different groups in society, represent new electoral opportunities for party formation, and strategic entry.

Electoral geography, therefore, has two important implications for the quality of the political representation of low-income and working class citizens:

First, as suggested by the analysis above, two-party competition ought to occur only rarely, when low-income voters have incentives to abandon their own party. That is, two-party competition ought to occur only when the vote-to-seat mapping for low-income citizens significantly undermines the viability of a low-income peoples' party, and low-income voters can secure more favorable policy by voting for another party. In the example above, perfectly heterogenous districts combined with turnout bias to ensure that a low-income peoples' party would not win a single seat. However, when the electoral geography ensures that the low-income peoples' party would win some seats in the legislature, the opportunities for policy gains keep the low-income peoples' party in the electoral contest.

[3] Iversen & Soskice (2006) show, for example, that left governments occur about as frequently as right governments, overall, and are especially likely under PR electoral rules.

Second, this analysis suggests an explanation for new party entry. Notice that while Aldrich's (2011) conditions for party formation might characterize long periods of time without new parties emerging, an emphasis on electoral geography provides some intuition about *when* we ought to see parties enter electoral contests, and about which parties ought to succeed, at least until new electoral geographies emerge. (A stable electoral geography may contribute to the appearance of "frozen" party systems.) Viewed from this perspective, for example, it is not surprising that we often see new parties form at the beginning of decades, following censuses, and during national conversations about who lives where. More specifically, this analysis focuses on four factors that have the potential to change the geographic distribution of income groups across electoral district boundaries, and create new incentives to represent a low-income constituency:

Internal migration is an important source of new electoral opportunities. As the next few sections (and a large historical literature) suggest, there are important differences in North American and European patterns of internal migration.

Changes in local conditions may also change electoral geography. For example, extreme droughts may change the relative standing of previously prosperous agricultural workers over a large geographic area, creating a new low-income constituency, with new interests and demands.

Immigration, particularly when the acquisition of citizenship and voting rights are straightforward and large groups of immigrants cluster in geographic space, has the capacity to change at least local electoral geography.

Electoral reform, including suffrage expansion or restriction, redistricting, and the creation of new districts, will intentionally (often strategically) alter the mappings of votes-to-seats for different income groups.

Notice that, in order to induce candidate coordination across districts and the formation of parties, each of these electoral-geography-changing phenomena must affect the vote-to-seat mapping of low-income voters in a significant number of districts: If the effects of internal migration, for example, are localized, candidates need only tailor their appeals to local interests. Instead, if large shares of the low-income population re-locate to common districts, then there may be new opportunities for party entry. Thus, as the first empirical implication of this theory of party entry suggests, new electoral opportunities are rare, and new parties rarely form.[4]

The first part of the following empirical analysis, therefore, does two things: First, by identifying periods of significant internal migration, this section justifies attention on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century for examining new electoral opportunities that

[4]Although patterns of internal migration, immigration, and perhaps even changes in local conditions, could reflect incentives of low-income voters to (re-)locate in those places in which they are well-represented, this seems unlikely. Electoral reforms, by contrast, are clearly endogenous to the electoral process, and may reflect the incentive structures of current office-holders. Further, to the extent that those office-holders can improve their re-election chances by establishing a low-income peoples' party, party formation may be endogenous to electoral reform.

emerge exogenously – from outside the existing party system. Second, this section suggests a reason why the entry of new low-income peoples' parties occurred only rarely after 1930, especially in the US: Because internal migration was generally more limited after 1930 (at least until the late 1970s), electoral opportunities for new low-income peoples' parties were also limited.

The next set of empirical implications concerns *where* – which districts – new parties will contest. Focusing on a period of significant population movement, change in local conditions, immigration, and suffrage expansion and redistricting in North America and Europe, the next section ties new party entries to changes in specific electoral geographies: New low-income peoples' parties identify districts in which the electoral power of low-income voters has dramatically increased, and put up their candidates there. New parties rarely contest districts without real changes in demography, even when low-income voters are pivotal.

Because the data used to provide empirical support are new and the result of fairly complex construction, Section 3 also provides some general detail about the mapping of income using historical, individual-level census data. In the end, this section broadens its scope, and replicates the analysis of populist entry in the US, for several other contemporary democracies (Canada, Great Britain, and Sweden). Each analysis focuses on who moves, and to where, and on how this might alter the distribution of electoral power across income groups. Further, each analysis will examine the development of agrarian and labor party platforms, in light of *where* the new electoral opportunities emerged. If low-income peoples' parties form and enter electoral contests when low-income citizens are favored by the vote-to-seat mappings of new electoral geographies, the policies they advocate ought to reflect the interests of the newly pivotal voters: Specifically, if the newly pivotal low-income voters are urban industrial workers, then we might expect the low-income people's party to seek protections specific to work in the manufacturing sector (e.g., limited work days, insurance programs). Alternatively, if the new electoral geography favors rural *agricultural* low-income citizens, then the new low-income peoples' parties would naturally campaign on issues that benefit this constituency (e.g., investment in transportation infrastructure, price standards).[5]

(A theory of political representation and party entry, that emphasizes the role of electoral geography, also has implications for voter behavior: Specifically, to the extent that an electoral geography favors a low-income voting bloc, parties and candidates have incentives to maximize its electoral power. That is, they have incentives to ensure that all low-income citizens turnout to vote, and that they vote as a bloc.[6] If, alternatively, few legislators rely on the electoral support of low-income citizens, turnout rates among low-income voters ought to be lower than turnout rates among more electorally powerful income groups, and cohesion will be undermined by the strategic incentives of local candidates, who may mobilize on cross-cutting issues. Jusko (2015) explores these implications of electoral geography for

[5]In the larger book project, two of the country case studies, Norway and Sweden, will also briefly examine the implications of electoral reform for the fortunes of low-income peoples' parties.

[6]These expectations – that low-income citizens are more likely to turnout, and to vote as a bloc when they are more frequently pivotal – may be seen as a generalization of Tingsten (1975), who claimed that the electoral participation within a group rises with the relative strength of that group in a district, was a law of comparative politics.

American political behavior.)

Contributions

The beginning of this manuscript used a five-stage model of democratic policy-making to focus attention on the incentives that are created by electoral geography, or the ways that votes for different groups in a society map into legislative seats. By emphasizing basic electoral power, and the ways in which electoral geography shapes the incentives of legislators, this framework provides a powerful way to explain differences in the quality of political representation across groups within a society, and for similar groups across cities, states, or countries. Here, I focus on low-income citizens because their share of the electorate can be fixed and equal across systems (i.e., they comprise 33 percent of the voters in each country), and because their preferences over policy may be more easily assumed. This electoral geography framework, however, could be extended to compare the electoral power and policy success of ethnic and racial minorities, for example, or the implications of proposed electoral reforms for the improved (or diminished) quality of equal representation.

In some ways, an emphasis on electoral geography is old-fashioned: Political analysts, especially those in SMD systems, have long been concerned with how electoral rules interact the social geographies of their societies, to create or undermine support for specific parties. In an attempt to demonstrate that "geographical or natural factors have contributed very materially in creating the conditions which determine political predilections" (432), Krebheil (1916), for example, shows that the composition of the local labor force is strongly related to election outcomes: "When the laboring class is most numerous in a county constituency the chances are that it will incline to the Liberal or Labor party" (Krebheil 1916, 424). Similar district-level analysis led Tingsten (1975) to introduce a "law of the social centre of gravity," that a group's electoral participation increases with its relative size, in each electoral district (Gosnell 1937). Johnston, Pattie & Allsopp (1988), especially, has extended this analysis in a careful treatment of neighborhood effects to show that, for example, levels of class voting in Britain depend upon the class composition of each district (see also Johnston, Propper, Sarker & Jones 2005). That is, whether or not a particular citizen identifies as "working class" – and votes accordingly – is dependent upon whether she lives in a predominantly working-class neighborhood These neighborhood effects are usually attributed to local networks: "Most social networks are dominated by people of a particular political persuasion, whose net influence on their fellow-members exceeds that of those having a minority persuasion" (Johnston & Pattie 2003, 346).

What is often missing, of course, from these earlier "input/output" analyses of electoral geography is a recognition of how electoral geography shapes the strategic incentives of voters, candidates, and parties.[7] The mechanism that links electoral geography to public policy lies in how potential vote-to-seat mappings vary across groups in society and structure

[7]Johnston et al. (2005) do include "local pressure" in their revised list of Miller's (1977) list of mechanisms by which neighborhood effects might operate, but do not consider how mobilization incentives vary across districts, or evaluate local pressure, relative to other mechanism.

the strategic interactions of these political actors – this is the main theoretical contribution of this paper, and larger book project.[8]

This manuscript also makes a significant departure from earlier analyses of the formation of parties and party systems: As Kalyvas (1996) suggests, many analyses of party formation see parties as the inevitable result of a shared concern or grievance. The formation of parties takes enormous effort, however, and the costs and benefits to political entrepreneurs warrant explicit attention. Further, an analysis of candidates' and voters' incentives, as suggested above, can offer clear empirical implications for when and where we ought to see new parties entering electoral competition.

Because preferences and voters' decisions are likely endogenous to the political incentives created by electoral geography, I focus instead on the electoral geography of well-defined income groups, and especially the geographic distribution of low-income voters. Within-country analyses will justify this focus on income groups, rather than occupational categories, in part because it is consistent with the way in which (at least some) political activists thought about their potential constituency: "We know that the interests of rural and urban labor are the same and that their enemies are the controllers of credit, commerce and land that others must use, those who by our present laws have the power to collect from workers, interest, and unjust freights and rents" (*Farmers' Alliance and Nebraska Independent* Apr. 7, 1892, in Pollack (1962)). Further, a careful read of social democratic/labor and agrarian/populist party platforms from this early period suggests that these low-income peoples' parties shared many interests, although specific calls for reform reflected the relative electoral strength of urban and rural voters.

Measuring electoral power, however, is complicated by two empirical challenges: First, for low-income voters, the income distribution must be evaluated within each district. Because district boundaries change frequently, estimates of electoral power are specific to particular time periods. Further, because census geography generally does not match electoral geography, each set period requires, that each enumeration district – often a city block – be individually allocated to an electoral district. Second, seats must be allocated as if an election had been held, and low-income citizens voted en masse and as a bloc. Later sections will provide both more detail and descriptive analysis of the electoral power of low-income voters in a variety of contemporary and historical settings. The second contribution of this project, then, lies in the data-sets that allow the historical electoral geography of income to be examined in reliable detail.

[8]Some political economists (e.g. Callander 2005) have analyzed the implications of electoral geography for the strategic selection of national party platforms. However, as Rodden (2010) argues, most political economists have ignored the moderating role that electoral geography might play in formal models of political and economic outcomes.

2 Local Population Change and Electoral Opportunities

Under which conditions will political entrepreneurs mobilize a new constituency, rather than standing as candidates for existing parties? Specifically, what happens to political entrepreneurs' incentive structures, such that coordination across districts and the formation of new parties seems like the optimal way to pursue their electoral and policy goals? When will low-income citizens stand up to form their own parties?

Low-income peoples' parties are formed by office-seeking political entrepreneurs when electoral geography changes in a way that favors the representation of low-income citizens. In the stylized example, when a fully-integrated electoral geography is replaced with an electoral geography that is more segregated, the vote-to-seat mapping for income groups improves so that a low-income peoples' party is now a viable way for candidates to pursue their goals. Prior to this change, efforts to mobilize low-income citizens will be proportionate to the difference between the shares of middle- and high-income citizens; especially middle-income candidates will recruit only as many low-income voters as they need to form a winning coalition. Dramatic changes in electoral geography, therefore, represent new opportunities to mobilize a low-income constituency, and to form a low-income peoples' party.[9]

(The assumptions necessary to sustain the stylized example provide some important insight into when, in addition to changes in electoral geography, we ought to observe new party entry. Specifically, the incentives to vote strategically, which undermine opportunities for party entry, are assumed to be structured by preferences over redistributive policy, or at least that there is a low-, middle-, high-income group ordering in preference, such that low-income voters prefer the policies of the middle-income parties, to the policies that would be implemented by a government representing the interests of high-income voters. Office-seeking candidates may attempt, instead, to shift the main dimension of electoral competition, with new electoral geographies and opportunities for entry.)

In this section, I track local population changes for (generally) stable geographic units, and over the 1880-2010 period, to justify later attention on changes in the electoral geography of income during the 1880-1930 period. Although dramatic and relatively widespread changes in local conditions will not be evident, this strategy will identify periods in which internal migration and immigration have the capacity to change the vote-to-seat mappings of different income groups. (Periods of electoral reform will also be noted.) This strategy will provide a way to compare periods of local population change and the timing of new party entry: if electoral geography effectively structures entry decisions, new parties should en-

[9]Bawn, Cohen, Karol, Masket, Noel & Zaller (2012, 579) present a slightly different model of party formation, in which coalitions of policy-demanding interest groups "form coalitions to nominate and elect politicians committed to their common program." The important difference, between Aldrich's (2011) and Bawn et al.'s (2012) accounts of party formation, lies in the nature of the interaction between party activists and incumbents: Aldrich sees the party as constraining office-seeking politicians as they attempt to be responsive to their local constituents. Alternatively, local interests dominate in Bawn et al., and play a central determining role in who receives each party's nomination. a "group-centric view of parties," but with an important role for leadership. Notice, however, that regardless of whether parties are mobilized by party elites, or policy-demanding interest groups, both sets of actors require a favorable electoral geography to pursue their goals.

ter electoral contests especially when we observe dramatic changes in the composition of electoral districts.

What are the other explanations for party entry? Earlier accounts of party formation have often see parties as the natural consequence of a widespread grievance or concern. This treatment, in my view, neglects two important features of political life: At any moment, there exists an important sense of injustice or concern that is shared by some subset of the population, and which never becomes an organizing issues for politics or the basis of partisan mobilization. Second, the largely functionalist literature on party formation assumes away the problem of collective action by "positing a direct and automatic leap from common interests to organization and action," as Kalyvas (1996, 11) points out in his analysis of Christian Democratic parties. That is, generally little attention is paid to who bares the costs of mobilizing a new constituency: what changes such that the formation of new parties makes sense in the cost-benefit analysis of electoral competition? As this discussion suggests, the timing of party entry provides critical insight into which features are especially important for party system development.

Measuring Local Population Change

This first empirical section attempts to do two things: First, this section identifies periods of significant local population. As a consequence, this section justifies later attention on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century for examining new electoral opportunities. Second, this section suggests a reason why the entry of new low-income peoples' parties occurred only rarely after 1930: Because local population change was more limited after 1930, especially in the US, electoral opportunities for new parties, generally, were equally limited. In combination with districts that are increasingly heterogeneous – that is, the vote-to-seat mapping became increasingly biased against low-income voters – incentives for party entry weakened.

Tracking changes in the electoral geography of income over long periods of time is complicated by frequent and concurrent electoral reform and redistricting. As suggested above, changes in the electoral geography of income – the vote-to-seat mappings for different income groups – are generated by three factors, in addition to electoral reform: internal migration, immigration, and local shocks. The changes induced by any of these factors must be geographically concentrated in order to alter the vote-to-seat mappings of national income groups. For example, if low-income citizens are just as likely as high-income citizens to relocate, and all relocate in a random way, we would not expect changes in the frequency with each income groups is pivotal in the allocation of legislative seats. Alternatively, if low-income citizens are more likely to move, and tend to relocate in geographically concentrated areas (because of similarly concentrated economic opportunities, for example), then even without income data, we would expect localized population changes to signal changes in the electoral power of low-income voters.

Here, therefore, I calculate population changes in small, stable geographic units, relative

to national population changes, and identify periods and regions that experience significant local population changes. Specifically, I estimate

$$\begin{aligned}\delta_t^d &= \text{Local Population Change}_t^d \\ &= \left(\frac{Population_t^d - Population_{t-1}^d}{Population_{t-1}^d} - \frac{Population_t^N - Population_{t-1}^N}{Population_{t-1}^N}\right)^2 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $Population$ levels are reported for $d = 1..D$ districts (actually, subnational units), at time t (coinciding with the census in each country, or each decade if other data are used), and N designates the national population. $Population$ estimates are generally derived from census data (for Europe, these data are reported in Rothenbacher 2002, Rothenbacher 2005), and are reported for the smallest geographic area that remains consistent over the twentieth century. In the US, for example, the boundaries of counties remain relatively consistent over time. In other countries, provinces or states are small and numerous enough to provide useful information about local population change. When major administrative boundaries shift over time, or new subnational units are created, observations from earlier years are matched to these new boundaries to allow, as much as possible, for stable unit observations throughout the 1870-2010 period. Subnational units are included in the analysis for as many periods for which δ_t^d can be calculated; the number of observations varies as states or provinces are created, or combined. Finally, when data are not available for a particular year (e.g., 1940), estimates for the next decade (e.g., 1950) are based on changes over the previous two decades (i.e., since 1930).

To generate a national summary for each decade, I estimate

$$\delta_t = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_d \delta^d}{D_t}}. \tag{2}$$

This estimate of the rate of local population change gives a measure that is similar to Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) in least squares regression analysis: It will be approximately zero when local population change mirrors national population change consistently across the country. Values larger than zero will indicate the average rate at which local population change deviates from national population change. For example, a value of $\delta_t = 0.10$ implies that local populations were growing (in this case), by an average of about ten percentage points more than the national population, as a whole. Table 1 provides a summary of the data used in this analysis.

Figure 1 reports the interquartile distribution of estimated values of average local population change (δ), by decade. In almost all countries, the values estimated for the 1880-1930 decades are generally large, reflecting rates of local population change that are quite different from national patterns of growth. Importantly, these values are typically lower in more recent decades, especially after 1980, suggesting the local population change increasingly approximated national trends. This suggests that electoral opportunities for party entry, created by population movement, were especially frequent early in the century. Note that estimates for the 1940s and 1950s should be interpreted with caution: data from 1940 are

Table 1: Estimates of Local Population Change

Country	Coverage Period	Unit of Analysis (D)	Mean (Std.Dev.)
Austria	1920-2000	State (9)	0.12 (0.16)
Belgium	1880-1930, 1950-2000	Arrondissement (43)	0.07 (0.02)
Canada	1880-2000	Province and territory (13)	0.35 (0.45)
Denmark	1880-2000	Region (14)	0.09 (0.06)
Finland	1920-1940, 1960-1990	Län (10)	0.06 (0.03)
France	1880-1930, 1950-2000	Department (85)	0.07 (0.03)
Germany	1880-1940, 1960-2000	Regierungsbezirk, Land (38)	0.13 (0.09)
Great Britain	1890-1930, 1950-2000	England: County. Scotland and Wales: Standard Region. (52)	0.12 (0.07)
Ireland	1880-2000	County (28)	0.07 (0.06)
Italy	1880, 1900-2000	Region (19)	0.06 (0.03)
Luxemburg	1880-1920, 1930-2000	Canton (13)	0.12 (0.05)
Norway	1890-2000	Amte/Fylke (19)	0.09 (0.06)
Sweden	1880-2000	Län (25)	0.08 (0.06)
Switzerland	1880-2000	Canton (26)	0.07 (0.02)
United States	1880-2000	County (3023)	0.46 (0.37)

NOTE. This Table reports the countries and periods included in the analysis of local population change. The number of districts reported (i.e., D) is for 2000, or the latest year for which data are available. Please refer to the Appendix A for more technical details of this analysis.

not available for five countries. In these case, observations for 1940 are simply missing; estimates for these countries for 1950, reflect changes since 1930. Later analysis will exclude war-time observations.

Examining the geographic distribution of these measure of local population change, within countries, can be helpful in validating the nature of the electoral opportunities. For example, in looking at the US (top panel of Figure 2), we observe that most of the dramatic changes occurred in the Midwest and west, while population change in the northeast more closely approximated national trends. Although both types of local population change suggest that the electoral geography is changing in important ways, the different locations of change suggest that the nature of electoral opportunity is quite different. Finally, notice, as well, that Figure 2 replicates the time series that we observed in Figure 1: relatively high rates of local population change occur especially between 1880 and 1930, in both the US and in England, as well as during the post-1970 period of party system realignment in England.

When do New Parties Form?

Are new parties more likely to form and enter electoral competition following major changes in electoral geography that shift the balance of electoral power? There are important empirical challenges associated with answering this question. For example, which parties ought to be included in the analysis? Here, I use an inclusive set of new parties because this analysis aims to explain the decision to enter electoral competition: if decisions to coordinate across districts and form parties, as suggested here, are structured by incentives related to likely success, a more limited set of parties, selected with criteria related to success (e.g., seat thresholds, etc.) would exaggerate the relationship between changes in electoral geography and new party entry. Ideally, this analysis would identify new parties by the behavior of candidates: First, is there evidence of a coordinated decision to contest the election, as a direct challenge to existing parties? Can the decision to establish a party be attributed to a specific date? Second, is there evidence of cross-district coordination in campaigns? Does the new party field at least, say, four candidates in at least two districts in the first election following the decision to establish a party? Any party that meets these two criteria – a clear origin date, and some cross-district coordination of candidates in original elections – is included in this analysis. The complete list of new parties, and the supporting criteria, are list in Appendix 3.B, of the larger book project.[10]

[10]This list is largely drawn from Caramani (2000) and the Constituency Level Elections Archive (CLEA). Note that Caramani reports district level electoral returns only for those parties that earn at least five percent vote within one territorial unit. In fact, the criteria used here exclude some of the parties included in the CLEA database, or in Caramani (2000).

Figure 1: Rates of Local Population Change



NOTE. This Figure reports values of local population change (δ_t) for each country and decade.
SOURCE. Rothenbacher (2002, 2005).

Figure 2: Rates of Local Population Change in Canada and the US



NOTE. This Figure reports values of local population change (δ_t) for each Canadian and American region, and for each decade.
SOURCE. Canada: Statistics Canada (2014). "Table A2-14. Population of Canada, by Province, census dates, 1851-1976" and "Annual of Estimates of Population for Canada, Provinces and Territories, from July 1, 1971, to July 1, 2014." US: Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0. (Total population by state, and county.)

Figure 3: New Party Entry



NOTE. This Figure reports the total number of new parties entering electoral competition, for each decade and country.
SOURCE. Caramani (2000) and CLEA (2014).

Figure 3 reports the number of new parties formed each decade, between 1880 and 2010. Immediately apparent, of course, is that the average number of new parties, formed in any election, is very low – approximately 2. Second, new parties frequently form *following* the decades in which we observe high levels of local population change – in the 1920s, for example, and then in the post-1970 period. The correspondence is not perfect, however, and some within-country temporal variation may in the number of parties formed may reflect response to each country's politics. A multivariate analysis, however, will allow this relationship to be assessed more rigorously. Specifically, let the number of new parties that enter in each decade be a function of the average local population movement, described above in Eq. (2), for each country. Then, factors that represent change in policy preferences or demands (i.e., change in national economic conditions) or the quality of existing representation, can be evaluated along with local population change in their contribution to the variance in timing of party entry.

Table 2 reports coefficients from (ordinary least squares, probit, and negative binomial) regression analyses in which the dependent variable is the number of new parties entering each system, each decade (or, in Model 4, a binary indicator of new party entry). Each column corresponds to different (and increasing complex) specifications or a restricted sample. Although this analysis can be thought of as a difference-in-difference set-up (note the exclusion of country fixed effects), an alternative specification, a negative binomial model, may also be appropriate because the dependent variable is a count of the number of new parties – a variable that takes only non-negative integer values (Models 5 and 6).

The analysis presented in Table 2 also attempts to control for the effects of potentially confounding variables – those that might be associated with the formation of new parties *and* local population change. Especially dire economic conditions, for example, might drive local population movement, and generate demands for new forms of political representation. This analysis includes measures of change in per capita GDP for almost the full set of observations. For a smaller set of country decades, this analysis also includes change in the share earned by the top one percent of the income distribution, as a measure of changing income inequality. Finally, this analysis includes an indication of whether the rules governing elections changed over the previous decade, to expand suffrage rights, to alter the number of districts, or to adopt a new electoral formula. Electoral reforms that change the distribution of electoral power across groups and regions in particular may create new electoral opportunities for entry.

In each of these specifications, the estimated effects for the key independent variable, local population change (δ_t), are consistently positive, and generally meet conventional standards of statistical significance. Periods of electoral reform, which more obviously change vote-to-seat mappings (often intentionally), generally do not contribute to new party entry, possibly because existing elites may implement changes in electoral rules *in response* to the entry of strong challengers. Other variables, like those that reflect changes in economic conditions, and which might signal change in policy demands, have more ambiguous effects: Decreases in GDP per capita are associated with new party entry, but the effect of changes in income inequality (in a more restricted sample) are estimated with more variance. The most con-

servative estimate (from Model 5) suggests that relatively moderate local population change (i.e., an estimate of $\delta = 0.08$, or an average rate of local population change that is eight percentage points greater than the national rate of growth) is associated with almost 3 new parties forming and standing for election.

This analysis therefore, provides some evidence that local population change represents new electoral opportunities for office-seeking elites. The next section of this analysis explores the strategic entry of new parties at the district level: Do new parties enter those district where demographic changes have altered the vote-to-seat mapping of low-income voters, and increased their electoral power?

Table 2: Predicting New Party Entry

	DV: New Party Entries				
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) Probit	(5) NBREG
Local Population Change (δ_t)	4.600**	3.279**	9.814	1.997	1.263**
	(1.456)	(1.438)	(5.105)	(1.231)	(0.514)
SMD electoral rules		2.174**			
		(0.601)			
Suffrage expansion		2.885**			
		(1.172)			
Electoral Reform		-0.472			
		(1.180)			
Change in GDP per capita			-0.044		
			(0.028)		
Change in Top 1% Income Share			5.041*		
			(2.464)		
Intercept	2.449**	1.471**	4.047**	0.425**	0.920**
	(0.363)	(0.432)	(1.106)	(0.169)	(0.120)
α					1.064
					(0.171)
N	161	161	79	161	161
Countries	15	15	12	15	15
(Pseudo) R^2	0.0531	0.135	0.0961	0.0238	0.011

NOTES. This Table reports coefficients, estimated in a series of regression models in which the dependent variable is the number of new parties entering electoral competition in each decade, as a function of local population change, electoral rules, or simple count of the number new parties (that meet the criteria outlined in the text) contesting elections, in each decade. (Standard errors are reported in parentheses; '**'p<0.01, '*' p<0.05).

3 The Electoral Geography of Income and the Strategic Entry of Low-Income Peoples' Parties

This section is about who is moving where during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in the US, and about how this movement shaped the electoral incentives of political entrepreneurs. The analysis presented in the previous section focused our attention on a key period, particularly between 1880 and 1900, when especially local population change was substantial. Of course, population movement between 1880 and 1920 period receives ample academic attention. The demographic changes that are considered here, however, are more specific than the well-documented trends of movement towards the frontier: How does the electoral geography change during this period? Specifically, how does the distribution of electoral power across income groups change? Where are low-income voters pivotal in the election of Representatives? How do their specific needs create or undermine incentives for different types of representation? This section considers these questions, and explores how American electoral geography shaped the incentives of America's most successful third party, the People's Party, and their ultimate decline, using individual-level census data from 1880-1900. Then, this section broadens the scope of this analysis to analysis the strategic entry of other low-income peoples' parties in other developed democracies (Canada, Great Britain, and Sweden).[11]

Mapping the Electoral Geography of Income

Individual-level census data offer important advantages for this analysis: First, the levels of aggregation used in official reports rarely coincide to electoral districts. Individual-level data, however, can be matched to congressional districts with a high degree of accuracy (more on this below). Second, with individual-level data, the analysis can be restricted to the eligible electorate. The 1881 electorate officially included all men, over the age of 18. However, there were also important more or less formal restrictions on African American suffrage rights that an analysis of individual-level census data can accommodate. Finally, with information about wages and salaries, individual-level census data can be used to examine the composition of electoral districts, including the concentration of poverty *within* districts, and overall and within-district levels of income inequality. This analysis, then, proceeds in four steps: For each census period, census geography is matched to electoral geography, and census data-sets are restricted to eligible voters. Second, using historical and archival resources, income and wages are estimated as precisely as possible for occupation groups. Then, the electoral power of low-income voters is assessed for each electoral district, and for each census period. Finally, this analysis concludes with estimates of the change in the electoral power of low-income voters, and how this change structured where Populist (and, in the larger book project) Progressive candidates entered electoral contests.

For each individual, the 1880 US Census reports their state, county, and enumeration dis-

[11] Each of these countries, plus Norway, are treated to focused case studies the large book project.

Table 3: Matching Census to Electoral Geography

	1880	1900
Census Units	255 counties 18,381 enumeration districts	269 counties 24,000 enumeration districts
Electoral Units	293 congressional districts	352 congressional districts

NOTE. This Table reports the numbers of nested census geographic units, which matched to the corresponding electoral units for the 1880, 1900, and 1910 censuses.

trict. Enumeration districts are those areas covered by a single enumerator, are unique within counties, and vary in size and across censuses. For most of the US, congressional district boundaries are designed to coincide with county boundaries. For example, the first district of New York, for the 47th Congress (1881-1883) is comprised of Suffolk, Queens, and Richmond counties. However, congressional district boundaries in cities often correspond to local political boundaries (i.e., wards and assembly districts), or are defined by streets: New York's eighth district includes wards 9, 15, 16, and "that portion of 18 lying within 14th St., 26th St., and Fourth and Sixth Aves." (Martis 1982, 248). Enumeration district descriptions can be used to match households to this and other urban districts, and are small enough – often only a city block – that they very rarely straddle congressional districts boundaries. (Rarely, a household cannot be allocated to a specific congressional district, and is excluded from the analysis.) The timing of re-districting can complicate the allocation of city wards and assembly districts to congressional districts: The ward and assembly district boundaries that were used to define the 47th congressional district boundaries, for New York, for example, were revised before the census, which describes enumeration districts with reference to the new boundaries. In cases like New York in 1880 (also, St. Louis), old boundary maps also provided an important link between American census and electoral geography. In the end, almost ninety-nine percent of the potentially voting eligible populations were allocated to congressional districts for the 1880, 1900, and 1910 censuses.

As suggested above, a second important advantage that comes from working with individual-level census data is the ability to restrict analysis to eligible voters. Suffrage was nationally restricted to male citizens, aged 21 and older, until 1920. Registration requirements, white primaries, literacy tests, and poll taxes, however, combined to dramatically restrict the suffrage rights of African Americans and poor whites in the South; individual-level census data will allow national analysis to be replicated (in the larger book project) for white native-born citizens only, and for regional subpopulations.

The second step in mapping the electoral geography of income involves, of course, the measurement of income. Although there was significant interest in the characteristics of national income distributions on both sides of the Atlantic during the late nineteenth century (see, e.g., Wright 1900), income data were not routinely collected by censuses. Only the Canadian census (to my knowledge) collected information about wages and salary during

this period. Instead, wage data were collected through surveys of firms, and compiled in government reports like the *The First Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor* (1886), and the *General Report of the Manual Labour Classes in the United Kingdom* (Giffen 1893). To collect these data in the US, the Bureau of Labor dispatched fifteen field agents to gather data about wages, the costs of living and production from "about forty industries, seven hundred and fifty-nine establishments, and about one hundred and fifty thousand employés" (although only 582 reported wage data), with the goal of understanding variation of wages in different parts of the country. Because of this extensive coverage, and because the data are reported separately for men, women, and children, with the average number of days and hours worked in each occupation category, the BLS data are generally recognized as the best available for this period (Long 1960, 9). Nevertheless, the BLS wage data are available only for those in manufacturing jobs.

Wage or income data for other trade and service occupations were compiled from a second Bureau of Labor report (Wright 1900), that standardizes all wage data included in any national or state-level official reports, from 1886 to 1900. This second resource offers two important advantages. First, wage data are often reported at the state-level, allowing better estimates of national averages, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the incorporation of state-level wage estimates when there are enough states reporting wages for a particular occupation and year. (This allows for some cost-of-living differences to be accommodated in estimates of income.) Second, wage data are reported for narrower occupation-industry categories (rather than industry categories). Here, the analysis uses the wages associated with the modal occupation for each industry category.

A report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Bureau of Statistics, *Wages of Farm Labor* reports average monthly earnings, with board, for farmers and agricultural workers, by state. These data were originally collected and reported by crop correspondents; Holmes (1914) then standardized the measures and periods to provide averages for each state and year.[12]

Finally, information on the salaries of professionals, teachers, and public servants from this

[12]One might worry that the use of wage data would be especially misleading for agricultural workers: they may have had access to resources that are not reflected in annual wages. However, as late as 1940, there was "considerable overlap among the three classes of agricultural workers – operators, unpaid family workers, and hired workers. Sharecroppers and share tenants are customarily grouped in the operator category, although in terms of economic status there is often little difference between them and wage workers" (Ducoff 1945, 21). Further, Ducoff (1945, 22) reports that "many agricultural workers do not remain in any one category during the course of a year. Operators of low-income farms may also work for wages on other farms, and unpaid family workers may work for pay for a while on the family farm or on another farm." Agricultural workers may also receive use of dwelling and gardens, as well as a stable and feed for livestock, food, firewood, etc. (Holmes 1914, 49). For all agricultural workers, this analysis uses "average wages of outdoor labor of men on farms, per month, in hiring by the year, with board" (Holmes 1914, 30,32). Annual earnings are calculated by multiplying monthly wages by twelve, rather than the more standard-for-agricultural-workers eight, to capture the flexibility in position and near-cash benefits agricultural workers receive: Although these data are available only for 1909, Holmes (1914, 52) estimates the average cash values of in-kind benefits to range, from about $7 to about $21 each month – between about a third and one full month of the national average monthly wage. As a consequence, cash incomes of agricultural workers are likely *over-estimated* – and yet, as discussed in the text, still fall short of estimates of poverty thresholds from this period.

Figure 4: Average Annual Earnings, 1880



NOTE. This Figure reports the average annual earnings for each industry group.

period comes from a variety of resources: For professionals (not clerks or bookkeepers), in finance, insurance, and real estate, this analysis uses the salary of members of the House of Representatives ($5000.00). Similarly, the average salary of federal district judges ($3,391) serves as an estimate for legal professionals. Teachers salaries are state-specific, and come from the annual report of the Commissioner for Education. In sum, this strategy yields at least 170 distinct wage or salary estimates for each census period. All wage data are reported as (nominal) annual salaries, and are reported only for full-time male employees. Figure **??** reports average annual salaries for each industry-group, and the 1880 census.

Table 4 provides a summary of the national income distributions, and indeed, measures of the levels of inequality for each census period, alongside contemporary measures of income inequality. Note the remarkable similarity in the historical and contemporary estimates of income inequality for each period, especially in the estimates of the Gini coefficients. There is some evidence that earnings have been increased concentrated among the highest quintile of income earners. However, the general pattern of income distribution that we observe in the late nineteenth century data, across quintiles and in the income ratios, is generally maintained in the current income distributions. (Table 4 also includes estimates of income

Table 4: Characteristics of the US National Income Distributions

	1880	1900	2010
Gini index	0.421	0.494	0.469
Income Ratios of Selected Percentiles			
90/10	6.21	8.25	11.67
95/50	3.96	3.11	3.66
50/10	1.72	3.67	4.15
Shares of Household Income Quintiles			
Q1	6%	4%	3%
Q2	10%	7%	9%
Q3	10%	14%	15%
Q4	36%	36%	23%
Q5	48%	39%	50%

NOTE. This Table reports characteristics of the national income distributions, for the US in 1880, 1900, and 1910. For comparison, the same statistics are reported for the current American income distributions.
SOURCE. US (2010): Current Population Reports, Series P60-204. "Table A-3. Selected Measures of Household Income Dispersion: 1967 to 2010."

inequality generated by the US Census Bureau, for comparison.)

A key challenge in analyzing changes in electoral geography – that is, changes in the way a group's votes map into seats – lies in the number of different ways groups can be identified. For example, if official poverty lines are used to identify low-income citizens, groups of different sizes might be identified for each country. This would complicate comparisons of statistics like the share of seats a low-income voting bloc might elect. So, to facilitate a comparative analysis of the implications of electoral geography, low-income citizens are defined here as the first third of the national (market) income distribution. In the US, this corresponds to an annual salary of less than $166 in 1880, about $200 in 1890, and $212 in 1900. Note that these estimates quite a bit lower than Hunter's (1904, 52) "most conservative" estimates of $300 per year (approximately the sixty-fifth percentile of the income distribution in Southern state, in 1900), for an average sized family in the South, and $460 in the North (the thirty-fifth percentile): "if any working-class family should be unable to obtain [these] wage[s], they would in all likelihood be unable to obtain the necessities for maintaining physical efficiency." In fact, other observers estimated that about half of the American population would be considered "very poor," and another thirty-eight percent would be "poor" (Spahr 1900, cited in Hunter 1904, 45). There is little doubt, therefore, that these thresholds focus attention on the most desperate families during this period – a group with significant grievance, but with how much electoral power?[13]

[13]One might worry that, by using a threshold based on the national income distribution, differences in the concentration of low-income citizens merely reflects differences in the cost of living. As noted in the text,

To answer this question, Figures 5 brings together the first three steps in this analysis, (1) matching electoral and census geography, (2) estimating wages on the basis of occupation, industry, and location, and (3) calculating differences in the share of low-income voters in each district, over time. The top panel reports the geographic concentration of low-income (adult male) citizens in the congressional districts, in 1892 (Figure 5).

A word of caution is in order: Almost all of the individual records collected in the 1890 census were destroyed in a fire in 1921. To estimate the geographic distribution of low-income voters in 1892, this analysis assumes that most of the movement observed between 1880 and 1900 occurred between 1880 and 1892 – a reasonable assumption, given changes in county populations – and that most occupations did not change over this period. Although individual-level records were destroyed, official census level reports, including county-level population estimates, remain. At least the rank order of county-level population estimates are stable between 1890 and 1900, with correlation estimates of approximately 0.97 (this correlation is slightly lower between 1880 and 1900, at 0.96). In those counties with the largest population increases (those in the upper quartile), an average of about 57 percent of the increase occurred between 1880 and 1890; in those counties that saw their populations decline, about 74 percent of the change occurred between 1880 and 1890. The assumption of stability in occupations is also generally reasonable: Using the NAPP linked census data, about 55 percent of those who were working in 1880, were working in the same industry in 1900. This percentage is higher among the 67 percent who did not move during this period – about 62 percent – and lower among those who moved to a new state, about 40 percent. With these assumptions in mind, individuals observed in the 1900 census were matched to 1892 congressional district boundaries. To estimate the electoral geography of income, I have used wage data reported for 1890, allowing for local shocks in earnings to be accommodated. While this strategy likely overestimates population movement between 1880 and 1890, to the extent that this bias exists, it introduces noise into later analysis: If parties enter where local population changes most favor low-income voters, and local changes in population are, in some places, exaggerated, this should reduce the predictive value of my measure of change in the electoral power of low-income voters, and increase the variance with which coefficients describing this relationship are estimated.

With this attenuation bias noted, we can return to Figure 5: In 1892, there was a very clear geographic concentration of low-income citizens in the South, but also in the Midwest. What is also clear is that changes in electoral geography are also geographically concentrated: We observe real increases in the percent of low-income citizens, especially in the Midwest. In most congressional districts in the South, the electoral power of low-income citizens *decreased* between 1880 and 1892. (Although most of the western states are relatively darkly shaded, in they generally fall into the "no change" category.)

This focus on the changing electoral power of low-income voters within districts provides analytic leverage on the mechanism at work: Are political entrepreneurs taking advantage of *new* opportunities when they coordinate across districts, and form new parties? Are polit-

however, state- or region-specific estimates of wages are used whenever data were sufficient. Consequently, some of these differences are incorporated into estimates of national income distribution.

ical entrepreneurs, for example, mobilizing movers and immigrants, who may come without strong party ties? Or, do political entrepreneurs see advantages in mobilizing groups with long-standing grievances and new electoral power? These questions are best addressed with qualitative evidence of party strategy, but it is helpful first to consider what drives the changes the electoral power of low-income voters that we observe in Figure 5.

Notice, for example, that districts in Michigan observe a dramatic increase in the share of men drawn from the first third of the national income distribution: Almost no one falls into in this category in 1880, while in 1900, about fifty percent do. In part, this has to do with the changing fortunes of Michigan's farmers, who were doing considerably better in 1880, relative to the national average earnings for agricultural workers, than they were in 1900. Holmes (1914) estimates that average monthly earnings for agricultural workers in 1880, in Michigan, and nationally, were $16.58 and $11.70. In 1890, Michigan farmers earned an average of $16.75, while the national average had increased to $14.59. Note that these earnings estimates put Michigan farmers above the poverty threshold in 1880 (i.e., in the second third of the national income distribution), but below the 1900 threshold. Similar changes in local conditions alter the electoral power of low-income voters in Kansas, as well.

How does internal migration affect the electoral power of low-income voters during this period? Obviously, when low-income voters move *into* a district, they increase the electoral power of low-income voters in that district (a "push" effect). However, when those earning higher incomes leave a district, they also increase the electoral power of low-income voters as a consequence (a "pull" effect). Analyzing the implications of internal migration is especially challenging when boundaries change as the population moves. Some insight, however, can be gained through an analysis of linked census data.[14] Overall, about thirty percent of men relocated to a different county or state between 1880 and 1900; about a quarter of these relocated to a different region (i.e., from the northeast to the Midwest, or the Midwest to the west, with each group about two percent of the total linked sample). Importantly, working-aged men who were in the lowest third of the market income distribution in 1880 were *less* likely to relocate to another state before 1900. While, in each region, migrants generally earn more than those who remained in same county during this period, the proportion of cross-state migrants earning low-incomes in 1900 is quite high in the Midwest (about thirty percent) and in the South (fifty percent), although not in the northeast or west (about eight percent in both regions). All of this suggests that, in fact, both the "push" and "pull" effects of internal migration are present, and they are quite important in changing the electoral geography of income during this period: Large proportions of district electorates (an average of about fifteen percent, but over fifty percent in twelve districts) had only recently moved to that state.

The third source of demographic transition in the US, between 1880 and 1900, of course, is immigration. About ten percent of the voting-aged men living in 1900, arrived here after 1880. About half of these immigrants settled in the northeast, and while (outside of the

[14]The North Atlantic Population Project has digitized and standardized the reporting of census data for several countries during this 1880-1930 period, and has linked observations across American censuses. See Minnesota Population Center (N.d.) documentation for more detail.

South) immigrants typically earned less on average than native born workers, they were unlikely to be counted in the bottom-third of the income distribution. One might suspect, therefore, that the arrival and geographic concentration of immigrants who become relatively well-off, therefore, could *reduce* the electoral power of the poor. In fact, this seems to be the case: more than half of those districts with the largest numbers of new arrivals (i.e., those districts in the top quartile, where immigrants comprise at least twenty percent of the district in 1900) experience a decline or no change in the electoral power of low-income voters.

Finally, American electoral geography was also altered between 1880 and 1892 when, after the Tenth Census, the size of the House of Representatives was increased by 32 seats, and again in 1891, by 24 seats. Seats were also added as North and South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah were admitted. These change in the size of the chamber coincided with an increase of *eighteen* districts in which low-income voters were now pivotal, for a total "delegation" of 138 Representatives. Although the total electoral power of low-income citizens – that is, the share of the seats a low-income bloc can elect – remained at about forty percent, these new districts nevertheless represented an opportunity for party entry, and for the mobilization of low-income voters.

A closer look at the geographic distribution of low-income voters in the five largest cities, in 1892, (Figure 6) is informative about the nature of this opportunity: In each congressional district, of each major city, low-income voters comprise less than twenty percent of the eligible voting population. Only about 6 percent of men living in New York earned less than the $460 Hunter (1904) suggested was necessary for fulfillment of basic needs. Even in those congressional districts in the city of St. Louis, which were surrounded by congressional districts in which low-income voters were over-represented, fewer than half earned less than $460. The urban workers generally earned much more than agricultural workers, and only rarely fell into the first-third of the national income distribution. As we shall see in the next section, this is not the case in Europe: Low-income citizens are often pivotal in the urban electoral districts of British and Swedish districts.

Because the construction of datasets used this analysis required several complicated steps, this section of the discussion has laid out features of the data, in some detail. Similar procedures were followed for each of the other countries included in this analysis, although in each case the best available data have been used. Hopefully, the detail here is sufficient to persuade a skeptical reader that these historical electoral geographies have been carefully constructed, from primary sources, and provide meaningful and reliable descriptions of the electoral context would-be political entrepreneurs faced. Later, archival materials will be used to confirm that, in fact, the electoral geography of income critically structured the incentives of new party elites.

The Populists and the "Third-Party Men"

When do parties have an incentive to stand as the party of low-income citizens? This section provides an empirical test of the argument presented above, that candidates will coordinate across districts to form parties when changes in electoral geography favor one group especially, and that these new parties will campaign on policy platforms that represent the interests of this group. Specifically, an empirical implication of the argument developed above is that new parties should contest those districts in which the group's electoral power has dramatically increased. This section uses estimates of the changing electoral power of low-income voters, developed in the previous section, to predict the People's Party entry.

The formation of the People's Party resulted from the explicit and strategic decisions of the leaders of three organizations, confederated labor, the 'silver men,' and especially the Farmers' Alliance. Over the course of 1891 and 1892, a series of conventions – labor in St. Louis, the silver men in Denver, and the Alliance in Cincinnati – consolidated the purpose and organization of each group so that when delegates of each finally convened in Omaha, Nebraska, in July 1892, "the new People's Party [was] a unit in its aggregation and combination of the tremendous organized forces." An Alliance leader stated that each " 'those several conventions... were all preliminary steps in an admirably-formulated plan for effective action in the coming campaign.' " (NYT July 3, 1892)

What becomes clear in a careful reading of accounts of the People's Party development is that this "plan" proceeded on a state-by-state, and district-by-district basis: Alliance leaders within each state deliberately chose whether to work within the Democratic party, or to coordinate as members of the new party. In the South, the Alliance men more often took control of the Democratic Party, and used its organization as its own. "The South has learned that it cannot trust the Republican Party. It will take no chances whatever, by dividing the Democratic vote, and so, while the Farmers' Alliance will exist as an organization, its members will vote with their old parties." (NYT April 9 1891) In Virginia, "the idea of the [Alliance] leaders is not to have any third party, but to make their demands within the ranks of the Democrats. If they do this, they can, they think, easily effect their purpose." (NYT April 5, 1891) In fact, this appears to be what happened:

> When the Democratic State Convention met on June 2 at Tampa, there was no Democratic Convention to meet. The People's Party men had control of it absolutely, and turned it into a State Convention of their own, assuming control of the Democratic machine. Three weeks before, the same thing happened in South Carolina, the Democratic State Convention having been turned into a People's Party Convention and adopting the People's platform. In Mississippi last week, at a Democratic County Convention it was found that only two of the delegates present did not belong to the new party.

The observer concludes, "The Democratic Party has simply been quietly swallowed." (NYT July 3, 1892) (In North Carolina, by contrast, Marion Butler led Alliance members in a revolt against the Democrats, and would eventually advocate "fusion" or outright cooperation with the North Carolina Republicans.)

Especially in the Midwest, candidates worked hard to coordinate and mobilize low-income voters in support of the new party. In St. Louis, in June 1891, the People's leadership "decided to make a special fight in Ohio, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Iowa." (NYT Jun 14, 1891) About a year later, Ignatius Donnelly, an early leader and "third-party man," described the organization in this way:

> The country is awake on this third party, as it has not been on any questions since it has not been since the war. Some compare it with the Greenback movement. The situation is different. The movement is more widespread. We have now 5,000,000 voters in the Alliance. We are sure to carry several States in the next election, and I anticipate that the party will carry the national election in 1892. The growth of the party is rapid. In Minnesota there are now 1338 Alliances, which have grown up in two years. We have in that State 50,000 voters. I believe we shall carry the State. We are sure of Kansas. The movement is growing in Wisconsin, where more than a hundred Alliances have been stated within a year. Nebraska is strongly Alliance and, I expect, will be carried at the next election by our party. In Ohio, the movement is new, but has grown remarkably..."

Clearly, the People's Party benefitted the existing Alliance organization as it tried to mobilize its supporters. But its leaders also invested heavily in local party organizations, themselves: Party elites, especially Donnelly, traveled extensively to meet with local Alliance members.

All of this suggests that the decision to contest each state, and indeed, each district, was the result of careful strategic calculations, motivated by policy concerns, but structured by expectations about the geographic distribution of electoral support.

One might worry that the People's strategic entry decisions were, in fact, structured by the presidential contest. This seems not to be the case: Although the People's Party nominated James Weaver and James Field to head their ticket, leaders of the People's Party did "admit that their only object in placing an Electoral ticket in the field in Virginia and other Southern States is to strengthen the chances of success for their candidates for Congress. They argue[d] that they could not have hoped to make any headway in this movement without presenting a Presidential candidate to be voted for. The whole fight is being made with the view of securing as many members of the House as possible, thus enabling them to hold the balance of power in that branch of Congress." (NYT September 9, 1892) Even though national focus generally shifted to presidential elections during this post-Civil War period, for the People's Party, and the 1892 election, congressional elections and the cumulation of power in Congress structured the party's strategic allocation of candidates and resources.

Finally, there is some evidence, in the case of the People's Party, that rather than parties emerging out of grievances, that political entrepreneurs and office seekers mobilized voters on salient issues to meet their own goals. In fact, it was not at all clear that a third party would be established; some in the Alliance and other organizations felt that policy reform could best be achieved through independent, non-partisan action. Further, as suggested

above, political elites in the South were especially concerned that the formation of a third party would facilitate a Republican victory. Through the strategic manipulation of the Ocala agenda, however, Donnelly ensured a third-party; the People's official support of the Sub-Treasury bill there was also admitted to be an attempt to divide Southern Democrats, and make way for the new party (NYT 18901214). One keen observer described the Cincinnati Convention was as a meeting of the "discontented and the ambitious, the latter seeking to lead the former" (NYT May 19, 1891) Further, "[t]hese third-party bosses are in politics for the money only, and they will sell out to the side that offers them the most." (NYT July 23, 1892)

What the historical record suggests, therefore, is that the geographic distributions of electoral opportunities structured the decisions political entrepreneurs, who would either coordinate across states and congressional districts, and form the new People's Party, or work within existing party organizations (the Democrats) to achieve their policy goals. The map in Figure 7 indicates those districts in which People's candidate entered electoral contests (dark gray), as well as those in which candidates contested on "fusion" tickets, as joint Populist-Democrat candidates. A casual comparison of Figures 5 and 7, suggests that, although the People's Party invested in a national mobilization effort, they were, in fact, more likely to contest those districts in which the share of low-income voters had increased over the 1880s. Further, as suggested above, the decision to enter electoral contests clearly proceeded on a district-by-district basis: Although there are some states which the populists contested every district, this was not generally the case.

In fact, this sense of opportunity represented by changes in the electoral power of low-income voters, is seen in a more rigorous assessment of the entry of People's candidates: The measure of changes in concentration of low-income voters in congressional districts, between 1880 and 1892, developed in the previous section, provides a robust prediction of where People's candidates contested elections. Table 5 reports coefficients from several probit regression analyses in which the dependent variable is a indicator of whether a candidate contested the election in that district on the People's Party ticket. The analyses increase in complexity across the columns, and in the last column is replicated for states outside of the South, as well. The first column only includes the percent of low-income voters and the total change in the percent of low-income voters, and in this basic specification we see that while the overall concentration of low-income voters does not predict which districts People's Party candidates will contest, the change in the electoral power of low-income voters *does* explain the strategic entry decisions. In the specification reported in the second column, the difference in the percentage of low-income voters is grouped into quartiles, and included as indicator variables. This specification shows that the apparent relationship between People's Party entry and the change comes primarily from the decision to contest elections where the percentage of low-income voters has *increased*. In the third column, the coefficients are reported for analysis that also includes more standard predictors of People's Party candidacy, the percentages of agricultural and industrial workers; neither of these variables account for variance in the entry of People's candidates. The fourth column provides an opportunity to examine whether the change in the percent of low-income voters ensured that they would be pivotal in the electoral outcome. Specifically, did People's candidates contest those

districts in which the electoral power of low-income voters enough to make them pivotal? In fact, this seems to be the case: In the forty districts in which low-income voters were now pivotal, People's candidates contested all but seven (83 percent; one of the remaining districts was contested by a fusion candidate). This contrasts with those districts in which the electoral power of low-income voters did not increase, and where People's Party candidates contested only about half of the districts. We also see candidates contesting in those districts in which low-income voters are not quite pivotal, but where their electoral power nevertheless increased (the median increase in percent of low-income voters is 37 percent in these districts). Finally, the fifth column replicates the strategic entry analysis of column (4), but excludes the South: As suggested above, the People's Party was hesitate to contest districts in the South for reasons other changes in the potential electoral power of the poor.

This focused analysis on the strategic entry decisions, of the Populists, therefore, provides some support for the importance of electoral geography in structuring entry decisions of parties: In this case, and as we shall see shortly, in the several others which can be assessed, especially when local demographic increased the electoral power of low-income voters, political elites saw and took advantage of new opportunities, forming parties.

Figure 5: The Changing Electoral Geography of Low-Income Voters in the US, 1880-1900

(a) 1892



(b) Change between 1880 and 1900



NOTE.

SOURCE. See the main text for details of how the wage data were collected. Congressional district boundary files: Lewis, DeVine & Pritcher (N.d.). State boundary file: NHGIS.

Figure 6: Low-Income Voters in US Cities, 1900



NOTE. This Figure reports the percentage of each congressional district, in each major city.

Figure 7: The Strategic Entry of People's Party Candidates, 1892



Table 5: Strategic Entry of People's Party Candidates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) South excluded
% Low-income voters	0.114	0.036	-0.925		
	(0.229)	(0.312)	(0.594)		
% Agricultural workers			0.854		
			(0.720)		
% Industrial/manufacturing workers			-0.333		
			(0.619)		
Change in percent low-income voters	1.245**				
	(0.297)				
Quantile 1 [-58%, -13%]					
Quantile 2 [-13%, -2%]		0.153	0.151		
		(0.204)	(0.205)		
Quantile 3 [-2%, 0%]		0.069	-0.209		
		(0.214)	(0.260)		
Quantile 4 [0%, 81%]		0.848**	0.841**		
		(0.210)	(0.212)		
No increase in low-income voters; low-income district				0.202	0.476
				(0.161)	(0.417)
Increase in low-income voters; not a low-income district				0.855**	0.885**
				(0.239)	(0.249)
Increase in low-income voters; low-income district				0.851**	1.059**
				(0.253)	(0.299)
Intercept	0.287*	0.073	0.208	0.084	0.128
	(0.107)	(0.174)	(0.410)	(0.098)	(0.104)
N	349	349	349	349	237
Psuedo R2	0.044	0.047	0.056	0.049	0.081

NOTE. This Table reports probit coefficients for an analysis in which the dependent is binary indicator of whether or not a People's Party candidate contested the election. (Standard errors are reported in parentheses; '**'p<0.01, '*' p<0.05).

SOURCE. Election data: Swift et al. (2009).

New Party Entry in Canada, Great Britain, and Sweden

Although a complete case study analysis of how the electoral geography of income structured the incentives of political entrepreneurs in Canada, Great Britain, and Sweden, is beyond the scope of this paper, it is helpful nonetheless to show how local changes in the electoral power of the poor created new opportunities for the entry of low-income peoples' parties in each country. Each analysis has generally proceeded according to the steps described above: Voting-eligible individuals were matched to their electoral districts. Then, earnings were estimated according to their occupation, industry, and whenever possible location. Canadians were asked to report their income; estimates for those who did not report their earnings were made on the basis of occupation and/or industry, and province. Earnings estimates for British and Swedish men of voting age are based on government surveys of firms and agricultural workers, similar to those conducted in the US. Low-income citizens are those that comprise the first third of the national income distribution in each case.

Low-income voters in Canada, especially during the early decades of the twentieth century, were mobilized by the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and Social Credit. While CCF and Social Credit share agrarian roots, and close ties with the United Farmers of Alberta, CCF is a social democratic party, and Social Credit has generally taken conservative positions. That both parties, in fact, contested many of the same districts – 42 of the districts 45 districts contested by Social Credit, were also contested by CCF candidates – suggests that they saw similar electoral opportunities, and that they were not tied to a specific ideological viewpoint. In the 1935 election, 113 candidates contested the election on the CCF ticket, in agricultural, as well as mining and manufacturing districts.

Tables 6 and 7 summarizes the relationship between Canada's changing electoral geography and CCF and Social Credit entry into party competition. In each case, the new party candidates were more likely to contest districts in which the income of the median voter had substantially decreased. There is no evidence that new parties simply contested those districts in which low-income voters – it was the change in economic standing that provided the new opportunity for mobilization. (In the Canadian case, one might worry that this result simply reflects the CCF and Social Credit reluctance to contest districts in Quebec, where citizens were generally better off in 1930, than they were in 1920; the analysis is replicated with the exclusion of Quebec to demonstrate the robustness of the main result.)

Late nineteenth century Britain provides an interesting test of the strategic entry argument: Towards the end of the century, local Liberal candidates aligned themselves with local trade unions, and contested elections as "Liberal-Labour" candidates. There was, however, no strategic allocation of candidates and resources from the party organization (Liberals contested elections in all districts). In contrast, the Labour Party was formed with the explicit purpose of establishing national, partisan representation of low-income workers. Therefore, while we might expect the Liberal-Labour candidates to contest elections in those districts with large, low-income working class constituencies, changes in electoral geography – new electoral opportunities – ought to be especially important for Labour candidates.

Table 6: Strategic Entry: CCF

	DV: CCF Entry			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) Excluding PQ
% Low-income voters	-1.936**			
	(0.653)			
Low-income district		-0.746**	-0.551	-0.843**
		(0.214)	(0.303)	(0.218)
Change in % low-income, 1931-1921	6.972**			
	(1.063)			
Quantile 1 [-41%,-7%]		-	-	-
		-	-	-
Quantile 2 [-6%, 6%]		1.786**	1.507**	0.742
		(0.306)	(0.327)	(0.518)
Quantile 3 [6%, 12%]		2.347**	2.096**	1.091*
		(0.329)	(0.356)	(0.524)
Quantile 4 [12%, 37%]		2.325**	2.178**	1.078*
		(0.336)	(0.361)	(0.528)
% in Farming, Forestry, or Fishing			-0.111**	
			(0.039)	
% in Mining, Construction, or Manufacturing			-0.056**	
			(0.020)	
More than 50% French-Speaking			-0.419*	
			(0.206)	
Intercept	0.477	-1.492**	0.604	-0.180
	(0.258)	(0.250)	(0.635)	(0.476)
N	232	232	232	170
Pseudo R^2	0.212	0.238	0.284	0.077

NOTE. This Table reports probit coefficients for an analysis in which the dependent is binary indicator of whether or not a CCF candidate contested the election in that district. (Standard errors are reported in parentheses; '**'p<0.01, '*' p<0.05).
SOURCE. Election data: Kollman et al. (2014).

Without the linked census data, tying the strategic decisions of parties and candidates to changes in electoral geography is a less straightforward task than in the American and Canadian cases. Here, I used changes in the size of the electorate in each parliamentary division, and identified those district in which low-income voters were likely to be pivotal in 1885. Labour party candidates ought to contest elections in those districts in which the proportions of low-income voters has dramatically increased – approximated here by those

Table 7: Strategic Entry: Social Credit

	DV: Social Credit Entry			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) Excluding PQ
% Low-income voters	1.468**			
	(0.707)			
Low-income district		0.578*	0.227	0.446*
		(0.215)	(0.343)	(0.216)
Change in % low-income, 1931-1921	3.219**			
	(1.165)			
Increase in % low-income		0.808**	1.083**	0.468
		(0.233)	(0.269)	(0.251)
% in Farming, Forestry, or Fishing			-0.225**	
			(0.045)	
% in Mining, Construction, or Manufacturing			-0.053*	
			(0.021)	
More than 50% French-Speaking			0.219	
			(0.237)	
Intercept	-1.679**	-2.121**	0.749	-1.194**
	(0.305)	(0.399)	(0.576)	(0.227)
N	232	232	232	170
Psuedo R2	0.139	0.156	0.267	0.052

NOTE. This Table reports probit coefficients for an analysis in which the dependent is binary indicator of whether or not a Social Credit candidate contested the election in that district. (Standard errors are reported in parentheses; '**'p<0.01, '*' p<0.05).
SOURCE. Election data: Kollman et al. (2014).

districts that were low-income in 1885, and which witnessed large increases in population at the end of the century.

Table 8, then, reports the coefficients from regression models that predict the probability that a Liberal-Labour candidate, or Labour candidate will contest the election in each district, as a function of change in population, whether low-income voters were likely to be pivotal in the allocation of the seat, and, finally, the change in population in low-income districts. In fact, we observe the same pattern for both Liberal-Labour and Labour candidates, but the relationships are stronger and estimated with less variance for Labour candidates; none of the coefficients for Liberal-Labour candidates are statistically distinguishable from zero. This provides some evidence in support of the strategic entry account of party formation: Where population change was limited, Liberal candidates shifted their position to

Table 8: Determinants of Labour Party Entry

	Liberal/Labour (1900)		Labour (1906)	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Population change (1000s)	0.054*	0.053	0.066**	0.034
	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.030)
Low-income constituencies		-0.538		-0.628**
		(0.331)		(0.234)
Population change in low-income constituencies		0.0528*		0.086**
		(0.036)		(0.025)
Intercept	-2.030**	-1.740**	-1.483**	-1.112**
	(0.159)	(0.224)	(0.114)	(0.173)
N	409	409	409	409
Pseudo R^2	0.037	0.076	0.039	0.066

NOTE. This Table report probit coefficients for an analysis in which the dependent is binary indicator of whether or not a Liberal/Labour or Labour candidate contested the election.
SOURCE. Election data: Caramani (2000) and Craig (1974).

align with Labour policy, but without abandoning the Liberal party infrastructure. Where there the local population grew, however, in ways that enhanced the electoral power of the poor, office-seeking candidates saw advantages in contesting the election on Labour party label.

Finally, in Sweden, the Social Democrats entered electoral competition tentatively, with affiliated candidates contesting districts in only a few counties in 1902, and expanding to districts in ten counties in 1905. Although suffrage was restricted and indirect in some cases, Caramani (2000, 860) suggests that by 1908 elections in most districts were direct. Most districts were single member districts, but several of the larger cities elected candidates in multimember districts with multiple voting. Here, estimates of population change are fully inclusive, and draw on the 1890 and 1900 censuses. Note, however, that SAP are reported for *counties*, rather than districts; to the extent that SAP party elites strategically entered districts within counties, this will likely result in the under-estimation of the main relationship, which will also be estimated with increased variance.

In spite of measurement challenges, in fact, Table 9 provides further evidence of the importance of electoral geography in structuring the entry decisions of new parties: In both 1902 and 1905, SAP candidates were more likely to contest districts in which changes in demography had made low-income voters pivotal in the electoral contest. (The effect is smaller in 1902, and estimated with more variance, but the pattern of entry is consistent with the

Table 9: Determinants of Social Democratic Party Entry

	1902		1905	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Low-income district	-0.249	-0.560	-0.047	-0.933
	(0.205)	(0.238)	(0.195)	(0.292)
Increase in % low-income voters		0.135		-0.009
		(0.238)		(0.225)
Increase in low-income voters, in		0.678		0.986
low-income districts		(0.423)		(0.405)
Intercept	-0.249	-0.619	-0.139	-0.134
	(0.205)	(0.179)	(0.112)	(0.168)
N	196	196	196	196
Pseudo R^2	0.007	0.033	0.022	0.056

NOTE. This Table report probit coefficients for an analysis in which the dependent is binary indicator of whether or not a Social Democratic candidate contested the election.
SOURCE. Election data: Lewin et. al. (1972).

more robust 1905 results.) And, as we have seen in every case so far, it is the change in the electoral power of the poor that matters: The SAP candidates are *less* likely to contest districts in which low-income voters are pivotal, without the new opportunity afforded by changing demography.

Summary

This section has used individual-level census data, and information about wages and earnings from the early decades of the twentieth century to map the electoral geography of income in the US, and in several other democratic systems. This section has drawn attention to the ways in which the electoral geography of income changed in each country during this period, and to how this created new opportunities for the formation of low-income peoples' parties. In each case, we see parties entering those districts in which the electoral power of the poor had recently increased – usually, dramatically. While it is not surprising that office-seeking political entrepreneurs will pursue strategies that are likely to be successful, the full implications of early electoral geography for the contemporary political representation of low-income voters have not yet been fully enumerated. The larger book project, to which this paper contributes, shows the implications of contemporary electoral geography for social policy, but also demonstrates the legacy of the early and important changes in way the votes of different income groups mapped into legislative seats.

Implications

This paper has presented evidence that (a) candidates coordinate across districts to form new parties following demographic changes that likely affect the way votes map into seats, for their constituencies, and (b) the new parties enter those districts in which their constituencies have recently become pivotal in the electoral contests. Who moves where, and how district boundaries are constructed or maintained, have important implications for whether or not new parties form, and for the platforms they adopt.

Although a full explanation of the absence of an American low-income peoples' party is likely attributable to several factors, and therefore may be beyond the scope of this paper, Figure 2 provides some insight into why "it didn't happen here" (Sombart 1976 [1906]): If new opportunities for party entry lie in changes in the distribution of electoral power across groups, there have been remarkably few opportunities in the US since about 1920. Moreover, the size of congressional districts more than tripled between 1910 and 2010, increasing from about 210 thousand, to over 710 thousand, on average. This means that the US is moving further away from the "segregated" case, considered in the earlier analytic example, and in which candidates have incentives to coordinate across districts to form new parties. Instead, American electoral geography is becoming fully-integrated in the sense that the income distribution within each congressional district increasingly resembles the national distribution. For example, low-income voters comprise more than 50 percent of only eight percent of congressional districts. If electoral geography effectively structures candidates,' parties,' and voters' incentives to mobilize, then we might reasonably expect that American politics will continue to be characterized by two-party competition and limited political representation of the poor.

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