

**Political Science 568: International Organization**  
**Friday, 9:30-11:55, Fenno Room (Harkness 329)**

**Fall 2015**

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Harkness Hall 336  
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**Purpose of the course:** This is an advanced course intended for Ph.D. students. The course conducts a broad survey of the field, focusing on recent developments in the theory of international organization, and making use of historical examples from a range of substantive issue areas.

**Course Requirements:** Each student writes a data-based research paper (20-25 pages, described below). A draft of the paper is due Monday, December 6, at 5:00 pm, and the final version is due December 17 at 12:00 noon. There will be opportunities to present versions of the paper during the semester. There will be a take-home final exam, due December 20 at 4:00 pm. Grading: 1/3 class participation, 1/3 final paper, 1/3 final.

**Research Papers:** Although the papers are short (no more than 25 pages, please), the standards are high. The papers are expected to formulate a hypothesis, ground it in appropriate literature, illustrate an argument or puzzle using qualitative evidence, and test the hypothesis using quantitative evidence.

**Books:**

- Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2002. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Davis, Christina L. 2012. *Why Adjudicate: Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).
- Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998.
- Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- Thompson, Robert, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher H. Achen, and Thomas König. 2006. *The European Union Decides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vreeland, James R. and Axel Dreher. 2014. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

**Course Outline:**

**Sept. 4: No class (APSA)**

**Sept 11: Public Goods and Transaction Costs**

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Stone, Randall W. 2008. Institutions, Power and Interdependence. In Helen Milner and Andrew Moravcsik, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stone, Randall W., Branislav Slantchev and Tamar London. 2008. Choosing How to Cooperate. *International Studies Quarterly*. (June).

**Sept. 18: Institutional Design**

Koremenos, Barbara. Contracting around International Uncertainty, *American Political Science Review* 99: 549-65, November 2005.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, eds. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4) (Autumn). Reprinted as *Rational Design: Explaining the Form of International Institutions*, Cambridge University Press, January 2004.

**Sept. 25: Delegation and Agency**

Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Vaubel, Roland. A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. *Public Choice* 51 (1986): 39-57.

Johnson, Tana. 2013. Institutional Design and Bureaucrats' Impact on Political Control *The Journal of Politics* 75 (1) (January): 183-197.

Michael N. Barnett, Martha Finnemore. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations *International Organization* 53 (4).

**Oct. 2: Informal Governance**

Stone, Randall W. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

### ***Oct. 9: Voting in the UN***

Vreeland, James R. and Axel Dreher. 2014. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker. 2006. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (4): 905-30.

Carter, David B., and Randall W. Stone. 2015. Multilateralism and Democracy: The Case of Vote Buying in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization* 68 (1): 1-33.

Voeten, Erik. 2000. Clashes in the Assembly. *International Organization* 54 (2) (Spring): 185-215.

### ***Oct. 16: Institutional Change in the European Union***

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press.

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. *International Organization* 52 (2) (Spring): 397-419.

Schneider, Christina J. 2007. Enlargement Processes and Distributional Conflicts: The Politics of Discriminatory Membership in the European Union. *Public Choice*, Vol. 132, No. 1/2 (July): 85-102.

### ***Oct. 23: EU Legislation***

Thompson, Robert, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher H. Achen, and Thomas König. 2006. *The European Union Decides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Selected chapters.

### ***Oct. 30: The WTO***

Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2002. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Chapters.

Steinberg, Richard. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-74.

Davis, Christina. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1) (February): 153-69.

**Nov. 6: Trade Disputes and Adjudication**

Davis, Christina L. 2012. *Why Adjudicate: Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kucik, J. and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization* 62 (3): 477-505

Busch, Marc L. 2007. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. *International Organization* 61 (4) (Oct): 735-61.

Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett, and Christina Davis. 2009. Who Files? Developing Country Participation in WTO Adjudication. *Journal of Politics* 71 (3) (July): 1033-1049.

**Nov. 13: International Law and Domestic Politics**

Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Dai, Xinyuan. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. *International Organization* 59 (2) (Spring 2005): 363-98.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Arrangements Influence Government Repression. *International Organization* 59 (1): 593-629.

**Nov. 20: International Law and Courts**

Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds. 2000. *Legalization and World Politics: A Special Issue of International Organization*. *International Organization* 54 (3) (Summer).

Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel and Charles R. Hankla. 2008. Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. *American Political Science Review* 102 (4): 435-452.

Voeten, Eric. 2008. The impartiality of international judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights. *American Political Science Review* 102 (4), 417-432.

Simmons, Beth A., and Allison Danner. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. *International Organization* 64 (2).

**Nov. 27: Informal Governance**

Randall W. Stone, ed. 2013. Special Issue on *Informal Governance of International Organizations*. *Review of International Organizations* 8 (2) (June).

Morse, Julia C., and Robert O. Keohane. 2014. Contested Multilateralism. *Review of International Organizations* 9 (4):385–412

**Dec. 4: Environmental Institutions**

Keohane, Robert O., and David G. Victor. 2011. The Regime Complex for Climate Change. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9 (1) (March): 7-24.

Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2) (Spring): 241-76.

McLean, Elena, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. The Kyoto Protocol: Two-Level Bargaining and European Integration. *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (1) (March): 99-113.

Randall W. Stone. 2009. Sharing Risk in International Politics. *Global Environmental Politics* 9 (3) (August): 40-60.

Johnson, Tana, and Johannes Urpelainen 2012. A Strategic Theory of Regime Integration and Separation. *International Organization* 66 (4) (Fall): 645-677.

Bättig, Michèle B., and Thomas Bernauer. 2009. National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy? *International Organization* 63 (2) (Spring): 281-308.

**Dec. 11: No class (Moscow)**