

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Pol. Sci. 513
Professor Rothenberg

Spring 2020

INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

Purpose: This course principally introduces students to the political science and political economy literatures on interest groups. This includes developing an understanding of the makeup of the group system, contribution decision that help support groups, the internal politics of organizations, the strategies that groups employ and the role that they play with respect to political institutions. As the study of organized groups cuts across many subdisciplines in political science and political economy, and includes certain elements of finance and even accounting, this course might have a wide appeal.

Requirements: Course requirements include research presentations and a longer final paper—either original research, a detailed literature review, or a research proposal (roughly 15 pages will suffice).

Office Hours. I am located in Room 108 at Harkness (Department of Political Science/Wallis Institute of Political Economy). You can come by any time and I will see you barring extenuating circumstances. My phone number is x3-4903 and my e-mail is lawrence.rothenberg@rochester.edu.

Availability of Readings. Articles will be made available through Dropbox. There are several standard books that I would be happy to reference if students would like. Additionally, if you would like a broader appreciation of what interest group scholars in Political Science do, you might consult the journal *Interest Groups & Advocacy*.

Grading. Grading will reflect your class participation and your final paper (weighted approximately 1/2, 1/2).

Week I: Introduction/Overview. (Jan. 27th)

Overview Pieces on Interest Groups (**not required reading**):

Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Beth L. Leech. 2012. "Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: Reexamining Interest Group Research," *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (3): 79-99.

John M. de Figueiredo and Brian Kelleher Richter. 2014. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 163-185.

Martin Gregor. 2017. "Lobbying Mechanisms," in *State, Institutions, and Democracy*, Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero eds., 17-52.

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. 2019. "Empirical Models of Lobbying." Working paper. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w26287>

Week II: Macro-Perspectives (Feb. 3rd).

David Lowery, and Virginia Gray. 2016. "On the Political Origins of Bias in the Heavenly Chorus," *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 5 (1): 25-56.

Herschel F. Thomas and Timothy M. LaPira. 2017. "How Many Lobbyists are in Washington? Shadow Lobbying and the Gray Market for Policy Advocacy," *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 6 (3): 199-214.

Thomas T. Holyoke. 2017. "Interest Group and Lobbying Research in a Higher Level Context: Two Tests of Integrating Multiple Levels of Analysis," *American Politics Research* 45 (5): 887-902.

Lee Drutman, Matt Grossmann, and Tim LaPira. 2019. "The Interest Group Top Tier: More Groups, Concentrated Clout," in *Can American Govern Itself?*, Frances E. Lee and Nolan McCarty, eds.

James Strickland. 2019: "America's Crowded Statehouses: Measuring and Explaining Lobbying in the U.S. States," *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 19 (3): 351-374.

Recommended:

Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy M. LaPira, and Nicholas A. Semanko. 2005. "Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy," *Political Research Quarterly* 58 (1): 19-30.

Frederick J. Boehmke, and Daniel C. Bowen. 2010. "Direct Democracy and Individual Interest Group Membership," *Journal of Politics* 72 (3): 659-671.

Gregory M. Randolph and Michael T. Tasto. 2012. "Special Interest Group Formation in the United States: Do Special Interest Groups Mirror the Success of their Spatial Neighbors," *Economics & Politics* 24 (2): 119-134.

Robert F. Salvino, Gregory M. Randolph, Geoffrey K. Turnbull , and Michael T. Tasto. 2019. "The Effects of Decentralization on Special Interest Groups," *Public Choice* 181 (3-4): 191-213.

Henry E. Brady, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2018. *Unequal and Unrepresented: Political Inequality and the People's Voice in the New Gilded Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Thomas T. Holyoke. 2019. "Dynamic State Interest Group Systems: A New Look with New Data," *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 8 (4): 499–518.

Week III. Micro-Foundations (Feb. 10th).

Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray. 2001. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox," *American Political Science Review* 95 (3): 663-672.

Alexander V. Hirsch. 2016. "Experimentation and Persuasion in Political Organizations," *American Political Science Review* 110 (1): 68-84.

Paul Pecorino. 2016. "Individual Welfare and the Group Size Paradox," *Public Choice* 168 (1-2): 137-152.

David K. Levine, Andrea Matozzi, and Salvatore Modica. 2019. "Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels?" Working paper. <http://www1.unipa.it/modica/cartels.rev.16.pdf>.

Zhao Li. 2018. "How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from Access-Seeking PACs," *American Political Science Review* 112 (4): 792-808

Note: Please be familiar with the basic logic of collective action at least to the level of Olson (1965); if not, review Mancur Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action*, Chs. 1, 2, and 6. There are also a variety of other works in this tradition as well to which I would be happy to provide citations. Here are three somewhat recent reviews of collective action theory:

Luis Medina. 2013. "The Analytical Foundations of Collective Action Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Developments," *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 259-283.

Paul Pecorino. 2015. "Olson's *Logic of Collective Action* at Fifty," *Public Choice* 162 (3-4): 243-262.

Todd Sandler. 2015. "Collective Action: Fifty Years Later," *Public Choice* 164 (3-4): 195-216.

Recommended:

Jack Walker. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*. Chapter 5.

Robert C. Lowry. 1999. "Foundation Patronage toward Citizen Groups and Think Tanks: Who Gets Grants?" *Journal of Politics* 61 (3): 758-776.

Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi. 2008. "The Group Size Paradox Revisited," *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 10 (5): 785-799.

Week IV. Lobbying: Who Lobbies—Part I (Feb. 17th).

Wendy Hansen, Neil J. Mitchell, and Jeffrey M. Drope. 2005. “The Logic of Private and Collective Action,” *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (1): 150-167.

Matilde Bombardini. 2008. “Firm Heterogeneity and Lobbying Participation,” *Journal of International Economics* 75 (2): 329–348.

William R. Kerr, William F. Lincoln, and Prachi Mishra. 2014. “The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying,” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6 (4): 343-379. Data: <https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/114883/version/V1/view;jsessionid=6777F4AD71A5E04664FECFB9B4B4989D>

In Song Kim. 2017. “Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization,” *American Political Science Review* 111 (1): 1-20. See LobbyView page: <https://www.lobbyview.org/#/>.

Alexander Fourinaies, and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. “How do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees,” *American Journal of Political Science* 62(1): 132-147. Data: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/PGCVDP>

In Song Kim, and Dmitriy Kunisky. 2020. “Mapping Political Communities: A Statistical Analysis of Lobbying Networks in Legislative Politics.” *Political Analysis* (forthcoming). See LobbyView page: <https://www.lobbyview.org/#/>.

Note: On measures of group ideology, see:

Adam Bonica. 2013. “Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (2): 294-311. Data: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/HUZNE2>

Jesse M. Crosson, Alexander C. Furnas, and Geoffrey M. Lorenz. 2019. “Polarized Pluralism: Organized Preferences and Biases in the American Pressure System.” https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jesse_Crosson2/publication/324040699_Estimating_Interest_Group_Ideal_Points_with_Public_Position-Taking_on_Bills_in_Congress/links/5ca791bb299bf118c4b58141/Estimating-Interest-Group-Ideal-Points-with-Public-Position-Taking-on-Bills-in-Congress.pdf

Kevin M. Esterling. 2016. “Placing Lobbyists in Legislative Ideological Space,” https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kevin_Esterling/publication/306464174_Placing_Lobbyists_and_Legislators_in_Common_Ideological_Space/links/57be394a08aed246b0f72fea/Placing-Lobbyists-and-Legislators-in-Common-Ideological-Space.pdf

For a broad modeling exercise, see:

David P. Baron. 2019. “Lobbying Dynamics,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 31 (3): 403–452.

Week V. Lobbying: Purpose and Strategies (Class to be rescheduled: Feb. 24th)

Richard L. Hall, and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," *American Political Science Review* 100 (1): 69-84.

Hye Young You. 2017. "Ex Post Lobbying," *Journal of Politics* 79(4): 1162-1176.

Keith E. Schnakenberg. 2017. "Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (1): 129-145.

Alexander V. Hirsch, Karam Kang, B. Pablo Montagnes, and Hye Young You. 2019. "Lobbyists as Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence."
https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/kangk/files/lobbyist_as_gatekeeper.pdf

Christopher J. Ellis, and Thomas Groll. 2020. "Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy," *American Political Science Review* 114 (1): 179–205.

Recommended:

Marco Battaglini, and Eleonora Patacchini. 2018. "Influencing Connected Legislators," *Journal of Political Economy* 126 (6): 2277-2322.

Richard L. Hall, and Molly E. Reynolds. 2012. "Targeted Issue Advertising and Legislative Strategy: The Inside Ends of Outside Lobbying," *Journal of Politics* 74 (3): 888-902.

Week VI: Lobbying—Coalitions and Venue Selections (March 2nd)

Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2012. “Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” *Journal of International Economics* 87 (1): 18-26.

Frederick J. Boehmke, Sean Gailmard, and John Wiggs Patty. 2013. “Business as Usual: Interest Group Access and Representation across Policy-Making Venues,” *Journal of Public Policy* 33 (1): 3-33.

Christine Mahoney, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2015. “Partners in Advocacy: Lobbyists and Government in Washington,” *Journal of Politics* 77 (1): 202-215.

Heaney, Michael T., and Philip Leifeld. 2018. “Contributions by Interest Groups to Lobbying Coalitions.” *Journal of Politics* 80 (2): 494-509. Data: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/UTJGTF>

Geoffrey Lorenz. 2020. “Prioritized Interests: Diverse Lobbying Coalitions and Congressional Committee Agenda Setting.” *Journal of Politics* 82 (1): 225-240.

Recommended:

Frederick J. Boehmke, Sean Gailmard, and John Wiggs Patty. 2006. “Whose Ear to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy-Making,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1 (2): 139-169.

Thomas Holyoke. 2009. “Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation,” *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2): 360-375.

Daniel P. Carpenter, Kevin M. Esterling, and David M. J. Lazer. 2004. “Friends, Brokers, and Transitivity: Who Informs Whom in Washington Politics?” *Journal of Politics* 66 (1): 224-246.

Week VII: Impacts of Lobbying (March 16th)

Deniz Igan and Prachi Mishra. 2014. "Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street: Political Influence and Financial Regulation," *Journal of Law and Economics* 57 (4): 1063-1084.

Karam Kang. 2016. Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector," *Review of Economic Studies* 83 (1): 269-305.

Federico Hunneus and In Song Kim. 2019. "The Effects of Firms' Lobbying on Resource Misallocation." Working paper.
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bc932127fdb8476acace36/t/5d2758615f0c0100019dc844/1562859617908/misallocation.pdf>

Stephane Wolton. 2019. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices." Working paper.
<https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=735105085006006008086073113009066106120009055009062036075096126085093104127078092094009013096038009044113125094121084103121072031087031066093111012127097030010117125095077054021085083070011071093015108076104085118097030089111030104075107114075072102113&EXT=pdf>

David Martimort. 2020. "When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming)
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428365>.

Recommended:

Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak, and Jeffrey F. Timmons. 2009. "Lobbying and Taxes," *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (4): 893-909.

Daniel E. Bergan. 2009. "Does Grassroots Lobbying Work?: A Field Experiment Measuring the Effects of an e-Mail Lobbying Campaign on Legislative Behavior," *American Politics Research* 37 (2): 327-352.

Matt Grossmann, and Kurt Pyle. 2013. "Lobbying and Congressional Bill Advancement," *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 2 (1): 91-111.

David K. Levine and Salvatore Modica. 2017. "Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations," *European Journal of Political Economy* 49 (Sept.): 71-83.

Christian Cox. 2019. "Lobbying for Governmental Appropriations." Working paper.
<https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=113078126115091094126090097004099027003089005085064035004103105071016000074074012069098036057038114126109090021000007003100124010075001029042122093119106102107026074025061078017074089125112022069074017113125116011000001125112069102120120124110073084007&EXT=pdf>

Week VIII. Personnel: The Revolving Door (March 23rd)

Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. 2012. "Revolving Door Lobbyists," *American Economic Review*, 102 (7): 3731-3748.

Ed deHaan, Kevin Koh, Simi Kedia, and Shivaram Rajgopal. 2014. "The Revolving Door and the SEC's Enforcement Outcomes? Initial Evidence from Civil Litigation," *Journal of Accounting and Economics* 60 (2-3): 65-96.

David Lucca, Amit Seru, and Francesco Trebbi. 2014. "The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 65 (July): 17-32, and Comment by Edward J. Kane, 33-35.

James M. Strickland. 2019. "The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists: Evidence from the American States," *American Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming).
<https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezp.lib.rochester.edu/doi/10.1111/ajps.12485>.

Michael E. Shepherd, and Hye Young You. 2020. "Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress," *American Political Science Review* 114 (1): 270-284.

Recommended:

Simon Luechinger, and Christoph Moser. 2014. "The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market," *Journal of Public Economics* 119 (November): 93-107.

Timothy LaPira and Herschel F. Thomas III. 2017. *Revolving Door Lobbying: Public Service, Private Influence, and the Unequal Representation of Interests*. University of Kansas Press.

Adam C. Pritchard and Stephen J. Choi. 2017. "SEC Enforcement Attorneys: Should I Stay or Should I Go?" Working paper. http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/127/

Maxwell Palmer, and Benjamin Schneer. 2019. "Post-political Careers: How Politicians Capitalize on Public Office," *Journal of Politics* 81(2): 670-675.

Joshua McCrain. 2018. "Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of Congressional Staff Connections," *Journal of Politics* 80 (4): 1369-1383.

Pamela Ban, Maxwell Palmer, and Benjamin Schneer. 2019. "From the Halls of Congress to K Street: Government Experience and its Value for Lobbying," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 44 (4): 713-752.

Benjamin V. K. Egerod. 2019. "The Revolving Door and Regulatory Enforcement Firm-level Evidence on Tax Rates and IRS Audits." Working paper.
https://curis.ku.dk/ws/files/213922817/ConnectionsTaxes_feb26_2019.pdf

Simon Weschle. 2019. "Campaign Finance Legislation and the Supply-side of the Revolving Door," *Political Science Research and Methods* (forthcoming)
https://simonweschle.github.io/papers/2019_PSRM_RD.pdf

Week IX. *Political Contributions—Motivations for Giving* (March 30th)

Sanford Gordon, Catherine Hafer, and Dimitri Landa. 2007. "On the Motivations for Political Giving," *Journal of Politics* 69 (4): 1057-1072.

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. 2011. "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," *Journal of Public Economics* 95 (7-8): 587-611.

Alexander Fourinaies, and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. "How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees," *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1): 132–147. Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/PGCVDP>.

Michael Barber, and Mandi Eatough. 2020. "Industry Politicization and Interest Group Campaign Contribution Strategies," *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming).

Edoardo Teso. 2020. "What Drive U.S. Corporate Elites' Contribution Behavior." Working paper.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58210c07197aea631e39422b/t/5e28716fff03df655d01f361/1579708784351/US_Donations_Corporate_Elites.pdf

Recommended:

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale," *American Economic Review* 84 (4): 833-850.

Kishore Gawande and Christopher Magee. 2012. "Free Riding and Protection for Sale," *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (4): 735-747.

Michael Barber. 2016. "Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology," *Political Research Quarterly* 69 (1): 148-159.

Adam Ramey and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. "Friends with Benefits? Social Media, NGOs, and the Determinants of Financial Support." Working paper.

Week X. *Political Contributions—Impacts* (Apr. 6th)

Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen, and Alexei V. Ovtchinnkov. 2010. “Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns,” *Journal of Finance* 65 (2): 687-724.

Meng Gao, and Jiekun Huang. 2016. “Capitalizing on Capitol Hill: Informed Trading by Hedge Fund Managers,” *Journal of Financial Economics* 121 (3): 521-545.

Joshua L. Kalla, and David E. Broockman. 2016. “Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment,” *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (3): 545-558. Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/28582>

Eric Avis. 2018. “Interest Groups, Campaign Finance and Policy Influence.” Working paper.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/eqzk6tovci6b6es/avis_jmp.pdf?dl=0.

Anthony Fowler, Haritz Garro, and Jörg L. Spenkuch. 2020. “Quid Pro Quo? Corporate Returns to Campaign Contributions,” *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming). Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml;jsessionid=ca7be792df2f2611016d070c75a2?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2FBQGWI&version=&q=&fileTypeGroupFacet=&fileAccess=%22Public%22&fileTag=&fileSortField=&fileSortOrder=>

Recommended:

Justin Fox and Lawrence Rothenberg. 2011. “Influence without Bribes: A Non-Contracting Model of Campaign Giving and Policymaking,” *Political Analysis* 19 (6): 325-341.
[Note, is an available supplemental appendix]

Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, and Tracy Yue Wang. 2012. “Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?” *Business and Politics* 14 (1): Article 3.

Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, and Eva Pantaleon. 2012. “Individual Political Contributions and Firm Performance,” *Journal of Financial Economics* 105 (2): 367-392.

Adam Bonica. 2016. “Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and their Directors and Executives,” *Business and Politics* 18 (4): 367-394. Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/6R1HAS>

Weeks XI-XII. Lobbying the Courts and Bureaucracy. (Apr. 13th, 20th).

Bureaucracy:

Richard L. Hall and Kristina C. Miller. 2008. "What Happens After the Alarm? Interest Group Subsidies to Legislative Overseers," *Journal of Politics* 70 (4): 990-1005.

Simon Haeder, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2015. "Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget," *American Political Science Review* 109 (3): 507-522.

Nolan McCarty. 2017. "The Regulation and Self-Regulation of a Complex Industry," *Journal of Politics* 79 (4): 1220-1236.

Amy M. McKay, and Brian Webb. 2019. "Presidential Position-Taking, Presidential Success, and Interest Group Activity," *Congress & the Presidency* 46 (1): 89-108.

Brian D. Libgober . 2020. "Strategic Proposals, Endogenous Comments, and Bias in Rulemaking," *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming).
<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/706891>.

Recommended:

Ernest del Bo and Rafael Di Tella. 2003. "Capture by Threat," *Journal of Political Economy* 111 (5): 1123-1154.

Sanford C. Gordon, and Catherine Hafer. 2007. "Corporate Influence and the Regulatory Mandate," *Journal of Politics* 69 (2): 300-319.

Amy McKay and Susan Webb Yackee. 2007. "Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules," *American Politics Research* 35 (3): 336-357.

Courts:

Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson, and Matthew P. Hitt. 2013. "Quality Over Quantity: Amici Influence and Judicial Decision Making," *American Political Science Review* 107 (3): 446-460. Data:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/WC8DPI>

Paul M. Collins, Jr., and Wendy L. Martinek. 2015. "Judges and Friends: The Influence of Amici Curiae on U.S. Court of Appeals Judges," *American Politics Research* 43 (2): 255-282.
http://peterbils.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/amicus_game.pdf

Week XIII. Private Politics and Student Presentations (Apr. 27th).

David P. Baron. 2012. “The Industrial Organization of Private Politics,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7 (2): 135-174.

Brian Kelleher Richter. 2016. “‘Good’ and ‘Evil’: The Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Political Activity,” <http://capitalism.wfu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Richter-paper.pdf>

Gregory Egorov, and Bård Harstad. 2017. “Private Politics and Public Regulation,” *Review of Economic Studies* 84 (4): 1652-1682.

Geeyoung Min and Hye Young You. 2017. “Corporate Political Spending and Shareholder Activism.” *Journal of Legal Studies* 48 (1): 81-116.

Neil Malhotra, Benoît Monin, and Michael Tomz. 2019. “Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?” *American Political Science Review*
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/does-private-regulation-preempt-public-regulation/4EDDD5AE317613AC3B0894A817056C42>.

Recommended:

Thomas Lyon and John Maxwell. 2004. “Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy,” *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* 13 (4): 561-597.

Craig Volden and Alan E. Wiseman. 2009. “A Theory of Government Regulation and Self-Regulation with the Specter of Nonmarket Threats,”
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=A64DC213C0A82AECC550CA030F6E7DFD?doi=10.1.1.158.3045&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

Some Data Sources

American data:

LobbyView: <http://web.mit.edu/insong/www/pdf/lobbyview.pdf>

Bonica Ideal Point Data: <https://web.stanford.edu/~bonica/data.html>

Some European data:

<http://www.intereuro.eu/public/data>

<https://www.cigsurvey.eu/>