**Political Science 268: International Organization Fall 2016**

**Monday-Wednesday, 10:25-11:40**

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**Purpose of the course:** This is an undergraduate course intended to introduce students to the wide range of international institutions that structure international relations. The course conducts a survey of the field, focusing on recent developments in the theory of international organization, and covering a range of substantive issue areas.

**Course Requirements:** It is essential to complete the required reading. There will be a final exam (Monday December 19, at 12:30) and two exams during the term, on October 5 and November 7. In addition, there will be ten debates during the term, which will require some independent research, and each student is required to participate in at least one. In the spirit of international organization, the winners of the debates will be determined by vote. Attendance at lectures/discussions is mandatory, and students are expected to come prepared to discuss the readings assigned for the day. In addition, there will small discussion sections led by a teaching assistant, Svanhildur Thorvaldsdottir, and attendance at those is mandatory as well.

**Grading:** 40% final exam, 20% each exam, 10% debate participation, and 10% class participation. Completing all of the written work is required to successfully complete the course. Each student is allowed to miss two class sessions for personal reasons, but missing more results in a penalty, and missing more than four (1/6 of the course) results in a failing grade.

**Writing Credit Requirements for Political Science:** In addition to the regular requirements, students registered for **IR/PSC 272W** write a term paper (approx. 20 pages) that uses primary sources and/or data to make a theoretical argument. A draft is due at 5:00 pm on November 14, and the final paper is due at 5:00 pm on December 14. Grading for W students will be as follows: 25% final, 25% term paper, 15% each exam, 10% debate participation, and 10% class participation.

**Readings:** All articles are available on [JSTOR](http://www.jstor.org/) or from my web site (<http://www.rochester.edu/college/psc/stone/>). The following books are recommended for purchase:

* Hurd, Ian. *International Organizations: Politics, Law and Practice* (2nd Ed.). (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014).
* Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.*  (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).
* Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
* Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

**Course Outline:**

***Aug. 31: International Organization and IR Theory***

***Sept. 5:*  *No class (Labor Day)***

***Sept. 7: The Demand for International Organization***

Keohane, Robert O. 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. *International Organization* 36 (2) (Spring).

Vaubel, Roland. A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. *Public Choice* 51 (1986):39-57.

***Sept. 12: A Model of International Organization***

Stone, Randall W. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Chapters 1-3.

***Sept. 14: The UN Security Council***

***Debate: Syria***

Hurd, Chpt. 6.

Fang, Songying. 2008. The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics. *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 304-21.

Voeten, Eric. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. *International Organization* 59 (3) (Fall): 527-57.

***Sept. 19:* *The UN System and UNGA Voting***

Hurd, Chpt. 5.

Carter, David B., and Randall W. Stone. 2015. Multilateralism and Democracy: The Case of Vote Buying in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization.*

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker. 2006. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (4): 905-30.

***Sept. 21: Power and International Cooperation***

***Debate: Keynes v. White***

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), Chpts 3, 8.

***Sept. 26: International Institutions and Cooperation***

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), Chpts. 4-6.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4) (Autumn): 761-799.

***Sept. 28: Trade Disputes***

***Debate: WTO case***

Reinhardt, Eric R. 2001. Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (April): 174–95.

Davis, Christina L., and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication. *The Journal of Politics* 71 (3) (July): 1033–1049

Hurd, Chpt. 3.

***Oct. 3: The Evolution of the World Trading System***

***Debate: The Doha Round***

Steinberg, Richard. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-74.

Davis, Christina. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1) (February): 153-69.

Stone, *Controlling Institutions,* Chpt. 5.

***Oct. 5: Exam***

***Oct. 10: Institutions for International Finance***

Stone, *Controlling Institutions,* Chpts. 4, 7-9.

Hurd, Chpt. 4.

***Oct. 12: Exchange Rates and Financial Crises***

***Debate: Argentina***

Feldstein, Martin. 1998. Refocusing the IMF. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr.): 20-33.

Fischer, Stanley. 1999. On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives,* Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn): 85-104.

Stone, *Controlling Institutions,* Chapter 9 (esp. pp. 197-206).

Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization* 66 (Fall): 537-69.

***Oct. 17: No class (Fall Break)***

***Oct. 19: Capital Controls and Globalization***

***Debate: Trans-Pacific Partnership***

Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate.  
*Foreign Policy* 107 (Summer): 19-37.

Helleiner, Eric. 1995. Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing States Back In. *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring): 315-341.

***Oct. 24: Development and the IFIs***

Morrison, Kevin M. 2013. Membership no longer has its privileges: The declining informal influence of Board members on IDA lending. *Review of International Organizations* 8 (2): 291-312.

Bas, Muhammet A., and **Barcode merge field was not found in header record of data source.**. 2014. Adverse Selection and Growth under IMF Programs. *The Review of International Organizations* 9 (1) (March): 1-28.

***Oct. 26: Debt and Structural Adjustment***

***Debate: Greece***

Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1988. Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework. *Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund*, 35 (4) (Dec.): 644-657.

Hennessy, Alexandra. Informal Governance and the Eurozone Crisis. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 21 (3): 430-47.

***Oct. 31: From the ECSC to The European Union***

Schneider, Gerald and Lars-Erik Cederman. 1994. The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration. *International Organization* 48 (4 )(Autumn): 633-62.

Henning, C. Randall. 1998. Systemic Conflict and Monetary Integration in Europe. *International Organization* 52 (3) (Summer): 537-74.

***Nov. 2: EMU and the Euro Crisis***

***Debate: ECB***

Stone, Controlling Institutions, Chpt. 6

***Nov. 7: Exam***

***Nov. 8: ELECTION DAY***

***Nov. 9: The EU as a Political System***

***Debate: Negotiating Brexit***

Kleine, Mareike. 2013. Knowing Your Limits: Informal Governance and Judgment in the European Union. *Review of International Organizations* 8 (2): 245-264.

***Nov. 14: EU Expansion***

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. *International Organization* 52 (2) (Spring): 397-419.

Schneider, Christina J. 2007. Enlargement Processes and Distributional Conflicts: The Politics of Discriminatory Membership in the European Union. *Public Choice*, Vol. 132, No. 1/2 (July): 85-102.

***Nov. 16: International Law and Human Rights***

***Debate: Human Rights***

### Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Chapters 1-4.

***Nov. 21: International Law and Human Rights***

### Simmons, Beth A. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Chapters 5-end.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62 (Fall 2008): 689-716.

***Nov. 23: No class (Thanksgiving)***

***Nov. 28: UN Conventions***

Hurd, Chpt. 7.

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. *International Organization* Vol. 54, No. 3, (Summer): 421-456

Koremenos, Barbara. 2013. What’s Left Out and Why? Informal Provisions in Formal International Law. *Review of International Organizations* 8 (2): 137-62.

***Nov. 30: International Courts***

***Debate: ICC v. Israel on the Second Gaza War, 2014***

Hurd, Chpts. 8, 9.

Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel and Charles R. Hankla. 2008. Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. *American Political Science Review* 102 (4): 435-452.

Kelley, Judith. Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-surrender Agreements. *American Political Science Review* 101.3 (August, 2007): 573-589.

***Dec. 5: Environmental Institutions***

***Debate: Climate Change***

Keohane, Robert O., and David G. Victor. 2011. The Regime Complex for Climate Change. *Perspectives on Politics,* 9 (1) (March): 7-24.

McLean, Elena, and Randall W. Stone. 2012. The Kyoto Protocol: Two-Level Bargaining and European Integration. *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (1) (March): 99-113.

Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2) (Spring): 241-76.

***Dec. 7:* No class *(Moscow)***

**Dec. 12: *Informal International Organizations***

Stone, *Controlling Institutions*, Chpt. 10.

Vabulas, Felicity, and Duncan Snidal. 2013. Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements. *Review of International Organizations* 8(2) (June): 193-220.

**Dec. 14, 5:00: Final Paper due for W students**

**Dec. 19, (Monday) at 12:30: Final Exam**