
On the Notion ‘Showing Something’¹

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‘show \`sho\ vb ... 1: to cause or permit to be seen’
--Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary

1 An Informal Introduction

In the final month of the last year of the last century (and the last millennium), certain predictable tasks came up, such as constructing ‘greatest X of the century’ lists. For example, the March 29th issue of *Time* magazine listed ‘the century’s greatest minds’ (‘scientists and thinkers’ it said), and I noted that no linguists appeared on their list for their accomplishments. It’s not that the area of language itself was neglected. Wittgenstein and Piaget appeared, but names like Sapir, Bloomfield, de Saussure, to name just a few, were absent (though Chomsky rated a small blurb and dated picture embedded within the Piaget article). And, it certainly had been an exciting century for linguistics. So, whatever it is we had done has, apparently, not sprung as brightly on the popular imagination as the work of Freud, Einstein, Fermi, Keynes, and the others.

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It is clear that linguists work on something that matters to *Time*'s general readership. Granted, it takes the form of 'Increase your vocabulary', 'Learn Spanish in 30 days', worrying about Jimmie's stuttering, a fascination with dialect differences, fervent feelings about the English Only issue, and so forth. To suggest that the subject matter of linguistics is something that is not important to people in general, and that's the source of the omission, is simply incorrect.

But perhaps instead we should ask ourselves what linguists have accomplished this past century that would merit the attention of *Time* magazine. Suppose, I'm sure contrafactually, that you were asked to edit a special issue of this magazine entitled 'Linguists of the 20th Century: Scientists and Thinkers'? Who would you put into this special issue? Who would be on the cover? And why? The point of this exercise is not to engage in some personality parade; it is instead to reflect on what we, as individuals, regard as the best of accomplishments that has gone under the rubric of LINGUISTICS, and what factors we employ to assess them.

Two criteria come most prominently to my mind: durability and impact. To illustrate what is intended by 'durability', consider what you would propose as the top ten accomplishments of linguistics of the nineteenth century? So, for instance, once the Egyptian hieroglyphs were deciphered, they stayed deciphered; or once Indo-European was 'discovered', it has likewise remained that way. What in the 20th century has this character?

As for impact, we might first think of influence within the field, that is, who has significantly shaped the way we think about our work the most? So, for instance, Leonard Bloomfield might be regarded by many as more influential than many of his contemporaries and, of course, Chomsky's dominant influence in the field in the latter decades should be obvious to all. In a somewhat different category, we might consider the standardization of a set of phonetic symbols--the IPA--this century as an accomplishment of this sort. Here's one thing we all use. But, perhaps even more important, is impact beyond linguistics, how an accomplishment or an idea has influenced other academic areas, and/or our society as a whole. How has it permitted us to do things we couldn't do before, or conceive of things in a way previously not possible? So, the influence of Structuralism in the earlier part of this century on sociology and cultural anthropology would be a possible example of this. Others might be the completion of the OED or the demonstration that signed communication systems of the deaf and hard of hearing have the earmarks of normal human languages (and are thus not simply elaborated gestural systems). These have made a very real difference to many people. I'll just leave it to you to assess whether linguists have any noteworthy 20th century accomplishments.

The perspective I'm trying to take here is what we look like from the outside, and what it can tell us about who or what we are, on the inside. Here, I must gauge our broader image from piecemeal evidence. In any event, I am going to take it that our broader image—among other academics as well as with the general public—is largely produced by the most visible and articulate proponents of linguistic theorizing, which in the past decades has clearly been Chomsky and those who approach the puzzle of language in likeminded ways. Many linguists do not like this state of affairs, which is fair enough, and many more have misgivings about some of the particulars of prevailing rhetoric, myself included. But to give some circumference to this characterization of 'like-mindedness', I would count myself among this group, showing it to be a rather loose characterization I intend.

In conversation with someone outside (or even inside) academics, I and others often have had a hard time explaining what we do for a living. This is not experienced by all linguists, but I take it (though you well may not) as characterizing something central about the field in terms of our external presentation. As evidence, witness all the web pages of linguistics departments and note how many have 'What is linguistics?' as one of the topics addressed. Now go compare those to the home pages of history or physics departments. There is something going on here. The question I wish to pose is why this might be so. The less immediate question I wish to pose is, if linguists were good at explaining themselves to outsiders, might one or two have shown up in *Time* magazine's listings?

2 Some Quick Issues

2.1 Is Linguistics an Intellectually Incoherent Field?

No. The foundations of an intellectually coherent field are decently enough in place, despite the variety one finds. Linguistics has its own specific domain of data which is unshared by other enterprises: namely, human language and languages. There are distinguishing constructs and theoretical/descriptive vocabulary: notions like SUBJECT, CASE-MARKING, WORD, PREPOSITION, OBSTRUENT and so forth are, collectively, unshared by other enterprises either as a basic element of theoretical vocabulary, or as a phenomenon to be accounted for in other terms. Finally, the subject of this conference, linguists working on linguistic theory have their own methodologies and values, rightly or wrongly, for what constitutes a decent account of phenomena. Thus, it's not that the field itself is particularly less coherent than others. So what is it?

2.2 A Terminological Issue?

To many people, the term ‘linguist’ is synonymous with ‘polyglot’, as examination of popular literature will easily show. Using the term ‘linguist(ics)’ in general public forums, or even in the presence of other academics, does not call forth a rich set of concepts and associations from which people divine that they have a grasp of what this means. It seems more confusing than illuminating. To think a name change would solve any problems, though, is putting the cart before the horse.

2.3 Neglected Public Relations?

The field has (and always has had) relatively few practitioners, so there is in comparison to other fields a dearth of popularizers, effective textbooks, or a critical mass of people with enough charm and charisma to grab the attention of the press. It might also be that linguists lack a popular iconographic image to project, no Margaret Mead sitting in a Samoan hut, Einstein writing abstruse but powerful formulas on a blackboard, or Freud and his cigar psychoanalyzing someone lying on a couch.² Is the difficulty one of not having a good PR firm? If so, it is hardly a current problem. If one lists some classically famous linguists and does a public survey on name recognition, the conclusion would be that linguistics lacks ‘stars’. When the philosophers claim Socrates and Kant, linguists get to claim Dionysius Thrax and Bopp in return; when the physicists get Newton, Kepler, and Einstein, linguistics gets Panini, Priscian and, you know, what’s-his-name, the guy that wrote the Port-Royale Grammar.

2.4 The Specter of Prescriptivism

The earliest experience with linguistics for most people is in the form of a prescriptive (and, proscriptive) approach to language. Even people who have since become linguists found this boring, simply another seemingly pointless set of classroom rules to be followed. Linguists thus become the Emily Posts of language, set your silverware this way, put your napkin here, do not split infinitives. It hardly seems to have anything to do with daily life. It also aligns linguists with an authoritarian view of the world, a view one would be very, very hard-pressed to achieve were one to examine actual working linguists.

² The closest I have been able to come as an iconographic image for linguists is the top-hatted Henry Higgins in ‘My Fair Lady’ (a character, I’m told, modeled after Henry Sweet).

2.5 Do People Really Want Their Languages Analyzed?

Unlike having dreams, desires, wishes and fears, the moment a person begins to speak, their thoughts and feelings are made public. Analysis brings a feeling of self-consciousness to this speaking process (particularly if one uses 'bad grammar' or speaks a socially identifiable dialect). This doesn't seem to bother working linguists very much, and if it did they wouldn't be linguists. But a good analogy that linguists might be able to connect better to is the study of gesture. If one has had the experience of the significance of one's gesture being pointed out publicly, often a discomfort arises which others easily feel about language.

3 Some Longer Issues

3.1 Abstractness

Many linguists do not have such difficulties of communicating what they do. If one studies second language acquisition, for instance, as a specialty within the field, the responses to 'What do you do?' are fairly accessible and understandable. Something like 'I try to understand the way people learn a new language, so that we can teach them more effectively' leaves few questions in anyone's mind. Or, if one focuses on sentence processing by employing experimental methodologies, or computational routines for text retrieval, or constructing dictionaries and any manner of things, people readily have as good an understanding of what one does for a living as they do of any physicist or anthropologist. The same goes for language specialists--people who identify themselves as an expert in Greek, Southeast Asian languages, or Tibetan, have an entirely understandable if slightly arcane place in people's minds. The details and issues may be lost on all but the specialists, but a fundamental understanding of what the enterprise is *about* will not be. There is some phenomenon, out there, in time and space, that is the object of our knowledge, whether it is the process of learning a second language, a series of Runic inscriptions, producing and understanding utterances, or engineering a machine to understand what you're asking about over the telephone.

However, use the bare term 'linguist' or 'linguistics' without such further elucidation, and most understanding vaporizes. The reason why these terms seem so obscure to most people is the result of incomplete communication, I believe, not simply that obscure terms are being tossed around. What, after all, is the phenomenon in time and space that is the object of study?

The obvious answer would seem to be 'language'. But this is found unsatisfactory on at least two counts. Consider, for instance, what comedian Jerry Seinfeld means when he says, in an interview, that his (former) television show *Seinfeld* was 'about language'. Those who have watched the show would realize that he means *usage*, the various things people can do (in this case, socially) with language. Linguistics textbooks present a different view, that 'language' is not usage, but something else.³

Linguistic work employing the methodologies distinctive of the field does not attempt to account for many aspects of linguistic behavior, such as average length of sentences in Faulkner or in Elvis Presley songs, or why the word 'party' might be used on some days more than others. Theorizing about language focuses on universals (in the philosophical sense of the term), and not particulars. Traditional notions like WORD, AFFIX, MEANING, and so forth, are abstracted from many particular token utterances, signs, or inscriptions, which are the particulars. Saying something so mundane as, 'In French, *chien* means 'dog'', or 'Old English had case-marking on nouns,' makes no reference to particular utterances in time and space. This focus on universals about language--what are traditionally called grammars--dissociates the contents of linguistic theorizing from the world of phenomena, and makes linguistics look a bit more like mathematics or philosophy than cognitive science. But linguistics is clearly an empirical area: unlike mathematics, proofs are not available to show most points; and unlike philosophy, there is a delimited domain of empirical data that primarily defines the area. As David Perlmutter and S.-Y. Kuroda have pointed out independently, the data of linguistic theorizing is (abstract) grammars, and its point is to theorize about how grammars could, and could not, be constructed. But (abstract) grammars are not phenomena in time and space to be understood, like historical events or observed planetary motion.

The other problem with concreteness is that one cannot just study 'language', as language appears in the world only in the form of particular languages, and it is almost universally assumed outside linguistics these do not have much in common. So 'language' remains this vague heterogeneous concept to most individuals. But many linguists consider it misleading to claim they work *on* particular languages (even if they work *with* them), as many see their work as aimed at trying to uncover and understand the basic design of language simpliciter. However, this can leave linguists, rhetorically, with little to say. Consider by way of analogy your reaction to the following:

³ Just one example is Radford (1997: 2-3). The distinction, in this instance, is put in terms of competence and performance.

You: What department are you in?
X: Biology
You: Oh, what do you study?
X: The principles of life.
You: Oh, how interesting. Now, what do you *really* study?
X: How life works.
You: (change of topic)

The focus on universals and 'language', rather than particulars and particular languages, can put linguists, on a public view, in the same position as the following professor:⁴

'I once heard of a course in esthetics given at a large Middle Western university in which an entire semester was devoted to Art and Beauty and the principles underlying them, and during which the professor, even when asked by students, persistently declined to name specific paintings, symphonies, sculptures, or objects of beauty to which his principles might apply. "We are interested," he would say, "in principles, not in particulars."'

No linguist I know of even remotely teaches or works this way, in practice. All work on some aspect of empirical data--some actual language or languages or language behavior. But something akin to this is a public impression which, if the universals are focused on a little too keenly, is all too easy to communicate.⁵

3.2 An Issue within Academics

One major development in the past twenty years or so is the slow departure of linguistics from cognitive science--or rather vice versa.⁶ One thing that is clear is that this widening gulf is due in some significant measure to the increasing discrepancy between the types of explanations linguists routinely offer, vs. the types of explanations offered by colleagues in the other cognitive sciences.⁷ From the standpoint of many psychologists and computer scientists, at least, it appears that most linguists have stuck to modes of explanation that may once have been acceptable in these adjacent fields, but

⁴ Related in Hayakawa (1978: 164-165).

⁵ Cf the discussion of linguistics by Dresner (1995: 9).

⁶ See Ray Jackendoff (1988) for a discussion which, even more than a dozen years later, this article echoes.

⁷ Discussions of this can be found in Miller (1990: 317-322) and in Osherson and Wasow (1976).

are no longer. Such constructs as RULES, LOGIC, GRAMMATICALITY, and many others that many linguists make use of, have come under attack and have been increasingly discarded in other areas.⁸ Linguists appear, in the eyes of some others, to be what's left on the beach after the tide went out, being unable to swim fast enough, and it is not always clear to others why linguists have not 'kept up'.

This view finds much favor among some of the closest colleagues, including a growing number within linguistics proper. The grounding assumption appears to be that linguistics is (in fact) a part of cognitive science, and if we take that seriously then it follows that we need to be serious about squaring the way linguists produce knowledge with the way knowledge is produced in other areas of cognitive science. But more often, the critique becomes one of pure theory. The criticism is, to put it simply, that linguists' distinctive methodologies and modes of explanation stop short, somehow. That's the view, and it's not confined to the late 1990's or critiques from cognitive science. Here's what it looked like to one professor offering advice to a student about how to get through the language history examinations, some fifty years ago:¹⁰

'When you hit a word in a text you cannot identify, simply correlate it with some modern word it sounds like and then invent a bridge between them. Most of the examiners will be suspicious, but may consider, so imprecise is linguistic science, your little word history an interesting possibility.'

Or, consider a commonly-encountered type of example from your Linguistics 101 class, where students have been asked to give a morphological analysis of, say, the word *ridiculous*. While the *-ous* part is pretty cut and dried, what about the *ridicul-* part? And, if it's decomposable, is it *-ic -ul*, or *i-cul*, or what? Does appeal to Latin settle the issue? Is the existence of the word *risible* or *deride* a relevancy? Wherein lies the fact of the matter? And if there is no fact of the matter, what are linguists up to?

This criticism has enough content to sting some, despite the demonstrated productivity of applying linguistic methodologies in finding out new facts about language and languages. The issue is *not* whether linguistics has produced a significant bank of knowledge about language during, say, this century (just compare what is known now to what was known a hundred

⁸ See, for just one example, Seidenberg and McDonald (1999).

⁹ Even simple quantification of judgment data would be a step in this direction. See, for instance, McCawley (1997).

¹⁰ From Delbanco (1999).

years ago!); rather, the issue seems to be whether the facts are as characterized by some form of current linguistic theory. It is a fact (to my knowledge discovered in the latter half of this century), for instance, that many languages have an unaccusative/unergative distinction in the domain of intransitive verbs. But is it a 'fact' that unaccusative subjects, in contrast to unergative subjects, are derived by movement from an underlying object position?

It is certainly an interesting and productive idea—but a fact? No. And, what's more, it is not clear what type of evidence would elevate this particular theoretical construct to fact-hood. Someone might become convinced enough to regard this idea of movement as something one is (intellectually) committed to and to incorporate it as a central and unshakable assumption of one's own work, and many have. But this is very different from someone *showing* that there is, in fact, movement.¹¹

From the standpoint of linguists who work on such things, the issue turns on whether there is significant and systematic *insight* into a language or languages that is to be gained. But the amount of insight to be gained simply cannot be judged if one lacks requisite knowledge of how the theory works as a whole, what the existing alternatives are (and how they seem to miss the point), and some prior knowledge of significant patterns of data. Even among people with this kind of background, of course, not everyone ends up in agreement. While empirical coverage is expected, it is actually not, in practice, fully expected, for lingering counterexamples are almost always tolerated. This whole process can be mystifying to colleagues in the other cognitive sciences, who are used to the touchstone of increased empirical coverage as largely determining the success and value of a particular approach or analysis.¹²

3.3 The Descriptive Base

What is to be considered 'data' is itself not a theory-free concept, of course. Data need to be delimited, organized and interpreted in a satisfactory and largely agreed-upon way before anyone can proceed with anything empiri-

¹¹ By 'movement' I intend any technical means of implementing this metaphor, such as copy-and-delete, 2 to 1 advancement, etc. I do not mean that one must literally detect spatial movement, though of course if this could be done somehow it would count.

¹² In lectures Chomsky has made the point that insight, and not prediction, is the key in linguistics (or any science). The following analogy is used: one can predict the next day's weather in Boston to a fair degree by reading the weather report of the current day in the Cleveland newspapers. Or, one can generate models of atmospheric dynamics. Even if the former turned out to be a better method of prediction, it still clearly lacks the ingredient of insight the alternative, even if less effective predictively, can offer.

cal, in any domain. In Chomskyan linguistics, the competence/performance distinction is (partly) a rule-of-thumb proposal for delimiting what counts as data, as is a notion of GRAMMATICALITY. Both may be subject to question, but such notions as PAST TENSE, MASS TERM, WORD, PRONOUN, CLAUSE, AFFIX, etc., while not entirely theory-free, form a broad and shared basis for common discourse about language structure.¹³ Let us call this the ‘descriptive base’. The descriptive base, like theoretical constructs, is open to question and revision; it can and does change, though more slowly. But it is not arbitrarily chosen. It reflects an interpretation of the data which is sufficiently justified by common standards to warrant presumption; it is a way of organizing data into reasonably justifiable classes of phenomena; it is that level which can be successfully shown to be so if pressed.

Hopefully, all linguists can show that there are words, or mass terms, or affixes, or vowels, to a level that would be acceptable to anyone respecting normal standards of evidence. This does not prevent people, of course, from turning right around and noting that the notion WORD (for instance) has problematic aspects to it, even to the point where, when you get right down to it, maybe there aren’t WORDS after all. But this is theory-talk, not talk of phenomena. In claiming there are no WORDS one would not be claiming that such things as one utters or finds in the dictionary are a delusion; they remain. Try telling a roommate that *cat* isn’t *really* a word and they’ll be completely lost. In one sense there are, in fact, words. In another sense, there might not *really* be WORDS after all. This is the difference between a descriptive base and the theory.

This is a distinction which linguists may not always keep in mind. Why it hasn’t been *shown* that there are movement transformations is, quite simply, this: an insufficient preponderance of linguists subscribe to this idea because evidence has not been produced up to the levels of normal standards of evidence (this is not to say other reasons don’t come into play as well). Not everyone’s convinced.

There is a somewhat artificial alternative to avoid the skeptics. To be much more persuasive, what one can do is to narrow the group addressed so that it has the effect of elevating a given theoretical construct to the level of fact-hood, by addressing only those who are ‘on board’. The flip side of this coin is to simply ignore the work of those who are not in agreement. This limitation of the audience raises the richness of the descriptive base for that group (as everyone addressed basically agrees) and allows for increasingly abstract and deeper discussion and, presumably, for greater progress to be made.

¹³ This constitutes what R.M.W. Dixon calls ‘basic linguistic theory’.

Let's not argue the question of increased progress one way or another; let's instead consider the cost of this strategy. While one can, to a large extent, limit one's audience or who one listens to, what are considered 'normal standards of evidence' remains almost exactly the same no matter what one does. And as one's descriptive base becomes increasingly dependent upon theoretical argument and conclusion, the implicit claim that this base encodes what can be satisfactorily shown--that is, what everyone pretty much agrees on-- becomes correspondingly less and less connected to the grounding of common standards of evidence in society at large, and also less and less connected to the standards of evidence invoked across academics in general. Note that this issue does not have to do with simple specialization per se; rather, it has to do with communicating to others what the results of all this work shows. If such statements as, 'Transderivational constraints exist' or 'Binding is expressible as three conditions', or 'The sound structure of language is a series of ranked universal constraints', are regarded as what has been shown, we're going to get the hearing we deserve. What, in terms of common experience, do such statements (whether correct or not) have to do with? Losing sight of this question results in others not being able to catch sight of what linguists, as a community, regard as answers, as what is known about language.

At the same time, there is no doubt as to both the necessity and worth of developing advanced, and highly abstract, forms of linguistic theory. This is what propels a huge amount of research that has advanced knowledge of language so much in this past century. It has proven massively productive. To present the theories themselves as what has been shown, however, communicates little to those outside.

3.4 Linguists as Scientists

It is common enough to speak as if linguistics is a science.¹⁴ It is something worthwhile to think about and examine, as it implies a certain rigor that linguists can aspire to. But, as a public presentation, this characterization has its drawbacks. For one, natural science is fundamentally about events and their causes and effects. Despite the commonalities of theory construction and empirical orientation unless someone can articulate what the events are (and some linguists in their work certainly can), and how linguists are trying to understand causal relations, there's an uphill battle. Note, for instance, that a notion of PREDICTION in linguistic theorizing is only about future

¹⁴ For one recent discussion surrounding this topic, see Lappin, Levine, and Johnson (2000), and the series of Topic-comment responses in *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 18: 4.

events in the derivative sense of order of observation, not actual order of occurrence (it's likely that in many papers some PREDICTIONS of an analysis were observed before the analysis itself was arrived at). Science also normally results, at least often enough, in some palpably engineered products that allow us to do things we couldn't do before. The point is not that linguists are unscientific (though my personal opinion is we're far more like philosophers than chemists). Rather, in asserting a scientific approach to others there is the risk of confusion because linguists don't wear white lab coats, often don't use expensive equipment and laboratories full of blinking lights and dials, the academic departments don't reside in science schools or divisions, and the scientists themselves don't appear to claim linguists in many important respects.¹⁵ So, this discussion, as one publicly presented, does not immediately meet with very much that is already familiar in the minds of the outside world, including other academics.

3.5 Ontology of the Object of Study

The object of study for all linguists is (some aspect of) language. Most, however, have underlying motivations for studying language that are derived from other or broader intellectual or social concerns. It is important to articulate these concerns; in so doing, however, it is likewise important to distinguish them from what is the object of study. Let's take an obvious example first, and here I am more or less reiterating published comments by Geoff Pullum.¹⁶ From one very common point of view, what linguistics is about is a particular endowment that human beings have by virtue of membership in a particular species, and that endowment is transmitted genetically. Thus, it is tempting to say that linguists are *really* doing genetics. Let us set aside the question of the correctness of this view--it is certainly not implausible. But people do read the job ads, and one thing all have failed to notice is medical schools or genetics departments advertising for linguists. If someone asks a linguist what they do for a living and hear 'genetics' in response, it counts, publicly, as wildly inaccurate.¹⁷

A slightly less pointed view that many find fascinating is this: that language is a creature of the mind. That is, linguists are *really* doing ('theoretical') psychology (Chomsky 1975:37). Again, this might be exactly right--

¹⁵ In some ways they do. Inclusion of linguists in the National Academy of Science, and within the structure of the National Science Foundation are indicators. But linguistics articles, particularly theoretical articles, are absent from those regularly appearing in *Science*.

¹⁶ For instance, Pullum (1995).

¹⁷ People may not know what linguists do, but, to quote Will Rogers, 'It's not what you know, it's what you know just ain't so.' And people know linguists don't do this.

and it is entirely plausible. But, as noted above, people read the job ads, and how many psychology departments are hiring linguists these days who do not share the experimental methodologies, and consequent modes of explanation, of others in such departments?

The basic claim examined is an ontological claim. That language is psychological (biological, genetic, chemical, on down the reductionist ramp). There exist competing ontological views--language as a social/cultural phenomenon is one perfectly respectable alternative, or that language is an abstract mathematically-specifiable system. There is also the (to my mind, strong) possibility that 'language' is of mixed ontology (Pullum and Scholz 1997). Regardless, my own view is that ontological claims are the very, very toughest ones of all to put through, and hardly anyone can do it successfully. Now, one can believe that in fact this or that is what linguists are up to (say, studying the mind), and it may even be true, but when this agenda takes the form of a public representation of the character of an entire field, there's confusion sown, since not all linguists would agree that 'the mind' is what is being studied. It does seem, in contrast, that all would agree linguists study (some aspect of) human language, by studying particular languages and language behaviors, (linguists do not study digestive systems of reptiles, architecture, or comets, for instance), and all would agree (I assume) that it is studied from a variety of perspectives, some complementary, and some genuinely in conflict. There seems little more specific than this one can say that accurately characterizes the field as a whole.

Should linguistics be a branch of psychology, or of mathematics, of anthropology, of sociology, of biology, of philosophy?¹⁸ Perhaps one or more of these answers is correct, perhaps not. More likely there is no 'correct' answer, but rather express judgments about the best ways to study language and languages--What is going to lead to more secure knowledge? What is going to attract more and better-qualified practitioners? What is going to lead to more productive research? These are questions that linguists differ on greatly. It may well, in the future, turn out that the methodologies which have bouyed the development of linguistic theory this century will have proven exhausted, and must be replaced by others. Perhaps some as-yet unenvisioned breakthrough will enable even more rapid development along the same lines, or in very different directions.

At this point, it might be an interesting thought experiment to transport oneself to the language world of December, 1899, and try and envision, given only what was known then, the next hundred years.

¹⁸ It is a fact of course that disciplines going by such names can be fluid, disjoint, with vague or even chaotic boundaries. Presumably, the publicly-presented labels will eventually catch up to these developments.

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