Candidate Objectives and Electoral Equilibrium

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1 Introduction

Elections, as the institution through which citizens choose their political agents, are at the core of representative democracy. It is therefore appropriate that they occupy a central position in the study of democratic politics. The formal analysis of elections traces back to the work of Hotelling (1929), Downs (1957), and Black (1958), who apply methods from social choice theory and game theory to understand the equilibrium outcomes of elections. This work, and the literature stemming from it, has focused mainly on the positional aspects of electoral campaigns, where we conceptualize candidates adopting positions in a “space” of possible policies prior to an election. We maintain this focus by considering the main results for the canonical model of elections, in which candidates simultaneously adopt policy platforms and the winner is committed to the platform on which he or she ran. These models abstract from much of the structural detail of elections, including party primary elections, campaign finance and advertising, the role of interest groups, etc. Nevertheless, in order to achieve a deep understanding of elections in their full complexity, it would seem that we must address the equilibrium effects of position-taking by candidates in elections.

In this article, I will cover known foundational results on spatial models of elections, taking up issues of equilibrium existence, the distance (or lack thereof) between the equilibrium policy positions of the candidates, and the characterization of equilibria in terms of social choice concepts such as the majority core.

*I thank David Epstein and Mark Fey for helpful discussions.*
and the utilitarian social welfare function. The article is structured primarily by our assumptions on voting behavior. I first consider results for the case of deterministic voting, which I refer to as the “Downsian model,” where candidates can essentially predict the votes of voters following policy choices. I then consider models of probabilistic voting, where voting behavior is modeled as a random variable from the perspective of the candidates. Within each section, I consider the most common objective functions used to model the electoral incentives of different types of candidates, including candidates who seek only to win the election and candidates who seek the best policy outcome from the election. Of several themes in the article, most prominent will be difficulties in obtaining existence of equilibrium, especially when the policy space is multidimensional. While the median voter theorem establishes existence of an equilibrium in the unidimensional Downsian model, models of probabilistic voting are commonly thought to mitigate existence problems in multiple dimensions. We will see that this is true to an extent, but that probabilistic voting can actually introduce existence problems in the unidimensional model.

As a point of reference for the existence issue, early articles by Debreu (1952), Fan (1952), and Glicksberg (1952) give useful sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium in the games we analyze. This existence result, which we will refer to as the “DFG theorem,” first assumes that each player’s set of actions is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of Euclidean space, i.e., $\mathbb{R}^n$, a regularity assumption that is easily satisfied in most models. Second, DFG assumes that the objective function of each player is:

- jointly continuous in the actions of all players
- quasi-concave in that player’s own actions.

These continuity and convexity conditions are violated in a range of electoral models. The possibility of discontinuities is well-known, and it is often attributed blame for existence problems. Probabilistic voting models smooth the objective functions of the candidates, preventing such discontinuities, but equilibrium existence can still be problematic due to convexity problems. Thus, while the issue of convexity may receive less attention than continuity, it is equally critical in obtaining existence of equilibria.

Quasi-concavity of the candidates’ objective functions is only an issue if we seek equilibria in pure strategies, but we may allow the candidates to use mixed strategies, which formalize the idea that neither candidate can precisely predict the campaign promises of the other. In this case, using the results of DFG, we can drop quasi-concavity: continuity of the objective functions is sufficient for existence of mixed strategy equilibria. In continuous models, this offers one solution to the existence problem. In discontinuous models, which include

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1Nash (1950) proves existence of mixed strategy equilibrium for finite games. Since our games involve convex (and therefore infinite) policy spaces, his result does not apply here.
most of those we cover, it is often possible to appeal to even more general
sets of sufficient conditions to obtain mixed strategy equilibria. In resorting
to mixed strategies to solve the existence problem, we arrive at a conclusion
that contrasts Riker’s (1980) claim of the inherent instability of democratic
politics: rather than taking the absence of pure strategy equilibria as evidence
of instability, we acknowledge that the positional aspects of elections give the
candidates an incentive to be unpredictable, as is the case for players in many
other strategically complex games. This element of indeterminacy does not,
however, preclude a scientific approach to the analysis of elections, as it is still
possible to make statistical predictions, to give bounds on the possible policy
positions, and to perform comparative statics.

For further background on the electoral modelling literature, there are a
number of surveys, such as Wittman (1990), Coughlin (1990, 1992), andAusten-
Smith and Banks (2004). I do not touch on a number of interesting issues in
electoral modelling, such as multiple (three or more) candidates, entry and exit
of candidates, informational aspects of campaigns. See Calvert (1986), Shepsle
(1991), and Osborne (1995) for surveys of much of that work.

2 The Electoral Framework

We will focus on the spatial model of politics, as elaborated by Davis, Hinich,
Here, we assume that the policy space \( X \) is a subset of Euclidean space of some
finite dimension, \( d \). Thus, a policy is a vector \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_d) \), where \( x_k \)
denotes the amount of spending on some project or a position on some issue,
suitably quantified. We assume that \( X \) is convex, so that it is possible to
move from one policy directly to another with no constraints, and that \( X \) is
compact, so that it is described by a well-defined boundary. We consider an
election with just two political candidates, \( A \) and \( B \) (sometimes interpreted
as parties), and we will analyze an abstract model of campaigns: we assume
that the candidates simultaneously announce policy positions \( x_A \) and \( x_B \) in the
space \( X \), and we assume that the winning candidate is committed to his or
her campaign promise. Following these announcements, a finite, odd number
\( n \) of voters, denoted \( i = 1, 2, \ldots, n \), cast their ballots \( b_i \in \{1, 0\} \), where \( b_i = 1 \)
denotes a vote for candidate \( A \) and \( b_i = 0 \) denotes a vote for \( B \), the winner
being the candidate with the most votes. We do not allow abstention by voters.

For now, we model the objectives of the candidates and the behavior of
voters at a general level. Let \( U_A(x_A, x_B, b_1, \ldots, b_n) \) denote candidate \( A \)'s utility
when the candidates take positions \( x_A \) and \( x_B \) and the vector of ballots is
\( (b_1, \ldots, b_n) \), and define the notation \( U_B(x_A, x_B, b_1, \ldots, b_n) \) similarly. At this
level of generality, we allow for the possibility that candidates seek only to win
the election, or that they seek only the most favorable policies possible, or a mix
of these ambitions. We begin with the first of these approaches to modelling
candidate objectives.

**Office motivation.** We will use the term “office motivation” to refer to two specific formalizations of the idea that the candidates seek only to maximize their electoral prospects. Before proceeding to describe these objective functions precisely, let

\[
\Phi(b_1, \ldots, b_n) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \sum_i b_i > 0 \\
0 & \text{if } \sum_i b_i < 0
\end{cases}
\]

indicate whether a majority of voters have voted for candidate \(A\) or \(B\). The first version of office motivation dictates that a candidate cares only about whether he or she garnered a majority votes. In other words, only the sign, rather than the magnitude, of the margin of victory matters.

**Win motivation.** The candidate receive utility equal to one from winning, zero otherwise, so that

\[
U_A(x_A, x_B, b_1, \ldots, b_n) = \Phi(b_1, \ldots, b_n),
\]

with candidate \(B\)’s utility equal to one minus the above quantity. According to the second version of office motivation, the candidates do indeed care about the margin of victory.

**Vote motivation.** The candidates’ utilities take the simple linear form

\[
U_A(x_A, x_B, b_1, \ldots, b_n) = \sum_i b_i,
\]

with candidate \(B\)’s utility being \(n - \sum_i b_i\). Note that, since we rule out abstention by voters, vote motivation is equivalent by a positive affine transformation to plurality motivation: the margin of victory for candidate \(A\), for example, is just \((2 \sum b_i) - n\).

The second main approach to modelling candidate objectives is to assume that candidates care only about the policy outcome of the election.

**Policy motivation.** Assume the candidates have policy preferences represented by concave, differentiable utility functions \(u_A\) and \(u_B\). Under these assumptions, each candidate has an ideal policy that yields a strictly higher utility than all other policies, and we denote these as \(\tilde{x}_A\) and \(\tilde{x}_B\). We assume these ideal policies are distinct, and in the special case of a unidimensional policy space, we assume \(\tilde{x}_A < \tilde{x}_B\) without loss of generality. Then candidate \(A\)’s utility from policy positions \(x_A\) and \(x_B\) and ballots \((b_1, \ldots, b_n)\) is

\[
U_A(x_A, x_B, b_1, \ldots, b_n) = \Phi(b_1, \ldots, b_n)u_A(x_A) + (1 - \Phi(b_1, \ldots, b_n))u_A(x_B),
\]

and likewise for candidate \(B\).
Though I focus on pure office and policy motivation in this article, a third approach which combines the above two has also been considered in the literature.

**Mixed motivation.** Assume candidates have policy preferences as above, and that the winner of the election receives a reward \( w > 0 \). Then candidate A’s utility is

\[
U_A(x_A, x_B, b_1, \ldots, b_n) = \Phi(b_1, \ldots, b_n)(u_A(x_A) + w) + (1 - \Phi(b_1, \ldots, b_n))u_A(x_B),
\]

and likewise for B.

In order to model voting behavior, let \( P_i(x_A, x_B) \) denote the probability that voter \( i \) votes for candidate A, i.e., casts ballot \( b_i = 1 \), given policy platforms \( x_A \) and \( x_B \). Of course, the probability of a vote for candidate B is then \( 1 - P_i(x_A, x_B) \). This representation of voting behavior allows for voters to vote in a deterministic fashion or, perhaps reflecting a lack of information on the candidates’ parts, in a probabilistic way. Finally, let \( P(x_A, x_B) \) denote the probability that candidate A wins the election, give the individual vote probabilities. Of course, B’s probability of winning is one minus this amount.

We assume that candidates are expected utility maximizers, so that candidate A seeks to maximize

\[
E[U_A(x_A, x_B, b_1, \ldots, b_n)],
\]

where the expectation is taken over vectors of ballots \( (b_1, \ldots, b_n) \) with respect to the distribution induced by the \( P_i(x_A, x_B) \) probabilities, and likewise for candidate B. Integrating out the vector of ballots, we may write expected utilities as functions \( EU_A(x_A, x_B) \) and \( EU_B(x_A, x_B) \) of the candidates’ policy positions alone.

### 3 The Downsian Model

We now specify voting behavior, following Downs (1957) and others, by assuming that voters vote in an essentially deterministic fashion as a function of the candidates’ platforms: each voter simply votes for the candidate who offers the best political platform, voting in a random way (by flipping a fair coin) only when indifferent.

**Downsian model.** We assume that each voter \( i \) has preferences over policies represented by a strictly concave, differentiable utility function \( u_i \). Under these assumptions, voter \( i \) has a unique ideal policy, denoted \( \tilde{x}_i \), that yields a strictly higher utility than any other policy. A common special case is that of “Euclidean preferences,” in which a voter cares only about the distance of a policy from his or her ideal policy, e.g., \( u_i \) is quadratic (so \( u_i(x) = -|x - \tilde{x}_i|^2 \) for all \( x \)). In this case, the voters’ indifference curves take the form of concentric circles centered at the ideal policy. For convenience, we assume that the ideal policies of the voters are distinct. We assume a voter votes for the candidate with the preferred policy position, randomizing only in case of indifference. This
assumption is natural in this context: it may be interpreted as “sincere” voting, and, assuming voting is costless, it is consistent with elimination of weakly dominated voting strategies in the voting stage. Thus, we assume

\[
P_i(x_A, x_B) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } u_i(x_A) > u_i(x_B) \\
0 & \text{if } u_i(x_A) < u_i(x_B) \\
\frac{1}{2} & \text{else.}
\end{cases}
\]

We will say that policy \( x \) is majority-preferred to policy \( y \) when more voters strictly prefer \( x \) than strictly prefer \( y \). Writing \( x P y \) to express this relation, we then formally have

\[
x P y \iff \#\{i \mid u_i(x) > u_i(y)\} > \#\{i \mid u_i(y) > u_i(x)\}.
\]

A closely related idea is that of the core, which is the set of maximal elements of this majority preference relation. That is, policy \( \tilde{x} \) is in the core (or is a “core point”) if there is no policy \( y \) such that \( y P x \). Under our assumptions, the latter condition can be strengthened somewhat: if policy \( \tilde{x} \) is in the core, then it is majority-preferred to every other policy \( y \). Thus, there is at most one core point. Such a point is defined by the interesting normative and positive property that any move to a different policy will make some member of each majority coalition worse off.

Unfortunately, the core may be empty. In fact, Plott (1967) proved the following necessary condition for a policy to belong to the core: any core point must be the ideal policy of some voter, and the gradients of the voters must be paired in such a way that, for every voter whose gradient points in one direction from the core point, there is a voter whose gradient points in the opposite direction. This condition is referred to as “radial symmetry.”

**Theorem 1 (Plott)** *In the Downsian model, let policy \( \tilde{x} \) be interior to the policy space \( X \). If \( \tilde{x} \) is the core point, then it is the ideal policy of some voter \( k \) and radial symmetry holds at \( \tilde{x} \): each voter \( i \neq k \) can be associated with a voter \( j \) (in a 1-1 way) so that \( \nabla u_j(\tilde{x}) \) points in the direction opposite \( \nabla u_i(\tilde{x}) \).*

In accordance with this result, we refer to the voter \( k \) as the “core voter,” and we denote the unique core point, when it exists, by \( \tilde{x}_k \). The most common application of the Downsian model is the unidimensional model, where \( X \) is a subset of the real line and policies represent positions on a single salient issue. In this case, Theorem 1 implies that the only possible core point is the median of the voters’ ideal policies, and since our assumptions imply that the preferences of all voters are single-peaked, Black’s (1958) theorem implies that this median ideal policy is, indeed, the core point. Thus, in one dimension, the core is always non-empty and is characterized simply as the unique median ideal policy.

When the policy space is multidimensional, however, the necessary condition of radial symmetry becomes extremely restrictive — so restrictive that we would
expect that the core is empty for almost all specifications of voter preferences. Moreover, existence of a core point, if there is one, is a razor’s edge phenomenon: if voter preferences were specified in such a way that the core was non-empty, then arbitrarily small perturbations of preferences could annihilate it. These ideas have been precisely formalized in the literature on the spatial model of social choice.\footnote{See, e.g., Cox (1984), Banks (1995), and Saari (1997).}

### 3.1 Office Motivation

Under the assumption of deterministic voting, win motivation takes the following simple form:

\[
EU_A(x_A, x_B) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x_A \mathcal{P} x_B \\
0 & \text{if } x_B \mathcal{P} x_A \\
\frac{1}{2} & \text{else,}
\end{cases}
\]

and likewise for candidate B, while the alternative of vote motivation is

\[
EU_A(x_A, x_B) = \# \{i \mid u_i(x_A) > u_i(x_B)\} + \frac{1}{2} \# \{i \mid u_i(x_A) = u_i(x_B)\},
\]

and likewise for B. In the Downsian version of the electoral game, the distinction between these two formalizations of office motivation becomes irrelevant. Nash equilibria are completely characterized by the following result, which connects the concept of equilibrium from non-cooperative game theory to the notion of core from social choice theory, described above.

**Theorem 2** In the Downsian model, assume office motivation. There is a Nash equilibrium \((x_A^*, x_B^*)\) of the electoral game if and only if the core is non-empty. In this case, the equilibrium is unique, and the candidates locate at the core point: \(x_A^* = x_B^* = \tilde{x}_k\).

The argument for this result is elementary. As it is clear that both candidates locating at the core point is an equilibrium, I will prove only uniqueness of this equilibrium. Suppose \((x_A^*, x_B^*)\) is a Nash equilibrium, but one of the candidates, say B, locates at a policy not in the core. Then there is a policy \(z\) that beats \(x_B^*\) in a majority vote. Adopting \(z\), candidate A can win the election with probability one and, of course, win more than \(n/2\) votes. Since \(x_A^*\) is a best response to \(x_B^*\), A’s probability of winning must equal one under win motivation; likewise, A’s expected vote must be greater than \(n/2\) under plurality motivation. But then candidate B can deviate by locating at \(x_B' = x_A^*\), winning with probability one half and obtaining an expected vote of \(n/2\). Under either objective function, this deviation is profitable for B, a contradiction.
Theorem 2 has several important implications. First, the candidates must adopt identical policy positions in equilibrium. Second, this position is majority-preferred to all other policies, and so is appealing normative and positive perspectives. Third, when the policy space is unidimensional, there is a unique Nash equilibrium, and in equilibrium the candidates both locate at the median ideal policy. Known as the “median voter theorem,” this connection was made by Hotelling (1929) in his model of spatial competition and by Downs (1957) in his classic analysis of elections.

**Corollary 1 (Hotelling; Downs)** In the Downsian model, assume $X$ is unidimensional and office-motivation. There is a unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game. In equilibrium, the candidates locate at the median ideal policy.

Perhaps the most noteworthy, and certainly the most pessimistic, implication of Theorem 2, together with Theorem 1, is that Nash equilibria of the Downsian electoral game fail to exist for almost all specifications of voter preferences. And when voter preferences are such that equilibrium existence is obtained, it is susceptible to arbitrarily small perturbations of preferences. Technically, the problem for existence is two-fold: both conditions of the DFG theorem, continuity and quasi-concavity of payoffs, are violated in the Downsian model. This single implication has limited much of the formal analysis of elections to the unidimensional model, where the median voter theorem applies, and has spurred the development of other electoral models in which the discontinuities of the Downsian model are limited or eliminated.

An alternative is to look for Nash equilibria of the electoral game in mixed strategies, which are modelled as probability distributions over the policy space and which allow for the possibility that one candidate may not be able to precisely predict the policy position of the other. Because the policy space is infinite in our model and the objective functions of the candidates are discontinuous, it is not known whether mixed strategy equilibria exist generally. One feature of the Downsian model that exacerbates these discontinuities is the inflexibility of voting behavior when a voter is indifferent between the positions of the candidates: the voter is assumed to vote for each candidate with equal probability. Duggan and Jackson (2004) show that, if we allow for indifferent voters to randomize with any probability between zero and one, then mixed strategy equilibria do indeed exist.

Duggan and Jackson (2004) also show that in equilibrium, the support of the candidates’ mixed strategies is contained in the “deep uncovered set,” a centrally located subset of the policy space related to McKelvey’s (1986) uncovered set. An implication of their results is that if voter preferences are specified so that a

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3Duggan and Jackson (2004) do require that, in equilibrium, indifferent voters treat the candidates symmetrically. If voter $i$ is indifferent between $x_A$ and $x_B$ and votes for candidate $A$ with probability, say $\alpha$, then $i$ must vote for $A$ with probability $1 - \alpha$ if the candidates switch positions.
core point exists, and if we perturb voter preferences slightly, then the equilibrium mixed strategies of the candidates will put probability arbitrarily close to one on policies near the original core point. Thus, while the existence of pure strategy equilibria is knife-edge, equilibrium outcomes change in a continuous way when voter preferences are perturbed.

3.2 Policy Motivation

The objective function representing policy motivation takes the following form under deterministic voting:

\[
EU_A(x_A, x_B) = \begin{cases} 
  u_A(x_A) & \text{if } x_A P x_B \\
  u_A(x_B) & \text{if } x_B P x_A \\
  \frac{u_A(x_A) + u_A(x_B)}{2} & \text{else.} 
\end{cases}
\]

Though the above objective function differs fundamentally from the case of office motivation, Roemer (1994) proves a median voter theorem for policy motivation, and Wittman (1977) and Calvert (1985), prove related results for multidimensional policy spaces and Euclidean preferences that yield the median voter result in the special case of one dimension. As with office motivation, there is a unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game, and in equilibrium both candidates locate at the median ideal policy.

**Theorem 3 (Wittman; Calvert; Roemer)** In the Downsian model, assume \(X\) is unidimensional and policy motivation. If \(\hat{x}_A < \hat{x}_k < \hat{x}_B\), then there is a unique Nash equilibrium \((x^*_A, x^*_B)\) of the electoral game. In equilibrium, the candidates locate at the median ideal policy: \(x^*_A = x^*_B = \hat{x}_k\).

Theorem 3 leaves open the question, however, of whether equilibria exist when the policy space is multidimensional. There is some reason to believe that the negative result of Theorem 2 might be attenuated in the case of pure policy motivation: under win motivation, a candidate could benefit from a move to any policy position that is majority-preferred to that of his or her opponent, creating a large number of potential profitable deviations; under policy motivation, however, a candidate can only benefit from moving to a policy position that he or she prefers to her opponent’s. This restricts the possibilities for profitable deviations and improves the prospects for finding Nash equilibria where none existed under win motivation. This possibility is noted by Duggan and Fey (2004a) and is depicted in Figure 1, where three voters have Euclidean preferences over a two-dimensional policy space. In this example, the core is empty and there is no equilibrium under win motivation, yet it is a Nash equilibrium under policy motivation for the candidates to locate at voter 3’s ideal policy. As the candidates’ indifference curves suggest, neither can move to a position that is both preferable to \(\hat{x}_3\) and beats \(\hat{x}_3\) in a majority vote. Moreover, existence of
equilibrium in this example is robust to small perturbations in the preferences of voters and candidates.

In Figure 1, we specify that candidates A and B choose identical policy positions. While this form of policy convergence is well-known from the unidimensional model, Duggan and Fey (2004a) show that it is a near universal feature of electoral competition with policy motivated candidates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space. Roemer (2001) also argues that equilibria in which the two candidates adopt distinct policy positions almost never exist.

**Theorem 4 (Duggan and Fey)** In the Downsian model, assume policy motivation. If \((x^*_A, x^*_B)\) is a Nash equilibrium of the electoral game such that the candidates’ gradients, \(\nabla u_A(x^*_A)\) and \(\nabla u_B(x^*_B)\), do not point in the same direction, then the candidates’ policy positions are identical: \(x^*_A = x^*_B = x^*\).

The next result shows that the kind of positive result depicted in Figure 1 is limited to the two-dimensional case. The result, due to Duggan and Fey (2004a), gives a strong necessary condition on Nash equilibria at which the candidates’ gradients are linearly independent, as they are in Theorem 3 and Figure 1. Like radial symmetry from Plott’s theorem, this necessary condition requires that the gradients of certain voters be diametrically opposed, though now the restriction applies only to voters whose gradients do not lie on the plane spanned by the gradients of the candidates.
Theorem 5 (Duggan and Fey) In the Downsian model, assume $X$ is at least three-dimensional and policy motivation. If the candidates’ gradients at $x^*$ are linearly independent, then each voter $i$ whose gradient does not lie on the plane spanned by the candidates’ gradients can be associated with a voter $j$ (in a 1-1 way) so that $\nabla u_j(x^*)$ points in the direction opposite $\nabla u_i(x^*)$.

We conclude that, as soon as we go to a policy space of three or more dimensions, Nash equilibria of the electoral game will almost never exist (or they must rely on the alignment of the candidates’ gradients). And if there is an equilibrium, then existence will necessarily be susceptible to even small perturbations of voter or candidate preferences. Thus, while policy motivation restricts the set of potential profitable moves, multidimensional policy spaces offer the candidates sufficient scope for deviations that equilibria will typically fail to exist. As in the case of office motivation, however, the result of Duggan and Jackson (2004) yields existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium, when we allow indifferent voters to randomize in a more flexible way.

4 The Probabilistic Voting Model

In the Downsian model, we assumed that voters behave in a deterministic fashion (unless indifferent between the candidates) and that the candidates can predict voting behavior precisely. The literature on probabilistic voting relaxes these assumptions, viewing the ballots of voters as random variables. While this class of models may capture indeterminacy inherent in the behavior of voters, it is also consistent with the rational choice approach: here, we view the decision of a voter as ultimately determined by the voters’ preferences, but we allow for the possibility that the candidates do not perfectly observe the preferences of voters; instead, candidates have beliefs about the preferences of voters, and therefore their behavior, and we model these beliefs probabilistically.

In contrast to the Downsian model, it now becomes important to distinguish between the two types of office motivation, as reflected in the results surveyed below. In addition, we must be explicit about the structure of the voters’ decision problems and the source of randomness in the model. We consider two main approaches to modelling probabilistic voting. The first approach endows voters with policy preferences that are known to the candidates (and therefore taken as given), but it assumes that the voters also have preferences over fixed characteristics of the candidates unrelated to their policy positions. These non-policy preferences are unknown to the candidates.

Stochastic additive bias model. Assume that each voter $i$ has a strictly concave, smooth utility function $u_i$, as in the deterministic voting model, but now assume a “utility bias” $\beta_i$ in favor of candidate $B$.\footnote{In case $\beta_i$ is negative, we can think of this as a bias for candidate $A$. We maintain the}
biases into our model of voting behavior by assuming that \( i \) votes for \( A \) if and only if the utility of candidate \( A \)'s platform exceeds that of \( B \)'s platform by at least \( \beta_i \). That is, \( i \) votes for \( A \) if and only if \( u_i(x_A) \geq u_i(x_B) + \beta_i \). We assume that the profile \((\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n)\) of biases is a random variable from the candidates’ perspective, and we assume that each \( \beta_i \) is independently distributed according to the distribution \( F_i \), so that the probability that voter \( i \) votes for candidate \( A \) given platforms \( x_A \) and \( x_B \) is \( F_i(u_i(x_A) - u_i(x_B)) \). We assume that each \( F_i \) is continuous and strictly increasing on an interval that includes all possible utility differences \( u_i(x) - u_i(y) \), as \( x \) and \( y \) range over all of \( X \).

We do not assume these biases are identically distributed, but we do impose a weak symmetry assumption. Letting \( f_i \) denote the density of \( F_i \), we assume that the likelihood that a voter is unbiased is the same for all voters: \( f_i(0) = f_j(0) \) for all voters \( i \) and \( j \). A convenient special case is that in which the \( F_i \) are uniform with identical supports. We refer to this as the uniform additive bias model.

The second main approach focuses only on policy considerations (dropping non-policy preferences) and allows for the possibility that the candidates do not perfectly observe the policy preferences of voters.

**Stochastic preference model.** Assume each voter \( i \) has a strictly concave, continuous utility function \( u_i(\cdot, \theta_i) \), where \( \theta_i \) is a preference parameter lying in a space \( \Theta \). We assume that the vector \((\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n)\) of parameters is a random variable from the candidates’ perspective, and we assume that each \( \theta_i \) is distributed according to a distribution function \( G_i \). We do not assume that these random variables are independent, but we assume that the distribution of preferences is sufficiently “dispersed” for each voter, in the following sense: for every voter \( i \) and all distinct policies \( x \) and \( y \), we have

\[
Pr\{\theta_i \mid u_i(z, \theta_i) > u_i(y, \theta_i) > u_i(x, \theta_i)\} > 0,
\]

where \( z \) is the midpoint between \( x \) and \( y \), and we also have

\[
Pr\{\theta_i \mid u_i(x, \theta_i) = u_i(y, \theta_i)\} = 0.
\]

Given parameter \( \theta_i \), our assumptions imply that voter \( i \) has a unique ideal policy, and we let \( H_i \) denote the distribution of voter \( i \)'s ideal policy. In the case of a unidimensional policy space, for example, \( H_i(x) \) is the probability that \( i \)'s ideal policy is less than or equal to \( x \), and by our dispersion assumption it is continuous and strictly increasing. It is common to identify \( \theta_i \) with voter \( i \)'s ideal policy and to assume that \( u_i(\cdot, \theta_i) \) is Euclidean, i.e., \( u_i(y, \theta_i) = -||y - \theta_i||^2 \) for every policy \( y \), and our dispersion condition is then satisfied under the uncontroversial assumption that the distribution of ideal policies is continuous with full support.

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5 An implication is that, given any two platforms for the candidates, there is some chance (perhaps very small) that the voter’s bias outweighs any policy considerations.

6 This space could be very general, but we may assume it is a subset of some finite-dimensional Euclidean space.
When all voters appear \textit{ex ante} identical to the candidates, we drop the \( i \) index on \( u \) and \( G \), and we assume without loss of generality that there is a single voter. We refer to this as the \textit{representative voter stochastic preference model}. In the Euclidean model with a unidimensional policy space, we may focus on the representative voter model without loss of generality. To see this, given a realization \((\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n)\) of ideal policies, let \( \theta_k \) denote the median ideal policy. It is well-known that the median voter \( k \) is “decisive,” in the sense that a candidate wins a majority of the vote if and only if his or her policy position is preferred by voter \( k \) to the other candidate’s position. Thus, we have

\[ P(x_A, x_B|\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } |x_A - \theta_k| < |x_B - \theta_k| \\
0 & \text{if } |x_B - \theta_k| < |x_A - \theta_k| \\
\frac{1}{2} & \text{else.}
\end{cases} \]

We can capture this formally by assuming a single voter and letting \( G \) be the distribution of the median ideal policy in the \( n \)-voter model, a special case we call the \textit{Euclidean stochastic preference model}.

We first consider the known results on equilibrium existence and characterization for these two models of probabilistic voting under the assumption of vote-motivated candidates.

### 4.1 Vote Motivation

In the general probabilistic voting framework, vote motivation for the candidates can be written

\[
EU_A(x_A, x_B) = \sum_i P_i(x_A, x_B),
\]

with \( EU_B(x_A, x_B) \) equal to \( n \) minus the above quantity. Because each candidate’s utility is a linear function of the individual vote probabilities, this objective function has very nice technical properties. Accordingly, it has received much attention in the literature, most often in the context of the stochastic additive bias model. We take up the stochastic additive bias model first, and we end by considering the stochastic preference model and a third model of voting behavior related to the stochastic additive bias model.

In the stochastic additive bias model, denote the unique maximizer of the sum of voter utilities by

\[
\bar{x} = \arg \max_{x \in X} \sum_i u_i(x).
\]

This policy is often referred to as the “utilitarian optimum,” though this term suggests welfare connotations that are difficult to justify.\footnote{Note that an individual’s vote probability \( P_i \) and a distribution \( F_i \) pin down a unique}
more neutral term *utilitarian point*. When voter utilities are quadratic, it is well-known that the utilitarian point is equal to the mean of the voters’ ideal policies.

Our first result on probabilistic voting establishes that, in equilibrium, the candidates must offer voters the same policy position. This policy is exactly the utilitarian point, implying that the candidates must adopt central positions in the policy space in equilibrium, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space. Versions of this result have appeared in several places, notably in the work of Hinich (1977, 1978) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993). The statement here is as in Banks and Duggan (2004). When voter utilities are quadratic, an implication is Hinich’s “mean voter” theorem.

**Theorem 6 (Hinich; Lindbeck and Weibull)** In the stochastic additive bias model, assume vote motivation. If \((x_A^*, x_B^*)\) is an interior Nash equilibrium of the electoral game, then both candidates locate at the utilitarian point: \(x_A^* = x_B^* = \bar{x}\).

The next result states known conditions for existence of a Nash equilibrium in the electoral game. The objective functions of the candidates are automatically continuous in the stochastic additive bias model, because \(F_i\) and \(u_i\) are assumed continuous, so the key is to ensure that quasi-concavity is satisfied. The sufficient conditions we give are fulfilled, for example, if the bias terms of the voters are uniformly distributed, or if the distributions \(F_i\) are “close enough” to uniform. Thus, in contrast to Theorem 2, which implies the generic non-existence of Nash equilibria in multiple dimensions under deterministic voting, Theorem 7 offers reasonable (if somewhat restrictive) conditions that guarantee an equilibrium under probabilistic voting. Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook (1972, 1973) give similar sufficient conditions in a model that allows for abstention by voters, and Enelow and Hinich (1989) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) make similar observations. By Theorem 6, if there is a Nash equilibrium, then it is unique, and both candidates locate at the utilitarian point.

**Theorem 7** In the stochastic additive bias model, assume vote motivation, and assume the following for each voter \(i\):

- \(F_i(u_i(x))\) is concave
- \(F_i(-u_i(x))\) is convex.

There is a Nash equilibrium of the electoral game.

utility function \(u_i\) in the stochastic additive bias model. Our symmetry requirement that \(f_i(0) = f_j(0)\) then allows us to compare voter utilities, but there is no special moral basis for this.

^8See also Coughlin (1992). Ledyard (1984) derives a similar utilitarian result from a model of costly and strategic voting.
The proof of Theorem 7 is straightforward. Continuity of the candidates’ expected utilities has already been noted. By the assumptions of the proposition, \( P_i(x_A, x_B) = F_i(u_i(x_A) - u_i(x_B)) \) is a concave function of \( x_A \). Therefore, as the sum of concave functions, \( EU_A(x_A, x_B) \) is a concave function of \( x_A \), and a similar argument holds for candidate \( B \). Thus, existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from the DFG theorem.

Theorems 6 and 7 taken together may suggest a puzzling discrepancy between the Downsian and stochastic additive bias models. Consider the possibility of modifying the Downsian model by introducing a “small” amount of bias, i.e., consider distributions \( F_i \) of biases that converge to the point mass on zero.\(^9\) In this way, we can satisfy the assumptions of the stochastic additive bias model in models arbitrarily close to the Downsian model. By Theorem 6, the equilibria of these stochastic additive bias models must be at the utilitarian point, and it may therefore appear that the Nash equilibrium moves from the median ideal policy in the Downsian model to the utilitarian point in the presence of the slightest noise in voting behavior. Or, to use Hinich’s (1977) terminology, it may appear that the median is an “artifact.”

In fact, however, Theorem 6 only gives a necessary condition for equilibria in the stochastic additive bias model: it says that if there is a Nash equilibrium of the electoral game, then both candidates must locate at the utilitarian point, leaving the possibility that there is no equilibrium. Banks and Duggan (2004) and Laussel and Le Breton (2002) show that this is necessarily the case: when voting behavior is close to deterministic in the stochastic additive bias model, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.\(^10\) Thus, the introduction of probabilistic voting into the Downsian model can actually create equilibrium existence problems, even in the unidimensional model, where the median voter theorem holds.

In contrast, since only continuity of the candidates’ utilities is required for existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium, we have general existence of mixed strategy equilibria in the stochastic additive bias model under no additional assumptions.

**Theorem 8** In the stochastic additive bias model, assume vote motivation. There is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the electoral game.

Although pure strategy Nash equilibria will not exist when we add a small amount of noise to voting behavior in the Downsian model, Theorem 8 implies that there will be mixed strategy equilibria. Moreover, Banks and Duggan (2004) prove that these mixed strategy equilibria must converge to the median

---

\(^9\) Here, “convergence” is in the sense of weak* convergence, a convention we maintain when referring to probability distributions.

\(^10\) This contradicts a result due to Hinich (1978). See Banks and Duggan (2004) for an extended discussion.
ideal policy as the amount of noise goes to zero, and we conclude that when a small amount of noise is added to voting behavior in the Downsian model, the equilibrium does not suddenly move to the utilitarian point. Pure strategy Nash equilibria cease to exist, but mixed strategy equilibria do exist, and policies close to the median will be played with probability arbitrarily close to one in these equilibria.

Our results for the stochastic additive bias model have immediate consequences for a closely related model in which voter biases enter into voting behavior in a multiplicative way.

**Stochastic multiplicative bias model.** Assume each voter $i$ has a positive, strictly log-concave, smooth utility function $u_i$ and a positive utility bias $\beta_i$ in favor of candidate $B$. In contrast to the stochastic additive bias model, assume that $i$ votes for $A$ if and only if $u_i(x_A) \geq u_i(x_B)\beta_i$. As before, each $\beta_i$ is independently distributed according to a distribution $F_i$. Thus, the probability that voter $i$ votes for candidate $A$ is $F_i(u_i(x_A)/u_i(x_B))$. We assume each $F_i$ is continuous and strictly increasing on an interval that includes all ratios of utilities $u_i(x)/u_i(y)$. Following the additive bias model, assume $f_i(1) = f_j(1)$ for all voters $i$ and $j$. Let

$$\hat{x} = \arg\max_{x \in X} \prod_i u_i(x)$$

maximize the product of voter utilities. This welfare function is known as the “Nash welfare” function, and we refer to $\hat{x}$ as the **Nash point**.

The next result is proved by Coughlin and Nitzan (1982) for the special case of the binary Luce model. The general statement here is due to Banks and Duggan (2004).

**Corollary 2 (Coughlin and Nitzan)** In the stochastic multiplicative bias model, assume vote motivation. If $(x^*_A, x^*_B)$ is an interior Nash equilibrium of the electoral game, then both candidates locate at the Nash point: $x^*_A = x^*_B = \hat{x}$.

The proof follows directly from Theorem 6, as shown by Banks and Duggan (2004), after an appropriate transformation of the stochastic multiplicative bias model. Given a model satisfying the assumptions of the corollary, define an associated additive bias model as follows:

$$\hat{u}_i(x) = \ln(u_i(x))$$
$$\hat{F}_i(x) = F_i(e^{\hat{u}_i(x)})$$

Note that the individual vote probabilities in the two models are identical, as

$$\hat{P}_i(x_A, x_B) = \hat{F}_i(\hat{u}_i(x_A) - \hat{u}_i(x_B)) = \hat{F}_i(\ln(u_i(x_A)/u_i(x_B)))$$
$$= F_i(u_i(x_A)/u_i(x_B)) = P_i(x_A, x_B).$$
and so, therefore, the candidates’ objective functions are identical as well. If \((x_A^*, x_B^*)\) is a Nash equilibrium in the stochastic multiplicative bias model, it follows that it is a Nash equilibrium in the associated additive bias model. By Theorem 6, applied to the associated additive bias model, we therefore have

\[
x_A^* = x_B^* = \arg\max_{x \in X} \sum_i \hat{u}_i(x) = \arg\max_{x \in X} \prod_i u_i(x) = \hat{x},
\]
as required.

By a similar logic, we can extend Theorem 7 to the stochastic multiplicative bias model as well, deriving sufficient conditions for existence of a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding electoral game: it is enough if the distributions \(F_i\), composed with the exponential function, possess the appropriate convexity properties. Note the expositional tradeoff apparent in Corollaries 2 and 3: we use only log-concavity of voter utility functions for the characterization of equilibrium at the Nash point, weakening the assumption of concavity in Theorem 6, but the conditions on distributions needed for equilibrium existence in the stochastic multiplicative bias model are more restrictive than those of Theorem 7.

**Corollary 3 (Coughlin and Nitzan)** In the stochastic multiplicative bias model, assume vote motivation, and assume the following for each voter \(i\):

- \(F_i(e^{u_i(x)})\) is concave
- \(F_i(e^{-u_i(x)})\) is convex.

There is a Nash equilibrium of the electoral game.

For an example of a distribution fulfilling the requirements of Corollary 3, consider the binary Luce model used by Coughlin and Nitzan (1981), where

\[
P_i(x_A, x_B) = \frac{u_i(x_A)}{u_i(x_A) + u_i(x_B)}.
\]

This is the special case of the stochastic multiplicative bias model with \(F_i(x) = \frac{x}{x+1}\), and it is then apparent that

\[
F_i(e^{u_i(x)}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-u_i(x)}},
\]
is concave in \(x\). These arguments illustrate that the stochastic additive and multiplicative bias models are equivalent, up to a simple transformation. We could just as well have begun with Corollaries 2 and 3 and derived Theorems 6 and 7 for the stochastic additive bias model.
In the stochastic preference model, we lose full continuity of the candidates’ expected utilities, as discontinuities appear along the “diagonal.” To see this, consider the Euclidean stochastic preference model in the context of a unidimensional policy space. Fix \( x_B \) to the right of the median of \( G \), and let \( x_A \) approach \( x_B \) from the left. Then candidate A’s expected utility converges to \( G(x_B) > 1/2 \), but at \( x_A = x_B \), A’s expected utility is 1/2. The only value of \( x_B \) where such a discontinuity does not occur is at the median of \( G \). Thus, the stochastic preference model generally exhibits discontinuities where one candidate “crosses over” the other. Despite the presence of these discontinuities, there is a unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game when the policy space is unidimensional, and it is easily characterized. Let \( H_\sigma \) be the distribution defined by \( H_\sigma(x) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i H_i(x) \), and let \( x_\sigma \) be the unique median of this distribution. The next result establishes that in equilibrium the candidates must locate at the same policy, the median of the average distribution.

Theorem 9 In the stochastic preference model, assume \( X \) is unidimensional and vote motivation. There is a unique Nash equilibrium \( (x_A^*, x_B^*) \) of the electoral game. In equilibrium, both candidates locate at the median of the average distribution: \( x_A^* = x_B^* = x_\sigma \).

It is relatively easy to prove that it is an equilibrium for both candidates to locate at \( x_\sigma \), so I will prove only uniqueness. Suppose that in equilibrium some candidate locates at a policy \( x^* \) other than \( x_\sigma \). Without loss of generality, assume \( x^* < x_\sigma \), so that \( H_\sigma(x^*) < 1/2 \). Since the electoral game is symmetric and zero-sum, a standard interchangeability argument shows that it must be an equilibrium for both candidates to locate at \( x^* \), where the expected utility of each candidate is \( n/2 \). But allow candidate A to deviate by moving slightly to the right of \( x^* \) to a position \( x^* + \epsilon < x_\sigma \). Since a voter with an ideal policy to the right of \( x^* + \epsilon \) will vote for A, we have

\[
U_A(x^* + \epsilon, x^*) \geq \sum_i [1 - H_i(x^* + \epsilon)]
= n - \sum_i H_i(x^* + \epsilon).
\]

By the assumption that \( x^* + \epsilon < x_\sigma \), this quantity is greater than \( n/2 \). Therefore, candidate A can achieve an expected vote greater than \( n/2 \) by deviating from \( x^* \), a contradiction. This argument shows that the only possible equilibrium is for both candidates to locate at \( x_\sigma \).

Now consider a sequence of stochastic preference models approaching the Downsian model, in the sense that each distribution \( G_i \) converges to the point mass on some value of \( \theta_i \). Assuming a unidimensional policy space, the median voter theorem implies that, in the Downsian model where voters’ preferences are
given by $u_i(\cdot, \theta_i)$, the unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game is for both candidates to locate at the median ideal policy. By Theorem 9, each model in the sequence admits a unique equilibrium, and in equilibrium the candidates locate at the median of the average distribution. In the limit, the average distributions will approach the distribution of ideal points in the Downsian model, and the equilibrium points $x_\sigma$ will approach the median ideal policy. Therefore, when we add a small amount of noise to voting behavior in the Downsian model, the equilibrium changes in a continuous way.

When the policy space is multidimensional, the task of equilibrium characterization is more difficult, and we simplify matters by specializing to the representative voter stochastic preference model. We say a policy $x$ is a generalized median in all directions if, compared to every other policy $y$, the voter is more likely to prefer $x$ to $y$ than the converse: for every policy $y$, we have

$$Pr(\{\theta \mid u(y, \theta) > u(x, \theta)\}) \leq \frac{1}{2}.$$ 

By our dispersion condition, if there is a generalized median in all directions, then there is exactly one, which we denote $x_\gamma$. In the Euclidean version of the model, $x_\gamma$ is equivalent to a median in all directions, in the usual sense. When the policy space is multidimensional, such a policy exists, for example, if $G$ has a radially symmetric density function, such as the normal distribution. This can be weakened, but existence of a median in all directions is generally quite restrictive when the policy space has dimension at least two.

The next result provides a characterization of equilibria in the stochastic preference model: in equilibrium, the candidates must locate at the generalized median in all directions. Under our maintained assumptions, a generalized median in all directions is essentially an “estimated median,” so the next result is very close to a result due to Calvert (1985), and it is similar in spirit to results of Davis and Hinich (1968) and Hoyer and Mayer (1974). As we have seen before, strategic incentives drive the candidates to take identical positions in equilibrium, but the implication for equilibrium existence in multidimensional policy spaces is negative, as existence of a generalized median in all directions is extremely restrictive.

**Theorem 10 (Calvert)** In the representative voter stochastic preference model, assume win motivation. There is a Nash equilibrium $(x^*_A, x^*_B)$ of the electoral game if and only if there is a generalized median in all directions. In this case, the equilibrium is unique, and the candidates locate at the generalized median point: $x^*_A = x^*_B = x_\gamma$.

To prove the theorem, suppose $(x^*_A, x^*_B)$ is a Nash equilibrium, but one of the candidates, say $B$, does not locate at the generalized median policy. Then there is some policy $z$ such that each voter prefers $z$ to $x_B$ with probability strictly greater than one half. Thus, adopting $z$, candidate $A$ can win the election with
probability greater than one half, and since $x_A^*$ is a best response to $x_B^*$, $A$’s probability of winning using $x_A^*$ can be no less. But then candidate $B$ can deviate by locating at $x_B' = x_A^*$, matching $A$ and winning with probability one half. Since this increases $B$’s probability of winning, the initial pair of policy positions cannot be an equilibrium, a contradiction.

Because discontinuities in the stochastic preference model are restricted to the diagonal, where the candidates choose identical platforms, existence of mixed strategy equilibria is more easily obtained than in the Downsian model. In this case, the results of Duggan and Jackson (2004) yield an equilibrium with no modifications of the probabilistic voting model regarding the behavior of indifferent voters.

Next, we consider these issues of equilibrium existence, policy convergence, and equilibrium characterization in the model of win-motivated candidates.

### 4.2 Win Motivation

In the general probabilistic voting framework, win motivation for the candidates takes the form

$$EU_A(x_A, x_B) = P(x_A, x_B),$$

with candidate $B$’s utility equal to one minus the above quantity. Because the candidates’ probability of winning is the probability of a certain event (receiving more votes than the opponent) with respect to a binomial probability distribution, this objective function lacks the nice linear form of vote motivation.

We begin with the stochastic additive bias model. As under vote motivation, the objective functions of the candidates are continuous. We will see that quasi-concavity is more difficult to maintain under win motivation, but there is, nevertheless, a close connection between the Nash equilibria generated by the two objective functions. Our first result, due to Duggan (2000), establishes that there is only one possible Nash equilibrium of the electoral game under win motivation: the utilitarian point, as in the analysis of vote motivation. Thus, again, equilibrium incentives drive the candidates to take identical positions at a central point in the policy space.

**Theorem 11 (Duggan)** In the stochastic additive bias model, assume win motivation, and assume the following for each voter $i$:

- $F_i(0) = 1/2$
- $F_i(u_i(x))$ is concave
- $F_i(-u_i(x))$ is convex.
If \((x_A^*, x_B^*)\) is an interior Nash equilibrium of the electoral game, then both candidates locate at the utilitarian point: \(x_A^* = x_B^* = \bar{x}\).

Of the conditions imposed on individual vote probabilities, the first merely assumes a weak form of symmetry, so that neither candidate is \textit{ex ante} advantaged. The second and third conditions are those used in Theorem 7 to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium under vote motivation. Here, those conditions serve a related purpose, which is depicted graphically in Figure 2 for the case of two voters. Fixing candidate B’s policy at the utilitarian point, \(x_B = \bar{x}\), a choice of \(x_A\) will determine a vector

\[
(P_1(x_A, \bar{x}), P_2(x_A, \bar{x}), \ldots, P_n(x_A, \bar{x}))
\]

determines a set of individual vote probabilities for candidate A. Varying \(x_A\) within the policy space \(X\), this generates a set of such probability vectors, the shaded area in Figure 6. Note that, by the symmetry assumption of Theorem 11, candidate A wins with probability one half if the candidate chooses \(x_A = \bar{x}\), and so the vector \((1/2, 1/2)\) lies in this set. The second and third assumptions in Theorem 11 imply that this set of “achievable” probability vectors is convex.

A consequence of Theorem 11 is that, in order to obtain a full understanding of Nash equilibria under win motivation, we need only understand the conditions under which it is indeed a Nash equilibrium for the candidates to locate at the utilitarian point. Clearly, under the conditions of Theorem 7, locating at the
utilitarian point is a Nash equilibrium under vote motivation: this is apparent in Figure 2, as the tangency at probability vector \((1/2, 1/2)\) shows that there is no other achievable vector of probabilities lying on a higher expected vote level set. The probability of winning objective is not linear in vote probabilities, however, and it does not generally possess good convexity properties. This is illustrated in Figure 2 by the “dip” in the probability of winning level set, which creates the possibility for a deviation by candidate \(A\) that is profitable under win motivation.

The next result gives simple conditions that rule out the problem illustrated in Figure 2. Assuming, for simplicity, that individual bias terms are uniformly distributed, it is sufficient to assume that the Hessian matrix of at least one voter’s utility function is negative definite at the utilitarian point. Since we maintain the assumption that utilities are concave, the Hessian is already negative semi-definite, so the added restriction of negative definiteness seems hardly objectionable. The result does not deliver the existence of a global Nash equilibrium, but only one that is immune to small deviations by one of the candidates. The statement here is in the context of the uniform additive bias model used in Duggan (2000), whereas Patty (2003) provides an extension to a more general model of voting and to multiple candidates.\(^{11}\)

**Theorem 12 (Duggan; Patty)** In the uniform additive bias model, assume win motivation. If \(D^2u_i(\overline{x})\) is negative definite for some voter \(i\), then \((\overline{x}, \overline{x})\) is a local Nash equilibrium.

Interestingly, the added restriction of negative definiteness is needed for Theorem 12: the assumption of concavity alone is not enough for the result. Duggan (2000) gives the following three-voter, unidimensional example of the uniform additive bias model in which the utilitarian point is not a local Nash equilibrium:

\[
\begin{align*}
  u_1(x) &= -2x - 4(x - 1/2)^4 \\
  u_2(x) &= x - 2(x - 1/2)^4 \\
  u_3(x) &= u_2(x). 
\end{align*}
\]

It is straightforward to verify that 1’s, 2’s, and 3’s ideal points are 0, 1, and 1, respectively, and that \(\overline{x} = 1/2\). Thus, \((1/2, 1/2)\) is the unique equilibrium under vote motivation. These utility functions are all strictly concave, but we have \(u_1''(\overline{x}) = u_2''(\overline{x}) = u_3''(\overline{x}) = 0\), violating the negative definiteness requirement in Theorem 12. In fact, arbitrarily small increases in \(A\)’s platform will produce a probability of winning greater than one half, and we conclude that \((1/2, 1/2)\) is not a local equilibrium under probability of winning.

In contrast, since the candidates’ objective functions are continuous in the stochastic additive bias model, the DFG theorem yields the general existence

\(^{11}\)See Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1974) for earlier results on the equivalence of vote and win motivation.
of a mixed strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, results of Kramer (1978) and Duggan and Jackson (2004) show that the mixed strategy Nash equilibria in models close to the Downsian model must put probability arbitrarily close to one on policies close to the median ideal policy. As with vote motivation, the equilibrium policy locations of the candidates change in a continuous way when noise is added to the Downsian model.

**Theorem 13** In the stochastic additive bias model, assume win motivation. There is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the electoral game.

In the stochastic preference model, we again may have discontinuities along the diagonal, posing potential difficulties for equilibrium existence. For multidimensional policy spaces, the equilibrium results in Theorem 10 and Theorem 11 for the representative voter model carry over directly, for in this model the objectives of vote motivation and win motivation coincide. Thus, similar negative conclusions hold for equilibrium existence in multiple dimensions. Despite the presence of these discontinuities, as with vote motivation, there is still a unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game when the policy space is unidimensional, though now the characterization is changed. Let \( H_\mu \) denote the distribution of median ideal policy, i.e., \( H_\mu(x) \) is the probability that the median voter’s ideal policy is less than or equal to \( x \). By our dispersion assumption, \( H_\mu \) is strictly increasing and has a unique median, denoted \( x_\mu \). The next result, due to Calvert (1985), establishes that in equilibrium the candidates must locate at the same policy, the median of \( x_\mu \). Thus, in the unidimensional version of the stochastic preference model, we are back to a “median-like” result, but now the equilibrium is at the median of the distribution of medians.

**Theorem 14 (Calvert)** In the stochastic preference model, assume \( X \) is unidimensional and win motivation. There is a unique Nash equilibrium \((x^*_A, x^*_B)\) of the electoral game. In equilibrium, the candidates locate at the median of the distribution of median ideal policies: \( x^*_A = x^*_B = x_\mu \).

It is relatively easy to show that it is an equilibrium for both candidates to locate at the median of medians \( x_\mu \). The uniqueness argument proceeds along the lines of the proof of Theorem 9. If both candidates locate at policy \( x^* < x_\mu \), for example, they each win with probability one half. But if candidate \( A \) deviates slightly to the right to \( x^* + \epsilon < x_\mu \), then with probability greater than one half the median voter will be to the right of \( x^* + \epsilon \) and strictly prefer candidate \( A \). By single-peakedness of the voters’ utility functions, in such cases candidate \( A \) will win a majority of votes, and so \( A \’s \) probability of winning after deviating is greater than one half, a contradiction. As with vote motivation, it is clear that the equilibrium policies in the stochastic preference model converge to the median ideal policy when we consider models approaching deterministic voting in the Downsian model.
Finally, we turn to the known results for equilibria in the model of policy-motivated candidates.

4.3 Policy Motivation

In the general probabilistic voting framework, policy motivation for the candidates takes the form

\[ EU_A(x_A, x_B) = P(x_A, x_B)u_A(x_A) + (1 - P(x_A, x_B))u_A(x_B), \]

and likewise for candidate B. The literature has considered policy motivation almost exclusively in the context of the stochastic preference model, and we will continue that focus. Our first result, however, gives a necessary condition for Nash equilibria of the electoral game that holds for both probabilistic voting models. The result, which is proved by Wittman (1983, 1990), Hansson and Stuart (1984), Calvert (1985), and Roemer (1994), shows that the candidates can never locate at identical positions in equilibrium.

**Theorem 15 (Wittman; Hansson and Stuart; Calvert; Roemer)** In the stochastic additive bias or stochastic preference models, assume policy motivation. If \((x_A^*, x_B^*)\) is a Nash equilibrium of the electoral game, then the candidates do not locate at the same policy position: \(x_A^* \neq x_B^*\).

To prove this result, simply note that whenever the two candidates locate at the same position, at least one candidate can deviate profitably by moving toward his or her ideal policy. By our assumption on the support of \(F_i\) in the stochastic additive bias model, and by our dispersion assumption in the stochastic preference model, that candidate will win with positive probability after moving, increasing his or her expected utility.

By Theorem 15, if we consider a sequence of stochastic preference models approaching the Downsian model, the candidates will adopt distinct policies in the equilibria of these models. Assuming a unidimensional policy space, the median voter theorem implies that, in the limiting Downsian model, the unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game is for both candidates to locate at the median ideal policy. Along the sequence, Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994) show that the wedge between the candidates’ equilibrium policies goes to zero as we approach the Downsian model, and that the equilibrium policies of both candidates’ must converge to the median ideal policy. Thus, equilibria change in a continuous way when we add noise to the behavior of voters in the Downsian model, as we have seen under vote and win motivation.

Theorem 15 leaves open the question of whether a Nash equilibrium exists in the first place. Under our maintained assumptions, measure-theoretic

\footnote{Wittman’s (1983, 1990) model is slightly different from the one here, as he assumes a hybrid of vote and policy motivation.}
arguments can be used to show that each voter $i$’s probability $P_i(x_A, x_B)$ is continuous in the positions of the candidates whenever $x_A$ and $x_B$ are distinct, and the candidates’ objective functions under policy motivation are therefore continuous, as discontinuities no longer occur when one candidate crosses over another. Thus, one of the main conditions in the DFG theorem is fulfilled. But the candidates’ objective functions may not be quasi-concave, making equilibrium existence a non-trivial issue, even in the simplest unidimensional models. In the Euclidean stochastic preference model, however, when the distribution $G$ of ideal points is uniform over an interval containing $[\tilde{x}_A, \tilde{x}_B]$, the candidates’ objective functions are strictly concave over $[\tilde{x}_A, \tilde{x}_B]$, allowing us to apply the DFG theorem. This simple observation is noted by Duggan and Fey (2004b). Though the result is stated only for a uniform distribution, it holds as well for distributions close enough to uniform.

**Theorem 16 (Duggan and Fey)** In the Euclidean stochastic preference model, assume $X$ is unidimensional, policy motivation, and $G$ is uniform on an interval containing $[\tilde{x}_A, \tilde{x}_B]$. There is a Nash equilibrium of the electoral game.

In case $u_A$ and $u_B$ are quadratic and $G$ is uniform with mean at the midpoint of $\tilde{x}_A$ and $\tilde{x}_B$, there is a unique Nash equilibrium, and we can calculate it explicitly. Assume for simplicity that $G$ is uniform on $[\tilde{x}_A, \tilde{x}_B] = [0, 1]$. The first order condition for candidate $A$ reduces to the simple quadratic equation,

$$-3x_A^2 - 2x_B x_A + x_B^2 = 0,$$

with the solution $x_A = x_B/3$. This is indeed a best response to $x_B$, and a similar calculation for candidate $B$ yields $x_B = (x_A/3) + (2/3)$. Solving these equations yields $x_A = 1/4$ and $x_B = 3/4$, giving us the unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game for this special case.

What if we depart from the assumption of uniformly distributed voter ideal points in Theorem 16? Perhaps surprisingly, Nash equilibria can fail to exist due to convexity problems, even in the unidimensional model. Duggan and Fey (2004b) illustrate that failure of existence can occur even in highly structured settings — with quadratic utilities for the candidates and a symmetric, single-peaked density for the distribution of ideal points, and with voting arbitrarily close to deterministic.\(^\text{13}\) They assume quadratic utilities with $\tilde{x}_A = 0$ and $\tilde{x}_B = 1$ and use a piece-wise linear distribution $G$ that may be arbitrarily close to the point mass on $1/2$. The problem created by the lack of quasi-concavity is that the candidates’ best responses are not uniquely defined, creating the possibility of a “jump” in their reaction functions. In Figure 3, this occurs for candidate $A$ at approximately $x_B = .6$. In response to this policy position, $A$ is indifferent between adopting a relatively desirable policy (about $2$), but

\(^\text{13}\)Ball (1999) presents an example of equilibrium non-existence in the model of mixed motivations. His example exploits the discontinuity in that model introduced by a positive weight on holding office.
Candidate A’s policy

Candidate B’s policy

Candidate A’s reaction function

Candidate B’s reaction function

Figure 3: Equilibrium non-existence with policy motivation

winning with a lower probability, and adopting a less appealing policy (about .4), but winning with a higher probability. This is also true of candidate B. As a result, in this example, the reaction functions of the candidates do not cross, and an equilibrium fails to exist.\footnote{This contradicts a theorem due to Hansson and Stuart (1984), whose existence proof mistakenly claims that the candidates’ objective functions are concave.}

As a consequence, we see that the convergence result of Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994) can be vacuous for some sequences of stochastic preference models: it may be that, when we add arbitrarily small amounts of noise to voting behavior in the Downsian model, pure strategy equilibria simply do not exist. Because the objective functions of the candidates are continuous in the stochastic preference model under policy motivation, however, the DFG theorem yields a general existence result for mixed strategy equilibrium, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space.

**Theorem 17** In the stochastic preference model, assume policy motivation. There exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the electoral game.

Finally, consider a sequence of stochastic preference models approaching the Downsian model. Assuming a unidimensional policy space, Theorem 3 implies that in the Downsian model the unique Nash equilibrium under policy motivation is for both candidates to locate at the median ideal policy. As we add a
small amount of noise to the behavior of voters in the Downsian model, we have seen that pure strategy Nash equilibria of the electoral game can fail to exist. By Theorem 17, there will be mixed strategy Nash equilibria, however, and it can be shown that, along the sequence of probabilistic voting models, the mixed strategy Nash equilibria must put probability arbitrarily close to one on policies close to the median ideal policy. Thus, equilibria change in a continuous way when we add noise to the Downsian model.

5 Conclusion

Of many themes throughout this article, the most repeated has been the difficulty in ensuring existence of Nash equilibria in the electoral game. This is especially true for the Downsian model, which assumes deterministic voting, when the policy space is multidimensional. Probabilistic voting models eliminate some of the discontinuities of the Downsian model, and the analysis of these models has yielded reasonable (if somewhat restrictive) sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence in multiple dimensions. The effect of these sufficient conditions is to ensure that the candidates’ objective functions have the appropriate convexity properties. They do not hold when voting behavior is close to Downsian, and as a consequence Nash equilibria may fail to exist, even when the policy space is unidimensional.

I have pursued one approach to solving the existence problem, namely, analyzing mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the electoral game. We have seen that these exist very generally, and that they often possess continuity properties that are desirable in a formal modelling approach: when we add a small amount of noise to voting behavior in the Downsian model, the equilibrium mixed strategies of the candidates close to the median ideal policy. This assures us that the predictions of the Downsian median voter theorem are not unduly sensitive to the specifications of the model.

Other approaches have been pursued in the literature, though I do not cover them at length in this article. One approach, taken by Roemer (2001), is to modify the objectives of the candidates to demand more for a deviation to be profitable. Roemer endows parties (rather than individual candidates) with multiple objectives of office and policy motivation, as well as an interest in “publicity,” whereby a party seeks to announce policy platforms consonant with its general stance, regardless of whether these platforms win. Roemer shows that, if we assume a deviation must satisfy all three of these objectives to be profitable, then an equilibrium exists in some two-dimensional environments.

A second approach, referred to as “citizen candidate” models, is pursued by Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). They model candidates as policy motivated and assume candidates cannot commit to campaign promises, removing all positional aspects from the electoral model. Instead,
strategic variable is whether to run in the election, and equilibria are guaranteed to exist. A related approach, referred to as “electoral accountability” models, views elections as repeated over time and takes up informational aspects of elections. Work in this vein, such as Ferejohn (1986), Banks and Sundaram (1993), and Banks and Duggan (2002), again abstracts away from campaigns. Office-holding politicians do make meaningful choices while in office, however, as candidates must consider the information (about preferences or abilities) their choices convey to voters. Equilibria of a simple (stationary) form can often be shown to exist quite generally in these models.

References


