

## **Political Science/IR 277W: International Security**

Instructor: Thomas M. Dolan

Class Sessions: Mondays and Wednesdays, 13:24-1640, Goergen 109

Office Hours: Tuesday 9:30-11:30 at Harkness Hall 323, and by appointment

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This course surveys the field of international security. It starts by examining the nature of security, force and the threat of force in the international realm. It then examines the international security problems that emerge from the interactions of the great powers, and considers important historical cases including the August 1914 crisis, the initiation of the Second World War, and the end of the Cold War. During the second half of the course, it examines asymmetric international security problems, including wars with weak states, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, and rising powers. It concludes by considering some of the solutions that have been proposed for the problems of international security, including international organizations, democracy promotion, and integration.

### **Course Goals**

1. Students will gain an intellectual framework for understanding and thinking about both enduring problems and current issues in the field of international security.
2. Students will gain a better understanding of specific current and future challenges in international security.
3. Students will improve their ability to comprehend and communicate social scientific approaches to world events.

*Please note that none of these goals involve the advancement of anyone's political or policy opinions (including those of the instructor). While I encourage political activity and the fulfillment of one's citizenship duties outside of the classroom, a political science course is not a proper forum for the airing of one's personal politics.*

### **Course Design**

This course involves a combination of class sessions involving both lecture and discussion, directed readings, papers, exams, and opportunities for informal discussion during office hours. Each part serves a purpose, be it information transmission and retention, promoting rigorous analysis, or encouraging the development of new ideas. Failing to engage with all parts will diminish the return on your efforts. For this reason, pre-class preparation is essential for this course. Students are expected to have read and considered the assigned material prior to the course, and be prepared to discuss it in class. Questions are placed beneath each reading to help focus your attention to what the instructor believes are the most important points. Please remember that the material of the course is delivered in *both* texts and in-class discussion, which means that the texts contain valuable ideas and information which may not be specifically addressed in class, and discussions and lectures will go beyond the readings. You are

responsible for understanding both, so please be sure to raise questions about things you are unsure about.

Because this course is designated as a writing course, particular attention will be paid to the process, nature, and character of good writing.

## **Assignments**

### **First Paper, [5 pages], Due 13 October, 15%**

Make an argument responding to one of the four options. Be sure that your answer is grounded in the literature addressed in the course. Where appropriate, use historical examples.

Option 1: How many poles are most stable? Why?

Option 2: Is anarchy really what states make of it? Or is structure determinative?

Option 3: What is the current state of the world in terms of polarity and hegemony? Does that bode well for world peace?

Option 4: How do trade and other economic factors influence the probability of great power war?

### **Response Papers [1 page], #1: no later than 6 October; # 2, after the midterm, no later than 6 December, each 5%**

Respond to a reading. Only asterisked readings are applicable.

### **Midterm, 20 October, in class, 20%**

Includes both short answer and essay components. Study guide will be distributed 1 week in advance.

### **Term Paper [10 pages], Due 22 November, 25%**

Identify a current problem or challenge in international security, analyze it using theoretical concepts developed in the course, and prescribe a solution or response to it that is theoretically grounded, realistic in terms of available resources, and politically possible.

- *1 page description of topic, strategy for the paper, and an initial bibliography must be approved by 3 November*

### **Final, Friday, 17 December at 08:30 (that is, 8:30 AM), 20%**

Cumulative. Includes both short answer and essay components. Study guide will be distributed by last normal class session.

### **Participation, 10%**

Your active participation in class is necessary if this class is to be a successful learning experience. This means you must come in having read the assignments and join in the class-room discussion of them, making evident that you have read and thought about them. While attendance is not graded as such, excessive truancy can affect this grade, since you are unable to participate when absent.

*Assignments are to be turned in by class time on the day they are due. They should be in hardcopy unless unforeseen circumstances prevent printing them in or handing them in a timely manner. For every 24 hours that pass thereafter, 5% of credit is lost, to a maximum of 40% lost.*

*Exams are to be sat at the date and time specified, unless prior approval has been given or a doctor's excuse is submitted at the next attended class meeting. Exams should be sat within 1 week of the general administration of the exam.*

**Grades**

Grades are assigned to both individual pieces of work and cumulatively. The grade scale I use for both is below (note that “g” refers to the numerical grade you receive). I do not usually curve grades, but reserve the right to do so if I deem it necessary. All material is graded on its own terms, rather than through comparison with other students’ work. For the cumulative grades, I do not round: what you get is what you get.

100>g≥93: A	90>g≥88: B+	80>g≥78: C+	70>g≥68: D+	60>g: E
	88>g≥83: B	78>g≥73: C	68>g≥63: D	
93>g≥90: A-	83>g≥80: B	73>g≥70: C-	63>g≥60: D	

Cheating and plagiarism are, of course, unacceptable in academic work, and when suspected will be pursued through the appropriate university channels. Proper citations and standards of integrity are not optional. If you have questions about what this means, please ask the instructor.

**Changes to the Syllabus:**

In the event that there is a need for there to be any changes to the syllabus, an e-mail will be sent to all students’ e-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar), and will be mentioned in class at two class meetings. Changes become effective immediately after their second mention in class, or the sending of the e-mail, whichever comes last.

**Cancellation of Class:** In the event that the instructor needs to cancel class, an e-mail will be sent to all students’ e-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar) prior to class time.

**Readings**

All Readings are available on-line through blackboard at my.rochester.edu

**Section 1: Introduction to International Security**

**1 September: Intro**

**6 September: LABOR DAY—NO CLASS**

## **8 September Geography and Geopolitics**

Zbigniew Brzezinski. *The Grand Chessboard*. Selected reading.\*

*Recommended:*

Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. Introduction and Chapter 1.\*  
[www.gutenberg.org/etext/13529](http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/13529)

## **13 September: The Tools at Hand: The Threat and Use of Force**

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 1.\*

Geoffrey Blainey, (1973) *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press. "Dreams and Delusions"

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 1966. (selections)

*Recommendations*

Fearon, J. (1995) "Rationalist Expectations for War," *International Organization*. 49:3, pp. 379-414.

Johnston, D. (2004) *Overconfidence and War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

*Recommended:*

## **15 September: What do States Want? Security and Power--What are they?**

Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in *Discord and Collaboration*. JHU Press, 1962.

David Baldwin, "Economic Statecraft." Princeton UP, 1985. Selected reading.

Deborah Larson and Alexi Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy," *International Security*, 34:4 (2010), 63-95.\*

*Recommended:*

William Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," *World Politics*, 61:1 (2009), 28-57.

## **Section 2: International Security and the Great Powers**

### **20 September: Anarchy, the Balance of Power, and Polarities**

Ken Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* 115-129.\*

Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 1948.\*

*Recommended:*

Steve Walt "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, *IS* (Spring 1985) Vol. 9 #4.

Robert Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," *World Politics*, 61:1, (2009), 188-213

E. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*.

Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

Robert Jervis, *System Effects*. Columbia University Press, 1998.

### **22 September: Revisionism and Bandwagoning?**

Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning For Profit," *International Security* Vol. 19 (Sum 1994) pp. 72-107.\*

John Mearsheimer. *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Ch. 2 and 5.\*

*Recommended:*

Kai He and Huiyin Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What?" *Security Studies*, (2008) 17: 363-395.

### **27 September: The Security Dilemma and Offense-Defense Balance Theory**

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, #2 (1978), pp. 186-214\*

G. H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics*. 1984.\*

*Recommended*

Stephen Van Evera, *Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War*. *International Security*. 1998.\*

C. Glaser and C. Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-defense Balance and Can We Measure it?" *International Security*, 1998.

Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory." *Journal of Politics*, 63:3.\*

T. Christensen and J. Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity." *International Organization*, 1990.

### **29 September: Hegemony and Power Transition Theory**

Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*. Princeton University Press, 1981. [selection]\*

*Recommended:*

Barbara Tuchman, *Guns of August*.

### **4 October: Trade and War**

Ed Mansfield and James Pevehouse, "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict," *International Organization*, 2003.\*

Stephen Brooks, *Producing Security*, Princeton 2005. Chapter 3 (required),\* Chapter 2 (recommended)

*Recommended:*

Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 1910.

Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," *International Security*, 1996.

### **6 October: Is Anarchy what States Make of It? Is there an international society? \*\*Last day for 1<sup>st</sup> response\*\***

Alex Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Organization* Vol. 46 (1992) \*

Martha Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity," *World Politics*, 61:1, 2009, 58-85.

*Recommended:*

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p.3-19; 44-49.

Alastair Iain Johnston. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton UP. 1998.

Harold and Margaret Sprout. *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*. Princeton UP, 1965.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

### **13 October: Managing Security? Concerts and Collective Security**

C. Kupchan and C. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Stability in Europe," *International Security*, 1991.\*

*Further Recommendation:*

Harold Nicholson, *The Concert of Vienna*.

### **18 October: The Outbreak of WWII \*\*First Paper Due\*\***

A. J. P. Taylor, *Origins of the Second World War*. Selected reading.

E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, selected reading.

Ike, Nobura. 1967. *Japan's Decision for War*. Selections.

*Recommended:*

Edward S. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy*, USNI Press, 2007.

### **20 October: Midterm**

## **Section 3: International Security Among Unequal Powers**

### **25 October: A Uni-polar Moment?**

William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Uni-polar World," *International Security*, 1999.\*

Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," *International Security*, Fall 2006\*

*Recommended:*

Stephen Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics*, 61:1, (2009), pp. 86-120.

Richard Haas, "The Age of Non-Polarity," *Foreign Affairs*, April-May 2008.

Thomas Christenson, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for US Security Strategy." *International Security*, 2001.

### **27 October: Crucial Case—China**

Ashley J. Tellis, "China's Military Space Strategy," *Survival*, Volume 49, Issue 3 September 2007, pp. 41 – 72.\*

Jonathan Holslag, "The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2009.\*

*Recommended:*

Robert Rose, "China's Naval Nationalism," *International Security*, 2009

### **1 November: Weaker States and Nuclear Proliferation**

Jacques Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.\*

Matthew Kroenig, "Exporting the Bomb," *American Political Science Review*. 103:1, 2009.\*

*Recommended:*

Matthew Fuhrman, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation," *International Security*, 2009.

Francis Gavin, "Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War," *International Security*, 34:3, (2009/10), pp. 7-37.\*

### **3 November: Crucial Cases—India and Pakistan**

Sumit Ganguly and Harrison Wagner, "India and Pakistan: Bargaining In the Shadow of Nuclear War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 27:3, (2004), pp. 479-507.\*

Nina Tannenwald, "Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization* 53 (Summer 1999), 433-68.\*

#### *Recommended:*

Kenneth Waltz, "More May Be Better," in K. Waltz and S. Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2002.\*

Sagan, Scott D. 1994. "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." *International Security* 18 (4):66- 107

Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace?" *International Security*, 34:2, (2009-10), pp. 38-78.

### **8 November: Asymmetric War: Why the Weak Win (Sometimes)**

Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," *International Security*, 2001.\*

#### *Recommended:*

*US Army Counter-insurgency handbook, chapter 2.*

<http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf> [note: this links to the whole manual, which is a large file (>13MB)]

Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" *World Politics*, 1975.

Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*. Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.

Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Presido Press, 1982.

*The Battle of Algiers*, movie, 1965

### **10 November: Crucial Cases—Iraq and Afghanistan**

TBA...two months is a long time in both places.

#### *Recommended:*

Stephen Biddle, Michael O'Hanlon, and Kenneth Pollack, "How to Leave a Stable Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2008.

A. Exum et al., "Triage: the Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan."

[http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/ExumFickHumayun\\_TriageAfPak\\_June09.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/ExumFickHumayun_TriageAfPak_June09.pdf)

### **15 November: Terrorism**

Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, 2003.\*

Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ""The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security*, Summer 2006.\*

#### *Recommended:*

Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, "Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks," *International Security*, (2009) 33:2, 7-44.

### **17 November: Weak States and State Failure**

Edward Newman, "Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2007.  
Idean Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups," *World Politics*, 2007.\*

#### *Recommended:*

Kimberly Martin, "Warlordism in Comparative Perspective," *International Security*, 2007.  
Michael Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" *International Security*, 1996.  
Seth Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," *International Security*, 2008.

### **22 November: Humanitarian Interventions \*\*Term Paper Due\*\***

Barry Posen, "Military Responses to Humanitarian Disasters," *International Security*, 1996.\*  
Samantha Powers, "Why the US let the Rwanda Genocide Happen," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 2001.

#### *Recommended:*

*Blackhawk Down*, movie, 2002

Alexander De Waal. *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Indiana University Press. 1997.\*

### **29 November:**

#### **The Environment as a Security Challenge**

Geoffrey Parker, "States Make War But Wars Also Break States," *Journal of Military History*, 71:1 (Jan. 2010), pp. 11-34. {the important stuff starts on the middle of p. 14 [publication pagination]}

Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 19: 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40.\*

Antony Froggatt and Michael Levi, "Climate and Energy Security Policies and Measures: Synergies and Conflicts," *International Affairs* (London) (2008) 85:6, 1129-41.

#### *Recommended:*

Daniel Yergin, "It's Still the One," *Foreign Policy*. September/October 2009

David J. Rothkopf, "Is a Green World a Safer World?" *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2009.

### **1 December: Human Security**

Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvil, Rose McDermott, Chad F. Emmett. "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States." *International Security*, 33:2 (2008/9).\*

#### *Recommended:*

Nicholas Kristoff and Sheryl WuDunn, "The Women's Crusade," *New York Time Magazine*, 17 August 2009.

Valerie Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, "A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace," *International Security*, 26:4, pp. 5-38.



#### **Section 4: Solving the Problems of International Security?**

##### **6 December: International Organizations? \*\*Last day for second response\*\***

G. John Ikenberry, "Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint," in *America Unrivaled*. (2002)\*  
*Recommended:*

G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?"  
*Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008

##### **8 December: Democracy?**

Bruce Russett, "Why Democratic Peace?" in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, Bruce Russett, ed. MIT Press, 1999.

##### **13 December: Integration?**

David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, 1943. pp. 25-102. 25-42, 54-81.

K. W. Deutsch. *Political Community and the North Atlantic*. Selected pages.

**Final Exam: Friday, 17 December at 08:30.**

## **Other Books, etc. about International Security**

Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*

Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*

Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*

Emanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*

Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*

Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*

EH Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis*

Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*

Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (alongside Mancur Olson, *Logic of Collective Action*)

Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*

Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*

Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*

Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," *International Organization* 51 (Autumn 1997), 513-53

Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24 (Fall 1999), 5-55