

Political Science 268: International Organization
Monday-Wednesday, 10:25-11:40

Fall 2015

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Harkness Hall 336
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Purpose of the course: This is an undergraduate course intended to introduce students to the wide range of international institutions that structure international relations. The course conducts a survey of the field, focusing on recent developments in the theory of international organization, and covering a range of substantive issue areas.

Course Requirements: It is essential to complete the required reading. There will be a final exam (Thursday December 17, at 12:30) and two exams during the term, on October 7 and November 4. In addition, there will be ten debates during the term, which will require some independent research, and each student is required to participate in at least one. In the spirit of international organization, the winners of the debates will be determined by vote. Attendance at lectures/discussions is mandatory, and students are expected to come prepared to discuss the readings assigned for the day.

Grading: 40% final exam, 20% each exam, 10% debate participation, and 10% class participation. Completing all of the written work is required to successfully complete the course. Each student is allowed to miss two class sessions for personal reasons, but missing more results in a penalty, and missing more than four (1/6 of the course) results in a failing grade.

Writing Credit Requirements for Political Science: In addition to the regular requirements, students registered for **IR/PSC 272W** write a term paper (approx. 20 pages) that uses primary sources and/or data to make a theoretical argument. A draft is due at 5:00 pm on November 13, and the final paper is due at 5:00 pm on December 14. Grading will be as follows: 25% final, 25% term paper, 15% each exam, 10% debate participation, and 10% class participation.

Readings: All articles are available on JSTOR or from my web site (<http://www.rochester.edu/college/psc/stone/>). The following books are recommended for purchase:

- Hurd, Ian. *International Organizations: Politics, Law and Practice* (2nd Ed.). (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014).
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).
- Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Course Outline:

Aug. 31: International Organization and IR Theory

Sept. 2: The Demand for International Organization

Keohane, Robert O. 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. *International Organization* 36 (2) (Spring).

Vaubel, Roland. A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. *Public Choice* 51 (1986):39-57.

Sept. 7: No class (Labor Day)

Sept. 9: A Model of International Organization

Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Chapters 1-3.

Sept. 14: The UN Security Council

Debate: Syria

Hurd, Chpt. 6.

Fang, Songying. 2008. The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics. *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 304-21.

Voeten, Eric. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. *International Organization* 59 (3) (Fall): 527-57.

Sept. 16: The UN System and UNGA Voting

Hurd, Chpt. 5.

Carter, David B., and Randall W. Stone. 2015. Multilateralism and Democracy: The Case of Vote Buying in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization*.

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker. 2006. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (4): 905-30.

Sept. 21: Power and International Cooperation

Debate: Keynes v. White

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), Chpts 3, 8.

Sept. 23: International Institutions and Cooperation

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), Chpts. 4-6.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4) (Autumn): 761-799.

Sept. 28: *Why Do We Need Institutions for Trade?*

Debate: WTO case

Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1999. An Economic Theory of GATT. *The American Economic Review*. Vol. 89, No. 1 (March): 215-248.

Reinhardt, Eric R. 2001. Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (April): 174-95.

Hurd, Chpt. 3.

Sept. 30: *The Evolution of the World Trading System*

Debate: The Doha Round

Steinberg, Richard. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-74.

Davis, Christina. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1) (February): 153-69.

Stone, *Controlling Institutions*, Chpt. 5.

Oct. 5: *No class (Fall Break)*

Oct. 7: *Exam*

Oct. 12: *Institutions for International Finance*

Stone, *Controlling Institutions*, Chpts. 4, 7-9.

Hurd, Chpt. 4.

Oct. 14: *Exchange Rates and Financial Crises*

Debate: Argentina

Feldstein, Martin. 1998. Refocusing the IMF. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr.): 20-33.

Fischer, Stanley. 1999. On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn): 85-104.

Stone, *Controlling Institutions*, Chapter 9 (esp. pp. 197-206).

Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization* 66 (Fall): 537-69.

Oct. 19: Capital Controls and Globalization

Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate. *Foreign Policy* 107 (Summer): 19-37.

Helleiner, Eric. 1995. Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing States Back In. *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring): 315-341.

Oct. 21: Debt and Structural Adjustment

Debate: Greece

Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1988. Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework. *Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund*, 35 (4) (Dec.): 644-657.

Hennessy, Alexandra. Informal Governance and the Eurozone Crisis. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 21 (3): 430-47.

Oct. 26: Development and the IFIs

Morrison, Kevin M. 2013. Membership no longer has its privileges: The declining informal influence of Board members on IDA lending. *Review of International Organizations* 8 (2): 291-312.

Bas, Muhammet A., and Randall W. Stone. 2014. Adverse Selection and Growth under IMF Programs. *The Review of International Organizations* 9 (1) (March): 1-28.

Oct. 28: From the ECSC to The European Union

Schneider, Gerald and Lars-Erik Cederman. 1994. The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration. *International Organization* 48 (4) (Autumn): 633-62.

Henning, C. Randall. 1998. Systemic Conflict and Monetary Integration in Europe. *International Organization* 52 (3) (Summer): 537-74.

Nov. 2: EMU and the Euro Crisis

Debate: ECB

Stone, Controlling Institutions, Chpt. 6

Nov. 4: Exam

Nov. 9: EU Expansion

Debate: Ukraine and the EU

Downs, George W., David M. Roake, Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. *International Organization* 52 (2) (Spring): 397-419.

Schneider, Christina J. 2007. Enlargement Processes and Distributional Conflicts: The Politics of Discriminatory Membership in the European Union. *Public Choice*, Vol. 132, No. 1/2 (July): 85-102.

Nov. 11: The EU as a Political System

Kleine, Mareike. 2013. Knowing Your Limits: Informal Governance and Judgment in the European Union. *Review of International Organizations* 8 (2): 245-264.

Nov. 16: International Law and Human Rights

Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Chapters 1-4.

Nov. 18: International Law and Human Rights

Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Chapters 5-end.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62 (Fall 2008): 689-716.

Nov. 23: International Courts

Debate: ICC v. Israel on the Second Gaza War, 2014

Hurd, Chpts. 8, 9.

Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel and Charles R. Hankla. 2008. Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. *American Political Science Review* 102 (4): 435-452.

Kelley, Judith. Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-surrender Agreements. *American Political Science Review* 101.3 (August, 2007): 573-589.

Nov. 25: No class (Thanksgiving)

Nov. 30: UN Conventions

Hurd, Chpt. 7.

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. *International Organization* Vol. 54, No. 3, (Summer): 421-456

Koremenos, Barbara. 2013. What's Left Out and Why? Informal Provisions in Formal International Law. *Review of International Organizations* 8 (2): 137-62.

Dec. 2: Environmental Institutions

Debate: Climate Change

Keohane, Robert O., and David G. Victor. 2011. The Regime Complex for Climate Change. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9 (1) (March): 7-24.

McLean, Elena, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. The Kyoto Protocol: Two-Level Bargaining and European Integration. *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (1) (March): 99-113.

Randall W. Stone. 2009. Sharing Risk in International Politics. *Global Environmental Politics* 9 (3) (August): 40-60.

Dec. 4: The World Bank

Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2) (Spring): 241-76.

Malik, Rabia, and Randall W. Stone. 2015. Private Politics in World Bank Lending. Unpublished.

Dec. 7: Informal International Organizations

Randall W. Stone, ed. 2013. Informal Governance of International Organizations. *Review of International Organizations* 8(2) (June): 121-36.

Stone, *Controlling Institutions*, Chpt. 10.

Vabulas, Felicity, and Duncan Snidal. 2013. Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements. *Review of International Organizations* 8(2) (June): 193-220.

Dec. 9: No class

Dec. 14, 5:00: Final Paper due for W students

Dec. 17, 12:30: Final Exam