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PSC 540
Models in American Politics: Theory & Data
Fall 2010

Course Description

In recent years there has been an upsurge in American politics research that combines formal modeling and data analysis. In this seminar we will critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of this approach and explore some of the major contributions to this literature. Topics will include party power, interbranch bargaining, delegation, lobbying, and the role of formal rules.

Readings

Journal articles are available on JSTOR or other online databases accessible through the library. Starred items are multiple chapters from books. These books will be made available on one-day course reserve, and of course you may also purchase them. Other readings will be made available by the instructors.

Course Requirements

In-Class Presentations (30% of grade). Each week students will present some or all of the week's readings. These presentations, as well as general class participation, are vital to the success of a graduate seminar.

Midterm Essay (35% of grade). This will be handed out on October 8 and will be due on October 22. We will ask you a question or set of questions that require you to apply what you have learned in the course to date.

Final Essay (35% of grade). This will be handed out on December 3 and will be due on December 17. We will ask you a question or set of questions that require you to apply what you have learned in the course to date.

Course Meetings

August 31 (note non-Friday date): Introduction and Overview

September 10: Connecting Models and Data

*Morton, Rebecca B. 2000. *Methods and Models*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1, 4-8.

Clarke, Kevin A., and David M. Primo. 2010. *Models with Meaning: Reimagining the Science of Politics*. Book Manuscript, chs. 3-5.

September 17: Legislatures I

Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data." *American Political Science Review* 98:355-370.

*Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1-3, 5.

*Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, chs. 1-5.

September 24: Legislatures II

Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2009. "A Unified Theory of U.S. Lawmaking: Preferences, Institutions, and Party Discipline." *Journal of Politics* 71:1257-1272.

Clinton, Joshua D. 2006. "Lawmaking and Roll Calls." *Journal of Politics* 69:457-469.

Hirsch, Alexander V. 2009. "Theory Driven Bias in Ideal Point Estimates—A Monte Carlo Study." Working Paper.

Stiglitz, Edward H., and Barry R. Weingast. 2010. "Agenda Control in Congress: Evidence from Cutpoint Estimates and Ideal Point Uncertainty." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 35:157-186.

October 1: Legislatures III

Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 95:981-1004.

Frechette, Guillaume R., John H. Kagel, and Steven F. Lehrer. 2003. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules." *American Political Science Review* 97:221-232.

Frechette, Guillaume R., John H. Kagel, and Massimo Morelli. 2005. "Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers." *Econometrica* 73:1893-1937.

Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. "The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending." Working Paper.

October 8: Presidency

*****Midterm essay assignment distributed**

Moe, Terry M. 2009. "The Revolution in Presidential Studies." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39:701-724.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2001. "Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:532-550.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 48:690-706.

*Howell, William G. 2003. *Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chs. 1-4.

October 15: Interbranch Bargaining I: Lawmaking

*Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 4-6.

Groseclose, Tim, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:100-119.

Segal, Jeffrey A. 1997. "Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts." *American Political Science Review* 91:28-44.

Segal, Jeffrey A. 1998. "Correction to 'Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts.'" *American Political Science Review* 92:923-926.
(See Groseclose and Schiavoni for a correction to the formal theory.)

Clark, Tom S. 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy." *American Journal of Political Science* 53:971-989.

October 22: Wallis Conference (No Class)

*****Midterm Essay Assignment Due**

October 29: Interbranch Bargaining II: Appointments

Krehbiel, Keith. 2007. "Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game." *American Journal of Political Science* 51:231-240.

Rohde, David W., and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2007. "Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate: Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court." *Journal of Politics* 69:664-677.

Primo, David M., Sarah A. Binder, and Forrest Maltzman. 2008. "Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection." *American Journal of Political Science* 52:471-489.

Shipan, Charles R., and Megan L. Shannon. 2003. "Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations." *American Journal of Political Science* 47:654-668.

November 5: Judicial Politics

Songer, Donald R., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Charles M. Cameron. 1994. "The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38:673-696.

Lax, Jeffrey R., and Charles M. Cameron. 2007. "Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 23:276-302.

Lax, Jeffrey R., and Kelly T. Rader. 2009. "Bargaining Power in the Supreme Court." Working Paper.

Black, Ryan C., and Ryan J. Owens. 2009. "Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence." *Journal of Politics* 71:1062-1075.

November 12: Bureaucracy

(*To be rescheduled)**

*Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 4, 6.

Eric S. Dickson, Sanford C. Gordon, and Gregory A. Huber. 2009. "Enforcement and Compliance in an Uncertain World." *Journal of Politics* 71:1357-1378.

Krause, George A., and Anne Joseph O'Connell. 2009. "A Measurement Model of Loyalty and Competence for Presidential Appointees in U.S. Government Agencies, 1977-2005: A Heirarchical Generalized Latent Trait Analysis." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Additional paper to be added later in the semester.

November 19: Interest Groups

Hall, Richard L., and Kristina C. Miller. 2008. "What Happens After the Alarm? Interest Group Subsidies to Legislative Overseers." *Journal of Politics* 70:990-1005.

Holyoke, Thomas T. 2009. "Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation." *American Journal of Political Science* 53:360-375.

Carpenter, Daniel, Susan I. Moffitt, Colin D. Moore, Ryan T. Rynbrandt, Michael M. Ting, Ian Yohai, and Evan James Zucker. Forthcoming. "Early Entrant Protection in Approval Regulation: Theory and Evidence from FDA Drug Review." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*.

Gordon, Sanford C., and Catherine Hafer. 2005. "Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review* 99:245-261.

November 26: Thanksgiving Break—No Class

December 3: The Value of Political Careers

*****Final essay assignment handed out (due December 17)**

Ziobrowski, Alan J., Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd, and Brigitte J. Ziobrowski. 2004. "Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate." *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis* 9:661-676.

Blaines i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. 2010. "Revolving Door Lobbyists." Working Paper.

Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo. 2005. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers." *American Economic Review* 95:347-373.

Querubin, Pablo, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2009. In *The Political Economy of Democracy*, eds. Enriqueta Aragones, Carmen Becia, Humberto Llavador, and Norman Schofield. Bilbao, Spain: Fundacion BBVA, 225-240.

Lenz, Gabriel. 2009. "Getting Rich(er) in Office? Corruption and Wealth Accumulation in Congress." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

December 10: State and Local Governments

Chen, Jowei. 2010. "The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures." *American Journal of Political Science* 54:301-322.

Coate, Stephen, and Brian Knight. 2009. "Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities." NBER Working Paper No. 14857.

Berry, Christopher. 2008. "Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common-Pool." *American Journal of Political Science* 52:802-820.

de Figueiredo, Rui J.P., Jr. 2003. "Endogenous Budget Institutions and Political Insulation: Why States Adopt the Item Veto." *Journal of Public Economics* 87:2677-2701.