Professor: John Duggan  
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Hours: by appointment

**Course Description:** We will take up several foundational topics in theoretical political economy. We begin with the analysis of several fundamental concepts that we use throughout the course: binary relations, preferences, and choice. We then study social choice theory, where we view collective decisions as arising from a social preference relation determined in some arbitrary way by the preferences of individuals. We'll prove Arrow's impossibility theorem and others, which inform us of inherent limitations on the rationality of collective decisions. We then consider the possibility that collective decisions are the outcomes of a game played by individual decision-makers. We will consider game-theoretic models of static elections, sequential voting, bargaining, and repeated elections, with special focus on connections to social choice.

**Textbook:** Lectures will be based on distributed notes, but there is extensive overlap with the only assigned textbook,


The Austen-Smith and Banks book is well-written and will be a very useful reference. Outside readings will be assigned as needed.

**Course Requirements:** In addition to class attendance, homeworks will be assigned and a final will be given. A midterm is possible.