**PSC 564**

**Development and Political Economy**

Fall 2019

2:00pm-4:40pm, Harkness 329

**Gretchen Helmke**

**Alexander Lee**

**Instructors:**

**Gretchen Helmke Alexander Lee**

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Office: Harkness Hall 331 Office: Harkness Hall 327

Office Hours: Thurs, 1:00pm-3:00pm Office Hours: Tuesday’s

**Course Goals:**

This course surveys selected topics in the extensive literature on political and economic development. We will focus on differences in formal and informal institutions across countries. Topics will include the determinants of economic growth, the modernization hypothesis, distributional conflict, government corruption, the success and failure of states to deliver of public goods, among others.

**Grading:**

Class Participation ⎯ 30%

Three short research proposals (10% each) ⎯ 30%

Final Research Proposal ⎯ 40%

**Course Policies:**

Unexcused late work will be penalized a whole letter grade, and an additional letter grade for every additional 24 hours of lateness. Plagiarism or cheating will be treated seriously and reported to the Board of Academic Honesty.

**Course Requirements:**

Students must do all required readings, and be prepared to discuss them actively. All of the readings will be located in a common Dropbox folder designated for the course. For each week, they must submit a reading response by email by midnight the evening before class. Each response must contain a critical discussion of all or some the readings (250 to 350 words) and two questions about the readings that can serve as a basis for class discussion. **(30% of the grade).**

During the course, students must submit and present three short research proposals on a topic relevant to the course material, which should be a maximum of 500 words in length **(10% of the grade each)**. This proposal should outline 1) An existing theoretical or empirical puzzle, 2) an intuition as to a solution to this puzzle, 3) the data needed to test this puzzle, and 4) the identification strategy to be used.

As a final assignment, students must submit and present a research proposal that develops one of their shorter proposals, which should be a maximum of 3000 words in length. This proposal should outline include a more detailed literature review, discussion of theoretical hypotheses, and a serious discussion of how to obtain the data. For projects with publicly available data, successful projects will include a rough preliminary analysis. **Note that the dates on which the assignments are due will be decided during the first week once the class size is determined.**

**Readings**

**Week 1: Introduction**

*September 4th: Introduction to the class and the subject*

**Week 2: The Historical Origins of Underdevelopment**

*September 11th*

*Readings:*

1. Jones, Eric. *The European miracle: environments, economies and geopolitics in the history of Europe and Asia*. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Ch. 1, 12
2. Pomeranz, Kenneth. *The great divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy*. Princeton University Press, 2009. P. 3-68
3. Besley, Timothy, and Marta Reynal-Querol. "The legacy of historical conflict: Evidence from Africa." *American Political Science Review* 108.2 (2014): 319-336.
4. Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane, and Pablo Querubin. "The historical state, local collective action, and economic development in Vietnam." *Econometrica* 86, no. 6 (2018): 2083-2121.

**Week 3: Colonialism**

*September 18th*

*Readings:*

1. Lee, Alexander, and Kenneth A. Schultz. "Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7 (2012): 365-410.
2. Nunn, Nathan. "The long-term effects of Africa's slave trades." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123.1 (2008): 139-176.
3. Acemoglu, Daron Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118: 1231-1294. 2002.
4. Iyer, Lakshmi. "Direct versus indirect colonial rule in India: Long-term consequences." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 92.4 (2010): 693-713.

**Week 4: State Policy and Development**

*September 25th*

*Readings:*

Bates, Robert H. *Markets and states in tropical Africa: the political basis of agricultural policies.* Univ of California Press, 2014. P.1-11.

Evans, Peter B. *Embedded autonomy: states and industrial transformation.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. P.3-20, 43-73.

1. Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. "Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth since World War II." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120.3 (2005): 835-864.
2. Frye, Timothy, and Andrei Shleifer. *The invisible hand and the grabbing hand*. No. w5856. national bureau of economic research, 1996.
3. Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed, and James A. Robinson. "Chiefs: Economic development and elite control of civil society in Sierra Leone*." Journal of Political Economy* 122.2 (2014): 319-368.

**Week 5: The Rule of Law**

*October 2nd*

*Readings:*

1. North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. "Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England." *The journal of economic history* 49, no. 4 (1989): 803-832.
2. Helmke, Gretchen, YeonKyung Jeong, Jae Eun Kim, and Seda Ozturk. “Upending Impunity: Explaining Post-Tenure Presidential Prosecutions in Latin America” Working Paper.
3. Holland, Alisha C. "Forbearance." *American Political Science Review* 110 (2016): 232-246.
4. Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. "Dictators as founding fathers? The role of constitutions under autocracy." *Economics & Politics* 24, no. 3 (2012): 279-306.

**Week 6: Corruption (I)**

*October 9th*

*Readings:*

1. Eggers, A. (2014). Partisanship and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 9(4), 441–472.
2. Williams, M. J. (2017). The political economy of unfinished development projects: Corruption, clientelism, or collective choice*? American Political Science Review*, 705-723.
3. Klasnja, M., Tucker, J. A., & Deegan-Krause, K. (2016). Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(1), 67–94.
4. Manzetti, L., & Wilson, C. J. (2007). Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support? Comparative Political Studies, 40(8), 949–970.

**No Class October 16th (Fall Break)**

**Week 7: Corruption (II)**

*October 23rd*

*Readings*:

1. Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123.2 (2008): 703-745.
2. Bertrand, M., S. Djankov, R. Hanna and S. Mullainathan. 2007. “Obtaining a Driver’s License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122:4, 1639-1676.
3. Chong, Alberto, De La O, Ana L., Karlan, Dean, and Wantchekon, L. (2015). Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification. The Journal of Politics, 77(1), 55-71.
4. Olken, B. (2007). Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), 200-249.

**Week 8: The Effects of Democracy on Development**

*October 30th*

*Readings:*

Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster, and Edward Miguel. "Reshaping institutions: Evidence on aid impacts using a preanalysis plan." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127.4 (2012): 1755-1812.

1. Ross, M. 2006. “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” *American Journal of Political Science, 50:4, 860-874.*
2. Manion, Melanie. "Democracy, community, trust The impact of elections in rural China." *Comparative Political Studies* 39.3 (2006): 301-324.
3. Harding, Robin, and David Stasavage. "What democracy does (and doesn’t do) for basic services: School fees, school inputs, and African elections." *The Journal of Politics* 76.1 (2013): 229-245.

**Week 9: Clientelism**

*November 6th*

*Readings:*

1. Ascencio, Sergio J., and Miguel R. Rueda. "Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation." *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 3 (2019): 727-742.
2. Shami, M. 2012. “Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity,” *American Political Science Review, 106:3, 588-606.*
3. Wantchekon, Leonard. "Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin." *World Politics* 55.03 (2003): 399-422.
4. Stokes, Susan C., et al. *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2013. Ch.1, 5.

**Week 10: State Capacity**

*November 13th*

*Readings:*

Herbst, Jeffery. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.* Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. Ch.1.

1. Lee, Melissa M., and Nan Zhang. "Legibility and the informational foundations of state capacity." *The Journal of Politics* 79.1 (2017): 118-132.

Scott, James. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. Ch.1.

1. Dasgupta, Aditya, and Devesh Kapur. "The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Effectiveness: Evidence from Local Rural Development Officials in India." *Available at SSRN 3057602*(2017).
2. Migdal, Joel S. *Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton University Press, 1988. Introduction to Part 1, chapter 1.

**Week 11: Gender and Identity**

*November 20th*

*Readings:*

1. Querubin, Pablo. "Family and politics: Dynastic persistence in the Philippines." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11, no. 2 (2016): 151-181.
2. Blaydes, Lisa, and Drew A. Linzer. "The political economy of women's support for fundamentalist Islam." *World Politics* 60.4 (2008): 576-609.
3. Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra, and Esther Duflo. "Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72.5 (2004): 1409-1443.
4. Lee, Alexander and Varun Ramachandra “Competing Inequalities? Gender Quotas and Caste in India.’’ Forthcoming, *American Journal of Political Science*.

**No Class November 27th (Thanksgiving)**

**Week 12: Trust, Social Capital and Diversity**

*December 4th*

*Readings:*

1. Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?." *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 04 (2007): 709-725.
2. Bhavnani, Rikhiland Alexander Lee. “Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from India” *The Journal of Politics*, 2018, 80.1, 71-87.
3. Tsai, Lily L. "Solidary groups, informal accountability, and local public goods provision in rural China." *American Political Science Review* 101.2 (2007): 355-372.
4. Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton university press, 1994. P83-136.

**Week 13: Ethnic Politics and Nationalism**

*December 11th*

*Readings:*

1. Dunning, Thad, and Lauren Harrison. "Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali." *American Political Science Review* 104.1 (2010): 21-39.
2. Franck, Raphael, and Ilia Rainer. "Does the leader's ethnicity matter? Ethnic favoritism, education, and health in sub-Saharan Africa." *American Political Science Review* 106.2 (2012): 294-325.
3. Posner, Daniel N. "The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review*98.4 (2004): 529-545.
4. Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism.* Cornell University Press, 1983. Ch.5.
5. Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Second Edition. New York: Verso, 1994. Ch.1,4.